the interest of america in sea power, present and future. by captain a.t. mahan, d.c.l., ll.d. united states navy. author of "the influence of sea power upon history, - ," "the influence of sea power upon the french revolution and empire," of a "life of farragut," and of "the life of nelson, the embodiment of the sea power of great britain." london: sampson low, marston & company, _limited._ . _copyright, ,_ by alfred t. mahan. _copyright, , ,_ by houghton, mifflin and company. _copyright, ,_ by the forum publishing company. _copyright, ,_ by lloyd bryce. _copyright, , ,_ by harper and brothers. _all rights reserved._ university press: john wilson and son, cambridge, u.s.a. preface. whatever interest may be possessed by a collection of detached papers, issued at considerable intervals during a term of several years, and written without special reference one to the other, or, at the first, with any view to subsequent publication, depends as much upon the date at which they were composed, and the condition of affairs then existent, as it does upon essential unity of treatment. if such unity perchance be found in these, it will not be due to antecedent purpose, but to the fact that they embody the thought of an individual mind, consecutive in the line of its main conceptions, but adjusting itself continually to changing conditions, which the progress of events entails. the author, therefore, has not sought to bring these papers down to the present date; to reconcile seeming contradictions, if such there be; to suppress repetitions; or to weld into a consistent whole the several parts which in their origin were independent. such changes as have been made extend only to phraseology, with the occasional modification of an expression that seemed to err by excess or defect. the dates at the head of each article show the time of its writing, not of its publication. the thanks of the author are expressed to the proprietors of the "atlantic monthly," of the "forum," of the "north american review," and of "harper's new monthly magazine," who have kindly permitted the republication of the articles originally contributed to their pages. a.t. mahan. _november, ._ contents. i. the united states looking outward from the atlantic monthly, december, . ii. hawaii and our future sea power from the forum, march, . iii. the isthmus and sea power from the atlantic monthly, september, . iv. possibilities of an anglo-american reunion from the north american review, november, . v. the future in relation to american naval power harper's new monthly magazine, october, . vi. preparedness for naval war harper's new monthly magazine, march, . vii. a twentieth-century outlook harper's new monthly magazine, september, . viii. strategic features of the caribbean sea and the gulf of mexico harper's new monthly magazine, october, . maps. the pacific the gulf and caribbean the united states looking outward. _august, ._ indications are not wanting of an approaching change in the thoughts and policy of americans as to their relations with the world outside their own borders. for the past quarter of a century, the predominant idea, which has asserted itself successfully at the polls and shaped the course of the government, has been to preserve the home market for the home industries. the employer and the workman alike have been taught to look at the various economical measures proposed from this point of view, to regard with hostility any step favoring the intrusion of the foreign producer upon their own domain, and rather to demand increasingly rigorous measures of exclusion than to acquiesce in any loosening of the chain that binds the consumer to them. the inevitable consequence has followed, as in all cases when the mind or the eye is exclusively fixed in one direction, that the danger of loss or the prospect of advantage in another quarter has been overlooked; and although the abounding resources of the country have maintained the exports at a high figure, this flattering result has been due more to the superabundant bounty of nature than to the demand of other nations for our protected manufactures. for nearly the lifetime of a generation, therefore, american industries have been thus protected, until the practice has assumed the force of a tradition, and is clothed in the mail of conservatism. in their mutual relations, these industries resemble the activities of a modern ironclad that has heavy armor, but inferior engines and guns; mighty for defence, weak for offence. within, the home market is secured; but outside, beyond the broad seas, there are the markets of the world, that can be entered and controlled only by a vigorous contest, to which the habit of trusting to protection by statute does not conduce. at bottom, however, the temperament of the american people is essentially alien to such a sluggish attitude. independently of all bias for or against protection, it is safe to predict that, when the opportunities for gain abroad are understood, the course of american enterprise will cleave a channel by which to reach them. viewed broadly, it is a most welcome as well as significant fact that a prominent and influential advocate of protection, a leader of the party committed to its support, a keen reader of the signs of the times and of the drift of opinion, has identified himself with a line of policy which looks to nothing less than such modifications of the tariff as may expand the commerce of the united states to all quarters of the globe. men of all parties can unite on the words of mr. blaine, as reported in a recent speech: "it is not an ambitious destiny for so great a country as ours to manufacture only what we can consume, or produce only what we can eat." in face of this utterance of so shrewd and able a public man, even the extreme character of the recent tariff legislation seems but a sign of the coming change, and brings to mind that famous continental system, of which our own is the analogue, to support which napoleon added legion to legion and enterprise to enterprise, till the fabric of the empire itself crashed beneath the weight. the interesting and significant feature of this changing attitude is the turning of the eyes outward, instead of inward only, to seek the welfare of the country. to affirm the importance of distant markets, and the relation to them of our own immense powers of production, implies logically the recognition of the link that joins the products and the markets,--that is, the carrying trade; the three together constituting that chain of maritime power to which great britain owes her wealth and greatness. further, is it too much to say that, as two of these links, the shipping and the markets, are exterior to our own borders, the acknowledgment of them carries with it a view of the relations of the united states to the world radically distinct from the simple idea of self-sufficingness? we shall not follow far this line of thought before there will dawn the realization of america's unique position, facing the older worlds of the east and west, her shores washed by the oceans which touch the one or the other, but which are common to her alone. coincident with these signs of change in our own policy there is a restlessness in the world at large which is deeply significant, if not ominous. it is beside our purpose to dwell upon the internal state of europe, whence, if disturbances arise, the effect upon us may be but partial and indirect. but the great seaboard powers there do not stand on guard against their continental rivals only; they cherish also aspirations for commercial extension, for colonies, and for influence in distant regions, which may bring, and, even under our present contracted policy, already have brought them into collision with ourselves. the incident of the samoa islands, trivial apparently, was nevertheless eminently suggestive of european ambitions. america then roused from sleep as to interests closely concerning her future. at this moment internal troubles are imminent in the sandwich islands, where it should be our fixed determination to allow no foreign influence to equal our own. all over the world german commercial and colonial push is coming into collision with other nations: witness the affair of the caroline islands with spain; the partition of new guinea with england; the yet more recent negotiation between these two powers concerning their share in africa, viewed with deep distrust and jealousy by france; the samoa affair; the conflict between german control and american interests in the islands of the western pacific; and the alleged progress of german influence in central and south america. it is noteworthy that, while these various contentions are sustained with the aggressive military spirit characteristic of the german empire, they are credibly said to arise from the national temper more than from the deliberate policy of the government, which in this matter does not lead, but follows, the feeling of the people,--a condition much more formidable. there is no sound reason for believing that the world has passed into a period of assured peace outside the limits of europe. unsettled political conditions, such as exist in haiti, central america, and many of the pacific islands, especially the hawaiian group, when combined with great military or commercial importance as is the case with most of these positions, involve, now as always, dangerous germs of quarrel, against which it is prudent at least to be prepared. undoubtedly, the general temper of nations is more averse from war than it was of old. if no less selfish and grasping than our predecessors, we feel more dislike to the discomforts and sufferings attendant upon a breach of peace; but to retain that highly valued repose and the undisturbed enjoyment of the returns of commerce, it is necessary to argue upon somewhat equal terms of strength with an adversary. it is the preparedness of the enemy, and not acquiescence in the existing state of things, that now holds back the armies of europe. on the other hand, neither the sanctions of international law nor the justice of a cause can be depended upon for a fair settlement of differences, when they come into conflict with a strong political necessity on the one side opposed to comparative weakness on the other. in our still-pending dispute over the seal-fishing of bering sea, whatever may be thought of the strength of our argument, in view of generally admitted principles of international law, it is beyond doubt that our contention is reasonable, just, and in the interest of the world at large. but in the attempt to enforce it we have come into collision not only with national susceptibilities as to the honor of the flag, which we ourselves very strongly share, but also with a state governed by a powerful necessity, and exceedingly strong where we are particularly weak and exposed. not only has great britain a mighty navy and we a long defenceless seacoast, but it is a great commercial and political advantage to her that her larger colonies, and above all canada, should feel that the power of the mother country is something which they need, and upon which they can count. the dispute is between the united states and canada, not the united states and great britain; but it has been ably used by the latter to promote the solidarity of sympathy between herself and her colony. with the mother country alone an equitable arrangement, conducive to well-understood mutual interests, could be reached readily; but the purely local and peculiarly selfish wishes of canadian fishermen dictate the policy of great britain, because canada is the most important link uniting her to her colonies and maritime interests in the pacific. in case of a european war, it is possible that the british navy will not be able to hold open the route through the mediterranean to the east; but having a strong naval station at halifax, and another at esquimalt, on the pacific, the two connected by the canadian pacific railroad, england possesses an alternate line of communication far less exposed to maritime aggression than the former, or than the third route by the cape of good hope, as well as two bases essential to the service of her commerce, or other naval operations, in the north atlantic and the pacific. whatever arrangement of this question is finally reached, the fruit of lord salisbury's attitude scarcely can fail to be a strengthening of the sentiments of attachment to, and reliance upon, the mother country, not only in canada, but in the other great colonies. these feelings of attachment and mutual dependence supply the living spirit, without which the nascent schemes for imperial federation are but dead mechanical contrivances; nor are they without influence upon such generally unsentimental considerations as those of buying and selling, and the course of trade. this dispute, seemingly paltry yet really serious, sudden in its appearance and dependent for its issue upon other considerations than its own merits, may serve to convince us of many latent and yet unforeseen dangers to the peace of the western hemisphere, attendant upon the opening of a canal through the central american isthmus. in a general way, it is evident enough that this canal, by modifying the direction of trade routes, will induce a great increase of commercial activity and carrying trade throughout the caribbean sea; and that this now comparatively deserted nook of the ocean will become, like the red sea, a great thoroughfare of shipping, and will attract, as never before in our day, the interest and ambition of maritime nations. every position in that sea will have enhanced commercial and military value, and the canal itself will become a strategic centre of the most vital importance. like the canadian pacific railroad, it will be a link between the two oceans; but, unlike it, the use, unless most carefully guarded by treaties, will belong wholly to the belligerent which controls the sea by its naval power. in case of war, the united states will unquestionably command the canadian railroad, despite the deterrent force of operations by the hostile navy upon our seaboard; but no less unquestionably will she be impotent, as against any of the great maritime powers, to control the central american canal. militarily speaking, and having reference to european complications only, the piercing of the isthmus is nothing but a disaster to the united states, in the present state of her military and naval preparation. it is especially dangerous to the pacific coast; but the increased exposure of one part of our seaboard reacts unfavorably upon the whole military situation. despite a certain great original superiority conferred by our geographical nearness and immense resources,--due, in other words, to our natural advantages, and not to our intelligent preparations,--the united states is wofully unready, not only in fact but in purpose, to assert in the caribbean and central america a weight of influence proportioned to the extent of her interests. we have not the navy, and, what is worse, we are not willing to have the navy, that will weigh seriously in any disputes with those nations whose interests will conflict there with our own. we have not, and we are not anxious to provide, the defence of the seaboard which will leave the navy free for its work at sea. we have not, but many other powers have, positions, either within or on the borders of the caribbean, which not only possess great natural advantages for the control of that sea, but have received and are receiving that artificial strength of fortification and armament which will make them practically inexpugnable. on the contrary, we have not on the gulf of mexico even the beginning of a navy yard which could serve as the base of our operations. let me not be misunderstood. i am not regretting that we have not the means to meet on terms of equality the great navies of the old world. i recognize, what few at least say, that, despite its great surplus revenue, this country is poor in proportion to its length of seaboard and its exposed points. that which i deplore, and which is a sober, just, and reasonable cause of deep national concern, is that the nation neither has nor cares to have its sea frontier so defended, and its navy of such power, as shall suffice, with the advantages of our position, to weigh seriously when inevitable discussions arise,--such as we have recently had about samoa and bering sea, and which may at any moment come up about the caribbean sea or the canal. is the united states, for instance, prepared to allow germany to acquire the dutch stronghold of curaçao, fronting the atlantic outlet of both the proposed canals of panama and nicaragua? is she prepared to acquiesce in any foreign power purchasing from haiti a naval station on the windward passage, through which pass our steamer routes to the isthmus? would she acquiesce in a foreign protectorate over the sandwich islands, that great central station of the pacific, equidistant from san francisco, samoa, and the marquesas, and an important post on our lines of communication with both australia and china? or will it be maintained that any one of these questions, supposing it to arise, is so exclusively one-sided, the arguments of policy and right so exclusively with us, that the other party will at once yield his eager wish, and gracefully withdraw? was it so at samoa? is it so as regards bering sea? the motto seen on so many ancient cannon, _ultima ratio regum_, is not without its message to republics. it is perfectly reasonable and legitimate, in estimating our needs of military preparation, to take into account the remoteness of the chief naval and military nations from our shores, and the consequent difficulty of maintaining operations at such a distance. it is equally proper, in framing our policy, to consider the jealousies of the european family of states, and their consequent unwillingness to incur the enmity of a people so strong as ourselves; their dread of our revenge in the future, as well as their inability to detach more than a certain part of their forces to our shores without losing much of their own weight in the councils of europe. in truth, a careful determination of the force that great britain or france could probably spare for operations against our coasts, if the latter were suitably defended, without weakening their european position or unduly exposing their colonies and commerce, is the starting-point from which to calculate the strength of our own navy. if the latter be superior to the force that thus can be sent against it, and the coast be so defended as to leave the navy free to strike where it will, we can maintain our rights; not merely the rights which international law concedes, and which the moral sense of nations now supports, but also those equally real rights which, though not conferred by law, depend upon a clear preponderance of interest, upon obviously necessary policy, upon self-preservation, either total or partial. were we so situated now in respect of military strength, we could secure our perfectly just claim as to the seal fisheries; not by seizing foreign ships on the open sea, but by the evident fact that, our cities being protected from maritime attack, our position and superior population lay open the canadian pacific, as well as the frontier of the dominion, to do with as we please. diplomats do not flourish such disagreeable truths in each other's faces; they look for a _modus vivendi_, and find it. while, therefore, the advantages of our own position in the western hemisphere, and the disadvantages under which the operations of a european state would labor, are undeniable and just elements in the calculations of the statesman, it is folly to look upon them as sufficient alone for our security. much more needs to be cast into the scale that it may incline in favor of our strength. they are mere defensive factors, and partial at that. though distant, our shores can be reached; being defenceless, they can detain but a short time a force sent against them. with a probability of three months' peace in europe, no maritime power would fear to support its demands by a number of ships with which it would be loath indeed to part for a year. yet, were our sea frontier as strong as it now is weak, passive self-defence, whether in trade or war, would be but a poor policy, so long as this world continues to be one of struggle and vicissitude. all around us now is strife; "the struggle of life," "the race of life," are phrases so familiar that we do not feel their significance till we stop to think about them. everywhere nation is arrayed against nation; our own no less than others. what is our protective system but an organized warfare? in carrying it on, it is true, we have only to use certain procedures which all states now concede to be a legal exercise of the national power, even though injurious to themselves. it is lawful, they say, to do what we will with our own. are our people, however, so unaggressive that they are likely not to want their own way in matters where their interests turn on points of disputed right, or so little sensitive as to submit quietly to encroachment by others, in quarters where they long have considered their own influence should prevail? our self-imposed isolation in the matter of markets, and the decline of our shipping interest in the last thirty years, have coincided singularly with an actual remoteness of this continent from the life of the rest of the world. the writer has before him a map of the north and south atlantic oceans, showing the direction of the principal trade routes and the proportion of tonnage passing over each; and it is curious to note what deserted regions, comparatively, are the gulf of mexico, the caribbean sea, and the adjoining countries and islands. a broad band stretches from our northern atlantic coast to the english channel; another as broad from the british islands to the east, through the mediterranean and red sea, overflowing the borders of the latter in order to express the volume of trade. around either cape--good hope and horn--pass strips of about one-fourth this width, joining near the equator, midway between africa and south america. from the west indies issues a thread, indicating the present commerce of great britain with a region which once, in the napoleonic wars, embraced one-fourth of the whole trade of the empire. the significance is unmistakable: europe has now little mercantile interest in the caribbean sea. when the isthmus is pierced, this isolation will pass away, and with it the indifference of foreign nations. from wheresoever they come and whithersoever they afterward go, all ships that use the canal will pass through the caribbean. whatever the effect produced upon the prosperity of the adjacent continent and islands by the thousand wants attendant upon maritime activity, around such a focus of trade will centre large commercial and political interests. to protect and develop its own, each nation will seek points of support and means of influence in a quarter where the united states always has been jealously sensitive to the intrusion of european powers. the precise value of the monroe doctrine is understood very loosely by most americans, but the effect of the familiar phrase has been to develop a national sensitiveness, which is a more frequent cause of war than material interests; and over disputes caused by such feelings there will preside none of the calming influence due to the moral authority of international law, with its recognized principles, for the points in dispute will be of policy, of interest, not of conceded right. already france and great britain are giving to ports held by them a degree of artificial strength uncalled for by their present importance. they look to the near future. among the islands and on the mainland there are many positions of great importance, held now by weak or unstable states. is the united states willing to see them sold to a powerful rival? but what right will she invoke against the transfer? she can allege but one,--that of her reasonable policy supported by her might. whether they will or no, americans must now begin to look outward. the growing production of the country demands it. an increasing volume of public sentiment demands it. the position of the united states, between the two old worlds and the two great oceans, makes the same claim, which will soon be strengthened by the creation of the new link joining the atlantic and pacific. the tendency will be maintained and increased by the growth of the european colonies in the pacific, by the advancing civilization of japan, and by the rapid peopling of our pacific states with men who have all the aggressive spirit of the advanced line of national progress. nowhere does a vigorous foreign policy find more favor than among the people west of the rocky mountains. it has been said that, in our present state of unpreparedness, a trans-isthmian canal will be a military disaster to the united states, and especially to the pacific coast. when the canal is finished, the atlantic seaboard will be neither more nor less exposed than it now is; it will merely share with the country at large the increased danger of foreign complications with inadequate means to meet them. the danger of the pacific coast will be greater by so much as the way between it and europe is shortened through a passage which the stronger maritime power can control. the danger will lie not merely in the greater facility for despatching a hostile squadron from europe, but also in the fact that a more powerful fleet than formerly can be maintained on that coast by a european power, because it can be called home so much more promptly in case of need. the greatest weakness of the pacific ports, however, if wisely met by our government, will go far to insure our naval superiority there. the two chief centres, san francisco and puget sound, owing to the width and the great depth of the entrances, cannot be effectively protected by torpedoes; and consequently, as fleets can always pass batteries through an unobstructed channel, they cannot obtain perfect security by means of fortifications only. valuable as such works will be to them, they must be further garrisoned by coast-defence ships, whose part in repelling an enemy will be co-ordinated with that of the batteries. the sphere of action of such ships should not be permitted to extend far beyond the port to which they are allotted, and of whose defence they form an essential part; but within that sweep they will always be a powerful reinforcement to the sea-going navy, when the strategic conditions of a war cause hostilities to centre around their port. by sacrificing power to go long distances, the coast-defence ship gains proportionate weight of armor and guns; that is, of defensive and offensive strength. it therefore adds an element of unique value to the fleet with which it for a time acts. no foreign states, except great britain, have ports so near our pacific coast as to bring it within the radius of action of their coast-defence ships; and it is very doubtful whether even great britain will put such ships at vancouver island, the chief value of which will be lost to her when the canadian pacific is severed,--a blow always in the power of this country. it is upon our atlantic seaboard that the mistress of halifax, of bermuda, and of jamaica will now defend vancouver and the canadian pacific. in the present state of our seaboard defence she can do so absolutely. what is all canada compared with our exposed great cities? even were the coast fortified, she still could do so, if our navy be no stronger than is designed as yet. what harm can we do canada proportionate to the injury we should suffer by the interruption of our coasting trade, and by a blockade of boston, new york, the delaware, and the chesapeake? such a blockade great britain certainly could make technically efficient, under the somewhat loose definitions of international law. neutrals would accept it as such. the military needs of the pacific states, as well as their supreme importance to the whole country, are yet a matter of the future, but of a future so near that provision should begin immediately. to weigh their importance, consider what influence in the pacific would be attributed to a nation comprising only the states of washington, oregon, and california, when filled with such men as now people them and still are pouring in, and which controlled such maritime centres as san francisco, puget sound, and the columbia river. can it be counted less because they are bound by the ties of blood and close political union to the great communities of the east? but such influence, to work without jar and friction, requires underlying military readiness, like the proverbial iron hand under the velvet glove. to provide this, three things are needful: first, protection of the chief harbors, by fortifications and coast-defence ships, which gives defensive strength, provides security to the community within, and supplies the bases necessary to all military operations. secondly, naval force, the arm of offensive power, which alone enables a country to extend its influence outward. thirdly, it should be an inviolable resolution of our national policy, that no foreign state should henceforth acquire a coaling position within three thousand miles of san francisco,--a distance which includes the hawaiian and galapagos islands and the coast of central america. for fuel is the life of modern naval war; it is the food of the ship; without it the modern monsters of the deep die of inanition. around it, therefore, cluster some of the most important considerations of naval strategy. in the caribbean and in the atlantic we are confronted with many a foreign coal depot, bidding us stand to our arms, even as carthage bade rome; but let us not acquiesce in an addition to our dangers, a further diversion of our strength, by being forestalled in the north pacific. in conclusion, while great britain is undoubtedly the most formidable of our possible enemies, both by her great navy and by the strong positions she holds near our coasts, it must be added that a cordial understanding with that country is one of the first of our external interests. both nations doubtless, and properly, seek their own advantage; but both, also, are controlled by a sense of law and justice, drawn from the same sources, and deep-rooted in their instincts. whatever temporary aberration may occur, a return to mutual standards of right will certainly follow. formal alliance between the two is out of the question, but a cordial recognition of the similarity of character and ideas will give birth to sympathy, which in turn will facilitate a co-operation beneficial to both; for if sentimentality is weak, sentiment is strong. [illustration: the pacific ocean] hawaii and our future sea power. [the origin of the ensuing article was as follows: at the time of the revolution in hawaii, at the beginning of , the author addressed to the "new york times" a letter, which appeared in the issue of january . this, falling under the eye of the editor of the "forum," suggested to him to ask an article upon the general military--or naval--value of the hawaiian group. the letter alluded to ran thus:-- _to the editor of the "new york times"_:-- there is one aspect of the recent revolution in hawaii which seems to have been kept out of sight, and that is the relation of the islands, not merely to our own and to european countries, but to china. how vitally important that may become in the future is evident from the great number of chinese, relatively to the whole population, now settled in the islands. it is a question for the whole civilized world and not for the united states only, whether the sandwich islands, with their geographical and military importance, unrivalled by that of any other position in the north pacific, shall in the future be an outpost of european civilization, or of the comparative barbarism of china. it is sufficiently known, but not, perhaps, generally noted in our country, that many military men abroad, familiar with eastern conditions and character, look with apprehension toward the day when the vast mass of china--now inert--may yield to one of those impulses which have in past ages buried civilization under a wave of barbaric invasion. the great armies of europe, whose existence is so frequently deplored, may be providentially intended as a barrier to that great movement, if it come. certainly, while china remains as she is, nothing more disastrous for the future of the world can be imagined than that general disarmament of europe which is the utopian dream of some philanthropists. china, however, may burst her barriers eastward as well as westward, toward the pacific as well as toward the european continent. in such a movement it would be impossible to exaggerate the momentous issues dependent upon a firm hold of the sandwich islands by a great, civilized, maritime power. by its nearness to the scene, and by the determined animosity to the chinese movement which close contact seems to inspire, our own country, with its pacific coast, is naturally indicated as the proper guardian for this most important position. to hold it, however, whether in the supposed case or in war with a european state, implies a great extension of our naval power. are we ready to undertake this? a.t. mahan, _captain, united states navy_. new york, jan. , .] the suddenness--so far, at least, as the general public is concerned--with which the long-existing troubles in hawaii have come to a head, and the character of the advances reported to be addressed to the united states by the revolutionary government, formally recognized as _de facto_ by our representative on the spot, add another to the many significant instances furnished by history, that, as men in the midst of life are in death, so nations in the midst of peace find themselves confronted with unexpected causes of dissension, conflicts of interests, whose results may be, on the one hand, war, or, on the other, abandonment of clear and imperative national advantage in order to avoid an issue for which preparation has not been made. by no premeditated contrivance of our own, by the cooperation of a series of events which, however dependent step by step upon human action, were not intended to prepare the present crisis, the united states finds herself compelled to answer a question--to make a decision--not unlike and not less momentous than that required of the roman senate, when the mamertine garrison invited it to occupy messina, and so to abandon the hitherto traditional policy which had confined the expansion of rome to the italian peninsula. for let it not be overlooked that, whether we wish or no, we _must_ answer the question, we _must_ make the decision. the issue cannot be dodged. absolute inaction in such a case is a decision as truly as the most vehement action. we can now advance, but, the conditions of the world being what they are, if we do not advance we recede; for there is involved not so much a particular action as a question of principle, pregnant of great consequences in one direction or in the other. occasion of serious difficulty, indeed, should not arise here. unlike the historical instance just cited, the two nations whose interests have come now into contact--great britain and the united states--are so alike in inherited traditions, habits of thought, and views of right, that injury to the one need not be anticipated from the predominance of the other in a quarter where its interests also predominate. despite the heterogeneous character of the immigration which the past few years have been pouring into our country, our political traditions and racial characteristics still continue english--mr. douglas campbell would say dutch, but even so the stock is the same. though thus somewhat gorged with food not wholly to its taste, our political digestion has contrived so far to master the incongruous mass of materials it has been unable to reject; and if assimilation has been at times imperfect, our political constitution and spirit remain english in essential features. imbued with like ideals of liberty, of law, of right, certainly not less progressive than our kin beyond sea, we are, in the safeguards deliberately placed around our fundamental law, even more conservative than they. that which we received of the true spirit of freedom we have kept--liberty and law--not the one or the other, but both. in that spirit we not only have occupied our original inheritance, but also, step by step, as rome incorporated the other nations of the peninsula, we have added to it, spreading and perpetuating everywhere the same foundation principles of free and good government which, to her honor be it said, great britain also has maintained throughout her course. and now, arrested on the south by the rights of a race wholly alien to us, and on the north by a body of states of like traditions to our own, whose freedom to choose their own affiliations we respect, we have come to the sea. in our infancy we bordered upon the atlantic only; our youth carried our boundary to the gulf of mexico; to-day maturity sees us upon the pacific. have we no right or no call to progress farther in any direction? are there for us beyond the sea horizon none of those essential interests, of those evident dangers, which impose a policy and confer rights? this is the question that long has been looming upon the brow of a future now rapidly passing into the present. of it the hawaiian incident is a part--intrinsically, perhaps, a small part--but in its relations to the whole so vital that, as has been said before, a wrong decision does not stand by itself, but involves, not only in principle but in fact, recession along the whole line. in our natural, necessary, irrepressible expansion, we are come here into contact with the progress of another great people, the law of whose being has impressed upon it a principle of growth which has wrought mightily in the past, and in the present is visible by recurring manifestations. of this working, gibraltar, malta, cyprus, egypt, aden, india, in geographical succession though not in strict order of time, show a completed chain; forged link by link, by open force or politic bargain, but always resulting from the steady pressure of a national instinct, so powerful and so accurate that statesmen of every school, willing or unwilling, have found themselves carried along by a tendency which no individuality can resist or greatly modify. both unsubstantial rumor and incautious personal utterance have suggested an impatient desire in mr. gladstone to be rid of the occupation of egypt; but scarcely has his long exclusion from office ended when the irony of events signalizes his return thereto by an increase in the force of occupation. further, it may be noted profitably of the chain just cited, that the two extremities were first possessed--first india, then gibraltar, far later malta, aden, cyprus, egypt--and that, with scarce an exception, each step has been taken despite the jealous vexation of a rival. spain has never ceased angrily to bewail gibraltar. "i had rather see the english on the heights of montmartre," said the first napoleon, "than in malta." the feelings of france about egypt are matter of common knowledge, not even dissembled; and, for our warning be it added, her annoyance is increased by the bitter sense of opportunity rejected. it is needless here to do more than refer to that other chain of maritime possessions--halifax, bermuda, santa lucia, jamaica--which strengthen the british hold upon the atlantic, the caribbean, and the isthmus of panama. in the pacific the position is for them much less satisfactory--nowhere, perhaps, is it less so, and from obvious natural causes. the commercial development of the eastern pacific has been far later, and still is less complete, than that of its western shores. the latter when first opened to european adventure were already the seat of ancient economies in china and japan, furnishing abundance of curious and luxurious products to tempt the trader by good hopes of profit. the western coast of america, for the most part peopled by savages, offered little save the gold and silver of mexico and peru, and these were monopolized jealously by the spaniards--not a commercial nation--during their long ascendency. being so very far from england and affording so little material for trade, pacific america did not draw the enterprise of a country the chief and honorable inducement of whose seamen was the hope of gain, in pursuit of which they settled and annexed point after point in the regions where they penetrated, and upon the routes leading thither. the western coasts of north america, being reached only by the long and perilous voyage around cape horn, or by a more toilsome and dangerous passage across the continent, remained among the last of the temperate productive seaboards of the earth to be possessed by white men. the united states were already a nation, in fact as well as in form, when vancouver was exploring puget sound and passed first through the channel separating the mainland of british america from the island which now bears his name. thus it has happened that, from the late development of british columbia in the northeastern pacific, and of australia and new zealand in the southwestern, great britain is found again holding the two extremities of a line, between which she must inevitably desire the intermediate links; nor is there any good reason why she should not have them, except the superior, more urgent, more vital necessities of another people--our own. of these links the hawaiian group possesses unique importance--not from its intrinsic commercial value, but from its favorable position for maritime and military control. the military or strategic value of a naval position depends upon its situation, upon its strength, and upon its resources. of the three, the first is of most consequence, because it results from the nature of things; whereas the two latter, when deficient, can be supplied artificially, in whole or in part. fortifications remedy the weaknesses of a position, foresight accumulates beforehand the resources which nature does not yield on the spot; but it is not within the power of man to change the geographical situation of a point which lies outside the limit of strategic effect. it is instructive, and yet apparent to the most superficial reading, to notice how the first napoleon, in commenting upon a region likely to be the scene of war, begins by considering the most conspicuous natural features, and then enumerates the commanding positions, their distances from each other, the relative directions, or, as the sea phrase is, their "bearings," and the particular facilities each offers for operations of war. this furnishes the ground plan, the skeleton, detached from confusing secondary considerations, and from which a clear estimate of the decisive points can be made. the number of such points varies greatly, according to the character of the region. in a mountainous, broken country they may be very many; whereas in a plain devoid of natural obstacles there may be few, or none save those created by man. if few, the value of each is necessarily greater than if many; and if there be but one, its importance is not only unique, but extreme,--measured only by the size of the field over which its unshared influence extends. the sea, until it approaches the land, realizes the ideal of a vast plain unbroken by obstacles. on the sea, says an eminent french tactician, there is no field of battle, meaning that there is none of the natural conditions which determine, and often fetter, the movements of the general. but upon a plain, however flat and monotonous, causes, possibly slight, determine the concentration of population into towns and villages, and the necessary communications between the centres create roads. where the latter converge, or cross, tenure confers command, depending for importance upon the number of routes thus meeting, and upon their individual value. it is just so at sea. while in itself the ocean opposes no obstacle to a vessel taking any one of the numerous routes that can be traced upon the surface of the globe between two points, conditions of distance or convenience, of traffic or of wind, do prescribe certain usual courses. where these pass near an ocean position, still more where they use it, it has an influence over them, and where several routes cross near by that influence becomes very great,--is commanding. let us now apply these considerations to the hawaiian group. to any one viewing a map that shows the full extent of the pacific ocean, with its shores on either side, two striking circumstances will be apparent immediately. he will see at a glance that the sandwich islands stand by themselves, in a state of comparative isolation, amid a vast expanse of sea; and, again, that they form the centre of a large circle whose radius is approximately--and very closely--the distance from honolulu to san francisco. the circumference of this circle, if the trouble is taken to describe it with compass upon the map, will be seen, on the west and south, to pass through the outer fringe of the system of archipelagoes which, from australia and new zealand, extend to the northeast toward the american continent. within the circle a few scattered islets, bare and unimportant, seem only to emphasize the failure of nature to bridge the interval separating hawaii from her peers of the southern pacific. of these, however, it may be noted that some, like fanning and christmas islands, have within a few years been taken into british possession. the distance from san francisco to honolulu, twenty-one hundred miles--easy steaming distance--is substantially the same as that from honolulu to the gilbert, marshall, samoan, society, and marquesas groups, all under european control, except samoa, in which we have a part influence. to have a central position such as this, and to be alone, having no rival and admitting no alternative throughout an extensive tract, are conditions that at once fix the attention of the strategist,--it may be added, of the statesmen of commerce likewise. but to this striking combination are to be added the remarkable relations, borne by these singularly placed islands, to the greater commercial routes traversing this vast expanse known to us as the pacific,--not only, however, to those now actually in use, important as they are, but also to those that must be called into being necessarily by that future to which the hawaiian incident compels our too unwilling attention. circumstances, as already remarked, create centres, between which communication necessarily follows; and in the vista of the future all discern, however dimly, a new and great centre that must largely modify existing sea routes, as well as bring new ones into existence. whether the canal of the central american isthmus be eventually at panama or at nicaragua matters little to the question now in hand, although, in common with most americans who have thought upon the subject, i believe it surely will be at the latter point. whichever it be, the convergence there of so many ships from the atlantic and the pacific will constitute a centre of commerce, interoceanic, and inferior to few, if to any, in the world; one whose approaches will be watched jealously, and whose relations to the other centres of the pacific by the lines joining it to them must be examined carefully. such study of the commercial routes and of their relations to the hawaiian islands, taken together with the other strategic considerations previously set forth, completes the synopsis of facts which determine the value of the group for conferring either commercial or naval control. referring again to the map, it will be seen that while the shortest routes from the isthmus to australia and new zealand, as well as those to south america, go well clear of any probable connection with or interference from hawaii, those directed toward china and japan pass either through the group or in close proximity to it. vessels from central america bound to the ports of north america come, of course, within the influence of our own coast. these circumstances, and the existing recognized distribution of political power in the pacific, point naturally to an international acquiescence in certain defined spheres of influence, for our own country and for others, such as has been reached already between great britain, germany, and holland in the southwestern pacific, to avoid conflict there between their respective claims. though artificial in form, such a recognition, in the case here suggested, would depend upon perfectly natural as well as indisputable conditions. the united states is by far the greatest, in numbers, interests, and power, of the communities bordering upon the eastern shores of the north pacific; and the relations of the hawaiian islands to her naturally would be, and actually are, more numerous and more important than they can be to any other state. this is true, although, unfortunately for the equally natural wishes of great britain and her colonies, the direct routes from british columbia to eastern australia and new zealand, which depend upon no building of a future canal, pass as near the islands as those already mentioned. such a fact, that this additional great highway runs close to the group, both augments and emphasizes their strategic importance; but it does not affect the statement just made, that the interest of the united states in them surpasses that of great britain, and dependent upon a natural cause, nearness, which has been admitted always as a reasonable ground for national self-assertion. it is unfortunate, doubtless, for the wishes of british columbia, and for the communications, commercial and military, depending upon the canadian pacific railway, that the united states lies between them and the south pacific, and is the state nearest to hawaii; but, the fact being so, the interests of our sixty-five million people, in a position so vital to our part in the pacific, must be allowed to outweigh those of the six millions of canada. from the foregoing considerations may be inferred the importance of the hawaiian islands as a position powerfully influencing the commercial and military control of the pacific, and especially of the northern pacific, in which the united states, geographically, has the strongest right to assert herself. these are the main advantages, which can be termed positive: those, namely, which directly advance commercial security and naval control. to the negative advantages of possession, by removing conditions which, if the islands were in the hands of any other power, would constitute to us disadvantages and threats, allusion only will be made. the serious menace to our pacific coast and our pacific trade, if so important a position were held by a possible enemy, has been mentioned frequently in the press, and dwelt upon in the diplomatic papers which from time to time are given to the public. it may be assumed that it is generally acknowledged. upon one particular, however, too much stress cannot be laid, one to which naval officers cannot but be more sensitive than the general public, and that is the immense disadvantage to us of any maritime enemy having a coaling-station well within twenty-five hundred miles, as this is, of every point of our coast-line from puget sound to mexico. were there many others available, we might find it difficult to exclude from all. there is, however, but the one. shut out from the sandwich islands as a coal base, an enemy is thrown back for supplies of fuel to distances of thirty-five hundred or four thousand miles,--or between seven thousand and eight thousand, going and coming,--an impediment to sustained maritime operations well-nigh prohibitive. the coal-mines of british columbia constitute, of course, a qualification to this statement; but upon them, if need arose, we might hope at least to impose some trammels by action from the land side. it is rarely that so important a factor in the attack or defence of a coast-line--of a sea frontier--is concentrated in a single position; and the circumstance renders doubly imperative upon us to secure it, if we righteously can. it is to be hoped, also, that the opportunity thus thrust upon us may not be viewed narrowly, as though it concerned but one section of our country or one portion of its external trade or influence. this is no mere question of a particular act, for which, possibly, just occasion may not have offered yet; but of a principle, a policy, fruitful of many future acts, to enter upon which, in the fulness of our national progress, the time now has arrived. the principle being accepted, to be conditioned only by a just and candid regard for the rights and reasonable susceptibilities of other nations,--none of which is contravened by the step here immediately under discussion,--the annexation, even, of hawaii would be no mere sporadic effort, irrational because disconnected from an adequate motive, but a first-fruit and a token that the nation in its evolution has aroused itself to the necessity of carrying its life--that has been the happiness of those under its influence--beyond the borders which heretofore have sufficed for its activities. that the vaunted blessings of our economy are not to be forced upon the unwilling may be conceded; but the concession does not deny the right nor the wisdom of gathering in those who wish to come. comparative religion teaches that creeds which reject missionary enterprise are foredoomed to decay. may it not be so with nations? certainly the glorious record of england is consequent mainly upon the spirit, and traceable to the time, when she launched out into the deep--without formulated policy, it is true, or foreseeing the future to which her star was leading, but obeying the instinct which in the infancy of nations anticipates the more reasoned impulses of experience. let us, too, learn from her experience. not all at once did england become the great sea power which she is, but step by step, as opportunity offered, she has moved on to the world-wide pre-eminence now held by english speech, and by institutions sprung from english germs. how much poorer would the world have been, had englishmen heeded the cautious hesitancy that now bids us reject every advance beyond our shore-lines! and can any one doubt that a cordial, if unformulated, understanding between the two chief states of english tradition, to spread freely, without mutual jealousy and in mutual support, would increase greatly the world's sum of happiness? but if a plea of the world's welfare seem suspiciously like a cloak for national self-interest, let the latter be accepted frankly as the adequate motive which it assuredly is. let us not shrink from pitting a broad self-interest against the narrow self-interest to which some would restrict us. the demands of our three great seaboards, the atlantic, the gulf, and the pacific,--each for itself, and all for the strength that comes from drawing closer the ties between them,--are calling for the extension, through the isthmian canal, of that broad sea common along which, and along which alone, in all the ages prosperity has moved. land carriage, always restricted and therefore always slow, toils enviously but hopelessly behind, vainly seeking to replace and supplant the royal highway of nature's own making. corporate interests, vigorous in that power of concentration which is the strength of armies and of minorities, may here withstand for a while the ill-organized strivings of the multitude, only dimly conscious of its wants; yet the latter, however temporarily opposed and baffled, is sure at last, like the blind forces of nature, to overwhelm all that stand in the way of its necessary progress. so the isthmian canal is an inevitable part in the future of the united states; yet one that cannot be separated from other necessary incidents of a policy dependent upon it, whose details cannot be foreseen exactly. but because the precise steps that hereafter may be opportune or necessary cannot yet be foretold certainly, is not a reason the less, but a reason the more, for establishing a principle of action which may serve to guide as opportunities arise. let us start from the fundamental truth, warranted by history, that the control of the seas, and especially along the great lines drawn by national interest or national commerce, is the chief among the merely material elements in the power and prosperity of nations. it is so because the sea is the world's great medium of circulation. from this necessarily follows the principle that, as subsidiary to such control, it is imperative to take possession, when it can be done righteously, of such maritime positions as contribute to secure command. if this principle be adopted, there will be no hesitation about taking the positions--and they are many--upon the approaches to the isthmus, whose interests incline them to seek us. it has its application also to the present case of hawaii. there is, however, one caution to be given from the military point of view, beyond the need of which the world has not yet passed. military positions, fortified posts, by land or by sea, however strong or admirably situated, do not confer control by themselves alone. people often say that such an island or harbor will give control of such a body of water. it is an utter, deplorable, ruinous mistake. the phrase indeed may be used by some only loosely, without forgetting other implied conditions of adequate protection and adequate navies; but the confidence of our own nation in its native strength, and its indifference to the defence of its ports and the sufficiency of its fleet, give reason to fear that the full consequences of a forward step may not be weighed soberly. napoleon, who knew better, once talked this way. "the islands of san pietro, corfu, and malta," he wrote, "will make us masters of the whole mediterranean." vain boast! within one year corfu, in two years malta, were rent away from the state that could not support them by its ships. nay, more: had bonaparte not taken the latter stronghold out of the hands of its degenerate but innocuous government, that citadel of the mediterranean would perhaps--would probably--never have passed into those of his chief enemy. there is here also a lesson for us. it is by no means logical to leap, from this recognition of the necessity of adequate naval force to secure outlying dependencies, to the conclusion that the united states would need for that object a navy equal to the largest now existing. a nation as far removed as is our own from the bases of foreign naval strength may reasonably reckon upon the qualification that distance--not to speak of the complex european interests close at hand--impresses upon the exertion of naval strength by european powers. the mistake is when our remoteness, unsupported by carefully calculated force, is regarded as an armor of proof, under cover of which any amount of swagger may be indulged safely. an estimate of what is an adequate naval force for our country may properly take into account the happy interval which separates both our present territory and our future aspirations from the centres of interest really vital to european states. if to these safeguards be added, on our part, a sober recognition of what our reasonable sphere of influence is, and a candid justice in dealing with foreign interests within that sphere, there will be little disposition to question our preponderance therein. among all foreign states, it is especially to be hoped that each passing year may render more cordial the relations between ourselves and the great nation from whose loins we sprang. the radical identity of spirit which underlies our superficial differences of polity surely will draw us closer together, if we do not set our faces wilfully against a tendency which would give our race the predominance over the seas of the world. to force such a consummation is impossible, and if possible would not be wise; but surely it would be a lofty aim, fraught with immeasurable benefits, to desire it, and to raise no needless impediments by advocating perfectly proper acts, demanded by our evident interests, in offensive or arrogant terms. the isthmus and sea power.[ ] _june, ._ for more than four hundred years the mind of man has been possessed with a great idea, which, although by its wide diffusion and prophetic nature resembling one of those fundamental instincts, whose very existence points to a necessary fulfilment, first quickened into life in the thought of christopher columbus. to him the vision, dimly seen through the scanty and inaccurate knowledge of his age, imaged a close and facile communication, by means of the sea, that great bond of nations, between two ancient and diverse civilizations, which centred, the one around the mediterranean, the birthplace of european commerce, refinement, and culture, the other upon the shores of that distant eastern ocean which lapped the dominions of the great khan, and held upon its breast the rich island of zipangu. hitherto an envious waste of land, entailing years of toilsome and hazardous journey, had barred them asunder. a rare traveller now and again might penetrate from one to the other, but it was impossible to maintain by land the constant exchange of influence and benefit which, though on a contracted scale, had constituted the advantage and promoted the development of the mediterranean peoples. the microcosm of the land-girt sea typified then that future greater family of nations, which one by one have been bound since into a common tie of interest by the broad enfolding ocean, that severs only to knit them more closely together. so with a seer's eye, albeit as in a glass darkly; saw columbus, and was persuaded, and embraced the assurance. as the bold adventurer, walking by faith and not by sight, launched his tiny squadron upon its voyage, making the first step in the great progress which was to be, and still is not completed, he little dreamed that the mere incident of stumbling upon an unknown region that lay across his route should be with posterity his chief title to fame, obscuring the true glory of his grand conception, as well as delaying its fulfilment to a far distant future. [ ] the map of the gulf and caribbean, p. , will serve for geographical references of this article. the story of his actual achievement is sufficiently known to all readers, and need not be repeated here. amid the many disappointments and humiliations which succeeded the brief triumphant blaze of his first return, and clouded the latter years of his life, columbus was spared the pang of realizing that the problem was insoluble for the time. like many a prophet before him, he knew not what, nor what manner of time, the spirit that was in him foretold, and died the happier for his ignorance. the certainty that a wilderness, peopled by savages and semi-barbarians, had been added to the known world, would have been a poor awakening from the golden dreams of beneficent glory as well as of profit which so long had beckoned him on. that the western land he had discovered interposed a barrier to the further progress of ships towards his longed-for goal, as inexorable as the mountain ranges and vast steppes of asia, was mercifully concealed from his eyes; and the elusive "secret of the strait" through which he to the last hoped to pass, though tantalizing in its constant evasion, kept in tension the springs of hope and moral energy which might have succumbed under the knowledge of the truth. it fell to the great discoverer, in his last voyage, to approach the continent, and to examine its shores along the region where the true secret of the strait lay hidden,--where, if ever, it shall pass from a dream to a reality, by the hand of man. in the autumn of , after many trials and misadventures, columbus, having skirted the south side of cuba, reached the north coast of honduras. there was little reason, except in his own unaccountable conviction, for continuing thence in one direction rather than in the other; but by some process of thought he had convinced himself that the sought-for strait lay to the south rather than to the north. he therefore turned to the eastward, though the wind was contrary, and, after a hard buffet against it, doubled cape gracias á dios, which still retains its expressive name, significant of his relief at finding that the trend of the beach at last permitted him to follow his desired course with a fair wind. during the next two months he searched the entire coast-line as far as porto bello, discovering and examining several openings in the land which since have been of historical importance, among others the mouth of the san juan river and the chiriqui lagoon, one of whose principal divisions still recalls his visit in its name, almirante bay, the bay of the admiral. a little beyond, to the eastward of porto bello, he came to a point already known to the spaniards, having been reached from trinidad. the explorer thus acquired the certainty that, from the latter island to yucatan, there was no break in the obdurate shore which barred his access to asia. every possible site for an interoceanic canal lies within the strip of land thus visited by columbus shortly before his death in . how narrow the insurmountable obstacle, and how tantalizing, in the apparent facilities for piercing it extended by the formation of the land, were not known until ten years later, when balboa, led on by the reports of the natives, reached the eminence whence he, first among europeans, saw the south sea,--a name long and vaguely applied to the pacific, because of the direction in which it lay from its discoverer. during these early years the history of the region we now know as central america was one of constant strife among the various spanish leaders, encouraged rather than stifled by the jealous home government; but it was also one of unbroken and venturesome exploration, a healthier manifestation of the same restless and daring energy that provoked their internal collisions. in january, , one gil gonzalez started from panama northward on the pacific side, with a few frail barks, and in march discovered lake nicaragua, which has its name from the cacique, nicaragua, or nicarao, whose town stood upon its shores. five years later, another adventurer took his vessel to pieces on the coast, transported it thus to the lake, and made the circuit of the latter; discovering its outlet, the san juan, just a quarter of a century after columbus had visited the mouth of the river. the conquest of peru, and the gradual extension of spanish domination and settlements in central america and along the shores of the pacific, soon bestowed upon the isthmus an importance, vividly suggestive of its rise into political prominence consequent upon the acquisition of california by the united states, and upon the spread of the latter along the pacific coast. the length and severity of the voyage round cape horn, then as now, impelled men to desire some shorter and less arduous route; and, inconvenient as the land transport with its repeated lading and unlading was, it presented before the days of steam the better alternative, as to some extent it still does. so the isthmus and its adjoining regions became a great centre of commerce, a point where many highways converged and whence they parted; where the east and the west met in intercourse, sometimes friendly, more often hostile. thus was realized partially, though most incompletely, the vision of columbus; and thus, after many fluctuations, and despite the immense expansion of these latter days, partial and incomplete his great conception yet remains. the secret of the strait is still the problem and the reproach of mankind. by whatever causes produced, where such a centre of commerce exists, there always will be found a point of general interest to mankind,--to all, at least, of those peoples who, whether directly commercial or not, share in the wide-spreading benefits and inconveniences arising from the fluctuations of trade. but enterprising commercial countries are not content to be mere passive recipients of these diverse influences. by the very characteristics which make them what they are, they are led perforce to desire, and to aim at, control of these decisive regions; for their tenure, like the key of a military position, exerts a vital effect upon the course of trade, and so upon the struggle, not only for bare existence, but for that increase of wealth, of prosperity, and of general consideration, which affect both the happiness and the dignity of nations. consequently, in every age, according to its particular temperament and circumstances, there will be found manifested this desire for control; sometimes latent in an attitude of simple watchfulness; sometimes starting into vivid action under the impulse of national jealousies, and issuing in diplomatic rivalries or hostile encounter. such, accordingly, has been the history of the central american isthmus since the time when it became recognized as the natural centre, towards which, if not thwarted by adverse influences, the current of intercourse between east and west inevitably must tend. here the direction of least resistance was indicated clearly by nature; and a concurrence of circumstances, partly inherent in the general character of the region, partly adventitious or accidental, contributed at an early date, and until very recently, to emphasize and enlarge the importance consequent upon the geographical situation and physical conformation of this narrow barrier between two great seas. for centuries the west india islands, circling the caribbean, and guarding the exterior approaches to the isthmus, continued to be the greatest single source of tropical products which had become increasingly necessary to the civilized nations of europe. in them, and in that portion of the continent which extended on either side of the isthmus, known under the vague appellation of the spanish main, great britain, during her desperate strife with the first napoleon,--a strife for very existence,--found the chief support of the commercial strength and credit that alone carried her to the triumphant end. the isthmus and the caribbean were vital elements in determining the issue of that stern conflict. for centuries, also, the treasures of mexico and peru, upon which depended the vigorous action of the great though decadent military kingdom of spain, flowed towards and accumulated around the isthmus, where they were reinforced by the tribute of the philippine islands, and whence they took their way in the lumbering galleons for the ports of the peninsula. where factors of such decisive influence in european politics were at stake, it was inevitable that the rival nations, in peace as well as in open war, should carry their ambitions to the scene; and the unceasing struggle for the mastery would fluctuate with the control of the waters, which, as in all maritime regions, must depend mainly upon naval preponderance, but also in part upon possession of those determining positions, of whose tenure napoleon said that "war is a business of positions." among these the isthmus was chief. the wild enterprises and bloody cruelties of the early buccaneers were therefore not merely a brutal exhibition of unpitying greed, indicative of the scum of nations as yet barely emerging from barbarism. they were this, doubtless, but they were something more. in the march of events, these early marauders played the same part, in relation to what was to succeed them, as the rude, unscrupulous, lawless adventurers who now precede the ruthless march of civilized man, who swarm over the border, occupy the outposts, and by their excesses stain the fair fame of the race whose pioneers they are. but, while thus libels upon and reproaches to the main body, they nevertheless belong to it, share its essential character, and foretell its inevitable course. like driftwood swept forward on the crest of a torrent, they betoken the approaching flood. so with the celebrated freebooters of the spanish main. of the same general type,--though varying greatly in individual characteristics, in breadth of view, and even in elevation of purpose,--their piratical careers not only evidenced the local wealth of the scene of their exploits, but attested the commercial and strategic importance of the position upon which in fact that wealth depended. the carcass was there, and the eagles as well as the vultures, the far-sighted as well as the mere carrion birds of prey, were gathering round it. "the spoil of granada," said one of these mercenary chieftains, two centuries ago, "i count as naught beside the knowledge of the great lake nicaragua, and of the route between the northern and southern seas which depends upon it." as time passed, the struggle for the mastery inevitably resulted, by a kind of natural selection, in the growing predominance of the people of the british islands, in whom commercial enterprise and political instinct were blended so happily. the very lawlessness of the period favored the extension of their power and influence; for it removed from the free play of a nation's innate faculties the fetters which are imposed by our present elaborate framework of precedents, constitutions, and international law. admirably adapted as these are to the conservation and regular working of a political system, they are, nevertheless, however wise, essentially artificial, and hence are ill adapted to a transition state,--to a period in which order is evolving out of chaos, where the result is durable exactly in proportion to the freedom with which the natural forces are allowed to act, and to reach their own equilibrium without extraneous interference. nor are such periods confined to the early days of mere lawlessness. they recur whenever a crisis is reached in the career of a nation; when old traditions, accepted maxims, or written constitutions have been outgrown, in whole or in part; when the time has come for a people to recognize that the limits imposed upon its expansion, by the political wisdom of its forefathers, have ceased to be applicable to its own changed conditions and those of the world. the question then raised is not whether the constitution, as written, shall be respected. it is how to reach modifications in the constitution--and that betimes--so that the genius and awakened intelligence of the people may be free to act, without violating that respect for its fundamental law upon which national stability ultimately depends. it is a curious feature of our current journalism that it is clear-sighted and prompt to see the unfortunate trammels in which certain of our religious bodies are held, by the cast-iron tenets imposed upon them by a past generation, while at the same time political tenets, similarly ancient, and imposed with a like ignorance of a future which is our present, are invoked freely to forbid this nation from extending its power and necessary enterprise into and beyond the seas, to which on every side it now has attained. during the critical centuries when great britain was passing through that protracted phase of her history in which, from one of the least among states, she became, through the power of the sea, the very keystone and foundation upon which rested the commercial--for a time even the political--fabric of europe, the free action of her statesmen and people was clogged by no uneasy sense that the national genius was in conflict with artificial, self-imposed restrictions. she plunged into the brawl of nations that followed the discovery of a new world, of an unoccupied if not unclaimed inheritance, with a vigor and an initiative which gained ever-accelerated momentum and power as the years rolled by. far and wide, in every sea, through every clime, her seamen and her colonists spread; but while their political genius and traditions enabled them, in regions adapted to the physical well-being of the race, to found self-governing colonies which have developed into one of the greatest, of free states, they did not find, and never have found, that the possession of and rule over barbarous, or semi-civilized, or inert tropical communities, were inconsistent with the maintenance of political liberty in the mother country. the sturdy vigor of the broad principle of freedom in the national life is attested sufficiently by centuries of steady growth, that surest evidence of robust vitality. but, while conforming in the long run to the dictates of natural justice, no feeble scrupulosity impeded the nation's advance to power, by which alone its mission and the law of its being could be fulfilled. no artificial fetters were forged to cramp the action of the state, nor was it drugged with political narcotics to dwarf its growth. in the region here immediately under consideration, great britain entered the contest under conditions of serious disadvantage. the glorious burst of maritime and colonial enterprise which marked the reign of elizabeth, as the new era dawned when the country recognized the sphere of its true greatness, was confronted by the full power of spain, as yet outwardly unshaken, in actual tenure of the most important positions in the caribbean and the spanish main, and claiming the right to exclude all others from that quarter of the world. how brilliantly this claim was resisted is well known; yet, had they been then in fashion, there might have been urged, to turn england from the path which has made her what she is, the same arguments that now are freely used to deter our own country from even accepting such advantages as are ready to drop into her lap. if it be true that great britain's maritime policy now is imposed to some extent by the present necessities of the little group of islands which form the nucleus of her strength, it is not true that any such necessities first impelled her to claim her share of influence in the world, her part in the great drama of nations. not for such reasons did she launch out upon the career which is perhaps the noblest yet run by any people. it then could have been said to her, as it now is said to us, "why go beyond your own borders? within them you have what suffices for your needs and those of your population. there are manifold abuses within to be corrected, manifold miseries to be relieved. let the outside world take care of itself. defend yourself, if attacked; being, however, always careful to postpone preparation to the extreme limit of imprudence. 'sphere of influence,' 'part in the world,' 'national prestige,'--there are no such things; or if there be, they are not worth fighting for." what england would have been, had she so reasoned, is matter for speculation; that the world would have been poorer may be confidently affirmed. as the strength of spain waned apace during the first half of the seventeenth century, the external efforts of great britain also slackened through the rise of internal troubles, which culminated in the great rebellion, and absorbed for the time all the energies of the people. the momentum acquired under drake, raleigh, and their associates was lost, and an occasion, opportune through the exhaustion of the great enemy, spain, passed unimproved. but, though thus temporarily checked, the national tendency remained, and quickly resumed its sway when cromwell's mighty hand had composed the disorders of the commonwealth. his clear-sighted statesmanship, as well as the immediate necessities of his internal policy, dictated the strenuous assertion by sea of great britain's claims, not only to external respect, which he rigorously exacted, but also to her due share in influencing the world outside her borders. the nation quickly responded to his proud appeal, and received anew the impulse upon the road to sea power which never since has been relaxed. to him were due the measures--not, perhaps, economically the wisest, judged by modern lights, but more than justified by the conditions of his times--which drew into english hands the carrying trade of the world. the glories of the british navy as an organized force date also from his short rule; and it was he who, in , laid a firm basis for the development of the country's sea power in the caribbean, by the conquest of jamaica, from a military standpoint the most decisive of all single positions in that sea for the control of the isthmus. it is true that the successful attempt upon this island resulted from the failure of the leaders to accomplish cromwell's more immediate purpose of reducing santo domingo,--that in so far the particular fortunate issue was of the nature of an accident; but this fact serves only to illustrate more emphatically that, when a general line of policy, whether military or political, is correctly chosen upon sound principles, incidental misfortunes or disappointments do not frustrate the conception. the sagacious, far-seeing motive, which prompted cromwell's movement against the west indian possessions of spain, was to contest the latter's claim to the monopoly of that wealthy region; and he looked upon british extension in the islands as simply a stepping-stone to control upon the adjacent continent. it is a singular commentary upon the blindness of historians to the true secret of great britain's rise among the nations, and of the eminent position she so long has held, that writers so far removed from each other in time and characteristics as hume and the late j.r. green should detect in this far-reaching effort of the protector, only the dulled vision of "a conservative and unspeculative temper misled by the strength of religious enthusiasm." "a statesman of wise political genius," according to them, would have fastened his eyes rather upon the growing power of france, "and discerned the beginning of that great struggle for supremacy" which was fought out under louis xiv. but to do so would have been only to repeat, by anticipation, the fatal error of that great monarch, which forever forfeited for france the control of the seas, in which the surest prosperity of nations is to be found; a mistake, also, far more ruinous to the island kingdom than it was to her continental rival, bitter though the fruits thereof have been to the latter. hallam, with clearer insight, says: "when cromwell declared against spain, and attacked her west indian possessions, there was little pretence, certainly, of justice, but not by any means, as i conceive, the impolicy sometimes charged against him. so auspicious was his star, that the very failure of that expedition obtained a more advantageous possession for england than all the triumphs of her former kings." most true; but because his star was despatched in the right direction to look for fortune,--by sea, not by land. the great aim of the protector was checked by his untimely death, which perhaps also definitely frustrated a fulfilment, in the actual possession of the isthmus, that in his strong hands might have been feasible. his idea, however, remained prominent among the purposes of the english people, as distinguished from their rulers; and in it, as has been said before, is to be recognized the significance of the exploits of the buccaneers, during the period of external debility which characterized the reigns of the second charles and james. with william of orange the government again placed itself at the head of the national aspirations, as their natural leader; and the irregular operations of the freebooters were merged in a settled national policy. this, although for a moment diverted from its course by temporary exigencies, was clearly formulated in the avowed objects with which, in , the wise dutchman entered upon the war of the spanish succession, the last great act of his political life. from the peace of utrecht, which closed this war in , the same design was pursued with ever-increasing intensity, but with steady success, and with it was gradually associated the idea of controlling also the communication between the two oceans by way of the isthmus. the best known instance of this, because of its connection with the great name of nelson, was the effort made by him, in conjunction with a land force, in , when still a simple captain, to take possession of the course of the san juan river, and so of the interoceanic route through lake nicaragua. the attempt ended disastrously, owing partly to the climate, and partly to the strong series of works, numbering no less than twelve, which the spaniards, duly sensible of the importance of the position, had constructed between the lake and the sea. difficulties such as were encountered by nelson withstood great britain's advance throughout this region. while neither blind nor indifferent to the advantages conferred by actual possession, through which she had profited elsewhere abundantly, the prior and long-established occupation by spain prevented her obtaining by such means the control she ardently coveted, and in great measure really exercised. the ascendency which made her, and still makes her, the dominant factor in the political system of the west indies and the isthmus resulted from her sea power, understood in its broadest sense. she was the great trader, source of supplies, and medium of intercourse between the various colonies themselves, and from them to the outer world; while the capital and shipping employed in this traffic were protected by a powerful navy, which, except on very rare occasions, was fully competent to its work. thus, while unable to utilize and direct the resources of the countries, as she could have done had they been her own property, she secured the fruitful use and reaped the profit of such commercial transactions as were possible under the inert and narrow rule of the spaniards. the fact is instructive, for the conditions to-day are substantially the same as those of a century ago. possession still vests in states and races which have not attained yet the faculty of developing by themselves the advantages conferred by nature; and control will abide still with those whose ships, whose capital, whose traders support the industrial system of the region, provided these are backed by a naval force adequate to the demands of the military situation, rightly understood. to any foreign state, control at the central american isthmus means naval control, naval predominance, to which tenure of the land is at best but a convenient incident. such, in brief, was the general tendency of events until the time when the spanish colonial empire began to break up, in - , and the industrial system of the west india islands to succumb under the approaching abolition of slavery. the concurrence of these two decisive incidents, and the confusion which ensued in the political and economical conditions, rapidly reduced the isthmus and its approaches to an insignificance from which the islands have not yet recovered. the isthmus is partially restored. its importance, however, depends upon causes more permanent, in the natural order of things, than does that of the islands, which, under existing circumstances, and under any circumstances that can be foreseen as yet, derive their consequence chiefly from the effect which may be exerted from them upon the tenure of the isthmus. hence the latter, after a period of comparative obscurity, again emerged into notice as a vital political factor, when the spread of the united states to the pacific raised the question of rapid and secure communication between our two great seaboards. the mexican war, the acquisition of california, the discovery of gold, and the mad rush to the diggings which followed, hastened, but by no means originated, the necessity for a settlement of the intricate problems involved, in which the united states, from its positions on the two seas, has the predominant interest. but, though predominant, ours is not the sole interest; though less vital, those of other foreign states are great and consequential; and, accordingly, no settlement can be considered to constitute an equilibrium, much less a finality, which does not effect our preponderating influence, and at the same time insure the natural rights of other peoples. so far as the logical distinction between commercial and political will hold, it may be said that our interest is both commercial and political, that of other states almost wholly commercial. the same national characteristics that of old made great britain the chief contestant in all questions of maritime importance--with the dutch in the mediterranean, with france in the east indies, and with spain in the west--have made her also the exponent of foreign opposition to our own asserted interest in the isthmus. the policy initiated by cromwell, of systematic aggression in the caribbean, and of naval expansion and organization, has resulted in a combination of naval force with naval positions unequalled, though not wholly unrivalled, in that sea. and since, as the great sea carrier, great britain has a preponderating natural interest in every new route open to commerce, it is inevitable that she should scrutinize jealously every proposition for the modification of existing arrangements, conscious as she is of power to assert her claims, in case the question should be submitted to the last appeal. nevertheless, although from the nature of the occupations which constitute the welfare of her people, as well as from the characteristics of her power, great britain seemingly has the larger immediate stake in a prospective interoceanic canal, it has been recognized tacitly on her part, as on our side openly asserted, that the bearing of all questions of isthmian transit upon our national progress, safety, and honor, is more direct and more urgent than upon hers. that she has felt so is plain from the manner in which she has yielded before our tenacious remonstrances, in cases where the control of the isthmus was evidently the object of her action,--as in the matters of the tenure of the bay islands and of the protectorate of the mosquito coast. our superior interest appears also from the nature of the conditions which will follow from the construction of a canal. so far as these changes are purely commercial, they will operate to some extent to the disadvantage of great britain; because the result will be to bring our atlantic seaboard, the frontier of a rival manufacturing and commercial state, much nearer to the pacific than it now is, and nearer to many points of that ocean than is england. to make a rough general statement, easily grasped by a reader without the map before him, liverpool and new york are at present about equidistant, by water, from all points on the west coast of america, from valparaiso to british columbia. this is due to the fact that, to go through the straits of magellan, vessels from both ports must pass near cape st. roque, on the east coast of brazil, which is nearly the same distance from each. if the nicaragua canal existed, the line on the pacific equidistant from the two cities named would pass, roughly, by yokohama, shanghai, hong kong, and melbourne, or along the coasts of japan, china, and eastern australia,--liverpool, in this case, using the suez canal, and new york that of nicaragua. in short, the line of equidistance would be shifted from the eastern shore of the pacific to its western coast, and all points of that ocean east of japan, china, and australia--for example, the hawaiian islands--would be nearer to new york than to liverpool. a recent british writer has calculated that about one-eighth of the existing trade of the british islands would be affected unfavorably by the competition thus introduced. but this result, though a matter of national concern, is political only in so far as commercial prosperity or adversity modifies a nation's current history; that is, indirectly. the principal questions affecting the integrity or security of the british empire are not involved seriously, for almost all of its component parts lie within the regions whose mutual bond of union and shortest line of approach are the suez canal. nowhere has great britain so little territory at stake, nowhere has she such scanty possessions, as in the eastern pacific, upon whose relations to the world at large, and to ourselves in particular, the isthmian canal will exert the greatest influence. the chief political result of the isthmian canal will be to bring our pacific coast nearer, not only to our atlantic seaboard, but also to the great navies of europe. therefore, while the commercial gain, through an uninterrupted water carriage, will be large, and is clearly indicated by the acrimony with which a leading journal, apparently in the interest of the great transcontinental roads, has lately maintained the singular assertion that water transit is obsolete as compared with land carriage, it is still true that the canal will present an element of much weakness from the military point of view. except to those optimists whose robust faith in the regeneration of human nature rejects war as an impossible contingency, this consideration must occasion serious thought concerning the policy to be adopted by the united states. the subject, so far, has given rise only to diplomatic arrangement and discussion, within which it is permissible to hope it always may be confined; but the misunderstandings and protracted disputes that followed the clayton-bulwer treaty, and the dissatisfaction with the existing status that still obtains among many of our people, give warning that our steps, as a nation, should be governed by some settled notions, too universally held to be set aside by a mere change of administration or caprice of popular will. reasonable discussion, which tends, either by its truth or by its evident errors, to clarify and crystallize public opinion on so important a matter, never can be amiss. this question, from an abstract, speculative phase of the monroe doctrine, took on the concrete and somewhat urgent form of security for our trans-isthmian routes against foreign interference towards the middle of this century, when the attempt to settle it was made by the oft-mentioned clayton-bulwer treaty, signed april , . great britain was found then to be in possession, actual or constructive, of certain continental positions, and of some outlying islands, which would contribute not only to military control, but to that kind of political interference which experience has shown to be the natural consequence of the proximity of a strong power to a weak one. these positions depended upon, indeed their tenure originated in, the possession of jamaica, thus justifying cromwell's forecast. of them, the belize, a strip of coast two hundred miles long, on the bay of honduras, immediately south of yucatan, was so far from the isthmus proper, and so little likely to affect the canal question, that the american negotiator was satisfied to allow its tenure to pass unquestioned, neither admitting nor denying anything as to the rights of great britain thereto. its first occupation had been by british freebooters, who "squatted" there a very few years after jamaica fell. they went to cut logwood, succeeded in holding their ground against the efforts of spain to dislodge them, and their right to occupancy and to fell timber was allowed afterwards by treaty. since the signature of the clayton-bulwer treaty, this "settlement," as it was styled in that instrument, has become a british "possession," by a convention with guatemala contracted in . later, in , the quondam "settlement" and recent "possession" was erected, by royal commission, into a full colony, subordinate to the government of jamaica. guatemala being a central american state, this constituted a distinct advance of british dominion in central america, contrary to the terms of our treaty. a more important claim of great britain was to the protectorate of the mosquito coast,--a strip understood by her to extend from cape gracias á dios south to the san juan river. in its origin, this asserted right differed little from similar transactions between civilized man and savages, in all times and all places. in , thirty years after the island was acquired, a chief of the aborigines there settled was carried to jamaica, received some paltry presents, and accepted british protection. while spanish control lasted, a certain amount of squabbling and fighting went on between the two nations; but when the questions arose between england and the united states, the latter refused to acquiesce in the so-called protectorate, which rested, in her opinion, upon no sufficient legal ground as against the prior right of spain, that was held to have passed to nicaragua when the latter achieved its independence. the mosquito coast was too close to the expected canal for its tenure to be considered a matter of indifference. similar ground was taken with regard to the bay islands, ruatan and others, stretching along the south side of the bay of honduras, near the coast of the republic of that name, and so uniting, under the control of the great naval power, the belize to the mosquito coast. the united states maintained that these islands, then occupied by great britain, belonged in full right to honduras. under these _de facto_ conditions of british occupation, the united states negotiator, in his eagerness to obtain the recession of the disputed points to the spanish-american republics, seems to have paid too little regard to future bearings of the subject. men's minds also were dominated then, as they are now notwithstanding the intervening experience of nearly half a century, by the maxims delivered as a tradition by the founders of the republic who deprecated annexations of territory abroad. the upshot was that, in consideration of great britain's withdrawal from mosquitia and the bay islands, to which, by our contention, she had no right, and therefore really yielded nothing but a dispute, we bound ourselves, as did she, without term, to acquire no territory in central america, and to guarantee the neutrality not only of the contemplated canal, but of any other that might be constructed. a special article, the eighth, was incorporated in the treaty to this effect, stating expressly that the wish of the two governments was "not only to accomplish a particular object, but to establish a general principle." considerable delay ensued in the restoration of the islands and of the mosquito coast to honduras and nicaragua,--a delay attended with prolonged discussion and serious misunderstanding between the united states and great britain. the latter claimed that, by the wording of the treaty, she had debarred herself only from future acquisitions of territory in central america; whereas our government asserted, and persistently instructed its agents, that its understanding had been that an entire abandonment of all possession, present and future, was secured by the agreement. it is difficult, in reading the first article, not to feel that, although the practice may have been perhaps somewhat sharp, the wording can sustain the british position quite as well as the more ingenuous confidence of the united states negotiator; an observation interesting chiefly as showing the eagerness on the one side, whose contention was the weaker in all save right, and the wariness on the other, upon whom present possession and naval power conferred a marked advantage in making a bargain. by , however, the restorations had been made, and the clayton-bulwer treaty since then has remained the international agreement, defining our relations to great britain on the isthmus. of the subsequent wrangling over this unfortunate treaty, if so invidious a term may be applied to the dignified utterances of diplomacy, it is unnecessary to give a detailed account. our own country cannot but regret and resent any formal stipulations which fetter its primacy of influence and control on the american continent and in american seas; and the concessions of principle over-eagerly made in , in order to gain compensating advantages which our weakness could not extort otherwise, must needs cause us to chafe now, when we are potentially, though, it must be confessed sorrowfully, not actually, stronger by double than we were then. the interest of great britain still lies, as it then lay, in the maintenance of the treaty. so long as the united states jealously resents all foreign interference in the isthmus, and at the same time takes no steps to formulate a policy or develop a strength that can give shape and force to her own pretensions, just so long will the absolute control over any probable contingency of the future rest with great britain, by virtue of her naval positions, her naval power, and her omnipresent capital. a recent unofficial british estimate of the british policy at the isthmus, as summarized in the clayton-bulwer treaty, may here have interest: "in the united states was recognized a coming formidable rival to british trade. in the face of the estimated disadvantage to european trade in general, and that of great britain in particular, to be looked for from a central american canal, british statesmen, finding their last attempt to control the most feasible route (by nicaragua) abortive, accomplished the next best object in the interest of british trade. they cast the onus of building the canal on the people who would reap the greatest advantage from it, and who were bound to keep every one else out, but were at the same time very unlikely to undertake such a gigantic enterprise outside their own undeveloped territories for many a long year; while at the same time they skilfully handicapped that country in favor of british sea power by entering into a joint guarantee to respect its neutrality when built. this secured postponement of construction indefinitely, and yet forfeited no substantial advantage necessary to establish effective naval control in the interests of british carrying trade." whether this passage truly represents the deliberate purpose of successive british governments may be doubtful, but it is an accurate enough estimate of the substantial result, as long as our policy continues to be to talk loud and to do nothing,--to keep others out, while refusing ourselves to go in. we neutralize effectually enough, doubtless; for we neutralize ourselves while leaving other powers to act efficiently whenever it becomes worth while. in a state like our own, national policy means public conviction, else it is but as sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal. but public conviction is a very different thing from popular impression, differing by all that separates a rational process, resulting in manly resolve, from a weakly sentiment that finds occasional hysterical utterance. the monroe doctrine, as popularly apprehended and indorsed, is a rather nebulous generality, which has condensed about the isthmus into a faint point of more defined luminosity. to those who will regard, it is the harbinger of the day, incompletely seen in the vision of the great discoverer, when the east and the west shall be brought into closer communion by the realization of the strait that baffled his eager search. but, with the strait, time has introduced a factor of which he could not dream,--a great nation midway between the west he knew and the east he sought, spanning the continent he unwittingly found, itself both east and west in one. to such a state, which in itself sums up the two conditions of columbus's problem; to which the control of the strait is a necessity, if not of existence, at least of its full development and of its national security, who can deny the right to predominate in influence over a region so vital to it? none can deny save its own people; and they do it,--not in words, perhaps, but in act. for let it not be forgotten that failure to act at an opportune moment is action as real as, though less creditable than, the most strenuous positive effort. action, however, to be consistent and well proportioned, must depend upon well-settled conviction; and conviction, if it is to be reasonable, and to find expression in a sound and continuous national policy, must result from a careful consideration of present conditions in the light of past experiences. here, unquestionably, strong differences of opinion will be manifested at first, both as to the true significance of the lessons of the past, and the manner of applying them to the present. such differences need not cause regret. their appearance is a sign of attention aroused; and when discussion has become general and animated, we may hope to see the gradual emergence of a sound and operative public sentiment. what is to be deprecated and feared is indolent drifting, in wilful blindness to the approaching moment when action must be taken; careless delay to remove fetters, if such there be in the constitution or in traditional prejudice, which may prevent our seizing opportunity when it occurs. whatever be the particular merits of the pending hawaiian question, it scarcely can be denied that its discussion has revealed the existence, real or fancied, of such clogs upon our action, and of a painful disposition to consider each such occurrence as merely an isolated event, instead of being, as it is, a warning that the time has come when we must make up our minds upon a broad issue of national policy. that there should be two opinions is not bad, but it is very bad to halt long between them. there is one opinion--which it is needless to say the writer does not share--that, because many years have gone by without armed collision with a great power, the teaching of the past is that none such can occur; and that, in fact, the weaker we are in organized military strength, the more easy it is for our opponents to yield our points. closely associated with this view is the obstinate rejection of any political action which involves implicitly the projection of our physical power, if needed, beyond the waters that gird our shores. because our reasonable, natural--it might almost be called moral--claim to preponderant influence at the isthmus heretofore has compelled respect, though reluctantly conceded, it is assumed that no circumstances can give rise to a persistent denial of it. it appears to the writer--and to many others with whom he agrees, though without claim to represent them--that the true state of the case is more nearly as follows: since our nation came into being, a century ago, with the exception of a brief agitation about the year ,--due to special causes, which, though suggestive, were not adequate, and summarized as to results in the paralyzing clayton-bulwer treaty,--the importance of the central american isthmus has been merely potential and dormant. but, while thus temporarily obscured, its intrinsic conditions of position and conformation bestow upon it a consequence in relation to the rest of the world which is inalienable, and therefore, to become operative, only awaits those changes in external conditions that must come in the fulness of time. the indications of such changes are already sufficiently visible to challenge attention. the rapid peopling of our territory entails at least two. the growth of the pacific states enhances the commercial and political importance of the pacific ocean to the world at large, and to ourselves in particular; while the productive energies of the country, and its advent to the three seas, impel it necessarily to seek outlet by them and access to the regions beyond. under such conditions, perhaps not yet come, but plainly coming, the consequence of an artificial waterway that shall enable the atlantic coast to compete with europe, on equal terms as to distance, for the markets of eastern asia, and shall shorten by two-thirds the sea route from new york to san francisco, and by one-half that to valparaiso, is too evident for insistence. in these conditions, not in european necessities, is to be found the assurance that the canal will be made. not to ourselves only, however, though to ourselves chiefly, will it be a matter of interest when completed. many causes will combine to retain in the line of the suez canal the commerce of europe with the east; but to the american shores of the pacific the isthmian canal will afford a much shorter and easier access for a trade already of noteworthy proportions. a weighty consideration also is involved in the effect upon british navigation of a war which should endanger its use of the suez canal. the power of great britain to control the long route from gibraltar to the red sea is seriously doubted by a large and thoughtful body of her statesmen and seamen, who favor dependence, in war, upon that by the cape of good hope. by nicaragua, however, would be shorter than by the cape to many parts of the east; and the caribbean can be safeguarded against distant european states much more easily than the line through the mediterranean, which passes close by their ports. under this increased importance of the isthmus, we cannot safely anticipate for the future the cheap acquiescence which, under very different circumstances, has been yielded in the past to our demands. already it is notorious that european powers are betraying symptoms of increased sensitiveness as to the value of caribbean positions, and are strengthening their grip upon those they now hold. moral considerations undoubtedly count for more than they did, and nations are more reluctant to enter into war; but still, the policy of states is determined by the balance of advantages, and it behooves us to know what our policy is to be, and what advantages are needed to turn in our favor the scale of negotiations and the general current of events. if the decision of the nation, following one school of thought, is that the weaker we are the more likely we are to have our way, there is little to be said. drifting is perhaps as good a mode as another to reach that desirable goal. if, on the other hand, we determine that our interest and dignity require that our rights should depend upon the will of no other state, but upon our own power to enforce them, we must gird ourselves to admit that freedom of interoceanic transit depends upon predominance in a maritime region--the caribbean sea--through which pass all the approaches to the isthmus. control of a maritime region is insured primarily by a navy; secondarily, by positions, suitably chosen and spaced one from the other, upon which as bases the navy rests, and from which it can exert its strength. at present the positions of the caribbean are occupied by foreign powers, nor may we, however disposed to acquisition, obtain them by means other than righteous; but a distinct advance will have been made when public opinion is convinced that we need them, and should not exert our utmost ingenuity to dodge them when flung at our head. if the constitution really imposes difficulties, it provides also a way by which the people, if convinced, can remove its obstructions. a protest, however, may be entered against a construction of the constitution which is liberal, by embracing all it can be constrained to imply, and then immediately becomes strict in imposing these ingeniously contrived fetters. meanwhile no moral obligation forbids developing our navy upon lines and proportions adequate to the work it may be called upon to do. here, again, the crippling force is a public impression, which limits our potential strength to the necessities of an imperfectly realized situation. a navy "for defence only" is a popular catchword. when, if ever, people recognize that we have three seaboards, that the communication by water of one of them with the other two will depend in a not remote future upon a strategic position hundreds of miles distant from our nearest port,--the mouth of the mississippi,--they will see also that the word "defence," already too narrowly understood, has its application at points far away from our own coast. that the organization of military strength involves provocation to war is a fallacy, which the experience of each succeeding year now refutes. the immense armaments of europe are onerous; but nevertheless, by the mutual respect and caution they enforce, they present a cheap alternative, certainly in misery, probably in money, to the frequent devastating wars which preceded the era of general military preparation. our own impunity has resulted, not from our weakness, but from the unimportance to our rivals of the points in dispute, compared with their more immediate interests at home. with the changes consequent upon the canal, this indifference will diminish. we also shall be entangled in the affairs of the great family of nations, and shall have to accept the attendant burdens. fortunately, as regards other states, we are an island power, and can find our best precedents in the history of the people to whom the sea has been a nursing mother. possibilities of an anglo-american reunion. _july, ._ [the following article was requested by the editor of the "north american review," as one of a number, by several persons, dealing with the question of a formal political connection, proposed by mr. andrew carnegie, between the united states and the british empire, for the advancement of the general interests of the english-speaking peoples. the projects advocated by previous writers embraced: , a federate union; , a merely naval union or alliance; or, , a defensive alliance of a kind frequent in political history.] the words "kinship" and "alliance" express two radically distinct ideas, and rest, for both the privileges and the obligations involved in them, upon foundations essentially different. the former represents a natural relation, the latter one purely conventional,--even though it may result from the feelings, the mutual interests, and the sense of incumbent duty attendant upon the other. in its very etymology, accordingly, is found implied that sense of constraint, of an artificial bond, that may prove a source, not only of strength, but of irksomeness as well. its analogue in our social conditions is the marriage tie,--the strongest, doubtless, of all bonds when it realizes in the particular case the supreme affection of which our human nature is capable; but likewise, as daily experience shows, the most fretting when, through original mistake or unworthy motive, love fails, and obligation alone remains. personally, i am happy to believe that the gradual but, as i think, unmistakable growth of mutual kindly feelings between great britain and the united states during these latter years--and of which the recent articles of sir george clarke and mr. arthur silva white in the "north american review" are pleasant indications--is a sure evidence that a common tongue and common descent are making themselves felt, and are breaking down the barriers of estrangement which have separated too long men of the same blood. there is seen here the working of kinship,--a wholly normal result of a common origin, the natural affection of children of the same descent, who have quarrelled and have been alienated with the proverbial bitterness of civil strife, but who all along have realized--or at the least have been dimly conscious--that such a state of things is wrong and harmful. as a matter of sentiment only, this reviving affection well might fix the serious attention of those who watch the growth of world questions, recognizing how far imagination and sympathy rule the world; but when, besides the powerful sentimental impulse, it is remembered that beneath considerable differences of political form there lie a common inherited political tradition and habit of thought, that the moral forces which govern and shape political development are the same in either people, the possibility of a gradual approach to concerted action becomes increasingly striking. of all the elements of the civilization that has spread over europe and america, none is so potential for good as that singular combination of two essential but opposing factors--of individual freedom with subjection to law--which finds its most vigorous working in great britain and the united states, its only exponents in which an approach to a due balance has been effected. like other peoples, we also sway between the two, inclining now to one side, now to the other; but the departure from the normal in either direction is never very great. there is yet another noteworthy condition common to the two states, which must tend to incline them towards a similar course of action in the future. partners, each, in the great commonwealth of nations which share the blessings of european civilization, they alone, though in varying degrees, are so severed geographically from all existing rivals as to be exempt from the burden of great land armies; while at the same time they must depend upon the sea, in chief measure, for that intercourse with other members of the body upon which national well-being depends. how great an influence upon the history of great britain has been exerted by this geographical isolation is sufficiently understood. in her case the natural tendency has been increased abnormally by the limited territorial extent of the british islands, which has forced the energies of their inhabitants to seek fields for action outside their own borders; but the figures quoted by sir george clarke sufficiently show that the same tendency, arising from the same cause, does exist and is operative in the united states, despite the diversion arising from the immense internal domain not yet fully occupied, and the great body of home consumers which has been secured by the protective system. the geographical condition, in short, is the same in kind, though differing in degree, and must impel in the same direction. to other states the land, with its privileges and its glories, is the chief source of national prosperity and distinction. to great britain and the united states, if they rightly estimate the part they may play in the great drama of human progress, is intrusted a maritime interest, in the broadest sense of the word, which demands, as one of the conditions of its exercise and its safety, the organized force adequate to control the general course of events at sea; to maintain, if necessity arise, not arbitrarily, but as those in whom interest and power alike justify the claim to do so, the laws that shall regulate maritime warfare. this is no mere speculation, resting upon a course of specious reasoning, but is based on the teaching of the past. by the exertion of such force, and by the maintenance of such laws, and by these means only, great britain, in the beginning of this century, when she was the solitary power of the seas, saved herself from destruction, and powerfully modified for the better the course of history. with such strong determining conditions combining to converge the two nations into the same highway, and with the visible dawn of the day when this impulse begins to find expression in act, the question naturally arises, what should be the immediate course to be favored by those who hail the growing light, and would hasten gladly the perfect day? that there are not a few who seek a reply to this question is evidenced by the articles of mr. carnegie, of sir george clarke, and of mr. white, all appearing within a short time in the pages of the "north american review." and it is here, i own, that, though desirous as any one can be to see the fact accomplished, i shrink from contemplating it, under present conditions, in the form of an alliance, naval or other. rather i should say: let each nation be educated to realize the length and breadth of its own interest in the sea; when that is done, the identity of these interests will become apparent. this identity cannot be established firmly in men's minds antecedent to the great teacher, experience; and experience cannot be had before that further development of the facts which will follow the not far distant day, when the united states people must again betake themselves to the sea and to external action, as did their forefathers alike in their old home and in the new. there are, besides, questions in which at present doubt, if not even friction, might arise as to the proper sphere of each nation, agreement concerning which is essential to cordial co-operation; and this the more, because great britain could not be expected reasonably to depend upon our fulfilment of the terms of an alliance, or to yield in points essential to her own maritime power, so long as the united states is unwilling herself to assure the security of the positions involved by the creation of an adequate force. it is just because in that process of adjusting the parts to be played by each nation, upon which alone a satisfactory cooperation can be established, a certain amount of friction is probable, that i would avoid all premature striving for alliance, an artificial and possibly even an irritating method of reaching the desired end. instead, i would dwell continually upon those undeniable points of resemblance in natural characteristics, and in surrounding conditions, which testify to common origin and predict a common destiny. cast the seed of this thought into the ground, and it will spring and grow up, you know not how,--first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear. then you may put in your sickle and reap the harvest of political result, which as yet is obviously immature. how quietly and unmarked, like the slow processes of nature, such feelings may be wrought into the very being of nations, was evidenced by the sudden and rapid rising of the north at the outbreak of our civil war, when the flag was fired upon at fort sumter. then was shown how deeply had sunk into the popular heart the devotion to the union and the flag, fostered by long dwelling upon the ideas, by innumerable fourth of july orations, often doubtless vainglorious, sometimes perhaps grotesque, but whose living force and overwhelming results were vividly apparent, as the fire leaped from hearthstone to hearthstone throughout the northern states. equally in the south was apparent how tenacious and compelling was the grip which the constant insistence upon the predominant claim of the state upon individual loyalty had struck into the hearts of her sons. what paper bonds, treaties, or alliances could have availed then to hold together people whose ideals had drifted so far apart, whose interests, as each at that time saw them, had become so opposed? although i am convinced firmly that it would be to the interest of great britain and the united states, and for the benefit of the world, that the two nations should act together cordially on the seas, i am equally sure that the result not only must be hoped but also quietly waited for, while the conditions upon which such cordiality depends are being realized by men. all are familiar with the idea conveyed by the words "forcing process." there are things that cannot be forced, processes which cannot be hurried, growths which are strong and noble in proportion as they imbibe slowly the beneficent influence of the sun and air in which they are bathed. how far the forcing process can be attempted by an extravagant imagination, and what the inevitable recoil of the mind you seek to take by storm, is amusingly shown by mr. carnegie's "look ahead," and by the demur thereto of so ardent a champion of anglo-american alliance--on terms which appear to me to be rational though premature--as sir george clarke. a country with a past as glorious and laborious as that of great britain, unprepared as yet, as a whole, to take a single step forward toward reunion, is confronted suddenly--as though the temptation must be irresistible--with a picture of ultimate results which i will not undertake to call impossible (who can say what is impossible?), but which certainly deprives the nation of much, if not all, the hard-wrought achievement of centuries. disunion, loss of national identity, changes of constitution more than radical, the exchange of a world-wide empire for a subordinate part in a great federation,--such _may_ be the destiny of great britain in the distant future. i know not; but sure i am, were i a citizen of great britain, the prospect would not allure me now to move an inch in such a direction. surely in vain the net is spread in the sight of any bird. the suggestions of sir george clarke and of mr. white are not open to the reproach of repelling those whom they seek to convince. they are clear, plain, business-like propositions, based upon indisputable reasons of mutual advantage, and in the case of the former quickened, as i have the pleasure of knowing through personal acquaintance, by a more than cordial good-will and breadth of view in all that relates to the united states. avoiding criticism of details--of which i have little to offer--my objection to them is simply that i do not think the time is yet ripe. the ground is not prepared yet in the hearts and understandings of americans, and i doubt whether in those of british citizens. both proposals contemplate a naval alliance, though on differing terms. the difficulty is that the united states, as a nation, does not realize or admit as yet that it has any strong interest in the sea; and that the great majority of our people rest firmly in a belief, deep rooted in the political history of our past, that our ambitions should be limited by the three seas that wash our eastern, western, and southern coasts. for myself, i believe that this, once a truth, can be considered so no longer with reference even to the present--much less to a future so near that it scarcely needs a prophet's eye to read; but even if it be but a prejudice, it must be removed before a further step can be taken. in our country national policy, if it is to be steadfast and consistent, must be identical with public conviction. the latter, when formed, may remain long quiescent; but given the appointed time, it will spring to mighty action--aye, to arms--as did the north and the south under their several impulses in . it is impossible that one who sees in the sea--in the function which it discharges towards the world at large--the most potent factor in national prosperity and in the course of history, should not desire a change in the mental attitude of our countrymen towards maritime affairs. the subject presents itself not merely as one of national importance, but as one concerning the world's history and the welfare of mankind, which are bound up, so far as we can see, in the security and strength of that civilization which is identified with europe and its offshoots in america. for what, after all, is our not unjustly vaunted european and american civilization? an oasis set in the midst of a desert of barbarism, rent with many intestine troubles, and ultimately dependent, not upon its mere elaboration of organization, but upon the power of that organization to express itself in a menacing and efficient attitude of physical force, sufficient to resist the numerically overwhelming, but inadequately organized hosts of outsiders. under present conditions these are diked off by the magnificent military organizations of europe, which also as yet cope successfully with the barbarians within. of what the latter are capable--at least in will--we have from time to time, and not least of late, terrific warnings, to which men scarcely can shut their eyes and ears; but sufficient attention hardly is paid to the possible dangers from those outside, who are wholly alien to the spirit of our civilization; nor do men realize how essential to the conservation of that civilization is the attitude of armed watchfulness between nations, which is maintained now by the great states of europe. even if we leave out of consideration the invaluable benefit to society, in this age of insubordination and anarchy, that so large a number of youth, at the most impressionable age, receive the lessons of obedience, order, respect for authority and law, by which military training conveys a potent antidote to lawlessness, it still would remain a mistake, plausible but utter, to see in the hoped-for subsidence of the military spirit in the nations of europe a pledge of surer progress of the world towards universal peace, general material prosperity, and ease. that alluring, albeit somewhat ignoble, ideal is not to be attained by the representatives of civilization dropping their arms, relaxing the tension of their moral muscle, and from fighting animals becoming fattened cattle fit only for slaughter. when carthage fell, and rome moved onward, without an equal enemy against whom to guard, to the dominion of the world of mediterranean civilization, she approached and gradually realized the reign of universal peace, broken only by those intestine social and political dissensions which are finding their dark analogues in our modern times of infrequent war. as the strife between nations of that civilization died away, material prosperity, general cultivation and luxury, flourished, while the weapons dropped nervelessly from their palsied arms. the genius of cæsar, in his gallic and germanic campaigns, built up an outside barrier, which, like a dike, for centuries postponed the inevitable end, but which also, like every artificial barrier, gave way when the strong masculine impulse which first created it had degenerated into that worship of comfort, wealth, and general softness, which is the ideal of the peace prophets of to-day. the wave of the invaders broke in,--the rain descended, the floods came, the winds blew, and beat upon the house, and it fell, because not founded upon the rock of virile reliance upon strong hands and brave hearts to defend what was dear to them. ease unbroken, trade uninterrupted, hardship done away, all roughness removed from life,--these are our modern gods; but can they deliver us, should we succeed in setting them up for worship? fortunately, as yet we cannot do so. we may, if we will, shut our eyes to the vast outside masses of aliens to our civilization, now powerless because we still, with a higher material development, retain the masculine combative virtues which are their chief possession; but, even if we disregard them, the ground already shakes beneath our feet with physical menace of destruction from within, against which the only security is in constant readiness to contend. in the rivalries of nations, in the accentuation of differences, in the conflict of ambitions, lies the preservation of the martial spirit, which alone is capable of coping finally with the destructive forces that from outside and from within threaten to submerge all the centuries have gained. it is not then merely, nor even chiefly, a pledge of universal peace that may be seen in the united states becoming a naval power of serious import, with clearly defined external ambitions dictated by the necessities of her interoceanic position; nor yet in the cordial co-operation, as of kindred peoples, that the future may have in store for her and great britain. not in universal harmony, nor in fond dreams of unbroken peace, rest now the best hopes of the world, as involved in the fate of european civilization. rather in the competition of interests, in that reviving sense of nationality, which is the true antidote to what is bad in socialism, in the jealous determination of each people to provide first for its own, of which the tide of protection rising throughout the world, whether economically an error or not, is so marked a symptom--in these jarring sounds which betoken that there is no immediate danger of the leading peoples turning their swords into ploughshares--are to be heard the assurance that decay has not touched yet the majestic fabric erected by so many centuries of courageous battling. in this same pregnant strife the united states doubtless will be led, by undeniable interests and aroused national sympathies, to play a part, to cast aside the policy of isolation which befitted her infancy, and to recognize that, whereas once to avoid european entanglement was essential to the development of her individuality, now to take her share of the travail of europe is but to assume an inevitable task, an appointed lot, in the work of upholding the common interests of civilization. our pacific slope, and the pacific colonies of great britain, with an instinctive shudder have felt the threat, which able europeans have seen in the teeming multitudes of central and northern asia; while their overflow into the pacific islands shows that not only westward by land, but also eastward by sea, the flood may sweep. i am not careful, however, to search into the details of a great movement, which indeed may never come, but whose possibility, in existing conditions, looms large upon the horizon of the future, and against which the only barrier will be the warlike spirit of the representatives of civilization. whate'er betide, sea power will play in those days the leading part which it has in all history, and the united states by her geographical position must be one of the frontiers from which, as from a base of operations, the sea power of the civilized world will energize. for this seemingly remote contingency preparation will be made, if men then shall be found prepared, by a practical recognition now of existing conditions--such as those mentioned in the opening of this paper--and acting upon that knowledge. control of the sea, by maritime commerce and naval supremacy, means predominant influence in the world; because, however great the wealth product of the land, nothing facilitates the necessary exchanges as does the sea. the fundamental truth concerning the sea--perhaps we should rather say the water--is that it is nature's great medium of communication. it is improbable that control ever again will be exercised, as once it was, by a single nation. like the pettier interests of the land, it must be competed for, perhaps fought for. the greatest of the prizes for which nations contend, it too will serve, like other conflicting interests, to keep alive that temper of stern purpose and strenuous emulation which is the salt of the society of civilized states, whose unity is to be found, not in a flat identity of conditions--the ideal of socialism--but in a common standard of moral and intellectual ideas. also, amid much that is shared by all the nations of european civilization, there are, as is universally recognized, certain radical differences of temperament and character, which tend to divide them into groups having the marked affinities of a common origin. when, as frequently happens on land, the members of these groups are geographically near each other, the mere proximity seems, like similar electricities, to develop repulsions which render political variance the rule and political combination the exception. but when, as is the case with great britain and the united states, the frontiers are remote, and contact--save in canada--too slight to cause political friction, the preservation, advancement, and predominance of the race may well become a political ideal, to be furthered by political combination, which in turn should rest, primarily, not upon cleverly constructed treaties, but upon natural affection and a clear recognition of mutual benefit arising from working together. if the spirit be there, the necessary machinery for its working will not pass the wit of the race to provide; and in the control of the sea, the beneficent instrument that separates us that we may be better friends, will be found the object that neither the one nor the other can master, but which may not be beyond the conjoined energies of the race. when, if ever, an anglo-american alliance, naval or other, does come, may it be rather as a yielding to irresistible popular impulse than as a scheme, however ingeniously wrought, imposed by the adroitness of statesmen. we may, however, i think, dismiss from our minds the belief, frequently advanced, and which is advocated so ably by sir george clarke, that such mutual support would tend in the future to exempt maritime commerce in general from the harassment which it hitherto has undergone in war. i shall have to try for special clearness here in stating my own views, partly because to some they may appear retrogressive, and also because they may be thought by others to contradict what i have said elsewhere, in more extensive and systematic treatment of this subject. the alliance which, under one form or another,--either as a naval league, according to sir george, or as a formal treaty, according to mr. white,--is advocated by both writers, looks ultimately and chiefly to the contingency of war. true, a leading feature of either proposal is to promote good-will and avert causes of dissension between the two contracting parties; but even this object is sought largely in order that they may stand by each other firmly in case of difficulty with other states. thus even war may be averted more surely; but, should it come, it would find the two united upon the ocean, consequently all-powerful there, and so possessors of that mastership of the general situation which the sea always has conferred upon its unquestioned rulers. granting the union of hearts and hands, the supremacy, from my standpoint, logically follows. but why, then, if supreme, concede to an enemy immunity for his commerce? "neither great britain nor america," says sir george clarke, though he elsewhere qualifies the statement, "can see in the commerce of other peoples an incentive to attack." why not? for what purposes, primarily, do navies exist? surely not merely to fight one another,--to gain what jomini calls "the sterile glory" of fighting battles in order to win them. if navies, as all agree, exist for the protection of commerce, it inevitably follows that in war they must aim at depriving their enemy of that great resource; nor is it easy to conceive what broad military use they can subserve that at all compares with the protection and destruction of trade. this sir george indeed sees, for he says elsewhere, "only on the principle of doing the utmost injury to an enemy, with a view to hasten the issue of war, can commerce-destroying be justified;" but he fails, i think, to appreciate the full importance of this qualifying concession, and neither he nor mr. white seems to admit the immense importance of commerce-destroying, as such. the mistake of both, i think, lies in not keeping clearly in view--what both certainly perfectly understand--the difference between the _guerre-de-course_, which is inconclusive, and commerce-destroying (or commerce prevention) through strategic control of the sea by powerful navies. some nations more than others, but all maritime nations more or less, depend for their prosperity upon maritime commerce, and probably upon it more than upon any other single factor. either under their own flag or that of a neutral, either by foreign trade or coasting trade, the sea is the greatest of boons to such a state; and under every form its sea-borne trade is at the mercy of a foe decisively superior. is it, then, to be expected that such foe will forego such advantage,--will insist upon spending blood and money in fighting, or money in the vain effort of maintaining a fleet which, having nothing to fight, also keeps its hands off such an obvious means of crippling the opponent and forcing him out of his ports? great britain's navy, in the french wars, not only protected her own commerce, but also annihilated that of the enemy; and both conditions--not one alone--were essential to her triumph. it is because great britain's sea power, though still superior, has declined relatively to that of other states, and is no longer supreme, that she has been induced to concede to neutrals the principle that the flag covers the goods. it is a concession wrung from relative weakness--or possibly from a mistaken humanitarianism; but, to whatever due, it is all to the profit of the neutral and to the loss of the stronger belligerent. the only justification, in policy, for its yielding by the latter, is that she can no longer, as formerly, bear the additional burden of hostility, if the neutral should ally himself to the enemy. i have on another occasion said that the principle that the flag covers the goods is forever secured--meaning thereby that, so far as present indications go, no one power would be strong enough at sea to maintain the contrary by arms. in the same way it may be asserted quite confidently that the concession of immunity to what is unthinkingly called the "private property" of an enemy on the sea, will never be conceded by a nation or alliance confident in its own sea power. it has been the dream of the weaker sea belligerents in all ages; and their arguments for it, at the first glance plausible, are very proper to urge from their point of view. that arch-robber, the first napoleon, who so remorselessly and exhaustively carried the principle of war sustaining war to its utmost logical sequence, and even in peace scrupled not to quarter his armies on subject countries, maintaining them on what, after all, was simply private property of foreigners,--even he waxes quite eloquent, and superficially most convincing, as he compares the seizure of goods at sea, so fatal to his empire, to the seizure of a wagon travelling an inland country road. in all these contentions there lies, beneath the surface plausibility, not so much a confusion of thought as a failure to recognize an essential difference of conditions. even on shore the protection of private property rests upon the simple principle that injury is not to be wanton,--that it is not to be inflicted when the end to be attained is trivial, or largely disproportionate to the suffering caused. for this reason personal property, not embarked in commercial venture, is respected in civilized maritime war. conversely, as we all know, the rule on land is by no means invariable, and private property receives scant consideration when its appropriation or destruction serves the purposes of an enemy. the man who trudges the highway, cudgel in hand, may claim for his cudgel all the sacredness with which civilization invests property; but if he use it to break his neighbor's head, the respect for his property, as such, quickly disappears. now, private property borne upon the seas is engaged in promoting, in the most vital manner, the strength and resources of the nation by which it is handled. when that nation becomes belligerent, the private property, so called, borne upon the seas, is sustaining the well-being and endurance of the nation at war, and consequently is injuring the opponent, to an extent exceeding all other sources of national power. in these days of war correspondents, most of us are familiar with the idea of the dependence of an army upon its communications, and we know, vaguely perhaps, but still we know, that to threaten or harm the communications of an army is one of the most common and effective devices of strategy. why? because severed from its base an army languishes and dies, and when threatened with such an evil it must fight at whatever disadvantage. well, is it not clear that maritime commerce occupies, to the power of a maritime state, the precise nourishing function that the communications of an army supply to the army? blows at commerce are blows at the communications of the state; they intercept its nourishment, they starve its life, they cut the roots of its power, the sinews of its war. while war remains a factor, a sad but inevitable factor, of our history, it is a fond hope that commerce can be exempt from its operations, because in very truth blows against commerce are the most deadly that can be struck; nor is there any other among the proposed uses of a navy, as for instance the bombardment of seaport towns, which is not at once more cruel and less scientific. blockade such as that enforced by the united states navy during the civil war, is evidently only a special phase of commerce-destroying; yet how immense--nay, decisive--its results! it is only when effort is frittered away in the feeble dissemination of the _guerre-de-course_, instead of being concentrated in a great combination to control the sea, that commerce-destroying justly incurs the reproach of misdirected effort. it is a fair deduction from analogy, that two contending armies might as well agree to respect each other's communications, as two belligerent states to guarantee immunity to hostile commerce. the future in relation to american naval power. _june, ._ that the united states navy within the last dozen years should have been recast almost wholly, upon more modern lines, is not, in itself alone, a fact that should cause comment, or give rise to questions about its future career or sphere of action. if this country needs, or ever shall need, a navy at all, indisputably in the hour had come when the time-worn hulks of that day, mostly the honored but superannuated survivors of the civil war, should drop out of the ranks, submit to well-earned retirement or inevitable dissolution, and allow their places to be taken by other vessels, capable of performing the duties to which they themselves were no longer adequate. it is therefore unlikely that there underlay this re-creation of the navy--for such in truth it was--any more recondite cause than the urgent necessity of possessing tools wholly fit for the work which war-ships are called upon to do. the thing had to be done, if the national fleet was to be other than an impotent parody of naval force, a costly effigy of straw. but, concurrently with the process of rebuilding, there has been concentrated upon the development of the new service a degree of attention, greater than can be attributed even to the voracious curiosity of this age of newsmongering and of interviewers. this attention in some quarters is undisguisedly reluctant and hostile, in others not only friendly but expectant, in both cases betraying a latent impression that there is, between the appearance of the new-comer and the era upon which we now are entering, something in common. if such coincidence there be, however, it is indicative not of a deliberate purpose, but of a commencing change of conditions, economical and political, throughout the world, with which sea power, in the broad sense of the phrase, will be associated closely; not, indeed, as the cause, nor even chiefly as a result, but rather as the leading characteristic of activities which shall cease to be mainly internal, and shall occupy themselves with the wider interests that concern the relations of states to the world at large. and it is just at this point that the opposing lines of feeling divide. those who hold that our political interests are confined to matters within our own borders, and are unwilling to admit that circumstances may compel us in the future to political action without them, look with dislike and suspicion upon the growth of a body whose very existence indicates that nations have international duties as well as international rights, and that international complications will arise from which we can no more escape than the states which have preceded us in history, or those contemporary with us. others, on the contrary, regarding the conditions and signs of these times, and the extra-territorial activities in which foreign states have embarked so restlessly and widely, feel that the nation, however greatly against its wish, may become involved in controversies not unlike those which in the middle of the century caused very serious friction, but which the generation that saw the century open would have thought too remote for its concern, and certainly wholly beyond its power to influence. religious creeds, dealing with eternal verities, may be susceptible of a certain permanency of statement; yet even here we in this day have witnessed the embarrassments of some religious bodies, arising from a traditional adherence to merely human formulas, which reflect views of the truth as it appeared to the men who framed them in the distant past. but political creeds, dealing as they do chiefly with the transient and shifting conditions of a world which is passing away continually, can claim no fixity of allegiance, except where they express, not the policy of a day, but the unchanging dictates of righteousness. and inasmuch as the path of ideal righteousness is not always plain nor always practicable; as expediency, policy, the choice of the lesser evil, must control at times; as nations, like men, will occasionally differ, honestly but irreconcilably, on questions of right,--there do arise disputes where agreement cannot be reached, and where the appeal must be made to force, that final factor which underlies the security of civil society even more than it affects the relations of states. the well-balanced faculties of washington saw this in his day with absolute clearness. jefferson either would not or could not. that there should be no navy was a cardinal prepossession of his political thought, born of an exaggerated fear of organized military force as a political, factor. though possessed with a passion for annexation which dominated much of his political action, he prescribed as the limit of the country's geographical expansion the line beyond which it would entail the maintenance of a navy. yet fate, ironical here as elsewhere in his administration, compelled the recognition that, unless a policy of total seclusion is adopted,--if even then,--it is not necessary to acquire territory beyond sea in order to undergo serious international complications, which could have been avoided much more easily had there been an imposing armed shipping to throw into the scale of the nation's argument, and to compel the adversary to recognize the impolicy of his course as well as what the united states then claimed to be its wrongfulness. the difference of conditions between the united states of to-day and of the beginning of this century illustrates aptly how necessary it is to avoid implicit acceptance of precedents, crystallized into maxims, and to seek for the quickening principle which justified, wholly or in part, the policy of one generation, but whose application may insure a very different course of action in a succeeding age. when the century opened, the united states was not only a continental power, as she now is, but she was one of several, of nearly equal strength as far as north america was concerned, with all of whom she had differences arising out of conflicting interests, and with whom, moreover, she was in direct geographical contact,--a condition which has been recognized usually as entailing peculiar proneness to political friction; for, while the interests of two nations may clash in quarters of the world remote from either, there is both greater frequency and greater bitterness when matters of dispute exist near at home, and especially along an artificial boundary, where the inhabitants of each are directly in contact with the causes of the irritation. it was therefore the natural and proper aim of the government of that day to abolish the sources of difficulty, by bringing all the territory in question under our own control, if it could be done by fair means. we consequently entered upon a course of action precisely such as a european continental state would have followed under like circumstances. in order to get possession of the territory in which our interests were involved, we bargained and manoeuvred and threatened; and although jefferson's methods were peaceful enough, few will be inclined to claim that they were marked by excess of scrupulousness, or even of adherence to his own political convictions. from the highly moral standpoint, the acquisition of louisiana under the actual conditions--being the purchase from a government which had no right to sell, in defiance of the remonstrance addressed to us by the power who had ceded the territory upon the express condition that it should not so be sold, but which was too weak to enforce its just reclamation against both napoleon and ourselves--reduces itself pretty much to a choice between overreaching and violence, as the less repulsive means of compassing an end in itself both desirable and proper; nor does the attempt, by strained construction, to wrest west florida into the bargain give a higher tone to the transaction. as a matter of policy, however, there is no doubt that our government was most wise; and the transfer, as well as the incorporation, of the territory was facilitated by the meagreness of the population that went with the soil. with all our love of freedom, it is not likely that many qualms were felt as to the political inclinations of the people concerning their transfer of allegiance. in questions of great import to nations or to the world, the wishes, or interests, or technical rights, of minorities must yield, and there is not necessarily any more injustice in this than in their yielding to a majority at the polls. while the need of continental expansion pressed thus heavily upon the statesmen of jefferson's era, questions relating to more distant interests were very properly postponed. at the time that matters of such immediate importance were pending, to enter willingly upon the consideration of subjects our concern in which was more remote, either in time or place, would have entailed a dissemination of attention and of power that is as greatly to be deprecated in statesmanship as it is in the operations of war. still, while the government of the day would gladly have avoided such complications, it found, as have the statesmen of all times, that if external interests exist, whatsoever their character, they cannot be ignored, nor can the measures which prudence dictates for their protection be neglected with safety. without political ambitions outside the continent, the commercial enterprise of the people brought our interests into violent antagonism with clear, unmistakable, and vital interests of foreign belligerent states; for we shall sorely misread the lessons of , and of the events which led to it, if we fail to see that the questions in dispute involved issues more immediately vital to great britain, in her then desperate struggle, than they were to ourselves, and that the great majority of her statesmen and people, of both parties, so regarded them. the attempt of our government to temporize with the difficulty, to overcome violence by means of peaceable coercion, instead of meeting it by the creation of a naval force so strong as to be a factor of consideration in the international situation, led us into an avoidable war. the conditions which now constitute the political situation of the united states, relatively to the world at large, are fundamentally different from those that obtained at the beginning of the century. it is not a mere question of greater growth, of bigger size. it is not only that we are larger, stronger, have, as it were, reached our majority, and are able to go out into the world. that alone would be a difference of degree, not of kind. the great difference between the past and the present is that we then, as regards close contact with the power of the chief nations of the world, were really in a state of political isolation which no longer exists. this arose from our geographical position--reinforced by the slowness and uncertainty of the existing means of intercommunication--and yet more from the grave preoccupation of foreign statesmen with questions of unprecedented and ominous importance upon the continent of europe. a policy of isolation was for us then practicable,--though even then only partially. it was expedient, also, because we were weak, and in order to allow the individuality of the nation time to accentuate itself. save the questions connected with the navigation of the mississippi, collision with other peoples was only likely to arise, and actually did arise, from going beyond our own borders in search of trade. the reasons now evoked by some against our political action outside our own borders might have been used then with equal appositeness against our commercial enterprises. let us stay at home, or we shall get into trouble. jefferson, in truth, averse in principle to commerce as to war, was happily logical in his embargo system. it not only punished the foreigner and diminished the danger of international complications, but it kept our own ships out of harm's way; and if it did destroy trade, and cause the grass to grow in the streets of new york, the incident, if inconvenient, had its compensations, by repressing hazardous external activities. few now, of course, would look with composure upon a policy, whatever its ground, which contemplated the peaceable seclusion of this nation from its principal lines of commerce. in , however, a great party accepted the alternative rather than fight, or even than create a force which might entail war, although more probably it would have prevented it. but would it be more prudent now to ignore the fact that we are no longer--however much we may regret it--in a position of insignificance or isolation, political or geographical, in any way resembling the times of jefferson, and that from the changed conditions may result to us a dilemma similar to that which confronted him and his supporters? not only have we grown,--that is a detail,--but the face of the world is changed, economically and politically. the sea, now as always the great means of communication between nations, is traversed with a rapidity and a certainty that have minimized distances. events which under former conditions would have been distant and of small concern, now happen at our doors and closely affect us. proximity, as has been noted, is a fruitful source of political friction, but proximity is the characteristic of the age. the world has grown smaller. positions formerly distant have become to us of vital importance from their nearness. but, while distances have shortened, they remain for us water distances, and, however short, for political influence they must be traversed in the last resort by a navy, the indispensable instrument by which, when emergencies arise, the nation can project its power beyond its own shore-line. whatever seeming justification, therefore, there may have been in the transient conditions of his own day for jefferson's dictum concerning a navy, rested upon a state of things that no longer obtains, and even then soon passed away. the war of demonstrated the usefulness of a navy,--not, indeed, by the admirable but utterly unavailing single-ship victories that illustrated its course, but by the prostration into which our seaboard and external communications fell, through the lack of a navy at all proportionate to the country's needs and exposure. the navy doubtless reaped honor in that brilliant sea struggle, but the honor was its own alone; only discredit accrued to the statesmen who, with such men to serve them, none the less left the country open to the humiliation of its harried coasts and blasted commerce. never was there a more lustrous example of what jomini calls "the sterile glory of fighting battles merely to win them." except for the prestige which at last awoke the country to the high efficiency of the petty force we called our navy, and showed what the sea might be to us, never was blood spilled more uselessly than in the frigate and sloop actions of that day. they presented no analogy to the outpost and reconnoissance fighting, to the detached services, that are not only inevitable but invaluable, in maintaining the _morale_ of a military organization in campaign. they were simply scattered efforts, without relation either to one another or to any main body whatsoever, capable of affecting seriously the issues of war, or, indeed, to any plan of operations worthy of the name. not very long after the war of , within the space of two administrations, there came another incident, epoch-making in the history of our external policy, and of vital bearing on the navy, in the enunciation of the monroe doctrine. that pronouncement has been curiously warped at times from its original scope and purpose. in its name have been put forth theories so much at odds with the relations of states, as hitherto understood, that, if they be maintained seriously, it is desirable in the interests of exact definition that their supporters advance some other name for them. it is not necessary to attribute finality to the monroe doctrine, any more than to any other political dogma, in order to deprecate the application of the phrase to propositions that override or transcend it. we should beware of being misled by names, and especially where such error may induce a popular belief that a foreign state is outraging wilfully a principle to the defence of which the country is committed. we have been committed to the monroe doctrine itself, not perhaps by any such formal assumption of obligations as cannot be evaded, but by certain precedents, and by a general attitude, upon the whole consistently maintained, from which we cannot recede silently without risk of national mortification. if seriously challenged, as in mexico by the third napoleon, we should hardly decline to emulate the sentiments so nobly expressed by the british government, when, in response to the emperors of russia and france, it declined to abandon the struggling spanish patriots to the government set over them by napoleon: "to spain his majesty is not bound by any formal instrument; but his majesty has, in the face of the world, contracted with that nation engagements not less sacred, and not less binding upon his majesty's mind, than the most solemn treaties." we may have to accept also certain corollaries which may appear naturally to result from the monroe doctrine, but we are by no means committed to some propositions which lately have been tallied with its name. those propositions possibly embody a sound policy, more applicable to present conditions than the monroe doctrine itself, and therefore destined to succeed it; but they are not the same thing. there is, however, something in common between it and them. reduced to its barest statement, and stripped of all deductions, natural or forced, the monroe doctrine, if it were not a mere political abstraction, formulated an idea to which in the last resort effect could be given only through the instrumentality of a navy; for the gist of it, the kernel of the truth, was that the country had at that time distant interests on the land, political interests of a high order in the destiny of foreign territory, of which a distinguishing characteristic was that they could be assured only by sea. like most stages in a nation's progress, the monroe doctrine, though elicited by a particular political incident, was not an isolated step unrelated to the past, but a development. it had its antecedents in feelings which arose before our war of independence, and which in , though we were then in deadly need of the french alliance, found expression in the stipulation that france should not attempt to regain canada. even then, and also in , the same jealousy did not extend to the floridas, which at the latter date were ceded by great britain to spain; and we expressly acquiesced in the conquest of the british west india islands by our allies. from that time to no remonstrance was made against the transfer of territories in the west indies and caribbean sea from one belligerent to another--an indifference which scarcely would be shown at the present time, even though the position immediately involved were intrinsically of trivial importance; for the question at stake would be one of principle, of consequences, far reaching as hampden's tribute of ship-money. it is beyond the professional province of a naval officer to inquire how far the monroe doctrine itself would logically carry us, or how far it may be developed, now or hereafter, by the recognition and statement of further national interests, thereby formulating another and wider view of the necessary range of our political influence. it is sufficient to quote its enunciation as a fact, and to note that it was the expression of a great national interest, not merely of a popular sympathy with south american revolutionists; for, had it been the latter, it would doubtless have proved as inoperative and evanescent as declarations arising from such emotions commonly are. from generation to generation we have been much stirred by the sufferings of greeks, or bulgarians, or armenians, at the hands of turkey; but, not being ourselves injuriously affected, our feelings have not passed into acts, and for that very reason have been ephemeral. no more than other nations are we exempt from the profound truth enunciated by washington--seared into his own consciousness by the bitter futilities of the french alliance in and the following years, and by the extravagant demands based upon it by the directory during his presidential term--that it is absurd to expect governments to act upon disinterested motives. it is not as an utterance of passing concern, benevolent or selfish, but because it voiced an enduring principle of necessary self-interest, that the monroe doctrine has retained its vitality, and has been made so easily to do duty as the expression of intuitive national sensitiveness to occurrences of various kinds in regions beyond the sea. at its christening the principle was directed against an apprehended intervention in american affairs, which depended not upon actual european concern in the territory involved, but upon a purely political arrangement between certain great powers, itself the result of ideas at the time moribund. in its first application, therefore, it was a confession that danger of european complications did exist, under conditions far less provocative of real european interest than those which now obtain and are continually growing. its subsequent applications have been many and various, and the incidents giving rise to them have been increasingly important, culminating up to the present in the growth of the united states to be a great pacific power, and in her probable dependence in the near future upon an isthmian canal for the freest and most copious intercourse between her two ocean seaboards. in the elasticity and flexibleness with which the dogma thus has accommodated itself to varying conditions, rather than in the strict wording of the original statement, is to be seen the essential characteristic of a living principle--the recognition, namely, that not merely the interests of individual citizens, but the interests of the united states as a nation, are bound up with regions beyond the sea, not part of our own political domain, in which therefore, under some imaginable circumstances, we may be forced to take action. it is important to recognize this, for it will help clear away the error from a somewhat misleading statement frequently made,--that the united states needs a navy for defence only, adding often, explanatorily, for the defence of our own coasts. now in a certain sense we all want a navy for defence only. it is to be hoped that the united states will never seek war except for the defence of her rights, her obligations, or her necessary interests. in that sense our policy may always be defensive only, although it may compel us at times to steps justified rather by expediency--the choice of the lesser evil--than by incontrovertible right. but if we have interests beyond sea which a navy may have to protect, it plainly follows that the navy has more to do, even in war, than to defend the coast; and it must be added as a received military axiom that war, however defensive in moral character, must be waged aggressively if it is to hope for success. for national security, the correlative of a national principle firmly held and distinctly avowed is, not only the will, but the power to enforce it. the clear expression of national purpose, accompanied by evident and adequate means to carry it into effect, is the surest safeguard against war, provided always that the national contention is maintained with a candid and courteous consideration of the rights and susceptibilities of other states. on the other hand, no condition is more hazardous than that of a dormant popular feeling, liable to be roused into action by a moment of passion, such as that which swept over the north when the flag was fired upon at sumter, but behind which lies no organized power for action. it is on the score of due preparation for such an ultimate contingency that nations, and especially free nations, are most often deficient. yet, if wanting in definiteness of foresight and persistency of action, owing to the inevitable frequency of change in the governments that represent them, democracies seem in compensation to be gifted with an instinct, the result perhaps of the free and rapid interchange of thought by which they are characterized, that intuitively and unconsciously assimilates political truths, and prepares in part for political action before the time for action has come. that the mass of united states citizens do not realize understandingly that the nation has vital political interests beyond the sea is probably true; still more likely is it that they are not tracing any connection between them and the reconstruction of the navy. yet the interests exist, and the navy is growing; and in the latter fact is the best surety that no breach of peace will ensue from the maintenance of the former. it is, not, then the indication of a formal political purpose, far less of anything like a threat, that is, from my point of view, to be recognized in the recent development of the navy. nations, as a rule, do not move with the foresight and the fixed plan which distinguish a very few individuals of the human race. they do not practise on the pistol-range before sending a challenge; if they did, wars would be fewer, as is proved by the present long-continued armed peace in europe. gradually and imperceptibly the popular feeling, which underlies most lasting national movements, is aroused and swayed by incidents, often trivial, but of the same general type, whose recurrence gradually moulds public opinion and evokes national action, until at last there issues that settled public conviction which alone, in a free state, deserves the name of national policy. what the origin of those particular events whose interaction establishes a strong political current in a particular direction, it is perhaps unprofitable to inquire. some will see in the chain of cause and effect only a chapter of accidents, presenting an interesting philosophical study, and nothing more; others, equally persuaded that nations do not effectively shape their mission in the world, will find in them the ordering of a divine ruler, who does not permit the individual or the nation to escape its due share of the world's burdens. but, however explained, it is a common experience of history that in the gradual ripening of events there comes often suddenly and unexpectedly the emergency, the call for action, to maintain the nation's contention. that there is an increased disposition on the part of civilized countries to deal with such cases by ordinary diplomatic discussion and mutual concession can be gratefully acknowledged; but that such dispositions are not always sufficient to reach a peaceable solution is equally an indisputable teaching of the recent past. popular emotion, once fairly roused, sweeps away the barriers of calm deliberation, and is deaf to the voice of reason. that the consideration of relative power enters for much in the diplomatic settlement of international difficulties is also certain, just as that it goes for much in the ordering of individual careers. "can," as well as "will," plays a large share in the decisions of life. like each man and woman, no state lives to itself alone, in a political seclusion resembling the physical isolation which so long was the ideal of china and japan. all, whether they will or no, are members of a community, larger or, smaller; and more and more those of the european family to which we racially belong are touching each other throughout the world, with consequent friction of varying degree. that the greater rapidity of communication afforded by steam has wrought, in the influence of sea power over the face of the globe, an extension that is multiplying the points of contact and emphasizing the importance of navies, is a fact, the intelligent appreciation of which is daily more and more manifest in the periodical literature of europe, and is further shown by the growing stress laid upon that arm of military strength by foreign governments; while the mutual preparation of the armies on the european continent, and the fairly settled territorial conditions, make each state yearly more wary of initiating a contest, and thus entail a political quiescence there, except in the internal affairs of each country. the field of external action for the great european states is now the world, and it is hardly doubtful that their struggles, unaccompanied as yet by actual clash of arms, are even under that condition drawing nearer to ourselves. coincidently with our own extension to the pacific ocean, which for so long had a good international claim to its name, that sea has become more and more the scene of political development, of commercial activities and rivalries, in which all the great powers, ourselves included, have a share. through these causes central and caribbean america, now intrinsically unimportant, are brought in turn into great prominence, as constituting the gateway between the atlantic and pacific when the isthmian canal shall have been made, and as guarding the approaches to it. the appearance of japan as a strong ambitious state, resting on solid political and military foundations, but which scarcely has reached yet a condition of equilibrium in international standing, has fairly startled the world; and it is a striking illustration of the somewhat sudden nearness and unforeseen relations into which modern states are brought, that the hawaiian islands, so interesting from the international point of view to the countries of european civilization, are occupied largely by japanese and chinese. in all these questions we have a stake, reluctantly it may be, but necessarily, for our evident interests are involved, in some instances directly, in others by very probable implication. under existing conditions, the opinion that we can keep clear indefinitely of embarrassing problems is hardly tenable; while war between two foreign states, which in the uncertainties of the international situation throughout the world may break out at any time, will increase greatly the occasions of possible collision with the belligerent countries, and the consequent perplexities of our statesmen seeking to avoid entanglement and to maintain neutrality. although peace is not only the avowed but for the most part the actual desire of european governments, they profess no such aversion to distant political enterprises and colonial acquisitions as we by tradition have learned to do. on the contrary, their committal to such divergent enlargements of the national activities and influence is one of the most pregnant facts of our time, the more so that their course is marked in the case of each state by a persistence of the same national traits that characterized the great era of colonization, which followed the termination of the religious wars in europe, and led to the world-wide contests of the eighteenth century. in one nation the action is mainly political,--that of a government pushed, by long-standing tradition and by its passion for administration, to extend the sphere of its operations so as to acquire a greater field in which to organize and dominate, somewhat regardless of economical advantage. in another the impulse comes from the restless, ubiquitous energy of the individual citizens, singly or in companies, moved primarily by the desire of gain, but carrying ever with them, subordinate only to the commercial aim, the irresistible tendency of the race to rule as well as to trade, and dragging the home government to recognize and to assume the consequences of their enterprise. yet again there is the movement whose motive is throughout mainly private and mercantile, in which the individual seeks wealth only, with little or no political ambition, and where the government intervenes chiefly that it may retain control of its subjects in regions where but for such intervention they would become estranged from it. but, however diverse the modes of operation, all have a common characteristic, in that they bear the stamp of the national genius,--a proof that the various impulses are not artificial, but natural, and that they therefore will continue until an adjustment is reached. what the process will be, and what the conclusion, it is impossible to foresee; but that friction at times has been very great, and matters dangerously near passing from the communications of cabinets to the tempers of the peoples, is sufficiently known. if, on the one hand, some look upon this as a lesson to us to keep clear of similar adventures, on the other hand it gives a warning that not only do causes of offence exist which may result at an unforeseen moment in a rupture extending to many parts of the world, but also that there is a spirit abroad which yet may challenge our claim to exclude its action and interference in any quarter, unless it finds us prepared there in adequate strength to forbid it, or to exercise our own. more and more civilized man is needing and seeking ground to occupy, room over which to expand and in which to live. like all natural forces, the impulse takes the direction of least resistance, but when in its course it comes upon some region rich in possibilities, but unfruitful through the incapacity or negligence of those who dwell therein, the incompetent race or system will go down, as the inferior race ever has fallen back and disappeared before the persistent impact of the superior. the recent and familiar instance of egypt is entirely in point. the continuance of the existing system--if it can be called such--had become impossible, not because of the native egyptians, who had endured the like for ages, but because there were involved therein the interests of several european states, of which two principally were concerned by present material interest and traditional rivalry. of these one, and that the one most directly affected, refused to take part in the proposed interference, with the result that this was not abandoned, but carried out solely by the other, which remains in political and administrative control of the country. whether the original enterprise or the continued presence of great britain in egypt is entirely clear of technical wrongs, open to the criticism of the pure moralist, is as little to the point as the morality of an earthquake; the general action was justified by broad considerations of moral expediency, being to the benefit of the world at large, and of the people of egypt in particular--however they might have voted in the matter. but what is chiefly instructive in this occurrence is the inevitableness, which it shares in common with the great majority of cases where civilized and highly organized peoples have trespassed upon the technical rights of possession of the previous occupants of the land--of which our own dealings with the american indian afford another example. the inalienable rights of the individual are entitled to a respect which they unfortunately do not always get; but there is no inalienable right in any community to control the use of a region when it does so to the detriment of the world at large, of its neighbors in particular, or even at times of its own subjects. witness, for example, the present angry resistance of the arabs at jiddah to the remedying of a condition of things which threatens to propagate a deadly disease far and wide, beyond the locality by which it is engendered; or consider the horrible conditions under which the armenian subjects of turkey have lived and are living. when such conditions obtain, they can be prolonged only by the general indifference or mutual jealousies of the other peoples concerned--as in the instance of turkey--or because there is sufficient force to perpetuate the misrule, in which case the right is inalienable only until its misuse brings ruin, or until a stronger force appears to dispossess it. it is because so much of the world still remains in the possession of the savage, or of states whose imperfect development, political or economical, does not enable them to realize for the general use nearly the result of which the territory is capable, while at the same time the redundant energies of civilized states, both government and peoples, are finding lack of openings and scantiness of livelihood at home, that there now obtains a condition of aggressive restlessness with which all have to reckon. that the united states does not now share this tendency is entirely evident. neither her government nor her people are affected by it to any great extent. but the force of circumstances has imposed upon her the necessity, recognized with practical unanimity by her people, of insuring to the weaker states of america, although of racial and political antecedents different from her own, freedom to develop politically along their own lines and according to their own capacities, without interference in that respect from governments foreign to these continents. the duty is self-assumed; and resting, as it does, not upon political philanthropy, but simply upon our own proximate interests as affected by such foreign interference, has towards others rather the nature of a right than a duty. but, from either point of view, the facility with which the claim has been allowed heretofore by the great powers has been due partly to the lack of pressing importance in the questions that have arisen, and partly to the great latent strength of our nation, which was an argument more than adequate to support contentions involving matters of no greater immediate moment, for example, than that of the honduras bay islands or of the mosquito coast. great britain there yielded, it is true, though reluctantly and slowly; and it is also true that, so far as organized force is concerned, she could have destroyed our navy then existing and otherwise have injured us greatly; but the substantial importance of the question, though real, was remote in the future, and, as it was, she made a political bargain which was more to her advantage than ours. but while our claim thus far has received a tacit acquiescence, it remains to be seen whether it will continue to command the same if the states whose political freedom of action we assert make no more decided advance towards political stability than several of them have done yet, and if our own organized naval force remains as slender, comparatively, as it once was, and even yet is. it is probably safe to say that an undertaking like that of great britain in egypt, if attempted in this hemisphere by a non-american state, would not be tolerated by us if able to prevent it; but it is conceivable that the moral force of our contention might be weakened, in the view of an opponent, by attendant circumstances, in which case our physical power to support it should be open to no doubt. that we shall seek to secure the peaceable solution of each difficulty as it arises is attested by our whole history, and by the disposition of our people; but to do so, whatever the steps taken in any particular case, will bring us into new political relations and may entail serious disputes with other states. in maintaining the justest policy, the most reasonable influence, one of the political elements, long dominant, and still one of the most essential, is military strength--in the broad sense of the word "military," which includes naval as well--not merely potential, which our own is, but organized and developed, which our own as yet is not. we wisely quote washington's warning against entangling alliances, but too readily forget his teaching about preparation for war. the progress of the world from age to age, in its ever-changing manifestations, is a great political drama, possessing a unity, doubtless, in its general development, but in which, as act follows act, one situation alone can engage, at one time, the attention of the actors. of this drama war is simply a violent and tumultuous political incident. a navy, therefore, whose primary sphere of action is war, is, in the last analysis and from the least misleading point of view, a political factor of the utmost importance in international affairs, one more often deterrent than irritant. it is in that light, according to the conditions of the age and of the nation, that it asks and deserves the appreciation of the state, and that it should be developed in proportion to the reasonable possibilities of the political future. preparedness for naval war. _december, ._ the problem of preparation for war in modern times is both extensive and complicated. as in the construction of the individual ship, where the attempt to reconcile conflicting requirements has resulted, according to a common expression, in a compromise, the most dubious of all military solutions,--giving something to all, and all to none,--so preparation for war involves many conditions, often contradictory one to another, at times almost irreconcilable. to satisfy all of these passes the ingenuity of the national treasury, powerless to give the whole of what is demanded by the representatives of the different elements, which, in duly ordered proportion, constitute a complete scheme of national military policy, whether for offence or defence. unable to satisfy all, and too often equally unable to say, frankly, "this one is chief; to it you others must yield, except so far as you contribute to its greatest efficiency," either the pendulum of the government's will swings from one extreme to the other, or, in the attempt to be fair all round, all alike receive less than they ask, and for their theoretical completeness require. in other words, the contents of the national purse are distributed, instead of being concentrated upon a leading conception, adopted after due deliberation, and maintained with conviction. the creation of material for war, under modern conditions, requires a length of time which does not permit the postponement of it to the hour of impending hostilities. to put into the water a first-class battle-ship, fully armored, within a year after the laying of her keel, as has been done latterly in england, is justly considered an extraordinary exhibition of the nation's resources for naval shipbuilding; and there yet remained to be done the placing of her battery, and many other matters of principal detail essential to her readiness for sea. this time certainly would not be less for ourselves, doing our utmost. war is simply a political movement, though violent and exceptional in its character. however sudden the occasion from which it arises, it results from antecedent conditions, the general tendency of which should be manifest long before to the statesmen of a nation, and to at least the reflective portion of the people. in such anticipation, such forethought, as in the affairs of common life, lies the best hope of the best solution,--peace by ordinary diplomatic action; peace by timely agreement, while men's heads are cool, and the crisis of fever has not been reached by the inflammatory utterances of an unscrupulous press, to which agitated public apprehension means increase of circulation. but while the maintenance of peace by sagacious prevision is the laurel of the statesman, which, in failing to achieve except by force, he takes from his own brow and gives to the warrior, it is none the less a necessary part of his official competence to recognize that in public disputes, as in private, there is not uncommonly on both sides an element of right, real or really believed, which prevents either party from yielding, and that it is better for men to fight than, for the sake of peace, to refuse to support their convictions of justice. how deplorable the war between the north and south! but more deplorable by far had it been that either had flinched from the maintenance of what it believed to be fundamental right. on questions of merely material interest men may yield; on matters of principle they may be honestly in the wrong; but a conviction of right, even though mistaken, if yielded without contention, entails a deterioration of character, except in the presence of force demonstrably irresistible--and sometimes even then. death before dishonor is a phrase which at times has been abused infamously, but it none the less contains a vital truth. to provide a force adequate to maintain the nation's cause, and to insure its readiness for immediate action in case of necessity, are the responsibility of the government of a state, in its legislative and executive functions. such a force is a necessary outcome of the political conditions which affect, or, as can be foreseen, probably may affect, the international relations of the country. its existence at all and its size are, or should be, the reflection of the national consciousness that in this, that, or the other direction lie clear national interests--for which each generation is responsible to futurity--or national duties, equally clear from the mere fact that the matter lies at the door, like lazarus at the rich man's gate. the question of when or how action shall be taken which may result in hostilities, is indeed a momentous one, having regard to the dire evils of war; but it is the question of a moment, of the last moment to which can be postponed a final determination of such tremendous consequence. to this determination preparation for war has only this relation: that it should be adequate to the utmost demand that then can be made upon it, and, if possible, so imposing that it will prevent war ensuing, upon the firm presentation of demands which the nation believes to be just. such a conception, so stated, implies no more than defence,--defence of the nation's rights or of the nation's duties, although such defence may take the shape of aggressive action, the only safe course in war. logically, therefore, a nation which proposes to provide itself with a naval or military organization adequate to its needs, must begin by considering, not what is the largest army or navy in the world, with the view of rivalling it, but what there is in the political status of the world, including not only the material interests but the temper of nations, which involves a reasonable, even though remote, prospect of difficulties which may prove insoluble except by war. the matter, primarily, is political in character. it is not until this political determination has been reached that the data for even stating the military problem are in hand; for here, as always, the military arm waits upon and is subservient to the political interests and civil power of the state. it is not the most probable of dangers, but the most formidable, that must be selected as measuring the degree of military precaution to be embodied in the military preparations thenceforth to be maintained. the lesser is contained in the greater; if equal to the most that can be apprehended reasonably, the country can view with quiet eye the existence of more imminent, but less dangerous complications. nor should it be denied that in estimating danger there should be a certain sobriety of imagination, equally removed from undue confidence and from exaggerated fears. napoleon's caution to his marshals not to make a picture to themselves--not to give too loose rein to fancy as to what the enemy might do, regardless of the limitations to which military movements are subject--applies to antecedent calculations, like those which we are considering now, as really as to the operations of the campaign. when british writers, realizing the absolute dependence of their own country upon the sea, insist that the british navy must exceed the two most formidable of its possible opponents, they advance an argument which is worthy at least of serious debate; but when the two is raised to three, they assume conditions which are barely possible, but lie too far without the limits of probability to affect practical action. in like manner, the united states, in estimating her need of military preparation of whatever kind, is justified in considering, not merely the utmost force which might be brought against her by a possible enemy, under the political circumstances most favorable to the latter, but the limitations imposed upon an opponent's action by well-known conditions of a permanent nature. our only rivals in potential military strength are the great powers of europe. these, however, while they have interests in the western hemisphere,--to which a certain solidarity is imparted by their instinctive and avowed opposition to a policy to which the united states, by an inward compulsion apparently irresistible, becomes more and more committed,--have elsewhere yet wider and more onerous demands upon their attention. since great britain, france, and germany have each acquired colonial possessions, varying in extent from one million to two and a half million square miles,--chiefly in africa. this means, as is generally understood, not merely the acquisition of so much new territory, but the perpetuation of national rivalries and suspicions, maintaining in full vigor, in this age, the traditions of past animosities. it means uncertainties about boundaries--that most fruitful source of disputes when running through unexplored wildernesses--jealousy of influence over native occupants of the soil, fear of encroachment, unperceived till too late, and so a constant, if silent, strife to insure national preponderance in these newly opened regions. the colonial expansion of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is being resumed under our eyes, bringing with it the same train of ambitions and feelings that were exhibited then, though these are qualified by the more orderly methods of modern days and by a well-defined mutual apprehension,--the result of a universal preparedness for war, the distinctive feature of our own time which most guarantees peace. all this reacts evidently upon europe, the common mother-country of these various foreign enterprises, in whose seas and lands must be fought out any struggle springing from these remote causes, and upon whose inhabitants chiefly must fall both the expense and the bloodshed thence arising. to these distant burdens of disquietude--in the assuming of which, though to an extent self-imposed, the present writer recognizes the prevision of civilization, instinctive rather than conscious, against the perils of the future--is to be added the proximate and unavoidable anxiety dependent upon the conditions of turkey and its provinces, the logical outcome of centuries of turkish misrule. deplorable as have been, and to some extent still are, political conditions on the american continents, the new world, in the matter of political distribution of territory and fixity of tenure, is permanence itself, as compared with the stormy prospect confronting the old in its questions which will not down. in these controversies, which range themselves under the broad heads of colonial expansion and the eastern question, all the larger powers of europe, the powers that maintain considerable armies or navies, or both, are directly and deeply interested--except spain. the latter manifests no solicitude concerning the settlement of affairs in the east of europe, nor is she engaged in increasing her still considerable colonial dominion. this preoccupation of the great powers, being not factitious, but necessary,--a thing that cannot be dismissed by an effort of the national will, because its existence depends upon the nature of things,--is a legitimate element in the military calculations of the united states. it cannot enter into her diplomatic considerations, for it is her pride not to seek, from the embarrassments of other states, advantages or concessions which she cannot base upon the substantial justice of her demands. but, while this is true, the united states has had in the past abundant experience of disputes, in which, though she believed herself right, even to the point of having a just _casus belli_, the other party has not seemed to share the same conviction. these difficulties, chiefly, though not solely, territorial in character, have been the natural bequest of the colonial condition through which this hemisphere passed on its way to its present political status. her own view of right, even when conceded in the end, has not approved itself at first to the other party to the dispute. fortunately these differences have been mainly with great britain, the great and beneficent colonizer, a state between which and ourselves a sympathy, deeper than both parties have been ready always to admit, has continued to exist, because founded upon common fundamental ideas of law and justice. of this the happy termination of the venezuelan question is the most recent but not the only instance. it is sometimes said that great britain is the most unpopular state in europe. if this be so,--and many of her own people seem to accept the fact of her political isolation, though with more or less of regret,--is there nothing significant to us in that our attitude towards her in the venezuelan matter has not commanded the sympathy of europe, but rather the reverse? our claim to enter, as of right, into a dispute not originally our own, and concerning us only as one of the american group of nations, has been rejected in no doubtful tones by organs of public opinion which have no fondness for great britain. whether any foreign government has taken the same attitude is not known,--probably there has been no official protest against the apparent admission of a principle which binds nobody but the parties to it. do we ourselves realize that, happy as the issue of our intervention has been, it may entail upon us greater responsibilities, more serious action, than we have assumed before? that it amounts in fact--if one may use a military metaphor--to occupying an advanced position, the logical result very likely of other steps in the past, but which nevertheless implies necessarily such organization of strength as will enable us to hold it? without making a picture to ourselves, without conjuring up extravagant contingencies, it is not difficult to detect the existence of conditions, in which are latent elements of future disputes, identical in principle with those through which we have passed heretofore. can we expect that, if unprovided with adequate military preparation, we shall receive from other states, not imbued with our traditional habits of political thought, and therefore less patient of our point of view, the recognition of its essential reasonableness which has been conceded by the government of great britain? the latter has found capacity for sympathy with our attitude,--not only by long and close contact and interlacing of interests between the two peoples, nor yet only in a fundamental similarity of character and institutions. besides these, useful as they are to mutual understanding, that government has an extensive and varied experience, extending over centuries, of the vital importance of distant regions to its own interests, to the interests of its people and its commerce, or to its political prestige. it can understand and allow for a determination not to acquiesce in the beginning or continuance of a state of things, the tendency of which is to induce future embarrassments,--to complicate or to endanger essential welfare. a nation situated as great britain is in india and egypt scarcely can fail to appreciate our own sensitiveness regarding the central american isthmus, and the pacific, on which we have such extensive territory; nor is it a long step from concern about the mediterranean, and anxious watchfulness over the progressive occupation of its southern shores, to an understanding of our reluctance to see the ambitions and conflicts of another hemisphere approach, even remotely and indirectly, the comparatively peaceful neighborhoods surrounding the caribbean sea, bearing a threat of disturbance to the political distribution of power or of territorial occupation now existing. whatever our interests may demand in the future may be a matter of doubt, but it is hard to see how there can be any doubt in the mind of a british statesman that it is our clear interest now, when all is quiet, to see removed possibilities of trouble which might break out at a less propitious season. such facility for reaching an understanding, due to experience of difficulties, is supported strongly by a hearty desire for peace, traditional with a commercial people who have not to reproach themselves with any lack of resolution or tenacity in assuming and bearing the burden of war when forced upon them. "militarism" is not a preponderant spirit in either great britain or the united states; their commercial tendencies and their isolation concur to exempt them from its predominance. pugnacious, and even warlike, when aroused, the idea of war in the abstract is abhorrent to them, because it interferes with their leading occupations, and its demands are alien to their habits of thought. to say that either lacks sensitiveness to the point of honor would be to wrong them; but the point must be made clear to them, and it will not be found in the refusal of reasonable demands, because they involve the abandonment of positions hastily or ignorantly assumed, nor in the mere attitude of adhering to a position lest there may be an appearance of receding under compulsion. napoleon i. phrased the extreme position of militarism in the words, "if the british ministry should intimate that there was anything the first consul had not done, _because he was prevented from doing it_, that instant he would do it." now the united states, speaking by various organs, has said, in language scarcely to be misunderstood, that she is resolved to resort to force, if necessary, to prevent the territorial or political extension of european power beyond its present geographical limits in the american continents. in the question of a disputed boundary she has held that this resolve--dependent upon what she conceives her reasonable policy--required her to insist that the matter should be submitted to arbitration. if great britain should see in this political stand the expression of a reasonable national policy, she is able, by the training and habit of her leaders, to accept it as such, without greatly troubling over the effect upon men's opinions that may be produced by the additional announcement that the policy is worth fighting for, and will be fought for if necessary. it would be a matter of course for her to fight for her just interests, if need be, and why should not another state say the same? the point--of honor, if you like--is not whether a nation will fight, but whether its claim is just. such an attitude, however, is not the spirit of "militarism," nor accordant with it; and in nations saturated with the military spirit, the intimation that a policy will be supported by force raises that sort of point of honor behind which the reasonableness of the policy is lost to sight. it can no longer be viewed dispassionately; it is prejudged by the threat, however mildly that be expressed. and this is but a logical development of their institutions. the soldier, or the state much of whose policy depends upon organized force, cannot but resent the implication that he or it is unable or unwilling to meet force with force. the life of soldiers and of armies is their spirit, and that spirit receives a serious wound when it seems--even superficially--to recoil before a threat; while with the weakening of the military body falls an element of political strength which has no analogue in great britain or the united states, the chief military power of which must lie ever in navies, never an aggressive factor such as armies have been. now, the united states has made an announcement that she will support by force a policy which may bring her into collision with states of military antecedents, indisposed by their interests to acquiesce in our position, and still less willing to accept it under appearance of threat. what preparation is necessary in case such a one is as determined to fight against our demands as we to fight for them? preparation for war, rightly understood, falls under two heads,--preparation and preparedness. the one is a question mainly of material, and is constant in its action. the second involves an idea of completeness. when, at a particular moment, preparations are completed, one is prepared--not otherwise. there may have been made a great deal of very necessary preparation for war without being prepared. every constituent of preparation may be behindhand, or some elements may be perfectly ready, while others are not. in neither case can a state be said to be prepared. in the matter of preparation for war, one clear idea should be absorbed first by every one who, recognizing that war is still a possibility, desires to see his country ready. this idea is that, however defensive in origin or in political character a war may be, the assumption of a simple defensive in war is ruin. war, once declared, must be waged offensively, aggressively. the enemy must not be fended off, but smitten down. you may then spare him every exaction, relinquish every gain; but till down he must be struck incessantly and remorselessly. preparation, like most other things, is a question both of kind and of degree, of quality and of quantity. as regards degree, the general lines upon which it is determined have been indicated broadly in the preceding part of this article. the measure of degree is the estimated force which the strongest _probable_ enemy can bring against you, allowance being made for clear drawbacks upon his total force, imposed by his own embarrassments and responsibilities in other parts of the world. the calculation is partly military, partly political, the latter, however, being the dominant factor in the premises. in kind, preparation is twofold,--defensive and offensive. the former exists chiefly for the sake of the latter, in order that offence, the determining factor in war, may put forth its full power, unhampered by concern for the protection of the national interests or for its own resources. in naval war, coast defence is the defensive factor, the navy the offensive. coast defence, when adequate, assures the naval commander-in-chief that his base of operations--the dock-yards and coal depots--is secure. it also relieves him and his government, by the protection afforded to the chief commercial centres, from the necessity of considering them, and so leaves the offensive arm perfectly free. coast defence implies coast attack. to what attacks are coasts liable? two, principally,--blockade and bombardment. the latter, being the more difficult, includes the former, as the greater does the lesser. a fleet that can bombard can still more easily blockade. against bombardment the necessary precaution is gun-fire, of such power and range that a fleet cannot lie within bombarding distance. this condition is obtained, where surroundings permit, by advancing the line of guns so far from the city involved that bombarding distance can be reached only by coming under their fire. but it has been demonstrated, and is accepted, that, owing to their rapidity of movement,--like a flock of birds on the wing,--a fleet of ships can, without disabling loss, pass by guns before which they could not lie. hence arises the necessity of arresting or delaying their progress by blocking channels, which in modern practice is done by lines of torpedoes. the mere moral effect of the latter is a deterrent to a dash past,--by which, if successful, a fleet reaches the rear of the defences, and appears immediately before the city, which then lies at its mercy. coast defence, then, implies gun-power and torpedo lines placed as described. be it said in passing that only places of decisive importance, commercially or militarily, need such defences. modern fleets cannot afford to waste ammunition in bombarding unimportant towns,--at least when so far from their own base as they would be on our coast. it is not so much a question of money as of frittering their fighting strength. it would not pay. even coast defence, however, although essentially passive, should have an element of offensive force, local in character, distinct from the offensive navy, of which nevertheless it forms a part. to take the offensive against a floating force it must itself be afloat--naval. this offensive element of coast defence is to be found in the torpedo-boat, in its various developments. it must be kept distinct in idea from the sea-going fleet, although it is, of course, possible that the two may act in concert. the war very well may take such a turn that the sea-going navy will find its best preparation for initiating an offensive movement to be by concentrating in a principal seaport. failing such a contingency, however, and in and for coast defence in its narrower sense, there should be a local flotilla of small torpedo-vessels, which by their activity should make life a burden to an outside enemy. a distinguished british admiral, now dead, has said that he believed half the captains of a blockading fleet would break down--"go crazy" were the words repeated to me--under the strain of modern conditions. the expression, of course, was intended simply to convey a sense of the immensity of suspense to be endured. in such a flotilla, owing to the smallness of its components, and to the simplicity of their organization and functions, is to be found the best sphere for naval volunteers; the duties could be learned with comparative ease, and the whole system is susceptible of rapid development. be it remembered, however, that it is essentially defensive, only incidentally offensive, in character. such are the main elements of coast defence--guns, lines of torpedoes, torpedo-boats. of these none can be extemporized, with the possible exception of the last, and that would be only a makeshift. to go into details would exceed the limits of an article,--require a brief treatise. suffice it to say, without the first two, coast cities are open to bombardment; without the last, they can be blockaded freely, unless relieved by the sea-going navy. bombardment and blockade are recognized modes of warfare, subject only to reasonable notification,--a concession rather to humanity and equity than to strict law. bombardment and blockade directed against great national centres, in the close and complicated network of national and commercial interests as they exist in modern times, strike not only the point affected, but every corner of the land. the offensive in naval war, as has been said, is the function of the sea-going navy--of the battle-ships, and of the cruisers of various sizes and purposes, including sea-going torpedo-vessels capable of accompanying a fleet, without impeding its movements by their loss of speed or unseaworthiness. seaworthiness, and reasonable speed under all weather conditions, are qualities necessary to every constituent of a fleet; but, over and above these, the backbone and real power of any navy are the vessels which, by due proportion of defensive and offensive powers, are capable of taking and giving hard knocks. all others are but subservient to these, and exist only for them. what is that strength to be? ships answering to this description are the _kind_ which make naval strength; what is to be its _degree_? what their number? the answer--a broad formula--is that it must be great enough to take the sea, and to fight, with reasonable chances of success, the largest force likely to be brought against it, as shown by calculations which have been indicated previously. being, as we claim, and as our past history justifies us in claiming, a nation indisposed to aggression, unwilling to extend our possessions or our interests by war, the measure of strength we set ourselves depends, necessarily, not upon our projects of aggrandizement, but upon the disposition of others to thwart what we consider our reasonable policy, which they may not so consider. when they resist, what force can they bring against us? that force must be naval; we have no exposed point upon which land operations, decisive in character, can be directed. this is the kind of the hostile force to be apprehended. what may its size be? there is the measure of our needed strength. the calculation may be intricate, the conclusion only approximate and probable, but it is the nearest reply we can reach. so many ships of such and such sizes, so many guns, so much ammunition--in short, so much naval material. in the material provisions that have been summarized under the two chief heads of defence and offence--in coast defence under its three principal requirements, guns, lines of stationary torpedoes, and torpedo-boats, and in a navy able to keep the sea in the presence of a probable enemy--consist what may be called most accurately preparations for war. in so far as the united states is short in them, she is at the mercy of an enemy whose naval strength is greater than that of her own available navy. if her navy cannot keep the enemy off the coast, blockade at least is possible. if, in addition, there are no harbor torpedo-boats, blockade is easy. if, further, guns and torpedo lines are deficient, bombardment comes within the range of possibility, and may reach even the point of entire feasibility. there will be no time for preparation after war begins. it is not in the preparation of material that states generally fall most short of being ready for war at brief notice; for such preparation is chiefly a question of money and of manufacture,--not so much of preservation after creation. if money enough is forthcoming, a moderate degree of foresight can insure that the amount of material deemed necessary shall be on hand at a given future moment; and a similar condition can be maintained steadily. losses by deterioration or expenditure, or demand for further increase if such appear desirable, can all be forecast with reasonable calculations, and requirements thence arising can be made good. this is comparatively easy, because mere material, once wrought into shape for war, does not deteriorate from its utility to the nation because not used immediately. it can be stored and cared for at a relatively small expense, and with proper oversight will remain just as good and just as ready for use as at its first production. there are certain deductions, a certain percentage of impairment to be allowed for, but the general statement holds. a very different question is confronted in the problem how to be ready at equally short notice to use this material,--to provide in sufficient numbers, upon a sudden call, the living agents, without whom the material is worthless. such men in our day must be especially trained; and not only so, but while training once acquired will not be forgot wholly--stays by a man for a certain time--it nevertheless tends constantly to drop off from him. like all habits, it requires continued practice. moreover, it takes quite a long time to form, in a new recruit, not merely familiarity with the use of a particular weapon, but also the habit and working of the military organization of which he is an individual member. it is not enough that he learn just that one part of the whole machinery which falls to him to handle; he must be acquainted with the mutual relations of the other parts to his own and to the whole, at least in great measure. such knowledge is essential even to the full and intelligent discharge of his own duty, not to speak of the fact that in battle every man should be ready to supply the place of another of his own class and grade who has been disabled. unless this be so, the ship will be very far short of her best efficiency. now, to possess such proficiency in the handling of naval material for war, and in playing an intelligent part in the general functioning of a ship in action, much time is required. time is required to obtain it, further time is needed in order to retain it; and such time, be it more or less, is time lost for other purposes,--lost both to the individual and to the community. when you have your thoroughly efficient man-of-war's man, you cannot store him as you do your guns and ammunition, or lay him up as you may your ships, without his deteriorating at a rate to which material presents no parallel. on the other hand, if he be retained, voluntarily or otherwise, in the naval service, there ensues the economical loss--the loss of productive power--which constitutes the great argument against large standing armies and enforced military service, advanced by those to whom the productive energies of a country outweigh all other considerations. it is this difficulty which is felt most by those responsible for the military readiness of european states, and which therefore has engaged their most anxious attention. the providing of material of war is an onerous money question; but it is simple, and has some compensation for the expense in the resulting employment of labor for its production. it is quite another matter to have ready the number of men needed,--to train them, and to keep them so trained as to be available immediately. the solution is sought in a tax upon time--upon the time of the nation, economically lost to production, and upon the time of the individual, lost out of his life. like other taxes, the tendency on all sides is to reduce this as far as possible,--to compromise between ideal proficiency for probable contingencies, and the actual demands of the existing and usual conditions of peace. although inevitable, the compromise is unsatisfactory, and yields but partial results in either direction. the economist still deplores and resists the loss of producers,--the military authorities insist that the country is short of its necessary force. to obviate the difficulty as far as possible, to meet both of the opposing demands, resort is had to the system of reserves, into which men pass after serving in the active force for a period, which is reduced to, and often below, the shortest compatible with instruction in their duties, and with the maintenance of the active forces at a fixed minimum. this instruction acquired, the recipient passes into the reserve, leaves the life of the soldier or seaman for that of the citizen, devoting a comparatively brief time in every year to brushing up the knowledge formerly acquired. such a system, under some form, is found in services both voluntary and compulsory. it is scarcely necessary to say that such a method would never be considered satisfactory in any of the occupations of ordinary life. a man who learns his profession or trade, but never practises it, will not long be considered fit for employment. no kind of practical preparation, in the way of systematic instruction, equals the practical knowledge imbibed in the common course of life. this is just as true of the military professions--the naval especially--as it is of civil callings; perhaps even more so, because the former are a more unnatural, and therefore, when attained, a more highly specialized, form of human activity. for the very reason that war is in the main an evil, an unnatural state, but yet at times unavoidable, the demands upon warriors, when average men, are exceptionally exacting. preparedness for naval war therefore consists not so much in the building of ships and guns as it does in the possession of trained men in adequate numbers, fit to go on board at once and use the material, the provision of which is merely one of the essential preparations for war. the word "fit" includes fairly all that detail of organization commonly called mobilization, by which the movements of the individual men are combined and directed. but mobilization, although the subjects of it are men, is itself a piece of mental machinery. once devised, it may be susceptible of improvement, but it will not become inefficient because filed away in a pigeon-hole, any more than guns and projectiles become worthless by being stored in their parks or magazines. take care of the pence and the pounds will take care of themselves. provide your fit men,--fit by their familiarity not only with special instruments, but with a manner of life,--and your mobilization is reduced to a slip of paper telling each one where he is to go. he will get there. that a navy, especially a large navy, can be kept fully manned in peace--manned up to the requirements of war--must be dismissed as impracticable. if greatly superior to a probable enemy, it will be unnecessary; if more nearly equal, then the aim can only be to be superior in the number of men immediately available, and fit according to the standard of fitness here generalized. the place of a reserve in any system of preparation for war must be admitted, because inevitable. the question, of the proportion and character of the reserve, relatively to the active force of peace, is the crux of the matter. this is essentially the question between long-service and short-service systems. with long service the reserves will be fewer, and for the first few years of retirement much more efficient, for they have acquired, not knowledge only, but a habit of life. with short service, more men are shoved through the mill of the training-school. consequently they pass more rapidly into the reserve, are less efficient when they get there, and lose more rapidly, because they have acquired less thoroughly; on the other hand, they will be decidedly more numerous, on paper at least, than the entire trained force of a long-service system. the pessimists on either side will expound the dangers--the one, of short numbers; the others, of inadequate training. long service must be logically the desire, and the result, of voluntary systems of recruiting the strength of a military force. where enrolment is a matter of individual choice, there is a better chance of entrance resulting in the adoption of the life as a calling to be followed; and this disposition can be encouraged by the offering of suitable inducements. where service is compulsory, that fact alone tends to make it abhorrent, and voluntary persistence, after time has been served, rare. but, on the other hand, as the necessity for numbers in war is as real as the necessity of fitness, a body where long service and small reserves obtain should in peace be more numerous than one where the reserves are larger. to long service and small reserves a large standing force is the natural corollary. it may be added that it is more consonant to the necessities of warfare, and more consistent with the idea of the word "reserve," as elsewhere used in war. the reserve in battle is that portion of the force which is withheld from engagement, awaiting the unforeseen developments of the fight; but no general would think of carrying on a pitched battle with the smaller part of his force, keeping the larger part in reserve. rapid concentration of effort, anticipating that of the enemy, is the ideal of tactics and of strategy,--of the battle-field and of the campaign. it is that, likewise, of the science of mobilization, in its modern development. the reserve is but the margin of safety, to compensate for defects in conception or execution, to which all enterprises are liable; and it may be added that it is as applicable to the material force--the ships, guns, etc.--as it is to the men. the united states, like great britain, depends wholly upon voluntary enlistments; and both nations, with unconscious logic, have laid great stress upon continuous service, and comparatively little upon reserves. when seamen have served the period which entitles them to the rewards of continuous service, without further enlistment, they are, though still in the prime of life, approaching the period when fitness, in the private seaman or soldier, depends upon ingrained habit--perfect practical familiarity with the life which has been their one calling--rather than upon that elastic vigor which is the privilege of youth. should they elect to continue in the service, there still remain some years in which they are an invaluable leaven, by character and tradition. if they depart, they are for a few years a reserve for war--if they choose to come forward; but it is manifest that such a reserve can be but small, when compared with a system which in three or five years passes men through the active force into the reserve. the latter, however, is far less valuable, man for man. of course, a reserve which has not even three years' service is less valuable still. the united states is to all intents an insular power, like great britain. we have but two land frontiers, canada and mexico. the latter is hopelessly inferior to us in all the elements of military strength. as regards canada, great britain maintains a standing army; but, like our own, its numbers indicate clearly that aggression will never be her policy, except in those distant regions whither the great armies of the world cannot act against her, unless they first wrench from her the control of the sea. no modern state has long maintained a supremacy by land and by sea,--one or the other has been held from time to time by this or that country, but not both. great britain wisely has chosen naval power; and, independent of her reluctance to break with the united states for other reasons, she certainly would regret to devote to the invasion of a nation of seventy millions the small disposable force which she maintains in excess of the constant requirements of her colonial interests. we are, it may be repeated, an insular power, dependent therefore upon a navy. durable naval power, besides, depends ultimately upon extensive commercial relations; consequently, and especially in an insular state, it is rarely aggressive, in the military sense. its instincts are naturally for peace, because it has so much at stake outside its shores. historically, this has been the case with the conspicuous example of sea power, great britain, since she became such; and it increasingly tends to be so. it is also our own case, and to a yet greater degree, because, with an immense compact territory, there has not been the disposition to external effort which has carried the british flag all over the globe, seeking to earn by foreign commerce and distant settlement that abundance of resource which to us has been the free gift of nature--or of providence. by her very success, however, great britain, in the vast increase and dispersion of her external interests, has given hostages to fortune, which for mere defence impose upon her a great navy. our career has been different, our conditions now are not identical, yet our geographical position and political convictions have created for us also external interests and external responsibilities, which are likewise our hostages to fortune. it is not necessary to roam afar in search of adventures; popular feeling and the deliberate judgment of statesmen alike have asserted that, from conditions we neither made nor control, interests beyond the sea exist, have sprung up of themselves, which demand protection. "beyond the sea"--that means a navy. of invasion, in any real sense of the word, we run no risk, and if we did, it must be by sea; and there, at sea, must be met primarily, and ought to be met decisively, any attempt at invasion of our interests, either in distant lands, or at home by blockade or by bombardment. yet the force of men in the navy is smaller, by more than half, than that in the army. the necessary complement of those admirable measures which have been employed now for over a decade in the creation of naval material is the preparation of an adequate force of trained men to use this material when completed. take an entirely fresh man: a battleship can be built and put in commission before he becomes a trained man-of-war's man, and a torpedo-boat can be built and ready for service before, to use the old sea phrase, "the hay seed is out of his hair." further, in a voluntary service, you cannot keep your trained men as you can your completed ship or gun. the inevitable inference is that the standing force must be large, because you can neither create it hastily nor maintain it by compulsion. having fixed the amount of material,--the numbers and character of the fleet,--from this follows easily the number of men necessary to man it. this aggregate force can then be distributed, upon some accepted idea, between the standing navy and the reserve. without fixing a proportion between the two, the present writer is convinced that the reserve should be but a small percentage of the whole, and that in a small navy, as ours, relatively, long will be, this is doubly imperative; for the smaller the navy, the greater the need for constant efficiency to act promptly, and the smaller the expense of maintenance. in fact, where quantity--number--is small, quality should be all the more high. the quality of the whole is a question of _personnel_ even more than of material; and the quality of the _personnel_ can be maintained only by high individual fitness in the force, undiluted by dependence upon a large, only partly efficient, reserve element. "one foot on sea and one on shore, to one thing constant never," will not man the fleet. it can be but an imperfect palliative, and can be absorbed effectually by the main body only in small proportions. it is in torpedo-boats for coast defence, and in commerce-destroying for deep-sea warfare, that the true sphere for naval reserves will be found; for the duties in both cases are comparatively simple, and the organization can be the same. every danger of a military character to which the united states is exposed can be met best outside her own territory--at sea. preparedness for naval war--preparedness against naval attack and for naval offence--is preparedness for anything that is likely to occur. a twentieth-century outlook. _may, ._ finality, the close of a life, of a relationship, of an era, even though this be a purely artificial creation of human arrangement, in all cases appeals powerfully to the imagination, and especially to that of a generation self-conscious as ours, a generation which has coined for itself the phrase _fin de siècle_ to express its belief, however superficial and mistaken, that it knows its own exponents and its own tendencies; that, amid the din of its own progress sounding in its ears, it knows not only whence it comes but whither it goes. the nineteenth century is about to die, only to rise again in the twentieth. whence did it come? how far has it gone? whither is it going? a full reply to such queries would presume an abridged universal history of the expiring century such as a magazine article, or series of articles, could not contemplate for a moment. the scope proposed to himself by the present writer, itself almost unmanageable within the necessary limits, looks not to the internal conditions of states, to those economical and social tendencies which occupy so large a part of contemporary attention, seeming to many the sole subjects that deserve attention, and that from the most purely material and fleshly point of view. important as these things are, it may be affirmed at least that they are not everything; and that, great as has been the material progress of the century, the changes in international relations and relative importance, not merely in states of the european family, but among the peoples of the world at large, have been no less striking. it is from this direction that the writer wishes to approach his subject, which, if applied to any particular country, might be said to be that of its external relations; but which, in the broader view that it will be sought to attain, regards rather the general future of the world as indicated by movements already begun and in progress, as well as by tendencies now dimly discernible, which, if not counteracted, are pregnant of further momentous shifting of the political balances, profoundly affecting the welfare of mankind. it appears a convenient, though doubtless very rough, way of prefacing this subject to say that the huge colonizing movements of the eighteenth century were brought to a pause by the american revolution, which deprived great britain of her richest colonies, succeeded, as that almost immediately was, by the french revolution and the devastating wars of the republic and of napoleon, which forced the attention of europe to withdraw from external allurements and to concentrate upon its own internal affairs. the purchase of louisiana by the united states at the opening of the current century emphasized this conclusion; for it practically eliminated the continent of north america from the catalogue of wild territories available for foreign settlement. within a decade this was succeeded by the revolt of the spanish colonies, followed later by the pronouncements of president monroe and of mr. canning, which assured their independence by preventing european interference. the firmness with which the position of the former statesman has been maintained ever since by the great body of the people of the united states, and the developments his doctrine afterwards received, have removed the spanish-american countries equally from all probable chance of further european colonization, in the political sense of the word. thus the century opened. men's energies still sought scope beyond the sea, doubtless; not, however, in the main, for the founding of new colonies, but for utilizing ground already in political occupation. even this, however, was subsidiary. the great work of the nineteenth century, from nearly its beginning to nearly its close, has been in the recognition and study of the forces of nature, and the application of them to the purposes of mechanical and economical advance. the means thus placed in men's hands, so startling when first invented, so familiar for the most part to us now, were devoted necessarily, first, to the development of the resources of each country. everywhere there was a fresh field; for hitherto it had been nowhere possible to man fully to utilize the gifts of nature. energies everywhere turned inward, for there, in every region, was more than enough to do. naturally, therefore, such a period has been in the main one of peace. there have been great wars, certainly; but, nevertheless, external peace has been the general characteristic of that period of development, during which men have been occupied in revolutionizing the face of their own countries by means of the new powers at their disposal. all such phases pass, however, as does every human thing. increase of production--the idol of the economist--sought fresh markets, as might have been predicted. the increase of home consumption, through increased ease of living, increased wealth, increased population, did not keep up with the increase of forth-putting and the facility of distribution afforded by steam. in the middle of the century china and japan were forced out of the seclusion of ages, and were compelled, for commercial purposes at least, to enter into relations with the european communities, to buy and to sell with them. serious attempts, on any extensive scale, to acquire new political possessions abroad largely ceased. commerce only sought new footholds, sure that, given the inch, she in the end would have the ell. moreover, the growth of the united states in population and resources, and the development of the british australian colonies, contributed to meet the demand, of which the opening of china and japan was only a single indication. that opening, therefore, was rather an incident of the general industrial development which followed upon the improvement of mechanical processes and the multiplication of communications. thus the century passed its meridian, and began to decline towards its close. there were wars and there were rumors of wars in the countries of european civilization. dynasties rose and fell, and nations shifted their places in the scale of political importance, as old-time boys in school went up and down; but, withal, the main characteristic abode, and has become more and more the dominant prepossession of the statesmen who reached their prime at or soon after the times when the century itself culminated. the maintenance of a _status quo_, for purely utilitarian reasons of an economical character, has gradually become an ideal--the _quieta non movere_ of sir robert walpole. the ideal is respectable, certainly; in view of the concert of the powers, in the interest of their own repose, to coerce greece and the cretans, we may perhaps refrain from calling it noble. the question remains, how long can it continue respectable in the sense of being practicable of realization,--a rational possibility, not an idle dream? many are now found to say--and among them some of the most bitter of the advocates of universal peace, who are among the bitterest of modern disputants--that when the czar nicholas proposed to move the quiet things, half a century ago, and to reconstruct the political map of southeastern europe in the interest of well-founded quiet, it was he that showed the idealism of rational statesmanship,--the only truly practical statesmanship,--while the defenders of the _status quo_ evinced the crude instincts of the mere time-serving politician. that the latter did not insure quiet, even the quiet of desolation, in those unhappy regions, we have yearly evidence. how far is it now a practicable object, among the nations of the european family, to continue indefinitely the present realization of peace and plenty,--in themselves good things, but which are advocated largely on the ground that man lives by bread alone,--in view of the changed conditions of the world which the departing nineteenth century leaves with us as its bequest? is the outlook such that our present civilization, with its benefits, is most likely to be insured by universal disarmament, the clamor for which rises ominously--the word is used advisedly--among our latter-day cries? none shares more heartily than the writer the aspiration for the day when nations shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning-hooks; but is european civilization, including america, so situated that it can afford to relax into an artificial peace, resting not upon the working of national consciences, as questions arise, but upon a permanent tribunal,--an external, if self-imposed authority,--the realization in modern policy of the ideal of the mediæval papacy? the outlook--the signs of the times, what are they? it is not given to human vision, peering into the future, to see more than as through a glass, darkly; men as trees walking, one cannot say certainly whither. yet signs may be noted even if they cannot be fully or precisely interpreted; and among them i should certainly say is to be observed the general outward impulse of all the civilized nations of the first order of greatness--except our own. bound and swathed in the traditions of our own eighteenth century, when we were as truly external to the european world as we are now a part of it, we, under the specious plea of peace and plenty--fulness of bread--hug an ideal of isolation, and refuse to recognize the solidarity of interest with which the world of european civilization must not only look forward to, but go out to meet, the future that, whether near or remote, seems to await it. i say _we_ do so; i should more surely express my thought by saying that the outward impulse already is in the majority of the nation, as shown when particular occasions arouse their attention, but that it is as yet retarded, and may be retarded perilously long, by those whose views of national policy are governed by maxims framed in the infancy of the republic. this outward impulse of the european nations, resumed on a large scale after nearly a century of intermission, is not a mere sudden appearance, sporadic, and unrelated to the past. the signs of its coming, though unnoted, were visible soon after the century reached its half-way stage, as was also its great correlative, equally unappreciated then, though obvious enough now, the stirring of the nations of oriental civilization. it is a curious reminiscence of my own that when in yokohama, japan, in , i was asked to translate a spanish letter from honolulu, relative to a ship-load of japanese coolies to be imported into hawaii. i knew the person engaged to go as physician to the ship, and, unless my memory greatly deceives me, he sailed in this employment while i was still in the port. similarly, when my service on the station was ended, i went from yokohama to hong-kong, prior to returning home by way of suez. among my fellow-passengers was an ex-confederate naval officer, whose business was to negotiate for an immigration of chinese into, i think, the southern states--in momentary despair, perhaps, of black labor--but certainly into the united states. we all know what has come in our own country of undertakings which then had attracted little attention. it is odd to watch the unconscious, resistless movements of nations, and at the same time read the crushing characterization by our teachers of the press of those who, by personal characteristics or by accident, happen to be thrust into the position of leaders, when at the most they only guide to the least harm forces which can no more be resisted permanently than can gravitation. such would have been the rôle of nicholas, guiding to a timely end the irresistible course of events in the balkans, which his opponents sought to withstand, but succeeded only in prolonging and aggravating. he is honored now by those who see folly in the imperial aspirations of mr. joseph chamberlain, and piracy in mr. cecil rhodes; yet, after all, in his day, what right had he, by the code of strict constructionists of national legal rights, to put turkey to death because she was sick? was not turkey in occupation? had she not, by strict law, a right to her possessions, and to live; yea, and to administer what she considered justice to those who were legally her subjects? but men are too apt to forget that law is the servant of equity, and that while the world is in its present stage of development equity which cannot be had by law must be had by force, upon which ultimately law rests, not for its sanction, but for its efficacy. we have been familiar latterly with the term "buffer states;" the pleasant function discharged by siam between great britain and france. though not strictly analogous, the term conveys an idea of the relations that have hitherto obtained between eastern and western civilizations. they have existed apart, each a world of itself; but they are approaching not only in geographical propinquity, a recognized source of danger, but, what is more important, in common ideas of material advantage, without a corresponding sympathy in spiritual ideas. it is not merely that the two are in different stages of development from a common source, as are russia and great britain. they are running as yet on wholly different lines, springing from conceptions radically different. to bring them into correspondence in that, the most important realm of ideas, there is needed on the one side--or on the other--not growth, but conversion. however far it has wandered, and however short of its pattern it has come, the civilization of modern europe grew up under the shadow of the cross, and what is best in it still breathes the spirit of the crucified. it is to be feared that eastern thinkers consider it rather an advantage than a detriment that they are appropriating the material progress of europe unfettered by christian traditions,--as agnostic countries. but, for the present at least, agnosticism with christian ages behind it is a very different thing from agnosticism which has never known christianity. what will be in the future the dominant spiritual ideas of those nations which hitherto have been known as christian, is scarcely a question of the twentieth century. whatever variations of faith, in direction or in degree, the close of that century may show, it is not probable that so short a period will reveal the full change of standards and of practice which necessarily must follow ultimately upon a radical change of belief. that the impress of christianity will remain throughout the coming century is reasonably as certain as that it took centuries of nominal faith to lift christian standards and practice even to the point they now have reached. decline, as well as rise, must be gradual; and gradual likewise, granting the utmost possible spread of christian beliefs among them, will be the approximation of the eastern nations, as nations, to the principles which powerfully modify, though they cannot control wholly even now, the merely natural impulses of western peoples. and if, as many now say, faith has departed from among ourselves, and still more will depart in the coming years; if we have no higher sanction to propose for self-restraint and righteousness than enlightened self-interest and the absurdity of war, war--violence--will be absurd just so long as the balance of interest is on that side, and no longer. those who want will take, if they can, not merely from motives of high policy and as legal opportunity offers, but for the simple reasons that they have not, that they desire, and that they are able. the european world has known that stage already; it has escaped from it only partially by the gradual hallowing of public opinion and its growing weight in the political scale. the eastern world knows not the same motives, but it is rapidly appreciating the material advantages and the political traditions which have united to confer power upon the west; and with the appreciation desire has arisen. coincident with the long pause which the french revolution imposed upon the process of external colonial expansion which was so marked a feature of the eighteenth century, there occurred another singular manifestation of national energies, in the creation of the great standing armies of modern days, themselves the outcome of the _levée en masse_, and of the general conscription, which the revolution bequeathed to us along with its expositions of the rights of man. beginning with the birth of the century, perfected during its continuance, its close finds them in full maturity and power, with a development in numbers, in reserve force, in organization, and in material for war, over which the economist perpetually wails, whose existence he denounces, and whose abolition he demands. as freedom has grown and strengthened, so have they grown and strengthened. is this singular product of a century whose gains for political liberty are undeniable, a mere gross perversion of human activities, as is so confidently claimed on many sides? or is there possibly in it also a sign of the times to come, to be studied in connection with other signs, some of which we have noted? what has been the effect of these great armies? manifold, doubtless. on the economical side there is the diminution of production, the tax upon men's time and lives, the disadvantages or evils so dinned daily into our ears that there is no need of repeating them here. but is there nothing to the credit side of the account, even perhaps a balance in their favor? is it nothing, in an age when authority is weakening and restraints are loosening, that the youth of a nation passes through a school in which order, obedience, and reverence are learned, where the body is systematically developed, where ideals of self-surrender, of courage, of manhood, are inculcated, necessarily, because fundamental conditions of military success? is it nothing that masses of youths out of the fields and the streets are brought together, mingled with others of higher intellectual antecedents, taught to work and to act together, mind in contact with mind, and carrying back into civil life that respect for constituted authority which is urgently needed in these days when lawlessness is erected into a religion? it is a suggestive lesson to watch the expression and movements of a number of rustic conscripts undergoing their first drills, and to contrast them with the finished result as seen in the faces and bearing of the soldiers that throng the streets. a military training is not the worst preparation for an active life, any more than the years spent at college are time lost, as another school of utilitarians insists. is it nothing that wars are less frequent, peace better secured, by the mutual respect of nations for each other's strength; and that, when a convulsion does come, it passes rapidly, leaving the ordinary course of events to resume sooner, and therefore more easily? war now not only occurs more rarely, but has rather the character of an occasional excess, from which recovery is easy. a century or more ago it was a chronic disease. and withal, the military spirit, the preparedness--not merely the willingness, which is a different thing--to fight in a good cause, which is a distinct good, is more widely diffused and more thoroughly possessed than ever it was when the soldier was merely the paid man. it is the nations now that are in arms, and not simply the servants of the king. in forecasting the future, then, it is upon these particular signs of the times that i dwell: the arrest of the forward impulse towards political colonization which coincided with the decade immediately preceding the french revolution; the absorption of the european nations, for the following quarter of a century, with the universal wars, involving questions chiefly political and european; the beginning of the great era of coal and iron, of mechanical and industrial development, which succeeded the peace, and during which it was not aggressive colonization, but the development of colonies already held and of new commercial centres, notably in china and japan, that was the most prominent feature; finally, we have, resumed at the end of the century, the forward movement of political colonization by the mother countries, powerfully incited thereto, doubtless, by the citizens of the old colonies in different parts of the world. the restlessness of australia and the cape colony has doubtless counted for much in british advances in those regions. contemporary with all these movements, from the first to the last, has been the development of great standing armies, or rather of armed nations, in europe; and, lastly, the stirring of the east, its entrance into the field of western interests, not merely as a passive something to be impinged upon, but with a vitality of its own, formless yet, but significant, inasmuch as where before there was torpor, if not death, now there is indisputable movement and life. never again, probably, can there of it be said, "it heard the legions thunder past, then plunged in thought again." of this the astonishing development of japan is the most obvious evidence; but in india, though there be no probability of the old mutinies reviving, there are signs enough of the awaking of political intelligence, restlessness under foreign subjection, however beneficent, desire for greater play for its own individualities; a movement which, because intellectual and appreciative of the advantages of western material and political civilization, is less immediately threatening than the former revolt, but much more ominous of great future changes. of china we know less; but many observers testify to the immense latent force of the chinese character. it has shown itself hitherto chiefly in the strength with which it has adhered to stereotyped tradition. but stereotyped traditions have been overthrown already more than once even in this unprogressive people, whose conservatism, due largely to ignorance of better conditions existing in other lands, is closely allied also to the unusual staying powers of the race, to the persistence of purpose, the endurance, and the vitality characteristic of its units. to ambition for individual material improvement they are not insensible. the collapse of the chinese organization in all its branches during the late war with japan, though greater than was expected, was not unforeseen. it has not altered the fact that the raw material so miserably utilized is, in point of strength, of the best; that it is abundant, racially homogeneous, and is multiplying rapidly. nor, with the recent resuscitation of the turkish army before men's eyes, can it be thought unlikely that the chinese may yet obtain the organization by which alone potential force receives adequate military development, the most easily conferred because the simplest in conception. the japanese have shown great capacity, but they met little resistance; and it is easier by far to move and to control an island kingdom of forty millions than a vast continental territory containing near tenfold that number of inhabitants. comparative slowness of evolution may be predicated, but that which for so long has kept china one, amid many diversities, may be counted upon in the future to insure a substantial unity of impulse which, combined with its mass, will give tremendous import to any movement common to the whole. to assert that a few selected characteristics, such as the above, summarize the entire tendency of a century of teeming human life, and stand alone among the signs that are chiefly to be considered in looking to the future, would be to take an untenable position. it may be said safely, however, that these factors, because the future to which they point is more remote, are less regarded than others which are less important; and further, that those among them which mark our own day are also the factors whose very existence is specially resented, criticised, and condemned by that school of political thought which assumes for itself the title of economical, which attained its maturity, and still lives, amid the ideas of that stage of industrial progress coincident with the middle of the century, and which sees all things from the point of view of production and of internal development. powerfully exerted throughout the world, nowhere is the influence of this school so unchecked and so injurious as in the united states, because, having no near neighbors to compete with us in point of power, military necessities have been to us not imminent, so that, like all distant dangers, they have received little regard; and also because, with our great resources only partially developed, the instinct to external activities has remained dormant. at the same period and from the same causes that the european world turned its eyes inward from the seaboard, instead of outward, the people of the united states were similarly diverted from the external activities in which at the beginning of the century they had their wealth. this tendency, emphasized on the political side by the civil war, was reinforced and has been prolonged by well-known natural conditions. a territory much larger, far less redeemed from its original wildness, and with perhaps even ampler proportionate resources than the continent of europe, contained a much smaller number of inhabitants. hence, despite an immense immigration, we have lagged far behind in the work of completing our internal development, and for that reason have not yet felt the outward impulse that now markedly characterizes the european peoples. that we stand far apart from the general movement of our race calls of itself for consideration. for the reasons mentioned it has been an easy but a short-sighted policy, wherever it has been found among statesmen or among journalists, to fasten attention purely on internal and economical questions, and to reject, if not to resent, propositions looking towards the organization and maintenance of military force, or contemplating the extension of our national influence beyond our own borders, on the plea that we have enough to do at home,--forgetful that no nation, as no man, can live to itself or die to itself. it is a policy in which we are behind our predecessors of two generations ago, men who had not felt the deadening influence of merely economical ideas, because they reached manhood before these attained the preponderance they achieved under politicians of the manchester school; a preponderance which they still retain because the youths of that time, who grew up under them, have not yet quite passed off the stage. it is the lot of each generation, salutary no doubt, to be ruled by men whose ideas are essentially those of a former day. breaches of continuity in national action are thus moderated or avoided; but, on the other hand, the tendency of such a condition is to blind men to the spirit of the existing generation, because its rulers have the tone of their own past, and direct affairs in accordance with it. on the very day of this writing there appears in an american journal a slashing contrast between the action of lord salisbury in the cretan business and the spirited letter of mr. gladstone upon the failure of the concert. as a matter of fact, however, both those british statesmen, while belonging to parties traditionally opposed, are imbued above all with the ideas of the middle of the century, and, governed by them, consider the disturbance of quiet the greatest of all evils. it is difficult to believe that if mr. gladstone were now in his prime, and in power, any object would possess in his eyes an importance at all comparable to that of keeping the peace. he would feel for the greeks, doubtless, as lord salisbury doubtless does; but he would maintain the concert as long as he believed that alone would avoid war. when men in sympathy with the ideas now arising among englishmen come on the stage, we shall see a change--not before. the same spirit has dominated in our own country ever since the civil war--a far more real "revolution" in its consequences than the struggle of the thirteen colonies against great britain, which in our national speech has received the name--forced our people, both north and south, to withdraw their eyes from external problems, and to concentrate heart and mind with passionate fervor upon an internal strife, in which one party was animated by the inspiring hope of independence, while before the other was exalted the noble ideal of union. that war, however, was directed, on the civil side, by men who belonged to a generation even then passing away. the influence of their own youth reverted with the return of peace, and was to be seen in the ejection--by threat of force--of the third napoleon from mexico, in the acquisition of alaska, and in the negotiations for the purchase of the danish islands and of samana bay. whatever may have been the wisdom of these latter attempts,--and the writer, while sympathizing with the spirit that suggested them, questions it from a military, or rather naval, stand-point,--they are particularly interesting as indicating the survival in elderly men of the traditions accepted in their youth, but foreign to the generation then rapidly coming into power, which rejected and frustrated them. the latter in turn is now disappearing, and its successors, coming and to come, are crowding into its places. is there any indication of the ideas these bring with them, in their own utterances, or in the spirit of the world at large, which they must needs reflect; or, more important perhaps still, is there any indication in the conditions of the outside world itself which they should heed, and the influence of which they should admit, in modifying and shaping their policies, before these have become hardened into fixed lines, directive for many years of the future welfare of their people? to all these questions the writer, as one of the departing generation, would answer yes; but it is to the last that his attention, possibly by constitutional bias, is more naturally directed. it appears to him that in the ebb and flow of human affairs, under those mysterious impulses the origin of which is sought by some in a personal providence, by some in laws not yet fully understood, we stand at the opening of a period when the question is to be settled decisively, though the issue may be long delayed, whether eastern or western civilization is to dominate throughout the earth and to control its future. the great task now before the world of civilized christianity, its great mission, which it must fulfil or perish, is to receive into its own bosom and raise to its own ideals those ancient and different civilizations by which it is surrounded and outnumbered,--the civilizations at the head of which stand china, india, and japan. this, to cite the most striking of the many forms in which it is presented to us, is surely the mission which great britain, sword ever at hand, has been discharging towards india; but that stands not alone. the history of the present century has been that of a constant increasing pressure of our own civilization upon these older ones, till now, as we cast our eyes in any direction, there is everywhere a stirring, a rousing from sleep, drowsy for the most part, but real, unorganized as yet, but conscious that that which rudely interrupts their dream of centuries possesses over them at least two advantages,--power and material prosperity,--the things which unspiritual humanity, the world over, most craves. what the ultimate result will be it would be vain to prophesy,--the data for a guess even are not at hand; but it is not equally impossible to note present conditions, and to suggest present considerations, which may shape proximate action, and tend to favor the preponderance of that form of civilization which we cannot but deem the most promising for the future, not of our race only, but of the world at large. we are not living in a perfect world, and we may not expect to deal with imperfect conditions by methods ideally perfect. time and staying power must be secured for ourselves by that rude and imperfect, but not ignoble, arbiter, force,--force potential and force organized,--which so far has won, and still secures, the greatest triumphs of good in the checkered history of mankind. our material advantages, once noted, will be recognized readily and appropriated with avidity; while the spiritual ideas which dominate our thoughts, and are weighty in their influence over action, even with those among us who do not accept historic christianity or the ordinary creeds of christendom, will be rejected for long. the eternal law, first that which is natural, afterwards that which is spiritual, will obtain here, as in the individual, and in the long history of our own civilization. between the two there is an interval, in which force must be ready to redress any threatened disturbance of an equal balance between those who stand on divergent planes of thought, without common standards. and yet more is this true if, as is commonly said, faith is failing among ourselves, if the progress of our own civilization is towards the loss of those spiritual convictions upon which it was founded, and which in early days were mighty indeed towards the overthrowing of strongholds of evil. what, in such a case, shall play the tremendous part which the church of the middle ages, with all its defects and with all the shortcomings of its ministers, played amid the ruin of the roman empire and the flood of the barbarians? if our own civilization is becoming material only, a thing limited in hope and love to this world, i know not what we have to offer to save ourselves or others; but in either event, whether to go down finally under a flood of outside invasion, or whether to succeed, by our own living faith, in converting to our ideal civilization those who shall thus press upon us,--in either event we need time, and time can be gained only by organized material force. nor is this view advanced in any spirit of unfriendliness to the other ancient civilizations, whose genius admittedly has been and is foreign to our own. one who believes that god has made of one blood all nations of men who dwell on the face of the whole earth cannot but check and repress, if he ever feels, any movement of aversion to mankind outside his own race. but it is not necessary to hate carthage in order to admit that it was well for mankind that rome triumphed; and we at this day, and men to all time, may be thankful that a few decades after the punic wars the genius of cæsar so expanded the bounds of the dominions of rome, so extended, settled, and solidified the outworks of her civilization and polity, that when the fated day came that her power in turn should reel under the shock of conquest, with which she had remodelled the world, and she should go down herself, the time of the final fall was protracted for centuries by these exterior defences. they who began the assault as barbarians entered upon the imperial heritage no longer aliens and foreigners, but impregnated already with the best of roman ideas, converts to roman law and to christian faith. "when the course of history," says mommsen, "turns from the miserable monotony of the political selfishness which fought its battles in the senate house and in the streets of rome, we may be allowed--on the threshold of an event the effects of which still at the present day influence the destinies of the world--to look round us for a moment, and to indicate the point of view under which the conquest of what is now france by the romans, and their first contact with the inhabitants of germany and of great britain, are to be regarded in connection with the general history of the world.... the fact that the great celtic people were ruined by the transalpine wars of cæsar was not the most important result of that grand enterprise,--far more momentous than the negative was the positive result. it hardly admits of a doubt that if the rule of the senate had prolonged its semblance of life for some generations longer, the migration of the peoples, as it is called, would have occurred four hundred years sooner than it did, and would have occurred at a time when the italian civilization had not become naturalized either in gaul or on the danube or in africa and spain. inasmuch as cæsar with sure glance perceived in the german tribes the rival antagonists of the romano-greek world, inasmuch as with firm hand he established the new system of aggressive defence down even to its details, and taught men to protect the frontiers of the empire by rivers or artificial ramparts, to colonize the nearest barbarian tribes along the frontier with the view of warding off the more remote, and to recruit the roman army by enlistment from the enemy's country, he gained for the hellenic-italian culture the interval necessary to civilize the west, just as it had already civilized the east.... centuries elapsed before men understood that alexander had not merely erected an ephemeral kingdom in the east, but had carried hellenism to asia; centuries again elapsed before men understood that cæsar had not merely conquered a new province for the romans, but had laid the foundation for the romanizing of the regions of the west. it was only a late posterity that perceived the meaning of those expeditions to england and germany, so inconsiderate in a military point of view, and so barren of immediate result.... that there is a bridge connecting the past glory of hellas and rome with the prouder fabric of modern history; that western europe is romanic, and germanic europe classic; that the names of themistocles and scipio have to us a very different sound from those of asoka and salmanassar; that homer and sophocles are not merely like the vedas and kalidasa, attractive to the literary botanist, but bloom for us in our own garden,--all this is the work of cæsar." history at times reveals her foresight concrete in the action of a great individuality like cæsar's. more often her profounder movements proceed from impulses whose origin and motives cannot be traced, although a succession of steps may be discerned and their results stated. a few names, for instance, emerge amid the obscure movements of the peoples which precipitated the outer peoples upon the roman empire, but, with rare exceptions, they are simply exponents, pushed forward and upward by the torrent; at the utmost guides, not controllers, of those whom they represent but do not govern. it is much the same now. the peoples of european civilization, after a period of comparative repose, are again advancing all along the line, to occupy not only the desert places of the earth, but the debatable grounds, the buffer territories, which hitherto have separated them from those ancient nations, with whom they now soon must stand face to face and border to border. but who will say that this vast general movement represents the thought, even the unconscious thought, of any one man, as cæsar, or of any few men? to whatever cause we may assign it, whether to the simple conception of a personal divine monarchy that shapes our ends, or to more complicated ultimate causes, the responsibility rests upon the shoulders of no individual men. necessity is laid upon the peoples, and they move, like the lemmings of scandinavia; but to man, being not without understanding like the beasts that perish, it is permitted to ask, "whither?" and "what shall be the end hereof?" does this tend to universal peace, general disarmament, and treaties of permanent arbitration? is it the harbinger of ready mutual understanding, of quick acceptance of, and delight in, opposing traditions and habits of life and thought? is such quick acceptance found now where easterns and westerns impinge? does contact forebode the speedy disappearance of great armies and navies, and dictate the wisdom of dispensing with that form of organized force which at present is embodied in them? what, then, will be the actual conditions when these civilizations, of diverse origin and radically distinct,--because the evolution of racial characteristics radically different,--confront each other without the interposition of any neutral belt, by the intervention of which the contrasts, being more remote, are less apparent, and within which distinctions shade one into the other? there will be seen, on the one hand, a vast preponderance of numbers, and those numbers, however incoherent now in mass, composed of units which in their individual capacity have in no small degree the great elements of strength whereby man prevails over man and the fittest survives. deficient, apparently, in aptitude for political and social organization, they have failed to evolve the aggregate power and intellectual scope of which as communities they are otherwise capable. this lesson too they may learn, as they already have learned from us much that they have failed themselves to originate; but to the lack of it is chiefly due the inferiority of material development under which, as compared to ourselves, they now labor. but men do not covet less the prosperity which they themselves cannot or do not create,--a trait wherein lies the strength of communism as an aggressive social force. communities which want and cannot have, except by force, will take by force, unless they are restrained by force; nor will it be unprecedented in the history of the world that the flood of numbers should pour over and sweep away the barriers which intelligent foresight, like cæsar's, may have erected against them. still more will this be so if the barriers have ceased to be manned--forsaken or neglected by men in whom the proud combative spirit of their ancestors has given way to the cry for the abandonment of military preparation and to the decay of warlike habits. nevertheless, even under such conditions,--which obtained increasingly during the decline of the roman empire,--positions suitably chosen, frontiers suitably advanced, will do much to retard and, by gaining time, to modify the disaster to the one party, and to convert the general issue to the benefit of the world. hence the immense importance of discerning betimes what the real value of positions is, and where occupation should betimes begin. here, in part at least, is the significance of the great outward movement of the european nations to-day. consciously or unconsciously, they are advancing the outposts of our civilization, and accumulating the line of defences which will permit it to survive, or at the least will insure that it shall not go down till it has leavened the character of the world for a future brighter even than its past, just as the roman civilization inspired and exalted its teutonic conquerors, and continues to bless them to this day. such is the tendency of movement in that which we in common parlance call the old world. as the nineteenth century closes, the tide has already turned and the current is flowing strongly. it is not too soon, for vast is the work before it. contrasted to the outside world in extent and population, the civilization of the european group of families, to which our interests and anxieties, our hopes and fears, are so largely confined, has been as an oasis in a desert. the seat and scene of the loftiest culture, of the highest intellectual activities, it is not in them so much that it has exceeded the rest of the world as in the political development and material prosperity which it has owed to the virile energies of its sons, alike in commerce and in war. to these energies the mechanical and scientific acquirements of the past half-century or more have extended means whereby prosperity has increased manifold, as have the inequalities in material well-being existing between those within its borders and those without, who have not had the opportunity or the wit to use the same advantages. and along with this preeminence in wealth arises the cry to disarm, as though the race, not of europe only, but of the world, were already run, and the goal of universal peace not only reached but secured. yet are conditions such, even within our favored borders, that we are ready to disband the particular organized manifestation of physical force which we call the police? despite internal jealousies and friction on the continent of europe, perhaps even because of them, the solidarity of the european family therein contained is shown in this great common movement, the ultimate beneficence of which is beyond all doubt, as evidenced by the british domination in india and egypt, and to which the habit of arms not only contributes, but is essential. india and egypt are at present the two most conspicuous, though they are not the sole, illustrations of benefits innumerable and lasting, which rest upon the power of the sword in the hands of enlightenment and justice. it is possible, of course, to confuse this conclusion, to obscure the real issue, by dwelling upon details of wrongs at times inflicted, of blunders often made. any episode in the struggling progress of humanity may be thus perplexed; but looking at the broad result, it is indisputable that the vast gains to humanity made in the regions named not only once originated, but still rest, upon the exertion and continued maintenance of organized physical force. the same general solidarity as against the outside world, which is unconsciously manifested in the general resumption of colonizing movements, receives particular conscious expression in the idea of imperial federation, which, amid the many buffets and reverses common to all successful movements, has gained such notable ground in the sentiment of the british people and of their colonists. that immense practical difficulties have to be overcome, in order to realize the ends towards which such sentiments point, is but a commonplace of human experience in all ages and countries. they give rise to the ready sneer of impossible, just as any project of extending the sphere of the united states, by annexation or otherwise, is met by the constitutional lion in the path, which the unwilling or the apprehensive is ever sure to find; yet, to use words of one who never lightly admitted impossibilities, "if a thing is necessary to be done, the more difficulties, the more necessary to try to remove them." as sentiment strengthens, it undermines obstacles, and they crumble before it. the same tendency is shown in the undeniable disposition of the british people and of british, statesmen to cultivate the good-will of the united states, and to draw closer the relations between the two countries. for the disposition underlying such a tendency mr. balfour has used an expression, "race patriotism,"--a phrase which finds its first approximation, doubtless, in the english-speaking family, but which may well extend its embrace, in a time yet distant, to all those who have drawn their present civilization from the same remote sources. the phrase is so pregnant of solution for the problems of the future, as conceived by the writer, that he hopes to see it obtain the currency due to the value of the idea which it formulates. that this disposition on the part of great britain, towards her colonies and towards the united states, shows sound policy as well as sentiment, may be granted readily; but why should sound policy, the seeking of one's own advantage, if by open and honest means, be imputed as a crime? in democracies, however, policy cannot long dispute the sceptre with sentiment. that there is lukewarm response in the united states is due to that narrow conception which grew up with the middle of the century, whose analogue in great britain is the little england party, and which in our own country would turn all eyes inward, and see no duty save to ourselves. how shall two walk together except they be agreed? how shall there be true sympathy between a nation whose political activities are world-wide, and one that eats out its heart in merely internal political strife? when we begin really to look abroad, and to busy ourselves with our duties to the world at large in our generation--and not before--we shall stretch out our hands to great britain, realizing that in unity of heart among the english-speaking races lies the best hope of humanity in the doubtful days ahead. in the determination of the duties of nations, nearness is the most conspicuous and the most general indication. considering the american states as members of the european family, as they are by traditions, institutions, and languages, it is in the pacific, where the westward course of empire again meets the east, that their relations to the future of the world become most apparent. the atlantic, bordered on either shore by the european family in the strongest and most advanced types of its political development, no longer severs, but binds together, by all the facilities and abundance of water communications, the once divided children of the same mother; the inheritors of greece and rome, and of the teutonic conquerors of the latter. a limited express or a flying freight may carry a few passengers or a small bulk overland from the atlantic to the pacific more rapidly than modern steamers can cross the former ocean, but for the vast amounts in numbers or in quantity which are required for the full fruition of communication, it is the land that divides, and not the sea. on the pacific coast, severed from their brethren by desert and mountain range, are found the outposts, the exposed pioneers of european civilization, whom it is one of the first duties of the european family to bind more closely to the main body, and to protect, by due foresight over the approaches to them on either side. it is in this political fact, and not in the weighing of merely commercial advantages, that is to be found the great significance of the future canal across the central american isthmus, as well as the importance of the caribbean sea; for the latter is inseparably intwined with all international consideration of the isthmus problem. wherever situated, whether at panama or at nicaragua, the fundamental meaning of the canal will be that it advances by thousands of miles the frontiers of european civilization in general, and of the united states in particular; that it knits together the whole system of american states enjoying that civilization as in no other way they can be bound. in the caribbean archipelago--the very domain of sea power, if ever region could be called so--are the natural home and centre of those influences by which such a maritime highway as a canal must be controlled, even as the control of the suez canal rests in the mediterranean. hawaii, too, is an outpost of the canal, as surely as aden or malta is of suez; or as malta was of india in the days long before the canal, when nelson proclaimed that in that point of view chiefly was it important to great britain. in the cluster of island fortresses of the caribbean is one of the greatest of the nerve centres of the whole body of european civilization; and it is to be regretted that so serious a portion of them now is in hands which not only never have given, but to all appearances never can give, the development which is required by the general interest. for what awaits us in the future, in common with the states of europe, is not a mere question of advantage or disadvantage--of more or less. issues of vital moment are involved. a present generation is trustee for its successors, and may be faithless to its charge quite as truly by inaction as by action, by omission as by commission. failure to improve opportunity, where just occasion arises, may entail upon posterity problems and difficulties which, if overcome at all--it may then be too late--will be so at the cost of blood and tears that timely foresight might have spared. such preventive measures, if taken, are in no true sense offensive but defensive. decadent conditions, such as we observe in turkey--and not in turkey alone--cannot be indefinitely prolonged by opportunist counsels or timid procrastination. a time comes in human affairs, as in physical ailments, when heroic measures must be used to save the life of a patient or the welfare of a community; and if that time is allowed to pass, as many now think that it was at the time of the crimean war, the last state is worse than the first,--an opinion which these passing days of the hesitancy of the concert and the anguish of greece, not to speak of the armenian outrages, surely indorse. europe, advancing in distant regions, still allows to exist in her own side, unexcised, a sore that may yet drain her life-blood; still leaves in recognized dominion, over fair regions of great future import, a system whose hopelessness of political and social improvement the lapse of time renders continually more certain,--an evil augury for the future, if a turning tide shall find it unchanged, an outpost of barbarism ready for alien occupation. it is essential to our own good, it is yet more essential as part of our duty to the commonwealth of peoples to which we racially belong, that we look with clear, dispassionate, but resolute eyes upon the fact that civilizations on different planes of material prosperity and progress, with different spiritual ideals, and with very different political capacities, are fast closing together. it is a condition not unprecedented in the history of the world. when it befell a great united empire, enervated by long years of unwarlike habits among its chief citizens, it entailed ruin, but ruin deferred through centuries, thanks to the provision made beforehand by a great general and statesman. the saracenic and turkish invasions, on the contrary, after generations of advance, were first checked, and then rolled back; for they fell upon peoples, disunited indeed by internal discords and strife, like the nations of europe to-day, but still nations of warriors, ready by training and habit to strike for their rights, and, if need were, to die for them. in the providence of god, along with the immense increase of prosperity, of physical and mental luxury, brought by this century, there has grown up also that counterpoise stigmatized as "militarism," which has converted europe into a great camp of soldiers prepared for war. the ill-timed cry for disarmament, heedless of the menacing possibilities of the future, breaks idly against a great fact, which finds its sufficient justification in present conditions, but which is, above all, an unconscious preparation for something as yet noted but by few. on the side of the land, these great armies, and the blind outward impulse of the european peoples, are the assurance that generations must elapse ere the barriers can be overcome behind which rests the citadel of christian civilization. on the side of the sea there is no state charged with weightier responsibilities than the united states. in the caribbean, the sensitive resentment by our people of any supposed fresh encroachment by another state of the european family has been manifested too plainly and too recently to admit of dispute. such an attitude of itself demands of us to be ready to support it by organized force, exactly as the mutual jealousy of states within the european continent imposes upon them the maintenance of their great armies--destined, we believe, in the future, to fulfil a nobler mission. where we thus exclude others, we accept for ourselves the responsibility for that which is due to the general family of our civilization; and the caribbean sea, with its isthmus, is the nexus where will meet the chords binding the east to the west, the atlantic to the pacific. the isthmus, with all that depends upon it,--its canal and its approaches on either hand,--will link the eastern side of the american continent to the western as no network of land communications ever can. in it the united states has asserted a special interest. in the present she can maintain her claim, and in the future perform her duty, only by the creation of that sea power upon which predominance in the caribbean must ever depend. in short, as the internal jealousies of europe, and the purely democratic institution of the _levée en masse_--the general enforcement of military training--have prepared the way for great national armies, whose mission seems yet obscure, so the gradual broadening and tightening hold upon the sentiment of american democracy of that conviction loosely characterized as the monroe doctrine finds its logical and inevitable outcome in a great sea power, the correlative, in connection with that of great britain, of those armies which continue to flourish under the most popular institutions, despite the wails of economists and the lamentations of those who wish peace without paying the one price which alone has ever insured peace,--readiness for war. thus it was, while readiness for war lasted, that the teuton was held back until he became civilized, humanized, after the standard of that age; till the root of the matter was in him, sure to bear fruit in due season. he was held back by organized armed force--by armies. will it be said that that was in a past barbaric age? barbarism, however, is not in more or less material prosperity, or even political development, but in the inner man, in the spiritual ideal; and the material, which comes first and has in itself no salt of life to save from corruption, must be controlled by other material forces, until the spiritual can find room and time to germinate. we need not fear but that that which appeals to the senses in our civilization will be appropriated, even though it be necessary to destroy us, if disarmed, in order to obtain it. our own civilization less its spiritual element is barbarism; and barbarism will be the civilization of those who assimilate its material progress without imbibing the indwelling spirit. let us worship peace, indeed, as the goal at which humanity must hope to arrive; but let us not fancy that peace is to be had as a boy wrenches an unripe fruit from a tree. nor will peace be reached by ignoring the conditions that confront us, or by exaggerating the charms of quiet, of prosperity, of ease, and by contrasting these exclusively with the alarms and horrors of war. merely utilitarian arguments have never convinced nor converted mankind, and they never will; for mankind knows that there is something better. its homage will never be commanded by peace, presented as the tutelary deity of the stock-market. nothing is more ominous for the future of our race than that tendency, vociferous at present, which refuses to recognize in the profession of arms, in war, that something which inspired wordsworth's "happy warrior," which soothed the dying hours of henry lawrence, who framed the ideals of his career on the poet's conception, and so nobly illustrated it in his self-sacrifice; that something which has made the soldier to all ages the type of heroism and of self-denial. when the religion of christ, of him who was led as a lamb to the slaughter, seeks to raise before its followers the image of self-control, and of resistance to evil, it is the soldier whom it presents. he himself, if by office king of peace, is, first of all, in the essence of his being, king of righteousness, without which true peace cannot be. conflict is the condition of all life, material and spiritual; and it is to the soldier's experience that the spiritual life goes for its most vivid metaphors and its loftiest inspirations. whatever else the twentieth century may bring us, it will not, from anything now current in the thought of the nineteenth, receive a nobler ideal. [illustration: the gulf of mexico and the caribbean sea] the strategic features of the gulf of mexico and the caribbean sea. _june, ._ the importance, absolute and relative, of portions of the earth's surface, and their consequent interest to mankind, vary from time to time. the mediterranean was for many ages the centre round which gathered all the influences and developments of those earlier civilizations from which our own, mediately or immediately, derives. during the chaotic period of struggle that intervened between their fall and the dawn of our modern conditions, the inland sea, through its hold upon the traditions and culture of antiquity, still retained a general ascendency, although at length its political predominance was challenged, and finally overcome, by the younger, more virile, and more warlike nationalities that had been forming gradually beyond the alps, and on the shores of the atlantic and northern oceans. it was, until the close of the middle ages, the one route by which the east and the west maintained commercial relations; for, although the trade eastward from the levant was by long and painful land journeys, over mountain range and desert plain, water communication, in part and up to that point, was afforded by the mediterranean, and by it alone. with the discovery of the passage by the cape of good hope this advantage departed, while at the same instant the discovery of a new world opened out to the old new elements of luxury and a new sphere of ambition. then the mediterranean, thrown upon its own productive resources alone, swayed in the east by the hopeless barbarism of the turk, in the west by the decadent despotism of spain, and, between the two, divided among a number of petty states, incapable of united and consequently of potent action, sank into a factor of relatively small consequence to the onward progress of the world. during the wars of the french revolution, when the life of great britain, and consequently the issue of the strife, depended upon the vigor of british commerce, british merchant shipping was nearly driven from that sea; and but two per cent of a trade that was increasing mightily all the time was thence derived. how the suez canal and the growth of the eastern question, in its modern form, have changed all that, it is needless to say. yet, through all the period of relative insignificance, the relations of the mediterranean to the east and to the west, in the broad sense of those expressions, preserved to it a political importance to the world at large which rendered it continuously a scene of great political ambitions and military enterprise. since great britain first actively intervened in those waters, two centuries ago, she at no time has surrendered willingly her pretensions to be a leading mediterranean power, although her possessions there are of purely military, or rather naval, value. the caribbean sea and the gulf of mexico, taken together, form an inland sea and an archipelago. they too have known those mutabilities of fortune which receive illustration alike in the history of countries and in the lives of individuals. the first scene of discovery and of conquest in the new world, these twin sheets of water, with their islands and their mainlands, became for many generations, and nearly to our own time, a veritable el dorado,--a land where the least of labor, on the part of its new possessors, rendered the largest and richest returns. the bounty of nature, and the ease with which climatic conditions, aided by the unwarlike character of most of the natives, adapted themselves to the institution of slavery, insured the cheap and abundant production of articles which, when once enjoyed, men found indispensable, as they already had the silks and spices of the east. in mexico and in peru were realized also, in degree, the actual gold-mine sought by the avarice of the earlier spanish explorers; while a short though difficult tropical journey brought the treasures of the west coast across the isthmus to the shores of the broad ocean, nature's great highway, which washed at once the shores of old and of new spain. from the caribbean, great britain, although her rivals had anticipated her in the possession of the largest and richest districts, derived nearly twenty-five per cent of her commerce, during the strenuous period when the mediterranean contributed but two per cent. but over these fair regions too passed the blight, not of despotism merely, for despotism was characteristic of the times, but of a despotism which found no counteractive, no element of future deliverance, in the temperament or in the political capacities of the people over whom it ruled. elizabeth, as far as she dared, was a despot; philip ii. was a despot; but there was already manifest in her subjects, while there was not in his, a will and a power not merely to resist oppression, but to organize freedom. this will and this power, after gaining many partial victories by the way, culminated once for all in the american revolution. great britain has never forgotten the lesson then taught; for it was one she herself had been teaching for centuries, and her people and statesmen were therefore easy learners. a century and a quarter has passed since that warning was given, not to great britain only, but to the world; and we to-day see, in the contrasted colonial systems of the two states, the results, on the one hand of political aptitude, on the other of political obtuseness and backwardness, which cannot struggle from the past into the present until the present in turn has become the past--irreclaimable. causes superficially very diverse but essentially the same, in that they arose from and still depend upon a lack of local political capacity, have brought the mediterranean and the caribbean, in our own time, to similar conditions, regarded as quantities of interest in the sphere of international relations. whatever the intrinsic value of the two bodies of water, in themselves or in their surroundings, whatever their present contributions to the prosperity or to the culture of mankind, their conspicuous characteristics now are their political and military importance, in the broadest sense, as concerning not only the countries that border them, but the world at large. both are land-girt seas; both are links in a chain of communication between an east and a west; in both the chain is broken by an isthmus; both are of contracted extent when compared with great oceans, and, in consequence of these common features, both present in an intensified form the advantages and the limitations, political and military, which condition the influence of sea power. this conclusion is notably true of the mediterranean, as is shown by its history. it is even more forcibly true of the caribbean, partly because the contour of its shores does not, as in the mediterranean peninsulas, thrust the power of the land so far and so sustainedly into the sea; partly because, from historical antecedents already alluded to, in the character of the first colonists, and from the shortness of the time the ground has been in civilized occupation, there does not exist in the caribbean or in the gulf of mexico--apart from the united states--any land power at all comparable with those great continental states of europe whose strength lies in their armies far more than in their navies. so far as national inclinations, as distinct from the cautious actions of statesmen, can be discerned, in the mediterranean at present the sea powers, great britain, france, and italy, are opposed to the land powers, germany, austria, and russia; and the latter dominate action. it cannot be so, in any near future, in the caribbean. as affirmed in a previous paper, the caribbean is pre-eminently the domain of sea power. it is in this point of view--the military or naval--that it is now to be considered. its political importance will be assumed, as recognized by our forefathers, and enforced upon our own attention by the sudden apprehensions awakened within the last two years. it may be well, though possibly needless, to ask readers to keep clearly in mind that the caribbean sea and the gulf of mexico, while knit together like the siamese twins, are distinct geographical entities. a leading british periodical once accused the writer of calling the gulf of mexico the caribbean sea, because of his unwillingness to admit the name of any other state in connection with a body of water over which his own country claimed predominance. the gulf of mexico is very clearly defined by the projection, from the north, of the peninsula of florida, and from the south, of that of yucatan. between the two the island of cuba interposes for a distance of two hundred miles, leaving on one side a passage of nearly a hundred miles wide--the strait of florida--into the atlantic, while on the other, the yucatan channel, somewhat broader, leads into the caribbean sea. it may be mentioned here, as an important military consideration, that from the mouth of the mississippi westward to cape catoche--the tip of the yucatan peninsula--there is no harbor that can be considered at all satisfactory for ships of war of the larger classes. the existence of many such harbors in other parts of the regions now under consideration practically eliminates this long stretch of coast, regarded as a factor of military importance in the problem before us. in each of these sheets of water, the gulf of mexico and the caribbean, there is one position of pre-eminent commercial importance. in the gulf the mouth of the mississippi is the point where meet all the exports and imports, by water, of the mississippi valley. however diverse the directions from which they come, or the destinations to which they proceed, all come together here as at a great crossroads, or as the highways of an empire converge on the metropolis. whatever value the mississippi and the myriad miles of its subsidiary water-courses represent to the united states, as a facile means of communication from the remote interior to the ocean highways of the world, all centres here at the mouth of the river. the existence of the smaller though important cities of the gulf coast--mobile, galveston, or the mexican ports--does not diminish, but rather emphasizes by contrast, the importance of the mississippi entrance. they all share its fortunes, in that all alike communicate with the outside world through the strait of florida or the yucatan channel. in the caribbean, likewise, the existence of numerous important ports, and a busy traffic in tropical produce grown within the region itself, do but make more striking the predominance in interest of that one position known comprehensively, but up to the present somewhat indeterminately, as the isthmus. here again the element of decisive value is the crossing of the roads, the meeting of the ways, which, whether imposed by nature itself, as in the cases before us, or induced, as sometimes happens, in a less degree, by simple human dispositions, are prime factors in mercantile or strategic consequence. for these reasons the isthmus, even under the disadvantages of land carriage and transshipment of goods, has ever been an important link in the communications from east to west, from the days of the first discoverers and throughout all subsequent centuries, though fluctuating in degree from age to age; but when it shall be pierced by a canal, it will present a maritime centre analogous to the mouth of the mississippi. they will differ in this, that in the latter case the converging water routes on one side are interior to a great state whose resources they bear, whereas the roads which on either side converge upon the isthmus lie wholly upon the ocean, the common possession of all nations. control of the latter, therefore, rests either upon local control of the isthmus itself, or, indirectly, upon control of its approaches, or upon a distinctly preponderant navy. in naval questions the latter is always the dominant factor, exactly as on land the mobile army--the army in the field--must dominate the question of fortresses, unless war is to be impotent. we have thus the two centres round which revolve all the military study of the caribbean sea and the gulf of mexico. the two sheets of water, taken together, control or affect the approaches on one side to these two supreme centres of commercial, and therefore of political and military, interest. the approaches on the other side--the interior communications of the mississippi, that is, or the maritime routes in the pacific converging upon the isthmus--do not here concern us. these approaches, in terms of military art, are known as the "communications." communications are probably the most vital and determining element in strategy, military or naval. they are literally the most radical; for all military operations depend upon communications, as the fruit of a plant depends upon communication with its root. we draw therefore upon the map the chief lines by which communication exists between these two centres and the outside world. such lines represent the mutual dependence of the centres and the exterior, by which each ministers to the others, and by severance of which either becomes useless to the others. it is from their potential effect upon these lines of communication that all positions in the gulf or the caribbean derive their military value, or want of value. it is impossible to precede or to accompany a discussion of this sort with a technical exposition of naval strategy. such definitions of the art as may be needed must be given _in loco_, cursorily and dogmatically. therefore it will be said here briefly that the strategic value of any position, be it body of land large or small, or a seaport, or a strait, depends, , upon situation (with reference chiefly to communications), , upon its strength (inherent or acquired), and, , upon its resources (natural or stored). as strength and resources are matters which man can accumulate where suitable situation offers, whereas he cannot change the location of a place in itself otherwise advantageous, it is upon situation that attention must primarily be fixed. strength and resources may be artificially supplied or increased, but it passes the power of man to move a port which lies outside the limits of strategic effect. gibraltar in mid-ocean might have fourfold its present power, yet would be valueless in a military sense. the positions which are indicated on the map by the dark squares have been selected, therefore, upon these considerations, after a careful study of the inherent advantages of the various ports and coast-lines of the caribbean sea and the gulf. it is by no means meant that there are not others which possess merits of various kinds; or that those indicated, and to be named, exhaust the strategic possibilities of the region under examination. but there are qualifying circumstances of degree in particular cases; and a certain regard must be had to political conditions, which may be said to a great extent to neutralize some positions. some, too, are excluded because overshadowed by others so near and so strong as practically to embrace them, when under the same political tenure. moreover, it is a commonplace of strategy that passive positions, fortified places, however strong, although indispensable as supports to military operations, should not be held in great number. to do so wastes force. similarly, in the study of a field of maritime operations, the number of available positions, whose relative and combined influence upon the whole is to be considered, should be narrowed, by a process of gradual elimination, to those clearly essential and representative. to embrace more confuses the attention, wastes mental force, and is a hindrance to correct appreciation. the rejection of details, where permissible, and understandingly done, facilitates comprehension, which is baffled by a multiplication of minutiae, just as the impression of a work of art, or of a story, is lost amid a multiplicity of figures or of actors. the investigation precedent to formulation of ideas must be close and minute, but that done, the unbiassed selection of the most important, expressed graphically by a few lines and a few dots, leads most certainly to the comprehension of decisive relations in a military field of action. in the united states, pensacola and the mississippi river have been rivals for the possession of a navy-yard. the recent decision of a specially appointed board in favor of the latter, while it commands the full assent of the writer, by no means eliminates the usefulness of the former. taken together, they fulfil a fair requirement of strategy, sea and land, that operations based upon a national frontier, which a coast-line is, should not depend upon a single place only. they are closer together than ideal perfection would wish; too easily, therefore, to be watched by an enemy without great dispersal of his force, which norfolk and new york, for instance, are not; but still, conjointly, they are the best we can do on that line, having regard to the draught of water for heavy ships. key west, an island lying off the end of the florida peninsula, has long been recognized as the chief, and almost the only, good and defensible anchorage upon the strait of florida, reasonable control of which is indispensable to water communication between our atlantic and gulf seaboards in time of war. in case of war in the direction of the caribbean, key west is the extreme point now in our possession upon which, granting adequate fortification, our fleets could rely; and, so used, it would effectually divert an enemy's force from pensacola and the mississippi. it can never be the ultimate base of operations, as pensacola or new orleans can, because it is an island, a small island, and has no resources--not even water; but for the daily needs of a fleet--coal, ammunition, etc.--it can be made most effective. sixty miles west of it stands an antiquated fortress on the dry tortugas. these are capable of being made a useful adjunct to key west, but at present they scarcely can be so considered. key west is miles distant from the mouth of the mississippi, and from the isthmus. the islands of santa lucia and of martinique have been selected because they represent the chief positions of, respectively, great britain and france on the outer limits of the general field under consideration. for the reasons already stated, grenada, barbadoes, dominica, and the other near british islands are not taken into account, or rather are considered to be embraced in santa lucia, which adequately represents them. if a secondary position on that line were required, it would be at antigua, which would play to santa lucia the part which pensacola does to the mississippi. in like manner the french guadeloupe merges in martinique. the intrinsic importance of these positions consists in the fact that, being otherwise suitable and properly defended, they are the nearest to the mother-countries, between whom and themselves there lies no point of danger near which it is necessary to pass. they have the disadvantage of being very small islands, consequently without adequate natural resources, and easy to be blockaded on all sides. they are therefore essentially dependent for their usefulness in war upon control of the sea, which neither pensacola nor new orleans is, having the continent at their backs. it is in this respect that the pre-eminent intrinsic advantages of cuba, or rather of spain in cuba, are to be seen; and also, but in much less degree, those of great britain in jamaica. cuba, though narrow throughout, is over six hundred miles long, from cape san antonio to cape maysi. it is, in short, not so much an island as a continent, susceptible, under proper development, of great resources--of self-sufficingness. in area it is half as large again as ireland, but, owing to its peculiar form, is much more than twice as long. marine distances, therefore, are drawn out to an extreme degree. its many natural harbors concentrate themselves, to a military examination, into three principal groups, whose representatives are, in the west, havana; in the east, santiago; while near midway of the southern shore lies cienfuegos. the shortest water distance separating any two of these is miles, from santiago to cienfuegos. to get from cienfuegos to havana miles of water must be traversed and the western point of the island doubled; yet the two ports are distant by land only a little more than a hundred miles of fairly easy country. regarded, therefore, as a base of naval operations, as a source of supplies to a fleet, cuba presents a condition wholly unique among the islands of the caribbean and of the gulf of mexico; to both which it, and it alone of all the archipelago, belongs. it is unique in its size, which should render it largely self-supporting, either by its own products, or by the accumulation of foreign necessaries which naturally obtains in a large and prosperous maritime community; and it is unique in that such supplies can be conveyed from one point to the other, according to the needs of a fleet, by interior lines, not exposed to risks of maritime capture. the extent of the coast-line, the numerous harbors, and the many directions from which approach can be made, minimize the dangers of total blockade, to which all islands are subject. such conditions are in themselves advantageous, but they are especially so to a navy inferior to its adversary, for they convey the power--subject, of course, to conditions of skill--of shifting operations from side to side, and finding refuge and supplies in either direction. jamaica, being but one-tenth the size of cuba, and one-fifth of its length, does not present the intrinsic advantages of the latter island, regarded either as a source of supplies or as a centre from which to direct effort; but when in the hands of a power supreme at sea, as at the present great britain is, the questions of supplies, of blockade, and of facility in direction of effort diminish in importance. that which in the one case is a matter of life and death, becomes now only an embarrassing problem, necessitating watchfulness and precaution, but by no means insoluble. no advantages of position can counterbalance, in the long-run, decisive inferiority in organized mobile force,--inferiority in troops in the field, and yet much more in ships on the sea. if spain should become involved in war with great britain, as she so often before has been, the advantage she would have in cuba as against jamaica would be that her communications with the united states, especially with the gulf ports, would be well under cover. by this is not meant that vessels bound to cuba by such routes would be in unassailable security; no communications, maritime or terrestrial, can be so against raiding. what is meant is that they can be protected with much less effort than they can be attacked; that the raiders--the offence--must be much more numerous and active than the defence, because much farther from their base; and that the question of such raiding would depend consequently upon the force great britain could spare from other scenes of war, for it is not likely that spain would fight her single-handed. it is quite possible that under such conditions advantage of position would more than counterbalance a _small_ disadvantage in local force. "war," said napoleon, "is a business of positions;" by which that master of lightning-like rapidity of movement assuredly did not mean that it was a business of getting into a position and sticking there. it is in the utilization of position by mobile force that war is determined, just as the effect of a chessman depends upon both its individual value _and_ its relative position. while, therefore, in the combination of the two factors, force and position, force is intrinsically the more valuable, it is always possible that great advantage of position may outweigh small advantage of force, as + is greater than + . the positional value of cuba is extremely great. regarded solely as a naval position, without reference to the force thereon based, jamaica is greatly inferior to cuba in a question of general war, notwithstanding the fact that in kingston it possesses an excellent harbor and naval station. it is only with direct reference to the isthmus, and therefore to the local question of the caribbean as the main scene of hostilities, that it possesses a certain superiority which will be touched on later. it is advisable first to complete the list, and so far as necessary to account for the selection, of the other points indicated by the squares. of these, three are so nearly together at the isthmus that, according to the rule before adopted, they might be reduced very properly to a single representative position. being, however, so close to the great centre of interest in the caribbean, and having different specific reasons constituting their importance, it is essential to a full statement of strategic conditions in that sea to mention briefly each and all. they are, the harbor and town of colon, sometimes called aspinwall; the harbor and city of cartagena, miles to the eastward of colon; and the chiriqui lagoon, miles west of colon, a vast enclosed bay with many islands, giving excellent and diversified anchorage, the shores of which are nearly uninhabited. colon is the caribbean terminus of the panama railroad, and is also that of the canal projected, and partly dug, under the de lesseps scheme. the harbor being good, though open to some winds, it is naturally indicated as a point where isthmian transit may begin or end. as there is no intention of entering into the controversy about the relative merits of the panama and nicaragua canal schemes, it will be sufficient here to say that, if the former be carried through, colon is its inevitable issue on one side. the city of cartagena is the largest and most flourishing in the neighborhood of the isthmus, and has a good harbor. with these conditions obtaining, its advantage rests upon the axiomatic principle that, other things being nearly equal, a place where commerce centres is a better strategic position than one which it neglects. the latter is the condition of the chiriqui lagoon. this truly noble sheet of water, which was visited by columbus himself, and bears record of the fact in the name of one of its basins,--the bay of the admiral,--has every natural adaptation for a purely naval base, but has not drawn to itself the operations of commerce. everything would need there to be created, and to be maintained continuously. it lies midway between colon and the mouth of the river san juan, where is greytown, which has been selected as the issue of the projected nicaragua canal; and therefore, in a peculiar way, chiriqui symbolizes the present indeterminate phase of the isthmian problem. with all its latent possibilities, however, little can be said now of chiriqui, except that a rough appreciation of its existence and character is essential to an adequate understanding of isthmian conditions. the dutch island of curaçao has been marked, chiefly because, with its natural characteristics, it cannot be passed over; but it now is, and it may be hoped will remain indefinitely, among the positions of which it has been said that they are neutralized by political circumstances. curaçao possesses a fine harbor, which may be made impregnable, and it lies unavoidably near the route of any vessel bound to the isthmus and passing eastward of jamaica. such conditions constitute undeniable military importance; but holland is a small state, unlikely to join again in a general war. there is, indeed, a floating apprehension that the german empire, in its present desires of colonial extension, may be willing to absorb holland, for the sake of her still extensive colonial possessions. improbable as this may seem, it is scarcely more incomprehensible than the recent mysterious movements upon the european chess-board, attributed by common rumor to the dominating influence of the emperor of germany, which we puzzled americans for months past have sought in vain to understand. the same probable neutrality must be admitted for the remaining positions that have been distinguished: mujeres island, samana bay, and the island of st. thomas. the first of these, at the extremity of the yucatan peninsula, belongs to mexico, a country whose interest in the isthmian question is very real; for, like the united states, she has an extensive seaboard both upon the pacific and--in the gulf of mexico--upon the atlantic ocean. mujeres island, however, has nothing to offer but situation, being upon the yucatan passage, the one road from all the gulf ports to the caribbean and the isthmus. the anchorage is barely tolerable, the resources _nil_, and defensive strength could be imparted only by an expense quite disproportionate to the result obtained. the consideration of the island as a possible military situation does but emphasize the fact, salient to the most superficial glance, that, so far as position goes, cuba has no possible rival in her command of the yucatan passage, just as she has no competitor, in point of natural strength and resources, for the control of the florida strait, which connects the gulf of mexico with the atlantic. samana bay, at the northeast corner of santo domingo, is but one of several fine anchorages in that great island, whose territory is now divided between two negro republics--french and spanish in tongue. its selection to figure in our study, to the exclusion of the others, is determined by its situation, and by the fact that we are seeking to take a comprehensive glance of the caribbean as a whole, and not merely of particular districts. for instance, it might be urged forcibly, in view of the existence of two great naval ports like santiago de cuba and port royal in jamaica, close to the windward passage, through which lies the direct route from the atlantic seaboard to the isthmus, that st. nicholas mole, immediately on the passage, offers the natural position for checking the others in case of need. the reply is that we are not seeking to check anything or anybody, but simply examining in the large the natural strategic features, and incidentally thereto noting the political conditions, of a maritime region in which the united states is particularly interested; political conditions, as has been remarked, having an unavoidable effect upon military values. the inquiry being thus broad, samana bay and the island of st. thomas are entitled to the pre-eminence here given to them, because they represent, efficiently and better than any other positions, the control of two principal passages into the caribbean sea from the atlantic. the mona passage, on which samana lies, between santo domingo and puerto rico, is particularly suited to sailing-vessels from the northward, because free from dangers to navigation. this, of course, in these days of steam, is a small matter militarily; in the latter sense the mona passage is valuable because it is an alternative to the windward passage, or to those to the eastward, in case of hostile predominance in one quarter or the other. st. thomas is on the anegada passage, actually much used, and which better than any other represents the course from europe to the isthmus, just as the windward passage does that from the north american atlantic ports. neither of these places can boast of great natural strength nor of resources; st. thomas, because it is a small island with the inherent weaknesses attending all such, which have been mentioned; samana bay, because, although the island on which it is is large and productive, it has not now, and gives no hope of having, that political stability and commercial prosperity which bring resources and power in their train. both places would need also considerable development of defensive works to meet the requirements of a naval port. despite these defects, their situations on the passages named entitle them to paramount consideration in a general study of the caribbean sea and the gulf of mexico. potentially, though not actually, they lend control of the mona and anegada passages, exactly as kingston and santiago do of the windward. for, granting that the isthmus is in the caribbean the predominant interest, commercial, and therefore concerning the whole world, but also military, and so far possessing peculiar concern for those nations whose territories lie on both oceans, which it now severs and will one day unite--of which nations the united states is the most prominent--granting this, and it follows that entrance to the caribbean, and transit across the caribbean to the isthmus, are two prime essentials to the enjoyment of the advantages of the latter. therefore, in case of war, control of these two things becomes a military object not second to the isthmus itself, access to which depends upon them; and in their bearing upon these two things the various positions that are passed under consideration must be viewed--individually first, and afterwards collectively. the first process of individual consideration the writer has asked the reader to take on faith; neither time nor space permits its elaboration here; but the reasons for choosing those that have been named have been given as briefly as possible. let us now look at the map, and regard as a collective whole the picture there graphically presented. putting to one side, for the moment at least, the isthmian points, as indicating the end rather than the precedent means, we see at the present time that the positions at the extremes of the field under examination are held by powers of the first rank,--martinique and santa lucia by france and great britain, pensacola and the mississippi by the united states. further, there are held by these same states of the first order two advanced positions, widely separated from the first bases of their power; namely, key west, which is miles from pensacola, and jamaica, which is miles from santa lucia. from the isthmus, key west is distant miles; jamaica, miles. between and separating these two groups, of primary bases and advanced posts, extends the chain of positions from yucatan to st. thomas. as far as is possible to position, apart from mobile force, these represent control over the northern entrances--the most important entrances--into the caribbean sea. no one of this chain belongs to any of the powers commonly reckoned as being of the first order of strength. the entrances on the north of the sea, as far as, but not including, the anegada passage, are called the most important, because they are so few in number,--a circumstance which always increases value; because they are so much nearer to the isthmus; and, very especially to the united states, because they are the ones by which, and by which alone,--except at the cost of a wide circuit,--she communicates with the isthmus, and, generally, with all the region lying within the borders of the caribbean. in a very literal sense the caribbean is a mediterranean sea; but the adjective must be qualified when comparison is made with the mediterranean of the old world or with the gulf of mexico. the last-named bodies of water communicate with the outer oceans by passages so contracted as to be easily watched from near-by positions, and for both there exist such positions of exceptional strength,--gibraltar and some others in the former case, havana and no other in the latter. the caribbean, on the contrary, is enclosed on its eastern side by a chain of small islands, the passages between which, although practically not wider than the strait of gibraltar, are so numerous that entrance to the sea on that side may be said correctly to extend over a stretch of near miles. the islands, it is true, are so many positions, some better, some worse, from which military effort to control entrance can be exerted; but their number prevents that concentration and that certainty of effect which are possible to adequate force resting upon gibraltar or havana. on the northern side of the sea the case is quite different. from the western end of cuba to the eastern end of puerto rico extends a barrier of land for miles--as against on the east--broken only by two straits, each fifty miles wide, from side to side of which a steamer of but moderate power can pass in three or four hours. these natural conditions, governing the approach to the isthmus, reproduce as nearly as possible the strategic effect of ireland upon great britain. there a land barrier of miles, midway between the pentland firth and the english channel--centrally situated, that is, with reference to all the atlantic approaches to great britain--gives to an adequate navy a unique power to flank and harass either the one or the other, or both. existing political conditions and other circumstances unquestionably modify the importance of these two barriers, relatively to the countries affected by them. open communication with the atlantic is vital to great britain, which the isthmus, up to the present time, is not to the united states. there are, however, varying degrees of importance below that which is vital. taking into consideration that of the -mile barrier to the caribbean miles is solid in cuba, that after the -mile gap of the windward passage there succeeds miles more of haiti before the mona passage is reached, it is indisputable that a superior navy, resting on santiago de cuba or jamaica, could very seriously incommode all access of the united states to the caribbean mainland, and especially to the isthmus. in connection with this should be considered also the influence upon our mercantile and naval communication between the atlantic and the gulf coasts exercised by the peninsula of florida, and by the narrowness of the channels separating the latter from the bahama banks and from cuba. the effect of this long and not very broad strip of land upon our maritime interests can be realized best by imagining it wholly removed, or else turned into an island by a practicable channel crossing its neck. in the latter case the two entrances to the channel would have indeed to be assured; but our shipping would not be forced to pass through a long, narrow waterway, bordered throughout on one side by foreign and possibly hostile territories. in case of war with either great britain or spain, this channel would be likely to be infested by hostile cruisers, close to their own base, the very best condition for a commerce-destroying war; and its protection by us under present circumstances will exact a much greater effort than with the supposed channel, or than if the florida peninsula did not exist. the effect of the peninsula is to thrust our route from the atlantic to the gulf miles to the southward, and to make imperative a base for control of the strait; while the case is made worse by an almost total lack of useful harbors. on the atlantic, the most exposed side, there is none; and on the gulf none nearer to key west than miles,[ ] where we find tampa bay. there is, indeed, nothing that can be said about the interests of the united states in an isthmian canal that does not apply now with equal force to the strait of florida. the one links the atlantic to the gulf, as the other would the atlantic to the pacific. it may be added here that the phenomenon of the long, narrow peninsula of florida, with its strait, is reproduced successively in cuba, haiti, and puerto rico, with the passages dividing them. the whole together forms one long barrier, the strategic significance of which cannot be overlooked in its effect upon the caribbean; while the gulf of mexico is assigned to absolute seclusion by it, if the passages are in hostile control. [ ] there is charlotte harbor, at miles, but it can be used only by medium-sized vessels. the relations of the island of jamaica to the great barrier formed by cuba, haiti, and puerto rico are such as to constitute it the natural stepping-stone by which to pass from the consideration of entrance into the caribbean, which has been engaging our attention, to that of the transit across, from entrance to the isthmus, which we must next undertake. in the matters of entrance to the caribbean, and of general interior control of that sea, jamaica has a singularly central position. it is equidistant ( miles) from colon, from the yucatan channel, and from the mona passage; it is even closer ( miles) to the nearest mainland of south america at point gallinas, and of central america at cape gracias-á-dios; while it lies so immediately in rear of the windward passage that its command of the latter can scarcely be considered less than that of santiago. the analogy of its situation, as a station for a great fleet, to that for an army covering a frontier which is passable at but a few points, will scarcely escape a military reader. a comparatively short chain of swift lookout steamers, in each direction, can give timely notice of any approach by either of the three passages named; while, if entrance be gained at any other point, the arms stretched out towards gallinas and gracias-á-dios will give warning of transit before the purposes of such transit can be accomplished undisturbed. with such advantages of situation, and with a harbor susceptible of satisfactory development as a naval station for a great fleet, jamaica is certainly the most important single position in the caribbean sea. when one recalls that it passed into the hands of great britain, in the days of cromwell, by accidental conquest, the expedition having been intended primarily against santo domingo; that in the two centuries and a half which have since intervened it has played no part adequate to its advantages, such as now looms before it; that, by all the probabilities, it should have been reconquered and retained by spain in the war of the american revolution; and when, again, it is recalled that a like accident and a like subsequent uncertainty attended the conquest and retention of the decisive mediterranean positions of gibraltar and malta, one marvels whether incidents so widely separated in time and place, all tending towards one end--the maritime predominance of great britain--can be accidents, or are simply the exhibition of a personal will, acting through all time, with purpose deliberate and consecutive, to ends not yet discerned. nevertheless, when compared to cuba, jamaica cannot be considered the preponderant position of the caribbean. the military question of position is quantitative as well as qualitative; and situation, however excellent, can rarely, by itself alone, make full amends for defect in the power and resources which are the natural property of size--of mass. gibraltar, the synonym of intrinsic strength, is an illustration in point; its smallness, its isolation, and its barrenness of resource constitute limits to its offensive power, and even to its impregnability, which are well understood by military men. jamaica, by its situation, flanks the route from cuba to the isthmus, as indeed it does all routes from the atlantic and the gulf to that point; but, as a military entity, it is completely overshadowed by the larger island, which it so conspicuously confronts. if, as has just been said, it by situation intercepts the access of cuba to the isthmus, it is itself cut off by its huge neighbor from secure communication with the north american continent, now as always the chief natural source of supplies for the west indies, which do not produce the great staples of life. with the united states friendly or neutral, in a case of war, there can be no comparison between the advantages of cuba, conferred by its situation and its size, and those of jamaica, which, by these qualities of its rival, is effectually cut off from that source of supplies. nor is the disadvantage of jamaica less marked with reference to communication with other quarters than the united states--with halifax, with bermuda, with europe. its distance from these points, and from santa lucia, where the resources of europe may be said to focus for it, makes its situation one of extreme isolation; a condition emphasized by the fact that both bermuda and santa lucia are themselves dependent upon outside sources for anything they may send to jamaica. at all these points, coal, the great factor of modern naval war, must be stored and the supply maintained. they do not produce it. the mere size of cuba, the amount of population which it has, or ought to have, the number of its seaports, the extent of the industries possible to it, tend naturally to an accumulation of resources such as great mercantile communities always entail. these, combined with its nearness to the united states, and its other advantages of situation, make cuba a position that can have no military rival among the islands of the world, except ireland. with a friendly united states, isolation is impossible to cuba. the aim of any discussion such as this should be to narrow down, by a gradual elimination, the various factors to be considered, in order that the decisive ones, remaining, may become conspicuously visible. the trees being thus thinned out, the features of the strategic landscape can appear. the primary processes in the present case have been carried out before seeking the attention of the reader, to whom the first approximations have been presented under three heads. first, the two decisive centres, the mouth of the mississippi and the isthmus. second, the four principal routes, connecting these two points with others, have been specified; these routes being, , between the isthmus and the mississippi themselves; , from the isthmus to the north american coast, by the windward passage; , from the gulf of mexico to the north american coast, by the strait of florida; and, , from the isthmus to europe, by the anegada passage. third, the principal military positions throughout the region in question have been laid down, and their individual and relative importance indicated. from the subsequent discussion it seems evident that, as "communications" are so leading an element in strategy, the position or positions which decisively affect the greatest number or extent of the communications will be the most important, so far as situation goes. of the four principal lines named, three pass close to, and are essentially controlled by, the islands of cuba and jamaica, namely, from the mississippi to the isthmus by the yucatan channel, from the mississippi to the atlantic coast of america by the strait of florida, and from the isthmus to the atlantic coast by the windward passage. the fourth route, which represents those from the isthmus to europe, passes nearer to jamaica than to cuba; but those two islands exercise over it more control than does any other one of the archipelago, for the reason that any other can be avoided more easily, and by a wider interval, than either jamaica or cuba. regarded as positions, therefore, these two islands are the real rivals for control of the caribbean and of the gulf of mexico; and it may be added that the strategic centre of interest for both gulf and caribbean is to be found in the windward passage, because it furnishes the ultimate test of the relative power of the two islands to control the caribbean. for, as has been said before, and cannot be repeated too often, it is not position only, nor chiefly, but mobile force, that is decisive in war. in the combination of these two elements rests the full statement of any case. the question of position has been adjudged in favor of cuba, for reasons which have been given. in the case of a conflict between the powers holding the two islands, the question of controlling the windward passage would be the test of relative mobile strength; because that channel is the shortest and best line of communications for jamaica with the american coast, with halifax, and with bermuda, and as such it must be kept open. if the power of jamaica is not great enough to hold the passage open by force, she is thrown upon evasion--upon furtive measures--to maintain essential supplies; for, if she cannot assert her strength so far in that direction, she cannot, from her nearness, go beyond cuba's reach in any direction. abandonment of the best road in this case means isolation; and to that condition, if prolonged, there is but one issue. the final result, therefore, may be stated in this way: the advantages of situation, strength, and resources are greatly and decisively in favor of cuba. to bring jamaica to a condition of equality, or superiority, is needed a mobile force capable of keeping the windward passage continuously open, not only for a moment, nor for any measurable time, but throughout the war. under the present conditions of political tenure, in case of a war involving only the two states concerned, such a question could admit of no doubt; but in a war at all general, involving several naval powers, the issue would be less certain. in the war of the tenure, not of the windward passage merely, but of jamaica itself, was looked upon by a large party in great britain as nearly hopeless; and it is true that only a happy concurrence of blundering and bad luck on the part of its foes then saved the island. it is conceivable that odds which have happened once may happen again. the end. the sea is his _thy way is in the sea, and thy path in the great waters, and thy footsteps are not known. --psalm lxxvii. v. ._ the sea is his: he made it, black gulf and sunlit shoal from barriered bight to where the long leagues of atlantic roll: small strait and ceaseless ocean he bade each one to be: the sea is his: he made it-- and england keeps it free. by pain and stress and striving beyond the nations' ken, by vigils stern when others slept, by lives of many men; through nights of storm, through dawnings blacker than midnights be-- this sea that god created, england has kept it free. count me the splendid captains who sailed with courage high to chart the perilous ways unknown-- tell me where these men lie! to light a path for ships to come they moored at dead man's quay; the sea is god's--he made it, and these men made it free. oh little land of england, oh mother of hearts too brave, men say this trust shall pass from thee who guardest nelson's grave. aye, but these braggarts yet shall learn who'd hold the world in fee, the sea is god's--and england, england shall keep it free. --r. e. vernÈde. [frontispiece: viking man-of-war.] flag and fleet how the british navy won the freedom of the seas by william wood lieutenant-colonel, canadian militia; member of the canadian special mission overseas; editor of "the logs of the conquest of canada"; author of "all afloat: a chronicle of craft and waterways"; "elizabethan sea dogs: a chronicle of drake and his companions"; and "the fight for canada: a naval and military sketch." with a preface by admiral-of-the-fleet sir david beatty g.c.b., o.m., g.c.v.o., etc., etc. toronto: the macmillan company of canada, ltd., at st. martin's house copyright, canada, , by the macmillan company of canada, limited to _admiral-of-the-fleet_ _lord jellicoe_ _in token of deep admiration and in gratitude for many kindnesses during the great war i dedicate this little book, which, published under the auspices of the navy league of canada and approved by the provincial departments of education, is written for the reading of canadian boys and girls_ preface by admiral-of-the-fleet sir david beatty, g.c.b., o.m., g.c.v.o., etc. in acceding to the request to write a preface for this volume i am moved by the paramount need that all the budding citizens of our great empire should be thoroughly acquainted with the part the navy has played in building up the greatest empire the world has ever seen. colonel wood has endeavored to make plain, in a stirring and attractive manner, the value of britain's sea-power. to read his _flag and fleet_ will ensure that the lessons of centuries of war will be learnt, and that the most important lesson of them all is this--that, as an empire, we came into being by the sea, and that we cannot exist without the sea. david beatty, nd of june, . introduction who wants to be a raw recruit for life, all thumbs and muddle-mindedness? well, that is what a boy or girl is bound to be when he or she grows up without knowing what the royal navy of our motherland has done to give the british empire birth, life, and growth, and all the freedom of the sea. the navy is not the whole of british sea-power; for the merchant service is the other half. nor is the navy the only fighting force on which our liberty depends; for we depend upon the united service of sea and land and air. moreover, all our fighting forces, put together, could not have done their proper share toward building up the empire, nor could they defend it now, unless they always had been, and are still, backed by the people as a whole, by every patriot man and woman, boy and girl. but while it takes all sorts to make the world, and very many different sorts to make and keep our british empire of the free, it is quite as true to say that all our other sorts together could not have made, and cannot keep, our empire, unless the royal navy had kept, and keeps today, true watch and ward over all the british highways of the sea. none of the different parts of the world-wide british empire are joined together by the land. all are joined together by the sea. keep the seaways open and we live. close them and we die. this looks, and really is, so very simple, that you may well wonder why we have to speak about it here. but man is a land animal. landsmen are many, while seamen are few; and though the sea is three times bigger than the land it is three hundred times less known. history is full of sea-power, but histories are not; for most historians know little of sea-power, though british history without british sea-power is like a watch without a mainspring or a wheel without a hub. no wonder we cannot understand the living story of our wars, when, as a rule, we are only told parts of _what_ happened, and neither _how_ they happened nor _why_ they happened. the _how_ and _why_ are the flesh and blood, the head and heart of history; so if you cut them off you kill the living body and leave nothing but dry bones. now, in our long war story no single _how_ or _why_ has any real meaning apart from british sea-power, which itself has no meaning apart from the royal navy. so the choice lies plain before us: either to learn what the navy really means, and know the story as a veteran should; or else leave out, or perhaps mislearn, the navy's part, and be a raw recruit for life, all thumbs and muddle-mindedness. contents book i the rowing age when soldiers fought rowboat battles beside the shores of the old world from the beginning of war on the water to king henry viii's first promise of a sailing fleet chapter i the very beginning of sea-power ( , years and more b.c.) ii the first far west (the last , years b.c.) iii east against west ( b. c.- b.c.) iv celtic britain under rome ( b.c.- a.d.) v the hardy norseman ( - ) vi the imperial norman ( - ) vii king of the english era ( ) book ii the sailing age when sailors fought on every ocean and the royal navy of the mother country won the british command of the sea both in the old world and the new drake to nelson - part i--the spanish war viii old spain and new ( - ) ix the english sea-dogs ( - ) x the spanish armada ( ) part ii--the dutch war xi the first dutch war ( - ) xii the second and third dutch wars ( - ) part iii--the french war xiii the first war against louis xiv ( - ) xiv the second war against louis xiv ( - ) xv war against france and spain ( - ) xvi pitt's imperial war ( - ) xvii the american revolution ( - ) xviii nelson ( - ) xix " " book iii the age of steam and steel when the british command of the sea saved the world from german slavery in the greatest of all wars - part i--a century of change ( - ) xx a century of british-french-american peace ( - ) xxi a century of minor british wars ( - ) part ii--the great war ( - ) xxii the handy man xxiii fifty years of warning ( - ) xxiv war ( - ) xxv jutland ( ) xxvi submarining ( - ) xxvii surrender! ( ) xxviii well done! postscript the freedom of the seas [transcriber's note: the following two errata items have been applied to this e-book.] errata page xiii. for "henry vii's" read "henry viii's." page . l. for "facing the germans" read "away from scheer," illustrations viking man-of-war. . . . . . . . . _frontispiece_ "dug-out" canoe roman trireme--a vessel with three benches of oars william the conqueror's transports eddystone lighthouse, . the first structure of stone and timber. build for trinity house by winstanley and swept away in a storm. eddystone lighthouse, . the fourth and present structure, erected by sir j. n. douglass for trinity house. the _santa maria_, flagship of christopher columbus when he discovered america in . length of keel, feet. length of ship proper, feet. length over all, feet. breadth, feet. tonnage, full displacement, . drake one of drake's men-of-war that fought the great armada in . armada off fowey (cornwall) as first seen in the english channel. sir francis drake on board the _revenge_ receiving the surrender of don pedro de valdes. sailing ship. the pilgrim fathers crossed in a similar vessel ( ). la hogue, . h.m.s. _centurion_ engaged and took the spanish galleon _nuestra senhora de capadongo_, from acapulco bound to manila, off cape espiritu santo, philippine islands, june , . the _royal george_ nelson fighting the guns on the main deck, . the blowing up of _l'orient_ during the battle of the nile. the battle of copenhagen, april nd, . (note the british line ahead.) the _victory_. nelson's flagship at trafalgar, launched in , and still used as the flagship in portsmouth harbour. trafalgar. st october, . model of the battle of trafalgar. (reproduced by permission from the model at the royal united service institution.) the _shannon_ and the _chesapeake_. the _royal william_. canadian built; the first boat to cross any ocean steaming the whole way ( ), the first steamer in the world to fire a shot in action (may , ). battleship. seaplane returning after flight. destroyer. a parting shot from the turks at gallipoli. jellicoe. beatty. light cruiser. h.m.s. _monmouth_, armoured cruiser. sunk at coronel, november st, . battleship firing a broadside. jellicoe's battle fleet in columns of divisions. . p.m. the battle of jutland--plan ii. jellicoe's battle line formed and fighting. : p.m. british submarine. minesweeper at work. h.m. king george v. flag and fleet book i the rowing age chapter i the very beginning op sea-power ( , years and more b.c.) thousands and thousands of years ago a naked savage in southern asia found that he could climb about quite safely on a floating log. one day another savage found that floating down stream on a log was very much easier than working his way through the woods. this taught him the first advantage of sea-power, which is, that you can often go better by water than land. then a third savage with a turn for trying new things found out what every lumberjack and punter knows, that you need a pole if you want to shove your log along or steer it to the proper place. by and by some still more clever savage tied two logs together and made the first raft. this soon taught him the second advantage of sea-power, which is, that, as a rule, you can carry goods very much better by water than land. even now, if you want to move many big and heavy things a thousand miles you can nearly always do it ten times better in a ship than in a train, and ten times better in a train than by carts and horses on the very best of roads. of course a raft is a poor, slow, clumsy sort of ship; no ship at all, in fact. but when rafts were the only "ships" in the world there certainly were no trains and nothing like one of our good roads. the water has always had the same advantage over the land; for as horses, trails, carts, roads, and trains began to be used on land, so canoes, boats, sailing ships, and steamers began to be used on water. anybody can prove the truth of the rule for himself by seeing how much easier it is to paddle a hundred pounds ten miles in a canoe than to carry the same weight one mile over a portage. presently the smarter men wanted something better than a little log raft nosing its slow way along through dead shallow water when shoved by a pole; so they put a third and longer log between the other two, with its front end sticking out and turning up a little. then, wanting to cross waters too deep for a pole, they invented the first paddles; and so made the same sort of catamaran that you can still see on the coromandel coast in southern india. but savages who knew enough to take catamarans through the pounding surf also knew enough to see that a log with a hollow in the upper side of it could carry a great deal more than a log that was solid; and, seeing this, they presently began making hollows and shaping logs, till at last they had made a regular dug-out canoe. when christopher columbus asked the west indian savages what they called their dug-outs they said _canoas_; so a boat dug out of a solid log had the first right to the word we now use for a canoe built up out of several different parts. [illustration: "dug-out" canoe] dug-outs were sometimes very big. they were the dreadnought battleships of their own time and place and people. when their ends were sharpened into a sort of ram they could stave in an enemy's canoe if they caught its side full tilt with their own end. dug-out canoes were common wherever the trees were big and strong enough, as in southern asia, central africa, and on the pacific coast of america. but men have always been trying to invent something better than what their enemies have; and so they soon began putting different pieces together to make either better canoes or lighter ones, or to make any kind that would do as well as or better than the dug-out. thus the ancient britons had coracles, which were simply very open basket-work covered with skins. their celtic descendants still use canvas coracles in parts of wales and ireland, just as the eskimos still use skin-covered kayaks and oomiaks. the oomiak is for a family with all their baggage. the kayak--sharp as a needle and light as a feather--is for a well-armed man. the oomiak is a cargo carrier. the kayak is a man-of-war. when once men had found out how to make and use canoes they had also found out the third and final principle of sea-power, which is, that if you live beside the water and do not learn how to fight on it you will certainly be driven off it by some enemy who has learnt how to fight there. for sea-power in time of war simply means the power to use the sea yourself while stopping the enemy from using it. so the first duty of any navy is to keep the seaways open for friends and closed to enemies. and this is even more the duty of the british navy than of any other navy. for the sea lies between all the different parts of the british empire; and so the life-or-death question we have to answer in every great war is this: does the sea unite us by being under british control, or does it divide us by being under enemy control? united we stand: divided we fall. at first sight you would never believe that sea-power could be lost or won as well by birchbarks as by battleships. but if both sides have the same sort of craft, or one side has none at all, then it does not matter what the sort is. when the iroquois paddled their birch-bark canoes past quebec in , and defied the french governor to stop them, they "commanded" the st. lawrence just as well as the british grand fleet commanded the north sea in the great war; and for the same reason, because their enemy was not strong enough to stop them. whichever army can drive its enemy off the roads must win the war, because it can get what it wants from its base, (that is, from the places where its supplies of men and arms and food and every other need are kept); while its enemy will have to go without, being unable to get anything like enough, by bad and roundabout ways, to keep up the fight against men who can use the good straight roads. so it is with navies. the navy that can beat its enemy from all the shortest ways across the sea must win the war, because the merchant ships of its own country, like its men-of-war, can use the best routes from the bases to the front and back again; while the merchant ships of its enemy must either lose time by roundabout voyages or, what is sure to happen as the war goes on, be driven off the high seas altogether. the savages of long ago often took to the water when they found the land too hot for them. if they were shepherds, a tyrant might seize their flocks. if they were farmers, he might take their land away from them. but it was not so easy to bully fishermen and hunters who could paddle off and leave no trace behind them, or who could build forts on islands that could only be taken after fights in which men who lived mostly on the water would have a much better chance than men who lived mostly on the land. in this way the water has often been more the home of freedom than the land: liberty and sea-power have often gone together; and a free people like ourselves have nearly always won and kept freedom, both for themselves and others, by keeping up a navy of their own or by forming part of such an empire as the british, where the mother country keeps up by far the greatest navy the world has ever seen. the canoe navies, like other navies, did very well so long as no enemy came with something better. but when boats began to gain ground, canoes began to lose it. we do not know who made the first boat any more than we know who made the first raft or canoe. but the man who laid the first keel was a genius, and no mistake about it; for the keel is still the principal part of every rowboat, sailing ship, and steamer in the world. there is the same sort of difference between any craft that has a keel and one that has not as there is between animals which have backbones and those which have not. by the time boats were first made someone began to find out that by putting a paddle into a notch in the side of the boat and pulling away he could get a stronger stroke than he could with the paddle alone. then some other genius, thousands of years after the first open boat had been made, thought of making a deck. once this had been done, the ship, as we know her, had begun her glorious career. but meanwhile sails had been in use for very many thousands of years. who made the first sail? nobody knows. but very likely some asiatic savage hoisted a wild beast's skin on a stick over some very simple sort of raft tens of thousands of years ago. rafts had, and still have, sails in many countries. canoes had them too. boats and ships also had sails in very early times, and of very various kinds: some made of skins, some of woven cloth, some even of wooden slats. but no ancient sail was more than what sailors call a wind-bag now; and they were of no use at all unless the wind was pretty well aft, that is, more or less from behind. we shall presently find out that tacking, (which is sailing against the wind), is a very modern invention; and that, within three centuries of its invention, steamers began to oust sailing craft, as these, in their turn, had ousted rowboats and canoes. chapter ii the first far west (the last years b.c.) this chapter begins with a big surprise. but it ends with a bigger one still. when you look first at the title and then at the date, you wonder how on earth the two can go together. but when you remember what you have read in chapter i you will see that the countries at the asiatic end of the mediterranean, though now called the near east, were then the far west, because emigrants from the older lands of asia had gone no farther than this twelve thousand years ago. then, as you read the present chapter, you will see emigrants and colonies moving farther and farther west along the mediterranean and up the atlantic shores of europe, until, at last, two thousand years before columbus, the new far west consisted of those very shores of spain and portugal, france and the british isles, from which the whole new western world of north and south america was to be settled later on. the atlantic shores of europe, and not the mediterranean shores of asia and of egypt, are called here "the first far west" because the first really western people grew up in europe and became quite different from all the eastern peoples. the second far west, two thousand years later, was america itself. _westward ho!_ is the very good name of a book about adventures in america when this second far west was just beginning. "go west!" was the advice given to adventurous people in america during the nineteenth century. "the last west and best west" is what canadians now call their own north-west. and it certainly is the very last west of all; for over there, across the pacific, are the lands of southern asia from which the first emigrants began moving west so many thousand years ago. thus the circuit of the world and its migrations is now complete; and we can at last look round and learn the whole story, from farthest east to farthest west. most of it is an old, old story from the common points of view; and it has been told over and over again by many different people and in many different ways. but from one point of view, and that a most important point, it is newer now than ever. look at it from the seaman's point of view, and the whole meaning changes in the twinkling of an eye, becoming new, true, and complete. nearly all books deal with the things of the land, and of the land alone, their writers forgetting or not knowing that the things of the land could never have been what they are had it not been for the things of the sea. without the vastly important things of the sea, without the war fleets and merchant fleets of empires old and new, it is perfectly certain that the world could not have been half so good a place to live in; for freedom and the sea tend to go together. true of all people, this is truer still of us; for the sea has been the very breath of british life and liberty ever since the first hardy norseman sprang ashore on english soil. nobody knows how the egyptians first learnt ship-building from the people farther east. but we do know that they were building ships in egypt seven thousand years ago, that their ninth king was called betou, which means "the prow of a ship", and that his artists carved pictures of boats five hundred years older than the great pyramid. these pictures, carved on the tombs of the kings, are still to be seen, together with some pottery, which, coming from the balkans, shows that betou had boats trading across the eastern end of the mediterranean. a picture carved more than six thousand years ago shows an egyptian boat being paddled by fourteen men and steered with paddles by three more on the right-hand side of the stern as you look toward the bow. thus the "steer-board" (or steering side) was no new thing when its present name of "starboard" was used by our norse ancestors a good many hundred years ago. the egyptians, steering on the right-hand side, probably took in cargo on the left side or "larboard", that is, the "load" or "lading" side, now called the "port" side, as "larboard" and "starboard" sounded too much alike when shouted in a gale. up in the bow of this old egyptian boat stood a man with a pole to help in steering down the nile. amidships stood a man with a cat-o'-nine-tails, ready to slash any one of the wretched slave paddlers who was not working hard. all through the rowing age, for thousands and thousands of years, the paddlers and rowers were the same as the well-known galley-slaves kept by the mediterranean countries to row their galleys in peace and war. these galleys, or rowing men-of-war, lasted down to modern times, as we shall soon see. they did use sails; but only when the wind was behind them, and never when it blew really hard. the mast was made of two long wooden spars set one on each side of the galley, meeting at the head, and strengthened in between by braces from one spar to another. as time went on better boats and larger ones were built in egypt. we can guess how strong they must have been when they carried down the nile the gigantic blocks of stone used in building the famous pyramids. some of these blocks weigh up to sixty tons; so that both the men who built the barges to bring them down the nile and those who built these huge blocks into the wonderful pyramids must have known their business pretty well a thousand years before noah built his ark. the ark was built in mesopotamia, less than five thousand years ago, to save noah from the flooded euphrates. the shipwrights seem to have built it like a barge or house-boat. if so, it must have been about fifteen thousand tons, taking the length of the cubit in the bible story at eighteen inches. it was certainly not a ship, only some sort of construction that simply floated about with the wind and current till it ran aground. but mesopotamia and the shores of the persian gulf were great places for shipbuilding. they were once the home of adventurers who had come west from southern asia, and of the famous phoenicians, who went farther west to find a new seaboard home along the shores of asia minor, just north of palestine, where they were in the shipping business three thousand years ago, about the time of the early kings of israel. these wonderful phoenicians touch our interest to the very quick; for they were not only the seamen hired by "solomon in all his glory" but they were also the founders of carthage and the first oversea traders with the atlantic coasts of france and the british isles. their story thus goes home to all who love the sea, the bible, and canada's two mother lands. they had shipping on the red sea as well as on the mediterranean; and it was their red sea merchant vessels that coasted arabia and east africa in the time of solomon ( - b.c.). they also went round to persia and probably to india. about b.c. they are said to have coasted round the whole of africa, starting from the red sea and coming back by gibraltar. this took them more than two years, as they used to sow wheat and wait on shore till the crop was ripe. long before this they had passed gibraltar and settled the colony of tarshish, where they found silver in such abundance that "it was nothing accounted of in the days of solomon." we do not know whether it was "the ships of tarshish and of the isles" that first felt the way north to france and england. but we do know that many phoenicians did trade with the french and british celts, who probably learnt in this way how to build ships of their own. chapter iii east against west ( - b.c.) for two thousand years eastern fleets and armies tried to conquer europe. sometimes hundreds of years would pass without an attack. but the result was always the same--the triumph of west over east; and the cause of each triumph was always the same--the sea-power of the west. without those western navies the europe and america we know today could never have existed. there could have been no greek civilization, no roman government, no british empire, and no united states. first, the persians fought the greeks at salamis in b.c. then carthage fought rome more than two hundred years later. finally, the conquering turks were beaten by the spaniards at lepanto more than two thousand years after salamis, but not far from the same spot, salamis being ten miles from athens and lepanto a hundred. long before salamis the greeks had been founding colonies along the mediterranean, among them some on the asiatic side of the aegean sea, where the french and british fleets had so much to do during the gallipoli campaign of against the turks and germans. meanwhile the persians had been fighting their way north-westwards till they had reached the aegean and conquered most of the greeks and phoenicians there. then the greeks at athens sent a fleet which landed an army that burnt the city of sardis, an outpost of persian power. thereupon king darius, friend of the prophet daniel, vowed vengeance on athens, and caused a trusty servant to whisper in his ear each day, "master, remember athens!" now, the persians were landsmen, with what was then the greatest army in the world, but with a navy and a merchant fleet mostly manned by conquered phoenicians and greek colonists, none of whom wanted to see greece itself destroyed. so when darius met the greeks at marathon his fleet and army did not form the same sort of united service that the british fleet and army form. he was beaten back to his ships and retired to asia minor. but "remember athens!" was always in his mind. so for ten years he and his son xerxes prepared a vast armada against which they thought no other force on earth could stand. but, like the spanish armada against england two thousand years later, this persian host was very much stronger ashore than afloat. its army was so vast that it covered the country like a swarm of locusts. at the world-famous pass of thermopylae the spartan king, leonidas, waited for the persians. xerxes sent a summons asking the greeks to surrender their arms. "come and take them," said leonidas. then wave after wave of persians rushed to the attack, only to break against the dauntless greeks. at last a vile traitor told xerxes of another pass (which the greeks had not men enough to hold, though it was on their flank). he thus got the chance of forcing them either to retreat or be cut off. once through this pass the persians overran the country; and all the spartans at thermopylae died fighting to the last. only the grecian fleet remained. it was vastly out-numbered by the persian fleet. but it was manned by patriots trained to fight on the water; while the persians themselves were nearly all landsmen, and so had to depend on the phoenicians and colonial greek seamen, who were none too eager for the fray. seeing the persians too densely massed together on a narrow front the greek commander, themistocles, attacked with equal skill and fury, rolled up the persian front in confusion on the mass behind, and won the battle that saved the western world. the persians lost two hundred vessels against only forty greek. but it was not the mere loss of vessels, or even of this battle of salamis itself, that forced xerxes to give up all hopes of conquest. the real reason was his having lost the command of the sea. he knew that the victorious greeks could now beat the fighting ships escorting his supply vessels coming overseas from asia minor, and that, without the constant supplies of men, arms, food, and everything else an army needs, his army itself must wither away. two hundred and twenty years later the sea-power of the roman west beat both the land- and sea-power of the carthaginian east; and for the very same reason. carthage was an independent colony of phoenicians which had won an empire in the western mediterranean by its sea-power. it held a great part of spain, the whole of sardinia, most of sicily, and many other islands. the romans saw that they would never be safe as long as carthage had the stronger navy; so they began to build one of their own. they copied a carthaginian war galley that had been wrecked; and meanwhile taught their men to row on benches set up ashore. this made the carthaginians laugh and led them to expect an easy victory. but the romans were thorough in everything they did, and they had the best trained soldiers in the world. they knew the carthaginians could handle war galleys better than they could themselves; so they tried to give their soldiers the best possible chance when once the galleys closed. they made a sort of drawbridge that could be let down with a bang on the enemy boats and there held fast by sharp iron spikes biting into the enemy decks. then their soldiers charged across and cleared everything before them. [illustration: roman trireme--a vessel with three benches of oars] the carthaginians never recovered from this first fatal defeat at mylae in b.c., though carthage itself was not destroyed for more than a century afterwards, and though hannibal, one of the greatest soldiers who ever lived, often beat the romans in the meantime. all sorts of reasons, many of them true enough in their way, are given for hannibal's final defeat. but sea-power, the first and greatest of all, is commonly left out. his march round the shores of the western mediterranean and his invasion of italy from across the alps will remain one of the wonders of war till the end of history. but the mere fact that he had to go all the way round by land, instead of straight across by water, was the real prime cause of his defeat. his forces simply wore themselves out. why? look at the map and you will see that he and his supplies had to go much farther by land than the romans and their supplies had to go by water because the roman victory over the carthaginian fleet had made the shortest seaways safe for romans and very unsafe for carthaginians. then remember that carrying men and supplies by sea is many times easier than carrying them by land; and you get the perfect answer. chapter iv celtic britain under rome ( b.c.- a.d.) when caesar was conquering the celts of western france he found that one of their strongest tribes, the veneti, had been joined by two hundred and twenty vessels manned by their fellow-celts from southern britain. the united fleets of the celts were bigger than any roman force that caesar could get afloat. moreover, caesar had nothing but rowboats, which he was obliged to build on the spot; while the celts had real ships, which towered above his rowboats by a good ten feet. but, after cutting the celtic rigging with scythes lashed to poles, the well-trained roman soldiers made short work of the celts. the battle of the loire seems to have been the only big sea fight the celts of britain ever fought. after this they left the sea to their invaders, who thus had a great advantage over them ashore. the fact is that the celts of the southern seaports were the only ones who understood shipbuilding, which they had learnt from the phoenicians, and the only ones who were civilized enough to unite among themselves and with their fellow-celts in what now is france but then was gaul. the rest were mere tribesmen under chiefs who were often squabbling with one another, and who never formed anything like an all-celtic army. for most of them a navy was out of the question, as they only used the light, open-work, basket-like coracles covered with skins--about as useful for fighting the romans at sea as bark canoes would be against real men-of-war. the roman conquest of britain was therefore made by the army, each conqueror, from caesar on, winning battles farther and farther north, until a fortified roman wall was built across the narrow neck of land between the forth and clyde. along these thirty-six miles the romans kept guard against the picts and other highland tribes. the roman fleet was of course used at all times to guard the seaways between britain and the rest of the roman empire, as well as to carry supplies along the coast when the army was fighting near by. this gave the romans the usual immense advantage of sea-transport over land-transport, never less than ten to one and often very much more. the romans could thus keep their army supplied with everything it needed. the celts could not. eighteen hundred years after caesar's first landing in britain, wolfe, the victor of quebec, noticed the same immense advantage enjoyed by king george's army over prince charlie's, owing to the same sort of difference in transport, king george's army having a fleet to keep it well supplied, while prince charlie's had nothing but slow and scanty land transport, sometimes more dead than alive. the only real fighting the romans had to do afloat was against the norsemen, who sailed out of every harbour from norway round to flanders and swooped down on every vessel or coast settlement they thought they had a chance of taking. to keep these pirates in check carausius was made "count of the saxon shore". it was a case of setting a thief to catch a thief; for carausius was a fleming and a bit of a pirate himself. he soon became so strong at sea that he not only kept the other norsemen off but began to set up as a king on his own account. he seized boulogne, harried the roman shipping on the coasts of france, and joined forces with those franks whom the romans had sent into the black sea to check the scythians and other wild tribes from the east. the franks were themselves norsemen, who afterwards settled in gaul and became the forefathers of the modern french. so rome was now threatened by a naval league of hardy norsemen, from the black sea, through the mediterranean, and all the way round to that "saxon shore" of eastern britain which was itself in danger from norsemen living on the other side of the north sea. once more, however, the romans won the day. the emperor constantius caught the franks before they could join carausius and smashed their fleet near gibraltar. he then went to gaul and made ready a fleet at the mouth of the seine, near le havre, which was a british base during the great war against the germans. meanwhile carausius was killed by his second-in-command, allectus, who sailed from the isle of wight to attack constantius, who himself sailed for britain at the very same time. a dense fog came on. the two fleets never met. constantius landed. allectus then followed him ashore and was beaten and killed in a purely land battle. this was a little before the year ; by which time the roman empire was beginning to rot away, because the romans were becoming softer and fewer, and because they were hiring more and more strangers to fight for them, instead of keeping up their own old breed of first-class fighting men. by rome itself was in such danger that they took their last ships and soldiers away from celtic britain, which at once became the prey of the first good fighting men who came that way; because the celts, never united enough to make a proper army or navy of their own, were now weaker than ever, after having had their country defended by other people for the last four hundred years. chapter v the hardy norseman ( - ) the british empire leads the whole world both in size and population. it ended the great war with the greatest of all the armies, the greatest of all the navies, and the greatest of all the mercantile marines. better still, it not only did most towards keeping its own--which is by far the oldest--freedom in the world, but it also did most towards helping all its allies to be free. there are many reasons why we now enjoy these blessings. but there are three without which we never could have had a single one. the first, of course, is sea-power. but this itself depends on the second reason, which, in its turn, depends upon the third. for we never could have won the greatest sea-power unless we had bred the greatest race of seamen. and we never could have bred the greatest race of seamen unless we ourselves had been mostly bred from those hardy norsemen who were both the terror and the glory of the sea. many thousands of years ago, when the brown and yellow peoples of the far south-east were still groping their way about their steamy asian rivers and hot shores, a race of great, strong, fair-haired seamen was growing in the north. this nordic race is the one from which most english-speaking people come, the one whose blood runs in the veins of most first-class seamen to the present day, and the one whose descendants have built up more oversea dominions, past and present, than have been built by all the other races, put together, since the world began. to the sturdy nordic stock belonged all who became famous as vikings, berserkers, and hardy norsemen, as well as all the anglo-saxons, jutes, danes, and normans, from whom came most of the people that made the british empire and the united states. "nordic" and "norse" are, therefore, much better, because much truer, words than "anglo-saxon", which only names two of the five chief tribes from which most english-speaking people come, and which is not nearly so true as "anglo-norman" to describe the people, who, once formed in england, spread over southern scotland and parts of ireland, and who have also gone into every british, american, or foreign country that has ever been connected with the sea. when the early nordics outgrew their first home beside the baltic they began sailing off to seek their fortune overseas. in course of time they not only spread over the greater part of northern europe but went as far south as italy and spain, where the good effects of their bracing blood have never been lost. they even left descendants among the berbers of north africa; and, as we have learnt already, some of them went as far east as the black sea. the belgians, dutch, and germans of caesar's day were all nordic. so were the franks, from whom france takes its name. the nordic blood, of course, became more or less mingled with that of the different peoples the nordic tribes subdued; and new blood coming in from outside made further changes still. but the nordic strain prevailed, as that of the conquerors, even where the nordic folk did not outnumber all the rest, as they certainly did in great britain. the franks, whose name meant "free men", at last settled down with the gauls, who outnumbered them; so that the modern french are a blend of both. but the gauls were the best warriors of all the celts: it took caesar eight years to conquer them. so we know that frenchmen got their soldier blood from both sides. we also know that they learnt a good deal of their civilization from the romans and passed it on to the empire-building normans, who brought more nordic blood into france. the normans in their turn passed it on to the anglo-saxons, who, with the jutes and danes, form the bulk, as the normans form the backbone, of most english-speaking folk within the british empire. the normans are thus the great bond of union between the british empire and the french. they are the franco-british kinsfolk of the sea. we must not let the fact that prussia borders on the north sea and the baltic mislead us into mistaking the prussians for the purest offspring of the nordic race. they are nothing of the kind. some of the finest nordics did stay near their baltic home. but these became norwegians, swedes, and danes; while nearly all the rest of the cream of this mighty race went far afield. its franks went into france by land. its normans went by sea. others settled in holland and belgium and became the dutch and flemings of today. but the mightiest host of hardy norsemen crossed the north sea to settle in the british isles; and from this chosen home of merchant fleets and navies the nordic british have themselves gone forth as conquering settlers across the seven seas. the prussians are the least nordic of all the germans, and most germans are rather the milk than the cream of the nordic race; for the cream generally sought the sea, while the milk stayed on shore. the prussians have no really nordic forefathers except the teutonic knights, who killed off the borussi or old-prussian savages, about seven hundred years ago, and then settled the empty land with their soldiers of fortune, camp-followers, hirelings, and serfs. these gangs had been brought together, by force or the hope of booty, from anywhere at all. the new prussians were thus a pretty badly mixed lot; so the teutonic knights hammered them into shape as the newer prussians whom frederick the great in the eighteenth century and bismarck in the nineteenth turned into a conquering horde. the kaiser's newest prussians need no description here. we all know him and them; and what became of both; and how it served them right. the first of the hardy norsemen to arrive in england with a regular fleet and army were the two brothers, hengist and horsa, whom the celts employed to defend them against the wild picts that were swarming down from the north. the picts once beaten, the celts soon got into the same troubles that beset every people who will not or can not fight for themselves. more and more norsemen kept coming to the isle of thanet, the easternmost point of kent, and disputes kept on growing between them and the celts over pay and food as well as over the division of the spoils. the norsemen claimed most of the spoil, because their sword had won it. the celts thought this unfair, because the country was their own. it certainly was theirs at that time. but they had driven out the people who had been there before them; so when they were themselves driven out they suffered no more than what they once had made these others suffer. presently the norsemen turned their swords on the celts and began a conquest that went on from father to son till there were hardly any celts left in the british isles outside of wales, the highlands of scotland, and the greater part of ireland. every place easily reached from the sea fell into the hands of the norsemen whenever they chose to take it; for the celts never even tried to have a navy. this, of course, was the chief reason why they lost the war on land; because the norsemen, though fewer by far at first, could move men, arms, and supplies ten times better than the celts whenever the battlefields were anywhere near the sea. islands, harbours, and navigable rivers were often held by the norsemen, even when the near-by country was filled with celts. the extreme north of scotland, like the whole of the south, became norse, as did the northern islands of orkney and shetland. scapa flow, that magnificent harbour in the orkneys, was a stronghold of norsemen many centuries before their descendants manned the british grand fleet there during the recent war. the isle of man was taken by norsemen. dublin, waterford, and other irish cities were founded by them. they attacked wales from anglessey; and, wherever they conquered, their armies were based on the sea. if you want to understand how the british isles changed from a celtic to a nordic land, how they became the centre of the british empire, and why they were the mother country from which the united states were born, you must always view the question from the sea. take the sea as a whole, together with all that belongs to it--its islands, harbours, shores, and navigable rivers. then take the roving norsemen as the greatest seamen of the great seafaring nordic race. never mind the confusing lists of tribes and kings on either side--the jutes and anglo-saxons, the danes and normans, on one side, and the celts of england, scotland, wales, and ireland, on the other; nor yet the different dates and places; but simply take a single bird's-eye view of all the seven seas as one sea, of all the british norsemen as one anglo-norman folk, and of all the centuries from the fifth to the twentieth as a single age; and then you can quite easily understand how the empire of the sea has been won and held by the same strong "hardy-norseman" hands these fifteen hundred years. there is nothing to offend the celts in this. they simply tried to do what never can be done: that is, they tried to hold a sea-girt country with nothing but an army, while their enemy had an army and a fleet. they fought well enough in the past on many a stricken field to save any race's honour; and none who know the glorious deeds of the really celtic highland, welsh, or irish regiments can fail to admire them now. but this book is about seamen and the sea, and how they have changed the fate of landsmen and the land. so we must tell the plain truth about the anglo-norman seamen without whom there could be no british empire and no united states. the english-speaking peoples owe a great deal to the celts; and there is celtic blood in a good many who are of mostly nordic stock. but the british empire and the american republic were founded and are led more by anglo-normans than even anglo-normans know. for the anglo-normans include not only the english and their descendants overseas but many who are called scotch and irish, because, though of anglo-norman blood, they or their forefathers were born in scotland or ireland. soldiers and sailors like wellington, kitchener, and beatty are as anglo-norman by descent as marlborough, nelson, and drake, though all three were born in ireland. they are no more irish celts than the english-speaking people in the province of quebec are french-canadians. they might have been as good or better if born irish celts or french-canadians. but that is not the point. the point is simply a fact without which we cannot understand our history; and it is this: that, for all we owe to other folk and other things than fleets, our sea-girt british empire was chiefly won, and still is chiefly kept, by warriors of the sea-borne "hardy-norseman" breed. the sea-farer desire in my heart ever urges my spirit to wander, to seek out the home of the stranger in lands afar off. there is no one that dwells on earth so exalted in mind, so large in his bounty, nor yet of such vigorous youth, nor so daring in deeds, nor to whom his liege lord is so kind, but that he has always a longing, a sea-faring passion for what the lord god shall bestow, be it honour or death. no heart for the harp has he, nor for acceptance of treasure, no pleasure has he in a wife, no delight in the world, nor in aught save the roll of the billows; but always a longing, a yearning uneasiness hastens him on to the sea. _anonymous_. _translated from the anglo-saxon_. chapter vi the imperial norman ( - ) the celts had been little more than a jumble of many different tribes before the romans came. the romans had ruled england and the south of scotland as a single country. but when they left it the celts had let it fall to pieces again. the norsemen tried, time after time, to make one united kingdom; but they never quite succeeded for more than a few years. they had to wait for the empire-building normans to teach them how to make, first, a kingdom and then an empire that would last. yet offa, edgar, and canute went far towards making the first step by trying to raise a royal navy strong enough to command at least the english sea. offa, king of mercia or middle england ( - ) had no sooner fought his way outwards to a sure foothold on the coast than he began building a fleet so strong that even the great emperor charlemagne, though ruling the half of europe, treated him on equal terms. here is offa's good advice to all future kings of england: "he who would be safe on land must be supreme at sea." alfred the great ( - ) was more likely to have been thinking of the navy than of anything else when, as a young man hiding from the danes, he forgot to turn the cakes which the housewife had left him to watch. anyhow he tried the true way to stop the danes, by attacking them before they landed, and he caused ships of a new and better kind to be built for the fleet. edgar ( - ) used to go round great britain every year inspecting the three different fleets into which his navy was divided; one off the east of england, another off the north of scotland, and the third in the irish sea. it is said that he was once rowed at chester on the river dee by no less than eight kings, which showed that he was following offa's advice by making his navy supreme over all the neighbouring coasts of england, ireland, scotland, and wales. after edgar's death the danes held command of the sea. they formed the last fierce wave of hardy norsemen to break in fury on the english shore and leave descendants who are seamen to the present day. nelson, greatest of all naval commanders, came from norfolk, where danish blood is strongest. most of the fishermen on the east coast of great britain are of partly danish descent; and no one served more faithfully through the great war than these men did against the submarines and mines. king george v, whose mother is a dane, and who is himself a first-rate seaman, must have felt a thrill of ancestral pride in pinning v.c.'s over their undaunted hearts. fifty years before the norman conquest canute the dane became sole king of england. he had been chosen king of denmark by the danish fleet. but he was true to england as well; and in , when he conquered norway, he had fifty english vessels with him. meanwhile another great norseman, leif ericsson, seems to have discovered america at the end of the tenth century: that is, he was as long before columbus as columbus was before our own day. in any case norsemen settled in iceland and discovered greenland; so it may even be that the "white eskimos" found by the canadian arctic expedition of were the descendants of vikings lost a thousand years ago. the saga of eric the red tells how leif ericsson found three new countries in the western world--helluland, markland, and vinland. as two of these must have been nova scotia and newfoundland, which cabot discovered with his english crew in , it is certain that canada was seen first either by norsemen or by their descendants. the norse discovery of america cannot be certainly proved like the discoveries made by cabot and columbus. but one proved fact telling in favour of the norsemen is that they were the only people who built vessels "fit to go foreign" a thousand years ago. all other people hugged the shore for centuries to come. the norsemen feared not any sea. some years ago a viking (or warrior's) ship, as old as those used by ericsson, was found in the "king's mound" in gokstad, southern norway. seated in her was the skeleton of the viking chief who, as the custom used to be, was buried in his floating home. he must have stood well over six foot three and been immensely strong, judging by his deep chest, broad shoulders, and long arms fit to cleave a foeman at a single stroke. this viking vessel is so well shaped to stand the biggest waves, and yet slip through the water with the greatest ease, that she could be used as a model now. she has thirty-two oars and a big square sail on a mast, which, like the one in the old egyptian boat we were talking of in chapter ii, could be quickly raised or lowered. if she had only had proper sails and rigging she could have tacked against the wind. but, as we shall soon see, the art of tacking was not invented till five centuries later; though then it was done by an english descendant of the vikings. eighty foot long and sixteen in the beam, this viking vessel must have looked the real thing as she scudded before a following wind or dashed ahead when her thirty-two oars were swept through the water by sixty-four pairs of the strongest arms on earth. her figure-head has gone; but she probably had a fierce dragon over the bows, just ready to strike. her sides were hung with glittering shields; and when mere landsmen saw a viking fleet draw near, the oars go in, the swords come out, and vikings leap ashore--no wonder they shivered in their shoes! it was in this way that the normans first arrived in normandy and made a home there in spite of franks and gauls, just as the danes made english homes in spite of celts and anglo-saxons. there was no navy to oppose them. neither was there any fleet to oppose william the conqueror in , when he crossed the channel to seize the english crown. harold of england had no great fleet in any case; and what he had was off the yorkshire coast, where his brother had come to claim the crown, backed by the king of norway. the battle of hastings, which made william king of england, was therefore a land battle only. but the fact that william had a fleet in the channel, while harold had not, gave william the usual advantage in the campaign. from that day to this england has never been invaded; and for the best of all reasons--because no enemy could ever safely pass her fleet. [illustration: william the conqueror's transports] the normans at last gave england what none of her other norsemen gave her, the power of becoming the head and heart of the future british empire. the celts, danes, jutes, and anglo-saxons had been fusing together the iron of their natures to make one strong, united british race. the normans changed this iron into steel: well tempered, stronger than iron could be, and splendidly fit for all the great work of imperial statesmen as well as for that of warriors by land and sea. the normans were not so great in numbers. but they were very great in leadership. they were a race of rulers. picked men of nordic stock to start with, they had learnt the best that france could teach them: roman law and order and the art of founding empires, frankish love of freedom, a touch of celtic wit, and the new french civilization. they went all over seaboard europe, conquerors and leaders wherever they went. but nowhere did they set their mark so firmly and so lastingly as in the british isles. they not only conquered and became leaders among their fellow-norsemen but they went through most of celtic scotland, ireland, and wales, founding many a family whose descendants have helped to make the empire what it is. william the conqueror built a fleet as soon as he could; for only a few of the vessels he brought over from normandy were of any use as men-of-war. but there were no great battles on the water till the one off the south foreland more than a century after his death. he and the kings after him always had to keep their weather eye open for danes and other rovers of the sea as well as for the navy of the kings of france. but, except when henry ii went to ireland in , there was no great expedition requiring a large fleet. strongbow and other ambitious nobles had then begun conquering parts of ireland on their own account. so henry recalled his englishmen, lest they should go too far without him, and held a court at which they promised to give him, as their liege overlord, all the conquests they either had made or might make. henry, who understood the value of sea-power, at once granted them whatever they could conquer, except the seaports, which he would keep for the crown. when henry died richard the lion-hearted and philip augustus of france agreed to join in a great crusade. zeal for the christian religion and love of adventure together drew vast numbers of crusaders to the holy land. but sea-power also had a great deal to do with the crusades. the saracens, already strong at sea in the east, were growing so much stronger that western statesmen thought it high time to check them, lest their fleets should command the whole mediterranean and perhaps the seas beyond. in richard joined his fleet at messina, in sicily, where roving normans were of course to be found as leaders in peace and war. vinesauf the historian, who was what we should now call a war correspondent, wrote a glowing account of the scene. "as soon as the people heard of his arrival they rushed in crowds to the shore to behold the glorious king of england, and saw the sea covered with innumerable galleys. and the sound of trumpets from afar, with the sharper blasts of clarions, resounded in their ears. and they saw the galleys rowing near the land, adorned and furnished with all kinds of arms, with countless pennons floating in the breeze, ensigns at the tops of lances, the beaks of the galleys beautified by painting, and glittering shields hanging from the prows. the sea looked as if it was boiling from the vast number of oar blades in it. the trumpets grew almost deafening. and each arrival was greeted with bursts of cheering. then our splendid king stood up on a prow higher than all the rest, with a gorgeously dressed staff of warriors about him, and surveyed the scene with pleasure. after this he landed, beautifully dressed, and showed himself graciously to all who approached him." the whole english fleet numbered about two hundred and thirty vessels, with stores for a year and money enough for longer still. a southerly gale made nearly everybody sea-sick; for the italian rowers in the galleys were little better as seamen than the soldiers were, being used to calm waters. some vessels were wrecked on the rocks of cyprus, when their crews were robbed by the king there. this roused the lion-hearted, who headed a landing party which soon brought king comnenus to his senses. vinesauf wrote to say that when comnenus sued for peace richard was mounted on a splendid spanish war-horse and dressed in a red silk tunic embroidered with gold. red seems to have been a favourite english war colour from very early times. the red st. george's cross on a white field was flown from the masthead by the commander-in-chief of the fleet, just as it is today. on another flag always used aboard ship three british lions were displayed. after putting comnenus into silver chains and shutting him up in a castle richard set two governors over cyprus, which thus became the first eastern possession of the british crown. seven centuries later it again came into british hands, this time to stay. richard then sailed for the siege of acre in palestine. but on the way he met a turkish ship of such enormous size that she simply took vinesauf's breath away. no one thought that any ship so big had ever been built before, "unless it might be noah's ark", richard had a hundred galleys. the turkish ship was quite alone; but she was a tough nut to crack, for all that. she was said to have had fifteen hundred men aboard, which might be true, as soldiers being rushed over for the defence of acre were probably packed like herrings in a barrel. as this was the first english sea fight in the crusades, and the first in which a king of all england fought, the date should be set down: the th of june, . the turk was a very stoutly built vessel, high out of the water and with three tall masts, each provided with a fighting top from which stones and jars of greek fire could be hurled down on the galleys. she also had "two hundred most deadly serpents, prepared for killing christians." altogether, she seems to have been about as devilish a craft as even germans could invent. as she showed no colours richard hailed her, when she said she was a french ship bound for acre. but as no one on board could speak french he sent a galley to test her. as soon as the englishmen went near enough the turks threw greek fire on them. then richard called out: "follow me and take her! if she escapes you lose my love for ever. if you take her, all that is in her will be yours." but when the galleys swarmed round her she beat them off with deadly showers of arrows and greek fire. there was a pause, and the galleys seemed less anxious to close again. then richard roared out: "if this ship escapes every one of you men will be hanged!" after this some men jumped overboard with tackle which they made fast to the turkish rudder. they and others then climbed up her sides, having made ropes fast with grapnels. a furious slashing and stabbing followed on deck. the turks below swarmed up and drove the english overboard. nothing daunted, richard prepared to ram her. forming up his best galleys in line-abreast he urged the rowers to their utmost speed. with a terrific rending crash the deadly galley beaks bit home. the turk was stove in so badly that she listed over and sank like a stone. it is a pity that we do not know her name. for she fought overwhelming numbers with a dauntless courage that nothing could surpass. as she was the kind of ship then called a "dromon" she might be best remembered as "the dauntless dromon." king john, who followed richard on the throne of england, should be known as john the unjust. he was hated in normandy, which philip augustus of france took from him in . he was hated in england, where the english lords forced him to sign magna charta in . false to his word, he had no sooner signed it than he began plotting to get back the power he had so shamefully misused; and the working out of this plot brought on the first great sea fight with the french. looking out for a better king the lords chose prince louis of france, who landed in england next year and met them in london. but john suddenly died. his son, henry iii, was only nine. so england was ruled by william marshal, the great earl of pembroke, one of the ablest patriots who ever lived. once john was out of the way the english lords who had wrung from him the great charter of english liberties became very suspicious of louis and the french. a french army was besieging lincoln in , helped by the english followers of louis, when the earl marshal, as pembroke is called, caught this anglo-french force between his own army and the garrison, who joined the attack, and utterly defeated it in a battle the people called the fair of lincoln. louis, who had been besieging dover, at once sent to france for another army. but this brought on the battle of the south foreland, which was the ruin of his hopes. the french commander was eustace the monk, a flemish hireling who had fought first for john and then for louis. he was good at changing sides, having changed from monk to pirate because it paid him better, and having since been always up for sale to whichever side would pay him best. but he was bold and skilful; he had a strong fleet; and both he and his followers were very keen to help louis, who had promised them the spoils of england if they won. luckily for england this danger brought forth her first great sea commander, hubert de burgh: let his name be long remembered. hubert had stood out against louis as firmly as he had against john, and as firmly as he was again to face another bad king, when henry iii tried to follow john's example. hubert had refused to let louis into dover castle. he had kept him out during the siege that followed. and he was now holding this key to the english channel with the same skill and courage as was shown by the famous dover patrol throughout the war against the germans. hubert saw at once that the best way to defend england from invasion was to defeat the enemy at sea by sailing out to meet him. this is as true today as ever. the best possible way of defending yourself always is to destroy the enemy's means of destroying you; and, with us of the british empire, the only sure way to begin is to smash the enemy's fleet or, if it hides in port, blockade it. hubert, of course, had trouble to persuade even the patriotic nobles that his own way was the right one; for, just as at the present day, most people knew nothing of the sea. but the men of the cinque ports, the five great seaports on the south-east coast of england, did know whereof they spoke when they answered hubert's call: "if this tyrant eustace lands he will lay the country waste. let us therefore meet him while he is at sea." hubert's english fleet of forty ships sailed from dover on the th of august, , and steered towards calais; for the wind was south-south-east and hubert wished to keep the weather gage. for six hundred years to come, (that is, till, after trafalgar, sails gave way to steam), the sea commanders who fought to win by bold attack always tried to keep the weather gage. this means that they kept on the windward side of the enemy, which gave them a great advantage, as they could then choose their own time for attacking and the best weak spot to attack, while the enemy, having the wind ahead, could not move half so fast, except when running away. hubert de burgh was the first commander who understood all about the weather gage and how to get it. even the clever eustace was taken in, for he said, "i know these clever villains want to plunder calais. but the people there are ready for them." so he held his course to the forelands, meaning to round into the mouth of thames and make for london. then hubert bore down. his fleet was the smaller; but as he had the weather gage he succeeded in smashing up the french rear before the rest could help it. as each english vessel ranged alongside it threw grappling irons into the enemy, who were thus held fast. the english archers hailed a storm of well aimed arrows on the french decks, which were densely crowded by the soldiers eustace was taking over to conquer england. then the english boarded, blinding the nearest french with lime, cutting their rigging to make their vessels helpless, and defeating the crews with great slaughter. eustace, having lost the weather gage, with which he had started out that morning, could only bring his fleet into action bit by bit. hubert's whole fleet fought together and won a perfect victory. more than a century later the unhappy hundred years war ( - ) broke out. all the countries of western europe took a hand in it at one time or another. scotland, which was a sort of sub-kingdom under the king of england, sided with france because she wished to be independent of england, while the smaller countries on the eastern frontier of france sided with england because they were afraid of france. but the two great opponents were always france and england. the kings of england had come from normandy and other parts of what is now france and what then were fiefs of the crown of france, as scotland was a fief of the crown of england. they therefore took as much interest in what they held in france as in their own out-and-out kingdom of england. moreover, they not only wanted to keep what they had in france but to make it as independent of the french king as the scotch king wanted to make scotland independent of them. in the end the best thing happened; for it was best to have both kingdoms completed in the way laid out by nature: france, a great land-power, with a race of soldiers, having all that is france now; and england, the great sea-power, with a race of sailors, becoming one of the countries that now make up the united kingdom of the british isles. but it took a hundred years to get the english out of france, and much longer still to bring all parts of the british isles under a single king. in the fourteenth century the population of france, including all the french possessions of the english crown, was four times the population of england. one would suppose that the french could easily have driven the english out of every part of france and have carried the war into england, as the romans carried their war into carthage. but english sea-power made all the difference. sea-power not only kept frenchmen out of england but it helped englishmen to stay in france and win many a battle there as well. most of the time the english fleet held the command of the sea along the french as well as along the english coast. so the english armies enjoyed the immense advantage of sea-transport over land-transport, whenever men, arms, horses, stores, food, and whatever else their armies needed could be moved by water, while the french were moving their own supplies by land with more than ten times as much trouble and delay. another and most important point about the hundred years war is this: that it does not stand alone in history, but is only the first of the two very different kinds of hundred years war which france and england have fought out. the first hundred years war was fought to decide the absolute possession of all the lands where frenchmen lived; and france, most happily, came out victorious. the second hundred years war ( - ) was fought to decide the command of the sea; and england won. when we reach this second hundred years war, and more especially when we reach that part of it which was directed by the mighty pitt, we shall understand it as the war which made the british empire of today. the first big battle of the first hundred years war was fought in between the french and english fleets at sluys, a little seaport up a river in the western corner of what is holland now. king philip of france had brought together all the ships he could, not only french ones but flemish, with hired war galleys and their soldiers and slave oarsmen from genoa and elsewhere. but, instead of using this fleet to attack the english, and so clear the way for an invasion of england, he let it lie alongside the mudbanks of sluys. edward iii, the future victor of cressy, poitiers, and winchelsea, did not take long to seize so good a chance. the french fleet was placed as if on purpose to ensure its own defeat; for it lay at anchor in three divisions, each division with all the vessels lashed together, and the whole three in one line with a flank to the sea. the english officers who had landed to look at it saw at once that if this flank was properly attacked it could be smashed in on the next bit of the line, and that on the next, and so on, before the remaining bits could come to the rescue. on the turn of the tide edward swooped down with his best ships, knocked this flank to pieces, and then went on till two divisions had been rolled up in complete confusion. then the ebb-tide set out to sea; and the genoese of the third division mostly got away. ten years later ( ) the english for the first time fought a spanish fleet and won a battle sometimes called winchelsea and sometimes espagnols-sur-mer or spaniards-on-the-sea. edward iii had sworn vengeance against the basque traders from the coast of spain who had plundered the english vessels coming in from france. so he made ready to attack the spanish basques sailing home from antwerp, where they had hired flemings and others to join the fray. this time each fleet was eager to attack the other; and a battle royal followed. on the fine afternoon of the th of august king edward sat on the deck of his flagship listening to sir john chandos, who was singing while the minstrels played. beside him stood his eldest son, the famous black prince, then twenty years of age, and his youngest son, john of gaunt, then only ten. suddenly the lookout called down from the tops: "sire, i see one, two, three, four--i see so many, so help me god, i cannot count them." then the king called for his helmet and for wine, with which he and his knights drank to each others' health and to their joint success in the coming battle. queen philippa and her ladies meanwhile went into winchelsea abbey to pray for victory, now and then stealing out to see how their fleet was getting on. the spaniards made a brave show. their fighting tops (like little bowl-shaped forts high up the masts) glinted with armed men. their soldiers stood in gleaming armour on the decks. long narrow flags gay with coloured crests fluttered in the breeze. the english, too, made a brave show of flags and armoured men. they had a few more vessels than the spaniards, but of a rather smaller kind, so the two fleets were nearly even. the king steered for the spaniards; though not so as to meet them end-for-end but at an angle. the two flagships met with a terrific crash; and the crowded main-top of the spaniard, snapping from off the mast, went splash into the sea, carrying its little garrison down with all their warlike gear. the charging ships rebounded for a moment, and then ground against each others' sides, wrecked each others' rigging, and began the fight with showers of arrows, battering stones from aloft, and wildfire flying to and fro. the spanish flagship was the bigger of the two, more stoutly built, and with more way on when they met; so she forged ahead a good deal damaged, while the king's ship wallowed after, leaking like a sieve. the tremendous shock of the collision had opened every seam in her hull and she began to sink. the king still wanted to follow the spanish flagship; but his sailors, knowing this was now impossible, said: "no, sire, your majesty can not catch her; but we can catch another." with that they laid aboard the next one, which the king took just in time, for his own ship sank a moment after. the black prince had the same good luck, just clearing the enemy's deck before his own ship sank. strange to say, the same thing happened to robert of namur, a flemish friend of edward's, whose vessel, grappled by a bigger enemy, was sinking under him as the two were drifting side by side, when hanekin, an officer of robert's, climbed into the spanish vessel by some entangled rigging and cut the ropes which held the spanish sails. down came the sails with a run, flopping about the spaniards' heads; and before the confusion could be put right robert was over the side with his men-at-arms, cutting down every spaniard who struggled out of the mess. the basques and spaniards fought most bravely. but the chief reason why they were beaten hand-to-hand was because the english archers, trained to shooting from their boyhood up, had killed and wounded so many of them before the vessels closed. the english won a great victory. but it was by no means complete, partly because the spanish fleet was too strong to be finished off, and partly because the english and their flemish friends wanted to get home with their booty. time out of mind, and for at least three centuries to come, fleets were mostly made up of vessels only brought together for each battle or campaign; and even the king's vessels were expected to make what they could out of loot. with the sea roads open to the english and mostly closed to the french and scots the english armies did as well on land as the navy did at sea. four years before this first great battle with the spaniards the english armies had won from the french at cressy and from the scots at neville's cross. six years after the spanish fight they won from the french again at poitiers. but in edward iii, worn out by trying to hold his lands in france, had been forced to neglect his navy; while jean de vienne, founder of the regular french navy, was building first-class men-of-war at rouen, where, five hundred years later, a british base was formed to supply the british army during the great war. with shakespeare's kingly hero, henry v, the fortunes of the english armies in france revived. in he won a great battle at agincourt, a place, like cressy, within a day's march of his ships in the channel. harfleur, at the mouth of the seine, had been henry's base for the agincourt campaign. so the french were very keen to get it back, while the english were equally keen to keep it. henry sent over a great fleet under the duke of bedford. the french, though their fleet was the smaller of the two, attacked with the utmost gallantry, but were beaten back with great loss. their genoese hirelings fought well at the beginning, but made off towards the end. in henry himself was back in france with his army. but he knew what sea-power meant, and how foolish it was to land without making sure that the seaways were quite safe behind him. so he first sent a fleet to make sure, and then he crossed his army, which now had a safe "line of communication," through its base in france, with its great home base in england. henry v was not, of course, the only man in england who then understood sea-power. for in , exactly five hundred years before jellicoe's victory of jutland, henry's parliament passed a resolution in which you still can read these words: "that the navy is the chief support of the wealth, the business, and the whole prosperity of england." some years later hungerford, one of henry's admirals, wrote a _book of english policy_, "exhorting all england to keep the sea" and explaining what edward iii had meant by stamping a ship on the gold coins called nobles: "four things our noble showeth unto me: king, ship, and sword, and power of the sea." these are themselves but repetitions of offa's good advice, given more than six centuries earlier: "he who would be safe on land must be supreme at sea." and all show the same kind of first-rate sea-sense that is shown by the "articles of war" which are still read out to every crew in the navy. the preamble or preface to these articles really comes to this: "it is upon the navy that, under the providence of god, the wealth, prosperity, and peace of the british empire chiefly depend." between the death of henry v in and the accession of henry vii in there was a dreary time on land and sea. the king of england lost the last of his possessions in the land of france. only the channel islands remained british, as they do still. at home the normans had settled down with the descendants of the other norsemen to form one people, the anglo-norman people of today, the leading race within the british empire and, to a less extent, within the united states. but england was torn in two by the wars of the roses, in which the great lords and their followers fought about the succession to the throne, each party wanting to have a king of its own choice. for the most part, however, the towns and seaports kept out of these selfish party wars and attended to their growing business instead. and when henry vii united both the warring parties, and these with the rest of england, he helped to lay the sure foundations of the future british empire. chapter vii king of the english sea ( ) england needed good pilots to take the ship of state safely through the troubled waters of the wonderful sixteenth century, and she found them in the three great royal tudors: henry vii ( - ), henry viii ( - ), and queen elizabeth ( - ). all three fostered english sea-power, both for trade and war, and helped to start the modern royal navy on a career of world-wide victory such as no other fighting service has ever equalled, not even the roman army in the palmy days of rome. it was a happy thought that gave the name of queen elizabeth to the flagship on board of which the british commander-in-chief received the surrender of the german fleet. ten generations had passed away between this surrender in and the defeat of the spanish armada in . but the british royal navy was still the same: in sea-sense, spirit, training, and surpassing skill. henry vii was himself an oversea trader, and a very good one too. he built ships and let them out to traders at a handsome profit for himself besides trading with them on his own account. but he was never so foolish as to think that peaceful trade could go on without a fighting navy to protect it. so he built men-of-war; though he used these for trade as well. men-of-war built specially for fighting were of course much better in a battle than any mere merchantman could be. but in those days, and for some time after, merchantmen went about well armed and often joined the king's ships of the royal navy during war, as many of them did against the germans in our own day. english oversea trade was carried on with the whole of europe, with asia minor, and with the north of africa. canyng, a merchant prince of bristol, employed a hundred shipwrights and eight hundred seamen. he sent his ships to iceland, the baltic, and all through the mediterranean. but the london merchants were more important still; and the king was the most important man of all. he had his watchful eye on the fishing fleet of iceland, which was then as important as the fleet of newfoundland became later on. he watched the baltic trade in timber and the flanders trade in wool. he watched the hansa towns of northern germany, then second only to venice itself as the greatest trading centre of the world. and he had his english consuls in italy as early as , the first year of his reign. one day columbus sent his brother to see if the king would help him to find the new world. but henry vii was a man who looked long and cautiously before he leaped; and even then he only leaped when he saw where he would land. so columbus went to ferdinand and isabella of spain, who sent him out to discover america in , the same year that they conquered the last eastern possession in western europe, the moorish kingdom of grenada, which thenceforth became a province of spain. five years later henry sent john cabot out from bristol in the little _matthew_ with only eighteen men "to sayle to all partes, countreys, and seas, of the east, of the west, and of the north; to seeke out, discover, and finde, whatsoever iles, countreyes, regions, or provinces, of the heathennes and infidelles" and "to set up our banners and ensigns in every village, towne, castel, yle, or maine lande, of them newly found." cabot discovered canada by reaching cape breton in , three years before columbus himself saw any part of the mainland. but as he found nobody there, not even "heathenries and infidelles," much less "villages, castels, and townes," as he lost money by his venture and could not pay the king the promised "royalty" of twenty per cent., we need not laugh too loudly over what the king gave him: "to hym that founde the new isle-- pounds," which was worth more than a thousand dollars would be now. cabot went again and his son sebastian after him; but there was no money to be made in this venture. true, sebastian said the fish off newfoundland were so thick that he could hardly force his vessels through the water. but fish stories and travellers' tales were as hard to believe then as now; and the english thought america was worth very little after all. indeed, the general opinion in europe was that america was more of a nuisance than anything else, because it seemed to block the way to the golden east. once people were persuaded that the world was round they wanted to find a short cut to cathay, the land of fabled wealth in silks and spices, gold and jewels; and they expected to find it by sailing due west till they reached the far east. so, finding instead that america had no such riches on its own shores and that these shores spoilt the short cut to cathay, and knowing that fish were plentiful in europe, most people never bothered their heads about america for another fifty years. [illustrations: eddystone lighthouse, . the first structure of stone and timber. built for trinity house by winstanley and swept away in a storm. eddystone lighthouse, . the fourth and present structure, erected by sir j. n. douglass for trinity house.] we shall soon see what wonderful changes took place when the old world at last discovered the riches of the new, and all the european sea-powers began fighting for the best places they could find there. when henry viii came to the throne in his first thought was for the "broade ditch," as he called the english channel. in , only a little before he died, he appointed a navy board, which answered its purpose so well that it looked after the pay, food, stores, docks, and ships of the royal navy for nearly three hundred years; and then became part of the admiralty, which now does everything for the navy that can be done from the land. in one word, this board took care of everything except the fighting part of the navy's work. that part was under the lord high admiral or a body of men appointed to act for him. this body still exists; and the old board of henry viii works with it under different names. one branch of the admiralty, as the whole management is now called, supplies the other with the means to fight. this other orders everything connected with the fighting fleets. the fighting fleets themselves are then left to do the best they can. henry never forgot for a moment that england could not live a day if she was not a mighty sea-power. he improved the dockyards founded by his father at deptford and portsmouth. he founded trinity house, which still examines pilots and looks after the lights and buoys all round the british isles. he put down pirates with a strong hand. and he brought the best ship-builders he could get from italy, where the scientific part of shipbuilding and navigation was then the best in the world, because the trade routes of asia, africa, and europe mostly met at venice. but he always kept his eyes open for good men at home; and in one of his own shipbuilders, fletcher of rye, he found a man who did more than anybody else to make the vastly important change from the ancient age of rowing fleets to the modern age of sailing ones. from the time when the first bit of a wild beast's skin was hoisted by some pre-historic savage, thousands and thousands of years ago, nobody had learnt how to tack, that is, to sail against the wind. the only way any ship could go at all well was with the wind, that is, with the wind blowing from behind. so long as men had nothing but a single "wind-bag" of skin or cloth the best wind was a "lubber's wind," that is, a wind from straight behind. when more and better sails were used a lubber's wind was not the best because one sail would stop the wind from reaching another one in front of it. the best wind then, as ever since, was a "quartering wind," that is, a wind blowing on a vessel's quarter, half way between her stern and the middle of her side. ships with better keels, sails, and shape of hull might have sailed with a "soldier's wind," that is, a wind blowing straight against the ship's side, at right angles to her course. but they must have "made leeway" by going sideways too. this wind on the beam was called a soldier's wind because it made equally plain sailing out and back again, and so did not bother landsmen with a lot of words and things they could not understand when ships tacked against head winds. who first "tacked ship" is more than we can say. but many generations of seamen must have wished they knew how to sail towards a place from which the wind was blowing. tacking probably came bit by bit, like other new inventions. but fletcher of rye, whom henry always encouraged, seems to have been the first man who really learnt how to sail against the wind. he did this by tacking (that is, zigzagging) against it with sails trimmed fore and aft. in this way the sails, as it were, slide against the wind at an angle and move the ship ahead, first to one side of the straight line towards the place she wants to reach, and then, after turning her head, to the other. it was in that fletcher made his trial trip, to the great amazement of the shipping in the channel. thus by , that year of naval changes, the new sailing age had certainly begun to live and the old rowing age had certainly begun to die. the invention of tacking made almost as great a change as steam made three hundred years later; for it shortened voyages from months to weeks, as steam afterwards shortened them from weeks to days. why did jacques cartier take months to make voyages from europe and up the st. lawrence when champlain made them in weeks? because champlain could tack and jacques cartier could not. columbus, cabot, and cartier could no more zigzag towards a place from which the wind was blowing dead against them than could the ships of hiram, king of tyre, who brought so many goods by sea for solomon. but champlain, who lived a century later, did know how to tack the _don de dieu_ against the prevailing south-west winds of the st. lawrence; and this was one reason why he made a voyage from the seine to the saguenay in only eighteen days, a voyage that remained the canadian record for ninety years to come. the year is coupled with the title "king of the english sea" because the fleet which henry viii then had at portsmouth was the first fleet in the world that showed any promise of being "fit to go foreign" and fight a battle out at sea with broadside guns and under sail. true, it had some rowing galleys, like those of other old-fashioned fleets; and its sailing men-of-war were nothing much to boast of in the way of handiness or even safety. the _mary rose_, which henry's admiral, sir edward howard, had described thirty years before as "the flower of all the ships that ever sailed," was built with lower portholes only sixteen inches above the water line. so when her crew forgot to close these ports, and she listed over while going about (that is, while making a turn to bring the wind on the other side), the water rushed in and heeled her over still more. then the guns on her upper side, which had not been lashed, slid across her steeply sloping decks bang into those on the lower side, whereupon the whole lot crashed through the ports or stove her side, so that she filled and sank with nearly everyone on board. no, the royal navy of was very far from being perfect either in ships or men. but it had made a beginning towards fighting with broadsides under sail; and this momentous change was soon to be so well developed under drake as to put english sea-power a century ahead of all its rivals in the race for oversea dominion both in the old world and the new. a rowing galley, with its platform crowded by soldiers waiting to board had no chance against a sailing ship which could fire all the guns of her broadsides at a safe distance. nor had the other foreign men-of-war a much better chance, because they too were crowded with soldiers, carried only a few light guns, and were far less handy than the english vessels under sail. they were, in fact, nothing very much better than armed transports full of soldiers, who were dangerous enough when boarding took place, but who were mere targets for the english guns when kept at arm's length. the actual portsmouth campaign of was more like a sham battle than a real one; though the french fleet came right over to england and no one can doubt french bravery. perhaps the best explanation is the one given by blaise de montluc, one of the french admirals: "our business is rather on the land than on the water, where i do not know of any great battles that we have ever won." henry viii had seized boulogne the year before, on which francis i (jacques cartier's king) swore he would clear the channel of the english, who also held calais. he raised a very big fleet, partly by hiring italian galleys, and sent it over to the isle of wight. there it advanced and retired through the summer, never risking a pitched battle with the english, who, truth to tell, did not themselves show much more enterprise. sickness raged in both fleets. neither wished to risk its all on a single chance unless that chance was a very tempting one. the french fleet was a good deal the bigger of the two; and lisle, the english commander-in-chief, was too cautious to attack it while it remained in one body. when the french were raiding the coast lisle's hopes ran high. "if we chance to meet with them," he wrote, "divided as they should seem to be, we shall have some sport with them." but the french kept together and at last retired in good order. that was the queer end of the last war between those two mighty monarchs, francis i and henry viii. but both kings were then nearing death; both were very short of money; and both they and their people were anxious for peace. thus ended the navy's part of . but three other events of this same year, all connected with english sea-power, remain to be noted down. first, drake, the hero of the coming spanish war, was born at crowndale, by tavistock, in devon. secondly, the mines of potosi in south america suddenly roused the old world to the riches of the new. and, thirdly, the words of the national anthem were, so to say, born on board the portsmouth fleet, where the "sailing orders" ended thus:--"the watchword in the night shall be, 'god save king henrye!' the other shall answer, 'long to raign over us!'" the national anthems of all the other empires, kingdoms, and republics in the world have come from their armies and the land. our own springs from the royal navy and the sea. this royal throne of kings, this scepter'd isle, this earth of majesty, this seat of mars, this other eden, demi-paradise; this fortress built by nature for herself against infection and the hand of war; this happy breed of men, this little world; this precious stone set in the silver sea, which serves it in the office of a wall, or as a moat defensive to a house, against the envy of less happier lands; this blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this england. _shakespeare_. _king richard ii, act ii, scene i_. to sea to sea, to sea! the calm is o'er; the wanton water leaps in sport, and rattles down the pebbly shore; the dolphin wheels, the sea-cows snort, and unseen mermaids' pearly song comes bubbling up, the weeds among. fling broad the sail, dip deep the oar; to sea, to sea! the calm is o'er. to sea, to sea! our wide-winged bark shall billowy cleave its sunny way, and with its shadow, fleet and dark, break the caved tritons' azure day, like mighty eagle soaring light o'er antelopes on alpine height. the anchor heaves, the ship swings free, the sails swell full: to sea, to sea! --_thomas lovell beddoes_. a hymn in praise of neptune of neptune's empire let us sing, at whose command the waves obey; to whom the rivers tribute pay, down the high mountains sliding: to whom the scaly nation yields homage for the crystal fields wherein they dwell: and every sea-god pays a gem yearly out of his wat'ry cell to deck great neptune's diadem. the tritons dancing in a ring before his palace gates do make the water with their echoes quake, like the great thunder sounding: the sea-nymphs chant their accents shrill, and the sirens, taught to kill with their sweet voice, make ev'ry echoing rock reply unto their gentle murmuring noise the praise of neptune's empery. --_thomas campion_. evening on calais beach it is a beauteous evening, calm and free, the holy time is quiet as a nun breathless with adoration; the broad sun is sinking down in its tranquillity; the gentleness of heaven is on the sea: listen! the mighty being is awake, and doth with his eternal motion make a sound like thunder--everlastingly. --_wordsworth_. bermudas where the remote bermudas ride in the ocean's bosom unespied, from a small boat that row'd along the listening winds received this song: 'what should we do but sing his praise that led us through the watery maze unto an isle so long unknown, and yet far kinder than our own? where he the huge sea-monsters wracks, that lift the deep upon their backs, he lands us on a grassy stage, safe from the storms' and prelates' rage: he gave us this eternal spring which here enamels everything, and sends the fowls to us in care on daily visits through the air: he hangs in shades the orange bright like golden lamps in a green night, and does in the pomegranates close jewels more rich than ormus shows: he makes the figs our mouths to meet and throws the melons at our feet; but apples plants of such a price, no tree could ever bear them twice. with cedars chosen by his hand from lebanon he stores the land; and makes the hollow seas that roar proclaim the ambergris on shore. he cast (of which we rather boast) the gospel's pearl upon our coast; and in these rocks for us did frame a temple where to sound his name. o, let our voice his praise exalt till it arrive at heaven's vault, which thence (perhaps) rebounding may echo beyond the mexique bay!' thus sung they in the english boat a holy and a cheerful note: and all the way, to guide their chime, with falling oars they kept the time. --_andrew marvell_. book ii the sailing age part i the spanish war ( - ) chapter viii old spain and new ( - ) just as germany tried to win the overlordship of the world in this twentieth century so spain tried in the sixteenth; and just as the royal navy was the chief, though by no means the biggest, force that has won the whole world's freedom from the germans now, so the royal navy was the chief force that won world-freedom from the spaniards then. spaniards and portuguese, who often employed italian seamen, were the first to begin taking oversea empires. they gained footholds in places as far apart as india and america. balboa crossed the isthmus of panama and waded into the pacific, sword in hand, to claim it for the king of spain. a portuguese ship was the first to go right round the world. the spaniards conquered all central and great parts of north and south america. the portuguese settled in brazil. while this was going on abroad france and england were taken up with their own troubles at home and with each other. so spain and portugal had it all their own way for a good many years. the spanish empire was by far the biggest in the world throughout the sixteenth century. charles v, king of spain, was heir to several other crowns, which he passed on to his son, philip ii. charles was the sovereign lord of spain, of what are belgium and holland now, and of the best parts of italy. he was elected emperor of germany, which gave him a great hold on that german "middle europe" which, stretching from the north sea to the adriatic, cut the rest in two. besides this he owned large parts of africa. and then, to crown it all, he won what seemed best worth having in central, north, and south america. [illustration: the _santa maria_, flagship of christopher columbus when he discovered america in . length of keel, feet. length of ship proper, feet. length over all, feet. breadth, feet. tonnage, full displacement, .] france and england had something to say about this. francis i wrote charles a pretty plain letter. "your majesty and the king of portugal have divided the world between you, offering no part of it to me. show me, i pray you, the will of our father adam, so that i may see if he has really made you his universal heirs." nor did the two henrys forget the claims of england. henry vii claimed most of the eastern coast of what are now canada and the united states, in virtue of the cabot discoveries. in the naval museum at madrid you can still see the bullock-hide map of juan de la cosa, which, made in the year , shows st. george's cross flying over these very parts. but it was not till after , when the mines of potosi made europe dream of el dorado, the great new golden west, that england began to think of trying her own luck in america. some of the fathers of drake's "sea-dogs" had already been in brazil, notably "olde mr. william hawkins, a man for his wisdome, valure, experience, and skill in sea causes much esteemed and beloved of king henry the eight." hawkins "armed out a tall and goodlie ship called the pole of plimmouth, wherewith he made three long and famous voyages into the coast of brasil." he went by way of africa, "where he trafiqued with the negroes, and took of them oliphants' teeth; and arriving on the coast of brasil, behaved himself so wisely, that he grew into great friendship with those savages"--very different from the vile cruelty with which the spaniards always treated the poor natives. these voyages were made about ; and the writer says that they were "in those days very rare, especially to our nation." in charles v planned to make all such voyages work for the glory of spain instead of england. but, thanks chiefly to the english sea-dogs, everything turned out the other way. charles saw that if he could only add england to his vast possessions he could command the world; for then he would have not only the greatest land-power but the greatest sea-power too. queen mary seemed made for his plan. her mother, katharine of aragon, henry viii's first wife, was a spaniard, and she herself cared less for england than for spain. she was only too ready to marry charles's heir, philip, of armada fame. after this charles would leave his throne to philip, who would then be king of england as well as king of spain. philip sailed for england with a hundred and sixty ships, and came up the channel with the spanish standard at the main (that is, at the tip top of the main, or highest, mast). lord howard of effingham sailed to meet him and answer philip's salute. but philip and his haughty dons thought it was nonsense for the prince of spain to follow the custom of the sea by saluting first when coming into english waters. so the spanish fleet sailed on and took no notice, till suddenly howard fired a shot across the spanish flagship's bows. then, at last, philip's standard came down with a run, and he lowered topsails too, so as to make the salute complete. howard thereupon saluted philip, and the two fleets sailed on together. but there was no love lost between them. neither was the marriage popular ashore. except for the people at court, who had to be civil to philip, london treated the whole thing more as a funeral than a wedding. philip drank beer in public, instead of spanish wine, and tried to be as english as he could. mary did her best to make the people like him. and both did their best to buy as many friends at court as spanish gold could buy. but, except for his queen and the few who followed her through thick and thin, and the spies he paid to sell their country, philip went back with even fewer english friends than he had had before; while the spanish gold itself did him more harm than good; for the english sea-dogs never forgot the long array of new-world wealth that he paraded through the streets of london--" chests of bullion, horseloads + cartloads of gold and silver coin, and boxes full of silver bars." that set them asking why the whole new world should be nothing but new spain. but seventeen years passed by; and the spanish empire seemed bigger and stronger than ever, besides which it seemed to be getting a firmer hold on more and more places in the golden west. nor was this all; for portugal, which had many ships and large oversea possessions, was becoming so weak as to be getting more and more under the thumb of spain; while spain herself had just ( ) become the victorious champion both of west against east and of christ against mahomet by beating the turks at lepanto, near corinth, in a great battle on landlocked water, a hundred miles from where the west had defeated the east when greeks fought persians at salamis two thousand years before. the fame of sir francis drake sir drake, whom well the world's end knew, which thou didst compass round, and whom both poles of heaven once saw, which north and south do bound. the stars above would make thee known, if men here silent were; the sun himself cannot forget his fellow-traveller. --_anonymous_. chapter ix the english sea-dogs ( - ) the daring english sailors who roved the waters to prey on spanish vessels were given the name of sea-dogs because they often used to hunt together like a pack of hounds. their norse forefathers were often called sea-wolves; and sometimes there was not so very much difference between the two. war to the knife was the rule at sea when spaniards and englishmen met, even in time of peace (that is, of peace between the sovereigns of spain and england, for there was no such thing as real peace at sea or in any oversea possession). spain was bound to keep englishmen out of the new world. englishmen were bound to get in. of course the sea-dogs preyed on other people too, and other peoples' own sea-dogs preyed on english vessels when they could; for it was a very rough-and-tumble age at sea, with each nation's seamen fighting for their own hand. but spanish greed and spanish cruelty soon made spain the one great enemy of all the english sea-dogs. [illustration: drake] sea-dogs were not brought up on any bed of roses. they were rough, and their lives were rougher. they were no gentler with spaniards than spaniards were with them when both were fighting. but, except by way of revenge, and then very seldom, they never practised such fiendish cruelty as the spaniards practised the whole time. "captain john smith, sometime governor of virginia and admiral of new england" (whom the indian girl pocahontas saved from death) did not write _the seaman's grammar_ till after most of queen elizabeth's sea-dogs were dead. but he was a big boy before drake died; so one of his _directions for the takying of a prize_ may well be quoted here to show that there was a sea-dog code of honour which would pass muster among the rules of war today. what's more, the sea-dogs kept it. "always have as much care to their wounded as to your own; and if there be either young women or aged men, use them nobly." some of the other _directions_ show that smith knew how to fight like a lion as well as how to treat his captives well. "out with all your sails! a steadie man at the helm! give him (the enemy) chace! hail him with trumpets! whence is your ship? of spain!--whence is yours? of england! be yare at the helm! edge in with him! give him a volley of small shot, also your prow and broadside as before! with all your great and small shot charge him! make fast your grapplings. board him!" then, after giving much good advice as to how the rest of a sea fight should be managed, smith tells his pupils what to do in case of fire. "captaine, we are foul of each other and the ship is on fire!" "cut anything to get clear and smother the fire with wet clothes." here he adds this delightful little note: "in such a case they will presentlie bee such friends as to help each other all they can to get clear; and if they bee generous, and the fire bee quenched, they will drink kindly one to the other, heave their canns overboard, _and begin again as before_." the duties of a good crew after the fight are carefully laid down: "chirurgeon (surgeon) look to the wounded and wind up the slain, and give them three guns (volleys) for their funerals" (as we do still). "swabber, make clean the ship! purser, record their names! watch, be vigilant! gunners, spunge your ordnance! souldiers, scour your pieces! carpenters, about your leaks! boatswain and the rest, repair sails and shrouds! cook, see you observe your directions against the morning watch!" the first thing in this "morning watch" the captain sings out, "boy, hallo! is the kettle boiled?"--"ay, ay, sir!" then the captain gives the order: "boatswain, call up the men to prayer and breakfast." the victory won, and the spanish ship once safe in the hands of an english crew, the _directions_ end with a grand salute: "sound drums and trumpets: saint george for england!" ("saint george for england!" is what sir roger keyes signalled to the fleet he led against the germans at zeebrugge on st. george's day in , three hundred years after smith's book was written.) sea-dogs worked desperately hard for all they got, ran far more than the usual risks of war, and were cheated by most of the traders ashore. as for the risks: when shakespeare speaks of a "putter-out of five for one" he means that what we now call insurance agents would bet five to one against the chance of a ship's ever coming back when she was going on a long voyage through distant seas full of known and unknown dangers, such as pirates, cannibals, shipwreck, and deadly diseases. as for cheats: sea-dogs were not perfect themselves, nor were all landsmen quite so bad as those in the old sailors' song: for sailours they bee honest men, and they do take great pains. but land-men and ruffling ladds do cheat them of their gains. all the same, the "land-men" often did cheat sailors so much that sailors might well be excused for poking fun at "land-men" who were seasick. yet, at a time when even the best crews had no means of keeping food and water properly, a land-lubber might also be excused for being not only seasick but sick in worse ways still. the want of fresh food always brought on scurvy; and the wonder is that any one lived to tell the tale when once this plague and others got a foothold in a ship. but the norse blood tingling in their veins, the manly love of wonderful adventure, and, by no means least, the gamble of it, that dared them to sail for strange outlandish parts with odds of five to one against them, these, quite as much as the wish to make a fortune, were the chief reasons why sea-dogs sailed from every port and made so many landsmen mad to join them. and, after all, life afloat, rough as it was, might well be better than life ashore, when men of spirit wanted to be free from the troubles of taking sides with all the ups and downs of kings and courts, rebels and religions. whether or not the man who wrote _the complaynt of scotland_ was only a passenger or off to join the sea-dogs is more than we shall ever know; for all he tells us is that he wrote his book in , and that he was then a landsman who "heard many words among the seamen, but knew not what they meant." in any case, he is the only man who ever properly described the daily work on board a sea-dog ship. the sea-dogs themselves never bothered their heads about what they thought such a very common thing; and whatever other landsmen wrote was always wrong. a page of this quaint old book, which was not printed till two hundred and fifty years after it was written, will show us how much the work aboard a sea-dog ship was, in some ways, like the work aboard any other sailing ship, even down to the present day; and yet how much unlike in other ways. some of the lingo has changed a good deal; for english seamen soon began to drop the words king henry's shipwrights brought north from the mediterranean. many of these words were italian, others even arabic; for the arabs, moors, and turks haunted the mediterranean for many centuries, and some of their sea-words passed current into all the northern tongues. we get _captain_ from the italian _capitano_, and _admiral_ from the arabic _amir-al-bahr_, which means commander-of-the-sea. "i shall report their crying and their call," says our author. "then the boatsman" (who was the officer next to the captain) "cried with an oath: 'i see a great ship.' then the master (that is, the captain) whistled and bade the mariners lay the cable to the windlass to wind and weigh (that is, heave the anchor up). then the mariners began to wind the cable in with many a loud cry; and, as one cried, all the others cried in that same tune, as it had been an echo in a cave. 'veer, veer; veer, veer; gentle gallants, gentle gallants! wind, i see him! wind, i see him! _pourbossa, pourbossa_! haul all and one!'" when the anchor was hauled above the water they cried: "_caupon, caupon; caupon, cola; caupon holt; sarrabossa_!" when setting sail they began with the same kind of gibberish. "_hou_! _hou_! _pulpela, pulpela_! hard out strife! before the wind! god send! god send! fair weather! many prizes! many prizes! stow! stow! make fast and belay--heisa! heisa! one long pull! one long pull! young blood! more mud! there, there! yellow hair! great and small! one and all!" the "yellow hair" refers to the fair-haired norsemen. what the master told the steersman might have been said by any skipper of our own day: "keep full and by! luff! con her! steady! keep close!" but what he told the "boatswain" next takes us back three hundred years and more. "bear stones and limepots full of lime to the top" (whence they would make it pretty hot for an enemy held fast alongside). the orders to the artillery and infantry on board are equally old and very odd when we remember modern war. "gunners, make ready your cannons, culverins, falcons, sakers, slings, head-sticks, murdering pieces, passevolants, bazzils, dogges, arquebusses, calivers, and hail shots! souldiers, make ready your cross-bows, hand-bows, fire-spars, hail-shot, lances, pikes, halberds, rondels, two-handed swords, and targes!" yet, old as all this was, the artillery seems to have made a good many noises that would have been familiar to those of us who heard the noises of the great war. "i heard the cannons and guns make many hideous cracks" (like the stabbing six-inchers). "the bazzils and falcons cried _tir-duf, tir-duf, tir-duf_" (like the anti-aircraft "archies"). then the small artillery cried _tik-tak, tik-tak, tik-tak_ (something like the rattle of machine-guns, only very much slower). the cannons of those days seem like mere pop-guns to those who knew the british grand fleet that swept the germans off the sea. but the best guns drake used against the spanish armada in were not at all bad compared with those that nelson used at trafalgar in . there is more change in twenty years now than there was in two hundred years then. the chief improvements were in making the cannon balls fit better, in putting the powder into canvas bags, instead of ladling it in loose, and in fitting the guns with tackle, so that they could be much more easily handled, fired, and aimed. the change in ships during the sailing age was much greater than the change in guns. more sails and better ones were used. the old forecastle, once something really like a little castle set up on deck, was made lower and lower, till it was left out altogether; though the name remains to describe the front part of every ship, and is now pronounced fo'c's'le or foxle. the same sort of top-hamper (that is, anything that makes the ship top-heavy) was cut down, bit by bit, as time went on, from the quarter-deck over the stern; till at last the big british men-of-war became more or less like the _victory_, which was nelson's flagship at trafalgar, and which is still kept in portsmouth harbour, where henry viii's first promise of a sailing fleet appeared in , the year that drake was born. drake was a first-rate seaman long before he grow up. his father, also a seaman, lived in a man-of-war on the medway near where chatham dockyard stands today; and drake and his eleven sturdy brothers spent every minute they could in sailing about and "learning the ropes." with "the master of a barque, which used to coast along the shore and sometimes carry merchandise into zeeland (holland) and france" drake went to sea at the age of ten, and did so well that "the old man at his death bequeathed his barque to him by will and testament." but the channel trade was much too tame for drake. so in , when he was twenty-two, he sailed with hawkins, who was already a famous sea-dog, to try his fortune round the spanish main, (that is, the mainland of northern south america and of the lands all round panama). luck went against them from start to finish. hawkins, who founded the slave trade that lasted till the nineteenth century, was attacked this time by the negroes he tried to "snare" in africa. "envenomed arrows" worked havoc with the englishmen. "there hardly escaped any that had blood drawn, but died in strange sort, with their mouths shut some ten days before they died." as everybody who sailed to foreign parts used slaves in those days hawkins and drake were no worse than the rest; and less bad than those whites who kept them three hundred years later, when people knew better. but hawkins' complaint against the negroes for not coming quietly is just the same sort of nonsense as any other complaint against anything alive for being "vicious" when we want to take or kill it. "this animal," said a frenchman who made wise fun of all such humbug, "is very wicked. when you attack it, it defends itself!" with what he could get--some four or five hundred negroes--hawkins did a roaring trade in those parts of the spanish main where king philip's subjects were not too closely watched by governors and troops. but new troubles began when hawkins, trying to leave the west indies, was blown back by a hurricane into vera cruz, then known as san juan de ulua. hawkins still had a hundred negroes left; so, hoping for leave from mexico city to trade them off, he held the kind's island, which entirely commanded the entrance to the harbour, where he saw twelve spanish treasure ships. but it was four hundred miles to the city of mexico and back again; and meanwhile a great spanish fleet was expected out from spain. hawkins had this fleet completely at his mercy; for it could no more get past the king's island if he chose to stop it than the fleet inside could get out. moreover, the stormy season was beginning; so the fleet from spain might easily be wrecked if hawkins kept it at bay. the very next morning the fleet arrived. hawkins was terribly tempted to keep it out, which would have made his own fleet safe and would have struck a heavy blow at spain; for all the spanish vessels together were worth many millions. but he feared the wrath of queen elizabeth, who did not want war with spain; so he let the spaniards "enter with their accustomed treason" after they had agreed not to attack him. for a few days everything went well. then suddenly the spaniards set on the english, killed every englishman they could catch ashore, and attacked the little english fleet by land and sea. once the two spanish fleets had joined they were in overwhelming force and could have smothered hawkins to death by sheer weight of numbers. but he made a brave fight. within an hour the spanish flagship and another vessel had been sunk, a third was on fire, and every english deck was clear of spanish boarding parties. but the king's island, to which hawkins had moored his vessels, now swarmed with spaniards firing cannon only a few yards off. to hearten his men he drank their health and called out, "stand by your ordnance lustily!" as he put the goblet down a round shot sent it flying. "look," he said, "how god has delivered me from that shot; and so will he deliver you from these traitors." then he ordered his own battered ship to be abandoned for the _minion_, telling drake to come alongside in the _judith_. in these two little vessels all that remained of the english sailed safely out, in spite of the many spanish guns roaring away at point-blank range and of two fire-ships which almost struck home. drake and hawkins lost each other in the darkness and gale outside. drake's tiny _judith_, of only fifty tons, went straight to england, with every inch of space crowded by her own crew and those she had rescued from the other vessels. hawkins was so overcrowded in the _minion_ (which then meant "darling") that he asked all who would try their luck ashore to go forward, while all who would stand by the _minion_ stayed aft. a hundred went forward, were landed south of the rio grande, and died to a man, except three. one of these walked all round the gulf of mexico and up the atlantic sea-board, till he reached the mouth of the st. john in new brunswick, when a frenchman took him home. the other two were caught by the spaniards and worked as slaves, one in mexico, the other as a galley-slave in europe. both escaped in the end, one after fourteen, the other after twenty-two, years. the spaniards found their own hostages all safe and sound aboard the flagship that hawkins had abandoned at the king's island. this surprised them very much; for they had kept all the english hostages hawkins had sent them in exchange for theirs when they had made the agreement never to attack him, and they knew that by the laws of war he had the right to kill all the spaniards who were in his power when the other spaniards broke their word. the treason of ulua took place in , just twenty years before the great armada. during those fateful twenty years the storm of english hatred against the spanish tyrants grew and grew until it burst in fury on their heads. nothing daunted, drake and his dare-devils went, three years running, to the spanish main. the third year, , brought him into fame. he had only two tiny vessels, the _pasha_ and the _swan_, with seventy-three men, all told. but with these faithful few he sailed into a secret harbour, intending to seize the whole year's treasure chest of spain. to his surprise the found this letter from a scout on the coast: "captain drake! if you fortune to come to this port, make haste away! for the spaniards have betrayed the place and taken away all that you left here." the date was fourteen days before. he soon saw that others knew his secret harbour; for in came rance, an englishman, who then joined forces. stealing quietly along the coast, the hundred and twenty english lay in wait off nombre de dios, the place on the atlantic coast of the isthmus of panama where the treasure was put aboard for spain. an hour before dawn drake passed the word along the waiting line: "shove off!" bounding into the bay he saw a spanish rowboat, which at once saw him and pulled hard-all for the shore. the english won the desperate race, making the spaniards sheer off to a landing some way beyond the town. then they landed and tumbled the spanish guns off their mountings on the wharf, to the amazement of the sleepy spanish sentry, who ran for dear life. no time was to be lost now; for the news spread like wildfire, and the alarm bells were ringing from every steeple in the town. so drake made straight for the governor's palace, while his lieutenant, oxenham, (the hero of _westward ho_!), went by a side street to take the enemy in flank. the spaniards fired a volley which killed drake's trumpeter, who had just sounded the _charge_! on went the english, swords flashing, fire-pikes blazing, and all ranks cheering like mad. when their two parties met each other the spaniards were in full flight through the treasure gate of panama, which drake banged to with a will. the door of the governor's palace was then burst open, and there, in solid gleaming bars, lay four hundred tons of purest silver, enough to sink the _pasha_ and the _swan_ and all drake's boats besides. but drake would not touch a single bar. it was only diamonds, pearls, and gold that he had room for now; so he made for the king's great treasure house itself. but a deluge of rain came on. the fire-pikes and arquebusses had to be taken under cover. the immensely strong treasure house defied every effort to break it in. the spaniards, finding how very few the english were, came on to the attack. drake was wounded, so that he had to be carried off the field. and the whole attack ended in failure, and dead loss. the game seemed up. rance and his men withdrew, and drake was left with less than fifty. but he was determined to be revenged on spain for the treachery to hawkins at ulua (the modern vera cruz); and equally determined to get some spanish treasure. so, keeping out of sight for the next five months, till the rainy season was over and the next treasure train was ready, he went wide of nombre de dios and made for panama (the pacific end of the trail across the isthmus). he had nineteen picked englishmen and thirty-one maroons, who, being the offspring of negro slaves and indians, hated spaniards like poison and knew the country to a foot. on the th of february, , from the top of a gigantic tree that stood on the divide, drake first saw the pacific. vowing to sail an english ship across the great south sea he pushed on eagerly. three days later his fifty men were lying in wait for the mule train bringing gold from panama. all had their shirts on over their coats, so as to know one another in the night attack. presently the tinkle of mule bells told of the spanish approach. when the whole line of mules had walked into his trap drake's whistle blew one long shrill blast and his men set on with glee. their two years of toil and failure seemed to have come to an end: for they easily mastered the train. but then, to their intense disgust, they found that the spaniards had fooled them by sending the silver train this way and the gold one somewhere else. without losing a moment drake marched back to the atlantic, where he met têtu, a very gallant frenchman, who, with his own seventy men, gladly joined company; for spain hated to see the french there quite as much as she hated to see the english. the new friends then struck inland to a lonely spot which another spanish train of gold and jewels had to pass on its way to nombre de dios. this time there was no mistake. when drake's whistle blew, and the leading mules were stopped, the others lay down, as mule trains will. then the guard was quickly killed or put to flight, and all the gold and jewels were safely seized and carried to the coast. here again disaster stared drake in the face; for all his boats were gone, and not one of the men left with them was in sight. but once more drake got through, this time by setting up an empty biscuit bag as a sail on a raft he quickly put together. with one other englishman and two frenchmen he soon found his boats, divided the treasure with the french, put the english share on board ship, and, after giving many presents to the friendly maroons, sailed for home. "and so," says one of his men, "we arrived at plymouth on sunday, the th of august, , at what time the news of our captain's return did so speedily pass over all the church that very few remained with the preacher, all hastening to see the evidence of god's love towards our gracious queen and country." the plot kept thickening fast and faster after this. new spain, of course, was spanish by right of discovery, conquest, and a certain kind of settling. but the spaniards wanted to keep everyone else away, not only from all they had but from all they wished to have. their governor-general plainly showed this by putting up in his palace the figure of a gigantic war-horse pawing at the sky, and by carving underneath, "_the earth itself is not enough for us_." nor was this the worst. no whites, not even the germans, have ever been so fiendishly cruel to any natives as the spaniards were to those they had in their power. they murdered, tortured, burnt alive, and condemned to a living death as slaves every native race they met. there were brutal belgians in the congo not so very long ago. american settlers and politicians have done many a dark deed to the indians. and the british record in the old days of newfoundland is quite as black. but, for out-and-out cruelty, "the devildoms of spain" beat everything bad elsewhere. moreover, while english, french, and spaniards all wanted gold when they could get it, there was this marked difference between the two chief opponents, that while spain cared mostly for tribute england cared mostly for trade. now, tribute simply means squeezing as much blood-money as possible out of an enslaved country, no matter at what cost of life and liberty to the people there; while trade, though often full of cheating, really means an exchange of goods and some give-and-take all round. when we consider this great difference, and remember how cruel the spaniards were to all whom they had made their enemies, we can understand why the spanish empire died and why the british lives. one day queen elizabeth sent for drake and spoke her mind straight out. "drake, i would gladly be revenged on the king of spain for divers injuries"; and, said drake, "she craved my advice; and i told her majesty the only way was to annoy him by the indies." then he told her his great plan for raiding the pacific, where no outsider had ever been, and where the spaniards were working their will without a thought of danger. elizabeth at once fell in with drake's idea and "did swear by her crown that if any within her realm did give the king of spain to understand hereof they should lose their heads therefor." the secret had to be very well kept, even from burleigh, who was then more or less like what a prime minister is now. burleigh was a very cautious man, afraid of bringing on an open war with spain. elizabeth herself did not want open war; but she was ready to go all lengths just short of that. in those days, and for the next two centuries, a good deal of fighting could go on at sea and round about oversea possessions without bringing on a regular war in europe. but for elizabeth to have shown her hand now would have put philip at least on his guard and perhaps spoilt drake's game altogether. so the secret was carefully hidden from every one likely to tell mendoza, the lynx-eyed ambassador of spain. that elizabeth was right in all she did is more than we can say. but with enemies like philip of spain and mary queen of scots (both ready to have her murdered, if that could be safely done) she had to hit back as best she could. "the famous voyage of sir francis drake into the south sea, and therehence about the whole globe of the earth, begun in the yeare of our lord " is the greatest raid in history. his fleet was small enough, compared with what we know of fleets today. but it did wonderful work for all that. the flagship _golden hind_ was of only a hundred tons. the four others were smaller still. there were less than two hundred men, all told. yet with these drake sailed off to raid the whole pacific seaboard of new spain. he took "great store of wildfire, chain-shot, harquebusses, pistols, corslets, bows, and other weapons. neither had he omitted to make provision for ornament and delight, carrying with him expert musicians, rich furniture, and divers shows of curious workmanship, whereby the magnificence of his native country might amongst all nations be the more admired." sou'sou'west went drake until he reached the "land of devils" in south america, northeast of montevideo. terrific storms raised tremendous seas through which the five little vessels buffeted their toilsome way. the old portuguese pilot, whom drake had taken for his knowledge of that wild coast, said the native savages had "sold themselves to the devil, because he was so much kinder than the spaniards; and the devil helped them to keep off spanish vessels by raising these awful storms." the frightful straits of magellan (through which the british ship _ortega_ led the germans such a dance of death) took drake seventeen squally days to clear. but he was out of the frying-pan into the fire when he reached the pacific, where he struck a storm fifty-two days long. one of his vessels sank. two others lost him and went home. but the _golden hind_ and the little pinnace _benedict_ remained safe together off cape horn, which drake was now the first man to discover. carried too far south of his course, and then too far west by trusting the bad spanish maps, drake only reached valparaiso in the north of chili at the end of . thinking he must be a spaniard, as no one else had ever sailed that sea, the crew of the _grand captain of the south_ opened a cask of wine and beat a welcome on their drums. before the spaniards knew what was happening gigantic tom moone had led the english boarders over the side and driven the crew below. half a million was the sum of this first prize. the news spread quickly, scaring the old governor to death, heartening the indians, who had just been defeated, and putting all spanish plans at sixes and sevens. messengers were sent post-haste to warn the coast. but drake of course went faster by sea than the spaniards could by land; so he overhauled and took every vessel he met. very few showed fight, as they never expected enemies at sea and were foolish enough not to be ready for those that were sure to come sooner or later. even ashore there was little resistance, often, it is true, because the surprise was complete. one day some spaniards, with half a ton of silver loaded on eight llamas, came round a corner straight into drake's arms. another day his men found a spaniard fast asleep near thirteen solid bars from the mines of potosi. the bars were lifted quietly and the spaniard left peacefully sleeping. sailing into lima drake cut every single spanish ship adrift and then sailed out again, leaving the harbour a perfect pandemonium of wrecks. overhauling a ship from panama he found that the king's great treasure ship, _nuestra señora de la concepcion_, the "chiefest glory of the whole south sea," had such a long start of him that she might unload at panama before he could come up with her. the spaniards, a lubberly lot, brave soldiers but never handy sailors, were afraid of the straits of magellan and knew nothing of cape horn; so they always sent their treasure across the isthmus of panama. drake set every stitch of canvas the _golden hind_ could carry, taking four more prizes by the way and learning that he was gaining on the treasure ship. after clearing the prizes he sent them back with no one on board hurt, plenty to eat and drink, and presents for all ranks and ratings--very much to the amazement of the spaniards. "only a day ahead," was the news the last prize gave him. but they were nearing panama; so drake strained every nerve anew, promising a chain of solid gold to the first look-out who saw the chase. next midday his cousin, young jack drake, yelled out "sail-ho!" and climbed down on deck to get the golden chain. panama was now so close that drake was afraid of scaring the treasure ship into making a run for it; so he trailed twelve empty wine casks over the stern to slacken the speed of the _golden hind_ and make her look more like a lubberly spaniard. as the evening breeze came up and reached him first he cut the casks adrift, set every sail, and presently ran alongside. "who are you?" asked the spanish captain. "a ship of chili!" answered drake. but when don anton looked down on the _golden hind_ he saw her decks crowded with armed men from whom a thundering shout of triumph came--"english! english! strike sail!" then drake blew his whistle, at which there was perfect silence while he called, "strike sail, señor anton! or i must send you to the bottom!" anton, however, was a very brave man, and he stoutly replied, "strike sail? come and do it yourself!" at once the english guns cut down his masts and rigging, while a perfect hail of arrows prevented the spaniards from clearing the wreckage away. don anton's crew began running below, and when, in despair of making sail, he looked overside, there was gigantic tom moone, at the head of the boarders, climbing out of the pinnace. then anton struck his flag, was taken aboard the _golden hind_, and, with all his crew, given a splendid banquet by his english foes. after this the millions and millions of treasure were loaded aboard the _golden hind_, and the spaniards were given handsome presents to soften their hard luck. then they and their empty treasure ship were allowed to sail for panama. throwing the spaniards off the scent by steering crooked courses drake at last landed at what is now drake's bay, near the modern san francisco, where the indians, who had never even heard of any craft bigger than canoes, were lost in wonder at the _golden hind_ and none the less at the big fair-haired strangers, whom they took for gods. drake, as always, was very kind to them, gave them rich presents, promised them the protection of his queen, whose coins he showed them, and, pointing to the sky while his men were praying, tried to make them understand that the one true god was there and not on earth. they then crowned him with a head-dress of eagle's feathers, while he made them a speech, saying that he would call their country new albion. california thus became the counterpart of cape breton, over which john cabot had raised st. george's cross eighty-two years before. leaving the indians in tears at his departure drake crossed the pacific to the moluccas, where a vile portuguese, with the suitable name of lopez de mosquito, had just killed the sultan, who was then his guest, chopped up the body, and thrown the pieces into the sea, to show his contempt for the natives. drake would have gladly helped the sultan's son, baber, if he had only had a few more men. but having no more than fifty-six left he could not risk war with the portuguese among their own possessions. he did, however, make a treaty with baber which was the foundation of all the english far-eastern trade. and here, as everywhere, he won the hearty good-will of the natives. after a narrow escape from being wrecked on an unknown reef, and other escapes from dangers which alone would fill a story book, the gallant _golden hind_ sailed into plymouth sound with ballast of silver and cargo of gold. "is her majesty alive and well?" asked drake of a fishing smack. "ay, ay, that she is, my master." so drake wrote off to her at once and came to anchor beside what is now drake's island. he wished to know how things were going at court before he went to london. the queen wrote back to say she wished to see him, and that she would "view" some of the wonderful things he had brought back from foreign parts. straight on this hint he went to town with jewels enough to soften any woman's heart. the spanish ambassador was beside himself with rage; but in london "the people were swarming daily in the streets to behold their captain drake and vowing hatred to all that misliked him." to crown everything, the _golden hind_ came round to london, where she was the wonder of the day, and when the queen herself went aboard to a state banquet at which she knighted the hero of the sea: "i bid thee rise, sir francis drake!" chapter x the spanish armada ( ) by , the year of drake's return, spain and england were fast moving toward the war that had been bound to come ever since the old world had found the riches of the new. the battle grounds of rival sea-powers had been shifting farther and farther west since history began. now the last step was to come. we have seen already that the centre of the world's sea trade had moved for thousands of years from south-eastern asia toward north-western europe, and that in the fifteenth century it was pretty well divided between venice and the hansa towns. this was only natural, because venice was in the middle of southern europe and the hansa towns were in the middle of northern europe. the two were therefore well placed to receive, store, and distribute the bulk of the oversea trade. in a word, venice (on the adriatic) and the hansa towns (mostly on what is now the german coast) were the great european central junctions of oversea trade; while the atlantic states of spain and portugal, france and england were only terminal points, that is, they were at the end of the line; for the atlantic ended the world to the west. the discovery of a rich new world changed all that. venice and the hansa towns became only stations by the way; while the new grand central junction of the world was bound to be somewhere among the atlantic states of england, france, portugal, and spain. when these four countries became rivals for this junction england won, partly because she had the advantage of being an island, and thus safe from invasion by land, but mostly because her men were of the fighting kindred of the sea. yet she had to fight hard to win; she had to fight hard to keep what she won; and we all know how hard she has just had to fight again for the real "freedom of the seas." her first great rival, spain, was stronger than ever in , because it was then that philip ii added portugal, as well as all the oversea possessions of portugal to his own enormous empire. he felt that if he could only conquer england, then the dream of his father, charles v, would certainly come true, and he would be the master of the world. france also stood in his way, but only by land; and if he had england and england's sea-power he could make short work of france. his having portugal gave him much that he needed for his "invincible armada": plenty of ships, sailors at least as good as his own, new ports and new islands, like the azores, and the "wealth of all the indies"--for he now had the portuguese trade with the indies as well as his own with the west. luckily for england, philip was a landsman, no soldier, and very slow. so england struck first, but at new spain, not, old, because elizabeth would not have open war if she could help it. she had enemies in scotland, enemies in france, a few at home, and millions in spain. besides, she was cleverer at playing off one against the other than in managing a big war; and, like most people everywhere, even in our own sea-girt empire now, she never quite understood how to make war at sea. in london was all agog about sir francis drake again; for he was to command the "indies voyage" against new spain, with frobisher, of north-west-passage fame, as his vice-admiral, and knollys, the queen's own cousin, as rear-admiral. there were twenty-one ships and twenty-three hundred men; with carleill, a first-class general, to command the soldiers ashore. drake's crew of the _golden hind_ came forward to a man, among them gigantic tom moone, the lion of the boarding parties. it is quite likely that shakespeare went down with the crowds of londoners who saw the fleet set sail from woolwich; for the famous london vessel, _tiger_, which he mentions both in _macbeth_ and in _twelfth night_, was one of drake's fleet. drake's written plan proves that he was not only a daring raider but a very great admiral as well. it marked down for attack all the places in new spain the taking of which would knock the sea trade there to pieces, because they were the same by sea as railway junctions are by land. more than this, he planned to hold havana, so that the junctions he destroyed could not be made to work again, as from there he could pounce on working parties anywhere else. drake first swooped down on san domingo in hayti, battering the walls from the sea while carleill attacked them by land. the spaniards had been on their guard, so no treasure was found. drake therefore put the town to ransom and sent his maroon servant to bring back the spanish answer. but the spanish messenger ran his lance into the maroon and cantered away. the maroon dragged himself back and fell dead at drake's feet. drake sent word to say he would hang two spaniards a day till the one who had killed his maroon was hanged himself. no answer having come in next morning, two spanish friars were strung up. then the offender was brought in and hanged by the spaniards in front of both armies. after this drake burnt a fresh bit of the town each day till the spaniards paid the ransom. the next dash was for cartagena on the mainland of south america. the spaniards felt safe from a naval attack here, as the harbour was very hard to enter, even with the best of spanish pilots. but drake did this trick quite easily without any pilot at all; and, after puzzling the spaniards by his movements, put carleill ashore in the dark just where the english soldiers could wade past the spanish batteries under cover at the weakest spot. when carleill reached the barricade his musketeers fired into the spaniards' faces and wheeled off to let the pikemen charge through. after a fierce hand-to-hand fight the spaniards ran. the town gave in next day. having been paid its ransom drake sailed for the spanish settlement of st. augustine in florida and utterly destroyed it, then went on to sir walter raleigh's colony of roanoke, in what is now north carolina, and thence home. he had missed the yearly treasure fleet by only half a day. he had lost so many men by sickness that he had no chance of taking and holding havana. and the ransoms were less than he had hoped for. but he had done enough to cripple new spain for the next few years at any rate. arrived at plymouth he wrote to london, saying, "there is now a very great gap opened, very little to the liking of the king of spain." but the king, stung to the quick, went on with his armada harder than before, and in had it more than half ready in lisbon and cadiz. then drake "singed king philip's beard" by swooping down on cadiz and smashing up the shipping there; by going on to cape st. vincent, which he seized and held with an army while his ships swept off the fishing craft that helped to feed the great armada; and by taking "the greatest ship in all portugal, richly laden, to our happy joy." this was the best east indies treasure ship, loaded with silks and spices, jewels and gold, to the value of many millions. but, better than even this, drake found among her papers the secrets of the wonderful trade with the east, a trade now taken over by the spaniards from the conquered portuguese. with these papers in english hands the english oversea traders set to work and formed the great east india company on the last day of the year . this company--founded, held, and always helped by british sea-power--went on, step by step, for the next two hundred and fifty-seven years, after which india, taken over by the british crown, at last grew into the present indian empire, a country containing three times as many people as the whole population of the united states, and yet a country which is only one of the many parts of the british empire all round the seven seas. crippled by english sea-power both in new spain and old, threatened by english sea-power in his trade with the far east, and harassed by english sea-power everywhere between spain and the spanish netherlands, where the duke of parma was preparing an army for the invasion of england, king philip kept working on with murder in his heart. at last, in the summer of , his great invincible spanish armada seemed to be as great, invincible, and spanish as he could ever hope to make it. all the landlubbers, even in england, thought it very great indeed; and most of them think so still. the best spanish soldiers, like all the few really good spanish sailors, had very grave doubts. those who knew the english navy best expected nothing but disaster: their letters still remain to prove it. but most people, then as now, knew nothing about navies; and so the armada went on collecting ships and men together, heartening the landsmen of spain, and disheartening far too many landsmen in england. the fatal weakness of the great armada was its being out of date. though little better than an ancient floating army, it had to fight what then was the one really modern fleet; and this was its undoing. time out of mind, as we have seen already, battles on the water had always been made as much like battles on the land as the wit of man could make them. they were fought by soldiers under generals, not by sailors under admirals. they were fought mostly on the platforms of huge rowboats called galleys; and the despised galley-slaves were almost the only seamen. even the officers and men who handled the clumsy old sailing craft, or the still clumsier sail aboard a galley, were thought to be next door to nobodies; for their only work was to fit their craft together like so many bits of land in order that the soldiers might have the best imitation of a "proper field." the main bodies of these floating armies drew up in line-abreast (that is, side by side) charged each other end-on, and fought it out hand-to-hand on the mass of jammed-together platforms. no such battle was ever fought far from the land; for a good breeze would make the platforms wobble, while no galley could survive a gale. these ancient rowboat battles on calm coastal waters lasted till lepanto in . guns, muskets, and sailing craft were all used at lepanto. but the main fighting was done on galley platforms, and not so very differently done from the way the greeks and persians fought at salamis twenty _centuries_ before. then, after less than twenty _years_, the armada, though better than the spaniards at lepanto, was sent across the open sea to fight a regular sea-going fleet, whose leaders were admirals, whose chief fighting men were sailors, whose movements were made under sail, and whose real weapon was the shattering broadside gun. it was ancient spanish floating army against modern english sea-dog fleet. philip's silly plan was that the armada should make for the straits of dover, where it would see that parma's spanish army had a safe passage from flanders into england. philip had lost his best admiral, santa cruz, and had put the armada in charge of medina sidonia, a seasick landlubber, whom he ordered not to fight any more than could possibly be helped until parma had reached england. parma, who was a good soldier, saw at once what nonsense it was to put the army first and navy second in the fighting, because, even if he could get into england, his lines of communication with the bases in flanders and spain could never be safe until drake's fleet had been beaten. he knew, as all soldiers and all sailors know, that unless you have a safe road over which to bring your supplies from your base to your front your fleets and armies must simply wither away for want of these supplies--for want of men, arms, food, and all the other things a fleet and army need. therefore he wanted the fleet to fight first, so as to clear, or try to clear, safe roads across the sea. after these roads, or "lines of communication" between the bases and the front, had been cleared he would try to conquer england with his spanish army. but philip went his own silly way; and elizabeth, his deadly enemy, nearly helped him by having some silly plans of her own. she and her council (all landsmen, and no great soldier among them) wanted to divide the english fleet so as to defend the different places they thought the armada might attack. this would also please the people; for most people do like to see ships and soldiers close in front of them, even when that is quite the wrong place for the ships and soldiers to be. of course this plan could never have worked, except in favour of the spaniards, who might have crushed, first, one bit of the english fleet, and then another, and another, though they had no chance whatever against the united whole. drake's own perfect plan was to take the whole fleet straight to lisbon and beat the armada as it tried to get out. this would have given him an enormous advantage; first, because he would have found the armada at once, instead of having to search for it after it had sailed; secondly, because he could have crushed it ship by ship as it came out of the tagus; and, thirdly, because this defeat of the armada off the coast of portugal would certainly prevent parma from taking his army from flanders into england. on the th of march, , a day to be forever remembered in the history of sea-power, drake wrote all this from plymouth to the queen and her councillors. one civilian, sir francis walsingham, saw at once that drake was right. but the others shook their heads; while even those who thought drake knew better than they did were afraid to let the fleet go so far away, because the people liked the comfort of seeing it close beside the coast. drake's way was the way of nelson, jellicoe, beatty, and all the greatest seamen. but he was not allowed to try it till the th of july, when the armada had left lisbon and was in the harbour of corunna at the northwest corner of the spanish coast. and even then the queen kept him so short of stores that he could not have waited there to take the best chance. when almost in sight of spain a roaring sou'wester blew up; so, being unable to wait, he had to come back to plymouth on the th. then for a week the english fleet was taking in stores as hard as it could. lord howard of effingham, the lord high admiral of england, was in command as the great officer of state who represented the queen. but he was a very sensible man, who, knowing that drake was the greatest seaman in the world, let him do the fighting in the proper way. [illustration: one of drake's men-of-war that fought the great armada in .] the southwest wind that blew drake back brought the armada out and up the english channel. howard and drake, their desperate week of taking in stores at last quite done, were playing a game of bowls on the green when captain fleming, of the ever famous _golden hind_, rushed up to say the spaniards were in sight of the lizard, only sixty miles west. drake, knowing perfectly well what time there was to spare, and how best to calm the people looking on, said, "there's time to finish the game first and the spaniards after." but the fleet got its sailing orders on the spot; and all that fateful night the ships were working out of plymouth sound. the queen and her politicians, though patriotic as any sea-dog, had, by keeping drake so short of stores, very nearly got their own fleet caught in just the same way as drake had wished to catch the great armada, that is, coming out of port, ship by ship, against a united fleet outside. but philip's silly plan, the clumsiness of the armada, and, above all, the supreme skill of the english sea-dogs, put everything to rights again. next morning drake was safely out at sea in the channel, with fifty-four ships, when he sighted a dim blur toward the west. this was the great invincible armada. rain killed the wind, and the english lay under bare poles, unseen by the spaniards, who still left some of their idle sails swinging to and fro. the great day had come at last. philip's armada had drunk to _der tag_ (the day) of england's overthrow just as the germans did three centuries later; and nearly all the spaniards thought that thirty thousand spaniards on the water were more than a match for fifteen thousand english. but the spaniards were six thousand short, through sickness and desertion, and of the remaining twenty-four thousand little more than a quarter were seamen. the rest were soldiers, with many camp-followers. the fifteen thousand english, on the other hand, were nearly all on board; and most of them had been trained to sea fighting from their youth up. the spaniards were one-quarter seamen and three-quarters landsmen. the english were three-quarters seamen and one-quarter landsmen; and most of these landsmen were like the marines of the present day, "soldier and sailor too." nor was this the only difference that helped to seal the fate of the doomed armada. for not only were the english seamen twice as many and twice as good as the spanish seamen, but in the numbers of their trained seamen-gunners the english beat the spaniards no less than ten to one: and guns were the weapons that decided the issue of the day, just as they did at jutland in our recent war against the germans. a little before sunset the mist lifted, and the spaniards, to their intense surprise, saw the whole english fleet together. every big ship in the armada sent boats hurrying off to know what orders sidonia had to give them. but sidonia had none. that the sea-dogs had worked out of plymouth so quickly and were all together in a single fleet was something he had not reckoned on, and something philip's silly plan had not provided for. still, the armada had one advantage left, the weather-gage; for the southwest wind was piping up again, blowing from the armada to the english. yet even this advantage was soon lost, not by any change of wind, but by english seamanship. for while eight english vessels held the attention of the armada, by working about between it and the shore, the rest of drake's fleet stole off to sea, got safely out of sight, tacked to windward with splendid skill, edged in toward the armada when sea-room west of it was gained, and then, next morning, to the still more intense surprise of the armada, came down to attack it, having won the weather-gage by sailing round behind it in the night. this was the decisive stroke. the fight itself was simply the slaughter of a floating army by a fleet. the spaniards fought like heroes, day after slaughterous day. but their light guns, badly served by ill-trained crews, fired much too high to hull the english ships "'twixt wind and water," that is, to smash holes in their sides along the water-line. on the other hand, the english had more and better guns, far more and far better seaman-gunners, and vessels managed by the sea's own "handy men." they ran in with the wind, just near enough to make their well-aimed cannon-balls most deadly on the spanish water-line, but never so near that the spaniards could catch them with grappling hooks and hold them fast while the spanish soldiers boarded. another way the skilful english had was to turn their broadside against the enemy's end-on. this, whether for a single ship or for a fleet, is called "crossing the t"; and if you will look at a t you will see that guns firing inward from the whole length of the cross-stroke have a great advantage over guns firing back from the front of the up-stroke. in other words, the broad front converges on the narrow front and smashes it. the crowded spaniards sailed on, the whole week long, before the pursuing english in the "eagle formation," with the big ships forming the body and the lighter ones the wings: good enough for ancient battles like lepanto, but of no use against a modern fleet like drake's. most of them could hardly have been more nearly useless if they had been just so many elephants fighting killer whales at sea. do what they could, they could not catch the nimble sea-dogs who were biting them to death. but they still fought on. their crowded soldiers were simply targets for the english cannon-balls. sometimes the spanish vessels were seen to drip a horrid red, as if the very decks were bleeding. but when, at the end of the week, sidonia asked oquendo, "what are we to do now?", oquendo, a dauntless warrior, at once replied: "order up more powder!" the spaniards at last reached calais and anchored in the roads. but, when the tidal stream was running toward them full, drake sent nine fire-ships in among them. there was no time to get their anchors up; so they cut their cables, swung round with the tide in horrible confusion, dashing into one another in the dark, and headed for the shallows of the flemish coast. this lost them their last chance of helping parma into england. but it also saved parma from losing the whole of his army at sea. once more the brave, though cruel, spaniards tried to fight the english fleet. but all in vain. this was the end. it came at gravelines, on the th of july , just ten days after captain fleming of the _golden hind_ had stopped drake's game of bowls at plymouth. north, and still north, the beaten armada ran for its life; round by the stormy orkneys, down the wild waters of the hebrides and western ireland, strewing the coasts with wreckage and dead men, till at last the few surviving ships limped home. [illustration: armada off fowey (cornwall) as first seen in the english channel.] there never was a better victory nor one more clearly gained by greater skill. nor has there ever been a victory showing more clearly how impossible it is to keep sea empires safe without a proper navy. but, after all, it is the whole sea-dog war, and not any single battle or campaign, that really made those vast changes in world-history which we enjoy today. for we owe it to the whole sea-dog breed that the fair lands of north america are what they are and not as spain might otherwise have made them. the sea-dogs won the english right of entry into spain's new world. they, strange as it may seem, won french rights, too; for spain and france were often deadly enemies, and spain would gladly have kept the french out of all america if she had only had the fleet with which to do it. thus even the french-canadians owe drake a debt of gratitude for breaking down the great sea barriers of spain. "the invincible armada" could not, of course, have been defeated without much english bravery. and we know that the queen, her councillors, and the great mass of english people would have fought the spanish army bravely enough had it ever landed. for even henry v, calling to his army at the siege of harfleur, once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more; or close the wall up with our english dead! was no braver than queen elizabeth addressing her own army at tilbury fort, the outwork of london, when the armada was sailing up the channel: "i am only a poor weak woman. but i have the heart of a king; and of a king of england too." there can be no doubt whatever that both leaders and followers must have good hearts, and have them in the right place too; and that the heart of england beat high throughout this great campaign. but good heads, rightly used, are equally needed in war. sea-dog courage counted for much against the great armada; but sea-dog skill for more. if you want a fight in which the sea-dog hearts might well have quailed against appalling odds, then turn to the glorious end of drake's old flagship, the _revenge_, when her new captain, sir richard grenville, fought her single-handed against a whole encircling fleet of spain. [illustration: sir francis drake on board the _revenge_ receiving the surrender of don pedro de valdes.] grenville, drake, and sir philip sidney had been among those members of parliament who had asked queen elizabeth to give sir walter raleigh a royal charter to found the first of the english oversea dominions--the colony on roanoke island in what is now north carolina. grenville himself went out to roanoke. he was a born soldier of fortune and "first-class fighting man"; an explorer, scout, and pioneer; but not a colonist at all. on his return from founding raleigh's colony his boats were swept away in a storm just before he saw a spanish treasure ship. but he made his carpenter put together some sort of boat with bits of boxes; and in this he boarded the spaniard, just reaching her deck before his makeshift craft went down. on the st of september, , the _revenge_, with grenville in command of her less than two hundred men, was at "flores in the azores" when don alonzo de bazan arrived with fifty-three ships of spain. the little english squadron under lord thomas howard had no chance against this overwhelming force. so it put to sea just in time to escape destruction. but when howard saw that the _revenge_ was being surrounded he gallantly came back and attacked the spaniards in rear; while the little _george noble_ of london ran alongside the _revenge_, offering to stand by through thick and thin. grenville ordered her off, and howard himself also retired, seeing no chance whatever of helping the _revenge_ and every chance of losing all his own ships. then, at three in the afternoon, the whole spanish fleet closed in on the _revenge_, which had only one hundred men really fit for duty. the rest were sick. grenville, who had sworn he would cut down the first man who touched a rope while there still seemed a chance to escape, now refused the spanish summons to surrender and prepared to fight to the last. trimming his sails as carefully as if for a yacht race he ran down close-hauled on the starboard tack, right between the two divisions of the spanish fleet, till the flagship, three times the size of the _revenge_, ranged up on his weather side, thus blanketing his canvas and stealing the wind. as the _revenge_ lost way the ships she had passed on the other side began ranging up to cut her off completely. but meanwhile her first broadside had crashed into the flagship, which hauled off for repairs and was replaced by two more ships. the fight raged with the utmost fury all that sunny afternoon and far into the warm dark night. two spaniards were sunk on the spot, a third sank afterwards, and a fourth could only be saved by beaching. but still the fight went on, the darkness reddened by the flaming guns. maddened to see one english ship keeping their whole fleet of fifty-three at bay the spaniards closed in till the _revenge_ was caught fast by two determined enemies. in came the spanish grapplings, hooking fast to the _revenge_ on either side. "boarders away!" yelled the spanish colonels. "repel boarders!" shouted grenville in reply. and the boarders were repelled, leaving a hundred killed behind them. only fifty english now remained. but they were as defiant as before, giving the spaniards deadly broadsides right along the water-line, till two fresh enemies closed in and grappled fast. again the boarders swarmed in from both sides. again the dauntless english drove them back. again the english swords and pikes dripped red with spanish blood. but now only twenty fighting men were left, while grenville himself had been very badly wounded twice. two fresh enemies then closed in, grappled, boarded, fought with fury, and were barely driven back. after this there was a pause while both sides waited for the dawn. four hundred spaniards had been killed or drowned and quite six hundred wounded. a hundred sea-dogs had thus accounted for a thousand enemies. but they themselves were now unable to resist the attack the spaniards seemed unwilling to resume; for the first streak of dawn found only ten men left with weapons in their hands, and these half dead with more than twelve hours' fighting. "sink me the ship, master gunner!" was the last order grenville gave. but meanwhile the only two officers left alive, both badly wounded, had taken boat to treat for terms; and the terms had been agreed upon. don bazan promised, and worthily accorded, all the honours of war. so grenville was carefully taken on board the flagship, laid in don bazan's cabin, and attended by the best spanish surgeon. then, with the spanish officers standing before him bareheaded, to show him all possible respect, grenville, after thanking them in their own language for all their compliments and courtesies, spoke his farewell to the world in words which his two wounded officers wrote home: "'here die i, richard grenville, with a joyful and quiet mind; for that i have ended my life as a true soldier ought to do, that hath fought for his queen and country, honour and religion.' and when he had said these and other such like words he gave up the ghost with a great and stout courage." the revenge _a ballad of the fleet_ at flores in the azores sir richard grenville lay, and a pinnace, like a flutter'd bird, came flying from far away: "spanish ships of war at sea! we have sighted fifty three!" * * * * * * he had only a hundred seamen to work the ship and to fight, and he sailed away from flores till the spaniard came in sight, with his huge sea-castles heaving upon the weather bow. "shall we fight or shall we fly? good sir richard, tell us now, for to fight is but to dip! there'll be little of us left by the time this sun be set." and sir richard said again: "we be all good englishmen. let us bang these dogs of seville, the children of the devil, for i never turn'd my back upon don or devil yet." * * * * * * sir richard spoke and he laugh'd, and we roar'd a hurrah, and so, the little _revenge_ ran on sheer into the heart of the foe, with her hundred fighters on deck, and her ninety sick below; for half of their fleet to the right and half to the left were seen, and the little _revenge_ ran on thro' the long sea-lane between. thousands of their soldiers look'd down from their decks and laugh'd, thousands of their seamen made mock at the mad little craft running on and on, till delay'd by their mountain-like _san philip_ that, of fifteen hundred tons, and up-shadowing high above us with her yawning tiers of guns, took the breath from our sails, and we stay'd. and while now the great _san philip_ hung above us like a cloud whence the thunderbolt will fall long and loud, four galleons drew away from the spanish fleet that day, and two upon the larboard and two upon the starboard lay, and the battle-thunder broke from them all. but anon the great san philip, she bethought herself and went, having that within her womb that had left her ill content; and the rest they came aboard us, and they fought us hand to hand, for a dozen times they came with their pikes and musqueteers, and a dozen times we shook 'em off as a dog that shakes his ears when he leaps from the water to the land. and the sun went down, and the stars came out far over the summer sea, but never a moment ceased the fight of the one and the fifty-three. ship after ship, the whole night long, their high-built galleons came, ship after ship, the whole night long, with her battle-thunder and flame; ship after ship, the whole night long, drew back with her dead and her shame. for some were sunk and many were shatter'd, and so could fight us no more-- god of battles, was ever a battle like this in the world before? for he said "fight on! fight on!" tho' his vessel was all but a wreck; and it chanced that, when half of the short summer night was gone, with a grisly wound to be drest he had left the deck. but a bullet struck him that was dressing it suddenly dead, and himself he was wounded again in the side and the head, and he said 'fight on! fight on!' and the night went down, and the sun smiled out far over the summer sea, and the spanish fleet with broken sides lay round us all in a ring; but they dared not touch us again, for they fear'd that we still could sting, so they watch'd what the end would be. and we had not fought them in vain, but in perilous plight were we, seeing forty of our poor hundred were slain, and half of the rest of us maim'd for life, in the crash of the cannonades and the desperate strife; and the sick men down in the hold were most of them stark and cold, and the pikes were all broken or bent, and the powder was all of it spent; and the masts and the rigging were lying over the side; but sir richard cried in his english pride, "we have fought such a fight for a day and a night as may never be fought again! we have won great glory, my men! and a day less or more at sea or ashore, we die--does it matter when? sink me the ship, master gunner--sink her, split her in twain! fall into the hands of god, not into the hands of spain!" and the gunner said, "ay, ay," but the seamen made reply: "we have children, we have wives, and the lord hath spared our lives. we will make the spaniard promise, if we yield, to let us go; we shall live to fight again, and to strike another blow." and the lion there lay dying, and they yielded to the foe. and the stately spanish men to their flagship bore him then, where they laid him by the mast, old sir richard caught at last, and they praised him to his face with their courtly foreign grace; but he rose upon their decks, and he cried: "i have fought for queen and faith like a valiant man and true; i have only done my duty as a man is bound to do: with a joyful spirit i sir richard grenville die!" and he fell upon their decks, and he died. and they stared at the dead that had been so valiant and true, and had holden the power and glory of spain so cheap that he dared her with one little ship and his english few; was he devil or man? he was devil for aught they knew, but they sank his body with honour down into the deep, and they mann'd the _revenge_ with a swarthier alien crew, and away she sail'd with her loss and long'd for her own; when a wind from the lands they had ruin'd awoke from sleep, and the water began to heave and the weather to moan, and or ever that evening ended a great gale blew, and a wave like the wave that is raised by an earthquake grew, till it smote on their hulls and their sails and their masts and their flags, and the whole sea plunged and fell on the shot-shatter'd navy of spain, and the little _revenge_ herself went down by the island crags to be lost evermore in the main. --_alfred, lord tennyson_. part ii the dutch war chapter xi the first dutch war ( - ) the dutch wars, which lasted off and on for fifty years ( - ), were caused by rivalry in oversea trade. in the sixteenth century the dutch and english had joined forces against the portuguese, who had tried to keep them out of the east indies altogether. but when once the portuguese were beaten the allies fell out among themselves, the dutch got the upper hand, and, in , killed off the english traders at amboyna, one of the moluccas. war did not come for many years. but there was always some fighting in the far south east; and amboyna was never forgotten. the final step toward war was taken when the british parliament passed the famous navigation act of . by this act nothing could be brought into england except in english ships or in ships belonging to the country from which the goods came. as the dutch were then doing half the oversea freight work of europe, and as they had also been making the most of what oversea freighting england had lost during her civil war, the act hit them very hard. but they did not want to fight. they had troubles of their own at home. they also had a land frontier to defend. and they wanted to keep their rich sea freight business without having to fight for it. but the british were bent on war. they remembered amboyna. they did not see why the dutch should keep other shippers out of the east indies. and it angered them to see the dutch grow rich on british trade taken away while the british were busy with a war. when things are in such a state the guns almost go off by themselves. captain young, with three ships, met three dutch men-of-war in the channel and fired at the first that refused to salute according to the custom of the sea. then the great british admiral, blake, fired at the great dutch admiral, van tromp, for the same reason. a hot fight followed in each case; but without a victory for either side. at dungeness, however, van tromp with eighty ships beat blake with forty, and swept the channel throughout the winter of - . but in february, when the fleets were about equal, the british got the better of him in the straits of dover, after a running fight of three days. blake being wounded, monk led the fleet to another victory in may. but the dogged dutch were not yet beaten; and it was not till the last of july that the final battle came. monk made straight for the dutch line at six in the morning. for nine hours the fight went on, the two fleets manoeuvring with great skill and fighting furiously every time they came together. each time they separated to manoeuvre again some ships were left behind, fighting, disabled, or sinking. the british attacked with the utmost courage. the dutch never flinched. and so noon passed, and one, and two o'clock as well. van tromp's flag still flew defiantly; but van tromp himself was dead. when the fleets first met he had been killed by a musket-shot straight through his heart. when they first parted the flag for a council of war was seen flying from his ship. the council of dutch admirals hurriedly met, decided to keep his flag aloft, so as not to discourage their men, took orders from his second-in-command, and met the british as bravely as before. but after nine hours fighting their fleet broke up and left the field, bearing with it the body of van tromp, the lion of the dutch, and by far the greatest leader who had as yet withstood the british on the sea. [illustration: sailing ship. the pilgrim fathers crossed in a similar vessel ( ).] this great battle off the coast of holland made the dutch give in. they were divided among themselves; the merchants keeping up a republic and a navy, but the nobles and inland people wishing for a king and army to make the frontier safe. the british, though also divided among themselves, had the advantages of living on an island, of having settled what kind of government they would obey for the time being, and of having at the head of this government the mighty cromwell, one of the greatest masters of the art of war the world has ever seen. cromwell understood warfare on the sea, though his own magnificent victories had been won on land. he also understood the three things britain needed then to make and keep her great: first, that she should be strong enough to make foreigners respect her; secondly, that her oversea trade should be protected by a strong navy; and thirdly, that she should begin to found a british empire overseas, as foreigners always tried to shut the british out of their own oversea dominions. in a fleet and army were sent against the spanish west indies; for, though there was no war with spain in europe, there never was any peace with spaniards overseas. cromwell's orders, like those of pitt a hundred years later, were perfect models of what such orders ought to be. he told the admiral and general exactly what the country wanted them to do, gave them the means of doing it, and then left them free to do it in whatever way seemed best on the spot. but the admiral and general did not agree. king's men and cromwell's men had to be mixed together, as enough good cromwellians could not be spared so far away from home. the leaders tried to stand well with both sides by writing to the king; and every other trouble was made ten times worse by this divided loyalty. jamaica was taken. but the rest was all disgraceful failure. a very different force sailed out the same year under glorious blake, who soon let spaniards, italians, and barbary pirates know that he would stand no nonsense if they interfered with british vessels in the mediterranean. the italian princes were brought to book, as the spaniards had just been brought to book at malaga. then blake swooped down on the moorish pirates' nest at tunis, sinking every vessel, silencing the forts, and forcing the pirates to let their christian slaves go free. after this the pirates of algiers quickly came to terms without waiting to be beaten first. meanwhile the frightened spaniards had stopped the treasure fleet of . but next year they were so short of money that they had to risk it; though now there was open war in europe as well as in new spain. running for cadiz, the first fleet of treasure ships fell into british hands after very little fighting; and londoners had the satisfaction of cheering the thirty huge wagon-loads of gold and silver booty on its way to safekeeping in the tower. all that winter blake was cruising off the coast of spain, keeping the seaways open for friends and closed to enemies, thus getting a strangle-hold under which the angry spaniards went from bad to worse. in the spring his hardy vigil met with its one reward; for he learnt that the second treasure fleet was hiding at santa cruz de teneriffe in the canary islands, within a hundred miles of north-western africa. teneriffe was strongly fortified, as it was a harbour of refuge between spain and her oversea possessions, both east and west. it was also very strong by nature, being surrounded by mountains, subject to dead calms and sudden storms, and lying snugly at the inner end of a big deep bay. but blake knew the brave spaniards for the lubbers they have always been at sea. so, on the th of april, , he ran in with wind and tide, giving the forts at the entrance more than they bargained for as he dashed by. next, ranging alongside, he sank, drove ashore, or set on fire every single spanish vessel in the place. then he went out with the tide, helped by the breeze which he knew would spring up with the set of the sun. this perfect feat of daring skill, though sometimes equalled by the navy, has never been surpassed; and when blake died on his way home the people mourned their sudden loss as they have never mourned except for nelson and for drake. chapter xii the second and third dutch wars ( - ) the dutch quickly took up the east india trade dropped by the beaten spaniards, started their general oversea freighting again, and were soon as dangerous rivals as before. the dutch at home were very much afraid of war, because their land frontier was threatened by france, while their seaways were threatened by england. but they could not make the dutch east india company keep its promises; for oversea companies in those days were mostly a law to themselves; and, in this case, the dutch at home, though afraid to say so, quite agreed with the dutch overseas in wishing to shut out the british from all the rich trade with the east. the new british government, under sly and selfish charles ii, was eager to show that it would care as much for british sea trade as great cromwell had. so it did not take long to bring on a war. the first battle was fought on the rd of june, , and won by the british, who broke through the dutch line. the dutch retreat, however, was magnificently covered by van tromp's son, cornelius; and the duke of york (brother to charles ii and afterwards himself king james ii) flinched from pressing home a finishing attack. next year monk, a really great commander, fought the famous four days battle in the downs, ( - june ). he was at first weaker in numbers than de ruyter, the excellent dutch admiral; but he skilfully struck one part of the dutch line very hard before the rest could support it. on the second and third days the dutch, do what they could, were quite unable to crush him. both sides had some bad ships and bad crews; but as the dutch had more of these than the british had they suffered the greater loss by flinching. on the fourth day monk was helped by gallant prince rupert, cousin to charles ii and by far the best of all the stuarts. the government of charles, afraid that louis xiv would send the french to join the dutch, had just done one of those foolish things that are always done when scared civilians try to manage fleets and armies for themselves. they had sent rupert off to guard against the french, thus risking a double defeat, by weakening monk in front of the dutch and rupert in front of the french (who never came at all) instead of leaving the whole fleet together, strong enough to fight either enemy before the two could join. rupert came in the nick of time; for, even with his fresh ships to help monk through this last and most desperate day, de ruyter and van tromp were just enough stronger to win. but the fighting had been so deadly to both sides that the dutch were in no condition to go on. again there was some very bad behaviour on both sides, especially among the court favourites. but charles never thought of punishing these men for deserting monk, any more than he thought of honouring the memory of sir christopher myngs, rupert's second-in-command, who fell, mortally wounded, at the end of the fight, after having done all that skill and courage could possibly do to turn the fortune of the day. myngs was one of those leaders whom men will follow anywhere; and in the diary of samuel pepys, a good official at navy headquarters in london, we may see the shame of charles shown up by the noble conduct of the twelve picked british seamen who, after following myngs to the grave, came forward, with tears in their eyes, to ask this favour: "we are here a dozen of us who have long served and honoured our dead commander, sir christopher myngs. all we have is our lives. but if you will give us a fire-ship we will do that which shall show how we honour his memory by avenging his death on the dutch." even the king did his best for the fleet now, as he was afraid to meet parliament without a british victory. after immense exertions monk and rupert met de ruyter and van tromp, with almost equal forces, on the th of july, at the mouth of the thames, and closed in so fiercely that there was hardly any manoeuvring on either side. locked together in a life-or-death struggle the two fleets fought all day long. next morning the british again closed in, and again the desperate fight began. but several dutch captains flinched this time; and so de ruyter, hoping the next shot would kill him, retired defeated at last. the following year ( ) the dutch came back and sank a british fleet at chatham; for charles and his vile favourites were doing for the british navy what de ruyter's flinching captains had been doing for the dutch. the peace of breda ended this second dutch war in disgrace. but the treaty of dover, in , brought on the third dutch war with even greater shame; for charles now sold himself to louis xiv, who thus bought the royal navy for an attack on the dutch, by which he and charles were to benefit at the expense of all the rest. the french and british fleets, worked by the hidden hands of their two kings, grew suspicious of each other and failed to win a victory. the dutch fought with the courage of despair and came through with the honours of war. but, worn out by their efforts, and unable to defend themselves by both land and sea, they soon lost their position as one of the great powers, and have never won it back. the moat it may be said now to england, _martha, martha_, thou art busy about many things, but one thing is necessary. to the question, what shall we do to be saved in this world? there is no other answer but this, look to your moat. the first article of an _englishman's_ political creed must be, that he believeth in the sea. . . . we are in an island, confined to it by god almighty, not as a penalty but a grace, and one of the greatest that can be given to mankind. happy confinement, that hath made us free, rich, and quiet. _george savile, marquis of halifax_, - . part iii the french war chapter xiii the first war against louis xiv ( - ) in chapter vi we saw how french and english once fought a hundred years war to decide the french possession of all the land of france, and how the french, having the greater army, won. now, in these next seven chapters we shall learn how they fought another hundred years war to decide the command of the sea, and how the english, grown into a british empire and having the greater navy, won in their turn. both victories proved to be for the best. france and england both gained by the first war; because the natural way for france to grow was all over the land that is france now, while the natural way for england to grow was not on the continent of europe but in the british isles. the british empire gained more than the french by the second war; but as france could never have held an oversea empire without a supreme navy, and as she could never have a supreme navy while she had two land frontiers to defend with great armies, she really lost nothing she then could have kept. besides, in the nineteenth century she won a great empire in northern africa, where her mediterranean sea-power keeps it safe. the british empire, on the other hand, being based on world-wide sea-power, is rightly placed as it is. so neither french nor british are tempted to envy each other now; while their hundred years peace, followed by their glorious alliance in the great war, should make them friends for ever. the franco-british wars which began in and ended on the field of waterloo in are not called the second hundred years war in books. but that is what they were in fact. the british navy was the chief cause of british victory all through, and, as french and british always took opposite sides, we may also call the whole of these seven wars by the one name of "the french war," just as we have called the other wars against our chief opponents "the spanish war" and "dutch war"; and just as we might call "the great war" by the name of "the german war." two more points must be well understood, or else we shall miss the real meaning of our imperial history and the supreme importance of the royal navy. first, there have been four attempts made in modern times by great powers on the continent of europe to seize the overlordship of the world; and each time the royal navy has been the central force that foiled the attack upon the freedom of mankind. these four attempts have been made about a century apart from one another. the spanish attempt was made at the end of the sixteenth century. the first french attempt was made by louis xiv at the end of the seventeenth. the second french attempt was made by napoleon at the beginning of the nineteenth. the german attempt was made at the beginning of the twentieth. though alike in the ambitions of their makers, these attempts were most unlike in the way the wars were carried on; for, while the spaniards and germans were monsters of cruelty, the french were foemen worthy of the noblest steel. secondly, as we shall see in chapter xvi, the middle of this long french war was marked by the marvellous growth of the british empire under the elder pitt; a man whose like the world had never seen before and may not see again; orator, statesman, founder of empire, champion of freedom, and one of the very few civilians who have ever wielded the united force of fleets and armies without weakening it by meddling with the things that warriors alone can do. louis xiv liked to be called the sun king (_roi soleil_) and great monarch (_grand monarque_). his own france was easily the first great power in europe. she was rich and populous. the french army was the most famous in the world. french became the language of diplomacy. whenever two nations speaking different languages wrote to each other about affairs of state or made treaties they did so in french, as they do still. but all this was not enough for louis. he wanted to be a conqueror in europe and beyond the seas. his people did not need oversea trade and empire in the same way as the dutch and british, did not desire it half so much, and were not nearly so well fitted for it when they had it. france was a kingdom of the land. but, no matter, louis must make conquests wherever he could. hoping to get england under his thumb he befriended james ii, the last stuart king, whom the english drove out in . james, less bad but less clever than his vile brother charles, had a party called jacobites, who wanted french help to set him on the throne again, but no french interference afterwards. most of great britain favoured the new king, william iii; most of ireland the old one, james. this greatly endangered british sea-power; for the french fleet had been growing very strong, and an enemy fleet based on ireland would threaten every harbour in great britain from bristol to the clyde. more than this, a strong enough fleet could close the channel between the south of ireland and the north of france. there would then be no way out of great britain on to the seven seas except round the north of scotland. but an enemy fleet strong enough to shut off great britain from the short cuts north and south of ireland would certainly be strong enough to command the roundabout way as well; for it would be close to its base on the west coast of ireland, while ships coming round by the north of scotland would be far from their own. thus ireland, then as now, was the key to the sea-door of great britain. luckily for great britain then, and for our empire and allies throughout the great war, keys are no good unless you have the hand to turn them. and, then as now, the strong right hand that holds the key of ireland was and is the royal navy. in william iii had at last succeeded in forming the grand alliance against louis xiv, who now had enemies all round him except in little switzerland. but france was easily the strongest of all the great powers, and she was under a single command; while spain and austria were lukewarm and weak against her, the many little german countries could not act well together, and great britain had many jacobites at home besides still more in ireland. thus the dutch and british friends of king william were the only ones to be depended on through thick and thin. moreover, the navy had grown dangerously weak under the last two stuart kings; and some of its men were jacobites who knew the french king wished to put the stuarts on the british throne again. so, when the great french admiral, tourville, defeated the dutch and british fleets off beachy head in , the british fought far more feebly than the dutch, who did as well as the best of them had done when led by the immortal van tromp. luckily for the british, louis xiv did not want to make them hate him more than he could help, because he hoped to use them for his own ends when he had brought them under james again. better still, william beat james in ireland about the same time. best of all, the royal navy began to renew its strength; while it made up its mind to stop foreign invasions of every kind. even jacobite officers swore they would stop the french fleet, even if james himself was on board of it. then the tide of fortune turned for good and all. in the spring of louis and james, with a french and a jacobite-irish army, were at la hogue, in the north-west corner of the normandy peninsula, ready for the invasion of england. they had to wait for tourville to clear the dutch and british fleets away. but they thought these fleets had not joined company and that the british fleet would be so full of jacobites as to be easily defeated again. at the first streak of dawn on the th of may admiral russell was off harfleur, at the north-east corner of the normandy peninsula. his own british ships of the line (that is, the ships of the biggest and strongest kind) numbered sixty-three; while his dutch allies had thirty-six. against these ninety-nine tourville had only forty-four. yet, having been ordered to attack, and not getting the counter-order till after the battle was over, he made for the overwhelming dutch and british with a skill and gallantry beyond all praise. [illustration: la hogue, .] the fury of the fight centred round the _soleil royal_, tourville's flagship, which at last had to be turned out of the line. then, as at jutland in the great war, mist veiled the fleets, so that friend and foe were mixed together. but the battle went on here and there between different parts of the fleets; while a hot action was fought after dark by admiral carter, who, though a jacobite, was determined that no foreign army should ever set foot in england. mortally wounded, he called to his flag captain, "fight the ship as long as she swims," and then fell dead. all through the foggy th the battle was continued whenever the french and allies could see each other. next morning the _soleil royal_ became so disabled that she drifted ashore near cherbourg. but tourville had meanwhile shifted his flag to another ship and fought his way into la hogue with twelve of his best men-of-war. some of the other french ships escaped by reaching st. malo through the dangerous channel between la hogue and the island of alderney. five others escaped to the eastward, and four went so far that they rounded scotland before getting home. on the rd and th admiral rooke, the future hero of gibraltar, sailed up the bay of la hogue with his lighter vessels; then took to his boats and burnt tourville's men-of-war, supply ships, and even rowboats, in full view of king louis and king james and of their whole army of invasion. no other navy has seen so many strange sights, afloat and ashore, as have been seen by the british. yet even the british never saw a stranger sight than when the french cavalry charged into the shallow water where the dutch and british sailors were finishing their work. a soldier-and-sailor rough-and-tumble followed, sabres and cutlasses slashing like mad, and some of the horsemen being dragged off their saddles by well-handled boat-hooks. la hogue was not a glorious victory, like trafalgar, because the odds were nine to four in favour of the dutch and british. but it was one of the great decisive battles of the world, because, from that time on, the british isles, though often threatened, were never again in really serious danger of invasion. chapter xiv the second war against louis xiv ( - ) king charles ii of spain, having no children, made a will leaving his throne to philip v, a grandson of louis xiv, whose wife was sister to charles. louis declared that "the pyrenees had ceased to exist"; by which boast he meant that he would govern the spanish empire through his grandson, turn the mediterranean into "a french lake," and work his will against british sea-power, both mercantile and naval. the war that followed was mostly fought on land; and the great british hero of it was the famous duke of marlborough, who was a soldier, not a sailor. but the facts that england, as usual, could not be invaded, and that her armies, also as usual, fought victoriously on the continent of europe, prove how well british sea-power worked: closing the sea to enemies, opening it for friends, moving armies to the best bases on the coast, and keeping them supplied with all they needed at the front--men, munitions, clothing, food, and everything else. the great naval feat of this war was the daring attack rooke made on gibraltar in with the help of some very gallant dutch. landing all the marines ("soldier and sailor too") on the narrow neck of ground joining the famous rock of gibraltar to the mainland of spain, and ranging all his broadsides against the batteries on the seaward front, rooke soon beat the spaniards from their guns and forced them to surrender a place which, if properly defended, should have kept out a fleet ten times as strong. no sooner had gibraltar fallen than a french fleet came to win it back. but, after a fierce battle off malaga, with over fifty ships a side, the french gave up the idea; and from that day to this gibraltar has been british. british sea-power won many advantages by the treaty of utrecht in . france and spain agreed that one king should never rule both countries. the british kept gibraltar and minorca, which together made two splendid bases for their fleet in the mediterranean; while france gave up all her claims to newfoundland and the territory of hudson bay, besides ceding acadia (nova scotia), to the british crown. chapter xv war against france and spain ( - ) though the same king did not reign over both countries the same family did. so the french and spanish bourbons made a family compact against british sea-power. spain promised to take away from the british all the trading rights she had been forced to grant them in america, while france promised to help spain to win gibraltar back again. when the secret began to leak out the feeling against the bourbons ran high; and when a merchant skipper called jenkins paraded london, showing the ear he said the spaniards had cut off him in south america, the people clamoured for immediate war. admiral vernon became immensely popular when he took porto bello in the spanish main. but he was beaten before cartagena. he was a good admiral; but the navy had been shamefully neglected by the government during the long peace; and no neglected navy can send out good fleets in a hurry. still, the navy and mercantile marine were good enough to enable british sea-power to turn the scale against prince charlie in scotland and against the french in canada. the french tried to help the last of the stuarts by sending supply ships and men-of-war to scotland. but the british fleet kept off the men-of-war, seized the supply ships, and advanced along the coast to support the army that was running the jacobites down. prince charlie's jacobites had to carry everything by land. the british army had most of its stores carried fen times better by sea. therefore, when the two armies met for their last fight at culloden, the jacobites were worn out, while the british army was quite fresh. in canada it was the same story when the french fortress of louisbourg was entirely cut off from the sea by a british fleet and forced to surrender or starve. in both cases the fleets and armies worked together like the different parts of one body. at louisbourg the british land force was entirely made up of american colonists, mostly from enlightened massachusetts. a fleet sent against the french in india failed to beat that excellent french admiral, la bourdonnais. but anson's famous four years voyage round the world ( - ) was a wonderful success. the navy having been so much neglected by the government for so many years before the war, anson had to put up with some bad ships and worse men. even poor old pensioners were sent on board at the last minute to make up the number required. of course they soon died off like flies. but his famous flagship, the _centurion_, got through, beat everything that stood up to her, and took vast quantities of spanish gold and silver. yet this is by no means the most wonderful fact about the _centurion_. the most wonderful thing of all is, that, though she was only a one-thousand-tonner (smaller than many a destroyer of the present day) she had no fewer than eight officers who rose to high and well-won rank in after years, and three--anson, saunders, and keppel--who all became first lords of the admiralty, and thus heads of the whole navy. [illustration: h.m.s. _centurion_ engaged and took the spanish galleon _nuestra senhora de capadongo_, from acapulco bound to manila, off cape espiritu santo, philippine islands, june , .] three years after his return anson won a victory over the french off cape finisterre, while hawke won another near the same place a few months later. in both the french fought very well indeed; but, with less skill in handling fleets and smaller numbers than the british, they had no chance. one of hawke's best captains was saunders. thus twelve years before pitt's conquest of canada the three great admirals most concerned with it had already been brought together. the peace of aix-la-chapelle, which ended the war in , settled nothing and satisfied nobody. it was, in fact, only a truce to let the tired opponents get their breath and prepare for the world-wide struggle which was to settle the question of oversea empire. the british in america were very angry with the mother country for giving back louisbourg. but they were much too narrow in their views; for their own fate in america depended entirely on the strength of the royal navy, which itself depended on having a safe base in the mother country. now, france had conquered those parts of the once spanish but then austrian netherlands which included the present coast of belgium; and britain could no more allow the french to threaten her naval base from the coast of belgium then than she could allow the spaniards before or the germans in our own time. therefore both she and her colonists won many points in the game, when playing for safety, by giving up louisbourg, from which there could be no real danger, and so getting france out of belgium, from which the whole empire might some day have been struck a mortal blow. chapter xvi pitt's imperial war ( - ) the british part of the seven years war was rightly known as the maritime war, because pitt, the greatest of british empire-builders, based it entirely on british sea-power, both mercantile and naval. pitt had a four-fold plan. first, it is needless to say that he made the navy strong enough to keep the seaways open to friends and closed to enemies; for once the seaways are cut the empire will bleed to death just as surely as a man will if you cut his veins and arteries. this being always and everywhere the navy's plainest duty it need not have been mentioned here unless each other part of pitt's fourfold plan had not only depended on it but helped to make it work. the second part of his plan was this: not to send british armies into the middle of europe, but to help frederick the great and other allies to pay their own armies--a thing made possible by the wealth brought into britain by oversea trade. the third part was to attack the enemy wherever british fleets and armies, acting together in "joint expeditions," could strike the best blows from the sea. the fourth was to send joint expeditions to conquer the french dominions overseas. but lesser men than pitt were at the head of the government when the fighting began; and it took some time to bring the ship of state on to her proper course even after his mighty hand began to steer. in "the shot heard round the world" was fired by the french at washington's american militiamen, who were building a fort on the spot where pittsburg stands today. the americans were determined to stop the french from "joining hands behind their backs" and thus closing every road to the west all the way from canada to new orleans. so they sent young george washington to build a fort at the best junction of the western trails. but he was defeated and had to surrender. then braddock was sent out from england in . but the french defeated him too. then france sent out to canada as great a master of the art of war on land as drake had been by sea. this was the gallant and noble montcalm, who, after taking oswego in and fort william henry in , utterly defeated a badly led british army, four times the size of his own, at ticonderoga in . meanwhile war had been declared in europe on the th of may, . on one side stood france, austria, saxony, russia, and sweden; on the other, great britain, prussia, and a few smaller german states, among them hanover and hesse. things went as badly here as overseas; for the meaner kind of party politicians had been long in power, and the fleet and army had both been neglected. there was almost a panic in england while the french were preparing a joint expedition against minorca in the mediterranean lest this might be turned against england herself. minorca was taken, a british fleet having failed to help it. hawke and saunders were then sent to the mediterranean as a "cargo of courage." but the fortunes of war could not be changed at once; and they became even worse next year ( ). the austrians drove frederick the great out of bohemia. the french took hanover. and, though frederick ended the year with two victories, pitt's own first joint expedition failed to take rochefort on the west coast of france. clive's great victory at plassey, which laid the foundation of our indian empire, was the only silver lining to the british clouds of war. but in pitt was at last managing the war in his own perfect way; and everything began to change for the better. the enemy had already felt the force of british sea-power in three different ways. they had felt it by losing hundreds of merchant vessels on the outbreak of war. they had felt it in hanover, where they were ready to grant the hanoverians any terms if the surrender would only be made before a british fleet should appear on their flank. and they had felt it during the rochefort expedition, because, though that was a wretched failure, they could not tell beforehand when or where the blow would fall, or whether the fleet and army might not be only feinting against rochefort and then going on somewhere else. there is no end to the advantages a joint fleet and army possesses over an army alone, even when the army alone has many more men. it is ten times easier to supply armies with what they need in the way of men, guns, munitions, food, clothes, and other stores, when these supplies can be carried by sea. it is ten times easier to keep your movements secret at sea, where nobody lives and where the weaker sea-power can never have the best of lookouts, than it is on land, where thousands of eyes are watching you and thousands of tongues are talking. so, if your army fights near a coast against an enemy who commands the sea, you can never tell when or where he may suddenly attack your line of supply by landing an army to cut it. the french generals, though they had the best army in the world, were always looking over their shoulders to see if some british joint expedition was not hovering round the flank exposed to the coast. the french navy, though very gallant, could only help french shipping here and there, by fits and starts, and at the greatest risk. so, while the british forces used the highways of the sea the whole time, the french forces could only use them now and then by great good luck. thus british sea-power hampered, spoilt, or ruined all the powers of the land. the french wanted to save louisbourg, the fall of which they knew would be the first step to the british conquest of canada. but they could not send a fleet through the english channel right under the eyes of the british naval headquarters, from which they were themselves expecting an attack. so they tried one from the mediterranean. but osborne and saunders shut the door in their faces at gibraltar and broke up their toulon fleet as well. then the french tried the bay of biscay. but hawke swooped down on the big convoy of supply vessels sheltering at aix and forced both them and their escorting men-of-war to run aground in order to save themselves from being burnt. meanwhile large numbers of french farmers and fishermen had to be kept under arms to guard the shores along the channel. this, of course, was bad for the harvest of both sea and land, on which the feeding of the men at the front so greatly depended. but there was no help for it, as the british fleet was watching its chance to pounce down on the first point left unguarded, and the french fleet was not strong enough to fight it out at sea. st. malo and cherbourg were successfully attacked. the only failure was at st. cast, where a silly old general made mistakes of which a clever french one quickly took advantage. thus harassed, blockaded, and weakened on every coast, france could do nothing to save louisbourg, the first link in the long, thin chain of french posts in america, where the fortunes of war were bound to follow the side that had the greater sea-power. no army could fight in america if cut off from europe; because the powder and shot, muskets and bayonets, cannons and cannon-balls, swords and pistols, all came out from france and england. more than this, the backbone of both armies were the french and british regulars, who also came from france and england. most of all, fleets were quite as important at quebec and montreal as at louisbourg, for ocean navigation went all those hundreds of miles inland. beyond these three great points, again, sea-power, of a wholly inland kind, was all-important; for the french lived along another line of waterways--from montreal, across the great lakes, and down the mississippi to the gulf of mexico. you might as well expect an army to march without legs as to carry on a war in america without fleets of sea-going ships and flotillas of inland small craft, even down to the birchbark canoe. pitt's plan for was to attack canada on both flanks and work into place for attacking her centre the following year. louisbourg on the coast of cape breton guarded her sea flank. fort duquesne (now pittsburg) at the forks of the ohio guarded her land flank and her door to the golden west. ticonderoga on lake champlain guarded her gateway into the st. lawrence from the south. here the british attack, though made with vastly superior numbers, was beaten back by the heroic and skilful montcalm. but fort duquesne, where washington and braddock had been defeated, was taken by forbes and re-named pittshurg in honour of the mighty minister of war. louisbourg likewise fell. so canada was beaten on both wings, though saved, for the moment, in the centre. louisbourg never had the slightest chance; for boscawen's great fleet cut it off from the sea so completely that no help the french could spare could have forced its way in, even if it had been able to dodge past the british off the coast of france. the british army, being well supplied from the sea, not only cut louisbourg off by land as well as the fleet had cut it off by sea but was able to press the siege home with such vigour that the french had to surrender after a brave defence of no more than eight weeks. the hero of the british army at louisbourg was a young general of whom we shall soon hear more--wolfe. if we ever want to choose an empire year, then the one to choose, beyond all shadow of a doubt, is ; and the hero of it, also beyond all shadow of a doubt, is pitt. hardwicke, pitt's chief civilian adviser, was a truly magnificent statesman for war. anson was a great man at the head of the navy. ligonier was equally good at the head of the army, with a commission as "commander-in-chief of all his majesty's forces in great britain and america," which showed how much pitt thought of the canadian campaigns. the silent saunders was one of the best admirals that even england ever had. and when people drank to "the eye of a hawke, and the heart of a wolfe!" they showed they knew of other first-rate leaders too. but by far the greatest head and heart, by far the most inspiring soul, of this whole vast empire war was pitt. in many and many a war, down to our own day, the warriors who have led the fleets and armies have been greater and nobler than the statesmen who managed the government. but pitt was greater, though even he could not be nobler, than any of the warriors who served the empire under him; for he knew, better than any one else, how to make fleets and armies work together as a single united service, and how to make the people who were not warriors work with the warriors for the welfare of the whole united empire. of course he had a wonderful head and a wonderful heart. but his crowning glory as an empire-maker is that he could rise above all the petty strife of party politicians and give himself wholly to the empire in the same spirit of self-sacrifice as warriors show upon the field of battle. in choosing commanders by land and sea pitt always took the best, no matter who or what their friends or parties were; and no commander left pitt's inspiring presence without feeling the fitter for the work in hand. in planning the conquest of canada, pitt and ligonier agreed that amherst and wolfe were the men for the army, while pitt and anson agreed that saunders and holmes were the men for the fleet. this was all settled at the beginning of empire year-- . but this was only a part, though the most important part, of pitt's imperial plan. no point of vantage, the whole world round, escaped his eagle eye. the french and dutch were beaten in india; though both fought well, and though the french fleet fought a drawn battle with the british off ceylon. on the continent of europe our allies were helped by a british army at the decisive victory of minden, which drove the french away from hanover. and in the west indies the island of guadaloupe was taken by a joint expedition of the usual kind; but only after the french had made a splendid resistance of over three months. stung to the quick by these sudden blows from the sea france planned a great invasion of the british isles. she did not hide it, hoping thereby to make the british keep their fleets at home in self-defence. but though, as always happens, there were people weak enough to want to keep the navy close beside the coast and stupidly divided up, so that plenty of timid folk could see the ships in front of them, just where the enemy with one well handled fleet could beat them bit by bit, pitt paid no attention at all to any silly nonsense of the kind. he and anson knew, of course, that, when you have the stronger fleet, the only right way is to defend yourself by attacking the enemy before he can attack you. so, instead of wasting force at home, pitt sent joint expeditions all over the seaboard world, wherever they were needed to guard or make the empire overseas; while he sent fleets to beat or blockade the french fleets off their own, not off the british, coasts. the dreaded invasion never came off; and the only two french fleets that did get out were destroyed: the one from the mediterranean off lagos in the south of portugal, and the one from the west coast of france in quiberon bay. boscawen's fleet was refitting and taking in stores at gibraltar when one of his look-out frigates signalled up to the governor's house, where boscawen was dining, that the french were slipping through the strait by hugging the african shore under cover of the dark. the british flagship had her sails unbent (that is, unfastened altogether). every vessel had her decks and hold lumbered up with stores. half the crews were ashore; and if a spy had taken a look round he would have thought the enemy could never have been overhauled. but the navy is never caught napping. in the twinkling of an eye gibraltar was full of british blue-jackets racing down to their ships, leaping on board, and turning their skilful hands to the first job waiting to be done. within two hours boscawen was off hotfoot after the french, hoisting in boats, stowing the last of the lumbering stores, and clearing decks for action. overhauling la clue near lagos, off the coast of portugal, he ranged up alongside, flagship to flagship. but the french, fighting with equal skill and courage, beat him off. falling astern he came abreast of the gallant _centaure_, which had already fought four british men-of-war. being now a mere battered hulk she surrendered. then boscawen, his damage repaired, pushed ahead again. la clue, whose fleet was the smaller, seeing no chance of either victory or escape, chose shipwreck rather than surrender, and ran his flagship straight on the rocks, with every stitch of canvas drawing full and his flag kept flying. [illustration: the _royal george_] quiberon and quebec go together, like "the eye of a hawke and the heart of a wolfe"; for hawke's victory at quiberon made it certain that wolfe's victory at quebec could not be undone. the french were trying to unite their west-coast fleets at morbihan for an invasion of england or at least a fight to give some of their own shipping a breathing spell free from blockade. their admiral, conflans, was trying to work his way in under very great difficulties. he was short of trained men, short of proper stores, and had fewer ships than hawke. hawke's cruisers had driven some of conflans' storeships into a harbour a hundred miles away from brest, where conflans was trying hard to get ready for the invasion of england. the result was that these stores had to be landed and carted across country, which not only took ten times longer than it would have taken to send them round by sea but also gave ten times as much trouble. at last conflans managed to move out. but he had about as much chance of escape as a fly in a spider's web; for hawke had cruisers watching everywhere and a battle fleet ready to pounce down anywhere. conflans had been ordered to save his fleet by all possible means till he had joined the french fleet and army of invasion. so he is not to be blamed for what he tried to do at quiberon. on the th of november he was sailing toward quiberon bay when he saw the vanguard of hawke's fleet coming up before a rising gale. with fewer ships, and with crews that had been blockaded so long that they were no match for the sea-living british, he knew he had no chance in a stand-up tight in the open, and more especially in the middle of a storm. so he made for quiberon, where he thought he would be safe; because the whole of that intricate bay is full of rocks, shoals, shallows, and all kinds of other dangers. but hawke came down on the wings of the wind, straight toward the terrific dangers of the bay, and flying before a gale which in itself seemed to promise certain shipwreck; for it blew on-shore. conflans ran for his life, got into the bay, and had begun to form his line of battle when some distant shots told him that his rear was being overhauled. then his last ships came racing in. but the leading british, like hounds in full cry, were closing on them so fast that before they could join his line they were caught in the fury of the fight. within a few desperate minutes two french ships were so badly battered that they had to surrender, while three more were sent to the bottom. then the gale shifted and blew conflans' own line out of order. he at once tried to move into a better place. but this only made matters worse. so he anchored in utter confusion, with wrecking rocks on one side and hawke's swooping fleet on the other. once more, however, he tried a change--this time the bold one of charging out to sea. but hawke was too quick for him, though the well-named _intrépide_ rushed in between the two racing flagships, the _royal george_ and _soleil royal_. this was the end. the gale rose to its height. darkness closed in. and then, amid the roaring of the battle and the sea, the victorious british anchored beside all that was left of the french. there were no such sea fights on the coasts of canada, where the british were in overwhelming naval strength. but never was there a joint expedition which owed more to its fleet than the one that took quebec this same year ( ). the fact that the battles were fought on the land, and that wolfe and montcalm both fell in the one which decided the fate of quebec, has made us forget that sea-power had more to do with this and the other american campaigns than all the other forces put together. the army did magnificently; and without wolfe's and the other armies the conquest could never have been made. but the point is this, that, while each little army was only a finger of the hand that drew the british sword in canada, the fleet which brought the armies there and kept them going was part and parcel of the whole vast body of british sea-power united round the world. pitt planned to give french canada the knockout blow in empire year. so, holding the extreme east and west at louisbourg and fort duquesne, he sent a small force to cut the line of the lakes at niagara, a much larger one to cut into the line of the st. lawrence from lake champlain, and the largest and strongest of all up the st. lawrence to take quebec, which, then as now, was the key of canada. niagara was taken; and the line of lake champlain was secured by amherst, who, however, never got through to the st. lawrence that year. but the great question was, who is to have the key? so we shall follow saunders and wolfe to quebec. wolfe's little army of nine thousand men was really a landing party from saunders' big fleet, which included nearly fifty men-of-war (almost a quarter of the whole royal navy) and well over two hundred transports and supply ships. the bluejackets on board the men-of-war and the merchant seamen on board the other ships each greatly outnumbered the men in wolfe's army. in fact, the whole expedition was made up of three-quarters sea-power and only one-quarter land. admiral durell, who had been left at halifax over the winter, was too slow in getting the advance guard under way in time to cut off the twenty-three little vessels sent out from france to montcalm in the spring. but this reinforcement was too small to make any real difference in the doom of quebec when once british sea-power had sealed the st. lawrence. saunders took wolfe's army and the main body of his own fleet up the great river in june: a hundred and forty-one vessels, all told, from the flagship _neptune_ of ninety guns down to the smallest craft that carried supplies. it was a brave sight off the mouth of the saguenay, where the deep-water estuary ends, to see the whole fleet, together at sunset, with its thousand white sails, in a crescent twenty miles long, a-gleam on the blue st. lawrence. the french-canadian pilots who had been taken prisoners swore that no fleet could ever get through the traverse, a tricky bit of water thirty miles below quebec. but, in the course of the summer, the british sailing masters, who had never been there before, themselves took two hundred and seventy-seven vessels right through it with greater ease in squadrons than any french-canadian could when piloting a single ship. the famous captain cook, of whom we shall soon hear more, had gone up a month ahead with durell, and, in only three days, had sounded, surveyed, and buoyed the traverse to perfection. when once the fleet had reached quebec montcalm was completely cut off from the outside world, except for the road and river up to montreal. his french-canadian militia more than equalled wolfe's army in mere numbers. but his french regulars from france, the backbone of the whole defence, were not half so many. vaudreuil, the french-canadian governor, was a fool. bigot, the french intendant, was a knave. they both hated the great and honest montcalm and did all they could to spite him. the natural strength of quebec, "the gibraltar of america," was, with his own french regulars, the only defence on which he could always rely. the bombardment of quebec from across the narrows of the st. lawrence ("kebec" is the indian for "narrows") went on without much result throughout july; and wolfe's attempt to storm the heights of montmorency, five miles below quebec, ended in defeat. during august a squadron under holmes, third-in-command of the fleet, kept pushing up the st. lawrence above quebec, and thus alarming the french for the safety of their road and river lines of communication with montreal, the only lines left. they sent troops up to watch the ships, and very wearing work it was; for while the ships carried wolfe's landing parties up and down with the tide, the unfortunate frenchmen had to scramble across country in a vain effort to be first at any threatened point. from the rd of september to the famous th wolfe worked out his own splendid plan with the help of the fleet. three-fourths of the french were entrenched along the six miles of north shore below quebec, to please vaudreuil, who, as governor, had power to order montcalm. the rest were in or above quebec; and mostly between cap rouge, which was seven miles, and pointe-aux-trembles, which was twenty-two miles, above. wolfe's plan was to make as big a show of force as possible, up to the very last minute, against the entrenchments below quebec and also against the fifteen miles of north shore between cap rouge and pointe-aux-trembles, while he would really land at what we now call wolfe's cove, which is little more than one mile above quebec. if he could then hold the land line west to montreal, while holmes held the river line, montcalm would be absolutely cut off in every direction and be forced to fight or starve. montcalm's secret orders from the king being to keep any other foothold he possibly could if quebec was taken, he had to leave stores of provisions at different points toward the west and south, as he intended to retire from point to point and make his last stand down by new orleans. quebec was, however, to be held if possible; and everything that skill and courage could do was done by montcalm to hold it. he even foresaw wolfe's final plan and sent one of his best french battalions to guard the plains of abraham. but vaudreuil withdrew it four days before the battle there. again, on the very eve of battle, montcalm ordered the same battalion to ramp for the night in defence of wolfe's cove. but vaudreuil again counter-ordered, this time before the men had marched off, thus leaving that post in charge of one of his own friends, a contemptible officer called vergor. wolfe knew all about vergor and what went on in the french camp, where vaudreuil could never keep a secret. so he and saunders and holmes set the plan going for the final blow. the unfortunate frenchmen above cap rouge were now so worn out by trying to keep up with the ships that wolfe knew they would take hours to get down to quebec if decoyed overnight anywhere up near pointe-aux-trembles, more than twenty miles away. he also knew that the show of force to be made by saunders the day before the battle would keep the french in their trenches along the six miles below quebec. besides this he knew that the fire of his batteries opposite quebec would drown the noise of taking vergor's post more than a mile above. finally, the fleet kept him perfectly safe from counter-attack, hid his movements, and took his army to any given spot far better and faster than the french could go there by land. with all this in his favour he then carried out his plan to perfection, holding the french close below and far above quebec by threatening attacks from the ships, secretly bringing his best men together in boats off cap rouge after dark, dropping them down to wolfe's cove just before dawn, rushing vergor's post with the greatest ease, and forming up across the plains of abraham, just west of quebec, an hour before montcalm could possibly attack him. cut off by water and land montcalm now had to starve or fight wolfe's well-trained regulars with about equal numbers of men, half of whom were militia quite untrained for flat and open battlefields. wolfe's perfect volleys then sealed the fate of quebec; while british sea-power sealed the fate of canada. the rest of the war was simply reaping the victories pitt had sown; though he left the government in , and spain joined our enemies the following year. the jealous new king, george iii, and his jealous new courtiers, with some of the jealous old politicians, made up a party that forced pitt out of the government. they then signed the treaty of versailles in without properly securing the fruit of all his victories. but canada had been won outright. the foundations of the indian empire had been well and truly laid. and the famous captain cook, who surveyed the traverse for saunders and made the first charts of british canada, soon afterwards became one of the founders of that british australasia whose australian-new zealand-army-corps became so justly famous as the fighting "anzacs" throughout our recent war against the germans. on the loss of the _royal george_ written when the news arrived (september, ). the _royal george_, hawke's flagship at the battle of quiberon bay, the battle which confirmed the conquest of canada, was a first-rate man-of-war of guns. on the th of august, , while at anchor off spithead, between portsmouth and the isle of wight, her guns broke loose with the rolling and she went down with all hands. toll for the brave-- the brave that are no more: all sunk beneath the wave, fast by their native shore. eight hundred of the brave, whose courage well was tried, had made the vessel heel and laid her on her side; a land-breeze shook the shrouds, and she was overset; down went the _royal george_, with all her crew complete. toll for the brave-- brave kempenfelt is gone, his last sea-fight is fought, his work of glory done. it was not in the battle, no tempest gave the shock, she sprang no fatal leak, she ran upon no rock; his sword was in the sheath, his fingers held the pen, when kempenfelt went down with twice four hundred men. weigh the vessel up, once dreaded by our foes, and mingle with your cup the tears that england owes; her timbers yet are sound, and she may float again, full charg'd with england's thunder, and plough the distant main; but kempenfelt is gone, his victories are o'er; and he and his eight hundred must plough the wave no more. --_cowper_. chapter xvii the american revolution ( - ) the rights and wrongs of this revolution are not our business here. but british sea-power is. so we should like to tell the whole story of the navy in that unhappy time; because most books say little about it and do not say that little well. but, as we have no time for more than the merest glance, all we can do is to ask those who want to learn the truth in full to read _the influence of sea-power on history_, by that expert american, admiral mahan. the revolution was not a fight between british and americans, as we and they are apt to think it now, but a british civil war that divided people in britain as well as in america. in both countries there were two parties, the government and opposition, each against the other; the only difference, though a very great one, being that while the opposition in america took up arms the opposition in britain did not. both countries were then parts of the same british empire; and so this war was really the link between the other two great civil wars that have divided the english-speaking peoples. thus there were three civil wars in three successive centuries: the british civil war in the seventeenth, between roundhead and cavalier in england; the british-american civil war in the eighteenth, between the king's party government and the opposition on both sides of the atlantic; and the american civil war in the nineteenth, between the north and south of the united states. the american opposition had no chance of winning their independence, however much they might proclaim it, so long as the royal navy held the sea against them. washington knew this perfectly well; and his written words are there to prove it. the revolutionists fought well on land. they invaded canada and took the whole country except the walls of quebec. they also fought well at sea; and paul jones, a scotsman born, raided the coasts of great britain till nurses hushed children by the mere sound of his name. but no fleet and army based on the new world could possibly keep up a war without help from the old; because, as we have seen all through pitt's imperial war, the old world was the only place in which enough men, ships, arms, and warlike stores could be found. stop enough supplies from crossing the atlantic, and the side whose supplies were stopped would certainly lose. and more than that: whichever side commanded the sea would soon command the land as well. quebec held out under carleton till relieved by a fleet in the spring. but, even if quebec had fallen, the american invaders would have been driven out again by the mere arrival of the fleet. for whichever side lost the use of the st. lawrence lost the only means of moving, feeding, arming, and reinforcing an army in canada well enough to stand the strain. the turn of the tide of fortune came, and only could come, when all the foreign navies in the world took sides against the king's party in this british civil war. france, spain, and holland were thirsting for revenge. so when they saw a vile creature like lord george germain bungling through a war pitt never would have made; when they saw british generals half-hearted because belonging to the party that opposed the king's; when they saw how steadfastly washington fought; and, most of all, when they saw how much the royal navy was weakened by the opposition in parliament, who stopped a great deal of money from being voted for the army and navy lest the king should be too strong against the americans; when foreigners whose own navies had been beaten by the british saw such a chance, they came in with navies which they had meanwhile been strengthening on purpose to get their revenge. france, spain, and holland all fought on the side of the revolution, their big navies joining the little one formed by paul jones; while russia, sweden, denmark (which then included norway), prussia, and the hansa towns, all formed the armed neutrality of the north against the weakened british navy. the king's party government thus had nine navies against it--four in arms and five in armed neutrality; and this checked the british command of the atlantic just long enough to make independence safe for the american revolutionists. it did, not, however, stop the navy from saving the rest of the empire; for pitt and the opposition in the mother country, who would not strengthen the navy against the americans, were eager to strengthen it against foreign attack. in rodney beat the french in the atlantic, and hughes beat them in the indian ocean; while gibraltar was held triumphantly against all that france and spain could do by land and sea together. chapter xviii nelson ( - ) nelson and napoleon never met; and wellington the soldier beat napoleon ten years after nelson was killed at trafalgar. yet it was nelson's victories that made napoleon's null and void, thus stopping the third attempt in modern times to win the overlordship of the world. as drake stopped philip of spain by defeating the armada, as russell stopped louis xiv by the battle of la hogue, as jellicoe in our own day stopped the kaiser off the jutland bank, so nelson stopped napoleon by making british sea-power quite supreme. century by century the four mightiest warlords of the land have carried all before them until their towering empires reached the sea. but there, where they were strangers, they all met the same royal navy, manned by sailors of the only race whose home has always been the sea, and, meeting it, they fell. [illustration: nelson] able men all, and mighty warlords, the might of three was much more in their armies than in themselves. cruel philip was not a warrior of any kind. ambitious louis and the vainglorious kaiser were only second-rate soldiers, who would never have won their own way to the highest command. but napoleon was utterly different. he was as great a master of the art of war on land as nelson was by sea; and that is one reason why nelson, who caused his downfall, stands supreme. but there are other reasons too. nelson, like drake, fought three campaigns with marvellous skill; but he also fought more seamanlike foes. like russell, he completely destroyed the enemy fleet; but he never had russell's advantage in numbers. we might go on with other reasons yet; but we shall only give two more: first, that magic touch of his warm heart which made his captains "like a band of brothers," which made the bluejackets who carried his coffin treasure up torn bits of the pall as most precious relics, and which made the empire mourn him as a friend; secondly, the very different kind of "nelson touch" he gave his fleet when handling it for battle, that last touch of perfection in forming it up, leading it on, striking hardest at the weakest spot, and then driving home the attack to the complete destruction of the enemy. nelson was not the first, but the fifth, great admiral to command fleets in the last french war ( - ). howe, hood, st. vincent, duncan, nelson: that is the order in which the victors came. howe, hood, st. vincent, and duncan were all men who had fought in pitt's imperial war; and each was old enough to have been nelson's father. howe was the hero of the relief of gibraltar in , at the time that all the foreign navies in the world were winning american independence by taking sides in a british civil war. howe was also the hero of "the glorious first of june" in , when he defeated the french off the north-west coast of france. but it was under hood, not howe, that nelson learnt the way fleets should be used; and it was under st. vincent that he first sprang into fame. [illustration: fighting the guns on the main deck, .] st. vincent, with fifteen ships of the line (that is, big battleships) was sailing south to stop a spanish fleet from coming north to join the french, when, on the th of february, , the look-out reported "enemy in sight." st. vincent was walking up and down the quarter-deck with his flag-captain, hallowell, as the reports came in. "ten ships of the line in sight." then "fifteen," the same number that he had himself. then "twenty" . . . "twenty-five" . . . and at last "twenty-seven." when this total of twenty-seven was reported, the officer reporting said, in a questioning way, "pretty long odds, sir?" but, quick as a flash, st. vincent answered, "enough of that, sir! the die is cast; and if they are fifty i will go through them!" and he did. this victory, which broke up the plans the french and spaniards had made against britain, was thought so important that jervis, as he then was called, was made lord st. vincent, taking his title from the place near which he won the battle, cape st. vincent, the south-west corner of europe. in october admiral duncan was made lord camperdown for destroying the dutch fleet which was trying to help the french into ireland. he caught it off camperduin (on the coast of north holland) and smashed it to pieces after a furious battle, in which the dutch, with a smaller fleet, showed that they too were of the viking breed. this victory stopped the danger from the north, just as st. vincent's stopped it from the south. both were fought in the only proper way to defend the british empire on the sea when the enemy comes out, that is, by going to meet him in his own waters, instead of waiting to let him choose his own point of attack against the british coast. next year, , nelson was also made a peer for a glorious victory won on his own account. he had learnt from lord hood the first principle of all defence--that the real aim is not so much to stand on guard or even to win a victory as to destroy the enemy's means of destroying you. this chimed in with his own straight-forward genius; and he never forgot his old chief: "the best officer that england has to boast of." hood had the misfortune never to have been in supreme command during a great battle. but, in nelson's opinion, he stood above all other commanders-in-chief of his own time; and, as we look back on him now, we see that nelson alone surpassed him. napoleon, like the germans of today, hoped to make land-power beat sea-power in the east by stirring up rebellion against the british rule in india and making egypt his bridge between europe and asia. with daring skill he crossed the mediterranean and conquered egypt. but his victory proved worse than useless; for nelson followed the french fleet and utterly defeated it in the bay of aboukir at the mouth of the nile on the st of august, . the battle was fought with the utmost firmness on both sides, each knowing that the fate of egypt, of the east, and of napoleon's army as well as of his fleet, hung trembling in the scales. the odds were twelve british battleships to thirteen french. the french sailors, as usual, were not such skilled hands as the british, partly because france had always been rather a country of landsmen than seamen, but chiefly because the french fleets were, as a rule, so closely blockaded that they could not use the open sea for training nearly so much as their british rivals did. still, the french fleet, though at anchor (and so unable to change its position quickly to suit the changes of the fight) looked as if it could defy even nelson himself. for it was drawn up across the bay with no spot left unguarded between it and the land at either end of the line; and it was so close in shore that its admirals never thought anybody would try to work his way inside. but that is just what nelson did. he sent some of his ships between the van of the french and the aboukir shoal, where there was just room to scrape through with hardly an inch to spare; and so skilful was the british seamanship that this marvellous manoeuvre took the french completely by surprise. then, having his own fleet under way, while the french was standing still, he doubled on their van (that is, he attacked it from both sides), held their centre, and left their rear alone. by this skilful move he crushed the van and then had the centre at his mercy. the french gunners stuck to their work with splendid courage, driving the _bellerophon_ off as a mere battered hulk and keeping most of the rest at bay for some time. but the french flagship, orient, which the _bellerophon_ had boldly attacked, was now attacked by the _swiftsure_ and _alexander_; and the french admiral, brueys, already wounded twice, was mortally hit by a cannon ball. he refused to be carried below, saying that "a french admiral should die on deck in a fight like this." his example encouraged the crew to redouble their efforts. but, just after he died, fire broke out on board the _orient_ and quickly spread fore and aft, up the rigging, and right in toward the magazine. the desperate battle was now at its fiercest, raging all round this furious fire, which lit the blackness of that warm egyptian night with devils' tongues of flame. the cannonade went on. but even the thunder of two thousand guns could not drown the roar of that seething fire, now eating into the very vitals of the ship, nearer and nearer to the magazine. every near-by ship that could move now hauled clear as far as possible; while the rest closed portholes and hatchways, took their powder below, sent all hands to fire stations, and breathlessly waited for the end. suddenly, as if the sea had opened to let hell's lightning loose, the _orient_ burst like a gigantic shell and crashed like doomsday thunder. the nearest ships reeled under the terrific shock, which racked their hulls from stem to stern and set some leaking badly. masts, boats, and twisted rigging flew blazing through the air, fell hissing on the watered decks, and set two british vessels and one french on fire. but the crews worked their very hardest, and they saved all three. [illustration: the blowing up of _l'orient_ during the battle of the nile.] for a few awed minutes every gun was dumb. then the _franklin_, the french ship that had taken fire, began the fight again. but the _defence_ and _swiftsure_ brought down her masts, silenced nearly all her guns, and forced her to surrender. by midnight the first seven ships in that gallant french line had all been taken or sunk; every man who could be saved being brought on board the victorious british men-of-war and, of course, well treated there. the eighth frenchman, the _tonnant_, still kept up the fight, hoping to stop the british from getting at the five astern. her heroic captain, thouars, had, first, his right arm, then his left, and then his right leg, smashed by cannon balls. but, like brueys, he would not leave the deck, and calmly gave his orders till he died. dawn found the _tonnant_ still trying to stem the british advance against the french rear, and the french frigate _justice_ actually making for the disabled british battleship, _bellerophon_, which she wished to take. but the light of day soon showed the remaining french that all they could do for their own side now was to save as many ships as possible. so the rear then tried to escape. but one blew up; two ran ashore; and, of all the fleet that was to have made napoleon's foothold sure, only four escaped, two from the line of battle and two from the frigates on the flank. nelson had won a victory which was quite perfect in reaching his great aim--the complete destruction of napoleon's power in egypt and the east. napoleon himself escaped to france, after a campaign in palestine followed by a retreat to egypt. but his army was stranded as surely as if it had been a wrecked ship, high and dry. three years after the battle of the nile the remnant of it was rounded up and made to surrender. moreover, malta, the central sea base of the whole mediterranean, had meanwhile ( ) fallen into british hands, where, like egypt, it remains to this day. the same year ( ) that saw the french surrender in egypt saw nelson win his second victory, this time in the north. napoleon (victorious, as usual, on land, and foiled, as usual, at sea) had tried to ruin british shipping by shutting it out of every port on the continent of europe. this was his "continental system." it hurt the continent; for british ships carried most of the goods used in trade not only between europe, asia, africa, and america, but also between the different ports on the european continent itself. napoleon, however, had no choice but to use his own land-power, no matter what the cost might be, against british sea-power. he was encouraged to do this by finding allies in those countries which had formed the anti-british armed neutrality of the north twenty years before. russia, sweden, denmark and norway, prussia, and the hansa towns of germany, were all glad to hit british sea-power in the hope of getting its trade for themselves. so the new alliance arranged that, as soon as the baltic ports were clear of ice, the russian, swedish, danish and norwegian fleets would join the french and spanish. but nelson was too quick for them. on the st of april he led a fleet along the channel opposite copenhagen, which is the gateway of the baltic. after dark, his trusty flag-captain, hardy, took a small rowboat in as close as possible and tried the depths with a pole; for the boat was so close to the danish fleet that the splash of the sounding lead on the end of a line would surely have been heard. by eleven o'clock nelson had found out that he could range his own fleet close enough alongside the danes. so he sat up all night planning his attack. at seven next morning he explained it to his captains, and at nine to the pilots and sailing-masters. half an hour later the fleet began to move into place. three big ships grounded in the narrow, shallow, and crooked channel. but the rest went on, closing up the dangerous gaps as best they could. just, after ten the first gun was fired; but it was another hour and a half before the two fleets were at it, hard all. at one o'clock a danish victory seemed quite as likely as a british one. very few danish gnus had been silenced, while two of the grounded british men-of-war were flying signals of distress, and the third was signalling to say she could do nothing. in the meantime the few british men-of-war that were trying to work into the channel from the other end under sir hyde parker were being headed off by the wind so much that they could hardly do more than threaten their own end of the danish line. parker was the commander-in-chief; though nelson was making the attack. [illustration: the battle of copenhagen, april nd, . (note the british line ahead.)] it was at this time of doubt and danger that parker, urged by a nervous staff officer, ordered up signal no. , which meant "discontinue action" (that is, stop the fight if you think you ought to do so). the story commonly told about this famous signal is wrong; as most stories of the kind are pretty sure to be. signal did not order nelson to break away, no matter what he thought, but meant that he could leave off if he thought that was the right thing to do. as, however, he thought the chance of winning still held good, he told his signal lieutenant simply to "acknowledge but not repeat no. ." then he added, "and keep mine flying," his own being the one for "close action." these two signals then gave nelson's captains the choice of going on or breaking off, according to which seemed the better. all went on except "the gallant, good riou," a man who, if he had lived today, would certainly have won the victoria cross. riou was in charge of a few small vessels which were being terribly mauled by the trekroner batteries without being able to do any good themselves. so he quite rightly hauled off, thus saving his division from useless destruction. unluckily he was killed before getting out of range; and no hero's death was ever more deeply mourned by all who knew his career. good commanders need cool heads quite as much as they need brave hearts. shortly after riou had left the scene the danes began to fire more slowly, while the british kept up as well as ever. but, the trekroner forts that had hammered riou now turned their guns on the _monarch_ and _defiance_, making the battle in that part of the line as hot as before; while some danes so lost their heads as to begin firing again from ships that had surrendered to the british. this was more than nelson could stand. so he wrote to the danish crown prince: "lord nelson has been commanded to spare denmark when she no longer resists. the line of defence which covers her shores has struck to the british flag. let firing cease, then, that he may take possession of his prizes, or he will blow them into the air along with the crews who have so nobly defended them. the brave danes are the brothers, and should never be the enemies, of the english." nelson refused the wafer offered him to close up the letter, saying, "this is no time to look hurried"; and, sending to his cabin for a candle, wax, and his biggest seal, he folded and sealed the letter as coolly as if writing in his house at home instead of in a storm of shot and shell. after arranging terms the danes gave in; and the whole armed neutrality of the north came to nothing. for the second time nelson had beaten napoleon. this defeat did not really harm the northern powers; for, though they liked their own shipping to do all the oversea trading it could, they were much better off with the british, who _could_ take their goods to market, than with napoleon, who could _not_. besides, the british let them use their own shipping so long as they did not let napoleon use it; while napoleon had to stop it altogether, lest the british, with their stronger navy, should turn it to their advantage instead of his. in a word: it was better to use the sea under the british navy than to lose it under napoleon's army. both sides now needed rest. so the peace of amiens was signed in march . with this peace ended napoleon's last pretence that he was trying to save the peoples of the world from their wicked rulers. some of them did need saving; and many of the french revolutionists were generous souls, eager to spread their own kind of liberty all over europe. but british liberty had been growing steadily for a good many hundreds of years, and the british people did not want a foreign sort thrust upon them, though many of them felt very kindly toward the french. so this, with the memory of former wars, had brought the two countries into strife once more. all might then have ended in a happy peace had not napoleon set out to win the overlordship of the world, like philip and louis before him and the german kaiser since. france, tired of revolutionary troubles and proud of the way her splendid army was being led to victory, let napoleon's dreams of conquest mislead her for twelve years to come. hence the new war that began in and ended on the field of waterloo. napoleon had used the peace to strengthen his navy for a last attempt to bring the british to their knees. villeneuve, the admiral who had escaped from the nile, was finally given command of the joint fleets of france and spain in the south, while napoleon himself commanded the great army of invasion at boulogne, within thirty miles of england. "let us," said napoleon, "be masters of the channel for six hours and we shall be the masters of the world." but he knew that the only way to reach london was to outwit nelson. napoleon's naval plans were wonderfully clever, like all his plans. but they were those of a landsman who failed to reckon with all the troubles of bringing the different squadrons of the french and spanish fleets together in spite of the british blockade. moreover, they were always changing, and not always for the better. finally, toward the end of august, , when he saw they were not going to work, he suddenly began a land campaign that ended with his stupendous victory over the austrians and russians at austerlitz early in december. but meanwhile the french and spanish fleets had remained a danger which nelson wished to destroy at its very source, by beating villeneuve's main body wherever he could find it. at last, on the st of october, after two years of anxious watching, he caught it off cape trafalgar, at the northwest entrance to the strait of gibraltar. directly he saw he could bring on a battle he ran up the signal which the whole world knows, and which we of the empire will cherish till the end of time: "england expects that every man will do his duty." that he had done his own we know from many an eye-witness, as well as from this entry in his private diary three months before trafalgar: "i went on shore for the first time since the th of june ; and, from having my foot out of the _victory_, two years wanting ten days." during all this long spell of harassing duty he kept his fleet "tuned up" to the last pitch of perfection in scouting, manoeuvring, and gunnery, so as to be always ready for victorious action at a moment's notice. [illustration: the _victory_. nelson's flagship at trafalgar, launched in , and still used as the flagship in portsmouth harbour.] villeneuve had thirty-three battleships, nelson only twenty-seven. but these twenty-seven all belonged to one navy and were manned by crews who had been drilled for battle on the open sea without a single spell of mere harbour work, like the french and spaniards. still, the enemy were brave, and nelson remarked that "they put a good face on it." but he quickly added, "i'll give them such a dressing as they never had before." it was a lovely day of light west wind and bright sunshine as the british bore down to the attack in two lines-ahead ("follow-my-leader"), the port (or left) one led by nelson in the immortal _victory_, flying the battle signal "engage the enemy more closely," and the starboard one by collingwood in the _royal sovereign_. the first shot was fired on the stroke of noon, or at "eight bells," as they say on board. nelson's plan, as usual, was to strike hardest at the weakest spot, which he knew he could reach because his fleet was so much better trained. he and collingwood went through the enemy's long line at two spots about half a mile apart, crushing his centre, and separating his front from his rear. the double-shotted british guns raked the enemy vessels with frightful effect as their muzzles passed close by the sterns. the enemy fired back bravely enough; but with much less skill and confidence. the spaniards were already beginning to feel none too friendly toward napoleon; while the french had already lost their trust in spanish help. [illustration: trafalgar. st october, .] yet the spaniards were a proud people, not to be beaten without a hard struggle; while the french were bound to do their best in any ease. so the fight was furious and fought at the closest quarters. the gunners could often see every feature of their opponents' faces and were sometimes scorched by the flashes from opposing guns. the _victory_ was fighting a terrific duel with the french _redoutable_, and nelson was pacing the deck with his flag-captain, hardy, when, at . , he suddenly sank on his knees and fell over on his side, having been hit by a musket-shot fired from the enemy's mizzentop, only fifteen yards away. "they've done for me at last," said nelson, as hardy stooped over him. a sergeant of marines and two bluejackets ran forward and carried him below. though in great agony he pulled out his handkerchief and, with his one hand, carefully covered his face, in the hope that the men between decks would not see who was hit. while nelson lay dying below, the fight raged worse than ever round the _victory_. the _redoutable's_ tops were full of snipers, who not only plied their muskets to good effect but also used hand grenades (something like the bombs of the present day). the _victory's_ deck was almost cleared by the intense fire of these men, and the crew of the _redoutable_ got ready to board. but on the word "_repel boarders_!" so many marines and blue-jackets rushed up from below that the french gave up the attempt. the musketry fire was still very hot from one ship to another; and the french snipers were as bad as ever. but those in the mizzentop from which nelson was hit were all sniped by his signal midshipman, young jack pollard, who, being a dead shot, picked off the frenchmen one by one as they leaned over to take aim. in this way pollard must have hit the man who hit nelson. [illustration: model of the battle of trafalgar. (reproduced by permission from the model at the royal united service institution.)] an hour after nelson had fallen the _victory_ had become so battered, so hampered by a maze of fallen masts and rigging, and so dangerously holed between wind and water, that hardy was glad of her sheering off a bit, out of the thick of the fight. he then ran below to see nelson, who at once asked, "well, hardy, how goes the battle?" "very well, my lord," said hardy, "we have twelve of the enemy's ships." "i hope," said nelson, "that none of ours have struck." "there's no fear of that," said hardy. another hour passed before hardy could come back to say, "i am certain that fourteen or fifteen have struck." "that's well," said nelson, "but i bargained for twenty." then, rousing himself to give his last order, he said, "anchor, hardy, anchor!" for he knew a storm was coming and that cape trafalgar was a bad lee shore (that is, a shore toward which the wind is blowing). a few minutes later he died, murmuring with his latest breath, "thank god, i've done my duty." trafalgar was so complete a victory that napoleon gave up all attempts to conquer the british at sea. but he renewed his "continental system" and made it ten times worse than before. having smashed the austrian and russian armies at austerlitz, and the prussian one at jena, he wrote the berlin decrees, ordering every port on the continent of europe to be shut against every single british ship. this was blockade from the land. the british answered with a blockade from the sea, giving notice, by their orders-in-council, that their navy would stop the trade of every port which shut out british vessels. napoleon hoped that if he could bully europe into obeying his berlin decrees he would "conquer the sea by the land." but what really happened was quite the other way round; for napoleon's land was conquered by the british sea. so much of the trade of the european ports had been carried on by british vessels that to shut these out meant killing the trade in some ports and hurting it in all. imagine the feelings of a merchant whose country's army had been beaten by napoleon, and whose own trade was stopped by the berlin decrees, when he saw the sea open to all who were under the care of the british navy and closed to all who were not! imagine also what he thought of the difference between napoleon's land-power, which made him a prisoner at home, and british sea-power, which only obliged him to obey certain laws of trade abroad! then imagine which side he thought the better one for trade, when he saw napoleon himself being forced to choose between letting british vessels into france with cloth or letting his army go bare! slowly, at first, but very surely, and faster as time went on, the shutting of the ports against british vessels roused the peoples of europe against napoleon. they were, of course, roused by his other acts of tyranny--by the way he cut up countries into new kingdoms to suit himself first and the people of these countries last or not at all, by his ordering foreigners about like slaves, and by his being a ruthless conqueror wherever he could. but his shutting of the ports added a kind of slow starvation in the needs and arts of life to all his other sins; while the opening of the ports to british fleets and armies, and to the british trade that followed, meant the bread of life and liberty. thus trafalgar forced napoleon either to give in at once or else to go on raising those hosts of enemies which sapped his strength in spain and russia and caused his fall at waterloo. chapter xix " " the fight between napoleon's land-blockade and britain's sea-blockade divided not only the people of europe into friends and foes but also divided the people of the united states into opposing parties, one in favour of napoleon, the other in favour of the british. the party favouring napoleon wanted war against the british. the other party wanted peace. the war party hated the british, coveted canada, and wished to break the british blockade. the peace party said that napoleon was a tyrant, while the british were on the side of freedom, and that napoleon was rougher with american ships which broke the land-blockade than the british were with those which broke the sea-blockade. the war party answered that, for one ship napoleon could catch, the british caught twenty. this was true. but it showed that the war party would rather make money on napoleon's side than lose it on the side of freedom. the war party's last argument was that british deserters should be safe under the american flag when on the high seas. the high seas meant the sea far enough from any country to be a "no-man's-land," where, as all the other peoples of the world agreed, any navy could enforce the laws of war against any one who broke them. the war party, however, said "no," and went on tempting british seamen to desert, by offering "dollars for shillings," a thing they could well afford, because they were making a great deal of money out of the war, while the british were forced to spend theirs in fighting the tyrant napoleon. the war party won the vote in congress; and war was declared in , just when napoleon was marching to stamp out resistance in russia. this war sprang a double surprise on the british. first, the americans failed badly on land against canada, though they outnumbered the canadians fifteen to one, and though the imperial garrison of canada was only four thousand strong. secondly, the little american navy gave the big british navy a great deal of trouble by daring cruises on the part of small but smart squadrons against the british trade routes, and, as there were no squadron battles, by what counted for very much more than squadron cruises in the eyes of the world, five ship duels won without a break. ship for ship of the same class the americans had the larger and smarter vessels of the two, and often the better crews. twenty years of war had worn out the reserves of british seamen. "dollars for shillings" had tempted many of the british who survived to desert the hard work against napoleon for the easier, safer, and better paid work under the stars and stripes; while the mere want of any enemy to fight for the command of the sea after trafalgar had tended to make the british get slack. but, even after making all allowances in favour of the british and against the americans, there is no denying that the yankee ships fought exceedingly well. their skilful manoeuvres and shattering broadsides deserved to win; and the u.s. ss. _constitution_, _hornet_, _wasp_, and _united states_ richly deserve their place of honour in the story of the sea. the turn of the tide came on the st of june, , when the u.s.s. _chesapeake_ sailed out of boston to fight h.m.s. _shannon_. these two frigates were about equal in size and armament. the _chesapeake_ carried fifty more men; but her captain, the very gallant lawrence, was new to her, like his officers and men, and the crew as a whole were not nearly such veterans as the _shannon's_, whom broke had trained to perfection for seven years. the duel lasted only fifteen minutes. every single british shot struck home; and when broke led his boarders on to the _chesapeake's_ deck the fight had been won already. [illustration: the _shannon_ and the _chesapeake_.] the british government, never wanting this war, and doing all they could to avoid it without endangering the side of freedom against napoleon, had not even now put forth their real naval strength. but in they blockaded all the ports in the united states that the war party could shut against them; whereupon, so far as these ports were concerned, american sea trade simply fell dead. they also burnt the american government buildings at washington as a reprisal for the canadian government buildings the americans had burnt at newark and toronto. those two splendid americans, commodores perry and macdonough, than whom the british never met a better or more generous foe, won the command of lakes erie and champlain, thus partly offsetting british victories elsewhere. the american peace delegates were, however, still more favoured by the state of europe at the end of , when they were arranging the treaty of ghent with the british; for, while they had no outside trouble to prevent them from driving a hard bargain, the british had half the other troubles of the world on their shoulders as well. the end of it all was that things were left as before. the treaty said nothing about the claims and causes for which the united states had made the war. home-thoughts, from the sea nobly, nobly cape saint vincent to the north-west died away; sunset ran, one glorious blood-red, reeking into cadiz bay; bluish 'mid the burning water, full in face trafalgar lay; in the dimmest north-east distance dawn'd gibraltar grand and gray; "here and here did england help me: how can i help england?"--say, whoso turns as i, this evening, turn to god to praise and pray, while jove's planet rises yonder, silent over africa. --_robert browning_. this england never did, nor never shall, lie at the proud foot of a conqueror, but when it first did help to wound itself. now these her princes are come home again, come the three corners of the world in arms, and we shall shock them. nought shall make us rue, if england to itself do rest but true. --_shakespeare._ _king john, act v, scene vii._ ye mariners of england ye mariners of england that guard our native seas! whose flag has braved a thousand years the battle and the breeze! your glorious standard launch again to match another foe; and sweep through the deep, while the stormy winds do blow! while the battle rages loud and long, and the stormy winds do blow. the spirit of your fathers shall start from every wave; for the deck it was their field of fame, and ocean was their grave: where blake and mighty nelson fell your manly hearts shall glow, as ye sweep through the deep, while the stormy winds do blow! while the battle rages loud and long, and the stormy winds do blow. britannia needs no bulwarks, no towers along the steep; her march is o'er the mountain-waves, her home is on the deep. with thunders from her native oak she quells the floods below, as they roar on the shore, when the stormy winds do blow! when the battle rages loud and long, and the stormy winds do blow. the meteor flag of england shall yet terrific burn; till danger's troubled night depart and the star of peace return. then, then, ye ocean warriors! our song and feast shall flow to the fame of your name, when the storm has ceased to blow! when the fiery fight is heard no more, and the storm has ceased to blow. --_thomas campbell._ sea-fever i must go down to the seas again, to the lonely sea and the sky, and all i ask is a tall ship and a star to steer her by, and the wheel's kick and the wind's song and the white sail's shaking, and a grey mist on the sea's face and a grey dawn breaking. i must go down to the seas again, for the call of the running tide is a wild call and a clear call that may not be denied; and all i ask is a windy day with the white clouds flying, and the flung spray and the blown spume, and the sea-gulls crying. i must go down to the seas again, to the vagrant gypsy life, to the gull's way and the whale's way, where the wind's like a whetted knife; and all i ask is a merry yarn from a laughing fellow-rover, and quiet sleep and a sweet dream when the long trick's over. --_john masefield._ o, falmouth is a fine town o, falmouth is a fine town with ships in the bay, and i wish from my heart it's there i was to-day; i wish from my heart i was far away from here, sitting in my parlour and talking to my dear. for it's home, dearie, home--it's home i want to be, our topsails are hoisted, and we'll away to sea; o, the oak and the ash and the bonnie birken tree, they're all growing green in the old countrie. in baltimore a-walking with a lady i did meet with her babe on her arm, as she came down the street; and i thought how i sailed, and the cradle standing ready for the pretty little babe that has never seen its daddy. and it's home, dearie, home, &c. o, if it be a lass, she shall wear a golden ring; and if it be a lad, he shall fight for his king: with his dirk and his hat and his little jacket blue he shall walk the quarter-deck as his daddie used to do. and it's home, dearie, home, &c. o, there's a wind a-blowing, a-blowing from the west, and that of all the winds is the one i like the best, for it blows at our backs, and it shakes our pennon free, and it soon will blow us home to the old countrie. for it's home, dearie, home--it's home i want to be, our topsails are hoisted, and we'll away to sea; o, the oak and the ash and the bonnie birken tree, they're all growing green in the old countrie. --_old song._ "farewell and adieu" this famous song was sung in the navy all through the sailing age; and it is not yet forgotten after a century of steam and steel. gibraltar, cadiz, and many other places on the coast of spain, were great ports of call for the navy as well as great ports of trade for the mercantile marine. so, what with music, dance, and song in these homes of the south, there was no end to the flirtations between the spanish ladies and the british tars in the piping times of peace. farewell, and adieu to you, gay spanish ladies, farewell and adieu to you, ladies of spain! for we've received orders for to sail for old england, but we hope in a short time to see you again. we'll rant and we'll roar like true british heroes, we'll rant and we'll roar across the salt seas, until we strike soundings in the channel of old england; from ushant to scilly is thirty-five leagues. then we hove our ship to, with the wind at sou'-west, boys, we hove our ship to, for to strike soundings clear; we got soundings in ninety-five fathom, and boldly up the channel of old england our course we did steer. the first we made it was calléd the deadman, next, ramshead off plymouth, start, portland, and wight; we passed by beechy, by fairleigh, and dungeness, and hove our ship to, off the south foreland light. then a signal was made for the grand fleet to anchor, all in the downs, that night for to sleep; then stand by your stoppers, let go your shank-painters, haul all your clew-garnets, stick out tacks and sheets. --_old song._ book iii the age of steam and steel part i a century of change ( - ) chapter xx a century of british-french-american peace ( - ) germany made a year of blood; but let us remember it as also being the hundredth year of peace between the british, americans, and french, those three great peoples who will, we hope, go on as friends henceforward, leading the world ever closer to the glorious goal of true democracy: that happier time when every boy and girl shall have at least the chance to learn the sacred trust of all self-government, and when most men and women shall have learnt this lesson well enough to use their votes for what is really best. chapter xxi a century of minor british wars ( - ) during the hundred and nine years between trafalgar and the great war against the germans the royal navy had no more fights for life or death. but it never ceased to protect the empire it had done so much to make. it took part in many wars; it prevented many others; it helped to spread law and justice in the world; and, at the end of all this, it was as ready as ever to meet the foe. sometimes it acted alone; but much oftener with the army in joint expeditions, as it had for centuries. and here let us remind ourselves again that the navy by itself could no more have made the empire than the army could alone. the united service of both was needed for such work in the past, just as the united service of these and of the royal air force will be needed to defend the empire in the future. nor is this all we must remember; for the fighting services draw their own strength from the strength of the whole people. so, whenever we talk of how this great empire of the free was won and is to be defended, let us never forget that it needed and it needs the patriotic service of every man and woman, boy and girl, whether in the fighting services by sea and land and air or among those remaining quietly at home. one for all, and all for one. the navy's first work after the peace of was to destroy the stronghold of the dey of algiers, who was a tyrant, enslaver, and pirate in one. this released thousands of christian slaves and broke up algerian slavery for ever. a few years later ( ) the french and british fleets, now happily allied, sank the turkish fleet at navarino, because the sultan was threatening to kill off the greeks. then the navy sent the pasha of egypt fleeing out of beirut and acre in syria, closed in on alexandria, and forced him to stop bullying the people of the whole near east. by this time ( ) steam had begun to be used in british men-of-war. but the first steamer in the world that ever fired a shot in action, and the first to cross any ocean under steam the whole way, was built at quebec in . this was the famous _royal william_, which steamed from pictou (in nova scotia) to london in , and which, on the th of may, , in the bay of san sebastian, fired the first shot ever fired in battle from a warship under steam. she had been sold to the spanish government for use against the carlists, who were the same sort of curse to spain that the stuarts were to britain, and was then leading the british auxiliary steam squadron under commodore henry. (the american _savannah_ is often said to have crossed the atlantic under steam in . but her log (ship's diary) proves that she steamed only eighty hours during her voyage of a month.) [illustration: the _royal william_. canadian built; the first boat to cross any ocean steaming the whole way ( ), the first steamer in the world to fire a shot in action (may , ).] in french and british were again allied, this time against russia, which wanted to cut europe off from asia by taking constantinople. the allies took sebastopol in the crimea because it was the russian naval base in the black sea. the czar never thought that "bleeding his big toe" could beat him. but it did. he had to supply his army by land, while the allies supplied theirs by sea; and though theirs fought thousands of miles from their bases at home, while his fought in russia itself, within a few hundred miles of its bases inland, yet their sea-power wore out his land-power in less than two years. russia was at that time a great world-power, stretching without a break from the baltic to alaska, which she owned. what, then, kept canada free from the slightest touch of war? the only answer is, the royal navy, that navy which, supported by the mother country alone, enabled all the oversea dominions to grow in perfect peace and safety for this whole hundred years of british wars. moreover, canada was then, and long remained, one of the greatest shipping countries in the world, dependent on her own and the mother country's shipping for her very life. what made her shipping safe on every sea? the royal navy. but, more than even this, the mother country spent twenty-five hundred millions of her own money on keeping canada canadian and british by land and sea. and here, again, nothing could have been done without the navy. the navy enabled the mother country to put down the indian mutiny, a mutiny which, if it had succeeded, would have thrown india back a thousand years, into the welter of her age-long wars; and these wars themselves would soon have snuffed out all the "pacifist" indian nationalists who bite the british hand that feeds them, though they want britain to do all the paying and fighting of indian defence. the navy enabled the mother country to save egypt from ruin at home, from the ruthless sword of the mahdi in the soudan, and from conquest by the germans or the turks. the navy also enabled the mother country to change a dozen savage lands into places where people could rise above the level of their former savage lives. all this meant war. but if these countries had not been brought into the british empire they could only have had the choice of two evils--either to have remained lands of blood and savagery or to have been bullied by the germans. and if the british do not make friends of those they conquer, how is it that so many natives fought for them without being in any way forced to do so, and how is it that the same boer commander-in-chief who fought against the british in the boer war led a boer army on the british side against the germans? the fact is that all the white man's countries of the british empire overseas are perfectly free commonwealths in which not only those of british blood but those of foreign origin, like boers and french-canadians, can live their lives in their own way, without the mother country's having the slightest wish or power to force them to give a ship, a dollar, or a man to defend the empire without which they could not live a day. she protects them for nothing. they join her or not, just as they please. and when they do join her, her navy is always ready to take their soldiers safe across the sea. no league of nations could ever better this. nor is this the only kind of freedom that flourishes under the white ensign of the navy. the oversea dominions, which govern themselves, make what laws they please about their trade, even to charging duty on goods imported from the mother country. but the parts of the empire which the mother country has to rule, (because their people, not being whites, have not yet learnt to rule themselves), also enjoy a wonderful amount of freedom in trade. and foreigners enjoy it too; for they are allowed to trade with the natives as freely as the british are themselves. nor is this all. during the hundred and nine years between trafalgar and the great war most of the oversea colonies of holland, spain, and portugal could have easily been taken by british joint expeditions. but not one of them was touched. there never was the slightest doubt that the navy's long arm could reach all round the seven seas. when the emperor of abyssinia imprisoned british subjects wrongly and would not let them go, the navy soon took an army to the east coast of africa and kept it supplied till it had marched inland, over the mountains, and brought the prisoners back. when the chinese mandarins treated a signed agreement like a "scrap of paper" (as the germans treated the neutrality of belgium) they presently found a hundred and seventy-three british vessels coming to know the reason why, though the chinese coast was sixteen thousand miles from england. no, there is no question about the navy's strong right arm. but it has no thievish fingers. the empire has grown by trade rather than by conquest. there have been conquests, plenty of them. but they have been brought on either by the fact that other powers have tried to shut us out of whole continents, as the spaniards tried in north and south america, or by fair war, as with the french, or by barbarians and savages who would not treat properly the british merchants with whom they had been very glad to trade. of course there have been mistakes, and british wrongs as well as british rights. but ask the conquered how they could live their own lives so much in their own way under a flag of their own and without the safeguard of the royal navy. these things being so, the empire, which is itself the first real league of nations the world has ever seen, would be wrong to give up any of the countries it holds in trust for their inhabitants; and its enormous size is more a blessing than a curse. the size itself is more than we can quite take in till we measure it by something else we know as being very large indeed. india, for instance, has three times as many people as there are in the whole of the united states; though india is only one of the many countries under the british crown. so much for population. now for area. the area added to the british empire in the last fifty years is larger than that of the whole united states. yet we don't hear much about it. that is not the british way. the navy is "the silent service." part ii the great war ( - ) chapter xxii the handy man we have not been through the sailing age without learning something about the "handy man" of the royal navy, whether he is a ship's boy or a veteran boatswain (bo's'n), a cadet or a commander-in-chief, a blue-jacket or a royal marine ("soldier and sailor too"). but we must not enter the age of steam and steel without taking another look at him, if only to see what a great part he plays in our lives and liberties by keeping the seaways open to friends and closed to enemies. without the handy man of the royal navy the merchant service could not live a day, the canadian army could not have joined the other british armies at the front, and the empire itself would be all parts and no whole, because divided, not united, by the seven seas. united we stand: divided we fall. the sea is three times bigger than the land, but three hundred times less known. yet even our everyday language is full of sea terms; because so much of it, like so much of our blood, comes from the hardy norsemen, and because so much of the very life of all the english-speaking peoples depends upon the handy man at sea. peoples who have norse blood, like french and germans, but who have never lived by sea-power, and peoples who, like the russians and chinese, have neither sea-power nor a sea-folk's blood, never use sea terms in their ordinary talk. they may dress up a landsman and put him on the stage to talk the same sort of twaddle that our own stage sailors talk--all about "shiver my timbers," "hitching his breeches," and "belaying the slack of your jaw." but they do not talk the real sea sense we have learnt from the handy man of whose strange life we know so little. when we say "that slacker's not pulling his weight" we use a term that has come down from the old rowing age, when a man who was not helping the boat along more with his oar than he was keeping her back with his weight really was the worst kind of "slacker." but most of the sea terms we use in our land talk come from the sailing age of drake and nelson. to be "a " is to be like the best class of merchant ships that are rated a for insurance. "first-rate," on the other hand, comes from the navy, and means ships of the largest size and strongest build, like the super-dreadnoughts of to-day. if you make a mess of things people say you are "on the wrong tack," may "get taken aback," and find yourself "on your beam ends" or, worse still, "on the rocks." so you had better remember that "if you won't be ruled by the rudder you are sure to be ruled by the rock." if you do not "know the ropes" you will not "keep on an even keel" when it's "blowing great guns." if you take to drink you will soon "have three sheets in the wind," because you will not have the sense to "steer a straight course," but, getting "half seas over," perhaps "go by the board" or be "thrown overboard" by friends who might have "brought you up with a round turn" before it was too late. remember three other bits of handy man's advice: "you'd better not sail so close to the wind" (do not go so near to doing something wrong), "don't speak to the man at the wheel" (because the ship may get off her course while you are bothering him), and, when a storm is brewing, mind you "shorten sail" and "take in a reef," instead of being such a fool as to "carry on till all is blue." when you are in for a fight then "clear the decks for action," by putting aside everything that might get in your way. the list could be made very much longer if we took the whole subject "by and large" and "trimmed our sails to every breeze" when we were "all aboard." but here we must "stow it," "make everything ship-shape," trust to the "sheet-anchor," and, leaving the age of mast and sail, go "full steam ahead" into our own. "full steam ahead" might well have been the motto of nelson's flag-captain, hardy, when he was first sea lord of the admiralty; because, twenty years before the first steam armoured ship was launched, he wrote this opinion: "science will alter the whole navy. depend on it, steam and gunnery are in their infancy." there were just a hundred years between trafalgar and laying the keel of the first modern _dreadnought_ in . but hardy foresaw the sort of change that was bound to come; and so helped on toward jellicoe and jutland. that is one reason why foreigners cannot catch the british navy napping. another is because the british "handy man" can "turn his hand to anything"; though even his worst enemies can never accuse him of being "jack of all trades and master of none." he is the master of the sea. but he knows the ropes of many other things as well; and none of the strange things he is called upon to do ever seem to find him wanting. when a british joint expedition attacked st. helena the dutch never dreamt of guarding the huge sheer cliffs behind the town. but up went a handy man with a long cord by which he pulled up a rope, which, in its turn, was used to haul up a ladder that the soldiers climbed at night. next morning the astounded dutchmen found themselves attacked by land as well as by sea and had to give in. one day the admiral (sir william kennedy) commanding in the indian ocean a few years ago heard that two englishwomen had been left on a desert island by a mail steamer from which they had landed for a picnic. the steamer was bound to go on. the women were not missed till too late. so the captain telegraphed to the admiral from the next port. the admiral at once went to the island in his flagship, found the women with their dresses all torn to ribbons on the rocks, measured them for sailor suits himself, and had them properly rigged out by the ship's tailor, just like the bluejackets, except for the skirts--white jerseys, navy blue serge uniforms, with blue jean collars and white trimmings, straw hats with h.m.s. _boadicea_ on the ribbon in gold, knife and lanyard, all complete. to beat this admiral in turning his hand to anything at a moment's notice we must take the bluejacket whom captain wonham saw escaping from a horde of savages on the west coast of africa during the ashanti war of . this man knew the natives well, as he had been the governor's servant there for several years before the niggers swarmed out of the bush to kill off the whites. every one seemed to be safe in the boats, when captain wonham suddenly spied jack running for his life on top of a long spit of high rocks that jutted out like a wharf. the natives, brandishing their spears and climbing the rocks, were just going to cut jack off when he, knowing their craze for the white man's clothes, threw his cap at them. immediately there was a scramble which held up their advance. as they came on again he threw them his serge, and so on, taking a spurt after each throw. at last he took off his trousers, which set all the niggers fighting like mad round two big chiefs, each of whom was hanging on to one leg. then he took a neat header and swam off to the boats, which had meanwhile pulled in to his rescue. when the battleship _majestic_ was sunk in the dardanelles a bluejacket ran along her upper side as she rolled over, then along her keel as she turned bottom upwards. finally, seeing that she was sinking by the stern, and knowing both her own length and the depth of the water, he climbed right up on the tip-top end of her stem, from which he was taken off as dry as a bone. meanwhile a very different kind of rescue was being made by captain talbot, who, having gone down with the ship, rose to the surface and was rescued by a launch. he had barely recovered his breath when he saw two of his bluejackets struggling for their lives. he at once dived in and rescued both at the very great risk of his own. from east to west, from the tropics to the poles, the navy has gone everywhere and done nearly everything that mortal man can do. think of the admiralty "rating" newfoundland, a country bigger than scotland and wales put together, as one of his majesty's ships and putting a captain in command! yet that was done in the early days; and it worked very well. think of the naval brigades (that is, men landed for service ashore) which have fought alone or with the army, or with many foreign armies and navies, all over the world for hundreds of years. drake, as we have seen, always used naval brigades, and they have always been the same keen "first-class fighting men" wherever they went. the only trouble was in holding them back. at the siege of tangier in north africa in the seventeenth century admiral herbert "checked" captain barclay "for suffering too forward and furious an advance, lest they might fall into an ambush"; whereupon barclay said, "sir, i can lead them on, but the furies can't call them back." a naval brigade man-handled the guns on the plains of abraham the day of wolfe's victory, and took forty-seven up the cliff and into position before the army had dug itself in for the night. nelson lost his right arm when leading a naval brigade at teneriffe in . peel's naval brigade in the indian mutiny ( - ) man-handled two big guns right up against the wall that kept lord clyde's army from joining hands with the british besieged in lucknow, blew a hole in it, though it was swarming with rebels, and so let the marines and the highlanders through. in egypt ( ) lord fisher, of whom we shall soon hear more, rigged up a train like an ironclad and kept arabi pasha at arm's length from alexandria, which lord alcester's fleet had bombarded and taken. lieutenant rawson literally "steered" lord wolseley's army across the desert by the stars during the night march that ended in the perfect victory of tel-el-kebir. mortally wounded he simply asked: "did i lead them straight, sir?" the egyptian campaigns continued off and on for sixteen years ( - ) till lord kitchener beat the mahdi far south in the wild soudan. british sea-power, as it always does, worked the sea lines of communication over which the army's supplies had to go to the front from england and elsewhere, and, again as usual, put the army in the best possible place from which to strike inland. needless to say, the naval part of british sea-power not only helped and protected the mercantile part, which carried the supplies, but helped both in the fighting and the inland water transport too. at one time ( ) the little naval brigade on the nile had to be led by a boatswain, every officer having been killed or wounded. in the attempt to rescue the saintly and heroic general gordon from khartoum, lord beresford rigged up the little egyptian steamer _safieh_ with armour plates and took her past an enemy fort that could easily have sunk her as she went by, only eighty yards away, if his machine-gunners had not kept such a stream of bullets whizzing through every hole from which an egyptian gun stuck out that not a single egyptian gunner could stand to his piece and live. lord beresford was well to the fore wherever hard work had to be done during that desperate venture; and it was he who performed the wonderful feat of getting the nile steamers hauled through the second cataract by fifteen hundred british soldiers, who hove them up against that awful stream of death while the blue-jackets looked after the tackle. beresford's naval brigade used to tramp fifteen miles a day along the river, sometimes work as many hours with no spell off for dinner, haul the whaleboats up-stream to where the rapids made a big loop, and then, avoiding the loop, portage them across the neck of land into the river again. handling these boats in the killing heat would have been hard enough in any case; but it was made still worse by the scorpions that swarmed in them under the mats and darted out to bite the nearest hand. beresford himself had to keep his weather eye on thirty miles of roaring river, on hundreds of soldiers and sailors, and on thousands of natives. yet he managed it all quite handily by riding about on his three famous camels: bimbashi, ballyhooly, and beelzebub. but let no one imagine that dozens of joint expeditions ever make the navy forget its first duty of keeping the seaways clear of every possible enemy during every minute of every day the whole year round. when the russian fleet was going out to the sea of japan during the russo-japanese war ( - ) it ran into the "gamecock fleet" of british fishing vessels in the north sea, got excited, and fired some shots that killed and wounded several fishermen. within a very few hours it was completely surrounded by a british fleet that did not interfere with its movements, but simply "shadowed" it along, waiting for orders. there was no fight; and the russians were left to be finished by the japanese. but the point is, that, although the british empire was then at peace with the whole world, the british navy was far readier for instant action than the russian navy, which had been many months at war. the happy warrior wordsworth's glorious poem is not in praise of war but of the self-sacrificing warriors who try to save their country from the horrors of war. no wise people, least of all the men who know it best, ever sing the praise of war itself. they might as well sing the praises of disease. but, while those who, like the germans, force a wicked war upon the world are no better than poisoners of wells and spreaders of the plague, those, on the other hand, who, like the allies, fight the poisoners of wells and spreaders of the plague are doing the same kind of service that doctors do when fighting germs. therefore, as doctors to disease, so is the happy warrior to war. he no more likes war than doctors like the germs of deadly sickness; and he would rid the world of this great danger if he could. but while war lasts, and wars are waged against the very soul of all we hold most dear, we need the happy warrior who can foresee the coming war and lead a host of heroes when it comes. and leaders and followers alike, when faithful unto death, are they not among the noblest martyrs ever known? _for greater love hath no man than this, that he lay down his life for his friends_. who is the happy warrior? who is he that every man in arms should wish to be? --it is the generous spirit, who, when brought among the tasks of real life, hath wrought upon the plan that pleased his boyish thought: whose high endeavours are an inward light that makes the path before him always bright: who, with a natural instinct to discern what knowledge can perform, is diligent to learn; abides by this resolve, and stops not there, but makes his moral being his prime care; who, doomed to go in company with pain, and fear, and bloodshed, miserable train! turns his necessity to glorious gain; in face of these doth exercise a power which is our human nature's highest dower; controls them and subdues, transmutes, bereaves of their bad influence, and their good receives: by objects, which might force the soul to abate her feeling, rendered more compassionate; is placable--because occasions rise so often that demand such sacrifice; more skilful in self-knowledge, even more pure, as tempted more; more able to endure, as more exposed to suffering and distress; * * * * * * thence, also, more alive to tenderness. but who, if he be called upon to face some awful moment to which heaven has joined great issues, good or bad for human kind, is happy as a lover; and attired with sudden brightness, like a man inspired; and, through the heat of conflict, keeps the law in calmness made, and sees what he foresaw; * * * * * * who, whether praise of him must walk the earth for ever, and to noble deeds give birth, or he must fall, to sleep without his fame, and leave a dead unprofitable name-- finds comfort in himself and in his cause; and, while the mortal mist is gathering, draws his breath in confidence of heaven's applause: this is the happy warrior; this is he that every man in arms should wish to be. --_william wordsworth_. chapter xxiii fifty years of warning ( - ) in the fathers of confederation met at quebec, while the germans took from the danes the neck of land through which they cut the kiel canal to give the german navy a safe back way between the north sea and the baltic. at first sight you cannot understand why canadian confederation and the german attack on denmark should ever be mentioned together. but, just as the waters of two streams in the same river system are bound to meet in the end, so canada and germany were bound to meet on the same battlefield when once canada had begun to grow into a nation within the british empire and germany had begun to grow into an empire for whose ambitions there was no room without a series of victorious wars. after beating austria in , to win the leadership of central europe, germany beat france in , took alsace and lorraine, and made herself the strongest land-power in the world. even then two such very different englishmen as cardinal newman and john stuart mill foresaw the clash that was bound to come between the new empire of the germans and the old one of the british. but most people never see far ahead, while many will not look at all if the prospect seems to be unpleasant. thirty years before the war ( ) germany began to get an empire overseas. taking every possible chance she went on till she had a million square miles and fifteen million natives. but she neither had nor could get without victorious war any land outside of germany where she could bring up german children under the german flag. even including the german parts of austria there was barely one quarter-million of square miles on which german-speaking people could go on growing under their own flags; while the english-speaking people of the british empire and the united states had twenty times as much land, fit for whites, on which to grow bigger and bigger populations of their own blood under their own flags. this meant that the new, strong, and most ambitious german empire was doomed to an ever-dwindling future as a world-power in comparison with the british empire. the germans could not see why they should not have as good a "place in the sun" of the white man's countries as the british, whom they now looked on very much as our ancestors looked upon the oversea spaniards about the time of the armada. "why," they asked, "should the british have so much white man's country while we have so little?" there are only three answers, two that the germans understand as well as we do, and one that, being what they are, they could hardly be expected to admit, though it is the only one that justifies our case. the two answers which the germans understand are of course these: that we had the sea-power while they had not; and that, because we had it, we had reaped the full benefit of "first come, first served." but the third answer, which is much the most important, because it turns upon the question of right and wrong, is that while the germans, like the spaniards, have grossly abused their imperial powers, we, on the whole, with all our faults, have not. there are so many crimes for which the germans have to answer that this whole book could not contain the hundredth part of them. but one crime in one of their oversea possessions will be enough to mention here, because it was all of a piece with the rest. in german south-west africa the herreros, a brave native people, were robbed if they worked hard for the german slave-drivers, flogged till their backs were flayed if they did not, and killed if they stood up for their rights. there are plenty of german photographs to prove that the modern germans are very like the spaniards of philip ii and utterly unlike the kindly modern french, italians, americans, and british. the world itself is witness now, and its conscience is the judge. so there we shall leave our case and turn to follow the ever thickening plot of coming war. in britain spent an extra hundred million dollars on building new men-of-war. next year germany got heligoland from britain in exchange for zanzibar. heligoland is only a tiny inland off the north sea coast of germany. but it was very useful to the germans as one of the main defences of the great naval base there. in the kaiser said, "i shall not rest till i have made my fleet as strong as my army." a year later he said, "our future is on the water." and in the german navy bill passed by the german parliament began by saying, "the german navy must be strong enough to endanger the supremacy of even the mightiest foreign navy." what "foreign navy" could that be if not the british? in the kaiser tried to steal a march on the too pacific british government by writing privately to lord tweedmouth, the feeble civilian first lord of the admiralty. the first lord represents the navy in parliament; and parliament represents the people, who elect its members. so when a first lord is a real statesman who knows what advice to take from the first sea lord (who is always an admiral) everything goes well; for then parliament and the navy work together as the trusted servants of the whole people. but tweedmouth, feeble and easily flattered, was completely taken in by the sly kaiser, who said germany was only building new ships in place of old ones, while she was really trying to double her strength. it was therefore a very lucky thing that the kaiser also tried to fool that wonderful statesman, wise king edward, who at once saw through the whole german trick. meanwhile ( ) the americans had driven the spaniards out of their last oversea possessions, much to the rage of the germans, who had hoped to get these themselves. the german admiral at manilla in the philippines blustered against the american fleet under admiral dewey; but was soon brought to book by sir edward chichester, who told him he would have to fight the british squadron as well if he gave any more trouble about things that were none of his business. the same year the germans tried to set the french and british by the ears over fashoda. a french expedition came out of french africa into the sudan, where kitchener's army was in possession after having freed egypt from the power of the madhi's wild sudanese. french and british both claimed the same place; and for some years fashoda was like a red rag to a bull when mentioned to frenchmen; for kitchener had got there first. luckily he had fought for france in , spoke french like a frenchman, and soon made friends with the french on the spot. more luckily still, king edward the wise went to paris in , despite the fears of his ministers, who did all they could to make him change his mind, and then, when this failed, to go there as a private person. they were afraid that memories of fashoda and of all the anti-british feeling stirred up by germans in europe and america over the boer war ( - ) would make the french unfriendly. but he went to pay his respects to france on his accession to the british throne, showed how perfectly he understood the french people, said and did exactly the right thing in the right way; and, before either friends or foes knew what was happening, had so won the heart of france that french and british, seeing what friends they might be, began that _entente cordiale_ (good understanding of each other) which our glorious alliance in the great war ought to make us keep forever. paris named one of her squares in his honour, _place edouard sept_; and there the wise king's statue stands to remind the world of what he did to save it from the german fury. next year lord fisher went to london as first sea lord ( - ) to get the navy ready for the coming war. he struck off the list of fighting ships every single one that would not be fit for battle in the near future. he put "nucleus crews" on board all ships fit for service that were not in sea-going squadrons for the time being; so that when the reserves were called out for the war they would find these nucleus crews ready to show them all the latest things aboard. he started a new class of battleships by launching ( ) the world-famous _dreadnought_. this kind of ship was so much better than all others that all foreign navies, both friends and foes, have copied it ever since, trying to keep up with each new british improvement as it appeared. but the greatest thing of all was fisher's new plan for bringing the mighty british fleets closer together and so "handier" for battles with the germans. the old plan of posting british squadrons all over the world takes us back to the conquest of canada; for it was the work of st. vincent, to whom wolfe handed his will the night before the battle of the plains ( ). st. vincent's plan of was so good that it worked well, with a few changes, down to fisher's anti-german plan of , about which time the french and british navies began talking over the best ways of acting together when the germans made their spring. in --the centenary of trafalgar--a british fleet visited france and a french fleet visited england. it was a thrilling sight to see that noble frenchman, admiral caillard, whose example was followed by all his officers, stand up in his carriage to salute the nelson statue in trafalgar square. in , when canada was celebrating the tercentenary of a life that could never have begun without drake or been saved without nelson, the french and british prime ministers (clemenceau and campbell-bannerman) were talking things over in paris. the result was that the british left the mediterranean mainly in charge of the french navy, while the french left the channel mostly and the north sea entirely in charge of the british. there was no treaty then or at any other time. each government left its own parliament, and therefore its own people, whose servant it was, to decide freely when the time came. but the men at the head of the french and british fleets and armies arranged, year by year, what they would do when they got the word _go_! at the same time (six years before the war) that the prime ministers were in conference in paris lord haldane, then secretary of state for war, was warning lord french in london that he would be expected to command the british army against the germans in france, and that he had better begin to study the problem at once. a great deal of sickening nonsense has been talked about our having been so "righteous" because so "unprepared." we were not prepared to _attack_ anybody; and quite rightly too; though we need not get self-righteous over it. but our great mother country's navy was most certainly and most rightly prepared to _defend_ the empire and its allies against the attack that was bound to come. if france and great britain had not been well enough prepared for self-defence, then the germans must have won; and wrong would have triumphed over right all over the world. there is only one answer to all this "pacifistic" stuff-and-nonsense--if you will not fight on the side of right, then you help those who fight on the side of wrong; and if you see your enemy preparing to attack you wrongfully, and you do not prepare to defend yourself, then you are a fool as well as a knave. all the great experts in statesmanship and war saw the clash coming; and saw that it was sure to come, because the german war party could force it on the moment they were ready. moreover, it was known that the men of this war party would have forced it on at once if a peace party had ever seemed likely to oust them. the real experts even foresaw the chief ways in which the war would be fought. lord fisher foresaw the danger of sea-going submarines long before submarines were used for anything but the defence of harbours. more than this, ten years before the war he named all the four senior men who led the first british army into flanders. in lord esher's diary for the th of january, , ten years before the war, is the following note about fisher's opinion on the best british generals: "french, because he never failed in south africa, and because he has the splendid gift of choosing the right man (he means douglas haig). then smith-dorrien and plumer." in the same way joffre and foch were known to be the great commanders of the french. again in the same way (that is, by the foreknowledge of the real experts) lord jellicoe, though a junior rear-admiral at the time, was pointed out at the quebec tercentenary ( ) as the man who would command the grand fleet; while sir david beatty and sir charles madden were also known as "rising stars." the following years were fuller than ever of the coming war. in the kaiser went to vienna and let the world know that he was ready to stand by austria in "shining armour." austria, bulgaria, turkey, and greece were all to be used for the grand german railway from berlin to bagdad that was to cut russia off from the rest of europe, get all the trade of the near east into german hands, and, by pushing down to the persian gulf, threaten the british oversea line between england and asia. during the next three years the italian conquest of tripoli (next door to egypt) and the two wars in the balkans hurt germany's friends, the turks and bulgarians, a great deal, and thus threatened the german berlin-to-bagdad "line of penetration" through the near east and into the asiatic sea flank of the hated british. with came the completion of the enlarged kiel canal (exactly as foretold by fisher years before); and this, together with the state of the world for and against the germans, made the war an absolute certainty at once. the murder of the heir to the austrian throne, franz ferdinand, was only an excuse to goad the gallant serbians into war. any other would have done as well if it had only served the german turn. hymn before action the earth is full of anger, the seas are dark with wrath, the nations in their harness go up against our path: ere yet we loose the legions-- ere yet we draw the blade, jehovah of the thunders, lord god of battles, aid! * * * * e'en now their vanguard gathers, e'en now we face the fray-- as thou didst help our fathers, help thou our host to-day! fulfilled of signs and wonders, in life, in death made clear-- jehovah of the thunders, lord god of battles, hear! --_rudyard kipling_. chapter xxiv war ( - ) no one who has had a look behind the scenes will ever forget the three war wednesdays of , the nd and th of july and the th of august; for during that dire fortnight the fate of the whole world hung trembling in the scales of life and death. on the first the king reviewed the grand fleet, when twenty-two miles of fighting ships steamed by, all ready for instant battle with the high sea fleet of germany: ready not only for battles _on_ the water but _under_ the water and _over_ the water as well. no king, even of sea-girt britain, was ever so good a judge of what a fleet should be as was king george on that momentous day; for, till the death of his elder brother made him heir to the throne, he had spent the whole of his keen young life as a naval officer who did his work so well that he must have risen to a place among the best of british admirals. just as it was a great thing to have had king edward the wise to make (as he alone could make) the _entente cordiale_ with france, so it was a great thing to have had king george the sailor standing by the helm of the ship of state when the fated war had come. british to the backbone, knowing the empire overseas as no other king had known it, george v was born to distrust the germans, being the son of the danish princess alexandra, who had seen all the country round the kiel canal torn from the crown of denmark within a year of her marriage to king edward. the kaiser's lying letter to lord tweedmouth in was the last straw that broke king george's little patience with the german plotters headed by grand admiral von tirpitz. "what," he exclaimed, "would the kaiser say, if the king wrote a letter like that to tirpitz?" the chief kinds of fighting craft in the grand fleet can be told off on the fingers of one hand. first, the battleships and battle cruisers. these are to our own fleets what ships-of-the-line-of-battle were to nelson's, that is, they are the biggest and strongest, with the biggest and strongest guns and the thickest armour. the battle cruiser is faster than the battleship, and therefore not so strong; because to be faster you must thin your heavy armour to let you put in bigger engines. all the ships of this first kind were either dreadnoughts or super-dreadnoughts; that is, they were classed according to whether they had been built during the five years after the _dreadnought_ ( - ), or during the five years just before the war ( - ). each year there had been great improvements, till ships like the _queen elizabeth_ had eight gigantic guns throwing shells that weighed nearly a ton each and that could be dropped on an enemy twenty miles away. [illustration: battleship.] the second kind is cruisers, made up of armoured cruisers and light cruisers, the armoured being the bigger and stronger, the light being the smaller and faster, and both being too small for the line of battle. cruisers are used in at least a dozen different ways. they scout. they attack and defend oversea trade. they "mother" flotillas ("little fleets") of destroyers, which are much smaller than themselves. they attack and defend the front, flank, and rear of the great lines of battle, clearing off the enemy's cruisers and destroyers and trying to get their own torpedoes home against his larger vessels. they are the eyes and ears, the scouts and skirmishers, the outposts and the watchdogs of the fleet--swift, keen, sinewy, vigilant, and able to hit pretty hard. thirdly come destroyers. this was the way in which they got their name. navies had small gunboats before torpedoes were used. then they had torpedo-boats. then they built torpedo-gunboats. finally, they built boats big enough to destroy gunboats, torpedo-boats, and torpedo-gunboats, without, however, losing the handy use of guns and torpedoes in vessels much smaller than cruisers. as battleships and cruisers are arranged in "squadrons" under admirals so destroyers are arranged in "flotillas" under commodores, who rank between admirals and captains. a new kind of light craft--a sort of dwarf destroyer--grew up with the war. it is so light that it forms a class of its own--the featherweight class. its proper name is the coastal motor boat, or the c.m.b. for short. but the handy man knows it simply as the scooter. the first scooters were only forty feet long, the next were fifty-five, the last were seventy. everything about them is made as light as possible; so that they can skim along in about two feet of water at an outside speed of nearly fifty (land) miles an hour. they are really the thinnest of racing shells fitted with the strongest of lightweight engines. they are all armed with depth charges, which are bombs that go off under water at whatever depth you set them for when attacking submarines. the biggest scooters also carry torpedoes. the scooters did well in the war. whenever the hovering aircraft had spotted a submarine they would call up the scooters, which raced in with their deadly depth charges. even destroyers were attacked and torpedoed. one day a german destroyer off dunkirk suddenly found itself surrounded by scooters which came in so close that a british officer had his cap blown off by the blast from a german gun. he and his scooter, however, both escaped and his torpedo sank the hun. fourthly, come the submarines, those sneaky vipers of the sea that seem made on purpose for the underhand tricks of ruthless germans. deadly against unarmed merchantmen, and very dangerous in some other ways, the submarine is slow under water, no match for even a destroyer on the surface, and "tender" to attack by gunfire, to bombs dropped from aircraft, to "sea-quaking" depth charges, and, of course, to ramming. we shall presently hear more about these inventions of the devil. [illustration: seaplane returning after flight.] fifthly, come the seaplanes, that is, aircraft which can light on the water as well as fly. we began the war with a fair number of comparatively small planes and ended it with a great number of large ones, a few of which could drop a ton-weight bomb fit to sink most battleships if the shot went home. but these monsters of the air were something more than ordinary seaplanes. for out of the seaplane there gradually grew a regular flying boat which began to make it hot for german submarines in . commander porte, of the royal navy, went on inventing and trying new kinds of flying boats for nearly three years before he made one good enough for its very hard and dangerous work. he had to overcome all the troubles of aircraft and seacraft, put together, before he succeeded in doing what no one had ever done before--making a completely new kind of craft that would be not only seaworthy but airworthy too. porte's base was at felixstowe, near the great destroyer and submarine base at harwich on the east coast of england. strangely enough, felixstowe was a favourite summer resort of the kaiser whenever he came to the british isles. felixstowe is within a hundred miles of the belgian coast, where the germans had submarines at ostend and zeebrugge. it is only fifty from the dutch lightship on the north hinder bank, where german submarines used to come up so as to make sure of their course on their way between the english channel and their own ports. the neighbourhood of this lightship naturally became a very favourite hunting ground of the new flying boats, which used to bomb the huns whenever one of their submarines was sighted either on or below the surface. forty flying boats were launched in , and forty-four submarines were bombed. the "porte baby," as the flying boat of ' was called, measured a hundred feet across the wings and carried a small aeroplane, complete with its own airman, on top. the "porte super-baby" of could lift no less than fifteen tons and was easily the strongest aircraft in the world. the "baby's" crew was four--pilot, navigator, wirelesser, and engineer. the "super-baby" carried more. two gigantic zeppelins and several submarines were destroyed by the "babies." the "super-babies" had no proper chance of showing what they could do, as the armistice came ( november ) before they were really at work. porte had many canadians in his crews; and canadians brought down the first zeppelin and sank the first submarine. but the five chief kinds of fighting craft are only half the battle. there are five more to be told off on the fingers of the other hand. first, the auxiliary cruisers, which are swift merchant liners quickly armed and manned by trained reservists, who are mostly merchant seamen and fishermen in time of peace. these cruisers do scouting and escort duty, and sometimes have a hard fight with the enemy; though they are not strong enough for regular battles between great men-of-war. secondly, the supply vessels of every size and every kind, which keep the fleet supplied with food and fuel, munitions and repairs, and everything else a great fleet needs. so vast is british sea-power of every kind, compared with the sea-power of any other people, that foreign fleets and joint expeditions generally have to get british shipping to help them through their troubles when the british are either neutral or allied. the russian fleet could not have gone to the far east in - without the supply ships of the british. the american fleet that went round the world in - had to depend on british colliers. and over three-fifths of all the american soldiers that went to france to fight the germans went in british transports. transports are any ships that can be used to carry troops, horses, motors, stores, munitions, guns, and all the other things an army needs. they come third on this list. fourthly, come those merchantmen which are not used by the army or navy because they carry on the regular oversea trade as best they can. fifthly, comes the fishing fleet, many of whose best men and vessels have to be used to fish for mines and submarines, but much of which must still be left to help out the food supply. the merchantmen and fishing craft which carried on their peace-time trade throughout the great war had many an adventure quite as thrilling and many a hero quite as glorious as any in the fighting fleets. so there was no kind of british sea-power which did not feel the awful stress of war; and none, we may be proud to add, that failed to do its duty. on the second war wednesday (july th) the british foreign minister warned the german ambassador that the british could not be so base as not to stand by their friends if germany attacked them without good reason. all through that night the staff of the foreign office were wonderfully cheered up in their own work by looking across the famous horse guards parade at the admiralty, which was ablaze with lights from roof to cellar. the usual way, after the royal review that ended the big fleet manoeuvres for the year, was to "demobilize" ships that had been specially "mobilized" (made ready for the front) by adding reserve men to their nucleus crews. but this year things were different. war was in the very air. so the whole fleet was kept mobilized; and the wireless on top of the admiralty roof was kept in constant touch with every ship and squadron all round the seven seas. by friday night, the st, the whole grand fleet had steamed through the straits of dover into the grim north sea and on to scapa flow, where it was already waiting when, four days later, it got the midnight call to arms. by the third war wednesday (august th) the germans had invaded belgium and france; that great soldier and creator of new armies, lord kitchener, had replaced the civilian, lord haldane, at the head of the war office; lord french's immortal first army had just got the word _go!_ and a german mine-layer was already at the work which cost her own life but sank the cruiser _amphion_. years before the first shot was fired the french and british navies had prepared their plans for blockading the austrians in the adriatic and the germans in the north sea. the french were more than a match for the austrians, the british more still for the germans. but the austrians had their whole navy together, while the germans also had at least nine-tenths of their own. so the french and british, in their efforts to keep the seaways open for friends and closed to enemies, had to reckon with the chances of battle as well as with those of blockade. the austrians never gave much trouble, except, like the germans, with their submarines; and after the italians had joined us (may ) the austrian navy was hopelessly outclassed. but the germans were different. by immense hard work they had passed every navy in the world except the british; and they were getting dangerously close even to that. their navy did not want war so soon; and no germans wanted the sort of war they got. their navy wanted to build and build for another ten or twenty years, hoping that our pacifist traitors (who were ready for peace at any price, honour and liberty of course included) would play the german game by letting the german navy outbuild the british. then _der tag_ (the day) would come in the way the germans hoped when they drank to it with shouts of _hoch der kaiser!_ (which really meant, _the kaiser on top, the british underneath!_ though that is not the translation). to get this kind of _tag_ the germans needed to strike down their victims one by one in three quite separate wars: first, france and belgium, russia and the southern slavs; a thing they could have done with austria, bulgaria, and turkey on their side and the rest of europe neutral. then, having made sure of their immensely strengthened new position in the world, _der tag_ would come against the british empire. last of all, they would work their will in south america, being by that time far too strong for the united states. a nightmare plan, indeed! but, with good luck and good management, and taking us one by one, and always having our vile pacifists to help them, this truly devilish plot might well have been worked out in three successive generations during the course of the twentieth century. as it was, we had trouble enough to beat them; for they fought well by sea and land and air, though more like devils than like men. the charge of cowardice against our enemies, especially the turks and germans, is nonsense. besides, it takes away our own men's glory if they had nothing more than cowards to put down. of course the enemy had cowards, as other peoples have; but they had plenty of brave men too; and what, that unsurpassable hero of the air, mccudden, said of one brave german will do for many more. "i shall never forget my admiration for that german pilot who, single-handed, fought seven of us for ten minutes, and also put some bullets through all our machines. his flying was wonderful, his courage magnificent." the germans had not only the advantage of being able to mass nearly all their navy together but of training it all together on the same north sea practice ground, and of building battle squadrons on purpose for one kind of fight close at home: a single tiger-spring and that was all. the british, on the other hand, had to build a good many ships "fit to go foreign" thousands of miles away, and so had to give up much space to the men's quarters and to fuel; while the germans could save half this space for increased power in armour, engines, guns, and other things suited to one short cruise and tiger-spring near home. not the least of the many british triumphs was winning against an enemy who was so brave, so skilful, so strong in many ways, and so very devilish in all. now that we know what we are about, let us clear the decks for action and go full steam ahead right through the fight at sea. the british navy had to help the british army into france and take care that the army's ever-growing forces there, as well as on a dozen different fronts elsewhere, always had the sea-roads kept open to many different bases over half the world. the seven seas are ten times bigger than the whole of north and south america. yet the navy watched or kept in touch with every part of all of them. so much for space. now for time. time was needed to get kitchener's vast new armies ready. millions sprang to arms. but it would have been sheer murder to send them to the front without many months of very hard training. so the enemy had to be kept at arm's length for a very long time--for the whole war, indeed, because reinforcements and supplies were always needed in vast and ever vaster quantities, both from the mother country and from the empire, allies, and neutrals overseas. in addition to this the british oversea trade routes had to be kept open and the german ones closed; fisheries protected on one side, attacked on the other; and an immense sea service carried on for our allies as well. some staggering facts and figures will be given in the chapter called "well done!" here we shall only note that the navy, with all its reserves and auxiliaries, grew from two and a half million tons of shipping to eight millions before the war was over. this means that the navy, in spite of all its losses, became bigger than any other country's navy, mercantile marine, fishing fleet, river steamers, and all other kinds of shipping, put together, since the world began. when we add the british mercantile marine, british shipbuilding, the british fishing fleets, and all the shipping interests of the empire overseas, we shall find that british sea-power of all kinds equalled all the sea-power of all the rest of the world together. destroy that sea-power and we die. scapa flow in the orkney islands off the north of scotland was a perfect base for the grand fleet, because it was well placed to watch the way out of the north sea through the two-hundred-mile gap between norway and the shetlands, and also because the tremendous tidal currents sweeping through it prevented submarines from sneaking about too close. six hundred miles south-east was the german fleet, near the north sea end of the kiel canal. between lay a hundred and twenty-five thousand square miles of water on which, taking one day with another the whole year round, you could not see clearly more than five miles. this "low average visibility" accounts for all the hide-and-seek that suited german tricks so well. within three hours of the british declaration of war two british submarines were off for heligoland, where they spied out the enemy's fleet. from that time on every german move was watched from under the water, on the water, or over the water, and instantly reported by wireless to the admiralty in london and to the grand fleet based on scapa flow. then, when the first british army began to cross into france, the fleet covered its flank against the germans, and went on covering it for fifty-one months without a break, through cold and wet, through ceaseless watching, and through many fights. the first fight was off heligoland, when british light cruisers and destroyers went into the bight on a scouting cruise planned by the admiralty, not the grand fleet. the german destroyers fell back to lure the british within range of the enormous guns on heligoland. that failed. but suddenly, out of the morning mist, came a bunch of german shells throwing up water-spouts that almost splashed aboard. instantly the british destroyers strung out, farther apart, and put on full racing speed as the next two bunches crept closer in. _whirrh!_ went the fourth, just overhead, as the flotilla flagship _arethusa_ signalled to fire torpedoes. at once the destroyers turned, all together, lashing the sea into foam as their sterns whisked round, and charged, faster than any cavalry, straight for the enemy. when the germans found the range and once more began bunching their shells too close in, the british destroyers snaked right and left, threw out the range-finding, and then raced ahead again. in less than ten minutes they had made more than five miles, fired their torpedoes, and were on their way back. then up came the british cruisers and converged on the _mainz_, which went down fighting. "the _mainz_," wrote one of the british officers who saw her, "was immensely gallant. with her whole midships a fuming inferno she kept one gun forward and another aft still spitting forth fury and defiance like a wild cat mad with wounds." in the mean time jellicoe, rightly anxious about leaving british light craft unsupported by heavier vessels so close to the german fleet, urged the admiralty to change their plan by sending on the battle cruisers. then up came beatty's four lordly giants--_lion, queen mary, invincible, new zealand_--and the outclassed germans retired. [illustration: destroyer.] the destroyer _defender_, having sunk a german, had lowered a whaleboat to pick up survivors, when she was chased by a big german cruiser. so there, all alone, was her whaler, a mere open boat, on the enemy's part of the battlefield. but, through a swirl alongside, up came submarine e , opened her conning tower, took the whole boat's crew aboard, dived down again before the germans could catch her, and landed safe home. e crept in six miles south of heligoland a fortnight later and sank the german cruiser _hela_. but within a week the german von weddigen had become the most famous of submarine commanders, for sinking no less than three british armoured cruisers with the loss of fifteen hundred men. the _aboukir_, having been hit first, was closed by the _hogue_ and _cressy_ in order to save her crew. but they were themselves torpedoed before they could either see their enemy or save their friends. meanwhile the only german squadron overseas had been doing some daringly clever work under its first-class admiral, graf von spee. leaving his worst vessels at tsing-tao (the german port in china which was taken by the japanese and british later on) he sailed into the vast pacific with his seven best. on his way south he sent the _königsberg_ to raid the east coast of africa and the _emden_ to raid the indian ocean. the _königsberg_ did a good deal of damage to merchantmen and sank the much weaker british light cruiser _pegasus_, which was caught refitting at zanzibar and was pounded into scrap iron with the loss of half her crew. but when the _königsberg_ made off, probably fearing the arrival of some avenging british, the _pegasus_ still had her colours flying, not from the mast, for that was shot away, but in the steadfast hands of two undauntable marines. the _emden_ was the most wonderful raider of modern times; and her captain, von müller, behaved much better than the general run of germans. arrived in the indian ocean he bagged six ships in five days, sending all the crews into calcutta in the sixth after sinking the rest. but he soon beat this by twice taking no less than seven ships in a single day! then he dashed into penang and sank the unready russian cruiser _jemchug_ on his way in and the ready little french destroyer _mousquet_ on his way out. the _mousquet_ hadn't the ghost of a chance. but she went straight for the _emden_ and fought till she sank; her heroic captain, with both legs blown off, commanding her to the very last gasp. by this time, however, the net was closing in; and twelve days later the big australian cruiser _sydney_ finished the _emden_ on cocos island reef. meanwhile von spee's five cruisers had been pressed south by the clever network of japanese warships working over the vast area of the pacific under the orders of a staff officer watching every move from his desk at tokyo. sir christopher cradock was waiting to catch the germans. but his slow battleship _canopus_ had not yet joined him when (november ), with only three cruisers and one armed merchantman, he attacked them off coronel on the coast of chili; though they were very hard to see, being against the mountains, while his own ships were clearly outlined against a brilliant sunset. ordering the armed merchantman away he began the fight between the armoured cruisers: _good hope_ and _monmouth_ against _scharnhorst_ and _gneisenau_. the german ships were newer, faster, better armed, and the best shooting vessels of the german fleet. the first of their salvoes (volleys) to get home set the _good hope_ blazing fore and aft. there was a gale blowing and big seas running; so the end soon came. cradock's last signal was for the light cruiser _glasgow_ to save herself, as she could do no further service. but she stood by the _monmouth_, whose own captain also ordered her away with the signal that, being too hard hit to escape himself, he would try to close the enemy so as to give the _glasgow_ a better chance. suddenly, like a volcano, the _good hope_ was rent by a shattering explosion. then the _monmouth_ began sinking by the head, and her guns ceased firing. no boat could live in those mountainous seas. so the _glasgow_, now under the fire of the whole german squadron, raced away for her life. von spee then swept the coast; and british vessels had to take refuge in chilean harbours. but captain kinnear, a merchant skipper, ran the gauntlet with a skill and courage which nothing could surpass. off the dreaded straits of magellan a german cruiser chased him at twenty-one knots, his own _ortega's_ regular full speed being only fourteen. but he called for volunteers to help the stokers, whereupon every one of the two hundred frenchmen going home to fight at once stepped forward, stripped to the waist, and whacked her up to eighteen. yet still the cruiser kept closing up. so kinnear turned into nelson's channel, the very worst channel in the very worst straits in the world, unlit, uncharted, and full of the wildest currents swirling through pinnacle rocks and over hidden reefs. the cruiser stopped, dumbfounded. the _ortega_ then felt her way ahead, got through without a scratch, and took her frenchmen safe to france. von spee presently rounded the horn and made for the falkland islands, the british naval base in the south atlantic. but, only a month after the news of coronel had found sir doveton sturdee sitting at his desk in london as the third sea lord of the admiralty, his avenging squadron had reached the falklands more than eight thousand miles away. next morning von spee also arrived; whereupon sturdee's much stronger squadron sprang out of port stanley and began a chase which could only have one ending. von spee turned to fight, with his two armoured cruisers against the two over-powering battle cruisers of the british, so that his three light cruisers might "star away" at their utmost speed, on three divergent courses, in an effort to escape. vain hope! sturdee's battle cruisers sank the _scharnhorst_ and _gneisenau_, while his other cruisers sank two of the three german cruisers. all the germans went down with colours flying and fighting to the very last. only the little _dresden_ escaped; to be sunk three months later by two british cruisers at robinson crusoe's island of juan fernandez, four hundred miles off the coast of chili. from this time forward not a single enemy warship sailed the outer seas. the austrians were blockaded in the adriatic, the germans in the north sea, and the turks at the east end of the mediterranean. now and then a german merchantman would be armed in the german colonies or in some friendly neutral harbour and prey on british trade routes for a time. but very few of these escaped being sunk after a very short career; and those that did get home never came out again. so closed with such a british command over the surface of the sea as even nelson had never imagined. the worst of the horrible submarine war was still to come. but that is a different story. the joint expedition of french and british against the turks and germans in the dardanelles filled with many a deed of more or less wasted daring. victory would have meant so much: joining hands with russia in the black sea, getting the russian wheat crop from odessa, driving the turks from constantinople, and cutting right through the berlin-to-bagdad line. but, once the allied governments had given the enemy time to hold the dardanelles in full force, the only right way to reach constantinople was the back way round by land through greece and turkey, combined with attacks on the dardanelles. this, however, needed a vastly larger army than the governments could spare. so, despite the objections of fisher, their naval adviser, they sent fleets and armies to wear themselves out against the dardanelles, till kitchener, their military adviser, got leave to take off all that were left. [illustration: a parting shot from the turks at gallipoli.] the politicians had blundered badly over the whole campaign. but the french and british soldiers and sailors, after fighting gloriously against long odds, managed their retirement in a way which might serve as the perfect model of what such retirements should be. the turks and germans, though eager to crown their victorious defence by smashing the fleet and army which had so long attacked them, were completely hoodwinked. the french and british kept up the cleverest show of force till the last streak of daylight had died away. then, over the worst of broken ground, down terrific slopes, and across the puzzling beaches, the gallant armies marched, silent as the grave and regular as clock-work. the boats were loaded and taken off to their appointed places as skilfully as wolfe's were brought down the st. lawrence the night before the battle of the plains. next morning the astounded enemy found an empty land in front of them; while the sea was swarming with crowded transports, safe beyond the retiring men-of-war. chapter xxv jutland ( ) at four o'clock in the morning of the th of august, , lord jellicoe opened the secret orders appointing him commander-in-chief of the grand fleet, which was then ready waiting in scapa flow, the great war harbour in the orkney islands off the far north coast of scotland. twenty-two months later, off the jutland bank of denmark, he fought that battle of the giant navies for which the germans had so long prepared. of course the germans did not want jutland at the time it came. for, as we have seen already, they wished to have two quite separate wars, the first against the french and russians, the second against the british; and, if the british had only kept out for as many months as the americans did years, the germans and their allies would certainly have won this first war, besides gaining an immensely better chance of winning the second war as well. even as it was, they were not only very strong on land but also very strong at sea. they were easily the second sea-power in the world, in regard to both their navy and their merchant shipping. moreover, they had many advantages, even over the british. this is so little known, and it is so important for a proper understanding of what took place at jutland, that we must begin by looking a little more closely into the strong and weak points of the two great rival navies. [illustration: jellicoe.] so far as fitness for battle depended on the officers and men of the navy itself the grand fleet was as nearly perfect as anything could be. sprung from the finest race of seamen in the world, trained for a longer time than any foreigners, and belonging to what everyone for centuries has known to be the first of all the navies, the british bluejackets formed the handiest crews you could have found in any age or country. their officers knew how to handle men, ships, and fleets alike; and every one had been long "tuned up" for instant action. the gunnery stood every test, as the germans know to their cost; and it actually got better as the fight grew worse, partly because the british keep so cool, and partly because length of expert training tells more and more as the storm and stress increase. it was the same in the engine room, the same in everything, right up to the supreme art of handling a fleet at racing speed in the midst of a battle on which the fate of freedom hung. but when we come to those things that depended on the government there is a very different tale to tell, because no government can get money for the navy without votes in parliament, and men cannot become members of parliament without the votes of the people, and most people will not spend enough money to get ready for even a life-or-death war unless they see the danger very close at hand, right in among the other things that press hard upon their notice. looking after the country's safety needs so much time, so much knowledge, and so much thinking out that it has to be left, like all other kinds of public service, to the government, which consists of a few leaders acting as the agents of parliament, which, in its turn, consists of a few hundred members elected by the people in their millions. whatever government is in power for the time being can, as the trusted agent of the people's chosen parliament, do whatever it likes with the army and navy. the great soldiers and sailors, who know most about war, can only tell the government what they think. the government can then follow this expert advice or not, just as it pleases. now, even in time of approaching danger, the trouble is that governments are always tempted to say and do what costs the least money and gives the least cause for alarm, because they think the people like that best. this was the case with the british governments in power during the fourteen years before the war, when germany was straining every nerve to get the better of the british navy. they were warned again and again. but they saw that most of the people, who were not watching the coming german storm, wanted most of the money spent on other things. so they did not like to hear the expert truth; they feared to tell the people; and they hoped the worst would never happen. but it did happen; and it found many a weak spot due to the government; though not one that was due to the navy itself. "well, it's all going just as we expected," said sir charles madden to lord jellicoe in the conning tower of the _iron duke_ in the middle of the jutland battle. so it did. everything that really mattered was foreseen by the real naval experts. you never catch the navy napping. but you do catch governments, parliaments, and people napping very often. yet here we should not be unjust either to governments in general or to those of our mother country in particular. governments of free countries depend upon the people; so we must all take our share of the blame for what our own elected agents do wrong or fail to do right. and as for the mother country; well, with all her faults, she did the best of any. we cannot fairly compare her with the self-governing dominions, like canada and australia, because she had so very much more to do. her war work was more than twice as hard as theirs, even in proportion to her strength; and she led the whole empire in making the greatest efforts and by far the greatest sacrifices. but we can compare her with our allies; and, if we do, we shall find her stand the test. for if her government made mistakes before the war, so did that french government whose prime minister, caillaux, had to be tried as a traitor during the war. so, too, did that party in italy which favoured the germans against the true italian patriots. and how about the peace party in the united states that kept the americans out of all but the end of the war, gaining a whole world of money and almost losing the nation's soul? great britain gave the navy what most voters think are needed for a war, especially such things as the papers talked of most, like dreadnoughts, guns, and torpedoes. but there was a lack of light cruisers and destroyers to fight off the same kind of german craft, guard the seaways, and kill the sneaking submarines. the docks in which ships are built and mended make little show for the money spent on them; so the government never asked parliament for enough till the war broke out, which meant that some dreadnoughts had to be more or less cramped so as to fit into the old-fashioned docks. the decks of the battle cruisers were not strong enough to keep out armour-piercing shells; so two of them were sunk at jutland that might have otherwise been saved. the means of guarding the big ships against mines and submarines wore not nearly good enough at the start. there were fishing craft enough, and fishermen who were as good sailors as the world has ever seen, and dockyard hands enough to build new boats to fish for the deadly mines and spread the nets for nosing submarines. but they were not used in time. now look at the germans. their officers knew their navy had no chance in a fair stand-up fight with jellicoe's grand fleet. but even these officers hoped that their mines and submarines, with a streak of good luck, might make the odds more even. apart from their naval experts the germans had no doubt at all. their bluejackets and the german people as a whole thought everything german the best in the world; and long before the war the million members of the german navy league had been persuading the people to vote most of the money the kaiser wanted for his fleet. the kiel canal let the german high sea fleet play hide-and-seek between the north sea and the baltic without the slightest risk on the way. the british, on the other hand, could only get into the baltic by going round between denmark and sweden, both being neutrals whose territories could not be touched. the way through is so narrow that the water is all "territorial," that is, it belongs to the countries beside it, and was, therefore, as neutral as they were. but even if denmark and sweden had let the grand fleet go through, it would have gone to certain defeat; for a weaker navy inside the baltic could have crushed the british as they came through one by one--the only possible way. now look at the north sea, which was the real battleground. the area is about a hundred and twenty-five thousand square miles. but the average distance you can see clearly, taking one day with another all the year round, is only five miles. this was very nice for lurking mines, sneaking submarines, and sudden cruiser raids against the british coasts. the coastline of the british isles is more than twenty times as long as the north sea coast of germany, much easier to navigate and very much harder to defend--another advantage for the germans. the grand fleet could not attack the german coast, which has only three good seaways into it, which has a string of islands off it, and which, difficult for foreign ships in time of peace, is impossible in time of war. the whole of the shore and off-shore islands were full of big guns in strong forts--and remember that you can sink a fleet, though you can't sink a coast--while the waters were full of mines and submarines. moreover, in destroyers, which are as dangerous out at sea as they are round a base, the german "high sea fleet" began with no less than eighty-eight against the forty-two in the british "grand fleet." the british had so many narrow seaways to defend that they could not spare jellicoe nearly enough light cruisers or destroyers. it was only after jutland that the grand fleet became so very much stronger than the high sea fleet. before jutland the odds in favour of the british battle squadrons were only about four to three; and the germans had special advantages in searchlights that showed up everything except the position of the ships that carried them, in wonderfully bright and bewildering star-shells, in the gear for bringing all the quick-firing guns of the big ships to bear at once on light craft trying to torpedo them, and in very cleverly made delay-shells, which could go through all but the thickest armour and then burst inside the vitals of a ship. it was one of these shells that blew up the _queen mary_, the finest of all the british battle cruisers. then, as we have seen already, another german advantage, and a very great advantage, was that, while most british men-of-war had to be built for general service all round the world, the german high sea fleet (which meant nine-tenths of all the german navy) could be built specially for one great battle close at home. not nearly so much room was needed for the men to live in, because they were always near the naval barracks at wilhelmshaven; and not nearly so much space was required for fuel. the weight and space saved in these two ways could all be used for extra shells, thicker armour, and other kinds of special strength. thus the germans were even stronger than the number of their men-of-war would lead you to think; and they were strongest of all for battles at night or in misty weather near their own base. the battle of jutland seemed to have been made on purpose to suit them. in the germans had been very much encouraged by the sinking of the three british cruisers, _hague_, _cressy_, and _aboukir_ in the north sea, by the _emden's_ famous raid in the indian ocean, by von spee's victory at coronel in the pacific, and by the way the kaiser and all the german papers boasted. in they were encouraged by the french and british failure against the turks and germans at the dardanelles. in , however, they began to feel the pinch of the british blockade so badly that they were eager for a sea-fight that would ease it off. if they had the finest navy in the world, why didn't it wipe the grand fleet off the north sea altogether? at the same time the british public and the allies wanted to know why the grand fleet didn't wipe the germans off. we have just seen why the grand fleet could not force on a battle round the german base. but the reason why the germans could not try to snatch a victory out of some lucky chance at the beginning of the war, when the odds were least against them, was of quite a different kind. the fact was that thousands of their trained seamen were hopelessly cut off from germany by the british navy. nearly every german merchant ship outside of the north sea or the baltic was either taken by the british or chased into some neutral port from which it never got out. the crews were mostly reservists in the german navy. they were ready for the call to arms. but they could not answer it. so new men had to be trained. meanwhile the one good chance slipped away; for by the time these recruits had been trained the grand fleet had grown much stronger than before. on the st of may, , jellicoe's whole force was making one of its regular "drives" across the north sea in two huge but handy fleets. the battle cruiser fleet under beatty was fifty miles south of the battle fleet, which was under jellicoe himself. jellicoe and beatty, the chosen leaders of the greatest fleet of the greatest navy in the greatest war in the world, had long been marked men. they were old friends, having fought side by side against the boxer rebellion in china in , the year the german navy bill was passed by the german parliament on purpose to endanger the "mightiest" of foreign navies--that is, the british. they had both been wonderfully keen students of every branch of naval warfare, from the handling of a single gun or ship to the supreme art of handling this "mightiest" of fleets; and both they and sir charles madden, the chief of staff, were looked upon as being the very fittest of the fit. but even the best of men and ships will not make the best fleet unless trained and "tuned up" to act together; and here, in its combined manuoeuvres, lay the crowning glory of the vast grand fleet. one day a visitor was watching it fight a sham battle against an enemy firing big guns at long range, when up came a real enemy, in the form of a german submarine, much closer than the sham. of course the visitor turned his glasses on the "sub" and on the destroyers racing after it, like greyhounds slipped from the leash. but when, a few minutes later, he looked round at the fleet, he could hardly believe his eyes; for there it was, moving, mile upon mile of it, in a completely new formation, after a sort of magic "general post" that had made light craft and battle-line entirely change places, over an area of a hundred square miles, without a moment's slackening of speed. hundreds of vessels had been in the best formation to fight each other on the surface. now they were in the best formation to fight submarines. then came four of those "sea-quakes" that make you feel as if your own ship had been torpedoed, but which really were depth-charges dropped round the submarine. then an anxious pause, quickly followed by "all clear," and that by another fleet order which changed the whole formation back again as easily as if the lines of wheeling ships had been a single piece of clockwork and their two million tons of steel had simply answered to the touching of a single spring. _first round of the great fight: . to . p.m. beatty and hipper with their battle cruisers._ at noon on the fateful st the grand fleet turned north and the german fleet turned south, each having come to the end of its "drive," and neither knowing that the other one was there. the weather had been very warm and fine; but the north sea mists had risen in time to veil the fleets from zeppelins and other aircraft. jellicoe's battle fleet was going north within a hundred miles of southern norway, and von scheer's battle fleet was going south within a hundred miles of the jutland coast of denmark, when the two battle cruiser fleets under beatty and von hipper suddenly saw each other's smoke, half way between jellicoe and scheer, and a hundred miles west of the skager rack. jellicoe and scheer were then more than a hundred miles apart. but the _galatea's_ wireless report to beatty, that there was smoke to the eastward, was caught by the wireless receivers aboard the _iron duke_, jellicoe's flagship; whereupon jellicoe ordered steam to be raised for full speed. beatty at once turned east and made straight for hipper, to cut him off from his base, force him to fight, and lure scheer back to save him. this would give jellicoe time to come up and get in the knock-out blow for which he prepared by ordering the battle fleet to clear for action at . . at . a british seaplane, sent up by beatty, and flying within two miles of the nearest german craft, reported five battle cruisers steaming south. at the same moment jellicoe thrilled his own command by signalling that a battle was expected. hipper was hurrying to join scheer's battle fleet, which now was racing north as jellicoe's was racing south. beatty then formed his six battle cruisers in line-ahead ("follow-my-leader") while his four fast _queen elisabeth_ battleships followed as hard as they could. he thus had ten dreadnoughts to fight hipper's five. but he and hipper were racing south toward scheer and away from jellicoe. yet that could not be helped. hipper must not be allowed to escape; and scheer must first be found and then lured on toward jellicoe. at twelve minutes to four both sides began firing at a range of eight miles and a speed of nearly thirty (land) miles an hour. jutland was a gunner's battle, just as the naval experts had foretold; though torpedoes played their part. it was much too fast and furious for submarines; and the thickening mist made aircraft useless. hipper's five ships hit hard at beatty's six; and one big german shell reached the vitals of the _indefatigable_, which blew up like a mine. there was a shattering crash, an enormous spurt of flame, a horrid "flurry" on the water; and ship and crew went down. that left five all. but, after the battle cruisers had been at it for twenty minutes, the four _queen elizabeths_ (that is, battleships of the same kind as the "q.e.") began heaving shells from eleven miles astern. ten minutes later the central german dreadnought turned out of line a mass of seething fire. but, after five minutes more, the magnificent _queen mary_, beatty's champion shooting battle cruiser, was simply torn in two by the explosion of her magazine. this left four all in battle cruisers, with the four fast british battleships straining their last turn of speed to come up. [illustration: beatty.] meanwhile fifteen german and twelve british destroyers charged out together to try their torpedoes, met in the middle, and had a fierce fight. two germans went down; but the british formation was broken, and only three closed the german battle cruisers, which received them with a perfect hurricane of shells from their quick-firing guns, sinking one, disabling another, and forcing the third to retire. commander bingham, who won the v.c. by leading this skilful and gallant attack, had his destroyer, the _nestor_, sunk under him. but he was saved, as if by a miracle, and taken prisoner aboard a german man-of-war. _second round: beatty luring scheer and hipper on towards jellicoe: . to . p.m._ commodore goodenough's splendid light cruisers went scouting ahead till they met scheer racing north. then they turned north themselves, under a tremendous outburst of fire, to rejoin beatty, who now, changing from pursuer to pursued, also turned north to join jellicoe. the germans, with their twenty-two dreadnoughts, now hoped _der tag_ had really come for beatty's eight. but beatty hit hard and drove a german battle cruiser out of the line very badly mauled. shortly afterwards the destroyer _moresby_ fired a torpedo which hit a german battleship. there was a tremendous burst of steam and smoke; and, when this had cleared off, the german was seen to be on fire. but beatty's strong point was speed. his battle cruisers and four fast _queen elizabeth_ battleships could do a good bit more than the slowest germans; and as the germans now had to keep together, in case jellicoe came up, their whole line could go no faster than its slowest ship. starting with a lead and putting on a spurt beatty turned gradually more to the eastward, that is, toward the german line, which then had to turn and keep parallel or else let him cross its t. if you will separate the crosspiece from the upright of a t--for big ships fight some miles apart--you will see quite plainly that ships in a line like the upright of the t have no chance at all against ships in a line like the crosspiece of the t. the crosspiece line can converge all its broadsides on the leading ship of the upright, smash it utterly, and then do the same to the next, and the next. so the germans, having to keep together and having to keep parallel to beatty, were gradually forced eastwards, which would give jellicoe the best chance to come into line against them. _the third and greatest round: jellicoe forms his victorious line of battle: . to . p.m._ for three hours and a half jellicoe, with his twenty-four dreadnought battleships, had been racing south to reach the scene of action. he had gained at first, when beatty was going east to find von hipper. he had lost when hipper and beatty were racing south to meet von scheer. but now the whole battle was coming north to meet him. as the battlefield kept shifting about, and the fortunes of the fight kept changing, he shaped his course accordingly. but he never slackened speed, racing along under every pound of steam the straining ships could carry, thanks to the skill of those quiet heroes of the engine-room, who, seeing nothing of either friend or foe, never know anything of either defeat or victory, life or death, till all is over either with the battle or themselves. as the great battle fleet came rushing from the north every eye was strained to catch the first sight of beatty and the germans. the thunder of a thousand guns rolled far across that summer sea. it was heard along the coast of jutland a hundred miles away; and the main body of the grand fleet knew _the day_ had come long before they reached the battlefield. presently the flashes began sparkling into view; and then the ships themselves loomed up, dimly made out through mist and smoke. jellicoe did not yet know exactly where the germans were, and beatty could not tell what they would do now jellicoe had come. but beatty turned sharp east immediately he sighted jellicoe, and the germans soon turned too, fearing to have him cross their t while jellicoe was rounding on them. they wanted to escape, seeing the fight was hopeless. but they could not take the quickest way, that of turning all together--each ship turning right round where she was and making off as hard as she could--because this would have changed the places of the admirals and put the battle cruisers in the rear as well. nor could they safely turn right back on their course, while keeping the same line-ahead, because some ships would then be masking the fire of others till the whole line had been reversed; and they sorely needed every gun they had. so the only way left was to keep parallel with beatty till a chance came to turn sharply enough to get away, but not sharply enough to mask any of their own fire. imagine the whole enormous battlefield as something like a target, with the germans circling round the bull's-eye, beatty round the inner, and jellicoe just coming into the outer. from beatty's reports and his own observation jellicoe could not know even that before six. so he sent out his own battle cruiser squadron under admiral hood to lengthen beatty's line and overlap the germans. hood then sent one of his light cruisers, the _chester_, speeding ahead to scout. but three german light cruisers held her up in a furious fight of twenty minutes. the _chester_ fought desperately, losing more than half her men, but getting her scout work done in spite of the fearful odds against her. how well she fought may be found out from the story of jack cornwell; for he was only one of her many heroes. ship's boy, first class, and sixteen years of age, jack cornwell would have been the youngest v.c. in the world had he lived to wear it. with every man in the gun's crew round him dead or dying, and with the gun-shield shot away, he stood there, under a terrific fire, mortally wounded, with the receivers at his ears, reporting exactly what had happened to everyone except himself, and calmly waiting for orders how to carry on. when the battered _chester_ told hood he was too far south-east he turned back north-west till he sighted beatty coming toward him at full speed. on beatty's orders he then carried out jellicoe's plan by turning back so as to lengthen beatty's line of battle cruisers at the forward end, thus overlapping the germans. this splendidly skilful and most daring move so alarmed the germans that they trained every gun they could on him in a furious effort to wipe out the deadly overlap. he led the gallant line, "bringing his squadron into action ahead in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval ancestors." (he was the great-great-grandson of the lord hood whom nelson always called the best of naval officers.) his flagship, the _invincible_, hit back with all her might, helped by the ships astern. "keep it up," called hood to his gunnery officer, commander dannreuther, one of the six survivors, "every shot is hitting them." but the converging fire of a hundred giant guns simply smashed the _invincible_ from stem to stern. at last a huge shell reached her magazine, and she blew up like a volcano; sheets of flame leaping higher than her masts, boats and loose gear whirling higher still, like leaves in an autumn gale, and then one sickening belch of steamy smoke to tell that all was over. after this hood's two remaining battle cruisers took station astern of beatty's four. [illustration: light cruiser.] meanwhile another light cruiser of hood's, the _canterbury_, was trying to protect three destroyers, led by the _shark_, that were fighting german light cruisers and destroyers. hipper and scheer were doing their very utmost to keep beatty and jellicoe at arm's length till they could complete the german turn round the bull's-eye and make an effort to get off the deadly target altogether. for if jellicoe could range round the inner, at higher speed and with an overlap, they would certainly be rounded up and crushed to death. the german light cruisers and destroyers therefore attacked the british light craft with the greatest fury, hoping to destroy the screen behind which jellicoe would form his line of battle in safety from torpedoes. as the _shark_ charged down at the head of her line she suddenly found two lines of german destroyers charging towards her. nothing daunted, she went straight on, her pulsing engines making her quiver with the thrilling race for life or death between them. once abreast of them she fired her guns and torpedoes right and left, sinking two german destroyers, one on each side, and giving the rest as good as she got, till, hit by torpedoes on both sides together, she sank like a stone. her commander, loftus jones, was awarded the second posthumous v.c. for the wonderfully gallant way he fought her till she went down with colours flying. her last torpedo, when just on the point of being fired, was hit by a german shell and exploded, killing and wounding everybody near. then another shell took jones's leg off. but he still fought the one gun left in action, firing its last round as the waters closed above him. about the same time the destroyer _onslow_ made for a german light cruiser that was trying to torpedo beatty's flagship, _lion_. hitting the light cruiser with every gun at short range she then passed on to try her own torpedoes on the german battle cruisers, when a big shell scooped out most of her midships above the water-line. retiring slowly she again met the light cruiser and this time finished her with a torpedo. finding he had two torpedoes left commander tovey then made for the german battle line with the last ounce of steam the _onslow's_ engines could work off. he fired them both, and probably hit the dreadnought that was seen to reel out of line about three minutes later. the _defender_, though herself half wrecked by several hits, then limped up and took the _onslow_ in tow till one o'clock the next afternoon, when tugs had come to the rescue. [illustration: h.m.s. _monmouth_, armoured cruiser. sunk at coronel, november st, .] the strongest of all the lighter ships that cleared the way for jellicoe's battle fleet were the armoured cruisers, which are about half way between the light and battle cruisers. sir robert arbuthnot's first armoured cruiser squadron, speeding ahead of jellicoe, swooped down on the german light cruisers in grand style, sank one, lamed two, and was driving the rest before it, helter-skelter, when, without a moment's warning, the huge hulls of the german battle line loomed out of the mist at almost point-blank range! in his eagerness to make short work of all the german light craft in the way sir robert had lost his bearings in the baffling mist and run right in between the two great battle lines. quick as a flash he fought the german giants with every gun that he could bring to bear while turning back to take his proper station on the flank. but he was doomed and knew it. yet, even at that fatal moment, his first thought was for the men whom, through no fault of his own, he had led into this appalling death-trap; and besides the order to turn back he signalled the noble apology to all hands under his command: "i beg your pardon." the end came soon. a perfect tornado of gigantic shells had struck his flagship, the _defence_, at the very first salvo. she reeled under the terrific shock and had hardly begun to right herself before her sides were smashed in by another. at the third she crumpled up and sank with every soul aboard of her. her next astern and second, the _black prince_, and the _warrior_, managed to crawl away under cover of the mist. but both went down; though the battered _black prince_ survived to be sunk by german battleships during the night. [illustration: battleship firing a broadside.] about this time, just after six, the fight was at its very fiercest, especially between the opposing light craft. it was a question of life or death for the germans to keep the british light craft away and use their own to the utmost while their battle line was turning toward the west in a desperate effort to keep ahead of jellicoe. this was not cowardice, but a desire to save the german fleet from utter ruin once victory was seen to be impossible. not all the brave deeds were on one side. how much the grand fleet's honour would be dimmed if its opponents had been cowards or if its own commander had failed to give the enemy his due! "the enemy," said jellicoe in his dispatch, "fought with the gallantry that was expected of him, and showed humanity in rescuing officers and men from the water. i particularly admired the conduct of those on board a disabled german light cruiser which passed down the british line under a heavy fire that was returned by the only gun still left in action." but of course this was well matched by many a vessel on the british side, in a fight so fierce and a turmoil so appalling that only men of iron training and steel nerves could face it. light craft of all kinds were darting to and fro, attacking, defending, firing guns and torpedoes, smashing and being smashed, sinking and being sunk, and trying to help or hinder the mighty lines of battle whose own gigantic guns flashed and thundered without a moment's pause. as jellicoe closed in to get the strangle-hold his mighty battle fleet had, in very truth, to go through fire and water: the racing ships, their slashing bows and seething wakes; the pall of smoke, stabbed by ten thousand points of fire, together making the devil's colours--yellow, red, and black; the leaping waterspouts thrown up by shells that missed; the awful crashings when the shells struck home; the vessels reeling under well-aimed, relentless salvoes; the ships on fire beyond the reach of human aid; the weirdness of the mist that veiled these dreadful horrors, or made them ghastlier still, or suddenly brought friend and foe together either to sink or swim; the summer sea torn into the maddest storm by ships and shells; while, through and round the whole of this inferno, there swelled and thundered the stunning roar of such a giant fight as other navies had never seen or even dreamt of. so deafening was this roar, and so absorbing were the changes of the fight, that when a ton-weight shell swept overboard every atom of the bridge aboard the leading ship of a flotilla--with compass, chart-house, engine-room-telegraph, steering wheel, and every soul on duty there--the men on "monkey's island," just above the bridge, never knew their ship was even hit till she began to run amuck and rammed another british vessel! this was the battle into which jellicoe had to fit his own vast force of twenty-four dreadnoughts without checking beatty, without letting the germans get a clear run home, and without risking the loss of his own best battleships by making one false move. at four minutes to six jellicoe sighted beatty. five minutes later he asked him for the position of the german line. nine minutes later he asked again. the smoke and mist were so bad at first that it was not till . that beatty could say exactly. at . --just two minutes later--jellicoe's plan was made and his orders had gone out. there, in the conning tower of the _iron duke_, within those two short minutes, he had calmly thought out every chance and change and way of going into action under conditions which could not have been worse for him or better for the germans. his twenty-four battleships were in six divisions, side by side, each division in line ahead, and all numbered off from port (left) to starboard (right). the leading ship of the st, or port wing, division was the _king george v_. the leading ship of the th, or starboard wing division, was the _marlborough_. his own flagship, the _iron duke_, led the rd division. [illustration: jellicoe's battle fleet in columns of divisions. . p.m.] the supreme moment had now arrived. there was not a second to lose; for the fleets were covering more miles in an hour than armies do in a whole day. but if he formed line on the starboard wing, the nearer to the germans, he would have had to wait some time till beatty's battle cruisers had drawn clear. during this dangerous pause, while his own fire would have to be blanketed by beatty, the german battle line would have had a double british target to make hits on, and the german light craft would have had the best chance of catching him with their torpedoes while he was in the act of forming line. moreover, the german line might have concentrated on the starboard wing before the port had taken station, and might have overlapped the whole line afterwards. jellicoe therefore decided to form on the port wing, giving his own line the chances of the overlap, and then fit in astern of beatty. but, being ready by the time beatty's battle cruisers were drawing ahead, he fitted in his own line between these and the four fast _queen elizabeths_ that formed the rear of beatty's line. thus, in the very worst of this gigantic battle, the twelve miles of the final british line were formed. three battle cruisers had been sunk: the _indefatigable_, _invincible_, and _queen mary_. one fast battleship, the _warspite_, had fallen astern with a damaged helm. but six battle cruisers still led the van. twenty-four fresh battleships followed. and three fast _queen elizabeths_ brought up the rear. jellicoe then personally commanded a single line-ahead twelve miles long and dreadnoughts all. every part of every change was made as perfectly as if at the king's review. you could not have made the line straighter with a ruler, nor placed it better if the germans had been standing still. for as beatty's overlap kept turning them from north to east and east to south, to save their t from being crossed, jellicoe's whole line had now worked to the landward side of them, that is, between them and their great home base on the german coast. fourth round: jellicoe victorious: . to . p.m. driven to desperation by being overlapped and turned away from germany, the germans made a supreme effort to escape toward the south-west, thus completing their circle round the bull's-eye, as jellicoe began to round them up from the inner. their destroyers spouted forth an immense grey smoke screen; the mist helped them to hide; and the sun went into a bank of clouds. as they ran they fired shoals of torpedoes, which are much deadlier for the chasers, who go toward them, than for the chased, who go from them. the battleship _marlborough_, flagship of sir cecil burney, jellicoe's second-in-command, was hit and began to list over. but she was so strong and so well handled that within ten minutes she was at it again. she had already fought two battleships and a cruiser while the british line was forming. now she caught another german battleship with fourteen salvoes running and drove her out of line. [illustration: the battle of jutland--plan ii. jellicoe's battle line formed and fighting. : p.m.] the germans fired every torpedo they could bring to bear; and nothing but jellicoe's supreme skill, backed by the skill of all his captains, saved his battleships from losing at least a third of their number. observers aloft watched the enemy manoeuvring to fire and then reported to jellicoe, who, keeping in line as long as possible for the sake of the guns, turned the fleet end-on, away from scheer, just in time to prevent the torpedoes catching it broadside on, and then left each captain free to work his own ship till that shoal of torpedoes had passed. the torpedoes arrived at about thirty miles an hour, shoals of them together, and showing no sign but the little line of bubbles from their screws. but most of them were spotted and not one got home. the _revenge_ worked her perilous way between a couple, one just missing her rudder and the other almost grazing her bows. during the whole of this fourth round the fight went on by fits and starts. whenever any part of the enemy's line showed up through the thickening mist the british guns turned on it with shattering salvoes. the _iron duke_, whose gunnery was simply perfect, caught a big german battleship for a few minutes only. but by the time the mist had shut down again the german was like a furnace, seething with a mass of flame. meanwhile the battle cruisers were crumpling up their opposite numbers in the german line, which thus became shorter and more overlapped than ever. the _lion_ and _princess royal_ each set their opponent on fire, while the _new zealand_ and _indomitable_ drove another clean out of line, heeling over, and burning furiously fore and aft. (the _indomitable_ was king george's flagship at the quebec tercentenary in , and the _new zealand_ was jellicoe's flagship on his tour of advice round the oversea empire in .) at . , somewhere behind the mist which then veiled the german line, there was a volcanic roar that shook every keel for miles around. scheer was losing heavily, running for his life, and doing his best to hold jellicoe back by desperate light craft attacks with hundreds of torpedoes. but jellicoe countered this with his own light craft, which sank four enemy destroyers before the night closed in. _fifth and last round: the germans in full flight: . p.m. st of may, to p.m. st of june, ._ jellicoe now had another hard question to answer, a question, indeed, to which there could not be a perfect answer. the germans were broken and flying. but they still had many light craft with hundreds of torpedoes; they were not far from home and near a swarm of their best submarines; and their whole coast was full of mines for many miles off shore, while the shore itself and the string of off-shore islands were defended by a regular chain of gigantic forts armed with enormous guns. following them home was therefore out of the question altogether; for you _can_ sink a fleet, while you _can't_ sink a coast. but even trying to run them down at night was out of the question too; for their strongest point was night fighting, which is much fuller of risks and chances than day battles are. besides, there was the chance of missing them and losing the best position between them and their base. so jellicoe and beatty separated again and steamed, parallel to each other, south-south-east to within a hundred miles of the german coast. they could not possibly cover more than a quarter of the whole way into the danish and german coasts; and so most of the germans managed to slip in behind them, round by the north. the night fighting was done by the light craft; and it was here that jellicoe had so much need of tyrwhitt's flotillas from harwich. harwich was very handy to the battlefield and tyrwhitt's light craft were as keen and ready as any one could be. but the government were afraid to let them go, for fear lest some germans might raid the english coast. there was very little chance of a raid at all. it could not have been a bad one in any case. no mere raid can change the course of a war. the best way to stop raids is to win the war by destroying the enemy's means of destroying you. the best way to do this is to smash his main force wherever it happens to be. and the best way to smash it is to throw all your own forces against it once you get a hold on it. but people who are scared in one place will not think about the war as a whole, though that is the way to save these very people as well as all the rest. so they ask for some defence they can actually see. it was much the same as in the days of the spanish armada. drake and jellicoe wanted to do the right thing. but queen elizabeth's council and king george's government wanted to humour the people concerned. the only comfort is that, with all our faults, we of the british empire make fewer naval mistakes than other people do. the light craft that did reach that famous battlefield could not have done more to guard the british battle lines and harass the flying germans. there was many a weird sight as scurrying cruisers and destroyers suddenly showed up, ominously black, against the ghastly whiteness of the searchlit sea. hunters and hunted raced, turned, and twisted without a moment's pause. "we couldn't tell what was happening," said the commander of a dashing destroyer. "every now and then out of the silence would come _bang! bang!! boom!!!_ as hard as it could for ten minutes on end. the flash of the guns lit up the whole sky for miles and miles, and the noise was far more penetrating than by day. then you would see a great burst of flame from some poor devil, as the searchlights switched on and off, and then perfect silence once more." _next day_. dawn comes early on the st of june at degrees north. but the mist veiled everything more than three or four miles off. at . a.m. a huge zeppelin flew across the british battle line, wirelessing down to any germans still to the westward the best way to get home. by nine the light craft had all come in after scouring the sea for germans. at a quarter past one it was plain that not a german ship remained to challenge the grand fleet. so jellicoe made for his base; took in fuel, stores, and ammunition; and at half-past nine next evening was ready for another battle. _the news_. very different was the plight of the flying germans, who lost more ships than the british (eighteen, and perhaps six more, to fourteen british) and who left the field for good and all. but germany sorely needed a victory just then. so the kaiser proclaimed one, and all the german papers echoed his words. the german lie got two days start of the british truth, and was eagerly repeated by every one who hated the british or allies. on the other hand, the british government simply said that there had been a battle and that fourteen british ships were down. they shrank from proclaiming the victory, because they thought that most people, knowing nothing of modern naval war and making no allowance for the weather and other german advantages, would not believe in a victory which let any of the german ships escape. and so the lie went round the world much faster than the truth. yet it was only believed by those who wanted to believe it. even some italian mountaineers who had never seen a ship said, "that's a lie," when italian traitors told them the grand fleet had been sunk. after waiting a month to examine the whole case thoroughly the board of admiralty, which has always been most sparing in its praise, wrote jellicoe an official letter, saying that "the grand fleet has known both how to study the new problems and how to turn the knowledge to account. the expectations of the country were high. they have been well fulfilled. my lords (the members of the board) desire to convey to you their full approval of your proceedings in this action." what jellicoe himself thought of those who fought so well under his inspiring leadership cannot be said better than in his own words. "the conduct of officers and men throughout the day and night actions was entirely beyond praise. no words of mine could do them justice. on all sides it is reported to me that the glorious traditions of the past were worthily upheld. officers and men were cool and determined, with a cheeriness that would have carried them through anything. the heroism of the wounded was the admiration of all. i cannot express the pride with which the spirit of the grand fleet filled me." _results_. jutland taught the german navy what every one should have known before: that whenever tyrants have tried to lord it over all the world they have always had to reckon with the british navy first, and that this navy has never failed to lay them low. more things were wrought by jutland than the british empire thinks, and more, far more, than other people, for lack of knowledge, can imagine. there was a regular, unbreakable chain of cause and effect, and jutland was the central link. to conquer their bully's "place in the sun" of the white man's empire overseas the germans built their navy. but the grand fleet blockaded it so well that the germans clamoured for a fight to wipe the british off the sea and to let the german merchant ships get out. jutland settled that. from jutland on to the end of the war the german bluejackets could never again be led against the british on the surface of the sea. so the murderous german submarine campaign was tried instead. this forced even the american peace party to change their minds and save their country's honour by joining the war party in armed defence both of american rights and of the freedom of the world. after another two years the germans failed under water as they had upon the surface; and when, in wild despair, the kaiser ordered the whole of his high sea fleet to try another fight, the final mutiny began. this broke out at a.m. on the rd of november, , eight days before the armistice. it was not the german army, nor yet the german people, that began the revolution, but the german fleet, which knew that a second jutland could only mean the death of every german there. in its own turn the revolution brought on the great surrender, a thing unheard-of in the story of the sea. thus, like the immortal battle of the marne on land, jutland was not only itself a mighty feat of arms but one on which the whole war turned. chapter xxvi submarining ( - ) jutland proved to all hands in the german navy that they had no chance whatever against jellicoe's grand fleet. but the great mass of the german people never heard this truth; and even their navy hoped to win under the water a victory it had found impossible on top. so, for the last two years of the war, the germans worked their hardest at what they called the "submarine blockade." as this "blockade" forced the united states into war, and as its failure showed the germans that, in the end, they had no more chance under water than on top, we can all see now that jutland turned the scale. the british fleets blockading germany of course seized and kept for the government, as spoils of war, whatever warlike stores (guns, shells, and so on) they could lay their hands on. but all the other goods the navy stopped the government bought, paying fair market prices. so the american and other neutrals trying to trade with the enemy had really nothing to complain of; for a blockade at sea is very like a siege on land, and nobody has ever pretended that a besieging army has not a perfect right to stop any supplies of any kind from reaching the besieged. moreover, the crews of the ships trying to break the british blockade were always very kindly treated, though their ships were trying to help the enemy and make fortunes for their owners at the expense of freedom. but when we turn to the german "submarine blockade" of the british isles we find something quite different; for the german submarines sank every ship they could, and they generally were as utterly careless about the lives of the crews as they were about the cargo, no matter what the cargo was. in short, germany tried everything, no matter how wrong, that could possibly hurt the hated british. she did let some neutral ships go by without attacking them. but that was only because she did not want to turn all the neutrals into enemies; and nothing proves better what a fiendish crime her "submarine blockade" really was than the fact that it forced even the peace party in the united states to change its mind about the war. for thirty-two months this peace party kept the united states out of a war waged by germany against the freedom of the world. there were a good many reasons why. most americans knew next to nothing about the affairs of europe; and germans had long been busy poisoning their minds against the french and british. then, washington and other presidents had often advised them not to meddle with anything outside of america; and president wilson had even said there was such a thing as being "too proud to fight." of course the pacifists were against all war, even when their refusing to fight on the side of right forced them to help the side of wrong. they had plenty of money, some of it german, and they made almost as much trouble as the germans and pro-germans themselves. then, the germans, pro-germans, and pacifists raised the bogey of trouble for the united states at home, while there did not seem to be much danger of getting hurt from abroad. finally, business was booming as it had never boomed before. the americans made twelve-and-a-half thousands of millions of dollars out of the war, clear net profit up to the end of . the war party said the whole war was about a question of right and wrong, and that the french and british were right, while the germans were wrong. they said that americans were safe because the british navy barred the way, that all the british oversea dominions had fought from the first, though not obliged to send a ship, a dollar, or a man except of their own free will. they said that every american patriot should be very proud to fight for the freedom of the world and very much ashamed to let the french and british uphold the cause of right alone. they said that the german submarines had already murdered many americans, that many other americans, ashamed to see their country hanging back, were already enlisting in canada, england, and france, and that although business was certainly booming, beyond the wildest dreams of the keenest money-makers before the war, yet this vast wealth was too much like blood-money, since the french and british were suffering immense losses in lives and money and in everything but honour, while the americans, losing nothing in lives, were making vast hoards of money out of a cause that really was their own--the cause of right and freedom. slowly but surely the war party gained, as more and more members of the peace party began to see the truth. but still, after twenty-seven months, the most popular cry among those who voted president wilson in for a second term was "he kept us out of war." three months later the german "submarine blockade" began (february ). then, two months later still, most of the peace party, seeing that their own ships would be sunk just as readily as french or british ships, gave their vote for war. it was a glorious moment in world-history when british, french, and americans at last stood side by side. the american navy led the way, joining the hunt for german submarines with a keenness whetted by having been held back so long. the army followed, bit by bit, until two million men had gone to europe, thanks chiefly to the british ships that took them there. the nation backed both army and navy with vast sums of money, which it could so easily afford, and with patriotic work of every splendid kind. but the war lasted only nineteen months longer; and in that time the americans were not able to do anything like what the allies had done before and still were doing. the entire american loss in men (killed, wounded, and prisoners) was over one-quarter million. but canada's loss of over two hundred thousand was ten times as great in proportion; for there are twelve-and-a-half times as many people in the united states as there are in canada. in the same way the losses of france and great britain were each more than twenty times greater than that of the united states. in ships and money the difference is far more striking still. the british alone lost one-and-a-half times as many ships as all the rest of the world put together. but the americans have actually gained, owing to the number of interned german vessels they seized in their ports. as for money: the british, the french, and all the allies have spent so much in fighting for the freedom of the world that neither they nor their children, nor their children's children, can ever pay the vast debt off; while the united states have made, on their own showing, the twelve-and-a-half "billions" mentioned already. these few facts (there are hundreds more) will show you a little of what the great war means to the world, what the british navy meant to the war, and what jutland meant to both the war and the world, by sweeping the german navy off the surface of the sea, and so bringing on the "submarine blockade" that itself forced the american government to fight in self-defence. [illustration: british submarine.] the germans, wishing to kill off their victims one at a time, were ready for the french and russian navies, but not for the british. they had less than forty sea-going submarines when the war began. but nearly four hundred took part, or were ready to take part, before the war was over, while many more were building. we have already noted the weak points of submarines. they are "tender" because they must be thin. an old collier that couldn't steam faster than you could walk sank a submarine by barging into it, end-on--one can hardly call it ramming. submarines are slower on the surface than dreadnoughts, cruisers, and destroyers; and, after doing a total of ten or twelve hours under water, they have to recharge their batteries; for they run by oil engines on the surface and by electricity submerged, and the crew would be smothered if the oil engines tried to charge batteries without coming up. then, firing torpedoes is not at all like firing big guns. at a range of five miles a shell will still be making feet a second or miles an hour. at the same range a torpedo like those used at jutland would be making only feet a second or miles an hour. thus shells whizz through the air forty times faster than torpedoes sneak through the water. a torpedo, in fact, is itself very like a submarine, more or less cigar-shaped, and with its own engine, screw, and rudder. hitting with a torpedo really means arranging a collision between it and the ship you are aiming at. when you and the ship and your torpedo and the water are all moving in different ways you can see that hitting is not so easy. the shorter the range the better. but you cannot see at all unless your periscope, with its little mirror, is high and dry out of the water; and periscopes are soon spotted by a sharp look-out at very short range. the best torpedoes are over twenty feet long and as many inches through, and they will go ten miles. but the longer the range the slower the pace and the less the chance of hitting. the engine is driven by air, which is compressed so hard into the middle of the torpedo that it actually bulges out the steel a tiny fraction of an inch. you may set the air-valve fast or slow, and the torpedo will go accordingly. but if you want to make pretty sure you must get within less than a mile, with the ship's broadside toward you, set the torpedo for the right depth, the right pace to keep it going as fast as possible just long enough to hit, and of course the right aim. then, if all goes well, the cap, or "war head" of the torpedo, on hitting the ship, will set off the fuse that sets off the tremendous charge of high explosive; and this may knock a hole in the side big enough to drive a street car through. but there are many more misses than hits. yet the german and austrian raiders, mines, and submarines sank fifteen million tons of shipping, which is not far short of a third of all the merchant tonnage in the world; and the submarines sank more than the mines and raiders sank together. (ships are measured by finding out how many cubic feet of space they contain and counting so many feet to the ton. thus you get a much better idea of how much shipping a country has by counting in tons rather than by the number of ships; for twenty-five ships of one thousand tons each have only half as much sea-power as one ship of fifty thousand tons.) the british loss was nine millions, half as much again as was lost by all the rest of the world put together. raiders like the cruiser _emden_, or the armed and disguised merchant vessel _möwe_, did a great deal of harm at the beginning of the war, as we have seen already. mines did even more harm, and did it all through. but submarines did most. our title "submarining" means any kind of underwater attack, by mines as well as by torpedoes, so we must take a glance at the mines before coming to the submarines. most mines are somewhat like big buoys with little horns all over the top. each horn ends in a cap which, when hit, sets off the charge. mines coupled together by a steel rope are more dangerous than two separate mines would be, as they are bound to be drawn in against any ship that strikes any part of the rope. the only safeguard a ship could carry was a paravane. a paravane is made up of a strong steel hawser (rope) that serves as a fender, and of two razor-edged blades that serve to cut the mine-moorings free. it is altogether under water and is shaped like a v, with the point jutting out on the end of steel struts ahead of the bows, the two strokes running clear of the sides, and their ends well winged out astern, where the two sharp blades stand straight up, one from each end. the lines by which mines are anchored were thus guided clear of the ship till they reached the blades, where they were cut. the mines then rose to the surface, where they could be set off at a safe distance. dragging a paravane through the water made the ship go slow. but that was better than being blown up. minefields cannot, of course, be crossed at all. you might as well try to walk over armies of porcupines in your bare feet. some minefields were very big. one british field ran from the orkneys right across to norway, to stop the german submarines from getting out round the north of scotland. the american navy did magnificent work at this field, the greater part of which was laid by american, not by british, vessels at the latter end of and earlier part of . other minefields blocked the channel. but here the germans once played a very clever trick which might have cost the british dear. a british minefield had been laid, some fifty feet deep, to catch submarines without being in the way of vessels on the surface. two days after it had been secretly laid at night the _nubian_, a british destroyer, had her bows blown off on the very same spot. the german submarine mine-layers had crept in by night and laid a shallow german minefield, exactly over the deep british minefield, to catch those who were trying to catch them. that, however, is not the end of the story. just after the _nubian_ had been towed into portsmouth with her bows blown off, the _zulu_, a destroyer of the same class, was towed in with her stern blown off. so perfectly were both these vessels built that, when they had each been cut in half, the good halves made an absolutely perfect new destroyer, which, under her compound name of _zubian_, did excellent work against the germans during the famous fights at zeebrugge and ostend. a mine laid by a german submarine blew up the cruiser _hampshire_ that was taking kitchener to russia by way of the orkneys on the th of june, . kitchener was drowned and only twelve men, who floated in on a raft, were saved. submarines lurking about at night would sometimes put mines right in the track of vessels. and sometimes swift mine-laying ships on the surface would do even more deadly harm, rolling a hundred mines off a little railway on deck. at other times mines would be loosed from the shore or from ships at anchor, so as to float in among vessels with the tide or down the current of a stream. one of these was tried against the british in west africa by a german missionary. others were sent against the french and british vessels in the dardanelles, sometimes blowing them up. but the enemy never had it all his own way. british submarines did wonderful work in spite of the mines. commander holbrook won the v.c. by feeling his perilous way through five lines of turkish mines, though the currents were very tricky, and more than once the side of his "sub" actually touched the steel ropes holding the mines to their anchors. when he reached constantinople he torpedoed and sank the turkish battleship that was supposed to be guarding these very mines! then he dived back through the five rows of mines and rejoined the fleet without a scratch. another british submarine stole into the sea of marmora with a couple of land mines to blow up the railway near constantinople. lieutenant d'oyley-hughes then swam ashore, pushing a little raft to which the mines were lashed. he was quite alone, but armed with a bayonet ground like a razor and an automatic seven-shooter. he also carried a flash-light and whistle. he shouldered first one mine and then the other, each the weight of a big man, took them up the hill, and put them under a little brickwork bridge within a hundred and fifty yards of the turkish sentries, who were talking round their fire. though he muffled the fuse pistol it was heard by the turks, who came running toward him, firing as hard as they could. he let them have his first clip of seven shots slap in the face and then raced a mile along the line, doubled back a bit down the cliff, and swam off toward the submarine. his whistle was not heard at first, as the submarine was in the next bay; and he had to swim a mile before he came across her backing out under fire from the turks. but he slipped into her conning tower safely, and no one on the british side was hurt. so great is the danger from mines, unless they are watched and tackled the whole time, that thousands of mine-sweeping vessels were always at work, manned by british fishermen who had been handling gigantic nets and mile-long steel hawsers (ropes) ever since they had gone afloat as boys. these north sea fishermen, in whom the viking blood runs strong, had always put in eleven months sea time every year of their lives. so storm and fog and clammy numbing cold had no terrors for them as they worked their "sweepers" to and fro, fishing for the deadly mines. sometimes, for all their skill and care, a mine would foul their tackle and blow them to pieces. but usually they could "gentle" a mine to the surface and set it off by rifle shots at a safe distance. sometimes, however, a hitch would happen and the mine would come close alongside. once a mine actually came aboard, caught fast in the tackle. the skipper (captain) ordered all hands into the boats, and then himself cut it clear after a whole hour's work, during which one false touch or even the slightest jolt would have blown his ship to smithereens. the wonder of it is that more men were not killed in keeping the seaways so carefully swept, night and day, all the year round, for tens of thousands of miles, during the fifty-one months of the war. [illustration: minesweeper at work.] still more dangerous was the fishing for those vilest of devil-fish, the german submarines. the fishermen "shot" enormous steel nets just as you shoot a fishing net, letting them hang a bit slack so as to be the more entangling. then, just as you feel your rod quiver when a fish takes your fly, so these anglers for germans would feel the quiver from a nosing submarine caught in the toils. very few submarines ever escaped; for the slack of the waving net was apt to foul the screw, and there they were held till the last struggle ceased and the last man was smothered inside. the fishermen would sometimes have rescued their ruthless enemies if they could have disentangled them in time. but this could rarely be done; and the germans met a just fate. one day a submarine came up alongside a british trawler which was engaged in its regular fishing, was quite unarmed, and had a crew of old men and young boys. the germans took all the fresh fish they wanted, sank the trawler, smashed up her boats, and put the fishermen on the submarine's deck. then they slammed-to the hatch of the conning tower and sank very slowly, washing the fishermen off. then they rose again to laugh at them drowning. an avenging destroyer came racing along and picked up the sole survivor. but the german jokers, seeing it coming, had gone. no wonder the seafaring british sometimes "saw red" to such a degree that they would do anything to get in a blow! and sometimes they did get it in, when the germans least thought it was coming. when a skipper suddenly found a german u-boat (_unterseeboot_ or under-sea-boat) rising beside him, just as his engine-room mechanic had come up with a hammer in his hand, he called out, "look sharp and blind her!" without a moment's hesitation the mechanic jumped on her deck and smashed her periscope to pieces, thus leaving her the blinded prey of gathering destroyers. the germans put their wits to work with hellish cunning. they wanted to surround great britain with a sea of death so full of mines and submarines that no ship could live. the mines were not placed at random, but where they would either kill their victims best or make them try another way where the lurking submarines could kill them. the sea-roads into great ports like london and liverpool converge, just as railway tracks converge toward some great central junction. so submarines lying in wait near these crowded waters had a great advantage in the earlier part of the war, when people still believed that the germans would not sink unarmed merchantmen on purpose, especially when women and children were known to be on board. on the th of may, , the _lusitania_, from new york for liverpool, was rounding the south of ireland, when the starboard (right-hand) look-out in the crow's nest (away up the mast) called to his mate on the port side, "good god, frank, here's a torpedo!" the next minute it struck and exploded, fifteen feet under water, with a noise like the slamming of a big heavy door. another minute and a second torpedo struck and exploded. meanwhile the crew had dashed to their danger posts and begun duties for which they had been carefully drilled, though very few people ever thought the germans would torpedo a passenger steamer known to be full of women and children, carrying many americans, and completely unarmed. the ship at once took a list to starboard (tilt to the right) so that the deck soon became as steep as a railway embankment. this made it impossible to lower boats on the up side, as they would have swung inboard, slithered across the steeply sloping deck, and upset. the captain, cool and ready as british captains always are, gave his orders from the up end of the bridge, while the other officers were helping the passengers into the boats. the sea soon came lapping over the down side of the deck, and people began slipping into it. the full boats shoved off; but not half of them on the down side were clear before the gigantic ship, with an appalling plunge, sank head first. it all happened so quickly that many had not been able to get on deck before this final plunge. they must have been crushed by the hurtling of all loose gear when the ship stood on her bows going down, then smothered and drowned, if not smashed dead at the first. the captain stood on the bridge to the last, went down with the ship, came up again among the wreckage, and was saved after hours in the water. he will never forget the long, piercing wail of despair from hundreds of victims as the gallant ship went down. this made it clear to all but those who did not want to understand that germany was going to defy the laws of the sea, at least as far as she could without changing president wilson's government into an enemy. so things went on, getting worse and worse, for another two years. the british, french, and italians had never prepared for a war like this. they were ready to fight submarines that fought their own men-of-war, as well as those that tried to sink transports carrying soldiers and arms to the many different fronts. but who would have thought that even the germans would sink every merchantman without the least care for the lives of the crew? the rest of the world thought the days of pirates and cut-throats were over among all civilized nations. but the germans did not. so the allies, the british especially, built more and more destroyers to fight the german submarines. the germans, of course, built more and more submarines; and so the fight went on, growing ever fiercer. it was up-hill work for the british to guard thousands of ships over millions of miles against the hidden foe, who sometimes struck without being seen at all. a ship is a small thing on millions of square miles. a slinking submarine is very much lower and harder to see on the surface. a periscope is far harder still. the ordinary periscope is simply a tube, a few inches in diameter, with a mirror in the upper end reflecting the outside view on the corresponding mirror at the lower end, where the captain watches his chance for a shot. no wonder the germans got on well for so long. it was over two years before british merchantmen were armed. there was a shortage of guns; and the neutral american government would not allow any armed merchantmen into their ports, though many and many a life was lost because a vessel was unarmed. but, bit by bit, the merchantmen were forced to arm or die like sheep before the german wolves; and once they had a gun they soon learnt how to use it. one gun over the stern was all that most ships had. it was mounted astern because the best chance of escape was to turn away and go full speed, zig-zagging every which way as you went, firing at the chasing submarine; this made vessels harder for submarines to hit, not only on account of the zig-zags, but because the ship, going the same way as the torpedo, made fast and short shots harder to get; also because the backwash of the screw helped to put torpedoes off their course; and finally because the target was itself firing back at the submarine. even so, however, it was often touch-and-go; and very few people ever enjoyed the fun of being fired at as much as that little canadian girl of six, who, seeing a torpedo shimmering past the ship's side, called out, "oh, mummy, look at the pretty fish!" once a fast torpedo was hit and exploded by a shell from the vessel its submarine was chasing. but this was a perfect fluke. more to the point was the readiness of the merchantman _valeria_ and of commander stockwell's destroyer to turn happy accidents to the best account on the spur of the moment. the _valeria_ bumped over a rising submarine at three o 'clock one summer morning off the coast of ireland. instantly all hands ran to "action stations," when the gunner saw, to his delight, that the periscope had been broken off and so the submarine was blind. his first shot hit the hull. his second was a miss. but his third struck the base of the conning tower; on which the submarine sank, nothing but bubbles and oil remaining to mark the spot where she went down. stockwell's adventure was rather different. he had marked a submarine slinking round in the early dawn, and, knowing the spot the germans liked best outside of liverpool, watched his chance over it. suddenly he felt his destroyer being lifted up, tilted over, and slid aside. the "sub" had risen right under it! swinging clear in a moment he let go a depth charge; and the sea-quake that followed had plenty of signs to show that the "sub" had gone down. was the great year of submarine war: the germans straining every nerve to kill off all the ships that went to or from the allied ports, the allies trying their best to kill off all the submarines. the mediterranean was bad, the north atlantic was worse, the west coasts of the british islands worst of all. the american navy came in and did splendid service off the south coast of ireland, in the bay of biscay, and along the north atlantic seaways between french and british and american ports. more and more destroyers were put into service, aided by "chasers"--very much smaller vessels with only one gun and a few men, but so cheap and easily built that they could be turned out in swarms to help in worrying the submarines to death. the "scooters" and "porte's babies," as we saw in chapter xxiv, were, however, even better than these swarming "chasers." the enormous steel nets were also used more than ever. you can fancy what they were like by thinking of a gigantic fishing-net many miles long, with armed steamers instead of floats. in the entrances to some harbours there were sea-gates made by swinging open a bit of the net by means of its steamers to let traffic go through, and then swinging it back again. the mine-fields were made bigger than ever; it was then that the vast one, mostly laid by the americans, was begun from the orkneys to norway. mines were also laid by british submarines and by daring fast surface mine-layers round heligoland and other places off the german coast. in this way the waters in which submarines could work were made narrower and narrower and were better and better guarded. but more and more submarines were launched, and they still sneaked out to sea along the dutch and norwegian coasts where the navy could not stop them because they used to slink through "territorial waters," that is, within three miles of the coast, where the sea belonged to the nearest country, just the same as the land. the navy, however, had lines of patrols always on the watch from the orkneys to the shetlands, on to iceland, over to norway, and north to the arctic ice. the narrow waters of the english channel were watched by the famous dover patrol under sir roger keyes. from folkestone to cap griz nez in france there was an unbroken line of the strongest searchlights on vessels anchored to ride out the biggest gales. seven miles west was another line. between were hundreds of patrol boats always ready, night or day, to fire at anything on the surface or to drop depth charges on anything that dived. a depth charge is a sort of mine that can be set to go off at a certain depth, say thirty to sixty feet down, when it makes a sea-quake that knocks the submarine out of gear and sinks it, even if it does not actually hit it. besides all these guards on the surface there were nets and mines underneath. that is why the british army in france never had its line of communication with england cut for one single day all through the war. now and then the germans tried a destroyer raid from their ports on the belgian coast, or even from their own coast; for they would sneak through dutch waters within the three-mile limit as well as through the danish or norwegian. they played a game of tip-and-run, their gunners firing at any surface craft they saw (for they knew no germans could be anywhere but underneath) and their captains streaking back home at the first sign of the british navy. on the night of the th of april, , they were racing back, after sinking some small craft, when an avenging flotilla of british destroyers began to overhaul them. seeing that one of the germans might escape in the dark, the _broke_ (named after captain broke of the _shannon_ in the war of ) turned and rammed her amidships. the germans fought well, swarming aboard the _broke_ and fighting hand to hand, as in the days of boarding. but midshipman giles stood up to the first of them, who was soon killed by a bluejacket's cutlass; and then, after a tremendous tussle with swords and pistols and anything else that was handy, every german was either driven overboard or killed on the spot, except two that surrendered. a year later (on st. george's day) the _vindictive_ led the famous raid on zeebrugge under captain carpenter, v.c. the idea was to destroy the principal german base in belgium from which aircraft and submarines were always starting. for weeks beforehand the crews that had volunteered to go on this desperate adventure were carefully trained in secret. the plan was to block the mouth of the bruges canal, by sinking three vessels filled with concrete, while the _vindictive_ smashed up the batteries on the mole (long solid wharf) guarding the entrance, and an old submarine, loaded like a gigantic torpedo, blew up the supports for the bridge that connected the mole with the land. twice the little expedition sailed and had to put back because the wind had shifted; for the smoke screen would not hide the block ships, unless the wind had just the proper slant. at last it started for the real thing; a great night of aircraft going ahead to bomb the defences and a squadron of monitors staying some miles astern to pour in shells at the same time. the crash of air bombs and the thudding of the distant monitors were quite familiar sounds to the german garrison, whose "archies" (anti-aircraft guns) barked hoarsely back, while the bigger guns roared at where they thought the monitors might be. (monitors are slow, strong, heavy, and very "bargy" craft, useful only as platforms for big guns against land defences.) suddenly, to the germans' wild astonishment, zeebrugge harbour was full of a smoke screen, of concrete-loaded block-ships, and of darting motor boats; while the old cruiser _vindictive_ made straight for the mole. instantly the monitors and aircraft were left alone, while every german gun that could be brought to bear was turned on to this new and far more dangerous enemy at hand. but the british won through. the three block-ships were sunk. the submarine used as a torpedo blew up the bridge joining the mole to the land; and the smoke screen worked fairly well. still, the tornado of german shells was almost more than flesh and blood could stand. meanwhile the old _vindictive_ ran alongside the mole and dropped her eighteen special gangways bang against it. in a moment her forlorn hope--her whole crew was one great forlorn hope--swarmed on to the mole, over the splintering gangways, while her guns roared defiance at the huge german batteries. the ground swell made the _vindictive_ roll and racked her breaking gangways terribly. the storm of german shells and the hail of machine-gun bullets seemed almost to be sweeping everything before them. an officer awaiting his turn on deck asked, "what are all those men lying down for?" and was answered, "all dead, sir"; killed before they had started. several gangways were smashed to pieces, the men on them falling between the _vindictive_ and the mole. the germans on the mole fired furiously to keep the storming party back. but, with an eager courage no viking could have beaten, and with a trained skill no viking could have equalled, every seaman and marine in that heroic party who was not killed or disabled pressed on till the flaming battery was silenced. then the survivors swarmed back with all the wounded they could find, climbed over the few broken gangways still holding together, and turned to the work of getting clear. at last the _vindictive_, though a mere mangled wreck, got off and limped home victorious with all that was left of the equally daring flotilla of small craft. zeebrugge was the bigger base on the belgian coast. but ostend remained; and both were connected by canals with bruges, which stood several miles inland. the whole formed a triple base shaped like the letter v, with bruges at the bottom, zeebrugge (sea-bruges) to the right, and ostend to the left. to close only zeebrugge was to leave the back door open. so ostend was raided, and smashed later on, the old _vindictive_, now past her fighting days, being sunk full of concrete. from all that remained of her still above water the hero-king, albert, was cheered into ostend after the armistice by the belgian boy scouts, as he steamed past with sir roger keyes to land, with his heroine-queen, on the soil so long fouled by german pirates. these raids spoilt german chances from the nearest ports to britain. but they did not stop the submarine campaign; and there was still plenty of work for camouflage, convoys, and "q" ships. camouflage at sea is a very different thing from camouflage on land. on land camouflage is meant to make one thing look like something else or to hide it altogether. but no kind of camouflage will hide a ship. nor is there any point in making a boat look like anything else; for everybody knows that ships are the only things at sea. camouflage afloat was therefore meant to confuse the submarine commander's aim by deceiving his eye as to his target's speed and course. by painting cunning arrangements of stripes and splashes of different colours a ship's course and speed could be so disguised that the torpedoist was puzzled in getting his sights on her and in working out the range and speed. if an old-fashioned sailor could have suddenly been dropped on to the deck of a transport in the midst of a convoy of camouflaged ships he would have thought all their helmsmen were drunk or stark, staring mad; for they would have seemed to be steering every which way at large and not one on any proper course at all. when this was added to their other troubles the submarines thought twice before risking an attack on a convoy of ships guarded by cruisers, as well as by destroyers ahead and on both sides, zig-zagging about on the hunt for submarines, much as a good sporting dog quarters likely ground for game. a "mothering" cruiser would keep station astern, where she could have her weather eye on every one. in narrow waters like the english channel there would also be an airship overhead, a little in advance, with seaplanes on the flanks. these aircraft could spot a submarine almost a hundred feet down in fair weather, just as seabirds spot fish. if a submarine did show up, it was kept in sight till the destroyers charged near enough to ram, shell, or torpedo it on the surface, or sea-quake it to death with a depth bomb if submerged. three hundred and seven ships brought wheat from different parts of america to britain, france, and italy under special convoy in the summer of , and only one was lost. "q" ships, those ships of mystery and such strange romance as former navies never dreamt of, were meant to lure the german devils to their doom. one q ship was a dirty old collier so well disguised as a common tramp (steamer belonging to no regular line) that she completely took in a british cruiser, whose boarding officer was intensely surprised to find her skipper was one of his own former shipmates. after five months of thrashing to and fro in the wintry north atlantic a torpedo sped across her bows and she knew her chance had come. instantly her alarm signals, quietly given, brought all hands to action stations, some in deck-houses, others in hen-coops, but each with his finger on the trigger or his hand on a ready spare shell. presently the submarine broke surface and fired a shot across the q ship's bow. on this the well-trained crew ran about in panic, while the captain screeched at them and waved his arms about like mad. then the submarine came up within three cables (ten to the nautical mile of yards); whereupon the captain blew his whistle, just as drake did long ago, the navy's white ensign fluttered up to the masthead, the hen-coops and deck-houses fell flat, and a hurricane of shells and maxim bullets knocked the "sub" out in three minutes' firing. but, as the war went on, still better q dodges had to be invented. one day an old q tramp, loaded chock-a-block with light-weight lumber, quietly let herself be torpedoed, just giving the wheel a knowing touch to take the torpedo well abaft the engine-room, where it would do least harm. the "panic-party" then left the ship quite crewless so far as anybody outside of her could see. but the "sub" was taking no risks that day. she circled the q, almost grazing her, but keeping fifteen feet under. the q captain, only ten yards off, was sorely tempted to fire. but shells striking water play queer tricks. so he held his fire; though the quarterdeck was awash instead of nearly twenty feet clear, and the ship's lucky black cat, blown overboard by the explosion, swam straight on to it out of the sea. then the sub came up, little more than a cable's length away; and the q captain at last sent a wireless call for help in case he should sink too soon. when the conning tower rose clear the german commander opened the hatch and smiled at his work. he was still cautious; for his gun crew began to appear. but the q caught him; knocking his head off with the very first shot, and riddling the whole sub in no time. the same q captain, gordon campbell, v.c., went out again in another q ship which was also disguised as a tramp. when a submarine attacked her she zig-zagged away in wild alarm, firing only her one merchantman's gun, and slowing down so as to get overhauled. knowing the sub would catch his message campbell wirelessed "help! come quick! submarine chasing and shelling." presently the q stopped, done up, and the "panic-party" left her to her fate. this fate really did seem, and might have been, certain; for she was on fire from the shelling and her after magazine blew up with terrible force, killing the stern gun's crew and blowing the gun overboard. moreover, the jar of this explosion set off the alarm; so down came all disguises and out came the guns. but campbell, still determined to kill off that sub, wirelessed in the secret code to keep all vessels off the horizon, lest the sub should get scared and run away. meanwhile she was diving, not liking the explosions; and she presently sent a torpedo straight home. then the second "panic-party" left; and the q ship lay wallowing in the trough of the sea, with two holes in her side, a big fire blazing, and ammunition boxes blowing up every few minutes. for nearly an hour the sub hovered round, a good distance off, and ended by rising astern to shell this obstinate q ship to death. but even then the dauntless q men still aboard never gave a sign of life. the wounded lay in their agonizing pain without making a sound, and stiff as soldiers at _attention!_ the rest stood by their guns and torpedoes, ready for anything. in the meantime another dangerous fire was blazing, more ammunition was blowing up, and the engulfing sea was creeping ever near and nearer yet. at last the submarine, quite satisfied, ceased firing. then she closed, and campbell fired two torpedoes, but missed with both. after this he wirelessed for help. but when british and american destroyers came tearing up they found him, cool as ever, arranging for a third "panic-party" to jump overboard and leave him alone with three men to try one more shot with the only gun left free by the fire. he failed this time. but two of his men earnt the v.c. as well as any men have ever earnt it; and his gallant q herself went down with colours flying. the news soon passed round the underworld of "sub-dom"; and the germans swore they would never be caught again. so when another sub chased and shelled an old tub of a sailing ship her commander took good care to make sure he had not caught another q. first and second panic parties, or what he thought were panic parties, did not satisfy him. but at last, when he had seen the ship's papers and had counted the crew, he laughed at his own mistake and came close alongside, ordering the boats away in spite of the skipper's entreaties to be allowed to go back and get his wife, who was crying her eyes out on deck with her baby in her arms. when the boats rowed off the poor woman went mad, rushing about wildly, with piercing shrieks, and finally, just as the german was coming on board, throwing her baby straight into his conning tower. what the germans thought of this will never be known; for the baby was made of rubber filled with high explosive, and it blew the sub to smithereens. chapter xxvii surrender! ( ) as jutland broke the spirit of the germans who fought on the surface so minefields, netting, convoys, patrolling, and q boats broke the spirit of those who fought in submarines. drake's sea-dogs would take their chance of coming home alive when the insurance on their ships used to be made by men whom shakespeare calls the "putters-out of five for one." as we say now, the chances were five to one against the sea-dog ship that went to foreign parts in time of war. but, when the odds reached four to one against the german subs, the german crews began to mutiny, refusing to go aboard of what they saw were fast becoming just new steel coffins of the sea. a belgian maid, compelled to slave for officers of german submarines at zeebrugge, kept count of those who returned alive. the same number, twenty, always boarded in the house. but, before the british came and drove the germans out, no less than sixteen of her twenty masters had stepped into dead men's shoes. finally, in the early morning of november the rd, when, in wild despair, the kaiser ordered the whole fleet out for one last fight, the men of aircraft, surface craft, and submarines alike refused point blank to go; and the german revolution then and there began. it was the german navy that rose first, brought to its senses by the might of british sea-power. the army followed. then the people. at the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month (the th of november, ) the _cease fire!_ sounded on every front by sea and land and air; for that supremely skilful hero, marshal foch, had signed the armistice as commander-in-chief of all the allied armies on the western front. one of the terms of this famous armistice was that germany should surrender her fleet to the allies in the firth of forth, where the british grand fleet was waiting with a few french and american men-of-war. never in the whole world's history had such a surrender taken place. but never in the whole world's history had any navy broken the laws of war so shamefully as the german navy had. and never in the whole world's history had any navy been more truly great or so gloriously strong as the british navy had become. on friday the th of november the german cruiser _königsberg_ steamed into the firth of forth and anchored near inchcape, which, aptly enough, is famous in scottish song as the death-place of a murderer and pirate. "beatty's destroyer," h.m.s. _oak_, unlike all other craft in her gala coat of gleaming white, then took admiral von meurer aboard the british flagship, _queen elizabeth_, where beatty sat waiting, with the model of a british lion on the table in front of him (as a souvenir of his former flagship, _lion_) and a portrait of nelson hanging on the wall behind. the hundred and fifty surrendered submarines went slinking into harwich, the great british north sea base for submarines. but the seventy-four surface craft came into the firth of forth on the st of november: sixteen dreadnoughts, eight light cruisers, and fifty destroyers. " . battle fleet meet german fleet" was the unique order posted up overnight in the _queen elizabeth_. but long before that hour the stately procession began filing out to sea. h.m. ss. _canada_, _australia_, _new zealand_, and _south africa_, were there to remind us that "united we stand, divided we fall." admiral grasset was there in the _aube_ to remind us that the french and british had been brothers-in-arms for fifty-one months of furious war. admirals rodman and sims were there in the u.s.s. _new york_ to remind us that during the last nineteen of these fifty-one months the three greatest self-governing peoples of the world had made common cause against the barbarous hun. finally, and clinchingly, the main body of the whole grand fleet was there, drawn up in two enormous lines-ahead, six miles apart, and sixteen miles from front to rear, with eighteen flagships leading its different squadrons, and scores of destroyers ahead, astern, and on the flanks, not one of which was counted in the thirty-two long miles of lines-ahead. before it had gone eight bells at four o'clock that morning, the _revenge_, flagship of sir charles madden, second-in-command of the grand fleet, led the way out to the appointed rendezvous: "x position, latitude , north, longitude , west." the present _revenge_, a magnificent super-dreadnought, is the ninth of her name in the navy; and, besides her name, has three curious links to recall the gallant days of drake. in her cabin is a copy of the griffin which, being grenville's crest, the first _revenge_ so proudly bore in the immortal fight of "the one and the fifty-three." then, had the german fleet come out again, madden and this ninth _revenge_ would have taken exactly the same place in action as drake and the first _revenge_ took just three hundred and thirty years before against the great armada. thirdly (but this, alas, was too good to come true!) sir charles told his canadian guest one day in scapa flow that he and sir david beatty had agreed to be caught playing a little game of bowls on the grand fleet clubhouse green the next time the german fleet appeared. "and," he added, "we'll finish the game first, and the germans after"--just what drake had said about the spaniards. nearing the rendezvous at nine the bugles sounded _action stations!_ for though the german ships were to come unarmed and only manned by navigating crews it was rightly thought wiser not to trust them. you never catch the navy napping. so, when the two fleets met, every british gun was manned, all ready to blow the germans out of the water at the very first sign of treachery. led captive by british cruisers, and watched by a hundred and fifty fast destroyers, as well as by a huge airship overhead, the vanquished germans steamed in between the two victorious lines, which then reversed by squadrons, perfect as a piece of clockwork, and headed for the firth of forth. thus the vast procession moved on, now in three lines-ahead, but filling the same area as before: a hundred square miles of sea. in all, there were over three hundred men-of-war belonging to the four greatest navies the world has ever known. at eight bells that afternoon all hands were piped aft by the boatswains' whistles, the bugles rang out the _sunset_ call, and down came every german flag, never again to be flown aboard those vessels of the high sea fleet. for germany _der tag_ had gone. for the british _the day_ had come; and they hailed it with a roar of british-lion cheers. most regrettably, the allies, headed by president wilson, decided that the german men-of-war should be interned, not surrendered, when sent to scapa flow. if these ships, after being surrendered to the allies, had been put in charge of the british, or any other navy, as "surrenders," guards would have been put on board of them and all would have been well. but interned ships are left to their own crews, no foreign guards whatever being allowed to live on board. the result of this mistake, deliberately made against the advice of the british, was that, on the st of june, the germans, with their usual treachery, opened the sea-cocks and sank the ships they had surrendered and the allies had interned. a week later, on the th of june, , in the renowned historic palace of versailles, the allies and germany signed the treaty of peace by which they ended the great war exactly five years after the assassination of franz ferdinand had given the austro-german empires the excuse they wanted to begin it. rule, britannia! thomson's famous verses and arne's famous air (in which wagner said he could see the whole character of the english people) were sung for the first time during the royal fête held at clieveden, a celebrated country residence beside "the silver thames." this was on the st of august, . the st of august was the day on which nelson won his first great victory just fifty-eight years later; and clieveden is where the duchess of connaught's canadian hospital was established during the great war. when britain first, at heaven's command, arose from out the azure main, this was the charter of the land, and guardian angels sung this strain: "rule, britannia! britannia rule the waves! britons never will be slaves." the nations not so bless'd as thee must in their turn to tyrants fall; while thou shall flourish great and free, the dread and envy of them all. "rule, britannia, &c." still more majestic shalt thou rise, more dreadful from each foreign stroke; as the loud blast that tears the skies serves but to root thy native oak. "rule, britannia, &c." thee haughty tyrants ne'er shall tame; all their attempts to bend thee down will but arouse thy generous flame, and work their woe and thy renown. "rule, britannia, &c." to thee belongs the rural reign; thy cities shall with commerce shine; all thine shall be the subject main, and every shore it circles thine. "rule, britannia, &c." the muses, still with freedom found, shall to thy happy coast repair; bless'd isle! with matchless beauty crown'd, and manly hearts to guard the fair. "rule, britannia! britannia rule the waves! britons never shall be slaves!" --_james thomson._ god save the king! the words we now sing with such hearty british loyalty all round the seven seas originated in the parole and countersign on board the famous portsmouth fleet of , when the parole was _god save the king!_ and the answering countersign was _long to reign over us!_ the national anthems of all the other empires, kingdoms, and republics in the world come from their armies and the land. our own comes from the royal navy and the sea. god save our gracious king, long live our noble king, god save the king. send him victorious, happy and glorious, long to reign over us, god save the king. o lord our god, arise, scatter his enemies, and make them fall. confound their politics, frustrate their knavish tricks, on thee our hopes we fix, god save us all. thy choicest gifts in store, on him be pleased to pour; long may he reign. may he defend our laws, and ever give us cause to sing with heart and voice, god save the king. chapter xxviii well done! the day the armistice was signed (the th of november, ) king george sent this royal message to the navy: now that the last and most formidable of our enemies has acknowledged the triumph of the allied arms on behalf of right and justice, i wish to express my praise and thankfulness to the officers, men, and women of the royal navy and marines, with their comrades of the fleet auxiliaries and the mercantile marine, who, for more than four years have kept open the seas, protected our shores, and given us safety. ever since that fateful fourth of august, , i have remained steadfast in my confidence that, whether fortune frowned or smiled, the royal navy would once more prove the sure shield of the british empire in the hour of trial. never in its history has the royal navy, with god's help, done greater things for us or better sustained its old glories and the chivalry of the sea. with full and grateful hearts the peoples of the british empire salute the white, the red, and the blue ensigns, and those who have given their lives for the flag. i am proud to have served in the navy. i am prouder still to be its head upon this memorable day. george, r.i. [illustration: h.m. king george v.] (the "women" to whom the king referred were the famous "wrens," so called because the initials of the women's royal naval service--w.r.n.s.--can easily be turned into "wrens." everything that women could do they did; and did it well.) (the white ensign is the flag of the navy: white, divided into four by the red st. george's cross, and with the union jack in the upper inside quarter. the red ensign is for the mercantile marine. the blue ensign is for any government service except the navy. the red and blue ensigns have the union jack in their upper inside quarters, but no st. george's cross.) the mercantile marine lost nearly fifteen thousand men killed; we ought to say murdered; for while a blockader can take ships and cargoes that try to run contraband (that is, whatever the blockader can rightfully proclaim to be forbidden) he must not kill the crews. the british merchant seamen fought; and the germans said that was why they had to kill them. but it was the germans who forced them to fight in self-defence. and that makes all the difference. when our enemies, germans or others, can prove one case of such murder against the british navy we shall punish the murderer ourselves. but they have not found that one case yet, while we have found close on fifteen thousand, not counting soldiers, passengers, women, or children. the germans aimed at scaring off the sea those merchant seamen whom they could not kill, disable, or make prisoners. but not a man refused to go to sea again, even when his last ship had been torpedoed and his chums been killed. that is the first glory of the mercantile marine. but there are many more. and not the least is the pluck with which the british, who did most and lost most, started the race for oversea trade again, though at an enormous disadvantage compared with those who did least and gained most. all kinds of british sea-power did magnificent work in the war, whether building ships, sailing them with passengers and cargoes, or fighting them. the navy and mercantile marine gained eleven million tons during the war, exactly half each. but as the mercantile marine lost nine millions sunk, it ended three-and-a-half to the bad, a terrible handicap in the race with the shipping of countries which, like the united states have made stupendous fortunes by the war, besides gaining enormously in shipping and oversea trade. norway, japan, and the states gained most. the states came out of the war three and three-quarter million tons to the good, thus gaining over seven millions as compared with the british. the case of the navy was one of life or death for us and all our allies; so the merchant fleet, fishing fleet, and shipbuilding yards had to let the navy come first, no matter what the cost might be. but we must never forget that the navy is only one-half of our british sea-power, that the mercantile marine is the other half, and that all kinds of british sea-power must work together or be lost. so we cannot separate one kind from another here; and we would not if we could. nor should we forget that british sea-power was itself only one of the many kinds of war-power put forth by britain in the cause of freedom. britain raised by far the largest force of volunteers ever raised by any country in any age or for any war--five million and forty-one thousand men for the army alone. this takes no account of conscripts, or of naval, air force, or civilian services; nor does it include one man belonging to any part of the british empire overseas. then she forced into the ranks those that could but would not go as long as they got others to do their fighting for them. in the meantime her whole population, except those slackers every country had, had put its strenuous hand to war work of one kind or another. so, whether by sea or land or air, whether as warriors or as civilians, the people of great britain gave their united all to the noblest cause on earth. and, when the war ended, great britain had the biggest army as well as the biggest navy in the world--biggest not only in absolute numbers but also biggest in proportion to the whole number of men fit to bear arms. nor was this in any way due to her having lost less than others; for she had the greatest total loss in killed and wounded of all the allies--greatest on land, greatest by sea, and greatest in the air. besides all we have seen before, in following the more purely naval fortunes of the war, the navy did priceless work in october , when the huge german armies, beaten by the heroic french at the immortal battle of the marne, tried to take the north-east coast of france with the ports of dunkirk, calais, and boulogne. held by joffre further south, they found more than their match in the north, when french's little british army fought them to a standstill, while the navy simply burnt them away from the coast by a perfect hurricane of fire. better still was the way the navy finished off the submarine blockade. of the enemy submarines destroyed were finished by the british navy. the french, americans, and italians killed off the rest. all the submarines surrendered came slinking into harwich, the great british base for submarines. all the submarines the germans were building when the war was stopped were given up to the allied naval commission headed by a british admiral and backed by a british fleet. but even more wonderful than this was the oversea transport done by all kinds of british sea-power working together as one united service. the british carried nearly half of all the imports into italy and france. they repaired more than a thousand ships a month. they ferried nearly two-thirds of all the americans that crossed the atlantic. they took to the many different fronts more than half a million vehicles, from one-horse carts to the biggest locomotives; more than two million animals--horses, mules, and camels; and more than twenty-two millions of men. add to this well over a couple of hundred million tons of oil, coal, and warlike stores; remember that this is by no means the whole story, and that it takes no account of the regular trade; and you may begin to understand what british sea-power meant in this war. in the mere transportation of armies alone it meant the same thing as taking the entire population of canada, three times over, with all its baggage three times over, and with its very houses three times over, across thousands of miles of dangerous waters in the midst of the worst war ever known. and yet, out of the more than twenty-two millions of men, less than five thousand were killed on the way; and many of these were murdered in hospital ships marked with the sacred red cross. the chances of safety from murder and fair risks of war put together were nearly five thousand to one. the chances of safety from fair risks of war by themselves were nearly ten thousand to one. no war, no navy, no sea-power since the world began, has any record to compare with this. "let us be backed with god and with the seas, which he hath given for fence impregnable, and with their helps, only, defend ourselves: in them, and in ourselves, our safety lies." --_shakespeare._ _king henry vi, part iii, act iv, scene i._ postscript the freedom of the seas landsmen are many while seamen are few. so the world thinks more of armies than of fleets. our enemies hate all british sea-power, while our friends never know the half of what it means. so friend and foe alike are apt to side against us by making the laws against blockading fleets very much harder than those against besieging armies. all we can do is to stand firmly on our perfect rights and show the world the five good reasons why:-- . the sea and land have equal rights. blockading fleets are like besieging armies. so if besieging armies have the right to stop supplies from reaching the places they besiege, why should blockading fleets be told to let supplies go through? . all parts of our great empire are joined together, not by land, but sea. so if we lose our rights of self-defence at sea we lose the very breath of life. . we claim no rights we will not share with others. when the american blockade of the south during the civil war ( - ) ruined the british cotton trade we never interfered, though we had by far the stronger navy. . we have never used the british navy to bully weak nations out of their oversea possessions. who could have stopped our taking the spanish, dutch, and portuguese possessions in africa and asia? . british sea-power has always been on the side of freedom; and every time a tyrant has tried to fight his way to world-dominion the royal navy has been the backbone of all the forces that have laid him low. the canadian i never saw the cliffs of snow, the channel billows tipped with cream, the restless, eddying tides that flow about the island of my dream. i never saw the english downs upon an april day, the quiet, old cathedral towns, the hedgerows white with may. and still the name of england, which tyrants laugh to scorn, can thrill my soul. it is to me a very bugle-horn. a thousand leagues from plymouth shore, in broader lands i saw the light. i never heard the cannon roar, or saw a mark of england's might; save that my people lived in peace, bronzed in the harvest sun, and thought that tyranny would cease, that battle-days were done. and still the flag of england streamed on a friendly breeze, and twice two hundred ships of war went surging through the seas. i heard polonius declaim about the new, the golden age, when force would be the mark of shame, and men would curb their murderous rage. "beat out your swords to pruning-hooks," he shouted to the folk, but i--i read my history books, and marvelled as he spoke. for it was glorious england, the mother of the free, who loosed that foolish tongue, but sent her admirals to sea. and liberty and love were ours, home, and a brood of lusty sons, the long, north sunlight and the flow'rs, how could we think about the guns, the searchlights on a wintry cloud, the seamen stern and bold, since we were hurrying with the crowd to rake the hills for gold? but it was glorious england who scanned the threatening morn. to me the very name of her is like a bugle-horn. --_j. e. middleton._ * * * * * +-----------------------------------------------------------+ | transcriber's note: | | | | inconsistent hyphenation in the original document has | | been preserved. | | | | some footnotes have two anchors in the text, the second | | of these has 'a' appended to distinguish it from the | | first, i.e. [ ] and [ a]. | | | | obvious typographical errors have been corrected. for | | a complete list, please see the end of this document. | | | +-----------------------------------------------------------+ * * * * * [illustration: the impressment of an american seaman] sea power in its relations to the war of by captain a.t. mahan, d.c.l., ll.d. united states navy author of "the influence of sea power upon history, - ," "the influence of sea power upon the french revolution and empire," "the interest of america in sea power," etc. in two volumes vol. i london sampson low, marston & company limited preface the present work concludes the series of "the influence of sea power upon history," as originally framed in the conception of the author. in the previous volumes he has had the inspiring consciousness of regarding his subject as a positive and commanding element in the history of the world. in the war of , also, the effect is real and dread enough; but to his own country, to the united states, as a matter of national experience, the lesson is rather that of the influence of a negative quantity upon national history. the phrase scarcely lends itself to use as a title; but it represents the truth which the author has endeavored to set forth, though recognizing clearly that the victories on lake erie and lake champlain do illustrate, in a distinguished manner, his principal thesis, the controlling influence upon events of naval power, even when transferred to an inland body of fresh water. the lesson there, however, was the same as in the larger fields of war heretofore treated. not by rambling operations, or naval duels, are wars decided, but by force massed, and handled in skilful combination. it matters not that the particular force be small. the art of war is the same throughout; and may be illustrated as really, though less conspicuously, by a flotilla as by an armada; by a corporal's guard, or the three units of the horatii, as by a host of a hundred thousand. the interest of the war of , to americans, has commonly been felt to lie in the brilliant evidence of high professional tone and efficiency reached by their navy, as shown by the single-ship actions, and by the two decisive victories achieved by little squadrons upon the lakes. without in the least overlooking the permanent value of such examples and such traditions, to the nation, and to the military service which they illustrate, it nevertheless appears to the writer that the effect may be even harmful to the people at large, if it be permitted to conceal the deeply mortifying condition to which the country was reduced by parsimony in preparation, or to obscure the lessons thence to be drawn for practical application now. it is perhaps useless to quarrel with the tendency of mankind to turn its eyes from disagreeable subjects, and to dwell complacently upon those which minister to self-content. we mostly read the newspapers in which we find our views reflected, and dispense ourselves easily with the less pleasing occupation of seeing them roughly disputed; but a writer on a subject of national importance may not thus exempt himself from the unpleasant features of his task. the author has thought it also essential to precede his work by a somewhat full exposition of the train of causes, which through a long series of years led to the war. it may seem at first far-fetched to go back to for the origins of the war of ; but without such preliminary consideration it is impossible to understand, or to make due allowance for, the course of great britain. it will be found, however, that the treatment of the earlier period is brief, and only sufficient for a clear comprehension of the five years of intense international strain preceding the final rupture; years the full narrative of which is indispensable to appreciating the grounds and development of the quarrel,--to realize what they fought each other for. that much of great britain's action was unjustifiable, and at times even monstrous, regarded in itself alone, must be admitted; but we shall ill comprehend the necessity of preparation for war, if we neglect to note the pressure of emergency, of deadly peril, upon a state, or if we fail to recognize that traditional habits of thought constitute with nations, as with individuals, a compulsive moral force which an opponent can control only by the display of adequate physical power. such to the british people was the conviction of their right and need to compel the service of their native seamen, wherever found on the high seas. the conclusion of the writer is, that at a very early stage of the french revolutionary wars the united states should have obeyed washington's warnings to prepare for war, and to build a navy; and that, thus prepared, instead of placing reliance upon a system of commercial restrictions, war should have been declared not later than , when the news of jena, and of great britain's refusal to relinquish her practice of impressing from american ships, became known almost coincidently. but this conclusion is perfectly compatible with a recognition of the desperate character of the strife that great britain was waging; that she could not disengage herself from it, napoleon being what he was; and that the methods which she pursued did cause the emperor's downfall, and her own deliverance, although they were invasions of just rights, to which the united states should not have submitted. if war is always avoidable, consistently with due resistance to evil, then war is always unjustifiable; but if it is possible that two nations, or two political entities, like the north and south in the american civil war, find the question between them one which neither can yield without sacrificing conscientious conviction, or national welfare, or the interests of posterity, of which each generation in its day is the trustee, then war is not justifiable only; it is imperative. in these days of glorified arbitration it cannot be affirmed too distinctly that bodies of men--nations--have convictions binding on their consciences, as well as interests which are vital in character; and that nations, no more than individuals, may surrender conscience to another's keeping. still less may they rightfully pre-engage so to do. nor is this conclusion invalidated by a triumph of the unjust in war. subjugation to wrong is not acquiescence in wrong. a beaten nation is not necessarily a disgraced nation; but the nation or man is disgraced who shirks an obligation to defend right. from to great britain was at war with napoleon, without intermission; until single handed, thenceforth till mostly without other allies than the incoherent and disorganized mass of the spanish insurgents. after austerlitz, as pitt said, the map of europe became useless to indicate distribution of political power. thenceforth it showed a continent politically consolidated, organized and driven by napoleon's sole energy, with one aim, to crush great britain; and the continent of europe then meant the civilized world, politically and militarily. how desperate the strife, the author in a previous work has striven fully to explain, and does not intend here to repeat. in it great britain laid her hand to any weapon she could find, to save national life and independence. to justify all her measures at the bar of conventional law, narrowly construed, is impossible. had she attempted to square herself to it she would have been overwhelmed; as the united states, had it adhered rigidly to its constitution, must have foregone the purchase of the territories beyond the mississippi. the measures which overthrew napoleon grievously injured the united states; by international law grievously wronged her also. should she have acquiesced? if not, war was inevitable. great britain could not be expected to submit to destruction for another's benefit. the author has been indebted to the officers of the public records office in london, to those of the canadian archives, and to the bureau of historical research of the carnegie institution of washington, for kind and essential assistance in consulting papers. he owes also an expression of personal obligation to the marquis of londonderry for permission to use some of the castlereagh correspondence, bearing on the peace negotiations, which was not included in the extensive published memoirs and correspondence of lord castlereagh; and to mr. charles w. stewart, the librarian of the united states navy department, for inexhaustible patience in searching for, or verifying, data and references, needed to make the work complete on the naval side. a.t. mahan. september, . contents antecedents of the war chapter i colonial conditions page remote origin of the causes of the war of two principal causes: impressment and the carrying trade claim of great britain as to impressment counter-claim of the united states lack of unanimity among the american people prevailing british ideas as to sea power and its relations to carrying trade and impressment the navigation acts distinction between "commerce" and "navigation" history and development of the navigation acts, and of the national opinions relating to them unanimity of conviction in great britain supposed benefit to the british carrying trade from loss of the american colonies british _entrepôt_ legislation relation of the _entrepôt_ idea to the orders in council of colonial monopoly a practice common to all european maritime states effect of the independence of the united states upon traditional commercial prepossessions consequent policy of great britain commercial development of the british transatlantic colonies during the colonial period interrelation of the continental and west india colonies of great britain bearing of this upon the navigation acts rivalry of american-built ships with british navigation during the colonial period resultant commercial rivalry after independence consequent disagreements, derived from colonial restrictions, and leading to war chapter ii from independence to jay's treaty rupture of the colonial relation transitional character of the period - , to the united states epochal significance of jay's treaty the question of british navigation, as affected by the loss of the colonies british commercial expectations from the political weakness of the united states, - system advocated by lord sheffield based upon considerations of navigation and naval power navigation acts essentially military in purpose jefferson's views upon this question imperial value of the british navigation act before american independence influence of the inter-colonial trade at the same period essential rivalry between it and british trade in general common interest of continental america and of great britain in the west indies pitt's bill, of march, controversy provoked by it in great britain british jealousy of american navigation desire to exclude american navigation from british colonial trade lord sheffield's pamphlet reply of the west india planters lapse of pitt's bill navigation acts applied in full rigor to intercourse between the united states and west indies this policy continues till jay's treaty not a wrong to the united states, though an injury naval impotence of the united states dependence on portugal against barbary pirates profit of great britain from this impotence apparent success of sheffield's trade policy, - increase of british navigation american counteractive legislation after the adoption of the constitution report of the committee of the british privy council on this subject, aggressive spirit of the navigation acts change of conditions through american navigation laws recommendations of the british committee effects of the french revolution collapse of french colonial system failure of sheffield's policy, in supplying the west indies from canada great britain's war necessities require aid of american shipping her resolve to deprive france of the same aid consequent lawless measures towards american ships and commerce jay's mission.--impressment not mentioned in his instructions chapter iii from jay's treaty to the orders in council, - arbitrary war measures of great britain, rule of peculiar relation of the united states to this rule jay's arrival in london characteristics of his negotiations great britain concedes direct trade with west indies rejection of this article by the senate, on account of accompanying conditions concession nevertheless continued by british order reasons for this tolerance conditions of trade from jay's mission to the peace of no concession of the principle of the rule of renewal of war between great britain and france, prosperity of american commerce question raised of "direct trade" decision in british admiralty court adverse to united states, united states subjected again to colonial regulation remonstrance and negotiation of monroe, american minister in london death of pitt. change of ministry in great britain. position of charles james fox fox's attempt at compromise the blockade of may , its lawfulness contested by the united states its importance in history retaliatory commercial action by the united states pinkney sent to england as colleague to monroe colonial trade, and impressment of seamen from american vessels, the leading subjects mentioned in their instructions historical summary of the impressment question opening of negotiations by monroe and pinkney death of fox course of the negotiations provisional treaty, signed december , rejected by united states government monroe and pinkney directed to reopen negotiations change of ministry in great britain. canning becomes foreign secretary the british government refuses further negotiation monroe leaves england, pinkney remaining as minister "free trade and sailors' rights" consistency of jefferson's administration on the subject of impressment it neglects to prepare for war chapter iv from the orders in council to war reservation of the british government in signing the treaty of december , the berlin decree ambiguity of its wording the question of "private property," so called, embarked in commercial venture at sea. discussion wide political scope of the berlin decree twofold importance of the united states in international policy consequent aims of france and great britain british order in council of january , attitude of the united states government military purpose of the berlin decree and the continental system the "chesapeake" affair conference concerning it between canning and monroe action of president jefferson use made of it by canning correspondence concerning the "chesapeake" affair rose appointed envoy to washington to negotiate a settlement failure of his mission persistent british refusal to punish the offending officer significance of the "chesapeake" affair in the relations of the two nations its analogy to impressment enforcement of the berlin decree by napoleon its essential character the decree and the continental system are supported by the course of the american government pinkney's conviction of great britain's peril the british orders in council, november, their effect upon the united states just resentment in america action of the administration and congress the embargo act of december, explanations concerning it to great britain its intentions, real and alleged its failure, as an alternative to war jefferson's aversion to the carrying trade growing ill-feeling between the united states and great britain relief to great britain from the effects of the continental system, by the spanish revolt against napoleon depression of united states industries under the embargo difficulty of enforcement evasions and smuggling the embargo beneficial to canada and nova scotia effects in great britain relief to british navigation through the embargo effect of the embargo upon american revenue numbers of american vessels remain abroad, submitting to the orders in council, and accepting british licenses and british convoy napoleon's bayonne decree against them; april , illustrations of the working of napoleon's decrees and of the orders in council vigorous enforcement of the embargo in popular irritation and opposition act for its further enforcement, january , evidences of overt resistance to it act for partial repeal, introduced february conflicting opinions as to the embargo, in and out of congress the non-intercourse act, march , its effect upon commercial restrictions canning's advances, in consequence of non-intercourse act instructions sent to erskine, british minister at washington erskine's misleading communication of them, april , consequent renewal of trade with great britain erskine disavowed. non-intercourse resumed, august , orders in council of november, , revoked; and substitute issued, april , consequent partial revival of american commerce francis j. jackson appointed as erskine's successor his correspondence with the american secretary of state further communication with him refused criticism of the american side of this correspondence wellesley succeeds canning as british foreign secretary jackson's dismissal communicated to wellesley by pinkney wellesley delays action british view of the diplomatic situation failure of the non-intercourse act difficulty of finding a substitute act of may , .--its provisions napoleon's rambouillet decree, march , act of may , , communicated to france and great britain napoleon's action. champagny's letter, august , madison accepts it as revoking the french decrees the arguments for and against this interpretation great britain refuses to accept it statement of her position in the matter wellesley's procrastinations pinkney states to him the american view, at length, december , wellesley's reply inconsistent action of the french government non-intercourse with great britain revived by statute, march , the american minister withdraws from london, february , non-intercourse with great britain remains in vigor to, and during, the war augustus j. foster appointed british minister to the united states, february, his instructions his correspondence with the secretary of state settlement of the "chesapeake" affair the collision between the "president" and the "little belt" special session of congress summoned the president's message to congress, november , increase of the army voted debate on the navy congress refuses to increase the navy, january , embargo of ninety days preparatory to war, april the evasions of this measure increasing evidence of the duplicity of napoleon's action report of the french minister of foreign affairs, march , consequent british declaration use of these papers by barlow, american minister to france the spurious french decree of april , , communicated to barlow communicated to the british government considerations influencing the british government the orders in council revoked madison sends a war message to congress, june , declaration of war, june , conditions of the army, navy, and treasury chapter v the theatre of operations limitations on american action through deficient sea power warfare against commerce considered its financial and political effects its military bearing distinction between military and commercial blockade commercial blockade identical in essence with commerce-destroying by cruisers recognition of this by napoleon commerce destruction by blockade the weapon of the stronger navy; by cruisers, of the weaker inefficiency of the american government shown in the want of naval preparation conditions in the army even worse jefferson's sanguine expectations propriety of the invasion of canada discussed the united states, weak on the seaboard, relatively strong towards canada function of the seaboard in the war; defensive offensive opportunity essential to any scheme of defence application of this principle; in general, and to conditions on the canada frontier, favoring the offensive by the united states importance of the great lakes to military operations over-confidence of americans corresponding apprehension of british officers decisive points on the line between the countries importance of the indians as an element in the situation proper offensive policy of the united states natural advantages favoring the united states the land frontier the proper scene of american offensive action seaboard conditions, for offence and defence chapter vi early cruises and engagements. hull's operations and surrender composition of commodore rodgers' squadron at outbreak of war indecisions of the navy department question between small squadrons and single cruisers for commerce-destroying opinions of prominent officers british convoy system for protecting trade the navy department formulates a plan of operations discussion of its merits rodgers sails without receiving department's plan encounter with the "belvidera" the cruise unproductive, offensively but not therefore unsuccessful, defensively its effect upon the movements of british vessels the sailing of the "constitution" chased by a british squadron cruise of the "constitution" under hull engagement with the "guerrière" hull and rodgers meet in boston misfortune on land wretched condition of the american army appointment of henry dearborn and william hull as generals. hull to command in the northwest isaac brock, the british general commanding in upper canada his well-considered scheme of operation incompetency of the american war department hull takes command at dayton advances to detroit crosses to canada brock causes seizure of michilimackinac hull's delays in canada, before malden the danger of his position the british attack his communications hull recrosses to detroit brock's difficulties moves against hull, and reaches malden crosses to detroit, and advances hull surrenders criticism of his conduct extenuating circumstances ultimate responsibility lies upon the governments which had been in power for ten years chapter vii operations on the northern frontier after hull's surrender. european events bearing on the war brock returns to niagara from detroit prevost, governor-general of canada, arranges with dearborn a suspension of hostilities suspension disapproved by the american government. hostilities resumed brock's advantage by control of the water two of his vessels on lake erie taken from him by lieutenant elliott, u.s. navy brock's estimate of this loss american attack upon queenston repulsed, but brock killed abortive american attack on the upper niagara inactivity of dearborn on the northern new york frontier military inefficiency throughout the united states improvement only in the naval situation on the lakes captain chauncey appointed to command on lakes erie and ontario his activity and efficiency disadvantages of his naval base, sackett's harbor chauncey's early operations, november, fleet lays up for the winter effect of his first operations general harrison succeeds to hull's command colonel procter commands the british forces opposed his instructions from prevost and brock harrison's plan of operations the american disaster at frenchtown effect upon harrison's plans the army remains on the defensive, awaiting naval control of lake erie chauncey visits lake erie disadvantages of black rock as a naval station chauncey selects presqu'isle (erie) instead orders vessels built there advantages and drawbacks of erie as a naval base commander perry ordered to the lakes assigned by chauncey to command on lake erie naval conditions on lakes erie and ontario, at close of contemporary european conditions napoleon's expedition against russia commercial embarrassments of great britain necessity of american supplies to the british armies in spain preoccupation of the british navy with conditions in europe and the east consequent embarrassment from the american war need of the american market danger to british west india trade from an american war burden thrown upon the british admiralty british anxiety to avoid war chapter viii ocean warfare against commerce--privateering--british licenses--naval actions: "wasp" and "frolic," "united states" and "macedonian" consolidation of british transatlantic naval commands sir john borlase warren commander-in-chief british merchant ships forbidden to sail without convoy continued hope for restoration of peace warren instructed to make propositions reply of the american government cessation of impressment demanded. negotiation fails warren's appreciation of the dangers to british commerce extemporized character of the early american privateering its activities therefore mainly within warren's station cruise of the privateer "rossie," captain barney privateering not a merely speculative undertaking conditions necessary to its success illustrated by the privateer "america" comparative immunity of american shipping and commerce at the beginning of hostilities causes for this controversial correspondence between warren and the admiralty policy of the admiralty. its effects american ships of war and privateers gradually compelled to cruise in distant seas american commerce excluded from the ocean sailing of the squadrons of rodgers and decatur their separation cruise of rodgers' squadron british licenses to american merchant vessels action between the "wasp" and "frolic" cruise of the "argus," of decatur's division action between the "united states" and "macedonian" the "united states" returns with her prize list of illustrations. volume one. the impressment of an american seaman _frontispiece_ from a drawing by stanley m. arthurs. gouverneur morris page from the painting by marchant, after sully, in independence hall, philadelphia. john jay page from the painting by gilbert stuart, in bedford (jay) house, katonah, n.y. james monroe page from the painting by gilbert stuart, in the possession of hon. t. jefferson coolidge. thomas jefferson page from the painting by gilbert stuart, in bowdoin college, brunswick, me. james madison page from the painting by gilbert stuart, in bowdoin college, brunswick, me. the chase of the _belvidera_ page from a drawing by carlton t. chapman. the forecastle of the _constitution_ during the chase page from a drawing by henry reuterdahl. captain isaac hull page from the engraving by d. edwin, after the painting by gilbert stuart. the burning of the _guerrière_ page from a drawing by henry reuterdahl. captain stephen decatur page from the painting by gilbert stuart, in independence hall, philadelphia. maps and battle plans. volume one. theatre of land and coast warfare page the atlantic ocean, showing the positions of the ocean actions of the war of and the movements of the squadrons in july and august, page plan of the engagement between the _constitution_ and _guerrière_ page map of lake frontier to illustrate campaigns of - page the cruises of the three american squadrons in the autumn of page plan of the engagement between the _united states_ and _macedonian_ page sea power in its relations to the war of antecedents of the war chapter i colonial conditions the head waters of the stream of events which led to the war of , between the united states and great britain, must be sought far back in the history of europe, in the principles governing commercial, colonial, and naval policy, accepted almost universally prior to the french revolution. it is true that, before that tremendous epoch was reached, a far-reaching contribution to the approaching change in men's ideas on most matters touching mercantile intercourse, and the true relations of man to man, of nation to nation, had been made by the publication, in , of adam smith's "inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations;" but, as is the case with most marked advances in the realm of thought, the light thus kindled, though finding reflection here and there among a few broader intellects, was unable to penetrate at once the dense surface of prejudice and conservatism with which the received maxims of generations had incrusted the general mind. against such obstruction even the most popular of statesmen--as the younger pitt soon after this became--cannot prevail at once; and, before time permitted the british people at large to reach that wider comprehension of issues, whereby alone radical change is made possible, there set in an era of reaction consequent upon the french revolution, the excesses of which involved in one universal discredit all the more liberal ideas that were leavening the leaders of mankind. the two principal immediate causes of the war of were the impressment of seamen from american merchant ships, upon the high seas, to serve in the british navy, and the interference with the carrying trade of the united states by the naval power of great britain. for a long time this interference was confined by the british ministry to methods which they thought themselves able to defend--as they did the practice of impressment--upon the ground of rights, prescriptive and established, natural or belligerent; although the american government contended that in several specific measures no such right existed,--that the action was illegal as well as oppressive. as the war with napoleon increased in intensity, however, the exigencies of the struggle induced the british cabinet to formulate and enforce against neutrals a restriction of trade which it confessed to be without sanction in law, and justified only upon the plea of necessary retaliation, imposed by the unwarrantable course of the french emperor. these later proceedings, known historically as the orders in council,[ ] by their enormity dwarfed all previous causes of complaint, and with the question of impressment constituted the vital and irreconcilable body of dissent which dragged the two states into armed collision. undoubtedly, other matters of difficulty arose from time to time, and were productive of dispute; but either they were of comparatively trivial importance, easily settled by ordinary diplomatic methods, or there was not at bottom any vital difference as to principle, but only as to the method of adjustment. for instance, in the flagrant and unpardonable outrage of taking men by force from the united states frigate "chesapeake," the british government, although permitted by the american to spin out discussion over a period of four years, did not pretend to sustain the act itself; the act, that is, of searching a neutral ship of war. whatever the motive of the ministry in postponing redress, their pretexts turned upon points of detail, accessory to the main transaction, or upon the subsequent course of the united states government, which showed conscious weakness by taking hasty, pettish half-measures; instead of abstaining from immediate action, and instructing its minister to present an ultimatum, if satisfaction were shirked. in the two causes of the war which have been specified, the difference was fundamental. whichever was right, the question at stake was in each case one of principle, and of necessity. great britain never claimed to impress american seamen; but she did assert that her native-born subjects could never change their allegiance, that she had an inalienable right to their service, and to seize them wherever found, except within foreign territory. from an admitted premise, that the open sea is common to all nations, she deduced a common jurisdiction, in virtue of which she arrested her vagrant seamen. this argument of right was reinforced by a paramount necessity. in a life and death struggle with an implacable enemy, great britain with difficulty could keep her fleet manned at all; even with indifferent material. the deterioration in quality of her ships' companies was notorious; and it was notorious also that numerous british seamen sought employment in american merchant ships, hoping there to find refuge from the protracted confinement of a now dreary maritime war. resort to impressment was not merely the act of a high-handed government, but the demand of both parties in the state, coerced by the sentiment of the people, whose will is ultimately irresistible. no ministry could hope to retain power if it surrendered the claim to take seamen found under a neutral flag. this fact was thoroughly established in a long discussion with united states plenipotentiaries, five years before the war broke out. on the other hand, the united states maintained that on the sea common the only jurisdiction over a ship was that of its own nation. she could not admit that american vessels there should be searched, for other purposes than those conceded to the belligerent by international law; that is, in order to determine the nature of the voyage, to ascertain whether, by destination, by cargo, or by persons carried, the obligations of neutrality were being infringed. if there was reasonable cause for suspicion, the vessel, by accepted law and precedent, might be sent to a port of the belligerent, where the question was adjudicated by legal process; but the actual captor could not decide it on the spot. on the contrary, he was bound, to the utmost possible, to preserve from molestation everything on board the seized vessel; in order that, if cleared, the owner might undergo no damage beyond the detention. so deliberate a course was not suited to the summary methods of impressment, nor to the urgent needs of the british navy. the boarding officer, who had no authority to take away a bale of goods, decided then and there whether a man was subject to impressment, and carried him off at once, if he so willed. it is to the credit of the american government under jefferson, that, though weak in its methods of seeking redress, it went straight back of the individual sufferer, and rested its case unswervingly on the broad principle.[ ] that impressment, thus practised, swept in american seamen, was an incident only, although it grievously aggravated the injury. whatever the native allegiance of individuals on board any vessel on the open ocean, their rights were not to be regulated by the municipal law of the belligerent, but by that of the nation to which the ship belonged, of whose territory she was constructively a part, and whose flag therefore was dishonored, if acquiescence were yielded to an infringement of personal liberty, except as conceded by obligations of treaty, or by the general law of nations. within british waters, the united states suffered no wrong by the impressment of british subjects--the enforcement of local municipal law--on board american vessels; and although it was suggested that such visits should not be made, and that an arriving crew should be considered to have the nationality of their ship, this concession, if granted, would have been a friendly limitation by great britain of her own municipal jurisdiction. it therefore could not be urged upon the british government by a nation which took its stand resolutely upon the supremacy of its own municipal rights, on board its merchant shipping on the high seas. it is to be noted, furthermore, that the voice of the people in the united states, the pressure of influence upon the government, was not as unanimous as that exerted upon the british ministry. the feeling of the country was divided; and, while none denied the grievous wrong done when an american was impressed, a class, strong at least in intellectual power, limited its demands to precautions against such mistakes and to redress when they occurred. the british claim to search, with the object of impressing british subjects, was considered by these men to be valid. thus gouverneur morris, who on a semi-official visit to london in had had occasion to remonstrate upon the impressment of americans in british ports, and who, as a pamphleteer, had taken strong ground against the measures of the british government injurious to american commerce, wrote as follows in about the practice of seizing british subjects in american ships: "that we, the people of america, should engage in ruinous warfare to support a rash opinion, that foreign sailors in our merchant ships are to be protected against the power of their sovereign, is downright madness." "why not," he wrote again in , while the war was raging, "waiving flippant debate, lay down the broad principle of national right, on which great britain takes her native seamen from our merchant ships? let those who deny the right pay, suffer, and fight, to compel an abandonment of the claim. men of sound mind will see, and men of sound principle will acknowledge, its existence." in his opinion, there was but one consistent course to be pursued by those who favored the war with great britain, which was to insist that she should, without compensation, surrender her claim. "if that ground be taken," he wrote, "the war [on our part] will be confessedly, as it is now impliedly, unjust."[ ] morris was a man honorably distinguished in our troubled national history--a member of the congress of the revolution and of the constitutional convention, a trained lawyer, a practised financier, and an experienced diplomatist; one who throughout his public life stood high in the estimation of washington, with whom he was in constant official and personal correspondence. it is to be added that those to whom he wrote were evidently in sympathy with his opinions. [illustration: gouverneur morris from the painting by marchant, after sully, in independence hall, philadelphia.] so again representative gaston, of north carolina, a member of the same political party as morris, speaking from his seat in the house in february, ,[ ] maintained the british doctrine of inalienable allegiance. "naturalization granted in another country has no effect whatever to destroy the original primary allegiance." even administration speakers did not deny this, but they maintained that the native allegiance could be enforced only within its territorial limits, not on the high seas. while perfectly firm and explicit as to the defence of american seamen,--even to the point of war, if needful,--gaston spoke of the british practice as a right. "if you cannot by substitute obtain an abandonment of the right, or practice, to search our vessels, regulate it so as to prevent its abuse; waiving for the present, not relinquishing, your objections to it." he expressed sympathy, too, for the desperate straits in which great britain found herself. "at a time when her floating bulwarks were her whole safeguard against slavery, she could not view without alarm and resentment the warriors who should have manned those bulwarks pursuing a more gainful occupation in american vessels. our merchant ships were crowded with british seamen, most of them deserters from their ships of war, and all furnished with fraudulent protections to prove them americans. to us they were not necessary." on the contrary, "they ate the bread and bid down the wages of native seamen, whom it was our first duty to foster and encourage." this competition with native seamen was one of the pleas likewise of the new england opposition, too much of which was obstinately and reprehensibly factious. "many thousands of british seamen," said governor strong of massachusetts, in addressing the legislature, may , , "deserted that service for a more safe and lucrative employment in ours." had they not, "the high price for that species of labor would soon have induced a sufficient number of americans to become seamen. it appears, therefore, that british seamen have been patronized at the expense of our own; and should great britain now consent to relinquish the _right of taking her own subjects_, it would be no advantage to our native seamen; it would only tend to reduce their wages by increasing the numbers of that class of men."[ ] gaston further said, that north carolina, though not a commercial state, had many native seamen; but, "at the moment war was declared, though inquiry was made, i could not hear of a single native seaman detained by british impressment." it is desirable, especially in these days, when everything is to be arbitrated, that men should recognize both sides of this question, and realize how impossible it was for either party to acquiesce in any other authority than their own deciding between them. "as i never had a doubt," said morris, "so i thought it a duty to express my conviction that british ministers would not, _dared not_, submit to mediation a question of essential right."[ ] "the way to peace is open and clear," he said the following year. "let the right of search and impressment be acknowledged as maxims of public law."[ ] these expressions, uttered in the freedom of private correspondence, show a profound comprehension of the constraint under which the british government and people both lay. it was impossible, at such a moment of extreme national peril, to depart from political convictions engendered by the uniform success of a policy followed consistently for a hundred and fifty years. for great britain, the time had long since passed into a dim distance, when the national appreciation of the sea to her welfare was that of mere defence, as voiced by shakespeare: england, hedged in with the main, that water-walled bulwark, still secure and confident from foreign purposes.[ ] this little world, this precious stone set in the silver sea, which serves it in the office of a wall, or as a moat defensive to a house against the envy of less happier lands.[ ] by the middle of the seventeenth century, the perception of great britain's essential need to predominate upon the sea had dawned upon men's minds, and thence had passed from a vague national consciousness to a clearly defined national line of action, adopted first through a recognition of existing conditions of inferiority, but after these had ceased pursued without any change of spirit, and with no important changes of detail. this policy was formulated in a series of measures, comprehensively known as the navigation acts, the first of which was passed in , during cromwell's protectorate. in , immediately after the restoration, it was reaffirmed in most essential features, and thenceforward continued to and beyond the times of which we are writing. in form a policy of sweeping protection, for the development of a particular british industry,--the carrying trade,--it was soon recognized that, in substance, its success had laid the foundations of a naval strength equally indispensable to the country. upon this ground it was approved even by adam smith, although in direct opposition to the general spirit of his then novel doctrine. while exposing its fallacies as a commercial measure, he said it exemplified one of two cases in which protective legislation was to be justified. "the defence of great britain, for example, depends very much upon the number of its sailors and shipping. the act of navigation therefore very properly endeavors to give the sailors and shipping of great britain the monopoly of the trade of their own country.... it is not impossible that some of the regulations of this famous act may have proceeded from national animosity. they are as wise, however, as though they had all been dictated by the most deliberate wisdom.... the act is not favorable to foreign commerce, nor to the opulence which can arise from that; but defence is of much more importance than opulence. the act of navigation is perhaps the wisest of all the commercial regulations of england."[ ] it became a dominant prepossession of british statesmen, even among smith's converts, in the conduct of foreign relations, that the military power of the state lay in the vast resources of native seamen, employed in its merchant ships. even the wealth returned to the country, by the monopoly of the imperial markets, and by the nearly exclusive possession of the carrying trade, which was insured to british commerce by the elaborate regulations of the act, was thought of less moment. "every commercial consideration has been repeatedly urged," wrote john adams, the first united states minister to great britain, "but to no effect; seamen, the navy, and power to strike an awful blow to an enemy at the first outbreak of war, are the ideas which prevail."[ ] this object, and this process, are familiar to us in these later days under the term "mobilization;" the military value of which, if rapidly effected, is well understood. in this light, and in the light of the preceding experience of a hundred and fifty years, we must regard the course of the british ministry through that period, extremely critical to both nations, which began when our war of independence ended, and issued in the war of . we in this day are continually told to look back to our fathers of the revolutionary period, to follow their precepts, to confine ourselves to the lines of their policy. let us then either justify the british ministries of pitt and his successors, in their obstinate adherence to the traditions they had received, or let us admit that even ancestral piety may be carried too far, and that venerable maxims must be brought to the test of existing conditions. the general movement of maritime intercourse between countries is commonly considered under two principal heads: commerce and navigation. the first applies to the interchange of commodities, however effected; the second, to their transportation from port to port. a nation may have a large commerce, of export and import, carried in foreign vessels, and possess little shipping of its own. this is at present the condition of the united states; and once, in far gone days, it was in great measure that of england. in such case there is a defect of navigation, consequent upon which there will be a deficiency of native seamen; of seamen attached to the country and its interests, by ties of birth or habit. for maritime war such a state will have but small resources of adaptable naval force; a condition dangerous in proportion to its dependence upon control of the sea. therefore the attention of british statesmen, during the period in which the navigation act flourished, fastened more and more upon the necessity of maintaining the navigation of the kingdom, as distinguished from its commerce. subsidiary to the movement of commerce, there is a third factor, relatively stationary, the consideration of which is probably less familiar now than it was to the contemporaries of the navigation act, to whom it was known under the name _entrepôt_. this term was applied to those commercial centres--in this connection maritime centres--where goods accumulate on their way to market; where they are handled, stored, or transshipped. all these processes involve expenditure, which inures to the profit of the port, and of the nation; the effect being the exact equivalent of the local gains of a railroad centre of the present day. it was a dominant object with statesmen of the earlier period to draw such accumulations of traffic to their own ports, or nations; to force trade, by ingenious legislation, or even by direct coercion, to bring its materials to their own shores, and there to yield to them the advantages of the _entrepôt_. thus the preamble to one of the series of navigation acts states, as a direct object, the "making this kingdom a staple[ ] [emporium], not only of the commodities of our plantations, but also of the commodities of other countries, and places, for the supply of the plantations."[ ] an instructive example of such indirect effort was the institution of free ports; ports which, by exemption from heavy customary tolls, or by the admission of foreign ships or goods, not permitted entrance to other national harbors, invited the merchant to collect in them, from surrounding regions, the constituents of his cargoes. on the other hand, the colonial system, which began to assume importance at the time of the navigation act, afforded abundant opportunity for the compulsion of trade. colonies being part of the mother country, and yet transoceanic with reference to her, maritime commerce between them and foreign communities could by direct legislation be obliged first to seek the parent state, which thus was made the distributing centre for both their exports and imports. for nearly three centuries before the decisive measures taken by the parliament of the commonwealth, the development and increase of english shipping, by regulation of english trade, had been recognized as a desirable object by many english rulers. the impulse had taken shape in various enactments, giving to english vessels privileges, exclusive or qualified, in the import or export carriage of the kingdom; and it will readily be understood that the matter appeared of even more pressing importance, when the navy depended upon the merchant service for ships, as well as for men; when the war fleets of the nation were composed of impressed ships, as well as manned by impressed sailors. these various laws had been tentative in character. both firmness of purpose and continuity of effort were lacking to them; due doubtless to the comparative weakness of the nation in the scale of european states up to the seventeenth century. during the reigns of the first two stuarts, this weakness was emphasized by internal dissensions; but the appreciation of the necessity for some radical remedy to the decay of english naval power remained and increased. to this conviction the ship-money of charles the first bears its testimony; but it was left to cromwell and his associates to formulate the legislation, upon which, for two centuries to come, the kingdom was thought to depend, alike for the growth of its merchant shipping and for the maintenance of the navy. all that preceded has interest chiefly as showing the origin and growth of an enduring national conviction, with which the united states came into collision immediately after achieving independence. the ninth of october, , is the date of the passing of the act, the general terms of which set for two hundred years the standard for british legislation concerning the shipping industry. the title of the measure, "goods from foreign ports, by whom to be imported," indicated at once that the object in view was the carrying trade; navigation, rather than commerce. commerce was to be manipulated and forced into english bottoms as an indispensable agency for reaching british consumers. at this time less than half a century had elapsed since the first english colonists had settled in massachusetts and virginia. the british plantation system was still in its beginnings, alike in america, asia, and africa. when the then recent civil war ended, in the overthrow of the royal power, it had been "observed with concern that the merchants of england had for several years usually freighted dutch ships for fetching home their merchandise, because the freights were lower than in english ships. dutch ships, therefore, were used for importing our own american products, while english ships lay rotting in harbor."[ ] "notwithstanding the regulations made for confining that branch of navigation to the mother country, it is said that in the west india islands there used, at this time, out of forty ships to be thirty-eight ships dutch bottoms."[ ] english mariners also, for want of employment, went into the dutch service. in this way seamen for the navy disappeared, just as, at a later day, they did into the merchant shipping of the united states. the one great maritime rival of england, holland, had thus engrossed, not only the carrying trade of europe at large, most of which, from port to port, was done by her seamen, but that of england as well. even of the english coasting trade much was done by dutch ships. under this competition, the english merchant marine was dwindling, and had become so inadequate that, when the exclusion of foreigners was enforced by the act, the cry at once arose in the land that the english shipping was not sufficient for the work thus thrust upon it. "although our own people have not shipping enough to import from all parts what they want, they are needlessly debarred from receiving new supplies of merchandise from other nations, who alone can, and until now did, import it."[ ] the effect of this decadence of shipping upon the resources of men for the navy is apparent. the existence of strained relations between england and holland facilitated the adoption of the first navigation act, which, as things were, struck the dutch only; they being the one great carrying community in europe. although both the letter and the purpose of the new law included in its prohibitions all foreign countries, the commercial interests of other states were too slight, and their commercial spirit too dull, to take note of the future effect upon themselves; whether absolutely, or in relation to the maritime power of great britain, the cornerstone of which was then laid. this first act directed that no merchandise from asia, africa, or america, including therein english "plantations," as the colonies were then styled,[ ] should be imported into england in other than english-built ships, belonging to english subjects, and of which "the master and mariners are also, for the most part of them, of the people of this commonwealth." this at once reserved a large part of the external trade to english ships; and also, by the regulation of the latter, constituted them a nursery for english seamen. to the general tenor of this clause, confining importation wholly to english vessels, an exception was made for europe only; importations from any part of which was permitted to "such foreign ships and vessels as do truly and properly belong to the people of that country or place of which the said goods are the growth, production, or manufacture."[ ] foreign merchantmen might therefore import into england the products of their own country; but both they and english vessels must ship such cargoes in the country of origin, not at any intermediate port. the purpose of these provisos, especially of the second, was to deprive holland of the profit of the middleman, or the _entrepôt_, which she had enjoyed hitherto by importing to herself from various regions, warehousing the goods, and then re-exporting. the expense of these processes, pocketed by dutch handlers, and the exaction of any dues levied by the dutch treasury, reappeared in increased cost to foreign consumers. this appreciation of the value of the _entrepôt_ underlay much of the subsequent colonial regulation of england, and actuated the famous orders in council of , which were a principal factor in causing the war of . a second effect of these restrictions, which in later times was deemed even more important than the pecuniary gain, was to compel english ships to go long voyages, to the home countries of the cargoes they sought, instead of getting them near by in dutch depots. this gave a corresponding development to the carrying trade--the navigation--of the commonwealth; securing greater employment for ships and seamen, increasing both their numbers and experience, and contributing thereby to the resources of the navy in men. "a considerable carrying trade would be lost to us, and would remain with the merchants of holland, of hamburg, and other maritime towns, if our merchants were permitted to furnish themselves by short voyages to those neighboring ports, and were not compelled to take upon themselves the burden of bringing these articles from the countries where they were produced."[ ] the act of , officially known as that of charles ii., modified the provisos governing the european trade. the exclusion of goods of european origin from all transportation to england, save in ships of their own nation, was to some extent removed. this surrender was censured by some, explicitly, because it again enabled the dutch to collect foreign articles and send them to england, thereby "permitting competition with this country in the longer part of the voyage;" to the injury, therefore, of british navigation. the remission, though real, was less than appeared; for the prohibitions of the commonwealth were still applied to a large number of specified articles, the produce chiefly of russia and turkey, which could be imported only in their national ships, or those of england. as those countries had substantially no long voyage shipping, trade with them was to all practical purposes confined to english vessels.[ ] the concession to foreign vessels, such as it was, was further qualified by heavier duties, called aliens' duties, upon their cargoes; and by the requirement that three-fourths of their crew, entering english ports, should be of the same nationality as the ship. the object of this regulation was to prevent the foreign state from increasing its tonnage, by employing seamen other than its own. this went beyond mere protection of english vessels, and was a direct attack, though by english municipal law, upon the growth of foreign shipping. this purpose indeed was authoritatively announced from the bench, construing the act in the decision of a specific case. "parliament had wisely foreseen that, if they restrained the importation or exportation of european goods, unless in our own ships, and manned with our own seamen, other states would do the same; and this, in its consequences, would amount to a prohibition of all such goods, which would be extremely detrimental to trade, and in the end defeat the very design of the act. it was seen, however, that many countries in europe, as france, spain, and italy, could more easily buy ships than build them; that, on the other hand, countries like russia, and others in the north, had timber and materials enough for building ships, but wanted sailors. it was from a consideration of this inaptness in most countries to accomplish a complete navigation, that the parliament prohibited the importation of most european goods, unless in ships owned and navigated by english, or in ships of the _build of_ and manned by sailors of that country of which the goods were the growth. the consequence would be that foreigners could not make use of ships they bought, though english subjects might. this would force them to have recourse to our shipping, and the general intent of the act, to secure the carrying trade to the english, would be answered as far as it possibly could." it was therefore ruled that the tenor of the act forbade foreigners to import to england in ships not of their own building; and, adds the reporter, "this exposition of the act of navigation is certainly the true one."[ ] having thus narrowed foreign competition to the utmost extent possible to municipal statutes, parliament made the carrying industry even more exclusively than before a preserve for native seamen. the commonwealth's requirement, that "the most" of the crew should be english, was changed to a definite prescription that the master and three-fourths of the mariners should be so. under such enactments, with frequent modification of detail, but no essential change of method, british shipping and seamen continued to be "protected" against foreign competition down to and beyond the war of . in this long interval there is no change of conception, nor any relaxation of national conviction. the whole history affords a remarkable instance of persistent policy, pursued consecutively for five or six generations. no better evidence could be given of its hold upon the minds of the people, or of the serious nature of the obstacle encountered by any other state that came into collision with it; as the united states during the napoleonic period did, in matters of trade and carriage, but especially in the closely related question of impressment. whether the navigation act, during its period of vigor, was successful in developing the british mercantile marine and supporting the british navy has been variously argued. the subsequent growth of british navigation is admitted; but whether this was the consequence of the measure itself has been disputed. it appears to the writer that those who doubt its effect in this respect allow their convictions of the strength of economical forces to blind them to the power of unremitting legislative action. to divert national activities from natural channels into artificial may be inexpedient and wasteful; and it may be reasonable to claim that ends so achieved are not really successes, but failures. nevertheless, although natural causes, till then latent, may have conspired to further the development which the navigation act was intended to promote, and although, since its abolition, the same causes may have sufficed to sustain the imposing national carrying trade built up during its continuance, it is difficult to doubt the great direct influence of the act itself; having in view the extent of the results, as well as the corroborative success of modern states in building up and maintaining other distinctly artificial industries, sometimes to the injury of the natural industries of other peoples, which the navigation act also in its day was meant to effect. the condition of british navigation in has been stated. the experience of the remaining years of the protectorate appears to have confirmed national opinion as to the general policy of the act, and to have suggested the modifications of the restoration. to trace the full sequence of development, in legislation or in shipping, is not here permissible; the present need being simply to give an account, and an explanation, of the strength of a national prepossession, which in its manifestation was a chief cause of the events that are the theme of this book. a few scattered details, taken casually, seem strikingly to sustain the claims of the advocates of the system, bearing always in mind the depression of the british shipping industry before the passage of the law. in there arrived in london from all parts beyond sea ships, of which only were under foreign flags; less than one in nine. in liverpool, in , of entered and cleared, but were foreign; in bristol, the same year, of but foreign. of the entire import of that year only per cent, in money value, came from europe; the carriage of the remaining per cent was confined to british ships. it may, of course, be maintained that this restriction of shipping operated to the disadvantage of the commerce of the kingdom; that there was direct pecuniary loss. this would not be denied, for the object of the act was less national gain than the upbuilding of shipping as a resource for the navy. nevertheless, at this same period, in , of ships entering the great north german commercial centre, hamburg, --over one-third--were british; the dutch but , the hamburgers themselves . a curious and suggestive comparison is afforded by the same port in . from the extensive, populous, and fruitful country of france, the _entrepôt_ of the richest west indian colony, santo domingo, there entered hamburg ships, of which not one was french; whereas from great britain there came a slightly larger total, , of which were british. such figures seem to substantiate the general contemporary opinion of the efficacy of the navigation act, and to support the particular claim of a british writer of the day, that the naval weakness of holland and france was due to the lack of similar measures. "the dutch have indeed pursued a different policy, but they have thereby fallen to a state of weakness, which is now the object of pity, or of contempt. it was owing to the want of sailors, and not to the fault of their officers, that the ten ships of the line, which during their late impudent quarrel with britain had been stipulated to join the french fleet, never sailed."[ ] "the french navy, which at all times depended chiefly upon the west india trade for a supply of seamen, must have been laid up, if the war (of american independence) had continued another year."[ ] whatever the accuracy of these statements,[ ]--and they are those of a well-informed man,--they represented a general conviction, not in great britain only but in europe, of the results of the navigation legislation. a french writer speaks of it as the source of england's greatness,[ ] and sums up his admiration in words which recognize the respective shares of natural advantages and sagacious supervision in the grand outcome. "called to commerce by her situation, it became the spirit of her government and the lever of her ambition. in other monarchies, it is private individuals who carry on commerce; but in that happy constitution it is the state, or the nation in its entirety." in great britain itself there was substantial unanimity. this colored all its after policy towards its lately rebellious and now independent children, who as carriers had revived the once dreaded rivalry of the dutch. to quote one writer, intimately acquainted with the whole theory and practice of the navigation acts, they "tend to the establishment of a monopoly; but our ancestors ... considered the defence of this island from foreign invasion as the first law in the national policy. judging that the dominion of the land could not be preserved without possessing that of the sea, they made every effort to procure to the nation a maritime power of its own. they wished that the merchants should own as many ships, and employ as many mariners as possible. to induce, and sometimes to force, them to this application of their capital, restrictions and prohibitions were devised. the interests of commerce were often sacrificed to this object." yet he claims that in the end commerce also profited, for "the increase in the number of ships became a spur to seek out employment for them." in , british registered shipping amounted to , , tons, employing , seamen. of these, by common practice, two-thirds--say , --were available for war, during which it was the rule to relax the act so far as to require only one-fourth of the crew to be british. "that the increase in our shipping is to be ascribed to our navigation system appears in the application of it to the trade of the united states. when those countries were part of our plantations, a great portion of our produce was transported to great britain and our west india islands in american bottoms; they had a share in the freight of sugars from those islands to great britain; they built annually more than one hundred ships, which were employed in the carrying trade of great britain; but since the independence of those states, since their ships have been excluded from our plantations, and that trade is wholly confined to british ships, we have gained that share of our carrying trade from which they are now excluded."[ ] in corroboration of the same tendency, it was also noted during the war with the colonies, that "the shipyards of britain in every port were full of employment, so that new yards were set up in places never before so used."[ ] that is, the war, stopping the intrusion of american colonists into the british carrying trade, just as the navigation act prohibited that of foreign nations, created a demand for british ships to fill the vacancy; a result perfectly in keeping with the whole object of the navigation system. but when hostilities with france began again in , and lasted with slight intermission for twenty years, the drain of the navy for seamen so limited the development of the british navigation as to afford an opening for competition, of which american maritime aptitude took an advantage, threatening british supremacy and arousing corresponding jealousy. besides the increase of national shipping, the idea of _entrepôt_ received recognition in both the earlier and later developments of the system. numerous specified articles, produced in english colonies, could be carried nowhere but to england, ireland, or another colony, where they must be landed before going farther. because regularly listed, such articles were technically styled "enumerated;" "enumerated commodities being such as must first be landed in england before being taken to foreign parts."[ ] from this privilege ireland was soon after excepted; enumerated goods for that country having first to be landed in england.[ ] among such enumerated articles, tobacco and rice held prominent places and illustrate the system. of the former, in the first half of the eighteenth century, it was estimated that on an average seventy-two million pounds were sent yearly to england, of which fifty-four million were re-exported; an export duty of sixpence per pound being then levied, besides the cost of handling. rice, made an enumerated article in , exemplifies aptly the ideas which influenced the multifold manipulation of the nation's commerce in those days. the restriction was removed in , so far as to permit this product to be sent direct from south carolina and georgia to any part of europe south of cape finisterre; but only in british ships navigated according to the act. in this there is a partial remission of the _entrepôt_ exaction, while the nursing of the carrying trade is carefully guarded. the latter was throughout the superior interest, inseparably connected in men's minds with the support of the navy. at a later date, west india sugar received the same indulgence as rice; it being found that the french were gaining the general european market, by permitting french vessels to carry the products of their islands direct to foreign continental ports. rice and sugar for northern europe, however, still had to be landed in england before proceeding. the colonial trade in general was made entirely subservient to the support and development of english shipping, and to the enrichment of england, as the half-way storehouse. into england foreign goods could be imported in some measure by foreign vessels, though under marked restrictions and disabilities; but into the colonies it was early forbidden to import any goods, whatever their origin, except in english-built ships, commanded and manned in accordance with the act. further, even in such ships they must be imported from england itself, not direct; not from the country of origin. the motive for this statute of [ ] is avowed in the preamble: to be with a view of maintaining a greater correspondence and kindness between them and the mother country, keeping the former in a firmer dependence upon the latter, and to make this kingdom the staple both of the commodities of the plantations, and of other countries in order to supply them. further, it was alleged that it was the usage of nations to keep their plantation trade to themselves.[ ] in compensation for this subjection of their trade to the policy of the mother country, the supplying of the latter with west india products was reserved to the colonists. thus, goods for the colonies, as well as those from the colonies, from or to a foreign country,--from or to france, for example,--must first be landed in england before proceeding to the ultimate destination. yet even this cherished provision, enforced against the foreigner, was made to subserve the carrying trade--the leading object; for, upon re-exportation to the colonies, there was allowed a drawback of duties paid upon admission to england, and permanent upon residents there. the effect of this was to make the articles cheaper in the colonies than in england itself, and so to induce increased consumption. it was therefore to the profit of the carrier; and the more acceptable, because the shipping required to bring home colonial goods was much in excess of that required for outward cargoes, to the consequent lowering of outward freights. "a regard to the profits of freights," writes a contemporary familiar with the subject, "as much as the augmentation of seamen, dictated this policy."[ ] from the conditions, it did not directly increase the number of seamen; but by helping the shipping merchant it supported the carrying industry as a whole. upon the legislative union of scotland with england, in , this _entrepôt_ privilege, with all other reserved advantages of english trade and commerce, was extended to the northern kingdom, and was a prominent consideration in inducing the scotch people to accept a political change otherwise distasteful, because a seeming sacrifice of independence. before this time they had had their own navigation system, modelled on the english; the acts of the two parliaments embodying certain relations of reciprocity. thenceforward, the navigation act is to be styled more properly a british, than an english, measure; but its benefits, now common to all great britain, were denied still to ireland. it will be realized that the habit of receiving exclusive favors at the expense of a particular set of people--the colonist and the foreigner--readily passed in a few generations into an unquestioning conviction of the propriety, and of the necessity, of such measures. it should be easy now for those living under a high protective tariff to understand that, having built up upon protection a principal national industry,--the carrying trade,--involving in its ramifications the prosperity of a large proportion of the wealth-producers of the country, english statesmen would fear to touch the fabric in any important part; and that their dread would be intensified by the conviction, universally held, that to remove any of these artificial supports would be to imperil at the same time the royal navy, the sudden expansion of which, from a peace to a war footing, depended upon impressment from the protected merchant ships. it will be seen also that with such precedents of _entrepôt_, for the nourishing of british commerce, it was natural to turn to the same methods,--although in a form monstrously exaggerated,--when napoleon by his decrees sought to starve british commerce to death. in conception and purpose, the orders in council of were simply a development of the _entrepôt_ system. their motto, "no trade save through england,"--the watchword of the ministry of canning, castlereagh, and perceval, - ,--was merely the revival towards the united states, as an independent nation, of the methods observed towards her when an assemblage of colonies, forty years before; the object in both cases being the welfare of great britain, involved in the monopoly of an important external commerce, the material of which, being stored first in her ports, paid duty to her at the expense of continental consumers. nor was there in the thought of the age, external to great britain, any corrective of the impressions which dominated her commercial policy. "commercial monopoly," wrote montesquieu, "is the leading principle of colonial intercourse;" and an accomplished west indian, quoting this phrase about , says: "the principles by which the nations of europe were influenced were precisely the same: ( ) to secure to themselves respectively the most important productions of their colonies, and ( ) to retain to themselves exclusively the advantage of supplying the colonies with european goods and manufactures."[ ] "i see," wrote john adams from france, in , "that the french merchants regard their colonies as english merchants considered us twenty years ago." the rigor of the french colonial trade system had been relaxed during the war of american independence, as was frequently done by all states during hostilities; but when louis xvi., in , sought to continue this, though in an extremely qualified concession, allowing american vessels of under sixty tons a limited trade between the west indies and their own country, the merchants of marseilles, bordeaux, rochelle, nantes, st. malo, all sent in excited remonstrances, which found support in the provincial parliaments of bordeaux and brittany.[ ] a further indication of the economical convictions of the french people, and of the impression made upon europe generally by the success of the british navigation act, is to be seen in the fact that in , under the republic, the national convention issued a decree identical in spirit, and almost identical in terms, with the english act of . in the latter year, said the report of the committee to the convention, "one-half the navigation of england was carried on by foreigners. she has imperceptibly retaken her rights. towards the year foreigners possessed no more than the fifth part of this navigation; in only a little more than the ninth; in a little more than a twelfth; and in they possessed only the fourteenth part of it."[ ] it is perhaps unnecessary to add that the colonial system of spain was as rigid as that of great britain, though far less capably administered. so universal was the opinion of the day as to the relation of colonies to navigation, that a contemporary american, familiar with the general controversy, wrote: "though speculative politicians have entertained doubts in regard to favorable effects from colonial possessions, taking into view the expenses of their improvement, defence, and government, no question has been made but that the monopoly of their trade greatly increases the commerce of the nations to which they are appurtenant."[ ] very soon after the adoption of the constitution, the congress of the united states, for the development of the carrying trade, enacted provisions analogous to the navigation act, so far as applicable to a nation having no colonies, but with large shipping and coasting interests to be favored. to such accepted views, and to such traditional practice, the independence of the thirteen british colonies upon the american continent came not only as a new political fact, but as a portentous breach in the established order of things. as such, it was regarded with uneasy jealousy by both france and spain; but to great britain it was doubly ominous. not only had she lost a reserved market, singly the most valuable she possessed, but she had released, however unwillingly, a formidable and recognized rival for the carrying trade, the palladium of her naval strength. the market she was not without hopes of regaining, by a compulsion which, though less direct, would be in effect as real as that enforced by colonial regulation; but the capacity of the americans as carriers rested upon natural conditions not so easy to overcome. the difficulty of the problem was increased by the fact that the governments of the world generally were awaking to the disproportionate advantages great britain had been reaping from them for more than a century, during which they had listlessly acquiesced in her aggressive absorption of the carriage of the seas. america could count upon their sympathies, and possible co-operation, in her rivalry with the british carrier. "it is manifest," wrote coxe in , "that a prodigious and almost universal revolution in the views of nations has taken place with regard to the carrying trade." when john adams spoke of the united states retaliating upon great britain, by enacting a similar measure of its own, the minister of portugal, then a country of greater weight than now, replied: "not a nation in europe would suffer a navigation act to be made by any other at this day. that of england was made in times of ignorance, when few nations cultivated commerce, and no country but she understood or cared anything about it, but now all courts are attentive to it;"[ ] so much so, indeed, that it has been said this was the age of commercial treaties. it was the age also of commercial regulation, often mistaken and injurious, which found its ideals largely in the navigation act of great britain, and in the resultant extraordinary processes of minute and comprehensive interference, with every species of commerce, and every article of export or import; for, while the general principles of the navigation act were few and simple enough, in application they entailed a watchful and constant balancing of advantages by the board of trade, and a consequent manipulation of the course of commerce,--a perfectly idealized and sublimated protection. the days of its glory, however, were passing fast. great britain was now in the position of one who has been first to exploit a great invention, upon which he has an exclusive patent. others were now entering the field, and she must prepare for competition, in which she most of all feared those of her own blood, the children of her loins; for the signs of the menacing conditions following the war of independence had been apparent some time before the revolt of the colonies gained for them liberty of action, heretofore checked in favor of the mother country. in these conditions, and in the national sentiment concerning them, are to be found the origin of a course of action which led to the war of . under the navigation act, and throughout the colonial period, the transatlantic colonies of great britain had grown steadily; developing a commercial individuality of their own, depending in each upon local conditions. the variety of these, with the consequent variety of occupations and products, and the distance separating all from the mother country, had contributed to develop among them a certain degree of mutual dependence, and consequent exchange; the outcome of which was a commercial system interior to the group as a whole, and distinct from the relations to great britain borne by them individually and collectively. there was a large and important intercolonial commerce,[ ] consistent with the letter of the navigation act, as well as a trade with great britain; and although each of these exerted an influence upon the other, it was indirect and circuitous. the two were largely separate in fact, as well as in idea; and the interchange between the various colonies was more than double that with the mother country. it drew in british as well as american seamen, and was considered thus to entail the disadvantage that, unless america were the scene of war, the crews there were out of reach of impressment; that measure being too crude and unsystematic to reach effectively so distant a source of supply. curiously enough, also, by an act passed in the reign of queen anne, seamen born in the american colonies were exempted from impressment.[ ] "during the late civil war (of american independence) it has been found difficult sufficiently to man our fleet, from the seamen insisting that, since they had been born in america, they could not be pressed to serve in the british navy."[ ] in these conditions, and especially in the difficulty of distinguishing the place of birth by the language spoken, is seen the foreshadowing of the troubles attending the practice of impressment, after the united states had become a separate nation. the british american colonies were divided by geographical conditions into two primary groups: those of the west india islands, and those of the continent. the common use of the latter term, in the thought and speech of the day, is indicated by the comprehensive adjective "continental," familiarly applied to the congress, troops, currency, and other attributes of sovereignty, assumed by the revolted colonies after their declaration of independence. each group had special commercial characteristics--in itself, and relatively to great britain. the islands, whatever their minor differences of detail, or their mutual jealousies, or even their remoteness from one another,--jamaica being a thousand miles from her eastern sisters,--were essentially a homogeneous body. similarity of latitude and climate induced similarity of social and economical conditions; notably in the dependence on slave labor, upon which the industrial fabric rested. their products, among which sugar and coffee were the most important, were such as europe did not yield; it was therefore to their advantage to expend labor upon these wholly, and to depend upon external sources for supplies of all kinds, including food. their exports, being directed by the navigation act almost entirely upon great britain, were, in connection with virginia tobacco, the most lucrative of the "enumerated" articles which rendered tribute to the _entrepôt_ monopoly of the mother country. it was in this respect particularly, as furnishing imports to be handled and re-exported, that the islands were valuable to the home merchants. to the welfare of the body politic they contributed by their support of the carrying trade; for the cargoes, being bulky, required much tonnage, and the entire traffic was confined to british ships, manned three-fourths by british seamen. as a market also the islands were of consequence; all their supplies coming, by law, either from or through great britain, or from the continental colonies. intercourse with foreign states was prohibited, and that with foreign colonies allowed only under rare and disabling conditions. but although the west indies thus maintained a large part of the mother country's export trade, the smallness of their population, and the simple necessities of the slaves, who formed the great majority of the inhabitants, rendered them as british customers much inferior to the continental colonies; and this disparity was continually increasing, for the continent was growing rapidly in numbers, wealth, and requirements. in the five years - , the exports from great britain to the two quarters were nearly equal; but a decade later the continent took double the amount that the islands demanded. the figures quoted for the period - are: to the west indies, £ , , ; to north america, £ , , .[ ] in the five years ending the west indies received £ , , ; the thirteen continental colonies, £ , , .[ ] imports from the continent also supported the carrying trade of great britain, but not to an extent proportionate to those from the islands; for many of the continental colonies were themselves large carriers. the imports to them, being manufactured articles, less bulky than the exports of the islands, also required less tonnage. the most marked single difference between the west india communities and those of the continent was that the latter, being distributed on a nearly north and south line, with consequent great divergences of climate and products, were essentially not homogeneous. what one had, another had not. such differences involve of course divergence of interests, with consequent contentions and jealousies, the influence of which was felt most painfully prior to the better union of , and never can wholly cease to act; but, on the other hand, it tends also to promote exchange of offices, where need and facility of transport combine to make such exchange beneficial to both. that the intercourse between the continental colonies required a tonnage equal to that employed between them and the west indies,--testified by the return of before quoted,[ ]--shows the existence of conditions destined inevitably to draw them together. the recognition of such mutual dependence, when once attained, furthers the practice of mutual concession for the purpose of combined action. consequently, in the protracted struggle between the centripetal and centrifugal forces in north america, the former prevailed, though not till after long and painful wavering. while thus differing greatly among themselves in the nature of their productions, and in their consequent wants, the continental colonists as a whole had one common characteristic. recent occupants of a new, unimproved, and generally fertile country, they turned necessarily to the cultivation of the soil as the most remunerative form of activity, while for manufactured articles they depended mainly upon external supplies, the furnishing of which great britain reserved to herself. for these reasons they afforded the great market which they were to her, and which by dint of habit and of interest they long continued to be. but, while thus generally agricultural by force of circumstances, the particular outward destinations of their surplus products varied. those of the southern colonies, from maryland to georgia, were classed as "enumerated," and, with the exception of the rice of south carolina and georgia, partially indulged as before mentioned, must be directed upon great britain. tobacco, cotton, indigo, pitch, tar, turpentine, and spars of all kinds for ships, were specifically named, and constituted much the larger part of the exports of those colonies. these were carried also chiefly by british vessels, and not by colonial. the case was otherwise in the middle colonies, pennsylvania, new york, new jersey, and in connecticut and rhode island of the eastern group. they were exporters of provisions,--of grain, flour, and meat, the latter both as live stock and salted; of horses also. as the policy of the day protected the british farmer, these articles were not required to be sent to great britain; on the contrary, grain was not allowed admission except in times of scarcity, determined by the price of wheat in the london market. the west indies, therefore, were the market of the middle colonies; the shortness of the voyage, and the comparatively good weather, after a little southing had been gained, giving a decisive advantage over european dealers in the transportation of live animals. flour also, because it kept badly in the tropics, required constant carriage of new supplies from sources near at hand. along with provisions the continental vessels took materials for building and cooperage, both essential to the industry of the islands,--to the housing of the inhabitants, and to the transport of their sugar, rum, and molasses. in short, so great was the dependence of the islands upon this trade, that a well-informed planter of the time quotes with approval the remark of "a very competent judge," that, "if the continent had been wholly in foreign hands, and england wholly precluded from intercourse with it, it is very doubtful whether we should now have possessed a single acre in the west indies."[ ] now this traffic, while open to all british shipping, was very largely in the hands of the colonists, who built ships decidedly cheaper than could be done in england, and could distribute their tonnage in vessels too small to brave the atlantic safely, but, from their numbers and size, fitted to scatter to the numerous small ports of distribution, which the badness of internal communications rendered advantageous for purposes of supply. a committee of the privy council of great britain, constituted soon after the independence of the united states to investigate the conditions of west india trade, reported that immediately before the revolt the carriage between the islands and the continent had occupied voyages, in vessels aggregating , tons, navigated by men. these transported what was then considered "the vast" american cargo, of £ , outward and £ , inward. but the ominous feature from the point of view of the navigation act was that this was carried almost wholly in american bottoms.[ ] in short, not to speak of an extensive practice of smuggling, facilitated by a coast line too long and indented to be effectually watched,--mention of which abounds in contemporary annals,[ ]--a very valuable part of the british carrying trade was in the hands of the middle colonists, whose activity, however, did not stop even there; for, not only did they deal with foreign west indies,[ ] but the cheapness of their vessels, owing to the abundance of the materials, permitted them to be used also to advantage in a direct trade with southern europe, their native products being for the most part "not enumerated." as early as , pennsylvania employed eight thousand tons of shipping, while the new england colonies at the same time owned forty thousand tons, distributed in six hundred vessels, manned by six thousand seamen. the new englanders, like their countrymen farther south, were mostly farmers; but the more rugged soil and severer climate gave them little or no surplus for export. for gain by traffic, for material for exchange, they therefore turned to the sea, and became the great carriers of america, as well as its great fishers. an english authority, writing of the years immediately preceding the war of independence, states that most of the seamen sailing out of the southern ports were british; from the middle colonies, half british and half american; but in the new england shipping he admits three-fourths were natives.[ ] this tendency of british seamen to take employment in colonial ships is worthy of note, as foreshadowing the impressment difficulties of a later day. these, like most of the disagreements which led to the war of , had their origin in ante-revolutionary conditions. for example, commodore palliser, an officer of mark, commanding the newfoundland station in , reported to the admiralty the "cruel custom," long practised by commanders of fishing ships, of leaving many men on the desert coast of newfoundland, when the season was over, whereby "these men were obliged to sell themselves to the colonists, or piratically run off with vessels, which they carry to the continent of america. by these practices the newfoundland fishery, supposed to be one of the most valuable nurseries for seamen,[ ] has long been an annual drain."[ ] in the two years, - , he estimates that , seamen thus went to the colonies; in the next two years, . the difference was probably due to the former period being immediately after a war, the effects of which it reflected. the general conditions of remained thirty years later, simply having become magnified as the colonies grew in wealth and population. in twenty-two thousand tons of shipping were annually built by the continental colonists. they even built ships for great britain; and this indulgence, for so it was considered, was viewed jealously by a class of well-informed men, intelligent, but fully imbued with the ideas of the navigation act, convinced that the carrying trade was the corner-stone of the british navy, and realizing that where ships were cheaply built they could be cheaply sailed, even if they paid higher wages. it is true, and should be sedulously remembered, especially now in the united states, that the strength of a merchant shipping lies in its men even more than in its ships; and therefore that the policy of a country which wishes a merchant marine should be to allow its ships to be purchased where they most cheaply can, in order that the owner may be able to spend more on his crew, and the nation consequently to keep more seamen under its flag. but in the relative conditions placed great britain under serious disadvantages towards america in the matter of ship-building; for the heavy drafts upon her native oak had caused the price to rise materially, and even the forests of continental europe felt the strain, while the colonies had scarcely begun to touch their resources. in , more than one-third of the foreign trade of great britain was carried in american-built ships; the respective tonnage being, british-built, , ; american, , .[ ] british merchants and ship-owners knew also that the colonial carriers were not ardent adherents of the navigation act, but conducted their operations in conformity with it only when compelled.[ ] they traded with the foreigner as readily as with the british subject; and, what was quite unpardonable in the ideas of that time, after selling a cargo in a west indian port, instead of reloading there, they would take the hard cash of the island to a french neighbor, buying of him molasses to be made into rum at home. in this commercial shrewdness the danger was not so much in the local loss, or in the single transaction, for in the commercial supremacy of england the money was pretty sure to find its way back to the old country. the sting was that the sharp commercial instinct, roving from port to port, with a keen scent for freight and for bargains, maintained a close rivalry for the carrying trade, which was doubly severe from the natural advantages of the shipping and the natural aptitudes of the ship-owners. already the economical attention of the new englanders to the details of their shipping business had been noted, and had earned for them the name of the dutchmen of north america; an epithet than which there was then none more ominous to british ears, and especially where with the carrying trade was associated the twin idea of a nursery of seamen for the british navy. a fair appreciation of the facts and relations, summarized in the preceding pages from an infinitude of details, is necessary to a correct view of the origin and course of the misunderstandings and disagreements which finally led to the war of . in , the restoration of peace and the acknowledgment of the independence of the former colonies removed from commerce the restrictions incident to hostilities, and replaced in full action, essentially unchanged, the natural conditions which had guided the course of trade in colonial days. the old country, retaining all the prepossessions associated with the now venerable and venerated navigation act, saw herself confronted with the revival of a commercial system, a commercial independence, of which she had before been jealous, and which could no longer be controlled by political dependence. it was to be feared that supplying the british west indies would increase american shipping, and that british seamen would more and more escape into it, with consequent loss to british navigation, both in tonnage and men, and discouragement to british maritime industries. hence, by the ideas of the time, was to be apprehended weakness for war, unless some effective check could be devised. what would have been the issue of these anxieties, and of the measures to which they gave rise, had not the french revolution intervened to aggravate the distresses of great britain, and to constrain her to violent methods, is bootless to discuss. it remains true that, both before and during the conflict with the french republic and empire, the general character of her actions, to which the united states took exception, was determined by the conditions and ideas that have been stated, and can be understood only through reference to them. no sooner had peace been signed, in , than disagreements sprang up again from the old roots of colonial systems and ideals. to these essentially was due the detailed sequence of events which, influenced by such traditions of opinion and policy as have been indicated, brought on the war of , which has not inaptly been styled the second war of independence. madison, who was contemporary with the entire controversy, and officially connected with it from to the end of the war, first as secretary of state, and later as president, justly summed up his experience of the whole in these words: "to have shrunk from resistance, under such circumstances, would have acknowledged that, on the element which forms three-fourths of the globe which we inhabit, and where all independent nations have equal and common rights, the american people were not an independent people, but colonists and vassals. with such an alternative war was chosen."[ ] the second war was closely related to the first in fact, though separated by a generation in time. footnotes: [ ] order in council was a general term applied to all orders touching affairs, internal as well as external, issued by the king in council. the particular orders here in question, by their extraordinary character and wide application, came to have a kind of sole title to the expression in the diplomatic correspondence between the two countries. [ ] instructions of madison, secretary of state, to monroe, minister to great britain, january , . article i. american state papers, vol. iii. p. . [ ] diary and letters of gouverneur morris, vol. ii. pp. , . [ ] annals of congress. thirteenth congress, vol. ii. pp. ; - . [ ] niles' register, vol. iv. p. . author's italics. [ ] diary and letters, vol. ii. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . those unfamiliar with the subject should be cautioned that the expression "right of search" is confined here, not quite accurately, to searching for british subjects liable to impressment. this right the united states denied. the "right of search" to determine the nationality of the vessel, and the character of the voyage, was admitted to belligerents then, as it is now, by all neutrals. [ ] king john, act ii. scene . [ ] king richard ii., act ii. scene . [ ] inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. edited by j.e. thorold rogers. oxford, , pp. - . in a subsequent passage (p. ), smith seems disposed somewhat to qualify the positive assertion here quoted, on the ground that the navigation act had not had time to exert much effect, at the period when some of the most decisive successes over the dutch were won. it is to be observed, however, that a vigorous military government, such as cromwell's was, can assert itself in the fleet as well as in the army, creating an effective organization out of scanty materials, especially when at war with a commercial state of weak military constitution, like holland. it was the story of rome and carthage repeated. louis xiv. for a while accomplished the same. but under the laxity of a liberal popular government, which england increasingly enjoyed after the restoration, naval power could be based securely only upon a strong, available, and permanent maritime element in the civil body politic; that is, on a mercantile marine. as regards the working of the navigation act to this end, whatever may be argued as to the economical expediency of protecting a particular industry, there is no possible doubt that such an industry can be built up, to huge proportions, by sagacious protection consistently enforced. the whole history of protection demonstrates this, and the navigation act did in its day. it created the british carrying trade, and in it provided for the royal navy an abundant and accessible reserve of raw material, capable of being rapidly manufactured into naval seamen in an hour of emergency. [ ] works of john adams, vol. viii. pp. - . [ ] this primary meaning of the word "staple" seems to have disappeared from common use, in which it is now applied to the commercial articles, the concentration of which at a particular port made that port a "staple." [ ] bryan edwards, west indies, vol. ii. p. . [ ] macpherson, annals of commerce, vol. ii. p. . [ ] reeves, history of the law of navigation, dublin, , p. . [ ] macpherson, vol. ii. p. . [ ] reeves, writing in , says that there seemed then no distinction of meaning between "plantation" and "colony." plantation was the earlier term; "'colony' did not come much into use till the reign of charles ii., and it seems to have denoted the political relation." (p. .) by derivation both words express the idea of cultivating new ground, or establishing a new settlement; but "plantation" seems to associate itself more with the industrial beginnings, and "colony" with the formal regulative purpose of the parent state. [ ] the navigation acts of , , , and , as well as other subsequent measures of the same character, can be found, conveniently for american readers, in macdonald's select charters illustrative of american history. macmillan, new york. . [ ] reeves, history of the law of navigation, p. . [ ] for instance, in , eighteen hundred and forty vessels passed the sound in the british trade. of these only thirty-five were russian. considerably more than half of the trade of st. petersburg with europe at large was done in british ships. macpherson, vol. iii. p. . [ ] opinion of chief baron parker, quoted by reeves, pp. - . [ ] chalmers, opinions on interesting subjects of public law and commercial policy arising from american independence, p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] a french naval historian supports them, speaking of the year : "the considerable armaments made since had exhausted the resources of personnel. to remedy the difficulty the complements were filled up with coast-guard militia, with marine troops until then employed only to form the guards of the ships, and finally with what were called 'novices volontaires,' who were landsmen recruited by bounties. it may be imagined what crews were formed with such elements."--troude, batailles navales, vol. ii. p. . [ ] raynal, histoire philosophique des deux indes, vol. vii. p. (edition ). raynal's reputation is that of a plagiarist, but his best work is attributed to far greater names of his time. he died in . [ ] reeves, pp. - . [ ] macpherson, vol. iv. p. . [ ] macpherson, annals of commerce, vol. i. p. - . [ ] bryan edwards, west indies, vol. ii. p. . [ ] officially, statute of charles ii. [ ] reeves, p. . [ ] chalmers, opinions on interesting subjects, p. . [ ] bryan edwards, west indies, vol. ii. p. - ( d edition). [ ] works of john adams, vol. viii. p. . [ ] compare with sheffield, observations on the commerce of the american states (edition february, ), p. , note; from which, indeed, these figures seem to have been taken, or from some common source. [ ] coxe's view of the united states of america, philadelphia, , p. . [ ] works of john adams, vol. viii. p. . adams says again, himself: "it is more and more manifest every day that there is, and will continue, a general scramble for navigation. carrying trade, ship-building, fisheries, are the cry of every nation."--vol. viii. p. . [ ] from an official statement, made public in , it appears that in the year the total trade, inward and outward, of the colonies on the american continent, amounted to , tons. of this per cent was coastwise, to other members of the group; with the west indies; with great britain and ireland; and with southern europe. bermuda and the bahamas, inconsiderable as to trade, were returned among continental colonies by the custom house.--sheffield, commerce of the american states, table vii. [ ] chalmers, opinions, p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] macpherson, vol. iii. p. . [ ] report of committee of privy council, jan. , , pp. - . [ ] ante, p. (note). [ ] bryan edwards, west indies, vol. ii. p. . [ ] chalmers, opinions, p. . [ ] see, for instance, the colden papers, proceedings n.y. historical society, . there is in these much curious economical information of other kinds. [ ] a comparison of the figures just quoted, as to the british west indies, with sheffield's table vii., indicates that the trade of the continent with the foreign islands about equalled that with the british. the trade with the french west indies, "open or clandestine, was considerable, and wholly in american vessels."--macpherson, vol. iii. p. . [ ] sheffield, commerce of the american states, p. . [ ] that is, for the navy. [ ] macpherson, annals of commerce, vol. iii. p. . [ ] macpherson, vol. iv. p. . the great west india cargo of , an especial preserve of the navigation act, was carried to england in ships, of which one-third were built in america. [ ] "the contraband trade carried on by plantation ships in defiance of the act of navigation was a subject of repeated complaint." "the laws of navigation were nowhere disobeyed and contemned so openly as in new england. the people of massachusetts bay were from the first disposed to act as if independent of the mother country."--reeves, pp. , . the particular quotations apply to the early days of the measure, - ; but the complaint continued to the end. in - , "one of the great grievances in the american trade was, that great quantities of foreign molasses and syrups were clandestinely run on shore in the british colonies."--p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. i. p. . chapter ii from independence to jay's treaty, the colonial connection between great britain and the thirteen communities which became the original states of the american union was brought to a formal conclusion in , by their declaration of independence. substantially, however, it had already terminated in . this year was marked by the passage of the boston port bill, with its accessory measures, by the british parliament, and likewise by the renewal, in the several colonies, of the retaliatory non-importation agreements of . the fundamental theory of the eighteenth century concerning the relations between a mother country and her colonies, that of reciprocal exclusive benefit, had thus in practice yielded to one of mutual injury; to coercion and deprivation on the one side, and to passive resistance on the other. on september the representatives of twelve colonies assembled in philadelphia; georgia alone sending no delegates, but pledging herself in anticipation to accept the decisions taken by the others. one of the first acts of this congress of the continental colonies was to indorse the resolutions by which massachusetts had placed herself in an attitude of contingent rebellion against the crown, and to pledge their support to her in case of a resort to arms. these several steps were decisive and irrevocable, except by an unqualified abandonment, by one party or the other, of the principles which underlay and dictated them. the die was cast. to use words attributed to george the third, "the colonies must now either submit or triumph." the period which here began, viewed in the aggregate of the national life of the united states, was one of wavering transition and uncertain issue in matters political and commercial. its ending, in these two particulars, is marked by two conspicuous events: the adoption of the constitution and the commercial treaty with great britain. the formation of the federal government, - , gave to the union a political stability it had hitherto lacked, removing elements of weakness and dissensions, and of consequent impotence in foreign relations; the manifestation of which since the acknowledgment of independence had justified alike the hopes of enemies and the forebodings of friends. settled conditions being thus established at home, with institutions competent to regulate a national commerce, internal and external, as well as to bring the people as a whole into fixed relations with foreign communities, there was laid the foundations of a swelling prosperity to which the several parts of the country jointly contributed. the effects of these changes were soon shown in a growing readiness on the part of other nations to enter into formal compacts with us. of this, the treaty negotiated by john jay with great britain, in , is the most noteworthy instance; partly because it terminated one long series of bickerings with our most dangerous neighbor, chiefly because the commercial power of the state with which it was contracted had reached a greater eminence, and exercised wider international effect, than any the modern world had then seen. whatever the merits of the treaty otherwise, therefore, the willingness of great britain to enter into it at all gave it an epochal significance. since independence, commercial intercourse between the two peoples had rested on the strong compelling force of natural conditions and reciprocal convenience, the true foundation, doubtless, of all useful relations; but its regulation had been by municipal ordinance of either state, changeable at will, not by mutual agreement binding on both for a prescribed period. since the separation, this condition had seemed preferable to great britain, which, as late as , had evaded overtures towards a commercial arrangement.[ ] her consenting now to modify her position was an implicit admission that in trade, as in political existence, the former mother country recognized at last the independence of her offspring. the latter, however, was again to learn that independence, to be actual, must rest on something stronger than words, and surer than the acquiescence of others. this was to be the lesson of the years between and , administered to us not only by the preponderant navy of great britain, but by the petty piratical fleets of the barbary powers. from the boston port bill to jay's treaty was therefore a period of transition from entire colonial dependence, under complete regulation of all commercial intercourse by the mother country, to that of national commercial power, self-regulative and efficient, through the adoption of the constitution. upon this followed international influence, the growing importance of which great britain finally recognized by formal concessions, hitherto refused or evaded. during these years the policy of her government was undergoing a process of adjustment, conditioned on the one hand by the still vigorous traditional prejudices associated with the administration of dependencies, and on the other by the radical change in political relations between her remaining colonies in america and the new states which had broken from the colonial bond. this change was the more embarrassing, because the natural connection of specific mutual usefulness remained, although the tie of a common allegiance had been loosed. the old order was yielding to the new, but the process was signalized by the usual slowness of men to accept events in their full significance. hitherto, all the western hemisphere had been under a colonial system of complete monopoly by mother countries, and had been generally excluded from direct communication with europe, except the respective parent states. in the comprehensive provisions of the british navigation act, america was associated with asia and africa. now had arisen there an independent state, in political standing identical with those of europe, yet having towards colonial america geographical and commercial relations very different from theirs. consequently there was novelty and difficulty in the question, what intercourse with the remaining british dominions, and especially with the american colonies, should be permitted to the new nation? notwithstanding the breach lately made, it continued a controlling aim with the british people, and of the government as determined by popular pressure, to restore the supremacy of british trade, by the subjection of america, independent as well as colonial, to the welfare of british commerce. notably this was to be so as regards the one dominant interest called navigation, under which term was comprised everything relating to shipping,--ship-building, seafaring men, and the carrying trade. independence had deprived great britain of the right she formerly had to manipulate the course of the export and import trade of the now united states. it remained to try whether there did not exist, nevertheless, the ability effectually to control it to the advantage of british navigation, as above defined. "our remaining colonies on the continent, and the west india islands," it was argued, "with the favorable state of english manufactures, may still give us almost exclusively the trade of america;" provided these circumstances were suitably utilized, and their advantages rigorously enforced, where power to do so still remained, as it did in the west indies. although by far the stronger and more flourishing part of her colonial dominions had been wrested from great britain, there yet remained to her upon the continent, in canada and the adjacent provinces, a domain great in area, and in the west india islands another of great productiveness. whatever wisdom had been learned as regards the political treatment of colonies, the views as to the nature of their economical utility to the mother country, and their consequent commercial regulation, had undergone no enlargement, but rather had been intensified in narrowness and rigor by the loss of so valuable a part of the whole. no counteractive effect to this prepossession was to be found in contemporary opinion in europe. the french revolution itself, subversive as it was of received views in many respects, was at the first characterized rather by an exaggeration of the traditional exclusive policy of the eighteenth century relating to colonies, shipping, and commerce. in america, the unsettled commercial and financial conditions which succeeded the peace, the divergence of interests between the several new states, the feebleness of the confederate government, its incompetency to deal assuredly with external questions, and lack of all power to regulate commerce, inspired a conviction in great britain that the continent could not offer strong, continued resistance to commercial aggression, carried on under the peaceful form of municipal regulation. it was generally thought that the new states could never unite, but instead would drift farther apart. the belief was perfectly reasonable; a gift of prophecy only could have foretold the happy result, of which many of the most prominent americans for some time despaired. "it will not be an easy matter," wrote lord sheffield,[ ] "to bring the american states to act as a nation; they are not to be feared as such by us. it must be a long time before they can engage, or will concur, in any material expense.... we might as reasonably dread the effects of combinations among the german as among the american states, and deprecate the resolves of the diet, as those of congress." "no treaty can be made that will be binding on the whole of them." "a decided cast has been given to public opinion here," wrote john adams from london, in november, , "by two presumptions. one is, that the american states are not, and cannot, be united."[ ] two years later washington wrote: "the situation of the general government, if it can be called a government, is shaken to its foundation, and liable to be overturned at every blast. in a word, it is at an end.... the primary cause of all our disorders lies in the different state governments, and in the tenacity of that power which underlies the whole of their systems. independent sovereignty is so ardently contended for." "at present, under our existing form of confederation, it would be idle to think of making commercial regulations on our part. one state passes a prohibitory law respecting one article; another state opens wide the avenue for its admission. one assembly makes a system, another assembly unmakes it."[ ] under such conditions it was natural that a majority of englishmen should see power and profit for great britain in availing herself of the weakness of her late colonists, to enforce upon them a commercial dependence as useful as the political dependence which had passed away. were this realized, she would enjoy the emoluments of the land without the expense of its protection. this gospel was preached at once to willing ears, and found acceptance; not by the strength of its arguments, for these, though plausible, were clearly inferior in weight to the facts copiously adduced by those familiar with conditions, but through the prejudices which the then generation had received from the three or four preceding it. the policy being adopted, the instrument at hand for enforcing it was the relation of colonies to mother countries, as then universally maintained by the governments of the day. the united states, like other independent nations, was to be excluded wholly from carrying trade with the british colonies, and as far as possible from sending them supplies. it was urged that canada, and the adjacent british dominions, encouraged by this reservation of the west india market for their produce, would prove adequate to furnishing the provisions and lumber previously derived from the old continental colonies. the prosperity once enjoyed by the latter would be transferred, and there would be reconstituted the system of commercial intercourse, interior to the empire, which previously had commanded general admiration. the new states, acting commercially as separated communities, could oppose no successful rivalry to this combination, and would revert to isolated commercial dependence; tributary to the financial supremacy of great britain, as they recently had been to her political power. in debt to her for money, and drawing from her manufactures, returns for both would compel their exports to her ports chiefly, whence distribution would be, as of old, in the hands of british middlemen and navigators. just escaped from the fetters of the carrying trade and _entrepôt_ regulations, the twin monopolies in which consisted the value of a colonial empire, it was proposed to reduce them again under bondage by means for which the west india islands furnished the leverage; for "the trade carried on by great britain with the countries now become the united states was, and still is, so connected with the trade carried on to the remaining british colonies in america, and the british islands in the west indies, that it is impossible to form a true judgment of the past and present of the first, without taking a comprehensive view of all, as they are connected with, and influence, each other."[ ] before the peace of , the writings of adam smith had gravely shaken belief in the mercantile system of extraordinary trade regulation and protection as conducive to national prosperity. though undermined, however, it had not been overthrown; and even to doubters there remained the exception, which smith himself admitted, of the necessity to protect navigation as a nursery for the navy, and consequently as a fundamental means of national defence. existence takes precedence of prosperity; the life is more than the meat. commercial regulation, though unfitted to increase wealth, could be justified as a means to promote ship-building; to retain ship-builders in the country; to husband the raw materials of their work; to force the transport of merchandise in british-built ships and by british seamen; and thus to induce capital to invest, and men to embark their lives, in maritime trade, to the multiplication of ships and seamen, the chief dependence of the nation in war. "keeping ships for freight," said sheffield, "is not the most profitable branch of trade. it is necessary, for the sake of our marine, to force or encourage it by exclusive advantages." "comparatively with the number of our people and the extent of our country, we are doomed almost always to wage unequal war; and as a means of raising seamen it cannot be too often repeated that it is not possible to be too jealous on the head of navigation." he proceeds then at once to draw the distinction between the protection of navigation and that of commerce generally. "this jealousy should not be confounded with that towards neighboring countries as to trade and manufactures; nor is the latter jealousy in many instances reasonable or well founded. competition is useful, forcing our manufacturers to act fairly, and to work reasonably." sheffield was the most conspicuous, and probably the most influential, of the controversialists on this side of the question at this period; the interest of the public is shown by his pamphlet passing through six editions in a twelvemonth. he was, however, far from singular in this view. chalmers, a writer of much research, said likewise: "in these considerations of nautical force and public safety we discover the fundamental principle of acts of navigation, which, though established in opposition to domestic and foreign clamors, have produced so great an augmentation of our native shipping and sailors, and which therefore should not be sacrificed to any projects of private gain,"--that is, of commercial advantage. "there are intelligent persons who suggest that the imposing of alien duties on alien ships, rather than on alien merchandise, would augment our naval strength."[ ] colonies therefore were esteemed desirable to this end chiefly. to use the expression of a french officer,[ ] they were the fruitful nursery of seamen. french writers of that day considered their west india islands the chief nautical support of the state. but in order to secure this, it was necessary to exercise complete control of their trade inward and outward; of the supplies they needed as well as of the products they raised, and especially to confine the carriage of both to national shipping. "the only use and advantage of the (remaining) american colonies[ ] or west india islands to great britain," says sheffield, "are the monopoly of their consumption and the carriage of their produce. it is the advantage to our navigation which in any degree countervails the enormous expense of protecting our islands. rather than give up their carrying trade it would be better to give up themselves." the _entrepôt_ system herein found additional justification, for not only did it foster navigation by the homeward voyage, confined to british ships, and extort toll in transit, but the re-exportation made a double voyage which was more than doubly fruitful in seamen; for from the nearness of the british islands to the european continent, which held the great body of consumers, this second carriage could be done, and actually was done, by numerous small vessels, able to bear a short voyage but not to brave an atlantic passage. economically, trade by many small vessels is more expensive than by a few large, because for a given aggregate tonnage it requires many more men; but this economical loss was thought to be more than compensated by the political gain in multiplying seamen. it was estimated in that there was a difference of from thirty-five to forty men in carrying the same quantity of goods in one large or ten small vessels. this illustrates aptly the theory of the navigation act, which sought wealth indeed, but, as then understood, subordinated that consideration distinctly to the superior need of increasing the resources of the country in ships and seamen. moreover, the men engaged in these short voyages were more immediately at hand for impressment in war, owing to the narrow range of their expeditions and their frequent returns to home ports. in , therefore, the navigation act had become in general acceptance a measure not merely commercial, but military. it was defended chiefly as essential to the naval power of great britain, which rested upon the sure foundation of maritime resources thus laid. nor need this view excite derision to-day, for it compelled then the adhesion of an american who of all in his time was most adverse to the general commercial policy of great britain. in a report on the subject made to congress in , by jefferson, as secretary of state, he said: "our navigation involves still higher considerations than our commerce. as a branch of industry it is valuable, but as a resource of defence essential. it will admit neither neglect nor forbearance. the position and circumstances of the united states leave them nothing to fear on their land-board; ... but on their seaboard they are open to injury, and they have there too a commerce (coasting) which must be protected. this can only be done by possessing a respectable body of citizen-seamen, and of artists and establishments in readiness for ship-building."[ ] the limitations of jefferson's views appear here clearly, in the implicit relegation of defence, not to a regular and trained navy, but to the occasional unskilled efforts of a distinctly civil force; but no stronger recognition of the necessities of great britain could be desired, for her nearness to the great military states of the world deprived her land-board of the security which the remoteness of the united states assured. with such stress laid upon the vital importance of merchant seamen to national safety, it is but a step in thought to perceive how inevitable was the jealousy and indignation felt in great britain, when she found her fleets, both commercial and naval, starving for want of seamen, who had sought refuge from war in the american merchant service, and over whom the american government, actually weak and but yesterday vassal, sought to extend its protection from impressment. up to the war of american independence, the singular geographical situation of great britain, inducing her to maritime enterprise and exempting her from territorial warfare, with the financial and commercial pre-eminence she had then maintained for three-fourths of a century, gave her peculiar advantages for enforcing a policy which until that time had thriven conspicuously, if somewhat illusively, in its commercial results, and had substantially attained its especial object of maritime preponderance. other peoples had to submit to the compulsion exerted by her overweening superiority. the obligation upon foreign shipping to be three-fourths manned by their own citizens, for instance, rested only upon a british law, and applied only in a british port; but the accumulations of british capital, with the consequent facility for mercantile operations and ability to extend credits, the development of british manufactures, the extent of the british carrying trade, the enforced storage of colonial products in british territory, with the correlative obligation that foreign goods for her numerous and increasing colonists must first be brought to her shores and thence transshipped,--all these circumstances made the british islands a centre for export and import, towards which foreign shipping was unavoidably drawn and so brought under the operation of the law. the nation had so far out-distanced competition that her supremacy was unassailable, and remained unimpaired for a century longer. to it had contributed powerfully the economical distribution of her empire, greatly diversified in particulars, yet symmetrical in the capacity of one part to supply what the other lacked. there was in the whole a certain self-sufficingness, resembling that claimed in this age for the united states, with its compact territory but wide extremes of boundary, climates, and activities. this condition, while it lasted, in large degree justified the navigation act, which may be summarily characterized as a great protective measure, applied to the peculiar conditions of a particular maritime empire, insuring reciprocal and exclusive benefit to the several parts. it was uncompromisingly logical in its action, not hesitating at rigid prohibition of outside competition. protection, in its best moral sense, may be defined as the regulation of all the business of the nation, considered as an interrelated whole, by the government, for the best interests of the entire community, likewise regarded as a whole. this the navigation act did for over a century after its enactment; and it may be plausibly argued that, as a war resort at least, it afterwards measurably strengthened the hands of great britain during the wars of the french revolution. no men suffered more than did the west india planters from its unrelieved enforcement after ; yet in their vehement remonstrance they said: "the policy of the act is justly popular. its regulations, until the loss of america, under the various relaxations which parliament has applied to particular events and exigencies as they arose, have guided the course of trade without oppressing it; for the markets which those regulations left open to the consumption of the produce of the colonies were sufficient to take off the whole, and no foreign country could have supplied the essential part of their wants materially cheaper than the colonies of the mother country could supply one another." thus things were, or were thought to be, up to the time when the revolt of the continental colonies made a breach in the wall of reciprocal benefit by which the whole had been believed to be enclosed. the products of the colonies sustained the commercial prosperity of the mother country, ministering to her export trade, and supplying a reserve of consumers for her monopoly of manufactures, which they were forbidden to establish for themselves, or to receive from foreigners. she on her part excluded from the markets of the empire foreign articles which her colonies produced, constituting for them a monopoly of the imperial home market, as well in great britain as in the sister colonies. the carriage of the whole was confined to british navigation, the maintenance of which by this means raised the british navy to the mastery of the seas, enabling it to afford to the entire system a protection, of which convincing and brilliant evidence had been afforded during the then recent seven years' war. as a matter of political combination and adjustment, for peace or for war, the general result appeared to most men of that day to be consummate in conception and in development, and therefore by all means to be perpetuated. in that light men of to-day must realize it, if they would adequately understand the influence exercised by this prepossession upon the course of events which for the united states issued in the war of . in this picture, so satisfactory as a whole, there had been certain shadows menacing to the future. already, in the colonial period, these had been recognized by some in great britain as predictive of increasing practical independence on the part of the continental colonies, with results injurious to the empire at large, and to the particular welfare of the mother kingdom. in the last analysis, this danger arose from the fact that, unlike the tropical west indies, these children were for the most part too like their parent in political and economical character, and in permanent natural surroundings. there was, indeed, a temporary variation of activities between the new communities, where the superabundance of soil kept handicrafts in abeyance, and the old country, where agriculture was already failing to produce food sufficient for the population, and men were being forced into manufactures and their export as a means of livelihood. there was also a difference in their respective products which ministered to beneficial exchange. nevertheless, in their tendencies and in their disposition, great britain and the united states at bottom were then not complementary, but rivals. the true complement of both was the west indies; and for these the advantage of proximity, always great, and especially so with regard to the special exigencies of the islands, lay with the united states. hence it came to pass that the trade with the west indies, which then had almost a monopoly of sugar and coffee production for the world, became the most prominent single factor in the commercial contentions between the two countries, and in the arbitrary commercial ordinances of great britain, which step by step led the two nations into war. the precedent struggle was over a market; artificial regulation and superior naval power seeking to withstand the natural course of things, and long successfully retarding it. the suspension of intercourse during the war of independence had brought the economical relations into stronger relief, and accomplished independence threatened the speedy realization of their tendencies. there were two principal dangers dreaded by great britain. the west india plantation industry had depended upon the continental colonies for food supplies, and to a considerable extent also financially; because these alone were the consumers of one important product--rum. again, ship-building and the carrying trade of the empire had passed largely into the hands of the continental colonists, keeping on that side of the atlantic, it was asserted, a great number of british-born seamen. while vessels from america visited many parts of the world, the custom-house returns showed that of the total inward and outward tonnage of the thirteen colonies, over sixty per cent had been either coastwise or with the west indies; and this left out of account the considerable number engaged in smuggling. of the remainder, barely twenty-five per cent went to great britain or ireland. in short, there had been building upon the western side of the ocean, under the colonial connection, a rival maritime system, having its own products, its own special markets, and its own carrying trade. the latter also, being done by very small vessels, adapted to the short transit, had created for itself, or absorbed from elsewhere, a separate and proportionately large maritime population, rivalling that of the home country, while yet remaining out of easy reach of impressment and remote from immediate interest in european wars. one chief object of the navigation act was thus thwarted; and indeed, as might be anticipated from quotations already made, it was upon this that british watchfulness more particularly centred. as far as possible all interchange was to be internal to the empire, a kind of coasting trade, which would naturally, as well as by statute, fall to british shipping. protective regulation therefore should develop in the several parts those productions which other parts needed,--the material of commerce; but where this could not be done, and supplies must be sought outside, they should go and come in british vessels, navigated according to the act. "our country," wrote sheffield, in concluding his work, "does not entirely depend upon the monopoly of the commerce of the thirteen american states, and it is by no means necessary to sacrifice any part of our carrying trade for imaginary advantages never to be attained."[ ] a further injury was done by the cheapness with which the americans built and sold ships, owing to their abundance of timber. they built them not only to order, but as it were for a market. although acceptable to the mercantile interest, and even indirectly beneficial by sparing the resources for building ships of war, this was an invasion of the manufacturing industry of the kingdom, in a particular peculiarly conducive to naval power. the returns of the british underwriters for twenty-seven shipping ports of great britain and ireland, during a series of years immediately preceding the american revolt, no ship being counted twice, showed the british-built vessels entered to be , , and the american , .[ ] the tonnage of the latter was more than one-third of the total. the intercourse between the american continent and the west indies, not included in this reckoning, was almost wholly in american bottoms. the proportion of american-built shipping in the total of the empire is hence apparent, as well as the growth of the ship-building industry. this of course was accompanied by a tendency of mechanics, as well as seamen, to remove to a situation so favorable for employment. but the maintenance of home facilities for building ships was as essential to the development of naval power as was the fostering of a class of seamen. in this respect, therefore, the ship-building of america was detrimental to the objects of the navigation act; and the evil threatened to increase, because of a discernible approaching shortness of suitable timber in the overtaxed forests of europe. such being the apparent tendency of things, owing to circumstances relatively permanent in character, the habit of mind traditional with british merchants and statesmen, formed by the accepted colonial and mercantile systems, impelled them at once to prohibitory measures of counteraction, as soon as the colonies, naturally rival, had become by independence a foreign nation. for a moment, indeed, it appeared that broader views might prevail, based upon a sounder understanding of actual conditions and of the principles of international commerce. the second william pitt was chancellor of the exchequer at the time the provisional articles of peace with the united states were signed, in november, ; and in march, , he introduced into the house of commons a bill for regulating temporarily the intercourse between the two nations, so far as dependent upon the action of great britain, until it should be possible to establish a mutual arrangement by treaty. this measure reflected not only a general attitude of good will towards america, characteristic of both father and son, but also the impression which had been made upon the younger man by the writings of adam smith. professing as its objects "to establish intercourse on the most enlarged principles of reciprocal benefit," and "to evince the disposition of great britain to be on terms of most perfect amity with the united states of america," the bill admitted the ships and vessels of the united states, with the merchandise on board, into all the ports of great britain in the same manner as the vessels of other independent states; that is, manned three-fourths by american seamen. this preserved the main restrictions of the navigation act, protective of british navigation; but the merchandise, even if brought in american ships, was relieved of all alien duties. these, however, wherever still existing for other nations, were light, and this remission slight;[ ] a more substantial concession was a rebate upon all exports from great britain to the united states, equal to that allowed upon goods exported to the colonies. as regarded intercourse with the west indies, there was to be made in favor of the thirteen states a special and large remission in the rigor of the act; one affecting both commerce and navigation. to british colonies, by long-standing proscription, no ships except british had been admitted to export or import. by the proposed measure, the united states, alone among the nations of the world, were to be allowed to import freely any goods whatsoever, of their own growth, produce, or manufacture, in their own ships; on the same terms exactly as british vessels, if these should engage in the traffic between the american continent and the islands. similarly, freedom to export colonial produce was granted to american bottoms from the west indies to the united states. both exports and imports, thus to be authorized, were to be "liable to the same duties and charges only as the same merchandise would be subject to, if it were the property of british native-born subjects, and imported in british ships, navigated by british seamen."[ ] in short, while the primary purpose doubtless was the benefit of the islands, the effect of the measure, as regarded the west india trade, was to restore the citizens of the now independent states to the privileges they had enjoyed as colonists. the carrying trade between the islands and the continent was conceded to them, and past experience gave ground to believe it would be by them absorbed. it was over this concession that the storm of controversy arose and raged, until the outbreak of the french revolution, by the conservative reaction it provoked in other governments, arrested for the time any change of principle in regard to colonial administration, whatever modifications might from time to time be induced by momentary exigencies of policy. the question immediately argued was probably on all hands less one of principle than of expediency. superior as commercial prosperity and the preservation of peace were to most other motives in the interest of pitt's mind, he doubtless would have admitted, along with his most earnest opponents, that the fostering of the national carrying trade, as a nursery to the navy and so contributory to national defence, took precedence of purely commercial legislation. with all good-will to america, his prime object necessarily was the welfare of great britain; but this he, contrary to the mass of public opinion, conceived to lie in the restoration of the old intercourse between the two peoples, modified as little as possible by the new condition of independence. he trusted that the habit of receiving everything from england, the superiority of british manufactures, a common tongue, and commercial correspondences only temporarily interrupted by the war, would tend to keep the new states customers of great britain chiefly, as they had been before; and what they bought they must pay for by sending their own products in return. this constraint of routine and convenience received additional force from the scarcity of capital in america, and its abundance in great britain, relatively to the rest of europe. the wealthiest nation could hold the americans by their need of accommodations which others could not extend. in so far there probably was a general substantial agreement in great britain. the americans had been consumers to over double the amount of the west indies before the war, and it was desirable to retain their custom. nor was the anticipation of success deceived. nine years later, despite the rejection of pitt's measure, an experienced american complained "that we draw so large a proportion of our manufactures from one nation. the other european nations have had the eight years of the war (of independence) exclusively, and the nine years of peace in fair competition, and do not yet supply us with manufactures equivalent to half of the stated value of the shoes made by ourselves."[ ] in the first year of the government under the constitution, from august, , to september , , after seven years of independence, out of a total of not quite $ , , imports to the united states, over $ , , were from the dominions of great britain;[ ] and nearly half the exports went to the same destination, either as raw material for manufactures, or as to the distributing centre for europe. the commercial dependence is evident; it had rather increased than diminished since the peace. as regards american navigation, the showing was somewhat better; but even here , tons british had entered united states ports, against a total of only , american. as of the latter only , had sailed from great britain, it is clear that the empire had retained its hold upon its carrying trade, throughout the years intervening between the peace and the adoption of the constitution. as regards the commercial relations between the two nations, these results corresponded in the main with the expectations of those who frustrated pitt's measure. he had conceived, however, that it was wise for great britain not only to preserve a connection so profitable, but also to develop it; to multiply the advantage by steps which would promote the prosperity and consequent purchasing power of the communities involved. this was the object of his proposed concession. during the then recent war, no part of the british dominions--save besieged gibraltar--had suffered so severely as the west indies. though other causes concurred, this was due chiefly to the cessation of communications with the revolted colonies, entailing failure of supplies indispensable to their industries. despite certain alleviations incidental to the war, such as the capture of american vessels bound to foreign islands, and the demand for tropical products by the british armies and fleets, there had been great misery among the population, as well as financial loss. the restoration of commercial intercourse would benefit the continent as well as the islands; but the latter more. the prosperity of both would redound to the welfare of great britain; for the one, though now politically independent, was chained to her commercial system by imperative circumstances, while of the trade of the other she would have complete monopoly, except for this tolerance of a strictly local traffic with the adjoining continent. as for british navigation, the supreme interest, pitt believed that it would receive more enlargement from the increase of productiveness in the islands, and of consequent demand for british manufactures, than it would suffer loss by american navigation. more commerce, more ships. then, as at the present day, the interests of great britain and of the united states, in their relations to a matter of common external concern, were not opposed, but complementary; for the prosperity of the islands through america would make for the prosperity of great britain through the islands. this, however, was just the point disputed; and, in default of the experience which the coming years were to furnish, fears not wholly unreasonable, from the particular point of view of sea power, as then understood, were aroused by the known facts of american shipping enterprise, both as ship-builders and carriers, even under colonial trammels. john adams, who was minister to great britain from to , had frequent cause to note the deep and general apprehension there entertained of the united states as a rival maritime state. the question of admission to the colonial trade, as it presented itself to most men of the day, was one of defence and of offence, and was complicated by several considerations. as a matter of fact, there was no denying the existence of that transatlantic commercial system, in which the former colonies had been so conspicuous a factor, the sole source of certain supplies to an important market, reflecting therein exactly great britain's own position relatively to the consumers of the european continent. the prospect of reviving what had always been an _imperium in imperio_, but now uncontrolled by the previous conditions of political subjection, seemed ominous; and besides, there was cherished the hope, ill-founded and delusive though it was, that the integrity of the empire as a self-sufficing whole, broken by recent revolt, might be restored by strong measures, coercive towards the commerce of the united states, and protective towards canada and the other remaining continental colonies. it was believed by some that the agriculture, shipping, and fisheries of canada, nova scotia, and newfoundland, despite the obstacles placed by nature, could be so fostered as to supply the needs of the west indies, and to develop also a population of consumers bound to take off british manufactures, as the lost colonists used to do. this may be styled the constructive idea, in sheffield's series of propositions, looking to the maintenance of the british carrying trade at the expense of that of the united states. this expectation proved erroneous. up to and through the war of , the british provinces, so far from having a surplus for export, had often to depend upon the united states for much of the supplies which sheffield expected them to send to the west indies. the proposition was strongly supported also by a wish to aid the american loyalists, who, to the number of many thousands, had fled from the old colonies to take refuge in the less hospitable north. these men, deprived of their former resources, and having a new start in life to make, desired that the west india market should be reserved for them, to build up their local industries. their influence was exerted in opposition to the planters, and the mother country justly felt itself bound to their relief by strong obligation. conjoined to this was doubtless the less worthy desire to punish the successful rebellion, as well as to hinder the growth of a competitor. "if i had not been here and resided here some time," wrote john adams, in , "i should not have believed, nor could have conceived, such an union of all parliamentary factions against us, which is a demonstration of the unpopularity of our cause."[ ] "their direct object is not so much the increase of their own wealth, ships, or sailors, as the diminution of ours. a jealousy of our naval power is the true motive, the real passion which actuates them. they consider the united states as their rival, and the most dangerous rival they have in the world. i can see clearly they are less afraid of the augmentation of french ships and sailors than american. they think they foresee that if the united states had the same fisheries, carrying trade, and same market for ready-built ships, they had ten years ago, they would be in so respectable a position, and in so happy circumstances, that british seamen, manufacturers, and merchants too, would hurry over to them."[ ] these statements, drawn from adams's association with many men, reflect so exactly the line of argument in the best known of the many controversial pamphlets published about that time,--lord sheffield's "observations on the commerce of the american states,"--as to prove that it represented correctly a preponderant popular feeling, not only adverse to the restoration of the colonial privileges contemplated by pitt, but distinctly inimical to the new nation; a feeling born of past defeat and of present apprehension. inextricably associated with this feeling was the conviction that the navigation supported by the sugar islands, being a monopoly always under the control of the mother country, and ministering to the _entrepôt_ on which so much other shipping depended, was the one sure support of the general carrying trade of the nation. "considering the bulk of west india commodities," sheffield had written, "and the universality and extent of the consumption of sugar, a consumption still in its infancy even in europe, and still more in america, it is not improbable that in a few ages the nation which may be in possession of the most extensive and best cultivated sugar islands, _subject to a proper policy_,[ ] will take the lead at sea." men of all schools concurred in this general view, which is explanatory of much of the course pursued by the british government, alike in military enterprise, commercial regulation, and political belligerent measures, during the approaching twenty years of war with france. it underlay pitt's subsequent much derided, but far from unwise, care to get the whole west india region under british control, by conquering its sugar islands. it underlay also the other measures, either instituted or countenanced by him, or inherited from his general war policy, which led through ever increasing exasperation to the war with the united states. the question, however, remained, "what is the proper policy conducive to the end which all desire?" those who thought with pitt in urged that to increase the facilities of the islands, by abundant supplies from the nearest and best source, in america, would so multiply the material of commerce as most to promote the necessary navigation. the west india planters pressed this view with forcible logic. "navigation and naval power are not the parents of commerce, but its happy fruits. if mutual wants did not furnish the subject of intercourse between distant countries, there would soon be an end of navigation. the carrying trade is of great importance, but it is of greater still to have trade to carry." to this the reply substantially was that if the trade were thrown open to americans, by allowing them to carry in their own vessels, the impetus so given to their navigation, with the cheapness of their ships, owing to the cheapness of materials, would make them carriers to the whole world, breaking up the monopoly of british merchants, and supplanting the employment of british ships. a few statesmen, more far seeing and deeper reasoning,--notably edmund burke,--came to pitt's support, and the west india proprietors, largely resident in england, by their knowledge of details contributed much to elucidate the facts; but their efforts were unavailing. their argument ran thus: "only the american continent can furnish at reasonable rates the animals required for the agriculture of the islands, the food for the slaves, the lumber for buildings and for packing produce. only the continent will take the rum which europe refuses, and with which the planter pays his running expenses. owing to irreversible currents of trade, neither british nor island shipping can carry this traffic at a profit to themselves, except by ruinously overcharging the planter. americans only can do it. concede the exchange by this means, and the development of sugar and coffee raising, owing to their bulk as freight, will enlarge british shipping to europe by an amount much beyond that lost in the local transport. of the european carriage you will retain a monopoly, as you will of the produce, which goes into your storehouses alone; whence you reap the advantage of brokerage and incidental handling, at the expense of the continental consumer, while your home navigation is enlarged by its export. refuse this privilege, and your islands sink under french and spanish competition. french santo domingo, especially, exceeds by far all your possessions, both in the extent of soil and quality of product." very shortly they were able also to say that the french allowed ships to be bought from americans; and, although in their treaty with the united states they had refused free intercourse to american vessels, a royal ordinance of permitted it to vessels of under sixty tons' burden. within a month of the introduction of pitt's bill the ministry to which he then belonged fell. the one which followed refrained from dealing at all with the subject, except by recourse to an expedient not uncommon with party leaders, dealing with a new question of admitted intricacy. they passed a bill leaving the whole matter to the crown for executive action. accordingly, in july, , a proclamation was issued permitting intercourse between the islands and the american continent, in a long list of specified articles, but only by british ships, owned and navigated as required by the navigation act. american vessels were excluded by omission, and while most necessaries for food, agriculture, and commerce were admitted, one staple article, salt fish, urgently requested by the planters, was forbidden. this was partly to encourage the newfoundland fisheries and those of great britain, and partly to injure american. both objects were in the line of the navigation act, to foster home navigation and impede that of foreigners; fisheries being considered a prime support of each. a generation before, the elder pitt had inveighed against the peace of paris, in , on account of the concession of the cod fisheries. "you leave to france," he said, "the opportunity of reviving her navy." before the separation, the near and great market of the west india negro population had consumed one-third of the american catch of fish. so profitable a condition could no longer be continued. salt provisions also, butter, and cheese, were not allowed, being reserved for irish producers.[ ] the next december the enabling bill was renewed and the proclamation re-issued. at this moment pitt returned to office. a few months later, in the spring of , parliament was dissolved, and the ensuing elections carried him into power at the head of a great majority. he made no immediate attempt to resume legislation favoring the american trade with the west indies. the disposition of the majority of englishmen in the matter had been plainly shown, and other more urgent commercial reforms engaged his attention. soon after the receipt of the news in america, some of the states passed retaliatory measures, on their own account, or authorized the continental congress so to act for them. the bad feeling already caused by the non-fulfilment, on both sides, of certain stipulations of the treaty of peace was particularly exasperated by this proclamation; for anticipation, aroused by pitt's proposed measure, had been nursed into confident expectation during the four months' interval, in which intercourse had been openly or tacitly allowed. it was at this period that nelson first came conspicuously into public notice, by checking the connivance of the west indian governors in the infractions of the navigation laws; the act authorizing commanders of kings' ships to seize offending vessels, and bring them before the court of admiralty.[ ] it is said also that his experience had much to do with shaping subsequent legislation upon the same prohibitory lines. in america disappointment was bitter. little concern was felt in england. concerted action by several states was thought most unlikely, and a more perfect union impossible. while massachusetts, for example, in forbade import or export in any vessel belonging in whole or in part to british subjects, the state then next to her in maritime importance, pennsylvania, in repealed laws imposing extra charges on british ships, and admitted all nations on equal terms with her sister states. "the ministry in england," wrote adams, "build all their hopes and schemes upon the supposition of such divisions in america as will forever prevent a combination of the states, either in prohibition or in retaliatory duties."[ ] effective retaliation consequently was not feared, and as for results otherwise, it was doubtless thought best to await the test of experience. proclamation, annually authorized and re-issued, remained therefore the mode of regulating commerce between the british dominions and the united states up to the date of jay's treaty. once only, in , parliament interfered so far as to pass a law, confining the trade with the west indies to british-built ships and to certain enumerated articles, in the strict spirit of the navigation system. otherwise, intercourse with the united states was throughout this period subject at any moment to be modified or annulled by the single will of the executive; whereas that with other nations, fixed by statute,--the navigation act,--could be altered only by the legislature.[ ] of this british commercial policy, following immediately upon the recognition of independence, americans had not the slightest reason to complain. they had insisted upon being independent, and it would be babyish to fret about the consequences, when unpalatable. it was unpleasant to find that great britain, satisfied that the carrying trade was the first of her interests, upon which depended her naval supremacy, rigorously excluded americans from branches of that trade before permitted to them; but in so doing she was simply seeking her own advantage by means of her own laws, as a nation does, for instance, when it imposes heavy protective duties. it is quite as legitimate to protect the carrying trade as any other form of industry; and the navigation act was no new device, for the special annoyance of americans. it is very possible that the action of great britain at this time was so stupid, that, to use words of jefferson's, the only way to prophesy what she would do was to ascertain what she ought to do, and infer the contrary. the rule, he said, never failed. this particular stupidity, if such it were,--and there was at least partial ground for the charge,--was simply another case of a most common form of human dulness of perception, preoccupation with a fixed idea. but were the policy wise or foolish, as regards herself, towards the americans it was not a wrong, but an injury; and, consequently, what the newly independent people had to do was not to complain, but to strike back with retaliatory commercial measures. jefferson, no friend generally to coercive action, wrote concerning this particular situation, "it is not to the moderation or justice of others we are to trust for fair and equal access to market with our productions, or for our due share in the transportation of them; but to our own means of independence, and the firm will to use them."[ ] equally, when great britain, under the emergencies of the french revolution, resorted to measures that overpassed her rights, either municipal or international, and infringed our own, the resort should have been to the remedy with which nations defend their rights, as distinct from their interest. the american people, then poor, and habituated to colonial dependence, failed to create for themselves in due time the power necessary to self-assertion; nor did they as a nation realize, what men like john adams and gouverneur morris saw and preached, that in the complicated tangle of warring interests which constitutes every contemporary situation, the influence of any single factor depends, not merely upon its own value, but upon that value taken in connection with other conditions. a pound is but a pound; but when the balance is nearly equal, a pound may turn a scale. because america could not possibly put afloat the hundred--or two hundred--ships-of-the-line which great britain had in commission, therefore, many argued, as many do to-day, it was vain to have any navy. "i believe," wrote morris in ,[ ] and few men better understood financial conditions, "that we could now maintain twelve ships-of-the-line, perhaps twenty, with a due proportion of frigates and smaller vessels. and i am tolerably certain that, while the united states of america pursue a just and liberal conduct, _with twenty sail-of-the-line at sea_, no nation on earth will dare to insult them. i believe also, that, not to mention individual losses, five years of war would involve more national expense than the support of a navy for twenty years. one thing i am thoroughly convinced of, that, if we do not render ourselves respectable, we shall continue to be insulted." a singular, and too much disregarded, instance of the insults to which the united states was exposed, by the absence of naval strength, is found in the action of the barbary powers towards our commerce, which scarcely dared to enter the mediterranean. it is less known that this condition of things was eminently satisfactory to british politicians of the old-fashioned school, and as closely linked as was the navigation system itself to the ancient rivalry with holland. "our ships," wrote the dutch statesman de witt, who died in , "should be well guarded by convoy against the barbary pirates. yet it would by no means be proper to free that sea of those pirates, because we should hereby be put upon the same footing with east-landers, [_i.e._, baltic nations, denmark, sweden, etc.] english, spaniards, and italians; wherefore it is best to leave that thorn in the sides of those nations, whereby they will be distressed in that trade, while we by convoy engross all the european traffic and navigation."[ ] this cynical philosophy was echoed in by the cultured english statesman, lord sheffield, the intimate friend of the historian gibbon, and editor of his memoirs. "if the great maritime powers know their interests," he wrote, "they will not encourage the americans to be carriers. that the barbary states are an advantage to the maritime powers is obvious. if they were suppressed, the little states of italy, etc., would have much more of the carrying trade. the armed neutrality would be as hurtful to the great maritime powers as the barbary states are useful."[ ] it may be a novel thought to many americans, that at that time american commerce in the mediterranean depended largely for protection upon portuguese cruisers; its own country extending none. when peace was unexpectedly made between portugal and algiers in , through the interposition of a british consular officer, a wail of dismay went up to heaven from american shipmen. "the conduct of the british in this business," wrote the american consul at lisbon, "leaves no room to doubt or mistake their object, which was evidently aimed at us, and that they will leave nothing unattempted to effect our ruin." it proved, indeed, that the british consul's action was not that of his government, but taken on his own initiative; but the incident not only recalls the ideas of the time, long since forgotten, but in its indications, both of british commercial security and american exposure, illustrates the theory of the navigation act as to the reciprocal influence of the naval and merchant services. there was then nothing, in the economical conditions of the united states, to forbid a navy stronger than the portuguese; yet the consul, in his pitiful appeal to the portuguese court, had to write: "my countrymen have been led into their present embarrassment by confiding in the friendship, power, and protection of her most faithful majesty," ... which "lulled our citizens into a fatal security."[ ] our lamentable dependence upon others, for the respect we should have extorted ourselves, is shown in the instructions issued to jay, on his mission to england in . "it may be represented to the british ministry, how productive of perfect conciliation it might be to the people of the united states, if great britain would use her influence with the dey of algiers for the liberation of the american citizens in captivity, and for a peace upon reasonable terms. it has been communicated from abroad, to be the fixed policy of great britain to check our trade in grain to the mediterranean. this is too doubtful to be assumed, but fit for inquiry."[ ] the dey had declared war in , this being with the barbary rulers the customary method of opening piratical action. "if the dey makes peace with every one," said one of his captains to nelson, "what is he to do with his ships?" the experience of the succeeding fifteen years was to give ample demonstration of the truth of morris's prophecy; but what is interesting now to observe is, that he, who certainly did not imagine twenty ships to be equal to a hundred, accurately estimated the deterrent force of such a body, prepared to act upon an enemy's communications,--or interests,--at a great distance from the strategic centre of operations. a valuable military lesson of the war of is just this: that a comparatively small force--a few frigates and sloops--placed as the united states navy was, can exercise an influence utterly disproportionate to its own strength. instances of great britain's extremity, subsequent to morris's prediction, are easily cited. in , her fleet was forced to abandon the mediterranean. in , a year after the nile, nelson had to implore a small portuguese division not to relinquish the blockade of malta, which he could not otherwise maintain. under such conditions, apprehension of even a slight additional burden of hostility imposes restraint. had morris's navy existed in , we probably should have had no war of ; that is, if jefferson's passion for peace, and abhorrence of navies, could have been left out of the account. war, as napoleon said, is a business of positions. the commercial importance of the united states, and the position of its navy relatively to the major interests of great britain, would together have produced an effect, to which, under the political emergency of the time, the mere commercial retaliation then attempted was quite inadequate. this distressed the enemy, but did not reduce him; and it bitterly alienated a large part of our own community, so that we went into the war a discordant, almost a disunited, nation. during the years of american impotence under the early confederation, the trade regulations of the british government, framed on the lines advocated by lord sheffield, met with a measure of success which was perhaps more apparent than real; due attention being scarcely paid to the actual loss entailed upon british planters by the heightened cost of supplies, and the consequent effect upon british commerce and navigation. "under the present limited intercourse with america," wrote the planter, edwards, "the west indies are subject to three sets of devouring monopolies: , the british ship-owners; , their agents in american ports; , their agents in the ports of the islands; all of whom exact an unnatural profit of the planters."[ ] chalmers, looking only to the navigation of the kingdom, which these culprits represented, admits that in the principal supplies great britain cannot compete with america; but, "whatever may be the difference in price to the west indians, this is but a small equivalent which they ought to pay to the british consumer, for enjoying the exclusive supply of sugar, rum, and other west india products."[ ] a few figures show conclusively that under all disadvantages the islands increased in actual prosperity, although they fell behind their french competitors, favored by a more liberal policy. in the quiet year , before the revolt of the continent, the british west indies shipped to the home country produce amounting to £ , , ;[ ] in this had risen to £ , , ,[ ] a gain of over per cent. between the same years, exports to the united states, limited after the peace to british ships, had fallen from £ , to £ , . american produce, confined to british bottoms for admission to british colonies, had gone largely to the french islands, with which before the revolution they could have only surreptitious intercourse. the result was that the british planter had to pay much more for his plantation supplies than did the french, who were furnished by american vessels, built and run much cheaper than british.[ ] he was rigidly forbidden also to seek stores in the french islands. such circuitous intercourse with america, by depriving british ships of the long voyage to the continent, would place the french islands in the obnoxious relation of _entrepôt_ to their neighbors, which holland had once occupied towards england. in all legislation minute care was taken to prevent such injury to navigation. direct trade with british dominions was the fetich of british policy; circuitous trade its abomination. despite drawbacks, a distinct advance was observable also in british navigation; in the development of the british-american colonies, continental and island; and in the intercolonial intercourse and shipping. immediately after the institution of the new government, the united states enacted laws protective of her own navigation; notably by an alien duty laid upon all foreign tonnage. to consider the probable effects of this legislation, and of the new american institutions, upon british commerce and navigation, a committee of the privy council was appointed, to which we owe a digested and authoritative summary of the change of conditions effected by the british measures, between and . from its report, based upon averages of several years, it appears that in the direct trade between great britain and the united states, in which american ships stood on equal terms with british, there had been little variation in value of imports or exports, with the single exception of tobacco and rice. these two articles, which formerly had to pass through great britain as an _entrepôt_, now went direct to their destination. the american shipping--navigation--employed in the trade with great britain herself, was only one-third of the british; the respective tonnage being , and , . as this was nearly the proportion of american to british built ships in the colonial period, american shipping before the adoption of the constitution had not gained at all, under the most favorable treatment conceded to it in british dominions. the report, indeed, estimated that it had lost by nearly per cent.[ ] in the colonial trade, on the other hand, very marked british gains could be reported. the commercially backward communities of canada, etc., forbidden now to admit american ships, or to import many articles from the united states, and given special privileges in the west indies, had more than doubled their imports from the mother country; the amount rising from £ , to £ , . these sums are not to be regarded in their own triviality, but as harbingers of a development, which it was hoped would fill the void in the british imperial system caused by the loss of the former colonies. the west indies showed a more gradual increase, though still satisfactory; their exports since had risen per cent. it was, however, in navigation, avowedly the chief aim of the protective legislation, that the intercolonial results were most encouraging. through the exclusion of american competition, british tonnage to canada and the neighboring colonies had enlarged fourfold, from , to , . the national tonnage engaged between the west indies and the mother country had grown from , to , ; per cent. more encouraging still, from the ideal point of view of a restored system of mutual support, embracing both sides of the atlantic, the tonnage employed between canada and the west indies had risen from only in , to , in . in brief, after a careful and systematic examination of the whole field, the committee considered that british navigation had gained , tons by excluding americans from branches of trade they had once shared, and still eagerly desired. the effects of the system were most conspicuous in the trade between the west indies and the united states. the tonnage here employed had fallen from , , before the war, to , . the reflections of the committee upon this particular are so characteristic of national convictions as to be worth quoting.[ ] "this decrease is rather less than half what it was before the war;[ ] but before the war five-eighths belonged to merchants, permanent inhabitants of the countries now under the dominion of the united states, and three-eighths to british merchants residing occasionally in the said countries. at that time, very few vessels belonging to british merchants, resident in the british european dominions, or in the british islands in the west indies, had a share in this trade. the vessels employed in this trade can now only belong to british subjects _residing_ in the present british dominions. many vessels now go from the ports of great britain, carrying british manufactures to the united states, there load with lumber and provisions for the british islands in the west indies, and return with the produce of these islands to great britain. the whole of this branch of freight may also be considered as a new acquisition, and was obtained by your majesty's order in council before mentioned,[ ] which has operated to the increase of british navigation, compared to that of the united states in a double ratio; _but it has taken from the navigation of the united states more than it has added to that of great britain_." the last sentence emphasizes the fact, which john adams had noted, that the object of the navigation system was scarcely more defensive than offensive, in the military sense of the word. the act carried provisions meant distinctly to impede the development of foreign shipping, as far as possible to do so by municipal regulation. the prohibition of entrance to a port of great britain by a foreign trader, unless three-fourths manned by citizens of the country whose flag she bore, was distinctly offensive in intent. but for this, other states might increase their tonnage by employing seamen not their own, which great britain could not do without weakening the reserves available for her navy, and imperative to her defence. rivalry was thus engendered, and became bitter and apprehensive in proportion to the national interests involved; but at no time had such considerations persuaded the country to depart from its purpose. "the foreign war which those measures first brought upon us, and the odium which they have never ceased to cause, to the present day ( ) among neighboring nations, have not induced the legislature to give up any one of its principles."[ ] in the case of the united states, the exasperation aroused was very great. it perpetuated the national animosity surviving from the war of independence, and provoked retaliation. before the formation of the better union this was too desultory and divided to have much effect, and the artificial system of which sheffield was the chief public champion had the appearance of success which has been described; but as soon as the thirteen states could wield their power as one whole, under a system at once consistent and permanent, american navigation began to make rapid headway. in there entered american ports from abroad , tons of american shipping and , foreign, of which , were british.[ ] after one year of the discriminating tonnage dues laid by the national congress, the american tonnage entering home ports from great britain had risen, from the , average of the three years, to , ascertained by the british committee, to , .[ ] in there entered , tons of native shipping,[ ] and but , foreign.[ ] the amount of british among the latter is not stated; but in the year there cleared from great britain, under her own flag, for the united states, but , tons.[ ] this reversal of the conditions in - , before quoted,[ ] was the result of a gradual progress, noticeable immediately after the american imposition of tonnage duties, and increasing up to , when it was accelerated by the war between great britain and france. it is carefully to be remembered that the british committee, representing strictly the prepossessions of the body by which it was constituted, looked primarily to the development of national carrying trade. "as the security of the british dominions principally depends on the greatness of your majesty's naval power, it has ever been the policy of the british government to watch with a jealous eye every attempt that has been made by foreign nations to the detriment of its navigation; and even in cases where the interests of commerce and those of navigation could not be wholly reconciled, the government of great britain has always given the preference to the interests of navigation; and it has never yet submitted to the imposition of any tonnage duties by foreign nations on british ships trading to their ports, without proceeding immediately to retaliation."[ ] it had, however, submitted to several such measures, retaliatory for the exclusion from the west india trade, enacted by the separate states in the years to ; as well as to other legislation, taxing british shipping by name much above that of other foreigners. this quiescence was due to confidence, that the advantages possessed by great britain would enable her to overcome all handicaps. it was therefore with satisfaction that, after six years of commercial antagonism, the committee was able, not only to report the growth of british shipping, already quoted, but to show by the first official statement of entries issued by the american government,[ ] for the first year of its own existence, that for every five american tons entering american ports from over sea, there entered also three british; and that of the whole foreign tonnage there were six british to one of all other nations together. upon the whole, therefore, while regretting the evidence in the american statement which showed increasing activity by american shipping over that ascertained by themselves for the previous years,--to be accounted for, as was believed, by transient circumstances,--the committee, after consultation with the leading merchants in the american trade, thought better to postpone retaliation for the new tonnage duties, which contained no invidious distinction in favor of other foreign shipping against british. the system of trade regulation so far pursued had given good results, and its continuance was recommended; though bitterly antagonizing americans, and maintaining ill-will between the two countries. upon one point, especially desired by the united states, the committee was particularly firm. it considered that its government might judiciously make one proposition--and one only--for a commercial treaty; namely, that there should be entire equality of treatment, as to duties and tonnage, towards the ships of both nations in the home ports of each other. "but if congress should propose (as they certainly will) that this principle of equality should be extended to the ports of our colonies and islands, and that the ships of the united states should there be treated as british ships, it should be answered that this demand cannot be admitted even as a subject of negotiation.... this branch of freight is of the same nature with the freight from one american state to another" (that is, trade internal to the empire is essentially a coasting trade). "congress has made regulations to confine the freight, employed between the different states, to the ships of the united states, and great britain does not object to this restriction."[ ] "the great advantages which have resulted from excluding american ships appear in the accounts given in this report; many of the merchants and planters of the west indies, who formerly resisted this advice, now acknowledge the wisdom of it."[ ] the committee recognized that exclusion from the carrying trade of the british west indies was in some degree compensated to the american carrier, by the permission given by the government of france for vessels not exceeding sixty tons to trade with her colonies, actually much greater producers, and therefore larger customers. santo domingo in particular, in the period following the american war, had enjoyed a heyday of prosperity, far eclipsing that of all the british islands together. this was due partly to natural advantages, and partly to social conditions,--the planters being generally resident, which the british were not; but cheaper supplies through free intercourse with the american continent also counted for much. from the french west indies there entered the united states in , , tons of shipping, of which only , were french.[ ] from the british islands there came , , but of these all but , were british.[ ] returning, the exports from the united states to the two were respectively, $ , , and $ , , .[ ] the flattering testimony borne by these figures to the meagreness of french navigation, in the particular quarter, needed doubtless to be qualified by reference to their home trade from the west indies, borne in french ships. this amounted in to , tons from santo domingo alone;[ ] whereas the british trade from all their islands employed but , .[ ] this, however, was the sole great carrying trade of france; to the united states she sent from her home ports less than , tons. it was the opinion of the british committee that the privilege conceded to american shipping in the french islands was so contrary to established colonial policy as to be of doubtful continuance. still, in concluding its report with a summary of american commercial conditions, which it deemed were in a declining way, it took occasion to utter a warning, based upon these relations of america with the foreign colonies. in case of a commercial treaty, "should it be proposed to treat on maritime regulations, any article allowing the ships of the united states to protect the property of the enemies of great britain in time of war" (that is, the flag to cover the goods), "should on no account be admitted. it would be more dangerous to concede this privilege to the united states than to any other foreign country. from their situation, the ships of these states would be able to cover the whole trade of france and spain with their islands and colonies, in america and the west indies, whenever great britain shall be engaged with either of those powers; and the navy of great britain would, in such case, be deprived of the means of distressing the enemy, by destroying his commerce and thereby diminishing his resources." it is well to note in these words the contemporary recognition of the importance of the position of the united states; of the value of the colonial trade; of the bearing of commerce destruction on war, by "diminishing the resources" of an enemy; and of the opportunity of the united states, "from their situation," to cover the carriage of colonial produce to europe; for upon these several points turned much of the troubles, which by their accumulation caused mutual exasperation, and established an antagonism that inevitably lent itself to the war spirit when occasion arose. the specific warning of the committee was doubtless elicited by the terms of the then recent british commercial treaty with france, in , by which the two nations had agreed that, in case of war to which one was a party, the vessels of the other might freely carry all kinds of goods, the property of any person or nation, except contraband. such a concession could be made safely to france,--was in fact perfectly one-sided in favoring great britain; but to america it would open unprecedented opportunity. to the state of things so far described came the french revolution; already begun, indeed, when the committee sat, but the course of which could not yet be foreseen. its coincidence with the formation of the new government of the united states is well to be remembered; for the two events, by their tendencies, worked together to promote the antagonism between the united states and great britain, which was already latent in the navigation system of the one and the maritime aptitudes of the other. washington, the first american president, was inaugurated in march, ; in may, the states general of france met. in february, , the french republic declared war against great britain, and in march washington entered on his second term. in the intervening four years the british government had persisted in maintaining the exclusion of american carrying trade from her colonial ports. during the same period the great french colony santo domingo had undergone a social convulsion, which ended in the wreck of its entire industrial system by the disappearance of slavery, and with it of all white government. the huge sugar and coffee product of the island vanished as a commercial factor, and with it the greater part of the colonial carriage of supplies, which had indemnified american shippers and agriculturists for their exclusion from british ports. of , american tonnage entering american ports from the west indies in , , had been from french islands. the removal of so formidable a competitor as santo domingo of course inured to the advantage of the british sugar and coffee planter, who was thus more able to bear the burden laid upon him to maintain the navigation of the empire, by paying a heavy percentage on his supplies. this, however, was not the only change in conditions affecting commerce and navigation. by it had become evident that canada, nova scotia, and their neighbors, could not fill the place in an imperial system which it had been hoped they would take, as producers of lumber and food stuffs. this increased the relative importance of the west india islands to the empire, just when the rise in price of sugar and coffee made it more desirable to develop their production. should war come, the same reason would make it expedient to extend by conquest british productive territory in the caribbean, and at the same time to cut off the supplies of such enemy's possessions as could not be subdued; thus crippling them, and removing their competition by force, as that of santo domingo had been by industrial ruin. these considerations tended further to fasten the interest of great britain upon this whole region, as particularly conducive to her navigation system. that cheapening supplies would stimulate production, to meet the favorable market and growing demands of the world, had been shown by the object-lesson of the french colonies; though as yet the example had not been followed. at this time also great britain had to recognize her growing dependence upon the sea, because her home territory had ceased to be self-sufficing. her agriculture was becoming inadequate to feeding her people, in whose livelihood manufactures and commerce were playing an increasing part. both these, as well as food from abroad, required the command of the sea, in war as in peace, to import raw materials and export finished products; and control of the sea required increase of naval resources, proportioned to the growing commercial movement. according to the ideas of the age, the colonial monopoly was the surest means to this. it was therefore urgent to resort to measures which should develop the colonies; and the question was inevitable whether reserving to british navigation the trade by which they were supplied was not more than compensated by the diminished production, with its effect in lessening the cargoes employing shipping for the homeward voyage. thus things were when war broke out. the two objects, or motives, which have been indicated, came then at once into play. the conquest of the french west indies, a perfectly legitimate move, was speedily undertaken; and meanwhile orders passing the bounds of recognized international law were issued, to suppress, by capture, their intercourse with the united states, alike in import and export. the blow of course fell upon american shipping, by which this traffic was almost wholly maintained. this was the beginning of a long series of arbitrary measures, dictated by a policy uniform in principle, though often modified by dictates of momentary expediency. it lasted for years in its various manifestations, the narration of which belongs to subsequent chapters. complementary to this was the effort to develop production in british colonies, by extending to them the neutral carriage denied to their enemies. this was effected by allowing direct trade between them and the united states to american vessels of not over seventy tons; a limit substantially the same as that before imposed by france, and designed to prevent their surreptitiously conveying the cargoes to europe, to the injury of british monopoly of the continental supply, effected by the _entrepôt_ system, and doubly valuable since the failure of french products. this concession to american navigation, despite the previous opposition, had become possible to pitt, partly because its advisability had been demonstrated and the opportunity recognized; partly, also, because the immense increase of the active navy, caused by the war, created a demand for seamen, which by impressment told heavily upon the merchant navigation of the kingdom, fostered for this very purpose. to meet this emergency, it was clearly politic to devolve the supply of the british west indies upon neutral carriers, who would enjoy an immunity from capture denied to merchant ships of a belligerent, as well as relieve british navigation of a function which it had never adequately fulfilled. the measure was in strict accord with the usual practice of remitting in war the requirement of the navigation act, that three-fourths of all crews should be british subjects; by which means a large number of native seamen became at once released to the navy. to throw open a reserved trade to foreign ships, and a reserved employment to foreign seamen, are evidently only different applications of the one principle, viz.: to draw upon foreign aid, in a crisis to which the national navigation was unequal. correlative to these measures, defensive in character, was the determination that the enemy should be deprived of these benefits; that, so far as international law could be stretched, neutral ships should not help him as they were encouraged to help the british. the welfare of the empire also demanded that native seamen should not be allowed to escape their liability to impressment, by serving in neutral vessels. the lawless measures taken to insure these two objects were the causes avowed by the united states in for declaring war. the impressment of american seamen, however, although numerous instances had already occurred, had not yet made upon the national consciousness an impression at all proportionate to the magnitude of the wrong; and the instructions given to jay,[ ] as special envoy in , while covering many points at issue, does not mention this, which eventually overtopped all others. footnotes: [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. i. p. . [ ] commerce of the american states (edition february, ), pp. - . [ ] works of john adams, vol. viii. p. . [ ] washington's correspondence, , edited by w.c. ford, vol. viii. pp. , , . [ ] report of the committee of the privy council, jan. , , p. . [ ] chalmers, opinions, p. . [ ] jurien de la gravière, guerres maritimes, paris, , vol. ii. p. . [ ] canada, newfoundland, bermuda, etc. [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. i. p. . [ ] p. . [ ] coxe, view of the united states, p. . [ ] reeves, p. . nevertheless, foreign nations frequently complained of this as a distinction against them (report of the committee of the privy council, jan. , , p. ). [ ] bryan edwards, west indies, vol. ii. p. (note). [ ] coxe's view, p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign affairs, vol. i. p. . jefferson added, "these imports consist mostly of articles on which industry has been exhausted,"--_i.e._, completed manufactures. the state papers, commerce and navigation, give the tabulated imports and exports for many succeeding years. [ ] works of john adams, vol. viii. p. . [ ] works of john adams, vol. viii. p. . [ ] my italics. [ ] chalmers, opinions, p. . [ ] reeves, pp. , . [ ] works of john adams, vol. viii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. i. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. i. p. . [ ] morris to randolph (secretary of state), may , . american state papers, foreign relations, vol. i. p. . the italics are morris's. [ ] quoted from de witt's interest of holland, in macpherson's annals of commerce, vol. ii. p. . [ ] observations on the commerce of the american states, , p. . concerning this pamphlet, gibbon wrote, "the navigation act, the palladium of britain, was defended, perhaps saved, by his pen." [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. i. pp. - . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. i. p. . [ ] west indies, vol. ii. page , note. [ ] opinions, p. . [ ] macpherson, vol. iii. p. . [ ] ibid., vol. iv. p. . [ ] bryan edwards, himself a planter of the time, says (vol. ii. p. ) that staves and lumber had risen per cent in the british islands, which he attributes to the extortions of the navigation monopoly, "under the present limited intercourse with america." coxe (view, etc., p. ) gives lists of comparative prices, in , june to november, in the neighboring islands of santo domingo and jamaica, which show forcibly the burdens under which the latter labored. [ ] chalmers, in one of his works quoted by macpherson (vol. iii. p. ), estimates the annual entries of american-built ships to british ports, - , to be , tons. from this figure the falling off was marked. [ ] report of the committee of the privy council, jan. , , p. . [ ] this awkward expression means that the amount of decrease was rather less than half the before-the-war total. [ ] june , , substantially the re-issue of that of dec. , , which reeves (p. ) considers the standard exemplar. [ ] reeves, p. . [ ] american state papers, commerce and navigation, vol. x. p. . [ ] ibid., foreign relations, vol. i. p. . [ ] ibid., commerce and navigation, vol. x. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] macpherson, annals of commerce, vol. iv. p. . [ ] ante, pp. , . [ ] report of the committee, p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] report, p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] american state papers, commerce and navigation, vol. x. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] coxe, p. . [ ] committee's estimate; report, p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. i. p. . [illustration: john jay from the painting by gilbert stuart, in bedford (jay) house, katonah, n.y.] chapter iii from jay's treaty to the orders in council - while there were many matters in dispute between the two countries, the particular occasion of jay's mission to london in was the measures injurious to the commerce of the united states, taken by the british government on the outbreak of war with france, in . neutrals are certain to suffer, directly and indirectly, from every war, and especially in maritime wars; for then the great common of all nations is involved, under conditions and regulations which by general consent legalize interference, suspension, and arrest of neutral voyages, when conflicting with acknowledged belligerent rights, or under reasonable suspicion of such conflict. it was held in the united states that in the treatment of american ships great britain had transcended international law, and abused belligerent privilege, by forced construction in two particulars. first, in june, , she sent into her own ports american vessels bound to france with provisions, on the ground that under existing circumstance these were contraband of war. she did indeed buy the cargoes, and pay the freight, thus reducing the loss to the shipper; but he was deprived of the surplus profit arising from extraordinary demand in france, and it was claimed besides that the procedure was illegal. secondly, in november of the same year, the british government directed the seizure of "all ships laden with goods the produce of any colony belonging to france, or carrying provisions or other supplies for the use of any such colony." neutrals were thus forbidden either to go to, or to sail from, any french colony for purposes of commercial intercourse. for the injuries suffered under these measures jay was to seek compensation. the first order raised only a question of contraband, of frequent recurrence in all hostilities. it did not affect the issues which led to the war of , and therefore need not here be further considered. but the second turned purely on the question of the intercourse of neutrals with the colonies of belligerents, and rested upon those received opinions concerning the relations of colonies to mother countries, which have been related in the previous chapters. the british government founded the justification of its action upon a precedent established by its own admiralty courts, which, though not strictly new, was recent, dating back only to the seven years' war, - , whence it had received the name of the rule of . at that time, in the world of european civilization, all the principal maritime communities were either mother countries or colonies. a colonial system was the appendage of every maritime state; and among all there obtained the invariable rule, the formulation of which by montesquieu has been already quoted, that "commercial monopoly is the leading principle of colonial intercourse," from which foreign states were rigorously excluded. dealing with such a recognized international relation, at a period when colonial production had reached unprecedented proportions, the british courts had laid down the principle that a trade which a nation in time of peace forbade to foreigners could not be extended to them, if neutrals, in time of war, at the will and for the convenience of the belligerent; because by such employment they were "in effect incorporated in the enemy's navigation, having adopted his commerce and character, and identified themselves with his interests and purposes."[ ] during the next great maritime war, that of american independence, the united states were involved as belligerents, and the only maritime neutrals were holland and the baltic states. these drew together in a league known historically as the armed neutrality of , in opposition to certain british interpretations of the rights of neutrals and belligerents; but in their formulated demands that of open trade with the colonies of belligerents does not appear, although there is found one closely cognate to it,--an asserted right to coasting trade, from port to port, of a country at war. the rule of therefore remained, in , a definition of international maritime law laid down by british courts, but not elsewhere accepted; and it rested upon a logical deduction from a system of colonial administration universal at that period. the logical deduction may be stated thus. the mother country, for its own benefit, reserves to itself both the inward and outward trade; the products of the colony, and the supplying of it with necessaries. the carriage of these commodities is also confined to its own ships. colonial commerce and navigation are thus each a national monopoly. to open to neutrals the navigation, the carriage of products and supplies, in time of war, is a war measure simply, designed to preserve a benefit endangered by the other belligerent. as a war measure, it tends to support the financial and naval strength of the nation employing it; and therefore, to an opponent whose naval power is capable of destroying that element of strength, the stepping in of a neutral to cover it is clearly an injury. the neutral so doing commits an unfriendly act, partial between the two combatants; because it aids the one in a proceeding, the origin and object of which are purely belligerent. when the united states in entered the family of nations, she came without colonies, but in the war attendant upon her liberation she had no rights as a neutral. in the interval of peace, between and , she had endeavored, as has been seen, to establish between herself and the caribbean region those conditions of open navigation which were indicated as natural by the geographical relations of the two and their several products. this had been refused by great britain; but france had conceded it on a restricted scale, plainly contrived, by the limitation of sixty tons on the size of vessels engaged, to counteract any attempt at direct carriage from the islands to europe, which was not permitted. under these circumstances the united states was brought into collision with the rule of , for the first time, by the order in council of november , . a people without colonies, and with a rapidly growing navigation, could have no sympathy with a system, coextensive with europe, which monopolized the carriage of colonial products. the immediate attitude assumed was one of antagonism; and the wrong as felt was the greater, because the direct intercourse between the united states and the then great french colonies was not incidental to war, but had been established in peace. in principle, the rule rested for its validity upon an exception made in war, for the purposes of war. the british government in fact had overlooked that the rule had originated in european conditions; and, if applicable at all to the new transatlantic state, it could only be if conditions were the same, or equivalent. till now, by universal usage, trade from colonies had been only to the mother country; the appearance of an american state with no colonies introduced two factors hitherto non-existent. here was a people not identified with a general system of colonial exclusiveness; and also, from their geographical situation, it was possible for a european government to permit them to trade with its colonies, without serious trespass on the privileges reserved to the mother country. the monopoly of the latter consisted not only in the commerce and carrying trade of the colony, but in the _entrepôt_; that is, in the receipt and storage of the colonial produce, and its distribution to less favored european communities,--the profit, in short, of the middleman, or broker. france had recognized, though but partially, this difference of conditions, and in somewhat grudging manner had opened her west indian ports to american vessels, for intercourse with their own country. this trade, being permitted in peace, did not come under the british rule; therefore by its own principle the seizures under it were unlawful. accordingly, on january , , the order was revoked, and the application limited to vessels bound from the west indies direct to europe. this further order in council preserved the principle of the rule of , but it removed the cause of a great number of the seizures which had afflicted american shipping. there were nevertheless, among these, some cases of vessels bound direct to france from french colonies, laden with colonial produce; one of which was the first presented to jay on his arrival in london. in writing to the secretary of state he says, "it unfortunately happens that this is not among the strongest of the cases;" and in a return made three years later to congress, of losses recovered under the treaty, this vessel's name does not appear. in the opinion of counsel, submitted to jay, it was unlikely that the case would be reversed on appeal, because it unequivocally fell under the rule.[ ] it is therefore to be inferred that this principle, the operation of which was revived so disastrously in , was not surrendered by the british government in . in fact, in the discussions between mr. jay and the british minister of foreign affairs, there seems to have been on both sides a disposition to avoid pronouncements upon points of abstract right. it remained the constant policy of british negotiators, throughout this thorny period, to seek modes of temporary arrangement, which should obviate immediate causes of complaint; leaving principles untouched, to be asserted, if desirable, at a more favorable moment. this was quite contrary to the wishes of the united states government, which repeatedly intimated to jay that in the case of the rule of it desired to settle the question of principle, which it denied. to this it had attached several other topics touching maritime neutral rights, such as the flag covering the cargo, and matters of contraband.[ ] jay apparently satisfied himself, by his interviews and observation of public feeling in england, that at the moment it was vain for a country without a navy to expect from great britain any surrender of right, as interpreted by her jurists; that the most to be accomplished was the adoption of measures which should as far as possible extend the immediate scope of american commerce, and remove its present injuries, presenting withal a probability of future further concessions. in his letter transmitting the treaty, he wrote: "that britain, at this period, and involved in war, should not admit principles which would impeach the propriety of her conduct in seizing provisions bound to france, and enemy's property on board neutral vessels, does not appear to me extraordinary. the articles, as they now stand, secure compensation for seizures, and leave us at liberty to decide whether they were made in such cases as to be warranted by the _existing_ law of nations."[ ] the italics are jay's, and the expression is obscure; but it seems to imply that, while either nation, in their respective claims for damages, would be bound by the decision of the commissioners provided for their settlement by the treaty, it would preserve the right to its own opinion as to whether the decision was in accordance with admitted law, binding in the future. in short, acceptance of the rule of would not be affected by the findings upon the claims. if adverse to great britain, she could still assert the rule in times to come, if expedient; if against the united states, she likewise, while submitting, reserved the right of protest, with or without arms, against its renewed enforcement. "as to the principles we contend for," continued jay, "you will find them saved in the conclusion of the twelfth article, from which it will appear that we still adhere to them." this conclusion specifies that after the termination of a certain period, during which great britain would open to american vessels the carrying trade between her west india islands and the united states, there should be further negotiation, looking to the extension of mutual intercourse; "and the said parties will then endeavor to agree whether, in any, and what, cases neutral vessels shall protect enemy's property; and in what cases provisions and other articles, not generally contraband, may become such. but in the meantime, their conduct towards each other in these respects shall be regulated by the articles hereinafter inserted on those subjects."[ ] the treaty therefore was a temporary arrangement, to meet temporary difficulties, and involved no surrender of principle on either side. although the rule of is not mentioned, it evidently shared the same fate as the other american propositions looking to the settlement of principles; the more so that subsequent articles admitted, not only the undoubted rule that the neutral flag did not cover enemy's goods, but also the vehemently disputed claim that naval stores and provisions were, or might be, contraband of war. further evidence of the understanding of great britain in this matter is afforded by a letter of the law adviser of the crown, transmitted in by the secretary for foreign affairs to mr. king, then united states minister. "the direct trade between the mother country and its colonies has not during this present war been recognized as legal, either by his majesty's government or by his tribunals."[ ] it is to be inferred that the administration and the senate, while possibly thinking jay too yielding as a negotiator, reached the conclusion that his estimate of british feeling, formed upon the spot, was correct as to the degree of concession then to be obtained. at all events, the treaty, which provided for mixed commissions to adjudicate upon the numerous seizures made under the british orders, and, under certain conditions, admitted american vessels to branches of british trade previously closed to them, was ratified with the exception of the twelfth article. this conferred on americans the privilege, long and urgently desired, of direct trade between their own country and the british west indies on the same terms as british ships, though in vessels of limited size. greatly desired as this permission had been, it came coupled with the condition, not only that cargoes from the islands should be landed in the united states alone, but also, while the concession lasted, american vessels should not carry "molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa, or cotton" from the united states to any part of the world. by strict construction, this would prevent re-exporting the produce of french or other foreign colonies; a traffic, the extent of which during this war may be conceived by the returns for a single year, , when united states shipping carried to europe thirty-five million pounds of sugar and sixty-two million pounds of coffee, products of the caribbean region. this article was rejected by the senate, and the treaty ratified without it; but the coveted privilege was continued by british executive order, the regulations in the matter being suspended on account of the war, and the trade opened to american as well as british ships. ostensibly a favor, not resting on the obligations of treaty, but on the precarious ground of the government's will, its continuance was assured under the circumstances of the time by its practical utility to great britain; for the trade of that country, and its vital importance in the prevailing wars, were developing at a rate which outstripped its own tonnage. the numbers of native seamen were likewise inadequate, through the heavy demands of the navy for men. the concurrence of neutrals was imperative. under the conditions it was no slight advantage to have the islands supplied and the american market retained, by the services of american vessels, leaving to british the monopoly of direct carrying between the colonies and europe. although vexations to neutrals incident to a state of war continued subsequent to this treaty, they turned upon points of construction and practice rather than upon principle. negotiation was continuous; and in september, , towards the close of adams's administration, mr. john marshall, then secretary of state, summed up existing complaints of commercial injury under three heads,--definitions of contraband, methods of blockade, and the unjust decisions of vice-admiralty courts; coupled with the absence of penalty to cruisers making unwarranted captures, which emboldened them to seize on any ground, because certain to escape punishment. but no formal pronouncement further injurious to united states commerce was made by the british government during this war, which ended in october, , to be renewed eighteen months later. on the contrary, the progress of events in the west indies, by its favorable effect upon british commerce, assisted pitt in taking the more liberal measures to which by conviction he was always inclined. the destruction of haiti as a french colony, and to a great degree as a producer of sugar and coffee, by eliminating one principal source of the world's supply, raised values throughout the remaining caribbean; while the capture of almost all the french and dutch possessions threw their commerce and navigation into the hands of great britain. in this swelling prosperity the british planter, the british carrier, and the british merchant at home all shared, and so bore without apparent grudging the issuance of an order, in january, , which extended to european neutrals the concession, made in to the united states, of carrying west indian produce direct from the islands to their own country, or to great britain; not, however, to a hostile port, or to any other neutral territory than their own. although this order in no way altered the existing status of the united states, it was embraced in a list of british measures affecting commerce,[ ] transmitted to congress in . from the american standpoint this was accurate; for the extension to neutrals to carry to their own country, and to no other, continued the exclusion of the united states from a direct traffic between the belligerent colonies and europe, which she had steadily asserted to be her right, but which the rule of denied. the utmost the united states had obtained was the restitution of privileges enjoyed by them as colonists of great britain, in trading with the british west indies; and this under circumstances of delay and bargain which showed clearly that the temporary convenience of great britain was alone consulted. no admission had been made on the point of right, as maintained by america. on the contrary, the order of was at pains to state as its motive no change of principle, but "consideration of the present state of the commerce of great britain, as well as of that of neutral countries," which makes it "expedient."[ ] up to the preliminaries of peace in , nothing occurred to change that state of commerce which made expedient the order of january, . it was renewed in terms when war again began between france and great britain, in may, . in consideration of present conditions, the direct trade was permitted to neutral vessels between an enemy's colony and their own country. the united states remained, as before, excluded from direct carriage between the west indies and europe; but the general course of the british administration of the moment gave hopes of a line of conduct more conformable to american standards of neutral rights. particularly, in reply to a remonstrance of the united states, a blockade of the whole coast of martinique and guadaloupe, proclaimed by a british admiral, was countermanded; instructions being sent him that the measure could apply only to particular ports, actually invested by sufficient force, and that neutrals attempting to enter should not be captured unless they had been previously warned.[ ] although no concession of principle as to colonial trade had been made, the united states acquiesced in, though she did not accept, the conditions of its enforcement. these were well understood by the mercantile community, and were such as admitted of great advantage, both to the merchant and to the carrying trade. in , mr. monroe, justifying his negotiations of , wrote that, even under new serious differences which had then arisen, "the united states were in a prosperous and happy condition, compared with that of other nations. as a neutral power, they were almost the exclusive carriers of the commerce of the whole world; and in commerce they flourished beyond example, notwithstanding the losses they occasionally suffered."[ ] under such circumstances matters ran along smoothly for nearly two years. in may, , occurred a change of administration in england, bringing pitt again into power. as late as november of this year, jefferson in his annual message said, "with the nations of europe, in general, our friendship and intercourse are undisturbed; and, from the governments of the belligerent powers, especially, we continue to receive those friendly manifestations which are justly due to an honest neutrality." monroe in london wrote at the same time, "our commerce was never so much favored in time of war."[ ] these words testify to general quietude and prosperity under existing conditions, but are not to be understood as affirming absence of subjects of difference. on the contrary, monroe had been already some time in london, charged to obtain from great britain extensive concessions of principle and practice, which jefferson, with happy optimism, expected a nation engaged in a life and death struggle would yield in virtue of reams of argument, maintaining views novel to it, advanced by a country enjoying the plenitude of peace, but without organized power to enforce its demands. about this time, but as yet unknown to the president, the question had been suddenly raised by the british government as to what constituted a direct trade; and american vessels carrying west indian products from the united states to europe were seized under a construction of "direct," which was affirmed by the court before whom the cases came for adjudication. as jefferson's expressions had reflected the contentment of the american community, profiting, as neutrals often profit, by the misfortunes of belligerents, so these measures of pitt proceeded from the discontents of planters, shippers, and merchants. these had come to see in the prosperity of american shipping, and the gains of american merchants, the measure of their own losses by a trade which, though of long standing, they now claimed was one of direct carriage, because by continuous voyage, between the hostile colonies and the continent of europe. the losses of planter and merchant, however, were but one aspect of the question, and not the most important in british eyes. the products of hostile origin carried by americans to neutral or hostile countries in europe did by competition reduce seriously the profit upon british colonial articles of the same kind, to the injury of the finances of the kingdom; and the american carriers, the american ships, not only supplanted so much british tonnage, but were enabled to do so by british seamen, who found in them a quiet refuge--relatively, though not wholly, secure--from the impressment which everywhere pursued the british merchant ship. it was a fundamental conviction of all british statesmen, and of the general british public, that the welfare of the navy, the one defence of the empire, depended upon maintaining the carrying trade, with the right of impressment from it; and pitt, upon his return to office, had noted "with considerable concern, the increasing acrimony which appears to pervade the representations made to you [the british minister at washington] by the american secretary of state on the subject of the impressment of seamen from on board american ships."[ ] the issue of direct trade was decided adversely to the contention of the united states, in the test case of the ship "essex," in may, , by the first living authority in england on maritime international law, sir william scott. resting upon the rule of , he held that direct trade from belligerent colonies to europe was forbidden to neutrals, except under the conditions of the relaxing orders of and ; but the privilege to carry to their own country having been by these extended, it was conceded, in accordance with precedent, that products thus imported, if they had complied with the legal requirements for admission _to use_ in the importing country, thenceforth had its nationality. they became neutral in character, and could be exported like native produce to any place open to commerce, belligerent or neutral. united states shippers, therefore, were at liberty to send even to france french colonial products which had been thus americanized. the effect of this procedure upon the articles in question was to raise their price at the place of final arrival, by all the expense incident to a broken transit; by the cost of landing, storing, paying duties, and reshipping, together with that of the delay consequent upon entering an american port to undergo these processes. with the value thus enhanced upon reaching the continent of europe, the british planter, carrier, and merchant might hope that british west india produce could compete; although various changes of conditions in the west indies, and bonaparte's efforts at the exclusion of british products from the continent, had greatly reduced their market there from the fair proportions of the former war. in the cases brought before sir william scott, however, it was found that the duties paid for admission to the united states were almost wholly released, by drawback, on re-exportation; so that the articles were brought to the continental consumer relieved of this principal element of cost. he therefore ruled that they had not complied with the conditions of an actual importation; that the articles had not lost their belligerent character; and that the carriage to europe was by direct voyage, not interrupted by an importation. the vessels were therefore condemned. the immediate point thus decided was one of construction, and in particular detail hitherto unsettled. the law adviser of the crown had stated in , as an accepted precedent, "that landing the goods and paying the duties in the neutral country breaks the continuity of the voyage;"[ ] but the circumstance of drawback, which belonged to the municipal prerogative of the independent neutral state, had not then been considered. the foundation on which all rested was the principle of . the underlying motive for the new action taken--the protection of a british traffic--linked the war of with the conditions of colonial dependence of the united states, which was a matter of recent memory to men of both countries still in the vigor of life. the american found again exerted over his national commerce a control indistinguishable in practice from that of colonial days; from what port his ships should sail, whither they might go, what cargoes they might carry, under what rules be governed in their own ports, were dictated to him as absolutely, if not in as extensive detail, as before the war of independence. the british government placed itself in the old attitude of a sovereign authority, regulating the commerce of a dependency with an avowed view to the interest of the mother country. this motive was identical with that of colonial administration; the particular form taken being dictated, of course, then as before, by the exigencies of the moment,--by a "consideration of the present state of the commerce of this country." messrs. monroe and pinkney, who were appointed jointly to negotiate a settlement of the trouble, wrote that "the british commissioners did not hesitate to state that their wish was to place their own merchants on an equal footing in the great markets of the continent with those of the united states, by burthening the intercourse of the latter with severe restrictions."[ ] the wish was allowable; but the method, the regulation of american commercial movement by british force, resting for justification upon a strained interpretation of a contested belligerent right, was naturally and accurately felt to be a re-imposition of colonial fetters upon a people who had achieved their independence. the motive remained; and the method, the regulation of american trade by british orders, was identical in substance, although other in form, with that of the celebrated orders in council of and . mr. monroe, who was minister to england when this interesting period began, had gone to spain on a special mission in october, , shortly after his announcement, before quoted, that "american commerce was never so much favored in time of war." "on no principle or pretext, so far, has more than one of our vessels been condemned." upon his return in july, , he found in full progress the seizures, the legality of which had been affirmed by sir william scott. a prolonged correspondence with the then british government followed, but no change of policy could be obtained. in january, , pitt died; and the ministry which succeeded was composed largely of men recently opposed to him in general principles of action. in particular, mr. fox, between whom and pitt there had been an antagonism nearly lifelong, became secretary for foreign affairs. his good dispositions towards america were well known, and dated from the war of independence. to him monroe wrote that under the recent measures "about one hundred and twenty vessels had been seized, several condemned, all taken from their course, detained, and otherwise subjected to heavy losses and damages."[ ] the injury was not confined to the immediate sufferers, but reacted necessarily on the general commercial system of the united states. [illustration: james monroe from the painting by gilbert stuart, in the possession of hon. t. jefferson coolidge.] in his first conversations with monroe, fox appeared to coincide with the american view, both as to the impropriety of the seizures and the general right of the united states to the trade in dispute, under their own interpretation of it; namely, that questions of duties and drawbacks, and the handling of the cargoes in american ports, were matters of national regulation, upon which a foreign state had no claim to pronounce. the american envoy was sanguine of a favorable issue; but the british secretary had to undergo the experience, which long exclusion from office made novel to him, that in the complications of political life a broad personal conviction has often to yield to the narrow logic of particular conditions. it is clear that the measures would not have been instituted, had he been in control; but, as it was, the american representative demanded not only their discontinuance, but a money indemnity. the necessity of reparation for wrong, if admitted, stood in the way of admitting as a wrong a proceeding authorized by the last government, and pronounced legal by the tribunals. to this obstacle was added the weight of a strong outdoor public feeling, and of opposition in the cabinet, by no means in accord upon fox's general views. consequently, to monroe's demands for a concession of principle, and for pecuniary compensation, fox at last replied with a proposition, consonant with the usual practical tone of english statesmanship, never more notable than at this period, that a compromise should be effected; modifying causes of complaint, without touching on principles. "can we not agree to suspend our rights, and leave you in a satisfactory manner the enjoyment of the trade? in that case, nothing would be said about the principle, and there would be no claim to indemnity."[ ] the united states government, throughout the controversy which began here and lasted till the war, clung with singular tenacity to the establishment of principles. to this doubtless contributed much the personality of madison, then secretary of state; a man of the pen, clear-headed, logical, incisive, and delighting like all men in the exercise of conscious powers. the discussion of principles, the exposure of an adversary's weakness or inconsistencies, the weighty marshalling of uncounted words, were to him the breath of life; and with happy disregard of the need to back phrases with deeds, there now opened before him a career of argumentation, of logical deduction and exposition, constituting a condition of political and personal enjoyment which only the deskman can fully appreciate. it was not, however, an era in which the pen was mightier than the sword; and in the smooth gliding of the current niagara was forgotten. like jefferson, he was wholly oblivious of the relevancy of pompey's retort to a contention between two nations, each convinced of its own right: "will you never have done with citing laws and privileges to men who wear swords?" to neither president nor secretary does it seem to have occurred that the provision of force might lend weight to argument; a consideration to which monroe, intellectually much their inferior, was duly sensible. "nothing will be obtained without some kind of pressure, such a one as excites an apprehension that it will be increased in case of necessity; and to produce that effect it will be proper to put our country in a better state of defence, by invigorating the militia system and increasing the naval force." "victorious at sea, great britain finds herself compelled to concentrate her force so much in this quarter, that she would not only be unable to annoy us essentially in case of war, but even to protect her commerce and possessions elsewhere, which would be exposed to our attacks."[ ] most true when written, in ; the time had passed in . "harassed as they are already with war, and the menaces of a powerful adversary, a state of hostility with us would probably go far to throw this country into confusion. it is an event which the ministry would find it difficult to resist, and therefore cannot, i presume, be willing to encounter."[ ] but he added, "there is here an opinion, which many do not hesitate to avow, that the united states are, by the nature of their government, incapable of any great, vigorous, or persevering exertion."[ ] this impression, for which it must sorrowfully be confessed there was much seeming ground in contemporary events, and the idiosyncrasies of jefferson and madison, in their full dependence upon commercial coercion to reduce great britain to concede their most extreme demands, contributed largely to maintain the successive british ministries in that unconciliatory and disdainful attitude towards the united states, which made inevitable a war that a higher bearing might have averted. monroe had been instructed that, if driven to it, he might waive the practical right to sail direct from a belligerent colony to the mother country, being careful to use no expression that would imply yielding of the abstract principle. but the general insistence of his government upon obtaining from great britain acknowledgment of right was so strong that he could not accept fox's suggestion. the british minister, forced along the lines of his predecessors by the logic of the situation, then took higher ground. "he proceeded to insist that," to break the continuity of the voyage, "our vessels which should be engaged in that commerce must enter our ports, their cargoes be landed, and the duties paid."[ ] this was the full extent of pitt's requirements, as of the rulings of the british admiralty court; and made the regulation of transactions in an american port depend upon the decisions of british authorities. monroe unhesitatingly rejected the condition, and their interview ended, leaving the subject where it had been. the british cabinet then took matters into its own hands, and without further communication with monroe adopted a practical solution, which removed the particular contention from the field of controversy by abandoning the existing measures, but without any expression as to the question of right or principle, which by this tacit omission was reserved. unfortunately for the wishes of both parties, this recourse to opportunism, for such it was, however ameliorative of immediate friction, resulted in a further series of quarrels; for the new step of the british government was considered by the american to controvert international principles as much cherished by it as the right to the colonial trade. monroe's interview was on april . on may he received a letter from fox, dated may , notifying him that, in consequence of certain new and extraordinary means resorted to by the enemy for distressing british commerce, a retaliatory commercial blockade was ordered of the coast of the continent, from the river elbe to brest. this blockade, however, was to be absolute, against all commerce, only between the seine and ostend. outside of those limits, on the coast of france west of the seine, and those of france, holland, and germany east of ostend, the rights of capture attaching to blockades would be forborne in favor of neutral vessels, bound in, which had not been laden at a port hostile to great britain; or which, going out, were not destined to such hostile port.[ ] no discrimination was made against the character of the cargo, except as forbidden by generally recognized laws of war. this omission tacitly allowed the colonial trade by way of american ports, just as the measure as a whole tacitly waived all questions of principle upon which that difference had turned. after this, a case coming before a british court would require from it no concession affecting its previous rulings. by these the vessel still would stand condemned; but she was relieved from the application of them by the new order, in which the government had relinquished its asserted right. the direct voyage from the colony to the mother country was from a hostile port, and therefore remained prohibited; but the proceedings in the united states ports, as affecting the question of direct voyage, though held by the court to be properly liable to interpretation by itself on international grounds, if brought before it, was removed from its purview by the act of its own government, granting immunity. the first impressions made upon monroe by this step were favorable, as it evidently relieved the immediate embarrassments under which american commerce was laboring. there would at least be no more seizures upon the plea of direct voyages. while refraining from expressing to fox any approbation of the order of may , he wrote home in this general sense of congratulation; and upon his letters, communicated to congress in , was founded a claim by the british minister at washington in , that the blockade thus instituted was not at the time regarded by him "as founded on other than just and legitimate principles." "i have not heard that it was considered in a contrary light when notified as such to you by mr. secretary fox, nor until it suited the views of france to endeavor to have it considered otherwise."[ ] monroe, who was then secretary of state, replied that with fox "an official formal complaint was not likely to be resorted to, because friendly communications were invited and preferred. the want of such a document is no proof that the measure was approved by me, or no complaint made."[ ] the general tenor of his home letters, however, was that of satisfaction; and it is natural to men dealing with questions of immediate difficulty to hail relief, without too close scrutiny into its ultimate consequences. it may be added that ministers abroad, in close contact with the difficulties and perplexities of the government to which they are accredited, recognize these more fully than do their superiors at home, and are more susceptible to the advantages of practical remedies over the maintenance of abstract principle. the legitimacy of the blockade of may , , was afterwards sharply contested by the united states. there was no difference between the two governments as to the general principle that a blockade, to be lawful, must be supported by the presence of an adequate force, making it dangerous for a vessel trying to enter or leave the port. "great britain," wrote madison, "has already in a formal communication admitted the principle for which we contend." the difficulty turned on a point of definition, as to what situation, and what size, of a blockading division constituted adequacy. the united states authorities based themselves resolutely on the position that the blockaders must be close to the ports named for closure, and denied that a coast-line in its entirety could thus be shut off from commerce, without specifying the particular harbors before which ships would be stationed. intent, as neutrals naturally are, upon narrowing belligerent rights, usually adverse to their own, they placed the strictest construction on the words "port" and "force." this is perhaps best shown by quoting the definition proposed by american negotiators to the british government over a year later,--july , . "in order to determine what characterizes a blockade, that denomination is given only to a _port_, where there is, by the disposition of the power which blockades it _with ships stationary_, an evident danger in entering."[ ] madison, in , discussing vexations to americans bound into the mediterranean, by a spanish alleged blockade of gibraltar, had anticipated and rejected the british action of . "like blockades might be proclaimed by any particular nation, enabled by its naval superiority to distribute its ships at the mouth of that or any similar sea, _or across channels or arms of the sea_, so as to make it dangerous for the commerce of other nations to pass to its destination. these monstrous consequences condemn the principle from which they flow."[ ] the blockade of may offered a particularly apt illustration of the point at issue. from the entrance of the english channel to the straits of dover, the whole of both shore-lines was belligerent. on one side all was british; on the other all french. evidently a line of ships disposed from ushant to the lizard, the nearest point on the english coast, would constitute a very real danger to a vessel seeking to approach any french port on the channel. fifteen vessels would occupy such a line, with intervals of only six miles, and in combination with a much smaller body at the straits of dover would assuredly bring all the french coast between them within the limits of any definition of danger. that these particular dispositions were adopted does not appear; but that very much larger numbers were continually moving in the channel, back and forth in every direction, is certain. as to the remainder of the coast declared under restriction, from the straits to the elbe,--about four hundred miles,--with the great entrances to antwerp, rotterdam, amsterdam, the ems, the weser, and the elbe, there can be no doubt that it was within the power of great britain to establish the blockade within the requirements of international law. whether she did so was a question of fact, on which both sides were equally positive. the british to the last asserted that an adequate force had been assigned, "and actually maintained,"[ ] while the blockade lasted. the incident derived its historical significance chiefly from subsequent events. it does not appear at the first to have engaged the special attention of the united states government, the general position of which, as to blockades, was already sufficiently defined. the particular instance was only one among several, and interest was then diverted to two other leading points,--impressment and the colonial trade. peculiar importance began to attach to it only in the following november, when napoleon issued his berlin decree. upon this ensued the exaggerated oppressions of neutral commerce by both antagonists; and the question arose as to the responsibility for beginning the series of measures, of which the berlin and milan decrees on one side, and the british orders in council of and on the other, were the most conspicuous features. napoleon contended that the whole sprang from the extravagant pretensions of great britain, particularly in the order of may , which he, in common with the united states, characterized as illegal. the british government affirmed that it was strictly within belligerent rights, and was executed by an adequate force; that consequently it gave no ground for the course of the french emperor. american statesmen, while disclaiming with formal gravity any purpose to decide with which of the two wrong-doers the ill first began,[ ] had no scruples about reiterating constantly that the order of may contravened international right; and in so far, although wholly within the limits of diplomatic propriety, they supported napoleon's assertion. thus it came to pass that the united states was more and more felt, not only in europe, but by dissentients at home, to side with france; and as the universal contest grew more embittered, this feeling became emphasized. while these discussions were in progress between monroe and fox, the united states government had taken a definite step to bring the dispute to an issue by commercial restriction. the remonstrances from the mercantile community, against the seizures under the new ruling as to direct trade, were too numerous, emphatic, and withal reasonable, to be disregarded. congress therefore, before its adjournment on april , , passed a law shutting the american market, after the following november , against certain articles of british manufacture, unless equitable arrangements between the two countries should previously be reached. this recourse was in line with the popular action of the period preceding the war of independence, and foreshadowed the general policy upon which the administration was soon to enter on a larger scale. the measure was initiated before news was received of pitt's death, and the accession of a more friendly ministry; but, having been already recommended in committee, it was not thought expedient to recede in consequence of the change. at the same time, the administration determined to constitute an extraordinary mission, for the purpose of "treating with the british government concerning the maritime wrongs which have been committed, and the regulation of commercial navigation between the parties." for this object mr. william pinkney, of maryland, was nominated as colleague to monroe, and arrived in england on june . the points to be adjusted by the new commissioners were numerous, but among them two were made pre-eminent,--the question of colonial trade, already explained, and that of impressment of seamen from american vessels. these were named by the secretary of state as the motive of the recent act prohibiting certain importations. the envoys were explicitly instructed that no stipulation requiring the repeal of that act was to be made, unless an effectual remedy for these two evils was provided. the question of impressment, wrote madison, "derives urgency from the licentiousness with which it is still pursued, and from the growing impatience of this country under it."[ ] when pinkney arrived, the matter of the colonial trade had already been settled indirectly by the order of may , and it was soon to disappear from prominence, merged in the extreme measures of which that blockade was the precursor; but impressment remained an unhealed sore to the end. to understand the real gravity of this dispute, it is essential to consider candidly the situation of both parties, and also the influence exerted upon either by long-standing tradition. the british government did not advance a crude claim to impress american seamen. what it did assert, and was enforcing, was a right to exercise over individuals on board foreign merchantmen, upon the high seas, the authority which it possessed on board british ships there, and over all ships in british ports. the united states took the ground that no such jurisdiction existed, unless over persons engaged in the military service of an enemy; and that only when a vessel entered the ports or territorial waters of great britain were those on board subject to arrest by her officers. there, as in every state, they came under the law of the land. the british argument in favor of this alleged right may be stated in the words of canning, who became foreign secretary a year later. writing to monroe, september , , he starts from the premise, then regarded by many even in america as sound, that allegiance by birth is inalienable,--not to be renounced at the will of the individual; consequently, "when mariners, subjects of his majesty, are employed in the private service of foreigners, they enter into engagements inconsistent with the duty of subjects. in such cases, the species of redress which the practice of all times has admitted and sanctioned is that of taking those subjects at sea out of the service of such foreign individuals, and recalling them to the discharge of that paramount duty, which they owe to their sovereign and to their country. that the exercise of this right involves some of the dearest interests of great britain, your government is ready to acknowledge.... it is needless to repeat that these rights existed in their fullest force for ages previous to the establishment of the united states of america as an independent government; and it would be difficult to contend that the recognition of that independence can have operated any change in this respect."[ ] had this been merely a piece of clever argumentation, it would have crumbled rapidly under an appreciation of the american case; but it represented actually a conviction inherited by all the british people, and not that of canning only. whether the foundation of the alleged right was solidly laid in reason or not, it rested on alleged prescription, indorsed by a popular acceptance and suffrage which no ministry could afford to disregard, at a time when the manning of the royal navy was becoming a matter of notorious and increasing difficulty. if americans saw with indignation that many of their fellow-citizens were by the practice forced from their own ships to serve in british vessels of war, it was equally well known, in america as in great britain, that in the merchant vessels of the united states were many british seamen, sorely needed by their country. public opinion in the united states was by no means united in support of the position then taken by jefferson and madison, as well as by their predecessors in office, proper and matter-of-course as that seems to-day. many held, and asserted even with vehemence, that the british right existed, and that an indisputable wrong was committed by giving the absentees shelter under the american flag. the claim advanced by the united states government, and the only one possible to it under the circumstances, was that when outside of territorial limits a ship's flag and papers must be held to determine the nation, to which alone belonged jurisdiction over every person on board, unless demonstrably in the military service of a belligerent. as a matter involving extensive practical consequences, this contention, like that concerning the colonial trade, had its origin from the entrance into the family of european nations of a new-comer, foreign to the european community of states and their common traditions; indisposed, consequently, to accept by mere force of custom rules and practices unquestioned by them, but traversing its own interests. as canning argued, the change of political relation, by which the colonies became independent, could not affect rights of great britain which did not derive from the colonial connection; but it did introduce an opposing right,--that of the american citizen to be free from british control when not in british territory. this the united states possessed in common with all foreign nations; but in her case it could not, as in theirs, be easily reconciled with the claim of great britain. when every one whose native tongue was english was also by birth the subject of great britain, the visitation of a foreign neutral, in order to take from her any british seamen, involved no great difficulty of discrimination, nor--granting the theory of inalienable allegiance--any injustice to the person taken. it was quite different when a large maritime english-speaking population, quite comparable in numbers to that remaining british, had become independent. the exercise of the british right, if right it was, became liable to grievous wrong, not only to the individuals affected, but to the nation responsible for their protection; and the injury was greater, both in procedure and result, because the officials intrusted with the enforcement of the british claim were personally interested in the decisions they rendered. no one who understands the affection of a naval officer for an able seaman, especially if his ship be short-handed, will need to have explained how difficult it became for him to distinguish between an englishman and an american, when much wanted. in short, there was on each side a practical grievance; but the character of the remedy to be applied involved a question of principle, the effect of which would be unequal between the disputants, increasing the burden of the one while it diminished that of the other, according as the one or the other solution was adopted. except for the fact that the british government had at its disposal overwhelming physical force, its case would have shared that of all other prescriptive rights when they come into collision with present actualities, demanding their modification. it might be never so true that long-standing precedent made legal the impressment of british seamen from neutral vessels on the open sea; but it remained that in practice many american seamen were seized, and forced into involuntary servitude, the duration of which, under the customs of the british navy, was terminable certainly only by desertion or death. the very difficulty of distinguishing between the natives of the two countries, "owing to similarity of language, habits, and manners,"[ ] alleged in by the british foreign secretary, lord grenville, to rufus king, the american minister, did but emphasize the incompatibility of the british claim with the security of the american citizen. the consul-general of great britain at new york during most of this stormy period, thomas barclay, a loyalist during the war of independence, affirms from time to time, with evident sincerity of conviction, the wishes of the british government and naval officers not to impress american seamen; but his published correspondence contains none the less several specific instances, in which he assures british admirals and captains that impressed men serving on board their ships are beyond doubt native americans, and his editor remarks that "only a few of his many appeals on behalf of americans unlawfully seized are here printed."[ ] this, too, in the immediate neighborhood of the united states, where evidence was most readily at hand. the condition was intolerable, and in principle it mattered nothing whether one man or many thus suffered. that the thing was possible, even for a single most humble and unknown native of the united states, condemned the system, and called imperiously for remedy. the only effectual remedy, however, was the abandonment of the practice altogether, whether or not the theoretic ground for such abandonment was that advanced by the united states. long before , experience had demonstrated, what had been abundantly clear to foresight, that a naval lieutenant or captain could not safely be intrusted with a function so delicate as deciding the nationality of a likely english-speaking topman, whom, if british, he had the power to impress. the united states did not refuse to recognize, distinctly if not fully, the embarrassment under which great britain labored by losing the services of her seamen at a moment of such national exigency; and it was prepared to offer many concessions in municipal regulations, in order to exclude british subjects from american vessels. various propositions were advanced looking to the return of deserters and to the prevention of enlistments; coupled always with a renunciation of the british claim to take persons from under the american flag. there had been much negotiation by individual ministers of the united states in the ordinary course of their duties; beginning as far back as , when john adams had to remonstrate vigorously with the cabinet "against this practice, which has been too common, of impressing american citizens, and especially with the aggravating circumstances of going on board american vessels, which ought to be protected by the flag of their sovereign."[ ] again, in , on hostilities threatening with spain, a number of american seamen were impressed in british ports. the arrests, being within british waters, were not an infringement of american jurisdiction, and the only question then raised was that of proving nationality. gouverneur morris, who afterwards so violently advocated the british claim to impress their own subjects in american vessels on the seas,[ ] was at this time in london on a special semi-official errand, committed to him by president washington. there being then no american resident minister, he took upon himself to mention to the foreign secretary "the conduct of their pressgangs, who had taken many american seamen, and had entered american vessels with as little ceremony as those belonging to britain;" adding, with a caustic humor characteristic of him, "i believe, my lord, this is the only instance in which we are not treated as aliens." he suggested certificates of citizenship, to be issued by the admiralty courts of the united states. this was approved by the secretary and by pitt; the latter, however, remarking that the plan was "very liable to abuse, notwithstanding every precaution."[ ] various expedients for attaching to the individual documentary evidence of birth were from time to time tried; but the heedless and inconsequent character and habits of the sailor of that day, and the facility with which the papers, once issued, could be transferred or bought, made any such resource futile. the united states was thus driven to the position enunciated in by jefferson, then secretary of state: "the simplest rule will be that the vessel being american shall be evidence that the seamen on board of her are such."[ ] if this demand comprehended, as it apparently did, cases of arrest in british harbors, it was clearly extravagant, resembling the idea proceeding from the same source that the gulf stream should mark the neutral line of united states waters; but for the open sea it formulated the doctrine on which the country finally and firmly took its stand. [illustration: thomas jefferson from the painting by gilbert stuart, in bowdoin college, brunswick, me.] the history of the practice of impressment, and of the consequent negotiations, from the time of jefferson's first proposition down to the mission of monroe and pinkney, had shown conclusively that no other basis of settlement than that of the flag vouching for the crew could adequately meet and remove the evil of which the united states complained; an evil which was not only an injury to the individuals affected, but a dishonor to the nation which should continue to submit. the subject early engaged the care of rufus king, who became minister to great britain in . in , lord grenville and he had a correspondence,[ ] which served merely to develop the difficulties on both sides, and things drifted from bad to worse. not only was there the oppression of the individual, but the safety of ships was endangered by the ruthless manner in which they were robbed of their crews; an evil from which british merchant vessels often suffered.[ ] on october , , king again presented grenville a paper,[ ] summarizing forcibly both the abuses undergone by americans, and the inconsistency of the british principle of inalienable allegiance with other british practices, which not only conferred citizenship upon aliens serving for a certain time in their merchant ships, but even attributed it compulsorily to seamen settled or married in the land.[ ] no satisfactory action followed upon this remonstrance. in march, , grenville having resigned with pitt, king brought the question before their successors, referring to the letter of october, , as "a full explanation, requiring no further development on the present occasion."[ ] at the same time, by authority from his government, he made a definite proposal, "that neither party shall upon the high seas impress seamen out of the vessels of the other." the instructions for this action were given under the presidency of john adams, john marshall being then secretary of state. on the high seas the vessels of the country were not under british jurisdiction for any purpose. the only concession of international law was that the ship itself could be arrested, if found by a belligerent cruiser under circumstances apparently in violation of belligerent rights, be brought within belligerent jurisdiction, and the facts there determined by due process of law. but in the practice of impressment the whole procedure, from arrest to trial and sentence, was transferred to the open sea; therefore to allow it extended thither a british jurisdiction, which possessed none of the guarantees for the sifting of evidence, the application of law, or the impartiality of the judge, which may be presumed in regular tribunals. yet, while holding clearly the absolute justice of the american contention, demonstrated both by the faulty character of the method and the outrageous injustice in results, let us not be blind to the actuality of the loss great britain was undergoing, nor to her estimate of the compensation offered for the relinquishment of the practice. the new england states, which furnished a large proportion of the maritime population, affirmed continually by their constituted authorities that very few of their seamen were known to be impressed. governor strong of massachusetts, in a message to the legislature, said, "the number of our native seamen impressed by british ships has been grossly exaggerated, and the number of british seamen employed by us has at all times been far greater than those of all nations who have been impressed from our vessels. if we are contending for the support of a claim to exempt british seamen from their allegiance to their own country, is it not time to inquire whether our claim is just?"[ ] it seems singular now that the fewness of the citizens hopelessly consigned to indefinite involuntary servitude should have materially affected opinion as to the degree of the outrage; but, after making allowance for the spirit of faction then prevalent, it can be readily understood that such conditions, being believed by the british, must color their judgment as to the real extent of the injustice by which they profited. at new york, in , consul-general barclay,[ ] who had then been resident for six years, in replying to a letter from the mayor, said, "it is a fact, too notorious to have escaped your knowledge, that many of his majesty's subjects are furnished with american protection, to which they have no title." this being brought to madison's attention produced a complaint to the british minister. in justifying his statements, barclay wrote there were "innumerable instances where british subjects within a month after their arrival in these states obtain certificates of citizenship." "the documents i have already furnished you prove the indiscriminate use of those certificates."[ ] representative gaston of north carolina, whose utterances on another aspect of the question have been before quoted,[ ] said in this relation, "in the battle, i think of the president and the little belt, a neighbor of mine, now an industrious farmer, noticed in the number of the slain one of his own name. he exclaimed, 'there goes one of my protections.' on being asked for an explanation, he remarked that in his wild days, when he followed the sea, it was an ordinary mode of procuring a little spending money to get a protection from a notary for a dollar, and sell it to the first foreigner whom it at all fitted for fifteen or twenty." but, while believing that the number of impressed americans "had been exaggerated infinitely beyond the truth," gaston added, with the clear perceptions of patriotism, "be they more or less, the right to the protection of their country is sacred and must be regarded."[ ] the logic was unimpeachable which, to every argument based upon numbers, replied that the question was not of few or many, but of a system, under which american seamen--one or more--were continually liable to be seized by an irresponsible authority, without protection or hearing of law, and sent to the uttermost part of the earth, beyond power of legal redress, or of even making known their situation. yet it can be understood that the british government, painfully conscious of the deterioration of its fighting force by the absence of its subjects, and convinced of its right, concerning which no hesitation was ever by it expressed, should have resolved to maintain it, distrustful of offers to exclude british seamen from the american merchant service, the efficacy of which must have been more than doubtful to all familiar with shipping procedures in maritime ports. the protections issued to seamen as american citizens fell under the suspicion which in later days not infrequently attached to naturalization papers; and, if questioned by some of our own people, it is not to be wondered that they seemed more than doubtful to a contrary interest. in presenting the proposition, "that neither party should impress from the ships of the other," king had characterized it as a temporary measure, "until more comprehensive and precise regulations can be devised to secure the respective rights of the two countries." nevertheless, the united states would doubtless have been content to rest in this, duly carried out, and even to waive concession of the principle, should it be thus voided in practice. as king from the first foresaw,[ ] acceptance by the british cabinet would depend upon the new head of the admiralty, lord st. vincent, a veteran admiral, whose reputation, and experience of over fifty years, would outweigh the opinions of his colleagues. in reply to a private letter from one of st. vincent's political friends, sent at king's request, the admiral wrote: "mr. king is probably not aware of the abuses which are committed by american consuls in france, spain, and portugal, from the generality of whom every englishman, knowing him to be such, may be made an american for a dollar. i have known more than one american master carry off soldiers, in their regimentals, arms, and accoutrements, from the garrison at gibraltar; and there cannot be a doubt but the american trade is navigated by a majority of british subjects; and a very considerable one too." however inspired by prejudice, these words in their way echo gaston's statements just quoted; while madison in admitted that the number of british seamen in american merchant ships was "considerable, though probably less than supposed." entertaining these impressions, the concurrence of st. vincent seemed doubtful; and in fact, through the period of nominal peace which soon ensued, and continued to may, , the matter dragged. when the renewal of the war was seen to be inevitable, king again urged a settlement, and the foreign secretary promised to sign any agreement which the admiral would approve. after conference, king thought he had gained this desired consent, for a term of five years, to the american proposition. he drew up articles embodying it, together with the necessary equivalents to be stipulated by the united states; but, before these could be submitted, he received a letter from st. vincent, saying that he was of the opinion that the narrow seas should be expressly excepted from the operation of the clause, "as they had been immemorially considered to be within the dominions of great britain." since this would give the consent of the united states to the extension of british jurisdiction far beyond the customary three miles from the shore, conceded by international law, king properly would not accept the solution, tempting as was the opportunity to secure immunity for americans in other quarters from the renewed outrages that could be foreseen. he soon after returned to the united states, where his decision was of course approved; for though the gulf stream appeared to jefferson the natural limit for the neutral jurisdiction of america, the claim of great britain to the narrow seas was evidently a grave encroachment upon the rights of others. in later years lord castlereagh, in an interview with the american chargé d'affaires, jonathan russell, assured him that mr. king had misapprehended st. vincent's meaning; reading, from a mass of records then before him, a letter of the admiral to sir william scott, judge of the high court of admiralty, "asking for counsel and advice, and confessing his own perplexity and total incompetency to discover any practical project for the safe discontinuance of the practice." "you see," proceeded lord castlereagh, "that the confidence of mr. king on this point was entirely unfounded."[ ] wherever the misunderstanding lay, matters had not advanced in the least towards a solution when monroe reached england, in , as king's successor. up to that time, no tabular statement seems to have been prepared, showing the total number of seamen impressed from american vessels during the first war, - ; nor does the present writer think it material to ascertain, from the fragmentary data at hand, the exact extent of an injury to which the question of more or less was secondary. the official agent of the american government, for the protection of seamen, upon quitting his post in london in , wrote that he had transferred to his successor "a list of seamen, where answers have been returned to me, stating that, having no documents to prove their citizenship, the lords commissioners of the admiralty could not consent to their discharge." only seven cases then remained without replies, which shows at the least a decent attention to the formalities of intercourse; and king, in his letter of october , , had acknowledged that the secretary to the admiralty had "given great attention to the numerous applications, and that a disposition has existed to comply with our demands, when the same could be done consistently with the maxims and practice adopted and adhered to by great britain." the admiralty, however, maintained that "the admission of the principle, that a man declaring himself to belong to a foreign state should, upon that assertion merely, and without direct or very strong circumstantial proof, be suffered to leave the service, would be productive of the most dangerous consequences to his majesty's navy." the agent himself had written to the secretary of the admiralty, "i freely confess that i believe many of them are british subjects; but i presume that all of them were impressed from american vessels, and by far the greater proportion are american citizens, who, from various causes, have been deprived of their certificates, and who, from their peculiar situation, have been unable to obtain proofs from america."[ ] when mr. monroe arrived in england in , after the conclusion of the louisiana purchase from france, war had just re-begun. instructions were sent him, in an elaborate series of articles framed by madison, for negotiating a convention to regulate those matters of difference which experience had shown were sure to arise between the two countries in the progress of the hostilities. among them, impressment was given the first place; but up to , when pinkney was sent as his associate, nothing had been effected, nor does urgency seem to have been felt. so long as in practice things ran smoothly, divergences of opinion were easily tolerable. soon after the receipt of the instructions, in march, ,[ ] the comparatively friendly administration of addington gave way to that of pitt; and upon this had followed monroe's nine-months absence in spain. before departure, however, he had written, "the negotiation has not failed in its great objects, ... nor was there ever less cause of complaint furnished by impressment."[ ] the outburst of seizure upon the plea of a constructively direct trade, already mentioned, had followed, and, with the retaliatory non-importation law of the united states, made the situation acute and menacing. further cause for exasperation was indicated in a report from the secretary of state, march , , giving, in reply to a resolution of the house, a tabulated statement, by name, of persons, who "appear to have been impressed from american vessels;" to which was added that "the aggregate number of impressments into the british service since the commencement of the present war in europe (may, ) is found to be , ."[ ] confronted by this situation of wrongs endured, by commerce and by seamen, the mission of monroe and pinkney was to negotiate a comprehensive treaty of "amity, commerce, and navigation," the first attempted between the two countries since jay's in . when pinkney landed, fox was already in the grip of the sickness from which he died in the following september. this circumstance introduced an element of delay, aggravated by the inevitable hesitations of the new ministry, solicitous on the one hand to accommodate, but yet more anxious not to incense british opinion. the prime minister, in room of mr. fox, received the envoys on august , and, when the american demand was explained to him, defined at once the delicacy of the question of impressment. "on the subject of the impressment of our seamen, he suggested doubts of the practicability of devising the means of discrimination between the seamen of the two countries, within (as we understood him) their respective jurisdictions; and he spoke of the importance to the safety of great britain, in the present state of the power of her enemy, of preserving in their utmost strength the right and capacity of government to avail itself in war of the services of its seamen. these observations were connected with frequent professions of an earnest wish that some liberal and equitable plan should be adopted, for _reconciling the exercise_ of this essential right with the just claims of the united states, and for removing from it all cause of complaint and irritation."[ ] in consequence of mr. fox's continued illness two negotiators, one of whom, lord holland, was a near relative of his, were appointed to confer with the american envoys, and to frame an agreement, if attainable. the first formal meeting was on august , the second on september .[ ] as the satisfactory arrangement of the impressment difficulty was a _sine quâ non_ to the ratification of any treaty, and to the repeal of the non-importation act, this american requirement was necessarily at once submitted. the reply was significant, particularly because made by men apparently chosen for their general attitude towards the united states, by a ministry certainly desirous to conciliate, and to retain the full british advantage from the united states market, if compatible with the preservation of an interest deemed greater still. "it was soon apparent that they felt the strongest repugnance to a formal renunciation, or the abandonment, of their claim to take from our vessels on the high seas such seamen as should appear to be their own subjects, and they pressed upon us with much zeal a provision" for documentary protection to individuals; "but that, subject to such protections, the ships of war of great britain should continue to visit and impress on the main ocean as heretofore." in the preliminary discussions the british negotiators presented the aspect of the case as it appeared to them and to their public. they "observed that they supposed the object of our plan to be to prevent the impressment at sea of american seamen, and not to withdraw british seamen from the naval service of their country in times of great national peril, for the purpose of employing them ourselves; that the first of these purposes would be effectually accomplished by a system which should introduce and establish a clear and conclusive distinction between the seamen of the two countries, which on all occasions would be implicitly respected; that if they should consent to make our commercial navy a floating asylum for all the british seamen who, tempted by higher wages, should quit their service for ours, the effect of such a concession upon their maritime strength, on which great britain depended, not only for her prosperity but for her safety, might be fatal; that on the most alarming emergency they might be deprived, to an extent impossible to calculate, of their only means of security; that our vessels might become receptacles for deserters to any amount, and when once at sea might set at defiance the just claims of the service to which such deserters belonged; that, even within the united states, it could not be expected that any plan for recovering british deserters could be efficacious; and that, moreover, the plan we proposed was inadequate in its range and object, inasmuch as it was merely prospective, confined wholly to deserters, and in no respect provided for the case of the vast body of british seamen _now_ employed in our trade to every part of the world." to these representations, which had a strong basis in fact and reason, if once the british principle was conceded, the american negotiators replied in detail as best they could. in such detail, the weight of argument and of probability appears to the writer to rest with the british case; but there is no adequate reply to the final american assertion, which sums up the whole controversy, "that impressment upon the high seas by those to whom that service is necessarily confided must under any conceivable guards be frequently abused;" such abuse being the imprisonment without trial of american citizens, as "a pressed man," for an indefinite period. lord cochrane, a british naval officer of rare distinction, stated in the house of commons a few years later that "the duration of the term of service in his majesty's navy is absolutely without limitation."[ ] the american envoys were prevented by their instructions from conceding this point, and from signing a treaty without some satisfactory arrangement. meantime, impressed by the conciliatoriness of the british representatives, and doubtless in measure by the evident seriousness of the difficulty experienced by the british government, they wrote home advising that the date for the non-importation act going into operation, now close at hand, should be postponed; and, in accordance with a recommendation from the president, the measure was suspended by congress, with a provision for further prolongation in the discretion of the executive. on september fox died, an event which introduced further delays, esteemed not unreasonable by monroe and pinkney. their next letter home, however, november ,[ ] while reporting the resumption of the negotiation, announced also its failure by a deadlock on this principal subject of impressment: "we have said everything that we could in support of our claim, that the flag should protect the crew, which we have contended was founded in unquestionable right.... this right was denied by the british commissioners, who asserted that of their government to seize its subjects on board neutral vessels on the high seas, and also urged that the relinquishment of it at this time would go far to the overthrow of their naval power, on which the safety of the state essentially depended." in support of the abstract right was quoted the report from a law officer of the crown, which "justified the pretension by stating that the king had a right, by his prerogative, to require the services of all his seafaring subjects against the enemy, and to seize them by force wherever found, not being within the territorial limits of another power; that as the high seas were extra-territorial, the merchant vessels of other powers navigating on them were not admitted to possess such a jurisdiction as to protect british subjects from the exercise of the king's prerogative over them." this was a final and absolute rejection of madison's doctrine, that merchant vessels on the high seas were under the jurisdiction only of their own country. asserted right was arrayed directly and unequivocally against asserted right. negotiation on that subject was closed, and to diplomacy was left no further resort, save arms, or submission to continued injury and insult. the british commissioners did indeed submit a project,[ ] in place of that of the united states, rejected by their government. by this it was provided that thereafter the captain of a cruiser who should impress an american citizen should be liable to heavy penalties, to be enacted by law; but as the preamble to this proposition read, "whereas it is not lawful for a belligerent to impress or carry off, from on board a neutral, seafaring persons _who are not the subjects of the belligerent_," there was admitted implicitly the right to impress those who were such subjects, the precise point at issue. the americans therefore pronounced it wholly inadmissible, and repeated that no project could be adopted "which did not allow our ships to protect their crews." the provision made indispensable by the united states having thus failed of adoption, the question arose whether the negotiation should cease. the british expressed an earnest desire that it should not, and as a means thereto communicated the most positive assurances from their government that "instructions have been given, and will be repeated and enforced, for the observance of the greatest caution in the impressing of british seamen; that the strictest care shall be taken to preserve the citizens of the united states from molestation or injury; and that prompt redress shall be afforded upon any representation of injury."[ ] to this assurance the american commissioners attached more value as a safeguard for the future than past experience warranted; but in london they were able to feel, more accurately than an official in washington, the extent and complexity of the british problem, both in actual fact and in public feeling. they knew, too, the anxious wish of the president for an accommodation on other matters; so they decided to proceed with their discussions, having first explicitly stated that they were acting on their own judgment.[ ] consequently, whatever instrument might result from their joint labors would be liable to rejection at home, because of the failure of the impressment demand. the discussions thus renewed terminated in a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, signed by the four negotiators, december , . into the details of this instrument it is unnecessary to go, as it never became operative. jefferson persisted in refusing approval to any formal convention which did not provide the required stipulation against impressment. he was dissatisfied also with particular details connected with the other arrangements. all these matters were set forth at great length in a letter[ ] of may , , from mr. madison to the american commissioners; in which they were instructed to reopen negotiations on the basis of the treaty submitted, endeavoring to effect the changes specified. the danger to great britain from american commercial restriction was fully expounded, as an argument to compel compliance with the demands; the whole concluding with the characteristic remark that, "as long as negotiation can be honorably protracted, it is a resource to be preferred, under existing circumstances, to the peremptory alternative of improper concessions or inevitable collisions." in other words, the united states government did not mean to fight, and that was all great britain needed to know. that she would suffer from the closure of the american market was indisputable; but, being assured of transatlantic peace, there were other circumstances of high import, political as well as commercial, which rendered yielding more inexpedient to her than a commercial war. at the end of march, , within three months of the signature at london, the british ministry fell, and the disciples of pitt returned to power. mr. canning became foreign secretary. circumstances were then changing rapidly on the continent of europe, and by the time madison's letter reached england a very serious event had modified also the relations of the united states to great britain. this was the attack upon the united states frigate "chesapeake" by a british ship of war, upon the high seas, and the removal of four of her crew, claimed as deserters from the british navy. unofficial information of this transaction reached england july , just one day after monroe and pinkney had addressed to canning a letter communicating their instructions to reopen negotiations, and stating the changes deemed desirable in the treaty submitted. the intervention of the "chesapeake" affair, to a contingent adjustment of which all other matters had been postponed, delayed to october the reply of the british minister.[ ] in this, after a preamble of "distinct protest against a practice, altogether unusual in the political transactions of states, by which the american government assumes to itself the privilege of revising and altering agreements concluded and signed on its behalf by its agents duly authorized for that purpose," canning thus announced the decision of the cabinet: "the proposal of the president of the united states for proceeding to negotiate anew, upon the basis of a treaty already solemnly concluded and signed, is a proposal wholly inadmissible. and his majesty has therefore no option, under the present circumstances of this transaction, but to acquiesce in the refusal of the president of the united states to ratify the treaty signed on december , ." the settlement of the "chesapeake" business having already been transferred to washington, by the appointment of a special british envoy, this rejection of further consideration of the treaty closed all matters pending between the two governments, except those appertaining to the usual duties of a legation, and monroe's mission ended. a fortnight later he sailed for the united states. his place as regularly accredited minister to the british court was taken by pinkney, through whom were conducted the subsequent important discussions, which arose from the marked extension given immediately afterwards by france and great britain to their several policies for the forcible restriction of neutral trade. those who have followed the course of the successive events traced in this chapter, and marked their accelerating momentum, will be prepared for the more extreme and startling occurrences which soon after ensued as a matter of inevitable development. they will be able also to understand how naturally the phrase, "free trade and sailors' rights," grew out of these various transactions, as the expression of the demands and grievances which finally drove the united states into hostilities; and will comprehend in what sense these terms were used, and what the wrongs against which they severally protested. "free trade" had no relation of opposition to a system of protection to home industries, an idea hardly as yet formulated to consciousness, except by a few advanced economists. it meant the trade of a nation carried on according to its own free will, relieved from fetters forcibly imposed by a foreign yoke, in which, under the circumstances of the time, the resurrection of colonial bondage was fairly to be discerned. "sailors' rights" expressed not only the right of the american seaman to personal liberty of action,--in theory not contested, but in practice continually violated by the british,--but the right of all seamen under the american flag to its protection in the voluntary engagements which they were then fulfilling. it voiced the sufferings of the individual; the personal side of an injury, the reverse of which was the disgrace of the nation responsible for his security. it was afterwards charged against the administrations of jefferson and madison, under which these events ran their course to their culmination in war, that impressment was not a cause of the break between the two countries, but was adduced subsequently to swell the array of injuries, in which the later orders in council were the real determinative factor. the drift of this argument was, that the repeal of the orders, made almost simultaneously with the american declaration of war, and known in the united states two months later, should have terminated hostilities. the british government, in an elaborate vindication of its general course, published in january, , stated that, "in a manifesto, accompanying their declaration of hostilities, in addition to the former complaints against the orders in council, a long list of grievances was brought forward; but none of them such as were ever before alleged by the american government to be grounds for war." in america itself similar allegations were made by the party in opposition. the maryland house of delegates, in january, , adopted a memorial, in which it was said that "the claim of impressment, which has been so much exaggerated, but which was never deemed of itself a substantive cause of war, has been heretofore considered susceptible of satisfactory arrangement in the judgment of both the commissioners, who were selected by the president then in office to conduct the negotiation with the english ministry in the year ."[ ] the words of the commissioners in their official letters of november , ,[ ] and april , ,[ ] certainly sustain this statement as to their opinion, which was again deliberately affirmed by monroe in a justificatory review of their course, addressed to madison in february, ,[ ] after his return. gaston, speaking in the house in february, , said: "sir, the question of seamen was not a cause of this war. more than five years had passed over since an arrangement on this question, perfectly satisfactory to our ministers, [monroe and pinkney] had been made with great britain; but it pleased not the president, and was rejected. yet, during the whole period that afterwards elapsed until the declaration of war, no second effort was made to adjust this cause of controversy."[ ] gaston here is slightly in error as to fact, for the attack upon the "chesapeake" was made by the government the occasion for again demanding an abandonment of the practice of impressment from american merchant ships; but, accepting the statements otherwise, nothing more could be required of the administration, so far as words went, than its insistence upon this relinquishment as a _sine quâ non_ to any treaty. its instructions to its ministers in had placed this demand first, not only in order, but in importance, coupling with it as indispensable only one other condition, the freedom of trade; the later and more extreme infringements of which were constituted by the orders in council of . after protracted discussion, the american requirement as to impressment had been refused by great britain, deliberately, distinctly, and in the most positive manner; nor does it seem possible to concur with the opinion of our envoys that the stipulations offered by her representatives, while not sacrificing the british principle, did substantially and in practice secure the american demands. these could be satisfactorily covered only by the terms laid down by the administration. thereafter, any renewal of the subject must come from the other side; it was inconsistent with self-respect for the united states again to ask it, unless with arms in her hands. to make further advances in words would have been, not to negotiate, but to entreat. this, in substance, was the reply of the government to its accusers at home, and it is irrefutable. it is less easy--rather, it is impossible--to justify the administration for refraining from adequate deeds, when the impotence of words had been fully and finally proved. in part, this was due to miscalculation, in itself difficult to pardon, from the somewhat sordid grounds and estimates of national feeling upon which it proceeded. the two successive presidents, and the party behind them, were satisfied that great britain, though standing avowedly and evidently upon grounds considered by her essential to national honor and national safety, could be compelled to yield by the menace of commercial embarrassment. that there was lacking in them the elevated instinct, which could recognize that they were in collision with something greater than a question of pecuniary profits, is in itself a condemnation; and their statesmanship was at fault in not appreciating that the enslaved conditions of the european continent had justly aroused in great britain an exaltation of spirit, which was prepared to undergo every extreme, in resistance to a like subjection, till exhaustion itself should cause her weapons to drop from her hands. the resentment of the united states government for the injuries done its people was righteous and proper. it was open to it to bear them under adequate protest, sympathizing with the evident embarrassments of the old cradle of the race; or, on the other hand, to do as she was doing, strain every nerve to compel the cessation of outrage. the administration preferred to persist in its military and naval economies, putting forth but one-half of its power, by measures of mere commercial restriction. these impoverished its own people, and divided national sentiment, but proved incapable within reasonable time to reduce the resolution of the opponent. that that finally gave way when war was clearly imminent proves, not that commercial restriction alone was sufficient, but that coupled with military readiness it would have attained its end more surely, and sooner; consequently with less of national suffering, and no national ignominy. entire conviction of the justice and urgency of the american contentions, especially in the matter of impressment, and only to a less degree in that of the regulation of trade by foreign force, as impeaching national independence, is not enough to induce admiration for the course of american statesmanship at this time. the acuteness and technical accuracy of madison's voluminous arguments make but more impressive the narrowness of outlook, which saw only the american point of view, and recognized only the force of legal precedent, at a time when the foundations of the civilized world were heaving. american interests doubtless were his sole concern; but what was practicable and necessary to support those interests depended upon a wide consideration and just appreciation of external conditions. that laws are silent amid the clash of arms, seems in his apprehension transformed to the conviction that at no time are they more noisy and compulsive. upon this political obtuseness there fell a kind of poetical retribution, which gradually worked the administration round to the position of substantially supporting napoleon, when putting forth all his power to oppress the liberties of spain, and of embarrassing great britain at the time when a people in insurrection against perfidy and outrage found in her their sole support. during these eventful five years, the history of which we are yet to trace, the bearing of successive british ministries towards the united states was usually uncompromising, often arrogant, sometimes insolent, hard even now to read with composure; but in the imminent danger of their country, during a period of complicated emergencies, they held, with cool heads, and with steady hands on the helm, a course taken in full understanding of world conditions, and with a substantially just forecast of the future. among their presuppositions, in the period next to be treated, was that america might argue and threaten, but would not fight. there was here no miscalculation, for she did not fight till too late, and she fought wholly unprepared. footnotes: [ ] wheaton's international law, p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. i. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. i. pp. - . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. i. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. ii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] history of the united states, by henry adams, vol. ii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. ii. p. . [ ] ibid., vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] monroe to madison, april , . american state papers, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. pp. , . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] for the text of this measure, see american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . author's italics. [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] see, particularly, foster to monroe, july , . american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] ibid., pp. , . [ ] the instructions to monroe and pinkney are found in american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. pp. , . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. ii. p. . [ ] correspondence of thomas barclay, edited by george l. rives, new york, . for instances, see index, impressment. [ ] works of john adams, vol. viii. p. . [ ] ante, p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. i. pp. - . [ ] jefferson's works, letter to t. pinckney, minister to great britain, june , . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. ii. pp. - . [ ] see, for example, naval chronicle, vol. xxvi. pp. - , - . [ ] life and correspondence of rufus king, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. ii. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. v. p. . [ ] correspondence, p. . [ ] correspondence, p. . [ ] ante, p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. v. supplement, p. . [ ] king to thomas erskine. life of king, vol. iii. p. . [ ] russell to the secretary of state, sept. , . american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. ii. pp. , . [ ] ibid., vol. iii. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. ii. pp. - . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . author's italics. [ ] for the american report of these interviews, see ibid., pp. - . [ ] cobbett's parliamentary debates, vol. xxvi. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. pp. - . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] ibid., pp. - . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. v. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. v. supplement, p. . chapter iv from the orders in council to war - when the treaty of december , , was about to be signed, the british negotiators delivered to the americans a paper, of the general character of which they had been forewarned, but which in precise terms then first came before them. its origin was due to a pronouncement of the french emperor, historically known as the decree of berlin, which was dated november , while the negotiations were in progress, but had become fully known only when they had reached a very advanced stage. the pretensions and policy set forth in the decree were considered by the british government to violate the rights of neutrals, with a specific and far-reaching purpose of thereby injuring great britain. it was claimed that acquiescence in such violations by the neutral, or submission to them, would be a concurrence in the hostile object of the enemy; in which case great britain might feel compelled to adopt measures retaliatory against france, through the same medium of neutral navigation. in such steps she might be fettered, should the present treaty take effect. in final ratification, therefore, the british government would be guided by the action of the united states upon the berlin decree. unless the emperor abandoned his policy, or "the united states by its conduct or assurances will have given security to his majesty that it will not submit to such innovations on the established system of maritime law, ... his majesty will not consider himself bound by the present signature of his commissioners to ratify the treaty, or precluded from adopting such measures as may seem necessary for counteracting the designs of his enemy."[ ] the american representatives transmitted this paper to washington, with the simple observation that "we do not consider ourselves a party to it, or as having given it in any the slightest degree our sanction."[ ] the berlin decree was remarkable not only in scope and spirit, but in form. "it had excited in us apprehensions," wrote madison to the united states minister in paris, "which were repressed only by the inarticulate import of its articles, and the presumption that it would be executed in a sense not inconsistent with the respect due to the treaty between france and the united states." it bore, in fact, the impress of its author's mind, which, however replete with knowledge concerning conventional international law, defined in accordance with the momentary and often hasty impulses of his own will, and consequently often also with the obscurity attendant upon ill-digested ideas. the preamble recited various practices of great britain as subversive of international right; most of which were not so, but in accordance with long-standing usage and general prescription. the methods of blockade instituted by her were more exceptionable, and were given prominence, with evident reference to the order of may , declaring the blockade of a long coast-line. it being evident, so ran the emperor's reasoning, that the object of this abuse of blockade was to interrupt neutral commerce in favor of british, it followed that "whoever deals on the continent in english merchandise favors that design, and becomes an accomplice." he therefore decreed, as a measure of just retaliation, "that the british islands were thenceforward in a state of blockade; that all correspondence and commerce with them was prohibited; that trade in english merchandise was forbidden; and that all merchandise belonging to england, or" (even if neutral property) "proceeding from its manufactories and colonies, is lawful prize." no vessel coming directly from british dominions should be received in any port to which the decree was applicable. the scope of its intended application was shown in the concluding command, that it should be communicated "to the kings of spain, of naples, of holland, of etruria, and to our allies, whose subjects, like ours, are the victims of the injustice and barbarism of the english maritime laws."[ ] the phrasing of the edict was ambiguous, as madison indicated. notably, while neutral vessels having on board merchandise neutral in property, but british in origin, were to be seized when voluntarily entering a french port, it was not clear whether they were for the same reason to be arrested when found on the high seas; and there was equal failure to specify whether the proclaimed blockade authorized the capture of neutrals merely because bound to the british isles, as was lawful if destined to a seaport effectively blockaded. again, some of the proposed measures, such as refusal of admission to vessels or merchandise coming to french ports from british, were matters of purely local concern and municipal regulation; whereas the seizure of neutral property, because of english manufacture, was at least of doubtful right, if exercised within municipal limits, and certainly unlawful, if effected on the high seas. whether such application was intended could not certainly be inferred from the text. the genius of the measure, as a whole, its inspiring motive and purpose, was revealed in the closing words of the preamble: "this decree shall be considered as the fundamental law of the empire, until england has acknowledged that the rights of war are the same an land and on sea; that it [war] cannot be extended to any private property whatever; nor to persons who are not military; and until the right of blockade be restrained to fortified places, actually invested by competent forces." these words struck directly at measures of war resting upon long-standing usage, in which the strength of a maritime state such as great britain was vitally implicated. the claim for private property possesses particular interest; for it involves a play upon words to the confusion of ideas, which from that time to this has vitiated the arguments upon which have been based a prominent feature of american policy. private property at a standstill is one thing. it is the unproductive money in a stocking, hid in a closet. property belonging to private individuals, but embarked in that process of transportation and exchange which we call commerce, is like money in circulation. it is the life-blood of national prosperity, upon which war depends; and as such is national in its employment, and only in ownership private. to stop such circulation is to sap national prosperity; and to sap prosperity, upon which war depends for its energy, is a measure as truly military as is killing the men whose arms maintain war in the field. prohibition of commerce is enforced at will where an enemy's army holds a territory; if permitted, it is because it inures to the benefit of the conqueror, or at least from its restricted scope does not injure him. it will not be doubted that, should a prohibition on shore be disregarded, the offending property would be seized in punishment. the sea is the great scene of commerce. the property transported back and forth, circulating from state to state in exchanges, is one of the greatest factors in national wealth. the maritime nations have been, and are, the wealthy nations. to prohibit such commerce to an enemy is, and historically has been, a tremendous blow to his fighting power; never more conspicuously so than in the napoleonic wars. but prohibition is a vain show, in war as it is in civil government, if not enforced by penalties; and the natural penalty against offending property is fine, extending even to confiscation in extreme cases. the seizure of enemy's merchant ships and goods, for violating the prohibition against their engaging in commerce, is what is commonly called the seizure of private property. under the methods of the last two centuries, it has been in administration a process as regular, legally, as is libelling a ship for an action in damages; nor does it differ from it in principle. the point at issue really is not, "is the property private?" but, "is the method conducive to the purposes of war?" property strictly private, on board ship, but not in process of commercial exchange, is for this reason never touched; and to do so is considered as disgraceful as a common theft. napoleon, as a ruler, was always poverty-stricken. for that reason he levied heavy contributions on conquered states, which it is needless to say were paid by private taxpayers; and for the same reason, by calling french ships and french goods "private property," he would compel for them the freedom of the sea, which the maritime preponderance of great britain denied them. he needed the revenue that commerce would bring in. so as to blockades. in denying the right to capture under a nominal blockade, unsupported by an effective force, he took the ground which the common-sense of nations had long before embodied in the common consent called international law. but he went farther. blockade is very inconvenient to the blockaded, which was the rôle played by france. along with the claim for "private property," he formulated the proposition that the right of blockade is restrained to fortified places; to which was afterwards added the corollary that the place must be invested by land as well as by sea. it is to be noticed that here also american policy showed a disposition to go astray, by denying the legitimacy of a purely commercial blockade; a tendency natural enough at that passing moment, when, as a weak nation, it was desired to restrict the rights of belligerents, but which in its results on the subsequent history of the country would have been ruinous. john marshall, one of the greatest names in american jurisprudence, when secretary of state in , wrote to the minister in london: on principle it might well be questioned whether this rule [of blockade] can be applied to a place not completely invested, by land as well as by sea. if we examine the reasoning on which is founded the right to intercept and confiscate supplies designed for a blockaded town, it will be difficult to resist the conviction that its extension to towns invested by sea only is an unjustifiable encroachment on the rights of neutrals. but it is not of this departure from principle (a departure which has received some sanction from practice) that we mean to complain.[ ] in , the then secretary of state enclosed to the american minister in london the letter from which this extract is taken, among other proofs of the positions maintained by the united states on the subject of blockade. the particular claim cited was not directly indorsed; but as its mention was unnecessary to the matter immediately in hand, we may safely regard its retention as indicative of the ideal of the secretary, and of the president, mr. madison. in consequence, we find the minister, william pinkney, in his letter of january , , adducing marshall's view to the british foreign secretary: it is by no means clear that it may not fairly be contended, on principle and early usage, that a maritime blockade is incomplete, with regard to states at peace,[ ] unless the place which it would affect is invested by land, as well as by sea. the united states, however, have called for the recognition of no such rule. they appear to have contented themselves, etc.[ ] the error into which both these eminent statesmen fell is military in character, and proceeds from the same source as the agitation in favor of exempting so-called private property from capture. both spring from the failure to recognize a function of the sea, vital to the maintenance of war by states which depend upon maritime commerce. to forbid the free use of the seas to enemy's merchant ships and material of commerce, differs in no wise in principle from shutting his ports to neutral vessels, as well as to his own, by blockade. both are aimed at the enemy's sources of supply, at his communications; and the penalty inflicted by the laws of war in both cases is the same,--forfeiture of the offending property. with clear recognition of this military principle involved, and of the importance of sustaining it by great britain, british high officials repeatedly declared that the berlin decree was to be regarded, not chiefly in its methods, but in its object, or principle, which was to deprive great britain of her principal weapon. this purpose stood avowed in the words, "this decree shall be considered the fundamental law of the empire until england has acknowledged," etc. british statesmen correctly paraphrased this, "has renounced the established foundations, admitted by all civilized nations, of her maritime rights and interests, upon which depend the most valuable rights and interests of the nation."[ ] the british authorities understood that, by relinquishing these rights, they would abandon in great measure the control of the sea, so far as useful to war. the united states have received their lesson in history. if the principle contended for by their representatives, marshall and pinkney, had been established as international law before , there could have been no blockade of the southern coast in the civil war. the cotton of the confederacy, innocent "private property," could have gone freely; the returns from it would have entered unimpeded; commerce, the source of national wealth, would have flourished in full vigor; supplies, except contraband, would have flowed unmolested; and all this at the price merely of killing some hundred thousands more men, with proportionate expenditure of money, in the effort to maintain the union, which would probably have failed, to the immeasurable loss of both sections. the british government took some time to analyze the "inarticulate import" of the berlin decree. hence, in the paper presented to monroe and pinkney, stress was laid upon the methods only, ignoring the object of compelling great britain to surrender her maritime rights. in the methods, however, instinct divined the true character of the plotted evil. there was to be formed, under military pressure, a vast political combination of states pledged to exclude british commerce from the markets of the continent; a design which in execution received the name of the continental system. the decree being issued after the battle of jena, upon the eve of the evident complete subjugation of prussia, following that of austria the year before, there was room to fear that the predominance of napoleon on the continent would compel in europe universal compliance with these measures of exclusion. it so proved, in fact, in the course of , leading to a commercial warfare of extraordinary rigor, the effects of which upon europe have been discussed by the author in a previous work.[ ] its influence upon the united states is now to be considered; for it was a prominent factor in the causes of the war of . although in a military sense weak to debility, and politically not welded as yet into a nation, strong in a common spirit and accepted traditions, the united states was already in two respects a force to be considered. she possessed an extensive shipping, second in tonnage only to that of the british islands, to which it was a dangerous rival in maintaining the commercial intercourse of europe; while her population and purchasing power were so increased as to constitute her a very valuable market, manufacturing for which was chiefly in the hands of great britain. it became, therefore, an object with napoleon, in prosecution of the design of the berlin decree, to draw the united states into co-operation with the european continental system, by shutting her ports to great britain; while the latter, confronted by this double danger, sought to impose upon neutral navigation--almost wholly american--such curtailment as should punish the emperor and his tributaries for their measures of exclusion, and also neutralize the effect of these by forcing the british islands into the chain of communication by which europe in general was supplied. to retaliate the berlin decree upon the enemy, and by the same means to nourish the trade of great britain, was the avowed twofold object. the shipping of the united states found itself between hammer and anvil, crushed by these opposing policies. napoleon banned it from continental harbors, if coming from england or freighted with english goods; great britain forbade it going to a continental port, unless it had first touched at one of hers; and both inflicted penalties of confiscation, when able to lay hands on a vessel which had violated their respective commands. the lack of precision in the terms of the berlin decree exposed it from the first to much latitude of interpretation; and the emperor remaining absent from france for eight months after its promulgation, preoccupied with an arduous warfare in eastern europe, the construction of the edict by the authorities in paris made little alteration in existing conditions. nevertheless, the impulse to retaliate prevailed; and the british ministry with which monroe and pinkney had negotiated, though comparatively liberal in political complexion, would not wait for more precise knowledge. the occasion was seized with a precipitancy which lent color to napoleon's assertion, that the leading aim was to favor their own trade by depressing that of others. this had already been acknowledged as the motive for interrupting american traffic in west india produce. now again, one week only after stating to monroe and pinkney that they "could not believe that the enemy will ever seriously attempt to enforce such a system," and without waiting to ascertain whether neutral nations, the united states in particular, would, "contrary to all expectations, acquiesce in such usurpations,"[ ] the government on january , , with no information as to the practical effect given to the decree in operation, issued an order in council, which struck americans directly and chiefly. neutrals were forbidden to sail from one port to another, both of which were so far under the control of france or her allies that british vessels might not freely trade thereat. this was aimed immediately at trade along the coast of europe, but it included, of course, the voyages from a hostile colony to a hostile european port already interdicted by british rulings, of which the new order was simply an extension. it fell with particular severity on americans, accustomed to go from port to port, not carrying on local coasting, but seeking markets for their outward cargoes, or making up a homeward lading. it is true that the cabinet by which the order was issued did not intend to forbid this particular procedure; but the wording naturally implied such prohibition, and was so construed by madison,[ ] who communicated his understanding to the british minister at washington. before this letter could reach london, the ministry changed, and the new government refrained from correcting the misapprehension. for this it was taken to task in parliament, by lords holland and grenville.[ ] monroe had once written to the british foreign secretary that "it cannot well be conceived how it should be lawful to carry on commerce from one port to another of the parent country, and not from its colonies to the mother country."[ ] this well meant argument, in favor of opening the colonial trade, gave to the new step of the british cabinet a somewhat gratuitous indorsement of logical consistency. a consciousness of this may have underlain the remarkable terms in which this grievous restriction was imparted to the united states government, as evincing the singular indulgence of great britain. her minister in washington, in conveying the order to the state department, wrote: "his majesty, with that forbearance and moderation which have at all times distinguished his conduct, has determined for the present to confine himself to exercising his decided naval superiority in such a manner only as is authorized by the acknowledged principles of the laws of nations, and has issued an order for preventing all commerce from port to port of his enemies; comprehending in this order not only the ports of france, but those of other nations, as, either in alliance with france, or subject to her dominion, have, by measures of active offence or by the exclusion of british ships, taken part in the present war."[ ] these words characterized the measure as strictly retaliatory. they implied that the extra-legal action of the enemy would warrant extra-legal action by great britain, but asserted expressly that the present step was sanctioned by existing law,--"in such a manner only as is authorized by the acknowledged principles of the law of nations." the prohibition of coasting trade could be brought under the law of nations only by invoking the rule of , forbidding neutrals to undertake for a state at war employment denied to them in peace. of this, coasting was a precise instance; but to call the rule an acknowledged principle of the law of nations was an assumption peculiarly calculated to irritate madison, who had expended reams in refutation. he penned two careful replies, logical, incisive, and showing the profound knowledge of the subject which distinguished him; but in a time of political convulsion he contended in vain against men who wore swords and thought their country's existence imperilled. the united states authorities argued by text and precedent. to the end they persisted in shutting their eyes to the important fact, recognized intuitively by great britain, that the berlin decree was no isolated measure, to be discussed on its separate merits, but an incident in an unprecedented political combination, already sufficiently defined in tendency, which overturned the traditional system of europe. it destroyed the checks inherent in the balance of power, concentrating the whole in the hands of napoleon, to whom there remained on the continent only one valid counterweight, the emperor of russia, whom he soon after contrived to lead into his scheme of policy. the balance of power was thus reduced to the opposing scales of great britain and france, and for five years so remained. the continental system, embracing all the rest of europe, was arrayed against great britain, and might well look to destroy her, if it could command the support of the united states. founded upon armed power, it proposed by continuous exertion of the same means to undermine the bases of british prosperity, and so to subvert the british empire. the enterprise was distinctly military, and could be met only by measures of a similar character, to which existing international law was unequal. the corner-stone was the military power of napoleon, which, by nullifying the independence of the continental states, compelled them to adopt the methods of the berlin decree contrary to their will, and contrary to the wishes, the interests, and the bare well-being of their populations. "you will see," wrote an observant american representative abroad, "that napoleon stalks at a gigantic stride among the pygmy monarchs of europe, and bends them to his policy. it is even an equal chance if russia, after all her blustering, does not accede to his demands without striking a blow."[ ] to meet the danger great britain opposed a maritime dominion, equally exclusive, equally founded on force, and exercised in equally arbitrary fashion over the populations of the sea. at the end of march, , the british cabinet with which monroe and pinkney had negotiated went out of office. their successors came in prepared for extreme action in consequence of the berlin decree; but their hand was for the moment stayed, because its enforcement remained in abeyance, owing to the emperor's continued absence in the field. towards the claims of the united states their attitude was likely to be uncompromising; and the secretary for foreign affairs, canning, to whom fell the expression of the government's views and purposes, possessed an adroitness in fastening upon minor weaknesses in a case, and postponing to such the consideration of the important point at issue, which, coupled with a peremptoriness of tone often bordering on insolence, effected nothing towards conciliating a people believed to be both unready and unwilling to fight. the american envoys, at their first interview, in april, met him with the proposition of their government to reopen negotiations on the basis of the treaty of december . learning from them that the treaty would not be ratified without a satisfactory arrangement concerning impressment, canning asked what relations would then obtain between the two nations. the reply was that the united states government wished them placed informally on the most friendly footing; that is, that an understanding should be reached as to practical action to be expected on either side, without concessions of principle.[ ] as final instructions from washington were yet to come, it was agreed that the matter should be postponed. when they arrived, on july , the envoys drew up a letter, submitting the various changes desired; but conveying also the fixed determination of the president "to decline any arrangement, formal or informal, which does not comprise a provision against impressments from american vessels on the high seas, and which would, notwithstanding, be a bar to legislative measures by congress for controlling that species of aggression."[ ] this letter was dated july , but by the time it could be delivered news arrived which threw into the background all matters of negotiation and illustrated with what respect british naval officers regarded "the instructions, repeated and enforced, for the observance of the greatest caution in impressing british seamen."[ ] it is probable, indeed, that the change of ministry, and the well-understood tone of the new-comers, had modified the influence of these restraining orders; and canning evidently felt that such an inference was natural, for monroe reported his noticeable desire "to satisfy me that no new orders had been issued by the present ministry to the commandant of the british squadron at halifax," who was primarily responsible for the lamentable occurrence which here traversed the course of negotiation. it had been believed, and doubtless correctly, that some deserters from british ships of war had found their way into the naval service of the united states. in june, , the american frigate "chesapeake," bearing the broad pendant of commodore james barron, had been fitting for sea in hampton roads. at this time two french ships of war were lying off annapolis, a hundred miles up chesapeake bay; and, to prevent their getting to sea, a small british squadron had been assembled at lynnhaven bay, just within cape henry, a dozen miles below the "chesapeake's" anchorage. they were thus, as jefferson said, enjoying the hospitality of the united states. on june the american frigate got under way for sea, and as she stood down, one of the british, the "leopard" of fifty guns, also made sail, going out ahead of her. shortly after noon the "chesapeake" passed the capes. when about ten miles outside, a little after three o'clock, the "leopard" approached, and hailed that she had a despatch for commodore barron. this was brought on board by a lieutenant, and proved to be a letter from the captain of the "leopard," enclosing an order from vice-admiral berkeley, in charge of the halifax station, "requiring and directing the captains and commanders of his majesty's vessels under my command, in case of meeting the american frigate, the 'chesapeake,' at sea, without the limits of the united states, to show her captain this order, and to require to search his ship for deserters from certain british ships," specified by name. upon barron's refusal, the "leopard" fired into the "chesapeake," killed or wounded twenty-one men, and reduced her to submission. the order for search was then enforced. four of the american crew, considered to be british deserters, were taken away. of these, one was hanged; one died; and the other two, after prolonged disputation, were returned five years later to the deck of the "chesapeake," in formal reparation. word of this transaction reached the british government before it did monroe, who was still sole american minister for all matters except the special mission. canning at once wrote him a letter of regret, and spontaneously promised "prompt and effectual reparation," if upon receipt of full information british officers should prove culpable. four days later, july , monroe and canning met in pursuance of a previous appointment, the object of which had been to discuss complaints against the conduct of british ships of war on the coast of the united states. the "chesapeake" business naturally now overshadowed all others. monroe maintained that, on principle, a ship of war could not be entered to search for deserters, or for any purpose, without violating the sovereignty of her nation. canning was very guarded; no admission of principle could then be obtained from him; but he gave monroe to understand that, in whatever light the action of the british officer should be viewed by his government, the point whether the men seized were british subjects or american citizens would be of consideration, in the question of restoring them, now that they were in british hands. monroe, in accordance with the position of his government on the subject of impressment, replied that the determining consideration was not the nationality of the men, but of the ship, the flag of which had been insulted. the conference ended with an understanding that monroe would send in a note embodying his position and claims. this he did the same day;[ ] but his statements were grounded upon newspaper accounts, as the british government had not yet published berkeley's official report. he would not await the positive information that must soon be given out, but applied strong language to acts not yet precisely ascertained; and he mingled with the "chesapeake" affair other very real, but different and minor, subjects of complaint, seemingly with a view to cumulative effect. he thus made the mistake of encumbering with extraneous or needless details a subject which required separate, undivided, and lucid insistence; while canning found an opportunity, particularly congenial to his temperament, to escape under a cloud of dignified words from the simple admission of wrong, and promise of reparation, which otherwise he would have had to face. he could assume a tone of haughty rebuke, where only that of apology should have been left open. his reply ran thus: i have the honor to acknowledge your official note of the th ultimo, which i have lost no time in laying before the king. as _the statement_ of the transaction to which this note refers is not brought forward either by the authority of the government of the united states, _or with any precise knowledge of the facts on which it is founded_, it might have been sufficient for me to express to you his majesty's readiness to take the whole of the circumstances of the case, _when fully disclosed_, into his consideration, and to make reparation for any _alleged injury_ to the sovereignty of the united states, whenever it should be _clearly shown_ that such injury has been _actually sustained_, and that such reparation is _really due_. of the existence of such a disposition on the part of the british government, you, sir, cannot be ignorant; i have already assured you of it, though in an unofficial form, by the letter which i addressed you on the first receipt of the intelligence of this unfortunate transaction; and i may, perhaps, be permitted to express my surprise, after such an assurance, at the tone of that representation which i have just had the honor to receive from you. but the earnest desire of his majesty to evince, in the most satisfactory manner, the principles of justice and moderation by which he is uniformly actuated, has not permitted him to hesitate in commanding me to assure you, that his majesty neither does, nor has at any time maintained the pretension of a right to search ships of war, in the national service of any state, for deserters. _if_, therefore, _the statement in your note should prove to be correct_, and to contain all the circumstances of the case, upon which the complaint is intended to be made, and it shall appear that the action of his majesty's officers rested on no other grounds than the simple and unqualified assertion of the pretension above referred to, his majesty has no difficulty in disavowing the act, and will have no difficulty in manifesting his displeasure at the conduct of his officers. with respect to the other causes of complaint, (whatever they may be,) which are hinted at in your note, i perfectly agree with you, in the sentiment which you express, as to the propriety of not involving them in a question, which of itself is of sufficient importance to claim a separate and most serious consideration. _i have only to lament that the same sentiment did not induce you to abstain from alluding to these subjects_, on an occasion which you were yourself of opinion was not favorable for pursuing the discussion of them.[ ] i have the honor to be, with great consideration, your most obedient, humble servant george canning. james monroe, esq. &c. while the right of the occasion was wholly with the american nation, the honors of the discussion, the weight of the first broadside, rested so far with the british secretary; the more so that monroe, by his manner of adducing his "other causes of complaint," admitted their irrelevancy and yet characterized them irritatingly to his correspondent. "i might state other examples of great indignity and outrage, many of which are of recent date, to which the united states have been exposed off their own coast, and even within several of their harbors, from the british squadron; but it is improper to mingle them with the present more serious causes of complaint." this invited canning's retort,--you do mingle them, in the same sentence in which you admit the impropriety. and why, he shrewdly insinuated, precipitate action ahead of knowledge, when the facts must soon be known? the unspoken reason is evident. because a government, which by its own fault is weak, will try with big words to atone to the public opinion of its people for that which it cannot, or will not, effect in deeds. bluster, whether measured or intemperate in terms, is bluster still, as long as it means only talk, not act. monroe comforted himself that, though canning's note was "harsh," he had obtained the "concession of the point desired."[ ] he had in fact obtained less than would probably have resulted from a policy of which the premises were assured, and the demands rigorously limited to the particular offence. canning's note set the key for the subsequent british correspondence, and dictated the methods by which he persistently evaded an amends spontaneously promised under the first emotions produced by an odious aggression. he continued to offer it; but under conditions impossible of acceptance, and as discreditable to the party at fault as they were humiliating to the one offended. in themselves, the first notes exchanged between monroe and canning are trivial, a revelation chiefly of individual characteristics. their interest lies in the exemplification of the general course of the american administration, imposed by its years of temporizing, of money-getting, and of military parsimony. president jefferson in america met the occasion precisely as did monroe in london, with the same result of a sharp correspondence, abounding in strong language, but affording canning further opportunity to confuse issues and escape from reparations, which, however just and wise, were distasteful. it was a pyrrhic victory for the british minister, destroying the last chance of conciliating american acquiescence in a line of action forced upon great britain by napoleon; but as a mere question of dialectics he had scored a success. when the news of the "chesapeake" outrage was received in washington, jefferson issued a proclamation, dated july , , suited chiefly for home consumption, as the phrase goes. he began with a recitation of the various wrongs and irritations, undeniable and extreme, which his long-suffering administration had endured from british cruisers, and to which monroe alluded in his note to canning. upon this followed an account of the "chesapeake" incident, thus inextricably entangled with other circumstances differing from it in essential feature. then, taking occasion by a transaction which, however reprehensible, was wholly external to the territory of the united states,--unless construed to extend to the gulf stream, according to one of jefferson's day-dreams,--action was based upon the necessity of providing for the internal peace of the nation and the safety of its citizens, and consequently of refusing admission to british ships of war, as inconsistent with these objects. therefore, "all armed vessels, bearing commissions under the government of great britain, now within the harbors of the united states, are required immediately and without any delay to depart from the same; and entrance of all the said harbors and waters is interdicted to the said armed vessels, and to all others bearing commissions under the authority of the british government." vessels carrying despatches were excepted. this procedure had the appearance of energy which momentarily satisfies a public demand that something shall be done. it also afforded canning the peg on which to hang a grievance, and dexterously to prolong discussion until the matter became stale in public interest. by the irrelevancy of the punishment to the crime, and by the intrusion of secondary matters into the complaint, the "chesapeake" issue, essentially clear, sharp, and impressive, became hopelessly confused with other considerations. upon the proclamation followed a despatch from madison to monroe, july , which opened with the just words, "this enormity is not a subject for discussion," and then proceeded to discuss at length. demand was to be made, most properly, for a formal disavowal, and for the restoration of the seamen to the ship. this could have been formulated in six lines, and had it stood alone could scarcely have been refused; but to it was attached indissolubly an extraneous requirement. "as a security for the future, an entire abolition of impressment from vessels[ ] under the flag of the united states, if not already arranged, is also to make an _indispensable part of the satisfaction_."[ ] this made accommodation hopeless. practically, it was an ultimatum; for recent notorious discussion had demonstrated that this the british government would not yield, and as it differed essentially from the point at issue in the "chesapeake" affair, there was no reason to expect a change of attitude in consequence of that. great as was the wrong to a merchant vessel, it has not the status of a ship of war, which carries even into foreign ports a territorial immunity resembling that of an ambassador, representing peculiarly the sovereignty of its nation. further, the men taken from the "chesapeake" were not seized as liable to impressment, but arrested as deserters; the case was distinct. finally, great britain's power to maintain her position on impressment had certainly not waned under the "chesapeake" humiliation, and was not likely to succumb to peremptory language from madison. no such demand should have been advanced, in such connection, by a self-respecting government, unless prepared to fight instantly upon refusal. the despatch indeed contains cautions and expressions indicating a sense of treading on dangerous ground; an apprehension of exciting hostile action, though no thought of taking it. the exclusion of armed vessels was justified "by the vexations and dangers to our peace, experienced from these visits." the reason, if correct, was adequate as a matter of policy under normal conditions; but it became inconsistent with self-respect when the national flag was insulted in the attack on the "chesapeake." entire composure, and forbearance from demonstrations bearing a trace of temper, alone comport with such a situation. to distinguish against british ships of war at such a moment, by refusing them only, and for the first time, admission into american harbors, was either a humiliating confession of impotence to maintain order within the national borders, or it justified canning's contention that it was in retaliation for the "leopard's" action. his further plea, that it must therefore be taken into the account in determining the reparation due, was pettifogging, reducing a question of insult and amends to one of debit and credit bookkeeping; but the american claim that the step was necessary to internal quiet was puerile, and its precipitancy carried the appearance of petulance. monroe received madison's despatch august , and on september had an interview with canning. in it he specified the redress indicated by madison. with this was coupled an intimation that a special mission to the united states ought to be constituted, to impart to the act of reparation "a solemnity which the extraordinary nature of the aggression particularly required." this assertion of the extraordinary nature of the occasion separated the incident from the impressment grievance, with which madison sought to join it; but what is more instructively noticeable is the contrast between this extreme formality, represented as requisite, and the wholly informal, and as it proved unreal, withdrawal by napoleon of his decrees, which the administration of madison at a later day maintained to be sufficient for the satisfaction of great britain. in this interview[ ] canning made full use of the advantages given him by his adversaries' method of presentation and action. "he said that by the president's proclamation, and the seizure and detention of some men who had landed on the coast to procure water, the government seemed to have taken redress into its own hands." to monroe's statement that "the suppression of the practice of impressment from merchant vessels had been made indispensable by the late aggression, for reasons which were sufficiently known to him," he retorted, "that the late aggression was an act different in all respects to the former practice; and ought not to be connected with it, as it showed a disposition to make a particular incident, in which great britain was in the wrong, instrumental to an accommodation in a case in which his government held a different doctrine." the remark went to the root of the matter. this was what the administration was trying to do. as madison afterwards put it to rose, the president was desirous "of converting a particular incident into an occasion for removing another and more extensive source of danger to the harmony of the two countries." this plausible rendering was not likely to recommend to a resolute nation such a method of obtaining surrender of a claimed right. the exclusion proclamation monroe represented to be "a mere measure of police indispensable for the preservation of order within the united states." canning declined to be shaken from his stand that it was an exhibition of partiality against great britain, the vessels of which alone were excluded, because of an outrage committed by one of them outside of american waters. the time at which the proclamation issued, and the incorporation in it of the "chesapeake" incident, made this view at least colorable. this interview also was followed by an exchange of notes. monroe's of september , , developed the american case and demand as already given. that of canning, september , stated as follows the dilemma raised by the president's proclamation: either it was an act of partiality between england and france, the warships of the latter being still admitted, or it was an act of retaliation for the "chesapeake" outrage, and so of the nature of redress, self-obtained, it is true, but to be taken into account in estimating the reparation which the british government "acknowledged to have been originally due."[ ] to the request for explanation monroe replied lamely, with a statement which can scarcely be taken as other than admitting the punitive character of the proclamation. "there certainly existed no desire of giving a preference;" but,--"_before, this aggression_ it is well known that his britannic majesty's ships of war lay within the waters of the chesapeake, and enjoyed all the advantages of the most favored nation; it cannot therefore be doubted that my government will be ready _to restore them to the same situation as soon as it can be done consistently with the honor and rights of the united states_."[ ] in closing his letter of september , canning asked monroe whether he could not, consistently with his instructions, separate the question of impressment from that of the "chesapeake." if not, as it was the fixed intention of his government not to treat the two as connected, the negotiation would be transferred to washington, and a special envoy sent. "but in order to avoid the inconvenience which has arisen from the mixed nature of your instructions, he will not be empowered to entertain, as connected with this subject, any proposition respecting the search of merchant vessels."[ ] monroe replied that his "instructions were explicit to consider the whole of this class of injuries as an entire subject."[ ] to his inquiry as to the nature of the special mission, in particulars, canning replied that it would be limited in the first instance to the question of the "chesapeake." whether it would have any further scope, he could not say.[ ] mr. george henry rose was nominated for this mission, and sailed from england in november. before his departure, the british government took a further step, which in view of the existing circumstances, and of all that had preceded, emphasized beyond the possibility of withdrawal the firmness of its decision not to surrender the claim to impress british subjects from foreign merchant vessels. on october , , a royal proclamation was issued, recalling all seafaring persons who had entered foreign services, whether naval or merchant, directing them to withdraw at once from such service and return home, or else to ship on board any accessible british ship of war. commanders of naval vessels were ordered to seize all such persons whenever found by them on board foreign merchantmen. in the case of british-born subjects, known to be serving on board foreign men-of-war,--which was the case of the "chesapeake,"--the repetition of the outrage was implicitly forbidden, by prescribing the procedure to be observed. requisition for the discharge of such persons was to be made on the foreign captain, and, in case of refusal, the particulars of the case were to be transmitted to the british minister to the nation concerned, or to the british home authorities; "in order that the necessary steps may be taken for obtaining redress ... for the injury done to us by the unwarranted detention of our natural-born subjects in the service of a foreign state." the proclamation closed by denying the efficacy of letters of naturalization to discharge native british from their allegiance of birth. rose's mission proved abortive. like monroe's, his instructions were positive to connect with his negotiation a matter which, if not so irrelevant as impressment, was at least of a character that a politic foreign minister might well have disregarded, in favor of the advantage to be gained by that most conciliatory of actions, a full and cordial apology. rose was directed not to open his business until the president had withdrawn the proclamation excluding british ships of war. having here no more option than monroe as to impressment, the negotiation became iron-bound. the united states government went to the utmost limit of concession to conclude the matter. receding from its first attitude, it agreed to sever the question of impressment from that of the "chesapeake;" but, with regard to the recalling of the president's proclamation, it demanded that rose should show his cards, should state what was the nature and extent of the reparation he was empowered to offer, and whether it was conditioned or unconditioned. if this first outcome were such as to meet the just expectations of the administration, revocation of the proclamation should bear the same date as the british act of reparation. certainly, more could not be offered. the government could not play a blind game, yielding point after point in reliance upon the unknown contents of rose's budget. this, however, was what it was required to do, according to the british envoy's reading of his orders, and the matter terminated in a fruitless exchange of argumentation.[ ] in april, , rose quitted the country, and redress for the "chesapeake" injury remained in abeyance for three years longer. interest in it had waned under more engrossing events which had already taken place, and it was relegated by both governments to the background of diplomacy. admiral berkeley had been recalled, as a mark of his majesty's disapproval. he arrived in england in the beginning of , some six months after the outrage, accompanied by the "leopard." her captain was not again given a ship; but before the end of the year the chief offender, the admiral, had been assigned to the important command at lisbon. to pinkney's observation upon this dissatisfying proceeding, canning replied that it was impossible for the admiralty to resist his claim to be employed (no other objection existing against him) after such a lapse of time since his return from halifax, without bringing him to a court-martial.[ ] in the final settlement, further punishment of berkeley was persistently refused. although standing completely apart from the continuous stream of connected events which constituted contemporaneous history,--perhaps because of that very separateness,--the "chesapeake" affair marks conspicuously the turning-point in the relations of the two countries. in point of time, its aptness as a sign-post is notable; for it occurred just at the moment when the british ministry, under the general exigencies of the situation, and the particular menace of the tilsit compacts between napoleon and the czar, were meditating the new and extraordinary maritime system by which alone they might hope to counteract the continental system that now threatened to become truly coextensive with europe. but to the writer the significance of the "chesapeake" business is more negative than positive; it suggests rather what might have been under different treatment by the portland ministry. the danger to great britain was imminent and stupendous, and her measures of counteraction needed to correspond. these were confessedly illegal in the form they took, and were justified by their authors only on the ground of retaliation. towards neutrals, among whom the united states were by far the chief, they were most oppressive. yet for over four years not only did the american government endure them, but its mercantile community conformed to the policy of great britain, found profit in so doing, and deprecated resort to war. at a later day jefferson asserted bitterly that under british influence one fourth of the nation had compelled the other three fourths to abandon the embargo. whether this be quite a fair statement may be doubted; but there was in it so much of truth as to suggest the possibility, if not of acquiescence in the orders in council, at least of such abstention from active resentment as would have been practically equivalent. the acquiescence, if possible even the co-operation, of america was at this time momentous to great britain as well as to napoleon. to complete his scheme for ruining his enemy, by closing against her commerce all the ports of europe, the emperor needed to deprive her also of access to the markets of the united states; while the grave loss to which great britain was exposed in the one quarter made it especially necessary to retain the large and increasing body of consumers across the atlantic. in the united states there was a division of public opinion and feeling, which offered a fair chance of inclining national action in one direction or the other. although the treaty of commerce and navigation of december , , had been rejected by the administration, and disapproved by the stricter followers of jefferson and madison, it was regarded with favor in many quarters. its negotiators had represented the two leading parties which divided the nation. monroe was a republican, traditionally allied to jefferson; pinkney was a federalist. although in it the principles of the united states had not been successfully asserted, as regarded either impressment or the transport of colonial produce, the terms of compromise had commanded their signatures, because they held that in effect the national objects were obtained; that impressment would practically cease, and the carrying trade, under the restrictions they had accepted, would not only nourish, but be as remunerative as before. monroe, who had a large personal following in his state and party, maintained this view in strong and measured language after his return home; and it found supporters in both political camps, as well as upon the floor of the two houses of congress. then, and afterwards, it was made a reproach to the administration that it had refused a working arrangement which was satisfactory in its substantial results and left the principles of the country untouched for future assertion. whatever may be thought, from an american standpoint, of the justice or dignity of this position, it showed grave divergences of sentiment, from which it is the skill of an opposing diplomatist to draw profit. it is impossible to estimate the effect upon the subsequent course of america, if the british ministry, with a certain big-heartedness, had seized the opportunity of the "chesapeake" affair; if they had disclaimed the act of their officers with frankness and cordiality, offering ungrudging regret, and reparation proportionate to the shame inflicted upon a community too weak in military power to avenge its wrongs. as it was, at a moment when the hostilities she had provoked would have been most embarrassing, great britain escaped only by the unreadiness of the american government. left unatoned, the attack on the "chesapeake" remained in american consciousness where jefferson and madison had sought to place it,--an example of the outrages of impressment. the incidental violence, which aroused attention and wrath, differed in nothing but circumstance from the procedure when an unresisting merchant vessel was deprived of men. in both cases there was the forcible exaction of a disputed claim. canning, indeed, was at pains to explain that originally the british right extended to vessels of every kind; but "for nearly a century the crown had forborne to instruct the commanders of its ships of war to search foreign ships of war for deserters, ... because to attack a national ship of war is an act of hostility. the very essence of the charge against admiral berkeley, as you represent it, is the having taken upon himself to commit an act of hostility without the previous authority of his government." under this construction, the incident only served to emphasize the fundamental opposition of principle, and to exasperate the war party in the united states. to deprive a foreign merchant vessel of men was not considered a hostile act; and the difference in the case of ships of war was only because the crown chose so to construe. the argument was, that to retain seamen of british birth, when recalled by proclamation, was itself hostile, because every such seaman disobeying this call was a deserter. it was to be presumed that a foreign power would not countenance their detention, and on this presumption no search of its commissioned ships was ordered. "but with respect to merchant vessels there is no such presumption."[ ] while the "chesapeake" affair was still in its earlier stages of discussion, the passage of events in europe was leading rapidly to the formulation of the extreme british measures of retaliation for the berlin decree. on june napoleon defeated the russians at the battle of friedland; and on june , the day the "leopard" attacked the "chesapeake," an armistice was signed between the contending parties. upon this followed the conventions of tilsit, july , , by which the czar undertook to support the continental system, and to close his ports to great britain. the deadly purpose of the commercial warfare thus reinforced was apparent; and upon the emperor's return to paris, soon afterwards, the berlin decree received an execution more consonant to its wording than was the construction hitherto given it by french officials. in may, an american ship, the "horizon," bound from england to peru, had been wrecked upon the coast of france. her cargo consisted in part of goods of british origin. up to that time, no decisions contrary to american neutral rights had been based upon the decree by french courts; but final action in the case of the "horizon" was not taken till some time after the emperor's return. meanwhile, on august , general armstrong, the american minister, had asked that spain, which had formally adopted the berlin decree as governing its own course, should be informed of the rulings of the french authorities; "for a letter from the _chargé des affaires_ of the united states at madrid shows that the fate of sundry american vessels, captured by spanish cruisers, will depend, not on the construction which might be given to the spanish decree by spanish tribunals, but on the practice which shall have been established in france."[ ] this letter was referred in due course--august --to the minister of marine, and a reply promised when his answer should be received. under napoleon's eye, doubts not entertained in his absence seem to have occurred to the ministers concerned, and on september armstrong learned that the emperor had been consulted, and had said that, as he had expressed no exceptions to the operation of his decree, french armed vessels were authorized to seize goods of english origin on board neutral vessels. this decision, having the force of law, was communicated to the tribunals, and under it so much of the "horizon's" cargo as answered to this description was condemned. the rest was liberated.[ ] when this decision became known, it was evident that within the range of napoleon's power there would henceforth be no refuge for british manufactures, or the produce of british colonies; that neutral ownership or jurisdiction would be no protection against force. even the pity commonly extended to the shipwrecked failed, if his property had been bought in england. recognition of the increased danger was shown in the doubling and trebling of insurance. the geographical sweep intended to be given to the edict was manifested by the action of state after state whither arms had extended napoleon's influence; or, as armstrong phrased it, "having settled the business of belligerents, with the exception of england, very much to his own liking, he was now on the point of settling that of neutrals in the same way." in july, denmark and portugal, as yet at peace, had been notified that they must choose between france and england, and had been compelled to exclude english commerce. august , a french division entered leghorn, belonging to the nominally independent kingdom of etruria, took possession of the harbor and forts, ordered the surrender of all british goods in the hands of the inhabitants, and laid a general embargo upon the shipping, among which were many americans. in lower italy, the papal states and naples underwent the same restrictions. prussia yielded under obvious constraint, and austria acceded from motives of policy, distinguishable in form only from direct compulsion. russia, as already said, had joined immediately after decisive defeat in the field. the co-operation of the united states, the second maritime nation in the world, was vital to the general plan. could it be secured? already, at an audience given to the diplomatic corps on august , the danish minister had taken armstrong aside and asked him whether any application had been made to him with regard to the projected _union of all commercial states against great britain_. being answered in the negative, he said, "you are much favored, but it will not last."[ ] armstrong characterized this incident as not important; but in truth the words italicized defined exactly the menacing scheme already matured in the emperor's mind, for the execution of which, as events already showed, and continued to prove, he relied upon the force of arms. to this the united states was not accessible; but to coerce or cajole her by other means became a prominent feature of french policy, which was powerfully abetted by the tone of great britain speaking through canning. to appreciate duly the impending measures of the british ministry, attention should fasten upon the single decisive fact that this vast combination was not the free act of the parties concerned, but a submission imposed by an external military power, which at the moment, and for five succeeding years, they were unable to resist. it is one thing to deny the right of any number of independent communities to join in a customs union; it is another to maintain the obligations upon third parties of such a convention, when extorted by external compulsion. either action may be resisted, but means not permissible in the one case may be justified in the other. in the european situation the subjected states, by reason of their subjection, disappeared as factors in diplomatic consideration. there remained only their master napoleon, with his momentary lieutenant the czar, and opposed to them great britain. "it is obvious," said the french minister of foreign affairs, champagny, to armstrong, "that his majesty _cannot permit_ to his allies a commerce which he denies to himself. this would be at once to defeat his system and oppress his subjects."[ ] a few days later he wrote formally, "his majesty considered himself bound to _order_ reprisals on american vessels _not only in his territory, but likewise in the countries which are under his influence_,--holland, spain, italy, naples."[ ] the emperor by strength of arms oppressed to their grievous injury those who could not escape him; what should be the course of those whom he could not reach, to whom was left the choice between actual resistance and virtual co-operation? the two really independent states were great britain and the united states. in the universal convulsion of civilization, the case of the several nations recalls the law of solon, that in civil tumults the man who took neither side should be disfranchised. the united states chose neutrality, and expected that it would be permitted her. she chose to overlook the interposition of napoleon, and to regard the exclusion laws, forced by him upon other states, as instances of municipal regulation, incontestable when freely exercised. not only would she not go behind the superficial form, but on technical grounds of international law she denied the right of another to do so. great britain had no choice. she was compelled to resistance; the question was as to methods. direct military action was impossible. the weapon used against her was commercial prohibition, which meant eventual ruin, unless adequately parried by her own action. from europe no help was to be expected. if the united states also decided so far to support napoleon as to prosecute her trade subject to his measures, accepting as legal regulations extorted by him from other european countries, the trade of europe would be transferred from great britain to america, and the revenues of france would expand in every way, while those of great britain shrank,--a result militarily fatal. in this the british government would not acquiesce. it chose instead war with the united states, under the forms of peace. that the tendency of the course pursued by the united states was to destroy british commerce, and that this tendency was successfully counteracted by the means framed by the british government,--the orders in council,--admits of little doubt. when the american policy had worked out to its logical conclusion, in open trade with france, and complete interdict of importation from great britain, joel barlow, american minister to france in - , and an intimate of jefferson and madison, wrote thus to the french minister of foreign affairs: "in adopting the late arrangements with france the united states could not contemplate the deprivation of revenue. they really expected to draw from this country and from the rest of continental europe the same species of manufactures, and to as great an amount as they were accustomed to do from england. they calculated with the more confidence on such a result as they saw how intimately it was combined with the great and essential interests of the imperial government. they perceived that _it would promote in an unexpected degree the continental system_, which the emperor has so much at heart.... the emperor now commands nearly all the ports of continental europe. the whole interior of the continent must be supplied with american products. these must pass through french territory, french commercial houses, canals, and wagons. they must pay" toll to france in various ways, "and thus render these territories as tributary to france as if they were part of her own dominions."[ ] but napoleon replied that his system, as it stood, had greatly crippled british commerce, and that if he should admit american shipping freely to the continent, trade could not be carried on, because the english under the orders in council would take it all, going or coming.[ ] "the peril of the moment is truly supposed to be great beyond all former example," wrote pinkney, now american minister in london, when communicating to his government the further orders in council adopted by great britain, in response to the attempted "union of all the commercial states" against her. as defined by canning to pinkney,[ ] "the principle upon which the whole of this measure has been framed is that of refusing to the enemy those advantages of commerce which he has forbidden to this country. the simplest method of enforcing this system of retaliation would have been to follow the example of the enemy, by prohibiting altogether all commercial intercourse between him and other states." america then would not be allowed to trade with the countries under his decrees. it was considered, however, more indulgent to neutrals--to the second parties in commercial intercourse with the enemy--to allow this intercourse subject to duties in transit to be paid in great britain. this would raise the cost to the continental consumer and pay revenue to great britain. the orders in council of november , , therefore forbade all entrance to ports of the countries which had embraced the continental system. it was not pretended that they would be blockaded effectively. "all ports from which the british flag is excluded shall from henceforth be subject to the same restrictions, in point of trade and navigation, with the exceptions hereinafter mentioned, _as if the same were actually blockaded_ in the most strict and rigorous manner by his majesty's naval forces." the exception was merely that a vessel calling first at a british port would be allowed to proceed to one of those prohibited, after paying certain duties upon her cargo and obtaining a fresh clearance. this measure was instituted by the executive, in pursuance of the custom of regulating trade with america by orders in council, prevalent since ; but it received legislative sanction by an act of parliament, march , , which fixed the duties to be paid on the foreign goods thus passing through british custom-houses. cotton, for instance, was to pay nine pence a pound, an amount intended to be prohibitory; tobacco, three halfpence. these were the two leading exports of united states domestic produce. in the united states this act of parliament was resented more violently, if possible, than the order in council itself. in the colonial period there had been less jealousy of the royal authority than of that of parliament, and the feeling reappears in the discussion of the present measures. "this," said a virginia senator,[ ] "is the act regulating our commerce, of which i complain. an export duty, which could not be laid in charleston because forbidden by our constitution, is laid in london, or in british ports." it was literally, and in no metaphorical sense, the reimposition of colonial regulation, to increase the revenues of great britain by reconstituting her the _entrepôt_ of commerce between america and europe. "the orders in council," wrote john quincy adams in a public letter, "if submitted to, would have degraded us to the condition of colonists."[ ] this just appreciation preponderated over other feelings throughout the middle and southern states. adams, a senator from massachusetts, had separated himself in action and opinion from the mass of the people in new england, where, although the orders were condemned, hatred of napoleon and his methods overbore the sense of injury received from great britain. the indignation of the supporters of the administration was intensified by the apparent purpose of the british government to keep back information of the measure. rose had sailed the day after its adoption, monroe two days later, but neither brought any official intimation of its issuance, although that was announced in the papers of the day. "the orders in council," wrote adams, "were not merely without official authenticity. rumors had been for several weeks in circulation, derived from english prints and from private correspondence, that such orders were to issue,[ ] and no inconsiderable pains were taken to discredit the facts. suspicions were lulled by declarations equivalent as nearly as possible to positive denial, and these opiates were continued for weeks after the embargo was laid, until mr. erskine received orders to make official communication of the orders themselves, in proper form, to our government."[ ] this remissness, culpable as it certainly was in a matter of such importance, was freely attributed to the most sinister motives. "these orders in council were designedly concealed from mr. rose, although they had long been deliberated upon, and almost matured, before he left london. they were the besom which was intended to sweep, and would have swept, our commerce from the ocean. great britain in the most insidious manner had issued orders for the entire destruction of our commerce."[ ] the wrath was becoming, but in this particular the inference was exaggerated. the orders, modelled on the general plan of blockades, provided for the warning of a vessel which had sailed before receiving notification; and not till after a first notice by a british cruiser was she liable to capture. mention of such cases occurs in the journals of the day.[ ] some captains persisted, and, if successful in reaching a port under napoleon's control, found themselves arrested under a new decree,--that of milan,--for having submitted to a visit they could not resist. such were sequestered, subject to the decision of the united states to take active measures against great britain. "arrived at new york, march , [ ], ship 'eliza,' captain skiddy, days from bordeaux. all american vessels in france which had been boarded by british cruisers were under seizure. the opinion was, they would so remain till it was known whether the united states had adjusted its difficulties with great britain, in which case they would be immediately condemned. a letter from the minister of marine was published that the decree of milan must be executed severely, strictly, and literally."[ ] independent of a perpetual need to raise money, by methods more consonant to the middle ages than to the current period, napoleon thus secured hostages for the action of the united states in its present dilemma. the orders in council of november , having been announced in english papers of the th, th, and th, appeared in the washington "national intelligencer" of december .[ ] the general facts were therefore known to the executive and to the legislature; and, though not officially adduced, could not but affect consideration, when the president, on december , , sent a message to congress recommending "an inhibition of the departure of our vessels from the ports of the united states." with his customary exaggerated expression of attendance upon instructions from congress, he made no further definition of wishes which were completely understood by the party leaders. "the wisdom of congress will also see the necessity of making every preparation for whatever events may grow out of the present crisis." accompanying the message, as documents justificatory of the action to be taken, were four official papers. one was the formal communication to the french council of prizes of napoleon's decision that goods of english origin were lawful prize on board neutral vessels; the second was the british proclamation directing the impressment of british seamen found on board neutral ships. these two were made public. secrecy was imposed concerning the others, which were a letter of september , from armstrong to the french minister of exterior relations, and the reply, dated october . in this the minister, m. champagny, affirmed the emperor's decision, and added a sentence which, while susceptible of double meaning, certainly covertly suggested that the united states should join in supporting the berlin decree. "the decree of blockade has now been issued eleven months. the principal powers of europe, far from protesting against its provisions, have adopted them. they have perceived that its execution must be complete to render it more effectual, and it has seemed easy to reconcile these measures with the observance of treaties, especially at a time when the infractions by england of the rights of _all maritime_ powers render their interests common, and tend to _unite them in support of the same cause_."[ ] this doubtless might be construed as applicable only to the european powers; but as a foremost contention of madison and armstrong had been that the berlin decree contravened the treaty between france and the united states, the sentence lent itself readily to the interpretation, placed upon it by the federalists, that the united states was invited to enforce in her own waters the continental system of exclusion, and so to help bring england to reason. this the united states immediately proceeded to do. though the motive differed somewhat, the action was precisely that suggested. on the same day that jefferson's message was received, the senate passed an embargo bill. this was sent at once to the house, returned with amendments, amendments concurred in, and bill passed and approved december . this rapidity of action--sunday intervened--shows a purpose already decided in general principle; while the enactment of three supplementary measures, before the adjournment of congress in april, indicates a precipitancy incompatible with proper weighing of details, and an avoidance of discussion, commendable only on the ground that no otherwise than by the promptest interception could american ships or merchandise be successfully jailed in port. the bill provided for the instant stoppage of all vessels in the ports of the united states, whether cleared or not cleared, if bound to any foreign port. exception was made only in favor of foreign ships, which of course could not be held. they might depart with cargo already on board, or in ballast. vessels cleared coastwise were to be deterred from turning foreign by bonds exacted in double the value of ship and cargo. american export and foreign navigation were thus completely stopped; and as the non-importation act at last went into operation on december ,[ ] there was practical exclusion of all british vessels, for none could be expected to enter a port where she could neither land her cargo nor depart. in communicating the embargo to pinkney, for the information of the british government,[ ] madison was careful to explain, as he had to the british minister at washington, that it was a measure of precaution only; not to be considered as hostile in character. this was scarcely candid; coercion of great britain, to compel the withdrawal of her various maritime measures objectionable to the united states, was at least a silent partner in the scheme, as formulated to the consciousness of jefferson and his followers.[ ] the motive transpired, as such motives necessarily do; but, even had it not, the operation of the act, under the conditions of the european war, was so plainly partial between the two belligerents, as to amount virtually to co-operation with napoleon by the preponderance of injury done to great britain. it deprived her of cotton for raw material; of tobacco, which, imported in payment for british manufactures, formed a large element in her commerce with the continent; of wheat and flour, which to some extent contributed to the support of her people, though in a much less degree than many supposed. it closed to her the american market at the moment that napoleon and alexander were actively closing the european; and it shut off from the west indies american supplies known to be of the greatest importance, and fondly, but mistakenly, believed to be indispensable. all this was well enough, if national policy required. great britain then was scarcely in a position to object seriously to retaliation by a nation thinking itself injured; but to define such a measure as not hostile was an insult to her common-sense. it was certainly hostile in nature, it was believed to be hostile in motive, and it intensified feelings already none too friendly. in france, although included in the embargo, and although her action was one of the reasons alleged for its institution, napoleon expressed approval. it was injurious to england, and added little to the pressure upon france exerted by the orders in council through the british control of the ocean. senator smith of maryland, a large shipping merchant, bore testimony to this. "it has been truly said by an eminent merchant of salem, that not more than one vessel in eight that sailed for europe within a short time before the embargo reached its destination. my own experience has taught me the truth of this; and as further proof i have in my hand a list of fifteen vessels which sailed for europe between september and december , . three arrived; two were captured by french and spaniards; one was seized in hamburg; and nine carried into england. but for the embargo, ships that would have sailed would have fared as ill, or worse. not one in twenty would have arrived." granting the truth of this anticipation, great britain might have claimed that, so far as evident danger was concerned, her blockades over long coast-lines were effective. the question speedily arose,--if the object of embargo be precaution only, to save our vessels from condemnation under the sweeping edicts of france and great britain, and seamen from impressment on american decks, why object to exporting native produce in foreign bottoms, and to commerce across the canada frontier? if, by keeping our vessels at home, we are to lose the profits upon sixty million dollars' worth of colonial produce which they have heretofore been carrying, with advantage to the national revenue, why also forbid the export of the forty to fifty million dollars' worth of domestic produce which foreign ship-owners would gladly take and safely carry? for such foreigners would be chiefly british, and would sail under british convoy, subject to small proportionate risk.[ ] why, also, to save seamen from impressment, deprive them of their living, and force them in search of occupation to fly our ports to british, where lower wages and more exposure to the pressgang await them? on the ground of precaution, there was no reply to these questions; unless, perhaps, that with open export of domestic produce the popular suffering would be too unequally distributed, falling almost wholly on new england shipping industries. logically, however, if the precaution were necessary, the suffering must be accepted; its incidence was a detail only. the embargo was distinctly a hostile measure; and more and more, as people talked, in and out of congress, was admitted to be simply an alternative for open war. as such it failed. it entailed most of the miseries of war, without any of its compensations. it could not arouse the popular enthusiasm which elevates, nor command the popular support that strengthens. hated and despised, it bred elusion, sneaking and demoralizing, and so debased public sentiment with reference to national objects, and individual self-sacrifice to national ends, that the conduct of the many who now evaded it was reproduced, during the war of , in dealings with the enemy which even now may make an american's head hang for shame. born of the jeffersonian horror of war, its evil communication corrupted morals among those whose standards were conventional only; for public opinion failed to condemn breaches of embargo, and by a natural declension equally failed soon after to condemn aid to the enemy in an unpopular war. was it wonderful that an administration which bade the seamen and the ship-owners of the day to starve, that a foreign state might be injured, and at the same time refused to build national ships to protect them, fell into contempt? that men, so far as they might, simply refused to obey, and wholly departed from respect? "i have believed, and still do believe," wrote mr. adams, "that our internal resources are competent to establish and maintain a naval force, if not fully adequate to the protection and defence of our commerce, at least sufficient to induce a retreat from these hostilities, and to deter from the renewal of them by either of the harrying parties;" in short, to compel peace, the first object of military preparation. "i believed that a system to that effect might be formed, ultimately far more economical, and certainly more energetic than a three years' embargo. i did submit such a proposition to the senate, and similar attempts had been made in the house of representatives, but equally discountenanced."[ ] this was precisely the effect of jefferson's teaching, which then dominated his party, and controlled both houses. at this critical moment he wrote, "believing, myself, that gunboats are the only water defence which can be useful to us, and protect us from the ruinous folly of a navy, i am pleased with everything which promises to improve them."[ ] not thus was a nation to be united, nor foreign governments impressed. the panacea recommended was to abandon the sea; to yield practical submission to the orders in council, which forbade american ships to visit the continent, and to the decrees of napoleon, which forbade them entrance to any dominion of great britain. by a curious mental process this was actually believed to be resistance. the american nation was to take as its model the farmer who lives on his own produce, sternly independent of his neighbor; whose sons delved, and wife span, all that the family needed. this programme, half sentiment, half philosophy, and not at all practical, or practicable, was the groundwork of jefferson's thought. to it co-operated a dislike approaching detestation for the carrying trade; the very opposite, certainly, of the other ideal. american shipping was then handling sixty million dollars' worth of foreign produce, and rolling up the wealth which for some reason follows the trader more largely than the agriculturist, who observed with ill-concealed envy. "i trust," wrote jefferson, "that the good sense of our country will see that its greatest prosperity depends on a due balance between agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, and not on this protuberant navigation, which has kept us in hot water from the commencement of our government. this drawback system enriches a few individuals, but lessens the stock of native productions, by withdrawing all the hands [seamen] thus employed. it is essentially necessary for us to have shipping and seamen enough to carry our surplus products to market, but beyond that i do not think we are bound to give it encouragement by drawbacks or other premiums." this meant that it was unjust to the rest of the community to allow the merchant to land his cargo, and send it abroad, without paying as much duty as if actually consumed in the country. "this exuberant commerce brings us into collision with other powers in every sea, and will force us into every war with european powers." "it is now engaging us in war."[ ] whether for merchant ships or navies the sea was odious to jefferson's conception of things. as a convenient medium for sending to market surplus cotton and tobacco, it might be tolerated; but for that ample use of it which had made the greatness of holland and england, he had only aversion. this prepossession characterized the whole body of men, who willingly stripped the seaman and his employers of all their living, after refusing to provide them with an armed protection to which the resources of the state were equal. up to the outbreak of the war not a ship was added to the navy. with this feeling, great britain, whose very being was maritime, not unnaturally became the object of a dislike so profound as unconsciously to affect action. napoleon decreed, and embargoed, and sequestered, with little effect upon national sentiment outside of new england. "certainly all the difficulties and the troubles of the government during our time proceeded from england," wrote jefferson soon after quitting office,[ ] to dearborn, his secretary of war. "at least all others were trifling in comparison." yet not to speak of the berlin decree, by which ships were captured for the mere offence of sailing for england,[ ] bonaparte, by the bayonne decree, april , , nearly a year before jefferson left office, pronounced the confiscation of all american vessels entering ports under his control, on the ground that under the existing embargo they could not lawfully have left their own country; a matter which was none of his business. within a year were condemned one hundred and thirty-four ships and cargoes, worth $ , , .[ ] that jefferson consciously leaned to france from any regard to napoleon is incredible; the character and procedures of the french emperor were repugnant to his deepest convictions; but that there was a still stronger bias against the english form of government, and the pursuit of the sea for which england especially stood, is equally clear. opposition to england was to him a kind of mission. his best wish for her had been that she might be republicanized by a successful french invasion.[ ] "i came into office," he wrote to a political disciple, "under circumstances calculated to generate peculiar acrimony. i found all the offices in the possession of a political sect, who wished to transform it ultimately into the shape of their darling model, the english government; and in the meantime to familiarize the public mind to the change, by administering it on english principles, and in english forms. the elective interposition of the people had blown all their designs, and they found themselves and their fortresses of power and profit put in a moment in the hand of other trustees."[ ] these words, written in the third of the fifteen embargo months, reveal an acrimony not wholly one-sided. it was perceived by the parties hardest hit by this essentially jeffersonian scheme; by the people of new england and of great britain. in the old country it intensified bitterness. in the following summer, at a dinner given to representatives of the spanish revolt against napoleon, the toast to the president of the united states was received with hisses,[ ] "and the marks of disapprobation continued till a new subject drew off the attention of the company." the embargo was not so much a definite cause of complaint, for at worst it was merely a retaliatory measure like the orders in council. enmity was recognized, alike in the council boards and in the social gatherings of the two peoples; the spirit that leads to war was aroused. nor could this hostile demonstration proceed from sympathy with the spanish insurgents; for, except so far as might be inferred from the previous general course of the american administration, there was no reason to believe that they would regard unfavorably the spanish struggle for liberty. yet they soon did, and could not but do so. it is a coincidence too singular to go unnoticed, that the first strong measure of the american government against great britain--embargo--was followed by napoleon's reverses in spain, which, by opening much of that country and of her colonies to trade, at once in large measure relieved great britain from the pressure of the continental system and the embargo; while the second, the last resort of nations, war, was declared shortly before the great russian catastrophe, which, by rapidly contracting the sphere of the emperor's control, both widened the area of british commerce and deprived the united states of a diversion of british effort, upon which calculation had rightly been based. it was impossible for the american government not to wish well to napoleon, when for it so much depended upon his success; and to wish him well was of course to wish ill to his opponents, even if fighting for freedom. congress adjourned april , having completed embargo legislation, as far as could then be seen necessary. on may occurred the rising in madrid, consequent upon napoleon's removal of the spanish royal family; and on july followed the surrender of dupont's corps at baylen. already, on july , the british government had stopped all hostilities against spain, and withdrawn the blockade of all spanish ports, except such as might still be in french control. on august , by the convention of cintra, portugal was evacuated by the french, and from that time forward the peninsula kingdoms, though scourged by war, were in alliance with great britain; their ports and those of their colonies open to her trade. this of itself was a severe blow to the embargo, which for coercive success depended upon the co-operation of the continental system. it was further thwarted and weakened by extensive popular repudiation in the united states. the political conviction of the expediency, or probable efficacy, of the measure was largely sectional; and it is no serious imputation upon the honesty of its supporters to say that they mustered most strongly where interests were least immediately affected. tobacco and cotton suffered less in keeping than flour and salt fish; and the deterioration of these was by no means so instant as the stoppage of a ship's sailing or loading. the farmer ideal is realizable on a farm; but it was not so for the men whose sole occupation was transporting that which the agriculturist did not need to markets now closed by law. wherever employment depended upon commerce, distress was immediate. the seamen, improvident by habit, first felt the blow. "i cannot conceive," said representative [afterwards justice] story, "why gentlemen should wish to paralyze the strength of the nation by keeping back our naval force, and particularly now, when many of our native seamen (and i am sorry to say from my own knowledge i speak it) are starving in our ports."[ ] the commandant of the new york navy yard undertook to employ, for rations only, not wages, three hundred of those adrift in the streets; the corporation of the city undertaking to pay for the food issued.[ ] they moved off, as they could get opportunity, towards the british provinces; and thus many got into the british service, by enlistment or impressment. "had your frigate arrived here instead of the chesapeake," wrote the british consul general at new york, as early as february , , "i have no doubt two or three hundred able british seamen would have entered on board her for his majesty's service; and even now, was your station removed to this city, i feel confident, _provided the embargo continues_, you would more than complete your complement."[ ] six months later, "is it not notorious that not a seaport in the united states can produce seamen enough to man three merchant ships?"[ ] in moving the estimates for one hundred and thirty thousand seamen a year later (february, ), the secretary of the admiralty observed that parliament would learn with satisfaction that the number of seamen now serving in the navy covered, if it did not exceed, the number here voted.[ ] it had not been so once. sir william parker, an active frigate captain during ten years of this period, wrote in , "i dread the discharge of our crew; for i do not think the miserable wretches with which the ships lately fitted out were manned are equal to fight their ships in the manner they are expected to do."[ ] the high wages, which the profits of the american merchant service enabled it to pay, outbade all competition by the british navy. "dollars for shillings," as the expression ran. the embargo stopped all this, and equivalent conditions did not return before the war. the american minister to france in wrote: "we complain with justice of the english practice of pressing our seamen into their service. but the fact is, and there is no harm in saying it, there are at present more american seamen who seek that service than are forced into it."[ ] after the seamen followed the associated employments; those whose daily labor was expended in occupations connected with transportation, or who produced objects which men could not eat, or with which they could dispense. before the end of the year testimony came from every quarter of the increase of suffering among the deserving poor; and not they only, but those somewhat above them as gainers of a comfortable living. they were for the most part helpless, except as helped by their richer neighbors. work for them there was not, and they could not rebel. not so with the seafarers, or the dwellers upon the frontiers. on the great scale, of course, a sure enforcement of the embargo was possible; the bulk of the shipping, especially the bigger, was corralled and idle. in the port of new york, february , , lay ships, brigs, and smaller sea-going vessels; in all unoccupied, of which only were foreign. in the much smaller port of savannah, at this early period there were . in philadelphia, a year later, , mostly of large tonnage for the period. "what is that huge forest of dry trees that spreads itself before the town?" asked a boston journal. "you behold the masts of ships thrown out of employment by the embargo."[ ] "our dismantled, ark-roofed vessels are indeed decaying in safety at our wharves, forming a suitable monument to the memory of our departed commerce. but where are your seamen? gone, sir! driven into foreign exile in search of subsistence."[ ] yet not all; for illicit employment, for evading the acts, enough remained to disconcert the government, alike by their numbers and the boldness of their movements. "this embargo law," wrote jefferson to gallatin, august , , "is certainly the most embarrassing we ever had to execute. i did not expect a crop of so sudden and rank growth of fraud, and open opposition by force, could have grown up within the united states."[ ] apostle of pure democracy as he was, he had forgotten to reckon with the people, and had mistaken the convictions of himself and a coterie for national sentiment. from all parts of the country men began silently and covertly to undermine the working of the system. passamaquoddy bay on the borders of new brunswick, and st. mary's on the confines of florida, remote from ordinary commerce, became suddenly crowded with vessels.[ ] coasters, not from recalcitrant new england only, but from the chesapeake and southern waters, found it impossible to reach their ports of destination. furious gales of wind drove them from their course; spars smitten with decay went overboard; butts of planking started, causing dangerous leaks. safety could be found only by bearing up for some friendly foreign port, in nova scotia or the west indies, where cargoes of flour and fish had to be sold for needed repairs, to enable the homeward voyage to be made. not infrequently the vessel's name had been washed off the stern by the violence of the waves, and the captain could remember neither it nor his own. the new york and vermont frontiers became the scene of widespread illegal trade, the shameful effects of which upon the patriotism of the inhabitants were conspicuous in the following war. a gentleman returning from canada in january, , reported that he had counted seven hundred sleighs, going and returning between montreal and vermont.[ ] this on one line only. a letter received in new york stated that, during the embargo year, , thirty thousand barrels of potash had been brought into quebec.[ ] "while our gunboats and cutters are watching the harbors and sounds of the atlantic," said a senator from his place, "a strange inversion of business ensues, and by a retrograde motion of all the interior machinery of the country, potash and lumber are launched upon the lakes, and ontario and champlain feel the bustle of illicit traffic.... violators of the laws are making fortunes, while the conscientious observers of them are suffering sad privations."[ ] not the conscientious only, but the unlucky. unlike new york, north carolina had not a friendly foreign boundary nigh to her naval stores. under these circumstances the blow glanced from the british dominions. at the first announcement of the embargo, prices of provisions and lumber rose heavily in the west indies; but reaction set in, as the leaks in the dam became manifest and copious. the british government fostered the rebellious evasions of american citizens by a proclamation, issued april , directing commanders of cruisers not to interrupt any neutral vessel laden with provisions or lumber, going to the west indies; no matter to whom the property belonged, nor whether the vessel had any clearance, or papers of any kind. a principal method of eluding the embargo, gallatin informed jefferson, was by loading secretly and going off without clearing. "evasions are chiefly effected by vessels going coastwise."[ ] the two methods were not incompatible. besides the sea-going vessels already mentioned as lying in new york alone, there were there over four hundred coasters. it was impossible to watch so many. the ridiculous gunboats, identified with this administration, derisively nicknamed "jeffs"[ ] by the unbelieving, were called into service to arrest the evil; but neither their numbers nor their qualities fitted them to cope with the ubiquity and speed of their nimble opponents. "the larger part of our gunboats," wrote commodore shaw[ ] from new orleans, "are well known to be dull sailers." "for enforcing the embargo," said secretary gallatin, "gunboats are better calculated as a stationary force, and for the purpose of stopping vessels in certain places, than for pursuit."[ ] a double bond was a mockery, when in west indian ports the cargo was worth from four to eight times what it was at the place of loading. these were the palmier days of the embargo breakers; the ease and frequency with which they escaped soon brought prices down. randolph, in the house, asserted that in the first four months of embargo one hundred thousand barrels of flour had been shipped from baltimore alone; and the west india planters, besides opening new sources of supply, devoted part of their ground to raising food. they thus turned farmer, after the jefferson ideal, supporting themselves off their own grounds; an economical error, for sugar was their better crop, but unavoidable in the circumstances. with all this, the difficulty in the way of exportation so cheapened articles in the united states as to maintain a considerable disproportion in prices there and abroad, which kept alive the spirit of speculation, and maintained the opportunity of large profits,[ ] at the same time that it distressed the american grower. upon the whole, after making allowance for the boasts which succeeded the first fright in the west indies, the indications seem to be that they escaped much better than had been expected, either by themselves or by the american government. just before adjourning, congress had passed a supplementary measure, which, besides drawing restrictions tighter, authorized the president to license vessels to go abroad in ballast, in order to bring home property belonging to american citizens. these dispersed in various directions, and in very large numbers.[ ] many doubtless remained away; but those which returned brought constant confirmation of the numerous american shipping in the various ports of the west indies, and the general abundance of american produce. a letter from havana, september , said: "we have nearly one hundred american vessels in port. three weeks ago there were but four or five. if the property, for which these vessels were ostensibly despatched, had been really here, why have they been so long delayed? the truth is, the property is not here. a host of people have been let loose, who could not possibly have had any other motive than procuring freight and passengers from merchants of this country, or from the french, who are supposed to be going off with their property [in consequence of the spanish outbreak]. the vast number of evasions and smugglers which the embargo has created is surprising. for some days after the last influx of american vessels, the quays and custom-house were every morning covered with all kinds of provisions, which had been landed during the preceding night."[ ] to quebec and halifax the embargo was a positive boon, from the diversion upon them of smuggling enterprise, by the lakes and by land, or by coasters too small to make the direct voyage to the west indies. in consequence of the embargo, these towns became an _entrepôt_ of commerce, such as the orders in council were designed to make the british islands. there was, of course, a return trade, through them, of british manufactures smuggled into the united states. these imports seem to have exceeded the exports by the same route. a new bedford town meeting, in august, affirmed that gold was already at a premium, from the facility with which it was transported through the country, and across the frontier, in payment of purchases.[ ] at the end of the summer one hundred and fifty vessels were despatched from quebec with full cargoes, and it may be believed they had not arrived empty. "from a canada price current now before us, it will be seen that since the embargo was laid the single port of quebec has done more foreign business than the whole united states. in less than eleven months there cleared thence three hundred and thirty-four vessels."[ ] an american merchant visiting halifax wrote home: "our embargo is an excellent thing for this place. every inhabitant of nova scotia is exceedingly desirous of its continuance, as it will be the making of their fortunes."[ ] independent of the _entrepôt_ profit, the british provinces themselves produced several of the articles which figured largely among the exports of the middle and eastern states; not to the extent imagined by sheffield, sufficient to supply the west indies, but, in the artificial scarcity caused by the embargo, the enhanced prices redounded directly to their advantage. sir george prevost, governor of nova scotia, summed up the experience of the year by saying that "the embargo has totally failed. new sources have been resorted to with success to supply deficiencies produced by so sudden an interruption of commerce, and the vast increase of export and import of this province proves that the embargo is a measure well adapted to promote the true interests of his majesty's american colonies."[ ] upon the british islands themselves the injury was more appreciable and conspicuous. it was, moreover, in the direction expected by jefferson and his supporters. the supply of cotton nearly ceased. mr. baring, march , , said in the house of commons that raw material had become so scarce and so high, that in many places it could not be procured. "in manchester during the greatest part of the past year, only nine cotton mills were in full employment; about thirty-one at half work, and forty-four without any at all."[ ] flaxseed, essential to the irish linen manufactures, and of which three fourths came from america, had risen from £ -½ to £ the quarter.[ ] the exports for the year had fallen fifteen per cent; the imports the same amount, involving a total diminution in trade of £ , , . an increase of distress was manifested in the poor rates. in manchester they had risen from £ , to £ , . on the other hand, the harvest for the year, contrary to first anticipation, had been very good; and, in part compensation for intercourse with the united states, there was the opening of spain, portugal, and their extensive colonies, the effect of which was scarcely yet fully felt. there was, besides, the relief of american competition in the carrying trade. this was a singularly noteworthy effect of the embargo; for this industry was particularly adverse to united states navigation, and particularly benefited by the locking up of american shipping. on april , , there was not in liverpool a vessel from boston or new york.[ ] the year before, four hundred and eighty-nine had entered, paying a tonnage duty of £ , .[ ] in bristol at the same time there were only ten americans. in consequence of the loss of so much tonnage, "those who have anything to do with vessels for freight or charter are absolutely insolent in their demands. for a ship of tons from this to st. petersburg and back £ , have been paid; £ , for a ship of tons to lisbon and back."[ ] at the end of august, in liverpool, the value of british shipping had increased rapidly, and vessels which had long been laid up found profitable employment at enormous freights.[ ] thus, while the effect of the embargo doubtless was to raise prices of american goods in england, it stopped american competition with the british carrying trade, especially in west india produce. this occurred also at the time when the revolt of spain opened to british navigation the colonies from which americans hitherto had been the chief carriers. the same event had further relieved british shipping by the almost total destruction of french privateering, thenceforth banished from its former ports of support in the caribbean. from all these causes, the appreciation quoted from a london letter of september seems probably accurate. "the continuance of the embargo is not as yet felt in any degree adequate to make a deep impression on the public mind.... except with those directly interested [merchants in the american trade], the dispute with the united states seems almost forgotten, or remembered only to draw forth ironical gratitude, that the kind embargo leaves the golden harvest to be reaped by british enterprise alone."[ ] upon the whole, through silent popular resistance, and the concurrence of the spanish revolution, the united states by cutting its own throat underwent more distress than it inflicted upon the enemy. besides the widespread individual suffering,[ ] already mentioned, the national revenue, dependent almost wholly on customs, shrank with the imports. despite the relief afforded by cargoes bound home when the embargo passed, and the permits issued to bring in american property abroad, the income from this source sank from over $ , , to $ , , .[ ] "however dissimilar in some respects," wrote gallatin in a public report, "it is not believed that in their effect upon national wealth and public revenue war and embargo would be materially different. in case of war, some part of that revenue will remain; but if embargo and suspension of commerce continue, that which arises from commerce will entirely disappear."[ ] jefferson nevertheless clung to the system, even to the end of his life, with a conviction that defied demonstration. the fundamental error of conception, of course, was in considering embargo an efficient alternative for war. the difference between the two measures, regarded coercively, was that embargo inflicted upon his own people all the loss that war could, yet spared the opponent that which war might do to him. for the united states, war would have meant, and when it came did mean, embargo, and little more. to great britain it would have meant all that the american embargo could do, plus the additional effort, expense, and actual loss, attendant upon the increased exposure of her maritime commerce, and its protection against active and numerous foes, singularly well fitted for annoyance by their qualities and situation. war and embargo, combined, with napoleon in the plenitude of his power, as he was in , would sorely have tried the enemy; even when it came, amid the emperor's falling fortunes, the strain was severe. but jefferson's lack of appreciation for maritime matters, his dislike to the navy, and the weakness to which he had systematically reduced it, prevented his realizing the advantages of war over embargo, as a measure of coercion. to this contributed also his conviction of the exposure of canada to offensive operations, which was just, though fatally vitiated by an unfounded confidence in untrained troops, or militia summoned from their farms. neither was there among his advisers any to correct his views; rather they had imbibed their own from him, and their utterances in debate betray radical misapprehension of military considerations. among the incidents attendant upon the embargo was the continuance abroad of a number of american vessels, which were there at the passage of the act. they remained, willing exiles, to share the constant employment and large freights which the sudden withdrawal of their compatriots had opened to british navigation. they were doubtless joined by many of those which received permission to sail in quest of american property. one flagrant instance of such abuse of privilege turned up at leghorn, with a load of tropical produce;[ ] and the comments above quoted from an havana letter doubtless depended upon that current acquaintance with facts which men in the midst of affairs pick up. it was against this class of traders specifically that napoleon launched the bayonne decree, april , . being abroad contrary to the law of the united states, he argued, was a clear indication that they were not american, but british in disguise. this they were not; but they were carrying on trade under the orders in council, and often under british convoy.[ ] the fact was noteworthy, as bearing upon the contention of the united states government soon after, that the non-intercourse law was adequate security for the action of american merchant vessels; a grotesque absurdity, in view of the embargo experiences. that it is not consonant with national self-esteem to accept foreign assistance to carry out national laws is undeniable; but it is a step further to expect another nation to accept, as assured, the efficiency of an authority notoriously and continually violated by its own subjects. under the general conditions named, the year wore on to its close. both the british orders in council and the decrees of the french emperor continued in force and received execution;[ ] but so far as the united states was concerned their effect was much limited, the embargo retaining at home the greater part of the nation's shipping. the vessels which had remained abroad, and still more those which escaped by violation of the law, or abuse of the permission to sail unloaded to bring back american property, for the most part purchased immunity by acquiescence in the british orders. they accepted british licenses, and british convoy also, where expedient. it was stated in congress that, of those which went to sea under permission, comparatively few were interrupted by british cruisers.[ ] napoleon's condemnations went on apace, and in the matter of loss,--waiving questions of principle,--were at this moment a more serious grievance than the british orders. nor could it be said that the grounds upon which he based his action were less arbitrary or unjust. the orders in council condemned a vessel for sailing for an enemy's port, because constructively blockaded--a matter as to which at least choice was free; the milan decree condemned because visited by a british cruiser, to avoid which a merchant ship was powerless. the american brig "vengeance" sailed from norfolk before the embargo was laid, for bilboa, then a port in alliance with france. on the passage the british frigate "iris" boarded her, and indorsed on her papers that, in accordance with the orders of november , she must not proceed. that night the "vengeance" gave the cruiser the slip, and pursued her course. she was captured off bilboa by a french vessel, sent in as a prize, and condemned because of the frigate's visit.[ ] this case is notable because of the pure application of a single principle, not obscured by other incidental circumstances, as often happens. the brig "george", equally bound to bilboa, after visitation by a british vessel had been to falmouth, and there received a british license to go to her destination. she was condemned for three offenses: the visit, the entrance to falmouth, and the license.[ a] these cases were far from isolated, and quite as flagrant as anything done by great britain; but, while not overlooked, nor unresented, by the supporters of the embargo, there was not evident in the debates of congress any such depth of feeling as was aroused by the british measures. as was said by mr. bayard, an opposition senator, "it may be from the habit of enduring, but we do not feel an aggression from france with the same quickness and sensibility that we do from england."[ ] throughout the year , the embargo was maintained by the administration with as much vigor as was possible to the nature of the administrator, profoundly interested in the success of a favorite measure. congress had supplemented the brief original act by a prohibition of all intercourse with foreign territories by land, as well as by sea. this was levelled at the florida and canada frontiers. authority had been given also for the absolute detention of all vessels bound coastwise, if with cargoes exciting suspicion of intention to evade the laws. part of the small navy was sent to cruise off the coast, and the gunboats were distributed among the maritime districts, to intercept and to enforce submission. steps were taken to build vessels on lakes ontario and champlain; for, in the undeveloped condition of the road systems, these sheets of water were principal means of transportation, after snow left the ground. to the embargo the navy owed the brig "oneida", the most formidable vessel on ontario when war came. all this restrictive service was of course extremely unpopular with the inhabitants; or at least with that active, assertive element, which is foremost in pushing local advantages, and directs popular sentiment. nor did feeling in all cases refrain from action. april , the president had to issue a proclamation against combinations to defy the law in the country about champlain. the collector at passamaquoddy wrote that, with upwards of a hundred vessels in port, he was powerless; and the mob threatened to burn his house.[ ] a kennebec paper doubted whether civil society could hang together much longer. there were few places in the region where it was safe for civil officers to execute the laws.[ a] troops and revenue vessels were despatched to the chief centres of disturbance; but, while occasional rencounters occurred, attended at times with bloodshed, and some captures of smuggled goods were effected, the weak arm of the government was practically powerless against universal connivance in the disaffected districts. smuggling still continued to a large extent, and was very profitable; while the determination of the smugglers assumed the character commonly styled desperate. such conditions, with a falling revenue, and an opposition strong in sectional support, confronted the supporters of the administration when congress again met in november. confident that embargo was an efficient coercive weapon, if relentlessly wielded, the president wished more searching enactments, and power for more extensive and vigorous enforcement. this congress proceeded to grant. additional revenue cutters were authorized; and after long debate was passed an act for the enforcement of the embargo, approved january , .[ ] the details of this law were derived from a letter[ ] addressed to a committee of congress by gallatin, the secretary of the treasury, upon whom the administration of the embargo system chiefly fell. the two principal difficulties so far encountered were the evasions of vessels bound coastwise, and departure without clearance. "the infractions thus practised threaten to prostrate the law and the government itself." even to take cargo on board should not be permitted, without authorization from the collector of the district. "the great number of vessels now laden and in a state of readiness to depart shows the necessity of this provision." it was therefore enacted that no vessel, coasting or registered, should load, without first having obtained permission from the custom-house, and given bond, in six times the value of the cargo, that she would not depart without a clearance, nor after clearing go to any foreign port, or transfer her lading to any other vessel. the loading was to be under the inspection of revenue officers. ships already loaded, when notice of the act was received, must unload or give bonds. further to insure compliance, vessels bound coastwise must, within two months after sailing, deposit with the collector at the port of clearance a certificate from the collector at the port of destination, that they had arrived there. if going to new orleans from the atlantic coast, four months were allowed for this formality. failing this, proof of total loss at sea would alone relieve the bond. "neither capture, distress, nor any other accident, shall be pleaded or given in evidence." collectors were empowered to take into custody specie and goods, whether on vessels or land vehicles, when there was reason to believe them intended for exportation; and authority was given to employ the army and navy, and the militia, for carrying out this and the other embargo legislation. a further provision of thirty armed vessels, to stop trade, was made by this congress; which otherwise, like its predecessors and successors, was perfectly faithful to the party tradition not to protect trade, or seek peace, by providing a navy. all this was sitting on the safety valve. however unflattering to national self-esteem it might be to see national legislation universally disregarded, the leakage of steam by evasion had made the tension bearable. the act also opened to a number of subaltern executive officers, of uncertain discretion, an opportunity for arbitrary and capricious action, to which the people of the united states were unaccustomed. already a justice of a circuit court had decided in opposition to instructions issued by the president himself. the new legislation was followed by an explosion of popular wrath and street demonstrations. these were most marked in the eastern states, where the opposition party and the shipping interest were strongest. feeling was the more bitter, because the revolt of spain, and the deliverance of portugal, had exempted those nations and their extensive colonies from the operation of the british orders in council, had paralyzed in many of their ports the edicts of napoleon, and so had extended widely the field safe for neutral commerce. it was evident also that, while the peninsula everywhere was the scene of war, it could not feed itself; nor could supplies for the population, or for the british armies there, come from england, often narrowly pressed herself for grain. cadiz was open on august ; all neutrals admitted, and the british blockade raised. through that portal and lisbon might flow a golden tide for american farmers and shipmen. the town meetings of new england again displayed the power for prompt political agitation which so impressed the imagination of jefferson. the governor of connecticut refused, on constitutional grounds, to comply with the president's request to detail officers of militia, to whom collectors could apply when needing assistance to enforce the laws. the attitude of the eastern people generally was that of mutiny; and it became evident that it could only be repressed by violence, and with danger to the union. congress was not prepared to run this risk. on february , less than a month after the enforcement act became law, its principal supporter in the senate[ ] introduced a resolution for the partial repeal of the embargo act. "this is not of my choice," he said, "nor is the step one by which i could wish that my responsibility should be tested. it is the offspring of conciliation, and of great concession on my part. on one point we are agreed,--resistance to foreign aggressions. the points of difficulty to be adjusted,--and compromised,--relate to the extent of that resistance and the mode of its application. in my judgment, if public sentiment could be brought to support them, wisdom would dictate the combined measures of embargo, non-intercourse, and war. sir, when the love of peace degenerates into fear of war, it becomes of all passions the most despicable." it was not the first time the word "war" had been spoken, but the occasion made it doubly significant and ominous; for it was the requiem of the measure upon which the dominant party had staked all to avoid war, and the elections had already declared that power should remain in the same hands for at least two years to come. within four weeks madison was to succeed his leader, jefferson; with a congressional majority, reduced indeed, but still adequate. the debate over the new measure, known as the non-intercourse act, was prolonged and heated, abounding in recriminations, ranging over the whole gamut of foreign injuries and domestic misdoings, whether by government policy or rebellious action; but clearer and clearer the demand for war was heard, through and above the din. "when the late intelligence from the northeast reached us," said an emotional follower of the administration,[ ] "it bore a character most distressful to every man who valued the integrity of the government. choosing not to enforce the law with the bayonet, i thought proper to acknowledge to the house that i was ready to abandon the embargo.... the excitement in the east renders it necessary that we should enforce it by the bayonet, or repeal. i will repeal, and could weep over it more than over a lost child." there was, he said, nothing now but war. "the very men who now set your laws at defiance," cried another, "will be against you if you go to war;" but he added, "i will never let go the embargo, unless on the very same day on which we let it go, we draw the sword."[ ] josiah quincy, an extremist on the other side, gave a definition of the position of massachusetts, which from his ability, and his known previous course on national questions, is particularly valuable. in the light of the past, and of what was then future, it may be considered to embody the most accurate summary of the views prevailing in new england, from the time of the "chesapeake" affair to the war. he "wished a negotiation to be opened, unshackled with the impedimenta which now exist. as long as they remained, people in the part of the country whence he came would not deem an unsuccessful attempt at negotiation cause for war. if they were removed, and an earnest attempt at negotiation made, unimpeded by these restrictions, and should not meet with success, they would join heartily in a war. they would not, however, go to war to contest the right of great britain to search american vessels for british seamen; for it was the general opinion with them that, if american seamen were encouraged, there would be no need for the employment of foreign seamen."[ ] quincy therefore condemned the retaliatory temper of the administration, as shown in the "chesapeake" incident by the proclamation excluding british ships of war, and in the embargo as a reply to the orders in council. the oppression of american trade, culminating in the orders, was a just cause of war; but war was not expedient before a further attempt at negotiation, favored by a withdrawal of all retaliatory acts. he was willing to concede the exercise of british authority on board american merchantmen on the high seas. in the main these were the coincident opinions of monroe, although a virginian and identified with the opposite party. at this time he wrote to jefferson privately, urging a special mission, for which he offered his services. "our affairs are evidently at a pause, and the next step to be taken, without an unexpected change, seems likely to be the commencement of war with both france and great britain, unless some expedient consistent with the honor of the government and country is adopted to prevent it." to jefferson's rejection of the proposition he replied: "i have not the hope you seem still to entertain that our differences with either power will be accommodated under existing arrangements. the embargo was not likely to accomplish the desired effect, if it did not produce it under the first impression.... without evidence of firm and strong union at home, nothing favorable to us can be expected abroad, and from the symptoms in the eastern states there is much cause to fear that tranquillity cannot be secured at present by adherence only to the measures which have heretofore been pursued."[ ] monroe had already[ ] expressed the opinion--not to jefferson, who had refused to ratify, but to a common intimate--that had the treaty of december , , signed by himself and pinkney, been accepted by the administration, none of the subsequent troubles with france and great britain would have ensued; that not till the failure of accommodation with great britain became known abroad was there placed upon the berlin decree that stricter interpretation which elicited the orders in council, whence in due sequence the embargo, the eastern commotions, and the present alarming outlook. in principle, quincy and monroe differed on the impressment question, but in practical adjustment there was no serious divergence. in other points they stood substantially together. under the combined influences indicated by the expressions quoted, congress receded rapidly from the extreme measures of domestic regulation embodied in the various embargo acts and culminating in that of january . the substitute adopted was pronouncedly of the character of foreign policy, and assumed distinctly and unequivocally the hostile form of retaliation upon the two countries under the decrees of which american commerce was suffering. it foreshadowed the general line of action followed by the approaching new administration, with whose views and purposes it doubtless coincided. passed in the house on february , , it was to go into effect may , after which date the ports of the united states were forbidden to the ships of war of both france and great britain, except in cases of distress, or of vessels bearing despatches. merchant vessels of the two countries were similarly excluded, with a provision for seizure, if entering. importation from any part of the dominions of those states was prohibited, as also that of any merchandise therein produced. under these conditions, and with these exceptions, the embargo was to stand repealed from march following; but american and other merchant vessels, sailing after the act went into operation, were to be under bonds not to proceed to any port of great britain or france, nor during absence to engage in any trade, direct or indirect, with such port. from the general character of these interdictions, stopping both navigation and commerce between the united states and the countries proscribed, this measure was commonly called the non-intercourse act. its stormy passage through the house was marked by a number of amendments and proposed substitutes, noticeable principally as indicative of the growth of warlike temper among southern members. there were embodied with the bill the administrative and police clauses necessary for its enforcement. finally, as a weapon of negotiation in the hands of the government, there was a provision, corresponding to one in the original embargo act, that in case either france or great britain should so modify its measures as to cease to violate the neutral commerce of the united states, the president was authorized to proclaim the fact, after which trade with that country might be renewed. in this shape the bill was returned to the senate, which concurred february . next day it became law, by the president's signature. the enforcement act and the non-intercourse act, taken together and in their rapid sequence, symbolize the death struggle between jefferson's ideal of peaceful commercial restriction, unmitigated and protracted, in the power of which he had absolute faith, and the views of those to whom it was simply a means of diplomatic pressure, temporary, and antecedent to war. napoleon himself was not more ruthless than jefferson in his desired application of commercial prohibition. not so his party, in its entirety. the leading provisions of the non-intercourse act, by partially opening the door and so facilitating abundant evasion, traversed jefferson's plan. it was antecedently notorious that their effect, as regarded great britain, would be to renew trade with her by means of intermediary ports. yet that they were features in the policy of the men about to become prominent under the coming administration was known to canning some time before the resolution was introduced by giles; before the enforcement act even could reach england. though hastened by the outburst in new england, the policy of the non-intercourse act was conceived before the collapse of jefferson's own measure was seen to be imminent. on january and canning, in informal conversations with pinkney, had expressed his satisfaction at proceedings in congress, recently become known, looking to the exclusion of french ships equally with british, and to the extension of non-importation legislation to france as well as great britain.[ ] he thought that such measures might open the way to a withdrawal of the orders in council, by enabling the british government to entertain the overture, made by pinkney august , under instructions, that the president would suspend the embargo, if the british government would repeal its orders. this he conceived could not be done, consistently with self-respect, so long as there was inequality of treatment. in these anticipations he was encouraged by representations concerning the attitude of madison and some intended members of his cabinet, made to him by erskine, the british minister in washington, who throughout seems to have cherished an ardent desire to reconcile differences which interfered with his just appreciation even of written words,--much more of spoken. in the interview of the d pinkney confined himself to saying everything "which i thought consistent with candor and discretion to confirm him in his dispositions." he suggested that the whole matter ought to be settled at washington, and "that it would be well (in case a special mission did not meet their approbation) that the necessary powers should be sent to mr. erskine."[ ] he added, "i offered my intervention for the purpose of guarding them against deficiencies in these powers."[ ] the remark is noteworthy, for it shows pinkney's sense that erskine's mere letter of credence as minister resident, not supplemented by full powers for the special transaction, was inadequate to a binding settlement of such important matters. in the sequel the american administration did not demand of erskine the production either of special powers or of the text of his instructions; a routine formality which would have forestalled the mortifying error into which it was betrayed by precipitancy, and which became the occasion of a breach with erskine's successor. the day after his interview with pinkney, canning sent erskine instructions,[ ] the starting-point of which was that the orders in council must be maintained, unless their object could be otherwise accomplished. assuming, as an indispensable preliminary to any negotiation, that equality of treatment between british and french ships and merchandise would have been established, he said he understood further from erskine's reports of conversations that the leading men in the new administration would be prepared to agree to three conditions: . that, contemporaneously with the withdrawal of the orders of january and november , there would be a removal of the restrictions upon british ships and merchandise, leaving in force those against french. . the claim, to carry on with enemies' colonies a trade not permitted in peace, would be abandoned for this war. . great britain should be at liberty to secure the operation of the non-intercourse measures, still in effect against france, by the action of the british navy, which should be authorized to capture american vessels seeking to enter ports forbidden them by the non-intercourse act. canning justly remarked that otherwise non-intercourse would be nugatory; there would be nothing to prevent americans from clearing for england or spain and going to holland or france. this was perfectly true. not only had a year's experience of the embargo so demonstrated, but a twelvemonth later[ ] gallatin had to admit that "the summary of destinations of these exports, being grounded on clearances, cannot be relied on under existing circumstances. thus, all the vessels actually destined for the dominions of great britain, which left the united states between april and june , , cleared for other ports; principally, it is believed, for sweden." nevertheless, the proposition that a foreign state should enforce national laws, because the united states herself could not, was saved from being an insult only by the belief, extracted by canning from erskine's report of conversations, that madison, or his associates, had committed themselves to such an arrangement. he added that pinkney "recently (but for the first time)" had expressed an opinion to the same effect. the british government would consent to withdraw the orders in council on the conditions cited; and for the purpose of obtaining a distinct and official recognition of them, canning authorized erskine to read his letter _in extenso_ to the american government. had this been done, as the three concessions were a _sine quâ non_, the misunderstanding on which the despatch was based would have been at once exposed; and while its assumptions and tone could scarcely have failed to give offence, there would have been saved the successive emotions of satisfaction and disappointment which swept over the united states, leaving bitterness worse than before. instead of communicating canning's letter, erskine, after ascertaining that the conditions would not be accepted, sent in a paraphrase of his own, dated april ,[ ] in which he made no mention of the three stipulations, but announced that, in consequence of the impartial attitude resulting from the non-intercourse act, his majesty would send a special envoy to conclude a treaty on all points of the relations between the two countries, and meanwhile would be willing to withdraw the orders of january and november , so far as affecting the united states, in the persuasion that the president would issue the proclamation restoring intercourse. this advance was welcomed, the assurance of revocation given, and the next day erskine wrote that he was "authorized to declare that the orders will have been withdrawn as respects the united states on the th day of june next." the same day, by apparent preconcertment, in accordance with canning's requirement that the two acts should be coincident, madison issued his proclamation, announcing the fact of the future withdrawal, and that trade between the united states and great britain might be renewed on june . erskine's proceeding was disavowed instantly by the british government, and himself recalled. a series of unpleasant explanations followed between him and the members of the american government,[ ] astonished by the interpretation placed upon their words, as shown in canning's despatch. canning also had to admit that he had strained erskine's words, in reaching his conclusions as to the willingness of madison and his advisers to allow the enforcement of the non-intercourse act by british cruisers;[ ] while pinkney entirely disclaimed intending any such opinion as canning imagined him to have expressed.[ ] the british secretary was further irritated by the tone of the american replies to erskine's notes; but he "forbore to trouble"[ ] pinkney with any comment upon them. that would be made through erskine's successor; an unhappy decision, as it proved. no explanation of the disavowal was given; but the instructions sent were read to pinkney by canning, and a letter followed saying that erskine's action had been in direct contradiction to them. things thus returned to the momentarily interrupted condition of american non-intercourse and british orders in council; the british government issuing a temporary order for the protection of american vessels which might have started for the ports of holland in reliance upon erskine's assurances. from america there had been numerous clearances for england; and it may be believed that there would have been many more if the transient nature of the opportunity had been foreseen. august , madison issued another proclamation, annulling the former. while erskine was conducting his side negotiation, the british government had largely modified the scope of the restrictions laid upon neutral trade. in consequence of the various events which had altered its relations with european states and their dependencies, the orders of november, , were revoked; and for them was substituted a new one, dated april , ,[ ] similar in principle but much curtailed in extent. only the coasts of france itself, of holland to its boundary, the river ems, and those of italy falling under napoleon's own dominion, from orbitello to pesaro, were thenceforth to be subject to "the same restrictions as if actually blockaded." further, no permission was given, as in the former orders, to communicate with the forbidden ports by first entering one of great britain, paying a transit duty, and obtaining a permit to proceed. in terms, prohibition was now unqualified; and although it was known that licenses for intercourse with interdicted harbors were freely issued, the overt offence of prescribing british channels to neutral navigation was avoided. within the area of restriction, "no trade save through england" was thus converted, in form, to no trade at all. this narrowing of the constructive blockade system, combined with the relaxations effected by the non-intercourse act, and with the food requirements of the spanish peninsula, did much to revive american commerce; which, however, did not again before the war regain the fair proportions of the years preceding the embargo. the discrepancy was most marked in the re-exportation of foreign tropical produce, sugar and coffee, a trade dependent wholly upon war conditions, and affecting chiefly the shipping interest engaged in carrying it. for this falling off there were several causes. after the continental system was more than ever remorselessly enforced, and it was to the continent almost wholly that americans had carried these articles. the spanish colonies were now open to british as well as american customers; and the last of the french west indies having passed into british possession, trade with them was denied to foreigners by the navigation act. in the value of the colonial produce re-exported from the united states was $ , , ; in , $ , , . the exports of domestic productions in the same years were: , $ , , ; in , $ , , . in connection with these figures, as significant of political conditions, it is interesting to note that of the latter sum $ , , went to spain and portugal, chiefly to supply demands created by war. so with tropical produce; out of the total of $ , , , $ , , went to the peninsula, and an equal amount to the baltic, that having become the centre of accumulation, from which subsequent distribution was made to the continent in elusion of the continental system. the increasing poverty of the continent, also, under napoleon's merciless suppression of foreign commerce, greatly lessened the purchasing power of the inhabitants. the great colonial trade had wasted under the combined action of british orders and french decrees, supplemented by changes in political relations. the remote extremities of the baltic lands and the spanish peninsula now alone sustained its drooping life. coincident with erskine's recall had been the appointment of his successor, mr. francis j. jackson, who took with him not only the usual credentials, but also full powers for concluding a treaty or convention.[ ] he departed for his post under the impulse of the emotions and comments excited by the manner and terms in which erskine's advances had been met, with which canning had forborne to trouble pinkney. upon his arrival in washington, disappointment was expressed that he had no authority to give any explanations of the reasons why his government had disavowed arrangements, entered into by erskine, concerning not only the withdrawal of the orders in council,--as touching the united states,--but also the reparation for the "chesapeake" business. this erskine had offered and concluded, coincidently with the revocation of the orders, though not in connection with it; but in both instances his action was disapproved by his government. after two verbal conferences, held within a week of jackson's arrival, the secretary of state, mr. robert smith, notified him on october that it was thought expedient, for the present occasion, that further communication on this matter should be in writing. there followed an exchange of letters, which in such circumstances passed necessarily under the eyes of president madison, who for the eight preceding years had held smith's present office. this correspondence[ ] presents an interesting exhibition of diplomatic fencing; but beyond the discussion, pro and con, of the matters in original and continuous dispute between the two countries, the issue turned upon the question whether the united states had received the explanation due to it,--in right and courtesy,--of the reasons for disavowing erskine's agreements. smith maintained it had not. jackson rejoined that sufficient explanation had been given by the terms of canning's letter of may to pinkney, announcing that erskine had been recalled because he had acted in direct contradiction to his instructions; an allegation sustained by reading to the american minister the instructions themselves. in advancing this argument, jackson stated also that canning's three conditions had been made known by erskine to the american government, which, in declining to admit them, had suggested substitutes finally accepted by erskine; so that the united states understood that the arrangement was reached on another basis than that laid down by canning. this assertion he drew from the expressions of erskine in a letter to canning, after the disavowal. smith replied that erskine, while not showing the despatch, had stated the three stipulations; that they had been rejected; and that the subsequent arrangement had been understood to be with a minister fully competent to recede from his first demand and to accept other conditions. distinctly he affirmed, that the united states government did not know, at any time during the discussion preceding the agreement, that erskine's powers were limited by the conditions in the text of his instructions, afterwards published. that he had no others, "is now for the first time made known to this government," by jackson's declaration. [illustration: james madison from the painting by gilbert stuart, in bowdoin college, brunswick, me.] jackson had come prepared to maintain, not only the british contention, but the note set by canning for british diplomatic correspondence. he was conscious too of opposing material force to argument, and had but recently been amid the scenes at copenhagen, which had illustrated nelson's maxim that a fleet of ships of the line were the best negotiators in europe. the position has its advantages, but also its dangers, when the field of warfare is that of words, not deeds; and in madison, who superintended the american case, he was unequally matched with an adversary whose natural dialectical ability had been tempered and sharpened in many campaigns. there is noticeable, too, on the american side, a labored effort at acuteness of discrimination, an adroitness to exaggerate shades of difference practically imperceptible, and an aptitude to give and take offence, not so evident under the preceding administration. these suggest irresistibly the absence, over madison the president, of a moderating hand, which had been held over madison the secretary of state. it may be due also to the fact that both the president and his cabinet were somewhat less indisposed to war than his predecessor had been. in his answer to smith jackson reiterated, what smith had admitted, that erskine had made known the three conditions. he added, "no stronger illustration of the deviation from them which occurred can be given than by a reference to the terms of the agreement." as an incidental comment, supporting the contention that erskine's departure from his sole authority was so decisive as to be a sufficient explanation for the disavowal of his procedure, the words were admissible; so much so as to invite the suspicion that the opponent, who had complained of the want of such explanation, felt the touch of the foil, and somewhat lost temper. whatever impression of an insinuation the phrase may have conveyed should have been wholly removed by the further expression, in close sequence, "you are already acquainted with the instruction given; and _i have had_[ ] the honor of informing you it was the only one." smith's knowledge that erskine's powers were limited to the one document is here attributed explicitly to jackson. the secretary (or president) saw fit not to recognize this, but took occasion to administer a severe rebuke, which doubtless the general tone of jackson's letter tended to provoke. "i abstain, sir, from making any particular animadversions on several irrelevant and improper allusions in your letter.... but it would be improper to conclude the few observations to which i purposely limit myself, without adverting to your repetition of a language implying a knowledge, on the part of this government, that the instructions of your predecessor did not authorize the arrangement formed by him. after the explicit and peremptory asseveration that this government had no such knowledge, and that with such a knowledge no such arrangement would have been entered into, the view which you have again presented of the subject makes it my duty to apprise you that such insinuations are inadmissible in the intercourse of a foreign minister with a government that understands what it owes to itself." whatever may be thought of the construction placed upon jackson's words by his opponent, this thrust should have made him look to his footing; but arrogance and temper carried the day, and laid him open to the fatal return which he received. by drawing attention to the qualifying phrase, he could have shown that he had been misunderstood, but he practically accepted the interpretation; for, instead of repelling it, he replied: "in my correspondence with you i have carefully avoided drawing conclusions that did not necessarily follow from the premises advanced by me, and least of all should i think of uttering an insinuation where i was unable to substantiate a fact. to facts, such as i have become acquainted with them, i have scrupulously adhered, and in so doing i must continue, whenever the good faith of his majesty's government is called in question," etc. to this outburst the reply was: "you have used language which cannot but be understood as reiterating, and even aggravating, the same gross insinuation. it only remains, in order to preclude opportunities which are thus abused, to inform you that no further communications will be received from you, and that the necessity for this determination will, without delay, be made known to your government." jackson thereupon quitted washington for new york, leaving a _chargé d'affaires_ for transacting current business. before leaving the city, however, jackson, through the channel of the _chargé_, made a statement to the secretary of state. in this he alleged that the facts which he considered it his duty to state, and to the assertion of which, as facts, exception was taken, and his dismissal attributed, were two. one was, that the three conditions had been submitted by mr. erskine to the secretary of state. this the secretary had admitted. "the other, namely: that that instruction is the only one, in which the conditions were prescribed to mr. erskine, for the conclusion of an arrangement on the matter to which it related, is known to mr. jackson by the instructions which he has himself received." this he had said in his second letter; if somewhat obscurely, still not so much so but that careful reading, and indisposition to take offence, could have detected his meaning, and afforded him the opportunity to be as explicit as in this final paper. if madison, who is understood to have given special supervision to this correspondence,[ ] meant the severe rebuke conveyed by his reply as a feint, to lead the british minister incautiously to expose himself to a punishment which his general bearing and that of his government deserved, he assuredly succeeded; yet it may be questioned who really came best out of the encounter. jackson had blundered in words; the american administration had needlessly intensified international bitterness. prepossession in reading, and proneness to angry misconception, must be inferred in the conduct of the american side of this discussion; for another notable and even graver instance occurs in the despatch[ ] communicating jackson's dismissal to pinkney, beyond whose notice it probably was not allowed to go. canning, in his third rejected condition, had written: great britain, for the purpose of securing _the operation of_ the embargo, and _of_ the bonâ fide intention of america to prevent her citizens from trading with france, and the powers adopting and acting under the french decrees, is to be considered as being at liberty to capture all such american vessels as shall be found attempting to trade with the ports of such powers;[ ] and he explained that, unless such permission was granted, "the raising of the embargo nominally as to great britain, would raise it, in fact, with respect to all the world," owing to the evident inability of the united states to enforce its orders beyond its own ports. in the passage quoted, both the explanatory comment and the syntax show that the object of this proposed concession was to secure _the operation_, the effectual working, of the _bonâ fide_ intention expressly conceded to the american government. the repetition of the preposition "of," before _bonâ fide_, secures this meaning beyond peradventure. nevertheless smith, in labored arraignment of the whole british course, wrote to pinkney as follows: in urging this concession, mr. canning has taken a ground forbidden by those principles of decorum which regulate and mark the proceedings of governments towards each other. in his despatch the condition is stated to be for the purpose of _securing the bonâ fide intention_ of america, to prevent her citizens from trading with france and certain other powers; in other words to secure a pledge to that effect against the _malâ fide_ intention of the united states. and this despatch too was authorized to be communicated _in extenso_ to the government, of which such language was used.[ ] being addressed only to pinkney, a man altogether too careful and shrewd not to detect the mistake, no occasion arose for this grave misstatement doing harm, or receiving correction. but, conjoined with the failure to note that jackson in his second letter had attributed to his own communication the american government's knowledge that erskine had no alternative instructions, the conclusion is irresistible that the president acted, perhaps unconsciously, under impulses foreign to the deliberate care which should precede and accompany so momentous an act as the refusal to communicate with an accredited foreign minister. it will be remembered that this action was taken on grounds avowedly independent of the reasonableness or justice of the british demands. it rested purely on the conduct of the minister himself. this incident powerfully furthered the alienation of the two nations, for the british government not only refused to disapprove jackson's conduct, but for nearly two years neglected to send a successor, thus establishing strained diplomatic relations. before finally leaving this unlucky business, it is due to a complete appreciation to mention that, in its very outset, at the beginning of erskine's well-meant but blundering attempt, the united states government had overpassed the limits of diplomatic civility. canning was a master of insolence; he could go to the utmost verge of insult and innuendo, without absolutely crossing the line which separates them from formal observance of propriety; but it cannot be said that the american correspondence in this instance was equally adroit. in replying to erskine's formal offer of reparation for the "chesapeake" affair, certain points essential to safeguarding the position of the united states were carefully and properly pointed out; then the reparation, as tended, was accepted. there the matter might have dropped; acceptance is acceptance; or, if necessary, failure of full satisfaction on the part of the united states might have been candidly stated, as due to itself. but the secretary[ ] proceeded to words--and mere words--reflecting on the british sovereign and government. "i have it in express charge from the president to state, that, while he forbears to insist upon the further punishment of the offending officer, he is not the less sensible of the justice and utility of such an example, nor the less persuaded that it would best comport with what is due from his britannic majesty to his own honor." to the writer nothing quite as bad as this occurs in jackson's letters, objectionable as they were in tone. with the opinion he agrees; the further employment of berkeley was indecent, nor was he a man for whom it could be claimed that he was indispensable; but it is one thing to hold an opinion, and another to utter it to the person concerned. had madison meant war, he might have spoken as he did, and fought; but to accept, and then to speak words barren of everything but useless insult, is intolerable. jackson very probably believed that the american government was lying when it said it did not know the facts as to erskine's instructions.[ ] it would be quite in character that he should; but he did not say so. there was put into his mouth a construction of his words which he heedlessly accepted. jackson's dismissal was notified to the british government through pinkney, on january , .[ ] some time before, a disagreement within the british cabinet had led to a duel between castlereagh and canning, in which the latter was severely wounded. he did not return to the foreign office, but was succeeded by the marquis wellesley, brother of the future duke of wellington. after presenting the view of the correspondence taken by his government, pinkney seems to betray a slight uneasiness as to the accuracy of the interpretation placed on jackson's words. "i willingly leave your lordship to judge whether mr. jackson's correspondence will bear any other construction than that it in fact received; and whether, supposing it to have been erroneously construed, his letter of the th of november should not have corrected the mistake, instead of confirming and establishing it." wellesley, with a certain indolent nonchalance, characteristic of his correspondence with pinkney, delayed to answer for two months, and then gave a reply as indifferent in manner as it was brief in terms. jackson had written, "there appears to have prevailed, throughout the whole of this transaction [erskine's], a fundamental mistake, which would suggest that his majesty had proposed to propitiate the government of the united states, to consent to the renewal of commercial intercourse; ... as if, in any arrangement, his majesty would condescend to barter objects of national policy and dignity for permission to trade with another country." the phrase was canning's, and summarized precisely the jealous attitude towards its own prestige characteristic of the british policy of the day. it also defined exactly the theory upon which the foreign policy of the united states had been directed for eight years by the party still in power. madison and jefferson had both placed just this construction upon erskine's tender. "the british cabinet must have changed its course under a full conviction that an adjustment with this country had become essential."[ ] "gallatin had a conversation with turreau at his residence near baltimore. he professes to be confident that his government will consider england broken down, by the examples she has given in repealing her orders."[ ] "by our unyielding adherence to principle great britain has been forced into revocation."[ ] canning and his associates intuitively divined this inference, which after all was obvious enough. the feeling increased their discontent with erskine, who had placed his country in the false light of receding under commercial pressure from america, and probably enough prepossessed them with the conviction that the american government could not but have realized that erskine was acting beyond his powers. wellesley, after his manner,--which was not canning's,--asserted equally the superiority of the british government to concession for the sake of such advantage. his majesty regretted the jackson episode, the more so that no opportunity had been given for him to interpose, which "was the usual course in such cases." mr. jackson had written positive assurances that it was not his purpose to give offence; to which the reply was apt, that in such matters it is not enough to intend, but to succeed in avoiding offence.[ ] "his majesty has not marked, with any expression of his displeasure, the conduct of mr. jackson, who does not appear, on this occasion, to have committed any intentional offence against the government of the united states." a _chargé_ would be appointed to carry on the ordinary intercourse, but no intention was expressed of sending another minister. persistence in this neglect soon became a further ground of bad feeling. by its own limitations the non-intercourse act was to expire at the end of the approaching spring session of the new congress, but it was renewed by that body to the end of the winter session. during the recess the jackson episode occurred, and was the first subject to engage attention on reassembling, november , . after prolonged discussion in the lower house,[ ] a joint resolution was passed approving the action of the executive, and pledging to him the support of the nation. despite a lucid exposition by josiah quincy, that the offence particularly attributed to the british minister was disproved by a reasonable attention to the construction of his sentences, the majority persisted in sustaining the party chief. that disposed of, the question of commercial restriction was again taken up. it was conceded on all sides that non-intercourse had failed, and precisely in the manner predicted. on the south, amelia island,--at the mouth of the st. mary's river, just outside the florida boundary,--and on the north halifax, and canada in general, had become ports of deposit for american products, whence they were conveyed in british ships to great britain and her dependencies, to which the act forbade american vessels to go. the effect was to give the carrying of american products to british shipping, in precise conformity with the astute provisions of the navigation acts. british markets were reached by a broken voyage, the long leg of which, from amelia and halifax to europe and elsewhere, was taken by british navigation. it was stated that there were at a given moment one hundred british vessels at amelia,[ ] the shores of which were encumbered with american goods awaiting such transportation. the freight from the american ports to amelia averaged a cent a pound, from amelia to england eight cents;[ ] the latter amount going to british pockets, the former to americans who were debarred from full transatlantic freight by the prohibitions of the non-intercourse act. the absence of competition necessarily raised the prices obtainable by the british shipper, and this, together with the additional cost of transshipment and delays, attendant upon a broken voyage, fell upon the american agriculturist, whose goods commanded just so much less at their place of origin. the measure was even ingeniously malaprop, considered from the point of view of its purpose towards great britain, whether retaliatory or coercive. upon france its effect was trivial, in any aspect. there was no french navigation, and the orders in council left little chance for american vessels to reach french ports. all agreed that the non-intercourse act must go; the difficulty was to find a substitute which should not confessedly abandon the whole system of commercial restrictions, idealized by the party in power, but from which it was being driven foot by foot. a first measure proposed was to institute a navigation act, borrowed in broad outline from that of great britain, but in operation applied only to that nation and france, in retaliation for their injurious edicts.[ ] open intercourse with the whole world should be restored; but british and french merchant ships, as well as vessels of war, should be excluded from american harbors. british and french products could be imported only in vessels owned wholly by american citizens; and after april , , could be introduced only by direct voyage from the place of origin. this was designed to prevent the continuance of trade by way of amelia or halifax. it was pointed out in debate, however, that french shipping practically did not exist, and that in the days of open trade, before the embargo, only about eight thousand tons of british shipping yearly entered american ports, whereas from three hundred thousand to four hundred thousand american tons visited great britain.[ ] should she, by a strict retaliation, resent this clumsy attempt at injuring her, the weight of the blow would fall on americans. american ships would be excluded from british ports; the carrying trade to amelia and halifax would be resumed, to the detriment of american vessels by a competition which otherwise would not exist, and british manufactures would be introduced by smuggling, to the grievous loss of the revenue, as had been notoriously and abundantly the case under the non-intercourse act. in truth, a purely commercial war with great britain was as injurious as a military war, and more hopeless. the bill consequently failed in the senate, though passed by the house. in its stead was adopted an act which repealed that of non-intercourse, but prescribed that in case either great britain or france, before march , , should so revoke or modify its edicts as that they should cease to violate the neutral commerce of the united states, the president should declare the fact by proclamation; and if the other nation should not, within three months from the date of such proclamation, in like manner so modify or revoke its edicts, there should revive against it those sections of the non-intercourse act which excluded its vessels from american ports, and forbade to american vessels importation from its ports, or of its goods from any part of the world whatsoever. the determination of the fact of revocation by either state was left to the sole judgment of the president, by whose approval the act became law may , .[ ] as great britain and france, by the orders in council and the berlin and milan decrees, were then engaged in a commercial warfare, in which the object of each was to exhaust its rival, the effect of this act was to tender the co-operation of the united states to whichever of them should embrace the offer. in terms, it was strictly impartial between the two. in fact, forasmuch as france could not prevent american intercourse with great britain, whereas great britain, in furtherance of her purposes, could and did prevent american trade with france, the latter had much more to gain; and particularly, if she should so word her revocation as to save her face, by not appearing the first to recede,--to show weakening,--as great britain had been made for the moment to seem by erskine's arrangement. should this ingenious diplomacy prove satisfactory to the president, yet fail so to convince great britain as to draw from her the recall of the orders in council, the united states, by the simple operation of the law itself, would become a party to the emperor's continental system, in its specific aim of reducing his opponent's strength. at this very moment napoleon was putting into effect against the united states one of those perverse and shameless interpretations of international relations, or actions, by which he not infrequently contrived to fill his pockets. the non-intercourse act, passed march , , had decreed forfeiture of any french or british ship, or goods, which should enter american waters after may , of the same year. the measure was duly communicated to the french government, and no remonstrance had been made against a municipal regulation, which gave ample antecedent warning. there the matter rested until march , , when the emperor, on the ground of the act, imposing these confiscations and forbidding american vessels to visit france, signed a retroactive decree that all vessels under the flag of the united states, which, since may , , had entered ports of his empire, colonies, or of the countries occupied by his arms, should be seized and sold. commissioners were sent to holland to enforce there this edict, known as the decree of rambouillet, which was not actually published till may .[ ] it took effect upon vessels which, during a twelvemonth previous, unwarned, had gone to france, or the other countries indicated. immediately before it was signed, the american minister, armstrong, had written to champagny, duke of cadore, the french minister of foreign affairs, "your excellency knows that there are not less than one hundred american ships within his majesty's possession, or that of his allies;" and he added that, from several sources of information, he felt warranted in believing that not a single french vessel had violated the non-intercourse law, and therefore none could have been seized.[ ] the law of may was duly communicated to the two states concerned, by the united states ministers there resident. great britain was informed that not only the orders in council, but the blockade of may, ,[ ] were included among the edicts affecting american commerce, the repeal of which was expected, as injurious to that commerce. france was told that this demand would be made upon her rival;[ ] but that it was also the purpose of the president not to give the law effect favorable to herself, by publishing a proclamation, if the late seizures of the property of citizens of the united states had been followed by absolute confiscation, and restoration were finally refused.[ ] this referred not to the rambouillet decree, as yet unknown in america, but to the previous seizures upon various pretexts, mentioned above by armstrong. ultimately this purpose was not adhered to; but the emperor was attentive to the president's intimation that "by putting in force, agreeably to the terms of this statute, the non-intercourse against great britain, the very species of resistance would be made which france has constantly been representing as most efficacious."[ ] thus, the co-operation of america to the continental system was no longer asked, but offered. the emperor did not wait even for information by the usual official channels. by some unexplained delay, armstrong's first knowledge was through a copy of the gazette of the united states containing the act, which he at once transmitted to champagny, who replied august , .[ ] his majesty wished that the acts of the united states government could be more promptly communicated; not till very lately had he heard of the non-intercourse,--a statement which armstrong promptly denied, referring champagny to the archives of his own department.[ ] in view of the act of may , the emperor's decision was announced in a paragraph of the same letter, in the following words: in this new state of things i am authorized to declare to you, sir, that the decrees of berlin and milan are revoked, and that after the first of november they will cease to have effect; it being understood that, in consequence of this declaration, the english shall revoke their orders in council, and renounce the new principles of blockade, which they have wished to establish; or that the united states, conformably to the act which you have just communicated, shall cause their rights to be respected by the english. definition is proverbially difficult; and over this superficially simple definition of circumstances and conditions, under which the decrees of berlin and milan stood revoked, arose a discussion concerning construction and meaning which resembled the wrangling of scholars over a corrupt text in an obscure classical author. clear-headed men became hopelessly involved, as they wrestled with each others' interpretations; and the most got no farther than sticking to their first opinions, probably reached in the majority of cases by sheer prepossession. the american ministers to france and great britain both accepted the words as a distinct, indisputable, revocation; and madison followed suit. these hasty conclusions are not very surprising; for there was personal triumph, dear to diplomatists as to other men, in seeing the repeal of the decrees, or of the orders, result from their efforts. it has been seen how much this factor entered into the feelings of madison and jefferson in the erskine business, and to armstrong the present turn was especially grateful, as he was about quitting his mission after several years buffeting against wind and tide. his sun seemed after all about to set in glory. he wrote to pinkney, "i have the honor to inform you that his majesty, the emperor and king, has been pleased to revoke his decrees of berlin and milan."[ ] pinkney, to whom the recall of the british orders offered the like laurels, was equally emphatic in his communication to wellesley; adding, "i take for granted that the revocation of the british orders in council of january and november, , april, , and all other orders dependent upon, or analogous, or in execution of them, will follow of course."[ ] the british government demurred to the interpretation; but madison accepted it, and on november proclaimed it as a fact. in consequence, by the terms of the act, non-intercourse would revive against great britain on february , . when congress met, distrust on one side and assertion on the other gave rise to prolonged and acute discussion. napoleon had surprised people so often, that no wonder need be felt at those who thought his words might bear a double meaning. the late president, who did not lack sagacity, had once written to his successor, "bonaparte's policy is so crooked that it eludes conjecture. i fear his first object now is to dry up the sources of british prosperity, by excluding her manufactures from the continent. he may fear that opening the ports of europe to our vessels will open them to an inundation of british wares."[ ] this was exactly bonaparte's dilemma, and suggested the point of view from which his every action ought to be scrutinized. then there was the recent deception with erskine, which, if it increased the doubts of some concerning the soundness of madison's judgment, made it the more incumbent on others to show that on this occasion at least he had not been precipitate. certainly, as regards the competency of the foreign official in either case, there was no comparison. a simple minister resident should produce particular powers or definite instructions, to guarantee his authority for concluding so important a modification of national policy as was accepted from erskine; but by common usage the minister of foreign affairs, at a national capital, is understood to speak for the chief executive. the statement of champagny, at paris, that he was "authorized" to make a specific declaration, could be accepted as the voice of napoleon himself. the only question was, what did the voice signify? in truth, explicit as champagny's words sound, napoleon's memoranda,[ ] on which they were based, show a deliberate purpose to avoid a formal revocation, for reasons analogous to those suggested by jefferson. throughout he used "_rapporter_" instead of "_révoquer_." in the particular connection, the words are nearly synonymous; yet to the latter attaches a natural fitness and emphasis, the avoidance of which betrays the bias, perhaps unconscious, towards seeking escape from self-committal on the matter in hand. his phrases are more definite. july he wrote, "after much reflection upon american affairs, i have decided that to withdraw (_rapporter_) my decrees of berlin and milan would conduce to nothing (_n'aurait aucun effet_); that it is better you should address a note to mr. armstrong, in which you will acquaint him that you have placed before me the details contained in the american gazette, ... and since he assures us it may be regarded as official, he may depend (_compter_) that my decrees of berlin and milan will not receive execution (_n'auront aucun effet_) dating from november ; and that he should consider them as withdrawn (_rapportés_) in consequence of the act of the american congress; provided," etc. "this," he concludes, "seems to me more suitable than a decree, which would cause disturbance and would not fulfil my aim. this method seems to me more conformable to my dignity and to the serious character of the business." the decrees, as touching the united states alone, were to be quietly withdrawn from action, but not formally revoked. they were to be dormant, yet potential. as convenience might dictate, it would be open to say that they were revoked [in effect], or not revoked [in form]. the one might, and did, satisfy the united states; the other might not, and did not, content great britain, against whom exclusion from the continent remained in force. the two english-speaking peoples were set by the ears. august the emperor made a draft of the note to be sent to armstrong. this champagny copied almost verbatim in the declaration quoted; substituting, however, "_révoquer_" for "_rapporter_." it would be intolerable to attempt to drag readers through the mazes of analysis, and of comparison with other papers, by which the parties to the discussion, ignorant of the above memoranda, sought to establish their respective views. one thing, however, should have been patent to all,--that, with a man so subtle and adroit as napoleon, any step in apparent reversal of a decided and cherished policy should have been complete and unequivocal, both in form and in terms. the berlin decree was put forth with the utmost formality with which majesty and power could invest it; the asserted revocation, if apparently explicit, was simply a paragraph in ordinary diplomatic correspondence, stating that revocation had taken place. if so, where was it? an act which undoes another, particularly if an injury, must correspond fully in form to that which it claims to undo. a private insult may receive private apology; but no private expression can atone for public insult or public wrong. in the appreciation of mr. madison, in , so grave an outrage as that of the "chesapeake" called for a special envoy, to give adequate dignity to the proffered reparation. yet his followers now would have form to be indifferent to substantial effect. champagny's letter, it is true, was published in the official paper; but, besides being in form merely a diplomatic letter, it bore the signature of champagny, whereas the decree bore that of napoleon. the decree of rambouillet, then less than six months old, was clothed with the like sanction. even pinkney, usually so clear-headed, and in utterance incisive, suffered himself here to be misled. does england find inadequate the "manner" of the french revocation? he asked. "it is precisely that in which the orders of its own government, establishing, modifying, or removing blockades, are usually proclaimed." but the decree of berlin was no mere proclamation of a blockade. it had been proclaimed, in the emperor's own name, a fundamental law of the empire, until england had abandoned certain lines of action. this was policy against policy, to which the blockade was incidental as a method. english blockades were announced and withdrawn under identical forms of circular letter; but when an order in council, as that of november, , was modified, as in april, , it was done by an order in council, not by a diplomatic letter. in short, champagny's utterance was the declaration of a fact; but where was the fact itself? great britain therefore refused to recognize the letter as a revocation, and could not be persuaded that it was by the opinion of the american authorities. nor was the form alone inadequate; the terms were ambiguous, and lent themselves to a construction which would deprive her of all benefit from the alleged revocation. she had to look to her own battle, which reached its utmost intensity in this year . except the helpless spanish and portuguese insurgents, she had not an open friend in europe; while napoleon, freed from all opponents by the overthrow of austria in , had organized against great britain and her feeble allies the most gigantic display of force made in the peninsula since his own personal departure thence, nearly two years before. the united states had plain sailing; so far as the letter went, the decrees were revoked, conditional on her executing the law of may . but great britain must renounce the "new" principles of blockade. what were these principles, pronounced new by the decree? they were, that unfortified ports, commercial harbors, might be blockaded, as the united states a half century later strangled the southern confederacy. such blockades were lawful then and long before. to yield this position would be to abandon rights upon which depended the political value of great britain's maritime supremacy; yet unless she did so the berlin decree remained in force against her. the decree was universal in application, not limited to the united states commerce, towards which champagny's letter undertook to relax it; and british commerce would remain excluded from neutral continental ports unless great britain not only withdrew the orders in council, but relinquished prescriptive rights upon which, in war, depended her position in the world. in declining to repeal, great britain referred to her past record in proof of consistency. in the first communication of the orders in council, february , ,[ ] erskine had written, "i am commanded by his majesty especially to represent to the government of the united states the earnest desire of his majesty to see the commerce _of the world_ restored once more to that freedom which is necessary for its prosperity, and his readiness to abandon the system which has been forced upon him, _whenever the enemy shall retract the principles_ which have rendered it necessary." the british envoy in these sentences reproduced _verbatim_ the instructions he had received,[ ] and the words italicized bar expressly the subsequent contention of the united states, that revocation by one party as to one nation, irrespective of the rest _of the world_, and that in practice only, not in principle, entitled the nation so favored to revocation by the other party. they exclude therefore, by all the formality of written words at a momentous instant, the singular assertion of the american government, in , that great britain had pledged herself to proceed "_pari passu_"[ ] with france in the revocation of their respective acts. as far as can be ascertained, the origin of this confident assumption is to be found in letters of february and , ,[ ] from madison, then secretary of state, to armstrong and pinkney. in these he says that erskine, in communicating the orders,[ ] expressed his majesty's regrets, and "assurances that his majesty would readily follow the example, in case the berlin decree should be rescinded, or would proceed _pari passu_ with france in relaxing the rigor of their measures." by whichever of the colloquists the expression was used, the contrast between this report of an interview and the official letter quoted sufficiently shows the snare latent in conversations, and the superior necessity of relying upon written communications, to which informal talk only smooths the way. on the very day of madison's writing to armstrong, february , the advocate general, who may be presumed to have understood the purposes of the government, was repudiating such a construction in the house of commons. "even let it be granted that there had been a public assurance to america that she alone was to be excepted from the influence of the berlin decree, would that have been a sufficient ground for us not to look further to our own interest? what! because france chooses to exempt america from her injurious decrees, are we to consent to their continuance?"[ ] where such a contradiction exists, to assert a pledge from a government, and that two years after erskine's singular performance of , which led to his recall, is a curious example of the capacity of the american administration, under madison's guidance, for putting words into an opponent's mouth. in the present juncture, wellesley replied[ ] to pinkney's claim for the revocation of the orders in council by quoting, and repeating, the assurance of erskine's letter of february , , given above. yet, unless the orders in council were repealed, napoleon's concessions would not go far to relieve the united states. the vessels he would admit would be but the gleanings, after british cruisers had reaped the ocean field. pinkney, therefore, had to be importunate in presenting the demands of his government. wellesley persisted in his method of procrastination. at last, on december , he wrote briefly to say that after careful inquiry he could find no authentic intelligence of the repeal, nor of the restoration of the commerce of neutral nations to its previous conditions. he invited, however, a fresh statement from pinkney, who then, in a letter dated december ,[ ] argued the case at length, under the three heads of the manner, or form, the terms, and the practical effect of the alleged repeal. having completed the argument, he took incidental occasion to present the views of the united states concerning the whole system of the orders in council; animadverting severely, and emphasizing with liberal italics. the orders went far beyond any intelligible standard of _retaliation_; but it soon appeared that neutrals might be permitted to traffic, if they would submit with a dependence _truly colonial_ to carry on their trade through british ports, to pay such duties as the british government might impose, and such charges as british agents might make. the modification of april , , was one of appearance only. true, neutrals were no longer compelled to enter british ports; their prohibition from interdicted ports was nominally absolute; but it was known that by coming to great britain they could obtain a license to enter them, so that the effect was the same; and by forged papers this license system was so extended "that the commerce of _england_ could advantageously find its way to those ports."[ ] wellesley delayed reply till december .[ ] he regretted the intrusion of these closing remarks, which might tend to interfere with a conciliatory spirit, but without further comment on them addressed himself to the main question. his government did not find the "notification" of the repeal of the french decrees such as would justify it in recalling the orders in council. the united states having demanded the formal revocation of the blockade of may, , as well as of the orders in council, he "must conclude, combining your requisition with that of the french minister, that america demands the revocation of that order of blockade, as a practical instance of our renunciation of those principles of blockade which are condemned by the french government." this inference seems overstrained; but certainly much greater substantial concession was required of great britain than of france. wellesley intimated that this concert of action was partial--not neutral--between the two belligerents. "i trust that the justice of the american government will not consider that france, by the repeal of her obnoxious decrees, _under such a condition_,[ ] has placed the question in that state which can warrant america in enforcing the non-intercourse act against great britain, and not against france." he reminded pinkney of the situation in which the commerce of neutral nations had been placed by many recent acts of the french government; and said that its system of violence and injustice required some precautions of defence on the part of great britain. in conclusion, his majesty stood ready to repeal, when the french decrees should be repealed without conditions injurious to the maritime rights and honor of the united kingdom. unhappily for pinkney's argument on the actuality of napoleon's repeal, on the very day of his own writing, december , the american _chargé_[ ] in paris, jonathan russell, was sending champagny a remonstrance[ ] upon the seizure of an american vessel at bordeaux, under the decrees of berlin and milan, on december ,--a month after their asserted repeal. that the director of customs at a principal seaport should understand them to be in force, nearly four months after the publication of champagny's letter in the "moniteur," would certainly seem to imply some defect in customary form;[ ] and the ensuing measures of the government would indicate also something misleading in the terms. russell told champagny that, since november , the alleged day of repeal, this was the first case to which the berlin and milan decrees could apply; and lo! to it they were applied. yet, "to execute the act of congress against the english requires the previous revocation of the decrees." it was, indeed, ingeniously argued in congress, by an able advocate of the administration, that all the law required was the revocation in terms of the decrees; their subsequent enforcement in act was immaterial.[ ] such a solution, however, would scarcely content the american people. the french government now took a step which clearly showed that the decrees were still in force, technically, however honest its purpose to hold to the revocation, if the united states complied with the conditions. instructions to the council of prizes,[ ] from the proper minister, directed that the vessel, and any others falling under the same category of entry after november , should "remain suspended" until after february , the period at which the united states should have fulfilled its obligation. then they should be restored. the general trend of argument, pro and con, with the subsequent events, probably shook the confidence of the administration, and of its supporters in congress, in the certainty of the revocation, which the president had authenticated by his proclamation. were the fact unimpeachable, the law was clear; non-intercourse with great britain would go into effect february , without further action. but the doubts started were so plausible that it was certain any condemnation or enforcement under the law would be carried up to the highest court, to test whether the fact of revocation, upon which the operativeness of the statute turned, was legally established. even should the court decline to review the act of the executive, and accept the proclamation as sufficient evidence for its own decision, such feeble indorsement would be mortifying. a supplementary act was therefore framed, doing away with the original, and then reviving it, as a new measure, against great britain alone. in presenting this, the member charged with its introduction said: "the committee thought proper that in this case the legislature should step forward and decide; that it was not consistent with the responsibility they owed the community to turn over to judicial tribunals the decision of the question, whether the non-intercourse was in force or not."[ ] the matter was thus taken from the purview of the courts, and decided by a party vote. after an exhausting discussion, this bill passed at a.m., february , . it was approved by the president, march . for the settlement of american litigation this course was adequate; not so for the vindication of international procedure. the united states at this time had abundant justification for war with both france and great britain, and it was within the righteous decision of her own policy whether she should declare against either or both; but it is a serious impeachment of a government's capacity and manfulness when, with such questions as impressment, the orders in council, napoleon's decrees, and his arbitrary sequestrations, war comes not from a bold grappling with difficulties, but from a series of huckstering attempts to buy off one antagonist or the other, with the result of being fairly overreached. the outcome, summarily stated, had been that a finesse of the french government had attached the united states to napoleon's continental system. she was henceforth, in effect, allied with the leading feature of french policy hostile to great britain. it was perfectly competent and proper for her so to attach herself, if she saw fit. the orders in council were a national wrong to her, justifying retaliation and war; still more so was impressment. but it is humiliating to see one's country finally committed to such a step through being outwitted in a paltry bargain, and the justification of her course rested, not upon a firm assertion of right, but upon the refusal of another nation to accept a manifestly unequal proposition. the course of great britain was high-handed, unjust, and not always straightforward; but it was candor itself alongside of napoleon's. there remained but one step to complete the formal breach; and that, if the writer's analysis has been correct, resulted as directly as did the final non-intercourse act from action erroneously taken by mr. madison's administration. jackson's place, vacated in november, , by the refusal to communicate further with him, remained still unfilled. this delay was thought deliberate by the united states government, which on may wrote to pinkney that it seemed to manifest indifference to the character of the diplomatic intercourse between the two countries, arising from dissatisfaction at the step necessarily taken with regard to mr. jackson. should this inference from wellesley's inaction prove correct, pinkney was directed to return to the united states, leaving the office with a _chargé d'affaires_, for whom a blank appointment was sent. he was, however, to exercise his own judgment as to the time and manner. in consequence of his interview with wellesley, and in reply to a formal note of inquiry, he received a private letter, july , , saying it was difficult to enter upon the subject in an official form, but that it was the secretary's intention immediately to recommend a successor to jackson. still the matter dragged, and at the end of the year no appointment had been made. in other ways, too, there was unexplained delay. in april pinkney had received powers to resume the frustrated negotiations committed first to him and monroe. wellesley had welcomed the advance, and had accepted an order of discussion which gave priority to satisfaction for the "chesapeake" affair. after that an arrangement for the revocation of the orders in council should be attempted. on june pinkney wrote home that a verbal agreement conformable to his instructions had been reached concerning the "chesapeake," and that he was daily expecting a written overture embodying the terms. august this had not been received,--to his great surprise, for wellesley's manner had shown every disposition to accommodate. upon this situation supervened cadore's declaration of the revocation of the french decrees, pinkney's acceptance of the fact as indisputable, and his urgency to obtain from the british government a corresponding measure in the repeal of the orders. through all ran the same procrastination, issuing in entire inaction. pinkney's correspondence shows a man diplomatically self-controlled and patient, though keenly sensible to the indignity of unwarrantable delays. the rough speaking of his mind concerning the orders in council, in his letter of december , suggests no loss of temper, but a deliberate letting himself go. there appeared to him now no necessity for further endurance. to wellesley's rejoinder of december he sent an answer on january , , "written," he said, "under the pressure of indisposition, and the influence of more indignation than could well be suppressed."[ ] the questions at issue were again trenchantly discussed, but therewith he brought to an end his functions as minister of the united states. under the same date, but by separate letter, he wrote that as no steps had been taken to replace jackson by an envoy of equal rank, his instructions imposed on him the duty of informing his lordship that the government of the united states could not continue to be represented in england by a minister plenipotentiary. owing to the insanity of the king, and the delays incident to the institution of a regency, his audience of leave was delayed to february ; and it is a noticeable coincidence that the day of this formal diplomatic act was also that upon which the non-intercourse bill against great britain passed the house of representatives. in the course of the spring pinkney embarked in the frigate "essex" for the united states. he had no successor until after the war of , and the non-intercourse act remained in vigor to the day of hostilities. on february , a month after pinkney's notification of his intended departure, wellesley wrote him that the prince regent, whose authority as such dated only from february , had appointed mr. augustus j. foster minister at washington. the delay had been caused in the first instance, "as i stated to you repeatedly," by the wish to make an appointment satisfactory to the united states, and afterwards by the state of his majesty's government; the regal function having been in abeyance until the king's incapacity was remedied by the institution of the regent. wellesley suggested the possibility of pinkney reconsidering his decision, the ground for which was thus removed; but the minister demurred. he replied that he inferred, from wellesley's letter, that the british government by this appointment signified its intention of conceding the demands of the united states; that the orders in council and blockade of may, , would be annulled; without this a beneficial effect was not to be expected. wellesley replied that no change of system was intended unless france revoked her decrees. the effect of this correspondence, therefore, was simply to place pinkney's departure upon the same ground as the new non-intercourse act against great britain. mr. augustus john foster was still a very young man, just thirty-one. he had but recently returned from the position of minister to sweden, the duties of which he had discharged[ ] during a year very critical for the fortunes of that country, and in the event for napoleon and europe. upon his new mission wellesley gave him a long letter of instructions,[ ] in which he dealt elaborately with the whole course of events connected with the orders in council and bonaparte's decree, especially as connected with america. in this occurs a concise and lucid summary of the british policy, which is worth quoting. "from this view of the origin of the orders in council, you will perceive that the object of our system was not to crush the trade of the continent, but to counteract an attempt to crush british trade; that we have endeavored to permit the continent to receive as large a portion of commerce as might be practicable through great britain, and that all our subsequent regulations, and every modification of the system, by new orders, or modes of granting or withholding licenses, have been calculated for _the purpose of encouraging the trade of neutrals through great britain_,[ ] whenever such encouragement might appear advantageous to the general interests of commerce and consistent with the public safety of the nation,--the preservation of which is the primary object of all national councils, and the paramount duty of the executive power." in brief, the plea was that bonaparte by armed constraint had forced the continent into a league to destroy great britain through her trade; that there was cause to fear these measures would succeed, if not counteracted; that retaliation by similar measures was therefore demanded by the safety of the state; and that the method adopted was retaliation, so modified as to produce the least possible evil to others concerned. it was admitted and deplored that prohibition of direct trade with the ports of the league injuriously affected the united states. that this was illegal, judged by the law of nations, was also admitted; but it was justified by the natural right of retaliation. wellesley scouted the view, pertinaciously urged by the american government, that the exclusion of british commerce from neutral continental ports by the continental system was a mere municipal regulation, which the united states could not resist. municipal regulation was merely the cloak, beneath which france concealed her military coercion of states helpless against her policy. "the pretext of municipal right, under which the violence of the enemy is now exercised against neutral commerce in every part of the continent, will not be admitted by great britain; nor can we ever deem the repeal of the french decrees to be effectual, until neutral commerce shall be restored to the conditions in which it stood, previously to the commencement of the french system of commercial warfare, as promulgated in the decrees." foster's mission was to urge these arguments, and to induce the repeal of the non-intercourse law against great britain, as partial between the two belligerents; who, if offenders against accepted law, were in that offenders equally. the united states was urged not thus to join napoleon's league against great britain, from which indeed, if so supported, the direst distress must arise. it is needless to pursue the correspondence which ensued with monroe, now secretary of state. by madison's proclamation, and the passage of the non-intercourse act of march , , the american government was irretrievably committed to the contention that france had so revoked her decrees as to constitute an obligation upon great britain and upon the united states. to admit mistake, even to one's self, in so important a step, probably passes diplomatic candor, and especially after the blunder in erskine's case. yet, even admitting the adequacy of champagny's letter, the decrees were not revoked; seizures were still made under them. in november, , monroe had to write to barlow, now american minister to france, "it is not sufficient that it should appear that the french decrees are repealed, in the _final decision_ of a cause brought _before a french tribunal_. an active prohibitory policy should be adopted _to prevent seizures_ on the principle."[ ] this was in the midst of his correspondence with foster. the two disputants threshed over and over again the particulars of the controversy, but nothing new was adduced by either.[ ] conditions were hopeless, and war assured, even when foster arrived in washington, in june, . one thing, however, was finally settled. in behalf of his government, in reparation for the "chesapeake" affair, foster repeated the previous disavowal of berkeley's action, and his consequent recall; and offered to restore to the ship herself the survivors of the men taken from her. pecuniary provision for those who had suffered in the action, or for their families, was also tendered. the propositions were accepted, while denying the adequacy of berkeley's removal from one command to another. the men were brought to boston harbor, and there formally given up to the "chesapeake." tardy and insufficient as was this atonement, it was further delayed, at the very moment of tendering, by an incident which may be said to have derived directly from the original injury. in june, , a squadron of frigates and sloops had been constituted under commodore john rodgers, to patrol the coast from the capes of the chesapeake northward to the eastern limit of the united states. its orders, generally, were to defend from molestation by a foreign armed ship all vessels of the united states within the marine league, seaward, to which neutral jurisdiction was conceded by international law. force was to be used, if necessary, and, if the offender were a privateer, or piratical, she was to be sent in. so weak and unready was the nominal naval force of the united states, that piracy near her very shores was apprehended; and concern was expressed in congress regarding vessels from santo domingo, thus converted into a kind of local barbary power. to these general instructions the secretary of the navy attached a special reminder. recalling the "chesapeake" affair, as a merely exaggerated instance of the contumely everywhere heaped upon the american flag by both belligerents, he wrote: "what has been perpetrated may be again attempted. it is therefore our duty to be prepared and determined at every hazard to vindicate the injured honor of our navy, and revive the drooping spirit of the nation. it is expected that, while you conduct the force under your command consistently with the principles of a strict and upright neutrality, you are to maintain and support at every risk and cost the dignity of our flag; and that, offering yourself no unjust aggression, you are to submit to none, not even a menace or threat from a force not materially your superior." under such reminiscences and such words, the ships' guns were like to go off of themselves. it requires small imagination to picture the feelings of naval officers in the years after the "chesapeake's" dishonor. in transmitting the orders to his captains, rodgers added, "every man, woman, and child, in our country, will be active in consigning our names to disgrace, and even the very vessels composing our little navy to the ravages of the worms, or the detestable transmigration to merchantmen, should we not fulfil their expectations. i should consider the firing of a shot by a vessel of war, of either nation, and particularly england, at one of our public vessels, whilst the colors of her nation are flying on board of her, as a menace of the grossest order, and in amount an insult which it would be disgraceful not to resent by the return of two shot at least; while should the shot strike, it ought to be considered an act of hostility meriting chastisement to the utmost extent of all your force."[ ] the secretary indorsed approval upon the copy of this order forwarded to him. rodgers' apprehension for the fate of the navy reflected accurately the hostile views of leaders in the dominant political party. demoralized by the gunboat system, and disorganized and browbeaten by the loud-mouthed disfavor of representative congressmen, the extinction of the service was not unnaturally expected. bainbridge, a captain of standing and merit, applied at this time for a furlough to make a commercial voyage to china, owing to straitened means. "i have hitherto refused such offers, on the presumption that my country would require my services. that presumption is removed, and even doubts entertained of the permanency of our naval establishment."[ ] the following year, , rodgers' squadron and orders were continued. the british admirals of adjacent stations, acting doubtless under orders from home, enjoined great caution upon their ships of war in approaching the american coast.[ ] while set not to relax the orders in council, the ministry did not wish war by gratuitous offence. cruising, however, continued, though charged with possibilities of explosion. under these circumstances rodgers' ship, the "president" frigate, and a british sloop of war, the "little belt," sighted each other on may , , fifty miles east of cape henry. independent of the general disposition of ships of war in troublous times to overhaul and ascertain the business of any doubtful sail, rodgers' orders prescribed the capture of vessels of certain character, even outside the three-mile limit; and, the "little belt" making sail from him, he pursued. about p.m., it being then full dark, the character and force of the chase were still uncertain, and the vessels within range. the two accounts of what followed differ diametrically; but the british official version[ ] is less exhaustive in matter and manner than the american, which rests upon the sworn testimony of numerous competent witnesses before a formal court of inquiry.[ ] by this it was found proved that the "little belt" fired the first gun, which by rodgers' statement cut away a backstay and went into the mainmast. the batteries of both ships opened, and an engagement followed, lasting twelve or fifteen minutes, during which the "little belt," hopelessly inferior in force, was badly cut up, losing nine killed and twenty-three wounded. deplorable as was this result, and whatever unreconciled doubts may be entertained by others than americans as to the blame, there can be no question that the affair was an accident, unpremeditated. it was clearly in evidence that rodgers had cautioned his officers against any firing prior to orders. there was nothing of the deliberate purpose characterizing the "chesapeake" affair; yet mr. foster, with the chariness which from first to last marked the british handling of that business, withheld the reparation authorized by his instructions until he had received a copy of the proceedings of the court. on july , , the president summoned congress to meet november , a month before the usual time, in consequence of the state of foreign affairs. his message spoke of ominous indications; of the inflexible hostility evidenced by great britain in trampling upon rights which no independent nation can relinquish; and recommended legislation for increasing the military force. as regarded the navy, his words were indefinite and vague, beyond suggesting the expediency of purchasing materials for ship-building. the debates and action of congress reflected the tone of the executive. war was anticipated as a matter of course, and mentioned freely in speeches. that the regular army should be enlarged, and dispositions made for more effective use of the militia, was granted; the only dispute being about the amount of development. in this the legislature exceeded the president's wishes, which were understood, though not expressed in the message. previous congresses had authorized an army of ten thousand, of which not more than five thousand were then in the ranks. it was voted to complete this; to add twenty-five thousand more regulars, and to provide for fifty thousand volunteers. doubts, based upon past experience, and which proved well founded, were expressed as to the possibility of raising so many regular troops, pledged for five years to submit to the restrictions of military life. it was urged that, in the economical conditions of the country, the class did not exist from which such a force could be recruited. this consideration did not apply to the navy. seamen could be had abundantly from the merchant shipping, the activities of which must necessarily be much curtailed by war with a great naval power. nevertheless, the dominance of jefferson, though in this particular already shaken, remained upon the mass of his party. the new secretary of the navy was from south carolina, not reckoned among the commercial states; but, however influenced, he ventured to intimate doubts as to the gunboat system. of one thing there was no doubt. on a gunboat a gun cost twelve thousand dollars a year; the same on a frigate cost but four thousand.[ ] in the house of representatives, the strongest support to the development of the navy as a permanent force came from the secretary's state, backed by henry clay from kentucky, and by the commercial states; the leading representative of which, josiah quincy, expressed, however, a certain diffidence, because in the embittered politics of the day the mere fact of federalist support tended rather to damage the cause. so much of the president's message as related to the navy--three lines, wholly non-committal--was referred to a special committee. the report[ ] was made by langdon cheves of south carolina, whose clear and cogent exposition of the capabilities of the country and the possibility of providing a force efficient against great britain, under her existing embarrassments, was supported powerfully and perspicuously by william lowndes of the same state. the text for their remarks was supplied by a sentence in the committee's report: "the important engine of national strength and national security, which is formed by a naval force, has hitherto been treated with a neglect highly impolitic, or supported by a spirit so languid, as, while it has preserved the existence of the establishment, has had the effect of loading it with the imputations of wasteful expense, and comparative inefficiency.... such a course is impolitic under any circumstances." this was the condemnation of the party's past. clay found his delight in dealing with some of the oratory, which on the present occasion still sustained--and for the moment successfully sustained--the prepossessions of jefferson. carthage, rome, venice, genoa, were republics with free institutions and great navies; carthage, rome, venice, and genoa had lost their liberties, and their national existence. clearly navies, besides being very costly, were fatal to constitutional freedom. not in reply to such _non sequitur_, but quickened by an insight which was to receive earlier vindication than he could have anticipated, quincy prophesied that, amid the diverse and contrary interests of the several states, which the lack of a common object of affection left still imperfectly unified in sentiment, a glorious navy, identified with the whole country because of its external action, yet local to no part, would supply a common centre for the enthusiasm not yet inspired by the central government, too closely associated for years back with a particular school of extreme political thought, narrowly territorial and clannish in its origin and manifestation. within a twelvemonth, the "constitution," most happily apt of all names ever given to a ship, became the embodiment of this verified prediction. the report of the committee was modest in its scope. "to the defence of your ports and harbors, and the protection of your coasting trade, should be confined the present objects and operations of any navy which the united states can, or ought, to have." to this office it was estimated that twelve ships of the line and twenty frigates would suffice. cheves and lowndes were satisfied that such a fleet was within the resources of the country; and to insure the fifteen thousand seamen necessary to man it, they would be willing to limit the number of privateers,--a most wholesome and necessary provision. by a careful historical examination of great britain's past and present exigencies, it was shown that such a force would most probably keep clear the approaches to all american ports, the most critical zone for shipping, whether inward or outward bound; because, to counteract it, the enemy would have to employ numbers so largely superior that they could not be spared from her european conflict. the argument was sound; but unhappily cheves, lowndes, clay, and quincy did not represent the spirit of the men who for ten years had ruled the country and evolved the gunboat system. these, in their day of power, not yet fully past, had neither maintained the fleet nor accumulated material, and there was no seasoned timber to build with. the administration which expired in had left timber for six -gun ships, of which now remained only enough for four. the rest had been wasted in gunboats, or otherwise. the committee therefore limited its recommendations to building the frigates, for which it was believed materials could be procured. even in this reduced form it proved impossible to overcome the opposition to a navy as economically expensive and politically dangerous. the question was amply debated; but as, on the one hand, little doubt was felt about the rapid conquest of canada by militia and volunteers, so, on the other, the same disposition to trust to extemporized irregular forces encouraged reliance simply upon privateering. private enterprise in such a cause undoubtedly has from time to time attained marked results; but in general effect the method is a wasteful expenditure of national resources, and, historically, saps the strength of the regular navy. in the manning of inefficient privateers--and the majority were inefficient and ineffective--were thrown away resources of seamen which, in an adequate naval force, organized and directed as it would have been by the admirable officers of that period, could have accomplished vastly more in the annoyance of british trade,--the one offensive naval undertaking left open to the nation. even with the assistance of the federalists the provision for the frigates could not be carried, though the majority was narrow-- to . the same fate befell the proposition to provide a dockyard. all that could be had was an appropriation of six hundred thousand dollars, distributed over three successive years, for buying timber. these votes were taken january , , in full expectation of war, and only five months before it was declared. early in april, congress, in secret session, passed an act of embargo for ninety days, which became law on the fourth by the president's signature. the motive was twofold: to retain at home the ships and seamen of the nation, in anticipation of war, to keep them from falling into the hands of the enemy; and also to prevent the carriage of supplies indispensably necessary to the british armies in spain. both objects were defeated by the action of quincy, in conjunction with senator lloyd of massachusetts and representative emott of new york. learning that the president intended to recommend the embargo, these gentlemen, as stated by quincy on the floor of the house, despatched at once to philadelphia, new york, and boston, expresses which left washington march , the day before madison's letter was dated. four or five days' respite was thus secured, and the whole mercantile community set zealously to work to counteract the effects of the measure. "niles' register," published in baltimore, said: "drays were working night and day, from tuesday night, march , and continued their toil till sunday morning, incessantly. in this hurly-burly to palsy the arm of the government all parties united. on sunday perhaps not twenty seamen, able to do duty, could be found in all baltimore." a new york paper is quoted as saying, "the property could not have been moved off with greater expedition had the city been enveloped in flames." from that port forty-eight vessels cleared; from baltimore thirty-one; philadelphia and alexandria in like proportions. it was estimated that not less than two hundred thousand barrels of flour, besides grain in other shapes, and provisions of all kinds, to a total value of fifteen million dollars, were rushed out of the country in those five days, when labor-saving appliances were nearly unknown.[ ] jonathan russell, who was now _chargé d'affaires_ at london, having been transferred from paris upon the arrival of armstrong's successor, joel barlow, wrote home, "the great shipments of provisions, which were hurried from america in expectation of the embargo, have given the peninsula a supply for about two months; and at the expiration of that period the harvest in that region will furnish a stock for about three months more.... the avidity discovered by our countrymen to escape from the embargo, and the disregard of its policy, have encouraged this government to hope that supplies will still continue to be received from the united states. the ship 'lady madison,' which left liverpool in march, has returned thither with a cargo taken in off sandy hook without entering an american port. there are several vessels now about leaving this country with the intention not only of procuring a cargo in the same way, but of getting rid, illicitly, of one they carry out."[ ] it was, indeed, a conspicuous instance of mercantile avidity, wholly disregardful of patriotic considerations, such as is to be found in all times and in all countries; strictly analogous to the constant smuggling between france and great britain at this very time. its significance in the present case, however, is as marking the widespread lack of a national patriotism, as distinct from purely local advantage and personal interests, which unhappily characterized americans at this period. of this great britain stood ready to avail herself, by extending to the united states the system of licenses, by which, combined with the orders in council, she was combating with a large degree of success napoleon's continental system. she hoped, and the sequel showed not unreasonably, that even during open hostilities she could in the same manner thwart the united states in its efforts to keep its own produce from her markets. less than a fortnight after the american declaration of war was received, russell, who had not yet left england, wrote to the secretary of state that the board of trade had given notice that licenses would be granted for american vessels to carry provisions from the united states to cadiz and lisbon, for the term of eight months; and that a policy had been issued at lloyds to a new york firm, insuring flour from that port to the peninsula, warranted free from british capture, and from capture or detention by the government of the united states.[ ] the british armies were thus nourished and dependent, both in spain and in canada. the supplying of the latter scarcely fell short of treason, and decisively affected the maintenance of the war in that quarter. it is difficult to demonstrate a moral distinction between what was done there, disregardful of national success, in shameful support of the enemy, and the supplying of the peninsula; but an intuitive sympathy extends to the latter a tolerance which the motives of the individual agents probably do not deserve, and for which calm reason cannot give a perfectly satisfactory account. but it was the misfortune of american policy, as shaped by the administration, that it was committed to support napoleon in his iniquitous attack upon the liberties of spain; that it saw in his success the probable fulfilment of its designs upon the floridas;[ ] and that its chosen ground for proceeding against great britain, rather than france, was her refusal to conform her action to a statement of the emperor's, the illusory and deceptive character of which became continually more apparent. to declare war because of the orders in council was a simple, straightforward, and wholly justifiable course; but the flying months made more and more evident, to the government and its agents abroad, that it was vain to expect revocation on the ground of napoleon's recall of his edicts, for they were not recalled. having entered upon this course, however, it seemed impossible to recede, or to acknowledge a mistake, the pinch of which was nevertheless felt. writing to russell, whose service in paris, from october, , to october, , and transfer thence to london, made him unusually familiar, on both sides of the channel, with the controversy over champagny's letter of august , , madison speaks "of the delicacy of our situation, having in view, on the one hand, the importance of obtaining from the french government confirmation of the repeal of the decrees, and on the other that of not weakening the ground on which the british repeal was urged."[ ] that is, it would be awkward to have the british ministry find out that we were pressing france for a confirmation of that very revocation which we were confidently asserting to them to be indisputable, and to require in good faith the withdrawal of their orders. respecting action taken under the so-called repeal, russell had written on march , , over three months after it was said to take effect, "by forbearing to condemn, or to acquit, distinctly and loyally, [the vessels seized since november ], this government encourages us to persevere in our non-importation against england, and england to persist in her orders against us. this state of things appears calculated to produce mutual complaint and irritation, and cannot probably be long continued without leading to a more serious contest, ... which is perhaps an essential object of this country's policy."[ ] july , he expressed regret to the duke of bassano, the french minister of foreign affairs, that the proceedings concerning captured american vessels "had been so partial, and confined to cases which from their peculiar circumstances proved nothing conclusively in relation to the revocation of the french edicts."[ ] russell might have found some light as to the causes of these delays, could he have seen a note addressed by the emperor to the administration of commerce, april . in this, renewing the reasoning of the bayonne decree, he argued that every american vessel which touched at an english port was liable to confiscation in the united states; consequently, could be seized by an american cruiser on the open sea; therefore, was equally open to seizure there by a french cruiser--the demand advanced by canning[ ] which gave such just offence; and if by a french cruiser at sea, likewise in a french port by the french government. she was in fact no longer american, not even a denationalized american, but an english vessel. under this supposition, napoleon luminously inferred, "it could be said: the decrees of berlin and milan are recalled as to the united states, but, as every ship which has stopped in england, or is destined thither, is a ship unacknowledged (_sans aveu_), which american laws punish and confiscate, she may be confiscated in france." the emperor concluded that should this theory not be capable of substantiation, the matter might for the present be left obscure.[ ] on september the ships in question had not been liberated. coincidently with his note to bassano, russell wrote to monroe, "it is my conviction that the great object of their policy is to entangle us in a war with england. they therefore abstain from doing any act which would furnish clear and unequivocal testimony of the revocation of their decrees, lest it should induce the extinction of the british orders, and thereby appease our irritation against their enemy. hence, of all the captured vessels since november , the three which were liberated were precisely those which had not violated the decrees."[ ] yet, such were the exigencies of the debate with england, those three cases were transmitted by him at the same time to the american _chargé_ in london as evidence of the revocation.[ ] to the french minister he wrote again, august , "after the declarations of m. de champagny and yourself, i cannot permit myself to doubt the revocation; ... but i may be allowed to lament that no fact has yet come to my knowledge of a character unequivocally and incontrovertibly to confirm that revocation." "that none of the captured vessels have been condemned, instead of proving the extinction of the edicts, appears rather to be evidence, at best, of a commutation of the penalty from prompt confiscation to perpetual detention."[ ] the matter was further complicated by an announcement of napoleon to the chamber of commerce, in april of the same year, that the berlin and milan decrees were the fundamental law of the empire concerning neutral commerce, and that american ships would be repelled from french ports, unless the united states conformed to those decrees, by excluding british ships and merchandise.[ ] under such conditions, argument with a sceptical british ministry was attended with difficulties. the position to which the government had become reduced, by endeavoring to play off france and great britain against each other, in order to avoid a war with either, was as perplexing as humiliating. "great anxiety,"[ ] to which little sympathy can be extended, was felt in washington as to the evidence for the actuality of the repeals. the situation was finally cleared up by a clever move of the british cabinet, forcing napoleon's hand at a moment when the orders in council could with difficulty be maintained longer against popular discontent. on march , , the french minister of foreign affairs, in a report to the senate, reiterated the demands of the decrees, and asserted again that, until those demands were conceded by england, the decrees must be enforced against powers which permitted their flags to be denationalized. the position thus reaffirmed was emphasized by a requirement for a large increase of the army for this object. "it is necessary that all the disposable forces of france be available for sending everywhere where the english flag, and other flags, denationalized or convoyed by english ships of war, may seek to enter."[ ] no exceptions in favor of the united states being stated, the british ministry construed the omission as conclusive proof of the unqualified continuance of the decrees;[ ] and the occasion was taken to issue an order in council, defining the government's position, both in the past and for the future. quoting the french minister's report, as removing all doubts of napoleon's persistence in the maintenance of a system, "as inconsistent with neutral rights and independence as it was hostile to the maritime rights and commercial interests of great britain," the prince regent declared that, "if at any time thereafter the berlin and milan decrees should be absolutely and unconditionally repealed, by some authentic act of the french government, publicly promulgated, then the orders in council of january, , and april, , shall without any further order be, and the same are hereby declared from thenceforth to be, wholly and absolutely revoked."[ ] no exception could be taken to the phrasing or form of this order. the wording was precise and explicit; the time fixed was definite,--the date of the french repeal; the manner of revocation was the same as that of promulgation, an order in council observant of all usual formalities. in substance, this well-timed state paper challenged champagny's letter of august , , and the american non-importation act based upon it. both these asserted the revocation of the french decrees. the british cabinet, seizing a happy opportunity, asked of the world the production of the revocation, or else the justification of its own course. the demand went far to silence the growing discontents at home, and to embarrass the american government in the grounds upon which it had chosen to base its action. it was well calculated also to disconcert the emperor, for, unless he did something more definite, dissension would increase in the united states, where, as barlow wrote, "it is well known to the world, for our public documents are full of it, that great doubts exist, even among our best informed merchants, and in the halls of congress itself, whether the berlin and milan decrees are to this day repealed, or even modified, in regard to the united states." the sentence is taken from a letter[ ] which he addressed to the french minister of foreign affairs, may , , when he had received the recent british order. he pointed out how astutely this step was calculated to undo the effect of champagny's letter, and to weaken the american administration at the critical moment when it was known to be preparing for war. he urged that the french government should now make and publish an authentic act, declaring the berlin and milan decrees, as relative to the united states, to have ceased in november, . "such an act is absolutely necessary to the american government; and, though solicited as an accommodation, it may be demanded as a right. if it was the duty of france to cease to apply those decrees to the united states, it is equally her duty to promulgate it to the world in as formal a manner as we have promulgated our law for the exclusion of british merchandise. she ought to declare and publish the non-application of these decrees in the same forms in which she enacted the decrees. the president has instructed me to propose and press this object." at last the demand was made which should have been enforced eighteen months before. after sending the letter, barlow had "a pretty sharp conversation" with bassano, in which he perceived a singular reluctance to answer his letter. at last the duke placed before him a decree, drawn up in due and customary form, dated a year before,--april , ,--declaring that "the decrees of berlin and milan are definitively, and to date from the first day of november last, [ ], considered as not having existed in regard to american vessels."[ ] this decree, bassano said, had been communicated to russell, and also sent to serrurier, the french minister at washington, with orders to convey it to the american government. both russell and serrurier denied ever having received the paper.[ ] barlow made no comment upon the strange manner in which this document was produced to him, and confined himself to inquiring if it had been published. the reply could only be, no; a singular admission with regard to a formal paper a year old, and of such importance to all concerned. he then asked that a copy might be sent him. upon receipt, he at once hastened it to russell in london, by the sloop of war "wasp," then lying in a french port. he wrote, "you will doubtless render an essential service to both great britain and the united states by communicating it without loss of time to the foreign secretary. if by this the cause of war should be removed, there is an obvious reason for keeping the secret, if possible, so long as that the "wasp" may not bring the news to this country in any other manner but in your despatch. this government, as you must long have perceived, wishes not to see that effect produced; and i should not probably have obtained the letter and documents from the minister, if the prince regent's declaration had not convinced this government that the war was now become inevitable."[ ] russell transmitted the decree to the british foreign secretary may , . the government was at the moment in confusion, through the assassination, may , of mr. perceval, the prime minister; who, though not esteemed of the first order of statesmanship by his contemporaries and colleagues, had been found in recent negotiations the only available man about whom a cabinet could unite. a period of suspense followed, in which the difficulty of forming a new government, owing to personal antagonisms, was complicated by radical differences as to public policy, especially in the cardinal point of pursuing or relinquishing the war in the peninsula. not till near the middle of june was an arrangement reached. the same ministry, substantially, remained in power, with lord liverpool as premier; castlereagh continuing as foreign secretary. this retained in office the party identified with the orders in council, and favoring armed support to the spanish revolt. the delay in settling the government afforded an excuse for postponing action upon the newly discovered french decree. it permitted also time for reflection. just before perceval's death, russell had noted a firm determination to maintain the orders in council, conditioned only by the late declaration of april ; but at the same time there was evident apprehension of the consequences of war with the united states.[ ] this, he carefully explained, was due to no apprehension of american military power. even lord grenville, one of the chief leaders of the opposition, was satisfied that the united states could not conquer canada. "we are, indeed, most miserably underrated in europe." "it is not believed here, notwithstanding the spirited report of the committee on foreign relations, that we shall resort to any definitive measures. we have indeed a reputation in europe for saying so much and doing so little that we shall not be believed in earnest until we act in a manner not to be mistaken." "i am persuaded this government has presumed much on our weakness and divisions, and that it continues to believe that we have not energy and union enough to make effective war. nor is this confined to the ministry, but extends to the leaders of the opposition." "mr. perceval is well known to calculate with confidence that even in case of war we shall be obliged to resort to a license trade for a supply of british manufactures." "he considers us incapable even of bearing the privations of a state of hostility with england, and much more incapable of becoming a formidable enemy." on march perceval in a debate in the house had indicated the most positive intentions of maintaining the orders, and asserted that, in consequence of napoleon's decrees, great britain was no longer restrained by the law of nations in the extent or form of retaliation to which she may resort upon the enemy. "i cannot perceive the slightest indication of apprehension of a rupture with the united states, or any measure of preparation to meet such an event. such is the conviction of our total inability to make war that the five or six thousand troops now in canada are considered to be amply sufficient to protect that province against our mightiest efforts."[ ] a revolution of sentiment was to be noted even in the minds of former advocates. castlereagh, at a levee on march , said to russell that the movements in the united states appeared to him to be nothing but party evolutions. there was, however, another side to the question which occasioned more concern to the british ministry. "it is the increasing want of our intercourse," wrote russell may , "rather than the apprehension of our arms which leads to a conciliatory spirit" which he had recently noticed. "they will endeavor to avoid the calamity of war with the united states by every means which can save their pride and their consistency. the scarcity of bread in this country, the distress of the manufacturing towns, and the absolute dependency of the allied troops in the peninsula on our supplies, form a check on their conduct which they can scarcely have the hardihood to disregard."[ ] two days after these words were written, the murder of perceval added political anarchy to the embarrassments of the government. the crisis then impending was indeed momentous. war between france and russia was certain. upon its outcome depended the fall of the continental system, or its prevalence over all europe in an extent and with a rigor never yet reached. "some of the powers of europe," said the emperor, "have not fulfilled their promise with respect to the continental system. i must force them to it." in carrying this message to the senate, the minister of foreign affairs said: "in whatever port of europe a british ship can enter there must be a french garrison to prevent it;"[ ] an interesting commentary upon the neutral regulations to which the united states professed that neither she nor great britain had any claim to object, because municipal. great britain had already touched ruin too nearly to think lightly of the conditions. by her orders in council she had so retorted napoleon's decrees as to induce him, in order still further to enforce them, into the peninsular war, and now into that with russia. to uphold the latter, her busy negotiators, profiting by his high-handedness, had obtained for the czar peace with sweden and turkey. more completely to sustain him, it was essential to support in fullest effect the powerful diversion which retained three hundred thousand french troops in spain. to do this, the assistance of american food supplies was imperative. if peace with the united states could be maintained, the triumph of british diplomacy would be unqualified. the announcement of the alleged decree of april , , came therefore most opportunely to save their pride and self-consistency. on june castlereagh transmitted to russell an order in council published that day, revoking as to the united states the celebrated orders of january , , and april , . "i am to request you," ran his letter, "that you will acquaint your government that the prince regent's ministers have taken _the earliest opportunity, after the resumption of the government_, to advise his royal highness to the adoption of a measure grounded upon the document communicated by you to this office on the th ultimo;"[ ] that is upon the decree of april . no one affected to believe that this had been framed at the date it bore. "there was something so very much like fraud on the face of it," wrote russell, "that in several conversations which i have since had with lord castlereagh, particularly at a dinner at the lord mayor's, when i was placed next his lordship, i have taken care not to commit the honor of my government by attempting its vindication. when his lordship called it a strange proceeding, a new specimen of french diplomacy, a trick unworthy of a civilized government, i have merely replied that the motives or good faith of the government which issued it, or the real time when it was issued, were of little importance as to the effect which it ought to have here; that it was sufficient that it contained a most precise and formal declaration that the berlin and milan decrees were revoked, in relation to america, from november , ."[ ] this was true; but the contention of the british government had been that the system of the decrees was one whole; that its effect upon america could not be dissociated from that upon continental neutral states, where it was enforced under the guise of municipal regulations; and that it must be revoked as a whole, in order to impose the repeal of the orders in council. this position had been reaffirmed in the recent order of april . opinion will therefore differ as to the ministry's success in escaping, under the cover of the new decree, from the dilemma in which they were placed by the irresistible agitation against the orders in council spreading through the nation, and the necessity of avoiding war with the united states, if possible, because of the affairs of the peninsula. they made the best of it by alleging, as it were, the spirit of the order of april ; the disposition "to take such measures as may tend to re-establish the intercourse between neutral and belligerent nations upon its accustomed principles." for this reason, while avowing explicitly that the tenor of the decree did not meet the requirements of the late order, the orders in council were revoked from august next following; and vessels captured after may , the date of russell's communicating the decree, would be released. the ministry thus receded gracefully under compulsion; and for their own people at least saved their face. superficially the british diplomatic triumph for the moment seemed complete. they had withdrawn their head from the noose just as it began to tighten; and they had done so not on any ground of stringent requirement, but with expressions of desire to go even farther than their just claims, in order to promote conciliation. russell naturally felt a moment of bitter discomfiture. "in yielding, the ministers appear to have been extremely perplexed in seeking for a subterfuge for their credit. all their feelings and all their prejudices revolted at the idea of publicly bending to the opposition, or truckling to the united states, and they were compelled to seize on the french decree of april , , as the only means of saving themselves from the degradation of acknowledging that they were vanquished. without this decree they would have been obliged to yield, and i almost regret that it existed to furnish a salvo, miserable as it is, for their pride. our victory, however, is still complete, and i trust that those who have refused to support our government in the contest will at least be willing to allow it the honors of a triumph."[ ] russell wrote under the mistaken impression that the repeal of the orders had come in time to save war; in which event the yielding of the british ministry, identified as it was with the orders in council, might be construed as a triumph for the system of peaceable coercion, by commercial restrictions, which formed the whole policy of jefferson and madison. the triumph claimed by him must be qualified, however, by the reflection that it was obtained at the expense of becoming the dupe of a french deception, on its face so obvious as to deprive mistake of the excuse of plausibility. the eagerness of the government, and of its representatives abroad, for a diplomatic triumph, had precipitated them into a step for which, on the grounds taken, no justification existed; and they had since then been dragged at the wheels of napoleon's chariot, in a constant dust of mystification, until he had finally achieved the end of his scheming and landed them in a war for which they were utterly unprepared, and which it had been the chief object of commercial reprisals to avoid. thus considered, the triumph was barren. on june , , president madison sent to congress a message,[ ] reciting the long list of international wrongs endured at the hands of great britain, and recommending to the deliberations of congress the question of peace or war. on june the house of representatives, by a vote of seventy-nine yeas to forty-nine nays, declared that a state of war existed between the united states and great britain. the bill then went to the senate, where it was discussed, amended, and passed on june , by nineteen yeas to thirteen nays. the next day the house concurred in the senate's amendments, and the bill thus passed received the president's signature immediately. the war thus began, formally, on june , , five days before the repeal of the british orders in council. while the declaration of war was still under debate, the secretary of war, eustis, on june reported to the senate that of the ten thousand men authorized as a peace establishment, there were in service six thousand seven hundred and forty-four. he was unable to state what number had been enlisted of the twenty-five thousand regulars provided by the legislation of the current session; a singular exhibition of the efficiency of the department. he had no hesitation, however, in expressing an unofficial opinion that there were five thousand of these recruits. it is scarce necessary to surmise what the condition of the army was likely to be, with james wilkinson as the senior general officer of consecutive service, and with dearborn, a man of sixty, and in civil life ever since the war of independence, as the first major-general appointed under the new legislation. the navy had a noble and competent body of officers, in the prime of life, a large proportion of whom had seen instructive service in the barbary conflict; but, as has been seen, congress had no faith in a navy, and refused it any increase. in this distrust the administration shared. mr. monroe, indeed, probably through his residence abroad, had attained a juster view of the influence of a navy on foreign relations. he has already been quoted in this connection,[ ] but in a letter to a friend, two years before , he developed his opinions with some precision. "i gave my opinion that our naval force ought to be increased. in advising this, i urged that the naval force of the united states ought not to be regulated by reference to the navies of the great powers, but to the strength of the squadrons which they usually stationed in time of war on our coasts, at the mouths of great rivers, and in our harbors. i thought that such a force, incorporated permanently with our system, would give weight at all times to our negotiations, and by means thereof prevent wars and save money."[ ] monroe at this time was not in the administration. such a policy was diametrically opposed to that of jefferson, madison, and gallatin; and when war came, ships had not been provided. under the circumstances the disposition of the government was to put the ships they had under a glass case. "at the commencement of the war," wrote monroe to jefferson, "i was decidedly of your opinion, that the best disposition which could be made of our little navy would be to keep it in a body in a safe port, from which it might sally, only on some important occasion, to render essential service. its safety, in itself, appeared an important object; as, while safe, it formed a check on the enemy in all operations along our coast, and increased proportionately his expense, in the force to be kept up, as well to annoy our commerce as to protect his own. the reasoning against this, in which all naval officers have agreed, is that, if stationed together in a port,--new york, for example,--the british would immediately block up this, by a force rather superior, and then harass our coast and commerce, without restraint, and with any force, however small. in that case a single frigate might, by cruising along the coast, and menacing continually different parts, keep in motion great bodies of militia; that, while our frigates are at sea, the expectation that they may be met together will compel the british to keep in a body, whenever they institute a blockade or cruise, a force equal at least to our own whole force; that they, [the american vessels] being the best sailors, hazard little by cruising separately, or together occasionally, as they might bring on an action, or avoid one, as they saw fit; that in that measure they would annoy the enemy's commerce wherever they went, excite alarm in the west indies and elsewhere, and even give protection to our own trade by drawing the enemy's squadron from our own coast.... the reasoning in favor of each plan is so nearly equal that it is hard to say which is best."[ ] it is to be hoped that the sequel will show which was best, although little can be hoped when means, military and naval, have been allowed to waste as they had under the essentially unmilitary administrations since . on november , , seven months before the war began, the secretary of the treasury, gallatin, communicated to the senate a report on the state of the finances,[ ] in which he showed that since , by economies which totally crippled the war power of the nation, the public debt had been diminished from $ , , to $ , , ,--a saving of $ , , , which lessened the annual interest on the debt by $ , , . a good financial showing, doubtless; but, had there been on hand the troops and the ships, which the saved money represented, the war of might have had an issue more satisfactory to national retrospect. gallatin also showed, in this paper, that by the restrictive system, enforced against great britain in consequence of the administration's decision that napoleon's revocation of his decrees was real, the revenue had dropped from $ , , to $ , , ; leaving the nation with a probable deficiency of $ , , , on the estimate of a year of peace for . footnotes: [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. ii. p. . [ ] that is, as restrictive of neutral shipping. [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] wellesley, minister of foreign affairs, to pinkney, dec. , ; also, feb. , . american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. pp. , . see also sir wm. scott, in the court of admiralty, ibid., p. . [ ] influence of sea power upon the french revolution and empire, chaps. xvii., xviii. [ ] declaration of the king's reservations, dec. , . american state papers, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] cobbett's parliamentary debates, vol. x. p. . [ ] aug. , . american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] jonathan russell to the secretary of state, nov. , . u.s. state department mss. [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. pp. , . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] the british commissioners to monroe and pinkney, nov. , . ibid., p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . author's italics. [ ] monroe to madison, aug. , . american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] that is, all vessels, including merchantmen. [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. pp. - . author's italics. [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. pp. - . [ ] american state papers, vol. iii. pp. , . [ ] american state papers, vol. iii. p. . author's italics. [ ] ibid., foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] the principal part of the correspondence between rose and madison will be found in american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. pp. - . rose's instructions from canning were first published by mr. henry adams, history of the united states, vol. iv. pp. - . they were of a character that completely justify the caution of the american government in refusing to go further without knowing their contents, concerning which, indeed, madison wrote that a glimpse had been obtained in the informal interviews, which showed their inadmissibility. madison to pinkney, feb. , , u.s. state department mss. [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] ibid., pp. - . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] armstrong to smith, u.s. secretary of state, jan. , . ibid., p. . author's italics. [ ] american state papers, vol. iii. p. . author's italics. [ ] barlow to bassano, nov. , . u.s. state department mss. author's italics. [ ] barlow to monroe, dec. , . u.s. state department mss. [ ] feb. , . american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] giles, annals of congress, - , pp. - . [ ] n.y. evening post, may , . [ ] jefferson, under date of nov. , , alludes to such a report. (jefferson's works, vol. v. p. .) already, indeed, on aug. , , an order in council, addressed to vessels bearing the neutral flags of mecklenburg, oldenburg, papenburg, or kniphausen, had been issued, which, though brief, imposed precisely the same restrictions as the later celebrated ones here under discussion. (annual register, , state papers, p. ; naval chronicle, vol. xviii. p. .) the fact is interesting, as indicative of the date of formulating a project, for the execution of which the "horizon" decision probably afforded the occasion. [ ] erskine's communication was dated feb. , . (american state papers, vol. iii. p. .) pinkney, however, had forwarded a copy of the orders on november . (ibid., p. .) canning's letter, of which erskine's was a transcript, was dated dec. , . (british foreign office archives.) [ ] senator giles of virginia. annals of congress, - , p. . [ ] the following are instances: philadelphia, february . the ship "venus," king, hence to the isle of france, has returned to port. january , lat. ° n., long. ° w., fell in with an english merchant fleet of thirty-six sail, under convoy of four ships of war. was boarded by the sloop of war "wanderer," which endorsed on all her papers, forbidding to enter any port belonging to france or her allies, they all being declared in a state of blockade. captain king therefore put back. (n.y. evening post, feb. , .) salem, mass., february . arrived bark "active," richardson. sailed hence for malaga, december . january , lat. ° n., long. ° w., boarded by a british cruiser, and papers endorsed against entering any but a british port. the voyage being thus frustrated, captain richardson returned. marblehead, february . schooner "minerva" returned, having been captured under the orders in council, released, and come home. ship "george," from amsterdam, arrived at new york, march , via yarmouth. was taken by an english cruiser into yarmouth and there cleared. (evening post, march .) [ ] n.y. evening post, march , . [ ] letter of john quincy adams to harrison gray otis. [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . author's italics. [ ] correspondence of thomas barclay, p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] "we expected, too, some effect from coercion of interest." (jefferson to armstrong, march , . works, vol. v. p. .) "the embargo is the last card we have to play short of war." (jefferson to madison, march , . ibid., p. .) "the coercive experiment we have made." (monroe to john taylor. works, vol. v. p. .) "i place immense value on the experiment being fully made how far an embargo may be an _effectual weapon_ in future, as well as on this occasion." (jefferson. works, vol. v. p. .) "bonaparte ought to be particularly satisfied with us, by whose unyielding adherence to principle england has been forced into the revocation of her orders." (jefferson to madison, april , . works, vol. v. p. .) this revocation was not actual, but a mistake of the british minister at washington. "i have always understood that there were two objects contemplated by the embargo laws. the first, precautionary; the second, coercive, operating upon the aggressive belligerents, by addressing strong appeals to the interests of both." (giles of virginia, in senate, nov. , .) "the embargo is not designed to affect our own citizens, but to make an impression in europe." (williams of south carolina, in house of representatives, april , .) [ ] the writer, in a previous work (sea power in the french revolution), believes himself to have shown that the losses by capture of british traders did not exceed two and one half per cent. [ ] letter to otis. [ ] to thomas paine, concerning an improved gunboat devised by him. sept. , . (jefferson's works, vol. v. p. .) [ ] jefferson's works, vol. v. pp. , . [ ] june , . works, vol. v. p. . [ ] an american ship putting into england, leaky, reported that on dec. , , she had been boarded by a french privateer, which allowed her to proceed because bound to holland. the french captain said he had captured four americans, all sent into passage, in spain; and that his orders were to bring in all americans bound to english ports. (n.y. evening post, march , .) this was under the berlin decree, as that of milan issued only december . the berlin decree proclaimed the british islands under blockade, but napoleon for a time reserved decision as to the mere act of sailing for them being an infringement. mr. james stephen, in parliament, stated that in several ships, not less than twenty-one, he thought, were taken for the mere fact of sailing between america and england; in consequence, insurance on american vessels rose per cent, from -½ to -¾. (parliamentary debates, vol. xiii. p. xxxix. app.) in the evening post of march , , will be found, quoted from a french journal, cases of four vessels carried into france, apparently only because bound to england. [ ] henry adams's history of the united states, vol. v. p. . [ ] "nothing can establish firmly the republican principles of our government but an establishment of them in england. france will be the apostle for this." (jefferson's works, vol. iv. p. .) "the subjugation of england would be a general calamity. happily it is impossible. should invasion end in her being only republicanized, i know not on what principles a true republican of our country could lament it." (ibid., p. ; feb. , .) [ ] jefferson to richard m. johnson, march , . works, vol. v. p. . [ ] london times of august , quoted in n.y. evening post of oct. , . [ ] annals of congress, - , p. . [ ] captains' letters, u.s. navy department mss. jan. , . [ ] thomas barclay's correspondence, p. . author's italics. [ ] n.y. evening post, sept. , . [ ] cobbett's parliamentary debates, vol. xii. p. . [ ] life of sir william parker, vol. i. p. . [ ] barlow to bassano, nov. , . u.s. state department mss. [ ] n.y. evening post, feb. , june , ; feb. , . [ ] senator white of delaware. annals of congress, - , p. . [ ] works, vol. v. p. . [ ] "trinidad, july , . we have just received , barrels of flour from passamaquoddy, and not a week passes but some drops in from philadelphia, norfolk, etc. cargo of , barrels would not now command more than twelve dollars; a year ago, eighteen." (n.y. evening post, july .) [ ] n.y. evening post, jan. , . [ ] ibid., february . [ ] mitchill of n.y. annals of congress, - , pp. , . [ ] jefferson's works, vol. v. pp. , . [ ] n.y. evening post, aug. , . [ ] feb. , . captains' letters, u.s. navy department mss. [ ] american state papers, finance, vol. ii. p. . [ ] with flour varying at short intervals from $ to $ , and $ , a barrel, it is evident that speculation must be rife, and also that only general statements can be made as to conditions over any length of time. [ ] orchard cook, of massachusetts, said in the house of representatives that vessels sailed thus by permission. annals of congress, - , p. . [ ] n.y. evening post, oct. , . [ ] ibid., sept. , . [ ] n.y. evening post, feb. , . [ ] ibid., sept. , . [ ] ibid., dec. , . [ ] cobbett's parliamentary debates, vol. xii. p. . [ ] lord grenville in house of lords. ibid., p. . [ ] n.y. evening post, june , . [ ] ibid., april . [ ] ibid., june . [ ] ibid., october . the same effect, though on a much smaller scale, was seen in france. deprived, through the joint operation of the embargo and the orders in council, of colonial produce brought by americans, a number of vessels were fitted out, and armed as letters of marque, to carry on this trade. these adventures were very successful, though they by no means filled the void caused by the absence of american carriers. see evening post of dec. , , and march and , . one of these, acting on her commission as a letter of marque, captured an american brig, returning from india, which was carried into cayenne and there condemned under the milan decree. ibid., dec. , . [ ] n.y. evening post, nov. , . [ ] for some instances see: annals of congress, - , p. ; n.y. evening post, feb. , , ; may ; aug. ; sept. , . gallatin, in a report dated dec. , , said, "at no time has there been so much specie, so much redundant unemployed capital in the country;" scarcely a token of prosperity in so new a country. (american state papers, finance, vol. ii. p. .) [ ] american state papers, finance, vol. ii. pp. , , . the second figure is an average of the two years, , , within which fell the fifteen months of embargo. [ ] ibid., p. (dec. , ). [ ] "the schooner 'john,' clayton, from la guayra, with two hundred thousand pounds of coffee, has been seized at leghorn, and it was expected would be condemned under the bayonne decree. the 'john' sailed from baltimore for la guayra, by permission, under the fourth supplementary embargo act. by some means or other she found her way to leghorn, where it was vainly hoped she might safely dispose of her cargo." (n.y. evening post, dec. , .) "the frigate 'chesapeake,' captain decatur, cruising in support of the embargo, captured off block island the brig 'mount vernon' and the ship 'john' loaded with provisions. of these the former, at least, is expressly stated to have cleared 'in ballast,' by permission." (ibid., aug. , .) [ ] two or three quotations are sufficient to illustrate a condition notorious at the time. "jamaica. nine americans came with the june fleet, (from england) with full cargoes. at first it was thought these vessels would not be allowed to take cargoes, (because contrary to navigation act); but a little reflection taught the government better. rum is the surplus crop of jamaica, and to keep on hand that which they do not want is too much our way (_i.e._ embargo). the british admiral granted these vessels convoy without hesitation, which saved them from five to seven and one half percent in insurance." (n.y. evening post, aug. , .) "gibraltar. a large number of american vessels are in these seas, sailing under license from great britain, to and from ports of spain, without interruption. our informant sailed in company with eight or ten, laden with wine and fruit for england." (ibid., june .) senator hillhouse, of connecticut: "many of our vessels which were out when the embargo was laid have remained out. they have been navigating under the american flag, and have been constantly employed, at vast profit." (annals of congress, , p. .) [ ] "at gibraltar, between january and april , eight vessels were sent in for breach of the orders, of which seven were condemned." (n.y. evening post, may , .) "baltimore, sept. . . arrived brig. 'sophia' from rotterdam, july , _via_ harwich, england. boarded by british brig 'phosphorus', and ordered to england. after arrival, cargo (of gin) gauged, and a duty exacted of eight pence sterling per gallon. allowed to proceed, with a license, after paying duty. in company with the 'sophia', and sent in with her, were three vessels bound for new york, with similar cargoes." (ibid., oct. .) "american ship 'othello,' from new york for nantes, with assorted cargo. ship, with thirty hogsheads of sugar condemned on ground of violating blockade;" _i.e._ orders in council. (naval chronicle, vol. xx. p. .) besides the 'othello' there are two other cases, turning on the orders, by compliance or evasion. from france came numerous letters announcing condemnations of vessels, because boarded by british cruisers. (n.y. evening post, sept. , oct. , oct. , dec. , dec. , ; march , .) proceedings were sometimes even more peremptory. more than one american vessel, though neutral, was burned or sunk at sea, as amenable under napoleon's decrees. (ibid., nov. and nov. , dec. , .) see also affidavits in the case of the "brutus", burned, and of the "bristol packet", scuttled. (ibid., april and april , .) [ ] hillhouse in the senate (annals of congress, , p. ), and cook, of massachusetts, in the house. "of about five hundred and ninety which sailed, only eight or ten have been captured." (ibid., - , p. .) yet many went to guadaloupe and other forbidden french islands. at saint pierre, martinique, in the middle of september, were nearly ninety american vessels. "flour, which had been up to fifty dollars per barrel, fell to thirty dollars, in consequence of the number of arrivals from america." (n.y. evening post, sept. , .) this shows how the permission to sail "in ballast" was abused. [ ] n.y. evening post, sept. , . [ ] annals of congress, - , p. . [ ] n.y. evening post, may and , . [ ] for the text of the act see annals of congress, - , pp. - . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] giles of virginia. annals of congress, - , pp. - . [ ] williams of south carolina. annals of congress, - , p. . [ ] nelson of maryland. annals of congress, - , p. . [ ] annals of congress, - , pp. - . [ ] monroe to jefferson, jan. and feb. , . monroe's works, vol. v. pp. , - . [ ] to john taylor, january . ibid., p. . [ ] pinkney, in connection with these, speaks of the "expected" act of congress. american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] this sentence was omitted in the papers when submitted to congress. [ ] state papers, p. . [ ] february , . american state papers, commerce and navigation, vol. i. p. . [ ] the correspondence between erskine and the secretary of state on this occasion is in american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. pp. - . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. pp. - . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] ibid. [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. pp. - . [ ] author's italics. [ ] see madison's works, vol. ii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. - . [ ] the italics in this quotation (american state papers, vol. iii. p. ) are introduced by the author, to draw attention to the words decisive to be noted. [ ] the italics are smith's. they serve exactly, however, to illustrate just wherein consists the perverseness of omission (the words "operation of"), and the misstatement of this remarkable passage. [ ] secretary smith subsequently stated that this sentence was added by express interposition of the president. (smith's address to the american people.) [ ] canning in his instructions to jackson (no. , july , , foreign office mss.) wrote: "the united states cannot have _believed_ that such an arrangement as mr. erskine consented to accept was conformable to his instructions. _if_ mr. erskine availed himself of the liberty allowed to him of communicating those instructions in the affair of the orders in council, they must have _known_ that it was not so." my italics. [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] writings of james madison. published by order of congress, . vol. ii. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . turreau was the french minister. [ ] works of jefferson, vol. v. pp. - . [ ] "when lord wellesley's answer speaks of the offence imputed to jackson, it does not say he gave no such cause of offence, but simply relied on his repeated asseverations that he did not mean to offend." pinkney to madison, aug. , . wheaton's life of pinkney, p. . [ ] annals of congress, - . [ ] ibid., january , , pp. , . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] annals of congress, - , pp. , . [ ] ibid., pp. , . [ ] annals of congress, , p. . [ ] for armstrong's letter and the text of the decree, see american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] armstrong to champagny, march , . american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] ibid. [ ] the secretary of state to armstrong, june , . american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] jefferson to madison, april , . works, vol. v. p. . [ ] correspondance de napoléon. napoleon to champagny, july , and august , , vol. xx. p. , and vol. xxi. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . author's italics. [ ] canning to erskine, dec. , , transmitting the orders in council of november . british foreign office mss. [ ] monroe to foster, oct. , . american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . see also, more particularly, ibid., pp. , . [ ] u.s. state department mss., and state papers, vol. iii. p. . [ ] that is, verbally, before his formal letter of february . [ ] cobbett's parliamentary debates, vol. x. p. . a search through the correspondence of canning and erskine, as well as through the debates of parliament upon the orders in council, january-april, , reveals nothing confirmatory of the _pari passu_ claim, put forth in madison's letters quoted, and afterwards used by monroe in his arguments with foster. but in canning's instructions to jackson, july , (no. ), appears a sentence which may throw some light on the apparent misunderstanding. "as to the willingness or ability of neutral nations to resist the decrees of france, his majesty has always professed ... _a disposition to relax or modify his measures of retaliation and self-defence in proportion as those of neutral, nations_ should come in aid of them and take their place." this would be action _pari passu_ with a neutral; and if the same were expressed to erskine, it is far from incredible, in view of his remarkable action of , that he may have extended it verbally without authority to cover an act of france. my italics. [ ] wellesley to pinkney, aug. , . american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] the american flag was used in this way to cover british shipping. for instances see american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] author's italics. [ ] armstrong had sailed for the united states two months before. [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] russell on november wrote that he had reason to believe that the revocation of the decrees had not been notified to the ministers charged with the execution of them. on december he said that, as the ordinary practice in seizing a vessel was to hold her sequestered till the papers were examined in paris, this might explain why the local custom-house was not notified of the repeal. russell to the secretary of state, u.s. state department mss. [ ] langdon cheves of south carolina. annals of congress, - , pp. - . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] annals of congress, - , p. . [ ] pinkney to the secretary of state, jan. , . american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] foster had succeeded as _chargé d'affaires_ in may, , by the departure of merry, formerly minister to the united states. he was afterwards appointed minister; but in june, , under pressure from bonaparte, sweden requested him to leave the country. [ ] pearce, life and correspondence of the marquis wellesley, vol. iii. p. . [ ] author's italics. [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . author's italics. [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] rodgers to secretary of the navy, aug. , . captains' letters. [ ] bainbridge to the secretary of the navy, may , . captains' letters. the case was not singular. [ ] orders of admiral sawyer to the captain of the "little belt." american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, vol. iii. p. . in the absence of the british admiral, the senior officer at halifax assembled a board of captains which collected what his letter styles the depositions of the "little belt's" officers. depositions would imply that the witnesses were sworn, but it is not so said in the report of the board, where they simply "state." in the case of honorable gentlemen history may give equal credit in either case; but the indication would be that inquiry was less particular. the board reports no question by itself; the "statements" are in the first person, apparently in reply to the request "tell all you know," and are uninterrupted by comment. [ ] the proceedings of this court are printed in american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. pp. - . [ ] annals of congress, - , p. . [ ] dec. , . american state papers, naval affairs, vol. i. p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. ii. pp. - . [ ] russell to monroe, may , . u.s. state department mss. [ ] russell to monroe, august and , . u.s. state department mss. [ ] see jefferson's works, vol. v. pp. , , , , , - . [ ] madison to russell, nov. , . u.s. state department mss. [ ] russell to robert smith, march , . u.s. state department mss. [ ] russell to the secretary of state, july , . ibid. [ ] ante, p. . [ ] note dictée en conseil d'administration du commerce, april , . correspondance de napoléon, vol. xxii. p. . [ ] russell to monroe, july , . u.s. state department mss. [ ] russell to j.s. smith, july , . american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] russell to bassano, aug. , . u.s. state department mss. [ ] russell to robert smith, april, . ibid. [ ] monroe to russell, june , . ibid. [ ] reports of the ministers of foreign relations and of war, march , . moniteur, march . [ ] russell to monroe, april , . u.s. state department mss. [ ] the copy of this order in council which the author is here using is in the naval chronicle, vol. xxvii. p. . [ ] this letter, which is given in a very mutilated form in the american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. , has been published in full by the bureau of historical research, carnegie institution, washington. report on the diplomatic archives of the department of state, , p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] barlow's interview with bassano, and the letters exchanged, will be found in american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. - . russell's denial is on p. . serrurier's is mentioned in a report made to the house by monroe, secretary of state, ibid., p. . [ ] barlow to russell, may , . u.s. state department mss. [ ] russell to monroe, may , . ibid. [ ] the passages cited above are from russell's correspondence with the state department, under the dates of january , february and , march and , . u.s. state department mss. [ ] russell to monroe, may , . u.s. state department mss. [ ] barlow to monroe, march , . ibid. published by bureau of historical research, carnegie institution, , p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . author's italics. [ ] russell to monroe, june , . u.s. state department mss. [ ] russell to monroe, june , . u.s. state department mss. [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] ante, p. . [ ] to john taylor, sept. , . works of james monroe, vol. vi. p. . [ ] monroe to jefferson, monroe's works, vol. v. p. . [ ] annals of congress, - , p. . [illustration: theatre of land and coast warfare] chapter v the theatre of operations war being now immediately at hand, it is advisable, for the better appreciation of the course of events, the more accurate estimate of their historical and military value, to consider the relative conditions of the two opponents, the probable seats of warlike operations, and the methods which it was open to either to pursue. invasion of the british islands, or of any transmarine possession of great britain--save canada--was denied to the united states by the immeasurable inferiority of her navy. to cross the sea in force was impossible, even for short distances. for this reason, land operations were limited to the north american continent. this fact, conjoined with the strong traditional desire, received from the old french wars and cherished in the war of independence, to incorporate the canadian colonies with the union, determined an aggressive policy by the united states on the northern frontier. this was indeed the only distinctively offensive operation available to her upon the land; consequently it was imposed by reasons of both political and military expediency. on the other hand, the sea was open to american armed ships, though under certain very obvious restrictions; that is to say, subject to the primary difficulty of evading blockades of the coast, and of escaping subsequent capture by the very great number of british cruisers, which watched all seas where british commerce went and came, and most of the ports whence hostile ships might issue to prey upon it. the principal trammel which now rests upon the movements of vessels destined to cripple an enemy's commerce--the necessity to renew the motive power, coal, at frequent brief intervals--did not then exist. the wind, upon which motion depended, might at particular moments favor one of two antagonists relatively to the other; but in the long run it was substantially the same for all. in this respect all were on an equal footing; and the supply, if fickle at times, was practically inexhaustible. barring accidents, vessels were able to keep the sea as long as their provisions and water lasted. this period may be reckoned as generally three months, while by watchful administration it might at times be protracted to six. it is desirable to explain here what was, and is, the particular specific utility of operations directed toward the destruction of an enemy's commerce; what its bearing upon the issues of war; and how, also, it affects the relative interests of antagonists, unequally paired in the matter of sea power. without attempting to determine precisely the relative importance of internal and external commerce, which varies with each country, and admitting that the length of transportation entails a distinct element of increased cost upon the articles transported, it is nevertheless safe to say that, to nations having free access to the sea, the export and import trade is a very large factor in national prosperity and comfort. at the very least, it increases by so much the aggregate of commercial transactions, while the ease and copiousness of water carriage go far to compensate for the increase of distance. furthermore, the public revenue of maritime states is largely derived from duties on imports. hence arises, therefore, a large source of wealth, of money; and money--ready money or substantial credit--is proverbially the sinews of war, as the war of was amply to demonstrate. inconvertible assets, as business men know, are a very inefficacious form of wealth in tight times; and war is always a tight time for a country, a time in which its positive wealth, in the shape of every kind of produce, is of little use, unless by freedom of exchange it can be converted into cash for governmental expenses. to this sea-commerce greatly contributes, and the extreme embarrassment under which the united states as a nation labored in was mainly due to commercial exclusion from the sea. to attack the commerce of the enemy is therefore to cripple him, in the measure of success achieved, in the particular factor which is vital to the maintenance of war. moreover, in the complicated conditions of mercantile activity no one branch can be seriously injured without involving others. this may be called the financial and political effect of "commerce destroying," as the modern phrase runs. in military effect, it is strictly analogous to the impairing of an enemy's communications, of the line of supplies connecting an army with its base of operations, upon the maintenance of which the life of the army depends. money, credit, is the life of war; lessen it, and vigor flags; destroy it, and resistance dies. no resource then remains except to "make war support war;" that is, to make the vanquished pay the bills for the maintenance of the army which has crushed him, or which is proceeding to crush whatever opposition is left alive. this, by the extraction of private money, and of supplies for the use of his troops, from the country in which he was fighting, was the method of napoleon, than whom no man held more delicate views concerning the gross impropriety of capturing private property at sea, whither his power did not extend. yet this, in effect, is simply another method of forcing the enemy to surrender a large part of his means, so weakening him, while transferring it to the victor for the better propagation of hostilities. the exaction of a pecuniary indemnity from the worsted party at the conclusion of a war, as is frequently done, differs from the seizure of property in transit afloat only in method, and as peace differs from war. in either case, money or money's worth is exacted; but when peace supervenes, the method of collection is left to the government of the country, in pursuance of its powers of taxation, to distribute the burden among the people; whereas in war, the primary object being immediate injury to the enemy's fighting power, it is not only legitimate in principle, but particularly effective, to seek the disorganization of his financial system by a crushing attack upon one of its important factors, because effort thus is concentrated on a readily accessible, fundamental element of his general prosperity. that the loss falls directly on individuals, or a class, instead of upon the whole community, is but an incident of war, just as some men are killed and others not. indirectly, but none the less surely, the whole community, and, what is more important, the organized government, are crippled; offensive powers impaired. but while this is the absolute tendency of war against commerce, common to all cases, the relative value varies greatly with the countries having recourse to it. it is a species of hostilities easily extemporized by a great maritime nation; it therefore favors one whose policy is not to maintain a large naval establishment. it opens a field for a sea militia force, requiring little antecedent military training. again, it is a logical military reply to commercial blockade, which is the most systematic, regularized, and extensive form of commerce-destruction known to war. commercial blockade is not to be confounded with the military measure of confining a body of hostile ships of war to their harbor, by stationing before it a competent force. it is directed against merchant vessels, and is not a military operation in the narrowest sense, in that it does not necessarily involve fighting, nor propose the capture of the blockaded harbor. it is not usually directed against military ports, unless these happen to be also centres of commerce. its object, which was the paramount function of the united states navy during the civil war, dealing probably the most decisive blow inflicted upon the confederacy, is the destruction of commerce by closing the ports of egress and ingress. incidental to that, all ships, neutrals included, attempting to enter or depart, after public notification through customary channels, are captured and confiscated as remorselessly as could be done by the most greedy privateer. thus constituted, the operation receives far wider scope than commerce-destruction on the high seas; for this is confined to merchantmen of belligerents, while commercial blockade, by universal consent, subjects to capture neutrals who attempt to infringe it, because, by attempting to defeat the efforts of one belligerent, they make themselves parties to the war. in fact, commercial blockade, though most effective as a military measure in broad results, is so distinctly commerce-destructive in essence, that those who censure the one form must logically proceed to denounce the other. this, as has been seen,[ ] napoleon did; alleging in his berlin decree, in , that war cannot be extended to any private property whatever, and that the right of blockade is restricted to _fortified_ places, actually invested by competent forces. this he had the face to assert, at the very moment when he was compelling every vanquished state to extract, from the private means of its subjects, coin running up to hundreds of millions to replenish his military chest for further extension of hostilities. had this dictum been accepted international law in , the united states could not have closed the ports of the confederacy, the commerce of which would have proceeded unmolested; and hostile measures being consequently directed against men's persons instead of their trade, victory, if accomplished at all, would have cost three lives for every two actually lost. it is apparent, immediately on statement, that against commerce-destruction by blockade, the recourse of the weaker maritime belligerent is commerce-destruction by cruisers on the high sea. granting equal efficiency in the use of either measure, it is further plain that the latter is intrinsically far less efficacious. to cut off access to a city is much more certainly accomplished by holding the gates than by scouring the country in search of persons seeking to enter. still, one can but do what one can. in to , the southern confederacy, unable to shake off the death grip fastened on its throat, attempted counteraction by means of the "alabama," "sumter," and their less famous consorts, with what disastrous influence upon the navigation--the shipping--of the union it is needless to insist. but while the shipping of the opposite belligerent was in this way not only crippled, but indirectly was swept from the seas, the confederate cruisers, not being able to establish a blockade, could not prevent neutral vessels from carrying on the commerce of the union. this consequently suffered no serious interruption; whereas the produce of the south, its inconvertible wealth--cotton chiefly--was practically useless to sustain the financial system and credit of the people. so, in and the two years following, the united states flooded the seas with privateers, producing an effect upon british commerce which, though inconclusive singly, doubtless co-operated powerfully with other motives to dispose the enemy to liberal terms of peace. it was the reply, and the only possible reply, to the commercial blockade, the grinding efficacy of which it will be a principal object of these pages to depict. the issue to us has been accurately characterized by mr. henry adams, in the single word "exhaustion."[ ] both parties to the war of being conspicuously maritime in disposition and occupation, while separated by three thousand miles of ocean, the sea and its navigable approaches became necessarily the most extensive scene of operations. there being between them great inequality of organized naval strength and of pecuniary resources, they inevitably resorted, according to their respective force, to one or the other form of maritime hostilities against commerce which have been indicated. to this procedure combats on the high seas were merely incidental. tradition, professional pride, and the combative spirit inherent in both peoples, compelled fighting when armed vessels of nearly equal strength met; but such contests, though wholly laudable from the naval standpoint, which under ordinary circumstances cannot afford to encourage retreat from an equal foe, were indecisive of general results, however meritorious in particular execution. they had no effect upon the issue, except so far as they inspired moral enthusiasm and confidence. still more, in the sequel they have had a distinctly injurious effect upon national opinion in the united states. in the brilliant exhibition of enterprise, professional skill, and usual success, by its naval officers and seamen, the country has forgotten the precedent neglect of several administrations to constitute the navy as strong in proportion to the means of the country as it was excellent through the spirit and acquirements of its officers. sight also has been lost of the actual conditions of repression, confinement, and isolation, enforced upon the maritime frontier during the greater part of the war, with the misery and mortification thence ensuing. it has been widely inferred that the maritime conditions in general were highly flattering to national pride, and that a future emergency could be confronted with the same supposed facility, and as little preparation, as the odds of are believed to have been encountered and overcome. this mental impression, this picture, is false throughout, alike in its grouping of incidents, in its disregard of proportion, and in its ignoring of facts. the truth of this assertion will appear in due course of this narrative, and it will be seen that, although relieved by many brilliant incidents, indicative of the real spirit and capacity of the nation, the record upon the whole is one of gloom, disaster, and governmental incompetence, resulting from lack of national preparation, due to the obstinate and blind prepossessions of the government, and, in part, of the people. this was so even upon the water, despite the great names--for great they were in measure of their opportunities--of decatur, hull, perry, macdonough, morris, and a dozen others. on shore things were far worse; for while upon the water the country had as leaders men still in the young prime of life, who were both seamen and officers,--none of those just named were then over forty,--the army at the beginning had only elderly men, who, if they ever had been soldiers in any truer sense than young fighting men,--soldiers by training and understanding,--had long since disacquired whatever knowledge and habit of the profession they had gained in the war of independence, then more than thirty years past. "as far as american movements are concerned," said one of wellington's trusted officers, sent to report upon the subject of canadian defence, "the campaign of is almost beneath criticism."[ ] instructed american opinion must sorrowfully admit the truth of the comment. that of was not much better, although some younger men--brown, scott, gaines, macomb, ripley--were beginning to show their mettle, and there had by then been placed at the head of the war department a secretary who at least possessed a reasoned understanding of the principles of warfare. with every material military advantage, save the vital one of adequate preparation, it was found too late to prepare when war was already at hand; and after the old inefficients had been given a chance to demonstrate their incapacity, it was too late to utilize the young men. jefferson, with curious insanity of optimism, had once written, "we begin to broach the idea that we consider the whole gulf stream as of our waters, within which hostilities and cruising are to be frowned on for the present, and prohibited as soon as either consent or force will permit;"[ ] while at the same time, under an unbroken succession of maritime humiliations, he of purpose neglected all naval preparation save that of two hundred gunboats, which could not venture out of sight of land without putting their guns in the hold. with like blindness to the conditions to which his administration had reduced the nation, he now wrote: "the acquisition of canada this year [ ], as far as the neighborhood of quebec, will be a mere matter of marching."[ ] this would scarcely have been a misappreciation, had his care for the army and that of his successor given the country in an effective force of fifteen thousand regulars. great britain had but forty-five hundred in all canada,[ ] from quebec to st. joseph's, near mackinac; and the american resources in militia were to hers as ten to one. but jefferson and madison, with their secretary of the treasury, had reduced the national debt between and from $ , , to $ , , , concerning which a virginia senator remarked: "this difference has never been felt by society. it has produced no effect upon the common intercourse among men. for my part, i should never have known of the reduction but for the annual treasury report."[ ] something was learned about it, however, in the first year of the war, and the interest upon the savings was received at detroit, on the niagara frontier, in the chesapeake and the delaware. the war of was very unpopular in certain sections of the united states and with certain parts of the community. by these, particular fault was found with the invasion of canada. "you have declared war, it was said, for two principal alleged reasons: one, the general policy of the british government, formulated in the successive orders in council, to the unjustifiable injury and violation of american commerce; the other, the impressment of seamen from american merchant ships. what have canada and the canadians to do with either? if war you must, carry on your war upon the ocean, the scene of your avowed wrongs, and the seat of your adversary's prosperity, and do not embroil these innocent regions and people in the common ruin which, without adequate cause, you are bringing upon your own countrymen, and upon the only nation that now upholds the freedom of mankind against that oppressor of our race, that incarnation of all despotism--napoleon." so, not without some alloy of self-interest, the question presented itself to new england, and so new england presented it to the government and the southern part of the union; partly as a matter of honest conviction, partly as an incident of the factiousness inherent in all political opposition, which makes a point wherever it can. logically, there may at first appear some reason in these arguments. we are bound to believe so, for we cannot entirely impeach the candor of our ancestors, who doubtless advanced them with some degree of conviction. the answer, of course, is, that when two nations go to war, all the citizens of one become internationally the enemies of the other. this is the accepted principle of international law, a residuum of the concentrated wisdom of many generations of international legists. when war takes the place of peace, it annihilates all natural and conventional rights, all treaties and compacts, except those which appertain to the state of war itself. the warfare of modern civilization assures many rights to an enemy, by custom, by precedent, by compact; many treaties bear express stipulations that, should war arise between the parties, such and such methods of warfare are barred; but all these are merely guaranteed exceptions to the general rule that every individual of each nation is the enemy of those of the opposing belligerent. canada and the canadians, being british subjects, became therefore, however involuntarily, the enemies of the united states, when the latter decided that the injuries received from great britain compelled recourse to the sword. moreover, war, once determined, must be waged on the principles of war; and whatever greed of annexation may have entered into the motives of the administration of the day, there can be no question that politically and militarily, as a war measure, the invasion of canada was not only justifiable but imperative. "in case of war," wrote the united states secretary of state, monroe, a very few days[ ] before the declaration, "it might be necessary to invade canada; not as an object of the war, but as a means to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion." war now is never waged for the sake of mere fighting, simply to see who is the better at killing people. the warfare of civilized nations is for the purpose of accomplishing an object, obtaining a concession of alleged right from an enemy who has proved implacable to argument. he is to be made to yield to force what he has refused to reason; and to do that, hold is laid upon what is his, either by taking actual possession, or by preventing his utilizing what he still may retain. an attachment is issued, so to say, or an injunction laid, according to circumstances; as men in law do to enforce payment of a debt, or abatement of an injury. if, in the attempt to do this, the other nation resists, as it probably will, then fighting ensues; but that fighting is only an incident of war. war, in substance, though not perhaps in form, began when the one nation resorted to force, quite irrespective of the resistance of the other. canada, conquered by the united states, would therefore have been a piece of british property attached; either in compensation for claims, or as an asset in the bargaining which precedes a treaty of peace. its retention even, as a permanent possession, would have been justified by the law of war, if the military situation supported that course. this is a political consideration; militarily, the reasons were even stronger. to americans the war of has worn the appearance of a maritime contest. this is both natural and just; for, as a matter of fact, not only were the maritime operations more pleasing to retrospect, but they also were as a whole, and on both sides, far more efficient, far more virile, than those on land. under the relative conditions of the parties, however, it ought to have been a land war, because of the vastly superior advantages on shore possessed by the party declaring war; and such it would have been, doubtless, but for the amazing incompetency of most of the army leaders on both sides, after the fall of the british general, brock, almost at the opening of hostilities. this incompetency, on the part of the united states, is directly attributable to the policy of jefferson and madison; for had proper attention and development been given to the army between and , it could scarcely have failed that some indication of men's fitness or unfitness would have preceded and obviated the lamentable experience of the first two years, when every opportunity was favorable, only to be thrown away from lack of leadership. that even the defects of preparation, extreme and culpable as these were, could have been overcome, is evidenced by the history of the lakes. the governor general, prevost, reported to the home government in july and august, , that the british still had the naval superiority on erie and ontario;[ ] but this condition was reversed by the energy and capacity of the american commanders, chauncey, perry, and macdonough, utilizing the undeniable superiority in available resources--mechanics and transportation--which their territory had over the canadian, not for naval warfare only, but for land as well. the general considerations that have been advanced are sufficient to indicate what should have been the general plan of the war on the part of the united states. every war must be aggressive, or, to use the technical term, offensive, in military character; for unless you injure the enemy, if you confine yourself, as some of the grumblers of that day would have it, to simple defence against his efforts, obviously he has no inducement to yield your contention. incidentally, however, vital interests must be defended, otherwise the power of offence falls with them. every war, therefore, has both a defensive and an offensive side, and in an effective plan of campaign each must receive due attention. now, in , so far as general natural conditions went, the united states was relatively weak on the sea frontier, and strong on the side of canada. the seaboard might, indeed, in the preceding ten years, have been given a development of force, by the creation of an adequate navy, which would have prevented war, by the obvious danger to british interests involved in hostilities. but this had not been done; and jefferson, by his gunboat policy, building some two hundred of those vessels, worthless unless under cover of the land, proclaimed by act as by voice his adherence to a bare defensive. the sea frontier, therefore, became mainly a line of defence, the utility of which primarily was, or should have been, to maintain communication with the outside world; to support commerce, which in turn should sustain the financial potency that determines the issues of war. the truth of this observation is shown by one single fact, which will receive recurrent mention from time to time in the narrative. owing partly to the necessities of the british government, and partly as a matter of favor extended to the new england states, on account of their antagonism to the war, the commercial blockade of the coast was for a long time--until april , --limited to the part between narragansett bay and the boundary of florida, then a spanish colony. during this period, which madison angrily called one of "invidious discrimination between different parts of the united states," new england was left open to neutral commerce, which the british, to supply their own wants, further encouraged by a system of licenses, exempting from capture the vessels engaged, even though american. owing largely to this, though partly to the local development of manufactures caused by the previous policy of restriction upon foreign trade, which had diverted new england from maritime commerce to manufactures, that section became the distributing centre of the union. in consequence, the remainder of the country was practically drained of specie, which set to the northward and eastward, the surplusage above strictly local needs finding its way to canada, to ease the very severe necessities of the british military authorities there; for great britain, maintaining her own armies in the spanish peninsula, and supporting in part the alliance against napoleon on the continent, could spare no coin to canada. it could not go far south, because the coasting trade was destroyed by the enemy's fleets, and the south could not send forward its produce by land to obtain money in return. the deposits in massachusetts banks increased from $ , , , in , to $ , , , in ; while in the same years the specie held was respectively $ , , and $ , , .[ ] it was a day of small things, relatively to present gigantic commercial enterprises; but an accumulation of cash in one quarter, coinciding with penury in another, proves defect in circulation consequent upon embarrassed communications. that flour in boston sold for $ . the barrel, while at baltimore and richmond it stood at $ . and $ . , tells the same tale of congestion and deficiency, due to interruption of water communication; the whole proving that, under the conditions of , as the united states government had allowed them to become, through failure to foster a navy by which alone coast defence in the true sense can be effected, the coast frontier was essentially the weak point. there great britain could put forth her enormous naval strength with the most sensible and widespread injury to american national power, as represented in the financial stability which constitutes the sinews of war. men enough could be had; there were one hundred thousand registered seamen belonging to the country; but in the preceding ten years the frigate force had decreased from thirteen of that nominal rate to nine, while the only additions to the service, except gunboats, were two sloops of war, two brigs, and four schooners. the construction of ships of the line, for six of which provision had been made under the administration which expired in , was abandoned immediately by its successor. there was no navy for defence. small vessels, under which denomination most frigates should be included, have their appropriate uses in a naval establishment, but in themselves are inadequate to the defence of a coast-line, in the true sense of the word "defence." it is one of the first elements of intelligent warfare that true defence consists in imposing upon the enemy a wholesome fear of yourself. "the best protection against the enemy's fire," said farragut, "is a rapid fire from our own guns." "no scheme of defence," said napoleon, "can be considered efficient that does not provide the means of attacking the enemy at an opportune moment. in the defence of a river, for instance," he continues, "you must not only be able to withstand its passage by the enemy, but must keep in your own hands means of crossing, so as to attack him, when occasion either offers, or can be contrived." in short, you must command either a bridge or a ford, and have a disposable force ready to utilize it by attack. the fact of such preparation fetters every movement of the enemy. at its very outbreak the war of gave an illustration of the working of this principle. tiny as was the united states navy, the opening of hostilities found it concentrated in a body of several frigates, with one or two sloops of war, which put to sea together. the energies of great britain being then concentrated upon the navy of napoleon, her available force at halifax and bermuda was small, and the frigates, of which it was almost wholly composed, were compelled to keep together; for, if they attempted to scatter, in order to watch several commercial ports, they were exposed to capture singly by this relatively numerous body of american cruisers. the narrow escape of the frigate "constitution" from the british squadron at this moment, on her way from the chesapeake to new york, which port she was unable to gain, exemplifies precisely the risk of dispersion that the british frigates did not dare to face while their enemy was believed to be at hand in concentrated force. they being compelled thus to remain together, the ports were left open; and the american merchant ships, of which a great number were then abroad, returned with comparative impunity, though certainly not entirely without losses. this actual experience illustrates exactly the principle of coast defence by the power having relatively the weaker navy. it cannot, indeed, drive away a body numerically much stronger; but, if itself respectable in force, it can compel the enemy to keep united. thereby is minimized the injury caused to a coast-line by the dispersion of the enemy's force along it in security, such as was subsequently acquired by the british in - , and by the united states navy during the civil war. the enemy's fears defend the coast, and protect the nation, by securing the principal benefit of the coast-line--coastwise and maritime trade, and the revenue thence proceeding. in order, however, to maintain this imposing attitude, the defending state must hold ready a concentrated force, of such size that the enemy cannot safely divide his own--a force, for instance, such as that estimated by gouverneur morris, twenty years before .[ ] the defendant fleet, further, must be able to put to sea at a moment inconvenient to the enemy; must have the bridge or ford napoleon required for his army. such the united states had in her seaports, which with moderate protection could keep an enemy at a distance, and from which escape was possible under conditions exceedingly dangerous for the detached hostile divisions; but although possessing these bridge heads leading to the scene of ocean war, no force to issue from them existed. in those eleven precious years during which great britain by american official returns had captured american ships,[ ] a large proportion of them in defiance of international law, as was claimed, and had impressed from american vessels , seamen,[ ] asserted to be mostly american citizens, the united states had built two sloops of guns, and two brigs of ; and out of twelve frigates had permitted three to rot at their moorings. to build ships of the line had not even been attempted. consequently, except when weather drove them off, puny divisions of british ships gripped each commercial port by the throat with perfect safety; and those weather occasions, which constitute the opportunity of the defendant sea power, could not be improved by military action. such in general was the condition of the sea frontier, thrown inevitably upon the defensive. with the passing comment that, had it been defended as suggested, great britain would never have forced the war, let us now consider conditions on the canadian line, where circumstances eminently favored the offensive by the united states; for this war should not be regarded simply as a land war or a naval war, nor yet as a war of offence and again one of defence, but as being continuously and at all times both offensive and defensive, both land and sea, in reciprocal influence. disregarding as militarily unimportant the artificial boundary dividing canada from new york, vermont, and the eastern parts of the union, the frontier separating the land positions of the two belligerents was the great lakes and the river st. lawrence. this presented certain characteristic and unusual features. that it was a water line was a condition not uncommon; but it was exceptionally marked by those broad expanses which constitute inland seas of great size and depth, navigable by vessels of the largest sea-going dimensions. this water system, being continuous and in continual progress, is best conceived by applying to the whole, from lake superior to the ocean, the name of the great river, the st. lawrence, which on the one hand unites it to the sea, and on the other divides the inner waters from the outer by a barrier of rapids, impassable to ships that otherwise could navigate freely both lakes and ocean. the importance of the lakes to military operations must always be great, but it was much enhanced in by the undeveloped condition of land communications. with the roads in the state they then were, the movement of men, and still more of supplies, was vastly more rapid by water than by land. except in winter, when iron-bound snow covered the ground, the routes of upper canada were well-nigh impassable; in spring and in autumn rains, wholly so to heavy vehicles. the mail from montreal to york,--now toronto,--three hundred miles, took a month in transit.[ ] in october, , when the war was virtually over, the british general at niagara lamented to the commander-in-chief that, owing to the refusal of the navy to carry troops, an important detachment was left "to struggle through the dreadful roads from kingston to york."[ ] "should reinforcements and provisions not arrive, the naval commander would," in his opinion, "have much to answer for."[ ] the commander-in-chief himself wrote: "the command of the lakes enables the enemy to perform in two days what it takes the troops from kingston sixteen to twenty days of severe marching. their men arrive fresh; ours fatigued, and with exhausted equipment. the distance from kingston to the niagara frontier exceeds two hundred and fifty miles, and part of the way is impracticable for supplies."[ ] on the united states side, road conditions were similar but much less disadvantageous. the water route by ontario was greatly preferred as a means of transportation, and in parts and at certain seasons was indispensable. stores for sackett's harbor, for instance, had in early summer to be brought to oswego, and thence coasted along to their destination, in security or in peril, according to the momentary predominance of one party or the other on the lake. in like manner, it was more convenient to move between the niagara frontier and the east end of the lake by water; but in case of necessity, men could march. an english traveller in says: "i accomplished the journey from albany to buffalo in october in six days with ease and comfort, whereas in may it took ten of great difficulty and distress."[ ] in the farther west the american armies, though much impeded, advanced securely through ohio and indiana to the shores of lake erie, and there maintained themselves in supplies sent over-country; whereas the british at the western end of the lake, opposite detroit, depended wholly upon the water, although no hostile force threatened the land line between them and ontario. the battle of lake erie, so disastrous to their cause, was forced upon them purely by failure of food, owing to the appearance of perry's squadron. from lake superior to the head of the first rapid of the st. lawrence, therefore, the control of the water was the decisive factor in the general military situation. both on the upper lakes, where water communication from sault sainte marie to niagara was unbroken, and on ontario, separated from the others by the falls of niagara, the british had at the outset a slight superiority, but not beyond the power of the united states to overtake and outpass. throughout the rapids, to montreal, military conditions resembled those which confront a general charged with the passage of any great river. if undertaken at all, such an enterprise requires the deceiving of the opponent as to the place and time when the attempt will be made, the careful provision of means and disposition of men for instant execution, and finally the prompt and decisive seizure of opportunity, to transfer and secure on the opposite shore a small body, capable of maintaining itself until the bulk of the army can cross to its support. nothing of the sort was attempted here, or needed to be undertaken in this war. naval superiority determined the ability to cross above the rapids, and there was no occasion to consider the question of crossing between them. immediately below the last lay montreal, accessible to sea-going vessels from the ocean. to that point, therefore, the sea power of great britain reached, and there it ended. the united states government was conscious of its great potential superiority over canada, in men and in available resources. so evident, indeed, was the disparity, that the prevalent feeling was not one of reasonable self-reliance, but of vainglorious self-confidence; of dependence upon mere bulk and weight to crush an opponent, quite irrespective of preparation or skill, and disregardful of the factor of military efficiency. jefferson's words have already been quoted. calhoun, then a youthful member of congress, and a foremost advocate of the war, said in march, : "so far from being unprepared, sir, i believe that in four weeks from the time a declaration of war is heard, on our frontier, the whole of upper canada"--halfway down the st. lawrence--"and a part of lower canada will be in our power." this tone was general in congress; henry clay spoke to the same effect. granting due preparation, such might indeed readily have been the result of a well-designed, active, offensive campaign. little hope of any other result was held by the british local officials, and what little they had was based upon the known want of military efficiency in the united states. brock, by far the ablest among them, in february declared his "full conviction that unless detroit and michilimackinac be both in our possession at the commencement of hostilities, not only amherstburg"--on the detroit river, a little below detroit--"but most probably the whole country, must be evacuated as far as kingston."[ ] this place is at the foot of ontario, close to the entrance to the st. lawrence. having a good and defensible harbor, it had been selected for the naval station of the lake. if successful in holding it, there would be a base of operations for attempting recovery of the water, and ultimately of the upper country. failing there, of course the british must fall back upon the sea, touch with which they would regain at montreal, resting there upon the navy of their nation; just as wellington, by the same dependence, had maintained himself at lisbon unshaken by the whole power of napoleon. there was, however, no certainty that the lisbon of canada would be found at montreal. though secure on the water side, there were there no lines of torres vedras; and it was well within the fears of the governors of canada that under energetic attack their forces would not be able to make a stand short of quebec, against the overwhelming numbers which might be brought against them. in december, , governor general craig, a soldier of tried experience and reputation, had written: "defective as it is, quebec is the only post that can be considered tenable for a moment. if the americans should turn their attention to lower canada, which is most probable, i have no hopes that the forces here can accomplish more than to check them for a short time. they will eventually be compelled to take refuge in quebec, and operations must terminate in a siege."[ ] consequent upon this report of a most competent officer, much had been done to strengthen the works; but pressed by the drain of the peninsular war, heaviest in the years to , when france elsewhere was at peace, little in the way of troops had been sent. as late as november , , the secretary for war, in london, notified governor general prevost that as yet he could give no hopes of reinforcements.[ ] napoleon had begun his retreat from moscow three weeks before, but the full effects of the impending disaster were not yet forecast. another three weeks, and the secretary wrote that a moderate detachment would be sent to bermuda, to await there the opening of the st. lawrence in the spring.[ ] but already the united states had lost mackinac and detroit, and canada had gained time to breathe. brock's remark, expanded as has here been done, defines the decisive military points upon the long frontier from lake superior to montreal. mackinac, detroit, kingston, montreal--these four places, together with adequate development of naval strength on the lakes--constituted the essential elements of the military situation at the opening of hostilities. why? mackinac and detroit because, being situated upon extremely narrow parts of the vital chain of water communication, their possession controlled decisively all transit. held in force, they commanded the one great and feasible access to the northwestern country. upon them turned, therefore, the movement of what was then its chief industry, the fur trade; but more important still, the tenure of those points so affected the interests of the indians of that region as to throw them necessarily on the side of the party in possession. it is difficult for us to realize how heavily this consideration weighed at that day with both nations, but especially with the british; because, besides being locally the weaker, they knew that under existing conditions in europe--napoleon still in the height of his power, never yet vanquished, and about to undertake the invasion of russia--they had nothing to hope from the mother country. yet the leaders, largely professional soldiers, faced the situation with soldierly instinct. "if we could destroy the american posts at detroit and michilimackinac," wrote lieutenant-governor gore of upper canada, to craig, in , "many indians would declare for us;" and he agrees with craig that, "if not for us, they will surely be against us."[ ] it was gore's successor, brock, that wrested from the americans at once the two places named, with the effect upon the indians which had been anticipated. the dependence of these upon this water-line communication was greatly increased by various punitive expeditions by the united states troops in the northwest, under general harrison, in the autumn and winter of - . to secure further the safety of the whites in the outer settlements, the villages and corn of the hostile natives were laid waste for a considerable surrounding distance.[ ] they were thus forced to remove, and to seek shelter in the northwest. this increase of population in that quarter, relatively to a store of food never too abundant, made it the more urgent for them to remain friends of those with whom it rested to permit the water traffic, by which supplies could come forward and the exchange of commodities go on. the fall of michilimackinac, therefore, determined their side, to which the existing british naval command of the upper lakes also contributed; and these causes were alleged by hull in justification of his surrender at detroit, which completed and secured the enemy's grip throughout the northwestern frontier. this accession of strength to the british was not without very serious drawbacks. shortly before the battle of lake erie the british commissaries were feeding fourteen thousand indians--men, women, and children. what proportion of these were warriors it is hard to say, and harder still how many could be counted on to take the field when wanted; but it is probable that the exhaustion of supplies due to this cause more than compensated for any service received from them in war. when barclay sailed to fight perry, there remained in store but one day's flour, and the crews of his ships had been for some days on half allowance of many articles. the opinion of competent soldiers on the spot, such as craig and brock, in full possession of all the contemporary facts, may be accepted explicitly as confirming the inferences which in any event might have been drawn from the natural features of the situation. upon mackinac and detroit depended the control and quiet of the northwestern country, because they commanded vital points on its line of communication. upon kingston and montreal, by their position and intrinsic advantages, rested the communication of all canada, along and above the st. lawrence, with the sea power of great britain, whence alone could be drawn the constant support without which ultimate defeat should have been inevitable. naval power, sustained upon the great lakes, controlled the great line of communication between the east and west, and also conferred upon the party possessing it the strategic advantage of interior lines; that is, of shorter distances, both in length and time, to move from point to point of the lake shores, close to which lay the scenes of operations. it followed that detroit and michilimackinac, being at the beginning in the possession of the united states, should have been fortified, garrisoned, provisioned, in readiness for siege, and placed in close communication with home, as soon as war was seen to be imminent, which it was in december, , at latest. having in that quarter everything to lose, and comparatively little to gain, the country was thrown on the defensive. on the east the possession of montreal or kingston would cut off all canada above from support by the sea, which would be equivalent to insuring its fall. "i shall continue to exert myself to the utmost to overcome every difficulty," wrote brock, who gave such emphatic proof of energetic and sagacious exertion in his subsequent course. "should, however, the communication between montreal and kingston be cut off, the fate of the troops in this part of the province will be decided."[ ] "the montreal frontier," said the officer selected by the duke of wellington to report on the defences of canada, "is the most important, and at present [ ] confessedly most vulnerable and accessible part of canada."[ ] there, then, was the direction for offensive operations by the united states; preferably against montreal, for, if successful, a much larger region would be isolated and reduced. montreal gone, kingston could receive no help from without; and, even if capable of temporary resistance, its surrender would be but a question of time. coincidently with this military advance, naval development for the control of the lakes should have proceeded, as a discreet precaution; although, after the fall of kingston and montreal, there could have been little use of an inland navy, for the british local resources would then have been inadequate to maintain an opposing force. considered apart from the question of military readiness, in which the united states was so lamentably deficient, the natural advantages in her possession for the invasion of canada were very great. the hudson river, lake george, and lake champlain furnished a line of water communication, for men and supplies, from the very heart of the resources of the country, centring about new york. this was not indeed continuous; but it was consecutive, and well developed. almost the whole of it lay within united states territory; and when the boundary line on champlain was reached, montreal was but forty miles distant. towards kingston, also, there was a similar line, by way of the mohawk river and lake oneida to oswego, whence a short voyage on ontario reached the american naval station at sackett's harbor, thirty miles from kingston. as had been pointed out six months before the war began, by general armstrong, who became the united states secretary of war in january, , when the most favorable conditions for initiative had already been lost, these two lines were identical as far as albany. "this should be the place of rendezvous; because, besides other recommendations, it is here that all the roads leading from the central portion of the united states to the canadas diverge--a circumstance which, while it keeps up your enemy's doubts as to your real point of attack, cannot fail to keep his means of defence in a state of division."[ ] the perplexity of an army, thus uncertain upon which extreme of a line one hundred and fifty miles long a blow will fall, is most distressing; and trebly so when, as in this case, the means of communication from end to end are both scanty and slow. "the conquest of lower canada," sir james craig had written, "must still be effected by way of lake champlain;" but while this was true, and dictated to the officer charged with the defence the necessity of keeping the greater part of his force in that quarter, it would be impossible wholly to neglect the exposure of the upper section. this requirement was reflected in the disposition of the british forces when war began; two thirds being below montreal, chiefly at quebec, the remainder dispersed through upper canada. to add to these advantages of the united states, trivial as was the naval force of either party on champlain, the preponderance at this moment, and throughout the first year, was in her hands. she was also better situated to enlarge her squadrons on all the lakes, because nearer the heart of her power. circumstances thus had determined that, in general plan, the seaboard represented the defensive scene of campaign for the united states, while the land frontier should be that of offensive action. it will be seen, with particular reference to the latter, that the character of the front of operations prescribed the offensive in great and concentrated force toward the st. lawrence, with preparations and demonstrations framed to keep the enemy doubtful to the last possible moment as to where the blow should fall; while on the western frontier, from michilimackinac to niagara, the defensive should have been maintained, qualifying this term, however, by the already quoted maxim of napoleon, that no offensive disposition is complete which does not keep in view, and provide for, offensive action, if opportunity offer. such readiness, if it leads to no more, at least compels the opponent to retain near by a degree of force that weakens by so much his resistance in the other quarter, against which the real offensive campaign is directed. similarly, the seaboard, defensive in general relation to the national plan as a whole, must have its own particular sphere of offensive action, without which its defensive function is enfeebled, if not paralyzed. having failed to create before the war a competent navy, capable of seizing opportunity, when offered, to act against hostile divisions throughout the world, it was not possible afterwards to retrieve this mistake. under the circumstances existing in , the previous decade having been allowed by the country to pass in absolute naval indifference, offensive measures were necessarily confined to the injury of the enemy's commerce. had a proper force existed, abundant opportunity for more military action was sure to occur. the characteristics of parts of the american coast prevented close blockade, especially in winter; and the same violent winds which forced an enemy's ships off, facilitated egress under circumstances favoring evasion. escape to the illimitable ocean then depended at worst upon speed. this was the case at boston, which commodore bainbridge before the war predicted could not be effectually blockaded; also at narragansett, recommended for the same reason by commodore john rodgers; and in measure at new york, though there the more difficult and shoaler bar involved danger and delay to the passage of heavy frigates. in this respect the british encountered conditions contrary to those they had know before the french atlantic ports, where the wind which drove the blockaders off prevented the blockaded from leaving. once out and away, a squadron of respectable force would be at liberty to seek and strike one of the minor divisions of the enemy, imposing caution as to how he dispersed his ships in face of such a chance. to the south, both the delaware and chesapeake could be sealed almost hermetically by a navy so superior as was that of great britain; for the sheltered anchorage within enabled a fleet to lie with perfect safety across the path of all vessels attempting to go out or in. south of this again, wilmington, charleston, and savannah, though useful commercial harbors, had not the facilities, natural or acquired, for sustaining a military navy. they were not maritime centres; the commerce of the south, even of baltimore with its famous schooners, being in peace carried on chiefly by shipping which belonged elsewhere--new england or foreign. the necessities of a number of armed ships could not there be supplied; and furthermore, the comparatively moderate weather made the coast at once more easy and less dangerous for an enemy to approach. these ports, therefore, were entered only occasionally, and then by the smaller american cruisers. for these reasons the northern portion of the coast, with its rugged shores and tempestuous weather, was the base of such offensive operations as the diminutive numbers of the united states navy permitted. to it the national ships sought to return, for they could enter with greater security, and had better prospects of getting out again when they wished. in the delaware, the chesapeake, and on the southern coast, the efforts of the united states were limited to action strictly, and even narrowly, defensive in scope. occasionally, a very small enemy's cruiser might be attacked; but for the most part people were content merely to resist aggression, if attempted. the harrying of the chesapeake, and to a less extent of the delaware, are familiar stories; the total destruction of the coasting trade and the consequent widespread distress are less known, or less remembered. what is not at all appreciated is the deterrent effect upon the perfect liberty enjoyed by the enemy to do as they pleased, which would have been exercised by a respectable fighting navy; by a force in the northern ports, equal to the offensive, and ready for it, at the time that great britain was so grievously preoccupied by the numerous fleet which napoleon had succeeded in equipping, from antwerp round to venice. of course, after his abdication in , and the release of the british navy and army, there was nothing for the country to do, in the then military strength of the two nations, save to make peace on the best terms attainable. having allowed to pass away, unresented and unimproved, years of insult, injury, and opportunity, during which the gigantic power of napoleon would have been a substantial, if inert, support to its own efforts at redress, it was the mishap of the united states government to take up arms at the very moment when the great burden which her enemy had been bearing for years was about to fall from his shoulders forever. footnotes: [ ] ante, p. . [ ] adams, history of the united states, vol. viii. chap. viii. [ ] sir j. carmichael smyth, précis of wars in canada, p. . [ ] to monroe, may , . jefferson's writings, collected and edited by p.l. ford, vol. viii. p. . [ ] ibid., vol. vi. p. . [ ] kingsford's history of canada, vol. viii. p. . the author is indebted to major general sir f. maurice, and major g. le m. gretton, of the british army, for extracts from the official records, from which it appears that, excluding provincial corps, not to be accounted regulars, the british troops in canada numbered in january, , , ; in july, , . [ ] giles, annals of congress, - , p. . [ ] june , . works of james monroe, vol. v. p. . [ ] prevost to liverpool, july , . canadian archives, q. . [ ] niles' register, vol. vii. p. . [ ] ante, p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. ii. p. . "official returns in the department of state" are alleged as authority for the statement. monroe to foster, may , , mentions "a list in this office of several thousand american seamen who have been impressed into the british service." american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] kingsford's history of canada, vol. viii. p. . [ ] drummond to prevost, oct. , . report on canadian archives, , upper canada, p. . [ ] ibid., oct. . [ ] prevost to bathurst, aug. , . report on canadian archives, , lower canada, p. . [ ] travels, j.m. duncan, vol. ii. p. . [ ] life of sir isaac brock, p. . [ ] report on canadian archives, , lower canada, p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] ibid. [ ] report on canadian archives, , lower canada, p. . [ ] brackenridge, war of , pp. , , , . [ ] life of brock, p. . [ ] smyth, précis of the wars in canada, p. . [ ] armstrong to eustis, jan. , . armstrong's notices of the war of , vol. i, p. . chapter vi early cruises and engagements: the "constitution" and "guerriÈre." hull's operations and surrender war was declared on june . on the st there was lying in the lower harbor of new york a division of five united states vessels under the command of commodore john rodgers. it consisted of three frigates, the "president" and "united states," rated of guns, the "congress" of , the ship-rigged sloop of war "hornet" of , and the brig "argus" of . this division, as it stood, was composed of two squadrons; that of rodgers himself, and that of commodore stephen decatur, the latter having assigned to him immediately the "united states," the "congress," and the "argus." there belonged also to rodgers' particular squadron the "essex," a frigate rated at guns. captain david porter, one of the most distinguished names in american naval annals, commanded her then, and until her capture by a much superior force, nearly two years later; but at this moment she was undergoing repairs, a circumstance which prevented her from accompanying the other vessels, and materially affected her subsequent history. it may be mentioned, as an indication of naval policy, that although rodgers and decatur each had more than one vessel under his control, neither was given the further privilege and distinction, frequent in such cases, of having a captain to command the particular ship on which he himself sailed. this, when done, introduces a very substantial change in the position of the officer affected. he is removed from being only first among several equals, and is advanced to a superiority of grade, in which he stands alone, with consequent enhancement of authority. rodgers was captain of the "president" as well as commodore of the small body of vessels assigned to him; decatur held the same relation to the frigate "united states," and to her consorts. though apparently trivial, the circumstance is not insignificant; for it indicates clearly that, so far as the navy department then had any mind, it had not yet made it up as to whether it would send out its vessels as single cruisers, or combine them into divisions, for the one operation open to the united states navy, namely, the destruction of the enemy's commerce. with divisions permanently constituted as such, propriety and effective action would have required the additional dignity for the officer in general charge, and they themselves doubtless would have asked for it; but for ships temporarily associated, and liable at any moment to be scattered, not only was the simple seniority of naval rank sufficient, but more would have been inexpedient. the commodores, now such only by courtesy and temporary circumstance, would suffer no derogation if deprived of ships other than their own; whereas the more extensive function, similarly curtailed, would become a mere empty show, a humiliation which no office, civil or military, can undergo without harm. this indecision of the department reflected the varying opinions of the higher officers of the service, which in turn but reproduced different schools of thought throughout all navies. historically, as a military operation, for the injury of an enemy's commerce and the protection of one's own, it may be considered fairly demonstrated that vessels grouped do more effective work than the same number scattered. this is, of course, but to repeat the general military teaching of operations of all kinds. it is not the keeping of the several vessels side by side that constitutes the virtue of this disposition; it is the placing them under a single head, thereby insuring co-operation, however widely dispersed by their common chief under the emergency of successive moments. like a fan that opens and shuts, vessels thus organically bound together possess the power of wide sweep, which insures exertion over a great field of ocean, and at the same time that of mutual support, because dependent upon and controlled from a common centre. such is concentration, reasonably understood; not huddled together like a drove of cattle, but distributed with a regard to a common purpose, and linked together by the effectual energy of a single will. there is, however, in the human mind an inveterate tendency to dispersion of effort, due apparently to the wish to do at once as many things as may be; a disposition also to take as many chances as possible in an apparent lottery, with the more hope that some one of them will come up successful. not an aggregate big result, and one only, whether hit or miss, but a division of resources and powers which shall insure possible compensation in one direction for what is not gained, or may even be lost, in another. the navy department, when hostilities were imminent, addressed inquiries to several prominent officers as to the best means of employing the very small total force available. the question involved the direction of effort, as well as the method; but as regards the former of these, the general routes followed by british commerce, and the modes of protecting it, were so far understood as to leave not much room for differences of opinion. rodgers may have been unconsciously swayed by the natural bias of an officer whose seniority would insure him a division, if the single-cruiser policy did not prevail. of the replies given, however, his certainly was the one most consonant with sound military views.[ ] send a small squadron, of two or three frigates and a sloop, to cruise on the coast of the british islands, and send the light cruisers to the west indies; for, though he did not express it, in the gentle breezes and smooth seas of the tropics small cruisers have a much better chance to avoid capture by big ships than in the heavy gales of the north atlantic. this much may be termed the distinctly offensive part of rodgers' project. for the defensive, employ the remainder of the frigates, singly or in squadron, to guard our own seaboard; either directly, by remaining off the coast, or by taking position in the track of the trade between great britain and the st. lawrence. irrespective of direct captures there made, this course would contribute to protect the access to home ports, by drawing away the enemy's ships of war to cover their own threatened commerce. alike in the size of his foreign squadron, and in the touch of uncertainty as to our own coasts, "singly or in squadron," rodgers reflected the embarrassment of a man whose means are utterly inadequate to the work he wishes to do. one does not need to be a soldier or a seaman to comprehend the difficulty of making ends meet when there is not enough to go round. decatur and bainbridge, whose written opinions are preserved, held views greatly modified from those of rodgers, or even distinctly opposed to them. "the plan which appears to me best calculated for our little navy to annoy the trade of great britain," wrote decatur,[ ] "would be to send them out distant from our own coast, singly, or not more than two frigates in company, without specific instructions; relying upon the enterprise of their officers. two frigates cruising together would not be so easily traced by an enemy as a greater number; their movements would be infinitely more rapid; they would be sufficiently strong in most instances to attack a convoy, and the probability is they would not meet with a superior cruising force. if, however, they should meet a superior, and cannot avoid it, we would not have to regret the whole of our marine crushed at one blow." bainbridge is yet more absolute. "i am anxious to see us all dispersed about various seas. if we are kept together in squadron, or lying in port, the whole are scarcely of more advantage than one ship. i wish all our public vessels here [boston] were dispersed in various ports, for i apprehend it will draw speedily a numerous force of the enemy to blockade or attack."[ ] at the moment of writing this, rodgers' squadron was in boston, having returned from a cruise, and the "constitution" also, immediately after her engagement with the "guerrière." it will be observed that, in spirit even more than in letter, rodgers' leading conception is that of co-operation, combined action. first, he would have a department general plan, embracing in a comprehensive scheme the entire navy and the ocean at large, in the british seas, west indies, and north atlantic; each contributing, by its particular action and impression, to forward the work of the others, and so of the whole. secondly, he intimates, not obscurely, though cautiously, in each separate field the concerted action of several ships is better than their disconnected efforts. decatur and bainbridge, on the contrary, implicitly, and indeed explicitly, favor individual movement. they would reject even combination by the department--"no specific instructions, rely upon the enterprise of the officers." nor will they have a local supervision or control in any particular; two frigates at the most are to act together, singly even is preferable, and they shall roam the seas at will. there can be little doubt as to which scheme is sounder in general principle. all military experience concurs in the general rule of co-operative action; and this means concentration, under the liberal definition before given--unity of purpose and subordination to a central control. general rules, however, must be intelligently applied to particular circumstances; and it will be found by considering the special circumstances of british commerce, under the war conditions of , that rodgers' plan was particularly suited to injure it. it is doubtless true that if merchant vessels were so dispersed over the globe, that rarely more than one would be visible at a time, one ship of war could take that one as well as a half-dozen could. but this was not the condition. british merchant ships were not permitted so to act. they were compelled to gather at certain centres, and thence, when enough had assembled, were despatched in large convoys, guarded by ships of war, in force proportioned to that disposable at the moment by the local admiral, and to the anticipated danger. consequently, while isolated merchant ships were to be met, they were but the crumbs that fell from the table, except in the near vicinity of the british islands themselves. such were the conditions while great britain had been at war with france alone; but the declaration of the united states led at once to increased stringency. all licenses to cross the atlantic without convoy were at once revoked, and every colonial and naval commander lay under heavy responsibility to enforce the law of convoy. insurance was forfeited by breach of its requirements; and in case of parting convoy, capture would at least hazard, if not invalidate, the policy. under all this compulsion, concentrated merchant fleets and heavy guards became as far as possible the rule of action. with such conditions it was at once more difficult for a single ship of war to find, and when found to deal effectually with, a body of vessels which on the one hand was large, and yet occupied but a small space relatively to the great expanse of ocean over which the pursuer might roam fruitlessly, missing continually the one moving spot he sought. for such a purpose a well-handled squadron, scattering within signal-distance from each other, or to meet at a rendezvous, was more likely to find, and, having found, could by concerted action best overcome the guard and destroy the fleet. on june , , the navy department issued orders for rodgers,[ ] which are interesting as showing its ideas of operations. the two squadrons then assembled under him were to go to sea, and there separate. he himself, with the frigates "president," "essex," and "john adams," sloop "hornet," and the small brig "nautilus," was to go to the capes of the chesapeake, and thence cruise eastwardly, off and on. decatur's two frigates, with the "argus," would cruise southwardly from new york. it was expected that the two would meet from time to time; and, should combined action be advisable, rodgers had authority to unite them under his broad pendant for that purpose. the object of this movement was to protect the commerce of the country, which at this time was expected to be returning in great numbers from the spanish peninsula; whither had been hurried every available ship, and every barrel of flour in store, as soon as the news of the approaching embargo of april became public. "the great bulk of our returning commerce," wrote the secretary, "will make for the ports between the chesapeake and our eastern extremities; and, in the protection to be afforded, such ports claim particular attention." the obvious comment on this disposition is that protection to the incoming ships would be most completely afforded, not by the local presence of either of these squadrons, but by the absence of the enemy. this absence was best insured by beating him, if met; and in the then size of the british halifax fleet it was possible that a detachment sent from it might be successfully engaged by the joint division, though not by either squadron singly. the other adequate alternative was to force the enemy to keep concentrated, and so to cover as small a part as might be of the homeward path of the scattered american trade. this also was best effected by uniting our own ships. without exaggerating the danger to the american squadrons, needlessly exposed in detail by the department's plan, the object in view would have been attained as surely, and at less risk, by keeping all the vessels together, even though they were retained between boston bay and the capes of the chesapeake for the local defence of commerce. in short, as was to be expected from the antecedents of the government, the scheme was purely and narrowly defensive; there was not in it a trace of any comprehension of the principle that offence is the surest defence. the opening words of its letter defined the full measure of its understanding. "it has been judged expedient so to employ our public armed vessels, as to afford to our returning commerce all possible protection." it may be added, that to station on the very spot where the merchant vessels were flocking in return, divisions inferior to that which could be concentrated against them, was very bad strategy; drawing the enemy by a double motive to the place whence his absence was particularly desirable. the better way was to influence british naval action by a distinct offensive step; by a movement of the combined divisions sufficiently obvious to inspire caution, but yet too vague to admit of precision of direction or definite pursuit. in accordance with the general ideas formulated in his letter, before quoted, rodgers had already fixed upon a plan, which, if successful, would inflict a startling blow to british commerce and prestige, and at the same time would compel the enemy to concentrate, thus diminishing his menace to american shipping. it was known to him that a large convoy had sailed from jamaica for england about may . the invariable course of such bodies was first to the north-northeast, parallel in a general sense to the gulf stream and american coast, until they had cleared the northeast trades and the belt of light and variable winds above them. upon approaching forty degrees north latitude, they met in full force the rude west winds, as the spanish navigators styled them, and before them bore away to the english channel. that a month after their starting rodgers should still have hoped to overtake them, gives a lively impression of the lumbering slowness of trade movement under convoy; but he counted also upon the far swifter joint speed of his few and well-found ships. to the effective fulfilment of his double object, defensive and offensive, however, he required more ships than his own squadron, and he held his course dependent upon decatur joining him.[ ] [illustration: the chase of the _belvidera_ from a drawing by carlton t. chapman.] on june decatur did join, and later in the same day arrived a department order of june with the declaration of war. within an hour the division of five ships was under way for sea. in consequence of this instant movement rodgers did not receive the subsequent order of the department, june , the purport of which has been explained and discussed. standing off southeasterly from sandy hook, at a.m. of june was spoken an american brig, which four days before had seen the convoy steering east in latitude °, longitude °, or about three hundred miles from where the squadron then was. canvas was crowded in pursuit, but three hours later was sighted in the northeast a large sail heading toward the squadron. the course of all the vessels was changed for her; but she, proving to be british,--the "belvidera," rated , and smaller than any one of the american frigates,--speedily turned and took flight. pursuit was continued all that day and until half an hour before midnight, the "president" leading as the fastest ship; but the british vessel, fighting for her life, and with the friendly port of halifax under her lee, could resort to measures impossible to one whose plan of distant cruising required complete equipment, and full stores of provisions and water. boats and spare spars and anchors were thrown overboard, and fourteen tons of drinking water pumped out. thus lightened, after being within range of the "president's" guns for a couple of hours, the "belvidera" drew gradually away, and succeeded in escaping, having received and inflicted considerable damage. in explanation of such a result between two antagonists of very unequal size, it must be remembered that a chasing ship of those days could not fire straight ahead; while in turning her side to bring the guns to bear, as the "president" several times did, she lost ground. the chased ship, on the other hand, from the form of the stern, could use four guns without deviating from her course. after some little delay in repairing, the squadron resumed pursuit of the convoy. on june , and again on july , vessels were spoken which reported encountering it; the latter the evening before. traces of its course also were thought to be found in quantities of cocoanut shell and orange peel, passed on one occasion; but, though the chase was continued to within twenty hours' sail of the english channel, the convoy itself was never seen. to this disappointing result atmospheric conditions very largely contributed. from june , on the western edge of the great banks, until july , when the pursuit was abandoned, the weather was so thick that "at least six days out of seven" nothing was visible over five miles away, and for long periods the vessels could not even see one another at a distance of two hundred yards. the same surrounding lasted to the neighborhood of madeira, for which the course was next shaped. after passing that island on june return was made toward the united states by way of the azores, which were sighted, and thence again to the banks of newfoundland and cape sable, reaching boston august , after an absence of seventy days. although rodgers's plan had completely failed in what may properly be called its purpose of offence, and he could report the capture of "only seven merchant vessels, and those not valuable," he congratulated himself with justice upon success on the defensive side.[ ] the full effect was produced, which he had anticipated from the mere fact of a strong american division being at large, but seen so near its own shores that nothing certain could be inferred as to its movements or intentions. the "belvidera," having lost sight of it at midnight, could, upon her arrival in halifax, give only the general information that it was at sea; and captain byron, who commanded her, thought with reason that the "president's" action warranted the conclusion that the anticipated hostilities had been begun. he therefore seized and brought in two or three american merchantmen; but the british admiral, sawyer, thinking there might possibly be some mistake, like that of the meeting between the "president" and "little belt" a year before, directed their release. a very few days later, definite intelligence of the declaration of war by the united states was received at halifax. at that period, the american seas from the equator to labrador were for administrative purposes divided by the british admiralty into four commands: two in the west indies, centring respectively at jamaica and barbados; one at newfoundland; while the fourth, with its two chief naval bases of halifax and bermuda, lay over against the united states, and embraced the atlantic coast-line in its field of operations. admiral sawyer now promptly despatched a squadron, consisting of one small ship of the line and three frigates, the "shannon", , "belvidera", , and "Æolus", , which sailed july . four days later, off nantucket, it was joined by the "guerrière", , and july arrived off sandy hook. there captain broke, of the "shannon", who by seniority of rank commanded the whole force, "received the first intelligence of rodgers' squadron having put to sea."[ ] as an american division of some character had been known to be out since the "belvidera" met it, and as rodgers on this particular day was within two days' sail of the english channel, the entire ignorance of the enemy as to his whereabouts could not be more emphatically stated. the components of the british force were such that no two of them could justifiably venture to encounter his united command. consequently, to remain together was imposed as a military necessity, and it so continued for some weeks. in fact, the first separation, that of the "guerrière", though apparently necessary and safe, was followed immediately by a disaster. rodgers was therefore justified in his claim concerning his cruise. "it is truly unpleasant to be obliged to make a communication thus barren of benefit to our country. the only consolation i, individually, feel on the occasion is derived from knowing that our being at sea obliged the enemy to concentrate a considerable portion of his most active force, and thereby prevented his capturing an incalculable amount of american property that would otherwise have fallen a sacrifice." "my calculations were," he wrote on another occasion, "even if i did not succeed in destroying the convoy, that leaving the coast as we did would tend to distract the enemy, oblige him to concentrate a considerable portion of his active navy, and at the same time prevent his single cruisers from lying before any of our principal ports, from their not knowing to which, or at what moment, we might return."[ ] this was not only a perfectly sound military conception, gaining additional credit from the contrasted views of decatur and bainbridge, but it was applied successfully at the most critical moment of all wars, namely, when commerce is flocking home for safety, and under conditions particularly hazardous to the united states, owing to the unusually large number of vessels then out. "we have been so completely occupied in looking out for commodore rodgers' squadron," wrote an officer of the "guerrière", "that we have taken very few prizes."[ ] president madison in his annual message[ ] said: "our trade, with little exception, has reached our ports, having been much favored in it by the course pursued by a squadron of our frigates under the command of commodore rodgers." [illustration: the atlantic ocean, showing the positions of the ocean actions of the war of and the movements of the squadrons in july and august, ] nor was it only the offensive action of the enemy against the united states' ports and commerce that was thus hampered. unwonted defensive measures were forced upon him. uncertainty as to rodgers' position and intentions led captain broke, on july , to join a homeward-bound jamaica fleet, under convoy of the frigate "thalia", some two or three hundred miles to the southward and eastward of halifax, and to accompany it with his division five hundred miles on its voyage. the place of this meeting shows that it was pre-arranged, and its distance from the american coast, five hundred miles away from new york, together with the length of the journey through which the additional guard was thought necessary, emphasize the effect of rodgers' unknown situation upon the enemy's movements. the protection of their own trade carried this british division a thousand miles away from the coast it was to threaten. it is in such study of reciprocal action between enemies that the lessons of war are learned, and its principles established, in a manner to which the study of combats between single ships, however brilliant, affords no equivalent. the convoy that broke thus accompanied has been curiously confused with the one of which rodgers believed himself in pursuit;[ ] and the british naval historian james chuckles obviously over the blunder of the yankee commodore, who returned to boston "just six days after the 'thalia', having brought home her charge in safety, had anchored in the downs." rodgers may have been wholly misinformed as to there being any jamaica convoy on the way when he started; but as on july he had passed madeira on his way home, it is obvious that the convoy which broke then joined south of halifax could not be the one the american squadron believed itself to be pursuing across the atlantic a month earlier. broke accompanied the merchant ships to the limits of the halifax station. then, on august , receiving intelligence of rodgers having been seen on their homeward path, he directed the ship of the line, "africa", to go with them as far as ° w., and for them thence to follow latitude ° n., instead of the usual more southerly route.[ ] after completing this duty the "africa" was to return to halifax, whither the "guerrière", which needed repairs, was ordered at once. the remainder of the squadron returned off new york, where it was again reported on september . the movement of the convoy, and the "guerrière's" need of refit, were linked events that brought about the first single-ship action of the war; to account for which fully the antecedent movements of her opponent must also be traced. at the time rodgers sailed, the united states frigate "constitution", , was lying at annapolis, enlisting a crew. fearing to be blockaded in chesapeake bay, a position almost hopeless, her captain, hull, hurried to sea on july . july , the ship being then off egg harbor, new jersey, some ten or fifteen miles from shore, bound to new york, broke's vessels, which had then arrived from halifax for the first time in the war, were sighted from the masthead, to the northward and inshore of the "constitution". captain hull at first believed that this might be the squadron of rodgers, of whose actual movements he had no knowledge, waiting for him to join in order to carry out commands of the department. two hours later, another sail was discovered to the northeast, off shore. the perils of an isolated ship, in the presence of a superior force of possible enemies, imposed caution, so hull steered warily toward the single unknown. attempting to exchange signals, he soon found that he neither could understand nor be understood. to persist on his course might surround him with foes, and accordingly, about p.m., the ship was headed to the southeast and so continued during the night. [illustration: the forecastle of the _constitution_ during the chase from a drawing by henry reuterdahl.] the next morning left no doubt as to the character of the strangers, among whom was the "guerrière"; and there ensued a chase which, lasting from daylight of july th to near noon of the th, has become historical in the united states navy, from the attendant difficulties and the imminent peril of the favorite ship endangered. much of the pursuit being in calm, and on soundings, resort was had to towing by boats, and to dragging the ship ahead by means of light anchors dropped on the bottom. in a contest of this kind, the ability of a squadron to concentrate numbers on one or two ships, which can first approach and cripple the enemy, thus holding him till their consorts come up, gives an evident advantage over the single opponent. on the other hand, the towing boats of the pursuer, being toward the stern guns of the pursued, are the first objects on either side to come under fire, and are vulnerable to a much greater degree than the ships themselves. under such conditions, accurate appreciation of advantages, and unremitting use of small opportunities, are apt to prove decisive. it was by such diligent and skilful exertion that the "constitution" effected her escape from a position which for a time seemed desperate; but it should not escape attention that thus early in the war, before great britain had been able to re-enforce her american fleet, one of our frigates was unable to enter our principal seaport. "finding the ship so far to the southward and eastward," reported hull, "and the enemy's squadron stationed off new york, which would make it impossible to get in there, i determined to make for boston, to receive your further orders." on july he writes from boston that there were as yet no british cruisers in the bay, nor off the new england coast; that great numbers of merchant vessels were daily arriving from europe; and that he was warning them off the southern ports, advising that they should enter boston. he reasoned that the enemy would now disperse, and probably send two frigates off the port. in this he under-estimated the deterrent effect of rodgers' invisible command, but the apprehension hastened his own departure, and on august he sailed again with the first fair wind. running along the maine coast to the bay of fundy, he thence went off halifax; and meeting nothing there, in a three or four days' stay, moved to the gulf of st. lawrence, to intercept the trade of canada and nova scotia. here in the neighborhood of cape race some important captures were made, and on august an american brig retaken, which gave information that broke's squadron was not far away. this was probably a fairly correct report, as its returning course should have carried it near by a very few days before. hull therefore determined to go to the southward, passing close to bermuda, to cruise on the southern coast of the united states. in pursuance of this decision the "constitution" had run some three hundred miles, when at p.m. of august , being then nearly midway of the route over which broke three weeks before had accompanied the convoy, a sail was sighted to the eastward, standing west. this proved to be the "guerrière," on her return to halifax, whither she was moving very leisurely, having traversed only two hundred miles in twelve days. as the "constitution," standing south-southwest for her destination, was crossing the "guerrière's" bows, her course was changed, in order to learn the character of the stranger. by half-past three she was recognized to be a large frigate, under easy sail on the starboard tack; which, the wind being northwesterly, gives her heading from west-southwest to southwest. the "constitution" was to windward. at . the "guerrière," without changing her course, backed her maintopsail, the effect of which was to lessen her forward movement, leaving just way enough to keep command with her helm (g ). to be thus nearly motionless assured the steadiest platform for aiming the guns, during the period most critical for the "constitution," when, to get near, she must steer nearly head on, toward her opponent. the disadvantage of this approach is that the enemy's shot, if they hit, pass from end to end of the ship, a distance, in those days, nearly fourfold that of from side to side; and besides, the line from bow to stern was that on which the guns and the men who work them were ranged. the risks of grave injury were therefore greatly increased by exposure to this, which by soldiers is called enfilading, but at sea a raking fire; and to avoid such mischance was one of the principal concerns of a captain in a naval duel. [illustration: captain isaac hull from the engraving by d. edwin, after the painting by gilbert stuart.] seeing his enemy thus challenge him to come on, hull, who had been carrying sail in order to close, now reduced his canvas to topsails, and put two reefs into them, bringing by the wind for that object (c ). all other usual preparations were made at the same time; the "constitution" during them lying side to wind, out of gunshot, practically motionless, like her antagonist. when all was ready, the ship kept away again, heading toward the starboard quarter of the british vessel; that is, she was on her right-hand side, steering toward her stern (c ). as this, if continued, would permit her to pass close under the stern, and rake, captain dacres waited until he thought her within gunshot, when he fired the guns on the right-hand side of the vessel--the starboard broadside--and immediately wore ship; that is, turned the "guerrière" round, making a half circle, and bringing her other side toward the "constitution," to fire the other, or port, battery (g ). it will be seen that, as both ships were moving in the same general direction, away from the wind, the american coming straight on, while the british retired by a succession of semicircles, each time this manoeuvre was repeated the ships would be nearer together. this was what both captains purposed, but neither proposed to be raked in the operation. hence, although the "constitution" did not wear, she "yawed" several times; that is, turned her head from side to side, so that a shot striking would not have full raking effect, but angling across the decks would do proportionately less damage. such methods were common to all actions between single ships. these proceedings had lasted about three quarters of an hour, when dacres, considering he now could safely afford to let his enemy close, settled his ship on a course nearly before the wind, having it a little on her left side (g ). the american frigate was thus behind her, receiving the shot of her stern guns, to which the bow fire of those days could make little effective reply. to relieve this disadvantage, by shortening its duration, a big additional sail--the main topgallantsail--was set upon the "constitution," which, gathering fresh speed, drew up on the left-hand side of the "guerrière," within pistol-shot, at p.m., when the battle proper fairly began ( ). for the moment manoeuvring ceased, and a square set-to at the guns followed, the ships running side by side. in twenty minutes the "guerrière's" mizzen-mast[ ] was shot away, falling overboard on the starboard side; while at nearly the same moment, so hull reported, her main-yard went in the slings.[ ] this double accident reduced her speed; but in addition the mast with all its hamper, dragging in the water on one side, both slowed the vessel and acted as a rudder to turn her head to starboard,--from the "constitution." the sail-power of the latter being unimpaired would have quickly carried her so far ahead that her guns would no longer bear, if she continued the same course. hull, therefore, as soon as he saw the spars of his antagonist go overboard, put the helm to port, in order to "oblige him to do the same, or suffer himself to be raked by our getting across his bows."[ ] the fall of the "guerrière's" mast effected what was desired by hull, who continues: "on our helm being put to port the ship came to, and gave us an opportunity of pouring in upon his larboard bow several broadsides." the disabled state of the british frigate, and the promptness of the american captain, thus enabled the latter to take a raking position upon the port (larboard) bow of the enemy; that is, ahead, but on the left side ( ). [illustration: plan of the engagement between the constitution and guerriÈre] the "constitution" ranged on very slowly across the "guerrière's" bows, from left to right; her sails shaking in the wind, because the yards could not be braced, the braces having been shot away. from this commanding position she gave two raking broadsides, to which her opponent could reply only feebly from a few forward guns; then, the vessels being close together, and the british forging slowly ahead, threatening to cross the american's stern, the helm of the latter was put up. as the "constitution" turned away, the bowsprit of the "guerrière" lunged over her quarter-deck, and became entangled by her port mizzen-rigging; the result being that the two fell into the same line, the "guerrière" astern and fastened to her antagonist as described. ( ) in her crippled condition for manoeuvring, it was possible that the british captain might seek to retrieve the fortunes of the day by boarding, for which the present situation seemed to offer some opportunity; and from the reports of the respective officers it is clear that the same thought occurred to both parties, prompting in each the movement to repel boarders rather than to board. a number of men clustered on either side at the point of contact, and here, by musketry fire, occurred some of the severest losses. the first lieutenant and sailing-master of the "constitution" fell wounded, and the senior officer of marines dead, shot through the head. all these were specially concerned where boarding was at issue. this period was brief; for at . the fore and main-masts of the british frigate gave way together, carrying with them all the head booms, and she lay a helpless hulk in the trough of a heavy sea, rolling the muzzles of her guns under. a sturdy attempt to get her under control with the spritsail[ ] was made; but this resource, a bare possibility to a dismasted ship in a fleet action, with friends around, was only the assertion of a sound never-give-up tradition, against hopeless odds, in a naval duel with a full-sparred antagonist. the "constitution" hauled off for half an hour to repair damages, and upon returning received the "guerrière's" surrender. it was then dark, and the night was passed in transferring the prisoners. when day broke, the prize was found so shattered that it would be impossible to bring her into port. she was consequently set on fire at p.m., and soon after blew up. [illustration: the burning of the _guerrière_ from a drawing by henry reuterdahl.] in this fight the american frigate was much superior in force to her antagonist. the customary, and upon the whole justest, mode of estimating relative power, was by aggregate weight of shot discharged in one broadside; and when, as in this case, the range is so close that every gun comes into play, it is perhaps a useless refinement to insist on qualifying considerations. the broadside of the "constitution" weighed pounds, that of the "guerrière" . the difference therefore in favor of the american vessel was thirty per cent, and the disparity in numbers of the crews was even greater. it is not possible, therefore, to insist upon any singular credit, in the mere fact that under such odds victory falls to the heavier vessel. what can be said, after a careful comparison of the several reports, is that the american ship was fought warily and boldly, that her gunnery was excellent, that the instant advantage taken of the enemy's mizzen-mast falling showed high seamanlike qualities, both in promptness and accuracy of execution; in short, that, considering the capacity of the american captain as evidenced by his action, and the odds in his favor, nothing could be more misplaced than captain dacres' vaunt before the court: "i am so well aware that the success of my opponent was owing to fortune, that it is my earnest wish to be once more opposed to the 'constitution,' with the same officers and crew under my command, in a frigate of similar force to the 'guerrière.'"[ ] in view of the difference of broadside weight, this amounts to saying that the capacity and courage of the captain and ship's company of the "guerrière," being over thirty per cent greater than those of the "constitution," would more than compensate for the latter's bare thirty per cent superiority of force. it may safely be said that one will look in vain through the accounts of the transaction for any ground for such assumption. a ready acquiescence in this opinion was elicited, indeed, from two witnesses, the master and a master's mate, based upon a supposed superiority of fire, which the latter estimated to be in point of rapidity as four broadsides to every three of the "constitution."[ ] but rapidity is not the only element of superiority; and dacres' satisfaction on this score, repeatedly expressed, might have been tempered by one of the facts he alleged in defence of his surrender--that "on the larboard side of the 'guerrière' there were about thirty shot which had taken effect about five sheets of copper down,"--far below the water-line. captain hull with the "constitution" reached boston august , just four weeks after his departure; and the following day commodore rodgers with his squadron entered the harbor. it was a meeting between disappointment and exultation; for so profound was the impression prevailing in the united states, and not least in new england, concerning the irreversible superiority of great britain on the sea, that no word less strong than "exultation" can do justice to the feeling aroused by hull's victory. sight was lost of the disparity of force, and the pride of the country fixed, not upon those points which the attentive seaman can recognize as giving warrant for confidence, but upon the supposed demonstration of superiority in equal combat. consolation was needed; for since rodgers' sailing much had occurred to dishearten and little to encourage. the nation had cherished few expectations from its tiny, navy; but concerning its arms on land the advocates of war had entertained the unreasoning confidence of those who expect to reap without taking the trouble to sow. in the first year of president jefferson's administration, , the "peace establishment" of the regular army, in pursuance of the policy of the president and party in power, was reduced to three thousand men. in , under the excitement of the outrage upon the "chesapeake" and of the orders in council, an "additional military force" was authorized, raising the total to ten thousand. the latter measure seems for some time to have been considered temporary in character; for in a return to congress in january, , the numbers actually in service are reported separately, as , and , ; total, , , exclusive of staff officers. general scott, who was one of the captains appointed under the act of , has recorded that the condition of both soldiers and officers was in great part most inefficient.[ ] speaking of the later commissions, he said, "such were the results of mr. jefferson's low estimate of, or rather contempt for, the military character, the consequence of the old hostility between him and the principal officers who achieved our independence."[ ] in january, , when war had in effect been determined upon in the party councils, a bill was passed raising the army to thirty-five thousand; but in the economical and social condition of the period the service was under a popular disfavor, to which the attitude of recent administrations doubtless contributed greatly, and recruiting went on very slowly. there was substantially no military tradition in the country. thirty years of peace had seen the disappearance of the officers whom the war of independence had left in their prime; and the government fell into that most facile of mistakes, the choice of old men, because when youths they had worn an epaulette, without regarding the experience they had had under it, or since it was laid aside. among the men thus selected were henry dearborn, for senior major general, to command the northern division of the country, from niagara to boston bay and new york; and william hull, a brigadier, for the northwestern frontier, centring round detroit. the latter, who was uncle to captain hull of the "constitution," seems to have been chosen because already civil governor of michigan territory. president madison thus reversed the practice of great britain, which commonly was to choose a military man for civil governor of exposed provinces. hull accepted with reluctance, and under pressure. he set out for his new duties, expecting that he would receive in his distant and perilous charge that measure of support which results from active operations at some other point of the enemy's line, presumably at niagara. in this he was disappointed. dearborn was now sixty-one, hull fifty-nine. both had served with credit during the war of independence, but in subordinate positions; and dearborn had been secretary of war throughout jefferson's two terms. opposed to these was the lieutenant governor of upper canada, isaac brock, a major-general in the british army. a soldier from boyhood, he had commanded a regiment in active campaign at twenty-eight. he was now forty-two, and for the last ten years had served in north america; first with his regiment, and later as a general officer in command of the troops. in october, , he was appointed to the civil government of the province. he was thoroughly familiar with the political and military conditions surrounding him, and his mind had long been actively engaged in considering probable contingencies, in case war, threatening since , should become actual. in formulated purpose and resolve, he was perfectly prepared for immediate action, as is shown by his letters, foreshadowing his course, to his superior, sir george prevost, governor general of canada. he predicted that the pressure of the indians upon the western frontier of the united states would compel that country to keep there a considerable force, the presence of which would naturally tend to more than mere defensive measures. with the numerical inferiority of the british, the co-operation of the indians was essential. to preserve upper canada, therefore, michilimackinac and detroit must be reduced. otherwise the savages could not be convinced that great britain would not sacrifice them at a peace, as they believed her to have done in , by jay's treaty. in this he agreed with hull, who faced the situation far more efficiently than his superiors, and at the same moment was writing officially, "the british cannot hold upper canada without the assistance of the indians, and that they cannot obtain if we have an adequate force at detroit."[ ] brock deemed it vital that amherstburg, nearly opposite detroit, should be held in force; both to resist the first hostile attack, and as a base whence to proceed to offensive operations. he apprehended, and correctly, as the event proved, that niagara would be chosen by the americans as the line for their main body to penetrate with a view to conquest. this was his defensive frontier; the western, the offensive wing of his campaign. these leading ideas dictated his preparations, imperfect from paucity of means, but sufficient to meet the limping, flaccid measures of the united states authorities. to this well-considered view the war department of the united states opposed no ordered plan of any kind, no mind prepared with even the common precautions of every-day life. this unreadiness, plainly manifested by its actions, was the more culpable because the unfortunate hull, in his letter of march , , just quoted, a month before his unwilling acceptance of his general's commission, had laid clearly before it the leading features of the military and political situation, recognized by him during his four years of office as governor of the territory. in this cogent paper, amid numerous illuminative details, he laid unmistakable emphasis on the decisive influence of detroit upon the whole northwest, especially in determining the attitude of the indians. he dwelt also upon the critical weakness of the communications on which the tenure of it depended, and upon the necessity of naval superiority to secure them. this expression of his opinion was in the hands of the government over three months before the declaration of war. as early as january, however, secretary eustis had been warned by armstrong, who subsequently succeeded him in the war department, that detroit, otherwise advantageous in position, "would be positively bad, unless your naval means have an ascendency on lake erie."[ ] unfortunately for himself and for the country, hull, upon visiting the capital in the spring, did not adhere firmly to his views as to the necessity for a lake navy. after the capitulation, president madison wrote to his friend, john nicholas, "the failure of our calculations with respect to the expedition under hull needs no comment. the worst of it was that we were misled by a reliance, authorized by himself, on its [the expedition] securing to us the command of the lakes."[ ] general peter b. porter, of the new york militia, a member also of the house of representatives, who served well on the niagara frontier, and was in no wise implicated by hull's surrender, testified before the court martial, "i was twice at the president's with general hull, when the subject of a navy was talked over. at first it was agreed to have one; but afterwards it was agreed to abandon it, doubtless as inexpedient."[ ] the indications from hull's earlier correspondence are that for the time he was influenced by the war spirit, and developed a hopefulness of achievement which affected his former and better judgment. on may , three weeks before the declaration of war, hull took command of the militia assembled at dayton, ohio. on june , he was at urbana, where a regiment of regular infantry joined. june , he reached the maumee river, and thence reported that his force was over two thousand, rank and file.[ ] he had not yet received official intelligence of war having been actually declared, but all indications, including his own mission itself, pointed to it as imminent. nevertheless, he here loaded a schooner with military stores, and sent her down the river for detroit, knowing that, twenty miles before reaching there, she must pass near the british fort malden, on the detroit river covering amherstburg; and this while the british had local naval superiority. in taking this risk, the very imprudence of which testifies the importance of water transportation to detroit, hull directed his aids to forward his baggage by the same conveyance; and with it, contrary to his intention, were despatched also his official papers. the vessel, being promptly seized by the boats of the british armed brig "hunter," was taken into malden, whence colonel st. george, commanding the district, sent the captured correspondence to brock. "till i received these letters," remarked the latter, "i had no idea general hull was advancing with so large a force."[ ] when brock thus wrote, july , he was at fort george, on the shore of ontario, near niagara river, watching the frontier where he expected the main attack. he had already struck his first blow. immediately upon being assured of the declaration of war, on june , he had despatched a letter to st. joseph's, directing all preparations to be made for proceeding against mackinac; the final determination as to offensive or defensive action being very properly left to the officer there in command. the latter, thus aware of his superior's wishes, started july , with some six hundred men,--of whom four hundred were indians,--under convoy of the armed brig "caledonia," belonging to the northwestern fur company. the next day he appeared before the american post, where the existence of war was yet unknown. the garrison numbered fifty-seven, including three officers; being about one third the force reported necessary for the peace establishment by mr. jefferson's secretary of war, in . the place was immediately surrendered. under all the conditions stated there is an entertaining ingenuousness in the reference made to this disaster by president madison: "we have but just learned that the important post of michilimackinac has fallen into the hands of the enemy, but from what cause remains to be known."[ ] brock received this news at toronto, july ; but not till august did it reach hull, by the arrival of the paroled prisoners. he was then on the canada side, at sandwich, opposite detroit; having crossed with from fourteen to sixteen hundred men on july . this step was taken on the strength of a discretionary order from the secretary of war, that if "the force under your command be equal to the enterprise, consistent with the safety of your own post, you will take possession of malden, and extend your conquests as circumstances may justify." it must be added, however, in justice to the administration, that the same letter, received july , three days before the crossing, contained the warning, "it is also proper to inform you that an adequate force cannot soon be relied on for the reduction of the enemy's posts below you."[ ] this bears on the question of hull's expectation of support by diversion on the niagara frontier, and shows that he had fair notice on that score. that over-confidence still possessed him seems apparent from a letter to the secretary dated july , in which he said, "in your letter of june , you direct me to adopt measures for the security of the country, and to await further orders. i regret that i have not larger latitude."[ ] now he received it, and his invasion of canada was the result. it is vain to deny his liberty of action, under such instructions, but it is equally vain to deny the responsibility of a superior who thus authorizes action, and not obscurely intimates a wish, under general military conditions perfectly well known, such as existed with reference to hull's communications. hull's attempt to justify his movement on the ground of pressure from subordinates, moral effect upon his troops, is admissible only if his decision were consistently followed by the one course that gave a chance of success. as a military enterprise the attempt was hopeless, unless by a rapid advance upon malden he could carry the works by instant storm. in that event the enemy's army and navy, losing their local base of operations, would have to seek one new and distant, one hundred and fifty miles to the eastward, at long point; whence attempts against the american positions could be only by water, with transportation inadequate to carrying large bodies of men. the american general thus might feel secure against attacks on his communications with ohio, the critical condition of which constituted the great danger of the situation, whether at detroit or sandwich. hull himself, ten days after crossing, wrote, "it is in the power of this army to take malden by storm, but it would be attended, in my opinion, with too great a sacrifice under the present circumstances."[ ] instead of prompt action, two days were allowed to pass. then, july , a council of war decided that immediate attack was inexpedient, and delay advisable. this conclusion, if correct, condemned the invasion, and should have been reached before it was attempted. the military situation was this: hull's line of supplies and re-enforcements was reasonably secure from hostile interference between southern ohio and the maumee; at which river proper fortification would permit the establishment of an advanced depot. thence to detroit was seventy-two miles, through much of which the road passed near the lake shore. it was consequently liable to attack from the water, so long as that was controlled by the enemy; while by its greater distance from the centre of american population in the west, it was also more exposed to indian hostilities than the portion behind the maumee. under these circumstances, detroit itself was in danger of an interruption of supplies and re-enforcements, amounting possibly to isolation. it was open to the enemy to land in its rear, secure of his own communications by water, and with a fair chance, in case of failure, to retire by the way he came; for retreat could be made safely in very small vessels or boats, so long as malden was held in force. the reduction of malden might therefore secure detroit, by depriving the enemy of a base suitable for using his lake power against its communications. unless this was accomplished, any advance beyond detroit with the force then at hand merely weakened that place, by just the amount of men and means expended, and was increasingly hazardous when it entailed crossing water. a sudden blow may snatch safety under such conditions; but to attempt the slow and graduated movements of a siege, with uncertain communications supporting it, is to court disaster. the holding of detroit being imperative, efforts external to it should have been chiefly exerted on its rear, and upon its front only to prevent the easy passage of the enemy. in short, when detroit was reached, barring the chance of a _coup de main_ upon malden, hull's position needed to be made more solid, not more extensive. as it was, the army remained at sandwich, making abortive movements toward the river canard, which covered the approach to malden, and pushing small foraging parties up the valley of the thames. the greatest industry was used, hull reported, in making preparations to besiege, but it was not till august , nearly four weeks after crossing, that the siege guns were ready; and then the artillery officers reported that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to take them to malden by land, and by water still more so, because the ship of war "queen charlotte," carrying eighteen -pounders, lay off the mouth of the canard, commanding the stream. the first impression produced by the advance into canada had been propitious to hull. he himself in his defence admitted that the enemy's force had diminished, great part of their militia had left them, and many of their indians.[ ] this information of the american camp corresponded with the facts. lieut. colonel st. george, commanding fort malden, reported the demoralized condition of his militia. three days after hull crossed he had left but four hundred and seventy-one, in such a state as to be absolutely inefficient.[ ] colonel procter, who soon afterwards relieved him, could on july muster only two hundred and seventy indians by the utmost exertion, and by the th these had rather decreased.[ ] professing to see no immediate danger, he still asked for five hundred more regulars. at no time before hull recrossed did he have two hundred and fifty.[ ] under hull's delay these favorable conditions disappeared. british re-enforcements, small but veteran, arrived; the local militia recovered; and the indians, with the facile changefulness of savages, passed from an outwardly friendly bearing over to what began to seem the winning side. colonel procter then initiated the policy of threatening hull's communications from the lake side. a body of indians sent across by him on august defeated an american detachment marching to protect a convoy from the maumee. this incident, coming upon accumulating adverse indications, and coinciding with the bad news received from mackinac, aroused hull to the essential danger of his situation. august he recrossed to detroit. august another vigorous effort was made by the enemy to destroy a detachment sent out to establish communications with the rear. although the british were defeated, the americans were unable to proceed, and returned to the town without supplies. in the first of these affairs some more of hull's correspondence was captured, which revealed his apprehensions, and the general moral condition of his command, to an opponent capable of appreciating their military significance. brock had remained near niagara, detained partly by the political necessity of meeting the provincial legislature, partly to watch over what he considered the more exposed portion of his military charge; for a disaster to it, being nearer the source of british power, would have upon the fortunes of the west an effect even more vital than a reverse there would exert upon the east. being soon satisfied that the preparations of the united states threatened no immediate action, and finding that hull's troops were foraging to a considerable distance east of sandwich, along the thames, he had decided to send against them a small body of local troops with a number of indians, while he himself gathered some militia and went direct by water to malden. to his dismay, the indians declined to assist, alleging their intention to remain neutral; upon which the militia also refused, saying they were afraid to leave their homes unguarded, till it was certain which side the savages would take. on july brock wrote that his plans were thus ruined; but july it became known that mackinac had fallen, and on that day the militia about york [toronto], where he then was, volunteered for service in any part of the province. august he embarked with three hundred of them, and a few regulars, at long point, on the north shore of lake erie; whence he coasted to malden, arriving on the th. meanwhile batteries had been erected opposite detroit, which opened on the evening of august , the fort replying; but slight harm was done on either side. next day brock crossed the greater part of his force, landing three miles below detroit. his little column of assault consisted of regulars, militia, and indians, the latter in the woods covering the left flank.[ ] the effective americans present were by that morning's report , ;[ ] while their field artillery, additional to that mounted in the works, was much superior to that of the enemy, was advantageously posted, and loaded with grape. moreover, they had the fort, on which to retire. brock's movements were audacious. some said nothing could be more desperate; "but i answer, that the state of upper canada admitted of nothing but desperate remedies."[ ] the british general had served under nelson at copenhagen, and quoted him here. he knew also, through the captured correspondence, that his opponent was a prey to a desperation very different in temper from his own, and had lost the confidence of his men. he had hoped, by the threatening position assumed between the town and its home base, to force hull to come out and attack; but learning now that the garrison was weakened by a detachment of three hundred and fifty, despatched two days before under colonel mcarthur to open intercourse with the maumee by a circuitous road, avoiding the lake shore, he decided to assault at once. when the british column had approached within a mile, hull withdrew within the works all his force, including the artillery, and immediately afterward capitulated. the detachment under mcarthur, with another from the state of ohio on its way to join the army, were embraced in the terms; brock estimating the whole number surrendered at not less than twenty-five hundred. a more important capture, under the conditions, was an american brig, the "adams," not yet armed, but capable of use as a ship of war, for which purpose she had already been transferred from the war department to the navy. in his defence before the court martial, which in march, , tried him for his conduct of the campaign, hull addressed himself to three particulars, which he considered to be the principal features in the voluminous charges and specifications drawn against him. these were, "the delay at sandwich, the retreat from canada, and the surrender at detroit."[ ] concerning these, as a matter of military criticism, it may be said with much certainty that if conditions imposed the delay at sandwich, they condemned the advance to it, and would have warranted an earlier retreat. the capitulation he justified on the ground that resistance could not change the result, though it might protract the issue. because ultimate surrender could not be averted, he characterized life lost in postponing it as blood shed uselessly. the conclusion does not follow from the premise; nor could any military code accept the maxim that a position is to be yielded as soon as it appears that it cannot be held indefinitely. delay, so long as sustained, not only keeps open the chapter of accidents for the particular post, but supports related operations throughout the remainder of the field of war. tenacious endurance, if it effected no more, would at least have held brock away from niagara, whither he hastened within a week after the capitulation, taking with him a force which now could be well spared from the westward. no one military charge can be considered as disconnected; therefore no commander has a right to abandon defence while it is possible to maintain it, unless he also knows that it cannot affect results elsewhere; and this practically can never be certain. the burden of anxieties, of dangers and difficulties, actual and possible, weighing upon brock, were full as great as those upon hull, for on his shoulders rested both niagara and malden. his own resolution and promptitude triumphed because of the combined inefficiency of hull and dearborn. he scarcely could have avoided disaster at one end or the other of the line, had either opponent been thoroughly competent. there was yet another reason which weighed forcibly with hull, and probably put all purely military considerations out of court. this was the dread of indian outrage and massacre. the general trend of the testimony, and hull's own defence, go to show a mind overpowered by the agony of this imagination. after receiving word of the desertion of two companies, he said, "i now became impatient to put the place under the protection of the british; i knew that there were thousands of savages around us." these thousands were not at hand. not till after september did as many as a hundred arrive from the north--from mackinac.[ ] in short, unless what cass styled the philanthropic reason can be accepted,--and in the opinion of the present writer it cannot,--hull wrote the condemnation of his action in his own defence. "i shall now state what force the enemy brought, or might bring, against me. i say, gentlemen, _might bring_, because it was that consideration which induced the surrender, and not the force which was actually landed on the american shore on the morning of the th. it is possible i might have met and repelled that force; and if i had no further to look than the event of a contest at that time, i should have trusted to the issue of a battle.... the force brought against me i am very confident was not less than one thousand whites, and as many savage warriors."[ ] the reproach of this mortifying incident cannot be lifted from off hull's memory; but for this very reason, in weighing the circumstances, it is far less than justice to forget his years, verging on old age, his long dissociation from military life, his personal courage frequently shown during the war of independence, nor the fact that, though a soldier on occasion, he probably never had the opportunity to form correct soldierly standards. to the credit account should also be carried the timely and really capable presentation of the conditions of the field of operations already quoted, submitted by him to the government, which should not have needed such demonstration. the mortification of the country fastened on his name; but had the measures urged by him been taken, had his expedition received due support by energetic operations elsewhere, events need not have reached the crisis to which he proved unequal. the true authors of the national disaster and its accompanying humiliation are to be sought in the national administrations and legislatures of the preceding ten or twelve years, upon whom rests the responsibility for the miserably unprepared condition in which the country was plunged into war. madison, too tardily repentant, wrote, "the command of the lakes by a superior force on the water ought to have been a fundamental part in the national policy from the moment the peace [of ] took place. what is now doing for the command proves what may be done."[ ] footnotes: [ ] captains' letters, june , . navy department mss. [ ] ibid., june , . [ ] captains' letters, sept. , . navy department mss. [ ] navy department mss. [ ] captains' letters, j. rodgers, sept. , . navy department mss. [ ] letter of sept. , . navy department mss. [ ] james, naval history (edition ), vol. v. p. . [ ] captains' letters, sept. , . navy department mss. [ ] naval chronicle (british), vol. xxviii. p. . [ ] nov. , . [ ] naval chronicle, vol. xxviii. p. ; james, vol. v. p. . [ ] sir j.b. warren to admiralty, aug , . canadian archives mss. m. . , p. . [ ] of the three masts of a "ship," the mizzen-mast is the one nearest the stern. [ ] the middle, where the yard is hung. [ ] hull's report, aug. , . captains' letters, navy department mss. [ ] the spritsail was set on a yard which in ships of that day crossed the bowsprit at its outer end, much as other yards crossed the three upright lower masts. under some circumstances ships would forge slowly ahead under its impulse. it was a survival from days which knew not jibs. [ ] dacres' defence before the court martial. naval chronicle, vol. xxviii. p. . [ ] "guerrière" court martial. ms. british records office. [ ] memoirs of gen. winfield scott, vol. i p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] hull to the war department, march , . report of hull's trial, taken by lieut. col. forbes, d u.s. infantry. hull's defence, p. . [ ] armstrong's notices of the war of , vol. i. p. . [ ] the writings of madison (ed. ), vol. ii. p. . see also his letter to dearborn, oct. , . ibid., p. . [ ] hull's trial, p. . porter was a witness for the defence. [ ] hull's trial, appendix, p. . [ ] life of brock, p. . [ ] writings of james madison (lippincott, ), vol. ii. p. . [ ] eustis to hull, june , . from ms. copy in the records of the war department. this letter was acknowledged by hull, july . [ ] hull's trial, appendix, p. . [ ] hull to eustis, july , . hull's trial, appendix, p. . [ ] hull's trial, defence, p. . [ ] canadian archives mss. c. , p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] hull's trial. evidence of lieutenant gooding, p. , and of sergeant forbush, p. (prisoners in malden). [ ] life of brock, p. . [ ] letter of colonel cass to u.s. secretary of war, sept. , . hull's trial, appendix, p. . [ ] life of brock, p. . [ ] hull's trial. defence, p. . [ ] hull's trial. testimony of captain eastman, p. , and of dalliby, ordnance officer, p. . [ ] ibid. hull's defence, pp. - . [ ] madison to dearborn, oct. , . writings, vol. ii, p. . chapter vii operations on the northern frontier after hull's surrender. european events bearing on the war by august , nine days after the capitulation of detroit, brock was again writing from fort george, by niagara. about the time of his departure for malden, prevost had received from foster, late british minister to washington, and now in nova scotia, letters foreshadowing the repeal of the orders in council. in consequence he had sent his adjutant-general, colonel baynes, to dearborn to negotiate a suspension of hostilities. like all intelligent flags of truce, baynes kept his eyes wide open to indications in the enemy's lines. the militia, he reported, were not uniformed; they were distinguished from other people of the country only by a cockade. the regulars were mostly recruits. the war was unpopular, the great majority impatient to return to their homes; a condition brock observed also in the canadians. they avowed a fixed determination not to pass the frontier. recruiting for the regular service went on very slowly, though pay and bounty were liberal. dearborn appeared over sixty, strong and healthy, but did not seem to possess the energy of mind or activity of body requisite to his post. in short, from the actual state of the american forces assembled on lake champlain, baynes did not think there was any intention of invasion. from its total want of discipline and order, the militia could not be considered formidable when opposed to well-disciplined british regulars.[ ] of this prognostic the war was to furnish sufficient saddening proof. the militia contained excellent material for soldiers, but soldiers they were not. dearborn declined to enter into a formal armistice, as beyond his powers; but he consented to a cessation of hostilities pending a reference to washington, agreeing to direct all commanders of posts within his district to abstain from offensive operations till further orders. this suspension of arms included the niagara line, from action upon which hull had expected to receive support. in his defence hull claimed that this arrangement, in which his army was not included, had freed a number of troops to proceed against him; but the comparison of dates shows that every man present at detroit in the british force had gone forward before the agreement could be known. the letter engaging to remain on the defensive only was signed by dearborn at greenbush, near albany, august . the same day brock was three hundred and fifty miles to the westward, embarking at long point for malden; and among his papers occurs the statement that the strong american force on the niagara frontier compelled him to take to detroit only one half of the militia that volunteered.[ ] his military judgment and vigor, unaided, had enabled him to abandon one line, and that the most important, concentrate all available men at another point, effect there a decisive success, and return betimes to his natural centre of operations. he owed nothing to outside military diplomacy. on the contrary, he deeply deplored the measure which now tied his hands at a moment when the americans, though restrained from fighting, were not prevented from bringing up re-enforcements to the positions confronting him. dearborn's action was not approved by the administration, and the armistice was ended september , by notification. meantime, to strengthen the british niagara frontier, all the men and ordnance that could now be spared from amherstburg had been brought back by brock to fort erie, which was on the lake of that name, at the upper end of the niagara river. although still far from secure, owing to the much greater local material resources of the united states, and the preoccupation of great britain with the peninsular war, which prevented her succoring canada, brock's general position was immensely improved since the beginning of hostilities. his successes in the west, besides rallying the indians by thousands to his support, had for the time so assured that frontier as to enable him to concentrate his efforts on the east; while the existing british naval superiority on both lakes, erie and ontario, covered his flanks, and facilitated transportation--communications--from kingston to niagara, and thence to malden, detroit, mackinac, and the great west. to illustrate the sweep of this influence, it may be mentioned here--for there will be no occasion to repeat--that an expedition from mackinac at a later period captured the isolated united states post at prairie du chien, on the mississippi, on the western border of what is now the state of wisconsin. already, at the most critical period, the use of the water had enabled brock, by simultaneous movements, to send cannon from fort george by way of fort erie to fort malden; while at the same time replacing those thus despatched by others brought from toronto and kingston. in short, control of the lakes conferred upon him the recognized advantage of a central position--the niagara peninsula--having rapid communication by interior lines with the flanks, or extremities; to malden and detroit in one direction, to toronto and kingston in the other. it was just here, also, that the first mischance befell him; and it cannot but be a subject of professional pride to a naval officer to trace the prompt and sustained action of his professional ancestors, who reversed conditions, not merely by a single brilliant blow, upon which popular reminiscence fastens, but by efficient initiative and sustained sagacious exertion through a long period of time. on september , captain isaac chauncey had been ordered from the new york navy yard to command on lakes erie and ontario. upon the latter there was already serving lieutenant melancthon t. woolsey, in command of a respectable vessel, the brig "oneida," of eighteen -pounder carronades. on erie there was as yet no naval organization nor vessel. chauncey consequently, on september , ordered thither lieutenant jesse d. elliott to select a site for equipping vessels, and to contract for two to be built of three hundred tons each. elliott, who arrived at buffalo on the th, was still engaged in this preliminary work, and was fitting some purchased schooners behind squaw island, three miles below, when, on october , there arrived from malden, and anchored off fort erie, two british armed brigs, the "detroit"--lately the american "adams," surrendered with hull--and the "caledonia," which co-operated so decisively in the fall of mackinac. the same day he learned the near approach of a body of ninety seamen, despatched by chauncey from new york on september .[ ] he sent to hasten them, and they arrived at noon. the afternoon was spent in preparations, weapons having to be obtained from the army, which also supplied a contingent of fifty soldiers. the seamen needed refreshment, having come on foot five hundred miles, but elliott would not trifle with opportunity. at a.m. of october he shoved off with a hundred men in two boats, and at was alongside the brigs. from buffalo to fort erie is about two miles; but this distance was materially increased by the strong downward current toward the falls, and by the necessity of pulling far up stream in order to approach the vessels from ahead, which lessened the chance of premature discovery, and materially shortened the interval between being seen and getting alongside. the enemy, taken by surprise, were quickly overpowered, and in ten minutes both prizes were under sail for the american shore. the "caledonia" was beached at black rock, where was elliott's temporary navy yard, just above squaw island; but the wind did not enable the "detroit," in which he himself was, to stem the downward drift of the river. after being swept some time, she had to anchor under the fire of batteries at four hundred yards range, to which reply was made till the powder on board was expended. then, the berth proving too hot, the cable was cut, sail again made, and the brig run ashore on squaw island within range of both british and american guns. here elliott abandoned her, she having already several large shot through her hull, with rigging and sails cut to pieces, and she was boarded in turn by a body of the enemy. under the conditions, however, neither side could remain to get her off, and she was finally set on fire by the americans.[ ] besides the vessel herself, her cargo of ordnance was lost to the british. american seamen afterward recovered from the wreck by night four -pounders, and a quantity of shot, which were used with effect. the conduct of this affair was of a character frequent in the naval annals of that day. elliott's quick discernment of the opportunity to reverse the naval conditions which constituted so much of the british advantage, and the promptness of his action, are qualities more noticeable than the mere courage displayed. "a strong inducement," he wrote, "was that with these two vessels, and those i have purchased, i should be able to meet the remainder of the british force on the upper lakes." the mishap of the "detroit" partly disappointed this expectation, and the british aggregate remained still superior; but the units lost their perfect freedom of movement, the facility of transportation was greatly diminished, and the american success held in it the germ of future development to the superiority which perry achieved a year later. none realized the extent of the calamity more keenly than brock. "this event is particularly unfortunate," he wrote to the governor general, "and may reduce us to incalculable distress. the enemy is making every exertion to gain a naval superiority on both lakes; which, if they accomplish, i do not see how we can retain the country. more vessels are fitting for war on the other side of squaw island, which i should have attempted to destroy but for your excellency's repeated instructions to forbear. now such a force is collected for their protection as will render every operation against them very hazardous."[ ] to his subordinate, procter, at detroit, he exposed the other side of the calamity.[ ] "this will reduce us to great distress. you will have the goodness to state the expedients you possess to enable us to replace, as far as possible, the heavy loss we have sustained in the 'detroit'.... a quantity of provisions was ready to be shipped; but as i am sending you the flank companies of the newfoundland regiment by the 'lady prevost,' she cannot take the provisions." trivial details these may seem; but in war, as in other matters, trivialities sometimes decide great issues, as the touching of a button may blow up a reef. the battle of lake erie, as before said, was precipitated by need of food. brock did not survive to witness the consequences which he apprehended, and which, had he lived, he possibly might have done something to avert. the increasing strength he had observed gathering about elliott's collection of purchased vessels corresponded to a gradual accumulation of american land force along the niagara line; the divisions of which above and below the falls were under two commanders, between whom co-operation was doubtful. general van rensselaer of the new york militia, who had the lower division, determined upon an effort to seize the heights of queenston, at the head of navigation from lake ontario. the attempt was made on october , before daybreak. brock, whose headquarters were at fort george, was quickly on the ground; so quickly, that he narrowly escaped capture by the advance guard of americans as they reached the summit. collecting a few men, he endeavored to regain the position before the enemy could establish himself in force, and in the charge was instantly killed at the head of his troops. in historical value, the death of brock was the one notable incident of the day, which otherwise was unproductive of results beyond an additional mortification to the united states. the americans gradually accumulated on the height to the number of some six hundred, and, had they been properly re-enforced, could probably have held their ground, affording an opening for further advance. it was found impossible to induce the raw, unseasoned men on the other side to cross to their support, and after many fruitless appeals the american general was compelled to witness the shameful sight of a gallant division driven down the cliffs to the river, and there obliged to surrender, because their comrades refused to go betimes to their relief. van rensselaer retired from service, and was succeeded by general smyth, who now held command of the whole line, thirty miles, from buffalo to fort niagara, opposite fort george, where the river enters lake ontario. a crossing in force, in the upper part of the river, opposite black rock, was planned by him for november . in preparation for it an attack was to be made shortly before daylight by two advance parties, proceeding separately. one was to carry the batteries and spike the guns near the point selected for landing; the other, to destroy abridge five miles below, by which re-enforcements might arrive to the enemy. to the first of these was attached a party of seventy seamen, who carried out their instructions, spiking and dismounting the guns. the fighting was unusually severe, eight out of the twelve naval officers concerned being wounded, two mortally, and half of the seamen either killed or wounded. although the bridge was not destroyed, favorable conditions for the crossing of the main body had been established; but, upon viewing the numbers at his disposal, smyth called a council of war, and after advising with it decided not to proceed. this was certainly a case of useless bloodshed. general porter of the new york militia, who served with distinguished gallantry on the niagara frontier to the end of the war, was present in this business, and criticised smyth's conduct so severely as to cause a duel between them. "if bravery be a virtue," wrote porter, "if the gratitude of a country be due to those who gallantly and desperately assert its rights, the government will make ample and honorable provision for the heirs of the brave tars who fell on this occasion, as well as for those that survive."[ ] another abortive movement toward crossing was made a few days later, and with it land operations on the niagara frontier ended for the year . smyth was soon afterward dropped from the rolls of the army. in the eastern part of dearborn's military division, where he commanded in person, toward albany and champlain, less was attempted than at detroit or niagara. to accomplish less would be impossible; but as nothing was seriously undertaken, nothing also disastrously failed. the commander-in-chief gave sufficient disproof of military capacity by gravely proposing to "operate with effect at the same moment against niagara, kingston, and montreal."[ ] such divergence of effort and dissemination of means, scanty at the best, upon points one hundred and fifty to two hundred miles apart, contravened all sound principle; to remedy which no compensating vigor was discoverable in his conduct. in all these quarters, as at detroit, the enemy were perceptibly stronger in the autumn than when the war began; and the feebleness of american action had destroyed the principal basis upon which expectation of success had rested--the disaffection of the inhabitants of canada and their readiness to side with the invaders. that this disposition existed to a formidable extent was well known. it constituted a large element in the anxieties of the british generals, especially of brock; for in his district there were more american settlers than in lower canada.[ ] on the niagara peninsula, especially, climatic conditions, favorable to farming, had induced a large immigration. but local disloyalty is a poor reed for an assailant to rest upon, and to sustain it in vigorous action commonly requires the presence of a force which will render its assistance needless. whatever inclination to rebel there might have been was effectually quelled by the energy of brock, the weakness of hull, and the impotence of dearborn and his subordinates. in the general situation the one change favorable to the united states was in a quarter the importance of which the administration had been slow to recognize, and probably scarcely appreciated even now. the anticipated military laurels had vanished like a dream, and the disinclination of the american people to military life in general, and to this war in particular, had shown itself in enlistments for the army, which, the president wrote, "fall short of the most moderate calculation." the attempt to supplement "regulars" by "volunteers," who, unlike the militia, should be under the general government instead of that of the states--a favorite resource always with the legislature of the united states--was "extremely unproductive;" while the militia in service were not under obligation to leave their state, and might, if they chose, abandon their fellow-countrymen outside its limits to slaughter and capture, as they did at niagara, without incurring military punishment. the governors of the new england states, being opposed to the war, refused to go a step beyond protecting their own territory from hostilities, which they declared were forced upon them by the administration rather than by the british. for this attitude there was a semblance of excuse in the utter military inefficiency to which the policy of jefferson and madison had reduced the national government. it was powerless to give the several states the protection to which it was pledged by the constitution. the citizens of new york had to fortify and defend their own harbor. the reproaches of new england on this score were seconded somewhat later by the outcries of maryland; and if virginia was silent under suffering, it was not because she lacked cause for complaint. it is to be remembered that in the matter of military and naval unpreparedness the great culprits were virginians. south of virginia the nature of the shore line minimized the local harrying, from which the northern part of the community suffered. nevertheless, there also the coasting trade was nearly destroyed, and even the internal navigation seriously harassed. only on the great lakes had the case of the united states improved, when winter put an end to most operations on the northern frontier. as in the civil war a half century later, so in , the power of the water over the issues of the land not only was not comprehended by the average official, but was incomprehensible to him. armstrong in january, and hull in march, had insisted upon a condition that should have been obvious; but not till september , when hull's disaster had driven home hull's reasoning, did captain chauncey receive orders "to assume command of the naval force on lakes erie and ontario, and to use every exertion to obtain control of them this fall." all preparations had still to be made, and were thrown, most wisely, on the man who was to do the work. he was "to use all the means which he might judge essential to accomplish the wishes of the government."[ ] it is only just to give these quotations, which indicate how entirely everything to be done was left to the energy and discretion of the officer in charge, who had to plan and build up, almost from the foundation, the naval force on both lakes. champlain, apparently by an oversight, was not included in his charge. near the end of the war he was directed to convene a court-martial on some occurrences there, and then replied that it had never been placed under his command.[ ] chauncey, who was just turned forty, entered on his duties with a will. having been for four years in charge of the navy yard at new york, he was intimately acquainted with the resources of the principal depot from which he must draw his supplies. on september , after three weeks of busy collecting and shipping, he started for his station by the very occasional steamboat of those days, which required from eighteen to twenty hours for the trip to albany. on the eve of departure, he wrote the government that he had despatched "one hundred and forty ship-carpenters, seven hundred seamen and marines, more than one hundred pieces of cannon, the greater part of large caliber, with muskets, shot, carriages, etc. the carriages have nearly all been made, and the shot cast, in that time. nay, i may say that nearly every article that has been sent forward has been made."[ ] the words convey forcibly the lack of preparation which characterized the general state of the country; and they suggest also the difference in energy and efficiency between a man of forty, in continuous practice of his profession, and generals of sixty, whose knowledge of their business derived over a disuse of more than thirty years, and from experience limited to positions necessarily very subordinate. from the meagreness of steamer traffic, all this provision of men and material had to go by sail vessel to albany; and chauncey wrote that his personal delay in new york was no injury, but a benefit, for as it was he should arrive well before the needed equipment. on october he reached sackett's harbor, "in company with his excellency the governor of new york, through the worst roads i ever saw, especially near this place, in consequence of which i have ordered the stores intended for this place to oswego, from which place they will come by water." elliott had reported from buffalo that "the roads are good, except for thirteen miles, which is intolerably bad; so bad that ordnance cannot be brought in wagons; it must come when snow is on the ground, and then in sleds." all expectation of contesting lake erie was therefore abandoned for that year, and effort concentrated on ontario. there the misfortune of the american position was that the only harbor on their side of the lake, sackett's, close to the entrance of the st. lawrence, was remote from the highways of united states internal traffic. the roads described by chauncey cut it off from communications by land, except in winter and the height of summer; while the historic water route by the mohawk river, lake oneida, and the outlet of the latter through the oswego river, debouched upon ontario at a point utterly insecure against weather or hostilities. it was necessary, therefore, to accept sackett's harbor as the only possible navy yard and station, under the disadvantage that the maintenance of it--and through it, of the naval command of ontario--depended upon this water transport of forty miles of open lake from the oswego river. the danger, when superiority of force lapsed, as at times it did, was lessened by the existence of several creeks or small rivers, within which coasting craft could take refuge and find protection from attack under the muskets of the soldiery. sackett's harbor itself, though of small area, was a safe port, and under proper precautions defensible; but in neither point of view was it comparable with kingston. while in new york, chauncey's preparations had not been limited to what could be done there. by communication with elliott and woolsey, he had informed himself well as to conditions, and had initiated the purchase and equipment of lake craft, chiefly schooners of from forty to eighty tons, which were fitted to carry one or two heavy guns; the weight of battery being determined partly by their capacity to bear it, and partly by the guns on hand. elliott's report concerning lake erie led to his being diverted, at his own suggestion, to the mouth of the genesee and to oswego, to equip four schooners lying there; for arming which cannon before destined to buffalo were likewise turned aside to those points. when chauncey reached sackett's, he found there also five schooners belonging mainly to the st. lawrence trade, which had been bought under his directions by woolsey. there was thus already a very fair beginning of a naval force; the only remaining apprehension being that, "from the badness of the roads and the lowness of the water in the mohawk, the guns and stores will not arrive in time for us to do anything decisive against the enemy this fall."[ ] should they arrive soon enough, he hoped to seek the british in their own waters by november. besides these extemporized expedients, two ships of twenty-four guns were under construction at sackett's, and two brigs of twenty, with three gunboats, were ordered on lake erie--all to be ready for service in the spring, their batteries to be sent on when the snow made it feasible. after some disappointing detention, the waters of the inlet and outlet of lake oneida rose sufficiently to enable guns to reach oswego, whence they were safely conveyed to sackett's. on november the report of a hostile cruiser in the neighborhood, and fears of her interfering with parts of the armaments still in transit, led chauncey to go out with the "oneida," the only vessel yet ready, to cut off the return of the stranger to kingston. on this occasion he saw three of the enemy's squadron, which, though superior in force, took no notice of him. this slackness to improve an evident opportunity may reasonably be ascribed to the fact that as yet the british vessels on the lakes were not in charge of officers of the royal navy, but of a force purely provincial and irregular. returning to sackett's, chauncey again sailed, on the evening of november , with the "oneida" and six armed schooners. on the th he fell in with a single british vessel, the "royal george," of twenty-one guns, which retreated that night into kingston. the americans followed some distance into the harbor on the th, and engaged both the ship and the works; but the breeze blowing straight in, and becoming heavy, made it imprudent longer to expose the squadron to the loss of spars, under the fire of shore guns, when retreat had to be effected against the wind. beating out, a british armed schooner was sighted coming in from the westward; but after some exchange of shots, she also, though closely pressed, escaped by her better local knowledge, and gained the protection of the port. the squadron returned to sackett's, taking with it two lake vessels as prizes, and having destroyed a third--all three possible resources for the enemy.[ ] nothing decisive resulted from this outing, but it fairly opened the campaign for the control of the lakes, and served to temper officers and men for the kind of task before them. it gave also some experience as to the strength of the works at kingston, which exceeded chauncey's anticipations, and seems afterward to have exerted influence upon his views of the situation; but at present he announced his intention, if supported by a military force, to attack the enemy's vessels at their anchorage. although several shot had been seen to strike, chauncey himself entertained no doubt that all their damages could readily be repaired, and that they would put out again, if only to join their force to that already in toronto. still, on november , he reported his certainty that he controlled the water, an assurance renewed on the th; adding that he had taken on board military stores, with which he would sail on the first fair wind for niagara river, and that he was prepared to effect transportation to any part of the lake, regardless of the enemy, but not of the weather. the last reservation was timely, for, sailing two days later, the vessels were driven back, one schooner being dismasted. as navigation on erie opened usually much later than that upon ontario, there was reasonable certainty that stores could reach the upper lake before they were needed in the spring, and the attempt was postponed till then. meantime, however, four of the schooners were kept cruising off kingston, to prevent intercourse between it and the other ports.[ ] on december chauncey wrote that it was no longer safe to navigate the lake, and that he would soon lay up the vessels. he ascertained subsequently that the recent action of the squadron had compelled troops for toronto to march by land, from kingston, and had prevented the transport of needed supplies to fort george, thus justifying his conviction of control established over the water communications. a few days before he had had the satisfaction of announcing the launch, on november , of the "madison," a new ship of the corvette type, of tons, one third larger than the ocean cruisers "wasp" and "hornet," of the same class, and with proportionately heavy armament; she carrying twenty-four -pounder carronades, and they sixteen to eighteen of the like weight. "she was built," added chauncey, "in the short time of forty-five days; and nine weeks ago the timber that she is composed of was growing in the forest."[ ] it seems scarcely necessary to point the moral, which he naturally did not draw for the edification of his superiors in the administration, that a like energy displayed on lake erie, when war was contemplated, would have placed hull's enterprise on the same level of security that was obtained for his successor by perry's victory a year later, and at much less cost. with the laying up of the fleet on the lakes operations on the northern frontier closed, except in the far west, where general harrison succeeded to the command after hull's capitulation. the loss of detroit had thrown the american front of operations back upon the maumee; nor would that, perhaps, have been tenable, had conditions in upper canada permitted brock to remain with the most of his force through august and september. as it was, just apprehension for the niagara line compelled his return thither; and the same considerations that decided the place of the commander-in-chief, dictated also that of the mass of his troops. the command at detroit and malden was left to colonel procter, whose position was defensively secured by naval means; the ship "queen charlotte" and brig "hunter" maintaining local control of the water. he was, however, forbidden to attempt operations distinctively offensive. "it must be explicitly understood," wrote brock to him, "that you are not to resort to offensive warfare for the purposes of conquest. your operations are to be confined to measures of defence and security."[ ] among these, however, brock included, by direct mention, undertakings intended to destroy betimes threatening gatherings of men or of stores; but such action was merely to secure the british positions, on the principle, already noted, that offence is the best defence. how far these restrictions represent brock's own wishes, or reflect simply the known views of sir george prevost, the governor general, is difficult to say. brock's last letter to procter, written within a week of his death, directed that the enemy should be kept in a state of constant ferment. it seems probable, however, that procter's force was not such as to warrant movement with a view to permanent occupation beyond detroit, the more so as the roads were usually very bad; but any effort on the part of the americans to establish posts on the maumee, or along the lake, must be promptly checked, if possible, lest these should form bases whence to march in force upon detroit or malden, when winter had hardened the face of the ground.[ ] the purpose of the americans being to recover detroit, and then to renew hull's invasion, their immediate aim was to establish their line as far to the front as it could for the moment be successfully maintained. the maumee was such a line, and the one naturally indicated as the advanced base of supplies upon which any forward movement by land must rest. the obstacle to its tenure, when summer was past and autumn rains had begun, was a great swamp, known locally as the black swamp, some forty miles wide, stretching from the sandusky river on the east to the indiana line on the west, and therefore impeding the direct approach from the south to the maumee. through this hull had forced his way in june, building a road as he went; but by the time troops had assembled in the autumn progress here proved wholly impossible. on account of the difficulties of transportation, harrison divided his force into three columns, the supplies of each of which in a new country could be more readily sustained than those of the whole body, if united; in fact, the exigencies of supply in the case of large armies, even in well-settled countries, enforce "dissemination in order to live," as napoleon expressed it. it is of the essence of such dissemination that the several divisions shall be near enough to support each other if there be danger of attack; but in the case of harrison, although his dispositions have been severely censured on this score, south of the maumee no such danger existed to a degree which could not be safely disregarded. the centre column, therefore, was to advance over the road opened by hull; the right by the east of the sandusky river to its mouth on lake erie, east of the swamp, whence it could move to the maumee; while the left, and the one most exposed, from its nearness to the indian country, was to proceed by the auglaize river, a tributary of the maumee navigable for boats of light draught, to fort defiance, at the junction of the two streams. had this plan been carried out, the army would have held a line from fort defiance to the rapids of the maumee, a distance of about forty miles, on which fortified depots could be established prior to further operations; and there would have been to it three chains of supply, corresponding to the roads used by the divisions in their march. fort defiance, with a work at the rapids, afterward built and called fort meigs, would sustain the line proper; while a subsidiary post, subsequently known as fort stephenson, on the lower sandusky, was essential to the defence of that road as it approached the lake, and thence westward, where it skirted the lake shore, and was in measure open to raids from the water. the western line of supplies, being liable to attack from the neighboring indians, was further strengthened by works adequate to repel savages. fort defiance on the left was occupied by october , and toward the middle of december some fifteen hundred men had assembled on the right, on the sandusky, upper and lower; but the centre column could not get through, and the attempt to push on supplies by that route seems to have been persisted in beyond the limits of reasonable perseverance. under these conditions, harrison established his headquarters at upper sandusky about december , sending word to general winchester, commanding at defiance, to descend the maumee to the rapids, and there to prepare sleds for a dash against malden across the lake, when frozen. this was the substitution, under the constraint of circumstances, of a sudden blow in place of regulated advance; for it abandoned, momentarily at least, the plan of establishing a permanent line. winchester moved as directed, reaching the rapids january , , and fixing himself in position with thirteen hundred men on the north bank, opposite hull's road. early in the month the swamp froze over, and quantities of supplies were hurried forward. the total disposable force now under harrison's command is given as sixty-three hundred. preparations and concentration had progressed thus far, when an impulsive outburst of sympathy evoked a singularly inconsiderate and rash movement on the part of the division on the maumee, the commander of which seems to have been rather under the influence of his troops than in control of them. word was brought to the camp that the american settlement of frenchtown, beyond the river raisin, thirty miles away toward detroit, and now within british control, was threatened with burning by indians. a council of war decided that relief should be attempted, and six hundred and sixty men started on the morning of january . they dispossessed the enemy and established themselves in the town, though with severe losses. learning their success, winchester himself went to the place on the th, followed closely by a re-enforcement of two-hundred and fifty. more than half his command was now thirty miles away from the position assigned it, without other base of retreat or support than the remnant left at the rapids. in this situation a superior force of british and indians under procter crossed the lake on the ice and attacked the party thus rashly advanced to frenchtown, which was compelled to surrender by a.m. of january . [illustration: map of lake frontier to illustrate campaigns of - ] winchester had notified harrison of his proposed action, but not in such time as to permit it to be countermanded. receiving the news on the morning of january , harrison at once recognized the hazardous nature of the step, and ordered forward troops from upper and lower sandusky; proceeding himself to the latter place, and thence to the rapids, which he reached early on the th, ahead of the re-enforcements. there was nothing to do but await developments until the men from sandusky arrived. at noon of the d he received intelligence of the surrender, and saw that, through the imprudence of his subordinate, his project of crossing the ice to attack the enemy had been crushed by procter, who had practically annihilated one of his principal divisions, beating it in detail. the loss of so large a part of the force upon which he had counted, and the spread of sickness among the remainder, arrested harrison's projects of offensive action. the maumee even was abandoned for a few days, the army falling back to portage river, toward the sandusky. it soon, however, returned to the rapids, and there fort meigs was built, which in the sequel proved sufficient to hold the position against procter's attack. the army of the northwest from that time remained purely on the defensive until the following september, when perry's victory, assuring the control of the lake, enabled it to march secure of its communications. whatever chance of success may attend such a dash as that against malden, planned by harrison in december, or open to hull in august, the undertaking is essentially outside the ordinary rules of warfare, and to be justified only by the special circumstances of the case, together with the possibility of securing the results obtained. frenchtown, as a particular enterprise, illustrates in some measure the case of malden. it was victoriously possessed, but under conditions which made its tenure more than doubtful, and the loss of the expeditionary corps more than probable. furthermore, if held, it conferred no advantage. the position was less defensible than the maumee, more exposed because nearer the enemy, more difficult to maintain because the communications were thirty miles longer, and, finally, it controlled nothing. the name of occupation, applied to it, was a mere misnomer, disguising a sham. malden, on the contrary, if effectually held, would confer a great benefit; for in the hands of an enemy it menaced the communications of detroit, and if coupled with command of the water, as was the case, it controlled them, as hull found to his ruin. to gain it, therefore, justified a good deal of risk; yet if seized, unless control of the water were also soon established, it would, as compared with detroit, entail upon the americans the additional disadvantage that frenchtown incurred over the maumee,--an increase of exposure, because of longer and more exposed lines of communication. though malden was valuable to the british as a local base, with all the benefits of nearness, it was not the only one they possessed on the lakes. the loss of it, therefore, so long as they possessed decided superiority in armed shipping, though a great inconvenience, would not be a positive disability. with the small tonnage they had on the lake, however, it would have become extremely difficult, if not impossible, to transport and maintain a force sufficient seriously to interrupt the road from the maumee, upon which detroit depended. in short, in all ordinary warfare, and in most that is extraordinary and seems outside the rules, one principle is sure to enforce itself with startling emphasis, if momentarily lost to sight or forgotten, and that is the need of secured communications. a military body, land or sea, may abandon its communications for a brief period, strictly limited, expecting soon to restore them at the same or some other point, just as a caravan can start across the desert with food and water which will last until another base is reached. there is no surrender of certainty in such a case; but a body of troops thrown into a position where it has no security of receiving supplies, incurs a risk that needs justification, and can receive it only from special circumstances. no position within striking distance of the lake shore was permanently secure unless supported by naval power; because all that is implied by the term "communications"--facility for transporting troops, supplies, and ammunition, rapidity of movement from point to point, central position and interior lines--all depended upon the control of the water, from mackinac to the rapids of the st. lawrence. this truth, announced before the war by hull and armstrong, as well as by harrison somewhat later, and sufficiently obvious to any thoughtful man, was recognized in act by harrison and the government after the frenchtown disaster. the general was not responsible for the blunder of his subordinate, nor am i able to see that his general plans for a land campaign, considered independent of the water, lacked either insight, judgment, or energy. he unquestionably made very rash calculations, and indulged in wildly sanguine assurances of success; but this was probably inevitable in the atmosphere in which he had to work. the obstacles to be overcome were so enormous, the people and the government, militarily, so ignorant and incapable, that it was scarcely possible to move efficiently without adopting, or seeming to adopt, the popular spirit and conviction. facts had now asserted themselves through the unpleasant medium of experience, and henceforth it was tacitly accepted that nothing could be done except to stand on the defensive, until the navy of lake erie, as yet unbuilt, could exert its power. until that day came, even the defensive positions taken were rudely shaken by procter, a far from efficient officer, but possessed still of the power of the lakes, and following, though over-feebly, the spirit of brock's instructions, to attack the enemy's posts and keep things in a ferment. with the frenchtown affair hostilities on the canada frontier ceased until the following april; but the winter months were not therefore passed in inactivity. chauncey, after laying up his ships at sackett's harbor, and representing to the government the danger to them and to the navy yard, now that frost had extended over the waters the solidity of the ground, enabling the enemy to cross at will, departed to visit his hitherto neglected command on lake erie. he had already seen cause to be dissatisfied with elliott's choice of a navy yard, known usually by the name black rock, a quarter of a mile above squaw island. the hostile shores were here so close together that even musketry could be exchanged; and elliott, when reporting his decision, said "the river is so narrow that the soldiers are shooting at each other across." there was the further difficulty that, to reach the open lake, the vessels would have to go three miles against a current that ran four knots an hour, and much of the way within point-blank range of the enemy. nevertheless, after examining all situations on lake erie, elliott had reported that none other would answer the purpose; "those that have shelters have not sufficient water, and those with water cannot be defended from the enemy and the violence of the weather."[ ] here he had collected materials and gathered six tiny vessels; the largest a brig of ninety tons, the others schooners of from forty to eighty. these he began to equip and alter about the middle of october, upon the arrival of the carpenters sent by chauncey; but the british kept up such a fire of shot and shell that the carpenters quitted their work and returned to new york, leaving the vessels with their decks and sides torn up.[ ] they were still in this condition when chauncey came, toward the end of december; and although then hauled into a creek behind squaw island, out of range, there were no workmen to complete them. he passed on to presqu'isle, now erie, on the pennsylvania shore, and found it in every way eligible as a port, except that there were but four or five feet of water on the bar. vessels of war within could reach the lake only by being lightened of their guns and stores, a condition impracticable in the presence of a hostile squadron; but the local advantages were much superior to those at black rock, and while it could be hoped that a lucky opportunity might insure the absence of the enemy's vessels, the enemy's guns on the niagara shore were fixtures, unless the american army took possession of them. between these various considerations chauncey decided to shift the naval base from black rock to erie; and he there assembled the materials for the two brigs, of three hundred tons each, which formed the backbone of perry's squadron nine months later.[ ] for supplies erie depended upon philadelphia and pittsburg, there being from the latter place water communication by the alleghany river, and its tributary the french river, to within fifteen miles, whence the transportation was by good road. except timber, which grew upon the spot, the materials--iron, cordage, provisions, and guns--came mainly by this route from pennsylvania; a number of guns, however, being sent from washington. by these arrangements the resources of new york, relieved of lake erie, were concentrated upon lakes ontario and champlain. chauncey further provided for the defence of black rock by its own resources against sudden attack; the army, except a local force of three hundred men, having gone into winter quarters ten miles back from the niagara. he then returned to sackett's harbor january , where he found preparations for protection even less satisfactory than upon lake erie,[ ] although the stake was far greater; for it may safely be said that the fall of either kingston or sackett's would have decided the fate of lake ontario and of upper canada, at once and definitively. it had now become evident that, in order to decide superiority on the water, there was to be between these neighboring and hostile stations the race of ship-building, which became and continued the most marked feature of the war on this lake. chauncey felt the increasing necessity thus entailed for his presence on the scene. he was proportionately relieved by receiving at this time an application from commander oliver h. perry to serve under him on the lakes, and immediately, on january , applied for his orders, stating that he could "be employed to great advantage, particularly on lake erie, where i shall not be able to go so early as i expected, owing to the increasing force of the enemy on this lake." this marks the official beginning of perry's entrance upon the duty in which he won a distinction that his less fortunate superior failed to achieve. at this time, however, chauncey hoped to attain such superiority by the opening of spring, and to receive such support from the army, as to capture kingston by a joint operation, the plan for which he submitted to the department. that accomplished, he would be able to transfer to lake erie the force of men needed to destroy the enemy's fleet there.[ ] this expectation was not fulfilled, and perry remained in practically independent command upon the upper lakes. the season of may be said, therefore, to have closed with the american squadron upon lake ontario concentrated in sackett's harbor, where also two new and relatively powerful ships were building. upon lake erie the force was divided between black rock, where elliott's flotilla lay, and erie, where the two brigs were laid down, and four other gunboats building. the concentration of these two bodies could be effected only by first taking possession of the british side of the niagara river. this done, and the black rock vessels thus released, there still remained the bar at erie to pass. the british force on ontario was likewise divided, between toronto and kingston, the vessels afloat being at the latter. neither place, however, was under such fetters as black rock, and the two divisions might very possibly be assembled despite the hostile fleet. on the upper lake their navy was at amherstburg, where also was building a ship, inferior in force, despite her rig, to either of the brigs ordered by chauncey at erie. the difficulties of obtaining supplies, mechanics, and seamen, in that then remote region, imposed great hindrances upon the general british preparations. there nevertheless remained in their hands, at the opening of the campaign, the great advantages over the americans--first, of the separation of the latter's divisions, enforced by the british holding the bank of the niagara; and secondly, of the almost insuperable difficulty of crossing the erie bar unarmed, if the enemy's fleet kept in position near it. that the british failed to sustain these original advantages condemns their management, and is far more a matter of military criticism than the relative power of the two squadrons in the battle of september . the principal business of each commander was to be stronger than the enemy when they met. that the american accomplished this, despite serious obstacles, first by concentrating his force, and second by crossing the bar unimpeded, so that when he encountered his opponent he was in decisively superior force, is as distinctly to his credit as it would have been distinctly to his discredit had the odds been reversed by any fault of his. perry by diligent efficiency overcame his difficulties, combined his divisions, gained the lake, and, by commanding it, so cut off his enemy's supplies that he compelled him to come out, and fight, and be destroyed. to compare the force of the two may be a matter of curious interest; but for the purpose of making comparisons of desert between them it is a mere waste of ink, important only to those who conceive the chief end of war to be fighting, and not victory. * * * * * the disaster at frenchtown, with the consequent abandonment of all project of forward movement by the army of the northwest, may be regarded as the definite termination of the land campaign of . before resuming the account of the ocean operations of the same period, it is expedient here to give a summary of european conditions at the same time, for these markedly affected the policy of the british government towards the united states, even after war had been formally declared. the british orders in council of , modified in in scope, though not in principle, had been for a long while the grievance chiefly insisted upon by the united states. against them mainly was directed, by jefferson and madison, the system of commercial restrictions which it was believed would compel their repeal. consequently, when the british government had abolished the obnoxious orders, on june , , with reservations probably admissible by the united states, it was unwilling to believe that war could still not be avoided; nor that, even if begun in ignorance of the repeal, it could not be stopped without further concession. till near the end of the year its measures were governed by this expectation, powerfully re-enforced by momentous considerations of european events, the effect of which upon the united states requires that they be stated. in june, , european politics were reaching a crisis, the issue of which could not then be forecast. war had begun between napoleon and russia; and on june the emperor, crossing the niemen, invaded the dominion of the czar. great britain, already nine years at war with france, had just succeeded in detaching russia from her enemy, and ranging her on her own side. the accession of sweden to this alliance conferred complete control of the baltic, thus releasing a huge british fleet hitherto maintained there, and opening an important trade, debarred to great britain in great measure for four years past. but on the other hand, napoleon still, as during all this recent period, controlled the continent from the pyrenees to the vistula, carrying its hosts forward against russia, and closing its ports to british commerce to the depressing injury of british finance. a young canadian, then in england, in close contact with london business life, wrote to his home at this period: "there is a general stagnation of commerce, all entrance to europe being completely shut up. there was never a time known to compare with the present, nearly all foreign traders becoming bankrupt, or reduced to one tenth of their former trade. merchants, who once kept ten or fifteen clerks, have now but two or three; thousands of half-starved discharged clerks are skulking about the streets. customhouse duties are reduced upwards of one half. of such dread power are bonaparte's decrees, which have of late been enforced in the strictest manner all over the continent, that it has almost ruined the commerce of england."[ ] a month before the united states declared war the perplexities of the british government were depicted by the same writer, in terms which palpably and graphically reflect the contemporary talk of the counting-house and the dinner-table: "if the orders in council are repealed, the trade of the united states will flourish beyond all former periods. they will then have the whole commerce of the continent in their hands, and the british, though blockading with powerful armaments the hostile ports of europe, will behold fleets of american merchantmen enter in safety the harbors of the enemy, and carry on a brisk and lucrative trade, whilst englishmen, who command the ocean and are sole masters of the deep, must quietly suffer two thirds of their shipping to be dismantled and lie useless in little rivers or before empty warehouses. their seamen, to earn a little salt junk and flinty biscuits, must spread themselves like vagabonds over the face of the earth, and enter the service of any nation. if, on the contrary, the government continue to enforce the orders, trade will still remain in its present deplorable state; an american war will follow, and poor canada will bear the brunt." cannot one see the fine old fellows of the period shaking their heads over their wine, and hear the words which the lively young provincial takes down almost from their lips? they portray truly, however, the anxious dilemma in which the government was living, and explain concisely the conflicting considerations which brought on the war with the united states. from this embarrassing situation the current year brought a double relief. the chance of american competition was removed by the declaration of war, and exclusion from the continent by napoleon's reverses. while matters were thus in northern and central europe, in the far southwest the spanish peninsula had for the same four dreary years been the scene of desolating strife, in which from the beginning great britain had taken a most active part, supporting the insurgent people with armies and money against the french legions. the weakening effect of this conflict upon the emperor, and the tremendous additional strain upon his resources now occasioned by the break with russia, were well understood, and hopes rose high; but heavy in the other scale were his unbroken record of success, and the fact that the war in the peninsula, the sustenance of which was now doubly imperative in order to maintain the fatal dissemination of his forces between the two extremities of europe, depended upon intercourse with the united states. the corn of america fed the british and their allies in the peninsula, and so abundantly, that flour was cheaper in lisbon than in liverpool. in , american vessels entered the tagus to british; and from all the rest of the outside world there came only . the peninsula itself, spain and portugal together, sent but .[ ] the merchants of baltimore, petitioning against the non-intercourse act, said that $ , , were owing by british merchants to americans, which could only be repaid by importations from england; and that this debt was chiefly for shipments to spain and portugal.[ ] the yearly export thither, mainly for the armies, was , barrels of flour, besides grain in other forms.[ ] the maintenance of this supply would be endangered by war. upon the continuance of peace depended also the enjoyment of the relatively tranquil conditions which great britain, after years of vexation, had succeeded at last in establishing in the western basin of the atlantic, and especially in the caribbean sea. in the revolt of the spanish people turned the spanish west indies once more to her side; and in and the conquest of the last of the french islands gave her control of the whole region, depriving french privateers of every base for local operations against british commerce. in , by returns to september , the royal navy had at sea one hundred and twenty ships of the line and one hundred and forty-five frigates, besides four hundred and twenty-one other cruisers, sixteen of which were larger and the rest smaller than the frigate class--a total of six hundred and eighty-six.[ ] of these there were on the north american and west india stations only three of the line, fifteen frigates, and sixty-one smaller--a total of seventy-nine.[ ] the huge remainder of over six hundred ships of war were detained elsewhere by the exigencies of the contest, the naval range of which stretched from the levant to the shores of denmark and norway, then one kingdom under napoleon's control; and in the far eastern seas extended to the straits of sunda, and beyond. from antwerp to venice, in various ports, when the empire fell, napoleon had over a hundred ships of the line and half a hundred frigates. to hold these in check was in itself a heavy task for the british sea power, even though most of the colonial ports which might serve as bases for their external action had been wrested from france. a hostile america would open to the french navy a number of harbors which it now needed; and at the will of the emperor the united states might receive a division of ships of a class she lacked entirely, but could both officer and man. one of napoleon's great wants was seamen, and it was perfectly understood by intelligent naval officers, and by appreciative statesmen like john adams and gouverneur morris, that a fleet of ships of the line, based upon american resources, would constitute for great britain a more difficult problem than a vastly larger number in europe. the probability was contemplated by both the british commander-in-chief and the admiralty, and was doubtless a chief reason for the comparatively large number of ships of the line--eleven--assigned on the outbreak of hostilities to a station where otherwise there was no similar force to encounter.[ ] to bring the french ships and this coast-line together was a combination correct in conception, and not impracticable. it was spoken of at the time--rumored as a design; and had not the attention and the means of the emperor been otherwise preoccupied, probably would have been attempted, and not impossibly effected. to avert such a conjuncture by the restoration of peace was necessarily an object of british policy. more than that, however, was at stake. the orders in council had served their turn. in conjunction with napoleon's continental system, by the misery inflicted upon all the countries under his control, they had brought about the desperation of russia and the resistance of the czar, who at first had engaged in the emperor's policy. russia and france were at war, and it was imperative at once to redouble the pressure in the peninsula, and to recuperate the financial strength of great britain, by opening every possible avenue of supply and of market to british trade, in order to bring the whole national power, economical and military, to bear effectively upon what promised to be a death struggle. the repeal of the orders, with the consequent admission of american merchant ships to every hostile port, except such, few as might be effectively blockaded in accordance with the accepted principles of international law, was the price offered for the preservation of peace, and for readmission to the american market, closed to british manufacturers and merchants by the non-importation acts. this extension of british commerce, now loudly demanded by the british people, was an object to be accomplished by the same means that should prevent the american people from constituting themselves virtually the allies of napoleon by going to war. should this dreaded alternative, however, come to pass, not only would british trade again miss the market, the loss of which had already caused widespread suffering, but, in common with it, british navigation, british shipping, the chief handmaid of commerce, would be exposed in a remote quarter, most difficult to guard, to the privateering activity of a people whose aptitude for such occupation had been demonstrated in the fight for independence and the old french wars. half a century before, in the years - , there had been fitted out in the single port of new york, for war against the french, forty-eight privateers, carrying six hundred and ninety-five guns and manned by over five thousand men.[ ] the conditions enumerated constituted the principal important military possibilities of the sea frontier of the united states, regarded as an element in the general international situation when the year opened. its importance to france was simply that of an additional weight thrown into the scale against great britain. france, being excluded from the sea, could not be aided or injured by the united states directly, but only indirectly, through their common enemy; and the same was substantially true of the continent at large. but to great britain a hostile seaboard in america meant the possibility of all that has been stated; and therefore, slowly and unwillingly, but surely, the apprehension of war with its added burden forced the government to a concession which years of intermittent commercial restrictions by the united states, and of opposition denunciation at home, had not been able to extort. the sudden death of spencer perceval, the prime minister identified with the orders in council, possibly facilitated the issue, but it had become inevitable by sheer pressure of circumstances as they developed. it came to pass, by a conjuncture most fortunate for great britain, and most unfavorable to the united states, that the moment of war, vainly sought to be avoided by both parties, coincided with the first rude jar to napoleon's empire and its speedy final collapse; leaving the union, weakened by internal dissension, exposed single-handed to the full force of the british power. at the beginning, however, and till toward the end of , it seemed possible that for an indefinite period the efforts of the americans would receive the support derived from the inevitable preoccupation of their enemy with european affairs; nor did many doubt napoleon's success against russia, or that it would be followed by great britain's abandoning the european struggle as hopeless. for such maritime and political contingencies the british admiralty had to prepare, when the near prospect of war with america threatened to add to the extensive responsibilities entailed by the long strife with napoleon. its measures reflected the double purpose of the government: to secure peace, if possible, yet not to surrender policies considered imperative. on may , , identical instructions were issued to each of the admirals commanding the four transatlantic stations,--newfoundland, halifax, jamaica, and barbados,--warning them of the imminent probability of hostilities, in the event of which, by aggressive action or formal declaration on the part of the united states, they were authorized to resort at once to all customary procedures of war; "to attack, take or sink, burn or destroy, all ships or vessels belonging to the united states or to the citizens thereof." at the same time, however, special stress was laid upon the urgent wish of the government to avoid occasions which might induce a collision. "you are to direct the commanders of his majesty's ships to exercise, except in the events hereinbefore specified, all possible forbearance toward the united states, and to contribute, as far as may depend upon them, to that good understanding which it is his royal highness's[ ] most earnest wish to maintain."[ ] the spirit of these orders, together with caution not to be attacked unawares, accounts for the absence of british ships of war from the neighborhood of the american coast noted by rodgers' cruising squadron in the spring of . decatur, indeed, was informed by a british naval agent that the admiral at bermuda did not permit more than two vessels to cruise at a time, and these were instructed not to approach the american coast.[ ] the temper of the controlling element in the administration, and the disposition of american naval officers since the "chesapeake" affair, were but too likely to afford causes of misunderstanding in case of a meeting. footnotes: [ ] baynes to prevost. canadian archives, c. , pp. - . [ ] life of brock, p. . brock first heard of the suspension august , at fort erie, on his return toward niagara. life, p. . see also a letter from brock to the american general van rensselaer, in the defence of general dearborn, by h.a.s. dearborn, p. . [ ] chauncey to the secretary of the navy, sept. , . captains' letters, navy department mss. [ ] elliott's report of this affair will be found in the captains' letters, navy department mss., forwarded by chauncey oct. , . [ ] life of brock, p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] porter's address to the public. niles' register, vol. iii. p. . [ ] see eustis's letter to dearborn, aug. , . hall's memoirs of the northwestern campaign, p. . [ ] life of brock, pp. , , . [ ] chauncey to secretary, sept. , . captains' letters, navy department mss. [ ] chauncey to secretary, feb. , . ibid. [ ] the details of chauncey's actions are appended to his letter of sept. , . [ ] chauncey to secretary of the nary, oct. , , , . captains' letters. [ ] chauncey to secretary, october , november , , . captains' letters. those for november and can be found in niles, vol. iii, pp. , . [ ] chauncey to secretary, november . captains' letters. [ ] chauncey to secretary, nov. , . ibid. [ ] life of brock, p. . [ ] in the canadian archives frequent mention is made of expeditions by procter's forces about the american lines, as of the british shipping on the lake front during the autumn of . [ ] elliott to chauncey, sept. , . captains' letters, navy department. [ ] chauncey to the secretary, oct. , . captains' letters, navy department. [ ] chauncey to the secretary, dec. , ; jan. and , and feb. , . captains' letters. [ ] see chauncey's letters of dec. , , and jan. , . captains' letters. [ ] chauncey to the secretary, jan. , feb. , . captains' letters. [ ] ridout, "ten years in upper canada," pp. , , . [ ] niles' register, vol ii. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] naval chronicle, vol. xxviii. p. . [ ] quoted from steele's list (british) by niles' register, vol. ii. p. . [ ] croker to warren, nov. , , and march , . british admiralty mss. out-letters. [ ] niles' register, vol. iii. p. . quoted from a publication of . [ ] the prince regent. george iii. was incapacitated at this time. [ ] admiralty out-letters, british records office. [ ] rodgers to the secretary, april , . decatur, june , . captains' letters. chapter viii ocean warfare against commerce--privateering--british licenses--naval actions: "wasp" and "frolic"; "united states" and "macedonian" in anticipation of war the british admiralty took the military measure of consolidating their transatlantic stations, with the exception of newfoundland. the jamaica, leeward islands, and halifax squadrons, while retaining their present local organizations, were subordinated to a single chief; for which position was designated admiral sir john borlase warren, an officer of good fighting record, but from his previous career esteemed less a seaman than a gallant man. this was apparently his first extensive command, although he was now approaching sixty; but it was foreseen that the british minister might have left washington in consequence of a rupture of relations, and that there might thus devolve upon the naval commander-in-chief certain diplomatic overtures, which the government had determined to make before definitely accepting war as an irreversible issue. warren, a man of courtly manners, had some slight diplomatic antecedents, having represented great britain at st. petersburg on one occasion. there were also other negotiations anticipated, dependent upon political conditions within the union; where bitter oppositions of opinion, sectional in character, were known to exist concerning the course of the administration in resorting to hostilities. warren was instructed on these several points. it was not until july , , that a despatch vessel from halifax brought word to england of the attack upon the "belvidera" by rodgers' squadron on june . by the same mail admiral sawyer wrote that he had sent a flag of truce to new york to ask an explanation, and besides had directed all his cruisers to assemble at halifax.[ ] the government recognized the gravity of the news, but expressed the opinion that there was no evidence that war had been decided upon, and that the action of the american commodore had been in conformity with previous orders not to permit foreign cruisers within the waters of the united states. some color was lent to this view by the circumstance that the "belvidera" was reported to have been off sandy hook, though not in sight of land.[ ] in short, the british cabinet officially assumed that facts were as they wished them to continue; the course best adapted to insure the maintenance of peace, if perchance not yet broken. on july , however, definite information was received that the united states government had declared that war existed between the two countries. on the st the cabinet took its first measures in consequence.[ ] one order was issued forbidding british merchant vessels to sail without convoy for any part of north america or the west indies; while another laid an embargo on all american merchant ships in british ports, and directed the capture of any met at sea, unless sailing under british licenses, as many then did to continental ports. no other hostile steps, such as general reprisals or commercial blockade, were at this time authorized; it was decided to await the effect in the united states of the repeal of the obnoxious orders in council. this having taken place only on june , intelligence of its reception and results could not well reach england before the middle of september. when parliament was prorogued on july , the speech from the throne expressed a willingness still "to hope that the accustomed relations of peace and amity between the two countries may yet be restored." it is a coincidence, accidental, yet noteworthy for its significance, that the date of the first hostile action against the united states, july , was also that of the official promulgation of treaties of peace between great britain, russia, and sweden.[ ] accompanied as these were with clauses embodying what was virtually a defensive alliance of the three powers against napoleon, they marked that turn of the tide in european affairs which overthrew one of the most important factors in the political and military anticipations of the united states administration. "can it be doubted," wrote madison on september , "that if, under the pressure added by our war to that previously felt by great britain, her government declines an accommodation, it will be owing to calculations drawn from our internal divisions?"[ ] of the approaching change, however, no sign yet appeared. the reverses of the french were still in the far future. not until september did they enter moscow, and news of this event was received in the united states only at the end of november. a contemporary weekly, under date of december , remarked: "peace before this time has been dictated by bonaparte, as ought to have been calculated upon by the dealers (_sic_) at st. petersburg, before they, influenced by the british, prevailed upon alexander to embark in the war.... all europe, the british islands excepted, will soon be at the feet of bonaparte."[ ] this expectation, generally shared during the summer of , is an element in the american situation not to be overlooked. as late as december , henry clay, addressing the house of representatives, of which he then was speaker, said: "the british trade shut out from the baltic--excluded from the continent of europe--possibly expelled the black sea--perishing in south america; its illicit avenue to the united states, through canada, closed--was this the period for throwing open our own market by abandoning our restrictive system? perhaps at this moment the fate of the north of europe is decided, and the french emperor may be dictating the law from moscow."[ ] the following night napoleon finally abandoned his routed army and started on his return to paris. war having been foreseen, the british government took its first step without hesitation. on august the foreign office issued warren's secret instructions, which were substantially the repetition of those already addressed on july to its representative in washington. it being probable that before they could be received he would have departed in consequence of the rupture, warren was to submit the proposition contained in them, that the united states government, in view of the revocation of the orders in council, so long demanded by it, should recall the hostile measures taken. in case of acceptance, he was authorized to stop at once all hostilities within his command, and to give assurance of similar action by his government in every part of the world. if this advance proved fruitless, as it did, no orders instituting a state of war were needed, for it already existed; but for that contingency warren received further instructions as to the course he was to pursue, in case "a desire should manifest itself in any considerable portion of the american union, more especially in those states bordering upon his majesty's north american dominions, to return to their relations of peace and amity with this country." the admiral was to encourage such dispositions, and should they take shape in formal act, making overtures to him for a cessation of hostilities for that part of the country, he was directed to grant it, and to enter into negotiations for commercial intercourse between the section thus acting and the british dominions. in short, if the general government proved irreconcilable, great britain was to profit by any sentiment of disunion found to exist.[ ] warren sailed from portsmouth august , arriving in halifax september . on the th, he despatched to the united states government the proposal for the cessation of hostilities. monroe, the secretary of state, replied on october . the president, he said, was at all times anxious to restore peace, and at the very moment of declaring war had instructed the _chargé_ in london to make propositions to that effect to the british ministry. an indispensable condition, however, was the abandonment of the practice of impressment from american vessels. the president recognized the embarrassment under which great britain lay, because of her felt necessity to control the services of her native seamen, and was willing to undertake that hereafter they should be wholly excluded from the naval and merchant ships of the united states. this should be done under regulations to be negotiated between the two countries, in order to obviate the injury alleged by great britain; but, meanwhile, impressing from under the american flag must be discontinued during any armistice arranged. "it cannot be presumed, while the parties are engaged in a negotiation to adjust amicably this important difference, that the united states would admit the right, or acquiesce in the practice of the opposite party, or that great britain would be unwilling to restrain her cruisers from a practice which would have the strongest tendency to defeat the negotiation." the orders in council having been revoked, impressment remained the only outstanding question upon which the united states was absolute in its demand. that conceded, upon the terms indicated, all other differences might be referred to negotiation. upon this point warren had no powers, for his government was determined not to yield. the maritime war therefore went on unabated; but it may be mentioned here that the president's undertaking to exclude british-born seamen from american ships took effect in an act of congress, approved by him march , . he had thenceforth in hand a pledge which he considered a full guarantee against whatever great britain feared to lose by ceasing to take seamen from under the american flag. it was not so regarded in england, and no formal agreement on this interesting subject was ever reached. the conditions existing upon his arrival, and the occurrences of the past three months, as then first fully known to warren, deeply impressed him with the largeness of his task in protecting the commerce of great britain. he found himself at once in the midst of its most evident perils, which in the beginning were concentrated about halifax, owing to special circumstances. although long seemingly imminent, hostilities when they actually came had found the mercantile community of the united states, for the most part, unbelieving and unprepared. the cry of "wolf!" had been raised so often that they did not credit its coming, even when at the doors. this was especially the case in new england, where the popular feeling against war increased the indisposition to think it near. on may , captain bainbridge, commanding the boston navy yard, wrote: "i am sorry to say that the people here do not believe we are going to war, and are too much disposed to treat our national councils with contempt, and to consider their preparations as electioneering."[ ] the presidential election was due in the following november. a baltimore newspaper of the day, criticising the universal rush to evade the embargo of april , instituted in order to keep both seamen and property at home in avoidance of capture, added that in justice it must be said that most people believed that the embargo, as on former occasions, did not mean war.[ ] under the general sense of unpreparedness, it seemed to many inconceivable that the administration would venture to expose the coasts to british reprisals. john randolph, repeating in the house of representatives in secret session a conversation between the committee on foreign relations and the secretary of state, said: "he was asked whether any essential changes would be made in the sixty days (of the proposed embargo) in the defence of our maritime frontier and seaports. he replied, pretty considerable preparations would be made. he said new york was in a pretty respectable state, but not such as to resist a formidable fleet; but that it was not to be expected that that kind of war would be carried on." the obvious reply was, "we must expect what commonly happens in wars." "as to the prepared state of the country, the president, in case of a declaration, would not feel bound to take more than his share of the responsibility. the unprepared state of the country was the only reason why ulterior measures should be deferred."[ ] randolph's recollections of this interview were challenged by members of the committee in other points, but not in these. the administration had then been in office three years, and the causes of war had been accumulating for at least seven; but so notorious was the unreadiness that a great part of the community even now saw only bluster. for these reasons the first rush to privateering, although feverishly energetic, was of a somewhat extemporized character. in consequence of the attempt to elude the embargo, by a precipitate and extensive export movement, a very large part of the merchant ships and seamen were now abroad. hence, in the haste to seize upon enemy's shipping, anything that could be sent to sea at quick notice was utilized. vessels thus equipped were rarely best fitted for a distant voyage, in which dependence must rest upon their own resources, and upon crews both numerous and capable. they were therefore necessarily directed upon commercial highways near at hand, which, though not intrinsically richest, nor followed by the cargoes that would pay best in the united states, could nevertheless adequately reward enterprise. in the near vicinity of halifax the routes from the british west indies to new brunswick, nova scotia, and the st. lawrence, met and crossed the equally important lines of travel from the british islands to the same points. this circumstance contributed to the importance of that place as a naval and commercial centre, and also focussed about it by far the larger part of the effort and excitement of the first privateering outburst from the united states. as rodgers' bold sortie, and disappearance into the unknown with a strong squadron had forced concentration upon the principal british vessels, the cruisers remaining for dispersion in search of privateers were numerically inadequate to suppress the many and scattered americans. before warren's arrival the prizes reported in the united states were one hundred and ninety, and they probably exceeded two hundred. an analysis of the somewhat imperfect data which accompany these returns indicates that about three fourths were seized in the bay of fundy and in the off-lying waters from thence round to newfoundland. of the remainder, half, probably, were taken in the west indies; and the rest out in the deep sea, beyond the gulf stream, upon the first part of the track followed by the sugar and coffee traders from the west indies to england.[ ] there had not yet been time to hear of prizes taken in europe, to which comparatively few privateers as yet went. one of the most intelligent and enterprising of the early privateers was commodore joshua barney, a veteran of the american navy of the revolution. he commissioned a baltimore schooner, the "rossie," at the outbreak of the war; partly, apparently, in order to show a good example of patriotic energy, but doubtless also through the promptings of a love of adventure, not extinguished by advancing years. the double motive kept him an active, useful, and distinguished public servant throughout the war. his cruise on this occasion, as far as can be gathered from the reports,[ ] conformed in direction to the quarters in which the enemy's merchant ships might most surely be expected. sailing from the chesapeake july , he seems to have stood at once outside the gulf stream for the eastern edge of the banks of newfoundland. in the ensuing two weeks he was twice chased by an enemy's frigate, and not till july did he take his first prize. from that day, to and including august , he captured ten other vessels--eleven in all. unfortunately, the precise locality of each seizure is not given, but it is inferable from the general tenor of the accounts that they were made between the eastern edge of the great banks and the immediate neighborhood of halifax; in the locality, in fact, to which hull during those same ten days was directing the "constitution," partly in pursuit of prizes, equally in search of the enemy's ships of war, which were naturally to be sought at those centres of movement where their national traders accumulated. on august the "rossie," having run down the nova scotia coast and passed by george's bank and nantucket, went into newport, rhode island. it is noticeable that before and after those ten days of success, although she saw no english vessels, except ships of war cruising on the outer approaches of their commerce, she was continually meeting and speaking american vessels returning home. these facts illustrate the considerations governing privateering, and refute the plausible opinion often advanced, that it was a mere matter of gambling adventure. thus mr. gallatin, the secretary of the treasury, in a communication to congress, said: "the occupation of privateers is precisely of the same species as the lottery, with respect to hazard and to the chance of rich prizes."[ ] gallatin approached the subject from the standpoint of the financier and with the abstract ideas of the political economist. his temporary successor, the secretary of the navy, mr. jones, had been a merchant in active business life, and he viewed privateering as a practical business undertaking. "the analogy between privateering and lotteries does not appear to me to be so strict as the secretary seems to consider it. the adventure of a privateer is of the nature of a commercial project or speculation, conducted by commercial men upon principles of mercantile calculation and profit. the vessel and her equipment is a matter of great expense, which is expected to be remunerated by the probable chances of profit, after calculating the outfit, insurance, etc., as in a regular mercantile voyage."[ ] mr. jones would doubtless have admitted what gallatin alleged, that the business was liable to be overdone, as is the case with all promising occupations; and that many would engage in it without adequate understanding or forethought. the elements of risk which enter into privateering are doubtless very great, and to some extent baffle calculation. in this it only shares the lot common to all warlike enterprise, in which, as the ablest masters of the art repeatedly affirm, something must be allowed for chance. but it does not follow that a reasonable measure of success may not fairly be expected, where sagacious appreciation of well-known facts controls the direction of effort, and preparation is proportioned to the difficulties to be encountered. heedlessness of conditions, or recklessness of dangers, defeat effort everywhere, as well as in privateering; nor is even the chapter of unforeseen accident confined to military affairs. in the courses followed by the enemy's trade were well understood, as were also the characteristics of their ships of war, in sailing, distribution, and management.[ ] regard being had to these conditions, the pecuniary venture, which privateering essentially is, was sure of fair returns--barring accidents--if the vessels were thoroughly well found, with superior speed and nautical qualities, and if directed upon the centres of ocean travel, such as the approaches to the english channel, or, as before noted, to where great highways cross, inducing an accumulation of vessels from several quarters. so pursued, privateering can be made pecuniarily successful, as was shown by the increasing number and value of prizes as the war went on. it has also a distinct effect as a minor offensive operation, harassing and weakening the enemy; but its merits are more contestable when regarded as by itself alone decisive of great issues. despite the efficiency and numbers of american privateers, it was not british commerce, but american, that was destroyed by the war. from newport the "rossie" took a turn through another lucrative field of privateering enterprise, the caribbean sea. passing by bermuda, which brought her in the track of vessels from the west indies to halifax, she entered the caribbean at its northeastern corner, by the anegada passage, near st. thomas, thence ran along the south shore of porto rico, coming out by the mona passage, between porto rico and santo domingo, and so home by the gulf stream. in this second voyage she made but two prizes; and it is noted in her log book that she here met the privateer schooner "rapid" from charleston, fifty-two days out, without taking anything. the cause of these small results does not certainly appear; but it may be presumed that with the height of the hurricane season at hand, most of the west india traders had already sailed for europe. despite all drawbacks, when the "rossie" returned to baltimore toward the end of october, she had captured or destroyed property roughly reckoned at a million and a half, which is probably an exaggerated estimate. two hundred and seventeen prisoners had been taken. while the "rossie" was on her way to the west indies, there sailed from salem a large privateer called the "america," the equipment and operations of which illustrated precisely the business conception which attached to these enterprises in the minds of competent business men. this ship-rigged vessel of four hundred and seventy-three tons, built of course for a merchantman, was about eight years old when the war broke out, and had just returned from a voyage. seeing that ordinary commerce was likely to be a very precarious undertaking, her owners spent the months of july and august in preparing her deliberately for her new occupation. her upper deck was removed, and sides filled in solid. she was given larger yards and loftier spars than before; the greatly increased number of men carried by a privateer, for fighting and for manning prizes, enabling canvas to be handled with greater rapidity and certainty. she received a battery of very respectable force for those days, so that she could repel the smaller classes of ships of war, which formed a large proportion of the enemy's cruisers. thus fitted to fight or run, and having very superior speed, she was often chased, but never caught. during the two and a half years of war she made four cruises of four months each; taking in all forty-one prizes, twenty-seven of which reached port and realized $ , , , after deducting expenses and government charges. as half of this went to the ship's company, the owners netted $ , for sixteen months' active use of the ship. her invariable cruising ground was from the english channel south, to the latitude of the canary islands.[ ] the united states having declared war, the americans enjoyed the advantage of the first blow at the enemy's trade. the reduced numbers of vessels on the british transatlantic stations, and the perplexity induced by rodgers' movement, combined to restrict the injury to american shipping. a number of prizes were made, doubtless; but as nearly as can be ascertained not over seventy american merchant ships were taken in the first three months of the war. of these, thirty-eight are reported as brought under the jurisdiction of the vice-admiralty court at halifax, and twenty-four as captured on the jamaica station. news of the war not being received by the british squadrons in europe until early in august, only one capture there appears before october , except from the mediterranean. there captain usher on september wrote from gibraltar that all the americans on their way down the sea--that is, out of the straits--had been taken.[ ] in like manner, though with somewhat better fortune, thirty or forty american ships from the baltic were driven to take refuge in the neutral swedish port of gottenburg, and remained war-bound.[ ] that the british cruisers were not inactive in protecting the threatened shores and waters of nova scotia and the st. lawrence is proved by the seizure of twenty-four american privateers, between july and august ;[ ] a result to which the inadequate equipment of these vessels probably contributed. but american shipping, upon the whole, at first escaped pretty well in the matter of actual capture. it was not in this way, but by the almost total suppression of commerce, both coasting and foreign, both neutral and american, that the maritime pressure of war was brought home to the united states. this also did not happen until a comparatively late period. no commercial blockade was instituted by the enemy before february, . up to that time neutrals, not carrying contraband, had free admission to all american ports; and the british for their own purposes encouraged a licensed trade, wholly illegitimate as far as united states ships were concerned, but in which american citizens and american vessels were largely engaged, though frequently under flags of other nations. a significant indication of the nature of this traffic is found in the export returns of the year ending september , . the total value of home produce exported was $ , , , chiefly flour, grain, and other provisions. of this, $ , , went to spain and portugal with their colonies; $ , , to the peninsula itself.[ ] it was not till october, , when the british armies entered france, that this demand fell. at the same time halifax and canada were being supplied with flour from new england; and the common saying that the british forces in canada could not keep the field but for supplies sent from the united states was strictly true, and has been attested by british commissaries. an american in halifax in november, , wrote home that within a fortnight twenty thousand barrels of flour had arrived in vessels under spanish and swedish flags, chiefly from boston. this sort of unfaithfulness to a national cause is incidental to most wars, but rarely amounts to as grievous a military evil as in and , when both the peninsula and canada were substantially at our mercy in this respect. with the fall of napoleon, and the opening of continental resources, such control departed from american hands. in the succeeding twelvemonth there was sent to the peninsula less than $ , , worth. warren's impressions of the serious nature of the opening conflict caused a correspondence between him and the admiralty somewhat controversial in tone. ten days after his arrival he represented the reduced state of the squadron: "the war assumes a new, as well as more active and inveterate aspect than heretofore." alarming reports were being received as to the number of ships of twenty-two to thirty-two guns fitting out in american ports, and he mentions as significant that the commission of a privateer officer, taken in a recaptured vessel, bore the number . at halifax he was in an atmosphere of rumors and excitement, fed by frequent communication with eastern ports, as well as by continual experience of captures about the neighboring shores; the enemies' crews even landing at times. when he went to bermuda two months later, so many privateers were met on the line of traffic between the west indies and the st. lawrence as to convince him of the number and destructiveness of these vessels, and "of the impossibility of our trade navigating these seas unless a very extensive squadron is employed to scour the vicinity." he was crippled for attempting this by the size of the american frigates, which forbade his dispersing his cruisers. the capture of the "guerrière" had now been followed by that of the "macedonian;" and in view of the results, and of rodgers being again out, he felt compelled to constitute squadrons of two frigates and a sloop. under these conditions, and with so many convoys to furnish, "it is impracticable to cut off the enemy's resources, or to repress the disorder and pillage which actually exist to a very alarming degree, both on the coast of british america and in the west indies, as will be seen by the copies of letters enclosed," from colonial and naval officials. he goes on to speak, in terms not carefully weighed, of swarms of privateers and letters-of-marque, their numbers now amounting to six hundred; the crews of which had landed in many points of his majesty's dominions, and even taken vessels from their anchors in british ports.[ ] the admiralty, while evidently seeing exaggeration in this language, bear witness in their reply to the harassment caused by the american squadrons and private armed ships. they remind the admiral that there are two principal ways of protecting the trade: one by furnishing it with convoys, the other by preventing egress from the enemy's ports, through adequate force placed before them. to disperse vessels over the open sea, along the tracks of commerce, though necessary, is but a subsidiary measure. his true course is to concentrate a strong division before each chief american port, and they intimate dissatisfaction that this apparently had not yet been done. as a matter of fact, up to the spring of , american ships of war had little difficulty in getting to sea. rodgers had sailed again with his own squadron and decatur's on october , the two separating on the th, though this was unknown to the british; and bainbridge followed with the "constitution" and "hornet" on the th. once away, power to arrest their depredations was almost wholly lost, through ignorance of their intentions. with regard to commerce, they were on the offensive, the british on the defensive, with the perplexity attaching to the latter rôle. under the circumstances, the admiralty betrays some impatience with warren's clamor for small vessels to be scattered in defence of the trade and coasts. they remind him that he has under his flag eleven sail of the line, thirty-four frigates, thirty-eight sloops, besides other vessels, making a total of ninety-seven; and yet first rodgers, and then bainbridge, had got away. true, boston cannot be effectively blockaded from november to march, but these two squadrons had sailed in october. even "in the month of december, though it was not possible perhaps to have maintained a permanent watch on that port, yet having, as you state in your letter of november , precise information that commodore bainbridge was to sail at a given time, their lordships regret that it was not deemed practicable to proceed off that port at a reasonable and safe distance from the land, and to have taken the chance at least of intercepting the enemy." "the necessity for sending heavy convoys arises from the facility and safety with which the american navy has hitherto found it possible to put to sea. the uncertainty in which you have left their lordships, in regard to the movements of the enemy and the disposition of your own force, has obliged them to employ six or seven sail of the line and as many frigates and sloops, independent of your command, in guarding against the possible attempts of the enemy. captain prowse, with two sail of the line, two frigates, and a sloop, has been sent to st. helena. rear-admiral beauclerk, with two of the line, two frigates, and two sloops, is stationed in the neighborhood of madeira and the azores, lest commodore bainbridge should have come into that quarter to take the place of commodore rodgers, who was retiring from it about the time you state commodore bainbridge was expected to sail. commodore owen, who had preceded admiral beauclerk in this station, with a ship of the line and three other vessels, is not yet returned from the cruise on which the appearance of the enemy near the azores had obliged their lordships to send this force; while the 'colossus' and the 'elephant' [ships of the line], with the 'rhin' and the 'armide,' are but just returned from similar services. thus it is obvious that, large as the force under your orders was, and is, it is not all that has been opposed to the americans, and that these services became necessary only because the chief weight of the enemy's force has been employed at a distance from your station."[ ] the final words here quoted characterize exactly the conditions of the first eight or ten months of the war, until the spring of . they also define the purpose of the british government to close the coast of the united states in such manner as to minimize the evils of widely dispersed commerce-destroying, by confining the american vessels as far as possible within their harbors. the american squadrons and heavy frigates, which menaced not commerce only but scattered ships of war as well, were to be rigorously shut up by an overwhelming division before each port in which they harbored; and the admiralty intimated its wish that a ship of the line should always form one of such division. this course of policy, initiated when the winter of - was over, was thenceforth maintained with ever increasing rigor; especially after the general peace in europe, in may, , had released the entire british navy. it had two principal results. the american frigates were, in the main, successfully excluded from the ocean. their three successful battles were all fought before january , . commodore john rodgers, indeed, by observing his own precept of clinging to the eastern ports of newport and boston, did succeed after this in making two cruises with the "president;" but entering new york with her on the last of these, in february, , she was obliged, in endeavoring to get to sea when transferred to decatur, to do so under circumstances so difficult as to cause her to ground, and by consequent loss of speed to be overtaken and captured by the blockading squadron. captain stewart reported the "constitution" nearly ready for sea, at boston, september , . three months after, he wrote the weather had not yet enabled him to escape. on december , however, she sailed; but returning on april , the blockaders drove her into salem, whence she could not reach boston until april , , and there remained until the th of the following december. her last successful battle, under his command, was on february , , more than two years after she captured the "java." when the war ended the only united states vessels on the ocean were the "constitution," three sloops--the "wasp," "hornet," and "peacock "--and the brig "tom bowline." the smaller vessels of the navy, and the privateers, owing to their much lighter draft, got out more readily; but neither singly nor collectively did they constitute a serious menace to convoys, nor to the scattered cruisers of the enemy. these, therefore, were perfectly free to pursue their operations without fear of surprise. on the other hand, because of this concentration along the shores of the united states, the vessels that did escape went prepared more and more for long absences and distant operations. on the sea "the weight of the enemy's force," to use again the words of the admiralty, "was employed at a distance from the north american station." whereas, at the first, most captures by americans were made near the united states, after the spring of there is an increasing indication of their being most successfully sought abroad; and during the last nine months of the war, when peace prevailed throughout the world except between the united states and great britain, when the chesapeake was british waters, when washington was being burned and baltimore threatened, when the american invasion of canada had given place to the british invasion of new york, when new orleans and mobile were both being attacked,--it was the coasts of europe, and the narrow seas over which england had claimed immemorial sovereignty, that witnessed the most audacious and successful ventures of american cruisers. the prizes taken in these quarters were to those on the hither side of the atlantic as two to one. to this contributed also the commercial blockade, after its extension over the entire seaboard of the united states, in april, . the practically absolute exclusion of american commerce from the ocean is testified by the exports of , which amounted to not quite $ , , ;[ ] whereas in , the last full year of unrestricted trade, they had been $ , , .[ ] deprived of all their usual employments, shipping and seamen were driven to privateering to earn any returns at all. from these special circumstances, the period from june, , when the war began, to the end of april, , when the departure of winter conditions permitted the renewal of local activity on sea and land, had a character of its own, favoring the united states on the ocean, which did not recur. some specific account of particular transactions during these months will serve to illustrate the general conditions mentioned. when warren reached halifax, there were still in boston the "constitution" and the ships that had returned with rodgers on august . from these the navy department now constituted three squadrons. the "hornet," captain james lawrence, detached from rodgers' command, was attached to the "constitution," in which captain william bainbridge had succeeded hull. bainbridge's squadron was to be composed of these two vessels and the smaller -gun frigate "essex," captain david porter, then lying in the delaware. rodgers retained his own ship, the "president," with the frigate "congress;" while to decatur was continued the "united states" and the brig "argus." these detachments were to act separately under their several commodores; but as decatur's preparations were only a few days behind those of rodgers, the latter decided to wait for him, and on october the two sailed in company, for mutual support until outside the lines of enemies, in case of meeting with a force superior to either singly. in announcing his departure, rodgers wrote the department that he expected the british would be distributed in divisions, off the ports of the coast, and that if reliable information reached him of any such exposed detachment, it would be his duty to seek it. "i feel a confidence that, with prudent policy, we shall, barring unforeseen accidents, not only annoy their commerce, but embarrass and perplex the commanders of their public ships, equally to the advantage of our commerce and the disadvantage of theirs." warren and the admiralty alike have borne witness to the accuracy of this judgment. rodgers was less happy in another forecast, in which he reflected that of his countrymen generally. as regards the reported size of british re-enforcements to america, "i do not feel confidence in them, as i cannot convince myself that their resources, situated as england is at present, are equal to the maintenance of such a force on this side of the atlantic; and at any rate, if such an one do appear, it will be only with a view to bullying us into such a peace as may suit their interests."[ ] the commodore's words reflected often an animosity, personal as well as national, aroused by the liberal abuse bestowed on him by british writers. [illustration: the cruises of the three american squadrons in the autumn of ] on october decatur's division parted company, the "president" and "congress" continuing together and steering to the eastward. on the th the two ships captured a british packet, the "swallow," from jamaica to falmouth, having $ , to $ , specie on board; and on the st, in longitude ° west, latitude ° north, two hundred and forty miles south of the azores, a pacific whaler on her homeward voyage was taken. these two incidents indicate the general direction of the course held, which was continued to longitude ° west, latitude ° north, the neighborhood of the cape verde group. this confirms the information of the british admiralty that rodgers was cruising between the azores and madeira; and it will be seen that bainbridge, as they feared, followed in rodgers' wake, though with a different ulterior destination. the ground indeed was well chosen to intercept homeward trade from the east indies and south america. returning, the two frigates ran west in latitude °, with the trade wind, as far as longitude °, whence they steered north, passing one hundred and twenty miles east of bermuda. in his report to the navy department rodgers said that he had sailed almost eleven thousand miles, making the circuit of nearly the whole western atlantic. in this extensive sweep he had seen only five enemy's merchant vessels, two of which were captured. the last four weeks, practically the entire month of december, had been spent upon the line between halifax and bermuda, without meeting a single enemy's ship. from this he concluded that "their trade is at present infinitely more limited than people imagine."[ ] in fact, however, the experience indicated that the british officials were rigorously enforcing the convoy law, according to the "positive directions," and warnings of penalties, issued by the government. a convoy is doubtless a much larger object than a single ship; but vessels thus concentrated in place and in time are more apt to pass wholly unseen than the same number sailing independently, and so scattered over wide expanses of sea. shortly before his return rodgers arrested and sent in an american vessel, from baltimore to lisbon, with flour, sailing under a protection from the british admiral at halifax. this was a frequent incident with united states cruisers, national or private, at this time; decatur, for example, the day after leaving rodgers, reported meeting an american ship having on board a number of licenses from the british government to american citizens, granting them protection in transporting grain to spain and portugal. the license was issued by a british consular officer, and ran thus:[ ] "to the commanders of his majesty's ships of war, or of private armed ships belonging to subjects of his majesty. "whereas, from the consideration of the great importance of continuing a regular supply of flour and other dried provisions, to the allied armies in spain and portugal, it has been deemed expedient by his majesty's government that, notwithstanding the hostilities now existing between great britain and the united states, every degree of encouragement and protection should be given to american vessels laden with flour and other dry provisions, and _bonâ fide_ bound to spain or portugal, and whereas, in furtherance of the views of his majesty's government, herbert sawyer, esq., vice admiral and commander-in-chief on the halifax station, has addressed to me a letter under the date of the th of august, (a copy whereof is hereunto annexed) wherein i am instructed to furnish a copy of his letter certified under my consular seal to every american vessel so laden and bound, destined to serve as a perfect safeguard and protection of such vessel in the prosecution of her voyage: now, therefore, in obedience to these instructions, i have granted to the american ship ----, ----, master," etc. to this was appended the following letter of instructions from admiral sawyer: "whereas mr. andrew allen, his majesty's consul at boston, has recommended to me mr. robert elwell, a merchant of that place, and well inclined toward the british interest, who is desirous of sending provisions to spain and portugal for the use of the allied armies in the peninsula, and whereas i think it fit and necessary that encouragement and protection should be afforded him in so doing, "these are therefore to require and direct all captains and commanders of his majesty's ships and vessels of war which may fall in with any american or other vessel bearing a neutral flag, laden with flour, bread, corn, and pease, or any other species of dry provisions, bound from america to spain or portugal, and having this protection on board, to suffer her to proceed without unnecessary obstruction or detention in her voyage, provided she shall appear to be steering a due course for those countries, and it being understood this is only to be in force for one voyage and within six months from the date hereof. "given under my hand and seal on board his majesty's ship 'centurion,' at halifax this fourth day of august, one thousand eight hundred and twelve. "(sig.) h. sawyer, vice admiral." this practice soon became perfectly known to the american government, copies being found not only on board vessels stopped for carrying them, but in seaports. nevertheless, it went on, apparently tolerated, or at least winked at; although, to say the least, the seamen thus employed in sustaining the enemies' armies were needed by the state.[ ] when the commercial blockade of the chesapeake was enforced in february, , and admiral warren announced that licenses would no longer enable vessels to pass, flour in baltimore fell two dollars a barrel. the blockade being then limited to the chesapeake and delaware, the immediate effect was to transfer this lucrative traffic further north, favoring that portion of the country which was considered, in the common parlance of the british official of that day, "well inclined towards british interests." on october , two days after rodgers and decatur parted at sea, the united states sloop of war "wasp," captain jacob jones, left the capes of the delaware on a cruise, steering to the eastward. on the th, in a heavy gale of wind, she lost her jib-boom. at half-past eleven in the night of the th, being then in latitude ° north, longitude ° west, between four and five hundred miles east of the chesapeake, in the track of vessels bound to europe from the gulf of mexico, half a dozen large sail were seen passing. these were part of a convoy which had left the bay of honduras september , on their way to england, under guard of the british brig of war "frolic," captain whinyates. jones, unable in the dark to distinguish their force, took a position some miles to windward, whence he could still see and follow their motions. in the morning each saw the other, and whinyates, properly concerned for his charges chiefly, directed them to proceed under all sail on their easterly course, while he allowed the "frolic" to drop astern, at the same time hoisting spanish colors to deceive the stranger; a ruse prompted by his having a few days before passed a spanish fleet convoyed by a brig resembling his own. it still blowing strong from the westward, with a heavy sea, captain jones, being to windward, and so having the choice of attacking, first put his ship under close-reefed topsails, and then stood down for the "frolic," which hauled to the wind on the port tack--that is, with the wind on the left side--to await the enemy. the british brig was under the disadvantage of having lost her main-yard in the same gale that cost the american her jib-boom; she was therefore unable to set any square sail on the rearmost of her two masts. the sail called the boom mainsail in part remedied this, so far as enabling the brig to keep side to wind; but, being a low sail, it did not steady her as well as a square topsail would have done in the heavy sea running, a condition which makes accurate aim more difficult. the action did not begin until the "wasp" was within sixty yards of the "frolic." then the latter opened fire, which the american quickly returned; the two running side by side and gradually closing. the british crew fired much the more rapidly, a circumstance which their captain described as "superior fire;" in this reproducing the illusion under which captain dacres labored during the first part of his fight with the "constitution." "the superior fire of our guns gave every reason to expect a speedy termination in our favor," wrote whinyates in his official report. dacres before his court martial asked of two witnesses, "did you understand it was not my intention to board whilst the masts stood, in consequence of our superior fire and their great number of men?" that superior here meant quicker is established by the reply of one of these witnesses: "our fire was a great deal quicker than the enemy's." superiority of fire, however, consists not only in rapidity, but in hitting; and while with very big ships it may be possible to realize nelson's maxim, that by getting close missing becomes impossible, it is not the same with smaller vessels in turbulent motion. it was thought on board the "wasp" that the enemy fired thrice to her twice, but the direction of their shot was seen in its effects; the american losing within ten minutes her maintopmast with its yard, the mizzen-topgallant-mast, and spanker gaff. within twenty minutes most of the running rigging was also shot away, so as to leave the ship largely unmanageable; but she had only five killed and five wounded. in other words, the enemy's shot flew high; and, while it did the damage mentioned, it inflicted no vital injury. the "wasp," on the contrary, as evidently fired low; for the loss of the boom mainsail was the only serious harm received by the "frolic's" motive power during the engagement, and when her masts fell, immediately after it, they went close to the deck. her loss in men, fifteen killed and forty-three wounded, tells the same story of aiming low. the "frolic" having gone into action without a main-yard, the loss of the boom mainsail left her unmanageable and decided the action. the "wasp," though still under control, was but little better off; for she was unable to handle her head yards, the maintopmast having fallen across the head braces. there is little reason therefore to credit a contemporary statement of her wearing twice before boarding. neither captain mentions further manoeuvring, and jones' words, "we gradually lessened the space till we laid her on board," probably express the exact sequence. as they thus closed, the "wasp's" greater remaining sail and a movement of her helm would effect what followed: the british vessel's bowsprit coming between the main and the mizzen rigging of her opponent, who thus grappled her in a position favorable for raking. a broadside or two, preparatory for boarding, followed, and ended the battle; for when the americans leaped on board there was no resistance. in view of the vigorous previous contest, this shows a ship's company decisively beaten.[ ] under the conditions of wind and weather, this engagement may fairly be described as an artillery duel between two vessels of substantially equal force. james' contention of inferior numbers in the "frolic" is true in the letter; but the greater rapidity of her firing shows it irrelevant to the issue. the want of the mainyard, which means the lack of the maintopsail, was a more substantial disadvantage. so long as the boom mainsail held, however, it was fairly offset by the fall of the "wasp's" maintopmast and its consequences. both vessels carried sixteen -pounder carronades, which gave a broadside of two hundred and fifty-six pounds. the "wasp" had, besides, two -pounder long guns. the british naval historian james states that the "frolic" had in addition to her main battery only two long sixes; but captain jones gives her six -pounders, claiming that she was therefore superior to the "wasp" by four -pounders. as we are not excusing a defeat, it may be sufficient to say that the fight was as nearly equal as it is given to such affairs to be. the action lasted forty-three minutes; the "frolic" hauling down her colors shortly after noon. almost immediately afterward the british seventy-four "poietiers" came in sight, and in the disabled condition of the two combatants overhauled them easily. two hours later she took possession of both "wasp" and "frolic," and carried them into bermuda. the "wasp" was added to the british navy under the name of "loup cervier" (lynx). when rodgers and decatur separated, on october , the former steered rather easterly, while the latter diverged to the southward as well as east, accompanied by the "argus." these two did not remain long together. it is perhaps worth noticing by the way, that rodgers adhered to his idea of co-operation between ships, keeping his two in company throughout; whereas decatur, when in control, illustrated in practice his preference for separate action. the brig proceeded to cape st. roque, the easternmost point of brazil, and thence along the north coast of south america, as far as surinam. from there she passed to the eastward of the west india islands and so toward home; remaining out as long as her stores justified, cruising in the waters between halifax, bermuda, and the continent. these courses, as those of the other divisions, are given as part of the maritime action, conducive to understanding the general character of effort put forth by national and other cruisers. of these four ships that sailed together, the "argus" alone encountered any considerable force of the enemy; falling in with a squadron of six british vessels, two of them of the line, soon after parting with the "united states." she escaped by her better sailing. her entire absence from the country was ninety-six days. decatur with the "united states" kept away to the southeast until october . at daybreak of that day the frigate was in latitude ° north, longitude ° ' west, steering southwest on the port tack, with the wind at south-southeast. soon after daylight there was sighted a large sail bearing about south-southwest; or, as seamen say, two points on the weather bow. she was already heading as nearly as the wind permitted in the direction of the stranger; but the latter, which proved to be the british frigate "macedonian," captain john s. carden, having the wind free, changed her course for the "united states," taking care withal to preserve the windward position, cherished by the seamen of that day. in this respect conditions differed from those of the "constitution" and "guerrière," for there the american was to windward. contrary also to the case of the "wasp" and "frolic," the interest of the approaching contest turns largely on the manoeuvres of the antagonists; for, the "united states" being fully fifty per cent stronger than the "macedonian" in artillery power, it was only by utilizing the advantage of her windward position, by judicious choice of the method of attack, that the british ship could hope for success. she had in her favor also a decided superiority of speed; and, being just from england after a period of refit, was in excellent sailing trim. when first visible to each other from the mastheads, the vessels were some twelve miles apart. they continued to approach until . , when the "united states," being then about three miles distant, wore--turned round--standing on the other tack. her colors, previously concealed by her sails, were by this manoeuvre shown to the british frigate, which was thus also placed in the position of steering for the quarter of her opponent; the latter heading nearer the wind, and inclining gradually to cross the "macedonian's" bows ( ). when this occurred, a conversation was going on between captain carden, his first lieutenant, and the master;[ ] the latter being the officer who usually worked the ship in battle, under directions from the captain. these officers had been in company with the "united states" the year before in chesapeake bay; and, whether they now recognized her or not, they knew the weight of battery carried by the heavy american frigates. the question under discussion by them, before the "united states" wore, was whether it was best to steer direct upon the approaching enemy, or to keep farther away for a time, in order to maintain the windward position. by the first lieutenant's testimony before the court, this was in his opinion the decisive moment, victory or defeat hinging upon the resolution taken. he favored attempting to cross the enemy's bows, which was possible if the "united states" should continue to stand as she at the moment was--on the port tack; but in any event to close with the least delay possible. the master appears to have preferred to close by going under the enemy's stern, and hauling up to leeward; but captain carden, impressed both with the advantage of the weather gage and the danger of approaching exposed to a raking fire, thought better to haul nearer the wind, on the tack he was already on, the starboard, but without bracing the yards, which were not sharp. his aim was to pass the "united states" at a distance, wear--turn round from the wind, toward her--when clear of her broadside, and so come up from astern without being raked. the interested reader may compare this method with that pursued by hull, who steered down by zigzag courses. the court martial censured carden's decision, which was clearly wrong, for the power of heavy guns over lighter, of the american 's over the british 's, was greatest at a distance; therefore, to close rapidly, taking the chances of being raked--if not avoidable by yawing--was the smaller risk. moreover, wearing behind the "united states," and then pursuing, gave her the opportunity which she used, to fire and keep away again, prolonging still farther the period of slow approach which carden first chose. [illustration: plan of the engagement between the united states and macedonian] the "united states" wearing, while this conversation was in progress, precipitated carden's action. he interpreted the manoeuvre as indicating a wish to get to windward, which the "macedonian's" then course, far off the wind, would favor. he therefore hurriedly gave the order to haul up ( ), cutting adrift the topmast studdingsail; a circumstance which to seamen will explain exactly the relative situations. that he had rightly interpreted decatur's purpose seems probable, for in fifteen or twenty minutes the "united states" again wore (_a_), resuming her original course, by the wind on the port tack, the "macedonian" continuing on the starboard; the two now running on lines nearly parallel, in opposite directions (_b b_). as they passed, at the distance of almost a mile, the american frigate discharged her main-deck battery, her spar-deck carronades not ranging so far. the british ship did not reply, but shortly afterward wore (_c_), and, heading now in the same general direction as the "united states," steered to come up on her port side. she thus reached a position not directly behind her antagonist, but well to the left, apparently about half a mile away. so situated, if steering the same course, each ship could train its batteries on the opponent; but the increased advantage at a distance was with the heavier guns, and when the "macedonian," to get near, headed more toward the "united states," most of hers ceased to bear, while those of her enemy continued their fire. a detailed description of the "united states's" manoeuvres by her own officers has not been transmitted; but in the searching investigation made by carden's court martial we have them probably well preserved. the master of the british ship stated that when the "macedonian" wore in chase, the "united states" first kept off before the wind, and then almost immediately came back to it as before (_c_), bringing it abeam, and immediately began firing. by thus increasing her lateral distance from the line of the enemy's approach, she was able more certainly to train her guns on him. after about fifteen minutes of this, the "macedonian" suffering severely, her foresail was set to close (_e_), upon which the "united states," hauling out the spanker and letting fly the jib-sheet, came up to the wind and backed her mizzen-topsail, in order not to move too fast from the advantageous position she had, yet to keep way enough to command the ship (_e_). under these unhappy conditions the "macedonian" reached within half musket-shot, which was scarcely the ideal close action of the day; but by that time she had lost her mizzen-topmast, mainyard, and maintopsail, most of her standing rigging was shot away, the lower masts badly wounded, and almost all her carronade battery, the principal reliance for close action, was disabled. she had also many killed and wounded; while the only visible damage on board the "united states" was the loss of the mizzen-topgallant-mast, a circumstance of absolutely no moment at the time. in short, although she continued to fight manfully for a half-hour more, the "macedonian," when she got alongside the "united states," was already beaten beyond hope. at the end of the half-hour her fore and main topmasts fell, upon which the "united states" filled her mizzen-topsail and shot ahead, crossing the bows of the "macedonian,"[ ] and thus ending the fight. surprise was felt on board the british vessel that a raking broadside was not at this moment poured in, and it was even believed by some that the american was now abandoning the contest. she was so, in the sense that the contest was over; a ship with all her spars standing, "in perfect condition," to use the expression of the enemy's first lieutenant, would be little less than brutal to use her power upon one reduced to lower masts, unless submission was refused. upon her return an hour later, the "macedonian's" mizzenmast had gone overboard, and her colors were hauled down as the "united states" drew near. [illustration: captain stephen decatur from the painting by gilbert stuart, in independence hall, philadelphia.] this action was fought by the "united states" with singular wariness, not to say caution. her change to the starboard tack, when still some three miles distant, seems to indicate a desire to get the weather gage, as the "macedonian" was then steering free. it was so interpreted on board the british vessel; but as carden also at once hauled up, it became apparent that he would not yield the advantage of the wind which he had, and which it was in his choice to keep, for the "united states" was a lumbering sailer. decatur, unable to obtain the position for attacking, at once wore again, and thenceforth played the game of the defensive with a skill which his enemy's mistake seconded. by the movements of his ship the "macedonian's" closing was protracted, and she was kept at the distance and bearing most favorable to the american guns. but when her foresail was set, the "united states," by luffing rapidly to the wind--flowing the jib-sheet and hauling out the spanker to hasten this movement--and at the same time backing the mizzen-topsail to steady her motions and position, was constituted a moving platform of guns, disposed in the very best manner to annihilate an opponent obliged to approach at a pretty broad angle. this account, summarized from the sworn testimony before the british court, is not irreconcilable with decatur's remark, that the enemy being to windward engaged at his own distance, to the greatness of which was to be ascribed the unusual length of the action. imbued with the traditions of their navy, the actions of the "united states" puzzled the british extremely. her first wearing was interpreted as running away, and her shooting ahead when the "macedonian's" topmasts fell, crossing her bows without pouring a murderous broadside into a beaten ship, coupled with the previous impression of wariness, led them to think that the american was using the bad luck by which alone they could have been beaten, in order to get away. three cheers were given, as though victorious in repelling an attack. they had expected, so the testimony ran, to have her in an hour.[ ] judged by this evidence, the handling of the "united states" was thoroughly skilful. though he probably knew himself superior in force, decatur's object necessarily should be to take his opponent at the least possible injury to his own ship. she was "on a cruise"; hence haste was no object, while serious damage might cripple her further operations. the result was, by his official statement, that "the damage sustained was not such as to render return to port necessary; and i should have continued her cruise, had i not deemed it important that we should see our prize in."[ ] in general principle, the great french admiral tourville correctly said that the best victories are those which cost least in blood, timber, and iron; but, in the particular instance before us, decatur's conduct may rest its absolute professional justification on the testimony of the master of the british ship and two of her three lieutenants. to the question whether closing more rapidly by the "macedonian" would have changed the result, the first lieutenant replied he thought there was a chance of success. the others differed from him in this, but agreed that their position would have been more favorable, and the enemy have suffered more.[ ] carden himself had no hesitation as to the need of getting near, but only as to the method. to avoid this was therefore not only fitting, but the bounden duty of the american captain. his business was not merely to make a brilliant display of courage and efficiency, but to do the utmost injury to the opponent at the least harm to his ship and men. it was the more notable to find this trait in decatur; for not, only had he shown headlong valor before, but when offered the new american "guerrière" a year later, he declined, saying that she was overmatched by a seventy-four, while no frigate could lie alongside of her. "there was no reputation to be made in this."[ ] the "united states" and her prize, after repairing damages sufficiently for a winter arrival upon the american coast, started thither; the "united states" reaching new london december , the "macedonian," from weather conditions, putting into newport. both soon afterward went to new york by long island sound. it is somewhat remarkable that no one of warren's rapidly increasing fleet should have been sighted by either. there was as yet no commercial blockade, and this, coupled with the numbers of american vessels protected by licenses, and the fewness of the american ships of war, may have indisposed the admiral and his officers to watch very closely an inhospitable shore, at a season unpropitious to active operations. besides, as appears from letters already quoted, the commander-in-chief's personal predilection was more for the defensive than the offensive; to protect british trade by cruisers patrolling its routes, rather than by preventing egress from the hostile ports. footnotes: [ ] naval chronicle, vol. xxviii. p. . [ ] ibid. [ ] ibid., pp. , . [ ] naval chronicle, vol. xxviii. p. . [ ] writings of madison (ed. ), vol. ii. p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. iii. p. . [ ] annals of congress, - , p. . [ ] castlereagh to the admiralty, aug. and , . british record office mss. warren's letter to the united states government and monroe's reply are in american state papers, vol. iii. pp. , . [ ] captains' letters. navy department mss. [ ] niles' register, vol. ii. p. . [ ] annals of congress, - , p. . [ ] these data are summarized from niles' register, which throughout the war collected, and periodically published, lists of prizes. [ ] a synopsis of the "rossie's" log is given in niles' register, vol. iii p. . [ ] gallatin, dec. , . american state papers, finance, vol. ii. p. . [ ] jones, july , . american state papers, finance, vol. ii. p. . [ ] in the memoir of commodore barney (p. ), published by his daughter, it is said that, successful though the "rossie's" cruise was in its issue, he was dissatisfied with the course laid down for him by his owners, who did not understand the usual tracks of british commerce. [ ] account of the private armed ship "america," by b.b. crowninshield. essex institute historical collections, vol. xxxvii. [ ] naval chronicle, vol. xxviii. p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. iii. p. . [ ] naval chronicle, vol. xxviii. p. . [ ] american state papers, commerce and navigation, vol. i. p. . [ ] warren to croker, dec. and , . records office mss. [ ] croker to warren, jan. , feb. , and march , . records office mss. [ ] american state papers. commerce and navigation, vol. i. p. . [ ] american state papers. commerce and navigation, vol. i. p. . [ ] captains' letters. navy department, oct. , . [ ] captains' letters, navy department, dee. , , and jan. , . [ ] from the file of captains' letters, jan. , . found in the american licensed brig "julia," captured by united states frigate "chesapeake," captain samuel evans. the vessel was condemned in the united states courts. [ ] besides the obvious impropriety, the practice was expressly forbidden by law. it was reprobated in strong terms by justice joseph story, of massachusetts, of the supreme court of the united states, affirming the condemnation of the "julia." his judgment is given in full in niles' register, vol. iv. pp. - . [ ] captain jones' report of this action can be found in niles' register, vol. iii. p. ; that of captain whinyates in naval chronicle, vol. xxix. p. . [ ] macedonian court martial. british records office mss. [ ] james states that this was in order to fill fresh cartridges, which is likely enough; but it is most improbable that the movement was deferred till the last cartridge ready was exhausted--that the battery could not have been fired when crossing the bows. [ ] "macedonian" court martial. [ ] decatur's report. niles' register, vol. iii. p. . [ ] "macedonian" court martial. [ ] captains' letters, april , . navy department mss. * * * * * +-----------------------------------------------------------+ | typographical errors corrected in text: | | | | page : handdlers replaced with handlers | | page : diference replaced with difference | | | +-----------------------------------------------------------+ * * * * * note: project gutenberg also has an html version of this file which includes the original illustrations. see -h.htm or -h.zip: (http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/ / / / / / -h/ -h.htm) or (http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/ / / / / / -h.zip) the navy as a fighting machine by rear admiral bradley a. fiske u. s. navy former aid for operations of the fleet; president of the u. s. naval institute; gold medallist of the u. s. naval institute and the franklin institute of pennsylvania author of "electricity in theory and practice," "war time in manila," etc. with map preface what is the navy for? of what parts should it be composed? what principles should be followed in designing, preparing, and operating it in order to get the maximum return for the money expended? to answer these questions clearly and without technical language is the object of the book. bradley a. fiske. u. s. naval war college, newport, r. i., september , . contents part i general considerations chapter i. war and the nations ii. naval a, b, c iii. naval power iv. naval preparedness v. naval defense vi. naval policy part ii naval strategy vii. general principles viii. designing the machine ix. preparing the active fleet x. reserves and shore stations xi. naval bases xii. operating the machine strategic map of the atlantic and pacific oceans *** chapters iii and vii were published originally in _the u. s. naval institute_; chapters i, ii, iv, v, and vii in _the north american review_. part i general considerations chapter i war and the nations because the question is widely discussed, whether peace throughout the world may be attained by the friendly co-operation of many nations, and because a nation's attitude toward this question may determine its future prosperity or ruin, it may be well to note what has been the trend of the nations hitherto, and whether any forces exist that may reasonably be expected to change that trend. we may then be able to induce from facts the law which that trend obeys, and make a reasonable deduction as to whether or not the world is moving toward peace. if we do this we shall follow the inductive method of modern science, and avoid the error (with its perilous results) of first assuming the law and then deducing conclusions from it. men have always been divided into organizations, the first organization being the family. as time went on families were formed into tribes, for self-protection. the underlying cause for the organization was always a desire for strength; sometimes for defense, sometimes for offense, usually for both. at times tribes joined in alliance with other tribes to attain a common end, the alliance being brought about by peaceful agreement, and usually ceasing after the end had been attained, or missed, or when tribal jealousies forbade further common effort. sometimes tribes joined to form one larger tribe; the union being either forced on a weaker by a stronger tribe, or caused by a desire to secure a strength greater and more lasting than mere alliance can insure. in the same way, and apparently according to similar laws, sovereign states or nations were formed from tribes; and in later years, by the union of separate states. the states or nations have become larger and larger as time has gone on; greater numbers, not only of people but of peoples, living in the same general localities and having hereditary ties, joining to form a nation. though the forms of government of these states or nations are numerous, and though the conceptions of people as to the purposes and functions of the state vary greatly, we find that one characteristic of a state has always prevailed among all the states and nations of the world--the existence of an armed military force, placed under the control of its government; the purpose of this armed force being to enable the government not only to carry on its administration of internal matters, but also to exert itself externally against the armed force of another state. this armed force has been a prominent factor in the life of every sovereign state and independent tribe, from history's beginning, and is no less a factor now. no instance can be found of a sovereign state without its appropriate armed force, to guard its sovereignty, and preserve that freedom from external control, without which freedom it ceases to exist as a sovereign state. the armed force has always been a matter of very great expense. it has always required the anxious care of the government and the people. the men comprising it have always been subjected to restraint and discipline, compelled to undergo hardships and dangers greater than those of civil life, and developed by a training highly specialized and exacting. the armed force in every state has had not only continuous existence always, but continuous, potential readiness, if not continuous employment; and the greatest changes in the mutual relations of nations have been brought about by the victory of the armed force of one state over the armed force of another state. this does not mean that the fundamental causes of the changes have been physical, for they have been psychological, and have been so profound and so complex as to defy analysis; but it does mean that the actual and immediate instrument producing the changes has been physical force; that physical force and physical courage acting in conjunction, of which conjunction war is the ultimate expression, have always been the most potent instruments in the dealings of nations with each other. is there any change toward peaceful methods now? no, on the contrary; war is recognized as the most potent method still; the prominence of military matters is greater than ever before; at no time in the past has interest in war been so keen as at the present, or the expenditure of blood and money been so prodigal; at no time before has war so thoroughly engaged the intellect and energy of mankind. in other words, the trend of the nations has been toward a clearer recognition of the efficacy of military power, and an increasing use of the instrumentality of war. this does not mean that the trend of the nations has been regular; for, on the contrary, it has been spasmodic. if one hundred photographs of the map of europe could be taken, each photograph representing in colors the various countries as they appeared upon the map at one hundred different times, and if those hundred photographs could be put on films and shown as a moving-picture on a screen, the result would resemble the shifting colored pieces in a kaleidoscope. boundaries advanced and receded, then advanced again; tribes and nations moved their homes from place to place; empires, kingdoms, principalities, duchies, and republics flourished brilliantly for a while, and then went out; many peoples struggled for an autonomous existence, but hardly a dozen acquired enough territory or mustered a sufficiently numerous population to warrant their being called "great nations." of those that were great nations, only three have endured as great nations for eight hundred years; and the three that have so endured are the three greatest in europe now--the french, the british, and the german. some of the ancient empires continued for long periods. the history of practical, laborious, and patient china is fairly complete and clear for more than two thousand years before our era; and of dreamy, philosophic india for almost as long, though in far less authentic form. egypt existed as a nation, highly military, artistic, and industrious, as her monuments show, for perhaps four thousand years; when she was forced by the barbarians of persia into a condition of dependence, from which she has never yet emerged. the time of her greatness in the arts and sciences of peace was the time of her greatest military power; and her decline in the arts and sciences of peace accompanied her decline in those of war. assyria, with her two capitals, babylon and nineveh, flourished splendidly for about six centuries, and was then subdued by the persians under cyrus, after the usual decline. the little kingdom of the hebrews, hardy and warlike under saul and david, luxurious and effeminate under solomon, lasted but little more than a hundred years. persia, rising rapidly by military means from the barbarian state, lived a brilliant life of conquest, cultivated but little those arts of peace that hold in check the passions of a successful military nation, yielded rapidly to the seductions of luxury, and fell abruptly before the macedonian alexander, lasting less than two hundred and fifty years. macedonia, trained under philip, rose to great military power under alexander, conquered in twelve years the ten most wealthy and populous countries of the world--nearly the whole known world; but fell to pieces almost instantly when alexander died. the cities of greece enjoyed a rare pre-eminence both in the arts and sciences of peace and in military power, but only for about one hundred and fifty years: falling at last before the superior military force of macedon, after neglecting the practice of the military arts, and devoting themselves to art, learning, and philosophy. rome as a great nation lasted about five hundred years; and the last three centuries of her life after the death of commodus, about a. d., illustrate curiously the fact that, even if a people be immoral, cruel, and base in many ways, their existence as an independent state may be continued long, if military requirements be understood, and if the military forces be preserved from the influence of the effeminacy of the nation as a whole. in rome, the army was able to maintain a condition of considerable manliness, relatively to the people at large, and thus preserve internal order and keep the barbarians at bay for nearly three hundred years; and at the same time exert a powerful and frequently deciding influence in the government. but the effeminacy of the people, especially of those in the higher ranks, made them the creatures of the army that protected them. in some cases, the emperor himself was selected by the army, or by the pretorian guard in rome; and sometimes the guard removed an emperor of whom it disapproved by the simple expedient of killing him. after the fall of the western empire in , when rome was taken by odoacer, a condition of confusion, approaching anarchy, prevailed throughout europe, until charlemagne founded his empire, about a. d., except that constantinople was able to stand up against all outside assaults and hold the eastern empire together. charlemagne's empire united under one government nearly all of what is now france, germany, austria, italy, belgium, and holland. the means employed by charlemagne to found his empire were wholly military, though means other than military were instituted to preserve it. he endeavored by just government, wise laws, and the encouragement of religion and of education of all kinds to form a united people. the time was not ripe, however; and charlemagne's empire fell apart soon after charlemagne expired. the rapid rise and spread of the mohammedan religion was made possible by the enthusiasm with which mahomet imbued his followers, but the actual founding of the arabian empire was due wholly to military conquest, achieved by the fanatic mussulmans who lived after him. after a little more than a hundred years, the empire was divided into two caliphates. brilliant and luxurious courts were thereafter held by caliphs at bagdad and cordova, with results similar to those in egypt, persia, assyria, and rome; the people becoming effeminate, employed warriors to protect them, and the warriors became their masters. then, effeminacy spreading even to the warriors, strength to resist internal disorders as well as external assaults gradually faded, and both caliphates fell. from the death of charlemagne until the fall of constantinople, in , the three principal nations of europe were those of france, germany, and england. until that time, and dating from a time shortly before the fall of rome, europe was in perpetual turmoil--owing not only to conflicts between nations, but to conflicts between the church of rome and the civil power of the kings and emperors, to conflicts among the feudal lords, and to conflicts between the sovereigns and the feudal lords. the power of the roman church was beneficent in checking a too arrogant and military tendency, and was the main factor in preventing an utter lapse back to barbarism. the end of the middle ages and the beginning of what are usually called "modern times" found only four great countries in the world--france, germany, spain, and england. of these spain dropped out in the latter part of the sixteenth century. the other three countries still stand, though none of them lies within exactly the same boundaries as when modern times began; and austria, which was a part of germany then, is now--with hungary--a separate state and nation. this very brief survey of history shows that every great nation has started from a small beginning and risen sometimes gradually, sometimes rapidly to greatness; and then fallen, sometimes gradually, sometimes rapidly, to mediocrity, dependence, or extinction; that the instrument which has effected the rise has always been military power, usually exerted by armies on the land, sometimes by navies on the sea; and that the instrument which has effected the actual fall has always been the military power of an adversary. in other words, _the immediate instrument that has decided the rise and the fall of nations has been military power_. that this should have been so need not surprise us, since nations have always been composed of human beings, influenced by the same hopes and fears and governed by the same laws of human nature. and as the most potent influence that could be brought to bear upon a man was a threat against his life, and as it was the province of military power to threaten life, it was unavoidable that military power should be the most potent influence that could be brought to bear upon a nation. the history of the world has been in the main a history of war and a narrative of wars. no matter how far back we go, the same horrible but stimulating story meets our eyes. in ancient days, when every weapon was rude, and manipulated by one man only, the injury a single weapon could do was small, the time required for preparation was but brief, and the time required for recuperation after war was also brief. at that time, military power was almost the sole element in the longevity of a tribe, or clan, or nation; and the warriors were the most important men among the people. but as civilization increased, the life not only of individuals but of nations became more complex, and warriors had to dispute with statesmen, diplomatists, poets, historians, and artists of various types, the title to pre-eminence. yet even in savage tribes and even in the conduct of savage wars, the value of wisdom and cunning was perceived, and the stimulating aid of the poet and the orator was secured. the relative value of men of war and men of peace depended during each period on the conditions prevailing then--in war, warriors held the stage; in peace, statesmen and artists had their day. naturally, during periods when war was the normal condition, the warrior was the normal pillar of the state. in how great a proportion of the time that history describes, war was the normal condition and peace the abnormal, few realize now in our country, because of the aloofness of the present generation from even the memory of war. our last great war ended in ; and since then only the light and transient touch of the spanish war has been laid upon us. even that war ended seventeen years ago and since then only the distant rumblings of battles in foreign lands have been borne across the ocean to our ears. these rumblings have disturbed us very little. feeling secure behind the , -mile barrier of the ocean, we have lent an almost incredulous ear to the story that they tell and the menace that they bear; though the story of the influence of successful and unsuccessful wars upon the rise and fall of nations is told so harshly and so loudly that, in order not to hear it, one must tightly stop his ears. that war has not been the only factor, however, in the longevity of nations is obviously true; and it is also true that nations which have developed the warlike arts alone have never even approximated greatness. in all complex matters, in all processes of nature and human nature, many elements are present, and many factors combine to produce a given result. man is a very complex individual, and the more highly he is developed the more complex he becomes. a savage is mainly an animal; but the civilized and highly educated man is an animal on whose elemental nature have been superposed very highly organized mental, moral, and spiritual natures. yet even a savage of the most primitive or warlike character has an instinctive desire for rest and softness and beauty, and loves a primitive music; and even the most highly refined and educated gentleman raises his head a little higher, and draws his breath a little deeper, when war draws near. thus in the breast of every man are two opposing forces; one urging him to the action and excitement of war, the other to the comparative inaction and tranquillity of peace. on the side that urges war, we see hate, ambition, courage, energy, and strength; on the side that urges peace we see love, contentment, cowardice, indolence, and weakness. we see arrayed for war the forceful faults and virtues; for peace the gentle faults and virtues. both the forceful and the gentle qualities tend to longevity in certain ways and tend to its prevention in other ways; but history clearly shows that the _forceful qualities have tended more to the longevity of nations than the gentle_. if ever two nations, or two tribes, have found themselves contiguous, one forceful and the other not, the forceful one has usually, if not always, obtained the mastery over the other, and therefore has outlived it. if any cow and any lion have found themselves alone together, the lion has outlived the cow. it is true that the mere fact of being a lion has not insured long life, and that the mere fact of being a cow has not precluded it; and some warlike tribes and nations have not lived so long as tribes and nations of softer fibre. this seems to have been due, however, either to the environments in which the two have lived, or to the fact that the softer nation has had available some forces that the other did not have. the native indians of north america were more warlike than the colonists from europe that landed on their shores; but the indians were armed with spears and arrows, and the colonists with guns. now, those guns were the product of the arts of peace; no nation that had pursued a warlike life exclusively could have produced them or invented the powder that discharged them. this fact indicates what a thousand other facts of history also indicate, that civilization and the peaceful arts contribute to the longevity of nations--not only by promoting personal comfort, and by removing causes of internal strife, and thus enabling large bodies of people to dwell together happily, but also by increasing their military power. every nation which has achieved greatness has cultivated assiduously both the arts of peace and the arts of war. every nation which has long maintained that greatness has done so by maintaining the policy by which she acquired it. _every nation that has attained and then lost greatness, has lost it by losing the proper balance between the military and the peaceful arts; never by exalting unduly the military, but always by neglecting them, and thereby becoming vulnerable to attack_. in other words, the history of every great nation that has declined shows three periods, the rise, the table-land of greatness, and the decline. during the rise, the military arts hold sway; on the table-land, the arts of peace and war are fairly balanced; during the decline the peaceful arts hold sway. _facilis descensus averni_. the rise is accomplished by expending energy, for which accomplishment the possession of energy is the first necessity; the height of the table-land attained represents the amount of energy expended; the length of time that the nation maintains itself upon this table-land, before starting on the inevitable descent therefrom, represents her staying power and constitutes her longevity as a great nation. how long shall any nation stay upon the table-land? as long as she continues to adapt her life wisely to her environment; as long as she continues to be as wise as she was while climbing up; for while climbing, she had not only to exert force, she had also to guide the force with wisdom. so we see that, in the ascent, a nation has to use both force and wisdom; on the table-land, wisdom; in the decline, neither. among the nations of antiquity one might suppose that, because of the slowness of transportation and communication, and the feebleness of weapons compared with those of modern days, much longer periods of time would be required for the rise of any nation, and also a longer period before her descent began. yet the vast empire of alexander lasted hardly a day after he expired, and the grecian cities maintained their greatness but a century and a half; while great britain, france, and germany have been great nations for nearly a thousand years. why have they endured longer than the others? the answer is hard to find; because many causes, and some of them obscure, have contributed to the result. but, as we observe the kind of constitution and the mode of life of long-lived people, in order to ascertain what kind of constitution and mode of life conduce to longevity in people, so perhaps we may logically do the same with nations. observing the constitution and mode of life of the british, french, and german nations, we are struck at once with the fact that those peoples have been by constitution active, ambitious, intelligent, and brave; and that they have observed in their national life a skilfully balanced relation between the arts of peace and the arts of war; neglecting neither and allowing neither to wax great at the expense of the other. in all those countries the _first_ aim has been protection from both external attack and internal disorder. protection from external attack has been gained by military force and highly trained diplomacy; protection from internal disorder has been gained _first_ by military force, and _second_ by wise laws, just courts, and the encouragement of religion and of those arts and sciences that lead to comfort and happiness in living. china may attract the attention of some as an instance of longevity; but is china a nation in the usual meaning of the word? certainly, she is not a great nation. it is true that no other nation has actually conquered her of late; but this has been largely by reason of her remoteness from the active world, and because other nations imposed their will upon her, without meeting any resistance that required the use of war to overcome. and even china has not lived a wholly peaceful life, despite the non-military character of her people. her whole history was one of wars, like that of other nations, until the middle of the fourteenth century of our era. since then, she has had four wars, in all of which she has been whipped: one in the seventeenth century when the country was successfully invaded, and the native dynasty was overthrown by the tartars of manchuria; one in , when great britain compelled her to cede hong-kong and to open five ports to foreign commerce, through which ports opium could be introduced; one in , with great britain and france, that resulted in the capture of pekin; and one with japan in . since that time (as well as before) china has been the scene of revolutions and wide-spread disturbances, so that, even though a peace-loving and non-resisting nation, peace has not reigned within her borders. the last dynasty was overthrown in . since then a feeble republic has dragged on a precarious existence, interrupted by the very short reign of yuan shih k'ai. this brief consideration of the trend of people up to the present time seems to show that, owing to the nature of man himself, especially to the nature of large "crowds" of men, the direction in which nations have been moving hitherto has not been toward increasing the prevalence of peace, but rather toward increasing the methods, instruments, and areas of war; furthermore, that this direction of movement has been necessary, in order to achieve and to maintain prosperity in any nation. this being the case, what forces exist that may reasonably be expected to change that trend? three main forces are usually mentioned: civilization, commerce, christianity. before considering these it may be well to note newton's first law of motion, that every body will continue in a state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line unless acted on by some external force; for though this law was affirmed of material bodies, yet its applicability to large groups of men is striking and suggestive. not only do human beings have the physical attributes of weight and inertia like other material bodies, but their mental organism, while of a higher order than the physical, is as powerfully affected by external forces. and though it is true that psychology has not yet secured her newton, and that no one has yet formulated a law that expresses exactly the action of the minds and spirits of men under the influence of certain mental and moral stimuli or forces, yet we know that our minds and spirits are influenced by fear, hope, ambition, hate, and so forth, in ways that are fairly well understood and toward results that often can be predicted in advance. our whole theory of government and our laws of business and every-day life are founded on the belief that men are the same to-day as they were yesterday, and that they will be the same to-morrow. the whole science of psychology is based on the observed and recorded actions of the human organism under the influence of certain external stimuli or forces, and starts from the assumption that this organism has definite and permanent characteristics. if this is not so--if the behavior of men in the past has not been governed by actual laws which will also govern their behavior in the future--then our laws of government are built on error, and the teachings of psychology are foolish. this does not mean that any man will necessarily act in the same way to-morrow as he did yesterday, when subjected to the influence of the same threat, inducement, or temptation; because, without grappling the thorny question of free will, we realize that a man's action is never the result of only one stimulus and motive, but is the resultant of many; and we have no reason to expect that he will act in the same way when subjected to the same stimulus, unless we know that the internal and external conditions pertaining to him are also the same. furthermore, even if we cannot predict what a certain individual will do, when exposed to a certain external influence, because of some differences in his mental and physical condition, on one occasion in comparison with another, yet when we consider large groups of men, we know that individual peculiarities, permanent and temporary, balance each other in great measure; that the average condition of a group of men is less changeable than that of one man, and that the degree of permanency of condition increases with the number of men in the group. from this we may reasonably conclude that, if we know the character of a man--or a group of men--and if we know also the line of action which he--or they-have followed in the past, we shall be able to predict his--or their--line of action in the future with considerable accuracy; and that the accuracy will increase with the number of men in the group, and the length of time during which they have followed the known line of action. le bon says: "every race carries in its mental constitution the laws of its destiny." therefore, the line of action that the entire human race has followed during the centuries of the past is a good index--or at least the best index that we have--to its line of action during the centuries of the future. now, men have been on this earth for many years; and history and psychology teach us that in their intercourse with each other, their conduct has been caused by a combination of many forces, among which are certain powerful forces that tend to create strife. the strongest by far of these forces is the _ego_ in man himself, a quality divinely implanted which makes a man in a measure self-protecting. this ego prompts a man not only to seek pleasure and avoid trouble for himself, but also to gain superiority, and, if possible, the mastery over his fellow men. men being placed in life in close juxtaposition to each other, the struggles of each man to advance his own interests produce rivalries, jealousies, and conflicts. similarly with nations. nations have been composed for the most part of people having an heredity more or less common to them all, so that they are bound together as great clans. from this it has resulted that nations have been jealous of each other and have combated each other. they have been doing this since history began, and are doing it as much as ever now. in fact, mankind have been in existence for so many centuries, and their physical, moral, mental, and spiritual characteristics were so evidently implanted in them by the almighty, that it seems difficult to see how any one, except the almighty himself, can change these characteristics and their resulting conduct. it is a common saying that a man cannot lift himself over the fence by his boot straps, though he can jump over the fence, if it is not too high. this saying recognizes the fact that "a material system can do no work on itself"; but needs external aid. when a man pulls upward on his boot straps, the upward force that he exerts is exactly balanced by the downward reaction exerted by his boot straps; but when he jumps, the downward thrust of his legs causes an equal reaction of the earth, which exerts a direct force upward upon the man; and it is this external force that moves him over the fence. it is this external force, the reaction of the earth or air or water, which moves every animal that walks, or bird that flies, or fish that swims. it is the will of the almighty, acting through the various stimuli of nature, that causes the desire to walk, and all the emotions and actions of men. if he shall cause any new force to act on men, their line of conduct will surely change. but if he does not--how can it change, or be changed; how can the human race turn about, by means of its own power only, and move in a direction the reverse from that in which it has been moving throughout all the centuries of the past? these considerations seem to indicate that nations, regarded in their relation toward each other, will go on in the direction in which they have been going unless acted upon by some external force. will civilization, commerce, or christianity impart that force? inasmuch as civilization is merely a condition in which men live, and an expression of their history, character and aims, it is difficult to see how it could of itself act as an external force, or cause an external force to act. "institutions and laws," says le bon, again, "are the outward manifestation of our character, the expression of its needs. being its outcome, institutions and laws cannot change this character." even if the civilization of a given nation may have been brought about in some degree by forces external to that nation, yet it is clear that we must regard that civilization rather as the result of those forces than as a force itself. besides, civilization has never yet made the relations of nations with each other more unselfish, civilized nations now and in the past, despite their veneer of courtesy, being fully as jealous of each other as the most savage tribes. that this should be so seems natural; because civilization has resulted mainly from the attempts of individuals and groups to enhance the pleasures and diminish the ills of life, and therefore cannot tend to unselfishness in either individuals or nations. civilization in the past has not operated to soften the relations of nations with each other, so why should it do so now? is not modern civilization, with its attendant complexities, rivalries, and jealousies, provocative of quarrels rather than the reverse? in what respect is modern civilization better than past civilization, except in material conveniences due to material improvements in the mechanic arts? are we any more artistic, strong, or beautiful than the greeks in their palmy days? are we braver than the spartans, more honest than the chinese, more spiritual than the hindoos, more religious than the puritans? is not the superior civilization of the present day a mechanical civilization pure and simple? and has not the invention of electrical and mechanical appliances, with the resulting insuring of communication and transportation, and the improvements in instruments of destruction, advantaged the great nations more than the weaker ones, and increased the temptation to great nations to use force rather than decreased it? do not civilization's improvements in weapons of destruction augment the effectiveness of warlike methods, as compared with the peaceful methods of argument and persuasion? diplomacy is an agency of civilization that was invented to avoid war, to enable nations to accommodate themselves to each other without going to war; but, practically, diplomacy seems to have caused almost as many wars as it has averted. and even if it be granted that the influence of diplomacy has been in the main for peace rather than for war, we know that diplomacy has been in use for centuries, that its resources are well understood, and that they have all been tried out many times; and therefore we ought to realize clearly that diplomacy cannot introduce any new force into international politics now, or exert, an influence for peace that will be more potent in the future than the influence that it has exerted in the past. these considerations seem to show that we cannot reasonably expect civilization to divert nations from the path they have followed hitherto. can commerce impart the external force necessary to divert nations from that path? since commerce bears exactly the same relation to nations now as in times past, and since it is an agency within mankind itself, it is difficult to see how it can act as an external force, or cause an external force to be applied. of course, commercial interests are often opposed to national interests, and improvements in speed and sureness of communication and transportation increase the size and power of commercial organizations. but the same factors increase the power of governments and the solidarity of nations. at no time in the past has there been more national feeling in nations than now. even the loosely held provinces of china are forming a chinese nation. despite the fundamental commercialism of the age, national spirit is growing more intense, the present war being the main intensifying cause. it is true that the interests of commerce are in many ways antagonistic to those of war. but, on the other hand, of all the causes that occasion war the economic causes are the greatest. for no thing will men fight more savagely than for money; for no thing have men fought more savagely than for money; and the greater the rivalry, the more the man's life becomes devoted to it, and the more fiercely he will fight to get or keep it. surely of all the means by which we hope to avoid war, the most hopeless by far is commerce. the greatest of all hopes is in christianity, because of its inculcation of love and kindliness, its obvious influence on the individual in cultivating unselfishness and other peaceful virtues, and the fact that it is an inspiration from on high, and therefore a force external to mankind. but let us look the facts solemnly in the face that the christian religion has now been in effect for nearly two thousand years; that the nations now warring are christian nations, in the very foremost rank of christendom; that never in history has there been so much bloodshed in such wide-spread areas and so much hate, and that we see no signs that christianity is employing any influence that she has not been employing for nearly two thousand years. if we look for the influence of christianity, we can find it in the daily lives of people, in the family, in business, in politics, and in military bodies; everywhere, in fact, in christian countries, so long as we keep inside of any organization the members of which feel bound together. this we must all admit, even the heathen know it; but where do we see any evidence of the sweetening effect of christianity in the dealings of one organization with another with which it has no special bonds of friendship? christianity is invoked in every warring nation now to stimulate the patriotic spirit of the nation and intensify the hate of the crowd against the enemy; and even if we think that such invoking is a perversion of religious influence to unrighteous ends, we must admit the fact that the christian religion itself is at this moment being made to exert a powerful influence--not toward peace but toward war! and this should not amaze us; for where does the bible say or intimate that love among nations will ever be brought about? the saviour said: "i bring not peace but a sword." so what reasonable hope does even christianity give us that war between nations will cease? and even if it did give reasonable hope, let us realize that between reasonable hope and reasonable expectation there is a great gulf fixed. therefore, we seem forced to the conclusion that the world will move in the future in the same direction as in the past; that nations will become larger and larger and fewer and fewer, the immediate instrument of international changes being war; and that certain nations will become very powerful and nearly dominate the earth in turn, as persia, greece, rome, spain, france, and great britain have done--and as some other country soon may do. fortunately, or perhaps unfortunately, a certain law of decadence seems to have prevailed, because of which every nation, after acquiring great power, has in turn succumbed to the enervating effects which seem inseparable from it, and become the victim of some newer nation that has made strenuous preparations for long years, in secret, and finally pounced upon her as a lion on its prey. were it not for this tendency to decadence, we should expect that the nations of the earth would ultimately be divided into two great nations, and that these would contend for the mastery in a world-wide struggle. but if the present rate of invention and development continues, improvements in the mechanic arts will probably cause such increase in the power of weapons of destruction, and in the swiftness and sureness of transportation and communication, that some _monster of efficiency_ will have time to acquire world mastery before her period of decadence sets in. in this event, wars will be of a magnitude besides which the present struggle will seem pygmy; and will rage over the surface of the earth, for the gaining and retaining of the mastery of the world. chapter ii naval a, b, c in order to realize what principles govern the use of navies, let us first consider what navies have to do and get history's data as to what navies in the past have done. it would obviously be impossible to recount here all the doings of navies. but neither is it necessary; for the reason that, throughout the long periods of time in which history records them, their activities have nearly always been the same. in all cases in which navies have been used for war there was the preliminary dispute, often long-continued, between two peoples or their rulers, and at last the decision of the dispute by force. in all cases the decision went to the side that could exert the most force at the critical times and places. the fact that the causes of war have been civil, and not military, demands consideration, for the reason that some people, confusing cause and effect, incline to the belief that armies and navies are the cause of war, and that they are to be blamed for its horrors. history clearly declares the contrary, and shows that the only rôle of armies and navies has been to wage wars, and, by waging, to finish them. it may be well here, in order to clear away a possible preconception by the reader, to try and dispel the illusion that army and navy officers are eager for war, in order that they may get promotion. this idea has been exploited by people opposed to the development of the army and navy, and has been received with so much credulity that it seriously handicaps the endeavors of officers to get an unbiassed hearing. but surely the foolishness of such an idea would promptly disappear from the brain of any one if he would remind himself that simply because a man joins the army or navy he does not cease to be a human being, with the same emotions of fear as other men, the same sensitiveness to pain, the same dread of death, and the same horror of leaving his family unsupported after his death. it is true that men in armies and navies are educated to dare death if need be; but the present writer has been through two wars, has been well acquainted with army and navy officers for forty-five years, and knows positively that, barring exceptions, they do not desire war at all. without going into an obviously impossible discussion of all naval wars, it may be instructive to consider briefly the four naval wars in which the united states has engaged. the first was the war of the american revolution. this war is instructive to those who contend that the united states is so far from europe as to be safe from attack by a european fleet; because the intervening distance was frequently traversed then by british and french fleets of frail, slow, sailing ships, which were vital factors in the war. without the british war-ships, the british could not have landed and supported their troops. without the french war-ships the french could not have landed and supported their troops, who, under rochambeau, were also under washington, and gave him the assistance that he wofully needed, to achieve by arms our independence. the war of is instructive from the fact that, though the actions of our naval ships produced little material effect, the skill, daring, and success with which they were fought convinced europeans of the high character and consequent noble destiny of the american people. the british were so superior in sea strength, however, that they were able to send their fleet across the ocean and land a force on the shores of chesapeake bay. this force marched to washington, attacked the city, and burned the capitol and other public buildings, with little inconvenience to itself. the war of the rebellion is instructive because it shows how two earnest peoples, each believing themselves right, can be forced, by the very sincerity of their convictions, to wage war against each other; and because it shows how unpreparedness for war, with its accompanying ignorance of the best way in which to wage it, causes undue duration of a war and therefore needless suffering. if the north had not closed its eyes so resolutely to the fact of the coming struggle, it would have noted beforehand that the main weakness of the confederacy lay in its dependence on revenue from cotton and its inability to provide a navy that could prevent a blockade of its coasts; and the north would have early instituted a blockade so tight that the confederacy would have been forced to yield much sooner than it did. the north would have made naval operations the main effort, instead of the auxiliary effort; and would have substituted for much of the protracted and bloody warfare of the land the quickly decisive and comparatively merciful warfare of the sea. in the spanish war the friction between the united states and spain was altogether about cuba. no serious thought of the invasion of either country was entertained, no invasion was attempted, and the only land engagements were some minor engagements in cuba and the philippines. the critical operations were purely naval. in the first of these, commodore dewey's squadron destroyed the entire far eastern squadron of the spanish in manila bay; in the second, admiral sampson's squadron destroyed the entire atlantic squadron of the spanish near santiago de cuba. the two naval victories compelled spain to make terms of peace practically as the united states wished. attention is invited to the fact that this war was not a war of conquest, was not a war of aggression, was not a war of invasion, was not a war carried on by either side for any base purpose; but was in its intention and its results for the benefit of mankind. the russo-japanese war was due to conflicting national policies. while each side accused the other of selfish ends, it is not apparent to a disinterested observer that either was unduly selfish in its policy, or was doing more than every country ought to advance the interests and promote the welfare of its people. russia naturally had a great deal of interest in manchuria, and felt that she had a right to expand through the uncivilized regions of manchuria, especially since she needed a satisfactory outlet to the sea. in other words, the interests of russia were in the line of its expanding to the eastward. but japan's interests were precisely the reverse of russia's--that is, japan's interests demanded that russia should not do those things that russia wanted to do. japan felt that russia's movement toward the east was bringing her entirely too close to japan. russia was too powerful a country, and too aggressive, to be trusted so close. japan had the same feeling toward russia that any man might have on seeing another man, heavily armed, gradually coming closer to him in the night. japan especially wished that russia should have no foothold in corea, feeling, as she expressed it, that the point of corea under russian power would be a dagger directed at the heart of japan. this feeling about corea was the same feeling that every country has about land near her; it has a marked resemblance to the feeling that the united states has embodied in monroe doctrine. after several years of negotiation in which japan and russia endeavored to secure their respective aims by diplomacy, diplomacy was finally abandoned and the sword taken up instead. japan, _because of the superior foresight of her statesmen_, was the first to realize that diplomacy must fail, was the first to realize that she must prepare for war, was the first to begin adequate preparation for war, was the first to complete preparation for war, was the first to strike, and in consequence was the victor. yet russia was a very much larger, richer, more populous country than japan. russia sent large forces of soldiers to manchuria by the trans-siberian railroad, and japan sent large forces there by transports across the sea of japan. japan could not prevent the passage of soldiers by the railroad, but russia could prevent the passage of transports across the japan sea, provided her fleet could overcome the japanese fleet and get command of the sea. russia had a considerable fleet in the far east; but she had so underestimated the naval ability of the japanese, that the russian fleet proved unequal to the task; and the japanese gradually reduced it to almost nothing, with very little loss to themselves. russia then sent out another fleet. the japanese met this fleet on the th of may, , near the island of tsushima, between corea and japan. the battle was decided in about an hour. the japanese sank practically all the russian ships before the battle was entirely finished, with comparatively small loss to japan. this battle was carried on , miles by sea route from saint petersburg. no invasion of russia or japan was contemplated, or attempted, and yet the naval battle decided the issue of the war completely, and was followed by a treaty of peace very shortly afterward. these wars show us, as do all wars in which navies have engaged, that the function of a navy is not only to defend the coast in the sense of preventing an enemy from landing on it, but also to exert force far distant from the coast. the study of war has taught its students for many centuries that a merely passive defense will finally be broken down, and that the most effective defense is the "offensive-defensive." perhaps the clearest case of a correct offensive-defensive is nelson's defense of england, which he carried on in the mediterranean, in the west indies, and wherever the enemy fleet might be, finally defeating napoleon's plan for invading england--not by waiting off the coast of england, but by attacking and crippling napoleon's fleet off the spanish coast near trafalgar. the idea held by many people that the defense of a country can be effected by simply preventing the invasion of its coasts, is a little like the notion of uneducated people that a disease can be cured by suppressing its symptoms. for even a successful defense of a coast against invasion by a hostile force cannot remove the inimical influence to a country's commerce and welfare which that hostile force exerts, any more than palliatives can cure dyspepsia. every intelligent physician knows that the only way to cure a disease is to remove its cause; and every intelligent military or naval man knows that history teaches that the only way in which a country can defend itself successfully against an enemy is to defeat the armed force of that enemy--be it a force of soldiers on the land, or a force of war-ships on the sea. in naval parlance, "our objective is the enemy's fleet." if the duty of a navy be merely to prevent the actual invasion of its country's coasts, a great mistake has been made by great britain, france, and other countries in spending so much money on their navies, and in giving so much attention to the education and training of their officers and enlisted men. to prevent actual invasion would be comparatively an easy task, one that could be performed by rows of forts along the coast, supplemented by mines and submarines. if that is the only kind of defense required, navies are hardly needed. the army in each country could man the forts and operate the mines, and a special corps of the army could even operate the submarines, which (if their only office is to prevent actual invasion) need hardly leave the "three-mile limit" that skirts the coasts. if the people of any country do not care to have dealings outside; if the nation is willing to be in the position of a man who is safe so long as he stays in the house, but is afraid to go outdoors, the problem of national defense is easy. but if the people desire to prevent interference with what our constitution calls "the general welfare," the problem becomes exceedingly complex and exceedingly grave--more complex and grave than any other problem that they have. if they desire that their ships shall be free to sail the seas, and their citizens to carry on business and to travel in other lands; and if they desire that their merchants shall be able to export their wares and their farmers their grain, also that the people shall be able to import the things they wish from foreign countries, then they must be able to exert actual physical force on the ocean at any point where vessels carrying their exports and imports may be threatened. naval ships are the only means for doing this. the possibility that an armed force sent to a given point at sea might have to fight an enemy force, brought about first the sending of more than one vessel, and later--as the mechanic arts progressed--the increasing of the size of individual vessels, and later still the development of novel types. there are two main reasons for building a small number of large ships rather than a large number of small ships. the first reason is that large ships are much more steady, reliable, safe, and fast than small ships. the second reason is that, when designed for any given speed, the large ships have more space available for whatever is to be carried; one -knot ship of , tons normal displacement, for instance, has about one and a half times as much space available for cargo, guns, and what-not, as four -knot ships of , tons each. these two reasons apply to merchant ships as well as naval ships. a third reason applies to naval vessels only, and is that a few large ships can be handled much better together than a large number of small ships, and embody that "concentration of force" which it is the endeavor of strategy and tactics to secure. a fourth reason is the obvious one that large ships can carry larger guns than small ships. the distinctly military (naval) purpose for which a war-ship is designed necessitates, first, that in addition to her ability to go rapidly and surely from place to place, she be able to exert physical force against an enemy ship or fort, and, second, that she have protection against the fire of guns and torpedoes from enemy ships and forts, against bombs dropped from aircraft, and against mines. this means that a man-of-war, intended to exert the maximum of physical force against an enemy and to be able to withstand the maximum of punishment, must have guns and torpedoes for offense, and must have armor and cellular division of the hull for defense; the armor to keep out the enemy's shells, and the cellular division of the hull to prevent the admission of more water than can fill one water-tight compartment in case the ship is hit. it must be admitted here that, at the present moment, torpedoes hold such large charges of explosive that the cellular division of ships does not adequately protect them. this means that a contest has been going on between torpedo-makers and naval constructors like the contest between armor-makers and gunmakers, and that just now the torpedo-makers are in the lead. for this reason a battleship needs other protection than that imparted by its cellular subdivision. this is given by its "torpedo defense battery" of minor guns of about -inch calibre. by reason of the great vulnerability of all ships to attack below the water-line, the torpedo was invented and developed. in its original form, the torpedo was motionless in the water, either anchored to the ground, or floating on the surface, and was in fact what now is called a "mine." but forty-eight years ago an englishman named whitehead invented the automobile, auto-steering, torpedo, which still bears his name. this torpedo is used in all the navies, and is launched on its mission from battleships, battle cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and other craft of various kinds. most torpedoes are to be found in destroyers--long, fast, frail vessels, averaging about tons displacement, that are intended to dash at enemy ships at night, or under other favorable conditions, launch their torpedoes, and hurry away. the torpedo is "a weapon of opportunity." it has had a long, slow fight for its existence; but its success during the present war has established it firmly in naval warfare. the submarine has followed the destroyer, and some people think will supplant it; though its relatively slow speed prevents those dashes that are the destroyer's rôle. the submarine is, however, a kind of destroyer that is submersible, in which the necessities of submersibility preclude great speed. the submarine was designed to accomplish a clear and definite purpose--a secret under-water attack on an enemy's ship in the vicinity. it has succeeded so well in its limited mission that some intelligent people declare that we need submarines only--ignoring the fact that, even if submarines could successfully prevent actual invasion, they could not carry on operations at a distance from their base of supplies. it is true that submarines may be made so large that they can steam at great speed from place to place, as capital ships steam now, carry large supplies of fuel and food, house their crews hygienically, and need no "mother ship" or tender. but if submarines achieve such size, they will be more expensive to build and run than battleships--and will be, in fact, submersible battleships. in other words, the submarine cannot displace the battleship, but may be developed and evolved into a new and highly specialized type of battleship. the necessity for operating at long distances from a base carries with it the necessity for supplying more fuel than even a battleship can carry; and this means that colliers must be provided. in most countries, the merchant service is so large that colliers can be taken from it, but in the united states no adequate merchant marine exists, and so it is found necessary to build navy colliers and have them in the fleet. the necessity for continuously supplying food and ammunition to the fleet necessitates supply ships and ammunition ships; but the problem of supplying food and ammunition is not so difficult as that of supplying fuel, for the reason that they are consumed more slowly. in order to take care of the sick and wounded, and prevent them from hampering the activities of the well, hospital ships are needed. hospital ships should, of course, be designed for that purpose before being constructed; but usually hospital ships were originally passenger ships, and were adapted to hospital uses later. the menace of the destroyer--owing to the sea-worthiness which this type has now achieved, and to the great range which the torpedo has acquired--has brought about the necessity of providing external protection to the battleships; and this is supplied by a "screen" of cruisers and destroyers, whose duty is to keep enemy destroyers and (so far as is practicable) the submarines at a safe distance. we now see why a fleet must be composed of various types of vessels. at the present moment, the battleship is the primary, or paramount type, the others secondary, because the battleship is the type that can exert the most force, stand the hardest punishment, steam the farthest in all kinds of weather, and in general, serve her country the best. of course, "battleship" is merely a name, and some think not a very good name, to indicate a ship that can take the part in battle that used to be taken by the "ship of the line." the reason for its primacy is fundamental: its displacement or total weight--the same reason that assured the primacy of the ship of the line. for displacement rules the waves; if "britannia rules the waves," it is simply because britannia has more displacement than any other power. the fleet needs to have a means of knowing where the enemy is, how many ships he has, what is their character, the direction in which they are steaming, and their speed. to accomplish this purpose, "scouts" are needed--fast ships, that can steam far in all kinds of weather and send wireless messages across great distances. so far as their scout duties go, such vessels need no guns whatever, and no torpedoes; but because the enemy will see the scout as soon as the scout sees the enemy, and because the enemy will try to drive away the scout by gun and torpedo fire, the scouts must be armed. and this necessity is reinforced by the necessity of driving off an enemy's scouts. in foreign navies the need for getting information in defiance of an enemy's attempts to prevent it, and to drive off the armed scouts of an enemy, has been one of the prime reasons for developing "battle cruisers," that combine the speed of the destroyer with the long steaming radius of the battleship, a battery almost as strong, and a very considerable protection by armor. the aeroplane and the air-ship are recent accessions to the list of fighting craft. their rôle in naval warfare cannot yet be defined, because the machines themselves have not yet reached an advanced stage of development, and their probable performance cannot be forecast. there is no doubt, however, in the minds of naval men that the rôle of aircraft is to be important and distinguished. chapter iii naval power mahan proved that sea power has exercised a determining influence on history. he proved that sea power has been necessary for commercial success in peace and military success in war. he proved that, while many wars have culminated with the victory of some army, the victory of some navy had been the previous essential. he proved that the immediate cause of success had often resulted inevitably from another cause, less apparent because more profound; that the operations of the navy had previously brought affairs up to the "mate in four moves," and that the final victory of the army was the resulting "checkmate." before mahan proved his doctrine, it was felt in a general way that sea power was necessary to the prosperity and security of a nation. mahan was not the first to have this idea, for it had been in the minds of some men, and in the policy of one nation, for more than a century. neither was mahan the first to put forth the idea in writing; but he was the first to make an absolute demonstration of the truth. newton was not the first man to know, or to say, that things near the earth tend to fall to the earth; but he was the first to formulate and prove the doctrine of universal gravitation. in the same way, all through history, we find that a few master minds have been able to group what had theretofore seemed unrelated phenomena, and deduce from them certain laws. in this way they substituted reasoning for speculation, fact for fancy, wisdom for opportunism, and became the guides of the human race. the effect of the acceptance of mahan's doctrine was felt at once. realizing that the influence of sea power was a fact, comprehending great britain's secret, after mahan had disclosed it, certain other great nations of the world, especially germany, immediately started with confidence and vigor upon the increase of their own sea power, and pushed it to a degree before unparalleled; with a result that must have been amazing to the man who, more than any other, was responsible for it. since the words "sea power," or their translation, is a recognized phrase the world over, and since the power of sea power is greater than ever before, and is still increasing, it may be profitable to consider sea power as an entity, and to inquire what are its leading characteristics, and in what it mainly consists. there is no trouble in defining what the sea is, but there is a good deal of trouble in defining what power is. if we look in a dictionary, we shall find a good many definitions of power; so many as to show that there are many different kinds of power, and that when we read of "power," it is necessary to know what kind of power is meant. clearly "sea power" means power on the sea. but what kind of power? there are two large classes into which power may be divided, passive and active. certainly we seem justified, at the start, in declaring that the power meant by mahan was not passive, but active. should this be granted, we cannot be far from right if we go a step further, and declare that sea power means ability to do something on the sea. if we ask what the something is that sea power has ability to do, we at once perceive that sea power may be divided into two parts, commercial power and naval power. the power exerted by commercial sea power is clearly that exerted by the merchant service, and is mainly the power of acquiring money. it is true that the merchant service has the power of rendering certain services in war, especially the power of providing auxiliary vessels, and of furnishing men accustomed to the sea; but as time goes on the power contributable by the merchant service must steadily decrease, because of the relatively increasing power of the naval service, and the rapidly increasing difference between the characteristics of ships and men suitable for the merchant service and those suitable for the naval service. but even in the past, while the importance of the merchant service was considerable in the ways just outlined, it may perhaps be questioned whether it formed an element of _sea power_, in the sense in which mahan discussed sea power. the power of every country depends on all the sources of its wealth: on its agriculture, on its manufacturing activities, and even more directly on the money derived from exports. but these sources of wealth and all sources of wealth, including the merchant service, can hardly be said to be elements of power themselves, but rather to be elements for whose protection power is required. in fact, apart from its usefulness in furnishing auxiliaries, it seems certain that the merchant service has been an element of _weakness_. the need for navies arose from the weakness of merchant ships and the corresponding necessity for assuring them safe voyages and proper treatment even in time of peace; while in time of war they have always been an anxious care, and have needed and received the protection of fighting ships that have been taken away from the fleet to act as convoys. if commercial sea power was not the power meant by mahan, then he must have meant naval power. and if one reads the pages of history with patient discrimination, the conviction must grow on him that what really constituted the sea power which had so great an influence on history, was _naval_ power; not the power of simply ships upon the sea, but the power of a navy composed of ships able to fight, manned by men trained to fight, under the command of captains skilled to fight, and led by admirals determined to fight. trafalgar was not won by the merchant service; nor mobile, manila, or tsushima. if sea power be essentially naval power, it may be interesting to inquire: in what does naval power consist and what are its principal characteristics? if one looks at a fleet of war-ships on the sea, he will be impressed consciously or unconsciously with the idea of power. if he is impressed consciously, he will see that the fleet represents power in the broadest sense--power active and power passive; power to do and power to endure; power to exert force and power to resist it. if he goes further and analyzes the reasons for this impression of power, he will see that it is not merely a mental suggestion, but a realization of the actual existence of tremendous mechanical power, under complete direction and control. in mechanics we get a definition of power, which, like all definitions in mechanics, is clear, definite, and correct. in mechanics, power is the rate at which mechanical work is performed. it is ability to do something in a certain definite time. now this definition gives us a clear idea of the way in which a navy directly represents power, because the power which a navy exerts is, primarily, mechanical; and any other power which it exerts is secondary and derived wholly from its mechanical power. the power of a gun is due wholly to the mechanical energy of its projectile, which enables it to penetrate a resisting body; and the power of a moving ship is due wholly to the mechanical energy of the burning coal within its furnaces. it may be objected that it is not reasonable to consider a ship's energy of motion as an element of naval power, in the mechanical sense in which we have been using the word "power," for the reason that it could be exerted only by the use of her ram, an infrequent use. to this it may be answered that energy is energy, no matter to what purpose it is applied; that a given projectile going at a given speed has a certain energy, whether it strikes its target or misses it; and that a battleship going at a certain speed must necessarily have a certain definite energy, no matter whether it is devoted to ramming another ship or to carrying itself and its contents from one place to another. besides the mechanical power exerted by the mere motion of the ship, and often superior to it, there is the power of her guns and torpedoes. perhaps the most important single invention ever made was the invention of gunpowder. why? because it put into the hands of man a tremendous force, compressed into a very small volume, which he could use instantaneously or refrain from using at his will. its first use was in war; and in war has been its main employment ever since. war gives the best field for the activity of gunpowder, because in war, we always wish to exert a great force at a definite point at a given instant; usually in order to _penetrate_ the bodies of men, or some defensive work that protects them. gunpowder is the principal agent used in war up to the present date. it is used by both armies and navies, but navies use it in larger masses, fired in more powerful guns. of course this does not mean that it would be impossible to send a lot of powder to a fort, more than a fleet could carry, and fire it; but it does mean that history shows that forts have rarely been called upon to fire much powder, that their lives have been serene, and that most of the powder fired on shore has been fired by infantry using muskets--though a good deal has been fired by field and siege artillery. leaving forts out of consideration and searching for something else in which to use gunpowder on a large scale, we come to siege-pieces, field-pieces, and muskets. disregarding siege-pieces and field-pieces, for the reason that the great variety of types makes it difficult to compare them with navy guns, we come to muskets. now the musket is an extremely formidable weapon, and has, perhaps, been the greatest single contributor to the victory of civilization over barbarism, and order over anarchy, that has ever existed up to the present time. but the enormous advances in engineering, including ordnance, during the last fifty years, have reduced enormously the relative value of the musket. remembering that energy, or the ability to do work, is expressed by the formula: e= / mv^ , remembering that the projectile of the modern -inch gun starts at about , f. s. velocity and weighs pounds, while the bullet of a musket weighs only grains and starts with a velocity of , feet per second, we see that the energy of the -inch projectile is about , times that of the bullet on leaving the muzzle. but after the bullet has gone, say , yards, its energy has fallen to zero, while the energy of the -inch projectile is nearly the same as when it started. while it would be truthful, therefore, to say that the energy of the -inch gun within , yards is greater than that of , muskets, it would also be truthful to say that outside of , yards, millions of muskets would not be equal to one -inch gun. not only is the -inch gun a weapon incomparably great, compared with the musket, but when placed in a naval ship, it possesses a portability which, while not an attribute of the gun itself, is an attribute of the combination of gun and ship, and a distinct attribute of naval power. a -inch gun placed in a fort may be just as good as a like gun placed in a ship, but it has no power to exert its power usefully unless some enemy comes where the gun can hit it. and when one searches the annals of history for the records of whatever fighting forts have done, he finds that they have been able to do very little. but a -inch gun placed in a man-of-war can be taken where it is needed, and recent history shows that naval -inch guns, modern though they are, have already done effective work in war. not only are -inch guns powerful and portable, but modern mechanical science has succeeded in so placing them in our ships that they can be handled with a precision, quickness, and delicacy that have no superior in any other branch of engineering. while granting the difficulty of an exact comparison, i feel no hesitation in affirming that the greatest triumph of the engineering art in handling heavy masses is to be found in the turret of a battleship. here again, and even inside of , yards, we find the superiority of the great gun over the musket, as evidenced by its accuracy in use. no soldier can fire his musket, even on a steady platform, himself and target stationary, and the range known perfectly, as accurately as a gun-pointer can fire a -inch gun; and if gun and target be moving, and the wind be blowing, and the range only approximately known, as is always the case in practice, the advantage of the big gun in accuracy becomes incomparable. but it is not only the big projectile itself which has energy, for this projectile carries a large charge of high explosive, which exploding some miles away from where it started, exerts a power inherent in itself, that was exhibited with frightful effect at the battles of tsushima and the skagerak. this brings us to the auto-torpedo, a weapon recently perfected; in fact not perfected yet. here is another power that science has put into the hands of naval men in addition to those she had already put there. the auto-torpedo, launched in security from below the water-line of the battleship, or from a destroyer or submarine, can be directed in a straight line over a distance and with a speed that are constantly increasing with the improvement of the weapon. at the present moment, a speed of knots over , yards can be depended on, with a probability that on striking an enemy's ship below the water-line it will disable that ship, if not sink her. there seems no doubt that, in a very few years, the systematic experiments now being applied to the development of the torpedo will result in a weapon which can hardly be called inferior to the -inch or even -inch gun and will probably surpass it. _controllability_.--if one watches a fleet of ships moving on the sea, he gets an impression of tremendous power. but if he watches niagara, or a thunder-storm, he also gets an impression of tremendous power. but the tremendous power of niagara, or the thunder-storm, is a power that belongs to niagara or the thunder-storm, and not to man. man cannot control the power of niagara or the thunder-storm; but he can control the power of a fleet. speaking, then, from the standpoint of the human being, one may say that the fleet has the element of controllability, while niagara and the thunder-storm have not. one man can make the fleet go faster or slower or stop; he can increase its power of motion or decrease it at his will; he can reduce it to zero. he cannot do so with the forces of nature. _directability_.--not only can one man control the power of the fleet, he can also direct it; that is, can turn it to the right or the left as much as he wishes. but one man cannot change the direction of motion of niagara or the lightning-bolt. _power, controllability, and directability_.--we may say, then, that a fleet combines the three elements of mechanical power, controllability, and directability. _the unit of military power_.--this is an enormous power that has come into the hands of the naval nations; but it has come so newly that we do not appreciate it yet. one reason why we do not and cannot appreciate it correctly is that no units have been established by which to measure it. to supply this deficiency, the author begs leave to point out that, since the military power of every nation has until recently been its army, of which the unit has been the soldier, whose power has rested wholly in his musket, the musket has actually been the unit of military power. in all history, the statement of the number of men in each army has been put forward by historians as giving the most accurate idea of their fighting value; and in modern times, nearly all of these men have been armed with muskets only. it has been said already that the main reason why the invention of gunpowder was so important was that it put into the hands of man a tremendous mechanical power compressed into a very small space, which man could use or not use at his will. this idea may be expressed by saying that gunpowder combines power and great controllability. but it was soon discovered that this gunpowder, put into a tube with a bullet in front of it, could discharge that bullet in any given direction. a musket was the result, and it combined the three requisites of a weapon--mechanical power, controllability, and directability. while the loaded gun is perhaps the clearest example of the combination of the three factors we are speaking of, the moving ship supplies the next best example. it has very much greater mechanical power; and in proportion to its mass, almost as much controllability and directability. the control and direction of a moving ship are very wonderful things; but the very ease with which they are exercised makes us overlook the magnitude of the achievement and the perfection of the means employed. it may seem absurd to speak of one man controlling and directing a great ship, but that is pretty nearly what happens sometimes; for sometimes the man at the wheel is the only man on board doing anything at all; and he is absolutely directing the entire ship. at such times (doubtless they are rare and short) the man at the wheel on board, say the _vaterland_, is directing unassisted by any human being a mass of , tons, which is going through the water at a speed of knots, or miles, an hour, nearly as fast as the average passenger-train. in fact, it would be very easy to arrange on board the _vaterland_ that this should actually happen; that everybody should take a rest for a few minutes, coal-passers, water-tenders, oilers, engineers, and the people on deck. and while such an act might have no particular value, _per se_, and prove nothing important, yet, nevertheless, a brief reflection on the possibility may be interesting, and lead us to see clearly into the essential nature of what is here called "directability." the man at the wheel on board the _vaterland_, so long as the fires burn and the oil continues to lubricate the engines, has a power in his hands that is almost inconceivable. the ship that he is handling weighs more than the , men that comprise the standing army of germany. now can anybody imagine the entire standing army of germany being carried along at miles an hour and turned almost instantly to the right or left by one man? the standing army of germany is supposed to be the most directable organization in the world; but could the emperor of germany move that army at a speed of miles an hour and turn it as a whole (not its separate units) through degrees in three minutes? the _vaterland_ being a merchant ship and not fully representing naval power, perhaps it might be better to take, say, the _pennsylvania_. the weight is about half that of the _vaterland_, that is, it is nearly twice the weight of the men of the british standing army; and the usual speed is about, say, knots. but in addition to all the power of the ship, as a ship, or an energy greater than that of , muskets, she has the power of all the guns, twelve -inch guns, and twenty-two -inch guns, whose projectiles, not including the torpedoes fired from four torpedo-tubes, have an energy at the muzzle equal to , muskets, seven-eighths of all the muskets in the german standing army. now any one who has seen a battleship at battle practice knows that all the various tremendous forces are under excellent direction and control. and while it cannot be strictly said that they are absolutely under the direction and control of the captain, while it must be admitted that no one man can really direct so many rapidly moving things, yet it is certainly well within the truth to say that the ship and all it contains are very much more under the control of her captain than the german standing army is under the control of the kaiser. the captain, acting through the helmsman, chief engineer, gunnery officer, and executive officer, can get very excellent information as to what is going on, and can have his orders carried out with very little delay; but the mere space occupied by an army of , men, and the unavoidable dispersion of its units prevent any such exact control. in other words, the captain of the _pennsylvania_ wields a weapon more mechanically powerful than all the muskets of the german standing army: and his control of it is more absolute than is the kaiser's control of that army. _mechanism vs. men_.--now what is the essential reason for the efficient direction exercised by the helmsman of the _pennsylvania_, and the relative impotency of generals? is it not that the helmsman acts through the medium of mechanism, while the generals act through the medium of men? a ship is not only made of rigid metal, but all her parts are fastened together with the utmost rigidity; while the parts of an army are men, who are held together by no means whatever except that which discipline gives, and the men themselves are far from rigid. in the nature of things it is impossible that an army should be directed as perfectly as a ship. the rudder of a ship is a mechanical appliance that can be depended upon to control the direction of the ship absolutely, while an army has no such a thing as a rudder, or anything to take its place. again, the rudder is only a few hundred feet from the helmsman, and the communication between them, including the steering-engine itself, is a strong reliable mechanism that has no counterpart in the army. the control of the main engines of a ship is almost as absolute as the control of the rudder; and the main engines are not only much more powerful than the legs of soldiers, but they act together in much greater harmony. _inherent power of a battleship_.--possibly the declaration may be accepted now that a battleship of , tons, such as the navies are building now, with, say, twelve -inch guns is a greater example of power, under the absolute direction and control than anything else existing; and that the main reason is the concentration of a tremendous amount of mechanical energy in a very small space, all made available by certain properties of water. nothing like a ship can be made to run on shore; but if an automobile could be constructed, carrying twelve -inch guns, twenty-two -inch guns, and four torpedo-tubes, of the size of the _pennsylvania_, and with her armor, able to run over the land in any direction at knots, propelled by engines of , horse-power, it could whip an army of a million men just as quickly as it could get hold of its component parts. such a machine could start at one end of an army and go through to the other like a mowing-machine through a field of wheat; and knock down all the buildings in new york afterward, smash all the cars, break down all the bridges, and sink all the shipping. _inherent power of a fleet_.--an idea of the power exertable by a fleet of modern ships may be derived from the following comparison. when sherman made his wonderful march to the sea from atlanta to savannah, he made a march whose details are historically known, which was unopposed, which was over a flat country, in good weather, and without the aid of railroad-trains. it was a march, pure and simple; and inasmuch as men are the same now as they were then, it gives excellent data of the way in which purely military or army power can move from one place to another, _while still preserving its character and exercising its functions_. similarly, when admiral schroeder, in november, , went from the east coast of the united states to the english channel, his march was unopposed, its details are known, and it gave an excellent illustration of how naval power can move from one place to another, _while still preserving its character and exercising its functions_. now general sherman was a man of world-wide fame, and so were some of his generals, and sherman's fame will last for centuries. compared with sherman, admiral schroeder was obscure; and compared with sherman's officers, admiral schroeder's were obscure. sherman's soldiers, privates and all, were made glorious for the rest of their lives by having been in sherman's march to the sea, while admiral schroeder's sailors achieved no glory at all. so, the next paragraph is not intended to detract in the slightest from sherman and his army, but simply to point out the change in conditions that mechanical progress has brought about. the statement of comparison is simply that when general sherman marched from atlanta to the sea his army composed , men, and it took him twenty-five days to go about land miles or sea miles; and when admiral schroeder went from our coast to europe he had ships, and he made the trip of more than , sea miles in less than fourteen days. disregarding twenty-eight -inch guns, two hundred and fifty-two -inch guns, and a lot of smaller guns, and disregarding all the torpedoes, admiral schroeder took eighty-four -inch guns, ninety-six -inch guns, eighty-eight -inch guns, and forty-eight -inch guns, _all mounted and available_; which, assuming the power of the modern musket as a unit, equalled more than , , modern muskets. such an enormous transfer of absolute, definite, available power would be impossible on land, simply because no means has been devised to accomplish it. such a transfer on land would be the transfer of ninety times as many soldiers as sherman had (even supposing they had modern muskets) over fifteen times the distance and at thirty times the speed; and as the work done in going from one place to another varies practically as the square of the speed, a transfer on land equivalent in magnitude and speed to schroeder's would be a performance x x ^ = , , times as great as sherman's. this may seem absurd, and perhaps it is; but why? the comparison is not between the qualities of the men or between the results achieved. great results often are brought about by very small forces, as when some state of equilibrium is disturbed, and vice versa. the comparison attempted is simply between the _power_ of a certain army and the power of a certain fleet. and while it is true that, for some purposes, such as overcoming small resistance, great power may not be as efficacious as feeble power or even gentleness, yet, nevertheless, it must be clear that, for the overcoming of _great_ resistance quickly great power must be applied. the existence of a certain power is quite independent of the desirability of using it. the existence of the power is all the writer wishes to insist upon at present; the question of its employment will be considered later. not only is the power of a fleet immeasurably greater than that of an army, but it must always be so, from the very nature of things. the speed of an army, _while exercising the functions of an army_, and the power of a musket, while exercising its functions as a weapon of one soldier, cannot change much from what they were when sherman went marching through georgia. but, thanks to mechanical science, there is no limit in sight to the power to which a fleet may attain. the power of a navy is of recent growth, but it is increasing and is going to continue to increase. every advance of civilization will advance the navy. every new discovery and invention will directly or indirectly serve it. the navy, more than any other thing, will give opportunity for mechanism and to mechanism. far beyond any possible imagination of to-day, it will become the highest expression of the genius of mechanism, and the embodiment of its spirit. the amount of money now being spent by the united states on its navy is so great that the expenditure can be justified only on the basis that great naval power is essential to the country. is it essential, and if so, why? _primary use for a navy_.--to answer this wisely, it may be well to remind ourselves that the principal object of all the vocations of men is directly or indirectly the acquiring of money. money, of course, is not wealth; but it is a thing which can be so easily exchanged for wealth, that it is the thing which most people work for. of course, at bottom, the most important work is the getting of food out of the ground; but inasmuch as people like to congregate together in cities, the thing taken out of the ground in one place must be transported to other places; and inasmuch as every person wants every kind of thing that he can get, a tremendous system of interchange, through the medium of money, has been brought about, which is called "trade." for the protection of property and life, and in order that trade may exist at all, an enormous amount of human machinery is employed which we call "government." this government is based on innumerable laws, but these laws would be of no avail unless they were carried out; and every nation in the world has found that employment of a great deal of force is necessary in order that they shall be carried out. this force is mainly exercised by the police of the cities; but many instances have occurred in the history of every country where the authority of the police has had to be supported by the army of the national government. there is no nation in the world, and there never has been one, in which the enforcement of the necessary laws for the protection of the lives, property, and trade of the people has not depended ultimately on the army; and the reason why the army could enforce the laws was simply the fact that the army had the power to inflict suffering and death. as long as a maritime country carried on trade within its own borders exclusively, as long as it lived within itself, so long as its people did not go to countries oversea, a navy was not necessary. but when a maritime country is not contented to live within its own borders, then a navy becomes essential to guard its people and their possessions on the highways of the sea; to enforce, not municipal or national law, as an army does, but international law. now the desire of the people of a country to extend their trade beyond the seas seems in some ways not always a conscious desire, not a deliberate intent, but to be an effort of self-protection, or largely an effort of expansion; for getting room or employment. as the people of a country become civilized, labor-saving devices multiply; and where one man by means of a machine can do the work of a hundred, ninety-nine men may be thrown out of employment; out of a hundred men who till the soil, only one man may be selected and ninety-nine men have to seek other employment. where shall it be gotten? evidently it must be gotten in some employment which may be called "artificial," such as working in a shop of some kind, or doing some manufacturing work. but so long as a people live unto themselves only, each nation can practically make and use all the machinery needed within its borders, and still not employ all the idle hands; and when the population becomes dense, employment must be sought in making goods to sell beyond the sea. the return comes back, sometimes in money, sometimes in the products of the soil and the mine and the manufactures of foreign lands. in this way every nation becomes like a great business firm. it exports (that is, sells,) certain things, and it imports (that is, buys,) certain things; and if it sells more than it buys it is making money; if it buys more than it sells it is spending money. this is usually expressed by saying that the "balance of trade" is in its favor or against it. in a country like the united states, or any other great nation, the amount of exporting and importing, of buying and selling almost every conceivable article under the sun, is carried on in the millions and millions of dollars; and so perfect has the organization for doing this business become in every great country, that the products of the most distant countries can be bought in almost every village; and any important event in any country produces a perceptible effect wherever the mail and telegraph go. the organization for effecting this in every country is so excellent and so wonderful, that it is like a machine. in fact, it is a machine, and with all the faults of a machine. now one of the faults of a machine, a fault which increases in importance with the complexity of the machine, is the enormous disturbance which may be produced by a cause seemingly trivial. that such is the case with the machine which the commerce of every great nation comprises, every-day experience confirms. so long as the steamers come and go with scheduled regularity, so long will the money come in at the proper intervals and be distributed through the various channels; so long will the people live the lives to which they are habituated; so long will order reign. but suppose the coming and going of all the steamers were suddenly stopped by a blockade. while it may be true that, in a country like the united states, no foreign trade is really necessary; while it may be true that the people of the united states would be just as happy, though not so rich, if they had no foreign trade--yet the sudden stoppage of foreign trade would not bring about a condition such as would have existed if we had never had any foreign trade, but would bring about a chaotic condition which cannot fitly be described by a feebler word than "horrible." the whole machinery of every-day life would be disabled. hundreds of thousands of people would be thrown out of employment, and the whole momentum of the rapidly moving enormous mass of american daily life would receive a violent shock which would strain to its elastic limit every part of the entire machine. it would take a large book to describe what would ensue from the sudden stoppage of the trade of the united states with countries over the sea. such a book would besides be largely imaginative; because in our history such a condition has never yet arisen. although wars have happened in the past in which there has been a blockade of our coast more or less complete, peace has been declared before the suffering produced had become very acute; and furthermore the conditions of furious trade which now exist have never existed before. disasters would ensue, apart from the actual loss of money, owing simply to the sudden change. in a railroad-train standing still or moving at a uniform speed, the passengers are comfortable; but if that same train is suddenly brought to rest when going at a high speed, say by collision, the consequences are horrible in the extreme, and the horror is caused _simply by the suddenness of the change_. the same is true all through nature and human nature. any sudden change in the velocity of any mass has its exact counterpart in any sudden change in the conditions of living of any man or woman, or any sudden change in the conditions under which any organization must carry on its business. the difficulty is not with individuals only, or with the organizations themselves, and does not rest solely on the personal inability of people to accommodate themselves to the losing of certain conveniences or luxuries; but it is an inertia which resists even the strenuous efforts of individuals and organizations to meet new situations promptly, and to grapple effectively with new problems. every organization, no matter how small, is conducted according to some system, and that system is based upon certain more or less permanent conditions, which, if suddenly changed, make the system inapplicable. the larger the organization and the more complex it is, the more will it be deranged by any change of external conditions and the longer time will it take to adapt itself to them. the sudden stoppage of our sea trade, including our coasting trade, by even a partial blockade of our ports, would change practically all the conditions under which we live. there is hardly a single organization in the country which would not be affected by it. and, as every organization would know that every other organization would be affected, but to a degree which could not possibly be determined, because there would be no precedent, it cannot be an exaggeration to declare that the blockading of our principal ports would, entirely apart from direct loss of money and other commodities, produce a state of confusion, out of which order could not possibly be evolved except by the raising of the blockade. in addition to the confusion brought about, there would, of course, be the direct loss of money and non-receipt of imported things; but what would probably be the very worst thing of all would be the numbers of men thrown out of employment by the loss of foreign markets. _so long as a country can keep its people in employment, so long the people will live in comparative order_. but when there are many unemployed men in a country, not only do their families lose the means of subsistence, but the very fact of the men being unemployed leads them into mischief. should the ports of any great commercial nation be suddenly closed, the greatest danger to the country would not be from the enemy outside, but from the unemployed people inside, unless the government gave them employment, by enlisting them in an enormous, improvised army. it will be seen, therefore, that the blockading of the principal ports of any purely commercial country would be a disaster so great that there could not be a greater one except actual invasion. another disaster might be the total destruction of its fleet by the enemy's fleet; but the only _direct_ result of this would be that the people of the country would have fewer ships to support and fewer men to pay. the loss of the fleet and the men would not _per se_ be any loss whatever to the country, but rather a gain. the loss of the fleet, however, would make it possible for the enemy's fleet to blockade our ports later, and thus bring about the horrors of which we have spoken. while it is true that an absolute blockade of any port might be practically impossible at the present day, while it is true that submarines and torpedo-boats might compel blockading ships to keep at such distance from ports that many loopholes of escape would be open to blockade runners, yet it may be pointed out that even a partial blockade, even a blockade that made it risky for vessels to try to break it, would have a very deleterious effect upon the prosperity of the country and of every man, woman, and child within it. a blockade like this was that maintained during the greater part of the civil war by the northern states against the southern states. this blockade, while not perfect, while it was such as to permit many vessels to pass both ways, was nevertheless so effective that it made it impossible for the southern states to be prosperous, or to have any reasonable hope of ever being prosperous. and while it would be an exaggeration to state that the navy itself, unaided by the army, could have brought the south to terms; while it would be an exaggeration to state that all the land battles fought in the civil war were unnecessary, that all the bloodshed and all the ruin of harvests and of homesteads were unnecessary, nevertheless it does seem that so long as the navy maintained the blockade which it did maintain, the people of the south would have been prevented from achieving enough prosperity to carry on an independent government; so that their revolt would have failed. the south, not being able to raise the blockade by means of their navy, might have tried to do so by sending an army into the northern states, to whip the northerners on their own ground; but this would clearly have been impossible. the sentences above are not written with the intention of minimizing the services rendered by the army in the civil war, or of detracting from the glory of the gallant officers and men who composed it, or of subtracting one jot or tittle from a grateful appreciation of their hardships and bloodshed; neither do they dare to question the wisdom of the statesmen who directed that the war should be fought mainly by the army. their sole intention is to point out that, if a meagre naval force could produce so great an effect against a country _mainly agricultural_, a very powerful naval force, blockading effectively the principal ports of a _manufacturing country_, would have an effect so great that it can hardly be estimated. it is plainly to be seen that the effect of a blockade against a purely commercial country by a modern navy would be incomparably greater now than it was fifty years ago, for two very important reasons. one reason is that the progress of modern engineering has made navies very much more powerful than they were fifty years ago; and the other reason is that the same cause has made countries very much more vulnerable to blockade, because it has made so many millions of people dependent upon manufacturing industries and the export of manufactured things, and forced them to live an artificial life. while the united states, for instance, does not depend for its daily bread on the regular coming of wheat from over the sea, yet millions of its people do depend, though indirectly, upon the money from the export of manufactured things; for with countries, as with people, habits are formed both of system and of mode of life, which it is dangerous suddenly to break; so that a country soon becomes as dependent upon outside commerce as a man does upon outside air, and a people suddenly deprived of a vigorous outside commerce would seem to be smothered almost like a man deprived of outside air. a rough idea of the possible effect of a blockade of our coast may be gathered from the fact that our exports last year were valued at more than $ , , , ; which means that goods to this amount were sold, for which a return was received, either in money or its equivalent, most of it, ultimately, as wages for labor. of course no blockade could stop all of this; but it does not seem impossible that it could stop half of it, if our fleet were destroyed by the enemy. supposing that this half were divided equally among all the people in the united states, it would mean that each man, woman, and child would lose about $ in one year. if the loss could be so divided up, perhaps no very great calamity would ensue. but, of course, no such division could be made, with the result that a great many people, especially poor people, earning wages by the day, would lose more than they could stand. suppose, for instance, that a number of people earning about $ a year, by employment in export enterprises, were the people upon whom the actual loss eventually fell by their being thrown out of employment. this would mean that more than a million people--men, women, and children--would be actually deprived of the means of living. it seems clear that such a thing would be a national disaster, for any loss of money to one man always means a loss of money or its equivalent to other men besides. for instance: suppose a owes $ to b, b owes $ to c, c owes $ to d, d owes $ to e, e owes $ to f, f owes $ to g, g owes $ to h, h owes $ to i, and i to j. if a is able to pay b, and does so, then b pays c, and so on, and everybody is happy. but suppose that a for some reason, say a blockade, fails to receive some money that he expected; then a cannot pay b, b cannot pay c, and so on; with the result, that not only does j lose his $ , but nine men are put in debt $ which they cannot pay; with the further result that a is dunned by h, b is dunned by c, and so on, producing a condition of distress which would seem to be out of all proportion to a mere lack of $ , but which would, nevertheless, be the actual result. so in this country of , , people, the sudden loss of $ , , , a year would produce a distress seemingly out of all proportion to that sum of money, because the individual loss of every loser would be felt by everybody else. since to a great manufacturing nation, like ours, the greatest danger from outside (except actual invasion) would seem to be the sudden stoppage of her oversea trade by blockade, we seem warranted in concluding that, since _the only possible means of preventing a blockade is a navy_, the primary use for our navy is to prevent blockade. this does not mean that a fleet's place is on its own coast, because a blockade might be better prevented by having the fleet elsewhere; in fact it is quite certain that its place is not on the coast as a rule, but at whatever point is the best with relation to the enemy's fleet, until the enemy's fleet is destroyed. in fact, since the defensive and the offensive are so inseparably connected that it is hard sometimes to tell where one begins and the other ends, the best position for our fleet might be on the enemy's coast. it may be objected that the coast of the united states is so long that it would be impossible to blockade it. perhaps, but that is not necessary: it would suffice to blockade boston, newport, new york, the delaware, the chesapeake, and the gulf, say with forty ships. and we must remember that blockade running would be much more difficult now than in the civil war, because of the increased power and accuracy of modern gunnery and the advent of the search-light, wireless telegraph, and aeroplane. it may also be objected that the blockading of even a defenseless coast would cost the blockading country a good deal of money, by reason of the loss of trade with that country. true; but war is always expensive, and the blockade would be very much more expensive to the blockaded country; and though it might hold out a long while, it would be compelled to yield in the end, not only because of the blockade itself but because of the pressure of neutral countries; and the longer it held out, the greater the indemnity it would have to pay. the expense of blockading would therefore be merely a profitable investment. the author is aware that actual invasion of a country from the sea would be a greater disaster than blockade, and that defense against invasion has often been urged in great britain as a reason for a great navy; so that the primary reason for a navy might be said to be defense against invasion. but why should an enemy take the trouble to invade us? blockade is easier and cheaper, and can accomplish almost everything that an enemy desires, especially if it be enlivened by the occasional dropping of thousand-pound shells into wall street and the navy-yard. while, however, the _primary_ use of naval power seems to be to prevent blockade, a navy, like any other weapon, may be put to any other uses which circumstances indicate. for instance, the northerners in the civil war used the navy not to prevent blockade, but to make blockade; the japanese used the navy to cover the transportation of their armies to manchuria and corea; and great britain has always used her navy to protect her trade routes. a general statement of the various uses of a navy has been put into the phrase "command of the sea." of course, the probability of getting "command of the sea," or of desiring to get it is dependent on the existence of a state of war, and there are some who believe that the probability of our becoming involved in a war with a great naval nation is too slight to warrant the expense of money and labor needed to prepare the necessary naval power. so it may be well to consider what is the degree of probability. this degree of probability cannot be determined as accurately as the probabilities of fire, death, or other things against which insurance companies insure us; for the reason that wars have been much less frequent than fires, deaths, etc., while the causes that make and prevent them are much more numerous and obscure. it seems clear, however, that, as between two countries of equal wealth, the probability of war varies with the disparity between their navies, and unless other nations are involved, is practically zero, when their navies are equal in power; and that, other factors being equal, the _greatest probability of war is between two countries, of which one is the more wealthy and the other the more powerful_. in reckoning the probability of war, we must realize that _the most pregnant cause of war is the combination of conflicting interests with disparity in power_. and we must also realize that it is not enough to consider the situation as it is now: that it is necessary to look at least ten years ahead, because it would take the united states that length of time to prepare a navy powerful enough to fight our possible foes with reasonable assurance of success. ten years, however, is not really far enough ahead to look, for the simple reason that, while we could get a great many ships ready in ten years, we could not get the entire navy ready as will be explained later. if, for instance, some change in policies or in interests should make war with great britain probable within ten years, we could not possibly build a navy that could prevent our being beaten, and blockaded, and forced to pay an enormous indemnity. is there _no_ probability of this? perhaps there is no great probability; but there certainly is a possibility. in fact, it might be a very wise act for great britain, seeing us gradually surpassing her, to go to war with us before it is too late, and crush us. it has often been said that great britain could not afford to go to war with us, because so many of her commercial interests would suffer. of course, they would suffer for a while; but so do the commercial interests of competing railroads when they begin to cut rates. cutting rates is war--commercial war: but it is often carried on, nevertheless, and at tremendous cost. just now, great britain does not wish to crush us; but it is certain that she can. it is certain that the richest country in the world lies defenseless against the most powerful; and that we could not alter this condition in ten years, even if we started to build an adequate navy now. yet even if the degree of probability of war with great britain, within say ten years, seems so small that we need not consider her, are there no other great powers with whom the degree of probability of war is great enough to make it wise for us to consider them? before answering this question, let us realize clearly that one of the strongest reasons that leads a country to abstain from war, even to seek relief from wrongs, actual or imagined, is a doubt of success; and that that reason disappears if another country, sufficiently powerful to assure success, is ready to help her, either by joining openly with her, or by seeking war herself at the same time with the same country. as we all know, cases like this have happened in the past. great britain knows it; and the main secret of her wealth is that she has always been strong enough to fight any two countries. it is plain that a coalition of two countries against us is possible now. the united states is regarded with feelings of extreme irritation by the two most warlike nations in the world, one on our eastern side and the other on the western. war with either one would call for all the energies of the country, and the issue would be doubtful. but if either country should consider itself compelled to declare war, the other, if free at the time, might see her opportunity to declare war simultaneously. the result would be the same as if we fought great britain, except that our pacific coast would be blockaded besides the atlantic, and we should have to pay indemnity to two countries instead of to one country. a coalition between these two countries would be an ideal arrangement, because it would enable each country to force us to grant the conditions it desires, and secure a large indemnity besides. would great britain interfere in our behalf? this can be answered by the man so wise that he knows what the international situation and the commercial situation will be ten years hence. let him speak. will the importance of naval power increase or decrease? it is clear that the importance to a country of a navy varies with two things--the value of that country's foreign trade and the probability of war. it is also clear that, other things being equal, the probability of a country becoming involved in war varies as the value of her foreign trade; because the causes of friction and the money at stake vary in that proportion. therefore, _the importance to a country of her navy varies as the square of the value of her foreign trade_. in order to answer the question, therefore, we must first consider whether foreign trade--sea trade--is going to increase or decrease. as to the united states alone, the value of our exports is about ten times what it was fifty years ago, and it promises to increase. but the united states is only one country, and perhaps her increase in foreign trade has been due to conditions past or passing. so what is the outlook for the future, both for the united states and other countries? will other countries seek foreign trade? yes. the recent commercial progress of germany, argentina, and japan, shows the growing recognition by civilized and enterprising countries of the benefits of foreign trade, and of the facilities for attaining it which are now given by the advent of large, swift, modern steamers; steamers which are becoming larger and swifter and safer every year, more and more adapted for ocean trade. for not only have the writings of mahan brought about an increase in the sea power of every great country; but this increase has so aroused the attention of the engineering professions that the improvement of ships, engines, and other sea material has gone ahead faster than all the other engineering arts. the reason why the engineering arts that are connected with the sea have gone ahead more rapidly than any other arts is simply that they are given wider opportunity and a greater scope. it is inherent in the very nature of things that it is easier to transport things by water than by land; that water transportation lends itself in a higher degree to the exercise of engineering skill, to the attainment of great results. the underlying reason for this difference seems to be that it is not possible to make any vehicle to travel on land appreciably larger than the present automobile, unless it run on rails; whereas the floating power of water is such that vehicles can be made, and are made, as large as , tons. the _mauretania_, of , tons displacement, has been running for eight years, larger vessels are even now running and vessels larger still will undoubtedly be run; for the larger the ships, the less they cost per ton of carrying power, the faster they go, and the safer they are. sea commerce thus gives to engineers, scientists, and inventors, as well as to commercial men, that gift of the gods--opportunity. the number of ships that now traverse the ocean and the larger bodies of water communicating with it aggregate millions of tons, and their number and individual tonnage are constantly increasing. these vessels cruise among all the important seaports of the world, and form a system of intercommunication almost as complete as the system of railroads in the united states. they bring distant ports of the world very close together, and make possible that ready interchange of material products, and that facility of personal intercourse which it is one of the aims of civilization to bring about. from a commercial point of view, london is nearer to new york than san francisco, and more intimately allied with her. the evident result of all this is to make the people of the world one large community, in which, though many nationalities are numbered, many tongues are spoken, many degrees of civilization and wealth are found, yet, of all, the main instincts are the same: the same passions, the same appetites, the same desire for personal advantage. not only does this admirable system of intercommunication bring all parts of the world very closely together, but it tends to produce in all a certain similarity in those characteristics and habits of thought that pertain to the material things of life. we are all imitative, and therefore we tend to imitate each other; but the inferior is more apt to imitate the superior than vice versa. particularly are we prone to imitate those actions and qualities by which others have attained material success. so it is to be expected, it is already a fact, that the methods whereby a few great nations attained success are already being imitated by other nations. japan has imitated so well that in some ways she has already surpassed her models. with such an example before her, should we be surprised that china has also become inoculated with the virus of commercial and political ambitions? it cannot be many years before she will be in the running with the rest of us, with , , of people to do the work; people of intelligence, patience, endurance, and docility; people with everything to gain and nothing to lose; with the secret of how to succeed already taught by other nations, which she can learn from an open book. if japan has learned our secret and mastered it in fifty years, will china not be able to do it in less than fifty years? before we answer this question, let us realize clearly that china is much nearer to us in civilization than japan was fifty years ago; that china has japan's example to guide her, and also that any degree of civilization which was acquired by us in say one hundred years will not require half that time for another nation merely to learn. the same is true of all branches of knowledge; the knowledge of the laws of nature which it took newton many years to acquire may now be mastered by any college student in two months. and let us not forget, besides, that almost the only difficult element of civilization which other people need to acquire, in order to enter into that world-wide competition which is characteristic of the time we live in, is "engineering" broadly considered. doubtless there are other things to learn besides; but it is not apparent that any other things have contributed largely to the so-called new civilization of japan. perhaps japan has advanced enough in christianity to account for her advance in material power, but if so she keeps very quiet about it. it may be, also, that the relations of the government to the governed people of japan are on a higher plane than they used to be, but on a plane not yet so high as in our own country; but has any one ever seen this claimed or even stated? it may be that the people of japan are more kindly, brave, courteous, and patriotic than they were, and that their improvement has been due to their imitating us in these matters; but this is not the belief of many who have been in japan. one thing, however, is absolutely sure; and that is that japan's advance has been simultaneous with her acquirement of the engineering arts, especially as applied to military and naval matters and the merchant marine. but even supposing that china does not take part in the world-wide race for wealth, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that great britain, germany, france, italy, japan, argentina, and the united states, besides others like sweden, norway, belgium, holland, spain, and portugal, are in the race already; and that several in south america bid fair to enter soon. not only do we see many contestants, whose numbers and ardor are increasing, but we see, also, the cause of this increasing. the cause is not only a clearer appreciation of the benefits to be derived from commerce across the water under conditions that exist now; it is also a growing appreciation of the possibilities of commerce under conditions that will exist later with countries whose resources are almost entirely undeveloped. for four hundred years, we of the united states, have been developing the land within our borders, and the task has been enormous. at one time it promised to be the work of centuries; and with the mechanical appliances of even one hundred years ago, it would have taken a thousand years to do what we have already done. mechanical appliances of all kinds, especially of transportation and agriculture, have made possible what would, otherwise, have been impossible; and mechanical appliances will do the same things in tierra del fuego and zululand. mechanism, working on land and sea, is opening up the resources of the world. and now, another allied art, that of chemistry, more especially biology, is in process of removing one of the remaining obstacles to full development, by making active life possible, and even pleasant, in the tropics. it is predicted by some enthusiasts that, in the near future, it will be healthier and pleasanter to live in the tropics, and even do hard work there, than in the temperate zone. when this day comes, and it may be soon, the development of the riches of lands within the tropics will begin in earnest, and wealth undreamed of now be realized. the opening of the undeveloped countries means a continuing increase of wealth to the nations that take advantage of the opportunity, and a corresponding backsliding to those nations that fail. it means over all the ocean an increasing number of steamers. it means the continuing increase of manufacturing in manufacturing countries, and the increasing enjoyment in them of the good things of all the world. it means in the undeveloped countries an increasing use of the conveniences and luxuries of civilization and an increasing possession of money or its equivalent. it means, throughout all the world, an increase of what we call "wealth." in discussing a subject so great as sea trade, while it may be considered presumptuous to look fifty years ahead, it can hardly be denied that we ought at least to try to look that far ahead. to look fifty years ahead, is, after all, not taking in a greater interval of time than fifty years back; and it certainly seems reasonable to conclude that, if a certain line of progress has been going on for fifty years in a perfectly straight line, and with a vigor which is increasing very fast and shows no sign of change, the same general line of progress will probably keep up for another fifty years. if we try to realize what this means, we shall probably fail completely and become dazed by the prospect. we cannot possibly picture accurately or even clearly to ourselves any definite conditions of fifty years hence; but we certainly are warranted in concluding that by the end of fifty years, practically all of the countries of the world, including africa, will be open to trade from one end to the other; that the volume of trade will be at least ten times as great as it is now; that the means of communication over the water and through the air will be very much better than now; and that there will be scores of appliances, methods, and processes in general use of which we have, as yet, no inkling, and cannot even imagine. now let us call to mind the accepted proverb that "competition is the life of trade," and this will make us see that, accompanying this stupendous trade, extending over, and into, every corner of the world, there will be stupendous competition, involving in a vast and complicated net, every red-blooded nation of the earth. we seem safe in concluding, therefore, that the importance of naval power will increase. a great deal is said and written nowadays about the ability of arbitration to make wars unnecessary, and a good deal also about the possibility of an agreement among the nations, whereby armaments may be limited to forces adequate to insure that every nation shall be compelled to abide by the decision of the others in any disputed case. in view of the number, the earnestness, and the prominence of many of the men interested in this cause; in view of the number of arbitration treaties that have been already signed; in view of the fact that arbitration among nations will simply establish a law among them like the law in any civilized country; in view of the fact that individuals in their dealings with each other sometimes surrender certain of their claims, and even rights, for the common good; in view of the fact that nations, like all business firms, like to cut down expenses, and in further view of the fact that a navy is not directly, but only indirectly, a contributor to a nation's prosperity, it seems probable that arbitration will be more and more used among the nations, and that armaments may be limited by agreement. it is clear, however, that the practical difficulties in the way of making the absolute agreement required are enormous, and that the most enthusiastic advocates of the plan do not expect that the actual limitation of armaments will become a fact for many years. after the necessary preliminaries shall have been arranged, and the conference takes place which shall settle what armament each nation may have, it is plain that it will be to the interest of each nation to keep down the armament of every other nation, and to be allowed as much as possible itself. in this way, the operation of making the agreement will be somewhat like the forming of a trust among several companies, and the advantage will lie with that nation which is the most powerful. for this reason it would seem a part of wisdom for each country to enter the conference with as large a navy as possible. therefore, the probability of an approaching agreement among the nations as to limitation of armaments, instead of being a reason for abating our exertions toward establishing a powerful navy, is really a conclusive reason for redoubling them. this brings us to the important question, "how powerful should our navy be?" this may seem a question impossible to answer. of course it is impossible to answer it in terms of ships and guns; but an approximate estimate may be reached by considering the case of a man playing poker who holds a royal straight flush. such a man would be a fool if he did not back his hand to the limit and get all the benefit possible from it. so will the united states, if she fails to back her hand to the limit, recognizing the fact that in the grand game now going on for the stakes of the commercial supremacy of the world, she holds the best hand. she has the largest and most numerous seaports, the most enterprising and inventive people, and the most wealth with which to force to success all the various necessary undertakings. this does not mean that the united states ought, as a matter either of ethics or of policy, to build a great navy in order to take unjust advantage of weaker nations; but it does mean that she ought to build a navy great enough to save her from being shorn of her wealth and glory by simple force, as france was shorn in . it is often said that the reason for great britain's having so powerful a navy is that she is so situated geographically that, without a powerful navy to protect her trade, the people would starve. while this statement may be true, the inference usually drawn is fallacious: the inference that if great britain were not so situated, she would not have so great a navy. why would she not? it is certain that that "tight little island" has attained a world-wide power, and a wealth per capita greater than those of any other country; that her power and wealth, as compared with her home area, are so much greater than those of any other country as to stagger the understanding; that she could not have done what she has done without her navy; that she has never hesitated to use her navy to assist her trade, and yet that she has never used her navy to keep her people from starving. in fact, the insistence on the anti-starvation theory is absurd. has any country ever fought until the people as a mass were starving? has starving anything to do with the matter? does not a nation give up fighting just as soon as it sees that further fighting would do more harm than good? a general or an admiral, in charge of a detached force, must fight sometimes even at tremendous loss and after all hope of local success has fled, in order to hold a position, the long holding of which is essential to the success of the whole strategic plan; but what country keeps up a war until its people are about to starve? did spain do so in our last war? did russia fear that japan would force the people of her vast territory into starvation? no--starvation has nothing to do with the case. if some discovery were made by which great britain could grow enough to support all her people, she would keep her great navy nevertheless--simply because she has found it to be a good investment. the anti-starvation theory--the theory that one does things simply to keep from starving--does apply to some tropical savages, but not to the anglo-saxon. long after starvation has been provided against, long after wealth has been secured, we still toil on. what are we toiling for? the same thing that great britain maintains her navy for--wealth and power. the real reason for great britain's having a powerful navy applies with exact equality to the united states. now that great britain has proved how great a navy is best for her, we can see at once how great a navy is best for us. that is--since great britain and the united states are the wealthiest countries in the world, and since the probability of war between any two countries is least when their navies are equal in power--the maximum good would be attained by making the united states navy exactly equal to the british navy. chapter iv naval preparedness in a preceding chapter i endeavored to show why it is that the necessities of the naval defense of a country have caused the gradual development of different types of vessels, each having its distinctive work. if those different types operated in separate localities they would lose that mutual support which it is the aim of organization to secure, and each separate group could be destroyed in turn by the combined groups of an enemy. for this reason, the types or groups are combined in one large fleet, and an admiral is placed in command. the command of a fleet is the highest effort of the naval art. its success in time of war demands in the admiral himself a high order of mind and nerve and body; and it demands in all the personnel, from the highest to the lowest, such a measure of trained ability and character that each shall be able to discharge with skill and courage the duties of his station. in order that the material fleet shall be efficient as a whole, each material unit must be efficient as a unit. each ship must be materially sound; each pump, valve, cylinder, gun, carriage, torpedo, and individual appliance, no matter how small, must be in condition to perform its expected task. the complexity of a fleet baffles any mental effort, by even those most familiar with it, to grasp it fully. each dreadnaught, battle cruiser, destroyer, submarine, collier, tender, hospital ship, scout, supply ship, and what-not, is a machine in itself, and is filled with scores--in some cases, hundreds--of highly specialized machines, operated by steam, oil, air, electricity, and water. a superdreadnaught is a machine which, including the machines inside of her, costs $ , , ; a battle cruiser more. the personnel is nearly as complicated as the material. not only are there all the various ranks of commissioned officers in the line, medical corps, pay corps, marine corps, etc., but there are ten kinds of warrant officers besides; while in the enlisted personnel there are ninety-one different "ratings" in the navy, and thirteen in the marine corps, besides temporary ratings, such as gun-pointer, gun-trainer, gun-captain, etc. each rank and rating carries its rigidly prescribed duties, as well as its distinctive uniform and pay. that such a multitudinous host of types and individuals, both material and personnel, can be actually combined in one unit fleet, and that fleet operated as a mobile directable organism by its admiral, is a high achievement of the human intellect. how is it done? by discipline, by training, by knowledge, by energy, by devotion, by will; by the exercise of those mental, moral, and spiritual faculties that may be grouped under the one term "mind": the same power that co-ordinates and controls a still more complex machine, the organism of the human body. despite its relative crudeness, a fleet possesses, more fully than any other fruit of man's endeavor, the characteristics of an organism, defined by webster as "an individual constituted to carry on the activities of life by means of parts or organs more or less separate in function, but mutually dependent." and though it must be true that no fleet can approximate the perfection of nature's organisms, nevertheless there is an analogy which may help us to see how a complex fleet of complex vessels has been slowly evolved from the simple galley fleets of earlier days; how its various parts may be mutually dependent yet severally independent; and how all must be made to work as one vast unit, and directed as one vast unit by the controlling mind toward "the end in view." the common idea is that an army consists of a number of soldiers, and a navy of a number of ships. this idea is due to a failure to realize that soldiers and ships are merely instruments, and that they are useless instruments unless directed by a trained intelligence: that the first essential in an army and the first essential in a navy is mind, which first correctly estimates the situation, then makes wise plans to meet it, then carries out those plans; which organizes the men and designs the ships, and then directs the physical power exertable by the men and the ships toward "the end in view." owing to the enormous mechanical power made available in ships by the floating properties of water, machinery is more used by navies than by armies; but this does not mean that machinery can take the place of men more successfully in navies than in armies, except in the sense that navies can use more mechanical power. the abundant use of machines and instruments in navies does not mean that machinery and instruments can take the place of trained intelligence--but exactly the reverse. under the guidance of trained intelligence, a machine or instrument can perform wonders. but it is not the machinery that does the wonders; it is the trained intelligence that devised the instrument or machine, and the trained intelligence that operates it. let the trained intelligence err, or sleep, and note the results that follow. the _titanic_, a mass of , tons, moving through the water at knots an hour, a marvel of the science and skill of man, crashes into an iceberg, because the trained intelligence directing her errs--and is reduced at once to an inert mass of iron and brass. the mighty fleet of russia meets the japanese fleet in tsushima straits; and because the trained intelligence that directed its movements seriously erred, in an engagement decided in less than an hour, is stripped of its power and glory, and transformed into a disorganized aggregation of separate ships--some sunk, some sinking, some in flight. the japanese fleet, on the other hand, because it is directed with an intelligence more highly trained than that which directs the russian fleet, and because, in consequence, the officers and enlisted men perform their various duties not only in the actual battle, but in preparation for it, with a skill greater than that used in the russian fleet, suffers but little damage in the fight--though the advantage in number and size of ships is slightly with the russians. as a consequence of that battle, the war between russia and japan was decided in favor of japan, and terms of peace were soon agreed upon. russia lost practically all the ships that took part in the battle, and several thousand of her officers and sailors--and _she lost the whole object for which she went to war_. the difference between the russian and japanese fleets that gave the victory to the japanese was a difference in trained intelligence and in the relative degrees of preparedness which that difference caused. during the actual battle, the intelligence was that of the officers and men in the respective fleets, in managing the two fleets, the ships themselves, and the guns, engines, and machines of all kinds that those ships contained. it is this factor--trained intelligence--that has decided most of the battles of history, and the course that nations thereafter followed. battles have usually been fought between forces not very different in point of numbers and material, for the reason that a force which knew itself to be weaker than another would not fight unless compelled to fight; and in cases where two forces of widely differing strength have fought, the situation has usually been brought about directly by a superior intelligence. in fact, one of the most frequent and important endeavors of strategy and tactics--used triumphantly by napoleon--has always been such a handling of one's forces as to be superior to the enemy at the point of contact--to "get the mostest men there the firstest," as general forrest is said to have expressed it. the effect of superior-trained intelligence is greatest "at the top," but it can accomplish little unless a fine intelligence permeates the whole. a fine intelligence at the top will so direct the men below, will so select men for the various posts, and will so co-ordinate their efforts, that the organization will resemble a veritable organism: all the various organs fulfilling separately yet accurately their allotted functions; all the fire-control parties, all the gun crews, all the torpedo crews, all the engineer forces properly organized and drilled; all the hulls of the vessels, all the guns, all the torpedoes, all the multifarious engines, machines, and instruments in good material condition and correctly adjusted for use. but it is not only in the actual battle that fine intelligence is required; it is required long before the battle and far distant from the scene--in the "admiralty" at home. the japanese fleet set out fully manned with a highly trained, enthusiastic, and confident personnel; the russian fleet set out manned with a poorly trained and discouraged personnel, only too well aware of their defects. the issue at tsushima was decided before the respective fleets left their respective homes--though that issue was not then known to mortals. the battle emphasized, but did not prove, what had been proved a hundred times before: the paramount importance of preparedness; that _when two forces fight--the actual battle merely secures the decision as to the relative values of two completed machines, and their degrees of preparedness for use_. preparedness of material is not, of course, so important as preparedness of personnel, because if the personnel is prepared, they will inevitably prepare the material. and the preparedness must pervade all grades: for while it is true that the preparedness of those in high command is more important than the preparedness of those in minor posts, yet there is no post so lowly that its good or its ill performance will not be a factor in the net result. an unskilful oiler may cause a hot bearing that will slow down a battleship, and put out of order the column of a squadron; a signalman's mistake may throw a fleet into confusion. perfect preparedness of personnel and material is essential because events follow each other so rapidly in war that no preparation can be made after it has begun. to fight is the most intense work a man can do; and a war is nothing but a fight. no matter how great or how small a war may be, no war can lose the essential qualities of a fight, or (save in the treatment of prisoners) be more brutal or less brutal when fought between two little savage tribes, than when fought between two colossal groups of christian nations, civilized to the highest point. war is the acme of the endeavor of man. each side determines that it will win at all costs and at all hazards; that nobody's comfort, happiness, or safety shall receive the slightest consideration; that everybody's strength and courage must be worked to the limit by night as well as by day, and that there must be no rest and no yielding to any softening influence whatever; that the whole strength and mind of the nation, and of every individual in it, must be devoted, and must be sacrificed, if need be, to the cause at stake. in war, a navy's primary duty has usually been to protect the coast and trade routes of its country; and in order to do this, it has had to be able to oppose to an attacking fleet a defending fleet more militarily effective. if it were less effective, even if no invasion were attempted, the attacking fleet could cripple or destroy the defending fleet and then institute a blockade. in modern times an effective blockade, or at least a hostile patrol of trade routes, could be held hundreds of miles from the coast, where the menace of submarines would be negligible; and this blockade would stop practically all import and export trade. this would compel the country to live exclusively on its own resources, and renounce intercourse with the outside world. some countries could exist a long time under these conditions. but they would exist merely, and the condition of mere existence would never end until they sued for peace; because, even if new warships were constructed with which to beat off the enemy, each new and untrained ship would be sunk or captured shortly after putting out to sea as, on june , , in massachusetts bay, the american frigate _chesapeake_ was captured and nearly half her crew were killed and wounded in fifteen minutes by a ship almost identical in the material qualities of size and armament--the better-trained british frigate _shannon_. for these reasons, every nation that has acquired and has long retained prosperity, has realized that every country liable to be attacked by any navy must either be defended by some powerful country, or else must keep a navy ready to repel the attack successfully. to do this, the defending navy must be ready when the attack comes; because if not ready then, it will never have time to get ready. in regard to our own country, much stress is laid by some intelligent people--who forget the _chesapeake_ and _shannon_--on the , miles of water stretching between the united states and europe. this , miles is, of course, a factor of importance, but it is not a prohibition, because it can be traversed with great surety and quickness--with much greater surety and quickness, for instance, than the , miles traversed by the russian fleet, in , in steaming from russia to japan. the , miles that separate the united states from europe can be traversed by a fleet more powerful than ours in from two to three weeks; and the fleet would probably arrive on our shores in good condition, and manned by full crews of well-trained officers and men, habituated to their duties by recent practice and thoroughly ready to fight, as the _shannon_ was. we could not meet this fleet successfully unless we met it with a fleet more militarily effective; and we could not do this unless we had in the regular service and the reserve a personnel of officers and men sufficiently numerous to man immediately all the vessels that would be needed, and to man in addition all the shore stations, which would have to be expanded to a war basis. the officers and enlisted men, of course, would have to be at least as well trained as the corresponding personnel in the attacking fleet, and have as recent and thorough practice in their respective duties; for otherwise, no matter how brave and devoted they might be, the fate of the american fleet would be the fate of the _chesapeake_. in order to be ready when war breaks, the first essential is a plan for preparation. preparation is divided naturally into two parts: first, preparation of sufficient material and personnel; second, preparation of plans for the conduct of the war after it has begun. these two parts are both considered in what are technically called "war plans." preparation for war has always been known to be essential. lack of preparation has never been due to lack of knowledge, but always to neglect. the difference between the wise and the foolish virgins was not a difference in knowledge but a difference in character. the difference between alexander's little army and the tremendous army of darius was not so much in numbers as in preparedness. trained under philip of macedon for many years, organized for conquest and aggression, prepared to meet any situation that might arise, philip's army carried philip's son from victory to victory, and made him the master of the world. cæsar was great in peace as well as war, but it was by cæsar's army that cæsar's greatness was established; and it was a thoroughness of preparation unknown before that made cæsar's army great. napoleon's successes were built on the splendid preparation of a mind transcendently fitted to grasp both principles and details, and on the comparatively unprepared state of his opponents. the great elector began in a course of laborious and scientific preparation which committed all prussia, as well as the army, to acquiring what now we call "efficiency." as this plan developed, especially under the elector's grandson king frederick william, the next king found himself, as alexander had done, the chief of an army more highly prepared for war than any other. by means of that army he made himself frederick the great, and raised prussia from a minor position to the first rank of european powers. pursuing frederick william's system of progressive preparation, prussia continued her prosperous course till william i defeated austria, then france, and founded the german empire. this does not mean that the only result of developing national efficiency to its highest point is to secure success in war--in fact, we know that it is not. but it does mean that the same quality--efficiency--which tends to prosperity in peace tends also to victory in war. preparing for war was a simple thing in the olden days compared with preparing now, for the reason that the implements of war are much more numerous and complicated than they used to be, especially in navies. a navy is not ready unless all preparations and plans have been made, tested, and kept up to date, to insure that all of the vessels of every kind and all the shore stations will be in material condition, fully equipped and manned by a sufficient and efficient personnel of officers and crews, in time to meet the enemy on advantageous terms, and unless the central authority has already decided what it will do, when any probable emergency shall arise. this was the condition of the german army in . this was also the condition of the british navy, when war broke out in august, ; the british navy was ready; and therefore it was able to assume command of the sea at once, drive its enemy's commerce from the ocean, and imprison its fleets in sheltered ports. in all countries the peace establishment of the army and navy is smaller than the war establishment, for reasons of economy, upon the assumption that there will be enough time after war is declared to get on a war basis before the enemy can strike. but since , all the military nations have realized that the vital struggle of a war takes place _before_ a shot is fired; that _the factors that decide which nation shall be the victor and which the vanquished are determined before the war begins_; that they are simply "functions" of preparedness. germany was ready not only for war but for victory, because her troops were so much better trained, organized, and equipped than those of france, and her war plans so much more complete, that she was able to lay france prostrate, before the enormous resources of that country in men and material could rally in her defense. the relative conditions in which two opposing forces will enter a war, and their relative performances afterward, will depend upon the relative excellence of the war plans made for them, and the thoroughness with which the plans are tested before war breaks. so it is not difficult to see why all the great armies have patterned after germany, and organized special bodies of officers for the preparation and execution of war plans; and why it is that they endeavor to secure for that peculiar duty the most thorough and industrious of their officers. owing to the nature of war itself, the principles of warfare apply in their essentials to navies as well as to armies; and so the navies have patterned after the armies and made plans whereby they can get ready to fight in fleet organization on the ocean with the greatest possible effectiveness in the shortest possible time. during peace times every navy is maintained on a "peace basis"; only such ships and other material being kept in full commission, and only such a number of officers and enlisted men being actively employed, as the appropriations allotted by the government permit. those ships and other material that are not actually in commission are maintained in reserve, a condition of partial readiness, of which several degrees are recognized, in which a reduced number of officers and men are kept on board, and the various structures and apparatus are kept in as high a degree of readiness as circumstances will permit. in order to man in time of war these vessels in reserve, and insure a sufficient personnel in the active fleet, a "naval reserve" is organized in each country, composed of officers and men who have had experience in the regular navy. they are compelled to undergo a specific amount of training each year, to keep themselves in readiness at all times to answer the call for active service on short notice, and to maintain such communication with the government as will make it easy to locate any man at any moment. the act of getting ready, the passing from a state of peace to a state of readiness for fighting, is called "mobilization." mobilization plans are an important element in war plans, but the details of any mobilization plan are of such a confidential nature that it would not be proper to discuss them in public print. there can be no impropriety, however, in making the general statement that in all navies the endeavor is made to keep the mobilization plans continually up to date, and to have them prepared in such detail that every officer and enlisted man in active service, the retired list, the naval reserve, and the naval militia, will become instantly available for a predetermined duty, and that every shore station and every necessary vessel will be ready to take part. the plans prescribe methods in very great detail whereby the ships and other vessels in reserve can be quickly put into commission with full crews of officers and men, all their various equipments, fuel, and ammunition put on board, and the vessels themselves sent out to sea to join the fleet. in addition, plans are made whereby certain auxiliaries can be fitted out at once and put into commission--such as supply ships, ammunition ships, transports, colliers, mine ships, hospital ships, etc. the mass of detailed plans, orders, and instructions is stupendous and bewildering. years of study, trial, and rectification are required to get them into such condition that the plans can be put into immediate and effective use when war breaks out. the work must be done, however, and with the utmost thoroughness, _before_ war breaks out; otherwise it will never be done, if an active enemy is about, because he will strike at once--and then it will be too late. in most of the great naval countries the work of mobilizing the fleet is comparatively easy, for the reason that the coast-line is short and is not far from any part of the interior, enabling reserves to live in fairly close touch with the coast and with naval affairs, and so near the coast that they can get quickly to any port. but the conditions in the united states are more difficult than those in any other country, because of the enormous stretch of our coast, the great average distance from any place in our country to the coast, the difficulty of getting a naval reserve that could be of practical use (owing to the ease with which young men can make a comfortable living on land), and the perilous slowness of the nation as a whole to realize the necessity for preparedness. as an offset to this, we have the , miles of ocean between us and europe, and the , miles between us and asia; and on account of this we may to a certain extent discount the danger of attack and the preparedness required to meet it. but our discount should be reasonable and reasoned out, and certainly not excessive. fortunately the problem of how much time we should allow for mobilizing and joining the fleet is easy, as a moment's thought will show us that it must be simply the two weeks needed for a fleet to come from europe to america; for we must realize that the report of the sailing of the hostile fleet would be the first news we should get of any hostile preparation or intent. the general situation in which every isolated naval nation stands regarding other nations is not complicated, but very plain. each nation has, as possible opponents in its policy, certain countries. the naval forces of those countries and the time in which they can be made ready are known with sufficient accuracy for practical purposes. if any isolated naval nation wishes to carry out a policy which any of those countries will forcibly oppose she must either build a navy equal to that of the other country, or else be prepared to abandon any attempt to force her policies. stating the question in another way, she can carry out only such policies as do not require for their enforcement a navy stronger than she has. it is true that diplomacy and the jealousies of foreign powers unite to make possible the averting of war during long periods of time. diplomacy averted war with germany for forty-three years, but it could not continue to avert war eternally. war finally broke out with a violence unparalleled in history, and possessing a magnitude proportional to the duration of the preceding peace. "long coming long last, short notice soon past" is a sailor's maxim about storms; and it seems not inapplicable to wars. certain it is that the frequent wars of savage tribes are far less terrible than the infrequent wars of enlightened powers. this indicates that, even though a nation may be able to avert war for a long time, war will come some day, in a form which the present war foreshadows; and it suggests the possibility that the longer the war is averted, the more tremendous it will be, the greater the relative unpreparedness of a slothful nation, and the sharper her punishment when war finally breaks upon her. chapter v naval defense there has never been a time since cain slew abel when men have not been compelled to devote a considerable part of their energies to self-defense. in the early ages, before large organizations existed or the mechanic arts had made much progress, defense was mostly defense of life itself. as time went on, and people amassed goods and chattels, and organized in groups and tribes, it came to include the defense of property--not only the property of individuals, but also of the tribe and the land it occupied. still later, defense carne to include good name or reputation, when it was realized that the reputation, even of an organization, could not be destroyed without doing it an injury. at the present day, owing to the complexity of nations and other organizations, and to the long time during which many of them have existed, the question of defense has become extremely difficult. the places in which defense has been brought to its highest excellence are the large cities of the civilized countries; for there we see that defense of the life, property, and reputation of every individual has been carefully provided for. this has been made possible by the intimate intermingling of the people, the absence of racial rivalries, and the fact that the interests of all are identical in the matter of defense of life, property, and reputation; since, no matter how bad any individual may be, he wishes that others shall be good, in order that he himself may be safe. the defense of reputation has two aspects: the practical and the sentimental. the practical aspect regards the defense of that element of reputation which affects ability to "make a living"; while the sentimental aspect is concerned with the purely personal reputation of the individual, or with the reputation of an organization or a nation. the sentimental aspect is much more important, especially in enlightened nations, than is realized by some who have not thought much about it; for there is, fortunately, in every decent man a craving for the esteem and even the affection of his fellow men; and a knowledge that, no matter how wealthy or powerful he may be, he cannot be happy if he knows that he is despised. the fact that individuals organize to acquire the strength of united effort brings about, among organizations, a spirit of competition like that among individuals. it is more intense, however, because no man alone can get up the enthusiasms that ten men acting together can get up, and ten men cannot get up as much as a thousand. the longer any organization is maintained, the sharper this spirit of rivalry grows to be, owing to the feeling of clanship that propinquity and material interests evoke. its acme is found in those organizations called nations, that have lived together, nourished from the same soil, for generations; where the same loves and jealousies and hates that they now feel were felt by their fathers and their grandfathers and great-grandfathers for centuries back. among a people possessing the potentialities of national solidarity and greatness this feeling waxes, into a self-sacrificing devotion to the nation and to the land that bore them. that there should be such a thing is sometimes deplored; because patriotism, like all human qualities, has its bad side and its unfortunate effects. if it were not for patriotism there would probably be no war, and the greatest suffering that the world endures would thus be obviated. but if it were not for patriotism there would be no competition among nations; and in any one nation there would be no national spirit, no endeavor on the part of every man to do his part toward making her strong, efficient, and of good repute or toward making the people individually prosperous and happy. in the same way, on a smaller scale, many people deplore the necessity of competition among organizations, saying that it is ruthless and selfish; that it stamps out the individual; that it makes every man a mere cog in a money-getting machine; that it brings about strife, hatred, jealousies, and sometimes murders; that, if it were not for competition, all men would live together in peace. this may be so; but if it were not for competition there would probably be little of that strenuous, endeavor without which no effective progress in advancing the welfare of men has ever yet been made. of course, it may be that what we call "progress" has really not advanced the welfare of men; that the savage in samoa is as happy as the millionaire in new york; that knowledge itself is not an unmixed benefit; and if we accept this view, we may logically declare that competition, progress, and patriotism are all disadvantages. but who will go so far? it seems to be a fact that we cannot get something for nothing: that every plus has its minus, every joy its pain; that if men succeed in passing beyond the savage state, and in overcoming the forces of nature, so that they can live in houses with every modern luxury and convenience, they must pay for it by a condition of competition that causes personal jealousies among individuals, commercial wars among organizations, physical wars among nations. yet the instinctive desire of every one is for peace and comfort, for the maximum of good with the minimum of exertion; and therefore the normal person dislikes to see interjected into human life the abominable confusion of war. from this it comes about that every nation, even if it consciously brings about a war, always endeavors to make it appear that the other party is the aggressor. for this reason in every country the army and navy are said to be for the "defense" of the country. no nation, no matter how aggressive its policy may secretly be, openly declares that it intends to provoke aggression. this does not mean that any nation ever deliberately raises an army and navy for aggression, and then consciously deceives the world in regard to its intention; for men are so constituted as to feel more or less unconsciously that their interests and desires are proper and those of their opponent wrong; and every nation is so firmly persuaded of the righteousness of its own policies as to feel that any country which exhibits antagonism toward these policies is trying to provoke a fight. now these policies, especially after a nation has adhered to them for long, seem vital in her eyes, and they usually are so. to great britain, whose major policy is that she must be mistress of the seas, it is vital that she should be. her people are surrounded by the ocean, and unless they are willing simply to eke out an agricultural existence, it is essential that she should be able to manufacture articles, send them out in ships to all parts of the world, and receive in return money and the products of other lands. in order that she may be able to do this, she must feel sure that no power on earth can restrain the peaceful sailing to and fro of her exporting and importing ships. this assurance can be had only through physical force; it can be exerted only by a navy. germany has been gradually coming into the same position, and the same clear comprehension, owing to the increase of her population, the growth of their desire for wealth, and their realization of the control by great britain and the united states of large areas of the surface of the earth. germany's determination to break down, at least in part, that overpowering command of the sea which great britain wields has been the result. the ensuing rapid growth and excellence of germany's navy and merchant marine brought germany and england into sharp competition. military and naval men have seen for years that these competing nations would have to go to war some day in "self-defense." in the minds of some people the idea of what constitutes "defense" is rather hazy, and "defense" is deemed almost synonymous with "resistance." perhaps the clearest idea of what constitutes "defense" is given in a sentence in webster's dictionary, that reads: "the inmates of a fortress are _defended_ by its guns, _protected_ by its walls, and _guarded_ against surprise by sentries." the distinction is important, and the partially aggressive character of defense it indicates is exemplified in all walks of human and brute life. any animal, no matter how peaceably inclined, will turn on his aggressor--unless, indeed, he runs away. no one ever saw any brute oppose a merely passive resistance to attack. every man recognizes in himself an instinct to hit back if he is hit. if it be an instinct, it must have been implanted in us for a reason; and the reason is not hard to find in the universal law of self-protection, which cannot be satisfied with the ineffectual method of mere parrying or resisting. naval defense, like military defense, therefore, is not passive defense only, but contains an element of "offense" as well. when the defense contains in large measure the element of offense, it is said in military parlance to be "offensive-defensive"; and the most effective defensive is this offensive-defensive. when a defending force throws off its defensive attitude entirely and advances boldly to attack, it is said to have "assumed the offensive"; but even this assumption, especially if it be temporary--as when a beleaguered garrison makes a sortie--does not rob the situation of its defensive character. for these reasons the dividing line between offense and defense is very vague; and it is made more vague through a realization by all military people that the offense has certain decided advantages over the defense (unless the defense has the advantage of position); so that when strained relations between two nations come, each is so fearful that the other will take the offensive first, when the two nations are near each other, that it is apt to take the offensive first--in real _self-defense!_ a striking illustration is the action of certain european powers in the latter part of july, . in addition to the sincere convictions of either party, there is also apt to be considerable yielding to the temptation to persuade the world that the other party is the aggressor, merely to get the sympathy that usually goes to the innocent victim--the support of what bismarck called "the imponderables." few wars have been frankly "offensive," like the conquests of alexander, cæsar, and pizarro, at least in modern times; each side has usually claimed (and often sincerely believed) that its action was demanded in self-defense and that its cause was just. to some in the united states naval defense means merely defense against invasion. this notion is of recent growth, and certainly was not held by the framers of our constitution. section of article i defines the powers of congress; and although eight of the eighteen paragraphs deal exclusively with measures of defense on sea and land, only one of those paragraphs (the fifteenth) deals with invasion. the, first paragraph reads: the congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, _to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the united states_; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the united states. the juxtaposition of the words "common defense" and "general welfare" in this admirably written paragraph could hardly have been accidental, or have been due to any other cause than a juxtaposition of those ideas in the minds of the constitution's framers. and what more natural connection can there be between any two ideas than between those of common defense and general welfare, since the general welfare of no country has ever continued long unless it was defended. now the general welfare of every maritime power has always been intimately concerned with its sea-borne commerce. it is only by means of sea-borne commerce, for instance, that americans can live in the way americans wish to live. "general welfare" means more than mere existence. a mere existence is the life a savage lives. furthermore, the general welfare of a country requires the safety of its exported and imported goods while on the sea, and includes the right of its citizens to travel with safety in every land, to buy and sell in foreign ports, to feel a proper measure of self-respect and national respect wherever they may go, and to command from the people of the lands they visit a proper recognition of their claims to justice. naval defense may, therefore, be said to consist of three parts: st--defense of the coast against bombardment and invasion. d--defense of the trade routes traversed by ships carrying the exports and imports of the country. d--defense of the national policy, including defense of the nation's reputation, honor, and prestige. of these, defense of the coast against bombardment and invasion is the easiest, and defense of the national policy the most difficult; because in preventing bombardment and invasion the defender has the strategical advantage of being nearer home than the adversary; while in the defense of a country's policy, a naval force may have to "assume the offensive," and go even to the far distant coasts of the enemy--as the russian fleet went to tsushima, where it met its death. in that part of naval defense which is concerned with trade routes, the strategical advantage must go, in general, to that side which is the nearer to the locality where the decisive battle may occur. in laying down a policy of naval defense, however, it is not necessary to consider these three parts separately, because no nation can ever tell whether in the distant future its naval defense will have to be used directly for any one of the three, or for all. in general terms, it may be stated that in nearly all naval wars the fleet has been used more for the defense of the nation's policy than for the actual defense of the coasts or the trade routes. this does not mean that there has never been a bombardment or invasion, or that the defense of trade routes may not have been the cause of the war itself; but it does mean that in actual wars bombardment or invasion has been rare, the capture of merchant vessels has played a minor part, and the deciding events have been battles between two fleets, that were often far from the land of either. owing to the fact that within modern times most of the important countries of the world have been those of continental europe, with frontiers contiguous, and in fact identical, the defense of a country has been largely committed to the army, and most of the wars have been on land. the country standing in exception to this has been great britain, whose isolated and insular situation demanded a defense that was strictly naval. the tremendous advance in recent times of the engineering arts, by which ships became larger and faster, and able to carry more powerful and accurate guns than ever before, has enhanced the value of naval power and enabled great britain to reach all over the surface of the earth, and become more powerful than any continental nation. thus she has made out of the very weakness of her position a paramount tower of strength. naval defense was taken up systematically in great britain in the eighth century by king offa, to whom is credited the maxim, "he who would be secure on land must be supreme at sea"; but it must have dropped to a low ebb by , for william of normandy landed in england unopposed. since that time great britain's naval defense, committed to her navy, has increased steadily in effectiveness and power, keeping pace with the increase in the national interests it defended, and utilizing all the growing resources of wealth and science which the world afforded. until the present crisis, great britain's naval defense did its most important work during napoleon's time, when great britain's standing, like the standing of every other european nation, was subjected to a strain that it could hardly bear. so keenly, however, did the nation and the nation's great leader, pitt, realize the situation that the most strenuous measures were adopted to keep the navy up, press-gangs even visiting the houses of subjects of the king, taking men out and putting them by force on board his majesty's ships. but the british navy, even more than the british army, brought great britain safe out of the napoleonic danger, and made the british the paramount nation of the world. since then great britain has waxed more and more powerful, her avowed policy being that her navy should be equal to any other two; realizing that her aloofness in point of national characteristics and policy from all other nations made it possible that a coalition of at least two great nations might be pitted against her at a time when she could not get an ally. accompanying the growth of the british navy has been the establishment of british foreign trade, british colonies, and british bases from which the navy could work, and the general making of a network of british commerce and british power over the surface of the earth. no other nation has ever dominated so large a part of the surface of the globe as has great britain during the last two centuries; and she has done it by means of her naval power. this naval power has been, in the language of great britain, for the "imperial defense"; not for coast defense alone, but for the defense of all the imperial interests, commercial and political, and even the imperial prestige. and this defense of prestige, it may here be remarked, is not a vainglorious defense, not an exhibition of a swaggering, swashbuckling spirit, but a recognition of the fact that the minds of men are so constituted that the prestige of an individual, an organization, or a nation has a practical value and is an actual force. no government that appreciates its responsibilities will willingly risk the prestige of the nation which it governs, because it knows that any weakening of it will be followed by a weakening of influence and a consequent increase of difficulty in attaining some "end in view." the greatness of the british navy, compared with that of the british army and the other elements of great britain's government, has taken on magnified dimensions during the last half century. so long as war-ships used sails as their principal motive power, so long were they forced to employ methods of construction and equipment that forbade the efficient employment of high-power guns, the attainment of great speed, and the use of instruments of precision; so long, in other words, was their military effectiveness prevented from increasing greatly. but when the british navy decided to abandon sail power altogether and propel their ships by steam, a new phase was entered upon, in which every resource of the engineering arts and the physical sciences was called into requisition; and now, on board a dreadnaught, battle cruiser, destroyer, or submarine, can be found the highest examples of mechanical and electrical art and science. every material resource which the brain and wealth of man can compass is enlisted in her naval defense; and in order to take advantage of the rapidity and certainty of movement they afford for operating fleets and ships, there has been a great advance in methods of operation, or, in military parlance, "staff work." to assist this work, the radio, the cable, and even the humble typewriter have contributed their essential share, with the result that to great britain's naval defense there has been devoted an extraordinary degree of efficiency, continuous effort, a more varied activity, and a larger expenditure of money than to any other object of man's activity. the united states navy, to which is committed the naval defense of the united states, has followed the same lines as the british; and its task, while in some ways easier, is in other ways more difficult. perhaps the chief reason why the naval defense of great britain is so difficult is the extreme closeness of her borders to the borders of her possible foes--for the english channel is only twenty-three miles across from dover to calais. and yet the very narrowness of the channel there lends a certain element of assistance to the defender of either coast against an enemy like germany, because it enables the defender, by simply protecting that narrow area, to prevent an enemy from passing to the sea or from it, except by going around the british isles. but while it is interesting thus to compare the tasks of two navies by comparing the lengths of coast line, populations, wealth, and areas of their countries, or their distances from possible antagonists, such comparisons are really misleading; for the reason that all nations are on a par in regard to the paramount element of national defense, which is defense of national policy. it was as important to belgium as it was to germany to maintain the national policy, and the army of belgium was approximately as strong as that of germany in proportion to her wealth, area, and population; but nevertheless the belgium army was routed, and belgium was conquered by the german army. much has been written to prove that the sole reason for the possession of the paramount navy by great britain is that the soil of great britain cannot support her people. in an essay, entitled "naval power," which i contributed to the _united states naval institute_ in , the fallacy of this was shown; and it was pointed out that even if great britain grew more than enough to feed her people, life could be made unendurable to the , , living there (or to the people in any civilized and isolated country) by an effective blockading fleet. _the question of how great a navy any country needs depends, not on the size, but on the policies of that country, and on the navies of the countries that may oppose those policies_. the navy that a country needs is a navy that can defend its policies, both offensively and defensively. if, for instance, the united states does not wish to enforce any policy that great britain would oppose, or to oppose any policy that great britain would enforce, then we may leave her navy out of consideration. but if we decide that we must maintain a certain policy which a certain country may oppose, then we must have a navy at least equal to hers; because we do not know whether we should have to meet that navy near our coast, or near hers, or far away from both. for the reason, furthermore, that a war with a european power might occur at a period of strained relations with some asiatic power, we must realize the temptation to that asiatic power to seize the opportunity and attack us on the pacific side, knowing that we should need all our navy on the atlantic side. this seems to mean that in order to have an effective naval defense (since we are precluded by our policy from having european allies and no south american country could give us any effective naval help) we must have on each ocean a fleet as strong as that of any nation on that ocean against whose wishes we may have to enforce a policy--or against whose policy we may have to oppose resistance. the essential requirement of any defense is that it shall be adequate; because an inadequate defense will be broken down, while the attack will retain a large proportion of its original strength. in the _united states naval institute_, in , the present writer showed, by means of a series of tables, how, when two forces fight, the force which is originally the more powerful will become gradually more powerful, relatively to the weaker, as the fight goes on. that, for instance, if two forces start with the relative powers of and , the weaker force will be reduced so much more rapidly than the stronger that when it has been reduced to zero the stronger force will have a value of . . the values mentioned indicated the actual fighting strength--strength made up of all the factors--material, physical, and psychic--that constituted it. of course, none of these factors can ever be accurately compared; but nevertheless the tables seemed to prove that in a contest between two forces whose total strengths are as and one force will be reduced to zero, while the other will be reduced not quite one-half. one of the lessons drawn was "the folly of ineffectual resistance." doubtless a clearer lesson would have been "the folly of ineffectual preparedness"; because, when the decision as to resistance or non-resistance is forced upon a nation, the matter is so urgent, the military, political, and international conditions so complex, and the excitement probably so intense, that a wise decision is very difficult to reach; whereas the question of what constitutes effectual preparedness is simple, and needs merely to be approached with calm nerves and an open mind. inasmuch as the psychic element in defense is the strongest single element, it is apparent that if the decision is reached to prepare an effectual defense the nation must be absolutely united, and must appreciate at its full value the debilitating influence of opposition to the measure; for, no matter how much money a nation may expend, no matter how many lives it may sacrifice, its defense cannot have an efficiency proportional to the effort if a considerable number of its citizens are permitted to oppose it. in our own country there has been so much talking and writing recently about defense, that there is danger of the question coming to be considered academic; though no question is more practical, no question is more urgent. _defense must defend_. chapter vi naval policy every country that has a satisfactory navy has acquired it as the result of a far-seeing naval policy, not of opportunism or of chance. the country has first studied the question thoroughly, then decided what it ought to do, then decided how to do it. naval policy has to deal with three elements: material, personnel, and operations, which, though separate, are mutually dependent. a clear comprehension of their actual relations and relative weights can be obtained only by thorough study; but without that comprehension no wise naval policy can be formulated, and therefore no satisfactory navy can be established. the most obvious thing about a navy is its material: the ponderous battleships, the picturesque destroyers, the submarines, the intricate engines of multifarious types, the radio, the signal-flags, the torpedo that costs $ , , the gun that can sink a ship miles away. the united states navy ever since its beginning in has excelled in its material; the ships have always been good, and in many cases they have surpassed those of similar kind in other navies. this has been due to the strong common sense of the american people, their engineering skill, and their inventive genius. the first war-ship to move under steam was the american ship _demologos_, sometimes called the _fulton the first_, constructed in ; the first electric torpedoes were american; the first submarine to do effective work in war was american; the first turret ship, the _monitor_, was american; the first warship to use a screw propeller was the _princeton_, an american; the naval telescope-sight was american. american ships now are not only well constructed, but all their equipments are of the best; and to-day the american battleship is the finest and most powerful vessel of her class in the world. our personnel, too, has always been good. the american seaman has always excelled, and so has the american gunner. no ships have ever been better handled than the american ships; no naval battles in history have been conducted with more skill and daring than those of american ships; no exploits in history surpass those of cushing, hobson, and decatur. in operations, however, in the handling of the navy as a whole, we have never excelled; though no better individual fleet leaders shine in the pages of all history than farragut and dewey. the strategical operating of our material and personnel has not been in accordance with carefully laid plans, but has been left largely to the inspiration of the commander on the spot, both in peace and in war. material has suffered from lack of a naval policy, but only quantitatively, because material is a subject that the people understand. personnel has suffered more, because the people fail to realize the amount of training needed to make a personnel competent to perform their tasks successfully, in competition with the highly trained men of other navies. but operations have suffered incomparably more than material and personnel; because naturally the people do not comprehend the supreme importance of being ready, when war breaks out, to operate the material and personnel skilfully against an active enemy, in accordance with well-prepared strategic plans; nor do they realize how difficult and long would be the task of preparing and testing out those plans. therefore, they fail to provide the necessary administrative machinery.[*] [footnote *: since this was written, the congress has so enlarged the scope of the office of chief of naval operations as to make it a general staff.] in fact, the kind and amount of machinery needed to conduct operations skilfully and quickly cannot be decided wisely until the country adopts some naval policy; and in naval policy the united states must be admitted to have lagged behind almost every other civilized country. spurred as we were to exertion by the coming of the revolutionary war, we constructed hastily, though with skill, the splendid ships that did service in that war. but after the war, interest in the navy waned; and if it had not been for the enormous tribute demanded by the pirates of the barbary coast from our government, and a realization of the fact that not only was it cheaper to build ships and fight the pirates than to pay the tribute, but paying the tribute was a disgraceful act, our navy would have run down even more than it did. yet even with this warning, found our navy in a desperate condition. rallying to the emergency, though too late to accomplish much practical result, we built a number of excellent ships, against the votes of many highly influential men in congress. these ships did gallant service, and redeemed the reputation of americans from the oft-repeated charge of being cowards and merely commercial men, though they were too few to prevent the blockade which british squadrons maintained on our atlantic coast. after the war, the navy was again allowed to deteriorate; and although our ships were excellent, and the officers and men were excellent, and although the war with mexico supplied some stimulation, the war of the rebellion caught us in a very bad predicament. the country rose to this emergency too slowly, as before; but the enemy were even less prepared than we, so that during the four years of the civil war we were able to construct, man, and buy several hundred ships of various kinds; with the result that, at the end of the war, our navy, if not quite so powerful as great britain's, was at least very close to it, and with a recent experience in actual war which the british navy did not possess. after that war, the same story was repeated. the people convinced themselves that they would never again be forced to go to war; that they had seen the folly of it, and the misery of it, and would devote themselves thereafter to the delightful pursuits of peace. gradually the fighting ships of the ironclad class were allowed to go to pieces; gradually even the larger ships of the wooden sailing class fell into disrepair; gradually the idea of war faded from the minds even of naval officers; gradually squadrons and fleets, as such, were broken up, and our ships were to be found scattered singly over all the seas, and swinging idly at their anchors in pleasant ports. fortunately, admiral luce and a very few other officers had learned the salient lessons of war during the rebellion, and sturdily stood up against the decadent tendency of the times. against much opposition, luce succeeded in founding the naval war college at newport, where the study of war as an art in itself was to be prosecuted, and in enlisting captain mahan in the work. in a few years mahan gave to the world that epochal book, "the influence of sea power upon history" (embodying his lectures before the war college), which stirred the nations of europe to such a realization of the significance of naval history, and such a comprehension of the efficacy of naval power, that they entered upon a determined competition for acquiring naval power, which continues to this day. meanwhile, a little before , the people became aroused to the fact that though the country was growing richer, their navy was becoming weaker, while the navies of certain european countries were becoming stronger. so they began in the construction of what was then called "the new navy." the construction of the new ships was undertaken upon the lines of the ships then building abroad, which were in startling contrast with the useless old-fashioned american ships which then were flying our flag. the construction of the material of the navy has progressed since then, but spasmodically. at every session of congress tremendous efforts have been made by people desiring an adequate navy, and tremendous resistance has been made by people who believed that we required no navy, or at least only a little navy. the country at large has taken a bystander's interest in the contest, not knowing much about the pros and cons, but feeling in an indolent fashion that we needed some navy, though not much. the result has been, not a reasonable policy, but a succession of unreasonable compromises between the aims of the extremists on both sides. great britain, on the other hand, has always regarded the navy question as one of the most difficult and important before the country, and has adopted, and for centuries has maintained, a definite naval policy. this does not mean that she has followed a rigid naval policy; for a naval policy, to be efficient, must be able to accommodate itself quickly to rapid changes in international situations, and to meet sudden dangers from even unexpected quarters--as the comparatively recent experience of great britain shows. at the beginning of this century the british navy was at the height of its splendor and self-confidence. britannia ruled the waves, and britannia's ships and squadrons enforced britannia's policies in every sea. the next most powerful navy was that of france; but it was not nearly so large, and seemed to be no more efficient, in proportion to its size. owing to britain's wise and continuing policy, and the excellence of the british sailor and his ships, the british navy proudly and almost tranquilly held virtual command of all the seas. but shortly after this century began, british officers discerned a new and disturbing element gradually developing on the horizon. the first thing which roused their attention to it was the unexpected attack of the japanese torpedo-boats on the russian squadron in port arthur. no war had been declared, and the russian squadron was riding peacefully at anchor. the suddenness of the attack, and the distinct though incomplete success which it achieved, startled the british into a realization of the fact that there had been introduced into warfare on the sea methods and tactics requiring _a higher order of preparation_ than had ever before been known; that the scientific methods which the germans employed so effectively on land in had been adapted by the japanese to naval warfare, and would necessitate the introduction into naval policies of _speedier methods_ than had hitherto been needed. another event which had happened shortly before showed that naval policies would have to be modified, if they were to utilize recent advances in scientific methods. this event was the unprecedented success at target practice of h. m. s. _terrible_, commanded by captain sir percy scott, which proved that by a long and strenuous training and the adoption of instruments of precision, it was possible to attain a skill in naval gunnery never attained before. up to this moment the british navy had almost despised gunnery. inheriting the traditions brought down from howe, rodney, and nelson, permeated with the ideals of the "blue-water school," proud of being british seamen, proud of the pure white of their ships, enamoured of the stimulating breeziness of the quarterdeck and bridge, imbued with almost a contempt for such mathematical sciences as were not directly used in practical navigation, british naval officers exalted seamanship as the acme of their art, and took little interest in gunnery. all the battles of the past had been won by dash and seamanship and dogged persistence. ships had always fought close alongside each other. no science had ever won any naval battle of the past, so why should they bother with science now--and why should they bother with target practice, except just enough to insure that the battery was in order, and that the men were not afraid of their guns? besides, target practice dirtied the ship--a sacrilege to the british naval officer. but the events of the war between japan and russia, especially the naval battles of port arthur, august , , and the sea of japan, may , , riveted their attention on the fact that something more than seamanship and navigation and clean ships would be needed, if the british navy was to maintain its proud supremacy on the sea; for in these battles, overwhelming victories were won purely by superior skill in gunnery, strategy, and tactics. to these causes of awakening was added one still greater, but of like import--the rapid rise of the german navy from a position of comparative unimportance to one which threatened the british navy itself. the fact became gradually evident to british officers that the german navy was proceeding along the same lines as had proceeded the german army. realizing the efficiency of the german government, noting the public declarations of the german emperor, observing the excellence of the german ships, the skill of the german naval officers, and the extraordinary energy which the german people were devoting to the improvement of the german navy--the british navy took alarm. so did the other navies. beginning about , great britain set to work with energy to reform her naval policy. roused to action by the sense of coming danger, she augmented the size and number of vessels of all types; increased the personnel of all classes, regular and reserve; scrapped all obsolete craft; built (secretly) the epochal _dreadnaught_, and modernized in all particulars the british navy. in every great movement one man always stands pre-eminent. the man in this case was admiral sir john fisher, first sea lord of the admiralty, afterward lord fisher. fisher brought about vital changes in the organization, methods, and even the spirit of the navy. he depleted the overgrown foreign squadrons, concentrated the british force in powerful fleets near home, established the war college, inculcated the study of strategy and tactics, appointed sir percy scott as inspector of target practice, put the whole weight of his influence on the side of gunnery and efficiency, placed officers in high command who had the military idea as distinguished from the idea of the "blue-water school," and imbued the entire service with the avowed idea that they must get ready to fight to the death, not the french navy, with its easy-going methods, but the german navy, allied perhaps with some other. at the admiralty he introduced methods analogous to those of the general staff, to maintain the navy ready for instant service at all times, to prepare and keep up to date mobilization plans in the utmost detail, and to arrange plans for the conduct of war in such wise that after a war should break out, all the various probable situations would have been studied out in advance. the work required at the admiralty, and still more in the fleet--night and day and in all weathers--taxed mental and physical endurance to the limit; but the result was complete success; for when war broke out on the st of august, , the british navy was absolutely ready. many complaints have appeared in print about the unreadiness of great britain; but no one who knows anything of the facts supposes that these criticisms include great britain's navy. the united states navy in the early part of this century occupied, relatively to others, a very ill-defined position; but the increased interest taken in it by our people after the spanish war, combined with the destruction of the flower of the russian fleet in the russo-japanese war, and the crushing blow inflicted on the french navy by the maladministration of camille pelletan, resulted in placing our navy, about three years ago, in a position second only to great britain's--a position which it recently has lost. owing to a common origin and language, our navy has always followed the british navy, though at a somewhat respectful distance; and while it is true that in point of mechanical inventions we are ahead, in seamanship, navigation, and engineering on a par, and in gunnery and tactics not far behind, yet we must admit that in policy and in policy's first cousin, strategy, we are very far in the rear. there are many reasons why this should be, the first being that the british navy has nearly always lived under more stimulating conditions than we, because the probability of war has seemed greater, and because the united states has underestimated what reasonable probability there has been, and failed to realize how tremendously difficult would be the task of getting ready for it. owing to the present war, our people have gradually come to see that they must get more ships and other material; but they realize this as only a measure of urgency, and not as a matter of policy. if the emergency passes us by in safety, the people may see in this fact only a confirmation of their notion that war can be postponed _ad infinitum_, and may therefore fail to take due precautions for the future. if so, when we at last become involved in a sudden war, we shall be as unprepared as now; and, relatively to some aggressive nation which, foreseeing this, may purposely prepare itself, we shall be more unprepared. a curious phase of the navy question in our country is the fact that very few people, even the most extreme partisans for or against a large navy, have ever studied it as a problem and endeavored to arrive at a correct solution. few have realized that it is a problem, in the strictest sense of the word; and that unless one approaches it as such his conclusions cannot be correct except by accident. in germany, on the other hand, and equally in japan, the question has been taken up as a concrete problem, just as definite as a problem in engineering. they have used for solving it the method called "the estimate of the situation," originated by the german general staff, which is now adopted in all the armies and navies of civilized countries for the solution of military problems. previous to the adoption of this method the general procedure had been such as is now common in civil life, when a number of people forming a group desire to make a decision as to what they will do in any given contingency. the usual procedure is for some one to suggest that a certain thing be done, then for somebody else to suggest that something else be done, and so on; and then finally for the group to make a decision which is virtually a compromise. this procedure is faulty, and the decisions resulting are apt to be unwise; because it is quite possible that some very important factors may be overlooked, and equally possible that some other factors be given undue weight. furthermore, a measure advocated by a man who has the persuasive and emotional abilities of the orator is more apt to be favorably considered than a measure advocated by a man not possessing those abilities. in the "estimate of the situation" method, on the other hand, the orator has no opportunity, because the procedure is simply an accurate process of reasoning. it is divided into four parts. the first part consists of a careful study of the "mission," ending in a clear determination of what the "mission" really is--that is, _what is the thing which it is desired to do?_ the second part consists of a careful study, and eventually a clear comprehension, of the difficulties in the way; the third part consists of a careful study, and eventually a clear comprehension, of what facilities are available with which to overcome the difficulties; the fourth part consists of a careful study of the mission, difficulties and facilities, in their mutual relations, and a "decision" as to what should therefore be done. military and naval people are so thoroughly convinced of the value of this method that they always employ it when making important decisions, writing down the various factors and the successive steps in regular order and in complete detail. in this country, while naval and military people use this method in their comparatively minor problems, the country at large does not use it in deciding the major problem--that is, in deciding how much navy they want, and of what composition. they do not take even the first step toward formulating a naval policy, because they do not study the "mission" of the navy--that is, _they do not study the international and national situations and their bearing on the need for a navy_. yet until they do this they will not be in a sufficiently informed condition of mind to determine what the "mission" is--that is, what they wish the navy to be able to do--because, before they can formulate the mission they must resolve what foreign navy or navies that mission must include. if they decide that the mission of the navy is to guard our coast and trade routes against the hostile efforts of liberia the resulting naval policy will be simple and inexpensive; while if they conclude that the mission of our navy is to guard our coast and trade routes against the hostile acts of _any_ navy the resulting naval policy will be so difficult and costly as to tax the brain and wealth of the country to a degree that will depend on _the length of time that will elapse before the date at which the navy must be ready to fulfil that mission_. this factor reminds us of another factor: _the minimum time in which the navy can get ready to fulfil a given mission_ (for instance, to protect us against any navy); and we cannot decide the mission correctly without taking this factor into account. for example, it would be foolish to decide that the mission of our navy is to protect us _now_ against any navy, including the greatest, when it would take us at least twenty years to develop and train a navy to accomplish that task; and it would be equally foolish to decide that the mission is to protect us against any navy _except_ the greatest, because such a decision could rest on no other ground than present improbability of conflict with the greatest navy, or improbability for the very few years ahead (say two or three) which we poor mortals can forecast. this reasoning seems to indicate that the first step in formulating a naval policy for the united states is to realize that any conclusion as to which navies should be included in the mission of our navy must not exclude any navy about whose peaceful conduct toward us we can entertain a reasonable doubt, _during the period of time which we would require to get ready to meet her_. for instance, inasmuch as it would take us at least twenty years to get ready to protect ourselves against the hostile efforts of the british navy, we cannot exclude even that navy from a consideration of the mission of our own, unless we entertain no doubt of the peaceful attitude of that navy toward us for at least that twenty years. clearly, the problem is not only very important but very difficult--perhaps the most difficult single problem before the country; and for this reason, naval officers have long marvelled that the leading minds of the country do not undertake it. perhaps one reason is that they do not know how difficult it is: that they do not realize the extraordinary complexity of modern ships and engines, and the trained skill required to handle them; that they do not realize what great britain now realizes, that we must prepare for one of the most stupendous struggles ever carried on; that we must have a personnel both of officers and enlisted men trained to the highest point, because they will have to meet officers and enlisted men trained to the highest point; that the training must be such that the skill produced can be exercised by night and day, in cold and heat, in storm and calm, under circumstances of the utmost possible difficulty and danger; that, while it takes four years to build a ship and get her into the fleet as an effective unit, it takes much longer to train an enlisted petty officer as he should be trained, and a lifetime to train officers of the upper grades. perhaps also our leading minds do not realize the intellectual requirements of the higher realms of the naval art, or comprehend what the examples of alexander, cæsar, napoleon, nelson, and farragut prove: that, _in the real crises of a nation's life her most valuable asset is the trained skill in strategy that directs the movements of her forces_. further than this, they may not realize that the greater the danger which they must avert, the earlier they must begin to prepare for it, because the more work in preparation will have to be performed; and yet realization of this truth is absolutely vital, as is also realization of the fact that we have no military power as our ally, and therefore must be ready to meet alone a hostile attack (though perhaps in the far-distant future) from _any_ foreign power. to see that this is true it is merely necessary to note the facts of history, and observe how nations that have long been on terms of friendship have suddenly found themselves at war with each other; and how countries which have always been hostile have found themselves fighting side by side. in the present war, great britain is allied with the two countries toward which, more than toward any other, she has been hostile; and she is fighting the country to which, more than any other, she is bound by ties of consanguinity and common interests. the history of war is so filled with alternations of peace and war between every pair of contiguous countries as to suggest the thought that the mere fact of two countries having interests that are common is a reason why their respective shares in those interests may conflict; that countries which have no common interests have nothing to fight about; that it is only for things in which two nations are interested, and which both desire, that those two nations fight. if our estimate of the situation should lead us to the decision that we must prepare our navy in such a way that, say twenty years hence, it will be able to protect the country against any enemy, we shall then instinctively adopt a policy. the fact of having ahead of us a definite, difficult thing to do, will at once take us out of the region of guesswork, and force us into logical methods. we shall realize the problem in its entirety; we shall see the relation of one part to another, and of all the parts to the whole; we shall realize that the deepest study of the wisest men must be devoted to it, as it is in all maritime countries except our own. the very difficulties of the problem, the very scope and greatness of it, the fact that national failure or national success will hinge on the way we solve it, will call into action the profoundest minds in all the nation. we shall realize that, more than any other problem before the country, this problem is urgent; because in no other problem have we so much lost time to make up for, and in no other work of the government are we so far behind the great nations that we may have to contend against. great britain was startled into a correct estimate of the situation ten years ago, and at once directed perhaps the best of her ability to meet it. certain it is that no other department of the british government is in such good condition as the navy; in no other department has the problem been so thoroughly understood, and so conscientiously worked out, or the success been so triumphant. the underlying reason for this is not so much the individual courage and ability of the officers and men, or even their skill in handling their ships and squadrons, as the fact that great britain has followed a definite naval policy; so that the british nation has had a perfectly clear realization of what it wishes the navy to do, and the navy has had a perfectly clear realization of how to do it. the united states has not yet made a correct estimate of the naval situation; she has not yet reached the point that great britain reached ten years ago. great britain apprehended the danger, and took action before it was too late. shall the united states take action now or wait until it is too late? part ii naval strategy chapter vii general principles strategy is difficult of definition; but though many definitions have been made, and though they do not agree together very well, yet all agree that strategy is concerned with the preparation of military forces for war and for operating them in war--while tactics is the immediate instrument for handling them in battle. strategy thinks out a situation beforehand, and decides what preparations as to material, personnel, and operations should be made. many books have been written on strategy, meaning strategy as applied to armies, but very few books have been written on naval strategy. the obvious reasons are that armies in the past have been much larger and more important than navies; that naval men have only recently had the appliances on board ship for writing on an extensive scale; and that the nature of their occupation has been such that continuous application of the kind needed for thinking out principles and expounding them in books, has only recently been possible. most of the few existing books on naval strategy deal with it historically, by describing and explaining the naval campaigns of the past and such land campaigns as illustrate principles that apply to sea and land alike. perhaps the best books are those of darrieus and mahan. until about fifty years ago, it was only by experience in actual war, supplemented by laborious study of the campaigns of the great commanders, and the reading of books on strategy which pointed out and expounded the principles involved in them, that one could arrive at any clear idea of strategy. but wars have fortunately been so infrequent, the information about them has often been so conflicting, and so many results have been due to chance, that, in default of experience, the mere reading of books did not lead to very satisfactory results, except in the case of geniuses; and therefore war problems and war games were devised, in which the various factors of material and personnel were represented, and made as true to life as possible. the _tactical_ games resulting, which naval strategists now play, employ models of the various craft used in war, such as battleships, submarines, etc., and are governed by rules that regulate the movements of those craft on a sort of big chess-board, several feet square, that represents an area of water several miles square. the _strategic_ games and problems are based on principles similar to those on which the tactical games are based, in the sense that actual operations are carried on in miniature; but naturally, the strategical operations cover several hundred miles, and sometimes thousands. the aim of both the tactical and the strategic games is to determine as closely as possible the laws that decide victory or defeat; and therefore, for any country, the material, personnel and operations it should employ. naturally the results obtained are not quite so convincing as those of actual war or battle; but they are more convincing than can be attained in any other way, as yet devised, especially as many of the operations of the game-board that turn out well in games are tried out afterward by the fleet in peace maneuvers. war games and problems may be compared to the drawings that an architect makes of a house which some one wants to build; the plans and drawings are not so realistic as a real house, but they are better than anything else; and, like the war games, they can be altered and realtered until the best result seems to have been attained, considering the amount of money allowed and other practical conditions. the idea of devising war games and war problems seems to have originated with von moltke; certainly it was first put in practice by his direction. shortly after he became chief of the general staff of the prussian army in , he set to work to carry out the ideas which he had had in mind for several years, while occupying minor posts, but which he had not had the power to enforce. it seems to have become clear to his mind that, if a chess-player acquired skill, not only by playing actual games and by studying actual games played by masters, but also by working out hypothetical chess problems, it ought to be possible to devise a system whereby army officers could supplement their necessarily meagre experience of actual war, and their necessarily limited opportunities for studying with full knowledge the actual campaigns of great strategists, by working out hypothetical, tactical, and strategic problems. von moltke succeeded in devising such a system and in putting it into successful operation. hypothetical problems were prepared, in which enemy forces were confronted with each other under given circumstances of weather, terrain, and distances, each force with its objective known only to itself: for instance, you are in command of such and such a force at such and such a place; you have received orders to accomplish such and such a purpose; you receive information that the enemy, comprising such and such troops, was at a certain time at a certain place, and marching in a certain direction. what do you do? classes of army officers were formed, and compelled to work out the problems exactly as boys at school were compelled to work out problems in arithmetic. the skill of individual officers in solving the problems was noted and recorded; and the problems themselves, as time went on and experience was gained, were made more and more to conform to probable situations in future wars with austria, france, and other countries, actual maps being used, and the exact nature and magnitude of every factor in each problem being precisely stated. by such work, the pupils (officers) acquired the same kind of skill in solving strategic and tactical problems that a boy acquires in solving problems in arithmetic--a skill in handling the instruments employed. now the skill acquired in solving any kind of problem, like the skill developed in any art, such as baseball, fencing, or piano-playing, does not give a man skill merely in doing a thing identically like a thing he has done before: such a skill would be useless, for the reason that identical conditions almost never recur, and identical problems are never presented. similar conditions often recur, however, and similar problems are often presented; and familiarity with any class of conditions or problems imparts skill in meeting any condition or any problem that comes within that class. if, for instance, a man memorizes the sums made by adding together any two of the digits, he is equipped to master any problem of addition; and if he will practise at adding numbers together, he will gradually acquire a certain ability of mind whereby he can add together a long row of figures placed in a sequence he never saw before, and having a sum he never attained before. or a pianist, having acquired the mastery of the technic of the keyboard and the ability to read music, can sit down before a piano he never sat at before and play off instantly a piece of music he never saw before. doubtless moltke had ideas of this kind in mind when his plans for educating strategists and tacticians by problems on paper and by games were ridiculed by the unimaginative, and resisted by the indolent; and certainly no man was ever proved right more gloriously than moltke. in the war with austria in , the prussian army defeated the austrian at sadowa or königgrätz in nineteen days after the declaration of war. in the war with france in , the prussian army routed the french and received the surrender of napoleon iii in seven weeks and two days, not because of superior courage or experience in war, but by more scientific strategy. as henderson says: "even the french generals of divisions and brigades had had more actual experience (in war) than those who led the german army corps. compared with the german rank and file, a great part of their non-commissioned officers and men were veterans, and veterans who had seen much service. their chief officers were practically familiar with the methods of moving, supplying, and maneuvering large masses of troops; their marshals were valiant and successful soldiers. and yet the history of modern warfare records no defeats so swift and complete as those of königgrätz and sedan. the great host of austria was shattered in seven weeks; the french imperial army was destroyed in seven weeks and three days; and to all intents and purposes the resistance they had offered was not much more effective than that of a respectable militia. but both the austrian and the french armies were organized and trained under the old system. courage, experience, and professional pride they possessed in abundance. man for man, in all virile qualities, neither officers nor men were inferior to their foes. but one thing their generals lacked, and that was education for war. strategy was almost a sealed book to them." also, "moltke committed no mistake. long before war had been declared every possible precaution had been made. and these included much more than arrangements for rapid mobilization, the assembly of superior numbers completely organized, and the establishment of magazines. the enemy's numbers, armaments, readiness, and efficiency had been submitted to a most searching examination. every possible movement that might be made, however unlikely, had been foreseen; every possible danger that might arise, however remote, discussed and guarded against"; also, "that the prussian system should be imitated, and her army deprived of its monopoly of high efficiency, was naturally inevitable. every european state has to-day its college, its intelligence department, its schools of instruction, and its course of field maneuvers and field firing." strategy may be divided into two parts, war strategy and preparation strategy; and of these two, preparation strategy is by far the more important. war strategy deals with the laying out of plans of campaign after war has begun, and the handling of forces until they come into contact with the enemy, when tactics takes those forces in its charge. it deals with actual situations, arranges for the provisioning, fuelling, and moving of actual forces, contests the field against an actual enemy, the size and power of which are fairly well known--and the intentions of which are sometimes known and sometimes not. the work of the strategist in war is arduous, pressing, definite, and exciting; and results are apt to follow decisions quickly. he plays the greatest and oldest game the world has ever known, with the most elaborate instruments, and for the largest stakes. in most wars, the antagonists have been so nearly equal in point of personnel and material that the result has seemed to be decided by the relative degrees of skill of the strategists on both sides. this has been the verdict of history; and victorious commanders in all times and in all lands have achieved rarer glories, and been crowned with higher honors, than any other men. preparation strategy deals with the laying out of plans for supposititious wars and the handling of supposititious forces against supposititious enemies; and arranges for the construction, equipment, mobilization, provisioning, fuelling, and moving of supposititious fleets and armies. war strategy is vivid, stimulating and resultful; preparation strategy is dull, plodding, and--for the strategist himself--apparently resultless. yet war strategy is merely the child of preparation strategy. the weapons that war strategy uses, preparation strategy put into its hands. the fundamental plans, the strength and composition of the forces, the training of officers and men, the collection of the necessary material of all kinds, the arrangements for supplies and munitions of all sorts--the very principles on which war strategy conducts its operations--are the fruit of the tedious work of preparation strategy. alexander reaps the benefit of the preliminary labors of his father, philip; william is made german emperor by the toil of moltke. the work of laying out a supposititious campaign, involving supposititious operations against a supposititious enemy, requires of the strategist a thorough estimate of the situation, including a careful estimate of the forces of the enemy, in material and personnel, and of the strategy that will probably govern his operations--whether he will act on the defensive, or assume the offensive; if he is to act on the defensive, how and where will he base his forces, how far will he operate away from his own shores? and if he is to act on the offensive, what direction will his operations take; will he secure an advance base; and if so, where? and as the character of the enemy's operations will depend on the personnel of the enemy general staff and of the high commanders afloat, who comprise the personnel, and what are their characteristics? to decide these questions correctly requires considerable acquaintance with the enemy country, its navy and its policy, a full knowledge of the strategy, personnel, and material of that navy, and a sound conception of strategy itself. but to decide the questions correctly is essential, because the decision will form the basis of the future plans. naturally, as the plan is entirely supposititious and is to take effect at some indefinite time in the future, all the factors that will be in existence at that time cannot be foretold exactly, and therefore must be estimated. this will necessitate several alternate hypotheses; and a war plan including mobilization and operations must be made out, based on each hypothesis. for instance, on the hypothesis that the enemy will take the offensive, one set of plans will have to be prepared on the basis that we shall also take the offensive, and another on the basis that circumstances may be such at that time as to make it wise for us to resort to the defensive; while on the hypothesis that the enemy is to remain on the defensive, a set of plans very different from the other two as to both mobilization and operations must be devised. each set of the plans just suggested may also have to be divided into two or more parts. on the basis that the enemy will remain on the defensive, for instance, the circumstances when the hour for action comes, such as the fact of his being quite unprepared, may indicate the advisability of an attack on him as sudden as it can be made; while, on the other hand, circumstances such as the fact of his being thoroughly prepared may render it necessary for us to send a larger force than we could get ready quickly, especially if the enemy coast be far away, and may therefore indicate the advisability of deliberate movements, and even a protracted delay before starting. but no matter what plan is to be followed, a detailed plan for every probable contingency must be prepared; and it must be elaborated in such detail that it can be put into operation instantly when the fateful instant comes; because the enemy will put his plans into operation at the same time we do, and the one whose plans are executed first will take a long step toward victory. not only must the plans provide some means whereby the plans themselves shall get into full operation instantly when war breaks; other plans must also provide that all the acts which those plans contemplate must be performed. not only must the plans provide that all the prearranged orders for putting the _kearsarge_ into full commission shall be instantly sent by mail, telegraph, and telephone to the proper officials, but other plans must also provide means whereby the officers and men shall actually march on board the _kearsarge_, her ensign and commission pennant be displayed, all the fuel, ammunition, provisions, and equipment be on board and the _kearsarge_ sail at once, and join the commander-in-chief at sea. doubtless the most complicated and comprehensive plans are those for sending a large expedition on an offensive mission to a far-distant coast, especially if that coast be guarded by an efficient navy, if it have outlying islands that would afford good bases for her destroyers and submarines, and if there are not good harbors which our fleet could seize as advance bases, from which to prosecute its future operations. the complexity of the task of planning such an expedition, taking due account, but not exaggerated account, of all the factors, favorable and adverse, is appalling; but the task must be undertaken and accomplished. the most tedious part is the logistics--the arrangements for supplying the fleet on the way and in the distant theatre of operations with the necessary provisions, equipment, and ammunition and, above all, the fuel. the average superdreadnaught consumes about tons of coal per day at full speed, and about tons at knots; and coal or other fuel for all the dreadnaughts, battle cruisers, cruisers of various classes, scouts, destroyers, submarines, ships, aircraft of different kinds, hospital ships, ammunition ships, transports, and the fuel ships themselves, must be provided by means that _must not fail_. while the work of planning an offensive movement to a distant coast is the most tedious and complex, the work of planning a defensive measure against a sudden attack on the coast needs the most concentration of effort; for whatever the plans require to be done must be done at once. this necessitates that the orders to be issued must be as few as possible; that they be as concise and clear as possible; that the things to be done be as few and as simple as possible, and that all possible foresight be exercised to prevent any confusion or misunderstanding, or any necessity on the part of any one for requesting more instructions. when the fateful instant comes, the final command to mobilize puts into execution whichever of the plans already made is to be followed; and for this reason it is clear that the various plans must be kept separate from each other, and each set of plans must include all the various orders that must be signed for carrying it into effect, including the particular word or phrase that directs the execution of that particular set of plans. it is the story that the final order to the british navy in the early part of august, , was the word "go." all the units went immediately, understandingly, unitedly; and the greatest machine the world has ever known was almost instantly in operation at full speed. no such stupendous feat, physically considered, had ever been done before. the mobilization of the prussian army in and of the german army about august , , were as great performances mentally and strategically, but not physically, by reason of the relative feebleness of the forces set in motion. this relative feebleness was due, of course, to the insignificance of muskets compared to navy guns, of railway-trains compared to battleships, etc.--an insignificance far from being neutralized by the greater number of the units, for one -inch shell has an energy equal to that of about , muskets, and no army contains anything approximating the powerfulness of a battleship. not only, however, must the strategist make plans in peace for preparations that culminate in mobilization, and simply insure that the navy shall be ready in material and personnel when war breaks; he must also make plans for operating the navy strategically afterward, along each of the various lines of direction that the war may take. in other words, the work of preparation strategy in making war plans may be divided into two parts--mobilization and operation. the plans of mobilization deal naturally with all the activities concerned, material and personnel, and endeavor to arrange a passing from a state of peace to a state of war in the quickest possible time, and with the least chance of errors and omissions. a considerable degree of imagination is required, an almost infinite patience, and a perfect willingness to work indefinitely without any reasonable expectation of getting tangible results. a more hopeless task can hardly be given any man or body of men than that of working out plans, general and detailed, day after day, for contingencies that will probably never happen, and to guard against dangers that will probably never come; preparing tables, diagrams, and schedules which are almost certainly doomed to rest forever in the sepulchre of the confidential files. yet this work is basic. perhaps it is for that reason, that it is obscure and dull; basic work is apt to be so. the spectacular success of an individual in any walk of life is often but the crowning of the unrecognized, and often utterly unknown work--of other men. strategy is not a science only; it is an art as well; and although the art cannot be practised in its perfection until after the science is well comprehended, yet the art of strategy was born before the science was. this is true of all those departments of man's activity that are divided into sciences and arts, such as music, surgery, government, navigation, gunnery, painting, sculpture, and the rest; because the fundamental facts--say of music--cannot even attract attention until some music has been produced by the art of some musician, crude though that art may be; and the art cannot advance very far until scientific methods have been applied, and the principles that govern the production of good music have been found. the unskilled navigators of the distant past pushed their frail craft only short distances from the land, guided by art and not by science; for no science of navigation then existed. but the knowledge gradually gained, passing first from adept to pupil by word of mouth, and afterward recorded on the written and then the printed page, resulted first in the realization of the fact that various apparently unrelated phenomena were based on the same underlying principles; and resulted later in the perception, and still later in the definite expression, of those underlying principles. using these principles, the navigator expanded the limits of his art. soon we see columbus, superbly bold, crossing the unknown ocean; and magellan piercing the southern tip of the american continent by the straits that now bear his name. but of all the arts and sciences, the art and science that are the oldest and the most important; that have caused the greatest expenditure of labor, blood, and money; that have been the immediate instruments of more changes and greater changes in the history of the world than any other, are the art and the science of strategy. until the time of moltke the art of strategy, like most arts, was more in evidence than the science. in fact, science of any kind is a comparatively recent product, owing largely to the more exact operations of the mind brought about by the birth of the science of measurement, and the ensuing birth and development of the mechanic arts. before moltke's time campaigns were won by wise preparation and skilful execution, as they are now; but the strategical skill was acquired by a general or admiral almost wholly by his own exertions in war, and by studying the campaigns of the great commanders, and reflecting upon them with an intensity that so embedded their lessons in his subjective mind that they became a part of him, and actions in conformity with those lessons became afterward almost automatic. alexander and napoleon are perhaps the best illustrations of this passionate grasping of military principles; for though both had been educated from childhood in military matters, the science of strategy was almost non-existent in concrete form, and both men were far too young to have been able to devote much time or labor to it. but each was a genius of the highest type, and reached decisions at once immediate and wise, not by inspiration, but by mental efforts of a pertinacity and concentratedness impossible to ordinary men. it was because von moltke realized this, realized the folly of depending on ability to get geniuses on demand, and realized further the value of ascertaining the principles of strategy, and then expressing them so clearly that ordinary men could grasp and use them, that he conceived and carried into execution his plan; whereby not only actual battles could be analyzed, and the causes of victory and defeat in each battle laid bare to students, but also hypothetical wars and battles could be fought by means of problems given. the first result of a course of study of such wars and battles, and practice with such problems, was a skill in decision a little like that developed in any competitive game, say tennis, whist, chess, poker, boxing, and the like--whereby any action of your adversary brings an instantaneous and almost automatic reply from you, that you could not have made so skilfully and quickly before you had practised at the game; and yet the exact move of your adversary, under the same conditions, you had never seen before. of course, this skill was a development, not of the science, but of the art, as mere skill always is; but as skill developed, the best methods for obtaining skill were noted; and the principles governing the attainment of success gradually unveiled themselves, and were formulated into a science. naturally, strategy is not an exact science like mathematics, physics, or engineering--at least not now. whether it ever will be cannot be foretold. the reason that strategy (like medicine and most other sciences concerning human beings) is not an exact science is simply because it involves too many unknown quantities--quantities of which our knowledge is too vague to permit of our applying exact methods to them, in the way in which we apply exact methods to the comparatively well-known quantities and elements in the so-called "exact sciences." but a science may be a science even if it is not an exact science; we may know certain important principles sufficiently well to use them scientifically, even if we do not know them with sufficient exactness to permit us to use them as confidently as we should like. we may know, for instance, that it is folly to divide a military force in the presence of an active enemy into such small forces, and at such distances apart, as to let the enemy defeat each small force, one after the other, even if we do not know exactly how far it would be safe to separate two forces of a given size, in the presence of an enemy of a given power. it is well to know a fact in general terms, even if we do not know it in precise terms: it is well to know in general terms that we must not take prussic acid, even if we do not know exactly how much is needed to kill. so the studies and problems instituted by von moltke, and copied in all the armies and navies of the world, have brought about a science of strategy which is real, even though not exact, and which dwells in the mind of each trained strategist, as the high tribunal to which all his questions are referred and by whose decisions he is guided; just as the principles of medicine are the guide alike of the humblest and the most illustrious practitioner, wherever the beneficent art of medicine is practised. it is clear that, in order to be skilful in strategy (in fact, in any intellectual art), not only must a man have its scientific principles firmly imprinted on his mind, but he must make its practice so thoroughly familiar to his mental muscles that he can use strategy as a _trained_ soldier uses his musket--automatically. inasmuch as any man requires years of study and practice--say, of chess--in order to play chess well enough to compete successfully with professional chess-players, it seems to follow that any man must require years of study and practice of the more complicated game of strategy, in order to play strategy well enough to compete successfully with professional strategists. the game of chess looks easy to a beginner; in fact, the kind of game that he thinks chess to be is easy. but after he has learned the moves, he finds the intricacies of the game developing more rapidly than he can master them, and discovers that chess is a game which some men spend their lifetime studying. the full realization of this fact, however, does not come to him until after defeats by better players have forced into his consciousness the almost infinite number of combinations possible, the difficulty of deciding on the correct move at any juncture, and the consequences that follow after wrong moves. so with strategy. the ease and certainty with which orders can be transmitted and received, the precision with which large forces can be quickly despatched from place to place, and the tremendous power exertable by those forces, tend to blind the mind to the fact that transferring any force to any place is merely making a "move," and that the other player can make moves, too. if a man were never to be pitted in strategy against another player, either in games or in actual war, the "infinite variety" of strategy would never be disclosed to his intelligence; and after learning how to make the moves, he might feel willing to tackle any one. illustrations of this tendency by people of great self-confidence are numerous in history, and have not been missing even in the present war, though none have been reported in this country as occurring on the teuton side. there has always been a tendency on the part of a ruling class to seize opportunities for military glory, and the ambition has often been disproportioned to the accompanying ability and knowledge--sometimes on the part of a king, prince, or man of high nobility, sometimes on the part of a minister, sometimes on the part of an army or navy man, who has been indebted to political or social influence for his place. but within the past fifty years, especially since the establishment of the general staff in prussia and the studies of von moltke, the overshadowing importance of strategy has been understood, the necessity of comprehending its principles and practising its technic has been appreciated, and attempts to practise strategy by persons inexpert in strategy have been deprecated. the game of strategy, while resembling in many ways the game of chess, differs from it, of course, in the obvious element of personal danger. it also differs from it in an equally important but less obvious way--its relation to the instruments employed; for in chess those instruments (pieces) are of a number and character fixed by the rules of the game; whereas in strategy the number and character of the instruments (ships, etc.) employed are determined by strategy itself, assisted by engineering. germany realizes this, and therefore has established and followed a system whereby the character of the various material and personnel units of the navy, and even the number of them (under the restrictions of the money alloted), are decided by a body of men who are highly trained in strategy and engineering. there is an intimate connection between policy and strategy, and therefore between naval policy and naval strategy; and while it is difficult to draw the line exactly which separates policy and strategy, it may be said in general that policy is the concern of the government, and strategy is the concern of the navy and army, to be employed by them to carry out the policy. as naval policy and naval strategy are so intimately connected in their essence, it is apparent that the naval policy of a country and its naval strategy should be intimately connected in fact; for the policy cannot be properly carried out if the strategy that tries to execute it is not good, or if the policy requires more naval force or skill than the navy can bring to bear; and the strategy cannot be good if it is called upon to execute a policy impossible to execute, or if the exact end in view of the policy is not distinctly known. some of the greatest mistakes that have been made by governments have been made because of a lack of co-ordination between the government and its navy, so that the policy and the strategy could not work together. we see an illustration of this throughout the history of france, whose civil and naval authorities have not worked harmoniously together, whose naval strategy has apparently been opportunistic and short-sighted, and whose navy in consequence has not been so successful as the large sums of money spent upon it might lead one to expect. across the english channel we see a totally different state of things. in great britain the development of the navy has been going on for more than twelve hundred years, ever since king offa declared that "he who would be secure at home must be supreme at sea." for about eight hundred years thereafter the development was carried on energetically, but in an opportunistic fashion, following the requirements of the hour. in , however, the board of admiralty was established; and with occasional interruptions, especially prior to , the board has continued in existence ever since. a coherent policy of development has thereby been assured, and a wisdom of strategy established which more than any other single factor has made great britain the mistress of the seas, and almost the mistress of the world. the wisdom of her strategy has been due largely to the fact of the close touch maintained between the civil government, including parliament, and the navy; for by its very constitution the board of admiralty includes some of the highest officers of parliament, the cabinet, and the navy. its presiding officer is a member of the cabinet, and also member of parliament; four of the officers are naval officers, high in rank, character, and attainments; and the junior civil lord is a civilian versed in naval matters. all the orders for great movements of the fleets and ships are directed by this board and signed by its secretary, the board, by a fiction of the law, being considered an individual replacing the lord high admiral--which it did, in . the board is supposed to meet every day with all the members present, the vote of each member carrying as much weight as that of any other member. naturally, the first lord of the admiralty being a cabinet officer and a member of parliament, has a far greater influence on broad questions than any other member; and the first sea lord being the person of the most experience in naval matters, has the most weight on strictly naval questions. theoretically, however, neither of these gentlemen can carry a measure opposed to the others; and any member, even a junior, has equal opportunity with the others to bring up and discuss any question and to attempt to procure its passage by the full board; but in the first lord at that time, mr. childers, brought about a change whereby the first lord was made personally responsible to the government. this vastly increased the power of the first lord, relatively to the others. two other navies, the german and the japanese, which with the british, are the most efficient navies in the world, have systems somewhat different from the british. in germany and japan the emperor is the head of the navy, and there is no civilian between him and it. in germany there is no minister of marine, unless the emperor himself may be said to be the minister, which he practically is; and the navy is divided into three parts, each under an admiral. the three parts are the general staff, which deals with war plans and fundamental questions; the naval cabinet, which deals with matters of personnel; and the administrative section, which has to do with questions of material, including money, and the getting of money from parliament. in japan the minister of marine is by law a naval officer, and under him is a chief of staff, also a naval officer. the minister of marine has the direction of the navy as a whole, but the ideas of the chief of staff are supposed to be carried out in matters that are strictly naval. the japanese naval officer has a higher regard for the office of chief of staff than for that of minister of marine, because it is given for professional excellence only. it might seem at first sight that in germany and japan there would be danger of a lack of co-ordination between the civil and the naval authorities, and a tendency for the navy to become unduly self-assertive. of course, one reason why there is no such danger is that the governments of those countries are controlled by men who, though civilians, have great knowledge of international affairs, and of military and naval subjects; another reason is that the navy is so vital a matter, accurate knowledge about it is so general, and interest in it so wide-spread and intense, that there is no great gulf fixed between naval people and civilians. still another reason is the fact that in each country the emperor is trained in military and naval duties as well as in civil duties, and therefore can effect in his own person the co-ordination of the civil and the naval authority: that is, of policy and strategy. such automatic and complete co-ordination is desirable not only in preventing the unnatural barrier between the civil and the military authority which exists in some countries such as ours, but in lightening the labors and enlightening the deliberations of the strategists. if, for instance, a bold policy is to be enforced, and a large sum of money allotted for material and personnel, the strategists will be led to recommendations different from those to which they would be led if a cautious policy were to be pursued, and a small sum of money to be allotted. germany did not turn her eyes seriously toward the navy until the emperor william ii read mahan's book, "the influence of sea power upon history." previous to that epochal event, germany had relied on her army to protect her interests and enforce her rights, being led thereto by the facts of her history and the shortness of her coast-line. but the strategically trained mind of william grasped at once the situation laid bare by mahan; and his military training led him to quick decision and prompt action. the necessary machinery was soon set in motion, with the amazing result that in twenty years the german navy became the second in power and perhaps the first in efficiency in the world. was this feat accomplished by prodigal expenditures in building vessels and other material of all kinds, and enlisting and commissioning a large number of officers and men? no, the expense was less than that of building our navy, even if a liberal allowance be made for the relative cheapness of things in germany; and the mere enlisting and commissioning of officers and men was the simplest part of the undertaking. how was it accomplished? in the simplest way imaginable: by following moltke's plan of solving hypothetical war problems, and adapting the military war game (_kriegspiel_) to naval forces; playing numberless war games, and deciding from those games the naval strategy best adapted to germany's needs--not only in matters of general principle, not only as to tactics, training, education, co-operation with the army, and the size of fleet required to carry out the policy of the nation--but also as to the composition of the fleet, relative proportions of vessels of the various types, and the characteristics of each type. nothing was left to chance; nothing was decided by guessing; no one man's dictum was accepted. the whole problem was attacked in its entirety, and a general solution found; and after this, the various divisions and subdivisions of the problem were attacked and solved, in obedience to the same principles, in accordance with the results obtained at _kriegspiel_. if a very large and complicated engine of new pattern is to be built by any engineering company, no casting of the smallest kind is made until general plans have been outlined, detailed plans prepared from these, and then "working plans" made for the workmen. from the working plans, the workmen construct the various parts; sometimes in number several hundred. finally, the whole intricate machine is put together, and the motive power applied. then all the parts, great and small, begin their allotted tasks, each part perfectly adapted to its work, not too large and not too small; all working together in apparent confusion, but in obedience to law--fulfilling exactly the will of the designing engineer. so, the vast and new machine of the german navy was designed in the drafting-room of the _kriegspiel_; and though it has been gradually strengthened and enlarged since then, each strengthening piece and each addition has been designed in accordance with the original plan, and has therefore harmonized with the original machine. thus the navy has expanded smoothly, symmetrically, purposefully. no other result was to be expected: the strategy having been correct, the result was correct also. perhaps one contributing factor to the success of the german navy has been her staff of officers highly trained in strategy by _kriegspiel_, that insures not only sound advice in general, but also insures that at any time, night or day, a body of competent officers shall be ready at the admiralty to decide what action should be taken, whenever any new situation is reported. this factor is most important; because in naval and military operations, even in time of peace, but especially in war, events follow each other so rapidly, and momentous crises develop so suddenly, that the demand for action that shall be both wise and instantaneous is imperative. the chess-player can linger long over his decisions, because his opponent cannot make his next move meanwhile; but in warfare no such rule or condition can exist. in war, time is as vital a factor as any other: and the strategist, who, like napoleon, can think faster and decide more quickly and accurately than his antagonist is, _ceteris paribus_, sure to win; and even if _ceteris_ are not quite _paribus_, his superior quickness and correctness will overcome great handicaps in material and personnel, as the lives of all the great strategists in history, especially alexander and napoleon, prove convincingly. to bring a preponderating force to bear at a given point ahead of the enemy--to move the maximum of force with the maximum of celerity--has always been the aim of strategy: and probably it always will be, for the science of strategy rests on principles, and principles never change. thus while we see in great britain's navy an example of the effect of a strategy continuous and wise, conducted for three hundred years, we see in the japanese and german navies equally good examples of a strategy equally wise, but of brief duration, which started with the example of the british navy, and took advantage of it. the german and japanese navies did not follow the british navy slavishly, however; for the national military character of their people required the introduction and control of more military and precise methods than those of the primarily sailor navy of great britain. we see, therefore, a curious similarity between the german and japanese navies, and very clear evidence in each of the engrafting of purely military ideals on maritime ideas. and we see not only this, we see the reaction on the british navy itself of the ideals of the german and the japanese, and a decided change during the last ten years from the principles of "the blue-water school"; as evidenced mainly by the institution of a naval war college, including a war staff, the employment at the admiralty of general staff methods, though without the name; and the introduction into naval methods, especially naval gunnery, of mathematical procedures. previous to the japanese-russian war, ten years ago, the strategy of the british navy may be characterized as physical rather than mental, depending on a superior number of ships and men; those ships and men being of a very high grade individually, and bound together by a discipline at once strict and sympathetic. all the personnel from the highest admiral to the humblest sailor prided themselves on being "british seamen," comrades of the sea, on whom their country placed her ultimate reliance. maneuvers on a large scale were held, target practice was carried on with regularity--and navy ships carried the banner of saint george over every sea, and displayed it in every port. tactics and seamanship filled the busy days with drills of many kinds; but strategy, though not quite forgotten, did not command so large a portion of the officers' time and study as it did in germany and japan. the rapid success of the germans and japanese, however, in building up their navies, as instanced by the evident efficiency of the german fleet almost under the nose of england, and the triumph of the japanese fleet in tsushima strait startled the british navy out of her conservatism, and caused her to proceed at full speed toward the modernization of her strategy. with the quick decision followed by quick action that characterizes the seaman everywhere, the british instituted a series of reforms, and prosecuted their efforts with such wisdom and such vigor, that, in the brief space of ten years, the british navy has been almost revolutionized. as in all such movements, the principal delay was in bringing about the necessary mental changes; the mental changes having been accomplished, the material changes followed automatically. the change whereby the german and japanese navies became preceptors to their preceptor is like changes that occur in every-day life, and is one of many illustrations of how a young and vigorous individual or organization, endowed with proper energy and mentality, can appropriate whatever is valuable for its purposes from its elders, and reject whatever those elders have had fastened on them by circumstances or tradition, and develop a superior existence. it is a little like the advantage which a comparatively new city like washington has over an old city like boston, in being started after it was planned, instead of being started haphazard, without being planned at all. the united states navy was started not like the city of washington, but like the city of boston. it was modelled on the british navy; but since the united states has never taken an interest in its navy at all comparable with that taken by great britain in its navy, and since our navy has been built up by successive impulses from congress and not in accordance with a basic plan, the lack of harmoniousness among its various parts reminds one of boston rather than of washington. owing to the engineering and inventive genius of our people and the information we got from europe, inferiority has not occurred in the units of the material: in fact, in some ways our material is perhaps the best of all. neither has inferiority been evidenced in the personnel, as individuals; for the excellent physique and the mental alertness of the american have shown themselves in the navy as well as in other walks of life. in strategy, however, it must be admitted that we have little reason to be proud. we do very well in the elementary parts of the naval profession. in navigation, seamanship, gunnery, and that part of international law that concerns the navy we are as good as any. but of the higher branches, especially of strategy, we have little clear conception. how can we have? strategy is one of the most complex arts the world contains; the masters in that art have borne such names as alexander, cæsar, nelson, and napoleon. naval strategy is naval chess, in which battleships and other craft take the place of queens and other pieces. but it is a more complicated game than chess, for the reason that not only are there more kinds of "pieces," but the element of time exerts a powerful influence in strategy while it does not even exist in chess. the time element has the effect not only of complicating every situation, but also of compelling intense concentration of mind, in order to make decisions quickly; and often it forces decisions without adequate time for consideration, under circumstances of the utmost excitement, discomfort, and personal peril. one dislikes intensely to criticise his own country, even to himself. but when a naval officer is studying--as he should continually do--what must be done, in order to protect his country from attack by some foreign foe, it would be criminal folly for him to estimate the situation otherwise than honestly; and to do this, it is necessary to try to see where his country is weak and where strong, relatively to the possible foes in question. if we do this, and compare the strategical methods employed by--say germany and us--we are forced to admit that the german methods are better adapted to producing economically a navy fitted to contend successfully in war against an enemy. in germany the development of the navy has been strictly along the lines of a method carefully devised beforehand; in our country no method whatever is apparent, at least no logical method. congress, and congress alone, decides what vessels and other craft shall be built, how many officers and men shall wear the uniform. it is true that they consult the report of the secretary of the navy, and ask the opinions of some naval officers; and it is true that the secretary of the navy gets the opinions of certain naval officers including the general board, before making his report. but both the secretary and congress estimate the situation from their own points of view, and place their own value on the advice of naval officers. and the advice of these naval officers is not so valuable, possibly, as it might be; for the reason that it is really irresponsible, since the advisers themselves know that it will not be taken very seriously. the difference between the advice of men held responsible for the results of following their advice, and the advice of men not so held responsible, is well recognized, and is discussed fully in the reports of the moody and the swift boards on the organization of the navy department. furthermore, our officers do not have the machinery of the _kriegspiel_ to help them. it is true that at the naval war college, a war-game apparatus is installed and that war games are played, and war problems solved; but the officers there are very properly engaged in the regular work of a war college, in educating officers in the principles of warfare, and have little time for other work. it is also true that the war games and problems there do lead occasionally to recommendations by the war college to the general board as to various matters; but the connection between the conclusions of the war college and the decisions of congress via the general board and the secretary of the navy is so fragile and discontinuous, that it may truthfully be said that the influence of the war games at our war college has but a faint resemblance to the determining force of the _kriegspiel_ in berlin. it is often said that germany is an empire and the united states a republic, and that _therefore_ the military methods of germany cannot be employed here. the inference is not necessarily correct, however, as is shown by the excellence of the army of france; for, france, although a republic, insists that military strategy only shall control and direct the army. the american congress can do the same with the american navy. whether congress shall so decide or not, the decision will undoubtedly be wise; and we of the navy will do our utmost to make the navy all it should be. in this connection, it should be noted that: . germany has been following a certain strategic system regarding the navy; we a system different from that of any other navy, which has been used now for about one hundred and forty years. both systems have been in operation for a time sufficiently long to warrant our comparing them, by comparing the results they have achieved. . the german navy has been in existence a much shorter time than the american navy, belongs to a much less populous and wealthy country, and yet is not only about per cent larger in material, and more than per cent larger in trained personnel, but if we judge by maneuvers carried on in both peace and war, is much better in organization, morale, and capacity for doing naval work upon the ocean. we do not, of course, know what germany has been doing since the war began on august , ; but all accounts show that germany, like all the other belligerent powers, has been adding units of material and personnel to her navy much more rapidly than they have been destroyed; as well as perfecting her strategy, under the influence of the war's stimulus. leaving out of consideration, however, what she may have been doing since the war began, and neglecting any unauthenticated accounts of her status before it started, we know positively that in the maneuvers of the german fleet were executed by a force of battleships, battle cruisers, small cruisers, flotillas of destroyers (that is seagoing torpedo vessels), submarines, an airship, a number of aeroplanes and special service ships, and mine-sweepers--all in one fleet, all under one admiral, and maneuvered as a unit. _this was nearly three years ago, and we have never come anywhere near such a performance_. in january, , the united states atlantic fleet, capable as to both material and personnel of going to sea and maneuvering together, consisted of battleships and destroyers, mine-depot ships, and mine-training ship, and tugs fitted as mine-sweepers--with no submarines, no aircraft of any kind, no scouts (unless the _chester_ be so considered, which was cruising alone off the coast of liberia, and the _birmingham_, which was flag-ship to the destroyer flotilla). this was the only fleet that we had ready to fight in january, ; because, although more battleships could have been put into commission, this could have been done only by putting out of commission certain smaller vessels, such as cruisers and gunboats; and the battleships would have had to be put into commission very hurriedly, filled up with men fresh from other ships, and no more ready to fight in the fleet against an enemy (whose ships were fully manned with well-trained officers and men, accustomed to the details of their respective ships, and acquainted with each other) than the _chesapeake_ was ready to fight the _shannon_. . in case our system is not so good as that of--say germany--or of any other country having a system equally excellent, we shall _never_ be able to contend successfully against that navy, under equal strategic conditions, unless we have an excess over her in numbers of personnel and material sufficient to counteract our inferiority in efficiency. the efficiency of a navy or an army is exactly what the strategic system makes it. eleven thousand greeks under miltiades, highly efficient and thoroughly trained, defeated , persians at marathon. a greek fleet under themistocies defeated and almost destroyed a much larger persian fleet at salamis. with an army of less than , men, but highly trained by philip of macedon, his father, alexander, in only twelve years conquered ten of the most wealthy and populous countries of the world. cæsar, alaric, attila, charlemagne, and all the great military men from the greatest antiquity down to the present moment have trained and organized bodies of soldiers and sailors, under systems suited to the times, and then waged successful war on peoples less militarily efficient. cortez conquered mexico, and pizarro conquered peru; the british, french, and spanish subdued the indians of north america, and during the latter half of the nineteenth century nearly all the land in the world that was "unoccupied" by europeans or their descendants was taken in possession by european powers. great britain is now mistress of about one-quarter of the land and the population of the globe. russia, france, germany, and the united states govern most of the remainder. these results were brought about almost solely by the exercise of military force:--and of this force, physical courage was not a determining element, because it was just as evident in the conquered as in the conquerors. the determining element was strategy that (under the behest of policy) prepared the military and naval forces in material and personnel before they were used, and directed their operations, while they were being used. of all the single factors that have actually and directly made the history of the world, the most important factor has been strategy. chapter viii designing the machine the most important element connected with a navy is the strategy which directs it, in accordance with which all its plans are laid--plans for preparation before war and plans for operations during war. strategy is to a navy what mind is to a man. it determines its character, its composition, its aims; and so far as external conditions will permit, the results which it accomplishes. it is possible for certain features connected with a navy to be good, even if the strategy directing it be faulty; or for those features to be faulty, even if the strategy directing it be good. experience has shown, however, that, in any organization the influence of the men at the top, and the effect of the policy they adopt, is so great that the whole organization will in the main be good or bad according to the kind of men that control it, and the methods they employ. the better the discipline of the organization, the more completely the quality of the management will influence the whole, and the more essential it becomes that good methods be employed. good discipline means concentration of the effort of the organization; and the more concentrated any effort is, the more necessary that it be directed aright. the simplest illustration of this is seen in naval gunnery; for there the effect of good fire-control is to limit the dispersion of the various shots fired, relatively to each other; to make a number of shots fired simultaneously to bunch closely together, that is to concentrate; getting away from the shotgun effect, and approximating the effect of a single shot. obviously, if the fire-control and the skill of the gunners are so great that the shots fall very close together, the chance of hitting the target is less than if the shots did not fall close together, if the range at which the guns are fired is incorrect. a mathematical formula showing the most effective dispersion for a given error in range was published in the _naval institute_ by lieutenant-commander b. a. long, u. s. n., in december, . so, we see that if the strategy directing a navy is incorrect, we can accomplish little by improving the discipline, and may do harm; when unwise orders have been given in the past, those orders have sometimes been disobeyed with beneficial effect. neither would it avail much to improve the details of the material or personnel, or to spend much money; for there is no benefit to be derived from building fine ships, if they are to be captured by the enemy. if the russian fleet sent to tsushima had been weaker than it was, the loss to russia would have been less. inasmuch as strategy, however, includes all the means taken to make a navy effective, it is obvious that a good strategical direction will be more likely to result in good discipline and good material than would a poor strategy. but this is not necessarily so, for the reason that a strategy may be in the main faulty, and yet be good in certain ways--especially in attention to details, for which a high degree of mentality is not required. in the same way, an individual who is short-sighted and imperfectly educated may be a most excellent and useful member of society, provided he is not permitted to use power in matters beyond his vision. an illustration of how an incorrect point of view does not necessarily injure, but may even benefit in details is shown by certain militia regiments, which are able to surpass some regiments of the regular army in many details of the drill, and in general precision of movement. in fact, a very wise strategical direction has as one of its most important functions the division of study and labor among various lines of action, and in deciding which lines are important and which not: and for this reason may--and often does--limit labor, and therefore perfection of result, along lines which a less wise strategy would not limit. illustrations of the casting aside of rigid and difficult forms of drill during the past fifty years in armies, and the substitution of more easy methods are numerous. this does not indicate, however, that a wise strategy may not encourage rigid forms of drill, for the army which is directed with the greatest strategical skill is the german, and no army has more precise methods, not only of procedure, but of drill. the prussian army of frederick william which frederick the great inherited was not more rigidly drilled in some particulars than the german army of to-day, fought by frederick the great's great-great-great-grandnephew, william ii. so we see that a wise and far-sighted strategy does not necessarily either frown on or encourage attention to details; it merely regulates it, deciding in each case and for each purpose what degree of attention to detail is best. the most obvious work of naval strategy, and therefore the work that impresses people most, is in directing naval forces against an enemy in war. but it is clear that before this can be done effectively strategy must first have made plans of preparation in time of peace; and it is equally clear that, previous to this, strategy must first determine the units of the force and their relation to each other: it must, in other words, design the machine. evidently, therefore, _the work of strategy is three-fold: first, to design the machine; second, to prepare it for war; and, third, to direct its operations during war_. a navy being a machine composed of human and material parts, it is clear that the work of designing it correctly should take account of all the parts at the outset; and not only this--the whole design should be completed before any parts are made and put together if the best results are to be obtained. this is the practice in making material machines in manufacturing establishments--and no other practice there could be successfully pursued. it is the outcome of the experience of tens of thousands of men for many years--and the result of the expenditure of tons of money. this remark as to manufacturing establishments does not include the development of new ideas, for which experimentation or original research is needed; because it is sometimes necessary, when venturing into untrodden fields, to test out by mere trial and error certain parts or features before determining enough of their details to warrant incorporating them in the drawing of the whole machine. similarly, some experiments must be made in the methods, organization, and material of the naval machine; but in this, case, as in the case of manufacturing establishments, the experimental work, no matter how promising or alluring, must be recognized as of unproved and doubtful value; and no scheme, plan, or doctrine must be incorporated in the naval machine, or allowed to pose as otherwise than experimental, until successful trials shall have put it beyond the experimental stage. the naval machine consists obviously of two parts, the personnel and the material; these two parts being independent, and yet mutually dependent, like the parts of any other organism. obviously, the parts are mutually dependent not only in the quantitative sense that the more numerous the material parts the more numerous must be the personnel to operate them, but also in the qualitative sense that the various kinds of material determine the various kinds of personnel that must be provided to operate them with success. gunners are needed to handle guns, and engineers to handle engines. in this respect, personnel follows material. in the galley days only two kinds of personnel were needed--sailors to handle the galleys (most of these being men merely to pull on oars)--and soldiers to fight, when the galleys got alongside of the enemy. ship organization remained in a condition of great simplicity until our civil war; for the main effort was to handle the ships by means of their sails, the handling of the simple battery being a very easy matter. every ship was much like every other ship, except in size; and in every ship the organization was simple and based mostly on the necessities of handling the ship by sails. the first important change from this condition followed the departure of the confederate ironclad _virginia_ (_merrimac_) carrying guns and men from the norfolk navy yard on the th of march, , and her sinking hardly two hours afterward the union sloop of war _cumberland_, carrying guns and men; and then destroying by fire the union frigate _congress_, carrying guns and men. the second step was taken on the following day, when the union _monitor_, guns and men, defeated the _merrimac_. these two actions on two successive days are the most memorable naval actions in history from the standpoint of naval construction and naval ordnance, and perhaps of naval strategy; because they instituted a new era--the era of mechanism in naval war. the next step was the successful attack by the confederate "fish-torpedo boat" _david_, on the union ironclad _housatonic_ in charleston harbor on february , ; and the next was the sinking of the confederate ironclad _albemarle_ by a spar torpedo carried on a little steam-launch commanded by lieutenant w. b. cushing, u. s. n., on october , . these four epochal events in our civil war demonstrated the possibilities of mechanism in naval warfare, and led the way to the use of the highly specialized and scientific instruments that have played so important a part in the present war. during the half-century that has intervened since the _monitor_ and _merrimac_ ushered in the modern era, since the five brave crews of the _david_ lost their lives, and since cushing made his amazing victory, a contest between the sailor and the scientist has been going on, as to which shall be deemed the ultimate master of the sea. as in many contests, the decision has gone unqualifiedly to neither; for he who sails the sea and braves its tempests, must be in heart and character a sailor--and yet he who fights the scientific war-craft of the present day cannot be merely a sailor, like him of the olden kind, but must be what the _new york times_, a few years ago, laughingly declared to be a combination quite unthinkable, "a scientific person and a sailor." each year since the fateful th of march, , has seen some addition to the fighting machinery of navies. some appliances have been developed gradually from their first beginnings, and are to-day substantially what they were at first--but of course improved; among these are the turret, the automobile torpedo, the telescope-sight, the submarine, and the gyrocompass. many other appliances found favor for a while and then, having demonstrated the value of what they attempted and did perform, were gradually supplemented by improved devices, doing the same thing, but in better ways; in this class are many forms of interior-communication apparatus, especially electrical. still other appliances are adaptations to ship and naval life of devices used in civil life--such as the telephone, electric light, and radio. each of these appliances has required for its successful use the educating of men to use it, and frequently the creation and organization of entirely new branches of the service; an illustration is the radio corps in each of our large ships. at the present time the attitude of officers and of the department itself is so much more favorable to new appliances that a clear probability of a new device being valuable is a sufficient stimulus to bring about the education of men to use it; but a very few years ago many devices were lost to us because they were considered "not adapted naval use." now we endeavor to adapt them. the present complexity of our material is therefore reflected in the complexity of the organization of our personnel; and as it is the demands of material that regulate the kind of personnel, and as a machine must be designed and built before men can learn to use it, it follows that our personnel must lag behind our material--that our material as material must be better than our personnel as personnel. it may be answered that all our material is first invented, then designed, and then constructed by men; that men create our material appliances (though not the matter of which they are composed), that the created cannot be better than the creator; and that therefore it is impossible for our material to be better than our personnel. but to this objection it may be pointed out that only a very small proportion of our personnel are employed in creating; that most of them are engaged merely in using the material with whatever degree of skill they possess, and that, if a man uses an instrument with perfect skill, he then succeeds merely in getting out of that instrument all that there is in it. a soldier's musket, for instance, is a very perfect tool--very accurate, very powerful, very rapid; and no marksman in the world is so skilful that he can shoot the musket with all the accuracy and speed of which the gun itself is capable. this indicates that the personnel of a navy is harder to handle than the material, and that therefore the most effort is required to be expended on the personnel. the strength of any system depends on the strength of its weakest part; in any organism, human or material, effort is best expended on the weak points rather than on the strong. recognition of this principle is easy, but carrying out the principle in practice is most difficult. one reason is the difficulty of seeing always where the weak spot is; but a greater difficulty is due to the fact that the principle as above stated must be modified by the consideration that things which are important need attention more than things that are unimportant. a weak point in any organism deserves attention more than a strong point of the same order of importance, or than a strong point in the same class; but not, necessarily more than a strong point of a higher order of importance, or a strong point in another class. it may be more beneficial, for instance, to drill an ineffective turret crew than to try to reduce friction in a training gear already nearly frictionless; or it may be more beneficial to overcome the faults of a mediocre gun-pointer than to develop still more highly the skill already great of another gun-pointer; but, on the other hand, it may be less beneficial to drill boat crews at boat-sailing, even if they need it, than to drill them at landing as armed forces on the beach, though they may do that pretty well; or it may be better not to have boat drill at all and to get under way for fleet drill, even though the ships are very expert at it. it is true that in any endeavor where many things are to be done, as in a navy, it is important that nothing be neglected; and yet, under the superintendence of any one, there are some things the doing of which requires priority over other things. the allotting of the scientifically correct amount of time, energy, and attention to each of the various things claiming one's attention is one of the most difficult, and yet one of the most important problems before any man. it requires an accurate sense of proportion. naturally the problem increases in complexity and importance the higher the position, and the greater the number of elements involved--being more difficult and important for instance in the office of the commander-in-chief of a fleet, whose time and attention have to be divided among multitudinous matters, than in that of captain of a single ship. for this reason, _the higher one is in position, the more imperative it is that he understand all elements involved, and estimate properly their various weights_. the success or non-success of a man in high authority depends largely on how his sense of proportion leads him to allot his time. but a matter fully as important as the allotment of time and attention to the consideration of various matters by the various members of the personnel is the allotment of money for the various items, especially of the material; for, after all, every navy department or admiralty must arrange its demands for ships, guns, men, etc., with reference to the total amount of money which the nation will allot. for this purpose, only one good means of solution has thus far been devised--the game-board. the game-board, naturally, tries out only the units that maneuver on the ocean; it does not try out the mechanism inside those units, because they can be tried out best by engineering methods. the province of the game-board is merely to try out on a very small scale, under proper conventions or agreements, things that could not be tried out otherwise, except at great expense, and very slowly; to afford a medium, half-way between actual trials with big ships and mere unaided reasoning, for arriving at correct conclusions. when the game-board is not used, people conferring on naval problems can do so only by forming pictures in their own minds, endeavoring to describe those pictures to the others (in which endeavor they rarely perfectly succeed) while at the same time, trying to see the pictures that are in the minds of the others--and then comparing all the pictures. the difficulty of doing this is shown by a little paragraph in "the autocrat of the breakfast table," in which dr. holmes points out that when john and thomas are talking, there are really six persons present--the real john, the person john thinks himself to be, the person thomas thinks him to be, the real thomas, the person thomas thinks himself to be, and the person john thinks him to be. the conditions surrounding john and thomas are those of the simplest kind, and the conversation between them of the most uncomplicated character. but when--not two people but--say a dozen or more, are considering highly complicated questions, such as the house naval committee discuss when officers are called to testify before them, no two of the twenty congressmen can form the same mental picture when an officer uses the word--say "fleet." the reason is simply that very few of the congressmen hearing that word have ever seen a fleet; none of them know exactly what it is, and every one forms a picture which is partly the result of all his previous education and experience; which are different from the previous education and experience of every other congressman on the committee. furthermore, no one of the officers uses words exactly as the other officers do; and the english language is too vague (or rather the usual interpretation put on words is too vague) to assure us that even ordinary words are mutually understood. for instance, the question is asked: "do you consider it probable that such or such a thing would happen?" now what does the questioner mean by "probable," and what does the officer think he means? mathematically, the meaning of "probable" is that there is more than per cent of chance that the thing would happen; but who in ordinary conversation uses that word in that way? that this is not an academic point is shown by the fact that if the answer is "no" the usual inference from the answer is that there is no need for guarding against the contingency. yet such an inference, if the word "probable" were used correctly by both the questioner and the answerer, would be utterly unjustified, because the necessity for taking precautions against a danger depends not so much on its probability or improbability, as on the degree of its probability; and to an equal degree on the greatness of the danger that impends. if the occurrence of a small mishap has a probability say of even per cent, there may be little necessity of guarding against it; while if the danger of total destruction has a probability as low as even per cent, we should guard against it sedulously. the more complicated the question, the more elements involved, the more difficult it is to settle it wisely by mere discussion. the effort of the imagination of each person must be directed not so much to getting a correct mental picture of what the words employed describe, as to getting a correct picture of what the person using the words desires them to describe. any person who has had experience in discussions of this character knows what an effort this is, even if he is talking with persons whom he has known for years, and with whose mental and lingual characteristics he is well acquainted: and he also knows how much more difficult it is when he is talking with persons whom he knows but slightly. it may here be pointed out how greatly the imaginations of men differ, and how little account is taken of this difference in every-day life. in poetry and fiction imagination is recognized; and it is also recognized to some extent in painting, inventing, and, in general, in "the arts." but in ordinary life, the difference among men in imagination is almost never noticed. yet a french proverb is "point d'imagination, point de grand general"; and napoleon indicated a danger from untrained imagination in his celebrated warning to his generals not to make "pictures" to themselves of difficulties and disasters. the difference in imagination among men is shown clearly by the difference--and often the differences--between inventors and engineers, and the scarcity of men who are both inventors and engineers. ericsson repudiated the suggestion that he was an inventor, and stoutly and always declared he was an engineer. this was at a time, not very long ago, when it was hardly respectable to be an inventor; when, even though men admitted that some inventors had done valuable work, the work was supposed to be largely a chance shot of a more or less crazy man. yet ericsson was an inventor--though he was an engineer. so were sir william thompson (afterward lord kelvin), helmholtz, westinghouse, and a very few others; so are edison and sperry. many inventors, however, live in their imaginations mainly--some almost wholly. like pegasus, they do not like to be fastened to a plough or anything else material. facts, figures, and blue-prints fill their souls with loathing, and bright generalities delight them. the engineer, on the other hand, is a man of brass and iron and logarithms; in imagination he is blind, in flexibility he resembles reinforced concrete. he is the antipodes of the inventor; he despises the inventor, and the inventor hates him. fortunately, however, there is a little bit of the inventor in most engineers, and a trace of the engineer in most inventors; while in some inventors there is a good deal of the engineer. and once in a while we meet a man who carries both natures in his brain. that man does marvels. despite the great gulf normally fixed, however, between the engineer and the inventor, most of the definite progress of the world for the past one hundred years has been done by the co-ordination of the two; a co-ordination accomplished by "the man of business." now the inventor and engineer type do not exist only in the world of engineering and mechanics, though it is in that world that they are the most clearly recognized; for they exist in all walks of life. in literature, inventors write novels; in business life, they project railroads; in strategy, they map out new lines of effort. in literature, the engineer writes cyclopædias; in business, he makes the projected railroads a success; in strategy, he works out logistics and does the quantitative work. in that part of strategy of which we are now thinking--the designing of the naval machine--the inventor and the engineer clearly have two separate lines of work: one line the conceiving, and the other line the constructing, of strategic and tactical methods, and of material instruments to carry out those methods. clearly, these two lines of work while independent are mutually dependent; and, if properly carried out are mutually assistant. the coworking of the inventor and the engineer is a little like that coworking of theory and practice, which has been the principal factor in bringing about the present amazing condition of human society commonly called "modern civilization." the shortcomings of human speech are most evident in discussing complicated matters; and for this reason speech is supplemented in the engineering arts by drawings of different kinds. no man ever lived who could describe a complicated machine accurately to a listener, unless that machine differed but little from a machine with which the listener was acquainted. but hand a drawing of even a very complicated machine to a man who knows its language--and the whole nature of the object is laid bare to him; not only its general plan and purpose, but its details, with all their dimensions and even the approximate weights. so, when the forces representing a complicated naval situation are placed upon the game-board, all the elements of the problem appear clearly and correctly to each person; the imagination has little work to do, and the chance for misunderstanding is almost negligible. of course, this does not mean that the game-board can decide questions with absolute finality. it cannot do this; but that is only because conditions are represented with only approximate realism, because the rules of the game may not be quite correct, and because sufficient correct data cannot be procured. the difficulties of securing absolute realism are of course insuperable, and the difficulties of getting absolutely correct data are very great. the more, however, this work is prosecuted, the more clearly its difficulties will be indicated, and therefore the more effectively the remedies can be provided. the more the game-board is used both on ship and shore, the more ease will be found in getting correct data for it, and the more correctly conclusions can then be deduced. these remarks, while intended for tactical games, seem to apply to strategical games as well; for both the tactical and the strategical games are simply endeavors to represent actual or probable situations and occurrences in miniature, by arbitrary symbols, in accordance with well-understood conventions. war games and war problems have not yet been accepted by some; for some regard them as games pure and simple and as academic, theoretical, and unpractical. it may be admitted that they are academic and theoretical; but so is the science of gunnery, and so is the science of navigation. in some ways, however, the lessons of the game-board are better guides to future work than "practical" and actual happenings of single battles: for in single battles everything is possible, and some things happen that were highly improbable and were really the result of accident. after nearly every recent war there has been a strong move made toward the adoption of some weapon, or some method, that has attained success in that war. for instance, after our civil war, many monitors were built, and the spar torpedo was installed in all our ships; after the battle of lissa, the ram was exploited as the great weapon of the future; the japanese war established the heavily armed and armored battleships on a secure foundation; and the early days of the present war caused a great rush toward the submarine. yet, in most cases, the success was a single success or a very few successes, and was a little like the throw of a die, in the sense that the result was caused in great measure by accident; that is, by causes beyond the control of man, or by conditions that would probably not recur. the game calls our attention to the influence of chance in war, and to the desirability of our recognizing that influence and endeavoring to eliminate it, when reasoning out the desirability or undesirability of a certain weapon or a certain method. of course, every thoughtful person realizes that few effects in life are due to one cause only, and that most effects are due to a combination of many causes; so that, if any weapon or method succeeds or fails, it is illogical to infer from that one fact that the weapon or method is good or bad. a common illustration is the well-known fact that a marksman may hit the target when his aim is too high or too low, provided that he has erroneously set his sight enough too low or too high to compensate; whereas if he had made only one error instead of two, he would have missed. "two wrongs cannot make a right," but two errors can compensate each other, and often do. the theory of the probability of errors recognizes this. in fact, if it were not true that some errors are plus and some minus, all errors in gunnery (in fact in everything) would be additive to each other, and we should live in a world of error. the partial advantage of the game-board over the occurrences of actual war, for the purpose of studying strategy, lies largely in its ability to permit a number of trials very quickly; the trials starting either with identical situations, or with certain changes in conditions. of course, the game-board has the tremendous disadvantage that it presents only a picture, and does not show a real performance; but the more it is used, and the more fleets and game-boards work together, the more accurate the picture will become, and the more correctly we shall learn to read it. one limitation of the game-board is that it can represent weather conditions only imperfectly--and this is a serious limitation that mayor may not be remedied as time goes on. the theory of the game-board is in fact in advance of the mechanism, and is waiting for some bright inventive genius for the remedy. until this happens, the imagination must do the best it can, and the effect of a certain kind of weather under the other conditions prevailing will have to be agreed upon by the contestants. the term "war game" is perhaps unfortunate, for the reason that it does not convey a true idea of what a "war game" is. the term conveys the idea of a competitive exercise, carried on for sport; whereas the idea underlying the exercise is of the most serious kind, and has no element of sport about it, except the element that competition gives. a war game may be simply a game of sport--and sometimes it is so played; but the intention is to determine some doubtful point of strategy or tactics, and the competitive element is simply to impart realism, and to stimulate interest. when two officers, or two bodies of officers, find themselves on different sides of a certain question, they sometimes "put it on the game-board," to see which side is right. this statement applies most obviously to tactical games; but it applies to strategic games as well; for both are inventions designed to represent in miniature the movements of two opposing forces. the main difference between strategic and tactical games is the difference in size. naturally, the actual means employed are different, but only so different as the relative areas of movement necessitate. in the strategic games, the opposing forces are far apart, and do not see each other; in the tactical games, they operate within each other's range of vision. war games when played for the purpose of determining the value of types of craft and vessels of all kinds, may take on almost an infinite variety of forms; for the combinations of craft of different kinds and sizes, and in different numbers, considered in connection with the various possible combinations of weather, climate, and possible enemy forces, are so numerous as to defy computation. in practice, however, and in a definite problem, the number of factors can be kept down by assuming average conditions of weather, using the fairly well-known enemy force that would appear in practice, and playing games in which the only important variable is the kind of vessel in question. for instance, in the endeavor to ascertain the value of the battle cruiser, games can be played in which battle cruisers are only on one side, or in which they are more numerous, or faster or more powerful on one side than on the other. naturally, the games cannot be as valuable practically as they otherwise would be, unless they consider the amount of money available. for instance, if games are played to ascertain the most effective number and kinds of craft for which to ask appropriations from congress at next session, the solution, unless a money limit were fixed, would be impossible. in other words, the amount of money to be expended must be one of the known or assumed factors in the problem. as this amount can never be known, it must be assumed; and, in order that the whole value of the games may not be lost, in case the amount assumed were incorrect, it is necessary to assume a number of possible sums, the upper limit being above the probable amount to be received, and the lower limit below it, and then work out the answer to the problem, under each assumption. of course, this procedure would be laborious, but most procedures are that bring about the best results. suppose that such a procedure were followed for, say, a year, and that a number of plans, all worked out, were presented to congress when it met: plan no. , for instance, consisting of such and such craft showing (according to the results of the games) the best programme, if $ , , were to be appropriated for the increase of the navy; plan no. , if $ , , were to be appropriated; plan no. , if $ , , were to be appropriated, and so on. each plan being concisely and clearly stated, and accompanied by drawings, sketches, and descriptions, congress could easily and quickly decide which plan it would adopt. this scheme would have the obvious advantage over the present scheme that the professional questions would be decided by professional men, while the financial question would be decided by congress, which alone has the power to decide it. at present, the laymen on the house naval committee spend laborious days interrogating singly, and on different days, various naval officers, who naturally do not always agree. finally, the house naval committee decides on a programme and recommends it to the house. the house discusses it most seriously (the professional points more seriously than the financial point), and decides on something. then the senate committee, using the house decision as a basis, recommends something to the senate, and the senate then decides on something more or less like what the senate committee recommends. then the whole question is decided by a conference committee of three senators and three members of the house. it is to be noted that this committee decides not only how much money the country shall spend on the navy, but also what kinds of vessels navy officers shall use to fight in the country's defense; how many officers there shall be, and how they shall be divided among the various grades! attention is requested here to the _ease_ with which a decision can be made, _provided one does not take into account all of the factors of a problem, or if he is not thoroughly acquainted with them_; and attention is also requested to the _impossibility_ of making a _wise_ decision (except by chance) unless one understands _all_ the factors, takes _all_ into consideration, and then combines them _all_, assigning to each its proper weight. from one point of view, every problem in life is like a problem in mathematics; for if all the factors are added, subtracted, multiplied, and divided correctly (that is, if they are combined correctly), and if correct values are assigned to them, the correct answer is inevitable. in most of the problems of life, however, certainly in the problems of strategy, we do not know all of the factors, and cannot assign them their exactly proper weights; and therefore we rarely get the absolutely correct answer. the best that any man can do is to estimate the factors as accurately as he can, judge as correctly as he can their interaction on each other, and then make his own conclusion or decision. when a man can do this well in the ordinary affairs of life, he is said to be "a man of good judgment"; when he can do it well in a certain line of work--say investments in real estate--he is said to have good judgment in real estate. the use of the word "judgment" here is excellent, because it expresses the act of a judge, who listens patiently to all the evidence in a case and then gives his decision. and the act of the judge, and the act of any man in coming carefully to any decision, consist mainly in estimating the relative values of all the factors, and their relations to each other ("sizing them up" is the expressive slang), and then perceiving with more or less correctness what the answer is. some men do not have good judgment; some men highly educated, brilliant, and well-meaning, seem never to get quite the correct answer to any problem in life. they are said to be unsuccessful and no one knows why. perhaps they lack that instinctive sense of proportion that some men have--a sense as real as an "ear for music"; or perhaps they lack a willingness or a capability to think about a situation with sufficient intentness to force a clear picture of the situation with all its various features upon the mental retina. the ability to make a mental picture, be it of a machine, of any group of material objects, such as the various units of a fleet organized as such, or of any other situation, varies with different men; but like every other kind of ability, it can be strengthened by practice, and assisted by appropriate means. in the engineering arts, the practice is gotten by observing and remembering actual machines; and the assistance is given by drawings of different kinds. in strategy, the practice is given by observing and remembering the movements of actual fleets; and the assistance by means of drawings of different kinds, and by war problems, and the game-board. the game-board represents a number of successive pictures, and is not very different in principle from moving-pictures. in fact, the suggestion has been made repeatedly for several years and is now in process of development that the various situations in tactical games might advantageously be photographed on films and afterward projected in rapid succession on a screen. one of the curious limitations of the naval game board, both in tactical and strategic games, is that it takes no account of personnel; that it assumes that all the various units are manned by crews that are adequate both in numbers and in training. of course, it would be impracticable to test say the relative values of kinds of vessels, unless all the factors of the problem were the same, except the two factors that were competing. therefore the limitation mentioned is not mentioned as a criticism, but simply to point out that the game-board, in common with most of the other means of discussion in naval matters, has gradually led people to think of naval matters in terms of material units only. that such an unfortunate state of affairs has come to pass can be verified by reading almost any paper, even professional, that speaks about navies; for one will be confronted at once with the statement that such and such a navy consists of such and such ships, etc. since when has a navy consisted of brass and iron? since when has the mind and character of man taken a place subordinate to matter? at what time did the change occur whereby the instrument employed dominated the human being who employed it? that this is not an academic point, or an unimportant thing to bear in mind is evidenced by countless facts in history. in order not to tire the reader, mention will be made of only one fact, the well-known fight between the american frigate _chesapeake_, and the british frigate _shannon_ to which i have already referred. these two ships were almost identical in size and in the number and kinds of guns, and in the number of officers and crew, and the battle was fought on june , , in massachusetts bay, under circumstances of weather and other conditions that gave no advantage to either. if material and numbers of personnel were the only factors in the fight, the fight would have continued very long and ended in a draw. did these things occur? no, the _chesapeake_ was captured in a little less than fifteen minutes after the first gun was fired, and nearly half her crew were killed or wounded! it would be tiresome to recount all the battles both on sea and land, in which smaller forces defeated forces numerically greater; but it may not be possible by any other means to force the fact on the attention--even sometimes of naval officers--that material vessels, guns, etc., are merely instruments, and that the work gotten out of any instrument depends not only on the instrument itself, but on the skill with which it is employed. usually, when thinking or speaking of the power of any instrument (or means or method or organization) we mean the power of which it is capable; that is, the result which it can produce, _if used with_ _per cent of skill_. possibly, we are subconsciously aware that we assume perfect skill; but whether we are or not, we have become so accustomed to the tacit acceptance of the phrase, "other things being equal," that we have come to forget that other things may not be equal at all; and that they certainly will not be on the day of trial, if we forget or undervalue those other things, while our antagonist does not. let us always remember, then, that the effective work gotten out of any means or instrument is the product of the maximum capability of the means or instrument and the skill with which it is used; that, for instance, if two fleets fight, which are numerically equal in material and personnel, but in which the skill of the personnel of the a fleet is twice as great as the skill of the personnel of the b fleet, the a fleet will be twice as powerful as the b fleet. it may be objected that it would be absurd to assume the skill of the personnel in one fleet as twice as great as that of the personnel in the other fleet, but it can easily be shown that even so great a disproportion is not impossible, provided the skill in one fleet is very great. the value of superior skill naturally becomes important where the difficulties are great. a very simple illustration is in firing a gun; for even if the skill of one marksman be greater than that of another, it will be unimportant, if the target is so large and so close that even the inferior marksman can hit it at each shot. the probability of hitting a target--so far as overs and shorts are concerned (or deviations to the left and right)--varies with the fraction _a/y_, where _a_ is the half height (or width) of the target, and _y_ is the mean error. the greater the size of the target, and the less the mean error, the greater the probability of hitting. the size of the two targets being fixed, therefore, the smaller the mean error the greater the probability of hitting. the probability of hitting, however (as can be seen by the formula), does not increase greatly with the decrease of error, except in cases where _a/y_ is small, where the mean error is large relatively to the width or height of the target. for instance, if _a/y_ is . in one case, and . in another case, the probability is practically double in the second case; whereas, if _a/y_ is in one case, and in another, the probability increases only per cent; while if it is in one case and in the other, the probability of hitting increases only per cent. this means that if two antagonists engage, the more skilful should, and doubtless will, engage under difficult conditions, where _y_ is considerable relatively to _a_; for instance, at long range. suppose that he engages at such a range that he can make per cent of hits--that is, make per cent of misses; and that his misses relatively to the enemy's is as to --so that the enemy makes per cent of misses. this does not seem to be (in fact it is not) an extreme case: and yet _a_ will hit _b_ twice as often as _b_ will hit _a_. in other words, the effective skill of _a_ will be twice that of _b_. this illustrates the effect of training--because all that training in handling any instrument can do is to attain as closely as possible to the maximum output of the instrument; and as the maximum output is attained only when the instrument is handled exactly as it should be handled, and as every departure is therefore an error in handling, we see that the effect of training is merely to diminish errors. that this illustration, drawn from gunnery, is applicable in general terms to strategy seems clear, for the reason that in every strategical situation, no matter how simple or how complex, there is, and can be only one _best_ thing to do; so that the statement of any strategic situation, if followed by a question as to what is the best thing to do, becomes a problem, to which the answer is--_the best thing to do_. of course, in most strategic problems, there are so many factors almost unknown, and so many factors only imperfectly known, that we can rarely ascertain mathematically what is the best thing to do. nevertheless, there must be a best thing to do, even if we never ascertain exactly what it is. now in arriving at the decision as to the best thing to do, one estimates the weight of each factor and its bearing on the whole. if one estimates each factor correctly, that is, if he makes no errors in any estimate, and if he makes no error in summing up, he will make an absolutely correct decision; and any departure from correctness in decision can result from no other cause than from errors in his various estimates and in their final summation. in other words, skill in strategy is to be attained by the same process as is skill in other arts: by eliminating errors. so, when we take the decisions of the game-board and the war problem, we must not allow ourselves to forget that there has been a tacit assumption that the numbers and the skill of the personnel have been equal on the two sides; and we must supplement our decision as to the best material to be employed by another decision as to how we shall see to it that the assumption of equality of personnel shall be realized in fact--or rather that it shall be realized in fact that our personnel shall get the maximum of effectiveness out of the material. in designing the machine, therefore, we are confronted with the curious fact that, in general, we must design the various material parts before designing the personnel parts that are to operate them. the most obvious characteristic of the personnel parts is that the number of personnel parts shall be sufficient to operate the material parts. to ascertain the number of personnel parts, the only means is actual trial; though naturally, if we have previously ascertained the number of men needed to operate any kind of mechanism, say a certain kind and size of gun, we can estimate quite accurately the number needed to operate a similar gun, even if it differ somewhat from the other gun. after the gun is tried, however, we may have to change our original estimate, not only because the estimate may have been in error, but because the requirement of operating the gun may have changed. for instance, the requirements of fire-control have within very recent years compelled the addition of a considerable number of men to the complements of battleships. now the need of supplying enough men to operate successfully any instrument or mechanism is absolute, for the reasons that the number of things to be done is fixed, and that an insufficient number of men in the ratio for instance of to may mean a falling off in the output of the machine much greater than in the ratio of to . a simple illustration may be taken from the baseball game; for it is obvious that the output of a baseball team, in competition with other teams, would fall off in a much greater ratio than of to , by leaving out one member of the nine. another illustration, or rather an analogy, may be found in machinery made of rigid metal--say a steam-engine; for the omission of almost any part in an engine would entirely stop its operation. not only, however, must we see that the number of personnel parts is sufficient, we must see that they are correctly divided among the various material parts; otherwise there will be too many in one place and too few in another; and while it is better to have too many men than too few, too many men prevent the attainment of the maximum effect. the effect of having too few men, however, is not merely in limiting the effectiveness of the output of the machine; for, if carried to a considerable degree, it prevents due care of the material parts themselves, and causes those material parts to deteriorate. this deterioration may take the form of actual wasting away as by rust; but even if the deterioration does not advance so far as actual wastage, it may easily, and often does, advance to the stage where, although not evidenced by visible rust or by any other indication, so long as the mechanism is not operated at its normal rate, it declares itself very clearly as soon as the mechanism is tried in service. for this reason, all mechanicians realize that it is better for every mechanism not to lie idle, but to be used considerably, though, of course, without being forced unduly. not only also must the personnel be sufficient in number and correctly divided, it must be organized in such manner that the personnel itself will have the characteristics of a machine, in the sense that each unit will be so placed relatively to the hope of reward and the fear of punishment, that he will do his allotted tasks industriously; that he will have the place in the organization for which his character and abilities fit him, and that he will be given such duties and exercises as will fit him more and more for his position, and more and more for advancement to positions higher. not only this, we must exercise foresight in the endeavor that the material parts and the personnel parts shall be ready at the same time, so that neither will have to wait for the other; and to insure the immediate availability when war breaks out, of sufficient trained personnel to man and fight effectively all the material units that we shall need to use. this raises the question: "what units shall we need?" the government itself must, of course, decide this matter; but it may be pointed out that if in any considerable war every unit we possess should not be utilized, the navy could not do as effective work as it otherwise could do. in the present war, the belligerents have not only utilized all the units that they had, they have built very many more, using the utmost possible diligence and despatch. in case we should be drawn into war with any considerable naval nation, all history and all reasoning show that we must do the same. few considerable wars have been waged except with the greatest energy on each side; for each side knows that the scale may be turned by a trifling preponderance on one side; and that if the scale once be turned, it will be practically impossible ever to restore the balance. every advantage gained makes one side relatively weaker to the other than it was before, and increases the chance that the same side will gain another advantage; gains and losses are cumulative in their effect. for this reason, it is essential, if we are to wage war successfully, that we start right, and send each unit immediately out to service, manned with a highly trained and skilful personnel; because that is what our foe will do. the germans meet the difficulty of keeping their personnel abreast of their material very wisely. they utilize the winter months, when naval operations are almost impossible, for reorganizing and rearranging their personnel; so that when spring comes, they are ready in all their ships to start the spring drilling on a systematic plan. the crews being already organized, and the scheme of drills well understood, the work of getting the recruits versed in their relatively simple tasks and the more experienced men skilled in their new positions is quickly accomplished, and the fleet is soon ready for the spring maneuvers. the fundamental requirement of any organization of men is that it shall approach as closely as possible the characteristics of an organism, in which all the parts, though independent, are mutually dependent, each part doing its appropriate work without interfering with any other, but on the contrary assisting it. the most complex organization in the world is that of a navy, due primarily to the great variety of mechanisms in it, and secondarily to the great variety of trained bodies of men for handling those mechanisms. this variety extends from the highest posts to the lowest; and to make such varied organizations work together to a common end is one of the greatest achievements of civilized man. how it is accomplished is not clear at first view. it is not hard to see how a company of soldiers, drawn up in line, can be made to move as one body by order of the captain. but how in a battleship carrying a thousand men does the coal-passer in the fire-room do as the captain on the bridge desires? it may be objected that he does not--that the captain has no wishes regarding the doings of any coal-passer--that all the captain is concerned with is the doings of the ship as a whole. true, in a way; and yet if the various coal-passers, firemen, quartermasters, _et al_., do not do as the captain wishes, the ship as a whole will not. the secret of the success achieved seems to lie in the knitting together of all the personnel parts by invisible wires of common understanding, analogous to the visible wires that connect the helmsman with the steering-engine. in the case of any small body of men, say the force in one fire-room, the connecting wire joining each man to the petty officer in charge of that fire-room is almost visible, because the petty officer is familiar, by experience, with the work of each man; for he has done that work himself, knows just how it should be done, and knows how to instruct each man. but the more complicated the organization is, the more invisible are the communicating wires that tie the men together, and yet the more important it is that those wires shall tie them; it is even more important, for instance, that the wires connecting the chief engineer with all his force shall operate than that the wires in any one fire-room shall operate. and yet not only are there more wires, but the wires themselves that connect the chief engineer to all the men below him, are longer and more subject to derangement, than the wires that connect the petty officer of one fire-room to the individuals under him. the chief engineer, of course, is not tied directly to his coal-passers, but to men close to himself; close not only in actual distance, but in experience, knowledge, and sympathy; men who speak the same languages as he does, who understand what he means when he speaks, and who speak to him in ways he understands. these men immediately under him are similarly tied to their immediate subordinates by wires of knowledge, experience, and sympathy--these to their immediate subordinates, and so on. the same statement applies to the captain in his relations with the chief engineer. the captain may not be an experienced engineer himself; but he is familiar enough with engineering, with its difficulties, its possibilities, and its aims, to converse with the chief engineer in language which both clearly understand. the same principles seem to apply throughout the whole range of the personnel: so that, no matter how large the organization of any navy may be, there is--there must be, if good work is to be done--a network of invisible wires, uniting all together, by a strong yet flexible bond of sympathy. and has the material of the navy no connection with this bond? who knows! brass and steel are said to be lifeless matter. but does any naval man believe this wholly? does any man feel that those battleships, and cruisers, and destroyers, and submarines are lifeless which he himself--with his own eyes--has seen darting swiftly, precisely, powerfully on perfect lines and curves, changing their relative positions through complicated maneuvers without accident or mistake? can we really believe that they take no part and feel no pride in those magnificent pageants on the ocean? from the earliest times, men have personified ships, calling a ship "he" or "she," and giving ships the names of people, and of states; and is not a ship with its crew a living thing, as much as the body of a man? the body of a man is in part composed of bones and muscles, and other parts, as truly things of matter as are the hull and engines of a ship. it is only the spirit of life that makes a man alive, and permits the members of his body, like the members of a ship, to perform their appointed tasks. but even if this notion seems fanciful and absurd, we must admit that as surely as the mind and brain and nerves and the material elements of a man must be designed and made to work in harmony together, so surely must all the parts of any ship, and all the parts of any navy, parts of material and parts of personnel, be designed and made to work in harmony together; obedient to the controlling mind, and sympathetically indoctrinated with the wish and the will to do as that mind desires. chapter ix preparing the active fleet john clerk, of eldin, scotland, never went to sea, and yet he devised a scheme of naval tactics, by following which the british admiral rodney gained his victory over the french fleet between dominica and guadeloupe in april, . clerk devised his system by the simple plan of thinking intently about naval actions in the large, disregarding such details as guns, rigging, masts, and weather, and concentrating on the movements of the fleets themselves, and the doings of the units of which those fleets were made. he assisted his mental processes by little models of ships, which he carried in his pockets, and which he could, and did, arrange on any convenient table, when he desired to study a problem, or to make a convert. he was enabled by this simple and inexpensive device to see the special problems of fleet tactics more clearly than he could have done by observing battles on board of any ships; for his attention in the ships would have been distracted by the exciting events occurring, by the noise and danger, and by the impossibility of seeing the whole because of the nearness of some of the parts. the amazing result was that he formed a clearer concept of naval tactics than any admiral of his time, finally overcame the natural prejudice of the british navy, and actually induced rodney to stake on the suggestion of a non-military civilian his own reputation and the issue of a great sea fight. furthermore, the issue was crowned with success. nothing could be simpler than clerk's method. it was, of course, applied to tactics, but similar methods are now applied to strategy; for strategy and tactics, as already pointed out, are based on similar principles, and differ mainly in the fact that strategy is larger, covers more space, occupies more time, and involves a greater number of quantities. most of the books on naval strategy go into the subject historically, and analyze naval campaigns, and also describe those measures of foresight whereby nations, notably great britain, have established bases all over the world and built up great naval establishments. these books lay bare the reasons for the large successes that good naval strategy has attained, both in peace and war, and constitute nearly all there is of the science of naval strategy. these books and this method of treating naval strategy are valuable beyond measure; but officers find considerable difficulty sometimes in applying the principles set forth to present problems, because of the paucity of data, the remoteness in time and distance of many of the episodes described, and the consequent difficulty of making due allowance for them. now, no study of naval strategy can be thoroughly satisfactory to a naval officer unless it assists him practically to decide what should be done in order to make the naval forces of his country, including himself, better in whatever will conduce to victory in the next war. therefore, at the various war colleges, although the student is given books on strategy to study, the major part of the training is given by the applicatory method, an extension of clerk's, in which the student applies his own skill to solving war problems, makes his own estimate of the situation, solves each problem in his own way (his solution being afterward criticised by the staff), and then takes part in the games in which the solutions presented are tried out. this procedure recognizes the fact that in any human art and science--say medicine, music, or navigation--it is the art and not the science by which one gets results; that the science is merely the foundation on which the art reposes, and that it is by practice of the art and not by knowledge of the science that skill is gained. this does not mean, of course, that we do not need as much knowledge of the science of naval strategy as we can get; for the reason that the naval profession is a growing profession, which necessitates that we keep the application of the principles of its strategy abreast of the improvements of the times, especially in mechanisms; which necessitates, in turn, that we know what those principles are. the applicatory method bears somewhat the same relation to the method of studying books and hearing lectures that exercises in practical navigation bear to the study of the theory. there is one difference, however, as applied to strategy and navigation, which is that the science of navigation is clearly stated in precise rules and formulæ, and the problems in practical navigation are solved by assigning values to quantities like _a, b, c, d_, etc., in the formulæ, and working out the results by mathematics; whereas in strategy, no exact science exists, there are no formulæ, and even the number of assured facts and principles is small. for this reason the art of strategy is more extensive and significant relatively to its science than is the art of navigation to its science. it is a defect of the historical system that it tends to make men do as people in the past have done--to make them work by rule. clerk's method took no note of what had been done before, but confined itself to working out what should be done at the moment (that is, by what we now call the "applicatory method"), taking account of conditions as they are. by combining the two methods, as all war colleges do now, officers get the good results of both. in the studies and exercises at the war colleges, note is taken of the great events that have gone by, and of the great problems now presented; by studying the historical events, and by solving war problems of the present, a certain knowledge of the science of naval strategy, and a certain skill in the art are gained. the studies and the problems naturally are of war situations. yet every war situation was the result of measures taken in time of peace. if these measures had been unwise on the part of one side--say blue--in the design of certain craft, or the adoption, or failure of adoption, of certain plans, then blue's strategic situation in the war would be more unfavorable than it would have been if the measures had been wise. this proves that it is not only in war that strategy should be consulted; that strategy should be made to perform important services in peace as well; that strategic considerations should be the guide to all measures great and small, that not only the major operations in war, but also the minor preparations in peace, should be conducted in accordance with the principles of strategy, and conform to its requirements. by this means, and by this means only, does a system of preparation seem possible in which all shall prepare with the same end in view, and in which, therefore, the best results will be secured in the least time and with the least labor. the naval machine having been designed, the various parts having been furnished by the administrative agencies directing personnel and material, and the consumable stores having been provided by the agencies of supply (all under the guidance and control of strategy, and in accordance with the calculations of logistics), the next step is the same as that with any other machine--to prepare the machine to do its work. the work that strategy has to do in accomplishing the preparation is only in planning; but this planning is not limited to general planning, for it extends to planning every procedure of training and administration, no matter how great or how small. it plans the mobilization of the navy as a whole, the exercises of the fleet, the training of officers and men to insure that the plans for mobilization and fleet exercises shall be efficiently carried out, the exercises of the various craft, and of the various mechanisms of all kinds in those craft, and even the drills of the officers and men, that insure that the various craft and mechanisms shall be handled well. this does not mean that strategy concerns itself directly with the training of mess cooks and coal-passers; and it may be admitted that such training is only under strategy's general guidance. it may be admitted, also, that a considerable part of the training of men in using mechanisms is caused by the requirements of the mechanism itself; that practically the same training is needed for a water-tender in the merchant service as for a water-tender in the navy. nevertheless, we must either declare that the training of mechanicians in the nary has no relation to the demands of preparation of the navy for war, or else admit that the training comes under the broad dominion of strategy. to admit this does not mean at all that the training of a naval radio electrician is not directed in its details almost wholly by electrical engineering requirements; it merely means that the training must be such as to fulfil the requirements of strategy, for otherwise it would have no value. no matter how well trained a man might be in radio work, his work would be useless for naval purposes, if not made useful by being adapted to naval requirements. the fact that strategy controls the training of radio electricians through the medium of electrical means is only one illustration of another important fact, which is that in all its operations strategy directs the methods by which results are to be attained, and utilizes whatever means, even technical means, are the most effective and appropriate. the naval machine having been designed as to both personnel and material, strategy has nothing to do with the material in preparing the machine for use, because the material parts are already prepared, and it is the work of engineering to keep those material parts in a state of continual preparedness. it must be noted, however, that the naval machine differs from most material machines in that its various parts, material as well as personnel, are continually being replaced by newer parts, and added to by parts of novel kinds. strategy must be consulted, of course, in designing the characteristics of the newer and the novel parts; but this work properly belongs in the designing stage, and not in the preparation stage. strategy's work, therefore, in preparing the naval machine for work consists wholly in preparing the personnel. this preparing may be divided into two parts--preparing the existing fleet already mobilized and preparing the rest of the navy. _preparing the fleet_.--the fleet itself is always ready. this does not mean that, in time of profound peace, every ship in the fleet has all its men on board, its chain hove short, and its engines ready to turn over at a moment's notice; but it does mean that this condition is always approximated in whatever degree the necessities of the moment exact. normally, it is not necessary to keep all the men on board; but whenever, or if ever, it becomes so necessary, the men can be kept on board and everything made ready for instant use. it is perfectly correct, therefore, to say that, so far as it may be necessary, a fleet in active commission is always ready. _training_.--before this state of readiness can be attained, however, a great deal of training has to be carried out; and this training must naturally be designed and prosecuted solely to attain this end. unless this end be held constantly in view, and unless the methods of training be adapted to attain it, the training cannot possibly be effective. to go from any point to another point, one must proceed in the correct direction. if he proceeds in another direction, he will miss the point. the training of the fleet naturally must be in doing the things which the fleet would have to do in war. to decide what things these will probably be, resort must be had to the teachings of history, especially the most recent history, and to the teachings of the war problem, the chart maneuver, and the game-board. the part of the personnel which it is the most important to train is, of course, the commander-in-chief himself; and no reason is apparent for supposing that his training should be conducted on principles different from those that control the training of every other person in the fleet. men being the same in general, their qualities differing only in degree, it is logical to conclude that, if a gun-pointer or coxswain is best trained by being made first to understand the principles that underlie the correct performance of his work, and then by being given a good deal of practice in performing it, a commander-in-chief, or a captain, engineer, or gunner, can be best trained under a similar plan. knowledge and practice have always been the most effective means of acquiring skill, and probably will continue to be the best for some time to come. owing to the fact that navies have been in existence for many years, the general qualifications of efficient naval officers are fairly well known; and they have always been the same in the most important particulars, though the recent coming of scientific apparatus has made available and valuable certain types of men not especially valuable before this scientific apparatus appeared. in all navies, and equally in all armies, the qualification that has been the most important has been character. to insure, or rather to do the utmost toward insuring, proper character in its officers, all countries for many years have educated certain young men of the country to be officers in the army and navy, and they have educated young men for no other service. if knowledge were the prime requirement, special training for young men would not be needed; the various educational institutions could supply young men highly educated; and if the government were to take each year a certain number of graduates who could pass certain examinations, the educational institutions would be glad to educate young men to pass them. in securing young men of proper education and physique, little difficulty would be found. special schools could even give sufficient instruction in military and maritime subjects to enable young men to become useful in minor positions on shipboard and in camp, after a brief experience there. in fact, for some of the positions in the army and navy, such as those in the medical corps and others, military or naval training is not needed, or exacted. the truth of these remarks is not so obvious now as it was some years ago, and it has never been so obvious in navies as in armies; because education in the use of the numerous special appliances used in ships could be given less readily by private instruction than in the use of the simpler appliances used in armies. but even now, and even in the navy, the course given at annapolis is usually termed a "training" rather than an education. yet even education, educators tell us, is more a matter of training than a matter of imparting knowledge. this indicates that even for the duties of civil life, the paramount aim of educators is so to train the characters of young men as to fit them for good citizenship. we may assume, therefore, that the primary aim of governments in preparing young men for the army and navy is to develop character along the line needed for useful work in those services. what is that line? probably nine officers in ten would answer this question with the words, "the line of duty." this does not mean that officers are the only people who should be trained to follow the line of duty; but it does mean that, in military and naval schools, the training is more devoted to this than in other schools, except, of course, those schools that train young men for the priesthood or other departments of the religious life. the analogy between the clerical and the military professions in this regard has been pointed out many times; but perhaps the closeness with which the medical profession approximates both in its adherence to the line of duty has not been appreciated as fully as it should be. _duty_.--the reason for the predominance of the idea of duty over any other in naval training is due, of course, to a realization of the fact that more can be accomplished by officers having a strict sense of duty though otherwise lacking, than by officers having any or all the other qualifications, but lacking the sense of duty. as an extreme instance of the doubtful value of highly trained officers who lack the sense of duty, we need but to point to those traitors who, in the past, have turned their powers in the hour of need against the cause they were engaged to fight for. one cannot pursue the path of duty when that path becomes difficult or disagreeable unless the sense of duty is so strong as to resist the temptation to leave the path. to train a man to be strong in this way, we train his character. there are several ways in which a man is tempted to leave the line of duty; of these perhaps the most important are danger, sloth, and love of pleasure. no human being is perfectly strong along any of these lines; and some are most tempted by danger, some by sloth, and some by love of pleasure. sloth and the love of pleasure do not act as hinderances to efficiency in the naval profession any more than they do in other callings. there is no profession, business, or vocation, in which a man's efficiency does not depend largely on his power of resistance to the allurement of sloth and pleasure. in all walks of life, including the usual routine of the naval life, these two factors are the main stumbling-blocks to the success of any man. that is, they are the main stumbling-blocks that training can remove or lessen; the main stumbling-blocks in the way of his attaining that degree of efficiency for which his mental and physical abilities themselves would fit him. natural abilities are not here considered; we are considering merely what training can do to develop men as they are for the naval life. _courage_.--danger is the special influence to divert a man from duty's line that is distinctive of the army and the navy; and therefore to secure ability to overcome this influence is the distinct effort of military training. to train a young man for the army, the training naturally is directed toward minimizing the influence of one class of dangers; while to train a young man for the navy, the training must be directed toward minimizing the influence of another class. of course training toward courage in any line develops courage in other lines; but nevertheless a naval training does not enable a man to ride a plunging cavalry horse with equanimity; nor does training as a cavalryman wholly fit a man to brave the dangers of the deep in a submarine. thirty years ago, the present writer showed commander royal bird bradford, u. s. n., the wonders of the u. s. s. _atlanta_, the first ship of what americans then called "the new navy." when i showed bradford the conning-tower, i remarked that many captains who had visited the _atlanta_ had said that they would not go into the conning-tower in battle. to this bradford replied: "the captain who would not go into the conning-tower in battle would be very brave, but he'd be a d----d fool." the obvious truth of this remark, the intimate connection which it suggested between courage and folly, and the fact often noted in life that to be brave is often to be foolish, contrasted with the fact that in all history the virtue of courage in men has been more lauded than any other virtue, suggests that a brief inquiry into the nature and influence of courage may be interesting. the definitions of courage found in the dictionary are most unsatisfactory, except that they say that the word "courage" comes from the latin "cor," the heart; showing that it is deemed a moral quality, rather than physical or mental. yet the deeds of courage that history and fiction tell, have been deeds of what we call "physical courage," in which heroes and heroines have braved death and physical suffering. far in the background are deeds of "moral courage," though many wise men have told us that "moral courage" is a quality higher than "physical courage," and more important. it is a little difficult to make a clear picture of courage that is physical, as distinguished from courage that is moral; or moral as distinguished from physical. courage seems to be a quality so clearly marked as to be hardly qualifiable by any adjective except an adjective indicating degree--such as "great" or "little"; but if any other adjective may be applied to it, the adjective "moral" seems to be the only one. for courage, no matter how or why displayed, is from its very essence, moral. strictly speaking, how can there be any courage except moral courage? if a man braves death or physical suffering, the quality that enables him to brave it is certainly not physical; certainly it does not pertain to the physical body. the "first law of nature" impels him to escape or yield; and it impels him with a powerful force. if this force be not successfully resisted, the man will yield. now the act of resisting a temptation to escape a physical danger is due to a more or less conscious desire to preserve one's self-respect and the respect of one's fellow men; and therefore, the best way in which to train a man to be brave is to cultivate his self-respect and a desire to have the respect of his fellow men; and to foster the idea that he will lose both if he acts in a cowardly way. naturally, some men are more apt to be cowards as regards physical dangers than are others; and men differ greatly in this way. men of rugged physique, dull imagination, and sluggish nerves are not so prone to fear of physical danger, especially danger far ahead in the future, as are men of delicate physique, keen imagination, and highly strung nervous system; and yet men of the latter class sometimes surpass men of the former class when the danger actually arrives--they seem to have prepared themselves for it, when men of the former class seem in a measure to be taken by surprise. it is the attainment of physical courage, or courage to defy a threat of physical injury, that military training aims at. that it has done so successfully in the past, the history of the valiant deeds of sailors and soldiers bears superabundant witness. this courage has been brought out because it was essential. courage is to a man what strength is to structural materials. no matter how physically strong and mentally equipped a man may be; no matter how perfectly designed and constructed an engine may be, neither the man nor the engine will "stand up to the work," unless the courage in the one case, and the strength of the materials in the other case, are adequate to the stress. while perfect courage would enable a man to approach certain death with equanimity, all that is usually demanded of a man is that he shall dare to risk death, if need be. to do this successfully, a great assistance is a knowledge that even if things look bad, the danger is not so great as it appears. therefore, training confronts men frequently with situations that look dangerous, but which skill and coolness can avert. in this way, the pupil becomes familiar with the face of danger, and learns that it is not so terrible as it seems. nothing else makes a man so brave regarding a certain danger as to have met that danger successfully before. this statement must be qualified with the remark that in some cases a danger, although passed successfully, has been known to do a harm to the nervous system from which it never has recovered. this is especially the case if it was accompanied with a great and sudden noise and the evidence of great injury to others. in cases like this, the shock probably comes too abruptly to enable the man to prepare himself to receive it. the efficacy of a little preparation, even preparation lasting but a few seconds, is worthy of remark. two theories connecting fear and trembling may be noted here: one that a person trembles because he fears; the other, and later, that trembling is automatic, and that a person fears _because he trembles_. but the influence of fear is not only to tempt a man to turn his back on duty and seek safety in flight, for it affects him in many degrees short of this. sometimes, in fact usually, it prevents the accurate operation of the mind in greater or less degree. here again training comes to the rescue, by so habituating a man to do his work in a certain way (loading a gun for instance) that he will do it automatically, and yet correctly, when his mind is almost paralyzed for a time. a very few men are so constituted that danger is a stimulus to not only their physical but their mental functions; so that they never think quite so quickly and so clearly as when in great danger. such men are born commanders. discussion of such an abstract thing as courage may seem out of place in a discussion of "naval strategy"; but while it is true that naval strategy is largely concerned with mental operations, while courage is a moral or spiritual quality, yet strategy concerns itself with the securing of all means to victory, and of these means courage is more important than any other one thing. one plan or one system of training may be better than another; but they differ only in degree, and if one plan fails another may be substituted; but if courage be found lacking, there is no substitute on earth. now, if courage is to be inculcated by some system of training, surely it is not amiss to devote a few minutes to an analysis of the nature of courage, to seek what light we can get as to the best methods of training to employ. _responsibility_.--there is one form of courage which most men are never called upon to use, and that is willingness to take responsibility. most men are never confronted with a situation requiring them to take it. to naval men, however, the necessity comes often, even to naval men in the lower grades; for they are often confronted with situations in which they can accept or evade responsibility. that courage is needed, no one can doubt who has had experience. to accept responsibility, however, is not always best either for the individual or for the cause; often it were better to lay the responsibility on higher authority, by asking for instructions. but the same remark is true of all uses of courage; it is not always best to be brave, either for the individual or for the cause. both the individual and the cause can often be better served by prudence than by her big brother courage. when, however, the conditions require courage in any form, such as willingness to accept responsibility, the man in charge of the situation at the moment must use courage, or--fail. in such cases the decision rests with the man himself. he cannot shift it to another's shoulders, even if he would. even if he decides and acts on the advice of others, the responsibility remains with him. _from the top down, or from the bottom up?_--there are two directions in which to approach the subject of training the personnel--from the top down, and from the bottom up. the latter is the easier way; is it the better? the latter is the easier way, because it is quicker and requires less knowledge. in training a turret crew in this way, for instance, one does not have to consider much outside of the turret itself. the ammunition can be sent up and down, and the guns can be loaded, pointed, and fired with just as much quickness and accuracy as is humanly practicable, without much reference to the ship itself, the fleet, or the navy. in fact, knowledge of outside requirements hinders in some ways rather than advances training of this kind. knowledge, for instance, of the requirements of actual battle is a distinct brake on many of the activities of mere target practice. but while it is easier to train in this way all the various bodies of men that must be trained, it is obvious that by training them wholly without reference to the requirements of the fleet as a whole, the best result that we could expect would be a number of bodies of men, each body well trained as a unit, but the combined units not trained at all as component elements of the whole. the result would be a little like what one would expect from the efforts of an orchestra at playing a selection which the whole orchestra had never played before together, but of which each member of the orchestra had previously learned his part, and played it according to his own ideas, without consulting the orchestra leader. by approaching the subject from the other direction, however, that is, from the top, the training of each organization within the fleet is arranged with reference to the work of the fleet as a whole, the various features of the drills of each organization being indicated by the conditions developed by that work. if this plan be carried out, a longer time will be required to drill the various bodies of men; but when it has been accomplished, those bodies will be drilled, not only as separate bodies, but as sympathetic elements of the whole. of course the desirability of drilling separate divisions of a fleet, ana separate ships, turret crews, fire-control parties, and what-not, in accordance with the requirements of fleet work does not prevent them from drilling by themselves as often as they wish--any more than the necessity of drilling in the orchestra prevents a trombone player from practising on his instrument as much as the police will let him. thus the fact of keeping a fleet together does more than merely give opportunity for acquiring skill in handling the fleet itself, and in handling the various ships so that they will work together as parts of the fleet machine; because it shows each of the various smaller units within the ships themselves how to direct its training. for this reason, the idea so often suggested of keeping the fleet normally broken up into smaller parts, those parts close enough together to unite before an enemy could strike, is most objectionable. it is impossible to keep the fleet together all the time, because of needed repairs, needed relaxation, and the necessity for individual drills that enable a captain or division commander to strengthen his weak points; but nevertheless since the "mission" of training is to attain fighting efficiency in the fleet as a whole, rather than to attain fighting efficiency in the various parts; and since it can be attained only by drilling the fleet as a whole, the decision to keep the fleet united as much as practicable seems inevitably to follow. besides, the statement cannot be successfully controverted that difficult things are usually not so well done as easy things, that drills of large organizations are more difficult than drills of small organizations, and that in every fleet the drills that are done the worst are the drills of the fleet as a whole. how could anything else be expected, when one considers how much more often, for instance, a turret crew is exercised at loading than the fleet is exercised at the difficult movement of changing the "line of bearing"? the older officers remember that for many years we carried on drills at what we called "fleet tactics," though we knew they were only tactical drills. they were excellent in the same sense as that in which the drill of the manual of arms was excellent, or the squad exercises given to recruits. they were necessary; but beyond the elementary purpose of training in ship handling in fleet movements, they had no "end in view"; they were planned with a limited horizon, they were planned from the bottom. _general staff_.--in order to direct the drills of a fleet toward some worthy end, that end itself must be clearly seen; and in order that it may be clearly seen, it first must be discovered. the end does not exist as a bright mark in the sky, but as the answer to a difficult problem; it cannot be found by guessing or by speculating or by groping in the dark. strategy says that the best way in which to find it is by the "estimate of the situation" method. owing to the fact that the commander-in-chief and all his personnel are, by the nature of the conditions surrounding them, on executive duty, the working out of the end in view of any extensive drills seems the task of the navy department; while the task of attaining it seems to belong to the commander-in-chief. owing to the present stage of electrical progress, the navy department has better means of ascertaining the whole naval situation than has the commander-in-chief, and if officers (general staff) be stationed at the department to receive and digest all the information received, and decide on the best procedure in each contingency as it arises, the navy department can then give the commander-in-chief the information he requires and general instructions how to proceed. this does not mean that the department would "interfere" with the commander-in-chief, but simply that it would assist him. the area of discretion of the commander-in-chief should not be invaded; for if it be invaded, not only may orders be given without knowledge of certain facts in the commander-in-chief's possession, but the commander-in-chief will have his difficulties increased by the very people who are trying to help him. he may be forced into disobeying orders, a most disturbing thing to have to do; and he will surely be placed in a position of continuous doubt as to what is expected of him. of course, it must be realized that the difficulties of co-operating with a commander-in-chief at sea, by means of even the most expert general staff, are of the highest order. it is hard to imagine any task more difficult. it must be accomplished, however, or else there will be danger all the time that the commander-in-chief will act as he would not act if he had all the information that the department had. this suggests at once that the proper office of the department is merely to give the commander-in-chief information and let him act on his own judgment. true in a measure; but the commander-in-chief must be given some instructions, even if they be general, for the reason that the commander-in-chief is merely an instrument for enforcing a certain policy. clearly, he must know what the policy is, what the department desires; and the mere statement of the department's desires is of itself an order. if it is admitted that the commander-in-chief is to carry out the orders of the department, it remains merely to decide in how great detail those orders ought to be. no general answer can be given to the question: "in what detail shall the orders be?" the general statement can be made, however, that the instructions should be confined as closely as practicable to a statement of the department's desires, and that this statement should be as clear as possible. if, for instance, the only desire of the department is that the enemy's fleet shall be defeated, no amplification of this statement is required. but if the department should desire, for reasons best known to itself, that the enemy should be defeated by the use of a certain method, then that should be stated also. maybe it would not be wise for the department to state the method the employment of which is desired; maybe the commander-in-chief would be the best judge of the method to be employed. but maybe circumstances of governmental policy dictate the employment of a certain method, even if militarily it is not the best; and maybe also the department might prefer that method by reason of information recently received, which it does not have time to communicate in full. now, if it is desirable for the department to give the commander-in-chief instructions, running the risk of invading his "area of discretion," and of doing other disadvantageous things, it is obvious that the department should be thoroughly equipped for doing it successfully. this means that the department should be provided not only with the most efficient radio apparatus that can be secured, manned, of course, by the most skilful operators, but also with a body of officers capable of handling that particular part of the navy department's work which is the concentrated essence of all its work, the actual handling of the naval forces. the usual name given to such a body of officers is "general staff." such bodies of officers have been developed in navies in recent years, by a desire to take advantage of electrical appliances which greatly increase the accuracy and rapidity of communication over long distances. in days not long ago, before communication by radio was developed, commanders on the spot were in possession of much more information about events in their vicinity, compared with the navy department, than they are now; and the difficulties and uncertainties of communication made it necessary to leave much more to their discretion and initiative. the president of the united states can now by telephone talk to the commander-in-chief, when he is in home waters, and every day sees some improvement in this line. this facility of communication carries with it, of course, the danger of "interfering," one of the most frequent causes of trouble in the past, in conducting the operations of both armies and fleets--a danger very real, very insidious, and very important. the very ease with which interference can be made, the trained instinct of the subordinate to follow the wishes of his superior if he can, the temptation to the superior to wield personally some military power and get some military glory, conspire to bring about interference. this is only an illustration, however, of the well-known fact that every power can be used for evil as well as for good, and is not a valid argument against developing to the utmost the communication between the department and the fleet. it is, however, a very valid argument against developing it unless there be developed simultaneously some means like a "safety device" for preventing or at least discouraging its misuse. the means devised is the general staff; and in some countries like germany it seems to work so well that (unless our information is incorrect) the emperor himself does not interfere. he gives the machine a certain problem to work out, and he accepts the answer as the answer which has a greater probability of being correct than any answer he could get by other means. _training of the staff_.--now, if there is to be at the navy department a body of men who will work out and recommend what instructions should be given to the commander-in-chief, it seems obvious that that body of men should be thoroughly trained. in the german army the training of men to do this work (general staff work) is given only to officers specially selected. certain young officers who promise well are sent to the war college. those who show aptitude and industry are then put tentatively into the general staff. those who show marked fitness in their tentative employment are then put into the general staff, which is as truly a special corps as is our construction corps. how closely this system is followed with the general staff in the german navy, the present writer does not know exactly; but his information is that the system in the navy is copied (though with certain modifications) after the system in the army. how can the general staff at the navy department be trained? in the same way as that in which officers at the war college are trained: by study and by solving war problems by tactical and strategical games. the training would naturally be more extended, as it would be a postgraduate course. there is a difference to be noted between games like war games in which the mental powers are trained, and games like billiards, in which the nerves and muscles receive practically all the training; and the difference refers mainly to the memory. games of cards are a little like war games; and many books on games of cards have been written, expounding the principles on which they rest and giving rules to follow. these books may be said to embody a science of card-playing. no such book on naval strategy has appeared; and the obvious reason is that only a few rules of naval strategy have been formulated. staff training, therefore, cannot be given wholly by studying books; but possibly the scheme suggested to the department by the writer, when he was aid for operations, may be developed into a sort of illustrative literature, which can assist the memory. by this scheme, a body of officers at the navy department would occupy their time wholly in studying war problems by devising and playing strategical and tactical games ashore and afloat. after each problem had been solved to the satisfaction of the staff, each distinctive situation in the approved solution would be photographed in as small a space as practicable, preferably on a moving-picture film. in the solution of problem ; for instance, there might be situations and therefore photographs. these photographs, shown in appropriate succession, would furnish information analogous to the information imparted to a chess student by the statement of the successive moves in those games of chess that one sees sometimes in books on chess and in newspapers. now if the film photographs were so arranged that the moves in the approved solution of, say, problem could be thrown on a screen, as slowly and as quickly as desired, and if the film records of a few hundred such games could be conveniently arranged, a very wide range of situations that would probably come up in war would be portrayed; and the moves made in handling those situations would form valuable precedents for action, whenever situations approximating them should come up in war. it must be borne in mind that in actual life, our only real guide to wise action in any contingency that may arise is a memory, more or less consciously realized, of how a similar contingency has been met, successfully or unsuccessfully, in the past. perhaps most of us do not realize that it is not so much experience that guides us as our memory of experiences. therefore in the training of both officers and enlisted men in strategy, tactics, seamanship, gunnery, engineering, and the rest, the memory of how they, or some one else, did this well and that badly (even if the memory be hardly conscious) is the immediate agency for bringing about improvement. imagine now a strategical system of training for the navy, in which a body of highly trained officers at the department will continuously regulate the exercises of the fleet, guided by the revelations of the _kriegspiel:_ the commander-in-chief will direct the activities of the main divisions of the fleet, carrying out the department's scheme; the commander of each division will regulate the activities of the units of his command in accordance with the fleet scheme; the officer in command of each unit of each division will regulate the activities of each unit in his ship, destroyer, submarine, or other craft in accordance with the division scheme; and every suborganization, in every ship, destroyer, or other craft will regulate likewise the activities of its members; so that the navy will resemble a vast and efficient organism, all the parts leagued together by a common understanding and a common purpose; mutually dependent, mutually assisting, sympathetically obedient to the controlling mind that directs them toward the "end in view." it must be obvious, however, that in order that the navy shall be like an organism, its brain (the general staff) must not be a thing apart, but must be of it, and bound to every part by ties of sympathy and understanding. it would be possible to have a staff excellent in many ways, and yet so out of touch with the fleet and its practical requirements that co-ordination between the two would not exist. analogous conditions are sometimes seen in people suffering from a certain class of nervous ailments; the mind seems unimpaired, but co-ordination between the brain and certain muscles is almost wholly lacking. to prevent such a condition, therefore, the staff must be kept in touch with the fleet; and it must also permit the fleet to keep in touch with the staff, by arranging that, accompanying the system of training, there shall be a system of education which will insure that the general plan will be understood throughout the fleet; and that the means undertaken to execute it will be made sufficiently clear to enable each person to receive the assistance of his own intelligence. no man can do his best work in the dark. darkness is of itself depressing; while light, if not too intense, stimulates the activities of every living thing. this does not mean that every mess attendant in the fleet should be put into possession of the war plans of the commander-in-chief, that he should be given any more information than he can assimilate and digest, or than he needs, to do his work the best. just how much information to impart, and just how much to withhold are quantitative questions, which can be decided wisely by only those persons who know what their quantitative values are. this is an important matter, and should be dealt with as such by the staff itself. to get the maximum work out of every man is the aim of training; to get the maximum work that shall be effective in attaining the end in view, training must be directed by strategy, because strategy alone has a clear knowledge of what is the end in view. _stimuli_.--some men are so slothful that exertion of any kind is abhorrent to them; but these men are few, and are very few indeed among a lot of healthy and normal men such as fill a navy. an office boy, lazy beyond belief in the work he is engaged to do, will go through the most violent exertions at a baseball game; and a darky who prefers a soft resting-place in the shade of an umbrageous tree to laboring in the fields will be stirred to wild enthusiasm by a game of "craps." now why are the office boy and the darky stimulated by these games? by the elements of competition, chance, and possible danger they bring out and the excitement thereby engendered. training, therefore introduces these elements into drills as much as it can. competition alone does not suffice, otherwise all men would play chess; competition and chance combined are not enough, or gentlemen would not need the danger of losing money to make card games interesting; but any game that brings in all three elements will rouse the utmost interest and activity of which a man is capable. games involving these three elements are known by many names; one name is "poker," another name is "business," and another name is "politics." there are many other games besides, but the greatest of all is strategy. now in the endeavor to prepare a fleet by training, no lack of means for exciting interest will be found; in fact no other training offers so many and so great a variety of means for introducing the elements of competition, chance, and danger. the problem is how best to employ them. to do this successfully, it must be realized, of course, that the greatest single factor in exciting interest is the personal factor, since comparatively few men can get much interested in a matter that is impersonal; a boy is more interested in watching a baseball game in which he knows some of the players than in watching a game between teams neither of which he has ever seen; and the men in any ship are more interested in the competition between their ship and some other than between any other two; feeling that _esprit de corps_ by reason of which every individual in every organization personifies the organization as a living thing of which he himself is part. _strategic problems_.--the training of the fleet, then, can best be done under the direction of a trained staff, that staff generously employing all the resources of competition, chance, and danger. the obvious way to do this is to give out to the fleet for solution a continual succession of strategic problems, which the entire fleet will be engaged in solving, and which will be the starting-point for all the drills of the fleet and in the fleet. (some officers prefer the word "maneuver" to "problem.") the arranging of a continual series of war problems, or maneuvers to be worked out in the fleet by "games," will call for an amount of strategical skill second only to the skill needed for operations in war, will deal with similar factors and be founded on similar principles. naturally, the war problems, before being sent to the fleet for solving, would be solved first by the staff, using strategical and tactical games, and other appropriate means; and inasmuch as the scheme of education and training is for the benefit of the staff itself, as well as for the benefit of the fleet, certain members of the staff would go out with the fleet to note in what ways, each problem sent down was defective, in what ways good--and in what ways it could be modified with benefit. the successive situations and solutions, made first by the staff and subsequently by the fleet, can then be photographed and made part of the history of war problems, for the library of the staff. in laying out the war problems, the staff will be guided naturally by the ends in view--first to work out solutions of strategic, logistic, and tactical situations in future wars, and second to give opportunity to the various divisions, ships, turret crews, engineers' forces, etc., for drills that will train them to meet probable contingencies in future wars. this double end will not be so difficult of attainment as might at first sight seem, for the reason that the solution of any problem which represents a situation actually probable will automatically provide all the minor situations necessary to drill the various bodies; and the more inherently probable a situation is, the more probable will be the situations in which the various flag-officers, captains, quartermasters, engineers' forces, turret crews, etc., will find themselves. of course, the prime difficulty in devising realistic problems is the fact that in war our whole fleet would be employed together against an enemy fleet; and as the staff cannot supply an enemy fleet, it must either imagine an enemy fleet, divert a small part of our fleet to represent an enemy fleet, or else divide our fleet into two approximately equal parts, one "red," and one "blue." _first scheme_.--the first scheme has its usefulness in working out the actual handling of the fleet as a whole; and considering the purposes of strategy only, is the most important, though, of course, "contacts" with the enemy cannot be simulated. from the standpoint of fleet tactical drill, and the standpoint of that part of strategy which arranges for handling large tactical situations with success, it is useful, since it provides for the tactical handling of the entire fleet. this certainly is important; for if the personnel are to be so trained that the actual fleet shall be handled with maximum effectiveness in battle, training in handling that actual fleet must frequently be had; the fleet is a machine, and no machine is complete if any of its parts is lacking. it may be objected that it is not necessary for the staff at the department to devise such training, because drills of the entire fleet can be devised and carried out by the commander-in-chief; in fact that that is what he is for. this, of course, is partly true; and it is not the idea of the author that the staff in the department should interfere with any scheme of drills that the commander-in-chief desires to devise and carry out; but it is his idea that the staff should arrange problems to be worked out by the fleet, in which the tactical handling of the fleet should be subordinate to, and carried out for, a strategic purpose. a very simple drill would be the mere transfer of the fleet to a distant point, when in supposititious danger from an enemy, employing by day and night the scouting and screening operations that such a trip would demand. another drill would be the massing of previously separated forces at a given place and time; still another would be the despatching of certain parts of the fleet to certain points at certain times. the problems need not be quite so simple as these, however; for they can include all the operations of a fleet under its commander-in-chief up to actual contact; the commander-in-chief being given only such information as the approximate position, speed, and course of the enemy at a given time, with orders to intercept him with his whole force; or he may be given information that the enemy has divided his force, that certain parts were at certain places going in certain directions at certain speeds at certain times, and he may be directed to intercept those supposititious parts; that is, to get such parts of his fleet as he may think best to certain places at certain times. of the strategic value to the staff of the practical solutions of this class of problems by the fleet, there can be little question; and the records made if kept up to date, would give data in future wars for future staffs, of what the whole fleet, and parts of it acting with the fleet, can reasonably be expected to accomplish, especially from the standpoint of logistics. and it has the advantage of dealing with only one thing; the actual handling of the actual fleet, uncomplicated by other matters, such as interference by an enemy. for the reason, however, that it leaves out of consideration the effects of scouting and of contacts with the enemy, it is incomplete. _second scheme_.--to remedy this incompleteness, resort may be had to the device of detaching a few vessels from the fleet and making each represent a force of the enemy; one destroyer, for instance, to represent a division, four destroyers four divisions, etc. this scheme has the advantage that all the capital ships can be handled together, and that, say three-quarters of the destroyers can be handled without much artificiality on the assumption that four-fourths are so handled; while for merely strategic purposes four destroyers, properly separated, can represent four divisions of destroyers very truthfully. this scheme is useful not only strategically but tactically; for the reasons that the contacts made are actual and visible, and that all the personnel on each side are put to doing things much like those they would do in war. the scheme is extremely flexible besides; for the number of ways in which the fleet can be divided is very great, and the number of operations that can be simulated with considerable accuracy is therefore very great also. the training given to the personnel of the fleet is obviously more varied, interesting, and valuable, than in the first scheme; and the records of the solutions (games played) will form instructive documents in the offices of the staff, concerning situations which the first scheme could not bring out. these records, naturally, will not be so simple as those under the first scheme, because many factors will enter in, some of which will bring up debatable points. for when actual contact occurs, but only "constructive" hits by torpedo and gun are made, much room for difference of opinion will occur, and many decisions will be disputed. to decide disputed questions must, of course, rest with the staff; but those questions must be decided, and if correct deductions from the games are to be made, the decisions must be correct. to achieve correctness in decision the members of the staff must be highly trained. to devise and develop a good scheme of staff training, several years may be required. _third scheme_.--the third kind of game is that in which the fleet is divided into two parts, fairly equal in each of the various elements, battleships, battle cruisers, destroyers, submarines, aircraft, etc. this scheme gives opportunity for more realistic situations than the other two, since each side operates and sees vessels and formations similar to those that it would operate and see in war; and it gives opportunity for games which combine both strategical and tactical operations and situations to a greater degree than do the other two schemes. its only weakness is the fact that the entire fleet is not operated as a unit; not even a large fraction, but only about one-half. like each of the other two schemes, however, it has its distinctive field of usefulness. its main advantage is its realism--the fact that two powerful naval forces, each composed of all the elements of a naval force, seek each other out; or else one evades and the other seeks; and then finally they fight a fairly realistic battle; or else one successfully evades the other; or else minor actions occur between detachments, and no major result occurs; just as happens in war. strategically, this scheme is less valuable than the other two; tactically, more so. for the experience and the records of the staff this scheme is less valuable than the other two, but for the training of the fleet it is more so. of course, the division of games for staff and fleet training into three general schemes is arbitrary, and not wholly correct; for no such division really exists, and in practice it would not be observed. the thought of the writer is merely to point out that, in a general way, the schemes may be divided into three classes, and to show the convenience of doing so--or at least of recognizing that there are three general kinds of games, and that each kind has its advantages and likewise its disadvantages. in our navy, only three strategic problems or maneuvers, devised at the department, have been worked out at sea--one in may, and one in october, , and one in august, : all belonged in the second category. they were devised by the general board and the war college, as we had no staff. the solving of the problems by the commander-in-chief aroused the greatest interest not only in the fleet, but in the navy department, in fact, throughout the entire navy, and to a surprising degree throughout the country, especially among the people on the atlantic coast. discussions of the utmost value were aroused and carried on, and a degree of co-operation between the department, the war college, and the fleet, never attained before, was realized. if a routine could be devised whereby such problems could be solved by practical games, say once a month, and the results analyzed and recorded in moving-picture form by the staff in washington, we could see our way in a few years' time to a degree of efficiency in strategy which now we cannot even picture. it would automatically indoctrinate the navy and produce a sympathetic understanding and a common aim, which would permeate the personnel and make the navy a veritable organism. it would attain the utmost attainable by any method now known. attention is respectfully invited to the fact that at the present time naval strategy is mainly an art; that it will probably continue so for many years; that whether a science of naval strategy will ever be formulated need not now concern us deeply, and that the art of naval strategy, like every other art, needs practice for its successful use. naval strategy is so vague a term that most of us have got to looking on it as some mystic art, requiring a peculiar and unusual quality of mind to master; but there are many things to indicate that a high degree of skill in it can be attained by the same means as can a high degree of skill in playing--say golf: by hard work; and not only by hard work, but by doing the same thing--or similar things--repeatedly. now most of us realize that any largely manual art, such as the technic of the piano, needs frequent repetition of muscular actions, in order to train the muscles; but few of us realize how fully this is true of mental arts, such as working arithmetical or strategical problems, though we know how easy it is to "get rusty" in navigation. our mental muscles and whatever nerves co-ordinate them with our minds seem to need fully as much practice for their skilful use as do our physical muscles; and so to attain skill in strategy, we must practise at it. this means that all hands must practise at it--not only the staff in their secret sanctuary, not only the commander-in-chief, not only the division commanders, but, in their respective parts, the captains, the lieutenants, the ensigns, the warrant officers, the petty officers, and the youngest recruits. to get this practice, the department, through the staff, must furnish the ideas, and the commander-in-chief the tools. then, day after day, month after month, and year after year, in port and at sea, by night and by day, the ideas assisted by the tools will be supplying a continuous stimulus to the minds of all. this stimulus, properly directed through the appropriate channels and devoted to wise purposes, will reach the mess attendant, the coal-passer, and the recruit, as well as those in positions more responsible (though not more honorable); and as the harmony of operation of the whole increases, as skill in each task increases, and as a perception of the strategic _why_ for the performance of each task increases, the knowledge will be borne in on all that in useful occupation is to be found the truest happiness; that only uninterested work at any task is drudgery; that interest in work brings skill, that skill brings pleasure in exerting it; and that the greater the number of men engaged together, and the more wise the system under which they work, the greater will be the happiness of each man, and the higher the efficiency of the whole. chapter x reserves and shore stations in the preceding chapter it was pointed out that the work of preparing the naval machine for use could be divided into two parts: preparing the existing fleet and preparing the rest of the navy. the "rest of the navy" consists of the navy department itself, the naval stations, the reserve ships and men, and also the ships and men that must be brought in from civil life. as the department is the agency for preparing the naval stations, the reserves, and the men and ships brought in from civil life, it is clear that the work of preparing the department will automatically prepare the others. the work of preparing any navy department necessitates the preparation and execution of plans, whereby the department itself and all the rest of the navy will be able to pass instantly from a peace footing to a war footing; will be able to pass instantly from a status of leisurely handling and supplying the existing fleet by means of the offices, bureaus, and naval stations, to the status of handling with the greatest possible despatch a force which will be not only much larger, but also much less disciplined and coherent. in time of peace a navy department which is properly administered for times of peace, as most navy departments are, can, by means of its bureaus, naval stations, offices, etc., handle the existing fleet, and also these bureaus, naval stations, offices, etc., by labors which for the most part are matters of routine. the department opens for business at a certain time in the morning and closes at a certain time in the afternoon. during office hours the various officials and their clerks fill a few busy hours with not very strenuous labor, and then depart, leaving their cares behind them. the naval stations are conducted on similar principles; and even the doings of the fleet become in a measure matters of routine. all the ordinary business of life tends to routine, in order that men may so arrange their time, that they may have regular hours for work, recreation, and sleep, and be able to make engagements for the future. but when war breaks out, all routine is instantly abolished. the element of surprise, which each side strives to interject into its operations, is inherently a foe to routine. in a routine life, expected things occur--it is the office of routine to arrange that expected things shall occur, and at expected times; in a routine life one is always prepared to see a certain thing happen at a certain time. surprise breaks in on all this, and makes unexpected things occur, and therefore finds men unprepared. it is the office of surprise to catch men unprepared. appreciating this, and appreciating the value of starting a war by achieving some great success, and of preventing the enemy from so doing, military countries in recent years have advanced more and more their preparations for war, even in time of the profoundest peace, in order that, when war breaks out, they may be prepared either to take the offensive at once, or to repel an offensive at once. with whatever forces a nation expects or desires to fight in a war, no matter whether it will begin on the offensive or begin on the defensive, the value to the nation of those forces will depend on how soon they are gotten ready. in a navy, the active fleet may be considered always ready; but the personnel and the craft of various kinds that must be added to it cannot be added to it as quickly as is desirable--because it is desirable that they should be added immediately, which is impossible. it is not in the nature of things that they should get ready as quickly as a fleet that has been kept ready always; but it is essential that the handicap to the operations of the active fleet, due to the tardiness of its additions, should be kept as small as possible. in other words, whatever additions are to be made to the active fleet should be made as quickly as possible. when the additions are made to the fleet (reserve ships and men, ships and men from civil life, etc.) it is clear that those ships and men should at that time be ready for effective work. if the ships are not in condition for effective work by reason of being out of order, or by reason of the ships from civil life not having been altered to suit their new requirements, or by reason of the men not being thoroughly drilled for their new tasks, considerable time will have to be lost by the necessity of getting the ships and the men into proper condition--or else warlike operations will have to be entered into while unprepared, and the classic _chesapeake-shannon_ tragedy re-enacted. therefore, the endeavor must be strongly made to have ready always all the ships and men that are to be added to the fleet; the ships equipped for their duties in the fleet, and the men drilled for their future tasks. the matter of getting ready the navy ships that are in reserve is largely a matter of getting the men to man them, as the ships themselves are kept in repair, and so in a state of readiness, materially speaking. at least this is the theory; and the successful application of the theory, when tested in practice, depends greatly on how large a proportion of the full complements has been kept on board, and on the amount and nature of the cruising which the vessels in reserve have done. the ideal conditions cannot be reached, unless the full complements have been kept on board, and the ships required to make frequent cruises. of course, such a condition is never met in reserve ships; there would be no reason for putting ships in reserve if they were to be so handled. the more closely, however, a ship is kept in that condition of readiness, the more quickly she can be made absolutely ready in her material condition. unless one realizes how and why ships deteriorate in material, it is surprising to see how many faults develop, when ships in reserve, that are apparently in good condition, are put into active service. trouble is not found, of course, with the stationary parts, like the bottoms, and sides, and decks, so much as with the moving parts, especially the parts that have to move and be steam and gas tight at the same time--the parts found mainly in the steam engineering and ordnance departments. defects in the moving parts, especially in the joints, are not apt to be found out until they are moved, and often not until they are moved under the pressure and with the speeds required in service. now "in service" usually means in service in time of peace; but the service for which those ships are kept in reserve is war service, and the requirements of war service are much more rigorous than those of peace service. objection may be made to this statement by remarking that engines turn around and guns are fired just the same in war as in peace, and that therefore the requirements are identical. true in a measure; but vessels and guns are apt to be forced more in war than in peace; and even if they were not, vessels in time of peace are gotten ready with a considerable degree of deliberation, are manned by well-trained men, and are sent to sea under circumstances which permit of gradually working up to full service requirements. but when reserve vessels are mobilized and sent into service for war, everything is done with the utmost haste; and the men, being hurriedly put on board, cannot possibly be as well trained and as ready to do skilful work as men sent on board in peace time; and when reserve vessels get to sea they may be required immediately to perform the most exacting service. for all these reasons, it is highly desirable--it is essential to adequate preparation--that vessels should be kept in a state of material readiness that is practically perfect. every vessel on board of which defects in material develop after she shall have been put into service, when war breaks out, will be a liability instead of an asset. she will be able to render no effective service, and she will require the expenditure of energy by officers and men, and possibly the assistance of other vessels, when their services are needed for other work. but the problem of how to keep reserve vessels in a state of material readiness is easier than the problem of how to keep the reserve men in a state of personnel readiness, which will insure their reporting on board of the reserve ships quickly enough and with adequate training. this problem is so difficult, and its solution is so important, that in great britain, france, germany, japan, and doubtless other navies, men are compelled to go into the reserves, and to remain in for several years after completing their periods of service in the regular navy. in this way, no breaking away from the navy occurs until after reserve service has been completed, and every man who enlists remains in the navy and is subject to its discipline until his reserve period has been passed. thus the question of the reserve is a question that has been answered in those countries, and is therefore no longer a question in them. if battleship _a_ in any of those countries is to be mobilized, the government knows just who are to go on board and when; and knows that every man has recently served in the regular navy, has been kept in training ever since he left it, and that he is competent to perform the duties of his allotted station in battleship _a_. the problem of getting into service the ships that are to be gotten from the merchant service is more difficult, and is perhaps of more importance; that is, it is more important to get into the service some vessels from the merchant service than some reserve ships; more important, for instance, to get colliers to serve the fleet with coal than to commission some antiquated cruisers. naturally, the number and kinds of ships that need to be provided will depend on the nature of the war--whether, for instance, a very large force is to be sent to the other side of the world, to meet a powerful fleet there, or whether a sudden attack on our atlantic coast is to be repelled. the difference, however, is largely numerical; so that if the plans provide for a sufficient number to take part in the distant expedition, it will be easy to get the appropriate number to meet a coast attack. to receive an attack upon the coast, however, provision must be made for vessels and men not needed on an expedition across the seas--that is, for vessels and men that will defend the coast itself from raids and similar expeditions. the work of preparing all that part of the naval machine which in time of peace is separate from the active fleet is purely one of logistics; it is that part of the preparation which calculates what ways and means are needed, and then supplies those ways and means. logistics, having been told by strategy what strategy plans to do, calculates how many and what kinds of vessels, men, guns, torpedoes, fuel, food, hospital service, ammunition, etc., are needed to make possible the fulfilling of those plans; and then proceeds to provide what it has calculated must be provided. this does not mean that strategy should hold itself aloof from logistics and make arbitrary demands upon it; for such a procedure would result in making demands that logistics could not supply; or, through an underestimate of what logistics can supply, in refraining from demanding as much as could be supplied. logistics, of course, does provide what strategy wants, in so far as it can; but in order that satisfactory results may be obtained, the fullest co-operation between strategy and logistics is essential; and to this end frequent conferences are required between the officers representing both. the logistic work of expanding the naval forces to a war basis may evidently be divided into two parts: the adding of vessels and other craft appropriately equipped and manned to the active fleet, and the establishment of a coast-defense force, which will be distributed along the coast and divided among the most important commercial and strategic centres. _adding to the fleet_.--naturally, the additions to the fleet will depend on the service for which the fleet is intended; that is, on the plans of strategy. if the navy were to be gotten ready for a definite undertaking, then the additions to carry out that undertaking could be calculated and prepared; and of course this condition does come up immediately before any war occurs. but in addition to these preparations which are to be made at the last moment (many of which cannot be made until the last moment), the staff must prepare in the leisure of profound peace for several different contingencies. inasmuch as many of the additions will be needed, no matter with what country the war may come; and inasmuch as the same general kind of additions will be made, it is clear that there must underlie all the various plans one general plan, to which modifications must be made to adapt it to special conditions. and as, no matter whether we are to take the offensive or the defensive, no matter whether the fleet is to go far away or stay near our coast, the matter of additions to it is mainly a matter of degree (whether for instance ten extra colliers are needed or a hundred), it seems clear that the general plan should be the one demanding the greatest additions, so that the modifications to adapt it to special cases would consist merely in making subtractions from it. to carry out this plan, strategy must make a sufficiently grave estimate of the situation; and logistics must make calculations to supply the most difficult demands that the estimate of the situation indicates as reasonable, and then arrange the means to provide what the calculations show. if one has provided a little more than is necessary, it is much easier to leave out something later than it is to add more, if one has not provided enough; and one's natural indolence then acts on the side of safety, since it tends to persuade one not to leave off too much; whereas in the opposite case, it tends to assure him that it is not really necessary to take the trouble to provide what it might be hard to get. _the estimate of the situation.--in no field of strategical work is an accurate estimate of the situation more clearly necessary than when it is to form the basis for the precise calculations of logistics_. general strategical plans require a vividness of imagination and a boldness of conception that find no field for exercise in logistics; and tactics requires a quickness of decision and a forcefulness of execution that neither strategy nor logistics need; but neither strategy nor tactics calls for the mathematical exactness that logistics must have, or be of no avail. yet there will be no use in working out the mathematically correct means to produce certain result, if the real nature of the desired result is underrated; there will be no use in working out laboriously how many ships and tons of coal and oil are needed, if the estimate of the situation, to meet which those ships and coal and oil are needed, is inadequate. the first step, therefore, in providing for the expansion of the navy for war, is to estimate the situation correctly. the greatest difficulty in doing this arises from a species of moral cowardice, which tempts a man to underestimate its dangers, and therefore the means required to meet them. _probably no single cause of defeat in war has been so pregnant with disaster as this failure to make a sufficiently grave estimate of the situation_. sometimes the failure seems due more to carelessness than to cowardice; napoleon's disastrous underestimate of the difficulties of his projected russian campaign seems more due to carelessness than to cowardice; but this may be due to a difficulty of associating cowardice with napoleon. but is it not equally difficult to associate carelessness with napoleon? what professional calculator, what lawyer's clerk was ever more careful than napoleon was, when dealing with problems of war? who was ever more attentive to details, who more industrious, who more untiring? and yet napoleon's plans for his russian campaign were inadequate to an amazing degree, and the inadequacy was the cause of his disaster. but whether the cause was carelessness or moral cowardice on his part, the fact remains that he did not estimate the situation with sufficient care, and make due plans to meet it. this unwillingness to look a difficult situation in the face one can see frequently in daily life. great difficulties seem to appall some people. they hate so much to believe a disaster possible, they fear so much to let themselves or others realize that a danger is impending, they are so afraid that other people will think them "nervous," and they shrink so from recommending measures that would cause great exertions or great expenditures, that they are very prone to believe and say that there is no especial danger, and that whatever danger there may be, can be obviated by measures that are easy and cheap to carry out. if we yield to this feeling, we are guilty of moral cowardice, and we vitiate all the results of all our labors. we _must_ make a correct estimate of the situation--or rather we must estimate the situation to be as grave as it is--or our preparations will be of no avail. if we estimate the situation too gravely, we may spend more money and time on our preparations than is quite needed, and our preparations may be more than adequate. it may be that the preparations which prussia made before for war with france were more than adequate. in fact, it looks as if they were, in view of the extreme quickness with which she conquered france. but does any military writer condemn prussia for having made assurance too sure? _the value of superadequate preparation_.--no, on the contrary. the very reasons that make adequate preparation valuable make superadequate preparation even more valuable. the reason is very clear, as is shown by the table on page illustrating the progressive wasting of fighting forces, which the writer published in the _u. s. naval institute_ in an essay called "american naval policy," in april, .[*] [footnote *: i have recently been informed that lieutenant (now commander) j. v. chase, u. s. n., arrived at practically the same results in by an application of the calculus; and that he submitted them to the u. s. naval war college in a paper headed, "sea fights: a mathematical investigation of the effect of superiority of force in."--b. a. f.] table i ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |col.|col.|col.|col.|col.|col.|col.|col.|col.|col.| | | | | | | | | | | | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------| |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at beginning b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in st a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of st period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in nd a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of nd period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in rd a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of rd period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | | | |etc.| | | | | | | | | |total damage done by a| | | | | | | | | | | | b| | | | | | | | | | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- these tables grew out of an attempt to ascertain how the values of two contending forces change as the fight goes on. the offensive power of the stronger force is placed in the beginning at , in each case, and the offensive power of the weaker force at , , , , , , , , and . these values are, of course, wholly arbitrary, and some may say imaginary; but, as they are intended merely to show the comparative strength of the two forces, they are a logical measure, because numerical; there is always some numerical factor that expresses the comparative value of two contending forces, even though we never know what that numerical factor is. two forces with offensive powers of , and respectively may mean , men opposed to men of equal average individual fighting value, commanded by officers of equal fighting ability; or it may mean ships opposed to like ships, manned by officers and men of equal numbers and ability; or it may mean two forces of equal strength, as regards number of men, ships, and guns, but commanded by officers whose relative ability is as , to . it may be objected here that it is ridiculous so to compare officers, because the ability of officers cannot be so mathematically tabulated. this, of course, is true; but the fact that we are unable so to compare officers is no reason for supposing that the abilities of officers, especially officers of high position, do not affect quantitatively the fighting value of the forces they command; and the intention in mentioning this factor is simply to show that the relative values of the forces, as indicated in these tables, are supposed to include all the factors that go to make them up. another convention, made in these tables, is that every fighting force is able to inflict a damage in a given time that is proportional to the force itself; that a force of , , for instance, can do twice as much damage in a given time as a force of can; also that a force can do an amount of damage under given conditions that is proportional to the time in which it is at work; that it can do twice as much damage in two hours, for instance, as in one hour, _provided the conditions for doing damage remain the same_. another convention follows from these two conventions, and it is that there is a period of time in which a given force can destroy a force equal, say, to one-tenth of itself under certain conditions; that there is some period of time, for instance, in which, under given conditions, , men can disable men, or ships disable ship, or guns silence gun. in the conflicts supposed to be indicated in these tables, this period is the one used. it will be plain that it is not necessary to know how long this period is, and also that it depends upon the conditions of the fight. in table i, it is supposed that the chance of hitting and the penetrability are the same to each contestant. in other words, it is assumed that the _effective targets_ presented by the two forces are alike in the sense that, if the two targets are hit at the same instant by like projectiles, equal injuries will be done. in other words, if each contestant at a given instant fires, say a -inch shell, the injury done to one will be the same as that done to the other; not proportionately but quantitatively. for instance, if one force has ships and the other has like ships, all the ships being so far apart that a shot aimed at one ship will probably not hit another, the conditions supposed in table i, column , are satisfied; the chances of hitting are identical for both contestants, and so is the damage done at every hit. table i supposes that the chance of hitting and damaging does not change until the target is destroyed. as the desire of the author is now to show the advantage of having a superadequate force, the following table has been calculated to show the effect of forces of different size in fighting an enemy of known and therefore constant size: table ii ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | |col. |col. |col. | |--------------------------------------------------|------|------|------| |value of offensive power at beginning. a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in st period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of st period a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in nd period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of nd period a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in rd period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of rd period a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in th period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of th period a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in th period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of th period a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in th period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of th period a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in th period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of th period a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in th period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of th period a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in th period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of th period a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in th period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of th period a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in th period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of th period a | | | | | b | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power at end of th period a | | | | | b | | | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- it will be noted that if our force is superior to the enemy's in the ratio of , to , , the fight will last longer than if it is superior in the ratio of , to , , in the proportion of to ; and that if it is superior in the ratio of , to , the fight will last longer than if it is superior in the ratio of to , in the proportion of to . we also see that we should, after reducing the enemy to , have forces represented by , , , and , , respectively, and suffer losses represented by , , and , respectively. now the difference in fighting forces cannot be measured in units of material and personnel only, though they furnish the most accurate general guide. two other factors of great importance enter, the factors of skill and morale. skill is perhaps more of an active agent, and morale is perhaps more of a passive agent, like the endurance of man or the strength of material; and yet in some battles morale has been a more important factor in attaining victory than even skill. it is not vital to this discussion which is the more important; but it is vital to realize clearly that skill and morale are not to be forgotten, when we calculate how many and what kinds of material and personnel units we must provide for a war; and inasmuch as we cannot weigh morale and skill, or even be sure in most cases as to which side will possess them in the superior degree, we are forced in prudence to assume that the enemy may possess them in a superior degree, and that therefore we should secure superadequacy in units of personnel and material; not so much to win victory with the minimum of loss to ourselves, as simply to avert disaster. the present war shows us that the factors of skill and morale, while independent of each other, are closely linked together, and react upon each other. nothing establishes a good morale more than does the knowledge of exceeding skill; and nothing promotes skill more than does an enthusiastic and firm morale. but superadequateness of preparation has a value greater than in merely insuring victory with minimum loss to ourselves, in case war comes, because it exerts the most potent of all influences in preventing war, since it warns an enemy against attacking. at the present day, the laws of victory and defeat are so well understood, and the miseries resulting from defeat are so thoroughly realized, that no civilized country will voluntarily go to war, except for extraneous reasons, if it realizes that the chances of success are small. and as the cumulative consequences of defeats are also realized, and as no country is apt to assume that the morale and skill of its forces are measurably greater than those of a probable antagonist, no country and no alliance is apt to provoke war with a nation whose armed forces are superior in number of units of personnel and material; unless, of course, the nation is markedly inferior in morale and skill, as the persians were to the legions of alexander. it is often insisted that superadequacy in armed force tends to war instead of peace, by inducing a country to make war itself; that the very principles which deter a weak country from attacking a strong country tend to make a strong country attack a weak one. there is some truth in this, of course, and history shows many cases of strong countries deliberately attacking weak ones for the purpose of conquest. analysis of wars, however, in which strong countries have done this, shows that as a rule, the "strong" country was one which was strong in a military sense only; and that the "weak" country was a country which was weak only militarily, but which was potentially strong in that it was possessed of wealth in land and goods. most of the great conquests of history were made by such "strong" over such "weak" countries. such were notably those wars by which persia, assyria, egypt, greece, rome, and spain gained their pre-eminence; and such were the wars by which they later fell. such were the wars of ghenghis khan, tamerlane, mahomet, and napoleon; such were the wars by which most tribes grew to be great nations, and by which as nations they subsequently fell. no greater cause of war has ever existed than a disproportion between countries or tribes of such a character that one was rich and weak, while the other was strong and poor. nations are much like individuals--and not very good individuals. highwaymen who are poor and strong organize and drill for the purpose of attacking people who are rich and weak; and while one would shrink from declaring that nations which are poor and strong do the same, it may nevertheless be stated that they have often been accused of doing so, and that some wars are explainable on that ground and on none other. the wars of cæsar in gaul and britain do not seem to fall in this category, and yet they really do; for rome was poor in julius cæsar's day; and while gaul and britain were not rich in goods, they were rich in land, and rome craved land. of course, there have been wars which were not due to deliberate attacks by poor and strong countries on rich and weak countries; wars like our wars of the revolution, and with mexico, our war of the rebellion, and our spanish war, and many others in which various nations have engaged. the causes of many wars have been so numerous and so complex that the true cause is hard to state; but it may be stated in general that wars in which countries that were both rich and strong, as great britain and france are now, have deliberately initiated an aggressive war are few and far apart. the reason seems to be that countries which are rich tend to become not militaristic and aggressive, but effeminate and pacific. the access of luxury, the refinements of living that the useful and the delightful arts produce, and the influence of women, tend to wean men from the hardships of military life, and to engender a distaste for the confusion, bloodshed, and "horrors" of war. for this reason, the rich countries have shown little tendency to aggression, but a very considerable tendency to invite aggression. physical fighting among nations bears some resemblance to physical fighting among men, in that rich nations and rich men are apt to abstain from it, unless they are attacked; or unless they think they are attacked, or will be. the fact of being rich has the double influence of removing a great inducement to go to war, and of causing a distaste for it. for all of the reasons given above, it would seem advisable when making an "estimate of the situation," in preparation for war, to estimate it as gravely as reasonable probability will permit. the tendency of human nature is to estimate it too lightly; but in matters of possible war, "madness lies that way." this seems to mean that in preparing plans for additions to the fleet for war, we should estimate for the worst condition that is reasonably probable. in the united states, this means that we should estimate for a sudden attack by a powerful fleet on our atlantic coast; and, as such an attack would occasion a tremendous temptation to any foe in asia to make a simultaneous attack in the pacific, we must estimate also for sending a large fleet at the same time on a cruise across the pacific ocean. this clearly means that our estimate must include putting into the atlantic and pacific all the naval vessels that we have, fully manned with fully drilled crews; and adding besides all the vessels from civil life that will be needed. the vessels taken from civil life will be mostly from the merchant service, and will be for such auxiliary duties as those of hospital ships, supply ships, fuel ships, and ammunition ships, with some to do duty as scouts. for the purposes of the united states, therefore, the office of naval strategy in planning additions to our fleet for war, is to make a grave estimate of the naval requirements in both the atlantic and the pacific; to divide the total actual and prospective naval force between the atlantic and the pacific in such a way as shall seem the wisest; to assign duties in general to each force; and then to turn over to logistics the task of making the quantitative calculations, and of performing the various acts, which will be necessary to carry out the decisions made. objection may be made to the phrase just used--"to divide the total force," because it is an axiom with some that one must never divide his total force; and the idea of dividing our fleet, by assigning part to the atlantic and part to the pacific, has been condemned by many officers, the present writer among them. this is an illustration of how frequently phrases are used to express briefly ideas which could not be expressed fully without careful qualifications and explanations that would necessitate many words; and it shows how carefully one must be on his guard, lest he put technical phrases to unintended uses, and attach incorrect meanings to them. as a brief technical statement, we may say, "never divide your force"; but when we say this, we make a condensed statement of a principle, and expect it to be regarded as such, and not as a full statement. the full statement would be: "in the presence of an active enemy, do not so divide your force that the enemy could attack each division in detail with a superior force." napoleon was a past master in the art of overwhelming separate portions of an enemy's force, and he understood better than any one else of his time the value of concentration. and yet a favorite plan of his was to detach a small part of his force, to hold a superior force of the enemy in check for--say a day--while he whipped another force of the enemy with his main body. he then turned and chastised the part which had been held in check by the small detachment, and prevented from coming to the relief of the force that he attacked first. when we say, then, that strategy directs how our naval force should be divided between the atlantic and the pacific, this does not mean that strategy should so divide it that both divisions would be confronted with forces larger than themselves. it may mean, however, that strategy, in order that the force in one ocean shall be sufficient, may be compelled to reduce the force in the other ocean almost to zero. some may say that, unless we are sure that our force--say in the atlantic--is superadequate, we ought to reduce the force in the pacific to actual zero. maybe contingencies might arise for which such a division would be the wisest; but usually such a condition exists that one force is so large that the addition to it of certain small units would increase the force only microscopically; whereas those small units would be of material value elsewhere--say in protecting harbors from the raids of small cruisers. practically speaking, therefore, strategy would divide our naval force into atlantic and pacific fleets, but those fleets might be very unequal in size, owing to the vastly greater commercial and national interests on our atlantic coast, and the greater remoteness of probable enemies on our pacific coast. in estimating the work to be done by the u. s. atlantic fleet, three general objects suggest themselves: . to repel an attack made directly on our atlantic continental coast. . to repel an expedition striving to establish a base in the caribbean, preliminary to an attack on our atlantic continental coast or on the panama canal. . to make an expedition to a distant point, to prevent the occupation of territory by a foreign government in the south atlantic or the pacific. _first object_.--to repel an attack made directly on the atlantic coast, the plan must provide for getting the needed additions to the fleet with the utmost despatch. owing to the keen appreciation by european nations of the value of secrecy and despatch, any attack contemplated by one of them on our atlantic coast would be prepared behind the curtain, and nothing about its preparation would be allowed to be reported to the outside world until after the attacking force had actually sailed. for the force to reach our shores, not more than two weeks would be needed, even if the fleet stopped at mid-atlantic islands to lay in fuel. it is very doubtful if the fact of stopping there would be allowed to be reported, as the commander-in-chief could easily take steps to prevent it. it is possible that merchant steamers might meet the fleet, and report the fact by radio, but it is not at all certain. a great proportion of the steamers met would willingly obey an order not to report it, or even to have their radio apparatus deranged; either because of national sympathy, or because the captain was "insulted with a very considerable bribe." the probability, therefore, would be that we should hear of the departure of the fleet from europe, and then hear nothing more about it until it was met by our scouts. this reasoning shows that to carry out the plans of strategy, logistics would have to provide plans and means to execute those plans, whereby our existing fleet, plus all the additions which strategy demanded, would be waiting at whatever points on the ocean strategy might indicate, before the coming enemy would reach those points. in other words, logistics must make and execute such plans that all the fleet which strategy demands will be at the selected points in less than two weeks from the time the enemy leaves the shores of europe. of course, the conditions will not necessarily be such that strategy will demand that all our reserve ships, especially the oldest ships, shall go out to sea with the active fleet, ready to engage in battle. maybe some of them will be found to be so slow and equipped with such short-range guns, that they would be an embarrassment to the commander-in-chief, instead of an assistance. unless it is clear, however, that any ship, especially a battleship, _would be an embarrassment_, her place is clearly with the fighting fleet. the issue of the battle cannot be known in advance; and as everything will depend upon that issue, no effort and no instrument should be spared that can assist in gaining victory. and even if the older ships might not be of material assistance in the early stages of a battle, they would do no harm because they could be kept out of the way, if need be. in case either side gains a conclusive victory at once, the older ships will do neither good nor harm; but in case a decisive result is not at once attained, and both sides are severely damaged, the old ships, held in reserve, may then come in fresh and whole, like the reserve in land engagements, and add a fighting force which at that time will be most important and may be decisive. probably some of the ships will be too old, however, to fill places of any value in the active fleet. these should be fully manned and equipped, however, for there will be many fields of usefulness for them. one field will be in assisting the land defenses, in protecting the mouths of harbors and mine-fields, in defending submarine bases, and acting as station ships in the coast-defense system. _second object_.--to repel an enemy expedition, striving to establish a base in the caribbean, preparation would have to be made for as prompt a mobilization as possible; for although the threat of invasion of our coast would not carry with it the idea of such early execution as would a direct attack on new york, yet the actual establishment of a base so near our shores would give such advantages to a hostile nation for a future invasion, that measures to prevent it should be undertaken with the utmost possible thoroughness and despatch; because the operation of establishing a base involves many elements of difficulty that an active defender can hinder by aeroplane attacks, etc.; whereas, after a base has once been established and equipped with appropriate defenses, attacks upon it are much less productive of results. the endeavor to establish a base and the opposing effort to prevent it, will offer many opportunities for excellent work on both sides. practically all the elements of naval force will be engaged, and events on the largest possible scale may be expected. the operations will naturally be more extended both in time and distance than in the case of a direct attack upon our coast, and therefore the task of logistics will be greater. actual battle between large forces; minor engagements among aircraft, scouts, submarines, and destroyers; attacks on the train of the invader--even conflicts on shore--will be among the probabilities. _third object_.--to send a large expedition to carry out naval operations in far distant waters--in the south atlantic, for instance, to prevent the extension of a monarchical government in south america, or in the western pacific to defend our possessions there--calls for plans involving more logistical calculation and execution, but permitting a more leisurely procedure. the distances to be traversed are so great, the lack of bases is so distinct and so difficult to remedy, and the impossibility of arriving in time to prevent the seizing of land by any hostile expedition is so evident, that they combine to necessitate great thoroughness of preparation and only such a measure of despatch as can be secured without endangering thoroughness. whether the projected expedition shall include troops, the conditions at the time must dictate. troops with their transports will much complicate and increase the difficulties of the problem, and they may or may not be needed. the critical results can be accomplished by naval operations only; since nothing can be accomplished if the naval part of the expedition fails to secure the command of the sea; and the troops cannot be landed until it has been secured, unless the fact of securing it can safely be relied on in advance. for these reasons, the troops may be held back until the command of the sea has been secured, and then sent out as an independent enterprise. this would seem the more prudent procedure in most cases, since one successful night attack on a group of transports by an active enemy might destroy it altogether. but whether a military expedition should accompany the fleet, or follow a few hundred miles behind, or delay starting until command of the sea has been achieved, it is obvious that the logistic calculations and executive measures for sending a modern fleet to a very distant place, and sustaining it there for an indefinite period, must be of the highest order of difficulty. the difficulty will be reduced in cases where there is a great probability of being able to secure a base which would be able to receive large numbers of deep-draft ships in protected waters, to repair ships of all classes that might be wounded in battle, and to store and supply great quantities of ammunition, food, and fuel. no expedition of such magnitude has ever yet been made--though some of the expeditions of ancient times, such as the naval expedition of persia against greece, b. c. , and the despatch of the spanish armada in more recent days, may have been as difficult, considering the meagreness of the material and engineering resources of those epochs. but even if no military force accompanies the expedition, the enormous quantities of fuel, supplies, ammunition, medical stores, etc., that will be required, especially fuel; the world-wide interest that will be centred on the expedition; the international importance attaching to it; and the unspeakable necessity that the plans shall underestimate no difficulty and overlook no factor, point with a long and steady finger at the necessity of attacking this problem promptly and very seriously, and of detailing the officers and constructing the administrative machinery needed to make the calculations and to execute the measures that the calculations show to be required. _static defense of the coast_.--but besides the mobile fleet which is a nation's principal concern, strategy requires that for certain points on the coast, where large national and commercial interests are centred, arrangements shall be made for what may be termed a "static defense," by vessels, mine-fields, submarines, aircraft, etc., assigned as permanent parts of the defense of these points, analogous to forts on the land. the naval activities of this species of defense will centre on the mine-fields which it is a great part of their duty to defend. to guard these, and to get timely information of the coming of any hostile force or raiding expedition, strategy says we must get our eyes and ears well out from the land. to do this, water craft and aircraft of various kinds are needed; and they must be not only sufficiently numerous over each area to scout the waters thoroughly, but they must be adapted to their purpose, manned by adequate and skilful crews, and organized so as to act effectively together. the work of this patrol system is not to be restricted, however, to getting and transmitting information. certain of the craft must be armed sufficiently to drive off hostile craft, trying to drag or countermine the defensive mine-fields; some must be able to add to the defensive mine-fields by planting mines, and some must be able to pilot friendly ships through the defensive mine-fields; others still must be able to countermine, drag, and sweep for any offensive mines that the enemy may plant. vessels for this patrol work do not have to be very large; in fact, for much of the work in the mine-fields, it were better if they were small, by reason of the ability of small vessels to turn in restricted spaces. it would seem that for the patrol service, the vessels of the revenue marine and lighthouse service (coast guard) are ideally adapted; but, of course, there are only a few in total. these would have to be supplemented by small craft of many kinds, such as tugs, fast motor-boats, fishing-boats, and trawlers. to find men competent to man such vessels and do the kind of work required would not be so difficult as to get men competent to man the more distinctive fighting ships. good merchant sailors, fishermen, and tugboat men would fit into the work with considerable ease, and in quite a short time. strategy declares, however, that a coast guard may be needed a very short time after war breaks out; and that the vessels and the men, with all the necessary equipment and all the necessary organization and training, should be put into actual operation beforehand. not only the fleet, however, but all the bureaus and offices of the navy department, all the navy-yards, and an the radio stations, recruiting stations, hydrographic offices, training stations, and agencies for securing information from foreign countries, will have to pass instantly from a peace basis to a war basis. to do these things quickly and correctly many preliminaries must be arranged; but if the general staff prepares good plans beforehand, arranges measures which will insure that the plans shall be promptly carried out, and holds a few mobilization drills to test them, the various bureaus and offices in the department can do the rest. if the fires have all been lighted, the engine gotten ready, and the boilers filled in time, the engineer may open the throttle confidently, when the critical time arrives, for the engine will surely do its part. but if the proper plans have not been made and executed, the sudden outbreak of war, in which any country becomes involved with a powerful naval country, will create confusion on a scale larger than any that the world has ever seen, and compared with which pandemonium would be a quaker meeting. a realization of facts will come to that country, and especially to the naval authorities, that will overwhelm them with the consciousness of their inability to meet the crisis marching toward them with swift but unhurried tread--confident, determined, unescapable. fear of national danger and the sense of shame, hopelessness and helplessness will combine to produce psychological effects so keen that even panic will be possible. officers in high places at sea and on shore will send telegrams of inquiry and suggestion; civilians in public and private station will do the same. no fitting answers can be given, because there will be no time for reflection and deliberation. the fact that it would be impossible to get the various additions to the fleet and the patrol services ready in time, and the consciousness that it would be useless to do any less, will tend to bring on a desperate resolve to accept the situation and let the enemy do his worst. the actual result, however, will probably be like the result of similar situations in the past; that is, some course of action will be hastily decided on, not in the reasoned-out belief that it can accomplish much, but with the feeling that action of any kind will relieve the nervous tension of the public by giving an outlet for mental and physical exertion and will, besides, lend itself to self-encouragement, and create a feeling that proper and effective measures are being taken. such conditions, though on a much smaller scale, are familiar to naval officers and are suggested by the supposititious order "somebody do something"; and we frequently see people placed in situations in which they do not know what to do, and so they do--not nothing, but anything; though it would often be wiser to do nothing than to do the thing they do do. many of the inane remarks that people make are due to their finding themselves in situations in which they do not know what to say, but in which they feel impelled to say "something." now what kind of "something" would be done under the stimulus of the outbreak of a war for which a country had not laid its plans? can any worse situation be imagined--except the situation that would follow when the enemy arrived? the parable of the wise and foolish virgins suggests the situation, both in the foolishness of the unpreparedness and in the despair when the consequent disaster is seen approaching. in nearly all navies and armies, until the recent enormous increase in all kinds of material took place, the work of getting a navy ready for war in personnel and material was comparatively simple. this does not mean that it was easier then than now; because the facilities for construction, transportation, communication, and accounting were much less than now; but it does mean that the actual number of articles to be handled was much less, and the number of kinds of articles was also much less; and it also means that the various mechanical improvements, while they have facilitated construction, transportation, communication, and accounting, have done so for every nation; so that none of the competing navies have had their labors expedited or made less. on the contrary, the very means devised and developed for expediting work is of the nature of an instrument; and in order to use that instrument successfully, one has to study it and practise with it; so that the necessity for studying and practising with the instrument has added a new and difficult procedure to those before existing. fifty years ago the various mechanisms of naval warfare were few, and those few simple. in our navy department the work of supplying those mechanisms was divided among several bureaus, and each bureau was given the duty and the accompanying power of supplying its particular quota. the rapid multiplication, during the past fifty years, of new mechanisms, and new kinds of mechanisms; the increased expense of those mechanisms compared with that of former mechanisms; the increased size and power of vessels, guns, and engines; the increased size and complexity of the utilities in navy-yards for handling them; the necessity for providing and using means and methods for despatching the resulting "business" speedily, and for guarding against mistakes in handling the multiplicity of details--the increase, in brief, in the number, size, and kinds of things that have to be done in preparation, has brought about not only more labor in doing those things by the various bureaus assigned to do them, but has brought about even more imperiously the demand for means whereby the central authority shall be assured that each bureau is doing its work. and it has brought about more imperiously still a demand that a clear conception shall be formed first of what must be done, and second of the maximum time that can be allowed for doing it. clearly, the forming of a correct conception should not be expected of men not trained to form it; clearly, for instance, mere knowledge of electricity and mere skill in using electrical instruments cannot enable a man to devise radio apparatus for naval use; a certain amount of knowledge of purely naval and nautical matters is needed in addition. clearly, the concept as to the kind of performance to be required of radio apparatus is not to be expected of a mere technician, but is to be expected of a strategist--and equally the ability to design, construct, and supply the apparatus is not to be expected of a strategist, but it is to be expected of a technician. a like remark may be made concerning any mechanism--say a gun, a torpedo, or an instrument, or a vessel of any kind. the strategist, by studying the requirements of probable war, concludes that a certain kind of thing is needed; and the technician supplies it, or does so to the best of his ability. the statement thus far made indicates a division of work into two sharply defined departments; and, theoretically, such a division does exist. this does not mean, however, that the strategist and the technician should work independently of each other. such a procedure would result in the strategist demanding things the technician could not supply, and in the technician supplying things the strategist did not want, under a mistaken impression as to what the strategist wanted. the fullest and most intimate understanding and co-operation must exist between the strategist and the technician, as it must equally between the architect and the builder of a house. from an appreciation of such facts as these, every great navy department, except that of the united states, has developed a general staff, which studies what should be done to prepare for passing from a state of peace to a state of war; which informs the minister at the head of the department what things should be done, and is given power to provide that the various bureaus and offices shall be able to do them when war breaks. this is the scheme which all the navy departments, except the american, have devised, to meet the sudden and violent shock of the outbreak of a modern war. _no other means has yet been devised_, and no other means is even forecasted. the means is extremely simple in principle, but complex beyond the reach of an ordinary imagination in detail. it consists simply in writing down a digest of all the various things that are to be done, dividing the task of doing them among the various bureaus and offices that are authorized by law to do them, and then seeing that the bureaus shall be able to do them in the time allowed. the best way of ascertaining if the bureaus are able to do them is to mobilize--to put into commission and send out to sea all the craft that will be needed, fully equipped with a trained personnel and with a well-conditioned material; and then direct the commander-in-chief to solve a definite strategic problem--say to defend the coast against a hypothetical enemy fleet--the solution including tactical games by day and night. before attempting the solution of a strategic problem by an entire naval force, however, it is usual to hold mobilization exercises of a character less complete, in the same way that any course of training begins with drills that are easy and progresses to drills that are difficult. the simplest of all the preparative drills--if drills they correctly can be called--is the periodical reporting, once a month, or once a quarter, by each bureau and office, of its state of readiness; the report to be in such detail as experience shows to be the best. in the days when each bureau's preparation consisted of comparatively few things to do, the chief of that bureau could be relied on to do the things required to be done by his bureau; and his oral assurance to the secretary that--say all the ships had enough ammunition, or that adequate provision had been made for coal, or that there were enough enlisted men--would fulfil all requirements. but in the past fifty years, the requirements have increased a hundredfold, while the human mind has remained just as it was. so it has seemed necessary to institute a system of periodical preparation reports, to examine them carefully, and to use all possible vigilance, lest any item be forgotten or any work done by two bureaus that ought to be done by only one. who should examine the reports? naturally the same persons as decide what should be done. the same studies and deliberations that fit a person to decide what is needed, fit him to inspect the product that is offered to supply the need; not only to see if it comes up to the specifications, but also to decide whether or not any observed omission is really important; to decide whether, in view of certain practical difficulties, the specifications may be modified; and also to decide whether certain improvements suggested by any bureau should or should not be adopted. this procedure may seem to put the strategy officers "over" the technical officers, to put a lieutenant-commander on the general staff "over" a rear admiral who is chief of bureau; but such an idea seems hardly justified. in any well-designed organization relative degrees of official superiority are functions of rank, and of nothing else; superiority in rank must, of course, be recognized, for the reason that when on duty together the junior must obey the senior. but even this superiority is purely official; it is a matter of position, and not a matter of honor. all the honor that is connected with any position is not by reason of the position itself, but by reason of the honorable service which a man must have rendered in order to attain it, and which he must continue to render in order to maintain it. so, in a navy department, the general staff officers cannot be "over" the bureau officers, unless by law or regulation certain of the staff are made to rank over certain bureau officers. a procedure like this would seem to be unnecessary, except in the case of the chief of staff himself, who might, for the purpose of prompt administration, be placed by law over the bureau chiefs. the importance of the question, however, does not rest on a personal basis, but a national basis. it makes no difference to the nation whether smith is put above jones, or jones above smith; and in all discussions of national matters it is essential to bear in mind clearly not only that national questions must not be obscured by the interjection of the personal element, but also that great vigilance is needed to prevent it. for the reason that questions of the salaries of government officials have been settled in advance, questions of personal prestige and authority are more apt to intrude themselves among them than among men in civil life, whose main object is to "make a living"--and as good a living as they can. in the long struggle that has gone on in the united states navy department between the advocates and the opponents of a general staff, the personal element has clouded the question--perhaps more than any other element. not only in the department itself, but in congress, the question of how much personal "power" the general staff would have has been discussed interminably--as though the personal element were of any importance whatever. such an attitude toward "power" is not remarkable when held by civilians, but it is remarkable when held by men who have had a military or naval training. of course, there is an instinct in all men to crave power; but it is not recognized as an instinct wholly worthy. it is associated in most men's minds with a desire for material possessions, such as money or political position, and not with such aspirations as a desire for honor. in other words, a strong desire for wealth or power, while natural and pardonable, is considered a little sordid; while a desire for honor, or for opportunity to do good service, is held to be commendable. so, when public officials, either military or civilian, condemn a measure because it will give somebody "power," the reason given seems to be incomplete, unless a further reason is given which states the harm that would be done by conferring the "power." military and naval men exercise "power" from the beginning of their careers until their careers are closed; and they exercise it under the sane and restraining influence of responsibility; without which influence, the exercise of power is unjustifiable, and under which influence the exercise of power is a burden--and oftentimes a heavy one. that men trained as military men are trained, should aspire to power for power's own sake, is a little hard to understand--unless it be confessed that the person desiring the power appreciates its pleasing features more than its responsibilities, and regards its duties more lightly than its glories. few men, even those who shoulder responsibility the most courageously, desire responsibility for its own sake--and so the fact of a man ardently desiring "power" seems a good reason for withholding power from him. and what is "power," in the sense in which officials, both military and civilian, use the word? is it ability to do good service, or is it ability to bestow favors in order that favors may be received, to give orders to others coupled with authority to enforce obedience, or to take revenge for injuries received or fancied? of course, "power" is ability to do all these things, good and bad. but if a man desires power simply to do good service, and if he holds a highly conscientious view of the accompanying duties and responsibilities, will he crave "power" as much as some men seem to do? it seems fundamental, then, that any strategic plan for preparing the navy department for war should be framed with a strong endeavor to leave out the personal element, and should regard national usefulness only. if this be done successfully, and if good selections be made of the personnel to do it, it will be found that the members of the personnel will think no more about their "power" than does an officer of the deck while handling a battleship in fleet formation during his four hours on the bridge. in preparing the department for war, one would be in danger of being overwhelmed by the enormousness and the complexity of the task, unless he bore in mind continuously that _it is only when we get into details that any matter becomes complex_; and therefore that if we can get a clear idea of the whole subject, the principles that underlie it, and the major divisions into which it naturally is divided, we can then make those divisions and afterward subdivide those divisions, and later divide the subdivisions; so that the whole subject will seem to fall apart as a fowl does under the hands of a skilful carver. the divisions and subdivisions of the subject having been made, the remaining task, while onerous, will be largely a matter of copying and of filling in blank forms. as all navy departments have means regulated by law such that the actual executive work of recruiting, constructing, and supplying the necessary personnel and material shall be done by certain bureaus and offices, strategy does not need executive power, except for forcing the bureaus and offices to do the necessary work--should such forcing become necessary. strategy being the art of being a general (_strategos_), one cannot conceive of it as bereft of executive power, since we cannot conceive of a general exercising generalship without having executive power. it is true that strategy occupies itself mainly with planning--but so does a general; and it is also true that strategy itself does not make the soldiers march, but neither does a general; it is the colonels and captains and corporals who make the soldiers march. the general plans the campaign and arranges the marches, the halts, the bivouacs, provisions, ammunition, etc., through his logistical officers, and they give the executive officers general instructions as to how to carry out the general's plans. strategy without executive functions would be like a mind that could think, but was imprisoned in a body which was paralyzed. of course, strategy should have executive functions for the purposes of strategy only; under the guidance of policy and to execute policy's behests. policy is the employer, and strategy the employee. chapter xi naval bases the nature of naval operations necessitates the expenditure of fuel, ammunition, and supplies; wear and tear of machinery; fatigue of personnel; and a gradual fouling of the bottoms of the ships. in case actual battles mark the operations, the expenditure of stored-up energy of all kinds is very great indeed, and includes not only damage done to personnel and material by the various agencies of destruction, but actual loss of vessels. to furnish the means of supplying and replenishing the stored-up energy required for naval operations is the office of naval bases. a naval base capable of doing this for a large fleet must be a very great establishment. in such a naval base, one must be able to build, dock, and repair vessels of all kinds, and the mechanisms needed in those vessels; anchor a large fleet in safety behind adequate military and naval protection; supply enough fuel, ammunition, and supplies for all purposes, and accommodate large reserves of material and personnel. inasmuch as a naval base is purely a means for expending energy for military purposes, and has no other cause for its existence, it is clear that it cannot be self-supporting. for this reason it is highly desirable that a naval base shall be near a great city, especially if that city be a large commercial and manufacturing centre. it is true that many large naval bases, such as malta and gibraltar are not near great cities; and it is true that most large naval bases have no facilities for building ships. but it is also true that few large naval bases fulfil all the requirements of a perfect naval base; in fact it is true that none do. the most obvious requirement of a naval base is a large sheet of sheltered water, in which colliers and oil-carriers may lie and give coal and oil to fighting craft, and in which those fighting craft may lie tranquilly at anchor, and carry on the simple and yet necessary repairs and adjustments to machinery that every cruising vessel needs at intervals. without the ability to fuel and repair, no fleet could continue long at work, any more than a man could do so, without food and the repairs which nature carries on in sleep. the coming of oil fuel and the consequent ease of fuelling, the practicability even of fuelling in moderate weather when actually at sea, subtract partially one of the reasons for naval bases; but they leave the other reasons still existent, especially the reasons connected with machinery repairs. the principal repair, and the one most difficult to furnish, is that given by docking in suitable docks. the size and expense of docks capable of carrying dreadnaughts and battle cruisers are so great, and their vulnerability to fire from ships and from aircraft is so extreme, that the matter of dry-docks is perhaps the most troublesome single matter connected with a naval base. the necessity of anchorage areas for submarines is a requirement of naval bases that has only recently been felt; and the present war shows a still newer requirement in suitable grounds for aircraft. the speed of aircraft, however, is so great that little delay or embarrassment would result if the camp for aircraft were not at the base itself. instead of the camp being on culebra, for instance, it might well be on porto rico. the extreme delicacy of aircraft, however, and the necessity for quick attention in case of injuries, especially injuries to the engine, demand a suitable base even more imperiously than do ships and other rugged things. that the vessels anchored in the base should be protected from the fire of ships at sea and from guns on neighboring shores is clear. therefore, even if a base be hidden from the sea and far from it as is the harbor of santiago, it must be protected by guns, or mines, or both; the guns being nearer to the enemy than are the ships in the waters of the base. an island having high bluffs, where large guns can be installed, and approached by gradually shoaling waters in which mines can be anchored, with deeper water outside in which submarines can operate, is desirable from this point of view. ability to store and protect large quantities of provisions is essential, and especially in the case of ammunition and high explosives. for storing the latter, a hilly terrain has advantages, since tunnels can be run horizontally into hills, where explosives can lie safe from attack, even attack from aircraft dropping bombs above them. naturally, the country that has led the world in the matter of naval bases is great britain; and the world at large has hardly yet risen to a realization of the enduring work that she has been quietly doing for two hundred years, in establishing and fortifying commodious resting-places for her war-ships and merchant ships in all the seas. while other nations have been devoting themselves to arranging and developing the interiors of their countries, great britain has searched all the oceans, has explored all the coasts, has established colonies and trading stations everywhere, and formed a network of intimate commercial relations which covers the world and radiates from london. to protect her commercial stations and her merchant ships from unfair dealings in time of peace, and from capture in time of war, and to threaten all rivals with defeat should they resort to war, great britain has built up the greatest navy in the world. and as this navy pervades the world, and as her merchant ships dot every sea and display great britain's ensign in every port, great britain has not failed to provide for their safety and support a series of naval stations that belt the globe. bases are of many kinds, and may be divided into many classes. an evident ground for division is that of locality in relation to the home country. looked at from this point of view, we may divide naval bases into two classes, home bases and distant bases. _home bases_.--a home base is, as its name implies, a base situated in the home country. the most usual type of the home naval base is the navy-yard, though few navy-yards can meet all the requirements of a naval base. the new york navy-yard, for instance, which is our most important yard, lacks three of the most vital attributes of a naval base, in that it has no means for receiving and protecting a large fleet, it cannot be approached by large ships except at high tide, and it could not receive a seriously injured battleship at any time, because the channel leading to it is too shallow. home bases that approach perfection were evidenced after the battle off the skagerak; for the wounded ships of both sides took refuge after the battle in protected bases, where they were repaired and refitted, and resupplied with fighting men and fuel. these bases seem to have been so located, so protected, and so equipped, as to do exactly what bases are desired to do; they were "bases of operations" in the best sense. the fleets of the opposing sides started from those bases as nearly ready as human means and foresight could devise, returned to them for refreshment after the operations had been concluded, and, during the operations, were based upon those bases. if the bases of either fleet had been improperly located, or inadequately protected or equipped, that fleet would not have been so completely ready for battle as, in fact, it was; and it could not have gone to its base for shelter and repairs so quickly and so surely as, in fact, it did. many illustrations can be found in history of the necessity for naval bases; but the illustration given by this battle of may is of itself so perfect and convincing, that it seems hardly necessary or even desirable to bring forward any others. the fact of the nearness to each other of the bases of the two contending fleets--the nearness of germany and great britain in other words--coupled with the nearness of the battle itself to the bases, and the fact that both fleets retired shortly afterward to the bases, bring out in clear relief the efficacy of bases; but nevertheless their efficacy would have been even more strongly shown if the battle had been near to the bases of the more powerful fleet, but far from the bases of the other fleet--as was the case at the battle, near tsushima, in the japan sea. of course the weaker fleet in the north sea battle would not have been drawn into battle under such conditions, because it would not have had a safe refuge to retreat to. it was the proximity of an adequate naval base, that could be approached through protected waters only, which justified the weaker fleet in dashing out and taking advantage of what seemed to be an opportunity. similarly, if the russian fleet in the japan sea had had a base near by, from which it had issued ready in all ways, and to which it could have retired as soon as the battle began to go against it, the russian disaster might not have occurred, and full command of the sea by the japanese might have been prevented. but there being no base or harbor of refuge, disaster succeeded disaster in a cumulative fashion, and the russian fleet was annihilated in deep water. if a naval base were lacking to the more powerful fleet, as was the case in the battle of manila, the effect would in many cases be but slight--as at manila. if, however, the more powerful fleet were badly injured, the absence of a base would be keenly felt and might entail disaster in the future, even though the more powerful fleet were actually victorious. the japanese fleet was practically victorious at the battle of august , near port arthur; but if it had not been able to refit and repair at a naval base, it would have met the russian fleet later with much less probability of success. mahan states that the three main requirements in a naval base are position, resources, and strength; and of these he considers that position is the most important; largely because resources and strength can be artificially supplied, while position is the gift of nature, and cannot be moved or changed. mahan's arguments seem to suggest that the bases he had in mind were bases distant from home, not home bases; since reference is continually made by him to the distance and direction of bases from important strategic points of actual or possible enemies. his arguments do not seem to apply with equal force to home bases, for the reason that home bases are intended primarily as bases from which operations are to start; secondarily as bases to which fleets may return, and only remotely as bases during operations; whereas, distant bases are intended as points from which operations may continually be carried on, during the actual prosecution of a war. the position of a home base, for instance, as referred to any enemy's coasts or bases, is relatively unimportant, compared with its ability to fit out a fleet; while, on the other hand, the position of distant bases, such as hong-kong, malta, or gibraltar, relatively to the coasts of an enemy, is vital in the extreme. it is the positions of these three bases that make them so valuable to their holders; placed at points of less strategic value, the importance of those bases would be strategically less. home bases are valuable mainly by reason of their resources. this does not mean that position is an unimportant factor; it does not mean, for instance, that a naval base would be valuable if situated in the adirondack mountains, no matter how great resources it might have. it does mean, however, that the "position" that is important for a home base is the position that the base holds relatively to large home commercial centres and to the open sea. new york, for instance, could be made an excellent naval base, mainly because of the enormous resources that it has and its nearness to the ocean. philadelphia, likewise, could be made valuable, though philadelphia's position relatively to deep water is far from good. "position," as used in this sense, is different from the "position" meant by mahan, who used the word in its strategic sense. the position of philadelphia relatively to deep water could be changed by simply deepening the channel of the delaware; but no human power could change the strategic position of malta or gibraltar. yet for even home bases, position, resources, and strength must be combined to get a satisfactory result; the "position" not being related to foreign naval bases, however, but to large industrial establishments, mainly in order that working men of various classes may be secured when needed. the requirements of work on naval craft are so discontinuous that steady employment can be provided for comparatively few men only; so that a sort of reservoir is needed, close at hand, which can be drawn up when men are needed, and into which men can be put back, whenever the need for them has ceased. and the same commercial and industrial conditions that assure a supply of skilled workers, assure a supply of provisions and all kinds of material as well. _distant bases_.--distant bases have two fields of usefulness which are distinct, though one implies the other; one field being merely that of supplying a fleet and offering a refuge in distress, and the other field being that of contributing thereby to offensive and defensive operations. no matter in which light we regard a distant naval base, it is clear that position, resources, and strength must be the principal factors; but as soon as we concentrate our attention on the operations that may be based upon it, we come to realize how strong a factor position, that is strategic position, is. the base itself is an inert collection of inert materials; these materials can be useful to the operations of a fleet that bases on it; but if the fleet is operating in the pacific, a base in the atlantic is not immediately valuable to it, no matter what strength and resources the base may have. the functions of a home base are therefore those that the name "home" implies; to start the fleet out on its mission, to receive it on its return, and to offer rest, refuge, and succor in times of accident and distress. the functions of a distant base concern more nearly the operations of a prolonged campaign. a distant base is more difficult to construct as a rule; largely because the fact of its distance renders engineering operations difficult and because the very excellence of its position as an outpost makes it vulnerable to direct attack and often to a concentration of attacks coming from different directions. if naval operations are to be conducted at considerable distance from home, say in the caribbean sea, distant bases are necessary, since without them, the fleet will operate under a serious handicap. under some conditions, a fleet operating in the caribbean without a base there, against an enemy that had established a satisfactory base, might have its normal fighting efficiency reduced per cent, or even more. a fleet is not a motionless fort, whose strength lies only in its ability to fire guns and withstand punishment; a fleet is a very live personality, whose ability to fight well--like a pugilist's--depends largely on its ability to move quickly and accurately, and to think quickly and accurately. the best pugilists are not usually the strongest men, though physical strength is an important factor; the best pugilists are men who are quick as well as strong, who see an advantage or a danger quickly, and whose eyes, nerves, and muscles act together swiftly and harmoniously. a modern fleet, filled with high-grade machinery of all kinds, manned by highly trained men to operate it, and commanded by officers fit to be intrusted with such responsibilities, is a highly developed and sensitive organism--and, like all highly developed and sensitive organisms, exists in a state of what may be called "unstable equilibrium." as pointed out in previous pages, the high skill needed to perform well any very difficult task can be gained only by great practice in overcoming difficulties and eliminating errors of many kinds; and when the difficulties are manifold and great, a comparatively small increase or decrease in the overcoming of them makes a great difference in the results attained. an interesting though possibly not very correct analogy is to be seen in the case of a polished surface; for we readily note that the more highly polished the surface is, the more easily it is sullied. another analogy may be found in the performance of a great pianist or violinist; for a very small failure in his skill for even an instant will produce a painful feeling that could not be produced by a much greater failure in an ordinary performer. another analogy is to be found in the case of a ship that is going at the upper limit of her speed; for a very minor failure of any part of her machinery will produce a much greater slowing than it would if her speed were slower. perhaps apologies are in order for dwelling so long on what may seem to some an academic question, but it does not seem to the writer to be academic at all. certainly, the "condition" of a pugilist, or a fleet, about to fight, is not an academic consideration; and if it is not, no matter which affects this condition can rightfully be considered academic. the whole usefulness of bases is due to their ability to put fleets into good fighting condition and to maintain them in it; and it seems a very proper and useful thing to note that the more highly trained a fleet is, and the more highly organized the various appliances the fleet contains, the more difference results from a falling off in the condition of its personnel and material. this shows the advantage of having a base as close to the place where a fight is going to happen as may be possible. this does not mean, of course, that a fleet should remain for long periods within its base; because a fleet, like any other practiser of any art, needs constant practice. it merely means that the closer the base is to the scene of the operations or the actual battle, the better "tuned up" the personnel and material will be. it also means that this consideration is of the highest practical importance. _advanced bases_.--the extreme desirability of having a base near the scene of operations, even if the base be only temporarily held, has led to the use of what are called "advanced bases." an excellent and modern illustration of an advanced base is the base which the japanese established at the elliot islands about sixty miles from port arthur, which the japanese were besieging. the russian fleet could issue from their base at port arthur whenever the russians wished, and return to it at will. while inside, until the japanese had landed and attacked them from the land side, the russians could make their preparations in security and leisure, and then go out. the japanese fleet, on the other hand, until they had established their base, were forced to remain under way at sea, and to accept action at the will of the russians; so that, although port arthur was besieged, the advantages of the offensive, to some extent, resided with the russians. the establishment of the base did not, of course, change the situation wholly; but it permitted a very considerable relaxation of vigilance and mental strain on the part of the japanese, and a considerable easement of the motive power of their ships. naturally, the japanese made arrangements whereby their heavy ships could remain in comparative tranquillity near the base, while destroyers and scouts of various kinds kept touch with port arthur, and notified the base by wireless of any probable sortie by the russian fleet. the temporary advanced base at the elliot islands was, as temporary advanced bases always must be, quite incomplete in every way as compared with the permanent bases at home. it fulfilled its mission, however, and was in fact as good a base as really was required. the strategic ability of the japanese was indicated quite early in the war by the promptness and skill with which they established this base. of course, all advanced bases are distant bases, but the words usually imply temporariness, as does in fact the word "advance." an instance of an advanced base that has been far from temporary is the island of jamaica, and another is the island of bermuda; another is malta, and still another is gibraltar. these bases form stepping-stones, by which great britain's navy may go by easy stages from one position to another, stopping at a base when desired, or going beyond it without stopping, secure in the knowledge that the base is "under her lee" in case of accident or distress. viewed from the standpoint of operations in an actual war, the strategic value of a certain position for a base is important, no matter whether the operations are offensive or defensive; and the same factors that make a position good for defensive operations make it good for offensive operations also. for instance, if we wish to send a fleet on a hostile expedition to a distant point, it is well to have a base on a salient as far out as practicable from the coast, in order that the fleet may be able to start, full of fuel and supplies, from a place near the distant point; and equally, if we are to receive an attack upon the coast, it is well to have a base far out, in order to embarrass the transit of the enemy toward our coast, by the threat--first against his flank, and later against his rear and his communications. naval bases looked at from this point of view resemble those forts that european nations place along their frontiers. it is true that any base placed at a salient has the weakness of all salients, in that fire can be concentrated on it from several directions; and a naval base has the added disadvantage of a more difficult withdrawal, if attacked by an overwhelming force, and a longer line of communications that has to be protected. but this weakness all distant bases have, from the fact that they are distant; and, naturally, the more distant they are, the more difficult it is to support them, because the longer are their lines of communications. distant naval bases, therefore, are vulnerable in a high degree; they are vulnerable both to direct attack and to an attack on their lines of communications; and the factors that help a base in one way injure it in another. if a naval base is placed on a rock, or a rugged little island that holds nothing else, and on which a hostile army could not land, it is very safe from land attack; whereas, if it is placed on a large and fertile island, on which an invading army could easily land, it is extremely vulnerable to land attack. but, on the other hand, the naval base on the inaccessible island could be starved out by simply breaking its lines of communications, while the naval base on the large and fertile island might be able to survive indefinitely, even though the communications were wholly ruptured. the establishment of any permanent distant naval base is a matter of great expense, even if the natural conditions are favorable. but favorable conditions have rarely existed; and the expense of establishing such bases as malta, gibraltar, and heligoland has been tremendous. an important consideration has been the fact that, unless the base were made so strong that it could not be taken, it might be better not to attempt to fortify it, on the theory that it would be better to let a poor naval base fall into the hands of the enemy than a good one. to this reasoning, the answer is usually made that no base can be made absolutely impregnable, and that sufficient defense will be provided if it makes the task and cost of capturing the base greater than the base is worth. this means simply that the more valuable the base is, the more money should be spent in defending it; and that _it is worse than useless to defend it by any means that is obviously too small, in proportion to its value_. it often happens that the places that have the best position are weak in strength and resources; a notable instance is gibraltar, another is culebra, and the most notable of all is guam. none of these places is fortunate in either resources or natural strength, though gibraltar was strong for the artillery of the time when the base was established there. in fact, it is hard to think of any place that combines in itself the three advantages of a fine strategical position, large resources, and great strength. the three attributes seem almost incompatible; for how can a base far distant from its home be well placed with reference to attacking the lines of communication of any enemy intending to attack the home coast, and yet have its own lines of communications safe? how can it have a sheet of water, just deep enough but not too deep to anchor a large fleet in, with all of its auxiliaries extensive enough to accommodate all the vessels and far enough from the sea to be safe from gun-fire, and yet be on an island so small and so rugged, that an enemy could not land troops near the base and capture it from the land side, as the japanese captured port arthur? the natural strategic advantages of a large and sheltered sheet of water seem to entail the disadvantages of a large island, or a continent. there seems only one way in which to solve the problem of where and how to establish a permanent naval base at a distant point, and that is the way in which the world's preceptor--great britain--has solved it; and the solution is to select a place that has already the advantage of position, and then add to it the artificial advantages of resources and military strength. this brief statement makes the matter seem a little too simple; and so it will have to be modified by adding that the mere fact of a place having a fine position is not quite sufficient, because the place must be of such a character that it is capable of having resources and strength added to it; a sharp pinnacle rock in the middle of the mediterranean, for instance, might have a fine strategic position, and yet be unavailable as a naval base. even here, however, we must pause to note that energy and will could do much toward making even a pinnacle rock a naval base; for we see the gigantic fortress of heligoland erected on what was little but a shoal; and we see the diminutive water areas of malta and gibraltar made to hold in safety the war-ships of the greatest navy in the world. despite the paramount importance of strategic position, we must not forget that a naval base should have sufficient military strength to be able to hold out for a long time against hostile operations, as many bases, notably gibraltar and port arthur, have done, without the assistance of the fleet. the german base at kiao-chau held out for more than two months in , without any external aid. during all the time of siege, even if surrender is ultimately to occur, the enemy's forces are prevented from being utilized elsewhere. this condition was clearly shown during the siege of port arthur, because the large force of japanese troops required to conduct the siege were urgently needed in manchuria--to which region they were sent as soon as port arthur fell. from this point of view, naval bases again look much like fortresses on the land; fortresses like metz and strasburg, that had to be subdued before an enemy could safely pass them. _strategic position of distant bases_.--since the strategic position of an outlying naval base is the principal factor that goes to make its value, it may be well to consider what elements make a strategic position good. to make the problem clear, let us take a concrete case, that of our own country, and consider what elements would constitute a good strategic position for a naval base of the united states, leaving out of consideration for the moment any questions of resources and military strength. in the case of a war with a nation that had only one naval home base, it is clear that the best position for our distant base would be one as close to the enemy's base as possible; because, if placed there, our fleet, if it were the more powerful, could do more to injure the enemy's fleet, or prevent its going out, than if placed at any point more distant from the enemy's base; and if it were less powerful, it could do more to cut the enemy's communications, because it could attack them at or near their source. a poor position would be one far away from both countries, and far away from the line joining them. in the case of a war between this country and norway, for instance, a very poor position for a naval base would be a spot near--say juan fernandez--in the south pacific. in case the enemy country has two home bases of equal importance, the best position for our base clearly would be one equidistant from them, and as near to each as practicable. if the distance from our base to a point half-way between the two bases is shorter than is the distance to it from either base, then a fleet at our base could probably prevent the junction of two forces issuing from those two bases--assuming, of course, that we had a proper system of scouting. our fleet would be able to operate on what are often called "interior lines"--a technical expression that has great efficacy in confusing a simple matter. it is also assumed that our fleet is considerably stronger than either of the two separated enemy forces; otherwise our case would be hopeless. if the two home bases of the enemy are unequal in importance, it would seem that our base should be nearer to the important base than to the other. more strictly speaking, it should be nearer to the base from which the larger force may be expected to come out. if the enemy country have three or more bases, from which parts of a fleet may be expected to come out, the question seems a little more complex; but nevertheless, since the first duty of our fleet would probably be to prevent junctions or a junction, of the separated parts of the enemy's fleet, the best position for our home base would be at a point about equally distant from them all, and as close to them as possible. in the wars between great britain and france in the early part of the nineteenth century, the base of the british fleet for operations on the western and northern coasts of france was as close to the enemy home bases as practicable--though the base was england itself. for operations on france's southern coast, the base was at gibraltar, or some mediterranean island. that any country should be able to hold a distant base close to the home base of a possible naval enemy might seem impossible, if we did not know that great britain holds bermuda and jamaica near to our own coast, and hong-kong actually inside of china, all far away from britain; besides malta and gibraltar in the mediterranean, nearer to the coasts of sometime enemies than to her own. that the united states should own a base far from her own coasts, and near those of other countries, might seem improbable, were it not for the fact that guam is such a base, and is so situated. it is true that guam is not strictly a naval base, because it is not so equipped or fortified; but we are thinking now of position only. in case the enemy country has several home bases, and it is impossible to have our distant base so near to them as to prevent the junction of parts of a fleet issuing from them, the value of the base is less than it otherwise would be. in this case, which is the one in which our country is actually concerned, because of its great distance from other countries, its value becomes merely the usual value attaching to a naval base; and the fact that the entire enemy fleet can operate as a unit, that it can divide into separate forces at will near its own shores, or send out detachments to prey on the long line of communications stretching from our distant base to that base's home, necessitates that the base be fortified in the strongest possible way, and provided with large amounts of supplies. its principal function in war would be to shorten the long trip that our vessels would have to make without refreshment, and therefore the length of their lines of communications, and to enable our vessels to arrive in enemy's waters in better condition of readiness for battle than would otherwise be the case. we have thus far considered the best position for an advanced naval base, in the case of operations against one country only. it seems clear that, if we are to consider operations against two countries separately, and at different times, we should be led to conclude that the case of each country should be decided individually; in the case of wars with norway and portugal, for instance, the best places for our two bases would be as close to the home bases of those countries as possible; and even in the case of fighting two simultaneously, the conclusion would be the same, if the two countries were in widely different directions from us--as are switzerland and china. if we consider the case of war against two contiguous countries simultaneously, however, it would seem better to have one base, situated similarly toward the home bases of the two countries as toward two different home bases in one country--since the two countries would be, in effect, allies; and their fleets would act in reality like separated portions of one fleet. as the united states possesses no island on the atlantic side which is nearer to foreign countries than to our own, and as our interests for the immediate future lie mostly on the atlantic side, it may be well now to apply the general principles just considered to the question of where is a naval base most urgently needed under actual conditions. imagining a war between us and some one european naval power, and imagining a war also between us and two or three allied european naval powers, and realizing the length of our atlantic and gulf coasts, extending from maine to panama, a glance at the map shows us that, apart from the home naval bases on our continental coasts, the position on american soil which is the closest to european bases is on the little island of culebra, which occupies a salient in the northeastern end of the caribbean sea.[*] [footnote *: the acquisition by the united states of the island of saint thomas, about miles east of culebra, if accomplished, will extend the salient just so much farther toward europe.] the only reason an enemy would have for entering the caribbean would be an intention to attack the panama canal region, or an intention to establish an advanced base, from which he could conduct more or less deliberate siege of our atlantic coast and cities. in either case, our fleet would be seriously handicapped if it had no adequate base in the caribbean; because its line of communications north would be exposed to the enemy's operations at all times; and seriously wounded american ships would have little chance of getting repairs; little chance even of making successfully the long trip to norfolk or new york. in case the enemy fleet should start from europe fully prepared in every way, we should be in ignorance of its intended destination; and as the enemy fleet would be stronger than ours (otherwise it would not start) it would doubtless be able to destroy our undefended station at guantanamo, seize some suitable place in the west indies, say the bay of samana, and then establish a base there, unless we had first seized and fortified all suitable localities; and the united states would then find itself in the anomalous position of being confronted near its own coasts with an enemy fleet well based for war, while her own fleet would not be based at all. not only would the enemy fleet be superior in power, but it would possess the strategical advantage, though far from its own shores. the situation, therefore, about a month after the foreign fleet left europe, would be that the caribbean sea would contain a hostile fleet which was not only superior to ours in power, but was securely resting on a base; while ours had no base south of norfolk, the other side of hatteras. our fleet would be in a position similar to that of the russian fleet when it rushed to its destruction in tsushirna straits, though not in so great a degree; because it would have had more recent docking and refitting in our home ports, and the personnel would be fresher. in case, however, we had a naval base strongly fortified and thoroughly equipped, at a salient in the caribbean region, say at culebra, and if our fleet were based upon it, a hostile fleet, even if it were considerably superior to our own, would hesitate to pass it and enter the caribbean, by reason of the continuous threat that the fleet would exert on its communications. even if the hostile fleet should pass culebra, and establish a base farther on, an american force based on culebra would continue to exert this threat on the communications between the hostile base and its mother country. an american base--say at guantanamo--would be very effective in embarrassing hostile operations _west_ of guantanamo, because it would be on the flank of the line of communications extending from europe; but it would be comparatively ineffective in embarrassing operations east of it, since the hostile line of communications would be protected from it by the interposition of its own main body; this interposition necessitating the despatch of defending forces around that main body. the coming hostile force would push before it all resistance, and leave the sea free for the passage of its auxiliaries and supplies. a defending force, operating from guantanamo, in endeavoring to prevent a hostile fleet from establishing a base to the _eastward_ of it, would act much less effectively than a force operating from culebra. not only would the force from guantanamo have to pass around the main body to attack the train; it would again have to pass around the main body to get back to guantanamo; whereas a force operating from culebra could make a direct attack upon the enemy's train, and then a direct retreat to culebra. this comparison assumes, as has been said, that the matter of resources and strength are not in question; that is, that they are equal in our two supposition bases. but, as in practice they would not be equal, the practical point to consider is how much strength and resources can compensate for inferiority of position, and how much position must be insisted on. of course, no correct quantitative answer can be given, except by accident. the problem, unfortunately, cannot be solved by mathematics, for the simple reason that no quantitative values can be assigned to the various factors, and because no mathematical formula now exists that expresses their relations to each other. it may be pointed out, however, that if a position be good, strength and resources can be artificially supplied; and that the cost of doing this, even on a tremendous scale, is relatively small compared to the cost of the fleet which the base will support, and in distress protect. in other words, we may be able to form an estimate of the relative values of bases, say at guantanamo and culebra, even if we cannot ascribe arithmetical values to each, and compare arithmetically those arithmetical values. if, for instance, we see that a fleet costing $ , , , would, if it operated from a base at culebra, be per cent more effective than if it operated from guantanamo, and that it would cost $ , , more to make a strong base there than to make an equally strong one at guantanamo, we should conclude that, since per cent of $ , , is $ , , , it would be wise to spend that $ , , , even if we had to forego the building of one battlesbip. we should come to the same conclusion, if we realized that no matter what their comparative values might be, a base at one place would not meet our necessities, and a base at the other place would. if a base at guantanamo would not meet our necessities in case of an invasion of the caribbean by a naval fleet superior to ours, then it seems idle to discuss the value of guantanamo relative to some other place, no matter how good the position of guantanamo may be, and no matter how nearly it may approximate to adequacy. there is no real usefulness in having a naval base anywhere, unless that naval base can accomplish the purpose for which it is desired. a naval base is desired for purposes of war, and for no other purpose whatever; and to decide on a position for a base without keeping this fact clearly in view, is to act on an underestimate of the situation, the folly of which has been pointed out in previous pages. we may conclude, then, that in deciding on the place for a distant permanent naval base, on which the operations of a whole fleet are to base for war, we should select the best site available, even if military strength and resources may have to be added to it artificially--unless in the case of any site considered the difficulties of adding them are insuperable. the last sentence may seem like shirking the whole question, because it does not state what "insuperable" means; so it may be well to add that in modern days few engineering difficulties are insuperable, as the existence of the fortress at heligoland shows. if the submarine and the mine did not exist, the difficulties would be greater than they actually are; because guns alone, no matter how carefully mounted and protected, could hardly be expected to keep off indefinitely the attack of a heavy fleet, or even to save from injury the fighting and auxiliary vessels anchored in its waters. but the submarine and mine combine to keep fighting ships at distances greater than those over which ship's guns can fire, and reduce the amount of fortification required on shore. one of the principal sources of expense in establishing bases at some points would be that of dredging out harbors sufficiently extensive, while harbors sufficiently extensive are provided already by nature in such localities as samana. but, as pointed out before, harbors on large islands can be taken from the land side, as was port arthur; and adequate protection from land attack is, in many cases, almost impossible if the enemy has command of the sea, as a superior hostile fleet would have in the caribbean; while the hills and waters of culebra and vieques sound could long defy not only actual invasion, but any fleet attack. this brings us face to face with the fact that it may be less expensive to establish and protect a naval base situated on a little island, even if an artificial harbor has to be constructed, than to establish and protect a base on a large island, even if the base on the large island has a large natural harbor and can be more easily defended against bombardment from the sea. it would be cheaper, for instance, to protect a base on culebra than one at guantanamo, or even samana, if the enemy commanded the sea; and cheaper to protect a base on the forbidding rocks of polillo or guam than on the large and fertile island of luzon, with its extensive gulfs and bays, in many of which a fleet in command of the sea could land its force; because protecting a base on a large island would require covering a very large area, and perhaps a long extent of coast. aircraft may exercise an important influence on the choice of the position of a base, perhaps in the direction of choosing a base on a large island rather than on a small one; since the great speed of aircraft tends to lessen the importance of having the base out a great distance from home--so far as purposes of scouting are concerned. it seems probable also that aircraft will soon be recognized as inherently adapted to preventing the landing of hostile troops, by dropping bombs on the troops, while they are in process of disembarkation, while proceeding in small boats to the shore, and while in the act of landing on the beach, with their guns, ammunition, supplies, horses, and impedimenta of various kinds. _co-operating bases_.--discussion of the relative values of positions for bases, say in the caribbean, should not blind our eyes to the fact, however, that no nation is prevented from establishing as many bases as it needs, wherever its flag may float; that the united states, for instance, is not debarred from establishing permanent naval bases at both guantanamo and culebra, should such a procedure seem desirable. the fact that each locality has advantages that the other does not have, suggests the idea that two bases, placed in those localities, would form a powerful combination. in fact, the great value of the position of culebra being its distance toward the enemy, which necessitates a great distance away from our continental coast, and a long line of communications from that coast suggest an intermediate base as a support and stepping-stone. analogous cases are seen in all the countries of europe, in the fortresses that are behind their boundary-lines--the fortresses existing less as individuals than as supporting members of a comprehensive scheme. two bases, one at guantanamo and one at culebra, would in time of war in the caribbean, add a value to our fleet that might make the difference between defeat and victory. the effective work that a fleet can do is a function of the material condition of the ships themselves, and of the physical and mental condition of the personnel that man them. fighting is the most strenuous work that men can do; it calls for the last ounce of strength, the last effort of the intellect, the last struggle of the will; it searches out every physical imperfection in men, in ships, in engines, in joints, in valves. surprise has sometimes been expressed at the quickness with which the japanese defeated the russians at tsushima; but would any one express surprise if a pugilist, fresh from rest, quickly defeated another pugilist who, exhausted from long travelling, staggered hopelessly into the ring? and how would the betting be before a football match, if it were known that one of the teams would enjoy a rest of twenty-four hours before the game, whereas the other team would walk from the railroad to the ball grounds after a trip across the continent? these analogies may seem forced--but are they? a living animal requires hours of rest and refreshment, in order that the tissues expended in action may be repaired by the internal mechanism of the body, and the food consumed be supplied from some external source. a fleet is in exactly the same category, even when operating in times of peace: and in time of war it needs, in addition, a station in which injuries may be repaired--a station analogous to that of the hospital for wounded men. in the caribbean it would seem necessary to successful operations, therefore, to have two bases, one say at guantanamo and one at culebra; the one at culebra to be the principal base, and the one at guantanamo the auxiliary. culebra, by reason of the great work to be accomplished, and the engineering difficulties to be encountered, cannot be gotten ready for several years. reliance, meanwhile, will have to be placed on guantanamo; and as the coming of any war is not usually very long foretold, the urgency of fortifying guantanamo stands out in clear relief. the mutual relations of guantanamo and culebra are much like the mutual relations of pearl harbor in hawaii and guam--and so are the joint relations of each pair to the mother country. culebra and guam are the potential bases of the united states farthest away from the coast in the atlantic and the pacific respectively; and the nearest to countries in europe and asia with any one of which, of course, war will be always possible, and sometimes probable. each is a small and rugged island, admitting of tremendous military strengthening by guns, fortifications, mines, and submarines, but connected to the motherland by a long line of communications. the line of communications of culebra would, of course, be safer than that of guam, because it is shorter than would be the line of an enemy attacking it; whereas, the line of communications of guam would be longer. guantanamo and pearl harbor are both stations about half-way from the home country to culebra and guam respectively; and though greater danger to our vital and commercial interests exists in the atlantic than in the pacific, pearl harbor has been fortified, and guantanamo has not--and neither has culebra. this sentence is not intended as a criticism of the government for fortifying pearl harbor. the hawaiian islands occupy the most valuable strategic position in the pacific, and pearl harbor is the most important strategic place in the hawaiian islands; and it ought to have been strengthened many years ago, and to a greater degree even than is contemplated now. but the sentence is intended as a protest against our continued inertness in failing to establish any suitable naval bases whatever, especially in the caribbean. _distant base in the philippines_.--the difficulty of finding suitable positions for bases is exemplified in the philippines, for no suitable island is to be found there, except some that are within the archipelago itself; and these are so placed that, to reach them, our fleet would have to go through long reaches of water, ideally suited for destroyer and submarine attack. a possible exception is the island of polillo, twenty miles east of the eastern coast of luzon; and in many ways polillo seems ideal. the practical difficulties are so great, however, the status of the islands in our national policy is so ill defined, and the futility of strengthening it, unless guam be adequately strengthened also, is so apparent, that the question has been hardly even mooted. polillo made impregnable, with guam defenseless, supported by an undefended line of communications several thousand miles long to the main country, would in case of war with an active asiatic power be reduced to the zero of effectiveness in whatever was the length of time in which its accumulated stores would be exhausted. this sentence may be modified by saying that the time might be lengthened by the occasional arrival of supply ships and colliers that might come by way of the mediterranean, or the cape of good hope, or any other route which approached the philippines from the southward; and it is possible that, in the unfortunate event of a war between us and some asiatic power, our relations with european countries might be such as to make the use by us of such routes feasible and safe. in view, however, of the conditions of island possession in the pacific as they actually are, and because of the rapid and abrupt changes that characterize international relations, the probability of being able to use such routes seems too small to receive grave consideration. _other bases in the pacific_.--the pacific ocean is so vast, and the interests of the united states there will some day be so great, that the question of establishing naval bases, in addition to bases at pearl harbor, the philippines, and guam, will soon demand attention. the localities that are the most obvious are the panama canal zone and the samoan islands in the south, and the aleutian islands in the north. a moderately far-seeing policy regarding the pacific, and a moderately far-seeing strategy for carrying out the policy, would dictate the establishment and adequate protection of bases in both the southern and the northern regions; so that our fleet could operate without undue handicap over the long distances required. the same principles that govern the selection of positions and the establishment of bases in the atlantic apply in the pacific; the same requirements that a base shall be near where the fleet will conduct its operations--no matter whether those operations be offensive or defensive, no matter whether they concern direct attack or a threat against communications. * * * * * in view of the great value of naval bases, one may be pardoned perhaps for a feeling of surprise that the united states has no real naval base, home or distant. our large navy-yards are our nearest approximation to real bases. the yards at norfolk and bremerton seem to combine the three factors of position, strength, and resources better than do any other stations; though both are surpassed in resources by new york, philadelphia, and boston. bremerton has the greatest natural military strength of all our stations; in fact, it is naturally very strong indeed, because of the length and nature of the waterway leading to it from the sea and the ease with which it could be denied. norfolk is fortunate in its nearness to chesapeake bay and lynn haven roads, and the ease with which the entrance to the chesapeake from seaward could be defended; but the fact that it is only miles from the atlantic coast-line makes it more vulnerable than bremerton to the attack of troops landed by an enemy fleet. the yard at mare island, near san francisco, is faultily placed as regards deep water; but dredging could rectify this. the panama canal zone has great facilities for repairs, docking, and supplies; but it must be adequately fortified in order to be a trustworthy base in the case of operations in its vicinity. new york, by reason of its enormous wealth of every kind, its steamer terminals, and its excessively vulnerable position, within gunshot of ships out in the deep water (a position without parallel in the large cities of the world) must, of course, be protected. the cheapest way to protect it is to do so locally, by means of fortifications, and other shore defenses. the only other means would be by a fleet permanently kept near new york, a measure that would be expensive beyond reason. in case the enemy should inform us that he would reach the vicinity of new york at a certain time, and in case he should fulfil his promise, the fact that new york was properly strengthened would not be very important; since our fleet would go there, and the whole war would be settled by one "stand-up fight." but wars are not so conducted and never have been. from the oldest times till now, and even among savage tribes, finesse has always been employed, in addition to actual force--more perhaps by the weaker than by the stronger side, but very considerably also by the stronger. a coming enemy would endeavor to keep his objective a close secret, and even to mislead us; so that our fleet would have to take a position out at sea, perhaps far away, which would leave our bases open to attack by the enemy fleet or at least exposed to raids. the most effective local defense of a naval base is a combination of mine-fields and heavy guns, which also give protection to which the wounded vessels can retire, as the german vessels did after the north sea battle. unless such protection be provided, swift destroyers can complete the work that guns began, as the japanese destroyers did, after the artillery battle at tsushima. in addition to their value in defending navy-yards from raids, and in giving wounded ships a refuge, the military strengthening of home bases, if such home bases are wisely placed near large commercial centres, prevents actual destruction of those commercial centres themselves, in case an attack is made upon them, either in the absence of the defending fleet, or after that fleet may have been destroyed. the line of engineering advance during recent years, although it has greatly increased the offensive power of war-ships, has increased even more greatly the defensive power of land works. for this reason, it is perfectly possible to defend successfully almost any land position against attack by ships; and it is so easy, that not to do so, is, in the case of large commercial centres, a neglectfulness of the extremest character. one important reason, therefore, for placing a permanent home base near a large commercial centre is the fact that the fortification of one is also the fortification of the other. assuming that new york is to be defended locally, we can state at once that the new york naval station can easily be made to be a permanent naval base of the highest order, and of the most efficient type. in fact, it can be made into a naval base better than any other now in the world, because of the large sheets of water tributary to it in new york bay, hudson river, and long island sound; the proximity of the sea; the untold resources in money, supplies, and men that it could on demand produce, and the ease with which it could be defended. to make such a base, it would be necessary to fortify the vicinity of coney island and the entrances from the ocean to the lower bay, and long island sound; to deepen the channel to the navy-yard, and to make clear and safe the waterway from the east river to long island sound. it would be necessary also to enlarge the navy-yard; and to this end, to buy back the land adjoining it, which the government most unwisely sold to private parties about twenty-five years ago. owing to the position of block island, relatively to the lines of communication of a hostile force coming from europe to attack our eastern coast, and because of the sheltered waters held within it, suitable for small craft, the advisability of establishing a small naval base there is apparent. with a suitable base there and another on martha's vineyard, and the present canal from massachusetts bay to buzzards bay sufficiently enlarged, the whole coast from boston to new york, including narragansett bay, could be made to form one naval base which would have three exits. our own ships could pass from one point to another, and concentrate at will near sandy hook, block island, or massachusetts bay; and, which is equally important, the establishment of an enemy base near new york would be made almost, if not quite, impossible. in case of an attack on our eastern coast, made directly from europe, which could be accomplished easily during the calm months of the summer, the degree of efficiency shown by the bases at norfolk, philadelphia, new york, and boston would influence vitally the condition in which our fleet would go to battle. owing to the traditional policy, or rather lack of policy, of the united states, and the consequent unreadiness of our preparations, we may reasonably assume that war will find us in such a condition that the utmost haste will be necessary to get our whole naval force out to sea in time to prevent the enemy from making an actual bombardment of our shores. we have no reason to suppose that the ships actually cruising in our active fleet will not be ready; we have every reason to believe that they will be ready. but it is inconceivable that we should not try to oppose such an attack with all the naval force that we could muster; which means that we should try to send out many ships from our home bases to join the active fleet at sea. the ease with which the passage of an enemy's fleet up the delaware or chesapeake could be prevented, in case any means of national defense whatever be attempted, compared with the difficulty of defending new york, and combined with the greater damage that an enemy could inflict on new york, mark the vicinity of new york as the probable objective of any determined naval attack upon our coast; no matter whether that attack be made directly from europe, or indirectly from europe by way of the caribbean. to meet such an attack, various parts of the fleet would have to issue from their bases; even parts of the active fleet would probably have had to go to their home ports for some needed repairs or supplies. the first thought of an attacking fleet would naturally be to prevent our ships from getting out, as it was the thought of nelson and other british commanders to prevent the issuing of forces from the ports of france. but in view of the great distance from europe to our coast, and the impossibility of preventing the knowledge reaching us of the departure of the fleet (unless indeed all the powers of europe combined to prevent it), it seems probable that no such issuing could be prevented, and that a very considerable american force would have time to take its station out at sea, prepared to meet the coming foe. the home bases if properly prepared would exert a powerful effect on a battle near them by equipping the fleet adequately and promptly, and also by preventing a possible defeat from becoming a disaster, by receiving wounded ships before they sank. the wounded ships of the enemy, on the other hand, would have no base near by, and only those inconsiderably injured could probably be gotten home. chapter xii operating the machine the naval machine, including the various vessels of all kinds, the bases and the personnel, having been designed, put together, and prepared for its appointed task of conducting war, and the appointed task having at last been laid upon it, how shall the machine be operated--how shall it be made successfully to perform its task? in order to answer this correctly, we must first see clearly what is its task. _war_.--war may be said to be the act of two nations or two sets of nations, by means of which each tries to get its way by physical force. the peaceful methods of diplomacy having been exhausted, arguments and threats having been tried in vain, both parties resort to the oldest and yet the latest court; the same court as that to which resort the lions of the desert, the big and little fishes of the sea, the fowls of the air, and even the blades of grass that battle for the sunshine. the vastness of the issue decided by war, the fact that from its decision there is no appeal, the greatness of the forces that nations can produce, the length of experience of war extending through , wars, and during more than three thousand years of recorded history, the enormous literature of the subject, and the fact that more brain power, energy, and character have been devoted to war than to any other fruit of man's endeavor--combine to give to the conduct of war an importance that no other subject can possess. the thing that each side brings forward against the other side is force; "that which moves or tends to move matter." in all ages, it has been directed primarily against the physical bodies of individual men, threatening each individual man with suffering and death. it appeals to the primal instinct of men, self-preservation, and is the _ultima ratio regum_, the last argument of kings--and not only of kings, but of all other living things as well. the first feeling aroused by the threat against life, or physical well-being, is fear; and, therefore, the first force with which to oppose the threat is a force of the same spiritual nature as fear, but opposite in direction. this force is called in the english language "courage." without courage every man and every nation would be at the mercy of every man or nation that made a threat against it. the inherent necessity for courage is thus apparent; and the reason is therefore apparent, for the fact that in every nation and tribe physical courage has been esteemed the greatest virtue in a man. in latin, we know, the word _virtus_ meant courage, and also virtue--showing that the romans held the two qualities to be identical or similar. in discussing the operations of war, little is usually said of courage. the reason, however, is not that its value is unrecognized, but that its existence is assumed; in the same way as that in which all the other faculties among the men are assumed, such as physical health, ability to march, etc. movements to inspire fear, however, actions to break down the morale, are of frequent use; because, if the morale of the opposing side is broken down, its power of resistance is destroyed. in the operations, therefore, of two contending parties, force is opposed by force. if the forces on both sides could be concentrated at a single point, and exerted in opposite directions, the result would be decided in an instant. such an arrangement has never yet been brought about; though fairly close approximations have been made, when two parties have selected two champions who have fought for them--the victory going by agreement to the side whose champion became the victor. barring such rare occasions, contests in war have usually been between two forces spread over considerable areas of land or water; and the contest has usually been decided by the defeat of one of the two. if in any individual combat, all the forces possessed by both sides had been engaged, and if either force had been annihilated, the entire war between the two parties would have been decided. this was nearly the case in the naval battle off tsushima between the russian and japanese fleets--and the treaty of peace was signed soon after. usually, however, neither party to the quarrel has had all its forces on the field in any one battle, and neither force in the battle has been annihilated. usually, only partial forces have been engaged, and only partial victories have been won; with the result that wars between contending nations have usually consisted of a series of battles, with intervals of rest between. if two opposing forces in any battle were exactly equal in fighting power, neither side in any battle would gain a victory, the two sides would inflict identical amounts of damage on each other, and the two sides would end the battle still equal in force. at rare intervals, such conditions have been approximated; but usually one side has had more fighting power than the other, and has inflicted more damage of various kinds than it has received, with the result that it attained an advantage more or less important over the other, and with the further result that the original disproportion between the two forces was increased. the increase may not necessarily have been due to a greater number of killed and wounded or even to a greater loss of material, such as guns or ships; there may have been no increase in inequality in either of these ways, for the increase in inequality may have consisted in the fact that the weaker force was driven to a position less advantageous to it for conducting operations in the future. but whatever the nature of the advantage gained by the stronger side, the result has been that the weaker side has come out of the battle relatively weaker than it was before. for this reason, it is highly desirable to each side to win each battle. this does not mean that the loss of any one battle by either party to a war means that the party losing that battle will necessarily lose the war; for many battles may be fought by such small portions of the whole nations' forces, or be lost by such small margins that the loss of one battle, or even several battles, may be retrieved; in fact, in few wars have the victories been all on one side. it does mean, however, that each lost battle is a backward step; and that for this reason the effort must be that no battle shall be lost. _strategy and tactics_.--now, to win battles, two things combine, strategy and tactics. the strategy of each side tries to arrange matters so that the forces on its side shall enter each battle with the greatest chance of victory; tactics tries to handle the forces with which it enters a battle in such a way that its side shall gain the victory. strategy prepares for battles; tactics fights them. the tactics of any battle must be in the hands of the commanders-in-chief on both sides. any other arrangement is inconceivable; but the strategy controlling the series of battles in any war cannot now be committed to them solely; though it was usually committed to them until lately. in the days when alexander went to war, or even when napoleon and nelson went to war, twenty-one centuries later, no telegraph by sea and land made swift communication possible; and the commanders on the spot were the only ones in possession of enough information about the contending forces to decide what measures should be taken. even in those days, however, the capitals of the countries engaged in war, by reason of their knowledge of what was passing in the way of policy, exerted an influence on the strategy of the forces on both sea and land; cæsar, for instance, was embarrassed in many of his operations by the roman senate, and it was for this reason that he crossed the rubicon and passed from gaul into italy. when william i and napoleon iii went to war in , however, von moltke had foreseen the effects of the telegraph and of rapid-mail communications, in giving to the headquarters of the army information of a much greater scope and reliability than had previously been the case, and had established a general staff which had elaborated plans whereby not only would the commanders-in-chief in the field have the assistance of information compiled at headquarters, but whereby the general nature of the operations of a war, especially those operations at the outset on which the future conduct of the war would largely depend, would be decided and laid down in advance and during times of peace. the reason for the rapid victory of the prussians over the french in was that the prussians were better prepared in almost every way; especially in the most important thing--the war plans. now, these war plans could not, of course, be of such a kind that they would foresee every contingency and prescribe the conduct to be followed, so that a commander in the field could turn to page of volume , and get directions as to what he ought to do; nor could they furnish the chief of staff, von moltke, with printed recommendations which he should offer to the king. in other words, the war plans could be only plans and, like all plans for future action, could be only tentative, and capable of being modified by events as they should come to pass. they were only plans of preparation, not plans of operation. yet there were plans of preparation for operations; plans prepared in accordance with the principles of strategy, and based on information as to the enemy's resources, skill, point of view, and probable intentions. they formed the general guide for future operations. since , the invention and practical development of the wireless telegraph, and especially its development for use over very great distances, has modified the relations of commanders on the spot to home headquarters, and especially of naval commanders to their navy departments. the wireless telegraph, under circumstances in which it operates successfully, annihilates distance so far as communication is concerned, though it does not annihilate distance so far as transportation is concerned. it improves the sending and receiving of news and instructions, both for the commander at sea and for his department at home; but it does it more effectively for the department than for the man at sea, because of the superior facilities for large and numerous apparatus that shore stations have, and their greater freedom from interruptions of all kinds. this condition tends to place the strategical handling of all the naval machine, including the active fleet itself, more in the hands of the department or admiralty, and less in the hands of the commander-in-chief: and this tendency is confirmed by the superior means for discussion and reflection, and for trial by war games, that exist in admiralties, compared with those that exist in ships. the general result is to limit the commander-in-chief more and more in strategical matters: to confine his work more and more to tactics. such a condition seems reasonable in many ways. the government decides on a policy, and tells the navy department to carry it out, employing the executive offices and bureaus to that end, under the guidance of strategy. strategy devotes itself during peace to designing and preparing the naval machine, and in war to operating it, utilizing both in war and peace the bureaus and offices and the fleet itself. and in the same way as that in which the bureaus and offices perform the calculations and executive functions of logistics, for furnishing the necessary material of all kinds, the fleet performs those of tactics. from this point of view, strategy plans and guides all the acts of navies, delegating one part of the practical work needed to carry out those plans to logistics, and the other part to tactics. operating the naval machine in war means practically operating the active fleet in such a way as to cause victories to occur, to cause the fleet to enter each battle under as favorable conditions as practicable, and to operate the other activities of the navy in such a way that the fleet will be efficiently and promptly supplied with all its needs. strategy employs tactics and logistics to bring these things to pass; but this does not mean that strategy stands apart and simply gives logistics and tactics tasks to do. the three agencies are too mutually dependent for any such procedure and require for their successful working, both individually and together, the most thorough mutual understanding and support. _flanking, t-ing, etc._--it being a fact that no nation can put a force upon the sea that is concentrated at one point; it being a fact that every naval force must be spread over a considerable area and made up of various parts, and that the efficacy of the various parts in exerting force upon a definite enemy depends on the unity of action of the various parts, it results that the most effective way in which to attack any naval force is not to attack all the parts at once, thus enabling all to reply, but to attack the force in such a way that all the parts cannot reply. if we attack a ship for instance, that can fire guns on a broadside and only guns ahead, it is clear that we can do better by attacking from ahead than from either side. similarly, if ships are in a column, steaming one behind the other, each ship being able to fire guns from either side and only ahead, the ships can fire guns on either side and only ahead; and therefore it would be better to attack the column from ahead (to "t" it), than to attack it from either side. it is curious to note how widely this simple illustration can be made to apply to both strategy and tactics; how the effort of each is to dispose our force so toward the enemy's force that we can use our weapons more effectively than he can use his. an extreme illustration might be made by imagining , soldiers standing in line and unable to face except to the front; in which case it is clear that, no matter how perfectly they might be armed, or how quickly and accurately they could fire, one man standing on the flank, or behind them, could kill one soldier after the other, until all the , were killed, and be in no danger himself. in case of attacking a ship or a column of ships from ahead, or of attacking a line of soldiers on the flank, the effectiveness of the method of attack lies in the fact that a number of the weapons that are present in the force attacked cannot be used in reply. [illustration: fig. ] _concentration and isolation_.--the value of "concentration" is often insisted on, but the author desires to call attention to a misunderstanding on this point, to which he called attention in an essay in . to the author, it seems that concentration is a means and not an end, and that the end is what he called "isolation" in the essay. if a man concentrates his mind on any subject, the advantage he gains is that he prevents other subjects from obstructing the application of his mental powers to that subject; he pushes to one side and isolates all other subjects. in this particular activity it does not matter whether we call his act "concentration" or "isolation" because the whole operation goes on inside of his own skull, and concentration on one subject automatically produces isolation or elimination of all others. but when concentration is attempted on external objects, the case is very different, for concentration may not produce isolation at all. for instance, if ships in column _a_ concentrate their fire on the leading ship in column _b_, the other ships in column _b_ are not isolated, and can fire on the ships of column _a_, even more effectively than if column _a_ was not concentrated on the leading ship of _b_, because they are undisturbed by being fired at. if, however, the ships of _a_ "flank" or "t" the ships of column _b_, as shown in fig. , and concentrate on the leader of b, they thereby isolate the other ships, and practically nullify their ability to fire at _a_. [illustration: fig. ] this effect is approximated by an approximate "t-ing" or "flanking," such as is shown in fig. ; because the average distance from the ships of _a_ to the leading ship in _b_ is less than the average distance from the ships in _b_ to any ship in _a_; and because the direction of fire from each ship in _a_ is more nearly abeam than is the direction of fire from the ships of _b_. these positions are very difficult to gain, even if _a_'s speed is considerably greater than _b's_; since all _b_ has to do to prevent it is to head to the right, unless shoals or other dangers such as enemy battleships, _c_, are on that side, co-operating with _a_. [illustration: fig. ] an interesting position is that shown in fig. , which may be assumed by _a_, either for flight, or to get the advantage in torpedo fire. the advantage is that the _a_ ships are running away from torpedoes fired by _b_, while _b_ is running into torpedoes fired by _a_. this advantage is not great if the distance between _a_ and _b_ is so little that _b's_ torpedoes can reach _a_. but if _a_ is able to make this distance equal to the entire range over which _b's_ torpedoes can run, or near it, _b's_ torpedoes cannot reach _a_ at all. [illustration: fig. ] a similar advantage, though in a modified degree, is that shown as possessed by _a_ in fig. . due to the direction of movement of the _a_ and _b_ fleets, it is easier for _a's_ torpedoes to reach _b_, than for _b's_ torpedoes to reach _a_. [illustration: fig. ] positions of advantage are usually gained by superior speed. one of the main reasons for the development of the battle cruiser has been the fact that her high speed and great offensive power enable her to gain positions of advantage and utilize them. the _a_ positions shown in the figures are attainable by battle cruisers against battleships, and are very effective. a procedure analogous to that of flanking is one in which part of a force is attacked when it is separated from the rest of the force, and cannot be supported by it--in that some of the weapons of one force cannot be used. the effect is similar in the two cases, but the events leading up to the two conditions may be quite different. in the former case, that of being flanked, or t'd, the force caught at a disadvantage was together, and was able to operate effectively as one force against a force located in a given direction; but was attacked by a force located in another direction; while in the latter case, the force was divided, and one part was caught, while distant from and entirely unsupported by the other part. the former condition is more likely to result from tactical operations, and the latter from strategical operations--and yet, especially in land operations, the flanking of one force may be brought about by the carefully planned strategical combinations of the other force; and catching one part of the enemy's force unsupported by the other parts may take place during the tactical maneuvers of an actual or a simulated battle. in naval operations, the catching of separated parts of an enemy's force is a more frequent attempt and accomplishment than is that of getting a position where a column of ships can be attacked from ahead or astern. it seldom happens, with the great number of vessels of all kinds which compose a modern fleet, that it is practicable to keep the various parts together, or that it would be desirable to do so. the closest approximation to keeping a large naval force together, is keeping them in column; because in that formation, the ships can be made simply to "follow the leader" without signal, and act like one long, flexible body. but the vessels of a modern fleet would make a column many miles long--a column of battleships alone would be miles long, and the addition of the various cruisers, destroyers, and other vessels, would make a column so long that it would be unwieldy; and if its ends were attacked, the other vessels could not come to their relief. besides, the duties of battleships, battle cruisers, scouts, destroyers, and submarines, are distinct--with the result that, as in land operations, bodies of the various types operate separately and apart from those of other types. not only, also, do the various types operate separately, but often the necessities of a case demand that a certain number--say of battleships--be sent away from the main body on some mission; or that a certain number of destroyers be sent away from the main body of destroyers. any such diversion entails a danger that is sometimes great, and sometimes small; but such diversions and risks cannot be avoided, and should not be avoided when they are necessary, any more than a man should avoid going out of doors, though that act always entails some danger. suppose, for instance, that in the operations of a war carried on in the caribbean, the navy department should get trustworthy information that the enemy had detailed battle cruisers to speed north and bombard new york. the department would probably have to detach a force from the fleet and send it north, to prevent the bombardment. yet not only would the force so sent be in danger until it returned of an attack by a superior force, but the main body from which it was detached would be thereby weakened; furthermore, the information might have been incorrect--it might have been originated and given out by the enemy, in the hope that it would cause such a diversion of force. every operation in war entails a risk more or less great; and if no risks were to be taken, it would be better not to go to war. it is true that some wars have been undertaken in which the preponderance of force was so great that there was very little doubt of the actual outcome, and very little risk taken by one of the two parties. such wars, however, have been very few; and they were hardly wars in the usual sense, any more than the beating of a little boy by a big boy could properly be called a "fight." reference may again be made here to table i on next page, which shows the way in which fights between unequal forces proceed, and the advantage of fighting the separated parts of an enemy rather than the united force. we can see this clearly if we note that, if two forces each aggregating , were in each other's vicinity, and if the entire force _a_ was able to engage half of _b_, or , it would whip half of _b_, and have remaining, with which to engage the other half ( ) of _b_. reference to the end of the third period in this table shows also that if a force of engages a force of , it will have left, after the other has been reduced to zero. so, a force of , that engages two forces of separately, will have more than left, after the others have both been reduced to zero: whereas, if it engages both, when they are united, both sides will be gradually reduced to zero, remaining equal all the time. table i ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |col.|col.|col.|col.|col.|col.|col.|col.|col.|col.| | | | | | | | | | | | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------| |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at beginning b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in st a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of st period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in nd a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of nd period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in rd a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of rd period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | | | |etc.| | | | | | | | | |total damage done by a| | | | | | | | | | | | b| | | | | | | | | | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- it is interesting to note how this simple fact is the key to most of the operations of strategy and tactics; how--the mechanical tools in the way of ships and guns and torpedoes having been supplied--the key to their successful use is simply to take advantage of all opportunities of isolating one part of the enemy's force from the rest, and then attacking one of the parts with a force superior to it. opportunities lacking, one must, of course, try to create opportunities by inducing the enemy to detach some part of his force, under circumstances such that you can attack it, or the weakened main body, with a superior force. naturally, one must try to prevent a similar procedure by the enemy. this does not mean that the sole effort of naval operations is finesse in either strategy or tactics; sometimes the sole effort is to force a pitched battle by the side that feels superior, and to avoid a pitched battle by the side that feels inferior. before the actual inferiority or superiority has been ascertained, however, the strategy of each commander is to bring about a situation in which his force shall have the advantage. the advantage having been gained and recognized (or an advantage existing and being recognized), strategy insists on forcing a battle, for the reason that _every contest weakens the loser more than it does the winner_. this does not mean that it is always wise to engage a weaker force that is temporarily separated from its main body. it is readily understandable, for instance, that it would be unwise in two cases: . a case in which the weaker force were so little weaker, and were part of a force so much larger than the total of the smaller force, that the gain as between the two forces actually engaged would not be great enough to compensate for the loss entailed. for instance, a reference to table i shows that an _a_ force of , engaging a _b_ force of would have left when _b_ was reduced to zero. this is impressive: but if the _b_ force of were part of a total _b_ force of , , in other words if there were an _a_ force of , near at hand, _b_ would have left with which to oppose , , a proportion a little less advantageous than the proportion he started with-- , to , . . a case by which the _b_ force may have divided with the express purpose of luring _a_ to attack; arrangements having been made whereby the inferior _b_ force would simply hold the _a_ force until the whole _b_ force could come to its assistance; arrangements having been also made that this would be accomplished before the detached part of _b_ should get very badly damaged. attention is invited to table iii, which is a continuation of table i. it represents what would happen if a force of , should fight separately two forces, one of and the other of . in column , _a_ is supposed to have engaged the first, and so to have become reduced to , and to engage afterward. in column , _a_ is supposed to have engaged first, thereby becoming reduced to , and then to engage the force. the table indicates that it makes no difference whether _a_ engages the stronger or the weaker force first. column shows that a force of , the part remaining after a force of , had annihilated a force of , would have left after annihilating a second force of . taken in connection with columns and , this indicates that it is easier to defeat two separated _equal_ forces than two separated _unequal_ forces of the same aggregate value; that the weakest way in which to divide a force is into _equal_ parts. this fact is mathematically demonstrated by mr. f. w. lanchester in a recent book called "air craft in warfare." table iii ------------------------------------------------------------------- | |col. |col. |col. | |---------------------------------------------|------|------|------| |value of offensive at beginning a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in st period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end st period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in d period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end d period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in d period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end d period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in th period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end th period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in th period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end th period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in th period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end th period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in th period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end th period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in th period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end th period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in th period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end th period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in th period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end th period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in th period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end th period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in th period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end th period a| | | | | b| | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------ the main advantage of superior speed in naval operations is the ability it gives to secure tactical positions of advantage, and to make desirable strategic dispositions; ability, for instance, to t or flank an enemy force, and to prevent the enemy from t-ing or flanking; also to catch separated parts of an enemy fleet before they can unite, while retaining the ability to divide one's own force without undue risk. for these purposes, speed is an element of the highest value; but the high price that it costs in gun power or armor protection--or both--and the fact that speed cannot always be counted on by reason of possible engine breakdowns and foul bottoms, result in giving to war-ships a lower speed than otherwise they would have. owing to the fact that, for any given horse-power put into a ship, the speed attainable increases with her length; and owing to the further fact that the weight that any ship can carry increases more rapidly than the displacement (weight of the ship complete), the best combination of gun power, armor protection, and speed is attainable in the largest ship. in other words, the larger the ship, the more power it can carry in proportion to its size, and the more quickly that power can be placed where it can do the most good. _strategic operations_.--these may be divided into two classes, offensive and defensive. the two classes are distinct; and yet there is no sharp dividing-line between them any more than there is between two contiguous colors in the spectrum. defensive operations of the kind described by a popular interpretation of the word "defense" would be operations limited to warding off or escaping the enemy's attack, and would be just as efficacious as the passive warding off of the blows of fists. such a defense can never succeed, for the reason that the recipient is reduced progressively in power of resistance as the attacks follow each other, while the attacker remains in unimpaired vigor, except for the gently depressing influence of fatigue. reference to table i will render this point clear, if we make the progressive reductions of the power of one contestant, and no reductions of the power of the other contestant. defensive operations, therefore, include "hitting back"; that is, a certain measure of offensive operations, intended to weaken the ability of the enemy to do damage. in fact, no operations are more aggressively offensive, or more productive of damage to the enemy's personnel and material, than operations that are carried on in order to defend something. no animal is so aggressively belligerent as a female "defending" her young. offensive and defensive operations are nevertheless quite different, especially in two particulars, one being the use of the initiative or attack, and the other the distance to the home. in offensive operations, the attack is made; in defensive operations, the attack is resisted; and even if the resistance takes an aggressive character, and drives the original attacker back to the place he started from, yet the side which has made the original attack has carried on offensive operations, and the other side defensive. offensive operations are, as a rule, carried on farther from home than defensive operations. if _a_ is carrying on offensive operations against _b_, _a_ is usually farther away from his home than _b_ is from his home. we see from this that the offensive has the advantage of the initiative, of making an attack for which the enemy may be unprepared, and has the disadvantage of being far from its home bases; whereas the defensive has the disadvantage of not knowing when or where or whence an attack is to come, and the advantage of the support of various kinds given by home bases. in other words, the offensive has the advantage except in so far as it is impaired by unfavorable conditions. for this reason, every military nation at the outset of war desires to be able to assume the offensive; and only refrains from the offensive from motives of prudence or because, in a particular case, the distance between the adversaries is so great, that the lack of bases would be of greater weight than the advantage of the initiative--or because the situations of the contending parties would be such that the side accepting the defensive rôle and staying near home, might be able to carry on aggressive attacks better than could the other. an illustration of a mistake in taking the offensive, and the wisdom of the other side in accepting the defensive, may be seen in napoleon's expedition against russia; for the russians were able to repel his attack completely, and then to assume a terrible offensive against his retreating, disorganized, and starving army. another illustration was the expedition made by a weak spanish fleet under cervera to the caribbean in . another illustration was that of the russians in the war of ; the practical disadvantages under which the russian fleet operated at tsushima were too great to be balanced by the advantage of the attack; especially as the situation was such that the japanese were able to foretell with enough accuracy for practical purposes the place where the attack would be delivered, and the time. operations on the sea, like operations on the land, consist in opposing force to force, in making thrusts and making parries. if two men or two ships contend in a duel, or if two parallel columns--say of ten ships each--are drawn up abreast each other, the result will depend mainly on the hitting and enduring powers of the combatants; the conditions of the "stand-up fight" are realized, and there is little opportunity for strategy to exert itself. but if any country--say the united states--finds herself involved in war with--say a powerful naval power or powers of europe, and the realization of the fact comes with the suddenness that characterized the coming of war in august, , and we hear the same day that a fleet of battleships, battle cruisers, destroyers, submarines, aircraft, and auxiliaries has left the enemy's country, followed by a fleet of transports carrying troops--there will be immediate need for strategy of the most skilful kind; and this need will continue until either the united states or her enemy has been made to acknowledge herself beaten, and to sue for peace. as such a war will be mainly naval, and as naval wars are characterized by great concentration of force, by each side getting practically all its naval force into the contest, by each side staking its all on the issue of perhaps a single battle (as the russians and japanese did at tsushima) one fleet or the other will be practically annihilated, and its country will be exposed naked to the enemy. the first effort on hearing of the departure of the hostile fleet will be, of course, to get our fleet out to sea, reinforced as much as practicable, by our reserve ships; and to get the coast-guard on their patrol stations. as we should not know the destination of the enemy, we should either have to assume a destination and send our fleet to that place (leaving the other places undefended) or else send our fleet out to sea to some position from which it would despatch scouts in different directions to intercept the enemy, in order that our fleet might meet it and prevent its farther advance. of course, the latter procedure could not be carried out reasonably, unless we had a great enough number of trained scouts to make the interception of the enemy fleet probable; because otherwise the probabilities would be that an enemy having the battle cruisers and scouts that european navies have, would succeed in evading our fleet and landing a force upon our shores; and it could not be carried out reasonably either, if we knew that our fleet was markedly inferior to the coming fleet; because to send out our fleet to meet a much more powerful one in actual battle would be to commit national suicide by the most expeditious method. in case the departure of the enemy fleet occurred in the stormy months of the winter, we might feel warranted in guessing that its immediate destination was the caribbean; yet if our fleet were in the caribbean at the time, and if our coast lacked shore defenses as at present, we might argue that the enemy would take the opportunity to make a direct descent upon our coast, seize a base--say on the eastern end of long island--and march directly on new york. it would be very difficult to plan the development of a line of scouts in such a way that the scouts would intercept an attack directed at some unknown point between boston and the west indies, perhaps in the southern part of the west indies--say margarita island. in fact, it would be impossible; with the result that, unless we intercepted it by simple good luck, the enemy would succeed in landing a force on our eastern coast, or else in the seizing of a base in the west indies or the southern part of the caribbean sea. either one of these acts, successfully performed by an enemy, would give him an advantage; that is, it would make his position relatively to ours better than it was before. it would have the same effect, therefore, as winning a battle; in fact it would constitute the winning of a battle--not a physical battle but a strategic battle. it may be objected that, unless we knew our fleet to be more powerful it would be wiser and more comfortable for all concerned to withdraw our ships to the shelter of their bases, and let the enemy do his worst--on the theory that he could not do anything else so ruinous to us as to sink our fleet. there is of course considerable reasonableness in this point of view; and strategy declares the unwisdom of engaging in battles that are sure to be lost. it must be remembered, however, that the coming fleet will operate at a considerable strategic disadvantage, owing to the necessity for guarding the "train" of auxiliary ships that will come with it, holding fuel and supplies of various kinds; that this handicap will offset a considerable advantage in offensive strength; and that the handicap will be still greater if the enemy fleet have near it a flotilla of transports carrying troops. it must be remembered also that in all probability, we should not have detailed information as to the number of vessels coming, and should not really know whether it was superior to ours or not: though we should be justified in assuming that the coming fleet believed itself to be superior to ours in actual fighting power. absence of trustworthy information on such points is usual in warfare, and is one of the elements that is the most difficult to handle. the navy department would be more able to form a correct estimate on this point than the commander-in-chief until such time as our scouts might come into absolute contact with the enemy's main body; but, until then, all that the department and fleet would know would be that a large hostile force had left europe. they would not know its size or destination. clearly, the first thing we should need would be information. to get this after war has broken out, the only means is scouts. _scouting and screening_.--scouts are needed by every navy; but they are most needed by a navy that has a very long coast-line to protect. if the great commercial centres and the positions that an enemy would desire for advanced bases along the coast, have local defenses adequate to keep off a hostile fleet for, say, two weeks, the urgency of scouts is not quite so absolute; since, even if the hostile fleet evades our scouts and our fleet, and reaches our shores, our fleet will have two weeks in which to get to the place attacked. but if the coast is not only long but also unguarded by shore defenses, the urgency is of the highest order. if we knew our fleet to be the weaker, but if we did not believe it to be so much the weaker as to force it to seek safety in flight, our natural plan would be that of napoleon's in italy in --to keep our force together, and to hurl it against detached parts of the enemy's force, whenever possible. this plan might not be difficult of execution, if the enemy were accompanied by his train of auxiliary and supply ships; since such ships are vulnerable to almost any kind of attack, have almost no means of defense whatever, and therefore require that a part of the fighting force of the main body be detached to guard them. whether the enemy would have his train quite close to him, or a day's steaming behind, say miles, we should not, of course, know. how could we ascertain? if the enemy came along with no scouts ahead, and if we happened to have some scouts located along his line of advance, these scouts faster than his ships, and so heavily armed as not to fear to venture near, our scouts might proceed along the flank of the enemy in daylight, pass along his rear, go entirely around him, and then report to our commander-in-chief by wireless telegraph exactly what craft of all kinds comprised the force, what formation they were in, the direction in which they were steaming, and the speed. such information would be highly appreciated by our commander-in-chief, as it would enable him to decide what he had better do. if, for instance, the scouts reported that the enemy fleet were steaming at a speed of knots an hour, and that the train was proceeding behind the fighting fleet without any guards of any kind around them, our commander-in-chief might decide to keep just out of sight until after dark, and then rush in with all his force of heavy ships and torpedo craft, and destroy the train entirely. but suppose the enemy fleet should advance with a "screen" consisting of a line miles long of, say, destroyers, miles ahead of the main body; followed by a line of, say, battle cruisers, miles behind the destroyers; and with destroyers and battle cruisers on each flank--say, miles distant from the main body. how could our scouts find out anything whatever about the size, composition, and formation of the enemy--even of his speed and direction of advance? the purpose of the "screen" is to prevent our ascertaining these things; and each individual part of the screen will do its best to carry out that purpose. all the vessels of the screen and of the main body will be equipped with wireless-telegraph apparatus and a secret code, by means of which instant communication will be continuously held, the purport of which cannot be understood by our ships. any endeavor of any of our scouts to "penetrate the screen" will be instantly met by the screen itself, out of sight of the enemy's main body; and the screen cannot be penetrated in the daytime, unless we can defeat those members of the screen that try to hold us off. now, inasmuch as all the considerable naval powers of europe have many battle cruisers, and we have no battle cruisers whatever, and no scouts of any kind, except three inefficient ones (the _birmingham_, _chester_, and _salem_) the degree of success that we should have penetrating the screen in the daytime can be estimated by any lawyer, merchant, or schoolboy. the laws of successful scouting and of the use of "search curves" have been worked out mathematically, and they are used to find an enemy of which one has certain information; but they are also used by the enemy to avoid being found, and they aid the enemy that is sought almost as much as they aid the seeker. and the sought has the advantage that the use of force, if force can be employed, breaks up the application of the mathematics of the seeker. it is true that two main bodies of two fleets may stumble against each other in the night-time, or in a fog or heavy mist. to prevent this possible occurrence, or to prevent a night attack by destroyers, no sure means has yet been found except examination before dark of a very large area around the fleet that is sought; but the area is too great for a search rigid enough to give complete security, and will probably be so until swift aircraft can scout over long distances at sea. accepting for the minute the convention that the main body of each side goes at the cruising speed of knots, and that darkness lasts hours, each side will go miles in darkness; and if the two main bodies happen to be going directly toward each other they will approach miles in the darkness of one night. therefore, a coming fleet, in order to feel entirely safe, would in daylight have to inspect by its scouts a circle of miles radius. to insure safety against destroyer attack, the area would have to be much greater on account of the greater speed of destroyers. [illustration] unless our defending fleet knew with reasonable sureness, however, the location, speed, and direction of motion of the coming fleet, so that it could make its dispositions for attack, it would hardly desire to meet the enemy at night, unless it were confident that it would meet the train and not the main fleet or the destroyers. night attacks, both on sea and land, are desirable, if the attacker can inflict surprise on the attacked, and not be surprised himself. in the darkness a flotilla of destroyers may make an attack on the various vulnerable colliers and supply vessels of a fleet, or even on the main body, and achieve a marked success, because that is the rôle they are trained to play. but the tremendous power and accuracy of battleships cannot be utilized or made available in darkness; and therefore a commander-in-chief, anxious to defeat by superior skill a coming fleet larger than his own, would hardly throw away all chance of using skill by risking his main body in a night encounter. every operation planned by strategy is supposed to result from the "decision" which follows the estimate of the situation; even if in some simple or urgent cases, the decision is not laboriously worked out, but is almost unconscious and even automatic. now, it is hardly conceivable that any estimate of the situation would be followed by a decision to go ahead and trust to luck, except in very desperate circumstances. in such circumstances, when hope is almost gone, a desperate blow, even in the dark, may save a situation--as a lucky hand at cards may redeem a gambler's fortune at even the last moment. but strategy is opposed to taking desperate measures; and pugilists and even gamblers recognize the fact that when a man becomes "desperate," his judgment is bad, and his chances of success are almost zero. while it is possible, therefore, that the main bodies of hostile fleets may come together in the night, we may assume that it will not be as part of any planned operations, and therefore not within the scope of this discussion; and that any combat which may result will be one in which strategy will play no part, and in which even tactics will yield first place to chance. but while our defending fleet will have to base most of its decisions on guesses, the coming fleet, on the other hand, having accepted the strategical disadvantage of leaving its base far in rear, will advance with all the advantage of the offensive, especially in knowing where it intends to go and what it desires to do. coming over on a definite mission it will have been able to know what preparations to make; and as the naval powers of europe understand the need of co-ordination between policy and strategy, the fleet will doubtless have had time to make those preparations; it will not have started, in fact, and war will not have been declared, until all those preparations have been made. we may assume that the coming fleet will come across with all possible precautions for protecting itself against detection by the defender's scouts, and therefore against an unexpected attack, by night or by day. it cannot receive an unexpected attack unless surprised; and how can it be surprised, if it has more scouts, faster scouts, and more powerfully armed scouts than the defending fleet has? the possession of the more powerful scouts, however, will be valuable to the enemy, not only for forming a screen as a protection against enemy scouts, but also for scouting and thereby getting information for itself. a numerous squadron of scouts of different kinds, sent out ahead and on each flank would see any of our scouts that saw them; and the scouts that were the more powerful would force the weaker scouts back to the arms of their own main body, toward which the more powerful scouts would, of course, advance. the weaker scouts, therefore, would have no value whatever as a screen, save in retarding the advance of the stronger scouts, and in delaying their getting information. if the coming fleet is more powerful than the defending fleet, and has a more numerous and powerful scouting force, it will, therefore, be able to push back the defending fleet, whether an actual battle occurs or not; and it will be able to bring over, also, a large invading force in transports if its fighting superiority be great enough. furthermore, if we have not fortified and protected the places which the enemy would wish to seize and use as advanced naval bases, the enemy will be able to seize them, and will doubtless do so. of course, this is so obvious as to seem hardly worth declaring; and yet some people hesitate even to admit it, and thereby they assume a passive condition of moral cowardice; for they know that a strong force has always overcome a weaker force that opposed it in war; and that it always will do so, until force ceases to be force. they know that force is that which moves, or tends to move, matter; and that the greater the force, the more surely it will move matter, or anything that opposes it. if, however, we establish naval bases near our valuable commercial and strategic ports, both on our coast and in the caribbean, and if we fortify them so that an enemy could not take them quickly, the condition of the enemy fleet will be much less happy; because it will have to remain out on the ocean, where fuelling and repairing are very difficult, and where it will be exposed, day and night, especially at night, to attack by destroyers and submarines; and in case necessity demands the occasional division of the force, it must beware of attacks on the separated portions of the fleet. the condition of a large fleet under way on an enemy's coast is one requiring much patience and endurance, and one in which the number of vessels is liable to be continuously reduced by the guerilla warfare of the defenders. in the case of our attempting offensive operations against the distant coast of an enemy, we would be in the same position as a foreign enemy would be in when attacking our coast, in that our chances of success would be excellent if our fleet were considerably superior to the defending fleet in fighting power, and in the number and strength of scouts, and if the enemy coast possessed numerous undefended bays and islands which we could seize as bases. but even if the superiority of our fleet in fighting power and scouts was considerably greater than the enemy's our ultimate success would be doubtful, if the enemy's coast and islands were so protected by guns and mines and submarines that we could not get a base near the scene of operations. it is true that the british were able to maintain blockades of the french coast during many weary months without any base nearer than england--a place far away to ships whose only motive power was sails; but destroyers and submarines and mines did not then exist, and these agencies are much more valuable to the defender than to the blockader who has no base at hand. our operations without a base on a distant enemy coast would be apt to degenerate into warding off a continual series of more or less minor attacks by the minor craft of the defender. the commander of our fleet would be constrained to keep his fighting force pretty close together, thus restricting his initiative; lest the entire enemy fleet catch a detached part out of supporting distance of the main body, and annihilate it with little loss to themselves. we could probably shut off most of the enemy's sea-borne commerce; and the war would become one of endurance between our fleet, on the one hand, and the economic forces and the morale of the enemy country on the other hand. in the case of operations carried on far away from the bases of both fleets, operations like those that the french and british carried on in the west indies, the commanders-in-chief will naturally be much less directed by the admiralties at home than will a commander-in-chief operating near home; and the strategical advantage, as affected by the proximity of bases, and by the possession of the better chance for the initiative, will be reduced to its minimum. of course, the victory will go to the more powerful force; but so many factors go to make up power, that it may be difficult to determine which is the more powerful, until after victory itself shall have decided it. supposing the skill to be equal on both sides, the victory will go to the side that possesses the most numerous and powerful vessels of all kinds. but unless there is a very great disproportion, it may be difficult to determine which side has the more powerful ships, even though we may know which side has the more numerous. it is extremely difficult to compare even two single war-ships because we do not know the relative values of their factors. suppose two ships, for instance, to be equal in all ways, except that one ship has ten -inch guns, and the other has twelve -inch guns of higher initial velocity. which is the more powerful ship? suppose one ship has more armor, another more speed. formulæ designed to assign numerical values to fighting ships have been laboriously worked out, notably by constructor otto kretschmer of the german navy; but the results cannot be accepted as anything except very able approximations. furthermore, if ship _a_ could whip ship _b_ under some conditions, _b_ could whip _a_ under other conditions. an extreme illustration would be battleship _a_ engaged with submarine _b_ at close quarters; _b_ being on the surface in one case, and submerged in the other case. _aircraft_.--the influence of aircraft on naval operations is to be very great indeed, but in directions and by amounts that it would not be wise to attempt to predict. the most obvious influence will be in distant scouting, for which the great speed of aircraft will make them peculiarly adapted, as was demonstrated in the battle near the skagerak. it is the belief of the author, however, that the time is close at hand when aeroplanes and dirigibles of large size will be capable of offensive operations of the highest order, including the launching of automobile torpedoes of the whitehead type. _skill_.--the question of skill bears a relation to the question of the material power directed by it that is very vital, but very elusive. if, for instance, ship _c_, firing ten -inch guns on a side, fights ship _d_, firing five like guns on a side, the advantage would seem to be with _c_; but it would not be if each gun on _d_ made three hits, while each gun on _c_ made one hit; a relative performance not at all impossible or unprecedented. similarily, if the head of the admiralty of the _e_ fleet were a very skilful strategist, and the head of the admiralty of the _f_ fleet were not, and if the various admirals, captains, lieutenants, engineers, and gunners of the _e_ fleet were highly skilled, and those of the _f_ fleet were not, the _e_ fleet might be victorious, even if materially it were much the smaller in material and personnel. in case the head of the admiralty of the _e_ fleet were the more skilful, while the officers of the _f_ fleet were, on the average, more skilful than those of the _e_ fleet, it would be impossible to weigh the difference between them; but as a rough statement, it may be said that if the head of the admiralty of either fleet is more skilful than the other, his officers will probably be more skilful than the officers of the other; so pervasive is the influence of the chief. the effectiveness of modern ships and guns and engines and torpedoes, when used with perfect skill, is so great that we tend unconsciously to assume the perfect skill, and think of naval power in terms of material units only. yet daily life is full of reminders that when two men or two bodies of men contend, the result depends in large though varying measure on their relative degrees of skill. whenever one thinks of using skill, he includes in his thought the thing in the handling of which the skill is employed. one can hardly conceive of using skill except in handling something of the general nature of an instrument, even if the skill is employed in handling something which is not usually called an instrument. for instance, if a man handles an organization with the intent thereby to produce a certain result, the organization is the instrument whereby he attempts to produce the result. if a man exercises perfect skill, he achieves with his instrument per cent of its possible effect. if he exercises imperfect skill, he achieves a smaller percentage of its possible effect. to analyze the effectiveness of skill, let us coin the phrase, "effective skill," and agree that, if a man produces per cent of the possible, his effective skill is per cent, and, in general, that a man's effective skill in using any instrument is expressed by the percentage he achieves of what the instrument can accomplish; that, for instance, if a gun is fired at a given range under given conditions, and per cent hits are made in a given time, then the effective skill employed is per cent. from this standpoint we see that imperfect skill is largely concerned with errors. if a man uses, say, a gun, with perfect skill, he commits no error in handling the gun; and the smaller the sum total of errors which he commits in handling the gun, the greater his effective skill and the greater the number of hits. the word "errors," as here used, does not simply mean errors of commission, but means errors of omission as well. if a man, in firing a gun, fails to press the button or trigger when his sights are on, he makes an error just as truly as the man does who presses the button or trigger when the sights are not on. suppose that, in firing a gun, under given conditions of range, etc., the effective skill employed is per cent. this means that per cent of hits are made. but it means another thing equally important--it means that per cent of misses are made. to what are these misses due? clearly they are due to errors made, not necessarily by the man who fires the gun, but by all the people concerned. if the correct sight-bar range were given to the gun, and if the gun were correctly laid and the pointer pressed the button at precisely the right instant, the shot would hit the target, practically speaking. but, in actual practice, the range-finder makes an error, the spotter makes an error, the plotting-room makes an error, the sight-setter makes an error, and the gun-pointer makes an error. the sum total of all of these errors results in per cent of misses. suppose that by careful training these errors are reduced in the relation of to , so that instead of there being per cent of misses there are only per cent. this does not seem a very difficult thing for training to accomplish, but note the result: the hits are increased from per cent to per cent. in other words, by a decrease in errors in the relation of to , the effective skill and the hits are doubled. conversely, if the errors increased in the ratio of to , the misses would increase from per cent to per cent, and the hits would be reduced from per cent to . suppose now that the conditions are so very difficult that only per cent of hits is made, or per cent of misses, and that by training the misses are reduced from per cent to per cent. clearly, by a decrease of errors of hardly more than per cent the effective skill and the hits are doubled. conversely, if the errors increased in the ratio of to , the misses would increase from per cent to per cent, and the hits would be reduced from per cent to . but suppose that the conditions are so easy that per cent of hits are made and only per cent of misses. clearly, if the errors were divided by , so that only per cent of misses was made, instead of per cent, the number of hits would increase only per cent, from per cent to per cent. of course, this is merely an arithmetical way of expressing the ancient truths that skill becomes more and more important as the difficulties of handling an instrument increase; and that, no matter how effective an instrument may be when used with perfect skill, the actual result obtained in practice is only the product of its possible performance and the effective skill with which it is used. applying this idea to naval matters, we see why the very maximum of skill is required in our war mechanisms and war organizations, in their almost infinite variety and complexity. the war mechanisms and war organizations of the military nations are capable of enormous results, but only when they are used with enormous skill. there are no other instruments or organizations that need so much skill to handle them, because of the difficulties attending their use and the issues at stake. their development has been a process long and painful. on no other things has so much money been spent; to perfect no other things have so many lives been sacrificed; on no other things, excepting possibly religion, have so many books been written; to no other things has the strenuous exertion of so many minds been devoted; in operating no other things has such a combination of talent and genius and power of will and spirit been employed. a battleship is an instrument requiring skill to handle well, considered both as a mechanism and as an organization. its effective handling calls for skill not only on the part of the captain, but on the part of all hands. the finest dreadnaught is ineffective if manned by an ineffective crew. the number and complexity of the mechanisms on board are so great as to stagger the imagination; and the circumstances of modern warfare are so difficult that, as between two forces evenly matched as to material, a comparatively slight advantage in errors made will turn the scale in favor of the more skilful. a difference in errors, for instance, in the relation of to , under the conditions mentioned above, between two fleets having an equal number of similar ships, would give one side twice as many hits as the other in any given length of time. in march, , the writer published an essay in the _proceedings of the u. s. naval institute_ called "american naval policy," in which the effect of initial superiority in gun-fire was shown in tables. one table showed that an initial advantage of only per cent secured an overwhelming victory by an accumulative effect. now a difference of per cent in hits, under conditions in which the hits were about per cent of the maximum, would mean, roughly speaking, the difference between hits and hits in a given length of time, or a difference between misses and misses; a difference in errors made of a little more than per cent. the conclusion to be drawn is too obvious to be stated. perhaps the conclusion is not broadly new; but possibly the idea is new that so small a difference in errors made will, under conditions of sufficient difficulty, produce such a tremendous difference in results. now, a division is more complex and more difficult to handle perfectly than is a battleship; a squadron more so than a division; a fleet more so than a squadron; a navy more so than a fleet. _necessity for knowledge of the naval machine_.--there is no machine or tool so simple that knowledge of it is not needed in order to use it skilfully. this does not mean that intimate knowledge of the details of construction of a machine is necessary in order to operate it; it does not mean, for instance, that a sharp-shooter must have a profound knowledge of the metallurgy of the metal of which his gun is mainly made, or of the laws of chemistry and physics that apply to powder, or of the laws of ballistics that govern the flight of the bullet to its target. but it does mean that any skilful handler of any machine must know how to use it; that a sharpshooter, for instance, must know how to use his machine--the gun. of course, a sharpshooter's skill is exercised in operating under very limited conditions, the conditions of shooting; and it does not include necessarily the maintenance of his gun in good condition. the operating of some machines, however, includes the maintenance of those machines; and a simple illustration is that of operating an automobile. an automobile is constructed to be operated at considerable distances from home; and a man whose knowledge and skill were limited to steering, stopping, starting, and backing the car--who had no knowledge of its details of construction and could not repair a trifling injury--would have very little value as a chauffeur. a like remark might truthfully be made about the operation of any complex machine; and the more complex the machine, the more aptly the remark would apply. the chief engineer of any electric plant, of any municipal water-works, of any railroad, of any steamship must have the most profound and intimate knowledge of the details of construction and the method of operation of the machine committed to his charge. recognition of this fact by the engineering profession is so complete and perfect as to be almost unconscious; and no man whose reasoning faculties had been trained by the exact methods of engineering could forget it for a moment. the whole structure of that noble science rests on facts that have been demonstrated to be facts, and the art rests on actions springing from those facts; and neither the science nor the art would now exist, if machines created by engineering skill had been committed to the charge of men unskilled. it is obvious that the more complicated in construction any machine is, the more time and study are needed to understand it fully; and that the more complicated its method of operation is, the more practice is needed in order to attain skill in operating it. the more simple the method of operation, the more closely a machine approaches automatism; but even automatic machines are automatic only in so far as their internal mechanisms are concerned; and the fact of their being automatic does not eliminate the necessity for skill in using them. an automatic gun, for instance, no matter how perfectly automatically it discharges bullets, may be fired at an advancing enemy skilfully or unskilfully, effectively or ineffectively. in operating some machines, such as a soldier's rifle, or a billiard cue, the number of mental, nervous, and muscular operations is apparently very few; yet every physician knows that the number is very great indeed, and the operations extremely complex--complex beyond the knowledge of the psychologist, physicist, chemist, and biologist. the operation of more complex mechanisms, such as automobiles, seems to be more difficult, because the operator has more different kinds of things to do. yet that it is really more difficult may be doubted for two reasons; one being that each single operation is of a more simple nature, and the other reason being that we know that a much higher degree of skill is possessed by a great billiardist than by an automobile chauffeur. of course, the reason of this may be that competition among billiardists has been much more keen than among chauffeurs; but even if this be true, it reminds us that _the difficulty of operating any machine depends on the degree of skill exacted_. it also reminds us that, if a machine is to be operated in competition with another machine, the skill of the operator should be as great as it can be made. the steaming competitions that have been carried on in our navy for several years are examples on a large scale of competitive trials of skill in operating machines. these machines are very powerful, very complex, very important; and that supreme skill shall be used in operating them is very important too. for this reason, every man in the engineering department of every ship, from the chief engineer himself to the youngest coal-passer, is made to pass an examination of some kind, in order that no man may be put into any position for which he is unfit, and no man advanced to any position until he has shown himself qualified for it, both by performance in the grade from which he seeks to rise, and by passing a professional examination as to the duties in the grade to which he desires to rise. the same principles apply to all machines; and the common sense of mankind appreciates them, even if the machines are of the human type. a captain of a company of soldiers, in all armies and in all times, has been trained to handle a specific human machine; so has the captain of a football team, so has the rector of a church. the training that each person receives gives him such a subconscious sense of the weights and uses of the various parts of the machine, that he handles them almost automatically--and not only automatically but instantly. the captain on the bridge, when an emergency confronts him, gives the appropriate order instantly. now the word "machine" conveys to the minds of most of us the image of an engine made of metal, the parts of which are moved by some force, such as the expansive force of steam. but machines were in use long before the steam-engine came, and one of the earliest known to man was man himself--the most perfect machine known to him now, and one of the most complicated and misused; for who of us does not know of some human machine of the most excellent type, that has been ruined by the ignorance or negligence of the man to whose care it was committed? a machine is in its essence an aggregation of many parts, so related to each other and to some external influence, that the parts can be made to operate together, to attain some desired end or object. from this point of view, which the author believes to be correct, a baseball team is a machine, so is a political party, so is any organization. before the days of civilization, machines were few in type; but as civilization progressed, the necessity for organizations of many kinds grew up, and organizations of many kinds appeared. then the necessity for knowledge of how to operate those organizations brought about certain professions, first that of the military, second that of the priesthood, and later those of the law, medicine, engineering, etc. as time has gone on, the preparation required for these professions, especially the progressive professions, has become increasingly difficult and increasingly demanded; and the members of the professions have become increasingly strict in their requirements of candidates for membership. now the profession that is the most strict of all, that demands the greatest variety of qualifications, and the earliest apprenticeship, is the military. the military profession serves on both the land and the sea, in armies and navies; and while both the land and the sea branches are exacting in their demands, the sea or naval branch is the more exacting of the two; by reason of the fact that the naval profession is the more esoteric, the more apart from the others, the more peculiar. in all the naval countries, suitable youths are taken in hand by their governments, and initiated into the "mysteries" of the naval profession--mysteries that would always remain mysteries to them, if their initiation were begun too late in life. many instances are known of men who obtained great excellence in professions which they entered late in life; but not one instance in the case of a man who entered the naval profession late in life. and though some civilian heads of navies have shown great mental capacity, and after--say three years'--incumbency have shown a comprehension of naval matters greater than might have been expected, none has made a record of performance like those of the naval ministers of germany and japan; or of admiral barham, as first lord of the admiralty, or sir john fisher as first sea lord, in england. a navy is so evidently a machine that the expression "naval machine" has often been applied to it. it is a machine that, both in peace and in war, must be handled by one man, no matter how many assistants he may have. if a machine cannot be made to obey the will of one man, it is not one machine. if two men are needed, at least two machines are to be operated; if three men are needed there are at least three machines, etc. one fleet is handled by one man, called the commander-in-chief. if there are two commanders-in-chief, there are two fleets; and these two fleets may act in conjunction, in opposition, or without reference to each other. the fact of a machine being operated by one man does not, however, prevent the machine from comprising several machines, operated by several men. a vessel of war, for instance, is operated as a unit by one man; the words "vessel of war," meaning not only the inert hull, but all the parts of personnel and material that make a vessel of war. the captain does not handle each individual machine or man; but he operates the mechanism and the personnel, by means of which all the machines and men are made to perform their tasks. now the naval machine is composed of many machines, but the machines that have to be "operated" in war, using the word "operated" in the usual military sense, are only the active fleet, the bureaus and offices and the bases; including in the bases any navy-yards within them. using the word "operated" still more technically, the only thing to be operated in war is the fleet: but the head of the navy department must also so direct the logistical efforts of the bureaus and offices and bases, that the fleet shall be given the material in fuel, supplies, and ammunition with which to conduct those operations. like the chief engineer of a ship, he must both operate and maintain the machine. the fleet itself is a complex machine, even in time of peace. in war time it is more so, for the reason that many additions are made to the fleet when war breaks out; and these additions, being largely of craft and men held in reserve, or brought in hurriedly from civil life, cannot be so efficient or so reliable as are the parts of the fleet that existed in time of peace. the active fleet consists of battleships, battle cruisers, cruisers of various speeds and sizes, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft. the fleet is under the immediate command of its commander-in-chief, just as the new york naval station is under the command of its commandant; but the commander-in-chief of the fleet is just as strictly under the command of the head of the admiralty or navy department as is the commandant. the commander-in-chief is the principal part of the naval machine that is operated in war; and the ultimate success of the naval machine in war depends largely on the amount and degree of understanding that exists between the commander-in-chief and the head of the navy department. that goodwill and kindly feeling should exist between them may be assumed, since both have the same object in view; but that real understanding should exist between them is more difficult to assume, especially if they have been trained in different schools and have not known each other until late in life. in the latter case, misunderstandings are apt to arise, as time goes on; and if they do, the most cordial good feeling may change into mutual distrust and suspicion, and even hatred. to see that such things have happened in the past, we do not have to look further back in history than the records of our own civil war, especially the records of the mutual relations of the head of the war department and some generals. that a situation equally grave did not exist between the head of the navy department and any of the admirals may be attributed to the fact that the number of naval defeats was less than the number of defeats on land, to the lesser number of persons in the navy, and to the smaller number of operations. perhaps a still greater reason was the greater confidence shown by civilians in their ability to handle troops, compared with their confidence in their ability to handle fleets. even between the navy department and the officers, however, mutual respect and understanding can hardly be said to have existed. this did not prevent the ultimate triumph of the union navy; but that could hardly have been prevented by any means, since the union navy was so much superior to the confederate. _co-operation between the navy department and the fleet_.--in any war with a powerful navy, into which the u. s. navy may enter, the question of co-operation between the department and the fleet will be the most important factor in the portentous situation that will face us. we shall be confronted with the necessity of handling the most complex and powerful machine known to man with the utmost possible skill; and any lack of understanding between the fleet and the department, and any slowness of apprehension or of action by the department, may cause a national disaster. one of the most important dangers to be guarded against will be loss of time. in naval operations the speed of movement of the forces is so great that crises develop and pass with a rapidity unexampled formerly; so that delays of any kind, or due to any causes, must be prevented if that be possible. if a swordsman directs a thrust at the heart, the thrust must be parried--_in time_. [illustration: strategic map of the atlantic and pacific oceans.] * * * * * +-----------------------------------------------------------+ | transcriber's note: | | | | inconsistent hyphenation and spelling in the original | | document have been preserved. | | | | subscripts are respresented with _{} e.g.: q_{ }. | | | | obvious typographical errors have been corrected. for | | a complete list, please see the end of this document. | | | +-----------------------------------------------------------+ * * * * * sea power in its relations to the war of by captain a.t. mahan, d.c.l., ll.d. _united states navy_ author of "the influence of sea power upon history, - ," "the influence of sea power upon the french revolution and empire," "the interest of america in sea power," etc. in two volumes vol. ii london sampson low, marston & company limited [illustration: _from a copley print copyright by curtis & cameron, publishers, boston._ _the constitution_] contents chapter ix the winter of - --bainbridge's squadron: actions between "constitution" and "java," "hornet" and "peacock"--increasing pressure on atlantic coast page bainbridge's squadron sails his plans for the cruise the "essex" fails to join proceedings of "constitution" and "hornet" action between "constitution" and "java" the "constitution" returns to the united states proceedings of the "hornet" action between the "hornet" and "peacock" the "hornet" returns the chesapeake and delaware blockaded subsequent extension of blockade to the whole coast south of newport three periods into which the war of divides difficulty of american frigates in getting to sea difficulty of manning the navy cruise of the "chesapeake" gradual suppression of american commerce increasing stringency of the commercial blockade british occupation of delaware and chesapeake bays diminution of the coasting trade, and increase of land carriage effects upon prices abandoned condition of the western atlantic diminution in number of prizes taken by americans estimate of relative captures by the two belligerents relative captures no indication of relative immunity american deprivation makes for the prosperity of halifax and canada the blockade the chief offensive maritime operation of great britain, in no opposition longer possible to the american navy strength of the british blockading divisions escape possible only by evasion the brunt of the british naval operations falls upon the chesapeake and delaware chapter x campaign of on the lake frontier, to the battle of lake erie the british naval service on the lakes under warren's supervision sir james yeo appointed to the local command appoints captain barclay to take charge of british vessels on lake erie the americans now superior on ontario montreal the true american objective dearborn ordered to concentrate effort upon lake ontario chauncey's first plan, to capture kingston dearborn and chauncey ordered to proceed first against kingston, then toronto, then niagara dearborn's objections his reports obtain change of plan from the government chauncey's new plan the expedition leaves sackett's harbor capture of toronto chauncey's anxiety for sackett's harbor capture of fort george, and british retreat from niagara effects of the american occupation of the niagara peninsula american naval vessels escape from black rock to erie british attack upon sackett's harbor premature firing of the naval yard and vessels consequent delay in chauncey's preparations yeo takes the lake with his squadron american reverse at stony creek the army retreats upon fort george the british re-occupy the peninsula, except fort george dearborn is relieved from command paralysis of the american forces at niagara yeo in temporary control of lake ontario chauncey sails to contest control characteristics of the ensuing naval campaign predominant idea of chauncey and yeo relative powers of the two squadrons their encounter of august , chauncey's extreme caution the engagement of september expediency of a "general chase" under the conditions chapter xi the campaign of on the lakes and northern frontier--the battle of lake erie the american navy on lake erie perry's eagerness for active operations coincidence of events on lakes erie and ontario inferiority of perry's crews in numbers and quality professional contrast between chauncey and perry personal difficulty. perry applies to be detached the navy department refuses position of the american army on the maumee procter's attack upon fort meigs procter and barclay plan attack on erie re-enforcements of troops refused them barclay blockades erie barclay visits long point perry's squadron crosses the bar at erie procter attacks fort stephenson, and is repulsed barclay retires to malden perry in control of the lake destitution of provisions in the british camp and fleet barclay goes out to fight composition and armament of the two squadrons controversy about the battle dispositions of the two commanders opening of the battle examination of the controversy between perry and elliott progress of the engagement second stage of the battle the british surrender meritorious conduct of captain barclay question of credit on the american side comparison of the campaigns on erie and on ontario effect of the battle on the fate of the northwest its bearing upon the peace negotiations of the following year influence of control of the water illustrated on the lakes chapter xii the campaign of on the lakes and northern frontier, after the battle of lake erie perry's victory promptly followed up general harrison lands his army at malden recovery of detroit. battle of the thames, october , the indians fall away from the british harrison's army transferred to niagara perry detached from the lake service changed american plan of campaign on ontario general james wilkinson replaces dearborn the government designates kingston as the objective the embarkation begins at niagara under cover of the navy yeo's squadron appears in the neighborhood encounter between the two squadrons, september , criticism of chauncey's management wilkinson's troops reach sackett's harbor the british re-enforce kingston new change of american plan. the army to be directed on montreal intended junction with the troops from lake champlain, under general hampton wilkinson's army assembled within the mouth of the st. lawrence it proceeds down the river pursuit by a british detachment american reverse at chrystler's farm hampton fails to join wilkinson, and returns to plattsburg the expedition abandoned. wilkinson goes into winter quarters at french mills chauncey returns to sackett's harbor from the st. lawrence transports harrison's division from niagara to sackett's harbor fleets lay up for the winter disastrous close of the campaign upon the niagara americans evacuate fort george and the peninsula they burn newark act disavowed by the american government sir gordon drummond in command in upper canada the british, under general riall, cross the niagara and capture fort niagara lewiston, youngstown, and manchester burned in retaliation for newark buffalo burned, and three naval vessels at black rock general failure of the campaign about lake ontario discussion of the causes chapter xiii seaboard maritime operations, united states on the defensive on the seaboard british reasons for partially relaxing severity of blockade reasons do not apply to armed vessels or coasting trade american navy powerless to protect commerce to destroy that of the enemy its principal mission cruises of the "president" and "congress" efficacy of the british convoy system its chief failure is near ports of arrival this dictates the orders to captain lawrence importance of the service imperfect preparation of the "chesapeake" efficiency of the "shannon." broke's professional merit his challenge to lawrence. not received the "chesapeake" sails, purposely to fight account of the action the "chesapeake" captured analysis of the engagement decatur fails to get to sea with a squadron driven to take refuge in new london frigates confined there for the war particular anxiety of the british government about american frigates expectations of the admiralty and the country from warren's fleet effects of the blockade of new london on local coasting evidence of the closeness of the whole blockade south of new london conditions at new york british operations in the upper chesapeake, conditions in delaware bay american precautions in chesapeake and delaware circumspect conduct of the british vessels in the chesapeake warren brings a detachment of troops from bermuda rencounters in and near hampton roads british attack upon craney island. fails attack upon hampton. ineffective further movements of the british in the chesapeake movement of licensed vessels in chesapeake bay during these operations consequent recommendation of president to prohibit all exports during the blockade rejected by senate. enforced in chesapeake by executive order glaring necessity for such action embargo law passed in december, main british fleet quits the chesapeake. its failure in direct military operation efficacy of the blockade characteristics of the different sections of the united states, as affecting their suffering from blockade statistical evidences of its effects prices of great staples: flour and sugar dependence of eastern and southern states upon coasting, greater than that of middle states captain hull's reports on eastern coasting action between the "boxer" and "enterprise" intermission of eastern blockade during winter its resumption in increased vigor in undefended conditions of the american coast conditions of southern coasting trade british blockade severs the mutual intercourse of the different sections of the united states remarks of representative pearson, of north carolina message of the governor of pennsylvania rigors of the blockade shown by figures momentary importance of the north carolina coast advocacy of an internal navigation system evidence of privation in the rebound of prices and shipping movement after peace exposition of conditions, in a contemporary letter by a naval officer the experiences of the war of now largely forgotten lessons to be deduced pressure upon the british government exerted, even by the puny contemporary american navy advantage of the american position opinions of presidents washington and adams as to the international advantage of a navy policy of president jefferson chapter xiv maritime operations external to the waters of the united states, - commerce destruction the one offensive maritime resort left open to the united states respective objects of privateers and of naval vessels the approaches to the british islands the most fruitful field for operations against commerce cruise of the "argus" capture of the "argus" by the "pelican" significance of the cruise of the "argus" great number of captures by american cruisers comparatively few american merchant ships captured at sea shows the large scale on which british commerce throve, and the disappearance of american shipping control of british navy shown by american practice of destroying prizes successes of the privateers "scourge" and "rattlesnake" in the north sea the "leo" and "lion" off coast of portugal british army in southern france incommoded by cruisers off cape finisterre american cruises based on french ports the privateer "yankee" on the gold-coast of africa action between the american privateer "globe" and two british packets, off madeira captures in the same neighborhood by privateers "governor tompkins" and "america" the west indies as a field for warfare on commerce activity there of american cruisers stringency of the convoy act in the west indies. papers captured there by the "constitution" indirect effects of the warfare on commerce cruise in the west indies of the naval brigs "rattlesnake" and "enterprise" combat between the privateer "decatur" and british war schooner "dominica" the "comet" and the british ship "hibernia" the "saucy jack" and the british ship "pelham" the "saucy jack" with the bomb-ship "volcano" and transport "golden fleece" remarkable seizure by the privateer "kemp" the cruises of the privateer "chasseur" combat between the "chasseur" and the british war schooner "st. lawrence" contrasted motives of the ship of war and the privateer relative success of american naval vessels and privateers in the war upon commerce cruise of the frigate "essex" arrival in valparaiso of the "essex," and of the british ships, "phoebe" and "cherub" action between the "essex" and the "phoebe" and "cherub" cruise of the "wasp" action between the "reindeer" and "wasp" action between the "avon" and "wasp" disappearance of the "wasp" cruise of the "peacock" action between "epervier" and "peacock" further cruise of the "peacock" activity of american cruisers in british waters agitation in great britain the effect produced due to the american people severally prostration of the government in the united states, determination to accept peace without relinquishment of impressment by great britain development of privateering adaptation of vessels to the pursuit practical considerations determining vessels to be employed secretary of the navy recommends squadrons of schooners for action against commerce debate in congress recommendation adopted chapter xv the niagara campaign, and events on the great lakes, in british advantages of position on the niagara line unusual mildness of winter - effect on operations british project against the vessels in put-in bay difficulty of maintaining british garrison at mackinac american army abandons cantonments at french mills part goes to lake champlain, part to sackett's harbor american project against kingston general brown's mistake as to the government's purpose carries his army to the niagara frontier chauncey's fears for sackett's harbor wilkinson's expedition to la colle. failure wilkinson superseded by general izard yeo obtains momentary superiority on ontario importance of oswego british capture oswego, and destroy depots yeo blockades sackett's harbor difficulty of american situation on ontario british naval disaster in attempting to intercept convoy from oswego to sackett's harbor yeo abandons blockade of sackett's harbor american plan of operations on northern frontier brown crosses the niagara. surrender of fort erie advance towards fort george battle of chippewa brown advances to queenston chauncey's failure to co-operate consequent anxiety of the government decatur ordered to relieve chauncey chauncey's defence of his conduct discussion of his argument british advantage through his inaction leads to the battle of lundy's lane battle of lundy's lane value to americans of the battles of chippewa and lundy's lane improvement in the militia through association with brown's army brown unable longer to keep the field. retires to fort erie british assault upon fort erie. disastrous repulse british now embarrassed by chauncey's blockade american successful sortie from fort erie drummond abandons the siege, and retires to the chippewa brown unable to follow him izard ordered from lake champlain to brown's aid his march his corps arrives at the niagara frontier strength of the british position on the chippewa izard's hopelessness blows up fort erie and retires across the niagara naval and military expedition against mackinac unsuccessful, except in destroying british transports british capture the american naval schooners "tigress" and "scorpion" american schooners "ohio" and "somers" also captured, off fort erie loss of the "caledonia" and "ariel" the erie fleet lays up for the winter, after the british abandon the siege of fort erie chapter xvi seaboard operations in . washington, baltimore, and maine defensive character of the british northern campaign in increase of vigor in their seaboard operations warren relieved by cochrane intentions of the british government retaliation for american actions in canada prevost's call upon cochrane to retaliate cochrane's orders to his vessels attitude of british officers early operations in chesapeake bay, relations of barney's flotilla to the british project against washington assembling of the british combined forces in the chesapeake condition of american preparations british advance. destruction of barney's flotilla retreat of american forces american position at bladensburg battle of bladensburg burning of washington capture and ransom of alexandria by british frigates failure of british attempt on baltimore british harrying of new england coast occupation of castine, in maine destruction of the american frigate "adams" chapter xvii lake champlain and new orleans arrival of large british re-enforcements in canada objects of the british northern campaign of previous neglect of lake champlain by both belligerents operations on the lake in british attempt in spring of macdonough in control of lake, in summer of british "confiance" building to contest control instructions of british government to prevost prevost in august reports approaching readiness to move treasonable actions of american citizens about lake champlain izard, with four thousand troops, leaves plattsburg for sackett's harbor consequent destitution of the champlain frontier british advance to plattsburg relative positions of american squadron and land forces question of distance between squadron and land batteries opinions of izard and yeo as to the relations of the batteries to the squadron proper combination for prevost backward state of "confiance" upon downie's taking command urgent letters of prevost to downie downie's expectations in attacking macdonough's dispositions downie's consequent plan of engagement naval battle of lake champlain decisive character of the american victory preoccupation of the british government with european conditions episodical character of the new orleans expedition negotiations of admiral cochrane for the co-operation of the creek indians his measures for training them, and preparations for the expedition objects of the british ministry attack upon fort bowyer, mobile bay, by a british squadron previous occupation of west florida to the perdido, by the united states pensacola, remaining in spanish hands, utilized by british seized by jackson, and works destroyed arrival of british expedition in mississippi sound gunboat battle of lake borgne british advance corps reaches the bank of the mississippi night attack by american navy and jackson sir edward pakenham arrives from england his preliminary movements particular danger of jackson's position details of the final day of assault, january , the british withdraw after repulse capture of fort bowyer, mobile bay final naval episodes sailing of the "president." she grounds on the new york bar overtaken, and is captured, by the british blockading division the "constitution" captures the "cyane" and "levant" capture of the british sloop "penguin" by the "hornet" chapter xviii the peace negotiations early overtures towards peace by the united states castlereagh refuses to entertain the project of abandoning impressment russia, in , suggests negotiations for peace under mediation of the czar united states accepts, but great britain refuses great britain, through the czar, offers a direct negotiation, the united states accepts, and names five commissioners the original instructions to the american commission, reduced, , through pressure of the war confident attitude of great britain at the opening of the negotiations hostile spirit in great britain towards the united states the instructions to the british commission the demand on behalf of the indians faulty presentation of it by the british commission british claim concerning the great lakes and boundaries discussion of these propositions reasons for british advocacy of the indians final reduction of british demand for the indians and acceptance by american commission concern of british ministry for the opinion of europe news received of the capture of washington sanguine anticipations based upon reports from cochrane and ross the british government suggests the _uti possidetis_ as the basis of agreement the american commission refuse, and offer instead the _status ante bellum_ news arrives of the british defeat on lake champlain the political instructions to the commanders of the new orleans expedition, to be communicated for the satisfaction of the continental powers urgency of the european situation dangerous internal state of france consequent wish of the british ministry to withdraw wellington from paris he is pressed to accept the american command wellington thus brought into the discussion of terms he pronounces against the basis of _uti possidetis_ the british ministry accept his judgment the _status ante bellum_ accepted by great britain subsequent rapid conclusion of agreement terms of the treaty signed by the commissioners, december , despatched to america by a british ship of war ratified by the united states, february , gallatin's opinion of the effect of the war upon the people of the united states index list of illustrations. volume two. the chase of the _constitution_ _frontispiece_ from the painting by s. salisbury tuckerman. the quarterdeck of the _java_ before the surrender page from a drawing by henry reuterdahl. the new carrying trade page from a drawing by stanley m. arthurs. the retreat of the british from sackett's harbor page from a drawing by henry reuterdahl. the fleets of chauncey and yeo manoeuvring on lake champlain page from a drawing by carlton t. chapman. captain isaac chauncey page from the engraving by d. edwin, after the painting by j. woods. captain sir james lucas yeo page from the engraving by h.r. cook, after the painting by a. buck. captain oliver hazard perry page from the painting by gilbert stuart, in the possession of o.h. perry, esq. perry receiving the surrender of the british at the battle of lake erie page from a drawing by henry reuterdahl. captain philip bowes vere broke page from the mezzotint by charles turner, after the painting by samuel lane, in the possession of lady saumarez. the capture of the _chesapeake_ by the _shannon_--the struggle on the quarterdeck page from a drawing by henry reuterdahl. captain james lawrence page from the painting by gilbert stuart, in the possession of the new jersey historical society, newark, n.j. the burning of a privateer prize page from a drawing by henry reuterdahl. captain david porter page from the painting by charles wilson peale, in independence hall, philadelphia. captain thomas macdonough page from the painting by gilbert stuart, in the century club, new york, by permission of the owner, rodney macdonough, esq. the battle of lake champlain page from a drawing by henry reuterdahl. maps and battle plans. volume two. plan of engagement between _constitution_ and _java_ page plan of engagement between _hornet_ and _peacock_ page map of niagara peninsula page surroundings of sackett's harbor page plan of chauncey's engagement, august , page plan of erie harbor, page diagram of the battle of lake erie, september , page chauncey and yeo, september , page _chesapeake_ and _shannon_ page outline map of chesapeake bay and rivers page _enterprise_ and _boxer_ page _argus_ and _pelican_ page _montague_, _pelham_, and _globe_ page _chasseur_ and _st. lawrence_ page _wasp_ and _reindeer_ page sketch of the march of the british army, under general ross, from the th to the th august, page tracing from pencil sketch of battle of lake champlain made by commodore macdonough page battle of lake champlain page the landing of the british army, its encampments and fortifications on the mississippi; works they erected on their retreat; with the encampments and fortifications of the american army page sea power in its relations to the war of the war (_continued_) chapter ix the winter of - --bainbridge's squadron: actions between "constitution" and "java," "hornet" and "peacock"--increasing pressure on atlantic coast the squadron under commodore william bainbridge, the third which sailed from the united states in october, , started nearly three weeks after the joint departure of rodgers and decatur. it consisted of the "constitution" and sloop of war "hornet," then in boston, and of the "essex," the only -gun frigate in the navy, fitting for sea in the delaware. the original armament of the latter, from which she derived her rate, had been changed to forty -pounder carronades and six long twelves; total, forty-six guns. it is noticeable that this battery, which ultimately contributed not merely to her capture, but to her almost helplessness under the fire of an enemy able to maintain his distance out of carronade range, was strongly objected to by captain porter. on october he applied to be transferred to the "adams," giving as reasons "my insuperable dislike to carronades, and the bad sailing of the "essex," which render her, in my opinion, the worst frigate in the service."[ ] the request was not granted, and porter sailed in command of the ship on october , the two other vessels having left boston on the th. in order to facilitate a junction, bainbridge had sent porter full details of his intended movements.[ ] a summary of these will show his views as to a well-planned commerce-destroying cruise. starting about october , he would steer first a course not differing greatly from the general direction taken by rodgers and decatur, to the cape verde islands, where he would fill with water, and by november sail for the island fernando de noronha, two hundred and fifty miles south of the equator, and two hundred miles from the mainland of brazil, then a portuguese colony, of which the island was a dependency. the trade winds being fair for this passage, he hoped to leave there by december , and to cruise south along the brazilian coast as far as rio de janeiro, until january . in the outcome the meeting of the "constitution" with the "java" cut short her proceedings at this point; but bainbridge had purposed to stay yet another month along the brazilian coast, between rio and st. catherine's, three hundred miles south. thence he would cross the south atlantic to the neighborhood of st. helena, remaining just beyond sight of it, to intercept returning british indiamen, which frequently stopped there. porter failed to overtake the other vessels, on account of the bad sailing of the "essex." he arrived at fernando de noronha december , one day before that fixed by bainbridge as his last there; but the "constitution" and "hornet" had already gone on to bahia, on the brazilian mainland, seven hundred miles to the southwest, leaving a letter for him to proceed off cape frio, sixty miles from the entrance of rio. he reached this rendezvous on the th, but saw nothing of bainbridge, who had been detained off bahia by conditions there. the result was that the "essex" never found her consorts, and finally struck out a career for herself, which belongs rather to a subsequent period of the war. we therefore leave her spending her christmas off cape frio. the two other vessels had arrived off bahia on december . here was lying a british sloop of war, the "bonne citoyenne," understood to have on board a very large amount of specie for england. the american vessels blockaded her for some days, and then captain lawrence challenged her to single combat; bainbridge acquiescing, and pledging his honor that the "constitution" should remain out of the way, or at least not interfere. the british captain, properly enough, declined. that his ship and her reported value were detaining two american vessels from wider depredations was a reason more important than any fighting-cock glory to be had from an arranged encounter on equal terms, and should have sufficed him without expressing the doubt he did as to bainbridge's good faith.[ ] on the th the commodore, leaving lawrence alone to watch the british sloop, stood out to sea with the "constitution," cruising well off shore; and thus on the th, at a.m., being then five miles south of the port and some miles from land, discovered two strange sail, which were the british frigate "java," captain henry lambert, going to bahia for water, with an american ship, prize to her. upon seeing the "constitution" in the south-southwest, the british captain shaped his course for her, directing the prize to enter the harbor. bainbridge, watching these movements, now tacked his ship, and at . a.m. steered away southeast under all plain sail, to draw the enemy well away from neutral waters; the portuguese authorities having shown some sensitiveness on that score. the "java" followed, running full ten miles an hour, a great speed in those days, and gaining rapidly. at . , being now as far off shore as desired, bainbridge went about and stood toward the enemy, who kept away with a view to rake, which the "constitution" avoided by the usual means of wearing, resuming her course southeast, but under canvas much reduced. at . the "java," having closed to a half mile, the "constitution" fired one gun ahead of her; whereupon the british ship hoisted her colors, and the american then fired two broadsides. the "java" now took up a position to windward of the "constitution," on her port side, a little forward ( . ); "within pistol-shot," according to the minutes submitted by the officer who succeeded to the command; "much further than i wished," by bainbridge's journal. it is not possible entirely to reconcile the pretty full details of further movements given by each;[ ] but it may be said, generally, that this battle was not mainly an artillery duel, like those of the "constitution" and "guerrière," the "wasp" and "frolic," nor yet one in which a principal manoeuvre, by its decisive effect upon the use of artillery, played the determining part, as was the case with the "united states" and "macedonian." here it was a combination of the two factors, a succession of evolutions resembling the changes of position, the retreats and advances, of a fencing or boxing match, in which the opponents work round the ring; accompanied by a continual play of the guns, answering to the thrusts and blows of individual encounter. in this game of manoeuvres the "constitution" was somewhat handicapped by her wheel being shot away at . . the rudder remained unharmed; but working a ship by relieving tackles, the substitute for the wheel, is for several reasons neither as quick nor as accurate. [illustration: plan of the engagement between constitution and java] certain salient incidents stand out in both accounts, marking the progress of the engagement. shortly before three o'clock the head of the "java's" bowsprit was shot away, and with it went the jib-boom. at this time, the fore and main masts of the british frigate being badly wounded, with all the rigging cut to pieces, captain lambert looked upon the day as lost unless he could board. the sailing master having been sent below wounded, the first lieutenant, whose account is here followed, was directed to run the ship alongside the enemy; but the helm was hardly put up when the foremast went overboard, at five minutes past three, a time in which both accounts agree. the british narrative states that the stump of their bowsprit caught in the mizzen rigging of the "constitution" ( . ). this bainbridge does not mention; but, if correct, the contact did not last long, for the "constitution" immediately wore across the "java's" bow, and the latter's maintopmast followed the foremast. the british frigate was now beaten beyond recovery; nevertheless the flag was kept flying, and it was after this that captain lambert fell, mortally wounded. resistance was continued until . , by the american accounts; by the british, till . . then, the enemy's mizzenmast having fallen, and nothing left standing but the main lower mast, the "constitution" shot ahead to repair damages. there was no more firing, but the "java's" colors remained up till . ,-- . by the british times,--when they were hauled down as the "constitution" returned. the american loss was nine killed and twenty-five wounded; that of the british, by their official accounts, twenty-two killed, one hundred and two wounded. the superiority in broadside weight of fire of the "constitution" over the "java" was about the same as over the "guerrière." the "java's" crew was stronger in number than that of the "guerrière," mustering about four hundred, owing to having on board a hundred supernumeraries for the east india station, to which the ship was ultimately destined. on the other hand, the material of the ship's company is credibly stated to have been extremely inferior, a condition frequently complained of by british officers at this late period of the napoleonic wars. it has also been said, in apparent extenuation of her defeat, that although six weeks out from england, having sailed november , and greater part of that time necessarily in the trade winds, with their usual good weather, the men had not been exercised in firing the guns until december , the day before meeting the "constitution," when six broadsides of blank cartridges were discharged. whatever excuse may exist in the individual instance for such neglect, it is scarcely receivable in bar of judgment when disaster follows. no particular reason is given, except "the many services of a newly fitted ship, lumbered with stores;" for in such latitudes the other allegation, "a succession of gales of wind since the day of departure,"[ ] is incredible. on broad general grounds the "java" needed no apology for being beaten by a ship so much heavier; and the "constitution's" loss in killed and wounded was over double that suffered from the "guerrière" four months before, when the american ship had substantially the same crew.[ ] further, bainbridge reported to his government that "the damage received in the action, but more especially the decayed state of the "constitution," made it necessary to return to the united states for repairs." although lieutenant chads, who succeeded lambert, was mistaken in supposing the american ship bound to the east indies, he was evidently justified in claiming that the stout resistance of the "java" had broken up the enemy's cruise, thus contributing to the protection of the british commerce. [illustration: the quarterdeck of the _java_ before the surrender. _drawn by henry reuterdahl._] the "java" was considered by bainbridge too much injured to be worth taking to the united states. she was therefore set on fire december , and the "constitution" went back to bahia, where the prisoners were landed under parole. thence she sailed for home january , , reaching boston february . before his departure the commodore directed lawrence to blockade bahia as long as seemed advisable, but to beware of a british seventy-four, said to be on the coast. when it became expedient, he was to quit the position and move northward; first off pernambuco, and thence to the coast of cayenne, surinam, and demerara, a favorite cruising ground for american commerce-destroyers. the "hornet" was to be in boston in the first fortnight of april. in pursuance of these discretionary orders lawrence remained off bahia for eighteen days, till january , when the expected seventy-four, the "montagu," appeared, forcing him into the harbor; but the same night he came out, gave her the slip, and proceeded on his cruise. on february , off the demarara river, he encountered the british brig of war "peacock," a vessel of the same class as the "frolic," which was captured a few months before by the "wasp," sister ship to the "hornet." there was no substantial difference in size between these two approaching antagonists; but, unfortunately for the equality of the contest, the "peacock" carried -pounder carronades, instead of the 's which were her proper armament. her battery power was therefore but two thirds that of the "hornet." the vessels crossed on opposite tacks, exchanging broadsides within half pistol-shot, the "hornet" to windward( ). the "peacock" then wore; observing which, lawrence kept off at once for her and ran on board her starboard quarter ( ). in this position the engagement was hot for about fifteen minutes, when the "peacock" surrendered, hoisting a flag union down, in signal of distress. she had already six feet of water in the hold. being on soundings, in less than six fathoms, both anchored, and every effort was made to save the british vessel; but she sank, carrying down nine of her own crew and three of the "hornet's." her loss in action was her commander and four men killed, and twenty-nine wounded, of whom three died; that of the american vessel, one killed and two wounded. the inequality in armament detracts inevitably from glory in achievement; but the credit of readiness and efficiency is established for lawrence and his crew by prompt action and decisive results. so, also, defeat is not inglorious under such odds; but it remains to the discredit of the british commander that his ship did no more execution, when well within the most effective range of her guns. in commenting upon this engagement, after noticing the dandy neatness of the "peacock," james says, "neglect to exercise the ship's company at the guns prevailed then over two thirds of the british navy; to which the admiralty, by their sparing allowance of powder and shot for practice, were in some degree instrumental." with the survivors of the "peacock," and prisoners from other prizes, captain lawrence found himself now with two hundred and seventy-seven souls on board and only thirty-four hundred gallons of water. there was at hand no friendly port where to deposit his captives, and provisions were running short. he therefore steered for the united states, and arrived at holmes' hole on march .[ ] [illustration: plan of engagement between hornet and peacock] the capture of the "peacock" was the last of five naval duels, three between frigates and two between sloops, all favorable in issue to the united states, which took place in what may justly be considered the first of the three periods into which the war of obviously divides. great britain, long reluctant to accept the fact of war as irreversible, did not begin to put forth her strength, or to exercise the measures of repression open to her, until the winter of - was drawing to a close. on october , convinced that the mere news of the revocation of the orders in council would not induce any change in the american determination, the hitherto deferred authority for general reprisals was given; but accompanying them was an express provision that they were not to be understood as recalling the declaration which warren had been commissioned to make, in order to effect a suspension of hostilities.[ ] on november , however, hopes from this source having apparently disappeared, directions were sent the admiral to institute a rigorous commercial blockade of delaware and chesapeake bays,[ ] the usual public notification of the fact to neutral powers, for the information of their shipping affected by it, being issued december , three days before the action between the "constitution" and "java." on february , three days before the "hornet" sank the "peacock," warren wrote that in compliance with the orders of november this blockade had been put in force. the ship "emily," from baltimore for lisbon, under a british license, with a cargo of flour, was turned back when attempting to go to sea from the chesapeake, about february ; warren indorsing on her papers that the bay had been placed under rigorous blockade the day before.[ ] captain stewart, the senior united states officer at norfolk, notified his government of these facts on february .[ ] soon after, by an order in council dated march , the measure was extended to new york, charleston, port royal, savannah, and the mississippi river.[ ] later in the year warren, by a sweeping proclamation, dated november ,[ ] widened its scope to cover long island sound, inside of montauk and black point; the latter being on the connecticut shore, eight miles west of new london. from thence it applied not only to the ports named, but to all inlets whatsoever, southward, as far as the florida boundary. narragansett bay and the rest of new england remained still exempt. these restrictions, together with the increase of warren's force and the operations of in the chesapeake, may be considered as initiating the second stage of the war, when great britain no longer cherished hopes of any other solution than by the sword, but still was restrained in the exercise of her power by the conflict with napoleon. with the downfall of the latter, in april, , began the third and final act, when she was more at liberty to let loose her strength, to terminate a conflict at once weakening and exasperating. it is not without significance that the treaty of peace with the restored bourbon government of france was signed may , ,[ ] and that on may was issued a proclamation placing under strict and rigorous blockade, not merely specified places, but "all the ports, harbors, bays, creeks, rivers, inlets, outlets, islands, and sea-coasts of the united states," from the border of new brunswick to that of florida.[ ] in form, this was only the public notification of a measure already instituted by warren's successor, cochrane, embracing newport, boston, and the east under restrictions heretofore limited to new york--including long island sound--and the coast southward; but it was not merely the assertion of a stringent resolution. it was a clear defiance, in the assurance of conscious power, of a principal contention of the united states, that the measure of blockades against neutrals was not legitimately applicable to whole coasts, but only to specified ports closely watched by a naval force competent to its avowed purpose. despite the gathering of the storm, the full force of which was to be expected in the spring, the united states ships of war that reached port in the early and middle winter of - remained. there is, perhaps, an unrecognized element of "hindsight" in the surprise felt at this fact by a seaman of to-day, knowing the views and wishes of the prominent officers of the navy at that period. decatur, with the "united states," reached new york in december, accompanied by the "macedonian." neither of these vessels got to sea again during the war. by the time they were ready, both outlets to the port were effectually blocked. rodgers, with the "president" and "congress," entered boston december , but did not sail again until april . the "constellation," captain stewart, was reported, perhaps erroneously, as nearly ready for sea at washington, november , waiting only for a few additional hands. later in the winter she went to annapolis, to examine her powder, leaving there for hampton roads february , on account of the ice. on the th, approaching her destination, she discovered two ships of the line, three frigates, and two smaller british vessels, working up from the capes for the roads. in the face of such a force there was nothing to do but to escape to norfolk, where she remained effectually shut up for the rest of the war. bainbridge, as already known, brought the "constitution" back for repairs in february. even from boston she was unable to escape till the following december. that there were satisfactory reasons for this seeming dilatoriness is assured by the character of the officers. probably the difficulty of keeping up the ship's companies, in competition with the superior attractions of privateering and the very high wages offered by the merchants for their hazardous but remunerative commercial voyages accounted for much. hull wrote from new york, october , , that the merchants fitting out their vessels gave such high wages that it was difficult to get either seamen or workmen.[ ] where no system of forced enrolment--conscription or impressment--is permitted, privateering has always tended to injure the regular naval service. though unquestionably capable of being put by owners on a business basis, as a commercial undertaking, with the individual seaman the appeal of privateering has always been to the stimulants of chance and gain, which prove so attractive in the lottery. stewart, an officer of great intelligence and experience in his profession, found a further cause in the heavy ships of the enemy. in the hostilities with france in - , he said, "we had nearly four thousand able seamen in the navy. we could frequently man a frigate in a week. one reason was because the enemy we were then contending with had not afloat (with very few exceptions) vessels superior in rate to frigates. the enemy we are fighting now have ships of the line, and our sailors know the great difference between them and frigates, and cannot but feel a degree of reluctance at entering the service from the disparity of force."[ ] the reason seems to prove too much; pressed to an extreme, no navy would be able to use light vessels, because the enemy had heavier which might--or might not--be encountered. certain it is, however, that when the government in the following winter, in order to stop the license trade with the enemy, embargoed all vessels in home ports, much less difficulty was experienced in getting seamen for the navy. whatever the reasons, the only frigates at sea during the first four months of were the "essex" and the "chesapeake." the former, after failing to meet bainbridge, struck off boldly for the pacific ocean on porter's own motion; and on march , , anchored at valparaiso, preparatory to entering on a very successful career of a year's duration in those seas. the "chesapeake" had sailed from boston december , making for the cape verde islands. in their neighborhood she captured two of a british convoy, which, thinking itself beyond danger, had dispersed for south american destinations. the frigate then proceeded to her cruising ground near the equator, between longitudes ° and ° west, where she remained for about a month, taking only one other merchantman. leaving this position, she was off the coast of surinam from march to , when she returned to the united states; passing sixty miles east of the caribbean islands and thence north of porto rico and santo domingo, as far west as longitude °, whence she ran parallel to the american coast, reaching boston april . having seen nothing between february and march , she then began to meet sails, speaking eight between the latter date and her arrival. most of these were americans, homeward bound from the spanish peninsula; the others neutrals.[ ] the conclusion is evident, that the british were keeping their trade well shepherded in convoys. if a ship like the "chesapeake" struck one of them, she would probably have to fight the escorting vessel, as the "wasp" did the "frolic," while the merchantmen escaped; but the chances were against her seeing anything. another evident conclusion, corresponding to the export returns already quoted, is that the enemy had not yet shut down upon the access of american merchant ships to their own coast. this process was gradual, but steady. it is necessary to keep in mind the distinction between a blockade, in the loose use of the term, which closes a port only to the ships of the hostile nation, and the commercial blockade which forbids neutrals as well. the former may be intermittent, for the mere fact of war authorizes the capture of the belligerent's shipping, wherever found; hence to intercept them at the mouths of their own harbors is merely a more effectual method of carrying out the measure. a blockade against neutrals requires the permanent presence, before the blockaded port, of a force adequate to make the attempt to enter or leave dangerous. for this many more ships are needed. the british ministry, desirous chiefly to compel the united states to peace, and embarrassed by the gigantic continental strife in which it was engaged, sought at the outset to inflict such harassment on the american coast as would cost the least diversion of strength from the european contest. an ordinary blockade might be tightened or relaxed as convenience demanded; and, moreover, there were as yet, in comparison with american vessels, few neutrals to be restrained. normally, american shipping was adequate to american commerce. the first move, therefore, was to gather upon the coast of the united states all cruisers that could be spared from the halifax and west india stations, and to dispose along the approaches to the principal ports those that were not needed to repress the privateers in the bay of fundy and the waters of nova scotia. the action of these privateers, strictly offensive in character, and the course of commodore rodgers in sailing with a large squadron, before explained, illustrate exactly how offensive operations promote defensive security. with numbers scanty for their work, and obliged to concentrate instead of scattering, the british, prior to warren's arrival, had not disposable the cruisers with which greatly to harass even the hostile shipping, still less to institute a commercial blockade. the wish to stock the spanish peninsula and the west indies with provisions contributed further to mitigate the pressure. these restraining considerations gradually disappeared. re-enforcements arrived. rodgers' squadron returned and could be watched, its position being known. the license trade filled up lisbon, cadiz, and the west indies. hopes of a change of mind in the american government lessened. napoleon's disaster in russia reversed the outlook in european politics. step by step the altered conditions were reflected in the measures of the british ministry and navy. for months, only the maritime centres of the middle states were molested. the senior naval officer at charleston, south carolina, wrote on october , four months after war was declared, "till to-day this coast has been clear of enemy's cruisers; now charleston is blockaded by three brigs, two very large, and they have captured nine sail within three miles of the bar."[ ] the number was increased shortly; and two months later he expressed surprise that the inland navigation behind the sea islands had not been destroyed,[ ] in consequence of its defenceless state. in january, , the mouth of the chesapeake was watched by a ship of the line, two frigates, and a sloop; the commercial blockade not having been yet established. the hostile divisions still remained outside, and american vessels continued to go out and in with comparative facility, both there and at charleston. a lively trade had sprung up with france by letters-of-marque; that is, by vessels whose primary object is commerce, and which therefore carry cargoes, but have also guns, and a commission from the government to make prizes. without such authorization capture is piracy. by february conditions grow worse. the blockaders have entered the chesapeake, the commercial blockade has been proclaimed, vessels under neutral flags, spanish and swedish, are being turned away, and two fine letter-of-marque schooners have been captured inside, one of them after a gallant struggle in which her captain was killed. nautical misadventures of that kind became frequent. on april three letters-of-marque and a privateer, which had entered the rappahannock, were attacked at anchor by boats from warren's fleet. the letters-of-marque, with smaller crews, offered little resistance to boarding; but the privateer, having near a hundred men, made a sharp resistance. the americans lost six killed and ten wounded; the enemy, two killed and eleven wounded.[ ] in like manner the lower delaware was occupied by one or more ships of the line. supported thus by a heavy squadron, hostile operations were pushed to the upper waters of both bays, and in various directions; the extensive water communications of the region offering great facilities for depredation. dismay and incessant disquietude spread through all quarters of the waterside. light cruisers make their way above reedy island, fifty miles from the capes of the delaware; coasting vessels are chased into the severn river, over a hundred miles above hampton roads; and a detachment appears even at the mouth of the patapsco, twelve miles from baltimore. the destruction of bay craft, and interruption of water traffic, show their effects in the rise of marketing and fuel to double their usual prices. by may , all intercourse by water was stopped, and philadelphia was also cut off from the lower delaware. both philadelphia and baltimore were now severed from the sea, and their commerce destroyed, not to revive till after the peace; while alarms, which the near future was to justify, were felt for the land road which connected the two cities. as this crossed the head waters of the chesapeake, it was open to attack from ships, which was further invited by deposits of goods in transit at elkton and frenchtown. fears for the safety of norfolk were felt by captain stewart, senior naval officer there. "when the means and force of the enemy are considered, and the state of this place for defence, it presents but a gloomy prospect for security."[ ] commodore murray from philadelphia reports serious apprehensions, consternation among the citizens, a situation daily more critical, and inadequate provision for resistance.[ ] there, as everywhere, the impotence of the general government has to be supplemented by local subscription and local energy. at the same time, both northward and southward of these two great estuaries, the approach of spring brought ever increasing enemies, big and little, vexing the coasting trade; upon which, then as now, depended largely the exchange of products between different sections of the country. what it meant at that day to be reduced to communication by land may be realized from a contemporary quotation: "four wagons loaded with dry goods passed to-day through georgetown, south carolina, for charleston, _forty-six days_ from philadelphia."[ ] under the heading "new carrying trade" a boston paper announces on april the arrival of "a large number of teams from new bedford with west india produce, and four pennsylvania wagons, seventeen days from philadelphia."[ ] "the enemy has commenced his depredations on the coasting trade of the eastern states on a very extensive scale, by several ships and sloops-of-war, and five or six active privateers. the united states brig "argus" cruises at the entrance of long island sound for the protection of trade, latterly jeopardized;"[ ] a position from which she was soon driven by an overwhelming force. hull, now commanding at portsmouth, reports april , "several privateers on the eastern coast, which have been successful in cutting coasters out of several harbors east." may : "a small force is indeed needed here; the enemy appear off the harbor nearly every day. a few days since, a little east of this, they burnt twelve coasters and chased several into this port."[ ] the town is defenceless. the governor of rhode island laments to the legislature "the critical and exposed situation of our fellow-citizens in newport, who are frequently menaced by the ships and vessels about point judith"; mentioning beside, "the burning of vessels in narragansett bay, and the destruction of our coasting trade, which deprives us of the usual and very necessary supplies of bread stuffs from other states."[ ] the ship "maddox," blockaded for two or three months in the chesapeake, escaped in may, and reached newport with five thousand barrels of flour. this is said to have reduced the price by $ . in boston, where it was ranging at $ to $ ; while at cadiz and lisbon, thanks to british licenses and heavy stocking in anticipation of war, it stood at $ to $ . the arrival at machias of a captured british vessel, laden with wheat, was hailed "as a seasonable supply for the starving inhabitants of the eastward."[ ] [illustration: the new carrying trade. _drawn by stanley m. arthurs._] ships returning from abroad necessarily had to pass through the cruisers which interrupted the coasting trade. "many valuable vessels arrive, making at times hairbreadth escapes." the trade of baltimore and philadelphia is thrown back upon new york and boston; but both of these, and the eastern entrance of long island sound, have hostile squadrons before them. the letter-of-marque schooner "ned" has transmitted an experience doubtless undergone by many. bound to baltimore, she arrived off the chesapeake april , and was chased away; tried to get into the delaware on the th, but was headed off; made for sandy hook, and was again chased. finally, she tried the east end of the sound, and there made her way through four or five ships of war, reaching new york april .[ ] of course, under such circumstances trade rapidly dwindled. only very fast and weatherly vessels could hope to cope with the difficulties. of these the conspicuous type was the baltimore schooner, which also had not too many eggs in one basket. in the general deprivation of commerce a lucky voyage was proportionately remunerative; but the high prices of the successful venture were but the complement and reflection of suffering in the community. the harbors, even of new york, became crowded with unemployed shipping. this condition of things coastwise, supplemented by the activity of american privateers, induced abnormal conditions of navigation in the western atlantic. the scanty success of rodgers, bainbridge, and the "chesapeake" have been noted; and it may be observed that there was a great similarity in the directions taken by these and others. the cape verdes, the equator between ° and ° west, the guiana coast, the eastern west indies, bermuda to halifax, indicate a general line of cruising; with which coincides substantially a project submitted by stewart, march , , for a cruise by the "constellation." these plans were conceived with intelligent reference to known british trade-routes; but, being met by the enemy with a rigid convoy system, it was often hard to find a sail. the scattered american traders were rapidly diminishing in numbers, retained in port as they arrived; and it is noted that a british division of four vessels, returning to halifax after a four months' cruise between the banks of newfoundland and bermuda, have captured only one american.[ ] an american privateer, arriving at providence after an absence of nearly four months, "vexing the whole atlantic," reports not seeing a single enemy's merchant ship. niles' return of prizes[ ] to american cruisers, national as well as privateers, gives three hundred and five as the total for the first six months of the war; of which seventy-nine only seem to have been taken distant from the home shores. for the second six months, to june , , the aggregate has fallen to one hundred and fifty-nine, of which, as far as can be probably inferred, ninety-one were captured in remote waters. comparing with the preceding and subsequent periods, we find here evidently a time of transition, when american enterprise had not yet aroused to the fact that british precaution in the western hemisphere had made it necessary to seek prizes farther afield. in view of the incompleteness of the data it is difficult to state more than broad conclusions. it seems fairly safe, however, to say that after the winter of - american commerce dwindled very rapidly, till in it was practically annihilated; but that, prior to napoleon's downfall, the necessities of the british government, and the importunity of the british mercantile community, promoted a certain collusive intercourse by licenses, or by neutrals, real or feigned, between the enemy and the eastern states of the union, for the exportation of american produce. this trade, from the reasons which prompted it, was of course exempt from british capture. subsidiary to it, as a partial relief to the loss of the direct american market, was fostered an indirect smuggling import from great britain, by way of halifax and montreal, which conduced greatly to the prosperity of both these places during the war, as it had during the preceding periods of commercial restriction. it was to maintain this contraband traffic, as well as to foster disaffection in an important section of the union, that the first extension of the commercial blockade, issued by warren from bermuda, may , , stopped short of newport; while the distinction thus drawn was emphasized, by turning back vessels even with british licenses seeking to sail from the chesapeake. by this insidious action the commercial prosperity of the country, so far as any existed, was centred about the eastern states. it was, however, almost purely local. little relief reached the middle and south, which besides, as before mentioned, were thus drained of specie, while their products lay idle in their stores. as regards relative captures made by the two belligerents, exact numbers cannot be affirmed; but from the lists transmitted a fairly correct estimate can be formed as to the comparative injury done in this way. it must be remembered that such losses, however grievous in themselves, and productive of individual suffering, have by no means the decisive effect produced by the stoppage of commerce, even though such cessation involves no more than the retention in harbor of the belligerent's ships, as the americans were after , or as had been the case during jefferson's embargo of . as that measure and its congeners failed in their object of bringing the british government to terms, by deprivation of commerce, the pecuniary harm done the united states by them was much greater than that suffered in the previous years from the arbitrary action of great britain. she had seized, it was alleged, as many as nine hundred and seventeen american vessels,[ ] many of which were condemned contrary to law, while the remainder suffered loss from detention and attendant expenses; but despite all this the commercial prosperity was such that the commercial classes were averse to resenting the insults and injury. it was the agricultural sections of the country, not the commercial, which forced on the war. niles' register has transmitted a careful contemporary compilation of american captures, in closing which the editor affirmed that in the course of the war he had examined not less than ten, perhaps twelve, thousand columns of ship news, rejecting all prizes not accounted for by arrival or destruction. it is unlikely that data complete as he used are now attainable, even if an increase of accuracy in this point were worth the trouble of the search. up to may , , he records four hundred and eleven captures, in which are included the british ships of war as well as merchantmen; not a very material addition. the british naval chronicle gives the prize lists of the various british admirals. from these may be inferred in the same period at least three hundred seizures of american merchant vessels. among these are a good many chesapeake bay craft, very small. this excludes privateers, but not letters-of-marque, which are properly cargo ships. both figures are almost certainly underestimates; but not improbably the proportion of four to three is nearly correct. granting, however, that the americans had seized four british ships for every three lost by themselves, what does the fact establish as regards the effect upon the commerce of the two peoples? take the simple report of a british periodical in the same month of may, : "we are happy to announce the arrival of a valuable fleet from the west indies, consisting of two hundred and twenty-six sail, under convoy of the "cumberland," seventy-four, and three other ships of war."[ ] this one fleet among many, safely entering port, numbers more than half of their total losses in the twelvemonth. contrast this relative security with the experience of the "ned," cited a few pages back, hunted from headland to headland on her home coast, and slipping in--a single ship by dexterous management--past foes from whom no countryman can pretend to shield her. even more mortifying to americans, because under their very eyes, in sharp contrast to their sufferings, was the prosperity of halifax and canada. vexed though british commerce was by the daring activity of american cruisers, the main streams continued to flow; diminished in volume, but not interrupted. the closure of american harbors threw upon the two ports named the business of supplying american products to the british forces, the british west indies, and in measure to great britain itself. the same reason fixed in them the deposit of british goods, to be illicitly conveyed into the united states by the smuggling that went on actively along the northern seacoast and land frontier; a revival of the practices under the embargo of . this underground traffic was of course inadequate to compensate for that lost by the war and the blockade; but it was quite sufficient to add immensely to the prosperity of these places, the communications of which with the sea were held open and free by the british navy, and in which centred what was left from one of the most important branches of british trade in the days of peace. halifax, from its position on the sea, was the chief gainer. the effects of the war on it were very marked. trade was active. prices rose. provisions were in great demand, to the profit of agriculture and fisheries. rents doubled and trebled. the frequent arrival of prizes, and of ships of war going and coming, added to the transactions, and made money plentiful.[ ] recalling the generalization already made, that the seacoast of the united states was strictly a defensive frontier, it will be recognized that the successive institution of the commercial blockades, first of the chesapeake and delaware in march, and afterward of the whole coast south of newport, in may, were the offensive operations with which the british initiated the campaign of . these blockades were supported, and their effects sustained and intensified, by an accumulation of naval force entirely beyond the competition of the american navy. in view of such overwhelming disparity, it was no longer possible, as in , by assembling a squadron, to impose some measure of concentration upon the enemy, and thus to facilitate egress and ingress. the movements of the british had passed wholly beyond control. their admiral was free to dispose his fleet as he would, having care only not to hazard a detachment weaker than that in the port watched. this was a condition perfectly easy of fulfilment with the numbers under his command. as a matter of fact, his vessels were distributed over the entire seacoast; and at every point, with the possible exception of boston, the division stationed was so strong that escape was possible only by evasion, under cover of severe weather conditions. under such circumstances, the larger the ship the more difficult for her to get out. as early as the middle of april, captain jones, formerly of the "wasp," and now commanding the "macedonian" in new york, reports that "both outlets are at present strongly blocked, but i believe at dark of the moon we shall be able to pass without much risk."[ ] may , when a moon had come and gone, decatur, still on board the "united states," in company with which the "macedonian" was to sail, thinks it will be better to try the sound route. "the last gale, which promised the fairest opportunity for us to get out, ended in light southerly winds, which continued till the blockading ships had regained their stations."[ ] a few days later, the attempt by the sound resulted in the two being driven into new london, where they remained to the close of the war. the only offensive operation by sea open to the united states, the destruction of the enemy's commerce, fell therefore to the smaller cruisers and privateers, the size and numbers of which combined to make it impossible to restrain them all. for defensive measures the seaboard depended upon such fortifications as existed, everywhere inadequate, but which either the laxness or the policy of the british commander did not attempt to overcome in the case of the seaports, narrowly so called. the wide-mouthed estuaries of the chesapeake and delaware, entrance to which could not thus be barred, bore, therefore, the full brunt of hostile occupation and widespread harassment. in this there may have been deliberate intention, as well as easy adoption of the readiest means of annoyance. the war, though fairly supported in the middle section of the union, was essentially a southern and western measure. its most strenuous fomenters came from those parts, and the administration was virginian. the president himself had been identified with the entire course of jefferson's commercial retaliation, and general policy toward great britain during twelve years past. it is impossible for land forces alone to defend against naval aggression a region like the chesapeake, with its several great, and numerous small, streams penetrating the country in every direction; and matters are not helped when the defendants are loosely organized militia. the water in such a case offers a great central district, with interior lines, in the hands of a power to which belongs the initiative, with an overpowering mobile force, able at any moment to appear where it will in superior strength. no wonder then that the local journals of the day speak of continual watchfulness, which from the present organization of the militia is exceedingly toilsome, and of no little derangement to the private affairs of the people.[ ] the enemy spreads in every direction; and, although the alarm caused much exceeds the injury done, disquietude is extreme and universal. "applications from various quarters are constantly pouring in upon us," wrote a governor of maryland to the president; "and as far as our very limited means will enable us we are endeavoring to afford protection. but we have not arms and ammunition to supply the demands of every section of the state; the unavoidable expense of calling out the militia for its protection would greatly exceed the ability of the state government. the capital of the state [which was three miles from the bay, on a navigable river] has not sufficient force for its protection. by the constitution of the united states, the common defence is committed to the national government, which is to protect each state against invasion, and to defray all necessary expenses of a national war; and to us it is a most painful reflection that after every effort we have made, or can make, for the security of our fellow-citizens and of their property, they have little to rely on but the possible forbearance of the enemy."[ ] the process of reaping what has been sowed is at times extremely unpleasant. footnotes: [ ] captains' letters. navy department. [ ] ibid., bainbridge, oct. , . [ ] niles' register, vol. iv. p. . [ ] bainbridge's report is in the captains' letters. navy department, jan. , . it will be found also in niles' register, vol. iii. p. . both give extracts from bainbridge's journal, which is very full on the subject of manoeuvres and times. the british account will be found in the naval chronicle, vol. xxix. pp. - , from which the plan of the battle is copied. [ ] james' naval history, edition , vol. v. p. . [ ] bainbridge in a private letter speaks of the men looking forward to prize money for the "guerrière" on their return. niles' register, vol. iii. p. . [ ] lawrence's report of these transactions is in captains' letters, march , . it will be found also in niles' register, vol. iv. p. . [ ] naval chronicle, vol. xxviii. p. . [ ] admiralty to warren, british records office. [ ] niles' register, vol. iii. p. . [ ] captains' letters. [ ] niles' register, vol. iv. p. . the admiralty's letter to warren to institute this blockade is dated march . british records office. [ ] niles' register, vol. v. p. . [ ] naval chronicle, vol. xxxi. p. . [ ] naval chronicle, vol. xxxi. p. . [ ] captains' letters. [ ] american state papers, naval affairs, vol. i. p. . [ ] captain evans' report, april , . captains' letters. [ ] captains' letters. [ ] ibid, dec. , . [ ] niles' register, vol. iv. p. . naval chronicle, vol. xxix. p. . [ ] march , . captains' letters. [ ] march , , and . ibid. [ ] niles' register, vol. iv. p. . [ ] columbian centinel. [ ] niles' register, vol. iv. p. . [ ] captains' letters. [ ] message of the governor of rhode island, may , . [ ] niles' register, vol. iv. pp. , . there were reported in cadiz at this time , barrels of flour, unsold. the columbian centinel (feb. ) speaks of the lisbon market as deplorable. [ ] niles' register, vol. iv. p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. iv. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . france in the same period had seized five hundred and fifty-eight. [ ] naval chronicle, vol. xxix. p. . the following extract from an american journal may have interest as indicating the extent of the british convoy movement. "american brig 'hazard,' arrived at new york from madeira, june , reports: 'april , arrived at funchal the outward bound east india and brazil fleets, forty sail, under convoy. sailed april . april , arrived outward bound cork fleet, one hundred and eighty sail convoyed by a seventy-four, a frigate, and a sloop.' april , sailed from jamaica, three hundred merchantmen, under convoy of a seventy-four, two frigates and a sloop." (columbian centinel, of boston, june , .) [ ] murdoch's history of nova scotia, vol. iii. p. . [ ] captains' letters, april , . [ ] ibid., may . [ ] niles' register, vol. iv. p. . [ ] letter of governor winder, april , . niles' register, vol. iv. p. . chapter x campaign of on the lake frontier, to the battle of lake erie in april, , on the land frontier of the north and west, no substantial change had taken place in the conditions which gave to the united states the power of the offensive. such modification as chauncey's energy had effected was to strengthen superiority, by promising ultimate control of the upper and lower lakes. the british had not been idle; but the greater natural difficulties under which they labored, from less numerous population and less advanced development of the country and its communications, together with a greater severity of climate, had not been compensated by a naval direction similar to that exercised by the american commodore and his efficient second, perry. sir john warren had been ordered to pay attention to the lakes, the naval service of which was placed under his charge. this added to his responsibilities, and to the drain upon his resources of men and materials; but, with an oversight already extending from halifax to jamaica and barbados, he could do little for the lakes, beyond meeting requisitions of the local authorities and furnishing a draft of officers. among those sent from his fleet was captain barclay, who commanded the british squadron in perry's action. the admiralty, meantime, had awaked to the necessity of placing preparations and operations under competent naval guidance, if command of the water was to be secured. for that purpose they selected captain sir james lucas yeo, a young officer of much distinction, just turned thirty, who was appointed to the general charge of the lake service, under warren. leaving england in march, accompanied by a body of officers and seamen, yeo did not reach kingston until may , , when the campaign was already well under way; having been begun by dearborn and chauncey april . his impressions on arrival were discouraging. he found the squadron in a weak state, and the enemy superior in fact and in promise. they had just succeeded in burning at york a british vessel intended for thirty guns, and they had, besides, vessels building at sackett's harbor. he had set to work, however, getting his force ready for action, and would go out as soon as possible to contest the control of ontario; for upon that depended the tenure of upper canada.[ ] barclay, upon the arrival of his superior, was sent on to amherstburg, to fulfil upon erie the same relation to yeo that perry did to chauncey. it had been clearly recognized by the american authorities that any further movement for the recapture of detroit and invasion of canada would depend upon the command of lake erie; and that that in turn would depend largely upon mastery of ontario. in fact, the nearer the sea control over the water communications could be established, the more radical and far-reaching the effect produced. for this reason, montreal was the true objective of american effort, but the government's attention from the first had centred upon the northwestern territory; upon the extremity of the enemy's power, instead of upon its heart. under this prepossession, despite adequate warning, it had persisted in the course of which hull's disaster was the outcome; and now, though aroused by this stunning humiliation, its understanding embraced nothing beyond the great lakes. clear indication of this narrow outlook is to be found in the conditions on lake champlain, the natural highway to canada. only the scantiest mention is to be found of naval preparation there, because actually little was being done; and although the american force was momentarily superior, it was so simply because the british, being in canada wholly on the defensive, and therefore obliged to conform to american initiative, contemplated no use of this lake, the mastery of which, nevertheless, was soon afterward thrown into their hands by a singularly unfortunate occurrence. dearborn, who still remained in chief command of the armies on the new york frontier, was therefore directed to concentrate his effort upon ontario, starting from sackett's harbor as a base. chauncey, whose charge extended no farther than the upper rapids of the st. lawrence, had of course no other interest. his first plan, transmitted to the navy department january , ,[ ] had been to proceed immediately upon the opening of navigation, with the fleet and a land force of a thousand picked troops, against kingston, the capture of which, if effected, would solve at a single stroke every difficulty in the upper territory. no other harbor was tenable as a naval station; with its fall, and the destruction of shipping and forts, would go the control of the lake, even if the place itself were not permanently held. deprived thus of the water communications, the enemy could retain no position to the westward, because neither re-enforcements nor supplies could reach them. to quote chauncey's own words, "i have no doubt we should succeed in taking or destroying their ships and forts, and, of course, preserve our ascendency on this lake." this remark, though sound, was narrow in scope; for it failed to recognize, what was perfectly knowable, that the british support of the lake erie stations and the upper country depended on their power to control, or at worst to contest, ontario. of this they themselves were conscious, as the words of yeo and brock alike testify. the new american secretary of war, armstrong, who was a man of correct strategical judgment and considerable military information, entered heartily into this view; and in a letter dated february communicated to dearborn the orders of the president for his operations, based upon the secretary's recommendation.[ ] four thousand men were to be assembled at sackett's, and three thousand at buffalo. the former, under convoy of the fleet, was to proceed first against kingston, then against york (toronto). after this the two corps should co-operate in an attack to be made upon the british niagara frontier, which rested upon fort george on the ontario shore, and fort erie upon lake erie. this plan was adopted upon the assumption, which was probably correct, that the enemy's entire military force upon ontario did not exceed twenty-one hundred regular troops, of whom six hundred were at kingston and twelve hundred at niagara. armstrong, who recognized the paramount importance of montreal, had received the exaggerated impression that there might be in that neighborhood eight to ten thousand regulars. there were not yet nearly that number in all canada;[ ] but he was perhaps correct in thinking that the provision for the offensive, which he had found upon taking office a few weeks before, was insufficient for an advance in that quarter. dearborn very soon discovered objections to proceeding against kingston, in his own estimates of the enemy's numbers, based upon remarkable reports received from sources "entitled to full credit." on march he was satisfied that from six to eight thousand men had been assembled there from quebec, montreal, and upper canada; while the presence of sir george prevost, the governor general, and commander-in-chief in canada, who had seized an opportunity to make a hurried visit to kingston to assure himself as to the progress of the ships building, convinced the american general that an attack upon sackett's was contemplated.[ ] from that time forward dearborn realized in his own person the process of making pictures to one's self concerning a military situation, against which napoleon uttered a warning. chauncey was more sceptical, although he could not very well avoid attention to the reports brought in. he expresses himself as believing that a considerable number of men had been assembled in kingston, but that their real object was to proceed against harrison in the far west.[ ] there seems to have been no foundation for any of these alarms. prevost was a soldier of good reputation, but wanting in initiative, audacity, and resolution, as the current war was to prove. his presence at kingston at this moment was simply one incident in a rapid official visit to the upper military posts, extending as far as niagara, and accomplished in four weeks; for, leaving quebec february , he was again writing from there on the th of march. as far as can be deduced from his correspondence, four companies of regulars had preceded him from montreal to kingston, and there may very well have been a gathering of local forces for inspection or otherwise; but no re-enforcements of regulars, other than that just mentioned, reached kingston from down the river before may. dearborn never renounced his belief in the meditated attack, though finally satisfied that it was abandoned; and his positive reports as to the enemy's numbers wrung from armstrong acquiescence in a change of plan, by which york, and not kingston, should be the first object of the campaign.[ ] chauncey, who had some sound military ideas, as his first plan showed, was also brought round to this conclusion by a process of reasoning which he developed in a second plan of operations, submitted march ,[ ] but evidently long since matured. it apparently antedates dearborn's apprehensions, and is not affected by them, though the two worked together to a common mistaken decision. the commodore's letter presents an interesting study, in its demonstration of how an erroneous first conception works out to false conclusions, and in the particular instance to ultimate military disaster. the capture of kingston, his first plan, and its retention, which armstrong purposed, would have settled the whole campaign and affected decisively the issue of the war. chauncey's new project is dominated throughout by the view, which was that of the government, that the great object of the war was to control the northwestern territory by local operations, instead of striking at the source of british power in its communication with the sea. at this moment, the end of march, the british naval force on ontario was divided between york and kingston; in each were vessels afloat and vessels building. an attack upon kingston, chauncey said, no doubt would be finally successful--an initial admission which gave away his case; but as the opposing force would be considerable, it would protract the general operations of the campaign--the reduction of the northwest--longer than would be advisable, particularly as large re-enforcements would probably arrive at quebec in the course of two months. on the other hand, to proceed against york, which probably could be carried immediately, would result in destroying at once a large fraction of the british fleet, greatly weakening the whole body. thence the combined americans would turn against fort george and the niagara line. if successful here, the abandonment of fort erie by the british would release the american vessels which by its guns were confined at black rock. they would sail forth and join their consorts at erie; which done, chauncey, leaving his ontario fleet to blockade yeo at kingston, would go to the upper lake and carry against the british the squadron thus concentrated there, would co-operate with the army under general harrison, recover detroit, and capture malden. lake erie and its surroundings would thus become an american holding. after this, it would be but a step to reconquer michilimackinac, thereby acquiring an influence over the indians which, in conjunction with military and naval preponderance, would compel the enemy to forsake the upper country altogether, and concentrate his forces about kingston and montreal. it is interesting to see an elaborate piece of serious reasoning gradually culminate in a _reductio ad absurdum_; and chauncey's reasoning ends in a military absurdity. the importance of kingston is conceded by him, and the probability of capturing it at the first is admitted. thereupon follows a long project of operation, which ends in compelling the enemy to concentrate all his strength at the very points--kingston and montreal--which it is most important for the americans to gain; away from which, therefore, they should seek to keep the enemy, and not to drive him in upon them. this comes from the bias of the government, and of the particular officer, regarding the northwestern territory as the means whereby success was to be accomplished instead of merely the end to be attained. to make the western territory and control of the indians the objects of the campaign was a political and military motive perfectly allowable, and probably, in view of recent history, extremely necessary; but to make these things the objective of operations was to invert the order of proceedings, as one who, desiring to fell a tree, should procure a ladder and begin cutting off the outermost branches, instead of striking at the trunk by the ground. eighteen months later chauncey wrote some very wise words in this spirit. "it has always been my opinion that the best means to conquer canada was to cut off supplies from lower to upper by taking and maintaining some position on the st. lawrence. that would be killing the tree by girdling; the branches, dependent on ordinary supplies, die of necessity. but it is now attempted to kill the tree by lopping off branches" [he is speaking of the niagara campaign of ]; "the body becomes invigorated by reducing the demands on its resources."[ ] by this time chauncey had been chastened by experience. he had seen his anticipated glory reaped on lake erie by his junior. he had seen the control of ontario contested, and finally wrung from him, by vessels built at kingston, the place which he had failed to take when he thought it possible. he had been blockaded during critical months by a superior squadron; and at the moment of writing, november , , sir james yeo was moving, irresistible, back and forth over the waters of ontario, with his flag flying in a ship of guns, built at kingston. in short, the canadian tree was rooted in the ocean, where it was nourished by the sea power of great britain. to destroy it, failing the ocean navy which the united states had not, the trunk must be severed; the nearer the root the better. demonstration of these truths was not long in coming, and will be supplied by the narrative of events. when chauncey penned the plan of operations just analyzed, there were in york two vessels, the "prince regent" of twenty guns, the "duke of gloucester," sixteen, and two--by his information--on the stocks. on april the ice in sackett's harbor broke up, though large floes still remained in the lake. on the th these also had disappeared. eighteen hundred troops were embarked by the squadron, and on the th the expedition started, but was driven back by heavy weather. the next day it got away finally, and on the early morning of the th appeared off york. the troops were landed westward of the town, and proceeded to attack, supported by the shipping. the enemy, inferior in number, retired; the small regular force making its escape, with the exception of fifty who surrendered with the militia present. the american loss, army and navy, was a little over three hundred; among whom was general pike, an excellent soldier, who commanded the landing and was mortally wounded by the explosion of a magazine. the "duke of gloucester" schooner was taken, but the "prince regent" had gone to kingston three days before; the weather which drove chauncey back had enabled her to join her fleet as soon as released by the ice. by her escape the blow lost most of its effect; for york itself was indefensible, and was taken again without difficulty in the following july. a -gun vessel approaching completion was found on the stocks and burned, and a large quantity of military and naval stores were either destroyed or brought away by the victorious squadron. these losses were among the news that greeted yeo's arrival; but, though severe, they were not irreparable, as chauncey for the moment imagined. he wrote: "i believe that the enemy has received a blow that he cannot recover, and if we succeed in our next enterprise, which i see no reason to doubt, we may consider the upper province as conquered."[ ] the mistake here was soon to be evident. no time was wasted at york. the work of destruction, and of loading what was to be carried away, was completed in three days, and on may the troops were re-embarked, to sail for fort george on the morrow. the wind, which for some days had been fair and moderate from the eastward, then came on to blow a gale which would make landing impossible off niagara, and even navigation dangerous for the small vessels. this lasted through the th, chauncey writing on that day that they were still riding with two anchors ahead and lower yards down. so crowded were the ships that only half the soldiers could be below at one time; hence they were exposed to the rain, and also to the fresh-water waves, which made a clean breach over the schooners. under such circumstances both troops and seamen sickened fast. on the th, the weather moderating, the squadron stood over to fort niagara, landed the troops for refreshment, and then returned to sackett's; it being thought that the opportunity for surprise had been lost, and that no harm could come of a short further delay, during which also re-enforcements might be expected. soon after his return chauncey sent a flag of truce to kingston. this made observations as to the condition of the enemy which began to dispel his fair illusions.[ ] his purpose to go in person to niagara was postponed; and despatching thither the squadron with troops, he remained at sackett's to protect the yard and the ships building, in co-operation with the garrison. his solicitude was not misplaced. niagara being a hundred and fifty miles from sackett's, the fleet and army had been committed to a relatively distant operation, depending upon a main line of communication,--the lake,--on the flank and rear of which, and close to their own inadequately protected base, was a hostile arsenal, kingston, harboring a naval force quite able to compete with their own. the danger of such a situation is obvious to any military man, and even to a layman needs only to be indicated. nevertheless the enterprise was launched, and there was nothing for it now but to proceed on the lines laid down. chauncey accordingly sailed may , re-enforcements of troops for the defence of sackett's having meantime arrived. he did not reach niagara until the th. the next day was spent in reconnoissances, and other preparations for a landing on the lake shore, a short mile west of fort george. on the th, at a.m., the attack began, covered by the squadron. general vincent, in command of the british niagara frontier, moved out to meet his enemy with the entire force near fort george, leaving only a small garrison of one hundred and thirty men to hold the post itself. there was sharp fighting at the coast-line; but vincent's numbers were much inferior, and he was compelled steadily to give ground, until finally, seeing that the only alternatives were the destruction of his force or the abandonment of the position, he sent word to the garrison to spike the guns, destroy the ammunition, and to join his column as it withdrew. he retreated along the niagara river toward queenston, and thence west to beaver dam, about sixteen miles from fort george. at the same time word was sent to the officers commanding at fort erie, and the intermediate post of chippewa, to retire upon the same place, which had already been prepared in anticipation of such an emergency. the three divisions were thus in simultaneous movement, converging upon a common point of concentration, where they all assembled during the night; the whole, as reported by vincent to his superior, now not exceeding sixteen hundred.[ ] the casualties during the day's fighting had been heavy, over four hundred killed and wounded; but in the retreat no prisoners were lost except the garrison of the fort, which was intercepted. dearborn, as before at york, had not landed with his troops; prevented, doubtless, by the infirmities of age increasing upon him. two days later he wrote to the department, "i had presumed that the enemy would confide in the strength of his position and venture an action, by which an opportunity would be afforded to cut off his retreat."[ ] this guileless expectation, that the net may be spread not in vain before the eyes of any bird, provoked beyond control such measure of equanimity as armstrong possessed. probably suspecting already that his correct design upon kingston had been thwarted by false information, he retorted: "i cannot disguise from you the _surprise_ occasioned by the _two escapes of a beaten enemy_; first on may , and again on june . battles are not gained, when an inferior and broken enemy is not destroyed. nothing is done, while anything that might have been done is omitted."[ ] vincent was unkind enough to disappoint his opponent. the morning after the engagement he retired toward a position at the head of the lake, known then as burlington heights, where the town of hamilton now stands. upon his tenure here the course of operations turned twice in the course of the next six months. [illustration: map of niagara peninsula] while vincent was in retreat upon burlington, captain barclay arrived at his headquarters, on the way to take charge of the lake erie squadron;[ ] having had to coast the north shore of ontario, on account of the american control of the water. the inopportuneness of the moment was prophetic of the numberless disappointments with which the naval officer would have to contend during the brief three months preceding his defeat by perry. "the ordnance, ammunition, and other stores for the service on lake erie," wrote prevost on july , with reference to barclay's deficiencies, "had been deposited at york for the purpose of being transported to amherstburg, but unfortunately were either destroyed or fell into the enemy's hands when york was taken by them; and the subsequent interruption to the communication, by their occupation of fort george, has rendered it extremely difficult to afford the supplies captain barclay requires, which, however, are in readiness to forward whenever circumstances will permit it to be done with safety."[ ] the road from queenston to fort erie, around niagara falls, was the most used and the best line of transportation, because the shortest. to be thrown off it to that from burlington to long point was a serious mishap for a force requiring much of heavy and bulky supplies. to add to these more vital embarrassments, the principal ship, the "queen charlotte," which had been lying at fort erie, had been ordered by vincent to leave there when the place was evacuated, and to go to amherstburg, thus giving barclay the prospect of a land journey of two hundred miles through the wilderness to his destination. fortunately for him, a vessel turned up at long point, enabling him to reach amherstburg about june . the second step in chauncey's programme had now been successfully taken, and the vessels at black rock were free to move. with an energy and foresight which in administration seldom forsook him, he had prepared beforehand to seize even a fleeting opportunity to get them out. immediately upon the fall of york, "to put nothing to hazard, i directed mr. eckford to take thirty carpenters to black rock, where he has gone to put the vessels lying there in a perfect state of repair, ready to leave the river for presqu' isle the moment we are in possession of the opposite shore." perry also was on hand, being actively engaged in the landing at fort george; and the same evening, may , he left for black rock to hasten the departure. the process involved great physical labor, the several vessels having to be dragged by oxen against the current of the niagara, here setting heavily toward the falls. it was not until june that they were all above the rapids, and even this could not have been accomplished but for soldiers furnished by dearborn.[ ] the circumstance shows how hopeless the undertaking would have been if the enemy had remained in fort erie. nor was this the only peril in their path. barclay, with commendable promptitude, had taken the lake in superior force very shortly after his arrival at amherstburg, and about june appeared off erie [presqu' isle]. having reconnoitred the place, he cruised between it and black rock, to intercept the expected division; but the small vessels, coasting the beach, passed their adversary unseen in a fog,[ ] and on june reached the port. as chauncey had reported on may that the two brigs building there were launched, affairs on that lake began to wear a promising aspect. the lakes station as a whole, however, was still very short of men; and the commodore added that if none arrived before his approaching return to sackett's, he would have to lay up the ontario fleet to man that upon erie. to do this would have been to abandon to the enemy the very important link in the communications, upon which chiefly depended the re-enforcement and supplies for both armies on the niagara peninsula. the inherent viciousness of the plan upon which the american operations were proceeding was now quickly evident. at the very moment of the attack upon fort george, a threatening but irresolute movement against sackett's was undertaken by prevost, with the co-operation of yeo, by whom the attempt is described as a diversion, in consequence of the enemy's attack upon fort george. had the place fallen, chauncey would have lost the ship then building, on which he was counting to control the water; he would have had nowhere to rest his foot except his own quarter-deck, and no means to repair his fleet or build the new vessels continually needed to maintain superiority. the case of yeo dispossessed of kingston would have been similar, but worse; for land transport in the united states was much better than in canada. the issue of the war, as regarded the lakes and the northwestern territory, lay in those two places. upon them depended offensive and defensive action. at the time of the attack upon sackett's only two vessels of the squadron were there, the senior officer of which, lieutenant chauncey, was in momentary command of the navy yard as well. the garrison consisted of four hundred regular troops, the coming of whom a week before had enabled chauncey to leave for niagara. dearborn had already written to major-general jacob brown, of the new york militia, asking him to take command of the station; for which his local knowledge particularly fitted him, as he was a resident of some years' standing. he had moreover manifested marked military capacity on the st. lawrence line, which was under his charge. brown, whose instincts were soldierly, was reluctant to supersede colonel backus, the officer of regulars in command; but a letter from the latter received on the th, asking him to take charge, determined his compliance. when he arrived five hundred militia had assembled. the british expedition left kingston with a fine fair wind on the early morning of may --the same day that the americans were landing at fort george. the whole fleet accompanied the movement, having embarked troops numbering over seven hundred; chiefly regulars. at noon they were off sackett's harbor. prevost and yeo stood in to reconnoitre; but in the course of an hour the troops, who were already in the boats, ready to pull to the beach, were ordered to re-embark, and the squadron stood out into the lake. the only result so far was the capture of twelve out of nineteen american barges, on their way from oswego to the harbor. the other seven gained the port. during the next thirty-six hours militia kept coming in, and brown took command. sackett's harbor is an indentation on the south side of a broad bay, called black river bay, into which the black river empties. the harbor opens eastward; that is, its back is toward the lake, from which it is distant a little over a mile; and its north side is formed by a long narrow point, called navy point, on which was the naval establishment. where black river bay meets the lake, its south shore is prolonged to the west by a projection called horse island, connected with the land by a fordable neck. brown expected the landing to be made upon this, and he decided to meet the attack at the water's edge of the mainland, as the enemy crossed the neck. there he disposed his five hundred militia, placing the regulars under backus in a second line; a steadying point in case the first line of untrained men failed to stand firm. it was arranged that, if the enemy could not be resisted, lieutenant chauncey was to set fire to the naval stores and shipping, and cross with his crews to the south side of the harbor, east of a work called fort volunteer, where brown proposed to make his final stand. from there, although an enemy at the yard could be molested, he could not certainly be prevented from carrying off stores or ships; hence the necessity for destruction. [illustration: surroundings of sackett's harbor] the british landed upon horse island soon after daylight of may , and from there advanced. the militia met them with a volley, but then broke and fled, as had been foreseen by brown, himself yet a militia officer. their colonel behaved gallantly, and was killed in trying to rally his men; while brown in person, collecting a hundred of the fugitives, worked round with them to the left flank of the approaching british. these, moving through the woods, now encountered backus and his regulars, who made upon them an impression of overwhelming numbers, to which the british official report bears a vivid testimony. the failure to carry the place is laid by this paper upon the light and adverse winds, which prevented the co-operation of the squadron's heavy guns, to reduce the batteries and blockhouse. without this assistance, it was impracticable to carry by assault the works in which the americans had taken refuge. the gunboats alone could get within range, and their small carronades were totally inadequate to make any impression on the forts and blockhouses. "the troops were reluctantly ordered to leave a beaten enemy." brown makes no mention of this retreat into the works, though it appears clear that the americans fell gradually back to their support; but he justifies prevost's withdrawal, bitterly criticised by writers of his own nation, in the words, "had not general prevost retreated most rapidly under the guns of his vessels, he would never have returned to kingston."[ ] in the midst of the action word was brought to lieutenant chauncey that the battle was lost, and that the yard must be fired. brown, in his official report, expressly acquitted him of blame, with words of personal commendation. the two schooners in commission had retreated up black river; but the prize "duke of gloucester," and the ship approaching completion, were fired. fortunately, the flames were extinguished before serious damage was done; but when commodore chauncey returned on june , he found that among a large quantity of materials consumed were the stores and sails of the new ship. the loss of these he thought would delay the movements of the squadron three weeks; for without her yeo's force was now superior.[ ] [illustration: the retreat of the british from sackett's harbor. _drawn by henry reuterdahl._] the defence of sackett's harbor obtained immediately for brown, who was just thirty-eight, the commission of brigadier general in the army; for the new secretary, armstrong, was looking round anxiously for men to put in command, and was quick to seize upon one when he found him. to chauncey, on the other hand, the affair in its consequences and demonstration of actualities was a rude awakening, to which his correspondence during the succeeding six weeks bears witness by an evident waning of confidence, not before to be noted. on june he tells the secretary of the navy that he has on ontario, exclusive of the new ship not yet ready, fourteen vessels of every description, mounting sixty-two guns; whereas yeo has seven, which, with six gunboats, carry one hundred and six. "if he leave kingston, i shall meet him. the result may be doubtful, but worth the trial." this resolution is not maintained. june he hears, with truth, that yeo was seen at the head of the lake on the th, and that the americans at fort george had taken his squadron to be chauncey's. by the same channel he learns of a disastrous engagement of the army there, which was likewise true. his impulse is to go out to meet the british squadron; but he reflects that the enemy may then again find an opportunity to descend upon sackett's, and perhaps succeed in burning the new ship. her size and armament will, he thinks, give him the decisive superiority. he therefore resolves to put nothing to hazard till she is finished.[ ] the impression produced by the late attack is obvious, and this decision was probably correct; but yeo too is building, and meantime he has possession of the lake. on june he left kingston with a squadron, two ships and four schooners, carrying some three hundred troops for vincent. on the evening of the th, about six o'clock, he was sighted by the american army, which was then at forty mile creek on the ontario shore; a position to which it had retired after a severe reverse inflicted by the enemy thirty-six hours before. vincent's retreat had been followed as far as stony creek, ten miles west of forty mile creek, and somewhat less distant from burlington heights, where the british lay. the situation of the latter was extremely perilous; for, though strongly placed, they were greatly outnumbered. in case of being driven from their lines, they must retreat on york by a long and difficult road; and upon the same poor communications they were dependent for supplies, unless their squadron kept control of the lake. recognizing that desperate conditions call for desperate remedies, vincent resolved to risk an attack with seven hundred men under colonel harvey, in whose suggestion the movement originated. these fell upon the american advance corps at two o'clock in the morning of june . an hour of fighting ensued, with severe loss on both sides; then harvey, considering sufficient effect produced, drew off his men before daylight revealed the smallness of their numbers. there was in this affair nothing intrinsically decisive, scarcely more than a business of outposts; but by a singular coincidence both american generals present were captured in the confusion. the officer who succeeded to the command, a colonel of cavalry, modestly distrustful of his own powers, could think of nothing more proper than to return to forty mile creek, sending word to fort george. dearborn, still too weak to go to the front, despatched thither general morgan lewis. on his way lewis was overtaken by two brief messages from the commander-in-chief announcing the appearance of yeo's fleet, and indicating apprehension that by means of it vincent might come upon fort george before the main army could fall back there. it was most improbable that the british general, with the command of the lake in doubt would thus place himself again in the position from which he had with difficulty escaped ten days before; but dearborn's fears for the safety of the forts prevailed, and he ordered a retreat. the movement began by noon of june , and in a few days the army was back at niagara river, having lost or abandoned a quantity of stores. the british followed to within ten miles of the fort, where they took up a position. they also reoccupied beaver dam; and a force of six hundred americans sent to dislodge them, under colonel boerstler, was compelled to surrender on june .[ ] dearborn, who had already reported to the department that he personally was "so reduced in strength as to be incapable of any command," attributed his embarrassments "to the temporary loss of command of the lake. the enemy has availed himself of the advantage and forwarded re-enforcements and supplies." the effect of controlling the water cannot be contested; but the conditions at stony creek were such that it should have been possible to drive vincent away from any hold on the south shore of ontario. creditable as had been the enterprise of colonel harvey, it had accomplished no change in material conditions. dearborn was soon afterward relieved. his officers, including scott, joined in a letter of regret and esteem, prompted doubtless by sympathy for the sufferings and miscarriage of an aged officer who had served gallantly in his youth during the war of independence. to colonel harvey's attack, on the morning of june , a british military critic has with justice assigned the turning of the tide in the affairs of upper canada.[ ] it is perfectly true that that well-judged movement, admirable in conception and execution, checked the progress of the american arms at a moment most favorable to them, and put an end to conditions of advantage which never there recurred. that this effect was produced, however, is attributable to the inefficiency of the american officers in command. if harvey had divined this, from the previous operations, and made it a part of his calculations, it is so much more to his credit; the competency of the opponent is a chief factor to be considered in a military enterprise. it detracts nothing from harvey's merit to say that there was no occasion for the american retreat, nor for the subsequent paralysis of effort, which ended in expulsion from the niagara peninsula at the end of the year. "for some two months after this," wrote a very competent eye-witness, afterward general scott, "the army of niagara, never less than four thousand strong, stood fixed in a state of ignominy, under boyd, within five miles of an unintrenched enemy, with never more than three thousand five hundred men."[ ] scott seems not to have known that this inactivity was enjoined by the war department till chauncey could resume control of the lake.[ ] from this time, in fact, the niagara army and its plans disappear from the active operations. yeo remained in undisputed mastery of the water. that the british at this time felt themselves the stronger in effective force, may be reasonably inferred from their continuing to keep the lake after chauncey's new ship was out. she was launched june , and named the "general pike," in honor of the officer killed at the taking of york. her armament was to be twenty-six long -pounders, which under some circumstances would make her superior, not only to any single vessel, but to any combination of vessels then under the british flag. if it was still possible, by use of favoring conditions, to contend with the american fleet after the addition to it of this ship, by so much more was yeo able to deal successfully with it before her coming. a comparison of the armaments of the opposing forces also demonstrates that, whatever chauncey's duty might have been without such prospect, he was justified, having this decisive advantage within reach, in keeping his fleet housed waiting for its realization. the british new vessel, the "wolfe," with the "royal george"[ ] and the "melville," together threw a broadside weight of nine hundred and twenty pounds,[ ] to which the "madison" and "oneida" could oppose only six hundred; and the batteries of all five being mainly carronades, there are no qualifications to be made on the score of differing ranges. the american schooners, though much more numerous than the british, in no way compensated for this disparity, for reasons which will be given when the narrative of operations begins. unknown to chauncey, the vindication of his delay was to be found in yeo's writing to the admiralty, that he was trying to induce the enemy to come out before his new ship was ready. disappointed in this endeavor, the british commodore meantime employed his vessels in maintaining the communications of the british and harassing those of the americans, thus observing the true relation of the lake to the hostilities. mention has been made of the effect upon dearborn; morally, in the apprehension created, actually, in the strength contributed to vincent's army. "the enemy's fleet is constantly hovering on the coast and interrupting our supplies," wrote general lewis, during dearborn's incapacity. besides incidental mentions by american officers, yeo himself reports the capture of two schooners and boats loaded with stores june ; and between that date and the th he landed parties at the genesee river and great sodus, capturing or destroying a quantity of provisions. transit between oswego and sackett's was also in constant danger of an unexpected interference by the british squadron. on june it appeared off oswego, with apparent disposition to attack; but yeo, who in his exercise of chief command displayed a degree of caution remarkable in view of his deservedly high reputation for dash acquired in less responsible positions, did not pass beyond threat. all the same, the mere uncertainty exercised a powerful influence on the maintenance of intercourse. "if the schooners 'lark' and 'fly' are not now in sackett's," wrote lieutenant woolsey from oswego, "they must have been taken yesterday by the british boats. they were loaded with powder, shot, and hospital stores for the army." he has also cordage, powder, guns, cables, to send, and boats in which to ship them; but "under existing circumstances i dare not take upon myself to send them farther than to sandy creek, under strong guard. i think it would be unsafe to venture round stony point [a projecting headland twelve miles from sackett's] without convoy or a good guard."[ ] on july , having ranged the lake at will since june , yeo returned to kingston, and chauncey again began to hear rumors. "the fleet has taken on board two thousand men, and two thousand more are to embark in boats; an attack upon this place is the object. the plan is to make a desperate push at our fleet before the 'general pike' can be got ready.... his real object may be to land re-enforcements near fort george, to act with general vincent against dearborn. if this be his object, he will succeed in obliging our army to recross the niagara river;"[ ] a damaging commentary on the american plan of campaign. this fear, however, was excessive, for the reason that an effective american army on the niagara had a land line of communication, bad but possible, alternative to the lake. the british had not. moreover, the niagara peninsula had for them a value, as a land link between ontario and erie, to which nothing corresponded on the united states side. had vincent been driven from burlington heights, not only would he have lost touch with the lake, and been forced back on york, but ontario would for the british have been entirely cut off from erie. the "general pike" was ready for service on july , and the following evening chauncey sailed. with this begins a period, extending over ten or twelve weeks, which has no parallel in the naval lake history of the war. it was unproductive of decisive results, and especially of the one particular result which is the object of all naval action--the destruction of the enemy's organized force, and the establishment of one's own control of the water; nevertheless, the ensuing movements of yeo and chauncey constituted a naval campaign of considerable interest. nothing resembling it occurred on either lake champlain or erie, and no similar condition recurred on ontario. the fleets were frequently in presence of each other, and three times came to blows. on erie and on champlain the opposing forces met but once, and then without any prolonged previous attempts at manoeuvring. they fought immediately; the result in each case being an american victory, not only complete but decisive, which has kept their remembrance alive to this day in the national memory. on ontario, after the close of the season of , the struggle resolved itself into a race of ship-building; both parties endeavoring to maintain superiority by the creation of ever-increasing numbers, instead of by crushing the enemy. such a contest sufficiently befits a period of peace; it is, for instance, at this moment the condition of the great naval nations of the world, each of which is endeavoring to maintain its place in the naval scale by the constant production and development of material. in war, however, the object is to put an end to a period of national tension and expense by destroying the enemy; and the failure of the commanders to effect this object calls for examination. the indecisive result on ontario was due to the particular composition of the two squadrons; to the absence of strong compelling conditions, such as made fighting imperative on barclay upon erie, and perhaps also on downie upon champlain; and finally, to the extreme wariness of the commanders, each of whom was deeply impressed with the importance of preserving his own fleet, in order not to sacrifice control of the lake. chauncey has depicted for us his frame of mind in instructions issued at this very moment--july --to his subordinate, perry. "the first object will be to destroy or cripple the enemy's fleet; but in all attempts upon the fleet you ought to use great caution, for the loss of a single vessel may decide the fate of the campaign."[ ] a practical commentary of singular irony was passed upon this utterance within two months; for by sacrificing a single ship perry decided his own campaign in his own favor. given the spirit of chauncey's warning, and also two opponents with fleets so different in constitution that one is strong where the other is weak, and _vice versa_, and there is found the elements of wary and protracted fighting, with a strong chance that neither will be badly hurt; but also that neither will accomplish much. this is what happened on ontario. [illustration: the fleets of chauncey and yeo manoeuvring on lake champlain. _drawn by carlton t. chapman._] the relative powers of the two fleets need to be briefly explained; for they constituted, so to say, the hands in the game which each commander had to play. the british had six vessels, of varying sizes and rigs, but all built for war, and sailing fairly well together. they formed therefore a good manoeuvring squadron. the americans had three vessels built for war, and at the beginning ten schooners also, not so designed, and not sailing well with the armaments they bore. whatever the merits of this or that vessel, the squadron as a whole manoeuvred badly, and its movements were impeded by the poorer sailors. the contrast in armaments likewise had a very decisive effect. there were in those days two principal classes of naval cannon,--long guns, often called simply "guns," and carronades. the guns had long range with light weight of shot fired; the carronades had short range and heavy shot. now in long guns the americans were four times as strong as the british, while in carronades the british were twice as strong as the americans. it follows that the american commodore should prefer long range to begin with; whereas the british would be careful not to approach within long range, unless with such a breeze as would carry him rapidly down to where his carronades would come into play. there was another controlling reason why short range favored the british against the americans. the schooners of the latter, not being built for war, carried their guns on a deck unprotected by bulwarks. the men, being exposed from the feet up, could be swept away by canister, which is a quantity of small iron balls packed in a case and fired from a cannon. when discharged, these separate and spread like buckshot, striking many in a group. they can maim or kill a man, but their range is short and penetrative power small. a bulwarked vessel was, so to say, armored against canister; for it makes no difference whether the protection is six inches of wood or ten of iron, provided it keeps out the projectile. the american schooners were in this respect wholly vulnerable. over-insistence upon details of advantage or disadvantage is often wearisome, and may be pushed to pettifogging; but these quoted are general and fundamental. to mention them is not to chaffer over details, but to state principles. there is one other which should be noted, although its value may be differently estimated. of the great long-gun superiority of the americans more than one half was in the unprotected schooners; distributed, that is, among several vessels not built for war, and not capable of acting well together, so as to concentrate their fire. there is no equality between ten guns in five such vessels and the same ten concentrated on one deck, under one captain. that this is not special pleading, to contravene the assertion advanced by james of great american superiority on ontario, i may quote words of my own, written years ago with reference to a british officer: "an attempt was made to disparage howe's conduct (in ), and to prove that his force was even superior to that of the french, by adding together the guns in all his ships, disregarding their classes, or by combining groups of his small vessels against d'estaing's larger units. for this kind of professional arithmetic howe felt and expressed just and utter contempt."[ ] so nelson wrote to the commander of a british cruising squadron, "your intentions of attacking the 'aigle'"--a seventy-four--"with your three frigates are certainly very laudable, but i do not consider your force by any means equal to it." the new american ship, the "general pike," possessed this advantage of the seventy-four. one discharge of her broadside was substantially equal to that of the ten schooners, and all her guns were long; entirely out-ranging the batteries of her antagonists. under some circumstances--a good breeze and the windward position--she was doubtless able to encounter and beat the whole british squadron on ontario. but the american schooners were mere gunboats, called to act in conditions unfavorable to that class of vessel, the record of which for efficiency is under no circumstances satisfactory. after leaving sackett's, chauncey showed himself off kingston and then went up the lake, arriving off niagara on the evening of july . an abortive attempt, in conjunction with the army, was made upon a position of the enemy at burlington heights, then far in rear of his main line; but it being found too strong, the fleet, with the troops still on board, bore over to york and there retaliated the injury done by yeo at genesee and sodus. there was no opposition; many stores were destroyed or brought away, some military buildings burned, and the vessels then returned to niagara. they were lying there at daybreak of august when the british appeared: two ships, two brigs, and two large schooners. chauncey had substantially his whole force: two ships, the "pike" and "madison," the brig "oneida," and ten schooners. he got under way shortly and put out into the lake. various manoeuvres followed, his principal object being to get to windward of the enemy; or, when the wind failed, to sweep[ ] the schooners close enough for their long guns to reach; the only useful function they possessed. these efforts were unsuccessful, and night shut in with the two opponents sailing in parallel lines, heading north, with the wind at west; the americans to leeward and in rear of the british. at two in the morning, in a heavy squall, two schooners upset, with the loss of all on board save sixteen souls. chauncey reckoned these to be among his best, and, as they together mounted nineteen guns, he considered that "this accident gave the enemy decidedly the superiority"; another instance of faulty professional arithmetic, omitting from the account the concentration of power in the "general pike." yeo did not estimate conditions in the same way, and persisted warily in keeping the weather gage, watching for a chance to cut off schooners, or for other favoring opportunity; while chauncey as diligently sought to gain the advantage of the wind, to force action with his heavy ships. manoeuvring continued all day of the th, th, and th. the winds, being light and shifting, favored now one, now the other; but in no case for long enough to insure a meeting which the american with good reason desired, and his antagonist with equal propriety would accept only under conditions that suited him. at nine in the evening of august the american squadron was standing northwest, with the wind at southwest, when the british, which was then following to windward, wore and stood south. chauncey made no change in direction, but kept his vessels in two lines; this being the order of battle by which, not being able to attack himself, he hoped to induce yeo to engage incautiously. the six smallest schooners, of the eight now left to him, were put in the weather line; therefore toward the enemy, if he persisted in keeping to windward. the lee line, abreast of the other, and six hundred yards from it, was composed of the "pike," "madison," and "oneida," astern of which were the two heaviest schooners. the smaller vessels were displayed as a tempting bait, disposed, as it were, in such manner that the opponent might hope to lay hands on one or more, without coming too much under the "pike's" heavy guns; for her two larger consorts, carrying carronades chiefly, might be neglected at the distance named. if such an attempt were made, the schooners' orders were to edge imperceptibly to leeward, enticing the enemy to follow in his eagerness; and when he was near enough they were to slip cleverly through the intervals in the lee line, leaving it to finish the business. the lure was perhaps a little too obvious, the enemy's innocent forgetfulness of the dangers to leeward too easily presumed; for a ship does not get out of the hold of a clear-headed captain as a mob of troops in hot pursuit may at times escape the control of their officers. in view, however, of yeo's evident determination to keep his "fleet in being," by avoiding action except on his own terms, nothing better was open to chauncey, unless fortune should favor him. at half-past ten the british again wore, now standing northwest after the american squadron, the rear vessels of which opened fire at eleven (a). at quarter-past eleven the cannonade became general between the enemy and the weather line (b). fifteen minutes later, the four rear schooners of the latter, which were overmatched when once within carronade range, bore up and ran to leeward; two taking position on the other side of the main division, and two astern of it (c, c). so far all went according to plan; but unhappily the leading two american schooners, instead of keeping away in obedience to orders, tacked--went about towards the enemy--keeping to windward (d). chauncey, seeing the risk involved for them, but prepossessed with the idea of luring yeo down by the appearance of flight set by the schooners, made what can scarcely be considered other than the mistake of keeping away himself, with the heavy ships; "filled the maintopsail, and edged away two points, to lead the enemy down, not only to engage him to more advantage, but to lead him away from the 'growler' and 'julia'" (c). yeo, equally dominated by a preconceived purpose not to bring his ships under the guns of the "pike," acted much as a squirrel would do with two nuts in sight; he went for the one safely distant from suspected danger. "he kept his wind," reported chauncey, "until he had completely separated those two vessels from the rest of the squadron, exchanged a few shot with the 'pike,' as he passed, without injury to us, and made sail after the two schooners" (e). some time after midnight these surrendered to odds plainly irresistible.[ ] the tacking of the two schooners was an act as ill-judged as it was insubordinate, for which chauncey was in no wise responsible. his bearing up was certainly an error, which unfortunately lent itself to the statement, contemporaneously made by an american paper, that he retreated, leaving the two vessels to their fate. it was possible, therefore, for sir james to word the transaction as he airily did: "at eleven we came within gunshot of their line of schooners, which opened a heavy fire, their ships keeping off the wind to prevent our closing. at half-past twelve this ship came within gunshot of the 'pike' and 'madison,' when they immediately bore up, fired their stern chase-guns, and made sail for niagara, leaving two of their schooners astern, which we captured."[ ] this gives a more victorious and dashing air to the success than it quite deserves. as it stood, it was real enough, though trivial. to take two vessels from a superior fleet, within range of its commander-in-chief, is a handsome business, which should not need to be embellished by the implication that a greatly desired fight could not be had. to quote marryat, "it is very hard to come at the real truth of this sort of thing, as i found out during the time that i was in his majesty's service." chauncey's version is perfectly probable. seeing that the enemy would not follow, "tacked and stood after him. at twelve (midnight), finding that i must either separate from the rest of the squadron, or relinquish the hope of saving the two which had separated, i reluctantly gave up the pursuit." his reading of yeo's conduct is plausible. "from what i have been able to discover of the movements of the enemy, he has no intention of engaging us, except he can get decidedly the advantage of wind and weather; and as his vessels in squadron sail better than our squadron, he can always avoid an action.... he thinks to cut off our small dull sailing schooners in detail." here and always chauncey's conduct reflects the caution prescribed in his instructions to perry, rather than the resolute determination the latter showed to bring matters to an issue. on the other hand, it is to be remembered that, owing to the nearly equal facilities for ship-building--for replacing ships lost--possessed by kingston and sackett's, a decisive naval victory would not have the finality of result to be expected on lake erie. contrary to the usual conditions of naval war, the two ports, not the fleets dependent on them, were the decisive elements of the ontario campaign; and the ignoring of that truth was the fundamental, irremediable, american error. [illustration: plan of chauncey's engagement august , ] chauncey returned to sackett's on august , provisioned the squadron for five weeks, and sailed the same evening. on the th he was back off niagara, and there again sighted the enemy; but a heavy westerly gale drove both squadrons to the lower end of the lake, where each entered its own harbor on the th. august the american put out again, having an additional newly built schooner, named the "sylph," large and fast, carrying three or four long -pounders. chauncey reported that he had now nine vessels with ninety-one guns, but that the enemy was still superior. in number of guns, possibly; but it is difficult to accept the statement otherwise, except in the one very important particular of squadron manoeuvring power. this enabled yeo to avoid action, except when it suited him to fight; or unless chauncey was willing to engage first with part only of his squadron, following it with the rest. such advantage in manoeuvring greatly increases the ability of the inferior to serve his own cause, but it does not constitute superiority. the delusion of measuring force by guns, irrespective of the ships that carry them, has been explained. yeo's intermediate movements do not appear, but on september the antagonists again met off the niagara river. from that day till the th the american fleet endeavored to force a general action, which the other steadily, and properly, refused. the persistent efforts of the one to close, and of the other to avoid, led to a movement round the lake, ending by the british entering amherst bay, five miles west of kingston. on one occasion, off the genesee on september , a westerly breeze carried the united states squadron within three-quarters of a mile of the enemy, before the latter felt it. a cannonade and pursuit of some hours followed, but without decisive result. there seems traceable throughout chauncey's account a distinct indisposition to what is called technically "a general chase;" to press on with part of the squadron, trusting to the slower vessels coming up soon enough to complete the work of the faster. he was unwilling thus to let his fleet loose. "this ship" (the "general pike"), "the 'madison,' and the 'sylph,' have each a schooner constantly in tow, yet the others cannot sail as fast as the enemy's squadron, which gives him decidedly the advantage, and puts it in his power to engage me when and how he chooses." in such a situation success can be had only by throwing the more rapid upon the enemy as an advance guard, engaging as they get within range, relying upon their effecting such detention that the others can arrive in time to their support. to this recourse, though in halting fashion, chauncey finally came on what proved to be his last collision with yeo, september . [illustration: captain isaac chauncey. _from the engraving by d. edwin after the painting by j. woods._] [illustration: captain sir james lucas yeo _from the engraving by h.r. cook after the painting by a. buck._] footnotes: [ ] yeo to croker, may , . admiralty in-letters, records office. [ ] captains' letters, navy department. [ ] american state papers, military affairs, vol. i. p. . [ ] between july, , and march , , prevost received re-enforcements amounting in all to , regulars. his total force then, for all canada, excluding militia, was , ; of which , were provincial corps. british records office. [ ] american state papers, military affairs, vol. i. p. . [ ] chauncey to navy department, march , , and , . captains' letters. [ ] american state papers, military affairs, vol. i. p. . [ ] captains' letters. [ ] captains' letters, nov. , . [ ] captains' letters, may , . [ ] ibid., may . [ ] canadian archives. c. , p. . [ ] american state papers, military affairs, vol. i. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . armstrong's italics. [ ] barclay's narrative before the british court martial on the battle of lake erie. british records office. [ ] prevost to bathurst, canadian archives. [ ] mackenzie's life of perry, vol. i. p. . [ ] barclay's narrative. [ ] brown's and prevost's reports of this affair may be found in niles' register, vol. iv. pp. , . that of yeo is in the canadian archives; m. , , p. . [ ] captains' letters, june , . [ ] captains' letters. [ ] the account of these transactions is summarized from american state papers, military affairs, vol. i. pp. - . for vincent's report of the stony creek affair see cruikshank's documentary history of the campaign on the niagara frontier, , part ii, p. . [ ] smyth's précis of wars in canada, p. . [ ] scott's memoirs, vol. i. p. . [ ] american state papers, military affairs, vol. i. pp. , . [ ] formerly the "prince regent." [ ] yeo's report of the vessels on the lakes, july , . british records office. [ ] woolsey to chauncey, june and , . captains' letters. [ ] chauncey to the department, july , . captains' letters. [ ] captains' letters. navy department mss. [ ] "history of the royal navy," edited by sir w.l. clowes, vol. iii. p. . [ ] that is,--row [ ] chauncey's report of this cruise is in captains' letters, aug. , . also, in niles' register, vol. iv. p. . [ ] james, naval occurrences. appendix, p. lxxiv. chapter xi the campaign of on the lakes and northern frontier. the battle of lake erie while the movements last related in the preceding chapter were in progress, the contest for lake erie was brought to a final decision. after the successful transfer of the vessels from black rock to erie, june , perry remained upon the upper lake superintending all administrative work; but in particular pressing the equipment of the two brigs ordered by chauncey the previous winter. to one of these, on which perry intended to embark his own fortunes, was given the name of "lawrence," the captain of the "chesapeake," whose death, heroic in defeat, occurred at this period. the other was called the "niagara." they were sister vessels, of five hundred tons, constructed for war, and brig-rigged; that is, with two masts, and carrying square sails on both. their armaments also were alike; eighteen -pounder carronades, and two long -pounder guns. they were thus about equivalent in fighting force to the ocean sloops-of-war, "wasp" and "hornet," which, however, were three-masted. the remainder of the force would now be called a scratch lot. three were schooner-rigged gunboats, built for the navy at erie; the remainder were the vessels brought from black rock. of these, one was the brig "caledonia," formerly british, captured by elliott the previous autumn; the others were purchased lake craft. when finally taking the lake, august , the squadron consisted of the two brigs, of the black rock division,--"caledonia," "somers," "tigress," "ohio," and "trippe,"--and of three other schooners,--"ariel," "scorpion," and "porcupine,"--apparently those built at erie; ten sail, all of which, except the "ohio," were in the final decisive battle. on july the vessels were rigged, armed, and ready for service, but there were not men enough to man them. how little exacting perry was in this matter, and how eager to enter upon active operations, is shown by a letter from his superior, chauncey, to the secretary of the navy, dated july : "i am at a loss," he says, "to account for the change in captain perry's sentiments with respect to the number of men required for the little fleet at presqu' isle; for when i parted with him on the last of may, we coincided in opinion perfectly as to the number required for each vessel, which was one hundred and eighty for each of the new brigs, sixty for the 'caledonia,' and forty for each of the other vessels, making in all seven hundred and forty officers and men. but if captain perry can beat the enemy with half that number, no one will feel more happy than myself."[ ] chauncey having supreme control over both lakes, all re-enforcements from the seaboard were sent to him; and as he had his own particular enemy on ontario to confront, it was evident, and natural, that perry would be least well served. hence, after successive disappointments, and being of more venturous temper than his superior, it is not surprising that he soon was willing to undertake his task with fewer men than his unbiased judgment would call necessary. the clash of interests between the two squadrons, having a common superior but separate responsibilities, is seen by a comparison of dates, which shows operations nearly simultaneous. on july the erie squadron was reported "all ready to meet the enemy the moment they are officered and manned;" on july the "general pike" was ready, and on the st the ontario squadron sailed from sackett's harbor. on august perry had his vessels across the bar at erie, and next day stood out into the lake. on the th chauncey and yeo met for their first encounter. on the th the two ontario schooners, "hamilton" and "scourge," were lost with nearly all on board; and on the th the "julia" and "growler" were captured. after this, it may be imagined that chauncey with difficulty parted with men; and in the midst of his second collision with yeo the battle of lake erie occurred. in it, of the one hundred and eighty men deemed necessary by chauncey, perry's brig had one hundred and forty-two, of whom thirty were sick; while the squadron, with nearly all its vessels present, instead of the intended seven hundred and forty, had but four hundred and ninety. of this total, nearly one hundred were received from the army on august , only nine days before the action. for the most part these were strangers to shipboard. barring them, perry's fighting force was barely more than half that required by chauncey's estimate. indirectly, and notwithstanding perry's disposition to make the best of his difficulty, this condition came near causing his withdrawal from the lake service; a loss which, had it occurred, might have reversed the issues, for in few general actions has the personality of the commander counted for so much, after the battle joined. in a letter of july to chauncey, he had written: "the men that came by mr. champlin are a motley set, blacks, soldiers, and boys. i cannot think you saw them after they were selected."[ ] chauncey replied, somewhat testily, "i regret you are not pleased with the men sent you; for, to my knowledge, a part of them are not surpassed by any seamen we have in the fleet; and i have yet to learn that the color of the skin, or the cut and trimmings of the coat, can affect a man's qualifications or usefulness." to this he added a warning not much short of a reproof: "as you have assured the secretary that you should conceive yourself equal or superior to the enemy, with a force in men so much less than i had deemed necessary, there will be a great deal expected from you by your country, and i trust they will not be disappointed in the high expectations formed of your gallantry and judgment. i will barely make an observation, which was impressed upon my mind by an old soldier; that is, 'never despise your enemy.'"[ ] this advice was sound, rightly weighed. yet it is not too much to say that the confidence which carried perry on to decisive victory has in it inevitably something of that assurance of success which is akin to contempt of the enemy, and that it was the precise quality in which chauncey, throughout his own career on the lakes, showed himself deficient, and consequently failed. his plan at that moment, as he himself said in a letter to perry of july , was "to seek a meeting with sir james yeo as soon as possible, in order to decide the fate of this lake, and join you immediately after." this was an intelligent project: to beat one enemy first, and then carry his force over to beat the other; but never, when in presence of his antagonist, could he despise him sufficiently to cut his gunboats adrift, and throw one or two vessels into the midst of the fire, as perry rushed his own ship in, had her cut to pieces,--and won. it is even worse to respect your enemy too greatly than to despise him. said farragut, speaking of an officer he highly valued: "drayton does not know fear, but he believes in acting as if the enemy never can be caught unprepared; whereas i believe in judging him by ourselves, and my motto in action is, '_l'audace, et encore de l'audace, et toujours de l'audace!_'" this described perry in battle. although chauncey closed with expressions of confidence which might be considered conciliatory, perry experienced an annoyance which was natural, though excessive. he was only twenty-eight, quick of temper, though amiable, and somewhat prone to see more offence than was intended. when the letter reached him, the squadron had just crossed the bar; the most critical movement of the campaign, had the enemy been duly watchful. having accomplished this, he had before him only the common vicissitudes of naval warfare. nevertheless, under his first impulse of resentment, he applied to be removed from the station,[ ] giving as his reason, not the quality of men sent, concerning which indeed he had said, "i am pleased to see anything in the shape of a man," but that "i cannot serve under an officer who has been so totally regardless of my feelings." he then summarized the difficulties with which he had contended, and added, "the critical state of general harrison was such that i took upon myself the responsibility of going out with the few young officers you had been pleased to send me," (elliott, the second in command, did not arrive till the squadron was over the bar), "with the few seamen i had, and as many volunteers as i could muster from the militia. i did not shrink from this responsibility; but, sir, at that very moment i surely did not anticipate the receipt of a letter in every line of which is an insult." he then renewed his request. "i am willing to forego that reward which i have considered for two months past almost within my grasp." fortunately for the renown of the service, from which one of its finest actions might have been lost, it was impossible to grant his application until after the battle had made the question of the command on lake erie one of very minor importance. the secretary replied to him with words in which rebuke and appreciation were aptly blended. "a change of commander, under existing circumstances, is equally inadmissible as it respects the interest of the service and your own reputation. it is right that you should reap the harvest which you have sown."[ ] [illustration: captain oliver hazard perry. _from the painting by gilbert stuart in the possession of o.h. perry, esq._] after the frenchtown disaster[ ] of january , , the army of the northwest under general harrison had remained strictly on the defensive throughout the spring and summer. the tenure of its position on the maumee river depended upon fort meigs, built during the winter just above the rapids, some twenty miles from the lake. thirty miles east of meigs was fort stephenson at the mouth of the sandusky river, protecting the approaches to sandusky bay, near which were harrison's headquarters at the time perry's squadron was ready to move. fort stephenson by its situation contributed also to secure the communications of the maumee line with central ohio, and was an obstacle to an enemy's approach by land to erie, a hundred and fifty miles further east. it was not, however, a work permanent in character, like meigs; and neither post could be considered secure, because inadequately garrisoned. fortunately, the general tenor of the instructions received by procter from prevost conspired with his own natural character to indispose him to energetic measures. his force of regulars was small; and he had not the faculty, which occasional white men have shown, to arouse vigorous and sustained activity in the indians, of whom he had an abundance at call. the use of them in desultory guerilla warfare, which was prescribed to him by prevost, became in his hands ineffective. nevertheless, from the number known to be under his command, and the control of the water enabling him to land where he would, the threat of savage warfare hung over the frontier like a pall, until finally dissipated by perry's victory. the danger to british control of the water, and thereby to the maintenance of their position in the northwest, if the american fleet now building should succeed in getting upon the lake, was perfectly apparent, and made erie a third and principal point of interest. at the time of perry's arrival, march , the place was entirely defenceless, and without any organization for defence, although the keels of the two brigs were laid, and the three gunboats well advanced in construction. by a visit to pittsburgh he obtained from an army ordnance officer four small guns, with some muskets; and upon his application the local commander of pennsylvania militia stationed at erie five hundred men, who remained till the vessels crossed the bar. under this slender protection went on the arduous work of building and equipping a squadron in what was substantially a wilderness, to which most of the mechanics and material had to be brought half a thousand miles from the seaboard, under the difficulties of transport in those days. the rapid advance in the preparations aroused the disquietude of the british, but procter had not the enterprising temper to throw all upon the hazard, for the sake of destroying an armament which, if completed, might destroy him; while the british inferiority of force on lake ontario and the niagara peninsula, together with the movement of chauncey and dearborn resulting in the capture of york, april , effectually prevented intervention from that quarter in the affairs of lake erie. at this time procter made his first effort of the season, directed against fort meigs, which he held besieged for over a week,--from may to may . although unable to capture it, the mismanagement of an american relief force enabled him to inflict a very severe loss; a corps of eight hundred and sixty-six men being cut to pieces or captured, only one hundred and seventy escaping. the chief points of interest in this business are the demonstration of the weakness of the american frontier,--the principal defence of which was thus not merely braved but threatened,--and the effect of control of the water. by it procter brought over gunboats which ascended the river, and guns of a weight not to be transported by land. the lake also secured his communications. after the failure before meigs, procter turned his attention more seriously to the situation at erie, and demanded re-enforcements to enable him to attack the place.[ ] prevost, being commander-in-chief for all canada, recognized the expediency of the move, and wrote him, june , that he had directed general de rottenburg at niagara, to push on re-enforcements and supplies; but prevost was in kingston, and de rottenburg, immediately responsible for niagara, wrote declining to weaken his force. he was already inferior to the united states army under boyd, which was then confronting him, resting upon fort george; and there was the prospect also that chauncey might regain control of the lake. instead of co-operation for offence, he transmitted arrangements for retreat in case of a disaster to yeo on ontario. procter enclosed this letter to the commander-in-chief, remarking pathetically that he was fully confident of receiving aid from him, but intentions were of no avail. had the force ordered been sent, he felt sure of destroying the fleet at erie, thus securing the command of the lake, which would have benefited also the centre [niagara] division. he should now, he said, make an attempt upon sandusky; erie was impossible without re-enforcements. at the same time, july , captain barclay was about to sail for long point, on the canada shore directly opposite erie, to embark one hundred troops, and then to endeavor to retain the american fleet in port until the required assistance could be sent. the new british ship "detroit" was nearly ready for launching at amherstburg, and could be equipped and gunned there; but seamen were absolutely needed. in accordance with these plans barclay went with his squadron to long point. there the desired soldiers were refused him; and, as also no seamen were forthcoming, he wrote on july a letter directly to sir george prevost, "lest sir james yeo should be on the lake," representing the critical state of affairs, owing to the inadequate equipment of his vessels, the want of seamen, and the advanced preparations of the americans to put afloat a force superior to his. july he appeared off erie, where perry's fleet was still in the harbor, waiting for men. how imminent the exposure of the american flotilla at that moment, and how great the british opportunity, appears from the recently published memoirs of a prominent resident.[ ] "an english fleet of five vessels of war was at that time cruising off the harbor, in full view. that fleet might at any time have sent in its boats during a dark night, and the destruction of the whole american fleet was almost inevitable; for perry's force was totally inadequate to its defence, and the regiment of pennsylvania militia, stationed at erie expressly for the defence of the fleet, refused to keep guard at night on board. 'i told the boys to go, captain,' said the worthless colonel of the regiment, 'but the boys won't go.'" like american merchant ships, american militia obeyed or disobeyed as they pleased. two hundred soldiers, loaned by dearborn when the black rock flotilla came round, had been recalled july . on the d and th re-enforcements were received from chauncey, in all one hundred and thirty men. with these, and some landsmen enlisted on the spot for four months, the force of the squadron, estimated to require seven hundred and forty men, was raised to three hundred; but having lately received two pressing letters from the navy department, urging general harrison's critical need of co-operation, perry determined to go out. most opportunely for his purpose, barclay disappeared on the th, friday, which thus for him made good its title to "unlucky." he was absent until august , and was by the americans believed to have gone to long point. before his court martial he merely stated that "i blockaded as closely as i could, until i one morning saw the whole of the enemy's force over the bar, and in a most formidable state of preparation." the court did not press inquiry on the point, which perhaps lay beyond its instructions; but the double failure, to intercept the black rock division on its way to erie,[ ] and to prevent the crossing of the bar, were serious strategic misadventures when confronting superior numbers. perry's preparations for the passage had been for some time completed, but information of contemplated movements travelled so easily from shore to shore that he gave no indication of immediate action until sunday. on that day the officers were permitted to disperse in town as usual, but afterwards were hastily summoned back, and the vessels moved down to the bar, on which the depth ordinarily was from five to seven feet, much less than needed for the "lawrence" and "niagara." this obstacle, hitherto a protection against naval attack, now imposed an extremely critical operation; for to get over, the brigs must be lightened of their guns and their hulls lifted upon floats. so situated, they were helplessly exposed to destruction, as far as their own powers went. from point to point the mouth of the harbor, where the outer bar occurs, was eight tenths of a mile wide. as shown by a sketch of the period, the distance to be travelled on the floats, from deep water within to deep water without, was a mile; rather less than more. on monday morning, august , the movement of the vessels began simultaneously. five of the smaller, which under usual conditions could pass without lightening, were ordered to cross and take positions outside, covering the channel; a sixth, with the "niagara," were similarly posted within. the protection thus afforded was re-enforced by three -pounder long guns, mounted on the beach, abreast the bar; distant not over five hundred yards from the point where the channel issued on the lake. while these dispositions were being made, the "lawrence's" guns were hoisted out, and placed in boats to be towed astern of her; the floats taken alongside, filled, sunk, and made fast, so that when pumped out their rising would lift the brig. in the course of these preparations it was found that the water had fallen to four feet, so that even the schooners had to be lightened, while the transit of the "lawrence" was rendered more tedious and difficult. the weather, however, was propitious, with a smooth lake; and although the brig grounded in the shoalest spot, necessitating a second sinking of the burden-bearing floats,--appropriately called "camels,"--perseverance protracted through that night and the day of the d carried her outside. at a.m. of the th she was fairly afloat. guns, singly light in weight as hers were, were quickly hoisted on board and mounted; but none too soon, for the enemy appeared almost immediately. the "niagara's" passage was more easily effected, and barclay offered no molestation. in a letter to the department, dated august , , p.m., perry reported, "i have great pleasure in informing you that i have succeeded in getting over the bar the united states vessels, the 'lawrence,' 'niagara,' 'caledonia,' 'ariel,' 'scorpion,' 'somers,' 'tigress,' and 'porcupine.'" he added, "the enemy have been in sight all day." the vessels named, with the schooner "ohio" and the sloop "trippe," constituted the entire squadron. [illustration: plan of erie harbor copied from captain's letters, , vol. , page , with letter from capt. a. sinclair. may , . a.h.e. verified, chas. w. stewart.] while perry was thus profitably employed, procter had embarked on another enterprise against the magazines on the american front of operations. his intention, as first reported to prevost, was to attack sandusky; but the conduct of the indians, upon the co-operation of whom he had to rely, compelled him to diverge to fort meigs. here the savages began to desert, an attempt to draw the garrison into an ambush having failed; and when procter, after two days' stay, determined to revert to sandusky, he was accompanied by "as many hundred of them as there should have been thousands." the white troops went on by water, the indians by the shore. they appeared before fort stephenson on sunday, august . the garrison was summoned, with the customary intimation of the dire consequences to be apprehended from the savages in case of an assault. the american commander, major croghan, accepted these possibilities, and the following day, during which the "lawrence" was working her way over erie bar, the artillery and the guns of the gunboats were busy battering the northwest angle of the fort. at p.m. an assault was made. it was repelled with heavy loss to the assailants, and little to the besieged. that night the baffled enemy withdrew to malden. the american squadron having gained the lake and mounted its batteries, barclay found himself like chauncey while awaiting the "general pike." his new and most powerful vessel, the ship "detroit," was approaching completion. he was now too inferior in force to risk action when he might expect her help so soon, and he therefore retired to malden. perry was thus left in control of lake erie. he put out on august ; but, failing to find the enemy, he anchored again off erie, to take on board provisions, and also stores to be carried to sandusky for the army. while thus occupied, there came on the evening of the th the welcome news that a re-enforcement of officers and seamen was approaching. on the th, these joined him to the number of one hundred and two. at their head was commander jesse d. elliott, an officer of reputation, who became second in command to perry, and took charge of the "niagara." on august the squadron finally made sail for the westward, not to return to erie till the campaign was decided. its intermediate movements possess little interest, the battle of lake erie being so conspicuously the decisive incident as to reduce all preceding it to insignificance. perry was off malden on august , and again on september . the wind on the latter day favoring movement both to go and come, a somewhat rare circumstance, he remained all day reconnoitring near the harbor's mouth. the british squadron appeared complete in vessels and equipment; but barclay had his own troubles about crews, as had his antagonist, his continual representations to yeo meeting with even less attention than perry conceived himself to receive from chauncey. he was determined to postpone action until re-enforcements of seamen should arrive from the eastward, unless failure of provisions, already staring him in the face, should force him to battle in order to re-establish communications by the lake. the headquarters of the united states squadron was at put-in bay, in the bass islands, a group thirty miles southeast of malden. the harbor was good, and the position suitable for watching the enemy, in case he should attempt to pass eastward down the lake, towards long point or elsewhere. hither perry returned on september , after a brief visit to sandusky bay, where information was received that the british leaders had determined that the fleet must, at all hazards, restore intercourse with long point. from official correspondence, afterwards captured with procter's baggage, it appears that the amherstburg and malden district was now entirely dependent for flour upon long point, access to which had been effectually destroyed by the presence of the american squadron. even cattle, though somewhat more plentiful, could no longer be obtained in the neighborhood in sufficient numbers, owing to the wasteful way in which the indians had killed where they wanted. they could not be restrained without alienating them, or, worse, provoking them to outrage. including warriors and their families, fourteen thousand were now consuming provisions. in the condition of the roads, only water transport could meet the requirements; and that not by an occasional schooner running blockade, but by the free transit of supplies conferred by naval control. to the decision to fight may have been contributed also a letter from prevost, who had been drawn down from kingston to st. david's, on the niagara frontier, by his anxiety about the general situation, particularly aroused by procter's repulse from fort stephenson. alluding to the capture of chauncey's two schooners on august , he wrote procter on the d, "yeo's experience should convince barclay that he has only to dare and he will be successful."[ ] it was to be sir george's unhappy lot, a year later, to goad the british naval commander on lake champlain into premature action; and there was ample time for the present indiscreet innuendo to reach barclay, and impel him to a step which prevost afterwards condemned as hasty, because not awaiting the arrival of a body of fifty seamen announced to be at kingston on their way to malden. at sunrise of september , the lookout at the masthead of the "lawrence" sighted the british squadron in the northwest. barclay was on his way down the lake, intending to fight. the wind was southwest, fair for the british, but adverse to the americans quitting the harbor by the channel leading towards the enemy. fortunately it shifted to southeast, and there steadied; which not only enabled them to go out, but gave them the windward position throughout the engagement. the windward position, or weather gage, as it was commonly called, conferred the power of initiative; whereas the vessel or fleet to leeward, while it might by skill at times force action, or itself obtain the weather gage by manoeuvring, was commonly obliged to await attack and accept the distance chosen by the opponent. where the principal force of a squadron, as in perry's case, consists in two vessels armed almost entirely with carronades, the importance of getting within carronade range is apparent. looking forward to a meeting, perry had prearranged the disposition of his vessels to conform to that which he expected the enemy to assume. unlike ocean fleets, all the lake squadrons, as is already known of ontario, were composed of vessels very heterogeneous in character. this was because the most had been bought, not designed for the navy. it was antecedently probable, therefore, that a certain general principle would dictate the constitution of the three parts of the order of battle, the centre and two flanks, into which every military line divides. the french have an expression for the centre,--_corps de bataille_,--which was particularly appropriate to squadrons like those of barclay and perry. each had a natural "body of battle," in vessels decisively stronger than all the others combined. this relatively powerful division would take the centre, as a cohesive force, to prevent the two ends--or flanks--being driven asunder by the enemy. barclay's vessels of this class were the new ship, "detroit," and the "queen charlotte;" perry's were the "lawrence" and "niagara." each had an intermediate vessel; the british the "lady prevost," the americans the "caledonia." in addition to these were the light craft, three british and six americans; concerning which it is to be said that the latter were not only the more numerous, but individually much more powerfully armed. the same remark is true, vessel for vessel, of those opposed to one another by perry's plan; that is, measuring the weight of shot discharged at a broadside, which is the usual standard of comparison, the "lawrence" threw more metal than the "detroit," the "niagara" much more than the "queen charlotte," and the "caledonia," than the "lady prevost." this, however, must be qualified by the consideration, more conspicuously noticeable on ontario than on erie, of the greater length of range of the long gun. this applies particularly to the principal british vessel, the "detroit." owing to the difficulties of transportation, and the demands of the ontario squadron, her proper armament had not arrived. she was provided with guns from the ramparts of fort malden, and a more curiously composite battery probably never was mounted; but, of the total nineteen, seventeen were long guns. it is impossible to say what her broadside may have weighed. all her pieces together fired two hundred and thirty pounds, but it is incredible that a seaman like barclay should not so have disposed them as to give more than half that amount to one broadside. that of the "lawrence," was three hundred pounds; but all her guns, save two twelves, were carronades. compared with the "queen charlotte," the battery of the "niagara" was as to ; both chiefly carronades. from what has been stated, it is evident that if perry's plan were carried out, opposing vessel to vessel, the americans would have a superiority of at least fifty per cent. such an advantage, in some quarter at least, is the aim of every capable commander; for the object of war is not to kill men, but to carry a point: not glory by fighting, but success in result. the only obvious dangers were that the wind might fail or be very light, which would unduly protract exposure to long guns before getting within carronade range; or that, by some vessels coming tardily into action, one or more of the others would suffer from concentration of the enemy's fire. it was this contingency, realized in fact, which gave rise to the embittered controversy about the battle; a controversy never settled, and probably now not susceptible of settlement, because the president of the united states, mr. monroe, pigeonholed the charges formulated by perry against elliott in . there is thus no american sworn testimony to facts, searched and sifted by cross-examination; for the affidavits submitted on the one side and the other were _ex parte_, while the court of inquiry, asked by elliott in , neglected to call all accessible witnesses--notably perry himself. in fact, there was not before it a single commanding officer of a vessel engaged. such a procedure was manifestly inadequate to the requirement of the navy department's letter to the court, that "a true statement of the facts in relation to captain elliott's conduct be exhibited to the world." investigation seems to have been confined to an assertion in a british periodical, based upon the proceedings of the court martial upon barclay, to the effect that elliott's vessel "had not been engaged, and was making away,"[ ] at the time when perry "was obliged to leave his ship, which soon after surrendered, and hoist his flag on board another of his squadron." the american court examined two officers of perry's vessel, and five of elliott's; no others. to the direct question, "did the 'niagara' at any time during the action attempt to make off from the british fleet?" all replied, "no." the court, therefore, on the testimony before it, decided that the charge "made in the proceedings[ ] of the british court martial ... was malicious, and unfounded in fact;" expressing besides its conviction "that the attempts to wrest from captain elliott the laurels he gained in that splendid victory ... ought in no wise to lessen him in the opinion of his fellow citizens as a brave and skilful officer." at the same time it regretted that "imperious duty compelled it to promulgate testimony which appears materially to differ in some of its most important points." in this state the evidence still remains, owing to the failure of the president to take action, probably with a benevolent desire to allay discord, and envelop facts under a kindly "all's well that ends well." perry died a year after making his charges, which labored under the just imputation that he had commended elliott in his report, and again immediately afterwards, though in terms that his subordinate thought failed to do him justice. american naval opinion divided, apparently in very unequal numbers. elliott's officers stood by him, as was natural; for men feel themselves involved in that which concerns the conduct of their ship, and see incidents in that light. perry's officers considered that the "lawrence" had not been properly supported; owing to which, after losses almost unparalleled, she had to undergo the mortification of surrender. her heroism, her losses, and her surrender, were truths beyond question. the historian to-day thus finds himself in the dilemma that the american testimony is in two categories, distinctly contradictory and mutually destructive; yet to be tested only by his own capacity to cross-examine the record, and by reference to the british accounts. the latter are impartial, as between the american parties; their only bias is to constitute a fair case for barclay, by establishing the surrender of the american flagship and the hesitancy of the "niagara" to enter into action. this would indicate victory so far, changed to defeat by the use perry made of the vessel preserved to him intact by the over-caution of his second. waiving motives, these claims are substantially correct, and constitute the analysis of the battle as fought and won. barclay, finding the wind to head him and place him to leeward, arranged his fleet to await attack in the following order, from van to rear: the schooner "chippewa," "detroit," "hunter," "queen charlotte," "lady prevost," "little belt."[ ] this, he said in his official letter, was "according to a given plan, so that each ship [that is, the "detroit" and "queen charlotte"] might be supported against the superior force of the two brigs opposed to them." the british vessels lay in column, in each other's wake, by the wind on the port tack, hove-to (stopped) with a topsail to the mast, heading to the southwest (position ). perry now modified some details of his disposition. it had been expected that the "queen charlotte" would precede the "detroit," and the american commander had therefore placed the "niagara" leading, as designated to fight the "charlotte," the "lawrence" following the "niagara." this order was now reversed, and the "caledonia" interposed between the two; the succession being "lawrence," "caledonia," "niagara." having more schooners than the enemy, he placed in the van two of the best, the "scorpion" and the "ariel"; the other four behind the "niagara." his centre, therefore, the "lawrence," "caledonia," and "niagara," were opposed to the "detroit," "hunter," and "queen charlotte." the long guns of the "ariel," "scorpion," and "caledonia" supplied in measure the deficiency of gun power in the "lawrence," while standing down outside of carronade range; the "caledonia," with the rear schooners, giving a like support to the "niagara." the "ariel," and perhaps also the "scorpion," was ordered to keep a little to windward of the "lawrence." this was a not uncommon use of van vessels, making more hazardous any attempt of the opponent to tack and pass to windward, in order to gain the weather gage with its particular advantages (position ). the rear four schooners, as is frequently the case in long columns, were straggling somewhat at the time the signal to bear down was made; and they had difficulty in getting into action, being compelled to resort to the sweeps because the wind was light. it is not uncommon to see small vessels with low sails thus retarded, while larger are being urged forward by their lofty light canvas. the line otherwise having been formed, perry stood down without regard to them. at quarter before noon the "detroit" opened upon the "lawrence" with her long guns. ten minutes later the americans began to reply. finding the british fire at this range more destructive than he had anticipated, perry made more sail upon the lawrence. word had already been passed by hail of trumpet to close up in the line, and for each vessel to come into action against her opponent, before designated. the "lawrence" continued thus to approach obliquely, using her own long twelves, and backed by the long guns of the vessels ahead and astern, till she was within "canister range," apparently about two hundred and fifty yards, when she turned her side to the wind on the weather quarter of the "detroit," bringing her carronade battery to bear (position ). this distance was greater than desirable for carronades; but with a very light breeze, little more than two miles an hour, there was a limit to the time during which it was prudent to allow an opponent's raking fire to play, unaffected in aim by any reply. moreover, much of her rigging was already shot away, and she was becoming unmanageable. the battle was thus joined by the commander-in-chief; but, while supported to his satisfaction by the "scorpion" and "ariel" ahead, and "caledonia" astern, with their long guns, the "niagara" did not come up, and her carronades failed to do their share. the captain of her opponent, the "queen charlotte," finding that his own carronades would not reach her, made sail ahead, passed the "hunter," and brought his battery to the support of the "detroit" in her contest with the "lawrence" (q_{ }). perry's vessel thus found herself under the combined fire of the "detroit," "queen charlotte," and in some measure of the "hunter"; the armament of the last, however, was too trivial to count for much. elliott's first placing of the "niagara" may, or may not, have been judicious as regards his particular opponent. the "queen charlotte's" twenty-fours would not reach him; and it may be quite proper to take a range where your own guns can tell and your enemy's cannot. circumstance must determine. the precaution applicable in a naval duel may cease to be so when friends are in need of assistance; and when the british captain, seeing how the case stood, properly and promptly carried his ship forward to support his commander, concentrating two vessels upon perry's one, the situation was entirely changed. the plea set up by cooper, who fought elliott's battle conscientiously, but with characteristic bitterness as well as shrewdness, that the "niagara's" position, assigned in the line behind the "caledonia," could not properly be left without signal, practically surrenders the case. it is applying the dry-rot system of fleet tactics in the middle of the eighteenth century to the days after rodney and nelson, and is further effectually disposed of by the consentient statement of several of the american captains, that their commander's dispositions were made with reference to the enemy's order; that is, that he assigned a special enemy's ship to a special american, and particularly the "detroit" to the "lawrence," and the "queen charlotte" to the "niagara." the vessels of both fleets being so heterogeneous, it was not wise to act as with units nearly homogeneous, by laying down an order, the governing principle of which was mutual support by a line based upon its own intrinsic qualities. the considerations dictating perry's dispositions were external to his fleet, not internal; in the enemy's order, not in his own. this was emphasized by his changing the previously arranged stations of the "lawrence" and the "niagara," when he saw barclay's line. lastly, he re-enforced all this by quoting to his subordinates nelson's words, that no captain could go very far wrong who placed his vessel close alongside those of the enemy. [illustration: diagram of the battle of lake erie september , ] cooper, the ablest of elliott's champions, has insisted so strongly upon the obligation of keeping the station _in the line_, as laid down, that it is necessary to examine the facts in the particular case. he rests the certainty of his contention on general principles, then long exploded, and further upon a sentence in perry's charges, preferred in , that "the commanding officer [perry] issued, st, an order directing in what manner the line of battle should be formed ... and enjoined upon the commanders to preserve their stations in the line" thus laid down.[ ] this is correct; but cooper omits to give the words immediately following in the specification: "and in all cases to keep as near the commanding officer's vessel [the "lawrence"] as possible."[ ] cooper also omits that which next succeeds: " d, an order of attack, in which the 'lawrence' was designated to attack the enemy's new ship (afterwards ascertained to have been named the 'detroit'), and the 'niagara' designated to attack the 'queen charlotte,' which orders were then communicated to all the commanders, including the said captain elliott, who for that purpose ... were by signal called together by the said commanding officer ... and expressly instructed that 'if, in the expected engagement, they laid their vessels close alongside of those of the enemy, they could not be out of the way.'"[ ] an officer, if at once gallant and intelligent, finding himself behind a dull sailing vessel, as cooper tells us the "caledonia" was, could hardly desire clearer authority than the above to imitate his commanding officer when he made sail to close the enemy:--"keep close to him," and follow up the ship which "the 'niagara' was designated to attack." charges preferred are not technical legal proof, but, if duly scrutinized, they are statements equivalent in value to many that history rightly accepts; and, at all events, that which cooper quotes is not duly scrutinized if that which he does not quote is omitted. he does indeed express a gloss upon them, in the words: "though the 'niagara' was ordered to direct her fire at the 'queen charlotte,' it could only be done from her station astern of the 'caledonia,' ... without violating the primary order to preserve the line."[ ] this does not correctly construe the natural meaning of perry's full instructions. it is clear that, while he laid down a primary formation, "a line of battle," he also most properly qualified it by a contingent instruction, an "order of attack," designed to meet the emergency likely to occur in every fleet engagement, and which occurred here, when a slavish adherence to the line of battle would prevent intelligent support to the main effort. if he knew naval history, as his quotation from nelson indicates, he also knew how many a battle had been discreditably lost by "keeping the line." with regard to the line, however, it is apt to remark that in fleet battle, unless otherwise specially directed, the line of the assailant was supposed to be parallel to that of the defence, for the obvious reason that the attacking vessels should all be substantially at the same effective range. this distance, equal for all in fleets as usually constituted, would naturally be set, and in practice was set, by the commander-in-chief; his ship forming the point through which should be drawn the line parallel to the enemy. this rule, well established under rodney, who died in , was rigidly applicable between vessels of the same force, such as the "lawrence" and "niagara;" and whatever deductions might be made for the case of a light-framed vessel, armed with long guns, like the "caledonia," keeping out of carronade distance of an opponent with heavy scantling, would not in the least apply to the "niagara." for her, the standard of position was not, as cooper insists, a half-cable's length from her next ahead, the "caledonia;" but abreast her designated opponent, at the same distance as the "lawrence" from the enemy's line. repeated mishaps had established the rule that position was to be taken from the centre,--that is, from the commander-in-chief. ships in line of battle, bearing down upon an enemy in like order, did not steer in each other's wake, unless specially ordered; and there is something difficult to understand in the "niagara" with her topsail sharp aback to keep from running on board the "caledonia," although the fact is in evidence. the expression in perry's report of the action, "at a.m. ... formed the line and bore up," would by a person familiar with naval battles be understood to mean that the line was first formed parallel to the enemy, the vessels following one another, after which they steered down for him, changing course together; they would then no longer be in each other's wake, but in echelon, or as the naval phrase then went, in bow and quarter line. barclay confirms this, "at the enemy bore up under easy sail, in a line abreast."[ ] thus, when the distance desired by the commander-in-chief was reached,--a fact more often indicated by his example than by signal,--the helm would bring them again in line of battle, their broadsides bearing upon the enemy. the technical point at issue is whether perry, finding the long-gun fire of the "detroit" more destructive than he had anticipated, and determining in consequence to shorten the period of its duration by changing his original plan, increasing sail beyond the speed of such slower vessels as the "caledonia," had a right to expect that his subordinates would follow his example. in the opinion of the writer, he had, in the then condition of the theory and practice of fleet battles; his transfer of his own position transferred the line of battle in its entirety to the distance relative to the enemy which he himself was seeking to assume. were other authority lacking, his action was warrant to his captains; but the expression in his report, "i made sail, and directed the other vessels to follow, for the purpose of closing with the enemy," causes increased regret that the exact facts were not ascertained by cross-examination before a court-martial. elliott's place therefore was alongside the "queen charlotte," so to engage her that she could attend to nothing else. this he did not do, and for failure the only possible excuse was inability, through lack of wind. the wind was light throughout, yet not so light but that the "lawrence" closed with the "detroit," and the "queen charlotte" with her flagship when she wished. none of elliott's witnesses before the court of inquiry state that he made sail before the middle of the action, but they attribute the failure to get down to the lightness of the wind. they do state that, after the "lawrence" was disabled, a breeze springing up, sail was made; which indicates that previously it had not been. again, it is alleged by the testimony in favor of elliott that much of the time the maintopsail was sharp aback, to keep from running into the "caledonia;" a circumstance upon which cooper dwells triumphantly, as showing that the "niagara" was not by the wind and was in her place, close astern of the "caledonia." accepting the statements, they would show there was wind enough to fan the "niagara" to--what was really her place--her commodore's aid; for in those days the distance between under fire and out of fire for efficient action was a matter of half a mile.[ ] perry's formulated charge, addressed to the navy department, and notified to elliott, but never brought to trial, was that when coming into action an order was passed by trumpet for the vessels astern to close up in the line; that a few moments previously to the enemy's opening fire the "niagara" had been within hail of the "lawrence," and nevertheless she was allowed to drop astern, and for two hours to remain at such distance from the enemy as to render useless all her battery except the two long guns. perry himself made sail at the time the hail by trumpet was passed. the "niagara" did not. there is little reason for doubt that the tenor of perry's instructions required elliott to follow the "queen charlotte," and no doubt whatever that military propriety imperiously demanded it of him. the question of wind must be matter of inference from the incidents above stated: the movement of the "lawrence" and "queen charlotte," and the bracing aback of the "niagara's" topsail. a sentence in perry's report apparently, but only apparently, attenuates the force of these. he said, "at half-past two, the wind springing up, captain elliott was enabled to bring his vessel, the 'niagara,' gallantly into close action." alluding to, without insisting on, perry's subsequent statement that he endeavored to give as favorable a color as possible to elliott's course, it is clear enough that these words simply state that captain elliott at . reached the range at which the "lawrence" had fought since a little after noon. quitting now the discussion of proprieties, the order of events seems to have been as follows: perry having taken the initiative of bearing down, under increased sail, elliott remained behind, governed by, or availing himself of--two very different motives, not lightly to be determined, or assumed, by the historian--the technical point, long before abandoned in practice, that he could not leave his place in the line without a signal. thus his action was controlled by the position of his next ahead in the line, the dull-sailing "caledonia," a vessel differing radically from his own in armament, having two long and for that day heavy guns, quite equal in range and efficiency to the best of the "detroit's,"[ ] and therefore capable of good service, though possibly not of their best, from the distance at which perry changed his speed. elliott's battery was the same as perry's. he thus continued until it became evident that, the "queen charlotte" having gone to the support of the "detroit," the "lawrence" was heavily overpowered. then, not earlier than an hour after perry bore down, he realized that his commander-in-chief would be destroyed under his eyes, unless he went to his support, and he himself would rest under the imputation of an inefficient spectator. he ordered the "caledonia" to bear up, in order that he might pass (position ; c_{ }, c_{ }). though not demonstrably certain, it seems probable that the wind, light throughout, was now so fallen as to impede the retrieval of his position; the opportunity to close, used by perry, had passed away. at all events it was not till between and . that the "niagara" arrived on the scene, within effective range of the carronades which constituted nine tenths of her battery. with this began the second stage of the battle ( ). perry's bearing down, receiving only the support of the long guns of the "caledonia" and of the schooners ahead of him, had brought the "lawrence" into hot engagement with the "detroit," supported a half hour later by the "queen charlotte." by a little after two o'clock both flagships were well-nigh disabled, hull and battery; the "lawrence" most so, having but one gun left out of ten on the broadside. "at . ," wrote barclay, "the detroit was a perfect wreck, principally from the raking fire of the gunboats." which gunboats? evidently the "ariel" and "scorpion," for all agree that the rear four were at this hour still far astern, though not absolutely out of range. to these last was probably due the crippling of the "lady prevost," which by now had gone to leeward with her rudder injured. up to this time, when the first scene closed, what had been the general course of the action? and what now the situation? assuming, as is very probable, that barclay did not open with his long 's until perry was a mile, two thousand yards, from him,--that distance requiring six degrees elevation for those guns,--an estimate of speeds and courses, as indicated by the evidence, would put the "lawrence" in action, at two hundred and fifty yards, at . . this calculation, made independently, received subsequent confirmation in consulting barclay's report, which says . .[ ] the same time, for the duller "caledonia" and the "niagara," would place them one thousand yards from the british line. this range, for the -pounder carronades of the "niagara," and the 's of the "queen charlotte," required an elevation of from four to six degrees. coupling this with the british statement, that the carronades of the "charlotte" could not reach the "niagara," we obtain probable positions, two hundred and fifty yards and one thousand yards, for the principal two american vessels at quarter-past noon. from the general lightness and occasional failure of the wind up to p.m., it is more than likely that no great change took place before that hour. what air there was might touch all alike, but would affect least the "lawrence," "detroit," and "queen charlotte," because their sails were being rent; and also they were in the centre of the cannonade, which is believed usually to kill the breeze. the tendency of the "caledonia," "niagara," and american vessels in rear of them, between . and p.m., during which period, to use barclay's report, "the action continued with great fury," would therefore be to approach slowly the scene where the "lawrence," supported by the long guns of the "ariel," "scorpion," and "caledonia," maintained the day against the "detroit" and "queen charlotte," backed by the schooner "chippewa" and the and pounder pop-guns of the "hunter." how near they drew is a mere matter of estimate. taking all together, it may be inferred that the "niagara" had then been carried as close as five hundred to six hundred yards to the british line, but it would appear also towards its rear; rather, probably, that the british had advanced relatively to her, owing to her course being oblique to theirs. the situation then was as follows: the "lawrence," disabled, was dropping astern of the "detroit," "queen charlotte," and "hunter." more than half her ship's company lay dead or wounded on her decks. her loss, killed and wounded out of a total of ,--sick included,[ ]--was mostly incurred before this. with only one gun left, she was a beaten ship, although her colors were up. the "detroit" lay in the british line almost equally mauled. on her lee quarter,--that is, behind, but on the lee side,--and close to her, was the "queen charlotte." her captain, second to barclay, had been killed,--the first man hit on board,--and her first lieutenant knocked senseless; being succeeded in command by an officer whom barclay described as of little experience. the first lieutenant of the "detroit" was also wounded mortally; and barclay himself, who already had been once hit in the thigh, was now a second time so severely injured,--being his eighth wound in battle, though now only thirty-two,--that he was forced at this critical instant to go below, leaving the deck with the second lieutenant. the "hunter" was astern of her two consorts. the "lady prevost," fifth in the british order, had fallen to leeward with her rudder crippled. the position of the leading and rear british schooners is not mentioned, and is not important; the reliance of each being one long -pounder gun. before this, taking advantage of the breeze freshening, the "niagara" had gone clear of the "caledonia," on her windward side, and had stood to the southwest, towards the "detroit." she had not at first either foresail or topgallantsails set; and since she passed the "lawrence" to windward, she was then almost certainly over two hundred and fifty yards from the british line, for there is no conclusive proof that the "lawrence" was nearer than that. combining the narrative of the british commodore with that of his second lieutenant, who now took charge, it appears that barclay, before going below, saw a boat passing from the "lawrence" to the "niagara," and that the second lieutenant, inglis, after relieving him, found the "niagara" on the weather beam of the "detroit." perry, seeing the "lawrence" incapable of further offensive action, had decided to leave her and go on board the "niagara," and in this brief interval was making his passage from one vessel to the other. after leaving the "lawrence" astern, the "niagara" had made sail; the foresail having been set, and the topgallantsails "in the act of being set, before captain perry came on board."[ ] this necessarily prolonged the time of his passage, and may have given rise to the opprobrious british report that she was making off. her making sail as she did indicated that she had suffered little aloft; she had been out of carronade range, while her consort, still in fighting condition, was bearing the brunt; it was natural to conclude that she would not alone renew the action, now that the "lawrence" was hopelessly disabled. the wish, too, may possibly have helped the thought. the "lawrence," in fact, having kept her colors flying till perry reached the "niagara," struck immediately afterwards. had she surrendered while he was on board, he could not honorably have quitted her; and the record was clearer by his reaching a fresh ship while the flag of the one he left was still up. what next happened is under no doubt so far as the movements of the "niagara" are concerned, though there is irreconcilable difference as to who initiated the action. immediately after perry came on board, elliott left her, to urge forward the rear gunboats. her helm was put up, and she bore down ahead of the "detroit" to rake her; supported in so doing by the small vessels, presumably the "ariel," "scorpion," and "caledonia." the british ship tried to wear, both to avoid being raked and to get her starboard battery into action; many of the guns on the broadside heretofore engaged being disabled. the "charlotte" being on her lee quarter, and ranging ahead, the two fell foul, and so remained for some time. this condition gave free play to the american guns, which were soon after re-enforced by those of the rear gunboats; enabled, like the "niagara," to close with the freshening breeze. after the two british vessels got clear, another attempt was made to bring their batteries to bear; but the end was inevitable, and is best told in the words of the officer upon whom devolved the duty of surrendering the "detroit." "the ship lying completely unmanageable, every brace cut away, the mizzen-topmast and gaff down, all the other masts badly wounded, not a stay left forward, hull shattered very much, a number of guns disabled, and the enemy's squadron raking both ships ahead and astern, none of our own in a position to support us, i was under the painful necessity of answering the enemy to say we had struck, the 'queen charlotte' having previously done so."[ ] a canadian officer taken prisoner at the battle of the thames saw the "detroit," a month later, at put-in bay. "it would be impossible," he wrote, "to place a hand upon that broadside which had been exposed to the enemy's fire without covering some portion of a wound, either from grape, round, canister, or chain shot."[ ] her loss in men was never specifically given. barclay reported that of the squadron as a whole to be forty-one killed, ninety-four wounded. he had lost an arm at trafalgar; and on this occasion, besides other injuries, the one remaining to him was so shattered as to be still in bandages a year later, when he appeared before the court martial which emphatically acquitted him of blame. the loss of the american squadron was twenty-seven killed, ninety-six wounded; of whom twenty-two killed and sixty-one wounded were on board the "lawrence." [illustration: perry receiving the surrender of the british at the battle of lake erie. _drawn by henry reuterdahl._] thus was the battle of lake erie fought and won. captain barclay not only had borne himself gallantly and tenaciously against a superior force,--favored in so doing by the enemy attacking in detail,--but the testimony on his trial showed that he had labored diligently during the brief period of his command, amid surroundings of extreme difficulty, to equip his squadron, and to train to discipline and efficiency the heterogeneous material of which his crews were composed. the only point not satisfactorily covered is his absence when perry was crossing the bar. in his defence his allusion to this incident is very casual,--resembles somewhat gliding rapidly over thin ice; but the court raised no question, satisfied, probably, with the certainty that the honor of the flag had not suffered in the action. on the american side, since the history of a country is not merely the narrative of principal transactions, but the record also of honor reflected upon the nation by the distinguished men it produces, it is proper to consider the question of credit, which has been raised in this instance. there can be no doubt that opportunity must be seized as it is offered; for accident or chance may prevent its recurrence. constituted as perry's squadron was, the opportunity presented to him could be seized only by standing down as he did, trusting that the other vessels would follow the example of their commander. the shifting of the wind in the morning, and its failure during the engagement, alike testify to the urgency of taking the tide as it serves. there was no lagging, like chauncey's, to fetch up heavy schooners; and the campaign was decided in a month, instead of remaining at the end of three months a drawn contest, to lapse thenceforth into a race of ship-building. had the "niagara" followed closely, there could have been no doubling on the "lawrence"; and perry's confidence would have been justified as well as his conduct. the latter needs no apology. without the help of the "niagara," the "detroit" was reduced to a "defenceless state," and a "perfect wreck,"[ ] by the carronades of the "lawrence," supported by the raking fire of the "ariel" and "scorpion." both the expressions quoted are applied by the heroic barclay to her condition at . , when, as he also says, the "niagara" was perfectly fresh. not only was the "detroit" thus put out of action, but the "charlotte" was so damaged that she surrendered before her. to this the "caledonia's" two long twenty-fours had contributed effectively. the first lieutenant of the "queen charlotte" testified that up to the time he was disabled, an hour or an hour and a quarter after the action began, the vessel was still manageable; that "the 'niagara' engaged us on our quarter, out of carronade range, with what long guns she had; but our principal injury was from the 'caledonia,' who laid on our beam, with two long -pounders on pivots, also out of carronade-shot distance."[ ] is it to perry, or to elliott, that is due the credit of the "niagara's" action in bearing up across the bows of the "detroit"? this is the second stage of the battle; the bringing up the reserves. an absolute reply is impossible in the face of the evidence, sworn but not cross-examined. a probable inference, which in the present writer amounts to conviction, is attainable. before the court of inquiry, in , captain elliott put the question to several of his witnesses, "was not the 'niagara's' helm up and she standing direct for the 'detroit' when captain perry came on board?" they replied, "yes." all these were midshipmen. by a singular fatality most of the "niagara's" responsible officers were already dead, and the one surviving lieutenant had been below, stunned, when perry reached the deck. it may very possibly be that this answer applied only to the first change of course, when elliott decided to leave his position behind the "caledonia"; but if it is claimed as covering also the subsequent bearing up eight points (at right angles), to cross the bows of the "detroit," it is to be observed that no mention of this very important movement is made in a letter addressed to the secretary of the navy, october , , one month after the battle, drawn up for the express purpose of vindicating elliott, and signed by all the lieutenants of the "niagara," and by the purser, who formerly had been a lieutenant in the navy. their account was that perry, on reaching the ship, said he feared the day was lost; that elliott replied it was not, that he would repair on board the rear schooners, and bring them up; that he did so, and "_the consequence was_ that in ten minutes the 'detroit' and 'queen charlotte' with the 'lady prevost,' struck to us, and soon after the whole of the enemy's squadron followed their example."[ ] this attributes the victory to the half-dozen long guns of the four schooners, mostly inferior in caliber to the nine carronades on board a single vessel, the "niagara," raking within pistol-shot of antagonists already in the condition described by barclay. such a conclusion traverses all experience of the tactical advantage of guns massed under one captain over a like number distributed in several commands, and also contravenes the particular superiority of carronades at close quarters. an officer of the "detroit," who was on deck throughout, testified that the "lawrence" had engaged at musket-shot, the "niagara," when she bore down under perry, at pistol-shot. barclay, and his surviving lieutenant, inglis, both lay most weight upon this action of the "niagara," from which arose also the fouling of the two largest british ships. perry's charges of against elliott formulated deliberate statements, under the responsible expectation of cross-examination under oath. this is his account: "when the commanding officer [perry] went on board the 'niagara,' captain elliott was keeping her on a course by the wind, which would in a few minutes have carried said vessel entirely out of action, to prevent which, and in order to bring the said vessel into close action with the enemy, the said commanding officer was under the necessity of heaving-to, stopping and immediately wearing said vessel, and altering her course at least eight points"; that is, perpendicular to the direction before steered. against this solemn and serious charge is unquestionably to be placed the commendatory mention and letter given by perry to elliott immediately after the battle. upon these also he had to expect the sharpest interrogation, to the mortification attendant upon which he could only oppose evidence extenuative of, but in no case justifying, undeniable self-contradiction. if the formal charge was true, no excuse can be admitted for the previous explicit commendation. as a matter of historical inquiry, however, such contradictions have to be met, and must be weighed in the light of all the testimony. the author's conclusion upon the whole is that, as perry's action in first standing down insured decisive action, so by him was imparted to the "niagara" the final direction which determined victory. the influence of the rear gunboats brought up by elliott was contributive, but not decisive. in short, the campaign of lake erie was brought to an immediate successful issue by the ready initiative taken by perry when he found the british distant fire more destructive than he expected, and by his instant acceptance of necessary risk, in standing down exposed to a raking cannonade to which he for a long while could not reply. if, as the author holds, he was entitled to expect prompt imitation by the "niagara," the risk was actual, but not undue. as it was, though the "lawrence" surrendered, it was not until she had, with the help of gunboats stationed by perry for that object, so damaged both her opponents that they were incapable of further resistance. in the tactical management of the "lawrence" and her supports was no mere headlong dash, but preparation adequate to conditions. had the "niagara" followed, the "lawrence" need never have struck. the contemporary incidents on erie and ontario afford an instructive commentary upon napoleon's incisive irony, that "war cannot be waged without running risks." there has been sufficient quotation from chauncey to indicate why the campaign on ontario dragged through two seasons, and then left the enemy in control. small as the scale and the theatre of these naval operations, they illustrate the unvarying lesson that only in offensive action can defensive security be found. the destruction of the british naval force decided the campaign in the northwest by transferring the control of the water. its general military results were in this respect final. nothing occurred to modify them during the rest of the war. detroit and michigan territory fell back into the hands of the united states; and the allegiance of the indians to the british cause, procured by brock's sagacious daring a twelvemonth before, but rudely shaken by the events narrated, was destroyed by the death of their great leader, tecumseh, a month later in the battle of the thames, itself the direct consequence of perry's success. the frontier was henceforth free from the indian terror, which had hitherto disquieted it from the maumee to cleveland. a more far-reaching political issue was also here definitely settled. a sense of having betrayed the indian interests in the previous treaties of and was prevalent in british official circles, and in their counsels a scheme had been circulated for constituting an independent indian territory, under joint guarantee of the two nations, between their several dominions. this would be locally within the boundaries of the united states; the sole jurisdiction of which was thus to be limited and trammelled, because open to continual british representation and reclamation, based upon treaty stipulations.[ ] this infringement upon the perfect sovereignty of the nation inside its own borders, in favor of savage communities and under foreign guarantee, was one of the propositions formally brought forward as a _sine quâ non_ by the british negotiators at ghent. although by that time the united states stood alone face to face with great britain, at whose full disposal were now the veterans of the peninsular war, and the gigantic navy, which the abdication of napoleon had released from all other opponents, the american commissioners refused with dignity to receive the proposition even for reference. "it is not necessary," they replied, "to refer such demands to the american government for its instructions. they will only be a fit subject for deliberation when it becomes necessary to decide upon the expediency of an absolute surrender of national independence."[ ] the envoys of the united states were able to be firm, because secure of indignant support by their people; but it is beyond question that two naval victories had arrayed upon their side, at the moment, the preponderance of military argument, which weighs so heavily in treaties of peace. new orleans was yet in the future, with adverse chances apparent; but, owing to the victory of perry, the united states was in firm military tenure of the territory, the virtual cession of which was thus demanded. a year after perry, mcdonough's equally complete success on lake champlain, by insuring control of the water route for invasion, rolled back the army of peninsular veterans under prevost, at a season of the year which forbade all hope of renewing the enterprise until another spring. great britain was too eager to end twenty years of continued war to brook further delay. the lake campaigns of and thus emphasized the teaching of history as to the influence of control of the water upon the course of events; and they illustrate also the too often forgotten truth, that it is not by brilliant individual feats of gallantry or skill, by ships or men, but by the massing of superior forces, that military issues are decided. for, although on a small scale, the lakes were oceans, and the forces which met on them were fleets; and as, on a wider field and in more tremendous issues, the fleets of great britain saved their country and determined the fortunes of europe, so perry and mcdonough averted from the united states, without further fighting, a rectification of frontier--as it is euphemistically styled,--the effecting of which is one of the most fruitful causes and frequent results of war in every continent and at every period. note.--for the battle of lake erie, the most important original data are the court martial upon barclay (british records office), and the court of inquiry held at elliott's request, in april, . the proceedings and testimony of the latter are published in the appendix to a "biographical notice of commodore jesse d. elliott," by russell jarvis, philadelphia, . perry's report of the battle, sept. , , is in american state papers, naval affairs, vol. i. p. . barclay's report is in naval chronicle, vol. xxxi. pp. - , as well as in the record of the court. jarvis, and mackenzie's life of perry ( th edition), give a large number of affidavits by officers present in the engagement, and mackenzie gives also a copy of the charges preferred by perry in against elliott. in the controversy which arose over the battle, mackenzie, in the appendix to the fifth edition of perry's life, duer, and tristam burges, battle of lake erie (boston, ), are the principal champions on perry's side; jarvis (as above) and j. fenimore cooper, battle of lake erie, on the side of elliott; but the latter himself published several vindications of his conduct. the usual naval histories, american and british, may be consulted, and there are also incidental mentions and reports in niles' register and the british naval chronicle, which will be found useful. footnotes: [ ] captains' letters, navy department mss. [ ] mackenzie's life of perry, vol. i. p. . [ ] mackenzie's life of perry, vol. i. p. . [ ] perry to the secretary of the navy, aug. , . mackenzie's life of perry, vol. i. p. . [ ] secretary's letters, aug. , . navy department mss. [ ] otherwise known by the name of the river raisin. ante, vol. i. p. . [ ] the data of this paragraph are taken from the report on canadian archives, , lower canada, pp. , - . barclay in his defence before the court martial mentions the designs on erie. [ ] harm jan huidekoper, by nina moore tiffany and francis tiffany. . p. . mr. huidekoper speaks admiringly of the unfaltering composure and cheerfulness which under these circumstances accompanied perry's energy. [ ] see ante, p. . [ ] report on canadian archives, . lower canada, p. . [ ] this statement appeared in the course of a _summary_ of the evidence before the british court, given by the naval chronicle, vol. xxxii. pp. - . the only support to it in the evidence, as recorded, is barclay's official letter, which he appears to have confirmed under oath, that the "niagara" kept out of carronade range, and "was perfectly fresh at . ," when perry went on board her. the first lieutenant of the "queen charlotte," who remained in command, the captain being killed, corroborated barclay as to her distance. [ ] in the finding--or verdict--of the british court, as in the evidence, there is no expression of a charge that the "niagara" was making away. the finding restricted itself to the matter before the court, namely, barclay's official conduct. [ ] there was a question whether the "hunter" was ahead or astern of the "queen charlotte." in the author's opinion the balance of evidence is as stated in the text. perry rearranged his line with reference to the british, upon seeing their array. had the "charlotte" been next the "detroit," as james puts her, it seems probable he would have placed the "niagara" next the "lawrence." [ ] cooper, battle of lake erie, p. . [ ] see mackenzie's life of perry, th edition, vol. ii. pp. - . perry's charges against elliott, dated aug. , , are there given in full. [ ] see mackenzie's life of perry, th edition, vol. ii. pp. - . [ ] cooper's battle of lake erie, p. . [ ] barclay's report, naval chronicle, vol. xxxi. p. . [ ] the range of a pdr. carronade, with which the "niagara" was armed, throwing one solid shot, with ¼ degree elevation,--substantially point-blank,--was yards; at degrees, yards. the difference, yards, is just half a sea mile. a british professional writer of that day, criticising their commander's choice of position at lake champlain, says: "at or yards the elevation necessary to be given a carronade would have been so great that none but chance shots [from the americans] could have taken effect; whereas, in closing, he gave up this advantage." naval chronicle, vol. xxxiii. p. . [ ] the "caledonia" had two long -pounders, and one other lighter gun, variously stated. the "detroit's" heaviest were also two long 's; she had besides one long , six long 's, etc. [ ] with reference to times, always very difficult to establish, and often very important as bases of calculation, the following extract from the diary of dr. usher parsons, surgeon of the "lawrence," possesses value; the more so as it is believed to have been copied from the log of the vessel, which afterwards disappeared. the phraseology is that of a log and a seaman, not of a physician. "at called all hands to quarters. a quarter before meridian the enemy began action at one mile distance. in a half hour came within musket-shot of the enemy's new ship.... at . , so entirely disabled we could work the brig no longer. at p.m., most of the guns were dismounted, breechings gone, or carriages knocked to pieces. at half-past two, when not another gun could be worked or fired, captain perry hauled down the fighting flag [not the national flag], which bore this motto 'don't give up the ship,' and repaired on board the 'niagara,' where he raised it again. in ten minutes after we struck." publications of the rhode island historical society, vol. vii. p. . this was called to the author's attention after the account in the text was written. [ ] mackenzie's life of perry, vol. ii. p. . [ ] evidence of midshipman montgomery of the "niagara," before the court of inquiry. [ ] naval chronicle, vol. xxxi. p. . [ ] richardson, war of , p. . [ ] barclay's report. [ ] british court martial record. [ ] navy department, mss. miscellaneous letters. my italics. [ ] this scheme appears outlined in a letter of oct. , , to lord bathurst from sir george prevost, who in support of it adduces brock's opinion (canadian archives mss). bathurst replied, dec. , , "i so entirely concur in the expediency of the suggestions contained in your despatch, as to the necessity of securing the territories of the indians from encroachment, that i have submitted it to his majesty's secretary for foreign affairs, in order that whenever negotiations for peace may be entered into, the security of their possessions may not be either compromised or forgotten." (british colonial office records). prevost transmitted a copy of the letter to admiral warren, in his early diplomatic capacity as a peace envoy. gordon drummond, the successor of brock, and later of prevost, expressed the same interest (canadian archives mss., april , ). [ ] american state papers, foreign affairs, vol. iii. pp. - . chapter xii the campaign of on the lakes and northern frontier, after the battle of lake erie perry's victory was promptly followed up by himself and harrison. besides its ultimate influence on the general course of events, already mentioned, it produced immediate military consequences, the effect of which was felt throughout the lake frontier, from detroit to champlain. that success elsewhere did not follow was due to other causes than remissness on their part to improve the occasion. although the "lawrence" had to be sent back to erie for extensive repairs, and the "detroit" and "queen charlotte" rolled their masts overboard at anchor in put-in bay on the third day after the battle, perry within a week had his squadron and four of the prizes sufficiently in repair to undertake the transport of the army. this timely facility, which betrayed the enemy's expectations, was due largely to the "lawrence" having borne the brunt of the action. had the injuries been more distributed, the delay of repairs must have been greater. the british adjutant general at niagara, harvey, the hero of stoney creek, wrote on hearing of the battle, "after an action of three hours and a half, the enemy's vessels must have received so much damage as not to be in a situation to undertake anything for some time."[ ] by september harrison had assembled his forces at an island in the lake, called middle sister, twelve miles from malden. on the th they were conveyed to malden, partly in vessels and partly in boats, the weather being fine. by september sandwich and detroit were occupied; procter retreating eastward up the valley of the thames. harrison pursued, and on october overtook the british and indians at a settlement called moravian town. here they made a stand and were defeated, with the destruction or dispersal of the entire body, in an action known to americans as the battle of the thames. procter himself, with some two hundred men, fled eastward and reached the lines at burlington heights, at the head of ontario, whither vincent had again retreated on october , immediately upon receiving news of the disaster at moravian town. after this the western indians fell wholly away from the british alliance, and harrison returned to detroit, satisfied that it was useless to pursue the enemy by land. the season was thought now too far advanced for operations against michilimackinac, which was believed also to be so effectually isolated, by the tenure of lake erie, as to prevent its receiving supplies. this was a mistake, there being a route, practicable though difficult, from toronto to georgian bay, on lake huron, by which necessary stores were hurried through before the winter closed in. mackinac remained in british hands to the end of the war. at detroit harrison and perry received orders to transport a body of troops down lake erie, to re-enforce the army on the general scene of operations centring round lake ontario. by the control of the niagara peninsula, consequent upon vincent's necessary retreat after the battle of the thames, the american communications were complete and secure throughout from detroit to sackett's harbor, permitting free movement from end to end. the two officers embarked together, taking with them thirteen hundred men in seven vessels. october they reached buffalo. harrison went on to niagara, but perry was here detached from the lake service, and returned to the seaboard, leaving elliott to command on erie. in acknowledging the order for perry's removal, chauncey regretted the granting of his application as a bad precedent; and further took occasion to remark that when he himself was sent to the lakes the only vessel on them owned by the united states was the brig "oneida." "since then two fleets have been created, one of which has covered itself with glory: the other, though less fortunate, has not been less industrious." it may be questioned whether the evident difference of achievement was to be charged to fortune, or to relative quickness to seize opportunity, when offered. the successes on lake erie had come very appositely for a change recently introduced into the plans of the government, and then in process of accomplishment. since the middle of the summer the secretary of war, armstrong, who at this time guided the military counsels, had become disgusted by the fruitlessness of the movements at the west end of ontario, and had reverted to his earlier and sounder prepossession in favor of an attack upon either kingston or montreal. it had now been for some time in contemplation to transfer to sackett's harbor all the troops that could be spared from niagara, leaving there only sufficient to hold fort george, with fort niagara on the american side, as supports to a defensive attitude upon that frontier. assured command of the lake was essential to the safety and rapidity of the concentration at sackett's, and this led to the next meeting of the squadrons. general james wilkinson, an officer advanced in years, of extremely poor reputation, personal as well as professional, and of broken constitution, had been either selected by, or forced upon,[ ] the secretary of war to replace dearborn in command of the new york frontier and conduct of the proposed operations. to his suggested doubts as to the direction of effort, whether westward or eastward, armstrong had replied definitely and finally on august : "operations westward of kingston, if successful, leave the strength of the enemy unbroken. it is the great depot of his resources. so long as he retains this, and keeps open his communication with the sea, he will not want the means of multiplying his naval and other defences, and of re-enforcing or renewing the war in the west." he then explained that there were two ways of reducing the place; by direct attack, or, indirectly, by cutting its communications with the lower river. to accomplish the latter, a demonstration of direct attack should be made by part of the troops, while the main body should move rapidly down the st. lawrence to madrid (or hamilton),[ ] in new york, and cross there to the canadian side, seizing and fortifying a bluff on the north bank to control the road and river. this done, the rest of the force should march upon montreal. the army division on champlain was to co-operate by a simultaneous movement and subsequent junction. the project, in general outline, had been approved by the president. in transmitting it armstrong wrote to wilkinson, "after this exposition, it is unnecessary to add, that, in conducting the present campaign, you will make kingston your _primary object_, and that you will _choose_ (as circumstances may warrant), between a _direct_ and _indirect_ attack upon that post."[ ] contemporary and subsequent movements are to be regarded in their bearing on this plan. the first object was the concentration at sackett's, for which some three thousand troops were to be withdrawn from the niagara frontier. wilkinson arrived at sackett's from washington, august . chauncey was then in port, after the gale which had driven both him and yeo down the lake. he sailed on the th. wilkinson followed shortly, reaching fort george september . on the th, armstrong himself came to sackett's, having established the war department in northern new york for the campaign. on the th perry destroyed the british squadron on lake erie, opening the way for harrison's victorious entry to upper canada and subsequent transfer to niagara. some days before the battle of the thames the embarkation from niagara for sackett's harbor took place under cover of the naval operations. after yeo had gone into amherst bay on september , as already mentioned,[ ] chauncey remained cruising in the neighborhood till the th, when he went to sackett's, the enemy having got into kingston. on the th he sailed again for niagara, to support the movement of the army. he arrived on the th, and found there a report of perry's victory, which had been received on the d. on the th embarkation began, and wilkinson hoped that the whole body, three thousand strong, would start on their coasting voyage along the south shore of the lake on the th; but after dark, to conceal the direction taken. at this juncture, on september , chauncey heard that the british fleet was at york, which was confirmed by a lookout vessel despatched by him. as yeo, unless checked, might molest the transportation of the troops, it became necessary first to seek him; but owing to a head wind the american squadron could not leave the river till the evening of the th. as the schooner gun-vessels sailed badly, the "pike," the "madison," and the "sylph" each took one in tow on the morning of the th, steering for york, where the british fleet was soon after sighted. as the americans stood in, the british quitted the bay to gain the open lake; for their better manoeuvring powers as a squadron would have scope clear of the land. they formed on the port tack, running south with the wind fresh at east (positions ). when about three miles distant, to windward, chauncey put his fleet on the same tack as the enemy and edged down towards him (positions ). at ten minutes past noon, the americans threatening to cut off the rearmost two of the british, yeo tacked his column in succession, beginning with his own ship, the leader (a), heading north toward his endangered vessels, between them and the opponents. when round, he opened fire on the "general pike." as this movement, if continued, would bring the leading and strongest british ships upon the weaker americans astern, chauncey put his helm up and steered for the "wolfe" (b), as soon as the "general pike" came abreast of her; the american column following in his wake. the "wolfe" then kept away, and a sharp encounter followed between the two leaders, in which the rest of the squadrons took some share (positions ). at the end of twenty minutes the "wolfe" lost her main and mizzen topmasts, and main yard. with all her after sail gone, there was nothing to do but to keep before the wind, which was fair for the british posts at the head of the bay (positions ). the american squadron followed; but the "madison," the next heaviest ship to the "pike," superior in battery power to the "wasp" and "hornet" of the ocean navy, and substantially equal to the second british ship, the "royal george," "having a heavy schooner in tow, prevented her commander from closing near enough to do any execution with her carronades."[ ] the explanation requires explanation, which is not forthcoming. concern at such instants for heavy schooners in tow is not the spirit in which battles are won or campaigns decided; and it must be admitted that commodore chauncey's solicitude to keep his schooners up with his real fighting vessels, to conform, at critical moments, the action of ships of eight hundred and six hundred tons, like the "pike" and "madison," to those of lake craft of under one hundred, is not creditable to his military instincts. he threw out a signal, true, for the fleet to make all sail; but as he held on to the schooner he had in tow, neither the "madison" nor "sylph" dropped hers. his flagship, individually, appears to have been well fought; but anxiety to keep a squadron united needs to be tempered with discretion of a kind somewhat more eager than the quality commonly thus named, and which on occasion can drop a schooner, or other small craft, in order to get at the enemy. as the dismasted "wolfe" ran to leeward, "the 'royal george,'" says the american naval historian cooper, "luffed up in noble style across her stern to cover the english commodore" (c), and "kept yawing athwart her stern, delivering her broadsides in a manner to extort exclamations of delight from the american fleet (positions ). she was commanded by captain mulcaster." her fighting mate, the "madison," had a heavy schooner in tow. this interposition of the "royal george" was especially timely if, as yeo states, chauncey was holding at a distance whence his long twenty-fours told, while the "wolfe's" carronades did not reach. at quarter before three chauncey relinquished pursuit. both squadrons were then about six miles from the head of the lake, running towards it before a wind which had increased to a gale, with a heavy sea. ahead of them was a lee shore, and for the americans a hostile coast. "though we might succeed in driving him on shore, the probability was we should go on shore also, he amongst his friends, we amongst our enemies; and after the gale abated, if he could get off one or two vessels out of the two fleets, it would give him as completely the command of the lake as if he had twenty vessels. moreover, he was covered at his anchorage by part of his army and several small batteries thrown up for the purpose." for these reasons, the commodore "without hesitation relinquished the opportunity then presenting itself of acquiring individual reputation at the expense of my country." the british squadron anchored without driving ashore. the american returned to niagara, having received a certain amount of damage aloft, and one of the purchased schooners having lost her foremast; but the killed and wounded by the enemy amounted to only five, all on board the "general pike." that vessel lost also twenty-two men by the bursting of a gun. [illustration: chauncey and yeo, september , ] chauncey had been in consultation with armstrong at sackett's, and understood perfectly the plans of the government. on his return to niagara he was requested by wilkinson to keep watch over the hostile squadron in its present position under burlington heights, so as to cover the eastward movement of the troops, which began october . on the d the last transport had gone, and wilkinson himself set out for sackett's; bringing, as he reported, thirty-five hundred men. on the d the british fleet was seen well towards the west end of the lake; but on the th a vessel sent especially to reconnoitre came back with the report that it was no longer there. this proved to be a mistake; but, as it came from a careful and competent officer, chauncey inferred that the enemy had given him the slip and gone to the eastward. he therefore ran down the lake, to cover the arrival of the troops as he had their departure. on the afternoon of the th, near kingston, he captured six out of seven transports bound thither with re-enforcements. of these, two were the schooners taken by yeo in the engagement of august , which the british had not thought fit to add to their fleet, but used simply as carriers; mounting their guns on the fortifications of kingston. cooper justly remarks, "this sufficiently proves the equivocal advantage enjoyed by the possession of these craft." chauncey himself, at the end of the campaign, recommended the building of "one vessel of the size of the 'sylph,'"--three hundred and forty tons,--"in lieu of all the heavy schooners; for really they are of no manner of service, except to carry troops or use as gunboats."[ ] the reflection is inevitable,--why, then, had he allowed them so to hamper his movements? it is to be feared that the long ascendency of the gunboat policy in the councils of the government had sapped the professional intelligence even of some naval officers. the capture of the detachment going from york to kingston showed that the british had divined the general character of the american plans. in fact, as early as october , major general de rottenburg, who after an interval had succeeded to brock's place in upper canada, as lieutenant governor and commander of the forces, had started with two regiments to re-enforce kingston, leaving the niagara peninsula again under the command of general vincent. on october chauncey's squadron entered sackett's, where wilkinson had arrived on the th. the general began at once to remonstrate strenuously with armstrong against an attempt upon kingston, as delaying and possibly frustrating what he saw fit to style the chief object of the campaign, the capture of montreal. the secretary listened patiently, but overruled him.[ ] kingston had been the principal object from the beginning, and still so continued; but, if the garrison should be largely re-enforced, if the british fleet should enter the harbor, or if the weather should make navigation of the lake dangerous for the transports, then the troops should proceed direct for montreal by the river. yeo apparently returned to kingston soon after this; but when chauncey left port on october , to bring forward from the genesee river a detachment under colonel winfield scott, he still had the understanding that kingston was first to be attacked. on october , however, the secretary reconsidered his decision. the concentration of the army at sackett's had not been effected until the th. on the th de rottenburg, having coasted the north shore of the lake, reached kingston with his two regiments, reckoned by armstrong at fifteen hundred men. these raised to twenty-two hundred the garrison previously estimated at seven to eight hundred.[ ] the numbers of the americans were diminishing by sickness, and no further re-enforcement was to be expected, excepting by uniting with the champlain division. this had been on the move from plattsburg since september , and was now at chateaugay, on the chateaugay river; a local centre, whence roads running northeast, to the river's junction with the st. lawrence, immediately opposite the island of montreal, and west to st. regis on the st. lawrence, forty miles higher up, gave facilities for moving in either direction to meet wilkinson's advance. by a letter of october from its commander, general wade hampton, this corps numbered "four thousand effective infantry, with a well-appointed train." to bring it by land to sackett's, over a hundred miles distant, was considered too protracted and laborious in the state of the roads; better utilize the current of the st. lawrence to carry wilkinson down to it. in view of these circumstances, and of the supposed increased strength of kingston, armstrong decided to abandon the attack upon the latter and to move against montreal, which was believed to be much weaker, as well as strategically more important.[ ] the movement was hazardous; for, as planned, ultimate success depended upon junction with another corps, which had natural difficulties of its own to contend with, while both were open to obstruction by an active enemy. as a distinguished military critic has said, "the americans committed upon this occasion the same error that the british government did in their plan for burgoyne's march from the head of champlain to albany,--that of making the desired result of an important operation depend upon the success of all its constituent or component parts." it is one of the most common of blunders in war. wilkinson and hampton did not meet. both moved, but one had retreated before the other arrived. in fact, while montreal, as the most important point in canada for the british, except quebec, and at the same time the one most accessible to the united states, was the true objective of the latter, concentration against it should have been made in territory entirely under american control, about lake champlain, and the advance begun early in the season. by its own choice the government had relinquished this obvious and natural course, and throughout the summer had directed its efforts to the westward. when the change of operations from niagara to the lower end of the lake was initiated, in the beginning of october, it was already too late to do more than attack kingston, the strength of which appears to have been gravely over-estimated. armstrong had good military ideas; but at this critical moment he seems to have faltered in the presence of an immediate difficulty, and to have sought escape from it by a hasty consent to a side measure, contrary to the soundest teachings of war. not the least of objections was the risk to which sackett's harbor, the naval base, was to be exposed. after october , chauncey had remained cruising between there and kingston, covering the approaches to the st. lawrence. his intended trip to genesee, to bring up scott's eight hundred regulars, had been abandoned at the urgent demand of wilkinson, who, while the troops were being transferred from sackett's to grenadier island, at the outlet of the lake to the river, "would not allow any part of the fleet to be absent four days without throwing the responsibility, in case of a failure of his expedition, wholly on the navy."[ ] the commodore did not learn of the new scheme until october , ten days after its adoption, when he was asked to cover the rear of the army from pursuit by water, by taking position inside the st. lawrence. while objecting strongly to the change of plan, he of course consented to afford all the co-operation in his power; but he wrote to the navy department, "if sir james yeo knows the defenceless situation of sackett's, he can take advantage of a westerly wind while i am in the river, run over and burn it; for to the best of my knowledge there are no troops left there except sick and invalids, nor are there more than three guns mounted."[ ] after many delays by rough water, wilkinson's troops were assembled at grenadier island towards the end of october. on november they began entering the river by detachments, collecting at french creek, on the american side, fifteen miles from the lake. being here immediately opposite one of the points considered suitable for advance on kingston, the object of the movement remained still doubtful to the enemy. the detachments first arriving were cannonaded by four of yeo's vessels that had come through the channel north of long island, which here divides the stream. on november chauncey anchored near by, preventing the recurrence of this annoyance. on the th the entire force was assembled, and next day started down the river with fine weather, which lasted until the th. up to this date no serious difficulty was encountered; but immediately that the departure from french creek proclaimed the real direction of the movement, de rottenburg despatched a body of six hundred regular troops, under lieutenant colonel morrison, accompanied by some gunboats under captain mulcaster, to harass the rear. for the purpose of being on hand to fall upon the american flotilla, should the attempt be made to cross the river to the north bank, sir james yeo on the th came out from kingston with his fleet. he anchored on the north side of long island, only five miles from the american squadron, but separated by a reef, over which the "general pike" could not pass without being lightened.[ ] steps were taken to effect this, and to buoy a channel; but on the th yeo retired to kingston. chauncey's letters make no mention of mulcaster's division, and after yeo's withdrawal he moved down to carleton island. morrison and mulcaster on the th reached fort wellington, opposite ogdensburg. here they paused and received re-enforcements from the garrison, raising their numbers to eight hundred, who continued to follow, by water and by land, until the th. then they were turned upon by the rearguard of an american division, marching on the north bank to suppress the harassment to which the flotilla otherwise was liable in its advance. an action followed, known as that of chrystler's farm, in which the americans were the assailants and in much superior numbers; but they were worsted and driven back, having lost one hundred and two killed and two hundred and thirty-seven wounded, besides one hundred prisoners. the troops engaged then embarked, and passed down the long saut rapids to cornwall, which is one hundred and twenty miles from kingston and eighty-two from montreal. here they were rejoined on the th by the vanguard of the division, which had met little resistance in its progress. at this time and place wilkinson received a letter from general hampton, to whom he had written that the provisions of his army were insufficient, and requested him to send "two or three months' supply by the safest route in a direction to the proposed scene of action."[ ] he also instructed him to join the advance at st. regis, opposite cornwall, the point which had now been reached. as the two bodies were co-operating, and wilkinson was senior, these instructions had the force of orders. in his reply, dated november ,[ ] hampton said, "the idea of meeting at st. regis was most pleasing, until i came to the disclosure of the amount of your supplies of provision." actually, the disclosure about the supplies preceded in the letter the appointment to meet at st. regis, which was the last subject mentioned. "it would be impossible," hampton continued, "for me to bring more than each man could carry on his back; and when i reflected that, in throwing myself upon your scanty means, i should be weakening you in your most vulnerable point, i did not hesitate to adopt the opinion that by throwing myself back upon my main depot [plattsburg], where all means of transportation had gone, and falling upon the enemy's flank, and straining every effort to open a communication from plattsburg to ... the st. lawrence, i should more effectually contribute to your success than by the junction at st. regis." hampton then retired to plattsburg, in the direction opposite from st. regis. wilkinson, upon receiving his letter, held a council of war and decided that "the attack on montreal should be abandoned for the present season." the army accordingly crossed to the american side and went into winter quarters at french mills, just within the new york boundary; on the salmon river, which enters the st. lawrence thirteen miles below st. regis. wilkinson was writing from there november , twelve days after he started from french creek to capture montreal. thus two divisions, of eight thousand and four thousand respectively, both fell back helplessly, when within a few days of a junction which the enemy could not have prevented, even though he might successfully have opposed their joint attack upon montreal. it is a delicate matter to judge the discretion of a general officer in hampton's position; but the fact remains, as to provisions, that he was in a country where, by his own statement of a month before, "we have, and can have, an unlimited supply of good beef cattle."[ ] a british commissary at prescott wrote two months later, january , , "our supplies for sixteen hundred men are all drawn from the american side of the river. they drive droves of cattle from the interior under pretence of supplying their army at salmon river, and so are allowed to pass the guards, and at night to cross them over to our side,"--the river being frozen. he adds, "i shall be also under the necessity of getting most of my flour from their side."[ ] it is not necessary greatly to respect wilkinson in order to think that in such a region hampton might safely have waited for his superior to join, and to decide upon the movements of the whole. he was acting conjointly, and the junior.[ ] under all the circumstances there can be no reasonable doubt that his independent action was precipitate, unnecessary, contrary to orders, and therefore militarily culpable. it gave wilkinson the excuse, probably much desired, for abruptly closing a campaign which had been ludicrously inefficient from the first, and under his leadership might well have ended in a manner even more mortifying. chauncey remained within the st. lawrence until november , the day before the engagement at chrystler's farm. he was troubled with fears as to what might happen in his rear; the defenceless condition of sackett's, and the possibility that the enemy by taking possession of carleton island, below him, might prevent the squadron's getting out.[ ] none of these things occurred, and it would seem that the british had not force to attempt them. on the th the squadron returned to the harbor, where was found a letter from armstrong, requesting conveyance to sackett's for the brigade of harrison's army, which perry had brought to niagara, and which the secretary destined to replace the garrison gone down stream with wilkinson. the execution of this service closed the naval operations on ontario for the year . on november chauncey wrote that he had transported harrison with eleven hundred troops. on the night of december the harbor froze over, and a few days later the commodore learned that yeo had laid up his ships for the winter. there remains yet to tell the close of the campaign upon the niagara peninsula, control of which had been a leading motive in the opening operations. its disastrous ending supplies a vivid illustration of the military truth that positions are in themselves of but little value, if the organized forces of the enemy, armies or fleets, remain unimpaired. the regular troops were all withdrawn for wilkinson's expedition; the last to go being the garrison of fort george, eight hundred men under colonel winfield scott, which left on october . the command of the frontier was turned over to brigadier general george m'clure of the new york militia. scott reported that fort george, "as a field work, might be considered as complete at that period. it was garnished with ten pieces of artillery, which number might have been increased from the spare ordnance of the opposite fort"[ ]--niagara. the latter, on the american side, was garrisoned by two companies of regular artillery and "such of m'clure's brigade as had refused to cross the river." it was immediately before scott's departure that the british forces under general vincent, upon receipt of news of the battle of the thames, had retreated precipitately to burlington heights, burning all their stores, and abandoning the rest of the peninsula. this was on october ; a week after de rottenburg had started for kingston with two regiments, leaving only ten or twelve hundred regulars. de rottenburg sent word for these also to retire upon york, and thence to kingston; but the lateness of the season, the condition of the roads, and the necessity in such action to abandon sick and stores, decided vincent, in the exercise of his discretion, to hold on. this resolution was as fortunate for his side as it proved unfortunate to the americans. m'clure's force, as stated by himself, was then about one thousand effective militia in fort george, and two hundred and fifty indians. concerning the latter he wrote, "an exhibition of two or three hundred of them will strike more terror into the british than a thousand militia."[ ] from time to time there were also bodies of "volunteers," who assembled on call and were subject to the orders of the national government for the period of their service. with such numbers, so constituted, it was as impossible for m'clure to trouble vincent as it was inexpedient for vincent to attack fort george. a gleam of hope appeared for the american commander when perry brought down the thirteen hundred of harrison's victorious army, with the general himself. the latter, who was senior to m'clure, lent a favorable ear to his suggestion that the two forces should be combined to attack vincent's lines. some four hundred additional volunteers gathered for this purpose; but, before the project could take effect, chauncey arrived to carry harrison's men to sackett's, stripped of troops for wilkinson's expedition. the urgency was real, and chauncey pressing, on account both of sackett's and the season. in reply to a very aggrieved remonstrance from m'clure, harrison expressed extreme sympathy with his disappointment and that of the volunteers, but said no material disadvantage was incurred, for he was convinced the british were removing as fast as they could from the head of the lake, and that an expedition thither would find them gone. therewith, on november , he embarked and sailed. the period of service for which the militia were "draughted" would expire december . to m'clure's representations the national government, which was responsible for the general defence, replied impotently by renewing its draught on the state government for another thousand militia. but, wrote armstrong, if you cannot raise volunteers, "what are you to expect from militia draughts, with their constitutional scruples?"--about leaving their state. armstrong was not personally responsible for the lack of organized power in the nation; but as the representative of the government, which by a dozen years of inefficiency and neglect had laid open this and other frontiers, the fling was unbecoming. on december , the garrison of fort george was reduced to "sixty effective regulars and probably forty volunteers. the militia have recrossed the river almost to a man."[ ] m'clure also learned "that the enemy were advancing in force." that night he abandoned the works, retiring to fort niagara, and carrying off such stores as he could; but in addition he committed the grave error of setting fire to the adjacent canadian village of newark, which was burned to the ground. for this step m'clure alleged the authority of the secretary of war, who on october had written him, "understanding that the defence of the post committed to your charge may render it proper to destroy the town of newark, you are directed to apprise its inhabitants of this circumstance, and to invite them to remove themselves and their effects to some place of greater safety." the general construed this to justify destruction in order to deprive the hostile troops of shelter near fort george. "the enemy are now completely shut out from any hopes or means of wintering in the vicinity of fort george." the exigency was insufficient to justify the measure, which was promptly disavowed by the united states government; but the act imparted additional bitterness to the war, and was taken by the enemy as a justification and incentive to the retaliatory violence with which the campaign closed. the civil and military government of upper canada at this time passed into the hands of sir gordon drummond. for the moment he sent to niagara general riall, who took over the command from vincent. on december , m'clure reported the enemy appearing in force on the opposite shore; but, "having deprived them of shelter, they are marching up to queenston." this alone showed the futility of burning newark, but more decisive demonstration was to be given. early on the th the british and indians crossed the river before dawn, surprised fort niagara, and carried it at the point of the bayonet; meeting, indeed, but weak and disorganized resistance. at the same time a detachment of militia at lewiston was attacked and driven in, and that village, with its neighbors, youngstown and manchester, were reduced to ashes, in revenge for newark. on december the british again crossed, burned buffalo, and destroyed at black rock three small vessels of the erie flotilla; two of which, the "ariel" and "trippe," had been in perry's squadron on september , while the third, the "little belt," was a prize taken in that action. two thousand militia had been officially reported assembled on the frontier on december , summoned after the first alarm; but, "overpowered by the numbers and discipline of the enemy," wrote their commander, "they gave way and fled on every side. every attempt to rally them was ineffectual."[ ] with this may be said to have terminated the northern campaign of . the british had regained full control of the niagara peninsula, and they continued to hold fort niagara, in the state of new york, till peace was concluded. the only substantial gain on the whole frontier, from the extreme east to the extreme west, was the destruction of the british fleet on lake erie, and the consequent transfer of power in the west to the united states. this was the left flank of the american position. had the same result been accomplished on the right flank,--as it might have been,--at montreal, or even at kingston, the centre and left must have fallen also. for the misdirection of effort to niagara, the local commanders, dearborn and chauncey, are primarily responsible; for armstrong yielded his own correct perceptions to the representations of the first as to the enemy's force, supported by the arguments of the naval officer favoring the diversion of effort from kingston to toronto. whether chauncey ever formally admitted to himself this fundamental mistake, which wrecked the summer's work upon lake ontario, does not appear; but that he had learned from experience is shown by a letter to the secretary of the navy,[ ] when the squadrons had been laid up. in this he recognized the uselessness of the heavy sailing schooners when once a cruising force of ships for war had been created, thereby condemning much of his individual management of the campaign; and he added: "if it is determined to prosecute the war offensively, and secure our conquests in upper canada, kingston ought unquestionably to be the first object of attack, and that so early in the spring as to prevent the enemy from using the whole of the naval force that he is preparing." in the three chapters which here end, the ontario operations have been narrated consecutively and at length, without interruption by other issues,--except the immediately related lake erie campaign,--because upon them turned, and upon them by the dispositions of the government this year were wrecked the fortunes of the war. the year , from the opening of the spring to the closing in of winter, was for several reasons the period when conditions were most propitious to the american cause. in war was not begun until june, and then with little antecedent preparation; and it was waged halfheartedly, both governments desiring to nip hostilities. in , on the other hand, when the season opened, napoleon had fallen, and the united states no longer had an informal ally to divert the efforts of great britain. but in the intervening year, , although the pressure upon the seaboard, the defensive frontier, was undoubtedly greater than before, and much vexation and harassment was inflicted, no serious injury was done beyond the suppression of commerce, inevitable in any event. in the north, on the lakes frontier, the offensive and the initiative continued in the hands of the united states. no substantial re-enforcements reached canada until long after the ice broke up, and then in insufficient numbers. british naval preparations had been on an inadequate scale, receiving no proper professional supervision. the american government, on the contrary, had had the whole winter to prepare, and the services of a very competent naval organizer. it had also the same period to get ready its land forces; while incompetent secretaries of war and of the navy gave place in january to capable men in both situations. with all this in its favor, and despite certain gratifying successes, the general outcome was a complete failure, the full measure of which could be realized only when the downfall of napoleon revealed what disaster may result from neglect to seize opportunity while it exists. the tide then ebbed, and never again flowed. for this many causes may be alleged. the imbecile ideas concerning military and naval preparation which had prevailed since the opening of the century doubtless counted for much. the intrusting of chief command to broken-down men like dearborn and wilkinson was enough to ruin the best conceived schemes. but, despite these very serious drawbacks, the strategic misdirection of effort was the most fatal cause of failure. there is a simple but very fruitful remark of a swiss military writer, that every military line may be conceived as having three parts, the middle and the two ends, or flanks. as sound principle requires that military effort should not be distributed along the whole of an enemy's position,--unless in the unusual case of overwhelming superiority,--but that distinctly superior numbers should be concentrated upon a limited portion of it, this idea of a threefold division aids materially in considering any given situation. one third, or two thirds, of an enemy's line may be assailed, but very seldom the whole; and everything may depend upon the choice made for attack. now the british frontier, which the united states was to assail, extended from montreal on the east to detroit on the west. its three parts were: montreal and the st. lawrence on the east, or left flank; ontario in the middle, centring at kingston; and erie on the right; the strength of the british position in the last named section being at detroit and malden, because they commanded the straits upon, which the indian tribes depended for access to the east. over against the british positions named lay those of the united states. given in the same order, these were: lake champlain, and the shores of ontario and of erie, centring respectively in the naval stations at sackett's harbor and presqu' isle. accepting these definitions, which are too obvious to admit of dispute, what considerations should have dictated to the united states the direction of attack; the one, or two, parts out of the three, on which effort should be concentrated? the reply, as a matter of abstract, accepted, military principle, is certain. unless very urgent reasons to the contrary exist, strike at one end rather than at the middle, because both ends can come up to help the middle against you quicker than one end can get to help the other; and, as between the two ends, strike at the one upon which the enemy most depends for re-enforcements and supplies to maintain his strength. sometimes this decision presents difficulties. before waterloo, wellington had his own army as a centre of interest; on his right flank the sea, whence came supplies and re-enforcements from england; on his left the prussian army, support by which was imminently necessary. on which flank would napoleon throw the weight of his attack? wellington reasoned, perhaps through national bias, intensified by years of official dependence upon sea support, that the blow would fall upon his right, and he strengthened it with a body of men sorely needed when the enemy came upon his left, in overwhelming numbers, seeking to separate him from the prussians. no such doubt was possible as to canada in . it depended wholly upon the sea, and it touched the sea at montreal. the united states, with its combined naval and military strength, crude as the latter was, was at the beginning of quite able in material power to grapple two out of the three parts,--montreal and kingston. had they been gained, lake erie would have fallen; as is demonstrated by the fact that the whole erie region went down like a house of cards the moment perry triumphed on the lake. his victory was decisive, simply because it destroyed the communications of malden with the sea. the same result would have been achieved, with effect over a far wider region, by a similar success in the east. footnotes: [ ] canadian archives mss. [ ] scott says, "the selection of this unprincipled imbecile was not the blunder of secretary armstrong." memoirs, vol. i. p. , note. [ ] both these names are used, confusingly, by armstrong. madrid was the township, hamilton a village on the st. lawrence, fifteen to twenty miles below the present ogdensburg. [ ] american state papers, military affairs, vol. i. p. . armstrong's italics. [ ] ante, p. . [ ] chauncey's report, oct. , , niles' register, vol. v. p. . the extract has been verified from the original in the captains' letters. the report of sir james yeo (british records office) agrees substantially with chauncey's accounts of the movements, but adds that upon the fall of the "wolfe's" topmasts the "pike" immediately took a distance out of carronade range, whence her long 's would tell. "i can assure you, sir, that the great advantage the enemy have over us from their long -pounders almost precludes the possibility of success, unless we can force them to close action, which they have ever avoided with the most studied circumspection." [ ] chauncey to navy department, dec. , . captains' letters. [ ] armstrong, oct. , . american state papers, military affairs, vol. i. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] armstrong, oct. , . american state papers, military affairs, vol. i. p. . [ ] scott's memoirs, vol. i. p. . in consequence, though scott personally succeeded in joining the movement from which so much was expected, this considerable number of regulars were withdrawn from it. they ultimately reached sackett's, forming the nucleus of a garrison. [ ] captains' letters, oct. , . [ ] chauncey to the navy department, nov. , . captains' letters. [ ] wilkinson to hampton. american state papers, military affairs, vol. i. p. . [ ] ibid. [ ] hampton's letters during this movement are in american state papers, military affairs, vol. i. pp. - . [ ] ridout, ten years in upper canada, p. . [ ] american state papers, military affairs, vol. i. p. . [ ] chauncey to navy department, nov. . captains' letters. [ ] american state papers, military affairs, vol. i. p. . [ ] american state papers, military affairs, vol. i. p. . [ ] american state papers, military affairs, vol. i. p. . [ ] report of general a. hall, niles' register, vol. v. p. . [ ] december , . captains' letters, navy department. chapter xiii seaboard maritime operations upon the canada frontier the conditions of had permitted the united states an ample field for offensive operations, with good prospect of success. what use was made of the opportunity has now been narrated. upon the seaboard, continuous illustration was afforded that there the country was widely open to attack, thrown wholly on the defensive, with the exception of preying upon the enemy's commerce by numerous small cruisers. as a secondary operation of war this has always possessed value, and better use of it perhaps never was made than by the american people at this time; but it is not determinative of great issues, and the achievements of the public and private armed vessels of the united states, energetic and successful as they were at this period, constituted no exception to the universal experience. control of the highways of the ocean by great fleets destroys an enemy's commerce, root and branch. the depredations of scattered cruisers may inflict immense vexation, and even embarrassment; but they neither kill nor mortally wound, they merely harass. co-operating with other influences, they may induce yielding in a maritime enemy; but singly they never have done so, and probably never can. in no commerce was left to the united states; and that conditions remained somewhat better during was due to collusion of the enemy, not to national power. the needs of the british armies in the spanish peninsula and in canada, and the exigencies of the west india colonies, induced the enemy to wink at, and even to uphold, a considerable clandestine export trade from the united states. combined with this was the hope of embarrassing the general government by the disaffection of new england, and of possibly detaching that section of the country from the union. for these reasons, the eastern coast was not included in the commercial blockade in . but no motive existed for permitting the egress of armed vessels, or the continuance of the coasting trade, by which always, now as then, much of the intercourse between different parts of the country must be maintained, and upon which in it depended almost altogether. with the approach of spring in , therefore, not only was the commercial blockade extended to embrace new york and all south of it, together with the mississippi river, but the naval constriction upon the shore line became so severe as practically to annihilate the coasting trade, considered as a means of commercial exchange. it is not possible for deep-sea cruisers wholly to suppress the movement of small vessels, skirting the beaches from headland to headland; but their operations can be so much embarrassed as to reduce their usefulness to a bare alleviation of social necessities, inadequate to any scale of interchange deserving the name of commerce. "i doubt not," wrote captain broke, when challenging lawrence to a ship duel, "that you will feel convinced that it is only by repeated triumphs in even combat that your little navy can now hope to console your country for the loss of that trade it cannot protect."[ ] the taunt, doubtless intended to further the object of the letter by the provocation involved, was applicable as well to coasting as to deep-sea commerce. it ignored, however, the consideration, necessarily predominant with american officers, that the conditions of the war imposed commerce destruction as the principal mission of their navy. they were not indeed to shun combat, when it offered as an incident, but neither were they to seek it as a mere means of glory, irrespective of advantage to be gained. lawrence, whom broke's letter did not reach, was perhaps not sufficiently attentive to this motive. the british blockade, military and commercial, the coastwise operations of their navy, and the careers of american cruisers directed to the destruction of british commerce, are then the three heads under which the ocean activities of divide. although this chapter is devoted to the first two of these subjects, brief mention should be made here of the distant cruises of two american vessels, because, while detached from any connection with other events, they are closely linked, in time and place, with the disastrous seaboard engagement between the "chesapeake" and "shannon," with which the account of sea-coast maritime operations opens. on april captain john rodgers put to sea from boston in the frigate "president," accompanied by the frigate "congress," captain john smith. head winds immediately after sailing detained them inside of cape cod until may , and it was not till near george's bank that any of the blockading squadron was seen. as, by the admiralty's instructions, one of the blockaders was usually a ship of the line, the american vessels very properly evaded them. the two continued together until may , when they separated, some six hundred miles east of delaware bay. rodgers kept along northward to the banks of newfoundland, hoping, at that junction of commercial highways, to fall in with a west india convoy, or vessels bound into halifax or the st. lawrence. nothing, however, was seen, and he thence steered to the azores with equal bad fortune. obtaining thereabouts information of a homeward-bound convoy from the west indies, he went in pursuit to the northeast, but failed to find it. not till june did he make three captures, in quick succession. being then two thirds of the way to the english channel, he determined to try the north sea, shaping his course to intercept vessels bound either by the north or south of ireland. not a sail was met until the shetland islands were reached, and there were found only danes, which, though denmark was in hostility with great britain, were trading under british licenses. the "president" remained in the north sea until the end of july, but made only two prizes, although she lay in wait for convoys of whose sailing accounts were received. having renewed her supply of water at bergen, in norway, she returned to the atlantic, made three captures off the north coast of ireland, and thence beat back to the banks, where two stray homeward-bound west indiamen were at last caught. from there the ship made her way, still with a constant head wind, to nantucket, off which was captured a british man-of-war schooner, tender to the admiral. on september she anchored in narragansett bay, having been absent almost five months, and made twelve prizes, few of which were valuable. one, however, was a mail packet to halifax, the capture of which, as of its predecessors, was noted by prevost.[ ] the "congress" was still less successful in material result. she followed a course which had hitherto been a favorite with american captains, and which rodgers had suggested as alternative to his own; southeast, passing near the cape verde islands, to the equator between longitudes ° and ° west; thence to the coast of brazil, and so home, by a route which carried her well clear of the west india islands. she entered portsmouth, new hampshire, december , having spent seven months making this wide sweep; in the course of which three prizes only were taken.[ ] it will be remembered that the "chesapeake," which had returned only a month before the "congress" sailed, had taken much the same direction with similar slight result. these cruises were primarily commerce-destroying, and were pursued in that spirit, although with the full purpose of fighting should occasion arise. the paucity of result is doubtless to be attributed to the prey being sought chiefly on the high seas, too far away from the points of arrival and departure. the convoy system, rigidly enforced, as captured british correspondence shows, cleared the seas of british vessels, except in the spots where they were found congested, concentrated, by the operation of the system itself. it may be noted that the experience of all these vessels showed that nowhere was the system so rigidly operative as in the west indies and western atlantic. doubtless, too, the naval officers in command took pains to guide the droves of vessels entrusted to them over unusual courses, with a view to elude pursuers. as the home port was neared, the common disposition to relax tension of effort as the moment of relief draws nigh, co-operated with the gradual drawing together of convoys from all parts of the world to make the approaches to the english channel the most probable scene of success for the pursuer. there the greatest number were to be found, and there presumption of safety tended to decrease carefulness. this was to be amply proved by subsequent experience. it had been predicted by rodgers himself, although he apparently did not think wise to hazard in such close quarters so fine and large a frigate as the "president." "it is very generally believed," he had written, "that the coasts of england, ireland, and scotland are always swarming with british men of war, and that their commerce would be found amply protected. this, however, i well know by experience, in my voyages when a youth, to be incorrect; and that it has always been their policy to keep their enemies as far distant from their shores as possible, by stationing their ships at the commencement of a war on the enemy's coasts, and in such other distant situations, ... and thereby be enabled to protect their own commerce in a twofold degree. this, however, they have been enabled to do, owing as well to the inactivity of the enemy, as to the local advantages derived from their relative situations."[ ] the same tendency was observable at other points of arrival, and recognition of this dictated the instructions issued to captain lawrence for the cruise of the "chesapeake," frustrated through her capture by the "shannon." lawrence was appointed to the ship on may ; the sailing orders issued to captain evans being transferred to him on that date. he was to go to the mouth of the gulf of st. lawrence, seeking there to intercept the military store-ships, and transports with troops, destined to quebec and upper canada. "the enemy," wrote the secretary, "will not in all probability anticipate our taking this ground with our public ships of war; and as his convoys generally separate between cape race and halifax, leaving the trade of the st. lawrence to proceed without convoy, the chance of captures upon an extensive scale is very flattering." he added the just remark, that "it is impossible to conceive a naval service of a higher order in a national point of view than the destruction of the enemy's vessels, with supplies for his army in canada and his fleets on this station."[ ] lawrence took command of the "chesapeake" at boston on may . the ship had returned from her last cruise april , and had been so far prepared for sea by her former commander that, as has been seen, her sailing orders were issued may . it would appear from the statement of the british naval historian james,[ ] based upon a paper captured in the ship, that the enlistments of her crew expired in april. although there were many reshipments, and a nucleus of naval seamen, there was a large infusion of new and untrained men, amounting to a reconstitution of the ship's company. more important still was the fact that both the captain and first lieutenant were just appointed; her former first lying fatally ill at the time she sailed. the third and fourth lieutenants were also strange to her, and in a manner to their positions; being in fact midshipmen, to whom acting appointments as lieutenants were issued at lawrence's request, by commodore bainbridge of the navy yard, on may , five days before the action. the third took charge of his division for the first time the day of the battle, and the men were personally unknown to him. the first lieutenant himself was extremely young. the bearing of these facts is not to excuse the defeat, but to enforce the lesson that a grave military enterprise is not to be hazarded on a side issue, or on a point of pride, without adequate preparation. the "chesapeake" was ordered to a service of very particular importance at the moment--may, --when the canada campaign was about to open. she was to act against the communications of the enemy; and while it is upon the whole more expedient, for the _morale_ of a service, that battle with an equal should not be declined, quite as necessarily action should not be sought when it will materially interfere with the discharge of a duty intrinsically of greater consequence. the capture of a single enemy's frigate is not to be confounded with, or inflated to, that destruction of an enemy's organized force which is the prime object of all military effort. indeed, the very purpose to which the "chesapeake" was designated was to cripple the organized force of the british, either the army in canada, or the navy on the lakes. the chance of a disabling blow by unexpected action in the st. lawrence much exceeded any gain to be anticipated, even by a victorious ship duel, which would not improbably entail return to port to refit; while officers new to their duties, and unknown to their men, detracted greatly from the chances of success, should momentary disaster or confusion occur. the blockade of boston harbor at this moment was conducted by captain philip vere broke of the "shannon", a -gun frigate, which he had then commanded for seven years. his was one of those cases where singular merit as an officer, and an attention to duty altogether exceptional, had not yet obtained opportunity for distinction. it would probably be safe to say that no more thoroughly efficient ship of her class had been seen in the british navy during the twenty years' war with france, then drawing towards its close; but after trafalgar napoleon's policy, while steadily directed towards increasing the number of his ships, had more and more tended to husbanding them against a future occasion, which in the end never came. the result was a great diminution in naval combats. hence, the outbreak of the american war, followed by three frigate actions in rapid succession, opened out a new prospect, which was none the less stimulative because of the british reverses suffered. captain broke was justly confident in his own leadership and in the efficiency of a ship's company, which, whatever individual changes it may have undergone, had retained its identity of organization through so many years of his personal and energetic supervision. he now reasonably hoped to demonstrate what could be done by officers and men so carefully trained. captain pechell of the "santo domingo," the flagship on the american station, wrote: "the 'shannon's' men were better trained, and understood gunnery better, than any men i ever saw;" nevertheless, he added, "in the action with the 'chesapeake' the guns were all laid by captain broke's directions, consequently the fire was all thrown in one horizontal line, not a shot going over the 'chesapeake.'"[ ] the escape of the "president" and "congress" early in may, while the "shannon" and her consort, the "tenedos," were temporarily off shore in consequence of easterly weather, put broke still more upon his mettle; and, fearing a similar mishap with the "chesapeake," he sent lawrence a challenge.[ ] it has been said, by both americans and english, that this letter was a model of courtesy. undoubtedly it was in all respects such as a gentleman might write; but the courtesy was that of the french duellist, nervously anxious lest he should misplace an accent in the name of the man whom he intended to force into fight, and to kill. it was provocative to the last degree, which, for the end in view, it was probably meant to be. in it broke showed himself as adroit with his pen--the adroitness of canning--as he was to prove himself in battle. not to speak of other points of irritation, the underlining of the words, "even combat," involved an imputation, none the less stinging because founded in truth, upon the previous frigate actions, and upon lawrence's own capture of the "peacock." in guns, the "chesapeake" and "shannon" were practically of equal force; but in the engagement the american frigate carried fifty more men than her adversary. to an invitation couched as was broke's lawrence was doubly vulnerable, for only six months had elapsed since he himself had sent a challenge to the "bonne citoyenne." with his temperament he could scarcely have resisted the innuendo, had he received the letter; but this he did not. it passed him on the way out and was delivered to bainbridge, by whom it was forwarded to the navy department. [illustration: captain philip bowes vere broke. _from the mezzotint by charles turner after the painting by samuel lane in the possession of lady saumarez._] although broke's letter did not reach him, captain lawrence made no attempt to get to sea without engagement. the "shannon's" running close to boston light, showing her colors, and heaving-to in defiance, served the purpose of a challenge. cooper, who was in full touch with the naval tradition of the time, has transmitted that lawrence went into the action with great reluctance. this could have proceeded only from consciousness of defective organization, for the heroic temper of the man was notorious, and there is no hint of that mysterious presentiment so frequent in the annals of military services. the wind being fair from the westward, the "chesapeake," which had unmoored at a.m., lifted her last anchor at noon, june , and made sail. the "shannon," seeing at hand the combat she had provoked, stood out to sea until on the line between cape ann and cape cod, where she hove-to on the starboard tack, heading to the southeast. the "chesapeake" followed under all sail until p.m., when she took in her light canvas, sending the loftier--royal--yards on deck; and at . hauled up her courses, thus reducing herself to the fighting trim already assumed by her adversary. the "shannon," which had been lying stopped for a long time, at this same moment filled her sails, to regain headway with which to manoeuvre, in case her opponent's action should require it; but, after gathering speed sufficient for this purpose, the british captain again slowed his ship, by so bracing the maintopsail that it was kept shaking in the wind. its effect being thus lost, though readily recoverable, her forward movement depended upon the sails of the fore and mizzen masts ( ). in this attitude, and steering southeast by the wind, she awaited her antagonist, who was running for her weather--starboard--quarter, and whose approach, thus seconded, became now very rapid. broke made no further change in the ship's direction, leaving the choice of windward or leeward side to lawrence, who took the former, discarding all tactical advantages, and preferring a simple artillery duel between the vessels. just before she closed, the "chesapeake" rounded-to, taking a parallel course, and backing the maintopsail ( ) to reduce her speed to that of the enemy. captain lawrence in his eagerness had made the serious error of coming up under too great headway. at . , as her bows doubled on the quarter of the "shannon" ( ), at the distance of fifty yards, the british ship opened fire, beginning with the after gun, and continuing thence forward, as each in succession bore upon the advancing american frigate. the latter replied after the second british discharge, and the combat at once became furious. the previous history of the two vessels makes it probable that the british gunnery was the better; but it is impossible, seeing the course the action finally took, so far to disentangle the effects of the fire while they were on equal terms of position, from the totals afterwards ascertained, as to say where the advantage, if any, lay during those few minutes. the testimony of the "chesapeake's" second lieutenant, that his division--the forward one on the gun deck--fired three rounds before their guns ceased to bear, agrees with broke's report that two or three broadsides were exchanged; and the time needed by well-drilled men to do this is well within, yet accords fairly with, james' statement, that from the first gun to the second stage in the action six minutes elapsed. during the first of this period the "chesapeake" kept moving parallel at fifty yards distance, but gaining continually, threatening thus to pass wholly ahead, so that her guns would bear no longer. to prevent this lawrence luffed closer to the wind to shake her sails, but in vain; the movement increased her distance, but she still ranged ahead, so that she finally reached much further than abreast of the enemy. to use the nautical expression, she was on the "shannon's" weather bow ( ). while this was happening her sailing master was killed and lawrence wounded; these being the two officers chiefly concerned in the handling of the ship. [illustration: diagram of the chesapeake vs. shannon battle] upon this supervened a concurrence of accidents, affecting her manageability, which initiated the second scene in the drama, and called for instantaneous action by the officers injured. the foretopsail tie being cut by the enemy's fire, the yard dropped, leaving the sail empty of wind; and at the same time were shot away the jib-sheet and the brails of the spanker. although the latter, flying loose, tends to spread itself against the mizzen rigging, it probably added little to the effect of the after sails; but, the foresail not being set, the first two mishaps practically took all the forward canvas off the "chesapeake." under the combined impulses she, at . , came up into the wind ( ), lost her way, and, although her mainyard had been braced up, finally gathered sternboard; the upshot being that she lay paralyzed some seventy yards from the "shannon" ( , , ), obliquely to the latter's course and slightly ahead of her. the british ship going, or steering, a little off ( ), her guns bore fair upon the "chesapeake," which, by her involuntarily coming into the wind,--to such an extent that broke thought she was attempting to haul off, and himself hauled closer to the wind in consequence ( ),--lost in great measure the power of reply, except by musketry. the british shot, entering the stern and quarter of her opponent, swept diagonally along the after parts of the spar and main decks, a half-raking fire. under these conditions lawrence and the first lieutenant were mortally wounded, the former falling by a musket-ball through his body; but he had already given orders to have the boarders called, seeing that the ship must drift foul of the enemy ( ). the chaplain, who in the boarding behaved courageously, meeting broke in person with a pistol-shot, and receiving a cutlass wound in return, was standing close by the captain at this instant. he afterwards testified that as lawrence cried "boarders away", the crews of the carronades ran forward; which corresponds to broke's report that, seeing the enemy flinching from their guns, he then gave the order for boarding. this may have been, indeed, merely the instinctive impulse which drives disorganized men to seek escape from a fire which they cannot return; but if cooper is correct in saying that it was the practice of that day to keep the boarders' weapons, not by their side, but on the quarter-deck or at the masts, it may also have been that this division, which had so far stuck to its guns while being raked, now, at the captain's call, ran from them to get the side-arms. at the court of inquiry it was in evidence that these men were unarmed; and one of them, a petty officer, stated that he had defended himself with the monkey tail of his gun. whatever the cause, although there was fighting to prevent the "chesapeake" from being lashed to the "shannon", no combined resistance was offered abaft the mainmast. there the marines made a stand, but were overpowered and driven forward. the negro bugler of the ship, who should have echoed lawrence's summons, was too frightened to sound a note, and the voices of the aids, who shouted the message to the gun deck, were imperfectly heard; but, above all, leaders were wanting. there was not on the upper deck an officer above the grade of midshipman; captain, first lieutenant, master, marine officer, and even the boatswain, had been mortally wounded before the ships touched. the second lieutenant was in charge of the first gun division, at the far end of the deck below, as yet ignorant how the fight was going, and that the fate of his superiors had put him in command. of the remaining lieutenants, also stationed on the gun deck, the fourth had been mortally wounded by the first broadside; while the third, who had heard the shout for boarders, committed the indiscretion, ruinous to his professional reputation, of accompanying those who, at the moment the ships came together, were carrying below the wounded captain. [illustration: the capture of the _chesapeake_ by the _shannon_.--the struggle on the quarterdeck. _drawn by henry reuterdahl._] before the new commanding officer could get to the spar deck, the ships were in contact. according to the report of captain broke, the most competent surviving eye-witness, the mizzen channels of the "chesapeake" locked in the fore-rigging of the "shannon." "i went forward," he continues, "to ascertain her position, and observing that the enemy were flinching from their guns, i gave orders to prepare for boarding." when the "chesapeake's" second lieutenant reached the forecastle, the british were in possession of the after part of the ship, and of the principal hatchways by which the boarders of the after divisions could come up. he directed the foresail set, to shoot the ship clear, to prevent thus a re-enforcement to the enemy already on board; and he rallied a few men, but was himself soon wounded and thrown below. in brief, the fall of their officers and the position of the ship, in irons and being raked, had thrown the crew into the confusion attendant upon all sudden disaster. from this state only the rallying cry of a well-known voice and example can rescue men. "the enemy," reported broke, "made a desperate but disorderly resistance." the desperation of brave men is the temper which at times may retrieve such conditions, but it must be guided and fashioned by a master spirit into something better than disorder, if it is to be effective. disorder at any stage of a battle is incipient defeat; supervening upon the enemy's gaining a commanding position it commonly means defeat consummated. fifteen minutes elapsed from the discharge of the first gun of the "shannon" to the "chesapeake's" colors being hauled down. this was done by the enemy, her own crew having been driven forward. in that brief interval twenty-six british were killed and fifty-six wounded; of the americans forty-eight were killed and ninety-nine wounded. in proportion to the number on board each ship when the action began, the "shannon" lost in men per cent; the "chesapeake" per cent, or practically double. although a certain amount of national exultation or mortification attends victory or defeat in an international contest, from a yacht race to a frigate action, there is no question of national credit in the result where initial inequality is great, as in such combats as that of the "chesapeake" and "shannon," or the "constitution" and "guerrière." it is possible for an officer to command a ship for seven years, as broke had, and fail to make of her the admirable pattern of all that a ship of war should be, which he accomplished with the "shannon"; but no captain can in four weeks make a thoroughly efficient crew out of a crowd of men newly assembled, and never out of harbor together. the question at issue is not national, but personal; it is the credit of captain lawrence. that it was inexpedient to take the "chesapeake" into action at all at that moment does not admit of dispute; though much allowance must be made for a gallant spirit, still in the early prime of life, and chafing under the thought that, should he get to sea by successful evasion, he would be open to the taunt, freely used by broke,[ ] of dodging, "eluding," an enemy only his equal in material force. having, however, undertaken a risk which cannot be justified, was captain lawrence also reckless, and vainly confident, in his conduct before and during the action? was he foolhardy, or only rash? the reply, if favorable, is due to one of the most gallant and attractive personalities in the annals of the united states navy. [illustration: captain james lawrence. _from the painting by gilbert stuart in the possession of the new jersey historical society, newark, n.j._] from his action it is evident that lawrence clearly recognized that a green crew can be more quickly formed to efficiency at the battery than to that familiarity with the rigging and the sails, and that habit of working together about decks, on which manoeuvring power depends. he therefore chose an artillery duel, surrendering even the opportunity of raking permitted him by broke, who awaited his approach without an attempt at molestation. how far was his expectation as to the results overstrained? the american crew lost double in proportion to their enemy; but it did not fail to inflict a very severe punishment, and it must be added under a very considerable disadvantage, which there has been a tendency recently to underestimate. the loss of the head sails, and all that followed, is part of the fortune of war; of that unforeseeable, which great leaders admit may derange even the surest calculations. it is not, therefore, to be complained of, but it is nevertheless to receive due account in the scales of praise and blame; for the man who will run no risks of accidents accomplishes nothing. in the preceding narrative, and in the following analysis, the account of the british naval writer james is in essentials adopted; chiefly because, of all historians having contemporary sources of information, he has been at most pains to insure precision.[ ] as told by him, the engagement divides into three stages. first, the combat side to side; second, the period during which the "chesapeake" lay in the wind being raked; third, the boarding and taking possession. to these james assigns, as times: for the first, six minutes; for the second, four; for the third, five; this last being again subdivisible into a space of two minutes, during which the "chesapeake" was being lashed to her opponent, and the actual fighting on her decks, which broke states did not exceed three. the brief and disorderly, though desperate, resistance to boarding proves that the "chesapeake" was already beaten by the cannonade, which lasted, as above, ten minutes. during only six of these, accepting james' times, was she on equal gunnery terms. during four tenths--nearly one half--of the gunnery contest she was at a great disadvantage. the necessity of manoeuvring, which lawrence tried to avoid, was forced upon him; and the ship's company, or her circumstances, proved unequal to meeting it. nevertheless, though little more than half the time on equal terms of position with her opponent, half her own loss was inflicted upon him. how great her subsequent disadvantage is best stated in the words of james, whom no one will accuse of making points in favor of americans. "at . , having had her jib-sheet and foretopsail tie shot away, and her helm, probably from the death of the men stationed at it, being at the moment unattended to, the 'chesapeake' came so sharp to the wind as completely to deaden her way." how extreme this deviation from her course is shown by the impression made on broke. "as the manoeuvres of the 'chesapeake' indicated an intention to haul away, captain broke ordered the helm to be put a-lee, as the 'shannon' had fallen off a little." the "chesapeake's" way being deadened, "the ship lay with her stern and quarter exposed to her opponent's broadside. the shot from the 'shannon's' aftermost guns now took a diagonal direction _along_[ ] the decks of the 'chesapeake,' beating in her stern ports, and sweeping the men from their quarters. the shot from the 'shannon's' foremost guns, at the same time, entering the 'chesapeake's' ports from the mainmast aft, did considerable execution." this describes a semi-raking fire, which lasted four minutes, from . to p.m., when the ships came together. the manner of collision and the injuries received bear out the above account. the quarter of the "chesapeake" came against the side of the "shannon," the angle at the moment, as represented in james' diagram, being such as to make it impossible that any of the "chesapeake's" guns, save one or two of the after ones, could then bear; and as she was already paying off, they had been in worse position before. "she was severely battered in the hull, on the larboard quarter particularly; and several shot entered the stern windows.... her three lower masts were badly wounded, the main and mizzen especially. the bowsprit received no injury." all these details show that the sum total of the "shannon's" fire was directed most effectively upon the after part of the ship, in the manner described by james; and coupled with the fact that the british first broadside, always reckoned the most deadly, would naturally take effect chiefly on the fore part of the "chesapeake," as she advanced from the "shannon's" stern to her bow,[ ] we are justified in the inference that the worst of her loss was suffered after accident had taken her movements out of lawrence's instant control. under these circumstances it may be claimed for him that the artillery duel, to which he sought to confine the battle, was not so entirely a desperate chance as has been inferred. it may therefore be said that, having resolved upon a risk which cannot be justified at the bar of dispassionate professional judgment, captain lawrence did not commit the further unpardonable error of not maturely weighing and judiciously choosing his course. that the crew was not organized and exercised at the guns, as far as his time and opportunity permitted, is disproved by incidental mention in the courts martial that followed, as well as by the execution done. within ten minutes at the utmost, within six of equal terms, the "chesapeake," an -pounder frigate, killed and wounded of the "shannon's" ship's company as many as the "constitution" with her 's did of the "guerrière's" in over twenty;[ ] and the "constitution" not only was a much heavier ship than her opponent, but had been six weeks almost continuously at sea. when her crew had been together four months longer, the loss inflicted by her upon the "java," in a contest spread over two hours, did not greatly exceed in proportion that suffered by the "shannon"; and the circumstances of that engagement, being largely manoeuvring, justified lawrence's decision, under his circumstances, to have none of it. his reliance upon the marksmanship of his men is further vindicated by broke's report that neither vessel suffered much aloft. the american and best british tradition of firing low was sustained by both ships. finally, although the organization of the "chesapeake" was not matured sufficiently to hold the people together, without leaders, after a tremendous punishment by the enemy's battery, and in the face of well-trained and rapidly supported boarders, it had so far progressed in cohesion that they did not flinch from their guns through a severe raking fire. what further shows this is that the boatswain of the "shannon," lashing the ships together in preparation for boarding, was mortally wounded, not by musketry only but by sabre. when thus attacked he doubtless was supported by a body of fighters as well as a gang of workers. in fact, broke was himself close by. under thus much of preparation, certainly not sufficient, lawrence chose for action a smooth sea, a royal breeze, an artillery duel, and a close range. "no manoeuvring, but downright fighting," as nelson said of his most critical battle; critical, just because his opponents, though raw tyros compared to his own crews, had nothing to do but to work their guns. the american captain took the most promising method open to him for achieving success, and carried into the fight a ship's company which was not so untrained but that, had some luck favored him, instead of going the other way, there was a fighting chance of victory. more cannot be claimed for him. he had no right, under the conditions, voluntarily to seek the odds against him, established by broke's seven years of faithful and skilful command. except in material force, the "chesapeake" was a ship much inferior to the "shannon," as a regiment newly enlisted is to one that has seen service; and the moment things went seriously wrong she could not retrieve herself. this her captain must have known; and to the accusation of his country and his service that he brought upon them a mortification which endures to this day, the only reply is that he died "sword in hand." this covers the error of the dead, but cannot justify the example to the living. as is customary in such cases, a court of inquiry was ordered to investigate the defeat of the "chesapeake," and sat from february to february , . little can be gleaned from the evidence concerning the manoeuvring of the ship; the only two commissioned officers surviving, having been stationed on the gun deck, could not see what passed above. incidental statements by midshipmen examined confirm substantially the account above given. one mentions the particular that, when the head sheets were shot away, "the bow of the 'shannon' was abreast of the 'chesapeake's' midships, and she came into the wind;" he adds that the mizzen-topsail was a-back, as well as the main. this is the only important contribution to the determination of the relative positions and handling of the vessels. as far as it goes, it confirms a general impression that lawrence's eagerness prevented his making due allowance for the way of the "chesapeake," causing him to overshoot his aim; an error of judgment, which the accidents to the headsails converted into irretrievable disaster. the general testimony agrees that the crew, though dissatisfied at non-receipt of pay and prize money, behaved well until the moment of boarding. four witnesses, all officers, stated as of their own observation that the "shannon" received several shot between wind and water, and used her pumps continuously on the way to halifax. budd, the second lieutenant, "was informed by an officer of the 'shannon' that she was in a sinking condition." "the 'chesapeake' was not injured below her quarters, except by one or two shot." "the 'chesapeake' made no water; but the 'shannon' had hands at the pumps continually." a good deal of pumping in a ship seven years in commission did not necessarily indicate injuries in action; midshipman curtis, however, who was transferred to the "shannon," testified that "the british officers were encouraging the men by cheering to work at the pumps," which looks more serious. the purser of the "chesapeake" swore that she had shot plugs at the water-line, and that "her sailing master said she had three shot holes below." the repetition of remarks made by the "shannon's" officers is of course only hearsay testimony; but as regards the shots below the water-line,--as distinguished from the general body of the ship,--this on the one hand shows that the "shannon" had her share of bad luck, for in the smoke of the battle this result is not attributable to nice precision of aiming. on the other hand it strongly re-enforces the proof of the excellent marksmanship of the american frigate, deducible from the killed and wounded of her opponent, and it confirms the inference that her own disproportionate loss was at least partly due to the raking fire and her simultaneous disability to reply. upon the whole, the conclusion to the writer is clear that, while lawrence should not have courted action, the condition of the "chesapeake" as a fighting ship was far better than has commonly been supposed. it may be added that an irresponsible contemporary statement, that his "orders were peremptory," is disproved by the department's letter, which forms part of the court's record. he was to "proceed to sea as soon as weather, and the force and position of the enemy, will admit." even a successful action must be expected to compel return to port, preventing his proceeding; and there is an obvious difference between fighting an enemy when met, and going out especially to fight him. the orders were discretional. whether, by paying attention to favoring conditions, captain lawrence could have repeated the success of commodore rodgers in gaining the sea a month before, must remain uncertain. the "constitution," under captain stewart, a seaman of very excellent reputation, was unable to do so, until the winter gales made it impossible for the blockaders to maintain an uninterrupted watch off boston. the sailing of the "president" and "congress" was the last successful effort for many months; and the capture of the "chesapeake" was the first of several incidents illustrating how complete was the iron-barring of the coast, against all but small vessels. commodore decatur, having found it impossible to get out from new york by the sandy hook route, undertook that by long island sound. passing through hell gate, may , with his little squadron,--the "united states," the "macedonian," her late prize, and the sloop of war "hornet,"--he was on the th off fisher's island, abreast of new london. here he remained until june , obtaining various information concerning the enemy, but only certain that there was at least a ship of the line and a frigate in the neighborhood. on the last named day, that of the fight between the "chesapeake" and the "shannon," the wind serving, and the two enemy's vessels being far to the southwest of montauk point, at the east end of long island, the squadron put to sea together; but on approaching block island, which was close to their course, two more enemy's cruisers loomed up to the eastward. the hostile groups manoeuvred severally to get between the americans and their ports of refuge, new london in the one quarter, newport in the other. in plain sight of this overwhelming force decatur feared the results of trying to slip out to sea, and therefore beat back to new london.[ ] the enemy followed, and, having now this division securely housed, instituted a close blockade. it was apprehended even that they might endeavor to take it by main force, the defences of the place being weak; but, as is commonly the case, the dangers of an attack upon land batteries were sufficient to deter the ships from an attempt, the object of which could be attained with equal certainty by means less hazardous, if less immediate. the upshot was that the two frigates remained there blockaded to the end of the war; dependent for their safety, in decatur's opinion, rather upon the difficulty of the channel than upon the strength of the fortifications. "fort trumbull, the only work here mounted or garrisoned, was in the most unprepared state, and only one or two cannon were to be had in the neighborhood for any temporary work which should be erected. i immediately directed all my exertions to strengthening the defences. groton heights has been hastily prepared for the reception of a few large guns, and they will be mounted immediately.... i think the place might be made impregnable; but the hostile force on our coast is so great that, were the enemy to exert a large portion of his means in an attack here, i do not feel certain he could be resisted successfully with the present defences."[ ] on december he reported that the squadron was moored across the channel and under groton heights, which had been fortified; while in the mouth of the harbor, three gunshots distant, was anchored a british division, consisting of one ship of the line, a frigate, and two smaller vessels. two other ships of the line and several frigates were cruising in the open, between the east end of long island and gay head. this state of affairs lasted throughout the winter, during which the ships were kept in a state of expectancy, awaiting a possible opportunity; but, when the return of spring found the hope unfulfilled, it was plainly idle to look to the summer to afford what winter had denied. the frigates were lightened over a three-fathom bar, and thence, in april, , removed up the thames fourteen miles, as far as the depth of water would permit. being there wholly out of reach of the enemy's heavy vessels, they were dismantled, and left to the protection of the shore batteries and the "hornet," retained for that purpose. decatur was transferred to the "president," then at new york, taking with him his ship's company; while the crew of the "macedonian" was sent to the lakes. the enemy's vessels then off new london were three seventy-fours, four frigates, and three sloops. this accumulation of force, to watch decatur's two frigates and the "president," which during october and november was lying at bristol, rhode island, testified to the anxiety of the british government to restrain or capture the larger american cruisers. their individual power was such that it was unwilling to expose to attack by them the vessels, nominally of the same class, but actually much inferior, which were ranging all seas to protect british commerce. that this should suffer, and in some considerable degree, from the operations of well-developed privateering enterprise, pursued by a maritime people debarred from every other form of maritime activity, was to be expected, and must be endured; but the frigates carried with them the further menace, not indeed of serious injury to the colossal naval power of great britain, but of mortification for defeats, which, however reasonably to be accounted for by preponderance of force, are not patiently accepted by a nation accustomed to regard itself as invincible. there are few things more wearing than explaining adverse results; and the moral effect of so satisfactory a reply as the victory of the "shannon" might well have weighed with an american captain, not to risk prestige already gained, by seeking action when conscious of deficient preparation. the clamor aroused in great britain by the three rapidly succeeding captures of the "guerrière," "macedonian," and "java," was ample justification of the american policy of securing superior force in single cruisers, throughout their several classes; a policy entirely consistent with all sound military principle. it should be remembered, however, that a cruiser is intended generally to act singly, and depends upon herself alone for that preponderance of strength which military effort usually seeks by concentration of numbers. the advantage of great individual power, therefore, does not apply so unqualifiedly to the components of fleets, the superiority of which depends upon the mutual support of its members, by efficient combination of movement, as well as upon their separate power. both the government and people of great britain expected with some confidence, from the large fleet placed under sir john warren, the utter destruction of the frigates and of the american navy generally. "we were in hopes, ere this," said a naval periodical in june, , "to have announced the capture of the american navy; and, as our commander-in-chief on that station has sufficient force to effect so desirable an object, we trust, before another month elapses, to lay before our readers what we conceive ought long since to have happened."[ ] the words of the admiralty were more measured, as responsible utterances are prone to be; but their tenor was the same. expressing to warren disappointment with the results so far obtained, they added: "it is of the highest importance to the _character_ and interests of the country that the naval force of the enemy should be quickly and completely disposed of. their lordships therefore have thought themselves justified at this moment in withdrawing ships from other important services, for the purpose of placing under your command a force with which you cannot fail to bring the naval war to a termination, either by the capture of the american national vessels, or by strictly blockading them in their own waters."[ ] this expectancy doubtless weighed with broke; and probably also prompted a challenge sent to decatur's squadron to meet two british frigates, under pledge of fair play, and of safe return if victorious. in the latter case they at least would be badly injured; so in either event the blockaders would be relieved of much of their burden. the presence of several american frigates, blockaded close to the point where narragansett bay and long island sound meet, constituted a great inconvenience to all that region, by attracting thither so many enemy's cruisers. to a coasting trade--then so singularly important--projecting headlands, or capes, are the places of greatest exposure; in this resembling the danger entailed by salients in all military lines, in fortification or in the field. traffic between new england and new york, general and local, had derived a further impetus from the fact that newport, not being included in the commercial blockade, could still receive external supplies by neutral vessels. intercourse depended largely on these waters; and it was to them a grave misfortune that there were no united states frigates left in new york to divert the enemy's attention. the vexations entailed were forcibly presented by the governor of connecticut.[ ] "the british force stationed in our waters having occasioned great inquietude along the whole of our maritime frontier, every precaution consistent with due regard to the general safety has been adopted for its protection.... in our present state of preparedness, it is believed a descent upon our coast will not be attempted; a well-grounded hope is entertained that it will be attended with little success. unfortunately, we have not the means of rendering our navigation equally secure. serious depredations have been committed even in our harbors, and to such an extent that the usual communication through the sound is almost wholly interrupted. thus, while anxiously engaged in protecting our public ships [decatur's], we are doomed to witness the unrestrained capture of our private vessels, and the consequent suspension of commercial pursuits." as "the disapprobation of the war by the people of connecticut had been publicly declared through the proper organs shortly after hostilities commenced,"[ ] it may be supposed the conditions described, accompanied by continual alarms withdrawing the militiaman from his shop or his harvest, to repel petty invasion, did not tend to conciliate opinion. an officer of the connecticut militia wrote in december, "our engagements with the enemy have become so frequent that it would be in vain to attempt a particular statement of each."[ ] similar conditions prevailed along the entire seaboard, from maine to georgia; being of course greatest where inland navigation with wide entrances, like long island sound, had given particular development to the coasting trade, and at the same time afforded to pursuers particular immunity from ordinary dangers of the sea. incidental confirmation of the closeness of the hostile pressure is afforded by bainbridge's report of the brig "siren's" arrival at boston, june , , from new orleans. "although at sea between thirty and forty days, and great time along our blockaded coast, she did not see one enemy's cruiser."[ ] the cause is evident. the chesapeake and delaware were blockaded from within. ships watching new york and long island sound would be far inside the course of one destined to boston from the southward. from hatteras to the florida line the enemy's vessels, mostly of small class, kept in summer well inside the line from cape to cape, harassing even the water traffic behind the sea-islands; while at boston, her port of arrival, the "siren" was favored by broke's procedure. in his eagerness to secure action with the "chesapeake," he had detached his consort, the "tenedos," with orders not to rejoin until june . under cover of her absence, and the "shannon's" return to halifax with her prize, the "siren" slipped into a harbor wholly relieved of the enemy's presence. with such conditions, a voyage along the coast could well be outside the british line of cruising. owing to the difficulty of the new york entrance, except with good pilotage, and to the absence thence of ships of war after decatur's departure, that port ceased to present any features of naval activity; except as connected with the lake squadrons, which depended upon it for supplies of all kinds. the blockade of the sound affected its domestic trade; and after may its external commerce shared the inconveniences of the commercial blockade, then applied to it, and made at least technically effective. what this pressure in the end became is shown by a casual mention a year later, under the heading "progress of luxury. a private stock of wine brought the average 'extraordinary' price of twenty-five dollars the gallon; while at the same period one auction lot of prize goods, comprising three decanters and twelve tumblers, sold for one hundred and twelve dollars."[ ] the arrival in august, , of a vessel in distress, which, like the "siren," had passed along the whole southern coast without seeing a hostile cruiser, would seem to show some lapse of watchfulness; but, although there were the occasional evasions which attend all blockades, the general fact of neutrals turned away was established. a flotilla of a dozen gunboats was kept in commission in the bay, but under an officer not of the regular navy. as might readily have been foreseen from conditions, and from experience elsewhere, the national gunboat experiment had abundantly shown that vessels of that class were not only excessively costly in expenditure, and lamentably inefficient in results, as compared with seagoing cruisers, but were also deleterious to the professional character of officers and seamen. two years before the war captain campbell, then in command both at charleston and savannah, had commented on the unofficer-like neglect noticeable in the gunboats, and gordon now reported the same effect upon the crew of the "constellation," while thus detached for harbor defence.[ ] the secretary of the navy, affirming the general observation, remarked that officers having knowledge of their business were averse to gunboat duty, while those who had it yet to acquire were unwilling, because there it could not be learned. "it is a service in which those who are to form the officers for the ships of war ought not to be employed."[ ] he therefore had recommended the commissioning of volunteer officers for this work. this local new york harbor guard at times convoyed coasters in the sound, and at times interfered, both in that quarter and off sandy hook, to prevent small cruisers or boats of the enemy from effecting seizures of vessels, close in shore or run on the beach. such military action possesses a certain minor value, diminishing in some measure the grand total of loss; but it is not capable of modifying seriously the broad results of a strong commercial blockade. the delaware and the chesapeake--the latter particularly--became the principal scenes of active operations by the british navy. here in the early part of the summer there seems to have been a formed determination on the part of sir john warren to satisfy his government and people by evidence of military exertion in various quarters. rear admiral george cockburn, an officer of distinction and energy, had been ordered at the end of from the cadiz station, with four ships of the line and several smaller cruisers, to re-enforce warren. this strong detachment, a token at once of the relaxing demand upon the british navy in europe, and of the increasing purpose of the british government towards the united states, joined the commander-in-chief at bermuda, and accompanied him to the chesapeake in march. cockburn became second in command. early in april the fleet began moving up the bay; an opening incident, already mentioned,[ ] being the successful attack by its boats upon several letters-of-marque and privateers in the rappahannock upon the d of the month. some of the schooners there captured were converted into tenders, useful for penetrating the numerous waterways which intersected the country in every direction. the fleet, comprising several ships of the line, besides numerous smaller vessels, continued slowly upwards, taking time to land parties in many quarters, keeping the country in perpetual alarm. the multiplicity and diverseness of its operations, the particular object of which could at no moment be foreseen, made it impossible to combine resistance. the harassment was necessarily extreme, and the sustained suspense wearing; for, with reports continually arriving, now from one shore and now from the other, each neighborhood thought itself the next to be attacked. defence depended wholly upon militia, hastily assembled, with whom local considerations are necessarily predominant. but while thus spreading consternation on either side, diverting attention from his main objective, the purpose of the british admiral was clear to his own mind. it was "to cut off the enemy's supplies, and destroy their foundries, stores, and public works, by penetrating the rivers at the head of the chesapeake." [illustration: outline map of chesapeake bay and rivers] on april an advanced division arrived off the mouth of the patapsco, a dozen miles from baltimore. there others successively joined, until the whole force was reported on the d to be three seventy-fours, with several frigates and smaller vessels, making a total of fifteen. the body of the fleet remained stationary, causing the city a strong anticipation of attack; an impression conducing to retain there troops which, under a reasonable reliance upon adequate fortifications, might have been transferred to the probable scene of operations, sufficiently indicated by its intrinsic importance. warren now constituted a light squadron of two frigates, with a half-dozen smaller vessels, including some of those recently captured. these he placed in charge of cockburn and despatched to the head of the bay. in addition to the usual crews there went about four hundred of the naval brigade, consisting of marines and seamen in nearly equal numbers. this, with a handful of army artillerists, was the entire force. with these cockburn went first up the elk river, where washington thirty years before had taken shipping on his way to the siege of yorktown. at frenchtown, notwithstanding a six-gun battery lately erected, a landing was effected on april , and a quantity of flour and army equipments were destroyed, together with five bay schooners. many cattle were likewise seized; cockburn, in this and other instances, offering to pay in british government bills, provided no resistance was attempted in the neighborhood. from frenchtown he went round to the susquehanna, to obtain more cattle from an island, just below havre de grace; but being there confronted on may by an american flag, hoisted over a battery at the town, he proceeded to attack the following day. a nominal resistance was made; but as the british loss, here and at frenchtown, was one wounded on each occasion, no great cause for pride was left with the defenders. holding the inhabitants responsible for the opposition in their neighborhood, he determined to punish the town. some houses were burned. the guns of the battery were then embarked; and during this process cockburn himself, with a small party, marched three or four miles north of the place to a cannon foundry, where he destroyed the guns and material found, together with the buildings and machinery. "our small division," he reported to warren, "has been during the whole of this day on shore, in the centre of the enemy's country, and on his high road between baltimore and philadelphia." the feat testified rather to the military imbecility of the united states government during the last decade than to any signal valor or enterprise on the part of the invaders. enough and to spare of both there doubtless was among them; for the expedition was of a kind continuously familiar to the british navy during the past twenty years, under far greater difficulty, in many parts of the world. seeing the trifling force engaged, the mortification to americans must be that no greater demand was made upon it for the display of its military virtues. besides the destruction already mentioned, a division of boats went up the susquehanna, destroyed five vessels and more flour; after which, "everything being completed to my utmost wishes, the division embarked and returned to the ships, after being twenty-two hours in constant exertion." from thence cockburn went round to the sassafras river, where a similar series of small injuries was inflicted, and two villages, georgetown and frederickstown, were destroyed, in consequence of local resistance offered, by which five british were wounded. assurance coming from several quarters that no further armed opposition would be made, and as there was "now neither public property, vessels, nor warlike stores remaining in the neighborhood," the expedition returned down the bay, may , and regained the fleet.[ ] the history of the delaware and its waters during this period was very much the same as that of the chesapeake; except that, the water system of the lower bay being less extensive and practicable, and the river above narrower, there was not the scope for general marauding, nor the facility for systematic destruction, which constituted the peculiar exposure of the chesapeake and gave cockburn his opportunity. neither was there the same shelter from the sweep of the ocean, nor any naval establishment to draw attention. for these reasons, the chesapeake naturally attracted much more active operations; and virginia, which formed so large a part of its coast-line, was the home of the president. she was also the leading member of the group of states which, in the internal contests of american politics, was generally thought to represent hatred to great britain and attachment to france. in both bays the american government maintained flotillas of gunboats and small schooners, together with--in the delaware at least--a certain number of great rowing barges, or galleys; but, although creditable energy was displayed, it is impossible to detect that, even in waters which might be thought suited to their particular qualities, these small craft exerted any substantial influence upon the movements of the enemy. their principal effect appears to have been to excite among the inhabitants a certain amount of unreasonable expectation, followed inevitably by similar unreasoning complaint. it is probable, however, that they to some extent restricted the movements of small foraging parties beyond the near range of their ships; and they served also the purpose of watching and reporting the dispositions of the british fleet. when it returned downwards from cockburn's expedition, it was followed by a division of these schooners and gunboats, under captain charles gordon of the navy, who remained cruising for nearly a month below the potomac, constantly sighting the enemy, but without an opportunity offering for a blow to be struck under conditions favorable to either party. "the position taken by the enemy's ships," reported gordon, "together with the constant protection given their small cruisers, particularly in the night, rendered any offensive operations on our part impracticable."[ ] in the delaware, a british corvette, running upon a shoal with a falling tide, was attacked in this situation by a division of ten gunboats which was at hand. such conditions were unusually favorable to them, and, though a frigate was within plain sight, she could not get within range on account of the shoalness of water; yet the two hours' action which followed did no serious injury to the grounded ship. meantime one of the gunboats drifted from its position, and was swept by the tide out of supporting distance from its fellows. the frigate and sloop then manned boats, seven in number, pulled towards her, and despite a plucky resistance carried her; their largely superior numbers easily climbing on board her low-lying deck. although the record of gunboats in all parts of the world is mostly unfruitful, some surprise cannot but be felt at the immunity experienced by a vessel aground under such circumstances.[ ] on may captain stewart of the "constellation" reported from norfolk that the enemy's fleet had returned down the bay; fifteen sail being at anchor in a line stretching from cape henry to near hampton roads. little had yet been done by the authorities to remedy the defenceless condition of the port, which he had deplored in his letter of march ; and he apprehended a speedy attack either upon hampton, on the north shore of the james river, important as commanding communications between norfolk and the country above, or upon craney island, covering the entrance to the elizabeth river, through the narrow channel of which the navy yard must be approached. there was a party now at work throwing up a battery on the island, on which five hundred troops were stationed, but he feared these preparations were begun too late. he had assigned seven gunboats to assist the defence. it was clear to his mind that, if norfolk was their object, active operations would begin at one of these approaches, and not immediately about the place itself. meanwhile, he would await developments, and postpone his departure to boston, whither he had been ordered to command the "constitution." much to stewart's surprise, considering the force of the enemy, which he, as a seaman, could estimate accurately and compare with what he knew to be the conditions confronting them, most of the british fleet soon after put to sea with the commander-in-chief, leaving cockburn with one seventy-four and four frigates to hold the bay. this apparent abandonment, or at best concession of further time to craney island, aroused in him contempt as well as wonder. he had commented a month before on their extremely circumspect management; "they act cautiously, and never separate so far from one another that they cannot in the course of a few hours give to each other support, by dropping down or running up, as the wind or tide serve."[ ] such precaution, however, was not out of place when confronted with the presence of gunboats capable of utilizing calms and local conditions. to avoid exposure to useless injury is not to pass the bounds of military prudence. it was another matter to have brought so large a force, and to depart with no greater results than those of frenchtown and havre de grace. "they do not appear disposed to put anything to risk, or to make an attack where they are likely to meet with opposition. their conduct while in these waters has been highly disgraceful to their arms, and evinces the respect and dread they have for their opponents."[ ] he added a circumstance which throws further light upon the well-known discontent of the british crews and their deterioration in quality, under a prolonged war and the confinement attending the impressment system. "their loss in prisoners and deserters has been very considerable; the latter are coming up to norfolk almost daily, and their naked bodies are frequently fished up on the bay shore, where they must have been drowned in attempting to swim. they all give the same account of the dissatisfaction of their crews, and their detestation of the service they are engaged in."[ ] deserters, however, usually have tales acceptable to those to whom they come. whether warren was judicious in postponing attack may be doubted, but he had not lost sight of the admiralty's hint about american frigates. there were just two in the waters of the chesapeake; the "constellation," , at norfolk, and the "adams," , captain charles morris, in the potomac. the british admiral had been notified that a division of troops would be sent to bermuda, to be under his command for operations on shore, and he was now gone to fetch them. early in june he returned, bringing these soldiers, two thousand six hundred and fifty in number.[ ] from his gazette letters he evidently had in view the capture of norfolk with the "constellation"; for when he designates hampton and craney island as points of attack, it is because of their relations to norfolk.[ ] this justified the forecast of stewart, who had now departed; the command of the "constellation" devolving soon after upon captain gordon. in connection with the military detachment intrusted to warren, the admiralty, while declining to give particular directions as to its employment, wrote him: "against a maritime country like america, the chief towns and establishments of which are situated upon navigable rivers, a force of the kind under your orders must necessarily be peculiarly formidable.... in the choice of objects of attack, it will naturally occur to you that on every account any attempt which should have the effect of crippling the enemy's naval force should have a preference."[ ] except for the accidental presence of decatur's frigates in new london, as yet scarcely known to the british commander-in-chief, norfolk, more than any other place, met this prescription of his government. his next movements, therefore, may be considered as resulting directly from his instructions. the first occurrence was a somewhat prolonged engagement between a division of fifteen gunboats and the frigate "junon," which, having been sent to destroy vessels at the mouth of the james river, was caught becalmed and alone in the upper part of hampton roads; no other british vessel being nearer than three miles. the cannonade continued for three quarters of an hour, when a breeze springing up brought two of her consorts to the "junon's" aid. the gunboats, incapable of close action with a single frigate in a working breeze, necessarily now retreated. they had suffered but slightly, one killed and two wounded; but retired with the confidence, always found in the accounts of such affairs, that they had inflicted great damage upon the enemy. the commander of a united states revenue cutter, lately captured, who was on board the frigate at the time, brought back word subsequently that she had lost one man killed and two or three wounded.[ ] the british official reports do not allude to the affair. as regards positive results, however, it may be affirmed with considerable assurance that the military value of gunboats in their day, as a measure of coast defence, was not what they effected, but the caution imposed upon the enemy by the apprehension of what they might effect, did this or that combination of circumstances occur. that the circumstances actually almost never arose detracted little from this moral influence. the making to one's self a picture of possible consequences is a powerful factor in most military operations; and the gunboat is not without its representative to-day in the sphere of imaginative warfare. the "junon" business was a casual episode. warren was already preparing for his attack on craney island. this little strip of ground, a half-mile long by two hundred yards across, lies within easy gunshot to the west of the elizabeth river, a narrow channel-way, three hundred yards from edge to edge, which from hampton roads leads due south, through extensive flats, to norfolk and portsmouth. the navy yard is four miles above the island, on the west side of the river, the banks of which there have risen above the water. up to and beyond craney island the river-bed proper, though fairly clear, is submerged and hidden amid the surrounding expanse of shoal water. good pilotage, therefore, is necessary, and incidental thereto the reduction beforehand of an enemy's positions commanding the approach. of these craney island was the first. from it the flats which constitute the under-water banks of the elizabeth extend north towards hampton roads, for a distance of two miles, and are not traversable by vessels powerful enough to act against batteries. for nearly half a mile the depth is less than four feet, while the sand immediately round the island was bare when the tide was out.[ ] attack here was possible only by boats armed with light cannon and carrying troops. on the west the island was separated from the mainland by a narrow strip of water, fordable by infantry at low tide. it was therefore determined to make a double assault,--one on the north, by fifteen boats, carrying, besides their crews, five hundred soldiers; the other on the west, by a division eight hundred strong,[ ] to be landed four miles away, at the mouth of the nansemond river. the garrison of the island numbered five hundred and eighty, and one hundred and fifty seamen were landed from the "constellation" to man one of the principal batteries. the british plan labored under the difficulty that opposite conditions of tide were desirable for the two parties which were to act in concert. the front attack demanded high water, in order that under the impulse of the oars the boats might get as near as possible before they took the ground, whence the advance to the assault must be by wading. the flanking movement required low water, to facilitate passing the ford. between the two, the hour was fixed for an ebbing tide, probably to allow for delays, and to assure the arrival of the infantry so as to profit by the least depth. at a.m. of june the boat division arrived off the northwest point of the island, opposite the battery manned by the seamen, in that day notoriously among the best of artillerists. a difference of opinion as to the propriety of advancing at all here showed itself among the senior naval officers; for there will always be among seamen a dislike to operating over unknown ground with a falling tide. the captain in command, however, overruled hesitations; doubtless feeling that in a combined movement the particular interest of one division must yield to the requirements of mutual support. a spirited forward dash was therefore made; but the guiding boat, sixty yards ahead of the others, grounded a hundred yards from the battery. one or two others, disregarding her signal, shared her mishap; and two were sunk by the american fire. under these circumstances a seaman, sounding with a boat hook, declared that he found along side three or four feet of slimy mud. this was considered decisive, and the attack was abandoned. the shore division had already retreated, having encountered obstacles, the precise character of which is not stated. warren's report simply said, "in consequence of the representation of the officer commanding the troops, of the difficulty of their passing over from the land, i considered that the persevering in the attempt would cost more men than the number with us would permit, as the other forts must have been stormed before the frigate and dockyard could be destroyed." the enterprise was therefore abandoned at the threshold, because of probable ulterior difficulties, the degree of which it would require to-day unprofitable labor even to conjecture; but reduced as the affair in its upshot was to an abortive demonstration, followed by no serious effort, it probably was not reckoned at home to have fulfilled the admiralty's injunctions, that the character as well as the interest of the country required certain results. the loss was trifling,--three killed, sixteen wounded, sixty-two missing.[ ] having relinquished his purpose against craney island, and with it, apparently, all serious thought of the navy yard and the "constellation", warren next turned his attention to hampton. on the early morning of june two thousand troops were landed to take possession of the place, which they did with slight resistance. three stand of colors were captured and seven field guns, with their equipment and ammunition. the defences of the town were destroyed; but as no further use was made of the advantage gained, the affair amounted to nothing more than an illustration on a larger scale of the guerilla depredation carried on on all sides of the chesapeake. with it ended warren's attempts against norfolk. his force may have been really inadequate to more; certainly it was far smaller than was despatched to the same quarter the following year; but the admiralty probably was satisfied by this time that he had not the enterprise necessary for his position, and a successor was appointed during the following winter. for two months longer the british fleet as a whole remained in the bay, engaged in desultory operations, which had at least the effect of greatly increasing their local knowledge, and in so far facilitating the more serious undertakings of the next season. the chesapeake was not so much blockaded as occupied. on june captain cassin of the navy yard reported that six sail of the line, with four frigates, were at the mouth of the elizabeth, and that the day before a squadron of thirteen--frigates, brigs, and schooners--had gone ten miles up the james, causing the inhabitants of smithfield and the surroundings to fly from their homes, terrified by the transactions at hampton. the lighter vessels continued some distance farther towards richmond. a renewal of the attack was naturally expected; but on july the fleet quitted hampton roads, and again ascended the chesapeake, leaving a division of ten sail in lynnhaven bay, under cape henry. two days later the main body entered the potomac, in which, as has before been mentioned, was the frigate "adams"; but she lay above the narrows, out of reach of such efforts as warren was willing to risk. he went as high as blakiston island, twenty-five to thirty miles from the river's mouth, and from there cockburn, with a couple of frigates and two smaller vessels, tried to get beyond the kettle bottom shoals, an intricate bit of navigation ten miles higher up, but still below the narrows.[ ] two of his detachment, however, took the ground; and the enterprise of approaching washington by this route was for that time abandoned. a year afterwards it was accomplished by captain gordon, of the british navy, who carried two frigates and a division of bomb vessels as far as alexandria. two united states gunboats, "the scorpion" and "asp", lying in yeocomico river, a shallow tributary of the potomac ten miles from the chesapeake, were surprised there july by the entrance of the enemy. getting under way hastily, the "scorpion" succeeded in reaching the main stream and retreating up it; but the "asp", being a bad sailer, and the wind contrary, had to go back. she was pursued by boats; and although an attack by three was beaten off, she was subsequently carried when they were re-enforced to five. her commander, midshipman sigourney, was killed, and of the twenty-one in her crew nine were either killed or wounded. the assailants were considerably superior in numbers, as they need to be in such undertakings. they lost eight. this was the second united states vessel thus captured in the chesapeake this year; the revenue cutter "surveyor" having been taken in york river, by the boats of the frigate "narcissus", on the night of june . in the latter instance, the sword of the commander, who survived, was returned to him the next day by the captor, with a letter testifying "an admiration on the part of your opponents, such as i have seldom witnessed, for your gallant and desperate attempt to defend your vessel against more than double your numbers."[ ] trivial in themselves as these affairs were, it is satisfactory to notice that in both the honor of the flag was upheld with a spirit which is worth even more than victory. sigourney had before received the commendation of captain morris, no mean judge of an officer's merits. the british fleet left the potomac july , and went on up the bay, spreading alarm on every side. morris, with a body of seamen and marines, was ordered from the "adams" to annapolis, the capital of maryland, on the river severn, to command the defences. these he reported, on august , to be in the "miserable condition" characteristic of all the national preparations to meet hostilities. with a view to entering, the enemy was sounding the bar, an operation which frequently must be carried on beyond protection by ships' guns; "but we have no floating force to molest them." the bulk of the fleet was above the severn, as were both admirals, and morris found their movements "contradictory, as usual."[ ] as many as twenty sail had at one time been visible from the state-house dome in the city. on august , fifteen, three of which were seventy-fours, were counted from north point, at the mouth of the patapsco, on which baltimore lies. kent island, on the eastern shore of the bay abreast annapolis, was taken possession of, and occupied for some days. at the same period attacks were reported in other quarters on that side of the chesapeake, as elsewhere in the extensive basin penetrated by its tributaries. the prosecution of these various enterprises was attended with the usual amount of scuffling encounter, which associates itself naturally with coastwise warfare of a guerilla character. the fortune of war inclined now to one side, now to the other, in the particular cases; but in the general there could be no doubt as to which party was getting the worst, undergoing besides almost all the suffering and quite all the harassment. this is the necessary penalty of the defensive, when inadequate. throughout most of this summer of conflict there went on, singularly enough, a certain amount of trade by licensed vessels, neutral and american, which passed down chesapeake bay and went to sea. doubtless the aggregate amount of traffic thus maintained was inconsiderable, as compared with normal conditions, but its allowance by either party to the war is noticeable,--by the british, because of the blockade declared by them; by the americans, because of the evident inexpediency of permitting to depart vessels having full knowledge of conditions, and almost certain to be boarded by the enemy. sailing from blockaded ports is of course promoted in most instances by the nation blockaded, for it is in support of trade; and with the sea close at hand, although there is risk, there is also chance of safe passage through a belt of danger, relatively narrow and entered at will. the case is quite different where a hazardous navigation of sixty to a hundred miles, increasing in intricacy at its further end, and lined throughout with enemy's cruisers, interposes before the sea is reached. the difficulty here is demonstrated by the fact that the "adams," a ship by no means large or exceptionally fettered by navigational difficulties, under a young captain burning to exercise his first command in war, waited four months, even after the bulk of the enemy's fleet had gone, before she was able to get through; and finally did so only under such conditions of weather as caused her to miss her way and strike bottom. the motive of the british for collusion is clear. the chesapeake was the heart of the wheat and flour production of the united states, and while some provision had been made for meeting the wants of the west indies, and of the armies in canada and spain, by refraining from commercial blockade of boston and other eastern ports, these necessary food supplies reached those places only after an expensive transport which materially increased their price; the more as they were carried by land to the point of exportation, it not suiting the british policy to connive at coasting trade even for that purpose. a neutral or licensed vessel, sailing from the chesapeake with flour for a port friendly to the united states, could be seized under cover of the commercial blockade, which she was violating, sent to halifax, and condemned for her technical offence. the cargo then was available for transport whither required, the whole transaction being covered by a veil of legality; but it is plain that the risks to a merchant, in attempting _bonâ fide_ to run a blockade like that of chesapeake bay, exceeded too far any probable gain to have been undertaken without some assurance of compensation, which did not appear on the surface. taken in connection with intelligence obtained by this means, the british motive is apparent; but why did the united states administration tolerate procedures which betrayed its counsels, and directly helped to sustain the enemy's war? something perhaps is due to executive weakness in a government constituted by popular vote; more, probably, at least during the period when immediate military danger did not threaten, to a wish to frustrate the particular advantage reaped by new england, through its exemption from the restrictions of the commercial blockade. when breadstuffs were pouring out of the country through the coast-line of a section which gloried in its opposition to the war,[ ] and lost no opportunity to renew the declaration of its disapproval and its criticism of the government, it was at least natural, perhaps even expedient, to wink at proceedings which transferred elsewhere some of the profits, and did not materially increase the advantage of the enemy. but circumstances became very different when a fleet appeared in the bay, the numbers and action of which showed a determination to carry hostile operations wherever conditions permitted. then, betrayal of such conditions by passing vessels became an unbearable evil; and at the same time the administration had forced upon its attention the unpleasant but notorious fact that, by the active complicity of many of its own citizens, not only the flour trade continued, but the wants of the blockading squadrons along the coast were being supplied. neutrals, real or pretended, and coasting vessels, assuming a lawful destination, took on board cattle, fresh vegetables, and other stores acceptable to ships confined to salt provisions, and either went direct to enemy's ports or were captured by collusion. news was received of contracts made by the british admiral at bermuda for fresh beef to be supplied from american ports, by american dealers, in american vessels; while halifax teemed with similar transactions, without serious attempt at concealment. such aid and comfort to an enemy is by no means unexampled in the history of war, particularly where one of the belligerents is shrewdly commercial; but it is scarcely too much to say that it attained unusual proportions at this time in the united states, and was countenanced by a public opinion which was more than tolerant, particularly in new england, where the attitude of the majority towards the government approached hostility. as a manifestation of contemporary national character, of unwillingness to subordinate personal gain to public welfare, to loyalty to country, it was pitiable and shameful, particularly as it affected large communities; but its instructive significance at this time is the evidence it gives that forty years of confederation, nearly twenty-five being of the closer union under the present constitution, had not yet welded the people into a whole, or created a consciousness truly national. the capacity for patriotism was there, and readiness to suffer for patriotic cause had been demonstrated by the war of independence; but the mass of americans had not yet risen sufficiently above local traditions and interests to discern clearly the noble ideal of national unity, and vagueness of apprehension resulted inevitably in lukewarmness of sentiment. this condition goes far to palliate actions which it cannot excuse; the reproach of helping the enemies of one's country is somewhat less when the nation itself has scarcely emerged to recognition, as it afterwards did under the inspiring watchword, "the union." the necessity to control these conditions of clandestine intercourse found official expression in a message of the president to congress, july , ,[ ] recommending "an immediate and effectual prohibition of all exports" for a limited time; subject to removal by executive order, in case the commercial blockade were raised. a summary of the conditions above related was given, as a cause for action. the president's further comment revealed the continuity of thought and policy which dictated his recommendation, and connected the proposed measure with the old series of commercial restrictions, associated with his occupancy of the state department under jefferson's administration. "the system of the enemy, combining with the blockade of our ports special licenses to neutral vessels, and insidious discrimination between different ports of the united states, if not counteracted, will have the effect of diminishing very materially the pressure of the war on the enemy, and encourage perseverance in it, and at the same time will leave the general commerce of the united states under all the pressure the enemy can impose, thus subjecting the whole to british regulation, in subserviency to british monopoly." the house passed a bill meeting the president's suggestions, but it was rejected by the senate on july . the executive then fell back on its own war powers; and on july the secretary of the navy, by direction of the president, issued a general order to all naval officers in command, calling attention to "the palpable and criminal intercourse held with the enemy's forces blockading and invading the waters of the united states." "this intercourse," he explicitly added, "is not only carried on by foreigners, under the specious garb of friendly flags, who convey provisions, water, and succors of all kinds (ostensibly destined for friendly ports, in the face, too, of a declared and rigorous blockade),[ ] direct to the fleets and stations of the enemy, with constant intelligence of our naval and military force and preparation, ... but the same traffic, intercourse, and intelligence is carried on with great subtlety and treachery by profligate citizens, who, in vessels ostensibly navigating our own waters, from port to port [coasters], find means to convey succors or intelligence to the enemy, and elude the penalty of law."[ ] officers were therefore instructed to arrest all vessels, the movements or situation of which indicated an intention to effect any of the purposes indicated. a similar order was issued, august , by the war department to army officers.[ ] in accordance with his instructions, captain morris of the "adams," on july or , stopped the ship "monsoon," from alexandria. her agent wrote a correspondent in boston that, when the bill failed in the senate, he had had no doubt of her being allowed to proceed, "but the secretary and mr. madison have made a sort of embargo, or directed the stoppage of vessels."[ ] he added that another brig was lying in the river ready loaded, but held by the same order. morris's indorsement on the ship's papers shows the barefacedness of the transaction. "whereas the within-mentioned ship 'monsoon' is laden with flour, and _must_ pass within the control of the enemy's squadron now within, and blockading chesapeake bay, if she be allowed to proceed on her intended voyage, and as the enemy might derive from her such intelligence and succor as would be serviceable to themselves and injurious to the united states, i forbid her proceeding while the enemy shall be so disposed as to prevent a reasonable possibility of her getting to sea without falling into their possession."[ ] at this writing the british had left the potomac itself, and the most of them were above. a week later, at charleston, a ship called the "caroline" was visited by a united states naval officer, and found with a license from cockburn to carry a cargo, free from molestation by british cruisers.[ ] "with flour at lisbon $ per barrel, _no sale_, and at halifax $ , _in demand_," queries a baltimore paper of the day, "where would all the vessels that would in a few days have been off from alexandria have gone, if the 'monsoon' had not been stopped? they would have been _captured_ and sent to halifax."[ ] morris's action was in accordance with the secretary's order, and went no further than to stop a voyage which, in view of the existing proclaimed blockade, and of the great british force at hand, bore collusion on its face. the president's request for legislation, which congress had denied, went much further. it was a recurrence, and the last, to the policy of commercial retaliation, fostered by himself and jefferson in preference to armed resistance. by such measures in peace, and as far as commercial prosperity was concerned, they had opened the nation's veins without vindicating its self-respect. the military value of food supplies to the enemy in canada and on the coast, however, could not be contested; and during the recess of congress it received emphasis by a canadian embargo upon the export of grain. hence, at the next session the president's recommendation of july was given attention, and there was passed almost immediately--december , ,--a sweeping embargo law, applicable not only to external commerce but to coasters. as this ended the long series of commercial restrictions, so was it also of limited duration as compared with them, being withdrawn the following april. by the act of december , as interpreted by the treasury, foreign merchant vessels might depart with cargoes already laden, except provisions and military stores, which must be relanded; but nothing could be shipped that was not already on board when the act was received. coasters, even for accustomed voyages, could obtain clearances only by permission from the president; and the rules for such permission, given through the collectors, were extremely stringent. in no case were the vessels permitted to leave interior waters, proceeding from one sound or bay to another, and be "at sea" for even a short distance; nor were they to be permitted to carry any provisions, or supplies useful to an enemy, if there was the slightest chance of their falling into his power. it would appear that the orders of july had been allowed to lapse after the great body of the british left the chesapeake; for morris, still in the potomac, acknowledging the receipt of this act on december , writes: "there are several vessels below us in the river with flour. i have issued orders to the gunboats to detain them, and as soon as the wind will permit, shall proceed with this ship, to give all possible effect to the act." six days afterwards, having gone down as he intended, he found the british anchored off the mouth of the stream, at a point where the bay is little more than five miles wide. "two american brigs passed down before us, and i have every reason to believe threw themselves into the enemy's hands last wednesday."[ ] on september the principal part of the british fleet quitted chesapeake bay for the season; leaving behind a ship of the line with some smaller vessels, to enforce the blockade. viewed as a military campaign, to sustain the character as well as the interests of the country, its operations cannot be regarded as successful. with overwhelming numbers, and signally favored by the quiet inland waters with extensive ramifications which characterized the scene of war, the results, though on a more extensive scale, differed nothing in kind from the harassment inflicted all along the coast from maine to georgia, by the squadrons cruising outside. ample demonstration was indeed afforded, there as elsewhere, of the steady, remorseless, far-reaching effect of a predominant sea power; and is confirmed explicitly by an incidental remark of the russian minister at washington writing to warren, april , , concerning an armistice, in connection with the abortive russian proffer of mediation.[ ] even at this early period, "it would be almost impossible to establish an armistice, without raising the blockade, since the latter does them more harm than all the hostilities."[ ] but in direct military execution the expedition had undoubtedly fallen far short of its opportunity, afforded by the wretchedly unprepared state of the region against which it had been sent. whether the fault lay with the commander-in-chief, or with the admiralty for insufficient means given him, is needless here to inquire. the squadron remaining through the winter perpetuated the isolation of norfolk from the upper bay, and barred the "constellation" and "adams" from the sea. ammunition and stores had to be brought by slow and unwieldly transportation from the potomac across country, and it was not till january , , that the "adams" got away. two attempts of the "constellation" a month later were frustrated. the principal two british divisions, the action of which has so far been considered, the one blockading the chesapeake, the other watching decatur's squadron in new london, marked the extremities of what may be considered the central section of the enemy's coastwise operations upon the atlantic. although the commercial shipping of the united states belonged largely to new england, much the greater part of the exports came from the district thus closed to the world; and within it also, after the sailing of the "president" and "congress" from boston, and the capture of the "chesapeake", lay in all the bigger vessels of the navy, save the "constitution". in the conditions presented to the enemy, the sections of the coast-line south of virginia, and north of cape cod, differed in some important respects from the central division, and from each other. there was in them no extensive estuary wide open to the sea, resembling chesapeake and delaware bays, and long island sound, accessible to vessels of all sizes; features which naturally determined upon these points the chief effort of a maritime enemy, enabling him readily to paralyze the whole system of intercourse depending upon them, domestic as well as foreign. the southern waters abounded indeed in internal coastwise communications; not consecutive throughout, but continuous for long reaches along the shores of north and south carolina and georgia. these, however, were narrow, and not easily approached. behind the sea islands, which inclose this navigation, small craft can make their voyages sheltered from the perils of the sea, and protected in great measure from attack other than by boats or very light cruisers; to which, moreover, some local knowledge was necessary, for crossing the bars, or threading the channels connecting sound with sound. into these inside basins empty numerous navigable rivers, which promoted intercourse, and also furnished lines of retreat from danger coming from the sea. coupled with these conditions was the fact that the united states had in these quarters no naval establishment, and no naval vessels of force. defence was intrusted wholly to gunboats, with three or four armed schooners of somewhat larger tonnage. american offensive operation, confined here as elsewhere to commerce destroying, depended entirely on privateers. into these ports, where there were no public facilities for repair, not even a national sloop of war entered until was well advanced. prior to the war, one third of the domestic export of the united states had issued from this southern section; and in the harassed year this ratio increased. the aggregate for the whole country was reduced by one half from that of , and amounted to little more than one fourth of the prosperous times preceding jefferson's embargo of , with its vexatious progeny of restrictive measures; but the proportion of the south increased. the same was observable in the middle states, containing the great centres of new york, philadelphia, and baltimore. there a ratio to the total, of a little under fifty per cent, rose to something above that figure. the relative diminution, corresponding to the increases just noted, fell upon new england, and is interesting because of what it indicates. before the war the export of domestic produce from the eastern ports was twenty per cent of the national total; in it fell to ten per cent. when the domestic export is taken in conjunction with the re-exportation of foreign products, the loss of new england is still more striking. from twenty-five per cent of the whole national export, domestic and foreign, she now fell to ten per cent of the diminished total. when it is remembered that throughout the eastern ports alone were open to neutral ships, no commercial blockade of them having yet been instituted, these results are the more noticeable. the general explanation is that the industries of the united states at that time divided into two principal classes,--agricultural and maritime; the former of which supplied the material for commerce, while the latter furnished transportation for whatever surplus of production remained for export. manufactures sufficed only for home demands, being yet in a state of infancy; forced, in fact, upon an unwilling new england by the policy of commercial restriction which drove her ships off the sea. domestic products for export therefore meant almost wholly the yield of the fields, the forests, and the fisheries. the latter belonged to new england, but they fell with the war. her soil did not supply grain enough to feed her people; and her domestic exports, therefore, were reduced to shipments of wheat and flour conveyed to her by inland transportation from the more fertile, but blockaded, regions to the southward. despite the great demand for provisions in halifax and the st. lawrence region, and the facility for egress by sea, through the absence of blockade, the slowness and cost of land carriage brought forward an insufficient supply, and laid a heavy charge upon the transaction; while the license system of the british, modifying this condition of things to their own advantage, by facilitating exports from the chesapeake, certainly did operate, as the president's message said, to regulate american commerce in conformity with british interests. the re-exportation of foreign produce had once played a very large part in the foreign trade of new england. this item consisted chiefly in west india commodities; and although, owing to several causes, it fell off very much in the years between and , it had remained still considerable. it was, however, particularly obnoxious to british interests, as then understood by british statesmen and people; and since it depended entirely upon american ships,--for it was not to the interest of a neutral to bring sugar and coffee to an american port merely to carry it away again,--it disappeared entirely when the outbreak of war rendered all american merchant vessels liable to capture. in fact, as far as the united states was concerned, although this re-exportation appeared among commercial returns, it was not an interest of commerce, accurately so called, but of navigation, of carrying trade. it had to do with ships, not with cargoes; its gain was that of the wagoner. still, the loss by the idleness of the ships, due to the war, may be measured in terms of the cargoes. in new england re-exported foreign products to the amount of $ , , ; in , $ , , ; in , no more than $ , . it remains to add that, as can be readily understood, all export, whether of foreign or domestic produce, was chiefly by neutrals, which were not liable to capture so long as there was no blockade proclaimed. from december to , , forty-four vessels cleared from boston for abroad, of which five only were americans.[ ] under the very reduced amount of their commercial movement, the tonnage of the middle and southern states was more than adequate to their local necessities; and they now had no need of the aid which in conditions of normal prosperity they received from the eastern shipping. the latter, therefore, having lost its usual local occupation, and also the office it had filled towards the other sections of the union, was either left idle or turned perforce to privateering. september , , there were in boston harbor ninety-one ships, two barks, one hundred and nine brigs, and forty-three schooners; total, two hundred and forty-five, besides coasters. the accumulation shows the lack of employment. december , two hundred square-rigged vessels were laid up in boston alone.[ ] insurance on american vessels was stated to be fifty per cent.[ ] whether tonnage to any large amount was transferred to a neutral flag, as afterwards so much american shipping was during the civil war, i have not ascertained. it was roundly intimated that neutral flags were used to cover the illicit intercourse with the enemy before mentioned; but whether by regular transfer or by fraudulent papers does not appear. an officer of the frigate "congress," in her unprofitable voyage just mentioned, says that after parting with the "president," she fell in with a few licensed americans and a great number of spaniards and portuguese.[ ] the flags of these two nations, and of sweden, certainly abounded to an abnormal extent, and did much of the traffic from america; but it seems unlikely that there was at that particular epoch any national commerce, other than british, at once large enough, and sufficiently deficient in shipping of its own, to absorb any great number of americans. in truth, the commerce of the world had lost pretty much all its american component, because this, through a variety of causes, had come to consist chiefly of domestic agricultural products, which were thrown back upon the nation's hands, and required no carriers; the enemy having closed the gates against them, except so far as suited his own purposes. the disappearance of american merchant ships from the high seas corresponded to the void occasioned by the blockade of american staples of commerce. the only serious abatement from this generalization arises from the british system of licenses, permitting the egress of certain articles useful to themselves. the results from the conditions above analyzed are reflected in the returns of commerce, in the movements of american coasters, and in the consequent dispositions of the enemy. in the treasury year ending september , , the value of the total exports from the eastern states was $ , , ; from the middle section, $ , , ; from the south, $ , , . virginia is here reckoned with the middle, because her exports found their way out by the chesapeake; and this appreciation is commercial and military in character, not political or social. while this was the state of foreign trade under war conditions, the effect of local circumstances upon coasting is also to be noticed. the middle section, characterized by the great estuaries, and by the description of its products,--grain primarily, and secondly tobacco,--was relatively self-sufficing and compact. its growth of food, as has been seen, was far in excess of its wants, and the distance by land between the extreme centres of distribution, from tide-water to tide-water, was comparatively short. from new york to baltimore by road is but four fifths as far as from new york to boston; and at new york and baltimore, as at boston, water communication was again reached for the great lines of distribution from either centre. in fact, traffic from new york southward needed to go no farther than elk river, forty miles short of baltimore, to be in touch with the whole chesapeake system. philadelphia lies half-way between new york and baltimore, approximately a hundred miles from each. the extremes of the middle section of the country were thus comparatively independent of coastwise traffic for mutual intercourse, and the character of their coasts co-operated to reduce the disposition to employ coasters in war. from the chesapeake to sandy hook the shore-line sweeps out to sea, is safely approachable by hostile navigators, and has for refuge no harbors of consequence, except the delaware. the local needs of the little communities along the beaches might foster a creeping stream of very small craft, for local supply; but as a highway, for intercourse on a large scale, the sea here was too exposed for use, when taken in connection with the facility for transport by land, which was not only short but with comparatively good roads. in war, as in other troublous times, prices are subject to complicated causes of fluctuation, not always separable. two great staples, flour and sugar, however, may be taken to indicate with some certainty the effects of impeded water transport. from a table of prices current, of august, , it appears that at baltimore, in the centre of the wheat export, flour was $ . per barrel; in philadelphia, $ . ; in new york, $ . ; in boston, $ . . at richmond, equally well placed with baltimore as regarded supplies, but with inferior communications for disposing of its surplus, the price was $ . . removing from the grain centre in the other direction, flour at charleston is reported at $ . --about the same as new york; at wilmington, north carolina, $ . . not impossibly, river transportation had in these last some cheapening effect, not readily ascertainable now. in sugar, the scale is seen to ascend in an inverse direction. at boston, unblockaded, it is quoted at $ . the hundredweight, itself not a low rate; at new york, blockaded, $ . ; at philadelphia, with a longer journey, $ . ; at baltimore, $ . ; at savannah, $ . in the last named place, nearness to the florida line, with the inland navigation, favored smuggling and safe transportation. the price at new orleans, a sugar-producing district, $ . , affords a standard by which to measure the cost of carriage at that time. flour in the same city, on february , , was $ the barrel. in both articles the jump between boston and new york suggests forcibly the harassment of the coasting trade. it manifests either diminution of supply, or the effect of more expensive conveyance by land; possibly both. the case of the southern seaboard cities was similar to that of boston; for it will not be overlooked that, as the more important food products came from the middle of the country, they would be equally available for each extreme. the south was the more remote, but this was compensated in some degree by better internal water communications; and its demand also was less, for the white population was smaller and less wealthy than that of new england. the local product, rice, also went far to supply deficiencies in other grains. in the matter of manufactured goods, however, the disadvantage of the south was greater. these had to find their way there from the farther extreme of the land; for the development of manufactures had been much the most marked in the east. it has before been quoted that some wagons loaded with dry goods were forty-six days in accomplishing the journey from philadelphia to georgetown, south carolina, in may of this year. some relief in these articles reached the south by smuggling across the florida line, and the spanish waters opposite st. mary's were at this time thronged with merchant shipping to an unprecedented extent; for although smuggling was continual, in peace as in war, across a river frontier of a hundred miles, the stringent demand consequent upon the interruption of coastwise traffic provoked an increased supply. "the trade to amelia,"--the northernmost of the spanish sea-islands,--reported the united states naval officer at st. mary's towards the end of the war, "is immense. upwards of fifty square-rigged vessels are now in that port under swedish, russian, and spanish colors, two thirds of which are considered british property."[ ] it was the old story of the continental and license systems of the napoleonic struggle, re-enacted in america; and, as always, the inhabitants on both sides the line co-operated heartily in beating the law. the two great food staples chosen sufficiently indicate general conditions as regards communications from centre to centre. upon this supervened the more extensive and intricate problem of distribution from the centres. this more especially imparted to the eastern and southern coasts the particular characteristics of coasting trade and coast warfare, in which they differ from the middle states. these form the burden of the letters from the naval captains commanding the stations at charleston, savannah, and portsmouth, new hampshire; nor is it without significance that bainbridge at boston, not a way port, but a centre, displayed noticeably less anxiety than the others about this question, which less touched his own command. captain hull, now commanding the portsmouth yard, writes, june , , that light cruisers like the "siren," lately arrived at boston, and the "enterprise," then with him, can be very useful by driving away the enemy's small vessels and privateers which have been molesting the coasting trade. he purposes to order them eastward, along the maine coast, to collect coasters in convoy and protect their long-shore voyages, after the british fashion on the high seas. "the coasting trade here," he adds, "is immense. not less than fifty sail last night anchored in this harbor, bound to boston and other points south. the 'nautilus' [a captured united states brig] has been seen from this harbor every week for some time past, and several other enemy's vessels are on the coast every few days." an american privateer has just come in, bringing with her as a prize one of her own class, called the "liverpool packet," which "within six months has taken from us property to an immense amount."[ ] ten days later hull's prospects have darkened. there has appeared off portsmouth a blockading division; a frigate, a sloop, and two brigs. "when our two vessels were first ordered to this station, i believed they would be very useful in protecting the coasting trade; but the enemy's cruisers are now so much stronger that we can hardly promise security to the trade, if we undertake to convoy it." on the contrary, the brigs themselves would be greatly hazarded, and resistance to attack, if supported by the neighborhood, may entail destruction upon ports where they have taken refuge; a thought possibly suggested by cockburn's action at havre de grace and frenchtown. he therefore now proposes that they should run the blockade and cruise at sea. this course was eventually adopted; but for the moment the secretary wrote that, while he perceived the propriety of hull's remarks, "the call for protection on that coast has been very loud, and having sent those vessels for that special purpose, i do not now incline immediately to remove them."[ ] it was necessary to bend to a popular clamor, which in this case did not, as it very frequently does, make unreasonable demands and contravene all considerations of military wisdom. a month later hull reports the blockade so strict that it is impossible to get out by day. the commander of the "enterprise," johnston blakely, expresses astonishment that the enemy should employ so large a force to blockade so small a vessel.[ ] it was, however, no matter for surprise, but purely a question of business. the possibilities of injury by the "enterprise" must be blasted at any cost, and blakely himself a year later, in the "wasp," was to illustrate forcibly what one smart ship can effect in the destruction of hostile commerce and hostile cruisers. blakely's letter was dated july . the "enterprise" had not long to wait for her opportunity, but it did not fall to his lot to utilize it. being promoted the following month, he was relieved in command by lieutenant william burrows. this officer had been absent in china, in mercantile employment, when the war broke out, and, returning, was captured at sea. exchanged in june, , he was ordered to the "enterprise," in which he saw his only service in the war,--a brief month. she left portsmouth september , on a coasting cruise, and on the morning of the th, being then off monhegan island, on the coast of maine, sighted a vessel of war, which proved to be the british brig "boxer," commander samuel blyth. the antagonists in the approaching combat were nearly of equal force, the respective armaments being, "enterprise," fourteen -pounder carronades, and two long -pounders, the "boxer," twelve -pounder carronades and two long sixes. the action began side by side, at half pistol-shot, the "enterprise" to the right and to windward (position ). after fifteen minutes the latter ranged ahead ( ). as she did so, one of her -pounders, which by the forethought of captain burrows had been shifted from its place in the bow to the stern,[ ] was used with effect to rake her opponent. she then rounded-to on the starboard tack, on the port-bow of the enemy,--ahead but well to the left ( ),--in position to rake with her carronades; and, setting the foresail, sailed slowly across from left to right. in five minutes the "boxer's" maintopmast and foretopsailyard fell. this left the "enterprise" the mastery of the situation, which she continued to hold until ten minutes later, when the enemy's fire ceased. her colors could not be hauled down, blyth having nailed them to the mast. he himself had been killed at the first broadside, and almost at the same instant burrows too fell, mortally wounded. [illustration: diagram of the enterprise vs. boxer battle] the "boxer" belonged to a class of vessel, the gun brigs, which marryat through one of his characters styled "bathing machines," only not built, as the legitimate article, to go up, but to go down. another,--the immortal boatswain chucks,--proclaimed that they would "certainly d--n their inventor to all eternity;" adding characteristically, that "their low common names, 'pincher,' 'thrasher,' 'boxer,' 'badger,' and all that sort, are quite good enough for them." in the united states service the "enterprise," which had been altered from a schooner to a brig, was considered a singularly dull sailer. as determined by american measurements, taken four days after the action, the size of the two was the same within twenty tons; the "boxer" a little the larger. the superiority of the "enterprise" in broadside force, was eight guns to seven; or, stated in weight of projectiles, one hundred and thirty-five pounds to one hundred and fourteen. this disparity, though real, was in no sense decisive, and the execution done by each bore no comparison to the respective armaments. the hull of the "boxer" was pierced on the starboard side by twelve -pound shot, nearly two for each of the "enterprise's" carronades. the -pounder had done even better, scoring five hits. on her port side had entered six of pounds, and four of pounds. by the official report of an inspection, made upon her arrival in portland, it appears that her upper works and sides forward were torn to pieces.[ ] in her mainmast alone were three -pound shot.[ ] as a set-off to this principal damage received, she had to show only one -pound shot in the hull of the "enterprise," one in the foremast, and one in the mainmast.[ ] from these returns, the american loss in killed and wounded, twelve, must have been largely by grapeshot or musketry. the british had twenty-one men hurt. it has been said that this difference in loss is nearly proportionate to the difference in force. this is obviously inexact; for the "enterprise" was superior in gun power by twelve per cent, while the "boxer's" loss was greater by seventy-five per cent. moreover, if the statement of crews be accurate, that the "enterprise" had one hundred and twenty and the "boxer" only sixty-six,[ ] it is clear that the latter had double the human target, and scored little more than half the hits. the contest, in brief, was first an artillery duel, side to side, followed by a raking position obtained by the american. it therefore reproduced in leading features, although on a minute scale, the affair between the "chesapeake" and "shannon"; and the exultation of the american populace at this rehabilitation of the credit of their navy, though exaggerated in impression, was in principle sound. the british court martial found that the defeat was "to be attributed to a superiority of the enemy's force, principally in the number of men, as well as to a greater degree of skill in the direction of her fire, and the destructive effects of her first broadside."[ ] this admission as to the enemy's gunnery is substantially identical with the claim made for that of the "shannon,"--notably as to the first broadside. as to the greater numbers, one hundred and twenty is certainly almost twice sixty-six, and the circumstance should be weighed; but in an engagement confined to the guns, and between -pounder carronade batteries, it is of less consequence than at first glance appears. a cruiser of those days expected to be ready to fight with many men away in prizes. had it come to boarding, or had the "boxer's" gunnery been good, disabling her opponent's men, the numbers would have become of consideration. as it was, they told for something, but not for very much. if national credit were at issue in every single-ship action, the balance of the "chesapeake" and "shannon," "enterprise" and "boxer," would incline rather to the american side; for the "boxer" was not just out of port with new commander, officers, and crew, but had been in commission six months, had in that time crossed the ocean, and been employed along the coast. the credit and discredit in both cases is personal, not national. it was the sadder in blyth's case because he was an officer of distinguished courage and activity, who had begun his fighting career at the age of eleven, when he was on board a heavily battered ship in lord howe's battle of june , . at thirty, with little influence, and at a period when promotion had become comparatively sluggish, he had fairly fought his way to the modest preferment in which he died. under the restricted opportunities of the united states navy, burrows had seen service, and his qualities received recognition, in the hostilities with tripoli. the unusual circumstance of both captains falling, and so young,--burrows was but twenty-eight,--imparted to this tiny combat an unusual pathos, which was somewhat heightened by the fact that blyth himself had acted as pall-bearer when lawrence, three months before, was buried with military honors at halifax. in portland, maine, the two young commanders were borne to their graves together, in a common funeral, with all the observance possible in a small coast town; business being everywhere suspended, and the customary tokens of mourning displayed upon buildings and shipping. after this engagement, as the season progressed, coastwise operations in this quarter became increasingly hazardous for both parties. on october , hull wrote that neither the "enterprise" nor the "rattlesnake" could cruise much longer. the enemy still maintained his grip, in virtue of greater size and numbers. ten days later comes the report of a convoy, with one of the brigs, driven into port by a frigate; that the enemy appear almost every day, and never without a force superior to that of both his brigs, which he fears to trust out overnight, lest they find themselves at morning under the guns of an opponent of weightier battery. the long nights and stormy seas of winter, however, soon afforded to coasters a more secure protection than friendly guns, and hull's letters intermit until april , , when he announces that the enemy has made his appearance in great force; he presumes for the summer. besides the danger and interruption of the coasting trade, hull was increasingly anxious as to the safety of portsmouth itself. by a recent act of congress four seventy-fours had been ordered to be built, and one of them was now in construction there under his supervision. despite the navigational difficulties of entering the port, which none was more capable of appreciating than he, he regarded the defences as so inadequate that it would be perfectly possible to destroy her on the stocks. "there is nothing," he said, "to prevent a very small force from entering the harbor." at the same moment decatur was similarly concerned for the squadron at new london, and we have seen the fears of stewart for norfolk. so marked was hull's apprehension in this respect, that he sent the frigate "congress" four miles up the river, where she remained to the end of the war; her crew being transferred to lake ontario. new york, the greater wealth of which increased both her danger and her capacity for self-protection, was looking to her own fortifications, as well as manning, provisioning, and paying the crews of the gunboats that patrolled her waters, on the side of the sea and of the sound. the exposure of the coasting trade from boston bay eastward was increased by the absence of interior coastwise channels, until the chain of islands about and beyond the penobscot was reached. on the other hand, the character of the shore, bold, with off-lying rocks and many small harbors, conferred a distinct advantage upon those having local knowledge, as the coasting seamen had. on such a route the points of danger are capes and headlands, particularly if their projection is great, such as the promontory between portsmouth and boston, of which cape ann is a conspicuous landmark. there the coaster has to go farthest from his refuge, and the deep-sea cruiser can approach with least risk. in a proper scheme of coast defence batteries are mounted on such positions. this, it is needless to say, in view of the condition of the port fortifications, had not been done in the united states. barring this, the whole situation of the coast, of trade, and of blockade, was one with which british naval officers had then been familiar for twenty years, through their employment upon the french and spanish coasts, as well mediterranean as atlantic, and in many other parts of the world. to hover near the land, intercepting and fighting by day, manning boats and cutting out by night, harassing, driving on shore, destroying the sinews of war by breaking down communications, was to them simply an old experience to be applied under new and rather easier circumstances. of these operations frequent instances are given in contemporary journals and letters; but less account has been taken of the effects, as running through household and social economics, touching purse and comfort. these are traceable in commercial statistics. at the time they must have been severely felt, bringing the sense of the war vividly home to the community. the stringency of the british action is betrayed, however, by casual notices. the captain of a schooner burned by the british frigate "nymphe" is told by her commander that he had orders to destroy every vessel large enough to carry two men. "a brisk business is now carrying on all along our coast between british cruisers and our coasting vessels, in ready money. friday last, three masters went into gloucester to procure money to carry to a british frigate to ransom their vessels. thursday, a marblehead schooner was ransomed by the "nymphe" for $ . saturday, she took off cape ann three coasters and six fishing boats, and the masters were sent on shore for money to ransom them at $ each." there was room for the wail of a federalist paper: "our coasts unnavigable to ourselves, though free to the enemy and the money-making neutral; our harbors blockaded; our shipping destroyed or rotting at the docks; silence and stillness in our cities; the grass growing upon the public wharves."[ ] in the district of maine, "the long stagnation of foreign, and embarrassment of domestic trade, have extended the sad effects from the seaboard through the interior, where the scarcity of money is severely felt. there is not enough to pay the taxes."[ ] south of chesapeake bay the coast is not bold and rocky, like that north of cape cod, but in its low elevation and gradual soundings resembles rather those of new jersey and delaware. it has certain more pronounced features in the extensive navigable sounds and channels, which lie behind the islands and sandbars skirting the shores. the north carolina system of internal water communications, pamlico sound and its extensions, stood by itself. to reach that to the southward, it was necessary to make a considerable sea run, round the far projecting cape fear, exposed to capture outside; but from charleston to the st. mary's river, which then formed the florida boundary for a hundred miles of its length, the inside passages of south carolina and georgia were continuous, though in many places difficult, and in others open to attack from the sea. between st. mary's and savannah, for example, there were seven inlets, and captain campbell, the naval officer in charge of that district, reported that three of these were practicable for frigates;[ ] but this statement, while literally accurate, conveys an exaggerated impression, for no sailing frigate would be likely to cross a difficult bar for a single offensive operation, merely to find herself confronted with conditions forbidding further movement. the great menace to the inside traffic consisted in the facility with which cruisers outside could pass from entrance to entrance, contrasted with the intricacies within impeding similar action by the defence. if a bevy of unprotected coasters were discerned by an enemy's lookouts, the ship could run down abreast, send in her boats, capture or destroy, before the gunboats, if equidistant at the beginning, could overcome the obstacles due to rise and fall of tide, or narrowness of passage, and arrive to the rescue.[ ] a suggested remedy was to replace the gunboats by rowing barges, similar to, but more powerful than, those used by the enemy in his attacks. the insuperable trouble here proved to be that men fit for such work, fit to contend with the seamen of the enemy, were unwilling to abandon the sea, with its hopes of prize money, or to submit to the exposure and discomfort of the life. "the crews of the gunboats," wrote captain campbell, "consist of all nations except turks, greeks, and jews." on one occasion the ship's company of an american privateer, which had been destroyed after a desperate and celebrated resistance to attack by british armed boats, arrived at st. mary's. of one hundred and nineteen american seamen, only four could be prevailed upon to enter the district naval force.[ ] this was partly due to the embarrassment of the national finances. "the want of funds to pay off discharged men," wrote the naval captain at charleston, "has given such a character to the navy as to stop recruiting."[ ] "men could be had," reported his colleague at st. mary's, now transferred to savannah, "were it not for the treasury notes, which cannot be passed at less than five per cent discount. men will not ship without cash. there are upwards of a hundred seamen in port, but they refuse to enter, even though we offer to ship for a month only."[ ] during the american civil war, fifty years after the time of which we are speaking, this internal communication was effectually intercepted by stationing inside steamers of adequate force; but that recourse, while not absolutely impracticable for small sailing cruisers, involved a risk disproportionate to the gain. through traffic could have been broken up by keeping a frigate in any one of the three sounds, entrance to which was practicable for vessels of that class. in view of the amount of trade passing back and forth, which campbell stated to be in one period of four months as much as eight million dollars, it is surprising that this obvious expedient was not adopted by the enemy. that they appreciated the situation is shown by the intention, announced in , of seizing one of the islands; which was effected in january, , by the occupation of cumberland and st. simons'. as it was, up to that late period the routine methods of their european experience prevailed, with the result that their coastwise operations in the south differed little from those in the extreme north. smaller vessels occasionally, armed boats frequently, pushed inside the inlets, seizing coasters, and at times even attacking the gunboats. while the positive loss thus inflicted was considerable, it will readily be understood that it was much exceeded by the negative effect, in deterring from movement, and reducing navigation to the limits of barest necessity. in these operations the ships of war were seconded by privateers from the west indies, which hovered round this coast, as the halifax vessels did round that of new england, seeking such scraps of prize money as might be left over from the ruin of american commerce and the immunities of the licensed traders. the united states officers at charleston and savannah were at their wits' ends to provide security with their scanty means,--more scanty even in men than in vessels; and when there came upon them the additional duty of enforcing the embargo of december, , in the many quarters, and against the various subterfuges, by which evasion would be attempted, the task was manifestly impossible. "this is the most convenient part of the world for illicit trade that i have ever seen," wrote campbell. from a return made this summer by the secretary of the navy to congress,[ ] it is shown that one brig of eighteen guns, which was not a cruiser, but a station ship at savannah, eleven gunboats, three other schooners, and four barges, were apportioned to the stretch of coast from georgetown to st. mary's,--over two hundred miles. with the fettered movement of the gunboats before mentioned, contrasted with the outside cruisers, it was impossible to meet conditions by distributing this force, "for the protection of the several inlets," as had at first been directed by the navy department. the only defensive recourse approximately satisfactory was that of the deep-sea merchant service of great britain, proposed also by hull at the northward, to assemble vessels in convoys, and to accompany them throughout a voyage. "i have deemed it expedient," wrote campbell from st. mary's, "to order the gun vessels to sail in company, not less than four in number, and have ordered convoy to the inland trade at stated periods, by which means vessels may be protected, and am sorry to say this is all that can be effected in our present situation."[ ] in this way a fair degree of immunity was attained. rubs were met with occasionally, and heavy losses were reported from time to time. there was a certain amount of fighting and scuffling, in which advantage was now on one side, now on the other; but upon the whole it would appear that the novelty of the conditions and ignorance of the ground rather imposed upon the imagination of the enemy, and that their operations against this inside trade were at once less active and less successful than under the more familiar features presented by the coasts of maine and massachusetts. whatever more or less of success or injury attended the coastwise trade in the several localities, the point to be observed is that the enemy's operations effectually separated the different sections of the country from one another, so far as this means of intercourse was concerned; thereby striking a deadly blow at the mutual support which might be given by communities differing so markedly in resources, aptitudes, and industries. the remark before made upon the effect of headlands, on the minor scale of a particular shore-line, applied with special force to one so extensive as that of the united states atlantic coast in . cape cod to the north and cape fear to the south were conspicuous examples of such projection. combined with the relatively shelterless and harborless central stretch, intervening between them, from the chesapeake to sandy hook, they constituted insuperable obstacles to sustained intercommunication by water. the presence of the enemy in great numbers before, around, and within the central section, emphasized the military weakness of position which nature herself had there imposed. to get by sea from one end of the country to the other it was necessary to break the blockade in starting, to take a wide sweep out to sea, and again to break it at the desired point of entrance. this, however, is not coasting. the effect which this coast pressure produced upon the welfare of the several sections is indicated here and there by official utterances. the war party naturally inclined to minimize unfavorable results, and their opponents in some measure to exaggerate them; but of the general tendency there can be no serious doubt. mr. pearson, an opposition member of the house from north carolina, speaking february , , when the record of was made up, and the short-lived embargo of december was yet in force, said: "blocked up as we are by the enemy's squadron upon our coast, corked up by our still more unmerciful embargo and non-importation laws, calculated as it were to fill up the little chasm in the ills which the enemy alone could not inflict; the entire coasting trade destroyed, and even the little pittance of intercourse from one port to the other in the same state destroyed [by the embargo], the planters of the southern and middle states, finding no market at home for their products, are driven to the alternative of wagoning them hundreds of miles, in search of a precarious market in the northern and eastern states, or permitting them to rot on their hands. many articles which are, or by habit have become, necessary for comfort, are obtained at extravagant prices from other parts of the union. the balance of trade, if trade it may be called, from these and other causes being so entirely against the southern and middle states, the whole of our specie is rapidly travelling to the north and east. our bank paper is thrown back upon the institutions from which it issued; and as the war expenditures in the southern and middle states, where the loans have been principally obtained, are proportionately inconsiderable, the bills of these banks are daily returning, and their vaults drained of specie, to be locked up in eastern and western states, never to return but with the return of peace and prosperity."[ ] the isolation of north carolina was extreme, with cape fear to the south and the occupied chesapeake north of her. the governor of the central state of pennsylvania, evidently in entire political sympathy with the national administration, in his message to the legislature at the same period,[ ] is able to congratulate the people on the gratifying state of the commonwealth; a full treasury, abundant yield of agriculture, and the progress of manufacturing development, which, "however we may deprecate and deplore the calamities of protracted war, console us with the prospect of permanent and extensive establishments equal to our wants, and such as will insure the real and practical independence of our country." but he adds: "at no period of our history has the immense importance of internal navigation been so strikingly exemplified as since the commencement of hostilities. the transportation of produce, and the intercourse between citizens of the different states, which knit more strongly the bonds of social and political union, are greatly retarded, and, through many of their accustomed channels, entirely interrupted by the water craft of the enemy, sinking, burning, and otherwise destroying, the property which it cannot appropriate to its own use." he looks forward to a renewal of similar misfortune in the following year, an anticipation more than fulfilled. the officials of other states, according to their political complexion, either lamented the sufferings of the war and its supposed injustice, or comforted themselves and their hearers by reflecting upon the internal fruitfulness of the country, and its increasing self-sufficingness. the people were being equipped for independence of the foreigner by the progress of manufactures, and by habits of economy and self-denial, enforced by deprivation arising from the suppression of the coasting trade and the rigors of the commercial blockade. the effect of the latter, which by the spring of had been in force nearly a twelvemonth over the entire coast south of narragansett bay, can be more directly estimated and concisely stated, in terms of money, than can the interruption of the coasting trade; for the statistics of export and import, contrasted with those of years of peace, convey it directly. it has already been stated that the exports for the year ending september , , during which the operation of the blockade was most universal and continuous, fell to $ , , , as compared with $ , , in , and $ , , in , a year of peace though of restricted intercourse. such figures speak distinctly as well as forcibly; it being necessary, however, to full appreciation of the difference between and , to remember that during the first half of the former official period--from october , , to april , ,--there had been no commercial blockade beyond the chesapeake and delaware; and that, even after it had been instituted, the british license system operated to the end of september to qualify its effects. here and there interesting particulars may be gleaned, which serve to illustrate these effects, and to give to the picture that precision of outline which heightens impression. "i believe," wrote a painstaking baltimore editor in december, , "that there has not been an arrival in baltimore from a foreign port for a twelvemonth";[ ] yet the city in had had a registered tonnage of , , and now boasted that of the scanty national commerce still maintained, through less secluded ports, at least one half was carried on by its celebrated schooners,[ ] the speed and handiness of which, combined with a size that intrusted not too many eggs to one basket, imparted special facilities for escaping pursuit and minimizing loss. a representative from maryland at about this time presented in the house a memorial from baltimore merchants, stating that "in consequence of the strict blockade of our bays and rivers the private-armed service is much discouraged," and submitting the expediency "of offering a bounty for the destruction of enemy's vessels;" a suggestion the very extravagance of which indicates more than words the extent of the depression felt. the price of salt in baltimore, in november, , was five dollars the bushel. in charleston it was the same, while just across the spanish border, at amelia island, thronged with foreign merchant ships, it was selling at seventy cents.[ ] such a contrast, which must necessarily be reproduced in other articles not indigenous, accounts at once for the smuggling deplored by captain campbell, and at the same time testifies both to the efficacy of the blockade and to the pressure exercised upon the inland navigation by the outside british national cruisers and privateers. this one instance, affecting one of the prime necessaries of life, certifies to the stringent exclusion from the sea of the coast on which charleston was the chief seaport. captain dent, commanding this naval district, alludes to the constant presence of blockaders, and occasionally to vessels taken outside by them, chased ashore, or intercepted in various inlets; narrating particularly the singular incident that, despite his remonstrances, a flag of truce was sent on board the enemy by local authorities to negotiate a purchase of goods thus captured.[ ] this unmilitary proceeding, which evinces the necessities of the neighborhood, was of course immediately stopped by the government. a somewhat singular incidental circumstance, supporting the other inferences, is found in the spasmodic elevation of the north carolina coast into momentary commercial consequence as a place of entry and deposit; not indeed to a very great extent, but ameliorating to a slight degree the deprivation of the regions lying north and south,--the neighborhood of charleston on the one hand, of richmond and baltimore on the other. "the waters of north carolina, from wilmington to ocracoke, though not favorable to commerce in time of peace, by reason of their shallowness and the danger of the coast, became important and useful in time of war, and a very considerable trade was prosecuted from and into those waters during the late war, and a coasting trade as far as charleston, attended with less risk than many would imagine. a vessel may prosecute a voyage from elizabeth city [near the virginia line] to charleston without being at sea more than a few hours at any one time."[ ] some tables of arrivals show a comparative immunity for vessels entering here from abroad; due doubtless to the unquestioned dangers of the coast, which conspired with the necessarily limited extent of the traffic to keep the enemy at a distance. it was not by them wholly overlooked. in july, , admiral cockburn anchored with a division off ocracoke bar, sent in his boats, and captured a privateer and letter-of-marque which had there sought a refuge denied to them by the blockade elsewhere. the towns of beaufort and portsmouth were occupied for some hours. the united states naval officer at charleston found it necessary also to extend the alongshore cruises of his schooners as far as cape fear, for the protection of this trade on its way to his district. the attention aroused to the development of internal navigation also bears witness to the pressure of the blockade. "it is my opinion," said the governor of pennsylvania, "that less than one half the treasure expended by the united states for the protection of foreign commerce, if combined with state and individual wealth, would have perfected an inland water communication from maine to georgia." it was argued by others that the extra money spent for land transportation of goods, while the coasting trade was suspended, would have effected a complete tide-water inland navigation such as here suggested; and there was cited a declaration of robert fulton, who died during the war, that within twenty-one months as great a sum had been laid out in wagon hire as would have effected this object. whatever the accuracy of these estimates, their silent witness to the influence of the blockade upon commerce, external and coastwise, quite overbears president madison's perfunctory denials of its effectiveness, based upon the successful evasions which more or less attend all such operations. perhaps, however, the most signal proof of the pressure exerted is to be seen in the rebound, the instant it was removed; in the effect upon prices, and upon the movements of shipping. taken in connection with the other evidence, direct and circumstantial, so far cited, what can testify more forcibly to the strangulation of the coasting trade than the fact that in the month of march, ,--news of the peace having been received february ,--there sailed from boston one hundred and forty-four vessels, more than half of them square-rigged; and that of the whole all but twenty-six were for united states ports. within three weeks of april there arrived at charleston, exclusive of coasters, one hundred and fifty-eight vessels; at savannah, in the quarter ending june , two hundred and three. something of this outburst of activity, in which neutrals of many nations shared, was due, as mr. clay said, to the suddenness with which commerce revived after momentary suspension. "the bow had been unstrung that it might acquire fresh vigor and new elasticity"; and the stored-up products of the country, so long barred within, imparted a peculiar nervous haste to the renewal of intercourse. the absolute numbers quoted do not give as vivid impression of conditions at differing times as do some comparisons, easily made. in the year , as shown by the returns of the united states treasury, out of , tons of registered--sea-going--shipping, only , --one third--paid the duties exacted upon each several voyage, and of these many doubtless sailed under british license.[ ] in the total tonnage, , , shows that ship-building had practically ceased; and of this amount one twelfth only, , tons, paid dues for going out.[ ] in , when peace conditions were fully established, though less than two years had passed, the total tonnage had increased to , ; duties, being paid each voyage, were collected on , .[ ] thus the foreign voyages that year exceeded the total shipping of the country, and by an amount greater than all the american tonnage that put to sea in . the movement of coasting vessels, technically called "enrolled," is not so clearly indicated by the returns, because all the trips of each were covered by one license annually renewed. a licensed coaster might make several voyages, or she might make none. in the figures show that, of , enrolled tonnage, , obtained licenses. in there is, as in the registered shipping, a diminution of the total to , , of which a still smaller proportion, , , took out the annual license. in the enrolment was , , the licensing , . in the fishing craft, a class by themselves, the employment rose from , in to , in ;[ ] the difference doubtless being attributable chiefly to the reopening of the cod fishing on the banks of newfoundland, necessarily closed to the american flag by the maritime hostilities. the influence of the peace upon prices is likewise a matter too interesting to a correct appreciation of effects to be wholly passed over. in considering it, the quotations before the receipt of the news doubtless represent conditions more correctly than do the immediate changes. the official tidings of peace reached new york, february , . the evening post, in its number of february , says, "we give to-day one of the effects of the prospect of peace, even before ratification. our markets of every kind experienced a sudden, and to many a shocking, change. sugar, for instance, fell from $ per hundredweight to $ . . tea, which sold on saturday at $ . , on monday was purchased at a $ . . specie, which had got up to the enormous rate of per cent premium, dropped down to . the article of tin, in particular, fell from the height of $ the box to $ . six per cents rose from to ; ten per cents and treasury notes from to . bank stock generally rose from five to ten per cent." in philadelphia, flour which sold at $ . the barrel on saturday had risen to $ on monday; a testimony that not only foreign export but home supply to the eastward was to be renewed. the fall in foreign products, due to freedom of import, was naturally accompanied by a rise in domestic produce, to which an open outlet with proportionate increase of demand was now afforded. in philadelphia the exchange on boston reflected these conditions; falling from twenty-five per cent to thirteen. it may then be concluded that there is little exaggeration in the words used by "a distinguished naval officer" of the day, in a letter contributed to niles' register, in its issue of june , . "no sooner had the enemy blockaded our harbors, and extended his line of cruisers from maine to georgia, than both foreign and domestic commerce came at once to be reduced to a deplorable state of stagnation; producing in its consequences the utter ruin of many respectable merchants, as well as of a great multitude besides, connected with them in their mercantile pursuits. but these were not the only consequences. the regular supply of foreign commodities being thereby cut off, many articles, now become necessaries of life, were raised to an exorbitant price, and bore much upon the finances of the citizen, whose family could not comfortably exist without them. add to this, as most of the money loaned to the government for the purposes of the war came from the pockets of merchants, they were rendered incapable of continuing these disbursements in consequence of this interruption to their trade; whence the cause of that impending bankruptcy with which the government was at one time threatened.... at a critical period of the war [april, ] congress found it necessary to remove all restrictions upon commerce, both foreign and domestic. it is a lamentable fact, however, that the adventurous merchant found no alleviation from these indulgences, his vessels being uniformly prevented by a strong blockading force, not only from going out, but from coming into port, at the most imminent risk of capture. the risk did not stop here; for the islands and ports most frequented by american vessels being known to the enemy, he was enabled from his abundance of means to intercept them there also. the coasting trade, that most valuable appendage to an extensive mercantile establishment in the united states, was entirely annihilated. the southern and northern sections of the union were unable to exchange their commodities, except upon a contracted scale through the medium of land carriage, and then only at a great loss; so that, upon the whole, nothing in a national point of view appeared to be more loudly called for by men of all parties than a naval force adequate to the protection of our commerce, and the raising of the blockade of our coast." such was the experience which sums up the forgotten bitter truth, concerning a war which has left in the united states a prevalent impression of distinguished success, because of a few brilliant naval actions and the closing battle of new orleans. the lesson to be deduced is not that the country at that time should have sought to maintain a navy approaching equality to the british. in the state of national population and revenue, it was no more possible to attempt this than that it would be expedient to do it now, under the present immense development of resources and available wealth. what had been possible during the decade preceding the war,--had the nation so willed,--was to place the navy on such a footing, in numbers and constitution, as would have made persistence in the course great britain was following impolitic to the verge of madness, because it would add to her war embarrassments the activity of an imposing maritime enemy, at the threshold of her most valuable markets,--the west indies,--three thousand miles away from her own shores and from the seat of her principal and necessary warfare. the united states could not have encountered great britain single-handed--true; but there was not then the slightest prospect of her having to do so. the injuries of which she complained were incidental to a state of european war; inconceivable and impossible apart from it. she was therefore assured of the support of most powerful allies, occupying the attention of the british navy and draining the resources of the british empire. this condition of things was notorious, as was the fact that, despite the disappointment of trafalgar, napoleon was sedulously restoring the numbers of a navy, to the restraining of which his enemy was barely competent. the anxiety caused to the british admiralty by the operations of the small american squadrons in the autumn of has already been depicted in quotations from its despatches to warren.[ ] three or four divisions, each containing one to two ships of the line, were kept on the go, following a general round in successive relief, but together amounting to five or six battle ships--to use the modern term--with proportionate cruisers. it was not possible to diminish this total by concentrating them, for the essence of the scheme, and the necessity which dictated it, was to cover a wide sweep of ocean, and to protect several maritime strategic points through which the streams of commerce, controlled by well-known conditions, passed, intersected, or converged. so also the admiralty signified its wish that one ship of the line should form the backbone of the blockade before each of the american harbors. for this purpose warren's fleet was raised to a number stated by the admiralty's letter to him of january , , to be "upwards of ten of the line, exclusive of the six sail of the line appropriated to the protection of the west india convoys." these numbers were additional to detachments which, outside of his command, were patrolling the eastern atlantic, about the equator, and from the cape verde islands to the azores, as mentioned in another letter of february . "in all, therefore, about twenty sail of the line were employed on account of american hostilities; and this, it will be noticed, was after napoleon's russian disaster was fully known in england. it has not been without interfering for the moment with other very important services that my lords have been able to send you this re-enforcement, and they most anxiously hope that the vigorous and successful use you will make of it will enable you shortly to return some of the line of battle ships to england, which, if the heavy american frigates should be taken or destroyed, you will immediately do, retaining four line of battle ships." attention should fasten upon the importance here attached by the british admiralty to the bigger ships; for it is well to learn of the enemy, and to appreciate that it was not solely light cruisers and privateers, but chiefly the heavy vessels, that counted in the estimate of experienced british naval officers. the facts are little understood in the united states, and consequently are almost always misrepresented. the reasons for this abundance of force are evident. as regards commerce great britain was on the defensive; and the defensive cannot tell upon which of many exposed points a blow may fall. dissemination of effort, however modified by strategic ingenuity, is thus to a certain extent imposed. if an american division might strike british trade on the equator between ° and ° west longitude, and also in the neighborhood of the cape verdes and of the azores, preparation in some form to protect all those points was necessary, and they are too wide apart for this to be effected by mere concentration. so the blockade of the united states harbors. there might be in new york no american frigates, but if a division escaped from boston it was possible it might come upon the new york blockade in superior force, if adequate numbers were not constantly kept there. the british commercial blockade, though offensive in essence, had also its defensive side, which compelled a certain dispersion of force, in order to be in local sufficiency in several quarters. these several dispersed assemblages of british ships of war constituted the totality of naval effort imposed upon great britain by "the fourteen sail of vessels of all descriptions"[ ] which composed the united states navy. it would not in the least have been necessary had these been sloops of war--were they fourteen or forty. the weight of the burden was the heavy frigates, two of which together were more than a match for three of the same nominal class--the -gun frigate--which was the most numerous and efficient element in the british cruising force. the american forty-four was unknown to british experience, and could be met only by ships of the line. add to this consideration the remoteness of the american shore, and its dangerous proximity to very vital british interests, and there are found the elements of the difficult problem presented to the admiralty by the combination of american force--such as it was--with american advantage of position for dealing a severe blow to british welfare at the period, - , when the empire was in the height of its unsupported and almost desperate struggle with napoleon; when prussia was chained, austria paralyzed, and russia in strict bonds of alliance--personal and political--with france. if conditions were thus menacing, as we know them to to have been in , when war was declared, and the invasion of russia just beginning, when the united states navy was "fourteen pendants," what would they not have been in , had the nation possessed even one half of the twenty ships of the line which gouverneur morris, a shrewd financier, estimated fifteen years before were within her competency? while entirely convinced of the illegality of the british measures, and feeling keenly--as what american even now cannot but feel?--the humiliation and outrage to which his country was at that period subjected, the writer has always recognized the stringent compulsion under which great britain lay, and the military wisdom, in his opinion, of the belligerent measures adopted by her to sustain her strength through that unparalleled struggle; while in the matter of impressment, it is impossible to deny--as was urged by representative gaston of north carolina and gouverneur morris--that her claim to the service of her native seamen was consonant to the ideas of the time, as well as of utmost importance to her in that hour of dire need. nevertheless, submission by america should have been impossible; and would have been avoidable if for the fourteen pendants there had been a dozen sail of the line, and frigates to match. to an adequate weighing of conditions there will be indeed resentment for impressment and the other mortifications; but it is drowned in wrath over the humiliating impotence of an administration which, owing to preconceived notions as to peace, made such endurance necessary. it is not always ignominious to suffer ignominy; but it always is so to deserve it. president washington, in his last annual message, december , , defined the situation then confronting the united states, and indicated its appropriate remedy, in the calm and forcible terms which characterized all his perceptions. "it is in our own experience, that the most sincere neutrality is not a sufficient guard against the depredations of nations at war. to secure respect for a neutral flag requires a naval force, organized and ready, to vindicate it from insult or aggression. this may even prevent the necessity of going to war, by discouraging belligerent powers from committing such violations of the rights of the neutral party as may, first or last, leave no other option" [than war]. the last sentence is that of the statesman and soldier, who accurately appreciates the true office and sphere of arms in international relations. his successor, john adams, yearly renewed his recommendation for the development of the navy; although, not being a military man, he seems to have looked rather exclusively on the defensive aspect, and not to have realized that possible enemies are more deterred by the fear of offensive action against themselves than by recognition of a defensive force which awaits attack at an enemy's pleasure. moreover, in his administration, it was not great britain, but france, that was most actively engaged in violating the neutral rights of american shipping, and french commercial interests then presented nothing upon which retaliation could take effect. the american problem then was purely defensive,--to destroy the armed ships engaged in molesting the national commerce. president jefferson, whose influence was paramount with the dominant party which remained in power from his inauguration in to the war, based his policy upon the conviction, expressed in his inaugural, that this "was the only government where every man would meet invasions of the public order as his own personal concern;" and that "a well-disciplined militia is our best reliance for the first moments of war, till regulars may relieve them." in pursuance of these fundamental principles, it was doubtless logical to recommend in his first annual message that, "beyond the small force which will probably be wanted for actual service in the mediterranean [against the barbary pirates], whatever annual sum you may think proper to appropriate to naval preparations would perhaps be better employed in providing those articles which may be kept without waste or consumption, and be in readiness when any exigence calls them into use. progress has been made in providing materials for seventy-four gun ships;" but this commended readiness issued in not laying their keels till after the war began. upon this first recommendation followed the discontinuance of building ships for ocean service, and the initiation of the gunboat policy; culminating, when war began, in the decision of the administration to lay up the ships built for war, to keep them out of british hands. the urgent remonstrances of two or three naval captains obtained the reversal of this resolve, and thereby procured for the country those few successes which, by a common trick of memory, have remained the characteristic feature of the war of . note.--after writing the engagement between the "boxer" and the "enterprise," the author found among his memoranda, overlooked, the following statement from the report of her surviving lieutenant, david mccreery: "i feel it my duty to mention that the bulwarks of the 'enterprise' were proof against our grape, when her musket balls penetrated through our bulwarks." (canadian archives, m. , . p. .) it will be noted that this does not apply to the cannon balls, and does not qualify the contrast in gunnery. footnotes: [ ] broke's letter to lawrence, june, . naval chronicle, vol. xxx. p. . [ ] rodgers' report of this cruise is in captains' letters, sept. , . [ ] captains' letters, dec. , . [ ] captains' letters, june , . [ ] the department's orders to evans and the letter transferring them to lawrence, captured in the ship, can be found published in the report on canadian archives, , p. . a copy is attached to the record of the subsequent court of inquiry, navy department mss. [ ] james' naval history, vol. vi., edition of . the account of the action between the "chesapeake" and "shannon" will be found on pp. - . [ ] secretary to the admiralty, in-letters, may, , vol. , p. . [ ] naval chronicle, vol. xxx, p. . [ ] broke, in his letter of challenge, "was disappointed that, after various verbal messages sent into boston, commodore rodgers, with the 'president' and 'congress,' had _eluded_ the 'shannon' and 'tenedos,' by sailing the first chance, after the prevailing easterly winds had obliged us to keep an offing from the coast." [ ] for the reason here assigned, and others mentioned in the narrative, the author has preferred to follow in the main james' account, analyzed, and compared with broke's report (naval chronicle, vol. xxx. p. ), and with the testimony in the court of inquiry held in boston on the surrender of the "chesapeake," and in the resultant courts martial upon lieutenant cox and other persons connected with the ship, which are in the navy department mss. the official report of lieutenant budd, the senior surviving officer of the "chesapeake", is published in niles' register (vol. iv, p. ), which gives also several unofficial statements of onlookers, and others. [ ] not "across"; the distinction is important, being decisive of general raking direction. [ ] actually, a contemporary account, borrowed by the british "naval chronicle" (vol. xxx. p. ) from a halifax paper, but avouched as trustworthy, says the "chesapeake" was terribly battered on the larboard bow as well as quarter. the details in the text indicate merely the local preponderance of injury, and the time and manner of its occurrence. [ ] a slight qualification is here needed, in that of the injured of the "shannon" some were hurt in the boarding, not by the cannonade; but the general statement is substantially accurate. [ ] decatur to navy department. captains' letters, june, . [ ] decatur to navy department. captains' letters, june, . [ ] naval chronicle, vol. xxix. p. . [ ] croker to warren, jan. , . admiralty out-letters, british records office. my italics. [ ] message of the governor of connecticut, october, . niles' register, vol. v. p. . [ ] message of the governor of connecticut, october, . niles' register, vol. v. p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. v. p. . [ ] captains' letters. [ ] niles' register, vol. vi. p. . [ ] captains' letters, nov. and dec. , ; march , ; and oct. , . [ ] american state papers, naval affairs, vol. i. p. . [ ] ante, page . [ ] the official reports of warren and cockburn concerning these operations are published in the naval chronicle, vol. xxx. pp. - . [ ] captains' letters, june , . [ ] the american official account of this affair is given in niles' register, vol. iv. pp. , . james' naval history, vol. vi. pp. - , gives the british story. [ ] captains' letters, april, . [ ] captains' letters, may , . [ ] ibid. [ ] james, naval history (edition ), vol. vi. p. . [ ] warren's gazette letters, here referred to, can be found in naval chronicle, vol. xxx. pp. , . [ ] croker to warren, march , . admiralty out-letters, records office. [ ] niles' register, vol. iv. p. . [ ] the rise of the tide is about two and a half feet. [ ] this is the number stated by james, the british naval historian, and is somewhat difficult to reconcile with warren's expression, "the troops and a re-enforcement of seamen and marines from the ships." to be effective, the attack should have been in greater numbers. [ ] the british story of this failure, outside the official despatches, is given in james' naval history, vol. vi. pp. - . [ ] report of the commander of the "scorpion" to captain morris, july , . captains' letters. [ ] this letter, from the commanding officer of the "narcissus", is in niles' register, vol. iv. p. . [ ] morris to navy department, august , , and . captains' letters. [ ] captain hayes, of the "majestic," in charge of the blockade of boston, wrote to warren, october , : "almost every vessel i meet has a license, or is under a neutral flag. spanish, portuguese, and swedes are passing in and out by hundreds, and licensed vessels out of number from the west indies. i find the licenses are sent blank to be filled up in boston. this is of course very convenient, and the portuguese consul is said to be making quite a trade of that flag, covering the property and furnishing the necessary papers for any person at a thousand dollars a ship." canadian archives, m. . . p. . [ ] annals of congress, - , vol. i. p. . [ ] this parenthesis shows that the censures were not directed against new england only, for the blockade so far declared did not extend thither. [ ] niles' register, vol. iv. pp. , . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. iv. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] ibid. [ ] ibid. author's italics. [ ] morris to navy department, dec. and , . captains' letters. [ ] post, chapter xviii. [ ] british records office, secret papers mss. [ ] niles' register, vol. v. p. . [ ] the columbian centinel, boston, sept. and dec. , . [ ] ibid., dec. . [ ] ibid. [ ] campbell to the navy department, nov. , . captains' letters. [ ] captains' letters. [ ] ibid., june , . [ ] hull to navy department, july , . ibid. [ ] cooper tells the story that when this gun was transported, and preparations being made to use it as a stern instead of a bow chaser, the crew--to whom burrows was as yet a stranger, known chiefly by his reputation for great eccentricity--came to the mast to express a hope that the brig was not going to retreat. [ ] report of lieutenant tillinghast to captain hull. captains' letters, sept. , . [ ] hull to bainbridge, sept. . niles' register, vol. v. p. . [ ] report of the carpenter of the "enterprise." captains' letters. [ ] there is a discrepancy in the statements concerning the "boxer's" crew. hull reported officially, "we have sixty-seven, exclusive of those killed and thrown overboard." (sept. . captains' letters.) lieutenant mccall, who succeeded to the command after burrows fell, reported that "from information received from officers of the 'boxer' it appears that there were between twenty and thirty-five killed, and fourteen wounded." (u.s. state papers, naval affairs, vol. i. p. .) the number killed is evidently an exaggerated impression received, resembling some statements made concerning the "chesapeake;" but it is quite likely that the "boxer's" loss should be increased by several bodies thrown overboard. [ ] naval chronicle, vol. xxxii. p. . [ ] columbian centinel, july , sept. , and nov. , . [ ] ibid., sept. . [ ] campbell to navy department, jan. , . captains' letters. [ ] for full particulars see captains' letters (campbell), june , ; jan. and , aug. , sept. , oct. , oct. , dec. , . [ ] campbell, dec. , . captains' letters. [ ] dent to navy department, jan. , . ibid. [ ] campbell, feb. , . ibid. [ ] june , . navy department mss. [ ] captains' letters, sept. , . [ ] benton's abridgment of the debates of congress, vol. v. p. . [ ] dec. , . niles' register, vol. v. pp. - . [ ] niles' register, vol. vii. p. . [ ] ibid., vol. viii. p. . [ ] ibid., vol. vii. p. . quoted from a charleston, s.c., paper. [ ] captains' letters, may , , ; june , ; august , ; nov. , , , . [ ] niles' register, vol. viii. p. . quoted from a norfolk paper. [ ] american state papers, commerce and navigation, vol. i. p. . [ ] ibid., vol. ii. p. . [ ] american state papers, commerce and navigation, vol. ii. p. . [ ] ibid., vol. i. p. ; vol. ii. pp. , . [ ] ante, vol. i. pp. - . [ ] admiralty's letter to warren. feb. , . chapter xiv maritime operations external to the waters of the united states, - in broad generalization, based upon analysis of conditions, it has been said that the seacoast of the united states was in a defensive frontier, from which, as from all defensive lines, there should be, and was, opportunity for offensive returns; for action planned to relieve the shore-line, and the general military situation, by inflicting elsewhere upon the opponent injury, harassment, and perplexity. the last chapter dealt with the warfare depending upon the seaboard chiefly from the defensive point of view; to illustrate the difficulties, the blows, and the sufferings, to which the country was exposed, owing to inability to force the enemy away from any large portion of the coast. the pressure was as universal as it was inexorable and irresistible. it remains still to consider the employment and effects of the one offensive maritime measure left open by the exigencies of the war; the cruises directed against the enemy's commerce, and the characteristic incidents to which they gave rise. in this pursuit were engaged both the national ships of war and those equipped by the enterprise of the mercantile community; but, as the operations were in their nature more consonant to the proper purpose of privateers, so the far greater number of these caused them to play a part much more considerable in effect, though proportionately less fruitful in conspicuous action. fighting, when avoidable, is to the privateer a misdirection of energy. profit is his object, by depredation upon the enemy's commerce; not the preservation of that of his own people. to the ship of war, on the other hand, protection of the national shipping is the primary concern; and for that reason it becomes her to shun no encounter by which she may hope to remove from the seas a hostile cruiser. the limited success of the frigates in their attempts against british trade has been noted, and attributed to the general fact that their cruises were confined to the more open sea, upon the highways of commerce. these were now travelled by british ships under strict laws of convoy, the effect of which was not merely to protect the several flocks concentrated under their particular watchdogs, but to strip the sea of those isolated vessels, that in time of peace rise in irregular but frequent succession above the horizon, covering the face of the deep with a network of tracks. these solitary wayfarers were now to be found only as rare exceptions to the general rule, until the port of destination was approached. there the homing impulse overbore the bonds of regulation; and the convoys tended to the conduct noted by nelson as a captain, "behaving as all convoys that ever i saw did, shamefully ill, parting company every day." commodore john rodgers has before been quoted, as observing that the british practice was to rely upon pressure on the enemy over sea, for security near home; and that the waters surrounding the british islands themselves were the field where commerce destruction could be most decisively effected. the first united states vessel to emphasize this fact was the brig "argus," captain william h. allen, which sailed from new york june , , having on board a newly appointed minister to france, mr. william h. crawford, recently a senator from georgia. on july she reached l'orient, having in the twenty-three days of passage made but one prize.[ ] three days later she proceeded to cruise in the chops of the english channel, and against the local trade between ireland and england; continuing thus until august , thirty-one days, during which she captured nineteen sail, extending her depredations well up into st. george's channel. the contrast of results mentioned, between her voyage across and her occupancy of british waters, illustrates the comparative advantages of the two scenes of operations, regarded in their relation to british commerce. on august the british brig of war "pelican," captain maples, anchored at cork from the west indies. before her sails were furled she received orders to go out in search of the american ship of war whose depredations had been reported. two hours later she was again at sea. the following evening, at half-past seven, a burning vessel to the eastward gave direction to her course, and at daybreak, august , she sighted a brig of war in the northeast, just quitting another prize, which had also been fired. the wind, being south, gave the windward position to the "pelican," which stood in pursuit; the "argus" steering east, near the wind, but under moderate sail to enable her opponent to close (positions ). the advantage in size and armament was on this occasion on the british side; the "pelican" being twenty per cent larger, and her broadside seventeen per cent heavier. at . a.m., st. david's head on the coast of wales bearing east, distant about fifteen miles, the "argus" wore, standing now to the westward, with the wind on the port side ( ). the "pelican" did the same, and the battle opened at six; the vessels running side by side, within the range of grapeshot and musketry,--probably under two hundred yards apart ( ). within five minutes captain allen received a wound which cost him his leg, and in the end his life. he at first refused to be taken below, but loss of blood soon so reduced him that he could no longer exercise command. ten minutes later the first lieutenant was stunned by the graze of a grapeshot along his head, and the charge of the ship devolved on the second. by this time the rigging of the "argus" had been a good deal cut, and the "pelican" bore up ( ) to pass under her stern; but the american brig, luffing close to the wind and backing her maintopsail ( ), balked the attempt, throwing herself across the enemy's path, and giving a raking broadside, the poor aim of which seems to have lost her the effect that should have resulted from this ready and neat manoeuvre. the main braces of the "argus" had already been shot away, as well as much of the other gear upon which the after sails depended; and at . the preventer (duplicate) braces, which formed part of the preparation for battle, were also severed. the vessel thus became unmanageable, falling off before the wind ( ), and the "pelican" was enabled to work round her at will. this she did, placing herself first under the stern ( ), and then on the bow ( ) of her antagonist, where the only reply to her broadside was with musketry. in this helpless situation the "argus" surrendered, after an engagement of a little over three quarters of an hour. the british loss was two killed and five wounded; the american, six killed and seventeen wounded, of whom five afterwards died. among these was captain allen, who survived only four days, and was buried with military honors at plymouth, whither captain maples sent his prize.[ ] after every allowance for disparity of force, the injury done by the american fire cannot be deemed satisfactory, and suggests the consideration whether the voyage to france under pressure of a diplomatic mission, and the busy preoccupation of making, manning, and firing prizes, during the brief month of channel cruising, may not have interfered unduly with the more important requirements of fighting efficiency. the surviving officer in command mentions in explanation, "the superior size and metal of our opponent, and the fatigue which the crew of the 'argus' underwent from a very rapid succession of prizes." [illustration: diagram of the argus vs. pelican battle] from the broad outlook of the universal maritime situation, this rapid succession of captures is a matter of more significance than the loss of a single brig of war. it showed the vulnerable point of british trade and local intercommunication; and the career of the "argus," prematurely cut short though it was, tended to fix attention upon facts sufficiently well known, but perhaps not fully appreciated. from this time the opportunities offered by the english channel and adjacent waters, long familiar to french corsairs, were better understood by americans; as was also the difficulty of adequately policing them against a number of swift and handy cruisers, preying upon merchant vessels comparatively slow, lumbering, and undermanned. the subsequent career of the united states ship "wasp," and the audacious exploits of several privateers, recall the impunity of paul jones a generation before, and form a sequel to the brief prelude, in which the leading part, though ultimately disastrous, was played by the "argus." while the cruise of the "argus" stood by no means alone at this time, the attending incidents made it conspicuous among several others of a like nature, on the same scene or close by; and it therefore may be taken as indicative of the changing character of the war, which soon began to be manifest, owing to the change of conditions in europe. in general summary, the result was to transfer an additional weight of british naval operations to the american side of the atlantic, which in turn compelled american cruisers, national and private, in pursuit of commerce destruction, to get away from their own shores, and to seek comparative security as well as richer prey in distant waters. to this contributed also the increasing stringency of british convoy regulation, enforced with special rigor in the caribbean sea and over the western atlantic. it was impossible to impose the same strict prescription upon the coastwise trade, by which chiefly the indispensable continuous intercourse between the several parts of the united kingdom was maintained. before the introduction of steam this had a consequence quite disproportionate to the interior traffic by land; and its development, combined with the feeling of greater security as the british islands were approached, occasioned in the narrow seas, and on the coasts of europe, a dispersion of vessels not to be seen elsewhere. this favored the depredations of the light, swift, and handy cruisers that alone are capable of profiting by such an opportunity, through their power to evade the numerous, but necessarily scattered, ships of war, which under these circumstances must patrol the sea, like a watchman on beat, as the best substitute for the more formal and regularized convoy protection, when that ceases to apply. from the end of the summer of , when this tendency to distant enterprise became predominant, to the corresponding season a year later, there were captured by american cruisers some six hundred and fifty british vessels, chiefly merchantmen; a number which had increased to between four and five hundred more, when the war ended in the following winter.[ ] an intelligible account of such multitudinous activities can be framed only by selecting amid the mass some illustrative particulars, accompanied by a general estimate of the conditions they indicate and the results they exemplify. thus it may be stated, with fair approach to precision, that from september , , to september , , there were taken six hundred and thirty-nine british vessels, of which four hundred and twenty-four were in seas that may be called remote from the united states. from that time to the end of the war, about six months, the total captures were four hundred and fourteen, of which those distant were two hundred and ninety-three. these figures, larger actually and in impression than they are relatively to the total of british shipping, represent the offensive maritime action of the united states during the period in question; but, in considering them, it must be remembered that such results were possible only because the sea was kept open to british commerce by the paramount power of the british navy. this could not prevent all mishaps; but it reduced them, by the annihilation of hostile navies, to such a small percentage of the whole shipping movement, that the british mercantile community found steady profit both in foreign and coasting trade, of which the united states at the same time was almost totally deprived. the numerous but beggarly array of american bay-craft and oyster boats, which were paraded to swell british prize lists, till there seemed to be a numerical set-off to their own losses, show indeed that in point of size and value of vessels taken there was no real comparison; but this was due to the fact, not at once suggested by the figures themselves, that there were but few american merchant vessels to be taken, because they did not dare to go to sea, with the exception of the few to whom exceptional speed gave a chance of immunity, not always realized. in the period under consideration, september, , to september, , despite the great falling off of trade noted in the returns, over thirty american merchant ships and letters of marque were captured at sea;[ ] at the head of the list being the "ned," whose hair-breadth escapes in seeking to reach a united states port have been mentioned already.[ ] she met her fate near the french coast, september , , on the outward voyage from new york to bordeaux. privateering, risky though it was, offered a more profitable employment, with less chance of capture; because, besides being better armed and manned, the ship was not impeded in her sailing by the carriage of a heavy cargo. while the enemy was losing a certain small proportion of vessels, the united states suffered practically an entire deprivation of external commerce; and her coasting trade was almost wholly suppressed, at the time that her cruisers, national and private, were causing exaggerated anxiety concerning the intercourse between great britain and ireland, which, though certainly molested, was not seriously interrupted. further evidence of the control exerted by the british navy, and of the consequent difficulty under which offensive action was maintained by the united states, is to be found in the practice, from this time largely followed, of destroying prizes, after removing from them packages of little weight compared to their price. the prospect of a captured vessel reaching an american port was very doubtful, for the same reason that prevented the movement of american commerce; and while the risk was sometimes run, it usually was with cargoes which were at once costly and bulky, such as west india goods, sugars and coffees. even then specie, and light costly articles, were first removed to the cruiser, where the chances for escape were decidedly better. recourse to burning to prevent recapture was permissible only with enemy's vessels. if a neutral were found carrying enemy's goods, a frequent incident of maritime war, she must be sent in for adjudication; which, if adverse, affected the cargo only. summary processes, therefore, could not be applied in such cases, and the close blockade of the united states coast seriously restricted the operations of her cruisers in this particular field. [illustration: the burning of a privateer prize. _drawn by henry reuterdahl._] examination of the records goes to show that, although individual american vessels sometimes made numerous seizures in rapid succession, they seldom, if ever, effected the capture or destruction of a large convoy at a single blow. this was the object with which rodgers started on his first cruise, but failed to accomplish. a stroke of this kind is always possible, and he had combined conditions unusually favorable to his hopes; but, while history certainly presents a few instances of such achievement on the large scale, they are comparatively rare, and opportunity, when it offers, can be utilized only by a more numerous force than at any subsequent time gathered under the american flag. in two privateers, the "scourge" of new york and "rattlesnake" of philadelphia, passed the summer in the north sea, and there made a number of prizes,--twenty-two,--which being reported together gave the impression of a single lucky encounter; were supposed in fact to be the convoy for which rodgers in the "president" had looked unsuccessfully the same season.[ ] the logs, however, showed that these captures were spread over a period of two months, and almost all made severally. norway being then politically attached to denmark, and hostile to great britain, such prizes as were not burned were sent into her ports. the "scourge" appears to have been singularly fortunate, for on her homeward trip she took, sent in, or destroyed, ten more enemy's vessels; and in an absence extending a little over a year had taken four hundred and twenty prisoners,--more than the crew of a -gun frigate.[ ] at the same time the privateer schooner "leo," of baltimore, was similarly successful on the coast of spain and portugal. by an odd coincidence, another of the same class, bearing the nearly identical name, "lion," was operating at the same time in the same waters, and with like results; which may possibly account for a contemporary report in a london paper, that an american off the tagus had taken thirty-two british vessels. the "leo" destroyed thirteen, and took four others; while the "lion" destroyed fifteen, having first removed from them cargo to the amount of $ , , which she carried safely into france. a curious circumstance, incidental to the presence of the privateers off cape finisterre, is that wellington's troops, which had now passed the pyrenees and were operating in southern france, had for a long time to wait for their great-coats, which had been stored in lisbon for the summer, and now could not be returned by sea to bayonne and bordeaux before convoy was furnished to protect the transports against capture. money to pay the troops, and for the commissariat, was similarly detained. niles' register, which followed carefully the news of maritime capture, announced in november, , that eighty british vessels had been taken within a few months in european seas by the "president," "argus," and five privateers. compared with the continuous harassment and loss to which the enemy had become hardened during twenty years of war with france, allied often with other maritime states, this result, viewed singly, was not remarkable; but coming in addition to the other sufferings of british trade, and associated with similar injuries in the west indies, and disquiet about the british seas themselves, the cumulative effect was undeniable, and found voice in public meetings, resolutions, and addresses to the government. although the united states was not in formal alliance with france, the common hostility made the ports of either nation a base of operations to the other, and much facilitated the activities of american cruisers in british seas. one of the most successful of the privateers, the "true blooded yankee," was originally equipped at brest, under american ownership, though it does not appear whether she was american built. on her first cruise her prizes are reported at twenty-seven. she remained out thirty-seven days, chiefly off the coast of ireland, where she is said to have held an island for six days. afterwards she burned several vessels in a scotch harbor. her procedure illustrates the methods of privateering in more respects than one. thus, two large ships, one from smyrna and one from buenos ayres, were thought sufficiently valuable to attempt sending into a french port, although the enemy watched the french coast as rigorously as the american. the recapture of a third, ordered to morlaix, received specific mention, because one of the prize crew, being found to be an englishman, was sentenced to death by an english court.[ ] eight others were destroyed; and, when the privateer returned to port, she carried in her own hold a miscellaneous cargo of light goods, too costly to risk in a less nimble bottom. among these are named eighteen bales of turkey carpets, forty-three bales of raw silk, seventy packs of skins, etc.[ ] the "true blooded yankee" apparently continued to prefer european waters; for towards the end of she was taken there and sent into gibraltar. while there were certain well-known districts, such as these just mentioned, and others before specified, in which from causes constant in operation there was always to be found abundant material for the hazardous occupation of the commerce-destroyer, it was not to them alone that american cruisers went. there were other smaller but lucrative fields, into which an occasional irruption proved profitable. such were the gold-coast on the west shore of africa, and the island groups of madeira, the canaries, and cape verde, which geographically appertain to that continent. thither captain morris directed the frigate "adams," in january, , after first escaping from his long blockade in the potomac. this voyage, whence he returned to savannah in april, was not remunerative; his most valuable prize, an east india ship, being snatched out of his hands, when in the act of taking possession, by an enemy's division in charge of a convoy of twenty-five sail, to which probably she had belonged, and had been separated by the thick weather that permitted her capture.[ ] a year before this the privateer "yankee," of bristol, rhode island, had had better success. when she returned to narragansett bay in the spring of , after a five months' absence, she reported having scoured the whole west coast of africa, taking eight vessels, which carried in the aggregate sixty-two guns, one hundred and ninety-six men, and property to the amount of $ , . in accordance with the practice already noticed, of distributing the spoil in order better to insure its arrival, she brought back in her own hold the light but costly items of six tons of ivory, thirty-two bales of fine goods, and $ , in gold-dust.[ ] this vessel was out again several times; and when the war closed was said to have been the most successful of all american cruisers. her prizes numbered forty, of which thirty-four were ships or brigs; that is, of the larger classes of merchantmen then used. the estimated value of themselves and cargoes, $ , , , is to be received with reserve.[ ] it was in this neighborhood that the privateer schooner "globe," captain moon, of baltimore, mounting eight -pounder carronades and one long gun, met with an adventure illustrative of the fighting incidental to the business. to this the privateersmen as a class were in no wise loath, where there was a fair prospect of the gain for which they were sent to look. being off funchal, in the island of madeira, november , , two brigs, which proved to be english packets, the "montague" and "pelham," were seen "backing and filling;" that is, keeping position in the open roadstead which constitutes the harbor, under sail, but not anchored. packets, being in government service, were well armed for their size, and as mail carriers were necessarily chosen for speed; they therefore frequently carried specie. in one taken by the "essex," captain porter found $ , , which as ready cash helped him much to pay his frigate's way in a long and adventurous career. it does not appear that the "globe" at first recognized the character of these particular vessels; but she lay-by during the night, watching for their quitting the shelter of neutral waters. this they did at p.m., when the privateer pursued, but lost sight of them in a squall. the next morning they were seen in the southwest, and again chased. at . a.m. the "montague" began firing her stern guns. the schooner replied, but kept on to board, knowing her superiority in men, and at . ran alongside ( ). the attack being smartly met, and the vessels separating almost immediately, the attempt failed disastrously; there being left on board the packet the two lieutenants of the "globe" and three or four seamen. immediately upon this repulse, the "pelham" crossed the privateer's bow and raked her (p ), dealing such destruction to sails and rigging as to leave her unmanageable. the "montague" and "globe" now lay broadside to broadside ( ), engaging; and ten minutes later the "montague" by her own report was completely disabled (m ). captain moon claimed that she struck; and this was probably the case, if his further incidental mention, that the mailbags were seen to be thrown overboard, is not a mistake. the action then continued with the "pelham," within pistol-shot ( ), for an hour or so, when the schooner, being found in a sinking condition, was compelled to haul off; "having seven shot between wind and water, the greater part of our standing and running rigging shot away, and not a sail but was perfectly riddled and almost useless." after separating, the several combatants all steered with the tradewinds for the canaries; the british going to teneriffe, and the american to the grand canary.[ ] from the injuries received, it is apparent that, for the armaments of the vessels, this was a very severe as well as determined engagement. the british had six killed and twelve wounded; the american five killed and thirteen wounded, besides the prisoners lost in boarding. all three captains were severely hurt, that of the "montague" being killed. the figures given are those reported by each side; how exaggerated the rumors current about such encounters, and the consequent difficulty to the historian, is shown by what each heard about the other's casualties. a spanish brig from teneriffe told moon that the enemy had twenty-seven men killed; while the british were equally credibly informed that the "globe" lost thirty-three killed and nineteen wounded. near about this time, in the same neighborhood of madeira, the privateer schooner "governor tompkins," of new york, captured in rapid succession three british merchant vessels which had belonged to a convoy from england to buenos ayres, but after its dispersal in a gale were pursuing their route singly. two of these reached an american port, their bulky and heavy ladings of dry goods and hardware not permitting transfer or distribution. the sale of one cargo realized $ , .[ ] at about the same moment came in a brig of like value, not improbably another wanderer from the same group, captured near madeira by the ship "america," of salem. this vicinity, from the islands to the equator, between ° and ° west longitude, belongs essentially to the thronged highway and cross-roads of commerce, which has been noted as a favorite cruising ground of american ships of war. hereabouts passed vessels both to and from the east indies and south america. the bad luck of several frigates, and the rough handling of the "globe" by the packets, illustrate one side of the fortune of war, as the good hap of the "america" and "governor tompkins" shows the other. [illustration: diagram of the montague, pelham, globe battle] it is, however, the beginnings and endings of commercial routes, rather than the intermediate stretch, which most favor enterprises against an enemy's trade. in the thronging of vessels, the caribbean sea, with its teeming archipelago, was second only, if second, to the waters surrounding the united kingdom. england was one extremity, and the several west india islands the other, of a traffic then one of the richest in the world; while the tropical articles of this exchange, if not absolute necessaries of life, had become by long indulgence indispensable to the great part of civilized mankind. here, therefore, the numbers, the efforts, and the successes of american privateers most nearly rivalled the daring achievements of their fellows in the narrow seas and the approaches to great britain and ireland. the two regions resembled each other in another respect. not only was there for both an external trade, mainly with one another, but in each there was also a local traffic of distribution and collection of goods, from and to central ports, in which was concentrated the movement of import and export. as has been remarked concerning the coastwise carriage of the united kingdom, this local intercourse, to be efficient, could not be regulated and hampered to the same extent as the long voyage, over-sea, transportation. a certain amount of freedom and independence was essential, and the risk attendant upon such separate action must be compensated, as far as might be, by diminishing the size of the vessels engaged; a resource particularly applicable to the moderate weather and quiet seas prevalent in the tropics. both the exposure of trade under such relaxed conditions, and the relative security obtained by the convoy system, rigidly applied, are shown by a few facts. from september , , to march , , six months, the number of prizes taken by americans, exclusive of those on the lakes, was reported as two hundred and seventy. of these, nearly one third--eighty-six--were to, from, or within the west indies. since in many reports the place of capture is not given, nor any data sufficient to fix it, it is probable that quite one third belonged to this trade. this evidences the scale, both of the commerce itself and of its pursuers, justifying a contemporary statement that "the west indies swarm with american privateers;" and it suggests also that many of the seizures were local traders between the islands, or at least vessels taking their chance on short runs. on the other hand, the stringency with which the local officials enforced the convoy act was shown, generally, by the experience at this time of the united states naval vessels, the records of which, unlike those of most privateers, have been preserved by filing or publication; and, specifically, by a number of papers found in a prize by the united states frigate "constitution," captain charles stewart, while making a round of these waters in the first three months of . among other documents was a petition, signed by many merchants of demerara, praying convoy for fifty-one vessels which were collected and waiting for many weary weeks, as often had to be done. in one letter occurs the following: "with respect to procuring a license for the "fanny" to run it, in case any other ships should be about to do so, we do not believe that, out of forty vessels ready to sail, any application has been made for such license, though out of the number are several out-port vessels well armed and manned. indeed, we are aware application would be perfectly useless, as the present governor, when at berbice, would not permit a vessel from that colony to this [adjoining] without convoy. if we could obtain a license, we could not justify ourselves to shippers, who have ordered insurance with convoy."[ ] the expense and embarrassment incident to such detentions are far-reaching, and the effects are as properly chargeable as are captures themselves to the credit of the cruisers, by the activity of which they are occasioned. the "constitution" could report only four prizes as the result of a three months' cruise, necessarily shortened by the approach of spring. this made it imperative for a vessel, denied admission to most home ports by her draught of water, to recover the shelter of one of them before the blockade again began, and the exhaustion of her provisions should compel her to attempt entrance under risk of an engagement with superior force. as it was, she was chased into salem, and had to lighten ship to escape. but stewart had driven an enemy's brig of war into surinam, chased a packet off barbados, and a frigate in the mona passage; and the report of these occurrences, wherever received, imposed additional precaution, delay, and expense. at the same time that the "constitution" was passing through the southern caribbean, the naval brigs "rattlesnake" and "enterprise" were searching its northern limits. these had put out from portsmouth, new hampshire, when the winter weather drove the blockaders from there, as from boston, whence the "constitution" had sailed. starting early in january, , these two light cruisers kept company, passing east of bermuda to the island of st. thomas, at the northeast corner of the caribbean. thence they turned west, skirting the north shores of porto rico and santo domingo as far as the windward passage. through this they entered the caribbean, followed the south coast of cuba, between it and jamaica, rounded cape san antonio, at its western extremity, and thence, traversing the straits of florida, returned along the coast of the united states. having already been chased twice in this cruise, they were compelled by a third pursuer to separate, february . the stranger chose to keep after the "enterprise," which being a very dull sailer was obliged in a flight of seventy hours to throw overboard most of her battery to escape. the two put into wilmington, north carolina, a port impracticable to a frigate.[ ] in this long round the brigs overhauled eleven vessels, two only of which were under the british flag. two were americans; the rest neutrals, either swedes or spaniards. of the two enemies, only one was a merchant ship. the other was a privateer, the chase of which gave rise to a curious and significant incident. being near the florida coast, and thinking the brigs to be british, twenty or thirty of the crew took to the boats and fled ashore to escape anticipated impressment. as marryat remarks, a british private vessel of that day feared a british ship of war more than it did an enemy of equal force. of the neutrals stopped, one was in possession of a british prize crew, and another had on board enemy's goods. for these reasons they were sent in for adjudication, and arrived safely. judged by these small results from the several cruises of the "enterprise," "rattlesnake," and "constitution," the large aggregate of captures before quoted, two hundred and seventy, would indicate that to effect them required a great number of cruisers, national and private. that this inference is correct will be shown later, by some interesting and instructive figures. while the making of prizes was the primary concern of the american privateers, their cruises in the west indies, as elsewhere, gave rise to a certain amount of hard fighting. one of the most noted of these encounters, that of the schooner "decatur," of charleston, with the man-of-war schooner "dominica," can hardly be claimed for the united states; for, though fought under the flag, her captain, diron, was french, as were most of the crew. the "dominica" was in company with a king's packet, which she was to convoy part of the way to england from st. thomas. on august , , the "decatur" met the two about three hundred miles north of the island. the british vessel was superior in armament, having fifteen guns; all carronades, except two long sixes. the "decatur's" battery was six carronades, and one long -pounder. for long distances the latter was superior in carrying power and penetration to anything on board the "dominica;" but the american captain, knowing himself to have most men, sought to board, and the artillery combat was therefore mainly at close quarters, within carronade range. it began at p.m. at . the schooners were within half-gunshot of one another; the "dominica" in the position of being chased, because of the necessity of avoiding the evident intention of the "decatur" to come hand to hand. twice the latter tried to run alongside, and twice was foiled by watchful steering, accompanied in each case by a broadside which damaged her rigging and sails, besides killing two of her crew. the third attempt was successful, the "decatur's" bow coming against the quarter of the "dominica," the jib-boom passing through her mainsail. the crew of the privateer clambered on board, and there followed a hand-to-hand fight equally honorable to both parties. the british captain, lieutenant barretté, a young man of twenty-five, who had already proved his coolness and skill in the management of the action, fell at the head of his men, of whom sixty out of a total of eighty-eight were killed or wounded before their colors were struck. the assailants, who numbered one hundred and three, lost nineteen. the packet, though armed, took no part in the fight, and when it was over effected her escape.[ ] the "decatur" with her prize reached charleston safely, august ; bringing also a captured merchantman. the moment of arrival was most opportune; two enemy's brigs, which for some time had been blockading the harbor, having left only the day before. in march, , the privateer schooner "comet," of baltimore, not being able to make her home port, put into wilmington, north carolina. she had been cruising in the west indies, and had there taken twenty vessels, most of which were destroyed after removing valuables. in the course of her operations she encountered near st. thomas the british ship "hibernia;" the size of which, and her height above the water, by preventing boarding, enabled her successfully to repel attack, and the privateer was obliged to haul off, having lost three men killed and thirteen wounded. the american account of this affair ascribes twenty-two guns to the "hibernia." the british story says that she had but six, with a crew of twenty-two men; of whom one was killed and eleven wounded. the importance of the matter in itself scarcely demands a serious attempt to reconcile this discrepancy; and it is safer to accept each party's statement of his own force. the two agree that the action lasted eight or nine hours, and that both were much cut up. it is evident also from each narrative that they lay alongside most of the time, which makes it probable that the ship's height saved her from being overborne by superior numbers. the "saucy jack," of charleston, passed through several severe combats, in one of which she was even worse mauled than the "comet" in the instance just cited. on april , , off st. nicolas mole, in the windward passage between cuba and santo domingo, she met the british ship "pelham," a vessel of five hundred and forty tons, and mounting ten guns, bound from london to port au prince. the "pelham" fought well, and the action lasted two hours, at the end of which she was carried by boarding. her forty men were overpowered by numbers, but nevertheless still resisted with a resolution which commanded the admiration of the victors. she lost four killed and eleven wounded; among the latter her captain, dangerously. the privateer had two killed and nine wounded. both vessels reached charleston safely, and the "saucy jack" at once fitted out again. it is told that, between daylight and dark of the day she began to enlist, one hundred and thirty able-bodied seamen had shipped; and this at a time when the navy with difficulty found crews.[ ] the "saucy jack" returned to the west indies for another cruise, in which she encountered one of those rude deceptions which privateers often experienced. she had made already eight prizes, for one of which, the ship "amelia," she had had to fight vigorously, killing four and wounding five of the enemy, while herself sustaining a loss of one killed and one wounded, when on october , , about a.m., being then off cape tiburon at the west end of haïti, she sighted two vessels standing to the westward. chase was made, and an hour later the privateer opened fire. the strangers replied, at the same time shortening sail, which looked ominous; but the "saucy jack," willing to justify her name, kept on to close. at a.m., having arrived within a few hundred yards, the enemy were seen to be well armed, but appeared not to be well manned. at seven, by which time it was daylight, the "saucy jack" began an engagement with the nearer, and ten minutes later ran her alongside, when she was found to be full of soldiers. the privateer sheered off at once, and took to her heels, followed by an incessant fire of grape and musketry from those whom she had recently pursued. this awkward position, which carried the chance of a disabling shot and consequent capture, lasted till eight, when the speed of the schooner took her out of range, having had in all eight men killed and fifteen wounded; two round shot in the hull, and spars and rigging much cut up. it was afterwards ascertained that her opponent was the "volcano" bombship, convoying the transport "golden fleece," on board which were two hundred and fifty troops from chesapeake bay for jamaica. the "volcano" lost an officer and two men killed, and two wounded; proving that under somewhat awkward circumstances the "saucy jack" could give as well as take.[ ] a little later in this season a group of nine sail, from the west indies for europe, was encountered by the privateer "kemp," of baltimore, broad off the coast of north carolina. excluded, like the "comet" and others, from return to the port where she belonged, the "kemp" had been in wilmington, which she left november , ; the strangers being sighted at a.m. december . one was a convoying frigate, which, when the "kemp" pursued, gave chase and drove her off that afternoon. the privateer outran her pursuer, and during the night by devious courses gave her the slip; thereupon steering for the position where she judged she would again fall in with the merchant vessels. in this she was successful, at daylight discovering them,--three ships, three brigs, and two schooners. at a.m. one ship was overtaken, but proving to be spanish, from havana to hamburg, was allowed to proceed, while the "kemp" again followed the others. at noon they were five miles to windward, drawn up in a line to fight; for in those days of war and piracy most merchant ships carried at least a few guns for defence, and in this case their numbers, combined in mutual support, might effect a successful resistance. at two they took the initiative, bearing down together and attacking. the "kemp" engaged them all, and in half an hour the untrained squadron was naturally in confusion. one after the other, six of the seven were boarded, or without waiting to be attacked struck their colors as the schooner drew up; but while four were being taken into possession, the two others seized the opportunity and made off. two ships and two brigs remained in the hands of the captor. all were laden with sugar and coffee, valuable at any time, but especially so in the then destitute condition of the united states. after this unusual, if not wholly unique, experience, the "kemp" returned to port, having been absent only six days. her prisoners amounted to seventy-one, her own crew being fifty-three. the separation of the escort from the convoy, the subsequent judicious search for the latter, and the completeness of the result, constitute this a very remarkable instance of good management accompanied by good fortune; success deserved and achieved.[ ] the privateer brig "chasseur," of baltimore, captain thomas boyle, was one of the typically successful and renowned cruisers of the time. she carried a battery of sixteen -pounder carronades, and in the course of the war thirty prizes are credited to her. in the late summer of she cruised off the coast of great britain and ireland, returning at the end of october; having made eighteen captures during an absence of three months. from these she paroled and sent in by cartels one hundred and fifty prisoners, bringing back with her forty-three, of whom she had not been able thus to rid herself.[ ] after refitting she went to the west indies for a winter cruise, which extended from the windward islands to the neighborhood of havana. here she signalized the approaching end of her career by an action, fought after peace not only had been concluded at ghent, but already was known in the united states. on february , , at a.m., being then twenty miles east of havana, and six miles from the cuban coast, a schooner was seen in the northeast ( ), running down before the northeast trade-wind. sail was made to intercept her ( ), there being at the time visible from the "chasseur's" masthead a convoy lying-to off havana, information concerning which probably accounts for her presence at this spot. the chase steered more to the northward ( ), bringing the wind on her starboard side, apparently wishing to avoid a meeting. the "chasseur" followed her motions, and when within about three miles the stranger's foretopmast went over the side, showing the press of sail she was carrying. after clearing the wreck she hauled close on the wind, heading northerly. at p.m., she began to fire her stern gun and showed british colors; but only three port-holes were visible on her port side,--towards the "chasseur." believing from appearances that he had before him a weakly armed vessel making a passage, and seeing but few men on her deck, captain boyle pressed forward without much preparation and under all sail. at . p.m. the "chasseur" had come within pistol-shot ( ), on the port side, when the enemy disclosed a tier of ten ports and opened his broadside, with round shot, grape, and musket balls. the american schooner, having much way on, shot ahead, and as she was to leeward in doing so, the british vessel kept off quickly ( ) to run under her stern and rake. this was successfully avoided by imitating the movement ( ), and the two were again side by side, but with the "chasseur" now to the right ( ). the action continued thus for about ten minutes, when boyle found his opponent's battery too heavy for him. he therefore ran alongside ( ), and in the act of boarding the enemy struck. she proved to be the british schooner "st. lawrence," belonging to the royal navy; formerly a renowned philadelphia privateer, the "atlas." her battery, one long -pounder and fourteen -pounder carronades, would have been no very unequal match for the sixteen of her antagonist; but the "chasseur" had been obliged recently to throw overboard ten of these, while hard chased by the barrosa frigate, and had replaced them with some -pounders from a prize, for which she had no proper projectiles. the complement allowed the "st. lawrence" was seventy-five, though it does not seem certain that all were on board; and she was carrying also some soldiers, marines, and naval officers, bound to new orleans, in ignorance probably of the disastrous end of that expedition. the "chasseur" had eighty-nine men, besides several boys. the british loss reported by her captain was six killed and seventeen wounded; the american, five killed and eight wounded.[ ] [illustration: diagram of the chasseur vs. st. lawrence battle] this action was very creditably fought on both sides, but to the american captain belongs the meed of having not only won success, but deserved it. his sole mistake was the over-confidence in what he could see, which made him a victim to the very proper ruse practised by his antagonist in concealing his force. his manoeuvring was prompt, ready, and accurate; that of the british vessel was likewise good, but a greater disproportion of injury should have resulted from her superior battery. in reporting the affair to his owners, captain boyle said, apologetically: "i should not willingly, perhaps, have sought a contest with a king's vessel, knowing that is not our object; but my expectations at first were a valuable vessel, and a valuable cargo also. when i found myself deceived, the honor of the flag intrusted to my care was not to be disgraced by flight." the feeling expressed was modest as well as spirited, and captain boyle's handsome conduct merits the mention that the day after the action, when the captured schooner was released as a cartel to havana, in compassion to her wounded, the commander of the "st. lawrence" gave him a letter, in the event of his being taken by a british cruiser, testifying to his "obliging attention and watchful solicitude to preserve our effects, and render us comfortable during the short time we were in his possession;" in which, he added, the captain "was carefully seconded by all his officers."[ ] these instances, occurring either in the west indies, or, in the case of the "kemp," affecting vessels which had just loaded there, are sufficient, when taken in connection with those before cited from other quarters of the globe, to illustrate the varied activities and fortunes of privateering. the general subject, therefore, need not further be pursued. it will be observed that in each case the cruiser acts on the offensive; being careful, however, in choosing the object of attack, to avoid armed ships, the capture of which seems unlikely to yield pecuniary profit adequate to the risk. the gallantry and skill of captain boyle of the "chasseur" made particularly permissible to him the avowal, that only mistake of judgment excused his committing himself to an encounter which held out no such promise; and it may be believed that the equally capable captain diron, if free to do as he pleased, would have chosen the packet, and not her escort the "dominica," as the object of his pursuit. this the naval schooner of course could not permit. it was necessary, therefore, first to fight her; and, although she was beaten, the result of the action was to insure the escape of the ship under her charge. these examples define exactly the spirit and aim of privateering, and distinguish them from the motives inspiring the ship of war. the object of the privateer is profit by capture; to which fighting is only incidental, and where avoidable is blamable. the mission of a navy on the other hand is primarily military; and while custom permitted the immediate captor a share in the proceeds of his prizes, the taking of them was in conception not for direct gain, personal or national, but for injury to the enemy. it may seem that, even though the ostensible motive was not the same, the two courses of operation followed identical methods, and in outcome were indistinguishable. this is not so. however subtle the working of the desire for gain upon the individual naval officer, leading at times to acts of doubtful propriety, the tone and spirit of a profession, even when not clearly formulated in phrase and definition, will assert itself in the determination of personal conduct. the dominating sense of advantage to the state, which is the military motive, and the dominating desire for gain in a mercantile enterprise, are very different incentives; and the result showed itself in a fact which has never been appreciated, and perhaps never noted, that the national ships of war were far more effective as prize takers than were the privateers. a contrary impression has certainly obtained, and was shared by the present writer until he resorted to the commonplace test of adding up figures. amid much brilliant achievement, privateering, like all other business pursuits, had also a large and preponderant record of unsuccess. the very small number of naval cruisers necessarily yielded a much smaller aggregate of prizes; but when the respective totals are considered with reference to the numbers of vessels engaged in making them, the returns from the individual vessels of the united states navy far exceed those from the privateers. among conspicuously successful cruisers, also, the united states ships "argus," "essex," "peacock," and "wasp" compare favorably in general results with the most celebrated privateers, even without allowing for the evident fact that a few instances of very extraordinary qualities and record are more likely to be found among five hundred vessels than among twenty-two; this being the entire number of naval pendants actually engaged in open-sea cruising, from first to last. these twenty-two captured one hundred and sixty-five prizes, an average of . each, in which are included the enemy's ships of war taken. of privateers of all classes there were five hundred and twenty-six; or, excluding a few small nondescripts, four hundred and ninety-two. by these were captured thirteen hundred and forty-four vessels, an average of less than three; to be exact, . . the proportion, therefore, of prizes taken by ships of war to those by private armed vessels was nearly three to one. comparison may be instituted in other ways. of the twenty-two national cruisers, four only, or one in five, took no prize; leaving to the remaining eighteen an average of nine. out of the grand total of five hundred and twenty-six privateers only two hundred and seven caught anything; three hundred and nineteen, three out of five, returned to port empty-handed, or were themselves taken. dividing the thirteen hundred and forty-four prizes among the two hundred and seven more or less successful privateers, there results an average of . ; so that, regard being had only to successful cruisers, the achievement of the naval vessels was to that of the private armed nearly as three to two. these results may be accepted as disposing entirely of the extravagant claims made for privateering as a system, when compared with a regular naval service, especially when it is remembered with what difficulty the american frigates could get to sea at all, on account of their heavy draft and the close blockade; whereas the smaller vessels, national or private, had not only many harbors open, but also comparatively numerous opportunities to escape. the frigate "united states" never got out after her capture of the "macedonian," in ; the "congress" was shut up after her return in december, ; and the "chesapeake" had been captured in the previous june. all these nevertheless count in the twenty-two pendants reckoned above. the figures here cited are from a compilation by lieutenant george f. emmons,[ ] of the united states navy, published in under the title, "the united states navy from to ." mr. emmons made no analyses, confining himself to giving lists and particulars; his work is purely statistical. counting captures upon the lakes, and a few along the coast difficult of classification, his grand total of floating craft taken from the enemy reaches fifteen hundred and ninety-nine; which agrees nearly with the sixteen hundred and thirty-four of niles, whom he names among his sources of information. from an examination of the tables some other details of interest may be drawn. of the five hundred and twenty-six privateers and letters-of-marque given by name, twenty-six were ships, sixty-seven brigs, three hundred and sixty-four schooners, thirty-five sloops, thirty-four miscellaneous; down to, and including, a few boats putting out from the beach. the number captured by the enemy was one hundred and forty-eight, or twenty-eight per cent. the navy suffered more severely. of the twenty-two vessels reckoned above, twelve were taken, or destroyed to keep them out of an enemy's hands; over fifty per cent. of the twelve, six were small brigs, corresponding in size and nautical powers to the privateer. three were frigates--the "president," "essex," and "chesapeake." one, the "adams," was not at sea when destroyed by her own captain to escape capture. only two sloops of war, the first "wasp" and the "frolic,"[ ] were taken; and of these the former, as already known, was caught when partially dismasted, at the end of a successful engagement. contemporary with the career of the "argus," the advantage of a sudden and unexpected inroad, like hers, upon a region deemed safe by the enemy, was receiving confirmation in the remote pacific by the cruise of the frigate "essex." this vessel, which had formed part of commodore bainbridge's squadron at the close of , was last mentioned as keeping her christmas off cape frio,[ ] on the coast of brazil, awaiting there the coming of the consorts whom she never succeeded in joining. captain porter maintained this station, hearing frequently about bainbridge by vessels from bahia, until january , . then a threatened shortness of provisions, and rumors of enemy's ships in the neighborhood, especially of the seventy-four "montagu" combined to send him to st. catherine's island, another appointed rendezvous, and the last upon the coast of brazil. in this remote and sequestered anchorage hostile cruisers would scarcely look for him, at least until more likely positions had been carefully examined. [illustration: captain david porter. _from the painting by charles wilson peale, in independence hall, philadelphia._] at st. catherine's porter heard of the action between the "constitution" and "java" off bahia, a thousand miles distant, and received also a rumor, which seemed probable enough, that the third ship of the division, the "hornet," had been captured by the "montagu." he consequently left port january , for the southward, still with the expectation of ultimately joining the commodore off st. helena, the last indicated point of assembly; but having been unable to renew his stores in st. catherine's, and ascertaining that there was no hope of better success at buenos ayres, or the other spanish settlements within the river la plata, he after reflection decided to cut loose from the squadron and go alone to the pacific. there he could reasonably hope to support himself by the whalers of the enemy; that class of vessel being always well provided for long absences. this alternative course he knew would be acceptable to the government, as well as to his immediate commander.[ ] the next six weeks were spent in the tempestuous passage round cape horn, the ship's company living on half-allowance of provisions; but on march , , the "essex" anchored in valparaiso, being the first united states ship of war to show the national flag in the pacific. by a noteworthy coincidence she had already been the first to carry it beyond the cape of good hope. chile received the frigate hospitably, being at the time in revolt against spain; but the authority of the mother country was still maintained in peru, where a spanish viceroy resided, and it was learned that in the capacity of ally of great britain he intended to fit out privateers against american whalers, of which there were many in these seas. as several of the british whalers carried letters-of-marque, empowering them to make prizes, the arrival of the "essex" not only menaced the hostile interests, but promised to protect her own countrymen from a double danger. her departure therefore was hastened; and having secured abundant provision, such as the port supplied, she sailed for the northward a week after anchoring. a privateer from peru was met, which had seized two americans. porter threw overboard her guns and ammunition, and then released her with a note for the viceroy, which served both as a respectful explanation and a warning. one of the prizes taken by this marauder was recaptured march , when entering callao, the port of lima. the "essex" then went to the galapagos islands, a group just south of the equator, five hundred miles from the south american mainland. these belong now to ecuador, and at that day were a noted rendezvous for whalers. in this neighborhood the frigate remained from april to october , during which period she captured twelve british whalers out of some twenty-odd reported in the pacific; with the necessary consequence of driving all others to cover for the time being. the prizes were valuable, some more, some less; not only from the character of their cargoes, but because they themselves were larger than the average merchant ship, and exceptionally well found. three were sent to valparaiso in convoy of a fourth, which had been converted into a consort of the "essex," under the name of the "essex junior," mounting twenty very light guns. september she returned, bringing word that a british squadron, consisting of the -gun frigate "phoebe," captain james hillyar, and the sloops of war "cherub" and "raccoon," had sailed for the pacific. the rumor was correct, though long antedating the arrival of the vessels. in consequence of it, porter, considering that his work at the galapagos was now complete, and that the "essex" would need overhauling before a possible encounter with a division, the largest unit of which was superior to her in class and force, decided to move to a position then even more remote from disturbance than st. catherine's had been. on october the "essex" and "essex junior" anchored at the island of nukahiva, of the marquesas group, having with them three of the prizes. of the others, besides those now at valparaiso, two had been given up to prisoners to convey them to england, and three had been sent to the united states. that all the last were captured on the way detracts nothing from porter's merit, but testifies vividly to the british command of the sea. at the marquesas, by aid of the resources of the prizes, the frigate was thoroughly overhauled, refitted, and provisioned for six months. porter had not only maintained his ship, but in part paid his officers and crew from the proceeds of his captures. on december he sailed for chile, satisfied with the material outcome of his venturous cruise, but wishing to add to it something of further distinction by an encounter with hillyar, if obtainable on terms approaching equality. with this object the ship's company were diligently exercised at the guns and small arms during the passage, which lasted nearly eight weeks; the chilean coast being sighted on january , far to the southward, and the "essex" running slowly along it until february , when she reached valparaiso. on the th the "phoebe" and "cherub" came in and anchored; the "raccoon" having gone on to the north pacific. the antagonists now lay near one another, under the restraint of a neutral port, for several days, during which some social intercourse took place between the officers; the two captains renewing an acquaintance made years before in the mediterranean. after a period of refit, and of repose for the crews, the british left the bay, and cruised off the port. the "essex" and "essex junior" remained at anchor, imprisoned by a force too superior to be encountered without some modifying circumstances of advantage. porter found opportunities for contrasting the speed of the two frigates, and convinced himself that the "essex" was on that score superior; but the respective armaments introduced very important tactical considerations, which might, and in the result did, prove decisive. the "essex" originally had been a -pounder frigate, classed as of thirty-two guns; but her battery now was forty -pounder carronades and six long twelves. captain porter in his report of the battle stated the armament of the "phoebe" to be thirty long -pounders and sixteen -pounder carronades. the british naval historian james gives her twenty-six long eighteens, fourteen -pounder carronades, and four long nines; while to the "cherub" he attributes a carronade battery of eighteen thirty-twos and six eighteens, with two long sixes. whichever enumeration be accepted, the broadside of the "essex" within carronade range considerably outweighed that of the "phoebe" alone, but was much less than that of the two british ships combined; the light built and light-armed "essex junior" not being of account to either side. there remained always the serious chance that, even if the "phoebe" accepted single combat, some accident of wind might prevent the "essex" reaching her before being disabled by her long guns. hillyar, moreover, was an old disciple of nelson, fully imbued with the teaching that achievement of success, not personal glory, must dictate action; and, having a well established reputation for courage and conduct, he did not intend to leave anything to the chances of fortune incident to engagement between equals. he would accept no provocation to fight apart from the "cherub." forced to accept this condition, porter now turned his attention to escape. valparaiso bay is an open roadstead, facing north. the high ground above the anchorage provides shelter from the south-southwest wind, which prevails along this coast throughout the year with very rare intermissions. at times, as is common under high land, it blows furiously in gusts. the british vessels underway kept their station close to the extreme western point of the bay, to prevent the "essex" from passing to southward of them, and so gaining the advantage of the wind, which might entail a prolonged chase and enable her, if not to distance pursuit, at least to draw the "phoebe" out of support of the "cherub." porter's aim of course was to seize an opportunity when by neglect, or unavoidably, they had left a practicable opening between them and the point. in the end, his hand was forced by an accident. on march the south wind blew with unusual violence, and the "essex" parted one of her cables. the other anchor failed to hold when the strain came upon it, and the ship began to drift to sea. the cable was cut and sail made at once; for though the enemy were too nearly in their station to have warranted the attempt to leave under ordinary conditions, porter, in the emergency thus suddenly thrust upon him, thought he saw a prospect of passing to windward. the "essex" therefore was hauled close to the wind under single-reefed topsails, heading to the westward; but just as she came under the point of the bay a heavy squall carried away the maintopmast. the loss of this spar hopelessly crippled her, and made it impossible even to regain the anchorage left. she therefore put about, and ran eastward until within pistol-shot of the coast, about three miles north of the city. here she anchored, well within neutral waters; hillyar's report stating that she was "so near shore as to preclude the possibility of passing ahead of her without risk to his majesty's ships." three miles, then the range of a cannon-shot, estimated liberally, was commonly accepted as the width of water adjacent to neutral territory, which was under the neutral protection. the british captain decided nevertheless to attack. the wind remaining southerly, the "essex" rode head to it; the two hostile vessels approaching with the intention of running north of her, close under her stern. the wind, however, forced them off as they drew near; and their first attack, beginning about p.m. and lasting ten minutes, produced no visible effect, according to hillyar's report. porter states, on the contrary, that considerable injury was done to the "essex"; and in particular the spring which he was trying to get on the cable was thrice shot away, thus preventing the bringing of her broadside to bear as required. the "phoebe" and her consort then wore, which increased their distance, and stood out again to sea. while doing this they threw a few "random shots;" fired, that is, at an elevation so great as to be incompatible with certainty of aim. during this cannonade the "essex," with three -pounders run out of her stern ports, had deprived the "phoebe" of "the use of her mainsail, jib and mainstay." on standing in again hillyar prepared to anchor, but ordered the "cherub" to keep underway, choosing a position whence she could most annoy their opponent. at . p.m., by hillyar's report,--porter is silent as to the hour,--the attack was renewed; the british ships both placing themselves on the starboard--seaward--quarter of the "essex." before the "phoebe" reached the position in which she intended to anchor, the "essex" was seen to be underway. hillyar could only suppose that her cable had been severed by a shot; but porter states that under the galling fire to which she was subjected, without power to reply, he cut the cable, hoping, as the enemy were to leeward, he might bring the ship into close action, and perhaps even board the "phoebe." the decision was right, but under the conditions a counsel of desperation; for sheets, tacks, and halliards being shot away, movement depended upon sails hanging loose,--spread, but not set. nevertheless, he was able for a short time to near the enemy, and both accounts agree that hereupon ensued the heat of the combat; "a serious conflict," to use hillyar's words, to which corresponds porter's statement that "the firing on both sides was now tremendous." the "phoebe," however, was handled, very properly, to utilize to the full the tactical advantages she possessed in the greater range of her guns, and in power of manoeuvring. in the circumstances under which she was acting, the sail power left her was amply sufficient; having simply to keep drawing to leeward, maintaining from her opponent a distance at which his guns were useless and her own effective. under these conditions, seeing success to be out of the question, and suffering great loss of men, porter turned to the last resort of the vanquished, to destroy the vessel and to save the crew from captivity. the "essex" was pointed for the shore; but when within a couple of hundred yards the wind, which had so far favored her approach, shifted ahead. still clinging to every chance, a kedge with a hawser was let go, to hold her where she was; perhaps the enemy might drift unwittingly out of range. but the hawser parted, and with it the frigate's last hold upon the country which she had honored by an heroic defence. porter then authorized any who might wish to swim ashore to do so; the flag being kept flying to warrant a proceeding which after formal surrender would be a breach of faith. at . the "essex" at last lowered her colors.[ ] out of a ship's company of two hundred and fifty-five, with which she sailed in the morning, fifty-eight were killed, or died of their wounds, and sixty-five were wounded. the missing were reported at thirty-one. by agreement between hillyar and porter, the "essex junior" was disarmed, and neutralized, to convey to the united states, as paroled prisoners of war, the survivors who remained on board at the moment of surrender. these numbered one hundred and thirty-two. it is an interesting particular, linking those early days of the united states navy to a long subsequent period of renown, and worthy therefore to be recalled, that among the combatants of the "essex" was midshipman david g. farragut, then thirteen years old. his name figures among the wounded, as well as in the list of passengers on board the "essex junior." the disaster to the "essex" is connected by a singular and tragical link with the fate of an american cruiser of like adventurous enterprise in seas far distant from the pacific. after the defeat at valparaiso, lieutenant stephen decatur mcknight and midshipman james lyman of the united states frigate were exchanged as prisoners of war against a certain number of officers and seamen belonging to one of the "essex's" prizes; which, having continued under protection of the neutral port, had undergone no change of belligerent relation by the capture of her captor. when the "essex junior" sailed, these two officers remained behind, by amicable arrangement, to go in the "phoebe" to rio janeiro, there to give certain evidence needed in connection with the prize claims of the british frigate; which done, it was understood they would be at liberty to return to their own country by such conveyance as suited them. after arrival in rio, the first convenient opportunity offering was by a swedish brig sailing for falmouth, england. in her they took passage, leaving rio august , . on october the brig fell in with the united states sloop of war "wasp," in mid-ocean, about three hundred miles west of the cape verde islands, homeward bound. the two passengers transferred themselves to her. since this occurrence nothing further has ever been heard of the american ship; nor would the incident itself have escaped oblivion but for the anxiety of friends, which after the lapse, of time prompted systematic inquiry to ascertain what had become of the missing officers. the captain of the "wasp" was master-commandant, or, as he would now be styled, commander johnstone blakely; the same who had commanded the "enterprise" up to a month before her engagement with the "boxer," when was demonstrated the efficiency to which he had brought her ship's company. he sailed from portsmouth, new hampshire, may , . of his instructions,[ ] the most decisive was to remain for thirty days in a position on the approaches to the english channel, about one hundred and fifty miles south of ireland, in which neighborhood occurred the most striking incidents of the cruise. on the outward passage was taken only one prize, june . she was from cork to halifax, twelve days out; therefore probably from six to eight hundred miles west of ireland. the second, from limerick for bordeaux, june , would show the "wasp" on her station; on which, blakely reported, it was impossible to keep her, even approximately, being continually drawn away in pursuit, and often much further up the english channel than desired, on account of the numerous sails passing.[ ] when overhauled, most of these were found to be neutrals. nevertheless, seven british merchant vessels were taken; all of which were destroyed, except one given up to carry prisoners to england. while thus engaged, the "wasp" on june sighted a sail, which proved to be the british brig of war "reindeer," captain manners, that had left plymouth six days before. the place of this meeting was latitude -½° north, longitude ° east; therefore nearly in the cruising ground assigned to blakely by his instructions. the antagonists were unequally matched; the american carrying twenty -pounder carronades and two long guns, the british sixteen -pounders and two long; a difference against her of over fifty per cent. the "reindeer" was to windward, and some manoeuvring took place in the respective efforts to keep or to gain this advantage. in the end the "reindeer" retained it, and the action began with both on the starboard tack, closehauled, the british sloop on the weather quarter of the "wasp,"--behind, but on the weather side, which in this case was to the right ( ). approaching slowly, the "reindeer" with great deliberation fired five times, at two-minute intervals, a light gun mounted on her forecastle, loaded with round and grape shot. finding her to maintain this position, upon which his guns would not train, blakely put the helm down, and the "wasp" turned swiftly to the right ( ), bringing her starboard battery to bear. this was at . p.m. the action immediately became very hot, at very close range ( ), and the "reindeer" was speedily disabled. the vessels then came together ( ), and captain manners, who by this time had received two severe wounds, with great gallantry endeavored to board with his crew, reduced by the severe punishment already inflicted to half its originally inferior numbers. as he climbed into the rigging, two balls from the "wasp's" tops passed through his head, and he fell back dead on his own deck. no further resistance was offered, and the "wasp" took possession. she had lost five killed and twenty-one wounded, of whom six afterwards died. the british casualties were twenty-three killed and forty-two wounded. the brig herself, being fairly torn to pieces, was burned the next day.[ ] [illustration: diagram of the wasp vs. reindeer battle] the results of this engagement testify to the efficiency and resolution of both combatants; but a special meed of praise is assuredly due to captain manners, whose tenacity was as marked as his daring, and who, by the injury done to his stronger antagonist, demonstrated both the thoroughness of his previous general preparation and the skill of his management in the particular instance. under his command the "reindeer" had become a notable vessel in the fleet to which she belonged; but as equality in force is at a disadvantage where there is serious inferiority in training and discipline, so the best of drilling must yield before decisive superiority of armament, when there has been equal care on both sides to insure efficiency in the use of the battery. to blakely's diligence in this respect his whole career bears witness. after the action blakely wished to remain cruising, which neither the condition of his ship nor her losses in men forbade; but the number of prisoners and wounded compelled him to make a harbor. he accordingly went into l'orient, france, on july . despite the change of government, and the peace with great britain which attended the restoration of the bourbons, the "wasp" was here hospitably received and remained for seven weeks refitting, sailing again august . by september she had taken and destroyed three more enemy's vessels; one of which was cut out from a convoy, and burnt under the eyes of the convoying -gun ship. at . p.m. of september four sails were sighted, from which blakely selected to pursue the one most to windward; for, should this prove a ship of war, the others, if consorts, would be to leeward of the fight, less able to assist. the chase lasted till . , when the "wasp" was near enough to see that the stranger was a brig of war, and to open with a light carronade on the forecastle, as the "reindeer" had done upon her in the same situation. confident in his vessel, however, blakely abandoned this advantage of position, ran under his antagonist's lee to prevent her standing down to join the vessels to leeward, and at . began the engagement, being then on her lee bow. at ten the "wasp" ceased firing and hailed, believing the enemy to be silenced; but receiving no reply, and the british guns opening again, the combat was renewed. at . , seeing the opponent to be suffering greatly, blakely hailed again and was answered that the brig had surrendered. the "wasp's" battery was secured, and a boat was in the act of being lowered to take possession, when a second brig was discovered close astern. preparation was made to receive her and her coming up awaited; but at . the two others were also visible, astern and approaching. the "wasp" then made sail, hoping to decoy the second vessel from her supports; but the sinking condition of the one first engaged detained the new-comer, who, having come within pistol-shot, fired a broadside which took effect only aloft, and then gave all her attention to saving the crew of her comrade. as the "wasp" drew away she heard the repeated signal guns of distress discharged by her late adversary, the name of which never became known to the captain and crew of the victorious ship.[ ] the vessel thus engaged was the british brig "avon," of sixteen -pounder carronades, and two long -pounders; her force being to that of the "wasp" as four to five. her loss in men was ten killed and thirty-two wounded; that of the "wasp" two killed and one wounded. the "avon" being much superior to the "reindeer," this comparatively slight injury inflicted by her testifies to inferior efficiency. the broadside of her rescuer, the "castilian," of the same weight as her own, wholly missed the "wasp's" hull, though delivered from so near; a circumstance which drew from the british historian, james, the caustic remark that she probably would have done no better than the "avon," had the action continued. the "wasp" was much damaged in sails and rigging; the "avon" sank two hours and a half after the "wasp" left her and one hour after being rejoined by the "castilian." the course of the "wasp" after this event is traced by her captures. the meeting with the "avon" was within a hundred miles of that with the "reindeer." on september and , having run south three hundred and sixty miles, she took two vessels; being then about two hundred and fifty miles west from lisbon. on the st, having made four degrees more southing, she seized the british brig "atalanta," a hundred miles east of madeira. this prize being of exceptional value, blakely decided to send her in, and she arrived safely at savannah on november , in charge of midshipman david geisinger, who lived to become a captain in the navy.[ ] she brought with her blakely's official despatches, including the report of the affair with the "avon." this was the last tidings received from the "wasp" until the inquiries of friends elicited the fact that the two officers of the "essex" had joined her three weeks after the capture of the "atalanta," nine hundred miles farther south. besides these, there were among the lost two lieutenants who had been in the "constitution" when she took the "guerrière" and the "java," and one who had been in the "enterprise" in her action with the "boxer." coincident in time with the cruise of the "wasp" was that of her sister ship, the "peacock"; like her also newly built, and named after the british brig sunk by captain lawrence in the "hornet." the finest achievement of the "wasp," however, was near the end of her career, while it fell to the "peacock" to begin with a successful action. having left new york early in march, she went first to st. mary's, georgia, carrying a quantity of warlike stores. in making this passage she was repeatedly chased by enemies. having landed her cargo, she sailed immediately and ran south as far as one of the bahama islands, called the great isaac, near to which vessels from jamaica and cuba bound to europe must pass, because of the narrowness of the channel separating the islands from the florida coast. in this neighborhood she remained from april to , seeing only one neutral and two privateers, which were pursued unsuccessfully. this absence of unguarded merchant ships, coupled with the frequency of hostile cruisers met before, illustrates exactly the conditions to which attention has been repeatedly drawn, as characterizing the british plan of action in the western atlantic. learning that the expected jamaica convoy would be under charge of a seventy-four, two frigates, and two sloops, and that the merchant ships in havana, fearing to sail alone, would await its passing to join, captain warrington next stood slowly to the northward, and on april , off cape canaveral, sighted four sail, which proved to be the british brig "epervier" of eighteen -pounder carronades,[ ] also northward bound, with three merchant vessels under her convoy; one of these being russian, and one spanish, belonging therefore to nations still at war with france, though neutral towards the united states. the third, a merchant brig, was the first british commercial vessel seen since leaving savannah. as usual and proper, the "epervier," seeing that the "peacock" would overtake her and her convoy, directed the latter to separate while she stood down to engage the hostile cruiser. the two vessels soon came to blows. the accounts of the action on both sides are extremely meagre, and preclude any certain statement as to manoeuvres; which indeed cannot have been material to the issue reached. the "epervier," for reasons that will appear later, fought first one broadside and then the other; but substantially the contest appears to have been maintained side to side. from the first discharge of the "epervier" two round shot struck the "peacock's" foreyard nearly in the same place, which so weakened the spar as to deprive the ship of the use of her foresail and foretopsail; that is, practically, of all sail on the foremast. having thenceforth only the jibs for headsail, she had to be kept a little off the wind. the action lasted forty-five minutes, when the "epervier" struck. her loss in men was eight killed, and fifteen wounded; the "peacock" had two wounded. in extenuation of this disproportion in result, james states that in the first broadside three of the "epervier's" carronades were unshipped; and that, when those on the other side were brought into action by tacking, similar mishaps occurred. further, the moment the guns got warm they drew out the breeching bolts. allowing full force to these facts, they certainly have some bearing on the general outcome; but viewed with regard to the particular question of efficiency, which is the issue of credit in every fight,[ ] there remains the first broadside, and such other discharges as the carronades could endure before getting warm. the light metal of those guns indisputably caused them to heat rapidly, and to kick nastily; but it can scarcely be considered probable that the "epervier" was not able to get in half a dozen broadsides. the result, two wounded, establishes inefficiency, and a practical certainty of defeat had all her ironwork held; for the "peacock," though only three months commissioned, was a good ship under a thoroughly capable and attentive captain. a comical remark of james in connection with this engagement illustrates the weakness of prepossession, in all matters relating to americans, which in him was joined to a painstaking accuracy in ascertaining and stating external facts. "two well-directed shot," he says, disabled the "peacock's" foreyard. it was certainly a capital piece of luck for the "epervier" that her opponent at the outset lost the use of one of her most important spars; but the implication that the shot were directed for the point hit is not only preposterous but, in a combat between vessels nearly equal, depreciatory. the shot of a first broadside had no business to be so high in the air. james alleges also poor quality and a mutinous spirit in the crew, and that at the end, when their captain called upon them to board, they refused, saying, "she is too heavy for us." to this the adequate reply is that the brig had been in commission since the end of ,--sixteen months; time sufficient to bring even an indifferent crew to a very reasonable degree of efficiency, yet not enough to cause serious deterioration of material. that after the punishment received the men refused to board, if discreditable to them under the conditions, is discreditable also to the captain; not to his courage, but to his hold upon the men whom he had commanded so long. the establishment of the "epervier's" inefficiency certainly detracts from the distinction of the "peacock's" victory; but it was scarcely her fault that her adversary was not worthier, and it does not detract from her credit for management and gunnery, considering that the combat began with the loss of her own foresails, and ended with forty-five shot in the hull, and five feet of water in the hold, of her antagonist. by dark of the day of action the prize was in condition to make sail, and the "peacock's" yard had been fished and again sent aloft. the two vessels then steered north for savannah. the next evening two british frigates appeared. captain warrington directed the "epervier" to keep on close along shore, while he stood southward to draw away the enemy. this proved effective; the "epervier" arriving safely may at the anchorage at the mouth of the savannah river, where the "peacock" rejoined her on the th. the "adams," captain morris, was also there; having arrived from the coast of africa on the day of the fight, and sailing again a week after it, may , for another cruise. on june the "peacock" also started upon a protracted cruise, from which she returned to new york october , after an absence of one hundred and forty-seven days.[ ] she followed the gulf stream, outside the line of british blockaders, to the banks of newfoundland, thence to the azores, and so on to ireland; off the south of which, between waterford and cape clear, she remained for four days. after this she passed round the west coast, and to the northward as far as shetland and the faroe islands. she then retraced her course, crossed the bay of biscay, and ran along the portuguese coast; pursuing in general outline the same path as that in which the "wasp" very soon afterwards followed. fourteen prizes were taken; of which twelve were destroyed, and two utilized as cartels to carry prisoners to england. of the whole number, one only was seized from september , when the ship was off the canaries, to october , off barbuda in the west indies; and none from there to the united states. "not a single vessel was seen from the cape verde to surinam," reported warrington; while in seven days spent between the rock of lisbon and cape ortegal, at the northwest extremity of the spanish peninsula, of twelve sail seen, nine of which were spoken, only two were british. in these conditions were seen, exemplified and emphasized, the alarm felt and precautions taken, by both the mercantile classes and the admiralty, in consequence of the invasion of european waters by american armed vessels, of a class and an energy unusually fitted to harass commerce. the lists of american prizes teem with evidence of extraordinary activity, by cruisers singularly adapted for their work, and audacious in proportion to their confidence of immunity, based upon knowledge of their particular nautical qualities. the impression produced by their operations is reflected in the representations of the mercantile community, in the rise of insurance, and in the stricter measures instituted by the admiralty. the naval chronicle, a service journal which since had been recording the successes and supremacy of the british navy, confessed now that "the depredations committed on our commerce by american ships of war and privateers have attained an extent beyond all former precedent.... we refer our readers to the letters in our correspondence. the insurance between bristol and waterford or cork is now three times higher than it was when we were at war with all europe. the admiralty have been overwhelmed with letters of complaint or remonstrance."[ ] in the exertions of the cruisers the pace seems to grow more and more furious, as the year draws to its close amid a scene of exasperated coast warfare, desolation, and humiliation, in america; as though they were determined, amid all their pursuit of gain, to make the enemy also feel the excess of mortification which he was inflicting upon their own country. the discouragement testified by british shippers and underwriters was doubtless enhanced and embittered by disappointment, in finding the movement of trade thus embarrassed and intercepted at the very moment when the restoration of peace in europe had given high hopes of healing the wounds, and repairing the breaches, made by over twenty years of maritime warfare, almost unbroken. in london, on august , , directors of two insurance companies presented to the admiralty remonstrances on the want of protection in the channel; to which the usual official reply was made that an adequate force was stationed both in st. george's channel and in the north sea. the london paper from which this intelligence was taken stated that premiums on vessels trading between england and ireland had risen from an ordinary rate of less than one pound sterling to five guineas per cent. the admiralty, taxed with neglect, attributed blame to the merchant captains, and announced additional severity to those who should part convoy. proceedings were instituted against two masters guilty of this offence.[ ] september , the merchants and shipowners of liverpool remonstrated direct to the prince regent, going over the heads of the admiralty, whom they censured. again the admiralty alleged sufficient precautions, specifying three frigates and fourteen sloops actually at sea for the immediate protection of st. george's channel and the western irish coast against depredations, which they nevertheless did not succeed in suppressing.[ ] at the same time the same classes in glasgow were taking action, and passing resolutions, the biting phrases of which were probably prompted as much by a desire to sting the admiralty as by a personal sense of national abasement. "at a time when we are at peace with all the rest of the world, when the maintenance of our marine costs so large a sum to the country, when the mercantile and shipping interests pay a tax for protection under the form of convoy duty, and when, in the plenitude of our power, we have declared the whole american coast under blockade, it is equally distressing and mortifying that our ships cannot with safety traverse our own channels, that insurance cannot be effected but at an excessive premium, and that a horde of american cruisers should be allowed, unheeded, unmolested, unresisted, to take, burn, or sink our own vessels in our own inlets, and almost in sight of our own harbours."[ ] in the same month the merchants of bristol, the position of which was comparatively favorable to intercourse with ireland, also presented a memorial, stating that the rate of insurance had risen to more than twofold the amount at which it was usually effected during the continental war, when the british navy could not, as it now might, direct its operations solely against american cruisers. shipments consequently had been in a considerable degree suspended. the admiralty replied that the only certain protection was by convoy. this they were ready to supply but could not compel, for the convoy act did not apply to trade between ports of the united kingdom. this was the offensive return made by america's right arm of national safety; the retort to the harrying of the chesapeake, and of long island sound, and to the capture and destruction of washington. but, despite the demonstrated superiority of a national navy, on the whole, for the infliction of such retaliation, even in the mere matter of commerce destroying,--not to speak of confidence in national prowess, sustained chiefly by the fighting successes at sea,--this weighty blow to the pride and commerce of great britain was not dealt by the national government; for the national government had gone to war culpably unprepared. it was the work of the people almost wholly, guided and governed by their own shrewdness and capacity; seeking, indeed, less a military than a pecuniary result, an indemnity at the expense of the enemy for the loss to which they had been subjected by protracted inefficiency in administration and in statesmanship on the part of their rulers. the government sat wringing its hands, amid the ruins of its capital and the crash of its resources; reaping the reward of those wasted years during which, amid abounding warning, it had neglected preparation to meet the wrath to come. monroe, the secretary of state, writing from washington to a private friend, july , , said, "even in this state, the government shakes to the foundation. let a strong force land anywhere, and what will be the effect?" a few months later, december , he tells jefferson, "our finances are in a deplorable state. the means of the country have scarcely yet been touched, yet we have neither money in the treasury nor credit."[ ] this statement was abundantly confirmed by a contemporary official report of the secretary of the treasury. at the end of the year, bainbridge, commanding the boston navy yard, wrote the department, "the officers and men of this station are really _suffering_ for want of pay due them, and articles now purchased for the use of the navy are, in consequence of payment in treasury notes, enhanced about thirty per cent. yesterday we had to discharge one hundred seamen, and could not pay them a cent of their wages. the officers and men have neither money, clothes, nor credit, and are embarrassed with debts."[ ] no wonder the privateers got the seamen. the decision to abandon the leading contention of the war had been reached long before.[ ] in an official letter, dated june , , to the commissioners appointed to treat for peace, after enumerating the threatening conditions confronting the country, now that the european conflict was at an end, monroe wrote, "on mature consideration it has been decided that, under all the circumstances above alluded to, incident to a prosecution of the war, _you may omit any stipulation on the subject of impressment_, if found indispensably necessary to terminate it. you will of course not recur to this expedient until all your efforts to adjust the controversy in a more satisfactory manner have failed."[ ] the phraseology of this instruction disposes completely of the specious plea, advanced by partisans of the administration, that the subject was dropped because impressment was no longer a live issue; the maritime war of europe being over. it was dropped because it had to be dropped; because the favorable opportunities presented in and had been lost by the incompetency of the national government, distributed over a period of nearly a dozen years of idle verbal argumentation; because in there stood between it and disastrous reverse, and loss of territory in the north, only the resolution and professional skill of a yet unrecognized seaman on the neglected waters of lake champlain. before concluding finally the subject of the offensive maritime operations against the enemy's commerce, it may be mentioned that in the last six months of the war, that is within one fifth of its duration, were made one third of the total captures. duly to weigh this result, regard must be had to the fact that, when the navy is adequate, the most numerous seizures of commercial shipping are usually effected at the beginning, because the scattered merchantmen are taken unawares. the success of the last few months of this war indicates the stimulus given to privateering, partly by the conditions of the country, imperiously demanding some relief from the necessity, and stagnancy of occupation, caused by the blockade; partly by the growing appreciation of the fact that a richer harvest was to be reaped by seeking the most suitable fields with the most suitable vessels. in an energetic and businesslike people it will be expected that the experience of the two preceding twelvemonths would have produced decided opinions and practical results in the construction of privateers, as well as in the direction given them. it is one thing to take what is at hand and make the most of it in an emergency; it is another to design thoughtfully a new instrument, best qualified for the end in view. the cruiser needed speed and handiness,--that is the first and obvious requirement; but, to escape the numerous enemies gradually let loose to shorten her career, it became increasingly requisite that she should have also weight of armament, to fight, and weight of hull--tonnage--to hold her way in rough and head seas. these qualities were not irreconcilable; but, to effect the necessary combination, additional size was inevitable. accordingly, recognition of these facts is found in the laying down of privateers for the particular business. niles' register, a baltimore weekly, notes with local pride that, although the port itself is bolted and barred by the blockade of the chesapeake, the baltimore model for schooners is in demand from maine to georgia; that they are being built, often with baltimore capital, in many places from which escape is always possible. in boston, there are in construction three stout hulls, pierced for twenty-two guns; clearly much heavier in tonnage, as in armament, than the schooner rate, and bearing the linked names of "blakely," "reindeer," and "avon." mention is made of one vessel of twenty-two long, heavy guns, which has already sailed, and of two others, to carry as many as thirty to thirty-six, nearly ready.[ ] between the divergent requirements of size and numbers, there is always a middle term; a mean, not capable of exact definition, but still existent within certain not very widely separated extremes. for commerce destroying by individual cruisers, acting separately, which was the measure that commended itself to the men of , vessels approaching the tonnage of the national sloops of war seemed, by their successes and their immunity from capture, to realize very nearly the best conditions of advantage. the national brigs which put to sea were all captured, save one; and she was so notoriously dull of sailing that her escape was attributed to mere good luck, experienced on several critical occasions. nearly all the sloops escaped; while the three frigates lost, the "chesapeake," "essex," and "president," were taken under circumstances that offered no parallel to the exigencies to which the privateer was liable. they were not run down, uninjured, in a fair race. the only sloop so lost was the "frolic," of the class of the "wasp" and "peacock;" and the circumstances under which she was caught by a frigate are not sufficiently known to pronounce whether she might have been saved, as her sister ship, the "hornet," was, from the hot pursuit of a seventy-four. under some conditions of wind and sea, inferiority of bulk inflicts irredeemable disadvantage of speed; but, taking one thing with another, in a system of commerce destroying which rejected squadron action, and was based avowedly upon dissemination of vessels, the gain of the frigate over the sloop due to size did not counterbalance the loss in distribution of effort which results from having only one ship, instead of two, for a first outlay. that some such convictions, the fruit of rude experience in actual cruising, were gradually forming in men's understanding, is probable from the particulars cited; and they would receive additional force from the consideration that, to make a profit out of privateering under existing conditions, it would be necessary, not only to capture vessels of weak force, but to return safely to port with at least some notable salvage from their cargoes. in other words, there must be power to fight small cruisers, and to escape large ones under all probable disadvantage of weather. whatever the conclusions of practical seamen and shipowners in this respect, they found no reflection in the dominant power in the administration and congress. the exploits of the "comet," the "chasseur," and a few other fortunate privateer schooners or brigs of small size, among them being cited specifically the "mammoth," which in the autumn of made twenty-one prizes in three months, produced a strong popular impression; and this was diligently but somewhat thoughtlessly deepened by the press, as such popular movements are apt to be, without thorough mastery of all facts, _contra_ as well as _pro_. it was undeniable, also, that in the threatening aspect of affairs, when great britain's whole strength was freed to be exerted against the country, want of time to prepare new means was a weighty element in decision, and recourse must be had to resources immediately at hand for the retaliatory depredation upon the enemy's commerce, from the effect of which so much was expected then, as it is now. for this reason the scheme had naval backing, prominent in which was captain porter, who had reached home in the july after the capture of the "essex." under these circumstances, the secretary of the navy addressed a letter, october , ,[ ] to the naval committees of both houses of congress, enlarging on the greater attention of the enemy drawn to the heavy frigates, and the increased difficulty of their getting to sea. he recommended an appropriation of $ , for the purchase of fast-sailing schooners for preying on the hostile commerce. in consequence, a bill was introduced to build or purchase for the navy twenty vessels, to carry not less than eight nor more than fourteen guns; in short, of privateer class, but to be under naval control, not only as regarded discipline and organization but direction of effort. it was intended that a squadron of them should be intrusted to captain porter, another to captain perry;[ ] and porter drew up a plan of operations, which he submitted to the department, providing for the departure of the vessels, their keeping together for support in one quarter, scattering in another, and again reuniting at a fixed rendezvous.[ ] both officers reported great difficulty in procuring suitable vessels, owing to the extent of privateering, the lack of necessary funds, and the depreciation of government credit, which caused its drafts to be refused. when introducing the bill into the lower house, the chairman of the naval committee, after paying some compliments to the military achievements of the naval vessels, said that in regard to depredation on the commerce of the enemy, he believed their efficiency could not be compared to that of vessels of a smaller class. this note dominated the brief discussion; the speakers in favor being significantly enough from maryland, prepossessed doubtless by local pride in their justly celebrated schooners. mr. ingersoll, of pennsylvania, moved an amendment to allow vessels of twenty-two guns; an increase of fifty per cent. the limitation to fourteen guns, he remarked, was inserted in the senate by a gentleman from maryland; but it was not the fact that the best privateers were limited to fourteen guns. one or two which had arrived lately, after reaping a rich harvest, carried sixteen. mr. lowndes, of south carolina, seconded this amendment, hoping that the senate limitation would be rejected. he quoted captain perry, who had "never known an instance in which a brig of the united states had failed to overtake a schooner." one member only, mr. reed, of massachusetts, spoke against the whole scheme. though opposed to the war, he said, he wished it conducted on correct principles. he "was warranted by facts in saying that no force would be half as efficient, in proportion to its expense; none would be of so much service to the country; none certainly would touch the enemy half so much as a naval force of a proper character;" which, he affirmed, this was not. ingersoll's amendment was rejected, obtaining only twenty-five votes. the bill went again to conference, and on november , , was reported and passed, fixing the limits of armament at from eight to sixteen guns; a paltry addition of two. forty years later the editor of the "debates of congress," senator benton, wrote, "this was a movement in the right direction. private armed vessels, and the success of small ships of war cruising as privateers, had taught congress that small vessels, not large ships, were the effective means of attacking and annoying the enemy's commerce."[ ] the final test was not permitted, to determine what success would have attended the operations of several baltimore schooners, united under the single control of a man like porter or perry, and limited strictly to the injury of the enemy's commerce by the destruction of prizes, without thought of profit by sending them in. the advent of peace put a stop to an experiment which would have been most instructive as well as novel. looking to other experiences of the past, it may be said with confidence little short of certainty that, despite the disadvantage of size, several schooners thus working in concert, and with pure military purpose, would effect vastly more than the same number acting separately, with a double eye to gain and glory. the french privateer squadrons of jean bart and duguay trouin, in the early eighteenth century, the example of the celebrated "western" squadrons of british frigates in the war of the french revolution, as protectors and destroyers of commerce, demonstrated beyond peradventure the advantage of combined action in this, as in all military enterprise; while the greater success of the individual united states cruiser over the average privateer, so singularly overlooked by the national legislators, gives assurance that porter's and perry's schooners would collectively have done incomparable work. this, however, is far from indicating that divisions of larger vessels,--sloops or frigates,--under officers of their known energy, could not have pushed home into the english channel, or elsewhere where british commerce congregated, an enterprise the results of which would have caused the ears of those that heard them to tingle. footnotes: [ ] captain allen to navy department. niles' register, vol. v. p. . [ ] the american official report of this action can be found in niles' register, vol. viii. p. . the british is in the naval chronicle, vol. xxx. p. . niles also gives it, vol. v. p. . [ ] the prize data have been taken from the successive volumes of niles' register. [ ] data concerning american vessels captured by british ships have been drawn chiefly from prize lists, or official reports, in the naval chronicle. [ ] ante, p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. v. p. . [ ] niles gives an abstract of the log of the "scourge," vol. vi. p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. v. p. . [ ] ibid., vol. vi. p. . [ ] for morris' letter see niles' register, vol. vi. p. . [ ] ibid., vol. iv. p. . [ ] ibid., vol. vii. p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. v. p. . naval chronicle, vol. xxxi. p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. v. p. ; vol. vi. p. . [ ] stewart's letter is dated april , , and, with the enclosures mentioned, will be found among the captains' letters, navy department mss. [ ] for the official reports of this cruise, and list of prizes, see niles, vol. vi. pp. - . [ ] niles' register, vol. v. pp. , . naval chronicle, vol. xxx. p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. vi. pp. , . [ ] niles' register, vol. vii. p. , gives both the american and british accounts. [ ] niles' register, vol. vii. p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. vii. pp. , . [ ] niles' register, vol. viii. p. . [ ] it may not be amiss here to quote an incident similarly creditable to privateersmen, a class usually much abused, and too often with good cause. it was told by a british colonel to colonel winfield scott, while a prisoner in canada. this gentleman with his wife had been passengers from england in a transport captured near halifax by an american privateer. although there was no fighting, the wife, who was in a critical state of health, was dangerously affected by the attendant alarm. as soon as the circumstances were mentioned to the captain of the cruiser, he placed at the husband's disposition all that part of the vessel where their quarters were, posting a sentry to prevent intrusion and to secure all their personal effects from molestation. scott's autobiography, vol. i. p. . [ ] afterwards rear-admiral emmons. [ ] the new united states sloop of war "frolic," named after the vessel taken by the "wasp," was captured by the frigate "orpheus," april , . [ ] ante, p. . [ ] porter to the secretary of the navy, july , . niles' register, vol. vi. p. . [ ] porter's report of this action is to be found in niles' register, vol. vi. pp. - . hillyar's in naval chronicle, vol. xxxii. pp. - . [ ] the secretary of the navy to blakely, march , . navy department mss. [ ] blakely to the navy department, niles' register, vol. vii. p. . [ ] the particulars of this action are taken from the minutes of the "wasp," enclosed in blakely's report, niles' register, vol. vii. p. . [ ] blakely's report, niles' register, vol. vii. p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. vii. p. . [ ] james says that two of these guns were -pounders; but the first lieutenant of the "peacock," who brought the prize into port, and from there wrote independently of warrington, agrees with him in saying eighteen thirty-twos. niles' register, vol. vi. pp. , . [ ] in a "synopsis of naval actions," between british and american vessels, contributed to the naval chronicle by a "british naval officer on the american station," occurs the remark relative to the defeat of the "avon": "miserable gunnery on our side, attributable ... above all to not drilling the men at firing at the guns; a practice the americans never neglect." naval chronicle, vol. xxxiv. p. . [ ] for captain warrington's report of this cruise, see niles' register, vol. vii. p. . [ ] naval chronicle, vol. xxxii. p. . see also, ibid., pp. , . [ ] london paper, quoted in niles' register, vol. vii. p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. vii. p. . naval chronicle, vol. xxxii. p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. vii. p. . [ ] writings of james monroe. [ ] captains' letters, dec. , . bainbridge's italics. [ ] it will be remembered that after the repeal of the orders in council, june , , impressment remained the only _sine quâ non_ of the united states. [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . author's italics. this was the result of a cabinet meeting held the same day. "june , . in consequence of letters from bayard and gallatin of may - , and other accounts from europe of the ascendancy and views of great britain, and the dispositions of the great continental powers, the question was put to the cabinet: 'shall a treaty of peace, silent on the subject of impressment, be authorized?' agreed to by monroe, campbell, armstrong, and jones. rush absent. our minister to be instructed, besides trying other conditions, to make a previous trial to insert or annex some declaration, or protest, against any inference, from the silence of the treaty on the subject of impressment, that the british claim was admitted or that of the united states abandoned." (works of madison, vol. iii. p. .) [ ] niles' register, vol. vii. p. . [ ] navy department mss. [ ] for porter's and perry's correspondence on this subject see captains' letters, navy department mss., oct. and , nov. , dec. , , and , ; jan. , . [ ] porter to secretary, feb. , . captains' letters. [ ] benton's abridgment of debates in congress, vol. v. p. , note. chapter xv the niagara campaign, and events on the great lakes, in active operations in the field for the winter of - came to an end with the successful incursion of the british army upon the territory of the state of new york, before narrated.[ ] this had resulted in the capture of fort niagara and in the wasting of the frontier, with the destruction of the villages of lewiston, manchester, buffalo, and others, in retaliation for the american burning of newark. holding now the forts on both banks of the niagara, at its entrance into lake ontario, the british controlled the harbor of refuge which its mouth afforded; and to this important accession of strength for naval operations was added an increased security for passing troops, at will and secretly, from side to side of the river. from a military standpoint each work was a bridge-head, assuring freedom of movement across in either direction; that such transit was by boats, instead of by a permanent structure, was merely an inconvenient detail, not a disability. the command of the two forts, and of a third called mississaga, on the canadian side, immediately overlooking the lake, appears to have been vested in a single officer, to whom, as to a common superior, were issued orders involving the action of the three. this disposition recognized implicitly the fact that the forts, taken together, constituted a distinct element in the general british scheme of operations. fort niagara by position threatened the line of communications of any american army seeking to act on the canadian side. an effective garrison there, unless checked by an adequate force stationed for the particular purpose, could move at any unexpected moment against the magazines or trains on the american side; and it was impossible to anticipate what number might be thus employed at a given time, because intercourse between niagara and george was open. if by original or acquired superiority of numbers, as had been the case in , the american general should push his opponent back towards the head of the lake, fort george would in turn become an additional menace to his communications. therefore, properly to initiate a campaign for the command of the niagara peninsula, in , it would be necessary either to reduce both these works, which, if they were properly garrisoned, meant an expenditure of time; or else to blockade them by a large detachment of troops, which meant a constant expenditure of force, diminishing that available for operations in the field. the british military situation thus comprised two factors, distinct but complementary; the active army in the field, and the stationary fortifications which contributed to its support by sheltering its supplies and menacing those of the enemy. the british commander of the district, lieutenant-general drummond, estimated that the blockaders before either fort, being ever on the defensive against a sortie which they could not foresee, must in numbers considerably exceed the besieged, covered as these were by their works, and able to receive re-enforcement from the opposite shore. consequently, when the officer in immediate local control, major-general riall, embarrassed by the smallness of his field force, suggested the destruction of fort niagara, except a citadel of restricted extent, needing a less numerous garrison, his superior replied that not only would such smaller work be much more easily taken, but that in every event the loss through holding the place was more than compensated by the danger and the precautions entailed upon the enemy.[ ] the inactivity, substantially unbroken, which prevailed throughout the winter of - , was due principally to the unusual mildness of the weather. this impeded movement in all quarters, by preventing the formation of ice and of the usual hard snow surface, which made winter the most favorable season for land transportation. chauncey at sackett's harbor chafed and fretted over the detention of the stores and guns for his new ships then building, upon which he was reckoning for control of the lake. "the roads are dreadful," he wrote on february , "and if the present mild weather continues we shall experience difficulty." a week later, "i have the mortification to inform you that all our heavy guns are stopped at and below poughkeepsie in consequence of the badness of the roads, and that the teamsters have abandoned them there." he has given up hopes of a frost, and counts now only upon water communication; but the delay and change of route were the cause of two smart affairs with which the lake operations opened, for on march he announces that the guns are still below albany, and now must come by way of oswego and the lake,[ ] instead of securely inland by sleds. yeo reported a like delay on his side in the equipment of his new ships, owing to the unusual scarcity of snow. the same conditions imposed similar, if less decisive, limitations upon the movements of bodies of men. the most important instance of purpose frustrated was in an enterprise projected by drummond against put-in bay, where were still lying the "detroit" and "queen charlotte", the most powerful of the prizes taken by perry the previous september, the injuries to which had prevented their removal to the safer position of erie. on january he communicated to governor-general prevost the details of an expedition of seventeen hundred and sixty men,[ ] two hundred of them seamen, who were to start from the niagara frontier by land against detroit, and from there to cross on the ice to the bass islands, where it was hoped they could seize and burn the vessels. the occupation of fort niagara, and other dispositions made of his division on the peninsula, had so narrowed his front of defence, and thereby strengthened it, as to warrant this large detachment. this project was one of several looking to regaining control of lake erie, which during the remainder of the war occupied unceasingly the attention of british officers. although the particular destination was successfully concealed, the general fact of preparations for some offensive undertaking did not escape the observation of the americans, who noted that in the recent raid and destruction care had been taken to spare a great number of sleighs, and to collect them within the british lines. from this it was inferred that, when lake erie froze over, a dash would be made against the naval station and ships at erie.[ ] this would be undoubtedly a more valuable achievement, but the enemy knew that the place was in some measure defended, with ample re-enforcements at call; whereas a descent upon put-in bay could encounter no other resistance than that of the small permanent garrison of seamen. the mildness of the weather, leaving the lake open on january , relieved the apprehension of the united states authorities, and on february drummond had to report that his scheme must be abandoned, as after that late period of the winter better conditions could not be expected.[ ] in default of the control of lake erie, measures were taken by the british to supply the remote and isolated posts of mackinac and st. joseph's by land carriage from toronto to lake simcoe, a distance of only forty miles, and thence across the ice to matchedash bay, on lake huron; where also were being built batteaux and gunboats, to transport the stores to their destination when navigation opened. as far as huron this land route was out of reach of probable molestation, but from there it was necessary to proceed at the earliest moment; for, although there was no american naval force then on that lake, one might be expected to arrive from erie early in the season. to this cross-country line there was an alternative one still more remote, from montreal up the ottawa river, and thence by other water communication, striking lake huron much higher up. it was practicable only for canoes with light lading, and in other respects not satisfactory. the maintenance of mackinac therefore must depend upon armed control of the upper lakes; and to this the destruction of the prizes at the islands would doubtless have contributed, morally and materially. on the american side as little was accomplished during the winter. wilkinson's army, which at the end of was cantoned at french mills, on the salmon river, just within the new york boundary, was withdrawn from that position february . the greater part marched to lake champlain, where they again took winter quarters in two divisions; one at burlington, vermont, the other at plattsburg. the third contingent, under the command of general brown, was sent to sackett's harbor, where it arrived february . the secretary of war, general armstrong, despite his vacillating course the previous year, had never lost sight of his perfectly accurate conviction that kingston, if not montreal, was the true objective for the northern army. convinced that he had been misled in the spring of by the opinions of the commanders on the spot, chauncey and dearborn, he was again anxious, as he had been in the intervening autumn, to retrieve the error. on february he issued to brown two sets of instructions;[ ] the one designed to transpire, in order to mislead the enemy, the other, most secret, conveying the real intention of the department. in the former, stress was laid upon the exposure of western new york, and the public humiliation at seeing fort niagara in the hands of the british. brigadier-general scott accordingly had been sent there to organize a force for the capture of the fort and the protection of the frontier; but, as his numbers were probably insufficient, brown was directed to march to batavia, and thence to buffalo, with the two thousand troops he had just brought from french mills. this letter was meant to reach the enemy's ears. the other, embodying the true object aimed at, read thus: "it is obviously prevost's policy, and probably his intention, to re-establish himself on lake erie during the ensuing month. but to effect this other points of his line must be weakened, and these will be either kingston or montreal. if the detachment from the former be great, a moment may occur in which you may do, with the aid of commodore chauncey, what i last year intended pike should have done without aid, and what we now all know was very practicable, viz.: to cross the river, or head of the lake, on the ice, and carry kingston by a _coup de main_." the letter ended by making the enterprise depend upon a concurrence of favorable conditions; in brief, upon the discretion of the general, with whom remained all the responsibility of final decision and action. these instructions were elicited, immediately, by recent information that the effective garrison in kingston was reduced to twelve hundred, with no prospect of increase before june, when re-enforcements from europe were expected. certainly, drummond at this time thought the force there no stronger than it should be, and early in april was apprehensive on that account for the safety of the place.[ ] brown and chauncey, however, agreed that less than four thousand men was insufficient for the undertaking. singularly enough, this number was precisely that fixed upon by yeo and drummond, in consultation, as necessary for the reduction of sackett's harbor; which they concurred with prevost in considering the quickest and surest solution of the difficulty attending their situation about niagara, owing to the exhaustion of local resources upon the peninsula.[ ] the scarcity thus experienced was aggravated by the number of dependent indian warriors, who with their families had followed the british retreat from malden and detroit, and now hung like lead upon the movements and supplies of the army. "nearly twelve hundred barrels of flour monthly to indians alone," complained the commanding officer, who had long since learned that for this expenditure there was no return in military usefulness. in the felt necessity to retain the good-will of the savages, no escape from the dilemma was open, except in the maintenance of a stream of supplies from lower canada by keeping command of the lake;[ ] to secure which nothing was so certain as to capture sackett's and destroy the shipping and plant. having decided that the enterprise against kingston was not feasible, brown fell into the not unnatural mistake of construing the secretary's other letter to present not merely a ruse, but an alternative line of action, more consonant to his active martial temper than remaining idle in garrison. accordingly, he left sackett's with his two thousand, an event duly chronicled in a letter of drummond's, that on sunday, march , three thousand five hundred left sackett's for niagara; a statement sufficiently characteristic of the common tendency of an enemy's force to swell, as it passes from mouth to mouth. the division had progressed as far as the present city of syracuse, sixty miles from sackett's, and brown himself was some forty miles in advance of it, at geneva, when one of his principal subordinates persuaded him that he had misconstrued the department's purpose. in considerable distress he turned about, passing through auburn on the d at the rate of thirty miles a day, so said a contemporary newspaper,[ ] and hurried back to sackett's. there further consultation with chauncey convinced him again that he was intended to go to niagara, and he resumed his march. before april he reached batavia, where his instructions read he would receive further orders. general scott was already at buffalo, and there the troops were placed under his immediate charge for organization and drill; brigadier-general gaines being sent back to command at sackett's, where he arrived april . at this moment chauncey was undergoing his turn of qualms. "the enemy," he wrote the following day, "have prepared a force of three thousand troops, with gunboats and a number of small craft, to attack the harbor the moment the fleet leaves it. they may, however, be determined to make the attack at all hazards, and i am sorry to say our force is but little adapted to the defence of the place. there are not a thousand effective men besides the sailors and marines."[ ] his information was substantially correct. drummond had arranged to concentrate three thousand men from the north shore of the lake; but he wanted besides eight hundred from the peninsula, and for lack of these the project was abandoned. the movement of brown's small contingent to buffalo, though contrary to the intention of the government, may be considered to have opened the campaign of ; destined to prove as abortive in substantial results as that of the year before, but not so futile and inglorious to the american arms. the troops engaged had been formed under the skilful organization and training of scott. led by brown, who, though not an educated soldier nor a master of the technicalities of the profession, was essentially an aggressive fighting man of masculine qualities, they failed indeed to achieve success, for which their numbers were inadequate; but there was no further disgrace. wilkinson, indeed, in his district, contrived to give to the beginning of operations the air of absurdity that ever hung round his path. although he was the senior officer on the whole frontier, the department had not notified him of brown's orders. this vicious practice of managing the campaign from a point as distant as washington then was, ignoring any local centre of control, drew subsequently the animadversion of the president, who in a minute to the secretary remarked that "it does not appear that izard,"--wilkinson's successor,--"though the senior officer of the district, has been made acquainted with the plan of operations under brown."[ ] on the present occasion wilkinson explained that, hearing of brown's march by common report, and having ascertained that the enemy was sending re-enforcements up the st. lawrence, he undertook an incursion into lower canada as a diversion against such increase of the force with which brown must contend.[ ] his enterprise was directed against la colle, a few miles from plattsburg, within the canada boundary; but upon arriving before the position it was found that the garrison were established in a stone mill, upon which the guns brought along could make no impression. after this somewhat ludicrous experience, the division, more than three thousand strong, retreated, having lost over seventy men. the result was scarcely likely to afford brown much relief by its deterrent influence upon the enemy. this affair happened march , and in the course of the following month wilkinson was finally superseded. he was succeeded by general izard, who assumed command may , and remained in the neighborhood of champlain, while brown continued immediately responsible for sackett's harbor and for the force at buffalo. on april yeo launched two new ships, the "prince regent" of fifty-eight guns and the "princess charlotte" of forty; and he at the same time had under construction one destined to carry one hundred and two heavy guns, superior therefore in size and armament to most of the british ocean navy, and far more formidable than any in which nelson ever served. fortunately for the americans, this vessel, which yeo undertook without authority from home, was not ready until october; but the former two, added to his last year's fleet, gave him for the moment a decided preponderance over chauncey, who also was building but had not yet completed. under these circumstances the project of attacking sackett's in force was again most seriously agitated among the british officials, military and naval, upon whom the destitution of the niagara peninsula pressed with increasing urgency. such an intention rarely fails to transpire, especially across a border line where the inhabitants on either side speak the same tongue and are often intimately acquainted. desertion, moreover, was frequent from both parties. the rumor brought brown back hastily to the place, where he arrived april . the enemy, however, again abandoned their purpose, and after embarking a considerable body of troops turned their arms instead against oswego. it will be remembered that the mildness of the winter had prevented the transport of guns and stores by land, and made necessary to accumulate them by water carriage at oswego, whence there remained the lake voyage to sackett's harbor. this, though a coasting operation, involved much danger while the enemy possessed naval control. meanwhile oswego became a somewhat congested and much exposed intermediate station, inviting attack. chauncey therefore had taken the precaution of retaining the most important articles, guns and their equipment, at the falls of the oswego river, some twelve miles inland. the enemy's change of plan becoming suspected, brown detached a small party--two hundred and ninety effectives--to defend the place, in conjunction with the few seamen already there. the british fleet appeared on may , but the attack was not made until the following day, weather conditions being unfavorable. despite the unprepared state of the defences characteristic of the universal american situation, on both lakes and seaboard, in this singular war, the officer in command offered a spirited resistance, inflicting considerable loss; but the urgency to preserve his force, for the superior necessity of protecting under more favorable circumstances the valuable property in the rear, compelled him to retreat, to escape the risk of being surrounded and captured. he accordingly drew off in good order, having lost six killed and thirty-eight wounded; besides twenty-five missing, probably prisoners. the casualties of the british, by their official reports, were eighteen killed and seventy-three wounded. they kept possession of the town during the night, retiring next day with two small schooners, over two thousand barrels of provisions, and a quantity of cordage.[ ] the most serious loss to the americans was that of nine heavy cannon; but the bulk of the armament for the fleet remained safe at the falls. after this yeo took position with his squadron off sackett's harbor, where the americans on may had launched a new big ship, the "superior", to carry sixty-two guns, thirty-two long -pounders, and thirty carronades of the same calibre. besides her there was building still another, of somewhat smaller force, without which chauncey would not consider himself able to contend with the enemy.[ ] on the th of the month he reported that "five sail were now anchored between point peninsula and stoney island, about ten miles from the harbor, and two brigs between stoney island and stoney point, completely blocking both passes." he added, "this is the first time that i have experienced the mortification of being blockaded on the lakes."[ ] the line thus occupied by the enemy covered the entire entrance to black river bay, within which sackett's harbor lies. this situation was the more intolerable under the existing necessity of bringing the guns by water. drummond, whose information was probably good, wrote at this period that not more than fifteen of the heavy cannon needed for the new ships had arrived, and that they could come from oswego only by the lake, as the roads were impassable except for horsemen. carronades, cordage, and other stores were going on by wagon from utica, but the long guns which were imperatively required could not do so.[ ] american contrivance proved equal to the dilemma, and led to a marked british misadventure. a few miles south of black river bay, and therefore outside the line of the british blockade, there was an inlet called stoney creek, from the head of which a short land carriage of three miles would strike henderson's bay. this, like sackett's, is an indentation of black river bay, and was well within the hostile ships. the transit from oswego to stoney creek, however, remained open to an enemy's attack, and to be effected without loss required address, enterprise, and rapidity of movement. the danger was lessened by the number of streams which enter mexico bay, the deep bight formed by the southern and eastern shores of lake ontario, between oswego and sackett's. these, being navigable for batteaux, constituted a series of harbors of refuge. chauncey directed all the lighter equipment to be turned back from oswego river to north bay, on lake oneida, and the long guns to be placed in batteaux, ready to move instantly, either up or down, as the movements of the enemy or a favorable opportunity might determine. discretionary power to act according to circumstances was then given to captain woolsey, in local command on the oswego. woolsey made great parade of his preparations to send everything, guns included, back across the portage from the river, to north bay. the reports reached yeo, as intended, but did not throw him wholly off his guard. on may woolsey despatched an officer in a fast pulling boat to reconnoitre the coast, while he himself went with the requisite force to the falls. on the th the batteaux, nineteen in number, carrying twenty-one long -pounders, and thirteen lighter pieces, besides ten heavy cables, were run over the rapids, reaching oswego at sunset. the lookout boat had returned, reporting all clear, and after dark the convoy started. besides the regular crews, there were embarked one hundred and fifty riflemen from the army. the next morning at sunrise one batteau was missing, but the other eighteen entered the salmon river, over twenty miles from oswego. the nights were short at that season, and the boats heavy; moreover there had been drenching rain. at salmon river, a party of one hundred and twenty oneida indians joined, who were to move along the coast on the flank of the convoy through the next stage of the journey, by day, to support the defence should the approach of an enemy compel refuge to be sought in one of the creeks. as soon as they had taken up their march the batteaux also started, and at noon, may , reached big sandy creek, ten miles further on, but eight miles short of the final destination at stoney creek. here greater care became necessary, on account of the nearness of the enemy's fleet; and while awaiting information the division moved two miles up the big sandy, where it anchored. the missing batteau, carrying two long 's and a cable, had been captured; having wandered away from the rest of the detachment, despite the watchful care exerted to keep them together. her crew betrayed the extent of the operation of which they formed part, and a division of boats was sent in quest, in charge of two captains of the blockading vessels; the senior officer of the whole being commander popham. on his way popham fell in with another group of armed boats, which he took under his command, raising his total to three gun-vessels and four smaller boats, with near two hundred seamen and marines. certain intelligence being received that the convoy had entered the big sandy, he steered thither, arriving off its mouth soon after daylight of may . a reconnaissance on shore discovering the masts of the batteaux plainly visible over a marsh, with apparently no intervening forest, an immediate attack was decided. having landed a party of flankers on either bank, the expedition proceeded up stream with due caution, firing an occasional round into the brush to dislodge any possible ambush. it was not known that an escort, beyond the usual crews, had accompanied the movement. such a precaution might indeed have been inferred from the importance of the object; but the same reason naturally, and not improperly, decided popham that considerable risk was justifiable in order to frustrate his enemy's purpose. woolsey was already forewarned of his coming. at a.m. of the same day, may , he had received from chauncey an express, in accordance with which an officer was sent out upon the lake, to reconnoitre towards the entrance of black river bay. at six o'clock he returned, having been seen and pursued by some of popham's division. the riflemen and indians were now advanced half a mile below the batteaux, where they found cover and concealment in the woods. at eight the british guns were heard. at nine a re-enforcement of cavalry and light artillery arrived from sackett's harbor, but it was decided that they should remain by the batteaux, the force already below being best adapted for bush fighting. towards ten o'clock the riflemen and indians attacked; a circumstance attributed by captain popham to an accident befalling the -pounder carronade in the bow of the leading gunboat, which compelled her to turn round, to bring into action her stern gun, a -pounder. "the enemy thought we were commencing a retreat, when they advanced their whole force, one hundred and fifty riflemen, near two hundred indians, and a numerous body of militia and cavalry, who soon overpowered the few men i had.... the winding of the creek, which gave the enemy a great advantage in advancing to intercept our retreat, rendered further resistance unavailing." the entire detachment surrendered, having had fourteen killed and twenty-eight wounded; besides whom two captains, six lieutenants, and one hundred and thirty-three seamen and marines remained prisoners. the american loss was but two wounded; a result showing clearly enough the disadvantage under which the british labored. this affair has been related in detail,[ ] because, although on a small scale, it was actually one of great consequence; but yet more because it illustrates aptly one kind of those minor operations of war, upon the success of which so much greater matters turn. the american management throughout was admirable in its detailed foresight and circumspection. to this was due the trivial loss attending its final success; a loss therefore attesting far greater credit than would the attaining of the same result by lavish expenditure of blood. to captain popham must be attributed both enterprise and due carefulness in undertaking an advance he knew to be hazardous, but from which, if successful, he was entitled to expect nothing less than the capture of almost the entire armament of a very large ship. in such circumstances censure because of failure is unjust, unless the risk is shown to be taken reckless of due precautions, which was not the case in this instance. yeo, whose deficiency in seamen was reported at two hundred and seventy-nine,[ ] three days after this affair, appears to have been more exasperated by the loss of the men than sensible of the merit of his subordinate. he had charged him not to enter any creek in the endeavor to capture the stores, and apparently laid the disaster to disregard of this order. the subsequent customary court martial decided that popham, having greatly re-enforced himself by junction with a division of vessels, in a manner which yeo could not have contemplated, was fully justified by the importance of preventing the convoy from reaching sackett's harbor. the court regretted that sir james yeo should have used such reproachful expressions in his letter to the admiralty communicating captain popham's capture. popham, and his second, spilsbury, were included in the promotions of a year later. soon after this mishap yeo abandoned the immediate blockade of sackett's harbor, returning to kingston june . the recent experience demonstrated that it would be impossible to prevent the forwarding of supplies by the mere presence of the fleet at the mouth of the port. the armament of the "superior" had arrived despite his efforts, and her speedy readiness to take the lake was assured. an exchange of letters between himself and drummond as to his proper course[ ] led to the conclusion that the blockade had not had all the effect expected; and that, in view of the large re-enforcements of men coming forward from england, the true policy was to avoid battle until the third new ship, the "st. lawrence" of one hundred and two guns, should be ready. "the enemy," wrote yeo, "are not in sufficient force to undertake any expedition in the face of our present squadron, but any disaster on our side might give them a serious ascendancy." drummond, who had rejoiced that the blockade "assures us a free intercourse throughout the lake," concurred in this view. "i have no hesitation in saying that there exists at present no motive or object, connected with the security of upper canada, which can make it necessary for you to act otherwise than cautiously on the defensive," until the large ship is ready or other circumstances arise. on june the cabinet of the united states held a meeting, in which was settled the plan of campaign on the northern frontier;[ ] where alone, and for a brief period only, an expected superiority of numbers would permit offensive operations. as in the year before, the decision, in general terms, was to direct the main effort against the enemy's right and centre, mackinac and the niagara peninsula, instead of against his left, at montreal or kingston. the principal movement was to be by a concentration near buffalo of forces from new york and the western territory, which the secretary of war estimated might place under brown's command five thousand regular troops and three thousand volunteers. he had proposed that these, with the assistance of the erie navy, should be landed on the coast between fort erie, at the entrance of the niagara river, and point abino, ten miles to the westward. thence they were to act against burlington heights, at the head of lake ontario, the tenure of which by vincent in , had baffled, on two occasions, the advance of the americans, and maintained the land communications of the british with york (toronto) despite their enemy's control of the water. the secretary's anticipation was that, after gaining this position, the force could proceed along the north shore of the lake towards york, receiving its supplies by the fleet, which was expected to be ready by june . chauncey himself stated june that he would be ready by july , if men were sent him.[ ] on the th was launched a second new ship, the "mohawk," to carry forty-two guns. the crew of the "congress" was ordered up from portsmouth, and part of them, with other re-enforcements, were reported to have arrived before june . june chauncey wrote, "i shall sail the first week in july to offer the enemy battle."[ ] he did not, however, take the lake until august . the cabinet had approved the secretary's suggestion, but extended the place of debarkation to be between fort erie and long point, eighty miles from the niagara river, and well west of burlington heights. subsidiary to this main attack, general izard at plattsburg was to make a diversion towards montreal. coincidently with these movements an expedition of four or five of the erie fleet, with eight hundred to one thousand troops, should go against mackinac; their first object, however, being matchedash bay, on lake huron, which was the seat of an incipient naval establishment, and the point of deposit for supplies proceeding to mackinac from york by way of lake simcoe. this attempt to choke the communications of mackinac, by holding a vital point upon their line, was to have its counterpart in the east by the provision of fifteen armed boats on the st. lawrence, supported by posts on the river garrisoned by detachments from izard's army, so as to intercept the water transport between montreal and kingston. it may be mentioned that this particular method had specially commended itself to both yeo and chauncey, as most suited to embarrass the british situation throughout the upper province. in a subsequent report to the admiralty, yeo characterized the failure of the americans to do this as an extreme stupidity, which had lost them the war, but upon a repetition of which in future hostilities great britain should not rely.[ ] the importance of this intercourse is indicated by a mention of chauncey's, that in the week before june more than two hundred boats passed ogdensburg for kingston.[ ] all this, however, simply emphasizes the fact that the decisive point of attack was montreal or kingston; not the line between them, which would become useless if either fell. still less could the niagara peninsula, though a valuable link in a chain of communication from the lower to the upper lakes, compare in importance with either of the places named. it matters not that a chain is complete in itself, if it is severed from one of the extremities which it is designed to connect. as regards any attempt on the part of the americans to interrupt the traffic, drummond appears to have been satisfied with yeo's promise that "every brigade of batteaux should have a suitable convoy of gunboats." the secretary of war, in his communication to the president before the cabinet met, had indicated plainly his preference for leaving mackinac alone and concentrating upon the central point of effort, niagara or burlington. "burlington and york carried, a barrier is interposed which completely protects detroit and malden, makes doubtful and hazardous the enemy's intercourse with the western indians, reduces mackinac to a possession perfectly useless, renders probable the evacuation of fort niagara, and takes from the enemy half his motive for continuing the naval conflict on lake ontario. on the other hand, take mackinac, and what is gained but mackinac itself?"[ ] the reasoning was indisputable, although armstrong acquiesced in the decision of the cabinet. the main feature of the plan adopted, the reduction of burlington heights and a successful advance on york, was of doubtful issue; but, if successful, the vital end of the chain upon which mackinac depended for existence dropped useless to the ground. all side enterprise that did not directly contribute to this decisive movement should have been discarded in favor of concentration upon brown's army, to which its execution was committed, and the actual strength of which was insufficient for the task. at the opening of the campaign its total strength was four thousand seven hundred and eighty, of whom eight hundred and thirty were militia.[ ] on july there were present for duty three thousand five hundred. there were also six hundred indians of the six nations. in this impotent conclusion resulted the secretary's estimate of five thousand regulars and three thousand volunteers. on july brown announced to his troops that he was authorized by the government to put them in motion against the enemy.[ ] he had decided to leave fort niagara, with its menace to his communications, in his rear, unguarded, and to throw his command directly upon the enemy on the west bank of the river. the crossing was made that night in two divisions; one landing opposite black rock, below fort erie, the other above that post, which surrendered july , at p.m. the garrison numbered one hundred and thirty-seven. from there brown proposed to turn north and advance towards ontario, where he hoped to join hands with the navy, which was expected by him, and by the government, to be on hand to co-operate. this expectation was based on chauncey's own assurance that he would take the lake on july , if supplied with men, who were known since to have arrived. it does not appear, however, that he had received specific instructions as to the course he was intended to follow; and, in assuming that he would go to the head of the lake, for direct co-operation, the government and the general were reckoning without their host, and in ignorance of his views. he was as loath to leave kingston and sackett's in his rear, unwatched, as brown was willing to take the same risk with regard to niagara. it was a profound difference of temperament in two capable men, to whom the government failed to impart the unifying element of orders. on july scott's brigade, which had crossed below the fort, advanced from fort erie fifteen miles, to street's creek, a small stream, bridged near its mouth, entering the niagara two miles south of the chippewa river, the defensive line selected by the british, who now fell back upon it. the chippewa is of respectable size, one hundred and fifty yards wide, and from twelve to twenty feet deep, running from west to east. in general direction it is parallel to street's creek; both entering the niagara at right angles to its course. in the belt separating the two the ground is flat, and was in great part open; but midway between them there was a strip of thick wood extending down to within a few hundred feet of the niagara. this formed a dense curtain, hiding movements on either side from the other. the british forces under riall were now north of the chippewa, scott's brigade south of street's; each having a bridge by which to advance into the space between. the other american brigade, ripley's, was in rear of scott--to the south. in this relative situation, scott's pickets on the left being disquieted by the british and indians in the intervening woods, brown ordered up the militia and american indians under general porter to expel them. this was done; but upon reaching the clearing on the further side, the indians, who were in the lead, encountered a heavy fire, which drove them back upon the militia, and the whole body retreated in a confusion which ended in a rout.[ ] riall had crossed the chippewa, and was advancing in force, although he believed brown's army much to outnumber his own now on the field, which in fact it did. gordon drummond, in his instructions to him some months before, (march ), had remarked that with the americans liberties might be taken which would seem hazardous "to a military man unacquainted with the character of the enemy he had to contend with, or with the events of the last two campaigns on that frontier."[ ] this unflattering, but not unreasonable, deduction from the performances of dearborn and others in , as of smyth and van rensselaer in , was misplaced in the present instance; but it doubtless governed riall's action, and justified it to himself and his superiors. he had not been engaged since he drove the militia of new york before him like sheep, in the preceding december; and he would have attacked on the very night after the crossing, but that a regiment from york, which he had reason to expect twenty-four hours before, did not arrive until the morning of the th. the instant it came he made his dispositions to move at p.m. of the same day. it was this advance which met porter and threw his division back, uncovering the wood on the west. scott at the same moment was marching his brigade into the open space between street's creek and the chippewa; not to meet the enemy, whom he did not expect, but for some drill in the cool of a hot summer's afternoon. as he went forward, the commander-in-chief, who had been reconnoitring in front, rode by, galloping to the rear to bring up his remaining force; for, while the army in the aggregate was superior to riall, the one brigade was inferior. in passing, he called to scott, "you will have a battle"; and the head of the latter's column, as it crossed the bridge, came at once under the enemy's guns. although inferior, exposed, and in a sense surprised, both commander and men were equal to the occasion. the division deployed steadily under fire, and its leader, sending hastily one battalion to check the enemy in the wood, formed front with the remainder of his force to meet those in the plain. these, being yet unopposed, advanced beyond the line of the wood, passing their own detachment within it, which was held in check by the americans charged with that duty. losing thus their support on that side, the british presented a new right flank, to use scott's expression. thereupon he extended his two wings as far as he dared, leaving between them a considerable interval, so as to overlap his opponent at either extremity; which done, he threw his left forward. his brigade thus formed an obtuse angle, the apex to the rear, the bullets therefore converging and crossing upon the space in front, into which it and the enemy were moving. in the approach both parties halted several times to fire, and scott says that the superiority of aim in his own men was evident. when within sixty paces a mutual rush, or charge, ensued; but the overlapping of the americans crowded the flanks of the enemy in upon his centre and produced confusion, to which the preceding fire doubtless had contributed. scott's own description is that "the wings of the enemy being outflanked, and in some measure doubled upon, were mouldered away like a rope of sand."[ ] in this brief and brilliant struggle only the one brigade was engaged. riall's account agrees substantially with that of scott, mentioning particularly "the greatest regularity" with which his opponents "deployed and opened fire."[ ] he directed a charge by the three regiments in line, "but i am sorry to say that they suffered so severely that i was obliged to withdraw them, finding their further efforts against the superior numbers of the enemy would be unavailing." he was right in believing that the aggregate of brown's army, although much short of the six thousand he estimated, was superior to that which he could bring together without abandoning posts he had to hold; but he was mistaken in thinking that in the actual collision his opponents were more numerous than the fifteen hundred regulars at which he states his own force, besides three hundred militia. scott's brigade, with its supporting artillery, when it crossed four days before, was less than fifteen hundred; and the militia and indians were routed before he began to fight. his artillery also was of lighter weight. the superiority of the american fire was shown by the respective losses. they were: british, one hundred and forty-eight killed, two hundred and twenty-one wounded, forty-six missing; american, fifty-six killed, two hundred and thirty-nine wounded, thirty-six missing. of this total, there fell to scott's command forty-four killed, and two hundred and twenty-four wounded; demonstrating conclusively that it alone was seriously engaged. not a man was reported missing. the other brigade lost only three killed and three wounded. at the end of the action it was coming up on scott's left, where he was most exposed, but it did not arrive until he had wrought his own deliverance. the remaining casualties were among the militia and indians. after the battle of chippewa, riall fell back towards fort george, and subsequently to the creek called twenty mile, west of niagara, on lake ontario. brown followed as far as queenston, where he arrived july . on the th he wrote to chauncey, begging for the fleet to meet him on the lake shore, west of fort george, to arrange a plan of operations; in which case he had no doubt of breaking the power of the enemy in upper canada in a short time. "all accounts," he said, "represent the force of the enemy at kingston as very light. sir james yeo will not fight,"--which was certain. "for god's sake, let me see you. i have looked for your fleet with the greatest anxiety since the th."[ ] chauncey had not left sackett's harbor, nor did he do so; to the utter consternation, not of brown only, but of the government. on july he chronicled the burning of an enemy's schooner on the north shore of the lake,[ ] an exploit creditable enough in itself, but utterly trivial in relation to pending issues; and on the th he wrote that some changes of officers and crews, incidental to the absence of a particular captain, would detain him a few days longer.[ ] these were flimsy reasons for inactivity at a moment of great national interest, and when the operations in progress had been begun absolutely upon the presupposition of naval control and co-operation, for which he had undertaken to provide the means, even if not pledged as to the manner. then followed a silence of over two weeks; after which, on july , he wrote again by his second to say that "the squadron had been prevented being earlier fitted for sea, in consequence of the delay in obtaining blocks and ironwork."[ ] he himself was too unwell to write, and had been so for some days. it is probable that lapse of energy consequent upon illness had something to do with this remarkable paralysis of action, in a man usually bustling and efficient; and there may naturally have been unwillingness to relinquish command,--which would have been his proper course,--after the mortifications of the previous year, when he was just flattering himself with the prospect of a new opportunity. this inaction, at the critical moment of brown's advance, caused the government extreme perplexity and distress. in chauncey was reposed a confidence expressed by the secretary of the navy to congress the year before, when the resolution of thanks to perry was pending. he then "intimated the propriety of noticing in an appropriate manner the commander-in-chief of the naval force upon the lakes, under whose immediate command captain perry acted;" and spoke of the "zeal, talent, constancy, courage, and prudence of the highest order, which appears to me to merit particular distinction."[ ] such preconceived opinion was hard to shake; but as day succeeded day of expectation and suspense, the patience of the administration gave way. letters bearing those elaborated phrases of assurance which most clearly testify uneasiness were sent him, but did not arrive till after brown had retreated and he himself taken the lake. on july the secretary writes, "i have expressed the solicitude which has produced this letter, but my confidence in your patriotism, skill, judgment, and energy is entire." on august , however, he says the explanation about blocks and ironwork--apparently just received--is so extraordinary at such a moment that "i cannot withhold from you the extreme anxiety and astonishment which the protracted and fatal delay of the squadron has excited in the mind of the president;" and on the th, "the known detention of the squadron at sackett's harbor until the th ultimo, the very feeble and precarious state of your health, the evils which have already resulted from delay," etc., "have induced the president, though with extreme reluctance, and undiminished confidence in your zeal and capacity, to order commodore decatur to proceed to sackett's harbor and take upon himself the naval command on lake ontario." the proposed change did not take place, the squadron having already resumed active cruising. the secretary repeated his expressions of confidence, but does not appear to have renewed his recommendations to congress. chauncey, stung by the reflections, open and implied, upon his conduct, retorted with a defence and definition of his course, as proposed and realized, which raises the whole question of the method of naval co-operation under the circumstances, and of its probable effectiveness. replying to brown's letter of july , quoted above, he said positively that he had never given the general ground to expect him at the head of the lake.[ ] this assertion he repeated to the secretary, whose letters to him demonstrate that the government had left him entire discretion as to his particular method of procedure. acting therefore upon his own judgment, he justified his course by alleging that direct co-operation at the niagara end of the lake was impossible, because the heavy ships could not get within two miles of the forts, and brown's army had never advanced to the lake shore; consequently, the fleet could neither have acted directly by itself, nor yet in support of a land force, with which it could not communicate. so much for the negative side of the argument. positively, he said, the mission of the navy was to seek and fight the enemy's squadron; and this duty was emphasized by the fact that to go westward to niagara, while the enemy was at kingston, would expose to capture sackett's harbor, the safety of which had remained a dominant anxiety with chauncey since its narrow escape the previous year. the protection of his own base, and the controlling or beating the organized force of the enemy, are unquestionably two leading considerations which should govern the general conduct of a general officer, land or sea. in these particulars chauncey's statement was unassailable; but, whether well or ill, he seems to have been incapable of rising to the larger estimate of naval control, to which the rules enunciated, conduce simply as a formulation of principles, giving to action preciseness and steadiness of direction. the destruction of the enemy's fleet is the means to obtain naval control; but naval control in itself is only a means, not an object. the object of the campaign, set by the government, was the acquirement of mastery upon the niagara peninsula, to the accomplishment of which brown's army was destined. naval control would minister thereto, partly by facilitating the re-enforcement and supply of the american army, and, conversely, by impeding that of the british. of these two means, the latter was the more efficacious, because, owing to the thoroughly denuded condition of the canadian territory, from the niagara to detroit, local resources were exhausted, and dependence was wholly upon the water; whereas the united states forces, near a fruitful friendly region, and in possession of lake erie, had other independent and sufficient streams of maintenance. to weaken the british was by so much to strengthen brown, even though direct communication with him were impossible. it was of this that the british stood in continual anxious terror, as shown by their letters; and this it was that chauncey gives no sign of recognizing. of support to his own colleague he spoke with ill-timed scorn: "that you might find the fleet somewhat of a convenience in the transportation of provisions and stores for the use of the army, and an agreeable appendage to attend its marches and countermarches, i am ready to believe; but, sir, the secretary of the navy has honored us with a higher destiny--we are intended to seek and to fight the enemy's fleet. this is the great purpose of the government in creating this fleet; and i shall not be diverted in my efforts to effectuate it by any sinister attempt to render us subordinate to, or an appendage of, the army." it would be difficult to cite an apter instance of wresting sound principles to one's own destruction. whatever the antecedent provocation, this is no temper in which to effect military objects. it is indeed hard to believe that an army so little numerous as that of brown could have accomplished the ambitious designs confided to it; but that does not affect the clear duty of affording it the utmost assistance that ingenuity could devise and energy effect. the words quoted were written august , but ignore entirely an alternative suggested in a letter received that day from the secretary, dated july , itself the repetition of one made july : "to destroy the enemy's fleet, or to blockade his force _and cut off his entire communication with the head of the lake_." the civilian here indicated clearly what the naval officer should have known from the very first moment. as before said, the contemporary correspondence of british officers abundantly shows their anxiety lest chauncey, in these important weeks, should do what he did not do. sir james yeo had deliberately formulated the policy of remaining inactive in kingston until the completion of the -gun ship, which would give him command of the lake beyond chance of dispute. to occupy the american fleet meanwhile with a local blockade, which he intended not to contest, was precisely what he wanted. to distress the army at niagara to the point of evacuating the peninsula was the one only thing that might impel--or compel--him to come out and fight, despite his deliberate intention. "several small vessels," wrote the commissary-general a month later[ ] to sir george prevost, "were despatched while the enemy's squadron were unable to leave sackett's harbor; but since the enemy commands the lake, that resource for the moment is cut off, and only batteaux can be employed. these are [not][ ] a very useful conveyance, not only from the danger of the enemy's small vessels, which can approach the shore without difficulty, but also from want of proper steersmen, pilots, and middlemen.... this feeble means of transport will never effect the forming of a sufficient depot at york, burlington heights, and niagara; and, unless the commissariat can be aided to a great extent by the royal navy, the most disastrous consequences must ensue." at the date this was written, august , chauncey's force was that which he had promised should be ready july , but with which he did not sail until august ,--too late. the very efficiency of his action in august condemns therefore his inaction in july. besides his two new big ships, which matched yeo's two, he had added to the fleet of the previous year, then superior to the british, two brigs of the armament and tonnage of the ocean sloops of war,--the "peacock" and class. against these yeo had nothing to show. it was therefore open to chauncey to blockade kingston with an equal force, thus covering sackett's, and to despatch to the head of the lake vessels adequate to embarrass riall and drummond most seriously. from york to niagara by land was eighty miles of road impassable to laden wagons; by lake thirty miles of water facility. from kingston to york, an additional distance of a hundred and fifty miles, the same relative difficulty of transportation obtained. yet as late as july , drummond could write from kingston, "as troops cannot be forwarded without provisions, i have requested sir james yeo to send his two brigs immediately, with as much flour and pork as they can carry to york and burlington." on the th, "the 'charwell' sailed yesterday for the head of the lake with provisions and ammunition. i have strong hopes she will arrive safe, as the enemy's whole squadron are lying in sackett's with their sails bent, and apparently ready for sea, though no guns forward of the foremast could be perceived on board the 'mohawk.'"[ ] yeo, holding both york and the mouth of the niagara, ventured thither two brigs and two schooners, under captain dobbs, one of his officers. "without their valuable aid in the transport of troops and stores," wrote drummond, august , "i certainly should not have been able to attempt offensive operations so soon after my arrival." by that time, when brown had of necessity abandoned the offensive, "commodore chauncey has left three of his brigs to watch our vessels in the niagara. they continue cruising off that place."[ ] chauncey, in his letter of vindication to the secretary, had maintained that "if our whole fleet were at the head of the lake, it would not detain a regiment from [york to] fort george more than twenty-four hours.... any one who knows anything of the navigation of this lake knows that boats may cross the head of the lake, from york to the opposite shore, unobserved by any fleet during the night."[ ] admitting that there is no literal exaggeration in this statement, it takes no account of the enemy's apprehensions, nor of the decisive difficulty of running vessels of a size to transport the heavy stores, without which the army could not remain. no one familiar with maritime affairs will deny the impossibility of wholly suppressing all furtive movement of small coasters, but it is equally certain much can be done to impede that full course of supplies which constitutes security of communication. to chauncey's affirmation, drummond gives an incidental reply, september : "the enemy's blockading squadron not having been seen for some days, i sent the 'vincent' across to york, where she has arrived in safety, and captain dobbs has directed the 'charwell' to push across the first morning the wind is fair. by their aid i got rid of many encumbrances (prisoners and sick), and shall receive the supplies that are waiting at york for this division."[ ] it is needless to multiply quotations from the utterances, and frequent outcries, that run throughout this correspondence. chauncey, from early july, had it in his hand seriously to molest the british communications, and at the same time to contain the british squadron in kingston. such action would subject yeo to the just and humiliating imputation of suffering the harassment of the army without an attempt at relief, or else would compel him to come out and fight under conditions which, "whatever the result," to use nelson's words, "would leave his squadron in a state to do no further harm," till the big ship was ready. thus also chauncey would cover his base; for, as prevost wrote, "while kingston is blockaded, no movement against sackett's harbor can take place." it was chauncey's misfortune himself to demonstrate his own shortcoming by the profound distress he inflicted, when sounder measures were instituted after the censure of the government,--too late. one of the most conspicuous instances of the effect of this neglect was realized in the desperate and sanguinary engagement of lundy's lane, the occurrence of which, at the time and in the manner it did, as stated by one of the chief actors, winfield scott, was due directly to the freedom of the lake to the british. brown had remained at queenston for some days after july , in painful suspense. a reconnaissance in force was made on the th by the militia brigade under general porter, accompanied by two pieces of artillery, which moved round fort george as far as lake ontario, whence the general reported "we had an opportunity to examine the _northern_ face of forts riall and niagara, about two miles distant."[ ] beyond a few random shots, no opposition was experienced. on the th the army as a whole advanced to the neighborhood of fort george, and made a demonstration of throwing up siege works; not without serious intention, for brown had not yet abandoned hope of receiving the cannon of necessary weight, -pounders, from sackett's harbor. he had with him only eighteens. riall was greatly alarmed, exaggerating the force before him, and receiving reports of re-enforcements expected by the lake. on july he sent hasty and pressing word of the impending emergency to drummond, who arrived the same evening at york from kingston; but in the afternoon of the day he was able to give better tidings. the americans were falling back again upon queenston, abandoning the positions recently assumed.[ ] brown had hoped that by his advance, blowing up the works at queenston, and leaving his rear evidently much exposed, riall might be induced to attack. the british general was much disposed to do so; but refrained, fearing for his own communications. on the morning of the d an express from general gaines, commanding at sackett's harbor, reached brown at queenston, informing him that chauncey was sick, that no one knew when the fleet would sail, and that an endeavor had been made to send forward by batteaux, coasting the south shore, the -pounder guns needed for besieging fort george; but the officer in command had stopped at the mouth of black river bay, thinking himself in danger from the british squadron.[ ] a contemporary account reads: "july , morgan with the riflemen and cannon prevented from sailing by yeo's blockade of the harbor."[ ] apparently, yeo had even come out of port, in order by menace of attack to arrest the forwarding of this essential succor. chauncey's incidental mention is positive that he approached no nearer than the ducks, some large islands thirty miles south of kingston, and forty west of sackett's;[ ] but it is obvious that in the quiescence of the american squadron such a position was prohibitive of movement by batteaux. it may readily be conceived that had brown's demonstration against the fort been coupled with an attempt to land the guns from a naval division, riall might have felt compelled to come out of his lines. neither guns nor naval division appeared, and drummond, able to move troops freely across the lake, concerted now a plan for striking a dangerous blow from fort niagara, against brown's communications on the new york side; the exposed condition of which was known to him. this was the immediate offensive of which he had spoken; his ability to undertake which he attributed to naval aid. he had as adjutant-general lieutenant-colonel harvey, the same who suggested and executed the brilliant stroke that disconcerted dearborn's campaign in ; and who on the present occasion drew up the instructions to riall, and to lieutenant-colonel tucker, the officer in charge of the forts, with a delightful lucidity which characterizes all papers signed by him.[ ] the brigs "star" and "charwell" left york july , with a re-enforcement of four hundred men for fort niagara, in which post the officer commanding was directed to concentrate so many more as would enable him to carry a full regiment of regulars against batteries that were being put up at youngstown. this movement was to be made at daylight of monday, july , and general riall was instructed to support it by a threatening demonstration on his side of the river. on the evening of the th, drummond himself sailed from york in one of yeo's schooners, and by daybreak reached niagara. upon his arrival,--or possibly before,--he learned that the americans had retired further, to the chippewa. the motive for this backward step was to draw necessary supplies across the river, from the magazines at fort schlosser, and to leave there all superfluous baggage, prior to a rush upon burlington heights, which brown had now substituted as the point of attack, in consequence of his disappointment about the siege guns.[ ] it had been his intention to rest over the th, in order to start forward fresh on the th. this retrograde movement, inducing riall to advance, changed the situation found by drummond. he decided therefore to apply his re-enforcements to the support of riall directly, and to have the enterprise from niagara proceed with somewhat smaller numbers towards lewiston,--opposite queenston,--where a body of americans were posted. this advance appears to have been detected very soon, for drummond writes, "some unavoidable delay having occurred in the march of the troops up the right bank, the enemy had moved off previous to colonel tucker's arrival." brown, in his report of this circumstance, wrote, "as it appeared that the enemy with his increased force was about to avail himself of the hazard under which our baggage and stores were on our [american] side of niagara, i conceived the most effectual method of recalling him from the object was to put myself in motion towards queenston. general scott with his brigade were accordingly put in march on the road leading thither." the result was the battle of lundy's lane. scott in his autobiography attributes the report of an advance towards schlosser to a mistake on the part of the officer making it. it was not so. there was an actual movement, modified in detail from the original elaborate plan, the execution of which was based by the british general upon the local control of the lake, enabling him to send re-enforcements. the employment of dobbs' four vessels, permitted by chauncey's inaction, thus had direct effect upon the occurrence and the result of the desperately contested engagement which ensued, upon the heights overlooking the lower torrent of the niagara. from the chippewa to the falls is about two miles, through which the main road from lake erie to ontario follows the curving west bank of the stream. a half mile further on it was joined at right angles by the crossroad, known as lundy's lane. as scott's column turned the bend above the falls there were evidences of the enemy's presence, which at first were thought to indicate only a detachment for observation; but a few more paces disclosed the lane held by a line of troops, superior in number to those encountered with equal unexpectedness on the chippewa, three weeks before. scott hesitated whether to fall back; but apprehensive of the effect of such a step upon the other divisions, he sent word to brown that he would hold his ground, and prepared for battle, making dispositions to turn the enemy's left,--towards the niagara. it was then near sundown. a hot engagement followed, in the course of which the pressure on the british left caused it to give ground. in consequence, the american right advancing and the british left receding, the two lines swung round perpendicular to the lane, the americans standing with their backs to the precipices, beneath which roar the lower rapids of niagara. at this period general riall, who had received a severe wound, was captured while being carried to the rear. as this change of front was taking place brown arrived, with ripley's brigade and porter's militia, which were brought into line with scott; the latter occupying the extreme right, ripley the centre, and porter the left. when this arrangement had been completed the attack was resumed, and a hill top, which was the key of the british position, was carried; the artillery there falling into the hands of the americans. "in so determined a manner were these attacks directed against our guns," reported drummond, "that our artillery men were bayoneted by the enemy in the act of loading, and the muzzles of the enemy's guns were advanced within a few yards of ours.... our troops having for a moment been pushed back, some of our guns remained for a few minutes in the enemy's hands."[ ] upon this central fact both accounts agree, but on the upshot of the matter they differ. "not only were the guns quickly recovered," continued drummond, "but the two pieces which the enemy had brought up were captured by us." he admits, however, the loss as well as gain of one -pounder. brown, on the contrary, claimed that the ground was held and that the enemy retired, leaving his guns. "he attempted to drive us from our position and to regain his artillery; our line was unshaken and the enemy repulsed. two other attempts having the same object had the same issue."[ ] by this time both brown and scott had been severely wounded and carried off the field. in this situation the commander-in-chief directed the officer now in command to withdraw the troops to the camp, three miles behind, for refreshment, and then to re-occupy the field of battle. whether this was feasible or not would require an inquiry more elaborate than the matter at stake demands. it is certain that the next day the british resumed the position without resistance, and continued to hold it. to americans the real interest and value of this action, combined with its predecessor at chippewa, and with the subsequent equally desperate fighting about fort erie, were that the contest did not close without this conspicuous demonstration that in capable hands the raw material of the american armies could be worked up into fighting quality equal to the best. regarded as an international conflict, the war was now staggering to its end, which was but a few months distant; and in every direction little but shame and mortification had befallen the american arms on land. it would have been a calamity, indeed, had the record closed for that generation with the showing of and . nothing is gained by explaining or excusing such results; the only expiation for them is by the demonstration of repentance, in works worthy of men and soldiers. this was abundantly afforded by brown's brief campaign of , otherwise fruitless. not only the regular troops, fashioned by scott in a few brief months from raw recruits to disciplined fighters, proved their mettle; the irregulars associated with them, though without the same advantage of training and concert of movement, caught their enthusiasm, gained confidence from their example, and emulated their deeds. the rabble which scarcely waited for a shot before scattering at the approach of riall's columns in december, , abandoning their homes to destruction, had earned the discriminating eulogium of general brown before the year closed. in august, after lundy's lane, he, a new yorker himself, wrote to the governor of new york:[ ] "this state has suffered in reputation in this war; its militia have done nothing, or but little, and that, too, after the state had been for a long time invaded." on september , after the sanguinary and successful sortie from fort erie, he wrote again: "the militia of new york have redeemed their character--they behaved gallantly. of those called out by the last requisition, fifteen hundred have crossed the state border to our support. this re-enforcement has been of immense importance to us; it doubled our effective strength, and their good conduct cannot but have the happiest effect upon the nation."[ ] the american losses at lundy's lane were, killed one hundred and seventy-one, wounded five hundred and seventy-two, missing one hundred and seventeen; total, eight hundred and sixty. those of the british were, killed eighty-four, wounded five hundred and fifty-nine, missing one hundred and ninety-three, prisoners forty-two; total, eight hundred and seventy-eight. of the british missing and prisoners, one hundred and sixty-nine were reported by the americans as in their hands; among them nineteen officers. this substantial equality in casualties corresponds to a similar equality in the numbers engaged. the americans had present for duty two thousand six hundred and forty-four, including over four hundred militia; drummond in his report states that first and last he had upon the field not more than two thousand eight hundred. that he estimates the force opposed to him to have been at least five thousand, may be coupled with his mention of "the reiterated and determined attacks which the enemy made upon our centre," as showing the impression produced upon his mind during the progress of the struggle. the comparison of numbers engaged with injuries sustained justifies the inference that, in result, the actual contest upon the ground was at least a drawn battle, if not the positive success claimed by brown and scott. colonel hercules scott, of the british d regiment, who to be sure shows somewhat of the malcontent ever present in camps, but who afterwards fell well at the front in the assault upon fort erie, was in this action; and in a private letter uses an expression which practically corroborates the american assertion that they held the ground at the end, and withdrew afterwards. "in the last attack they gained possession of five out of seven of our guns, but the fire kept upon them was so severe that it afterwards appeared they had not been able to carry them off; _for we found them next morning_ on the spot they had been taken. no [we?] boast of a 'great victory,' but in my opinion it was nearly equal on both sides."[ ] equality of loss, or even a technical victory, does not imply equality of subsequent conditions. brown had at the front all his available force; he had no reserves or depots upon which to draw. he had expended the last shot in the locker. drummond not only had been receiving re-enforcements, absolutely small, yet considerable in proportion to the contending numbers, but he was continuing to receive them. lundy's lane was july ; chauncey did not take the lake until august , and it was the th when he came off niagara, where he at once intercepted and drove ashore one of the british brigs, which was fired by her captain. he thus had immediate ocular demonstration of what had been going on in his absence; but it was already too late for the american squadron to turn the scales of war. if this could have been accomplished at all, it would have been by such intervention as in this instance; by injuring the enemy rather than by helping the friend. but this would have been possible only in the beginning. brown felt himself unable longer to keep the field; and the army, now under general ripley, withdrew the following day, july , to fort erie, where it proceeded to strengthen the work itself, and to develop a fortified line depending upon it, covering the angle of ground made by the shores of the niagara river and lake erie. brown was carried to buffalo to recover of his wounds, which were not dangerous, though severe. he subsequently resumed chief command, but scott was unable to serve again during the campaign. general gaines was summoned from sackett's harbor, and on august took charge at fort erie. from this time the operations on either side were limited to the effort to take or to hold this position. drummond's experience at lundy's lane, and the extent of his loss, made him cautious in pursuit; and time was yielded to the enemy to make good their entrenchment. on the early morning of august the british assaulted, and were repelled with fifty-seven killed, three hundred and nine wounded, and five hundred and thirty-nine missing.[ ] the americans, covered by their works, reported a loss of less than one hundred. "i am now reduced to a most unpleasant predicament with regard to force," wrote drummond to prevost.[ ] "i have ordered the th and d from york to this frontier. i had intended to order another regiment from kingston, but from the badness of the roads since the recent rains i could not calculate upon their arrival here before our squadron will be able to take the lake, and as even at present the diminution of stores and provisions is beginning to be felt, i intreat your excellency will impress upon the commodore the necessity of conveying to this division, the very moment the squadron can leave harbor, a full supply of each, as well as a re-enforcement of troops." after this sharp reverse drummond settled down to a siege, in the course of which he complained frequently and grievously of the annoyance caused him by chauncey's blockade, established august , with three vessels competent seriously to interrupt transportation of supplies, or of men in large detachments. the season was still propitious for marching; but as early as august drummond was afraid "that relief by control of the lake may not reach us in time." september , "our batteries have almost been silent for several days from the reduced state of the ammunition." september , "the sudden and most unlooked for return to the head of lake ontario of the two brigs, by which the niagara has been so long blockaded, _and my communication with york cut off_, has had the effect of preventing the junction of the th regiment, which arrived at york the th, and probably would have been here the following day but for this unlucky circumstance."[ ] september , "the deficiency of provisions and transport is the difficulty attending every operation in this country, as it prevents the collection at any one point of an adequate force for any object. these difficulties we must continue to experience, until our squadron appears superior on the lake." it would be impossible to depict more strongly the course incumbent upon chauncey in july, or to condemn more severely, by implication, his failure then to do what he could, taking the chance of that chapter of accidents, "to be in the way of good luck," which it is the duty of every military leader to consider as among the clear possibilities of war. "the blockade of kingston," wrote prevost on october to lord bathurst,[ ] "has been vigorously maintained for the last six weeks by the enemy's squadron. the vigilance of the american cruisers on lake ontario was felt even by our batteaux creeping along the shore with provisions for drummond's division. in consequence, i found that the wants of that army had grown to an alarming extent."[ ] in pushing his siege works, drummond by september had erected three batteries, the last of which, then just completed, "would rake obliquely the whole american encampment."[ ] brown determined then upon a sortie in force, which was made on the afternoon of september , with entire success. it was in this attack that the new york militia, of whom fifteen hundred had crossed to the fort, bore an honorable and distinguished part. brown states the actual force engaged in the fighting at one thousand regulars and one thousand militia, to whose energy and stubbornness drummond again pays the compliment of estimating them at five thousand. the weight of the onslaught was thrown on the british right flank, and there doubtless the assailants were, and should have been, greatly superior. two of the three batteries were carried, one of them being that which had directly incited the attack. "the enemy," reported drummond, "was everywhere driven back; not however before he had disabled the guns in no. battery, and exploded its magazine;"[ ] that is, not before he had accomplished his purpose. nor was this all. the stroke ended the campaign. drummond had nearly lost hope of a successful issue, and this blow destroyed what little remained. the american navy still held the lake; the big ship in kingston still tarried; rains torrential and almost incessant were undermining the ramparts of forts george and niagara, causing serious alarm for the defence, and spreading sickness among his troops, re-enforcements to which could with difficulty be sent. the british returns of loss in repelling the sortie gave one hundred and fifteen killed, one hundred and forty-eight wounded, three hundred and sixteen missing; total, five hundred and seventy-nine. the americans, whose casualties were five hundred and eleven, reported that they brought back three hundred and eighty-five prisoners; among whom the roll of officers tallies with the british list. four days afterwards, september , drummond abandoned his works, leaving his fires burning and huts standing, and fell back secretly by night to the chippewa. brown was in no condition to follow. in a brief ten weeks, over which his adventurous enterprise spread, he had fought four engagements, which might properly be called general actions, if regard were had to the total force at his disposal, and not merely to the tiny scale of the campaign. barring the single episode of the battle of new orleans, his career on the niagara peninsula is the one operation of the land war of upon which thoughtful and understanding americans of the following generation could look back with satisfaction. of how great consequence this evidence of national military character was, to the men who had no other experience, is difficult to be appreciated by us, in whose memories are the successes of the mexican contest and the fierce titanic strife of the civil war. in truth, chippewa, lundy's lane, and new orleans, are the only names of preserved to popular memory,[ ] ever impatient of disagreeable reminiscence. hull's surrender was indeed an exception; the iron there burned too deep to leave no lasting scar. to brown and his distinguished subordinates we owe the demonstration of what the war of might have accomplished, had the government of the united states since the beginning of the century possessed even a rudimentary conception of what military preparation means to practical statesmanship. shortly after the sortie which decided drummond to retire, the defenders of fort erie were brought into immediate relation with the major part of the forces upon lake champlain, under general izard. both belonged to the same district, the ninth, which in dearborn's time had formed one general command; but which it now pleased the secretary of war, general armstrong, to manage as two distinct divisions, under his own controlling directions from washington. the secretary undoubtedly had a creditable amount of acquired military knowledge, but by this time he had manifested that he did not possess the steadying military qualities necessary to play the role of a distant commander-in-chief. izard, at the time of his appointment, reported everything connected with his command, the numbers and discipline of the troops, their clothing and equipment, in a deplorable state of inefficiency.[ ] the summer months were spent in building up anew the army on champlain, and in erecting fortifications; at plattsburg, where the main station was fixed, and at cumberland head, the promontory which defines the eastern side of plattsburg bay. upon the maintenance of these positions depended the tenure of the place itself, as the most suitable advanced base for the army and for the fleet, mutually indispensable for the protection of that great line of operations. on july , before the secretary could know of lundy's lane, but when he did anticipate that brown must fall back on fort erie, he wrote to izard that it would be expedient for him to advance against montreal, or against prescott,--on the st. lawrence opposite ogdensburg,--in case large re-enforcements had been sent from montreal to check brown's advance, as was reported. his own inclination pointed to prescott, with a view to the contingent chance of an attack upon kingston, in co-operation with chauncey and the garrison at sackett's.[ ] this letter did not reach izard till august . he construed its somewhat tentative and vacillating terms as an order. "i will make the movement you direct, if possible; but i shall do it with the apprehension of risking the force under my command, and with the certainty that everything in this vicinity, save the lately erected works at plattsburg and cumberland head, will, in less than three days after my departure, be in possession of the enemy."[ ] izard, himself, on july , had favored a step like this proposed; but, as he correctly observed, the time for it was when brown was advancing and might be helped. now, when brown had been brought to a stand, and was retiring, the movement would not aid him, but would weaken the champlain frontier; and that at the very moment when the divisions from wellington's army, which had embarked at bordeaux, were arriving at quebec and montreal. on august , armstrong wrote again, saying that his first order had been based upon the supposition that chauncey would meet and beat yeo, or at least confine him in port. this last had in fact been done; but, if the enemy should have carried his force from montreal to kingston, and be prepared there, "a safer movement was to march two thousand men to sackett's, embark there, and go to brown's assistance."[ ] izard obediently undertook this new disposition, which he received august ; but upon consultation with his officers concluded that to march by the northern route, near the canada border, would expose his necessarily long column to dangerous flank attack. he therefore determined to go by way of utica.[ ] on august the division, about four thousand effectives, set out from the camp at chazy, eight miles north of plattsburg, and on september reached sackett's. bad weather prevented immediate embarkation, but on the st about two thousand five hundred infantry sailed, and having a fair wind reached next day the genesee, where they were instantly put ashore. a regiment of light artillery and a number of dragoons, beyond the capacity of the fleet to carry, went by land and arrived a week later. in this manner the defence of lake champlain was deprived of four thousand fairly trained troops at the moment that the british attack in vast superiority of force was maturing. their advance brigade, in fact, crossed the frontier two days after izard's departure. at the critical moment, and during the last weeks of weather favorable for operations, the men thus taken were employed in making an unprofitable march of great length, to a quarter where there was now little prospect of successful action, and where they could not arrive before the season should be practically closed. brown, of course, hailed an accession of strength which he sorely needed, and did not narrowly scrutinize a measure for which he was not responsible. on september , ten days after the successful sortie from fort erie, he was at batavia, in new york, where he had an interview with izard, who was the senior. in consequence of their consultation izard determined that his first movement should be the siege of fort niagara.[ ] in pursuance of this resolve his army marched to lewiston, where it arrived october . there he had a second meeting with brown, accompanied on this occasion by porter, and under their representations decided that it would be more proper to concentrate all the forces at hand on the canadian bank of the niagara, south of the chippewa, and not to undertake a siege while drummond kept the field.[ ] despite many embarrassments, and anxieties on the score of supplies and provisions while deprived of the free use of the lake, the british general was now master of the situation. his position rested upon the chippewa on one flank, and upon fort niagara on the other. from end to end he had secure communication, for he possessed the river and the boats, below the falls. by these interior lines, despite his momentary inferiority in total numbers, he was able to concentrate his forces upon a threatened extremity with a rapidity which the assailants could not hope to rival. fort niagara was not in a satisfactory condition to resist battery by heavy cannon; but izard had none immediately at hand. drummond was therefore justified in his hope that "the enemy will find the recapture of the place not to be easily effected."[ ] his line of the chippewa rested on the left upon the niagara. on its right flank the ground was impassable to everything save infantry, and any effort to turn his position there would have to be made in the face of artillery, to oppose which no guns could be brought forward. accordingly when izard, after crossing in accordance with his last decision, advanced on october against the british works upon the chippewa, he found they were too strong for a frontal attack, the opinion which drummond himself entertained,[ ] while the topographical difficulties of the country baffled every attempt to turn them. drummond's one serious fear was that the americans, finding him impregnable here, might carry a force by lake erie, and try to gain his rear from long point, or by the grand river.[ ] though they would meet many obstacles in such a circuit, yet the extent to which he would have to detach in order to meet them, and the smallness of his numbers, might prove very embarrassing. izard entertained no such project. after his demonstration of october , which amounted to little more than a reconnaisance in force, he lapsed into hopelessness. the following day he learned by express that the american squadron had retired to sackett's harbor and was throwing up defensive works. with his own eyes he saw, too, that the british water service was not impeded. "notwithstanding our supremacy on lake ontario, at the time i was in lewiston [october - ] the communication between york and the mouth of the niagara was uninterrupted. i saw a large square-rigged vessel arriving, and another, a brig, lying close to the canada shore. not a vessel of ours was in sight."[ ] the british big ship, launched september , was on october reported by yeo completely equipped. the next day he would proceed up the lake to drummond's relief. chauncey had not waited for the enemy to come out. convinced that the first use of naval superiority would be to reduce his naval base, he took his ships into port october ; writing to washington that the "st. lawrence" had her sails bent, apparently all ready for sea, and that he expected an attack in ten days.[ ] "i confess i am greatly embarrassed," wrote izard to monroe, who had now superseded armstrong as secretary of war. "at the head of the most efficient army the united states have possessed during this war, much must be expected from me; and yet i can discern no object which can be achieved at this point worthy of the risk which will attend its attempt." the enemy perfectly understood his perplexity, and despite his provocations refused to play into his hands by leaving the shelter of their works to fight. on october , he broke up his camp, and began to prepare winter quarters for his own command opposite black rock, sending brown with his division to sackett's harbor. two weeks later, on november , having already transported all but a small garrison to the american shore, he blew up fort erie and abandoned his last foothold on the peninsula. during the operations along the niagara which ended thus fruitlessly, the united states navy upon lake erie met with some severe mishaps. the cabinet purpose, of carrying an expedition into the upper lakes against michilimackinac, was persisted in despite the reluctance of armstrong. commander arthur sinclair, who after an interval had succeeded perry, was instructed to undertake this enterprise with such force as might be necessary; but to leave within lake erie all that he could spare, to co-operate with brown. accordingly he sailed from erie early in june, arriving on the st off detroit, where he was to embark the troops under colonel croghan for the land operations. after various delays st. joseph's was reached july , and found abandoned. its defences were destroyed. on the th the vessels were before mackinac, but after a reconnaisance croghan decided that the position was too strong for the force he had. sinclair therefore started to return, having so far accomplished little except the destruction of two schooners, one on lake huron, and one on lake superior, both essential to the garrison at mackinac; there being at the time but one other vessel on the lakes competent to the maintenance of their communications. this remaining schooner, called the "nancy," was known to be in nottawasaga bay, at the south end of georgian bay, near the position selected by the british as a depot for stores coming from york by way of lake simcoe. after much dangerous search in uncharted waters, sinclair found her lying two miles up a river of the same name as the bay, where she was watching a chance to slip through to mackinac. her lading had been completed july , and the next day she had already started, when a messenger brought word that approach to the island was blocked by the american expedition. the winding of the river placed her present anchorage within gunshot of the lake; but as she could not be seen through the brush, sinclair borrowed from the army a howitzer, with which, mounted in the open beyond, he succeeded in firing both the "nancy" and the blockhouse defending the position. the british were thus deprived of their last resource for transportation in bulk upon the lake. what this meant to mackinac may be inferred from the fact that flour there was sixty dollars the barrel, even before sinclair's coming. having inflicted this small, yet decisive, embarrassment on the enemy, sinclair on august started back with the "niagara" and "hunter" for erie, whither he had already despatched the "lawrence"--perry's old flagship--and the "caledonia." he left in nottawasaga bay the schooners "scorpion" and "tigress," "to maintain a rigid blockade until driven from the lake by the inclemency of the weather," in order "to cut the line of communications from michilimackinac to york." lieutenant daniel turner of the "scorpion," who had commanded the "caledonia" in perry's action, was the senior officer of this detachment. after sinclair's departure the gales became frequent and violent. finding no good anchorage in nottawasaga bay, turner thought he could better fulfil the purpose of his instructions by taking the schooners to st. joseph's, and cruising thence to french river, which enters georgian bay at its northern end. on the night of september , the "scorpion" being then absent at the river, the late commander of the "nancy," lieutenant miller worsley, got together a boat's crew of eighteen seamen, and obtained the co-operation of a detachment of seventy soldiers. with these, followed by a number of indians in canoes, he attacked the "tigress" at her anchors and carried her by boarding. the night being very dark, the british were close alongside when first seen; and the vessel was not provided with boarding nettings, which her commander at his trial proved he had not the cordage to make. deprived of this essential defence, which in such an exposed situation corresponds to a line of intrenched works on shore, her crew of thirty men were readily overpowered by the superior numbers, who could come upon them from four quarters at once, and had but an easy step to her low-lying rail. the officer commanding the british troops made a separate report of the affair, in which he said that her resistance did credit to her officers, who were all severely wounded.[ ] transferring his men to the prize, worsley waited for the return of the "scorpion," which on the th anchored about five miles off, ignorant of what had happened. the now british schooner weighed and ran down to her, showing american colors; and, getting thus alongside without being suspected, mastered her also. besides the officers hurt, there were of the "tigress'" crew three killed and three wounded; the british having two killed and eight wounded. no loss seems to have been incurred on either side in the capture of the "scorpion." in reporting this affair sir james yeo wrote: "the importance of this service is very great. had not the naval force of the enemy been taken, the commanding officer at mackinac must have surrendered."[ ] he valued it further for its influence upon the indians, and upon the future of the naval establishment which he had in contemplation for the upper lakes. when sinclair reached detroit from nottawasaga he received news of other disasters. according to his instructions, before starting for the upper lakes he had left a division of his smaller vessels, under lieutenant kennedy, to support the army at niagara. when brown fell back upon fort erie, after lundy's lane, three of these, the "ohio," "somers," and "porcupine," anchored close by the shore, in such a position as to flank the approaches to the fort, and to molest the breaching battery which the british were erecting. as this interfered with the besiegers' plans for an assault, captain dobbs, commanding the naval detachment on ontario which yeo had assigned to co-operate with drummond, transported over land from below the falls six boats or batteaux, and on the night of august attacked the american schooners, as worsley afterwards did the "tigress" and "scorpion." the "ohio" and "somers," each with a crew of thirty-five men, were carried and brought successfully down the river within the british lines. dobbs attributed the escape of the "porcupine" to the cables of the two others being cut, in consequence of which they with the victorious assailants on board drifted beyond possibility of return.[ ] to these four captures by the enemy must be added the loss by accident of the "caledonia"[ ] and "ariel," reported by sinclair about this time. perry's fleet was thus disappearing by driblets; but the command of the lake was not yet endangered, for there still remained, besides several of the prizes, the two principal vessels, "lawrence" and "niagara."[ ] with these sinclair returned to the east of the lake, and endeavored to give support to the army at fort erie; but the violence of the weather and the insecurity of the anchorage on both shores, as the autumn drew on, not only prevented effectual co-operation, but seriously threatened the very existence of the fleet, upon which control of the water depended. in an attempt to go to detroit for re-enforcements for brown, a gale of wind was encountered which drifted the vessels back to buffalo, where they had to anchor and lie close to a lee shore for two days, september to , with topmasts and lower yards down, the sea breaking over them, and their cables chafing asunder on a rocky bottom. after this, drummond having raised the siege of fort erie, the fleet retired to erie and was laid up for the winter. footnotes: [ ] ante, pp. - . [ ] documentary history of the campaign on the niagara frontier in , by ernest cruikshank, part i. p. . [ ] captains' letters, feb. , march and , . [ ] canadian archives, c. , p. . [ ] niles' register, feb. , , vol. v. pp. , . [ ] canadian archives. c. , p. . [ ] armstrong, notices of the war of , vol. ii. p. . [ ] canadian archives, c. , p. . [ ] ibid., pp. , - . [ ] ibid., c. , p. . [ ] niles' register, april , , vol. vi. p. . [ ] captains' letters, april , . [ ] writings of madison, edition of , vol. ii. p. . [ ] wilkinson's letter to a friend, april , . niles' register, vol. vi. p. . his official report of the affair is given, p. . [ ] yeo's report, canadian archives, m. . , p. . [ ] the armaments of the corresponding two british vessels were: "prince regent", thirty long -pounders, eight -pounder carronades, twenty -pounder carronades; "princess charlotte", twenty-four long -pounders, sixteen -pounder carronades. canadian archives, m. . , p. . [ ] captains' letters. [ ] canadian archives, c. , p. . [ ] woolsey's report, forwarded by chauncey june , is in captains' letters. it is given, together with several other papers bearing on the affair, in niles' register, vol. vi. pp. , - . for popham's report, see naval chronicle, vol. xxxii. p. . [ ] canadian archives, c. , p. . [ ] cruikshank's documentary history, , pp. - . [ ] writings of madison (edition of ), vol. iii. p. . [ ] captains' letters. [ ] ibid. [ ] yeo to admiralty, may , . canadian archives, m. . , p. . for chauncey's opinion to the same effect, see captains' letters, nov. , . [ ] captains' letters, june , . [ ] armstrong to madison, april (_sic_), . armstrong's notices of war of , vol. ii. p. . [ ] these official returns are taken by the present writer from mr. henry adams' history of the united states. [ ] cruikshank's documentary history of the niagara campaign of , p. . [ ] cruikshank, documentary history. [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] scott's autobiography, vol. i. pp. - . [ ] cruikshank's documentary history, p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. vii. p. . [ ] captains' letters. [ ] secretary of the navy to chauncey, july , , secretary's letters. [ ] secretary to chauncey, aug. , . ibid. [ ] ibid., dec. , . [ ] chauncey to brown, aug. , . niles' register, vol. vii. p. . [ ] august . cruikshank's documentary history, pp. - . the whole letter has interest as conveying an adequate idea of the communications difficulty. [ ] this word is wanting; but the context evidently requires it. [ ] cruikshank's documentary history, , pp. , . [ ] cruikshank's documentary history, , p. . [ ] captains' letters. aug. , . [ ] cruikshank's documentary history, , p. . [ ] cruikshank's documentary history, , p. . [ ] cruikshank's documentary history, . riall to drummond, july , , , pp. - . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] "sir james yeo has not been nearer sackett's harbor than the ducks since june ." captains' letters, aug. , . [ ] cruikshank's documentary history, , pp. , . [ ] brown's report of lundy's lane to secretary of war, aug. , . ibid., p. . [ ] drummond's report of the engagement, july . cruikshank, pp. - . [ ] brown's report. ibid., p. . [ ] brown to governor tompkins, aug. , . cruikshank, p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] cruikshank's documentary history, , p. . author's italics. [ ] the american account of this total is: killed, left on the field, ; wounded, left on the field, ; prisoners, . total, . two hundred supposed to be killed on the left flank (in the water) and permitted to float down the niagara. [ ] aug. . cruikshank, pp. - . [ ] cruikshank's documentary history, , pp. , . author's italics. [ ] bathurst was secretary of state for war and the colonies. [ ] cruikshank's documentary history, , pp. , . [ ] ibid., p. . brown to tompkins, sept. , . [ ] cruikshank's documentary history, p. . [ ] an interesting indication of popular appreciation is found in the fact that two ships of the line laid down by chauncey in or near sackett's harbor, in the winter of - , were named the "new orleans" and the "chippewa." yeo after the peace returned to england by way of sackett's and new york, and was then greatly surprised at the rapidity with which these two vessels, which he took to be of one hundred and twenty guns each, (canadian archives, m. . , p. ), had been run up, to meet his "st. lawrence" in the spring, had the war continued. the "new orleans" remained on the navy list, as a seventy-four, "on the stocks," until , when she was sold. for years she was the exception to a rule that ships of her class should bear the name of a state of the union. the other square-rigged vessels on ontario were sold, in may, . (records of the bureau of construction and repair, navy department.) [ ] izard to secretary of war, may , . official correspondence of the department of war with major-general izard, and . [ ] izard correspondence, p. . [ ] izard correspondence, p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] izard correspondence, p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] oct. , . cruikshank's documentary history, , p. . [ ] izard correspondence, p. ; cruikshank, p. . [ ] cruikshank, p. . [ ] izard correspondence, p. . [ ] captains' letters. [ ] canadian archives, c. , pp. - . [ ] ibid., m. . , p. . [ ] the reports of captain dobbs and the american lieutenant, conkling, are in cruikshank's documentary history, p. . [ ] captains' letters, sept. , . [ ] this account of naval events on the upper lakes in has been summarized from sinclair's despatches, captains' letters, may to nov. , , and from certain captured british letters, which, with several of sinclair's, were published in niles' register, vol. vii. and supplement. chapter xvi seaboard operations in . washington, baltimore, and maine the british command of the water on lake ontario was obtained too late in the year to have any decisive effect upon their operations. combined with their continued powerlessness on lake erie, this caused their campaign upon the northern frontier to be throughout defensive in character, as that of the americans had been offensive. drummond made no attempt in the winter to repeat the foray into new york of the previous december, although he and prevost both considered that they had received provocation to retaliate, similar to that given at newark the year before. the infliction of such vindictive punishment was by them thrown upon warren's successor in the north atlantic command, who responded in word and will even more heartily than in deed. the champlain expedition, in september of this year, had indeed offensive purpose, but even there the object specified was the protection of canada, by the destruction of the american naval establishments on the lake, as well as at sackett's harbor;[ ] while the rapidity with which prevost retreated, as soon as the british squadron was destroyed, demonstrated how profoundly otherwise the spirit of a simple defensive had possession of him, as it had also of the more positive and aggressive temperaments of drummond and yeo, and how essential naval control was in his eyes. in this general view he had the endorsement of the duke of wellington, when his attention was called to the subject, after the event. upon the seaboard it was otherwise. there the british campaign of much exceeded that of in offensive purpose and vigor, and in effect. this was due in part to the change in the naval commander-in-chief; in part also to the re-enforcements of troops which the end of the european war enabled the british government to send to america. early in the year , warren had represented to the admiralty the impossibility of his giving personal supervision to the management of the west india stations, and had suggested devolving the responsibility upon the local admirals, leaving him simply the power to interfere when circumstances demanded.[ ] the admiralty then declined, alleging that the character of the war required unity of direction over the whole.[ ] later they changed their views. the north atlantic, jamaica, and leeward islands stations were made again severally independent, and warren was notified that as the american command, thus reduced, was beneath the claims of an officer of his rank,--a full admiral,--a successor would be appointed.[ ] vice-admiral sir alexander cochrane accordingly relieved him, april , ; his charge embracing both the atlantic and gulf coasts. at the same period the lakes station, from champlain to superior inclusive, was constituted a separate command; yeo's orders to this effect being dated the same day as cochrane's, january , . cochrane brought to his duties a certain acrimony of feeling, amounting almost to virulence. "i have it much at heart," he wrote bathurst, "to give them a complete drubbing before peace is made, when i trust their northern limits will be circumscribed and the command of the mississippi wrested from them." he expects thousands of slaves to join with their masters' horses, and looks forward to enlisting them. they are good horsemen; and, while agreeing with his lordship in deprecating a negro insurrection, he thinks such bodies will "be as good cossacks as any in the russian army, and more terrific to the americans than any troops that can be brought forward." washington and baltimore are equally accessible, and may be either destroyed or laid under contribution.[ ] these remarks, addressed to a prominent member of the cabinet, are somewhat illuminative as to the formal purposes, as well as to the subsequent action, of british officials. the sea coast from maine to georgia, according to the season of the year, was made to feel the increasing activity and closeness of the british attacks; and these, though discursive and without apparent correlation of action, were evidently animated throughout by a common intention of bringing the war home to the experience of the people. as a whole, the principal movements were meant to serve as a diversion, detaining on the chesapeake and seaboard troops which might otherwise be sent to oppose the advance prevost was ordered to make against sackett's harbor and lake champlain; for which purpose much the larger part of the re-enforcements from europe had been sent to canada. the instructions to the general detailed to command on the atlantic specified as his object "a diversion on the coast of the united states in favor of the army employed in the defence of upper and lower canada."[ ] during the operations, "if in any descent you shall be enabled to take such a position as to threaten the inhabitants with the destruction of their property, you are hereby authorized to levy upon them contributions in return for your forbearance." negroes might be enlisted, or carried away, though in no case as slaves. taken in connection with the course subsequently pursued at washington, such directions show an aim to inflict in many quarters suffering and deprivation, in order to impress popular consciousness with the sense of an irresistible and ubiquitous power incessantly at hand. such moral impression, inclining those subject to it to desire peace, conduced also to the retention of local forces in the neighborhood where they belonged, and so furthered the intended diversion. the general purpose of the british government is further shown by some incidental mention. gallatin, who at the time of napoleon's abdication was in london, in connection with his duties on the peace commission, wrote two months afterwards: "to use their own language, they mean to inflict on america a chastisement which will teach her that war is not to be declared against great britain with impunity. this is a very general sentiment of the nation; and that such are the opinions of the ministry was strongly impressed on the mind of ---- by a late conversation he had with lord castlereagh. admiral warren also told levett harris, with whom he was intimate at st. petersburg, that he was sorry to say the instructions given to his successor on the american station were very different from those under which he acted, and that he feared very serious injury would be done to america."[ ] thus inspired, the coast warfare, although more active and efficient than the year before, and on a larger scale, continued in spirit and in execution essentially desultory and wasting. as it progressed, a peculiar bitterness was imparted by the liberal construction given by british officers to the word "retaliation." by strict derivation, and in wise application, the term summarizes the ancient retribution of like for like,--an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; and to destroy three villages for one, as was done in retort for the burning of newark, the inhabitants in each case being innocent of offence, was an excessive recourse to a punitive measure admittedly lawful. two further instances of improper destruction by americans had occurred during the campaign of . just before sinclair sailed for mackinac, he suggested to a colonel campbell, commanding the troops at erie, that it would be a useful step to visit long point, on the opposite canada shore, and destroy there a quantity of flour, and some mills which contributed materially to the support of the british forces on the niagara peninsula.[ ] this was effectively done, and did add seriously to drummond's embarrassment; but campbell went further and fired some private houses also, on the ground that the owners were british partisans and had had a share in the burning of buffalo. a court of inquiry, of which general scott was president, justified the destruction of the mills, but condemned unreservedly that of the private houses.[ ] again, in brown's advance upon chippewa, some american "volunteers," despatched to the village of st. david's, burned there a number of dwellings. the commanding officer, colonel stone, was ordered summarily and immediately by brown to retire from the expedition, as responsible for an act "contrary to the orders of the government, and to those of the commanding general published to the army."[ ] in both these cases disavowal had been immediate; and it had been decisive also in that of newark. the intent of the american government was clear, and reasonable ultimate compensation might have been awaited; at least for a time. prevost, however, being confined to the defensive all along his lines, communicated the fact of the destruction to cochrane, calling upon him for the punishment which it was not in his own power then to inflict. cochrane accordingly issued an order[ ] to the ships under his command, to use measures of retaliation "against the cities of the united states, from the saint croix river to the southern boundary, near the st. mary's river;" "to destroy and lay waste," so he notified the united states government, "such towns and districts upon the coast as may be found assailable."[ ] in the first heat of his wrath, he used in his order an expression, "and you will spare merely the lives of the unarmed inhabitants of the united states," which he afterwards asked prevost to expunge, as it might be construed in a sense he never meant;[ ] and he reported to his government that he had sent private instructions to exercise forbearance toward the inhabitants.[ ] it can easily be believed that, like many words spoken in passion, the phrase far outran his purposes; but it has significance and value as indicating the manner in which americans had come to be regarded in great britain, through the experience of the period of peace and the recent years of war. however the british government might justify in terms the impressment of seamen from american ships, or the delay of atonement for such an insult as that of the chesapeake, the nation which endured the same, content with reams of argument instead of blow for blow, had sunk beneath contempt as an inferior race, to be cowed and handled without gloves by those who felt themselves the masters. nor was the matter bettered by the notorious fact that the interference with the freedom of american trade, which great britain herself admitted to be outside the law, had been borne unresisted because of the pecuniary stake involved. the impression thus produced was deepened by the confident boasts of immediate successes in canada, made by leading members of the party which brought on the war; followed as these were by a display of inefficiency so ludicrous that opponents, as well native as foreign, did not hesitate to apply to it the word "imbecility." the american for a dozen years had been clubbed without giving evidence of rebellion, beyond words; now that he showed signs of restiveness, without corresponding evidence of power, he should feel the lash, and there need be no nicety in measuring punishment. codrington, an officer of mark and character, who joined cochrane at this time as chief of staff, used expressions which doubtless convey the average point of view of the british officer of that day: president madison, "by letting his generals burn villages in canada again, has been trying to excite terror; but as you may shortly see by the public exposition of the admiral's orders, the terror and the suffering will probably be brought home to the doors of his own fellow citizens. i am fully convinced that this is the true way to end this yankee war, whatever may be said in parliament against it."[ ] it is the grievous fault of all retaliation, especially in the heat of war, that it rarely stays its hand at an equal measure, but almost invariably proceeds to an excess which provokes the other party to seek in turn to even the scale. the process tends to be unending; and it is to the honor of the united states government that, though technically responsible for the acts of agents which it was too inefficient to control, it did not seriously entertain the purpose of resorting to this means, to vindicate the wrongs of its citizens at the expense of the subjects of its opponent. happily, the external brutality of attitude which cochrane's expression so aptly conveyed yielded for the most part to nobler instincts in the british officers. there was indeed much to condemn, much done that ought not to have been done; but even in the contemporary accounts it is quite possible to trace a certain rough humanity, a wish to deal equitably with individuals, for whom, regarded nationally, they professed no respect. even in the marauding of the chesapeake, the idea of compensation for value taken was not lost to view; and in general the usages of war, as to property exempt from destruction or appropriation, were respected, although not without the rude incidents certain to occur where atonement for acts of resistance, or the price paid for property taken, is fixed by the victor. if retaliation upon any but the immediate culprit is ever permissible, which in national matters will scarcely be contested, it is logically just that it should fall first of all upon the capital, where the interests and honor of the nation are centred. there, if anywhere, the responsibility for the war and all its incidents is concrete in the representatives of the nation, executive and legislative, and in the public offices from which all overt acts are presumed to emanate. so it befell the united states. in the first six months of , the warfare in the chesapeake continued on the same general lines as in ; there having been the usual remission of activity during the winter, to resume again as milder weather drew on. the blockade of the bay was sustained, with force adequate to make it technically effective, although baltimore boasted that several of her clipper schooners got to sea. on the part of the united states, captain gordon of the navy had been relieved in charge of the bay flotilla by commodore barney, of revolutionary and privateering renown. this local command, in conformity with the precedent at new york, and as was due to so distinguished an officer, was made independent of other branches of the naval service; the commodore being in immediate communication with the navy department. on april , he left baltimore and proceeded down the bay with thirteen vessels; ten of them being large barges or galleys, propelled chiefly by oars, the others gunboats of the ordinary type. the headquarters of this little force became the patuxent river, to which in the sequel it was in great measure confined; the superiority of the enemy precluding any enlarged sphere of activity. its presence, however, was a provocation to the british, as being the only floating force in the bay capable of annoying them; the very existence of which was a challenge to their supremacy. to destroy it became therefore a dominant motive, which was utilized also to conceal to the last their purpose, tentative indeed throughout, to make a dash at washington. the patuxent enters chesapeake bay from the north and west, sixty miles below baltimore, and twenty above the mouth of the potomac, to the general direction of which its own course in its lower part is parallel. for boats drawing no more than did barney's it is navigable for forty miles from its mouth, to pig point; whence to washington by land is but fifteen miles. a pursuit of the flotilla so far therefore brought pursuers within easy striking distance of the capital, provided that between them and it stood no obstacle adequate to impose delay until resistance could gather. it was impossible for such a pursuit to be made by the navy alone; for, inadequate as the militia was to the protection of the bay shore from raiding, it was quite competent to act in conjunction with barney, when battling only against boats, which alone could follow him into lairs accessible to him, but not to even the smaller vessels of the enemy. ships of the largest size could enter the river, but could ascend it only a little way. up the patuxent itself, or in its tributaries, the americans therefore had always against the british navy a refuge, in which they might be blockaded indeed, but could not be reached. for all these reasons, in order to destroy the flotilla, a body of troops must be used; a necessity which served to mask any ulterior design. in the course of these operations, and in support of them, the british navy had created a post at tangier island, ten miles across the bay, opposite the mouth of the potomac.[ ] here they threw up fortifications, and established an advanced rendezvous. between the island and the eastern shore, tangier sound gave sheltered anchorage. the position was in every way convenient, and strategically central. being the junction of the water routes to baltimore and washington, it threatened both; while the narrowness of the chesapeake at this point constituted the force there assembled an inner blockading line, well situated to move rapidly at short notice in any direction, up or down, to one side or the other. at such short distance from the patuxent, barney's movements were of course well under observation, as he at once experienced. on june , he left the river, apparently with a view to reaching the potomac. two schooners becalmed were then visible, and pursuit was made with the oars; but soon a large ship was seen under sail, despatching a number of barges to their assistance. a breeze springing up from southwest put the ship to windward, between the potomac and the flotilla, which was obliged to return to the patuxent, closely followed by the enemy. some distant shots were exchanged, but barney escaped, and for the time was suffered to remain undisturbed three miles from the bay; a -gun ship lying at the river's mouth, with barges plying continually about her. the departure of the british schooners, however, was construed to indicate a return with re-enforcements for an attack; an anticipation not disappointed. two more vessels soon joined the seventy-four; one of them a brig. on their appearance barney shifted his berth two miles further up, abreast st. leonard's creek. at daylight of june , one of the ships, the brig, two schooners, and fifteen rowing barges, were seen coming up with a fair wind. the flotilla then retreated two miles up the creek, formed there across it in line abreast, and awaited attack. the enemy's vessels could not follow; but their boats did, and a skirmish ensued which ended in the british retiring. later in the day the attempt was renewed with no better success; and barney claimed that, having followed the boats in their retreat, he had seriously disabled one of the large schooners anchored off the mouth of the creek to support the movement. there is no doubt that the american gunboats were manfully and skilfully handled, and that the crews in this and subsequent encounters gained confidence and skill, the evidences of which were shown afterwards at bladensburg, remaining the only alleviating remembrance from that day of disgrace. from barney would be expected no less than the most that man can do, or example effect; but his pursuit was stopped by the ship and the brig, which stayed within the patuxent. the flotilla continued inside the creek, two frigates lying off its mouth, until june , when an attack by the boats, in concert with a body of militia,--infantry and light artillery,--decided the enemy to move down the patuxent. barney took advantage of this to leave the creek and go up the river. we are informed by a journal of the day that the government was by these affairs well satisfied with the ability of the flotilla to restrain the operations of the enemy within the waters of the chesapeake, and had determined on a considerable increase to it. nothing seems improbable of that government; but, if this be true, it must have been easily satisfied. barney had secured a longer line of retreat, up the river; but the situation was not materially changed. in either case, creek or river, there was but one way out, and that was closed. he could only abide the time when the enemy should see fit to come against him by land and by water, which would seal his fate.[ ] on june there had sailed from bordeaux for america a detachment from wellington's army, twenty-five hundred strong, under major-general ross. it reached bermuda july , and there was re-enforced by another battalion, increasing its strength to thirty-four hundred. on august it left bermuda, accompanied by several ships of war, and on the th passed in by the capes of the chesapeake. admiral cochrane had preceded it by a few days, and was already lying there with his own ship and the division under rear-admiral cockburn, who hitherto had been in immediate charge of operations in the bay. there were now assembled over twenty vessels of war, four of them of the line, with a large train of transports and store-ships. a battalion of seven hundred marines were next detailed for duty with the troops, the landing force being thus raised to over four thousand. the rendezvous at tangier island gave the americans no certain clue to the ultimate object, for the reason already cited; and cochrane designedly contributed to their distraction, by sending one squadron of frigates up the potomac, and another up the chesapeake above baltimore.[ ] on august the main body of the expedition moved abreast the mouth of the patuxent, and at noon of that day entered the river with a fair wind. the purposes at this moment of the commanders of the army and navy, acting jointly, are succinctly stated by cochrane in his report to the admiralty: "information from rear-admiral cockburn that commodore barney, with the potomac flotilla, had taken shelter at the head of the patuxent, afforded a pretext for ascending that river to attack him near its source, above pig point, while the ultimate destination of the combined force was washington, should it be found that the attempt might be made with any prospect of success."[ ] august , the troops were landed at benedict, twenty-five miles from the mouth of the river, and the following day began their upward march, flanked by a naval division of light vessels; the immediate objective being barney's flotilla. for the defence of the capital of the united states, throughout the region by which it might be approached, the government had selected brigadier-general winder; the same who the year before had been captured at stoney creek, on the niagara frontier, in vincent's bold night attack. he was appointed july to the command of a new military district, the tenth, which comprised "the state of maryland, the district of columbia, and that part of virginia lying between the potomac and the rappahannock;"[ ] in brief, washington and baltimore, with the ways converging upon them from the sea. this was just seven weeks before the enemy landed in the patuxent; time enough, with reasonable antecedent preparation, or trained troops, to concert adequate resistance, as was shown by the british subsequent failure before baltimore. the conditions with which winder had to contend are best stated in the terms of the court of inquiry[ ] called to investigate his conduct, at the head of which sat general winfield scott. after fixing the date of his appointment, and ascertaining that he at once took every means in his power to put his district in a proper state of defence, the court found that on august , the day of the battle of bladensburg, he "was enabled by great and unremitting exertions to bring into the field about five or six thousand men, all of whom except four hundred were militia; that he could not collect more than half his men until a day or two previously to the engagement, and six or seven hundred of them did not arrive until fifteen minutes before its commencement; ... that the officers commanding the troops were generally unknown to him, and but a very small number of them had enjoyed the benefit of military instruction or experience." so far from attributing censure, the court found that, "taking into consideration the complicated difficulties and embarrassments under which he labored, he is entitled to no little commendation, notwithstanding the result; before the action he exhibited industry, zeal, and talent, and during its continuance a coolness, a promptitude, and a personal valor, highly honorable to himself." the finding of a court composed of competent experts, convened shortly after the events, must be received with respect. it is clear, however, that they here do not specify the particular professional merits of winder's conduct of operations, but only the general hopelessness of success, owing to the antecedent conditions, not of his making, under which he was called to act, and which he strenuously exerted himself to meet. the blame for a mishap evidently and easily preventible still remains, and, though of course not expressed by the court, is necessarily thrown back upon the administration, and upon the party represented by it, which had held power for over twelve years past. a hostile corps of less than five thousand men had penetrated to the capital, through a well populated country, which was, to quote the secretary of war, "covered with wood, and offering at every step strong positions for defence;"[ ] but there were neither defences nor defenders. the sequence of events which terminated in this humiliating manner is instructive. the cabinet, which on june had planned offensive operations in canada, met on july in another frame of mind, alarmed by the news from europe, to plan for the defence of washington and baltimore. it will be remembered that it was now two years since war had been declared. in counting the force on which reliance might be placed for meeting a possible enemy, the secretary of war thought he could assemble one thousand regulars, independent of artillerists in the forts.[ ] the secretary of the navy could furnish one hundred and twenty marines, and the crews of barney's flotilla, estimated at five hundred.[ ] for the rest, dependence must be upon militia, a call for which was issued to the number of ninety-three thousand, five hundred.[ ] of these, fifteen thousand were assigned to winder, as follows: from virginia, two thousand; from maryland, six thousand; from pennsylvania, five thousand; from the district of columbia, two thousand.[ ] so ineffective were the administrative measures for bringing out this paper force of citizen soldiery, the efficiency of which the leaders of the party in power had been accustomed to vaunt, that winder, after falling back from point to point before the enemy's advance, because only so might time be gained to get together the lagging contingents, could muster in the open ground at bladensburg, five miles from the capital, where at last he made his stand, only the paltry five or six thousand stated by the court. on the morning of the battle the secretary of war rode out to the field, with his colleagues in the administration, and in reply to a question from the president said he had no suggestions to offer; "as it was between regulars and militia, the latter would be beaten."[ ] the phrase was winder's absolution; pronounced for the future, as for the past. the responsibility for there being no regulars did not rest with him, nor yet with the secretary, but with the men who for a dozen years had sapped the military preparation of the nation. under the relative conditions of the opposing forces which have been stated, the progress of events was rapid. probably few now realize that only a little over four days elapsed from the landing of the british to the burning of the capitol. their army advanced along the west bank of the patuxent to upper marlborough, forty miles from the river's mouth. to this place, which was reached august , ross continued in direct touch with the navy; and here at pig point, nearly abreast on the river, the american flotilla was cornered at last. seeing the inevitable event, and to preserve his small but invaluable force of men, barney had abandoned the boats on the st, leaving with each a half-dozen of her crew to destroy her at the last moment. this was done when the british next day approached; one only escaping the flames. the city of washington, now the goal of the enemy's effort, lies on the potomac, between it and a tributary called the eastern branch. upon the east bank of the latter, five or six miles from the junction of the two streams, is the village of bladensburg. from upper marlborough, where the british had arrived, two roads led to washington. one of these, the left going from marlborough, crossed the eastern branch near its mouth; the other, less direct, passed through bladensburg. winder expected the british to advance by the former; and upon it barney with the four hundred seamen remaining to him joined the army, at a place called oldfields, seven miles from the capital. this route was militarily the more important, because from it branches were thrown off to the potomac, up which the frigate squadron under captain gordon was proceeding, and had already passed the kettle-bottoms, the most difficult bit of navigation in its path. the side roads would enable the invaders to reach and co-operate with this naval division; unless indeed winder could make head against them. this he was not able to do; but he remained almost to the last moment in perplexing uncertainty whether they would strike for the capital, or for its principal defence on the potomac, fort washington, ten miles lower down.[ ] [illustration: sketch _of the_ march of the british army under gen. ross _from the th. to the th. august _] for the obvious reasons named, because the doubts of their opponent facilitated their own movements by harassing his mind, as well as for the strategic advantage of a central line permitting movement in two directions at choice, the british advanced, as anticipated, by the left-hand road, and at nightfall of august were encamped about three miles from the americans. here winder covered a junction; for at oldfields the road by which the british were advancing forked. one division led to washington direct, crossing the eastern branch of the potomac where it is broadest and deepest, near its mouth; the other passed it at bladensburg. winder feared to await the enemy, because of the disorder to which his inexperienced troops would be exposed by a night attack, causing possibly the loss of his artillery; the one arm in which he felt himself superior. he retired therefore during the night by the direct road, burning its bridge. this left open the way to bladensburg, which the british next day followed, arriving at the village towards noon of the th. contrary to winder's instruction, the officer stationed there had withdrawn his troops across the stream, abandoning the place, and forming his line on the crest of some hills on the west bank. the impression which this position made upon the enemy was described by general ross, as follows: "they were strongly posted on very commanding heights, formed in two lines, the advance occupying a fortified house, which with artillery covered the bridge over the eastern branch, across which the british troops had to pass. a broad and straight road, leading from the bridge to washington, ran through the enemy's position, which was carefully defended by artillerymen and riflemen."[ ] allowing for the tendency to magnify difficulties overcome, the british would have had before them a difficult task, if opposed by men accustomed to mutual support and mutual reliance, with the thousand-fold increase of strength which comes with such habit and with the moral confidence it gives. the american line had been formed before winder came on the ground. it extended across the washington road as described by ross. a battery on the hill-top commanded the bridge, and was supported by a line of infantry on either side, with a second line in the rear. fearing, however, that the enemy might cross the stream higher up, where it was fordable in many places, a regiment from the second line was reluctantly ordered forward to extend the left; and winder, when he arrived, while approving this disposition, carried thither also some of the artillery which he had brought with him.[ ] the anxiety of the americans was therefore for their left. the british commander was eager to be done with his job, and to get back to his ships from a position militarily insecure. he had long been fighting napoleon's troops in the spanish peninsula, and was not yet fully imbued with drummond's conviction that with american militia liberties might be taken beyond the limit of ordinary military precaution. no time was spent looking for a ford, but the troops dashed straight for the bridge. the fire of the american artillery was excellent, and mowed down the head of the column; but the seasoned men persisted and forced their way across. at this moment barney was coming up with his seamen, and at winder's request brought his guns into line across the washington road, facing the bridge. soon after this, a few rockets passing close over the heads of the battalions supporting the batteries on the left started them running, much as a mule train may be stampeded by a night alarm. it was impossible to rally them. a part held for a short time; but when winder attempted to retire them a little way, from a fire which had begun to annoy them, they also broke and fled.[ ] the american left was thus routed, but barney's battery and its supporting infantry still held their ground. "during this period," reported the commodore,--that is, while his guns were being brought into battery, and the remainder of his seamen and marines posted to support them,--"the engagement continued, the enemy advancing, and our own army retreating before them, apparently in much disorder. at length the enemy made his appearance on the main road, in force, in front of my battery, and on seeing us made a halt. i reserved our fire. in a few minutes the enemy again advanced, when i ordered an -pounder to be fired, which completely cleared the road; shortly after, a second and a third attempt was made by the enemy to come forward, but all were destroyed. they then crossed into an open field and attempted to flank our right; he was met there by three -pounders, the marines under captain miller, and my men, acting as infantry, and again was totally cut up. by this time not a vestige of the american army remained, except a body of five or six hundred, posted on a height on my right, from whom i expected much support from their fine situation."[ ] in this expectation barney was disappointed. the enemy desisted from direct attack and worked gradually round towards his right flank and rear. as they thus moved, the guns of course were turned towards them; but a charge being made up the hill by a force not exceeding half that of its defenders, they also "to my great mortification made no resistance, giving a fire or two, and retired. our ammunition was expended, and unfortunately the drivers of my ammunition wagons had gone off in the general panic." barney himself, being wounded and unable to escape from loss of blood, was left a prisoner. two of his officers were killed, and two wounded. the survivors stuck to him till he ordered them off the ground. ross and cockburn were brought to him, and greeted him with a marked respect and politeness; and he reported that, during the stay of the british in bladensburg, he was treated by all "like a brother," to use his own words.[ ] the character of this affair is sufficiently shown by the above outline narrative, re-enforced by the account of the losses sustained. of the victors sixty-four were killed, one hundred and eighty-five wounded. the defeated, by the estimate of their superintending surgeon, had ten or twelve killed and forty wounded.[ ] such a disparity of injury is usual when the defendants are behind fortifications; but in this case of an open field, and a river to be crossed by the assailants, the evident significance is that the party attacked did not wait to contest the ground, once the enemy had gained the bridge. after that, not only was the rout complete, but, save for barney's tenacity, there was almost no attempt at resistance. ten pieces of cannon remained in the hands of the british. "the rapid flight of the enemy," reported general ross, "and his knowledge of the country, precluded the possibility of many prisoners being taken."[ ] that night the british entered washington. the capitol, white house, and several public buildings were burned by them; the navy yard and vessels by the american authorities. ross, accustomed to european warfare, did not feel drummond's easiness concerning his position, which technically was most insecure as regarded his communications. on the evening of june he withdrew rapidly, and on that of the th regained touch with the fleet in the patuxent, after a separation of only four days. cockburn remarked in his official report that there was no molestation of their retreat; "not a single musket having been fired."[ ] it was the completion of the administration's disgrace, unrelieved by any feature of credit save the gallant stand of barney's four hundred. the burning of washington was the impressive culmination of the devastation to which the coast districts were everywhere exposed by the weakness of the country, while the battle of bladensburg crowned the humiliation entailed upon the nation by the demagogic prejudices in favor of untrained patriotism, as supplying all defects for ordinary service in the field. in the defenders of bladensburg was realized jefferson's ideal of a citizen soldiery,[ ] unskilled, but strong in their love of home, flying to arms to oppose an invader; and they had every inspiring incentive to tenacity, for they, and they only, stood between the enemy and the centre and heart of national life. the position they occupied, though unfortified, had many natural advantages; while the enemy had to cross a river which, while in part fordable, was nevertheless an obstacle to rapid action, especially when confronted by the superior artillery the americans had. the result has been told; but only when contrasted with the contemporary fight at lundy's lane is bladensburg rightly appreciated. occurring precisely a month apart, and with men of the same race, they illustrate exactly the difference in military value between crude material and finished product. coincident with the capture of washington, a little british squadron--two frigates and five smaller vessels--ascended the potomac. fort washington, a dozen miles below the capital, was abandoned august by the officer in charge, removing the only obstacle due to the foresight of the government. he was afterwards cashiered by sentence of court martial. on the th, captain gordon, the senior officer, anchored his force before alexandria, of which he kept possession for three days. upon withdrawing, he carried away all the merchantmen that were seaworthy, having loaded them with merchandise awaiting exportation. energetic efforts were made by captains rodgers, perry, and porter, of the american navy, to molest the enemy's retirement by such means as could be extemporized; but both ships and prizes escaped, the only loss being in life: seven killed and forty-five wounded. after the burning of washington, the british main fleet and army moved up the chesapeake against baltimore, which would undoubtedly have undergone the lot of alexandria, in a contribution laid upon shipping and merchandise. the attack, however, was successfully met. the respite afforded by the expedition against washington had been improved by the citizens to interpose earthworks on the hills before the city. this local precaution saved the place. in the field the militia behaved better than at bladensburg, but showed, nevertheless, the unsteadiness of raw men. to harass the british advance a body of riflemen had been posted well forward, and a shot from these mortally wounded general ross; but, "imagine my chagrin, when i perceived the whole corps falling back upon my main position, having too credulously listened to groundless information that the enemy was landing on back river to cut them off."[ ] the british approached along the narrow strip of land between the patapsco and back rivers. the american general, stricker, had judiciously selected for his line of defence a neck, where inlets from both streams narrowed the ground to half a mile. his flanks were thus protected, but the water on the left giving better indication of being fordable, the british directed there the weight of the assault. to meet this, stricker drew up a regiment to the rear of his main line, and at right angles, the volleys from which should sweep the inlet. when the enemy's attack developed, this regiment "delivered one random fire," and then broke and fled; "totally forgetful of the honor of the brigade, and of its own reputation," to use stricker's words.[ ] this flight carried along part of the left flank proper. the remainder of the line held for a time, and then retired without awaiting the hostile bayonet. the american report gives the impression of an orderly retreat; a british participant, who admits that the ground was well chosen, and that the line held until within twenty yards, wrote that after that he never witnessed a more complete rout. the invaders then approached the city, but upon viewing the works of defence, and learning that the fleet would not be able to co-operate, owing to vessels sunk across the channel, the commanding officer decided that success would not repay the loss necessary to achieve it. fleet and army then withdrew. the attacks on washington and baltimore, the seizure of alexandria, and the general conduct of operations in the chesapeake, belong strictly to the punitive purpose which dictated british measures upon the seaboard. similar action extended through long island sound, and to the eastward, where alarm in all quarters was maintained by the general enterprise of the enemy, and by specific injury in various places. "the government has declared war against the most powerful maritime nation," wrote the governor of massachusetts to the legislature, "and we are disappointed in our expectations of national defence. but though we may be convinced that the war was unnecessary and unjust, and has been prosecuted without any useful or practicable object with the inhabitants of canada, while our seacoast has been left almost defenceless, yet i presume there will be no doubt of our right to defend our possessions against any hostile attack by which their destruction is menaced." "the eastern coast," reports a journal of the time, "is much vexed by the enemy. having destroyed a great portion of the coasting craft, they seem determined to enter the little outports and villages, and burn everything that floats."[ ] on april , six british barges ascended the connecticut river eight miles, to pettipaug, where they burned twenty-odd sea-going vessels.[ ] on june , at wareham, massachusetts, a similar expedition entered and destroyed sixteen.[ ] these were somewhat large instances of an action everywhere going on, inflicting indirectly incalculably more injury than even the direct loss suffered; the whole being with a view to bring the meaning of war close home to the consciousness of the american people. they were to be made to realize the power of the enemy and their own helplessness. an attempt looking to more permanent results was made during the summer upon the coast of maine. the northward projection of that state, then known as the district of maine,[ ] intervened between the british provinces of lower canada and new brunswick, and imposed a long détour upon the line of communications between quebec and halifax, the two most important military posts in british north america. this inconvenience could not be remedied unless the land in question were brought into british possession; and when the end of the war in europe gave prospect of a vigorous offensive from the side of canada, the british ministry formulated the purpose of demanding there a rectification of frontier. the object in this case being acquisition, not punishment, conciliation of the inhabitants was to be practised; in place of the retaliatory action prescribed for the sea-coast elsewhere. moose island, in passamaquoddy bay, though held by the united states, was claimed by great britain to have been always within the boundary line of new brunswick. it was seized july , ; protection being promised to persons and property. in august, general sherbrooke, the governor of nova scotia, received orders "to occupy so much of the district of maine as shall insure an uninterrupted communication between halifax and quebec."[ ] his orders being discretional as to method, he decided that with the force available he would best comply by taking possession of machias and the penobscot river.[ ] on september , a combined naval and army expedition appeared at the mouth of the penobscot, before castine, which was quickly abandoned. a few days before, the united states frigate "adams," captain charles morris, returning from a cruise, had run ashore upon isle au haut, and in consequence of the injuries received had been compelled to make a harbor in the river. she was then at hampden, thirty miles up. a detachment of seamen and soldiers was sent against her. her guns had been landed, and placed in battery for her defence, and militia had gathered for the support necessary to artillery so situated; but they proved unreliable, and upon their retreat nothing was left but to fire the ship.[ ] this was done, the crew escaping. the british penetrated as far as bangor, seized a number of merchant vessels, and subsequently went to machias, where they captured the fort with twenty-five cannon. sherbrooke then returned with the most of his force to halifax, whence he issued a voluminous proclamation[ ] to the effect that he had taken possession of all the country between the penobscot and new brunswick; and promised protection to the inhabitants, if they behaved themselves accordingly. two regiments were left at castine, with transports to remove them in case of attack by superior numbers. this burlesque of occupation, "one foot on shore, and one on sea," was advanced by the british ministry as a reason justifying the demand for cession of the desired territory to the northward. wellington, when called into counsel concerning american affairs, said derisively that an officer might as well claim sovereignty over the ground on which he had posted his pickets. the british force remained undisturbed, however, to the end of the war. amicable relations were established with the inhabitants, and a brisk contraband trade throve with nova scotia. it is even said that the news of peace was unwelcome in the place. it was not evacuated until april , .[ ] footnotes: [ ] "some account of the life of sir george prevost." london, , pp. , . the author has not been able to find the despatch of june , , there quoted. [ ] warren to croker, feb. , . admiralty in-letters mss. [ ] croker to warren, march , . admiralty out-letters. [ ] warren to croker, jan. , . canadian archives mss. [ ] cochrane to bathurst, july , . war office in-letters mss. [ ] bathurst's instructions to the officer in command of the troops detached from the gironde. may , . from copy sent to cochrane. admiralty in-letters, from secretary of state. [ ] gallatin to monroe, london, june , . adams' writings of gallatin, vol. i. p. . [ ] sinclair, erie, may , . captains' letters. [ ] cruikshank's documentary history of the campaign of , p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] cruikshank's documentary history, pp. , . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. pp. , . [ ] cochrane to prevost, july , . canadian archives mss., c. , p. . [ ] report on canadian archives, , p. . [ ] life of sir edward codrington, vol. i. p. . [ ] see map of chesapeake bay, ante, p. . [ ] this account of barney's movements is summarized from his letters, and others, published in niles' register, vol. vi. pp. , , . [ ] report of admiral cochrane, naval chronicle, vol. xxxii. p. . [ ] report of admiral cochrane, naval chronicle, vol. xxxii. p. . [ ] american state papers, military affairs, vol. i. p. . [ ] the finding of the court of inquiry was published in niles' register for feb. , , from the official paper, the national intelligencer. niles, vol. vii. p. . [ ] report of secretary armstrong to a committee of the house of representatives. american state papers, military affairs, vol. i. p. . [ ] ibid., pp. , , . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] works of madison (ed. ), vol. iii. p. . [ ] winder's narrative. american state papers, military affairs, vol. i pp. - . [ ] ross's despatch, aug. , . naval chronicle, vol. xxxii. p. . [ ] narrative of monroe, the secretary of state. american state papers, military affairs, vol. i. p. . [ ] winder's narrative. [ ] barney's report, aug. , . state papers, military affairs, vol. i. p. . [ ] barney's report. [ ] american state papers, military affairs, vol. i. p. . [ ] ross's despatch. [ ] report of rear-admiral cockburn, naval chronicle, vol. xxxii. p. . [ ] ante, p. . [ ] report of brigadier-general stricker of the maryland militia. niles' register, vol. vii. pp. , . [ ] ibid. [ ] niles' register, vol. vi. p. . [ ] ibid., pp. , , . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] maine was then attached politically to massachusetts. [ ] sherbrooke to prevost, aug. , . canadian archives mss., c. , p. . [ ] sherbrooke to prevost, aug. , . ibid., p. . [ ] morris' reports (captains' letters, navy dept.) are published in niles' register, vol. vii. pp. , ; and supplement, p. . [ ] sept. , . niles' register, vol. vii. p. . [ ] ibid., p. , and vol. viii. pp. , . chapter xvii lake champlain and new orleans general brown's retirement within the lines of fort erie, july , , may be taken as marking the definitive abandonment by the united states of the offensive on the canada frontier. the opportunities of two years had been wasted by inefficiency of force and misdirection of effort. it was generally recognized by thoughtful men that the war had now become one of defence against a greatly superior enemy, disembarrassed of the other foe which had hitherto engaged his attention, and imbued with ideas of conquest, or at least of extorting territorial cession for specific purposes. while brown was campaigning, the re-enforcements were rapidly arriving which were to enable the british to assume the aggressive; although, in the absence of naval preponderance on the lakes, their numbers were not sufficient to compel the rectification of frontier by surrender of territory which the british government now desired. lord castlereagh, secretary for foreign affairs, and the leading representative of the aims of the cabinet, wrote in his instructions to the peace commissioners, august , : "the views of the government are strictly defensive. territory as such is by no means their object; but, as the weaker power in north america, great britain considers itself entitled to claim the use of the lakes as a military barrier."[ ] the declaration of war by the united states was regarded by most englishmen as a wanton endeavor to overthrow their immemorial right to the services of their seamen, wherever found; and consequently the invasion of canada had been an iniquitous attempt to effect annexation under cover of an indefensible pretext. to guard against the renewal of such, the lakes must be made british waters, to which the american flag should have only commercial access. dominion south of the lakes would not be exacted, "provided the american government will stipulate not to preserve or construct any fortifications upon or within a limited distance of their shores." "on the side of lower canada there should be such a line of demarcation as may establish a direct communication between quebec and halifax."[ ] such were the political and military projects with which the british ministry entered upon the summer campaign of in canada. luckily, although napoleon had fallen, conditions in europe were still too unsettled and volcanic to permit great britain seriously to weaken her material force there. two weeks later castlereagh wrote to the prime minister: "are we prepared to continue the war for territorial arrangements?" "is it desirable to take the chances of the campaign, and then be governed by circumstances?"[ ] the last sentence defines the policy actually followed; and the chances went definitely against it when macdonough destroyed the british fleet on lake champlain. except at baltimore and new orleans,--mere defensive successes,--nothing but calamity befell the american arms. to the battle of lake champlain it was owing that the british occupancy of united states soil at the end of the year was such that the duke of wellington advised that no claim for territorial cession could be considered to exist, and that the basis of _uti possidetis_, upon which it was proposed to treat, was untenable.[ ] the earnestness of the government, however, in seeking the changes specified, is indicated by the proposition seriously made to the duke to take the command in america. owing to the military conditions hitherto existing on the american continent, the power to take the offensive throughout the lake frontier had rested with the united states government; and the direction given by this to its efforts had left lake champlain practically out of consideration. sir george prevost, being thrown on the defensive, could only conform to the initiative of his adversary. for these reasons, whatever transactions took place in this quarter up to the summer of were in characteristic simply episodes; an epithet which applies accurately to the more formidable, but brief, operations here in , as also to those in louisiana. whatever intention underlay either attempt, they were in matter of fact almost without any relations of antecedent or consequent. they stood by themselves, and not only may, but should, be so considered. prior to them, contemporary reference to lake champlain, or to louisiana, is both rare and casual. for this reason, mention of earlier occurrences in either of these quarters has heretofore been deferred, as irrelevant and intrusive if introduced among other events, with which they coincided in time, but had no further connection. a brief narrative of them will now be presented, as a necessary introduction to the much more important incidents of . at the beginning of hostilities the balance of naval power on lake champlain rested with the united states, and so continued until june, . the force on each side was small to triviality, nor did either make any serious attempt to obtain a marked preponderance. the americans had, however, three armed sloops, the "president," "growler," and "eagle," to which the british could oppose only one. both parties had also a few small gunboats and rowing galleys, in the number of which the superiority lay with the british. under these relative conditions the americans ranged the lake proper at will; the enemy maintaining his force in the lower narrows, at isle aux noix, which was made a fortified station. on june , , a detachment of british boats, coming up the lake, passed the boundary line and fired upon some small american craft. the "eagle" and "growler," being then at plattsburg, started in pursuit on the d, and by dark had entered some distance within the narrows, where they anchored. the following morning they sighted three of the enemy's gunboats and chased them with a fair south wind; but, being by this means led too far, they became entangled in a place where manoeuvring was difficult. the officers of the royal navy designated for service on lake champlain had not yet arrived, and the flotilla was at the disposition of the commanding army officer at isle aux noix. only one sloop being visible at first to the garrison, he sent out against her the three gunboats; but when the second appeared he landed a number of men on each bank, who took up a position to rake the vessels. the action which followed lasted three hours. the circumstances were disadvantageous to the americans; but the fair wind with which they had entered was ahead for return, and to beat back was impossible in so narrow a channel. the "eagle" received a raking shot, and had to be run ashore to avoid sinking. both then surrendered, and the "eagle" was afterwards raised. the two prizes were taken into the british service; and as this occurrence followed immediately after the capture of the "chesapeake" by the "shannon," they were called "broke" and "shannon." these names afterwards were changed, apparently by admiralty order, to "chub" and "finch," under which they took part in the battle of lake champlain, where they were recaptured. although not built for war, but simply purchased vessels of not over one hundred tons, this loss was serious; for by it superiority on the lake passed to the british, and with some fluctuation so remained for a twelvemonth,--till may, . they were still too deficient in men to profit at once by their success; the difficulty of recruiting in canada being as great as in the united states, and for very similar reasons. "it is impossible to enlist seamen in quebec for the lakes, as merchants are giving twenty-five to thirty guineas for the run to england. recruits desert as soon as they receive the bounty."[ ] after some correspondence, captain everard, of the sloop of war "wasp," then lying at quebec, consented to leave his ship, go with a large part of her crew to champlain, man the captured sloops, and raid the american stations on the lake. a body of troops being embarked, the flotilla left isle aux noix july . on the th they came to plattsburg, destroyed there the public buildings, with the barracks at saranac, and brought off a quantity of stores. a detachment was sent to champlain town, and a landing made also at swanton in vermont, where similar devastation was inflicted on public property. thence they went up the lake to burlington, where macdonough, who was alarmingly short of seamen since the capture of the "eagle" and "growler," had to submit to seeing himself defied by vessels lately his own. after seizing a few more small lake craft, everard on august hastened back, anxious to regain his own ship and resume the regular duties, for abandoning which he had no authority save his own. the step he had taken was hardly to be anticipated from a junior officer, commanding a ship on sea service so remote from the scene of the proposed operation; and the rapidity of his action took the americans quite by surprise, for there had been no previous indication of activity. as soon as macdonough heard of his arrival at isle aux noix, he wrote for re-enforcements, but it was too late. his letter did not reach new york till the british had come and gone.[ ] upon everard's return both he and captain pring, of the royal navy, who had been with him during the foray and thenceforth remained attached to the fortunes of the champlain flotilla, recommended the building of a large brig of war and two gunboats, in order to preserve upon the lake the supremacy they had just asserted in act. with the material at hand, they said, these vessels could all be afloat within eight weeks after their keels were laid.[ ] this suggestion appears to have been acted upon; for in the following march it was reported that there were building at st. john's a brig to carry twenty guns, a schooner of eighteen, and twelve -gun galleys. however, the americans also were by this time building, and at the crucial moment came out a very little ahead in point of readiness. nothing further of consequence occurred during . after the british departed, macdonough received a re-enforcement of men. he then went in person with such vessels as he had to the foot of the lake, taking station at plattsburg, and advancing at times to the boundary line, twenty-five miles below. the enemy occasionally showed themselves, but were apparently indisposed to action in their then state of forwardness. later the american flotilla retired up the lake to otter creek in vermont, where, on april , , was launched the ship "saratoga," which carried macdonough's pendant in the battle five months afterwards. on may , pring, hoping to destroy the american vessels before ready for service, made another inroad with his squadron, consisting now of the new brig, called the "linnet," five armed sloops, and thirteen galleys. on the th he was off otter creek and attacked; but batteries established on shore compelled him to retire. macdonough in his report of this transaction mentions only eight galleys, with a bomb vessel, as the number of the enemy engaged. the new brig was probably considered too essential to naval control to be risked against shore guns; a decision scarcely to be contested, although prevost seems to have been dissatisfied as usual with the exertions of the navy. the american force at this time completed, or approaching completion, was, besides the "saratoga," one schooner, three sloops,[ ] and ten gunboats or galleys. of the sloops one only, the "preble," appears to have been serviceable. the "president" and another called the "montgomery" were not in the fight at plattsburg; where macdonough certainly needed every gun he could command. a brig of twenty guns, called the "eagle," was subsequently laid down and launched in time for the action. prevost reported at this period that a new ship was building at isle aux noix, which would make the british force equal to the american. [illustration: captain thomas macdonough. _from the painting by gilbert stuart in the century club, new york, by permission of rodney macdonough, esq._] before the end of may, , macdonough's fleet was ready, except the "eagle"; and on the th he was off plattsburg, with the "saratoga," the schooner "ticonderoga," the sloop "preble," and ten galleys. the command of the lake thus established permitted the transfer of troops and stores, before locked up in burlington. the "saratoga" carried twenty-six guns; of which eight were long -pounders, the others carronades, six -pounders, and twelve 's. she was so much superior to the "linnet," which had only sixteen guns, long -pounders, that the incontestable supremacy remained with the americans, and it was impossible for the british squadron to show itself at all until their new ship was completed. she was launched august ,[ ] and called the "confiance."[ ] the name excited some derision after her defeat and capture, but seems to have had no more arrogant origin than the affectionate recollection of the commander-in-chief on the lakes, sir james yeo, for the vessel which he had first and long commanded, to which he had been promoted for distinguished gallantry in winning her, and in which he finally reached post-rank. the new "confiance," from which doubtless much was hoped, was her namesake. she was to carry twenty-seven -pounders. one of these, being on a pivot, fought on either side of the ship; thus giving her fourteen of these guns for each broadside. in addition, she had ten carronades, four of them -pounders, and six 's. on july , , prevost had reported the arrival at montreal of the first of four brigades from wellington's peninsular army. these had sailed from bordeaux at the same period as the one destined for the atlantic coast operations, under general ross, already related. he acknowledged also the receipt of instructions, prescribing the character of his operations, which he had anxiously requested the year before. among these instructions were "to give immediate protection to his majesty's possessions in america," by "the entire destruction of sackett's harbor, and of the naval establishments on lake erie and lake champlain."[ ] they will be obeyed, he wrote, as soon as the whole force shall have arrived; but defensive measures only will be practicable, until the complete command of lakes ontario and champlain shall be obtained, which cannot be expected before september.[ ] the statement was perfectly correct. the command of these lakes was absolutely essential to both parties to the war, if intending to maintain operations in their neighborhood. on august , prevost reported home that the troops from bordeaux had all arrived, and, with the exception of a brigade destined for kingston, would be at their points of formation by the th; at which date his returns show that he had under his general command, in upper and lower canada, exclusive of officers, twenty-nine thousand four hundred and thirty-seven men. all these were british regulars, with the exception of four thousand seven hundred and six; of which last, two thousand two hundred belonged to "foreign" regiments, and the remainder to provincial corps. of this total, from eleven thousand to fourteen thousand accompanied him in his march to plattsburg. under the same date he reported that the "confiance" could not be ready before september ; for which time had he patiently waited, he would at least have better deserved success. his decision as to his line of advance was determined by a singular consideration, deeply mortifying to american recollection, but which must be mentioned because of its historical interest, as an incidental indication of the slow progress of the people of the united states towards national sentiment. "vermont has shown a disinclination to the war, and, as it is sending in specie and provisions, i will confine offensive operations to the west side of lake champlain."[ ] three weeks later he writes again, "two thirds of the army are supplied with beef by american contractors, principally of vermont and new york."[ ] that this was no slander was indignantly confirmed by a citizen of vermont, who wrote to general izard, june , "droves of cattle are continually passing from the northern parts of this state into canada for the british." izard, in forwarding the letter, said: "this confirms a fact not only disgraceful to our countrymen but seriously detrimental to the public interest. from the st. lawrence to the ocean an open disregard prevails for the laws prohibiting intercourse with the enemy. the road to st. regis [new york] is covered with droves of cattle, and the river with rafts destined for the enemy. on the eastern side of lake champlain the high roads are insufficient for the cattle pouring into canada. like herds of buffaloes they press through the forests, making paths for themselves. were it not for these supplies, the british forces in canada would soon be suffering from famine."[ ] the british commissary at prescott wrote, june , , "i have contracted with a yankee magistrate to furnish this post with fresh beef. a major came with him to make the agreement; but, as he was foreman of the grand jury of the court in which the government prosecutes the magistrates for high treason and smuggling, he turned his back and would not see the paper signed."[ ] more vital still in its treason to the interests of the country, commodore macdonough reported officially, june , that one of his officers had seized two spars, supposed from their size to be for the fore and mizzen masts of the "confiance," on the way to canada, near the lines, under the management of citizens of the united states; and eight days later there were intercepted four others, which from their dimensions were fitted for her mainmast and three topmasts.[ ] by this means the british ship was to be enabled to sail for the attack on the american fleet, and by this only; for to drag spars of that weight up the rapids of the richelieu, or over the rough intervening country, meant at least unendurable delay. "the turpitude of many of our citizens in this part of the country," wrote macdonough, "furnishes the enemy with every information he wants."[ ] on august , four days after prevost's divisions were expected to be assembled at their designated rendezvous, izard, in the face of the storm gathering before him, started with his four thousand men from plattsburg for sackett's harbor, in obedience to the intimation of the war department, which he accepted as orders. brigadier-general macomb was left to hold the works about plattsburg with a force which he stated did not exceed fifteen hundred effectives.[ ] his own brigade having been broken up to strengthen izard's division, none of this force was organized, except four companies of one regiment. the remainder were convalescents, or recruits of new regiments; soldiers as yet only in name, and without the constituted regimental framework, incorporation into which so much facilitates the transition from the recruit to the veteran. on september seven hundred militia from the neighborhood joined, in response to a call from macomb; and before the final action of the th other militia from new york, and volunteers from vermont, across the lake, kept pouring in from all quarters, in encouraging contrast to their fellow citizens who were making money by abetting the enemy. prevost's army, which had been assembled along the frontier of lower canada, from the richelieu river to the st. lawrence, began its forward march august ; the leading brigade entering the state of new york, and encamping that night at champlain town, a short distance south of the boundary. by september the whole body had reached to the village of chazy, twenty-five miles from plattsburg. thus far, to the mouth of the little chazy river, where the supplies of the army were to be landed, no opposition was experienced. the american squadron waiting on the defensive at plattsburg, the left flank of the british received constant support from their flotilla of gunboats and galleys under the command of captain pring, who seized also the american island la motte, in the narrows of the lake, abreast the little chazy. the following day, september , delays began to be met through the trees felled and bridges broken by macomb's orders. on the th there was some skirmishing between the advanced guards; but the american militia "could not be prevailed on to stand, notwithstanding the exertions of their officers, although the fields were divided by strong stone walls, and they were told that the enemy could not possibly cut them off."[ ] deprived of this support, the small body of regulars could do little, and the british peninsulars pushed on contemptuously, and almost silently. "they never deployed in their whole march," reported macomb, "always pressing on in column." that evening they entered plattsburg. macomb retreated across the saranac, which divided the town. he removed from the bridges their planking, which was used to form breastworks to dispute any attempt to force a passage, and then retired to the works previously prepared by izard. these were on the bluffs on the south side of the saranac, overlooking the bay, and covering the peninsula embraced between the lake and the river. from the th to the th, the day of the battle, the british were employed in preparations for battering the forts, preliminary to an assault, and there was constant skirmishing at the bridges and fords. macomb utilized the same time to strengthen his works, aided by the numbers of militia continually arriving, who labored night and day with great spirit. prevost's purposes and actions were dominated by the urgency of haste, owing to the lateness of the season; and this motive co-operated with a certain captiousness of temper to precipitate him now into a grave error of judgment and of conduct. at plattsburg he found the small american army intrenched behind a fordable river, the bridges of which had been made useless; and in the bay lay the american squadron, anchored with a view to defence. the two were not strictly in co-operation, in their present position. tactically, they for the moment contributed little to each other's support; for the reason that the position chosen judiciously by macdonough for the defence of the bay was too far from the works of the army to receive--or to give--assistance with the guns of that day. the squadron was a little over a mile from the army. it could not remain there, if the british got possession of the works, for it would be within range of injury at long shot; but in an engagement between the hostile fleets the bluffs could have no share, no matter which party held them, for the fire would be as dangerous to friend as to foe. the question of probability, that the american squadron was within long gunshot of the shore batteries, is crucial, for upon it would depend the ultimate military judgment upon the management of sir george prevost. that he felt this is evident by letters addressed on his behalf to macdonough; by a.w. cochran, a lawyer of quebec, to whom prevost, after his recall to england for trial, left the charge of collecting testimony, and by cadwalader colden of new york.[ ] both inquire specifically as to this distance, colden particularizing that "it would be all important to learn that the american squadron were during the engagement beyond the effectual range of the batteries." to colden, macdonough replied guardedly, "it is my opinion that our squadron was anchored one mile and a half from the batteries." the answer to cochran has not been found; but on the back of the letter from him the commodore sketched his recollection of the situation, which is here reproduced. without insisting unduly on the precision of such a piece, it seems clear that he thought his squadron but little more than half way towards the other side of the bay. cumberland head being by survey two miles from the batteries, it would follow that the vessels were a little over a mile from them. this inference is adopted as more dependable than the estimate, "a mile and a half." such eye reckoning is notoriously uncertain; and this seemingly was made by recollection, not contemporaneously.[ ] the - and -pounder long gun of that day ranged a sea mile and a half, with an elevation of less than fifteen degrees.[ ] they could therefore annoy a squadron at or within that distance. the question is not of best fighting range. it is whether a number of light built and light draught vessels could hold their ground under such a cannonade, knowing that a hostile squadron awaited them without. even at such random range, a disabling shot in hull or spars must be expected. at whatever risk, departure is enforced. [illustration: tracing from pencil sketch of battle of l. champlain, made by com. macdonough on back of a letter of inquiry, addressed to him within a year of the action. the names are not in the sketch; but with the letters, express the author's understanding of the commodore's meaning.] to a similar letter from colden, general macomb replied that he did not think the squadron within range. there is also a statement in niles' register[ ] that several british officers visited macomb at plattsburg, and at their request experiments were made, presumably trial shots, to ascertain whether the guns of the forts could have annoyed the american squadron. it was found they could not. macomb's opinion may have rested upon this, and the conclusion may be just; but it is open to remark that, as the squadron was not then there, its assumed position depended upon memory,--like macdonough's sketch. macomb said further, that "a fruitless attempt was made during the action to elevate the guns so as to bear on the enemy; but none were fired, all being convinced that the vessels were beyond their reach." the worth of this conviction is shown by the next remark, which he repeated under date of august , .[ ] "this opinion was strengthened by observations on the actual range of the guns of the 'confiance'--her heaviest metal [ -pounders] falling upwards of five hundred yards short of the shore." the "confiance" was five hundred yards further off than the american squadron, and to reach it her guns would be elevated for that distance only. because under such condition they dropped their shot five hundred yards short of three thousand five hundred yards, it is scarcely legitimate to infer that guns elevated for three thousand could not carry so far. the arguments having been stated, it is to be remarked that, whatever the truth, it is knowledge after the fact as far as prevost was concerned. in his report dated september , , the day of the action, he speaks of the difficulties which had been before him; among them "blockhouses armed with _heavy_ ordnance." this he then believed; and whether this ordnance could reach the squadron he could only know by trying. it was urgently proper, in view of his large land force, and of the expectations of his government, which had made such great exertions for an attainable and important object, that he should storm the works and try. after a careful estimate of the strength of the two squadrons, i think that a seaman would certainly say that in the open the british was superior; but decidedly inferior for an attack upon the american at anchor. this was the opinion of the surviving british officers, under oath, and of downie. general izard, who had been in command at plattsburg up to a fortnight before the attack, wrote afterwards to the secretary of war, "i may venture to assert that without the works, fort moreau and its dependencies, captain macdonough would not have ventured to await the enemy's attack in plattsburg bay, but would have retired to the upper part of lake champlain."[ ] the whole campaign turning upon naval control, the situation was eminently one that called upon the army to drive the enemy from his anchorage. the judgment of the author endorses the words of sir james yeo: "there was not the least necessity for our squadron giving the enemy such decided advantages by going into their bay to engage them. even had they been successful, it could not in the least have assisted the troops in storming the batteries; whereas, had our troops taken their batteries first, it would have obliged the enemy's squadron to quit the bay and given ours a fair chance."[ ] at the court martial two witnesses, lieutenant drew of the "linnet," and brydone, master of the "confiance," swore that after the action macdonough removed his squadron to crab island, out of range of the batteries. macdonough in his report does not mention this; nor was it necessary that he should. in short, though apparently so near, the two fractions of the american force, the army and the navy, were actually in the dangerous military condition of being exposed to be beaten in detail; and the destruction of either would probably be fatal to the other. the largest two british vessels, "confiance" and "linnet," were slightly inferior to the american "saratoga" and "eagle" in aggregate weight of broadside; but, like the "general pike" on ontario in , the superiority of the "confiance" in long guns, and under one captain, would on the open lake have made her practically equal to cope with the whole american squadron, and still more with the "saratoga" alone, assuming that the "linnet" gave the "eagle" some occupation. it would seem clear, therefore, that the true combination for the british general would have been to use his military superiority, vast in quality as in numbers, to reduce the works and garrison at plattsburg. that accomplished, the squadron would be driven to the open lake, where the "confiance" could bring into play her real superiority, instead of being compelled to sacrifice it by attacking vessels in a carefully chosen position, ranged with a seaman's eye for defence, and prepared with a seaman's foresight for every contingency. prevost, however, became possessed with the idea that a joint attack was indispensable,[ ] and in communicating his purpose to the commander of the squadron, captain downie, he used language indefensible in itself, tending to goad a sensitive man into action contrary to his better judgment; and he clenched this injudicious proceeding with words which certainly implied an assurance of assault by the army on the works, simultaneous with that of the navy on the squadron. captain downie had taken command of the champlain fleet only on september . he was next in rank to yeo on the lakes, a circumstance that warranted his orders; the immediate reason for which, however, as explained by yeo to the admiralty, was that his predecessor's temper had shown him unfit for chief command. he had quarrelled with pring, and yeo felt the change essential. downie, upon arrival, found the "confiance" in a very incomplete state, for which he at least was in no wise responsible. he had brought with him a first lieutenant in whom he had merited confidence, and the two worked diligently to get her into shape. the crew had been assembled hurriedly by draughts from several ships at quebec, from the th regiment, and from the marine artillery. the last detachment came on board the night but one before the battle. they thus were unknown by face to their officers, and largely to one another. launched august , the ship hauled from the wharf into the stream september , and the same day started for the front, being towed by boats against a head wind and downward current. behind her dragged a batteau carrying her powder, while her magazine was being finished. the next day a similar painful advance was made, and the crew then were stationed at the guns, while the mechanics labored at their fittings. that night she anchored off chazy, where the whole squadron was now gathered. the th was spent at anchor, exercising the guns; the mechanics still at work. in fact, the hammering and driving continued until two hours before the ship came under fire, when the last gang shoved off, leaving her still unfinished. "this day"--the th--wrote the first lieutenant, robertson, "employed setting-up rigging, scraping decks, manning and arranging the gunboats. exercised at great guns. artificers employed fitting beds, coins, belaying pins, etc;"[ ]--essentials for fighting the guns and working the sails. it scarcely needs the habit of a naval seaman to recognize that even three or four days' grace for preparation would immensely increase efficiency. nevertheless, such was the pressure from without that the order was given for the squadron to go into action next day; and this was prevented only by a strong head wind, against which there was not channel space to beat. as long as prevost was contending with the difficulties of his own advance he seems not to have worried downie; but as soon as fairly before the works of plattsburg he initiated a correspondence, which on his part became increasingly peremptory. it will be remembered that he not only was much the senior in rank,--as in years,--but also governor-general of canada. nor should it be forgotten that he had known and written a month before that the "confiance" could not be ready before september . he knew, as his subsequent action showed, that if the british fleet were disabled his own progress was hopeless; and, if he could not understand that to a ship so lately afloat a day was worth a week of ordinary conditions, he should at least have realized that the naval captain could judge better than he when she was ready for battle. on september he wrote to urge downie, who replied the same day with assurances of every exertion to hasten matters. the th he sent information of macdonough's arrangements by an aid, who carried also a letter saying that "it is of the highest importance that the ships, vessels, and gunboats, under your command, should combine a co-operation with the division of the army under my command. i only wait for your arrival to proceed against general macomb's last position on the south bank of the saranac." on the th he wrote, "in consequence of your communication of yesterday i have postponed action until your squadron is prepared to co-operate. i need not dwell with you on the evils resulting to both services from delay." he inclosed reports received from deserters that the american fleet was insufficiently manned; and that when the "eagle" arrived, a few days before, they had swept the guard houses of prisoners to complete her crew. a postscript conveyed a scarcely veiled intimation that an eye was kept on his proceedings. "captain watson of the provincial cavalry is directed to remain at little chazy until you are preparing to get underway, when he is instructed to return to this place with the intelligence."[ ] thus pressed, downie, as has been said, gave orders to sail at midnight, with the expectation of rounding into plattsburg bay about dawn, and proceeding to an immediate attack. this purpose was communicated formally to prevost. the preventing cause, the head wind, was obvious enough, and spoke for itself; but the check drew from prevost words which stung downie to the quick. "in consequence of your letter the troops have been held in readiness, since six o'clock this morning, to storm the enemy's works at nearly the same moment as the naval action begins in the bay. i ascribe the disappointment i have experienced to the unfortunate change of wind, and shall rejoice to learn that my reasonable expectations have been frustrated by no other cause." the letter was sent by the aid, major coore, who had carried the others; and both he and pring, who were present, testified to the effect upon downie. coore, in a vindication of prevost, wrote, "after perusing it, captain downie said with some warmth, 'i am surprised sir george prevost should think necessary to urge me upon this subject. he must feel i am as desirous of proceeding to active operations as he can be; but i am responsible for the squadron, and no man shall make me lead it into action before i consider it in fit condition.'"[ ] nevertheless, the effect was produced; for he remarked afterward to pring, "this letter does not deserve an answer, but i will convince him that the naval force will not be backward in their share of the attack."[ ] it was arranged that the approach of the squadron should be signalled by scaling the guns,--firing cartridges without shot; and downie certainty understood, and informed his officers generally, that the army would assault in co-operation with the attack of the fleet. the precise nature of his expectation was clearly conveyed to pring, who had represented the gravity of this undertaking. "when the batteries are stormed and taken possession of by the british land forces, which the commander of the land forces has promised to do at the moment the naval action commences, the enemy will be obliged to quit their position, whereby we shall obtain decided advantage over them during their confusion. i would otherwise prefer fighting them on the lake, and would wait until our force is in an efficient state; but i fear they would take shelter up the lake and would not meet me on equal terms."[ ] the following morning, september , the wind being fair from northeast, the british fleet weighed before daylight and stood up the narrows for the open lake and plattsburg bay. about five o'clock the agreed signal was given by scaling the guns, the reports of which it was presumed must certainly be heard by the army at the then distance of six or seven miles, with the favorable air blowing. at . , near cumberland head, the squadron hove-to, and captain downie went ahead in a boat to reconnoitre the american position. for defence against the hostile squadron, macdonough had had to rely solely on his own force, and its wise disposition by him. on shore, a defensive position is determined by the circumstances of the ground selected, improved by fortification; all which gives strength additional to the number of men. a sailing squadron anchored for defence similarly gained force by adapting its formation to the circumstances of the anchorage, and to known wind conditions, with careful preparations to turn the guns in any direction; deliberate precautions, not possible to the same extent to the assailant anchoring under fire. to this is to be added the release of the crew from working sails to manning the guns. plattsburg bay, in which the united states squadron was anchored, is two miles wide, and two long. it lies north and south, open to the southward. its eastern boundary is called cumberland head. the british vessels, starting from below, in a channel too narrow to beat, must come up with a north wind. to insure that this should be ahead, or bring them close on the wind, after rounding the head,--a condition unfavorable for attack,--macdonough fixed the head of his line as far north as was safe; having in mind that the enemy might bring guns to the shore north of the saranac. his order thence extended southward, abreast of the american works, and somewhat nearer the cumberland than the plattsburg side. the wind conditions further made it expedient to put the strongest vessels to the northward,--to windward,--whence they would best be able to manoeuvre as circumstances might require. the order from north to south therefore was: the brig "eagle," twenty guns; the ship "saratoga," twenty-six; the "ticonderoga" schooner, seven, and the sloop "preble," seven. macdonough's dispositions being perfectly under observation, captain downie framed his plan accordingly.[ ] the "confiance" should engage the "saratoga;" but, before doing so, would pass along the "eagle," from north to south, give her a broadside, and then anchor head and stern across the bows of the "saratoga." after this, the "linnet," supported by the "chub," would become the opponent of the "eagle," reduced more nearly to equality by the punishment already received. three british vessels would thus grapple the two strongest enemies. the "finch" was to attack the american rear, supported by all the british gunboats--eleven in number. there were american gunboats, or galleys, as well, which macdonough distributed in groups, inshore of his order; but, as was almost invariably the case, these light vessels exerted no influence on the result. this being the plan, when the wind came northeast on the morning of september , the british stood up the lake in column, as follows: "finch," "confiance," "linnet," "chub." thus, when they rounded cumberland head, and simultaneously changed course towards the american line, they would be properly disposed to reach the several places assigned. as the vessels came round the head, to downie's dismay no co-operation by the army was visible. he was fairly committed to his movement, however, and could only persist. as the initial act was to be the attack upon the "eagle" by the "confiance," she led in advance of her consorts, which caused a concentration of the hostile guns upon her; the result being that she was unable to carry out her part. the wind also failed, and she eventually anchored five hundred yards from the american line. her first broadside is said to have struck down forty, or one fifth of the "saratoga's" crew. as in the case of the "chesapeake," this shows men of naval training, accustomed to guns; but, as with the "chesapeake," lack of organization, of the habit of working together, officers and men, was to tell ere the end. fifteen minutes after the action began captain downie was killed, leaving in command lieutenant robertson. [illustration: battle of lake champlain] the "linnet" reached her berth and engaged the "eagle" closely; but the "chub," which was to support her, received much damage to her sails and rigging, and the lieutenant in charge was nervously prostrated by a not very severe wound. instead of anchoring, she was permitted to drift helplessly, and so passed through the american order, where she hauled down her colors. though thus disappointed of the assistance intended for her, the "linnet" continued to fight manfully and successfully, her opponent finally quitting the line; a result to which the forward battery of the "confiance" in large measure contributed.[ ] the "finch," by an error of judgment on the part of her commander, did not keep near enough to the wind. she therefore failed to reach her position, near the "ticonderoga;" and the breeze afterwards falling, she could not retrieve her error. ultimately, she went ashore on crab island, a mile to the southward. this remoteness enabled her to keep her flag flying till her consorts had surrendered; but the credit of being last to strike belongs really to the "linnet," captain pring. by the failure of the "finch," the "ticonderoga" underwent no attack except by the british gunboats. whatever might possibly have come of this was frustrated by the misbehavior of most of them. four fought with great gallantry and persistence, eliciting much admiration from their opponents; but the remainder kept at distance, the commander of the whole actually running away, and absconding afterwards to avoid trial. the "ticonderoga" maintained her position to the end; but the weak "preble" was forced from her anchors, and ran ashore under the plattsburg batteries. the fight thus resolved itself into a contest between the "saratoga" and "eagle," on one side, the "confiance" and "linnet" on the other. the wind being north-northeast, the ships at their anchors headed so that the forward third of the "confiance's" battery bore upon the "eagle," and only the remaining two thirds upon the "saratoga." this much equalized conditions all round. it was nine o'clock when she anchored. at . the "eagle," having many of her guns on the engaged side disabled, cut her cable, ran down the line, and placed herself south of the "saratoga," anchoring by the stern. this had the effect of turning towards the enemy her other side, the guns of which were still uninjured. "in this new position," wrote lieutenant robertson, "she kept up a destructive fire on the "confiance," without being exposed to a shot from that ship or the "linnet." on the other hand, macdonough found the "saratoga" suffer from the "linnet," now relieved of her immediate opponent."[ ] by this time the fire of both the "saratoga" and "confiance" had materially slackened, owing to the havoc among guns and men. nearly the whole battery on the starboard side of the united states ship was dismounted, or otherwise unserviceable. the only resource was to bring the uninjured side towards the enemy, as the "eagle" had just done; but to use the same method, getting under way, would be to abandon the fight, for there was not astern another position of usefulness for the "saratoga." there was nothing for it but to "wind"[ ] the ship--turn her round where she was. then appeared the advantage attendant upon the defensive, if deliberately utilized. the "confiance" standing in had had shot away, one after another, the anchors and ropes upon which she depended for such a manoeuvre.[ ] the "saratoga's" resources were unimpaired. a stern anchor was let go, the bow cable cut, and the ship winded, either by force of the wind, or by the use of "springs"[ ] before prepared, presenting to the "confiance" her uninjured broadside--for fighting purposes a new vessel. the british ship, having now but four guns that could be used on the side engaged,[ ] must do the like, or be hopelessly overmatched. the stern anchor prepared having been shot away, an effort was made to swing her by a new spring on the bow cable; but while this slow process was carrying on, and the ship so far turned as to be at right angles with the american line, a raking shot entered, killing and wounding several of the crew. then, reported lieutenant robertson, the surviving officer in command, "the ship's company declared they would stand no longer to their quarters, nor could the officers with their utmost exertions rally them." the vessel was in a sinking condition, kept afloat by giving her a marked heel to starboard, by running in the guns on the port side, so as to bring the shot holes out of water.[ ] the wounded on the deck below had to be continually moved, lest they should be drowned where they lay. she drew but eight and a half feet of water. her colors were struck at about a.m.; the "linnet's" fifteen minutes later. by macdonough's report, the action had lasted two hours and twenty minutes, without intermission. [illustration: the battle of lake champlain. _drawn by henry reuterdahl._] few combats have been more resolutely contested. the "saratoga" had fifty-five round shot in her hull; the "confiance," one hundred and five.[ ] of the american crew of two hundred and ten men, twenty-eight were killed and twenty-nine wounded. the british loss is not known exactly. robertson reported that there were thirty-eight bodies sent ashore for interment, besides those thrown overboard in action. this points to a loss of about fifty killed, and james states the wounded at about sixty; the total was certainly more than one hundred in a ship's company of two hundred and seventy. there was reason for obstinacy, additional to the natural resolution of the parties engaged. the battle of lake champlain, more nearly than any other incident of the war of , merits the epithet "decisive." the moment the issue was known, prevost retreated into canada; entirely properly, as indicated by the duke of wellington's words before and after. his previous conduct was open to censure, for he had used towards captain downie urgency of pressure which induced that officer to engage prematurely; "goaded" into action, as yeo wrote. before the usual naval court martial, the officers sworn testified that downie had been led to expect co-operation, which in their judgment would have reversed the issue; but that no proper assault was made. charges were preferred, and prevost was summoned home; but he died before trial. there remains therefore no sworn testimony on his side, nor was there any adequate cross-examination of the naval witnesses. in the judgment of the writer, it was incumbent upon prevost to assault the works when downie was known to be approaching, with a fair wind, in the hope of driving the american squadron from its anchors to the open lake, where the real superiority of the british could assert itself.[ ] castlereagh's "chances of the campaign" had gone so decidedly against the british that no ground was left to claim territorial adjustments. to effect these the war must be continued; and for this great britain was not prepared, nor could she afford the necessary detachment of force. in the completeness of napoleon's downfall, we now are prone to forget that remaining political conditions in europe still required all the great powers to keep their arms at hand. * * * * * the war was practically ended by prevost's retreat. what remained was purely episodical in character, and should be so regarded. nevertheless, although without effect upon the issue, and indeed in great part transacted after peace had been actually signed, it is so directly consecutive with the war as to require united treatment. very soon after reaching bermuda, vice-admiral cochrane, in pursuance of the "confidential communications with which he was charged," the character of which, he intimated to warren,[ ] was a reason for expediting the transfer of the command, despatched the frigate "orpheus" to the appalachicola river to negotiate with the creek and other indians. the object was to rouse and arm "our indian allies in the southern states," and to arrange with them a system of training by british officers, and a general plan of action; by which, "supporting the indian tribes situated on the confines of florida, and in the back parts of georgia, it would be easy to reduce new orleans, and to distress the enemy very seriously in the neighboring provinces."[ ] the "orpheus" arrived at the mouth of the appalachicola may , , and on the th her captain, pigot, had an interview with the principal creek chiefs. he found[ ] that the feeling of their people was very strong against the americans; and from the best attainable information he estimated that twenty-eight hundred warriors were ready to take up arms with the british. there were said to be as many more choctaws thus disposed; and perhaps a thousand other indians, then dispersed and unarmed, could be collected. the negroes of georgia would probably also come over in crowds, once the movement started. with a suitable number of british subalterns and drill sergeants, the savages could be fitted to act in concert with british troops in eight or ten weeks; for they were already familiar with the use of fire-arms, and were moreover good horsemen. the season of the year being still so early, there was ample time for the necessary training. with these preparations, and adequate supplies of arms and military stores, pigot thought that a handful of british troops, co-operating with the creeks and choctaws, could get possession of baton rouge, from which new orleans and the lower mississippi would be an easy conquest. between pensacola, still in the possession of spain, and new orleans, mobile was the only post held by the united states. in its fort were two hundred troops, and in those up country not more than seven hundred. when transmitting this letter, which, with his own of june , was received at the admiralty august , cochrane endorsed most of pigot's recommendations. he gave as his own estimate, that to drive the americans entirely out of louisiana and the floridas would require not more than three thousand british troops; to be landed at mobile, where they would be joined by all the indians and the disaffected french and spaniards.[ ] in this calculation reappears the perennial error of relying upon disaffected inhabitants, as well as savages. disaffection must be supported by intolerable conditions, before inhabitants will stake all; not merely the chance of life, but the certainty of losing property, if unsuccessful. cochrane took the further practical step of sending at once such arms and ammunition as the fleet could spare, together with four officers and one hundred and eight non-commissioned officers and privates of the marine corps, to train the indians. these were all under the command of major nicholls, who for this service was given the local rank of colonel. the whole were despatched july , in the naval vessels "hermes" and "carron," for the appalachicola. the admiral, while contemplating evidently a progress towards baton rouge, looked also to coastwise operations; for he asked the government to furnish him vessels of light draught, to carry heavy guns into lake ponchartrain, and to navigate the shoal water between it and mobile, now called mississippi sound. the admiralty in reply[ ] reminded cochrane of the former purpose of the government to direct operations against new orleans, with a very large force under lord hill, wellington's second in the peninsular war. circumstances had made it inexpedient to send so many troops from europe at this moment; but, in view of the admiral's recommendation, general ross would be directed to co-operate in the intended movement at the proper season, and his corps would be raised to six thousand men, independent of such help in seamen and marines as the fleet might afford. the re-enforcements would be sent to negril bay, at the west end of jamaica, which was made the general rendezvous; and there cochrane and ross were directed to join not later than november . the purpose of the government in attempting the enterprise was stated to be twofold. "first, to obtain command of the embouchure of the mississippi, so as to deprive the back settlements of america of their communication with the sea; and, secondly, to occupy some important and valuable possession, by the restoration of which the conditions of peace might be improved, or which we might be entitled to exact the cession of, as the price of peace." entire discretion was left with the two commanders as to the method of proceeding, whether directly against new orleans, by water, or to its rear, by land, through the country of the creeks; and they were at liberty to abandon the undertaking in favor of some other, should that course seem more suitable. when news of the capture of washington was received, two thousand additional troops were sent to bermuda, under the impression that the general might desire to push his success on the atlantic coast. these ultimately joined the expedition two days before the attack on jackson's lines. upon the death of general ross, sir edward pakenham was ordered to replace him; but he did not arrive until after the landing, and had therefore no voice in determining the general line of operations adopted. these were the military instructions. to them were added certain others, political in character, dictated mainly by the disturbed state of europe, and with an eye to appease the jealousies existing among the powers, which extended to american conditions, colonial and commercial. while united against napoleon, they viewed with distrust the aggrandizement of great britain. ross was ordered, therefore, to discountenance any overture of the inhabitants to place themselves under british dominion; but should he find a general and decided disposition to withdraw from their recent connection with the united states, with the view of establishing themselves as an independent people, or of returning under the dominion of spain, from which they then had been separated less than twenty years, he was to give them every support in his power. he must make them clearly understand, however, that in the peace with the united states neither independence nor restoration to spain could be made a _sine quâ non_;[ ] there being about that a finality, of which the government had already been warned in the then current negotiations with the american commissioners. these instructions to ross were communicated to lord castlereagh at vienna, to use as might be expedient in the discussions of the conference. no serious attempt was made in the direction of baton rouge, through the back countries of georgia and florida; nor does there appear any result of consequence from the mission of colonel nicholls. on september the "hermes" and "carron," supported by two brigs of war, made an attack upon fort bowyer, a work of logs and sand commanding the entrance to mobile bay. after a severe cannonade, lasting between two and three hours, they were repulsed; and the "hermes," running aground, was set on fire by her captain to prevent her falling into the hands of the enemy. mobile was thus preserved from becoming the starting point of the expedition, as suggested by cochrane; and that this object underlay the attempt may be inferred from the finding of the court martial upon captain percy of the "hermes," which decided that the attack was perfectly justified by the circumstances stated at the trial.[ ] in october, , by executive proclamation of president madison, the united states had taken possession of the region between louisiana and the river perdido,[ ] being the greater part of what was then known as west florida. the spanish troops occupying mobile, however, were not then disturbed;[ ] nor was there a military occupation, except of one almost uninhabited spot near bay st. louis.[ ] this intervention was justified on the ground of a claim to the territory, asserted to be valid; and occasion for it was found in the danger of a foreign interference, resulting from the subversion of spanish authority by a revolutionary movement. by great britain it was regarded as a usurpation, to effect which advantage had been taken of the embarrassment of the spaniards when struggling against napoleon for national existence. on may , , being then on the verge of war with great britain, the ally of spain, an act of congress declared the whole country annexed, and extended over it the jurisdiction of the united states. mobile was occupied april , . pensacola, east of the perdido, but close to it, remained in the hands of spain, and was used as a base of operations by the british fleet, both before and after the attack of the "hermes" and her consorts upon fort bowyer. from there nicholls announced that he had arrived in the floridas for the purpose of annoying "the only enemy great britain has in the world"[ ]; and captain percy thence invited the pirates of barataria to join the british cause. cochrane also informed the admiralty that for quicker communication, while operating in the gulf, he intended to establish a system of couriers through florida, between amelia island and pensacola, both under spanish jurisdiction.[ ] on the score of neutrality, therefore, fault can scarcely be found with general jackson for assaulting the latter, which surrendered to him november . the british vessels departed, and the works were blown up; after which the place was restored to the spaniards. in acknowledging the admiralty's letter of august , cochrane said that the diminution of numbers from those intended for lord hill would not affect his plans; that, unless the united states had sent very great re-enforcements to louisiana, the troops now to be employed were perfectly adequate, even without the marines. these he intended to send under rear-admiral cockburn, to effect a diversion by occupying cumberland island, off the south coast of georgia, about november , whence the operations would be extended to the mainland. it was hoped this would draw to the coast the american force employed against the indians, and so favor the movements in louisiana.[ ] while not expressly stated, the inference seems probable that cochrane still--october --expected to land at mobile. for some reason cockburn's attack on cumberland island did not occur until january , when the new orleans business was already concluded; so that, although successful, and prosecuted further to the seacoast, it had no influence upon the general issues. cochrane, with the division from the atlantic coast, joined the re-enforcements from england in negril bay, and thence proceeded to mississippi sound; anchoring off ship island, december . on the d general jackson had arrived in new orleans, whither had been ordered a large part of the troops heretofore acting against the creeks. the british commanders had now determined definitely to attack the city from the side of the sea. as there could be little hope for vessels dependent upon sails to pass the forts on the lower mississippi, against the strong current, as was done by farragut's steamers fifty years later, it was decided to reach the river far above those works, passing the army through some of the numerous bayous which intersect the swampy delta to the eastward. from ship island this desired approach could be made through lake borgne. for the defence of these waters there were stationed five american gunboats and two or three smaller craft, the whole under command of lieutenant thomas ap catesby jones. as even the lighter british ships of war could not here navigate, on account of the shoalness, and the troops, to reach the place of debarkation, the bayou des pêcheurs, at the head of lake borgne, must go sixty miles in open boats, the hostile gun vessels had first to be disposed of. jones, who from an advanced position had been watching the enemy's proceedings in mississippi sound, decided december that their numbers had so increased as to make remaining hazardous. he therefore retired, both to secure his retreat and to cause the boats of the fleet a longer and more harassing pull to overtake him. the movement was none too soon, for that night the british barges and armed boats left the fleet in pursuit. jones was not able to get as far as he wished, on account of failure of wind; but nevertheless on the th the enemy did not come up with him. during the night he made an attempt at further withdrawal; but calm continuing, and a strong ebb-tide running, he was compelled again to anchor at a.m. of the th, and prepared for battle. his five gunboats, with one light schooner, were ranged in line across the channel way, taking the usual precautions of springs on their cables and boarding nettings triced up. unluckily for the solidity of his order, the current set two of the gunboats, one being his own, some distance to the eastward,--in advance of the others. at daylight the british flotilla was seen nine miles distant, at anchor. by jones' count it comprised forty-two launches and three light gigs.[ ] they soon after weighed and pulled towards the gunboats. at ten, being within long gunshot, they again anchored for breakfast; after which they once more took to the oars. an hour later they closed with their opponents. the british commander, captain lockyer, threw his own boat, together with a half-dozen others, upon jones' vessel, "number ,"[ ] and carried her after a sharp struggle of about twenty minutes, during which both lockyer and jones were severely wounded. her guns were then turned against her late comrades, in support of the british boarders, and at the end of another half-hour, at . p.m., the last of them surrendered. that this affair was very gallantly contested on both sides is sufficiently shown by the extent of the british loss--seventeen killed and seventy-seven wounded.[ ] they were of course in much larger numbers than the americans. no such attempt should be made except with this advantage, and the superiority should be as great as is permitted by the force at the disposal of the assailant. this obstacle to the movement of the troops being removed, debarkation began at the mouth of the bayou des pêcheurs;[ ] whence the british, undiscovered during their progress, succeeded in penetrating by the bayou bienvenu and its tributaries to a point on the mississippi eight miles below new orleans. the advance corps, sixteen hundred strong, arrived there at noon, december , accompanied by major-general keane, as yet in command of the whole army. the news reached jackson two hours later. fresh from the experiences of washington and baltimore, the british troops flattered themselves with the certainty of a quiet night. the americans, they said to each other, have never dared to attack. at . , however, a vessel dropped her anchor abreast them, and a voice was heard, "give them this for the honor of america!" the words were followed by the discharge of her battery, which swept through the camp. without artillery to reply, having but two light field guns, while the assailant--the naval schooner "caroline," lieut. j.d. henley--had anchored out of musket range, the invaders, suffering heavily, were driven to seek shelter behind the levee, where they lay for nearly an hour.[ ] at the end of this, a dropping fire was heard from above and inland. jackson, with sound judgment and characteristic energy, had decided to attack at once, although, by his own report, he could as yet muster only fifteen hundred men, of whom but six hundred were regulars. a confused and desperate night action followed, the men on both sides fighting singly or in groups, ignorant often whether those before them were friends or foes. the americans eventually withdrew, carrying with them sixty-six prisoners. their loss in killed and wounded was one hundred and thirty-nine; that of the british, two hundred and thirteen. the noise of this rencounter hastened the remainder of the british army, and by the night of december the whole were on the ground. meantime, the "caroline" had been joined by the ship "louisiana," which anchored nearly a mile above her. in her came commodore patterson, in chief naval command. the presence of the two impelled the enemy to a slight retrograde movement, out of range of their artillery. the next morning, christmas, sir edward pakenham arrived from england. a personal examination satisfied him that only by a reconnaissance in force could he ascertain the american strength and preparations, and that, as a preliminary to such attempt, the vessels whose guns swept the line of advance must be driven off. on the th the "caroline" tried to get up stream to jackson's camp, but could not against a strong head wind; and on the th the british were able to burn her with hot shot. the "louisiana" succeeded in shifting her place, and thenceforth lay on the west bank of the stream, abreast of and flanking the entrenchments behind which jackson was established. these obstacles gone, pakenham made his reconnaissance. as described by a participant,[ ] the british advanced four or five miles on december , quite unaware what awaited them, till a turn in the road brought them face to face with jackson's entrenchments. these covered a front of three fourths of a mile, and neither flank could be turned, because resting either on the river or the swamp. they were not yet complete, but afforded good shelter for riflemen, and had already several cannon in position, while the "louisiana's" broadside also swept the ground in front. a hot artillery fire opened at once from both ship and works, and when the british infantry advanced they were met equally with musketry. the day's results convinced pakenham that he must resort to the erection of batteries before attempting an assault; an unfortunate necessity, as the delay not only encouraged the defenders, but allowed time for re-enforcement, and for further development of their preparations. while the british siege pieces were being brought forward, largely from the fleet, a distance of seventy miles, the american navy was transferring guns from the "louisiana" to a work on the opposite side of the river, which would flank the enemies' batteries, as well as their columns in case of an attempt to storm. [illustration: map showing the landing of the british army its several encampments and fortifications on the mississippi and the works they erected on their retreat; also the different posts, encampments and fortifications made by the several corps of the american army during the whole campaign by major a. lacarriere latour late principal engineer th military district u.s. army ] when the guns had arrived, the british on the night of december threw up entrenchments, finding convenient material in the sugar hogsheads of the plantations. on the morning of january they opened with thirty pieces at a distance of five hundred yards; but it was soon found that in such a duel they were hopelessly overmatched, a result to which contributed the enfilading position of the naval battery. "to the well-directed exertions from the other side of the river," wrote jackson to patterson, after the close of the operations, "must be ascribed in great measure that harassment of the enemy which led to his ignominious flight." the british guns were silenced, and for the moment abandoned; but during the night they were either withdrawn or destroyed. it was thus demonstrated that no adequate antecedent impression could be made on the american lines by cannonade; and, as neither flank could be turned, no resource remained, on the east shore at least, but direct frontal assault. but while jackson's main position was thus secure, he ran great risk that the enemy, by crossing the river, and successful advance there, might establish themselves in rear of his works; which, if effected, would put him at the same disadvantage that the naval battery now imposed upon his opponents. his lines would be untenable if his antagonist commanded the water, or gained the naval battery on his flank, to which the crew of the "louisiana" and her long guns had now been transferred. this the british also perceived, and began to improve a narrow canal which then led from the head of the bayou to the levee, but was passable by canoes only. they expected ultimately to pierce the levee, and launch barges upon the river; but the work was impeded by the nature of the soil, the river fell, and some of the heavier boats grounding delayed the others, so that, at the moment of final assault, only five hundred men had been transported instead of thrice that number, as intended.[ ] what these few effected showed how real and great was the danger. the canal was completed on the evening of january , on which day the last re-enforcements from england, sixteen hundred men under major-general lambert, reached the front. daylight of january was appointed for the general assault; the intervening day and night being allowed for preparations, and for dragging forward the boats into the river. it was expected that the whole crossing party of fifteen hundred, under colonel thornton, would be on the west bank, ready to move forward at the same moment as the principal assault, which was also to be supported by all the available artillery, playing upon the naval battery to keep down its fire. there was therefore no lack of ordinary military prevision; but after waiting until approaching daylight began to throw more light than was wished upon the advance of the columns, pakenham gave the concerted signal. owing to the causes mentioned, thornton had but just landed with his first detachment of five hundred. eager to seize the battery, from which was to be feared so much destructive effect on the storming columns on the east bank, he pushed forward at once with the men he had, his flank towards the river covered by a division of naval armed boats; "but the ensemble of the general movement," wrote the british general, lambert, who succeeded pakenham in command, "was thus lost, and in a point which was of the last importance to the [main] attack on the left bank of the river." not only was thornton too weak, but he was eight hours[ ] late, though not by his own fault. commodore patterson, whose duties kept him on the west bank, reported that the naval battery was actively and effectively employed upon the flank of the storming columns, and it was not until some time after the engagement opened that he was informed of the near approach of the british detachment on that side. in prevision of such an attempt, a line of works had been thrown up at the lower end of the naval battery, at right angles to it, to cover its flank. this was weak, however, at the extremity farthest from the river, and thither the british directed their attack. the defenders there, some very newly joined kentucky militia, broke and fled, and their flight carried with them all the other infantry. the seamen of the battery, deprived of their supports, retreated after spiking their guns, which fell into the enemy's hands; and thornton, who was severely wounded, was able to date his report of success from the "redoubt on the right bank of the mississippi."[ ] he advanced actually, and without serious opposition, a mile above--that is, in rear of--jackson's lines and the "louisiana's" anchorage. "this important rout," wrote jackson, "had totally changed the aspect of affairs. the enemy now occupied a position from which they might annoy us without hazard, and by means of which they might have been enabled to defeat, in a great measure, the effects of our success on this side of the river. it became, therefore, an object of the first consequence to dislodge him as soon as possible." jackson himself attributed his success in this desirable object as much to negotiation as to the force he would be able to apply. the story of the main assault and its disastrous repulse is familiar. in itself, it was but an instance of a truth conspicuously illustrated, before and after, on many fields, of the desperate character of a frontal attack upon protected men accustomed to the use of fire-arms--even though they be irregulars. could thornton's movement have been made in full force assigned, and at the moment intended,--so that most of the advance on both sides the river could have been consummated before dawn,--a successful flanking operation would have been effected; and it is far from improbable that jackson, finding the naval guns turned against him, would have been driven out of his lines. with raw troops under his command, and six thousand veterans upon his heels, no stand could have been made short of the town, nor in it. as it was, the failure of the two parts of the british to act coincidently caused them to be beaten in detail: for the disastrous and bloody repulse of the columns on the east bank led to the withdrawal of the tiny body on the west.[ ] no further attempt was made. on the th of january the british withdrew. in pursuance of the full discretionary power given by their orders as to any further employment upon the american coast of the forces under their command, general lambert and the admiral then concerted an attack upon fort bowyer, at the entrance to mobile bay. this surrendered february , the day that the news of the peace reached new york. * * * * * the ocean as well as the land had its episodes of fighting after peace had been signed. the united states frigate "president," which during the first two years of the war had been commanded continuously by commodore john rodgers, was in may, , transferred to decatur, who took to her with him the crew of his old ship, the "united states," irretrievably shut up in new london. the "president" remained in new york throughout the year, narrowly watched by the enemy. in a letter of august , decatur speaks of the unfavorable conditions of the season for sailing; that four british ships kept close to sandy hook, at times even anchored. he then mentions also "the great apprehension and danger" which new york was undergoing, in common with the entire seaboard, and the wish of the city government that the crew of the ship should remain for defence of the port.[ ] it will be remembered that this was in the anxious period preceding the development of the british menace to the coast, which issued in the capture of washington and alexandria, and the attack on baltimore. philadelphia also trembled; and decatur received an order to carry the "president's" crew to her protection, if threatened.[ ] on new year day, , the "president" was still in the bay, awaiting a chance to sail. she was deeply laden for a long absence, and was to be accompanied by a merchant brig, the "macedonian," carrying further stores. the sloops "hornet" and "peacock," and brig "tom bowline," were likewise watching to slip out. on the night of january , , in a heavy northwester, the "president's" attempt was made; the pilots for the occasion having undertaken to mark the channel by boats suitably stationed. despite these precautions the ship grounded, and beat heavily on the bottom for an hour and a half. by this she was seriously injured, and would have gone back had the wind permitted. as it was, she had to be forced over, and at p.m. went clear; but with loss of a large part of that speed for which she was known, and which had been among decatur's chief reasons for preferring her to the new "guerrière."[ ] the "macedonian" was in company. the british blockading division was under the command of captain john hayes, of the razee[ ] "majestic," and consisted, besides that ship, of the forty-gun -pounder frigate "endymion," and the thirty-eight-gun -pounder frigates "pomone" and "tenedos"; the latter of which had joined on the th. the vessels were driven off shore by the violence of the gale; but hayes, reasoning as a seaman, anticipated both decatur's sailing that night and his probable course. after clearing the bar, the "president" steered nearly due east, along the south shore of long island, for fifty miles, when she headed off, southeast by east, for the open sea. at a.m. three of the british squadron were seen ahead on the new course; the fourth, the "tenedos," being then out of sight to the southward, either detached for a wider sweep of watchfulness, or separated by the gale. the "president," on seeing the enemy, hauled up again along shore, and a stern chase began, which lasted till near nightfall of the th; the "endymion" leading the british squadron. the "tenedos" being sighted soon after daybreak, hayes detached the "pomone" to ascertain what ship it was; a step which for the time threw the "pomone," as well as the "tenedos," out of the running. at p.m. the "endymion" had got well within point-blank shot of the "president." it must be appreciated that, with the whole hostile squadron at her heels, the american frigate could not delay, or turn her side with its battery towards an assailant behind; for to do so enabled the others to gain on her. on the other hand, the pursuer could so deflect--yaw--at frequent intervals, and having the greater speed could continually recover the ground thus lost. this was what captain hope of the "endymion" did, with sound judgment. he took a position on the off-shore quarter of the "president," where neither her broadside nor stern guns could bear upon him, so long as she held her course. thence, yawing continually, the "endymion" poured in her successive broadsides, practically unopposed, mistress of the situation. decatur endured this for a time; but it was the military merit of his antagonist's conduct that it must eventually force him to turn aside, and so convert the stern chase of the british squadron to the more hopeful attempt to cut him off on a new course. after half an hour the "president's" helm was put to port, and the ship headed abruptly south, threatening to cross the "endymion's" bow, and rake. the british frigate had to follow this movement of her opponent, and the two ran off on parallel lines, exchanging broadsides. the object of decatur was to dismantle this enemy, strip him of his motive power, and so increase his own chance of escape. in this he was successful. after two hours and a half, between and . p.m., the "endymion's" sails were stripped from the yards. she dropped astern, and the "president" again steered east, bringing the other enemy's ships once more in her wake,--a stern chase. at p.m. the "pomone" and "tenedos" overtook her. these were of the class of the "guerrière," "macedonian," and "shannon," very much lighter, singly, than the "president," which had a heavier battery than the "constitution." had the american ship retained her normal speed, she probably would have escaped; but the "pomone," the first to arrive, outsailed her without using studdingsails, which the "president" was still able to carry alow and aloft, despite her engagement with the "endymion." this fresh british ship luffed to port, and fired her starboard broadside. the "president" imitated the manoeuvre, heading up to north; but she did not fire. at this point the historian is met by a direct contradiction of evidence. decatur says that the "pomone" was now on the port bow, within musket-shot,[ ] the "tenedos" five hundred yards astern, "taking up a raking position on our quarter, and the rest (with the exception of the 'endymion') within gunshot."[ ] these statements are confirmed by the sworn testimony before the american court of inquiry. the log of the "pomone," published with intention, reads that the "tenedos" was not more than three miles off,--a distance to which no gun on shipboard of that day could carry,--and the "endymion" and "majestic" so far away that they did not come on the scene until . and a.m., respectively, of the th. the "pomone" fired a second broadside, and hauling still further to port was about to discharge a third, from a raking position ahead, when the "president" struck. she had not fired a gun at either the "pomone" or the "tenedos." the log of the "pomone" is clear on this point, and decatur's elaborate report makes no mention of having done so. the witnesses before the court of inquiry are equally silent. between the "endymion" and the "president," in point of battery, the proportion of force was as four to three, in favor of the american ship. against that must fairly be weighed the power of the "endymion" to maintain for half an hour a quartering and raking position, owing to the necessity to escape laid on the "president." a quantitative estimate of this advantage would be largely guess; but it may safely be said that the disproportion of killed and wounded[ ] can probably be laid to this, coupled with the very proper endeavor of decatur to throw off his immediate enemy by aiming at her spars. after two and a half hours' fighting, the sails of the "endymion" were "stripped from the yards," captain hayes reported; while the "president," by the "pomone's" log, "continued to stand east under a press of sail," all studdingsails set, from lower to royal. this result accounts for where the "president's" shot went, and under the circumstances should have gone, and for why the "endymion" lost fewer men; and it was not the sole reason for the last. there is, in the writer's judgment, no ground whatever for the assumption that the "endymion" did, or singly would, have beaten the "president." the disparity of material force was counterbalanced by the circumstance that the "president" had the other vessels to take into account. from the legal point of view ships merely in sight contribute, and are therefore entitled to prize money. in the present instance they necessarily affected the manoeuvring and gunnery of the "president." there is a good deal of human nature, and some food for quiet entertainment, in the british accounts. there were several to share, and apparently the glory was not quite enough to go round. with admiral hotham, not present in the action, but in immediate command of the station during cochrane's absence at new orleans and cockburn's in georgia, it was "the force which i had collected off the bar of new york." captain hayes had much to say on his calculations of the enemy's movements: "what is a little singular, at the very instant of arriving at the point of the supposed track of the enemy, sandy hook west-northwest fifteen leagues, we were made happy by the sight of a ship and a brig, not more than two miles on the weather bow." the published report of captain hope, of the "endymion," is simple and modest; but some of his followers apparently would have all the glory. the "endymion" had done the whole business. this drew forth the publication of the "pomone's" log, concerning which the naval chronicle remarks, "it appears that some differences have taken place between the british frigates engaged, as to the honor of having captured the 'president.'"[ ] had decatur appreciated at the moment that his speedy surrender to the "pomone" would be attributed to the subjection to which the "endymion" was supposed to have reduced his ship, he very probably would have made a second fight of it. but he was convinced that ultimate escape was impossible. "two fresh," though much weaker, ships of the enemy at hand, his own having fought for two hours and a half; "about one fifth of my crew killed and wounded, my ship crippled, and a more than fourfold force opposed to me, without a chance of escape left, i deemed it my duty to surrender." physical and mental fatigue, the moral discomfiture of a hopeless situation, are all fairly to be taken into account; nor should resistance be protracted where it means merely loss of life. yet it may be questioned whether the moral tone of a military service, which is its breath of life, does not suffer when the attempt is made to invest with a halo of extraordinary heroism such a resistance as decatur made, by his own showing. unless the "president" was really thrashed out by the "endymion," which was the british assertion,[ ] she might have put one of his majesty's thirty-eight-gun frigates, the "pomone," out of commission for a long time; and that, in addition to the "endymion,"--the two fastest british vessels,--would have been no light matter in the then state of the new york blockade. if the finding of the american court of inquiry,[ ] that "the 'endymion' was conquered, while the 'president' in the contest with her had sustained but little injury," be admitted, there seems no reply to the comment that the "president" surrendered within musket-shot of a thirty-eight-gun frigate which with three or four broadsides she should have nearly annihilated. she was out to destroy commerce and enemy's cruisers, and she struck before her powers in that respect--by the court's finding--were exhausted. escape was impossible; one object of her cruise--the enemy's commerce--had become impracticable; was it justifiable to neglect the last opportunity for the other? decatur's personal gallantry is beyond question; but, if the defence of the "president" is to be considered "glorious," and "heroic," it is difficult to know what term can be applied to that of the "essex." war is violence, wounds, and death. needless bloodshed is to be avoided; but even more, at the present day, is to be deprecated the view that the objects of a war are to be sacrificed to the preservation of life. after a long detention, through the closeness of the boston blockade, the "constitution," still commanded by captain charles stewart, effected her escape to sea towards the end of december. on february , , two hundred miles east-northeast from madeira, she fell in with two british ships of war, the "cyane," and the "levant," then on their way from gibraltar to the azores, and thence to the american coast. the "cyane," a frigate-built ship, carried a battery of carronades: thirty -pounders, two -pounders. she had also two long -pounders; making a total of thirty-four guns, throwing a broadside weight of five hundred and seven pounds.[ ] the "levant" was a sloop of war, of the american "hornet" class, carrying eighteen -pounder carronades and two long -pounders; giving two hundred and ninety-seven as her broadside weight. between the two they therefore threw eight hundred and four pounds of metal. the "constitution's" broadside was seven hundred and four pounds; but of this three hundred and eighty-four were in long -pounders. supposing both parties willing to fight under such circumstances, the game would be all in the "constitution's" hands. her problem rather was so to conduct the contest that neither enemy should escape. captain stewart, in reporting his success, dwelt upon the advantages derived by the enemy "from a divided and more active force, as also their superiority in the weight and numbers of guns." one cannot but feel the utmost diffidence in differing from a seaman of the time, and one so skilful as stewart; but the advantage of a divided force is as difficult to see as the superiority in battery power. though consorts, the enemy when first seen were separated by a distance of ten miles; and were sighted successively between and p.m. the wind was easterly and light. the "constitution" was unable to prevent their junction, which was effected at . . they then formed in line on the starboard tack, the "levant" leading; with an interval between them of three hundred feet. at six the "constitution" drew up on the weather side of the "cyane," and five minutes later the action began at a distance of three hundred yards. after a quarter of an hour, noting the enemy's fire to slacken, stewart stopped his own, to allow the smoke to lift. when he could see, he found the "constitution" abreast the "levant," with the "cyane" astern, luffing up for his port quarter. he gave his port broadside to the "levant," then braced aback his after-sails, and so went astern towards the "cyane," bringing her abeam under cover of the renewed cannonade. at . --about ten minutes later--the enemy's fire again weakened, and the "levant" was seen to be bearing up before the wind. stewart made sail ahead, raked her twice from astern with the port guns, and then saw the "cyane" also wearing. the "constitution" immediately wore short round, and caught this opponent before she had completed her manoeuvre, so that she raked her also from astern with the starboard battery. the "cyane" then came to the wind on the port tack, and fired that broadside, to which the "constitution," having reloaded after raking, was about to reply, when, at . this enemy struck, and fired a lee gun,--the signal of submission. a prize crew, with a party of marines to guard prisoners, was hastily thrown on board, and at eight the "constitution" made sail again after the "levant." at . this plucky little ship was met returning to the conflict. at . the two passed on opposite tacks, and exchanged broadsides, after which the "constitution" kept away under the enemy's stern and raked again. the "levant" could now run with a clear conscience. whatever argument can be based on the united batteries of the two british ships, and the advantage of divided force, eighteen -pounder carronades were no match for the "constitution." the "levant" took to her heels, but at p.m. was overtaken and surrendered.[ ] the losses as reported by stewart were: "constitution," killed three; wounded twelve; "cyane," killed twelve; wounded twenty-six; "levant," killed twenty-three; wounded sixteen. captain stewart's management of his vessel was strikingly clever and prompt. the advantages which he attributed to the enemy, an aggregate of guns, slightly superior in total weight, divided between two smaller ships, the author has never been able to recognize.[ ] the sloops of war "hornet," commander james biddle, and "peacock," commander lewis warrington, and the brig "tom bowline," which were waiting their opportunity in the lower bay of new york when the "president" sailed, got to sea five days after her, january . when two days out, the "hornet" separated in chase. the vessels had a rendezvous at the lonely island of tristan d'acunha, in the south atlantic, some fifteen hundred miles west of the cape of good hope. the "hornet" arrived first, and was about to anchor, at . in the morning of march , when a sail was seen to the southeast, steering west. as it soon passed behind the island, the "hornet" made sail to the westward, and the two shortly came within sight. the stranger was the british sloop of war "penguin," captain dickinson. by the report of captain biddle, based on examination after the action, she carried sixteen -pounder carronades, two long -pounders in broadside, and one long twelve on a pivot, fighting either side. the "hornet" had eighteen -pounder carronades, and two long twelves. the wind being south-southwest, the "penguin" was to windward, and bore up to close. at . p.m., being nearly within musket-shot, she hauled to the wind on the starboard tack, a movement which the "hornet" at once imitated, and the battle began; the "hornet" to leeward, the two running on parallel courses,--an artillery duel. the "penguin" drew gradually nearer, and at . put her helm hard up, to run her antagonist on board. the american crew were called to repel boarders, and so were on hand when the enemy's bowsprit came in between the main and mizzen rigging; but, while ready to resist an attempt to board, the course of the action had so satisfied biddle of the superiority of his ship's gunnery that he would not throw his men away in a hand-to-hand contest upon the enemy's decks. the small arms men and marines, however, distributed along the "hornet's" side kept up a lively musketry fire, which the british endured at great disadvantage, crowded upon the narrow front presented by a ship's forecastle. the "penguin" finally wrenched clear with the loss of her foremast and bowsprit, and in this crippled state surrendered immediately. from the first gun to hauling down the flag was twenty-two minutes. the british ship had lost fourteen killed and twenty-eight wounded, her captain being among the slain. the "hornet" had one killed and ten wounded. the comparative efficiency of the two vessels is best indicated by the fact that the "hornet" had not a single cannon-ball in her hull, nor any serious injury even to her lower masts; yet that her rigging and sails were very much cut proves that her opponent's guns were active. by the ready skill of the seamen of that day she was completely ready for any service forty-eight hours later. the "penguin" was scuttled. the action between the "hornet" and "penguin" was the last naval combat of the war of . the day after it, march , the "peacock" and "tom bowline" arrived, in time to see the "penguin" before her captor sunk her. the brig "macedonian," which had sailed in company with the "president," but escaped her fate, also came to tristan d'acunha, which would seem to have been intended as a fresh starting point for some enterprise in common. footnotes: [ ] memoirs and correspondence of lord castlereagh. series iii. vol. ii. pp. - . [ ] castlereagh memoirs, series iii. vol. ii. pp. - . [ ] castlereagh to liverpool (prime minister), aug. , . ibid., pp. - . [ ] wellington to liverpool, nov. , . castlereagh memoirs, series iii. vol. ii. pp. - . [ ] canadian archives, c. , p. . the date is sept. , . [ ] letter of captain evans, commanding n.y. navy yard, aug. , . [ ] canadian archives, c. , pp. , . [ ] izard says two. official correspondence of the department of war with major-general izard, and , p. . [ ] british court martial record. [ ] confidence. [ ] account of the public life of sir george prevost, p. . [ ] prevost to bathurst, july , . report on canadian archives, . lower canada, p. . [ ] prevost to bathurst, aug. , . ibid., p. . [ ] prevost to bathurst, aug. . [ ] official correspondence of general izard with the department of war, pp. , . philadelphia, . [ ] ridout, ten years in upper canada, p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. vi. p. . [ ] june , . navy department mss. [ ] macomb's report, brannan's military and naval letters, p. . izard (correspondence, p. ) says, "there were at or about the works at plattsburg not less than three thousand regulars, of whom fifteen hundred were fit for duty in the field. in the number were three companies of artillery." [ ] general benjamin mooers, who was in command of the new york state militia during these operations, in a letter to governor tompkins, dated sept. , (gov. tompkins mss. vol. ix. pp. - , state library, albany, n.y.), claims that macomb was here less than just to the militia, "many of whom stood their ground as long as it was tenable" during the first day. in a general order issued by him sept. (niles' register, vol. vii. p. ), he spoke of some "who fled at the first approach of the enemy, and afterwards basely disbanded themselves, and returned home." macomb himself wrote that after the first day, when the army had retired to the works, "the militia behaved with great spirit." [ ] for copies of these letters, and of macdonough's reply and endorsement, i am indebted to mr. rodney macdonough, the commodore's grandson. cochran's is dated march , and colden's june , ; macdonough's reply july . it is well to note that all these preceded the british naval court martial, held in portsmouth, aug. - , , where the testimony that the squadron was within range was unanimous and accepted by the court. [ ] the first lieutenant of the "confiance" in his evidence said that it was not more than ten minutes after the ship rounded cumberland head that the enemy began firing at her, and that the shot at first fell short. as far as it goes, this would show that the american squadron was over a mile from the head; and, if so, scarcely more than a mile from the batteries. [ ] for information as to ranges, the author applied to professor philip r. alger, u.s. navy, whose intimate acquaintance with questions of ordnance and gunnery is known throughout his service. [ ] vol. viii. p. , april , . [ ] these two letters of macomb are given in the "account of the public life of sir george prevost," p. . [ ] izard's correspondence, p. . [ ] yeo to the admiralty, sept. , . from a copy in the court martial record. [ ] in his narrative, submitted to the court martial, captain pring stated that prevost wished a joint attack, because, in the advance along the head of cumberland bay, the left flank of the army, when crossing dead creek, had been much annoyed by the american gunboats. he feared the same in crossing the saranac to the assault of the works, and wanted the navy to draw off the gunboats. [ ] robertson's narrative before the court martial. [ ] the correspondence between prevost and downie, sept. - , is in the canadian archives, m. . . pp. - . [ ] this letter of major coore, published in a canadian paper, feb. , , is to be found in the canadian archives mss., m. . . p. . [ ] court martial evidence. [ ] evidence of pring, and of brydone, master of the "confiance," before the court martial. robertson in his narrative is equally positive and explicit on this point. [ ] robertson's narrative. [ ] robertson's narrative. [ ] macdonough's report. [ ] pronounced "wynd." [ ] robertson's narrative. [ ] a spring is a rope taken from the stern of a ship to the anchor, by hauling on which the ship is turned in the direction desired. [ ] brydone's evidence. [ ] evidence of sailing master brydone. [ ] macdonough's report. [ ] for the battle of lake champlain much the most complete and satisfactory evidence is the record of the british court martial. there having been no dispute on the american side, as between perry and elliott at lake erie, there has not been the same output of conflicting statements, tending to elucidate as well as to confuse. commander henley of the "eagle" was apparently dissatisfied with macdonough's report, as the commodore (apparently) was with his action. this drew from him a special report. navy department mss. niles' register, vol. vii. supplement, p. , contains this letter with many verbal changes, which do not materially affect its purport. [ ] cochrane arrived at bermuda march ; but, despite his urgency and evident annoyance, warren, who was senior, and had had ample notice of his supersession, took his own leisurely time about giving over the command, which he did not do till april , sailing for england april . [ ] bathurst to ross, sept. , . war office, entry book. [ ] pigot's report to cochrane, june , . admiralty in-letters mss. [ ] cochrane to the admiralty, june , . admiralty in-letters mss. [ ] admiralty to cochrane, aug. , . the reference in the text depends upon a long paper near the end of vol. , british war office records, which appears to the writer to have been drawn up for the use of the ministry in parliamentary debate. it gives step by step the procedure of the government in entering on the new orleans undertaking. [ ] bathurst to ross, sept. , . british war office records. [ ] naval chronicle, vol. xxxiii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. iii. p. . [ ] ibid., vol. vii. pp. - . [ ] cochrane to the admiralty, oct. , . admiralty in-letters. [ ] ibid. [ ] neither cochrane nor lockyer gives the number of the british boats; but as there were three divisions, drawn from five ships of the line and three or four frigates, besides smaller vessels, jones' count was probably accurate. he had ample time to observe. [ ] the gunboats of jefferson's building had no names, and were distinguished by number only. [ ] jones' report of this affair is found in niles' register, vol. viii. p. ; those of cochrane and lockyer in the naval chronicle, vol. xxxiii. pp. - . [ ] so styled in cochrane's report, which also speaks of it as bayou catalan. the name does not appear on the map of major latour, chief of engineers to jackson, who in his report calls the whole bayou bienvenu. [ ] gleig, narrative of the campaign of washington, baltimore, and new orleans, pp. - . [ ] gleig, pp. - . [ ] gleig's narrative, p. . cochrane's report, naval chronicle, vol. xxxiii. p. . report of major c.r. forrest, british assistant quarter-master-general, war office records. [ ] thornton's report. james' military occurrences of the war of , vol. ii., p. . [ ] james' military occurrences, vol. ii. p. . [ ] niles' register, vols. vii. and viii., gives a large number of the official reports, as well british as american, concerning the new orleans expedition. so also does james in his "military occurrences" and "naval occurrences" of the war of . regarded in outline, as is attempted in the text, the operations are of a simple character, presenting no difficulties. [ ] captains' letters. navy department mss. [ ] ibid., sept. , . [ ] decatur to navy department, april , . captains' letters. [ ] a razee is a ship cut down, and reduced from her original rate. the "majestic" had been a seventy-four, and probably was the same vessel which under that name and rate took part in the battle of the nile. the expedient of razeeing had been adopted by the british government, in order rapidly to prepare vessels superior to the american forty-fours, yet less costly in crews than ships of the line. these razees were rated as carrying fifty-six guns. [ ] deposition of commodore decatur at bermuda. naval chronicle, vol. xxxiii. p. . [ ] decatur's report. niles' register, vol. viii. p. . in his deposition decatur says "the 'tenedos' did not fire at the time of such surrender." [ ] the loss of the "president" was twenty-four killed, fifty-five wounded. (decatur's report.) that of the "endymion," eleven killed and fourteen wounded. (naval chronicle, vol. xxxiii. p. .) [ ] naval chronicle, vol. xxxiii. p. . [ ] captain hayes' report. niles' register, vol. viii. p. . naval chronicle, vol. xxxiii. p. . [ ] niles' register, vol. viii. p. . [ ] the armament of the "cyane" is that reported by lieut. hoffman, u.s. navy, who brought her to the united states. niles' register, vol. viii. p. . [ ] the "cyane" reached a united states port, but the "levant" was recaptured by a british squadron. both names remained in the united states navy till the civil war. a "levant," built in succession to the one captured, was lost at sea in --never heard from. [ ] the account given in the text depends upon stewart's "minutes of the action" (niles' register, vol. viii. p. ), compared with the "constitution's" log (navy department mss.), of which the minutes are a development. chapter xviii the peace negotiations the government of the united states had been honestly loath to declare war in , and had signalized its reluctance by immediate advances looking to a restoration of peace. these were made through jonathan russell, the _chargé d'affaires_ in london when hostilities began. to use the expression of monroe, then secretary of state, "at the moment of the declaration of war, the president, regretting the necessity which produced it, looked to its termination, and provided for it."[ ] the two concessions required as indispensable, in the overture thus referred to, dated june , , were the revocation of the orders in council, and the abandonment of the practice of impressing from american merchant ships. should these preliminary conditions be obtained, russell was authorized to stipulate an armistice, during which the two countries should enter upon negotiations, to be conducted either at washington or in london, for the settlement of all points of difference. russell made this communication to castlereagh august , . before this date admiral warren had sailed from england for the american command, carrying with him the propositions of the british government for a suspension of hostilities, consequent upon the repeal of the orders in council.[ ] in view of warren's mission, and of the fact that russell had no powers to negotiate, but merely to conclude an arrangement upon terms which he could not alter, and which his government had laid down in ignorance of the revocation of the orders, castlereagh declined to discuss with him the american requirements. "i cannot, however," he wrote, "refrain on one single point from expressing my surprise, namely, that as a condition preliminary even to a suspension of hostilities, the government of the united states should have thought fit to demand that the british government should desist from its ancient and accustomed practice of impressing british seamen from the merchant ships of a foreign state, simply on the assurance that a law shall hereafter be passed to prohibit the employment of british seamen in the public or commercial service of that state."[ ] "the government could not consent to suspend the exercise of a right upon which the naval strength of the empire mainly depends," until fully convinced that the object would be assured by other means. to a subsequent modification of the american propositions, in form, though not in tenor, the british minister replied in the same spirit, throwing the weight of his objections upon the question of impressment, which indeed remained alone of the two causes of rupture.[ ] commendable as was its desire for peace, the american government had made the mistake of being unwilling to insure it by due and timely preparation for war. in these advances, therefore, its adversary naturally saw not magnanimity, but apprehension. russell, in reporting his final interview, wrote, "lord castlereagh once observed somewhat loftily, that if the american government was so anxious _to get rid of the war_,[ ] it would have an opportunity of doing so on learning the revocation of the orders in council." the american representative rejoined with proper spirit; but the remark betrayed the impression produced by this speedy offer, joined to the notorious military unreadiness of the united states. such things do not make for peace. the british ministry, like a large part of the american people, saw in the declaration of war a mere variation upon the intermittent policy of commercial restrictions of the past five years; an attempt to frighten by bluster. in such spirit monroe, in this very letter of june to russell, had dwelt upon the many advantages to be derived from peace with the united states; adding, "not to mention the injuries which cannot fail to result from a prosecution of the war." in transcribing his instructions, russell discreetly omitted the latter phrase; but the omission, like the words themselves, betrays consciousness that the administration was faithful to the tradition of its party, dealing in threats rather than in deeds. through great part of the final negotiations the impression thus made remained with the british ministers. on september , , the chancellor of the russian empire requested a visit from the american minister resident at st. petersburg, mr. john quincy adams. in the consequent interview, the next evening, the chancellor said that the czar, having recently made peace and re-established commercial intercourse with great britain, was much concerned that war should have arisen almost immediately between her and the united states. hostilities between the two nations, which together nearly monopolized the carrying trade of the world, would prevent the economical benefits to russia expected from the recent change in her political relations. the question was then asked, whether a proffer of russian mediation would be regarded favorably by the united states. adams had not yet received official intelligence even of the declaration of war, and was without information as to the views of his government on the point suggested; but he expressed certainty that such an advance would be cordially met, and he could foresee no obstacle to its entertainment. the proposal was accordingly made to the president, through the customary channels, and on march , , was formally accepted by him. james a. bayard and albert gallatin were nominated commissioners, conjointly with mr. adams, to act for the united states in forming a treaty of peace under the mediation of the czar. they sailed soon afterwards. the american acceptance reached st. petersburg about june ; but on that day adams was informed by the chancellor that his despatches from london signified the rejection of the russian proposition by the british government, on the ground that the differences with the united states involved principles of the internal government of great britain, which could not be submitted to the discussion of any mediation.[ ] as the russian court was then in campaign, at the headquarters of the allied armies, in the tremendous operations of the summer of against napoleon, much delay necessarily ensued. on september , however, the british ambassador, who was accompanying the court in the field, presented a formal letter reaffirming the unwillingness of his government to treat under mediation, but offering through the czar, whose mediatorial advance was so far recognized, to nominate plenipotentiaries to meet those of the united states in direct consultation. in the backward and forward going of despatches in that preoccupied and unsettled moment, it was not till near november that the british foreign office heard from the ambassador that the american commissioners were willing so to treat, and desirous to keep their business separate from that of the continent of europe; but that their powers were limited to action through the mediation of russia. castlereagh then, on november , addressed a note to the united states government, offering a direct negotiation. this was accepted formally, january , ;[ ] and henry clay with jonathan russell were added to the commission already constituted, raising the number of members to five. the representatives of great britain were three: admiral lord gambier, henry goulburn, and william adams. ghent was fixed upon for the place of meeting. the instructions issued to the american commissioners were voluminous. they contained not only the requirements of the government, but arguments from every point of view, and alternatives of several descriptions, to meet anticipated objections. such elaboration was perhaps necessary when negotiation was to take place so remote from communication with home. on one point, however, as originally issued in contemplation of russian mediation, demand was peremptory. impressment must cease, by stipulation. "if this encroachment of great britain is not provided against, the united states have appealed to arms in vain." at that moment, april , ,[ ] the flush of expectation was still strong. "should improper impressions have been taken of the probable consequences of the war, you will have ample means to remove them. it is certain that from its prosecution great britain can promise to herself no advantage, while she exposes herself to great expenses and to the danger of still greater losses." nine months later, looking to direct negotiation, the same confident tone is maintained. "on impressment, the sentiments of the president have undergone no change. this degrading practice must cease.... no concession is contemplated on any point in controversy;"[ ] and three weeks afterwards, february , , "should peace be made in europe, it is presumed that the british government would have less objection to forbear impressment for a specified term, than it would have should the war continue. in concluding a peace, even in case of a previous general peace in europe, it is important to obtain such a stipulation."[ ] on june , the note was lowered. "if found indispensably necessary to terminate the war, you may omit any stipulation on the subject of impressment." this was in pursuance of the cabinet determination of june , already quoted.[ ] it abandoned the only ground for war that had existed since august, , when the orders in council were known to have been repealed. the commissioners were indeed to do their best to obtain from the british government the demanded concessions, not in the matter of impressment only, but on the whole subject of irregular blockades, which underlay the orders in council, as well as on other maritime questions in dispute; but in pressing such demands they were under orders to fall back before resistance. from the opening of the colloquy they were on the defensive. quite different was the position assumed at first by the british government and people. the events of the critical year , both in europe and america, had changed the entire outlook. alexander baring, whose general attitude towards the united states was friendly, wrote to gallatin, october , , "we wish for peace, but the pressure of the war upon our commerce and manufactures is over. they have ample relief in other quarters; indeed, the dependence of the two countries on each other was overrated." he was positive that there would be no concession on impressment. again, on december , "the pressure of the war is diminished. commerce is now abundantly prosperous."[ ] gallatin himself had occasion to spend some time in london during the succeeding spring,-- . quotation from his observations has been made already.[ ] in a letter of april ,--after napoleon's abdication,--"the prosecution of war with the united states would afford a convenient pretext for preserving a more considerable standing force."[ ] this would be a useful element in the troublesome diplomacy to be foreseen, in settling the disturbed affairs of europe; and the government stood in need of reasons for maintaining the pressure of taxation, which was already eliciting, and later in the year still more elicited, symptoms of great discontent and dangerous parliamentary opposition. yet in its conduct towards america the cabinet had the people behind it. two months later, gallatin wrote to the secretary of state, "you may rest assured of the general hostile spirit of this nation, and of its wish to inflict serious injury on the united states; that no assistance can be expected from europe; and that no better terms will be obtained than the _status ante bellum_."[ ] at the time of this writing, june , the british foreign secretary, lord castlereagh, returned from paris, where he had been spending the two months succeeding the first abdication of napoleon. during this period formal peace with france had been established, and the bourbons reseated on her throne. his instructions to the british commissioners at ghent, issued july , were framed on lines which showed consciousness of mastery.[ ] the question of abandoning the practice of impressment would not be so much as entertained. the rule of should "rest on its own clear and well established authority."[ ] the commissioners were not even to discuss it. equally decisive was the position taken with regard to questions of irregular blockades, and of compensation for seizures under the orders in council. when these were presented by the american commissioners, the first was waived aside, as one on which there was no difference of abstract principle; while as to the second, "you cannot be too peremptory in discouraging, at the outset, the smallest expectation of any restitution of captures made under the orders in council."[ ] military and naval weakness, combined with the changed conditions in europe, made the united states powerless when thus confronted with refusal. the british secretary stood on far less sure ground, as to success, when he began to formulate his own demands. these were essentially two: suitable arrangements for the indians, and a rectification of the frontiers. there was a third question, concerning the fisheries on the great banks of newfoundland. as to these, the general right of all nations to frequent the banks, being open sea, was explicitly admitted; but the subjects of a foreign state had no right to fish within the maritime jurisdiction of great britain, much less to land with their catch on coasts belonging to her. the provisions of the treaty of therefore would not be renewed, unless for an equivalent. as regarded the indians, an adequate arrangement of their interests was a _sine quâ non_ of peace; nor would a full and express recognition of present limits by itself alone fulfil this demand. there must be security for its future observance. the particular method by which this observance should be maintained was not made indispensable; but it was plainly stated in the instructions that the best means was "a mutual guarantee of the indian possessions, as they shall be established upon the peace, against encroachment on the part of either state." the suggestion, in its logical consequence and in its intent, went to establishing the communities of indians as a sovereign state, with boundaries guaranteed by great britain and the united states,--a most entangling alliance. in support of this, castlereagh alleged that such a barrier of separation possessed a distinct advantage over a line of contact between the two guaranteeing states, such as now existed in their common boundary. the collisions incident to intercourse between red and white men were easily transferred from side to side of such a conventional line, causing continual disputes. the advantages of a buffer state, to use the modern term, would be secured by the proposed arrangement. writing to the prime minister, the earl of liverpool, he said, "the question is one of expediency; and not of principle, as the american commissioners have endeavored to make it. it does not follow, because, in the year , the two states, not perhaps very justly, took a common boundary, thereby assuming a sort of sovereignty over the indians, that they may not mutually recede from that boundary, if a frontier conterminous with that of the indians is preferable to one with each other."[ ] however plausible reasoning based upon such premises might seem to the party advancing it, it could not qualify the fact that it required from the united states a large cession of territory, to be surrendered to the indians under british guarantee. such a demand was a dangerous diplomatic weapon to put within reach of a commission, of which adams and gallatin were members. in presenting it, also, the british representatives went beyond the letter of their instructions, issued by castlereagh on july , and enlarged august . not only was the inclusion of the indians in the peace to be a _sine quâ non_, but they wrote, "_it is equally necessary_" that a definite boundary be assigned, and the integrity of their possessions mutually guaranteed.[ ] this paper was submitted to castlereagh as he passed through ghent to paris, on his way to the vienna conference. "had i been to prepare the note given in on our part, i should have been less peremptory;" but, like many superiors, he hesitated to fetter the men in immediate charge, and "acquiesced in the expression, 'it is equally necessary, etc.,' which is very strong."[ ] the prime minister was still more deprecatory. he wrote castlereagh, "our commissioners had certainly taken a very erroneous view of our policy. if the negotiations had been allowed to break off upon the two notes already presented, ... i am satisfied the war would have become popular in america."[ ] the american commissioners could see this also, and were quick to use the advantage given by the wording of the paper before them, to improve the status of the united states in the negotiation; for one of the great weaknesses, on which great britain reckoned, was the disunion of american sentiment on the subject of the war. of their reply, dated august , castlereagh wrote, "it is extremely material to answer the american note, as it is evidently intended to rouse the people upon the question of their independence."[ ] besides the indian proposition, the british note of august had conveyed also the explicit views of the ministry as to rectification of frontier. stated briefly, the chain of the great lakes was asserted to be a military barrier essential to the security of canada, as the weaker community in north america. to assure it, no territorial cession was required; but the lakes should be in the sole military tenure of great britain. the united states might use them freely for commercial purposes, but should maintain on them no ship of war, nor build any fortification on their shores, or within a certain distance, to be fixed by agreement. in addition to this, on the side of the lower st. lawrence, there was to be such a cession of the northern part of maine as would establish a direct communication between quebec and halifax. the american reply of august [ ] discussed these questions, patiently but instructively. the matters involved were made plain for the american reader, and the paper closed with the clear intimation that before such terms were accepted there must be a great deal more fighting. "it is not necessary to refer such demands to the american government for instructions. they will only be a fit subject of deliberation when it becomes necessary to decide upon the expediency of an absolute surrender of national independence." so far as the british proposals went, the question was military, not diplomatic; for soldiers and seamen to decide, not for negotiators. so it stood, and so in the solution it proved. the american commissioners held firm to this ground; while on the part of the british there was thenceforth a continual effort to escape from a false position, or to temporize, until some favorable change of circumstances might enable them to insist. "the substance of the question," wrote castlereagh to the prime minister, "is, are we prepared to continue the war for territorial arrangements. if not, is this the best time to make peace, or is it desirable to take the chances of the campaign and then to be governed by circumstances?"[ ] "if our campaign in canada should be as successful as our military preparations would lead us to expect," ... replied liverpool, "if our commander does his duty, i am persuaded we shall have acquired by our arms every point on the canadian frontier, which we ought to insist on keeping."[ ] by these considerations the next british note was dictated, and presented september .[ ] it simply argued the question, with dilatory design, in a somewhat minatory tone. "i think it not unlikely," liverpool had written with reference to it, "that the american commissioners will propose to refer the subject to their government. in that case, the negotiation may be adjourned till the answer is received, and we shall know the result of the campaign before it can be resumed." but the americans did not refer. they too needed time for their people to learn what now was the purpose of hostilities, which the british envoys had precipitately stated as an indispensable concession, and to manifest the national temper under the changed circumstances; but they did not choose that the matter should be stated as one open to discussion. they knew well enough the harassment of maintaining a land warfare three thousand miles from great britain, as well as the dangers threatening the european situation and embarrassing the british ministry. they in turn discussed at length, scrutinizing historically the several arguments of their opponents; but their conclusion was foregone. the two propositions--first, of assigning "a definite boundary to the indians living within the limit of the united states, beyond which boundary they [the united states] should stipulate not to acquire any territory; secondly, of securing the exclusive military possession of the lakes to great britain--are both inadmissible. we cannot subscribe to, and would deem useless to refer to our government, any arrangement containing either of these propositions." the british government was not permitted any subterfuge to escape from the premature insistence upon cession of territory made by their envoys, which would tend to unite the people in america; nor was it to be anticipated that prolonged hostilities for such an object would be acceptable in great britain. the pre-eminence given to the indian question by great britain in these negotiations was due to the importance attached by british local officials to the aid of the savages in war, and to a sensitive conviction that, when thus utilized, they should not be abandoned in peace. their military value was probably over-estimated. it consisted chiefly in numbers, in which the british were inferior, and in the terror produced by their cruelties; doubtless, also, in some degree to their skill in woodcraft; but they were not dependable. such as it was, their support went usually to the weaker party; not because the indian naturally sided with the weaker, but because he instinctively recognized that from the stronger he had most to fear. therefore in colonial days france, in later days great britain, in both cases canada, derived more apparent profit from their employment than did their opponent, whose more numerous white men enabled him to dispense with the fickle and feebler aid of the aborigines. before the firm attitude of the note of september , the british government again procrastinated, and receded from demands which sound policy should from the first have recognized as untenable, unless reposing upon decisive military success and occupation. on september , their commissioners replied[ ] that while the exclusive military possession of the lakes would be conducive to a good understanding, without endangering the security of the united states, it had not been advanced as a _sine quâ non_. a final proposition on the subject of the canadian boundaries would be made, when the indian question was settled. concerning this, they were "authorized distinctly to declare that they are instructed not to sign a treaty of peace, unless the indian nations are included in it, and restored to all the rights, privileges, and territories, which they enjoyed in the year ," by treaties then existing. "from this point the british plenipotentiaries cannot depart." they were instructed further to _offer for discussion_ an article establishing indian boundaries, within which the two countries should bind themselves not to make acquisitions by purchase during a term of years. to the absence of lord castlereagh, and consequent private correspondence between him and his colleagues in london, we owe the knowledge that the question of purchasing indian lands, and the guarantee, would no longer be insisted on; and that the military control of the lakes was now reduced in purpose to the retention of forts michilimackinac and niagara.[ ] the intention remained, however, to insist upon the indian provisions as just stated. on september , the american commission replied that, as thus presented, there was no apparent difference in the purposes of the two nations as regarded the substantial welfare of the indians themselves. the united states meant towards them peace, and the placing them in the position in which they stood before the war. "the real difference was" in the methods proposed. great britain "insisted on including the indians, as allies, in the treaty of peace between her and the united states." but the indians concerned dwelt within the acknowledged bounds of the united states, and their political relations towards her were no concern of great britain; nor could any arrangement be admitted which would constitute them independent communities, in whose behalf great britain might hereafter claim a right to interfere. the error underlying the british demand was the assumption that the indian tribes were independent; whereas, in their relation to foreign countries, they were merely dwellers in the united states, who had made war upon her in co-operation with great britain. the upshot was a mutual agreement, drawn up by the british plenipotentiaries, that upon the conclusion of peace each state would put an end to hostilities in which it might be engaged with the indians, and would restore them to the rights enjoyed before . the americans accepted this, subject to ratification at home, on the ground that, while it included the indians in the peace, it did not do so as parties to the treaty, and left the manner of settlement in the hands of each government interested. the agreement thus framed formed one of the articles of the treaty. on september the gazette account of the capture of washington was published in london. lord bathurst, who in the absence of castlereagh was acting as foreign secretary, despatched the news the same day to the commissioners at ghent, instructing them to assure the americans that it made no difference in the british desire for peace, nor would modify unfavorably the requirements as to frontier, as yet unstated.[ ] liverpool wrote coincidently to castlereagh, suggesting that he should communicate to the sovereigns and ministers at vienna the moderation with which the government was acting, as well as the tone assumed by the american commissioners, "so very different from what their situation appears to warrant." "i fear the emperor of russia is half an american, and it would be very desirable to do away any prejudices which may exist in his mind, or in that of count nesselrode, on this subject."[ ] the remark is illuminating as to the reciprocal influence of the american contest and the european negotiations, and also as to the reasons for declining the proposed russian mediation of . the continent generally, and russia conspicuously, held opinions on neutral maritime rights similar to those of the united states. liverpool had already[ ] expressed his wish to be well out of the war, although expecting decided military successes, and convinced that the terms as now reduced would be very unpopular in england; "but i feel too strongly the inconvenience of a continuance not to make me desirous of concluding it at the expense of some popularity." it was in this spirit, doubtless, that bathurst instructed the envoys that, if the americans wished to refer the very modified proposals, or to sign them conditional upon ratification at home, either proposition would be accepted; an assurance repeated on october .[ ] were neither alternative embraced as to the indian settlement, the negotiation should be closed and the commission return to england. british military anticipation then stood high. not only was the capture of washington over-estimated, but ross and cochrane had impressed their government with brilliant expectations. "they are very sanguine about the future operations. they intend, on account of the season, to proceed in the first instance to the northward, and to occupy rhode island, where they propose remaining and living upon the country until about the first of november. they will then proceed southward, destroy baltimore, if they should find it practicable without too much risk, occupy several important points on the coast of georgia and the carolinas, take possession of mobile in the floridas, and close the campaign with an attack on new orleans."[ ] this was a large programme for a corps of the size of ross', after all allowance made for the ease with which washington had fallen. it is probably to be read in connection with the project of sending to america very large re-enforcements; so numerous, indeed, that lord hill, wellington's second in the peninsula, had been designated for the command. this purpose had been communicated to ross and cochrane; and at the time of the capture of washington they had not received the letters notifying them that "circumstances had induced his majesty's government to defer their intention of employing so considerable a force in that quarter."[ ] for this change of mind america doubtless was indebted to european considerations. besides the expectations mentioned, the british government had well-founded reasons to hope for control of lake ontario, and for substantial results from the handsome force placed at the disposal of sir george prevost, to which the triumphant expedition of cochrane and ross had been intended only as a diversion. under these flattering anticipations were formulated the bases upon which to treat, now that the indian question was out of the way. on october and bathurst instructed the commissioners to propose, as a starting point, the principle that each party should hold what it had, subject to modifications for mutual accommodation. "considering the relative situation of the two countries, the moderation evinced by his majesty's government in admitting this principle, (thereby surrendering claim to the future conquests), in the present state of the contest, must be manifest." when this was accepted, but not before, the mutual accommodations were to be suggested. the present captured possessions were stated to be: british, fort michilimackinac, fort niagara, and all the country east of the penobscot; the american, fort erie and fort malden. upon the surrender of the two latter, great britain would restore the forts at castine and machias. she would retain mackinac and fort niagara, the latter with a surrounding strip of five miles of territory; and in exchange (apparently) for "all the country east of the penobscot," would accept that part of maine which lies north of the aroostook river, thus insuring between quebec and halifax a direct communication, wholly under british jurisdiction. there were some further minor matters of detail, unnecessary to mention; the more so that they did not come formally before the american commissioners, who immediately rejected the proposed principle of _uti possidetis_, and replied, october , that they were not empowered to yield any territory, and could treat only on the basis of entire mutual restitution. this liverpool testily likened to the claim of the french revolutionary government[ ] that territory could not be ceded because contrary to the fundamental law of the republic. in the american case, however, it was substantially an affirmation that the military conditions did not warrant surrender. meanwhile, on october , the news of macdonough's victory reached london from american sources. although the british official accounts did not arrive until some time later, liverpool, writing to castlereagh on that day, admitted that there could be no doubt of the defeat of the flotilla.[ ] despite this check, the cabinet still cherished hopes of further successes, and were unwilling yet to abandon entirely the last inches of the ground heretofore assumed. "had it not been for this unfortunate adventure on lake champlain," wrote bathurst to castlereagh, "i really believe we should have signed a peace by the end of this month. this will put the enemy in spirits. the campaign will end in our doing much where we thought we should have done little, and doing nothing where we expected everything."[ ] he announced the intention to send pakenham in ross' place for the new orleans expedition, and to increase his force in the spring, should the war last till then. meanwhile, it might be well to let the powers assembled at vienna understand that, whatever the success in louisiana, the inhabitants would be distinctly told that in no case would the country be taken under british protection. they might be granted independence, but preferably would be urged to place themselves again under the spanish crown; but they must know that, in treating with the united states, neither of these solutions would be made by great britain a _sine quâ non_. the government had probably taken a distaste to that peremptory formula by the unsatisfactory result of the proposition about the indians. this care concerning the effect produced upon the course of events at vienna appears forcibly in the letters of liverpool. after the receipt of the american commission's refusal to accept the basis of the _uti possidetis_, he wrote to castlereagh, october , that he feared it put an end to any hopes of bringing the american war to a conclusion. the expectation of some favorable change in the aspect of affairs, however, decided the ministry to gain a little more time before bringing the negotiation to a close; and the envoys at ghent were therefore to be instructed to demand a full _projet_ of all the american conditions before entering on further discussion. the same day liverpool sent a second letter,[ ] in which he said distinctly that, in viewing the european settlement, it was material to consider that the war with america would probably be of some duration; that enemies should not be made in other quarters by holding out too long on the questions of poland, naples, and saxony, for he was apprehensive that "some of our european allies will not be indisposed to favor the americans; and, if the emperor of russia should be desirous of taking up their cause, we are well aware from some of lord walpole's late communications that there is a most powerful party in russia to support him. looking to a continuance of the american war, our financial state is far from satisfactory. we shall want a loan for the ensuing year of £ , , or £ , , . the american war will not cost us less than £ , , , in addition to our peace establishment and other expenses. we must expect, therefore, to have it said that the property tax is continued for the purpose of securing a better frontier for canada." castlereagh himself had already spoken of the financial conditions as "perfectly without precedent in our financial history."[ ] the renewal of the european war, avowedly dreaded by liverpool,[ ] was thought not impossible by castlereagh and wellington; while conditions in france already threatened an explosion, such as bonaparte occasioned in the succeeding march. "it is impossible," wrote wellington, "to conceive the distress in which individuals of all descriptions are. the only remedy is the revival of bonaparte's system of war and plunder; and it is evident that cannot be adopted during the reign of the bourbons."[ ] neither he nor castlereagh doubted the imminence of the danger. "it sounds incredible," wrote the latter, "that talleyrand should treat the notion of any agitation at paris as wholly unfounded."[ ] a plot was believed to exist, which embraced as one of its features the seizing of the duke, and holding him as a hostage. he himself thought it possible, and saw no means in the french government's hands adequate to resist. "you already know my opinion of the danger at paris.... the event may occur any night, and if it should occur, i don't think i should be allowed to depart. my safety depends upon the king's;"[ ] but he was characteristically averse to any step which bore the appearance of precipitate withdrawal. while the american negotiators were drawing up the _projet_ which they had decided to present in response to the british demand, the combination of circumstances just stated led the british ministry to resolve on removing wellington from paris on some pretext, lest his services should be lost to them in the emergency now momentarily dreaded. the urgency for peace with america co-operated to determine the ostensible reason, which was almost a true one. the american command was offered to him. "the duke of wellington would restore confidence to the army, place the military operations on a proper footing, and give us the best chance of peace. i know he is very anxious for the restoration of peace with america, if it can be made upon terms at all honorable. it is a material consideration, likewise, that if we shall be disposed for the sake of peace to give up something of our just pretensions, we can do this more creditably through him than through any other person."[ ] liverpool voiced the conclusions of the cabinet, and it would be difficult for words to manifest more forcibly anxiety to escape from a situation. wellington himself drew attention to this. "does it not occur to your lordship that, by appointing me to go to america at this moment, you give ground for belief, all over europe, that your affairs there are in a much worse situation than they really are? and will not my nomination at this moment be a triumph to the americans, and their friends here and elsewhere?"[ ] conditions were alarming, but the action resembled panic. the offer, which was really a request, brought wellington by a side wind into the american negotiations, and enabled him to give the government the weight of his name and authority in concluding a peace otherwise than on their "just pretensions." the war, he said, has been honorable to great britain; meaning doubtless that, considering the huge physical mass and the proximity of the united states, it was well done to have escaped injury, as it was militarily disgraceful to the american government, with such superiority, to have been so impotent. but, he continued, neither i nor any one else can achieve success, in the way of conquests, unless you have naval superiority on the lakes. that was what was needed; "not a general, nor general officers and troops. till that superiority is acquired, it is impossible, according to my notion, to maintain an army in such a situation as to keep the enemy out of the whole frontier, much less to make any conquest from the enemy, which, with those superior means, might, with reasonable hopes of success, be undertaken.... the question is, whether we can obtain this naval superiority on the lakes. if we cannot, i shall do you but little good in america; and i shall go there only to prove the truth of prevost's defence, and to sign a peace which might as well be signed now." this endorsed not only prevost's retreat, but also the importance of macdonough's victory. the duke then added frankly that, in the state of the war, they had no right to demand any concession of territory. he brushed contemptuously aside the claim of occupying the country east of the penobscot, on the ground of sherbrooke's few companies at castine, ready to retreat at a moment's notice. "if this reasoning be true, why stipulate for the _uti possidetis_?"[ ] penned november , the day before the american negotiators at ghent handed in their requested _projet_, this letter may be regarded as decisive. november , liverpool replied that the ministry was waiting anxiously for the american _projet_, ... and, "without entering into particulars, i can assure you that we shall be disposed to meet your views upon the points on which the negotiation appears to turn at present;" the points being the _uti possidetis_, with the several details of possession put forward by bathurst. the american paper was in london before the th, when liverpool wrote to castlereagh, "i think we have determined, if all other points can be satisfactorily settled, not to continue the war for the purpose of obtaining, or securing, any acquisition of territory. we have been led to this determination by the consideration of the unsatisfactory state of the negotiations at vienna, and by that of the alarming situation of the interior of france." "under such circumstances, it has appeared to us desirable to bring the american war, if possible, to a conclusion."[ ] the basis of the _status quo ante bellum_, sustained all along by the american commission, was thus definitely accepted, and so stated formally by bathurst.[ ] this fundamental agreement having been reached, the negotiations ran rapidly to a settlement without further serious hitch; a conclusion to which contributed powerfully the increasing anxiety of the british ministry over the menacing aspect of the continent. the american _projet_,[ ] besides the customary formal stipulations as to procedure for bringing hostilities to a close, consisted of articles embodying the american positions on the subjects of impressment and blockade, with claims for indemnity for losses sustained by irregular captures and seizures during the late hostilities between france and great britain; a provision aimed at the orders in council. these demands, which covered the motives of the war, and may be regarded as the offensive side of the american negotiation, were pronounced inadmissible at once by the british, and were immediately abandoned. their presentation had been merely formal; the united states government, within its own council chamber, had already recognized that they could not be enforced. the _projet_ included the agreement previously framed concerning the indians; who were thus provided for in the treaty, though excluded from any recognition as parties to it, or as independent political communities. this was the only demand which great britain can be said fairly to have carried, and it was so far a reduction from her original requirement as to be unrecognizable. an american proposition, pledging each of the contracting parties not again to employ indians in war, was rejected. the remaining articles of the _projet_, although entirely suitable to a treaty of peace, were not essentially connected with the war. the treaty merely gave a suitable occasion for presenting them. they provided for fixing, by mixed commissions, the boundary lines between the british possessions and the united states. these the treaty of had stated in terms which had as yet received no proper topographical determination. from the mouth of the st. croix river, and the islands within it and in the adjacent sea, around, north and west, as far as the head of lake superior, the precise course of the bounding line needed definition by surveyors. these propositions were agreed to; but when it came to similar provision for settling the boundary of the new territories acquired by the louisiana purchase, as far as the rocky mountains, difficulties arose. in the result it was agreed that the determination of the boundary should be carried as far as the most northwestern point of the lake of the woods, "in conformity with the true intent of the said treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three." the treaty was silent on the subject of boundary westward of the lake of the woods, and this article of the _projet_ was dropped. it differed indeed from its associates, in providing the settlement for a new question, and not the definition of an old settlement. in conclusion, the british commissioners obtained the adoption of an agreement that both parties "would use their best endeavors to promote the entire abolition of the slave trade." in great britain the agitation for this measure had reached proportions which were not the least among the embarrassments of the ministry; and at this critical juncture the practical politicians conducting affairs found themselves constrained by a popular demand to press the subject upon the less sympathetic statesmen of the cabinet. the american commissioners had made a good fight, and shown complete appreciation of the factors working continuously in their behalf. to the end, and even more evidently at the end, was apparent the increasing anxiety of the british government, the reasonable cause for it in european conditions, and the immense difficulty under such circumstances of accomplishing any substantial military successes in america. the duke of wellington wrote that "all the american armies of which i ever read would not beat out of a field of battle the troops that went from bordeaux last summer;"[ ] but still, "his opinion is that no military advantage can be expected if the war goes on, and he would have great reluctance in undertaking the command unless we made a serious effort first to obtain peace, without insisting upon keeping any part of our conquests."[ ] on december , liverpool sent a long and anxious letter to castlereagh, in reply to his late despatches. the fear of a renewal of war on the continent is prominent in his consideration, and it was recognized that the size of the european armaments, combined with the pecuniary burden of maintaining them, tended of itself to precipitate an outbreak. should that occur, france could scarcely fail to be drawn in; and france, if involved, might direct her efforts towards the low countries, "the only object on the continent which would be regarded as a distinct british interest of sufficient magnitude to reconcile the country to war," with its renewed burden of taxation. "we are decidedly and unanimously of opinion that all your efforts should be directed to the continuance of peace. there is no mode in which the arrangements in poland, germany, and italy, can be settled, consistently with the stipulations of the treaty of paris, which is not to be preferred, under present circumstances, to a renewal of hostilities between the continental powers." coincidently with this, in another letter of the same day, he mentions the meetings which have taken place on account of the property tax, and the spirit which had arisen on the subject. "this, as well as other considerations, make us most anxious to get rid of the american war."[ ] the treaty of ghent was signed december , , by the eight commissioners. the last article provided for its ratification, without alteration, at washington, within four months from the signature. a _chargé d'affaires_ to the united states was appointed, and directed to proceed at once in a british ship of war to america, with the prince regent's ratification, to be exchanged against that of the president; but he was especially instructed that the exchange should not be made unless the ratification by the united states was without alteration, addition, or exclusion, in any form whatsoever. hostilities were not to cease until such action had taken place. the british government were apparently determined that concessions wrung from them, by considerations foreign to the immediate struggle, should not be subjected to further modification in the senate. mr. baker, the british _chargé_, sailed in the british sloop of war "favorite," accompanied by mr. carroll bearing the despatches of the american commissioners. the "favorite" arrived in new york on saturday, february . the treaty was ratified by the president, as it stood, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, on the th of february, . * * * * * a year after the conclusion of peace, a weighty opinion as to the effect of the war of upon the national history was expressed by one of the commissioners, mr. albert gallatin. for fifteen years past, no man had been in closer touch with the springs of national life, national policy, and national action; as representative in congress, and as intimate adviser of two consecutive presidents, in his position as secretary of the treasury. his experience, the perspicuity of his intellect, and his lucidity of thought and expression, give particular value to his conclusions; the more so that to some extent they are the condemnation, regretfully uttered, of a scheme of political conduct with the main ideas of which he had been closely identified. he wrote: "the war has been productive of evil and of good, but i think the good preponderates. independent of the loss of lives, and of the property of individuals, the war has laid the foundations of permanent taxes and military establishments, which the republicans[ ] had deemed unfavorable to the happiness and free institutions of the country. but under our former system we were becoming too selfish, too much attached exclusively to the acquisition of wealth, above all, too much confined in our political feelings to local and state objects. the war has renewed and reinstated the national feelings and character which the revolution had given, and which were daily lessening. the people have now more general objects of attachment, with which their pride and political opinions are connected. they are more americans; they feel and act more as a nation; and i hope that the permanency of the union is thereby better secured."[ ] such, even at so early a date, could be seen to be the meaning of the war of in the progress of the national history. the people, born by war to independence, had by war again been transformed from childhood, absorbed in the visible objects immediately surrounding it, to youth with its dawning vision and opening enthusiasms. they issued from the contest, battered by adversity, but through it at last fairly possessed by the conception of a national unity, which during days of material prosperity had struggled in vain against the predominance of immediate interests and local prepossessions. the conflict, indeed, was not yet over. two generations of civic strife were still to signalize the slow and painful growth of the love for "the union"; that personification of national being, upon which can safely fasten the instinct of human nature to centre devotion upon a person and a name. but, through these years of fluctuating affections, the work of the war of was continuously felt. men had been forced out of themselves. more and more of the people became more americans; they felt and acted more as a nation; and when the moment came that the unity of the state was threatened from within, the passion for the union, conceived in , and nurtured silently for years in homes and hearts, asserted itself. the price to be paid was heavy. again war desolated the land; but through war the permanency of the union was secured. since then, relieved from internal weakness, strong now in the maturity of manhood, and in a common motive, the nation has taken its place among the powers of the earth. footnotes: [ ] monroe to russell, aug. , . american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] ante, vol. i. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] correspondence between russell and castlereagh, sept. - , ; and russell to monroe, sept. . american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. pp. - . [ ] russell's italics. [ ] the correspondence relating to the russian proffer of mediation is to be found in american state papers, vol. iii. pp. - . [ ] american state papers, vol. iii. pp. - . [ ] ibid., pp. - . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] ibid., p. . [ ] ante, p. , and note. [ ] writings of albert gallatin, edited by henry adams, vol. i. pp. , . [ ] ante, p. . [ ] writings of albert gallatin, vol. i. p. . [ ] ibid., vol. i. p. . [ ] a similar consciousness appears to the writer discernible in a letter of wellington to castlereagh, of may , . to procure "the cession of olivenza by spain to portugal, we could promise to _bind_ north america, by a secret article in our treaty of peace, to give no encouragement, or _countenance_, or assistance, to the spanish colonies" (then in revolt). memoirs and correspondence of lord castlereagh, series iii. vol. ii. p. . the italics are mine. [ ] castlereagh to the british commissioners, july , . castlereagh's memoirs and correspondence, series iii. vol. ii. p. . [ ] ibid., aug. , , pp. , . [ ] castlereagh to liverpool, paris, aug. , . castlereagh memoirs, p. . [ ] note of the british commissioners, aug. , . american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . my italics. [ ] castlereagh to liverpool, aug. , . castlereagh memoirs, series iii. vol. ii. p. . [ ] liverpool to castlereagh, sept. , . castlereagh papers mss. [ ] castlereagh memoirs, etc., series iii. vol. ii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. pp. - . [ ] castlereagh to liverpool, august . memoirs, etc., series iii. vol. ii. p. . [ ] liverpool to castlereagh, september , castlereagh papers mss. [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] bathurst to castlereagh, sept. , . castlereagh papers mss. [ ] castlereagh memoirs, series iii. vol. ii. p. . [ ] liverpool to castlereagh, september . castlereagh papers mss. [ ] september . ibid. [ ] castlereagh memoirs, series iii. vol. ii. p. . [ ] liverpool to castlereagh, sept. , . castlereagh papers mss. [ ] ante, p. ; and , note. [ ] liverpool to castlereagh, oct. . castlereagh papers mss. [ ] liverpool to castlereagh, oct. , . ibid. [ ] bathurst to castlereagh, oct. , . castlereagh papers mss. [ ] castlereagh papers mss. [ ] castlereagh to sir h. wellesley, sept. , . memoirs, series iii. vol. ii. p. . [ ] liverpool to castlereagh, nov. , . castlereagh papers mss. [ ] wellington to liverpool, nov. , . castlereagh memoirs, series iii. vol. ii. p. . [ ] castlereagh to wellington, nov. , . castlereagh memoirs, series iii. vol. ii. p. . [ ] wellington to liverpool, nov. and , . ibid., pp. , . [ ] liverpool to castlereagh, nov. , . castlereagh mss. [ ] wellington to liverpool, nov. , . castlereagh letters, series iii. vol. ii. p. . [ ] wellington to liverpool, nov. , . castlereagh memoirs, series iii. vol. ii. p. . [ ] liverpool to castlereagh, nov. , . castlereagh mss. [ ] bathurst to the commissioners, dec. , . castlereagh memoirs, series iii. vol. ii. p. . [ ] american state papers, foreign relations, vol. iii. p. . [ ] castlereagh memoirs, series iii. vol. ii. p. . [ ] liverpool to castlereagh, nov. , . castlereagh mss. [ ] ibid., dec. , . castlereagh mss. [ ] the contemporary name of the political party to which jefferson, madison, and gallatin belonged. [ ] writings of gallatin, may , , vol. i. p. . index _actions, land._ i.: detroit, ; queenston, ; niagara, ; frenchtown, . ii.: york [toronto], , ; fort george, ; sackett's harbor, ; stony creek, ; beaver dam, ; fort meigs, ; fort stephenson, ; the thames, ; chrystler's farm, ; chippewa, ; lundy's lane, ; fort erie, , ; bladensburg, ; plattsburg, ; new orleans, . _actions, naval._ i.: elliott's capture of "caledonia" and "detroit," ; "constitution" and "guerrière," ; "frolic" and "wasp," ; "macedonian" and "united states," . ii.: "constitution" and "java," ; "hornet" and "peacock," ; squadron engagements on lake ontario, , august , ; september , ; september , ; battle of lake erie, ; "chesapeake" and "shannon," ; "boxer" and "enterprise," ; "argus" and "pelican," ; "essex" with "phoebe" and "cherub," ; "wasp" and "reindeer," ; "wasp" and "avon," ; "epervier" and "peacock," ; battle of lake champlain, ; gunboat squadron on lake borgne, ; "president" with british squadron, ; "constitution" with "cyane" and "levant," ; "hornet" and "penguin," . _actions, privateer._ ii.: "globe" with british packets, ; "decatur" and "dominica," ; "comet" and "hibernia," ; "saucy jack" and "pelham," ; "saucy jack" with "volcano" and "golden fleece," ; "kemp" with seven british merchantmen, ; "chasseur" and "st. lawrence," . _acts of congress._ to protect american shipping, i. , ; non-importation act, against great britain, april, , , , ; embargo act, december , , ; act for the better enforcement of the embargo, january , , ; partial repeal of embargo act--"non-intercourse" act against great britain and france, march , , , , , ; act repealing non-intercourse act, with a substitute, may , , , ; supplementary act, reviving non-intercourse against great britain alone, march , , , ; embargo act for ninety days, war measure, april , , ; declaration of war, june , , . _adams, john._ minister to great britain. french colonial principles, i. ; british interest in navigation, , (and note); public opinion in england, as observed by him, , , , , ; remonstrates against impressment of american seamen, ; president of united states, instructs against impressment, ; care for the navy, ii. . _adams, john quincy._ senator from massachusetts. opinions as to orders in council, i. - ; opinions on a navy, ; minister to russia, ii. ; commissioner to treat for peace, . "_adams._" american frigate. blockaded in potomac, ii. , - , ; escapes, ; cruise of, , ; runs ashore on isle au haut, ; takes refuge in penobscot, and destroyed to escape capture, . _allen, william h._ commander, u.s.n. commands "argus," ii. ; killed in action, . "_america._" private armed ship, i. ; ii. . "_argus._" american brig of war, i. - ; captured by "pelican," ii. . _armstrong, john._ u.s. minister to france at the time of the berlin decree, i. - , , , - , , . advice to eustis, secretary of war, before the outbreak of hostilities, , . secretary of war, , , , , - , - , , , , (note), , - , , , . "_avon._" british brig of war. sunk by u.s.s. "reindeer," ii. . _bainbridge, william._ captain, u.s.n. applies for furlough, because of the condition of the navy, i. ; opinion as to employment of navy in war, ; mentions public opinion in boston, ; commands squadron, ; his plans for the cruise, ii. ; captures java, ; instructions to lawrence for cruise of "hornet," ; returns to the united states, ; commands boston navy yard, , , . _barclay, robert h._ commander, r.n. sent to lakes by warren, ii. ; ordered by yeo to command on lake erie, ; difficulty in reaching his command, ; operations prior to battle of lake erie, , - ; battle of lake erie, ; merits of his conduct, . _barclay, thomas._ british consul-general at new york. on impressment question, i. , ; on effects of embargo on seamen, . _barlow, joel._ u.s. minister to france, in succession to armstrong, i. , , , - . _barney, joshua._ commodore by courtesy. commands privateer "rossie," i. - ; commands chesapeake flotilla, ii. - ; gallant conduct of himself and men at bladensburg, , . _bassano, duke of._ french minister of foreign affairs. presents to the american minister the spurious decree of april , , i. . _bathurst, earl._ british secretary for war and colonies. quoted, ii. , (note), , , , , , , , . _berkeley, george c._ vice-admiral, r.n., commanding north american station. issues the order to search the u.s.s. "chesapeake," i. ; recalled from his command in consequence, , but given within a year the important command at lisbon, ; british government refuses further punishment for his action, . _biddle, james._ commander, u.s.n. commands "hornet" when she captures "penguin," ii. . _black rock._ selected by elliott as american naval station on lake erie, i. , ; changed by chauncey, ; mentioned in operations, , , , ; ii. , , , , , . _blakely, johnstone._ commander, u.s.n. commands "enterprise," ii. ; commands "wasp," ; captures "reindeer," ; sinks "avon," ; lost at sea, . _blockades._ general principle determining legality of, i. , , ; position of united states concerning, defined, ; that of may , , illustrates difference between united states and great britain, ; napoleon's definition of the right of blockade, - ; marshall, in , and pinkney, , incidentally support napoleon's view, , ; effect of this view upon sea power, and upon great britain, ; effect upon the civil war of the united states, had it been conceded, ; the orders in council of are admitted by great britain to usurp the privileges of, without complying with the obligations, ; though modelled on the general plan of, ; distinction between military and commercial, ; in essence and effect, a form of commerce destruction, ; as such, the weapon of the stronger, ; of chesapeake and delaware,--commercial,--by british, notified, december , , ii. ; extended to coast south of narragansett bay, march and november , , ; to whole united states coast, april and may, , ; the last a defiance in form of the united states claim concerning, ; effects of the british commercial, upon united states, - , - ; american definition of, rejected as inadmissible at the treaty of peace, . "_boxer._" british brig of war. captured by "enterprise," ii. . see also note to chap. xiii. _brock, isaac._ british general. lieutenant governor, and military commander in upper canada, i. ; his professional opinions, , ; his successful action against hull for the preservation of the northwest, - ; returns to the niagara frontier, ; killed in action at queenston, . _broke, philip b.v._ captain, r.n. commands frigate "shannon"; senior officer of vessels of new york, i. ; accompanies west india convoy, ; chase of "constitution," ; blockading boston, ii. ; singular merit of, ; sends challenge to lawrence, ; action with, and capture of, u.s.s. "chesapeake," . _brown, jacob._ american general. first in the militia, successfully defends sackett's harbor, ii. ; appointed brigadier general in the army, ; stationed at sackett's harbor, , ; campaign on niagara peninsula, - ; wounded at lundy's lane, ; defence of fort erie, - ; returns to sackett's at end of the campaign, . _burrows, william._ lieutenant, u.s.n. commands "enterprise" when she captures "boxer," ii. ; killed in the action, . "_caledonia._" british armed brig on lakes. aids at capture of mackinac, i. ; captured by lieutenant elliott, ; takes part as american in battle of lake erie, ii. ; lost, . _calhoun, john c._ member of american congress. confidence concerning the conquest of canada, i. . _campbell, hugh g._ captain, u.s.n., commanding georgia coast district. reports on coast conditions, ii. , , , , , . _canada._ expected by british writers to take the place of the united states in supplying west indies, i. , ; unable to do so, , ; benefited, however, by enforcement of navigation laws against the united states, , ; propriety of invasion of by the united states, in , considered, - ; object of invasion of, defined by monroe, ; how regarded in england, ii. . _canning, george._ british secretary of state for foreign affairs. takes office, i. ; statement as to the british right of impressment from foreign merchant vessels, ; refusal to re-open treaty negotiations with monroe and pinkney, ; characteristics of his letters, ; negotiations with monroe, concerning the "chesapeake" affair, - ; instructions to erskine, for proposals to united states, - ; erskine's action disavowed by, and jackson sent in place, ; misquotation of, by robert smith, american secretary of state, , ; duel with castlereagh, ; succeeded in office by lord wellesley, . _carden, john s._ captain, r.n. commands "macedonian" captured by "united states," i. . _castlereagh, lord._ british secretary of state for foreign affairs. duel with canning, i. ; remains in office after perceval's assassination, ; opinion on political movements in united states immediately before war, ; concerning napoleon's alleged decree of april , , ; instructions to the peace commission at ghent, - ; quoted in connection with the peace negotiations, , , , , , . _chalmers, george._ british writer on political and economical subjects. quoted, i. , , , , , , (note). _champagny, duc de cadore._ french minister of foreign affairs. quoted in connection with napoleon's decrees, i. . , ; celebrated letter of, august , , ; accepted by american government as a valid revocation of the decrees, ; discussion of, - ; rejected as a revocation by great britain, . _champlain, lake._ natural highway to canada, i. ; neglected by american government in , i. , ; ii. , ; not under chauncey's command, i. ; events on, and , ii. - ; sir george prevost's expedition, - ; battle of lake champlain, - ; effects of battle on conditions of peace, (see also - ). _chauncey, isaac._ captain, u.s.n. ordered to command on lakes erie and ontario, i. , ; early measures of preparation, - ; cruises in , , ; lays up for the winter, ; preparations on lake erie, - ; commander perry ordered as second to, ; effects of energy of, ii. ; first plan of campaign, , ; second plan, ; comment upon, ; expedition against york, ; operations about niagara peninsula, - ; impression produced on, by attack on sackett's harbor, ; naval campaign of, , july -september , - , - ; engagements with british squadron, august , - ; september , ; september , ; professional characteristics shown, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , - , - , , ; recommendations for campaign of , ; singular inaction of, in june and july, , - ; controversy with general brown, - ; correspondence of department with, ; decatur ordered to relieve, ; subsequent movements of, - , . "_cherub._" british sloop of war. takes part in attack on "essex," ii. - . _chesapeake bay._ blockade of, ii. ; operations in, , , - , - ; singular contraband trade in, , - ; military exposure of, , , ; operations in, , - . "_chesapeake._" american frigate. attack upon by british ship of war "leopard," i. , , ; negotiations concerning the affair, - , , , ; settlement of, ; cruise of, in , ii. ; action with, and capture by, the "shannon," - . _cheves, langdon._ member of american congress. report recommending increase of navy, i. - . _clay, henry._ member of american congress. favors increase of navy, i. ; expects rapid conquest of canada, ; calculations on bonaparte's success in russia, ; appointed peace commissioner at ghent, ii. . _cochrane, sir alexander._ vice-admiral, r.n. appointed commander-in-chief on the american station, in succession to warren, ii. , (note); his retaliatory order for the burning of newark, - ; operations in the chesapeake, , - ; plans for action against new orleans, - ; operations against new orleans and mobile, - ; capture of fort bowyer, mobile, . _cockburn, george._ rear admiral, r.n. second in command to warren, ii. ; expedition to the upper chesapeake, , , ; in the potomac, ; american vessel licensed by, ; attack at ocracoke inlet, n.c., ; at capture of washington, , ; expedition against cumberland island, georgia, . _colonies._ relations of colonies to mother countries in respect to trade, during the period of american dependence, i. - ; montesquieu's phrase, ; bryan edwards' statement, ; john adams' observation, ; supposed effect of, upon the carrying trade, , , , , ; and naval power, , ; the _entrepôt_ monopoly, derived from colonial system, , , ; renewed by the orders in council of , ; characteristics of the west india group of colonies, , , and of those now the united states, , ; their mutual relations, as colonies, , , ; the imperial inter-action of the mother country, and the two groups of colonies, , , ; british hopes of reinstating this condition, after the revolution, by substituting canada and nova scotia for the lost continental colonies, , ; effect of colonial traditions upon events subsequent to american independence, - , - ; tendency to reimpose colonial restriction upon the new states, a cause of war of , , , , - , , . _committee_, of the privy council of great britain, . report on the conditions of british commerce since the independence of the united states, and the probable effect of american legislation for the protection of american carrying trade, i. - . "_constellation._" american frigate. hopelessly blockaded in norfolk throughout the war, ii. , , . "_constitution._" american frigate. chased by british squadron, i. ; captures the "guerrière," i. - ; the "java," ii. - ; the "cyane" and "levant," - . _continental._ distinctive significance of the term, applied to the colonial system of great britain in north america, i. ; bermuda and the bahamas reckoned officially among the continental colonies, (note). _continental system_ of napoleon. extraordinary political character of, defined, i. , , ; co-operation of the united states desired in, ; and practically given by the united states, . _cooper, james fenimore._ american naval historian. quoted, ii. - , (note), , , , , (note). _craney island_, near norfolk. attack on by the british, in , ii. - . _croghan, george._ major, u.s. army. gallant defence of fort stephenson, , ii. ; commands troops in the abortive military and naval expedition against michilimackinac, , . "_cyane._" british ship of war. captured by the "constitution," ii. - . _dacres, james r._ captain, r.n., commanding "guerrière." his defence before the court martial, i. . _dearborn, henry._ american general. appointed, i. ; age, ; characterized by a british officer, ; negotiates a suspension of hostilities, which is disapproved, ; inactivity, ; ii. , , ; apprehensions, ii. , ; relieved from command, . _decatur, stephen._ captain, u.s.n. commands a squadron, i. ; plan for employment of the navy in war, , ; accompanies john rodgers on the first cruise of the war, - ; sails on an independent cruise, , , ; action between the "united states" and "macedonian," ; in unable to get to sea with a squadron, ii. , , which is blocked in new london for the rest of the war, ; ordered to relieve chauncey on the lakes, ; appointed to command frigate "president," ; action with "endymion," ; surrenders to british squadron, - . _decrees, napoleon's._ berlin, november , , i. - ; its design, and counter design of great britain, ; rigid enforcement of, ; milan, december , , , , (note), ; bayonne, april , , , ; rambouillet, march , , , ; alleged revocation of, by champagny's letter of august , , - ; spurious decree of april , , . _delaware bay._ blockade of, and operations in, ii. , , - . _dent, john h._ captain, u.s.n., commanding south carolina coast district. reports on coast conditions, ii. , , (and note), . "_detroit._" british armed brig (late american "adams"). captured by elliott on lake erie, i. - . "_detroit._" british flagship at battle of lake erie, ii. , ; condition when surrendered, . _direct trade._ to foreign countries, forbidden to colonies, i. - ; common practice of all maritime states, , ; stress laid upon this idea in great britain, , , , , ; question of what constitutes, ; decision adverse to american navigation, by sir william scott, ; practical effect of the decision, . _downie, george._ commander, r.n. commands the british squadron on lake champlain, ii. - ; his plan of action, ; killed in the battle, . _drummond, sir gordon._ civil and military governor of upper canada, ii. ; his plans for the winter of - , - ; his appreciations of the strength of kingston and of sackett's harbor, ; dependence upon the control of the water, i. , ; ii. , - , - , - ; comments on american troops, ; campaign of --arrival at york, ; plan of action, - ; battle of lundy's lane, - ; assault on fort erie, ; american sortie against, ; line of the "chippewa," , - . _elliott, jesse d._ commander u.s.n. serves under chauncey on the lake, i. , ; captures british brigs "caledonia" and "detroit," ; selects black rock for naval station on lake erie, ; ordered as second to perry, on lake erie, ii. ; conduct in the battle, - , - , ; in command on lake erie, after perry's detachment, . _embargo_, of . approved by president jefferson, december , , i. ; its aims, - ; its effects in the united states, - ; upon west indies, - ; upon canada and nova scotia, ; upon great britain, , ; act for better enforcement, january , , ; repeal of, ; embargo of , for ninety days, . "_endymion._" british frigate. her action with the "president," ii. - . "_enterprise._" american brig of war, ii. , , - ; capture of british brig "boxer," . _entrepôt._ significance of the term, and advantage to commerce, i. ; conspicuous part in colonial regulation, , - ; underlying relation to orders in council of , . "_enumerated_" articles. definition of, i. . "_epervier._" british sloop of war. captured by the "peacock," ii. - . _erie, town of._ selected by chauncey for naval station on lake erie, i. ; advantages and drawbacks, ; british designs against, ii. . _erskine, david m._ british minister to washington. exceeds his instructions in negotiating, i. - ; disavowed and recalled, ; succeeded by francis j. jackson, . "_essex._" american frigate. captain porter's dissatisfaction with, ii. , ; sails, but fails to join bainbridge's squadron, ; goes to the pacific, ; cruise in the pacific, ; action with, and capture by, british ships "phoebe" and "cherub," - . _europe._ conditions in, as affecting war in america, i. - , - , , ; ii. - , , - , (and note), , , - , - , - ; effect upon the peace negotiations, ii. , , , , - , - , . _fox, charles james._ british secretary for foreign affairs. takes office, i. ; negotiations with monroe concerning "direct" trade, ; connection with blockade of may , , ; illness and death, - . "_frolic._" british brig of war. captured by "wasp," - ; recaptured, . "_frolic._" american sloop of war, named after above. captured by "orpheus," ii. (note), (note). _gallattin, albert._ american secretary of the treasury. concerning the embargo of , i. , , , ; concerning non-intercourse act, ; conversation with turreau, concerning erskine's proposition, ; report on the finances, immediately before the war, ; opinion as to privateering, ; observations as to feeling in england, , ii. , ; appointed peace commissioner, ; opinion as to the effect of the war upon the nation, - . _gambier, lord._ british admiral. peace commissioner at ghent, . _gaston, william._ representative from north carolina. speech on allegiance and impressment, i. - , , . _ghent._ negotiations at, and treaty of, ii. - ; names of commissioners, , ; terms of, - ; signature and ratification of, - . _goulburn, henry._ british peace commissioner at ghent, ii. . _grenville, lord._ british secretary for foreign affairs. correspondence with rufus king concerning impressment, i. - , - . "_guerrière._" british frigate. captured by the "constitution," i. - . "_guerrière._" american, named after above. command declined by decatur for reasons, i. ; ii. . _gunboats._ jefferson's sole naval dependence on, i. ; ii. - ; nautical disqualifications of, , , ; extravagant expense of, , ; ii. ; proclaim a merely defensive policy, ; demoralizing effect upon officers and crews, ii. , ; committed in war to officers not of regular navy, , - ; general uselessness in war, , , , , , , , , ; gallant defence of the "asp," , and of the lake borgne flotilla, - . _halifax._ benefited by american embargo and war of , i. ; ii. , ; importance relative to trade routes, and cruising, i. , . _hampton._ town in virginia. local military importance of, ii. , ; attack on, . _hampton, wade._ american general. commands lake champlain district, , ii. ; to co-operate with wilkinson, ; fails to join, and retires on plattsburg, , . _harrison, william h._ american general. succeeds to hull's command, i. ; plans of campaign, , , overthrown by winchester's disaster at frenchtown, ; remains on defensive awaiting naval control of lakes, ; resumes operations after perry's victory, ii. ; wins battle of the thames, ; transferred to niagara, , and thence to sackett's harbor, . _harvey, j._ lieutenant-colonel, british army. suggests and conducts decisive attack at stony creek, ii. - . quoted, , . _hillyar, james._ captain, r.n. commands frigate "phoebe," ii. ; in company with "cherub" captures u.s.s. "essex," - . "_hornet._" american sloop of war. captures the "peacock," ii. ; sails with decatur's squadron, , and driven into new london, , ; escapes thence to new york, sails again, , and captures, "penguin," - . _hull, isaac._ captain, u.s.n. commands "constitution," i. ; chased by british squadron, ; sails from boston on a cruise, ; captures "guerrière," - ; commanding portsmouth yard, reports on coastwise conditions, ii. , , , . _hull, william._ american general. appointed brigadier general, i. ; his letter setting forth military conditions prior to war, ; his campaign, - , and surrender, . _impressment._ a principal cause of war of , i. ; statement of the british claim, ; counter-claim of american government, , ; american people not unanimous in support, , ; opinions of morris, gaston, and strong, - ; not mentioned in jay's instructions, , ; made pre-eminent in those to monroe and pinkney, , ; historical summary of the controversy, to , - ; treaty of december , , does not provide for, satisfactorily, ; rejected therefore by jefferson, ; a real cause of the war, though so denied by some, - ; american demand revived in connection with the "chesapeake" affair, ; great britain refuses to mingle the two questions, ; numbers of american seamen alleged to have been impressed, , (and note); demand renewed, coincident with a proposal looking to peace after the declaration of war, ii. ; great britain again refuses, ; stated as a _sine quâ non_ in reply to british propositions made through admiral warren, i. ; embodied in instructions to peace commissioners, ii. - ; again refused by great britain, ; abandoned by the american government, in consequence of the pressure of the war, ii. (and note), , . _indians_, american. estimated importance of, in consideration of war, i. - , , ; ii. , , ; effect upon hull, in surrendering, ; instability of, , ; ii. , , , , , ; desire of british officials to secure them in their possessions at the peace, ii. , (note), ; the consequent effect upon the peace negotiations, - ; not included, as parties to the treaty, . _izard, george._ american general. relieves wilkinson in command of champlain district, ii. ; action first intended for, ; his reports of conditions, - , ; his preparations about plattsburg, , ; ordered to proceed to brown's assistance on niagara frontier, - ; his march thither, - , ; proceedings about niagara, - ; blows up fort erie and retreats to new york side, . _jackson, andrew._ american general. takes pensacola, ii. ; goes to new orleans, ; operations about new orleans, - . _jackson, francis j._ british minister to the united states. appointed, with special powers, i. ; negotiations at washington, - ; american government declines further intercourse with, ; discussion of the correspondence, - ; british government declines to censure, , . _james, william._ british naval historian. quoted, i. , , , ; ii. , , , , (note), , (and note), , , (note), , (note), , (note), , , (note), (note). "_java._" british frigate. captured by "constitution," ii. - . _jay, john._ chief justice of the united states supreme court. epochal significance of treaty with great britain negotiated by, i. ; appointed special envoy, ; occasion for the mission, , ; character of the negotiation, - ; the treaty a temporary arrangement, ; ratified, with an omission, . _jefferson, thomas._ american secretary of state. opinion as to the importance of navigation to national defence, i. ; unflattering opinion of british policy, ; favors coercive retaliation in matters of commerce and navigation, ; principle as to impressment enunciated by, . president of the united states. broad principle as to impressment asserted by, i. ; expectations of commercial concessions from great britain, , ; aversion to military and naval preparations, , , , , , , , ; ii. - ; reliance upon commercial coercion, ; refuses approval of treaty of december , , because without stipulation against impressment, ; consistency of position in regard to impressment, - ; action in the "chesapeake" affair, - ; endeavors to utilize it to obtain relinquishment of impressment, ; recommends a general embargo, ; expectations of, from the embargo, (and note); dislike to the carrying trade, , and to great britain, - ; gunboat policy of, , , ; ii. - ; embarrassment in executing embargo, i. ; tenacious adherence to the embargo policy, ; views as to american neutral waters, . after leaving office. opinion as to cause of erskine's arrangement, , i. ; on bonaparte's policy, ; favors keeping navy under cover during war, ; expectations as to easy conquest of canada, . _jones, jacob._ commander, u.s.n., commanding "wasp." captures "frolic," i. - ; taken by british seventy-four, ; commands frigate "macedonian" (as captain), ii. ; expectations of escape, deceived, ; sails with decatur, , and blockaded in new london, . _jones, thomas ap catesby._ lieutenant, u.s.n. commands gunboat flotilla in lake borgne and mississippi sound, ii. ; overpowered, wounded, and captured by superior enemy's force, . _jones, william._ secretary of the navy. commercial estimate of privateering by, i. ; judicious reply to perry's request for detachment, ii. ; comments on the effects of gunboat service on naval officers, , ; stigmatizes american intercourse with enemy, and issues order to prevent, ; recommends to congress procurement of naval schooners for commerce destroying, ; recommendation of chauncey to congress, , ; anxious correspondence with chauncey, , ; naval force available for defence of washington, stated by, . _keane, john._ british general. in temporary command of the expedition against new orleans, . _king, rufus._ american minister to great britain. appointed, i. ; negotiations concerning impressment, - , - . _kingston_, canada. strategic importance of, i. - ; ii. , , ; operations contemplated against, ii. - , - , - , . _lakes, the great._ strategic importance of, in war of , i. - , , ; ii. , - , - , - , - , , - , - ; decisive positions upon, i. - ; hull's exposition of effect of naval predominance on, ; madison's admission concerning, ; improved conditions on, through chauncey's energy, - ; control of, dependent on naval force, , ; ii. - , - , - , - , - ; minor naval events on, i. - ; ii. - ; british demands concerning, in the negotiations for peace, ii. - , , , . _lambert, henry._ captain, r.n. commands "java" when taken by the "constitution," ii. ; mortally wounded in the action, . _lambert, sir john._ british general. joins new orleans expedition two days before the assault, ii. ; succeeds to command upon pakenham's death, - ; proceeds against and captures fort bowyer, in mobile bay, . _lawrence, james._ captain, u.s.n. commands "hornet" in bainbridge's squadron, i. ; sails in company with "constitution," ii. ; challenges "bonne citoyenne," ; sinks the "peacock," ; returns to united states, ; ordered to command "chesapeake," ; nature of his orders, - ; action with, and captured by, "shannon," - ; mortally wounded, ; examination of his conduct, - . "_levant._" british sloop of war. captured by "constitution," ii. - ; recaptured by british squadron, (note). _lewis, morgan._ american general, ii. ; temporarily succeeds dearborn in command at niagara, . _licenses._ british to american merchant vessels, i. - ; for the supply of armies in spanish peninsula, i. , - ; ii. , , , - . _liverpool, earl of._ prime minister of great britain. quotations from correspondence of, relative to the peace negotiations, chap. xviii., ii. - . _macdonough, thomas._ captain, u.s.n. commands flotilla on lake champlain, ii. ; operations prior to prevost's invasion, - ; preparations for battle, - , - , ; wins battle of lake champlain, - ; effects of the victory, - , , - ; news of the victory received in london, . "_macedonian._" british frigate. captured by the united states, i. - . "_macedonian._" american frigate (captured as above). unable to get to sea, ii. , and blockaded in new london during the war, - . _macomb, alexander._ american general. left by izard in command at plattsburg, ii. ; operations before, and at, plattsburg, - ; opinions of, as to distance of macdonough's squadron from the shore batteries, . _m'clure, george._ american, general of n.y. militia. left in command of niagara frontier, ii. ; difficulties of situation of, ; retreats to american side of river, ; burns canadian village of newark, ; this action of, disavowed by the government, . _madison, james._ secretary of state, and president of the united states. close association of, with events leading to war of , and summary of its cause, i. ; characterization of, ; discussion of questions of blockade, , ; pronouncement on impressment, , , ; instructions to monroe and pinkney to reopen negotiations, , ; narrow outlook of, ; opinion of the berlin decree, , ; upon the rule of , ; instructions to monroe by, in the "chesapeake" affair, , ; object of jefferson's course in that affair, stated by, ; use of the affair, made by, ; explanation of the motive of the embargo of by, ; relation of, to non-intercourse act, ; misled (as president) in negotiations with erskine, - ; proclamation, renewing intercourse with great britain, ; annulled, ; negotiations with jackson, erskine's successor, - ; declines further communication with jackson, ; special supervision of this correspondence by, ; interpretation of british motive for erskine's supposed concession, ; accepts champagny's letter as an actual revocation of napoleon's decrees, and so proclaims, , ; afterwards recognizes delicacy of situation thus created, ; non-intercourse with great britain revives, ; message of, to congress in special session, november , , ; recommends embargo, preparatory to war, ; identified with policy of peaceful coercion, , ; ii. , - ; sends war message to congress, and approves declaration of war, i. ; assumes only his share of responsibility for the war, ; indignation of, at british sectional blockade of coast, ; ii. ; selects dearborn and hull for general officers, i. ; failure of expectations as to hull's expedition, admitted by, ; ingenuous surprise at capitulation of michilimackinac, ; admits mistake of not securing naval command of lakes, ; military inefficiency of government under, ; ii. - , ; insists on relinquishment of impressment as a preliminary to treating for peace, i. , but obtains also from congress law excluding british-born seamen from american ships, ; to prevent clandestine supply of enemy, recommends prohibition of all export, ii. ; issues executive order to same end, ; denials of effectiveness of british blockade, ; decides to abandon demand for cessation of impressment as a condition for peace, (note); comment on armstrong's management of military operations, . _manners, william._ commander, r.n., commanding "reindeer," ii. ; skill and gallantry of, in action with "wasp," - ; killed in the action, . _maples, j.f._ commander, r.n., commanding "pelican." captures "argus," ii. - . _marshall, john._ american secretary of state under president john adams. summary of commercial injuries received from great britain, i. ; propositions to great britain concerning impressment, ; opinion concerning blockades, ; tendency of this opinion, if accepted, . (afterwards chief justice of supreme court.) _militia._ jefferson's dependence upon, i. ; ii. ; conduct of, american and canadian, i. , , , , , ; ii. , , , , , - , - , , , , , , , - , , , , (and note), , - . _monroe, james._ american minister to great britain, i. , ; reports conditions of american commerce in prosperous, , , , but changed in , ; consequent negotiations with fox, - ; pinkney appointed as colleague to, for special negotiation, ; negotiations with british ministry on impressment, - ; with pinkney signs treaty of december , , ; treaty rejected by jefferson, and new negotiations ordered, ; "chesapeake" affair intervenes, but british government eventually refuses to reopen, ; unlucky comment of, upon rule of , ; negotiations of, with canning, concerning "chesapeake" affair, - ; returns to the united states, leaving pinkney as minister, ; after return vindicates the rejected treaty, , ; proposes to jefferson, in , a special mission to france and great britain, for which he offers himself, ; becomes secretary of state, under president madison, ; correspondence, while secretary, quoted, , , ; ii. , , , , ; advanced views, for one of his party, concerning utility of a navy, i. ; on project of keeping navy in port, in war, , ; statement regarding readiness for war, . secretary of war, ii. . _montreal._ strategic importance of, i. - . _mooers, benjamin._ general, new york militia. vindicates the conduct of most part of the militia under his command, ii. (note). _morris, charles_. captain, u.s.n. (first lieutenant of the "constitution" in action with "guerrière"). commands frigate "adams," in potomac, ii. , ; services in potomac, and at annapolis, , - ; difficulty in escaping british blockade, , ; first cruise of "adams," , ; second cruise, strikes on isle au haut, takes refuge in penobscot, and burned to escape capture, - . _morris, gouverneur._ american statesman. opinion favorable to british right of impressment of british-born seamen on high seas, i. - ; opinion of the united states' ability to maintain a strong navy, ; in london, contends against impressment of americans, . _napoleon, the emperor._ issues berlin decree, i. ; purpose, as defined by himself, ; objects of, as towards the united states, , , , , , , , ; scope of berlin decree, , , , , - ; sole control of continent by, , , , , ; vigorous application of decree to american shipping, ; effects of his reverses in spain, , ; bayonne decree of, ; tenor of milan decree of, ; decree of rambouillet, - ; alleged revocation of decrees by, , , ; instances of arguments of, , ; effect of reverses in russia upon the war of , ; of downfall of, ii. , , . _navigation._ connection between naval power and, , - , ; distinction between commerce and, , . _navigation, acts of._ the formulated expression of a national need, i. ; opinion of adam smith concerning, - ; historical summary of, - ; apparent effects of, ; british national conviction concerning, - , - ; relation of colonies to system of, - ; endeavor to maintain system of, towards united states after independence, , , , , - , ; copied by french convention, ; attitude of foreigners towards, ; progress of british colonies under, - ; attitude of american colonists towards, ; lord sheffield's pamphlet upon, , , , , , , , (and note), ; inter-relations of british empire protected by, - , - , ; working of, threatened by american independence, - , ; modifications of, proposed by pitt, but rejected by country, ; dependence of, upon west indies, ; system of, continued by proclamation towards united states, - , - ; british commerce and shipping grow under this enforcement of, - ; purpose of, offensive, in military sense, ; effect of french revolution on, - ; dependence of rule of upon the system of, ; principle of rule of leads up to molestation of american navigation, and orders in council of , , - , and so to war with united states, . _navy, american._ gouverneur morris' opinion of power of united states to maintain, i. ; opinion of john quincy adams, ; recommendation of presidents washington and john adams, ii. , ; policy of president jefferson, ; i. , ; neglect of, during administrations of jefferson and madison, shown by condition of, at outbreak of war, , , , and stated by a committee of congress, , - ; madison's lukewarm mention, , ; congress on approach of war refuses to increase, ; high professional merit of officers of, - ; numbers of, as estimated by british admiralty, ii. ; total numbers of vessels in active employment, all told, from beginning of war to its conclusion, twenty-two, . _new orleans._ for battle of, see _actions, land_. "_new orleans._" ship of the line, on the lakes, ii. (note). _niagara, peninsula of._ strategic importance of, i. , - , , ; ii. - , , , ; effect of climatic conditions of, i. . _orders in council._ general definition of, i. (note); of , cause of war with united states, ; _entrepôt_ motive for, , ; of june and november, , , ; of january, , ; relations of, to rule of , ; of january, , motive of, , and renewal in , ; effect of these last upon "direct trade," ; of may, , , effect and purpose of, ; legitimacy of, denied by the united states, - , and by napoleon, who upon it bases berlin decree, ; of january, , and its effects, - ; of november, , purport of, , ; resented by united states, ; delay in communicating to american government, ; general plan of, that of blockades, ; illustrative instances of execution of, (note), , (notes); known in united states before the passage of embargo act, ; conditional offer of british government to withdraw, - ; revocation of, by substitution of order of april, , ; american expectation of revocation, in consequence of champagny's letter, ; british government declines to revoke, - ; pinkney's analysis, and condemnation, of, to wellesley, - ; wellesley's reply, ; wellesley's exposition of policy of, - ; discontent in great britain with, ; order of april , , promises revocation, conditional, ; british determination to maintain, otherwise, - ; revocation of, june, , , to date from august , , ; too late to secure peace with america, , or to restore it, - ; ii. ; compensation for seizures under, refused in peace negotiations, ii. , . _pakenham, sir edward._ british general. named to command new orleans expedition after death of ross, ii. ; instructions to, concerning conduct in louisiana, ; arrival and operations, - . _patterson, daniel t._ captain, u.s.n. commands in chief in waters of new orleans, ii. - . "_peacock._" british sloop of war. captured by "hornet," ii. - . "_peacock._" american sloop of war. captures "epervier," ii. - ; subsequent cruise of, - ; sails again, january , , . _pearson, joseph._ representative in congress from north carolina. speech on conditions of country, owing to the war, ii. . "_pelican._" british brig of war. captures american brig "argus," ii. . "_penguin._" british sloop of war. captured by "hornet," ii. . _perceval, spencer._ prime minister of great britain. murder of, and consequent confusion in the government, i. ; firm determination of, to maintain orders in council, and opinion of american resistance, . _perry, oliver h._ captain, u.s.n. applies for, and ordered to, the lakes service, i. ; assigned by chauncey to lake erie, and practical independence of action there, ; conditions of force found, , and merits of general action of, ; engaged at capture of fort george, and transfers black rock flotilla to erie, ii. ; thenceforth remains on lake erie, , but always under chauncey, ; collision of interests between the two officers, ; altercation with chauncey, ; applies to be detached, ; navy department refuses, ; exposed situation of erie, and preparations for defence, during equipment of squadron, - ; blockaded by british squadron, ; seizes opportunity of its absence, to cross bar, ; proceedings prior to battle of lake erie, - ; battle of lake erie, - ; discussion of claim to credit of, - ; consequences of success of, - ; prompt subsequent action of, ; detached from lakes service, ; engaged in harassing retreat of british squadron down the potomac, ; opinion as to qualities of smaller and larger vessels, ; detailed to command a squadron of schooners, against enemy's commerce, - . "_phoebe._" british frigate. sent to pacific with two sloops of war to capture "essex," ; with "cherub" captures "essex," - . _pinkney, william._ appointed colleague to monroe, in london, for special negotiations, i. ; course of negotiations, - ; signs treaty of december , , ; remains as minister, after monroe's return, ; quoted in connection with mission, , , , , , , , , , ; party relations, ; early forwards a copy of orders in council of november , , (note); letter of secretary of state to, communicating dismissal of jackson by u.s. government, - ; communicates the same to the british government, ; construes champagny's letter to revoke french decrees, and demands recall of british orders in council, ; letter to british secretary for foreign affairs, analyzing and condemning system of orders in council, ; conditional instructions to, to present recall, ; dilatory course of wellesley towards, ; presents recall, ; returns to the united states, ; no successor to, till after the war, . _pitt, william._ prime minister of great britain. popularity of, i. ; as chancellor of exchequer, , introduces bill favorable to united states, for regulating commerce, ; controversy over bill, ; measure then dropped, , ; concession becomes possible to, , ; return to power, in , ; new measures of, due to popular discontents, - ; remark to gouverneur morris, concerning impressment difficulties, ; death of, . _porter, david._ captain, u.s.n. commands frigate "essex," i. ; ii. - , ; cruise of "essex," in pacific, ii. - ; action with, and capture by, "phoebe" and "cherub," - ; approves of commerce destroying by naval armed schooners, appointed to command a squadron of them, and draws up plan of operations, ; engaged in harassing retreat of british frigates in potomac, . _porter, peter b._ representative in congress from new york, and general of new york militia. testimony at trial of general hull, i. ; duel with general smyth, ; tribute to gallantry of naval detachment at niagara, ; engaged at chippewa, ii. , on niagara peninsula, , and lundy's lane, . "_president._" american frigate. rencounter with british sloop of war "little belt," i. - ; cruises under command of commodore rodgers, i. - , - ; ii. - ; sails under decatur, ; capture of, by british squadron, - . _prevost, sir george._ british general. governor of nova scotia, reports failure of american embargo, i. . governor-general of canada, and commander-in-chief, reports british naval superiority on lakes, , i. ; statements of effect of naval control on operations, ; ii. , , , - , - ; negotiates suspension of hostilities with dearborn, i. - ; instructs brock to forbear offensive, , ; visit of, to kingston, february, , effect of, on american plans, ii. ; attack on sackett's harbor by, in conjunction with yeo, - ; instructions to procter, at malden, , and to de rottenburg, at niagara, ; submits plan for securing territories in united states to indian allies of great britain, (note); calls upon admiral cochrane to inflict retaliation for unauthorized burning by americans in canada, , ; receives large re-enforcements from wellington's peninsular army, - , with instructions for operations, ; reasons for advancing by new york side of lake champlain, instead of through vermont, ; advance upon plattsburg, - ; awaits the arrival of british squadron before attacking, - ; reason for desiring a joint attack by army and navy, (note); correspondence with captain downie, commanding the squadron, - ; charges against, by naval officers of the squadron, , ; retreats after squadron's defeat, ; summoned home under charges, but dies before trial, . retreat of, after the naval defeat, endorsed by wellington, . _pring, daniel._ commander, r.n. attached to lake service, lake champlain, ; operations on, - , ; second in command at battle of lake champlain, - . _privateering._ employment of a sea-militia force, requiring little antecedent training, i. ; recourse of the weaker belligerent, ; aptitude of americans for, ; extemporized character of early, in war of , ; opinions concerning nature of, of secretaries gallatin and jones, ; susceptible of business regulation and direction, , ; ii. , , ; energy of american, noted by warren, i. - ; effect of, upon regular navy, ii. ; a secondary operation of war, not in itself decisive, ; primary object of, - , ; details of methods pursued, in , , , , ; comparison of, with a regular naval service, in motive, and inefficiency for the particular object of commerce destroying, - ; a popular effort in war of , independent of government initiative, ; development and systematization of, towards end of war, - , . _privateers_ mentioned by name: "america," i. ; ii. ; "chasseur," ii. - ; "comet," ii. ; "decatur," ii. ; "globe," ii. - ; "governor tompkins," ii. ; "kemp," ii. ; "leo," ii. ; "lion," ii. ; "mammoth," ii. ; "rapid," i. ; "rattlesnake," ii. ; "rossie," i. - ; "saucy jack," ii. - ; "scourge," ii. ; "true-blooded yankee," ii. ; "yankee," ii. . number and classes of, ii. - . combats, of. see _actions, privateer_. _prizes_ taken by americans in first three months of war, and in what localities taken, i. - ; taken by british in same period, - ; at later period of war, ; transition period of prize-taking, january-june, , ii. ; estimate of relative losses by the two belligerents, - ; compilation of lists, by niles' register, ; overlooked significance of the greater british losses, , ; limited success of american frigates in taking, to what attributable, ; taken by american cruisers, in latter part of war, - ; in west indies, ; total number taken throughout the war, by american naval vessels, and by privateers, - . _proclamation._ commerce between great britain and america, regulated by, - , i. - ; issued by jefferson excluding british armed vessels from american waters, after "chesapeake" affair, - ; royal, directing commanders of british naval vessels to impress british-born seamen found in foreign merchant ships, and denying efficacy of naturalization papers to discharge from allegiance, ; by jefferson, against combinations to defy embargo laws, ; by madison, permitting renewal of trade with great britain, , and withdrawn, ; by madison, announcing revocation of napoleon's decrees, . _procter, henry._ british general. as colonel, in command of fort malden, i. ; acts against hull's communications, ; instructions from brock, after fall of detroit, ; compels surrender of winchester's detachment at frenchtown, ; subsequent action, ; ii. , ; attack on fort meigs, ; project against erie, ; baffled at fort stephenson, ; upon harrison's approach, after battle of lake erie, evacuates detroit and malden, retreating up valley of the thames, and defeated at moravian town, ; reaches british lines at burlington, with remnant of his force, . _quincy, josiah._ representative in congress from massachusetts. defines position of new england concerning orders in council and impressment questions, i. - ; disproves the accuracy of the charge brought by the administration against the british minister, jackson, ; supports the report for increase of navy, ; predicts that a suitable naval establishment would be a unifying force in national politics, ; sends word to seaports of intended embargo of april, , . "_rattlesnake._" american brig of war. particulars of cruise of, ii. - . _reeves._ british writer on the navigation laws, quoted, i. , , , , , , (note). "_reindeer._" british sloop of war. captured by "wasp," ii. . _riall, phineas._ british general, commanding on niagara frontier, december, . captures fort niagara, and raids successfully western new york, burning towns in retaliation for the burning of newark, ii. - ; in , suggests destruction of fort niagara, ; at chippewa and lundy's lane, with intervening operations, - , - ; wounded and captured at lundy's lane, . _rodgers, john._ captain, u.s.n. encounter with british sloop "little belt," i. - ; commands a squadron at declaration of war, ; opinion as to proper mode of using navy against enemy's commerce, - ; ii. - , ; orders of navy department to, ; sails with squadron on the first cruise of the war, ; incidents, - , and effects, direct and indirect, of first cruise of, - ; effects of second cruise, - ; incidents of second cruise, with "president" and "congress," - ; incidents of third cruise, in "president" alone, ii. - ; after fourth cruise, enters new york, and turns over command of "president" to decatur, i. . employed in potomac river, harassing retreat of british squadron from alexandria, . _rose, george h._ british special envoy to washington for settlement of "chesapeake" affair, i. - ; failure of mission, . _ross, robert._ british general employed in chesapeake expedition. instructions issued to, ii. ; capture of washington, - ; killed in advance against baltimore, ; instructions to, for new orleans expedition, - ; sanguine expectations of, after capture of washington, - ; succeeded by sir edward pakenham for new orleans expedition, , . _rottenburg, de._ british general in command on niagara frontier june, , ii. ; declines to detach to aid of procter and barclay on lake erie, ; proceeds to kingston, with re-enforcements, in anticipation of american attack, - ; despatches detachment in pursuit of wilkinson's movement down the st. lawrence, . _russell, jonathan._ american _chargé d'affaires_ in france, after armstrong's departure, i. ; correspondence with american and french governments relative to the alleged repeal of the french decrees, quoted, , , ; transferred as _chargé_ to london, ; correspondence as such with american and british governments, quoted, , , - ; opinion of the alleged french decree of april , , , ; negotiation with castlereagh, after declaration of war, looking to suspension of hostilities, ii. - ; appointed additional peace commissioner at ghent, . _russia._ offers in mediation between great britain and united states, ii. ; accepted by united states, but rejected by great britain, ; attitude of czar towards america, - , . _sackett's harbor._ american naval station on lake ontario. conditions at, i. , , , , ; ii. , , , - , - , , , , , , , ; ships constructed at, , , ; ii. , , , , (note); attack upon, by prevost and yeo, ii. - ; brown's march from, to niagara frontier, ; yeo's blockade of, , abandoned, ; izard's march to, on way to support brown at niagara, - ; chauncey retires finally to, after launch of the british "st. lawrence," ; destruction of, prescribed to prevost by instructions, in , , ; yeo's observations at, (note). _seaboard, united states._ conditions on, i. - , , - , , , - ; ii. - , - , - , - , - , ; chesapeake and delaware bays, , ii. - ; three divisions of the seaboard, northern, middle, and southern, ; distinctive topographical features of each, , , , , , ; proportionate effect of the war upon each, with reasons therefor, - ; commercial and military characteristics of middle section, - ; necessity of coasting trade to middle, , less than to northern and southern, - ; effect of hostile pressure upon coasting in northern section, - ; in southern section, - , ; effectual separation between the sections by the british blockades, - ; statistics of export, ; momentary importance of north carolina coast, ; effects of pressure upon seaboard shown by rebound upon peace, in prices, and in shipping statistics, - ; statement by a naval officer of the time, - ; operations in chesapeake bay, , - , - ; capture of washington, - ; occurrences on new england coast, ; invasion of maine, and occupation of castine, - ; gulf coast and new orleans, - . _scott, winfield._ american general. quoted, i. ; ii. , (note), , (note), ; joins wilkinson's expedition down the st. lawrence, ii. ; on niagara frontier, in , , , ; battle of chippewa, - ; lundy's lane, - ; severely wounded, , and unable to serve again during the campaign, ; president of the court of inquiry concerning the capture of washington, - . "_shannon._" british frigate, blockading off new york. pursuit of "constitution," and protection of convoy, i. - ; admirable efficiency of, under captain broke, - ; capture of "chesapeake" by, - ; reported injuries to, - . _sheffield, lord._ british writer on economical questions. conspicuous opponent of pitt's policy in opening west india trade to american navigation, i. ; leading constructive ideas of, in scheme of policy towards the united states, - , - ; success of, in preventing pitt's measure, , ; gibbon's estimate of, (note); apparent temporary success of policy of, - ; canada and the other north-american colonies fail to fulfil the part expected from them, ; pamphlet of, "observations on the commerce of the american states," ; quotations from, i. (note), (note), (and note), , , , , , , . _sherbrooke, sir john._ british general, governor of nova scotia. ordered to occupy so much of maine as shall insure direct communication between halifax and quebec, ii. ; expedition to the penobscot, and seizure of castine and machias, ; wellington's opinion of the result, , . _sinclair, arthur._ commander, u.s.n., commanding on upper lakes, in , ii. ; operations of, - ; mentioned, . _smith, adam._ quoted in connection with the navigation act, i. - , . _smith, robert._ american secretary of state during early part of madison's first term, i. ; correspondence with, and in the case of, jackson, the british minister to washington, - ; attributes to madison's intervention an offensive expression in letter to erskine, - . _smith, samuel._ senator from maryland. quoted in connection with embargo legislation, i. . _stewart, charles._ captain, u.s.n. commands "constellation," ii. , when driven into norfolk, and there blockaded for the rest of the war, ; his reports while in norfolk waters, , , - ; transferred to the "constitution," at boston, , ; difficulty in escaping from boston, (see also i. and ii. ); first cruise in "constitution," - ; second escape, ; captures "cyane" and "levant," - ; quoted, ii. , . _strong, caleb._ governor of massachusetts. quoted, in support of british claim to impress, i. ; in condemnation of the war, and of the invasion of canada, ii. . _st. vincent, earl of._ british admiral and first lord of the admiralty. statements and opinions concerning impressment, during rufus king's negotiations, i. - . _turreau, general._ french minister to the united states. opinion that erskine's concessions showed the break-down of great britain, i. . _vincent, john._ british general, commanding on niagara line, at the time of dearborn's attack, ii. ; retreat to burlington, ; attack by, at stony creek, ; on american retreat reoccupies peninsula, except fort george, - ; superseded by de rottenburg, lieutenant governor of upper canada, ; left again in command by de rottenburg's departure to kingston, ; retreats again to burlington on the news of battle of the thames, , ; ordered to retire further, to york, and reasons for not doing so, . _warren, sir john._ british admiral, and commander-in-chief on north american station, i. ; halifax and west indian stations consolidated under, ; charged with diplomatic overture to american government, ; reply received by, ; first impressions on arrival, ; representations to, , and correspondence with, admiralty, - ; proclamations of blockades, ii. , ; the lakes service under supervision of, ; expectations of british government and people from, ; operations in the chesapeake, - ; quits chesapeake for the season, ; urgency of the admiralty upon, - ; relieved by cochrane, . remark quoted, . _warrington, lewis._ commander, u.s.n., commanding "peacock." captures "epervier," ii. - ; subsequent cruise, - ; later cruise, - . _washington, city of._ capture by the british, ii. - . _washington, george._ statements concerning conditions in the united states before the adoption of the constitution, i. ; as president of the united states, recommendations concerning the navy, ii. - . "_wasp._" american sloop of war. action with, and capture of, "frolic," i. - ; is captured with her prize by the "poictiers," seventy-four, . "_wasp._" american sloop of war, built and named for the last, which was captured only by overwhelming force. cruise of, ii. - ; action with, and capture of, "reindeer," ; action with, and sinking of, "avon," ; disappears at sea, . _wellesley, marquis of._ british secretary for foreign affairs. succeeds canning, i. ; treatment of the jackson case, - , - ; action in view of champagny's letter, , - ; construction placed by him upon the american demands consequent on that letter, ; dilatory actions of, ; suggests to pinkney to reconsider his intended departure, in view of the nomination of foster, ; summary statement of the british policy in the orders in council, - . _wellington, duke of._ represents to british government conditions in france, , ii. , and imminence of trouble in paris, ; anxiety of british government, to remove him from paris, ; pressed to accept the command in america, ; reluctance of, ; influence of, upon the negotiations at ghent, - ; approves prevost's retreat in default of naval command of the lakes, - ; opinion of sherbrooke's occupation of maine, (see also ). _west indies._ relations of, to the mother country and to the colonies of the american continent, i. - , - , - , - ; british expectation that in these relations the lost colonies might be replaced by canada, nova scotia, etc., - , - , ; sufferings of, after and , , - , ; pitt's measure, , for benefit of, - ; measure fails, and navigation acts applied to intercourse between united states and, - ; effect upon, , , ; recommendations of committee of privy council, , - ; increased importance of, after outbreak of french revolution, - ; result, in fettering american intercourse with, , ; concession to united states of trade to, obtained in jay's treaty, ; continued by british executive order, although article not confirmed by senate, ; course of british policy relating to, until , - ; question of american trade from, "direct" or "indirect," raised in , ; decision adverse to american interests, - ; object of new departure of british government, ; principle asserted identical with colonial practice, and with orders in council of , which led to war of , . as a field for operations against commerce, ii. - . _wilkinson, james._ american general. replaces dearborn in command of new york frontier, ii. ; armstrong's instructions to, ; movements of, ; concentrates at sackett's harbor, - ; expedition down st. lawrence against montreal, - ; failure of, and winter quarters at french mills, ; removes thence to plattsburg, ; abortive attempt against la colle, - ; superseded by izard, . _winder, william h._ american general. captured in the british attack at stony creek, ii. , ; appointed to command the tenth military district, including baltimore and washington, ; conditions found by, as shown by court of inquiry, ; operations of, - . _woolsey, melancthon t._ lieutenant (afterwards captain), u.s.n. commands brig "oneida" on lake ontario when war begins, i. ; employed organizing lake force, ; affairs at oswego, , ii. - ; successful expedition by, in , - . _yeo, sir james lucas._ british commodore. appointed to charge of lakes service, under sir j. warren, ii. ; attack on sackett's harbor, in combination with army, - ; in temporary control of lake ontario, - ; contest with chauncey in , - ; action of august , - , and september , ; action of september , - ; subsequent movements in , , ; proposed renewed attack on sackett's harbor, , ; made on oswego instead, ; blockades sackett's harbor for a time, - ; abandons blockade, returns to kingston, and there remains, ; opinion of the importance of the st. lawrence river, ; inactive policy during summer of , , ; launches, and takes the lake with, a ship of guns, giving him entire control, ; observations at sackett's harbor, on his return to england after peace, (note); given independent command on lakes after warren's detachment, . * * * * * +-----------------------------------------------------------+ | typographical errors corrected in text: | | | | page : vesesls replaced with vessels | | page : frustated replaced with frustrated | | page : philadephia replaced with philadelphia | | | +-----------------------------------------------------------+ * * * * * operations upon the sea operations upon the sea a study by freiherr von edelsheim in the service of the german general staff in translated from the german new york the outdoor press copyright, , by the outdoor press published november, vail-ballou company binghamton and new york foreword this book is of especial importance at this time, for if germany is to reach the degree of advantage which her military preparedness seemed to prophesy, it is plain that her navy must become increasingly active, and play a far different rôle than that it has assumed in the early stages of the war. covering this phase of the german operations the present volume must appeal as forecasting movements strictly within the bounds of actuality. a literal translation is all that has been attempted, with absolutely no embellishment to make it "popular" or easy reading. with characteristic bluntness this german officer brushes aside non-essentials and goes to the main point in daring fashion. for that very reason it is exceedingly pertinent to present-day discussions. issued as a military study in germany, semi-official in nature, to characterize it mildly, the material herein published for the first time in english reveals the theories of at least a portion of the military arm of the german government, which it is only fair to state may not represent the convictions of the german people. americans, as neutral but extremely interested observers of happenings of the moment, cannot be blamed, however, for making note of revelations that may come from either side in the conflict. beyond that, there are evidences on every hand that the patriotic citizens of this country are waking to the necessity to face more securely the difficulties a peace-loving nation may meet because of its lack of enthusiasm for war. the publishers. preface the purpose of this book is to estimate the value of operation over the sea as demonstrated in modern warfare, to point out the most important factors in its accomplishment, to describe the powerful expedients provided by germany for such an enterprise, and to broaden the sphere of studying these important questions of interest to our fatherland. the author. contents page introduction theoretical views i principles of operations over the sea ii accomplishment of sea transportation preparations during peace preparations at the outbreak of war embarkation sea voyage landing operations reembarkation application i consideration of landing operations against powers that can be reached only by sea ii views on colonial expeditions iii concluding views operations upon the sea introduction within recent years we have had a closer view of operations over the sea in connection with wars on land. the war between japan and china, between america and spain, between england and the transvaal, and finally the chinese expedition, have largely demonstrated the methods of transporting troops over the sea. whilst moltke has shown the insignificance of the land forces for such operations, the military authorities must in the future reckon on the important problem of preparing for and conducting a war across the sea. germany has greater resources for enterprises of this kind, and is more efficient, than any other country. the excellent training and readiness for war, the rapidity with which the troops can be mobilized, are not attained by any other power; then, too, germany has the second largest merchant marine in the world, which affords a first-class transport fleet not surpassed even by england's. finally, the constant improvement and strengthening of our battle fleet affords additional security in transporting troops. these especially favorable factors make possible a wide field for germany's activity in world politics. it is feasible for us to build strong military forces which will be of great use to the empire in this direction, to secure by fighting a feared and esteemed position in the world such as we have attained in europe. in this connection, it must be admitted that our navy cannot in the near future reach the degree of development where it would be in a position alone to solve for us the problems arising from energetic participation in world politics. this shows the advisability of impressing distant countries that believe themselves inaccessible to direct attack and that have hitherto held germany in little respect, with the size and strength of our army. that is why we must keep in mind the land operations in expeditions over-sea. these operations, through their extent and aims, are concerned with the most vital interests of the various nations, and include small enterprises which would serve to acquire commanding positions for war as well as for colonial requirements. all, however, emphasize the problems of transporting, which vary with the conditions of wars on land and which make distinct demands for preparation. these newly found difficulties should be carefully examined by germany. theoretical views i. principles of operations over the sea since steamers have supplanted sailing ships for commercial intercourse it is possible to transport our large troop forces in them; but fixed plans should be formulated with the view of making use of these strong and numerous vessels in over-seas operations. the main difficulty arises in the fact that all sea and land fighting forces must be combined. however, any consequent friction can easily be avoided if the army and fleet, in time of peace, become familiar with their mutual dependence and with the need of individual cooperation. it is plain, therefore, that operations over the sea should be planned for in advance. there is no prospect of success unless the parts of the complicated mechanism are individually prepared. the selection of a favorable time and situation for operations is an important factor in its success. if an unexpected landing could be made the opponents would not succeed in making a strong defense, nor would they be able to concentrate sufficient forces to oppose the invasion. hence the preparation of the land operations must be so thoroughly advanced that in case of war the rapidity of mobilizing and transporting would assure an advantageous surprise. how difficult and costly this task is has been demonstrated by the united states in its expedition to cuba and by england in transporting its first troops to south africa. the object of the operation must by all means be concealed and the preliminary preparations should be planned so as to delude the opponents. napoleon's expedition against egypt and the manner in which it was undertaken even to-day remains a standard example. a landing operation on an enemy's shore is generally possible only where one is superior in naval strength to that which the enemy can muster at a critical time. after a landing a victory at sea by our opponents would not be of benefit to them, in case they have not provided sufficient land fighting forces successfully to combat the invasion. therefore, it is imperative at least to strengthen our german battle fleet so greatly that it would assure the troops a safe passage, and also defeat or hold in check that portion of the enemy's naval forces which they could readily employ. if the transports sail ahead of the fleet there is the possibility that with a reverse at sea the landing operations could not be carried through. the rule to be followed is to employ for operations over the sea all available battleships, part in the regular fleet and part as an escort for the protection of the transports. in no case should the land forces be transported on battleships, for they would restrict the fighting value of the ships. so, for example, the french admiral gauthaunce-- --in spite of his superior battle fleet was compelled to withdraw to toulon before the english fleet because his ships had suffered in fighting value through the presence of land troops. only the largest steamships are to be considered for transports because they have a greater field for action, can carry more troops and require a smaller escort of battleships, thereby giving a small battle fleet like ours more available strength, which is, of course, of great value. naturally, the ships should be loaded to a capacity in proportion to the length of the voyage. in cases where the distance is not great the transport ships can make the trip twice, but it is important that the principal part of the expedition go in the first transports so as not to land an inefficient force on the enemy's coast. the whole purpose of the enterprise might be defeated through lack of aggressive strength of the landing troops. the number of troops to be landed must be greater than the estimated number of the enemy. as they must be able to assume the offensive, it is desirable that the militia be debarred and only well drilled forces, under experienced officers, be sent over. such a combination gives the required fighting value. in spite of the difficulty experienced in transporting horses, the cavalry is an extremely valuable adjunct in operations of invasion, playing a great part in offensive movements and in assisting the field and heavy artillery. the cavalry will also be able to prevent an attack on the infantry, which might otherwise inflict damage hard to retrieve. in the crimean war marshal st. arnault was hindered in the pursuit of the routed russians because of the deficiency in the cavalry and artillery in the french army. he had only one hundred troopers at his disposal, and his guns, drawn by only four horses, were greatly hampered in their movements. the difficulties in transporting large cavalry and artillery divisions can be overcome through modern methods. the extent of our merchant marine makes it possible to forward the necessary number of troops, but it must be remembered that on account of our present political position we can send only as strong a force as we can afford to dispense with at home, without endangering the country. the management of the complete operation over the sea as a rule can be better executed by an army officer than by a naval officer, for the success of the enterprise depends principally on the land operations. this leadership would usually fall to the commanding officer of the transport fleet and escorting squadron. it is out of the question to change commands at such a critical period as disembarking. with us the commander-in-chief of the transport troops is lower in rank than the commander of the escorting squadron, a designation which the vicissitudes of war have found very disadvantageous. more than one well-planned operation has been restrained by the commanding admiral because he sacrificed favorable conditions from the standpoint of land operations to gain a slight advantage from a naval standpoint. on the other hand, napoleon i, against the advice of his admirals, disembarked his troops in egypt, and thereby kept them from sharing the fate of the fleet. after successful landings it may be necessary to place the transport fleet and its escort in command of the chief of the land troops. even the battle fleet should be under his direction when a change of base is necessary or when the land and sea forces are in joint action. for technical naval questions the chief command would be assigned to an officer of the admiral staff. in a joint attack on a coast city the advantage of harmony and cooperation is readily seen. in the battle on the alma this fact was demonstrated, the striking of the fleet on the flank was not ordered by the commander of the land forces and was not brought about in unison with the land attack. ii. accomplishment of sea transportation preparations during peace. whether the operations be large or small, full preparations must be made during peace. these preparations include first of all the drawing up of plans through the study of political and military relations. then the operations can be carried out under international jurisdiction, avoiding thereby any disturbances of importance. the possibilities of friction must be given careful thought. first of all, a base for prospective operations must be determined by exhaustive investigations as to landings that may be suitable. while the first inquiries are made by naval officers, they can only be completed by army officers. the following essential points must be kept in view in searches made by naval officers: i. to determine the naval strength required for protection of the transport fleet and to settle the question of communication with home ports. ii. to decide upon proper and specific points on the respective coasts, from a marine standpoint. iii. to investigate all harbor facilities for the disembarking of the troops, and to ascertain the number and size of ships the harbor will admit so as to insure the protection of the land and sea flank. iv. to study the enemy's coast defenses and decide upon the strength required to attack them. the researches of the army officers concern principally the following: i. the aim of the operations is to overcome the obstacles as reported by the naval officers. ii. the number of troops which the opponents can muster against the invasion should be estimated. iii. all questions as to climate, water supply, and equipment necessary should be decided. all this information has been shown to be of distinct value, and perhaps would cause us to alter, within the next year, the disposition of the line of battle in case of war. through a well ordered intelligence department definite plans can be made. regarding operations which require troops fitted for tropical service, capable officers and forces should be reviewed and inspected during times of peace and made note of accordingly. the division would make a suitable unit for large operations and could be formed from different army corps. these divisions should be so equipped that they could operate independently in customary situations. fuller preparations should be made for the sending of heavy artillery, the telegraph and airship divisions. these formations would be important problems during the voyage at sea. an especially skilled staff is needed. to this end, loading transports and landing maneuvers for the heavy artillery and other heavy divisions should take place annually in suitable harbors on coasts that present the right opportunities for the troops. an enlarged command of officers and subordinate officers would show sufficient strength in a relatively short time. incidentally it might be possible to have these maneuvers take place in our foreign possessions, where we could better determine the actual needs of operations of this sort. this training would bring forth the simplest and best means for the adjustment of our merchant marine for transporting troops. all other expedients for the voyage would likewise be shown. some of this needed experience has already been acquired through our expedition to china. just as a detailed plan of mobilization is required for any war on land, a complete plan is necessary for operations over the sea which embraces also the railway trip to the harbor and the rapid execution of the tasks involved in embarking. on account of limited facilities only one division can be handled on a railroad. the necessity for transfer by wagons to the ships requires enlarged railway stations and piers in many places. furthermore, many different supply depots must be built and maintained. in these depots building material should be held in reserve for the alterations that are needed for the transformation of the merchant ships into transports. all other apparatus for successful transporting, such as extra lifting contrivances, flat-bottom boats, gang planks, and so forth, should be stored in advance. usually, these adjuncts are lacking in the merchant marine. light railroad rolling stock for use in the tropics or in difficult land conditions is also recommended. in addition to these supply depots there must be in all harbors large warehouses containing clothing, food and coal. the small requirements of our transport to china did not emphasize sufficiently the value of advance preparations, but it is evident that within a few days over one hundred steamers should be provided with such accommodations. to do this in an emergency would require too much time aside from the difficulty that might be encountered in securing skilled labor. for long distance transportation our large harbors on the north and east seas can be utilized equally well for embarkation. speed is the chief requisite. in order to lessen the distance of transporting, operations toward the west must be conducted from the north sea ports and toward the east from our east sea ports. this does not preclude the possibility of towing the transports from the east sea through the kaiser wilhelm canal to the north sea should it be found desirable, but it would involve a waste of time. the smaller harbors should not be used for embarking for large enterprises because they lack the necessary facilities. they might be utilized to advantage in a smaller way, provided sufficient means were at hand to take care of one division a day. especially suitable harbors on the north sea are emden, wilhelmshaven and bremerhaven, in connection with bremen, and cuxhaven with hamburg and glückstadt. these are the harbors that should have complete preparations made for possible expeditions. bremerhaven is by far the best. in every respect it would take first place for embarkation, because of its extensive wharfs. from this point two or more divisions could be shipped daily without difficulty. cuxhaven is not so well situated, but its connection with hamburg is important. if it were brought up to full development it could take care of two divisions a day which hamburg could well supply. glückstadt is an especially important base because most of our live stock exporting business is carried on there. it is recommended that a short double-track railroad be built from elmshorn to glückstadt, making a connection with the reserve corps frontier. in glückstadt one infantry division and part of a cavalry division can be shipped. in wilhelmshaven all the essential features are at hand, but it is doubtful whether, in view of simultaneous mobilization of the fleet, this place can be chosen for the embarkation of land troops. in any event, it would be necessary to enlarge the harbor buildings. the railroad facilities would also have to be increased. while emden is favorably situated, an examination discloses many drawbacks. it needs better dock facilities and railroads to bring it up to standard and in order to relieve the extensive shipping of troops at wilhelmshaven. under existing circumstances leer and papenburg could be used for transporting purposes, and these two with emden could handle one division. the situation on the baltic sea is peculiarly unfavorable, no harbor, with the exception of kiel, being deep enough to accommodate our larger steamships. at danzig the dredging of navigable waters and extension of docks should be planned, which are of great importance from a military standpoint. the other smaller ports on the baltic are at present not suitable for transporting troops. the kiel harbor could not be utilized for the loading of large transports because of the same conditions that affect wilhelmshaven, namely, the delay that might hinder the rapid mobilizing of the fleet, which would not be permitted. the docks at kiel must therefore be greatly enlarged so that they could thoroughly satisfy simultaneously the demands of the battle and transport fleets. pillau and swinemünde should be authorized to extend their very small docks. on the other hand, the large dry docks in danzig, stettin and kiel should be in a position, within the shortest possible time, to provide the necessary buildings for transporting, if the materials and warehouses are planned correctly. of the greatest importance in operations over the sea is the provision of the proper number of ships. defects in preparations in time of peace would hinder successful execution and would give the enemy time to take the necessary precautions to oppose an invasion. yet it should be stated that england, at the outbreak of the boer, although lacking full preparation during peace, in the course of a few weeks procured the required number of ships for the first shipment. the problem of ship control would at best fall to the loading commission, which should be settled upon as an established authority to make a comprehensive survey and appraise the german steamers for military transporting. this commission should also list the foreign-owned steamers which might be available in the harbors for use in emergencies. through close commercial relations this control can be extended to neighboring foreign ports (amsterdam, rotterdam, copenhagen) to the end that we might charter several large foreign steamers. the construction of stables for horses on our commercial ships would cause delay, as we have pointed out previously. it would seem advantageous to have our subsidized steamship companies to build several ships which can be quickly adjusted for shipping horses. this ought to be an easy matter with ships used for shipping cattle. the hamburg-american line, it is known, will readily provide such a ship. the management of the transport depots and the training of the dry-dock and harbor personnel would obviously fall to the loading commission. in a similar way, the navy would be permitted to divide the sea-fighting strength, in the event of mobilization, into a fleet of warships and an escort for the transport fleet, assuring effective protection and a fighting force equal in rank to the enemy. preparations at the outbreak of war. actual preparations for war cannot be kept secret for any length of time. opponents would receive information through secret channels, which would give them opportunity to concentrate and equip their forces. the immediate preparations before the outbreak of war dare not be instituted generally, but as soon as the decision for operations is conceived, they must be promptly inaugurated. the aim should be to keep the opponents in uncertainty for a short time, and then a rapidly executed operation would take them unawares. an unexpected attack depends largely upon rapidity of movement. incidentally, diplomatic pressure should be avoided if possible because such friction would lessen considerably the chances for a successful undertaking. in connection with wars on land the preliminary preparations are simplified, for under these circumstances most of the battleships and troops have been equipped and prepared for action. the methods to be employed by the battleships to carry out the operations would vary and must be left to the discretion of the chosen naval expert. it should be pointed out in this connection, however, that with a small battle fleet like ours it is most necessary to concentrate our full strength for the defense and execution of the land operations. we must endeavor, therefore, in time of peace to get our fleet forces out of foreign waters and keep the battle fleet together. thus the great political questions would be decided only upon the european scene. a rapid mobilization of our sea fighting forces, namely, those which belong to the battle fleet, is of great advantage, but the calling in from foreign waters of such forces would undoubtedly serve to create suspicion. the kaiser wilhelm canal affords us the means to concentrate these forces quickly as may be required either in the north or baltic sea. if the demands for ships and supplies exceed our advance preparations, proper methods should be employed to seize quickly what is needed and immediate reparation made. plans should also be made to secure sufficient reenforcements of troops. in large operations where all our ships are employed, after they are successfully loaded and started on the voyage the transports arriving from foreign waters can be equipped. all ships belonging to hostile nations that are lying in our harbors we would of course seize and utilize for transports. while the distribution of our transport steamers at the various points of embarkation will have been taken care of by the loading commission, various difficulties would be encountered in altering the vessels that by chance are at the disposal of the commission for transports, such as unforeseen defects and inaccurate measurements of the foreign chartered steamers arriving in our ports. the adjustment and equipment of these ships must be expedited so that the troops can be despatched in masses as fast as they arrive. once the ships reach the selected harbors the necessary rearrangements probably can be made simultaneously with the loading, depending upon the advance preparations and the presence of a skilled staff of workmen. the time needed will depend somewhat upon the length of the voyage to be made. in england the steamers for transporting troops to cape town, which is a long trip, were prepared in four days for the infantry and in seven days for the cavalry and artillery. the consuming of such time, even for a long sea voyage, must be considered poor execution. at the time of our expedition to china we had the ships complete in a short time. for one steamer, the discharge of the cargo, readjustment for transport and reloading, with the exception of the cavalry, not more than two days need be consumed. for short distances, according to english and russian estimates, one day is required for infantry and two to two and one-half days for cavalry and artillery. these periods can be greatly shortened through the efficiency of the building staff, as pointed out previously. the formation of the expedition corps must of course be established in the annual maneuvers. various factors, such as seasons, political aims, present situation of opponents, extent of material for the available ships, all bear witness to the urgency of taking up measures in advance for facilitating the work of mobilization. the speedy concentration of troops and materials at the points of embarkation will make heavy demands upon the railroads, even though the haul is short, and the shipment comparatively small. arrangements should therefore be made with the railroads to have on hand at all times sufficient rolling stock for these purposes, to guarantee the prompt departure of the transports. it is urged that authority be given the loading commission to supervise and direct this work. it must be taken into consideration that part of the troops are inexperienced reserves and good order must be maintained. a high standard of efficiency should prevail, to lessen the burdens of executing orders. numerous machine gun divisions increase the fighting strength and do not require great space or support. the usefulness of a cyclist division depends entirely upon the condition of the roads in the hostile country. for the reasons stated previously, cavalry would not suffer in distribution of strength, which is customary in wars on land. in large over-seas operations it is recommended that a special cavalry division or brigade be formed for reconnoitering purposes. beyond this, the strength of the cavalry division must be sufficient to render possible an independent operation. it would also be of great value to the field artillery, of which an ample supply is on hand. especially important is the method of distributing supply trains, for these require a great deal of space and render landing very difficult. they also hinder the rapid movement of the expedition corps. when the transports do not remain in close communication with the troops after landing, a very large supply of stores is necessary to make the army independent of the vessels. there should be added, therefore, a reserve ammunition column to that already provided. a fixed amount of supplies should be determined upon, taking due consideration of the extent of the voyage. the troops could requisition some materials from the hostile country. embarkation. proper loading is the business of the land forces and should be conducted by trained officers so as to ensure the shipment of materials and men. to make landing effective the necessary supplies should go on the vessels with the troops. a loading plan should be so drawn up in advance as to meet all emergencies. the length of time consumed for loading depends on the distance of the voyage. at the most the limit of a short sea voyage for us has been considered about forty-eight hours. this is too small an estimate; it should undoubtedly be doubled. the italian general staff estimates the length of a short sea voyage to be five days. besides, to preserve the fighting worth of our troops, we must allow sufficient time for rest. the troop transport capacity of a ship has heretofore been calculated by the ship's tonnage, that is, sixty per cent. of the ship's capacity is net ton loading space. the necessary space for us, for a long sea voyage, is set at two tons for each man and six to seven tons for each horse. the english and russian estimates are about the same. but the english transports to cape town accommodated a larger number of troops than was thought possible, and the american transports to cuba were increased by one-third. as for the arrangements which must be made for sleeping, cooking and washing and for a hospital service, we need not go any further here, as they have been discussed at length in the press. the stowing of equipment and baggage should be done in such a way as to make the articles available on landing in the order in which they are needed. the ship's space required for maintenance supplies for man and horse figures relatively as about one to five. coming next to the loading of the artillery, the rule should be to place all common and machine guns on deck. a certain amount of ammunition should be stowed so as to be quickly accessible. this is an essential measure to afford the transport protection from some privateer. the guns should be securely placed to prevent their movement by the motion of the sea and to render feasible their use on deck. trials will soon be made to find the suitable means whereby field artillery may be put to successful use on shipboard, and this testing will certainly repay us. all rolling stock will be stowed away firmly in the freight space without removing the wheels. the material and personnel of the field hospital should be divided among the ships, so that a ship's hospital division may be formed. the airship division should be placed on deck in such fashion that observation flights may be made during the voyage. the shipping of horses is especially difficult. by former methods the horses had to stand the entire trip and had practically no exercise. this left them in a weakened condition and made necessary a long rest after arrival. for a war transport, in which is required a rapid and successful offensive, such horses are not useful. because of the important work to be done by them after landing, careful attention should be given to the horses to keep them in good working condition. to this end, proper nourishment must be given and facilities provided for daily exercise while on the transports, which should consume at least three-quarters of an hour for each horse. ships that are built particularly for the transportation of horses can be adjusted with four decks over each other, including upper deck stables and two courses for exercise, so that a transport of from three to four thousand net tons capacity can carry over one thousand horses. three ships would accommodate two cavalry brigades. on every large steamer many horses can be shipped for a long trip, in addition to its regular quota of men and supplies. after the transports have been prepared, about seven hundred and fifty horses, equal to one cavalry regiment, or six batteries, can be loaded daily on the lower decks. cleanliness, ventilation and care are the three most important factors for the good health of the horses. every horse transport must be given ventilating apparatus to assure sufficient fresh air. artificial ventilation is to be preferred to natural ventilation, for if the latter becomes too strong the horses' lungs are easily affected. through this cause, for example, the american transport to cuba lost the greater number of their horses. likewise condensers are required for the necessary quantities of drinking water. it is recommended that each ship be given its own condenser. the provision of only one or two large condensers on special ships which supply the entire demand of the transport fleet, as the americans employed in their expedition to cuba, has not proved practical. for the short sea voyage, our transports would be able to despatch substantially more troops, through germany's geographical position. the strength of near-by powers requires, though, the immediate utilization of all ships and materials at our disposal, if the operations are to succeed. for short expeditions, the general rule will be to ship as many troops as the transports will carry. the forces will bivouac on the upper and lower decks and receive only straw bags and covers. they will keep their whole baggage with them. cooking will be done in large field kettles. if time permits, it is recommended that the same adjustments as for a long journey be made for the horses, at least to provide separate stalls. this will prevent heavy losses in case of rough weather. guns and accessories can be disposed of in the same manner as for long voyages. the length of time for embarkation depends on whether the loading can be done from the wharves of the harbors or whether the troops and materials must be taken out by lighters and then transferred to the ships. the latter method is a waste of time and is dependent on wind and weather. the time required for loading is as follows: fifteen minutes for one hundred men, one minute for one horse, ten minutes for a cannon. in an operation by the russians, , men, including infantry and cavalry, were embarked in eight hours. in our loading of east asia transports, it required one to one and one-half hours to load one battalion. the speed of our loading has amazed departmental circles in general. it is certain, though, that this time can be greatly reduced through detailed preparation and training. napoleon i, in the year , had ostensibly drilled his troops so well that he could plan to put , men and their materials on shipboard in two hours. it must be remembered that everything, troops, guns and supplies must eventually be landed on open coasts. portable flat-bottom boats and building materials for piers must therefore be carried on the transports. special vessels must accompany the transport fleet with large reserve supplies of food, equipment, ammunition, coal and so forth. a cable-laying ship is also required. we must now consider to what extent germany is able to load forces for the execution of operations which involve only a short voyage, in which success depends so much on speed. for embarkation on the north sea, hamburg and bremen alone could furnish so many steamers capable of being converted into transports, that with their tonnage capacity the loading of four infantry divisions is possible in a period of four days. with the addition of ships from emden, wilhelmshaven, glückstadt and kiel we would be able to despatch in the same length of time, at least six infantry divisions, or five infantry and one cavalry division. to these must be added several especially large and fast german steamers, partly for the shipment that might be delayed and partly to expedite the return to home waters. a large number of troops can also be shipped from baltic ports. besides this, a repeated trip of the transport fleet is possible if the command of the sea is maintained continuously. for longer sea voyages, in which the importance of speed is not so great, our transport fleet can be greatly increased through chartering or purchasing ships of foreign nations. still, we are at present in the position to despatch about four infantry divisions, with present available ships, within ten or twelve days. sea voyage. for transporting troops over the sea, it is the chief problem of the navy to clear the course to the hostile shore. all enterprises of this kind are dependent on the battle fleet, whose first aim, therefore, must be to run down and attack the enemy's fleet which the transports might encounter; if the opportunity is afforded our fleet must bring about an engagement for the command of the sea at least by the time of embarkation. as the mobilizing of the battle ships is finished before the transport fleet is ready to put to sea, they can undertake an early offensive to make secure the passage of the expedition. also, throughout the voyage offensive operations can be undertaken by the battle fleet, in waters distant from the transport, which would serve the same ends of keeping the course clear. the escorts of the transport squadron should consist of just enough ships to give immediate protection. a large number would increase unnecessarily the size of the transport fleet without increasing its safety, while every addition of strength to the battle fleet is of the greatest value. the task of the escorts is only to protect the transports from attacks by single or several small vessels of the enemy. our torpedo boats are particularly adapted for escort service, and make it feasible to restrict the number of large battle ships used for this purpose. during the assembling of the transports, these boats may devote themselves to secure the safety of the traffic between the loading harbors. the departure of the transports from the various harbors must be so regulated that they sail in close union, to assure a safe voyage and a quick landing. the loading commission must take appropriate means to expedite the loading in those harbors farthest removed from the central assembling points. as a rule, the transport steamers would sail with the battle fleet; but in the english expedition to south africa and ours to east asia, this rule was not followed. an essential requirement is that the transports put to sea as soon as the loading is complete. they cannot wait for news of the success of the battle fleet. a certain risk is involved, but it is not great, for the transport fleet can always turn back. only an early departure would insure successful, unexpected landing. the shorter the voyage the greater the necessity for a surprise attack. in the event of our battle fleet being attacked, it does not follow that the transport operations must be abandoned, for if the voyage be short an energetic continuation of the venture will command a fair prospect of success. even the victor in a great naval battle might not be able to carry out an attack against the transport squadron. an individual hostile battle ship or cruiser would find it difficult to break into the transport fleet. an important factor in the sea voyage, perhaps the most important, is the weather. for short distances, it is possible to a certain degree to choose favorable weather for the passage, with the help of scientific forecasts. conditions might be such that a delay would not harm the operations. adverse weather conditions would more seriously affect long-distance transporting, to a degree that might cause abandonment. our vessels must be so improved as to make them independent of wind and weather, to make certain the speed of the voyage and to permit the establishing of a time record. for the time of the passage, the highest speed of the slowest boat is the standard, which could probably be increased by towing with tugs. in putting to sea all transport ships must retain the order of position they are to take in the squadron; this order is not broken until after leaving the harbor, so that the object of the voyage is known only to the home officials. the advance guard of troops will sail in the fastest ships so that they can make the unexpected landing. the pioneer and airship divisions are placed with the advance guard. the ships which have artillery ride on the flank of the troop transports. then follow the ships carrying supplies. the cable ship comes last. the laying of the cable gives a continuous communication with the home country. for extensive voyages, preparations must be made for taking on coal on the open sea. the commander-in-chief of the expedition corps should be on a transport steamer so that in event of a fight the transport fleet will not be without proper guidance. on long sea voyages, gymnastics, drilling and target practise can be pursued. ample daily exercising of the horses will occupy the greater part of the time of the cavalry. for short sea voyages these features are not so necessary. in general, strict discipline must be exercised to overcome the tediousness of the trip. while the command of the troops on every transport is in the oldest officer, the command of the ship remains in the hands of the captain, who is inferior in rank to the commander of the troops. if this captain has not served in the german navy, a midshipman may be signed as a coordinate officer. it is our policy to provide every transport ship with a naval officer. landing. military history shows that an attempt to prevent a really bold landing is never successful. the defense must either scatter its forces along the coast to be protected, or concentrate its full strength to cover one point, while the assailant, through the mobility of its transport, can keep its landing plan uncertain, and under the protection of long-range guns on the ships can throw more troops quickly on the land than the defense is able to concentrate in the same time. a simultaneous landing at different places is hazardous if the opponent can muster considerable strength. an expedition is seldom so large that disadvantages arise through landing at one point. on the other hand, it would require a great many battleships for the protection of numerous landing places. a division of the forces weakens all of them, and great difficulty would be found in uniformly managing the start of the operations for want of time and means. therefore, it is recommended, when the situation permits, to select one central place for landing. for the disembarking a harbor is of course the most advantageous; less advantageous but always favorable is an enclosed, protected bay; the most unfavorable is the open coast. yet a landing on the open coast would encounter little resistance if it is carried out with great speed. if the chosen landing place be near a bay or a seaport town, it would be the mission of the first landed advance guard to seize this port, to make it possible for the transport fleet to disembark the mass of troops, horses and materials. the occupation of a good harbor will greatly hasten the unloading, prevent a hostile attack from the sea and add greatly to the ability of the landing corps to carry on the operations. if a seizure of a port is not possible, the landing of the entire expedition must take place by means of prepared disembarking contrivances. every transport must be equipped for landing on an open coast. the best landing place is a site nearest the object of the operations, which would force the opponents to a decision before they were thoroughly prepared. clear coast regions within range of the ships' guns are desirable, as is also quiet, deep water near to the landing site. it is possible to land within range of important hostile garrisons and fortifications. russian landing maneuvers have demonstrated the truth of this statement. fortifications are effective against landing enterprises only when sufficient troops are on hand to defend the coast. if the assailant is successful in landing a detachment of troops out of the range of the fortifications, the latter would be ineffective for defense. the best security, however, for the initial landing is its unexpected delivery. reconnoitering of the coast site by boats sent beforehand is an absurdity, for the opponents immediately become acquainted with the landing plans and are given time for preparations for defense. of great importance for rapid, well-regulated landing is uniform management through the signal service of the ships and the telephone service on land, which can be installed advantageously. in anchoring the ships must be the correct distance apart, to avoid crowding. the execution of the landing as a rule is as follows: the advance guard rides ahead, on the last stretch, with its own escort of battleships, and lands, if possible, unawares, usually at night. if the landing be on an open coast, the mass of troops which follow should immediately throw up earthworks. the entire disembarking must be made with great speed, for the quicker the landing is accomplished the less the danger of being disturbed. the most favorable time for attacking the coast is at dawn, for the landing can take place unknown to the enemy and day be used for disembarking. as the ships do not carry a sufficient number of patent boats for landing on an open coast, special flat-bottom boats should be prepared for unloading horses and heavy material. the english employ collapsible boats for landing men, which accommodate a crew of fifty, while the russians have flat-bottom boats capable of holding two hundred men, or one complete cannon. it is recommended that we be permitted to try the russian model, which has been well tested. small power boats should be employed for tugging, as rowing would be a waste of valuable time. to permit horses to swim ashore is to be condemned, for it would cause confusion and delay, and we know from experience that a large number are sometimes lost. the americans, in their landing in cuba, lost seven per cent. of their horses. for the landing of artillery and heavy materials small landing bridges must be erected on the beach, for which prepared material is carried on the transports. the assembling of the troops must not be permitted on the beach, for all space there must be kept for the landing of supplies. if a landing near a harbor is successful, the advance guard will strive to take the same unawares, to seize those coast sentinels at hand and to destroy the telegraph and signal service along the coast. if all this is successful, the transport fleet will be signaled to draw near. the advantage is apparent in landing in a large harbor or bay, which affords the possibility of protection from a sea attack, through the mining of the waters or through the guard of a limited number of battleships. earthworks, equipped with cannon and machine guns, must be thrown up for the protection from the land side. the piers must be distributed to make sufficient room for disembarking. the existing plans for improvising landing bridges and gangways should be extended, in order to expedite the landing. the piers and bridges will be used for ships carrying horses, artillery and heavy materials, while the infantry land by boats, under the protection of large guns on shore or of the escorting battleships, should the battle fleet maintain command of the sea. the landed troops should be supplied provisions for many days so that they can begin operations independent of the supply trains. the time required for landing is considerably less than for loading. the natural desire of the troops to land quickly helps to shorten the time. one writer gives the following data: lord cochran landed , men on the open coast of america in five hours; in the crimean war the english accomplished the disembarking of , men, guns and about horses in less than eleven hours. the french are slower on account of their handling of supply trains. the russians, in their landing maneuvers in the black sea, have landed a slow division in eleven and one-half hours, where the steamers had to anchor five to six kilometers from the coast. the marine writer degories figures that under average conditions it is possible to land , infantry, , cavalry and guns in six hours. if the landing can be made in a harbor, this time can be essentially lessened. after the disembarking of the expedition, the further task of the transport fleet and its escort of battleships depends on the maritime strength of the country attacked. if the assailant continues in command of the sea, the transport fleet can remain as a floating base for the landed corps and can effect the reenforcement of the expedition. if the assailant is not in command of the sea, then the transport fleet must attempt to evade the operations of the hostile fleet, by an immediate retreat to home waters. operations. the operations of the landed expedition corps on the whole can be conducted according to the principles set down by the commanders of the troops, but these principles must take into account the particular conditions under which the forces operate. the well-known marine writer, mahan, emphasizes the fact that a landing operation must be offensive to succeed. military history shows that after boldly carried out landings at abukir and cape breton, for example, the success of the extensive operations was impaired, almost lost, because of lack of energy and rapidity of execution of offensive movements. the assembled strength must be thrown forward on the line of least resistance. defensive strategy should be used only when a delay is necessary to receive expected reenforcements. the primary aim of the operations is to dispose of hostile forces, within the shortest possible time and with the least loss to ourselves. during the progress of the operations the country through which the troops pass can be drawn upon to supplement equipment and supplies, but the speed of the advance and the efficiency of the troops must not be decreased through extended raids. while the distance to the objective of the invasion is generally not great, it should be our endeavor to be independent of our base of supplies. much progress has been made in the methods of making condensed foods, for man and horse, which will help to solve the problem of provisions. the army of invasion can also take an important site in the hostile country and utilize it as a base of operations. continuous communication with the home country is therefore not absolutely necessary. in a densely populated and rich country it is easy to secure provisions and supplies. the maintenance of long lines of communications is hazardous in that it requires excessive guard duty. when the battle fleet has gained command of the sea it will be in a position to protect continuously the base on the coast, and would also make it possible for the corps of invasion to select new bases. sherman's march to savannah in the civil war has shown the practicability of this plan. after one objective has been attained, it should be possible for the expedition to reembark to land at some other point on the coast for further operations. against the enemy's defenses we must throw our full strength and avoid enterprises that involve a delay or a weakening of our forces. dearly purchased victories will in the end defeat our own aims. if the operations of the troops are carried on along the coast, or if the objective of the operations is a harbor or a coast fortification, the battle fleet should act in unison with the land forces. battleships are superior to the field artillery, as they can be moved at will and so are hard to put out of action. continuous bombardment from the battleships would prove effective aid for the troops. it is important, then, that the command of land and naval forces be joined in a commander-in-chief who would direct the field forces as well as the naval forces. small coast defenses of seaport cities could not for any length of time withstand such a combined attack. it is certain also that present-day coast defenses could not withstand an energetic attack from the land side. they are more vulnerable than inland fortresses because they are open to attack simultaneously from land and water. however, if the battle fleet cannot gain the command of the sea, and must retreat before the opposing forces, the operations of the landed troops must be conducted wholly as a war on land. reembarkation. a reembarkation of the expedition corps is possible only when the battle fleet is able to prevent attack from the sea. in the event of defeat on land, reembarkation is not absolutely impossible, for if good order is maintained the improvised defenses of the landing sites, with the help of the fleet, will sufficiently delay the pursuers. if the reembarking must take place from some other point, preparations for its defense must be made in advance. when the reembarkation is done with the aim in view of attacking at another place, the rules as explained in the chapter on "embarkation" must be adhered to. for such an operation, more time is essential, and pressure of the enemy should not be permitted to interfere with its management. application i. consideration of landing operations against powers that can be reached only by sea the recognized military complication with england and america affords an interesting example on account of the difference in distances in which the transporting of troops takes place, on account of the strength of the sea and land fighting forces of the two opponents, and lastly on account of the difference in the territorial extensions of the aforesaid countries, and on the whole challenges various measures. a conflict with england must be fixed in the eye of germany, for the great german struggle for commerce represents to england just as great a danger as the advance of russia against india. beginning operations with a naval war with england, we could almost foresee the result. england has brought about the existence of such a powerful, active navy that we, with the best defenses we have, would hardly be able to win a decisive victory. only by closing an alliance with russia would the strength of england be injured indeed, but never by a direct threat from these provinces. but an alliance with france would in fact menace england. the latter, however, through her geographical location and through her large and timely expenditures, which every combined operation demands, could make possible by proper equipment a maritime superiority against this alliance. england's weakness is in just that which forms our strength, namely, the land army. the english army responds to neither quantity nor quality of its great and powerful position in comparison with the extent of the land; therefore england, from convictions, proceeds so that every invasion of the land can be prevented by the fleet. these convictions are in no way justified, for while england in developing a powerful sea-fighting strength has every day prepared for war, she has not had a view of the consequences of confronting and beating a really weaker sea opponent with its fighting units. these are the measures which germany, in case of a threatened war with england, must adopt and practise: our endeavors must be to engage the fleet, if possible; to throw part of our land forces upon the english coast, so that the conflict on the sea can be carried to the enemy's land, where our troops are already superior in quality to england's, and so that a victory for england's powerful naval strength could have but the smallest influence. the army fighting strength of england under the commander-in-chief is composed of the army reserve, the militia, the volunteers and the yeomanry. in the event of an unexpected invasion, only the commander-in-chief and army reserve can be considered to any extent, for the militia needs so much time to assemble and equip that they would be in a weak position to assist the commander-in-chief in the first decisive battle. the volunteers and yeomanry cannot in so short a time be trained for war or be mobilized for action. also their insignificant fighting value must be kept in view, beside which our well-trained troops will not let them seem as menacing opponents. the english army is formed of three army corps with three divisions to each corps. a third to a half of these corps is comprised of militia, so that either it must be first completed, and then it would be too late for cooperation in the first decisive battle, or it would be so untrained that it really cannot be said to reach the strength of a division. of two army corps, two divisions and one cavalry brigade are in ireland, the greater part of which must remain there to prevent the undertaking of a german invasion through ireland even though it brought about the longed-for freedom. the preparation for defense should also be considered. this might consist of one army corps with three divisions, or one army corps comprised of two divisions, with perhaps a cavalry brigade made up from three army corps. whereas the army strength of an english division is about , men, a german division carries , men, hence four german divisions and a cavalry division would have a superiority over the english army. but we are in a position to set over in england, in the shortest time, six divisions of infantry, or five divisions of infantry and one cavalry division. how a well regulated operation against england is to be conducted across the sea, obviously cannot be forecasted here. the passage in moderate weather is a little over thirty hours' ride from our north sea harbors. the english coast affords extensive stretches of shore which are suitable for landing troops. the land contains such large resources that the invading army can procure a living therefrom. on the other hand, the extent of the island is not so great that the english land defenses could ever succeed in timely destroying a successful invading force. it is improbable that germany could carry on for very long a well regulated war necessitating considerable reenforcement of troops. the supplies would have to be furnished for the greater part on land. maintaining communication with the home country can therefore readily be seen to be of importance. it is conclusive that the first aim of every operation of invasion in england is their field army, and the second must be london. it is probable that these two objectives would fall together, in that the field army, on account of the small value of the volunteers, is needed for the protection of london fortifications, so as not to leave the metropolis insufficiently defended. powerful public opinion would demand this for fear that london would fall into the hands of the invaders. but if london is taken by the invading army this would still be only one of the many war ports which must be seized, to secure a base of supplies and for the further operations which have every view to concluding the overthrow of england. operations against the united states of north america must be entirely different. with that country, in particular, political friction, manifest in commercial aims, has not been lacking in recent years, and has, until now, been removed chiefly through acquiescence on our part. however, as this submission has its limit, the question arises as to what means we can develop to carry out our purpose with force, in order to combat the encroachment of the united states upon our interests. our main factor here is our fleet. our battle fleet has every prospect of victoriously defeating the forces of the united states, widely dispersed over the two oceans. it is certain that after the defeat of the united states fleet, the great extension of unprotected coast line and powerful resources of that country would compel them to make peace. there is no effective method to force this opponent to relinquish its maritime operations, even though there is only a trifling number of american merchantmen, except the simultaneous blockading with our sea forces of american ports, which can only be taken with heavy losses, while our fleet demonstrated the actual limited worth of the unpacified american colonies. it must be deemed a possibility that the battle fleet of the united states would not risk an engagement at sea except to avoid a disaster, but would await, in its fortified harbors, a favorable opportunity to strike. it is evident, then, that a naval war against the united states cannot be carried on with success without at the same time inaugurating action on land. because of the great extensions of the united states it would not be satisfactory for the operation of an invading army to be directed toward conquering the interior of the land. it is almost a certainty, however, that a victorious assault on the atlantic coast, tying up the importing and exporting business of the whole country, would bring about such an annoying situation that the government would be willing to treat for peace. if the german invading force were equipped and ready for transporting the moment the battle fleet is despatched, under average conditions these corps can begin operations on american soil within at least four weeks. to what extent we will be able to succeed has already been considered. the united states at this time is not in a position to oppose our troops with an army of equal rank. its regular army actually totals , men, of whom not more than , are ready to defend the home country. of these at least , men are required to guard indian territory and for the garrisoning of coast-wise fortifications, so that only a regular army of , is available for field service. there is also a militia of , men, the larger number of whom have not been trained since the last war summons, and they are poorly equipped with inferior rifles and still more poorly drilled. if an unexpected invasion of the united states is prevented by the length of time for the transporting of troops, and only an unexpected landing can take place, it must be emphasized that the weakness and inexperience of their regular army would essentially facilitate a quick invasion. for the continued occupation of as large a territory as the united states, if they can oppose us for any length of time, an important fighting force will be necessary, to protect the operating lines and to carry on a successful warfare. an invading operation will be difficult to reenforce, in that a second trip of the transport fleet will be required, in order to despatch the necessary number of troops, at such a great distance. it is upon the whole questionable whether there is anything to be gained in occupying for any length of time so large a stretch of land as the united states. the fact that one or two of her provinces are occupied by the invaders would not alone move the americans to sue for peace. to accomplish this end the invaders would have to inflict real material damage by injuring the whole country through the successful seizure of many of the atlantic seaports in which the threads of the entire wealth of the nation meet. it should be so managed that a line of land operations would be in close juncture with the fleet, through which we would be in a position to seize, within a short time, many of these important and rich cities, to interrupt their means of supply, disorganize all governmental affairs, assume control of all useful buildings, confiscate all war and transport supplies, and lastly, to impose heavy indemnities. for enterprises of this sort small land forces would answer our purpose, for it would be unwise for the american garrisons to attempt an attack. their excellently developed net of railways will enable them to concentrate their troops in a relatively short time at the various recognized landing points on the coast. but there are many other splendid landings, and it appears feasible for the invading corps to conduct its operations on these points with the cooperation of the fleet. the land corps can either advance aggressively against the concentrated opposing forces, or through embarking evade an attack and land at a new place. as a matter of fact, germany is the only great power which is in a position to conquer the united states. england could of course carry out a successful attack on the sea, but she would not be prepared to protect her canadian provinces, with which the americans could compensate themselves for a total or crushing defeat on the sea. none of the other great powers can provide the necessary transport fleet to attempt an invasion. ii. views on colonial expeditions all operations for colonial expeditions can be undertaken successfully because of the small forces necessary to transport over the sea to make war upon a country which does not possess modern equipment and trained troops. just such an expedition was unostentatiously carried out in china before our own eyes. the sending of an expedition to east asia affords an interesting example of what can be done. without resistance we have set up governments at a distance from the home country. it is possible with the aid of the fleet to secure similar results. however, there are many obstacles to be overcome. it is imperative that in time of peace we should prepare in every possible way for war in foreign lands which have any commercial value for us. inasmuch as the german army has determined upon larger divisions of troops, the problems of operations on the distant sea falls to the navy. in the future the conducting of such operations will rest with the general staff. it will be necessary to continue the preparations, described fully in the forepart of this book, for the carrying out of operations against such countries as asia, africa and south america. good judgment must be used in the selection of methods. the execution of the first operations would require the constantly combined efforts of the general staff and the admiral staff. our excellent knowledge of east asia has given us the necessary technical preparation in the way of equipment. the chartering of transport ships for service to china should not be difficult in consequence of the large size of the expedition. the expedition corps would require eighteen ships, material and supplies would take five. the greater part of this number would be amply supplied by our two large steamship companies, the north german lloyd and the hamburg-american line. the charter of these steamship companies provides for their use as transports if needed for expeditions of this sort. the disadvantages of this arrangement once appeared in the delay through a labor strike, when it was necessary to transport part of the unfinished ships to wilhelmshaven. another drawback is that not enough room is provided in these ships. on the steamers of the hamburg-american line, for example, only sixty-five per cent. of their normal passenger capacity can be utilized for troops which means at the most an approximate displacement of three net tons, so that only one man instead of two can be carried. an adjustment should be reached to the end that the entire freight capacity of the steamers could be counted upon. the interior arrangements of a steamer to be used for troop transport must be planned according to law. fire-extinguishers, life-saving apparatus and other necessities must be provided for; numerous tables and benches which can be drawn up to the ceiling should be in the troops rooms, and should also be found up on deck. hospital arrangements for two and one-half per cent. of the transport strength should be provided. the active troops of the expedition corps are at present drawn from volunteers, the reserve and the militia, and grouped in new formations. through this the home defenses may be benefited, but the expedition corps would not be up to standard, even though the newly formed troops would have sufficient time to concentrate. it is advisable for such an expedition to employ active, well-trained soldiers for the main part, while the balance could be made up of reserves. it is also to be recommended that in the near future we form a fixed body of troops trained for hospital service. such a formation would have great intrinsic worth. a few words should be said about the organizing of a colonial army, which would be called upon to play an essential part in german military operations over the sea. it would be of extraordinary value in preserving order in our colonies and would also be of assistance in commercial aims. the colonial army would constitute a picked body of men, suitable for service in hot climates and uncivilized countries, who would be able to fight effectively against colonies with which we might be at war. there would still remain, however, the need of preparation of our home forces for colonial expeditions. we are not assured at present of the assembling of the necessary number of qualified troops without drawing on our regular army. it requires a good deal of time to procure the equipment for an expedition to east asia. therefore, contracts with capable firms should be made, to make delivery in the shortest possible time. while the equipment of the infantry with up-to-date weapons is easily accomplished, it is noteworthy that only about thirty horses can be loaded by the english system. some effort should be made to solve the horse problem. the purchasing of horses in australia, america and south china has ceased, in consequence of the knowledge that only a small percentage can withstand the change of climate. it would be impossible to employ joint cavalry forces, due to lack of mounts. it is imperative to find the means for forming a mounted infantry, for there is an insufficient number of advanced cavalry troops to meet an emergency. it would be advantageous if large brigades now idle could be moved for operations in eastern china. past experience in china has emphasized the great importance of cavalry for operations in large countries. the losses in newly purchased horses would be greater than if we would send trained horses accustomed to military service. the great loss in transporting horses is no longer to be feared. the experience of the english in transporting horses to cape town proves the worth of their loading system. and it should be pointed out that the prussian horses, through their training, can endure climatic changes and the hardships of sea transportation much better than the english horses. the thirty horses on the transport must be well taken care of to reach east asia. the ships should be fitted out with this aim in view. accidents usually occur in crossing the equator. the red sea and the indian ocean are especially difficult to cross. this could be overcome by sending the transport by way of cape town, where a part of the trip could be made south through the tropic of cancer. it has been demonstrated that horses not older than from ten to sixteen years should be selected for service abroad. no fear need be felt as to the feeding of the horses, for our horses are accustomed to little corn. sometimes feedings of soaked rice with molasses added have given favorable results. a possible help for the outfitting of the artillery would be the purchasing in italy of native mules and loading them at genoa. in english sea-transporting these animals have demonstrated their exceptional powers of resistance. they are preferable to horses because they can endure hardships better and can more easily be accustomed to conditions in east asia. while we have a large variety of artillery, our expedition corps must be equipped with mountain guns which can be carried by beasts of burden. this is often necessary in colonial expeditions. experience shows that it is difficult to move the heavy artillery of the field army over bad roads, and the large guns would not get very far. this is true also of the steel-boat bridge trains. it is surprising that our collapsible boats, universally approved as superior, are not utilized. our military arrangements have not included a suitable hospital service, because the ambulances are too heavy and unwieldy. the french seem to have been afforded very good service by the so-called cacolets--saddle horses with pack saddles for the sick and wounded. these are excellent for use in colonial countries. a light wagon model is generally recommended for supplies, for despite the condition of the roads they must be able to follow the troops. it is a question how the unfavorable conditions of communication with our men-of-war can be improved. once the forces and supplies are in bremen and bremerhaven no difficulties would be found in embarking. for the future a central place is recommended from which the expedition corps can sail. if thorough preparations are made the loading of the transports can be accomplished in two or three days; by the old method of loading it took two days for each ship. to facilitate the work, the loading should be done simultaneously on both sides of the steamer. the greater part of the supplies can be brought by tugs from bremen to bremerhaven. the troops can consequently embark at quai in about four hours. the vessels, which have been arranged to utilize all available space, can also carry all accouterments, ammunition and supplies. great delay and inconvenience might be caused by not accurately calculating the massive proportions of the military shipment. it is therefore above all argument that the military authorities and not the steamship company should oversee the loading so that it would be done properly from a military standpoint. through a haphazard loading, the detached troops might not go in the same boat with their belongings, and they might not even know where their individual effects were stowed. disembarking would be difficult and delayed, causing the forces to wait a long time for the unloading of their guns and ammunition. with regard to the sea voyage, it is very advantageous for us that the sailing of the joint fleet is not required. the trip by transport would take from forty-two to fifty-seven days. the trip from shanghai to taku can be made successfully with the aid of our battle fleet. the transports should sail without artillery equipment, so that no difficulty would be experienced in getting letters-of-marque; but if they could have on deck even a small amount of the guns which they have on board, they would have nothing to fear from privateers or auxiliary cruisers. upon arrival at taku, considerable difficulties might be encountered, for it is reported that it is practically impossible to procure the extra help needed. considering a landing at tsingtau, it should be noted that there has not been provided a sufficient number of disembarking boats. this situation proves that under all circumstances the troop transport must be equipped independently to land its troops and supplies. experience has taught us that a great deal of preparation is necessary to undertake colonial expeditions and it behooves us now to lay a foundation for future operations over the sea. iii. concluding views many operations of our army, under protection of the fleet, can be conducted in hitherto unexpected directions; many commands which our fleet may not be able to carry out alone can be accomplished by the combination of the land and sea forces. now if the army across the sea is able to resist our strength, it is necessary to prepare in advance to have our battle fleet so strong that it will be in a position to assist materially in any undertaking of our troops. from studies of the strength of our various opponents across the sea whom we must aim at, because their neighboring territory is of great importance to us, it is plain that we must enlarge our fleet to protect our commercial interests. it is essential that the speed of our battle fleets be increased. not the least important thing to realize is the fact that as a rule it is impossible to undertake large operations across the sea, and to carry them out successfully, unless exhaustive preparations are made during times of peace. the end none sea-power and other studies by admiral sir cyprian bridge, g.c.b. preface the essays collected in this volume are republished in the hope that they may be of some use to those who are interested in naval history. the aim has been to direct attention to certain historical occurrences and conditions which the author ventures to think have been often misunderstood. an endeavour has been made to show the continuity of the operation of sea-power throughout history, and the importance of recognising this at the present day. in some cases specially relating to our navy at different periods a revision of the more commonly accepted conclusions--formed, it is believed, on imperfect knowledge--is asked for. it is also hoped that the intimate connection between naval history in the strict sense and military history in the strict sense has been made apparent, and likewise the fact that both are in reality branches of the general history of a nation and not something altogether distinct from and outside it. in a collection of essays on kindred subjects some repetitions are inevitable, but it is believed that they will be found present only to a moderate extent in the following pages. my nephew, mr. j. s. c. bridge, has very kindly seen the book through the press. _june_ . contents i. sea-power. ii. the command of the sea. iii. war and its chief lessons. iv. the historical relations between the navy and the merchant service. v. facts and fancies about the press-gang. vi. projected invasions of the british isles. vii. over-sea raids and raids on land. viii. queen elizabeth and her seamen. ix. nelson: the centenary of trafalgar. x. the share of the fleet in the defence of the empire. xi. naval strategy and tactics at the time of trafalgar. xii. the supply and communications of a fleet. index. ten of the essays included in this volume first appeared in the _encyclopoedia_britannica_, the _times_, the _morning_post_, the _national_review_, the _nineteenth_century_and_after_, the _cornhill_magazine_, and the _naval_annual_. the proprietors of those publications have courteously given me permission to republish them here. special mention must be made of my obligation to the proprietors of the _encyclopoedia_britannica_ for allowing me to reproduce the essays on 'sea-power' and 'the command of the sea.' they are the owners of the copyright of both essays, and their courtesy to me is the more marked because they are about to republish them themselves in the forthcoming edition of the _encyclopoedia_. the paper on 'naval strategy and tactics at the time of trafalgar' was read at the institute of naval architects, and that on 'the supply and communications of a fleet' at the hong-kong united service institution. i sea-power[ ] [footnote : written in . (_encyclopoedia_britannica_.)] sea-power is a term used to indicate two distinct, though cognate things. the affinity of these two and the indiscriminate manner in which the term has been applied to each have tended to obscure its real significance. the obscurity has been deepened by the frequency with which the term has been confounded with the old phrase, 'sovereignty of the sea,' and the still current expression, 'command of the sea.' a discussion--etymological, or even archæological in character--of the term must be undertaken as an introduction to the explanation of its now generally accepted meaning. it is one of those compound words in which a teutonic and a latin (or romance) element are combined, and which are easily formed and become widely current when the sea is concerned. of such are 'sea-coast,' 'sea-forces' (the 'land- and sea-forces' used to be a common designation of what we now call the 'army and navy'), 'sea-service,' 'sea-serpent,' and 'sea-officer' (now superseded by 'naval officer'). the term in one form is as old as the fifteenth century. edward iii, in commemoration of the naval victory of sluys, coined gold 'nobles' which bore on one side his effigy 'crowned, standing in a large ship, holding in one hand a sword and in the other a shield.' an anonymous poet, who wrote in the reign of henry vi, says of this coin: for four things our noble showeth to me, king, ship, and sword, and _power_of_the_sea_. even in its present form the term is not of very recent date. grote [ ] speaks of 'the conversion of athens from a land-power into a sea-power.' in a lecture published in , but probably delivered earlier, the late sir j. r. seeley says that 'commerce was swept out of the mediterranean by the besom of the turkish sea-power.'[ ] the term also occurs in vol. xviii. of the 'encyclopædia britannica,' published in . at p. of that volume (art. persia) we are told that themistocles was 'the founder of the attic sea-power.' the sense in which the term is used differs in these extracts. in the first it means what we generally call a 'naval power'--that is to say, a state having a considerable navy in contradistinction to a 'military power,' a state with a considerable army but only a relatively small navy. in the last two extracts it means all the elements of the naval strength of the state referred to; and this is the meaning that is now generally, and is likely to be exclusively, attached to the term owing to the brilliant way in which it has been elucidated by captain a. t. mahan of the united states navy in a series of remarkable works.[ ] the double use of the term is common in german, though in that language both parts of the compound now in use are teutonic. one instance out of many may be cited from the historian adolf holm.[ ] he says[ ] that athens, being in possession of a good naval port, could become '_eine_bedeutende_ _seemacht_,' i.e. an important naval power. he also says[ ] that gelon of syracuse, besides a large army (_heer_), had '_eine_ _bedeutende_seemacht_,' meaning a considerable navy. the term, in the first of the two senses, is old in german, as appears from the following, extracted from zedler's 'grosses universal lexicon,' vol. xxxvi:[ ] 'seemachten, seepotenzen, latin. _summae_ _potestates_mari_potentes_.' 'seepotenzen' is probably quite obsolete now. it is interesting as showing that german no more abhors teuto-latin or teuto-romance compounds than english. we may note, as a proof of the indeterminate meaning of the expression until his own epoch-making works had appeared, that mahan himself in his earliest book used it in both senses. he says,[ ] 'the spanish netherlands ceased to be a sea-power.' he alludes[ ] to the development of a nation as a 'sea-power,' and[ ] to the inferiority of the confederate states 'as a sea-power.' also,[ ] he remarks of the war of the spanish succession that 'before it england was one of the sea-powers, after it she was _the_ sea-power without any second.' in all these passages, as appears from the use of the indefinite article, what is meant is a naval power, or a state in possession of a strong navy. the other meaning of the term forms the general subject of his writings above enumerated. in his earlier works mahan writes 'sea power' as two words; but in a published letter of the th february , he joins them with a hyphen, and defends this formation of the term and the sense in which he uses it. we may regard him as the virtual inventor of the term in its more diffused meaning, for--even if it had been employed by earlier writers in that sense--it is he beyond all question who has given it general currency. he has made it impossible for anyone to treat of sea-power without frequent reference to his writings and conclusions. [footnote : _hist._of_greece_, v. p. , published in , but with preface dated .] [footnote : _expansion_of_england_, p. .] [footnote : _influence_of_sea-power_on_history_, published ; _influence_of_sea-power_on_the_french_revolution_and_empire_, vols. ; _nelson:_the_embodiment_of_the_sea-power_of_great_ _britain_, vols. .] [footnote : _griechische_geschichte_. berlin, .] [footnote : _ibid_. ii. p. .] [footnote : _ibid_. ii. p. .] [footnote : leipzig und halle, .] [footnote : _influence_of_sea-power_on_history_, p. .] [footnote : _ibid_. p. .] [footnote : _ibid_. p. .] [footnote : _ibid_. p. .] there is something more than mere literary interest in the fact that the term in another language was used more than two thousand years ago. before mahan no historian--not even one of those who specially devoted themselves to the narration of naval occurrences--had evinced a more correct appreciation of the general principles of naval warfare than thucydides. he alludes several times to the importance of getting command of the sea. this country would have been saved some disasters and been less often in peril had british writers--taken as guides by the public--possessed the same grasp of the true principles of defence as thucydides exhibited. one passage in his history is worth quoting. brief as it is, it shows that on the subject of sea-power he was a predecessor of mahan. in a speech in favour of prosecuting the war, which he puts into the mouth of pericles, these words occur:-- _oi_meu_ _gar_ouch_exousiu_allaeu_autilabeiu_amachei_aemiu_de_esti_ _gae_pollae_kai_eu_uaesois_kai_kat_aepeirou_mega_gar_ _to_tes_thalassaes_kratos_. the last part of this extract, though often translated 'command of the sea,' or 'dominion of the sea,' really has the wider meaning of sea-power, the 'power of the sea' of the old english poet above quoted. this wider meaning should be attached to certain passages in herodotus,[ ] which have been generally interpreted 'commanding the sea,' or by the mere titular and honorific 'having the dominion of the sea.' one editor of herodotus, ch. f. baehr, did, however, see exactly what was meant, for, with reference to the allusion to polycrates, he says, _classe_maximum_valuit_. this is perhaps as exact a definition of sea-power as could be given in a sentence. [footnote : _herodotus_, iii. in two places; v. .] it is, however, impossible to give a definition which would be at the same time succinct and satisfactory. to say that 'sea-power' means the sum-total of the various elements that go to make up the naval strength of a state would be in reality to beg the question. mahan lays down the 'principal conditions affecting the sea-power of nations,' but he does not attempt to give a concise definition of it. yet no one who has studied his works will find it difficult to understand what it indicates. our present task is to put readers in possession of the means of doing this. the best, indeed--as mahan has made us see--the only effective way of attaining this object is to treat the matter historically. whatever date we may agree to assign to the formation of the term itself, the idea--as we have seen--is as old as history. it is not intended to give a condensed history of sea-power, but rather an analysis of the idea and what it contains, illustrating this analysis with examples from history ancient and modern. it is important to know that it is not something which originated in the middle of the seventeenth century, and having seriously affected history in the eighteenth, ceased to have weight till captain mahan appeared to comment on it in the last decade of the nineteenth. with a few masterly touches mahan, in his brief allusion to the second punic war, has illustrated its importance in the struggle between rome and carthage. what has to be shown is that the principles which he has laid down in that case, and in cases much more modern, are true and have been true always and everywhere. until this is perceived there is much history which cannot be understood, and yet it is essential to our welfare as a maritime people that we should understand it thoroughly. our failure to understand it has more than once brought us, if not to the verge of destruction, at any rate within a short distance of serious disaster. sea-power in ancient times the high antiquity of decisive naval campaigns is amongst the most interesting features of international conflicts. notwithstanding the much greater frequency of land wars, the course of history has been profoundly changed more often by contests on the water. that this has not received the notice it deserved is true, and mahan tells us why. 'historians generally,' he says, 'have been unfamiliar with the conditions of the sea, having as to it neither special interest nor special knowledge; and the profound determining influence of maritime strength on great issues has consequently been overlooked.' moralising on that which might have been is admittedly a sterile process; but it is sometimes necessary to point, if only by way of illustration, to a possible alternative. as in modern times the fate of india and the fate of north america were determined by sea-power, so also at a very remote epoch sea-power decided whether or not hellenic colonisation was to take root in, and hellenic culture to dominate, central and northern italy as it dominated southern italy, where traces of it are extant to this day. a moment's consideration will enable us to see how different the history of the world would have been had a hellenised city grown and prospered on the seven hills. before the tarquins were driven out of rome a phocoean fleet was encountered ( b.c.) off corsica by a combined force of etruscans and phoenicians, and was so handled that the phocoeans abandoned the island and settled on the coast of lucania.[ ] the enterprise of their navigators had built up for the phoenician cities and their great off-shoot carthage, a sea-power which enabled them to gain the practical sovereignty of the sea to the west of sardinia and sicily. the control of these waters was the object of prolonged and memorable struggles, for on it--as the result showed--depended the empire of the world. from very remote times the consolidation and expansion, from within outwards, of great continental states have had serious consequences for mankind when they were accompanied by the acquisition of a coast-line and the absorption of a maritime population. we shall find that the process loses none of its importance in recent years. 'the ancient empires,' says the historian of greece, ernst curtius, 'as long as no foreign elements had intruded into them, had an invincible horror of the water.' when the condition, which curtius notices in parenthesis, arose, the 'horror' disappeared. there is something highly significant in the uniformity of the efforts of assyria, egypt, babylon, and persia to get possession of the maritime resources of phoenicia. our own immediate posterity will, perhaps, have to reckon with the results of similar efforts in our own day. it is this which gives a living interest to even the very ancient history of sea-power, and makes the study of it of great practical importance to us now. we shall see, as we go on, how the phenomena connected with it reappear with striking regularity in successive periods. looked at in this light, the great conflicts of former ages are full of useful, indeed necessary, instruction. [footnote : mommsen, _hist._rome_, english trans., i. p. .] in the first and greatest of the contests waged by the nations of the east against europe--the persian wars--sea-power was the governing factor. until persia had expanded to the shores of the levant the european greeks had little to fear from the ambition of the great king. the conquest of egypt by cambyses had shown how formidable that ambition could be when supported by an efficient navy. with the aid of the naval forces of the phoenician cities the persian invasion of greece was rendered comparatively easy. it was the naval contingents from phoenicia which crushed the ionian revolt. the expedition of mardonius, and still more that of datis and artaphernes, had indicated the danger threatening greece when the master of a great army was likewise the master of a great navy. their defeat at marathon was not likely to, and as a matter of fact did not, discourage the persians from further attempts at aggression. as the advance of cambyses into egypt had been flanked by a fleet, so also was that of xerxes into greece. by the good fortune sometimes vouch-safed to a people which, owing to its obstinate opposition to, or neglect of, a wise policy, scarcely deserves it, there appeared at athens an influential citizen who understood all that was meant by the term sea-power. themistocles saw more clearly than any of his contemporaries that, to enable athens to play a leading part in the hellenic world, she needed above all things a strong navy. 'he had already in his eye the battle-field of the future.' he felt sure that the persians would come back, and come with such forces that resistance in the open field would be out of the question. one scene of action remained--the sea. persuaded by him the athenians increased their navy, so that of the vessels comprising the greek fleet at artemisium, had been provided by athens, which also sent a large reinforcement after the first action. though no one has ever surpassed themistocles in the faculty of correctly estimating the importance of sea-power, it was understood by xerxes as clearly as by him that the issue of the war depended upon naval operations. the arrangements made under the persian monarch's direction, and his very personal movements, show that this was his view. he felt, and probably expressed the feeling, exactly as--in the war of arnerican independence--washington did in the words, 'whatever efforts are made by the land armies, the navy must have the casting vote in the present contest.' the decisive event was the naval action of salamis. to have made certain of success, the persians should have first obtained a command of the Ægean, as complete for all practical purposes as the french and english had of the sea generally in the war against russia of - . the persian sea-power was not equal to the task. the fleet of the great king was numerically stronger than that of the greek allies; but it has been proved many times that naval efficiency does not depend on numerical superiority alone. the choice sections of the persian fleet were the contingents of the ionians and phoenicians. the former were half-hearted or disaffected; whilst the latter were, at best, not superior in skill, experience, and valour to the greek sailors. at salamis greece was saved not only from the ambition and vengeance of xerxes, but also and for many centuries from oppression by an oriental conqueror. persia did not succeed against the greeks, not because she had no sea-power, but because her sea-power, artificially built up, was inferior to that which was a natural element of the vitality of her foes. ionia was lost and greece in the end enslaved, because the quarrels of greeks with greeks led to the ruin of their naval states. the peloponnesian was largely a naval war. the confidence of the athenians in their sea-power had a great deal to do with its outbreak. the immediate occasion of the hostilities, which in time involved so many states, was the opportunity offered by the conflict between corinth and corcyra of increasing the sea-power of athens. hitherto the athenian naval predominance had been virtually confined to the Ægean sea. the corcyræan envoy, who pleaded for help at athens, dwelt upon the advantage to be derived by the athenians from alliance with a naval state occupying an important situation 'with respect to the western regions towards which the views of the athenians had for some time been directed.'[ ] it was the 'weapon of her sea-power,' to adopt mahan's phrase, that enabled athens to maintain the great conflict in which she was engaged. repeated invasions of her territory, the ravages of disease amongst her people, and the rising disaffection of her allies had been more than made up for by her predominance on the water. the scale of the subsequent syracusan expedition showed how vigorous athens still was down to the interruption of the war by the peace of nicias. the great expedition just mentioned over-taxed her strength. its failure brought about the ruin of the state. it was held by contemporaries, and has been held in our own day, that the athenian defeat at syracuse was due to the omission of the government at home to keep the force in sicily properly supplied and reinforced. this explanation of failure is given in all ages, and should always be suspected. the friends of unsuccessful generals and admirals always offer it, being sure of the support of the political opponents of the administration. after the despatch of the supporting expedition under demosthenes and eurymedon, no further great reinforcement, as nicias admitted, was possible. the weakness of athens was in the character of the men who swayed the popular assemblies and held high commands. a people which remembered the administration of a pericles, and yet allowed a cleon or an alcibiades to direct its naval and military policy, courted defeat. nicias, notwithstanding the possession of high qualities, lacked the supreme virtue of a commander--firm resolution. he dared not face the obloquy consequent on withdrawal from an enterprise on which the popular hopes had been fixed; and therefore he allowed a reverse to be converted into an overwhelming disaster. 'the complete ruin of athens had appeared, both to her enemies and to herself, impending and irreparable. but so astonishing, so rapid, and so energetic had been her rally, that [a year after syracuse] she was found again carrying on a terrible struggle.'[ ] nevertheless her sea-power had indeed been ruined at syracuse. now she could wage war only 'with impaired resources and on a purely defensive system.' even before arginusæ it was seen that 'superiority of nautical skill had passed to the peloponnesians and their allies.'[ ] [footnote : thirwall, _hist._greece_, iii. p. .] [footnote : grote, _hist._greece_, v. p. .] [footnote : _ibid._ p. .] the great, occasionally interrupted, and prolonged contest between rome and carthage was a sustained effort on the part of one to gain and of the other to keep the control of the western mediterranean. so completely had that control been exercised by carthage, that she had anticipated the spanish commercial policy in america. the romans were precluded by treaties from trading with the carthaginian territories in hispania, africa, and sardinia. rome, as mommsen tells us, 'was from the first a maritime city and, in the period of its vigour, never was so foolish or so untrue to its ancient traditions as wholly to neglect its war marine and to desire to be a mere continental power.' it may be that it was lust of wealth rather than lust of dominion that first prompted a trial of strength with carthage. the vision of universal empire could hardly as yet have formed itself in the imagination of a single roman. the area of phoenician maritime commerce was vast enough both to excite jealousy and to offer vulnerable points to the cupidity of rivals. it is probable that the modern estimate of the sea-power of carthage is much exaggerated. it was great by comparison, and of course overwhelmingly great when there were none but insignificant competitors to challenge it. mommsen holds that, in the fourth and fifth centuries after the foundation of rome, 'the two main competitors for the dominion of the western waters' were carthage and syracuse. 'carthage,' he says, 'had the preponderance, and syracuse sank more and more into a second-rate naval power. the maritime importance of the etruscans was wholly gone.... rome itself was not exempt from the same fate; its own waters were likewise commanded by foreign fleets.' the romans were for a long time too much occupied at home to take much interest in mediterranean matters. the position of the carthaginians in the western basin of the mediterranean was very like that of the portuguese long afterwards in india. the latter kept within reach of the sea; 'nor did their rule ever extend a day's march from their ships.'[ ] 'the carthaginians in spain,' says mommsen, 'made no effort to acquire the interior from the warlike native nations; they were content with the possession of the mines and of stations for traffic and for shell and other fisheries.' allowance being made for the numbers of the classes engaged in administration, commerce, and supervision, it is nearly certain that carthage could not furnish the crews required by both a great war-navy and a great mercantile marine. no one is surprised on finding that the land-forces of carthage were composed largely of alien mercenaries. we have several examples from which we can infer a parallel, if not an identical, condition of her maritime resources. how, then, was the great carthaginian carrying-trade provided for? the experience of more than one country will enable us to answer this question. the ocean trade of those off-shoots or dependencies of the united kingdom, viz. the united states, australasia, and india, is largely or chiefly conducted by shipping of the old country. so that of carthage was largely conducted by old phoenicians. these may have obtained a 'carthaginian register,' or the contemporary equivalent; but they could not all have been purely carthaginian or liby-phoenician. this must have been the case even more with the war-navy. british india for a considerable time possessed a real and indeed highly efficient navy; but it was officered entirely and manned almost entirely by men from the 'old country.' moreover, it was small. the wealth of india would have sufficed to furnish a larger material element; but, as the country could not supply the _personnel_, it would have been absurd to speak of the sea-power of india apart from that of england. as soon as the romans chose to make the most of their natural resources the maritime predominance of carthage was doomed. the artificial basis of the latter's sea-power would not enable it to hold out against serious and persistent assaults. unless this is perceived it is impossible to understand the story of the punic wars. judged by every visible sign of strength, carthage, the richer, the more enterprising, ethnically the more predominant amongst her neighbours, and apparently the more nautical, seemed sure to win in the great struggle with rome which, by the conditions of the case, was to be waged largely on the water. yet those who had watched the struggles of the punic city with the sicilian greeks, and especially that with agathocles, must have seen reason to cherish doubts concerning her naval strength. it was an anticipation of the case of spain in the age of philip ii. as the great elizabethan seamen discerned the defects of the spanish naval establishment, so men at rome discerned those of the carthaginian. dates in connection with this are of great significance. a comprehensive measure, with the object of 'rescuing their marine from its condition of impotence,' was taken by the romans in the year b.c. four _quoestores_ _classici_--in modern naval english we may perhaps call them port-admirals--were nominated, and one was stationed at each of four ports. the objects of the roman senate, so mommsen tells us, were very obvious. they were 'to recover their independence by sea, to cut off the maritime communications of tarentum, to close the adriatic against fleets coming from epirus, and to emancipate themselves from carthaginian supremacy.' four years afterwards the first punic war began. it was, and had to be, largely a naval contest. the romans waged it with varying fortune, but in the end triumphed by means of their sea-power. 'the sea was the place where all great destinies were decided.'[ ] the victory of catulus over the carthaginian fleet off the Ægatian islands decided the war and left to the romans the possession of sicily and the power of possessing themselves of sardinia and corsica. it would be an interesting and perhaps not a barren investigation to inquire to what extent the decline of the mother states of phoenicia, consequent on the campaigns of alexander the great, had helped to enfeeble the naval efficiency of the carthaginian defences. one thing was certain. carthage had now met with a rival endowed with natural maritime resources greater than her own. that rival also contained citizens who understood the true importance of sea-power. 'with a statesmanlike sagacity from which succeeding generations might have drawn a lesson, the leading men of the roman commonwealth perceived that all their coast-fortifications and coast-garrisons would prove inadequate unless the war-marine of the state were again placed on a footing that should command respect.'[ ] it is a gloomy reflection that the leading men of our own great maritime country could not see this in . a thorough comprehension of the events of the first punic war enables us to solve what, until mahan wrote, had been one of the standing enigmas of history, viz. hannibal's invasion of italy by land instead of by sea in the second punic war. mahan's masterly examination of this question has set at rest all doubts as to the reason of hannibal's action.[ ] the naval predominance in the western basin of the mediterranean acquired by rome had never been lost. though modern historians, even those belonging to a maritime country, may have failed to perceive it, the carthaginians knew well enough that the romans were too strong for them on the sea. though other forces co-operated to bring about the defeat of carthage in the second punic war, the roman navy, as mahan demonstrates, was the most important. as a navy, he tells us in words like those already quoted, 'acts on an element strange to most writers, as its members have been from time immemorial a strange race apart, without prophets of their own, neither themselves nor their calling understood, its immense determining influence on the history of that era, and consequently upon the history of the world, has been overlooked.' [footnote : r. s. whiteway, _rise_of_the_portuguese_power_ _in_india_ p. . westminster, .] [footnote : j. h. burton, _hist._of_scotland_, , vol. i. p. .] [footnote : mommsen, i. p. .] [footnote : _inf._on_hist._, pp. - .] the attainment of all but universal dominion by rome was now only a question of time. 'the annihilation of the carthaginian fleet had made the romans masters of the sea.'[ ] a lodgment had already been gained in illyricum, and countries farther east were before long to be reduced to submission. a glance at the map will show that to effect this the command of the eastern basin of the mediterranean, like that of the western, must be secured by the romans. the old historic navies of the greek and phoenician states had declined. one considerable naval force there was which, though it could not have prevented, was strong enough to have delayed the roman progress eastwards. this force belonged to rhodes, which in the years immediately following the close of the second punic war reached its highest point as a naval power.[ ] far from trying to obstruct the advance of the romans the rhodian fleet helped it. hannibal, in his exile, saw the necessity of being strong on the sea if the east was to be saved from the grasp of his hereditary foe; but the resources of antiochus, even with the mighty cooperation of hannibal, were insufficient. in a later and more often-quoted struggle between east and west--that which was decided at actium--sea-power was again seen to 'have the casting vote.' when the whole of the mediterranean coasts became part of a single state the importance of the navy was naturally diminished; but in the struggles within the declining empire it rose again at times. the contest of the vandal genseric with majorian and the african expedition of belisarius--not to mention others--were largely influenced by the naval operations.[ ] [footnote : schmitz, _hist._rome_, p. .] [footnote : c. torr, _rhodes_in_ancient_times_, p. .] [footnote : gibbon, _dec._and_fall_, chaps. xxxvi. xli] sea-power in the middle ages a decisive event, the mohammedan conquest of northern africa from egypt westwards, is unintelligible until it is seen how great a part sea-power played in effecting it. purely land expeditions, or expeditions but slightly supported from the sea, had ended in failure. the emperor at constantinople still had at his disposal a fleet capable of keeping open the communications with his african province. it took the saracens half a century ( - a.d.) to win 'their way along the coast of africa as far as the pillars of hercules';[ ] and, as gibbon tells us, it was not till the commander of the faithful had prepared a great expedition, this time by sea as well as by land, that the saracenic dominion was definitely established. it has been generally assumed that the arabian conquerors who, within a few years of his death, spread the faith of mohammed over vast regions, belonged to an essentially non-maritime race; and little or no stress has been laid on the extent to which they relied on naval support in prosecuting their conquests. in parts of arabia, however, maritime enterprise was far from non-existent; and when the mohammedan empire had extended outwards from mecca and medina till it embraced the coasts of various seas, the consequences to the neighbouring states were as serious as the rule above mentioned would lead us to expect that they would be. 'with the conquest of syria and egypt a long stretch of sea-board had come into the saracenic power; and the creation and maintenance of a navy for the protection of the maritime ports as well as for meeting the enemy became a matter of vital importance. great attention was paid to the manning and equipment of the fleet.'[ ] at first the fleet was manned by sailors drawn from the phoenician towns where nautical energy was not yet quite extinct; and later the crews were recruited from syria, egypt, and the coasts of asia minor. ships were built at most of the syrian and egyptian ports, and also at obolla and bushire on the persian gulf,' whilst the mercantile marine and maritime trade were fostered and encouraged. the sea-power thus created was largely artificial. it drooped--as in similar cases--when the special encouragement was withdrawn. 'in the days of arabian energy,' says hallam, 'constantinople was twice, in and , attacked by great naval armaments.' the same authority believes that the abandonment of such maritime enterprises by the saracens may be attributed to the removal of the capital from damascus to bagdad. the removal indicated a lessened interest in the affairs of the mediterranean sea, which was now left by the administration far behind. 'the greeks in their turn determined to dispute the command of the sea,' with the result that in the middle of the tenth century their empire was far more secure from its enemies than under the first successors of heraclius. not only was the fall of the empire, by a rational reliance on sea-power, postponed for centuries, but also much that had been lost was regained. 'at the close of the tenth century the emperors of constantinople possessed the best and greatest part' of southern italy, part of sicily, the whole of what is now called the balkan peninsula, asia minor, with some parts of syria and armenia.[ ] [footnote : hallam, _mid._ages_, chap. vi.] [footnote : ameer ali, syed, _short_hist._saracens_, p. ] [footnote : hallam, chap. vi.; gibbon, chap. li.] neglect of sea-power by those who can be reached by sea brings its own punishment. whether neglected or not, if it is an artificial creation it is nearly sure to disappoint those who wield it when it encounters a rival power of natural growth. how was it possible for the crusaders, in their various expeditions, to achieve even the transient success that occasionally crowned their efforts? how did the christian kingdom of jerusalem contrive to exist for more than three-quarters of a century? why did the crusades more and more become maritime expeditions? the answer to these questions is to be found in the decline of the mohammedan naval defences and the rising enterprise of the seafaring people of the west. venetians, pisans, and genoese transported crusading forces, kept open the communications of the places held by the christians, and hampered the operations of the infidels. even the great saladin failed to discern the important alteration of conditions. this is evident when we look at the efforts of the christians to regain the lost kingdom. saladin 'forgot that the safety of phoenicia lay in immunity from naval incursions, and that no victory on land could ensure him against an influx from beyond the sea.'[ ] not only were the crusaders helped by the fleets of the maritime republics of italy, they also received reinforcements by sea from western europe and england, on the 'arrival of _malik_ankiltar_ (richard coeur de lion) with twenty shiploads of fighting men and munitions of war.' [footnote : ameer ali, syed, pp. , .] participation in the crusades was not a solitary proof of the importance of the naval states of italy. that they had been able to act effectively in the levant may have been in some measure due to the weakening of the mohammedans by the disintegration of the seljukian power, the movements of the moguls, and the confusion consequent on the rise of the ottomans. however that may have been, the naval strength of those italian states was great absolutely as well as relatively. sismondi, speaking of venice, pisa, and genoa, towards the end of the eleventh century, says 'these three cities had more vessels on the mediterranean than the whole of christendom besides.'[ ] dealing with a period two centuries later, he declares it 'difficult to comprehend how two simple cities could put to sea such prodigious fleets as those of pisa and genoa.' the difficulty disappears when we have mahan's explanation. the maritime republics of italy--like athens and rhodes in ancient, catalonia in mediæval, and england and the netherlands in more modern times--were 'peculiarly well fitted, by situation and resources, for the control of the sea by both war and commerce.' as far as the western mediterranean was concerned, genoa and pisa had given early proofs of their maritime energy, and fixed themselves, in succession to the saracens, in the balearic isles, sardinia, and corsica. sea-power was the themistoclean instrument with which they made a small state into a great one. [footnote : _ital._republics_, english ed., p. .] a fertile source of dispute between states is the acquisition of territory beyond sea. as others have done before and since, the maritime republics of italy quarrelled over this. sea-power seemed, like saturn, to devour its own children. in , in a great sea-fight off meloria, the pisans were defeated by the genoese with heavy loss, which, as sismondi states, 'ruined the maritime power' of the former. from that time genoa, transferring her activity to the levant, became the rival of venice, the fleets of the two cities in met near cyprus in an encounter, said to be accidental, that began 'a terrible war which for seven years stained the mediterranean with blood and consumed immense wealth.' in the next century the two republics, 'irritated by commercial quarrels'--like the english and dutch afterwards--were again at war in the levant. sometimes one side, sometimes the other was victorious; but the contest was exhausting to both, and especially to venice. within a quarter of a century they were at war again. hostilities lasted till the genoese met with the crushing defeat of chioggia. 'from this time,' says hallam, 'genoa never commanded the ocean with such navies as before; her commerce gradually went into decay; and the fifteenth century, the most splendid in the annals of venice, is till recent times the most ignominious in those of genoa.' venice seemed now to have no naval rival, and had no fear that anyone could forbid the ceremony in which the doge, standing in the bows of the _bucentaur_, cast a ring into the adriatic with the words, _desponsamus_te,_mare,_in_signum_veri_perpetuique_dominii_. the result of the combats at chioggia, though fatal to it in the long-run, did not at once destroy the naval importance of genoa. a remarkable characteristic of sea-power is the delusive manner in which it appears to revive after a great defeat. the persian navy occasionally made a brave show afterwards; but in reality it had received at salamis a mortal wound. athens seemed strong enough on the sea after the catastrophe of syracuse; but, as already stated, her naval power had been given there a check from which it never completely recovered. the navy of carthage had had similar experience; and, in later ages, the power of the turks was broken at lepanto and that of spain at gravelines notwithstanding deceptive appearances afterwards. venice was soon confronted on the sea by a new rival. the turkish naval historian, haji khalifeh,[ ] tells us that, 'after the taking of constantinople, when they [the ottomans] spread their conquests over land and sea, it became necessary to build ships and make armaments in order to subdue the fortresses and castles on the rumelian and anatolian shores, and in the islands of the mediterranean.' mohammed ii established a great naval arsenal at constantinople. in the turks, 'for the first time, equipped a fleet with which they drove that of the venetians out of the grecian seas.'[ ] the turkish wars of venice lasted a long time. in that which ended in the decline of the venetians' naval power was obvious. 'the mussulmans had made progress in naval discipline; the venetian fleet could no longer cope with theirs.' henceforward it was as an allied contingent of other navies that that of venice was regarded as important. dyer[ ] quotes a striking passage from a letter of Æneas sylvius, afterwards pope pius ii, in which the writer affirms that, if the venetians are defeated, christendom will not control the sea any longer; for neither the catalans nor the genoese, without the venetians, are equal to the turks. [footnote : _maritime_wars_of_the_turks_, mitchell's trans., p. .] [footnote : sismondi, p. .] [footnote : _hist._europe_, i. p. .] sea-power in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the last-named people, indeed, exemplified once more the rule that a military state expanding to the sea and absorbing older maritime populations becomes a serious menace to its neighbours. even in the fifteenth century mohammed ii had made an attack on southern italy; but his sea-power was not equal to the undertaking. suleymân the magnificent directed the ottoman forces towards the west. with admirable strategic insight he conquered rhodes, and thus freed himself from the danger of a hostile force on his flank. 'the centenary of the conquest of constantinople was past, and the turk had developed a great naval power besides annexing egypt and syria.'[ ] the turkish fleets, under such leaders as khair-ad-din (barbarossa), piale, and dragut, seemed to command the mediterranean including its western basin; but the repulse at malta in was a serious check, and the defeat at lepanto in virtually put an end to the prospect of turkish maritime dominion. the predominance of portugal in the indian ocean in the early part of the sixteenth century had seriously diminished the ottoman resources. the wealth derived from the trade in that ocean, the persian gulf, and the red sea, had supplied the mohammedans with the sinews of war, and had enabled them to contend with success against the christians in europe. 'the main artery had been cut when the portuguese took up the challenge of the mohammedan merchants of calicut, and swept their ships from the ocean.'[ ] the sea-power of portugal wisely employed had exercised a great, though unperceived, influence. though enfeebled and diminishing, the turkish navy was still able to act with some effect in the seventeenth century. nevertheless, the sea-power of the turks ceased to count as a factor of importance in the relations between great states. [footnote : seeley, _british_policy_, i. p. .] [footnote : whiteway, p. .] in the meantime the state which had a leading share in winning the victory of lepanto had been growing up in the west. before the union of its crown with that of castile and the formation of the spanish monarchy, aragon had been expanding till it reached the sea. it was united with catalonia in the twelfth century, and it conquered valencia in the thirteenth. its long line of coast opened the way to an extensive and flourishing commerce; and an enterprising navy indemnified the nation for the scantiness of its territory at home by the important foreign conquests of sardinia, sicily, naples, and the balearic isles. amongst the maritime states of the mediterranean catalonia had been conspicuous. she was to the iberian peninsula much what phoenicia had been to syria. the catalan navy had disputed the empire of the mediterranean with the fleets of pisa and genoa. the incorporation of catalonia with aragon added greatly to the strength of that kingdom. the aragonese kings were wise enough to understand and liberal enough to foster the maritime interests of their new possessions.[ ] their french and italian neighbours were to feel, before long, the effect of this policy; and when the spanish monarchy had been consolidated, it was felt not only by them, but by others also. the more spanish dominion was extended in italy, the more were the naval resources at the command of spain augmented. genoa became 'spain's water-gate to italy.... henceforth the spanish crown found in the dorias its admirals; their squadron was permanently hired to the kings of spain.' spanish supremacy at sea was established at the expense of france.[ ] the acquisition of a vast domain in the new world had greatly developed the maritime activity of castile, and spain was as formidable on the ocean as in the mediterranean. after portugal had been annexed the naval vessels of that country were added to the spanish, and the great port of lisbon became available as a place of equipment and as an additional base of operations for oceanic campaigns. the fusion of spain and portugal, says seeley, 'produced a single state of unlimited maritime dominion.... henceforth the whole new world belonged exclusively to spain.' the story of the tremendous catastrophe--the defeat of the armada--by which the decline of this dominion was heralded is well known. it is memorable, not only because of the harm it did to spain, but also because it revealed the rise of another claimant to maritime pre-eminence--the english nation. the effects of the catastrophe were not at once visible. spain still continued to look like the greatest power in the world; and, though the english seamen were seen to be something better than adventurous pirates--a character suggested by some of their recent exploits--few could have comprehended that they were engaged in building up what was to be a sea-power greater than any known to history. [footnote : prescott, _ferdinand_and_isabella_, introd. sects. i. ii.] [footnote : g. w. prothero, in m. hume's _spain_, - , p. .] they were carrying forward, not beginning the building of this. 'england,' says sir j. k. laughton, 'had always believed in her naval power, had always claimed the sovereignty of the narrow seas; and more than two hundred years before elizabeth came to the throne, edward iii had testified to his sense of its importance by ordering a gold coinage bearing a device showing the armed strength and sovereignty of england based on the sea.'[ ] it is impossible to make intelligible the course of the many wars which the english waged with the french in the middle ages unless the true naval position of the former is rightly appreciated. why were crecy, poitiers, agincourt--not to mention other combats--fought, not on english, but on continental soil? why during the so-called 'hundred years' war' was england in reality the invader and not the invaded? we of the present generation are at last aware of the significance of naval defence, and know that, if properly utilised, it is the best security against invasion that a sea-surrounded state can enjoy. it is not, however, commonly remembered that the same condition of security existed and was properly valued in mediæval times. the battle of sluys in rendered invasion of england as impracticable as did that of la hogue in , that of quiberon bay in , and that of trafalgar in ; and it permitted, as did those battles, the transport of troops to the continent to support our allies in wars which, had we not been strong at sea, would have been waged on the soil of our own country. our early continental wars, therefore, are proofs of the long-established efficiency of our naval defences. notwithstanding the greater attention paid, within the last dozen years or so, to naval affairs, it is doubtful if the country generally even yet recognises the extent to which its security depends upon a good fleet as fully as our ancestors did nearly seven centuries ago. the narrative of our pre-elizabethan campaigns is interesting merely as a story; and, when told--as for instance d. hannay has told it in the introductory chapters of his 'short history of the royal navy'--it will be found instructive and worthy of careful study at the present day. each of the principal events in our early naval campaigns may be taken as an illustration of the idea conveyed by the term 'sea-power,' and of the accuracy with which its meaning was apprehended at the time. to take a very early case, we may cite the defeat of eustace the monk by hubert de burgh in . reinforcements and supplies had been collected at calais for conveyance to the army of prince louis of france and the rebel barons who had been defeated at lincoln. the reinforcements tried to cross the channel under the escort of a fleet commanded by eustace. hubert de burgh, who had stoutly held dover for king john, and was faithful to the young henry iii, heard of the enemy's movements. 'if these people land,' said he, 'england is lost; let us therefore boldly meet them.' he reasoned in almost the same words as raleigh about four centuries afterwards, and undoubtedly 'had grasped the true principles of the defence of england.' he put to sea and defeated his opponent. the fleet on which prince louis and the rebellious barons had counted was destroyed; and with it their enterprise. 'no more admirably planned, no more fruitful battle has been fought by englishmen on water.'[ ] as introductory to a long series of naval operations undertaken with a like object, it has deserved detailed mention here. [footnote : _armada_, introd. (navy records society).] [footnote : hannay, p. .] the sixteenth century was marked by a decided advance in both the development and the application of sea-power. previously its operation had been confined to the mediterranean or to coast waters outside it. spanish or basque seamen--by their proceedings in the english channel--had proved the practicability of, rather than been engaged in, ocean warfare. the english, who withstood them, were accustomed to seas so rough, to seasons so uncertain, and to weather so boisterous, that the ocean had few terrors for them. all that was wanting was a sufficient inducement to seek distant fields of action and a development of the naval art that would permit them to be reached. the discovery of the new world supplied the first; the consequently increased length of voyages and of absence from the coast led to the second. the world had been moving onwards in other things as well as in navigation. intercommunication was becoming more and more frequent. what was done by one people was soon known to others. it is a mistake to suppose that, because the english had been behindhand in the exploration of remote regions, they were wanting in maritime enterprise. the career of the cabots would of itself suffice to render such a supposition doubtful. the english had two good reasons for postponing voyages to and settlement in far-off lands. they had their hands full nearer home; and they thoroughly, and as it were by instinct, understood the conditions on which permanent expansion must rest. they wanted to make sure of the line of communication first. to effect this a sea-going marine of both war and commerce and, for further expansion, stations on the way were essential. the chart of the world furnishes evidence of the wisdom and the thoroughness of their procedure. taught by the experience of the spaniards and the portuguese, when unimpeded by the political circumstances of the time, and provided with suitable equipment, the english displayed their energy in distant seas. it now became simply a question of the efficiency of sea-power. if this was not a quality of that of the english, then their efforts were bound to fail; and, more than this, the position of their country, challenging as it did what was believed to be the greatest of maritime states, would have been altogether precarious. the principal expeditions now undertaken were distinguished by a characteristic peculiar to the people, and not to be found in connection with the exploring or colonising activity of most other great nations even down to our own time. they were really unofficial speculations in which, if the government took part at all, it was for the sake of the profit expected and almost, if not exactly, like any private adventurer. the participation of the government, nevertheless, had an aspect which it is worth while to note. it conveyed a hint--and quite consciously--to all whom it might concern that the speculations were 'under-written' by the whole sea-power of england. the forces of more than one state had been used to protect its maritime trade from the assaults of enemies in the mediterranean or in the narrow seas. they had been used to ward off invasion and to keep open communications across not very extensive areas of water. in the sixteenth century they were first relied upon to support distant commerce, whether carried on in a peaceful fashion or under aggressive forms. this, naturally enough, led to collisions. the contention waxed hot, and was virtually decided when the armada shaped course to the northward after the fight off gravelines. the expeditions against the spanish indies and, still more, those against philip ii's peninsular territory, had helped to define the limitations of sea-power. it became evident, and it was made still more evident in the next century, that for a great country to be strong it must not rely upon a navy alone. it must also have an adequate and properly organised mobile army. notwithstanding the number of times that this lesson has been repeated, we have been slow to learn it. it is doubtful if we have learned it even yet. english seamen in all ages seem to have mastered it fully; for they have always demanded--at any rate for upwards of three centuries--that expeditions against foreign territory over-sea should be accompanied by a proper number of land-troops. on the other hand, the necessity of organising the army of a maritime insular state, and of training it with the object of rendering effective aid in operations of the kind in question, has rarely been perceived and acted upon by others. the result has been a long series of inglorious or disastrous affairs like the west indies voyage of - , the cadiz expedition of , and that to the ile de ré of . additions might be made to the list. the failures of joint expeditions have often been explained by alleging differences or quarrels between the naval and the military commanders. this way of explaining them, however, is nothing but the inveterate critical method of the streets by which cause is taken for effect and effect for cause. the differences and quarrels arose, no doubt; but they generally sprang out of the recriminations consequent on, not producing, the want of success. another manifestation of the way in which sea-power works was first observed in the seventeenth century. it suggested the adoption of, and furnished the instrument for carrying out a distinct maritime policy. what was practically a standing navy had come into existence. as regards england this phenomenon was now of respectable age. long voyages and cruises of several ships in company had been frequent during the latter half of the sixteenth century and the early part of the seventeenth. even the grandfathers of the men who sailed with blake and penn in could not have known a time when ships had never crossed the ocean, and squadrons kept together for months had never cruised. however imperfect it may have been, a system of provisioning ships and supplying them with stores, and of preserving discipline amongst their crews, had been developed, and had proved fairly satisfactory. the parliament and the protector in turn found it necessary to keep a considerable number of ships in commission, and make them cruise and operate in company. it was not till well on in the reign of queen victoria that the man-of-war's man was finally differentiated from the merchant seaman; but two centuries before some of the distinctive marks of the former had already begun to be noticeable. there were seamen in the time of the commonwealth who rarely, perhaps some who never, served afloat except in a man-of-war. some of the interesting naval families which were settled at portsmouth and the eastern ports, and which--from father to son--helped to recruit the ranks of our bluejackets till a date later than that of the launch of the first ironclad, could carry back their professional genealogy to at least the days of charles ii, when, in all probability, it did not first start. though landsmen continued even after the civil war to be given naval appointments, and though a permanent corps, through the ranks of which everyone must pass, had not been formally established, a body of real naval officers--men who could handle their ships, supervise the working of the armament, and exercise military command--had been formed. a navy, accordingly, was now a weapon of undoubted keenness, capable of very effective use by anyone who knew how to wield it. having tasted the sweets of intercourse with the indies, whether in the occupation of portugal or of spain, both english and dutch were desirous of getting a larger share of them. english maritime commerce had increased and needed naval protection. if england was to maintain the international position to which, as no one denied, she was entitled, that commerce must be permitted to expand. the minds of men in western europe, moreover, were set upon obtaining for their country territories in the new world, the amenities of which were now known. from the reign of james i the dutch had shown great jealousy of english maritime enterprise. where it was possible, as in the east indian archipelago, they had destroyed it. their naval resources were great enough to let them hold english shipping at their mercy, unless a vigorous effort were made to protect it. the dutch conducted the carrying trade of a great part of the world, and the monopoly of this they were resolved to keep, while the english were resolved to share in it. the exclusion of the english from every trade-route, except such as ran by their own coast or crossed the narrow seas, seemed a by no means impossible contingency. there seemed also to be but one way of preventing it, viz. by war. the supposed unfriendliness of the dutch, or at least of an important party amongst them, to the regicide government in england helped to force the conflict. the navigation act of was passed and regarded as a covert declaration of hostilities. so the first dutch war began. it established our claim to compete for the position of a great maritime commercial power. the rise of the sea-power of the dutch, and the magnitude which it attained in a short time and in the most adverse circumstances, have no parallel in history. the case of athens was different, because the athenian power had not so much been unconsciously developed out of a great maritime trade, as based on a military marine deliberately and persistently fostered during many years. thirlwall believes that it was solon who 'laid the foundations of the attic navy,'[ ] a century before salamis. the great achievement of themistocles was to convince his fellow-citizens that their navy ought to be increased. perhaps the nearest parallel with the power of the dutch was presented by that of rhodes, which rested largely on a carrying trade. the rhodian undertakings, however, were by comparison small and restricted in extent. motley declares of the seven united provinces that they 'commanded the ocean,'[ ] and that it would be difficult to exaggerate the naval power of the young commonwealth. even in the days of spain's greatness english seamen positively declined to admit that she was stronger than england on the sea; and the story of the armada justified their view. our first two dutch wars were, therefore, contests between the two foremost naval states of the world for what was primarily a maritime object. the identity of the cause of the first and of the second war will be discerned by anyone who compares what has been said about the circumstances leading to the former, with monk's remark as to the latter. he said that the english wanted a larger share of the trade enjoyed by the dutch. it was quite in accordance with the spirit of the age that the dutch should try to prevent, by force, this want from being satisfied. anything like free and open competition was repugnant to the general feeling. the high road to both individual wealth and national prosperity was believed to lie in securing a monopoly. merchants or manufacturers who called for the abolition of monopolies granted to particular courtiers and favourites had not the smallest intention, on gaining their object, of throwing open to the enterprise of all what had been monopolised. it was to be kept for the exclusive benefit of some privileged or chartered company. it was the same in greater affairs. as mahan says, 'to secure to one's own people a disproportionate share of the benefits of sea commerce every effort was made to exclude others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitory regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence.' the apparent wealth of spain was believed to be due to the rigorous manner in which foreigners were excluded from trading with the spanish over-sea territories. the skill and enterprise of the dutch having enabled them to force themselves into this trade, they were determined to keep it to themselves. the dutch east india company was a powerful body, and largely dictated the maritime policy of the country. we have thus come to an interesting point in the historical consideration of sea-power. the elizabethan conflict with spain had practically settled the question whether or not the expanding nations were to be allowed to extend their activities to territories in the new world. the first two dutch wars were to settle the question whether or not the ocean trade of the world was to be open to any people qualified to engage in it. we can see how largely these were maritime questions, how much depended on the solution found for them, and how plain it was that they must be settled by naval means. [footnote : _hist._greece_, ii. p. .] [footnote : _united_netherlands_, ii. p. .] mahan's great survey of sea-power opens in , midway between the first and second dutch wars. 'the sailing-ship era, with its distinctive features,' he tells us, 'had fairly begun.' the art of war by sea, in its more important details, had been settled by the first war. from the beginning of the second the general features of ship design, the classification of ships, the armament of ships, and the handling of fleets, were to remain without essential alteration until the date of navarino. even the tactical methods, except where improved on occasions by individual genius, altered little. the great thing was to bring the whole broadside force to bear on an enemy. whether this was to be impartially distributed throughout the hostile line or concentrated on one part of it depended on the character of particular admirals. it would have been strange if a period so long and so rich in incidents had afforded no materials for forming a judgment on the real significance of sea-power. the text, so to speak, chosen by mahan is that, notwithstanding the changes wrought in naval _matériel_ during the last half-century, we can find in the history of the past instructive illustrations of the general principles of maritime war. these illustrations will prove of value not only 'in those wider operations which embrace a whole theatre of war,' but also, if rightly applied, 'in the tactical use of the ships and weapons' of our own day. by a remarkable coincidence the same doctrine was being preached at the same time and quite independently by the late vice-admiral philip colomb in his work on 'naval warfare.' as a prelude to the second dutch war we find a repetition of a process which had been adopted somewhat earlier. that was the permanent conquest of trans-oceanic territory. until the seventeenth century had well begun, naval, or combined naval and military, operations against the distant possessions of an enemy had been practically restricted to raiding or plundering attacks on commercial centres. the portuguese territory in south america having come under spanish dominion in consequence of the annexation of portugal to spain, the dutch--as the power of the latter country declined--attempted to reduce part of that territory into permanent possession. this improvement on the practice of drake and others was soon seen to be a game at which more than one could play. an expedition sent by cromwell to the west indies seized the spanish island of jamaica, which has remained in the hands of its conquerors to this day. in an english force occupied the dutch north american settlements on the hudson. though the dispossessed rulers were not quite in a position to throw stones at sinners, this was rather a raid than an operation of recognised warfare, because it preceded the formal outbreak of hostilities. the conquered territory remained in english hands for more than a century, and thus testified to the efficacy of a sea-power which europe had scarcely begun to recognise. neither the second nor the third dutch war can be counted amongst the occurrences to which englishmen may look back with unalloyed satisfaction; but they, unquestionably, disclosed some interesting manifestations of sea-power. much indignation has been expressed concerning the corruption and inefficiency of the english government of the day, and its failure to take proper measures for keeping up the navy as it should have been kept up. some, perhaps a good deal, of this indignation was deserved; but it would have been nearly as well deserved by every other government of the day. even in those homes of political virtue where the administrative machinery was worked by or in the interest of speculating capitalists and privileged companies, the accumulating evidence of late years has proved that everything was not considered to be, and as a matter of fact was not, exactly as it ought to have been. charles ii and his brother, the duke of york, have been held up to obloquy because they thought that the coast of england could be defended against a naval enemy better by fortifications than by a good fleet and, as pepys noted, were 'not ashamed of it.' the truth is that neither the king nor the duke believed in the power of a navy to ward off attack from an island. this may have been due to want of intellectual capacity; but it would be going a long way to put it down to personal wickedness. they have had many imitators, some in our own day. the huge forts which stud the coast of the united kingdom, and have been erected within the memory of the present generation, are monuments, likely to last for many years, of the inability of people, whom no one could accuse of being vicious, to rate sea-power at its proper value. it is much more likely that it was owing to a reluctance to study questions of naval defence as industriously as they deserved, and to that moral timidity which so often tempts even men of proved physical courage to undertake the impossible task of making themselves absolutely safe against hostile efforts at every point. charles ii has also been charged with indifference to the interests of his country, or worse, because during a great naval war he adopted the plan of trying to weaken the enemy by destroying his commerce. the king 'took a fatal resolution of laying up his great ships and keeping only a few frigates on the cruise.' it is expressly related that this was not charles's own idea, but that it was urged upon him by advisers whose opinion probably seemed at the time as well worth listening to as that of others. anyhow, if the king erred, as he undoubtedly did, he erred in good company. fourteen hundred years earlier the statesmen who conducted the great war against carthage, and whose astuteness has been the theme of innumerable panegyrics since, took the same 'fatal resolution.' in the midst of the great struggle they 'did away with the fleet. at the most they encouraged privateering; and with that view placed the war-vessels of the state at the disposal of captains who were ready to undertake a corsair warfare on their own account.'[ ] in much later times this method has had many and respectable defenders. mahan's works are, in a sense, a formal warning to his fellow-citizens not to adopt it. in france, within the last years of the nineteenth century, it found, and appears still to find, adherents enough to form a school. the reappearance of belief in demonstrated impossibilities is a recognised incident in human history; but it is usually confined to the emotional or the vulgar. it is serious and filled with menaces of disaster when it is held by men thought fit to administer the affairs of a nation or advise concerning its defence. the third dutch war may not have settled directly the position of england in the maritime world; but it helped to place that country above all other maritime states,--in the position, in fact, which great britain, the united kingdom, the british empire, whichever name may be given it, has retained up to the present. it also manifested in a very striking form the efficacy of sea-power. the united provinces, though attacked by two of the greatest monarchies in the world, france and england, were not destroyed. indeed, they preserved much of their political importance in the state system of europe. the republic 'owed this astonishing result partly to the skill of one or two men, but mainly to its sea-power.' the effort, however, had undermined its strength and helped forward its decline. [footnote : mommsen, ii. p. .] the war which was ended by the peace of ryswick in presents two features of exceptional interest: one was the havoc wrought on english commerce by the enemy; the other was torrington's conduct at and after the engagement off beachy head. mahan discusses the former with his usual lucidity. at no time has war against commerce been conducted on a larger scale and with greater results than during this period. we suffered 'infinitely more than in any former war.' many of our merchants were ruined; and it is affirmed that the english shipping was reduced to the necessity of sailing under the swedish and danish flags. the explanation is that louis xiv made great efforts to keep up powerful fleets. our navy was so fully occupied in watching these that no ships could be spared to protect our maritime trade. this is only another way of saying that our commerce had increased so largely that the navy was not strong enough to look after it as well as oppose the enemy's main force. notwithstanding our losses we were on the winning side in the conflict. much misery and ruin had been caused, but not enough to affect the issue of the war. torrington's proceedings in july were at the time the subject of much angry debate. the debate, still meriting the epithet angry, has been renewed within the last few years. the matter has to be noticed here, because it involves the consideration of a question of naval strategy which must be understood by those who wish to know the real meaning of the term sea-power, and who ought to learn that it is not a thing to be idly risked or thrown away at the bidding of the ignorant and the irresponsible. arthur herbert, earl of torrington--the later peerage is a viscounty held by the byng family--was in command of the allied english and dutch fleet in the channel. 'the disparity of force,' says mahan, 'was still in favour of france in , but it was not so great as the year before.' we can measure the ability of the then english government for conducting a great war, when we know that, in its wisdom, it had still further weakened our fleet by dividing it (vice-admiral killigrew having been sent to the mediterranean with a squadron), and had neglected, and indeed refused when urged, to take the necessary steps to repair this error. the government having omitted, as even british governments sometimes do, to gain any trustworthy intelligence of the strength or movements of the enemy, torrington suddenly found himself confronted by a considerably superior french fleet under tourville, one of the greatest of french sea-officers. of late years the intentions of the french have been questioned; but it is beyond dispute that in england at the time tourville's movements were believed to be preliminary to invasion. whether tourville deliberately meant his movement to cover an invasion or not, invasion would almost certainly have followed complete success on his part; otherwise his victory would have been without any valuable result. torrington saw that as long as he could keep his own fleet intact, he could, though much weaker than his opponent, prevent him from doing serious harm. though personally not a believer in the imminence of invasion, the english admiral knew that 'most men were in fear that the french would invade.' his own view was, 'that whilst we had a fleet in being they would not dare to make an attempt.' of late years controversy has raged round this phrase, 'a fleet in being,' and the strategic principle which it expresses. most seamen were at the time, have been since, and still are in agreement with torrington. this might be supposed enough to settle the question. it has not been allowed, however, to remain one of purely naval strategy. it was made at the time a matter of party politics. this is why it is so necessary that in a notice of sea-power it should be discussed. both as a strategist and as a tactician torrington was immeasurably ahead of his contemporaries. the only english admirals who can be placed above him are hawke and nelson. he paid the penalty of his pre-eminence: he could not make ignorant men and dull men see the meaning or the advantages of his proceedings. mahan, who is specially qualified to do him full justice, does not devote much space in his work to a consideration of torrington's case, evidently because he had no sufficient materials before him on which to form a judgment. the admiral's character had been taken away already by macaulay, who did have ample evidence before him. william iii, with all his fine qualities, did not possess a military genius quite equal to that of napoleon; and napoleon, in naval strategy, was often wrong. william iii understood that subject even less than the french emperor did; and his favourites were still less capable of understanding it. consequently torrington's action has been put down to jealousy of the dutch. there have been people who accused nelson of being jealous of the naval reputation of caracciolo! the explanation of torrington's conduct is this:-- he had a fleet so much weaker than tourville's that he could not fight a general action with the latter without a practical certainty of getting a crushing defeat. such a result would have laid the kingdom open: a defeat of the allied fleet, says mahan, 'if sufficiently severe, might involve the fall of william's throne in england.' given certain movements of the french fleet, torrington might have manoeuvred to slip past it to the westward and join his force with that under killigrew, which would make him strong enough to hazard a battle. this proved impracticable. there was then one course left. to retire before the french, but not to keep far from them. he knew that, though not strong enough to engage their whole otherwise unemployed fleet with any hope of success, he would be quite strong enough to fight and most likely beat it, when a part of it was trying either to deal with our ships to the westward or to cover the disembarkation of an invading army. he, therefore, proposed to keep his fleet 'in being' in order to fall on the enemy when the latter would have two affairs at the same time on his hands. the late vice-admiral colomb rose to a greater height than was usual even with him in his criticism of this campaign. what torrington did was merely to reproduce on the sea what has been noticed dozens of times on shore, viz. the menace by the flanking enemy. in land warfare this is held to give exceptional opportunities for the display of good generalship, but, to quote mahan over again, a navy 'acts on an element strange to most writers, its members have been from time immemorial a strange race apart, without prophets of their own, neither themselves nor their calling understood.' whilst torrington has had the support of seamen, his opponents have been landsmen. for the crime of being a good strategist he was brought before a court-martial, but acquitted. his sovereign, who had been given the crowns of three kingdoms to defend our laws, showed his respect for them by flouting a legally constituted tribunal and disregarding its solemn finding. the admiral who had saved his country was forced into retirement. still, the principle of the 'fleet in being' lies at the bottom of all sound strategy. admiral colomb has pointed out a great change of plan in the later naval campaigns of the seventeenth century. improvements in naval architecture, in the methods of preserving food, and in the arrangements for keeping the crews healthy, permitted fleets to be employed at a distance from their home ports for long continuous periods. the dutch, when allies of the spaniards, kept a fleet in the mediterranean for many months. the great de ruyter was mortally wounded in one of the battles there fought. in the war of the spanish succession the anglo-dutch fleet found its principal scene of action eastward of gibraltar. this, as it were, set the fashion for future wars. it became a kind of tacitly accepted rule that the operation of british sea-power was to be felt in the enemy's rather than in our own waters. the hostile coast was regarded strategically as the british frontier, and the sea was looked upon as territory which the enemy must be prevented from invading. acceptance of this principle led in time to the so-called 'blockades' of brest and toulon. the name was misleading. as nelson took care to explain, there was no desire to keep the enemy's fleet in; what was desired was to be near enough to attack it if it came out. the wisdom of the plan is undoubted. the hostile navy could be more easily watched and more easily followed if it put to sea. to carry out this plan a navy stronger in number of ships or in general efficiency than that of the enemy was necessary to us. with the exception of that of american independence, which will therefore require special notice, our subsequent great wars were conducted in accordance with the rule. sea-power in the eighteenth century and early part of the nineteenth century in the early part of the eighteenth century there was a remarkable manifestation of sea-power in the baltic. peter the great, having created an efficient army, drove the swedes from the coast provinces south of the gulf of finland. like the earlier monarchies of which we have spoken, russia, in the baltic at least, now became a naval state. a large fleet was built, and, indeed, a considerable navy established. it was a purely artificial creation, and showed the merits and defects of its character. at first, and when under the eye of its creator, it was strong; when peter was no more it dwindled away and, when needed again, had to be created afresh. it enabled peter the great to conquer the neighbouring portion of finland, to secure his coast territories, and to dominate the baltic. in this he was assisted by the exhaustion of sweden consequent on her endeavours to retain, what was no longer possible, the position of a _quasi_ great power which she had held since the days of gustavus adolphus. sweden had been further weakened, especially as a naval state, by almost incessant wars with denmark, which prevented all hope of scandinavian predominance in the baltic, the control of which sea has in our own days passed into the hands of another state possessing a quickly created navy--the modern german empire. the war of the spanish succession left great britain a mediterranean power, a position which, in spite of twice losing minorca, she still holds. in the war of the austrian succession, 'france was forced to give up her conquests for want of a navy, and england saved her position by her sea-power, though she had failed to use it to the best advantage.'[ ] this shows, as we shall find that a later war showed more plainly, that even the government of a thoroughly maritime country is not always sure of conducting its naval affairs wisely. the seven years' war included some brilliant displays of the efficacy of sea-power. it was this which put the british in possession of canada, decided which european race was to rule in india, and led to a british occupation of havannah in one hemisphere and of manila in the other. in the same war we learned how, by a feeble use of sea-power, a valuable possession like minorca may be lost. at the same time our maritime trade and the general prosperity of the kingdom increased enormously. the result of the conflict made plain to all the paramount importance of having in the principal posts in the government men capable of understanding what war is and how it ought to be conducted. [footnote : mahan, _inf._on_hist._ p. .] this lesson, as the sequel demonstrated, had not been learned when great britain became involved in a war with the insurgent colonies in north america. mahan's comment is striking: 'the magnificence of sea-power and its value had perhaps been more clearly shown by the uncontrolled sway and consequent exaltation of one belligerent; but the lesson thus given, if more striking, is less vividly interesting than the spectacle of that sea-power meeting a foe worthy of its steel, and excited to exertion by a strife which endangered not only its most valuable colonies, but even its own shores.'[ ] we were, in fact, drawing too largely on the _prestige_ acquired during the seven years' war; and we were governed by men who did not understand the first principles of naval warfare, and would not listen to those who did. they quite ignored the teaching of the then comparatively recent wars which has been alluded to already--that we should look upon the enemy's coast as our frontier. a century and a half earlier the dutchman grotius had written-- quæ meta britannis litora sunt aliis. [footnote : _influence_on_hist._ p. .] though ordinary prudence would have suggested ample preparation, british ministers allowed their country to remain unprepared. instead of concentrating their efforts on the main objective, they frittered away force in attempts to relieve two beleaguered garrisons under the pretext of yielding to popular pressure, which is the official term for acting on the advice of irresponsible and uninstructed busybodies. 'depuis le début de la crise,' says captain chevalier, 'les ministres de la grande bretagne s'étaient montrés inférieurs à leur tâche.' an impressive result of this was the repeated appearance of powerful and indeed numerically superior hostile fleets in the english channel. the war--notwithstanding that, perhaps because, land operations constituted an important part of it, and in the end settled the issue--was essentially oceanic. captain mahan says it was 'purely maritime.' it may be true that, whatever the belligerent result, the political result, as regards the _status_ of the insurgent colonies, would have been the same. it is in the highest degree probable, indeed it closely approaches to certainty, that a proper use of the british sea-power would have prevented independence from being conquered, as it were, at the point of the bayonet. there can be no surprise in store for the student acquainted with the vagaries of strategists who are influenced in war by political in preference to military requirements. still, it is difficult to repress an emotion of astonishment on finding that a british government intentionally permitted de grasse's fleet and the french army in its convoy to cross the atlantic unmolested, for fear of postponing for a time the revictualling of the garrison beleaguered at gibraltar. washington's opinion as to the importance of the naval factor has been quoted already; and mahan does not put the case too strongly when he declares that the success of the americans was due to 'sea-power being in the hands of the french and its improper distribution by the english authorities.' our navy, misdirected as it was, made a good fight of it, never allowed itself to be decisively beaten in a considerable battle, and won at least one great victory. at the point of contact with the enemy, however, it was not in general so conspicuously successful as it was in the seven years' war, or as it was to be in the great conflict with the french republic and empire. the truth is that its opponent, the french navy, was never so thoroughly a sea-going force as it was in the war of american independence; and never so closely approached our own in real sea-experience as it did during that period. we met antagonists who were very nearly, but, fortunately for us, not quite as familiar with the sea as we were ourselves; and we never found it so hard to beat them, or even to avoid being beaten by them. an englishman would, naturally enough, start at the conclusion confronting him, if he were to speculate as to the result of more than one battle had the great suffren's captains and crews been quite up to the level of those commanded by stout old sir edward hughes. suffren, it should be said, before going to the east indies, had 'thirty-eight years of almost uninterrupted sea-service.'[ ] a glance at a chart of the world, with the scenes of the general actions of the war dotted on it, will show how notably oceanic the campaigns were. the hostile fleets met over and over again on the far side of the atlantic and in distant indian seas. the french navy had penetrated into the ocean as readily and as far as we could do ourselves. besides this, it should be remembered that it was not until the th april . when rodney in one hemisphere and suffren in the other showed them the way, that our officers were able to escape from the fetters imposed on them by the _fighting_ _instructions_,--a fact worth remembering in days in which it is sometimes proposed, by establishing schools of naval tactics on shore, to revive the pedantry which made a decisive success in battle nearly impossible. [footnote : laughton, _studies_in_naval_hist._ p. .] the mighty conflict which raged between great britain on one side and france and her allies on the other, with little intermission, for more than twenty years, presents a different aspect from that of the war last mentioned. the victories which the british fleet was to gain were generally to be overwhelming; if not, they were looked upon as almost defeats. whether the fleet opposed to ours was, or was not, the more numerous, the result was generally the same--our enemy was beaten. that there was a reason for this which can be discovered is certain. a great deal has been made of the disorganisation in the french navy consequent on the confusion of the revolution. that there was disorganisation is undoubted; that it did impair discipline and, consequently, general efficiency will not be disputed; but that it was considerable enough to account by itself for the french naval defeats is altogether inadmissible. revolutionary disorder had invaded the land-forces to a greater degree than it had invaded the sea-forces. the supersession, flight, or guillotining of army officers had been beyond measure more frequent than was the case with the naval officers. in spite of all this the french armies were on the whole--even in the early days of the revolution--extraordinarily successful. in 'the most formidable invasion that ever threatened france,' as alison calls it, was repelled, though the invaders were the highly disciplined and veteran armies of prussia and austria. it was nearly two years later that the french and english fleets came into serious conflict. the first great battle, which we call 'the glorious first of june,' though a tactical victory for us, was a strategical defeat. villaret-joyeuse manoeuvred so as to cover the arrival in france of a fleet of merchant vessels carrying sorely needed supplies of food, and in this he was completely successful. his plan involved the probability, almost the necessity, of fighting a general action which he was not at all sure of winning. he was beaten, it is true; but the french made so good a fight of it that their defeat was not nearly so disastrous as the later defeats of the nile or trafalgar, and--at the most--not more disastrous than that of dominica. yet no one even alleges that there was disorder or disorganisation in the french fleet at the date of anyone of those affairs. indeed, if the french navy was really disorganised in , it would have been better for france--judging from the events of and --if the disorganisation had been allowed to continue. in point of organisation the british navy was inferior, and in point of discipline not much superior to the french at the earliest date; at the later dates, and especially at the latest, owing to the all-pervading energy of napoleon, the british was far behind its rival in organisation, in 'science,' and in every branch of training that can be imparted without going to sea. we had the immense advantage of counting amongst our officers some very able men. nelson, of course, stands so high that he holds a place entirely by himself. the other british chiefs, good as they were, were not conspicuously superior to the hawkes and rodneys of an earlier day. howe was a great commander, but he did little more than just appear on the scene in the war. almost the same may be said of hood, of whom nelson wrote, 'he is the greatest sea-officer i ever knew.'[ ] there must have been something, therefore, beyond the meritorious qualities of our principal officers which helped us so consistently to victory. the many triumphs won could not have been due in every case to the individual superiority of the british admiral or captain to his opponent. there must have been bad as well as good amongst the hundreds on our lists; and we cannot suppose that providence had so arranged it that in every action in which a british officer of inferior ability commanded a still inferior french commander was opposed to him. the explanation of our nearly unbroken success is, that the british was a thoroughly sea-going navy, and became more and more so every month; whilst the french, since the close of the american war, had lost to a great extent its sea-going character and, because we shut it up in its ports, became less and less sea-going as hostilities continued. the war had been for us, in the words of mr. theodore roosevelt, 'a continuous course of victory won mainly by seamanship.' our navy, as regards sea-experience, especially of the officers, was immensely superior to the french. this enabled the british government to carry into execution sound strategic plans, in accordance with which the coasts of france and its dependent or allied countries were regarded as the english frontier to be watched or patrolled by our fleets. [footnote : laughton, _nelson's_lett._and_desp._ p. .] before the long european war had been brought to a formal ending we received some rude rebuffs from another opponent of unsuspected vigour. in the quarrel with the united states, the so-called 'war of ,' the great sea-power of the british in the end asserted its influence, and our antagonists suffered much more severely, even absolutely, than ourselves. at the same time we might have learned, for the americans did their best to teach us, that over-confidence in numerical strength and narrow professional self-satisfaction are nearly sure to lead to reverses in war, and not unlikely to end in grave disasters. we had now to meet the _élite_ of one of the finest communities of seamen ever known. even in the americans had a great maritime commerce, which, as mahan informs us, 'had come to be the wonder of the statesmen of the mother country.' in the six-and-thirty years which had elapsed since then this commerce had further increased. there was no finer nursery of seamen than the then states of the american union. roosevelt says that 'there was no better seaman in the world' than the american, who 'had been bred to his work from infancy.' a large proportion of the population 'was engaged in sea-going pursuits of a nature strongly tending to develop a resolute and hardy character in the men that followed them.'[ ] having little or no naval protection, the american seaman had to defend himself in many circumstances, and was compelled to familiarise himself with the use of arms. the men who passed through this practical, and therefore supremely excellent, training school were numerous. very many had been trained in english men-of-war, and some in french ships. the state navy which they were called on to man was small; and therefore its _personnel_, though without any regular or avowed selection, was virtually and in the highest sense a picked body. the lesson of the war of should be learned by englishmen of the present day, when a long naval peace has generated a confidence in numerical superiority, in the mere possession of heavier _matériel_, and in the merits of a rigidly uniform system of training, which confidence, as experience has shown, is too often the forerunner of misfortune. it is neither patriotic nor intelligent to minimise the american successes. certainly they have been exaggerated by americans and even by ourselves. to take the frigate actions alone, as being those which properly attracted most attention, we see that the captures in action amounted to three on each side, the proportionate loss to our opponents, considering the smallness of their fleet, being immensely greater than ours. we also see that no british frigate was taken after the first seven months of a war which lasted two and a half years, and that no british frigate succumbed except to admittedly superior force. attempts have been made to spread a belief that our reverses were due to nothing but the greater size and heavier guns of our enemy's ships. it is now established that the superiority in these details, which the americans certainly enjoyed, was not great, and not of itself enough to account for their victories. of course, if superiority in mere _matériel_, beyond a certain well-understood amount, is possessed by one of two combatants, his antagonist can hardly escape defeat; but it was never alleged that size of ship or calibre of guns--greater within reasonable limits than we had--necessarily led to the defeat of british ships by the french or spaniards. in the words of admiral jurien de la gravière, 'the ships of the united states constantly fought with the chances in their favour.' all this is indisputable. nevertheless we ought to see to it that in any future war our sea-power, great as it may be, does not receive shocks like those that it unquestionably did receive in . [footnote : _naval_war_of_ _, rd ed. pp. , .] sea-power in recent times we have now come to the end of the days of the naval wars of old time. the subsequent period has been illustrated repeatedly by manifestations of sea-power, often of great interest and importance, though rarely understood or even discerned by the nations which they more particularly concerned. the british sea-power, notwithstanding the first year of the war of , had come out of the great european conflict unshaken and indeed more preeminent than ever. the words used, half a century before by a writer in the great french 'encyclopédie,' seemed more exact than when first written. '_l'empire_des_mers_,' he says, is, 'le plus avantageux de tous les empires; les phoeniciens le possédoient autre fois et c'est aux anglois que cette gloire appartient aujourd'hui sur toutes les puissances maritimes.'[ ] vast out-lying territories had been acquired or were more firmly held, and the communications of all the over-sea dominions of the british crown were secured against all possibility of serious menace for many years to come. our sea-power was so ubiquitous and all-pervading that, like the atmosphere, we rarely thought of it and rarely remembered its necessity or its existence. it was not till recently that the greater part of the nation--for there were many, and still are some exceptions--perceived that it was the medium apart from which the british empire could no more live than it could have grown up. forty years after the fall of napoleon we found ourselves again at war with a great power. we had as our ally the owner of the greatest navy in the world except our own. our foe, as regards his naval forces, came the next in order. yet so overwhelming was the strength of great britain and france on the sea that russia never attempted to employ her navy against them. not to mention other expeditions, considerable enough in themselves, military operations on the largest scale were undertaken, carried on for many months, and brought to a successful termination on a scene so remote that it was two thousand miles from the country of one, and three thousand from that of the other partner in the alliance. 'the stream of supplies and reinforcements, which in terms of modern war is called "communications,", was kept free from even the threat of molestation, not by visible measures, but by the undisputed efficacy of a real, though imperceptible sea-power. at the close of the russian war we encountered, and unhappily for us in influential positions, men who, undismayed by the consequences of mimicking in free england the cast-iron methods of the great frederick, began to measure british requirements by standards borrowed from abroad and altogether inapplicable to british conditions. because other countries wisely abstained from relying on that which they did not possess, or had only imperfectly and with elaborate art created, the mistress of the seas was led to proclaim her disbelief in the very force that had made and kept her dominion, and urged to defend herself with fortifications by advisers who, like charles ii and the duke of york two centuries before, were 'not ashamed of it.' it was long before the peril into which this brought the empire was perceived; but at last, and in no small degree owing to the teachings of mahan, the people themselves took the matter in hand and insisted that a great maritime empire should have adequate means of defending all that made its existence possible. [footnote : _encyclopédie_, th jan. , art. 'thalassarchie.'] in forms differing in appearance, but identical in essentials, the efficacy of sea-power was proved again in the american secession war. if ever there were hostilities in which, to the unobservant or short-sighted, naval operations might at first glance seem destined to count for little, they were these. the sequel, however, made it clear that they constituted one of the leading factors of the success of the victorious side. the belligerents, the northern or federal states and the southern or confederate states, had a common land frontier of great length. the capital of each section was within easy distance of this frontier, and the two were not far apart. in wealth, population, and resources the federals were enormously superior. they alone possessed a navy, though at first it was a small one. the one advantage on the confederate side was the large proportion of military officers which belonged to it and their fine training as soldiers. in _physique_ as well as in _morale_ the army of one side differed little from that of the other; perhaps the federal army was slightly superior in the first, and the confederate, as being recruited from a dominant white race, in the second. outnumbered, less well equipped, and more scantily supplied, the confederates nevertheless kept up the war, with many brilliant successes on land, for four years. had they been able to maintain their trade with neutral states they could have carried on the war longer, and--not improbably--have succeeded in the end. the federal navy, which was largely increased, took away all chance of this. it established effective blockades of the confederate ports, and severed their communications with the outside world. indispensable articles of equipment could not be obtained, and the armies, consequently, became less and less able to cope with their abundantly furnished antagonists. by dominating the rivers the federals cut the confederacy asunder; and by the power they possessed of moving troops by sea at will, perplexed and harassed the defence, and facilitated the occupation of important points. meanwhile the confederates could make no reply on the water except by capturing merchant vessels, by which the contest was embittered, but the course of the war remained absolutely unaffected. the great numbers of men under arms on shore, the terrific slaughter in many battles of a war in which tactical ability, even in a moderate degree, was notably uncommon on both sides, and the varying fortunes of the belligerents, made the land campaigns far more interesting to the ordinary observer than the naval. it is not surprising, therefore, that peace had been re-established for several years before the american people could be made to see the great part taken by the navy in the restoration of the union; and what the americans had not seen was hidden from the sight of other nations. in several great wars in europe waged since france and england made peace with russia sea-power manifested itself but little. in the russo-turkish war the great naval superiority of the turks in the black sea, where the russians at the time had no fleet, governed the plans, if not the course, of the campaigns. the water being denied to them, the russians were compelled to execute their plan of invading turkey by land. an advance to the bosphorus through the northern part of asia minor was impracticable without help from a navy on the right flank. consequently the only route was a land one across the danube and the balkans. the advantages, though not fully utilised, which the enforcement of this line of advance put into the hands of the turks, and the difficulties and losses which it caused the russians, exhibited in a striking manner what sea-power can effect even when its operation is scarcely observable. this was more conspicuous in a later series of hostilities. the civil war in chili between congressists and balmacedists is specially interesting, because it throws into sharp relief the predominant influence, when a non-maritime enemy is to be attacked, of a navy followed up by an adequate land-force. at the beginning of the dispute the balmacedists, or president's party, had practically all the army, and the congressists, or opposition party, nearly all the chilian navy. unable to remain in the principal province of the republic, and expelled from the waters of valparaiso by the balmacedist garrisons of the forts--the only and doubtful service which those works rendered to their own side--the congressists went off with the ships to the northern provinces, where they counted many adherents. there they formed an army, and having money at command, and open sea communications, they were able to import equipment from abroad, and eventually to transport their land-force, secured from molestation on the voyage by the sea-power at their disposal, to the neighbourhood of valparaiso, where it was landed and triumphantly ended the campaign. it will have been noticed that, in its main outlines, this story repeated that of many earlier campaigns. it was itself repeated, as regards its general features, by the story of the war between china and japan in - . 'every aspect of the war,' says colomb, 'is interesting to this country, as japan is to china in a position similar to that which the british islands occupy to the european continent.'[ ] it was additionally interesting because the sea-power of japan was a novelty. though a novelty, it was well known by english naval men to be superior in all essentials to that of china, a novelty itself. as is the rule when two belligerents are contending for something beyond a purely maritime object, the final decision was to be on land. korea was the principal theatre of the land war; and, as far as access to it by sea was concerned, the chief bases of the two sides were about the same distance from it. it was possible for the chinese to march there by land. the japanese, coming from an island state, were obliged to cross the water. it will be seen at once that not only the success of the japanese in the struggle, but also the possibility of its being carried on by them at all, depended on sea-power. the japanese proved themselves decisively superior at sea. their navy effectually cleared the way for one army which was landed in korea, and for another which was landed in the chinese province of shantung. the chinese land-forces were defeated. the navy of japan, being superior on the sea, was able to keep its sister service supplied or reinforced as required. it was, however, not the navy, but the army, which finally frustrated the chinese efforts at defence, and really terminated the war. what the navy did was what, in accordance with the limitations of sea-power, may be expected of a navy. it made the transport of the army across the sea possible; and enabled it to do what of itself the army could not have done, viz. overcome the last resistance of the enemy. [footnote : _naval_warfare_, rd ed. p. .] the issue of the spanish-american war, at least as regards the mere defeat of spain, was, perhaps, a foregone conclusion. that spain, even without a serious insurrection on her hands, was unequal to the task of meeting so powerful an antagonist as the united states must have been evident even to spaniards. be that as it may, an early collapse of the spanish defence was not anticipated, and however one-sided the war may have been seen to be, it furnished examples illustrating rules as old as naval warfare. mahan says of it that, 'while possessing, as every war does, characteristics of its own differentiating it from others, nevertheless in its broad analogies it falls into line with its predecessors, evidencing that unity of teaching which pervades the art from its beginnings unto this day.'[ ] the spaniards were defeated by the superiority of the american sea-power. 'a million of the best soldiers,' says mahan, 'would have been powerless in face of hostile control of the sea.' that control was obtained and kept by the united states navy, thus permitting the unobstructed despatch of troops--and their subsequent reinforcement and supply--to spanish territory, which was finally conquered, not by the navy, but by the army on shore. that it was the navy which made this final conquest possible happened, in this case, to be made specially evident by the action of the united states government, which stopped a military expedition on the point of starting for cuba until the sea was cleared of all spanish naval force worth attention. [footnote : _lessons_of_the_war_with_spain_, p. .] the events of the long period which we have been considering will have shown how sea-power operates, and what it effects. what is in it will have appeared from this narrative more clearly than would have been possible from any mere definition. like many other things, sea-power is composed of several elements. to reach the highest degree of efficacy it should be based upon a population naturally maritime, and on an ocean commerce naturally developed rather than artificially enticed to extend itself. its outward and visible sign is a navy, strong in the discipline, skill, and courage of a numerous _personnel_ habituated to the sea, in the number and quality of its ships, in the excellence of its _matériel_, and in the efficiency, scale, security, and geographical position of its arsenals and bases. history has demonstrated that sea-power thus conditioned can gain any purely maritime object, can protect the trade and the communications of a widely extended empire, and whilst so doing can ward off from its shores a formidable invader. there are, however, limitations to be noted. left to itself its operation is confined to the water, or at any rate to the inner edge of a narrow zone of coast. it prepares the way for the advance of an army, the work of which it is not intended, and is unable to perform. behind it, in the territory of which it guards the shores, there must be a land-force adjusted in organisation, equipment, and numbers to the circumstances of the country. the possession of a navy does not permit a sea-surrounded state to dispense with all fixed defences or fortification; but it does render it unnecessary and indeed absurd that they should be abundant or gigantic. the danger which always impends over the sea-power of any country is that, after being long unused, it may lose touch of the sea. the revolution in the constructive arts during the last half-century, which has also been a period of but little-interrupted naval peace, and the universal adoption of mechanical appliances, both for ship-propulsion and for many minor services--mere _matériel_ being thereby raised in the general estimation far above really more important matters--makes the danger mentioned more menacing in the present age than it has ever been before. ii the command of the sea[ ] [footnote : written in . (_encyclopoedia_britannica_.)] this phrase, a technical term of naval warfare, indicates a definite strategical condition. the term has been substituted occasionally, but less frequently of late years, for the much older 'dominion of the sea' or 'sovereignty of the sea,' a legal term expressing a claim, if not a right. it has also been sometimes treated as though it were identical with the rhetorical expression 'empire of the sea.' mahan, instead of it, uses the term 'control of the sea,' which has the merit of precision, and is not likely to be misunderstood or mixed up with a form of words meaning something different. the expression 'command of the sea,' however, in its proper and strategic sense, is so firmly fixed in the language that it would be a hopeless task to try to expel it; and as, no doubt, writers will continue to use it, it must be explained and illustrated. not only does it differ in meaning from 'dominion or sovereignty of the sea,' it is not even truly derived therefrom, as can be briefly shown. 'it has become an uncontested principle of modern international law that the sea, as a general rule, cannot be subjected to appropriation.'[ ] this, however, is quite modern. we ourselves did not admit the principle till ; the russians did not admit it till ; and the americans, and then only tacitly, not till . most european nations at some time or other have claimed and have exercised rights over some part of the sea, though far outside the now well-recognised 'three miles' limit.' venice claimed the adriatic, and exacted a heavy toll from vessels navigating its northern waters. genoa and france each claimed portions of the western mediterranean. denmark and sweden claimed to share the baltic between them. spain claimed dominion over the pacific and the gulf of mexico, and portugal over the indian ocean and all the atlantic south of morocco.[ ] the claim which has made the greatest noise in the world is that once maintained by the kings of england to the seas surrounding the british isles. like other institutions, the english sovereignty of the sea was, and was admitted to be, beneficent for a long period. then came the time when it ought to have been abandoned as obsolete; but it was not, and so it led to war. the general conviction of the maritime nations was that the lord of the sea would provide for the police of the waters over which he exercised dominion. in rude ages when men, like the ancients, readily 'turned themselves to piracy,' this was of immense importance to trade; and, far from the right of dominion being disputed by foreigners, it was insisted upon by them and declared to carry with it certain duties. in , not only english merchants, but also 'the maritime people of genoa, catalonia, spain, germany, zealand, holland, frisia, denmark, norway, and several other places of the empire' declared that the kings of england had from time immemorial been in 'peaceable possession of the sovereign lordship of the sea of england,' and had done what was 'needful for the maintenance of peace, right, and equity between people of all sorts, whether subjects of another kingdom or not, who pass through those seas.'[ ] the english sovereignty was not exercised as giving authority to exact toll. all that was demanded in return for keeping the sea safe for peaceful traffic was a salute, enforced no doubt as a formal admission of the right which permitted the (on the whole, at any rate) effective police of the waters to be maintained. the dutch in the seventeenth century objected to the demand for this salute. it was insisted upon. war ensued; but in the end the dutch acknowledged by solemn treaties their obligation to render the salute. the time for exacting it, however, was really past. s. r. gardiner[ ] maintains that though the 'question of the flag' was the occasion, it was not the cause of the war. there was not much, if any, piracy in the english channel which the king of england was specially called upon to suppress, and if there had been the merchant vessels of the age were generally able to defend themselves, while if they were not their governments possessed force enough to give them the necessary protection. we gave up our claim to exact the salute in . [footnote : w. e. hall, _treatise_on_international_law_, th ed. , p. .] [footnote : hall, pp. , .] [footnote : j. k. laughton, 'sovereignty of the sea,' _fortnightly_ _review_, august .] [footnote : _the_first_dutch_war_ (navy records society), .] the necessity of the foregoing short account of the 'sovereignty or dominion of the seas' will be apparent as soon as we come to the consideration of the first struggle, or rather series of struggles, for the command of the sea. gaining this was the result of our wars with the dutch in the seventeenth century. at the time of the first dutch war, - , and probably of the later wars also, a great many people, and especially seamen, believed that the conflict was due to a determination on our part to retain, and on that of the dutch to put an end to, the english sovereignty or dominion. the obstinacy of the dutch in objecting to pay the old-established mark of respect to the english flag was quite reason enough in the eyes of most englishmen, and probably of most dutchmen also, to justify hostilities which other reasons may have rendered inevitable. the remarkable thing about the dutch wars is that in reality what we gained was the possibility of securing an absolute command of the sea. we came out of the struggle a great, and in a fair way of becoming the greatest, naval power. it is this which prompted vice-admiral p. h. colomb to hold that there are various kinds of command, such as 'absolute or assured,' 'temporary,' 'with definite ulterior purpose,' &c. an explanation that would make all these terms intelligible would be voluminous and is unnecessary here. it will be enough to say that the absolute command--of attempts to gain which, as colomb tells us, the anglo-dutch wars were the most complete example--is nothing but an attribute of the nation whose power on the sea is paramount. it exists and may be visible in time of peace. the command which, as said above, expresses a definite strategical condition is existent only in time of war. it can easily be seen that the former is essential to an empire like the british, the parts of which are bound together by maritime communications. inability to keep these communications open can have only one result, viz. the loss of the parts with which communication cannot be maintained. experience of war as well as reason will have made it evident that inability to keep open sea-communications cannot be limited to any single line, because the inability must be due either to incapacity in the direction of hostilities or insufficiency of force. if we have not force enough to keep open all the communications of our widely extended empire, or if--having force enough--we are too foolish to employ it properly, we do not hold the command of the sea, and the empire must fall if seriously attacked. the strategic command of the sea in a particular war or campaign has equal concern for all maritime belligerents. before seeing what it is, it will be well to learn on high authority what it is not. mahan says that command, or, to use his own term, 'control of the sea, however real, does not imply that an enemy's single ships or small squadrons cannot steal out of port, cannot cross more or less frequented tracts of ocean, make harassing descents upon unprotected points of a long coast-line, enter blockaded harbours. on the contrary, history has shown that such evasions are always possible, to some extent, to the weaker party, however great the inequality of naval strength.'[ ] the anglo-french command of the sea in - , complete as it was, did not enable the allies to intercept the russian ships in the north-western pacific, nor did that held by the federals in the american civil war put an early stop to the cruises of the confederate vessels. what the term really does imply is the power possessed from the first, or gained during hostilities, by one belligerent of carrying out considerable over-sea expeditions at will. in the russian war just mentioned the allies had such overwhelmingly superior sea-power that the russians abandoned to them without a struggle the command of the sea; and the more recent landing in south africa, more than six thousand miles away, of a large british army without even a threat of interruption on the voyage is another instance of unchallenged command. in wars between great powers and also between secondary powers, if nearly equally matched, this absence of challenge is rare. the rule is that the command of the sea has to be won after hostilities begin. to win it the enemy's naval force must be neutralised. it must be driven into his ports and there blockaded or 'masked,' and thus rendered virtually innocuous; or it must be defeated and destroyed. the latter is the preferable, because the more effective, plan. as was perceptible in the spanish-american war of , as long as one belligerent's fleet is intact or at large, the other is reluctant to carry out any considerable expedition over-sea. in fact, the command of the sea has not been secured whilst the enemy continues to have a 'fleet in being.'[ ] [footnote : _influence_of_sea-power_on_history_, , p. .] [footnote : see _ante_, sea-power, p. .] in a greatly superior franco-spanish fleet was covering the siege of gibraltar. had this fleet succeeded in preventing the revictualling of the fortress the garrison would have been starved into surrender. a british fleet under lord howe, though much weaker in numbers, had not been defeated and was still at large. howe, in spite of the odds against him, managed to get his supply-ships in to the anchorage and to fight a partial action, in which he did the allies as much damage as he received. there has never been a display of higher tactical skill than this operation of howe's, though, it may be said, he owes his fame much more to his less meritorious performance on the first of june. the revictualling of gibraltar surpassed even suffren's feat of the capture of trincomalee in the same year. in the french, assuming that a temporary superiority in the mediterranean had given them a free hand on the water, sent a great expedition to egypt. though the army which was carried succeeded in landing there, the covering fleet was destroyed by nelson at the nile, and the army itself was eventually forced to surrender. the french had not perceived that, except for a short time and for minor operations, you cannot separate the command of the mediterranean or of any particular area of water from that of the sea in general. local command of the sea may enable a belligerent to make a hasty raid, seize a relatively insignificant port, or cut out a vessel; but it will not ensure his being able to effect anything requiring considerable time for its execution, or, in other words, anything likely to have an important influence on the course of the war. if great britain has not naval force enough to retain command of the mediterranean, she will certainly not have force enough to retain command of the english channel. it can be easily shown why it should be so. in war danger comes less from conditions of locality than from the enemy's power to hurt. taking up a weak position when confronting an enemy may help him in the exercise of his power, but it does not constitute it.[ ] a maritime enemy's power to hurt resides in his fleet. if that can be neutralised his power disappears. it is in the highest degree improbable that this end can be attained by splitting up our own fleet into fragments so as to have a part of it in nearly every quarter in which the enemy may try to do us mischief. the most promising plan--as experience has often proved--is to meet the enemy, when he shows himself, with a force sufficiently strong to defeat him. the proper station of the british fleet in war should, accordingly, be the nearest possible point to the enemy's force. this was the fundamental principle of nelson's strategy, and it is as valid now as ever it was. if we succeed in getting into close proximity to the hostile fleet with an adequate force of our own, our foe cannot obtain command of the sea, or of any part of it, whether that part be the mediterranean or the english channel, at any rate until he has defeated us. if he is strong enough to defeat our fleet he obtains the command of the sea in general; and it is for him to decide whether he shall show the effectiveness of that command in the mediterranean or in the channel. [footnote : in his _history_of_scotland_ ( ). j. h. m. burton, speaking of the orkney and shetland isles in the viking times, says (vol. i. p. ): 'those who occupied them were protected, not so much by their own strength of position, as by the complete command over the north sea held by the fleets that found shelter in the fiords and firths.'] in the smaller operations of war temporary command of a particular area of water may suffice for the success of an expedition, or at least will permit the execution of the preliminary movements. when the main fleet of a country is at a distance--which it ought not to be except with the object of nearing the opposing fleet--a small hostile expedition may slip across, say the channel, throw shells into a coast town or burn a fishing village, and get home again unmolested. its action would have no sort of influence on the course of the campaign, and would, therefore, be useless. it would also most likely lead to reprisals; and, if this process were repeated, the war would probably degenerate into the antiquated system of 'cross-raiding,' discarded centuries ago, not at all for reasons of humanity, but because it became certain that war could be more effectually waged in other ways. the nation in command of the sea may resort to raiding to expedite the formal submission of an already defeated enemy, as russia did when at war with sweden in ; but in such a case the other side cannot retaliate. temporary command of local waters will also permit of operations rather more considerable than mere raiding attacks; but the duration of these operations must be adjusted to the time available. if the duration of the temporary command is insufficient the operation must fail. it must fail even if the earlier steps have been taken successfully. temporary command of the baltic in war might enable a german force to occupy an aland isle; but unless the temporary could be converted into permanent command, germany could make no use of the acquisition, which in the end would revert as a matter of course to its former possessors. the command of the english channel, which napoleon wished to obtain when maturing his invasion project, was only temporary. it is possible that a reminiscence of what had happened in egypt caused him to falter at the last; and that, quite independently of the proceedings of villeneuve, he hesitated to risk a second battle of the nile and the loss of a second army. it may have been this which justified his later statement that he did not really mean to invade england. in any case, the english practice of fixing the station of their fleet wherever that of the enemy's was, would have seriously shortened the duration of his command of the channel, even if it had allowed it to be won at all. moreover, attempts to carry out a great operation of war against time as well as against the efforts of the enemy to prevent it are in the highest degree perilous. in war the british navy has three prominent duties to discharge. it has to protect our maritime trade, to keep open the communications between the different parts of the empire, and to prevent invasion. if we command the sea these duties will be discharged effectually. as long as we command the sea the career of hostile cruisers sent to prey on our commerce will be precarious, because command of the sea carries with it the necessity of possessing an ample cruiser force. as long as the condition mentioned is satisfied our ocean communications will be kept open, because an inferior enemy, who cannot obtain the command required, will be too much occupied in seeing to his own safety to be able to interfere seriously with that of any part of our empire. this being so, it is evident that the greater operation of invasion cannot be attempted, much less carried to a successful termination, by the side which cannot make head against the opposing fleet. command of the sea is the indispensable preliminary condition of a successful military expedition sent across the water. it enables the nation which possesses it to attack its foes where it pleases and where they seem to be most vulnerable. at the same time it gives to its possessor security against serious counter-attacks, and affords to his maritime commerce the most efficient protection that can be devised. it is, in fact, the main object of naval warfare. iii war and its chief lessons[ ] [footnote : written in . (_naval_annual_, .)] had the expression 'real war' been introduced into the title of this chapter, its introduction would have been justifiable. the sources--if not of our knowledge of combat, at least of the views which are sure to prevail when we come to actual fighting--are to be found in two well-defined, dissimilar, and widely separated areas. within one are included the records of war; within the other, remembrance of the exercises and manoeuvres of a time of peace. the future belligerent will almost of a certainty have taken a practical part in the latter, whilst it is probable that he will have had no personal experience of the former. the longer the time elapsed since hostilities were in progress, the more probable and more general does this absence of experience become. the fighting man--that is to say, the man set apart, paid, and trained so as to be ready to fight when called upon--is of the same nature as the rest of his species. this is a truism; but it is necessary to insist upon it, because professional, and especially professorial, strategists and tacticians almost invariably ignore it. that which we have seen and know has not only more, but very much more, influence upon the minds of nearly all of us than that of which we have only heard, and, most likely, heard but imperfectly. the result is that, when peace is interrupted and the fighting man--on both sea and land--is confronted with the problems of practical belligerency, he brings to his attempts at their solution an intellectual equipment drawn, not from knowledge of real war, but from the less trustworthy arsenal of the recollections of his peace training. when peace, especially a long peace, ends, the methods which it has introduced are the first enemies which the organised defenders of a country have to overcome. there is plenty of evidence to prove that--except, of course, in unequal conflicts between highly organised, civilised states and savage or semi-barbarian tribes--success in war is directly proportionate to the extent of the preliminary victory over the predominance of impressions derived from the habits and exercises of an armed force during peace. that the cogency of this evidence is not invariably recognised is to be attributed to insufficient attention to history and to disinclination to apply its lessons properly. a primary object of the _naval_annual_--indeed, the chief reason for its publication--being to assist in advancing the efficiency of the british navy, its pages are eminently the place for a review of the historical examples of the often-recurring inability of systems established in peace to stand the test of war. hostilities on land being more frequent, and much more frequently written about, than those by sea, the history of the former as well as of the latter must be examined. the two classes of warfare have much in common. the principles of their strategy are identical; and, as regards some of their main features, so are those of the tactics followed in each. consequently the history of land warfare has its lessons for those who desire to achieve success in warfare on the sea. that this has often been lost sight of is largely due to a misapprehension of the meaning of terms. the two words 'military' and 'army' have been given, in english, a narrower signification than they ought, and than they used, to have. both terms have been gradually restricted in their use, and made to apply only to the land service. this has been unfortunate; because records of occurrences and discussions, capable of imparting much valuable instruction to naval officers, have been passed over by them as inapplicable to their own calling. it may have been noticed that captain mahan uses the word 'military' in its right sense as indicating the members, and the most important class of operations, of both land- and sea-forces. the french, through whom the word has come to us from the latin, use it in the same sense as mahan. _un_militaire_ is a member of either a land army or a navy. the 'naval _and_ military intelligence' of the english press is given under the heading 'nouvelles militaires' in the french. our word 'army' also came to us direct from the french, who still apply it equally to both services--_armée_de_ _terre,_armée_de_mer_. it is a participle, and means 'armed,' the word 'force' being understood. the kindred words _armada_ in spanish and portuguese, and _armata_ in italian--equally derived from the latin--are used to indicate a fleet or navy, another name being given to a land army. the word 'army' was generally applied to a fleet in former days by the english, as will be seen on reference to the navy records society's volumes on the defeat of the spanish armada. this short etymological discussion is not inappropriate here, for it shows why we should not neglect authorities on the history and conduct of war merely because they do not state specially that they are dealing with the naval branch of it. a very slight knowledge of history is quite enough to make us acquainted with the frequent recurrence of defeats and disasters inflicted on armed forces by antagonists whose power to do so had not been previously suspected. it has been the same on the sea as on the land, though--owing to more copious records--we may have a larger list of events on the latter. it will not be denied that it is of immense importance to us to inquire how this happened, and ascertain how--for the future--it may be rendered highly improbable in our own case. a brief enumeration of the more striking instances will make it plain that the events in question have been confined to no particular age and to no particular country. it may be said that the more elaborately organised and trained in peace time an armed force happened to be, the more unexpected always, and generally the more disastrous, was its downfall. examples of this are to be found in the earliest campaigns of which we have anything like detailed accounts, and they continue to reappear down to very recent times. in the elaborate nature of its organisation and training there probably never has been an army surpassing that led by xerxes into greece twenty-four centuries ago. something like eight years had been devoted to its preparation. the minute account of its review by xerxes on the shores of the hellespont proves that, however inefficient the semi-civilised contingents accompanying it may have been, the regular persian army appeared, in discipline, equipment, and drill, to have come up to the highest standard of the most intense 'pipeclay' epoch. in numbers alone its superiority was considerable to the last, and down to the very eve of platæa its commander openly displayed his contempt for his enemy. yet no defeat could be more complete than that suffered by the persians at the hands of their despised antagonists. as if to establish beyond dispute the identity of governing conditions in both land and maritime wars, the next very conspicuous disappointment of an elaborately organised force was that of the athenian fleet at syracuse. at the time athens, without question, stood at the head of the naval world: her empire was in the truest sense the product of sea-power. her navy, whilst unequalled in size, might claim, without excessive exaggeration, to be invincible. the great armament which the athenians despatched to sicily seemed, in numbers alone, capable of triumphing over all resistance. if the athenian navy had already met with some explicable mishaps, it looked back with complacent confidence on the glorious achievements of more than half a century previously. it had enjoyed many years of what was so nearly a maritime peace that its principal exploits had been the subjection of states weak to insignificance on the sea as compared with imperial athens. profuse expenditure on its maintenance; the 'continued practice' of which pericles boasted, the peace manoeuvres of a remote past; skilfully designed equipment; and the memory of past glories;--all these did not avail to save it from defeat at the hands of an enemy who only began to organise a fleet when the athenians had invaded his coast waters. ideal perfection as a regular army has never been so nearly reached as by that of sparta. the spartan spent his life in the barrack and the mess-room; his amusements were the exercises of the parade ground. for many generations a spartan force had never been defeated in a pitched battle. we have had, in modern times, some instances of a hectoring soldiery arrogantly prancing amongst populations whose official defenders it had defeated in battle; but nonesuch could vie with the spartans in the sublimity of their military self-esteem. overweening confidence in the prowess of her army led sparta to trample with ruthless disdain on the rights of others. the iniquitous attack on thebes, a state thought incapable of effectual resentment, was avenged by the defeat of leuctra, which announced the end of the political supremacy and the military predominance of sparta. in the series of struggles with carthage which resulted in putting rome in a position enabling her eventually to win the dominion of the ancient world, the issue was to be decided on the water. carthage was essentially a maritime state. the foundation of the city was effected by a maritime expedition; its dominions lay on the neighbouring coast or in regions to which the carthaginians could penetrate only by traversing the sea. to carthage her fleet was 'all in all': her navy, supported by large revenues and continuously maintained, was more of a 'regular' force than any modern navy before the second half of the seventeenth century. the romans were almost without a fleet, and when they formed one the undertaking was ridiculed by the carthaginians with an unconcealed assumption of superiority. the defeat of the latter off mylæ, the first of several, came as a great surprise to them, and, as we can see now, indicated the eventual ruin of their city. we are so familiar with stories of the luxury and corruption of the romans during the decline of the empire that we are likely to forget that the decline went on for centuries, and that their armed forces, however recruited, presented over and over again abundant signs of physical courage and vigour. the victory of stilicho over alaric at pollentia has been aptly paralleled with that of marius over the cimbri. this was by no means the only achievement of the roman army of the decadence. a century and a quarter later--when the empire of the west had fallen and the general decline had made further progress--belisarius conducted successful campaigns in persia, in north africa, in sicily, and in italy. the mere list of countries shows that the mobility and endurance of the roman forces during a period in which little creditable is generally looked for were not inferior to their discipline and courage. yet they met with disastrous defeat after all, and at the hands of races which they had more than once proved themselves capable of withstanding. it could not have been because the later roman equipment was inferior, the organisation less elaborate, or the training less careful than those of their barbarian enemies. though it is held by some in these days that the naval power of spain in the latter part of the sixteenth century was not really formidable, that does not appear to have been the opinion of contemporaries, whether spaniards or otherwise. some english seamen of the time did, indeed, declare their conviction that philip the second's navy was not so much to be feared as many of their fellow-countrymen thought; but, in the public opinion of the age, spain was the greatest, or indeed the one great, naval state. she possessed a more systematically organised navy than any other country having the ocean for a field of action had then, or till long afterwards. even genoa and venice, whose operations, moreover, were restricted to mediterranean waters, could not have been served by more finished specimens of the naval officer and the man-of-war's man of the time than a large proportion of the military _personnel_ of the regular spanish fleet. as basques, castilians, catalans, or aragonese, or all combined, the crews of spanish fighting ships could look back upon a glorious past. it was no wonder that, by common consent of those who manned it, the title of 'invincible' was informally conferred upon the armada which, in , sailed for the english channel. how it fared is a matter of common knowledge. no one could have been more surprised at the result than the gallant officers who led its squadrons. spain furnishes another instance of the unexpected overthrow of a military body to which long cohesion and precise organisation were believed to have secured invincibility. the spanish was considered the 'most redoubtable infantry in europe' till its unexpected defeat at rocroi. the effects of this defeat were far-reaching. notwithstanding the bravery of her sons, which has never been open to question, and, in fact, has always been conspicuous, the military superiority of spain was broken beyond repair. in the history of other countries are to be found examples equally instructive. the defeats of almansa, brihuega, and villaviciosa were nearly contemporary with the victories of blenheim and ramillies; and the thousands of british troops compelled to lay down their arms at the first named belonged to the same service as their fellow-countrymen who so often marched to victory under marlborough. a striking example of the disappointment which lies in wait for military self-satisfaction was furnished by the defeat of soubise at rossbach by frederick the great. before the action the french had ostentatiously shown their contempt for their opponent. the service which gloried in the exploits of anson and of hawke discerned the approach of the seven years' war without misgiving; and the ferocity shown in the treatment of byng enables us now to measure the surprise caused by the result of the action off minorca. there were further surprises in store for the english navy. at the end of the seven years' war its reputation for invincibility was generally established. few, perhaps none, ventured to doubt that, if there were anything like equality between the opposing forces, a meeting between the french and the british fleets could have but one result--viz. the decisive victory of the latter. experience in the english channel, on the other side of the atlantic, and in the bay of bengal--during the war of american independence--roughly upset this flattering anticipation. yet, in the end, the british navy came out the unquestioned victor in the struggle: which proves the excellence of its quality. after every allowance is made for the incapacity of the government, we must suspect that there was something else which so often frustrated the efforts of such a formidable force as the british navy of the day must essentially have been. on land the surprises were even more mortifying; and it is no exaggeration to say that, a year before it occurred, such an event as the surrender of burgoyne's army to an imperfectly organised and trained body of provincials would have seemed impossible. the army which frederick the great bequeathed to prussia was universally regarded as the model of efficiency. its methods were copied in other countries, and foreign officers desiring to excel in their profession made pilgrimages to berlin and potsdam to drink of the stream of military knowledge at its source. when it came in contact with the tumultuous array of revolutionary france, the performances of the force that preserved the tradition of the great frederick were disappointingly wanting in brilliancy. a few years later it suffered an overwhelming disaster. the prussian defeat at jena was serious as a military event; its political effects were of the utmost importance. yet many who were involved in that disaster took, later on, an effective part in the expulsion of the conquerors from their country, and in settling the history of europe for nearly half a century at waterloo. the brilliancy of the exploits of wellington and the british army in portugal and spain has thrown into comparative obscurity that part of the peninsular war which was waged for years by the french against the spaniards. spain, distracted by palace intrigues and political faction, with the flower of her troops in a distant comer of europe, and several of her most important fortresses in the hands of her assailant, seemed destined to fall an easy and a speedy prey to the foremost military power in the world. the attitude of the invaders made it evident that they believed themselves to be marching to certain victory. even the british soldiers--of whom there were never many more than , in the peninsula, and for some years not half that number--were disdained until they had been encountered. the french arms met with disappointment after disappointment. on one occasion a whole french army, over , strong, surrendered to a spanish force, and became prisoners of war. before the struggle closed there were six marshals of france with nearly , troops in the peninsula. the great efforts which these figures indicate were unsuccessful, and the intruders were driven from the country. yet they were the comrades of the victors of austerlitz, of jena, and of wagram, and part of that mighty organisation which had planted its victorious standards in berlin and vienna, held down prussia like a conquered province, and shattered into fragments the holy roman empire. in the british navy was at the zenith of its glory. it had not only defeated all its opponents; it had also swept the seas of the fleets of the historic maritime powers--of spain, of france, which had absorbed the italian maritime states, of the netherlands, of denmark. warfare, nearly continuous for eighteen, and uninterrupted for nine years, had transformed the british navy into an organisation more nearly resembling a permanently maintained force than it had been throughout its previous history. its long employment in serious hostilities had saved it from some of the failings which the narrow spirit inherent in a close profession is only too sure to foster. it had, however, a confidence--not unjustified by its previous exploits--in its own invincibility. this confidence did not diminish, and was not less ostentatiously exhibited, as its great achievements receded more and more into the past. the new enemy who now appeared on the farther side of the atlantic was not considered formidable. in the british navy there were , men. in the united states navy the number of officers, seamen, and marines available for ocean service was less than --an insignificant numerical addition to the enemies with whom we were already contending. the subsequent and rapid increase in the american _personnel_ to , shows the small extent to which it could be considered a 'regular' force, its permanent nucleus being overwhelmingly outnumbered by the hastily enrolled additions. our defeats in the war of have been greatly exaggerated; but, all the same, they did constitute rebuffs to our naval self-esteem which were highly significant in themselves, and deserve deep attention. rebuffs of the kind were not confined to the sea service, and at new orleans our army, which numbered in its ranks soldiers of busaco, fuentes de onoro, and salamanca, met with a serious defeat. when the austro-prussian war broke out in , the austrian commander-in-chief, general benedek, published an order, probably still in the remembrance of many, which officially declared the contempt for the enemy felt in the imperial army. even those who perceived that the prussian forces were not fit subjects of contempt counted with confidence on the victory of the austrians. yet the latter never gained a considerable success in their combats with the prussians; and within a few weeks from the beginning of hostilities the general who had assumed such a lofty tone of superiority in speaking of his foes had to implore his sovereign to make peace to avoid further disasters. at the beginning of the franco-german war of , the widespread anticipation of french victories was clearly shown by the unanimity with which the journalists of various nationalities illustrated their papers with maps giving the country between the french frontier and berlin, and omitting the part of france extending to paris. in less than five weeks from the opening of hostilities events had made it certain that a map of the country to the eastward of lorraine would be practically useless to a student of the campaign, unless it were to follow the route of the hundreds of thousands of french soldiers who were conveyed to germany as prisoners of war. it is to be specially noted that in the above enumeration only contests in which the result was unexpected--unexpected not only by the beaten side but also by impartial observers--have been specified. in all wars one side or the other is defeated; and it has not been attempted to give a general _résumé_ of the history of war. the object has been to show the frequency--in all ages and in all circumstances of systematic, as distinguished from savage, warfare--of the defeat of the force which by general consent was regarded as certain to win. now it is obvious that a result so frequently reappearing must have a distinct cause, which is well worth trying to find out. discovery of the cause may enable us to remove it in the future, and thus prevent results which are likely to be all the more disastrous because they have not been foreseen. professional military writers--an expression which, as before explained, includes naval--do not help us much in the prosecution of the search which is so eminently desirable. as a rule, they have contrived rather to hide than to bring to light the object sought for. it would be doing them injustice to assume that this has been done with deliberate intention. it is much more likely due to professional bias, which exercises over the minds of members of definitely limited professions incessant and potent domination. when alluding to occurrences included in the enumeration given above, they exhibit signs of a resolve to defend their profession against possible imputations of inefficiency, much more than a desire to get to the root of the matter. this explains the unremitting eagerness of military writers to extol the special qualities developed by long-continued service habits and methods. they are always apprehensive of the possibility of credit being given to fighting bodies more loosely organised and less precisely trained in peace time than the body to which they themselves belong. this sensitiveness as to the merits of their particular profession, and impatience of even indirect criticism, are unnecessary. there is nothing in the history of war to show that an untrained force is better than a trained force. on the contrary, all historical evidence is on the other side. in quite as many instances as are presented by the opposite, the forces which put an unexpected end to the military supremacy long possessed by their antagonists were themselves, in the strictest sense of the word, 'regulars.' the thebans whom epaminondas led to victory over the spartans at leuctra no more resembled a hasty levy of armed peasants or men imperfectly trained as soldiers than did napoleon's army which overthrew the prussians at jena, or the germans who defeated the french at gravelotte and sedan. nothing could have been less like an 'irregular' force than the fleet with which la galissonnière beat byng off minorca, or the french fleets which, in the war of american independence, so often disappointed the hopes of the british. the records of war on land and by sea--especially the extracts from them included in the enumeration already given--lend no support to the silly suggestion that efficient defence can be provided for a country by 'an untrained man with a rifle behind a hedge.' the truth is that it was not the absence of organisation or training on one side which enabled it to defeat the other. if the beaten side had been elaborately organised and carefully trained, there must have been something bad in its organisation or its methods. now this 'something bad,' this defect--wherever it has disclosed itself--has been enough to neutralise the most splendid courage and the most unselfish devotion. it has been seen that armies and navies the valour of which has never been questioned have been defeated by antagonists sometimes as highly organised as they were, and sometimes much less so. this ought to put us on the track of the cause which has produced an effect so little anticipated. a 'regular' permanently embodied or maintained service of fighting men is always likely to develop a spirit of intense professional self-satisfaction. the more highly organised it is, and the more sharply its official frontiers are defined, the more intense is this spirit likely to become. a 'close' service of the kind grows restive at outside criticism, and yields more and more to the conviction that no advance in efficiency is possible unless it be the result of suggestions emanating from its own ranks. its view of things becomes narrower and narrower, whereas efficiency in war demands the very widest view. ignorant critics call the spirit thus engendered 'professional conservatism'; the fact being that change is not objected to--is even welcomed, however frequent it may be, provided only that it is suggested from inside. an immediate result is 'unreality and formalism of peace training'--to quote a recent thoughtful military critic. as the formalism becomes more pronounced, so the unreality increases. the proposer or introducer of a system of organisation of training or of exercises is often, perhaps usually, capable of distinguishing between the true and the false, the real and the unreal. his successors, the men who continue the execution of his plans, can hardly bring to their work the open mind possessed by the originator; they cannot escape from the influence of the methods which have been provided for them ready made, and which they are incessantly engaged in practising. this is not a peculiarity of the military profession in either branch--it extends to nearly every calling; but in the profession specified, which is a service rather than a freely exercised profession, it is more prominent. human thought always has a tendency to run in grooves, and in military institutions the grooves are purposely made deep, and departure from them rigorously forbidden. all exercises, even those designed to have the widest scope, tend to become mere drill. each performance produces, and bequeaths for use on the next occasion, a set of customary methods of execution which are readily adopted by the subsequent performers. there grows up in time a kind of body of customary law governing the execution of peace operations--the principles being peace-operation principles wholly and solely--which law few dare to disobey, and which eventually obtains the sanction of official written regulations. as scharnhorst, quoted by baron von der goltz, said, 'we have begun to place the art of war higher than military virtues.' the eminent authority who thus expressed himself wrote the words before the great catastrophe of jena; and, with prophetic insight sharpened by his fear of the menacing tendency of peace-training formalism and unreality, added his conviction that 'this has been the ruin of nations from time immemorial.' independently of the evidence of history already adduced, it would be reasonable to conclude that the tendency is strengthened and made more menacing when the service in which it prevails becomes more highly specialised. if custom and regulation leave little freedom of action to the individual members of an armed force, the difficulty--sure to be experienced by them--of shaking themselves clear of their fetters when the need for doing so arises is increased. to realise--when peace is broken--the practical conditions of war demands an effort of which the unfettered intelligence alone seems capable. the great majority of successful leaders in war on both elements have not been considerably, or at all, superior in intellectual acuteness to numbers of their fellows; but they have had strength of character, and their minds were not squeezed in a mould into a commonplace and uniform pattern. the 'canker of a long peace,' during recent years at any rate, is not manifested in disuse of arms, but in mistaken methods. for a quarter of a century the civilised world has tended more and more to become a drill-ground, but the spirit dominating it has been that of the pedant. there has been more exercise and less reality. the training, especially of officers, becomes increasingly scholastic. this, and the deterioration consequent on it, are not merely modern phenomena. they appear in all ages. 'the sword of the saracens,' says gibbon, 'became less formidable when their youth was drawn from the camp to the college.' the essence of pedantry is want of originality. it is nourished on imitation. for the pedant to imitate is enough of itself; to him the suitability of the model is immaterial. thus military bodies have been ruined by mimicry of foreign arrangements quite inapplicable to the conditions of the mimics' country. more than twenty years ago sir henry maine, speaking of the war of american independence, said, 'next to their stubborn valour, the chief secret of the colonists' success was the incapacity of the english generals, trained in the stiff prussian system soon to perish at jena, to adapt themselves to new conditions of warfare.' he pointed out that the effect of this uncritical imitation of what was foreign was again experienced by men 'full of admiration of a newer german system.' we may not be able to explain what it is, but, all the same, there does exist something which we call national characteristics. the aim of all training should be to utilise these to the full, not to ignore them. the naval methods of a continental state with relatively small oceanic interests, or with but a brief experience of securing these, cannot be very applicable to a great maritime state whose chief interests have been on the seas for many years. how is all this applicable to the ultimate efficiency of the british navy? it may be allowed that there is a good deal of truth in what has been written above; but it may be said that considerations sententiously presented cannot claim to have much practical value so long as they are absolute and unapplied. the statement cannot be disputed. it is unquestionably necessary to make the application. the changes in naval _matériel_, so often spoken of, introduced within the last fifty years have been rivalled by the changes in the composition of the british navy. the human element remains in original individual character exactly the same as it always was; but there has been a great change in the opportunities and facilities offered for the development of the faculties most desired in men-of-war's men. all reform--using the word in its true sense of alteration, and not in its strained sense of improvement--has been in the direction of securing perfect uniformity. if we take the particular directly suggested by the word just used, we may remember, almost with astonishment, that there was no british naval uniform for anyone below the rank of officer till after . now, at every inspection, much time is taken up in ascertaining if the narrow tape embroidery on a frock collar is of the regulation width, and if the rows of tape are the proper distance apart. the diameter of a cloth cap is officially defined; and any departure from the regulation number of inches (and fractions of an inch) is as sure of involving punishment as insubordination. it is the same in greater things. till --in which year the change came into force--there was no permanent british naval service except the commissioned and warrant officers. not till several years later did the new 'continuous service' men equal half of the bluejacket aggregate. now, every bluejacket proper serves continuously, and has been in the navy since boyhood. the training of the boys is made uniform. no member of the ship's company--except a domestic--is now allowed to set foot on board a sea-going ship till he has been put through a training course which is exactly like that through which every other member of his class passes. even during the comparatively brief period in which young officers entered the navy by joining the college at portsmouth, it was only the minority who received the special academic training. till the establishment of the _illustrious_ training school in , the great majority of officers joined their first ship as individuals from a variety of different and quite independent quarters. now, every one of them has, as a preliminary condition, to spend a certain time--the same for all--in a school. till a much later period, every engineer entered separately. now, passing through a training establishment is obligatory for engineers also. within the service there has been repeated formation of distinct branches or 'schools,' such as the further specialised specialist gunnery and torpedo sections. it was not till that uniform watch bills, quarter bills, and station bills were introduced, and not till later that their general adoption was made compulsory. up to that time the internal organisation and discipline of a ship depended on her own officers, it being supposed that capacity to command a ship implied, at least, capacity to distribute and train her crew. the result was a larger scope than is now thought permissible for individual capability. however short-lived some particular drill or exercise may be, however soon it is superseded by another, as long as it lasts the strictest conformity to it is rigorously enforced. even the number of times that an exercise has to be performed, difference in class of ship or in the nature of the service on which she is employed notwithstanding, is authoritatively laid down. still more noteworthy, though much less often spoken of than the change in _matériel_, has been the progress of the navy towards centralisation. naval duties are now formulated at a desk on shore, and the mode of carrying them out notified to the service in print. all this would have been quite as astonishing to the contemporaries of nelson or of exmouth and codrington as the aspect of a battleship or of a -inch breech-loading gun. let it be clearly understood that none of these things has been mentioned with the intention of criticising them either favourably or unfavourably. they have been cited in order that it may be seen that the change in naval affairs is by no means one in _matériel_ only, and that the transformation in other matters has been stupendous and revolutionary beyond all previous experience. it follows inevitably from this that we shall wage war in future under conditions dissimilar from any hitherto known. in this very fact there lies the making of a great surprise. it will have appeared from the historical statement given above how serious a surprise sometimes turns out to be. its consequences, always significant, are not unfrequently far-reaching. the question of practical moment is: how are we to guard ourselves against such a surprise? to this a satisfactory answer can be given. it might be summarised in the admonitions: abolish over-centralisation; give proper scope to individual capacity and initiative; avoid professional self-sufficiency. when closely looked at, it is one of the strangest manifestations of the spirit of modern navies that, though the issues of land warfare are rarely thought instructive, the peace methods of land forces are extensively and eagerly copied by the sea-service. the exercises of the parade ground and the barrack square are taken over readily, and so are the parade ground and the barrack square themselves. this may be right. the point is that it is novel, and that a navy into the training of which the innovation has entered must differ considerably from one that was without it and found no need of it during a long course of serious wars. at any rate, no one will deny that parade-ground evolutions and barrack-square drill expressly aim at the elimination of individuality, or just the quality to the possession of which we owe the phenomenon called, in vulgar speech, the 'handy man.' habits and sentiments based on a great tradition, and the faculties developed by them, are not killed all at once; but innovation in the end annihilates them, and their not having yet entirely disappeared gives no ground for doubting their eventual, and even near, extinction. the aptitudes still universally most prized in the seaman were produced and nourished by practices and under conditions no longer allowed to prevail. should we lose those aptitudes, are we likely to reach the position in war gained by our predecessors? for the british empire the matter is vital: success in maritime war, decisive and overwhelming, is indispensable to our existence. we have to consider the desirability of 'taking stock' of our moral, as well as of our material, naval equipment: to ascertain where the accumulated effect of repeated innovations has carried us. the mere fact of completing the investigation will help us to rate at their true value the changes which have been introduced; will show us what to retain, what to reject, and what to substitute. there is no essential vagueness in these allusions. if they seem vague, it is because the moment for particularising has not yet come. the public opinion of the navy must first be turned in the right direction. it must be led to question the soundness of the basis on which many present methods rest. having once begun to do this, we shall find no difficulty in settling, in detail and with precision, what the true elements of naval efficiency are. iv[ ] the historical relations between the navy and the merchant service [footnote : written in . (_the_times_.)] the regret, often expressed, that the crews of british merchant ships now include a large proportion of foreigners, is founded chiefly on the apprehension that a well-tested and hitherto secure recruiting ground for the navy is likely to be closed. it has been stated repeatedly, and the statement has been generally accepted without question, that in former days, when a great expansion of our fleet was forced on us by the near approach of danger, we relied upon the ample resources of our merchant service to complete the manning of our ships of war, even in a short time, and that the demands of the navy upon the former were always satisfied. it is assumed that compliance with those demands was as a rule not voluntary, but was enforced by the press-gang. the resources, it is said, existed and were within reach, and the method employed in drawing upon them was a detail of comparatively minor importance; our merchant ships were manned by native-born british seamen, of whom tens of thousands were always at hand, so that if volunteers were not forthcoming the number wanted could be 'pressed' into the royal service. it is lamented that at the present day the condition of affairs is different, that the presence in it of a large number of foreigners forbids us to regard with any confidence the merchant service as an adequate naval recruiting ground in the event of war, even though we are ready to substitute for the system of 'impressment'--which is now considered both undesirable and impossible--rewards likely to attract volunteers. the importance of the subject need not be dwelt upon. the necessity to a maritime state of a powerful navy, including abundant resources for manning it, is now no more disputed than the law of gravitation. if the proportion of foreigners in our merchant service is too high it is certainly deplorable; and if, being already too high, that proportion is rising, an early remedy is urgently needed. i do not propose to speak here of that matter, which is grave enough to require separate treatment. my object is to present the results of an inquiry into the history of the relations between the navy and the merchant service, from which will appear to what extent the latter helped in bringing the former up to a war footing, how far its assistance was affected by the presence in it of any foreign element, and in what way impressment ensured or expedited the rendering of the assistance. the inquiry has necessarily been largely statistical; consequently the results will often be given in a statistical form. this has the great advantage of removing the conclusions arrived at from the domain of mere opinion into that of admitted fact. the statistics used are those which have not been, and are not likely to be, questioned. it is desirable that this should be understood, because official figures have not always commanded universal assent. lord brougham, speaking in the house of lords in of tables issued by the board of trade, said that a lively impression prevailed 'that they could prove anything and everything'; and in connection with them he adopted some unnamed person's remark, 'give me half an hour and the run of the multiplication table and i'll engage to payoff the national debt.' in this inquiry there has been no occasion to use figures relating to the time of lord brougham's observations. we will take the last three great maritime wars in which our country has been engaged. these were: the war of american independence, the war with revolutionary france to the peace of amiens, and the war with napoleon. the period covered by these three contests roughly corresponds to the last quarter of the eighteenth and the first fifteen years of the nineteenth century. in each of the three wars there was a sudden and large addition to the number of seamen in the navy; and in each there were considerable annual increases as the struggle continued. it must be understood that we shall deal with the case of seamen only; the figures, which also were large, relating to the marines not being included in our survey because it has never been contended that their corps looked to the merchant service for any appreciable proportion of its recruits. in taking note of the increase of seamen voted for any year it will be necessary to make allowance also for the 'waste' of the previous year. the waste, even in the latter part of the last century, was large. commander robinson, in his valuable work, 'the british fleet,' gives details showing that the waste during the seven years' war was so great as to be truly shocking. in lord brassey (_naval_annual_) allowed for the _personnel_ of the navy, even in these days of peace and advanced sanitary science, a yearly waste of per cent., a percentage which is, i expect, rather lower than that officially accepted. we may take it as certain that, during the three serious wars above named, the annual waste was never less than per cent. this is, perhaps, to put it too low; but it is better to understate the case than to appear to exaggerate it. the recruiting demand, therefore, for a year of increased armament will be the sum of the increase in men _plus_ the waste on the previous year's numbers. the capacity of the british merchant service to supply what was demanded would, of course, be all the greater the smaller the number of foreigners it contained in its ranks. this is not only generally admitted at the present day; it is also frequently pointed out when it is asserted that the conditions now are less favourable than they were owing to a recent influx of foreign seamen. the fact, however, is that there were foreigners on board british merchant ships, and, it would seem, in considerable numbers, long before even the war of american independence. by george ii, c. , foreigners, not exceeding three-fourths of the crew, were permitted in british vessels, 'and in two years to be naturalised.' by george ii, c. , exemption from impressment was granted to 'every person, being a foreigner, who shall serve in any merchant ship, or other trading vessel or privateer belonging to a subject of the crown of great britain.' the acts quoted were passed about the time of the 'jenkins' ear war' and the war of the austrian succession; but the fact that foreigners were allowed to form the majority of a british vessel's crew is worthy of notice. the effect and, probably, the object of this legislation were not so much to permit foreign seamen to enter our merchant service as to permit the number of those already there to be increased. it was in that lord, then commander, duncan reported that the crew of the hired merchant ship _royal_ _exchange_ consisted 'to a large extent of boys and foreigners, many of whom could not speak english.' in by george iii, c. , merchant ships were allowed to have three-fourths of their crews foreigners till the st february . acts permitting the same proportion of foreign seamen and extending the time were passed in , , , , , and . a similar act was passed in . it was in contemplation to reduce the foreign proportion, after the war, to one-fourth. in it was enacted ( george iii, c. ), 'for the encouragement of british seamen,' that after the expiration of six months from the conclusion of the war, vessels in the foreign, as distinguished from the coasting, trade were to have their commanders and three-fourths of their crews british subjects. from the wording of the act it seems to have been taken for granted that the proportion of three-fourths _bona_fide_ british-born seamen was not likely to be generally exceeded. it will have been observed that in all the legislation mentioned, from the time of george ii downwards, it was assumed as a matter of course that there were foreign seamen on board our merchant vessels. the united states citizens in the british navy, about whom there was so much discussion on the eve of the war of , came principally from our own merchant service, and not direct from the american. it is remarkable that, until a recent date, the presence of foreigners in british vessels, even in time of peace, was not loudly or generally complained of. mr. w. s. lindsay, writing in , stated that the throwing open the coasting trade in had 'neither increased on the average the number of foreigners we had hitherto been allowed to employ in our ships, nor deteriorated the number and quality of british seamen.' i have brought forward enough evidence to show that, as far as the merchant service was the proper recruiting ground for the british navy, it was not one which was devoid of a considerable foreign element. we may, nevertheless, feel certain that that element never amounted to, and indeed never nearly approached, three-fourths of the whole number of men employed in our 'foreign-going' vessels. for this, between , and , men would have been required, at least in the last of the three wars above mentioned. if all the foreign mercantile marines at the present day, when nearly all have been so largely increased, were to combine, they could not furnish the number required after their own wants had been satisfied. during the period under review some of the leading commercial nations were at war with us; so that few, if any, seamen could have come to us from them. our custom-house statistics indicate an increase in the shipping trade of the neutral nations sufficient to have rendered it impossible for them to spare us any much larger number of seamen. therefore, it is extremely difficult to resist the conclusion that during the wars the composition of our merchant service remained nearly what it was during peace. it contained a far from insignificant proportion of foreigners; and that proportion was augmented, though by no means enormously, whilst war was going on. this leads us to the further conclusion that, if our merchant service supplied the navy with many men, it could recover only a small part of the number from foreign countries. in fact, any that it could give it had to replace from our own population almost exclusively. the question now to be considered is, what was the capacity of the merchant service for supplying the demands of the navy? in the year the number of seamen voted for the navy was , . owing to a fear of a difficulty with spain about the falkland islands, the number for the following year was suddenly raised to , . consequently, the increase was , , which, added to the 'waste' on the previous year, made the whole naval demand about , . we have not got statistics of the seamen of the whole british empire for this period, but we have figures which will enable us to compute the number with sufficient accuracy for the purpose in hand. in england and wales there were some , seamen, and those of the rest of the empire amounted to about , . large as the 'waste' was in the royal navy, it was, and still is, much larger in the merchant service. we may safely put it at per cent. at least. therefore, simply to keep up its numbers-- , --the merchant service would have had to engage fully fresh hands. in view of these figures, it is difficult to believe that it could have furnished the navy with , men, or, indeed, with any number approximating thereto. it could not possibly have done so without restricting its operations, if only for a time. so far were its operations from shrinking that they were positively extended. the english tonnage 'cleared outwards' from our ports was for the years mentioned as follows: , , ; , , ; , . owing to the generally slow rate of sailing when on voyages and to the great length of time taken in unloading and reloading abroad--both being often effected 'in the stream' and with the ship's own boats--the figures for clearances outward much more nearly represented the amount of our 'foreign-going' tonnage a century ago than similar figures would now in these days of rapid movement. after the navy was reduced and kept at a relatively low standard till . in that year the state of affairs in america rendered an increase of our naval forces necessary. in we were at war with france; in with spain as well; and in december we had the dutch for enemies in addition. in september we were again at peace. the way in which we had to increase the navy will be seen in the following table:-- ------------------------------------------------------- | | | | | total | | | seamen | | | additional | | | voted for | | | number | | year. | the navy | increase. | 'waste.' | required. | |-------------------------------------------------------| | | , | -- | -- | -- | | | , | , | | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | ------------------------------------------------------- it cannot be believed that the merchant service, with its then dimensions, could have possibly satisfied these great and repeated demands, besides making up its own 'waste,' unless its size were much reduced. after , indeed, there was a considerable fall in the figures of english tonnage 'outwards.' i give these figures down to the first year of peace. , tons 'outwards.' , " " , " " , " " , " " , " " , " " , " " at first sight it would seem as if there had, indeed, been a shrinkage. we find, however, on further examination that in reality there had been none. 'during the [american] war the ship-yards in every port of britain were full of employment; and consequently new ship-yards were set up in places where ships had never been built before.' even the diminution in the statistics of outward clearances indicated no diminution in the number of merchant ships or their crews. the missing tonnage was merely employed elsewhere. 'at this time there were about vessels of private property employed by the government as transports and in other branches of the public service.' of course there had been some diminution due to the transfer of what had been british-american shipping to a new independent flag. this would not have set free any men to join the navy. when we come to the revolutionary war we find ourselves confronted with similar conditions. the case of this war has often been quoted as proving that in former days the navy had to rely practically exclusively on the merchant service when expansion was necessary. in giving evidence before a parliamentary committee about fifty years ago, admiral sir t. byam martin, referring to the great increase of the fleet in , said, 'it was the merchant service that enabled us to man some sixty ships of the line and double that number of frigates and smaller vessels.' he added that we had been able to bring promptly together 'about , or , men of the mercantile marine.' the requirements of the navy amounted, as stated by the admiral, to about , men; to be exact, , . the number of seamen in the british empire in was , . in the next year the number showed no diminution; in fact it increased, though but slightly, to , . how our merchant service could have satisfied the above-mentioned immense demand on it in addition to making good its waste and then have even increased is a thing that baffles comprehension. no such example of elasticity is presented by any other institution. admiral byam martin spoke so positively, and, indeed, with such justly admitted authority, that we should have to give up the problem as insoluble were it not for other passages in the admiral's own evidence. it may be mentioned that all the witnesses did not hold his views. sir james stirling, an officer of nearly if not quite equal authority, differed from him. in continuation of his evidence sir t. byam martin stated that afterwards the merchant service could give only a small and occasional supply, as ships arrived from foreign ports or as apprentices grew out of their time. now, during the remaining years of this war and throughout the napoleonic war, great as were the demands of the navy, they only in one year, that of the rupture of the peace of amiens, equalled the demand at the beginning of the revolutionary war. from the beginning of hostilities till the final close of the conflict in the number of merchant seamen fell only once--viz. in , the fall being . in , however, the demand for men for the navy was less than half that of . the utmost, therefore, that sir t. byam martin desired to establish was that, on a single occasion in an unusually protracted continuance of war, the strength of our merchant service enabled it to reinforce the navy up to the latter's requirements; but its doing so prevented it from giving much help afterwards. all the same, men in large numbers had to be found for the navy yearly for a long time. this will appear from the tables which follow:-- revolutionary war ------------------------------------------------------- | | | | | total | | | seamen | | | additional | | | voted for | | | number | | year. | the navy | increase. | 'waste.' | required. | |-------------------------------------------------------| | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | -- | , | , | | | , | -- | , | , | | | , | -- | -- | -- | | | , | , | absorbed | , | | | | | by | | | | | | previous | | | | | |reduction.| | ------------------------------------------------------- napoleonic war ------------------------------------------------------- | | | | | total | | | seamen | | | additional | | | voted for | | | number | | year. | the navy | increase. | 'waste.' | required. | |-------------------------------------------------------| | | / , \ | | | | | | \ , / | , | -- | , | | | , | | , | , | | | | |(for nine | | | | | | months) | | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | -- | , | , | | | , | -- | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | -- | , | , | | | , | -- | , | , | | | , | reduction | -- | -- | | | / , \ | | | | | | \ , / | do. | -- | -- | ------------------------------------------------------- (no 'waste' is allowed for when there has been a reduction.) it is a reasonable presumption that, except perhaps on a single occasion, the merchant service did not furnish the men required--not from any want of patriotism or of public spirit, but simply because it was impossible. even as regards the single exception the evidence is not uncontested; and by itself, though undoubtedly strong, it is not convincing, in view of the well-grounded presumptions the other way. the question then that naturally arises is--if the navy did not fill up its complements from the merchant service, how did it fill them up? the answer is easy. our naval complements were filled up largely with boys, largely with landsmen, largely with fishermen, whose numbers permitted this without inconvenience to their trade in general, and, to a small extent, with merchant seamen. it may be suggested that the men wanted by the navy could have been passed on to it from our merchant vessels, which could then complete their own crews with boys, landsmen, and fishermen. it was the age in which dr. price was a great authority on public finance, the age of mr. pitt's sinking fund, when borrowed money was repaid with further borrowings; so that a corresponding roundabout method for manning the navy may have had attractions for some people. a conclusive reason why it was not adopted is that its adoption would have been possible only at the cost of disorganising such a great industrial undertaking as our maritime trade. that this disorganisation did not arise is proved by the fact that our merchant service flourished and expanded. it is widely supposed that, wherever the men wanted for the navy may have come from, they were forced into it by the system of 'impressment.' the popular idea of a man-of-war's 'lower deck' of a century ago is that it was inhabited by a ship's company which had been captured by the press-gang and was restrained from revolting by the presence of a detachment of marines. the prevalence of the belief that seamen were 'raised'--'recruited' is not a naval term--for the navy by forcible means can be accounted for without difficulty. the supposed ubiquity of the press-gang and its violent procedure added much picturesque detail, and even romance, to stories of naval life. stories connected with it, if authentic, though rare, would, indeed, make a deep impression on the public; and what was really the exception would be taken for the rule. there is no evidence to show that even from the middle of the seventeenth century any considerable number of men was raised by forcible impressment. i am not acquainted with a single story of the press-gang which, even when much embellished, professes to narrate the seizure of more than an insignificant body. the allusions to forcible impressment made by naval historians are, with few exceptions, complaints of the utter inefficiency of the plan. in mr. david, hannay's excellent 'short history of the royal navy' will be found more than one illustration of its inefficient working in the seventeenth century. confirmation, if confirmation is needed, can be adduced on the high authority of mr. m. oppenheim. we wanted tens of thousands, and forcible impressment was giving us half-dozens, or, at the best, scores. even of those it provided, but a small proportion was really forced to serve. mr. oppenheim tells us of an act of parliament ( charles i) legalising forcible impressment, which seems to have been passed to satisfy the sailors. if anyone should think this absurd, he may be referred to the remarkable expression of opinion by some of the older seamen of sunderland and shields when the russian war broke out in . the married sailors, they said, naturally waited for the impressment, for 'we know that has always been and always will be preceded by the proclamation of bounty.' the most fruitful source of error as to the procedure of the press-gang has been a deficient knowledge of etymology. the word has, properly, no relation to the use of force, and has no etymological connection with 'press' and its compounds, 'compress,' 'depress,' 'express,' 'oppress,' &c. 'prest money is so-called from the french word _prest_--that is, readie money, for that it bindeth all those that have received it to be ready at all times appointed.' professor laughton tells us that 'a prest or imprest was an earnest or advance paid on account. a prest man was really a man who received the prest of d., as a soldier when enlisted.' writers, and some in an age when precision in spelling is thought important, have frequently spelled _prest_ pressed, and _imprest_ impressed. the natural result has been that the thousands who had received 'prest money' were classed as 'pressed' into the service by force. the foregoing may be summed up as follows:-- for years at least there never has been a time when the british merchant service did not contain an appreciable percentage of foreigners. during the last three (and greatest) maritime wars in which this country has been involved only a small proportion of the immense number of men required by the navy came, or could have come, from the merchant service. the number of men raised for the navy by forcible impressment in war time has been enormously exaggerated owing to a confusion of terms. as a matter of fact the number so raised, for quite two centuries, was only an insignificant fraction of the whole. v facts and fancies about the press-gang[ ] [footnote : written in , (_national_review_.)] of late years great attention has been paid to our naval history, and many even of its obscure byways have been explored. a general result of the investigation is that we are enabled to form a high estimate of the merits of our naval administration in former centuries. we find that for a long time the navy has possessed an efficient organisation; that its right position as an element of the national defences was understood ages ago; and that english naval officers of a period which is now very remote showed by their actions that they exactly appreciated and--when necessary--were able to apply the true principles of maritime warfare. if anyone still believes that the country has been saved more than once merely by lucky chances of weather, and that the england of elizabeth has been converted into the great oceanic and colonial british empire of victoria in 'a fit of absence of mind,' it will not be for want of materials with which to form a correct judgment on these points. it has been accepted generally that the principal method of manning our fleet in the past--especially when war threatened to arise--was to seize and put men on board the ships by force. this has been taken for granted by many, and it seems to have been assumed that, in any case, there is no way of either proving it or disproving it. the truth, however, is that it is possible and--at least as regards the period of our last great naval war--not difficult to make sure if it is true or not. records covering a long succession of years still exist, and in these can be found the name of nearly every seaman in the navy and a statement of the conditions on which he joined it. the exceptions would not amount to more than a few hundreds out of many tens of thousands of names, and would be due to the disappearance--in itself very infrequent--of some of the documents and to occasional, but also very rare, inaccuracies in the entries. the historical evidence on which the belief in the prevalence of impressment as a method of recruiting the navy for more than a hundred years is based, is limited to contemporary statements in the english newspapers, and especially in the issues of the periodical called _the_naval_chronicle_, published in , the first year of the war following the rupture of the peace of amiens. readers of captain mahan's works on sea-power will remember the picture he draws of the activity of the press-gang in that year, his authority being _the_naval_chronicle_. this evidence will be submitted directly to close examination, and we shall see what importance ought to be attached to it. in the great majority of cases, however, the belief above mentioned has no historical foundation, but is to be traced to the frequency with which the supposed operations of the press-gang were used by the authors of naval stories and dramas, and by artists who took scenes of naval life for their subject. violent seizure and abduction lend themselves to effective treatment in literature and in art, and writers and painters did not neglect what was so plainly suggested. a fruitful source of the widespread belief that our navy in the old days was chiefly manned by recourse to compulsion, is a confusion between two words of independent origin and different meaning, which, in ages when exact spelling was not thought indispensable, came to be written and pronounced alike. during our later great maritime wars, the official term applied to anyone recruited by impressment was 'prest-man.' in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and part of the eighteenth century, this term meant the exact opposite. it meant a man who had voluntarily engaged to serve, and who had received a sum in advance called 'prest-money.' 'a prest-man,' we are told by that high authority, professor sir j. k. laughton, 'was really a man who received the prest of d., as a soldier when enlisted.' in the 'encyclopædia metropolitana' ( ), we find:-- 'impressing, or, more correctly, impresting, i.e. paying earnest-money to seamen by the king's commission to the admiralty, is a right of very ancient date, and established by prescription, though not by statute. many statutes, however, imply its existence--one as far back as richard ii, cap. .' an old dictionary of james i's time ( ), called 'the guide into the tongues, by the industrie, studie, labour, and at the charges of john minshew,' gives the following definition:--'imprest-money. g. [gallic or french], imprest-ànce; _imprestanza_, from _in_ and _prestare_, to lend or give beforehand.... presse-money. t. [teutonic or german], soldt, from salz, _salt_. for anciently agreement or compact between the general and the soldier was signified by salt.' minshew also defines the expression 'to presse souldiers' by the german _soldatenwerben_, and explains that here the word _werben_ means prepare (_parare_). 'prest-money,' he says, 'is so-called of the french word _prest_, i.e. readie, for that it bindeth those that have received it to be ready at all times appointed.' in the posthumous work of stephen skinner, 'etymologia linguæ anglicanæ' ( ), the author joins together 'press or imprest' as though they were the same, and gives two definitions, viz.: ( ) recruiting by force (_milites_cogere_); ( ) paying soldiers a sum of money and keeping them ready to serve. dr. murray's 'new english dictionary,' now in course of publication, gives instances of the confusion between imprest and impress. a consequence of this confusion has been that many thousands of seamen who had received an advance of money have been regarded as carried off to the navy by force. if to this misunderstanding we add the effect on the popular mind of cleverly written stories in which the press-gang figured prominently, we can easily see how the belief in an almost universal adoption of compulsory recruiting for the navy became general. it should, therefore, be no matter of surprise when we find that the sensational reports published in the english newspapers in were accepted without question. impressment of seamen for the navy has been called 'lawless,' and sometimes it has been asserted that it was directly contrary to law. there is, however, no doubt that it was perfectly legal, though its legality was not based upon any direct statutory authority. indirect confirmations of it by statute are numerous. these appear in the form of exemptions. the law of the land relating to this subject was that all 'sea-faring' men were liable to impressment unless specially protected by custom or statute. a consideration of the long list of exemptions tends to make one believe that in reality very few people were liable to be impressed. some were 'protected' by local custom, some by statute, and some by administrative order. the number of the last must have been very great. the 'protection books' preserved in the public record office form no inconsiderable section of the admiralty records. for the period specially under notice, viz. that beginning with the year , there are no less than five volumes of 'protections.' exemptions by custom probably originated at a very remote date: ferrymen, for example, being everywhere privileged from impressment. the crews of colliers seem to have enjoyed the privilege by custom before it was confirmed by act of parliament. the naval historian, burchett, writing of , cites a 'proclamation forbidding pressing men from colliers.' every ship in the coal trade had the following persons protected, viz. two a.b.'s for every ship of tons, and one for every tons in larger ships. when we come to consider the sensational statements in _the_naval_chronicle_ of , it will be well to remember what the penalty for infringing the colliers' privilege was. by the act & william iii, c. , sect. , 'any officer who presumes to impress any of the above shall forfeit to the master or owner of such vessel £ for every man so impressed; and such officer shall be incapable of holding any place, office, or employment in any of his majesty's ships of war.' it is not likely that the least scrupulous naval officer would make himself liable to professional ruin as well as to a heavy fine. no parish apprentice could be impressed for the sea service of the crown until he arrived at the age of eighteen ( & anne, c. , sect. ). persons voluntarily binding themselves apprentices to sea service could not be impressed for three years from the date of their indentures. besides sect. of the act of anne just quoted, exemptions were granted, before , by anne, c. ; and george ii, c. . by the act last mentioned all persons fifty-five years of age and under eighteen were exempted, and every foreigner serving in a ship belonging to a british subject, and also all persons 'of what age soever who shall use the sea' for two years, to be computed from the time of their first using it. a customary exemption was extended to the proportion of the crew of any ship necessary for her safe navigation. in practice this must have reduced the numbers liable to impressment to small dimensions. even when the admiralty decided to suspend all administrative exemptions--or, as the phrase was, 'to press from all protections'--many persons were still exempted. the customary and statutory exemptions, of course, were unaffected. on the th november their lordships informed officers in charge of rendezvous that it was 'necessary for the speedy manning of h.m. ships to impress all persons of the denominations exprest in the press-warrant which you have received from us, without regard to any protections, excepting, however, all such persons as are protected pursuant to acts of parliament, and all others who by the printed instructions which accompanied the said warrant are forbidden to be imprest.' in addition to these a long list of further exemptions was sent. the last in the list included the crews of 'ships and vessels bound to foreign parts which are laden and cleared outwards by the proper officers of h.m. customs.' it would seem that there was next to no one left liable to impressment; and it is not astonishing that the admiralty, as shown by its action very shortly afterwards, felt that pressing seamen was a poor way of manning the fleet. though the war which broke out in was not formally declared until may, active preparations were begun earlier. the navy had been greatly reduced since the peace of amiens, and as late as the nd december the house of commons had voted that ' , seamen be employed for the service of the year , including , marines.' on the th march an additional number was voted. it amounted to , men, of whom were to be marines. much larger additions were voted a few weeks later. the total increase was , men; viz. , seamen and , marines. it never occurred to anyone that forcible recruiting would be necessary in the case of the marines, though the establishment of the corps was to be nearly doubled, as it had to be brought up to , from , . attention may be specially directed to this point. the marine formed an integral part of a man-of-war's crew just as the seamen did. he received no better treatment than the latter; and as regards pecuniary remuneration, prospects of advancement, and hope of attaining to the position of warrant officer, was, on the whole, in a less favourable position. it seems to have been universally accepted that voluntary enlistment would prove--as, in fact, it did prove--sufficient in the case of the marines. what we have got to see is how far it failed in the case of the seamen, and how far its deficiencies were made up by compulsion. on the th march the admiralty notified the board of ordnance that twenty-two ships of the line--the names of which were stated--were 'coming forward' for sea. many of these ships are mentioned in _the_naval_chronicle_ as requiring men, and that journal gives the names of several others of various classes in the same state. the number altogether is thirty-one. the aggregate complements, including marines and boys, of these ships amounted to , . the number of 'seamen' was , , though this included some of the officers who were borne on the same muster-list. the total number of seamen actually required exceeded , . the _naval_ _chronicle_ contains a vivid, not to say sensational, account of the steps taken to raise them. the report from plymouth, dated th march, is as follows: 'several bodies of royal marines in parties of twelve and fourteen each, with their officers and naval officers armed, proceeded towards the quays. so secret were the orders kept that they did not know the nature of the business on which they were going until they boarded the tier of colliers at the new quay, and other gangs the ships in the catwater and the pool, and the gin-shops. a great number of prime seamen were taken out and sent on board the admiral's ship. they also pressed landsmen of all descriptions; and the town looked as if in a state of siege. at stonehouse, mutton cove, morris town, and in all the receiving and gin-shops at dock [the present devonport] several hundreds of seamen and landsmen were picked up and sent directly aboard the flag-ship. by the returns last night it appears that upwards of useful hands were pressed last night in the three towns.... one press-gang entered the dock [devonport] theatre and cleared the whole gallery except the women.' the reporter remarks: 'it is said that near men have been impressed in this neighbourhood.' the number--if obtained--would not have been sufficient to complete the seamen in the complements of a couple of line-of-battle ships. naval officers who remember the methods of manning ships which lasted well into the middle of the nineteenth century, and of course long after recourse to impressment had been given up, will probably notice the remarkable fact that the reporter makes no mention of any of the parties whose proceedings he described being engaged in picking up men who had voluntarily joined ships fitting out, but had not returned on board on the expiration of the leave granted them. the description in _the_naval_chronicle_ might be applied to events which--when impressment had ceased for half a century--occurred over and over again at portsmouth, devonport, and other ports when two or three ships happened to be put in commission about the same time. we shall find that the reported as impressed had to be considerably reduced before long. the reporter afterwards wisely kept himself from giving figures, except in a single instance when he states that 'about forty' were taken out of the flotilla of plymouth trawlers. reporting on th march he says that 'last thursday and yesterday'--the day of the sensational report above given--'several useful hands were picked up, mostly seamen, who were concealed in the different lodgings and were discovered by their girls.' he adds, 'several prime seamen were yesterday taken disguised as labourers in the different marble quarries round the town.' on th october the report is that 'the different press-gangs, with their officers, literally scoured the country on the eastern roads and picked up several fine young fellows.' here, again, no distinction is drawn between men really impressed and men who were arrested for being absent beyond the duration of their leave. we are told next that 'upon a survey of all impressed men before three captains and three surgeons of the royal navy, such as were deemed unfit for his majesty's service, as well as all apprentices, were immediately discharged,' which, no doubt, greatly diminished the above-mentioned . the reporter at portsmouth begins his account of the 'press' at that place by saying, 'they indiscriminately took every man on board the colliers.' in view of what we know of the heavy penalties to which officers who pressed more than a certain proportion of a collier's crew were liable, we may take it that this statement was made in error. on th march it was reported that 'the constables and gangs from the ships continue very alert in obtaining seamen, many of whom have been sent on board different ships in the harbour this day.' we do not hear again from portsmouth till may, on the th of which month it was reported that 'about men were obtained.' on the th the report was that 'on saturday afternoon the gates of the town were shut and soldiers placed at every avenue. tradesmen were taken from their shops and sent on board the ships in the harbour or placed in the guard-house for the night, till they could be examined. if fit for his majesty's service they were kept, if in trade set at liberty.' the 'tradesmen,' then, if really taken, were taken simply to be set free again. as far as the reports first quoted convey any trustworthy information, it appears that at portsmouth and plymouth during march, april, and the first week of may, men were 'picked up,' and that of these many were immediately discharged. how many of the were not really impressed, but were what in the navy are called 'stragglers,' i.e. men over-staying their leave of absence, is not indicated. _the_times_ of the th march , and th may , also contained reports of the impressment operations. it says: 'the returns to the admiralty of the seamen impressed (apparently at the thames ports) on tuesday night amounted to , of whom no less than two-thirds are considered prime hands. at portsmouth, portsea, gosport, and cowes a general press took place the same night.... upwards of seamen were collected in consequence of the promptitude of the measures adopted.' it was added that the government 'relied upon increasing our naval forces with , seamen, either volunteers or impressed men, in less than a fortnight.' the figures show us how small a proportion of the , was even alleged to be made up of impressed men. a later _times_ report is that: 'the impress on saturday, both above and below the bridge, was the hottest that has been for some time. the boats belonging to the ships at deptford were particularly active, and it is supposed they obtained upwards of men.' _the_ _times_ reports thus account for men over and above the stated to have been impressed at plymouth and portsmouth, thus making a grand total of . it will be proved by official figures directly that the last number was an over-estimate. before going farther, attention may be called to one or two points in connection with the above reports. the increase in the number of seamen voted by parliament in march was . the reports of the impressment operations only came down to may. it was not till the th june that parliament voted a further addition to the navy of , seamen. yet whilst the latter great increase was being obtained--for obtained it was--the reporters are virtually silent as to the action of the press-gang. we must ask ourselves, if we could get , additional seamen with so little recourse to impressment that the operations called for no special notice, how was it that compulsion was necessary when only men were wanted? the question is all the more pertinent when we recall the state of affairs in the early part of . the navy had been greatly reduced in the year before, the men voted having diminished from , to , . what became of the , men not required, of whom about , must have been of the seaman class and have been discharged from the service? there was a further reduction of , to take effect in the beginning of . sir sydney smith, at that time a member of parliament, in the debate of the nd december , 'expressed considerable regret at the great reductions which were suddenly made, both in the king's dockyards and in the navy in general. a prodigious number of men,' he said, 'had been thus reduced to the utmost poverty and distress.' he stated that he 'knew, from his own experience, that what was called an ordinary seaman could hardly find employment at present, either in the king's or in the merchants' service.' the increase of the fleet in march must have seemed a godsend to thousands of men-of-war's men. if there was any holding back on their part, it was due, no doubt, to an expectation--which the sequel showed to be well founded--that a bounty would be given to men joining the navy. the muster-book of a man-of-war is the official list of her crew. it contains the name of every officer and man in the complement. primarily it was an account-book, as it contains entries of the payments made to each person whose name appears in it. at the beginning of the nineteenth century it was usual to make out a fresh muster-book every two months, though that period was not always exactly adhered to. each new book was a copy of the preceding one, with the addition of the names of persons who had joined the ship since the closing of the latter. until the ship was paid off and thus put out of commission--or, in the case of a very long commission, until 'new books' were ordered to be opened so as to escape the inconveniences due to the repetition of large numbers of entries--the name of every man that had belonged to her remained on the list, his disposal--if no longer in the ship--being noted in the proper column. one column was headed 'whence, and whether prest or not?' in this was noted his former ship, or the fact of his being entered direct from the shore, which answered to the question 'whence?' there is reason to believe that the muster-book being, as above said, primarily an account-book, the words 'whether prest or not' were originally placed at the head of the column so that it might be noted against each man entered whether he had been paid 'prest-money' or not. however this may be, the column at the beginning of the nineteenth century was used for a record of the circumstances of the man's entering the ship, whether he had been transferred from another, had joined as a volunteer from the shore, or had been impressed. i have examined the muster-book of every ship mentioned in the admiralty letter to the board of ordnance above referred to, and also of the ships mentioned in _the_naval_chronicle_ as fitting out in the early part of . there are altogether thirty-three ships; but two of them, the _utrecht_ and the _gelykheid_, were used as temporary receiving ships for newly raised men.[ ] the names on their lists are, therefore, merely those of men who were passed on to other ships, in whose muster-books they appeared again. there remained thirty-one ships which, as far as could be ascertained, account for the additional force which the government had decided to put in commission, more than two-thirds of them being ships of the line. as already stated, their total complements amounted to , , and the number of the 'blue-jackets' of full age to at least , . the muster-books appear to have been kept with great care. the only exception seems to be that of the _victory_, in which there is some reason to think the number of men noted as 'prest' has been over-stated owing to an error in copying the earlier book. ships in did not get their full crews at once, any more than they did half a century later. i have, therefore, thought it necessary to take the muster-books for the months in which the crews had been brought up to completion. [footnote : the words 'recruit' and 'enlist,' except as regards marines, are unknown in the navy, in which they are replaced by 'raise' and 'enter.'] an examination of the books would be likely to dispel many misconceptions about the old navy. not only is it noted against each man's name whether he was 'pressed' or a volunteer, it is also noted if he was put on board ship as an alternative to imprisonment on shore, this being indicated by the words 'civil power,' an expression still used in the navy, but with a different meaning. the percentage of men thus 'raised' was small. sometimes there is a note stating that the man had been allowed to enter from the '----shire militia.' a rare note is 'brought on board by soldiers,' which most likely indicated that the man had been recaptured when attempting to desert. it is sometimes asserted that many men who volunteered did so only to escape impressment. this may be so; but it should be said that there are frequent notations against the names of 'prest' men that they afterwards volunteered. this shows the care that was taken to ascertain the real conditions on which a man entered the service. for the purposes of this inquiry all these men have been considered as impressed, and they have not been counted amongst the volunteers. it is, perhaps, permissible to set off against such men the number of those who allowed themselves to be impressed to escape inconveniences likely to be encountered if they remained at home. of two john westlakes, ordinary seamen of the _boadicea_, one--john (i.)--was 'prest,' but was afterwards 'taken out of the ship for a debt of twenty pounds'; which shows that he had preferred to trust himself to the press-gang rather than to his creditors. without being unduly imaginative, we may suppose that in there were heroes who preferred being 'carried off' to defend their country afloat to meeting the liabilities of putative paternity in their native villages. the muster-books examined cover several months, during which many 'prest' men were discharged and some managed to desert, so that the total was never present at anyone time. that total amounts to . it is certain that even this is larger than the reality, because it has been found impossible--without an excessive expenditure of time and labour--to trace the cases of men being sent from one ship to another, and thus appearing twice over, or oftener, as 'prest' men. as an example of this the _minotaur_ may be cited. out of twenty names on one page of her muster-book thirteen are those of 'prest' men discharged to other ships. the discharges from the _victory_ were numerous; and the _ardent_, which was employed in keeping up communication with the ships off brest, passed men on to the latter when required. i have, however, made no deductions from the 'prest' total to meet these cases. we can see that not more than men, and probably considerably fewer, were impressed to meet the increase of the navy during the greater part of . admitting that there were cases of impressment from merchant vessels abroad to complete the crews of our men-of-war in distant waters, the total number impressed--including these latter--could not have exceeded greatly the figures first given. we know that owing to the reduction of , as stated by sir sydney smith, the seamen were looking for ships rather than the ships for seamen. it seems justifiable to infer that the whole number of impressed men on any particular day did not exceed, almost certainly did not amount to, . if they had been spread over the whole navy they would not have made per cent. of the united complements of the ships; and, as it was, did not equal one-nineteenth of the , seamen ('blue-jackets') raised to complete the navy to the establishment sanctioned by parliament. a system under which more than , volunteers come forward to serve and less than men are obtained by compulsion cannot be properly called compulsory. the plymouth reporter of _the_naval_chronicle_ does not give many details of the volunteering for the navy in , though he alludes to it in fluent terms more than once. on the th october, however, he reports that, 'so many volunteer seamen have arrived here this last week that upwards of £ bounty is to be paid them afloat by the paying commissioner, rear-admiral dacres.' at the time the bounty was £ s. for an a.b., £ s. for an ordinary seaman, and £ for a landsman. taking only £ as the full amount paid, and assuming that the three classes were equally represented, three men were obtained for every £ , or in all, a number raised in about a week, that may be compared with that given as resulting from impressment. in reality, the number of volunteers must have been larger, because the a.b.'s were fewer than the other classes. some people may be astonished because the practice of impressment, which had proved to be so utterly inefficient, was not at once and formally given up. no astonishment will be felt by those who are conversant with the habits of government departments. in every country public officials evince great and, indeed, almost invincible reluctance to give up anything, whether it be a material object or an administrative process, which they have once possessed or conducted. one has only to stroll through the arsenals of the world, or glance at the mooring-grounds of the maritime states, to see to what an extent the passion for retaining the obsolete and useless holds dominion over the official mind. a thing may be known to be valueless--its retention may be proved to be mischievous--yet proposals to abandon it will be opposed and defeated. it is doubtful if any male human being over forty was ever converted to a new faith of any kind. the public has to wait until the generation of administrative conservatives has either passed away or been outnumbered by those acquainted only with newer methods. then the change is made; the certainty, nevertheless, being that the new men in their turn will resist improvements as obstinately and in exactly the same way as their predecessors. to be just to the board of admiralty of , it must be admitted that some of its members seem to have lost faith in the efficacy of impressment as a system of manning the navy. the lords commissioners of that date could hardly--all of them, at any rate--have been so thoroughly destitute of humour as not to suspect that seizing a few score of men here and a few there when tens of thousands were needed, was a very insufficient compensation for the large correspondence necessitated by adherence to the system (and still in existence). their lordships actively bombarded the home office with letters pointing out, for example, that a number of british seamen at guernsey 'appeared to have repaired to that island with a view to avoid being pressed'; that they were 'of opinion that it would be highly proper that the sea-faring men (in jersey as well as guernsey), not natives nor settled inhabitants, should be impressed'; that when the captain of h.m.s. _aigle_ had landed at portland 'for the purpose of raising men' some resistance had 'been made by the sailors'; and dealing with other subjects connected with the system. a complaint sent to the war department was that 'amongst a number of men lately impressed (at leith) there were eight or ten shipwrights who were sea-faring men, and had been claimed as belonging to a volunteer artillery corps.' we may suspect that there was some discussion at whitehall as to the wisdom of retaining a plan which caused so much inconvenience and had such poor results. the conclusion seems to have been to submit it to a searching test. the coasts of the united kingdom were studded with stations--thirty-seven generally, but the number varied--for the entry of seamen. the ordinary official description of these--as shown by entries in the muster-books--was 'rendezvous'; but other terms were used. it has often been thought that they were simply impressment offices. the fact is that many more men were raised at these places by volunteering than by impressment. the rendezvous, as a rule, were in charge of captains or commanders, some few being entrusted to lieutenants. the men attached to each were styled its 'gang,' a word which conveys no discredit in nautical language. on th november the admiralty sent to the officers in charge of rendezvous the communication already mentioned--to press men 'without regard to any protections,'--the exceptions, indeed, being so many that the officers must have wondered who could legitimately be taken. the order at first sight appeared sweeping enough. it contained the following words: 'whereas we think fit that a general press from all protections as above mentioned shall commence at london and in the neighbourhood thereof on the night of monday next, the th instant, you are therefore (after taking the proper preparatory measures with all possible secrecy) hereby required to impress and to give orders to the lieutenants under your command to impress all persons of the above-mentioned denominations (except as before excepted) and continue to do so until you receive orders from us to the contrary.' as it was addressed to officers in all parts of the united kingdom, the 'general press' was not confined to london and its neighbourhood, though it was to begin in the capital. though returns of the numbers impressed have not been discovered, we have strong evidence that this 'general press,' notwithstanding the secrecy with which it had been arranged, was a failure. on the th december , just a month after it had been tried, the admiralty formulated the following conclusion: 'on a consideration of the expense attending the service of raising men on shore for his majesty's fleet comparatively with the number procured, as well as from other circumstances, there is reason to believe that either proper exertions have not been made by some of the officers employed on that service, or that there have been great abuses and mismanagement in the expenditure of the public money.' this means that it was now seen that impressment, though of little use in obtaining men for the navy, was a very costly arrangement. the lords of the admiralty accordingly ordered that 'the several places of rendezvous should be visited and the conduct of the officers employed in carrying out the above-mentioned service should be inquired into on the spot.' rear-admiral arthur phillip, the celebrated first governor of new south wales, was ordered to make the inquiry. this was the last duty in which that distinguished officer was employed, and his having been selected for it appears to have been unknown to all his biographers. it is not surprising that after this the proceedings of the press-gang occupy scarcely any space in our naval history. such references to them as there are will be found in the writings of the novelist and the dramatist. probably individual cases of impressment occurred till nearly the end of the great war; but they could not have been many. compulsory service most unnecessarily caused--not much, but still some--unjustifiable personal hardship. it tended to stir up a feeling hostile to the navy. it required to work it machinery costly out of all proportion to the results obtained. indeed, it failed completely to effect what had been expected of it. in the great days of old our fleet, after all, was manned, not by impressed men, but by volunteers. it was largely due to that that we became masters of the sea. vi projected invasions of the british isles[ ] [footnote : written in . (_the_times_.)] the practice to which we have become accustomed of late, of publishing original documents relating to naval and military history, has been amply justified by the results. these meet the requirements of two classes of readers. the publications satisfy, or at any rate go far towards satisfying, the wishes of those who want to be entertained, and also of those whose higher motive is a desire to discover the truth about notable historical occurrences. putting the public in possession of the materials, previously hidden in more or less inaccessible muniment-rooms and record offices, with which the narratives of professed historians have been constructed, has had advantages likely to become more and more apparent as time goes on. it acts as a check upon the imaginative tendencies which even eminent writers have not always been able, by themselves, to keep under proper control. the certainty, nay the mere probability, that you will be confronted with the witnesses on whose evidence you profess to have relied--the 'sources' from which your story is derived--will suggest the necessity of sobriety of statement and the advisability of subordinating rhetoric to veracity. had the contemporary documents been available for an immediate appeal to them by the reading public, we should long ago have rid ourselves of some dangerous superstitions. we should have abandoned our belief in the fictions that the armada of was defeated by the weather, and that the great herbert of torrington was a lubber, a traitor, and a coward. it is not easy to calculate the benefit that we should have secured, had the presentation of some important events in the history of our national defence been as accurate as it was effective. enormous sums of money have been wasted in trying to make our defensive arrangements square with a conception of history based upon misunderstanding or misinterpretation of facts. pecuniary extravagance is bad enough; but there is a greater evil still. we have been taught to cherish, and we have been reluctant to abandon, a false standard of defence, though adherence to such a standard can be shown to have brought the country within measurable distance of grievous peril. captain duro, of the spanish navy, in his 'armada invencible,' placed within our reach contemporary evidence from the side of the assailants, thereby assisting us to form a judgment on a momentous episode in naval history. the evidence was completed; some being adduced from the other side, by our fellow-countryman sir j. k. laughton, in his 'defeat of the spanish armada,' published by the navy records society. others have worked on similar lines; and a healthier view of our strategic conditions and needs is more widely held than it was; though it cannot be said to be, even yet, universally prevalent. superstition, even the grossest, dies hard. something deeper than mere literary interest, therefore, is to be attributed to a work which has recently appeared in paris.[ ] to speak strictly, it should be said that only the first volume of three which will complete it has been published. it is, however, in the nature of a work of the kind that its separate parts should be virtually independent of each other. consequently the volume which we now have may be treated properly as a book by itself. when completed the work is to contain all the documents relating to the french preparations during the period - , for taking the offensive against england (_tous_les_documents_se_rapportant_ _à_la_préparation_de_l'offensive_contre_l'angleterre_). the search for, the critical examination and the methodical classification of, the papers were begun in october . the book is compiled by captain desbrière, of the french cuirassiers, who was specially authorised to continue his editorial labours even after he had resumed his ordinary military duties. it bears the _imprimatur_ of the staff of the army; and its preface is written by an officer who was--and so signs himself--chief of the historical section of that department. there is no necessity to criticise the literary execution of the work. what is wanted is to explain the nature of its contents and to indicate the lessons which may be drawn from them. nevertheless, attention may be called to a curious misreading of history contained in the preface. in stating the periods which the different volumes of the book are to cover, the writer alludes to the peace of amiens, which, he affirms, england was compelled to accept by exhaustion, want of means of defence, and fear of the menaces of the great first consul then disposing of the resources of france, aggrandised, pacified, and reinforced by alliances. the book being what it is and coming whence it does, such a statement ought not to be passed over. 'the desire for peace,' says an author so easily accessible as j. r. green, 'sprang from no sense of national exhaustion. on the contrary, wealth had never increased so fast.... nor was there any ground for despondency in the aspect of the war itself.' this was written in by an author so singularly free from all taint of chauvinism that he expressly resolved that his work 'should never sink into a drum and trumpet history.' a few figures will be interesting and, it may be added, conclusive. between when the war began and when the peace of amiens interrupted it, the public income of great britain increased from £ , , to £ , , , the war taxes not being included in the latter sum. the revenue of france, notwithstanding her territorial acquisitions, sank from £ , , to £ , , . the french exports and imports by sea were annihilated; whilst the british exports were doubled and the imports increased more than per cent. the french navy had at the beginning , at the end of the war , ships of the line; the british began the contest with and ended it with . even as regards the army, the british force at the end of the war was not greatly inferior numerically to the french. it was, however, much scattered, being distributed over the whole british empire. in view of the question under discussion, no excuse need be given for adducing these facts. [footnote : - . _projets_et_tentatives_de_débarquement_ _aux_iles_britanniques_, par Édouard desbrière, capitaine breveté aux er cuirassiers. paris, chapelot et cie. . (publié sous la direction de la section historique de l'État-major de l'armée.)] captain desbrière in the present volume carries his collection of documents down to the date at which the then general bonaparte gave up his connection with the flotilla that was being equipped in the french channel ports, and prepared to take command of the expedition to egypt. the volume therefore, in addition to accounts of many projected, but never really attempted, descents on the british isles, gives a very complete history of hoche's expedition to ireland; of the less important, but curious, descent in cardigan bay known as the fishguard, or fishgard, expedition; and of the formation of the first 'army of england,' a designation destined to attain greater celebrity in the subsequent war, when france was ruled by the great soldier whom we know as the emperor napoleon. the various documents are connected by captain desbrière with an explanatory commentary, and here and there are illustrated with notes. he has not rested content with the publication of mss. selected from the french archives. in preparing his book he visited england and examined our records; and, besides, he has inserted in their proper place passages from captain mahan's works and also from those of english authors. the reader's interest in the book is likely to be almost exclusively concentrated on the detailed, and, where captain desbrière's commentary appears, lucid, account of hoche's expedition. of course, the part devoted to the creation of the 'army of england' is not uninteresting; but it is distinctly less so than the part relating to the proceedings of hoche. several of the many plans submitted by private persons, who here describe them in their own words, are worth examination; and some, it may be mentioned, are amusing in the _naïveté_ of their anglophobia and in their obvious indifference to the elementary principles of naval strategy. in this indifference they have some distinguished companions. we are informed by captain desbrière that the idea of a hostile descent on england was during a long time much favoured in france. the national archives and those of the ministries of war and of marine are filled with proposals for carrying it out, some dating back to . whether emanating from private persons or formulated in obedience to official direction, there are certain features in all the proposals so marked that we are able to classify the various schemes by grouping together those of a similar character. in one class may be placed all those which aimed at mere annoyance, to be effected by landing small bodies of men, not always soldiers, to do as much damage as possible. the appearance of these at many different points, it was believed, would so harass the english that they would end the war, or at least so divide their forces that their subjection might be looked for with confidence. in another class might be placed proposals to seize outlying, out not distant, british territory--the channel islands or the isle of wight, for example. a third class might comprise attempts on a greater scale, necessitating the employment of a considerable body of troops and meriting the designation 'invasion.' some of these attempts were to be made in great britain, some in ireland. in every proposal for an attempt of this class, whether it was to be made in great britain or in ireland, it was assumed that the invaders would receive assistance from the people of the country invaded. indeed, generally the bulk of the force to be employed was ultimately to be composed of native sympathisers, who were also to provide--at least at the beginning--all the supplies and transport, both vehicles and animals, required. every plan, no matter to which class it might belong, was based upon the assumption that the british naval force could be avoided. until we come to the time when general bonaparte, as he then was, dissociated himself from the first 'army of england,' there is no trace, in any of the documents now printed, of a belief in the necessity of obtaining command of the sea before sending across it a considerable military expedition. that there was such a thing as the command of the sea is rarely alluded to; and when it is, it is merely to accentuate the possibility of neutralising it by evading the force holding it. there is something which almost deserves to be styled comical in the absolutely unvarying confidence, alike of amateurs and highly placed military officers, with which it was held that a superior naval force was a thing that might be disregarded. generals who would have laughed to scorn anyone maintaining that, though there was a powerful prussian army on the road to one city and an austrian army on the road to the other, a french army might force its way to either berlin or vienna without either fighting or even being prepared to fight, such generals never hesitated to approve expeditions obliged to traverse a region in the occupation of a greatly superior force, the region being pelagic and the force naval. we had seized the little islands of st. marcoff, a short distance from the coast of normandy, and held them for years. it was expressly admitted that their recapture was impossible, 'à raison de la supériorité des forces navales anglaises'; but it was not even suspected that a much more difficult operation, requiring longer time and a longer voyage, was likely to be impracticable. we shall see by and by how far this remarkable attitude of mind was supported by the experience of hoche's expedition to ireland. hoche himself was the inventor of a plan of harassing the english enemy which long remained in favour. he proposed to organise what was called a _chouannerie_ in england. as that country had no _chouans_ of her own, the want was to be supplied by sending over an expedition composed of convicts. hoche's ideas were approved and adopted by the eminent carnot. the plan, to which the former devoted great attention, was to land on the coast of wales from to _forçats_, to be commanded by a certain mascheret, of whom hoche wrote that he was 'le plus mauvais sujet dont on puisse purger la france.' in a plan accepted and forwarded by hoche, it was laid down that the band, on reaching the enemy's country, was, if possible, not to fight, but to pillage; each man was to understand that he was sent to england to steal , f., 'pour ensuite finir sa carrière tranquillement dans l'aisance,' and was to be informed that he would receive a formal pardon from the french government. the plan, extraordinary as it was, was one of the few put into execution. the famous fishguard invasion was carried out by some fourteen hundred convicts commanded by an american adventurer named tate. the direction to avoid fighting was exactly obeyed by colonel tate and the armed criminals under his orders. he landed in cardigan bay from a small squadron of french men-of-war at sunset on the nd february ; and, on the appearance of lord cawdor with the local yeomanry and militia, asked to be allowed to surrender on the th. at a subsequent exchange of prisoners the french authorities refused to receive any of the worthies who had accompanied tate. at length were allowed to land; but were imprisoned in the forts of cherbourg. the french records contain many expressions of the dread experienced by the inhabitants of the coast lest the english should put on shore in france the malefactors whom they had captured at fishguard. a more promising enterprise was that in which it was decided to obtain the assistance of the dutch, at the time in possession of a considerable fleet. the dutch fleet was to put to sea with the object of engaging the english. an army of , was then to be embarked in the ports of holland, and was to effect a diversion in favour of another and larger body, which, starting from france, was to land in ireland, repeating the attempt of hoche in december , which will be dealt with later on. the enterprise was frustrated by the action of admiral duncan, who decisively defeated the dutch fleet off camperdown in october. it might have been supposed that this would have driven home the lesson that no considerable military expedition across the water has any chance of success till the country sending it has obtained command of the sea; but it did not. to bonaparte the event was full of meaning; but no other french soldier seems to have learned it--if we may take captain desbrière's views as representative--even down to the present day. on the rd february bonaparte wrote: 'opérer une descente en angleterre sans être maître de la mer est l'opération la plus hardie et la plus difficile qui ait été faite.' there has been much speculation as to the reasons which induced bonaparte to quit the command of the 'army of england' after holding it but a short time, and after having devoted great attention to its organisation and proposed methods of transport across the channel. the question is less difficult than it has appeared to be to many. one of the foremost men in france, bonaparte was ready to take the lead in any undertaking which seemed likely to have a satisfactory ending--an ending which would redound to the glory of the chief who conducted it. the most important operation contemplated was the invasion of england; and--now that hoche was no more--bonaparte might well claim to lead it. his penetrating insight soon enabled him to see its impracticability until the french had won the command of the channel. of that there was not much likelihood; and at the first favourable moment he dissociated himself from all connection with an enterprise which offered so little promise of a successful termination that it was all but certain not to be begun. an essential condition, as already pointed out, of all the projected invasions was the receipt of assistance from sympathisers in the enemy's country. hoche himself expected this even in tate's case; but experience proved the expectation to be baseless. when the prisoners taken with tate were being conducted to their place of confinement, the difficulty was to protect them, 'car la population furieuse contre les français voulait les lyncher.' captain desbrière dwells at some length on the mutinies in the british fleet in , and asks regretfully, 'qu'avait-on fait pour profiter de cette chance unique?' he remarks on the undoubted and really lamentable fact that english historians have usually paid insufficient attention to these occurrences. one, and perhaps the principal reason of their silence, was the difficulty, at all events till quite lately, of getting materials with which to compose a narrative. the result is that the real character of the great mutinies has been altogether misunderstood. lord camperdown's recently published life of his great ancestor, lord duncan, has done something to put them in their right light. as regards defence against the enemy, the mutinies affected the security of the country very little. the seamen always expressed their determination to do their duty if the enemy put to sea. even at the nore they conspicuously displayed their general loyalty; and, as a matter of fact, discipline had regained its sway some time before the expedition preparing in holland was ready. how effectively the crews of the ships not long before involved in the mutiny could fight, was proved at camperdown. though earlier in date than the events just discussed, the celebrated first expedition to ireland has been intentionally left out of consideration till now. as to the general features of the undertaking, and even some of its more important details, the documents now published add little to our knowledge. the literature of the expedition is large, and captain chevalier had given us an admirable account of it in his 'histoire de la marine française sous la première république.' the late vice-admiral colomb submitted it to a most instructive examination in the _journal_of_the_ _royal_united_service_institution_ for january . we can, however, learn something from captain desbrière's collection. the perusal suggests, or indeed compels, the conclusion that the expedition was doomed to failure from the start. it had no money, stores, or means of transport. there was no hope of finding these in a country like the south-western corner of ireland. grouchy's decision not to land the troops who had reached bantry bay was no doubt dictated in reality by a perception of this; and by the discovery that, even if he got on shore, sympathisers with him would be practically non-existent. on reading the letters now made public, one is convinced of hoche's unfitness for the leadership of such an enterprise. the adoration of mediocrities is confined to no one cult and to no one age. hoche's canonisation, for he is a prominent saint in the republican calendar, was due not so much to what he did as to what he did not do. he did not hold the supreme command in la vendée till the most trying period of the war was past. he did not continue the cruelties of the jacobin emissaries in the disturbed districts; but then his pacificatory measures were taken when the spirit of ferocity which caused the horrors of the _noyades_ and of the terror had, even amongst the mob of paris, burnt itself out. he did not overthrow a constitutional government and enslave his country as bonaparte did; and, therefore, he is favourably compared with the latter, whose opportunities he did not have. his letters show him to have been an adept in the art of traducing colleagues behind their backs. in writing he called admiral villaret-joyeuse 'perfide,' and spoke of his 'mauvaise foi.' he had a low opinion of general humbert, whom he bracketed with mascheret. grouchy, he said, was 'un inconséquent paperassier,' and general vaillant 'un misérable ivrogne.' he was placed in supreme command of the naval as well as of the military forces, and was allowed to select the commander of the former. yet he and his nominee were amongst the small fraction of the expeditionary body which never reached a place where disembarkation was possible. notwithstanding all this, the greater part of the fleet, and of the troops conveyed by it, did anchor in bantry bay without encountering an english man-of-war; and a large proportion continued in the bay, unmolested by our navy, for more than a fortnight. is not this, it may be asked, a sufficient refutation of those who hold that command of the sea gives security against invasion? as a matter of fact, command of the sea--even in the case in question--did prevent invasion from being undertaken, still more from being carried through, on a scale likely to be very formidable. the total number of troops embarked was under , , of whom were lost, owing to steps taken to avoid the hostile navy, before the expedition had got fully under way. it is not necessary to rate hoche's capacity very highly in order to understand that he, who had seen something of war on a grand scale, would not have committed himself to the command of so small a body, without cavalry, without means of transport on land, without supplies, with but an insignificant artillery and that not furnished with horses, and, as was avowed, without hope of subsequent reinforcement or of open communications with its base--that he would not have staked his reputation on the fate of a body so conditioned, if he had been permitted by the naval conditions of the case to lead a larger, more effectually organised, and better supplied army. the commentary supplied by captain desbrière to the volume under notice discloses his opinion that the failure of the expedition to ireland was due to the inefficiency of the french navy. he endeavours to be scrupulously fair to his naval fellow-countrymen; but his conviction is apparent. it hardly admits of doubt that this view has generally been, and still is, prevalent in the french army. foreign soldiers of talent and experience generalise from this as follows: let them but have the direction of the naval as well as of the military part of an expedition, and the invasion of england must be successful. the complete direction which they would like is exactly what hoche did have. he chose the commander of the fleet, and also chose or regulated the choice of the junior flag officers and several of the captains. admiral morard de galles was not, and did not consider himself, equal to the task for which hoche's favour had selected him. his letter pointing out his own disqualifications has a striking resemblance to the one written by medina sidonia in deprecation of his appointment in place of santa cruz. nevertheless, the french naval officers did succeed in conveying the greater part of the expeditionary army to a point at which disembarkation was practicable. now we have some lessons to learn from this. the advantages conferred by command of the sea must be utilised intelligently; and it was bad management which permitted an important anchorage to remain for more than a fortnight in the hands of an invading force. we need not impute to our neighbours a burning desire to invade us; but it is a becoming exercise of ordinary strategic precaution to contemplate preparations for repelling what, as a mere military problem, they consider still feasible. no amount of naval superiority will ever ensure every part of our coast against incursions like that of tate and his gaol-birds. naval superiority, however, will put in our hands the power of preventing the arrival of an army strong enough to carry out a real invasion. the strength of such an army will largely depend upon the amount of mobile land force of which we can dispose. consequently, defence against invasion, even of an island, is the duty of a land army as well as of a fleet. the more important part may, in our case, be that of the latter; but the services of the former cannot be dispensed with. the best method of utilising those services calls for much thought. in , when the 'first army of england' menaced us from the southern coast of the channel, it was reported to our government that an examination of the plans formerly adopted for frustrating intended invasions showed the advantage of troubling the enemy in his own home and not waiting till he had come to injure us in ours. vii over-sea raids and raids on land[ ] [footnote : written in . (_the_morning_post_.)] it has been contended that raids by 'armaments with , , , and , men on board respectively' have succeeded in evading 'our watching and chasing fleets,' and that consequently invasion of the british isles on a great scale is not only possible but fairly practicable, british naval predominance notwithstanding. i dispute the accuracy of the history involved in the allusions to the above-stated figures. the number of men comprised in a raiding or invading expedition is the number that is or can be put on shore. the crews of the transports are not included in it. in the cases alluded to, humbert's expedition was to have numbered officers and other ranks, and were put on shore in killala bay. though the round number, , represents this figure fairly enough, there was a per cent. shrinkage from the original embarkation strength. in hoche's expedition the total number of troops embarked was under , , of whom were lost before the expedition had got clear of its port of starting, and of the remainder only a portion reached ireland. general bonaparte landed in egypt not , men, but about , . in the expeditions of hoche and humbert it was not expected that the force to be landed would suffice of itself, the belief being that it would be joined in each case by a large body of adherents in the raided country. outside the ranks of the 'extremists of the dinghy school'--whose number is unknown and is almost certainly quite insignificant--no one asserts or ever has asserted that raids in moderate strength are not possible even in the face of a strong defending navy. it is a fact that the whole of our defence policy for many generations has been based upon an admission of their possibility. captain mahan's statement of the case has never been questioned by anyone of importance. it is as follows: 'the control of the sea, however real, does not imply that an enemy's single ships or small squadrons cannot steal out of port, cannot cross more or less frequented tracts of ocean, make harassing descents upon unprotected points of a long coast-line, enter blockaded harbours.' it is extraordinary that everyone does not perceive that if this were not true the 'dinghy school' would be right. students of clausewitz may be expected to remember that the art of war does not consist in making raids that are unsuccessful; that war is waged to gain certain great objects; and that the course of hostilities between two powerful antagonists is affected little one way or the other by raids even on a considerable scale. the egyptian expedition of deserves fuller treatment than it has generally received. the preparations at toulon and some italian ports were known to the british government. it being impossible for even a moltke or--comparative resources being taken into account--the greater strategist kodama to know everything in the mind of an opponent, the sensible proceeding is to guard against his doing what would be likely to do you most harm. the british government had reason to believe that the toulon expedition was intended to reinforce at an atlantic port another expedition to be directed against the british isles, or to effect a landing in spain with a view to marching into portugal and depriving our navy of the use of lisbon. either if effected would probably cause us serious mischief, and arrangements were made to prevent them. a landing in egypt was, as the event showed, of little importance. the threat conveyed by it against our indian possessions proved to be an empty one. upwards of , hostile troops were locked up in a country from which they could exercise no influence on the general course of the war, and in which in the end they had to capitulate. suppose that an expedition crossing the north sea with the object of invading this country had to content itself with a landing in iceland, having eventual capitulation before it, should we not consider ourselves very fortunate, though it may have temporarily occupied one of the shetland isles _en_route_? the truth of the matter is that the egyptian expedition was one of the gravest of strategical mistakes, and but for the marvellous subsequent achievements of napoleon it would have been the typical example of bad strategy adduced by lecturers and writers on the art of war for the warning of students. the supposition that over-sea raids, even when successful in part, in any way demonstrate the inefficiency of naval defence would never be admitted if only land and sea warfare were regarded as branches of one whole and not as quite distinct things. to be consistent, those that admit the supposition should also admit that the practicability of raids demonstrates still more conclusively the insufficiency of defence by an army. an eminent military writer has told us that 'a raiding party of french landed in ireland without opposition, after sixteen days of navigation, unobserved by the british navy; defeated and drove back the british troops opposing them on four separate occasions... entirely occupied the attention of all the available troops of a garrison of ireland , strong; penetrated almost to the centre of the island, and compelled the lord-lieutenant to send an urgent requisition for "as great a reinforcement as possible."' if an inference is to be drawn from this in the same way as one has been drawn from the circumstances on the sea, it would follow that one hundred thousand troops are not sufficient to prevent a raid by one thousand, and consequently that one million troops would not be sufficient to prevent one by ten thousand enemies. on this there would arise the question, if an army a million strong gives no security against a raid by ten thousand men, is an army worth having? and this question, be it noted, would come, not from disciples of the blue water school, 'extremist' or other, but from students of military narrative. the truth is that raids are far more common on land than on the ocean. for every one of the latter it would be possible to adduce several of the former. indeed, accounts of raids are amongst the common-places of military history. there are few campaigns since the time of that smart cavalry leader mago, the younger brother of hannibal, in which raids on land did not occur or in which they exercised any decisive influence on the issue of hostilities. it is only the failure to see the connection between warfare on land and naval warfare that prevents these land raids being given the same significance and importance that is usually given to those carried out across the sea. in the year , the year of wagram, napoleon's military influence in central germany was, to say the least, not at its lowest. yet colonel schill, of the prussian cavalry, with men, subsequently increased to infantry and squadrons, proceeded to wittenberg, thence to magdeburg, and next to stralsund, which he occupied and where he met his death in opposing an assault made by french troops. he had defied for a month all the efforts of a large army to suppress him. in the same year the duke of brunswick-oels and colonel dornberg, notwithstanding the smallness of the force under them, by their action positively induced napoleon, only a few weeks before wagram, to detach the whole corps of kellerman, , strong, which otherwise would have been called up to the support of the grande armée, to the region in which these enterprising raiders were operating. the mileage covered by schill was nearly as great as that covered by the part of hoche's expedition which under grouchy did reach an irish port, though it was not landed. instances of cavalry raids were frequent in the war of secession in america. the federal colonel b. h. grierson, of the th illinois cavalry, with another illinois and an iowa cavalry regiment, in april made a raid which lasted sixteen days, and in which he covered miles of hostile country, finally reaching baton rouge, where a friendly force was stationed. the confederate officers, john h. morgan, john s. mosby, and especially n. b. forrest, were famous for the extent and daring of their raids. of all the leaders of important raids in the war of secession none surpassed the great confederate cavalry general, j. e. b. stuart, whose riding right round the imposing federal army is well known. yet not one of the raids above mentioned had any effect on the main course of the war in which they occurred or on the result of the great conflict. in the last war the case was the same. in january , general mischenko with , sabres and three batteries of artillery marched right round the flank of marshal oyama's great japanese army, and occupied niu-chwang--not the treaty port so-called, but a place not very far from it. for several days he was unmolested, and in about a week he got back to his friends with a loss which was moderate in proportion to his numbers. in the following may mischenko made another raid, this time round general nogi's flank. he had with him fifty squadrons, a horse artillery battery, and a battery of machine guns. starting on the th, he was discovered on the th, came in contact with his enemy on the th, but met with no considerable hostile force till the th, when the japanese cavalry arrived just in time to collide with the russian rearguard of two squadrons. on this general mischenko 'retired at his ease for some thirty miles along the japanese flank and perhaps fifteen miles away from it.' these russians' raids did not alter the course of the war nor bring ultimate victory to their standards. it would be considered by every military authority as a flagrant absurdity to deduce from the history of these many raids on land that a strong army is not a sufficient defence for a continental country against invasion. what other efficient defence against that can a continental country have? apply the reasoning to the case of an insular country, and reliance on naval defence will be abundantly justified. to maintain that canada, india, and egypt respectively could be invaded by the united states, russia, and turkey, backed by germany, notwithstanding any action that our navy could take, would be equivalent to maintaining that one part of our empire cannot or need not reinforce another. suppose that we had a military force numerically equal to or exceeding the russian, how could any of it be sent to defend canada, india, and egypt, or to reinforce the defenders of those countries, unless our sea communications were kept open? can these be kept open except by the action of our navy? it is plain that they cannot. viii queen elizabeth and her seamen[ ] [footnote : written in . (_nineteenth_century_and_after_, .)] an eminent writer has recently repeated the accusations made within the last forty years, and apparently only within that period, against queen elizabeth of having starved the seamen of her fleet by giving them food insufficient in quantity and bad in quality, and of having robbed them by keeping them out of the pay due to them. he also accuses the queen, though somewhat less plainly, of having deliberately acquiesced in a wholesale slaughter of her seamen by remaining still, though no adequate provision had been made for the care of the sick and wounded. there are further charges of obstinately objecting, out of mere stinginess, to take proper measures for the naval defence of the country, and of withholding a sufficient supply of ammunition from her ships when about to meet the enemy. lest it should be supposed that this is an exaggerated statement of the case against elizabeth as formulated by the writer in question, his own words are given. he says: 'instead of strengthening her armaments to the utmost, and throwing herself upon her parliament for aid, she clung to her moneybags, actually reduced her fleet, withheld ammunition and the more necessary stores, cut off the sailor's food, did, in short, everything in her power to expose the country defenceless to the enemy. the pursuit of the armada was stopped by the failure of the ammunition, which, apparently, had the fighting continued longer, would have been fatal to the english fleet.' the writer makes on this the rather mild comment that 'treason itself could scarcely have done worse.' why 'scarcely'? surely the very blackest treason could not have done worse. he goes on to ask: 'how were the glorious seamen, whose memory will be for ever honoured by england and the world, rewarded after their victory?' this is his answer: 'their wages were left unpaid, they were docked of their food, and served with poisonous drink, while for the sick and wounded no hospitals were provided. more of them were killed by the queen's meanness than by the enemy.' it is safe to challenge the students of history throughout the world to produce any parallel to conduct so infamous as that which has thus been imputed to an english queen. if the charges are true, there is no limit to the horror and loathing with which we ought to regard elizabeth. are they true? that is the question. i respectfully invite the attention of those who wish to know the truth and to retain their reverence for a great historical character, to the following examination of the accusations and of the foundations on which they rest. it will not, i hope, be considered presumptuous if i say that--in making this examination--personal experience of life in the navy sufficiently extensive to embrace both the present day and the time before the introduction of the great modern changes in system and naval _matériel_ will be of great help. many things which have appeared so extraordinary to landsmen that they could account for their occurrence only by assuming that this must have been due to extreme culpability or extreme folly will be quite familiar to naval officers whose experience of the service goes back forty years or more, and can be satisfactorily explained by them. there is little reason to doubt that the above-mentioned charges against the great queen are based exclusively on statements in froude's history. it is remarkable how closely froude has been followed by writers treating of elizabeth and her reign. he was known to have gone to original documents for the sources of his narrative; and it seems to have been taken for granted, not only that his fidelity was above suspicion--an assumption with which i do not deal now--but also that his interpretation of the meaning of those who wrote the papers consulted must be correct. motley, in his 'history of the united netherlands,' published in , had dwelt upon the shortness of ammunition and provisions in the channel fleet commanded by lord howard of effingham; but he attributed this to bad management on the part of officials, and not to downright baseness on that of elizabeth. froude has placed beyond doubt his determination to make the queen responsible for all shortcomings. 'the queen,' he says, 'has taken upon herself the detailed arrangement of everything. she and she alone was responsible. she had extended to the dockyards the same hard thrift with which she had pared down her expenses everywhere. she tied the ships to harbour by supplying the stores in driblets. she allowed rations but for a month, and permitted no reserves to be provided in the victualling offices. the ships at plymouth, furnished from a distance, and with small quantities at a time, were often for many days without food of any kind. even at plymouth, short food and poisonous drink had brought dysentery among them. they had to meet the enemy, as it were, with one arm bandaged by their own sovereign. the greatest service ever done by an english fleet had been thus successfully accomplished by men whose wages had not been paid from the time of their engagement, half-starved, with their clothes in rags, and so ill-found in the necessaries of war that they had eked out their ammunition by what they could take in action from the enemy himself. the men expected that at least after such a service they would be paid their wages in full. the queen was cavilling over the accounts, and would give no orders for money till she had demanded the meaning of every penny that she was charged.... their legitimate food had been stolen from them by the queen's own neglect.' we thus see that froude has made elizabeth personally responsible for the short rations, the undue delay in paying wages earned, and the fearful sickness which produced a heavy mortality amongst the crews of her channel fleet; and also for insufficiently supplying her ships with ammunition. the quotations from the book previously referred to make it clear that it is possible to outdo froude in his denunciations, even where it is on his statements that the accusers found their charges. in his 'history of england'--which is widely read, especially by the younger generation of englishmen--the rev. j. franck bright tells us, with regard to the defensive campaign against the armada: 'the queen's avarice went near to ruin the country. the miserable supplies which elizabeth had alone allowed to be sent them (the ships in the channel) had produced all sorts of disease, and thousands of the crews came from their great victory only to die. in the midst of privations and wanting in all the necessaries of life, the sailors had fought with unflagging energy, with their wages unpaid, with ammunition supplied to them with so stingy a hand that each shot sent on board was registered and accounted for; with provisions withheld, so that the food of four men had habitually to be divided among six, and that food so bad as to be really poisonous.' j. r. green, in his 'history of the english people,' states that: 'while england was thrilling with the triumph over the armada, its queen was coolly grumbling over the cost and making her profit out of the spoiled provisions she had ordered for the fleet that had saved her.' the object of each subsequent historian was to surpass the originator of the calumnies against elizabeth. in his sketch of her life in the 'dictionary of national biography,' dr. augustus jessopp asserts that the queen's ships 'were notoriously and scandalously ill-furnished with stores and provisions for the sailors, and it is impossible to lay the blame on anyone but the queen.' he had previously remarked that the merchant vessels which came to the assistance of the men-of-war from london and the smaller ports 'were as a rule far better furnished than the queen's ships,' which were 'without the barest necessaries.' after these extracts one from dr. s. r. gardiner's 'student's history of england' will appear moderate. here it is: 'elizabeth having with her usual economy kept the ships short of powder, they were forced to come back' from the chase of the armada. the above allegations constitute a heavy indictment of the queen. no heavier could well be brought against any sovereign or government. probably the first thing that occurs to anyone who, knowing what elizabeth's position was, reads the tremendous charges made against her will be, that--if they are true--she must have been without a rival in stupidity as well as in turpitude. there was no person in the world who had as much cause to desire the defeat of the armada as she had. if the duke of medina sidonia's expedition had been successful she would have lost both her throne and her life. she herself and her father had shown that there could be a short way with queens--consort or regnant--whom you had in your power, and whose existence might be inconvenient to you. yet, if we are to believe her accusers, she did her best to ensure her own dethronement and decapitation. 'the country saved itself and its cause in spite of its queen.' how did this extraordinary view of elizabeth's conduct arise? what had froude to go upon when he came forward as her accuser? these questions can be answered with ease. every government that comes near going to war, or that has gone to war, is sure to incur one of two charges, made according to circumstances. if the government prepares for war and yet peace is preserved, it is accused of unpardonable extravagance in making preparations. whether it makes these on a sufficient scale or not, it is accused, if war does break out--at least in the earlier period of the contest--of not having done enough. political opponents and the 'man in the street' agree in charging the administration with panic profusion in one case, and with criminal niggardliness in the other. elizabeth hoped to preserve peace. she had succeeded in keeping out of an 'official' war for a long time, and she had much justification for the belief that she could do so still longer. 'she could not be thoroughly persuaded,' says mr. david hannay,[ ] 'that it was hopeless to expect to avert the spanish invasion by artful diplomacy.' whilst reasonable precautions were not neglected, she was determined that no one should be able to say with truth that she had needlessly thrown away money in a fright. for the general naval policy of england at the time, elizabeth, as both the nominal and the real head of the government, is properly held responsible. the event showed the perfect efficiency of that policy. [footnote : _a_short_history_of_the_royal_navy_, pp. , .] the war having really come, it was inevitable that the government, and elizabeth as its head, should be blamed sooner or later for not having made adequate provision for it. no one is better entitled to speak on the naval policy of the armada epoch than mr. julian corbett,[ ] who is not disposed to assume that the queen's action was above criticism. he says that 'elizabeth has usually been regarded as guilty of complete and unpardonable inaction.' he explains that 'the event at least justified the queen's policy. there is no trace of her having been blamed for it at the time at home; nor is there any reason to doubt it was adopted sagaciously and deliberately on the advice of her most capable officers.' mr. david hannay, who, as an historian, rightly takes into consideration the conditions of the age, points out that 'elizabeth was a very poor sovereign, and the maintenance of a great fleet was a heavy drain upon her resources.' he adds: 'there is no reason to suppose that elizabeth and her lord treasurer were careless of their duty; but the government of the time had very little experience in the maintenance of great military forces.' [footnote : _drake_and_the_tudor_navy_, , vol. ii. p. .] if we take the charges against her in detail, we shall find that each is as ill-founded as that of criminal neglect of naval preparations generally. the most serious accusation is that with regard to the victuals. it will most likely be a surprise to many people to find that the seamen of elizabeth were victualled on a more abundant and much more costly scale than the seamen of victoria. nevertheless, such is the fact. in the contract allowance for victualling was - / d. a day for each man in harbour, and d. a day at sea. there was also an allowance of d. a man per month at sea and d. in harbour for 'purser's necessaries.' mr. oppenheim, in whose valuable work[ ] on naval administration the details as to the elizabethan victualling system are to be found, tells us that in the rate was raised to d. a day in harbour and - / d. at sea; and that in it was again raised, this time to - / d. in harbour and d. at sea. these sums were intended to cover both the cost of the food and storage, custody, conveyance, &c., the present-day 'establishment charges.' the repeated raising of the money allowance is convincing proof that the victualling arrangements had not been neglected, and that there was no refusal to sanction increased expenditure to improve them. it is a great thing to have mr. oppenheim's high authority for this, because he is not generally favourable to the queen, though even he admits that it 'is a moot point' how far she was herself responsible. [footnote : _the_administration_of_the_royal_navy,_ _ - _. london, .] if necessary, detailed arguments could be adduced to show that to get the present value of the sums allowed in we ought to multiply them by six[ ] the sum allowed for each man's daily food and the 'establishment charges'--increased as they had been in --did little more than cover the expenditure; and, though it does not appear that the contractor lost money, he nevertheless died a poor man. it will be hardly imputed to elizabeth for iniquity that she did not consider that the end of government was the enrichment of contractors. the fact that she increased the money payment again in may be accepted as proof that she did not object to a fair bargain. as has been just said, the elizabethan scale of victualling was more abundant than the early victorian, and not less abundant than that given in the earlier years of king edward vii.[ ] as shown by mr. hubert hall and thorold rogers, in the price-lists which they publish, the cost of a week's allowance of food for a man-of-war's man in , in the money of the time, amounted to about s. - / d., which, multiplied by six, would be about s. d. of our present money. the so-called 'savings price' of the early twentieth century allowance was about - / d. a day, or s. - / d. weekly. the 'savings price' is the amount of money which a man received if he did not take up his victuals, each article having a price attached to it for that purpose. it may be interesting to know that the full allowance was rarely, perhaps never, taken up, and that some part of the savings was till the last, and for many years had been, almost invariably paid. [footnote : see mr. hubert hall's _society_in_the_elizabethan_ _age_, and thorold rogers's _history_of_agriculture_and_prices_, vols. v. and vi. froude himself puts the ratio at six to one.] [footnote : it will be convenient to compare the two scales in a footnote, observing that--as i hope will not be thought impertinent--i draw on my own personal experience for the more recent, which was in force for some years after i went to sea. weekly ---------------------------------------------- | | | early | | | elizabethan | victorian | | | scale | scale | |----------------------------------------------| | beef | lbs. | lbs. | | biscuit | " | " | | salted fish | " | none | | cheese | / lb. | " | | butter | " | " | | beer | gallons | " | | vegetables | none | - / lbs. | | spirits | " | / pint | | tea | " | - / oz. | | sugar | " | " | | cocoa | " | " | ---------------------------------------------- there is now a small allowance of oatmeal, pepper, mustard, and vinegar, against which we may set the 'purser's necessaries' of elizabeth's day. in that day but little sugar was used, and tea and cocoa were unknown even in palaces. it is just a question if seven gallons of beer did not make up for the weekly allowance of these and for the seven-eighths of a pint of spirits. tea was only allowed in , and was not an additional article. it replaced part of the spirits. the biscuit allowance is now - / lbs. weekly. the victorian dietary is more varied and wholesome than the elizabethan; but, as we have seen, it is less abundant and can be obtained for much less money, even if we grant that the 'savings price'--purposely kept low to avoid all suggestion that the men are being bribed into stinting themselves--is less than the real cost. the excess of this latter, however, is not likely to be more than per cent., so that elizabeth's expenditure in this department was more liberal than the present. such defects as were to be found in the elizabethan naval dietary were common to it with that of the english people generally. if there was plenty, there was but little variety in the food of our ancestors of all ranks three centuries ago. as far as was possible in the conditions of the time, elizabeth's government did make provision for victualling the fleet on a sufficient and even liberal scale; and, notwithstanding slender pecuniary resources, repeatedly increased the money assigned to it, on cause being shown. in his eagerness to make queen elizabeth a monster of treacherous rapacity, froude has completely overreached himself, he says that 'she permitted some miserable scoundrel to lay a plan before her for saving expense, by cutting down the seamen's diet.' the 'miserable scoundrel' had submitted a proposal for diminishing the expenses which the administration was certainly ill able to bear, the candid reader will draw his own conclusions when he finds that the queen did not approve the plan submitted; and yet that not one of her assailants has let this appear.[ ] [footnote : it may be stated here that the word 'rations' is unknown in the navy. the official term is 'victuals.' the term in common use is 'provisions.'] it is, of course, possible to concede that adequate arrangements had been made for the general victualling of the fleet; and still to maintain that, after all, the sailors afloat actually did run short of food. in his striking 'introduction to the armada despatches' published by the navy records society, professor sir john laughton declares that: 'to anyone examining the evidence, there can be no question as to victualling being conducted on a fairly liberal scale, as far as the money was concerned. it was in providing the victuals that the difficulty lay.... when a fleet of unprecedented magnitude was collected, when a sudden and unwonted demand was made on the victualling officers, it would have been strange indeed if things had gone quite smoothly.' there are plenty of naval officers who have had experience, and within the last ten years of the nineteenth century, of the difficulty, and sometimes of the impossibility, of getting sufficient supplies for a large number of ships in rather out-of-the-way places. in the comparative thinness of population and insufficiency of communications and means of transport must have constituted obstacles, far greater than any encountered in our own day, to the collection of supplies locally and to their timely importation from a distance. 'you would not believe,' says lord howard of effingham himself, 'what a wonderful thing it is to victual such an army as this is in such a narrow corner of the earth, where a man would think that neither victuals were to be had nor a cask to put it in.' no more effective defence of elizabeth and her ministers could well be advanced than that which mr. oppenheim puts forward as a corroboration of the accusation against them. he says that the victualling officials 'found no difficulty in arranging for , men in and in after timely notice.' this is really a high compliment, as it proves that the authorities were quite ready to, and in fact did, learn from experience. mr. oppenheim, however, is not an undiscriminating assailant of the queen; for he remarks, as has been already said, that, 'how far elizabeth was herself answerable is a moot point.' he tells us that there 'is no direct evidence against her'; and the charge levelled at her rests not on proof, but on 'strong probability.' one would like to have another instance out of all history, of probability, however strong, being deemed sufficient to convict a person of unsurpassed treachery and stupidity combined, when the direct evidence, which is not scanty, fails to support the charge and indeed points the other way. the lord admiral himself and other officers have been quoted to show how badly off the fleet was for food. yet at the close of the active operations against the armada, sir j. hawkins wrote: 'here is victual sufficient, and i know not why any should be provided after september, but for those which my lord doth mean to leave in the narrow seas.' on the same day howard himself wrote from dover: 'i have caused all the remains of victuals to be laid here and at sandwich, for the maintaining of them that shall remain in the narrow seas.' any naval officer with experience of command who reads howard's representations on the subject of the victuals will at once perceive that what the admiral was anxious about was not the quantity on board the ships, but the stock in reserve. howard thought that the latter ought to be a supply for six weeks. the council thought a month's stock would be enough; and--as shown by the extracts from howard's and hawkins's letters just given--the council was right in its estimate. anyone who has had to write or to read official letters about stocks of stores and provisions will find something especially modern in howard's representations. though the crews of the fleet did certainly come near the end of their victuals afloat, there is no case of their having actually run out of them. the complement of an ordinary man-of-war in the latter part of the sixteenth century, judged by our modern standard, was very large in proportion to her size. it was impossible for her to carry provisions enough to last her men for a long time. any unexpected prolongation of a cruise threatened a reduction to short commons. a great deal has been made of the fact that howard had to oblige six men to put up with the allowance of four. 'when a large force,' says mr. d. hannay, 'was collected for service during any length of time, it was the common rule to divide four men's allowance among six.' there must be still many officers and men to whom the plan would seem quite familiar. it is indicated by a recognised form of words, 'six upon four.' i have myself been 'six upon four' several times, mostly in the pacific, but also, on at least one occasion, in the east indies. as far as i could see, no one appeared to regard it as an intolerable hardship. the government, it should be known, made no profit out of the process, because money was substituted for the food not issued. howard's recourse to it was not due to immediate insufficiency. speaking of the merchant vessels which came to reinforce him, he says: 'we are fain to help them with victuals to bring them thither. there is not any of them that hath one day's victuals.' these merchant vessels were supplied by private owners; and it is worth noting that, in the teeth of this statement by howard, dr. jessopp, in his eagerness to blacken elizabeth, says that they 'were, as a rule, far better furnished than the queen's ships.' the lord admiral on another occasion, before the fight off gravelines, said of the ships he hoped would join him from portsmouth: 'though they have not two days' victuals, let that not be the cause of their stay, for they shall have victuals out of our fleet,' a conclusive proof that his ships were not very short. as to the accusation of deliberately issuing food of bad quality, that is effectually disposed of by the explanation already given of the method employed in victualling the navy. a sum was paid for each man's daily allowance to a contractor, who was expressly bound to furnish 'good and seasonable victuals.'[ ] professor laughton, whose competence in the matter is universally allowed, informs us that complaints of bad provisions are by no means confined to the armada epoch, and were due, not to intentional dishonesty and neglect, but to insufficient knowledge of the way to preserve provisions for use on rather long cruises. mr. hannay says that the fleet sent to the coast of spain, in the year after the defeat of the armada, suffered much from want of food and sickness. 'yet it was organised, not by the queen, but by a committee of adventurers who had every motive to fit it out well.' it is the fashion with english historians to paint the condition of the navy in the time of the commonwealth in glowing colours, yet mr. oppenheim cites many occasions of well-founded complaints of the victuals. he says: 'the quality of the food supplied to the men and the honesty of the victualling agents both steadily deteriorated during the commonwealth.' lord howard's principal difficulty was with the beer, which would go sour. the beer was the most frequent subject of protest in the commonwealth times. also, in , lord (then sir edward) hawke reported: 'our daily employment is condemning the beer from plymouth.' the difficulty of brewing beer that would stand a sea voyage seemed to be insuperable. the authorities, however, did not soon abandon attempts to get the right article. complaints continued to pour in; but they went on with their brewing till , and then gave it up as hopeless. [footnote : see 'the mariners of england before the armada,' by mr. h. halliday sparling, in the _english_illustrated_magazine_, july , .] one must have had personal experience of the change to enable one to recognise the advance that has been made in the art of preserving articles of food within the last half-century. in the first drury lane pantomime that i can remember--about a year before i went to sea--a practical illustration of the quality of some of the food supplied to the navy was offered during the harlequinade by the clown, who satisfied his curiosity as to the contents of a large tin of 'preserved meat' by pulling out a dead cat. on joining the service i soon learned that, owing to the badness of the 'preserved' food that had been supplied, the idea of issuing tinned meat had been abandoned. it was not resumed till some years later. it is often made a joke against naval officers of a certain age that, before eating a biscuit, they have a trick of rapping the table with it. we contracted the habit as midshipmen when it was necessary to get rid of the weevils in the biscuit before it could be eaten, and a fairly long experience taught us that rapping the table with it was an effectual plan for expelling them. there is no more justification for accusing queen elizabeth of failure to provide well-preserved food to her sailors than there is for accusing her of not having sent supplies to plymouth by railway. steam transport and efficient food preservation were equally unknown in her reign and for long after. it has been intimated above that, even had she wished to, she could not possibly have made any money out of bad provisions. the victualling system did not permit of her doing so. the austere republican virtue of the commonwealth authorities enabled them to do what was out of elizabeth's power. in , 'beer and other provisions "decayed and unfit for use" were licensed for export free of customs.' mr. oppenheim, who reports this fact, makes the remarkable comment that this was done 'perhaps in the hope that such stores would go to holland,' with whose people we were at war. as the heavy mortality in the navy had always been ascribed to the use of bad provisions, we cannot refuse to give to the sturdy republicans who governed england in the seventeenth century the credit of contemplating a more insidious and more effective method of damaging their enemy than poisoning his wells. one would like to have it from some jurist if the sale of poisonously bad food to your enemy is disallowed by international law. that there was much sickness in the fleet and that many seamen died is, unfortunately, true. if howard's evidence is to be accepted--as it always is when it seems to tell against the queen--it is impossible to attribute this to the bad quality of the food then supplied. the lord admiral's official report is 'that the ships of themselves be so infectious and corrupted as it is thought to be a very plague; and we find that the fresh men that we draw into our ships are infected one day and die the next.' the least restrained assertor of the 'poisonous' food theory does not contend that it killed men within twenty-four hours. the armada reached the channel on the th of july ( th, new style). a month earlier howard had reported that 'several men have fallen sick and by thousands fain to be discharged'; and, after the fighting was over, he said of the _elizabeth_jonas_, she 'hath had a great infection in her from the beginning.' lord henry seymour, who commanded the division of the fleet stationed in the straits of dover, noted that the sickness was a repetition of that of the year before, and attributed it not to bad food, but to the weather. 'our men,' he wrote, 'fall sick by reason of the cold nights and cold mornings we find; and i fear me they will drop away faster than they did last year with sir henry palmer, which was thick enough.' 'the sickness,' says professor laughton, 'was primarily and chiefly due to infection from the shore and ignorance or neglect of what we now know as sanitary laws.... similar infections continued occasionally to scourge our ships' companies, and still more frequently french and spanish ships' companies, till near the close of the eighteenth century.' it is not likely that any evidence would suffice to divert from their object writers eager to hurl calumny at a great sovereign; but a little knowledge of naval and of military history also would have saved their readers from a belief in their accusations. in the fleet in the west indies commanded by admiral hosier, commemorated in glover's ballad, lost ten flag officers and captains, fifty lieutenants, and seamen. in the seven years' war the total number belonging to the fleet killed in action was ; whilst the number that died of disease and were missing was , . from to , out of , men voted by parliament for the navy, , were 'sent sick.' in the summer, , the french fleet cruising at the mouth of the english channel, after landing , had still about men sick. at the beginning of autumn the number of sick had become so great that many ships had not enough men to work them. the _ville_de_paris_ had sick, and lost . the _auguste_ had sick, and lost . on board the _intrépide_ died out of sick. these were the worst cases; but other ships also suffered heavily. it is, perhaps, not generally remembered till what a very late date armies and navies were more than decimated by disease. in the house of commons affirmed by a resolution, concerning the walcheren expedition: 'that on the th of august a malignant disorder showed itself amongst h.m. troops; and that on the th of september the number of sick amounted to upwards of , men. that of the army which embarked for service in the scheldt sixty officers and men, exclusive of those killed by the enemy, had died before the st of february last.' in a volume of 'military, medical, and surgical essays'[ ] prepared for the united states' sanitary commission, and edited by dr. wm. a. hammond, surgeon-general of the u.s. army, it is stated that, in our peninsular army, averaging a strength of , officers and men, the annual rate of mortality from the th of december to the th of may was per cent. of the officers and per cent. of the men. we may calculate from this that some , officers and men died. there were - / per cent., or over , , 'constantly sick.' out of , french soldiers sent to the crimea in - , the number of killed and those who died of wounds was , the number who died of disease was , . at the same date navies also suffered. dr. stilon mends, in his life of his father,[ ] admiral sir william mends, prints a letter in which the admiral, speaking of the cholera in the fleets at varna, says: 'the mortality on board the _montebello_, _ville_de_paris_, _valmy_ (french ships), and _britannia_ (british) has been terrible; the first lost in three days, the second in three days, the third in ten days, but the last lost in one night and the subsequent day.' kinglake tells us that in the end the _britannia's_ loss went up to . with the above facts before us, we are compelled to adopt one of two alternatives. we must either maintain that sanitary science made no advance between and , or admit that the mortality in elizabeth's fleet became what it was owing to ignorance of sanitary laws and not to intentional bad management. as regards care of the sick, it is to be remembered that the establishment of naval and military hospitals for the reception of sick soldiers and sailors is of recent date. for instance, the two great english military hospitals, netley and the herbert, are only about sixty years old. [footnote : philadelphia, .] [footnote : london, .] so far from our fleet in having been ill-supplied with ammunition, it was in reality astonishingly well equipped, considering the age. we learn from mr. julian corbett,[ ] that 'during the few years immediately preceding the outbreak of the war, the queen's navy had been entirely re-armed with brass guns, and in the process of re-armament a great advance in simplicity had been secured.' froude, without seeing where the admission would land him, admits that our fleet was more plentifully supplied than the armada, in which, he says, 'the supply of cartridges was singularly small. the king [philip the second] probably considered that a single action would decide the struggle; and it amounted to but fifty rounds for each gun.' our own supply therefore exceeded fifty rounds. in his life of vice-admiral lord lyons,[ ] sir s. eardley wilmot tells us that the british ships which attacked the sebastopol forts in october 'could only afford to expend seventy rounds per gun.' at the close of the nineteenth century, the regulated allowance for guns mounted on the broadside was eighty-five rounds each. consequently, the elizabethan allowance was nearly, if not quite, as much as that which our authorities, after an experience of naval warfare during three centuries, thought sufficient. 'the full explanation,' says professor laughton, 'of the want [of ammunition] seems to lie in the rapidity of fire which has already been mentioned. the ships had the usual quantity on board; but the expenditure was more, very many times more, than anyone could have conceived.' mr. julian corbett considers it doubtful if the ammunition, in at least one division of the fleet, was nearly exhausted. [footnote : _the_spanish_war_, - (navy records society), , p. .] [footnote : london, , p. .] exhaustion of the supply of ammunition in a single action is a common naval occurrence. the not very decisive character of the battle of malaga between sir george rooke and the count of toulouse in was attributed to insufficiency of ammunition, the supply in our ships having been depleted by what 'mediterranean' byng, afterwards lord torrington, calls the 'furious fire' opened on gibraltar. the rev. thomas pocock, chaplain of the _ranelagh_, byng's flag-ship at malaga, says:[ ] 'many of our ships went out of the line for want of ammunition.' byng's own opinion, as stated by the compiler of his memoirs, was, that 'it may without great vanity be said that the english had gained a greater victory if they had been supplied with ammunition as they ought to have been.' i myself heard the late lord alcester speak of the anxiety that had been caused him by the state of his ships' magazines after the attack on the alexandria forts in . at a still later date, admiral dewey in manila bay interrupted his attack on the spanish squadron to ascertain how much ammunition his ships had left. the carrying capacity of ships being limited, rapid gun-fire in battle invariably brings with it the risk of running short of ammunition. it did this in the nineteenth century just as much as, probably even more than, it did in the sixteenth. [footnote : in his journal (p. ), printed as an appendix to _memoirs_relating_to_the_lord_torrington_, edited by j. k. laughton for the camden society, .] to charge elizabeth with criminal parsimony because she insisted on every shot being 'registered and accounted for' will be received with ridicule by naval officers. of course every shot, and for the matter of that every other article expended, has to be accounted for. one of the most important duties of the gunner of a man-of-war is to keep a strict account of the expenditure of all gunnery stores. this was more exactly done under queen victoria than it was under queen elizabeth. naval officers are more hostile to 'red tape' than most men, and they may lament the vast amount of bookkeeping that modern auditors and committees of public accounts insist upon, but they are convinced that a reasonable check on expenditure of stores is indispensable to efficient organisation. so far from blaming elizabeth for demanding this, they believe that both she and burleigh, her lord treasurer, were very much in advance of their age. another charge against her is that she defrauded her seamen of their wages. the following is froude's statement:-- 'want of the relief, which, if they had been paid their wages, they might have provided for themselves had aggravated the tendencies to disease, and a frightful mortality now set in through the entire fleet.' the word 'now' is interesting, froude having had before him howard's and seymour's letters, already quoted, showing that the appearance of the sickness was by no means recent. elizabeth's illiberality towards her seamen may be judged from the fact that in her reign their pay was certainly increased once and perhaps twice.[ ] in the sailor's pay was raised from s. d. to s. a month. a rise of pay of per cent. all at once is, i venture to say, entirely without parallel in the navy since, and cannot well be called illiberal. the elizabethan s. would be equal to £ in our present accounts; and, as the naval month at the earlier date was the lunar, a sailor's yearly wages would be equal to £ now. the year's pay of an a.b., 'non-continuous service,' as elizabeth's sailors were, is at the present time £ s. d. it is true that the sailor now can receive additional pay for good-conduct badges, gunnery-training, &c., and also can look forward to that immense boon--a pension--nearly, but thanks to sir j. hawkins and drake's establishment of the 'chatham chest,' not quite unknown in the sixteenth century. compared with the rate of wages ruling on shore, elizabeth's seamen were paid highly. mr. hubert hall states that for labourers 'the usual rate was d. or d. a day.' ploughmen received a shilling a week. in these cases 'board' was also given. the sailor's pay was s. a week with board. even compared with skilled labour on shore the sailor of the armada epoch was well paid. thorold rogers gives, for , the wages, without board, of carpenters and masons at d. and s. a day. a plumber's wages varied from - / d. to s.; but there is one case of a plumber receiving as much as s. d., which was probably for a single day. [footnote : mr. halliday sparling, in the article already referred to (p. ), says twice; but mr. oppenheim seems to think that the first increase was before elizabeth's accession.] delay in the payment of wages was not peculiar to the elizabethan system. it lasted very much longer, down to our own times in fact. in the seamen of the fleet were kept without their pay for several months. in the great majority of cases, and most likely in all, the number of these months was less than six. even within the nineteenth century men-of-war's men had to wait for their pay for years. commander c. n. robinson, in his 'british fleet,'[ ] a book that ought to be in every englishman's library, remarks: 'all through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was the rule not to pay anybody until the end of the commission, and to a certain degree the practice obtained until some fifty years ago.' as to the nineteenth century, lord dundonald, speaking in parliament, may be quoted. he said that of the ships on the east indies station, the _centurion's_ men had been unpaid for eleven years; the _rattlesnake's_ for fourteen; the _fox's_ for fifteen. the elizabethan practice compared with this will look almost precipitate instead of dilatory. to draw again on my personal experience, i may say that i have been kept without pay for a longer time than most of the people in lord howard's fleet, as, for the first two years that i was at sea, young officers were paid only once in six months; and then never in cash, but always in bills. the reader may be left to imagine what happened when a naval cadet tried to get a bill for some £ or £ cashed at a small spanish-american port. [footnote : london, .] a great deal has been made of the strict audit of the accounts of howard's fleet. the queen, says froude, 'would give no orders for money till she had demanded the meaning of every penny that she was charged.' why she alone should be held up to obloquy for this is not clear. until a very recent period, well within the last reign, no commanding officer, on a ship being paid off, could receive the residue of his pay, or get any half-pay at all, until his 'accounts had been passed.'[ ] the same rule applied to officers in charge of money or stores. it has been made a further charge against elizabeth that her officers had to meet certain expenditure out of their own pockets. that certainly is not a peculiarity of the sixteenth-century navy. till less than fifty years ago the captain of a british man-of-war had to provide one of the three chronometers used in the navigation of his ship. even later than that the articles necessary for cleaning the ship and everything required for decorating her were paid for by the officers, almost invariably by the first lieutenant, or second in command. there must be many officers still serving who have spent sums, considerable in the aggregate, of their own money on public objects. though pressure in this respect has been much relieved of late, there are doubtless many who do so still. it is, in fact, a traditional practice in the british navy and is not in the least distinctly elizabethan. [footnote : this happened to me in .] some acquaintance with present conditions and accurate knowledge of the naval methods prevailing in the great queen's reign--a knowledge which the publication of the original documents puts within the reach of anyone who really cares to know the truth--will convince the candid inquirer that elizabeth's administration of the navy compares favourably with that of any of her successors; and that, for it, she deserves the admiration and unalloyed gratitude of the nation. ix[ ] [footnote : written in . (_cornhill_magazine_.)] nelson: the centenary of trafalgar [the following article was read as an address, in compliance with the request of its council, at the annual meeting of the navy records society in july . it was, and indeed is still, my opinion, as stated to the meeting in some prefatory remarks, that the address would have come better from a professed historian, several members of the society being well known as entitled to that designation. the council, however, considered that, as nelson's tactical principles and achievements should be dealt with, it would be better for the address to be delivered by a naval officer--one, moreover, who had personal experience of the manoeuvres of fleets under sail. space would not suffice for treating of nelson's merits as a strategist, though they are as great as those which he possessed as a tactician.] centenary commemorations are common enough; but the commemoration of nelson has a characteristic which distinguishes it from most, if not from all, others. in these days we forget soon. what place is still kept in our memories by even the most illustrious of those who have but recently left us? it is not only that we do not remember their wishes and injunctions; their existence has almost faded from our recollection. it is not difficult to persuade people to commemorate a departed worthy; but in most cases industry has to take the place of enthusiasm, and moribund or extinct remembrances have to be galvanised by assiduity into a semblance of life. in the case of nelson the conditions are very different. he may have been misunderstood; even by his professional descendants his acts and doctrines may have been misinterpreted; but he has never been forgotten. the time has now come when we can specially do honour to nelson's memory without wounding the feelings of other nations. there is no need to exult over or even to expatiate on the defeats of others. in recalling the past it is more dignified as regards ourselves, and more considerate of the honour of our great admiral, to think of the valour and self-devotion rather than the misfortunes of those against whom he fought. we can do full justice to nelson's memory without reopening old wounds. the first thing to be noted concerning him is that he is the only man who has ever lived who by universal consent is without a peer. this is said in full view of the new constellation rising above the eastern horizon; for that constellation, brilliant as it is, has not yet reached the meridian. in every walk of life, except that which nelson chose as his own, you will find several competitors for the first place, each one of whom will have many supporters. alexander of macedon, hannibal, cæsar, marlborough, frederick the great, and napoleon have been severally put forward for the palm of generalship. to those who would acclaim richelieu as the first of statesmen, others would oppose chatham, or william pitt, or cavour, or bismarck, or marquis ito. who was the first of sculptors? who the first of painters? who the first of poets? in every case there is a great difference of opinion. ask, however, who was the first of admirals, and the unanimous reply will still be--'nelson,' tried as he was by many years of high command in war. it is not only amongst his fellow-countrymen that his preeminence is acknowledged. foreigners admit it as readily as we proclaim it ourselves. we may consider what it was that gave nelson this unique position among men. the early conditions of his naval career were certainly not favourable to him. it is true that he was promoted when young; but so were many other officers. nelson was made a commander only a few months after the outbreak of war between great britain and france, and was made a post-captain within a few days of the declaration of war by spain. an officer holding a rank qualifying him for command at the outset of a great war might well have looked forward confidently to exceptional opportunities of distinguishing himself. even in our own days, when some trifling campaign is about to be carried on, the officers who are employed where they can take no part in it vehemently lament their ill-fortune. how much more disheartening must it have been to be excluded from active participation in a great and long-continued conflict! this was nelson's case. as far as his hopes of gaining distinction were concerned, fate seemed to persecute him pertinaciously. he was a captain of more than four years' seniority when the treaty of versailles put an end to the war of american independence. yet, with the exception of the brief nicaragua expedition--which by the side of the important occurrences of grand naval campaigns must have seemed insignificant--his services during all those years of hostilities were uneventful, and even humdrum. he seemed to miss every important operation; and when the war ended--we may almost say--he had never seen a ship fire a broadside in anger. there then came what promised to be, and in fact turned out to be, a long period of peace. with no distinguished war service to point to, and with the prospect before him of only uneventful employment, or no employment afloat at all, nelson might well have been disheartened to the verge of despondency. that he was not disheartened, but, instead thereof, made a name for himself in such unfavourable circumstances, must be accepted as one of the most convincing proofs of his rare force of character. to have attracted the notice, and to have secured the confidence, of so great a sea-officer as lord hood constituted a distinction which could have been won only by merit so considerable that it could not long remain unrecognised. the war of american independence had still seven months to run when lord hood pointed to nelson as an officer to be consulted on 'questions relative to naval tactics,' professor laughton tells us that at that time nelson had never served with a fleet. lord hood was one of the last men in the world to go out of his way to pay to a youthful subordinate an empty compliment, and we may confidently base our estimate of an officer's merits on lord hood's belief in them. he, no doubt, gave a wide signification to the term 'tactics,' and used it as embracing all that is included in the phrase 'conduct of war.' he must have found out, from conversations with, and from the remarks of, the young captain, whom he treated as intimately as if he was his son, that the latter was already, what he continued to be till the end, viz. a student of naval warfare. this point deserves particular attention. the officers of the navy of the present day, period of peace though it be, can imitate nelson at least in this. he had to wait a long time before he could translate into brilliant action the result of his tactical studies. fourteen years after lord hood spoke of him as above related, by a 'spontaneous and sudden act, for which he had no authority by signal or otherwise, except his own judgment and quick perceptions,' nelson entirely defeated the movement of the enemy's fleet, contributed to the winning of a great victory, and, as captain mahan tells us, 'emerged from merely personal distinction to national renown.' the justification of dwelling on this is to be found in the necessity, even at this day, of preventing the repetition of mistakes concerning nelson's qualities and disposition. his recent biographers, captain mahan and professor laughton, feel constrained to tell us over and over again that nelson's predominant characteristic was not mere 'headlong valour and instinct for fighting'; that he was not the man 'to run needless and useless risks' in battle. 'the breadth and acuteness of nelson's intellect,' says mahan, 'have been too much overlooked in the admiration excited by his unusually grand moral endowments of resolution, dash, and fearlessness of responsibility!' in forming a true conception of what nelson was, the publications of the navy records society will help us greatly. there is something very remarkable in the way in which mr. gutteridge's volume[ ] not only confirms captain mahan's refutation of the aspersions on nelson's honour and humanity, but also establishes professor laughton's conclusions, reached many years ago, that it was the orders given to him, and not his amour, which detained him at naples at a well-known epoch. the last volume issued by the society, that of mr. julian corbett,[ ] is, i venture to affirm, the most useful to naval officers that has yet appeared among the society's publications. it will provide them with an admirable historical introduction to the study of tactics, and greatly help them in ascertaining the importance of nelson's achievements as a tactician. for my own part, i may say with gratitude that but for mr. corbett's valuable work i could not have completed this appreciation. [footnote : _nelson_and_the_neapolitan_jacobins_.] [footnote : _fighting_instructions_, - .] the most renowned of nelson's achievements was that performed in his final battle and victory. strange as it may seem, that celebrated performance has been the subject of much controversy, and, brilliant as it was, the tactics adopted in it have been freely, and indeed unfavourably, criticised. there is still much difference of opinion as to the preliminary movements, and as to the exact method by which nelson's attack was made. it has been often asserted that the method really followed was not that which nelson had expressly declared his intention of adopting. the question raised concerning this is a difficult one, and, until the appearance of mr. julian corbett's recent work and the interesting volume on trafalgar lately published by mr. h. newbolt, had not been fully discussed. the late vice-admiral p. h. colomb contributed to the _united_service_magazine_ of september a very striking article on the subject of nelson's tactics in his last battle, and those who propose to study the case should certainly peruse what he wrote. the criticism of nelson's procedure at trafalgar in its strongest form may be summarised as follows. it is affirmed that he drew up and communicated to the officers under his orders a certain plan of attack; that just before the battle he changed his plan without warning; that he hurried on his attack unnecessarily; that he exposed his fleet to excessive peril; and, because of all this, that the british loss was much heavier and much less evenly distributed among the ships of the fleet than it need have been. the most formidable arraignment of the mode of nelson's last attack is, undoubtedly, to be found in the paper published by sir charles ekins in his book on 'naval battles,' and vouched for by him as the work of an eye-witness--almost certainly, as mr. julian corbett holds, an officer on board the _conqueror_ in the battle. it is a remarkable document. being critical rather than instructive, it is not to be classed with the essay of clerk of eldin; but it is one of the most important contributions to the investigation of tactical questions ever published in the english tongue. on it are based nearly, or quite, all the unfavourable views expressed concerning the british tactics at trafalgar. as it contains a respectfully stated, but still sharp, criticism of nelson's action, it will not be thought presumptuous if we criticise it in its turn. notwithstanding the fact that the author of the paper actually took part in the battle, and that he was gifted with no mean tactical insight, it is permissible to say that his remarks have an academic tinge. in fact, they are very much of the kind that a clever professor of tactics, who had not felt the responsibilities inseparable from the command of a fleet, would put before a class of students. between a professor of tactics, however clever, and a commanding genius like nelson the difference is great indeed. the writer of the paper in question perhaps expressed the more general opinion of his day. he has certainly suggested opinions to later generations of naval officers. the captains who shared in nelson's last great victory did not agree among themselves as to the mode in which the attack was introduced. it was believed by some of them, and, thanks largely to the _conqueror_ officer's paper, it is generally believed now, that, whereas nelson had announced his intention of advancing to the attack in lines-abreast or lines-of-bearing, he really did so in lines-ahead. following up the path of investigation to which, in his article above mentioned, admiral colomb had already pointed, we can, i think, arrive only at the conclusion that the announced intention was adhered to. before the reasons for this conclusion are given it will be convenient to deal with the suggestions, or allegations, that nelson exposed his fleet at trafalgar to unduly heavy loss, putting it in the power of the enemy--to use the words of the _conqueror's_ officer--to 'have annihilated the ships one after another in detail'; and that 'the brunt of the action would have been more equally felt' had a different mode of advance from that actually chosen been adopted. now, trafalgar was a battle in which an inferior fleet of twenty-six ships gained a victory over a superior fleet of thirty-three. the victory was so decisive that more than half of the enemy's capital ships were captured or destroyed on the spot, and the remainder were so battered that some fell an easy prey to the victor's side soon after the battle, the rest having limped painfully to the shelter of a fortified port near at hand. to gain such a victory over a superior force of seamen justly celebrated for their spirit and gallantry, very hard fighting was necessary. the only actions of the napoleonic period that can be compared with it are those of camperdown, the nile, and copenhagen. the proportionate loss at trafalgar was the least in all the four battles.[ ] the allegation that, had nelson followed a different method at trafalgar, the 'brunt of the action would have been more equally felt' can be disposed of easily. in nearly all sea-fights, whether nelsonic in character or not, half of the loss of the victors has fallen on considerably less than half the fleet. that this has been the rule, whatever tactical method may have been adopted, will appear from the following statement. in rodney's victory ( th april ) half the loss fell upon nine ships out of thirty-six, or one-fourth; at 'the first of june' it fell upon five ships out of twenty-five, or one-fifth; at st. vincent it fell upon three ships out of fifteen, also one-fifth; at trafalgar half the loss fell on five ships out of twenty-seven, or very little less than an exact fifth. it has, therefore, been conclusively shown that, faulty or not faulty, long-announced or hastily adopted, the plan on which the battle of trafalgar was fought did not occasion excessive loss to the victors or confine the loss, such as it was, to an unduly small portion of their fleet. as bearing on this question of the relative severity of the british loss at trafalgar, it may be remarked that in that battle there were several british ships which had been in other great sea-fights. their losses in these latter were in nearly every case heavier than their trafalgar losses.[ ] authoritative and undisputed figures show how baseless are the suggestions that nelson's tactical procedure at trafalgar caused his fleet to suffer needlessly heavy loss. [footnote : camperdown loss out of , : per cent. the nile " " , : . " copenhagen " " , : . " _trafalgar_ , " " , : . " ] [footnote : ---------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | | | | trafalgar | | ship | action |killed|wounded|total|--------------------| | | | | | |killed|wounded|total| |----------------------------------------------------------------------| |_ajax_ | rodney's | | | | | | | | |(ap. , )| | | | | | | |_agamemnon_ | " | | | | | | | |_conqueror_ | " | | | | | | | |_defence_ | st june | | | | | | | |_bellerophon_| the nile | | | | | | | |_swiftsure_ | " | | | | | | | |_defiance_ | copenhagen | | | | | | | |_polyphemus_ | " | | | | | | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- [in only one case was the trafalgar total loss greater than the total loss of the same ship in an earlier fight; and in this case (the _defiance_) the number of killed at trafalgar was only about two-thirds of the number killed in the other action.] it is now necessary to investigate the statement that nelson, hastily and without warning, changed his plan for fighting the battle. this investigation is much more difficult than that into the losses of the british fleet, because, whilst the latter can be settled by arithmetic, the former must proceed largely upon conjecture. how desirable it is to make the investigation of the statement mentioned will be manifest when we reflect on the curious fact that the very completeness of nelson's success at trafalgar checked, or, indeed, virtually destroyed, the study of tactics in the british navy for more than three-quarters of a century. his action was so misunderstood, or, at any rate, so variously represented, that it generally passed for gospel in our service that nelson's method consisted merely in rushing at his enemy as soon as he saw him. against this conception his biographers, one after another, have protested in vain. at the outset of this investigation it will be well to call to mind two or three things, simple enough, but not always remembered. one of these is that advancing to the attack and the attack itself are not the same operations. another is, that, in the order of sailing in two or more columns, if the ships were 'by the wind' or close-hauled--the column-leaders were not abeam of each other, but bore from one another in the direction of the wind. also, it may be mentioned that by simple alterations of course a line-abreast may be converted into a line-of-bearing and a line-of-bearing into a line-ahead, and that the reverse can be effected by the same operation. again, adherence to a plan which presupposes the enemy's fleet to be in a particular formation after he is found to be in another is not to be expected of a consummate tactician. this remark is introduced here with full knowledge of the probability that it will be quoted as an admission that nelson did change his plan without warning. no admission of the kind is intended. 'in all cases of anticipated battle,' says mahan, 'nelson was careful to put his subordinates in possession both of his general plans and, as far as possible, of the underlying ideas.' the same biographer tells us, what is well worth remembering, that 'no man was ever better served than nelson by the inspiration of the moment; no man ever counted on it less.' the plan announced in the celebrated memorandum of th october indicated, for the attack from to windward, that the british fleet, in what would be called on shore an echelon of two main divisions and an 'advance squadron,' would move against an enemy assumed to be in single line-ahead. the 'advance squadron,' it should be noted, was not to be ahead of the two main divisions, but in such a position that it could be moved to strengthen either. the name seems to have been due to the mode in which the ships composing the squadron were employed in, so to speak, 'feeling for' the enemy. on th october six ships were ordered 'to go ahead during the night'; and, besides the frigates, two more ships were so stationed as to keep up the communication between the six and the commander-in-chief's flag-ship. thus eight ships in effect composed an 'advance squadron,' and did not join either of the main divisions at first. when it was expected that the british fleet would comprise forty sail-of-the-line and the enemy's fleet forty-six, each british main division was to be made up of sixteen ships; and eight two-deckers added to either division would increase the strength of the latter to twenty-four ships. it is interesting to note that, omitting the _africa_, which ship came up late, each british main division on the morning of st october had nine ships--a number which, by the addition of the eight already mentioned as distinct from the divisions, could have been increased to seventeen, thus, except for a fraction, exactly maintaining the original proportion as regards the hostile fleet, which was now found to be composed of thirty-three ships. during the night of th- st october the franco-spanish fleet, which had been sailing in three divisions and a 'squadron of observation,' formed line and stood to the southward, heading a little to the eastward of south. the 'squadron of observation' was parallel to the main body and to windward (in this case to the westward) of it, with the leading ships rather more advanced. the british main divisions steered wsw. till a.m. after that they steered sw. till a.m. there are great difficulties about the time, as the notation of it[ ] differed considerably in different ships; but the above hours are taken from the _victory's_ log. at a.m. the british fleet, or rather its main divisions, wore and stood n. by e. as the wind was about nw. by w., the ships were close-hauled, and the leader of the 'lee-line,' i.e. collingwood's flag-ship, was when in station two points abaft the _victory's_ beam as soon as the 'order of sailing' in two columns--which was to be the order of battle--had been formed. [footnote : except the chronometers, which were instruments of navigation so precious as always to be kept under lock and key, there were no clocks in the navy till some years after i joined it. time on board ship was kept by half-hour sand-glasses.] about a.m. the enemy's fleet was sighted from the _victory_, and observed to bear from her e. by s. and be distant from her ten or twelve miles. the distance is corroborated by observed bearings from collingwood's flag-ship.[ ] viewed from the british ships, placed as they were relatively to it, the enemy's fleet must have appeared as a long single line-ahead, perhaps not very exactly formed. as soon as the hostile force was clearly made out, the british divisions bore up and stood to the eastward, steering by the _victory's_ compass ene. the position and formation of the british main divisions were by this made exactly those in which they are shown in the diagram usually attached to the celebrated memorandum of th october . the enemy must have appeared to the british, who were ten or twelve miles to windward of him, and on his beam, as if he were formed in line-ahead. he therefore was also in the position and formation assigned to him in that diagram. [footnote : it would necessitate the use of some technicalities to explain it fully; but it may be said that the bearings of the extremes of the enemy's line observed from his flag-ship prove that collingwood was in the station that he ought to have occupied when the british fleet was in the order of sailing and close to the wind.] at a time which, because of the variety in the notations of it, it is difficult to fix exactly, but somewhere between and a.m., the enemy's ships wore together and endeavoured to form a line to the northward, which, owing to the direction of the wind, must have been about n. by e. and s. by w., or nne. and ssw. the operation--not merely of wearing, but of both wearing and reforming the line, such as it was--took more than an hour to complete. the wind was light; there was a westerly swell; the ships were under easy sail; consequently there must have been a good deal of leeway, and the hostile or 'combined' fleet headed in the direction of cadiz, towards which, we are expressly told by a high french authority--chevalier--it advanced. nelson had to direct the course of his fleet so that its divisions, when about to make the actual attack, would be just opposite the points to which the respective hostile ships had advanced in the meantime. in a light wind varying in force a direct course to those points could not be settled once for all; but that first chosen was very nearly right, and an alteration of a point, viz. to e. by n., was for a considerable time all that was necessary. collingwood later made a signal to his division to alter course one point to port, which brought them back to the earlier course, which by the _victory's_ compass had been ene. the eight ships of what has been referred to as the 'advance squadron' were distributed between the two main british divisions, six being assigned to collingwood's and two to nelson's. they did not all join their divisions at the same time, some--probably owing to the distance at which they had been employed from the rest of the fleet and the feebleness of the breeze--not till several hours after the combined fleet had been sighted. collingwood preserved in his division a line-of-bearing apparently until the very moment when the individual ships pushed on to make the actual attack. the enemy's fleet is usually represented as forming a curve. it would probably be more correct to call it a very obtuse re-entering angle. this must have been largely due to gravina's 'squadron of observation' keeping away in succession, to get into the wake of the rest of the line, which was forming towards the north. about the centre of the combined fleet there was a gap of a mile. ahead and astern of this the ships were not all in each other's wake. many were to leeward of their stations, thus giving the enemy's formation the appearance of a double line, or rather of a string of groups of ships. it is important to remember this, because no possible mode of attack--the enemy's fleet being formed as it was--could have prevented some british ships from being 'doubled on' when they cut into the enemy's force. on 'the first of june,' notwithstanding that the advance to the attack was intended to be in line-abreast, several british ships were 'doubled on,' and even 'trebled on,' as will be seen in the experiences on that day of the _brunswick_, _marlborough_, _royal_sovereign_, and _queen_charlotte_ herself. owing to the shape of the hostile 'line' at trafalgar and the formation in which he kept his division, collingwood brought his ships, up till the very moment when each proceeded to deliver her attack, in the formation laid down in the oft-quoted memorandum. by the terms of that document nelson had specifically assigned to his own division the work of seeing that the movements of collingwood's division should be interrupted as little as possible. it would, of course, have been beyond his power to do this if the position of his own division in the echelon formation prescribed in the memorandum had been rigorously adhered to after collingwood was getting near his objective point. in execution, therefore, of the service allotted to his division, nelson made a feint at the enemy's van. this necessitated an alteration of course to port, so that his ships came into a 'line-of-bearing' so very oblique that it may well have been loosely called a 'line-ahead.' sir charles ekins says that the two british lines '_afterwards_ fell into line-ahead, the ships in the wake of each other,' and that this was in obedience to signal. collingwood's line certainly did not fall into line-ahead. at the most it was a rather oblique line-of-bearing almost parallel to that part of the enemy's fleet which he was about to attack. in nelson's line there was more than one alteration of course, as the _victory's_ log expressly states that she kept standing for the enemy's van, which we learn from the french accounts was moving about n. by e. or nne. in the light wind prevailing the alterations of course must have rendered it, towards the end of the forenoon, impossible to keep exact station, even if the _victory_ were to shorten sail, which we know she did not. as admiral colomb pointed out, 'several later signals are recorded which were proper to make in lines-of-bearing, but not in lines-ahead.' it is difficult to import into this fact any other meaning but that of intention to preserve, however obliquely, the line-of-bearing which undoubtedly had been formed by the act of bearing-up as soon as the enemy's fleet had been distinguished. when collingwood had moved near enough to the enemy to let his ships deliver their attacks, it became unnecessary for nelson's division to provide against the other's being interrupted. accordingly, he headed for the point at which he meant to cut into the enemy's fleet. now came the moment, as regards his division, for doing what collingwood's had already begun to do, viz. engage in a 'pell-mell battle,'[ ] which surely may be interpreted as meaning a battle in which rigorous station-keeping was no longer expected, and in which 'no captain could do very wrong if he placed his ship alongside that of the enemy.' [footnote : nelson's own expression.] in several diagrams of the battle as supposed to have been fought the two british divisions just before the moment of impact are represented as converging towards each other. the spanish diagram, lately reproduced by mr. newbolt, shows this, as well as the english diagrams. we may take it, therefore, that there was towards the end of the forenoon a convergence of the two columns, and that this was due to nelson's return from his feint at the hostile van to the line from which he intended to let go his ships to deliver the actual attack. collingwood's small alteration of course of one point to port slightly, but only slightly, accentuated this convergence. enough has been said here of nelson's tactics at trafalgar. to discuss them fully would lead me too far for this occasion. i can only express the hope that in the navy the subject will receive fuller consideration hereafter. nelson's last victory was gained, be it remembered, in one afternoon, over a fleet more than per cent. his superior in numbers, and was so decisive that more than half of the hostile ships were taken. this was the crowning effort of seven years spent in virtually independent command in time of war--seven years, too, illustrated by more than one great victory. the more closely we look into nelson's tactical achievements, the more effective and brilliant do they appear. it is the same with his character and disposition. the more exact researches and investigations of recent times have removed from his name the obloquy which it pleased some to cast upon it. we can see now that his 'childlike, delighted vanity'--to use the phrase of his greatest biographer--was but a thin incrustation on noble qualities. as in the material world valueless earthy substances surround a vein of precious metal, so through nelson's moral nature there ran an opulent lode of character, unimpaired in its priceless worth by adjacent frailties which, in the majority of mankind, are present without any precious stuff beneath them. it is with minds prepared to see this that we should commemorate our great admiral. veneration of nelson's memory cannot be confined to particular objects or be limited by locality. his tomb is wider than the space covered by dome or column, and his real monument is more durable than any material construction. it is the unwritten and spiritual memorial of him, firmly fixed in the hearts of his fellow-countrymen. x the share of the fleet in the defence of the empire[ ] [footnote : written in . (_naval_annual_, .)] at the close of the great war, which ended in the downfall of napoleon, the maritime position of the british empire was not only predominant--it also was, and long remained, beyond the reach of challenge. after the stupendous events of the great contest such successes as those at algiers where we were helped by the dutch, at navarino where we had two allies, and at acre were regarded as matters of course, and no very grave issue hung upon any one of them. for more than half a century after nelson's death all the most brilliant achievements of british arms were performed on shore, in india or in the crimea. there were also many small wars on land, and it may well have seemed to contemporaries that the days of great naval contests were over and that force of circumstances was converting us into a military from a naval nation. the belief in the efficacy of naval defence was not extinct, but it had ceased to operate actively. even whilst the necessity of that form of defence was far more urgent, inattention to or ignorance of its true principles had occasionally allowed it to grow weak, but the possibility of substituting something else for it had not been pressed or even suggested. to this, however, we had now come; and it was largely a consequence of the crimean war. in that war the british army had nobly sustained its reputation as a fighting machine. for the first time after a long interval it had met in battle european troops, and had come out of the conflict more renowned for bravery than ever. nothing seemed able to damp its heroism--not scantiness of food, not lack of clothing amidst bitter cold, not miserable quarters, not superior forces of a valiant enemy. it clung to its squalid abodes in the positions which it was ordered to hold with a tenacious fortitude that had never been surpassed in its glorious history, and that defied all assaults. in combination with its brave allies it brought to a triumphant conclusion a war of an altogether peculiar character. the campaign in the crimea was in reality the siege of a single fortress. all the movements of the western invaders were undertaken to bring them within striking distance of the place, to keep them within reach of it, or to capture it. every battle that occurred was fought with one of those objects. when the place fell the war ended. the one general who, in the opinion of all concerned, gained high distinction in the war was the general who had prolonged the defence of sebastopol by the skilful use of earthworks. it was no wonder that the attack and defence of fortified places assumed large importance in the eyes of the british people. the command of the sea held by the allied powers was so complete and all-pervading that no one stopped to think what the course of hostilities would have been without it, any more than men stop to think what the course of any particular business would be if there were no atmosphere to breathe in. not a single allied soldier had been delayed on passage by the hostile fleet; not a single merchant vessel belonging to the allies had been captured by a hostile cruiser. supplies and reinforcements for the besieging armies were transported to them without escort and with as little risk of interruption as if the operations had been those of profound peace. no sooner was the crimean war over than another struggle took place, viz. the war of the indian mutiny, and that also was waged entirely on land. here again the command of the sea was so complete that no interruption of it, even temporary, called attention to its existence. troops and supplies were sent to india from the united kingdom and from hong-kong; horses for military purposes from australia and south africa; and in every case without a thought of naval escort. the experience of hostilities in india seemed to confirm the experience of the crimea. what we had just done to a great european nation was assumed to be what unfriendly european nations would wish to do and would be able to do to us. it was also assumed that the only way of frustrating their designs would be to do what had recently been done in the hope of frustrating ours, but to do it better. we must--it was said--depend on fortifications, but more perfect than those which had failed to save sebastopol. the protection to be afforded by our fleet was deliberately declared to be insufficient. it might, so it was held, be absent altogether, and then there would be nothing but fortifications to stand between us and the progress of an active enemy. in the result the policy of constructing imposing passive defence-works on our coast was adopted. the fortifications had to be multiplied. dependence on that class of defence inevitably leads to discovery after discovery that some spot open to the kind of attack feared has not been made secure. we began by fortifying the great dockyard ports--on the sea side against a hostile fleet, on the land side against hostile troops. then it was perceived that to fortify the dockyard ports in the mother country afforded very little protection to the outlying portions of the empire. so their principal ports also were given defence-works--sometimes of an elaborate character. again, it was found that commercial ports had been left out and that they too must be fortified. when this was done spots were observed at which an enemy might effect a landing in force, to prevent which further forts or batteries must be erected. the most striking thing in all this is the complete omission to take note of the conditions involved in the command of the sea. evidently it had not been understood that it was that very command which alone had enabled the armies of western europe to proceed, not only without serious interruption, but also without encountering an attempt at obstruction, to the field in the crimea on which their victories had been won, and that the same command would be necessary before any hostile expedition, large enough to justify the construction of the fortifications specially intended to repel it, could cross the sea and get within striking distance of our shores. it should be deeply interesting to the people of those parts of the british empire which lie beyond sea to note that the defensive system comprised in the fortification of the coast of the united kingdom promised no security to them in the event of war. making all proper allowance for the superior urgency of defending the heart of the empire, we must still admit that no system of defence is adequate which does not provide for the defence of other valuable parts of the great body politic as well. again, the system of defence proved to be imperfect. every part of the empire depended for prosperity--some parts depended for existence--on practically unrestricted traffic on the ocean. this, which might be assailed at many points and on lines often thousands of miles in length, could find little or no defence in immovable fortifications. it could not be held that the existence of these released the fleet from all duty but that of protecting our ocean commerce, because, if any enemy's navy was able to carry out an operation of such magnitude and difficulty as a serious attack on our home territory, it would assuredly be able to carry out the work of damaging our maritime trade. power to do the latter has always belonged to the navy which was in a position to extend its activity persistently to the immediate neighbourhood of its opponent's coast-line. it is not to be supposed that there was no one to point this out. several persons did so, but being mostly sailors they were not listened to. in actual practice the whole domain of imperial strategy was withdrawn from the intervention of the naval officer, as though it were something with which he could not have anything to do. several great wars had been waged in europe in the meantime, and all of them were land wars. naval forces, if employed at all, were employed only just enough to bring out how insignificant their participation in them was. as was to have been expected, the habit of attaching importance to the naval element of imperial defence declined. the empire, nevertheless, continued to grow. its territory was extended; its population, notably its population of european stock, increased, and its wealth and the subsequent operations of exchanging its productions for those of other countries were enormously expanded. at the same time the navy, to the strength and efficiency of which it had to look for security, declined absolutely, and still more relatively. other navies were advancing: some had, as it were, come into existence. at last the true conditions were discerned, and the nation, almost with one voice, demanded that the naval defences of the empire should be put upon a proper footing. let no one dismiss the foregoing retrospect as merely ancient history. on the contrary, let all those who desire to see the british empire follow the path of its natural development in tranquillity study the recent past. by doing this we shall be able to estimate aright the position of the fleet in the defence of the empire. we must examine the circumstances in which we are placed. for five-and-thirty years the nations of the world have practically lived under the rule of force. the incessant object of every great state has been to increase the strength of its armed forces up to the point at which the cost becomes intolerable. countries separated from one another only by arbitrary geographical lines add regiment to regiment and gun to gun, and also devise continually fresh expedients for accelerating the work of preparing their armies to take the field. the most pacifically inclined nation must do in this respect as its neighbours do, on pain of losing its independence and being mutilated in its territory if it does not. this rivalry has spread to the sea, and fleets are increased at a rate and at a cost in money unknown to former times, even to those of war. the possession of a powerful navy by some state which has no reason to apprehend over-sea invasion and which has no maritime interests, however intrinsically important they may be, commensurate with the strength of its fleets, may not indicate a spirit of aggression; but it at least indicates ability to become an aggressor. consequently, for the british fleet to fill its proper position in the defence of the empire it must be strong. to be strong more than large numbers will be required. it must have the right, that is the best, material, the best organisation, the best discipline, the best training, the best distribution. we shall ascertain the position that it should hold, if we examine what it would have to do when called upon for work more active than that of peace time. with the exception of india and canada no part of the empire is liable to serious attack that does not come over-sea. any support that can be given to india or canada by other parts of the empire must be conveyed across the sea also. this at once indicates the importance of ocean lines of communication. war is the method adopted, when less violent means of persuasion have failed, to force your enemy to comply with your demands. there are three principal ways of effecting this--invasion of his country, raids on his territory, destruction or serious damage of his sea-borne commerce. successful invasion must compel the invaded to come to terms, or his national existence will be lost. raids upon his territory may possibly so distress him that he would rather concede your terms than continue the struggle.[ ] damage to his sea-borne commerce may be carried so far that he will be ruined if he does not give in. so much for one side of the account; we have to examine the other. against invasion, raids, or attempts at commerce-destruction there must be some form of defence, and, as a matter of historical fact, defence against each has been repeatedly successful. if we need instances we have only to peruse the history of the british empire. [footnote : though raids rarely, if ever, decide a war, they may cause inconvenience or local distress, and an enemy desiring to make them should be obstructed as much as possible.] how was it that--whilst we landed invading armies in many hostile countries, seized many portions of hostile territory, and drove more than one enemy's commerce from the sea--our own country has been free from successful invasion for more than eight centuries, few portions of our territory have been taken from us even temporarily, and our commerce has increased throughout protracted maritime wars? to this there can only be one answer, viz. that the arrangements for defence were effectual. what, then, were these arrangements? they were comprised in the provision of a powerful, well-distributed, well-handled navy, and of a mobile army of suitable strength. it is to be observed that each element possessed the characteristic of mobility. we have to deal here more especially with the naval element, and we must study the manner in which it operates. naval war is sea-power in action; and sea-power, taken in the narrow sense, has limitations. it may not, even when so taken, cease to act at the enemy's coast-line, but its direct influence extends only to the inner side of a narrow zone conforming to that line. in a maritime contest each side tries to control the ocean communications and to prevent the other from controlling them. if either gains the control, something in addition to sea-power strictly defined may begin to operate: the other side's territory may be invaded or harassed by considerable raids, and its commerce may be driven from the sea. it will be noticed that control of ocean communications is the needful preliminary to these. it is merely a variant of the often employed expression of the necessity, in war, of obtaining command of the sea. in the case of the most important portion of the british empire, viz. the united kingdom, our loss of control of the ocean communications would have a result which scarcely any foreign country would experience. other countries are dependent on importations for some part of the food of their population and of the raw material of their industry; but much of the importation is, and perhaps all of it may be, effected by land. here, we depend upon imports from abroad for a very large part of the food of our people, and of the raw material essential to the manufacture of the commodities by the exchange of which we obtain necessary supplies; and the whole of these imports come, and must come to us, by sea. also, if we had not freedom of exportation, our wealth and the means of supporting a war would disappear. probably all the greater colonies and india could feed their inhabitants for a moderately long time without sea-borne imports, but unless the sea were open to them their prosperity would decline. this teaches us the necessity to the british empire of controlling our maritime communications, and equally teaches those who may one day be our enemies the advisability of preventing us from doing so. the lesson in either case is driven farther home by other considerations connected with communications. in war a belligerent has two tasks before him. he has to defend himself and hurt his enemy. the more he hurts his enemy, the less is he likely to be hurt himself. this defines the great principle of offensive defence. to act in accordance with this principle, a belligerent should try, as the saying goes, to carry the war into the enemy's country. he should try to make his opponents fight where he wants them to fight, which will probably be as far as possible from his own territory and as near as possible to theirs. unless he can do this, invasion and even serious raids by him will be out of the question. more than that, his inability to do it will virtually indicate that on its part the other side can fix the scene of active hostilities unpleasantly close to the points from which he desires to keep its forces away. a line of ocean communications may be vulnerable throughout its length; but it does not follow that an assailant can operate against it with equal facility at every point, nor does it follow that it is at every point equally worth assailing. lines running past hostile naval ports are especially open to assault in the part near the ports; and lines formed by the confluence of two or more other lines--like, for example, those which enter the english channel--will generally include a greater abundance of valuable traffic than others. consequently there are some parts at which an enemy may be expected to be more active than elsewhere, and it is from those very parts that it is most desirable to exclude him. they are, as a rule, relatively near to the territory of the state whose navy has to keep the lines open, that is to say, prevent their being persistently beset by an enemy. the necessary convergence of lines towards that state's ports shows that some portion of them would have to be traversed, or their traversing be attempted, by expeditions meant to carry out either invasion or raids. if, therefore, the enemy can be excluded as above mentioned, invasions, raids, and the more serious molestation of sea-borne commerce by him will be prevented. if we consider particular cases we shall find proof upon proof of the validity of the rule. three great lines--one from the neighbourhood of the cape of good hope, one from the red sea, and a third from india and ceylon--converge near the south-western part of australia and run as one line towards the territory of the important states farther east. if an assailant can be excluded from the latter or combined line he must either divide his force or operate on only one of the confluents, leaving the rest free. the farther he can be pushed back from the point of confluence the more effectually will he be limited to a single line, because the combining lines, traced backwards, trend more and more apart, and it is, therefore, more and more difficult for him to keep detachments of his force within supporting distance of each other if they continue to act against two or more lines. the particular case of the approaches to the territory of the united kingdom has the same features, and proves the rule with equal clearness. this latter case is so often adduced without mention of others, that there is some risk of its being believed to be a solitary one. it stands, however, exactly on all fours with all the rest as regards the principle of the rule. a necessary consequence of an enemy's exclusion from the combined line as it approaches the territory to be defended is--as already suggested--that invasion of that territory and serious raids upon it will be rendered impracticable. indeed, if the exclusion be absolutely complete and permanent, raids of every kind and depredations on commerce in the neighbourhood will be prevented altogether. it should be explained that though lines and communications are spoken of, it is the area crossed by them which is strategically important. a naval force, either guarding or intending to assail a line, does not necessarily station itself permanently upon it. all that it has to do is to remain, for the proper length of time, within the strategic area across which the defended or threatened line runs. the strategic area will be of varying extent, its boundaries being determined by circumstances. the object of the defence will be to make the area from which the enemy's ships are excluded as extensive as possible. when the enemy has been pushed back into his own waters and into his own ports the exclusion is strategically complete. the sea is denied to his invading and important raiding expeditions, and indeed to most of his individual cruisers. at the same time it is free to the other belligerent. to effect this a vigorous offensive will be necessary. the immediate theatre of operations, the critical strategic area, need not be, and often ought not to be, near the territory defended by our navy. it is necessary to dwell upon this, because no principle of naval warfare has been more frequently or more seriously misapprehended. misapprehension of it has led to mischievous and dangerous distribution of naval force and to the squandering of immense sums of money on local defence vessels; that is, vessels only capable of operating in the very waters from which every effort should be made to exclude the enemy. failure to exclude him from them can only be regarded as, at the very least, yielding to him an important point in the great game of war. if we succeed in keeping him away, the local defence craft of every class are useless, and the money spent on them has been worse than wasted, because, if it had not been so spent, it might have been devoted to strengthening the kind of force which must be used to keep the enemy where he ought to be kept, viz. at a distance from our own waters. the demand that ships be so stationed that they will generally, and except when actually cruising, be within sight of the inhabitants, is common enough in the mother country, and perhaps even more common in the over-sea parts of the british empire. nothing justifies it but the honest ignorance of those who make it; nothing explains compliance with it but the deplorable weakness of authorities who yield to it. it was not by hanging about the coast of england, when there was no enemy near it, with his fleet, that hawke or nelson saved the country from invasion, nor was it by remaining where they could be seen by the fellow-countrymen of their crews that the french and english fleets shut up their enemy in the baltic and black sea, and thus gained and kept undisputed command of the sea which enabled them, without interruption, to invade their enemy's territory. the condition insisted upon by the australasian governments in the agreement formerly made with the home government, that a certain number of ships, in return for an annual contribution of money, should always remain in australasian waters, was in reality greatly against the interests of that part of the empire. the australasian taxpayer was, in fact, made to insist upon being injured in return for his money. the proceeding would have been exactly paralleled by a householder who might insist that a fire-engine, maintained out of rates to which he contributes, should always be kept within a few feet of his front door, and not be allowed to proceed to the end of the street to extinguish a fire threatening to extend eventually to the householder's own dwelling. when still further localised naval defence--localised defence, that is, of what may be called the smaller description--is considered, the danger involved in adopting it will be quite as apparent, and the waste of money will be more obvious. localised defence is a near relation of passive defence. it owes its origin to the same sentiment, viz. a belief in the efficacy of staying where you are instead of carrying the war into the enemy's country. there may be cases in which no other kind of naval defence is practicable. the immense costliness of modern navies puts it out of the power of smaller states to maintain considerable sea-going fleets. the historic maritime countries--sweden, denmark, the netherlands, and portugal, the performances of whose seamen are so justly celebrated--could not now send to sea a force equal in number and fighting efficiency to a quarter of the force possessed by anyone of the chief naval powers. the countries named, when determined not to expose themselves unarmed to an assailant, can provide themselves only with a kind of defence which, whatever its detailed composition, must be of an intrinsically localised character. in their case there is nothing else to be done; and in their case defence of the character specified would be likely to prove more efficacious than it could be expected to be elsewhere. war is usually made in pursuit of an object valuable enough to justify the risks inseparable from the attempt to gain it. aggression by any of the countries that have been mentioned is too improbable to call for serious apprehension. aggression against them is far more likely. what they have to do is to make the danger of attacking them so great that it will equal or outweigh any advantage that could be gained by conquering them. their wealth and resources, compared with those of great aggressive states, are not large enough to make up for much loss in war on the part of the latter engaging in attempts to seize them. therefore, what the small maritime countries have to do is to make the form of naval defence to which they are restricted efficacious enough to hurt an aggressor so much that the victory which he may feel certain of gaining will be quite barren. he will get no glory, even in these days of self-advertisement, from the conquest of such relatively weak antagonists; and the plunder will not suffice to repay him for the damage received in effecting it. the case of a member of the great body known as the british empire is altogether different. its conquest would probably be enormously valuable to a conqueror; its ruin immensely damaging to the body as a whole. either would justify an enemy in running considerable risks, and would afford him practically sufficient compensation for considerable losses incurred. we may expect that, in war, any chance of accomplishing either purpose will not be neglected. provision must, therefore, be made against the eventuality. let us for the moment suppose that, like one of the smaller countries whose case has been adduced, we are restricted to localised defence. an enemy not so restricted would be able to get, without being molested, as near to our territory--whether in the mother country or elsewhere--as the outer edge of the comparatively narrow belt of water that our localised defences could have any hope of controlling effectively. we should have abandoned to him the whole of the ocean except a relatively minute strip of coast-waters. that would be equivalent to saying good-bye to the maritime commerce on which our wealth wholly, and our existence largely, depends. no thoughtful british subject would find this tolerable. everyone would demand the institution of a different defence system. a change, therefore, to the more active system would be inevitable. it would begin with the introduction of a cruising force in addition to the localised force. the unvarying lesson of naval history would be that the cruising division should gain continuously on the localised. it is only in times of peace, when men have forgotten, or cannot be made to understand, what war is, that the opposite takes place. if it be hoped that a localised force will render coast-wise traffic safe from the enemy, a little knowledge of what has happened in war and a sufficiently close investigation of conditions will demonstrate how baseless the hope must be. countries not yet thickly populated would be in much the same condition as the countries of western europe a century ago, the similarity being due to the relative scarcity of good land communications. a part--probably not a very large part--of the articles required by the people dwelling on and near the coast in one section would be drawn from another similar section. these articles could be most conveniently and cheaply transported by water. if it were worth his while, an enemy disposing of an active cruising force strong enough to make its way into the neighbourhood of the coast waters concerned would interrupt the 'long-shore traffic' and defy the efforts of a localised force to prevent him. the history of the great war at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth teems with instances of interruption by our navy of the enemy's coast-wise trade when his ocean trade had been destroyed. the history of the american war of supplies other instances. the localised defence could not attempt to drive off hostile cruisers remaining far from the shore and meaning to infest the great lines of maritime communication running towards it. if those cruisers are to be driven off at all it can be done only by cruising ships. unless, therefore, we are to be content to leave our ocean routes, where most crowded and therefore most vulnerable, to the mercy of an enemy, we must have cruisers to meet the hostile cruisers. if we still adhere to our localised defence, we shall have two distinct kinds of force---one provided merely for local, and consequently restricted, action; the other able to act near the shore or far out at sea as circumstances may demand. if we go to the expense of providing both kinds, we shall have followed the example of the sage who cut a large hole in his study door for the cat and a small one for the kitten. is local naval defence, then, of any use? well, to tell the truth, not much; and only in rare and exceptional circumstances. even in the case of the smaller maritime countries, to which reference has been made above, defence of the character in question would avail little if a powerful assailant were resolved to press home his attack. that is to say, if only absolute belligerent considerations were regarded. in war, however, qualifying considerations can never be left out of sight. as the great napoleon observed, you can no more make war without incurring losses than you can make omelettes without breaking eggs. the strategist--and the tactician also, within his province--will always count the cost of a proposed operation, even where they are nearly certain of success. the occupation of a country, which would be of no great practical value to you when you got it, would be a poor return for the loss to which you would have been put in the process. that loss might, and probably would, leave you at a great disadvantage as regards enemies more nearly on an equality with yourself. it would, therefore, not be the improbability of breaking down the local naval defence of a minor maritime state, but the pressure of qualifying and only indirectly belligerent considerations, that would prevent its being attempted. in a struggle between two antagonists of the first rank, the circumstances would be different. purely belligerent considerations would have fuller play. mistakes will be made, of course, for war is full of mistakes; but it may be accepted that an attack on any position, however defended, is in itself proof that the assailant believed the result hoped for to be quite worth the cost of obtaining it. consequently, in a struggle as assumed, every mode of defence would have to stand on its intrinsic merits, nearly or quite unaided by the influence of considerations more or less foreign to it. every scrap of local defence would, in proportion to its amount, be a diminution of the offensive defence. advocates of the former may be challenged to produce from naval history any instance of local naval defence succeeding against the assaults of an actively aggressive navy. in the late war between japan and russia the russian local defence failed completely. in the last case, a class of vessel like that which had failed in local defence was used successfully, because offensively, by the japanese. this and many another instance show that the right way to use the kind of craft so often allocated to local defence is to use them offensively. it is only thus that their adoption by a great maritime power like the british empire can be justified. the origin and centre of our naval strength are to be looked for in the united kingdom. the shores of the latter are near the shores of other great maritime powers. its ports, especially those at which its fleets are equipped and would be likely to assemble on the imminence of war, are within reach of more than one foreign place from which small swift craft to be used offensively might be expected to issue. the method of frustrating the efforts of these craft giving most promise of success is to attack them as soon as possible after they issue from their own port. to the acceptance of this principle we owe the origin of the destroyer, devised to destroy hostile torpedo-boats before they could reach a position from which they would be able to discharge with effect their special weapon against our assembled ships. it is true that the destroyer has been gradually converted into a larger torpedo-boat. it is also true that when used as such in local defence, as at port arthur, her failure was complete; and just as true that she has never accomplished anything except when used offensively. when, therefore, a naval country's coast is so near the ports of another naval country that the latter would be able with swift small craft to attack the former's shipping, the provision of craft of a similar kind is likely to prove advantageous. war between great powers is a two-sided game, and what one side can do the other will at least be likely to attempt. nothing supports the view that it is well--either above or beneath the surface of the water--to stand on the defensive and await attack. everything points to the superiority of the plan of beating up the enemy's quarters and attacking him before he can get far from them on his way towards his objective. consequently the only justification of expending money on the localised vessels of which we have been speaking, is the probability that an enemy would have some of his bases within reach of those vessels' efforts. where this condition does not exist, the money expended is, from the belligerent point of view, thrown away. here comes in the greatest foe of belligerent efficiency, viz. political expediency. in time of peace it is thought better to conciliate voters than to prepare to meet an enemy. if local defence is thought to be pleasing to an inexpert electorate, it is only too likely to be provided, no matter how ineffectual and how costly in reality it will turn out to be. not only is the british empire the first of naval powers, it is also the first of colonial powers. one attribute is closely connected with the other; neither, without the other, would be applicable. the magnitude of our colonial domain, and especially the imposing aspects of some of its greater components--the dominion, the commonwealth, south africa, new zealand--are apt to blind us to a feature of great strategical importance, and that is the abundance and excellence of the naval bases that stud our ocean lines of communication. in thinking of the great daughter states we are liable to forget these; yet our possession of them helps greatly to strengthen our naval position, because it facilitates our assuming a far-reaching offensive. by themselves, if not too numerous, they can afford valuable support to the naval operations that are likely to prove most beneficial to us. the fact that they are ours, and not an opponent's, also constitutes for us an advantage of importance. of course, they have to be defended, or else they may fall into an opponent's hands. have we here a case in which highly localised or even passive defences are desirable? no doubt we did act for a time as though we believed that the question could only be answered in the affirmative; but that was when we were under the influence of the feelings engendered by observation of the long series of land wars previously discussed. perhaps we have not yet quite shaken off the effects of that influence; but we have at least got so far as to tolerate the statement of the other side of the question. it would be a great mistake to suppose that the places alluded to are meant to be ports of refuge for our ships. though they were to serve that purpose occasionally in the case of isolated merchant vessels, it would be but an accident, and not the essence, of their existence. what they are meant for is to be utilised as positions where our men-of-war can make reasonably sure of finding supplies and the means of refit. this assurance will largely depend upon their power of resistance if attacked. before we can decide how to impart that power to them we shall have to see the kind of attack against which they would have to be prepared. if they are on a continent, like, for example, gibraltar, attack on them by a land force, however improbable, is physically possible. against an attack of the kind a naval force could give little direct help. most of our outlying naval bases are really or virtually insular, and are open to attack only by an expedition coming across the sea. an essential characteristic of a naval base is that it should be able to furnish supplies as wanted to the men-of-war needing to replenish their stocks. some, and very often all, of these supplies are not of native production and must be brought to the base by sea. if the enemy can stop their conveyance to it, the place is useless as a base and the enemy is really in control of its communications. if he is in control of its communications he can send against it as great an expedition as he likes, and the place will be captured or completely neutralised. similarly, if we control the communications, not only can supplies be conveyed to it, but also no hostile expedition will be allowed to reach it. thus the primary defence of the outlying base is the active, sea-going fleet. moderate local defence, chiefly of the human kind, in the shape of a garrison, will certainly be needed. though the enemy has not been able to obtain control of the communications of the place, fitful raids on it will be possible; and the place should be fortified enough and garrisoned enough to hold out against the inconsiderable assaults comprised in these till our own ships can drive the enemy's away. outlying naval bases, though but moderately fortified, that contain depots of stores, docks, and other conveniences, have the vice of all immobile establishments. when war does come, some of them almost certainly, and all of them possibly, may not be in the right place with regard to the critical area of operations. they cannot, however, be moved. it will be necessary to do what has been done over and over again in war, in the latest as well as in earlier wars, and that is, establish temporary bases in more convenient situations. thus much, perhaps all, of the cost and trouble of establishing and maintaining the permanent bases will have been wasted. this inculcates the necessity of having not as many bases as can be found, but as few as it is possible to get on with. the control of ocean communications, or the command of the sea, being the end of naval warfare, and its acquisition being practicable only by the assumption of a vigorous offensive, it follows as a matter of course that we must have a strong and in all respects efficient mobile navy. this is the fundamental condition on which the continued existence of the british empire depends. it is thoroughly well known to every foreign government, friendly or unfriendly. the true objective in naval warfare is the enemy's navy. that must be destroyed or decisively defeated, or intimidated into remaining in its ports. not one of these can be effected without a mobile, that is a sea-going, fleet. the british empire may fall to pieces from causes as yet unknown or unsuspected: it cannot be kept together if it loses the power of gaining command of the sea. this is not a result of deliberate policy: it is inherent in the nature of the empire, scattered as its parts are throughout the world, with only the highway of the sea between them. such is the position of the fleet in the defence of the empire: such are its duties towards it. duties in the case are mutual, and some are owed to the fleet as well as by it. it is incumbent on every section of the empire, without neglecting its land forces, to lend zealous help in keeping the fleet efficient. it is not to be supposed that this can be done only by making pecuniary contributions to its maintenance. it is, indeed, very doubtful if any real good can be done by urging colonies to make them. it seems certain that the objections to this are greater than any benefit that it can confer. badgering our fellow-subjects beyond sea for money payments towards the cost of the navy is undignified and impolitic. the greatest sum asked for by the most exacting postulant would not equal a twentieth part of the imperial naval expenditure, and would not save the taxpayer of the mother country a farthing in the pound of his income. no one has yet been able to establish the equity of a demand that would take something from the inhabitants of one colony and nothing from those of another. adequate voluntary contribution is a different matter. there are other ways in which every trans-marine possession of the crown can lend a hand towards perfecting the efficiency of the fleet--ways, too, which would leave each in complete and unmenaced control of its own money. sea-power does not consist entirely of men-of-war. there must be docks, refitting establishments, magazines, and depots of stores. ports, which men-of-war must visit at least occasionally in war for repair or replenishment of supplies, will have to be made secure against the assaults which it has been said that a hastily raiding enemy, notwithstanding our general control of the communications, might find a chance of making. moderate fixed fortifications are all the passive defence that would be needed; but good and active troops must be available. if all these are not provided by the part of the empire in which the necessary naval bases lie, they will have to be provided by the mother country. if the former provides them the latter will be spared the expense of doing so, and spared expense with no loss of dignity, and with far less risk of friction and inconvenience than if her taxpayers' pockets had been nominally spared to the extent of a trifling and reluctantly paid money contribution. it has been pointed out on an earlier page that a country can be, and most probably will be, more effectually defended in a maritime war if its fleet operates at a distance from, rather than near, its shores. every subject of our king should long to see this condition exist if ever the empire is involved in hostilities. it may be--for who can tell what war will bring?--that the people of some great trans-marine dependency will have to choose between allowing a campaign to be conducted in their country or forcing the enemy to tolerate it in his. if they choose the latter they must be prepared to furnish part at least of the mobile force that can give effect to their choice. that is to say, they must be prepared to back up our sea-power in its efforts to keep off the tide of war from the neighbourhood of their homes. history shows how rarely, during the struggle between european nations for predominance in north america, the more settled parts of our former american colonies were the theatre of war: but then the colonists of those days, few comparatively as they were, sent strong contingents to the armies that went campaigning, in the territory of the various enemies. this was in every way better--the sequel proved how much better--than a money contribution begged or extorted would have been. helping in the manner first suggested need not result in dissociating our fellow-subjects beyond the seas from participation in the work of the active sea-going fleet. it is now, and still would be, open to them as much as to any native or denizen of the mother country. the time has fully come when the people of the greater outlying parts of the empire should insist upon perfect equality of treatment with their home fellow-subjects in this matter. they should resent, as a now quite out-of-date and invidious distinction, any difference in qualification for entry, locality of service, or remuneration for any rank or rating. self-respect and a dignified confidence in their own qualities, the excellence of which has been thoroughly tested, will prompt the king's colonial subjects to ask for nothing but equal chances in a force on which is laid so large a part of the duty of defending the empire. why should they cut themselves off from the promising career that service in the royal navy opens to the capable, the zealous, and the honourable aspirant of every grade? some of the highest posts in the navy are now, or lately have been, held by men who not only happened to be born in british colonies, but who also belong to resident colonial families. surely in this there is a strong moral cement for binding and keeping the empire together. it is unnecessary to expatiate on the contrast between the prospect of such a career and that which is all that a small local service could offer. it would soon be seen towards which the enterprising and the energetic would instinctively gravitate. in the defence of the british empire the fleet holds a twofold position. to its general belligerent efficiency, its strength and activity, we must look if the plans of an enemy are to be brought to nought. it, and it only, can secure for us the control of the ocean communications, on the freedom of which from serious interruptions the prosperity--indeed, the existence--of a scattered body must depend. in time of peace it can be made a great consolidating force, fostering every sentiment of worthy local patriotism whilst obliterating all inclination to mischievous narrow particularism, and tending to perfect the unity which gives virtue to national grandeur and is the true secret of national independence and strength. xi naval strategy and tactics at the time of trafalgar[ ] [footnote : written in . (read at institute of naval architects.)] the subject on which i have been invited to read a paper, and which is taken as the title of the latter, would require for anything like full discussion a much longer time than you can be expected to allot to it. to discuss it adequately, a volume of no diminutive size would be necessary. it may, however, be possible to indicate with the brevity appropriate to the occasion the main outlines of the subject, and to suggest for your consideration certain points which, over and above their historical interest, may furnish us with valuable guidance at the present day. in taking account of the conditions of the trafalgar epoch we have to note two distinct but, of course, closely related matters. these are the strategic plan of the enemy and the strategic plan adopted to meet it by the british. the former of these was described in the house of commons by william pitt at the beginning of the war in words which may be used without change at the present time. on th may the war, which had been interrupted by the unstable peace of amiens, was definitely resumed. the struggle was now to be a war not so much between the united kingdom and the french nation as between the united kingdom and the great napoleon, wielding more than the resources of france alone. speaking a week after the declaration of war, pitt said that any expectation of success which the enemy might have must be based on the supposition that he could break the spirit or weaken the determination of the country by harassing us with the perpetual apprehension of descents on our coasts; or else that our resources could be impaired and our credit undermined by the effects of an expensive and protracted war. more briefly stated, the hostile plan was to invade the united kingdom, ruin our maritime trade, and expel us from our over-sea possessions, especially in the east, from which it was supposed our wealth was chiefly derived. the plan was comprehensive, but not easily concealed. what we had to do was to prevent the invasion of the united kingdom and defend our trade and our outlying territories. as not one of the hostile objects could be attained except by making a maritime expedition of some kind, that is to say, by an expedition which had to cross more or less extensive areas of water, it necessarily followed that our most effective method of defence was the keeping open of our sea communications. it became necessary for us to make such arrangements that the maritime paths by which a hostile expedition could approach our home-coasts, or hostile cruisers molest our sea-borne trade, or hostile squadrons move to the attack of our trans-marine dependencies--that all these paths should be so defended by our navy that either the enemy would not venture to traverse them or, if he did, that he could be driven off. short as it is, the time at my disposal permits me to give a few details. it was fully recognised that defence of the united kingdom against invasion could not be secured by naval means alone. as in the times of queen elizabeth, so in those of george iii, no seaman of reputation contended that a sufficient land force could be dispensed with. our ablest seamen always held that small hostile expeditions could be prepared in secret and might be able to slip through the most complete lines of naval defence that we could hope to maintain. it was not discovered or alleged till the twentieth century that the crew of a dinghy could not land in this country in the face of the navy. therefore an essential feature of our defensive strategy was the provision of land forces in such numbers that an invader would have no chance of succeeding except he came in strength so great that his preparations could not be concealed and his expedition could not cross the water unseen. as our mercantile marine was to be found in nearly every sea, though in greater accumulation in some areas than in others, its defence against the assaults of an enemy could only be ensured by the virtual ubiquity of our cruising force. this, of course, involved the necessity of employing a large number of cruisers, and of arranging the distribution of them in accordance with the relative amount and value of the traffic to be protected from molestation in different parts of the ocean. it may be mentioned here that the term 'cruiser,' at the time with which we are dealing, was not limited to frigates and smaller classes of vessels. it included also ships of the line, it being the old belief of the british navy, justified by the experience of many campaigns and consecrated by the approval of our greatest admirals, that the value of a ship of war was directly proportionate to her capacity for cruising and keeping the sea. if the ocean paths used by our merchant ships--the trade routes or sea communications of the united kingdom with friendly or neutral markets and areas of production--could be kept open by our navy, that is, made so secure that our trade could traverse them with so little risk of molestation that it could continue to be carried on, it resulted as a matter of course that no sustained attack could be made on our outlying territory. where this was possible it was where we had failed to keep open the route or line of communications, in which case the particular trade following it was, at least temporarily, destroyed, and the territory to which the route led was either cut off or seized. naturally, when this was perceived, efforts were made to re-open and keep open the endangered or interrupted communication line. napoleon, notwithstanding his supereminent genius, made some extraordinary mistakes about warfare on the sea. the explanation of this has been given by a highly distinguished french admiral. the great emperor, he says, was wanting in exact appreciation of the difficulties of naval operations. he never understood that the naval officer--alone of all men in the world--must be master of two distinct professions. the naval officer must be as completely a seaman as an officer in any mercantile marine; and, in addition to this, he must be as accomplished in the use of the material of war entrusted to his charge as the members of any aimed force in the world. the emperor's plan for the invasion of the united kingdom was conceived on a grand scale. a great army, eventually , strong, was collected on the coast of north-eastern france, with its headquarters at boulogne. the numerical strength of this army is worth attention. by far the larger part of it was to have made the first descent on our territory; the remainder was to be a reserve to follow as quickly as possible. it has been doubted if napoleon really meant to invade this country, the suggestion being that his collection of an army on the shores of the straits of dover and the english channel was merely a 'blind' to cover another intended movement. the overwhelming weight of authoritative opinion is in favour of the view that the project of invasion was real. it is highly significant that he considered so large a number of troops necessary. it could not have been governed by any estimate of the naval obstruction to be encountered during the sea passage of the expedition, but only by the amount of the land force likely to be met if the disembarkation on our shores could be effected. the numerical strength in troops which napoleon thought necessary compelled him to make preparations on so great a scale that concealment became quite impossible. consequently an important part of his plan was disclosed to us betimes, and the threatened locality indicated to us within comparatively narrow limits of precision. notwithstanding his failure to appreciate all the difficulties of naval warfare, the great emperor had grasped one of its leading principles. before the peace of amiens, indeed before his campaign in egypt, and even his imposing triumphs in italy, he had seen that the invasion of the united kingdom was impracticable without first obtaining the command of the sea. his strategic plan, therefore, included arrangements to secure this. the details of the plan were changed from time to time as conditions altered; but the main object was adhered to until the final abandonment of the whole scheme under pressure of circumstances as embodied in nelson and his victorious brothers-in-arms. the gunboats, transport boats, and other small craft, which to the number of many hundreds filled the ports of north-eastern france and the netherlands, were not the only naval components of the expedition. fleets of line-of-battle ships were essential parts of it, and on their effective action the success of the scheme was largely made to depend. this feature remained unaltered in principle when, less than twelve months before trafalgar, spain took part in the war as napoleon's ally, and brought him a great reinforcement of ships and important assistance in money. we should not fail to notice that, before he considered himself strong enough to undertake the invasion of the united kingdom, napoleon found it necessary to have at his disposal the resources of other countries besides france, notwithstanding that by herself france had a population more than per cent. greater than that of england. by the alliance with spain he had added largely to the resources on which he could draw. moreover, his strategic position was geographically much improved. with the exception of that of portugal, the coast of western continental europe, from the texel to leghorn, and somewhat later to taranto also, was united in hostility to us. this complicated the strategic problem which the british navy had to solve, as it increased the number of points to be watched; and it facilitated the junction of napoleon's mediterranean naval forces with those assembled in his atlantic ports by supplying him with allied ports of refuge and refit on spanish territory--such as cartagena or cadiz--between toulon and the bay of biscay. napoleon, therefore, enforced upon us by the most convincing of all arguments the necessity of maintaining the british navy at the 'two-power standard' at least. the lesson had been taught us long before by philip ii, who did not venture on an attempt at invading this country till he was master of the resources of the whole iberian peninsula as well as of those of the spanish dominions in italy, in the burgundian heritage, and in the distant regions across the atlantic ocean. at several points on the long stretch of coast of which he was now the master, napoleon equipped fleets that were to unite and win for him the command of the sea during a period long enough to permit the unobstructed passage of his invading army across the water which separated the starting points of his expedition from the united kingdom. command of the sea to be won by a powerful naval combination was thus an essential element in napoleon's strategy at the time of trafalgar. it was not in deciding what was essential that this soldier of stupendous ability erred: it was in choosing the method of gaining the essential that he went wrong. the british strategy adopted in opposition to that of napoleon was based on the acquisition and preservation of the command of the sea. formulated and carried into effect by seamen, it differed in some important features from his. we may leave out of sight for the moment the special arrangements made in the english channel to oppose the movements of napoleon's flotillas of gunboats, transport boats, and other small craft. the british strategy at the time of trafalgar, as far as it was concerned with opposition to napoleon's sea-going fleets, may be succinctly described as stationing off each of the ports in which the enemy's forces were lying a fleet or squadron of suitable strength. though some of our admirals, notably nelson himself, objected to the application of the term 'blockade' to their plans, the hostile ships were to this extent blockaded, that if they should come out they would find outside their port a british force sufficient to drive them in again, or even to defeat them thoroughly and destroy them. beating them and thus having done with them, and not simply shutting them up in harbour, was what was desired by our admirals. this necessitated a close watch on the hostile ports; and how consistently that was maintained let the history of cornwallis's command off brest and of nelson's off toulon suffice to tell us. the junction of two or more of napoleon's fleets would have ensured over almost any single british fleet a numerical superiority that would have rendered the defeat or retirement of the latter almost certain. to meet this condition the british strategy contemplated the falling back, if necessary, of one of our detachments on another, which might be carried further and junction with a third detachment be effected. by this step we should preserve, if not a numerical superiority over the enemy, at least so near an equality of force as to render his defeat probable and his serious maltreatment, even if undefeated, a certainty. the strategic problem before our navy was, however, not quite so easy as this might make it seem. the enemy's concentration might be attempted either towards brest or towards toulon. in the latter case, a superior force might fall upon our mediterranean fleet before our watching ships in the atlantic could discover the escape of the enemy's ships from the atlantic port or could follow and come up with them. against the probability of this was to be set the reluctance of napoleon to carry out an eccentric operation which a concentration off toulon would necessitate, when the essence of his scheme was to concentrate in a position from which he could obtain naval control of the english channel. after the addition of the spanish navy to his own, napoleon to some extent modified his strategic arrangements. the essential feature of the scheme remained unaltered. it was to effect the junction of the different parts of his naval force and thereupon to dominate the situation, by evading the several british fleets or detachments which were watching his. before spain joined him in the war his intention was that his escaping fleets should go out into the atlantic, behind the backs, as it were, of the british ships, and then make for the english channel. when he had the aid of spain the point of junction was to be in the west indies. the remarkable thing about this was the evident belief that the command of the sea might be won without fighting for it; won, too, from the british navy which was ready, and indeed wished, to fight. we now see that napoleon's naval strategy at the time of trafalgar, whilst it aimed at gaining command of the sea, was based on what has been called evasion. the fundamental principle of the british naval strategy of that time was quite different. so far from thinking that the contest could be settled without one or more battles, the british admirals, though nominally blockading his ports, gave the enemy every facility for coming out in order that they might be able to bring him to action. napoleon, on the contrary, declared that a battle would be useless, and distinctly ordered his officers not to fight one. could it be that, when pitted against admirals whose accurate conception of the conditions of naval warfare had been over and over again tested during the hostilities ended by the peace of amiens, napoleon still trusted to the efficacy of methods which had proved so successful when he was outmanoeuvring and intimidating the generals who opposed him in north italy? we can only explain his attitude in the campaign of trafalgar by attributing to him an expectation that the british seamen of his day, tried as they had been in the fire of many years of war, would succumb to his methods as readily as the military formalists of central europe. napoleon had at his disposal between seventy and eighty french, dutch, and spanish ships of the line, of which some sixty-seven were available at the beginning of the trafalgar campaign. in january , besides other ships of the class in distant waters or specially employed, we--on our side--had eighty ships of the line in commission. a knowledge of this will enable us to form some idea of the chances of success that would have attended napoleon's concentration if it had been effected. to protect the passage of his invading expedition across the english channel he did not depend only on concentrating his more distant fleets. in the texel there were, besides smaller vessels, nine sail of the line. thus the emperor did what we may be sure any future intending invader will not fail to do, viz. he provided his expedition with a respectable naval escort. the british naval officers of the day, who knew what war was, made arrangements to deal with this escort. lord keith, who commanded in the downs, had under him six sail of the line in addition to many frigates and sloops; and there were five more line-of-battle ships ready at spithead if required. there had been a demand in the country that the defence of our shores against an invading expedition should be entrusted to gunboats, and what may be called coastal small craft and boats. this was resisted by the naval officers. nelson had already said, 'our first defence is close to the enemy's ports,' thus agreeing with a long line of eminent british seamen in their view of our strategy. lord st. vincent said that 'our great reliance is on the vigilance and activity of our cruisers at sea, any reduction in the number of which by applying them to guard our ports, inlets, and beaches would, in my judgment, tend to our destruction.' these are memorable words, which we should do well to ponder in these days. the government of the day insisted on having the coastal boats; but st. vincent succeeded in postponing the preparation of them till the cruising ships had been manned. his plan of defence has been described by his biographer as 'a triple line of barricade; -gun ships, frigates, sloops of war, and gun-vessels upon the coast of the enemy; in the downs opposite france another squadron, but of powerful ships of the line, continually disposable, to support the former or attack any force of the enemy which, it might be imagined possible, might slip through the squadron hanging over the coast; and a force on the beach on all the shores of the english ports, to render assurance doubly sure.' this last item was the one that st. vincent had been compelled to adopt, and he was careful that it should be in addition to those measures of defence in the efficacy of which he and his brother seamen believed. concerning it his biographer makes the following remark: 'it is to be noted that lord st. vincent did not contemplate repelling an invasion of gunboats by gunboats,' &c. he objected to the force of sea-fencibles, or long-shore organisation, because he considered it more useful to have the sea-going ships manned. speaking of this coastal defence scheme, he said: 'it would be a good bone for the officers to pick, but a very dear one for the country.' the defence of our ocean trade entered largely into the strategy of the time. an important part was played by our fleets and groups of line-of-battle ships which gave usually indirect, but sometimes direct, protection to our own merchant vessels, and also to neutral vessels carrying commodities to or from british ports. the strategy of the time, the correctness of which was confirmed by long belligerent experience, rejected the employment of a restricted number of powerful cruisers, and relied upon the practical ubiquity of the defending ships, which ubiquity was rendered possible by the employment of very numerous craft of moderate size. this can be seen in the lists of successive years. in january the number of cruising frigates in commission was , and of sloops and smaller vessels , the total being . in the numbers were: frigates, ; sloops, &c., ; with a total of . in the figures had grown to frigates, sloops, &c., the total being . most of these were employed in defending commerce. we all know how completely napoleon's project of invading the united kingdom was frustrated. it is less well known that the measures for defending our sea-borne trade, indicated by the figures just given, were triumphantly successful. our mercantile marine increased during the war, a sure proof that it had been effectually defended. consequently we may accept it as established beyond the possibility of refutation that that branch of our naval strategy at the time of trafalgar which was concerned with the defence of our trade was rightly conceived and properly carried into effect. as has been stated already, the defence of our sea-borne trade, being in practice the keeping open of our ocean lines of communication, carried with it the protection, in part at any rate, of our transmarine territories. napoleon held pertinaciously to the belief that british prosperity was chiefly due to our position in india. we owe it to captain mahan that we now know that the eminent american fulton--a name of interest to the members of this institution--told pitt of the belief held abroad that 'the fountains of british wealth are in india and china.' in the great scheme of naval concentration which the emperor devised, seizure of british colonies in the west indies had a definite place. we kept in that quarter, and varied as necessary, a force capable of dealing with a naval raid as well as guarding the neighbouring lines of communication. in we had four ships of the line in the west indian area. in we had six of the same class; and in , while the line-of-battle ships were reduced to four, the number of frigates was increased from nine to twenty-five. whether our government divined napoleon's designs on india or not, it took measures to protect our interests there. in january we had on the cape of good hope and the east indies stations, both together, six sail of the line, three smaller two-deckers, six frigates, and six sloops, or twenty-one ships of war in all. this would have been sufficient to repel a raiding attack made in some strength. by the beginning of our east indies force had been increased; and in the year itself we raised it to a strength of forty-one ships in all, of which nine were of the line and seventeen were frigates. had, therefore, any of the hostile ships managed to get to the east indies from the atlantic or the mediterranean ports, in which they were being watched by our navy, their chances of succeeding in their object would have been small indeed. when we enter the domain of tactics strictly so-called, that is to say, when we discuss the proceedings of naval forces--whether single ships, squadrons, or fleets--in hostile contact with one another, we find the time of trafalgar full of instructive episodes. even with the most recent experience of naval warfare vividly present to our minds, we can still regard nelson as the greatest of tacticians. naval tactics may be roughly divided into two great classes or sections, viz. the tactics of groups of ships, that is to say, fleet actions; and the tactics of what the historian james calls 'single ship actions,' that is to say, fights between two individual ships. in the former the achievements of nelson stand out with incomparable brilliancy. it would be impossible to describe his method fully in such a paper as this. we may, however, say that nelson was an innovator, and that his tactical principles and methods have been generally misunderstood down to this very day. if ever there was an admiral who was opposed to an unthinking, headlong rush at an enemy, it was he. yet this is the character that he still bears in the conception of many. he was, in truth, an industrious and patient student of tactics, having studied them, in what in these days we should call a scientific spirit, at an early period, when there was but little reason to expect that he would ever be in a position to put to a practical test the knowledge that he had acquired and the ideas that he had formed. he saw that the old battle formation in single line-ahead was insufficient if you wanted--as he himself always did--to gain an overwhelming victory. he also saw that, though an improvement on the old formation, lord howe's method of the single line-abreast was still a good deal short of tactical perfection. therefore, he devised what he called, with pardonable elation, the 'nelson touch,' the attack in successive lines so directed as to overwhelm one part of the enemy's fleet, whilst the other part was prevented from coming to the assistance of the first, and was in its turn overwhelmed or broken up. his object was to bring a larger number of his own ships against a smaller number of the enemy's. he would by this method destroy the part attacked, suffering in the process so little damage himself that with his whole force he would be able to deal effectively with the hostile remnant if it ventured to try conclusions with him. it is of the utmost importance that we should thoroughly understand nelson's fundamental tactical principle, viz. the bringing of a larger number of ships to fight against a smaller number of the enemy's. there is not, i believe, in the whole of the records of nelson's opinions and actions a single expression tending to show that tactical efficiency was considered by him to be due to superiority in size of individual ships of the same class or--as far as _matériel_ was concerned--to anything but superior numbers, of course at the critical point. he did not require, and did not have, more ships in his own fleet than the whole of those in the fleet of the enemy. what he wanted was to bring to the point of impact, when the fight began, a larger number of ships than were to be found in that part of the enemy's line. i believe that i am right in saying that, from the date of salamis downwards, history records no decisive naval victory in which the victorious fleet has not succeeded in concentrating against a relatively weak point in its enemy's formation a greater number of its own ships. i know of nothing to show that this has not been the rule throughout the ages of which detailed history furnishes us with any memorial--no matter what the class of ship, what the type of weapon, what the mode of propulsion. the rule certainly prevailed in the battle of the th august off port arthur, though it was not so overwhelmingly decisive as some others. we may not even yet know enough of the sea fight in the straits of tsushima to be able to describe it in detail; but we do know that at least some of the russian ships were defeated or destroyed by a combination of japanese ships against them. looking back at the tactics of the trafalgar epoch, we may see that the history of them confirms the experience of earlier wars, viz. that victory does not necessarily fall to the side which has the biggest ships. it is a well-known fact of naval history that generally the french ships were larger and the spanish much larger than the british ships of corresponding classes. this superiority in size certainly did not carry with it victory in action. on the other hand, british ships were generally bigger than the dutch ships with which they fought; and it is of great significance that at camperdown the victory was due, not to superiority in the size of individual ships, but, as shown by the different lists of killed and wounded, to the act of bringing a larger number against a smaller. all that we have been able to learn of the occurrences in the battle of the japan sea supports instead of being opposed to this conclusion; and it may be said that there is nothing tending to upset it in the previous history of the present war in the far east. i do not know how far i am justified in expatiating on this point; but, as it may help to bring the strategy and tactics of the trafalgar epoch into practical relation with the stately science of which in our day this institution is, as it were, the mother-shrine and metropolitical temple, i may be allowed to dwell upon it a little longer. the object aimed at by those who favour great size of individual ships is not, of course, magnitude alone. it is to turn out a ship which shall be more powerful than an individual antagonist. all recent development of man-of-war construction has taken the form of producing, or at any rate trying to produce, a more powerful ship than those of earlier date, or belonging to a rival navy. i know the issues that such statements are likely to raise; and i ask you, as naval architects, to bear with me patiently when i say what i am going to say. it is this: if you devise for the ship so produced the tactical system for which she is specially adapted you must, in order to be logical, base your system on her power of defeating her particular antagonist. consequently, you must abandon the principle of concentration of superior numbers against your enemy; and, what is more, must be prepared to maintain that such concentration on his part against yourself would be ineffectual. this will compel a reversion to tactical methods which made a fleet action a series of duels between pairs of combatants, and--a thing to be pondered on seriously--never enabled anyone to win a decisive victory on the sea. the position will not be made more logical if you demand both superior size and also superior numbers, because if you adopt the tactical system appropriate to one of the things demanded, you will rule out the other. you cannot employ at the same time two different and opposed tactical systems. it is not necessary to the line of argument above indicated to ignore the merits of the battleship class. like their predecessors, the ships of the line, it is really battleships which in a naval war dominate the situation. we saw that it was so at the time of trafalgar, and we see that it has been so in the war between russia and japan, at all events throughout the campaign. the experience of naval war, down to the close of that in which trafalgar was the most impressive event, led to the virtual abandonment of ships of the line[ ] above and below a certain class. the -gun ships and smaller two-deckers had greatly diminished in number, and repetitions of them grew more and more rare. it was the same with the three-deckers, which, as the late admiral colomb pointed out, continued to be built, though in reduced numbers, not so much for their tactical efficiency as for the convenient manner in which they met the demands for the accommodation required in flag-ships. the tactical condition which the naval architects of the trafalgar period had to meet was the employment of an increased number of two-deckers of the medium classes. [footnote : experience of war, as regards increase in the number of medium-sized men-of-war of the different classes, tended to the same result in both the french revolutionary war ( to ) and the napoleonic war which began in . taking both contests down to the end of the trafalgar year, the following table will show how great was the development of the line-of-battle-ship class below the three-decker and above the -gun ship. it will also show that there was no development of, but a relative decline in, the three-deckers and the 's, the small additions, where there were any, being generally due to captures from the enemy. the two-deckers not 'fit to lie in a line' were at the end of the trafalgar year about half what they were when the first period of the 'great war' began. when we come to the frigate classes we find the same result. in the earlier war frigates of and guns were introduced into our navy. it is worth notice that this number was not increased, and by the end of the trafalgar year had, on the contrary, declined to . the smallest frigates, of guns, were in , and at the end of the trafalgar year. on the other hand, the increase in the medium frigate classes ( , , and guns) was very large. from to the end of the trafalgar year the -gun frigates increased from to , and the -gun frigates from to . ------------------------------------------------------------- | | | napoleonic war to | | | french | the end of the | | | revolutionary war | trafalgar year | | classes of ships |-------------------|-------------------| | |commence-|commence-|commence-|commence-| | | ment of | ment of | ment of | ment of | | | | | | | |-------------------------------------------------------------| | -deckers | | | | | | -deckers of | | | | | | guns, and above | | | | | | and gun ships | | | | | | -deckers not 'fit | | | | | | to lie in a line' | | | | | | frigates guns | | | | | | " " | | | | | | " " | | | | | | " " | | | | | | " " | | | | | | " " | | | | | ------------------------------------------------------------- the liking for three-deckers, professed by some officers of nelson's time, seems to have been due to a belief, not in the merit of their size as such, but in the value of the increased number of medium guns carried on a 'middle' deck. there is, i believe, nothing to show that the two-deckers _gibraltar_ ( tons) and _coesar_ ( ) were considered more formidable than the three-deckers _balfleur_ ( ), _glory_ ( ), or _queen_ ( ). all these ships were in the same fleet, and fought in the same battle.] a fleet of ships of the line as long as it could keep the sea, that is, until it had to retreat into port before a stronger fleet, controlled a certain area of water. within that area smaller men-of-war as well as friendly merchant ships were secure from attack. as the fleet moved about, so the area moved with it. skilful disposition and manoeuvring added largely to the extent of sea within which the maritime interests that the fleet was meant to protect would be safe. it seems reasonable to expect that it will be the same with modern fleets of suitable battleships. the tactics of 'single ship actions' at the time of trafalgar were based upon pure seamanship backed up by good gunnery. the better a captain handled his ship the more likely he was to beat his antagonist. superior speed, where it existed, was used to 'gain the weather gage,' not in order to get a suitable range for the faster ship's guns, but to compel her enemy to fight. superior speed was also used to run away, capacity to do which was not then, and ought not to be now, reckoned a merit in a ship expressly constructed for fighting, not fleeing. it is sometimes claimed in these days that superior speed will enable a modern ship to keep at a distance from her opponent which will be the best range for her own guns. it has not been explained why a range which best suits her guns should not be equally favourable for the guns of her opponent; unless, indeed, the latter is assumed to be weakly armed, in which case the distance at which the faster ship might engage her would be a matter of comparative indifference. there is nothing in the tactics of the time of trafalgar to make it appear that--when a fight had once begun--superior speed, of course within moderate limits, conferred any considerable tactical advantage in 'single ship actions,' and still less in general or fleet actions. taking up a position ahead or astern of a hostile ship so as to be able to rake her was not facilitated by originally superior speed so much as by the more damaged state of the ship to be raked--raking, as a rule, occurring rather late in an action. a remarkable result of long experience of war made itself clearly apparent in the era of trafalgar. i have already alluded to the tendency to restrict the construction of line-of-battle ships to those of the medium classes. the same thing may be noticed in the case of the frigates.[ ] those of , , and guns relatively or absolutely diminished in number; whilst the number of the -gun, -gun, and -gun frigates increased. the officers who had personal experience of many campaigns were able to impress on the naval architects of the day the necessity of recognising the sharp distinction that really exists between what we should now call the 'battleship' and what we should now call the 'cruiser.' in the earlier time there were ships which were intermediate between the ship of the line and the frigate. these were the two-deckers of , , , , and even guns. they had long been regarded as not 'fit to lie in a line,' and they were never counted in the frigate classes. they seemed to have held a nondescript position, for no one knew exactly how to employ them in war any more than we now know exactly how to employ our armoured cruisers, as to which it is not settled whether they are fit for general actions or should be confined to commerce defending or other cruiser service. the two-deckers just mentioned were looked upon by the date of trafalgar as forming an unnecessary class of fighting ships. some were employed, chiefly because they existed, on special service; but they were being replaced by true battleships on one side and true frigates on the other.[ ] [footnote : see footnote .] [footnote : see footnote .] in conclusion, i would venture to say that the strategical and tactical lessons taught by a long series of naval campaigns had been mastered by our navy by the time of the trafalgar campaign. the effect of those lessons showed itself in our ship-building policy, and has been placed on permanent record in the history of maritime achievement and of the adaptation of material means to belligerent ends. xii the supply and communications of a fleet[ ] [footnote : written in . (read at the hong-kong united service institution.)] a problem which is not an attractive one, but which has to be solved, is to arrange the proper method of supplying a fleet and maintaining its communications. in time of peace as well as in time of war there is a continuous consumption of the articles of various kinds used on board ship, viz. naval stores, ordnance stores, engineers' stores, victualling stores, coal, water, &c. if we know the quantity of each description of stores that a ship can carry, and if we estimate the progressive consumption, we can compute, approximately but accurately enough for practical purposes, the time at which replenishment would be necessary and to what amount it should be made up. as a general rule ships stow about three months' stores and provisions. the amount of coal and engineers' stores, measured in time, depends on the proceedings of the ship, and can only be calculated if we know during what portion of any given period she will be under way. of course, this can be only roughly estimated. in peace time we know nearly exactly what the expenditure of ammunition within a given length of time--say, a quarter of a year--will be. for war conditions we can only form an estimate based upon assumptions. the consumption of provisions depends upon the numbers of officers and men, and in war or peace would be much the same. the greater activity to be expected in war would lead to more wear and tear, and consequently to a larger expenditure of naval stores. in peaceful times the quarterly expenditure of ammunition does not vary materially. in case we were at war, a single action might cause us to expend in a few hours as much as half a dozen quarterly peace allowances. there is a certain average number of days that a ship of a particular class is under way in a year, and the difference between that number and is, of course, the measure of the length of time she is at anchor or in harbour. expenditure of coal and of some important articles of engineers' stores depends on the relation between the time that she is stationary and the time she is under way. it should be particularly noted that the distinction is not between time at anchor and time at sea, but between time at anchor and 'time under way.' if a ship leaves her anchorage to run an engine-trial after refit, or to fire at a target, or to adjust compasses, or to go into dock--she burns more coal than if she remained stationary. these occasions of movement may be counted in with the days in which the ship is at sea, and the total taken as the number of days under way. it may be assumed that altogether these will amount to six or seven a month. in time of war the period under way would probably be much longer, and the time spent in expectation of getting under way in a hurry would almost certainly be considerable, so that expenditure of coal and machinery lubricants would be greatly increased. the point to be made here is that--independently of strategic conditions, which will be considered later--the difference in the supply of a given naval force in war and in peace is principally that in the former the requirements of nearly everything except provisions will be greater; and consequently that the articles must be forwarded in larger quantities or at shorter intervals than in peace time. if, therefore, we have arranged a satisfactory system of peace supply, that system--defence of the line of communications being left out of consideration for the present--will merely have to be expanded in time of war. in other words, practice in the use of the system during peace will go a long way towards preparing us for the duty of working it under war conditions. that a regular system will be absolutely indispensable during hostilities will not be doubted. the general principles which i propose to indicate are applicable to any station. we may allow for a squadron composed of-- battleships, large cruisers, second-class cruisers, smaller vessels of various kinds, and destroyers, being away from the principal base-port of the station for several months of the year. the number of officers and men would be, in round numbers, about , . in estimating the amounts of stores of different kinds required by men-of-war, it is necessary--in order to allow for proper means of conveyance--to convert tons of dead-weight into tons by measurement, as the two are not always exactly equivalent. in the following enumeration only estimated amounts are stated, and the figures are to be considered as approximate and not precise. it is likely that in each item an expert maybe able to discover some variation from the rigorously exact; but the general result will be sufficiently accurate for practical purposes, especially as experience will suggest corrections. a thousand men require about . tons of victualling stores, packages included, daily, we may make this figure up to . tons to allow for 'medical comforts' and canteen stores, consequently , men require about tons a day, and about tons for six months. the assumed squadron, judging from experience, would require in peace time about tons of engineers' stores, about tons of naval stores, and--if the ships started with only their exact allowance on board and then carried out a full quarterly practice twice--the quantity of ordnance stores and ammunition required would be about tons, to meet the ordinary peace rate of expenditure, we thus get for a full six months' supply the following figures:-- victualling stores , tons. engineers' stores " naval stores " ordnance stores and ammunition , " ----- total , " some allowance must be made for the needs of the 'auxiliaries,'[ ] the vessels that bring supplies and in other ways attend on the fighting ships. this may be put at per cent. the tonnage required would accordingly amount in all to about . [footnote : the per cent. mentioned in the text would probably cover nearly all the demands--except coal--of auxiliaries, which would not require much or any ammunition. coal is provided for separately.] the squadron would burn in harbour or when stationary about tons of coal a day, and when under way about tons a day. for harbour-days the consumption would be about , tons; and for days under way about , : so that for coal requirements we should have the following:-- harbour consumption , tons. under-way consumption , " ------ total for fighting ships , " per cent. for auxiliaries (say) , " ------ grand total , " some time ago (in ) a representation was made from the china station that, engine-room oil being expended whenever coal is expended, there must be some proportion between the quantities of each. it was, therefore, suggested that every collier should bring to the squadron which she was supplying a proportionate quantity of oil. this has been approved, and it has been ordered that the proportions will be gallons of oil to every tons of coal.[ ] it was also suggested that the oil should be carried in casks of two sizes, for the convenience of both large and small ships. [footnote : i was informed (on the th december ), some time after the above was written, that the colliers supplying the united states navy are going to carry gallons of oil for every tons of coal.] there is another commodity, which ships have never been able to do without, and which they need now in higher proportion than ever. that commodity is fresh water. the squadron constituted as assumed would require an average of about tons of fresh water a day, and nearly , tons in six months. of this the ships, without adding very inconveniently to their coal consumption, might themselves distil about one-half; but the remaining , tons would have to be brought to them; and another thousand tons would probably be wanted by the auxiliaries, making the full six months' demand up to , tons. the tonnage requirements of the squadron and its 'auxiliaries' for a full six months' period would be about , , without fresh water. as, however, the ships would have started with full store-rooms, holds, and bunkers, and might be expected to return to the principal base-port of the station at the end of the period, stores for four-and-a-half months', and coal to meet twenty weeks', consumption would be sufficient. these would be about tons of stores and ammunition and , tons of coal.[ ] [footnote : to avoid complicating the question, the water or distilling vessel, the hospital ship, and the repair vessel have not been considered specially. their coal and stores have been allowed for.] the stores, &c., would have to be replenished twice and--as it would not be prudent to let the ships run right out of them--replenishment should take place at the end of the second and at the end of the fourth months. two vessels carrying stores and ammunition, if capable of transporting a cargo of nearly tons apiece, would bring all that was wanted at each replenishment. to diminish risk of losing all of one description of supplies, if carried by itself in a separate vessel, it has been considered desirable that each supply-carrier, when employed, is to contain some ammunition, some stores, and some provisions. there are great advantages in having supply-carriers, including, of course, colliers, of moderate size. many officers must have had experience of the inconvenience and delay due to the employment of a single very large vessel which could only coal one man-of-war at a time. several vessels, each carrying a moderate amount of cargo, would permit much more rapid replenishment of the ships of a squadron. the inconvenience that would be caused by the loss or breakdown of a supply-carrier would be reduced by employing several vessels of moderate cargo-capacity instead of only one or two of great capacity. each battleship and large cruiser of the assumed squadron may be expected to burn about tons of coal in five weeks, so that the quantity to be used in that time by all those ships would be tons. the remaining ships, scattered between different places as most of them would probably be, would require about tons. therefore, every five weeks or so , tons of coal would be required. four replenishments would be necessary in the whole period, making a total of , tons. each replenishment could be conveyed in five colliers with tons apiece. moderate dimensions in store- and coal-carriers would prove convenient, not only because it would facilitate taking in stores and coaling, if all the squadron were assembled at one place, but also if part were at one place and part at another. division into several vessels, instead of concentration in a few, would give great flexibility to the system of supply. a single very capacious cargo-carrier might have to go first to one place and supply the ships there, and then go to supply the remaining ships lying at another anchorage. this would cause loss of time. the same amount of cargo distributed amongst two or more vessels would permit the ships at two or more places to be supplied simultaneously. you may have noticed that i have been dealing with the question as though stores and coal were to be transported direct to the men-of-war wherever they might be and put straight on board them from the carrying-vessels. there is, as you all know, another method, which may be described as that of 'secondary bases.' speaking generally, each of our naval stations has a principal base at which considerable or even extensive repairs of the ships can be effected and at which stores are accumulated. visits to it for the sake of repair being necessary, the occasion may be taken advantage of to replenish supplies, so that the maintenance of a stock at the place makes for convenience, provided that the stock is not too large. the so-called 'secondary base' is a place at which it is intended to keep in store coal and other articles in the hope that when war is in progress the supply of our ships may be facilitated. it is a supply, and not a repairing base. a comparison of the 'direct' system and 'secondary base' system may be interesting. a navy being maintained for use in war, it follows, as a matter of course, that the value of any part of its equipment or organisation depends on its efficiency for war purposes. the question to be answered is--which of the two systems promises to help us most during hostilities? this does not exclude a regard for convenience and economy in time of peace, provided that care is taken not to push economy too far and not to make ordinary peace-time convenience impede arrangements essential to the proper conduct of a naval campaign. it is universally admitted that a secondary base at which stocks of stores are kept should be properly defended. this necessitates the provision of fortifications and a garrison. nearly every article of naval stores of all classes has to be brought to our bases by sea, just as much as if it were brought direct to our ships. consequently the communications of the base have to be defended. they would continue to need defending even if our ships ceased to draw supplies from it, because the communications of the garrison must be kept open. we know what happened twice over at minorca when the latter was not done. the object of accumulating stores at a secondary base is to facilitate the supply of fighting ships, it being rather confidently assumed that the ships can go to it to replenish without being obliged to absent themselves for long from the positions in which they could best counteract the efforts of the enemy. when war is going on it is not within the power of either side to arrange its movements exactly as it pleases. movements must, at all events very often, conform to those of the enemy. it is not a bad rule when going to war to give your enemy credit for a certain amount of good sense. our enemy's good sense is likely to lead him to do exactly what we wish him not to do, and not to do that which we wish him to do. we should, of course, like him to operate so that our ships will not be employed at an inconvenient distance from our base of supplies. if we have created permanent bases in time of peace the enemy will know their whereabouts as well as we do ourselves, and, unless he is a greater fool than it is safe to think he is, he will try to make us derive as little benefit from them as possible. he is likely to extend his operations to localities at a distance from the places to which, if we have the secondary base system of supply, he knows for certain that our ships must resort. we shall have to do one of two things--either let him carry on his operations undisturbed, or conform to his movements. to this is due the common, if not invariable, experience of naval warfare, that the fleet which assumes the offensive has to establish what are sometimes called 'flying bases,' to which it can resort at will. this explains why nelson rarely used gibraltar as a base; why we occupied balaclava in ; and why the americans used guantanamo bay in . the flying base is not fortified or garrisoned in advance. it is merely a convenient anchorage, in a good position as regards the circumstances of the war; and it can be abandoned for another, and resumed, if desirable, as the conditions of the moment dictate. it is often argued that maintenance of stocks of stores at a secondary base gives a fleet a free hand and at least relieves it from the obligation of defending the line of communications. we ought to examine both contentions. it is not easy to discover where the freedom comes in if you must always proceed to a certain place for supplies, whether convenient or not. it may be, and very likely will be, of the utmost importance in war for a ship to remain on a particular station. if her coal is running short and can only be replenished by going to a base, go to the base she must, however unfortunate the consequences. it has been mentioned already that nearly every item on our store list has to be brought to a base by sea. let us ascertain to what extent the accumulation of a stock at a place removes the necessity of defending the communication line. coal is so much the greater item that consideration of it will cover that of all the rest. the squadron, as assumed, requires about , tons of coal every five weeks in peace time. some is commonly obtained from contractors at foreign ports; but to avoid complicating the subject we may leave contract issues out of consideration. if you keep a stock of , tons at your permanent secondary base, you will have enough to last your ships about four-and-a-half weeks. consequently you must have a stream of colliers running to the place so as to arrive at intervals of not more than about thirty days. calculations founded on the experience of manoeuvres show that in war time ships would require nearly three times the quantity used in peace. it follows that, if you trebled your stock of coal at the base and made it , tons, you would in war still require colliers carrying that amount to arrive about every four weeks. picture the line of communications with the necessary colliers on it, and see to what extent you are released from the necessity of defending it. the bulk of other stores being much less than that of coal, you could, no doubt, maintain a sufficient stock of them to last through the probable duration of the war; but, as you must keep your communications open to ensure the arrival of your coal, it would be as easy for the other stores to reach you as it would be for the coal itself. why oblige yourself to use articles kept long in store when much fresher ones could be obtained? therefore the maintenance of store depots at a secondary base no more releases you from the necessity of guarding your communications than it permits freedom of movement to your ships. the secondary base in time of war is conditioned as follows. if the enemy's sphere of activity is distant from the base which you have equipped with store-houses and fortifications, the place cannot be of any use to you. it can, and probably will, be a cause of additional anxiety to you, because the communications of its garrison must still be kept open. if it is used, freedom of movement for the ships must be given up, because they cannot go so far from it as to be obliged to consume a considerable fraction of their coal in reaching it and returning to their station. the line along which your colliers proceed to it must be effectively guarded. contrast this with the system of direct supply to the ships-of-war. you choose for your flying base a position which will be as near to the enemy's sphere of action as you choose to make it. you can change its position in accordance with circumstances. if you cease to use the position first chosen you need trouble yourself no more about its special communications. you leave nothing at it which will make it worth the enemy's while to try a dash at it. the power of changing the flying base from one place to another gives almost perfect freedom of movement to the fighting ships. moreover, the defence of the line communicating with the position selected is not more difficult than that of the line to a fixed base. the defence of a line of communication ought to be arranged on the same plan as that adopted for the defence of a trade route, viz. making unceasing efforts to attack the intending assailant. within the last few years a good deal has been written about the employment of cruisers. the favourite idea seems to be that peace-time preparation for the cruiser operations of war ought to take the form of scouting and attendance on fleets. the history of naval warfare does not corroborate this view. we need not forget nelson's complaint of paucity of frigates: but had the number attached to his fleet been doubled, the general disposition of vessels of the class then in commission would have been virtually unaltered. at the beginning of , the year of trafalgar, we had--besides other classes-- frigates and sloops in commission; at the beginning of we had . it is doubtful if forty of these were attached to fleets. it is sometimes contended that supply-carriers ought to be vessels of great speed, apparently in order that they may always keep up with the fighting ships when at sea. this, perhaps, is due to a mistaken application of the conditions of a land force on the march to those of a fleet or squadron making a voyage. in practice a land army cannot separate itself--except for a very short time--from its supplies. its movements depend on those of its supply-train. the corresponding 'supply-train' of a fleet or squadron is in the holds and bunkers of its ships. as long as these are fairly well furnished, the ships might be hampered, and could not be assisted, by the presence of the carriers. all that is necessary is that these carriers should be at the right place at the right time, which is merely another way of saying that proper provision should be made for 'the stream of supplies and reinforcements which in terms of modern war is called communications'--the phrase being mahan's. the efficiency of any arrangement used in war will depend largely on the experience of its working gained in time of peace. why do we not work the direct system of supply whilst we are at peace so as to familiarise ourselves with the operations it entails before the stress of serious emergency is upon us? there are two reasons. one is, because we have used the permanent base method so long that, as usually happens in such cases, we find it difficult to form a conception of any other. the other reason is that the direct supply method is thought to be too costly. the first reason need not detain us. it is not worthy of even a few minutes' consideration. the second reason deserves full investigation. we ought to be always alive to the necessity of economy. the only limit to economy of money in any plan of naval organisation is that we should not carry it so far that it will be likely to impair efficiency. those who are familiar with the correspondence of the great sea-officers of former days will have noticed how careful they were to prevent anything like extravagant expenditure. this inclination towards a proper parsimony of naval funds became traditional in our service. the tradition has, perhaps, been rather weakened in these days of abundant wealth; but we should do our best not to let it die out. extravagance is a serious foe to efficient organisation, because where it prevails there is a temptation to try imperfectly thought-out experiments, in the belief that, if they fail, there will still be plenty of money to permit others to be tried. this, of course, encourages slovenly want of system, which is destructive of good organisation. we may assume, for the purposes of our investigation, that our permanently equipped secondary base contains a stock of , tons of coal. any proportionate quantity, however, may be substituted for this, as the general argument will remain unaffected. as already intimated, coal is so much greater in bulk and aggregate cost than any other class of stores that, if we arrange for its supply, the provision of the rest is a comparatively small matter. the squadron which we have had in view requires an estimated amount of , tons of coal in six months' period specified, and a further quantity of tons may be expected to suffice for the ships employed in the neighbouring waters during the remainder of the year. this latter amount would have to be brought in smaller cargoes, say, five of tons each. allowing for the colliers required during the six months whilst the whole squadron has to be supplied an average cargo of tons, we should want twenty arrivals with an aggregate of , tons, and later on five arrivals of smaller colliers with an aggregate of tons to complete the year. the freight or cost of conveyance to the place need not be considered here, as it would be the same in either system. if we keep a stock of supplies at a place we must incur expenditure to provide for the storage of the articles. there would be what may be called the capital charges for sites, buildings, residences, jetties, tram lines, &c., for which £ , would probably not be enough, but we may put it at that so as to avoid the appearance of exaggeration. a further charge would be due to the provision of tugs or steam launches, and perhaps lighters. this would hardly be less than £ , . interest on money sunk, cost of repairs, and maintenance, would not be excessive if they amounted to £ a year. there must be some allowance for the coal used by the tugs and steam launches. it is doubtful if £ a year would cover this; but we may put it at that. salaries and wages of staff, including persons employed in tugs and steam launches, would reach quite £ a year. it is to be noted that the items which these charges are assumed to cover cannot be dispensed with. if depots are established at all, they must be so arranged that the stores deposited in them can be securely kept and can be utilised with proper expedition. the total of the charges just enumerated is £ a year. there are other charges that cannot be escaped. for example, landing a ton of coal at wei-hai-wei, putting it into the depot, and taking it off again to the man-of-war requiring it, costs $ cents, or at average official rate of exchange two shillings. at hong-kong the cost is about s. d. a ton. the charge at s. per ton on , tons would be £ . i am assured by every engineer officer to whom i have spoken on the subject that the deterioration in coal due to the four different handlings which it has to undergo if landed in lighters and taken off again to ships from the coal-store cannot be put at less than per cent. note that this is over and above such deterioration as would be due to passing coal direct from the hold of a collier alongside into a ship's bunkers. if anyone doubts this deterioration it would be well for him to examine reports on coal and steam trials. he will be unusually fortunate if he finds so small a deterioration as per cent. the lowest that i can remember having seen reported is per cent.; reports of and even per cent. are quite common. some of it is for deterioration due to climate and length of time in store. this, of course, is one of the inevitable conditions of the secondary base system, the object of which is to keep in stock a quantity of the article needed. putting the purchase price of the coal as low as s. a ton, a deterioration due to repeated handling only of per cent. on , tons would amount to £ . there is nearly always some loss of coal due to moving it. i say 'nearly always' because it seems that there are occasions on which coal being moved increases in bulk. it occurs when competitive coaling is being carried on in a fleet and ships try to beat records. a collier in these circumstances gives out more coal than she took in. we shall probably be right if we regard the increase in this case as what the german philosophers call 'subjective,' that is, rather existent in the mind than in the external region of objective, palpable fact. it may be taken as hardly disputable that there will be less loss the shorter the distance and the fewer the times the coal is moved. without counting it we see that the annual expenses enumerated are-- establishment charges £ , landing and re-shipping , deterioration , ------- £ , this £ , is to be compared with the cost of the direct supply system. the quantity of coal required would, as said above, have to be carried in twenty colliers--counting each trip as that of a separate vessel--with, on the average, tons apiece, and five smaller ones. it would take fully four days to unload tons at the secondary base, and even more if the labour supply was uncertain or the labourers not well practised. demurrage for a vessel carrying the cargo mentioned, judging from actual experience, would be about £ a day; and probably about £ a day for the smaller vessels. if we admit an average delay, per collier, of eighteen days, that is, fourteen days more than the time necessary for removing the cargo into store, so as to allow for colliers arriving when the ships to be coaled are absent, we should get-- x x £ , x x , ------- £ , as the cost of transferring the coal from the holds to the men-of-war's bunkers on the direct supply system. an average of eighteen days is probably much too long to allow for each collier's stay till cleared: because, on some occasions, ships requiring coal may be counted on as sure to be present. even as it is, the £ , is a smaller sum than the £ , which the secondary base system costs over and above the amount due to increased deterioration of coal. if a comparison were instituted as regards other kinds of stores, the particular figures might be different, but the general result would be the same. the first thing that we have got to do is to rid our minds of the belief that because we see a supply-carrier lying at anchor for some days without being cleared, more money is being spent than is spent on the maintenance of a shore depot. there may be circumstances in which a secondary base is a necessity, but they must be rare and exceptional. we saw that the establishment of one does not help us in the matter of defending our communications. we now see that, so far from being more economical than the alternative method, the secondary base method is more costly. it might have been demonstrated that it is really much more costly than the figures given make it out to be, because ships obliged to go to a base must expend coal in doing so, and coal costs money. it is not surprising that consideration of the secondary base system should evoke a recollection of the expression applied by dryden to the militia of his day: in peace a charge; in war a weak defence. i have to say that i did not prepare this paper simply for the pleasure of reading it, or in order to bring before you mere sets of figures and estimates of expense. my object has been to arouse in some of the officers who hear me a determination to devote a portion of their leisure to the consideration of those great problems which must be solved by us if we are to wage war successfully. many proofs reach me of the ability and zeal with which details of material are investigated by officers in these days. the details referred to are not unimportant in themselves; but the importance of several of them if put together would be incomparably less than that of the great question to which i have tried to direct your attention. the supply of a fleet is of high importance in both peace time and time of war. even in peace it sometimes causes an admiral to pass a sleepless night. the arrangements which it necessitates are often intricate, and success in completing them occasionally seems far off. the work involved in devising suitable plans is too much like drudgery to be welcome to those who undertake it. all the same it has to be done: and surely no one will care to deny that the fleet which has practised in quiet years the system that must be followed in war will start with a great advantage on its side when it is at last confronted with the stern realities of naval warfare. postscript the question of 'communications,' if fully dealt with in the foregoing paper, would have made it so long that its hearers might have been tired out before its end was reached. the following summary of the points that might have been enlarged upon, had time allowed, may interest many officers:-- in time of war we must keep open our lines of communication. if we cannot, the war will have gone against us. open communications mean that we can prevent the enemy from carrying out decisive and sustained operations against them and along their line. to keep communications open it is not necessary to secure every friendly ship traversing the line against attacks by the enemy. all that is necessary is to restrict the enemy's activity so far that he can inflict only such a moderate percentage of loss on the friendly vessels that, as a whole, they will not cease to run. keeping communications open will not secure a friendly place against every form of attack. it will, however, secure a place against attacks with large forces sustained for a considerable length of time. if he can make attacks of this latter kind, it is clear that the enemy controls the communications and that we have failed to keep them open. if communications are open for the passage of vessels of the friendly mercantile marine, it follows that the relatively much smaller number of supply-vessels can traverse the line. as regards supply-vessels, a percentage of loss caused by the enemy must be allowed for. if we put this at per cent.--which, taken absolutely, is probably sufficient--it means that _on_the_ _average_ out of ten supply-vessels sent we expect nine to reach their destination. we cannot, however, arrange that an equal loss will fall on every group of ten vessels. two such groups may arrive intact, whilst a third may lose three vessels. yet the per cent. average would be maintained. this condition has to be allowed for. investigations some years ago led to the conclusion that it would be prudent to send five carriers for every four wanted. the word 'group' has been used above only in a descriptive sense. supply-carriers will often be safer if they proceed to their destination separately. this, however, depends on circumstances. index adventure, voyages of agincourt, battle of alcester, lord alexander the great alexandria, bombardment of american war of independence; sir henry maine on ---- war of secession; raids in ---- war with spain ammunition, supply of; alleged shortage at the defeat of the armada army co-operation athenian navy; at the battle of syracuse australian fleet, localisation of austro-prussian war baehr, c. f balaclava, capture of bantry bay, french invasion of battleships, merits of; coal consumption of beer, for the navy benedek, general blockades bounty for recruits brassey, lord bright, rev. j. f. brougham, lord brunswick-oels, duke of burchett, quoted burleigh, lord byng, admiral (_see_under_ torrington, earl of). cadiz, expedition camperdown, battle of camperdown, lord cardigan bay, french invasion of carnot, president carrying trade, of the colonies; of the world carthaginian navy; fall of cawdor, lord centralisation, evils of charles ii, king 'chatham chest' chevalier, captain; quoted chino-japanese war chioggia, battle of coal, allowance of; bases for; cost of coast defence (_see_also_under_ invasion) collingwood, admiral, at trafalgar colomb, vice-admiral p. h.; on the chino-japanese war; on the command of the sea; on nelson's tactics at trafalgar colonies, naval bases in the; contributions by the; and terms of service in the navy command of the sea; and the claim to a salute; in the crimean war; local and temporary; and the french invasion; land fortification and; in war; and our food supply; essential to the empire commerce, protection of naval; destruction of; at the time of trafalgar communications, in war; control of; with naval bases; of a fleet corbett, mr. julian; on nelson cornwallis, admiral crécy, battle of crimean war; command of the sea in; mortality in cromwell, oliver cruisers, necessity for; their equivalent at trafalgar; coal consumption of; duties of crusades dacres, rear-admiral de burgh, hubert de galles, admiral morard de grasse, admiral de la gravière, admiral de ruyter, admiral defence, of naval commerce; against invasion; offensive; inefficiency of localised; against raids desbrière, capt. destroyers, origin of dewey, admiral 'dictionary of national biography' dockyards, fortification of dornberg, colonel drake, sir francis drury lane pantomime dryden, quoted duncan, lord; life of; quoted dundonald, lord duro, captain dutch east india co. ---- navy ---- war economy and efficiency edward iii, king egypt, french expedition to ekins, sir charles elizabeth (queen) and her seamen empire, the defence of; and control of ocean communications english channel, command of the exploration, voyages of fishguard, french invasion of fleet, positions in war for the; duties of the; and the defence of empire; supply and communications of the 'fleet in being' food supply and control of the sea foods, preservation of foreign seamen, in our merchant service; their exemption from impressment franco-german war froude's history fulton, quoted gardiner, dr. s. r., quoted genoese navy german navy, in the baltic gibbon, quoted gibraltar; siege of gravelines, battle of greek navy green, j. r., quoted grierson, colonel b. h. grouchy, admiral gutteridge, mr. hall, mr. hubert hammond, dr. w. a. 'handy man' evolution of the hannay, mr. d. hannibal hawke, lord hawkins, sir j. herodotus, quoted history, influence of naval campaigns on; of war hoche, general holm, adolf hood, lord; and nelson hosier, admiral howard of effingham, lord; quoted howe, lord; at gibraltar; his tactics hughes, sir edward humbert's bxpedition _illustrious_ training school impressment; exemption of foreigners from; inefficiency of; legalised forcible; popular misconceptions of; exemptions from (_see_also_under_ press gang) indian mutiny international law, and the sea; and the sale of bad food invasion, prevention of; of british isles; over sea and land raids; land defence against; as a means of war ireland, french invasion of jamaica, seizure of james, quoted japan and china war jena, battle of jessopp, dr. a. joyeuse, admiral villaret keith, lord killigrew, vice-admiral kinglake, quoted la hogue, battle of laughton, professor sir j. k.; 'defeat of the armada,'; on nelson lepanto, battle of lindsay, w. s. local defence, inefficiency of; of naval bases lyons, admiral lord mahan, captain a. t.; on the roman navy; on sea commerce; on early naval warfare; on the naval 'calling'; on the american war of independence; influence of his teaching; on the spanish-american war; on control of the sea; on impressment; on nelson at trafalgar malaga, battle of manoeuvres marathon, battle of marines and impressment martin, admiral sir t. byam medina-sidonia, duke of mediterranean, command of the mends, dr. stilon ---- admiral sir w. merchant service, foreign seamen in our; historical relations of the navy with the; its exemption from impressment (_see_ _also_under_ commerce) minorca mischenko, general mortality from disease in war motley, quoted mutiny at the nore napoleon, emperor; and the invasion of england; expedition to egypt; on losses in war naval bases; defence of; cost of _naval_chronicle_ naval strategy; in the american war of independence; the frontier in; and command of the sea; the fleet's position in war; compared with military; and the french expedition to egypt; in defence of empire; for weak navies; at the time of trafalgar ---- tactics, nelson's achievements in; at trafalgar; consideration of cost in ---- warfare, influence on history of; the true objective in (_see_also_under_ war) navies, costliness of; strength of foreign navigation act ( ) navy, necessity for a strong; and army co-operation; human element in the; changes in organisation; conditions of service in the; peace training of the; historical relations with the merchant service; impressment in the; records of the; queen elizabeth's; victualling the; pay in the; its mobility; and the two-power standard; question of size of ships for the; economy and efficiency in the navy records society nelson, lord; on blockades; and the 'nile'; his strategy; and trafalgar; his tactics netley hospital newbolt, mr. h. nile, battle of the oil, ship's allowance of oppenheim, mr. m. oversea raids palmer, six henry peace training, and war; of the 'handy man' pepys, quoted pericles, quoted persian navy peter the great phillip, rear-admiral arthur phoenician navy pitt, william; quoted piracy pocock, rev. thomas poitiers, battle of policing the sea port arthur, battle off ports, fortification of portuguese navy press gang; popular misconceptions of the; facts and fancies about the; in literature and art; operations of the price, dr. quiberon bay, battle of raiding attacks; prevention of raids, oversea and on land raleigh, sir walter recruiting, from the merchant service; by the press gang recruits, bounty for rhodes navy robinson, commander rodney, lord rogers, thorold roman navy rooke, sir george roosevelt, mr. theodore, quoted russo-japanese war ---- turkish war st. vincent, lord salamis, battle of salute, the claim to a saracen navy schill, colonel sea, international law and the sea power, history and meaning of the term; defined; influence on history of naval campaigns; of the phoenicians; of greece and persia; of rome and carthage; in the middle ages; of the saracens; and the crusades; of venice, pisa and genoa; of the turks; in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; of portugal and spain; rise in england of; and exploration and adventure; and military co-operation; of the dutch; and naval strategy; in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; examples of its efficiency; in recent times; in crimean war; in american war of secession; in russo-turkish war; in chino-japanese war; in spanish-american war sebastopol, siege of seeley, sir j. r. seymour, lord henry ships for the navy, question of size of; for supply sismondi, quoted sluys, battle of smith, sir sydney spanish armada, defeat of the; records of; queen elizabeth and the ---- american war spanish indies ---- navy spartan army stirling, sir james stores, reserve of ship's strategy (_see_under_ naval strategy) stuart, general j. e. b. suffren, admiral supply and communications of a fleet supply ships, sizes of syracuse, battle of tactics (_see_under_ naval tactics) tate, colonel themistocles; and the greek navy thucydides, quoted _times_, quoted torpedo boats, defence against torrington, earl of tourville, admiral trafalgar, battle of; tactics of; british losses at; the attack; contemporary strategy and tactics training (_see_under_ peace training) turkish navy united states navy venetian navy victualling allowances; and modern preserved foods walcheren expedition, mortality in wales, french invasion of war, and its chief lessons; human element in; the unexpected in; under modern conditions; how to avoid surprise in; mortality from disease in; methods of making; command of the sea in; compensation for losses in; napoleon on loss of life in; supplies in (_see_also_under_ invasion, naval warfare, and raids) washington, george water, ship's allowance of waterloo, battle of wellington, duke of william iii, king wilmot, sir s. eardley xerxes; his highly trained army the end note: project gutenberg also has an html version of this file which includes the original illustrations. see -h.htm or -h.zip: (http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/ / / / / / -h/ -h.htm) or (http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/ / / / / / -h.zip) +-----------------------------------------------------------+ | transcriber's note: | | | | inconsistent hyphenation, and spelling in the original | | document have been preserved. | | | | obvious typographical errors have been corrected. for | | a complete list, please see the end of this document. | | | +-----------------------------------------------------------+ the influence of sea power upon history - by a. t. mahan, d.c.l., ll.d. author of "the influence of sea power upon the french revolution and empire, - ," etc. twelfth edition [illustration] boston little, brown and company copyright, , by captain a. t. mahan. copyright, , by ellen lyle mahan. printed in the united states of america preface. the definite object proposed in this work is an examination of the general history of europe and america with particular reference to the effect of sea power upon the course of that history. historians generally have been unfamiliar with the conditions of the sea, having as to it neither special interest nor special knowledge; and the profound determining influence of maritime strength upon great issues has consequently been overlooked. this is even more true of particular occasions than of the general tendency of sea power. it is easy to say in a general way, that the use and control of the sea is and has been a great factor in the history of the world; it is more troublesome to seek out and show its exact bearing at a particular juncture. yet, unless this be done, the acknowledgment of general importance remains vague and unsubstantial; not resting, as it should, upon a collection of special instances in which the precise effect has been made clear, by an analysis of the conditions at the given moments. a curious exemplification of this tendency to slight the bearing of maritime power upon events may be drawn from two writers of that english nation which more than any other has owed its greatness to the sea. "twice," says arnold in his history of rome, "has there been witnessed the struggle of the highest individual genius against the resources and institutions of a great nation, and in both cases the nation was victorious. for seventeen years hannibal strove against rome, for sixteen years napoleon strove against england; the efforts of the first ended in zama, those of the second in waterloo." sir edward creasy, quoting this, adds: "one point, however, of the similitude between the two wars has scarcely been adequately dwelt on; that is, the remarkable parallel between the roman general who finally defeated the great carthaginian, and the english general who gave the last deadly overthrow to the french emperor. scipio and wellington both held for many years commands of high importance, but distant from the main theatres of warfare. the same country was the scene of the principal military career of each. it was in spain that scipio, like wellington, successively encountered and overthrew nearly all the subordinate generals of the enemy before being opposed to the chief champion and conqueror himself. both scipio and wellington restored their countrymen's confidence in arms when shaken by a series of reverses, and each of them closed a long and perilous war by a complete and overwhelming defeat of the chosen leader and the chosen veterans of the foe." neither of these englishmen mentions the yet more striking coincidence, that in both cases the mastery of the sea rested with the victor. the roman control of the water forced hannibal to that long, perilous march through gaul in which more than half his veteran troops wasted away; it enabled the elder scipio, while sending his army from the rhone on to spain, to intercept hannibal's communications, to return in person and face the invader at the trebia. throughout the war the legions passed by water, unmolested and unwearied, between spain, which was hannibal's base, and italy, while the issue of the decisive battle of the metaurus, hinging as it did upon the interior position of the roman armies with reference to the forces of hasdrubal and hannibal, was ultimately due to the fact that the younger brother could not bring his succoring reinforcements by sea, but only by the land route through gaul. hence at the critical moment the two carthaginian armies were separated by the length of italy, and one was destroyed by the combined action of the roman generals. on the other hand, naval historians have troubled themselves little about the connection between general history and their own particular topic, limiting themselves generally to the duty of simple chroniclers of naval occurrences. this is less true of the french than of the english; the genius and training of the former people leading them to more careful inquiry into the causes of particular results and the mutual relation of events. there is not, however, within the knowledge of the author any work that professes the particular object here sought; namely, an estimate of the effect of sea power upon the course of history and the prosperity of nations. as other histories deal with the wars, politics, social and economical conditions of countries, touching upon maritime matters only incidentally and generally unsympathetically, so the present work aims at putting maritime interests in the foreground, without divorcing them, however, from their surroundings of cause and effect in general history, but seeking to show how they modified the latter, and were modified by them. the period embraced is from , when the sailing-ship era, with its distinctive features, had fairly begun, to , the end of the american revolution. while the thread of general history upon which the successive maritime events is strung is intentionally slight, the effort has been to present a clear as well as accurate outline. writing as a naval officer in full sympathy with his profession, the author has not hesitated to digress freely on questions of naval policy, strategy, and tactics; but as technical language has been avoided, it is hoped that these matters, simply presented, will be found of interest to the unprofessional reader. a. t. mahan december, . contents. introductory. history of sea power one of contest between nations, therefore largely military permanence of the teachings of history unsettled condition of modern naval opinion contrasts between historical classes of war-ships essential distinction between weather and lee gage analogous to other offensive and defensive positions consequent effect upon naval policy lessons of history apply especially to strategy less obviously to tactics, but still applicable illustrations: the battle of the nile, a.d. trafalgar, a.d. siege of gibraltar, a.d. - actium, b.c. , and lepanto, a.d. second punic war, b.c. - naval strategic combinations surer now than formerly wide scope of naval strategy chapter i. discussion of the elements of sea power. the sea a great common advantages of water-carriage over that by land navies exist for the protection of commerce dependence of commerce upon secure seaports development of colonies and colonial posts links in the chain of sea power: production, shipping, colonies general conditions affecting sea power: i. geographical position ii. physical conformation iii. extent of territory iv. number of population v. national character vi. character and policy of governments england holland france influence of colonies on sea power the united states: its weakness in sea power its chief interest in internal development danger from blockades dependence of the navy upon the shipping interest conclusion of the discussion of the elements of sea power purpose of the historical narrative chapter ii. state of europe in .--second anglo-dutch war, - .--sea battles of lowestoft and of the four days accession of charles ii. and louis xiv. followed shortly by general wars french policy formulated by henry iv. and richelieu condition of france in condition of spain condition of the dutch united provinces their commerce and colonies character of their government parties in the state condition of england in characteristics of french, english, and dutch ships conditions of other european states louis xiv. the leading personality in europe his policy colbert's administrative acts second anglo-dutch war, battle of lowestoft, fire-ships, compared with torpedo-cruisers the group formation the order of battle for sailing-ships the four days' battle, military merits of the opposing fleets soldiers commanding fleets, discussion ruyter in the thames, peace of breda, military value of commerce-destroying chapter iii. war of england and france in alliance against the united provinces, - .--finally, of france against combined europe, - .--sea battles of solebay, the texel, and stromboli. aggressions of louis xiv. on spanish netherlands policy of the united provinces triple alliance between england, holland, and sweden anger of louis xiv. leibnitz proposes to louis to seize egypt his memorial bargaining between louis xiv. and charles ii. the two kings declare war against the united provinces military character of this war naval strategy of the dutch tactical combinations of de ruyter inefficiency of dutch naval administration battle of solebay, tactical comments effect of the battle on the course of the war land campaign of the french in holland murder of john de witt, grand pensionary of holland accession to power of william of orange uneasiness among european states naval battles off schoneveldt, naval battle of the texel, effect upon the general war equivocal action of the french fleet general ineffectiveness of maritime coalitions military character of de ruyter coalition against france peace between england and the united provinces sicilian revolt against spain battle of stromboli, illustration of clerk's naval tactics de ruyter killed off agosta england becomes hostile to france sufferings of the united provinces peace of nimeguen, effects of the war on france and holland notice of comte d'estrées chapter iv. english revolution.--war of the league of augsburg, - .--sea battles of beachy head and la hougue. aggressive policy of louis xiv. state of french, english, and dutch navies accession of james ii. formation of the league of augsburg louis declares war against the emperor of germany revolution in england louis declares war against the united provinces william and mary crowned james ii. lands in ireland misdirection of french naval forces william iii. lands in ireland naval battle of beachy head, tourville's military character battle of the boyne, end of the struggle in ireland naval battle of la hougue, destruction of french ships influence of sea power in this war attack and defence of commerce peculiar characteristics of french privateering peace of ryswick, exhaustion of france: its causes chapter v. war of the spanish succession, - .--sea battle of malaga. failure of the spanish line of the house of austria king of spain wills the succession to the duke of anjou death of the king of spain louis xiv. accepts the bequests he seizes towns in spanish netherlands offensive alliance between england, holland, and austria declarations of war the allies proclaim carlos iii. king of spain affair of the vigo galleons portugal joins the allies character of the naval warfare capture of gibraltar by the english naval battle of malaga, decay of the french navy progress of the land war allies seize sardinia and minorca disgrace of marlborough england offers terms of peace peace of utrecht, terms of the peace results of the war to the different belligerents commanding position of great britain sea power dependent upon both commerce and naval strength peculiar position of france as regards sea power depressed condition of france commercial prosperity of england ineffectiveness of commerce-destroying duguay-trouin's expedition against rio de janeiro, war between russia and sweden chapter vi. the regency in france.--alberoni in spain.--policies of walpole and fleuri.--war of the polish succession.--english contraband trade in spanish america.--great britain declares war against spain.-- - . death of queen anne and louis xiv. accession of george i. regency of philip of orleans administration of alberoni in spain spaniards invade sardinia alliance of austria, england, holland, and france spaniards invade sicily destruction of spanish navy off cape passaro, failure and dismissal of alberoni spain accepts terms great britain interferes in the baltic death of philip of orleans administration of fleuri in france growth of french commerce france in the east indies troubles between england and spain english contraband trade in spanish america illegal search of english ships walpole's struggles to preserve peace war of the polish succession creation of the bourbon kingdom of the two sicilies bourbon family compact france acquires bar and lorraine england declares war against spain morality of the english action toward spain decay of the french navy death of walpole and of fleuri chapter vii. war between great britain and spain, .--war of the austrian succession, .--france joins spain against great britain, .--sea battles of matthews, anson, and hawke.--peace of aix-la-chapelle, . characteristics of the wars from to neglect of the navy by french government colonial possessions of the french, english, and spaniards dupleix and la bourdonnais in india condition of the contending navies expeditions of vernon and anson outbreak of the war of the austrian succession england allies herself to austria naval affairs in the mediterranean influence of sea power on the war naval battle off toulon, causes of english failure courts-martial following the action inefficient action of english navy capture of louisburg by new england colonists, causes which concurred to neutralize england's sea power france overruns belgium and invades holland naval actions of anson and hawke brilliant defence of commodore l'Étenduère projects of dupleix and la bourdonnais in the east indies influence of sea power in indian affairs la bourdonnais reduces madras peace of aix-la-chapelle, madras exchanged for louisburg results of the war effect of sea power on the issue chapter viii. seven years' war, - .--england's overwhelming power and conquests on the seas, in north america, europe, and east and west indies.--sea battles: byng off minorca; hawke and conflans; pocock and d'achÉ in east indies. peace of aix-la-chapelle leaves many questions unsettled dupleix pursues his aggressive policy he is recalled from india his policy abandoned by the french agitation in north america braddock's expedition, seizure of french ships by the english, while at peace french expedition against port mahon, byng sails to relieve the place byng's action off port mahon, characteristics of the french naval policy byng returns to gibraltar he is relieved, tried by court-martial, and shot formal declarations of war by england and france england's appreciation of the maritime character of the war france is drawn into a continental struggle the seven years' war ( - ) begins pitt becomes prime minister of england operations in north america fall of louisburg, fall of quebec, , and of montreal, influence of sea power on the continental war english plans for the general naval operations choiseul becomes minister in france he plans an invasion of england sailing of the toulon fleet, its disastrous encounter with boscawen consequent frustration of the invasion of england project to invade scotland sailing of the brest fleet hawke falls in with it and disperses it, accession of charles iii. to spanish throne death of george ii. clive in india battle of plassey, decisive influence of sea power upon the issues in india naval actions between pocock and d'aché, , destitute condition of french naval stations in india the french fleet abandons the struggle final fall of the french power in india ruined condition of the french navy alliance between france and spain england declares war against spain rapid conquest of french and spanish colonies french and spaniards invade portugal the invasion repelled by england severe reverses of the spaniards in all quarters spain sues for peace losses of british mercantile shipping increase of british commerce commanding position of great britain relations of england and portugal terms of the treaty of paris opposition to the treaty in great britain results of the maritime war results of the continental war influence of sea power in countries politically unstable interest of the united states in the central american isthmus effects of the seven years' war on the later history of great britain subsequent acquisitions of great britain british success due to maritime superiority mutual dependence of seaports and fleets chapter ix. course of events from the peace of paris to .--maritime war consequent upon the american revolution.--sea battle off ushant. french discontent with the treaty of paris revival of the french navy discipline among french naval officers of the time choiseul's foreign policy domestic troubles in great britain controversies with the north american colonies genoa cedes corsica to france dispute between england and spain about the falkland islands choiseul dismissed death of louis xv. naval policy of louis xvi. characteristics of the maritime war of instructions of louis xvi. to the french admirals strength of english navy characteristics of the military situation in america the line of the hudson burgoyne's expedition from canada howe carries his army from new york to the chesapeake surrender of burgoyne, american privateering clandestine support of the americans by france treaty between france and the americans vital importance of the french fleet to the americans the military situation in the different quarters of the globe breach between france and england sailing of the british and french fleets battle of ushant, position of a naval commander-in-chief in battle chapter x. maritime war in north america and west indies, - .--its influence upon the course of the american revolution.--fleet actions off grenada, dominica, and chesapeake bay. d'estaing sails from toulon for delaware bay, british ordered to evacuate philadelphia rapidity of lord howe's movements d'estaing arrives too late follows howe to new york fails to attack there and sails for newport howe follows him there both fleets dispersed by a storm d'estaing takes his fleet to boston howe's activity foils d'estaing at all points d'estaing sails for the west indies the english seize sta. lucia ineffectual attempts of d'estaing to dislodge them d'estaing captures grenada naval battle of grenada, ; english ships crippled d'estaing fails to improve his advantages reasons for his neglect french naval policy english operations in the southern states d'estaing takes his fleet to savannah his fruitless assault on savannah d'estaing returns to france fall of charleston de guichen takes command in the west indies rodney arrives to command english fleet his military character first action between rodney and de guichen, breaking the line subsequent movements of rodney and de guichen rodney divides his fleet goes in person to new york de guichen returns to france arrival of french forces in newport rodney returns to the west indies war between england and holland disasters to the united states in de grasse sails from brest for the west indies, engagement with english fleet off martinique cornwallis overruns the southern states he retires upon wilmington, n.c., and thence to virginia arnold on the james river the french fleet leaves newport to intercept arnold meets the english fleet off the chesapeake, french fleet returns to newport cornwallis occupies yorktown de grasse sails from hayti for the chesapeake action with the british fleet, surrender of cornwallis, criticism of the british naval operations energy and address shown by de grasse difficulties of great britain's position in the war of the military policy best fitted to cope with them position of the french squadron in newport, r.i., great britain's defensive position and inferior numbers consequent necessity for a vigorous initiative washington's opinions as to the influence of sea power on the american contest chapter xi. maritime war in europe, - . objectives of the allied operations in europe spain declares war against england allied fleets enter the english channel, abortive issue of the cruise rodney sails with supplies for gibraltar defeats the spanish squadron of langara and relieves the place the allies capture a great british convoy the armed neutrality of the baltic powers, england declares war against holland gibraltar is revictualled by admiral derby the allied fleets again in the channel, they retire without effecting any damage to england destruction of a french convoy for the west indies fall of port mahon, the allied fleets assemble at algesiras grand attack of the allies on gibraltar, which fails, lord howe succeeds in revictualling gibraltar action between his fleet and that of the allies conduct of the war of by the english government influence of sea power proper use of the naval forces chapter xii. events in the east indies, - .--suffren sails from brest for india, .--his brilliant naval campaign in the indian seas, , . neglect of india by the french government england at war with mysore and with the mahrattas arrival of the french squadron under comte d'orves it effects nothing and returns to the isle of france suffren sails from brest with five ships-of-the-line, attacks an english squadron in the cape verde islands, conduct and results of this attack distinguishing merits of suffren as a naval leader suffren saves the cape colony from the english he reaches the isle of france succeeds to the chief command of the french fleet meets the british squadron under hughes at madras analysis of the naval strategic situation in india the first battle between suffren and hughes, feb. , suffren's views of the naval situation in india tactical oversights made by suffren inadequate support received by him from his captains suffren goes to pondicherry, hughes to trincomalee the second battle between suffren and hughes, april , suffren's tactics in the action relative injuries received by the opposing fleets contemporaneous english criticisms upon hughes's conduct destitute condition of suffren's fleet his activity and success in supplying wants he communicates with hyder ali, sultan of mysore firmness and insight shown by suffren his refusal to obey orders from home to leave the indian coast the third battle between suffren and hughes, july , qualities shown by hughes stubborn fighting by the british admiral and captains suffren deprives three captains of their commands dilatory conduct of admiral hughes suffren attacks and takes trincomalee strategic importance of this success comparative condition of the two fleets in material for repairs the english government despatches powerful reinforcements the french court fails to support suffren the fourth battle between suffren and hughes, sept. , mismanagement and injuries of the french contrast between the captains in the opposing fleets two ships of suffren's fleet grounded and lost arrival of british reinforcements under admiral bickerton approach of bad-weather season; hughes goes to bombay military situation of french and english in india delays of the french reinforcements under bussy suffren takes his fleet to achem, in sumatra he returns to the indian coast arrival of bussy decline of the french power on shore the english besiege bussy in cuddalore by land and sea suffren relieves the place the fifth battle between suffren and hughes, june , decisive character of suffren's action news of the peace received at madras suffren sails for france his flattering reception everywhere his distinguishing military qualities his later career and death chapter xiii. events in the west indies after the surrender of yorktown.-- encounters of de grasse with hood.--the sea battle of the saints.-- - . maritime struggle transferred from the continent to west indies de grasse sails for the islands french expedition against the island of st. christopher, january, hood attempts to relieve the garrison manoeuvres of the two fleets action between de grasse and hood hood seizes the anchorage left by de grasse de grasse attacks hood at his anchorage hood maintains his position surrender of the garrison and island merits of hood's action criticism upon de grasse's conduct rodney arrives in west indies from england junction of rodney and hood at antigua de grasse returns to martinique allied plans to capture jamaica rodney takes his station at sta. lucia the french fleet sails and is pursued by rodney action of april , criticism upon the action the chase continued; accidents to french ships the naval battle of the saints, april , rodney breaks the french line capture of the french commander-in-chief and five ships-of-the-line details of the action analysis of the effects of rodney's manoeuvre tactical bearing of improvements in naval equipment lessons of this short naval campaign rodney's failure to pursue the french fleet examination of his reasons and of the actual conditions probable effect of this failure upon the conditions of peace rodney's opinions upon the battle of april successes achieved by rodney during his command he is recalled by a new ministry exaggerated view of the effects of this battle upon the war subsequent career of de grasse court-martial ordered upon the officers of the french fleet findings of the court de grasse appeals against the finding he is severely rebuked by the king deaths of de grasse, rodney, and hood chapter xiv. critical discussion of the maritime war of . the war of purely maritime peculiar interest therefore attaching to it successive steps in the critical study of a war distinction between "object" and "objective" parties to the war of objects of the different belligerents foundations of the british empire of the seas threatened by the revolt of the colonies the british fleet inferior in numbers to the allies choice of objectives the fleets indicated as the keys of the situation everywhere elements essential to an active naval war the bases of operations in the war of :-- in europe on the american continent in the west indies in the east indies strategic bearing of the trade-winds and monsoons the bases abroad generally deficient in resources consequent increased importance of the communications the navies the guardians of the communications need of intermediate ports between europe and india inquiry into the disposition of the naval forces difficulty of obtaining information at sea perplexity as to the destination of a naval expedition disadvantages of the defensive england upon the defensive in consequent necessity for wise and vigorous action the key of the situation british naval policy in the napoleonic wars british naval policy in the seven years' war difficulties attending this policy disposition of the british navy in the war of resulting inferiority on many critical occasions effect on the navy of the failure to fortify naval bases the distribution of the british navy exposes it to being out-numbered at many points the british naval policy in and in other wars compared naval policy of the allies divergent counsels of the coalition "ulterior objects" the allied navies systematically assume a defensive attitude dangers of this line of action glamour of commerce-destroying the conditions of peace, index list of illustrations. list of maps. i. mediterranean sea ii. english channel and north sea iii. indian peninsula and ceylon iv. north atlantic ocean plans of naval battles. _in these plans, when the capital letters a, b, c, and d are used, all positions marked by the same capital are simultaneous._ i. four days' battle, ii. four days' battle, iii. battle of solebay, iv. battle of the texel, v. battle of stromboli, v a. pocock and d'aché, vi. battle of beachy head, vi a. battle of la hougue, vii. matthews's action off toulon, vii a. byng's action off minorca, viii. hawke and conflans, ix. battle of ushant, x. d'estaing and byron, xi. rodney and de guichen, april , xii. arbuthnot and destouches, xiii. suffren at porto praya, xiv. suffren and hughes, february , xv. suffren and hughes, april , xvi. suffren and hughes, july , xvii. suffren and hughes, september , xviii. hood and de grasse, january, xix. hood and de grasse, january, xx. rodney and de grasse, april , xxi. rodney's victory, april , influence of sea power upon history. introductory. the history of sea power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in war. the profound influence of sea commerce upon the wealth and strength of countries was clearly seen long before the true principles which governed its growth and prosperity were detected. to secure to one's own people a disproportionate share of such benefits, every effort was made to exclude others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitory regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence. the clash of interests, the angry feelings roused by conflicting attempts thus to appropriate the larger share, if not the whole, of the advantages of commerce, and of distant unsettled commercial regions, led to wars. on the other hand, wars arising from other causes have been greatly modified in their conduct and issue by the control of the sea. therefore the history of sea power, while embracing in its broad sweep all that tends to make a people great upon the sea or by the sea, is largely a military history; and it is in this aspect that it will be mainly, though not exclusively, regarded in the following pages. a study of the military history of the past, such as this, is enjoined by great military leaders as essential to correct ideas and to the skilful conduct of war in the future. napoleon names among the campaigns to be studied by the aspiring soldier, those of alexander, hannibal, and cæsar, to whom gunpowder was unknown; and there is a substantial agreement among professional writers that, while many of the conditions of war vary from age to age with the progress of weapons, there are certain teachings in the school of history which remain constant, and being, therefore, of universal application, can be elevated to the rank of general principles. for the same reason the study of the sea history of the past will be found instructive, by its illustration of the general principles of maritime war, notwithstanding the great changes that have been brought about in naval weapons by the scientific advances of the past half century, and by the introduction of steam as the motive power. it is doubly necessary thus to study critically the history and experience of naval warfare in the days of sailing-ships, because while these will be found to afford lessons of present application and value, steam navies have as yet made no history which can be quoted as decisive in its teaching. of the one we have much experimental knowledge; of the other, practically none. hence theories about the naval warfare of the future are almost wholly presumptive; and although the attempt has been made to give them a more solid basis by dwelling upon the resemblance between fleets of steamships and fleets of galleys moved by oars, which have a long and well-known history, it will be well not to be carried away by this analogy until it has been thoroughly tested. the resemblance is indeed far from superficial. the feature which the steamer and the galley have in common is the ability to move in any direction independent of the wind. such a power makes a radical distinction between those classes of vessels and the sailing-ship; for the latter can follow only a limited number of courses when the wind blows, and must remain motionless when it fails. but while it is wise to observe things that are alike, it is also wise to look for things that differ; for when the imagination is carried away by the detection of points of resemblance,--one of the most pleasing of mental pursuits,--it is apt to be impatient of any divergence in its new-found parallels, and so may overlook or refuse to recognize such. thus the galley and the steamship have in common, though unequally developed, the important characteristic mentioned, but in at least two points they differ; and in an appeal to the history of the galley for lessons as to fighting steamships, the differences as well as the likeness must be kept steadily in view, or false deductions may be made. the motive power of the galley when in use necessarily and rapidly declined, because human strength could not long maintain such exhausting efforts, and consequently tactical movements could continue but for a limited time;[ ] and again, during the galley period offensive weapons were not only of short range, but were almost wholly confined to hand-to-hand encounter. these two conditions led almost necessarily to a rush upon each other, not, however, without some dexterous attempts to turn or double on the enemy, followed by a hand-to-hand _mêlée_. in such a rush and such a _mêlée_ a great consensus of respectable, even eminent, naval opinion of the present day finds the necessary outcome of modern naval weapons,--a kind of donnybrook fair, in which, as the history of _mêlées_ shows, it will be hard to know friend from foe. whatever may prove to be the worth of this opinion, it cannot claim an historical basis in the sole fact that galley and steamship can move at any moment directly upon the enemy, and carry a beak upon their prow, regardless of the points in which galley and steamship differ. as yet this opinion is only a presumption, upon which final judgment may well be deferred until the trial of battle has given further light. until that time there is room for the opposite view,--that a _mêlée_ between numerically equal fleets, in which skill is reduced to a minimum, is not the best that can be done with the elaborate and mighty weapons of this age. the surer of himself an admiral is, the finer the tactical development of his fleet, the better his captains, the more reluctant must he necessarily be to enter into a _mêlée_ with equal forces, in which all these advantages will be thrown away, chance reign supreme, and his fleet be placed on terms of equality with an assemblage of ships which have never before acted together.[ ] history has lessons as to when _mêlées_ are, or are not, in order. the galley, then, has one striking resemblance to the steamer, but differs in other important features which are not so immediately apparent and are therefore less accounted of. in the sailing-ship, on the contrary, the striking feature is the difference between it and the more modern vessel; the points of resemblance, though existing and easy to find, are not so obvious, and therefore are less heeded. this impression is enhanced by the sense of utter weakness in the sailing-ship as compared with the steamer, owing to its dependence upon the wind; forgetting that, as the former fought with its equals, the tactical lessons are valid. the galley was never reduced to impotence by a calm, and hence receives more respect in our day than the sailing-ship; yet the latter displaced it and remained supreme until the utilization of steam. the powers to injure an enemy from a great distance, to manoeuvre for an unlimited length of time without wearing out the men, to devote the greater part of the crew to the offensive weapons instead of to the oar, are common to the sailing vessel and the steamer, and are at least as important, tactically considered, as the power of the galley to move in a calm or against the wind. in tracing resemblances there is a tendency not only to overlook points of difference, but to exaggerate points of likeness,--to be fanciful. it may be so considered to point out that as the sailing-ship had guns of long range, with comparatively great penetrative power, and carronades, which were of shorter range but great smashing effect, so the modern steamer has its batteries of long-range guns and of torpedoes, the latter being effective only within a limited distance and then injuring by smashing, while the gun, as of old, aims at penetration. yet these are distinctly tactical considerations, which must affect the plans of admirals and captains; and the analogy is real, not forced. so also both the sailing-ship and the steamer contemplate direct contact with an enemy's vessel,--the former to carry her by boarding, the latter to sink her by ramming; and to both this is the most difficult of their tasks, for to effect it the ship must be carried to a single point of the field of action, whereas projectile weapons may be used from many points of a wide area. the relative positions of two sailing-ships, or fleets, with reference to the direction of the wind involved most important tactical questions, and were perhaps the chief care of the seamen of that age. to a superficial glance it may appear that since this has become a matter of such indifference to the steamer, no analogies to it are to be found in present conditions, and the lessons of history in this respect are valueless. a more careful consideration of the distinguishing characteristics of the lee and the weather "gage,"[ ] directed to their essential features and disregarding secondary details, will show that this is a mistake. the distinguishing feature of the weather-gage was that it conferred the power of giving or refusing battle at will, which in turn carries the usual advantage of an offensive attitude in the choice of the method of attack. this advantage was accompanied by certain drawbacks, such as irregularity introduced into the order, exposure to raking or enfilading cannonade, and the sacrifice of part or all of the artillery-fire of the assailant,--all which were incurred in approaching the enemy. the ship, or fleet, with the lee-gage could not attack; if it did not wish to retreat, its action was confined to the defensive, and to receiving battle on the enemy's terms. this disadvantage was compensated by the comparative ease of maintaining the order of battle undisturbed, and by a sustained artillery-fire to which the enemy for a time was unable to reply. historically, these favorable and unfavorable characteristics have their counterpart and analogy in the offensive and defensive operations of all ages. the offence undertakes certain risks and disadvantages in order to reach and destroy the enemy; the defence, so long as it remains such, refuses the risks of advance, holds on to a careful, well-ordered position, and avails itself of the exposure to which the assailant submits himself. these radical differences between the weather and the lee gage were so clearly recognized, through the cloud of lesser details accompanying them, that the former was ordinarily chosen by the english, because their steady policy was to assail and destroy their enemy; whereas the french sought the lee-gage, because by so doing they were usually able to cripple the enemy as he approached, and thus evade decisive encounters and preserve their ships. the french, with rare exceptions, subordinated the action of the navy to other military considerations, grudged the money spent upon it, and therefore sought to economize their fleet by assuming a defensive position and limiting its efforts to the repelling of assaults. for this course the lee-gage, skilfully used, was admirably adapted so long as an enemy displayed more courage than conduct; but when rodney showed an intention to use the advantage of the wind, not merely to attack, but to make a formidable concentration on a part of the enemy's line, his wary opponent, de guichen, changed his tactics. in the first of their three actions the frenchman took the lee-gage; but after recognizing rodney's purpose he manoeuvred for the advantage of the wind, not to attack, but to refuse action except on his own terms. the power to assume the offensive, or to refuse battle, rests no longer with the wind, but with the party which has the greater speed; which in a fleet will depend not only upon the speed of the individual ships, but also upon their tactical uniformity of action. henceforth the ships which have the greatest speed will have the weather-gage. it is not therefore a vain expectation, as many think, to look for useful lessons in the history of sailing-ships as well as in that of galleys. both have their points of resemblance to the modern ship; both have also points of essential difference, which make it impossible to cite their experiences or modes of action as tactical _precedents_ to be followed. but a precedent is different from and less valuable than a principle. the former may be originally faulty, or may cease to apply through change of circumstances; the latter has its root in the essential nature of things, and, however various its application as conditions change, remains a standard to which action must conform to attain success. war has such principles; their existence is detected by the study of the past, which reveals them in successes and in failures, the same from age to age. conditions and weapons change; but to cope with the one or successfully wield the others, respect must be had to these constant teachings of history in the tactics of the battlefield, or in those wider operations of war which are comprised under the name of strategy. it is however in these wider operations, which embrace a whole theatre of war, and in a maritime contest may cover a large portion of the globe, that the teachings of history have a more evident and permanent value, because the conditions remain more permanent. the theatre of war may be larger or smaller, its difficulties more or less pronounced, the contending armies more or less great, the necessary movements more or less easy, but these are simply differences of scale, of degree, not of kind. as a wilderness gives place to civilization, as means of communication multiply, as roads are opened, rivers bridged, food-resources increased, the operations of war become easier, more rapid, more extensive; but the principles to which they must be conformed remain the same. when the march on foot was replaced by carrying troops in coaches, when the latter in turn gave place to railroads, the scale of distances was increased, or, if you will, the scale of time diminished; but the principles which dictated the point at which the army should be concentrated, the direction in which it should move, the part of the enemy's position which it should assail, the protection of communications, were not altered. so, on the sea, the advance from the galley timidly creeping from port to port to the sailing-ship launching out boldly to the ends of the earth, and from the latter to the steamship of our own time, has increased the scope and the rapidity of naval operations without necessarily changing the principles which should direct them; and the speech of hermocrates twenty-three hundred years ago, before quoted, contained a correct strategic plan, which is as applicable in its principles now as it was then. before hostile armies or fleets are brought into con_tact_ (a word which perhaps better than any other indicates the dividing line between tactics and strategy), there are a number of questions to be decided, covering the whole plan of operations throughout the theatre of war. among these are the proper function of the navy in the war; its true objective; the point or points upon which it should be concentrated; the establishment of depots of coal and supplies; the maintenance of communications between these depots and the home base; the military value of commerce-destroying as a decisive or a secondary operation of war; the system upon which commerce-destroying can be most efficiently conducted, whether by scattered cruisers or by holding in force some vital centre through which commercial shipping must pass. all these are strategic questions, and upon all these history has a great deal to say. there has been of late a valuable discussion in english naval circles as to the comparative merits of the policies of two great english admirals, lord howe and lord st. vincent, in the disposition of the english navy when at war with france. the question is purely strategic, and is not of mere historical interest; it is of vital importance now, and the principles upon which its decision rests are the same now as then. st. vincent's policy saved england from invasion, and in the hands of nelson and his brother admirals led straight up to trafalgar. it is then particularly in the field of naval strategy that the teachings of the past have a value which is in no degree lessened. they are there useful not only as illustrative of principles, but also as precedents, owing to the comparative permanence of the conditions. this is less obviously true as to tactics, when the fleets come into collision at the point to which strategic considerations have brought them. the unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting,--in the handling and disposition of troops or ships on the battlefield. hence arises a tendency on the part of many connected with maritime matters to think that no advantage is to be gained from the study of former experiences; that time so used is wasted. this view, though natural, not only leaves wholly out of sight those broad strategic considerations which lead nations to put fleets afloat, which direct the sphere of their action, and so have modified and will continue to modify the history of the world, but is one-sided and narrow even as to tactics. the battles of the past succeeded or failed according as they were fought in conformity with the principles of war; and the seaman who carefully studies the causes of success or failure will not only detect and gradually assimilate these principles, but will also acquire increased aptitude in applying them to the tactical use of the ships and weapons of his own day. he will observe also that changes of tactics have not only taken place _after_ changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but that the interval between such changes has been unduly long. this doubtless arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil. it can be remedied only by a candid recognition of each change, by careful study of the powers and limitations of the new ship or weapon, and by a consequent adaptation of the method of using it to the qualities it possesses, which will constitute its tactics. history shows that it is vain to hope that military men generally will be at the pains to do this, but that the one who does will go into battle with a great advantage,--a lesson in itself of no mean value. we may therefore accept now the words of a french tactician, morogues, who wrote a century and a quarter ago: "naval tactics are based upon conditions the chief causes of which, namely the arms, may change; which in turn causes necessarily a change in the construction of ships, in the manner of handling them, and so finally in the disposition and handling of fleets." his further statement, that "it is not a science founded upon principles absolutely invariable," is more open to criticism. it would be more correct to say that the application of its principles varies as the weapons change. the application of the principles doubtless varies also in strategy from time to time, but the variation is far less; and hence the recognition of the underlying principle is easier. this statement is of sufficient importance to our subject to receive some illustrations from historical events. the battle of the nile, in , was not only an overwhelming victory for the english over the french fleet, but had also the decisive effect of destroying the communications between france and napoleon's army in egypt. in the battle itself the english admiral, nelson, gave a most brilliant example of grand tactics, if that be, as has been defined, "the art of making good combinations preliminary to battles as well as during their progress." the particular tactical combination depended upon a condition now passed away, which was the inability of the lee ships of a fleet at anchor to come to the help of the weather ones before the latter were destroyed; but the principles which underlay the combination, namely, to choose that part of the enemy's order which can least easily be helped, and to attack it with superior forces, has not passed away. the action of admiral jervis at cape st. vincent, when with fifteen ships he won a victory over twenty-seven, was dictated by the same principle, though in this case the enemy was not at anchor, but under way. yet men's minds are so constituted that they seem more impressed by the transiency of the conditions than by the undying principle which coped with them. in the strategic effect of nelson's victory upon the course of the war, on the contrary, the principle involved is not only more easily recognized, but it is at once seen to be applicable to our own day. the issue of the enterprise in egypt depended upon keeping open the communications with france. the victory of the nile destroyed the naval force, by which alone the communications could be assured, and determined the final failure; and it is at once seen, not only that the blow was struck in accordance with the principle of striking at the enemy's line of communication, but also that the same principle is valid now, and would be equally so in the days of the galley as of the sailing-ship or steamer. nevertheless, a vague feeling of contempt for the past, supposed to be obsolete, combines with natural indolence to blind men even to those permanent strategic lessons which lie close to the surface of naval history. for instance, how many look upon the battle of trafalgar, the crown of nelson's glory and the seal of his genius, as other than an isolated event of exceptional grandeur? how many ask themselves the strategic question, "how did the ships come to be just there?" how many realize it to be the final act in a great strategic drama, extending over a year or more, in which two of the greatest leaders that ever lived, napoleon and nelson, were pitted against each other? at trafalgar it was not villeneuve that failed, but napoleon that was vanquished; not nelson that won, but england that was saved; and why? because napoleon's combinations failed, and nelson's intuitions and activity kept the english fleet ever on the track of the enemy, and brought it up in time at the decisive moment.[ ] the tactics at trafalgar, while open to criticism in detail, were in their main features conformable to the principles of war, and their audacity was justified as well by the urgency of the case as by the results; but the great lessons of efficiency in preparation, of activity and energy in execution, and of thought and insight on the part of the english leader during the previous months, are strategic lessons, and as such they still remain good. in these two cases events were worked out to their natural and decisive end. a third may be cited, in which, as no such definite end was reached, an opinion as to what should have been done may be open to dispute. in the war of the american revolution, france and spain became allies against england in . the united fleets thrice appeared in the english channel, once to the number of sixty-six sail of the line, driving the english fleet to seek refuge in its ports because far inferior in numbers. now, the great aim of spain was to recover gibraltar and jamaica; and to the former end immense efforts both by land and sea were put forth by the allies against that nearly impregnable fortress. they were fruitless. the question suggested--and it is purely one of naval strategy--is this: would not gibraltar have been more surely recovered by controlling the english channel, attacking the british fleet even in its harbors, and threatening england with annihilation of commerce and invasion at home, than by far greater efforts directed against a distant and very strong outpost of her empire? the english people, from long immunity, were particularly sensitive to fears of invasion, and their great confidence in their fleets, if rudely shaken, would have left them proportionately disheartened. however decided, the question as a point of strategy is fair; and it is proposed in another form by a french officer of the period, who favored directing the great effort on a west india island which might be exchanged against gibraltar. it is not, however, likely that england would have given up the key of the mediterranean for any other foreign possession, though she might have yielded it to save her firesides and her capital. napoleon once said that he would reconquer pondicherry on the banks of the vistula. could he have controlled the english channel, as the allied fleet did for a moment in , can it be doubted that he would have conquered gibraltar on the shores of england? to impress more strongly the truth that history both suggests strategic study and illustrates the principles of war by the facts which it transmits, two more instances will be taken, which are more remote in time than the period specially considered in this work. how did it happen that, in two great contests between the powers of the east and of the west in the mediterranean, in one of which the empire of the known world was at stake, the opposing fleets met on spots so near each other as actium and lepanto? was this a mere coincidence, or was it due to conditions that recurred, and may recur again?[ ] if the latter, it is worth while to study out the reason; for if there should again arise a great eastern power of the sea like that of antony or of turkey, the strategic questions would be similar. at present, indeed, it seems that the centre of sea power, resting mainly with england and france, is overwhelmingly in the west; but should any chance add to the control of the black sea basin, which russia now has, the possession of the entrance to the mediterranean, the existing strategic conditions affecting sea power would all be modified. now, were the west arrayed against the east, england and france would go at once unopposed to the levant, as they did in , and as england alone went in ; in case of the change suggested, the east, as twice before, would meet the west half-way. at a very conspicuous and momentous period of the world's history, sea power had a strategic bearing and weight which has received scant recognition. there cannot now be had the full knowledge necessary for tracing in detail its influence upon the issue of the second punic war; but the indications which remain are sufficient to warrant the assertion that it was a determining factor. an accurate judgment upon this point cannot be formed by mastering only such facts of the particular contest as have been clearly transmitted, for as usual the naval transactions have been slightingly passed over; there is needed also familiarity with the details of general naval history in order to draw, from slight indications, correct inferences based upon a knowledge of what has been possible at periods whose history is well known. the control of the sea, however real, does not imply that an enemy's single ships or small squadrons cannot steal out of port, cannot cross more or less frequented tracts of ocean, make harassing descents upon unprotected points of a long coast-line, enter blockaded harbors. on the contrary, history has shown that such evasions are always possible, to some extent, to the weaker party, however great the inequality of naval strength. it is not therefore inconsistent with the general control of the sea, or of a decisive part of it, by the roman fleets, that the carthaginian admiral bomilcar in the fourth year of the war, after the stunning defeat of cannæ, landed four thousand men and a body of elephants in south italy; nor that in the seventh year, flying from the roman fleet off syracuse, he again appeared at tarentum, then in hannibal's hands; nor that hannibal sent despatch vessels to carthage; nor even that, at last, he withdrew in safety to africa with his wasted army. none of these things prove that the government in carthage could, if it wished, have sent hannibal the constant support which, as a matter of fact, he did not receive; but they do tend to create a natural impression that such help could have been given. therefore the statement, that the roman preponderance at sea had a decisive effect upon the course of the war, needs to be made good by an examination of ascertained facts. thus the kind and degree of its influence may be fairly estimated. [illustration: mediterranean sea] at the beginning of the war, mommsen says, rome controlled the seas. to whatever cause, or combination of causes, it be attributed, this essentially non-maritime state had in the first punic war established over its sea-faring rival a naval supremacy, which still lasted. in the second war there was no naval battle of importance,--a circumstance which in itself, and still more in connection with other well-ascertained facts, indicates a superiority analogous to that which at other epochs has been marked by the same feature. as hannibal left no memoirs, the motives are unknown which determined him to the perilous and almost ruinous march through gaul and across the alps. it is certain, however, that his fleet on the coast of spain was not strong enough to contend with that of rome. had it been, he might still have followed the road he actually did, for reasons that weighed with him; but had he gone by the sea, he would not have lost thirty-three thousand out of the sixty thousand veteran soldiers with whom he started. while hannibal was making this dangerous march, the romans were sending to spain, under the two elder scipios, one part of their fleet, carrying a consular army. this made the voyage without serious loss, and the army established itself successfully north of the ebro, on hannibal's line of communications. at the same time another squadron, with an army commanded by the other consul, was sent to sicily. the two together numbered two hundred and twenty ships. on its station each met and defeated a carthaginian squadron with an ease which may be inferred from the slight mention made of the actions, and which indicates the actual superiority of the roman fleet. after the second year the war assumed the following shape: hannibal, having entered italy by the north, after a series of successes had passed southward around rome and fixed himself in southern italy, living off the country,--a condition which tended to alienate the people, and was especially precarious when in contact with the mighty political and military system of control which rome had there established. it was therefore from the first urgently necessary that he should establish, between himself and some reliable base, that stream of supplies and reinforcements which in terms of modern war is called "communications." there were three friendly regions which might, each or all, serve as such a base,--carthage itself, macedonia, and spain. with the first two, communication could be had only by sea. from spain, where his firmest support was found, he could be reached by both land and sea, unless an enemy barred the passage; but the sea route was the shorter and easier. in the first years of the war, rome, by her sea power, controlled absolutely the basin between italy, sicily, and spain, known as the tyrrhenian and sardinian seas. the sea-coast from the ebro to the tiber was mostly friendly to her. in the fourth year, after the battle of cannæ, syracuse forsook the roman alliance, the revolt spread through sicily, and macedonia also entered into an offensive league with hannibal. these changes extended the necessary operations of the roman fleet, and taxed its strength. what disposition was made of it, and how did it thereafter influence the struggle? the indications are clear that rome at no time ceased to control the tyrrhenian sea, for her squadrons passed unmolested from italy to spain. on the spanish coast also she had full sway till the younger scipio saw fit to lay up the fleet. in the adriatic, a squadron and naval station were established at brindisi to check macedonia, which performed their task so well that not a soldier of the phalanxes ever set foot in italy. "the want of a war fleet," says mommsen, "paralyzed philip in all his movements." here the effect of sea power is not even a matter of inference. in sicily, the struggle centred about syracuse. the fleets of carthage and rome met there, but the superiority evidently lay with the latter; for though the carthaginians at times succeeded in throwing supplies into the city, they avoided meeting the roman fleet in battle. with lilybæum, palermo, and messina in its hands, the latter was well based in the north coast of the island. access by the south was left open to the carthaginians, and they were thus able to maintain the insurrection. putting these facts together, it is a reasonable inference, and supported by the whole tenor of the history, that the roman sea power controlled the sea north of a line drawn from tarragona in spain to lilybæum (the modern marsala), at the west end of sicily, thence round by the north side of the island through the straits of messina down to syracuse, and from there to brindisi in the adriatic. this control lasted, unshaken, throughout the war. it did not exclude maritime raids, large or small, such as have been spoken of; but it did forbid the sustained and secure communications of which hannibal was in deadly need. on the other hand, it seems equally plain that for the first ten years of the war the roman fleet was not strong enough for sustained operations in the sea between sicily and carthage, nor indeed much to the south of the line indicated. when hannibal started, he assigned such ships as he had to maintaining the communications between spain and africa, which the romans did not then attempt to disturb. the roman sea power, therefore, threw macedonia wholly out of the war. it did not keep carthage from maintaining a useful and most harassing diversion in sicily; but it did prevent her sending troops, when they would have been most useful, to her great general in italy. how was it as to spain? spain was the region upon which the father of hannibal and hannibal himself had based their intended invasion of italy. for eighteen years before this began they had occupied the country, extending and consolidating their power, both political and military, with rare sagacity. they had raised, and trained in local wars, a large and now veteran army. upon his own departure, hannibal intrusted the government to his younger brother, hasdrubal, who preserved toward him to the end a loyalty and devotion which he had no reason to hope from the faction-cursed mother-city in africa. at the time of his starting, the carthaginian power in spain was secured from cadiz to the river ebro. the region between this river and the pyrenees was inhabited by tribes friendly to the romans, but unable, in the absence of the latter, to oppose a successful resistance to hannibal. he put them down, leaving eleven thousand soldiers under hanno to keep military possession of the country, lest the romans should establish themselves there, and thus disturb his communications with his base. cnæus scipio, however, arrived on the spot by sea the same year with twenty thousand men, defeated hanno, and occupied both the coast and interior north of the ebro. the romans thus held ground by which they entirely closed the road between hannibal and reinforcements from hasdrubal, and whence they could attack the carthaginian power in spain; while their own communications with italy, being by water, were secured by their naval supremacy. they made a naval base at tarragona, confronting that of hasdrubal at cartagena, and then invaded the carthaginian dominions. the war in spain went on under the elder scipios, seemingly a side issue, with varying fortune for seven years; at the end of which time hasdrubal inflicted upon them a crushing defeat, the two brothers were killed, and the carthaginians nearly succeeded in breaking through to the pyrenees with reinforcements for hannibal. the attempt, however, was checked for the moment; and before it could be renewed, the fall of capua released twelve thousand veteran romans, who were sent to spain under claudius nero, a man of exceptional ability, to whom was due later the most decisive military movement made by any roman general during the second punic war. this seasonable reinforcement, which again assured the shaken grip on hasdrubal's line of march, came by sea,--a way which, though most rapid and easy, was closed to the carthaginians by the roman navy. two years later the younger publius scipio, celebrated afterward as africanus, received the command in spain, and captured cartagena by a combined military and naval attack; after which he took the most extraordinary step of breaking up his fleet and transferring the seamen to the army. not contented to act merely as the "containing"[ ] force against hasdrubal by closing the passes of the pyrenees, scipio pushed forward into southern spain, and fought a severe but indecisive battle on the guadalquivir; after which hasdrubal slipped away from him, hurried north, crossed the pyrenees at their extreme west, and pressed on to italy, where hannibal's position was daily growing weaker, the natural waste of his army not being replaced. the war had lasted ten years, when hasdrubal, having met little loss on the way, entered italy at the north. the troops he brought, could they be safely united with those under the command of the unrivalled hannibal, might give a decisive turn to the war, for rome herself was nearly exhausted; the iron links which bound her own colonies and the allied states to her were strained to the utmost, and some had already snapped. but the military position of the two brothers was also perilous in the extreme. one being at the river metaurus, the other in apulia, two hundred miles apart, each was confronted by a superior enemy, and both these roman armies were between their separated opponents. this false situation, as well as the long delay of hasdrubal's coming, was due to the roman control of the sea, which throughout the war limited the mutual support of the carthaginian brothers to the route through gaul. at the very time that hasdrubal was making his long and dangerous circuit by land, scipio had sent eleven thousand men from spain by sea to reinforce the army opposed to him. the upshot was that messengers from hasdrubal to hannibal, having to pass over so wide a belt of hostile country, fell into the hands of claudius nero, commanding the southern roman army, who thus learned the route which hasdrubal intended to take. nero correctly appreciated the situation, and, escaping the vigilance of hannibal, made a rapid march with eight thousand of his best troops to join the forces in the north. the junction being effected, the two consuls fell upon hasdrubal in overwhelming numbers and destroyed his army; the carthaginian leader himself falling in the battle. hannibal's first news of the disaster was by the head of his brother being thrown into his camp. he is said to have exclaimed that rome would now be mistress of the world; and the battle of metaurus is generally accepted as decisive of the struggle between the two states. the military situation which finally resulted in the battle of the metaurus and the triumph of rome may be summed up as follows: to overthrow rome it was necessary to attack her in italy at the heart of her power, and shatter the strongly linked confederacy of which she was the head. this was the objective. to reach it, the carthaginians needed a solid base of operations and a secure line of communications. the former was established in spain by the genius of the great barca family; the latter was never achieved. there were two lines possible,--the one direct by sea, the other circuitous through gaul. the first was blocked by the roman sea power, the second imperilled and finally intercepted through the occupation of northern spain by the roman army. this occupation was made possible through the control of the sea, which the carthaginians never endangered. with respect to hannibal and his base, therefore, rome occupied two central positions, rome itself and northern spain, joined by an easy interior line of communications, the sea; by which mutual support was continually given. had the mediterranean been a level desert of land, in which the romans held strong mountain ranges in corsica and sardinia, fortified posts at tarragona, lilybæum, and messina, the italian coast-line nearly to genoa, and allied fortresses in marseilles and other points; had they also possessed an armed force capable by its character of traversing that desert at will, but in which their opponents were very inferior and therefore compelled to a great circuit in order to concentrate their troops, the military situation would have been at once recognized, and no words would have been too strong to express the value and effect of that peculiar force. it would have been perceived, also, that the enemy's force of the same kind might, however inferior in strength, make an inroad, or raid, upon the territory thus held, might burn a village or waste a few miles of borderland, might even cut off a convoy at times, without, in a military sense, endangering the communications. such predatory operations have been carried on in all ages by the weaker maritime belligerent, but they by no means warrant the inference, irreconcilable with the known facts, "that neither rome nor carthage could be said to have undisputed mastery of the sea," because "roman fleets sometimes visited the coasts of africa, and carthaginian fleets in the same way appeared off the coast of italy." in the case under consideration, the navy played the part of such a force upon the supposed desert; but as it acts on an element strange to most writers, as its members have been from time immemorial a strange race apart, without prophets of their own, neither themselves nor their calling understood, its immense determining influence upon the history of that era, and consequently upon the history of the world, has been overlooked. if the preceding argument is sound, it is as defective to omit sea power from the list of principal factors in the result, as it would be absurd to claim for it an exclusive influence. instances such as have been cited, drawn from widely separated periods of time, both before and after that specially treated in this work, serve to illustrate the intrinsic interest of the subject, and the character of the lessons which history has to teach. as before observed, these come more often under the head of strategy than of tactics; they bear rather upon the conduct of campaigns than of battles, and hence are fraught with more lasting value. to quote a great authority in this connection, jomini says: "happening to be in paris near the end of , a distinguished person did me the honor to ask my opinion as to whether recent improvements in firearms would cause any great modifications in the way of making war. i replied that they would probably have an influence upon the details of tactics, but that in great strategic operations and the grand combinations of battles, victory would, now as ever, result from the application of the principles which had led to the success of great generals in all ages; of alexander and cæsar, as well as of frederick and napoleon." this study has become more than ever important now to navies, because of the great and steady power of movement possessed by the modern steamer. the best-planned schemes might fail through stress of weather in the days of the galley and the sailing-ship; but this difficulty has almost disappeared. the principles which should direct great naval combinations have been applicable to all ages, and are deducible from history; but the power to carry them out with little regard to the weather is a recent gain. the definitions usually given of the word "strategy" confine it to military combinations embracing one or more fields of operations, either wholly distinct or mutually dependent, but always regarded as actual or immediate scenes of war. however this may be on shore, a recent french author is quite right in pointing out that such a definition is too narrow for naval strategy. "this," he says, "differs from military strategy in that it is as necessary in peace as in war. indeed, in peace it may gain its most decisive victories by occupying in a country, either by purchase or treaty, excellent positions which would perhaps hardly be got by war. it learns to profit by all opportunities of settling on some chosen point of a coast, and to render definitive an occupation which at first was only transient." a generation that has seen england within ten years occupy successively cyprus and egypt, under terms and conditions on their face transient, but which have not yet led to the abandonment of the positions taken, can readily agree with this remark; which indeed receives constant illustration from the quiet persistency with which all the great sea powers are seeking position after position, less noted and less noteworthy than cyprus and egypt, in the different seas to which their people and their ships penetrate. "naval strategy has indeed for its end to found, support, and increase, as well in peace as in war, the sea power of a country;" and therefore its study has an interest and value for all citizens of a free country, but especially for those who are charged with its foreign and military relations. the general conditions that either are essential to or powerfully affect the greatness of a nation upon the sea will now be examined; after which a more particular consideration of the various maritime nations of europe at the middle of the seventeenth century, where the historical survey begins, will serve at once to illustrate and give precision to the conclusions upon the general subject. * * * * * note.--the brilliancy of nelson's fame, dimming as it does that of all his contemporaries, and the implicit trust felt by england in him as the one man able to save her from the schemes of napoleon, should not of course obscure the fact that only one portion of the field was, or could be, occupied by him. napoleon's aim, in the campaign which ended at trafalgar, was to unite in the west indies the french fleets of brest, toulon, and rochefort, together with a strong body of spanish ships, thus forming an overwhelming force which he intended should return together to the english channel and cover the crossing of the french army. he naturally expected that, with england's interests scattered all over the world, confusion and distraction would arise from ignorance of the destination of the french squadrons, and the english navy be drawn away from his objective point. the portion of the field committed to nelson was the mediterranean, where he watched the great arsenal of toulon and the highways alike to the east and to the atlantic. this was inferior in consequence to no other, and assumed additional importance in the eyes of nelson from his conviction that the former attempts on egypt would be renewed. owing to this persuasion he took at first a false step, which delayed his pursuit of the toulon fleet when it sailed under the command of villeneuve; and the latter was further favored by a long continuance of fair winds, while the english had head winds. but while all this is true, while the failure of napoleon's combinations must be attributed to the tenacious grip of the english blockade off brest, _as well as_ to nelson's energetic pursuit of the toulon fleet when it escaped to the west indies and again on its hasty return to europe, the latter is fairly entitled to the eminent distinction which history has accorded it, and which is asserted in the text. nelson did not, indeed, fathom the intentions of napoleon. this may have been owing, as some have said, to lack of insight; but it may be more simply laid to the usual disadvantage under which the defence lies before the blow has fallen, of ignorance as to the point threatened by the offence. it is insight enough to fasten on the key of a situation; and this nelson rightly saw was the fleet, not the station. consequently, his action has afforded a striking instance of how tenacity of purpose and untiring energy in execution can repair a first mistake and baffle deeply laid plans. his mediterranean command embraced many duties and cares; but amid and dominating them all, he saw clearly the toulon fleet as the controlling factor there, and an important factor in any naval combination of the emperor. hence his attention was unwaveringly fixed upon it; so much so that he called it "his fleet," a phrase which has somewhat vexed the sensibilities of french critics. this simple and accurate view of the military situation strengthened him in taking the fearless resolution and bearing the immense responsibility of abandoning his station in order to follow "his fleet." determined thus on a pursuit the undeniable wisdom of which should not obscure the greatness of mind that undertook it, he followed so vigorously as to reach cadiz on his return a week before villeneuve entered ferrol, despite unavoidable delays arising from false information and uncertainty as to the enemy's movements. the same untiring ardor enabled him to bring up his own ships from cadiz to brest in time to make the fleet there superior to villeneuve's, had the latter persisted in his attempt to reach the neighborhood. the english, very inferior in aggregate number of vessels to the allied fleets, were by this seasonable reinforcement of eight veteran ships put into the best possible position strategically, as will be pointed out in dealing with similar conditions in the war of the american revolution. their forces were united in one great fleet in the bay of biscay, interposed between the two divisions of the enemy in brest and ferrol, superior in number to either singly, and with a strong probability of being able to deal with one before the other could come up. this was due to able action all round on the part of the english authorities; but above all other factors in the result stands nelson's single-minded pursuit of "his fleet." this interesting series of strategic movements ended on the th of august, when villeneuve, in despair of reaching brest, headed for cadiz, where he anchored on the th. as soon as napoleon heard of this, after an outburst of rage against the admiral, he at once dictated the series of movements which resulted in ulm and austerlitz, abandoning his purposes against england. the battle of trafalgar, fought october , was therefore separated by a space of two months from the extensive movements of which it was nevertheless the outcome. isolated from them in point of time, it was none the less the seal of nelson's genius, affixed later to the record he had made in the near past. with equal truth it is said that england was saved at trafalgar, though the emperor had then given up his intended invasion; the destruction there emphasized and sealed the strategic triumph which had noiselessly foiled napoleon's plans. footnotes: [ ] thus hermocrates of syracuse, advocating the policy of thwarting the athenian expedition against his city (b.c. ) by going boldly to meet it, and keeping on the flank of its line of advance, said: "as their advance must be slow, we shall have a thousand opportunities to attack them; but if they clear their ships for action and in a body bear down expeditiously upon us, they must ply hard at their oars, and _when spent with toil_ we can fall upon them." [ ] the writer must guard himself from appearing to advocate elaborate tactical movements issuing in barren demonstrations. he believes that a fleet seeking a decisive result must close with its enemy, but not until some advantage has been obtained for the collision, which will usually be gained by manoeuvring, and will fall to the best drilled and managed fleet. in truth, barren results have as often followed upon headlong, close encounters as upon the most timid tactical trifling. [ ] a ship was said to have the weather-gage, or "the advantage of the wind," or "to be to windward," when the wind allowed her to steer for her opponent, and did not let the latter head straight for her. the extreme case was when the wind blew direct from one to the other; but there was a large space on either side of this line to which the term "weather-gage" applied. if the lee ship be taken as the centre of a circle, there were nearly three eighths of its area in which the other might be and still keep the advantage of the wind to a greater or less degree. lee is the opposite of weather. [ ] see note at end of introductory chapter, page . [ ] the battle of navarino ( ) between turkey and the western powers was fought in this neighborhood. [ ] a "containing" force is one to which, in a military combination, is assigned the duty of stopping, or delaying the advance of a portion of the enemy, while the main effort of the army or armies is being exerted in a different quarter. chapter i. discussion of the elements of sea power. the first and most obvious light in which the sea presents itself from the political and social point of view is that of a great highway; or better, perhaps, of a wide common, over which men may pass in all directions, but on which some well-worn paths show that controlling reasons have led them to choose certain lines of travel rather than others. these lines of travel are called trade routes; and the reasons which have determined them are to be sought in the history of the world. notwithstanding all the familiar and unfamiliar dangers of the sea, both travel and traffic by water have always been easier and cheaper than by land. the commercial greatness of holland was due not only to her shipping at sea, but also to the numerous tranquil water-ways which gave such cheap and easy access to her own interior and to that of germany. this advantage of carriage by water over that by land was yet more marked in a period when roads were few and very bad, wars frequent and society unsettled, as was the case two hundred years ago. sea traffic then went in peril of robbers, but was nevertheless safer and quicker than that by land. a dutch writer of that time, estimating the chances of his country in a war with england, notices among other things that the water-ways of england failed to penetrate the country sufficiently; therefore, the roads being bad, goods from one part of the kingdom to the other must go by sea, and be exposed to capture by the way. as regards purely internal trade, this danger has generally disappeared at the present day. in most civilized countries, now, the destruction or disappearance of the coasting trade would only be an inconvenience, although water transit is still the cheaper. nevertheless, as late as the wars of the french republic and the first empire, those who are familiar with the history of the period, and the light naval literature that has grown up around it, know how constant is the mention of convoys stealing from point to point along the french coast, although the sea swarmed with english cruisers and there were good inland roads. under modern conditions, however, home trade is but a part of the business of a country bordering on the sea. foreign necessaries or luxuries must be brought to its ports, either in its own or in foreign ships, which will return, bearing in exchange the products of the country, whether they be the fruits of the earth or the works of men's hands; and it is the wish of every nation that this shipping business should be done by its own vessels. the ships that thus sail to and fro must have secure ports to which to return, and must, as far as possible, be followed by the protection of their country throughout the voyage. this protection in time of war must be extended by armed shipping. the necessity of a navy, in the restricted sense of the word, springs, therefore, from the existence of a peaceful shipping, and disappears with it, except in the case of a nation which has aggressive tendencies, and keeps up a navy merely as a branch of the military establishment. as the united states has at present no aggressive purposes, and as its merchant service has disappeared, the dwindling of the armed fleet and general lack of interest in it are strictly logical consequences. when for any reason sea trade is again found to pay, a large enough shipping interest will reappear to compel the revival of the war fleet. it is possible that when a canal route through the central-american isthmus is seen to be a near certainty, the aggressive impulse may be strong enough to lead to the same result. this is doubtful, however, because a peaceful, gain-loving nation is not far-sighted, and far-sightedness is needed for adequate military preparation, especially in these days. as a nation, with its unarmed and armed shipping, launches forth from its own shores, the need is soon felt of points upon which the ships can rely for peaceful trading, for refuge and supplies. in the present day friendly, though foreign, ports are to be found all over the world; and their shelter is enough while peace prevails. it was not always so, nor does peace always endure, though the united states have been favored by so long a continuance of it. in earlier times the merchant seaman, seeking for trade in new and unexplored regions, made his gains at risk of life and liberty from suspicious or hostile nations, and was under great delays in collecting a full and profitable freight. he therefore intuitively sought at the far end of his trade route one or more stations, to be given to him by force or favor, where he could fix himself or his agents in reasonable security, where his ships could lie in safety, and where the merchantable products of the land could be continually collecting, awaiting the arrival of the home fleet, which should carry them to the mother-country. as there was immense gain, as well as much risk, in these early voyages, such establishments naturally multiplied and grew until they became colonies; whose ultimate development and success depended upon the genius and policy of the nation from which they sprang, and form a very great part of the history, and particularly of the sea history, of the world. all colonies had not the simple and natural birth and growth above described. many were more formal, and purely political, in their conception and founding, the act of the rulers of the people rather than of private individuals; but the trading-station with its after expansion, the work simply of the adventurer seeking gain, was in its reasons and essence the same as the elaborately organized and chartered colony. in both cases the mother-country had won a foothold in a foreign land, seeking a new outlet for what it had to sell, a new sphere for its shipping, more employment for its people, more comfort and wealth for itself. the needs of commerce, however, were not all provided for when safety had been secured at the far end of the road. the voyages were long and dangerous, the seas often beset with enemies. in the most active days of colonizing there prevailed on the sea a lawlessness the very memory of which is now almost lost, and the days of settled peace between maritime nations were few and far between. thus arose the demand for stations along the road, like the cape of good hope, st. helena, and mauritius, not primarily for trade, but for defence and war; the demand for the possession of posts like gibraltar, malta, louisburg, at the entrance of the gulf of st. lawrence,--posts whose value was chiefly strategic, though not necessarily wholly so. colonies and colonial posts were sometimes commercial, sometimes military in their character; and it was exceptional that the same position was equally important in both points of view, as new york was. in these three things--production, with the necessity of exchanging products, shipping, whereby the exchange is carried on, and colonies, which facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping and tend to protect it by multiplying points of safety--is to be found the key to much of the history, as well as of the policy, of nations bordering upon the sea. the policy has varied both with the spirit of the age and with the character and clear-sightedness of the rulers; but the history of the seaboard nations has been less determined by the shrewdness and foresight of governments than by conditions of position, extent, configuration, number and character of their people,--by what are called, in a word, natural conditions. it must however be admitted, and will be seen, that the wise or unwise action of individual men has at certain periods had a great modifying influence upon the growth of sea power in the broad sense, which includes not only the military strength afloat, that rules the sea or any part of it by force of arms, but also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests. the principal conditions affecting the sea power of nations may be enumerated as follows: i. geographical position. ii. physical conformation, including, as connected therewith, natural productions and climate. iii. extent of territory. iv. number of population. v. character of the people. vi. character of the government, including therein the national institutions. i. _geographical position._--it may be pointed out, in the first place, that if a nation be so situated that it is neither forced to defend itself by land nor induced to seek extension of its territory by way of the land, it has, by the very unity of its aim directed upon the sea, an advantage as compared with a people one of whose boundaries is continental. this has been a great advantage to england over both france and holland as a sea power. the strength of the latter was early exhausted by the necessity of keeping up a large army and carrying on expensive wars to preserve her independence; while the policy of france was constantly diverted, sometimes wisely and sometimes most foolishly, from the sea to projects of continental extension. these military efforts expended wealth; whereas a wiser and consistent use of her geographical position would have added to it. the geographical position may be such as of itself to promote a concentration, or to necessitate a dispersion, of the naval forces. here again the british islands have an advantage over france. the position of the latter, touching the mediterranean as well as the ocean, while it has its advantages, is on the whole a source of military weakness at sea. the eastern and western french fleets have only been able to unite after passing through the straits of gibraltar, in attempting which they have often risked and sometimes suffered loss. the position of the united states upon the two oceans would be either a source of great weakness or a cause of enormous expense, had it a large sea commerce on both coasts. england, by her immense colonial empire, has sacrificed much of this advantage of concentration of force around her own shores; but the sacrifice was wisely made, for the gain was greater than the loss, as the event proved. with the growth of her colonial system her war fleets also grew, but her merchant shipping and wealth grew yet faster. still, in the wars of the american revolution, and of the french republic and empire, to use the strong expression of a french author, "england, despite the immense development of her navy, seemed ever, in the midst of riches, to feel all the embarrassment of poverty." the might of england was sufficient to keep alive the heart and the members; whereas the equally extensive colonial empire of spain, through her maritime weakness, but offered so many points for insult and injury. the geographical position of a country may not only favor the concentration of its forces, but give the further strategic advantage of a central position and a good base for hostile operations against its probable enemies. this again is the case with england; on the one hand she faces holland and the northern powers, on the other france and the atlantic. when threatened with a coalition between france and the naval powers of the north sea and the baltic, as she at times was, her fleets in the downs and in the channel, and even that off brest, occupied interior positions, and thus were readily able to interpose their united force against either one of the enemies which should seek to pass through the channel to effect a junction with its ally. on either side, also, nature gave her better ports and a safer coast to approach. formerly this was a very serious element in the passage through the channel; but of late, steam and the improvement of her harbors have lessened the disadvantage under which france once labored. in the days of sailing-ships, the english fleet operated against brest making its base at torbay and plymouth. the plan was simply this: in easterly or moderate weather the blockading fleet kept its position without difficulty; but in westerly gales, when too severe, they bore up for english ports, knowing that the french fleet could not get out till the wind shifted, which equally served to bring them back to their station. the advantage of geographical nearness to an enemy, or to the object of attack, is nowhere more apparent than in that form of warfare which has lately received the name of commerce-destroying, which the french call _guerre de course_. this operation of war, being directed against peaceful merchant vessels which are usually defenceless, calls for ships of small military force. such ships, having little power to defend themselves, need a refuge or point of support near at hand; which will be found either in certain parts of the sea controlled by the fighting ships of their country, or in friendly harbors. the latter give the strongest support, because they are always in the same place, and the approaches to them are more familiar to the commerce-destroyer than to his enemy. the nearness of france to england has thus greatly facilitated her _guerre de course_ directed against the latter. having ports on the north sea, on the channel, and on the atlantic, her cruisers started from points near the focus of english trade, both coming and going. the distance of these ports from each other, disadvantageous for regular military combinations, is an advantage for this irregular secondary operation; for the essence of the one is concentration of effort, whereas for commerce-destroying diffusion of effort is the rule. commerce-destroyers scatter, that they may see and seize more prey. these truths receive illustration from the history of the great french privateers, whose bases and scenes of action were largely on the channel and north sea, or else were found in distant colonial regions, where islands like guadaloupe and martinique afforded similar near refuge. the necessity of renewing coal makes the cruiser of the present day even more dependent than of old on his port. public opinion in the united states has great faith in war directed against an enemy's commerce; but it must be remembered that the republic has no ports very near the great centres of trade abroad. her geographical position is therefore singularly disadvantageous for carrying on successful commerce-destroying, unless she find bases in the ports of an ally. if, in addition to facility for offence, nature has so placed a country that it has easy access to the high sea itself, while at the same time it controls one of the great thoroughfares of the world's traffic, it is evident that the strategic value of its position is very high. such again is, and to a greater degree was, the position of england. the trade of holland, sweden, russia, denmark, and that which went up the great rivers to the interior of germany, had to pass through the channel close by her doors; for sailing-ships hugged the english coast. this northern trade had, moreover, a peculiar bearing upon sea power; for naval stores, as they are commonly called, were mainly drawn from the baltic countries. but for the loss of gibraltar, the position of spain would have been closely analogous to that of england. looking at once upon the atlantic and the mediterranean, with cadiz on the one side and cartagena on the other, the trade to the levant must have passed under her hands, and that round the cape of good hope not far from her doors. but gibraltar not only deprived her of the control of the straits, it also imposed an obstacle to the easy junction of the two divisions of her fleet. at the present day, looking only at the geographical position of italy, and not at the other conditions affecting her sea power, it would seem that with her extensive sea-coast and good ports she is very well placed for exerting a decisive influence on the trade route to the levant and by the isthmus of suez. this is true in a degree, and would be much more so did italy now hold all the islands naturally italian; but with malta in the hands of england, and corsica in those of france, the advantages of her geographical position are largely neutralized. from race affinities and situation those two islands are as legitimately objects of desire to italy as gibraltar is to spain. if the adriatic were a great highway of commerce, italy's position would be still more influential. these defects in her geographical completeness, combined with other causes injurious to a full and secure development of sea power, make it more than doubtful whether italy can for some time be in the front rank among the sea nations. as the aim here is not an exhaustive discussion, but merely an attempt to show, by illustration, how vitally the situation of a country may affect its career upon the sea, this division of the subject may be dismissed for the present; the more so as instances which will further bring out its importance will continually recur in the historical treatment. two remarks, however, are here appropriate. circumstances have caused the mediterranean sea to play a greater part in the history of the world, both in a commercial and a military point of view, than any other sheet of water of the same size. nation after nation has striven to control it, and the strife still goes on. therefore a study of the conditions upon which preponderance in its waters has rested, and now rests, and of the relative military values of different points upon its coasts, will be more instructive than the same amount of effort expended in another field. furthermore, it has at the present time a very marked analogy in many respects to the caribbean sea,--an analogy which will be still closer if a panama canal-route ever be completed. a study of the strategic conditions of the mediterranean, which have received ample illustration, will be an excellent prelude to a similar study of the caribbean, which has comparatively little history. the second remark bears upon the geographical position of the united states relatively to a central-american canal. if one be made, and fulfil the hopes of its builders, the caribbean will be changed from a terminus, and place of local traffic, or at best a broken and imperfect line of travel, as it now is, into one of the great highways of the world. along this path a great commerce will travel, bringing the interests of the other great nations, the european nations, close along our shores, as they have never been before. with this it will not be so easy as heretofore to stand aloof from international complications. the position of the united states with reference to this route will resemble that of england to the channel, and of the mediterranean countries to the suez route. as regards influence and control over it, depending upon geographical position, it is of course plain that the centre of the national power, the permanent base,[ ] is much nearer than that of other great nations. the positions now or hereafter occupied by them on island or mainland, however strong, will be but outposts of their power; while in all the raw materials of military strength no nation is superior to the united states. she is, however, weak in a confessed unpreparedness for war; and her geographical nearness to the point of contention loses some of its value by the character of the gulf coast, which is deficient in ports combining security from an enemy with facility for repairing war-ships of the first class, without which ships no country can pretend to control any part of the sea. in case of a contest for supremacy in the caribbean, it seems evident from the depth of the south pass of the mississippi, the nearness of new orleans, and the advantages of the mississippi valley for water transit, that the main effort of the country must pour down that valley, and its permanent base of operations be found there. the defence of the entrance to the mississippi, however, presents peculiar difficulties; while the only two rival ports, key west and pensacola, have too little depth of water, and are much less advantageously placed with reference to the resources of the country. to get the full benefit of superior geographical position, these defects must be overcome. furthermore, as her distance from the isthmus, though relatively less, is still considerable, the united states will have to obtain in the caribbean stations fit for contingent, or secondary, bases of operations; which by their natural advantages, susceptibility of defence, and nearness to the central strategic issue, will enable her fleets to remain as near the scene as any opponent. with ingress and egress from the mississippi sufficiently protected, with such outposts in her hands, and with the communications between them and the home base secured, in short, with proper military preparation, for which she has all necessary means, the preponderance of the united states on this field follows, from her geographical position and her power, with mathematical certainty. ii. _physical conformation._--the peculiar features of the gulf coast, just alluded to, come properly under the head of physical conformation of a country, which is placed second for discussion among the conditions which affect the development of sea power. the seaboard of a country is one of its frontiers; and the easier the access offered by the frontier to the region beyond, in this case the sea, the greater will be the tendency of a people toward intercourse with the rest of the world by it. if a country be imagined having a long seaboard, but entirely without a harbor, such a country can have no sea trade of its own, no shipping, no navy. this was practically the case with belgium when it was a spanish and an austrian province. the dutch, in , as a condition of peace after a successful war, exacted that the scheldt should be closed to sea commerce. this closed the harbor of antwerp and transferred the sea trade of belgium to holland. the spanish netherlands ceased to be a sea power. numerous and deep harbors are a source of strength and wealth, and doubly so if they are the outlets of navigable streams, which facilitate the concentration in them of a country's internal trade; but by their very accessibility they become a source of weakness in war, if not properly defended. the dutch in found little difficulty in ascending the thames and burning a large fraction of the english navy within sight of london; whereas a few years later the combined fleets of england and france, when attempting a landing in holland, were foiled by the difficulties of the coast as much as by the valor of the dutch fleet. in the harbor of new york, and with it undisputed control of the hudson river, would have been lost to the english, who were caught at disadvantage, but for the hesitancy of the french admiral. with that control, new england would have been restored to close and safe communication with new york, new jersey, and pennsylvania; and this blow, following so closely on burgoyne's disaster of the year before, would probably have led the english to make an earlier peace. the mississippi is a mighty source of wealth and strength to the united states; but the feeble defences of its mouth and the number of its subsidiary streams penetrating the country made it a weakness and source of disaster to the southern confederacy. and lastly, in , the occupation of the chesapeake and the destruction of washington gave a sharp lesson of the dangers incurred through the noblest water-ways, if their approaches be undefended; a lesson recent enough to be easily recalled, but which, from the present appearance of the coast defences, seems to be yet more easily forgotten. nor should it be thought that conditions have changed; circumstances and details of offence and defence have been modified, in these days as before, but the great conditions remain the same. before and during the great napoleonic wars, france had no port for ships-of-the-line east of brest. how great the advantage to england, which in the same stretch has two great arsenals, at plymouth and at portsmouth, besides other harbors of refuge and supply. this defect of conformation has since been remedied by the works at cherbourg. besides the contour of the coast, involving easy access to the sea, there are other physical conditions which lead people to the sea or turn them from it. although france was deficient in military ports on the channel, she had both there and on the ocean, as well as in the mediterranean, excellent harbors, favorably situated for trade abroad, and at the outlet of large rivers, which would foster internal traffic. but when richelieu had put an end to civil war, frenchmen did not take to the sea with the eagerness and success of the english and dutch. a principal reason for this has been plausibly found in the physical conditions which have made france a pleasant land, with a delightful climate, producing within itself more than its people needed. england, on the other hand, received from nature but little, and, until her manufactures were developed, had little to export. their many wants, combined with their restless activity and other conditions that favored maritime enterprise, led her people abroad; and they there found lands more pleasant and richer than their own. their needs and genius made them merchants and colonists, then manufacturers and producers; and between products and colonies shipping is the inevitable link. so their sea power grew. but if england was drawn to the sea, holland was driven to it; without the sea england languished, but holland died. in the height of her greatness, when she was one of the chief factors in european politics, a competent native authority estimated that the soil of holland could not support more than one eighth of her inhabitants. the manufactures of the country were then numerous and important, but they had been much later in their growth than the shipping interest. the poverty of the soil and the exposed nature of the coast drove the dutch first to fishing. then the discovery of the process of curing the fish gave them material for export as well as home consumption, and so laid the corner-stone of their wealth. thus they had become traders at the time that the italian republics, under the pressure of turkish power and the discovery of the passage round the cape of good hope, were beginning to decline, and they fell heirs to the great italian trade of the levant. further favored by their geographical position, intermediate between the baltic, france, and the mediterranean, and at the mouth of the german rivers, they quickly absorbed nearly all the carrying-trade of europe. the wheat and naval stores of the baltic, the trade of spain with her colonies in the new world, the wines of france, and the french coasting-trade were, little more than two hundred years ago, transported in dutch shipping. much of the carrying-trade of england, even, was then done in dutch bottoms. it will not be pretended that all this prosperity proceeded only from the poverty of holland's natural resources. something does not grow from nothing. what is true, is, that by the necessitous condition of her people they were driven to the sea, and were, from their mastery of the shipping business and the size of their fleets, in a position to profit by the sudden expansion of commerce and the spirit of exploration which followed on the discovery of america and of the passage round the cape. other causes concurred, but their whole prosperity stood on the sea power to which their poverty gave birth. their food, their clothing, the raw material for their manufactures, the very timber and hemp with which they built and rigged their ships (and they built nearly as many as all europe besides), were imported; and when a disastrous war with england in and had lasted eighteen months, and their shipping business was stopped, it is said "the sources of revenue which had always maintained the riches of the state, such as fisheries and commerce, were almost dry. workshops were closed, work was suspended. the zuyder zee became a forest of masts; the country was full of beggars; grass grew in the streets, and in amsterdam fifteen hundred houses were untenanted." a humiliating peace alone saved them from ruin. this sorrowful result shows the weakness of a country depending wholly upon sources external to itself for the part it is playing in the world. with large deductions, owing to differences of conditions which need not here be spoken of, the case of holland then has strong points of resemblance to that of great britain now; and they are true prophets, though they seem to be having small honor in their own country, who warn her that the continuance of her prosperity at home depends primarily upon maintaining her power abroad. men may be discontented at the lack of political privilege; they will be yet more uneasy if they come to lack bread. it is of more interest to americans to note that the result to france, regarded as a power of the sea, caused by the extent, delightfulness, and richness of the land, has been reproduced in the united states. in the beginning, their forefathers held a narrow strip of land upon the sea, fertile in parts though little developed, abounding in harbors and near rich fishing-grounds. these physical conditions combined with an inborn love of the sea, the pulse of that english blood which still beat in their veins, to keep alive all those tendencies and pursuits upon which a healthy sea power depends. almost every one of the original colonies was on the sea or on one of its great tributaries. all export and import tended toward one coast. interest in the sea and an intelligent appreciation of the part it played in the public welfare were easily and widely spread; and a motive more influential than care for the public interest was also active, for the abundance of ship-building materials and a relative fewness of other investments made shipping a profitable private interest. how changed the present condition is, all know. the centre of power is no longer on the seaboard. books and newspapers vie with one another in describing the wonderful growth, and the still undeveloped riches, of the interior. capital there finds its best investments, labor its largest opportunities. the frontiers are neglected and politically weak; the gulf and pacific coasts actually so, the atlantic coast relatively to the central mississippi valley. when the day comes that shipping again pays, when the three sea frontiers find that they are not only militarily weak, but poorer for lack of national shipping, their united efforts may avail to lay again the foundations of our sea power. till then, those who follow the limitations which lack of sea power placed upon the career of france may mourn that their own country is being led, by a like redundancy of home wealth, into the same neglect of that great instrument. among modifying physical conditions may be noted a form like that of italy,--a long peninsula, with a central range of mountains dividing it into two narrow strips, along which the roads connecting the different ports necessarily run. only an absolute control of the sea can wholly secure such communications, since it is impossible to know at what point an enemy coming from beyond the visible horizon may strike; but still, with an adequate naval force centrally posted, there will be good hope of attacking his fleet, which is at once his base and line of communications, before serious damage has been done. the long, narrow peninsula of florida, with key west at its extremity, though flat and thinly populated, presents at first sight conditions like those of italy. the resemblance may be only superficial, but it seems probable that if the chief scene of a naval war were the gulf of mexico, the communications by land to the end of the peninsula might be a matter of consequence, and open to attack. when the sea not only borders, or surrounds, but also separates a country into two or more parts, the control of it becomes not only desirable, but vitally necessary. such a physical condition either gives birth and strength to sea power, or makes the country powerless. such is the condition of the present kingdom of italy, with its islands of sardinia and sicily; and hence in its youth and still existing financial weakness it is seen to put forth such vigorous and intelligent efforts to create a military navy. it has even been argued that, with a navy decidedly superior to her enemy's, italy could better base her power upon her islands than upon her mainland; for the insecurity of the lines of communication in the peninsula, already pointed out, would most seriously embarrass an invading army surrounded by a hostile people and threatened from the sea. the irish sea, separating the british islands, rather resembles an estuary than an actual division; but history has shown the danger from it to the united kingdom. in the days of louis xiv., when the french navy nearly equalled the combined english and dutch, the gravest complications existed in ireland, which passed almost wholly under the control of the natives and the french. nevertheless, the irish sea was rather a danger to the english--a weak point in their communications--than an advantage to the french. the latter did not venture their ships-of-the-line in its narrow waters, and expeditions intending to land were directed upon the ocean ports in the south and west. at the supreme moment the great french fleet was sent upon the south coast of england, where it decisively defeated the allies, and at the same time twenty-five frigates were sent to st. george's channel, against the english communications. in the midst of a hostile people, the english army in ireland was seriously imperilled, but was saved by the battle of the boyne and the flight of james ii. this movement against the enemy's communications was strictly strategic, and would be just as dangerous to england now as in . spain, in the same century, afforded an impressive lesson of the weakness caused by such separation when the parts are not knit together by a strong sea power. she then still retained, as remnants of her past greatness, the netherlands (now belgium), sicily, and other italian possessions, not to speak of her vast colonies in the new world. yet so low had the spanish sea power fallen, that a well-informed and sober-minded hollander of the day could claim that "in spain all the coast is navigated by a few dutch ships; and since the peace of their ships and seamen are so few that they have publicly begun to hire our ships to sail to the indies, whereas they were formerly careful to exclude all foreigners from there.... it is manifest," he goes on, "that the west indies, being as the stomach to spain (for from it nearly all the revenue is drawn), must be joined to the spanish head by a sea force; and that naples and the netherlands, being like two arms, they cannot lay out their strength for spain, nor receive anything thence but by shipping,--all which may easily be done by our shipping in peace, and by it obstructed in war." half a century before, sully, the great minister of henry iv., had characterized spain "as one of those states whose legs and arms are strong and powerful, but the heart infinitely weak and feeble." since his day the spanish navy had suffered not only disaster, but annihilation; not only humiliation, but degradation. the consequences briefly were that shipping was destroyed; manufactures perished with it. the government depended for its support, not upon a wide-spread healthy commerce and industry that could survive many a staggering blow, but upon a narrow stream of silver trickling through a few treasure-ships from america, easily and frequently intercepted by an enemy's cruisers. the loss of half a dozen galleons more than once paralyzed its movements for a year. while the war in the netherlands lasted, the dutch control of the sea forced spain to send her troops by a long and costly journey overland instead of by sea; and the same cause reduced her to such straits for necessaries that, by a mutual arrangement which seems very odd to modern ideas, her wants were supplied by dutch ships, which thus maintained the enemies of their country, but received in return specie which was welcome in the amsterdam exchange. in america, the spanish protected themselves as best they might behind masonry, unaided from home; while in the mediterranean they escaped insult and injury mainly through the indifference of the dutch, for the french and english had not yet begun to contend for mastery there. in the course of history the netherlands, naples, sicily, minorca, havana, manila, and jamaica were wrenched away, at one time or another, from this empire without a shipping. in short, while spain's maritime impotence may have been primarily a symptom of her general decay, it became a marked factor in precipitating her into the abyss from which she has not yet wholly emerged. except alaska, the united states has no outlying possession,--no foot of ground inaccessible by land. its contour is such as to present few points specially weak from their saliency, and all important parts of the frontiers can be readily attained,--cheaply by water, rapidly by rail. the weakest frontier, the pacific, is far removed from the most dangerous of possible enemies. the internal resources are boundless as compared with present needs; we can live off ourselves indefinitely in "our little corner," to use the expression of a french officer to the author. yet should that little corner be invaded by a new commercial route through the isthmus, the united states in her turn may have the rude awakening of those who have abandoned their share in the common birthright of all people, the sea. iii. _extent of territory._--the last of the conditions affecting the development of a nation as a sea power, and touching the country itself as distinguished from the people who dwell there, is extent of territory. this may be dismissed with comparatively few words. as regards the development of sea power, it is not the total number of square miles which a country contains, but the length of its coast-line and the character of its harbors that are to be considered. as to these it is to be said that, the geographical and physical conditions being the same, extent of sea-coast is a source of strength or weakness according as the population is large or small. a country is in this like a fortress; the garrison must be proportioned to the _enceinte_. a recent familiar instance is found in the american war of secession. had the south had a people as numerous as it was warlike, and a navy commensurate to its other resources as a sea power, the great extent of its sea-coast and its numerous inlets would have been elements of great strength. the people of the united states and the government of that day justly prided themselves on the effectiveness of the blockade of the whole southern coast. it was a great feat, a very great feat; but it would have been an impossible feat had the southerners been more numerous, and a nation of seamen. what was there shown was not, as has been said, how such a blockade can be maintained, but that such a blockade is possible in the face of a population not only unused to the sea, but also scanty in numbers. those who recall how the blockade was maintained, and the class of ships that blockaded during great part of the war, know that the plan, correct under the circumstances, could not have been carried out in the face of a real navy. scattered unsupported along the coast, the united states ships kept their places, singly or in small detachments, in face of an extensive network of inland water communications which favored secret concentration of the enemy. behind the first line of water communications were long estuaries, and here and there strong fortresses, upon either of which the enemy's ships could always fall back to elude pursuit or to receive protection. had there been a southern navy to profit by such advantages, or by the scattered condition of the united states ships, the latter could not have been distributed as they were; and being forced to concentrate for mutual support, many small but useful approaches would have been left open to commerce. but as the southern coast, from its extent and many inlets, might have been a source of strength, so, from those very characteristics, it became a fruitful source of injury. the great story of the opening of the mississippi is but the most striking illustration of an action that was going on incessantly all over the south. at every breach of the sea frontier, war-ships were entering. the streams that had carried the wealth and supported the trade of the seceding states turned against them, and admitted their enemies to their hearts. dismay, insecurity, paralysis, prevailed in regions that might, under happier auspices, have kept a nation alive through the most exhausting war. never did sea power play a greater or a more decisive part than in the contest which determined that the course of the world's history would be modified by the existence of one great nation, instead of several rival states, in the north american continent. but while just pride is felt in the well-earned glory of those days, and the greatness of the results due to naval preponderance is admitted, americans who understand the facts should never fail to remind the over-confidence of their countrymen that the south not only had no navy, not only was not a seafaring people, but that also its population was not proportioned to the extent of the sea-coast which it had to defend. iv. _number of population._--after the consideration of the natural conditions of a country should follow an examination of the characteristics of its population as affecting the development of sea power; and first among these will be taken, because of its relations to the extent of the territory, which has just been discussed, the number of the people who live in it. it has been said that in respect of dimensions it is not merely the number of square miles, but the extent and character of the sea-coast that is to be considered with reference to sea power; and so, in point of population, it is not only the grand total, but the number following the sea, or at least readily available for employment on ship-board and for the creation of naval material, that must be counted. for example, formerly and up to the end of the great wars following the french revolution, the population of france was much greater than that of england; but in respect of sea power in general, peaceful commerce as well as military efficiency, france was much inferior to england. in the matter of military efficiency this fact is the more remarkable because at times, in point of military preparation at the outbreak of war, france had the advantage; but she was not able to keep it. thus in , when war broke out, france, through her maritime inscription, was able to man at once fifty ships-of-the-line. england, on the contrary, by reason of the dispersal over the globe of that very shipping on which her naval strength so securely rested, had much trouble in manning forty at home; but in she had one hundred and twenty in commission or ready for commission, while france had never been able to exceed seventy-one. again, as late as , when the two nations were on the verge of war in the levant, a most accomplished french officer of the day, while extolling the high state of efficiency of the french fleet and the eminent qualities of its admiral, and expressing confidence in the results of an encounter with an equal enemy, goes on to say: "behind the squadron of twenty-one ships-of-the-line which we could then assemble, there was no reserve; not another ship could have been commissioned within six months." and this was due not only to lack of ships and of proper equipments, though both were wanting. "our maritime inscription," he continues, "was so exhausted by what we had done [in manning twenty-one ships], that the permanent levy established in all quarters did not supply reliefs for the men, who were already more than three years on cruise." a contrast such as this shows a difference in what is called staying power, or reserve force, which is even greater than appears on the surface; for a great shipping afloat necessarily employs, besides the crews, a large number of people engaged in the various handicrafts which facilitate the making and repairing of naval material, or following other callings more or less closely connected with the water and with craft of all kinds. such kindred callings give an undoubted aptitude for the sea from the outset. there is an anecdote showing curious insight into this matter on the part of one of england's distinguished seamen, sir edward pellew. when the war broke out in , the usual scarceness of seamen was met. eager to get to sea and unable to fill his complement otherwise than with landsmen, he instructed his officers to seek for cornish miners; reasoning from the conditions and dangers of their calling, of which he had personal knowledge, that they would quickly fit into the demands of sea life. the result showed his sagacity, for, thus escaping an otherwise unavoidable delay, he was fortunate enough to capture the first frigate taken in the war in single combat; and what is especially instructive is, that although but a few weeks in commission, while his opponent had been over a year, the losses, heavy on both sides, were nearly equal. it may be urged that such reserve strength has now nearly lost the importance it once had, because modern ships and weapons take so long to make, and because modern states aim at developing the whole power of their armed force, on the outbreak of war, with such rapidity as to strike a disabling blow before the enemy can organize an equal effort. to use a familiar phrase, there will not be time for the whole resistance of the national fabric to come into play; the blow will fall on the organized military fleet, and if that yield, the solidity of the rest of the structure will avail nothing. to a certain extent this is true; but then it has always been true, though to a less extent formerly than now. granted the meeting of two fleets which represent practically the whole present strength of their two nations, if one of them be destroyed, while the other remains fit for action, there will be much less hope now than formerly that the vanquished can restore his navy for that war; and the result will be disastrous just in proportion to the dependence of the nation upon her sea power. a trafalgar would have been a much more fatal blow to england than it was to france, had the english fleet then represented, as the allied fleet did, the bulk of the nation's power. trafalgar in such a case would have been to england what austerlitz was to austria, and jena to prussia; an empire would have been laid prostrate by the destruction or disorganization of its military forces, which, it is said, were the favorite objective of napoleon. but does the consideration of such exceptional disasters in the past justify the putting a low value upon that reserve strength, based upon the number of inhabitants fitted for a certain kind of military life, which is here being considered? the blows just mentioned were dealt by men of exceptional genius, at the head of armed bodies of exceptional training, _esprit-de-corps_, and prestige, and were, besides, inflicted upon opponents more or less demoralized by conscious inferiority and previous defeat. austerlitz had been closely preceded by ulm, where thirty thousand austrians laid down their arms without a battle; and the history of the previous years had been one long record of austrian reverse and french success. trafalgar followed closely upon a cruise, justly called a campaign, of almost constant failure; and farther back, but still recent, were the memories of st. vincent for the spaniards, and of the nile for the french, in the allied fleet. except the case of jena, these crushing overthrows were not single disasters, but final blows; and in the jena campaign there was a disparity in numbers, equipment, and general preparation for war, which makes it less applicable in considering what may result from a single victory. england is at the present time the greatest maritime nation in the world; in steam and iron she has kept the superiority she had in the days of sail and wood. france and england are the two powers that have the largest military navies; and it is so far an open question which of the two is the more powerful, that they may be regarded as practically of equal strength in material for a sea war. in the case of a collision can there be assumed such a difference of _personnel_, or of preparation, as to make it probable that a decisive inequality will result from one battle or one campaign? if not, the reserve strength will begin to tell; organized reserve first, then reserve of seafaring population, reserve of mechanical skill, reserve of wealth. it seems to have been somewhat forgotten that england's leadership in mechanical arts gives her a reserve of mechanics, who can easily familiarize themselves with the appliances of modern iron-clads; and as her commerce and industries feel the burden of the war, the surplus of seamen and mechanics will go to the armed shipping. the whole question of the value of a reserve, developed or undeveloped, amounts now to this: have modern conditions of warfare made it probable that, of two nearly equal adversaries, one will be so prostrated in a single campaign that a decisive result will be reached in that time? sea warfare has given no answer. the crushing successes of prussia against austria, and of germany against france, appear to have been those of a stronger over a much weaker nation, whether the weakness were due to natural causes, or to official incompetency. how would a delay like that of plevna have affected the fortune of war, had turkey had any reserve of national power upon which to call? if time be, as is everywhere admitted, a supreme factor in war, it behooves countries whose genius is essentially not military, whose people, like all free people, object to pay for large military establishments, to see to it that they are at least strong enough to gain the time necessary to turn the spirit and capacity of their subjects into the new activities which war calls for. if the existing force by land or sea is strong enough so to hold out, even though at a disadvantage, the country may rely upon its natural resources and strength coming into play for whatever they are worth,--its numbers, its wealth, its capacities of every kind. if, on the other hand, what force it has can be overthrown and crushed quickly, the most magnificent possibilities of natural power will not save it from humiliating conditions, nor, if its foe be wise, from guarantees which will postpone revenge to a distant future. the story is constantly repeated on the smaller fields of war: "if so-and-so can hold out a little longer, this can be saved or that can be done;" as in sickness it is often said: "if the patient can only hold out so long, the strength of his constitution may pull him through." england to some extent is now such a country. holland was such a country; she would not pay, and if she escaped, it was but by the skin of her teeth. "never in time of peace and from fear of a rupture," wrote their great statesman, de witt, "will they take resolutions strong enough to lead them to pecuniary sacrifices beforehand. the character of the dutch is such that, unless danger stares them in the face, they are indisposed to lay out money for their own defence. i have to do with a people who, liberal to profusion where they ought to economize, are often sparing to avarice where they ought to spend." that our own country is open to the same reproach, is patent to all the world. the united states has not that shield of defensive power behind which time can be gained to develop its reserve of strength. as for a seafaring population adequate to her possible needs, where is it? such a resource, proportionate to her coast-line and population, is to be found only in a national merchant shipping and its related industries, which at present scarcely exist. it will matter little whether the crews of such ships are native or foreign born, provided they are attached to the flag, and her power at sea is sufficient to enable the most of them to get back in case of war. when foreigners by thousands are admitted to the ballot, it is of little moment that they are given fighting-room on board ship. though the treatment of the subject has been somewhat discursive, it may be admitted that a great population following callings related to the sea is, now as formerly, a great element of sea power; that the united states is deficient in that element; and that its foundations can be laid only in a large commerce under her own flag. v. _national character._--the effect of national character and aptitudes upon the development of sea power will next be considered. if sea power be really based upon a peaceful and extensive commerce, aptitude for commercial pursuits must be a distinguishing feature of the nations that have at one time or another been great upon the sea. history almost without exception affirms that this is true. save the romans, there is no marked instance to the contrary. all men seek gain and, more or less, love money; but the way in which gain is sought will have a marked effect upon the commercial fortunes and the history of the people inhabiting a country. if history may be believed, the way in which the spaniards and their kindred nation, the portuguese, sought wealth, not only brought a blot upon the national character, but was also fatal to the growth of a healthy commerce; and so to the industries upon which commerce lives, and ultimately to that national wealth which was sought by mistaken paths. the desire for gain rose in them to fierce avarice; so they sought in the new-found worlds which gave such an impetus to the commercial and maritime development of the countries of europe, not new fields of industry, not even the healthy excitement of exploration and adventure, but gold and silver. they had many great qualities; they were bold, enterprising, temperate, patient of suffering, enthusiastic, and gifted with intense national feeling. when to these qualities are added the advantages of spain's position and well-situated ports, the fact that she was first to occupy large and rich portions of the new worlds and long remained without a competitor, and that for a hundred years after the discovery of america she was the leading state in europe, she might have been expected to take the foremost place among the sea powers. exactly the contrary was the result, as all know. since the battle of lepanto in , though engaged in many wars, no sea victory of any consequence shines on the pages of spanish history; and the decay of her commerce sufficiently accounts for the painful and sometimes ludicrous inaptness shown on the decks of her ships of war. doubtless such a result is not to be attributed to one cause only. doubtless the government of spain was in many ways such as to cramp and blight a free and healthy development of private enterprise; but the character of a great people breaks through or shapes the character of its government, and it can hardly be doubted that had the bent of the people been toward trade, the action of government would have been drawn into the same current. the great field of the colonies, also, was remote from the centre of that despotism which blighted the growth of old spain. as it was, thousands of spaniards, of the working as well as the upper classes, left spain; and the occupations in which they engaged abroad sent home little but specie, or merchandise of small bulk, requiring but small tonnage. the mother-country herself produced little but wool, fruit, and iron; her manufactures were naught; her industries suffered; her population steadily decreased. both she and her colonies depended upon the dutch for so many of the necessaries of life, that the products of their scanty industries could not suffice to pay for them. "so that holland merchants," writes a contemporary, "who carry money to most parts of the world to buy commodities, must out of this single country of europe carry home money, which they receive in payment of their goods." thus their eagerly sought emblem of wealth passed quickly from their hands. it has already been pointed out how weak, from a military point of view, spain was from this decay of her shipping. her wealth being in small bulk on a few ships, following more or less regular routes, was easily seized by an enemy, and the sinews of war paralyzed; whereas the wealth of england and holland, scattered over thousands of ships in all parts of the world, received many bitter blows in many exhausting wars, without checking a growth which, though painful, was steady. the fortunes of portugal, united to spain during a most critical period of her history, followed the same downward path: although foremost in the beginning of the race for development by sea, she fell utterly behind. "the mines of brazil were the ruin of portugal, as those of mexico and peru had been of spain; all manufactures fell into insane contempt; ere long the english supplied the portuguese not only with clothes, but with all merchandise, all commodities, even to salt-fish and grain. after their gold, the portuguese abandoned their very soil; the vineyards of oporto were finally bought by the english with brazilian gold, which had only passed through portugal to be spread throughout england." we are assured that in fifty years, five hundred millions of dollars were extracted from "the mines of brazil, and that at the end of the time portugal had but twenty-five millions in specie,"--a striking example of the difference between real and fictitious wealth. the english and dutch were no less desirous of gain than the southern nations. each in turn has been called "a nation of shopkeepers;" but the jeer, in so far as it is just, is to the credit of their wisdom and uprightness. they were no less bold, no less enterprising, no less patient. indeed, they were more patient, in that they sought riches not by the sword but by labor, which is the reproach meant to be implied by the epithet; for thus they took the longest, instead of what seemed the shortest, road to wealth. but these two peoples, radically of the same race, had other qualities, no less important than those just named, which combined with their surroundings to favor their development by sea. they were by nature business-men, traders, producers, negotiators. therefore both in their native country and abroad, whether settled in the ports of civilized nations, or of barbarous eastern rulers, or in colonies of their own foundation, they everywhere strove to draw out all the resources of the land, to develop and increase them. the quick instinct of the born trader, shopkeeper if you will, sought continually new articles to exchange; and this search, combined with the industrious character evolved through generations of labor, made them necessarily producers. at home they became great as manufacturers; abroad, where they controlled, the land grew richer continually, products multiplied, and the necessary exchange between home and the settlements called for more ships. their shipping therefore increased with these demands of trade, and nations with less aptitude for maritime enterprise, even france herself, great as she has been, called for their products and for the service of their ships. thus in many ways they advanced to power at sea. this natural tendency and growth were indeed modified and seriously checked at times by the interference of other governments, jealous of a prosperity which their own people could invade only by the aid of artificial support,--a support which will be considered under the head of governmental action as affecting sea power. the tendency to trade, involving of necessity the production of something to trade with, is the national characteristic most important to the development of sea power. granting it and a good seaboard, it is not likely that the dangers of the sea, or any aversion to it, will deter a people from seeking wealth by the paths of ocean commerce. where wealth is sought by other means, it may be found; but it will not necessarily lead to sea power. take france. france has a fine country, an industrious people, an admirable position. the french navy has known periods of great glory, and in its lowest estate has never dishonored the military reputation so dear to the nation. yet as a maritime state, securely resting upon a broad basis of sea commerce, france, as compared with other historical sea-peoples, has never held more than a respectable position. the chief reason for this, so far as national character goes, is the way in which wealth is sought. as spain and portugal sought it by digging gold out of the ground, the temper of the french people leads them to seek it by thrift, economy, hoarding. it is said to be harder to keep than to make a fortune. possibly; but the adventurous temper, which risks what it has to gain more, has much in common with the adventurous spirit that conquers worlds for commerce. the tendency to save and put aside, to venture timidly and on a small scale, may lead to a general diffusion of wealth on a like small scale, but not to the risks and development of external trade and shipping interests. to illustrate,--and the incident is given only for what it is worth,--a french officer, speaking to the author about the panama canal, said: "i have two shares in it. in france we don't do as you, where a few people take a great many shares each. with us a large number of people take one share or a very few. when these were in the market my wife said to me, 'you take two shares, one for you and one for me.'" as regards the stability of a man's personal fortunes this kind of prudence is doubtless wise; but when excessive prudence or financial timidity becomes a national trait, it must tend to hamper the expansion of commerce and of the nation's shipping. the same caution in money matters, appearing in another relation of life, has checked the production of children, and keeps the population of france nearly stationary. the noble classes of europe inherited from the middle ages a supercilious contempt for peaceful trade, which has exercised a modifying influence upon its growth, according to the national character of different countries. the pride of the spaniards fell easily in with this spirit of contempt, and co-operated with that disastrous unwillingness to work and wait for wealth which turned them away from commerce. in france, the vanity which is conceded even by frenchmen to be a national trait led in the same direction. the numbers and brilliancy of the nobility, and the consideration enjoyed by them, set a seal of inferiority upon an occupation which they despised. rich merchants and manufacturers sighed for the honors of nobility, and upon obtaining them, abandoned their lucrative professions. therefore, while the industry of the people and the fruitfulness of the soil saved commerce from total decay, it was pursued under a sense of humiliation which caused its best representatives to escape from it as soon as they could. louis xiv., under the influence of colbert, put forth an ordinance "authorizing all noblemen to take an interest in merchant ships, goods and merchandise, without being considered as having derogated from nobility, provided they did not sell at retail;" and the reason given for this action was, "that it imports the good of our subjects and our own satisfaction, to efface the relic of a public opinion, universally prevalent, that maritime commerce is incompatible with nobility." but a prejudice involving conscious and open superiority is not readily effaced by ordinances, especially when vanity is a conspicuous trait in national character; and many years later montesquieu taught that it is contrary to the spirit of monarchy that the nobility should engage in trade. in holland there was a nobility; but the state was republican in name, allowed large scope to personal freedom and enterprise, and the centres of power were in the great cities. the foundation of the national greatness was money--or rather wealth. wealth, as a source of civic distinction, carried with it also power in the state; and with power there went social position and consideration. in england the same result obtained. the nobility were proud; but in a representative government the power of wealth could be neither put down nor overshadowed. it was patent to the eyes of all; it was honored by all; and in england, as well as holland, the occupations which were the source of wealth shared in the honor given to wealth itself. thus, in all the countries named, social sentiment, the outcome of national characteristics, had a marked influence upon the national attitude toward trade. in yet another way does the national genius affect the growth of sea power in its broadest sense; and that is in so far as it possesses the capacity for planting healthy colonies. of colonization, as of all other growths, it is true that it is most healthy when it is most natural. therefore colonies that spring from the felt wants and natural impulses of a whole people will have the most solid foundations; and their subsequent growth will be surest when they are least trammelled from home, if the people have the genius for independent action. men of the past three centuries have keenly felt the value to the mother-country of colonies as outlets for the home products and as a nursery for commerce and shipping; but efforts at colonization have not had the same general origin, nor have different systems all had the same success. the efforts of statesmen, however far-seeing and careful, have not been able to supply the lack of strong natural impulse; nor can the most minute regulation from home produce as good results as a happier neglect, when the germ of self-development is found in the national character. there has been no greater display of wisdom in the national administration of successful colonies than in that of unsuccessful. perhaps there has been even less. if elaborate system and supervision, careful adaptation of means to ends, diligent nursing, could avail for colonial growth, the genius of england has less of this systematizing faculty than the genius of france; but england, not france, has been the great colonizer of the world. successful colonization, with its consequent effect upon commerce and sea power, depends essentially upon national character; because colonies grow best when they grow of themselves, naturally. the character of the colonist, not the care of the home government, is the principle of the colony's growth. this truth stands out the clearer because the general attitude of all the home governments toward their colonies was entirely selfish. however founded, as soon as it was recognized to be of consequence, the colony became to the home country a cow to be milked; to be cared for, of course, but chiefly as a piece of property valued for the returns it gave. legislation was directed toward a monopoly of its external trade; the places in its government afforded posts of value for occupants from the mother-country; and the colony was looked upon, as the sea still so often is, as a fit place for those who were ungovernable or useless at home. the military administration, however, so long as it remains a colony, is the proper and necessary attribute of the home government. the fact of england's unique and wonderful success as a great colonizing nation is too evident to be dwelt upon; and the reason for it appears to lie chiefly in two traits of the national character. the english colonist naturally and readily settles down in his new country, identifies his interest with it, and though keeping an affectionate remembrance of the home from which he came, has no restless eagerness to return. in the second place, the englishman at once and instinctively seeks to develop the resources of the new country in the broadest sense. in the former particular he differs from the french, who were ever longingly looking back to the delights of their pleasant land; in the latter, from the spaniards, whose range of interest and ambition was too narrow for the full evolution of the possibilities of a new country. the character and the necessities of the dutch led them naturally to plant colonies; and by the year they had in the east indies, in africa, and in america a large number, only to name which would be tedious. they were then far ahead of england in this matter. but though the origin of these colonies, purely commercial in its character, was natural, there seems to have been lacking to them a principle of growth. "in planting them they never sought an extension of empire, but merely an acquisition of trade and commerce. they attempted conquest only when forced by the pressure of circumstances. generally they were content to trade under the protection of the sovereign of the country." this placid satisfaction with gain alone, unaccompanied by political ambition, tended, like the despotism of france and spain, to keep the colonies mere commercial dependencies upon the mother-country, and so killed the natural principle of growth. before quitting this head of the inquiry, it is well to ask how far the national character of americans is fitted to develop a great sea power, should other circumstances become favorable. it seems scarcely necessary, however, to do more than appeal to a not very distant past to prove that, if legislative hindrances be removed, and more remunerative fields of enterprise filled up, the sea power will not long delay its appearance. the instinct for commerce, bold enterprise in the pursuit of gain, and a keen scent for the trails that lead to it, all exist; and if there be in the future any fields calling for colonization, it cannot be doubted that americans will carry to them all their inherited aptitude for self-government and independent growth. vi. _character of the government._--in discussing the effects upon the development of a nation's sea power exerted by its government and institutions, it will be necessary to avoid a tendency to over-philosophizing, to confine attention to obvious and immediate causes and their plain results, without prying too far beneath the surface for remote and ultimate influences. nevertheless, it must be noted that particular forms of government with their accompanying institutions, and the character of rulers at one time or another, have exercised a very marked influence upon the development of sea power. the various traits of a country and its people which have so far been considered constitute the natural characteristics with which a nation, like a man, begins its career; the conduct of the government in turn corresponds to the exercise of the intelligent will-power, which, according as it is wise, energetic and persevering, or the reverse, causes success or failure in a man's life or a nation's history. it would seem probable that a government in full accord with the natural bias of its people would most successfully advance its growth in every respect; and, in the matter of sea power, the most brilliant successes have followed where there has been intelligent direction by a government fully imbued with the spirit of the people and conscious of its true general bent. such a government is most certainly secured when the will of the people, or of their best natural exponents, has some large share in making it; but such free governments have sometimes fallen short, while on the other hand despotic power, wielded with judgment and consistency, has created at times a great sea commerce and a brilliant navy with greater directness than can be reached by the slower processes of a free people. the difficulty in the latter case is to insure perseverance after the death of a particular despot. england having undoubtedly reached the greatest height of sea power of any modern nation, the action of her government first claims attention. in general direction this action has been consistent, though often far from praiseworthy. it has aimed steadily at the control of the sea. one of its most arrogant expressions dates back as far as the reign of james i., when she had scarce any possessions outside her own islands; before virginia or massachusetts was settled. here is richelieu's account of it:-- "the duke of sully, minister of henry iv. [one of the most chivalrous princes that ever lived], having embarked at calais in a french ship wearing the french flag at the main, was no sooner in the channel than, meeting an english despatch-boat which was there to receive him, the commander of the latter ordered the french ship to lower her flag. the duke, considering that his quality freed him from such an affront, boldly refused; but this refusal was followed by three cannon-shot, which, piercing his ship, pierced the heart likewise of all good frenchmen. might forced him to yield what right forbade, and for all the complaints he made he could get no better reply from the english captain than this: 'that just as his duty obliged him to honor the ambassador's rank, it also obliged him to exact the honor due to the flag of his master as sovereign of the sea.' if the words of king james himself were more polite, they nevertheless had no other effect than to compel the duke to take counsel of his prudence, feigning to be satisfied, while his wound was all the time smarting and incurable. henry the great had to practise moderation on this occasion; but with the resolve another time to sustain the rights of his crown by the force that, with the aid of time, he should be able to put upon the sea." this act of unpardonable insolence, according to modern ideas, was not so much out of accord with the spirit of nations in that day. it is chiefly noteworthy as the most striking, as well as one of the earliest indications of the purpose of england to assert herself at all risks upon the sea; and the insult was offered under one of her most timid kings to an ambassador immediately representing the bravest and ablest of french sovereigns. this empty honor of the flag, a claim insignificant except as the outward manifestation of the purpose of a government, was as rigidly exacted under cromwell as under the kings. it was one of the conditions of peace yielded by the dutch after their disastrous war of . cromwell, a despot in everything but name, was keenly alive to all that concerned england's honor and strength, and did not stop at barren salutes to promote them. hardly yet possessed of power, the english navy sprang rapidly into a new life and vigor under his stern rule. england's rights, or reparation for her wrongs, were demanded by her fleets throughout the world,--in the baltic, in the mediterranean, against the barbary states, in the west indies; and under him the conquest of jamaica began that extension of her empire, by force of arms, which has gone on to our own days. nor were equally strong peaceful measures for the growth of english trade and shipping forgotten. cromwell's celebrated navigation act declared that all imports into england or her colonies must be conveyed exclusively in vessels belonging to england herself, or to the country in which the products carried were grown or manufactured. this decree, aimed specially at the dutch, the common carriers of europe, was resented throughout the commercial world; but the benefit to england, in those days of national strife and animosity, was so apparent that it lasted long under the monarchy. a century and a quarter later we find nelson, before his famous career had begun, showing his zeal for the welfare of england's shipping by enforcing this same act in the west indies against american merchant-ships. when cromwell was dead, and charles ii. sat on the throne of his father, this king, false to the english people, was yet true to england's greatness and to the traditional policy of her government on the sea. in his treacherous intrigues with louis xiv., by which he aimed to make himself independent of parliament and people, he wrote to louis: "there are two impediments to a perfect union. the first is the great care france is now taking to create a commerce and to be an imposing maritime power. this is so great a cause of suspicion with us, who can possess importance only by our commerce and our naval force, that every step which france takes in this direction will perpetuate the jealousy between the two nations." in the midst of the negotiations which preceded the detestable attack of the two kings upon the dutch republic, a warm dispute arose as to who should command the united fleets of france and england. charles was inflexible on this point. "it is the custom of the english," said he, "to command at sea;" and he told the french ambassador plainly that, were he to yield, his subjects would not obey him. in the projected partition of the united provinces he reserved for england the maritime plunder in positions that controlled the mouths of the rivers scheldt and meuse. the navy under charles preserved for some time the spirit and discipline impressed on it by cromwell's iron rule; though later it shared in the general decay of _morale_ which marked this evil reign. monk, having by a great strategic blunder sent off a fourth of his fleet, found himself in in presence of a greatly superior dutch force. disregarding the odds, he attacked without hesitation, and for three days maintained the fight with honor, though with loss. such conduct is not war; but in the single eye that looked to england's naval prestige and dictated his action, common as it was to england's people as well as to her government, has lain the secret of final success following many blunders through the centuries. charles's successor, james ii., was himself a seaman, and had commanded in two great sea-fights. when william iii. came to the throne, the governments of england and holland were under one hand, and continued united in one purpose against louis xiv. until the peace of utrecht in ; that is, for a quarter of a century. the english government more and more steadily, and with conscious purpose, pushed on the extension of her sea dominion and fostered the growth of her sea power. while as an open enemy she struck at france upon the sea, so as an artful friend, many at least believed, she sapped the power of holland afloat. the treaty between the two countries provided that of the sea forces holland should furnish three eighths, england five eighths, or nearly double. such a provision, coupled with a further one which made holland keep up an army of , against england's , , virtually threw the land war on one and the sea war on the other. the tendency, whether designed or not, is evident; and at the peace, while holland received compensation by land, england obtained, besides commercial privileges in france, spain, and the spanish west indies, the important maritime concessions of gibraltar and port mahon in the mediterranean; of newfoundland, nova scotia, and hudson's bay in north america. the naval power of france and spain had disappeared; that of holland thenceforth steadily declined. posted thus in america, the west indies, and the mediterranean, the english government thenceforth moved firmly forward on the path which made of the english kingdom the british empire. for the twenty-five years following the peace of utrecht, peace was the chief aim of the ministers who directed the policy of the two great seaboard nations, france and england; but amid all the fluctuations of continental politics in a most unsettled period, abounding in petty wars and shifty treaties, the eye of england was steadily fixed on the maintenance of her sea power. in the baltic, her fleets checked the attempts of peter the great upon sweden, and so maintained a balance of power in that sea, from which she drew not only a great trade but the chief part of her naval stores, and which the czar aimed to make a russian lake. denmark endeavored to establish an east india company aided by foreign capital; england and holland not only forbade their subjects to join it, but threatened denmark, and thus stopped an enterprise they thought adverse to their sea interests. in the netherlands, which by the utrecht treaty had passed to austria, a similar east india company, having ostend for its port, was formed, with the emperor's sanction. this step, meant to restore to the low countries the trade lost to them through their natural outlet of the scheldt, was opposed by the sea powers england and holland; and their greediness for the monopoly of trade, helped in this instance by france, stifled this company also after a few years of struggling life. in the mediterranean, the utrecht settlement was disturbed by the emperor of austria, england's natural ally in the then existing state of european politics. backed by england, he, having already naples, claimed also sicily in exchange for sardinia. spain resisted; and her navy, just beginning to revive under a vigorous minister, alberoni, was crushed and annihilated by the english fleet off cape passaro in ; while the following year a french army, at the bidding of england, crossed the pyrenees and completed the work by destroying the spanish dock-yards. thus england, in addition to gibraltar and mahon in her own hands, saw naples and sicily in those of a friend, while an enemy was struck down. in spanish america, the limited privileges to english trade, wrung from the necessities of spain, were abused by an extensive and scarcely disguised smuggling system; and when the exasperated spanish government gave way to excesses in the mode of suppression, both the minister who counselled peace and the opposition which urged war defended their opinions by alleging the effects of either upon england's sea power and honor. while england's policy thus steadily aimed at widening and strengthening the bases of her sway upon the ocean, the other governments of europe seemed blind to the dangers to be feared from her sea growth. the miseries resulting from the overweening power of spain in days long gone by seemed to be forgotten; forgotten also the more recent lesson of the bloody and costly wars provoked by the ambition and exaggerated power of louis xiv. under the eyes of the statesmen of europe there was steadily and visibly being built up a third overwhelming power, destined to be used as selfishly, as aggressively, though not as cruelly, and much more successfully than any that had preceded it. this was the power of the sea, whose workings, because more silent than the clash of arms, are less often noted, though lying clearly enough on the surface. it can scarcely be denied that england's uncontrolled dominion of the seas, during almost the whole period chosen for our subject, was by long odds the chief among the military factors that determined the final issue.[ ] so far, however, was this influence from being foreseen after utrecht, that france for twelve years, moved by personal exigencies of her rulers, sided with england against spain; and when fleuri came into power in , though this policy was reversed, the navy of france received no attention, and the only blow at england was the establishment of a bourbon prince, a natural enemy to her, upon the throne of the two sicilies in . when war broke out with spain in , the navy of england was in numbers more than equal to the combined navies of spain and france; and during the quarter of a century of nearly uninterrupted war that followed, this numerical disproportion increased. in these wars england, at first instinctively, afterward with conscious purpose under a government that recognized her opportunity and the possibilities of her great sea power, rapidly built up that mighty colonial empire whose foundations were already securely laid in the characteristics of her colonists and the strength of her fleets. in strictly european affairs her wealth, the outcome of her sea power, made her play a conspicuous part during the same period. the system of subsidies, which began half a century before in the wars of marlborough and received its most extensive development half a century later in the napoleonic wars, maintained the efforts of her allies, which would have been crippled, if not paralyzed, without them. who can deny that the government which with one hand strengthened its fainting allies on the continent with the life-blood of money, and with the other drove its own enemies off the sea and out of their chief possessions, canada, martinique, guadeloupe, havana, manila, gave to its country the foremost rôle in european politics; and who can fail to see that the power which dwelt in that government, with a land narrow in extent and poor in resources, sprang directly from the sea? the policy in which the english government carried on the war is shown by a speech of pitt, the master-spirit during its course, though he lost office before bringing it to an end. condemning the peace of , made by his political opponent, he said: "france is chiefly, if not exclusively, formidable to us as a maritime and commercial power. what we gain in this respect is valuable to us, above all, through the injury to her which results from it. you have left to france the possibility of reviving her navy." yet england's gains were enormous; her rule in india was assured, and all north america east of the mississippi in her hands. by this time the onward path of her government was clearly marked out, had assumed the force of a tradition, and was consistently followed. the war of the american revolution was, it is true, a great mistake, looked at from the point of view of sea power; but the government was led into it insensibly by a series of natural blunders. putting aside political and constitutional considerations, and looking at the question as purely military or naval, the case was this: the american colonies were large and growing communities at a great distance from england. so long as they remained attached to the mother-country, as they then were enthusiastically, they formed a solid base for her sea power in that part of the world; but their extent and population were too great, when coupled with the distance from england, to afford any hope of holding them by force, _if_ any powerful nations were willing to help them. this "if," however, involved a notorious probability; the humiliation of france and spain was so bitter and so recent that they were sure to seek revenge, and it was well known that france in particular had been carefully and rapidly building up her navy. had the colonies been thirteen islands, the sea power of england would quickly have settled the question; but instead of such a physical barrier they were separated only by local jealousies which a common danger sufficiently overcame. to enter deliberately on such a contest, to try to hold by force so extensive a territory, with a large hostile population, so far from home, was to renew the seven years' war with france and spain, and with the americans, against, instead of for, england. the seven years' war had been so heavy a burden that a wise government would have known that the added weight could not be borne, and have seen it was necessary to conciliate the colonists. the government of the day was not wise, and a large element of england's sea power was sacrificed; but by mistake, not wilfully; through arrogance, not through weakness. this steady keeping to a general line of policy was doubtless made specially easy for successive english governments by the clear indications of the country's conditions. singleness of purpose was to some extent imposed. the firm maintenance of her sea power, the haughty determination to make it felt, the wise state of preparation in which its military element was kept, were yet more due to that feature of her political institutions which practically gave the government, during the period in question, into the hands of a class,--a landed aristocracy. such a class, whatever its defects otherwise, readily takes up and carries on a sound political tradition, is naturally proud of its country's glory, and comparatively insensible to the sufferings of the community by which that glory is maintained. it readily lays on the pecuniary burden necessary for preparation and for endurance of war. being as a body rich, it feels those burdens less. not being commercial, the sources of its own wealth are not so immediately endangered, and it does not share that political timidity which characterizes those whose property is exposed and business threatened,--the proverbial timidity of capital. yet in england this class was not insensible to anything that touched her trade for good or ill. both houses of parliament vied in careful watchfulness over its extension and protection, and to the frequency of their inquiries a naval historian attributes the increased efficiency of the executive power in its management of the navy. such a class also naturally imbibes and keeps up a spirit of military honor, which is of the first importance in ages when military institutions have not yet provided the sufficient substitute in what is called _esprit-de-corps_. but although full of class feeling and class prejudice, which made themselves felt in the navy as well as elsewhere, their practical sense left open the way of promotion to its highest honors to the more humbly born; and every age saw admirals who had sprung from the lowest of the people. in this the temper of the english upper class differed markedly from that of the french. as late as , at the outbreak of the revolution, the french navy list still bore the name of an official whose duty was to verify the proofs of noble birth on the part of those intending to enter the naval school. since , and especially in our own day, the government of england has passed very much more into the hands of the people at large. whether her sea power will suffer therefrom remains to be seen. its broad basis still remains in a great trade, large mechanical industries, and an extensive colonial system. whether a democratic government will have the foresight, the keen sensitiveness to national position and credit, the willingness to insure its prosperity by adequate outpouring of money in times of peace, all which are necessary for military preparation, is yet an open question. popular governments are not generally favorable to military expenditure, however necessary, and there are signs that england tends to drop behind. it has already been seen that the dutch republic, even more than the english nation, drew its prosperity and its very life from the sea. the character and policy of its government were far less favorable to a consistent support of sea power. composed of seven provinces, with the political name of the united provinces, the actual distribution of power may be roughly described to americans as an exaggerated example of states rights. each of the maritime provinces had its own fleet and its own admiralty, with consequent jealousies. this disorganizing tendency was partly counteracted by the great preponderance of the province of holland, which alone contributed five sixths of the fleet and fifty-eight per cent of the taxes, and consequently had a proportionate share in directing the national policy. although intensely patriotic, and capable of making the last sacrifices for freedom, the commercial spirit of the people penetrated the government, which indeed might be called a commercial aristocracy, and made it averse to war, and to the expenditures which are necessary in preparing for war. as has before been said, it was not until danger stared them in the face that the burgomasters were willing to pay for their defences. while the republican government lasted, however, this economy was practised least of all upon the fleet; and until the death of john de witt, in , and the peace with england in , the dutch navy was in point of numbers and equipment able to make a fair show against the combined navies of england and france. its efficiency at this time undoubtedly saved the country from the destruction planned by the two kings. with de witt's death the republic passed away, and was followed by the practically monarchical government of william of orange. the life-long policy of this prince, then only eighteen, was resistance to louis xiv. and to the extension of french power. this resistance took shape upon the land rather than the sea,--a tendency promoted by england's withdrawal from the war. as early as , admiral de ruyter found the force given him unequal to cope with the french alone. with the eyes of the government fixed on the land frontier, the navy rapidly declined. in , when william of orange needed a fleet to convoy him to england, the burgomasters of amsterdam objected that the navy was incalculably decreased in strength, as well as deprived of its ablest commanders. when king of england, william still kept his position as stadtholder, and with it his general european policy. he found in england the sea power he needed, and used the resources of holland for the land war. this dutch prince consented that in the allied fleets, in councils of war, the dutch admirals should sit below the junior english captain; and dutch interests at sea were sacrificed as readily as dutch pride to the demands of england. when william died, his policy was still followed by the government which succeeded him. its aims were wholly centred upon the land, and at the peace of utrecht, which closed a series of wars extending over forty years, holland, having established no sea claim, gained nothing in the way of sea resources, of colonial extension, or of commerce. of the last of these wars an english historian says: "the economy of the dutch greatly hurt their reputation and their trade. their men-of-war in the mediterranean were always victualled short, and their convoys were so weak and ill-provided that for one ship that we lost, they lost five, which begat a general notion that we were the safer carriers, which certainly had a good effect. hence it was that our trade rather increased than diminished in this war." from that time holland ceased to have a great sea power, and rapidly lost the leading position among the nations which that power had built up. it is only just to say that no policy could have saved from decline this small, though determined, nation, in face of the persistent enmity of louis xiv. the friendship of france, insuring peace on her landward frontier, would have enabled her, at least for a longer time, to dispute with england the dominion of the seas; and as allies the navies of the two continental states might have checked the growth of the enormous sea power which has just been considered. sea peace between england and holland was only possible by the virtual subjection of one or the other, for both aimed at the same object. between france and holland it was otherwise; and the fall of holland proceeded, not necessarily from her inferior size and numbers, but from faulty policy on the part of the two governments. it does not concern us to decide which was the more to blame. france, admirably situated for the possession of sea power, received a definite policy for the guidance of her government from two great rulers, henry iv. and richelieu. with certain well-defined projects of extension eastward upon the land were combined a steady resistance to the house of austria, which then ruled in both austria and spain, and an equal purpose of resistance to england upon the sea. to further this latter end, as well as for other reasons, holland was to be courted as an ally. commerce and fisheries as the basis of sea power were to be encouraged, and a military navy was to be built up. richelieu left what he called his political will, in which he pointed out the opportunities of france for achieving sea power, based upon her position and resources; and french writers consider him the virtual founder of the navy, not merely because he equipped ships, but from the breadth of his views and his measures to insure sound institutions and steady growth. after his death, mazarin inherited his views and general policy, but not his lofty and martial spirit, and during his rule the newly formed navy disappeared. when louis xiv. took the government into his own hands, in , there were but thirty ships of war, of which only three had as many as sixty guns. then began a most astonishing manifestation of the work which can be done by absolute government ably and systematically wielded. that part of the administration which dealt with trade, manufactures, shipping, and colonies, was given to a man of great practical genius, colbert, who had served with richelieu and had drunk in fully his ideas and policy. he pursued his aims in a spirit thoroughly french. everything was to be organized, the spring of everything was in the minister's cabinet. "to organize producers and merchants as a powerful army, subjected to an active and intelligent guidance, so as to secure an industrial victory for france by order and unity of efforts, and to obtain the best products by imposing on all workmen the processes recognized as best by competent men.... to organize seamen and distant commerce in large bodies like the manufactures and internal commerce, and to give as a support to the commercial power of france a navy established on a firm basis and of dimensions hitherto unknown,"--such, we are told, were the aims of colbert as regards two of the three links in the chain of sea power. for the third, the colonies at the far end of the line, the same governmental direction and organization were evidently purposed; for the government began by buying back canada, newfoundland, nova scotia, and the french west india islands from the parties who then owned them. here, then, is seen pure, absolute, uncontrolled power gathering up into its hands all the reins for the guidance of a nation's course, and proposing so to direct it as to make, among other things, a great sea power. to enter into the details of colbert's action is beyond our purpose. it is enough to note the chief part played by the government in building up the sea power of the state, and that this very great man looked not to any one of the bases on which it rests to the exclusion of the others, but embraced them all in his wise and provident administration. agriculture, which increases the products of the earth, and manufactures, which multiply the products of man's industry; internal trade routes and regulations, by which the exchange of products from the interior to the exterior is made easier; shipping and customs regulations tending to throw the carrying-trade into french hands, and so to encourage the building of french shipping, by which the home and colonial products should be carried back and forth; colonial administration and development, by which a far-off market might be continually growing up to be monopolized by the home trade; treaties with foreign states favoring french trade, and imposts on foreign ships and products tending to break down that of rival nations,--all these means, embracing countless details, were employed to build up for france ( ) production; ( ) shipping; ( ) colonies and markets,--in a word, sea power. the study of such a work is simpler and easier when thus done by one man, sketched out by a kind of logical process, than when slowly wrought by conflicting interests in a more complex government. in the few years of colbert's administration is seen the whole theory of sea power put into practice in the systematic, centralizing french way; while the illustration of the same theory in english and dutch history is spread over generations. such growth, however, was forced, and depended upon the endurance of the absolute power which watched over it; and as colbert was not king, his control lasted only till he lost the king's favor. it is, however, most interesting to note the results of his labors in the proper field for governmental action--in the navy. it has been said that in , when he took office, there were but thirty armed ships, of which three only had over sixty guns. in there were seventy, of which fifty were ships of the line and twenty were fire-ships; in , from seventy the number had increased to one hundred and ninety-six. in there were one hundred and seven ships of from twenty-four to one hundred and twenty guns, twelve of which carried over seventy-six guns, besides many smaller vessels. the order and system introduced into the dock-yards made them vastly more efficient than the english. an english captain, a prisoner in france while the effect of colbert's work still lasted in the hands of his son, writes:-- "when i was first brought prisoner thither, i lay four months in a hospital at brest for care of my wounds. while there i was astonished at the expedition used in manning and fitting out their ships, which till then i thought could be done nowhere sooner than in england, where we have ten times the shipping, and consequently ten times the seamen, they have in france; but there i saw twenty sail of ships, of about sixty guns each, got ready in twenty days' time; they were brought in and the men were discharged; and upon an order from paris they were careened, keeled up, rigged, victualled, manned, and out again in the said time with the greatest ease imaginable. i likewise saw a ship of one hundred guns that had all her guns taken out in four or five hours' time; which i never saw done in england in twenty-four hours, and this with the greatest ease and less hazard than at home. this i saw under my hospital window." a french naval historian cites certain performances which are simply incredible, such as that the keel of a galley was laid at four o'clock, and that at nine she left port, fully armed. these traditions may be accepted as pointing, with the more serious statements of the english officer, to a remarkable degree of system and order, and abundant facilities for work. yet all this wonderful growth, forced by the action of the government, withered away like jonah's gourd when the government's favor was withdrawn. time was not allowed for its roots to strike down deep into the life of the nation. colbert's work was in the direct line of richelieu's policy, and for a time it seemed there would continue the course of action which would make france great upon the sea as well as predominant upon the land. for reasons which it is not yet necessary to give, louis came to have feelings of bitter enmity against holland; and as these feelings were shared by charles ii., the two kings determined on the destruction of the united provinces. this war, which broke out in , though more contrary to natural feeling on the part of england, was less of a political mistake for her than for france, and especially as regards sea power. france was helping to destroy a probable, and certainly an indispensable, ally; england was assisting in the ruin of her greatest rival on the sea, at this time, indeed, still her commercial superior. france, staggering under debt and utter confusion in her finances when louis mounted the throne, was just seeing her way clear in , under colbert's reforms and their happy results. the war, lasting six years, undid the greater part of his work. the agricultural classes, manufactures, commerce, and the colonies, all were smitten by it; the establishments of colbert languished, and the order he had established in the finances was overthrown. thus the action of louis--and he alone was the directing government of france--struck at the roots of her sea power, and alienated her best sea ally. the territory and the military power of france were increased, but the springs of commerce and of a peaceful shipping had been exhausted in the process; and although the military navy was for some years kept up with splendor and efficiency, it soon began to dwindle, and by the end of the reign had practically disappeared. the same false policy, as regards the sea, marked the rest of this reign of fifty-four years. louis steadily turned his back upon the sea interests of france, except the fighting-ships, and either could not or would not see that the latter were of little use and uncertain life, if the peaceful shipping and the industries, by which they were supported, perished. his policy, aiming at supreme power in europe by military strength and territorial extension, forced england and holland into an alliance, which, as has before been said, directly drove france off the sea, and indirectly swamped holland's power thereon. colbert's navy perished, and for the last ten years of louis' life no great french fleet put to sea, though there was constant war. the simplicity of form in an absolute monarchy thus brought out strongly how great the influence of government can be upon both the growth and the decay of sea power. the latter part of louis' life thus witnessed that power failing by the weakening of its foundations, of commerce, and of the wealth that commerce brings. the government that followed, likewise absolute, of set purpose and at the demand of england, gave up all pretence of maintaining an effective navy. the reason for this was that the new king was a minor; and the regent, being bitterly at enmity with the king of spain, to injure him and preserve his own power, entered into alliance with england. he aided her to establish austria, the hereditary enemy of france, in naples and sicily to the detriment of spain, and in union with her destroyed the spanish navy and dock-yards. here again is found a personal ruler disregarding the sea interests of france, ruining a natural ally, and directly aiding, as louis xiv. indirectly and unintentionally aided, the growth of a mistress of the seas. this transient phase of policy passed away with the death of the regent in ; but from that time until the government of france continued to disregard her maritime interests. it is said, indeed, that owing to some wise modifications of her fiscal regulations, mainly in the direction of free trade (and due to law, a minister of scotch birth), commerce with the east and west indies wonderfully increased, and that the islands of guadeloupe and martinique became very rich and thriving; but both commerce and colonies lay at the mercy of england when war came, for the navy fell into decay. in , when things were no longer at their worst, france had but forty-five ships-of-the-line, england nearly one hundred and thirty; and when the forty-five were to be armed and equipped, there was found to be neither material nor rigging nor supplies; not even enough artillery. nor was this all. "lack of system in the government," says a french writer, "brought about indifference, and opened the door to disorder and lack of discipline. never had unjust promotions been so frequent; so also never had more universal discontent been seen. money and intrigue took the place of all else, and brought in their train commands and power. nobles and upstarts, with influence at the capital and self-sufficiency in the seaports, thought themselves dispensed with merit. waste of the revenues of the state and of the dock-yards knew no bounds. honor and modesty were turned into ridicule. as if the evils were not thus great enough, the ministry took pains to efface the heroic traditions of the past which had escaped the general wreck. to the energetic fights of the great reign succeeded, by order of the court, 'affairs of circumspection.' to preserve to the wasted material a few armed ships, increased opportunity was given to the enemy. from this unhappy principle we were bound to a defensive as advantageous to the enemy as it was foreign to the genius of our people. this circumspection before the enemy, laid down for us by orders, betrayed in the long run the national temper; and the abuse of the system led to acts of indiscipline and defection under fire, of which a single instance would vainly be sought in the previous century." a false policy of continental extension swallowed up the resources of the country, and was doubly injurious because, by leaving defenceless its colonies and commerce, it exposed the greatest source of wealth to be cut off, as in fact happened. the small squadrons that got to sea were destroyed by vastly superior force; the merchant shipping was swept away, and the colonies, canada, martinique, guadeloupe, india, fell into england's hands. if it did not take too much space, interesting extracts might be made, showing the woful misery of france, the country that had abandoned the sea, and the growing wealth of england amid all her sacrifices and exertions. a contemporary writer has thus expressed his view of the policy of france at this period:-- "france, by engaging so heartily as she has done in the german war, has drawn away so much of her attention and her revenue from her navy that it enabled us to give such a blow to her maritime strength as possibly she may never be able to recover. her engagement in the german war has likewise drawn her from the defence of her colonies, by which means we have conquered some of the most considerable she possessed. it has withdrawn her from the protection of her trade, by which it is entirely destroyed, while that of england has never, in the profoundest peace, been in so flourishing a condition. so that, by embarking in this german war, france has suffered herself to be undone, so far as regards her particular and immediate quarrel with england." in the seven years' war france lost thirty-seven ships-of-the-line and fifty-six frigates,--a force three times as numerous as the whole navy of the united states at any time in the days of sailing-ships. "for the first time since the middle ages," says a french historian, speaking of the same war, "england had conquered france single-handed, almost without allies, france having powerful auxiliaries. she had conquered solely by the superiority of her government." yes; but it was by the superiority of her government using the tremendous weapon of her sea power,--the reward of a consistent policy perseveringly directed to one aim. the profound humiliation of france, which reached its depths between and , at which latter date she made peace, has an instructive lesson for the united states in this our period of commercial and naval decadence. we have been spared her humiliation; let us hope to profit by her subsequent example. between the same years ( and ) the french people rose, as afterward in , and declared they would have a navy. "popular feeling, skilfully directed by the government, took up the cry from one end of france to the other, 'the navy must be restored.' gifts of ships were made by cities, by corporations, and by private subscriptions. a prodigious activity sprang up in the lately silent ports; everywhere ships were building or repairing." this activity was sustained; the arsenals were replenished, the material of every kind was put on a satisfactory footing, the artillery reorganized, and ten thousand trained gunners drilled and maintained. the tone and action of the naval officers of the day instantly felt the popular impulse, for which indeed some loftier spirits among them had been not only waiting but working. at no time was greater mental and professional activity found among french naval officers than just then, when their ships had been suffered to rot away by governmental inaction. thus a prominent french officer of our own day writes:-- "the sad condition of the navy in the reign of louis xv., by closing to officers the brilliant career of bold enterprises and successful battles, forced them to fall back upon themselves. they drew from study the knowledge they were to put to the proof some years later, thus putting into practice that fine saying of montesquieu, 'adversity is our mother, prosperity our step-mother.'... by the year was seen in all its splendor that brilliant galaxy of officers whose activity stretched to the ends of the earth, and who embraced in their works and in their investigations all the branches of human knowledge. the académie de marine, founded in , was reorganized."[ ] the académie's first director, a post-captain named bigot de morogues, wrote an elaborate treatise on naval tactics, the first original work on the subject since paul hoste's, which it was designed to supersede. morogues must have been studying and formulating his problems in tactics in days when france had no fleet, and was unable so much as to raise her head at sea under the blows of her enemy. at the same time england had no similar book; and an english lieutenant, in , was just translating a part of hoste's great work, omitting by far the larger part. it was not until nearly twenty years later that clerk, a scotch private gentleman, published an ingenious study of naval tactics, in which he pointed out to english admirals the system by which the french had thwarted their thoughtless and ill-combined attacks.[ ] "the researches of the académie de marine, and the energetic impulse which it gave to the labors of officers, were not, as we hope to show later, without influence upon the relatively prosperous condition in which the navy was at the beginning of the american war." it has already been pointed out that the american war of independence involved a departure from england's traditional and true policy, by committing her to a distant land war, while powerful enemies were waiting for an opportunity to attack her at sea. like france in the then recent german wars, like napoleon later in the spanish war, england, through undue self-confidence, was about to turn a friend into an enemy, and so expose the real basis of her power to a rude proof. the french government, on the other hand, avoided the snare into which it had so often fallen. turning her back on the european continent, having the probability of neutrality there, and the certainty of alliance with spain by her side, france advanced to the contest with a fine navy and a brilliant, though perhaps relatively inexperienced, body of officers. on the other side of the atlantic she had the support of a friendly people, and of her own or allied ports, both in the west indies and on the continent. the wisdom of this policy, the happy influence of this action of the government upon her sea power, is evident; but the details of the war do not belong to this part of the subject. to americans, the chief interest of that war is found upon the land; but to naval officers upon the sea, for it was essentially a sea war. the intelligent and systematic efforts of twenty years bore their due fruit; for though the warfare afloat ended with a great disaster, the combined efforts of the french and spanish fleets undoubtedly bore down england's strength and robbed her of her colonies. in the various naval undertakings and battles the honor of france was upon the whole maintained; though it is difficult, upon consideration of the general subject, to avoid the conclusion that the inexperience of french seamen as compared with english, the narrow spirit of jealousy shown by the noble corps of officers toward those of different antecedents, and above all, the miserable traditions of three quarters of a century already alluded to, the miserable policy of a government which taught them first to save their ships, to economize the material, prevented french admirals from reaping, not the mere glory, but the positive advantages that more than once were within their grasp. when monk said the nation that would rule upon the sea must always attack, he set the key-note to england's naval policy; and had the instructions of the french government consistently breathed the same spirit, the war of might have ended sooner and better than it did. it seems ungracious to criticise the conduct of a service to which, under god, our nation owes that its birth was not a miscarriage; but writers of its own country abundantly reflect the spirit of the remark. a french officer who served afloat during this war, in a work of calm and judicial tone, says:-- "what must the young officers have thought who were at sandy hook with d'estaing, at st. christopher with de grasse, even those who arrived at rhode island with de ternay, when they saw that these officers were not tried at their return?"[ ] again, another french officer, of much later date, justifies the opinion expressed, when speaking of the war of the american revolution in the following terms:-- "it was necessary to get rid of the unhappy prejudices of the days of the regency and of louis xv.; but the mishaps of which they were full were too recent to be forgotten by our ministers. thanks to a wretched hesitation, fleets, which had rightly alarmed england, became reduced to ordinary proportions. intrenching themselves in a false economy, the ministry claimed that, by reason of the excessive expenses necessary to maintain the fleet, the admirals must be ordered to maintain the '_greatest circumspection_,' as though in war half measures have not always led to disasters. so, too, the orders given to our squadron chiefs were to keep the sea as long as possible, without engaging in actions which might cause the loss of vessels difficult to replace; so that more than once complete victories, which would have crowned the skill of our admirals and the courage of our captains, were changed into successes of little importance. a system which laid down as a principle that an admiral should not use the force in his hands, which sent him against the enemy with the foreordained purpose of receiving rather than making the attack, a system which sapped moral power to save material resources, must have unhappy results.... it is certain that this deplorable system was one of the causes of the lack of discipline and startling defections which marked the periods of louis xvi., of the [first] republic, and of the [first] empire."[ ] within ten years of the peace of came the french revolution; but that great upheaval which shook the foundations of states, loosed the ties of social order, and drove out of the navy nearly all the trained officers of the monarchy who were attached to the old state of things, did not free the french navy from a false system. it was easier to overturn the form of government than to uproot a deep-seated tradition. hear again a third french officer, of the highest rank and literary accomplishments, speaking of the inaction of villeneuve, the admiral who commanded the french rear at the battle of the nile, and who did not leave his anchors while the head of the column was being destroyed:-- "a day was to come [trafalgar] in which villeneuve in his turn, like de grasse before him, and like duchayla, would complain of being abandoned by part of his fleet. we have come to suspect some secret reason for this fatal coincidence. it is not natural that among so many honorable men there should so often be found admirals and captains incurring such a reproach. if the name of some of them is to this very day sadly associated with the memory of our disasters, we may be sure the fault is not wholly their own. we must rather blame the nature of the operations in which they were engaged, and that system of defensive war prescribed by the french government, which pitt, in the english parliament, proclaimed to be the forerunner of certain ruin. that system, when we wished to renounce it, had already penetrated our habits; it had, so to say, weakened our arms and paralyzed our self-reliance. too often did our squadrons leave port with a special mission to fulfil, and with the intention of avoiding the enemy; to fall in with him was at once a piece of bad luck. it was thus that our ships went into action; they submitted to it instead of forcing it.... fortune would have hesitated longer between the two fleets, and not have borne in the end so heavily against ours, if brueys, meeting nelson half way, could have gone out to fight him. this fettered and timid war, which villaret and martin had carried on, had lasted long, thanks to the circumspection of some english admirals and the traditions of the old tactics. it was with these traditions that the battle of the nile had broken; the hour for decisive action had come."[ ] some years later came trafalgar, and again the government of france took up a new policy with the navy. the author last quoted speaks again:-- "the emperor, whose eagle glance traced plans of campaign for his fleets as for his armies, was wearied by these unexpected reverses. he turned his eyes from the one field of battle in which fortune was faithless to him, and decided to pursue england elsewhere than upon the seas; he undertook to rebuild his navy, but without giving it any part in the struggle which became more furious than ever.... nevertheless, far from slackening, the activity of our dock-yards redoubled. every year ships-of-the-line were either laid down or added to the fleet. venice and genoa, under his control, saw their old splendors rise again, and from the shores of the elbe to the head of the adriatic all the ports of the continent emulously seconded the creative thought of the emperor. numerous squadrons were assembled in the scheldt, in brest roads, and in toulon.... but to the end the emperor refused to give this navy, full of ardor and self-reliance, an opportunity to measure its strength with the enemy.... cast down by constant reverses, he had kept up our armed ships only to oblige our enemies to blockades whose enormous cost must end by exhausting their finances." when the empire fell, france had one hundred and three ships-of-the-line and fifty-five frigates. to turn now from the particular lessons drawn from the history of the past to the general question of the influence of government upon the sea career of its people, it is seen that that influence can work in two distinct but closely related ways. first, in peace: the government by its policy can favor the natural growth of a people's industries and its tendencies to seek adventure and gain by way of the sea; or it can try to develop such industries and such sea-going bent, when they do not naturally exist; or, on the other hand, the government may by mistaken action check and fetter the progress which the people left to themselves would make. in any one of these ways the influence of the government will be felt, making or marring the sea power of the country in the matter of peaceful commerce; upon which alone, it cannot be too often insisted, a thoroughly strong navy can be based. secondly, for war: the influence of the government will be felt in its most legitimate manner in maintaining an armed navy, of a size commensurate with the growth of its shipping and the importance of the interests connected with it. more important even than the size of the navy is the question of its institutions, favoring a healthful spirit and activity, and providing for rapid development in time of war by an adequate reserve of men and of ships and by measures for drawing out that general reserve power which has before been pointed to, when considering the character and pursuits of the people. undoubtedly under this second head of warlike preparation must come the maintenance of suitable naval stations, in those distant parts of the world to which the armed shipping must follow the peaceful vessels of commerce. the protection of such stations must depend either upon direct military force, as do gibraltar and malta, or upon a surrounding friendly population, such as the american colonists once were to england, and, it may be presumed, the australian colonists now are. such friendly surroundings and backing, joined to a reasonable military provision, are the best of defences, and when combined with decided preponderance at sea, make a scattered and extensive empire, like that of england, secure; for while it is true that an unexpected attack may cause disaster in some one quarter, the actual superiority of naval power prevents such disaster from being general or irremediable. history has sufficiently proved this. england's naval bases have been in all parts of the world; and her fleets have at once protected them, kept open the communications between them, and relied upon them for shelter. colonies attached to the mother-country afford, therefore, the surest means of supporting abroad the sea power of a country. in peace, the influence of the government should be felt in promoting by all means a warmth of attachment and a unity of interest which will make the welfare of one the welfare of all, and the quarrel of one the quarrel of all; and in war, or rather for war, by inducing such measures of organization and defence as shall be felt by all to be a fair distribution of a burden of which each reaps the benefit. such colonies the united states has not and is not likely to have. as regards purely military naval stations, the feeling of her people was probably accurately expressed by an historian of the english navy a hundred years ago, speaking then of gibraltar and port mahon. "military governments," said he, "agree so little with the industry of a trading people, and are in themselves so repugnant to the genius of the british people, that i do not wonder that men of good sense and of all parties have inclined to give up these, as tangiers was given up." having therefore no foreign establishments, either colonial or military, the ships of war of the united states, in war, will be like land birds, unable to fly far from their own shores. to provide resting-places for them, where they can coal and repair, would be one of the first duties of a government proposing to itself the development of the power of the nation at sea. as the practical object of this inquiry is to draw from the lessons of history inferences applicable to one's own country and service, it is proper now to ask how far the conditions of the united states involve serious danger, and call for action on the part of the government, in order to build again her sea power. it will not be too much to say that the action of the government since the civil war, and up to this day, has been effectively directed solely to what has been called the first link in the chain which makes sea power. internal development, great production, with the accompanying aim and boast of self-sufficingness, such has been the object, such to some extent the result. in this the government has faithfully reflected the bent of the controlling elements of the country, though it is not always easy to feel that such controlling elements are truly representative, even in a free country. however that may be, there is no doubt that, besides having no colonies, the intermediate link of a peaceful shipping, and the interests involved in it, are now likewise lacking. in short, the united states has only one link of the three. the circumstances of naval war have changed so much within the last hundred years, that it may be doubted whether such disastrous effects on the one hand, or such brilliant prosperity on the other, as were seen in the wars between england and france, could now recur. in her secure and haughty sway of the seas england imposed a yoke on neutrals which will never again be borne; and the principle that the flag covers the goods is forever secured. the commerce of a belligerent can therefore now be safely carried on in neutral ships, except when contraband of war or to blockaded ports; and as regards the latter, it is also certain that there will be no more paper blockades. putting aside therefore the question of defending her seaports from capture or contribution, as to which there is practical unanimity in theory and entire indifference in practice, what need has the united states of sea power? her commerce is even now carried on by others; why should her people desire that which, if possessed, must be defended at great cost? so far as this question is economical, it is outside the scope of this work; but conditions which may entail suffering and loss on the country by war are directly pertinent to it. granting therefore that the foreign trade of the united states, going and coming, is on board ships which an enemy cannot touch except when bound to a blockaded port, what will constitute an efficient blockade? the present definition is, that it is such as to constitute a manifest danger to a vessel seeking to enter or leave the port. this is evidently very elastic. many can remember that during the civil war, after a night attack on the united states fleet off charleston, the confederates next morning sent out a steamer with some foreign consuls on board, who so far satisfied themselves that no blockading vessel was in sight that they issued a declaration to that effect. on the strength of this declaration some southern authorities claimed that the blockade was technically broken, and could not be technically re-established without a new notification. is it necessary, to constitute a real danger to blockade-runners, that the blockading fleet should be in sight? half a dozen fast steamers, cruising twenty miles off-shore between the new jersey and long island coast, would be a very real danger to ships seeking to go in or out by the principal entrance to new york; and similar positions might effectively blockade boston, the delaware, and the chesapeake. the main body of the blockading fleet, prepared not only to capture merchant-ships but to resist military attempts to break the blockade, need not be within sight, nor in a position known to the shore. the bulk of nelson's fleet was fifty miles from cadiz two days before trafalgar, with a small detachment watching close to the harbor. the allied fleet began to get under way at a.m., and nelson, even under the conditions of those days, knew it by . . the english fleet at that distance was a very real danger to its enemy. it seems possible, in these days of submarine telegraphs, that the blockading forces in-shore and off-shore, and from one port to another, might be in telegraphic communication with one another along the whole coast of the united states, readily giving mutual support; and if, by some fortunate military combination, one detachment were attacked in force, it could warn the others and retreat upon them. granting that such a blockade off one port were broken on one day, by fairly driving away the ships maintaining it, the notification of its being re-established could be cabled all over the world the next. to avoid such blockades there must be a military force afloat that will at all times so endanger a blockading fleet that it can by no means keep its place. then neutral ships, except those laden with contraband of war, can come and go freely, and maintain the commercial relations of the country with the world outside. it may be urged that, with the extensive sea-coast of the united states, a blockade of the whole line cannot be effectively kept up. no one will more readily concede this than officers who remember how the blockade of the southern coast alone was maintained. but in the present condition of the navy, and, it may be added, with any additions not exceeding those so far proposed by the government,[ ] the attempt to blockade boston, new york, the delaware, the chesapeake, and the mississippi, in other words, the great centres of export and import, would not entail upon one of the large maritime nations efforts greater than have been made before. england has at the same time blockaded brest, the biscay coast, toulon, and cadiz, when there were powerful squadrons lying within the harbors. it is true that commerce in neutral ships can then enter other ports of the united states than those named; but what a dislocation of the carrying traffic of the country, what failure of supplies at times, what inadequate means of transport by rail or water, of dockage, of lighterage, of warehousing, will be involved in such an enforced change of the ports of entry! will there be no money loss, no suffering, consequent upon this? and when with much pain and expense these evils have been partially remedied, the enemy may be led to stop the new inlets as he did the old. the people of the united states will certainly not starve, but they may suffer grievously. as for supplies which are contraband of war, is there not reason to fear that the united states is not now able to go alone if an emergency should arise? the question is eminently one in which the influence of the government should make itself felt, to build up for the nation a navy which, if not capable of reaching distant countries, shall at least be able to keep clear the chief approaches to its own. the eyes of the country have for a quarter of a century been turned from the sea; the results of such a policy and of its opposite will be shown in the instance of france and of england. without asserting a narrow parallelism between the case of the united states and either of these, it may safely be said that it is essential to the welfare of the whole country that the conditions of trade and commerce should remain, as far as possible, unaffected by an external war. in order to do this, the enemy must be kept not only out of our ports, but far away from our coasts.[ ] can this navy be had without restoring the merchant shipping? it is doubtful. history has proved that such a purely military sea power can be built up by a despot, as was done by louis xiv.; but though so fair seeming, experience showed that his navy was like a growth which having no root soon withers away. but in a representative government any military expenditure must have a strongly represented interest behind it, convinced of its necessity. such an interest in sea power does not exist, cannot exist here without action by the government. how such a merchant shipping should be built up, whether by subsidies or by free trade, by constant administration of tonics or by free movement in the open air, is not a military but an economical question. even had the united states a great national shipping, it may be doubted whether a sufficient navy would follow; the distance which separates her from other great powers, in one way a protection, is also a snare. the motive, if any there be, which will give the united states a navy, is probably now quickening in the central american isthmus. let us hope it will not come to the birth too late. here concludes the general discussion of the principal elements which affect, favorably or unfavorably, the growth of sea power in nations. the aim has been, first to consider those elements in their natural tendency for or against, and then to illustrate by particular examples and by the experience of the past. such discussions, while undoubtedly embracing a wider field, yet fall mainly within the province of strategy, as distinguished from tactics. the considerations and principles which enter into them belong to the unchangeable, or unchanging, order of things, remaining the same, in cause and effect, from age to age. they belong, as it were, to the order of nature, of whose stability so much is heard in our day; whereas tactics, using as its instruments the weapons made by man, shares in the change and progress of the race from generation to generation. from time to time the superstructure of tactics has to be altered or wholly torn down; but the old foundations of strategy so far remain, as though laid upon a rock. there will next be examined the general history of europe and america, with particular reference to the effect exercised upon that history, and upon the welfare of the people, by sea power in its broad sense. from time to time, as occasion offers, the aim will be to recall and reinforce the general teaching, already elicited, by particular illustrations. the general tenor of the study will therefore be strategical, in that broad definition of naval strategy which has before been quoted and accepted: "naval strategy has for its end to found, support, and increase, as well in peace as in war, the sea power of a country." in the matter of particular battles, while freely admitting that the change of details has made obsolete much of their teaching, the attempt will be made to point out where the application or neglect of true general principles has produced decisive effects; and, other things being equal, those actions will be preferred which, from their association with the names of the most distinguished officers, may be presumed to show how far just tactical ideas obtained in a particular age or a particular service. it will also be desirable, where analogies between ancient and modern weapons appear on the surface, to derive such probable lessons as they offer, without laying undue stress upon the points of resemblance. finally, it must be remembered that, among all changes, the nature of man remains much the same; the personal equation, though uncertain in quantity and quality in the particular instance, is sure always to be found. footnotes: [ ] by a base of permanent operations "is understood a country whence come all the resources, where are united the great lines of communication by land and water, where are the arsenals and armed posts." [ ] an interesting proof of the weight attributed to the naval power of great britain by a great military authority will be found in the opening chapter of jomini's "history of the wars of the french revolution." he lays down, as a fundamental principle of european policy, that an unlimited expansion of naval force should not be permitted to any nation which cannot be approached by land,--a description which can apply only to great britain. [ ] gougeard: la marine de guerre; richelieu et colbert. [ ] whatever may be thought of clerk's claim to originality in constructing a system of naval tactics, and it has been seriously impugned, there can be no doubt that his criticisms on the past were sound. so far as the author knows, he in this respect deserves credit for an originality remarkable in one who had the training neither of a seaman nor of a military man. [ ] la serre: essais hist. et crit. sur la marine française. [ ] lapeyrouse-bonfils: hist. de la marine française. [ ] jurien de la gravière: guerres maritimes. [ ] since the above was written, the secretary of the navy, in his report for , has recommended a fleet which would make such a blockade as here suggested very hazardous. [ ] the word "defence" in war involves two ideas, which for the sake of precision in thought should be kept separated in the mind. there is defence pure and simple, which strengthens itself and awaits attack. this may be called passive defence. on the other hand, there is a view of defence which asserts that safety for one's self, the real object of defensive preparation, is best secured by attacking the enemy. in the matter of sea-coast defence, the former method is exemplified by stationary fortifications, submarine mines, and generally all immobile works destined simply to stop an enemy if he tries to enter. the second method comprises all those means and weapons which do not wait for attack, but go to meet the enemy's fleet, whether it be but for a few miles, or whether to his own shores. such a defence may seem to be really offensive war, but it is not; it becomes offensive only when its object of attack is changed from the enemy's fleet to the enemy's country. england defended her own coasts and colonies by stationing her fleets off the french ports, to fight the french fleet if it came out. the united states in the civil war stationed her fleets off the southern ports, not because she feared for her own, but to break down the confederacy by isolation from the rest of the world, and ultimately by attacking the ports. the methods were the same; but the purpose in one case was defensive, in the other offensive. the confusion of the two ideas leads to much unnecessary wrangling as to the proper sphere of army and navy in coast-defence. passive defences belong to the army; everything that moves in the water to the navy, which has the prerogative of the offensive defence. if seamen are used to garrison forts, they become part of the land forces, as surely as troops, when embarked as part of the complement, become part of the sea forces. chapter ii. state of europe in .--second anglo-dutch war, - . sea battles of lowestoft and of the four days. the period at which our historical survey is to begin has been loosely stated as the middle of the seventeenth century. the year will now be taken as the definite date at which to open. in may of that year charles ii. was restored to the english throne amid the general rejoicing of the people. in march of the following year, upon the death of cardinal mazarin, louis xiv. assembled his ministers and said to them: "i have summoned you to tell you that it has pleased me hitherto to permit my affairs to be governed by the late cardinal; i shall in future be my own prime minister. i direct that no decree be sealed except by my orders, and i order the secretaries of state and the superintendent of the finances to sign nothing without my command." the personal government thus assumed was maintained, in fact as well as in name, for over half a century. within one twelvemonth then are seen, setting forward upon a new stage of national life, after a period of confusion more or less prolonged, the two states which, amid whatever inequalities, have had the first places in the sea history of modern europe and america, indeed, of the world at large. sea history, however, is but one factor in that general advance and decay of nations which is called their history; and if sight be lost of the other factors to which it is so closely related, a distorted view, either exaggerated or the reverse, of its importance will be formed. it is with the belief that that importance is vastly underrated, if not practically lost sight of, by people unconnected with the sea, and particularly by the people of the united states in our own day, that this study has been undertaken. the date taken, , followed closely another which marked a great settlement of european affairs, setting the seal of treaty upon the results of a general war, known to history as the thirty years' war. this other date was that of the treaty of westphalia, or munster, in . in this the independence of the dutch united provinces, long before practically assured, was formally acknowledged by spain; and it being followed in by the treaty of the pyrenees between france and spain, the two gave to europe a state of general external peace, destined soon to be followed by a series of almost universal wars, which lasted as long as louis xiv. lived,--wars which were to induce profound changes in the map of europe; during which new states were to arise, others to decay, and all to undergo large modifications, either in extent of dominion or in political power. in these results maritime power, directly or indirectly, had a great share. we must first look at the general condition of european states at the time from which the narrative starts. in the struggles, extending over nearly a century, whose end is marked by the peace of westphalia, the royal family known as the house of austria had been the great overwhelming power which all others feared. during the long reign of the emperor charles v., who abdicated a century before, the head of that house had united in his own person the two crowns of austria and spain, which carried with them, among other possessions, the countries we now know as holland and belgium, together with a preponderating influence in italy. after his abdication the two great monarchies of austria and spain were separated; but though ruled by different persons, they were still in the same family, and tended toward that unity of aim and sympathy which marked dynastic connections in that and the following century. to this bond of union was added that of a common religion. during the century before the peace of westphalia, the extension of family power, and the extension of the religion professed, were the two strongest motives of political action. this was the period of the great religious wars which arrayed nation against nation, principality against principality, and often, in the same nation, faction against faction. religious persecution caused the revolt of the protestant dutch provinces against spain, which issued, after eighty years of more or less constant war, in the recognition of their independence. religious discord, amounting to civil war at times, distracted france during the greater part of the same period, profoundly affecting not only her internal but her external policy. these were the days of st. bartholomew, of the religious murder of henry iv., of the siege of la rochelle, of constant intriguing between roman catholic spain and roman catholic frenchmen. as the religious motive, acting in a sphere to which it did not naturally belong, and in which it had no rightful place, died away, the political necessities and interests of states began to have juster weight; not that they had been wholly lost sight of in the mean time, but the religious animosities had either blinded the eyes, or fettered the action, of statesmen. it was natural that in france, one of the greatest sufferers from religious passions, owing to the number and character of the protestant minority, this reaction should first and most markedly be seen. placed between spain and the german states, among which austria stood foremost without a rival, internal union and checks upon the power of the house of austria were necessities of political existence. happily, providence raised up to her in close succession two great rulers, henry iv. and richelieu,--men in whom religion fell short of bigotry, and who, when forced to recognize it in the sphere of politics, did so as masters and not as slaves. under them french statesmanship received a guidance, which richelieu formulated as a tradition, and which moved on the following general lines,--( ) internal union of the kingdom, appeasing or putting down religious strife and centralizing authority in the king; ( ) resistance to the power of the house of austria, which actually and necessarily carried with it alliance with protestant german states and with holland; ( ) extension of the boundaries of france to the eastward, at the expense mainly of spain, which then possessed not only the present belgium, but other provinces long since incorporated with france; and ( ) the creation and development of a great sea power, adding to the wealth of the kingdom, and intended specially to make head against france's hereditary enemy, england; for which end again the alliance with holland was to be kept in view. such were the broad outlines of policy laid down by statesmen in the front rank of genius for the guidance of that country whose people have, not without cause, claimed to be the most complete exponent of european civilization, foremost in the march of progress, combining political advance with individual development. this tradition, carried on by mazarin, was received from him by louis xiv.; it will be seen how far he was faithful to it, and what were the results to france of his action. meanwhile it may be noted that of these four elements necessary to the greatness of france, sea power was one; and as the second and third were practically one in the means employed, it may be said that sea power was one of the two great means by which france's _external_ greatness was to be maintained. england on the sea, austria on the land, indicated the direction that french effort was to take. as regards the condition of france in , and her readiness to move onward in the road marked by richelieu, it may be said that internal peace was secured, the power of the nobles wholly broken, religious discords at rest; the tolerant edict of nantes was still in force, while the remaining protestant discontent had been put down by the armed hand. all power was absolutely centred in the throne. in other respects, though the kingdom was at peace, the condition was less satisfactory. there was practically no navy; commerce, internal and external, was not prosperous; the finances were in disorder; the army small. spain, the nation before which all others had trembled less than a century before, was now long in decay and scarcely formidable; the central weakness had spread to all parts of the administration. in extent of territory, however, she was still great. the spanish netherlands still belonged to her; she held naples, sicily, and sardinia; gibraltar had not yet fallen into english hands; her vast possessions in america--with the exception of jamaica, conquered by england a few years before--were still untouched. the condition of her sea power, both for peace and war, has been already alluded to. many years before, richelieu had contracted a temporary alliance with spain, by virtue of which she placed forty ships at his disposal; but the bad condition of the vessels, for the most part ill armed and ill commanded, compelled their withdrawal. the navy of spain was then in full decay, and its weakness did not escape the piercing eye of the cardinal. an encounter which took place between the spanish and dutch fleets in shows most plainly the state of degradation into which this once proud navy had fallen. "her navy at this time," says the narrative quoted, "met one of those shocks, a succession of which during this war degraded her from her high station of mistress of the seas in both hemispheres, to a contemptible rank among maritime powers. the king was fitting out a powerful fleet to carry the war to the coasts of sweden, and for its equipment had commanded a reinforcement of men and provisions to be sent from dunkirk. a fleet accordingly set sail, but were attacked by von tromp, some captured, the remainder forced to retire within the harbor again. soon after, tromp seized three english [neutral] ships carrying spanish soldiers from cadiz to dunkirk; he took the troops out, but let the ships go free. leaving seventeen vessels to blockade dunkirk, tromp with the remaining twelve advanced to meet the enemy's fleet on its arrival. it was soon seen entering the straits of dover to the number of sixty-seven sail, and having two thousand troops. being joined by de witt with four more ships, tromp with his small force made a resolute attack upon the enemy. the fight lasted till four p.m., when the spanish admiral took refuge in the downs. tromp determined to engage if they should come out; but oquendo with his powerful fleet, many of which carried from sixty to a hundred guns, suffered himself to be blockaded; and the english admiral told tromp he was ordered to join the spaniards if hostilities began. tromp sent home for instructions, and the action of england only served to call out the vast maritime powers of the dutch. tromp was rapidly reinforced to ninety-six sail and twelve fire-ships, and ordered to attack. leaving a detached squadron to observe the english, and to attack them if they helped the spaniards, he began the fight embarrassed by a thick fog, under cover of which the spaniards cut their cables to escape. many running too close to shore went aground, and most of the remainder attempting to retreat were sunk, captured, or driven on the french coast. never was victory more complete."[ ] when a navy submits to such a line of action, all tone and pride must have departed; but the navy only shared in the general decline which made spain henceforward have an ever lessening weight in the policy of europe. "in the midst of the splendors of her court and language," says guizot, "the spanish government felt itself weak, and sought to hide its weakness under its immobility. philip iv. and his minister, weary of striving only to be conquered, looked but for the security of peace, and only sought to put aside all questions which would call for efforts of which they felt themselves incapable. divided and enervated, the house of austria had even less ambition than power, and except when absolutely forced, a pompous inertia became the policy of the successors of charles v."[ ] such was the spain of that day. that part of the spanish dominions which was then known as the low countries, or the roman catholic netherlands (our modern belgium), was about to be a fruitful source of variance between france and her natural ally, the dutch republic. this state, whose political name was the united provinces, had now reached the summit of its influence and power,--a power based, as has already been explained, wholly upon the sea, and upon the use of that element made by the great maritime and commercial genius of the dutch people. a recent french author thus describes the commercial and colonial conditions, at the accession of louis xiv., of this people, which beyond any other in modern times, save only england, has shown how the harvest of the sea can lift up to wealth and power a country intrinsically weak and without resources:-- "holland had become the phoenicia of modern times. mistresses of the scheldt, the united provinces closed the outlets of antwerp to the sea, and inherited the commercial power of that rich city, which an ambassador of venice in the fifteenth century had compared to venice herself. they received besides in their principal cities the workingmen of the low countries who fled from spanish tyranny of conscience. the manufactures of clothes, linen stuffs, etc., which employed six hundred thousand souls, opened new sources of gain to a people previously content with the trade in cheese and fish. fisheries alone had already enriched them. the herring fishery supported nearly one fifth of the population of holland, producing three hundred thousand tons of salt-fish, and bringing in more than eight million francs annually. "the naval and commercial power of the republic developed rapidly. the merchant fleet of holland alone numbered , sail, , seamen, and supported , inhabitants. she had taken possession of the greater part of the european carrying-trade, and had added thereto, since the peace, all the carriage of merchandise between america and spain, did the same service for the french ports, and maintained an importation traffic of thirty-six million francs. the north countries, brandenburg, denmark, sweden, muscovy, poland, access to which was opened by the baltic to the provinces, were for them an inexhaustible market of exchange. they fed it by the produce they sold there, and by purchase of the products of the north,--wheat, timber, copper, hemp, and furs. the total value of merchandise yearly shipped in dutch bottoms, in all seas, exceeded a thousand million francs. the dutch had made themselves, to use a contemporary phrase, the wagoners of all seas."[ ] it was through its colonies that the republic had been able thus to develop its sea trade. it had the monopoly of all the products of the east. produce and spices from asia were by her brought to europe of a yearly value of sixteen million francs. the powerful east india company, founded in , had built up in asia an empire, with possessions taken from the portuguese. mistress in of the cape of good hope, which guaranteed it a stopping-place for its ships, it reigned as a sovereign in ceylon, and upon the coasts of malabar and coromandel. it had made batavia its seat of government, and extended its traffic to china and japan. meanwhile the west india company, of more rapid rise, but less durable, had manned eight hundred ships of war and trade. it had used them to seize the remnants of portuguese power upon the shores of guinea, as well as in brazil. the united provinces had thus become the warehouse wherein were collected the products of all nations. the colonies of the dutch at this time were scattered throughout the eastern seas, in india, in malacca, in java, the moluccas, and various parts of the vast archipelago lying to the northward of australia. they had possessions on the west coast of africa, and as yet the colony of new amsterdam remained in their hands. in south america the dutch west india company had owned nearly three hundred leagues of coast from bahia in brazil northward; but much had recently escaped from their hands. the united provinces owed their consideration and power to their wealth and their fleets. the sea, which beats like an inveterate enemy against their shores, had been subdued and made a useful servant; the land was to prove their destruction. a long and fierce strife had been maintained with an enemy more cruel than the sea,--the spanish kingdom; the successful ending, with its delusive promise of rest and peace, but sounded the knell of the dutch republic. so long as the power of spain remained unimpaired, or at least great enough to keep up the terror that she had long inspired, it was to the interest of england and of france, both sufferers from spanish menace and intrigue, that the united provinces should be strong and independent. when spain fell,--and repeated humiliations showed that her weakness was real and not seeming,--other motives took the place of fear. england coveted holland's trade and sea dominion; france desired the spanish netherlands. the united provinces had reason to oppose the latter as well as the former. under the combined assaults of the two rival nations, the intrinsic weakness of the united provinces was soon to be felt and seen. open to attack by the land, few in numbers, and with a government ill adapted to put forth the united strength of a people, above all unfitted to keep up adequate preparation for war, the decline of the republic and the nation was to be more striking and rapid than the rise. as yet, however, in , no indications of the coming fall were remarked. the republic was still in the front rank of the great powers of europe. if, in , the war with england had shown a state of unreadiness wonderful in a navy that had so long humbled the pride of spain on the seas, on the other hand the provinces, in , had effectually put a stop to the insults of france directed against her commerce; and a year later, "by their interference in the baltic between denmark and sweden, they had hindered sweden from establishing in the north a preponderance disastrous to them. they forced her to leave open the entrance to the baltic, of which they remained masters, no other navy being able to dispute its control with them. the superiority of their fleet, the valor of their troops, the skill and firmness of their diplomacy, had caused the prestige of their government to be recognized. weakened and humiliated by the last english war, they had replaced themselves in the rank of great powers. at this moment charles ii. was restored." the general character of the government has been before mentioned, and need here only be recalled. it was a loosely knit confederacy, administered by what may not inaccurately be called a commercial aristocracy, with all the political timidity of that class, which has so much to risk in war. the effect of these two factors, sectional jealousy and commercial spirit, upon the military navy was disastrous. it was not kept up properly in peace, there were necessarily rivalries in a fleet which was rather a maritime coalition than a united navy, and there was too little of a true military spirit among the officers. a more heroic people than the dutch never existed; the annals of dutch sea-fights give instances of desperate enterprise and endurance certainly not excelled, perhaps never equalled, elsewhere; but they also exhibit instances of defection and misconduct which show a lack of military spirit, due evidently to lack of professional pride and training. this professional training scarcely existed in any navy of that day, but its place was largely supplied in monarchical countries by the feeling of a military caste. it remains to be noted that the government, weak enough from the causes named, was yet weaker from the division of the people into two great factions bitterly hating each other. the one, which was the party of the merchants (burgomasters), and now in power, favored the confederate republic as described; the other desired a monarchical government under the house of orange. the republican party wished for a french alliance, if possible, and a strong navy; the orange party favored england, to whose royal house the prince of orange was closely related, and a powerful army. under these conditions of government, and weak in numbers, the united provinces in , with their vast wealth and external activities, resembled a man kept up by stimulants. factitious strength cannot endure indefinitely; but it is wonderful to see this small state, weaker by far in numbers than either england or france, endure the onslaught of either singly, and for two years of both in alliance, not only without being destroyed, but without losing her place in europe. she owed this astonishing result partly to the skill of one or two men, but mainly to her sea power. the conditions of england, with reference to her fitness to enter upon the impending strife, differed from those of both holland and france. although monarchical in government, and with much real power in the king's hands, the latter was not able to direct the policy of the kingdom wholly at his will. he had to reckon, as louis had not, with the temper and wishes of his people. what louis gained for france, he gained for himself; the glory of france was his glory. charles aimed first at his own advantage, then at that of england; but, with the memory of the past ever before him, he was determined above all not to incur his father's fate nor a repetition of his own exile. therefore, when danger became imminent, he gave way before the feeling of the english nation. charles himself hated holland; he hated it as a republic; he hated the existing government because opposed in internal affairs to his connections, the house of orange; and he hated it yet more because in the days of his exile, the republic, as one of the conditions of peace with cromwell, had driven him from her borders. he was drawn to france by the political sympathy of a would-be absolute ruler, possibly by his roman catholic bias, and very largely by the money paid him by louis, which partially freed him from the control of parliament. in following these tendencies of his own, charles had to take account of certain decided wishes of his people. the english, of the same race as the dutch, and with similar conditions of situation, were declared rivals for the control of the sea and of commerce; and as the dutch were now leading in the race, the english were the more eager and bitter. a special cause of grievance was found in the action of the dutch east india company, "which claimed the monopoly of trade in the east, and had obliged distant princes with whom it treated to close their states to foreign nations, who were thus excluded, not only from the dutch colonies, but from all the territory of the indies." conscious of greater strength, the english also wished to control the action of dutch politics, and in the days of the english republic had even sought to impose a union of the two governments. at the first, therefore, popular rivalry and enmity seconded the king's wishes; the more so as france had not for some years been formidable on the continent. as soon, however, as the aggressive policy of louis xiv. was generally recognized, the english people, both nobles and commons, felt the great danger to be there, as a century before it had been in spain. the transfer of the spanish netherlands (belgium) to france would tend toward the subjection of europe, and especially would be a blow to the sea power both of the dutch and english; for it was not to be supposed that louis would allow the scheldt and port of antwerp to remain closed, as they then were, under a treaty wrung by the dutch from the weakness of spain. the reopening to commerce of that great city would be a blow alike to amsterdam and to london. with the revival of inherited opposition to france the ties of kindred began to tell; the memory of past alliance against the tyranny of spain was recalled; and similarity of religious faith, still a powerful motive, drew the two together. at the same time the great and systematic efforts of colbert to build up the commerce and the navy of france excited the jealousy of both the sea powers; rivals themselves, they instinctively turned against a third party intruding upon their domain. charles was unable to resist the pressure of his people under all these motives; wars between england and holland ceased, and were followed, after charles's death, by close alliance. although her commerce was less extensive, the navy of england in was superior to that of holland, particularly in organization and efficiency. the stern, enthusiastic religious government of cromwell, grounded on military strength, had made its mark both on the fleet and army. the names of several of the superior officers under the protector, among which that of monk stands foremost, appear in the narrative of the first of the dutch wars under charles. this superiority in tone and discipline gradually disappeared under the corrupting influence of court favor in a licentious government; and holland, which upon the whole was worsted by england alone upon the sea in , successfully resisted the combined navies of england and france in . as regards the material of the three fleets, we are told that the french ships had greater displacement than the english relatively to the weight of artillery and stores; hence they could keep, when fully loaded, a greater height of battery. their hulls also had better lines. these advantages would naturally follow from the thoughtful and systematic way in which the french navy at that time was restored from a state of decay, and has a lesson of hope for us in the present analogous condition of our own navy. the dutch ships, from the character of their coast, were flatter-bottomed and of less draught, and thus were able, when pressed, to find a refuge among the shoals; but they were in consequence less weatherly and generally of lighter scantling than those of either of the other nations. thus as briefly as possible have been sketched the conditions, degree of power, and aims which shaped and controlled the policy of the four principal seaboard states of the day,--spain, france, england, and holland. from the point of view of this history, these will come most prominently and most often into notice; but as other states exercised a powerful influence upon the course of events, and our aim is not merely naval history but an appreciation of the effect of naval and commercial power upon the course of general history, it is necessary to state shortly the condition of the rest of europe. america had not yet begun to play a prominent part in the pages of history or in the policies of cabinets. germany was then divided into many small governments, with the one great empire of austria. the policy of the smaller states shifted, and it was the aim of france to combine as many of them as possible under her influence, in pursuance of her traditional opposition to austria. with france thus working against her on the one side, austria was in imminent peril on the other from the constant assaults of the turkish empire, still vigorous though decaying. the policy of france had long inclined to friendly relations with turkey, not only as a check upon austria, but also from her wish to engross the trade with the levant. colbert, in his extreme eagerness for the sea power of france, favored this alliance. it will be remembered that greece and egypt were then parts of the turkish empire. prussia as now known did not exist. the foundations of the future kingdom were then being prepared by the elector of brandenburg, a powerful minor state, which was not yet able to stand quite alone, but carefully avoided a formally dependent position. the kingdom of poland still existed, a most disturbing and important factor in european politics, because of its weak and unsettled government, which kept every other state anxious lest some unforeseen turn of events there should tend to the advantage of a rival. it was the traditional policy of france to keep poland upright and strong. russia was still below the horizon; coming, but not yet come, within the circle of european states and their living interests. she and the other powers bordering upon the baltic were naturally rivals for preponderance in that sea, in which the other states, and above all the maritime states, had a particular interest as the source from which naval stores of every kind were chiefly drawn. sweden and denmark were at this time in a state of constant enmity, and were to be found on opposite sides in the quarrels that prevailed. for many years past, and during the early wars of louis xiv., sweden was for the most part in alliance with france; her bias was that way. the general state of europe being as described, the spring that was to set the various wheels in motion was in the hands of louis xiv. the weakness of his immediate neighbors, the great resources of his kingdom, only waiting for development, the unity of direction resulting from his absolute power, his own practical talent and untiring industry, aided during the first half of his reign by a combination of ministers of singular ability, all united to make every government in europe hang more or less upon his action, and be determined by, if not follow, his lead. the greatness of france was his object, and he had the choice of advancing it by either of two roads,--by the land or by the sea; not that the one wholly forbade the other, but that france, overwhelmingly strong as she then was, had not power to move with equal steps on both paths. louis chose extension by land. he had married the eldest daughter of philip iv., the then reigning king of spain; and though by the treaty of marriage she had renounced all claim to her father's inheritance, it was not difficult to find reasons for disregarding this stipulation. technical grounds were found for setting it aside as regarded certain portions of the netherlands and franche comté, and negotiations were entered into with the court of spain to annul it altogether. the matter was the more important because the male heir to the throne was so feeble that it was evident that the austrian line of spanish kings would end in him. the desire to put a french prince on the spanish throne--either himself, thus uniting the two crowns, or else one of his family, thus putting the house of bourbon in authority on both sides of the pyrenees--was the false light which led louis astray during the rest of his reign, to the final destruction of the sea power of france and the impoverishment and misery of his people. louis failed to understand that he had to reckon with all europe. the direct project on the spanish throne had to wait for a vacancy; but he got ready at once to move upon the spanish possessions to the east of france. in order to do this more effectually, he cut off from spain every possible ally by skilful diplomatic intrigues, the study of which would give a useful illustration of strategy in the realm of politics, but he made two serious mistakes to the injury of the sea power of france. portugal had until twenty years before been united to the crown of spain, and the claim to it had not been surrendered. louis considered that were spain to regain that kingdom she would be too strong for him easily to carry out his aims. among other means of prevention he promoted a marriage between charles ii. and the infanta of portugal, in consequence of which portugal ceded to england, bombay in india, and tangiers in the straits of gibraltar, which was reputed an excellent port. we see here a french king, in his eagerness for extension by land, inviting england to the mediterranean, and forwarding her alliance with portugal. the latter was the more curious, as louis already foresaw the failure of the spanish royal house, and should rather have wished the union of the peninsular kingdoms. as a matter of fact, portugal became a dependent and outpost of england, by which she readily landed in the peninsula down to the days of napoleon. indeed, if independent of spain, she is too weak not to be under the control of the power that rules the sea and so has readiest access to her. louis continued to support her against spain, and secured her independence. he also interfered with the dutch, and compelled them to restore brazil, which they had taken from the portuguese. on the other hand, louis obtained from charles ii. the cession of dunkirk on the channel, which had been seized and used by cromwell. this surrender was made for money, and was inexcusable from the maritime point of view. dunkirk was for the english a bridge-head into france. to france it became a haven for privateers, the bane of england's commerce in the channel and the north sea. as the french sea power waned, england in treaty after treaty exacted the dismantling of the works of dunkirk, which it may be said in passing was the home port of the celebrated jean bart and other great french privateersmen. meanwhile the greatest and wisest of louis' ministers, colbert, was diligently building up that system of administration, which, by increasing and solidly basing the wealth of the state, should bring a surer greatness and prosperity than the king's more showy enterprises. with those details that concern the internal development of the kingdom this history has no concern, beyond the incidental mention that production, both agricultural and manufacturing, received his careful attention; but upon the sea a policy of skilful aggression upon the shipping and commerce of the dutch and english quickly began, and was instantly resented. great trading companies were formed, directing french enterprise to the baltic, to the levant, to the east and west indies; customs regulations were amended to encourage french manufactures, and to allow goods to be stored in bond in the great ports, by which means it was hoped to make france take holland's place as the great warehouse for europe, a function for which her geographical position eminently fitted her; while tonnage duties on foreign shipping, direct premiums on home-built ships, and careful, rigorous colonial decrees giving french vessels the monopoly of trade to and from the colonies, combined to encourage the growth of her mercantile marine. england retaliated at once; the dutch, more seriously threatened because their carrying-trade was greater and their home resources smaller, only remonstrated for a time; but after three years they also made reprisals. colbert, relying on the great superiority of france as an actual, and still more as a possible producer, feared not to move steadily on the grasping path marked out; which, in building up a great merchant shipping, would lay the broad base for the military shipping, which was being yet more rapidly forced on by the measures of the state. prosperity grew apace. at the end of twelve years everything was flourishing, everything rich in the state, which was in utter confusion when he took charge of the finances and marine. "under him," says a french historian, "france grew by peace as she had grown by war.... the warfare of tariffs and premiums skilfully conducted by him tended to reduce within just limits the exorbitant growth of commercial and maritime power which holland had arrogated at the expense of other nations; and to restrain england, which was burning to wrest this supremacy from holland in order to use it in a manner much more dangerous to europe. the interest of france seemed to be peace in europe and america; a mysterious voice, at once the voice of the past and of the future, called for her warlike activity on other shores."[ ] this voice found expression through the mouth of leibnitz, one of the world's great men, who pointed out to louis that to turn the arms of france against egypt would give her, in the dominion of the mediterranean and the control of eastern trade, a victory over holland greater than the most successful campaign on land; and while insuring a much needed peace within his kingdom, would build up a power on the sea that would insure preponderance in europe. this memorial called louis from the pursuit of glory on the land to seek the durable grandeur of france in the possession of a great sea power, the elements of which, thanks to the genius of colbert, he had in his hands. a century later a greater man than louis sought to exalt himself and france by the path pointed out by leibnitz; but napoleon did not have, as louis had, a navy equal to the task proposed. this project of leibnitz will be more fully referred to when the narrative reaches the momentous date at which it was broached; when louis, with his kingdom and navy in the highest pitch of efficiency, stood at the point where the roads parted, and then took the one which settled that france should not be the power of the sea. this decision, which killed colbert and ruined the prosperity of france, was felt in its consequences from generation to generation afterward, as the great navy of england, in war after war, swept the seas, insured the growing wealth of the island kingdom through exhausting strifes, while drying up the external resources of french trade and inflicting consequent misery. the false line of policy that began with louis xiv. also turned france away from a promising career in india, in the days of his successor. [illustration: english channel and north sea.] meanwhile the two maritime states, england and holland, though eying france distrustfully, had greater and growing grudges against each other, which under the fostering care of charles ii. led to war. the true cause was doubtless commercial jealousy, and the conflict sprang immediately from collisions between the trading companies. hostilities began on the west coast of africa; and an english squadron, in , after subduing several dutch stations there, sailed to new amsterdam (now new york), and seized it. all these affairs took place before the formal declaration of war in february, . this war was undoubtedly popular in england; the instinct of the people found an expression by the lips of monk, who is reported to have said, "what matters this or that reason? what we want is more of the trade which the dutch now have." there is also little room to doubt that, despite the pretensions of the trading companies, the government of the united provinces would gladly have avoided the war; the able man who was at their head saw too clearly the delicate position in which they stood between england and france. they claimed, however, the support of the latter in virtue of a defensive treaty made in . louis allowed the claim, but unwillingly; and the still young navy of france gave practically no help. the war between the two sea states was wholly maritime, and had the general characteristics of all such wars. three great battles were fought,--the first off lowestoft, on the norfolk coast, june , ; the second, known as the four days' battle in the straits of dover, often spoken of by french writers as that of the pas de calais, lasting from the th to the th of june, ; and the third, off the north foreland, august of the same year. in the first and last of these the english had a decided success; in the second the advantage remained with the dutch. this one only will be described at length, because of it alone has been found such a full, coherent account as will allow a clear and accurate tactical narrative to be given. there are in these fights points of interest more generally applicable to the present day than are the details of somewhat obsolete tactical movements. in the first battle off lowestoft, it appears that the dutch commander, opdam, who was not a seaman but a cavalry officer, had very positive orders to fight; the discretion proper to a commander-in-chief on the spot was not intrusted to him. to interfere thus with the commander in the field or afloat is one of the most common temptations to the government in the cabinet, and is generally disastrous. tourville, the greatest of louis xiv.'s admirals, was forced thus to risk the whole french navy against his own judgment; and a century later a great french fleet escaped from the english admiral keith, through his obedience to imperative orders from his immediate superior, who was sick in port. in the lowestoft fight the dutch van gave way; and a little later one of the junior admirals of the centre, opdam's own squadron, being killed, the crew was seized with a panic, took the command of the ship from her officers, and carried her out of action. this movement was followed by twelve or thirteen other ships, leaving a great gap in the dutch line. the occurrence shows, what has before been pointed out, that the discipline of the dutch fleet and the tone of the officers were not high, despite the fine fighting qualities of the nation, and although it is probably true that there were more good seamen among the dutch than among the english captains. the natural steadfastness and heroism of the hollanders could not wholly supply that professional pride and sense of military honor which it is the object of sound military institutions to encourage. popular feeling in the united states is pretty much at sea in this matter; there is with it no intermediate step between personal courage with a gun in its hand and entire military efficiency. opdam, seeing the battle going against him, seems to have yielded to a feeling approaching despair. he sought to grapple the english commander-in-chief, who on this day was the duke of york, the king's brother. he failed in this, and in the desperate struggle which followed, his ship blew up. shortly after, three, or as one account says four, dutch ships ran foul of one another, and this group was burned by one fire-ship; three or four others singly met the same fate a little later. the dutch fleet was now in disorder, and retreated under cover of the squadron of van tromp, son of the famous old admiral who in the days of the commonwealth sailed through the channel with a broom at his masthead. fire-ships are seen here to have played a very conspicuous part, more so certainly than in the war of , though at both periods they formed an appendage to the fleet. there is on the surface an evident resemblance between the rôle of the fire-ship and the part assigned in modern warfare to the torpedo-cruiser. the terrible character of the attack, the comparative smallness of the vessel making it, and the large demands upon the nerve of the assailant, are the chief points of resemblance; the great points of difference are the comparative certainty with which the modern vessel can be handled, which is partly met by the same advantage in the iron-clad over the old ship-of-the-line, and the instantaneousness of the injury by torpedo, whose attack fails or succeeds at once, whereas that of the fire-ship required time for effecting the object, which in both cases is total destruction of the hostile ship, instead of crippling or otherwise reducing it. an appreciation of the character of fire-ships, of the circumstances under which they attained their greatest usefulness, and of the causes which led to their disappearance, may perhaps help in the decision to which nations must come as to whether the torpedo-cruiser, pure and simple, is a type of weapon destined to survive in fleets. a french officer, who has been examining the records of the french navy, states that the fire-ship first appears, incorporated as an arm of the fleet, in . "whether specially built for the purpose, or whether altered from other purposes to be fitted for their particular end, they received a special equipment. the command was given to officers not noble, with the grade of captain of fire-ship. five subordinate officers and twenty-five seamen made up the crew. easily known by grappling-irons which were always fitted to their yards, the fire-ship saw its rôle growing less in the early years of the eighteenth century. it was finally to disappear from the fleets _whose speed it delayed and whose evolutions were by it complicated_. as the ships-of-war grew larger, their action in concert with fire-ships became daily more difficult. on the other hand, there had already been abandoned the idea of combining them with the fighting-ships to form a few _groups_, _each_ provided with all the means of attack and defence. the formation of the close-hauled line-of-battle, by assigning the fire-ships a place in a second line placed half a league on the side farthest from the enemy, made them more and more unfitted to fulfil their office. the official plan of the battle of malaga ( ), drawn up immediately after the battle, shows the fire-ship in this position as laid down by paul hoste. finally the use of shells, enabling ships to be set on fire more surely and quickly, and introduced on board at the period of which we are now treating, though the general use did not obtain until much later, was the last blow to the fire-ship."[ ] those who are familiar with the theories and discussions of our own day on the subject of fleet tactics and weapons, will recognize in this short notice of a long obsolete type certain ideas which are not obsolete. the fire-ship disappeared from fleets "whose speed it delayed." in heavy weather small bulk must always mean comparatively small speed. in a moderate sea, we are now told, the speed of the torpedo-boat falls from twenty knots to fifteen or less, and the seventeen to nineteen knot cruiser can either run away from the pursuing boats, or else hold them at a distance under fire of machine and heavy guns. these boats are sea-going, "and it is thought can keep the sea in all weathers; but to be on board a -foot torpedo-boat, when the sea is lively, is said to be far from agreeable. the heat, noise, and rapid vibrations of the engines are intense. cooking seems to be out of the question, and it is said that if food were well cooked few would be able to appreciate it. to obtain necessary rest under these conditions, added to the rapid motions of the boat, is most difficult." larger boats are to be built; but the factor of loss of speed in rough weather will remain, unless the size of the torpedo-cruiser is increased to a point that will certainly lead to fitting them with something more than torpedoes. like fire-ships, _small_ torpedo-cruisers will delay the speed and complicate the evolutions of the fleet with which they are associated.[ ] the disappearance of the fire-ship was also hastened, we are told, by the introduction of shell firing, or incendiary projectiles; and it is not improbable that for deep-sea fighting the transfer of the torpedo to a class of larger ships will put an end to the mere torpedo-cruiser. the fire-ship continued to be used against fleets at anchor down to the days of the american civil war; and the torpedo-boat will always be useful within an easy distance of its port. a third phase of naval practice two hundred years ago, mentioned in the extract quoted, involves an idea very familiar to modern discussions; namely, the group formation. "the idea of combining fire-ships with the fighting-ships to form a few groups, each provided with all the means of attack and defence," was for a time embraced; for we are told that it was later on abandoned. the combining of the ships of a fleet into groups of two, three, or four meant to act specially together is now largely favored in england; less so in france, where it meets strong opposition. no question of this sort, ably advocated on either side, is to be settled by one man's judgment, nor until time and experience have applied their infallible tests. it may be remarked, however, that in a well-organized fleet there are two degrees of command which are in themselves both natural and necessary, that can be neither done away nor ignored; these are the command of the whole fleet as one unit, and the command of each ship as a unit in itself. when a fleet becomes too large to be handled by one man, it must be subdivided, and in the heat of action become practically two fleets acting to one common end; as nelson, in his noble order at trafalgar, said, "the second in command will, _after_ my intentions are made known to him" (mark the force of the "after," which so well protects the functions both of the commander-in-chief and the second), "have the entire direction of his line, to make the attack upon the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed." the size and cost of the individual iron-clad of the present day makes it unlikely that fleets will be so numerous as to require subdivision; but whether they are or not does not affect the decision of the group question. looking simply to the principle underlying the theory, and disregarding the seeming tactical clumsiness of the special groups proposed, the question is: shall there be introduced between the natural commands of the admiral and of the captains of individual ships a third artificial contrivance, which on the one hand will in effect partly supersede the supreme authority, and on the other will partly fetter the discretion of commanders of ships? a further difficulty springing from the narrow principle of support specially due to particular ships, on which the group system rests, is this: that when signals can no longer be seen, the duty of the captain to his own ship and to the fleet at large will be complicated by his duty to observe certain relations to particular ships; which particular ships must in time come to have undue prominence in his views. the group formation had its day of trial in old times, and disappeared before the test of experience; whether in its restored form it will survive, time will show. it may be said, before quitting the subject, that as an order of sailing, corresponding to the route-step of an army in march, a loose group formation has some advantages; maintaining some order without requiring that rigid exactness of position, to observe which by day and night must be a severe strain on captain and deck-officers. such a route-order should not, however, be permitted until a fleet has reached high tactical precision. to return to the question of fire-ships and torpedo-boats, the rôle of the latter, it is often said, is to be found in that _mêlée_ which is always to succeed a couple of headlong passes between the opposing fleets. in the smoke and confusion of that hour is the opportunity of the torpedo-boat. this certainly sounds plausible, and the torpedo vessel certainly has a power of movement not possessed by the fire-ship. a _mêlée_ of the two fleets, however, was not the condition most favorable for the fire-ship. i shall quote here from another french officer, whose discussion of these anglo-dutch sea-fights, in a late periodical, is singularly clear and suggestive. he says: "far from impeding the direct action of the fire-ship, which was naught or nearly so during the confused battles of the war of , the regularity and _ensemble_ newly attained in the movements of squadrons seem rather to favor it. the fire-ships played a very important part at the battles of lowestoft, pas de calais, and the north foreland. thanks to the good order preserved by the ships-of-the-line, these incendiary ships can indeed be better protected by the artillery; much more efficiently directed than before toward a distinct and determined end."[ ] in the midst of the confused _mêlées_ of the fire-ship "acted, so to speak, alone, seeking by chance an enemy to grapple, running the risk of a mistake, without protection against the guns of the enemy, nearly sure to be sunk by him or else burned uselessly. all now, in , has become different. its prey is clearly pointed out; it knows it, follows it easily into the relatively fixed position had by it in the enemy's line. on the other hand, the ships of his own division do not lose sight of the fire-ship. they accompany it as far as possible, cover it with their artillery to the end of its course, and disengage it before burning, if the fruitlessness of the attempt is seen soon enough. evidently under such conditions its action, always uncertain (it cannot be otherwise), nevertheless acquires greater chances of success." these instructive comments need perhaps the qualifying, or additional, remark that confusion in the enemy's order at the time that your own remains good gives the best opening for a desperate attack. the writer goes on to trace the disappearance of the fire-ship:-- "here then we see the fire-ship at the point of its highest importance. that importance will decrease, the fire-ship itself will end by disappearing from engagements in _the open sea_, when naval artillery becoming more perfect shall have greater range, be more accurate and more rapid;[ ] when ships receiving better forms, greater steering power, more extensive and better balanced sail power, shall be able, thanks to quicker speed and handling, to avoid almost certainly the fire-ships sent against them; when, finally, fleets led on principles of tactics as skilful as they were timid, a tactics which will predominate a century later during the whole war of american independence, when these fleets, in order not to jeopardize the perfect regularity of their order of battle, will avoid coming to close quarters, and will leave to the cannon alone to decide the fate of an action." in this discussion the writer has in view the leading feature which, while aiding the action of the fire-ship, also gives this war of its peculiar interest in the history of naval tactics. in it is found for the first time the close-hauled line-of-battle undeniably adopted as the fighting order of the fleets. it is plain enough that when those fleets numbered, as they often did, from eighty to a hundred ships, such lines would be very imperfectly formed in every essential, both of line and interval; but the general aim is evident, amid whatever imperfections of execution. the credit for this development is generally given to the duke of york, afterward james ii.; but the question to whom the improvement is due is of little importance to sea-officers of the present day when compared with the instructive fact that so long a time elapsed between the appearance of the large sailing-ship, with its broadside battery, and the systematic adoption of the order which was best adapted to develop the full power of the fleet for mutual support. to us, having the elements of the problem in our hands, together with the result finally reached, that result seems simple enough, almost self-evident. why did it take so long for the capable men of that day to reach it? the reason--and herein lies the lesson for the officer of to-day--was doubtless the same that leaves the order of battle so uncertain now; namely, that the necessity of war did not force men to make up their minds, until the dutch at last met in the english their equals on the sea. the sequence of ideas which resulted in the line-of-battle is clear and logical. though familiar enough to seamen, it will be here stated in the words of the writer last quoted, because they have a neatness and precision entirely french:-- "with the increase of power of the ship-of-war, and with the perfecting of its sea and warlike qualities, there has come an equal progress in the art of utilizing them.... as naval evolutions become more skilful, their importance grows from day to day. to these evolutions there is needed a base, a point from which they depart and to which they return. a fleet of war-ships must be always ready to meet an enemy; logically, therefore, this point of departure for naval evolutions must be the order of battle. now, since the disappearance of galleys, almost all the artillery is found upon the sides of a ship of war. hence it is the beam that must necessarily and always be turned toward the enemy. on the other hand, it is necessary that the sight of the latter must never be interrupted by a friendly ship. only one formation allows the ships of the same fleet to satisfy fully these conditions. that formation is the line ahead [column]. this line, therefore, is imposed as the only order of battle, and consequently as the basis of all fleet tactics. in order that this order of battle, this long thin line of guns, may not be injured or broken at some point weaker than the rest, there is at the same time felt the necessity of putting in it only ships which, if not of equal force, have at least equally strong sides. logically it follows, at the same moment in which the line ahead became definitively the order for battle, there was established the distinction between the ships 'of the line,' alone destined for a place therein, and the lighter ships meant for other uses." if to these we add the considerations which led to making the line-of-battle a close-hauled line, we have the problem fully worked out. but the chain of reasoning was as clear two hundred and fifty years ago as it is now; why then was it so long in being worked out? partly, no doubt, because old traditions--in those days traditions of galley-fighting--had hold of and confused men's minds; chiefly because men are too indolent to seek out the foundation truths of the situation in their day, and develop the true theory of action from its base up. as a rare instance of clear-sightedness, recognizing such a fundamental change in conditions and predicting results, words of admiral labrousse of the french navy, written in , are most instructive. "thanks to steam," he wrote, "ships will be able to move in any direction with such speed that the effects of collision may, and indeed must, as they formerly did, take the place of projectile weapons and annul the calculations of the skilful manoeuvrer. the ram will be favorable to speed, without destroying the nautical qualities of a ship. as soon as one power shall have adopted this terrible weapon, all others must accept it, under pain of evident inferiority, and thus combats will become combats of ram against ram." while forbearing the unconditional adhesion to the ram as the controlling weapon of the day, which the french navy has yielded, the above brief argument may well be taken as an instance of the way in which researches into the order of battle of the future should be worked out. a french writer, commenting on labrousse's paper, says:-- "twenty-seven years were scarce enough for our fathers, counting from , the date of building the 'couronne,' to , to pass from the tactical order of the line abreast, the order for galleys, to that of the line ahead. we ourselves needed twenty-nine years from , when the first steamship was brought into our fleet, to , when the application of the principle of ram-fighting was affirmed by laying down the 'solferino' and the 'magenta' to work a revolution in the contrary direction; so true it is that truth is always slow in getting to the light.... this transformation was not sudden, not only because the new material required time to be built and armed, but above all, it is sad to say, because the necessary consequences of the new motive power escaped most minds."[ ] we come now to the justly celebrated four days' battle of june, , which claims special notice, not only on account of the great number of ships engaged on either side, nor yet only for the extraordinary physical endurance of the men who kept up a hot naval action for so many successive days, but also because the commanders-in-chief on either side, monk and de ruyter, were the most distinguished seamen, or rather sea-commanders, brought forth by their respective countries in the seventeenth century. monk was possibly inferior to blake in the annals of the english navy; but there is a general agreement that de ruyter is the foremost figure, not only in the dutch service, but among all the naval officers of that age. the account about to be given is mainly taken from a recent number of the "revue maritime et coloniale,"[ ] and is there published as a letter, recently discovered, from a dutch gentleman serving as volunteer on board de ruyter's ship, to a friend in france. the narrative is delightfully clear and probable,--qualities not generally found in the description of those long-ago fights; and the satisfaction it gave was increased by finding in the memoirs of the count de guiche, who also served as volunteer in the fleet, and was taken to de ruyter after his own vessel had been destroyed by a fire-ship, an account confirming the former in its principal details.[ ] this additional pleasure was unhappily marred by recognizing certain phrases as common to both stories; and a comparison showed that the two could not be accepted as independent narratives. there are, however, points of internal difference which make it possible that the two accounts are by different eye-witnesses, who compared and corrected their versions before sending them out to their friends or writing them in their journals. the numbers of the two fleets were: english about eighty ships, the dutch about one hundred; but the inequality in numbers was largely compensated by the greater size of many of the english. a great strategic blunder by the government in london immediately preceded the fight. the king was informed that a french squadron was on its way from the atlantic to join the dutch. he at once divided his fleet, sending twenty ships under prince rupert to the westward to meet the french, while the remainder under monk were to go east and oppose the dutch. a position like that of the english fleet, threatened with an attack from two quarters, presents one of the subtlest temptations to a commander. the impulse is very strong to meet both by dividing his own numbers as charles did; but unless in possession of overwhelming force it is an error, exposing both divisions to be beaten separately, which, as we are about to see, actually happened in this case. the result of the first two days was disastrous to the larger english division under monk, which was then obliged to retreat toward rupert; and probably the opportune return of the latter alone saved the english fleet from a very serious loss, or at the least from being shut up in their own ports. a hundred and forty years later, in the exciting game of strategy that was played in the bay of biscay before trafalgar, the english admiral cornwallis made precisely the same blunder, dividing his fleet into two equal parts out of supporting distance, which napoleon at the time characterized as a glaring piece of stupidity. the lesson is the same in all ages. [illustration: pl. i.] the dutch had sailed for the english coast with a fair easterly wind, but it changed later to southwest with thick weather, and freshened, so that de ruyter, to avoid being driven too far, came to anchor between dunkirk and the downs.[ ] the fleet then rode with its head to the south-southwest and the van on the right; while tromp, who commanded the rear division in the natural order, was on the left. for some cause this left was most to windward, the centre squadron under ruyter being to leeward, and the right, or van, to leeward again of the centre.[ ] this was the position of the dutch fleet at daylight of june , ; and although not expressly so stated, it is likely, from the whole tenor of the narratives, that it was not in good order. the same morning monk, who was also at anchor, made out the dutch fleet to leeward, and although so inferior in numbers determined to attack at once, hoping that by keeping the advantage of the wind he would be able to commit himself only so far as might seem best. he therefore stood along the dutch line on the starboard tack, leaving the right and centre out of cannon-shot, until he came abreast of the left, tromp's squadron. monk then had thirty-five ships well in hand; but the rear had opened and was straggling, as is apt to be the case with long columns. with the thirty-five he then put his helm up and ran down for tromp, whose squadron cut their cables and made sail on the same tack (v'); the two engaged lines thus standing over toward the french coast, and the breeze heeling the ships so that the english could not use their lower-deck guns (fig. , v''). the dutch centre and rear also cut (fig. , c'), and followed the movement, but being so far to leeward, could not for some time come into action. it was during this time that a large dutch ship, becoming separated from her own fleet, was set on fire and burned, doubtless the ship in which was count de guiche. as they drew near dunkirk the english went about, probably all together; for in the return to the northward and westward the proper english van fell in with and was roughly handled by the dutch centre under ruyter himself (fig. , c''). this fate would be more likely to befall the rear, and indicates that a simultaneous movement had reversed the order. the engaged ships had naturally lost to leeward, thus enabling ruyter to fetch up with them. two english flag-ships were here disabled and cut off; one, the "swiftsure," hauled down her colors after the admiral, a young man of only twenty-seven, was killed. "highly to be admired," says a contemporary writer, "was the resolution of vice-admiral berkeley, who, though cut off from the line, surrounded by enemies, great numbers of his men killed, his ship disabled and boarded on all sides, yet continued fighting almost alone, killed several with his own hand, and would accept no quarter; till at length, being shot in the throat with a musket-ball, he retired into the captain's cabin, where he was found dead, extended at his full length upon a table, and almost covered with his own blood." quite as heroic, but more fortunate in its issue, was the conduct of the other english admiral thus cut off; and the incidents of his struggle, though not specially instructive otherwise, are worth quoting, as giving a lively picture of the scenes which passed in the heat of the contests of those days, and afford coloring to otherwise dry details. "being in a short time completely disabled, one of the enemy's fire-ships grappled him on the starboard quarter; he was, however, freed by the almost incredible exertions of his lieutenant, who, having in the midst of the flames loosed the grappling-irons, swung back on board his own ship unhurt. the dutch, bent on the destruction of this unfortunate ship, sent a second which grappled her on the larboard side, and with greater success than the former; for the sails instantly taking fire, the crew were so terrified that nearly fifty of them jumped overboard. the admiral, sir john harman, seeing this confusion, ran with his sword drawn among those who remained, and threatened with instant death the first man who should attempt to quit the ship, or should not exert himself to quench the flames. the crew then returned to their duty and got the fire under; but the rigging being a good deal burned, one of the topsail yards fell and broke sir john's leg. in the midst of this accumulated distress, a third fire-ship prepared to grapple him, but was sunk by the guns before she could effect her purpose. the dutch vice-admiral, evertzen, now bore down to him and offered quarter; but sir john replied, 'no, no, it is not come to that yet,' and giving him a broadside, killed the dutch commander; after which the other enemies sheered off."[ ] it is therefore not surprising that the account we have been following reported two english flag-ships lost, one by a fire-ship. "the english chief still continued on the port tack, and," says the writer, "as night fell we could see him proudly leading his line past the squadron of north holland and zealand [the actual rear, but proper van], which from noon up to that time had not been able to reach the enemy [fig. , r''] from their leewardly position." the merit of monk's attack as a piece of grand tactics is evident, and bears a strong resemblance to that of nelson at the nile. discerning quickly the weakness of the dutch order, he had attacked a vastly superior force in such a way that only part of it could come into action; and though the english actually lost more heavily, they carried off a brilliant prestige and must have left considerable depression and heart-burning among the dutch. the eye-witness goes on: "the affair continued until ten p.m., friends and foes mixed together and as likely to receive injury from one as from the other. it will be remarked that the success of the day and the misfortunes of the english came from their being too much scattered, too extended in their line; but for which we could never have cut off a corner of them, as we did. the mistake of monk was in not keeping his ships better together;" that is, closed up. the remark is just, the criticism scarcely so; the opening out of the line was almost unavoidable in so long a column of sailing-ships, and was one of the chances taken by monk when he offered battle. the english stood off on the port tack to the west or west-northwest, and next day returned to the fight. the dutch were now on the port tack in natural order, the right leading, and were to windward; but the enemy, being more weatherly and better disciplined, soon gained the advantage of the wind. the english this day had forty-four ships in action, the dutch about eighty; many of the english, as before said, larger. the two fleets passed on opposite tacks, the english to windward;[ ] but tromp, in the rear, seeing that the dutch order of battle was badly formed, the ships in two or three lines, overlapping and so masking each other's fire, went about and gained to windward of the enemy's van (r'); which he was able to do from the length of the line, and because the english, running parallel to the dutch order, were off the wind. "at this moment two flag-officers of the dutch van kept broad off, presenting their sterns to the english (v'). ruyter, greatly astonished, tried to stop them, but in vain, and therefore felt obliged to imitate the manoeuvre in order to keep his squadron together; but he did so with some order, keeping some ships around him, and was joined by one of the van ships, disgusted with the conduct of his immediate superior. tromp was now in great danger, separated [by his own act first and then by the conduct of the van] from his own fleet by the english, and would have been destroyed but for ruyter, who, seeing the urgency of the case, hauled up for him," the van and centre thus standing back for the rear on the opposite tack to that on which they entered action. this prevented the english from keeping up the attack on tromp, lest ruyter should gain the wind of them, which they could not afford to yield because of their very inferior numbers. both the action of tromp and that of the junior flag-officers in the van, though showing very different degrees of warlike ardor, bring out strongly the lack of subordination and of military feeling which has been charged against the dutch officers as a body; no signs of which appear among the english at this time. how keenly ruyter felt the conduct of his lieutenants was manifested when "tromp, immediately after this partial action, went on board his flagship. the seamen cheered him; but ruyter said, 'this is no time for rejoicing, but rather for tears.' indeed, our position was bad, each squadron acting differently, in no line, and all the ships huddled together like a flock of sheep, so packed that the english might have surrounded all of them with their forty ships [june , fig. ]. the english were in admirable order, but did not push their advantage as they should, whatever the reason." the reason no doubt was the same that often prevented sailing-ships from pressing an advantage,--disability from crippled spars and rigging, added to the inexpediency of such inferior numbers risking a decisive action. ruyter was thus able to draw his fleet out into line again, although much maltreated by the english, and the two fleets passed again on opposite tacks, the dutch to leeward, and ruyter's ship the last in his column. as he passed the english rear, he lost his maintopmast and mainyard. after another partial rencounter the english drew away to the northwest toward their own shores, the dutch following them; the wind being still from southwest, but light. the english were now fairly in retreat, and the pursuit continued all night, ruyter's own ship dropping out of sight in the rear from her crippled state. the third day monk continued retreating to the westward. he burned, by the english accounts, three disabled ships, sent ahead those that were most crippled, and himself brought up the rear with those that were in fighting condition, which are variously stated, again by the english, at twenty-eight and sixteen in number (plate ii., june ). one of the largest and finest of the english fleet, the "royal prince," of ninety guns, ran aground on the galloper shoal and was taken by tromp (plate ii. a); but monk's retreat was so steady and orderly that he was otherwise unmolested. this shows that the dutch had suffered very severely. toward evening rupert's squadron was seen; and all the ships of the english fleet, except those crippled in action, were at last united. the next day the wind came out again very fresh from the southwest, giving the dutch the weather-gage. the english, instead of attempting to pass upon opposite tacks, came up from astern relying upon the speed and handiness of their ships. so doing, the battle engaged all along the line on the port tack, the english to leeward.[ ] the dutch fire-ships were badly handled and did no harm, whereas the english burned two of their enemies. the two fleets ran on thus, exchanging broadsides for two hours, at the end of which time the bulk of the english fleet had passed through the dutch line.[ ] all regularity of order was henceforward lost. "at this moment," says the eye-witness, "the lookout was extraordinary, for all were separated, the english as well as we. but luck would have it that the largest of our fractions surrounding the admiral remained to windward, and the largest fraction of the english, also with their admiral, remained to leeward [figs. and , c and c']. this was the cause of our victory and their ruin. our admiral had with him thirty-five or forty ships of his own and of other squadrons, for the squadrons were scattered and order much lost. the rest of the dutch ships had left him. the leader of the van, van ness, had gone off with fourteen ships in chase of three or four english ships, which under a press of sail had gained to windward of the dutch van [fig. , v]. van tromp with the rear squadron had fallen to leeward, and so had to keep on [to leeward of ruyter and the english main body, fig. , r] after van ness, in order to rejoin the admiral by passing round the english centre." de ruyter and the english main body kept up a sharp action, beating to windward all the time. tromp, having carried sail, overtook van ness, and returned bringing the van back with him (v', r'); but owing to the constant plying to windward of the english main body he came up to leeward of it and could not rejoin ruyter, who was to windward (fig. , v'', r''). ruyter, seeing this, made signal to the ships around him, and the main body of the dutch kept away before the wind (fig , c''), which was then very strong. "thus in less than no time we found ourselves in the midst of the english; who, being attacked on both sides, were thrown into confusion and saw their whole order destroyed, as well by dint of the action, as by the strong wind that was then blowing. this was the hottest of the fight [fig. ]. we saw the high admiral of england separated from his fleet, followed only by one fire-ship. with that he gained to windward, and passing through the north holland squadron, placed himself again at the head of fifteen or twenty ships that rallied to him." [illustration: pl. ii.] thus ended this great sea-fight, the most remarkable, in some of its aspects, that has ever been fought upon the ocean. amid conflicting reports it is not possible to do more than estimate the results. a fairly impartial account says: "the states lost in these actions three vice-admirals, two thousand men, and four ships. the loss of the english was five thousand killed and three thousand prisoners; and they lost besides seventeen ships, of which nine remained in the hands of the victors."[ ] there is no doubt that the english had much the worst of it, and that this was owing wholly to the original blunder of weakening the fleet by a great detachment sent in another direction. great detachments are sometimes necessary evils, but in this case no necessity existed. granting the approach of the french, the proper course for the english was to fall with their whole fleet upon the dutch before their allies could come up. this lesson is as applicable to-day as it ever was. a second lesson, likewise of present application, is the necessity of sound military institutions for implanting correct military feeling, pride, and discipline. great as was the first blunder of the english, and serious as was the disaster, there can be no doubt that the consequences would have been much worse but for the high spirit and skill with which the plans of monk were carried out by his subordinates, and the lack of similar support to ruyter on the part of the dutch subalterns. in the movements of the english, we hear nothing of two juniors turning tail at a critical moment, nor of a third, with misdirected ardor, getting on the wrong side of the enemy's fleet. their drill also, their tactical precision, was remarked even then. the frenchman de guiche, after witnessing this four days' fight, wrote:-- "nothing equals the beautiful order of the english at sea. never was a line drawn straighter than that formed by their ships; thus they bring all their fire to bear upon those who draw near them.... they fight like a line of cavalry which is handled according to rule, and applies itself solely to force back those who oppose; whereas the dutch advance like cavalry whose squadrons leave their ranks and come separately to the charge."[ ] the dutch government, averse to expense, unmilitary in its tone, and incautious from long and easy victory over the degenerate navy of spain, had allowed its fleet to sink into a mere assembly of armed merchantmen. things were at their worst in the days of cromwell. taught by the severe lessons of that war, the united provinces, under an able ruler, had done much to mend matters, but full efficiency had not yet been gained. "in as in ," says a french naval writer, "the fortune of war seemed to lean to the side of the english. of the three great battles fought two were decided victories; and the third, though adverse, had but increased the glory of her seamen. this was due to the intelligent boldness of monk and rupert, the talents of part of the admirals and captains, and the skill of the seamen and soldiers under them. the wise and vigorous efforts made by the government of the united provinces, and the undeniable superiority of ruyter in experience and genius over any one of his opponents, could not compensate for the weakness or incapacity of part of the dutch officers, and the manifest inferiority of the men under their orders."[ ] england, as has been said before, still felt the impress of cromwell's iron hand upon her military institutions; but that impress was growing weaker. before the next dutch war monk was dead, and was poorly replaced by the cavalier rupert. court extravagance cut down the equipment of the navy as did the burgomaster's parsimony, and court corruption undermined discipline as surely as commercial indifference. the effect was evident when the fleets of the two countries met again, six years later. there was one well-known feature of all the military navies of that day which calls for a passing comment; for its correct bearing and value is not always, perhaps not generally, seen. the command of fleets and of single vessels was often given to soldiers, to military men unaccustomed to the sea, and ignorant how to handle the ship, that duty being intrusted to another class of officer. looking closely into the facts, it is seen that this made a clean division between the direction of the fighting and of the motive power of the ship. this is the essence of the matter; and the principle is the same whatever the motive power may be. the inconvenience and inefficiency of such a system was obvious then as it is now, and the logic of facts gradually threw the two functions into the hands of one corps of officers, the result being the modern naval officer, as that term is generally understood.[ ] unfortunately, in this process of blending, the less important function was allowed to get the upper hand; the naval officer came to feel more proud of his dexterity in managing the motive power of his ship than of his skill in developing her military efficiency. the bad effects of this lack of interest in military science became most evident when the point of handling fleets was reached, because for that military skill told most, and previous study was most necessary; but it was felt in the single ship as well. hence it came to pass, and especially in the english navy, that the pride of the seaman took the place of the pride of the military man. the english naval officer thought more of that which likened him to the merchant captain than of that which made him akin to the soldier. in the french navy this result was less general, owing probably to the more military spirit of the government, and especially of the nobility, to whom the rank of officer was reserved. it was not possible that men whose whole association was military, all of whose friends looked upon arms as the one career for a gentleman, could think more of the sails and rigging than of the guns or the fleet. the english corps of officers was of different origin. there was more than the writer thought in macaulay's well-known saying: "there were seamen and there were gentlemen in the navy of charles ii.; but the seamen were not gentlemen, and the gentlemen were not seamen." the trouble was not in the absence or presence of gentlemen as such, but in the fact that under the conditions of that day the gentleman was pre-eminently the military element of society; and that the seaman, after the dutch wars, gradually edged the gentleman, and with him the military tone and spirit as distinguished from simple courage, out of the service. even "such men of family as herbert and russell, william iii.'s admirals," says the biographer of lord hawke, "were sailors indeed, but only able to hold their own by adopting the boisterous manners of the hardy tarpaulin." the same national traits which made the french inferior as seamen made them superior as military men; not in courage, but in skill. to this day the same tendency obtains; the direction of the motive power has no such consideration as the military functions in the navies of the latin nations. the studious and systematic side of the french character also inclined the french officer, when not a trifler, to consider and develop tactical questions in a logical manner; to prepare himself to handle fleets, not merely as a seaman but as a military man. the result showed, in the american revolutionary war, that despite a mournful history of governmental neglect, men who were first of all military men, inferior though they were in opportunities as seamen to their enemies, could meet them on more than equal terms as to tactical skill, and were practically their superiors in handling fleets. the false theory has already been pointed out, which directed the action of the french fleet not to crushing its enemy, but to some ulterior aim; but this does not affect the fact that in tactical skill the military men were superior to the mere seamen, though their tactical skill was applied to mistaken strategic ends. the source whence the dutch mainly drew their officers does not certainly appear; for while the english naval historian in says that most of the captains of their fleet were sons of rich burgomasters, placed there for political reasons by the grand pensionary, and without experience, duquesne, the ablest french admiral of the day, comments in on the precision and skill of the dutch captains in terms very disparaging to his own. it is likely, from many indications, that they were generally merchant seamen, with little original military feeling; but the severity with which the delinquents were punished both by the state and by popular frenzy, seems to have driven these officers, who were far from lacking the highest personal courage, into a sense of what military loyalty and subordination required. they made a very different record in from that of . before finally leaving the four days' fight, the conclusions of another writer may well be quoted:-- "such was that bloody battle of the four days, or straits of calais, the most memorable sea-fight of modern days; not, indeed, by its results, but by the aspect of its different phases; by the fury of the combatants; by the boldness and skill of the leaders; and by the new character which it gave to sea warfare. more than any other this fight marks clearly the passage from former methods to the tactics of the end of the seventeenth century. for the first time we can follow, as though traced upon a plan, the principal movements of the contending fleets. it seems quite clear that to the dutch as well as to the british have been given a tactical book and a code of signals; or, at the least, written instructions, extensive and precise, to serve instead of such a code. we feel that each admiral now has his squadron in hand, and that even the commander-in-chief disposes at his will, during the fight, of the various subdivisions of his fleet. compare this action with those of , and one plain fact stares you in the face,--that between the two dates naval tactics have undergone a revolution. "such were the changes that distinguish the war of from that of . as in the latter epoch, the admiral still thinks the weather-gage an advantage for his fleet; but it is no longer, from the tactical point of view, the principal, we might almost say the sole, preoccupation. now he wishes above all to keep his fleet in good order and compact as long as possible, so as to keep the power of _combining_, during the action, the movements of the different squadrons. look at ruyter, at the end of the four days' fight; with great difficulty he has kept to windward of the english fleet, yet he does not hesitate to sacrifice this advantage in order to unite the two parts of his fleet, which are separated by the enemy. if at the later fight off the north foreland great intervals exist between the dutch squadrons, if the rear afterward continues to withdraw from the centre, ruyter deplores such a fault as the chief cause of his defeat. he so deplores it in his official report; he even accuses tromp [who was his personal enemy] of treason or cowardice,--an unjust accusation, but which none the less shows the enormous importance thenceforth attached, during action, to the reunion of the fleet into a whole strictly and regularly maintained."[ ] this commentary is justified in so far as it points out general aims and tendencies; but the results were not as complete as might be inferred from it. the english, notwithstanding their heavy loss in the four days' battle, were at sea again within two months, much to the surprise of the dutch; and on the th of august another severe fight was fought off the north foreland, ending in the complete defeat of the latter, who retired to their own coasts. the english followed, and effected an entrance into one of the dutch harbors, where they destroyed a large fleet of merchantmen as well as a town of some importance. toward the end of both sides were tired of the war, which was doing great harm to trade, and weakening both navies to the advantage of the growing sea power of france. negotiations looking toward peace were opened; but charles ii., ill disposed to the united provinces, confident that the growing pretensions of louis xiv. to the spanish netherlands would break up the existing alliance between holland and france, and relying also upon the severe reverses suffered at sea by the dutch, was exacting and haughty in his demands. to justify and maintain this line of conduct he should have kept up his fleet, the prestige of which had been so advanced by its victories. instead of that, poverty, the result of extravagance and of his home policy, led him to permit it to decline; ships in large numbers were laid up; and he readily adopted an opinion which chimed in with his penury, and which, as it has had advocates at all periods of sea history, should be noted and condemned here. this opinion, warmly opposed by monk, was:-- "that as the dutch were chiefly supported by trade, as the supply of their navy depended upon trade, and, as experience showed, nothing provoked the people so much as injuring their trade, his majesty should therefore apply himself to this, which would effectually humble them, at the same time that it would less exhaust the english than fitting out such mighty fleets as had hitherto kept the sea every summer.... upon these motives the king took a fatal resolution of laying up his great ships and keeping only a few frigates on the cruise."[ ] in consequence of this economical theory of carrying on a war, the grand pensionary of holland, de witt, who had the year before caused soundings of the thames to be made, sent into the river, under de ruyter, a force of sixty or seventy ships-of-the-line, which on the th of june, , went up as high as gravesend, destroying ships at chatham and in the medway, and taking possession of sheerness. the light of the fires could be seen from london, and the dutch fleet remained in possession of the mouth of the river until the end of the month. under this blow, following as it did upon the great plague and the great fire of london, charles consented to peace, which was signed july , , and is known as the peace of breda. the most lasting result of the war was the transfer of new york and new jersey to england, thus joining her northern and southern colonies in north america. before going on again with the general course of the history of the times, it will be well to consider for a moment the theory which worked so disastrously for england in ; that, namely, of maintaining a sea-war mainly by preying upon the enemy's commerce. this plan, which involves only the maintenance of a few swift cruisers and can be backed by the spirit of greed in a nation, fitting out privateers without direct expense to the state, possesses the specious attractions which economy always presents. the great injury done to the wealth and prosperity of the enemy is also undeniable; and although to some extent his merchant-ships can shelter themselves ignobly under a foreign flag while the war lasts, this _guerre de course_, as the french call it, this commerce-destroying, to use our own phrase, must, if in itself successful, greatly embarrass the foreign government and distress its people. such a war, however, cannot stand alone; it must be _supported_, to use the military phrase; unsubstantial and evanescent in itself, it cannot reach far from its base. that base must be either home ports, or else some solid outpost of the national power, on the shore or the sea; a distant dependency or a powerful fleet. failing such support, the cruiser can only dash out hurriedly a short distance from home, and its blows, though painful, cannot be fatal. it was not the policy of , but cromwell's powerful fleets of ships-of-the-line in , that shut the dutch merchantmen in their ports and caused the grass to grow in the streets of amsterdam. when, instructed by the suffering of that time, the dutch kept large fleets afloat through two exhausting wars, though their commerce suffered greatly, they bore up the burden of the strife against england and france united. forty years later, louis xiv. was driven, by exhaustion, to the policy adopted by charles ii. through parsimony. then were the days of the great french privateers, jean bart, forbin, duguay-trouin, du casse, and others. the regular fleets of the french navy were practically withdrawn from the ocean during the great war of the spanish succession ( - ). the french naval historian says:-- "unable to renew the naval armaments, louis xiv. increased the number of cruisers upon the more frequented seas, especially the channel and the german ocean [not far from home, it will be noticed]. in these different spots the cruisers were always in a position to intercept or hinder the movements of transports laden with troops, and of the numerous convoys carrying supplies of all kinds. in these seas, in the centre of the commercial and political world, there is always work for cruisers. notwithstanding the difficulties they met, owing to the absence of large friendly fleets, they served advantageously the cause of the two peoples [french and spanish]. these cruisers, in the face of the anglo-dutch power, needed good luck, boldness, and skill. these three conditions were not lacking to our seamen; but then, what chiefs and what captains they had!"[ ] the english historian, on the other hand, while admitting how severely the people and commerce of england suffered from the cruisers, bitterly reflecting at times upon the administration, yet refers over and over again to the increasing prosperity of the whole country, and especially of its commercial part. in the preceding war, on the contrary, from to , when france sent great fleets to sea and disputed the supremacy of the ocean, how different the result! the same english writer says of that time:-- "with respect to our trade it is certain that we suffered infinitely more, not merely than the french, for that was to be expected from the greater number of our merchant-ships, but than we ever did in any former war.... this proceeded in great measure from the vigilance of the french, who carried on the war in a piratical way. it is out of all doubt that, taking all together, our traffic suffered excessively; our merchants were many of them ruined."[ ] macaulay says of this period: "during many months of the english trade with the mediterranean had been interrupted almost entirely. there was no chance that a merchantman from london or amsterdam would, if unprotected, reach the pillars of hercules without being boarded by a french privateer; and the protection of armed vessels was not easily obtained." why? because the vessels of england's navy were occupied watching the french navy, and this diversion of them from the cruisers and privateers constituted the support which a commerce-destroying war must have. a french historian, speaking of the same period in england ( ), says: "the state of the finances was deplorable; money was scarce, maritime insurance thirty per cent, the navigation act was virtually suspended, and the english shipping reduced to the necessity of sailing under the swedish and danish flags."[ ] half a century later the french government was again reduced, by long neglect of the navy, to a cruising warfare. with what results? first, the french historian says: "from june, , to june, , french privateers captured from the english more than twenty-five hundred merchantmen. in , though france had not, so to speak, a single ship-of-the-line at sea, and though the english had taken two hundred and forty of our privateers, their comrades still took eight hundred and twelve vessels. but," he goes on to say, "the prodigious growth of the english shipping explains the number of these prizes."[ ] in other words, the suffering involved to england in such numerous captures, which must have caused great individual injury and discontent, did not really prevent the growing prosperity of the state and of the community at large. the english naval historian, speaking of the same period, says: "while the commerce of france was nearly destroyed, the trading-fleet of england covered the seas. every year her commerce was increasing; the money which the war carried out was returned by the produce of her industry. eight thousand merchant vessels were employed by the english merchants." and again, summing up the results of the war, after stating the immense amount of specie brought into the kingdom by foreign conquests, he says: "the trade of england increased gradually every year, and such a scene of national prosperity, while waging a long, bloody, and costly war, was never before shown by any people in the world." on the other hand, the historian of the french navy, speaking of an earlier phase of the same wars, says: "the english fleets, having nothing to resist them, swept the seas. our privateers and single cruisers, having no fleet to keep down the abundance of their enemies, ran short careers. twenty thousand french seamen lay in english prisons."[ ] when, on the other hand, in the war of the american revolution france resumed the policy of colbert and of the early reign of louis xiv., and kept large battle-fleets afloat, the same result again followed as in the days of tourville. "for the first time," says the annual register, forgetting or ignorant of the experience of , and remembering only the glories of the later wars, "english merchant-ships were driven to take refuge under foreign flags."[ ] finally, in quitting this part of the subject, it may be remarked that in the island of martinique the french had a powerful distant dependency upon which to base a cruising warfare; and during the seven years' war, as afterward during the first empire, it, with guadeloupe, was the refuge of numerous privateers. "the records of the english admiralty raise the losses of the english in the west indies during the first years of the seven years' war to fourteen hundred merchantmen taken or destroyed." the english fleet was therefore directed against the islands, both of which fell, involving a loss to the trade of france greater than all the depredations of her cruisers on the english commerce, besides breaking up the system; but in the war of the great fleets protected the islands, which were not even threatened at any time. so far we have been viewing the effect of a purely cruising warfare, not based upon powerful squadrons, only upon that particular part of the enemy's strength against which it is theoretically directed,--upon his commerce and general wealth; upon the sinews of war. the evidence seems to show that even for its own special ends such a mode of war is inconclusive, worrying but not deadly; it might almost be said that it causes needless suffering. what, however, is the effect of this policy upon the general ends of the war, to which it is one of the means, and to which it is subsidiary? how, again, does it react upon the people that practise it? as the historical evidences will come up in detail from time to time, it need here only be summarized. the result to england in the days of charles ii. has been seen,--her coast insulted, her shipping burned almost within sight of her capital. in the war of the spanish succession, when the control of spain was the military object, while the french depended upon a cruising war against commerce, the navies of england and holland, unopposed, guarded the coasts of the peninsula, blocked the port of toulon, forced the french succors to cross the pyrenees, and by keeping open the sea highway, neutralized the geographical nearness of france to the seat of war. their fleets seized gibraltar, barcelona, and minorca, and co-operating with the austrian army failed by little of reducing toulon. in the seven years' war the english fleets seized, or aided in seizing, all the most valuable colonies of france and spain, and made frequent descents on the french coast. the war of the american revolution affords no lesson, the fleets being nearly equal. the next most striking instance to americans is the war of . everybody knows how our privateers swarmed over the seas, and that from the smallness of our navy the war was essentially, indeed solely, a cruising war. except upon the lakes, it is doubtful if more than two of our ships at any time acted together. the injury done to english commerce, thus unexpectedly attacked by a distant foe which had been undervalued, may be fully conceded; but on the one hand, the american cruisers were powerfully supported by the french fleet, which being assembled in larger or smaller bodies in the many ports under the emperor's control from antwerp to venice, tied the fleets of england to blockade duty; and on the other hand, when the fall of the emperor released them, our coasts were insulted in every direction, the chesapeake entered and controlled, its shores wasted, the potomac ascended, and washington burned. the northern frontier was kept in a state of alarm, though there squadrons, absolutely weak but relatively strong, sustained the general defence; while in the south the mississippi was entered unopposed, and new orleans barely saved. when negotiations for peace were opened, the bearing of the english toward the american envoys was not that of men who felt their country to be threatened with an unbearable evil. the late civil war, with the cruises of the "alabama" and "sumter" and their consorts, revived the tradition of commerce-destroying. in so far as this is one means to a general end, and is based upon a navy otherwise powerful, it is well; but we need not expect to see the feats of those ships repeated in the face of a great sea power. in the first place, those cruises were powerfully supported by the determination of the united states to blockade, not only the chief centres of southern trade, but every inlet of the coast, thus leaving few ships available for pursuit; in the second place, had there been ten of those cruisers where there was one, they would not have stopped the incursion in southern waters of the union fleet, which penetrated to every point accessible from the sea; and in the third place, the undeniable injury, direct and indirect, inflicted upon individuals and upon one branch of the nation's industry (and how high that shipping industry stands in the writer's estimation need not be repeated), did not in the least influence or retard the event of the war. such injuries, unaccompanied by others, are more irritating than weakening. on the other hand, will any refuse to admit that the work of the great union fleets powerfully modified and hastened an end which was probably inevitable in any case? as a sea power the south then occupied the place of france in the wars we have been considering, while the situation of the north resembled that of england; and, as in france, the sufferers in the confederacy were not a class, but the government and the nation at large. it is not the taking of individual ships or convoys, be they few or many, that strikes down the money power of a nation; it is the possession of that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and which, by controlling the great common, closes the highways by which commerce moves to and from the enemy's shores. this overbearing power can only be exercised by great navies, and by them (on the broad sea) less efficiently now than in the days when the neutral flag had not its present immunity. it is not unlikely that, in the event of a war between maritime nations, an attempt may be made by the one having a great sea power and wishing to break down its enemy's commerce, to interpret the phrase "effective blockade" in the manner that best suits its interests at the time; to assert that the speed and disposal of its ships make the blockade effective at much greater distances and with fewer ships than formerly. the determination of such a question will depend, not upon the weaker belligerent, but upon neutral powers; it will raise the issue between belligerent and neutral rights; and if the belligerent have a vastly overpowering navy he may carry his point, just as england, when possessing the mastery of the seas, long refused to admit the doctrine of the neutral flag covering the goods. footnotes: [ ] davies: history of holland. [ ] république d'angleterre. [ ] lefèvre-pontalis: jean de witt. [ ] martin: history of france. [ ] gougeard: marine de guerre. [ ] since the above was written, the experience of the english autumn manoeuvres of has verified this statement; not indeed that any such experiment was needed to establish a self-evident fact. [ ] chabaud-arnault: revue mar. et col. . [ ] the recent development of rapid-firing and machine guns, with the great increase of their calibre and consequent range and penetration, reproduces this same step in the cycle of progress. [ ] gougeard: marine de guerre. [ ] vol. lxxxii. p. . [ ] mémoires du cte. de guiche. À londres, chez p. changuion. pp. - . [ ] see map of english channel and north sea, page . [ ] plate i., june , , fig. . v, van; c, centre; r, rear: in this part of the action the dutch order was inverted, so that the actual van was the proper rear. the great number of ships engaged in the fleet actions of these anglo-dutch wars make it impossible to represent each ship and at the same time preserve clearness in the plans. each figure of a ship therefore represents a group more or less numerous. [ ] campbell: lives of the admirals. [ ] plate i., june , fig. , v, c, r. [ ] plate ii., june , fig. , e, d. [ ] fig. , v, c, r. this result was probably due simply to the greater weatherliness of the english ships. it would perhaps be more accurate to say that the dutch had sagged to leeward so that they drifted through the english line. [ ] lefèvre-pontalis. jean de witt. [ ] mémoires, pp. , , , . [ ] chabaud-arnault: revue mar. et col. . [ ] the true significance of this change has often been misunderstood, and hence erroneous inferences as to the future have been drawn. it was not a case of the new displacing the old, but of the military element in a military organization asserting its necessary and inevitable control over all other functions. [ ] chabaud-arnault: revue mar. et col. . [ ] campbell: lives of the admirals. [ ] lapeyrouse-bonfils: hist. de la marine française. [ ] campbell: lives of the admirals. [ ] martin: history of france. [ ] martin: history of france. [ ] lapeyrouse-bonfils. [ ] annual reg., vol. xxvii. p. . chapter iii. war of england and france in alliance against the united provinces, - .--finally, of france against combined europe, - .--sea battles of solebay, the texel, and stromboli. shortly before the conclusion of the peace of breda, louis xiv. made his first step toward seizing parts of the spanish netherlands and franche comté. at the same time that his armies moved forward, he sent out a state paper setting forth his claims upon the territories in question. this paper showed unmistakably the ambitious character of the young king, roused the anxiety of europe, and doubtless increased the strength of the peace party in england. under the leadership of holland, but with the hearty co-operation of the english minister, an alliance was formed between the two countries and sweden, hitherto the friend of france, to check louis' advance before his power became too great. the attack first on the netherlands in , and then on franche comté in , showed the hopeless weakness of spain to defend her possessions; they fell almost without a blow. the policy of the united provinces, relative to the claims of louis at this time, was summed up in the phrase that "france was good as a friend, but not as a neighbor." they were unwilling to break their traditional alliance, but still more unwilling to have her on their border. the policy of the english people, though not of their king, turned toward the dutch. in the increased greatness of louis they saw danger to all europe; to themselves more especially if, by a settled preponderance on the continent, his hands were free to develop his sea power. "flanders once in the power of louis xiv.," wrote the english ambassador temple, "the dutch feel that their country will be only a maritime province of france;" and sharing that opinion, "he advocated the policy of resistance to the latter country, whose domination in the low countries he considered as a threatened subjection of all europe. he never ceased to represent to his government how dangerous to england would be the conquest of the sea provinces by france, and he urgently pointed out the need of a prompt understanding with the dutch. 'this would be the best revenge,' said he, 'for the trick france has played us in involving us in the last war with the united provinces.'" these considerations brought the two countries together in that triple alliance with sweden which has been mentioned, and which for a time checked the onward movement of louis. but the wars between the two sea nations were too recent, the humiliation of england in the thames too bitter, and the rivalries that still existed too real, too deeply seated in the nature of things, to make that alliance durable. it needed the dangerous power of louis, and his persistence in a course threatening to both, to weld the union of these natural antagonists. this was not to be done without another bloody encounter. louis was deeply angered at the triple alliance, and his wrath was turned mainly upon holland, in which from the necessities of her position he recognized his most steadfast opponent. for the time, however, he seemed to yield; the more readily because of the probable approaching failure of the spanish royal line, and the ambition he had of getting more than merely the territory lying to the east of france, when the throne became vacant. but, though he dissembled and yielded, from that time he set his mind upon the destruction of the republic. this policy was directly contrary to that laid down by richelieu, and to the true welfare of france. it was to england's interest, at least just then, that the united provinces should not be trodden down by france; but it was much more to the interest of france that they should not be subjected to england. england, free from the continent, might stand alone upon the seas contending with france; but france, hampered by her continental politics, could not hope to wrest the control of the seas from england without an ally. this ally louis proposed to destroy, and he asked england to help him. the final result is already known, but the outlines of the contest must now be followed. before the royal purpose had passed into action, and while there was still time to turn the energies of france into another channel, a different course was proposed to the king. this was the project of leibnitz, before spoken of, which has special interest for our subject because, in proposing to reverse the lines which louis then laid down, to make continental expansion secondary and growth beyond the sea the primary object of france, the tendency avowedly and necessarily was to base the greatness of the country upon the control of the sea and of commerce. the immediate object offered to the france of that day, with the attainment of which, however, she could not have stopped short, was the conquest of egypt; that country which, facing both the mediterranean and eastern seas, gave control of the great commercial route which in our own day has been completed by the suez canal. that route had lost much of its value by the discovery of the way round the cape of good hope, and yet more by the unsettled and piratical conditions of the seas through which it lay; but with a really strong naval power occupying the key of the position it might have been largely restored. such a power posted in egypt would, in the already decaying condition of the ottoman empire, have controlled the trade not only of india and the far east, but also of the levant; but the enterprise could not have stopped there. the necessity of mastering the mediterranean and opening the red sea, closed to christian vessels by mohammedan bigotry, would have compelled the occupation of stations on either side of egypt; and france would have been led step by step, as england has been led by the possession of india, to the seizure of points like malta, cyprus, aden, in short, to a great sea power. that is clear now; but it will be interesting to hear the arguments by which leibnitz sought to convince the french king two hundred years ago. after pointing out the weakness of the turkish empire, and the readiness with which it might be further embarrassed by stirring up austria and poland, the latter the traditional ally of france; after showing that france had no armed enemy in the mediterranean, and that on the other side of egypt she would meet the portuguese colonies, longing to obtain protection against the dutch in india, the memorial proceeds:-- "the conquest of egypt, that holland of the east, is infinitely easier than that of the united provinces. france needs peace in the west, war at a distance. war with holland will probably ruin the new indian companies as well as the colonies and commerce lately revived by france, and will increase the burdens of the people while diminishing their resources. the dutch will retire into their maritime towns, stand there on the defensive in perfect safety, and assume the offensive on the sea with great chance of success. if france does not obtain a complete victory over them, she loses all her influence in europe, and by victory she endangers that influence. in egypt, on the contrary, a repulse, almost impossible, will be of no great consequence, and victory will give the dominion of the seas, the commerce of the east and of india, the preponderance in christendom, and even the empire of the east on the ruins of the ottoman power. the possession of egypt opens the way to conquests worthy of alexander; the extreme weakness of the orientals is no longer a secret. whoever has egypt will have all the coasts and islands of the indian ocean. it is in egypt that holland will be conquered; it is there she will be despoiled of what alone renders her prosperous, the treasures of the east. she will be struck without being able to ward off the blow. should she wish to oppose the designs of france upon egypt, she would be overwhelmed with the universal hatred of christians; attacked at home, on the contrary, not only could she ward off the aggression, but she could avenge herself sustained by universal public opinion, which suspects the views of france of ambition."[ ] the memorial had no effect. "all that the efforts of ambition and human prudence could do to lay the foundations for the destruction of a nation, louis xiv. now did. diplomatic strategy on a vast scale was displayed in order to isolate and hem in holland. louis, who had been unable to make europe accept the conquest of belgium by france, now hoped to induce it to see without trembling the fall of holland." his efforts were in the main successful. the triple alliance was broken; the king of england, though contrary to the wishes of his people, made an offensive alliance with louis; and holland, when the war began, found herself without an ally in europe, except the worn-out kingdom of spain and the elector of brandenburg, then by no means a first-class state. but in order to obtain the help of charles ii., louis not only engaged to pay him large sums of money, but also to give to england, from the spoils of holland and belgium, walcheren, sluys, and cadsand, and even the islands of goree and voorn; the control, that is, of the mouths of the great commercial rivers the scheldt and the meuse. with regard to the united fleets of the two nations, it was agreed that the officer bearing the admiral's flag of england should command in chief. the question of naval precedence was reserved, by not sending the admiral of france afloat; but it was practically yielded. it is evident that in his eagerness for the ruin of holland and his own continental aggrandizement louis was playing directly into england's hand, as to power on the sea. a french historian is justified in saying: "these negotiations have been wrongly judged. it has been often repeated that charles sold england to louis xiv. this is true only of internal policy. charles indeed plotted the political and religious subjugation of england with the help of a foreign power; but as to external interests, he did not sell them, for the greater share in the profit from the ruin of the dutch was to go to england."[ ] during the years preceding the war the dutch made every diplomatic effort to avert it, but the hatred of charles and louis prevented any concession being accepted as final. an english royal yacht was ordered to pass through the dutch ships-of-war in the channel, and to fire on them if they did not strike their flags. in january, , england sent an ultimatum, summoning holland to acknowledge the right of the english crown to the sovereignty of the british seas, and to order its fleets to lower their flags to the smallest english man-of-war; and demands such as these received the support of a french king. the dutch continued to yield, but seeing at length that all concessions were useless, they in february ordered into commission seventy-five ships-of-the-line, besides smaller vessels. on the d of march the english, without declaration of war, attacked a fleet of dutch merchantmen; and on the th the king declared war. this was followed, april th, by the declaration of louis xiv.; and on the th of the same month he set out to take command in person of his army. the war which now began, including the third and last of the great contests between the english and dutch upon the ocean, was not, like those before it, purely a sea war; and it will be necessary to mention its leading outlines on the land also, not only in order to clearness of impression, but also to bring out the desperate straits to which the republic was reduced, and the final deliverance through its sea power in the hands of the great seaman de ruyter. the naval war differs from those that preceded it in more than one respect; but its most distinctive feature is that the dutch, except on one occasion at the very beginning, did not send out their fleet to meet the enemy, but made what may properly be called a strategic use of their dangerous coast and shoals, upon which were based their sea operations. to this course they were forced by the desperate odds under which they were fighting; but they did not use their shoals as a mere shelter,--the warfare they waged was the defensive-offensive. when the wind was fair for the allies to attack, ruyter kept under cover of his islands, or at least on ground where the enemy dared not follow; but when the wind served so that he might attack in his own way, he turned and fell upon them. there are also apparent indications of tactical combinations, on his part, of a higher order than have yet been met; though it is possible that the particular acts referred to, consisting in partial attacks amounting to little more than demonstrations against the french contingent, may have sprung from political motives. this solution for the undoubted fact that the dutch attacked the french lightly has not been met with elsewhere by the writer; but it seems possible that the rulers of the united provinces may have wished not to increase the exasperation of their most dangerous enemy by humiliating his fleet, and so making it less easy to his pride to accept their offers. there is, however, an equally satisfactory military explanation in the supposition that, the french being yet inexperienced, ruyter thought it only necessary to contain them while falling in force upon the english. the latter fought throughout with their old gallantry, but less than their old discipline; whereas the attacks of the dutch were made with a sustained and unanimous vigor that showed a great military advance. the action of the french was at times suspicious; it has been alleged that louis ordered his admiral to economize his fleet, and there is good reason to believe that toward the end of the two years that england remained in his alliance he did do so. the authorities of the united provinces, knowing that the french fleet at brest was to join the english in the thames, made great exertions to fit out their squadron so as to attack the latter before the junction was made; but the wretched lack of centralization in their naval administration caused this project to fail. the province of zealand was so backward that its contingent, a large fraction of the whole, was not ready in time; and it has been charged that the delay was due, not merely to mismanagement, but to disaffection to the party in control of the government. a blow at the english fleet in its own waters, by a superior force, before its ally arrived, was a correct military conception; judging from the after-history of this war, it might well have produced a profound effect upon the whole course of the struggle. ruyter finally got to sea and fell in with the allied fleets, but though fully intending to fight, fell back before them to his own coast. the allies did not follow him there, but retired, apparently in full security, to southwold bay, on the east coast of england, some ninety miles north of the mouth of the thames. there they anchored in three divisions,--two english, the rear and centre of the allied line, to the northward, and the van, composed of french ships, to the southward. ruyter followed them, and on the early morning of june , , the dutch fleet was signalled by a french lookout frigate in the northward and eastward; standing down before a northeast wind for the allied fleet, from which a large number of boats and men were ashore in watering parties. the dutch order of battle was in two lines, the advanced one containing eighteen ships with fire-ships (plate iii., a). their total force was ninety-one ships-of-the-line; that of the allies one hundred and one. the wind was blowing toward the coast, which here trends nearly north and south, and the allies were in an awkward position. they had first to get under way, and they could not fall back to gain time or room to establish their order. most of the ships cut their cables, and the english made sail on the starboard tack, heading about north-northwest, a course which forced them soon to go about; whereas the french took the other tack (plate iii., b). the battle began therefore by the separation of the allied fleet. ruyter sent one division to attack the french, or rather to contain them; for these opponents exchanged only a distant cannonade, although the dutch, being to windward, had the choice of closer action if they wished it. as their commander, bankert, was not censured, it may be supposed he acted under orders; and he was certainly in command a year later, and acting with great judgment and gallantry at the battle of the texel. meanwhile ruyter fell furiously upon the two english divisions, and apparently with superior forces; for the english naval historians claim that the dutch were in the proportion of three to two.[ ] if this can be accepted, it gives a marked evidence of ruyter's high qualities as a general officer, in advance of any other who appears in this century. [illustration: pl. iii.] the results of the battle, considered simply as an engagement, were indecisive; both sides lost heavily, but the honors and the substantial advantages all belonged to the dutch, or rather to de ruyter. he had outgeneralled the allies by his apparent retreat, and then returning had surprised them wholly unprepared. the false move by which the english, two thirds of the whole, stood to the northward and westward, while the other third, the french, went off to the east and south, separated the allied fleet; ruyter threw his whole force into the gap, showing front to the french with a division probably smaller in numbers, but which, from its position to windward, had the choice of coming to close action or not, while with the remainder he fell in much superior strength upon the english (plate iii., b). paul hoste says[ ] that vice-admiral d'estrées, commanding the french, had taken measures for tacking and breaking through the dutch division opposed to him so as to rejoin the duke of york, the allied commander-in-chief. it may be so, for d'estrées was a very brave man, and not enough of a seaman to appreciate the dangers of the attempt; but no such move was begun, and both the english and ruyter thought that the french rather avoided than sought close action. had d'estrées, however, gone about, and attempted to break through the line of experienced dutchmen to windward of him with the still raw seamen of france, the result would have been as disastrous as that which overtook the spanish admiral at the battle of st. vincent a hundred and twenty-five years later, when he tried to reunite his broken fleet by breaking through the close order of jervis and nelson. (see plate iii., a.) the truth, which gradually dawns through a mass of conflicting statements, is, that the duke of york, though a fair seaman and a brave man, was not an able one; that his fleet was not in good order and was thus surprised; that his orders beforehand were not so precise as to make the french admiral technically disobedient in taking the opposite tack from the commander-in-chief, and so separating the squadrons; and that ruyter profited most ably by the surprise which he had himself prepared, and by the further opportunity given him by the ineptness of his enemies. unless for circumstances that are not stated, the french admiral took the right tack, with a northeast wind, for it led out to sea and would give room for manoeuvring; had the duke of york chosen the same, the allied fleet would have gone out together, with only the disadvantage of the wind and bad order. in that case, however, ruyter could, and probably would, have done just what he did at the texel a year later,--check the van, the french, with a small containing force, and fall with the mass of his fleet upon the centre and rear. it is the similarity of his action in both cases, under very different conditions, that proves he intended at southwold bay merely to keep the french in check while he destroyed the english. in this battle, called indifferently southwold bay and solebay, ruyter showed a degree of skill combined with vigor which did not appear upon the sea, after his death, until the days of suffren and nelson. his battles of the war of were no "affairs of circumspection," though they were fought circumspectly; his aim was no less than the enemy's total overthrow, by joining good combinations to fury of attack. at solebay he was somewhat, though not greatly, inferior to his enemies; afterward much more so. the substantial results of solebay fight were wholly favorable to the dutch. the allied fleets were to have assisted the operations of the french army by making a descent upon the coast of zealand. ruyter's attack had inflicted an amount of damage, and caused an expenditure of ammunition, which postponed the sailing of the fleet for a month; it was a diversion, not only important, but vital in the nearly desperate condition to which the united provinces were reduced ashore. it may be added, as an instructive comment on the theory of commerce-destroying, that after this staggering check to the enemy's superior forces, ruyter met and convoyed safely to port a fleet of dutch merchantmen. the progress of the land campaign must now be briefly described.[ ] early in may the french army in several corps moved forward, passing through the outskirts of the spanish netherlands, and directing their attack upon holland from the south and east. the republican party which was in power in holland had neglected the army, and now made the mistake of scattering the force they had among many fortified towns, trusting that each would do something toward delaying the french. louis, however, under the advice of turenne, simply observed the more important places, while the second-rate towns surrendered nearly as fast as they were summoned; the army of the provinces, as well as their territory, thus passing rapidly, by fractions, into the power of the enemy. within a month the french were in the heart of the country, having carried all before them, and with no organized force remaining in their front sufficient of itself to stop them. in the fortnight following the battle of solebay, terror and disorganization spread throughout the republic. on the th of june the grand pensionary obtained permission of the states-general to send a deputation to louis xiv., begging him to name the terms on which he would grant them peace; any humiliation to the foreigner was better in the eyes of the politician than to see the opposite party, the house of orange, come into power on his downfall. while negotiations were pending, the dutch towns continued to surrender; and on the th of june a few french soldiers entered muyden, the key to amsterdam. they were only stragglers, though the large body to which they belonged was near at hand; and the burghers, who had admitted them under the influence of the panic prevailing throughout the land, seeing that they were alone, soon made them drunk and put them out. the nobler feeling that animated amsterdam now made itself felt in muyden; a body of troops hurried up from the capital, and the smaller city was saved. "situated on the zuyder zee, two hours distant from amsterdam, at the junction of a number of rivers and canals, muyden not only held the key of the principal dykes by which amsterdam could surround herself with a protecting inundation, it also held the key of the harbor of this great city, all the ships which went from the north sea to amsterdam by the zuyder zee being obliged to pass under its guns. muyden saved and its dykes open, amsterdam had time to breathe, and remained free to break off her communications by land and to maintain them by sea."[ ] it was the turning-point of the invasion; but what would have been the effect upon the spirit of the dutch, oppressed by defeat and distracted in council, if in that fateful fortnight which went before, the allied fleet had attacked their coasts? from this they were saved by the battle of solebay. negotiations continued. the burgomasters--the party representing wealth and commerce--favored submission; they shrank from the destruction of their property and trade. new advances were made; but while the envoys were still in the camp of louis, the populace and the orange party rose, and with them the spirit of resistance. on the th of june amsterdam opened the dykes, and her example was followed by the other cities of holland; immense loss was entailed, but the flooded country and the cities contained therein, standing like islands amid the waters, were safe from attack by land forces until freezing weather. the revolution continued. william of orange, afterward william iii. of england, was on the th of july made stadtholder, and head of the army and navy; and the two de witts, the heads of the republican party, were murdered by a mob a few weeks later. the resistance born of popular enthusiasm and pride of country was strengthened by the excessive demands of louis xiv. it was plain that the provinces must conquer or be destroyed. meanwhile the other states of europe were waking up to the danger, and the emperor of germany, the elector of brandenburg, and the king of spain declared for holland; while sweden, though nominally in alliance with france, was unwilling to see the destruction of the provinces, because that would be to the advantage of england's sea power. nevertheless the next year, , opened with promise for france, and the english king was prepared to fulfil his part of the compact on the seas; but the dutch, under the firm leadership of william of orange, and with their hold on the sea unshaken, now refused to accept conditions of peace which had been offered by themselves the year before. three naval battles were fought in , all near the coast of the united provinces; the first two, june and june , off schoneveldt, from which place they have taken their name; the third, known as the battle of the texel, august . in all three ruyter attacked, choosing his own time, and retiring when it suited him to the protection of his own shores. for the allies to carry out their objects and make any diversion upon the seaboard, or on the other hand to cripple the sea resources of the hard-pressed provinces, it was necessary first to deal successfully with ruyter's fleet. the great admiral and his government both felt this, and took the resolution that "the fleet should be posted in the passage of schoneveldt, or a little farther south toward ostend, to observe the enemy, and if attacked, or seeing the enemy's fleet disposed to make a descent upon the shores of the united provinces, should resist vigorously, by opposing his designs and destroying his ships."[ ] from this position, with good lookouts, any movement of the allies would be known. the english and french put to sea about the st of june, under the command of prince rupert, first cousin to the king, the duke of york having been obliged to resign his office on account of the passage of the test act, directed against persons of the roman catholic faith holding any public employment. the french were under vice-admiral d'estrées, the same who had commanded them at solebay. a force of six thousand english troops at yarmouth was ready to embark if de ruyter was worsted. on the th of june the dutch were made out, riding within the sands at schoneveldt. a detached squadron was sent to draw them out, but ruyter needed no invitation; the wind served, and he followed the detached squadron with such impetuosity as to attack before the allied line was fairly formed. on this occasion the french occupied the centre. the affair was indecisive, if a battle can be called so in which an inferior force attacks a superior, inflicts an equal loss, and frustrates the main object of the enemy. a week later ruyter again attacked, with results which, though indecisive as before as to the particular action, forced the allied fleet to return to the english coast to refit, and for supplies. the dutch in these encounters had fifty-five ships-of-the-line; their enemies eighty-one, fifty-four of which were english. the allied fleets did not go to sea again until the latter part of july, and this time they carried with them a body of troops meant for a landing. on the th of august the dutch fleet was seen under way between the texel and the meuse. rupert at once got ready to fight; but as the wind was from the northward and westward, giving the allies the weather-gage, and with it the choice of the method of attack, ruyter availed himself of his local knowledge, keeping so close to the beach that the enemy dared not approach,--the more so as it was late in the day. during the night the wind shifted to east-southeast off the land, and at daybreak, to use the words of a french official narrative, the dutch "made all sail and stood down boldly into action." the allied fleet was to leeward on the port tack, heading about south,--the french in the van, rupert in the centre, and sir edward spragge commanding the rear. de ruyter divided his fleet into three squadrons, the leading one of which, of ten or twelve ships only, he sent against the french; while with the rest of his force he attacked the english in the centre and rear (plate iv., a, a', a''). if we accept the english estimate of the forces, which gives the english sixty ships, the french thirty, and the dutch seventy, ruyter's plan of attack, by simply holding the french in check as at solebay, allowed him to engage the english on equal terms. the battle took on several distinct phases, which it is instructive to follow. m. de martel, commanding the van of the french, and consequently the leading subdivision of the allied fleet, was ordered to stretch ahead, go about and gain to windward of the dutch van, so as to place it between two fires. this he did (b); but as soon as bankert--the same who had manoeuvred so judiciously at solebay the year before--saw the danger, he put his helm up and ran through the remaining twenty ships of d'estrées' squadron with his own twelve (c),--a feat as creditable to him as it was discreditable to the french; and then wearing round stood down to de ruyter, who was hotly engaged with rupert (c'). he was not followed by d'estrées, who suffered him to carry this important reinforcement to the dutch main attack undisturbed. this practically ended the french share in the fight. [illustration: pl. iv. texel. aug. , .] rupert, during his action with de ruyter, kept off continually, with the object of drawing the dutch farther away from their coast, so that if the wind shifted they might not be able to regain its shelter. de ruyter followed him, and the consequent separation of the centre from the van (b, b') was one of the reasons alleged by d'estrées for his delay. it does not, however, seem to have prevented bankert from joining his chief. in the rear an extraordinary action on the part of sir edward spragge increased the confusion in the allied fleet. for some reason this officer considered tromp, who commanded the dutch rear, as his personal antagonist, and in order to facilitate the latter's getting into action, he hove-to (stopped) the whole english rear to wait for him. this ill-timed point of honor on spragge's part seems to have sprung from a promise he had made to the king that he would bring back tromp alive or dead, or else lose his own life. the stoppage, which recalls the irresponsible and insubordinate action of the junior dutch flag-officers in the former war, of course separated the rear (a'', b'', c''), which also drifted rapidly to leeward, spragge and tromp carrying on a hot private action on their own account. these two junior admirals sought each other personally, and the battle between their flags was so severe that spragge twice had to shift his own to another ship; on the second occasion the boat in which he was embarked was sunk by a shot, and he himself drowned. rupert, thus forsaken by his van and rear, found himself alone with ruyter (b'); who, reinforced by his van, had the address further to cut off the rear subdivision of the allied centre, and to surround the remaining twenty ships with probably thirty or forty of his own (c'). it is not creditable to the gunnery of the day that more substantial results did not follow; but it is to be remembered that all ruyter's skill could secure, except for probably a very short time, was an action on equal terms with the english; his total inferiority in numbers could not be quite overcome. the damage to the english and dutch may therefore have been great, and was probably nearly equal. rupert finally disengaged himself, and seeing that the english rear (c'') was not replying well to its immediate opponents, ran down toward it, ruyter following him; the two opposing centres steering parallel courses, and within cannon-shot, but by mutual consent, induced perhaps by ammunition running short, refraining from firing. at four p.m. the centres and rears united, and toward five a fresh engagement began, which continued till seven, when ruyter withdrew, probably because of the approach of the french, who, by their own accounts, rejoined rupert about that time. this ended the battle, which, like all that preceded it in this war, may be called a drawn fight, but as to which the verdict of the english naval historian is doubtless correct: "the consequences which the dutch, through the prudence of their admiral, drew from this battle were exceedingly great; for they opened their ports, which were entirely blocked up, and put an end to all thoughts, by removing the possibility, of an invasion."[ ] the military features of the action have sufficiently appeared in the account that has been given,--the skill of de ruyter; the firmness and promptness of bankert, first in checking and then in passing through the french division; the apparent disloyalty or, at the best, inefficiency of the latter; the insubordination and military blundering of spragge; the seeming lack of everything but hard fighting on rupert's part. the allies indulged in bitter mutual recriminations. rupert blamed both d'estrées and spragge; d'estrées found fault with rupert for running to leeward; and d'estrées' own second, martel, roundly called his chief a coward, in a letter which earned him an imprisonment in the bastille. the french king ordered an inquiry by the intendant of the navy at brest, who made a report[ ] upon which the account here given has mainly rested, and which leaves little doubt of the dishonor of the french arms in this battle. "m. d'estrées gave it to be understood," says the french naval historian, "that the king wished his fleet spared, and that the english should not be trusted. was he wrong in not relying upon the sincerity of the english alliance, when he was receiving from all quarters warnings that the people and the nobles were murmuring against it, and charles ii. was perhaps alone in his kingdom in wishing it?"[ ] possibly not; but he was surely wrong if he wished any military man, or body of men, to play the equivocal part assigned to the french admiral on this day; the loss of the fleet would have been a lighter disaster. so evident to eye-witnesses was the bad faith or cowardice (and the latter supposition is not admissible), that one of the dutch seamen, as they discussed among themselves why the french did not come down, said: "you fools! they have hired the english to fight for them, and all their business here is to see that they earn their wages." a more sober-minded and significant utterance is that with which the intendant at brest ends the official report before mentioned: "it would appear in all these sea-fights ruyter has never cared to attack the french squadron, and that in this last action he had detached ten ships of the zealand squadron to keep it in play."[ ] no stronger testimony is needed to ruyter's opinion of the inefficiency or faithlessness of that contingent to the allied forces. another chapter in the history of maritime coalitions was closed, on the st of august, , by the battle of the texel. in it, as in others, were amply justified the words with which a modern french naval officer has stamped them: "united by momentary political interests, but at bottom divided to the verge of hatred, never following the same path in counsel or in action, they have never produced good results, or at least results proportioned to the efforts of the powers allied against a common enemy. the navies of france, spain, and holland seem, at several distinct times, to have joined only to make more complete the triumph of the british arms."[ ] when to this well-ascertained tendency of coalitions is added the equally well known jealousy of every country over the increasing power of a neighbor, and the consequent unwillingness to see such increase obtained by crushing another member of the family of nations, an approach is made to the measure of naval strength required by a state. it is not necessary to be able to meet all others combined, as some englishmen have seemed to think; it is necessary only to be able to meet the strongest on favorable terms, sure that the others will not join in destroying a factor in the political equilibrium, even if they hold aloof. england and spain were allies in toulon in , when the excesses of revolutionary france seemed to threaten the social order of europe; but the spanish admiral told the english flatly that the ruin of the french navy, a large part of which was there in their hands, could not fail to be injurious to the interests of spain, and a part of the french ships was saved by his conduct, which has been justly characterized as not only full of firmness, but also as dictated by the highest political reason.[ ] the battle of the texel, closing the long series of wars in which the dutch and english contended on equal terms for the mastery of the seas, saw the dutch navy in its highest efficiency, and its greatest ornament, de ruyter, at the summit of his glory. long since old in years, for he was now sixty-six, he had lost none of his martial vigor; his attack was as furious as eight years before, and his judgment apparently had ripened rapidly through the experience of the last war, for there is far more evidence of plan and military insight than before. to him, under the government of the great pensionary de witt, with whom he was in close sympathy, the increase of discipline and sound military tone now apparent in the dutch navy must have been largely due. he went to this final strife of the two great sea-peoples in the fulness of his own genius, with an admirably tempered instrument in his hands, and with the glorious disadvantage of numbers, to save his country. the mission was fulfilled not by courage alone, but by courage, forethought, and skill. the attack at the texel was, in its general lines, the same as that at trafalgar, the enemy's van being neglected to fall on the centre and rear, and as at trafalgar the van, by failing to do its duty, more than justified the conception; but as the odds against de ruyter were greater than those against nelson, so was his success less. the part played by bankert at solebay was essentially the same as that of nelson at st. vincent, when he threw himself across the path of the spanish division with his single ship (see plate iii., c, c'); but nelson took his course without orders from jervis, while bankert was carrying out ruyter's plan. once more, still himself in his bearing, but under sadly altered surroundings, will this simple and heroic man come before us; and here, in contrast with his glory, seems a proper place to insert a little description by the comte de guiche[ ] of his bearing in the four days' fight, which brings out at once the homely and the heroic sides of his character. "i never saw him [during those last three days] other than even-tempered; and when victory was assured, saying always it was the good god that gives it to us. amid the disorders of the fleet and the appearance of loss, he seemed to be moved only by the misfortune to his country, but always submissive to the will of god. finally, it may be said that he has something of the frankness and lack of polish of our patriarchs; and, to conclude what i have to say of him, i will relate that the day after the victory i found him sweeping his own room and feeding his chickens." nine days after the battle of the texel, on the th of august, , a formal alliance was made between holland on the one hand, and spain, lorraine, and the emperor of germany on the other, and the french ambassador was dismissed from vienna. louis almost immediately offered holland comparatively moderate terms; but the united provinces, with their new allies by their sides and with their backs borne firmly upon the sea which had favored and supported them, set their face steadily against him. in england the clamor of the people and parliament became louder; the protestant feeling and the old enmity to france were daily growing, as was the national distrust of the king. charles, though he had himself lost none of his hatred of the republic, had to give way. louis, seeing the gathering storm, made up his mind, by the counsel of turenne, to withdraw from his dangerously advanced position by evacuating holland, and to try to make peace with the provinces separately while continuing the war with the house of austria in spain and germany. thus he returned to richelieu's policy, and holland was saved. february , , peace was signed between england and the provinces. the latter recognized the absolute supremacy of the english flag from cape finisterre in spain to norway, and paid a war indemnity. the withdrawal of england, which remained neutral during the remaining four years of the war, necessarily made it less maritime. the king of france did not think his navy, either in numbers or efficiency, able to contend alone with that of holland; he therefore withdrew it from the ocean and confined his sea enterprises to the mediterranean, with one or two half-privateering expeditions to the west indies. the united provinces for their part, being freed from danger on the side of the sea, and not having, except for a short time, any serious idea of operating against the french coast, diminished their own fleets. the war became more and more continental, and drew in more and more the other powers of europe. gradually the german states cast their lot with austria, and on may , , the diet proclaimed war against france. the great work of french policy in the last generations was undone, austria had resumed her supremacy in germany, and holland had not been destroyed. on the baltic, denmark, seeing sweden inclining toward france, hastened to make common cause with the german empire, sending fifteen thousand troops. there remained in germany only bavaria, hanover, and wurtemberg faithful still to their french alliance. the land war had thus drawn in nearly all the powers of europe, and, from the nature of the case, the principal theatre of the conflict was beyond the eastern boundary of france, toward the rhine, and in the spanish netherlands; but while this was raging, a maritime episode was introduced by the fact of denmark and sweden being engaged on opposite sides. of this it will not be necessary to speak, beyond mentioning that the dutch sent a squadron under tromp to join the danes, and that the united fleets won a great victory over the swedes in , taking from them ten ships. it is therefore evident that the sea superiority of holland detracted greatly from sweden's value as an ally to louis xiv. another maritime strife arose in the mediterranean by the revolt of the sicilians against the spanish rule.[ ] the help they asked from france was granted as a diversion against spain, but the sicilian enterprise never became more than a side issue. its naval interest springs from bringing ruyter once more on the scene, and that as the antagonist of duquesne, the equal, and by some thought even the superior, of tourville, whose name has always stood far above all others in the french navy of that day. messina revolted in july, , and the french king at once took it under his protection. the spanish navy throughout seems to have behaved badly, certainly inefficiently; and early in the french were safely established in the city. during the year their naval power in the mediterranean was much increased, and spain, unable to defend the island herself, applied to the united provinces for a fleet, the expenses of which she would bear. the provinces, "fatigued by the war, involved in debt, suffering cruelly in their commerce, exhausted by the necessity of paying the emperor and all the german princes, could no longer fit out the enormous fleets which they had once opposed to france and england." they however hearkened to spain and sent de ruyter, with a squadron of only eighteen ships and four fire-ships. the admiral, who had noted the growth of the french navy, said the force was too small, and departed oppressed in spirit, but with the calm resignation which was habitual to him. he reached cadiz in september, and in the mean time the french had further strengthened themselves by the capture of agosta, a port commanding the southeast of sicily. de ruyter was again delayed by the spanish government, and did not reach the north coast of the island until the end of december, when head winds kept him from entering the straits of messina. he cruised between messina and the lipari islands in a position to intercept the french fleet convoying troops and supplies, which was expected under duquesne. on the th of january, , the french came in sight, twenty ships-of-the-line and six fire-ships; the dutch had but nineteen ships, one of which was a spaniard, and four fire-ships; and it must be remembered that, although there is no detailed account of the dutch ships in this action, they were as a rule inferior to those of england, and yet more to those of france. the first day was spent in manoeuvring, the dutch having the weather-gage; but during that night, which was squally and drove the spanish galleys accompanying the dutch to take refuge under lipari, the wind shifted, and coming out at west-southwest, gave the french the weather-gage and the power to attack. duquesne resolved to use it, and sending the convoy ahead, formed his line on the starboard tack standing south; the dutch did the same, and waited for him (plate v., a, a, a). [illustration: pl. v. stromboli jan. , . pl. va. pocock and d'achÉ .] an emotion of surprise must be felt at seeing the great dutch admiral surrender the choice of attack on the th. at daybreak of that day he saw the enemy and steered for him; at three p.m., a french account says, he hauled his wind on the same tack as themselves, but out of cannon-shot to windward. how account for the seeming reluctance of the man who three years before had made the desperate attacks of solebay and the texel? his reasons have not been handed down; it may be that the defensive advantages of the lee-gage had been recognized by this thoughtful seaman, especially when preparing to meet, with inferior forces, an enemy of impetuous gallantry and imperfect seamanship. if any such ideas did influence him they were justified by the result. the battle of stromboli presents a partial anticipation of the tactics of the french and english a hundred years later; but in this case it is the french who seek the weather-gage and attack with fury, while the dutch take the defensive. the results were very much such as clerk pointed out to the english in his celebrated work on naval tactics, the accounts here followed being entirely french.[ ] the two fleets being drawn up in line-of-battle on the starboard tack, heading south, as has been said, de ruyter awaited the attack which he had refused to make. being between the french and their port, he felt they must fight. at nine a.m. the french line kept away all together and ran down obliquely upon the dutch, a manoeuvre difficult to be performed with accuracy, and during which the assailant receives his enemy's fire at disadvantage (a', a'', a'''). in doing this, two ships in the french van were seriously disabled. "m. de la fayette, in the 'prudente,' began the action; but having rashly thrown himself into the midst of the enemy's van, he was dismantled and forced to haul off" (a). confusion ensued in the french line, from the difficult character of the manoeuvre. "vice-admiral de preuilli, commanding the van, in keeping away took too little room, so that in coming to the wind again, the ships, in too close order, lapped and interfered with one another's fire [a']. the absence of m. de la fayette from the line threw the 'parfait' into peril. attacked by two ships, she lost her maintopmast and had also to haul off for repairs." again, the french came into action in succession instead of all together, a usual and almost inevitable result of the manoeuvre in question. "in the _midst_ of a terrible cannonade," that is, after part of his ships were engaged, "duquesne, commanding the centre, took post on the beam of ruyter's division." the french rear came into action still later, after the centre (a'', a'''). "langeron and bethune, commanding leading ships of the french centre, are crushed by superior forces." how can this be, seeing the french had the more ships? it was because, as the narrative tells us, "the french had not yet repaired the disorder of the first movement." however, all at last got into action (b, b, b), and duquesne gradually restored order. the dutch, engaged all along the line, resisted everywhere, and there was not one of their ships which was not closely engaged; more cannot be said for the admiral and captains of the inferior fleet. the remaining part of the fight is not very clearly related. ruyter is said to have given way continually with his two leading divisions; but whether this was a confession of weakness or a tactical move does not appear. the rear was separated (c'), in permitting which either ruyter or the immediate commander was at fault; but the attempts made by the french to surround and isolate it failed, probably because of damaged spars, for one french ship did pass entirely around the separated division. the action ended at . p.m., except in the rear, and the spanish galleys shortly after came up and towed the disabled dutch ships away. their escape shows how injured the french must have been. the positions, c, c', are intended to show the dutch rear far separated, and the disorder in which a fleet action under sail necessarily ended from loss of spars. those who are familiar with clerk's work on naval tactics, published about , will recognize in this account of the battle of stromboli all the features to which he called the attention of english seamen in his thesis on the methods of action employed by them and their adversaries in and before his time. clerk's thesis started from the postulate that english seamen and officers were superior in skill or spirit, or both, to the french, and their ships on the whole as fast; that they were conscious of this superiority and therefore eager to attack, while the french, equally conscious of inferiority, or for other reasons, were averse to decisive engagements. with these dispositions the latter, feeling they could rely on a blindly furious attack by the english, had evolved a crafty plan by which, while seeming to fight, they really avoided doing so, and at the same time did the enemy much harm. this plan was to take the lee-gage, the characteristic of which, as has before been pointed out, is that it is a defensive position, and to await attack. the english error, according to clerk, upon which the french had learned by experience that they could always count, was in drawing up their line parallel to the enemy, or nearly so, and then keeping away all together to attack, ship for ship, each its opposite in the hostile line. by standing down in this manner the assailant lost the use of most of his artillery, while exposed to the full fire of his opponent, and invariably came up in confusion, because the order of attack was one difficult to maintain at any time, and much more so in the smoke under fire, with torn sails and falling masts. this was precisely the attack made by duquesne at stromboli, and it there had precisely the consequences clerk points out,--confusion in the line, the van arriving first and getting the brunt of the fire of the defence, disabled ships in the van causing confusion in the rear, etc. clerk further asserts, and he seems to be right, that as the action grew warm, the french, by running off to leeward, in their turn, led the english to repeat the same mode of attack;[ ] and so we find, at stromboli, ruyter giving ground in the same way, though his motive does not appear. clerk also points out that a necessary corollary of the lee-gage, assumed for tactical reasons, is to aim at the assailant's spars, his motive power, so that his attack cannot be pushed farther than the defendant chooses, and at stromboli the crippled condition of the french is evident; for after ruyter had fallen to leeward, and could no longer help his separated rear, it was practically unmolested by the french, although none of these had been sunk. while therefore there cannot with certainty be attributed to ruyter the deliberate choice of the lee-gage, for which there was as yet no precedent, it is evident that he reaped all its benefits, and that the character of the french officers of his day, inexperienced as seamen and of impetuous valor, offered just the conditions that gave most advantage to an inferior force standing on the defensive. the qualities and characteristics of the enemy are among the principal factors which a man of genius considers, and it was to this as much as to any other one trait that nelson owed his dazzling successes. on the other hand, the french admiral attacked in a wholly unscientific manner, ship against ship, without an attempt to concentrate on a part of the enemy, or even trying to keep him in play until the french squadron of eight ships-of-the-line in messina, near by, could join. such tactics cannot be named beside that of solebay or the texel; but as duquesne was the best french officer of the century, with the possible exception of tourville, this battle has a value of its own in the history of tactics, and may by no means be omitted. the standing of the commander-in-chief is the warrant that it marks the highest point to which french naval tactics has as yet attained. before quitting this discussion, it may be noted that the remedy clerk proposed was to attack the rear ships of the enemy's line, and preferably to leeward; the remainder of the fleet must then either abandon them or stand down for a general action, which according to his postulate was all that the english seamen desired. after the fight de ruyter sailed to palermo, one of his ships sinking on the way. duquesne was joined outside messina by the french division that had been lying there. the remaining incidents of the sicilian war are unimportant to the general subject. on the d of april, de ruyter and duquesne met again off agosta. duquesne had twenty-nine ships, the allied spaniards and dutch twenty-seven, of which ten were spanish. unfortunately the spaniard commanded in chief, and took the centre of the line with the ships of his country, contrary to the advice of ruyter, who, knowing how inefficient his allies were, wished to scatter them through the line and so support them better. ruyter himself took the van, and the allies, having the wind, attacked; but the spanish centre kept at long cannon range, leaving the brunt of the battle to fall on the dutch van. the rear, following the commander-in-chief's motions, was also but slightly engaged. in this sorrowful yet still glorious fulfilment of hopeless duty, de ruyter, who never before in his long career had been struck by an enemy's shot, received a mortal wound. he died a week later at syracuse, and with him passed away the last hope of resistance on the sea. a month later the spanish and dutch fleets were attacked at anchor at palermo, and many of them destroyed; while a division sent from holland to reinforce the mediterranean fleet was met by a french squadron in the straits of gibraltar and forced to take refuge in cadiz. the sicilian enterprise continued to be only a diversion, and the slight importance attached to it shows clearly how entirely louis xiv. was bent on the continental war. how differently would the value of sicily have impressed him, had his eyes been fixed on egypt and extension by sea. as the years passed, the temper of the english people became more and more excited against france; the trade rivalries with holland seemed to fall into the shade, and it became likely that england, which had entered the war as the ally of louis, would, before it closed, take up arms against him. in addition to other causes of jealousy she saw the french navy increased to a number superior to her own. charles for a while resisted the pressure of parliament, but in january, , a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was made between the two sea countries; the king recalled the english troops which until now had been serving as part of the french army, and when parliament opened again in february, asked for money to equip ninety ships and thirty thousand soldiers. louis, who was expecting this result, at once ordered the evacuation of sicily. he did not fear england by land, but on the sea he could not yet hold his own against the union of the two sea powers. at the same time he redoubled his attacks on the spanish netherlands. as long as there was a hope of keeping the ships of england out of the fight, he had avoided touching the susceptibilities of the english people on the subject of the belgian sea-coast; but now that they could no longer be conciliated, he thought best to terrify holland by the sharpness of his attack in the quarter where she dreaded him most. the united provinces were in truth the mainspring of the coalition. though among the smallest in extent of the countries arrayed against louis, they were strongest in the character and purpose of their ruler, the prince of orange, and in the wealth which, while supporting the armies of the confederates, also kept the poor and greedy german princes faithful to their alliance. almost alone, by dint of mighty sea power, by commercial and maritime ability, they bore the burden of the war; and though they staggered and complained, they still bore it. as in later centuries england, so at the time we are now speaking of holland, the great sea power, supported the war against the ambition of france; but her sufferings were great. her commerce, preyed upon by french privateers, lost heavily; and there was added an immense indirect loss in the transfer of the carrying-trade between foreign countries, which had contributed so much to the prosperity of the dutch. when the flag of england became neutral, this rich business went to her ships, which crossed the seas the more securely because of the eager desire of louis to conciliate the english nation. this desire led him also to make very large concessions to english exigencies in the matter of commercial treaties, undoing much of the work of protection upon which colbert sought to nourish the yet feeble growth of french sea power. these sops, however, only stayed for a moment the passions which were driving england; it was not self-interest, but stronger motives, which impelled her to a break with france. still less was it to the interest of holland to prolong the war, after louis showed a wish for peace. a continental war could at best be but a necessary evil, and source of weakness to her. the money she spent on her own and the allied armies was lost to her navy, and the sources of her prosperity on the sea were being exhausted. how far the prince of orange was justified, by the aims of louis xiv., in that unyielding attitude of opposition toward him which he always maintained, may be uncertain, and there is here no need to decide the question; but there can be no doubt that the strife sacrificed the sea power of holland through sheer exhaustion, and with it destroyed her position among the nations of the world. "situated between france and england," says a historian of holland, "by one or other of them were the united provinces, after they had achieved their independence of spain, constantly engaged in wars, which exhausted their finances, annihilated their navy, and caused the rapid decline of their trade, manufactures, and commerce; and thus a peace-loving nation found herself crushed by the weight of unprovoked and long-continued hostilities. often, too, the friendship of england was scarcely less harmful to holland than her enmity. as one increased and the other lessened, it became the alliance of the giant and the dwarf."[ ] hitherto we have seen holland the open enemy or hearty rival of england; henceforward she appears as an ally,--in both cases a sufferer from her smaller size, weaker numbers, and less favored situation. the exhaustion of the united provinces and the clamor of their merchants and peace party on the one hand, aided on the other by the sufferings of france, the embarrassment of her finances, and the threatened addition of england's navy to her already numerous enemies, inclined to peace the two principal parties to this long war. louis had long been willing to make peace with holland alone; but the states had been withheld, at first by fidelity to those who had joined them in their hour of trouble, and latterly by the firm purpose of william of orange. difficulties were gradually smoothed away, and the peace of nimeguen between the united provinces and france was signed august , . the other powers shortly afterward acceded to it. the principal sufferer, as was natural, was the overgrown but feeble monarchy whose centre was spain, which gave up to france franche comté and a number of fortified towns in the spanish netherlands, thus extending the boundaries of france to the east and northeast. holland, for whose destruction louis began the war, lost not a foot of ground in europe; and beyond the seas only her colonies on the west coast of africa and in guiana. she owed her safety at first, and the final successful issue, to her sea power. that delivered her in the hour of extreme danger, and enabled her afterward to keep alive the general war. it may be said to have been one of the chief factors, and inferior to no other one singly, in determining the event of the great war which was formally closed at nimeguen. the effort none the less sapped her strength, and being followed by many years of similar strain broke her down. but what was the effect upon the vastly greater state, the extreme ambition of whose king was the principal cause of the exhausting wars of this time? among the many activities which illustrated the brilliant opening of the reign of the then youthful king of france, none was so important, none so intelligently directed, as those of colbert, who aimed first at restoring the finances from the confusion into which they had fallen, and then at establishing them upon a firm foundation of national wealth. this wealth, at that time utterly beneath the possibilities of france, was to be developed on the lines of production encouraged, trade stimulated to healthful activity, a large merchant shipping, a great navy, and colonial extension. some of these are sources, others the actual constituents, of sea power; which indeed may be said in a seaboard nation to be the invariable accompaniment, if it be not the chief source, of its strength. for nearly twelve years all went well; the development of the greatness of france in all these directions went forward rapidly, if not in all with equal strides, and the king's revenues increased by bounds. then came the hour in which he had to decide whether the exertions which his ambition naturally, perhaps properly, prompted should take the direction which, while imposing great efforts, did nothing to sustain but rather hindered the natural activities of his people, and broke down commerce by making control of the sea uncertain; or whether he should launch out in pursuits which, while involving expense, would keep peace on his borders, lead to the control of the sea, and by the impulse given to trade, and all upon which trade depends, would bring in money nearly if not quite equal to that which the state spent. this is not a fanciful picture; by his attitude toward holland, and its consequences, louis gave the first impulse to england upon the path which realized to her, within his own day, the results which colbert and leibnitz had hoped for france. he drove the dutch carrying-trade into the ships of england; allowed her to settle peacefully pennsylvania and carolina, and to seize new york and new jersey; and he sacrificed, to gain her neutrality, the growing commerce of france. not all at once, but very rapidly, england pressed into the front place as a sea power; and however great her sufferings and the sufferings of individual englishmen, it remained true of her that even in war her prosperity was great. doubtless france could not forget her continental position, nor wholly keep free from continental wars; but it may be believed that if she had chosen the path of sea power, she might both have escaped many conflicts and borne those that were unavoidable with greater ease. at the peace of nimeguen the injuries were not irreparable, but "the agricultural classes, commerce, manufactures, and the colonies had alike been smitten by the war; and the conditions of peace, so advantageous to the territorial and military power of france, were much less so to manufactures, the protective tariffs having been lowered in favor of england and holland,"[ ] the two sea powers. the merchant shipping was stricken, and the splendid growth of the royal navy, that excited the jealousy of england, was like a tree without roots; it soon withered away under the blast of war. before finally quitting this war with holland, a short notice of the comte d'estrées, to whom louis committed the charge of the french contingent of the allied fleet, and who commanded it at solebay and the texel, will throw some light upon the qualifications of the french naval officers of the day before experience had made seamen of many of them. d'estrées went to sea for the first time in , being then a man of mature years; but in we find him in the chief command of an important squadron, having under him duquesne, who was a seaman, and had been so for nearly forty years. in , d'estrées obtained from the king a body of eight ships which he undertook to maintain at his own expense, upon the condition of receiving half the prizes made. with this squadron he made an attack upon the then dutch island of tobago, with a recklessness which showed that no lack of courage prompted his equivocal conduct at the texel. the next year he went out again and contrived to run the whole squadron ashore on the aves islands. the account given by the flag-captain of this transaction is amusing as well as instructive. in his report he says:-- "the day that the squadron was lost, the sun having been taken by the pilots, the vice-admiral as usual had them put down the position in his cabin. as i was entering to learn what was going on, i met the third pilot, bourdaloue, who was going out crying. i asked him what the matter was, and he answered: 'because i find more drift than the other pilots, the admiral is threatening me and abusing me, as usual; yet i am only a poor lad who does the best he can.' when i had entered the cabin, the admiral, who was very angry, said to me, 'that scoundrel of a bourdaloue is always coming to me with some nonsense or other; i will drive him out of the ship. he makes us to be running a course, the devil knows where, i don't.' as i did not know which was right," says the captain of the ship, rather naïvely, "i did not dare to say anything for fear of bringing down a like storm on my own head."[ ] some hours after this scene, which, as the french officer from whom the extract is taken says, "appears now almost grotesque, but which is only an exact portrayal of the sea manners of the day, the whole squadron was lost on a group of rocks known as the aves islands. such were the officers." the flag-captain, in another part of his report, says: "the shipwreck resulted from the general line of conduct held by vice-admiral d'estrées. it was always the opinion of his servants, or others than the proper officers of the ship, which prevailed. this manner of acting may be understood in the comte d'estrées, who, without the necessary knowledge of a profession he had embraced so late, always had with him obscure counsellors, in order to appropriate the opinions they gave him so as to blind the ship's company as to his capacity."[ ] d'estrées had been made vice-admiral two years after he first went aboard ship. footnotes: [ ] martin: history of france. [ ] martin: history of france. [ ] ledyard, vol ii. p. ; campbell: lives of the admirals. see also letter of sir richard haddock, naval chronicle, vol. xvii. p. . [ ] hoste: naval tactics. [ ] see map, p. . [ ] martin: history of france. [ ] brandt: life of de ruyter. [ ] campbell: lives of the admirals. [ ] troude: batailles navales de la france, year . [ ] ibid. [ ] troude: batailles navales de la france, year . [ ] chabaud-arnault: revue mar. et col. july, . [ ] jurien de la gravière: guerres maritimes. [ ] mémoires. [ ] see map of mediterranean, p. . [ ] lapeyrouse-bonfils: hist. de la marine française. [ ] this movement, according to clerk, was not made by the whole of a french line together, but in a way much more scientific and military. a group of two or three ships withdrew at a time, being covered by the smoke and the continued fire of the rest of their line. in time a second line was partly formed, which in its turn protected the ships which had remained on the first, as they executed the somewhat exposed movement of falling back. in plan v., dutch ships at b, b, b, are represented as thus withdrawing. english official reports of the eighteenth century often speak of french ships acting thus; the english officers attributing to their superior valor a movement which clerk more plausibly considers a skilful military manoeuvre, well calculated to give the defence several opportunities of disabling the assailants as they bore down on a course which impeded the use of their artillery. in the frigate "united states," commanded by decatur, employed the same tactics in her fight with the "macedonian;" and the confederate gunboats at mobile by the same means inflicted on farragut's flag-ship the greater part of the heavy loss which she sustained. in its essential features the same line of action can now be followed by a defendant, having greater speed, when the ardor of the attack, or the necessities of the case, force the assailant to a direct approach. an indirect cause of a lee line falling farther to leeward has never been noticed. when a ship in that line (as at c) found itself without an opponent abeam, and its next ahead perhaps heavily engaged, the natural impulse would be to put up the helm so as to bring the broadside to bear. this advantage would be gained by a loss of ground to leeward and consequent disorder in the line; which, if the act were repeated by several ships, could only be restored by the whole line keeping away. [ ] davies: history of holland. [ ] martin: history of france. [ ] gougeard: marine de guerre. [ ] troude: batailles navales. chapter iv. english revolution.--war of the league of augsburg, - .--sea battles of beachy head and la hougue. the peace of nimeguen was followed by a period of ten years in which no extensive war broke out. they were, however, far from being years of political quiet. louis xiv. was as intent upon pushing on his frontiers to the eastward in peace as in war, and grasped in quick succession fragments of territory which had not been given him by the peace. claiming this and that in virtue of ancient feudal ties; this and that other as implicitly surrendered by the treaty, because dependent upon something else that had been explicitly surrendered; purchasing at one time, using bare force in other cases, and backing up all the so-called peaceful methods of obtaining his asserted rights by the presence of armed power, he carried on this process of extension between and . the aggression most startling to europe, and above all to the german empire, was the seizure of the then imperial city of strasburg on the th of september, ; and on the same day casale, in italy, was sold to him by the duke of mantua, showing that his ambitions were directed that way as well as to the north and east. both of these were positions of great strategic importance, threatening, the one germany, the other italy, in case of war. the excitement throughout europe was very great; in every direction louis, serenely trusting to his power, was making new enemies and alienating former friends. the king of sweden, directly insulted, and injured in his duchy of deux-ponts, turned against him, as did the italian states; and the pope himself sided with the enemies of a king who was already showing his zeal for the conversion of the protestants, and was preparing for the revocation of the edict of nantes. but the discontent, though deep and general, had to be organized and directed; the spirit necessary to give it form and final effective expression was found again in holland, in william of orange. time, however, was needed to mature the work. "no one yet armed himself; but every one talked, wrote, agitated, from stockholm to madrid.... the war of the pen preceded by many years the war of the sword; incessant appeals were made to european opinion by indefatigable publicists; under all forms was diffused the terror of the new universal monarchy," which was seeking to take the place once filled by the house of austria. it was known that louis sought to make himself or his son emperor of germany. but complications of different kinds, private interests, lack of money, all combined to delay action. the united provinces, despite william's wishes, were yet unwilling to act again as banker for a coalition, and the emperor was so threatened on his eastern frontier by the rebel hungarians and the turks that he dared not risk a western war. meanwhile the armed navy of france was daily growing in strength and efficiency under colbert's care, and acquiring the habit of war by attacks upon the barbary pirates and their ports. during the same years the navies both of england and of holland were declining in numbers and efficiency. it has already been said that in , when william needed dutch ships for his expedition to england, it was objected that the navy was in a far different condition from , "being incalculably decreased in strength and deprived of its most able commanders." in england, the decline of discipline had been followed by an economical policy as to material, gradually lessening the numbers and injuring the condition of the fleet; and after the little flare-up and expected war with france in , the king gave the care of the navy to a new body of men, concerning whom an english naval historian says: "this new administration lasted five years, and if it had continued five years longer would in all probability have remedied even the numerous and mighty evils it had introduced, by wearing out the whole royal navy, and so leaving no room for future mistakes. however, a just sense of this induced the king, in , to resume the management of the fleet into his own hands, restoring most of the old officers; but before any great progress in the work of restoration could be made, his majesty died,"[ ]--in . the change of sovereigns was of vast importance, not merely to the english navy, but from the ultimate effect it was to have upon the designs of louis xiv. and the fortune of the general war which his aggressions were preparing. james ii. was peculiarly interested in the navy, being himself a seaman, and having commanded in chief at lowestoft and southwold bay. he knew its actual depressed condition; and the measures he at once took to restore it, both in numbers and efficiency, were thoughtful and thorough. in the three years of his reign very much indeed was done to prepare a weapon which was first proved against himself and his best friend. the accession of james ii., which promised fairly for louis, precipitated the action of europe against him. the house of stuart, closely allied to the king of france, and sympathizing with his absolutist rule, had used the still great power of the sovereign to check the political and religious enmity of the english nation to france. james ii. added to the same political sympathies a strength of roman catholic fervor which led him into acts peculiarly fitted to revolt the feeling of the english people, with the final result of driving him from the throne, and calling to it, by the voice of parliament, his daughter mary, whose husband was william of orange. in the same year that james became king, a vast diplomatic combination against france began. this movement had two sides, religious and political. the protestant states were enraged at the increasing persecutions of the french protestants, and their feelings became stronger as the policy of james of england showed itself more and more bent toward rome. the protestant northern states, holland, sweden, and brandenburg, drew together in alliances; and they counted for support upon the emperor of austria and germany, upon spain and other roman catholic states whose motives were political apprehension and anger. the emperor had latterly been successful against the turks, thus freeing his hands for a move against france. july , , there was signed at augsburg a secret agreement between the emperor, the kings of spain and sweden, and a number of german princes. its object was at first defensive only against france, but it could readily be turned into an offensive alliance. this compact took the name of the league of augsburg, and from it the general war which followed two years later was called the war of the league of augsburg. the next year, , saw yet greater successes of the empire over the turks and hungarians. it was evident that france could expect no more from diversions in that quarter. at the same time the discontent of the english and the ambitions of the prince of orange, who hoped from his accession to the throne of england no ordinary personal aggrandizement, but the fulfilment of his strongest political wish and conviction, in curbing forever the power of louis xiv., became more and more plain. but for his expedition into england, william needed ships, money, and men from the united provinces; and they hung back, knowing that the result would be war with the french king, who proclaimed james his ally. their action was at last decided by the course of louis, who chose this moment to revoke concessions made at nimeguen to dutch trade. the serious injury thus done to holland's material interests turned the wavering scale. "this violation of the conventions of nimeguen," says a french historian,[ ] "by giving a severe blow to dutch commerce, reducing her european trade more than one fourth, removed the obstacle that religious passions still encountered in material interests, and put all holland at the disposition of william, none having reason longer to conciliate france." this was in november, . in the summer of the following year the birth of an heir to the english throne brought things to an issue. english loyalty might have put up with the reign of the father, now advanced in years, but could not endure the prospect of a continued roman catholic royalty. matters had at last reached the crisis to which they had been tending for years. louis and william of orange, long-standing enemies, and at the moment the two chief figures in european politics, alike from their own strong personalities and the cause which either represented, stood on the brink of great actions, whose effects were to be felt through many generations. william, despotic in temper himself, stood on the shores of holland looking hopefully toward free england, from which he was separated by the narrow belt of water that was the defence of the island kingdom, and might yet be an impassable barrier to his own high aims; for the french king at that moment could control the sea if he would. louis, holding all the power of france in his single grasp, facing eastward as before, saw the continent gathering against him; while on his flank was england heartily hostile, longing to enter on the strife against him, but as yet without a leader. it still remained with him to decide whether he would leave the road open for the head to join the waiting body, and to bring holland and england, the two sea powers, under one rule. if he attacked holland by land, and sent his superior navy into the channel, he might well keep william in his own country; the more so as the english navy, beloved and petted by the king, was likely to have more than the usual loyalty of seamen to their chief. faithful to the bias of his life, perhaps unable to free himself from it, he turned toward the continent, and september , , declared war against germany and moved his armies toward the rhine. william, overjoyed, saw removed the last obstacle to his ambition. delayed for some weeks by contrary winds, he finally set sail from holland on the th of october. more than five hundred transports, with fifteen thousand troops, escorted by fifty men-of-war, formed the expedition; and it is typical of its mingled political and religious character, that the larger part of the army officers were french protestants who had been driven from france since the last war, the commander-in-chief under william being the huguenot schomberg, late a marshal of france. the first start was foiled by a violent storm; but sailing again on the th of november, a fresh, fair breeze carried the ships through the straits and the channel, and william landed on the th at torbay. before the end of the year, james had fled from his kingdom. on the st of the following april, william and mary were proclaimed sovereigns of great britain, and england and holland were united for the war, which louis had declared against the united provinces as soon as he heard of william's invasion. during all the weeks that the expedition was preparing and delayed, the french ambassador at the hague and the minister of the navy were praying the king to stop it with his great sea power,--a power so great that the french fleet in the first years of the war outnumbered those of england and holland combined; but louis would not. blindness seems to have struck the kings of england and france alike; for james, amid all his apprehensions, steadily refused any assistance from the french fleet, trusting to the fidelity of the english seamen to his person, although his attempts to have mass celebrated on board the ships had occasioned an uproar and mutiny which nearly ended in the crews throwing the priests overboard. france thus entered the war of the league of augsburg without a single ally. "what her policy had most feared, what she had long averted, was come to pass. england and holland were not only allied, but united under the same chief; and england entered the coalition with all the eagerness of passions long restrained by the stuart policy." as regards the sea war, the different battles have much less tactical value than those of de ruyter. the chief points of strategic interest are the failure of louis, having a decided superiority at sea, properly to support james ii. in ireland, which remained faithful to him, and the gradual disappearance from the ocean of the great french fleets, which louis xiv. could no longer maintain, owing to the expense of that continental policy which he had chosen for himself. a third point of rather minor interest is the peculiar character and large proportions taken on by the commerce-destroying and privateering warfare of the french, as their large fleets were disappearing. this, and the great effect produced by it, will appear at first to contradict what has been said as to the general inadequacy of such a warfare when not supported by fleets; but an examination of the conditions, which will be made later on, will show that the contradiction is rather apparent than real. taught by the experience of the last conflict, the chief effort of the french king, in the general war he had brought upon himself, should have been directed against the sea powers,--against william of orange and the anglo-dutch alliance. the weakest point in william's position was ireland; though in england itself not only were there many partisans of the exiled king, but even those who had called in william fenced his kingship about with jealous restrictions. his power was not secure so long as ireland was not subdued. james, having fled from england in january, , landed in ireland in the following march, accompanied by french troops and a french squadron, and was enthusiastically welcomed everywhere but in the protestant north. he made dublin his capital, and remained in the country until july of the next year. during these fifteen months the french were much superior at sea; they landed troops in ireland on more than one occasion; and the english, attempting to prevent this, were defeated in the naval battle of bantry bay.[ ] but although james was so well established, and it was of the utmost importance to sustain him; although it was equally important to keep william from getting a foothold till james was further strengthened and londonderry, then passing through its famous siege, reduced; and although the french were superior to the united english and dutch on the seas in and ; nevertheless, the english admiral rooke was able, unmolested, to throw succors and troops into londonderry, and afterward landed marshal schomberg, with a small army, near carrickfergus. rooke stopped intercourse between ireland and scotland, where were many stuart partisans, and then with his small squadron passed along the east coast of ireland, attempted to burn the shipping in dublin harbor, failing only through lack of wind, and finally came off cork, then occupied by james, took possession of an island in the harbor, and returned in safety to the downs in october. these services, which raised the siege of londonderry and kept open the communications between england and ireland, extended throughout the summer months; nor was any attempt made by the french to stop them. there can be little doubt that an effective co-operation of the french fleet in the summer of would have broken down all opposition to james in ireland, by isolating that country from england, with corresponding injury to william's power. the following year the same strategic and political mistake was made. it is the nature of an enterprise such as james's, dependent upon a weaker people and foreign help, to lose strength if it does not progress; but the chances were still in his favor, provided france co-operated heartily, and above all, with her fleet. it is equally the nature of a merely military navy like that of france to be strongest at the beginning of hostilities; whereas that of the allied sea powers grew daily stronger, drawing upon the vast resources of their merchant shipping and their wealth. the disparity of force was still in favor of france in , but it was not as great as the year before. the all-important question was where to direct it. there were two principal courses, involving two views of naval strategy. the one was to act against the allied fleet, whose defeat, if sufficiently severe, might involve the fall of william's throne in england; the other was to make the fleet subsidiary to the irish campaign. the french king decided upon the former, which was undoubtedly the proper course; but there was no reason for neglecting, as he did, the important duty of cutting off the communications between the two islands. as early as march he had sent a large fleet with six thousand troops and supplies of war, which were landed without any trouble in the southern ports of ireland; but after performing that service, the ships employed returned to brest, and there remained inactive during may and june while the grand fleet under the comte de tourville was assembling. during those two months the english were gathering an army on their west coast, and on the st of june, william embarked his forces at chester on board two hundred and eighty-eight transports, escorted by only six men-of-war. on the th he landed in carrickfergus, and the ships-of-war were dismissed to join the english grand fleet, which, however, they were not able to do; tourville's ships having in the mean time got to sea and occupied the channel to the eastward. there is nothing more striking than the carelessness shown by both the contending parties, during the time that ireland was in dispute, as to the communications of their opponents with the island; but this was especially strange in the french, as they had the larger forces, and must have received pretty accurate information of what was going on from disaffected persons in england. it appears that a squadron of twenty-five frigates, to be supported by ships-of-the-line, were told off for duty in st. george's channel; but they never reached their station, and only ten of the frigates had got as far as kinsale by the time james had lost all at the battle of the boyne. the english communications were not even threatened for an hour. tourville's fleet, complete in numbers, having seventy-eight ships, of which seventy were in the line-of-battle, with twenty-two fire-ships, got to sea june , the day after william embarked. on the th the french were off the lizard, to the dismay of the english admiral, who was lying off the isle of wight in such an unprepared attitude that he had not even lookout ships to the westward. he got under way, standing off-shore to the southeast, and was joined from time to time, during the next ten days, by other english and dutch ships. the two fleets continued moving to the eastward, sighting each other from time to time. the political situation in england was critical. the jacobites were growing more and more open in their demonstrations, ireland had been in successful revolt for over a year, and william was now there, leaving only the queen in london. the urgency of the case was such that the council decided the french fleet must be fought, and orders to that effect were sent to the english admiral, herbert. in obedience to his instructions he went out, and on the th of july, being to windward, with the wind at northeast, formed his line-of-battle, and then stood down to attack the french, who waited for him, with their foretopsails aback[ ] on the starboard tack, heading to the northward and westward. the fight that followed is known as the battle of beachy head. the ships engaged were, french seventy, english and dutch according to their own account fifty-six, according to the french sixty. in the allied line of battle the dutch were in the van; the english, commanded in person by herbert, in the centre; and the rear was made up partly of english and partly of dutch ships. the stages of the battle were as follows:-- . the allies, being to windward, bore down together in line abreast. as usual, this manoeuvre was ill performed, and as also generally happens, the van came under fire before the centre and rear, and bore the brunt of the injury. . admiral herbert, though commander-in-chief, failed to attack vigorously with the centre, keeping it at long range. the allied van and rear came to close action (plate vi., a). paul hoste's[ ] account of this manoeuvre of the allies is that the admiral intended to fall mainly on the french rear. to that end he closed the centre to the rear and kept it to windward at long cannon-shot (refused it), so as to prevent the french from tacking and doubling on the rear. if that were his purpose, his plan, though tolerably conceived in the main, was faulty in detail, for this manoeuvre of the centre left a great gap between it and the van. he should rather have attacked, as ruyter did at the texel, as many of the rear ships as he thought he could deal with, and refused his van, assigning to it the part of checking the french van. it may be conceded that an admiral who, from inferior numbers, cannot spread as long and close a line as his enemy, should not let the latter overlap the extremities of his fleet; but he should attain his end not, as herbert did, by leaving a great opening in the centre, but by increasing each interval between the ships refused. the allied fleet was thus exposed to be doubled on at two points, both van and centre; and both points were attacked. . the commander of the french van, seeing the dutch close to his line and more disabled than himself, pressed six of his leading ships ahead, where they went about, and so put the dutch between two fires (plate vi. b). [illustration: pl. vi. la hougue may , . pl. via. beachy head july , .] at the same time tourville, finding himself without adversaries in the centre, having beaten off the leading division of the enemy's centre, pushed forward his own leading ships, which herbert's dispositions had left without opponents; and these fresh ships strengthened the attack upon the dutch in the van (b). this brought about a _mêlée_ at the head of the lines, in which the dutch, being inferior, suffered heavily. luckily for the allies the wind fell calm; and while tourville himself and other french ships got out their boats to tow into action again, the allies were shrewd enough to drop anchor with all sail set, and before tourville took in the situation the ebb-tide, setting southwest, had carried his fleet out of action. he finally anchored a league from his enemy. at nine p.m., when the tide changed, the allies weighed and stood to the eastward. so badly had many of them been mauled, that, by english accounts, it was decided rather to destroy the disabled ships than to risk a general engagement to preserve them. tourville pursued; but instead of ordering a general chase, he kept the line-of-battle, reducing the speed of the fleet to that of the slower ships. the occasion was precisely one of those in which a _mêlée_ is permissible, indeed, obligatory. an enemy beaten and in flight should be pursued with ardor, and with only so much regard to order as will prevent the chasing vessels from losing mutual support,--a condition which by no means implies such relative bearings and distances as are required in the beginning or middle of a well-contested action. the failure to order such general pursuit indicates the side on which tourville's military character lacked completeness; and the failure showed itself, as is apt to be the case, at the supreme moment of his career. he never had such another opportunity as in this, the first great general action in which he commanded in chief, and which hoste, who was on board the flag-ship, calls the most complete naval victory ever gained. it was so indeed at that time,--the most complete, but not the most decisive, as it perhaps might have been. the french, according to hoste, lost not even a boat, much less a ship, which, if true, makes yet more culpable the sluggishness of the pursuit; while the allies fled, casting sixteen of their ships ashore and burning them in sight of the enemy, who pursued as far as the downs. the english indeed give the allied loss as only eight ships,--an estimate probably full as much out one way as the french the other. herbert took his fleet to the thames, and baffled the enemy's further pursuit by removing the buoys.[ ] tourville's is the only great historical name among the seamen of this war, if we except the renowned privateersmen at whose head was jean bart. among the english, extraordinary merit cannot be claimed for any one of the gallant and enterprising men who commanded squadrons. tourville, who by this time had served afloat for nearly thirty years, was at once a seaman and a military man. with superb courage, of which he had given dazzling examples in his youth, he had seen service wherever the french fleets had fought,--in the anglo-dutch war, in the mediterranean, and against the barbary pirates. reaching the rank of admiral, he commanded in person all the largest fleets sent out during the earlier years of this war, and he brought to the command a scientific knowledge of tactics, based upon both theory and experience, joined to that practical acquaintance with the seaman's business which is necessary in order to apply tactical principles upon the ocean to the best advantage. but with all these high qualities he seems to have failed, where so many warriors fail, in the ability to assume a great responsibility.[ ] the caution in his pursuit of the allies after beachy head, though so different in appearance, came from the same trait which impelled him two years later to lead his fleet into almost certain destruction at la hougue, because he had the king's order in his pocket. he was brave enough to do anything, but not strong enough to bear the heaviest burdens. tourville was in fact the forerunner of the careful and skilful tacticians of the coming era, but with the savor still of the impetuous hard-fighting which characterized the sea commanders of the seventeenth century. he doubtless felt, after beachy head, that he had done very well and could be satisfied; but he could not have acted as he did had he felt, to use nelson's words, that "if we had taken ten ships out of the enemy's eleven, and let the eleventh escape, being able to take her, i could never call such a good day." the day after the sea fight off beachy head, with its great but still partial results, the cause of james ii. was lost ashore in ireland. the army which william had been allowed to transport there unmolested was superior in number and quality to that of james, as william himself was superior as a leader to the ex-king. the counsel of louis xiv. was that james should avoid decisive action, retiring if necessary to the shannon, in the midst of a country wholly devoted to him. it was, however, a good deal to ask, this abandonment of the capital after more than a year's occupancy, with all the consequent moral effect; it would have been much more to the purpose to stop william's landing. james undertook to cover dublin, taking up the line of the river boyne, and there on the th of july the two armies met, with the result that james was wholly defeated. the king himself fled to kinsale, where he found ten of those frigates that had been meant to control st. george's channel. he embarked, and again took refuge in france, begging louis to improve the victory at beachy head by landing him with another french army in england itself. louis angrily refused, and directed that the troops still remaining in ireland should be at once withdrawn. the chances of a rising in favor of james, at least upon the shores of the channel, if they existed at all, were greatly exaggerated by his own imagination. after the safe retreat of the allied fleet to the thames, tourville, in accordance with his instructions, made several demonstrations in the south of england; but they were wholly fruitless in drawing out any show of attachment to the stuart cause. in ireland it was different. the irish army with its french contingent fell back, after the battle of the boyne, to the shannon, and there again made a stand; while louis, receding from his first angry impulse, continued to send reinforcements and supplies. but the increasing urgency of the continental war kept him from affording enough support, and the war in ireland came to a close a little over a year later, by the defeat at aghrim and capitulation of limerick. the battle of the boyne, which from its peculiar religious coloring has obtained a somewhat factitious celebrity, may be taken as the date at which the english crown was firmly fixed on william's head. yet it would be more accurate to say that the success of william, and with it the success of europe against louis xiv. in the war of the league of augsburg, was due to the mistakes and failure of the french naval campaign in ; though in that campaign was won the most conspicuous single success the french have ever gained at sea over the english. as regards the more striking military operations, it is curious to remark that tourville sailed the day after william left chester, and won beachy head the day before the battle of the boyne; but the real failure lay in permitting william to transport that solid body of men without hindrance. it might have been favorable to french policy to let him get into ireland, but not with such a force at his back. the result of the irish campaign was to settle william safely on the english throne and establish the anglo-dutch alliance; and the union of the two sea peoples under one crown was the pledge, through their commercial and maritime ability, and the wealth they drew from the sea, of the successful prosecution of the war by their allies on the continent. the year was distinguished by only one great maritime event. this was ever afterward known in france as tourville's "deep-sea" or "off-shore" cruise; and the memory of it as a brilliant strategic and tactical display remains to this day in the french navy. that staying power, which has already been spoken of as distinctive of nations whose sea power is not a mere military institution, but based upon the character and pursuits of the people, had now come into play with the allies. notwithstanding the defeat and loss of beachy head, the united fleets took the sea in with one hundred ships-of-the-line under the command of admiral russell. tourville could only gather seventy-two, the same number as the year before. "with these he left brest june . as the enemy had not yet appeared upon the coasts of the channel, he took up his cruising ground at the entrance, sending lookout ships in all directions. informed that the allies had stationed themselves near the scilly islands to cover the passage of a convoy expected from the levant, tourville did not hesitate to steer for the english coasts, where the approaching arrival of another merchant fleet from jamaica was equally expected. deceiving the english cruisers by false courses, he reached the latter fleet, took from it several ships, and dispersed it before russell could come up to fight him. when at last tourville was in presence of the allied fleet, he manoeuvred so skilfully, always keeping the weather-gage, that the enemy, drawn far out into the ocean, lost fifty days without finding an opportunity to engage. during this time french privateers, scattered throughout the channel, harassed the enemy's commerce and protected convoys sent into ireland. worn out by fruitless efforts, russell steered for the irish coast. tourville, after having protected the return of the french convoys, anchored again in brest roads." the actual captures made by tourville's own fleet were insignificant, but its service to the commerce-destroying warfare of the french, by occupying the allies, is obvious; nevertheless, the loss of english commerce was not as great this year as the next. the chief losses of the allies seem to have been in the dutch north sea trade. the two wars, continental and maritime, that were being waged, though simultaneous, were as yet independent of each other. it is unnecessary in connection with our subject to mention the operations of the former. in there occurred the great disaster to the french fleet which is known as the battle of la hougue. in itself, considered tactically, it possesses little importance, and the actual results have been much exaggerated; but popular report has made it one of the famous sea battles of the world, and therefore it cannot be wholly passed by. misled by reports from england, and still more by the representations of james, who fondly nursed his belief that the attachment of many english naval officers to his person was greater than their love of country or faithfulness to their trust, louis xiv. determined to attempt an invasion of the south coast of england, led by james in person. as a first step thereto, tourville, at the head of between fifty and sixty ships-of-the-line, thirteen of which were to come from toulon, was to engage the english fleet; from which so many desertions were expected as would, with the consequent demoralization, yield the french an easy and total victory. the first hitch was in the failure of the toulon fleet, delayed by contrary winds, to join; and tourville went to sea with only forty-four ships, but with a peremptory order from the king to fight when he fell in with the enemy, were they few or many, and come what might. on the th of may, tourville saw the allies to the northward and eastward; they numbered ninety-nine sail-of-the-line. the wind being southwest, he had the choice of engaging, but first summoned all the flag-officers on board his own ship, and put the question to them whether he ought to fight. they all said not, and he then handed them the order of the king.[ ] no one dared dispute that; though, had they known it, light vessels with contrary orders were even then searching for the fleet. the other officers then returned to their ships, and the whole fleet kept away together for the allies, who waited for them, on the starboard tack, heading south-southeast, the dutch occupying the van, the english the centre and rear. when they were within easy range, the french hauled their wind on the same tack, keeping the weather-gage. tourville, being so inferior in numbers, could not wholly avoid the enemy's line extending to the rear of his own, which was also necessarily weak from its extreme length; but he avoided herbert's error at beachy head, keeping his van refused with long intervals between the ships, to check the enemy's van, and engaging closely with his centre and rear (plate via. a, a, a). it is not necessary to follow the phases of this unequal fight; the extraordinary result was that when the firing ceased at night, in consequence of a thick fog and calm, not a single french ship had struck her colors nor been sunk. no higher proof of military spirit and efficiency could be given by any navy, and tourville's seamanship and tactical ability contributed largely to the result, which it must also be confessed was not creditable to the allies. the two fleets anchored at nightfall (b, b, b), a body of english ships (b') remaining to the southward and westward of the french, later on, these cut their cables and allowed themselves to drift through the french line in order to rejoin their main body; in doing which they were roughly handled. having amply vindicated the honor of his fleet, and shown the uselessness of further fighting, tourville now thought of retreat, which was begun at midnight with a light northeast wind and continued all the next day. the allies pursued, the movements of the french being much embarrassed by the crippled condition of the flag-ship "royal sun," the finest ship in the french navy, which the admiral could not make up his mind to destroy. the direction of the main retreat was toward the channel islands, thirty-five ships being with the admiral; of them twenty passed with the tidal current through the dangerous passage known as the race of alderney, between the island of that name and the mainland, and got safe to st. malo. before the remaining fifteen could follow, the tide changed; and the anchors which had been dropped dragging, these ships were carried to the eastward and to leeward of the enemy. three sought refuge in cherbourg, which had then neither breakwater nor port, the remaining twelve at cape la hougue; and they were all burned either by their own crews or by the allies. the french thus lost fifteen of the finest ships in their navy, the least of which carried sixty guns; but this was little more than the loss of the allies at beachy head. the impression made upon the public mind, accustomed to the glories and successes of louis xiv., was out of all proportion to the results, and blotted out the memory of the splendid self-devotion of tourville and his followers. la hougue was also the last general action fought by the french fleet, which did rapidly dwindle away in the following years, so that this disaster seemed to be its death-blow. as a matter of fact, however, tourville went to sea the next year with seventy ships, and the losses were at the time repaired. the decay of the french navy was not due to any one defeat, but to the exhaustion of france and the great cost of the continental war; and this war was mainly sustained by the two sea peoples whose union was secured by the success of william in the irish campaign. without asserting that the result would have been different had the naval operations of france been otherwise directed in , it may safely be said that their misdirection was the immediate cause of things turning out as they did, and the first cause of the decay of the french navy. the five remaining years of the war of the league of augsburg, in which all europe was in arms against france, are marked by no great sea battles, nor any single maritime event of the first importance. to appreciate the effect of the sea power of the allies, it is necessary to sum up and condense an account of the quiet, steady pressure which it brought to bear and maintained in all quarters against france. it is thus indeed that sea power usually acts, and just because so quiet in its working, it is the more likely to be unnoticed and must be somewhat carefully pointed out. the head of the opposition to louis xiv. was william iii., and his tastes being military rather than naval combined with the direction of louis' policy to make the active war continental rather than maritime; while the gradual withdrawal of the great french fleets, by leaving the allied navies without enemies on the sea, worked in the same way. furthermore, the efficiency of the english navy, which was double in numbers that of the dutch, was at this time at a low pitch; the demoralizing effects of the reign of charles ii. could not be wholly overcome during the three years of his brother's rule, and there was a yet more serious cause of trouble growing out of the political state of england. it has been said that james believed the naval officers and seamen to be attached to his person; and, whether justly or unjustly, this thought was also in the minds of the present rulers, causing doubts of the loyalty and trustworthiness of many officers, and tending to bring confusion into the naval administration. we are told that "the complaints made by the merchants were extremely well supported, and showed the folly of preferring unqualified men to that board which directed the naval power of england; and yet the mischief could not be amended, because the more experienced people who had been long in the service were thought disaffected, and it appeared the remedy might have proved worse than the disease."[ ] suspicion reigned in the cabinet and the city, factions and irresolution among the officers; and a man who was unfortunate or incapable in action knew that the yet more serious charge of treason might follow his misadventure. after la hougue, the direct military action of the allied navies was exerted in three principal ways, the first being in attacks upon the french ports, especially those in the channel and near brest. these had rarely in view more than local injury and the destruction of shipping, particularly in the ports whence the french privateers issued; and although on some occasions the number of troops embarked was large, william proposed to himself little more than the diversion which such threats caused, by forcing louis to take troops from the field for coast defence. it may be said generally of all these enterprises against the french coast, in this and later wars, that they effected little, and even as a diversion did not weaken the french armies to any great extent. if the french ports had been less well defended, or french water-ways open into the heart of the country, like our own chesapeake and delaware bays and the southern sounds, the result might have been different. in the second place, the allied navies were of great direct military value, though they fought no battles, when louis xiv. decided in to make his war against spain offensive. spain, though so weak in herself, was yet troublesome from her position in the rear of france; and louis finally concluded to force her to peace by carrying the war into catalonia, on the northeast coast. the movement of his armies was seconded by his fleet under tourville; and the reduction of that difficult province went on rapidly until the approach of the allied navies in largely superior force caused tourville to retire to toulon. this saved barcelona; and from that time until the two sea nations had determined to make peace, they kept their fleets on the spanish coast and arrested the french advance. when, in , william had become disposed to peace and spain refused it, louis again invaded, the allied fleet did not appear, and barcelona fell. at the same time a french naval expedition was successfully directed against cartagena in south america, and under the two blows, both of which depended upon the control of the sea, spain yielded. the third military function of the allied navies was the protection of their sea commerce; and herein, if history may be trusted, they greatly failed. at no time has war against commerce been conducted on a larger scale and with greater results than during this period; and its operations were widest and most devastating at the very time that the great french fleets were disappearing, in the years immediately after la hougue, apparently contradicting the assertion that such a warfare must be based on powerful fleets or neighboring seaports. a somewhat full discussion is due, inasmuch as the distress to commerce wrought by the privateers was a large factor in bringing the sea nations to wish for peace; just as the subsidies, which their commerce enabled them to pay the continental armies, besides keeping up their own, were the chief means by which the war was prolonged and france brought to terms. the attack and defence of commerce is still a living question. in the first place it is to be observed that the decay of the french fleet was gradual, and that the moral effect of its appearance in the channel, its victory at beachy head, and gallant conduct at la hougue remained for some time impressed on the minds of the allies. this impression caused their ships to be kept together in fleets, instead of scattering in pursuit of the enemy's cruisers, and so brought to the latter a support almost equal to an active warfare on the seas. again, the efficiency of the english navy, as has been said, was low, and its administration perhaps worse; while treason in england gave the french the advantage of better information. thus in the year following la hougue, the french, having received accurate information of a great convoy sailing for smyrna, sent out tourville in may, getting him to sea before the allies were ready to blockade him in brest, as they had intended. this delay was due to bad administration, as was also the further misfortune that the english government did not learn of tourville's departure until after its own fleet had sailed with the trade. tourville surprised the convoy near the straits, destroyed or captured one hundred out of four hundred ships, and scattered the rest. this is not a case of simple cruising warfare, for tourville's fleet was of seventy-one ships; but it shows the incompetency of the english administration. in truth, it was immediately after la hougue that the depredations of cruisers became most ruinous; and the reason was twofold: first, the allied fleet was kept together at spithead for two months and more, gathering troops for a landing on the continent, thus leaving the cruisers unmolested; and in the second place, the french, not being able to send their fleet out again that summer, permitted the seamen to take service in private ships, thus largely increasing the numbers of the latter. the two causes working together gave an impunity and extension to commerce-destroying which caused a tremendous outcry in england. "it must be confessed," says the english naval chronicler, "that our commerce suffered far less the year before, when the french were masters at sea, than in this, when their grand fleet was blocked up in port." but the reason was that the french having little commerce and a comparatively large number of seamen, mainly employed in the fleet, were able, when this lay by, to release them to cruisers. as the pressure of the war became greater, and louis continued to reduce the number of his ships in commission, another increase was given to the commerce-destroyers. "the ships and officers of the royal navy were loaned, under certain conditions, to private firms, or to companies who wished to undertake privateering enterprises, in which even the cabinet ministers did not disdain to take shares;" indeed, they were urged to do so to please the king. the conditions generally provided that a certain proportion of the profits should go to the king, in return for the use of the ships. such employment would be demoralizing to any military service, but not necessarily all at once; and the conditions imparted for the time a tone and energy to privateering that it cannot always have. in truth, the public treasury, not being able to maintain the navy, associated with itself private capital, risking only material otherwise useless, and looking for returns to robbing the enemy. the commerce-destroying of this war, also, was no mere business of single cruisers; squadrons of three or four up to half a dozen ships acted together under one man, and it is only just to say that under seamen like jean bart, forbin, and duguay-trouin, they were even more ready to fight than to pillage. the largest of these private expeditions, and the only one that went far from the french shores, was directed in against cartagena, on the spanish main. it numbered seven ships-of-the-line and six frigates, besides smaller vessels, and carried twenty-eight hundred troops. the chief object was to lay a contribution on the city of cartagena; but its effect on the policy of spain was marked, and led to peace. such a temper and concert of action went far to supply the place of supporting fleets, but could not wholly do so; and although the allies continued to keep their large fleets together, still, as the war went on and efficiency of administration improved, commerce-destroying was brought within bounds. at the same time, as an evidence of how much the unsupported cruisers suffered, even under these favorable conditions, it may be mentioned that the english report fifty-nine ships-of-war captured against eighteen admitted by the french during the war,--a difference which a french naval historian attributes, with much probability, to the english failing to distinguish between ships-of-war properly so called, and those loaned to private firms. captures of actual privateers do not appear in the list quoted from. "the commerce-destroying of this war, therefore, was marked by the particular characteristics of cruisers acting together in squadron, not far from their base, while the enemy thought best to keep his fleet concentrated elsewhere; notwithstanding which, and the bad administration of the english navy, the cruisers were more and more controlled as the great french fleets disappeared." the results of the war of - do not therefore vitiate the general conclusion that "a cruising, commerce-destroying warfare, to be destructive, must be seconded by a squadron warfare, and by divisions of ships-of-the-line; which, forcing the enemy to unite his forces, permit the cruisers to make fortunate attempts upon his trade. without such backing the result will be simply the capture of the cruisers." toward the end of this war the real tendency was becoming manifest, and was still more plainly seen in the next, when the french navy had sunk to a yet lower state of weakness. notwithstanding their losses, the sea nations made good their cause. the war, which began with the french taking the offensive, ended by reducing them everywhere to the defensive, and forced louis to do violence at once to his strongest prejudices and his most reasonable political wishes, by recognizing as king of england him whom he looked upon as a usurper as well as his own inveterate enemy. on its surface, and taken as a whole, this war will appear almost wholly a land struggle, extending from the spanish netherlands down the line of the rhine, to savoy in italy and catalonia in spain. the sea fights in the channel, the irish struggle receding in the distance, look like mere episodes; while the underlying action of trade and commerce is wholly disregarded, or noticed only as their outcries tell of their sufferings. yet trade and shipping not only bore the burden of suffering, but in the main paid the armies that were fighting the french; and this turning of the stream of wealth from both sea nations into the coffers of their allies was perhaps determined, certainly hastened, by the misdirection of that naval supremacy with which france began the war. it was then possible, as it will usually be possible, for a really fine military navy of superior force to strike an overwhelming blow at a less ready rival; but the opportunity was allowed to slip, and the essentially stronger, better founded sea power of the allies had time to assert itself. the peace signed at ryswick in was most disadvantageous to france; she lost all that had been gained since the peace of nimeguen, nineteen years before, with the single important exception of strasburg. all that louis xiv. had gained by trick or force during the years of peace was given up. immense restitutions were made to germany and to spain. in so far as the latter were made in the netherlands, they were to the immediate advantage of the united provinces, and indeed of all europe as well as of spain. to the two sea nations the terms of the treaty gave commercial benefits, which tended to the increase of their own sea power and to the consequent injury of that of france. france had made a gigantic struggle; to stand alone as she did then, and as she has since done more than once, against all europe is a great feat. yet it may be said that as the united provinces taught the lesson that a nation, however active and enterprising, cannot rest upon external resources alone, if intrinsically weak in numbers and territory, so france in its measure shows that a nation cannot subsist indefinitely off itself, however powerful in numbers and strong in internal resources. it is said that a friend once found colbert looking dreamily from his windows, and on questioning him as to the subject of his meditations, received this reply: "in contemplating the fertile fields before my eyes, i recall those which i have seen elsewhere; what a rich country is france!" this conviction supported him amid the many discouragements of his official life, when struggling to meet the financial difficulties arising from the extravagance and wars of the king; and it has been justified by the whole course of the nation's history since his days. france is rich in natural resources as well as in the industry and thrift of her people. but neither individual nations nor men can thrive when severed from natural intercourse with their kind; whatever the native vigor of constitution, it requires healthful surroundings, and freedom to draw to itself from near and from far all that is conducive to its growth and strength and general welfare. not only must the internal organism work satisfactorily, the processes of decay and renewal, of movement and circulation, go on easily, but, from sources external to themselves, both mind and body must receive healthful and varied nourishment. with all her natural gifts france wasted away because of the want of that lively intercourse between the different parts of her own body and constant exchange with other people, which is known as commerce, internal or external. to say that war was the cause of these defects is to state at least a partial truth; but it does not exhaust the matter. war, with its many acknowledged sufferings, is above all harmful when it cuts a nation off from others and throws it back upon itself. there may indeed be periods when such rude shocks have a bracing effect, but they are exceptional, and of short duration, and they do not invalidate the general statement. such isolation was the lot of france during the later wars of louis xiv., and it well-nigh destroyed her; whereas to save her from the possibility of such stagnation was the great aim of colbert's life. war alone could not entail it, if only war could be postponed until the processes of circulation within and without the kingdom were established and in vigorous operation. they did not exist when he took office; they had to be both created and firmly rooted in order to withstand the blast of war. time was not given to accomplish this great work, nor did louis xiv. support the schemes of his minister by turning the budding energies of his docile and devoted subjects into paths favorable to it. so when the great strain came upon the powers of the nation, instead of drawing strength from every quarter and through many channels, and laying the whole outside world under contribution by the energy of its merchants and seamen, as england has done in like straits, it was thrown back upon itself, cut off from the world by the navies of england and holland, and the girdle of enemies which surrounded it upon the continent. the only escape from this process of gradual starvation was by an effectual control of the sea; the creation of a strong sea power which should insure free play for the wealth of the land and the industry of the people. for this, too, france had great natural advantages in her three seaboards, on the channel, the atlantic, and the mediterranean; and politically she had had the fair opportunity of joining to her own maritime power that of the dutch in friendly alliance, hostile or at least wary toward england. in the pride of his strength, conscious of absolute control in his kingdom, louis cast away this strong reinforcement to his power, and proceeded to rouse europe against him by repeated aggressions. in the period which we have just considered, france justified his confidence by a magnificent, and upon the whole successful, maintenance of his attitude against all europe; she did not advance, but neither did she greatly recede. but this display of power was exhausting; it ate away the life of the nation, because it drew wholly upon itself and not upon the outside world, with which it could have been kept in contact by the sea. in the war that next followed, the same energy is seen, but not the same vitality; and france was everywhere beaten back and brought to the verge of ruin. the lesson of both is the same; nations, like men, however strong, decay when cut off from the external activities and resources which at once draw out and support their internal powers. a nation, as we have already shown, cannot live indefinitely off itself, and the easiest way by which it can communicate with other peoples and renew its own strength is the sea. footnotes: [ ] campbell: lives of the admirals. [ ] martin: history of france. [ ] see map of english channel, etc., p. . [ ] that is, nearly motionless. [ ] hoste: naval tactics. [ ] ledyard says the order to remove the buoys was not carried out (naval history, vol. ii. p. ). [ ] seignelay, the french minister of marine of the day, called him "poltron de tête, mais pas de coeur." [ ] the author has followed in the text the traditional and generally accepted account of tourville's orders and the motives of his action. a french writer, m. de crisenoy, in a very interesting paper upon the secret history preceding and accompanying the event, traverses many of these traditional statements. according to him, louis xiv. was not under any illusion as to the loyalty of the english officers to their flag; and the instructions given to tourville, while peremptory under certain conditions, did not compel him to fight in the situation of the french fleet on the day of the battle. the tone of the instructions, however, implied dissatisfaction with the admiral's action in previous cruises, probably in the pursuit after beachy head, and a consequent doubt of his vigor in the campaign then beginning. mortification therefore impelled him to the desperate attack on the allied fleet; and, according to m. de crisenoy, the council of war in the admiral's cabin, and the dramatic production of the king's orders, had no existence in fact. [ ] campbell: lives of the admirals. chapter v. war of the spanish succession, - .--sea battle of malaga. during the last thirty years of the seventeenth century, amid all the strifes of arms and diplomacy, there had been clearly foreseen the coming of an event which would raise new and great issues. this was the failure of the direct royal line in that branch of the house of austria which was then on the spanish throne; and the issues to be determined when the present king, infirm both in body and mind, should die, were whether the new monarch was to be taken from the house of bourbon or from the austrian family in germany; and whether, in either event, the sovereign thus raised to the throne should succeed to the entire inheritance, the empire of spain, or some partition of that vast inheritance be made in the interests of the balance of european power. but this balance of power was no longer understood in the narrow sense of continental possessions; the effect of the new arrangements upon commerce, shipping, and the control both of the ocean and the mediterranean, was closely looked to. the influence of the two sea powers and the nature of their interests were becoming more evident. it is necessary to recall the various countries that were ruled by spain at that time in order to understand the strategic questions, as they may fairly be called, now to be settled. these were, in europe, the netherlands (now belgium); naples and the south of italy; milan and other provinces in the north; and, in the mediterranean, sicily, sardinia, and the balearic isles. corsica at that time belonged to genoa. in the western hemisphere, besides cuba and porto rico, spain then held all that part of the continent now divided among the spanish american states, a region whose vast commercial possibilities were coming to be understood; and in the asian archipelago there were large possessions that entered less into the present dispute. the excessive weakness of this empire, owing to the decay of the central kingdom, had hitherto caused other nations, occupied as they were with more immediate interests, to regard with indifference its enormous extent. this indifference could not last when there was a prospect of a stronger administration, backed possibly by alliances with one of the great powers of europe. it would be foreign to our subject to enter into the details of diplomatic arrangement, which, by shifting about peoples and territories from one ruler to another, sought to reach a political balance peacefully. the cardinal points of each nation's policy may be shortly stated. the spanish cabinet and people objected to any solution which dismembered the empire. the english and the dutch objected to any extension of france in the spanish netherlands, and to the monopoly by the french of the trade with spanish america, both which they feared as the results of placing a bourbon on the spanish throne. louis xiv. wanted naples and sicily for one of his sons, in case of any partition; thus giving france a strong mediterranean position, but one which would be at the mercy of the sea powers,--a fact which induced william iii. to acquiesce in this demand. the emperor of austria particularly objected to these mediterranean positions going away from his family, and refused to come into any of the partition treaties. before any arrangement was perfected, the actual king of spain died, but before his death was induced by his ministers to sign a will, bequeathing all his states to the grandson of louis xiv., then duke of anjou, known afterward as philip v. of spain. by this step it was hoped to preserve the whole, by enlisting in its defence the nearest and one of the most powerful states in europe,--nearest, if are excepted the powers ruling the sea, which are always near any country whose ports are open to their ships. louis xiv. accepted the bequest, and in so doing felt bound in honor to resist all attempts at partition. the union of the two kingdoms under one family promised important advantages to france, henceforth delivered from that old enemy in the rear, which had balked so many of her efforts to extend her frontiers eastward. as a matter of fact, from that time, with rare breaks, there existed between the two kingdoms an alliance, the result of family ties, which only the weakness of spain kept from being dangerous to the rest of europe. the other countries at once realized the situation, and nothing could have saved war but some backward step on the part of the french king. the statesmen of england and holland, the two powers on whose wealth the threatened war must depend, proposed that the italian states should be given to the son of the austrian emperor, belgium be occupied by themselves, and that the new king of spain should grant no commercial privileges in the indies to france above other nations. to the credit of their wisdom it must be said that this compromise was the one which after ten years of war was found, on the whole, best; and in it is seen the growing sense of the value of extension by sea. louis, however, would not yield; on the contrary, he occupied, by connivance of the spanish governors, towns in the netherlands which had been held by dutch troops under treaties with spain. soon after, in february, , the english parliament met, and denounced any treaty which promised france the dominion of the mediterranean. holland began to arm, and the emperor of austria pushed his troops into northern italy, where a campaign followed, greatly to the disadvantage of louis. in september of the same year, , the two sea powers and the emperor of austria signed a secret treaty, which laid down the chief lines of the coming war, with the exception of that waged in the spanish peninsula itself. by it the allies undertook to conquer the spanish netherlands in order to place a barrier between france and the united provinces; to conquer milan as a security for the emperor's other provinces; and to conquer naples and sicily for the same security, and also for the security of the navigation and commerce of the subjects of his britannic majesty and of the united provinces. the sea powers should have the right to conquer, for the utility of the said navigation and commerce, the countries and towns of the spanish indies; and all that they should be able to take there should be for them and remain theirs. the war begun, none of the allies could treat without the others, nor without having taken just measures--first, to prevent the kingdoms of france and spain from ever being united under the same king; second, to prevent the french from ever making themselves masters of the spanish indies, or from sending ships thither to engage, directly or indirectly, in commerce; third, to secure to the subjects of his britannic majesty and of the united provinces the commercial privileges which they enjoyed in all the spanish states under the late king. it will be noticed that in these conditions there is no suggestion of any intention to resist the accession of the bourbon king, who was called to the throne by the spanish government and at first acknowledged by england and holland; but, on the other hand, the emperor of austria does not withdraw the austrian claim, which centred in his own person. the voice of the sea powers was paramount in the coalition, as the terms of the treaty safeguarding their commercial interests show, though, as they were about to use german armies for the land war, german claims also had to be considered. as a french historian points out:-- "this was really a new treaty of partition.... william iii., who had conducted all, had taken care not to exhaust england and holland, in order to restore the spanish monarchy, intact, to the emperor; his final condition was to reduce the new king, philip v., to spain proper, and to secure to england and holland at once the commercial use of all the regions that had been under the spanish monarchy, together with important military and maritime positions against france."[ ] but though war was imminent, the countries about to engage hesitated. holland would not move without england, and despite the strong feeling of the latter country against france, the manufacturers and merchants still remembered the terrible sufferings of the last war. just then, as the scales were wavering, james ii. died. louis, yielding to a sentiment of sympathy and urged by his nearest intimates, formally recognized the son of james as king of england; and the english people, enraged at what they looked on as a threat and an insult, threw aside all merely prudential considerations. the house of lords declared that "there could be no security till the usurper of the spanish monarchy was brought to reason;" and the house of commons voted fifty thousand soldiers and thirty-five thousand seamen, besides subsidies for german and danish auxiliaries. william iii. died soon after, in march, ; but queen anne took up his policy, which had become that of the english and dutch peoples. louis xiv. tried to break part of the on-coming storm by forming a league of neutrals among the other german states; but the emperor adroitly made use of the german feeling, and won to his side the elector of brandenburg by acknowledging him as king of prussia, thus creating a north-german protestant royal house, around which the other protestant states naturally gathered, and which was in the future to prove a formidable rival to austria. the immediate result was that france and spain, whose cause was thenceforth known as that of the two crowns, went into the war without any ally save bavaria. war was declared in may by holland against the kings of france and spain; by england against france and spain, anne refusing to recognize philip v. even in declaring war, because he had recognized james iii. as king of england; while the emperor was still more outspoken, declaring against the king of france and the duke of anjou. thus began the great war of the spanish succession. it is far from easy, in dealing with a war of such proportions, lasting for more than ten years, to disentangle from the general narrative that part which particularly touches our subject, without at the same time losing sight of the relation of the one part to the whole. such a loss, however, is fatal to the end in view, which is not a mere chronicle of naval events, nor even a tactical or strategic discussion of certain naval problems divorced from their surroundings of cause and effect in general history, but an appreciation of the effect of sea power upon the general result of the war and upon the prosperity of nations. it will conduce to clearness, however, to point out again that the aim of william iii. was not to dispute the claim of philip v. to the throne,--a matter of comparative indifference to the sea powers,--but to seize, to the benefit of their commerce and colonial empire, such portions of the spanish american possessions as he could, and at the same time to impose such conditions upon the new monarchy as would at least prevent any loss, to english and dutch commerce, of the privileges they had had under the austrian line. such a policy would not direct the main effort of the sea nations upon the spanish peninsula, but upon america; and the allied fleets might not have entered the straits. sicily and naples were to go, not to england, but to austria. subsequent causes led to an entire change in this general plan. a new candidate, a son of the emperor of germany, was set up in by the coalition under the name of carlos iii., and the peninsula became the scene of a doubtful and bloody war, keeping the anglo-dutch fleets hovering round the coasts; with the result, as regards the sea powers, that nothing of decisive importance was done in spanish america, but that england issued from the strife with gibraltar and port mahon in her hands, to be thenceforth a mediterranean power. at the same time that carlos iii. was proclaimed, a treaty was negotiated with portugal, known as the methuen treaty, which gave england the practical monopoly of portuguese trade, and sent the gold of brazil by way of lisbon to london,--an advantage so great that it aided materially in keeping up the war on the continent as well as in maintaining the navy. at the same time the efficiency of the latter so increased that the losses by french cruisers, though still heavy, were at no time unendurable. when the war broke out, in pursuance of the original policy, sir george rooke, with a fleet of fifty ships-of-the-line and transports carrying fourteen thousand troops, was sent against cadiz, which was the great european centre of the spanish-american trade; there came the specie and products of the west, and thence they were dispersed through europe. it had been the purpose of william iii. also to seize cartagena, one of the principal centres of the same trade in the other hemisphere; and to that end, six months before his death, in september, , he had despatched there a squadron under that traditional seaman of the olden time, benbow. benbow fell in with a french squadron sent to supply and strengthen the place, and brought it to action north of cartagena; but though superior in force, the treason of several of his captains, who kept out of action, defeated his purpose, and after fighting till his ship was helpless and he himself had received a mortal wound, the french escaped and cartagena was saved. before his death benbow received a letter from the french commodore to this effect: "yesterday morning i had no hope but i should have supped in your cabin. as for those cowardly captains of yours, hang them up, for, by god! they deserve it." and hanged two of them were. rooke's expedition against cadiz also failed, as it was nearly certain to do; for his instructions were so to act as to conciliate the spanish people and disincline them to the bourbon king. such doubtful orders tied his hands; but after failing there, he learned that the galleons from the west indies, loaded with silver and merchandise, had put into vigo bay under escort of french ships-of-war. he went there at once, and found the enemy in a harbor whose entrance was but three quarters of a mile wide, defended by fortifications and a heavy boom; but a passage was forced through the boom under a hot fire, the place seized, and all the shipping, with much of the specie, either taken or sunk. this affair, which is known in history as that of the vigo galleons, was a brilliant and interesting feat of arms, but has no military features calling for mention, except the blow it gave to the finances and prestige of the two crowns. the affair at vigo had, however, important political results, and helped to that change in the general plan of the sea powers which has been mentioned. the king of portugal, moved by fear of the french, had acknowledged philip v.; but his heart was against him, for he dreaded french influence and power brought so near his little and isolated kingdom. it had been a part of rooke's mission to detach him from the alliance of the two crowns; and the affair of vigo, happening so near his own frontiers, impressed him with a sense of the power of the allied navies. in truth, portugal is nearer to the sea than to spain, and must fall naturally under the influence of the power controlling the sea. inducements were offered,--by the emperor of austria a cession of spanish territory, by the sea powers a subsidy; but the king was not willing to declare himself until the austrian claimant should have landed at lisbon, fairly committing the coalition to a peninsular as well as a continental war. the emperor transferred his claims to his second son, charles; and the latter, after being proclaimed in vienna and acknowledged by england and holland, was taken by the allied fleets to lisbon, where he landed in march, . this necessitated the important change in the plans of the sea powers. pledged to the support of carlos, their fleets were thenceforth tied to the shores of the peninsula and the protection of commerce; while the war in the west indies, becoming a side issue on a small scale, led to no results. from this time on, portugal was the faithful ally of england, whose sea power during this war gained its vast preponderance over all rivals. her ports were the refuge and support of english fleets, and on portugal was based in later days the peninsular war with napoleon. in and through all, portugal, for a hundred years, had more to gain and more to fear from england than from any other power. great as were the effects of the maritime supremacy of the two sea powers upon the general result of the war, and especially upon that undisputed empire of the seas which england held for a century after, the contest is marked by no one naval action of military interest. once only did great fleets meet, and then with results that were indecisive; after which the french gave up the struggle at sea, confining themselves wholly to a commerce-destroying warfare. this feature of the war of the spanish succession characterizes nearly the whole of the eighteenth century, with the exception of the american revolutionary struggle. the noiseless, steady, exhausting pressure with which sea power acts, cutting off the resources of the enemy while maintaining its own, supporting war in scenes where it does not appear itself, or appears only in the background, and striking open blows at rare intervals, though lost to most, is emphasized to the careful reader by the events of this war and of the half-century that followed. the overwhelming sea power of england was the determining factor in european history during the period mentioned, maintaining war abroad while keeping its own people in prosperity at home, and building up the great empire which is now seen; but from its very greatness its action, by escaping opposition, escapes attention. on the few occasions in which it is called to fight, its superiority is so marked that the affairs can scarcely be called battles; with the possible exceptions of byng's action at minorca and hawke's at quiberon, the latter one of the most brilliant pages in naval history, no decisive encounter between equal forces, possessing military interest, occurs between and . owing to this characteristic, the war of the spanish succession, from the point of view of our subject, has to be blocked out in general outline, avoiding narrative and indicating general bearings, especially of the actions of the fleets. with the war in flanders, in germany, and in italy the navies had naturally no concern; when they had so protected the commerce of the allies that there was no serious check to that flow of subsidies upon which the land war depended, their part toward it was done. in the spanish peninsula it was different. immediately after landing carlos iii. at lisbon, sir george rooke sailed for barcelona, which it was understood would be handed over when the fleets appeared; but the governor was faithful to his king and kept down the austrian party. rooke then sailed for toulon, where a french fleet was at anchor. on his way he sighted another french fleet coming from brest, which he chased but was unable to overtake; so that both the enemy's squadrons were united in the port. it is worth while to note here that the english navy did not as yet attempt to blockade the french ports in winter, as they did at a later date. at this period fleets, like armies, went into winter quarters. another english admiral, sir cloudesley shovel, had been sent in the spring to blockade brest; but arriving too late, he found his bird flown, and at once kept on to the mediterranean. rooke, not thinking himself strong enough to resist the combined french squadrons, fell back toward the straits; for at this time england had no ports, no base, in the mediterranean, no useful ally; lisbon was the nearest refuge. rooke and shovel met off lagos, and there held a council of war, in which the former, who was senior, declared that his instructions forbade his undertaking anything without the consent of the kings of spain and portugal. this was indeed tying the hands of the sea powers; but rooke at last, chafing at the humiliating inaction, and ashamed to go home without doing something, decided to attack gibraltar for three reasons: because he heard it was insufficiently garrisoned, because it was of infinite importance as a port for the present war, and because its capture would reflect credit on the queen's arms. the place was attacked, bombarded, and then carried by an assault in boats. the english possession of gibraltar dates from august , , and the deed rightly keeps alive the name of rooke, to whose judgment and fearlessness of responsibility england owes the key of the mediterranean. the bourbon king of spain at once undertook to retake the place, and called upon the french fleet in toulon to support his attack. tourville had died in , and the fleet was commanded by the count of toulouse,--a natural son of louis xiv., only twenty-six years old. rooke also sailed eastward, and the two fleets met on the th of august off velez malaga. the allies were to windward with a northeast wind, both fleets on the port tack heading to the southward and eastward. there is some uncertainty as to the numbers; the french had fifty-two ships-of-the-line, their enemy probably half a dozen more. the allies kept away together, each ship for its opposite; there was apparently no attempt on rooke's part at any tactical combination. the battle of malaga possesses indeed no military interest, except that it is the first in which we find fully developed that wholly unscientific method of attack by the english which clerk criticised, and which prevailed throughout the century. it is instructive to notice that the result in it was the same as in all others fought on the same principle. the van opened out from the centre, leaving quite an interval; and the attempt made to penetrate this gap and isolate the van was the only tactical move of the french. we find in them at malaga no trace of the cautious, skilful tactics which clerk rightly thought to recognize at a later day. the degeneracy from the able combinations of monk, ruyter, and tourville to the epoch of mere seamanship is clearly marked by the battle of malaga, and gives it its only historical importance. in it was realized that primitive mode of fighting which macaulay has sung, and which remained for many years the ideal of the english navy:-- "then on both sides the leaders gave signal for the charge; and on both sides the footmen strode forth with lance and targe; and on both sides the horsemen struck their spurs deep in gore, and _front to front_ the armies met with a mighty roar." human movement is not always advance; and there are traces of a somewhat similar ideal in the naval periodical literature of our own day. the fight was severe, lasting from ten in the morning till five in the afternoon, but was entirely indecisive. the next day the wind shifted, giving the weather-gage to the french, but they did not use the opportunity to attack; for which they were much to blame, if their claim of the advantage the day before is well founded. rooke could not have fought; nearly half his fleet, twenty-five ships, it is said, had used up all their ammunition. even during the battle itself several of the allied ships were towed out of line, because they had not powder and ball for a single broadside. this was doubtless due to the attack upon gibraltar, in which fifteen thousand shot were expended, and to the lack of any port serving as a base of supplies,--a deficiency which the new possession would hereafter remove. rooke, in seizing gibraltar, had the same object in view that prompted the united states to seize port royal at the beginning of the civil war, and which made the duke of parma urge upon his king, before sending the spanish great armada, to seize flushing on the coast of holland,--advice which, had it been followed, would have made unnecessary that dreary and disastrous voyage to the north of england. the same reasons would doubtless lead any nation intending serious operations against our seaboard, to seize points remote from the great centres and susceptible of defence, like gardiner's bay or port royal, which in an inefficient condition of our navy they might hold with and for their fleets. rooke retired in peace to lisbon, bestowing by the way on gibraltar all the victuals and ammunition that could be spared from the fleet. toulouse, instead of following up his victory, if it was one, went back to toulon, sending only ten ships-of-the-line to support the attack on gibraltar. all the attempts of the french against the place were carried on in a futile manner; the investing squadron was finally destroyed and the land attack converted into a blockade. "with this reverse," says a french naval officer, "began in the french people a regrettable reaction against the navy. the wonders to which it had given birth, its immense services, were forgotten. its value was no longer believed. the army, more directly in contact with the nation, had all its favor, all its sympathy. the prevailing error, that the greatness or decay of france depended upon some rhenish positions, could not but favor these ideas adverse to the sea service, which have made england's strength and our weakness."[ ] during this year, , the battle of blenheim was fought, in which the french and bavarian troops were wholly overthrown by the english and german under marlborough and prince eugene. the result of this battle was that bavaria forsook the french alliance, and germany became a secondary theatre of the general war, which was waged thereafter mainly in the netherlands, italy, and the peninsula. the following year, , the allies moved against philip v. by two roads,--from lisbon upon madrid, and by way of barcelona. the former attack, though based upon the sea, was mainly by land, and resultless; the spanish people in that quarter showed unmistakably that they would not welcome the king set up by foreign powers. it was different in catalonia. carlos iii. went there in person with the allied fleet. the french navy, inferior in numbers, kept in port. the french army also did not appear. the allied troops invested the town, aided by three thousand seamen and supported by supplies landed from the fleet, which was to them both base of supplies and line of communications. barcelona surrendered on the th of october; all catalonia welcomed carlos, and the movement spread to aragon and valencia, the capital of the latter province declaring for carlos. the following year, , the french took the offensive in spain on the borders of catalonia, while defending the passes of the mountains toward portugal. in the absence of the allied fleet, and of the succors which it brought and maintained, the resistance was weak, and barcelona was again besieged, this time by the french party supported by a french fleet of thirty sail-of-the-line and numerous transports with supplies from the neighboring port of toulon. the siege, begun april , was going on hopefully; the austrian claimant himself was within the walls, the prize of success; but on the th of may the allied fleet appeared, the french ships retired, and the siege was raised in disorder. the bourbon claimant dared not retreat into aragon, and so passed by roussillon into france, leaving his rival in possession. at the same time there moved forward from portugal--that other base which the sea power of the english and dutch at once controlled and utilized--another army maintained by the subsidies earned from the ocean. this time the western attack was more successful; many cities in estremadura and leon fell, and as soon as the allied generals learned the raising of the siege of barcelona, they pressed on by way of salamanca to madrid. philip v., after escaping into france, had returned to spain by the western pyrenees; but on the approach of the allies he had again to fly, leaving to them his capital. the portuguese and allied troops entered madrid, june , . the allied fleet, after the fall of barcelona, seized alicante and cartagena. so far success had gone; but the inclinations of the spanish people had been mistaken, and the strength of their purpose and pride, supported by the natural features of their country, was not yet understood. the national hatred to the portuguese was aroused, as well as the religious dislike to heretics, the english general himself being a huguenot refugee. madrid and the surrounding country were disaffected, and the south sent the bourbon king assurance of its fidelity. the allies were not able to remain in the hostile capital, particularly as the region around was empty of supplies and full of guerillas. they retired to the eastward, drawing toward the austrian claimant in aragon. reverse followed reverse, and on the th of april, , the allied army was disastrously overthrown at almansa, losing fifteen thousand men. all spain fell back again into the power of philip v., except the province of catalonia, part of which also was subdued. the next year, , the french made some progress in the same quarter, but were not able to attack barcelona; valencia and alicante, however, were reduced. the year was not marked by any naval event of importance. during the summer the allied fleets in the mediterranean were diverted from the coast of spain to support an attack upon toulon made by the austrians and piedmontese. the latter moved from italy along the coast of the mediterranean, the fleet supporting the flank on the sea, and contributing supplies. the siege, however, failed, and the campaign was inconclusive. returning home, the admiral, sir cloudesley shovel, with several ships-of-the-line, was lost on the scilly islands, in one of those shipwrecks which have become historical. in the allied fleets seized sardinia, which from its fruitfulness and nearness to barcelona became a rich storehouse to the austrian claimant, so long as by the allied help he controlled the sea. the same year minorca, with its valuable harbor, port mahon, was also taken, and from that time for fifty years remained in english hands. blocking cadiz and cartagena by the possession of gibraltar, and facing toulon with port mahon, great britain was now as strongly based in the mediterranean as either france or spain; while, with portugal as an ally, she controlled the two stations of lisbon and gibraltar, watching the trade routes both of the ocean and of the inland sea. by the end of the disasters of france by land and sea, the frightful sufferings of the kingdom, and the almost hopelessness of carrying on a strife which was destroying france, and easily borne by england, led louis xiv. to offer most humiliating concessions to obtain peace. he undertook to surrender the whole spanish monarchy, reserving only naples for the bourbon king. the allies refused; they demanded the abandonment of the whole spanish empire without exception by the duke of anjou, refusing to call him king, and added thereto ruinous conditions for france herself. louis would not yield these, and the war went on. during the remaining years the strenuous action of the sea power of the allies, which had by this time come to be that of great britain alone, with little help from holland, was less than ever obtrusive, but the reality of its effect remained. the austrian claimant, confined to catalonia for the most part, was kept in communication with sardinia and the italian provinces of germany by the english fleet; but the entire disappearance of the french navy and the evident intention on the part of louis to keep no squadrons at sea, allowed some diminution of the mediterranean fleet, with the result of greater protection to trade. in the years and expeditions were also made against the french colonies in north america. nova scotia was taken, but an attempt on quebec failed. during the winter of and louis withdrew all the french troops from spain, thus abandoning the cause of his grandson. but when the cause of france was at the very lowest, and it seemed as though she might be driven to concessions which would reduce her to a second-class power, the existence of the coalition was threatened by the disgrace of marlborough, who represented england in it. his loss of favor with the queen was followed by the accession to power of the party opposed to the war, or rather to its further continuance. this change took place in the summer of , and the inclination toward peace was strengthened both by the favorable position in which england then stood for treating, and by the heavy burden she was bearing; which it became evident could bring in no further advantages commensurate to its weight. the weaker ally, holland, had gradually ceased to contribute her stipulated share to the sea forces; and although far-sighted englishmen might see with complacency the disappearance of a rival sea power, the immediate increase of expense was more looked to and felt by the men of the day. the cost both of the continental and spanish wars was also largely defrayed by england's subsidies; and while that on the continent could bring her no further gain, it was seen that the sympathies of the spanish people could not be overborne in favor of carlos iii. without paying more than the game was worth. secret negotiations between england and france soon began, and received an additional impulse by the unexpected death of the emperor of germany, the brother of the austrian claimant of the spanish throne. there being no other male heir, carlos became at once emperor of austria, and was soon after elected emperor of germany. england had no more wish to see two crowns on an austrian head than on that of a bourbon. the demands made by england, as conditions of peace in , showed her to have become a sea power in the purest sense of the word, not only in fact, but also in her own consciousness. she required that the same person should never be king both of france and spain; that a barrier of fortified towns should be granted her allies, holland and germany, as a defensive line against france; that french conquests from her allies should be restored; and for herself she demanded the formal cession of gibraltar and port mahon, whose strategic and maritime value has been pointed out, the destruction of the port of dunkirk, the home nest of the privateers that preyed on english commerce, the cession of the french colonies of newfoundland, hudson's bay, and nova scotia, the last of which she held at that time, and finally, treaties of commerce with france and spain, and the concession of the monopoly of the slave trade with spanish america, known as the asiento, which spain had given to france in . negotiations continued, though hostilities did not cease; and in june, , a four months' truce between great britain and france removed the english troops from the allied armies on the continent, their great leader marlborough having been taken from their head the year before. the campaign of was favorable to france; but in almost any event the withdrawal of great britain made the end of the war a question of but a short time. the remonstrances of holland were met by the reply that since the dutch had not furnished more than one third their quota of ships, and taking the war through, not over one half. the house of commons in an address to the throne in complained that-- "the service at sea hath been carried on through the whole course of the war in a manner highly disadvantageous to your majesty's kingdom, for the necessity requiring that great fleets should be fitted out every year for maintaining a superiority in the mediterranean and for opposing any force which the enemy might prepare either at dunkirk or in the ports of west france; your majesty's readiness, in fitting out your proportion of ships for all parts of that service, hath not prevailed with holland, which has been greatly deficient every year in proportion to what your majesty hath furnished.... hence your majesty hath been obliged to supply those deficiencies with additional reinforcements of your own ships, and your majesty's ships have been forced in greater numbers to continue in remote seas, and at unseasonable times of the year, to the great damage of the navy. this also hath straitened the convoys for trade; the coasts have been exposed for want of cruisers; and you have been disabled from annoying the enemy in their most beneficial commerce with the west indies, whence they received those vast supplies of treasure, without which they could not have supported the expenses of the war." in fact, between and the commerce of spanish america had brought into france forty million dollars in specie. to these complaints the dutch envoy to england could only reply that holland was not in a condition to fulfil her compacts. the reverses of , added to great britain's fixed purpose to have peace, decided the dutch to the same; and the english still kept, amid their dissatisfaction with their allies, so much of their old feeling against france as to support all the reasonable claims of holland. april , , an almost general peace, known as the peace of utrecht, one of the landmarks of history, was signed between france on the one hand, and england, holland, prussia, portugal, and savoy on the other. the emperor still held out, but the loss of british subsidies fettered the movements of his armies, and with the withdrawal of the sea powers the continental war might have fallen of itself; but france with her hands freed carried on during a brilliant and successful campaign in germany. on the th of march, , peace was signed between france and austria. some embers of the war continued to burn in catalonia and the balearic islands, which persisted in their rebellion against philip v.; but the revolt was stifled as soon as the arms of france were turned against them. barcelona was taken by storm in september, ; the islands submitted in the following summer. the changes effected by this long war and sanctioned by the peace, neglecting details of lesser or passing importance, may be stated as follows: . the house of bourbon was settled on the spanish throne, and the spanish empire retained its west indian and american possessions; the purpose of william iii. against her dominion there was frustrated when england undertook to support the austrian prince, and so fastened the greater part of her naval force to the mediterranean. . the spanish empire lost its possessions in the netherlands, gelderland going to the new kingdom of prussia and belgium to the emperor; the spanish netherlands thus became the austrian netherlands. . spain lost also the principal islands of the mediterranean; sardinia being given to austria, minorca with its fine harbor to great britain, and sicily to the duke of savoy. . spain lost also her italian possessions, milan and naples going to the emperor. such, in the main, were the results to spain of the fight over the succession to her throne. france, the backer of the successful claimant, came out of the strife worn out, and with considerable loss of territory. she had succeeded in placing a king of her own royal house on a neighboring throne, but her sea strength was exhausted, her population diminished, her financial condition ruined. the european territory surrendered was on her northern and eastern boundaries; and she abandoned the use of the port of dunkirk, the centre of that privateering warfare so dreaded by english merchants. in america, the cession of nova scotia and newfoundland was the first step toward that entire loss of canada which befell half a century later; but for the present she retained cape breton island, with its port louisburg, the key to the gulf and river st. lawrence. the gains of england, by the treaty and the war, corresponded very nearly to the losses of france and spain, and were all in the direction of extending and strengthening her sea power. gibraltar and port mahon in the mediterranean, and the colonies already mentioned in north america, afforded new bases to that power, extending and protecting her trade. second only to the expansion of her own was the injury to the sea power of france and holland, by the decay of their navies in consequence of the immense drain of the land warfare; further indications of that decay will be given later. the very neglect of holland to fill up her quota of ships, and the bad condition of those sent, while imposing extra burdens upon england, may be considered a benefit, forcing the british navy to greater development and effort. the disproportion in military power on the sea was further increased by the destruction of the works at dunkirk; for though not in itself a first-class port, nor of much depth of water, it had great artificial military strength, and its position was peculiarly adapted to annoy english trade. it was but forty miles from the south foreland and the downs, and the channel abreast it is but twenty miles wide. dunkirk was one of louis' earliest acquisitions, and in its development was as his own child; the dismantling of the works and filling-in of the port show the depth of his humiliation at this time. but it was the wisdom of england not to base her sea power solely on military positions nor even on fighting-ships, and the commercial advantages she had now gained by the war and the peace were very great. the grant of the slave trade with spanish america, in itself lucrative, became yet more so as the basis for an immense smuggling intercourse with those countries, which gave the english a partial recompense for their failure to obtain actual possession; while the cessions made to portugal by france in south america were mainly to the advantage of england, which had obtained the control of portuguese trade by the treaty of . the north american colonies ceded were valuable, not merely nor chiefly as military stations, but commercially; and treaties of commerce on favorable terms were made both with france and spain. a minister of the day, defending the treaty in parliament, said: "the advantages from this peace appear in the addition made to our wealth; in the great quantities of bullion lately coined in our mint; by the vast increase in our shipping employed since the peace, in the fisheries, and in merchandise; and by the remarkable growth of the customs upon imports, and of our manufactures, and the growth of our country upon export;" in a word, by the impetus to trade in all its branches. while england thus came out from the war in good running condition, and fairly placed in that position of maritime supremacy which she has so long maintained, her old rival in trade and fighting was left hopelessly behind. as the result of the war holland obtained nothing at sea,--no colony, no station. the commercial treaty with france placed her on the same terms as england, but she received no concessions giving her a footing in spanish america like that obtained by her ally. indeed, some years before the peace, while the coalition was still maintaining carlos, a treaty was made with the latter by the british minister, unknown to the dutch, practically giving the british monopoly of spanish trade in america; sharing it only with spaniards, which was pretty much the same as not sharing it at all. this treaty accidentally became known, and made a great impression on the dutch; but england was then so necessary to the coalition that she ran no risk of being left out by its other members. the gain which holland made by land was that of military occupation only, of certain fortified places in the austrian netherlands, known to history as the "barrier towns;" nothing was added by them to her revenue, population, or resources; nothing to that national strength which must underlie military institutions. holland had forsaken, perhaps unavoidably, the path by which she had advanced to wealth and to leadership among nations. the exigencies of her continental position had led to the neglect of her navy, which in those days of war and privateering involved a loss of carrying-trade and commerce: and although she held her head high through the war, the symptoms of weakness were apparent in her failing armaments. therefore, though the united provinces attained the great object for which they began the war, and saved the spanish netherlands from the hands of france, the success was not worth the cost. thenceforth they withdrew for a long period from the wars and diplomacy of europe; partly, perhaps, because they saw how little they had gained, but yet more from actual weakness and inability. after the strenuous exertions of the war came a reaction, which showed painfully the inherent weakness of a state narrow in territory and small in the number of its people. the visible decline of the provinces dates from the peace of utrecht; the real decline began earlier. holland ceased to be numbered among the great powers of europe, her navy was no longer a military factor in diplomacy, and her commerce also shared in the general decline of the state. it remains only to notice briefly the results to austria, and to germany generally. france yielded the barrier of the rhine, with fortified places on the east bank of the river. austria received, as has been mentioned, belgium, sardinia, naples, and the spanish possessions in northern italy; dissatisfied in other respects, austria was especially discontented at her failure to obtain sicily, and did not cease negotiating afterward, until she had secured that island. a circumstance more important to germany and to all europe than this transitory acquisition of distant and alien countries by austria was the rise of prussia, which dates from this war as a protestant and military kingdom destined to weigh in the balance against austria. such were the leading results of the war of the spanish succession, "the vastest yet witnessed by europe since the crusades." it was a war whose chief military interest was on the land,--a war in which fought two of the greatest generals of all times, marlborough and prince eugene, the names of whose battles, blenheim, ramillies, malplaquet, turin, are familiar to the most casual reader of history; while a multitude of able men distinguished themselves on the other theatres of the strife, in flanders, in germany, in italy, in spain. on the sea only one great battle, and that scarcely worthy of the name, took place. yet looking only, for the moment, to immediate and evident results, who reaped the benefit? was it france, whose only gain was to seat a bourbon on the spanish throne? was it spain, whose only gain was to have a bourbon king instead of an austrian, and thus a closer alliance with france? was it holland, with its barrier of fortified towns, its ruined navy, and its exhausted people? was it, lastly, austria, even though she had fought with the money of the sea powers, and gained such maritime states as the netherlands and naples? was it with these, who had waged war more and more exclusively by land, and set their eyes more and more on gains on the land, or was it not rather with england, who had indeed paid for that continental war and even backed it with her troops, but who meanwhile was building up her navy, strengthening, extending, and protecting her commerce, seizing maritime positions,--in a word, founding and rearing her sea power upon the ruins of that of her rivals, friend and foe alike? it is not to depreciate the gains of others that the eye fixes on england's naval growth; their gains but bring out more clearly the immenseness of hers. it was a gain to france to have a friend rather than an enemy in her rear, though her navy and shipping were ruined. it was a gain to spain to be brought in close intercourse with a living country like france after a century of political death, and she had saved the greater part of her threatened possessions. it was a gain to holland to be definitively freed from french aggression, with belgium in the hands of a strong instead of a weak state. and it doubtless was a gain to austria not only to have checked, chiefly at the expense of others, the progress of her hereditary enemy, but also to have received provinces like sicily and naples, which, under wise government, might become the foundation of a respectable sea power. but not one of these gains, nor all together, compared in greatness, and much less in solidity, with the gain to england of that unequalled sea power which started ahead during the war of the league of augsburg, and received its completeness and seal during that of the spanish succession. by it she controlled the great commerce of the open sea with a military shipping that had no rival, and in the exhausted condition of the other nations could have none; and that shipping was now securely based on strong positions in all the disputed quarters of the world. although her indian empire was not yet begun, the vast superiority of her navy would enable her to control the communications of other nations with those rich and distant regions, and to assert her will in any disputes arising among the trading-stations of the different nationalities. the commerce which had sustained her in prosperity, and her allies in military efficiency, during the war, though checked and harassed by the enemy's cruisers (to which she could pay only partial attention amid the many claims upon her), started with a bound into new life when the war was over. all over the world, exhausted by their share of the common suffering, people were longing for the return of prosperity and peaceful commerce; and there was no country ready as england was in wealth, capital, and shipping to forward and reap the advantages of every enterprise by which the interchange of commodities was promoted, either by lawful or unlawful means. in the war of the spanish succession, by her own wise management and through the exhaustion of other nations, not only her navy but her trade was steadily built up; and indeed, in that dangerous condition of the seas, traversed by some of the most reckless and restless cruisers france ever sent out, the efficiency of the navy meant safer voyages, and so more employment for the merchant-ships. the british merchant-ships, being better protected than those of the dutch, gained the reputation of being far safer carriers, and the carrying-trade naturally passed more and more into their hands; while the habit of employing them in preference, once established, was likely to continue. "taking all things together," says an historian of the british navy, "i doubt whether the credit of the english nation ever stood higher than at this period, or the spirit of the people higher. the success of our arms at sea, the necessity of protecting our trade, and the popularity of every step taken to increase our maritime power, occasioned such measures to be pursued as annually added to our force. hence arose that mighty difference which at the close of the year appeared in the royal navy; this, not only in the number but in the quality of the ships, was much superior to what it had been at the time of the revolution or even before. hence it was that our trade rather increased than diminished during the last war, and that we gained so signally by our strict intercourse with portugal."[ ] the sea power of england therefore was not merely in the great navy, with which we too commonly and exclusively associate it; france had had such a navy in , and it shrivelled away like a leaf in the fire. neither was it in a prosperous commerce alone; a few years after the date at which we have arrived, the commerce of france took on fair proportions, but the first blast of war swept it off the seas as the navy of cromwell had once swept that of holland. it was in the union of the two, carefully fostered, that england made the gain of sea power over and beyond all other states; and this gain is distinctly associated with and dates from the war of the spanish succession. before that war england was one of the sea powers; after it she was _the_ sea power, without any second. this power also she held alone, unshared by friend and unchecked by foe. she alone was rich, and in her control of the sea and her extensive shipping had the sources of wealth so much in her hands that there was no present danger of a rival on the ocean. thus her gain of sea power and wealth was not only great but solid, being wholly in her own hands; while the gains of the other states were not merely inferior in degree, but weaker in kind, in that they depended more or less upon the good will of other peoples. is it meant, it may be asked, to attribute to sea power alone the greatness or wealth of any state? certainly not. the due use and control of the sea is but one link in the chain of exchange by which wealth accumulates; but it is the central link, which lays under contribution other nations for the benefit of the one holding it, and which, history seems to assert, most surely of all gathers to itself riches. in england, this control and use of the sea seems to arise naturally, from the concurrence of many circumstances; the years immediately preceding the war of the spanish succession had, moreover, furthered the advance of her prosperity by a series of fiscal measures, which macaulay speaks of as "the deep and solid foundation on which was to rise the most gigantic fabric of commercial prosperity which the world had ever seen." it may be questioned, however, whether the genius of the people, inclined to and developed by trade, did not make easier the taking of such measures; whether their adoption did not at least partially spring from, as well as add to, the sea power of the nation. however that may be, there is seen, on the opposite side of the channel, a nation which started ahead of england in the race,--a nation peculiarly well fitted, by situation and resources, for the control of the sea both by war and commerce. the position of france is in this peculiar, that of all the great powers she alone had a free choice; the others were more or less constrained to the land chiefly, or to the sea chiefly, for any movement outside their own borders; but she to her long continental frontier added a seaboard on three seas. in she definitely chose expansion by land. at that time colbert had administered her finances for twelve years, and from a state of terrible confusion had so restored them that the revenue of the king of france was more than double that of the king of england. in those days france paid the subsidies of europe; but colbert's plans and hopes for france rested upon making her powerful on the sea. the war with holland arrested these plans, the onward movement of prosperity ceased, the nation was thrown back upon itself, shut off from the outside world. many causes doubtless worked together to the disastrous result which marked the end of the reign of louis xiv.: constant wars, bad administration in the latter half of the period, extravagance throughout; but france was practically never invaded, the war was kept at or beyond her own frontiers with slight exceptions, her home industries could suffer little from direct hostilities. in these respects she was nearly equal to england, and under better conditions than her other enemies. what made the difference in the results? why was france miserable and exhausted, while england was smiling and prosperous? why did england dictate, and france accept, terms of peace? the reason apparently was the difference in wealth and credit. france stood alone against many enemies; but those enemies were raised and kept moving by english subsidies. the lord treasurer of england, writing in to marlborough, says:-- "though the land and trade of both england and holland have excessive burthens upon them, yet the credit continues good both of them and us; whereas the finances of france are so much more exhausted that they are forced to give twenty and twenty-five per cent for every penny they send out of the kingdom, unless they send it in specie." in the expenditure of france was , , francs, while the taxes brought in only , , gross, of which, after deducting losses and necessary expenses, only , , remained in the treasury; the deficit was sought to be met by anticipating parts of the revenue for years ahead, and by a series of extraordinary transactions tedious to name or to understand. "in the summer of [two years after the peace] it seemed as if the situation could not grow worse,--no more public nor private credit; no more clear revenue for the state; the portions of the revenue not pledged, anticipated on the following years. neither labor nor consumption could be resumed for want of circulation; usury reigned on the ruins of society. the alternations of high prices and the depreciation of commodities finally crushed the people. provision riots broke out among them, and even in the army. manufactures were languishing or suspended; forced mendicity was preying upon the cities. the fields were deserted, the lands fallow for lack of instruments, for lack of manure, for lack of cattle; the houses were falling to ruin. monarchical france seemed ready to expire with its aged king."[ ] thus it was in france, with a population of nineteen millions at that time to the eight millions of all the british islands; with a land vastly more fertile and productive; before the great days, too, of coal and iron. "in england, on the contrary, the immense grants of parliament in struck the french prodigiously; for while their credit was low, or in a manner quite gone, ours was at its zenith." during that same war "there appeared that mighty spirit among our merchants which enabled them to carry on all their schemes with a vigor that kept a constant circulation of money throughout the kingdom, and afforded such mighty encouragement to all manufactures as has made the remembrance of those times grateful in worse." "by the treaty with portugal we were prodigious gainers.... the portuguese began to feel the comfortable effects of their brazil gold mines, and the prodigious commerce that followed with us made their good fortune in great measure ours; and so it has been ever since; otherwise i know not how the expenses of the war had been borne.... the running cash in the kingdom increased very considerably, which must be attributed in great measure to our portuguese trade; and this, as i have made manifest, we owed wholly to our power at sea [which took portugal from the alliance of the two crowns, and threw her upon the protection of the maritime powers]. our trade with the spanish west indies by way of cadiz was certainly much interrupted at the beginning of this war; but afterward it was in great measure restored, as well by direct communication with several provinces when under the archduke, as through portugal, by which a very great though contraband trade was carried on. we were at the same time very great gainers by our commerce with the spaniards in the west indies [also contraband].... our colonies, though complaining of neglect, grew richer, more populous, and carried their trade farther than in former times.... our national end with respect to england was in this war particularly in great measure answered,--i mean the destruction of the french power at sea, for, after the battle of malaga, we hear no more of their great fleets; and though by this the number of their privateers was very much increased, yet the losses of our merchants were far less in the latter than in the former reign.... it is certainly a matter of great satisfaction that ... setting out at first with the sight of so great a naval power as the french king had assembled in , while we struggled under such difficulties, and when we got out of that troublesome war, in , found ourselves loaded with a debt too heavy to be shaken off in the short interval of peace, yet by , instead of seeing the navy of france riding upon our coast, we sent every year a powerful fleet to insult theirs, superior to them not only in the ocean, but in the mediterranean, forcing them entirely out of that sea by the mere sight of our flag.... by this we not only secured our trade with the levant, and strengthened our interests with all the italian princes, but struck the states of barbary with terror, and awed the sultan from listening to any proposals from france. such were the fruits of the increase of our naval power, and of the manner in which it was employed.... such fleets were necessary; they at once protected our flag and our allies, and attached them to our interest; and, what is of greater importance than all the rest, they established our reputation for maritime force so effectually that we feel even to this day [ ] the happy effects of the fame thus acquired."[ ] it is needless to add more. thus stood the power of the seas during the years in which the french historians tell us that their cruisers were battening on her commerce. the english writer admits heavy losses. in , that is, in the space of five years, the returns, according to the report of a committee of the house of lords, "show that since the beginning of the war england had lost ships-of-war and merchant-ships, of which were retaken; whereas we had taken from them, or destroyed, ships-of-war, and merchantmen; privateers also were taken." the greater number of the ships-of-war were probably on private venture, as has been explained. but, be the relative numbers what they may, no argument is needed beyond the statements just given, to show the inability of a mere cruising warfare, not based upon large fleets, to break down a great sea power. jean bart died in ; but in forbin, du casse, and others, and above all in duguay-trouin, he left worthy successors, the equals of any commerce-destroyers the world has ever seen. the name of duguay-trouin suggests the mention, before finally leaving the war of the spanish succession, of his greatest privateering expedition, carried to a distance from home rarely reached by the seamen of his occupation, and which illustrates curiously the spirit of such enterprises in that day, and the shifts to which the french government was reduced. a small french squadron had attacked rio janeiro in , but being repulsed, had lost some prisoners, who were said to have been put to death. duguay-trouin sought permission to avenge the insult to france. the king, consenting, advanced the ships and furnished the crews; and a regular contract was drawn up between the king on the one hand and the company employing duguay-trouin on the other, stipulating the expenses to be borne and supplies furnished on either hand; among which we find the odd, business-like provision that for every one of the troops embarked who shall die, be killed, or desert during the cruise, the company should pay a forfeit of thirty francs. the king was to receive one fifth of the net profits, and was to bear the loss of any one of the vessels that should be wrecked, or destroyed in action. under these provisions, enumerated in full in a long contract, duguay-trouin received a force of six ships-of-the-line, seven frigates, and over two thousand troops, with which he sailed to rio janeiro in ; captured the place after a series of operations, and allowed it to be ransomed at the price of something under four hundred thousand dollars, probably nearly equal to a million in the present day, besides five hundred cases of sugar. the privateering company cleared about ninety-two per cent on their venture. as two of the ships-of-the-line were never heard from after sailing on the return voyage, the king's profits were probably small. while the war of the spanish succession was engaging all western europe, a strife which might have had a profound influence upon its issue was going on in the east. sweden and russia were at war, the hungarians had revolted against austria, and turkey was finally drawn in, though not till the end of the year . had turkey helped the hungarians, she would have made a powerful diversion, not for the first time in history, in favor of france. the english historian suggests that she was deterred by fear of the english fleet; at all events she did not move, and hungary was reduced to obedience. the war between sweden and russia was to result in the preponderance of the latter upon the baltic, the subsidence of sweden, the old ally of france, into a second-rate state, and the entrance of russia definitively into european politics. footnotes: [ ] martin: history of france. [ ] lapeyrouse-bonfils: hist. de la marine française. [ ] campbell: lives of the admirals. [ ] martin: history of france. [ ] campbell: lives of the admirals. chapter vi. the regency in france.--alberoni in spain.--policies of walpole and fleuri.--war of the polish succession.--english contraband trade in spanish america.--great britain declares war against spain.-- - . the peace of utrecht was soon followed by the deaths of the rulers of the two countries which had played the foremost part in the war of the spanish succession. queen anne died august , ; louis xiv. on the st of september, . the successor to the english throne, the german george i., though undoubtedly the choice of the english people, was far from being their favorite, and was rather endured as a necessary evil, giving them a protestant instead of a roman catholic king. along with the coldness and dislike of his own partisans, he found a very considerable body of disaffected men, who wished to see the son of james ii. on the throne. there was therefore a lack of solidity, more apparent than real, but still real, in his position. in france, on the contrary, the succession to the throne was undisputed; but the heir was a child of five years, and there was much jealousy as to the possession of the regency, a power more absolute than that of the king of england. the regency was obtained and exercised by the next in succession to the throne, philip, duke of orleans; but he had to apprehend, not only attempts on the part of rivals in france to shake his hold, but also the active enmity of the bourbon king of spain, philip v.,--an enmity which seems to have dated from an intrigue of orleans, during the late war, to supplant philip on the spanish throne. there was therefore a feeling of instability, of apprehension, in the governments of england and france, which influenced the policy of both. as regards the relations of france and spain, the mutual hatred of the actual rulers stood for a while in the way of the friendly accord louis xiv. had hoped from family ties, and was injurious to the true interests of both nations. the regent orleans, under the advice of the most able and celebrated french statesman of that day, the abbé dubois, made overtures of alliance to the king of great britain. he began first by commercial concessions of the kind generally acceptable to the english, forbidding french shipping to trade to the south seas under penalty of death, and lowering the duties on the importation of english coal. england at first received these advances warily; but the regent would not be discouraged, and offered, further, to compel the pretender, james iii., to withdraw beyond the alps. he also undertook to fill up the port at mardyck, a new excavation by which the french government was trying to indemnify itself for the loss of dunkirk. these concessions, all of which but one, it will be noted, were at the expense of the sea power or commercial interests of france, induced england to sign a treaty by which the two countries mutually guaranteed the execution of the treaties of utrecht as far as their respective interests were concerned; especially the clause by which the house of orleans was to succeed to the french throne, if louis xv. died childless. the protestant succession in england was likewise guaranteed. holland, exhausted by the war, was unwilling to enter upon new engagements, but was at last brought over to this by the remission of certain dues on her merchandise entering france. the treaty, signed in january, , was known as the triple alliance, and bound france to england for some years to come. while france was thus making overtures to england, spain, under the guidance of another able churchman, was seeking the same alliance and at the same time developing her national strength with the hope of recovering her lost italian states. the new minister, cardinal alberoni, promised philip v. to put him in a position to reconquer sicily and naples, if granted five years of peace. he worked hard to bring up the revenues, rebuild the navy, and re-establish the army, while at the same time promoting manufactures, commerce, and shipping, and the advance made in all these was remarkable; but the more legitimate ambition of spain to recover her lost possessions, and with them to establish her power in the mediterranean, so grievously wounded by the loss of gibraltar, was hampered by the ill-timed purpose of philip to overthrow the regency of orleans in france. alberoni was compelled to alienate france, whose sea power, as well as that of spain, was concerned in seeing sicily in friendly hands, and, instead of that natural ally, had to conciliate the maritime powers, england and holland. this he also sought to do by commercial concessions; promising promptly to put the english in possession of the privileges granted at utrecht, concerning which spain had so far delayed. in return, he asked favorable action from them in italy. george i., who was at heart german, received coldly advances which were unfriendly to the german emperor in his italian dominions; and alberoni, offended, withdrew them. the triple alliance, by guaranteeing the existing arrangement of succession to the french throne, gave further offence to philip v., who dreamed of asserting his own claim. the result of all these negotiations was to bind england and france together against spain,--a blind policy for the two bourbon kingdoms. the gist of the situation created by these different aims and feelings, was that the emperor of austria and the king of spain both wanted sicily, which at utrecht had been given to the duke of savoy; and that france and england both wished for peace in western europe, because war would give an opportunity to the malcontents in either kingdom. the position of george, however, being more secure than that of orleans, the policy of the latter tended to yield to that of the former, and this tendency was increased by the active ill-will of the king of spain. george, as a german, wished the emperor's success; and the english statesmen naturally preferred to see sicily in the hands of their late ally and well-assured friend rather than in spain's. france, contrary to her true policy, but under the urgency of the regent's position, entertained the same views, and it was proposed to modify the treaty of utrecht by transferring sicily from savoy to austria, giving the former sardinia instead. it was necessary, however, to consider spain, which under alberoni had already gained a degree of military power astounding to those who had known her weakness during the last war. she was not yet ready to fight, for only half of the five years asked by the cardinal had passed; but still less was she ready to forego her ambitions. a trifling incident precipitated an outbreak. a high spanish official, travelling from rome to spain by land, and so passing through the italian states of the emperor, was arrested as a rebellious subject by order of the latter, who still styled himself king of spain. at this insult, alberoni could not hold philip back. an expedition of twelve ships of war and eighty-six hundred soldiers was sent against sardinia, the transfer to savoy not having yet taken effect, and reduced the island in a few months. this happened in . doubtless the spaniards would at once have moved on against sicily; but france and england now intervened more actively to prevent the general war that seemed threatening. england sent a fleet to the mediterranean, and negotiations began at paris, vienna, and madrid. the outcome of these conferences was an agreement between england and france to effect the exchange of sardinia and sicily just mentioned, recompensing spain by giving her parma and tuscany in northern italy, and stipulating that the emperor should renounce forever his absurd but irritating claim to the spanish crown. this arrangement was to be enforced by arms, if necessary. the emperor at first refused consent; but the increasing greatness of alberoni's preparations at last decided him to accept so advantageous an offer, and the accession of holland to the compact gave it the historical title of the quadruple alliance. spain was obstinate; and it is significant of alberoni's achievements in developing her power, and the eagerness, not to say anxiety, of george i., that the offer was made to purchase her consent by ceding gibraltar. if the regent orleans knew this, it would partly justify his forwarding the negotiations. alberoni tried to back up his military power by diplomatic efforts extending all over europe. russia and sweden were brought together in a project for invading england in the interest of the stuarts; the signing of the quadruple alliance in holland was delayed by his agents; a conspiracy was started in france against the regent; the turks were stirred up against the emperor; discontent was fomented throughout great britain; and an attempt was made to gain over the duke of savoy, outraged by being deprived of sicily. on the st of july, , a spanish army of thirty thousand troops, escorted by twenty-two ships-of-the-line, appeared at palermo. the troops of savoy evacuated the city and pretty nearly the whole island, resistance being concentrated in the citadel of messina. anxiety was felt in naples itself, until the english admiral, byng,[ ] anchored there the day after the investment of messina. the king of sicily having now consented to the terms of the quadruple alliance, byng received on board two thousand austrian troops to be landed at messina. when he appeared before the place, finding it besieged, he wrote to the spanish general suggesting a suspension of arms for two months. this was of course refused; so the austrians were landed again at reggio, in italy, and byng passed through the straits of messina to seek the spanish fleet, which had gone to the southward. the engagement which ensued can scarcely be called a battle, and, as is apt to happen in such affairs, when the parties are on the verge of war but war has not actually been declared, there is some doubt as to how far the attack was morally justifiable on the part of the english. it seems pretty sure that byng was determined beforehand to seize or destroy the spanish fleet, and that as a military man he was justified by his orders. the spanish naval officers had not made up their minds to any line of conduct; they were much inferior in numbers, and, as must always be the case, alberoni's hastily revived navy had not within the same period reached nearly the efficiency of his army. the english approached threateningly near, one or more spanish ships opened fire, whereupon the english, being to windward, stood down and made an end of them; a few only escaped into valetta harbor. the spanish navy was practically annihilated. it is difficult to understand the importance attached by some writers to byng's action at this time in attacking without regard to the line-of-battle. he had before him a disorderly force, much inferior both in numbers and discipline. his merit seems rather to lie in the readiness to assume a responsibility from which a more scrupulous man might have shrunk; but in this and throughout the campaign he rendered good service to england, whose sea power was again strengthened by the destruction not of an actual but a possible rival, and his services were rewarded by a peerage. in connection with this day's work was written a despatch which has great favor with english historians. one of the senior captains was detached with a division against some escaping ships of the enemy. his report to the admiral ran thus: "sir,--we have taken or destroyed all the spanish ships upon this coast, the number as per margin. respectfully, etc., g. walton." one english writer makes, and another indorses, the uncalled-for but characteristic fling at the french, that the ships thus thrust into the margin would have filled some pages of a french narration.[ ] it may be granted that the so-called "battle" of cape passaro did not merit a long description, and captain walton possibly felt so; but if all reports of naval transactions were modelled upon his, the writing of naval history would not depend on official papers. thus the spanish navy was struck down on the th of august, , off cape passaro. this settled the fate of sicily, if it had been doubtful before. the english fleet cruised round the island, supporting the austrians and isolating the spaniards, none of whom were permitted to withdraw before peace was made. alberoni's diplomatic projects failed one after the other, with a strange fatality. in the following year the french, in pursuance of the terms of the alliance, invaded the north of spain and destroyed the dock-yards; burning nine large ships on the stocks, besides the materials for seven more, at the instigation of an english _attaché_ accompanying the french headquarters. thus was completed the destruction of the spanish navy, which, says an english historian, was ascribed to the maritime jealousy of england. "this was done," wrote the french commander, the duke of berwick, a bastard of the house of stuart, "in order that the english government may be able to show the next parliament that nothing has been neglected to diminish the navy of spain." the acts of sir george byng, as given by the english naval historian, make yet more manifest the purpose of england at this time. while the city and citadel of messina were being besieged by the austrians, english, and sardinians, a dispute arose as to the possession of the spanish men-of-war within the mole. byng, "reflecting within himself that possibly the garrison might capitulate for the safe return of those ships into spain, which he was determined not to suffer; that on the other hand the right of possession might breed an inconvenient dispute at a critical juncture among the princes concerned, and if it should at length be determined that they did not belong to england it were better they belonged to no one else, proposed to count de merci, the austrian general, to erect a battery and destroy them as they lay."[ ] after some demur on the part of the other leaders, this was done. if constant care and watchfulness deserve success, england certainly deserved her sea power; but what shall be said of the folly of france at this time and in this connection? the steady stream of reverses, and the hopelessness of contending for distant maritime possessions when without a navy, broke down the resistance of spain. england and france insisted upon the dismissal of alberoni, and philip yielded to the terms of the quadruple alliance. the austrian power, necessarily friendly to england, was thus firmly settled in the central mediterranean, in naples and sicily, as england herself was in gibraltar and port mahon. sir robert walpole, the minister now coming into power in england, failed at a later day to support this favorable conjunction, and so far betrayed the traditional policy of his country. the dominion of the house of savoy in sardinia, which then began, has lasted; it is only within our own day that the title king of sardinia has merged in the broader one of king of italy. contemporaneously with and for some time after the short episode of alberoni's ministry and spain's ambition, a struggle was going on around the shores of the baltic which must be mentioned, because it gave rise to another effectual illustration of the sea power of england, manifested alike in the north and south with a slightness of exertion which calls to mind the stories of the tap of a tiger's paw. the long contest between sweden and russia was for a moment interrupted in , by negotiations looking to peace and to an alliance between the two for the settlement of the succession in poland and the restoration of the stuarts in england. this project, on which had rested many of alberoni's hopes, was finally stopped by the death in battle of the swedish king. the war went on; and the czar, seeing the exhaustion of sweden, purposed its entire subjugation. this destruction of the balance of power in the baltic, making it a russian lake, suited neither england nor france; especially the former, whose sea power both for peace and war depended upon the naval stores chiefly drawn from those regions. the two western kingdoms interfered, both by diplomacy, while england besides sent her fleet. denmark, which was also at war with her traditional enemy sweden, readily yielded; but peter the great chafed heavily under the implied coercion, until at last orders were sent to the english admiral to join his fleet to that of the swedes and repeat in the baltic the history of cape passaro. the czar in alarm withdrew his fleet. this happened in ; but peter, though baffled, was not yet subdued. the following year the interposition of england was repeated with greater effect, although not in time to save the swedish coasts from serious injury; but the czar, recognizing the fixed purpose with which he had to deal, and knowing from personal observation and practical experience the efficiency of england's sea power, consented finally to peace. the french claim much for their own diplomacy in this happy result, and say that england supported sweden feebly; being willing that she should lose her provinces on the eastern shore of the baltic because russia, thus brought down to the sea-shore, could more easily open to english trade the vast resources of her interior. this may very possibly be true, and certainty can be felt that british interests, especially as to commerce and sea power, were looked after; but the character of peter the great is the guarantee that the argument which weighed most heavily with him was the military efficiency of the british fleet and its ability to move up to his very doors. by this peace of nystadt, august , , sweden abandoned livonia, esthonia, and other provinces on the east side of the baltic. this result was inevitable; it was yearly becoming less possible for small states to hold their own. it can readily be understood that spain was utterly discontented with the terms wrung from her by the quadruple alliance. the twelve years which followed are called years of peace, but the peace was very uncertain, and fraught with elements of future wars. the three great grievances rankling with spain were--sicily and naples in the possession of austria, gibraltar and mahon in the hands of england, and lastly, the vast contraband trade carried on by english merchants and ships in spanish america. it will be seen that england was the active supporter of all these injuries; england therefore was the special enemy of spain, but spain was not the only enemy of england. the quiet, such as it was, that succeeded the fall of alberoni was due mainly to the character and policy of the two ministers of france and england, who agreed in wishing a general peace. the policy and reasons of the french regent are already known. moved by the same reasons, and to remove an accidental offence taken by england, dubois obtained for her the further concession from spain, additional to the commercial advantages granted at utrecht, of sending a ship every year to trade in the west indies. it is said that this ship, after being anchored, was kept continually supplied by others, so that fresh cargo came in over one side as fast as the old was sent ashore from the other. dubois and the regent both died in the latter half of , after an administration of eight years, in which they had reversed the policy of richelieu by alliance with england and austria and sacrificing to them the interests of france. the regency and the nominal government of france passed to another member of the royal family; but the real ruler was cardinal fleuri, the preceptor of the young king, who was now thirteen years of age. efforts to displace the preceptor resulted only in giving him the title, as well as the power, of minister in . at this time sir robert walpole had become prime minister of england, with an influence and power which gave him practically the entire guidance of the policy of the state. the chief wish of both walpole and fleuri was peace, above all in western europe. france and england therefore continued to act together for that purpose, and though they could not entirely stifle every murmur, they were for several years successful in preventing outbreaks. but while the aims of the two ministers were thus agreed, the motives which inspired them were different. walpole desired peace because of the still unsettled condition of the english succession; for the peaceful growth of english commerce, which he had ever before his eyes; and probably also because his spirit, impatient of equals in the government, shrank from war which would raise up stronger men around him. fleuri, reasonably secure as to the throne and his own power, wished like walpole the peaceful development of his country, and shrank from war with the love of repose natural to old age; for he was seventy-three when he took office, and ninety when he laid it down in death. under his mild administration the prosperity of france revived; the passing traveller could note the change in the face of the country and of the people; yet it may be doubted whether this change was due to the government of the quiet old man, or merely to the natural elasticity of the people, no longer drained by war nor isolated from the rest of the world. french authorities say that agriculture did not revive throughout the country. it is certain, however, that the maritime prosperity of france advanced wonderfully, owing mainly to the removal of commercial restrictions in the years immediately following the death of louis xiv. the west india islands in particular throve greatly, and their welfare was naturally shared by the home ports that traded with them. the tropical climate of martinique, guadeloupe, and louisiana, and cultivation by slaves, lent themselves readily to the paternal, semi-military government which marks all french colonies, but which produced less happy results in the bitter weather of canada. in the west indies, france at this time obtained a decided preponderance over england; the value of the french half of hayti was alone equal to that of all the english west indies, and french coffee and sugar were driving those of england out of european markets. a like advantage over england in the mediterranean and levant trade is asserted by french historians. at the same time the east india company was revived, and its french depot, whose name tells its association with the east, the breton town of l'orient, quickly became a splendid city. pondicherry on the coromandel coast, and chandernagore on the ganges, the chief seats of french power and commerce in india, grew rapidly; the isle of bourbon and the isle of france, now the mauritius, whose position is so well suited for the control of the indian ocean, became, the one a rich agricultural colony, the other a powerful naval station. the monopoly of the great company was confined to the trade between home and the chief indian stations; the traffic throughout the indian seas was open to private enterprise and grew more rapidly. this great movement, wholly spontaneous, and even looked on with distrust by the government, was personified in two men, dupleix and la bourdonnais; who, the former at chandernagore and the latter at the isle of france, pointed out and led the way in all these undertakings, which were building up the power and renown of the french in the eastern seas. the movement was begun which, after making france the rival of england in the hindustan peninsula, and giving her for a moment the promise of that great empire which has bestowed a new title on the queen of great britain, was destined finally to falter and perish before the sea power of england. the extent of this expansion of french trade, consequent upon peace and the removal of restrictions, and not due in any sense to government protection, is evidenced by the growth of french merchant shipping from only three hundred vessels at the death of louis xiv., to eighteen hundred, twenty years later. this, a french historian claims, refutes "the deplorable prejudices, born of our misfortunes, that france is not fitted for sea commerce, the only commerce that indefinitely extends the power of a nation with its sphere of activity."[ ] this free and happy movement of the people was far from acceptable to fleuri, who seems to have seen it with the distrust of a hen that has hatched ducklings. walpole and himself were agreed to love peace; but walpole was obliged to reckon with the english people, and these were prompt to resent rivalry upon the sea and in trade, however obtained. moreover, fleuri had inherited the unfortunate policy of louis xiv.; his eyes were fixed on the continent. he did not indeed wish to follow the course of the regency in quarrelling with spain, but rather to draw near to her; and although he was not able for a time to do so without sacrificing his peace policy, because of spain's restless enmity to england, yet his mind was chiefly bent upon strengthening the position of france on the land, by establishing bourbon princes where he could, and drawing them together by family alliances. the navy was allowed to decay more and more. "the french government abandoned the sea at the very moment that the nation, through the activity of private individuals, was making an effort to regain it." the material force fell to fifty-four ships-of-the-line and frigates, mostly in bad condition; and even when war with england had been imminent for five years, france had but forty-five ships-of-the-line to england's ninety. this difference foreshadowed the results which followed a quarter of a century of war. during the same period walpole, relying upon fleuri's co-operation, resolutely set his face against open war between england and spain. the difficulties caused by the threatening and exasperating action of the latter country, and of such allies as she from time to time could raise, were met, and for a while successfully met, by naval demonstrations,--reminders of that sea power which one nation after another had felt and yielded to. in , the spanish king and the emperor agreed to sink their long-standing feud, and signed a treaty at vienna, in which there was a secret clause providing that the emperor would support the claim of spain to gibraltar and port mahon, by arms if necessary. russia also showed a disposition to join this confederacy. a counter-alliance was formed between england, france, and prussia; and english fleets were sent, one to the baltic to awe the czarina, another to the coast of spain to check that government and protect gibraltar, and a third to porto bello, on the spanish main, to blockade the fleet of galleons there assembled, and by cutting off the supplies remind the spanish king at once of his dependence upon the specie of america, and of england's control of the highway by which it reached him. walpole's aversion to war was marked by giving the admiral at porto bello the strictest orders not to fight, only to blockade; the consequence of which, through the long delay of the squadron upon the sickly coast, was a mortality among the crews that shocked the nation, and led, among other causes, to the minister's overthrow many years later. between three and four thousand officers and men, including admiral hosier himself, died there. walpole's aim, however, was reached; though spain made a foolish attack by land upon gibraltar, the presence of the english fleet assured its supplies and provisions and averted the formal outbreak of war. the emperor withdrew from the alliance, and under english pressure also revoked the charter of an east india company which he had authorized in the austrian netherlands, and which took its name from the port of ostend. english merchants demanded the removal of this competitor, and also of a similar rival established in denmark; both which concessions the english ministry, backed by holland, obtained. so long as commerce was not seriously disturbed, walpole's peace policy, accompanied as it naturally was by years of plenty and general content, was easily maintained, even though spain continued threatening and arrogant in her demands for gibraltar; but unfortunately she now entered more deeply upon a course of annoyance to english trade. the concessions of the asiento, or slave-trade, and of the annual ship to south america have been mentioned; but these privileges were but a part of the english commerce in those regions. the system of spain with regard to the trade of her colonies was of the narrowest and most exclusive character; but, while attempting to shut them out from foreign traffic, she neglected to provide for their wants herself. the consequence was that a great smuggling or contraband trade arose throughout her american possessions, carried on mainly by the english, who made their lawful traffic by the asiento and the yearly ship subserve also the unlawful, or at least unauthorized, trade. this system was doubtless advantageous to the great body of the spanish colonists, and was encouraged by them, while colonial governors connived at it, sometimes for money, sometimes swayed by local public opinion and their own knowledge of the hardships of the case; but there were spanish subjects who saw their own business injured by the use and abuse of english privileges, and the national government suffered both in pocket and in pride by these evasions of the revenue. it now began to pull the strings tighter. obsolete regulations were revived and enforced. words in which the action of spain in this old controversy have been described are curiously applicable to certain recent disputes to which the united states has been a party. "the letter of the treaty was now followed, though the spirit which dictated it was abandoned. although english ships still enjoyed the liberty of putting into spanish harbors for the purpose of refitting and provisioning, yet they were far from enjoying the same advantages of carrying on a friendly and commercial intercourse. they were now watched with a scrupulous jealousy, strictly visited by guarda-costas, and every efficient means adopted to prevent any commerce with the colonies, except what was allowed by the annual ship." if spain could have confined herself to closer watchfulness and to enforcing in her own waters vexatious customs regulations, not essentially different from those sanctioned by the general commercial ideas of that day, perhaps no further harm would have resulted; but the condition of things and the temper of her government would not let her stop there. it was not possible to guard and effectually seal a sea-coast extending over hundreds of miles, with innumerable inlets; nor would traders and seamen, in pursuit of gain which they had come to consider their right, be deterred by fears of penalties nor consideration for spanish susceptibilities. the power of spain was not great enough to enforce on the english ministry any regulation of their shipping, or stoppage of the abuse of the treaty privileges, in face of the feelings of the merchants; and so the weaker state, wronged and harassed, was goaded into the use of wholly unlawful means. ships-of-war and guarda-costas were instructed, or at least permitted, to stop and search english ships on the high seas, outside of spanish jurisdiction; and the arrogant spanish temper, unrestrained by the weak central government, made many of these visits, both the lawful and the unlawful, scenes of insult and even violence. somewhat similar results, springing from causes not entirely different, have occurred in the relations of spanish officials to the united states and american merchant-ships in our own day. the stories of these acts of violence coming back to england, coupled with cases of loss by confiscation and by the embarrassment of trade, of course stirred up the people. in the west india merchants petitioned the house of commons, saying,-- "for many years past their ships have not only frequently been stopped and searched, but also forcibly and arbitrarily seized upon the high seas, by spanish ships fitted out to cruise, under the plausible pretext of guarding their own coasts; that the commanders thereof, with their crews, have been inhumanly treated, and their ships carried into some of the spanish ports and there condemned with their cargoes, in manifest violation of the treaties subsisting between the two crowns; that the remonstrances of his majesty's ministers at madrid receive no attention, and that insults and plunder must soon destroy their trade." walpole struggled hard, during the ten years following , to keep off war. in that year a treaty signed at seville professed to regulate matters, restoring the conditions of trade to what they had been four years before, and providing that six thousand spanish troops should at once occupy the territory of tuscany and parma. walpole argued with his own people that war would lose them the commercial privileges they already enjoyed in spanish dominions; while with spain he carried on constant negotiations, seeking concessions and indemnities that might silence the home clamor. in the midst of this period a war broke out concerning the succession to the polish throne. the father-in-law of the french king was one claimant; austria supported his opponent. a common hostility to austria once more drew france and spain together, and they were joined by the king of sardinia, who hoped through this alliance to wrest milan from austria and add it to his own territory of piedmont. the neutrality of england and holland was secured by a promise not to attack the austrian netherlands, the possession of any part of which by france was considered to be dangerous to england's sea power. the allied states declared war against austria in october, , and their armies entered italy together; but the spaniards, intent on their long-cherished projects against naples and sicily, left the others and turned southward. the two kingdoms were easily and quickly conquered, the invaders having command of the sea and the favor of the population. the second son of the king of spain was proclaimed king under the title of carlos iii., and the bourbon kingdom of the two sicilies thus came into existence. walpole's aversion to war, leading him to abandon a long-standing ally, thus resulted in the transfer of the central mediterranean to a control necessarily unfriendly to great britain. but while walpole thus forsook the emperor, he was himself betrayed by his friend fleuri. while making the open alliance with spain against austria, the french government agreed to a secret clause directed against england. this engagement ran as follows: "whenever it seems good to both nations alike, the abuses which have crept into commerce, especially through the english, shall be abolished; and if the english make objection, france will ward off their hostility with all its strength by land and sea." "and this compact was made," as the biographer of lord hawke points out, "during a period of intimate and ostentatious alliance with england itself."[ ] "thus the policy against which william iii. had called on england and europe to arm, at last came into existence." had walpole known of this secret agreement, it might have seemed to him an additional argument in favor of peace; for, his keen political sagacity warning him of the existence of a danger which he yet could not see, he told the house of commons that "if the spaniards had not private encouragement from powers more considerable than themselves, they would never have ventured on the insults and injuries which have been proved at your bar;" and he expressed the opinion that "england was not a match for the french and spaniards too." fleuri had indeed given his old friend and fellow-statesman an ugly fall. the particular question which excited the two years' war of the polish succession, the choice of a ruler for a distracted kingdom fated soon to disappear from the list of european states, seems a small matter; but the turn imparted to european politics by the action of the powers engaged gives it a very different importance. france and austria came to an arrangement in october, , upon terms to which sardinia and spain afterward acceded, the principal points of which were as follows: the french claimant to the polish throne gave up his claim to it, and received instead the duchies of bar and lorraine on the east of france, with the provision that upon his death they were to go to his son-in-law, the king of france, in full sovereignty; the two kingdoms of sicily and naples were confirmed to the spanish bourbon prince, don carlos; and austria received back parma. the sardinian monarchy also got an increase to its italian territory. france thus, under the peace-loving fleuri, obtained in bar and lorraine an accession of strength which more warlike rulers had coveted in vain; and at the same time her external position was fortified at the expense of england, by the transfer of controlling positions in the central mediterranean to an ally. yet the heart of fleuri might well have failed him as he remembered the secret agreement to check the commerce of england, and thought of her mighty sea power alongside of the decayed navy of france. that compact between france and spain, to which the two sicilies acceded later, bore within it, in the then strained relations between england and spain, the germ of the great wars between england and the house of bourbon which issued in the creation of the british empire and the independence of the united states. the clamor in england over spanish outrages continued, and was carefully nursed by the opposition to walpole. the minister was now over sixty years of age, and scarcely able to change the settled convictions and policy of his prime. he was face to face with one of those irrepressible conflicts between nations and races toward which a policy of repression and compromise can be employed but for a short time. the english were bent upon opening the west indies and spanish america, the spanish government equally bent upon obstructing them. unfortunately for their policy of obstruction, they strengthened walpole's enemies by unlawful search of english ships on the open sea, and possibly also by outrages to english seamen. some of the latter were brought before the bar of the house of commons, and testified that they had been not merely plundered, but tortured, shut up in prison, and compelled to live and work under loathsome conditions. the most celebrated case was that of a certain jenkins, the master of a merchant-brig, who told that a spanish officer had torn off one of his ears, bidding him carry it to the king his master, and say that if he had been there he would have been served likewise. being asked what were his feelings at such a moment of danger and suffering, he was said to have replied, "i commended my soul to god and my cause to my country." this well-turned dramatic utterance from the mouth of a man of his class throws a suspicion of high coloring over the whole story; but it can be readily imagined what a capital campaign-cry it would be in the heat of a popular movement. the tide of feeling swept away walpole's patchwork of compromise, and war was declared against spain by great britain on the th of october, . the english ultimatum insisted upon a formal renunciation of the right of search as claimed and exercised by the spaniards, and upon an express acknowledgment of the british claims in north america. among these claims was one relating to the limits of georgia, then a recently established colony, touching the spanish territory of florida. how far the war thus urged on and begun by england, against the judgment of her able minister, was morally justifiable has been warmly argued on either side by english writers. the laws of spain with regard to the trade of her colonies did not differ in spirit from those of england herself as shown by her navigation act, and spanish naval officers found themselves in a position nearly identical with that of nelson when captain of a frigate in the west indies half a century later. american ships and merchants then, after the separation from the mother-country, continued the trade which they had enjoyed as colonists; nelson, zealous for the commercial advantage of england as then understood, undertook to enforce the act, and in so doing found against him the feeling of the west indians and of the colonial authorities. it does not seem that he or those supporting him searched unlawfully, for the power of england was great enough to protect her shipping interests without using irregular means; whereas spain between and , being weak, was tempted, as she has since been, to seize those whom she knew to have injured her wherever she could find them, even outside her lawful jurisdiction. after reading the entirely sympathetic presentation of the case of walpole's opponents, urging war, which is given by professor burrows in his life of lord hawke, a foreigner can scarcely fail to conclude that the spaniards were grievously wronged, according to the rights of the mother-country over colonies as commonly admitted in that day; though no nation could tolerate the right of search as claimed by them. it chiefly concerns our subject to notice that the dispute was radically a maritime question, that it grew out of the uncontrollable impulse of the english people to extend their trade and colonial interests. it is possible that france was acting under a similar impulse, as english writers have asserted; but the character and general policy of fleuri, as well as the genius of the french people, make this unlikely. there was no parliament and no opposition to make known popular opinion in the france of that day, and very different estimates of fleuri's character and administration have found voice since then. the english look rather at the ability which obtained lorraine for france and the sicilies for the house of bourbon, and blame walpole for being overreached. the french say of fleuri that "he lived from day to day seeking only to have quiet in his old age. he had stupefied france with opiates, instead of laboring to cure her. he could not even prolong this silent sleep until his own death."[ ] when the war broke out between england and spain, "the latter claimed the advantage of her defensive alliance with france. fleuri, grievously against his will, was forced to fit out a squadron; he did so in niggardly fashion." this squadron, of twenty-two ships, convoyed to america the spanish fleet assembled at ferrol, and the reinforcement prevented the english from attacking.[ ] "still, fleuri made explanations to walpole and hoped for compromise,--an ill-founded hope, which had disastrous results for our sea interests, and prevented measures which would have given france, from the beginning of the war, the superiority in eastern seas." but "upon walpole's overthrow," says another frenchman, "fleuri perceived his mistake in letting the navy decay. its importance had lately struck him. he knew that the kings of naples and sardinia forsook the french alliance merely because an english squadron threatened to bombard naples and genoa and to bring an army into italy. for lack of this element of greatness, france silently swallowed the greatest humiliations, and could only complain of the violence of english cruisers, which pillaged our commerce, in violation of the law of nations,"[ ] during the years of nominal peace that elapsed between the time when the french fleet was confined to protecting the spanish against the english and the outbreak of formal war. the explanation of these differing views seems not very hard. the two ministers had tacitly agreed to follow lines which apparently could not cross. france was left free to expand by land, provided she did not excite the jealousy of the english people, and walpole's own sense of english interests, by rivalry at sea. this course suited fleuri's views and wishes. the one sought power by sea, the other by land. which had been wiser, war was to show; for, with spain as an ally to one party, war had to come, and that on the sea. neither minister lived to see the result of his policy. walpole was driven from power in , and died in march, . fleuri died in office, january , . footnotes: [ ] afterward lord torrington; father of admiral john byng, shot in . [ ] campbell: lives of the admirals; quoted by lord mahon in his history of england. [ ] lives of the admirals [ ] martin: history of france. [ ] burrows: life of lord hawke. [ ] martin: history of france. [ ] the peculiar political relation which france bore toward england between and , while the latter country was at war with spain, needs to be explained, as it depended upon views of international duties which are practically obsolete. by her defensive alliance with spain, france had bound herself to furnish a contingent of specified force to the spanish fleet when that country was involved in war of a certain kind. she claimed, however, that her sending these succors was not such an act of hostility to england as involved a breach of the peace existing between the two nations. the french ships-of-war, while thus serving with the spanish fleet under the terms of the treaty, were enemies; but the french nation and all other armed forces of france, on sea and land, were neutrals, with all the privileges of neutrality. of course england was not bound to accept this view of the matter, and could make the action of france a _casus belli_; but france claimed it was not justly so, and england practically conceded the claim, though the relation was likely to lead to formal war, as it did in . a few years later the dutch will be found claiming the same privilege of neutrality toward france while furnishing a large contingent to the austrian army acting against her. [ ] lapeyrouse-bonfils: hist. de la marine française. chapter vii. war between great britain and spain, .--war of the austrian succession, .--france joins spain against great britain, .--sea battles of matthews, anson, and hawke.--peace of aix-la-chapelle, . we have now reached the opening of a series of great wars, destined to last with short intervals of peace for nearly half a century, and having, amid many misleading details, one broad characteristic distinguishing them from previous, and from many subsequent, wars. this strife embraced the four quarters of the world, and that not only as side issues here and there, the main struggle being in europe; for the great questions to be determined by it, concerning the world's history, were the dominion of the sea and the control of distant countries, the possession of colonies, and, dependent upon these, the increase of wealth. singularly enough it is not till nearly the end of the long contest that great fleets are found engaging, and the struggle transferred to its proper field, the sea. the action of sea power is evident enough, the issue plainly indicated from the beginning; but for a long time there is no naval warfare of any consequence, because the truth is not recognized by the french government. the movement toward colonial extension by france is wholly popular, though illustrated by a few great names; the attitude of the rulers is cold and mistrustful: hence came neglect of the navy, a foregone conclusion of defeat on the main question, and destruction for the time of her sea power. such being the character of the coming wars, it is important to realize the relative positions of the three great powers in those quarters of the world, outside of europe, where the strife was to engage. in north america, england now held the thirteen colonies, the original united states, from maine to georgia. in these colonies was to be found the highest development of that form of colonization peculiar to england, bodies of free men essentially self-governing and self-dependent, still enthusiastically loyal, and by occupation at once agricultural, commercial, and sea-faring. in the character of their country and its productions, in its long sea-coast and sheltered harbors, and in their own selves, they had all the elements of sea power, which had already received large development. on such a country and such a people the royal navy and army were securely based in the western hemisphere. the english colonists were intensely jealous of the french and canadians. france held canada and louisiana, a name much more extensive in its application then than now, and claimed the entire valley of the ohio and mississippi, by right of prior discovery, and as a necessary link between the st. lawrence and the gulf of mexico. there was as yet no adequate occupation of this intermediate country, nor was the claim admitted by england, whose colonists asserted the right to extend indefinitely westward. the strength of the french position was in canada; the st. lawrence gave them access to the heart of the country, and though newfoundland and nova scotia had been lost, in cape breton island they still held the key of the gulf and river. canada had the characteristics of the french colonial system planted in a climate least suited to it. a government paternal, military, and monkish discouraged the development of individual enterprise and of free association for common ends. the colonists abandoned commerce and agriculture, raising only food enough for immediate consumption, and were given to arms and hunting. their chief traffic was in furs. there was so little mechanical art among them that they bought of the english colonies part of the vessels for their interior navigation. the chief element of strength was the military, arms-bearing character of the population; each man was a soldier. besides the hostility inherited from the mother-countries, there was a necessary antagonism between two social and political systems, so directly opposed, and lying one alongside the other. the remoteness of canada from the west indies, and the inhospitable winter climate, made it, from the naval point of view, of much less value to france than the english colonies to england; besides which the resources and population were greatly inferior. in the population of canada was eighty thousand, that of the english colonies twelve hundred thousand. with such disparity of strength and resources, the only chance for canada lay in the support of the sea power of france, either by direct control of the neighboring seas, or by such powerful diversion elsewhere as would relieve the pressure upon her. on the continent of north america, in addition to mexico and the countries south of it, spain held florida; under which name were embraced extensive regions beyond the peninsula, not accurately defined, and having little importance at any period of these long wars. in the west indies and south america, spain held mainly what are still known as spanish american countries, besides cuba, porto rico, and part of hayti; france had guadeloupe, martinique, and the western half of hayti; england, jamaica, barbadoes, and some of the smaller islands. the fertile character of the soil, the commercial productions, and the less rigorous climate would seem to make these islands objects of particular ambition in a colonial war; but as a matter of fact no attempt was made, nor, except as to jamaica, which spain wished to recover, was any intention entertained of conquering any of the larger islands. the reason probably was that england, whose sea power made her the principal aggressor, was influenced in the direction of her efforts by the wishes of the great body of englishmen on the north american continent. the smaller west india islands are singly too small to be strongly held except by a power controlling the sea. they had a twofold value in war: one as offering military positions for such a power: the other a commercial value, either as adding to one's own resources or diminishing those of the enemy. war directed against them may be considered as a war upon commerce, and the islands themselves as ships or convoys loaded with enemy's wealth. they will be found therefore changing hands like counters, and usually restored when peace comes; though the final result was to leave most of them in the hands of england. nevertheless, the fact of each of the great powers having a share in this focus of commerce drew thither both large fleets and small squadrons, a tendency aided by the unfavorable seasons for military operations on the continent; and in the west indies took place the greater number of the fleet-actions that illustrated this long series of wars. [illustration: peninsula of india and ceylon.] in yet another remote region was the strife between england and france to be waged, and there, as in north america, finally decided by these wars. in india, the rival nations were represented by their east india companies, who directly administered both government and commerce. back of them, of course, were the mother-countries; but in immediate contact with the native rulers were the presidents and officers appointed by the companies. at this time the principal settlements of the english were,--on the west coast, bombay; on the east, calcutta upon the ganges, at some distance from the sea, and madras; while a little south of madras another town and station, known generally to the english as fort st. david, though sometimes called cuddalore, had been established later. the three presidencies of bombay, calcutta, and madras were at this time mutually independent, and responsible only to the court of directors in england. france was established at chandernagore, on the ganges, above calcutta; at pondicherry, on the east coast, eighty miles south of madras; and on the west coast, far to the south of bombay, she had a third station of inferior importance, called mahé. the french, however, had a great advantage in the possession of the intermediate station already pointed out in the indian ocean, the neighboring islands of france and bourbon. they were yet more fortunate in the personal character of the two men who were at this time at the head of their affairs in the indian peninsula and the islands, dupleix and la bourdonnais,--men to whom no rivals in ability or force of character had as yet appeared among the english indian officials. yet in these two men, whose cordial fellow-working might have ruined the english settlement in india, there appeared again that singular conflict of ideas, that hesitation between the land and the sea as the stay of power, a prophecy of which seems to be contained in the geographical position of france itself. the mind of dupleix, though not inattentive to commercial interests, was fixed on building up a great empire in which france should rule over a multitude of vassal native princes. in the pursuit of this end he displayed great tact and untiring activity, perhaps also a somewhat soaring and fantastic imagination; but when he met la bourdonnais, whose simpler and sounder views aimed at sea supremacy, at a dominion based upon free and certain communication with the home country instead of the shifting sands of eastern intrigues and alliances, discord at once arose. "naval inferiority," says a french historian who considers dupleix to have had the higher aims, "was the principal cause that arrested his progress;"[ ] but naval superiority was precisely the point at which la bourdonnais, himself a seaman and the governor of an island, aimed. it may be that with the weakness of canada, compared to the english colonies, sea power could not there have changed the actual issue; but in the condition of the rival nations in india everything depended upon controlling the sea. such were the relative situations of the three countries in the principal foreign theatres of war. no mention has been made of the colonies on the west coast of africa, because they were mere trading stations having no military importance. the cape of good hope was in possession of the dutch, who took no active part in the earlier wars, but long maintained toward england a benevolent neutrality, surviving from the alliance in the former wars of the century. it is necessary to mention briefly the condition of the military navies, which were to have an importance as yet unrealized. neither precise numbers nor an exact account of condition of the ships can be given; but the relative efficiency can be fairly estimated. campbell, the english contemporary naval historian, says that in the english navy had eighty-four ships-of-the-line, from sixty guns up; forty -gun ships, and fifty-four frigates and smaller vessels. in this number had fallen to seventy ships-of-the-line and nineteen -gun ships. in , after four years of war with spain alone, the number was ninety ships-of-the-line and eighty-four frigates. the french navy at the same time he estimates at forty-five ships-of-the-line and sixty-seven frigates. in , near the end of the first war, he says that the royal navy of spain was reduced to twenty-two ships-of-the-line, that of france to thirty-one, while the english had risen to one hundred and twenty-six. the french writers consulted are less precise in their figures, but agree in representing not only that the navy was reduced to a pitiful number of ships, but that these were in bad condition and the dock-yards destitute of materials. this neglect of the navy lasted more or less throughout these wars, until , when the sense of the nation was aroused to the importance of restoring it; too late, however, to prevent the most serious of the french losses. in england as well as in france discipline and administration had been sapped by the long peace; the inefficiency of the armaments sent out was notorious, and recalls the scandals that marked the outbreak of the crimean war; while the very disappearance of the french ships led, by the necessity of replacing them, to putting afloat vessels superior singly, because more modern and scientific, to the older ships of the same class in england. care must be had, however, in accepting too easily the complaints of individual writers; french authors will be found asserting that english ships are faster, while at the same period englishmen complain that they are slower. it may be accepted as generally true that the french ships built between and were better designed and larger, class for class, than the english. the latter had the undoubted superiority both in the number and quality of the seamen and officers. keeping some fleets always afloat, whether better or worse, the officers could not quite lose touch of their profession; whereas in france it is said that not one fifth of the officers were, in , employed. this superiority was kept and increased by the practice, which henceforth obtained, of blockading the french military ports with superior force; the enemy's squadrons when they put to sea found themselves at once at a disadvantage in point of practical skill. on the other hand, large as was the number of english seamen, the demands of commerce were so great that war found them scattered all over the world, and part of the fleet was always paralyzed for lack of crews. this constant employment assured good seamanship, but the absence of so many men had to be supplied by an indiscriminate press, which dragged in a class of miserable and sickly men, sadly diluting the quality of the whole. to realize the condition of ships' companies of that day, it will be necessary only to read the accounts of those sent to anson starting for a cruise round the world, or to hawke when fitting out for war service; the statements are now almost incredible, and the results most deplorable. it was not a question of sanitation only; the material sent was entirely unfit to meet the conditions of sea life under the most favorable circumstances. in both the french and english service a great deal of weeding among the officers was necessary. those were the palmy days of court and political influence; and, moreover, it is not possible, after a long peace, at once to pick out from among the fairest-seeming the men who will best stand the tests of time and exposure to the responsibilities of war. there was in both nations a tendency to depend upon officers who had been in their prime a generation before, and the results were not fortunate. war having been declared against spain by england in october, , the first attempts of the latter power were naturally directed against the spanish-american colonies, the cause of the dispute, in which it was expected to find an easy and rich prey. the first expedition sailed under admiral vernon in november of the same year, and took porto bello by a sudden and audacious stroke, but found only the insignificant sum of ten thousand dollars in the port whence the galleons sailed. returning to jamaica, vernon received large reinforcements of ships, and was joined by a land force of twelve thousand troops. with this increased force, attempts were made upon both cartagena and santiago de cuba, in the years and , but in both wretched failures resulted; the admiral and the general quarrelled, as was not uncommon in days when neither had an intelligent comprehension of the other's business. marryatt, when characterizing such misunderstandings by a humorous exaggeration, seems to have had in view this attempt on cartagena: "the army thought that the navy might have beaten down stone ramparts ten feet thick; and the navy wondered why the army had not walked up the same ramparts, which were thirty feet perpendicular." another expedition, justly celebrated for the endurance and perseverance shown by its leader, and famous both for the hardships borne and singular final success, was sent out in under anson. its mission was to pass round cape horn and attack the spanish colonies on the west coast of south america. after many delays, due apparently to bad administration, the squadron finally got away toward the end of . passing the cape at the worst season of the year, the ships met a series of tempests of the most violent kind; the squadron was scattered, never all to meet again, and anson, after infinite peril, succeeded in rallying a part of it at juan fernandez. two ships had put back to england, a third was lost to the southward of chiloe. with the three left to him he cruised along the south american coast, taking some prizes and pillaging the town of payta, intending to touch near panama and join hands with vernon for the capture of that place and the possession of the isthmus, if possible. learning of the disaster at cartagena, he then determined to cross the pacific and waylay the two galleons that sailed yearly from acapulco to manila. in the passage across, one of the two ships now left to him was found in such bad condition that she had to be destroyed. with the other he succeeded in his last undertaking, capturing the great galleon with a million and a half dollars in specie. the expedition, from its many misfortunes, had no military result beyond the terror and consequent embarrassment caused to the spanish settlements; but its very misfortunes, and the calm persistency which worked out a great success from them all, have given it a well-deserved renown. during the year happened two events which led to a general european war breaking in upon that in which spain and england were already engaged. in may of that year frederick the great became king of prussia, and in october the emperor charles vi., formerly the austrian claimant of the spanish throne, died. he had no son, and left by will the sovereignty of his estates to his eldest daughter, the celebrated maria theresa, to secure whose succession the efforts of his diplomacy had been directed for many years. this succession had been guaranteed by the european powers; but the apparent weakness of her position excited the ambitions of other sovereigns. the elector of bavaria laid claim to the whole inheritance, in which he was supported by france; while the prussian king claimed and seized the province of silesia. other powers, large and small, threw in their lot with one or the other; while the position of england was complicated by her king being also elector of hanover, and in that capacity hurriedly contracting an obligation of neutrality for the electorate, although english feeling was strongly in favor of austria. meanwhile the failure of the spanish-american expeditions and the severe losses of english commerce increased the general outcry against walpole, who resigned early in . england under the new ministry became the open ally of austria; and parliament voted not only a subsidy to the empress-queen, but also a body of troops to be sent as auxiliaries to the austrian netherlands. at the same time holland, under english influence, and bound like england by previous treaties to support the succession of maria theresa, also voted a subsidy. here occurs again that curious view of international relations before mentioned. both of these powers thus entered the war against france, but only as auxiliaries to the empress, not as principals; as nations, except the troops actually in the field, they were considered to be still at peace. such an equivocal situation could in the end have only one result. on the sea france had already assumed the same position of auxiliary to spain, in virtue of the defensive alliance between the two kingdoms, while affecting still to be at peace with england; and it is curious to see the gravity with which french writers complain of assaults upon french by english ships, upon the plea that there was no open war between the two states. it has already been mentioned that in a french squadron supported a division of spanish ships on their way to america. in , spain, having now entered the continental war as an enemy of austria, sent a body of fifteen thousand troops from barcelona to attack the austrian possessions in italy. the english admiral haddock, in the mediterranean, sought and found the spanish fleet; but with it was a division of twelve french sail-of-the-line, whose commander informed haddock that he was engaged in the same expedition and had orders to fight, if the spaniards, though formally at war with england, were attacked. as the allies were nearly double his force, the english admiral was obliged to go back to port mahon. he was soon after relieved; and the new admiral, matthews, held at once the two positions of commander-in-chief in the mediterranean and english minister at turin, the capital of the king of sardinia. in the course of the year an english captain in his fleet, chasing some spanish galleys, drove them into the french port of st. tropez, and following them into the harbor burned them, in spite of the so-called neutrality of france. in the same year matthews sent a division of ships under commodore martin to naples, to compel the bourbon king to withdraw his contingent of twenty thousand troops serving with the spanish army in northern italy against the austrians. to the attempts to negotiate, martin replied only by pulling out his watch and giving the government an hour to come to terms. there was nothing for it but submission; and the english fleet left the harbor after a stay of twenty-four hours, having relieved the empress of a dangerous enemy. henceforward it was evident that the spanish war in italy could only be maintained by sending troops through france; england controlled the sea and the action of naples. these two last incidents, at st. tropez and naples, deeply impressed the aged fleuri, who recognized too late the scope and importance of a well-founded sea power. causes of complaint were multiplying on both sides, and the moment was fast approaching when both france and england must quit the pretence of being only auxiliaries in the war. before it came to that, however, the controlling sea power and wealth of england again made itself felt by attaching the king of sardinia to the austrian cause. between the dangers and advantages of the french or english alliance the king's action was determined by a subsidy and the promise of a strong english fleet in the mediterranean; in return he engaged to enter the war with an army of forty-five thousand men. this compact was signed in september, . in october, fleuri being now dead, louis xv. made with spain a treaty, by which he engaged to declare war against england and sardinia, and to support the spanish claims in italy, as also to gibraltar, mahon, and georgia. open war was thus near at hand, but the declaration was still deferred. the greatest sea fight that took place occurred while nominal peace yet existed. [illustration: pl. vii. matthews. feb., ., pl. viia. byng. may, .] in the latter part of the infante philip of spain had sought to land on the coast of the genoese republic, which was unfriendly to the austrians; but the attempt had been frustrated by the english fleet, and the spanish ships forced to retreat into toulon. they lay there for four months, unable to go out on account of the english superiority. in this dilemma the court of spain applied to louis xv. and obtained an order for the french fleet, under the command of admiral de court,--an old man of eighty years, a veteran of the days of louis xiv.,--to escort the spaniards either to the gulf of genoa or to their own ports, it does not clearly appear which. the french admiral was ordered not to fire unless he was attacked. in order to secure the best co-operation of the spaniards, whose efficiency he probably distrusted, de court proposed, as ruyter had done in days long gone by, to scatter their ships among his own; but as the spanish admiral, navarro, refused, the line-of-battle was formed with nine french ships in the van, in the centre six french and three spaniards, in the rear nine spanish ships; in all, twenty-seven. in this order the combined fleets sailed from toulon february , . the english fleet, which had been cruising off hyères in observation, chased, and on the d its van and centre came up with the allies; but the rear division was then several miles to windward and astern, quite out of supporting distance (plate vii., r). the wind was easterly, both fleets heading to the southward, and the english had the weather-gage. the numbers were nearly equal, the english having twenty-nine to the allied twenty-seven; but this advantage was reversed by the failure of the english rear to join. the course of the rear-admiral has been generally attributed to ill-will toward matthews; for although he proved that in his separated position he made all sail to join, he did not attack later on when he could, on the plea that the signal for the line-of-battle was flying at the same time as the signal to engage; meaning that he could not leave the line to fight without disobeying the order to form line. this technical excuse was, however, accepted by the subsequent court-martial. under the actual conditions matthews, mortified and harassed by the inaction of his lieutenant, and fearing that the enemy would escape if he delayed longer, made the signal to engage when his own van was abreast the enemy's centre, and at once bore down himself out of the line and attacked with his flag-ship of ninety guns the largest ship in the enemy's line, the "royal philip," of one hundred and ten guns, carrying the flag of the spanish admiral (a). in doing this he was bravely supported by his next ahead and astern. the moment of attack seems to have been judiciously chosen; five spanish ships had straggled far to the rear, leaving their admiral with the support only of his next ahead and astern, while three other spaniards continued on with the french. the english van stood on, engaging the allied centre, while the allied van was without antagonists. being thus disengaged, the latter was desirous of tacking to windward of the head of the english line, thus putting it between two fires, but was checked by the intelligent action of the three leading english captains, who, disregarding the signal to bear down, kept their commanding position and stopped the enemy's attempts to double. for this they were cashiered by the court-martial, but afterward restored. this circumspect but justifiable disregard of signals was imitated without any justification by all the english captains of the centre, save the admiral's seconds already mentioned, as well as by some of those in the van, who kept up a cannonade at long range while their commander-in-chief was closely and even furiously engaged. the one marked exception was captain hawke, afterward the distinguished admiral, who imitated the example of his chief, and after driving his first antagonist out of action, quitted his place in the van (b), brought to close quarters (b') a fine spanish ship that had kept at bay five other english ships, and took her,--the only prize made that day. the commander of the english van, with his seconds, also behaved with spirit and came to close action. it is unnecessary to describe the battle further; as a military affair it deserves no attention, and its most important result was to bring out the merit of hawke, whom the king and the government always remembered for his share in it. the general inefficiency and wide-spread misbehavior of the english captains, after five years of declared war, will partly explain the failure of england to obtain from her undoubted naval superiority the results she might have expected in this war--the first act in a forty years' drama--and they give military officers a lesson on the necessity of having their minds prepared and stocked, by study of the conditions of war in their own day, if they would not be found unready and perhaps disgraced in the hour of battle.[ ] it is not to be supposed that so many english seamen misbehaved through so vulgar and rare a defect as mere cowardice; it was unpreparedness of mind and lack of military efficiency in the captains, combined with bad leadership on the part of the admiral, with a possible taint of ill will toward him as a rude and domineering superior, that caused this fiasco. attention may here fitly be drawn to the effect of a certain cordiality and good-will on the part of superiors toward their subordinates. it is not perhaps essential to military success, but it undoubtedly contributes to the other elements of that success a spirit, a breath of life, which makes possible what would otherwise be impossible; which reaches heights of devotion and achievement that the strictest discipline, not so enkindled, cannot attain. doubtless it is a natural gift. the highest example of it possibly ever known among seamen was nelson. when he joined the fleet just before trafalgar, the captains who gathered on board the flag-ship seemed to forget the rank of their admiral in their desire to testify their joy at meeting him. "this nelson," wrote captain duff, who fell in the battle, "is so lovable and excellent a man, so kindly a leader, that we all wish to exceed his desires and anticipate his orders." he himself was conscious of this fascination and its value, when writing of the battle of the nile to lord howe, he said, "i had the happiness to command a band of brothers." the celebrity attained by matthews's action off toulon, certainly not due to the skill with which it was managed, nor to its results, sprang from the clamor at home, and chiefly from the number and findings of the courts-martial that followed. both the admiral and his second, and also eleven captains out of the twenty-nine, had charges preferred against them. the admiral was cashiered because he had broken the line; that is, because his captains did not follow him when he left it to get at the enemy,--a decision that smacks more of the irish bull than of the irish love of fighting. the second was acquitted on the technical grounds already given; he avoided the fault of breaking the line by keeping far enough away. of the eleven captains one died, one deserted, seven were dismissed or suspended, two only were acquitted. nor were the french and spaniards better pleased; mutual recriminations passed. admiral de court was relieved from his command, while the spanish admiral was decorated by his government with the title of marquis de la victoria, a most extraordinary reward for what was at best a drawn fight. the french, on the other hand, assert that he left the deck on the plea of a very slight wound, and that the ship was really fought by a french captain who happened to be on board. to use a common expression, this battle, the first general action since that off malaga forty years before, "woke up" the english people and brought about a healthful reaction. the sifting process begun by the battle itself was continued, but the result was reached too late to have its proper effect on the current war. it is rather by its deficient action, than by such conspicuous successes as were attained in earlier and later times, that the general value of england's sea power is now shown; like some precious faculty, scarcely valued when possessed, but keenly missed when withdrawn. mistress now of the seas rather by the weakness of her enemies than by her own disciplined strength, she drew from that mastery no adequate results; the most solid success, the capture of cape breton island, in , was achieved by the colonial forces of new england, to which indeed the royal navy lent valuable aid, for to troops so situated the fleet is the one line of communication. the misconduct off toulon was repeated by officers high in command in the west and east indies, resulting in the latter case in the loss of madras. other causes concurred with the effete condition of the naval officers to hamper the action of that sea power which launches out far from home. the condition of england itself was insecure; the cause of the stuarts was still alive, and though a formidable invasion by fifteen thousand troops under marshal saxe, in , was foiled, partly by the english channel fleet, and partly by a storm which wrecked several of the transports assembled off dunkirk, with the loss of many lives, yet the reality of the danger was shown in the following year, when the pretender landed in scotland with only a few men at his back and the northern kingdom rose with him. his successful invasion was carried well down into england itself; and sober historians have thought that at one time the chances of ultimate success were rather with than against him. another serious fetter upon the full use of england's power was the direction given to the french operations on land and the mistaken means used to oppose them. neglecting germany, france turned upon the austrian netherlands, a country which england, out of regard to her sea interests, was not willing to see conquered. her commercial preponderance would be directly threatened by the passing of antwerp, ostend, and the scheldt into the hands of her great rival; and though her best check against this would have been to seize valuable french possessions elsewhere and hold them as a pledge, the weakness of her government and the present inefficiency of the navy prevented her doing so. the position of hanover, again, controlled the action of england; for though united only by the tie of a common sovereign, the love of that sovereign for his continental dominion, his native country, made itself strongly felt in the councils of a weak and time-serving ministry. it was the disregard of hanover by the first william pitt, consequent upon his strong english feeling, that incensed the king and led him so long to resist the demands of the nation that he should be put at the head of affairs. these different causes--dissension at home, interest in the netherlands, regard for hanover--combined to prevent a subservient and second-rate ministry, divided also among themselves, from giving a proper direction and infusing a proper spirit into the naval war; but a better condition of the navy itself, more satisfactory results from it, might have modified even their action. as it was, the outcome of the war was almost nothing as regards the disputes between england and her special enemies. on the continent, the questions after reduced themselves to two,--what part of the austrian possessions should be given to prussia, spain, and sardinia, and how peace was to be wrenched by france from england and holland. the sea countries still, as of old, bore the expenses of the war, which however now fell chiefly upon england. marshal saxe, who commanded the french in flanders throughout this war, summed up the situation in half a dozen words to his king. "sire," said he, "peace is within the walls of maestricht." this strong city opened the course of the meuse and the way for the french army into the united provinces from the rear; for the english fleet, in conjunction with that of holland, prevented an attack from the sea. by the end of , despite the efforts of the allies, nearly all belgium was in the hands of the french; but up to this time, although dutch subsidies were supporting the austrian government, and dutch troops in the netherlands were fighting for it, there was nominal peace between the united provinces and france. in april, , "the king of france invaded dutch flanders, announcing that he was obliged to send his army into the territory of the republic, to arrest the protection granted by the states-general to the austrian and english troops; but that he had no intention of breaking with it, and that the places and provinces occupied would be restored to the united provinces as soon as they gave proof that they had ceased to succor the enemies of france." this was actual, but not formal, war. numerous places fell during the year, and the successes of the french inclined both holland and england to come to terms. negotiations went on during the winter; but in april, , saxe invested maestricht. this forced a peace. meanwhile, though languishing, the sea war was not wholly uneventful. two encounters between english and french squadrons happened during the year , completing the destruction of the french fighting navy. in both cases the english were decidedly superior; and though there was given opportunity for some brilliant fighting by particular captains, and for the display of heroic endurance on the part of the french, greatly outnumbered but resisting to the last, only one tactical lesson is afforded. this lesson is, that when an enemy, either as the result of battle or from original inequality, is greatly inferior in force, obliged to fly without standing on the order of his flying, the regard otherwise due to order must be in a measure at least dismissed, and a general chase ordered. the mistake of tourville in this respect after beachy head has already been noted. in the first of the cases now under discussion, the english admiral anson had fourteen ships against eight french, weaker individually as well as in total number; in the second, sir edward hawke had fourteen against nine, the latter being somewhat larger, ship for ship, than the english. in both cases the signal was made for a general chase, and the action which resulted was a _mêlée_. there was no opportunity for anything else; the one thing necessary was to overtake the running enemy, and that can only certainly be done by letting the fleetest or best situated ships get ahead, sure that the speed of the fastest pursuers is better than that of the slowest of the pursued, and that therefore either the latter must be abandoned or the whole force brought to bay. in the second case the french commander, commodore l'Étenduère, did not have to be followed far. he had with him a convoy of two hundred and fifty merchant-ships; detaching one ship-of-the-line to continue the voyage with the convoy, he placed himself with the other eight between it and the enemy, awaiting the attack under his topsails. as the english came up one after another they divided on either side of the french column, which was thus engaged on both sides. after an obstinate resistance, six of the french ships were taken, but the convoy was saved. the english had been so roughly handled that the two remaining french men-of-war got back safely to france. if, therefore, sir edward hawke showed in his attack the judgment and dash which always distinguished that remarkable officer, it may be claimed for commodore l'Étenduère that fortune, in assigning him the glorious disadvantage of numbers, gave him also the leading part in the drama, and that he filled it nobly. a french officer justly remarks that "he defended his convoy as on shore a position is defended, when the aim is to save an army corps or to assure an evolution; he gave himself to be crushed. after an action that lasted from mid-day till eight p.m. the convoy was saved, thanks to the obstinacy of the defence; two hundred and fifty ships were saved to their owners by the devotion of l'Étenduère and of the captains under his orders. this devotion cannot be questioned, for eight ships had but few chances of surviving an action with fourteen; and not only did the commander of the eight accept an action which he might possibly have avoided, but he knew how to inspire his lieutenants with trust in him; for all supported the strife with honor, and yielded at last, showing the most indisputable proofs of their fine and energetic defence. four ships were entirely dismasted, two had only the foremast standing."[ ] the whole affair, as conducted on both sides, affords an admirable study of how to follow up an advantage, original or acquired, and of the results that may be obtained by a gallant, even hopeless defence, for the furtherance of a particular object. it may be added that hawke, disabled from further pursuit himself, sent a sloop of war express to the west indies, with information of the approach of the convoy,--a step which led to the capture of part of it, and gives a touch of completeness to the entire transaction, which cannot fail to be gratifying to a military student interested in seeing the actors in history fully alive to and discharging to the utmost their important tasks. before bringing to a close the story of this war and mentioning the peace settlement, an account must be given of the transactions in india, where france and england were then on equal terms. it has been said that affairs there were controlled by the east india companies of either nation; and that the french were represented in the peninsula by dupleix, in the islands by la bourdonnais. the latter was appointed to his post in , and his untiring genius had been felt in all the details of administration, but especially in converting the isle of france into a great naval station,--a work which had to be built up from the foundations. everything was wanting; everything was by him in greater or less measure supplied,--storehouses, dock-yards, fortifications, seamen. in , when war between france and england became probable, he obtained from the east india company a squadron, though smaller than he asked, with which he proposed to ruin the english commerce and shipping; but when war actually began in , he received orders not to attack the english, the french company hoping that neutrality might exist between the companies in that distant region, though the nations were at war. the proposition does not seem absurd in view of the curious relations of holland to france, nominally at peace while sending troops to the austrian army; but it was much to the advantage of the english, who were inferior in the indian seas. their company accepted the proffer, while saying that it of course could bind neither the home government nor the royal navy. the advantage won by the forethought of la bourdonnais was thus lost; though first, and long alone, on the field, his hand was stayed. meanwhile the english admiralty sent out a squadron and began to seize french ships between india and china; not till then did the company awake from its illusion. having done this part of its work, the english squadron sailed to the coast of india, and in july, , appeared off pondicherry, the political capital of french india, prepared to sustain an attack which the governor of madras was about to make by land. la bourdonnais' time was now come. meanwhile, on the mainland of the indian peninsula, dupleix had been forming wide views and laying broad foundations for the establishment of french preponderance. having entered the service of their company at first in a subordinate clerical position, his ability had raised him by rapid steps to be head of the commercial establishments at chandernagore, to which he gave a very great enlargement, seriously affecting, it is said even destroying, parts of the english trade. in he was made governor-general, and as such removed to pondicherry. here he began to develop his policy, which aimed at bringing india under the power of france. he saw that through the progress and extension of the european races over the seas of the whole world the time had come when the eastern peoples must be brought into ever-increasing contact with them; and he judged that india, so often conquered before, was now about to be conquered by europeans. he meant that france should win the prize, and saw in england the only rival. his plan was to meddle in indian politics: first, as head of a foreign and independent colony, which he already was; and second, as a vassal of the great mogul, which he intended to become. to divide and conquer, to advance the french lines and influence by judicious alliances, to turn wavering scales by throwing in on one side or the other the weight of french courage and skill,--such were his aims. pondicherry, though a poor harbor, was well adapted for his political plans; being far distant from delhi, the capital of the mogul, aggressive extension might go on unmarked, until strong enough to bear the light. dupleix's present aim, therefore, was to build up a great french principality in southeast india, around pondicherry, while maintaining the present positions in bengal. let it be noted, however,--and the remark is necessary in order to justify the narration of these plans in connection with our subject, a connection perhaps not at first evident,--that the kernel of the question now before dupleix was not how to build up an empire out of the indian provinces and races, but how to get rid of the english, and that finally. the wildest dreams of sovereignty he may have entertained could not have surpassed the actual performance of england a few years later. european qualities were bound to tell, if not offset by the opposition of other europeans; and such opposition on the one side or the other depended upon the control of the sea. in a climate so deadly to the white races the small numbers whose heroism bore up the war against fearful odds on many a field must be continually renewed. as everywhere and always, the action of sea power was here quiet and unperceived; but it will not be necessary to belittle in the least the qualities and career of clive the english hero of this time and the founder of their empire, in order to prove the decisive influence which it exerted, despite the inefficiency of the english naval officers first engaged, and the lack of conclusive results in such naval battles as were fought.[ ] if during the twenty years following , french fleets instead of english had controlled the coasts of the peninsula and the seas between it and europe, can it be believed that the schemes of dupleix would have utterly failed? "naval inferiority," justly says a french historian, "was the principal cause that arrested the progress of dupleix. the french royal navy did not make its appearance in the east indies" in his day. it remains to tell the story briefly. the english, in , made preparations to besiege pondicherry, in which the royal navy was to support the land forces; but the effects of dupleix's political schemes were at once seen. the nabob of the carnatic threatened to attack madras, and the english desisted. the following year la bourdonnais appeared on the scene, and an action took place between his squadron and that under commodore peyton; after which, although it had been a drawn fight, the english officer deserted the coast, taking refuge in ceylon, and leaving the control at sea with the french. la bourdonnais anchored at pondicherry, where quarrels between him and dupleix soon arose, and were aggravated by the conflicting tone of their instructions from home. in september he went to madras, attacked by land and sea, and took the place, but made with the governor the stipulation that it might be ransomed; and a ransom of two million dollars was accordingly paid. when dupleix heard of this he was very angry, and claimed to annul the terms of capitulation on the ground that, once taken, the place was within his jurisdiction. la bourdonnais resented this attempt as dishonorable to him after the promise given. while the quarrel was going on, a violent cyclone wrecked two of his ships and dismasted the rest. he soon after returned to france, where his activity and zeal were repaid by three years' imprisonment under charges, from the effects of which treatment he died. after his departure dupleix broke the capitulation, seized and kept madras, drove out the english settlers, and went on to strengthen the fortifications. from madras he turned against fort st. david, but the approach of an english squadron compelled him to raise the siege in march, . during this year the disasters to the french navy in the atlantic, already related, left the english undisturbed masters of the sea. in the following winter they sent to india the greatest european fleet yet seen in the east, with a large land force, the whole under the command of admiral boscawen, who bore a general's commission in addition to his naval rank. the fleet appeared off the coromandel coast in august, . pondicherry was attacked by land and sea, but dupleix made a successful resistance. the english fleet in its turn suffered from a hurricane, and the siege was raised in october. shortly after came the news of the peace of aix-la-chapelle, which ended the european war. dupleix, with his home communications restored, could now resume his subtle and persevering efforts to secure a territorial base which should, as far as possible, shelter him from the chances of sea war. pity that so much genius and patience should have been spent in an effort wholly vain; nothing could protect against that sea attack but a naval aid, which the home government could not give. one of the conditions of the peace was that madras should be restored to the english in exchange for louisburg, the prize won by the north american colonists and released by them as reluctantly as madras was by dupleix. this was indeed illustrating napoleon's boast that he would reconquer pondicherry on the bank of the vistula; yet, although the maritime supremacy of england made louisburg in her hands much stronger than madras, or any other position in india, when held by the french, the gain by the exchange was decidedly on the side of great britain. the english colonists were not men to be contented with this action; but they knew the naval power of england, and that they could do again what they had done once, at a point not far distant from their own shores. they understood the state of the case. not so with madras. how profound must have been the surprise of the native princes at this surrender, how injurious to the personality of dupleix and the influence he had gained among them, to see him, in the very hour of victory, forced, by a power they could not understand, to relinquish his spoil! they were quite right; the mysterious power which they recognized by its working, though they saw it not, was not in this or that man, king or statesman, but in that control of the sea which the french government knew forbade the hope of maintaining that distant dependency against the fleets of england. dupleix himself saw it not; for some years more he continued building, on the sand of oriental intrigues and lies, a house which he vainly hoped would stand against the storms that must descend upon it. the treaty of aix-la-chapelle, ending this general war, was signed april , , by england, france, and holland, and finally by all the powers in october of the same year. with the exception of certain portions shorn off the austrian empire,--silesia for prussia, parma for the infante philip of spain, and some italian territory to the east of piedmont for the king of sardinia,--the general tenor of the terms was a return to the status before the war. "never, perhaps, did any war, after so many great events, and so large a loss of blood and treasure, end in replacing the nations engaged in it so nearly in the same situation as they held at first." in truth, as regarded france, england, and spain, the affair of the austrian succession, supervening so soon upon the outbreak of war between the two latter, had wholly turned hostilities aside from their true direction and postponed for fifteen years the settlement of disputes which concerned them much more nearly than the accession of maria theresa. in the distress of her old enemy, the house of austria, france was easily led to renew her attacks upon it, and england as easily drawn to oppose the attempts of the french to influence or dictate in german affairs,--a course the more readily followed from the german interests of the king. it may be questioned whether the true policy for france was to direct the war upon the heart of the austrian empire, by way of the rhine and germany, or, as she finally did, upon the remote possessions of the netherlands. in the former case she rested on friendly territory in bavaria, and gave a hand to prussia, whose military power was now first felt. such was the first theatre of the war. on the other hand, in the netherlands, whither the chief scene of hostilities shifted later, france struck not only at austria, but also at the sea powers, always jealous of her intrusion there. they were the soul of the war against her, by their subsidies to her other enemies and by the losses inflicted on her commerce and that of spain. the misery of france was alleged to the king of spain by louis xv., as forcing him to conclude peace; and it is evident that the suffering must have been great to induce him to yield such easy terms as he did, when he already held the netherlands and parts of holland itself by force of arms. but while so successful on the continent, his navy was annihilated and communication with the colonies thus cut off; and though it may be doubted whether the french government of that day cherished the colonial ambitions ascribed to it by some, it is certain french commerce was suffering enormously. while this was the condition of france, impelling her to peace, england in found that, from disputes about trade in spanish america and through the inefficient action of her navy, she had been led away into a continental war, in which she had met with disaster, incurred nearly £ , , of debt, and now saw her ally holland threatened with invasion. the peace itself was signed under a threat by the french envoy that the slightest delay would be the signal for the french to destroy the fortifications of the captured towns and at once begin the invasion. at the same time her own resources were drained, and holland, exhausted, was seeking to borrow from her. "money," we are told, "was never so scarce in the city, and cannot be had at twelve per cent." had france, therefore, at this time had a navy able to make head against that of england, even though somewhat inferior in strength, she might, with her grip on the netherlands and maestricht, have exacted her own conditions. england, on the other hand, though driven to the wall on the continent, was nevertheless able to obtain peace on equal terms, through the control of the sea by her navy. the commerce of all three nations had suffered enormously, but the balance of prizes in favor of great britain was estimated at £ , , . stated in another way, it is said that the combined losses of french and spanish commerce amounted during the war to , ships, the english to , ; but in considering such figures, the relation they bear to the total merchant shipping of either nation must not be forgotten. a thousand vessels were a very much larger fraction of french shipping than of english, and meant more grievous loss. "after the disaster to the squadron of l'Étenduère," says a french writer, "the french flag did not appear at sea. twenty-two ships-of-the-line composed the navy of france, which sixty years before had one hundred and twenty. privateers made few prizes; followed everywhere, unprotected, they almost always fell a prey to the english. the british naval forces, without any rivals, passed unmolested over the seas. in one year they are said to have taken from french commerce £ , , sterling. yet this sea power, which might have seized french and spanish colonies, made few conquests from want of unity and persistence in the direction given them."[ ] to sum up, france was forced to give up her conquests for want of a navy, and england saved her position by her sea power, though she had failed to use it to the best advantage. footnotes: [ ] martin: history of france [ ] there is not in modern naval history a more striking warning to the officers of every era, than this battle of toulon. coming as it did after a generation of comparative naval inactivity, it tried men's reputation as by fire. the lesson, in the judgment of the author, is the danger of disgraceful failure to men who have neglected to keep themselves prepared, not only in knowledge of their profession, but in the sentiment of what war requires. the average man is not a coward; but neither is he endowed by nature only with the rare faculty of seizing intuitively the proper course at a critical moment. he gains it, some more, some less, by experience or by reflection. if both have been lacking to him, indecision will follow; either from not knowing what to do, or from failure to realize that utter self-devotion of himself and his command are required. of one of the captains cashiered it is said: "no man had ever lived with a fairer or more honorable character previous to the unfortunate event which did such irreparable injury to his reputation. many of his contemporaries, men in the highest popular estimation, who knew him well, could scarcely credit what were indisputably established as facts, and declared, with the utmost astonishment, 'they believed it next to impossible for captain burrish to behave otherwise than as a man of gallantry and intrepidity.'" he had been twenty-five years in service, and eleven afloat as a captain (charnock's biographia navalis). others of the condemned men bore fair characters; and even richard norris, who absconded to avoid trial, had been of respectable repute. [ ] troude: batailles navales de la france [ ] "notwithstanding the extraordinary effort made by the french in sending out m. lally with a considerable force last year, i am confident before the end of this [ ] they will be near their last gasp in the carnatic unless some very unforeseen event interpose in their favor. the _superiority of our squadron_ and the plenty of money and supplies of all kinds which our friends on that coast will be furnished with from this province [bengal], while the enemy are in total want of everything, without any visible means of redress, are such advantages as, if properly attended to, cannot fail of wholly effecting their ruin in that as well as in every other part of india" (letter of clive to pitt, calcutta, january , ; gleig's life of lord clive). it will be remembered that the control and use of bengal, upon which clive here counts, had only lately been acquired by the english; in the days of dupleix they did not possess them. as will be seen later, clive's predictions in this letter were wholly fulfilled. [ ] lapeyrouse-bonfils: hist. de la marine française. chapter viii. seven years' war, - .--england's overwhelming power and conquests on the seas, in north america, europe, and east and west indies.--sea battles: byng off minorca; hawke and conflans; pocock and d'achÉ in east indies. the urgency with which peace was desired by the principal parties to the war of the austrian succession may perhaps be inferred from the neglect to settle definitely and conclusively many of the questions outstanding between them, and notably the very disputes about which the war between england and spain began. it seems as though the powers feared to treat thoroughly matters that contained the germs of future quarrels, lest the discussion should prolong the war that then existed. england made peace because the fall of holland was otherwise inevitable, not because she had enforced, or surrendered, her claims of against spain. the right of uninterrupted navigation in west indian seas, free from any search, was left undetermined, as were other kindred matters. not only so, but the boundaries between the english and french colonies in the valley of the ohio, toward canada, and on the land side of the nova scotian peninsula, remained as vague as they had before been. it was plain that peace could not last; and by it, if she had saved holland, england surrendered the control of the sea which she had won. the true character of the strife, shrouded for a moment by the continental war, was revealed by the so-called peace; though formally allayed, the contention continued in every part of the world. in india, dupleix, no longer able to attack the english openly, sought to undermine their power by the line of policy already described. mingling adroitly in the quarrels of surrounding princes, and advancing his own power while so doing, he attained by rapid steps to the political control, in , of the southern extremity of india,--a country nearly as large as france. given the title of nabob, he now had a place among the princes of the land. "a merely commercial policy was in his eyes a delusion; there could be no middle course between conquest and abandonment." in the course of the same year further grants extended the french power through extensive regions to the north and east, embracing all the coast of orissa, and made dupleix ruler of a third of india. to celebrate his triumphs, perhaps also in accordance with his policy of impressing the native mind, he now founded a town and put up a pillar setting forth his successes. but his doings caused the directors of the company only disquietude; instead of the reinforcements he asked for they sent him exhortations to peace; and at about this time robert clive, then but twenty-six years old, began to show his genius. the success of dupleix and his allies became checkered with reverses; the english under clive's leadership supported the native opponents of the french. the company at home was but little interested in his political schemes, and was annoyed at the failure of dividends. negotiations were opened at london for a settlement of difficulties, and dupleix was summoned home; the english government, it is said, making his recall an absolute condition of continued peace. two days after his departure, in , his successor signed a treaty with the english governor, wholly abandoning his policy, stipulating that neither company should interfere in the internal politics of india, and that all possessions acquired during the war in the carnatic should be given back to the mogul. what france thus surrendered was in extent and population an empire, and the mortification of french historians has branded the concession as ignominious; but how could the country have been held, with the english navy cutting off the eagerly desired reinforcements? in north america, the declaration of peace was followed by renewed agitation, which sprang from and betokened the deep feeling and keen sense of the situation had by the colonists and local authorities on either side. the americans held to their points with the stubbornness of their race. "there is no repose for our thirteen colonies," wrote franklin, "so long as the french are masters of canada." the rival claims to the central unsettled region, which may accurately enough be called the valley of the ohio, involved, if the english were successful, the military separation of canada from louisiana; while on the other hand, occupation by the french, linking the two extremes of their acknowledged possessions, would shut up the english colonists between the alleghany mountains and the sea. the issues were apparent enough to leading americans of that day, though they were more far-reaching than the wisest of them could have foreseen; there is room for curious speculation as to the effect, not only upon america, but upon the whole world, if the french government had had the will, and the french people the genius, effectively to settle and hold the northern and western regions which they then claimed. but while frenchmen upon the spot saw clearly enough the coming contest and the terrible disadvantage of unequal numbers and inferior navy under which canada must labor, the home government was blind alike to the value of the colony and to the fact that it must be fought for; while the character and habits of the french settlers, lacking in political activity and unused to begin and carry through measures for the protection of their own interests, did not remedy the neglect of the mother-country. the paternal centralizing system of french rule had taught the colonists to look to the mother-country, and then failed to take care of them. the governors of canada of that day acted as careful and able military men, doing what they could to supply defects and weaknesses; it is possible that their action was more consistent and well-planned than that of the english governors; but with the carelessness of both home governments, nothing in the end could take the place of the capacity of the english colonists to look out for themselves. it is odd and amusing to read the conflicting statements of english and french historians as to the purposes and aims of the opposing statesmen in these years when the first murmurings of the storm were heard; the simple truth seems to be that one of those conflicts familiarly known to us as irrepressible was at hand, and that both governments would gladly have avoided it. the boundaries might be undetermined; the english colonists were not. the french governors established posts where they could on the debatable ground, and it was in the course of a dispute over one of these, in , that the name of washington first appears in history. other troubles occurred in nova scotia, and both home governments then began to awake. in braddock's disastrous expedition was directed against fort duquesne, now pittsburg, where washington had surrendered the year before. later in the year another collision between the english and french colonists happened near lake george. although braddock's expedition had been first to start, the french government was also moving. in may of the same year a large squadron of ships-of-war, mostly armed _en flûte_[ ], sailed from brest with three thousand troops, and a new governor, de vaudreuil, for canada. admiral boscawen had already preceded this fleet, and lay in wait for it off the mouth of the st. lawrence. there was as yet no open war, and the french were certainly within their rights in sending a garrison to their own colonies; but boscawen's orders were to stop them. a fog which scattered the french squadron also covered its passage; but two of the ships were seen by the english fleet and captured, june , . as soon as this news reached europe, the french ambassador to london was recalled, but still no declaration of war followed. in july, sir edward hawke was sent to sea with orders to cruise between ushant and cape finisterre, and to seize any french ships-of-the-line he might see; to which were added in august further orders to take all french ships of every kind, men-of-war, privateers, and merchantmen, and to send them into english ports. before the end of the year, three hundred trading vessels, valued at six million dollars, had been captured, and six thousand french seamen were imprisoned in england,--enough to man nearly ten ships-of-the-line. all this was done while nominal peace still existed. war was not declared until six months later. france still seemed to submit, but she was biding her time, and preparing warily a severe stroke for which she had now ample provocation. small squadrons, or detachments of ships, continued to be sent to the west indies and to canada, while noisy preparations were made in the dock-yard of brest, and troops assembled upon the shores of the channel. england saw herself threatened with invasion,--a menace to which her people have been peculiarly susceptible. the government of the day, weak at best, was singularly unfit for waging war, and easily misled as to the real danger. besides, england was embarrassed, as always at the beginning of a war, not only by the numerous points she had to protect in addition to her commerce, but also by the absence of a large number of her seamen in trading-vessels all over the world. the mediterranean was therefore neglected; and the french, while making loud demonstrations on the channel, quietly equipped at toulon twelve ships-of-the-line, which sailed on the th of april, , under admiral la galissonière, convoying one hundred and fifty transports with fifteen thousand troops, commanded by the duke of richelieu. a week later the army was safely landed in minorca, and port mahon invested, while the fleet established itself in blockade before the harbor. practically this was a complete surprise; for though the suspicions of the english government had been at last aroused, its action came too late. the garrison had not been reinforced, and numbered a scant three thousand men, from which thirty-five officers were absent on leave, among them the governor and the colonels of all the regiments. admiral byng sailed from portsmouth with ten ships-of-the-line only three days before the french left toulon. six weeks later, when he reached the neighborhood of port mahon, his fleet had been increased to thirteen ships-of-the-line, and he had with him four thousand troops. it was already late; a practicable breach had been made in the fortress a week before. when the english fleet came in sight, la galissonière stood out to meet it and bar the entrance to the harbor. the battle that followed owes its historical celebrity wholly to the singular and tragic event which arose from it. unlike matthews's battle off toulon, it does afford some tactical instruction, though mainly applicable to the obsolete conditions of warfare under sail; but it is especially linked to the earlier action through the effect produced upon the mind of the unfortunate byng by the sentence of the court-martial upon matthews. during the course of the engagement he repeatedly alluded to the censure upon that admiral for leaving the line, and seems to have accepted the judgment as justifying, if not determining, his own course. briefly, it may be said that the two fleets, having sighted each other on the morning of the th of may, were found after a series of manoeuvres both on the port tack, with an easterly wind, heading southerly, the french to leeward, between the english and the harbor. byng ran down in line ahead off the wind, the french remaining by it, so that when the former made the signal to engage, the fleets were not parallel, but formed an angle of from thirty to forty degrees (plate viia. a, a). the attack which byng by his own account meant to make, each ship against its opposite in the enemy's line, difficult to carry out under any circumstances, was here further impeded by the distance between the two rears being much greater than that between the vans; so that his whole line could not come into action at the same moment. when the signal was made, the van ships kept away in obedience to it, and ran down for the french so nearly head-on (b, b) as to sacrifice their artillery fire in great measure; they received three raking broadsides, and were seriously dismantled aloft. the sixth english ship, counting from the van, had her foretopmast shot away, flew up into the wind, and came aback, stopping and doubling up the rear of the line. then undoubtedly was the time for byng, having committed himself to the fight, to have set the example and borne down, just as farragut did at mobile when his line was confused by the stopping of the next ahead; but according to the testimony of the flag-captain, matthews's sentence deterred him. "you see, captain gardiner, that the signal for the line is out, and that i am ahead of the ships 'louisa' and 'trident' [which in the order should have been ahead of him]. you would not have me, as the admiral of the fleet, run down as if i were going to engage a single ship. it was mr. matthews's misfortune to be prejudiced by not carrying down his force together, which i shall endeavor to avoid." the affair thus became entirely indecisive; the english van was separated from the rear and got the brunt of the fight (c). one french authority blames galissonière for not tacking to windward of the enemy's van and crushing it. another says he ordered the movement, but that it could not be made from the damage to the rigging; but this seems improbable, as the only injury the french squadron underwent aloft was the loss of one topsail yard, whereas the english suffered very badly. the true reason is probably that given and approved by one of the french authorities on naval warfare. galissonière considered the support of the land attack on mahon paramount to any destruction of the english fleet, if he thereby exposed his own. "the french navy has always preferred the glory of assuring or preserving a conquest to that more brilliant perhaps, but actually less real, of taking some ships, and therein has approached more nearly the true end that has been proposed in war."[ ] the justice of this conclusion depends upon the view that is taken of the true end of naval war. if it is merely to assure one or more positions ashore, the navy becomes simply a branch of the army for a particular occasion, and subordinates its action accordingly; but if the true end is to preponderate over the enemy's navy and so control the sea, then the enemy's ships and fleets are the true objects to be assailed on all occasions. a glimmer of this view seems to have been present to morogues when he wrote that at sea there is no field of battle to be held, nor places to be won. if naval warfare is a war of posts, then the action of the fleets must be subordinate to the attack and defence of the posts; if its object is to break up the enemy's power on the sea, cutting off his communications with the rest of his possessions, drying up the sources of his wealth in his commerce, and making possible a closure of his ports, then the object of attack must be his organized military forces afloat; in short, his navy. it is to the latter course, for whatever reason adopted, that england owed a control of the sea that forced the restitution of minorca at the end of this war. it is to the former that france owed the lack of prestige in her navy. take this very case of minorca; had galissonière been beaten, richelieu and his fifteen thousand troops must have been lost to france, cooped up in minorca, as the spaniards, in , were confined to sicily. the french navy therefore assured the capture of the island; but so slight was the impression on the ministry and the public, that a french naval officer tells us: "incredible as it may seem, the minister of marine, after the glorious affair off mahon, instead of yielding to the zeal of an enlightened patriotism and profiting by the impulse which this victory gave to france to build up the navy, saw fit to sell the ships and rigging which we still had in our ports. we shall soon see the deplorable consequences of this cowardly conduct on the part of our statesmen."[ ] neither the glory nor the victory is very apparent; but it is quite conceivable that had the french admiral thought less of mahon and used the great advantage luck had given him to take, or sink, four or five of the enemy, the french people would have anticipated the outbreak of naval enthusiasm which appeared too late, in . during the remainder of this war the french fleets, except in the east indies, appear only as the pursued in a general chase. the action imposed upon the french fleets was, however, consistent with the general policy of the french government; and john clerk was probably right in saying that there is apparent in this action off minorca a tactics too well defined to be merely accidental,--a tactics essentially defensive in its scope and aim.[ ] in assuming the lee-gage the french admiral not only covered mahon, but took a good defensive position, imposing upon his enemy the necessity of attacking with all the consequent risks. clerk seems to bring evidence enough to prove that the leading french ships did, after roughly handling their assailants, astutely withdraw (c) thus forcing the latter to attack again with like results. the same policy was repeatedly followed during the american war twenty years later, and with pretty uniform success; so much so that, although formal avowal of the policy is wanting, it may be concluded that circumspection, economy, defensive war, remained the fixed purpose of the french authorities, based doubtless upon the reasons given by admiral grivel, of that navy:-- "if two maritime powers are at strife, the one that has the fewest ships must always avoid doubtful engagements; it must run only those risks necessary for carrying out its missions, avoid action by manoeuvring, or at worst, if forced to engage, assure itself of favorable conditions. the attitude to be taken should depend radically upon the power of your opponent. let us not tire of repeating, according as she has to do with an inferior or superior power, france has before her two distinct strategies, radically opposite both in means and ends,--grand war and cruising war." such a formal utterance by an officer of rank must be received with respect, and the more so when it expresses a consistent policy followed by a great and warlike nation; yet it may be questioned whether a sea power worthy of the name can thus be secured. logically, it follows from the position assumed, that combats between equal forces are to be discouraged, because the loss to you is greater than the loss to your opponent. "in fact," says ramatuelle, upholding the french policy, "of what consequence to the english would be the loss of a few ships?" but the next inevitable step in the argument is that it is better not to meet the enemy. as another frenchman,[ ] previously quoted, says, it was considered a mishap to their ships to fall in with a hostile force, and, if one was met, their duty was to avoid action if possible to do so honorably. they had ulterior objects of more importance than fighting the enemy's navy. such a course cannot be consistently followed for years without affecting the spirit and tone of the officers charged with it; and it led directly to as brave a man as ever commanded a fleet, the comte de grasse, failing to crush the english under rodney when he had the chance, in . on the th of april of that year, being chased by the english among the windward islands, it happened to him to have sixteen of their fleet under his lee while the main body was becalmed under dominica. though greatly superior to the separated ships, during the three hours that this state of things lasted, de grasse left them undisturbed, except by a distant cannonade by his own van; and his action was justified by the court which tried him, in which were many officers of high rank and doubtless of distinction, as being "an act of prudence on the part of the admiral, dictated to him by the ulterior projects of the cruise." three days later he was signally beaten by the fleet he had failed to attack at disadvantage, and all the ulterior projects of the cruise went down with him. to return to minorca; after the action of the th, byng called a council of war, which decided that nothing more could be done, and that the english fleet should go to gibraltar and cover that place from an attack. at gibraltar, byng was relieved by hawke and sent home to be tried. the court-martial, while expressly clearing him of cowardice or disaffection, found him guilty of not doing his utmost either to defeat the french fleet or to relieve the garrison at mahon; and, as the article of war prescribed death with no alternative punishment for this offence, it felt compelled to sentence him to death. the king refused to pardon, and byng was accordingly shot. the expedition against minorca was begun while nominal peace still lasted. on the th of may, three days before byng's battle, england declared war, and france replied on the th of june. on the th, port mahon surrendered, and minorca passed into the hands of france. the nature of the troubles between the two nations, and the scenes where they occurred, pointed out clearly enough the proper theatre of the strife, and we should by rights now be at the opening of a sea war, illustrated by great naval actions and attended with great modifications in the colonial and foreign possessions of the two powers. of the two, england alone recognized the truth; france was again turned aside from the sea by causes which will shortly be given. her fleets scarcely appeared; and losing the control of the sea, she surrendered one by one her colonies and all her hopes in india. later in the struggle she drew in spain as her ally, but it was only to involve that country in her own external ruin. england, on the other hand, defended and nourished by the sea, rode it everywhere in triumph. secure and prosperous at home, she supported with her money the enemies of france. at the end of seven years the kingdom of great britain had become the british empire. it is far from certain that france could have successfully contended with england on the sea, without an ally. in the french navy had sixty-three ships-of-the-line, of which forty-five were in fair condition; but equipments and artillery were deficient. spain had forty-six ships-of-the-line; but from the previous and subsequent performances of the spanish navy, it may well be doubted if its worth were equal to its numbers. england at this time had one hundred and thirty ships-of-the-line; four years later she had one hundred and twenty actually in commission. of course when a nation allows its inferiority, whether on land or sea, to become as great as that of france now was, it cannot hope for success. nevertheless, she obtained advantages at first. the conquest of minorca was followed in november of the same year by the acquisition of corsica. the republic of genoa surrendered to france all the fortified harbors of the island. with toulon, corsica, and port mahon, she now had a strong grip on the mediterranean. in canada, the operations of , under montcalm, were successful despite the inferiority of numbers. at the same time an attack by a native prince in india took from the english calcutta, and gave an opportunity to the french. yet another incident offered a handle for french statesmanship to strengthen her position on the ocean. the dutch had promised france not to renew their alliance with england, but to remain neutral. england retaliated by declaring "all the ports of france in a state of blockade, and all vessels bound to those ports liable to seizure as lawful prize." such a violation of the rights of neutrals can only be undertaken by a nation that feels it has nothing to fear from their rising against it. the aggressiveness, born of the sense of power, which characterized england might have been used by france to draw spain and possibly other states into alliance against her. instead of concentrating against england, france began another continental war, this time with a new and extraordinary alliance. the empress of austria, working on the religious superstitions of the king and upon the anger of the king's mistress, who was piqued at sarcasms uttered against her by frederick the great, drew france into an alliance with austria against prussia. this alliance was further joined by russia, sweden and poland. the empress urged that the two roman catholic powers should unite to take silesia away from a protestant king, and expressed her willingness to give to france a part of her possessions in the netherlands, which france had always desired. frederick the great, learning the combination against him, instead of waiting for it to develop, put his armies in motion and invaded saxony, whose ruler was also king of poland. this movement, in october, , began the seven years' war; which, like the war of the austrian succession, but not to the same extent, drew some of the contestants off from the original cause of difference. but while france, having already on hand one large quarrel with her neighbor across the channel, was thus needlessly entering upon another struggle, with the avowed end of building up that austrian empire which a wiser policy had long striven to humble, england this time saw clearly where her true interests lay. making the continental war wholly subsidiary, she turned her efforts upon the sea and the colonies; at the same time supporting frederick both with money and cordial sympathy in the war for the defence of his kingdom, which so seriously diverted and divided the efforts of france. england thus had really but one war on hand. in the same year the direction of the struggle was taken from the hands of a weak ministry and given into those of the bold and ardent william pitt, who retained his office till , by which time the ends of the war had practically been secured. in the attack upon canada there were two principal lines to be chosen,--that by the way of lake champlain, and that by the way of the st. lawrence. the former was entirely inland, and as such does not concern our subject, beyond noting that not till after the fall of quebec, in , was it fairly opened to the english. in the attempt against louisburg failed; the english admiral being unwilling to engage sixteen ships-of-the-line he found there, with the fifteen under his own command, which were also, he said, of inferior metal. whether he was right in his decision or not, the indignation felt in england clearly shows the difference of policy underlying the action of the french and english governments. the following year an admiral of a higher spirit, boscawen, was sent out accompanied with twelve thousand troops, and, it must in fairness be said, found only five ships in the port. the troops were landed, while the fleet covered the siege from the only molestation it could fear, and cut off from the besieged the only line by which they could look for supplies. the island fell in , opening the way by the st. lawrence to the heart of canada, and giving the english a new base both for the fleet and army. the next year the expedition under wolfe was sent against quebec. all his operations were based upon the fleet, which not only carried his army to the spot, but moved up and down the river as the various feints required. the landing which led to the decisive action was made directly from the ships. montcalm, whose skill and determination had blocked the attacks by way of lake champlain the two previous years, had written urgently for reinforcements; but they were refused by the minister of war, who replied that in addition to other reasons it was too probable that the english would intercept them on the way, and that the more france sent, the more england would be moved to send. in a word, the possession of canada depended upon sea power. montcalm, therefore, in view of the certain attack upon quebec by the river, was compelled to weaken his resistance on the champlain route; nevertheless, the english did not get farther than the foot of the lake that year, and their operations, though creditable, had no effect upon the result at quebec. in , the english, holding the course of the st. lawrence, with louisburg at one end and quebec at the other, seemed firmly seated. nevertheless, the french governor, de vaudreuil, still held out at montreal, and the colonists still hoped for help from france. the english garrison at quebec, though inferior in numbers to the forces of the canadians, was imprudent enough to leave the city and meet them in the open field. defeated there, and pursued by the enemy, the latter nearly entered quebec pell-mell with the english troops, and trenches were opened against the city. a few days later an english squadron came in sight, and the place was relieved. "thus," says the old english chronicler of the navy, "the enemy saw what it was to be inferior at sea; for, had a french squadron got the start of the english in sailing up the river, quebec must have fallen." wholly cut off now, the little body of frenchmen that remained in montreal was surrounded by three english armies, which had come, one by way of lake champlain, the others from oswego and from quebec. the surrender of the city on the th of september, , put an end forever to the french possession of canada. in all other quarters of the world, after the accession of pitt to power, the same good fortune followed the english arms, checkered only at the first by some slight reverses. it was not so on the continent, where the heroism and skill of frederick the great maintained with difficulty his brilliant struggle against france, austria, and russia. the study of the difficulties of his position, of the military and political combinations attending it, do not belong to our subject. sea power does not appear directly in its effects upon the struggle, but indirectly it was felt in two ways,--first, by the subsidies which the abundant wealth and credit of england enabled her to give frederick, in whose thrifty and able hands they went far; and second, in the embarrassment caused to france by the attacks of england upon her colonies and her own sea-coast, in the destruction of her commerce, and in the money--all too little, it is true, and grudgingly given--which france was forced to bestow on her navy. stung by the constant lashing of the power of the sea, france, despite the blindness and unwillingness of the rulers, was driven to undertake something against it. with a navy much inferior, unable to cope in all quarters of the world, it was rightly decided to concentrate upon one object; and the object chosen was great britain itself, whose shores were to be invaded. this decision, soon apprehended by the fears of the english nation, caused the great naval operations to centre for some years around the coast of france and in the channel. before describing them, it will be well to sum up the general plan by which england was guided in the use of her overwhelming sea power. besides the operations on the north american continent already described, this plan was fourfold:-- . the french atlantic ports were watched in force, especially brest, so as to keep the great fleets or small squadrons from getting out without fighting. . attacks were made upon the atlantic and channel coasts with flying squadrons, followed at times by the descent of small bodies of troops. these attacks, the direction of which could not be foreseen by the enemy, were chiefly intended to compel him to keep on hand forces at many points, and so to diminish the army acting against the king of prussia. while the tendency would certainly be that way, it may be doubted whether the actual diversion in favor of frederick was of much consequence. no particular mention will be made of these operations, which had but little visible effect upon the general course of the war. . a fleet was kept in the mediterranean and near gibraltar to prevent the french toulon fleet from getting round to the atlantic. it does not appear that any attempt was seriously made to stop communications between france and minorca. the action of the mediterranean fleet, though an independent command, was subsidiary to that in the atlantic. . distant foreign expeditions were sent against the french colonies in the west india islands and on the coast of africa, and a squadron was maintained in the east indies to secure the control of those seas, thereby supporting the english in the peninsula, and cutting off the communications of the french. these operations in distant waters, never intermitted, assumed greater activity and larger proportions after the destruction of the french navy had relieved england from the fear of invasion, and when the ill-advised entrance of spain into the war, in , offered yet richer prizes to her enterprise. the close blockade of the enemy's fleet in brest, which was first systematically carried out during this war, may be considered rather a defensive than an offensive operation; for though the intention certainly was to fight if opportunity offered, the chief object was to neutralize an offensive weapon in the enemy's hands; the destruction of the weapon was secondary. the truth of this remark is shown by the outburst of fear and anger which swept over england when an unavoidable absence of the blockading fleet in allowed the french to escape. the effect of the blockade in this and after wars was to keep the french in a state of constant inferiority in the practical handling of their ships, however fair-showing their outward appearance or equal their numerical force. the position of the port of brest was such that a blockaded fleet could not get out during the heavy westerly gales that endangered the blockaders; the latter, therefore, had the habit of running away from them to torbay or plymouth, sure, with care, of getting back to their station with an east wind before a large and ill-handled fleet could get much start of them. in the latter part of , france, depressed by the sense of failure upon the continent, mortified and harassed by english descents upon her coasts, which had been particularly annoying that year, and seeing that it was not possible to carry on both the continental and sea wars with her money resources, determined to strike directly at england. her commerce was annihilated while the enemy's throve. it was the boast of london merchants that under pitt commerce was united with and made to flourish by war;[ ] and this thriving commerce was the soul also of the land struggle, by the money it lavished on the enemy of france. at this time a new and active-minded minister, choiseul, was called into power by louis xv. from the beginning of , preparations were made in the ocean and channel ports. flat-boats to transport troops were built at havre, dunkirk, brest, and rochefort. it was intended to embark as many as fifty thousand men for the invasion of england, while twelve thousand were to be directed upon scotland. two squadrons were fitted out, each of respectable strength, one at toulon, the other at brest. the junction of these two squadrons at brest was the first step in the great enterprise. it was just here that it broke down, through the possession of gibraltar by the english, and their naval superiority. it seems incredible that even the stern and confident william pitt should, as late as , have offered to surrender to spain the watch-tower from which england overlooks the road between the mediterranean and the atlantic, as the price of her help to recover minorca. happily for england, spain refused. in , admiral boscawen commanded the english mediterranean fleet. in making an attack upon french frigates in toulon roads, some of his ships were so damaged that he sailed with his whole squadron to gibraltar to refit; taking the precaution, however, to station lookout frigates at intervals, and to arrange signals by guns to notify him betimes of the enemy's approach. taking advantage of his absence, and in obedience to orders, the french commodore, de la clue, left toulon with twelve ships-of-the-line on the th of august, and on the th found himself at the straits of gibraltar, with a brisk east wind carrying him out into the atlantic. everything seemed propitious, a thick haze and falling night concealing the french ships from the land, while not preventing their sight of each other, when an english frigate loomed up in the near distance. as soon as she saw the fleet, knowing they must be enemies, she hauled in for the land and began firing signal-guns. pursuit was useless; flight alone remained. hoping to elude the chase he knew must follow, the french commodore steered west-northwest for the open sea, putting out all lights; but either from carelessness or disaffection,--for the latter is hinted by one french naval officer,--five out of the twelve ships headed to the northward and put into cadiz when on the following morning they could not see the commodore. the latter was dismayed when at daylight he saw his forces thus diminished. at eight o'clock some sails made their appearance, and for a few minutes he hoped they were the missing ships. instead of that, they were the lookouts of boscawen's fleet, which, numbering fourteen ships-of-the-line, was in full pursuit. the french formed their order on one of the close-hauled lines, and fled; but of course their fleet-speed was less than that of the fastest english ships. the general rule for all chases where the pursuer is decidedly superior, namely, that order must be observed only so far as to keep the leading ships within reasonable supporting distance of the slower ones, so that they may not be singly overpowered before the latter can come up, was by this time well understood in the english navy, and that is certainly the fitting time for a _mélêe_. boscawen acted accordingly. the rear ship of the french, on the other hand, nobly emulated the example of l'Étenduère when he saved his convoy. overtaken at two o'clock by the leading english ship, and soon after surrounded by four others, her captain made for five hours a desperate resistance, from which he could hope, not to save himself, but to delay the enemies long enough for the better sailers to escape. he so far succeeded that--thanks to the injury done by him and their better speed--they did that day escape action at close quarters, which could only have ended in their capture. when he hauled down his flag, his three topmasts were gone, the mizzen-mast fell immediately after, and the hull was so full of water that the ship was with difficulty kept afloat. m. de sabran--his name is worthy to be remembered--had received eleven wounds in this gallant resistance, by which he illustrated so signally the duty and service of a rearguard in retarding pursuit. that night two of the french ships hauled off to the westward, and so escaped. the other four continued their flight as before; but the next morning the commodore, despairing of escape, headed for the portuguese coast, and ran them all ashore between lagos and cape st. vincent. the english admiral followed and attacked them, taking two and burning the others, without regard to the neutrality of portugal. for this insult no amend was made beyond a formal apology; portugal was too dependent upon england to be seriously considered. pitt, writing to the english minister to portugal about the affair, told him that while soothing the susceptibilities of the portuguese government he must not allow it to suppose that either the ships would be given up or the distinguished admiral censured.[ ] the destruction or dispersal of the toulon fleet stopped the invasion of england, though the five ships that got into cadiz remained a matter of anxiety to sir edward hawke, who cruised before brest. choiseul, balked of his main object, still clung to the invasion of scotland. the french fleet at brest, under marshal de conflans, a sea officer despite his title, numbered twenty sail-of-the-line, besides frigates. the troops to be embarked are variously stated at fifteen to twenty thousand. the original purpose was to escort the transports with only five ships-of-the-line, besides smaller vessels. conflans insisted that the whole fleet ought to go. the minister of the navy thought that the admiral was not a sufficiently skilful tactician to be able to check the advance of an enemy, and so insure the safe arrival of the convoy at its destination near the clyde without risking a decisive encounter. believing therefore that there would be a general action, he considered that it would be better to fight it before the troops sailed; for if disastrous, the convoy would not be sacrificed, and if decisively victorious, the road would then be clear. the transports were assembled, not at brest, but in the ports to the southward as far as the mouth of the loire. the french fleet therefore put to sea with the expectation and purpose of fighting the enemy; but it is not easy to reconcile its subsequent course with that purpose, nor with the elaborate fighting instructions[ ] issued by the admiral before sailing. about the th or th of november there came on a tremendous westerly gale. after buffeting it for three days, hawke bore up and ran into torbay, where he waited for the wind to shift, keeping his fleet in readiness to sail at once. the same gale, while keeping back the french already in brest, gave the chance to a small squadron under m. bompart, which was expected from the west indies, to slip in during hawke's absence. conflans made his preparations with activity, distributed bompart's crews among his own ships, which were not very well manned, and got to sea with an easterly wind on the th. he stood at once to the southward, flattering himself that he had escaped hawke. the latter, however, had sailed from torbay on the th; and though again driven back, sailed a second time on the th, the same day that conflans left brest. he soon readied his station, learned that the enemy had been seen to the southward steering east, and easily concluding that they were bound to quiberon bay, shaped his own course for the same place under a press of sail. at eleven p.m. of the th the french admiral estimated his position to be seventy miles southwest by west from belle isle;[ ] and the wind springing up fresh from the westward, he stood for it under short sail, the wind continuing to increase and hauling to west-northwest. at daybreak several ships were seen ahead, which proved to be the english squadron of commodore duff, blockading quiberon. the signal was made to chase; and the english, taking flight, separated into two divisions,--one going off before the wind, the other hauling up to the southward. the greater part of the french fleet continued its course after the former division, that is, toward the coast; but one ship hauled up for the second. immediately after, the rear french ships made signal of sails to windward, which were also visible from aloft on board the flag-ship. it must have been about the same moment that the lookout frigate in advance of the english fleet informed her admiral of sails to leeward. hawke's diligence had brought him up with conflans, who, in his official reports, says he had considered it impossible that the enemy could have in that neighborhood forces superior or even equal to his own. conflans now ordered his rear division to haul its wind in support of the ship chasing to the southward and eastward. in a few moments more it was discovered that the fleet to windward numbered twenty-three ships-of-the-line to the french twenty-one, and among them some three-deckers. conflans then called in the chasing ships and got ready for action. it remained to settle his course under circumstances which he had not foreseen. it was now blowing hard from the west-northwest, with every appearance of heavy weather, the fleet not far from a lee shore, with an enemy considerably superior in numbers; for besides hawke's twenty-three of the line, duff had four fifty-gun ships. conflans therefore determined to run for it and lead his squadron into quiberon bay, trusting and believing that hawke would not dare to follow, under the conditions of the weather, into a bay which french authorities describe as containing banks and shoals, and lined with reefs which the navigator rarely sees without fright and never passes without emotion. it was in the midst of these ghastly dangers that forty-four large ships were about to engage pell-mell; for the space was too contracted for fleet manoeuvres. conflans flattered himself that he would get in first and be able to haul up close under the western shore of the bay, forcing the enemy, if he followed, to take position between him and the beach, six miles to leeward. none of his expectations were fulfilled. in the retreat he took the head of his fleet; a step not unjustifiable, since only by leading in person could he have shown just what he wanted to do, but unfortunate for his reputation with the public, as it placed the admiral foremost in the flight. hawke was not in the least, nor for one moment, deterred by the dangers before him, whose full extent he, as a skilful seaman, entirely realized; but his was a calm and steadfast as well as a gallant temper, that weighed risks justly, neither dissembling nor exaggerating. he has not left us his reasoning, but he doubtless felt that the french, leading, would serve partially as pilots, and must take the ground before him; he believed the temper and experience of his officers, tried by the severe school of the blockade, to be superior to those of the french; and he knew that both the government and the country demanded that the enemy's fleet should not reach another friendly port in safety. on the very day that he was thus following the french, amid dangers and under conditions that have made this one of the most dramatic of sea fights, he was being burnt in effigy in england for allowing them to escape. as conflans, leading his fleet, was rounding the cardinals,--as the southernmost rocks at the entrance of quiberon bay are called,--the leading english ships brought the french rear to action. it was another case of a general chase ending in a _mêlée_, but under conditions of exceptional interest and grandeur from the surrounding circumstances of the gale of wind, the heavy sea, the lee shore, the headlong speed, shortened canvas, and the great number of ships engaged. one french seventy-four, closely pressed and outnumbered, ventured to open her lower-deck ports; the sea sweeping in carried her down with all on board but twenty men. another was sunk by the fire of hawke's flag-ship. two others, one of which carried a commodore's pennant, struck their colors. the remainder were dispersed. seven fled to the northward and eastward, and anchored off the mouth of the little river vilaine, into which they succeeded in entering at the top of high water in two tides,--a feat never before performed. seven others took refuge to the southward and eastward in rochefort. one, after being very badly injured, ran ashore and was lost near the mouth of the loire. the flag-ship bearing the same name as that of tourville burned at la hougue, the "royal sun," anchored at nightfall off croisic, a little to the northward of the loire, where she rode in safety during the night. the next morning the admiral found himself alone, and, somewhat precipitately it would seem, ran the ship ashore to keep her out of english hands. this step has been blamed by the french, but needlessly, as hawke would never have let her get away. the great french fleet was annihilated; for the fourteen ships not taken or destroyed were divided into two parts, and those in the vilaine only succeeded in escaping, two at a time, between fifteen months and two years later. the english lost two ships which ran upon a shoal (a), and were hopelessly wrecked; their losses in action were slight. at nightfall hawke anchored his fleet and prizes in the position shown in the plate (b). [illustration: pl. viii.] all possibility of an invasion of england passed away with the destruction of the brest fleet. the battle of november , , was the trafalgar of this war; and though a blockade was maintained over the fractions that were laid up in the vilaine and at rochefort, the english fleets were now free to act against the colonies of france, and later of spain, on a grander scale than ever before. the same year that saw this great sea fight and the fall of quebec witnessed also the capture of guadeloupe in the west indies, of goree on the west coast of africa, and the abandonment of the east indian seas by the french flag after three indecisive actions between their commodore, d'aché, and admiral pocock,--an abandonment which necessarily led to the fall of the french power in india, never again to rise. in this year also the king of spain died, and his brother succeeded, under the title of charles iii. this charles had been king of naples at the time when an english commodore had allowed one hour for the court to determine to withdraw the neapolitan troops from the spanish army. he had never forgotten this humiliation, and brought to his new throne a heart unfriendly to england. with such feelings on his part, france and spain drew more readily together. charles's first step was to propose mediation, but pitt was averse to it. looking upon france as the chief enemy of england, and upon the sea and the colonies as the chief source of power and wealth, he wished, now that he had her down, to weaken her thoroughly for the future as well as the present, and to establish england's greatness more firmly upon the wreck. later on he offered certain conditions; but the influence of louis's mistress, attached to the empress of austria, prevailed to except prussia from the negotiations, and england would not allow the exception. pitt, indeed, was not yet ready for peace. a year later, october , , george ii. died, and pitt's influence then began to wane, the new king being less bent on war. during these years, and , frederick the great still continued the deadly and exhausting strife of his small kingdom against the great states joined against him. at one moment his case seemed so hopeless that he got ready to kill himself; but the continuance of the war diverted the efforts of france from england and the sea. the hour was fast approaching for the great colonial expeditions, which made the last year of the war illustrious by the triumph of the sea power of england over france and spain united. it is first necessary to tell the entirely kindred story of the effect of that sea power in the east indian peninsula. the recall of dupleix and the entire abandonment of his policy, which resulted in placing the two east india companies on equal terms, have already been told. the treaty stipulations of had not, however, been fully carried out. the marquis de bussy, a brave and capable soldier who had been a second to dupleix, and was wholly in accord with his policy and ambitions, remained in the deccan,--a large region in the southern central part of the peninsula, over which dupleix had once ruled. in , troubles arose between the english and the native prince in bengal. the nabob of that province had died, and his successor, a young man of nineteen, attacked calcutta. the place fell, after a weak resistance, in june, and the surrender was followed by the famous tragedy known as that of the black hole of calcutta. the news reached madras in august, and clive, whose name has already been mentioned, sailed with the fleet of admiral watson, after a long and vexatious delay. the fleet entered the river in december and appeared before calcutta in january, when the place fell into english hands again as easily as it had been lost. the nabob was very angry, and marched against the english; sending meanwhile an invitation to the french at chandernagore to join him. although it was now known that england and france were at war, the french company, despite the experience of , weakly hoped that peace might be kept between it and the english. the native invitation was therefore refused, and offers of neutrality made to the other company. clive marched out, met the indian forces and defeated them, and the nabob at once asked for peace, and sought the english alliance, yielding all the claims on the strength of which he had first attacked calcutta. after some demur his offers were accepted. clive and watson then turned upon chandernagore and compelled the surrender of the french settlement. the nabob, who had not meant to allow this, took umbrage, and entered into correspondence with bussy in the deccan. clive had full knowledge of his various intrigues, which were carried on with the vacillation of a character as weak as it was treacherous; and seeing no hope of settled peace or trade under the rule of this man, entered into an extensive conspiracy for his dethronement, the details of which need not be given. the result was that war broke out again, and that clive with three thousand men, one third of whom were english, met the nabob at the head of fifteen thousand horse and thirty-five thousand foot. the disproportion in artillery was nearly as great. against these odds was fought and won the battle of plassey, on the d of june, ,--the date from which, by common consent, the british empire in india is said to begin. the overthrow of the nabob was followed by placing in power one of the conspirators against him, a creature of the english, and dependent upon them for support. bengal thus passed under their control, the first-fruits of india. "clive," says a french historian, "had understood and applied the system of dupleix." this was true; yet even so it may be said that the foundation thus laid could never have been kept nor built upon, had the english nation not controlled the sea. the conditions of india were such that a few europeans, headed by men of nerve and shrewdness, dividing that they might conquer, and advancing their fortunes by judicious alliances, were able to hold their own, and more too, amidst overwhelming numerical odds; but it was necessary that they should not be opposed by men of their own kind, a few of whom could turn the wavering balance the other way. at the very time that clive was acting in bengal, bussy invaded orissa, seized the english factories, and made himself master of much of the coast regions between madras and calcutta; while a french squadron of nine ships, most of which, however, belonged to the east india company and were not first-rate men-of-war, was on its way to pondicherry with twelve hundred regular troops,--an enormous european army for indian operations of that day. the english naval force on the coast, though fewer in numbers, may be considered about equal to the approaching french squadron. it is scarcely too much to say that the future of india was still uncertain, and the first operations showed it. the french division appeared off the coromandel coast to the southward of pondicherry on the th of april, , and anchored on the th before the english station called fort st. david. two ships kept on to pondicherry, having on board the new governor, comte de lally, who wished to go at once to his seat of government. meanwhile, the english admiral, pocock, having news of the enemy's coming, and fearing specially for this post, was on his way to it, and appeared on the th of april, before the two ships with the governor were out of sight. the french at once got under way and stood out to sea on the starboard tack (plate va.), heading to the northward and eastward, the wind being southeast, and signals were made to recall the ship and frigate (a) escorting lally; but they were disregarded by the latter's order, an act which must have increased, if it did not originate, the ill-will between him and commodore d'aché, through which the french campaign in india miscarried. the english, having formed to windward on the same tack as the french, made their attack in the then usual way, and with the usual results. the seven english ships were ordered to keep away together for the french eight, and the four leading ships, including the admiral's, came into action handsomely; the last three, whether by their own fault or not, were late in doing so, but it will be remembered that this was almost always the case in such attacks. the french commodore, seeing this interval between the van and the rear, formed the plan of separating them, and made signal to wear together, but in his impatience did not wait for an answer. putting his own helm up, he wore round, and was followed in succession by the rear ships, while the van stood on. the english admiral, who had good reason to know, gives d'aché more credit than the french writers, for he describes this movement thus:-- "at half-past four p.m. the rear of the french line had drawn pretty close up to their flag-ship. our three rear ships were signalled to engage closer. soon after, m. d'aché broke the line, and put before the wind; his second astern, who had kept on the 'yarmouth's' [english flag-ship] quarter most part of the action, then came up alongside, gave his fire, and then bore away; and a few minutes after, the enemy's van bore away also." by this account, which is by no means irreconcilable with the french, the latter effected upon the principal english ship a movement of concentration by defiling past her. the french now stood down to their two separated ships, while the english vessels that had been engaged were too much crippled to follow. this battle prevented the english fleet from relieving fort st. david, which surrendered on the d of june. after the fall of this place, the two opposing squadrons having refitted at their respective ports and resumed their station, a second action was fought in august, under nearly the same conditions and in much the same fashion. the french flag-ship met with a series of untoward accidents, which determined the commodore to withdraw from action; but the statement of his further reasons is most suggestive of the necessary final overthrow of the french cause. "prudence," a writer of his own country says, "commanded him not to prolong a contest from which his ships could not but come out with injuries very difficult to repair in a region where it was impossible to supply the almost entire lack of spare stores." this want of so absolute a requisite for naval efficiency shows in a strong light the fatal tendency of that economy which always characterized french operations at sea, and was at once significant and ominous. returning to pondicherry, d'aché found that, though the injuries to the masts and rigging could for this time be repaired, there was lack of provisions, and that the ships needed calking. although his orders were to remain on the coast until october , he backed himself with the opinion of a council of war which decided that the ships could not remain there longer, because, in case of a third battle, there was neither rigging nor supplies remaining in pondicherry; and disregarding the protests of the governor, lally, he sailed on the d of september for the isle of france. the underlying motive of d'aché, it is known, was hostility to the governor, with whom he quarrelled continually. lally, deprived of the help of the squadron, turned his arms inland instead of against madras. upon arriving at the islands, d'aché found a state of things which again singularly illustrates the impotence and short-sightedness characteristic of the general naval policy of the french at this time. his arrival there was as unwelcome as his departure from india had been to lally. the islands were then in a state of the most complete destitution. the naval division, increased by the arrival of three ships-of-the-line from home, so exhausted them that its immediate departure was requested of the commodore. repairs were pushed ahead rapidly, and in november several of the ships sailed to the cape of good hope, then a dutch colony, to seek provisions; but these were consumed soon after being received, and the pressure for the departure of the squadron was renewed. the situation of the ships was no less precarious than that of the colony; and accordingly the commodore replied by urging his entire lack of food and supplies. the condition was such that, a little later, it was necessary to make running rigging out of the cables, and to put some of the ships on the bottom, so as to give their materials to others. before returning to india, d'aché wrote to the minister of the navy that he "was about to leave, only to save the crews from dying of hunger, and that nothing need be expected from the squadron if supplies were not sent, for both men and things were in a deplorable state." under these circumstances d'aché sailed from the islands in july, , and arrived off the coromandel coast in september. during his year of absence lally had besieged madras for two months, during the northeast monsoon. both squadrons were absent, that season being unfit for naval operations on this coast; but the english returned first, and are said by the french to have caused, by the english to have hastened, the raising of the siege. d'aché, upon his return, was much superior in both number and size of ships; but when the fleets met, pocock did not hesitate to attack with nine against eleven. this action, fought september , , was as indecisive as the two former; but d'aché retreated, after a very bloody contest. upon it campbell, in his "lives of the admirals," makes a droll, but seemingly serious, comment: "pocock had reduced the french ships to a very shattered condition, and killed a great many of their men; but what shows the singular talents of both admirals, they had fought three pitched battles in eighteen months without the loss of a ship on either side." the fruits of victory, however, were with the weaker fleet; for d'aché returned to pondicherry and thence sailed on the st of the next month for the islands, leaving india to its fate. from that time the result was certain. the english continued to receive reinforcements from home, while the french did not; the men opposed to lally were superior in ability; place after place fell, and in january, , pondicherry itself surrendered, surrounded by land and cut off from the sea. this was the end of the french power in india; for though pondicherry and other possessions were restored at the peace, the english tenure there was never again shaken, even under the attacks of the skilful and bold suffren, who twenty years later met difficulties as great as d'aché's with a vigor and conduct which the latter at a more hopeful moment failed to show. france having thus lost both canada and india by the evident failure of her power to act at a distance by sea, it would seem scarcely possible that spain, with her own weak navy and widely scattered possessions, would choose this moment for entering the war. yet so it was. the maritime exhaustion of france was plain to all, and is abundantly testified to by her naval historians. "the resources of france were exhausted," says one; "the year saw only a few single ships leave her ports, and all of them were captured. the alliance with spain came too late. the occasional ships that went to sea in were taken, and the colonies still remaining to france could not be saved."[ ] even as early as , another frenchman writes, "want of money, the depression of commerce given over to english cruisers, the lack of good ships, the lack of supplies, etc., compelled the french ministry, unable to raise large forces, to resort to stratagems, to replace the only rational system of war, grand war, by the smallest of petty wars,--by a sort of game in which the great aim is not to be caught. even then, the arrival of four ships-of-the-line at louisburg, by avoiding the enemy, was looked on as a very fortunate event.... in the lucky arrival of the west india convoy caused as much surprise as joy to the merchants. we see how rare had become such a chance in seas ploughed by the squadrons of england."[ ] this was before the disasters of la clue and conflans. the destruction of french commerce, beginning by the capture of its merchant-ships, was consummated by the reduction of the colonies. it can hardly, therefore, be conceded that the family compact now made between the two courts, containing, as it did, not only an agreement to support each other in any future war, but also a secret clause binding spain to declare war against england within a year, if peace were not made, "was honorable to the wisdom of the two governments." it is hard to pardon, not only the spanish government, but even france for alluring a kindred people into such a bad bargain. it was hoped, however, to revive the french navy and to promote an alliance of neutral powers; many of which, besides spain, had causes of complaint against england. "during the war with france," confesses an english historian, "the spanish flag had not always been respected by british cruisers."[ ] "during ," says another, "not less than one hundred and seventy-six neutral vessels, laden with the rich produce of the french colonies or with military or naval stores, fell into the hands of the english."[ ] the causes were already at work which twenty years later gave rise to the "armed neutrality" of the baltic powers, directed against the claims of england on the sea. the possession of unlimited power, as the sea power of england then really was, is seldom accompanied by a profound respect for the rights of others. without a rival upon the ocean, it suited england to maintain that enemy's property was liable to capture on board neutral ships, thus subjecting these nations not only to vexatious detentions, but to loss of valuable trade; just as it had suited her earlier in the war to establish a paper blockade of french ports. neutrals of course chafed under these exactions; but the year was ill-chosen for an armed protest, and of all powers spain risked most by a war. england had then one hundred and twenty ships-of-the-line in commission, besides those in reserve, manned by seventy thousand seamen trained and hardened by five years of constant warfare afloat, and flushed with victory. the navy of france, which numbered seventy-seven ships-of-the-line in , lost as prizes to the english in twenty-seven, besides eight destroyed and many frigates lost; indeed, as has been seen, their own writers confess that the navy was ruined, root and branch. the spanish navy contained about fifty ships; but the personnel, unless very different from the days before and after, must have been very inferior. the weakness of her empire, in the absence of an efficient navy, has before been pointed out. neutrality, too, though at times outraged, had been of great advantage to her, permitting her to restore her finances and trade and to re-establish her internal resources; but she needed a still longer period of it. nevertheless, the king, influenced by family feeling and resentment against england, allowed himself to be drawn on by the astute choiseul, and the family compact between the two crowns was signed on the th of august, . this compact, into which the king of naples was also to enter, guaranteed their mutual possessions by the whole power of both kingdoms. this in itself was a weighty undertaking; but the secret clause further stipulated that spain should declare war against england on the st of may, , if peace with france had not then been made. negotiations of this character could not be kept wholly secret, and pitt learned enough to convince him that spain was becoming hostile in intention. with his usual haughty resolve, he determined to forestall her by declaring war; but the influence against him in the councils of the new king was too strong. failing to carry the ministry with him, he resigned on the th of october, . his prevision was quickly justified; spain had been eager in professing good-will until the treasure-ships from america should arrive laden with the specie so needed for carrying on war. on the st of september the flota of galleons anchored safely in cadiz; and on the d of november the british ambassador announced to his government that "two ships had safely arrived with very extraordinary rich cargoes from the west indies, so that all the wealth that was expected from spanish america is now safe in old spain," and in the same despatch reports a surprising change in the words of the spanish minister, and the haughty language now used.[ ] the grievences and claims of spain were urged peremptorily, and the quarrel grew so fast that even the new english ministry, though ardently desiring peace, recalled their ambassador before the end of the year, and declared war on the th of january, ; thus adopting pitt's policy, but too late to reap the advantages at which he had aimed. however, no such delay on the part of england could alter the essential inequality, in strength and preparation, between the two nations. the plans formed by pitt were in the main adopted by his successor, and carried out with a speed which the readiness of the english navy permitted. on the th of march, pocock, who had returned from the east indies, sailed from portsmouth, convoying a fleet of transports to act against havana; in the west indies he was reinforced from the forces in that quarter, so that his command contained nineteen ships-of-the-line besides smaller vessels, and ten thousand soldiers. in the previous january, the west india fleet, under the well-known rodney, had acted with the land forces in the reduction of martinique, the gem and tower of the french islands and the harbor of an extensive privateering system. it is said that fourteen hundred english merchantmen were taken during this war in the west indian seas by cruisers whose principal port was fort royal in martinique. with this necessary base fell also the privateering system resting upon it. martinique was surrendered february , and the loss of this chief commercial and military centre was immediately followed by that of the smaller islands, grenada, sta. lucia, st. vincent. by these acquisitions the english colonies at antigua, st. kitts, and nevis, as well as the ships trading to those islands, were secured against the enemy, the commerce of england received large additions, and all the lesser antilles, or windward islands, became british possessions. admiral pocock was joined off cape st. nicholas by the west indian reinforcement on the th of may, and as the season was so far advanced, he took his great fleet through the old bahama channel instead of the usual route around the south side of cuba. this was justly considered a great feat in those days of poor surveys, and was accomplished without an accident. lookout and sounding vessels went first, frigates followed, and boats or sloops were anchored on shoals with carefully arranged signals for day or night. having good weather, the fleet got through in a week and appeared before havana. the operations will not be given in detail. after a forty days' siege the moro castle was taken on the th of july, and the city surrendered on the th of august. the spaniards lost not only the city and port, but twelve ships-of-the-line, besides £ , , in money and merchandise belonging to the spanish king. the importance of havana was not to be measured only by its own size, or its position as centre of a large and richly cultivated district; it was also the port commanding the only passage by which the treasure and other ships could sail from the gulf of mexico to europe in those days. with havana in an enemy's hands it would be necessary to assemble them at cartagena and from there beat up against the trade-winds,--an operation always difficult, and which would keep ships long in waters where they were exposed to capture by english cruisers. not even an attack upon the isthmus would have been so serious a blow to spain. this important result could only be achieved by a nation confident of controlling the communications by its sea power, to which the happy issue must wholly be ascribed, and which had another signal illustration in the timely conveying of four thousand american troops to reinforce the english ranks, terribly wasted by battle and fever. it is said that only twenty-five hundred serviceable fighting men remained on foot when the city fell. while the long reach and vigor of england's sea power was thus felt in the west indies, it was receiving further illustration in portugal and in the far east. the allied crowns in the beginning had invited portugal to join their alliance against those whom they had taken to calling the "tyrants of the seas," reminding her how the english monopoly of her trade was draining the country of gold, and recalling the deliberate violation of her neutrality by the fleet under boscawen. the portuguese minister of the day well knew all this, and keenly felt it; but though the invitation was accompanied by the plain statement that portugal would not be allowed to continue a neutrality she could not enforce, he judged rightly that the country had more to fear from england and her fleet than from the spanish army. the allies declared war and invaded portugal. they were for a time successful; but the "tyrants of the seas" answered portugal's call, sent a fleet and landed at lisbon eight thousand soldiers, who drove the spaniards over the frontiers, and even carried the war into spain itself. simultaneous with these significant events, manila was attacked. with so much already on hand, it was found impossible to spare troops or ships from england. the successes in india and the absolute security of the establishments there, with the control of the sea, allowed the indian officials themselves to undertake this colonial expedition. it sailed in august, , and reaching malacca on the th, was supplied at that neutral port with all that was needed for the siege about to be undertaken; the dutch, though jealous of the english advance, not venturing to refuse their demands. the expedition, which depended entirely upon the fleet, resulted in the whole group of philippine islands surrendering in october and paying a ransom of four million dollars. at about the same time the fleet captured the acapulco galleon having three million dollars on board, and an english squadron in the atlantic took a treasure-ship from lima with four million dollars in silver for the spanish government. "never had the colonial empire of spain received such blows. spain, whose opportune intervention might have modified the fate of the war, entered it too late to help france, but in time to share her misfortunes. there was reason to fear yet more. panama and san domingo were threatened, and the anglo-americans were preparing for the invasion of florida and louisiana.... the conquest of havana had in great measure interrupted the communications between the wealthy american colonies of spain and europe. the reduction of the philippine islands now excluded her from asia. the two together severed all the avenues of spanish trade and cut off all intercourse between the parts of their vast but disconnected empire."[ ] the selection of the points of attack, due to the ministry of pitt, was strategically good, cutting effectually the sinews of the enemy's strength; and if his plans had been fully carried out and panama also seized, the success would have been yet more decisive. england had lost also the advantage of the surprise he would have effected by anticipating spain's declaration of war; but her arms were triumphant during this short contest, through the rapidity with which her projects were carried into execution, due to the state of efficiency to which her naval forces and administration had been brought. with the conquest of manila ended the military operations of the war. nine months, counting from the formal declaration by england in january, had been sufficient to shatter the last hope of france, and to bring spain to a peace in which was conceded every point on which she had based her hostile attitude and demands. it seems scarcely necessary, after even the brief summary of events that has been given, to point out that the speed and thoroughness with which england's work was done was due wholly to her sea power, which allowed her forces to act on distant points, widely apart as cuba, portugal, india, and the philippines, without a fear of serious break in their communications. before giving the terms of peace which ought to summarize the results of the war, but do so imperfectly, owing to the weak eagerness of the english ministry to conclude it, it is necessary to trace in outline the effect of the war upon commerce, upon the foundations of sea power and national prosperity. one prominent feature of this war may be more strongly impressed upon the mind by a startling, because paradoxical, statement that the prosperity of the english is shown by the magnitude of their losses. "from to ," states a french historian, "french privateers captured from the english more than twenty-five hundred merchantmen. in , though france had not, so to speak, a single ship-of-the-line at sea, and though the english had taken two hundred and forty of our privateers, their comrades still took eight hundred and twelve english vessels. the explanation of the number of these prizes lies in the prodigious growth of the english shipping. in it is claimed that the english had at sea eight thousand sail; of these the french captured nearly one tenth, despite escorts and cruisers. in the four years from to the french lost only nine hundred and fifty vessels."[ ] but this discrepancy is justly attributed by an english writer "to the diminution of the french commerce and the dread of falling into the hands of the english, which kept many of their trading-vessels from going to sea;" and he goes on to point out that the capture of vessels was not the principal benefit resulting from the efficiency of england's fleets. "captures like duquesne, louisburg, prince edward's island, the reduction of senegal, and later on of guadeloupe and martinique, were events no less destructive to french commerce and colonies than advantageous to those of england."[ ] the multiplication of french privateers was indeed a sad token to an instructed eye, showing behind them merchant shipping in enforced idleness, whose crews and whose owners were driven to speculative pillage in order to live. nor was this risk wholly in vain. the same englishman confesses that in the losses of merchantmen showed a worse balance than the ships-of-war. while the french were striving in vain to regain equality upon the sea and repair their losses, but to no purpose, for "in building and arming vessels they labored only for the english fleet," yet, "notwithstanding the courage and vigilance of english cruisers, french privateers so swarmed that in this year they took two hundred and forty british vessels, chiefly coasters and small craft." in the same authority gives the british loss in trading-vessels at over three hundred, and in at over eight hundred, three times that of the french; but he adds: "it would not have been wonderful had they taken more and richer ships. while their commerce was nearly destroyed, and they had few merchant-ships at sea, the trading-fleets of england covered the seas. every year her commerce was increasing; the money which the war carried out was returned by the produce of her industry. eight thousand vessels were employed by the traders of great britain." the extent of her losses is attributed to three causes, of which the first only was preventable: ( ) the inattention of merchant-ships to the orders of the convoying vessels; ( ) the immense number of english ships in all seas; ( ) the enemy's venturing the whole remains of his strength in privateering. during the same year, , the navy lost one ship-of-the-line, which was retaken, and one cutter. at the same time, notwithstanding the various exchanges, the english still held twenty-five thousand french prisoners, while the english prisoners in france were but twelve hundred. these were the results of the sea war. finally, in summing up the commercial condition of the kingdom at the end of the war, after mentioning the enormous sums of specie taken from spain, the writer says:-- "these strengthened trade and fostered industry. the remittances for foreign subsidies were in great part paid by bills on merchants settled abroad, who had the value of the drafts in british manufactures. the trade of england increased gradually every year, and such a scene of national prosperity while waging a long, costly, and bloody war, was never before shown by any people in the world." no wonder, with such results to her commerce and such unvarying success attending her arms, and seeing the practical annihilation of the french navy, that the union of france and spain, which was then lowering on her future and had once excited the fears of all europe, was now beheld by great britain alone without the smallest fear or despondency. spain was by her constitution and the distribution of her empire peculiarly open to the attack of a great sea people; and whatever the views of the government of the day, pitt and the nation saw that the hour had come, which had been hoped for in vain in , because then years of peace and the obstinate bias of a great minister had relaxed the muscles of her fleet. now she but reached forth her hand and seized what she wished; nor could there have been any limit to her prey, had not the ministry again been untrue to the interests of the country. the position of portugal with reference to great britain has been alluded to, but merits some special attention as instancing an element of sea power obtained not by colonies, but by alliance, whether necessary or prudential. the commercial connection before spoken of "was strengthened by the strongest political ties. the two kingdoms were so situated as to have little to fear from each other, while they might impart many mutual advantages. the harbors of portugal gave shelter as well as supplies to the english fleet, while the latter defended the rich trade of portugal with brazil. the antipathy between portugal and spain made it necessary for the former to have an ally, strong yet distant. none is so advantageous in that way as england, which in her turn might, and always has, derived great advantages from portugal in a war with any of the southern powers of europe." this is an english view of a matter which to others looks somewhat like an alliance between a lion and a lamb. to call a country with a fleet like england's "distant" from a small maritime nation like portugal is an absurdity. england is, and yet more in those days was, wherever her fleet could go. the opposite view of the matter, showing equally the value of the alliance, was well set forth in the memorial by which, under the civil name of an invitation, the crowns of france and spain ordered portugal to declare against england. the grounds of that memorial--namely, the unequal benefit to portugal from the connection and the disregard of portuguese neutrality--have already been given. the king of portugal refused to abandon the alliance, for the professed reason that it was ancient and wholly defensive. to this the two crowns replied:-- "the defensive alliance is actually an offensive one by the situation of the portuguese dominions and the nature of the english power. the english squadrons cannot in all seasons keep the sea, nor cruise on the principal coasts of france and spain for cutting off the navigation of the two countries, without the ports and assistance of portugal; and these islanders could not insult all maritime europe, if the whole riches of portugal did not pass through their hands, which furnishes them with the means to make war and renders the alliance truly and properly offensive." between the two arguments the logic of situation and power prevailed. portugal found england nearer and more dangerous than spain, and remained for generations of trial true to the alliance. this relationship was as useful to england as any of her colonial possessions, depending of course upon the scene of the principal operations at any particular time. the preliminaries of peace were signed at fontainebleau, november , ; the definitive treaty on the th of the following february, at paris, whence the peace takes its name. by its terms france renounced all claims to canada, nova scotia, and all the islands of the st. lawrence; along with canada she ceded the valley of the ohio and all her territory on the east side of the mississippi, except the city of new orleans. at the same time spain, as an equivalent for havana, which england restored, yielded florida, under which name were comprised all her continental possessions east of the mississippi. thus england obtained a colonial empire embracing canada, from hudson's bay, and all of the present united states east of the mississippi. the possibilities of this vast region were then only partially foreseen, and as yet there was no foreshadowing of the revolt of the thirteen colonies. in the west indies, england gave back to france the important islands of guadeloupe and martinique. the four so-called neutral islands of the lesser antilles were divided between the two powers; sta. lucia going to france, st. vincent, tobago, and dominica to england, which also retained grenada. minorca was given back to england; and as the restoration of the island to spain had been one of the conditions of the alliance with the latter, france, unable to fulfil her stipulation, ceded to spain louisiana west of the mississippi. in india, france recovered the possessions she had held before dupleix began his schemes of aggrandizement; but she gave up the right of erecting fortifications or keeping troops in bengal, and so left the station at chandernagore defenceless. in a word, france resumed her facilities for trading, but practically abandoned her pretensions to political influence. it was tacitly understood that the english company would keep all its conquests. the right of fishing upon the coasts of newfoundland and in parts of the gulf of st. lawrence, which france had previously enjoyed, was conceded to her by this treaty; but it was denied to spain, who had claimed it for her fishermen. this concession was among those most attacked by the english opposition. the nation at large and pitt, the favorite of the nation, were bitterly opposed to the terms of the treaty. "france," said pitt, "is chiefly formidable to us as a maritime and commercial power. what we gain in this respect is valuable to us above all through the injury to her which results from it. you leave to france the possibility of reviving her navy." in truth, from the point of view of sea power and of the national jealousies which the spirit of that age sanctioned, these words, though illiberal, were strictly justifiable. the restoration to france of her colonies in the west indies and her stations in india, together with the valuable right of fishery in her former american possessions, put before her the possibility and the inducement to restore her shipping, her commerce, and her navy, and thus tended to recall her from the path of continental ambition which had been so fatal to her interests, and in the same proportion favorable to the unprecedented growth of england's power upon the ocean. the opposition, and indeed some of the ministry, also thought that so commanding and important a position as havana was poorly paid for by the cession of the yet desolate and unproductive region called florida. porto rico was suggested, florida accepted. there were other minor points of difference, into which it is unnecessary to enter. it could scarcely be denied that with the commanding military control of the sea held by england, grasping as she now did so many important positions, with her navy overwhelmingly superior in numbers, and her commerce and internal condition very thriving, more rigorous terms might easily have been exacted and would have been prudent. the ministry defended their eagerness and spirit of concession on the ground of the enormous growth of the debt, which then amounted to £ , , , a sum in every point of view much greater then than now; but while this draft upon the future was fully justified by the success of the war, it also imperatively demanded that the utmost advantages which the military situation made attainable should be exacted. this the ministry failed to do. as regards the debt, it is well observed by a french writer that "in this war, and for years afterward, england had in view nothing less than the conquest of america and the progress of her east india company. by these two countries her manufactures and commerce acquired more than sufficient outlets, and repaid her for the numerous sacrifices she had made. seeing the maritime decay of europe,--its commerce annihilated, its manufactures so little advanced,--how could the english nation feel afraid of a future which offered so vast a perspective?" unfortunately the nation needed an exponent in the government; and its chosen mouthpiece, the only man, perhaps, able to rise to the level of the great opportunity, was out of favor at court. nevertheless, the gains of england were very great, not only in territorial increase, nor yet in maritime preponderance, but in the prestige and position achieved in the eyes of the nations, now fully opened to her great resources and mighty power. to these results, won by the sea, the issue of the continental war offered a singular and suggestive contrast. france had already withdrawn, along with england, from all share in that strife, and peace between the other parties to it was signed five days after the peace of paris. the terms of the peace were simply the _status quo ante bellum_. by the estimate of the king of prussia, one hundred and eighty thousand of his soldiers had fallen or died in this war, out of a kingdom of five million souls; while the losses of russia, austria, and france aggregated four hundred and sixty thousand men. the result was simply that things remained as they were.[ ] to attribute this only to a difference between the possibilities of land and sea war is of course absurd. the genius of frederick, backed by the money of england, had proved an equal match for the mismanaged and not always hearty efforts of a coalition numerically overwhelming. what does seem a fair conclusion is, that states having a good seaboard, or even ready access to the ocean by one or two outlets, will find it to their advantage to seek prosperity and extension by the way of the sea and of commerce, rather than in attempts to unsettle and modify existing political arrangements in countries where a more or less long possession of power has conferred acknowledged rights, and created national allegiance or political ties. since the treaty of paris in , the waste places of the world have been rapidly filled; witness our own continent, australia, and even south america. a nominal and more or less clearly defined political possession now generally exists in the most forsaken regions, though to this statement there are some marked exceptions; but in many places this political possession is little more than nominal, and in others of a character so feeble that it cannot rely upon itself alone for support or protection. the familiar and notorious example of the turkish empire, kept erect only by the forces pressing upon it from opposing sides, by the mutual jealousies of powers that have no sympathy with it, is an instance of such weak political tenure; and though the question is wholly european, all know enough of it to be aware that the interest and control of the sea powers is among the chief, if not the first, of the elements that now fix the situation; and that they, if intelligently used, will direct the future inevitable changes. upon the western continents the political condition of the central american and tropical south american states is so unstable as to cause constant anxiety about the maintenance of internal order, and seriously to interfere with commerce and with the peaceful development of their resources. so long as--to use a familiar expression--they hurt no one but themselves, this may go on; but for a long time the citizens of more stable governments have been seeking to exploit their resources, and have borne the losses arising from their distracted condition. north america and australia still offer large openings to immigration and enterprise; but they are filling up rapidly, and as the opportunities there diminish, the demand must arise for a more settled government in those disordered states, for security to life and for reasonable stability of institutions enabling merchants and others to count upon the future. there is certainly no present hope that such a demand can be fulfilled from the existing native materials; if the same be true when the demand arises, no theoretical positions, like the monroe doctrine, will prevent interested nations from attempting to remedy the evil by some measure, which, whatever it may be called, will be a political interference. such interferences must produce collisions, which may be at times settled by arbitration, but can scarcely fail at other times to cause war. even for a peaceful solution, that nation will have the strongest arguments which has the strongest organized force. it need scarcely be said that the successful piercing of the central american isthmus at any point may precipitate the moment that is sure to come sooner or later. the profound modification of commercial routes expected from this enterprise, the political importance to the united states of such a channel of communication between her atlantic and pacific seaboards, are not, however, the whole nor even the principal part of the question. as far as can be seen, the time will come when stable governments for the american tropical states must be assured by the now existing powerful and stable states of america or europe. the geographical position of those states, the climatic conditions, make it plain at once that sea power will there, even more than in the case of turkey, determine what foreign state shall predominate,--if not by actual possession, by its influence over the native governments. the geographical position of the united states and her intrinsic power give her an undeniable advantage; but that advantage will not avail if there is a great inferiority of organized brute-force, which still remains the last argument of republics as of kings. herein lies to us the great and still living interest of the seven years' war. in it we have seen and followed england, with an army small as compared with other states, as is still her case to-day, first successfully defending her own shores, then carrying her arms in every direction, spreading her rule and influence over remote regions, and not only binding them to her obedience, but making them tributary to her wealth, her strength, and her reputation. as she loosens the grasp and neutralizes the influence of france and spain in regions beyond the sea, there is perhaps seen the prophecy of some other great nation in days yet to come, that will incline the balance of power in some future sea war, whose scope will be recognized afterward, if not by contemporaries, to have been the political future and the economical development of regions before lost to civilization; but that nation will not be the united states if the moment find her indifferent, as now, to the empire of the seas. the direction then given to england's efforts, by the instinct of the nation and the fiery genius of pitt, continued after the war, and has profoundly influenced her subsequent policy. mistress now of north america, lording it in india, through the company whose territorial conquests had been ratified by native princes, over twenty millions of inhabitants,--a population larger than that of great britain and having a revenue respectable alongside of that of the home government,--england, with yet other rich possessions scattered far and wide over the globe, had ever before her eyes, as a salutary lesson, the severe chastisement which the weakness of spain had allowed her to inflict upon that huge disjointed empire. the words of the english naval historian of that war, speaking about spain, apply with slight modifications to england in our own day. "spain is precisely that power against which england can always contend with the fairest prospect of advantage and honor. that extensive monarchy is exhausted at heart, her resources lie at a great distance, and whatever power commands the sea, may command the wealth and commerce of spain. the dominions from which she draws her resources, lying at an immense distance from the capital and from one another, make it more necessary for her than for any other state to temporize, until she can inspire with activity all parts of her enormous but disjointed empire."[ ] it would be untrue to say that england is exhausted at heart; but her dependence upon the outside world is such as to give a certain suggestiveness to the phrase. this analogy of positions was not overlooked by england. from that time forward up to our own day, the possessions won for her by her sea power have combined with that sea power itself to control her policy. the road to india--in the days of clive a distant and perilous voyage on which she had not a stopping-place of her own--was reinforced as opportunity offered by the acquisition of st. helena, of the cape of good hope, of the mauritius. when steam made the red sea and mediterranean route practicable, she acquired aden, and yet later has established herself at socotra. malta had already fallen into her hands during the wars of the french revolution, and her commanding position, as the corner-stone upon which the coalitions against napoleon rested, enabled her to claim it at the peace of . being but a short thousand miles from gibraltar, the circles of military command exercised by these two places intersect. the present day has seen the stretch from malta to the isthmus of suez, formerly without a station, guarded by the cession to her of cyprus. egypt, despite the jealousy of france, has passed under english control. the importance of that position to india, understood by napoleon and nelson, led the latter at once to send an officer overland to bombay with the news of the battle of the nile and the downfall of bonaparte's hopes. even now, the jealousy with which england views the advance of russia in central asia is the result of those days in which her sea power and resources triumphed over the weakness of d'aché and the genius of suffren, and wrenched the peninsula of india from the ambition of the french. "for the first time since the middle ages," says m. martin, speaking of the seven years' war, "england had conquered france single-handed almost without allies, france having powerful auxiliaries. she had conquered solely by the superiority of her government." yes! but by the superiority of her government using the tremendous weapon of her sea power. this made her rich, and in turn protected the trade by which she had her wealth. with her money she upheld her few auxiliaries, mainly prussia and hanover, in their desperate strife. her power was everywhere that her ships could reach, and there was none to dispute the sea to her. where she would she went, and with her went her guns and her troops. by this mobility her forces were multiplied, those of her enemies distracted. ruler of the seas, she everywhere obstructed its highways. the enemies' fleets could not join; no great fleet could get out, or if it did, it was only to meet at once, with uninured officers and crews, those who were veterans in gales and warfare. save in the case of minorca, she carefully held her own sea-bases and eagerly seized those of the enemy. what a lion in the path was gibraltar to the french squadrons of toulon and brest! what hope for french succor to canada, when the english fleet had louisburg under its lee? the one nation that gained in this war was that which used the sea in peace to earn its wealth, and ruled it in war by the extent of its navy, by the number of its subjects who lived on the sea or by the sea, and by its numerous bases of operations scattered over the globe. yet it must be observed that these bases themselves would have lost their value if their communications remained obstructed. therefore the french lost louisburg, martinique, pondicherry; so england herself lost minorca. the service between the bases and the mobile force between the ports and the fleets is mutual.[ ] in this respect the navy is essentially a light corps; it keeps open the communications between its own ports, it obstructs those of the enemy; but it sweeps the sea for the service of the land, it controls the desert that man may live and thrive on the habitable globe. footnotes: [ ] that is, with the guns on board, but for the most part not mounted on their carriages, in order to give increased accommodation for troops. when the troops were landed, the guns were mounted. [ ] ramatuelle: tactique navale. [ ] lapeyrouse-bonfils: hist. de la marine. [ ] clerk: naval tactics. [ ] jurien de la gravière: guerres maritimes. [ ] mahon: history of england. [ ] mahon: history of england. [ ] for these, see troude: batailles navales. [ ] see plate viii. [ ] troude: batailles navales de la france. [ ] lapeyrouse-bonfils. [ ] mahon: history of england. [ ] campbell: lives of the admirals. [ ] mahon: history of england. [ ] martin: history of france. [ ] martin: history of france. [ ] campbell: lives of the admirals. [ ] see annual register, , p. [ ] campbell: lives of the admirals. [ ] these remarks, always true, are doubly so now since the introduction of steam. the renewal of coal is a want more frequent, more urgent, more peremptory, than any known to the sailing-ship. it is vain to look for energetic naval operations distant from coal stations. it is equally vain to acquire distant coaling stations without maintaining a powerful navy; they will but fall into the hands of the enemy. but the vainest of all delusions is the expectation of bringing down an enemy by commerce-destroying alone, with no coaling stations outside the national boundaries. chapter ix. course of events from the peace of paris to .--maritime war consequent upon the american revolution.--sea battle off ushant. if england had reason to complain that she had not reaped from the treaty of paris all the advantages that her military achievements and position entitled her to expect, france had every cause for discontent at the position in which the war left her. the gain of england was nearly measured by her losses; even the cession of florida, made to the conqueror by spain, had been bought by france at the price of louisiana. naturally the thoughts of her statesmen and of her people, as they bent under the present necessity to bear the burden of the vanquished, turned to the future with its possibilities of revenge and compensation. the duc de choiseul, able though imperious, remained for many years more at the head of affairs, and worked persistently to restore the power of france from the effects of the treaty. the austrian alliance had been none of his seeking; it was already made and working when he came to office in ; but he had even at the first recognized that the chief enemy was england, and tried as far as could be to direct the forces of the nation against her. the defeat of conflans having thwarted his projects of invasion, he next sought, in entire consistency with his main purpose, to stir up spain and gain her alliance. the united efforts of the two kingdoms with their fine seaboards could, under good administration and with time for preparation, put afloat a navy that would be a fair counterpoise to that of england. it was also doubtless true that weaker maritime states, if they saw such a combination successfully made and working efficiently, would pluck up heart to declare against a government whose greatness excited envy and fear, and which acted with the disregard to the rights and welfare of others common to all uncontrolled power. unhappily for both france and spain, the alliance came too late. the virtual annihilation of the french fleet in was indeed followed by an outburst of national enthusiasm for the navy, skilfully fostered and guided by choiseul. "popular feeling took up the cry, from one end of france to the other, 'the navy must be restored.' gifts of cities, corporations, and private individuals raised funds. a prodigious activity sprang up in the lately silent ports; everywhere ships were building and repairing." the minister also recognized the need of restoring the discipline and tone, as well as the material of the navy. the hour, however, was too late; the middle of a great and unsuccessful war is no time to begin preparations. "better late than never" is not so safe a proverb as "in time of peace prepare for war." the condition of spain was better. when war broke out, the english naval historian estimates that she had one hundred ships of all sizes; of these, probably sixty were of the line. nevertheless, although the addition of spain to her numerous enemies might make the position of england seem critical, the combination in her favor of numbers, skill, experience, and prestige, was irresistible. with seventy thousand veteran seamen, she had only to maintain a position already won. the results we know. after the peace, choiseul wisely remained faithful to his own first ideas. the restoration of the navy continued, and was accompanied and furthered by a spirit of professional ambition and of desire to excel, among the officers of the navy, which has been before mentioned, and which, in the peculiar condition of the united states navy at the present day, may be commended as a model. the building of ships-of-war continued with great activity and on a large scale. at the end of the war, thanks to the movement begun in , there were forty ships-of-the-line in good condition. in , when choiseul was dismissed, the royal navy numbered sixty-four of the line and fifty frigates afloat. the arsenals and storehouses were filled, and a stock of ship-timber laid up. at the same time the minister tried to improve the efficiency of the officers by repressing the arrogant spirit of those of noble birth, which showed itself both toward superiors and toward another order of officers, not of the nobility, whose abilities made them desired on board the fleet. this class-feeling carried with it a curious sentiment of equality among officers of very different grades, which injuriously affected the spirit of subordination. members, all, of a privileged social order, their equality as such was more clearly recognized than their inequality as junior and senior. the droll story told by marryatt of the midshipman, who represented to his captain that a certain statement had been made in confidence, seems to have had a realization on the french quarter-deck of that day. "confidence!" cried the captain; "who ever heard of confidence between a post-captain and a midshipman!" "no sir," replied the youngster, "not between a captain and a midshipman, but between two gentlemen." disputes, arguments, suggestions, between two gentlemen, forgetful of their relative rank, would break out at critical moments, and the feeling of equality, which wild democratic notions spread throughout the fleets of the republic, was curiously forestalled by that existing among the members of a most haughty aristocracy. "i saw by his face," says one of marryatt's heroes, "that the first lieutenant did not agree with the captain; but he was too good an officer to say so at such a moment." the phrase expresses one of the deepest-rooted merits of the english system, the want of which is owned by french writers:-- "under louis xvi. the intimacy and fellowship existing between the chief and the subordinate led the latter to discuss the orders which were given him.... the relaxation of discipline and the spirit of independence were due also to another cause than that pointed out; they can be partly attributed to the regulation of the officers' messes. admiral, captain, officers, midshipmen, ate together; everything was in common. they thee-and-thou'd each other like chums. in handling the ship, the inferior gave his opinion, argued, and the chief, irritated, often preferred to yield rather than make enemies. facts of this kind are asserted by witnesses whose truthfulness is above suspicion."[ ] insubordination of this character, to which weaker men gave way, dashed in vain against the resolute and fiery temper of suffren; but the spirit of discontent rose almost to the height of mutiny, causing him to say in his despatches to the minister of the navy, after his fourth battle: "my heart is pierced by the most general defection. it is frightful to think that i might four times have destroyed the english fleet, and that it still exists." choiseul's reforms broke against this rock, which only the uprising of the whole nation finally removed; but in the personnel of the crews a great improvement was made. in he reorganized the artillery of the fleet, forming a body of ten thousand gunners, who were systematically drilled once a week during the ten years still to intervene before the next war with england. losing sight of no part of his plans, choiseul, while promoting the naval and military power of france, paid special attention to the alliance with spain and judiciously encouraged and furthered the efforts of that country in the path of progress under charles iii., the best of her kings of the bourbon line. the austrian alliance still existing was maintained, but his hopes were chiefly fixed upon spain. the wisdom and insight which had at once fastened upon england as the centre of enmity to france had been justified and further enlightened by the whole course of the seven years' war. in spain was the surest, and, with good administration, the most powerful ally. the close proximity of the two countries, the relative positions of their ports, made the naval situation particularly strong; and the alliance which was dictated by sound policy, by family ties, and by just fear of england's sea power, was further assured to france by recent and still existing injuries that must continue to rankle with spain. gibraltar, minorca, and florida were still in the hands of england; no spaniard could be easy till this reproach was wiped out. it may be readily believed, as is asserted by french historians, that england viewed with disquietude the growth of the french navy, and would gladly have nipped it betimes; but it is more doubtful whether she would have been willing to force a war for that purpose. during the years succeeding the peace of paris a succession of short ministries, turning mainly upon questions of internal policy or unimportant party arrangement, caused her foreign policy to present a marked contrast to the vigorous, overbearing, but straightforward path followed by pitt. internal commotions, such as are apt to follow great wars, and above all the controversy with the north american colonies, which began as early as with the well-known stamp act, conspired with other causes to stay the hand of england. twice at least during the years of choiseul's ministry there occurred opportunities which a resolute, ready, and not too scrupulous government might easily have converted into a cause of war; the more so as they involved that sea power which is to england above all other nations the object of just and jealous concern. in the genoese, weary of their unsuccessful attempts to control corsica, again asked france to renew the occupation of the ports which had been garrisoned by her in . the corsicans also sent an ambassador to france in order to solicit recognition of the independence of the island, in consideration of a tribute equivalent to that which they had formerly paid to genoa. the latter, feeling its inability to reconquer the island, at length decided practically to cede it. the transaction took the shape of a formal permission for the king of france to exercise all the rights of sovereignty over all the places and harbors of corsica, as security for debts owing to him by the republic. this cession, disguised under the form of a security in order to palliate the aggrandizement of france in the eyes of austria and england, recalls the conditional and thinly veiled surrender of cyprus to england nine years ago,--a transfer likely to be as final and far-reaching as that of corsica. england then remonstrated and talked angrily; but though burke said, "corsica as a province of france is terrible to me," only one member of the house of commons, the veteran admiral sir charles saunders, was found to say "that it would be better to go to war with france than consent to her taking possession of corsica."[ ] having in view the then well-recognized interests of england in the mediterranean, it is evident that an island so well situated as corsica for influencing the shores of italy and checking the naval station at minorca, would not have been allowed to go into the hands of a strong master, if the nation had felt ready and willing for war. again, in , a dispute arose between england and spain relative to the possession of the falkland islands. it is not material to state the nature of either claim to what was then but a collection of barren islands, destitute of military as well as of natural advantages. both england and spain had had a settlement, on which the national colors were flying; and at the english station a captain in the navy commanded. before this settlement, called port egmont, there suddenly appeared, in june, , a spanish expedition, fitted out in buenos ayres, of five frigates and sixteen hundred soldiers. to such a force the handful of englishmen could make no serious resistance; so after a few shots, exchanged for the honor of the flag, they capitulated. the news of this transaction, which reached england in the following october, showed by its reception how much more serious is an insult than an injury, and how much more bitterly resented. the transfer of corsica had scarcely occasioned a stir outside the offices of statesmen; the attack on port egmont roused the people and parliament. the minister to madrid was ordered to demand the immediate restoration of the islands, with a disavowal of the action of the officer who had ordered the attack. without waiting for a reply, ships were ordered into commission, press-gangs swept the streets, and in a short time a powerful fleet was ready at spithead to revenge the insult. spain, relying upon the bourbon family compact and the support of france, was disposed to stand firm; but the old king, louis xv., was averse to war, and choiseul, among whose enemies at court was the last mistress, was dismissed. with his fall disappeared the hopes of spain, which at once complied with the demands of england, reserving, however, the question as to the rights of sovereignty. this conclusion shows clearly that england, though still wielding an effective sea power able to control spain, was not eager for a war merely in order to break down the rival navies. it is not wholly alien to the question of sea power to note, without dwelling upon it, a great event which now happened, seemingly utterly removed from all relation to the sea. the first partition of poland between prussia, russia, and austria, carried out in , was made easier by the preoccupation of choiseul with his naval policy and the spanish alliance. the friendship and support of poland and turkey, as checks upon the house of austria, were part of the tradition received from henry iv. and richelieu; the destruction of the former was a direct blow to the pride and interest of france. what choiseul would have done had he been in office, cannot be known; but if the result of the seven years' war had been different, france might have interfered to some purpose. on the th of may, , louis xv. died, at the time when the troubles in the north american colonies were fast coming to a head. under his youthful successor, louis xvi., the policy of peace on the continent, of friendly alliance with spain, and of building up the navy in numbers and efficiency, was continued. this was the foreign policy of choiseul, directed against the sea power of england as the chief enemy, and toward the sea power of france as the chief support, of the nation. the instructions which, according to a french naval author, the new king gave to his ministers show the spirit with which his reign up to the revolution was inspired, whether or not they originated with the king himself:-- "to watch all indications of approaching danger; to observe by cruisers the approaches to our islands and the entrance to the gulf of mexico; to keep track of what was passing on the banks of newfoundland, and to follow the tendencies of english commerce; to observe in england the state of the troops and armaments, the public credit and the ministry; to meddle adroitly in the affairs of the british colonies; to give the insurgent colonists the means of obtaining supplies of war, while maintaining the strictest neutrality; to develop actively, but noiselessly, the navy; to repair our ships of war; to fill our storehouses and to keep on hand the means for rapidly equipping a fleet at brest and at toulon, while spain should be fitting one at ferrol; finally, at the first serious fear of rupture, to assemble numerous troops upon the shores of brittany and normandy, and get everything ready for an invasion of england, so as to force her to concentrate her forces, and thus restrict her means of resistance at the extremities of the empire."[ ] such instructions, whether given all at once as a symmetrical, well-thought-out plan, or from time to time, as occasion arose, showed that an accurate forecast of the situation had been made, and breathed a conviction which, if earlier felt, would have greatly modified the history of the two countries. the execution was less thorough than the conception. in the matter of developing the navy, however, fifteen years of peace and steady work showed good results. when war openly broke out in , france had eighty ships-of-the-line in good condition, and sixty-seven thousand seamen were borne on the rolls of the maritime conscription. spain, when she entered the war in as the ally of france, had in her ports nearly sixty ships-of-the-line. to this combination england opposed a total number of two hundred and twenty-eight ships of all classes, of which about one hundred and fifty were of the line. the apparent equality in material which would result from these numbers was affected, to the disadvantage of england, by the superior size and artillery of the french and spaniards; but on the other hand her strength was increased by the unity of aim imparted by belonging to one nation. the allies were destined to feel the proverbial weakness of naval coalitions, as well as the degenerate administration of spain, and the lack of habit--may it not even be said without injustice, of aptitude for the sea--of both nations. the naval policy with which louis xvi. began his reign was kept up to the end; in , two years after the assembly of the states-general, the french navy numbered eighty-six ships-of-the-line, generally superior, both in dimensions and model, to english ships of the same class. we have come, therefore, to the beginning of a truly maritime war; which, as will be granted by those who have followed this narrative, had not been seen since the days of de ruyter and tourville. the magnificence of sea power and its value had perhaps been more clearly shown by the uncontrolled sway, and consequent exaltation, of one belligerent; but the lesson thus given, if more striking, is less vividly interesting than the spectacle of that sea power meeting a foe worthy of its steel, and excited to exertion by a strife which endangered, not only its most valuable colonies, but even its own shores. waged, from the extended character of the british empire, in all quarters of the world at once, the attention of the student is called now to the east indies and now to the west; now to the shores of the united states and thence to those of england; from new york and chesapeake bay to gibraltar and minorca, to the cape verde islands, the cape of good hope, and ceylon. fleets now meet fleets of equal size, and the general chase and the _mêlée_, which marked the actions of hawke, boscawen, and anson, though they still occur at times, are for the most part succeeded by wary and complicated manoeuvres, too often barren of decisive results as naval battles, which are the prevailing characteristic of this coming war. the superior tactical science of the french succeeded in imparting to this conflict that peculiar feature of their naval policy, which subordinated the control of the sea by the destruction of the enemy's fleets, of his organized naval forces, to the success of particular operations, the retention of particular points, the carrying out of particular ulterior strategic ends. it is not necessary to endeavor to force upon others the conviction of the present writer that such a policy, however applicable as an exception, is faulty as a rule; but it is most desirable that all persons responsible for the conduct of naval affairs should recognize that the two lines of policy, in direct contradiction to each other, do exist. in the one there is a strict analogy to a war of posts; while in the other the objective is that force whose destruction leaves the posts unsupported and therefore sure to fall in due time. these opposing policies being recognized, consideration should also be had of the results of the two as exemplified in the history of england and france. it was not, however, with such cautious views that the new king at first sought to impress his admirals. in the instructions addressed to the count d'orvilliers, commanding the first fleet sent out from brest, the minister, speaking in the name of the king, says:-- "your duty now is to restore to the french flag the lustre with which it once shone; past misfortunes and faults must be buried out of sight; only by the most illustrious actions can the navy hope to succeed in doing this. his majesty has the right to expect the greatest efforts from his officers.... under whatever circumstances the king's fleet may be placed, his majesty's orders, which he expressly charges me to impress upon you, as well as upon all officers in command, are that his ships attack with the greatest vigor, and defend themselves, on all occasions, to the last extremity." more follows to the same effect; upon which a french officer, who has not before been quoted in connection with this phase of french naval policy, says:-- "how different this language from that held to our admirals during the last war; for it would be an error to believe that they followed by choice and temper the timid and defensive system which predominated in the tactics of the navy. the government, always finding the expenses exacted by the employment of the navy excessive, too often prescribed to its admirals to keep the sea as long as possible without coming to pitched battles, or even to brushes, generally very expensive, and from which might follow the loss of ships difficult to replace. often they were enjoined, if driven to accept action, carefully to avoid compromising the fate of their squadron by too decisive encounters. they thought themselves, therefore, obliged to retreat as soon as an engagement took too serious a turn. thus they acquired the unhappy habit of voluntarily yielding the field of battle as soon as an enemy, even inferior, boldly disputed it with them. thus to send a fleet to meet the enemy, only to retire shamefully from his presence; to receive action instead of offering it; to begin battles only to end them with the semblance of defeat; to ruin moral force in order to save physical force,--that was the spirit which, as has been very judiciously said by m. charles dupin, guided the french ministry of that epoch. the results are known."[ ] the brave words of louis xvi. were followed almost immediately by others, of different and qualifying tenor, to admiral d'orvilliers before he sailed. he was informed that the king, having learned the strength of the english fleet, relied upon his prudence as to the conduct to be followed at a moment when he had under his orders all the naval force of which france could dispose. as a matter of fact the two fleets were nearly equal; it would be impossible to decide which was the stronger, without detailed information as to the armament of every ship. d'orvilliers found himself, as many a responsible man has before, with two sets of orders, on one or the other of which he was sure to be impaled, if unlucky; while the government, in the same event, was sure of a scape-goat. the consideration of the relative force of the two navies, material and moral, has necessarily carried us beyond the date of the opening of the american revolutionary war. before beginning with that struggle, it may be well to supplement the rough estimate of england's total naval force, given, in lack of more precise information, by the statement of the first lord of the admiralty made in the house of lords in november, , a very few months before the war with france began. replying to a complaint of the opposition as to the smallness of the channel fleet, he said:-- "we have now forty-two ships-of-the-line in commission in great britain (without counting those on foreign service), thirty-five of which are completely manned, and ready for sea at a moment's warning.... i do not believe that either france or spain entertains any hostile disposition toward us; but from what i have now submitted to you, i am authorized to affirm that our navy is more than a match for that of the whole house of bourbon."[ ] it must, however, be said that this pleasing prospect was not realized by admiral keppel when appointed to command in the following march, and looking at his fleet with (to use his own apt expression) "a seaman's eye;"[ ] and in june he went to sea with only twenty ships. it is plainly undesirable to insert in a narrative of this character any account of the political questions which led to the separation of the united states from the british empire. it has already been remarked that the separation followed upon a succession of blunders by the english ministry,--not unnatural in view of the ideas generally prevalent at that day as to the relations of colonies to the mother-country. it needed a man of commanding genius to recognize, not only the substantial justice of the american claims,--many did that,--but also the military strength of their situation, as before indicated. this lay in the distance of the colonies from home, their nearness to each other independently of the command of the sea, the character of the colonists,--mainly of english and dutch stock,--and the probable hostility of france and spain. unfortunately for england, the men most able to cope with the situation were in the minority and out of office. it has been said before that, had the thirteen colonies been islands, the sea power of great britain would have so completely isolated them that their fall, one after the other, must have ensued. to this it may be added that the narrowness of the strip then occupied by civilized man, and the manner in which it was intersected by estuaries of the sea and navigable rivers, practically reduced to the condition of islands, so far as mutual support went, great sections of the insurgent country, which were not large enough to stand alone, yet too large for their fall not to have been a fatal blow to the common cause. the most familiar case is that of the line of the hudson, where the bay of new york was held from the first by the british, who also took the city in september, , two months after the declaration of independence. the difficulties in the way of moving up and down such a stream were doubtless much greater to sailing vessels than they now are to steamers; yet it seems impossible to doubt that active and capable men wielding the great sea power of england could so have held that river and lake champlain with ships-of-war at intervals and accompanying galleys as to have supported a sufficient army moving between the head-waters of the hudson and the lake, while themselves preventing any intercourse by water between new england and the states west of the river. this operation would have closely resembled that by which in the civil war the united states fleets and armies gradually cut in twain the southern confederacy by mastering the course of the mississippi, and the political results would have been even more important than the military; for at that early stage of the war the spirit of independence was far more general and bitter in the section that would have been cut off,--in new england,--than in new york and new jersey, perhaps than anywhere except in south carolina.[ ] in the british attempted to accomplish this object by sending general burgoyne from canada to force his way by lake champlain to the hudson. at the same time sir henry clinton moved north from new york with three thousand men, and reached west point, whence he sent by shipping a part of his force up the river to within forty miles of albany. here the officer in command learned of the surrender of burgoyne at saratoga, and returned; but what he did at the head of a detachment from a main body of only three thousand, shows what might have been done under a better system. while this was happening on the hudson, the english commander-in-chief of the troops acting in america had curiously enough made use of the sea power of his nation to transport the bulk of his army--fourteen thousand men--from new york to the head of chesapeake bay, so as to take philadelphia in the rear. this eccentric movement was successful as regarded its objective, philadelphia; but it was determined by political considerations, because philadelphia was the seat of congress, and was contrary to sound military policy. the conquest therefore was early lost; but it was yet more dearly won, for by this diversion of the british forces the different corps were placed out of mutual support, and the control of the water-line of the hudson was abandoned. while burgoyne, with seven thousand regular troops, besides auxiliaries, was moving down to seize the head-waters of the river, fourteen thousand men were removed from its mouth to the chesapeake. the eight thousand left in or near new york were consequently tied to the city by the presence of the american army in new jersey. this disastrous step was taken in august; in october burgoyne, isolated and hemmed in, surrendered. in the following may the english evacuated philadelphia, and after a painful and perilous march through new jersey, with washington's army in close pursuit, regained new york. this taking of the british fleet to the head of the chesapeake, coupled with the ascent of the potomac in by english sailing-frigates, shows another weak line in the chain of the american colonies; but it was not, like that of the hudson and champlain, a line both ends of which rested in the enemy's power,--in canada on the one hand, on the sea on the other. as to the sea warfare in general, it is needless to enlarge upon the fact that the colonists could make no head against the fleets of great britain, and were consequently forced to abandon the sea to them, resorting only to a cruising warfare, mainly by privateers, for which their seamanship and enterprise well fitted them, and by which they did much injury to english commerce. by the end of the english naval historian estimates that american privateers had taken nearly a thousand merchant-ships, valued at nearly £ , , ; he claims, however, that the losses of the americans were heavier. they should have been; for the english cruisers were both better supported and individually more powerful, while the extension of american commerce had come to be the wonder of the statesmen of the mother-country. when the war broke out, it was as great as that of england herself at the beginning of the century. an interesting indication of the number of the seafaring population of north america at that time is given by the statement in parliament by the first lord of the admiralty, "that the navy had lost eighteen thousand of the seamen employed in the last war by not having america,"[ ]--no inconsiderable loss to a sea power, particularly if carried over to the ranks of the enemy. the course of warfare on the sea gave rise, as always, to grievances of neutrals against the english for the seizures of their ships in the american trade. such provocation, however, was not necessary to excite the enmity and the hopes of france in the harassed state of the british government. the hour of reckoning, of vengeance, at which the policy of choiseul had aimed, seemed now at hand. the question was early entertained at paris what attitude should be assumed, what advantage drawn from the revolt of the colonies. it was decided that the latter should receive all possible support short of an actual break with england; and to this end a frenchman named beaumarchais was furnished with money to establish a business house which should supply the colonists with warlike stores. france gave a million francs, to which spain added an equal sum, and beaumarchais was allowed to buy from government arsenals. meanwhile agents were received from the united states, and french officers passed into its service with little real hindrance from their government. beaumarchais' house was started in ; in december of that year benjamin franklin landed in france, and in may, , lafayette came to america. meanwhile the preparations for war, especially for a sea war, were pushed on; the navy was steadily increased, and arrangements were made for threatening an invasion from the channel, while the real scene of the war was to be in the colonies. there france was in the position of a man who has little to lose. already despoiled of canada, she had every reason to believe that a renewal of war, with europe neutral and the americans friends instead of enemies, would not rob her of her islands. recognizing that the americans, who less than twenty years before had insisted upon the conquest of canada, would not consent to her regaining it, she expressly stipulated that she would have no such hopes, but exacted that in the coming war she should retain any english west indian possessions which she could seize. spain was differently situated. hating england, wanting to regain gibraltar, minorca, and jamaica,--no mere jewels in her crown, but foundation-stones of her sea power,--she nevertheless saw that the successful rebellion of the english colonists against the hitherto unrivalled sea power of the mother-country would be a dangerous example to her own enormous colonial system, from which she yearly drew so great subsidies. if england with her navy should fail, what could spain achieve? in the introductory chapter it was pointed out that the income of the spanish government was drawn, not as a light tax upon a wealthy sea power, built upon the industry and commerce of the kingdom, but from a narrow stream of gold and silver trickling through a few treasure-ships loaded with the spoils of colonies administered upon the narrowest system. spain had much to lose, as well as to gain. it was true still, as in , that she was the power with which england could war to the greatest advantage. nevertheless, existing injuries and dynastic sympathy carried the day. spain entered upon the secretly hostile course pursued by france. to this explosive condition of things the news of burgoyne's surrender acted as a spark. the experience of former wars had taught france the worth of the americans as enemies, and she was expecting to find in them valuable helpers in her schemes of revenge; now it seemed that even alone they might be able to take care of themselves, and reject any alliance. the tidings reached europe on the d of december, ; on the th the french foreign minister informed the commissioners of congress that the king was ready to recognize the independence of the united states, and to make with them a commercial treaty and contingent defensive alliance. the speed with which the business was done shows that france had made up her mind; and the treaty, so momentous in its necessary consequences, was signed on the th of february, . it is not necessary to give the detailed terms of the treaty; but it is important to observe, first, that the express renunciation of canada and nova scotia by france foreshadowed that political theory which is now known as the monroe doctrine, the claims of which can scarcely be made good without an adequate sea-force; and next, that the alliance with france, and subsequently with spain, brought to the americans that which they above all needed,--a sea power to counterbalance that of england. will it be too much for american pride to admit that, had france refused to contest the control of the sea with england, the latter would have been able to reduce the atlantic seaboard? let us not kick down the ladder by which we mounted, nor refuse to acknowledge what our fathers felt in their hour of trial. before going on with the story of this maritime war, the military situation as it existed in the different parts of the world should be stated. the three features which cause it to differ markedly from that at the opening of the seven years' war, in , are--( ) the hostile relation of america to england; ( ) the early appearance of spain as the ally of france; and ( ) the neutrality of the other continental states, which left france without preoccupation on the land side. on the north american continent the americans had held boston for two years. narragansett bay and rhode island were occupied by the english, who also held new york and philadelphia. chesapeake bay and its entrance, being without strong posts, were in the power of any fleet that appeared against them. in the south, since the unsuccessful attack upon charlestown in , no movement of importance had been made by the english; up to the declaration of war by france the chief events of the war had been north of the chesapeake (of baltimore). in canada, on the other hand, the americans had failed, and it remained to the end a firm base to the english power. in europe the most significant element to be noted is the state of preparedness of the french navy, and to some extent of the spanish, as compared with previous wars. england stood wholly on the defensive, and without allies; while the bourbon kings aimed at the conquest of gibraltar and port mahon, and the invasion of england. the first two, however, were the dear objects of spain, the last of france; and this divergence of aims was fatal to the success of this maritime coalition. in the introductory chapter allusion was made to the strategic question raised by these two policies. in the west indies the grip of the two combatants on the land was in fact about equal, though it should not have been so. both france and england were strongly posted in the windward islands,--the one at martinique, the other at barbadoes. it must be noted that the position of the latter, to windward of all others of the group, was a decided strategic advantage in the days of sail. as it happened, the fighting was pretty nearly confined to the neighborhood of the lesser antilles. here, at the opening of the struggle, the english island of dominica lay between the french martinique and guadeloupe; it was therefore coveted and seized. next south of martinique lay sta. lucia, a french colony. its strong harbor on the lee side, known as gros ilot bay, was a capital place from which to watch the proceedings of the french navy in fort royal, martinique. the english captured the island, and from that safe anchorage rodney watched and pursued the french fleet before his famous action in . the islands to the southward were of inferior military consequence. in the greater islands, spain should have outweighed england, holding as she did cuba, porto rico, and, with france, hayti, as against jamaica alone. spain, however, counted here for nothing but a dead-weight; and england had elsewhere too much on her hands to attack her. the only point in america where the spanish arms made themselves felt was in the great region east of the mississippi, then known as florida, which, though at that time an english possession, did not join the revolt of the colonies. in the east indies it will be remembered that france had received back her stations at the peace of ; but the political predominance of the english in bengal was not offset by similar control of the french in any part of the peninsula. during the ensuing years the english had extended and strengthened their power, favored in so doing by the character of their chief representatives, clive and warren hastings. powerful native enemies had, however, risen against them in the south of the peninsula, both on the east and west, affording an excellent opportunity for france to regain her influence when the war broke out; but her government and people remained blind to the possibilities of that vast region. not so england. the very day the news of the outbreak of war reached calcutta, july , , hastings sent orders to the governor of madras to attack pondicherry, and set the example by seizing chandernagore. the naval force of each nation was insignificant; but the french commodore, after a brief action, forsook pondicherry, which surrendered after a siege by land and sea of seventy days. the following march, , mahé, the last french settlement, fell, and the french flag again disappeared; while at the same time there arrived a strong english squadron of six ships-of-the-line under admiral hughes. the absence of any similar french force gave the entire control of the sea to the english until the arrival of suffren, nearly three years later. in the mean while holland had been drawn into the war, and her stations, negapatam on the coromandel coast, and the very important harbor of trincomalee in ceylon, were both captured, the latter in january, , by the joint forces of the army and navy. the successful accomplishment of these two enterprises completed the military situation in hindostan at the time when the arrival of suffren, just one month later, turned the nominal war into a desperate and bloody contest. suffren found himself with a decidedly stronger squadron, but without a port, either french or allied, on which to base his operations against the english. of these four chief theatres of the war, two, north america and the west indies, as might be expected from their nearness, blend and directly affect each other. this is not so obviously the case with the struggles in europe and india. the narrative therefore naturally falls into three principal divisions, which may to some extent be treated separately. after such separate consideration their mutual influence will be pointed out, together with any useful lessons to be gathered from the goodness or badness, the success or failure, of the grand combinations, and from the part played by sea power. on the th of march, , the french ambassador at london notified the english government that france had acknowledged the independence of the united states, and made with them a treaty of commerce and defensive alliance. england at once recalled her ambassador; but though war was imminent and england at disadvantage, the spanish king offered mediation, and france wrongly delayed to strike. in june, admiral keppel sailed from portsmouth, with twenty ships, on a cruise. falling in with two french frigates, his guns, to bring them to, opened the war. finding from their papers that thirty-two french ships lay in brest, he at once returned for reinforcements. sailing again with thirty ships, he fell in with the french fleet under d'orvilliers to the westward of ushant, and to windward, with a westerly wind. on the th of july was fought the first fleet action of the war, generally known as the battle of ushant. this battle, in which thirty ships-of-the-line fought on either side, was wholly indecisive in its results. no ship was taken or sunk; both fleets, after separating, returned to their respective ports. the action nevertheless obtained great celebrity in england from the public indignation at its lack of result, and from the storm of naval and political controversy which followed. the admiral and the officer third in command belonged to different political parties; they made charges, one against the other, and in the following courts-martial all england divided, chiefly on party lines. public and naval sentiment generally favored the commander-in-chief, keppel. [illustration: pl. ix. keppel off ushant july , .] tactically, the battle presents some interesting features, and involves one issue which is still living to-day. keppel was to leeward and wished to force an action; in order to do this he signalled a general chase to windward, so that his fastest ships might overtake the slower ones of the enemy. granting equal original fleet-speed, this was quite correct. d'orvilliers, to windward, had no intention of fighting except on his own terms. as will generally be the case, the fleet acting on the offensive obtained its wish. at daybreak of the th both fleets were on the port tack, heading west-northwest, with a steady breeze at southwest (plate ix., a, a, a).[ ] the english rear (r) had fallen to leeward,[ ] and keppel consequently made signal to six of its ships to chase to windward, so as to place them in a better position to support the main body if it could get into action. d'orvilliers observed this movement, and construed it to show an intention to attack his rear with a superior force. the two fleets being then from six to eight miles apart, he wore his fleet in succession (french a to b), by which he lost ground to leeward, but approached the enemy, and was able to see them better (positions b, b, b). at the completion of this evolution the wind hauled to the southward, favoring the english; so keppel, instead of going about, stood on for half an hour more (english b to c), and then tacked together in wake of the french. this confirmed d'orvilliers' suspicions, and as the wind, which certainly favored the english that morning, now hauled back again to the westward, permitting them to lay up for the french rear, he wore his fleet together (b to c), thus bringing the rest to aid the rear, now become the van, and preventing keppel from concentrating on or penetrating it. the two fleets thus passed on opposite tacks (c),[ ] exchanging ineffective broadsides, the french running free to windward and having the power to attack, but not using it. d'orvilliers then made the signal for his van, formerly the rear, to wear to leeward of the english rear, which was to leeward of its own main body, intending himself to remain to windward and so attack it on both sides; but the commander of that division, a prince of the blood royal, did not obey, and the possible advantage was lost. on the english side the same manoeuvre was attempted. the admiral of the van and some of his ships tacked, as soon as out of fire (d),[ ] and stood after the french rear; but for the most part the damage to rigging prevented tacking, and wearing was impossible on account of the ships coming up behind. the french now stood to leeward and formed line again, but the english were not in condition to attack. this was the end of the battle. it has been said that there are some interesting points about this resultless engagement. one is, that keppel's conduct was approved throughout, on oath before the court-martial, by one of the most distinguished admirals england has brought forth, sir john jervis, who commanded a ship in the fleet. it does not indeed appear what he could have done more; but his lack of tactical understanding is shown by a curious remark in his defence. "if the french admiral really meant to come to action," says he, "i apprehend he would never have put his fleet on the contrary tack to that on which the british fleet was approaching." this remark can only proceed from ignorance or thoughtlessness of the danger to which the rear of the french fleet would have been exposed, and is the more curious as he himself had said the english were lying up for it. keppel's idea seems to have been that the french should have waited for him to come up abreast, and then go at it, ship for ship, in what was to him the good old style; d'orvilliers was too highly trained to be capable of such action. the failure of the duc de chartres,[ ] commanding the french van during the firing, to wear in obedience to orders, whether due to misunderstanding or misconduct, raises the question, which is still debated, as to the proper position for a naval commander-in-chief in action. had d'orvilliers been in the van, he could have insured the evolution he wished. from the centre the admiral has the extremities of his fleet equally visible, or invisible, as it may be. at the head he enforces his orders by his example. the french toward the end of this war solved the question by taking him out of the line altogether and putting him on board a frigate, for the avowed reasons that he could thus better see the movements of his fleet and of the enemy without being blinded by smoke or distracted by the occurrences on board his own ship, and that his signals could be better seen.[ ] this position, resembling somewhat that of a general on shore, being remote from personal risk, was also assumed by lord howe in ; but both that officer and the french abandoned the practice later. nelson at trafalgar, the end of his career, led his column; but it may be doubted whether he had any other motive than his ardor for battle. the two other great attacks in which he commanded in chief were directed against ships at anchor, and in neither did he take the head of the column; for the good reason that, his knowledge of the ground being imperfect, the leading ship was in most danger of grounding. the common practice in the days of broadside sailing-ships, except when a general chase was ordered, was for the admiral to be in the line, and in the centre of it. the departure from this custom on the part of both nelson and collingwood, each of whom led his own columns at trafalgar, may have had some reason, and an ordinary man rather shrinks from criticising the action of officers of their eminence. the danger to which were exposed the two senior officers of the fleet, upon whom so much depended, is obvious; and had any serious injury befallen their persons, or the head of their columns, the lack of their influence would have been seriously felt. as it was, they were speedily obliterated, as admirals, in the smoke of the battle, leaving to those who came after them no guidance or control except the brilliancy of their courage and example. a french admiral has pointed out that the practical effect of the mode of attack at trafalgar, two columns bearing down upon a line at right angles to them, was to sacrifice the head of the columns in making two breaches in the enemy's line. so far, very well; the sacrifice was well worth while; and into these breaches came up the rear ships of each column, nearly fresh, forming in fact a _reserve_ which fell upon the shattered ships of the enemy on either side of the breaks. now this idea of a reserve prompts a thought as to the commander-in-chief. the size of his ship was such as precluded its being out of the order; but would it not have been well had the admiral of each column been with this reserve, keeping in his hands the power of directing it according to the chances of the action, making him a reality as well as a name for some time longer, and to a very useful purpose? the difficulty of arranging any system of signals or light despatch-boats which could take the place of the aids or messengers of a general, coupled with the fact that ships cannot stand still, as divisions of men do, waiting orders, but that they must have steerage-way, precludes the idea of putting an admiral of a fleet under way in a light vessel. by so doing he becomes simply a spectator; whereas by being in the most powerful ship of the fleet he retains the utmost weight possible after action is once engaged, and, if this ship be in the reserve, the admiral keeps to the latest possible moment the power of commander-in-chief in his own hands. "half a loaf is better than no bread;" if the admiral cannot, from the conditions of sea warfare, occupy the calmly watchful position of his brother on shore, let there be secured for him as much as may be. the practice of farragut after new orleans and vicksburg, that is to say, in the latter part of his career, when it may be believed experience had determined his views, was to lead in person. it is known that he very reluctantly, at the solicitation of various officers, yielded his convictions in this matter at mobile so far as to take the second place, and afterward freely expressed his regrets for having done so. it may, however, be argued that the character of all the actions in which farragut commanded had a peculiarity, differentiating them from battles in the strict sense of the word. at new orleans, at vicksburg, at port hudson, and at mobile, the task was not to engage, but to pass fortifications which the fleet confessedly could not stand up to; and the passage was to be made under conditions mainly of pilotage upon ground as to which, unlike nelson, he had good knowledge. there was thus imposed upon the commander-in-chief the duty of leadership in the literal, as well as the military, sense of the term. so leading, he not only pointed out to the fleet the safe road, but, drawing continually ahead of the smoke, was better able to see and judge the path ahead, and to assume the responsibility of a course which he may have prescribed and intended throughout, but from which a subordinate might shrink. it has not perhaps been commonly noted, that at mobile the leaders, not only of one but of both columns, at the critical point of the road hesitated and doubted as to the admiral's purpose; not that they had not received it clearly, but because circumstances seemed to them to be different from what he had supposed. not only alden in the "brooklyn," but craven also in the "tecumseh," departed from the admiral's orders and left the course dictated to them, with disastrous results. there is no necessity to condemn either captain; but the irresistible inference is that farragut was unqualifiedly right in his opinion that the man who alone has the highest responsibility should, under the conditions of his battles, be in the front. and here it must be remarked that at such critical moments of doubt any but the highest order of mind tends to throw off the responsibility of decision upon the superior, though from the instancy of the case hesitation or delay may be fatal. a man who as the commissioned chief would act intelligently, as the mere subordinate will balk. nelson's action at st. vincent will rarely be emulated, a truth which is strongly shown by the fact that collingwood was immediately in his rear that day, and did not imitate his action till signalled by the commander-in-chief; yet after receiving the authority of the signal, he particularly distinguished himself by his judgment and daring.[ ] it will be recalled, also, in connection with this question of pilot-ground battles, that a central position nearly lost the flag-ship at new orleans, owing to the darkness and to the smoke from the preceding ships; the united states fleet came near finding itself without its leader after the passage of the forts. now as the mention of a reserve prompted one set of considerations, so the name of pilotage suggests certain ideas, broader than itself, which modify what has been said of keeping the admiral with the reserve. the ease and quickness with which a steam fleet can change its formation make it very probable that a fleet bearing down to attack may find itself, almost at the very moment of collision, threatened with some unlooked-for combination; then where would be the happiest position for an admiral? doubtless in that part of his own order where he could most readily pilot his ships into the new disposition, or direction, by which he would meet the changed conditions; that is, in the position of leading. it would seem that there are always two moments of greatest importance in a sea-fight; one which determines the method of the main attack, the other the bringing up and directing the effort of the reserve. if the first is more important, the second perhaps requires the higher order of ability; for the former may and should proceed on a before-determined plan, while the latter may, and often must, be shaped to meet unforeseen exigencies. the conditions of sea-battles of the future contain one element that land battles cannot have,--the extreme rapidity with which encounters and changes of order can take place. however troops may be moved by steam to the field of battle, they will there fight on foot or on horseback, and with a gradual development of their plan, which will allow the commander-in-chief time to make his wishes known (as a rule, of course), in case of a change in the enemy's attack. on the other hand, a fleet, comparatively small in numbers and with its component units clearly defined, may be meditating an important change of which no sign can appear until it begins, and which will occupy but a few minutes. so far as these remarks are sound, they show the need of a second in command thoroughly conversant with not only the plans, but with the leading principles of action of his chief,--a need plain enough from the fact that the two extremities of the order-of-battle may be necessarily remote, and that you want the spirit of the leader at both extremities. as he cannot be there in person, the best thing is to have an efficient second at one end. as regards nelson's position at trafalgar, mentioned at the beginning of this discussion, it is to be noted that the "victory" did nothing that another ship could not have done as well, and that the lightness of the wind forbade the expectation of any sudden change in the enemy's order. the enormous risk run by the person of the admiral, on whose ship was concentrated the fire of the enemy's line, and which led several captains to implore a change, was condemned long before by nelson himself in one of his letters after the battle of the nile:-- "i think, if it had pleased god i had not been wounded, not a boat would have escaped to have told the tale; but do not believe that any individual in the fleet is to blame.... i only mean to say that if my experience could in person have directed those individuals, there was every appearance that almighty god would have continued to bless my endeavors," etc.[ ] yet, notwithstanding such an expression of opinion based upon experience, he took the most exposed position at trafalgar, and upon the loss of the leader there followed a curious exemplification of its effects. collingwood at once, rightly or wrongly, avoidably or unavoidably, reversed nelson's plans, urged with his last breath. "anchor! hardy, do you anchor!" said the dying chief. "anchor!" said collingwood. "it is the last thing i should have thought of." footnotes: [ ] troude: batailles navales. [ ] mahon: history of england. [ ] lapeyrouse-bonfils, vol. iii. p. . [ ] troude, vol. ii. pp. - . for other quotations from french authors to the same effect, see _ante_, pages , , . [ ] mahon: history of england; gentleman's magazine, , p. . [ ] keppel's defence. [ ] "a candid view of our affairs, which i am going to exhibit, will make you a judge of the difficulties under which we labor. almost all our supplies of flour and no inconsiderable part of our meat are drawn from the states westward of hudson's river. this renders a secure communication across that river indispensably necessary, both to the support of your squadron and the army. the enemy, being masters of that navigation, would interrupt this essential intercourse between the states. they have been sensible of these advantages.... if they could by any demonstration in another part draw our attention and strength from this important point, and by anticipating our return possess themselves of it, the consequences would be fatal. our dispositions must therefore have equal regard to co-operating with you [at boston] in a defensive plan, and securing the north river, which the remoteness of the two objects from each other renders peculiarly difficult."--washington to d'estaing, sept. , . [ ] annual register, , p. . [ ] in this plate the plan followed in every other instance, of showing only the characteristic phases of a battle, in succession, but disconnected, has been abandoned, and the attempt is to indicate _continuously_ the series of manoeuvres and the tracks by which the fleets at last came into contact (from a to c). as the _battle_ consisted merely in the passage by each other of two fleets, moving in opposite parallel directions, an encounter always indecisive and futile, the previous manoeuvres constitute the chief interest in an affair whose historical importance is due to other than tactical reasons. [ ] the line drawn through the centre of the english fleet at a shows the close-hauled line (south-southeast) on which, by strict tactical requirement, the english ships should have borne from each other. [ ] the leading ships of the two fleets diverged from each other (c), which is, by the french, attributed to the english van keeping away; by the english it is said that the french van luffed. the latter account is followed in the diagrams. [ ] the position d, separated from the rest of the plan, shows the end of the passage by, which began at c. it could not be shown in connection with the other tracks without producing confusion. [ ] afterward duc d'orleans; the philippe Égalité of the french revolution, and father of louis philippe. [ ] the capture of the french commander-in-chief on board his flag-ship, in the battle of april , , was also a motive for this new order. [ ] the following incident, occurring during rodney's chase of de grasse, in april, , shows how far subordination may be carried. hood was one of the finest of the british officers; nor does the author undertake to criticise his action. he was some miles from rodney at the time. "the separated french ship in the n.w., having got the breeze at the same time as our van division, boldly stood for and endeavored to weather the british advanced ships; that being the only way to regain her own fleet, then to windward. to such a length did she carry her audacity that she compelled the alfred, the headmost ship of sir samuel hood's division, to bear up in order to allow her to pass. every eye was fixed upon the bold frenchman, excepting those who were anxiously looking out on the commander-in-chief to make the signal to engage, but who, most likely from not supposing it could be an enemy, did not throw out the ardently looked-for signal, and therefore not a gun was fired. this is mentioned to show the state of discipline on board the ships composing sir samuel hood's division, and that he, though second in command, would not fire a single shot until directed to do so by his commander-in-chief. 'it is more than probable that sir s. hood's reason for having waited for the signal to engage from his commander-in-chief, ere he would fire, arose from the supposition that had he been the occasion of prematurely bringing on an action under the above circumstances, he would have been responsible for the results.'" (white's naval researches, p. .) hood may have been influenced by rodney's bearing toward inferiors whose initiative displeased him. the relations of the two seem to have been strained. [ ] sir n.h. nicholas: despatches and letters of lord nelson. chapter x. maritime war in north america and west indies, - .--its influence upon the course of the american revolution.--fleet actions off grenada, dominica, and chesapeake bay. on the th of april, , admiral comte d'estaing sailed from toulon for the american continent, having under his command twelve ships-of-the-line and five frigates. with him went as a passenger a minister accredited to congress, who was instructed to decline all requests for subsidies, and to avoid explicit engagements relative to the conquest of canada and other british possessions. "the cabinet of versailles," says a french historian, "was not sorry for the united states to have near them a cause of anxiety, which would make them feel the value of the french alliance."[ ] while acknowledging the generous sympathy of many frenchmen for their struggle, americans need not blind themselves to the self-interestedness of the french government. neither should they find fault; for its duty was to consider french interests first. d'estaing's progress was very slow. it is said that he wasted much time in drills, and even uselessly. however that may be, he did not reach his destination, the capes of the delaware, until the th of july,--making a passage of twelve weeks, four of which were spent in reaching the atlantic. the english government had news of his intended sailing; and in fact, as soon as they recalled their ambassador at paris, orders were sent to america to evacuate philadelphia, and concentrate upon new york. fortunately for them, lord howe's movements were marked by a vigor and system other than d'estaing's. first assembling his fleet and transports in delaware bay, and then hastening the embarkation of stores and supplies, he left philadelphia as soon as the army had marched from there for new york. ten days were taken up in reaching the mouth of the bay;[ ] but he sailed from it the th of june, ten days before d'estaing arrived, though more than ten weeks after he had sailed. once outside, a favoring wind took the whole fleet to sandy hook in two days. war is unforgiving; the prey that d'estaing had missed by delays foiled him in his attempts upon both new york and rhode island. the day after howe's arrival at sandy hook the english army reached the heights of navesink, after an harassing march through new jersey, with washington's troops hanging upon its rear. by the active co-operation of the navy it was carried up to new york by the th of july; and howe then went back to bar the entrance to the port against the french fleet. as no battle followed, the details of his arrangements will not be given; but a very full and interesting account by an officer of the fleet can be found in ekins's "naval battles." attention, however, may well be called to the combination of energy, thought, skill, and determination shown by the admiral. the problem before him was to defend a practicable pass with six sixty-four-gun ships and three of fifty, against eight of seventy-four guns or over, three sixty-fours, and one fifty,--it may be said against nearly double his own force. d'estaing anchored outside, south of the hook, on the th of july, and there remained until the d, engaged in sounding the bar, and with every apparent determination to enter. on the d a high northeast wind, coinciding with a spring tide, raised the water on the bar to thirty feet. the french fleet got under way, and worked up to windward to a point fair for crossing the bar. then d'estaing's heart failed him under the discouragement of the pilots; he gave up the attack and stood away to the southward. naval officers cannot but sympathize with the hesitation of a seaman to disregard the advice of pilots, especially on a coast foreign to him; but such sympathy should not close their eyes to the highest type of character. let any one compare the action of d'estaing at new york with that of nelson at copenhagen and the nile, or that of farragut at mobile and port hudson, and the inferiority of the frenchman as a military leader, guided only by military considerations, is painfully apparent. new york was the very centre of the british power; its fall could not but have shortened the war. in fairness to d'estaing, however, it must be remembered that other than military considerations had to weigh with him. the french admiral doubtless had instructions similar to those of the french minister, and he probably reasoned that france had nothing to gain by the fall of new york, which might have led to peace between america and england, and left the latter free to turn all her power against his own country. less than that would have been enough to decide his wavering mind as to risking his fleet over the bar. howe was more fortunate than d'estaing, in having no divided purposes. having escaped from philadelphia and saved new york by his diligence, he had in store the further honor of saving rhode island by the like rapid movements. scattered ships-of-war from a fleet despatched from england now began to arrive. on the th of july howe was informed that the french fleet, which had disappeared to the southward, had been seen heading for rhode island. in four days his fleet was ready for sea, but owing to contrary winds did not reach point judith till the th of august. there he anchored, and learned that d'estaing had run the batteries the day before and anchored between gould and canonicut islands;[ ] the seakonnet and western passages had also been occupied by french ships, and the fleet was prepared to sustain the american army in an attack upon the british works. the arrival of howe, although his reinforcements did not raise the english fleet to over two thirds the strength of the french, upset d'estaing's plans. with the prevailing summer southwest breezes blowing straight into the bay, he was exposed to any attempts his adversary might make. that same night the wind shifted unexpectedly to the northward, and d'estaing at once got under way and stood out to sea. howe, though surprised by this unlooked-for act,--for he had not felt himself strong enough to attack,--also made sail to keep the weather-gage. the next twenty-four hours passed in manoeuvring for the advantage; but on the night of the th of august a violent gale of wind dispersed the fleets. great injury was done to the vessels of both, and among others the french flag-ship "languedoc," of ninety guns, lost all her masts and her rudder. immediately after the gale two different english fifty-gun ships, in fighting order, fell in, the one with the "languedoc," the other with the "tonnant," of eighty guns, having only one mast standing. under such conditions both english ships attacked; but night coming on, they ceased action, intending to begin again in the morning. when morning came, other french ships also came, and the opportunity was lost. it is suggestive to note that one of the captains was hotham, who as admiral of the mediterranean fleet, seventeen years later, so annoyed nelson by his cool satisfaction in having taken only two ships: "we must be contented; we have done very well." this was the immediate occasion of nelson's characteristic saying, "had we taken ten sail, and allowed the eleventh to escape, being able to get at her, i could never have called it well done." the english fell back on new york. the french rallied again off the entrance of narragansett bay; but d'estaing decided that he could not remain on account of the damage to the squadron, and accordingly sailed for boston on the st of august. rhode island was thus left to the english, who retained it for a year longer, evacuating then for strategic reasons. howe on his part diligently repaired his ships, and sailed again for rhode island when he heard of the french being there; but meeting on the way a vessel with word of their going to boston, he followed them to that harbor, in which they were too strongly placed to be attacked. taking into consideration his enforced return to new york, the necessary repairs, and the fact that he was only four days behind the french at boston, it may be believed that howe showed to the end the activity which characterized the beginning of his operations. scarcely a shot had been exchanged between the two fleets, yet the weaker had thoroughly outgeneralled the stronger. with the exception of the manoeuvres for the weather-gage after d'estaing left newport, which have not been preserved, and of howe's dispositions to receive the expected attack in new york bay, the lessons are not tactical, but strategic, and of present application. chief among them undoubtedly stands the value of celerity and watchfulness, combined with knowledge of one's profession. howe learned of his danger by advices from home three weeks after d'estaing sailed from toulon. he had to gather in his cruisers from the chesapeake and outside, get his ships-of-the-line from new york and rhode island, embark the supplies of an army of ten thousand men, move down the delaware,--which unavoidably took ten days,--and round to new york again. d'estaing was ten days behind him at the delaware, twelve days at sandy hook, and only one day ahead of him in entering newport, outside which harbor he had lain ten days before sailing in. an english narrator in the fleet, speaking of the untiring labor between june , when the english army reached navesink, and the arrival of the french fleet on the th of july, says: "lord howe attended in person as usual, and by his presence animated the zeal and quickened the industry of officers and men." in this quality he was a marked contrast to his amiable but indolent brother, general howe. the same industry and watchfulness marked his remaining operations. as soon as the french ships hauled off to the southward, lookout vessels followed them, and preparations continued (notably of fireships) for pursuit. the last ship that joined from england crossed the bar at new york on the th of july. on the st of august the fleet was ready for sea, with four fire-ships. the accident of the wind delayed his next movements; but, as has been seen, he came up only one day after the entrance of the enemy into newport, which his inferior force could not have prevented. but the object of the enemy, which he could not oppose, was frustrated by his presence. d'estaing was no sooner in newport than he wished himself out. howe's position was strategically excellent. with his weatherly position in reference to the prevailing winds, the difficulty of beating a fleet out through the narrow entrance to the harbor would expose the french ships trying it to be attacked in detail; while if the wind unluckily came fair, the admiral relied upon his own skill to save his squadron. cooper, in one of his novels, "the two admirals," makes his hero say to a cavilling friend that if he had not been in the way of good luck, he could not have profited by it. the sortie of the french, the subsequent gale, and the resulting damage were all what is commonly called luck; but if it had not been for howe's presence off point judith threatening them, they would have ridden out the gale at their anchors inside. howe's energy and his confidence in himself as a seaman had put him in the way of good luck, and it is not fair to deny his active share in bringing it about. but for him the gale would not have saved the british force in newport.[ ] d'estaing, having repaired his ships, sailed with his whole force for martinique on the th of november; on the same day commodore hotham left new york for barbadoes, with five sixty-four and fifty-gun ships and a convoy of five thousand troops, destined for the conquest of sta. lucia island. on the way a heavy gale of wind injured the french fleet more than the english, the french flag-ship losing her main and mizzen topmasts. the loss of these spars, and the fact that twelve unencumbered ships-of-war reached martinique only one day before the convoy of fifty-nine english transports reached barbadoes, a hundred miles farther on, tells badly for the professional skill which then and now is a determining feature in naval war. admiral barrington, commanding at barbadoes, showed the same energy as howe. the transports arrived on the th; the troops were kept on board; sailed on the morning of the th for sta. lucia, and anchored there at three p.m. the th. the same afternoon half the troops were landed, and the rest the next morning. they seized at once a better port, to which the admiral was about to move the transports when the appearance of d'estaing prevented him. all that night the transports were being warped inside the ships-of-war, and the latter anchored across the entrance to the bay, especial care being taken to strengthen the two extremities of the line, and to prevent the enemy from passing inside the weather end, as the english ships in after years did at the battle of the nile. the french was much more than double the english fleet; and if the latter were destroyed, the transports and troops would be trapped. d'estaing stood down along the english order twice from north to south, cannonading at long range, but did not anchor. abandoning then his intentions against the fleet, he moved to another bay, landed some french soldiers, and assaulted the position of the english troops. failing here also, he retired to martinique; and the french garrison, which had been driven into the interior of the island, surrendered. it seems scarcely necessary to point out the admirable diligence of admiral barrington, to which and to the skill of his dispositions he owed this valuable strategic success; for such it was. sta. lucia was the island next south of martinique, and the harbor of gros ilot at its northern end was especially adapted to the work of watching the french depot at fort royal, their principal station in the west indies. thence rodney pursued them before his great action in . the absence of precise information causes hesitation in condemning d'estaing for this mortifying failure. his responsibility depends upon the wind, which may have been light under the land, and upon his power to anchor. the fact, however, remains that he passed twice along the enemy's line within cannon-shot, yet did not force a decisive action. his course was unfavorably criticised by the great suffren, then one of his captains.[ ] the english had thus retrieved the capture of dominica, which had been taken on the th of september by the french governor of the west india islands. there being no english squadron there, no difficulty had been met. the value of dominica to the french has been pointed out; and it is necessary here to use the example of both dominica and sta. lucia to enforce what has before been said, that the possession of these smaller islands depended solely upon the naval preponderance. upon the grasp of this principle held by any one will depend his criticism upon the next action of d'estaing, to be immediately related. six months of almost entire quiet followed the affair of sta. lucia. the english were reinforced by the fleet of byron, who took chief command; but the french, being joined by ten more ships-of-the-line, remained superior in numbers. about the middle of june, byron sailed with his fleet to protect a large convoy of merchant-ships, bound for england, till they were clear of the islands. d'estaing then sent a very small expedition which seized st. vincent, june , , without difficulty; and on the th of june he sailed with his whole fleet to attack grenada. anchoring off georgetown on the d of july, he landed his soldiers, and on the th the garrison of seven hundred men surrendered the island. meanwhile byron, hearing of the loss of st. vincent and probable attack on grenada, sailed with a large convoy of vessels carrying troops, and with twenty-one ships-of-the-line, to regain the one and relieve the other. receiving on the way definite information that the french were before grenada, he kept on for it, rounding the northwest point of the island at daybreak of july . his approach had been reported the day before to d'estaing, who remained at anchor,[ ] fearing lest with the currents and light winds he might drop too far to leeward if he let go the bottom. when the english came in sight, the french got under way; but the confused massing of their ships prevented byron from recognizing at once the disparity of numbers, they having twenty-five ships-of-the-line. he made signal for a general chase, and as the disorder of the french fleet forced it to form on the leewardmost ships, the english easily retained the advantage of the wind with which they approached. as the action began, therefore, the french were to the westward with a partly formed line, on the starboard tack, heading north, the rear in disorder, and to windward of the van and centre (plate x., a.). the english stood down with a fair wind, steering south by west on the port tack (a), between the island and the enemy, their leading ships approaching at a slight angle, but heading more directly for his yet unformed rear; while the english convoy was between its own fleet and the island, under special charge of three ships (a, a), which were now called in. as the signal so far commanded a general chase, the three fastest of the english, among which was the flag of the second in command, admiral barrington, came under fire of the french centre and rear, apparently unsupported (b), and suffered much from the consequent concentration of fire upon them. when they reached the sternmost ships they wore upon the same tack with them and stood north, after and to windward of them; and at about the same time byron, who had not before known of the surrender, saw the french flag flying over the forts. signals followed to wear in succession, and for the advanced ships to form line for mutual support, ceasing the general chase under which the engagement had hitherto been fought. while the main body was still standing south on the port tack, three ships,--"cornwall," "grafton," and "lion" (c),--obeying literally the signal for close action, had passed much to leeward of the others, drawing upon themselves most of the fire of the enemy's line. they thus suffered very severely in men and spars; and though finally relieved by the advanced ships, as these approached from the southward on the opposite tack, they were unable, after wearing (b, c', c''), to keep up with the fleet, and so dropped astern and toward the french. the bulk of the injury sustained by the english fell upon these three, upon the three advanced ships under barrington, and upon two others in the rear (a, a), which, seeing the van so heavily engaged, did not follow the successive movement, but bore down straight out of the order, and took their places at the head of the column (b, a, a'),--an act strongly resembling that which won nelson such high renown at cape st. vincent, but involving less responsibility.[ ] [illustration: pl. x. d'estaing and byron july , ] so far byron had conducted his attack, using the initiative permitted him by the advantage of the wind and the disorder of the french rear. it will be observed that, though it was desirable to lose no time in assailing the latter while in confusion, it is questionable whether barrington's three ships should have been allowed to separate as far as they seem to have done from the rest of the fleet. a general chase is permissible and proper when, from superiority of numbers, original or acquired, or from the general situation, the ships first in action will not be greatly outnumbered, or subjected to overpowering concentration before support comes up, or when there is probability that the enemy may escape unless promptly struck. this was not so here. nor should the "cornwall," "grafton," and "lion" have been permitted to take a course which allowed, almost compelled, the enemy to concentrate rather than diffuse his fire. the details of the affair are not precise enough to warrant more comment than naming these mistakes, without necessarily attributing them to fault on the part of the admiral. the french had up to this time remained strictly on the defensive, in accordance with their usual policy. there was now offered an opportunity for offensive action which tested d'estaing's professional qualities, and to appreciate which the situation at the moment must be understood. both fleets were by this on the starboard tack, heading north (b, b, b), the french to leeward. the latter had received little injury in their motive power, though their line was not in perfect order; but the english, owing to the faulty attack, had seven ships seriously crippled, four of which--the "monmouth" (a'), "grafton," "cornwall" (c'), and "lion" (c'')--were disabled. the last three, by three p.m., were a league astern and much to leeward of their line, being in fact nearer the french than the english; while the speed of the english fleet was necessarily reduced to that of the crippled ships remaining in line. these conditions bring out strongly the embarrassments of a fleet whose injuries are concentrated upon a few ships, instead of being distributed among all; the ten or twelve which were practically untouched had to conform to the capabilities of the others. d'estaing, with twenty-five ships, now had byron to windward of him with seventeen or eighteen capable of holding together, but slower and less handy than their enemies, and saw him tactically embarrassed by the care of a convoy to windward and three disabled ships to leeward. under these circumstances three courses were open to the french admiral: ( ) he might stretch ahead, and, tacking in succession, place himself between byron and the convoy, throwing his frigates among the latter; ( ) he might tack his fleet together and stand up to the english line to bring on a general action; or ( ) he could, after going about, cut off the three disabled ships, which might bring on a general action with less exposure. none of these did he do. as regards the first, he, knowing the criticisms of the fleet, wrote home that his line was too much disordered to allow it. whatever the technical irregularity, it is difficult to believe that, with the relative power of motion in the two fleets, the attempt was hopeless. the third alternative probably presented the greatest advantage, for it insured the separation between the enemy's main body and the crippled ships, and might very probably exasperate the british admiral into an attack under most hazardous conditions. it is stated by english authorities that byron said he would have borne down again, had any attack been made on them. at three p.m. d'estaing tacked all together, forming line on the lee ship,[ ] and stood to the southward again. the english imitated this movement, except the van ship "monmouth" (a'), which being too badly hurt to manoeuvre kept on to the northward, and the three separated ships. two of these (c') kept on north and passed once more under the french broadsides; but the "lion" (c''), unable to keep to the wind, kept broad off before it across the bows of the enemy, for jamaica, a thousand miles away. she was not pursued; a single transport was the sole maritime trophy of the french. "had the admiral's seamanship equalled his courage," wrote the celebrated suffren, who commanded the french van ship, "we would not have suffered four dismasted vessels to escape." "d'estaing, at the age of thirty, had been transferred from the army to the navy with the premature rank of rear-admiral. the navy did not credit him with nautical ability when the war broke out, and it is safe to say that its opinion was justified by his conduct during it."[ ] "brave as his sword, d'estaing was always the idol of the soldier, the idol of the seaman; but moral authority over his officers failed him on several occasions, notwithstanding the marked protection extended to him by the king."[ ] another cause than incapacity as a seaman has usually been assigned by french historians for the impotent action of d'estaing on this occasion. he looked upon grenada, they say, as the real objective of his efforts, and considered the english fleet a very secondary concern. ramatuelle, a naval tactician who served actively in this war and wrote under the empire, cites this case, which he couples with that of yorktown and others, as exemplifying the true policy of naval war. his words, which probably reflect the current opinion of his service in that day, as they certainly do the policy of french governments, call for more than passing mention, as they involve principles worthy of most serious discussion:-- "the french navy has always preferred the glory of assuring or preserving a conquest to that, more brilliant perhaps, but actually less real, of taking a few ships; and in that it has approached more nearly the true end to be proposed in war. what in fact would the loss of a few ships matter to the english? the essential point is to attack them in their possessions, the immediate source of their commercial wealth and of their maritime power. the war of furnishes examples which prove the devotion of the french admirals to the true interests of the country. the preservation of the island of grenada, the reduction of yorktown where the english army surrendered, the conquest of the island of st. christopher, were the result of great battles in which the enemy was allowed to retreat undisturbed, rather than risk giving him a chance to succor the points attacked." the issue could not be more squarely raised than in the case of grenada. no one will deny that there are moments when a probable military success is to be foregone, or postponed, in favor of one greater or more decisive. the position of de grasse at the chesapeake, in , with the fate of yorktown hanging in the balance, is in point; and it is here coupled with that of d'estaing at grenada, as though both stood on the same grounds. both are justified alike; not on their respective merits as fitting the particular cases, but upon a general principle. is that principle sound? the bias of the writer quoted betrays itself unconsciously, in saying "a few ships." a whole navy is not usually to be crushed at a blow; a few ships mean an ordinary naval victory. in rodney's famous battle only five ships were taken, though jamaica was saved thereby. in order to determine the soundness of the principle, which is claimed as being illustrated by these two cases (st. christopher will be discussed later on), it is necessary to examine what was the advantage sought, and what the determining factor of success in either case. at yorktown the advantage sought was the capture of cornwallis's army; the objective was the destruction of the enemy's organized military force on shore. at grenada the chosen objective was the possession of a piece of territory of no great military value; for it must be remarked that all these smaller antilles, if held in force at all, multiplied large detachments, whose mutual support depended wholly upon the navy. these large detachments were liable to be crushed separately, if not supported by the navy; and if naval superiority is to be maintained, the enemy's navy must be crushed. grenada, near and to leeward of barbadoes and sta. lucia, both held strongly by the english, was peculiarly weak to the french; but sound military policy for all these islands demanded one or two strongly fortified and garrisoned naval bases, and dependence for the rest upon the fleet. beyond this, security against attacks by single cruisers and privateers alone was needed. such were the objectives in dispute. what was the determining factor in this strife? surely the navy, the organized military force afloat. cornwallis's fate depended absolutely upon the sea. it is useless to speculate upon the result, had the odds on the th of september, , in favor of de grasse, been reversed; if the french, instead of five ships more, had had five ships less than the english. as it was, de grasse, when that fight began, had a superiority over the english equal to the result of a hard-won fight. the question then was, should he risk the almost certain decisive victory over the organized enemy's force ashore, for the sake of a much more doubtful advantage over the organized force afloat? this was not a question of yorktown, but of cornwallis and his army; there is a great deal in the way things are put. so stated,--and the statement needs no modifications,--there can be but one answer. let it be remarked clearly, however, that _both_ de grasse's alternatives brought before him the organized forces as the objective. not so with d'estaing at grenada. his superiority in numbers over the english was nearly as great as that of de grasse; his alternative objectives were the organized force afloat and a small island, fertile, but militarily unimportant. grenada is said to have been a strong position for defence; but intrinsic strength does not give importance, if the position has not strategic value. to save the island, he refused to use an enormous advantage fortune had given him over the fleet. yet upon the strife between the two navies depended the tenure of the islands. seriously to hold the west india islands required, first, a powerful seaport, which the french had; second, the control of the sea. for the latter it was necessary, not to multiply detachments in the islands, but to destroy the enemy's navy, which may be accurately called the army in the field. the islands were but rich towns; and not more than one or two fortified towns, or posts, were needed. it may safely be said that the principle which led to d'estaing's action was not, to say the least, unqualifiedly correct; for it led him wrong. in the case of yorktown, the principle as stated by ramatuelle is not the _justifying_ reason of de grasse's conduct, though it likely enough was the _real_ reason. what justified de grasse was that, the event depending upon the unshaken control of the sea, for a short time only, he already had it by his greater numbers. had the numbers been equal, loyalty to the military duty of the hour must have forced him to fight, to stop the attempt which the english admiral would certainly have made. the destruction of a few ships, as ramatuelle slightingly puts it, gives just that superiority to which the happy result at yorktown was due. as a general principle, this is undoubtedly a better objective than that pursued by the french. of course, exceptions will be found; but those exceptions will probably be where, as at yorktown, the military force is struck at directly elsewhere, or, as at port mahon, a desirable and powerful base of that force is at stake; though even at mahon it is doubtful whether the prudence was not misplaced. had hawke or boscawen met with byng's disaster, they would not have gone to gibraltar to repair it, unless the french admiral had followed up his first blow with others, increasing their disability. grenada was no doubt very dear in the eyes of d'estaing, because it was his only success. after making the failures at the delaware, at new york, and at rhode island, with the mortifying affair at sta. lucia, it is difficult to understand the confidence in him expressed by some french writers. gifted with a brilliant and contagious personal daring, he distinguished himself most highly, when an admiral, by leading in person assaults upon intrenchments at sta. lucia and grenada, and a few months later in the unsuccessful attack upon savannah. during the absence of the french navy in the winter of - , the english, controlling now the sea with a few of their ships that had not gone to the west indies, determined to shift the scene of the continental war to the southern states, where there was believed to be a large number of loyalists. the expedition was directed upon georgia, and was so far successful that savannah fell into their hands in the last days of . the whole state speedily submitted. operations were thence extended into south carolina, but failed to bring about the capture of charleston. word of these events was sent to d'estaing in the west indies, accompanied by urgent representations of the danger to the carolinas, and the murmurings of the people against the french, who were accused of forsaking their allies, having rendered them no service, but on the contrary having profited by the cordial help of the bostonians to refit their crippled fleet. there was a sting of truth in the alleged failure to help, which impelled d'estaing to disregard the orders actually in his hands to return at once to europe with certain ships. instead of obeying them he sailed for the american coast with twenty-two ships-of-the-line, having in view two objects,--the relief of the southern states and an attack upon new york in conjunction with washington's army. arriving off the coast of georgia on the st of september, d'estaing took the english wholly at unawares; but the fatal lack of promptness, which had previously marked the command of this very daring man, again betrayed his good fortune. dallying at first before savannah, the fleeting of precious days again brought on a change of conditions, and the approach of the bad-weather season impelled him, too slow at first, into a premature assault. in it he displayed his accustomed gallantry, fighting at the head of his column, as did the american general; but the result was a bloody repulse. the siege was raised, and d'estaing sailed at once for france, not only giving up his project upon new york, but abandoning the southern states to the enemy. the value of this help from the great sea power of france, thus cruelly dangled before the eyes of the americans only to be withdrawn, was shown by the action of the english, who abandoned newport in the utmost haste when they learned the presence of the french fleet. withdrawal had been before decided upon, but d'estaing's coming converted it into flight. after the departure of d'estaing, which involved that of the whole french fleet,--for the ships which did not go back to france returned to the west indies,--the english resumed the attack upon the southern states, which had for a moment been suspended. the fleet and army left new york for georgia in the last weeks of , and after assembling at tybee, moved upon charleston by way of edisto. the powerlessness of the americans upon the sea left this movement unembarrassed save by single cruisers, which picked up some stragglers,--affording another lesson of the petty results of a merely cruising warfare. the siege of charleston began at the end of march,--the english ships soon after passing the bar and fort moultrie without serious damage, and anchoring within gunshot of the place. fort moultrie was soon and easily reduced by land approaches, and the city itself was surrendered on the th of may, after a siege of forty days. the whole state was then quickly overrun and brought into military subjection. the fragments of d'estaing's late fleet were joined by a reinforcement from france under the comte de guichen, who assumed chief command in the west indian seas march , . the next day he sailed for sta. lucia, which he hoped to find unprepared; but a crusty, hard-fighting old admiral of the traditional english type, sir hyde parker, had so settled himself at the anchorage, with sixteen ships, that guichen with his twenty-two would not attack. the opportunity, if it were one, did not recur. de guichen, returning to martinique, anchored there on the th; and the same day parker at sta. lucia was joined by the new english commander-in-chief, rodney. this since celebrated, but then only distinguished, admiral was sixty-two years old at the time of assuming a command where he was to win an undying fame. of distinguished courage and professional skill, but with extravagant if not irregular habits, money embarrassments had detained him in exile in france at the time the war began. a boast of his ability to deal with the french fleet, if circumstances enabled him to go back to england, led a french nobleman who heard it to assume his debts, moved by feelings in which chivalry and national pique probably bore equal shares. upon his return he was given a command, and sailed, in january, , with a fleet of twenty ships-of-the-line, to relieve gibraltar, then closely invested. off cadiz, with a good luck for which he was proverbial, he fell in with a spanish fleet of eleven ships-of-the-line, which awkwardly held their ground until too late to fly.[ ] throwing out the signal for a general chase, and cutting in to leeward of the enemy, between them and their port, rodney, despite a dark and stormy night, succeeded in blowing up one ship and taking six. hastening on, he relieved gibraltar, placing it out of all danger from want; and then, leaving the prizes and the bulk of his fleet, sailed with the rest for his station. despite his brilliant personal courage and professional skill, which in the matter of tactics was far in advance of his contemporaries in england, rodney, as a commander-in-chief, belongs rather to the wary, cautious school of the french tacticians than to the impetuous, unbounded eagerness of nelson. as in tourville we have seen the desperate fighting of the seventeenth century, unwilling to leave its enemy, merging into the formal, artificial--we may almost say trifling--parade tactics of the eighteenth, so in rodney we shall see the transition from those ceremonious duels to an action which, while skilful in conception, aimed at serious results. for it would be unjust to rodney to press the comparison to the french admirals of his day. with a skill that de guichen recognized as soon as they crossed swords, rodney meant mischief, not idle flourishes. whatever incidental favors fortune might bestow by the way, the objective from which his eye never wandered was the french fleet,--the organized military force of the enemy on the sea. and on the day when fortune forsook the opponent who had neglected her offers, when the conqueror of cornwallis failed to strike while he had rodney at a disadvantage, the latter won a victory which redeemed england from the depths of anxiety, and restored to her by one blow all those islands which the cautious tactics of the allies had for a moment gained, save only tobago. de guichen and rodney met for the first time on the th of april, , three weeks after the arrival of the latter. the french fleet was beating to windward in the channel between martinique and dominica, when the enemy was made in the southeast. a day was spent in manoeuvring for the weather-gage, which rodney got. the two fleets being now well to leeward of the islands[ ] (plate xi.), both on the starboard tack heading to the northward and the french on the lee bow of the english, rodney, who was carrying a press of sail, signalled to his fleet that he meant to attack the enemy's rear and centre with his whole force; and when he had reached the position he thought suitable, ordered them to keep away eight points ( °) together (a, a, a). de guichen, seeing the danger of the rear, wore his fleet all together and stood down to succor it. rodney, finding himself foiled, hauled up again on the same tack as the enemy, both fleets now heading to the southward and eastward.[ ] later, he again made signal for battle, followed an hour after, just at noon, by the order (quoting his own despatch), "for every ship to bear down and steer for her opposite in the enemy's line." this, which sounds like the old story of ship to ship, rodney explains to have meant her opposite at the moment, not her opposite in numerical order. his own words are: "in a slanting position, that my leading ships might attack the van ships of the enemy's centre division, and the whole british fleet be opposed to only two thirds of the enemy" (b, b). the difficulty and misunderstanding which followed seem to have sprung mainly from the defective character of the signal book. instead of doing as the admiral wished, the leading ships (a) carried sail so as to reach their supposed station abreast their numerical opposite in the order. rodney stated afterward that when he bore down the second time, the french fleet was in a very extended line of battle; and that, had his orders been obeyed, the centre and rear must have been disabled before the van could have joined. [illustration: pl. xi. rodney & guichen april , .] there seems every reason to believe that rodney's intentions throughout were to double on the french, as asserted. the failure sprang from the signal-book and tactical inefficiency of the fleet; for which he, having lately joined, was not answerable. but the ugliness of his fence was so apparent to de guichen, that he exclaimed, when the english fleet kept away the first time, that six or seven of his ships were gone; and sent word to rodney that if his signals had been obeyed he would have had him for his prisoner.[ ] a more convincing proof that he recognized the dangerousness of his enemy is to be found in the fact that he took care not to have the lee-gage in their subsequent encounters. rodney's careful plans being upset, he showed that with them he carried all the stubborn courage of the most downright fighter; taking his own ship close to the enemy and ceasing only when the latter hauled off, her foremast and mainyard gone, and her hull so damaged that she could hardly be kept afloat. an incident of this battle mentioned by french writers and by botta,[ ] who probably drew upon french authorities, but not found in the english accounts, shows the critical nature of the attack in the apprehension of the french. according to them, rodney, marking a gap in their order due to a ship in rear of the french admiral being out of station, tried to break through (b); but the captain of the "destin," seventy-four, pressed up under more sail and threw himself across the path of the english ninety-gun ship. "the action of the 'destin' was justly praised," says lapeyrouse-bonfils. "the fleet ran the danger of almost certain defeat, but for the bravery of m. de goimpy. such, after the affair, was the opinion of the whole french squadron. yet, admitting that our line was broken, what disasters then would necessarily threaten the fleet? would it not always have been easy for our rear to remedy the accident by promptly standing on to fill the place of the vessels cut off? that movement would necessarily have brought about a _mêlée_, which would have turned to the advantage of the fleet having the bravest and most devoted captains. but then, as under the empire, it was an acknowledged principle that ships cut off were ships taken, and the belief wrought its own fulfilment." the effect of breaking an enemy's line, or order-of-battle, depends upon several conditions. the essential idea is to divide the opposing force by penetrating through an interval found, or made, in it, and then to concentrate upon that one of the fractions which can be least easily helped by the other. in a column of ships this will usually be the rear. the compactness of the order attacked, the number of the ships cut off, the length of time during which they can be isolated and outnumbered, will all affect the results. a very great factor in the issue will be the moral effect, the confusion introduced into a line thus broken. ships coming up toward the break are stopped, the rear doubles up, while the ships ahead continue their course. such a moment is critical, and calls for instant action; but the men are rare who in an unforeseen emergency can see, and at once take the right course, especially if, being subordinates, they incur responsibility. in such a scene of confusion the english, without presumption, hoped to profit by their better seamanship; for it is not only "courage and devotion," but skill, which then tells. all these effects of "breaking the line" received illustration in rodney's great battle in . de guichen and rodney met twice again in the following month, but on neither occasion did the french admiral take the favorite lee-gage of his nation. meanwhile a spanish fleet of twelve ships-of-the-line was on its way to join the french. rodney cruised to windward of martinique to intercept them; but the spanish admiral kept a northerly course, sighted guadeloupe, and thence sent a despatch to de guichen, who joined his allies and escorted them into port. the great preponderance of the coalition, in numbers, raised the fears of the english islands; but lack of harmony led to delays and hesitations, a terrible epidemic raged in the spanish squadron, and the intended operations came to nothing. in august de guichen sailed for france with fifteen ships. rodney, ignorant of his destination, and anxious about both north america and jamaica, divided his fleet, leaving one half in the islands, and with the remainder sailing for new york, where he arrived on the th of september. the risk thus run was very great, and scarcely justifiable; but no ill effect followed the dispersal of forces.[ ] had de guichen intended to turn upon jamaica, or, as was expected by washington, upon new york, neither part of rodney's fleet could well have withstood him. two chances of disaster, instead of one, were run, by being in small force on two fields instead of in full force on one. rodney's anxiety about north america was well grounded. on the th of july of this year the long expected french succor arrived,--five thousand french troops under rochambeau and seven ships-of-the-line under de ternay. hence the english, though still superior at sea, felt forced to concentrate at new york, and were unable to strengthen their operations in carolina. the difficulty and distance of movements by land gave such an advantage to sea power that lafayette urged the french government further to increase the fleet; but it was still naturally and properly attentive to its own immediate interests in the antilles. it was not yet time to deliver america. rodney, having escaped the great hurricane of october, , by his absence, returned to the west indies later in the year, and soon after heard of the war between england and holland; which, proceeding from causes which will be mentioned later, was declared december , . the admiral at once seized the dutch islands of st. eustatius and st. martin, besides numerous merchant-ships, with property amounting in all to fifteen million dollars. these islands, while still neutral, had played a rôle similar to that of nassau during the american civil war, and had become a great depot of contraband goods, immense quantities of which now fell into the english hands. the year had been gloomy for the cause of the united states. the battle of camden had seemed to settle the english yoke on south carolina, and the enemy formed high hopes of controlling both north carolina and virginia. the treason of arnold following had increased the depression, which was but partially relieved by the victory at king's mountain. the substantial aid of french troops was the most cheerful spot in the situation. yet even that had a checkered light, the second division of the intended help being blocked in brest by the english fleet; while the final failure of de guichen to appear, and rodney coming in his stead, made the hopes of the campaign fruitless. a period of vehement and decisive action was, however, at hand. at the end of march, , the comte de grasse sailed from brest with twenty-six ships-of-the-line and a large convoy. when off the azores, five ships parted company for the east indies, under suffren, of whom more will be heard later on. de grasse came in sight of martinique on the th of april. admiral hood (rodney having remained behind at st. eustatius) was blockading before fort royal, the french port and arsenal on the lee side of the island, in which were four ships-of-the-line, when his lookouts reported the enemy's fleet. hood had two objects before him,--one to prevent the junction of the four blockaded ships with the approaching fleet, the other to keep the latter from getting between him and gros ilot bay in sta. lucia. instead of effecting this in the next twenty-four hours, by beating to windward of the diamond rock, his fleet got so far to leeward that de grasse, passing through the channel on the th, headed up for fort royal, keeping his convoy between the fleet and the island. for this false position hood was severely blamed by rodney, but it may have been due to light winds and the lee current. however that be, the four ships in fort royal got under way and joined the main body. the english had now only eighteen ships to the french twenty-four, and the latter were to windward; but though thus in the proportion of four to three, and having the power to attack, de grasse would not do it. the fear of exposing his convoy prevented him from running the chance of a serious engagement. great must have been his distrust of his forces, one would say. when is a navy to fight, if this was not a time? he carried on a distant cannonade, with results so far against the english as to make his backwardness yet more extraordinary. can a policy or a tradition which justifies such a line of conduct be good? the following day, april , de grasse, having thrown away his chance, attempted to follow hood; but the latter had no longer any reason for fighting, and his original inferiority was increased by the severe injuries of some ships on the th. de grasse could not overtake him, owing to the inferior speed of his fleet, many of the ships not being coppered,--a fact worthy of note, as french vessels by model and size were generally faster than english; but this superiority was sacrificed through the delay of the government in adopting the new improvement. hood rejoined rodney at antigua; and de grasse, after remaining a short time at fort royal, made an attempt upon gros ilot bay, the possession of which by the english kept all the movements of his fleet under surveillance. foiled here, he moved against tobago, which surrendered june , . sailing thence, after some minor operations, he anchored on the th of july at cap français (now cape haytien), in the island of hayti. here he found awaiting him a french frigate from the united states, bearing despatches from washington and rochambeau, upon which he was to take the most momentous action that fell to any french admiral during the war. the invasion of the southern states by the english, beginning in georgia and followed by the taking of charleston and the military control of the two extreme states, had been pressed on to the northward by way of camden into north carolina. on the th of august, , general gates was totally defeated at camden; and during the following nine months the english under cornwallis persisted in their attempts to overrun north carolina. these operations, the narration of which is foreign to our immediate subject, had ended by forcing cornwallis, despite many successes in actual encounter, to fall back exhausted toward the seaboard, and finally upon wilmington, in which place depots for such a contingency had been established. his opponent, general greene, then turned the american troops toward south carolina. cornwallis, too weak to dream of controlling, or even penetrating, into the interior of an unfriendly country, had now to choose between returning to charleston, to assure there and in south carolina the shaken british power, and moving northward again into virginia, there to join hands with a small expeditionary force operating on the james river under generals phillips and arnold. to fall back would be a confession that the weary marching and fighting of months past had been without results, and the general readily convinced himself that the chesapeake was the proper seat of war, even if new york itself had to be abandoned. the commander-in-chief, sir henry clinton, by no means shared this opinion, upon which was justified a step taken without asking him. "operations in the chesapeake," he wrote, "are attended with great risk unless we are sure of a permanent superiority at sea. i tremble for the fatal consequences that may ensue." for cornwallis, taking the matter into his own hands, had marched from wilmington on the th of april, , joining the british already at petersburg on the th of may. the forces thus united numbered seven thousand men. driven back from the open country of south carolina into charleston, there now remained two centres of british power,--at new york and in the chesapeake. with new jersey and pennsylvania in the hands of the americans, communication between the two depended wholly upon the sea. despite his unfavorable criticism of cornwallis's action, clinton had himself already risked a large detachment in the chesapeake. a body of sixteen hundred men under benedict arnold had ravaged the country of the james and burned richmond in january of this same year. in the hopes of capturing arnold, lafayette had been sent to virginia with a nucleus of twelve hundred troops, and on the evening of the th of march the french squadron at newport sailed, in concerted movement, to control the waters of the bay. admiral arbuthnot, commanding the english fleet lying in gardiner's bay,[ ] learned the departure by his lookouts, and started in pursuit on the morning of the th, thirty-six hours later. favored either by diligence or luck, he made such good time that when the two fleets came in sight of each other, a little outside of the capes of the chesapeake, the english were leading[ ] (plate xii., a, a). they at once went about to meet their enemy, who, on his part, formed a line-of-battle. the wind at this time was west, so that neither could head directly into the bay. the two fleets were nearly equal in strength, there being eight ships on each side; but the english had one ninety-gun ship, while of the french one was only a heavy frigate, which was put into the line. nevertheless, the case was eminently one for the general french policy to have determined the action of a vigorous chief, and the failure to see the matter through must fall upon the good-will of commodore destouches, or upon some other cause than that preference for the ulterior objects of the operations, of which the reader of french naval history hears so much. the weather was boisterous and threatening, and the wind, after hauling once or twice, settled down to northeast, with a big sea, but was then fair for entering the bay. the two fleets were by this time both on the port tack standing out to sea, the french leading, and about a point on the weather bow of the english (b, b). from this position they wore in succession (c) ahead of the latter, taking the lee-gage, and thus gaining the use of their lower batteries, which the heavy sea forbade to the weather-gage. the english stood on till abreast the enemy's line (a, b), when they wore together, and soon after attacked in the usual manner, and with the usual results (c). the three van ships were very badly injured aloft, but in their turn, throwing their force mainly on the two leaders of the enemy, crippled them seriously in hulls and rigging. the french van then kept away, and arbuthnot, in perplexity, ordered his van to haul the wind again. m. destouches now executed a very neat movement by defiling. signalling his van to haul up on the other tack (e), he led the rest of his squadron by the disabled english ships, and after giving them the successive broadsides of his comparatively fresh ships, wore (d), and out to sea (d). this was the end of the battle, in which the english certainly got the worst; but with their usual tenacity of purpose, being unable to pursue their enemy afloat, they steered for the bay (d), made the junction with arnold, and thus broke up the plans of the french and americans, from which so much had been hoped by washington. there can be no doubt, after careful reading of the accounts, that after the fighting the french were in better force than the english, and they in fact claimed the victory; yet the ulterior objects of the expedition did not tempt them again to try the issue with a fleet of about their own size.[ ] [illustration: pl. xii. arbuthnot & destouches. march , .] the way of the sea being thus open and held in force, two thousand more english troops sailing from new york reached virginia on the th of march, and the subsequent arrival of cornwallis in may raised the number to seven thousand. the operations of the contending forces during the spring and summer months, in which lafayette commanded the americans, do not concern our subject. early in august, cornwallis, acting under orders from clinton, withdrew his troops into the peninsula between the york and james rivers, and occupied yorktown. washington and rochambeau had met on the st of may, and decided that the situation demanded that the effort of the french west indian fleet, when it came, should be directed against either new york or the chesapeake. this was the tenor of the despatch found by de grasse at cap français, and meantime the allied generals drew their troops toward new york, where they would be on hand for the furtherance of one object, and nearer the second if they had to make for it. in either case the result, in the opinion both of washington and of the french government, depended upon superior sea power; but rochambeau had privately notified the admiral that his own preference was for the chesapeake as the scene of the intended operations, and moreover the french government had declined to furnish the means for a formal siege of new york.[ ] the enterprise therefore assumed the form of an extensive military combination, dependent upon ease and rapidity of movement, and upon blinding the eyes of the enemy to the real objective,--purposes to which the peculiar qualities of a navy admirably lent themselves. the shorter distance to be traversed, the greater depth of water and easier pilotage of the chesapeake, were further reasons which would commend the scheme to the judgment of a seaman; and de grasse readily accepted it, without making difficulties or demanding modifications which would have involved discussion and delay. having made his decision, the french admiral acted with great good judgment, promptitude, and vigor. the same frigate that brought despatches from washington was sent back, so that by august th the allied generals knew of the intended coming of the fleet. thirty-five hundred soldiers were spared by the governor of cap français, upon the condition of a spanish squadron anchoring at the place, which de grasse procured. he also raised from the governor of havana the money urgently needed by the americans; and finally, instead of weakening his force by sending convoys to france, as the court had wished, he took every available ship to the chesapeake. to conceal his coming as long as possible, he passed through the bahama channel, as a less frequented route, and on the th of august anchored in lynnhaven bay, just within the capes of the chesapeake, with twenty-eight ships-of-the-line. three days before, august , the french squadron at newport, eight ships-of-the-line with four frigates and eighteen transports under m. de barras, sailed for the rendezvous; making, however, a wide circuit out to sea to avoid the english. this course was the more necessary as the french siege-artillery was with it. the troops under washington and rochambeau had crossed the hudson on the th of august, moving toward the head of chesapeake bay. thus the different armed forces, both land and sea, were converging toward their objective, cornwallis. the english were unfortunate in all directions. rodney, learning of de grasse's departure, sent fourteen ships-of-the-line under admiral hood to north america, and himself sailed for england in august, on account of ill health. hood, going by the direct route, reached the chesapeake three days before de grasse, looked into the bay, and finding it empty went on to new york. there he met five ships-of-the-line under admiral graves, who, being senior officer, took command of the whole force and sailed on the st of august for the chesapeake, hoping to intercept de barras before he could join de grasse. it was not till two days later that sir henry clinton was persuaded that the allied armies had gone against cornwallis, and had too far the start to be overtaken. admiral graves was painfully surprised, on making the chesapeake, to find anchored there a fleet which from its numbers could only be an enemy's. nevertheless, he stood in to meet it, and as de grasse got under way, allowing his ships to be counted, the sense of numerical inferiority--nineteen to twenty-four--did not deter the english admiral from attacking. the clumsiness of his method, however, betrayed his gallantry; many of his ships were roughly handled, without any advantage being gained. de grasse, expecting de barras, remained outside five days, keeping the english fleet in play without coming to action; then returning to port he found de barras safely at anchor. graves went back to new york, and with him disappeared the last hope of succor that was to gladden cornwallis's eyes. the siege was steadily endured, but the control of the sea made only one issue possible, and the english forces were surrendered october , . with this disaster the hope of subduing the colonies died in england. the conflict flickered through a year longer, but no serious operations were undertaken. in the conduct of the english operations, which ended thus unfortunately, there was both bad management and ill fortune. hood's detachment might have been strengthened by several ships from jamaica, had rodney's orders been carried out.[ ] the despatch-ship, also, sent by him to admiral graves commanding in new york, found that officer absent on a cruise to the eastward, with a view to intercept certain very important supplies which had been forwarded by the american agent in france. the english court had laid great stress upon cutting off this convoy; but, with the knowledge that he had of the force accompanying it, the admiral was probably ill-advised in leaving his headquarters himself, with all his fleet, at the time when the approach of the hurricane season in the west indies directed the active operations of the navies toward the continent. in consequence of his absence, although rodney's despatches were at once sent on by the senior officer in new york, the vessel carrying them being driven ashore by enemy's cruisers, graves did not learn their contents until his return to port, august . the information sent by hood of his coming was also intercepted. after hood's arrival, it does not appear that there was avoidable delay in going to sea; but there does seem to have been misjudgment in the direction given to the fleet. it was known that de barras had sailed from newport with eight ships, bound probably for the chesapeake, certainly to effect a junction with de grasse; and it has been judiciously pointed out that if graves had taken up his cruising-ground near the capes, but out of sight of land, he could hardly have failed to fall in with him in overwhelming force. knowing what is now known, this would undoubtedly have been the proper thing to do; but the english admiral had imperfect information. it was nowhere expected that the french would bring nearly the force they did; and graves lost information, which he ought to have received, as to their numbers, by the carelessness of his cruisers stationed off the chesapeake. these had been ordered to keep under way, but were both at anchor under cape henry when de grasse's appearance cut off their escape. one was captured, the other driven up york river. no single circumstance contributed more to the general result than the neglect of these two subordinate officers, by which graves lost that all-important information. it can readily be conceived how his movements might have been affected, had he known two days earlier that de grasse had brought twenty-seven or twenty-eight sail of the line; how natural would have been the conclusion, first, to waylay de barras, with whom his own nineteen could more than cope. "had admiral graves succeeded in capturing that squadron, it would have greatly paralyzed the besieging army [it had the siege train on board], if it would not have prevented its operations altogether; it would have put the two fleets nearly on an equality in point of numbers, would have arrested the progress of the french arms for the ensuing year in the west indies, and might possibly have created such a spirit of discord between the french and americans[ ] as would have sunk the latter into the lowest depths of despair, from which they were only extricated by the arrival of the forces under de grasse."[ ] these are true and sober comments upon the naval strategy. in regard to the admiral's tactics, it will be enough to say that the fleet was taken into battle nearly as byng took his; that very similar mishaps resulted; and that, when attacking twenty-four ships with nineteen, seven, under that capable officer hood, were not able to get into action, owing to the dispositions made. on the french side de grasse must be credited with a degree of energy, foresight, and determination surprising in view of his failures at other times. the decision to take every ship with him, which made him independent of any failure on the part of de barras; the passage through the bahama channel to conceal his movements; the address with which he obtained the money and troops required, from the spanish and the french military authorities; the prevision which led him, as early as march , shortly after leaving brest, to write to rochambeau that american coast pilots should be sent to cap français; the coolness with which he kept graves amused until de barras's squadron had slipped in, are all points worthy of admiration. the french were also helped by the admiral's power to detain the two hundred merchant-ships, the "west india trade," awaiting convoy at cap français, where they remained from july till november, when the close of operations left him at liberty to convoy them with ships-of-war. the incident illustrates one weakness of a mercantile country with representative government, compared with a purely military nation. "if the british government," wrote an officer of that day, "had sanctioned, or a british admiral had adopted, such a measure, the one would have been turned out and the other hanged."[ ] rodney at the same time had felt it necessary to detach five ships-of-the-line with convoys, while half a dozen more went home with the trade from jamaica. it is easier to criticise the division of the english fleet between the west indies and north america in the successive years and , than to realize the embarrassment of the situation. this embarrassment was but the reflection of the military difficulty of england's position, all over the world, in this great and unequal war. england was everywhere outmatched and embarrassed, as she has always been as an empire, by the number of her exposed points. in europe the channel fleet was more than once driven into its ports by overwhelming forces. gibraltar, closely blockaded by land and sea, was only kept alive in its desperate resistance by the skill of english seamen triumphing over the inaptness and discords of their combined enemies. in the east indies, sir edward hughes met in suffren an opponent as superior to him in numbers as was de grasse to hood, and of far greater ability. minorca, abandoned by the home government, fell before superior strength, as has been seen to fall, one by one, the less important of the english antilles. the position of england from the time that france and spain opened their maritime war was everywhere defensive, except in north america; and was therefore, from the military point of view, essentially false. she everywhere awaited attacks which the enemies, superior in every case, could make at their own choice and their own time. north america was really no exception to this rule, despite some offensive operations which in no way injured her real, that is her naval, foes. thus situated, and putting aside questions of national pride or sensitiveness, what did military wisdom prescribe to england? the question would afford an admirable study to a military inquirer, and is not to be answered off-hand, but certain evident truths may be pointed out. in the first place, it should have been determined what part of the assailed empire was most necessary to be preserved. after the british islands themselves, the north american colonies were the most valuable possessions in the eyes of the england of that day. next should have been decided what others by their natural importance were best worth preserving, and by their own inherent strength, or that of the empire, which was mainly naval strength, could most surely be held. in the mediterranean, for instance, gibraltar and mahon were both very valuable positions. could both be held? which was more easily to be reached and supported by the fleet? if both could not probably be held, one should have been frankly abandoned, and the force and efforts necessary to its defence carried elsewhere. so in the west indies the evident strategic advantages of barbadoes and sta. lucia prescribed the abandonment of the other small islands by garrisons as soon as the fleet was fairly outnumbered, if not before. the case of so large an island as jamaica must be studied separately, as well as with reference to the general question. such an island may be so far self-supporting as to defy any attack but one in great force and numbers, and that would rightly draw to it the whole english force from the windward stations at barbadoes and sta. lucia. with the defence thus concentrated, england's great weapon, the navy, should have been vigorously used on the offensive. experience has taught that free nations, popular governments, will seldom dare wholly to remove the force that lies between an invader and its shores or capital. whatever the military wisdom, therefore, of sending the channel fleet to seek the enemy before it united, the step may not have been possible. but at points less vital the attack of the english should have anticipated that of the allies. this was most especially true of that theatre of the war which has so far been considered. if north america was the first object, jamaica and the other islands should have been boldly risked. it is due to rodney to say that he claims that his orders to the admirals at jamaica and new york were disobeyed in , and that to this was owing the inferiority in number of graves's fleet. but why, in , when the departure of de guichen for europe left rodney markedly superior in numbers during his short visit to north america, from september to november , should no attempt have been made to destroy the french detachment of seven ships-of-the-line in newport? these ships had arrived there in july; but although they had at once strengthened their position by earthworks, great alarm was excited by the news of rodney's appearance off the coast. a fortnight passed by rodney in new york and by the french in busy work, placed the latter, in their own opinion, in a position to brave all the naval force of england. "we twice feared, and above all at the time of rodney's arrival," wrote the chief of staff of the french squadron, "that the english might attack us in the road itself; and there was a space of time during which such an undertaking would not have been an act of rashness. now [october ], the anchorage is fortified so that we can there brave all the naval force of england."[ ] the position thus taken by the french was undoubtedly very strong.[ ] it formed a re-entrant angle of a little over ninety degrees, contained by lines drawn from goat island to what was then called brenton's point, the site of the present fort adams on the one side, and to rose island on the other. on the right flank of the position rose island received a battery of thirty-six -pounders; while twelve guns of the same size were placed on the left flank at brenton's point. between rose and goat islands four ships, drawn up on a west-northwest line, bore upon the entrance and raked an approaching fleet; while three others, between goat island and brenton's point, crossed their fire at right angles with the former four. on the other hand, the summer winds blow directly up the entrance, often with great force. there could be no question even of a considerably crippled attacking ship reaching her destined position, and when once confused with the enemy's line, the shore batteries would be neutralized. the work on rose island certainly, that on brenton's point probably, had less height than the two upper batteries of a ship-of-the-line, and could be vastly outnumbered. they could not have been casemated, and might indisputably have been silenced by the grapeshot of the ships that could have been brought against them. rose island could be approached on the front and on the west flank within two hundred yards, and on the north within half a mile. there was nothing to prevent this right flank of the french, including the line of ships, being enfiladed and crushed by the english ships taking position west of rose island. the essential points of close range and superior height were thus possible to the english fleet, which numbered twenty to the enemy's seven. if successful in destroying the shipping and reducing rose island, it could find anchorage farther up the bay and await a favorable wind to retire. in the opinion of a distinguished english naval officer of the day,[ ] closely familiar with the ground, there was no doubt of the success of an attack; and he urged it frequently upon rodney, offering himself to pilot the leading ship. the security felt by the french in this position, and the acquiescence of the english in that security, mark clearly the difference in spirit between this war and the wars of nelson and napoleon. it is not, however, merely as an isolated operation, but in relation to the universal war, that such an attempt is here considered. england stood everywhere on the defensive, with inferior numbers. from such a position there is no salvation except by action vigorous almost to desperation. "it is impossible for us," wrote with great truth the first lord of the admiralty to rodney, "to have a superior fleet in every part; and unless our commanders-in-chief will take the great line, as you do, and consider the king's whole dominions under their care, our enemies must find us unprepared somewhere, and carry their point against us."[ ] attacks which considered in themselves alone might be thought unjustifiable, were imposed upon english commanders. the allied navy was the key of the situation, and its large detachments, as at newport, should have been crushed at any risk. the effect of such a line of action upon the policy of the french government is a matter of speculation, as to which the present writer has no doubts; but no english officer in chief command rose to the level of the situation, with the exception of hood, and possibly of howe. rodney was now old, infirm, and though of great ability, a careful tactician rather than a great admiral. the defeat of graves and subsequent surrender of cornwallis did not end the naval operations in the western hemisphere. on the contrary, one of the most interesting tactical feats and the most brilliant victory of the whole war were yet to grace the english flag in the west indies; but with the events at yorktown the patriotic interest for americans closes. before quitting that struggle for independence, it must again be affirmed that its successful ending, at least at so early a date, was due to the control of the sea,--to sea power in the hands of the french, and its improper distribution by the english authorities. this assertion may be safely rested on the authority of the one man who, above all others, thoroughly knew the resources of the country, the temper of the people, the difficulties of the struggle, and whose name is still the highest warrant for sound, quiet, unfluttered good-sense and patriotism. the keynote to all washington's utterances is set in the "memorandum for concerting a plan of operations with the french army," dated july , , and sent by the hands of lafayette:-- "the marquis de lafayette will be pleased to communicate the following general ideas to count de rochambeau and the chevalier de ternay, as the sentiments of the underwritten: "i. _in any operation, and under all circumstances, a decisive naval superiority is to be considered as a fundamental principle, and the basis upon which every hope of success must ultimately depend._" this, however, though the most formal and decisive expression of washington's views, is but one among many others equally distinct. thus, writing to franklin, december , , he says:-- "disappointed of the second division of french troops [blockaded in brest], but more especially in the expected naval superiority, which was the pivot upon which everything turned, we have been compelled to spend an inactive campaign after a flattering prospect at the opening of it.... latterly we have been obliged to become spectators of a succession of detachments from the army at new york in aid of lord cornwallis; while our naval weakness, and the political dissolution of a large part of our army, put it out of our power to counteract them at the southward, or to take advantage of them here." a month later, january , , in a memorandum letter to colonel laurens, sent on a special mission to france, he says:-- "next to a loan of money, a constant naval superiority upon these coasts is the object most interesting. this would instantly reduce the enemy to a difficult defensive.... indeed, it is not to be conceived how they could subsist a large force in this country, if we had the command of the seas to interrupt the regular transmission of supplies from europe. this superiority, with an aid in money, would enable us to convert the war into a vigorous offensive. with respect to us it seems to be one of two deciding points." in another letter to the same person, then in paris, dated april , he writes:-- "if france delays a timely and powerful aid in the critical posture of our affairs, it will avail us nothing, should she attempt it hereafter.... why need i run into detail, when it may be declared in a word that we are at the end of our tether, and that now or never our deliverance must come? how easy would it be to retort the enemy's own game upon them, if it could be made to comport with the general plan of the war to keep a superior fleet always in these seas, and france would put us in condition to be active by advancing us money." ships and money are the burden of his cry. may , , he writes to the chevalier de la luzerne: "i do not see how it is possible to give effectual support to the southern states, and avert the evils which threaten, while we are inferior in naval force in these seas." as the season for active operations advances, his utterances are more frequent and urgent. to major general greene, struggling with his difficulties in south carolina, he writes, june , : "our affairs have been attentively considered in every point of view, and it was finally determined to make an attempt upon new york, in preference to a southern operation, as we had not decided command of the water." to jefferson, june : "should i be supported in the manner i expect, by the neighboring states, the enemy will, i hope, be reduced to the necessity of recalling part of their force from the southward to support new york, or they will run the most imminent risk of being expelled from that post, which is to them invaluable; and should we, by a lucky coincidence of circumstances, gain a naval superiority, their ruin would be inevitable.... while we remain inferior at sea ... policy dictates that relief should be attempted by diversion rather than by sending reinforcements immediately to the point in distress," that is, to the south. to rochambeau, june : "your excellency will recollect that new york was looked upon by us as the only practicable object under present circumstances; but should we be able to secure a naval superiority, we may perhaps find others more practicable and equally advisable." by the th of august the letters of de grasse announcing his sailing for the chesapeake were received, and the correspondence of washington is thenceforth filled with busy preparations for the campaign in virginia, based upon the long-delayed fleet. the discouragement of de grasse, and his purpose to go to sea, upon learning that the english fleet in new york had been reinforced, drew forth an appealing letter dated september , which is too long for quotation; but the danger passed, washington's confidence returns. the day after the capitulation he writes to de grasse: "the surrender of york ... _the honor of which belongs to your excellency_, has greatly anticipated [in time] our most sanguine anticipations." he then goes on to urge further operations in the south, seeing so much of the good season was still left: "the general naval superiority of the british, previous to your arrival, gave them decisive advantages in the south, in the rapid transport of their troops and supplies; while the immense land marches of our succors, too tardy and expensive in every point of view, subjected us to be beaten in detail. it will depend upon your excellency, therefore, to terminate the war." de grasse refusing this request, but intimating an intention to co-operate in the next year's campaign, washington instantly accepts: "with your excellency i need not insist upon the indispensable necessity of a maritime force capable of giving you an absolute ascendency in these seas.... you will have observed that, whatever efforts are made by the land armies, the navy must have the casting vote in the present contest." a fortnight later, november , he writes to lafayette, who is on the point of sailing for france:-- "as you expressed a desire to know my sentiments respecting the operations of the next campaign, i will, without a tedious display of reasoning, declare in one word that it must depend absolutely upon the naval force which is employed in these seas, and the time of its appearance next year. no land force can act decisively unless accompanied by a maritime superiority.... a doubt did not exist, nor does it at this moment, in any man's mind, of the total extirpation of the british force in the carolinas and georgia, if count de grasse could have extended his co-operation two months longer." such, in the opinion of the revered commander-in-chief of the american armies, was the influence of sea power upon the contest which he directed with so much skill and such infinite patience, and which, amidst countless trials and discouragements, he brought to a glorious close. it will be observed that the american cause was reduced to these straits, notwithstanding the great and admitted losses of british commerce by the cruisers of the allies and by american privateers. this fact, and the small results from the general war, dominated as it was by the idea of commerce-destroying, show strongly the secondary and indecisive effect of such a policy upon the great issues of war. footnotes: [ ] martin: history of france. [ ] this delay was due to calms. howe's despatch, gentleman's magazine, . [ ] most accounts say between goat island and canonicut; but the position given seems more probable. the names "goat" and "gould" (often written "gold") are easily confused. since writing the above, the author has been favored with the sight of a contemporary manuscript map obtained in paris, which shows the anchorage as near canonicut and abreast coaster's harbor island; the latter being marked "l'isle d'or ou golde isle." the sketch, while accurate in its main details, seems the more authentic from its mistakes being such as a foreigner, during a hurried and exciting stay of twenty-four hours, might readily make. [ ] "the arrival of the french fleet upon the coast of america is a great and striking event; but the operations of it have been injured by a number of unforeseen and unfavorable circumstances, which, though they ought not to detract from the merit and good intention of our great ally, have nevertheless lessened the importance of its services in a great degree. the length of the passage, in the first instance, was a capital misfortune; for had even one of common length taken place, lord howe, with the british ships-of-war and all the transports in the river delaware, must inevitably have fallen; and sir henry clinton must have had better luck than is commonly dispensed to men of his profession under such circumstances, if he and his troops had not shared at least the fate of burgoyne. the long passage of count d'estaing was succeeded by an unfavorable discovery at the hook, which hurt us in two respects,--first, in a defeat of the enterprise upon new york and the shipping and troops at that place, and next in the delay occasioned in ascertaining the depth of water over the bar which was essential to their entrance into the harbor of new york. and, moreover, after the enterprise upon rhode island had been planned and was in the moment of execution, that lord howe with the british ships should interpose merely to create a diversion and draw the french fleet from the island was again unlucky, as the count had not returned on the th to the island, though drawn off from it on the th; by which means the land operations were retarded, and the whole subjected to a miscarriage in case of the arrival of byron's squadron."--washington's letter, aug. , . [ ] see page . [ ] d'estaing's position at anchor is marked by the anchor in plate x. [ ] of one of these, the "monmouth," sixty-four (a'), it is said that the officers of the french flag-ship drank to the health of the captain of the "little black ship." ships' names, like those of families, often have a marked career. a former "monmouth," twenty years before, had attacked and taken, practically single-handed, the "foudroyant," eighty-four, one of the finest ships in the french navy. she was then commanded by a captain gardiner, who, having commanded byng's ship in the battle which led to his execution, was moved by his mortification at the result of that affair to dare such desperate odds, and thereby lost his life. the same ship, here punished so severely off grenada, will be found in like sturdy fight, under another captain, three years later in india. [ ] the line bc shows the final direction of the french line-of-battle; the lee ship (o) having tacked and standing to o', while the other ships took position in her wake. though not expressly stated, byron doubtless formed in the same way on a parallel line. into this new line the disabled ships (c'), which could scarcely have made good the course they were heading, would be easily received. [ ] chevalier: hist. de la marine française. [ ] guérin: hist. maritime. [ ] drinkwater, in his history of the siege of gibraltar, explains that the spanish admiral believed that rodney would not accompany the convoy to the straits, but had separated from it. he did not detect his mistake until too late. [ ] the place where the battle was fought is shown by the crossed flags. [ ] the black ships, in position a, represent the english ships bearing down upon the french centre and rear. the line v r is the line-of-battle from van to rear before bearing down. the positions v', r', are those of the van and rear ships after hauling up on the port tack, when the french wore. [ ] in a severe reprimand addressed to captain carkett, commanding the leading ship of the english line, by rodney, he says: "your leading in the manner you did, induced others to follow so bad an example; and thereby, forgetting that the signal for the line was at only two cables' length distance from each other, the van division was led by you to _more than two leagues distance_ from the centre division, which was thereby exposed to the greatest strength of the enemy and not properly supported" (life, vol. i. p. ). by all rules of tactical common-sense it would seem that the other ships should have taken their distance from their next astern, that is, should have closed toward the centre. in conversation with sir gilbert blane, who was not in this action, rodney stated that the french line extended four leagues in length, "as if de guichen thought we meant to run away from him" (naval chronicle, vol. xxv. p. ). [ ] history of the american revolution. [ ] for rodney's reasons, see his life, vol. i. pp. - . [ ] at the eastern end of long island. [ ] the french ascribe this disadvantage to the fact that some of their ships were not coppered. [ ] that the french government was not satisfied with m. destouches's action can be safely inferred from its delay to reward the officers of the squadron, which called forth much feeling and very lively remonstrances. the french asserted that arbuthnot was hooted in the streets of new york and recalled by his government. the latter is a mistake, as he went home by his own request; but the former is likely enough. both commanders reversed in this case the usual naval policy of their nations. [ ] bancroft: history of the united states. [ ] life of rodney, vol. ii. p. ; clerk: naval tactics, p. . [ ] de barras had been unwilling to go to the chesapeake, fearing to be intercepted by a superior force, and had only yielded to the solicitation of washington and rochambeau. [ ] naval researches: capt. thomas white, r.n. [ ] white: naval researches. [ ] bouclon: la marine de louis xvi., p. . under a rather misleading title this work is really a lengthy biography of liberge de granchain, chief of staff to the french squadron under ternay. [ ] diary of a french officer, ; magazine of american history for march, . the works at the time of rodney's visit to new york were doubtless less complete than in . this authority, a year later, gives the work on rose island twenty -pounders. [ ] sir thomas graves, afterward second in command to nelson in the attack at copenhagen in ,--an enterprise fully as desperate and encompassed with greater difficulties of pilotage than the one here advocated. see biographical memoir, naval chronicle, vol. viii. [ ] rodney's life, vol. i. p. . chapter xi. maritime war in europe, - . the last chapter closed with the opinions of washington, expressed in many ways and at many times, as to the effect of sea power upon the struggle for american independence. if space allowed, these opinions could be amply strengthened by similar statements of sir henry clinton, the english commander-in-chief.[ ] in europe the results turned yet more entirely upon the same factor. there the allies had three several objectives, at each of which england stood strictly upon the defensive. the first of these was england herself, involving, as a preliminary to an invasion, the destruction of the channel fleet,--a project which, if seriously entertained, can scarcely be said to have been seriously attempted; the second was the reduction of gibraltar; the third, the capture of minorca. the last alone met with success. thrice was england threatened by a largely superior fleet, thrice the threat fell harmless. thrice was gibraltar reduced to straits; thrice was it relieved by the address and fortune of english seamen, despite overpowering odds. after keppel's action off ushant, no general encounter took place between fleets in european seas during the year and the first half of . meantime spain was drawing toward a rupture with england and an active alliance with france. war was declared by her on the th of june, ; but as early as april , a treaty between the two bourbon kingdoms, involving active war upon england, had been signed. by its terms the invasion of great britain or ireland was to be undertaken, every effort made to recover for spain, minorca, pensacola, and mobile, and the two courts bound themselves to grant neither peace, nor truce, nor suspension of hostilities, until gibraltar should be restored.[ ] the declaration of war was withheld until ready to strike; but the english government, doubtless, should have been upon its guard in the strained relations of the two countries, and prepared to prevent a junction of the two fleets. as it was, no efficient blockade of brest was established, and twenty-eight french sail-of-the-line went out unopposed[ ] june , , under d'orvilliers, keppel's opponent of the year before. the fleet steered for the coasts of spain, where it was to find the spanish ships; but it was not till the d of july that the full contingent joined. seven precious summer weeks thus slipped by unimproved, but that was not all the loss; the french had been provisioned for only thirteen weeks, and this truly great armada of sixty-six ships-of-the-line and fourteen frigates had not more than forty working-days before it. sickness, moreover, ravaged the fleet; and although it was fortunate enough to enter the channel while the english were at sea, the latter, numbering little more than half their enemies, succeeded in passing within them. the flabbiness of coalitions increased the weakness due to inefficient preparation; a great and not unnatural panic on the english channel coast, and the capture of one ship-of-the-line, were the sole results of a cruise extending, for the french, over fifteen weeks.[ ] the disappointment, due to bad preparation, mainly on the part of spain, though the french ministry utterly failed to meet the pressing wants of its fleet, fell, of course, upon the innocent admiral d'orvilliers. that brave and accomplished but unfortunate officer, whose only son, a lieutenant, had died of the pestilence which scourged the allies, could not support the odium. being of a deeply religious character, the refuge which villeneuve after trafalgar found in suicide was denied him; but he threw up his command and retired into a religious house. the scanty maritime interest of the year , in europe, centres round cadiz and gibraltar. this fortress was invested by spain immediately upon the outbreak of war, and, while successfully resisting direct attack, the supply of provisions and ammunition was a matter of serious concern to england, and involved both difficulty and danger. for this purpose, rodney sailed on the th of december, , having under his command twenty ships-of-the-line with a large convoy and reinforcements for gibraltar and minorca, as well as the west india trade. the latter parted company on the th of january, under the care of four frigates, and the following morning the fleet fell in with and captured a spanish squadron of seven ships-of-war and sixteen supply-ships. twelve of the latter being laden with provisions were carried on to gibraltar. a week later, at one p.m. of the th, a spanish fleet of eleven sail-of-the-line was seen in the southeast. they held their ground, supposing the approaching vessels to be only supply-ships for gibraltar, without a strong force of men-of-war,--an unfortunate error from which they did not awake until too late to escape, owing to the yet more unfortunate oversight of having no lookout frigates thrown out. when the spanish admiral, don juan de langara, recognized his mistake, he attempted to escape; but the english ships were copper-bottomed, and rodney making the signal for a general chase overtook the enemy, cut in between him and his port, regardless of a blowy night, lee shore, and dangerous shoals, and succeeded in capturing the commander-in-chief with six ships-of-the-line. a seventh was blown up. the weather continuing very tempestuous, one of the prizes was wrecked, and one forced into cadiz; several of the english ships were also in great danger, but happily escaped, and within a few days the entire force entered gibraltar bay. the convoy for minorca was at once despatched, and immediately after the return of the ships-of-war guarding it, on the th of february, rodney sailed for the west indies with four ships-of-the-line, sending the rest of his force, with the prizes, to england under admiral digby. the state of politics and parties in england at this time was such that, combined with the unavoidable inferiority of the channel fleet, it was difficult to find an admiral willing to accept the chief command. an admirable officer, barrington, the captor of sta. lucia, refused the first place, though willing to serve as second, even to a junior.[ ] the allied fleet, to the number of thirty-six sail-of-the-line, assembled at cadiz. their cruises, however, were confined to the portuguese coast; and their only service, a most important one, was the capture of an entire convoy, largely laden with military stores, for the east and west indies. the entrance of sixty english prizes, with nearly three thousand prisoners, into cadiz, was a source of great rejoicing to spain. on the th of october, de guichen, returning from his contest with rodney, came into the same port with his west indian squadron, of nineteen ships-of-the-line; but the immense armament thus assembled did nothing. the french ships returned to brest in january, . while thus unproductive of military results in europe, the war in gave rise to an event which cannot wholly be passed over by any history of sea power. this was the armed neutrality, at the head of which stood russia, joined by sweden and denmark. the claim of england to seize enemy's goods in neutral ships bore hard upon neutral powers, and especially upon those of the baltic and upon holland, into whose hands, and those of the austrian netherlands, the war had thrown much of the european carrying-trade; while the products of the baltic, naval stores and grain, were those which england was particularly interested in forbidding to her enemies. the declarations finally put forth by russia, and signed by sweden and denmark, were four in number: . that neutral vessels had a right, not only to sail to unblockaded ports, but also from port to port of a belligerent nation; in other words, to maintain the coasting trade of a belligerent. . that property belonging to the subjects of a power at war should be safe on board neutral vessels. this was the principle involved in the now familiar maxim, "free ships make free goods." . that no articles are contraband, except arms, equipments, and munitions of war. this ruled out naval stores and provisions unless belonging to the government of a belligerent. . that blockades, to be binding, must have an adequate naval force stationed in close proximity to the blockaded port. the contracting parties being neutral in the present war, but binding themselves to support these principles by a combined armed fleet of a fixed minimum number, the agreement received the name of the armed neutrality. the discussion of the propriety of the various declarations belongs to international law; but it is evident that no great maritime state, situated as england then was, would submit to the first and third as a matter of right. policy only could induce her to do so. without meeting the declarations by a direct contradiction, the ministry and the king determined to disregard them,--a course which was sustained in principle even by prominent members of the bitter opposition of that day. the undecided attitude of the united provinces, divided as in the days of louis xiv. between the partisans of england and france, despite a century of alliance with the former, drew the especial attention of great britain. they had been asked to join the armed neutrality; they hesitated, but the majority of the provinces favored it. a british officer had already gone so far as to fire upon a dutch man-of-war which had resisted the search of merchant-ships under its convoy; an act which, whether right or wrong, tended to incense the dutch generally against england. it was determined by the latter that if the united provinces acceded to the coalition of neutrals, war should be declared. on the th of december, , the english ministry was informed that the states-general had resolved to sign the declarations of the armed neutrality without delay. orders were at once sent out to rodney to seize the dutch west india and south american possessions; similar orders to the east indies; and the ambassador at the hague was recalled. england declared war four days later. the principal effect, therefore, of the armed neutrality upon the war was to add the colonies and commerce of holland to the prey of english cruisers. the additional enemy was of small account to great britain, whose geographical position effectually blocked the junction of the dutch fleet with those of her other enemies. the possessions of holland fell everywhere, except when saved by the french; while a bloody but wholly uninstructive battle between english and dutch squadrons in the north sea, in august, , was the only feat of arms illustrative of the old dutch courage and obstinacy. the year , decisive of the question of the independence of the united states, was marked in the european seas by imposing movements of great fleets followed by puny results. at the end of march de grasse sailed from brest with twenty-six ships-of-the-line. on the th he detached five under suffren to the east indies, and himself continued on to meet success at yorktown and disaster in the west indies. on the d of june de guichen sailed from brest with eighteen ships-of-the-line for cadiz, where he joined thirty spanish ships. this immense armament sailed on the d of july for the mediterranean, landed fourteen thousand troops at minorca, and then moved upon the english channel. the english had this year first to provide against the danger to gibraltar. that beset fortress had had no supplies since rodney's visit, in january of the year before, and was now in sore want, the provisions being scanty and bad, the biscuits weevilly, and the meat tainted. amid the horrors and uproar of one of the longest and most exciting sieges of history, the sufferings of the combatants were intensified by the presence of many peaceful inhabitants, including the wives and families of soldiers as well as of officers. a great fleet of twenty-eight ships-of-the-line sailed from portsmouth on the th of march, convoying three hundred merchant-ships for the east and west indies, besides ninety-seven transports and supply-ships for the rock. a delay on the irish coast prevented its falling in with de grasse, who had sailed nine days after it. arriving off cape st. vincent, it met no enemy, and looking into cadiz saw the great spanish fleet at anchor. the latter made no move, and the english admiral, derby, threw his supplies into gibraltar on the th of april, undisturbed. at the same time he, like de grasse, detached to the east indies a small squadron, which was destined before long to fall in with suffren. the inaction of the spanish fleet, considering the eagerness of its government about gibraltar and its equal if not superior numbers, shows scanty reliance of the spanish admiral upon himself or his command. derby, having relieved gibraltar and minorca, returned to the channel in may. upon the approach of the combined fleet of nearly fifty sail in august following, derby fell back upon torbay and there anchored his fleet, numbering thirty ships. de guichen, who held chief command, and whose caution when engaged with rodney has been before remarked, was in favor of fighting; but the almost unanimous opposition of the spaniards, backed by some of his own officers, overruled him in a council of war,[ ] and again the great bourbon coalition fell back, foiled by their own discord and the unity of their enemy. gibraltar relieved, england untouched, were the results of these gigantic gatherings; they can scarcely be called efforts. a mortifying disaster closed the year for the allies. de guichen sailed from brest with seventeen sail, protecting a large convoy of merchantmen and ships with military supplies. the fleet was pursued by twelve english ships under admiral kempenfeldt, an officer whose high professional abilities have not earned the immortality with which poetry has graced his tragical death. falling in with the french one hundred and fifty miles west of ushant, he cut off a part of the convoy, despite his inferior numbers.[ ] a few days later a tempest dispersed the french fleet. only two ships-of-the-line and five merchantmen out of one hundred and fifty reached the west indies. the year opened with the loss to the english of port mahon, which surrendered on the th of february, after a siege of six months.--a surrender induced by the ravages of scurvy, consequent upon the lack of vegetables, and confinement in the foul air of bombproofs and casemates, under the heavy fire of an enemy. on the last night of the defence the call for necessary guards was four hundred and fifteen, while only six hundred and sixty men were fit for duty, thus leaving no reliefs. the allied fleets assembled this year in cadiz, to the number of forty ships-of-the-line. it was expected that this force would be increased by dutch ships, but a squadron under lord howe drove the latter back to their ports. it does not certainly appear that any active enterprise was intended against the english coast; but the allies cruised off the mouth of the channel and in the bay of biscay during the summer months. their presence insured the safe arrival and departure of the homeward and outward bound merchantmen, and likewise threatened english commerce; notwithstanding which, howe, with twenty-two ships, not only kept the sea and avoided an engagement, but also succeeded in bringing the jamaica fleet safe into port. the injury to trade and to military transportation by sea may be said to have been about equal on either side; and the credit for successful use of sea power for these most important ends must therefore be given to the weaker party. having carried out their orders for the summer cruise, the combined fleets returned to cadiz. on the th of september they sailed thence for algesiras, on the opposite side of the bay from gibraltar, to support a grand combined attack by land and sea, which, it was hoped, would reduce to submission the key to the mediterranean. with the ships already there, the total rose to nearly fifty ships-of-the-line. the details of the mighty onslaught scarcely belong to our subject, yet cannot be wholly passed by, without at least such mention as may recognize and draw attention to their interest. the three years' siege which was now drawing to its end had been productive of many brilliant feats of arms, as well as of less striking but more trying proofs of steadfast endurance, on the part of the garrison. how long the latter might have held out cannot be said, seeing the success with which the english sea power defied the efforts of the allies to cut off the communications of the fortress; but it was seemingly certain that the place must be subdued by main force or not at all, while the growing exhaustion of the belligerents foretold the near end of the war. accordingly spain multiplied her efforts of preparation and military ingenuity; while the report of them and of the approaching decisive contest drew to the scene volunteers and men of eminence from other countries of europe. two french bourbon princes added, by their coming, to the theatrical interest with which the approaching drama was invested. the presence of royalty was needed adequately to grace the sublime catastrophe; for the sanguine confidence of the besiegers had determined a satisfactory _dénouement_ with all the security of a playwright. besides the works on the isthmus which joins the rock to the mainland, where three hundred pieces of artillery were now mounted, the chief reliance of the assailants was upon ten floating batteries elaborately contrived to be shot and fire proof, and carrying one hundred and fifty-four heavy guns. these were to anchor in a close north-and-south line along the west face of the works, at about nine hundred yards distance. they were to be supported by forty gunboats and as many bomb vessels, besides the efforts of the ships-of-the-line to cover the attack and distract the garrison. twelve thousand french troops were brought to reinforce the spaniards in the grand assault, which was to be made when the bombardment had sufficiently injured and demoralized the defenders. at this time the latter numbered seven thousand, their land opponents thirty-three thousand men. the final act was opened by the english. at seven o'clock on the morning of september , , the commanding general, elliott, began a severe and most injurious fire upon the works on the isthmus. having effected his purpose, he stopped; but the enemy took up the glove the next morning, and for four days successively poured in a fire from the isthmus alone of six thousand five hundred cannon-balls and one thousand one hundred bombs every twenty-four hours. so approached the great closing scene of september . at seven a.m. of that day the ten battering-ships unmoored from the head of the bay and stood down to their station. between nine and ten they anchored, and the general fire at once began. the besieged replied with equal fury. the battering-ships seem in the main, and for some hours, to have justified the hopes formed of them; cold shot glanced or failed to get through their sides, while the self-acting apparatus for extinguishing fires balked the hot shot. about two o'clock, however, smoke was seen to issue from the ship of the commander-in-chief, and though controlled for some time, the fire continued to gain. the same misfortune befell others; by evening, the fire of the besieged gained a marked superiority, and by one o'clock in the morning the greater part of the battering-ships were in flames. their distress was increased by the action of the naval officer commanding the english gunboats, who now took post upon the flank of the line and raked it effectually,--a service which the spanish gunboats should have prevented. in the end, nine of the ten blew up at their anchors, with a loss estimated at fifteen hundred men, four hundred being saved from the midst of the fire by the english seamen. the tenth ship was boarded and burned by the english boats. the hopes of the assailants perished with the failure of the battering-ships. there remained only the hope of starving out the garrison. to this end the allied fleets now gave themselves. it was known that lord howe was on his way out with a great fleet, numbering thirty-four ships-of-the-line, besides supply vessels. on the th of october a violent westerly gale injured the combined ships, driving one ashore under the batteries of gibraltar, where she was surrendered. the next day howe's force came in sight, and the transports had a fine chance to make the anchorage, which, through carelessness, was missed by all but four. the rest, with the men-of-war, drove eastward into the mediterranean. the allies followed on the th; but though thus placed between the port and the relieving force, and not encumbered, like the latter, with supply-ships, they yet contrived to let the transports, with scarcely an exception, slip in and anchor safely. not only provisions and ammunition, but also bodies of troops carried by the ships-of-war, were landed without molestation. on the th the english fleet repassed the straits with an easterly wind, having within a week's time fulfilled its mission, and made gibraltar safe for another year. the allied fleet followed, and on the th an action took place at long range, the allies to windward, but not pressing their attack close. the number of ships engaged in this magnificent spectacle, the closing scene of the great drama in europe, the after-piece to the successful defence of gibraltar, was eighty-three of the line,--forty-nine allies and thirty-four english. of the former, thirty-three only got into action; but as the duller sailers would have come up to a general engagement, lord howe was probably right in declining, so far as in him lay, a trial which the allies did not too eagerly court. such were the results of this great contest in the european seas, marked on the part of the allies by efforts gigantic in size, but loose-jointed and flabby in execution. by england, so heavily overmatched in mere numbers, were shown firmness of purpose, high courage, and seamanship; but it can scarcely be said that the military conceptions of her councils, or the cabinet management of her sea forces, were worthy of the skill and devotion of her seamen. the odds against her were not so great--not nearly so great--as the formidable lists of guns and ships seemed to show; and while allowance must justly be made for early hesitations, the passing years of indecision and inefficiency on the part of the allies should have betrayed to her their weakness. the reluctance of the french to risk their ships, so plainly shown by d'estaing, de grasse, and de guichen, the sluggishness and inefficiency of the spaniards, should have encouraged england to pursue her old policy, to strike at the organized forces of the enemy afloat. as a matter of fact, and probably from the necessities of the case, the opening of every campaign found the enemies separated,--the spaniards in cadiz, the french in brest.[ ] to blockade the latter in full force before they could get out, england should have strained every effort; thus she would have stopped at its head the main stream of the allied strength, and, by knowing exactly where this great body was, would have removed that uncertainty as to its action which fettered her own movements as soon as it had gained the freedom of the open sea. before brest she was interposed between the allies; by her lookouts she would have known the approach of the spaniards long before the french could know it; she would have kept in her hands the power of bringing against each, singly, ships more numerous and individually more effective. a wind that was fair to bring on the spaniards would have locked their allies in the port. the most glaring instances of failure on the part of england to do this were when de grasse was permitted to get out unopposed in march, ; for an english fleet of superior force had sailed from portsmouth nine days before him, but was delayed by the admiralty on the irish coast;[ ] and again at the end of that year, when kempenfeldt was sent to intercept de guichen with an inferior force, while ships enough to change the odds were kept at home. several of the ships which were to accompany rodney to the west indies were ready when kempenfeldt sailed, yet they were not associated with an enterprise so nearly affecting the objects of rodney's campaign. the two forces united would have made an end of de guichen's seventeen ships and his invaluable convoy. gibraltar was indeed a heavy weight upon the english operations, but the national instinct which clung to it was correct. the fault of the english policy was in attempting to hold so many other points of land, while neglecting, by rapidity of concentration, to fall upon any of the detachments of the allied fleets. the key of the situation was upon the ocean; a great victory there would have solved all the other points in dispute. but it was not possible to win a great victory while trying to maintain a show of force everywhere.[ ] north america was a yet heavier clog, and there undoubtedly the feeling of the nation was mistaken; pride, not wisdom, maintained that struggle. whatever the sympathies of individuals and classes in the allied nations, by their governments american rebellion was valued only as a weakening of england's arm. the operations there depended, as has been shown, upon the control of the sea; and to maintain that, large detachments of english ships were absorbed from the contest with france and spain. could a successful war have made america again what it once was, a warmly attached dependency of great britain, a firm base for her sea power, it would have been worth much greater sacrifices; but that had become impossible. but although she had lost, by her own mistakes, the affection of the colonists, which would have supported and secured her hold upon their ports and sea-coast, there nevertheless remained to the mother-country, in halifax, bermuda, and the west indies, enough strong military stations, inferior, as naval bases, only to those strong ports which are surrounded by a friendly country, great in its resources and population. the abandonment of the contest in north america would have strengthened england very much more than the allies. as it was, her large naval detachments there were always liable to be overpowered by a sudden move of the enemy from the sea, as happened in and . to the abandonment of america as hopelessly lost, because no military subjection could have brought back the old loyalty, should have been added the giving up, for the time, all military occupancy which fettered concentration, while not adding to military strength. most of the antilles fell under this head, and the ultimate possession of them would depend upon the naval campaign. garrisons could have been spared for barbadoes and sta. lucia, for gibraltar and perhaps for mahon, that could have effectually maintained them until the empire of the seas was decided; and to them could have been added one or two vital positions in america, like new york and charleston, to be held only till guarantees were given for such treatment of the loyalists among the inhabitants as good faith required england to exact. having thus stripped herself of every weight, rapid concentration with offensive purpose should have followed. sixty ships-of-the-line on the coast of europe, half before cadiz and half before brest, with a reserve at home to replace injured ships, would not have exhausted by a great deal the roll of the english navy; and that such fleets would not have had to fight, may not only be said by us, who have the whole history before us, but might have been inferred by those who had watched the tactics of d'estaing and de guichen, and later on of de grasse. or, had even so much dispersal been thought unadvisable, forty ships before brest would have left the sea open to the spanish fleet to try conclusions with the rest of the english navy when the question of controlling gibraltar and mahon came up for decision. knowing what we do of the efficiency of the two services, there can be little question of the result; and gibraltar, instead of a weight, would, as often before and since those days, have been an element of strength to great britain. the conclusion continually recurs. whatever may be the determining factors in strifes between neighboring continental states, when a question arises of control over distant regions, politically weak,--whether they be crumbling empires, anarchical republics, colonies, isolated military posts, or islands below a certain size,--it must ultimately be decided by naval power, by the organized military force afloat, which represents the communications that form so prominent a feature in all strategy. the magnificent defence of gibraltar hinged upon this; upon this depended the military results of the war in america; upon this the final fate of the west india islands; upon this certainly the possession of india. upon this will depend the control of the central american isthmus, if that question take a military coloring; and though modified by the continental position and surroundings of turkey, the same sea power must be a weighty factor in shaping the outcome of the eastern question in europe. if this be true, military wisdom and economy, both of time and money, dictate bringing matters to an issue as soon as possible upon the broad sea, with the certainty that the power which achieves military preponderance there will win in the end. in the war of the american revolution the numerical preponderance was very great against england; the actual odds were less, though still against her. military considerations would have ordered the abandonment of the colonies; but if the national pride could not stoop to this, the right course was to blockade the hostile arsenals. if not strong enough to be in superior force before both, that of the more powerful nation should have been closed. here was the first fault of the english admiralty; the statement of the first lord as to the available force at the outbreak of the war was not borne out by facts. the first fleet, under keppel, barely equalled the french; and at the same time howe's force in america was inferior to the fleet under d'estaing. in and , on the contrary, the english fleet was superior to that of the french alone; yet the allies joined unopposed, while in the latter year de grasse got away to the west indies, and suffren to the east. in kempenfeldt's affair with de guichen, the admiralty knew that the french convoy was of the utmost importance to the campaign in the west indies, yet they sent out their admiral with only twelve ships; while at that time, besides the reinforcement destined for the west indies, a number of others were stationed in the downs, for what fox justly called "the paltry purpose" of distressing the dutch trade. the various charges made by fox in the speech quoted from, and which, as regarded the franco-spanish war, were founded mainly on the expediency of attacking the allies before they got away into the ocean wilderness, were supported by the high professional opinion of lord howe, who of the kempenfeldt affair said: "not only the fate of the west india islands, but perhaps the whole future fortune of the war, might have been decided, almost without a risk, in the bay of biscay."[ ] not without a risk, but with strong probabilities of success, the whole fortune of the war should at the first have been staked on a concentration of the english fleet between brest and cadiz. no relief for gibraltar would have been more efficacious; no diversion surer for the west india islands; and the americans would have appealed in vain for the help, scantily given as it was, of the french fleet. for the great results that flowed from the coming of de grasse must not obscure the fact that he came on the st of august, and announced from the beginning that he must be in the west indies again by the middle of october. only a providential combination of circumstances prevented a repetition to washington, in , of the painful disappointments by d'estaing and de guichen in and . footnotes: [ ] the curious reader can consult clinton's letters and notes, in the "clinton cornwallis controversy," by b.f. stevens. london, . [ ] bancroft: history of the united states, vol. x. p. . [ ] although the english thus culpably failed to use their superiority to the french alone, the channel fleet numbering over forty of the line, the fear that it might prevent the junction caused the brest fleet to sail in haste and undermanned,--a fact which had an important effect upon the issue of the cruise. (chevalier, p. .) [ ] the details of the mismanagement of this huge mob of ships are so numerous as to confuse a narrative, and are therefore thrown into a foot-note. the french fleet was hurried to sea four thousand men short. the spaniards were seven weeks in joining. when they met, no common system of signals had been arranged; five fair summer days were spent in remedying this defect. not till a week after the junction could the fleet sail for england. no steps were taken to supply the provisions consumed by the french during the seven weeks. the original orders to d'orvilliers contemplated a landing at portsmouth, or the seizure of the isle of wight, for which a large army was assembled on the coast of normandy. upon reaching the channel, these orders were suddenly changed, and falmouth indicated as the point of landing. by this time, august , summer was nearly over; and falmouth, if taken, would offer no shelter to a great fleet. then an easterly gale drove the fleet out of the channel. by this time the sickness which raged had so reduced the crews that many ships could be neither handled nor fought. ships companies of eight hundred or a thousand men could muster only from three to five hundred. thus bad administration crippled the fighting powers of the fleet; while the unaccountable military blunder of changing the objective from a safe and accessible roadstead to a fourth-rate and exposed harbor completed the disaster by taking away the only hope of a secure base of operations during the fall and winter months. france then had no first-class port on the channel; hence the violent westerly gales which prevail in the autumn and winter would have driven the allies into the north sea. [ ] life of admiral keppel, vol. ii pp. , , . see also barrow: life of lord howe, pp. - . [ ] beatson gives quite at length (vol. v. p. ) the debate in the allied council of war. the customary hesitation of such councils, in face of the difficulties of the situation, was increased by an appeal to the delusion of commerce-destroying as a decisive mode of warfare. m. de beausset urged that "the allied fleets should direct their whole attention to that great and attainable object, the intercepting of the british homeward-bound west india fleets. this was a measure which, as they were now masters of the sea, could scarcely fail of success; and it would prove a blow so fatal to that nation, that she could not recover it during the whole course of the war." the french account of lapeyrouse-bonfils is essentially the same. chevalier, who is silent as to details, justly remarks: "the cruise just made by the allied fleet was such as to injure the reputation of france and spain. these two powers had made a great display of force which had produced no result." the english trade also received little injury. guichen wrote home: "i have returned from a cruise fatiguing but not glorious." [ ] this mishap of the french was largely due to mismanagement by de guichen, a skilful and usually a careful admiral. when kempenfeldt fell in with him, all the french ships-of-war were to leeward of their convoy, while the english were to windward of it. the former, therefore, were unable to interpose in time; and the alternative remedy, of the convoy running down to leeward of their escort, could not be applied by all the merchant-ships in so large a body. [ ] "in the spring of the british admiralty had assembled in the channel ports forty-five ships-of-the-line. the squadron at brest was reduced to twelve or fifteen.... to please spain, twenty french ships-of-the-line had joined the flag of admiral cordova in cadiz. in consequence of these dispositions, the english with their channel fleet held in check the forces which we had in brest and in cadiz. enemy's cruisers traversed freely the space between the lizard and the straits of gibraltar." (chevalier, p. .) in "the cabinet of versailles called the attention of holland and spain to the necessity of assembling at brest a fleet strong enough to impose upon the ships which great britain kept in the channel. the dutch remained in the texel, and the spaniards did not leave cadiz. from this state of things it resulted that the english, with forty ships-of-the-line, blocked seventy belonging to the allied powers." (p. .) [ ] "a question was very much agitated both in and out of parliament; namely, whether the intercepting of the french fleet under the count de grasse should not have been the first object of the british fleet under vice-admiral darby, instead of losing time in going to ireland, by which that opportunity was missed. the defeat of the french fleet would certainly totally have disconcerted the great plans which the enemies had formed in the east and west indies. it would have insured the safety of the british west india islands; the cape of good hope must have fallen into the hands of britain; and the campaign in north america might have had a very different termination." (beatson's memoirs, vol. v. p. , where the contrary arguments are also stated.) [ ] this is one of the most common and flagrant violations of the principles of war,--stretching a thin line, everywhere inadequate, over an immense frontier. the clamors of trade and local interests make popular governments especially liable to it. [ ] annual register, . chapter xii. events in the east indies, - .--suffren sails from brest, .--his brilliant naval campaign in the indian seas, , . the very interesting and instructive campaign of suffren in the east indies, although in itself by far the most noteworthy and meritorious naval performance of the war of , failed, through no fault of his, to affect the general issue. it was not till that the french court felt able to direct upon the east naval forces adequate to the importance of the issue. yet the conditions of the peninsula at that time were such as to give an unusual opportunity for shaking the english power. hyder ali, the most skilful and daring of all the enemies against whom the english had yet fought in india, was then ruling over the kingdom of mysore, which, from its position in the southern part of the peninsula, threatened both the carnatic and the malabar coast. hyder, ten years before, had maintained alone a most successful war against the intruding foreigners, concluding with a peace upon the terms of a mutual restoration of conquests; and he was now angered by the capture of mahé. on the other hand, a number of warlike tribes, known by the name of the mahrattas, of the same race and loosely knit together in a kind of feudal system, had become involved in war with the english. the territory occupied by these tribes, whose chief capital was at poonah, near bombay, extended northward from mysore to the ganges. with boundaries thus conterminous, and placed centrally with reference to the three english presidencies of bombay, calcutta, and madras, hyder and the mahrattas were in a position of advantage for mutual support and for offensive operations against the common enemy. at the beginning of the war between england and france, a french agent appeared at poonah. it was reported to warren hastings, the governor-general, that the tribes had agreed to terms and ceded to the french a seaport on the malabar coast. with his usual promptness, hastings at once determined on war, and sent a division of the bengal army across the jumna and into berar. another body of four thousand english troops also marched from bombay; but being badly led, was surrounded and forced to surrender in january, . this unusual reverse quickened the hopes and increased the strength of the enemies of the english; and although the material injury was soon remedied by substantial successes under able leaders, the loss of prestige remained. the anger of hyder ali, roused by the capture of mahé, was increased by imprudent thwarting on the part of the governor of madras. seeing the english entangled with the mahrattas, and hearing that a french armament was expected on the coromandel coast, he quietly prepared for war. in the summer of swarms of his horsemen descended without warning from the hills, and appeared near the gates of madras. in september one body of english troops, three thousand strong, was cut to pieces, and another of five thousand was only saved by a rapid retreat upon madras, losing its artillery and trains. unable to attack madras, hyder turned upon the scattered posts separated from each other and the capital by the open country, which was now wholly in his control. such was the state of affairs when, in january, , a french squadron of six ships-of-the-line and three frigates appeared on the coast. the english fleet under sir edward hughes had gone to bombay. to the french commodore, count d'orves, hyder appealed for aid in an attack upon cuddalore. deprived of support by sea, and surrounded by the myriads of natives, the place must have fallen. d'orves, however, refused, and returned to the isle of france. at the same time one of the most skilful of the english indian soldiers, sir eyre coote, took the field against hyder. the latter at once raised the siege of the beleaguered posts, and after a series of operations extending through the spring months, was brought to battle on the st of july, . his total defeat restored to the english the open country, saved the carnatic, and put an end to the hopes of the partisans of the french in their late possession of pondicherry. a great opportunity had been lost. meanwhile a french officer of very different temper from his predecessors was on his way to the east indies. it will be remembered that when de grasse sailed from brest, march , , for the west indies, there went with his fleet a division of five ships-of-the-line under suffren. the latter separated from the main body on the th of the month, taking with him a few transports destined for the cape of good hope, then a dutch colony. the french government had learned that an expedition from england was destined to seize this important halting-place on the road to india, and suffren's first mission was to secure it. in fact, the squadron under commodore johnstone[ ] had got away first, and had anchored at porto praya, in the cape verde islands, a portuguese colony, on the th of april. it numbered two ships-of-the-line, and three of fifty guns, with frigates and smaller vessels, besides thirty-five transports, mostly armed. without apprehension of attack, not because he trusted to the neutrality of the port but because he thought his destination secret, the english commodore had not anchored with a view to battle. it so happened that at the moment of sailing from brest one of the ships intended for the west indies was transferred to suffren's squadron. she consequently had not water enough for the longer voyage, and this with other reasons determined suffren also to anchor at porto praya. on the th of april, five days after johnstone, he made the island early in the morning and stood for the anchorage, sending a coppered ship ahead to reconnoitre. approaching from the eastward, the land for some time hid the english squadron; but at quarter before nine the advance ship, the "artésien," signalled that enemy's ships were anchored in the bay. the latter is open to the southward, and extends from east to west about a mile and a half; the conditions are such that ships usually lie in the northeast part, near the shore (plate xiii).[ ] the english were there, stretching irregularly in a west-northwest line. both suffren and johnstone were surprised, but the latter more so; and the initiative remained with the french officer. few men were fitter, by natural temper and the teaching of experience, for the prompt decision required. of ardent disposition and inborn military genius, suffren had learned, in the conduct of boscawen toward the squadron of de la clue,[ ] in which he had served, not to lay weight upon the power of portugal to enforce respect for her neutrality. he knew that this must be the squadron meant for the cape of good hope. the only question for him was whether to press on to the cape with the chance of getting there first, or to attack the english at their anchors, in the hope of so crippling them as to prevent their further progress. he decided for the latter; and although the ships of his squadron, not sailing equally well, were scattered, he also determined to stand in at once, rather than lose the advantage of a surprise. making signal to prepare for action at anchor, he took the lead in his flag-ship, the "héros," of seventy-four guns, hauled close round the southeast point of the bay, and stood for the english flag-ship (f). he was closely followed by the "hannibal," seventy-four (line a b); the advance ship "artésien" (c), a sixty-four, also stood on with him; but the two rear ships were still far astern. [illustration: pl. xiii. porto praya. april , .] the english commodore got ready for battle as soon as he made out the enemy, but had no time to rectify his order. suffren anchored five hundred feet from the flag-ship's starboard beam (by a singular coincidence the english flag-ship was also called "hero"), thus having enemy's ships on both sides, and opened fire. the "hannibal" anchored ahead of her commodore (b), and so close that the latter had to veer cable and drop astern (a); but her captain, ignorant of suffren's intention to disregard the neutrality of the port, had not obeyed the order to clear for action, and was wholly unprepared,--his decks lumbered with water-casks which had been got up to expedite watering, and the guns not cast loose. he did not add to this fault by any hesitation, but followed the flag-ship boldly, receiving passively the fire, to which for a time he was unable to reply. luffing to the wind, he passed to windward of his chief, chose his position with skill, and atoned by his death for his first fault. these two ships were so placed as to use both broadsides. the "artésien," in the smoke, mistook an east india ship for a man-of-war. running alongside (c'), her captain was struck dead at the moment he was about to anchor, and the critical moment being lost by the absence of a head, the ship drifted out of close action, carrying the east-indiaman along with her (c''). the remaining two vessels, coming up late, failed to keep close enough to the wind, and they too were thrown out of action (d, e). then suffren, finding himself with only two ships to bear the brunt of the fight, cut his cable and made sail. the "hannibal" followed his movement; but so much injured was she that her fore and main masts went over the side,--fortunately not till she was pointed out from the bay, which she left shorn to a hulk. putting entirely aside questions of international law, the wisdom and conduct of suffren's attack, from the military point of view, invite attention. to judge them properly, we must consider what was the object of the mission with which he was charged, and what were the chief factors in thwarting or forwarding it. his first object was to protect the cape of good hope against an english expedition; the chief reliance for effecting his purpose was to get there first; the obstacle to his success was the english fleet. to anticipate the arrival of the latter, two courses were open to him,--to run for it in the hope of winning the race, or to beat the enemy and so put him out of the running altogether. so long as his whereabouts was unknown, a search, unless with very probable information, would be a waste of time; but when fortune had thrown his enemy across his path, the genius of suffren at once jumped to the conclusion that the control of the sea in southern waters would determine the question, and should be settled at once. to use his own strong expression, "the destruction of the english squadron would _cut off the root_ of all the plans and projects of that expedition, gain us for a long time the superiority in india, a superiority whence might result a glorious peace, and hinder the english from reaching the cape before me,--an object which has been fulfilled and was the principal aim of my mission." he was ill-informed as to the english force, believing it greater than it was; but he had it at disadvantage and surprised. the prompt decision to fight, therefore, was right, and it is the most pronounced merit of suffren in this affair, that he postponed for the moment--dismissed, so to speak, from his mind--the ulterior projects of the cruise; but in so doing he departed from the traditions of the french navy and the usual policy of his government. it cannot be imputed to him as a fault that he did not receive from his captains the support he was fairly entitled to expect. the accidents and negligence which led to their failure have been mentioned; but having his three best ships in hand, there can be little doubt he was right in profiting by the surprise, and trusting that the two in reserve would come up in time. the position taken by his own ship and by the "hannibal," enabling them to use both broadsides,--in other words, to develop their utmost force,--was excellently judged. he thus availed himself to the full of the advantage given by the surprise and by the lack of order in the enemy's squadron. this lack of order, according to english accounts, threw out of action two of their fifty-gun ships,--a circumstance which, while discreditable to johnstone, confirmed suffren's judgment in precipitating his attack. had he received the aid upon which, after all deductions, he was justified in counting, he would have destroyed the english squadron; as it was, he saved the cape colony at porto praya. it is not surprising, therefore, that the french court, notwithstanding its traditional sea policy and the diplomatic embarrassment caused by the violation of portuguese neutrality, should have heartily and generously acknowledged a vigor of action to which it was unused in its admirals. it has been said that suffren, who had watched the cautious movements of d'estaing in america, and had served in the seven years' war, attributed in part the reverses suffered by the french at sea to the introduction of tactics, which he stigmatized as the veil of timidity; but that the results of the fight at porto praya, necessarily engaged without previous arrangement, convinced him that system and method had their use.[ ] certainly his tactical combinations afterward were of a high order, especially in his earlier actions in the east (for he seems again to have abandoned them in the later fights under the disappointment caused by his captains' disaffection or blundering). but his great and transcendent merit lay in the clearness with which he recognized in the english fleets, the exponent of the british sea power, the proper enemy of the french fleet, to be attacked first and always when with any show of equality. far from blind to the importance of those ulterior objects to which the action of the french navy was so constantly subordinated, he yet saw plainly that the way to assure those objects was not by economizing his own ships, but by destroying those of the enemy. attack, not defence, was the road to sea power in his eyes; and sea power meant control of the issues upon the land, at least in regions distant from europe. this view out of the english policy he had the courage to take, after forty years of service in a navy sacrificed to the opposite system; but he brought to its practical application a method not to be found in any english admiral of the day, except perhaps rodney, and a fire superior to the latter. yet the course thus followed was no mere inspiration of the moment; it was the result of clear views previously held and expressed. however informed by natural ardor, it had the tenacity of an intellectual conviction. thus he wrote to d'estaing, after the failure to destroy barrington's squadron at sta. lucia, remonstrating upon the half-manned condition of his own and other ships, from which men had been landed to attack the english troops:-- "notwithstanding the small results of the two cannonades of the th of december [directed against barrington's squadron], and the unhappy check our land forces have undergone, we may yet hope for success. but the only means to have it is to attack vigorously the squadron, which, with our superiority, cannot resist, notwithstanding its land batteries, whose effects will be neutralized if we run them aboard, or anchor upon their buoys. if we delay, they may escape.... besides, our fleet being unmanned, it is in condition neither to sail nor to fight. what would happen if admiral byron's fleet should arrive? what would become of ships having neither crews nor admiral? their defeat would cause the loss of the army and the colony. let us destroy that squadron; their army, lacking everything and in a bad country, would soon be obliged to surrender. then let byron come, we shall be pleased to see him. i think it is not necessary to point out that for this attack we need men and plans well concerted with those who are to execute them." equally did he condemn the failure of d'estaing to capture the four crippled ships of byron's squadron, after the action off grenada. owing to a combination of misfortunes, the attack at porto praya had not the decisive result it deserved. commodore johnstone got under way and followed suffren; but he thought his force was not adequate to attack in face of the resolute bearing of the french, and feared the loss of time consequent upon chasing to leeward of his port. he succeeded, however, in retaking the east india ship which the "artésien" had carried out. suffren continued his course and anchored at the cape, in simon's bay, on the st of june. johnstone followed him a fortnight later; but learning by an advance ship that the french troops had been landed, he gave up the enterprise against the colony, made a successful commerce-destroying attack upon five dutch india ships in saldanha bay, which poorly repaid the failure of the military undertaking, and then went back himself to england, after sending the ships-of-the-line on to join sir edward hughes in the east indies. having seen the cape secured, suffren sailed for the isle of france, arriving there on the th of october, . count d'orves, being senior, took command of the united squadron. the necessary repairs were made, and the fleet sailed for india, december . on the d of january, , an english fifty-gun ship, the "hannibal," was taken. on the th of february count d'orves died, and suffren became commander-in-chief, with the rank of commodore. a few days later the land was seen to the northward of madras; but owing to head-winds the city was not sighted until february . nine large ships-of-war were found anchored in order under the guns of the forts. they were the fleet of sir edward hughes, not in confusion like that of johnstone.[ ] here, at the meeting point between these two redoubtable champions, each curiously representative of the characteristics of his own race,--the one of the stubborn tenacity and seamanship of the english, the other of the ardor and tactical science of the french, too long checked and betrayed by a false system,--is the place to give an accurate statement of the material forces. the french fleet had three seventy-fours, seven sixty-fours, and two fifty-gun ships, one of which was the lately captured english "hannibal." to these sir edward hughes opposed two seventy-fours, one seventy, one sixty-eight, four sixty-fours, and one fifty-gun ship. the odds, therefore, twelve to nine, were decidedly against the english; and it is likely that the advantage in single-ship power, class for class, was also against them. it must be recalled that at the time of his arrival suffren found no friendly port or roadstead, no base of supplies or repair. the french posts had all fallen by ; and his rapid movement, which saved the cape, did not bring him up in time to prevent the capture of the dutch indian possessions. the invaluable harbor of trincomalee, in ceylon, was taken just one month before suffren saw the english fleet at madras. but if he thus had everything to gain, hughes had as much to lose. to suffren, at the moment of first meeting, belonged superiority of numbers and the power of taking the offensive, with all its advantages in choice of initiative. upon hughes fell the anxiety of the defensive, with inferior numbers, many assailable points, and uncertainty as to the place where the blow would fall. it was still true, though not so absolutely as thirty years before, that control in india depended upon control of the sea. the passing years had greatly strengthened the grip of england, and proportionately loosened that of france. relatively, therefore, the need of suffren to destroy his enemy was greater than that of his predecessors, d'aché and others; whereas hughes could count upon a greater strength in the english possessions, and so bore a somewhat less responsibility than the admirals who went before him. nevertheless, the sea was still by far the most important factor in the coming strife, and for its proper control it was necessary to disable more or less completely the enemy's fleet, and to have some reasonably secure base. for the latter purpose, trincomalee, though unhealthy, was by far the best harbor on the east coast; but it had not been long enough in the hands of england to be well supplied. hughes, therefore, inevitably fell back on madras for repairs after an action, and was forced to leave trincomalee to its own resources until ready to take the sea again. suffren, on the other hand, found all ports alike destitute of naval supplies, while the natural advantages of trincomalee made its possession an evident object of importance to him; and hughes so understood it. independently, therefore, of the tradition of the english navy impelling hughes to attack, the influence of which appears plainly between the lines of his letters, suffren had, in moving toward trincomalee, a threat which was bound to draw his adversary out of his port. nor did trincomalee stand alone; the existing war between hyder ali and the english made it imperative for suffren to seize a port upon the mainland, at which to land the three thousand troops carried by the squadron to co-operate on shore against the common enemy, and from which supplies, at least of food, might be had. everything, therefore, concurred to draw hughes out, and make him seek to cripple or hinder the french fleet. the method of his action would depend upon his own and his adversary's skill, and upon the uncertain element of the weather. it was plainly desirable for him not to be brought to battle except on his own terms; in other words, without some advantage of situation to make up for his weaker force. as a fleet upon the open sea cannot secure any advantages of ground, the position favoring the weaker was that to windward, giving choice of time and some choice as to method of attack, the offensive position used defensively, with the intention to make an offensive movement if circumstances warrant. the leeward position left the weaker no choice but to run, or to accept action on its adversary's terms. whatever may be thought of hughes's skill, it must be conceded that his task was difficult. still, it can be clearly thought down to two requisites. the first was to get in a blow at the french fleet, so as to reduce the present inequality; the second, to keep suffren from getting trincomalee, which depended wholly on the fleet.[ ] suffren, on the other hand, if he could do hughes, in an action, more injury than he himself received, would be free to turn in any direction he chose. suffren having sighted hughes's fleet at madras, february , anchored his own four miles to the northward. considering the enemy's line, supported by the batteries, to be too strong for attack, he again got under way at four p.m., and stood south. hughes also weighed, standing to the southward all that night under easy sail, and at daylight found that the enemy's squadron had separated from the convoy, the ships of war being about twelve miles east, while the transports were nine miles southwest, from him (plate xiv. a, a). this dispersal is said to have been due to the carelessness of the french frigates, which did not keep touch of the english. hughes at once profited by it, chasing the convoy (c), knowing that the line-of-battle ships must follow. his copper-bottomed ships came up with and captured six of the enemy, five of which were english prizes. the sixth carried three hundred troops with military stores. hughes had scored a point. suffren of course followed in a general chase, and by three p.m. four of his best sailers were two or three miles from the sternmost english ships. hughes's ships were now much scattered, but not injudiciously so, for they joined by signal at seven p.m. both squadrons stood to the southeast during the night, under easy sail. at daylight of the th--the date of the first of four actions fought between these two chiefs within seven months--the fleets were six or eight miles apart, the french bearing north-northeast from the english (b, b). the latter formed line-ahead on the port tack (a), with difficulty, owing to the light winds and frequent calms. admiral hughes explains that he hoped to weather the enemy by this course so as to engage closely, counting probably on finding himself to windward when the sea-breeze made. the wind continuing light, but with frequent squalls, from north-northeast, the french, running before it, kept the puffs longer and neared the english rapidly, suffren's intention to attack the rear being aided by hughes's course. the latter finding his rear straggling, bore up to line abreast (b), retreating to gain time for the ships to close on the centre. these movements in line abreast continued till twenty minutes before four p.m., when, finding he could not escape attack on the enemy's terms, hughes hauled his wind on the port tack and awaited it (c). whether by his own fault or not, he was now in the worst possible position, waiting for an attack by a superior force at its pleasure. the rear ship of his line, the "exeter," was not closed up; and there appears no reason why she should not have been made the van, by forming on the starboard tack, and thus bringing the other ships up to her. [illustration: pl. xiv. suffren & hughes. feb. . .] the method of suffren's attack (c) is differently stated by him and by hughes, but the difference is in detail only; the main facts are certain. hughes says the enemy "steered down on the rear of our line in an irregular double line-abreast," in which formation they continued till the moment of collision, when "three of the enemy's ships in the first line bore right down upon the 'exeter,' while four more of their second line, headed by the 'héros,' in which m. de suffren had his flag, hauled _along the outside of the first line_ toward our centre. at five minutes past four the enemy's three ships began their fire upon the 'exeter,' which was returned by her and her second ahead; the action became general from our rear to our centre, the commanding ship of the enemy, with three others of their second line, leading down on our centre, yet never advancing farther than opposite to the 'superbe,' our centre ship, with little or no wind and some heavy rain during the engagement. under these circumstances, the enemy brought eight of their best ships to the attack of five of ours, as the van of our line, consisting of the 'monmouth,' 'eagle,' 'burford,' and 'worcester,' could not be brought into action without tacking on the enemy," for which there was not enough wind. here we will leave them, and give suffren's account of how he took up his position. in his report to the minister of marine he says:-- "i should have destroyed the english squadron, less by superior numbers than by the advantageous disposition in which i attacked it. i attacked the rear ship and stood along the english line as far as the sixth. i thus made three of them useless, so that we were twelve against six. i began the fight at half-past three in the afternoon, taking the lead and making signal to form line as best could be done; without that i would not have engaged. at four i made signal to three ships to double on the enemy's rear, and to the squadron to approach within pistol-shot. this signal, though repeated, was not executed. i did not _myself_ give the example, in order that i might hold in check the three van ships, which by tacking would have doubled on me. however, except the 'brilliant,' which doubled on the rear, no ship was as close as mine, nor received as many shots." the principal point of difference in the two accounts is, that suffren asserts that his flag-ship passed along the whole english line, from the rear to the sixth ship; while hughes says the french divided into two lines, which, upon coming near, steered, one on the rear, the other on the centre, of his squadron. the latter would be the better manoeuvre; for if the leading ship of the attack passed, as suffren asserts, along the enemy's line from the rear to the sixth, she should receive in succession the first fire of six ships, which ought to cripple her and confuse her line. suffren also notes the intention to double on the rear by placing three ships to leeward of it. two of the french did take this position. suffren further gives his reason for not closing with his own ship, which led; but as those which followed him went no nearer, hughes's attention was not drawn to his action. the french commodore was seriously, and it would seem justly, angered by the inaction of several of his captains. of the second in command he complained to the minister: "being at the head, i could not well see what was going on in the rear. i had directed m. de tromelin to make signals to ships which might be near him; he only repeated my own without having them carried out." this complaint was wholly justified. on the th of february, ten days before the fight, he had written to his second as follows:-- "if we are so fortunate as to be to windward, as the english are not more than eight, or at most nine, my intention is to double on their rear. supposing your division to be in the rear, you will see by your position what number of ships will overlap the enemy's line, and you will make signal to them to double[ ] [that is, to engage on the lee side].... in any case, i beg you to order to your division the manoeuvres which you shall think best fitted to assure the success of the action. the capture of trincomalee and that of negapatam, and perhaps of all ceylon, should make us wish for a general action." the last two sentences reveal suffren's own appreciation of the military situation in the indian seas, which demanded, first, the disabling of the hostile fleet, next, the capture of certain strategic ports. that this diagnosis was correct is as certain as that it reversed the common french maxims, which would have put the port first and the fleet second as objectives. a general action was the first desideratum of suffren, and it is therefore safe to say that to avoid such action should have been the first object of hughes. the attempt of the latter to gain the windward position was consequently correct; and as in the month of february the sea-breeze at madras sets in from the eastward and southward about eleven a.m., he probably did well to steer in that general direction, though the result disappointed him. de guichen in one of his engagements with rodney shaped the course of his fleet with reference to being to windward when the afternoon breeze made, and was successful. what use hughes would have made of the advantage of the wind can only be inferred from his own words,--that he sought it in order to engage more closely. there is not in this the certain promise of any skilful use of a tactical advantage. suffren also illustrates, in his words to tromelin, his conception of the duties of a second in command, which may fairly be paralleled with that of nelson in his celebrated order before trafalgar. in this first action he led the main attack himself, leaving the direction of what may be called the reserve--at any rate, of the second half of the assault--to his lieutenant, who, unluckily for him, was not a collingwood, and utterly failed to support him. it is probable that suffren's leading was due not to any particular theory, but to the fact that his ship was the best sailer in the fleet, and that the lateness of the hour and lightness of the wind made it necessary to bring the enemy to action speedily. but here appears a fault on the part of suffren. leading as he did involves, not necessarily but very naturally, the idea of example; and holding his own ship outside of close range, for excellent tactical reasons, led the captains in his wake naturally, almost excusably, to keep at the same distance, notwithstanding his signals. the conflict between orders and example, which cropped out so singularly at vicksburg in our civil war, causing the misunderstanding and estrangement of two gallant officers, should not be permitted to occur. it is the business of a chief to provide against such misapprehensions by most careful previous explanation of both the letter and spirit of his plans. especially is this so at sea, where smoke, slack wind, and intervening rigging make signals hard to read, though they are almost the only means of communication. this was nelson's practice; nor was suffren a stranger to the idea. "dispositions well concerted with those who are to carry them out are needed," he wrote to d'estaing, three years before. the excuse which may be pleaded for those who followed him, and engaged, cannot avail for the rear ships, and especially not for the second in command, who knew suffren's plans. he should have compelled the rear ships to take position to leeward, leading himself, if necessary. there was wind enough; for two captains actually engaged to leeward, one of them without orders, acting, through the impulse of his own good will and courage, on nelson's saying, "no captain can do very wrong who places his ship alongside that of an enemy." he received the special commendation of suffren, in itself an honor and a reward. whether the failure of so many of his fellows was due to inefficiency, or to a spirit of faction and disloyalty, is unimportant to the general military writer, however interesting to french officers jealous for the honor of their service. suffren's complaints, after several disappointments, became vehement. "my heart," wrote he, "is wrung by the most general defection. i have just lost the opportunity of destroying the english squadron.... all--yes, all--might have got near, since we were to windward and ahead, and none did so. several among them had behaved bravely in other combats. i can only attribute this horror to the wish to bring the cruise to an end, to ill-will, and to ignorance; for i dare not suspect anything worse. the result has been terrible. i must tell you, monseigneur, that officers who have been long at the isle of france are neither seamen nor military men. not seamen, for they have not been at sea; and the trading temper, independent and insubordinate, is absolutely opposed to the military spirit." this letter, written after his fourth battle with hughes, must be taken with allowance. not only does it appear that suffren himself, hurried away on this last occasion by his eagerness, was partly responsible for the disorder of his fleet, but there were other circumstances, and above all the character of some of the officers blamed, which made the charge of a general disaffection excessive. on the other hand, it remains true that after four general actions, with superior numbers on the part of the french, under a chief of the skill and ardor of suffren, the english squadron, to use his own plaintive expression, "still existed;" not only so, but had not lost a single ship. the only conclusion that can be drawn is that of a french naval writer: "quantity disappeared before quality."[ ] it is immaterial whether the defect was due to inefficiency or disaffection. the inefficiency which showed itself on the field of battle disappeared in the general conduct of the campaign where the qualities of the chief alone told. the battle of february th ended with a shift of wind to the southeast at six p.m., after two hours action. the english were thus brought to windward, and their van ships enabled to share in the fight. night falling, suffren, at half-past six, hauled his squadron by the wind on the starboard tack, heading northeast, while hughes steered south under easy sail. it is said by captain chevalier, of the french navy, that suffren intended to renew the fight next day. in that case he should have taken measures to keep within reach. it was too plainly hughes's policy not to fight without some advantage,--to allow the supposition that with one ship, the "exeter," lost to him through the concentration of so many enemies upon her, he would quietly await an attack. this is so plain as to make it probable that suffren saw sufficient reason, in the results to his fleet and the misconduct of his officers, not to wish to renew action at once. the next morning the two fleets were out of sight of each other. the continuance of the north wind, and the crippled state of two of his ships, forced hughes to go to trincomalee, where the sheltered harbor allowed them to repair. suffren, anxious about his transports, went to pondicherry, where he anchored in their company. it was his wish then to proceed against negapatam; but the commander of the troops chose to act against cuddalore. after negotiations and arrangements with hyder ali the army landed south of porto novo, and marched against cuddalore, which surrendered on the th of april. meanwhile suffren, anxious to act against his principal objective, had sailed again on the d of march. it was his hope to cut off two ships-of-the-line which were expected from england. for this he was too late; the two seventy-fours joined the main body at madras, march th. hughes had refitted at trincomalee in a fortnight, and reached madras again on the th of march. soon after the reinforcement had joined him, he sailed again for trincomalee with troops and military stores for the garrison. on the th of april suffren's squadron was seen to the northeast, also standing to the southward. hughes kept on, through that and the two following days, with light northerly winds. on the th he made the coast of ceylon, fifty miles north of trincomalee, and bore away for the port. on the morning of the th the french squadron in the northeast was seen crowding sail in pursuit. it was the day on which rodney and de grasse met in the west indies, but the parts were reversed; here the french, not the english, sought action. the speed of the ships in both squadrons was very unequal; each had some coppered ships and some not coppered. hughes found that his slow sailers could not escape the fastest of his enemy,--a condition which will always compel a retreating force to hazard an action, unless it can resolve to give up the rear ships, and which makes it imperative for the safety, as well as the efficiency, of a squadron that vessels of the same class should all have a certain minimum speed. the same cause--the danger of a separated ship--led the unwilling de grasse, the same day, in another scene, to a risky manoeuvre and a great mishap. hughes, with better reason, resolved to fight; and at nine a.m. formed his line on the starboard tack, standing in-shore (plate xv., a), the squadron in good order, with intervals of two cables between the ships.[ ] his account, which again varies from that of suffren, giving a radically different idea of the tactics used by the french commodore, and more to the credit of the latter's skill, will first be followed. he says:-- "the enemy, bearing north by east, distant six miles, with wind at north by east, continued manoeuvring their ships and changing their positions in line, till fifteen minutes past noon, when they bore away (a) to engage us, five sail of their van stretching along (b) to engage the ships of our van, and the other seven sail (b') steering directly on our three centre ships, the 'superbe,' the 'monmouth,' her second ahead, and the 'monarca,' her second astern. at half-past one the engagement began in the van of both squadrons; three minutes after, i made the signal for battle. the french admiral in the 'héros' and his second astern in 'l'orient' (both seventy-fours) bore down on the 'superbe'[ ] within pistol-shot. the 'héros' continued in her position, giving and receiving a severe fire for nine minutes, and then stood on, greatly damaged, to attack the 'monmouth,' at that time engaged with another of the enemy's ships, making room for the ships in his rear to come up to the attack of our centre, where the engagement was hottest. at three the 'monmouth' had her mizzen-mast shot away, and in a few minutes her mainmast, and bore out of the line to leeward (c, c); and at forty minutes past three the wind unexpectedly continuing far northerly without any sea-breeze, and being careful not to entangle our ships with the land, i made signal to wear and haul by the wind in a line-of-battle on the larboard tack, still engaging the enemy." now here, practically, was concentration with a vengeance. in this, the hardest fight between these two hard fighters, the english loss was killed and wounded in eleven ships. of this total, the two centre ships, the flag-ship and her next ahead, lost killed and wounded,--fifty-three per cent of the entire loss of the squadron, of which they formed eighteen per cent. the casualties were very much heavier, in proportion to the size of the ships, than those of the leaders of the two columns at trafalgar.[ ] the material injury to hulls, spars, etc., was yet more serious. the english squadron, by this concentration of the enemy upon a small fraction of it, was entirely crippled. inferior when the action began, its inferiority was yet more decisive by the subtraction of two ships, and suffren's freedom to move was increased. [illustration: pl. xv. suffren & hughes. april , .] but how far was this concentration intended by suffren? for this we must go to the pages of two french writers,[ ] who base their narratives upon his own despatches on record in the french marine office. the practical advantage gained by the french must also be tested by comparing the lists of casualties, and the injuries received by their individual ships; for it is evident that if both the squadrons received the same total amount of injury, but that with the english it fell on two ships, so that they could not be ready for action for a month or more, while with the french the damage was divided among the twelve, allowing them to be ready again in a few days, the victory tactically and strategically would rest with the latter.[ ] as regards suffren's purpose, there is nothing to indicate that he meant to make such an attack as hughes describes. having twelve ships to the english eleven, his intention seems to have been to pursue the usual english practice,--form line parallel to the enemy, bear down together, and engage ship to ship. to this he added one simple combination; the twelfth french ship, being unprovided with an opponent, was to engage the rear english ship on her lee side, placing her thus between two fires. in truth, a concentration upon the van and centre, such as hughes describes, is tactically inferior to a like effort upon the centre and rear of a column. this is true of steamers even, which, though less liable to loss of motive power, must still turn round to get from van to rear, losing many valuable seconds; but it is specially true of sailing vessels, and above all in the light, baffling airs which are apt to mark the change of monsoon at the season when this fight was fought. nelson emphasized his contempt of the russians of his day by saying he would not hesitate to attack their van, counting upon throwing the whole line in confusion from their want of seamanship; but though entertaining a not much better opinion of the spaniards, he threw the weight of attack on the rear of the allied fleets at trafalgar. in dealing with such seamen as the captains of hughes's fleet, it would have been an error to assail the van instead of the rear. only a dead calm could have kept the latter out of action. suffren's attack is thus described by captain chevalier. after mentioning hughes's forming line on the starboard tack, he says:-- "this manoeuvre was imitated by the french, and the two squadrons ran on parallel lines, heading about west-northwest (a, a). at eleven, our line being well formed, suffren made signal to keep away to west-southwest, by a movement all together. our ships did not keep their bearing upon the prescribed line, and the van, composed of the best sailers, came first within range of the enemy.[ ] at one, the leading ships of the english fleet opened fire upon the 'vengeur' and 'artésien' [french van]. these two ships, having luffed[ ] to return the fire, were at once ordered to keep away again. suffren, who wished for a decisive action, kept his course, receiving without reply the shots directed upon his ship by the enemy. when at pistol-range of the 'superbe,' he hauled to the wind (b), and the signal to open fire appeared at his mainmast head. admiral hughes having only eleven ships, the 'bizarre,' according to the dispositions taken by the commander-in-chief, was to attack on the quarter the rear ship of the english fleet and double on it to leeward. at the moment when the first cannon-shots were heard, our worst sailers were not up with their stations. breathing the letter, and not the spirit, of the commodore's orders, the captains of these ships luffed at the same time as those which preceded them. hence it resulted that the french line formed a curve (b), whose extremities were represented in the van by the 'artésien' and 'vengeur,' and in the rear by the 'bizarre,' 'ajax,' and 'sévère.' in consequence, these ships were very far from those which corresponded to them in the enemy's line." it is evident from all this, written by a warm admirer of suffren, who has had full access to the official papers, that the french chief intended an attack elementary in conception and difficult of execution. to keep a fleet on a line of bearing, sailing free, requires much drill, especially when the ships have different rates of speed, as had suffren's. the extreme injury suffered by the "superbe" and "monmouth," undeniably due to a concentration, cannot be attributed to suffren's dispositions. "the injuries which the 'héros' received at the beginning of the action did not allow her to remain by the 'superbe.' not being able to back her topsails in time, the braces having been cut, she passed ahead, and was only stopped on the beam of the 'monmouth.'"[ ] this accounts for the suffering of the latter ship, already injured, and now contending with a much larger opponent. the "superbe" was freed from suffren only to be engaged by the next frenchman, an equally heavy ship; and when the "monmouth" drifted or bore up, to leeward, the french flag-ship also drifted so that for a few moments she fired her stern guns into the "superbe's" bow (c, d). the latter at the same time was engaged on the beam and quarter by two french ships, who, either with or without signal, came up to shield their commodore. an examination of the list of casualties shows that the loss of the french was much more distributed among their ships than was the case with the english. no less than three of the latter escaped without a man killed, while of the french only one. the kernel of the action seems to have been in the somewhat fortuitous concentration of two french seventy-fours and one sixty-four on an english seventy-four and sixty-four. assuming the ships to have been actually of the same force as their rates, the french brought, counting broadside only, one hundred and six guns against sixty-nine. some unfavorable criticism was excited by the management of admiral hughes during the three days preceding the fight, because he refrained from attacking the french, although they were for much of the time to leeward with only one ship more than the english, and much separated at that. it was thought that he had the opportunity of beating them in detail.[ ] the accounts accessible are too meagre to permit an accurate judgment upon this opinion, which probably reflected the mess-table and quarter-deck talk of the subordinate officers of the fleet. hughes's own report of the position of the two fleets is vague, and in one important particular directly contradictory to the french. if the alleged opportunity offered, the english admiral in declining to use it adhered to the resolve, with which he sailed, neither to seek nor shun the enemy, but to go directly to trincomalee and land the troops and supplies he had on board. in other words, he was governed in his action by the french rather than the english naval policy, of subordinating the attack of the enemy's fleet to the particular mission in hand. if for this reason he did allow a favorable chance of fighting to slip, he certainly had reason bitterly to regret his neglect, in the results of the battle which followed; but in the lack of precise information the most interesting point to be noted is the impression made upon public and professional opinion, indicating how strongly the english held that the attack of the enemy's fleet was the first duty of an english admiral. it may also be said that he could hardly have fared worse by attacking than he did by allowing the enemy to become the assailant; and certainly not worse than he would have fared had suffren's captains been as good as his own. after the action, towards sunset, both squadrons anchored in fifteen fathoms of water, irregular soundings, three of the french ships taking the bottom on coral patches. here they lay for a week two miles apart, refitting. hughes, from the ruined condition of the "monmouth," expected an attack; but when suffren had finished his repairs on the th, he got under way and remained outside for twenty-four hours, inviting a battle which he would not begin. he realized the condition of the enemy so keenly as to feel the necessity of justifying his action to the minister of marine, which he did for eight reasons unnecessary to particularize here. the last was the lack of efficiency and hearty support on the part of his captains. it is not likely that suffren erred on the side of excessive caution. on the contrary, his most marked defect as a commander-in-chief was an ardor which, when in sight of the enemy, became impatience, and carried him at times into action hastily and in disorder. but if, in the details and execution of his battles, in his tactical combinations, suffren was at times foiled by his own impetuosity and the short-comings of most of his captains, in the general conduct of the campaign, in strategy, where the personal qualities of the commander-in-chief mainly told, his superiority was manifest, and achieved brilliant success. then ardor showed itself in energy, untiring and infectious. the eagerness of his hot provençal blood overrode difficulty, created resources out of destitution, and made itself felt through every vessel under his orders. no military lesson is more instructive nor of more enduring value than the rapidity and ingenuity with which he, without a port or supplies, continually refitted his fleet and took the field, while his slower enemy was dawdling over his repairs. the battle forced the english to remain inactive for six weeks, till the "monmouth" was repaired. unfortunately, suffren's situation did not allow him to assume the offensive at once. he was short of men, provisions, and especially of spare spars and rigging. in an official letter after the action he wrote: "i have no spare stores to repair rigging; the squadron lacks at least twelve spare topmasts." a convoy of supply-ships was expected at point de galles, which, with the rest of ceylon, except trincomalee, was still dutch. he therefore anchored at batacalo, south of trincomalee, a position in which he was between hughes and outward-bound english ships, and was favorably placed to protect his own convoys, which joined him there. on the d of june he sailed for tranquebar, a danish possession, where he remained two or three weeks, harassing the english communications between madras and the fleet at trincomalee. leaving there, he sailed for cuddalore, to communicate with the commander of the land forces and hyder ali. the latter was found to be much discontented with the scanty co-operation of the french general. suffren, however, had won his favor, and he expressed a wish to see him on his return from the expedition then in contemplation; for, true to his accurate instinct, the commodore was bent upon again seeking out the english fleet, _after_ beating which he intended to attack negapatam. there was not in him any narrowness of professional prejudice; he kept always in view the necessity, both political and strategic, of nursing the alliance with the sultan and establishing control upon the seaboard and in the interior; but he clearly recognized that the first step thereto was the control of the sea, by disabling the english fleet. the tenacity and vigor with which he followed this aim, amid great obstacles, joined to the clear-sightedness with which he saw it, are the distinguishing merits of suffren amid the crowd of french fleet-commanders,--his equals in courage, but trammelled by the bonds of a false tradition and the perception of a false objective. hughes meantime, having rigged jury-masts to the "monmouth," had gone to trincomalee, where his squadron refitted and the sick were landed for treatment; but it is evident, as has before been mentioned, that the english had not held the port long enough to make an arsenal or supply port, for he says, "i will be able to remast the 'monmouth' from the spare stores on board the several ships." his resources were nevertheless superior to those of his adversary. during the time that suffren was at tranquebar, worrying the english communications between madras and trincomalee, hughes still stayed quietly in the latter port, sailing for negapatam on the d of june, the day after suffren reached cuddalore. the two squadrons had thus again approached each other, and suffren hastened his preparations for attack as soon as he heard that his enemy was where he could get at him. hughes awaited his movement. before sailing, however, suffren took occasion to say in writing home: "since my arrival in ceylon, partly by the help of the dutch, partly through the prizes we have taken, the squadron has been equipped for six months' service, and i have rations of wheat and rice assured for more than a year." this achievement was indeed a just source of pride and self-congratulation. without a port, and destitute of resources, the french commodore had lived off the enemy; the store ships and commerce of the latter had supplied his wants. to his fertility of resource and the activity of his cruisers, inspired by himself, this result was due. yet he had but two frigates, the class of vessel upon which an admiral must mainly depend for this predatory warfare. on the d of march, both provisions and stores had been nearly exhausted. six thousand dollars in money, and the provisions in the convoy, were then his sole resources. since then he had fought a severe action, most expensive in rigging and men, as well as in ammunition. after that fight of april he had left only powder and shot enough for one other battle of equal severity. three months later he was able to report as above, that he could keep the sea on his station for six months without further supplies. this result was due wholly to himself,--to his self-reliance, and what may without exaggeration be called his greatness of soul. it was not expected at paris; on the contrary, it was expected there that the squadron would return to the isle of france to refit. it was not thought possible that it could remain on a hostile coast, so far from its nearest base, and be kept in efficient condition. suffren thought otherwise; he considered, with true military insight and a proper sense of the value of his own profession, that the success of the operations in india depended upon the control of the sea, and therefore upon the uninterrupted presence of his squadron. he did not shrink from attempting that which had always been thought impossible. this firmness of spirit, bearing the stamp of genius, must, to be justly appreciated, be considered with reference to the circumstances of his own time, and of the preceding generations in which he grew up. suffren was born july , , and served during the wars of and . he was first under fire at matthews's action off toulon, february , . he was the contemporary of d'estaing, de guichen, and de grasse, before the days of the french revolution, when the uprising of a people had taught men how often impossibilities are not impossible; before napoleon and nelson had made a mock of the word. his attitude and action had therefore at the time the additional merit of originality, but his lofty temper was capable of yet higher proof. convinced of the necessity of keeping the squadron on its station, he ventured to disregard not only the murmurs of his officers but the express orders of the court. when he reached batacalo, he found despatches directing him to return to the isle of france. instead of taking them as a release from the great burden of responsibility, he disobeyed, giving his reasons, and asserting that he on the spot could judge better than a minister in europe what the circumstances demanded. such a leader deserved better subordinates, and a better colleague than he had in the commander of the forces on shore. whether or no the conditions of the general maritime struggle would have permitted the overthrow of the english east indian power may be doubtful; but it is certain that among all the admirals of the three nations there was none so fitted to accomplish that result as suffren. we shall find him enduring severer tests, and always equal to them. in the afternoon of the th of july suffren's squadron came in sight of the english, anchored off cuddalore. an hour later, a sudden squall carried away the main and mizzen topmasts of one of the french ships. admiral hughes got under way, and the two fleets manoeuvred during the night. the following day the wind favored the english, and the opponents found themselves in line of battle on the starboard tack, heading south-southeast, with the wind at southwest. the disabled french ship having by unpardonable inactivity failed to repair her injuries, the numbers about to engage were equal,--eleven on each side. at eleven a.m. the english bore down together and engaged ship against ship; but as was usual under those conditions, the rear ships did not come to as close action as those ahead of them (plate xvi., position i.). captain chevalier carefully points out that their failure was a fair offset to the failure of the french rear on the th of april,[ ] but fails to note in this connection that the french van, both on that occasion and again on the d of september, bungled as well as the rear. there can remain little doubt, in the mind of the careful reader, that most of the french captains were inferior, as seamen, to their opponents. during this part of the engagement the fourth ship in the french order, the "brilliant" (a), lost her mainmast, bore up out of the line (a'), and dropped gradually astern and to leeward (a'') [illustration: pl. xvi. suffren & hughes. july , .] at one p.m., when the action was hottest, the wind suddenly shifted to south-southeast, taking the ships on the port bow (position ii.). four english ships, the "burford," "sultan" (s), "worcester," and "eagle," seeing the breeze coming, kept off to port, toward the french line; the others were taken aback and paid off to starboard. the french ships, on the other hand, with two exceptions, the "brilliant" (a) and "sévère" (b), paid off from the english. the effect of the change of wind was therefore to separate the main parts of the two squadrons, but to bring together between the lines four english and two french ships. technical order was destroyed. the "brilliant," having dropped far astern of her position, came under the fire of two of the english rear, the "worcester" and the "eagle," who had kept off in time and so neared the french. suffren in person came to her assistance (position iii., a) and drove off the english, who were also threatened by the approach of two other french ships that had worn to the westward in obedience to signal. while this partial action was taking place, the other endangered french ship, the "sévère" (b), was engaged by the english "sultan" (s), and, if the french captain m. de cillart can be believed, by two other english ships. it is probable, from her place in the line, that the "burford" also assailed her. however this may be, the "sévère" hauled down her flag; but while the "sultan" was wearing away from her, she resumed her fire, raking the english ship. the order to surrender, given by the french captain and carried into execution by the formal well-established token of submission, was disregarded by his subordinates, who fired upon their enemy while the flag was down. in effect, the action of the french ship amounted to using an infamous _ruse de guerre_; but it would be unjust to say that this was intended. the positions of the different vessels were such that the "sultan" could not have secured her prize; other french ships were approaching and must have retaken it. the indignation of the french juniors at the weakness of their captain was therefore justified; their refusal to be bound by it may be excused to men face to face with an unexpected question of propriety, in the heat of battle and under the sting of shame. nevertheless, scrupulous good faith would seem to demand that their deliverance should be awaited from other hands, not bound by the action of their commander; or at least that the forbearing assailant should not have suffered from them. the captain, suspended and sent home by suffren, and cashiered by the king, utterly condemned himself by his attempted defence: "when captain de cillart saw the french squadron drawing off,--for all the ships except the 'brilliant' had fallen off on the other tack,--he thought it useless to prolong his defence, and had the flag hauled down. _the ships engaged with him immediately ceased their fire_, and the one on the starboard side moved away. at this moment the 'sévère' fell off to starboard and her sails filled; captain de cillart then ordered the fire to be resumed by his lower-deck guns, the only ones still manned, and he rejoined his squadron."[ ] this action was the only one of the five fought by suffren on the coast of india, in which the english admiral was the assailant. there can be found in it no indication of military conceptions, of tactical combinations; but on the other hand hughes is continually showing the aptitudes, habits of thought, and foresight of the skilful seaman, as well as a courage beyond all proof. he was in truth an admirable representative of the average english naval officer of the middle of the eighteenth century; and while it is impossible not to condemn the general ignorance of the most important part of the profession, it is yet useful to remark how far thorough mastery of its other details, and dogged determination not to yield, made up for so signal a defect. as the roman legions often redeemed the blunders of their generals, so did english captains and seamen often save that which had been lost by the errors of their admirals,--errors which neither captain nor seamen recognized, nor would probably have admitted. nowhere were these solid qualities so clearly shown as in suffren's battles, because nowhere else were such demands made upon them. no more magnificent instances of desperate yet useful resistance to overwhelming odds are to be found in naval annals, than that of the "monmouth" on april , and of the "exeter" on february . an incident told of the latter ship is worth quoting. "at the heel of the action, when the 'exeter' was already in the state of a wreck, the master came to commodore king to ask him what he should do with the ship, as two of the enemy were again bearing down upon her. he laconically answered, 'there is nothing to be done but to fight her till she sinks.'"[ ] she was saved. suffren, on the contrary, was by this time incensed beyond endurance by the misbehavior of his captains. cillart was sent home; but besides him two others, both of them men of influential connections, and one a relative of suffren himself, were dispossessed of their commands. however necessary and proper this step, few but suffren would have had the resolution to take it; for, so far as he then knew, he was only a captain in rank, and it was not permitted even to admirals to deal thus with their juniors. "you may perhaps be angry, monseigneur," he wrote, "that i have not used rigor sooner; but i beg you to remember that the regulations do not give this power even to a general officer, which i am not." it is immediately after the action of the th of july that suffren's superior energy and military capacity begin markedly to influence the issue between himself and hughes. the tussle had been severe; but military qualities began to tell, as they surely must. the losses of the two squadrons in men, in the last action, had been as one to three in favor of the english; on the other hand, the latter had apparently suffered more in sails and spars,--in motive power. both fleets anchored in the evening, the english off negapatam, the french to leeward, off cuddalore. on the th of july suffren was again ready for sea; whereas on the same day hughes had but just decided to go to madras to finish his repairs. suffren was further delayed by the political necessity of an official visit to hyder ali, after which he sailed to batacalo, arriving there on the th of august, to await reinforcements and supplies from france. on the st, these joined him; and two days later he sailed, now with fourteen ships-of-the-line, for trincomalee, anchoring off the town on the th. the following night the troops were landed, batteries thrown up, and the attack pressed with vigor. on the th and st the two forts which made the defensive strength of the place surrendered, and this all-important port passed into the hands of the french. convinced that hughes would soon appear, suffren granted readily all the honors of war demanded by the governor of the place, contenting himself with the substantial gain. two days later, on the evening of september d, the english fleet was sighted by the french lookout frigates. during the six weeks in which suffren had been so actively and profitably employed, the english admiral had remained quietly at anchor, repairing and refitting. no precise information is available for deciding how far this delay was unavoidable; but having in view the well-known aptitude of english seamen of that age, it can scarcely be doubted that, had hughes possessed the untiring energy of his great rival, he could have gained the few days which decided the fate of trincomalee, and fought a battle to save the place. in fact, this conclusion is supported by his own reports, which state that on the th of august the ships were nearly fitted; and yet, though apprehending an attack on trincomalee, he did not sail until the th. the loss of this harbor forced him to abandon the east coast, which was made unsafe by the approach of the northeast monsoon, and conferred an important strategic advantage upon suffren, not to speak of the political effect upon the native rulers in india. to appreciate thoroughly this contrast between the two admirals, it is necessary also to note how differently they were situated with regard to material for repairs. after the action of the th, hughes found at madras spars, cordage, stores, provisions, and material. suffren at cuddalore found nothing. to put his squadron in good fighting condition, nineteen new topmasts were needed, besides lower masts, yards, rigging, sails, and so on. to take the sea at all, the masts were removed from the frigates and smaller vessels, and given to the ships-of-the-line while english prizes were stripped to equip the frigates. ships were sent off to the straits of malacca to procure other spars and timber. houses were torn down on shore to find lumber for repairing the hulls. the difficulties were increased by the character of the anchorage, an open roadstead with frequent heavy sea, and by the near presence of the english fleet; but the work was driven on under the eyes of the commander-in-chief, who, like lord howe at new york, inspired the working parties by his constant appearance among them. "notwithstanding his prodigious obesity, suffren displayed the fiery ardor of youth; he was everywhere where work was going on. under his powerful impulse, the most difficult tasks were done with incredible rapidity. nevertheless, his officers represented to him the bad state of the fleet, and the need of a port for the ships-of-the-line. 'until we have taken trincomalee,' he replied, 'the open roadsteads of the coromandel coast will answer.'"[ ] it was indeed to this activity on the coromandel coast that the success at trincomalee was due. the weapons with which suffren fought are obsolete; but the results wrought by his tenacity and fertility in resources are among the undying lessons of history. while the characters of the two chiefs were thus telling upon the strife in india, other no less lasting lessons were being afforded by the respective governments at home, who did much to restore the balance between them. while the english ministry, after the news of the battle of porto praya, fitted out in november, , a large and compact expedition, convoyed by a powerful squadron of six ships-of-the-line, under the command of an active officer, to reinforce hughes, the french despatched comparatively scanty succors in small detached bodies, relying apparently upon secrecy rather than upon force to assure their safety. thus suffren, while struggling with his innumerable embarrassments, had the mortification of learning that now one and now another of the small detachments sent to his relief were captured, or driven back to france, before they were clear of european waters. there was in truth little safety for small divisions north of the straits of gibraltar. thus the advantages gained by his activity were in the end sacrificed. up to the fall of trincomalee the french were superior at sea; but in the six months which followed, the balance turned the other way, by the arrival of the english reinforcements under sir richard bickerton. with his usual promptness the french commodore had prepared for further immediate action as soon as trincomalee surrendered. the cannon and men landed from the ships were at once re-embarked, and the port secured by a garrison strong enough to relieve him of any anxiety about holding it. this great seaman, who had done as much in proportion to the means intrusted to him as any known to history, and had so signally illustrated the sphere and influence of naval power, had no intention of fettering the movements of his fleet, or risking his important conquest, by needlessly taking upon the shoulders of the ships the burden of defending a seaport. when hughes appeared, it was past the power of the english fleet by a single battle to reduce the now properly garrisoned post. doubtless a successful campaign, by destroying or driving away the french sea power, would achieve this result; but suffren might well believe that, whatever mishaps might arise on a single day, he could in the long run more than hold his own with his opponent. seaports should defend themselves; the sphere of the fleet is on the open sea, its object offence rather than defence, its objective the enemy's shipping wherever it can be found. suffren now saw again before him the squadron on which depended the english control of the sea; he knew that powerful reinforcements to it must arrive before the next season, and he hastened to attack. hughes, mortified by his failure to arrive in time,--for a drawn battle beforehand would have saved what a successful battle afterward could not regain,--was in no humor to balk him. still, with sound judgment, he retreated to the southeast, flying in good order, to use suffren's expression; regulating speed by the slowest ships, and steering many different courses, so that the chase which began at daybreak overtook the enemy only at two in the afternoon. the object of the english was to draw suffren so far to leeward of the port that, if his ships were disabled, he could not easily regain it. the french numbered fourteen ships-of-the-line to twelve english. this superiority, together with his sound appreciation of the military situation in india, increased suffren's natural eagerness for action; but his ships sailed badly, and were poorly handled by indifferent and dissatisfied men. these circumstances, during the long and vexatious pursuit, chafed and fretted the hot temper of the commodore, which still felt the spur of urgency that for two months had quickened the operations of the squadron. signal followed signal, manoeuvre succeeded manoeuvre, to bring his disordered vessels into position. "sometimes they edged down, sometimes they brought to," says the english admiral, who was carefully watching their approach, "in no regular order, as if undetermined what to do." still, suffren continued on, and at two p.m., having been carried twenty-five miles away from his port, his line being then partly formed and within striking distance of the enemy, the signal was made to come to the wind to correct the order before finally bearing down. a number of blunders in executing this made matters worse rather than better; and the commodore, at last losing patience, made signal thirty minutes later to attack (plate xvii., a), following it with another for close action at pistol range. this being slowly and clumsily obeyed, he ordered a gun fired, as is customary at sea to emphasize a signal; unluckily this was understood by his own crew to be the opening of the action, and the flag-ship discharged all her battery. this example was followed by the other ships, though yet at the distance of half cannon-shot, which, under the gunnery conditions of that day, meant indecisive action. thus at the end and as the result of a mortifying series of blunders and bad seamanship, the battle began greatly to the disadvantage of the french, despite their superior numbers. the english, who had been retreating under short and handy sail, were in good order and quietly ready; whereas their enemies were in no order (b). seven ships had forereached in rounding to,[ ] and now formed an irregular group ahead of the english van, as well as far from it, where they were of little service; while in the centre a second confused group was formed, the ships overlapping and masking each other's fire. under the circumstances the entire brunt of the action fell upon suffren's flag-ship (a) and two others which supported him; while at the extreme rear a small ship-of-the-line, backed by a large frigate, alone engaged the english rear; but these, being wholly overmatched, were soon forced to retire. [illustration: pl. xvii. suffren and hughes sept. , .] a military operation could scarcely be worse carried out. the french ships in the battle did not support each other; they were so grouped as to hamper their own fire and needlessly increase the target offered to the enemy; so far from concentrating their own effort, three ships were left, almost unsupported, to a concentrated fire from the english line.[ ] "time passed on, and our three ships [b, a], engaged on the beam by the centre of the english fleet and raked [enfiladed] by van and rear, suffered greatly. after two hours the 'héros'' sails were in rags, all her running rigging cut, and she could no longer steer. the 'illustre' had lost her mizzen-mast and maintopmast." in this disorder such gaps existed as to offer a great opportunity to a more active opponent. "had the enemy tacked now," wrote the chief-of-staff in his journal, "we would have been cut off and probably destroyed." the faults of an action in which every proper distribution was wanting are summed up in the results. the french had fourteen ships engaged. they lost eighty-two killed and two hundred and fifty-five wounded. of this total, sixty-four killed and one hundred and seventy-eight wounded, or three fourths, fell to three ships. two of these three lost their main and mizzen masts and foretopmast; in other words, were helpless. this was a repetition on a larger scale of the disaster to two of hughes's ships on the th of april; but on that day the english admiral, being to leeward and in smaller force had to accept action on the adversary's terms, while here the loss fell on the assailant, who, to the advantage of the wind and choice of his mode of attack, added superiority in numbers. full credit must in this action be allowed to hughes, who, though lacking in enterprise and giving no token of tactical skill or _coup d'oeil_, showed both judgment and good management in the direction of his retreat and in keeping his ships so well in hand. it is not easy to apportion the blame which rests upon his enemies. suffren laid it freely upon his captains.[ ] it has been rightly pointed out, however, that many of the officers thus condemned in mass had conducted themselves well before, both under suffren and other admirals; that the order of pursuit was irregular, and suffren's signals followed each other with confusing rapidity; and finally that chance, for which something must always be allowed, was against the french, as was also the inexperience of several captains. it is pretty certain that some of the mishap must be laid to the fiery and inconsiderate haste of suffren, who had the defects of his great qualities, upon which his coy and wary antagonist unwittingly played. it is noteworthy that no complaints of his captains are to be found in hughes's reports. six fell in action, and of each he speaks in terms of simple but evidently sincere appreciation, while on the survivors he often bestows particular as well as general commendation. the marked contrast between the two leaders, and between the individual ship-commanders, on either side, makes this singularly instructive among naval campaigns; and the ultimate lesson taught is in entire accordance with the experience of all military history from the beginning. suffren had genius, energy, great tenacity, sound military ideas, and was also an accomplished seaman. hughes had apparently all the technical acquirements of the latter profession, would probably have commanded a ship equally well with any of his captains, but shows no trace of the qualities needed by a general officer. on the other hand, without insisting again upon the skill and fidelity of the english subordinates, it is evident that, to whatever it be attributed, the french single ships were as a rule incomparably worse-handled than those of their opponents. four times, suffren claims, certainly thrice, the english squadron was saved from overwhelming disaster by the difference in quality of the under officers. good troops have often made amends for bad generalship; but in the end the better leader will prevail. this was conspicuously the case in the indian seas in and . war cut short the strife, but not before the issue was clearly indicated. the action of september , like that of july , was brought to a close by a shift of wind to the southeast. when it came, the english line wore, and formed again on the other tack. the french also wore; and their van ships, being now to windward, stood down between their crippled ships and the enemy's line (c). toward sundown hughes hauled off to the northward, abandoning the hope of regaining trincomalee, but with the satisfaction of having inflicted this severe retaliation upon his successful opponent. that firmness of mind which was not the least of suffren's qualities was severely tried soon after the action off trincomalee. in returning to port, a seventy-four, the "orient," was run ashore and lost by mismanagement, the only consolation being that her spars were saved for the two dismasted ships. other crippled masts were replaced as before by robbing the frigates, whose crews also were needed to replace the losses in battle. repairs were pushed on with the usual energy, the defence of the port was fully provided for, and on the th of september the squadron sailed for the coromandel coast, where the state of french interests urgently called for it. cuddalore was reached in four days; and here another incapable officer wrecked the "bizarre," of sixty-four guns, in picking up his anchorage. in consequence of the loss of these two ships, suffren, when he next met the enemy, could oppose only fifteen to eighteen ships-of-the-line; so much do general results depend upon individual ability and care. hughes was at madras, ninety miles north, whither he had gone at once after the late action. he reports his ships badly damaged; but the loss was so evenly distributed among them that it is difficult to justify his failure to follow up the injuries done to the french. at this season the monsoon wind, which has come for four or five months from southwest, changes to northeast, blowing upon the east coast of the peninsula, where are no good harbors. the consequent swell made the shore often unapproachable, and so forbade support from fleet to army. the change of the monsoon is also frequently marked by violent hurricanes. the two commanders, therefore, had to quit a region where their stay might be dangerous as well as useless. had trincomalee not been lost, hughes, in the condition of his squadron, might have awaited there the reinforcements and supplies expected soon from england; for although the port is not healthy, it is secure and well situated. bickerton had already reached bombay, and was on his way now to madras with five ships-of-the-line. as things were, hughes thought necessary to go to bombay for the season, sailing or rather being driven to sea by a hurricane, on the th of october. four days later bickerton reached madras, not having fallen in with the admiral. with an activity which characterized him he sailed at once, and was again in bombay on the th of november. hughes's ships, scattered and crippled by tempest, dropped in one by one, a few days later. suffren held trincomalee, yet his decision was not easy. the port was safe, he had not to fear an attack by the english fleet; and on the other hand, besides being sickly during the approaching monsoon, it was doubtful whether the provisions needed for the health of the crews could be had there. in short, though of strategic value from its strength and position, the port was deficient in resources. opposed to trincomalee there was an alternative in achem, a harbor on the other side of the bay of bengal, at the west end of the island of sumatra. this was healthy, could supply provisions, and, from its position with reference to the northeast monsoon, would permit ships to regain the coromandel coast sooner than those in bombay, when the milder ending of the season made landing more practicable. these simple considerations were not, however, the only elements in the really difficult problem before suffren. the small results that followed this campaign must not hide the fact that great issues were possible, and that much might depend upon his decision. owing to the french policy of sending out reinforcements in several small bodies, not only was there much loss, but great uncertainty prevailed among the scattered commands as to conditions elsewhere. this uncertainty, loss, and delay profoundly affected the political situation in india. when suffren first reached the coast, the english had on their hands not only hyder ali, but the mahrattas as well. peace with the latter was signed on the th of may, ; but, owing probably to an opposition party among them, the ratifications were not exchanged until december. both there and in the court of hyder ali there was division of interest; and representations were made from both to the french, who, though suspicious, could obtain no certain information of the treaty, that everything depended upon the relative military strength of themselves and the english. the presence and the actions of suffren were all that france had to show,--the prestige of his genius, the capture of trincomalee, his success in battle. the french army, cooped up in cuddalore, was dependent upon the sultan for money, for food, and for reinforcements; even the fleet called on him for money, for masts, for ammunition, for grain. the english, on the other hand, maintained their ground; though on the whole worsted, they lost no ships; and bickerton's powerful squadron was known to have reached bombay. above all, while the french asked for money, the english lavished it. it was impossible for the french to make head against their enemy without native allies; it was essential to keep hyder from also making peace. here the inadequate support and faulty dispositions of the home government made themselves felt. the command in india, both by land and sea, was intrusted to general de bussy, once the brilliant fellow-worker with dupleix, now a gouty invalid of sixty-four. with a view to secrecy, bussy sailed from cadiz in november, , with two ships-of-the-line, for teneriffe, where he was to be joined by a convoy leaving brest in december. this convoy was captured by the english, only two of the vessels escaping to bussy. the latter pursued his journey, and learning at the cape of good hope that bickerton's strong force was on the way, felt compelled to land there a great part of his troops. he reached the isle of france on the st of may. the next convoy of eighteen transports, sailing in april for india, was also intercepted. two of the four ships-of-war were taken, as also ten of the transports; the remainder returned to brest. a third detachment was more fortunate, reaching the cape in may; but it was delayed there two months by the wretched condition of the ships and crews. these disappointments decided bussy to remain at the island until joined by the expected ships from the cape, and suffren at this critical moment did not know what the state of things there was. the general had only written him that, as he could not reach the coast before the bad season, he should rendezvous at achem. these uncertainties made a painful impression upon hyder ali, who had been led to expect bussy in september, and had instead received news of bickerton's arrival and the defection of his old allies, the mahrattas. suffren was forced to pretend a confidence which he did not feel, but which, with the influence of his own character and achievements, determined the sultan to continue the war. this settled, the squadron sailed for achem on the th of october, anchoring there the d of november. three weeks afterward a vessel arrived from bussy, with word that his departure was indefinitely delayed by an epidemic raging among the troops. suffren therefore determined to hasten his own return to the coast, and sailed on the th of december. january , , he anchored off ganjam, five hundred miles northeast of cuddalore, whence he would have a fair wind to proceed when he wished. it was his purpose to attack not only the coasting vessels but the english factories on shore as well, the surf being now often moderate; but learning on the th, from an english prize, the important and discouraging news of hyder ali's death, he gave up all minor operations, and sailed at once for cuddalore, hoping to secure by his presence the continuance of the alliance as well as the safety of the garrison. he reached the place on the th of february. during his four months absence the failure of bussy to appear with his troops, and the arrival of bickerton, who had shown himself on both coasts, had seriously injured the french cause. the treaty of peace between the english and the mahrattas had been ratified; and the former, released from this war and reinforced, had attacked the sultan on the west, or malabar, coast. the effect of this diversion was of course felt on the east coast, despite the efforts of the french to keep the new sultan there. the sickness among the troops at the isle of france had, however, ceased early in november; and had bussy then started without delay, he and suffren would now have met in the carnatic, with full command of the sea and large odds in their favor ashore. hughes did not arrive till two months later. being thus alone, suffren, after communicating with tippoo-saib, the new sultan of mysore, went to trincomalee; and there he was at last joined, on the th of march, by bussy, accompanied by three ships-of-the-line and numerous transports. eager to bring the troops into the field, suffren sailed on the th with his fastest ships, and landed them the next day at porto novo. he returned to trincomalee on the th of april, and fell in with hughes's fleet of seventeen ships-of-the-line off the harbor's mouth. having only part of his force with him, no fight ensued, and the english went on to madras. the southwest monsoon was now blowing. it is not necessary to follow the trivial operations of the next two months. tippoo being engaged on the other side of the peninsula and bussy displaying little vigor, while hughes was in superior force off the coast, the affairs of the french on shore went from bad to worse. suffren, having but fifteen ships to eighteen english, was unwilling to go to leeward of trincomalee, lest it should fall before he could return to it. under these conditions the english troops advanced from madras, passing near but around cuddalore, and encamped to the southward of it, by the sea. the supply-ships and light cruisers were stationed off the shore near the army; while admiral hughes, with the heavy ships, anchored some twenty miles south, where, being to windward, he covered the others. in order to assure to suffren the full credit of his subsequent course, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that bussy, though commander-in-chief both by land and sea, did not venture to order him to leave trincomalee and come to his support. allowing him to feel the extremity of the danger, he told him not to leave port unless he heard that the army was shut up in cuddalore, and blockaded by the english squadron. this letter was received on the th of june. suffren waited for no more. the next day he sailed, and forty-eight hours later his frigates saw the english fleet. the same day, the th, after a sharp action, the french army was shut up in the town, behind very weak walls. everything now depended on the action of the fleets. upon suffren's appearance, hughes moved away and anchored four or five miles from the town. baffling winds prevailed for three days; but the monsoon resuming on the th, suffren approached. the english admiral not liking to accept action at anchor, and to leeward, in which he was right, got under way; but attaching more importance to the weather-gage than to preventing a junction between the enemy's land and sea forces, he stood out into the offing with a southerly, or south-southeast wind, notwithstanding his superior numbers. suffren formed on the same tack, and some manoeuvring ensued during that night and the next day. at eight p.m. of the th the french squadron, which had refused to be drawn to sea, anchored off cuddalore and communicated with the commander-in-chief. twelve hundred of the garrison were hastily embarked to fill the numerous vacancies at the guns of the fleet. until the th the wind, holding unexpectedly at west, denied hughes the advantage which he sought; and finally on that day he decided to accept action and await the attack. it was made by suffren with fifteen ships to eighteen, the fire opening at quarter-past four p.m. and lasting until half-past six. the loss on both sides was nearly equal; but the english ships, abandoning both the field of battle and their army, returned to madras. suffren anchored before cuddalore. the embarrassment of the british army was now very great. the supply-ships on which it had depended fled before the action of the th, and the result of course made it impossible for them to return. the sultan's light cavalry harassed their communications by land. on the th, the general commanding wrote that his "mind was on the rack without a moment's rest since the departure of the fleet, considering the character of m. de suffren, and the infinite superiority on the part of the french now that we are left to ourselves." from this anxiety he was relieved by the news of the conclusion of peace, which reached cuddalore on the th by flag-of-truce from madras. if any doubt had remained as to the relative merits of the two sea-commanders, the last few days of their campaign would have removed them. hughes alleges the number of his sick and shortness of water as his reasons for abandoning the contest. suffren's difficulties, however, were as great as his own;[ ] and if he had an advantage at trincomalee, that only shifts the dispute a step back, for he owed its possession to superior generalship and activity. the simple facts that with fifteen ships he forced eighteen to abandon a blockade, relieved the invested army, strengthened his own crews, and fought a decisive action, make an impression which does not need to be diminished in the interests of truth.[ ] it is probable that hughes's self-reliance had been badly shaken by his various meetings with suffren. although the tidings of peace sent by hughes to bussy rested only upon unofficial letters, they were too positive to justify a continuance of bloodshed. an arrangement was entered into by the authorities of the two nations in india, and hostilities ceased on the th of july. two months later, at pondicherry, the official despatches reached suffren. his own words upon them are worth quoting, for they show the depressing convictions under which he had acted so noble a part: "god be praised for the peace! for it was clear that in india, though we had the means to impose the law, all would have been lost. i await your orders with impatience, and heartily pray they may permit me to leave. war alone can make bearable the weariness of certain things." on the th of october, , suffren finally sailed from trincomalee for france, stopping at the isle of france and the cape of good hope. the homeward voyage was a continued and spontaneous ovation. in each port visited the most flattering attentions were paid by men of every degree and of every nation. what especially gratified him was the homage of the english captains. it might well be so; none had so clearly established a right to his esteem as a warrior. on no occasion when hughes and suffren met, save the last, did the english number over twelve ships; but six english captains had laid down their lives, obstinately opposing his efforts. while he was at the cape, a division of nine of hughes's ships, returning from the war, anchored in the harbor. their captains called eagerly upon the admiral, the stout commodore king of the "exeter" at their head. "the good dutchmen have received me as their savior," wrote suffren; "but among the tributes which have most flattered me, none has given me more pleasure than the esteem and consideration testified by the english who are here." on reaching home, rewards were heaped upon him. having left france as a captain, he came back a rear-admiral; and immediately after his return the king created a fourth vice-admiralship, a special post to be filled by suffren, and to lapse at his death. these honors were won by himself alone; they were the tribute paid to his unyielding energy and genius, shown not only in actual fight but in the steadfastness which held to his station through every discouragement, and rose equal to every demand made by recurring want and misfortune. alike in the general conduct of his operations and on the battlefield under the fire of the enemy, this lofty resolve was the distinguishing merit of suffren; and when there is coupled with it the clear and absolute conviction which he held of the necessity to seek and crush the enemy's fleet, we have probably the leading traits of his military character. the latter was the light that led him, the former the spirit that sustained him. as a tactician, in the sense of a driller of ships, imparting to them uniformity of action and manoeuvring, he seems to have been deficient, and would probably himself have admitted, with some contempt, the justice of the criticism made upon him in these respects. whether or no he ever actually characterized tactics--meaning thereby elementary or evolutionary tactics--as the veil of timidity, there was that in his actions which makes the _mot_ probable. such a contempt, however, is unsafe even in the case of genius. the faculty of moving together with uniformity and precision is too necessary to the development of the full power of a body of ships to be lightly esteemed; it is essential to that concentration of effort at which suffren rightly aimed, but which he was not always careful to secure by previous dispositions. paradoxical though it sounds, it is true that only fleets which are able to perform regular movements can afford at times to cast them aside; only captains whom the habit of the drill-ground has familiarized with the shifting phases it presents, can be expected to seize readily the opportunities for independent action presented by the field of battle. howe and jervis must make ready the way for the successes of nelson. suffren expected too much of his captains. he had the right to expect more than he got, but not that ready perception of the situation and that firmness of nerve which, except to a few favorites of nature, are the result only of practice and experience. still, he was a very great man. when every deduction has been made, there must still remain his heroic constancy, his fearlessness of responsibility as of danger, the rapidity of his action, and the genius whose unerring intuition led him to break through the traditions of his service and assert for the navy that principal part which befits it, that offensive action which secures the control of the sea by the destruction of the enemy's fleet. had he met in his lieutenants such ready instruments as nelson found prepared for him, there can be little doubt that hughes's squadron would have been destroyed while inferior to suffren's, before reinforcements could have arrived; and with the english fleet it could scarcely have failed that the coromandel coast also would have fallen. what effect this would have had upon the fate of the peninsula, or upon the terms of the peace, can only be surmised. his own hope was that, by acquiring the superiority in india, a glorious peace might result. no further opportunities of distinction in war were given to suffren. the remaining years of his life were spent in honored positions ashore. in , upon an appearance of trouble with england, he was appointed to the command of a great fleet arming at brest; but before he could leave paris he died suddenly on the th of december, in the sixtieth year of his age. there seems to have been no suspicion at the time of other than natural causes of death, he being exceedingly stout and of apoplectic temperament; but many years after a story, apparently well-founded, became current that he was killed in a duel arising out of his official action in india. his old antagonist on the battlefield, sir edward hughes, died at a great age in . footnotes: [ ] this commodore johnstone, more commonly known as governor johnstone, was one of the three commissioners sent by lord north in to promote a reconciliation with america. owing to certain suspicious proceedings on his part, congress declared it was incompatible with their honor to hold any manner of correspondence or intercourse with him. his title of governor arose from his being at one time governor of pensacola. he had a most unenviable reputation in the english navy. (see charnock's biog. navalis.) [ ] this plate is taken almost wholly from cunat's "vie de suffren." [ ] page . [ ] la serre: essais hist. et critiques sur la marine française. [ ] the question of attacking the english squadron at its anchors was debated in a council of war. its opinion confirmed suffren's decision not to do so. in contrasting this with the failure of the english to attack the french detachment in newport (p. ), it must be borne in mind that in the latter case there was no means of forcing the ships to leave their strong position; whereas by threatening trincomalee, or other less important points, suffren could rely upon drawing hughes out. he was therefore right in not attacking, while the english before newport were probably wrong. [ ] the dependence of trincomalee upon the english fleet in this campaign affords an excellent illustration of the embarrassment and false position in which a navy finds itself when the defence of its seaports rests upon it. this bears upon a much debated point of the present day, and is worthy the study of those who maintain, too unqualifiedly, that the best coast defence is a navy. in one sense this is doubtless true,--to attack the enemy abroad is the best of defences; but in the narrow sense of the word "defence" it is not true. trincomalee unfortified was simply a centre round which hughes had to revolve like a tethered animal; and the same will always happen under like conditions. [ ] plate xiv., fig. d, shows the order of battle suffren intended in this action. the five rear ships of the enemy would each have two opponents close aboard. the leading french ship on the weather side was to be kept farther off, so that while attacking the sixth englishman she could "contain" the van ships if they attempted to reinforce the rear by tacking. [ ] troude: batailles navales. [ ] between four and five hundred yards. [ ] the english and french flag-ships are denoted in the plan by their exceptional size. [ ] the "victory," nelson's ship at trafalgar, a -gun ship, lost killed and wounded; hughes's ship, a , lost killed and wounded. collingwood's ship, the "royal sovereign," also of guns, lost killed and wounded; the "monmouth," a , in hughes's action lost killed and wounded. [ ] troude: batailles navales; chevalier: hist. de la marine française. [ ] this remark seems too self-evident to need emphasis; yet it may be questioned whether naval men generally carry it in their stock of axioms. [ ] as always. [ ] that is turned their side to the enemy instead of approaching him. [ ] chevalier. [ ] annual register, . [ ] the british account differs materially as to the cause of the distance separating the two rears. "in this action it did not fall to the 'monmouth's' lot to sustain a very considerable share, the enemy's rear being so far to leeward that the ships of the british rear could not, even whilst the wind was favorable, close with them without considerably breaking the order of their own line" (memoir of captain alms, naval chronicle, vol. ii). such contradictions are common, and, except for a particular purpose, need not to be reconciled. alms seems to have been not only a first-rate seaman, but an officer capable of resolute and independent action; his account is probably correct. [ ] troude: batailles navales. it was seen from suffren's ship that the "sévère's" flag was down; but it was supposed that the ensign halliards had been shot away. the next day hughes sent the captain of the "sultan" to demand the delivery to him of the ship which had struck. the demand, of course, could not be complied with. "the 'sultan,'" troude says, "which had hove-to to take possession of the 'sévère,' was the victim of this action; she received during some time, without replying, the whole fire of the french ship." [ ] annual register, . [ ] cunat: vie de suffren. [ ] the curves in (b) represent the movements of the ships _after_ the shift of wind, which practically ended the battle. the ships themselves show the order in fighting. [ ] the enemy formed a semicircle around us and raked us ahead and astern, as the ship came up and fell off, with the helm to leeward.--_journal de bord du bailli de suffren._ [ ] see page . he added: "it is frightful to have had four times in our power to destroy the english squadron, and that it still exists." [ ] there was not a single ship of suffren's which had more than three-fourths of her regular complement of men. it must be added that soldiers and sepoys made up half of these reduced crews.--_chevalier_, p. . [ ] you will have learned my promotion to commodore and rear-admiral. now, i tell you in the sincerity of my heart and for your own ear alone, that what i have done since then is worth infinitely more than what i had done before. you know the capture and battle of trincomalee; but the end of the campaign, and that which took place between the month of march and the end of june, is far above anything that has been done in the navy since i entered it. the result has been very advantageous to the state, for the squadron was endangered and the army lost.--_private letter of suffren, sept. , ; quoted in the "journal de bord du bailli de suffren."_ chapter xiii. events in the west indies after the surrender of yorktown--encounters of de grasse with hood.--the sea battle of the saints.-- , . the surrender of cornwallis marked the end of the active war upon the american continent. the issue of the struggle was indeed assured upon the day when france devoted her sea power to the support of the colonists; but, as not uncommonly happens, the determining characteristics of a period were summed up in one striking event. from the beginning, the military question, owing to the physical characteristics of the country, a long seaboard with estuaries penetrating deep into the interior, and the consequent greater ease of movement by water than by land, had hinged upon the control of the sea and the use made of that control. its misdirection by sir william howe in , when he moved his army to the chesapeake instead of supporting burgoyne's advance, opened the way to the startling success at saratoga, when amazed europe saw six thousand regular troops surrendering to a body of provincials. during the four years that followed, until the surrender of yorktown, the scales rose and fell according as the one navy or the other appeared on the scene, or as english commanders kept touch with the sea or pushed their operations far from its support. finally, at the great crisis, all is found depending upon the question whether the french or the english fleet should first appear, and upon their relative force. the maritime struggle was at once transferred to the west indies. the events which followed there were antecedent in time both to suffren's battles and to the final relief of gibraltar; but they stand so much by themselves as to call for separate treatment, and have such close relation to the conclusion of the war and the conditions of peace, as to form the dramatic finale of the one and the stepping-stone of transition to the other. it is fitting indeed that a brilliant though indecisive naval victory should close the story of an essentially naval war. the capitulation of yorktown was completed on the th of october, , and on the th of november, de grasse, resisting the suggestions of lafayette and washington that the fleet should aid in carrying the war farther south, sailed from the chesapeake. he reached martinique on the th, the day after the marquis de bouillé, commanding the french troops in the west indies, had regained by a bold surprise the dutch island of st. eustatius. the two commanders now concerted a joint expedition against barbadoes, which was frustrated by the violence of the trade winds. foiled here, the french proceeded against the island of st. christopher, or st. kitt's (plate xviii.). on the th of january, , the fleet, carrying six thousand troops, anchored on the west coast off basse terre, the chief town. no opposition was met, the small garrison of six hundred men retiring to a fortified post ten miles to the northwest, on brimstone hill, a solitary precipitous height overlooking the lee shore of the island. the french troops landed and pursued, but the position being found too strong for assault, siege operations were begun. the french fleet remained at anchor in basse terre road. meanwhile, news of the attack was carried to sir samuel hood, who had followed de grasse from the continent, and, in the continued absence of rodney, was naval commander-in-chief on the station. he sailed from barbadoes on the th, anchored at antigua on the st, and there embarked all the troops that could be spared,--about seven hundred men. on the afternoon of the d the fleet started for st. kitt's, carrying such sail as would bring it within striking distance of the enemy at daylight next morning. the english having but twenty-two ships to the french twenty-nine, and the latter being generally superior in force, class for class, it is necessary to mark closely the lay of the land in order to understand hood's original plans and their subsequent modifications; for, resultless as his attempt proved, his conduct during the next three weeks forms the most brilliant military effort of the whole war. the islands of st. kitt's and nevis (plates xviii. and xix.) being separated only by a narrow channel, impracticable for ships-of-the-line, are in effect one, and their common axis lying northwest and southeast, it is necessary for sailing-ships, with the trade wind, to round the southern extremity of nevis, from which position the wind is fair to reach all anchorages on the lee side of the islands. basse terre is about twelve miles distant from the western point of nevis (fort charles), and its roadstead lies east and west. the french fleet were anchored there in disorder (plate xviii., a), three or four deep, not expecting attack, and the ships at the west end of the road could not reach those at the east without beating to windward,--a tedious, and under fire a perilous process. a further most important point to note is that all the eastern ships were so placed that vessels approaching from the southward could reach them with the usual wind. hood, therefore, we are told, intended to appear at early daylight, in order of and ready for battle, and fall upon the eastern ships, filing by them with his whole fleet (a, a'), thus concentrating the fire of all upon a few of the enemy; then turning away, so as to escape the guns of the others, he proposed, first wearing and then tacking, to keep his fleet circling in long procession (a', a'') past that part of the enemy's ships chosen for attack. the plan was audacious, but undeniably sound in principle; some good could hardly fail to follow, and unless de grasse showed more readiness than he had hitherto done, even decisive results might be hoped for.[ ] [illustration: pl. xviii. hood & de grasse. jan. & , .] the best-laid plans, however, may fail, and hood's was balked by the awkwardness of a lieutenant of the watch, who hove-to (stopped) a frigate at night ahead of the fleet, and was consequently run down by a ship-of-the-line. the latter also received such injury as delayed the movement, several hours being lost in repairing damages. the french were thus warned of the enemy's approach, and although not suspecting his intention to attack, de grasse feared that hood would pass down to leeward of him and disturb the siege of brimstone hill,--an undertaking so rash for an inferior force that it is as difficult to conceive how he could have supposed it, as to account for his overlooking the weakness of his own position at anchor. at one p.m. of the th the english fleet was seen rounding the south end of nevis; at three de grasse got under way and stood to the southward. toward sundown hood also went about and stood south, as though retreating; but he was well to windward of his opponent, and maintained this advantage through the night. at daybreak both fleets were to leeward of nevis,--the english near the island, the french about nine miles distant (plate xix.). some time was spent in manoeuvring, with the object on hood's part of getting the french admiral yet more to leeward; for, having failed in his first attempt, he had formed the yet bolder intention of seizing the anchorage his unskilful opponent had left, and establishing himself there in an impregnable manner. in this he succeeded, as will be shown; but to understand the justification for a movement confessedly hazardous, it must be pointed out that he thus would place himself between the besiegers of brimstone hill and their fleet; or if the latter anchored near the hill, the english fleet would be between it and its base in martinique, ready to intercept supplies or detachments approaching from the southward. in short, the position in which hood hoped to establish himself was on the flank of the enemy's communications, a position the more advantageous because the island alone could not long support the large body of troops so suddenly thrown upon it. moreover, both fleets were expecting reinforcements; rodney was on his way and might arrive first, which he did, and in time to save st. kitt's, which he did not. it was also but four months since yorktown; the affairs of england were going badly; something must be done, something left to chance, and hood knew himself and his officers. it may be added that he knew his opponent. at noon, when the hillsides of nevis were covered with expectant and interested sightseers, the english fleet rapidly formed its line on the starboard tack and headed north for basse terre (plate xix., a, a'). the french, at the moment, were in column steering south, but went about at once and stood for the enemy in a bow-and-quarter line[ ] (a, a). at two the british had got far enough for hood to make signal to anchor. at twenty minutes past two the van of the french came within gunshot of the english centre (b, b, b), and shortly afterward the firing began, the assailants very properly directing their main effort upon the english rear ships, which, as happens with most long columns, had opened out, a tendency increased in this case by the slowness of the fourth ship from the rear, the "prudent." the french flag-ship, "ville de paris," of one hundred and twenty guns, bearing de grasse's flag, pushed for the gap thus made, but was foiled by the "canada," seventy-four, whose captain, cornwallis, the brother of lord cornwallis, threw all his sails aback, and dropped down in front of the huge enemy to the support of the rear,--an example nobly followed by the "resolution" and the "bedford" immediately ahead of him (a). the scene was now varied and animated in the extreme. the english van, which had escaped attack, was rapidly anchoring (b) in its appointed position. the commander-in-chief in the centre, proudly reliant upon the skill and conduct of his captains, made signal for the ships ahead to carry a press of sail, and gain their positions regardless of the danger to the threatened rear. the latter, closely pressed and outnumbered, stood on unswervingly, shortened sail, and came to anchor, one by one, in a line ahead (b, b'), under the roar of the guns of their baffled enemies. the latter filed by, delivered their fire, and bore off again to the southward, leaving their former berths to their weaker but clever antagonists. [illustration: pl. xix. hood & de grasse. jan. , .] the anchorage thus brilliantly taken by hood was not exactly the same as that held by de grasse the day before; but as it covered and controlled it, his claim that he took up the place the other had left is substantially correct. the following night and morning were spent in changing and strengthening the order, which was finally established as follows (plate xviii., b, b'). the van ship was anchored about four miles southeast from basse terre, so close to the shore that a ship could not pass inside her, nor, with the prevailing wind, even reach her, because of a point and shoal just outside, covering her position. from this point the line extended in a west-northwest direction to the twelfth or thirteenth ship (from a mile and a quarter to a mile and a half), where it turned gradually but rapidly to north, the last six ships being on a north and south line. hood's flag-ship, the "barfleur," of ninety guns, was at the apex of the salient angle thus formed. it would not have been impossible for the french fleet to take the anchorage they formerly held; but it and all others to leeward were forbidden by the considerations already stated, so long as hood remained where he was. it became necessary therefore to dislodge him, but this was rendered exceedingly difficult by the careful tactical dispositions that have been described. his left flank was covered by the shore. any attempt to enfilade his front by passing along the other flank was met by the broadsides of the six or eight ships drawn up _en potence_ to the rear. the front commanded the approaches to basse terre. to attack him in the rear, from the northwest, was forbidden by the trade-wind. to these difficulties was to be added that the attack must be made under sail against ships at anchor, to whom loss of spars would be of no immediate concern; and which, having springs[ ] out, could train their broadsides over a large area with great ease. nevertheless, both sound policy and mortification impelled de grasse to fight, which he did the next day, january . the method of attack, in single column of twenty-nine ships against a line so carefully arranged, was faulty in the extreme; but it may be doubted whether any commander of that day would have broken through the traditional fighting order.[ ] hood had intended the same, but he hoped a surprise on an ill-ordered enemy, and at the original french anchorage it was possible to reach their eastern ships, with but slight exposure to concentrated fire. not so now. the french formed to the southward and steered for the eastern flank of hood's line. as their van ship drew up with the point already mentioned, the wind headed her, so that she could only reach the third in the english order, the first four ships of which, using their springs, concentrated their guns upon her. this vessel was supposed by the english to be the "pluton," and if so, her captain was d'albert de rions, in suffren's opinion the foremost officer of the french navy. "the crash occasioned by their destructive broadsides," wrote an english officer who was present, "was so tremendous that whole pieces of plank were seen flying from her off side ere she could escape the cool, concentrated fire of her determined adversaries. as she proceeded along the british line, she received the first fire of every ship in passing. she was indeed in so shattered a state as to be compelled to bear away for st. eustatius." and so ship after ship passed by, running the length of the line (plate xviii., b, b), distributing their successive fires in gallant but dreary, ineffectual monotony over the whole extent. a second time that day de grasse attacked in the same order, but neglecting the english van, directed his effort upon the rear and centre. this was equally fruitless, and seems to have been done with little spirit. from that time until the th of february, hood maintained his position in sight of the french fleet, which remained cruising in the offing and to the southward. on the st a despatch vessel arrived from kempenfeldt, informing him of the dispersal of the french reinforcements for the west indies, which must have renewed his hopes that his bold attempt would be successful through rodney's arrival. it was not, however, to be so. brimstone hill surrendered on the th, after a creditable defence. on the th de grasse took his fleet, now amounting to thirty-three ships-of-the-line, to nevis, and anchored there. on the night of the th hood summoned all his captains on board, had them set their watches by his, and at eleven p.m., one after another, without noise or signal, cut their cables and made sail to the northward, passing round that end of the island unnoticed, or at least unmolested, by the french. both strategically and tactically hood's conceptions and dispositions were excellent, and their execution was most honorable to the skill and steadiness of himself and his captains. regarded as a single military operation, this was brilliant throughout; but when considered with reference to the general situation of england at the time, a much higher estimate must be formed of the admiral's qualities.[ ] st. kitt's in itself might not be worth a great risk; but it was of the first importance that energy and audacity should be carried into the conduct of england's naval war, that some great success should light upon her flag. material success was not obtained. the chances, though fair enough, turned against hood; but every man in that fleet must have felt the glow of daring achievement, the assured confidence which follows a great deed nobly done. had this man been in chief command when greater issues were at stake, had he been first instead of second at the chesapeake, cornwallis might have been saved. the operation--seizing an anchorage left by the enemy--would have been nearly the same; and both situations may be instructively compared with suffren's relief of cuddalore. the action of de grasse, also, should be considered not only with reference to the particular occasion, but to the general condition of the war as well, and when thus weighed, and further compared with other very similar opportunities neglected by this general officer, a fair estimate of his military capacity can be reached. this comparison, however, is better deferred to the now not very distant close of the campaign. the most useful comment to be made here is, that his action in failing to crush hood at his anchors, with a force at least fifty per cent greater, was in strict accordance with the general french principle of subordinating the action of the fleet to so-called particular operations; for nothing is more instructive than to note how an unsound principle results in disastrous action. hood's inferiority was such as to weaken, for offensive purposes, his commanding position. so long as de grasse kept to windward, he maintained his communications with martinique, and he was strong enough, too, to force communication when necessary with the troops before brimstone hill. it was probable, as the event showed, that the particular operation, the reduction of st. kitt's, would succeed despite the presence of the english fleet; and "the french navy has always preferred the glory of assuring a conquest to that, more brilliant perhaps but less real, of taking a few ships." so far de grasse may be acquitted of any error beyond that of not rising above the traditions of his service. some days, however, before the surrender of the island and the departure of the english fleet, he was joined by two ships-of-the-line which brought him word of the dispersal of the expected convoy and reinforcements from europe.[ ] he then knew that he himself could not be strengthened before rodney's arrival, and that by that event the english would be superior to him. he had actually thirty-three ships-of-the-line in hand, and a few miles off lay twenty-two english in a position where he knew they would await his attack; yet he let them escape. his own explanation implies clearly that he had no intention of attacking them at anchor:-- "the day after the capitulation of brimstone hill was the moment to watch hood closely, and to fight him _as soon as he got under way_ from the conquered island. but our provisions were exhausted; we had only enough for thirty-six hours. some supply-ships had arrived at nevis, and you will admit one must live before fighting. i went to nevis, always to windward and in sight of the enemy, a league and a half from him, in order to take on board the necessary supplies as rapidly as possible. hood decamped at night without signals, and the next morning i found only the sick whom he left behind."[ ] in other words, hood having held his ground with consummate audacity and skill, when he had some chance of successful resistance, declined to await his adversary's attack under conditions overwhelmingly unfavorable. what shall be said of this talk about provisions? did not the comte de grasse know a month before how long, to a day, the supplies on board would last? did he not know, four days before hood sailed, that he had with him every ship he could probably count on for the approaching campaign, while the english would surely be reinforced? and if the english position was as strong as good judgment, professional skill, and bold hearts could make it, had it not weak points? were not the lee ships to leeward? if they did attempt to beat to windward, had he not ships to "contain" them? if the van ship could not be reached, had he not force enough to double and treble on the third and following ships, as far down the line as he chose? a letter of suffren's, referring to a similar condition of things at santa lucia,[ ] but written three years before these events, seems almost a prophetic description of them:-- "notwithstanding the slight results of the two cannonades of december [ ], we can yet expect success; but the only way to attain it is to attack vigorously the squadron, which in consequence of our superiority cannot hold out, despite their land works, which will become of no effect _if we lay them on board, or anchor upon their buoys_. if we delay, a thousand circumstances may save them. _they may profit by the night to depart._" there can be no doubt that the english would have sold their defeat dearly; but results in war must be paid for, and the best are in the long run the cheapest. a tight grip of a few simple principles--that the enemy's fleet was the controlling factor in the coming campaign, that it was therefore his true objective, that one fraction of it must be crushed without delay when caught thus separated--would have saved de grasse a great blunder; but it is only fair to note that it would have made him an exception to the practice of the french navy. the hour was now close at hand when the french admiral should feel, even if he did not admit, the consequences of this mistake, by which he had won a paltry island and lost an english fleet. rodney had sailed from europe on the th of january, with twelve ships-of-the-line. on the th of february he anchored at barbadoes, and the same day hood reached antigua from st. kitt's. on the th the squadrons of rodney and hood met to windward of antigua, forming a united fleet of thirty-four ships-of-the-line. the next day de grasse anchored in fort royal, thus escaping the pursuit which rodney at once began. the english admiral then returned to sta. lucia, where he was joined by three more ships-of-the-line from england, raising his force to thirty-seven. knowing that a large convoy was expected from france, before the arrival of which nothing could be attempted, rodney sent a part of his fleet to cruise to windward and as far north as guadeloupe; but the officer in charge of the french convoy, suspecting this action, kept well north of that island, and reached fort royal, martinique, on the th of march. the ships-of-war with him raised de grasse's fleet to thirty-three effective sail-of-the-line and two fifty-gun ships. the object of the united efforts of france and spain this year was the conquest of jamaica. it was expected to unite at cap français (now cap haïtien), in hayti, fifty ships-of-the-line and twenty thousand troops. part of the latter were already at the rendezvous; and de grasse, appointed to command the combined fleets, was to collect in martinique all the available troops and supplies in the french islands, and convoy them to the rendezvous. it was this junction that rodney was charged to prevent. the region within which occurred the important operations of the next few days covers a distance of one hundred and fifty miles, from south to north, including the islands of sta. lucia, martinique, dominica, and guadeloupe, in the order named. (see plate xi. p. .) at this time the first was in english, the others in french, hands. the final, and for the moment decisive, encounter took place between, and a little to westward of, dominica and guadeloupe. these are twenty-three miles apart; but the channel is narrowed to thirteen by three islets called the saints, lying ten miles south of guadeloupe. it is said to have been de grasse's intention, instead of sailing direct for cap français,[ ] to take a circuitous course near the islands, which, being friendly or neutral, would give refuge to the convoy if pressed. the close pursuit of the english, who came up with him off dominica, led him to forsake this plan, sending the convoy into basse terre at the south end of guadeloupe, while with the fleet he tried to beat through the channel and pass east of the island, thus drawing the english away from the transports and ridding himself of the tactical embarrassment due to the latter's presence. accidents to various ships thwarted this attempt, and brought about a battle disastrous to him and fatal to the joint enterprise. the anchorages of the two fleets, in martinique and sta. lucia, were thirty miles apart. the prevailing east wind is generally fair to pass from one to the other; but a strong westerly current, and the frequency of calms and light airs, tend to throw to leeward sailing-ships leaving sta. lucia for the northern island. a chain of frigates connected the english lookout ships off martinique, by signal, with rodney's flag-ship in gros ilot bay. everything was astir at the two stations, the french busy with the multitudinous arrangements necessitated by a great military undertaking, the english with less to do, yet maintaining themselves in a state of expectancy and preparation for instant action, that entails constant alertness and mental activity. on the th of april rodney was informed that the soldiers were being embarked, and on the th, soon after daylight, the lookout frigates were seen making signal that the enemy was leaving port. the english fleet at once began to get under way, and by noon was clear of the harbor to the number of thirty-six of the line. at half-past two p.m. the advanced frigates were in sight of the french fleet, which was seen from the mastheads of the main body just before sundown. the english stood to the northward all night, and at daybreak of the th were abreast dominica, but for the most part becalmed. in-shore of them, to the northward and eastward, were seen the french fleet and convoy: the men-of-war numbering thirty-three of the line, besides smaller vessels; the convoy a hundred and fifty sail, under special charge of the two fifty-gun ships. the irregular and uncertain winds, common to the night and early hours of the day near the land, had scattered these unwieldy numbers. fifteen sail-of-the-line were in the channel between dominica and the saints, with a fresh trade-wind, apparently beating to windward; the remainder of the ships-of-war and most of the convoy were still becalmed close under dominica (plate xx., position i, b). gradually, however, one by one, the french ships were catching light airs off the land; and by favor of these, which did not reach so far as the english in the offing, drew out from the island and entered the more steady breeze of the channel, reinforcing the group which was thus possessed of that prime element of naval power, mobility. at the same time light airs from the southeast crept out to the english van under hood, fanning it gently north from the main body of the fleet toward two isolated french ships (i), which, having fallen to leeward during the night, had shared the calms that left the english motionless, with their heads all round the compass. they had come nearly within gunshot, when a light puff from the northwest enabled the frenchmen to draw away and approach their own ships in the channel. the farther the english van advanced, the fresher grew their wind, until they fairly opened the channel of the saints and felt the trade-wind. de grasse signalled to the convoy to put into guadeloupe, which order was so well carried out that they were all out of sight to the northward by two in the afternoon, and will appear no more in the sequel. the two french ships, already spoken of as fallen to leeward, not being yet out of danger from the english van, which had now a commanding breeze, and the latter being much separated from their rear and centre, de grasse ordered his van to bear down and engage. this was obeyed by the ships signalled and by three others, in all by fourteen or fifteen, the action beginning at half-past nine a.m., and lasting with intermissions until quarter-past one p.m. hood was soon forced to heave-to, in order not to increase too much his separation from the main fleet; the french kept under way, approaching from the rear and passing in succession at half cannon-shot to windward (plate xx., position i.). as each ship drew ahead of the english division, she tacked, standing back to the southward until in position to resume her place in the order of attack, thus describing a continuous irregular curve of elliptical form, to windward of their opponents. the brunt of the attack fell upon eight or nine of the english, this number being successively increased as one ship after another, as the baffling airs served, drew out from the calm space under dominica; but the french received similar accessions. while this engagement was going on, part of the english centre, eight ships with rodney's flag among them (position i., a), by carefully watching the puffs and cat's-paws, had worked in with the land and caught the sea breeze, which was felt there sooner than in the offing. as soon as they had it, about eleven a.m., they stood to the north, being now on the weather quarter[ ] both of the english van and its assailants (position ii., a). the latter, seeing this, tacked, and abandoning the contest for the moment, steered south to join their centre, lest rodney's eight ships should get between them. at half-past eleven the french again formed line on the starboard tack, most of their ships being now clear of the land, while the english rear was still becalmed. the greater numbers of the french enabled them to extend from north to south along the length of the english line, whereas the latter was still broken by a great gap between the van and centre (position ii.). the attack upon hood was therefore hotly renewed; but the french centre and rear (b), having the wind, kept their distance, and held rodney's division at long range. at quarter-past one the french, finding that the whole british line was coming up with the wind, ceased firing, and at two rodney hauled down the signal for battle, the enemy having withdrawn. [illustration: pl. xx. rodney & de grasse. april , .] this action of the th of april amounted actually to no more than an artillery duel. one french ship, the "caton," a sixty-four (d), received injuries which sent her into guadeloupe; two english were disabled, but repaired their injuries without leaving the fleet. the material advantage, therefore, lay with the latter. opinions differ as to the generalship of the comte de grasse on this day, but they divide on the same basis of principle as to whether ulterior operations, or the chances of beating the enemy's fleet, are to determine an admiral's action. the facts of the case are these: sixteen of the english fleet, all the rear and four of the centre (position ii., c), were not able at any time to fire a shot. apparently every french ship, first and last, might have been brought into action. at the beginning, eight or nine english were opposed to fifteen french. at the end there were twenty english to thirty-three french, and these general proportions doubtless obtained throughout the four hours. de grasse therefore found himself in the presence of a fleet superior to his own, in numbers at least, and by the favor of providence that fleet so divided that nearly half of it was powerless to act. he had the wind, he had a fine body of captains; what was to prevent him from attacking hood's nine ships with fifteen, putting one on each side of the six in the rear. had those nine been thoroughly beaten, rodney's further movements must have been hopelessly crippled. the french lost only five in their defeat three days later. the subsequent court-martial, however, laid down the french doctrine thus: "the decision to persist in engaging with only a part of our fleet may be considered as an act of prudence on the part of the admiral, which might be dictated by the ulterior projects of the campaign." on this a french professional writer naturally remarks, that if an attack were made at all, it would be more prudent to make it in force; less injury would fall on individual ships, while in the end the whole fleet would inevitably be drawn in to support any which, by losing spars, could not return to windward. three times in one year had fortune thrown before de grasse the opportunity of attacking english fleets with decisive odds on his side.[ ] her favors were now exhausted. three days more were to show how decidedly the ulterior projects of a campaign may be affected by a battle and the loss of a few ships. from the th to the morning of the th the french fleet continued beating to windward between dominica and the saints, in no regular order. on the night of the th the english hove-to to repair damages. the next day the chase to windward was resumed, but the french gained very decidedly upon their pursuers. on the night of the th two ships, the "jason" and "zélé," collided. the "zélé" was the bane of the french fleet during these days. she was one of those that were nearly caught by the enemy on the th, and was also the cause of the final disaster. the injuries to the "jason" forced her to put into guadeloupe. on the th the main body was to windward of the saints, but the "zélé" and another had fallen so far to leeward that de grasse bore down to cover them, thus losing much of the ground gained. on the night following, the "zélé" was again in collision, this time with de grasse's flag-ship; the latter lost some sails, but the other, which had not the right of way and was wholly at fault, carried away both foremast and bowsprit. the admiral sent word to the frigate "astrée" to take the "zélé" in tow; and here flits across the page of our story a celebrated and tragical figure, for the captain of the "astrée" was the ill-fated explorer lapeyrouse, the mystery of whose disappearance with two ships and their entire crews remained so long unsolved. two hours were consumed in getting the ship under way in tow of the frigate,--not very smart work under the conditions of weather and urgency; but by five a.m. the two were standing away for basse terre, where the "caton" and "jason," as well as the convoy, had already arrived. the french fleet had thus lost three from its line-of-battle since leaving martinique. the disabled ship had not long been headed for basse terre, when the faint streaks of dawn announced the approach of the th of april, a day doubly celebrated in naval annals. the sun had not quite set upon the exhausted squadrons of suffren and hughes, anchoring after their fiercest battle off ceylon, when his early rays shone upon the opening strife between rodney and de grasse.[ ] the latter was at the time the greatest naval battle in its results that had been fought in a century; its influence on the course of events was very great, though far from as decisive as it might have been; it was attended with circumstances of unusual though somewhat factitious brilliancy, and particularly was marked by a manoeuvre that was then looked upon as exceptionally daring and decisive,--"breaking the line." it must be added that it has given rise to a storm of controversy; and the mass of details, as given by witnesses who should be reliable, are so confused and contradictory, owing mainly to the uncertainties of the wind, that it is impossible now to do more than attempt to reconcile them in a full account. nevertheless, the leading features can be presented with sufficient accuracy, and this will first be done briefly and barely; the outline thus presented can afterward be clothed with the details which give color, life, and interest to the great scene. at daylight[ ] (about half-past five) the english fleet, which had gone about at two a.m., was standing on the starboard tack, with the wind at southeast,[ ] an unusual amount of southing for that hour (plate xxi., a). it was then about fifteen miles from the saints, which bore north-northeast, and ten from the french fleet, which bore northeast. the latter, owing to the events of the night, was greatly scattered, as much as eight or ten miles separating the weather, or easternmost, ships from the lee,[ ] the flag-ship "ville de paris" being among the latter. anxiety for the "zélé" kept the french admiral, with the ships in his company, under short canvas, standing to the southward on the port tack (a). the english on the starboard tack, with the wind as they had it,[ ] headed east-northeast, and thus, as soon as there was light to see, found the french "broad on the lee bow, and one of m. de grasse's ships (the "zélé") towed by a frigate, square under our lee (a), with his bowsprit and foremast prostrate across his forecastle."[ ] to draw the french farther to leeward, rodney detached four ships (b) to chase the "zélé." as soon as de grasse saw this he signalled his fleet to keep away (c), as rodney wished, and at the same time to form the line-of-battle, thus calling down to him the ships to windward. the english line was also formed rapidly, and the chasing ships recalled at seven a.m. de grasse, seeing that if he stood on he would lose the weather-gage altogether, hauled up again on the port tack (c'); and the breeze changing to east-southeast and east in his favor and knocking the english off, the race of the two fleets on opposite tacks, for the advantage of the wind, became nearly equal. the french, however, won, thanks to a superiority in sailing which had enabled them to draw so far to windward of the english on the previous days, and, but for the awkwardness of the "zélé," might have cleared them altogether (plate xxi., b). their leading ships first reached and passed the point where the rapidly converging tracks intersected, while the english leader, the "marlborough," struck the french line between the sixth and tenth ships (variously stated). the battle, of course, had by this time begun, the ninth ship in the french line, the "brave," opening fire at twenty minutes before eight a.m. upon the "marlborough." as there was no previous intention of breaking the line, the english leader kept away, in obedience to a signal from rodney, and ran close along under the enemy's lee, followed in succession by all the ships as they reached her wake. the battle thus assumed the common and indecisive phase of two fleets passing on opposite tacks, the wind very light, however, and so allowing a more heavy engagement than common under these circumstances, the ships "sliding by" at the rate of three to four knots. since the hostile lines diverged again south of their point of meeting, de grasse made signal to keep away four points to south-southwest, thus bringing his van (b, a) to action with the english rear, and not permitting the latter to reach his rear unscathed. there were, however, two dangers threatening the french if they continued their course. its direction, south or south-southwest, carried them into the calms that hung round the north end of dominica; and the uncertainty of the wind made it possible that by its hauling to the southward the enemy could pass through their line and gain the wind, and with it the possibility of forcing the decisive battle which the french policy had shunned; and this was in fact what happened. de grasse therefore made signal at half-past eight to wear _together_ and take the same tack as the english. this, however, was impossible; the two fleets were too close together to admit the evolution. he then signalled to haul close to the wind and wear _in succession_, which also failed to be done, and at five minutes past nine the dreaded contingency arose; the wind hauled to the southward, knocking off all the french ships that had not yet kept away; that is, all who had english ships close under their lee (plate xxi. c). rodney, in the "formidable," was at this time just drawing up with the fourth ship astern of de grasse's flag. luffing to the new wind, he passed through the french line, followed by the five ships next astern of him (c, a), while nearly at the same moment, and from the same causes, his sixth astern (c, b) led through the interval abreast him, followed by the whole english rear. the french line-of-battle was thus broken in two places by columns of enemies' ships in such close order as to force its vessels aside, even if the wind had not conspired to embarrass their action. every principle upon which a line-of-battle was constituted, for mutual support and for the clear field of fire of each ship, was thus overthrown for the french, and preserved for the english divisions which filed through; and the french were forced off to leeward by the interposition of the enemy's columns, besides being broken up. compelled thus to forsake the line upon which they had been ranged, it was necessary to re-form upon another, and unite the three groups into which they were divided,--a difficult piece of tactics under any circumstances, but doubly so under the moral impression of disaster, and in presence of a superior enemy, who, though himself disordered, was in better shape, and already felt the glow of victory. [illustration: pl. xxi. rodney & de grasse. april , .] it does not appear that any substantial attempt to re-form was made by the french. to reunite, yes; but only as a flying, disordered mass. the various shifts of wind and movements of the divisions left their fleet, at midday (plate xxi. d), with the centre (c) two miles northwest of and to leeward of the van (v), the rear (r) yet farther from the centre and to leeward of it. calms and short puffs of wind prevailed now through both fleets. at half-past one p.m. a light breeze from the east sprang up, and de grasse made signal to form the line again on the port tack; between three and four, not having succeeded in this, he made signal to form on the starboard tack. the two signals and the general tenor of the accounts show that at no time were the french re-formed after their line was broken; and all the manoeuvres tended toward, even if they did not necessitate, taking the whole fleet as far down as the most leewardly of its parts (d). in such a movement, it followed of course that the most crippled ships were left behind, and these were picked up, one by one, by the english, who pursued without any regular order, for which there was no need, as mutual support was assured without it. shortly after six p.m. de grasse's flag-ship, the "ville de paris," struck her colors to the "barfleur," carrying the flag of sir samuel hood. the french accounts state that nine of the enemy's ships then surrounded her, and there is no doubt that she had been fought to the bitter end. her name, commemorating the great city whose gift she had been to the king, her unusual size, and the fact that no french naval commander-in-chief had before been taken prisoner in battle, conspired to bestow a peculiar brilliancy upon rodney's victory. four other ships-of-the-line were taken,[ ] and, singularly enough, upon these particular ships was found the whole train of artillery intended for the reduction of jamaica. such were the leading features of the battle of the saints, or, as it is sometimes styled, of the th of april, known to the french as the battle of dominica. certain points which have so far been omitted for the sake of clearness, but which affect the issue, must now be given. when the day opened, the french fleet was greatly scattered and without order.[ ] de grasse, under the influence of his fears for the "zélé," so precipitated his movements that his line was not properly formed at the moment of engaging. the van ships had not yet come into position (b, a), and the remainder were so far from having reached their places that de vaudreuil, commanding the rear division and last engaged, states that the line was formed under the fire of musketry. the english, on the contrary, were in good order, the only change made being to shorten the interval between ships from two to one cable's length (seven hundred feet). the celebrated stroke of breaking through the french line was due, not to previous intention, but to a shift of wind throwing their ships out of order and so increasing the spaces between them; while the gap through which rodney's group penetrated was widened by the "diadème" on its north side being taken aback and paying round on the other tack (c, c.) sir charles douglas says the immediate effect, where the flag-ship broke through, was "the bringing together, almost if not quite in contact with each other, the four ships of the enemy which were nearest," on the north, "to the point alluded to (c), and coming up in succession. this unfortunate group, composing now only one large single object at which to fire, was attacked by the "duke," "namur," and "formidable" (ninety-gun ships) all at once, receiving several broadsides from each, not a single shot missing; and great must have been the slaughter." the "duke" (c, d), being next ahead of the flag-ship, had followed her leader under the french lee; but as soon as her captain saw that the "formidable" had traversed the enemy's order, he did the same, passing north of this confused group and so bringing it under a fire from both sides. the log of the "magnanime," one of the group, mentions passing under the fire of two three-deckers, one on either side. as soon as the order was thus broken, rodney hauled down the signal for the line, keeping flying that for close action, and at the same time ordered his van, which had now passed beyond and north of the enemy's rear, to go about and rejoin the english centre. this was greatly delayed through the injuries to spars and sails received in passing under the enemy's fire. his own flag-ship and the ships with her went about. the rear, under hood, instead of keeping north again to join the centre, stood to windward for a time, and were then becalmed at a considerable distance from the rest of the fleet. much discussion took place at a later day as to the wisdom of rodney's action in breaking through his enemy's order, and to whom the credit, if any, should be ascribed. the latter point is of little concern; but it may be said that the son of sir charles douglas, rodney's chief-of-staff, brought forward an amount of positive evidence, the only kind that could be accepted to diminish the credit of the person wholly responsible for the results, which proves that the suggestion came from douglas, and rodney's consent was with difficulty obtained. the value of the manoeuvre itself is of more consequence than any question of personal reputation. it has been argued by some that, so far from being a meritorious act, it was unfortunate, and for rodney's credit should rather be attributed to the force of circumstances than to choice. it had been better, these say, to have continued along under the lee of the french rear, thus inflicting upon it the fire of the whole english line, and that the latter should have tacked and doubled on the french rear. this argument conveniently forgets that tacking, or turning round in any way, after a brush of this kind, was possible to only a part of the ships engaged; and that these would have much difficulty in overtaking the enemies who had passed on, unless the latter were very seriously crippled. therefore this suggested attack, the precise reproduction of the battle of ushant, really reduces itself to the fleets passing on opposite tacks, each distributing its fire over the whole of the enemy's line without attempting any concentration on a part of it. it may, and must, be conceded at once, that rodney's change of course permitted the eleven rear ships of the french (d, r) to run off to leeward, having received the fire of only part of their enemy, while the english van had undergone that of nearly the whole french fleet. these ships, however, were thus thrown entirely out of action for a measurable and important time by being driven to leeward, and would have been still more out of position to help any of their fleet, had not de grasse himself been sent to leeward by hood's division cutting the line three ships ahead of him. the thirteen leading french ships, obeying the last signal they had seen, were hugging the wind; the group of six with de grasse (c, e) would have done the same had they not been headed off by hood's division. the result of rodney's own action alone, therefore, would have been to divide the french fleet into two parts, separated by a space of six miles, and one of them hopelessly to leeward. the english, having gained the wind, would have been in position easily to "contain" the eleven lee ships, and to surround the nineteen weather ones in overwhelming force. the actual condition, owing to the _two_ breaches in the line, was slightly different; the group of six with de grasse being placed between his weather and lee divisions, two miles from the former, four from the latter (d). it seems scarcely necessary to insist upon the tactical advantages of such a situation for the english, even disregarding the moral effect of the confusion through which the french had passed. in addition to this, a very striking lesson is deducible from the immediate effects of the english guns in passing through. of the five ships taken, three were those under whose sterns the english divisions pierced.[ ] instead of giving and taking, as the parallel lines ran by, on equal terms, each ship having the support of those ahead and astern, the french ships near which the penetrating columns passed received each the successive fire of all the enemy's division. thus hood's thirteen ships filed by the two rear ones of the french van, the "césar" and "hector," fairly crushing them under this concentration of fire; while in like manner, and with like results, rodney's six passed by the "glorieux." this "concentration by defiling" past the extremity of a column corresponds quite accurately to the concentration upon the flank of a line, and has a special interest, because if successfully carried out it would be as powerful an attack now as it ever has been. if quick to seize their advantage, the english might have fired upon the ships on both sides of the gaps through which they passed, as the "formidable" actually did; but they were using the starboard broadsides, and many doubtless did not realize their opportunity until too late. the natural results of rodney's act, therefore, were: ( ) the gain of the wind, with the power of offensive action; ( ) concentration of fire upon a part of the enemy's order; and ( ) the introduction into the latter of confusion and division, which might, and did, become very great, offering the opportunity of further tactical advantage. it is not a valid reply to say that, had the french been more apt, they could have united sooner. a manoeuvre that presents a good chance of advantage does not lose its merit because it can be met by a prompt movement of the enemy, any more than a particular lunge of the sword becomes worthless because it has its appropriate parry. the chances were that by heading off the rear ships, while the van stood on, the french fleet would be badly divided; and the move was none the less sagacious because the two fragments could have united sooner than they did, had they been well handled. with the alternative action suggested, of tacking after passing the enemy's rear, the pursuit became a stern chase, in which both parties having been equally engaged would presumably be equally crippled. signals of disability, in fact, were numerous in both fleets. independently of the tactical handling of the two fleets, there were certain differences of equipment which conferred tactical advantage, and are therefore worth noting. the french appear to have had finer ships, and, class for class, heavier armaments. sir charles douglas, an eminent officer of active and ingenious turn of mind, who paid particular attention to gunnery details, estimated that in weight of battery the thirty-three french were superior to the thirty-six english by the force of four -gun ships; and that after the loss of the "zélé," "jason," and "caton" there still remained an advantage equal to two seventy-fours. the french admiral la gravière admits the generally heavier calibre of french cannon at this era. the better construction of the french ships and their greater draught caused them to sail and beat better, and accounts in part for the success of de grasse in gaining to windward; for in the afternoon of the th only three or four of the body of his fleet were visible _from the mast-head_ of the english flag-ship, which had been within gunshot of them on the th. it was the awkwardness of the unlucky "zélé" and of the "magnanime," which drew down de grasse from his position of vantage, and justified rodney's perseverance in relying upon the chapter of accidents to effect his purpose. the greater speed of the french as a body is somewhat hard to account for, because, though undoubtedly with far better lines, the practice of coppering the bottom had not become so general in france as in england, and among the french there were several uncoppered and worm-eaten ships.[ ] the better sailing of the french was, however, remarked by the english officers, though the great gain mentioned must have been in part owing to rodney's lying-by, after the action of the th, to refit, due probably to the greater injury received by the small body of his vessels, which had been warmly engaged, with greatly superior numbers. it was stated, in narrating that action, that the french kept at half cannon-range; this was to neutralize a tactical advantage the english had in the large number of carronades and other guns of light weight but large calibre, which in close action told heavily, but were useless at greater distances. the second in command, de vaudreuil, to whom was intrusted the conduct of that attack, expressly states that if he had come within reach of the carronades his ships would have been quickly unrigged. whatever judgment is passed upon the military policy of refusing to crush an enemy situated as the english division was, there can be no question that, if the object was to prevent pursuit, the tactics of de vaudreuil on the th was in all respects excellent. he inflicted the utmost injury with the least exposure of his own force. on the th, de grasse, by allowing himself to be lured within reach of carronades, yielded this advantage, besides sacrificing to an impulse his whole previous strategic policy. rapidly handled from their lightness, firing grape and shot of large diameter, these guns were peculiarly harmful in close action and useless at long range. in a later despatch de vaudreuil says: "the effect of these new arms is most deadly within musket range; it is they which so badly crippled us on the th of april." there were other gunnery innovations, in some at least of the english ships, which by increasing the accuracy, the rapidity, and the field of fire, greatly augmented the power of their batteries. these were the introduction of locks, by which the man who aimed also fired; and the fitting to the gun-carriages of breast-pieces and sweeps, so that the guns could be pointed farther ahead or astern,--that is, over a larger field than had been usual. in fights between single ships, not controlled in their movements by their relations to a fleet, this improvement would at times allow the possessor to take a position whence he could train upon his enemy without the latter being able to reply, and some striking instances of such tactical advantage are given. in a fleet fight, such as is now being considered, the gain was that the guns could be brought to bear farther forward, and could follow the opponent longer as he passed astern, thus doubling, or more, the number of shots he might receive, and lessening for him the interval of immunity enjoyed between two successive antagonists.[ ] these matters of antiquated and now obsolete detail carry with them lessons that are never obsolete; they differ in no respect from the more modern experiences with the needle-gun and the torpedo. and indeed this whole action of april , , is fraught with sound military teaching. perseverance in pursuit, gaining advantage of position, concentration of one's own effort, dispersal of the enemy's force, the efficient tactical bearing of small but important improvements in the material of war, have been dwelt on. to insist further upon the necessity of not letting slip a chance to beat the enemy in detail, would be thrown away on any one not already convinced by the bearing of april on april . the abandonment of the attack upon jamaica, after the defeat of the french fleet, shows conclusively that the true way to secure ulterior objects is to defeat the force which threatens them. there remains at least one criticism, delicate in its character, but essential to draw out the full teachings of these events; that is, upon the manner in which the victory was followed up, and the consequent effects upon the war in general. the liability of sailing-ships to injury in spars and sails, in other words, in that mobility which is the prime characteristic of naval strength, makes it difficult to say, after a lapse of time, what might or might not have been done. it is not only a question of actual damage received, which log-books may record, but also of the means for repair, the energy and aptitude of the officers and seamen, which differ from ship to ship. as to the ability of the english fleet, however, to follow up its advantages by a more vigorous pursuit on the th of april, we have the authority of two most distinguished officers,--sir samuel hood, the second in command, and sir charles douglas, the captain of the fleet, or chief-of-staff to the admiral. the former expressed the opinion that twenty ships might have been taken, and said so to rodney the next day; while the chief-of-staff was so much mortified by the failure, and by the manner in which the admiral received his suggestions, as seriously to contemplate resigning his position.[ ] advice and criticism are easy, nor can the full weight of a responsibility be felt, except by the man on whom it is laid; but great results cannot often be reached in war without risk and effort. the accuracy of the judgment of these two officers, however, is confirmed by inference from the french reports. rodney justifies his failure to pursue by alleging the crippled condition of many ships, and other matters incident to the conclusion of a hard-fought battle, and then goes on to suggest what might have been done that night, had he pursued, by the french fleet, which "went off in a body of twenty-six ships-of-the-line."[ ] these possibilities are rather creditable to his imagination, considering what the french fleet had done by day; but as regards the body of twenty-six[ ] ships, de vaudreuil, who, after de grasse's surrender, made the signal for the ships to rally round his flag, found only ten with him next morning, and was not joined by any more before the th. during the following days five more joined him at intervals.[ ] with these he went to the rendezvous at cap français, where he found others, bringing the whole number who repaired thither to twenty. the five remaining, of those that had been in the action, fled to curaçoa, six hundred miles distant, and did not rejoin until may. the "body of twenty-six ships," therefore, had no existence in fact; on the contrary, the french fleet was very badly broken up, and several of its ships isolated. as regards the crippled condition, there seems no reason to think the english had suffered more, but rather less, than their enemy; and a curious statement, bearing upon this, appears in a letter from sir gilbert blane:-- "it was with difficulty we could make the french officers believe that the returns of killed and wounded, made by our ships to the admiral, were true; and one of them flatly contradicted me, saying we always gave the world a false account of our loss. i then walked with him over the decks of the 'formidable,' and bid him remark what number of shot-holes there were, and _also how little her rigging had suffered_, and asked if that degree of damage was likely to be connected with the loss of more than fourteen men, which was our number killed, and _the greatest of any in the fleet_, except the 'royal oak' and 'monarch.' he ... owned our fire must have been much better kept up and directed than theirs."[ ] there can remain little doubt, therefore, that the advantage was not followed up with all possible vigor. not till five days after the battle was hood's division sent toward san domingo, where they picked up in the mona passage the "jason" and the "caton," which had separated before the battle and were on their way to cap français. these, and two small vessels with them, were the sole after-fruits of the victory. under the conditions of england's war this cautious failure is a serious blot on rodney's military reputation, and goes far to fix his place among successful admirals. he had saved jamaica for the time; but he had not, having the opportunity, crushed the french fleet. he too, like de grasse, had allowed the immediate objective to blind him to the general military situation, and to the factor which controlled it. to appreciate the consequences of this neglect, and the real indecisiveness of this celebrated battle, we must go forward a year and listen to the debates in parliament on the conditions of peace, in february, . the approval or censure of the terms negotiated by the existing ministry involved the discussion of many considerations; but the gist of the dispute was, whether the conditions were such as the comparative financial and military situations of the belligerents justified, or whether it would have been better for england to continue the war rather than submit to the sacrifices she had made. as regards the financial condition, despite the gloomy picture drawn by the advocates of the peace, there was probably no more doubt then than there is now about the comparative resources of the different countries. the question of military strength was really that of naval power. the ministry argued that the whole british force hardly numbered one hundred sail-of-the-line, while the navies of france and spain amounted to one hundred and forty, not to speak of that of holland. "with so glaring an inferiority, what hopes of success could we derive, either from the experience of the last campaign, or from any new distribution of our force in that which would have followed? in the west indies we could not have had more than forty-six sail to oppose to forty, which on the day that peace was signed lay in cadiz bay, with sixteen thousand troops on board, ready to sail for that quarter of the world, where they would have been joined by twelve of the line from havana and ten from san domingo.... might we not too reasonably apprehend that the campaign in the west indies would have closed with the loss of jamaica itself, the avowed object of this immense armament?"[ ] these are certainly the reasonings of an avowed partisan, for which large allowances must be made. the accuracy of the statement of comparative numbers was denied by lord keppel, a member of the same party, and but lately at the head of the admiralty, a post which he had resigned because he disapproved the treaty.[ ] english statesmen, too, as well as english seamen, must by this time have learned to discount largely the apparent, when estimating the real, power of the other navies. nevertheless, how different would have been the appreciation of the situation, both moral and material, had rodney reaped the full fruits of the victory which he owed rather to chance than to his own merit, great as that undeniably was. a letter published in , anonymous, but bearing strong internal evidence of being written by sir gilbert blane, the physician of the fleet and long on intimate terms with rodney, who was a constant sufferer during his last cruise, states that the admiral "thought little of his victory on the th of april, ." he would have preferred to rest his reputation upon his combinations against de guichen, april , , and "looked upon that opportunity of beating, with an inferior fleet, such an officer, whom he considered the best in the french service, as one by which, but for the disobedience of his captains, he might have gained immortal renown."[ ] few students will be inclined to question this estimate of rodney's merit on the two occasions. fortune, however, decreed that his glory should depend upon a battle, brilliant in itself, to which his own qualities least contributed, and denied him success when he most deserved it. the chief action of his life in which merit and success met, the destruction of langara's fleet off cape st. vincent, has almost passed into oblivion; yet it called for the highest qualities of a seaman, and is not unworthy of comparison with hawke's pursuit of conflans.[ ] within the two years and a half which had elapsed since rodney was appointed to his command he had gained several important successes, and, as was remarked, had taken a french, a spanish, and a dutch admiral. "in that time he had added twelve line-of-battle ships, all taken from the enemy, to the british navy, and destroyed five more; and to render the whole still more singularly remarkable, the 'ville de paris' was said to be the only first-rate man-of-war that ever was taken and carried into port by any commander of any nation." notwithstanding his services, the party spirit that was then so strong in england, penetrating even the army and navy, obtained his recall[ ] upon the fall of lord north's ministry, and his successor, a man unknown to fame, had already sailed when news arrived of the victory. in the fallen and discouraging state of english affairs at the time, it excited the utmost exultation, and silenced the strictures which certain parts of the admiral's previous conduct had drawn forth. the people were not in a humor to be critical, and amid the exaggerated notions that prevailed of the results achieved, no one thought of the failure to obtain greater. this impression long prevailed. as late as , when rodney's life was first published, it was asserted "that the french navy had been so effectually crippled and reduced by the decisive victory of the th of april, as to be no longer in a condition to contest with great britain the empire of the seas." this is nonsense, excusable in , but not to the calm thought of after days. the favorable terms obtained were due to the financial embarrassment of france, not to her naval humiliation; and if there was exaggeration in the contention of the advocates of peace that england could not save jamaica, it is probable that she could not have recovered by arms the other islands restored to her by the treaty. the memory of de grasse will always be associated with great services done to america. his name, rather than that of rochambeau, represents the material succor which france gave to the struggling life of the young republic, as lafayette's recalls the moral sympathy so opportunely extended. the incidents of his life, subsequent to the great disaster which closed his active career, cannot be without interest to american readers. after the surrender of the "ville de paris," de grasse accompanied the english fleet and its prizes to jamaica, whither rodney repaired to refit his ships, thus appearing as a captive upon the scene of his intended conquest. on the th of may he left the island, still a prisoner, for england. both by naval officers and by the english people he was treated with that flattering and benevolent attention which comes easily from the victor to the vanquished, and of which his personal valor at least was not unworthy. it is said that he did not refuse to show himself on several occasions upon the balcony of his rooms in london, to the populace shouting for the valiant frenchman. this undignified failure to appreciate his true position naturally excited the indignation of his countrymen; the more so as he had been unsparing and excessive in denouncing the conduct of his subordinates on the unlucky th of april. "he bears his misfortune," wrote sir gilbert blane, "with equanimity; conscious, as he says, that he has done his duty.... he attributes his misfortune, not to the inferiority of his force, but to the base desertion of his officers in the other ships, to whom he made the signal to rally, and even hailed them to abide by him, but was abandoned."[ ] this was the key-note to all his utterances. writing from the english flag-ship, the day after the battle, he "threw upon the greater part of his captains the misfortunes of the day. some had disobeyed his signals; others, and notably the captains of the 'languedoc' and 'couronne,' that is to say his next ahead and astern, had abandoned him."[ ] he did not, however, confine himself to official reports, but while a prisoner in london published several pamphlets to the same effect, which he sent broadcast over europe. the government, naturally thinking that an officer could not thus sully the honor of his corps without good reason, resolved to search out and relentlessly punish all the guilty. the captains of the "languedoc" and "couronne" were imprisoned as soon as they reached france, and all papers, logs, etc., bearing upon the case were gathered together. under all the circumstances it is not to be wondered at that on his return to france, de grasse, to use his own words, "found no one to hold out a hand to him."[ ] it was not till the beginning of that all the accused and witnesses were ready to appear before the court-martial; but the result of the trial was to clear entirely and in the most ample manner almost every one whom he had attacked, while the faults found were considered of a character entitled to indulgence, and were awarded but slight punishment. "nevertheless," cautiously observes a french writer, "one cannot but say, with the court, that the capture of an admiral commanding thirty ships-of-the-line is an historical incident which causes the regret of the whole nation."[ ] as to the conduct of the battle by the admiral, the court found that the danger of the "zélé" on the morning of the th was not such as to justify bearing down for so long a time as was done; that the crippled ship had a breeze which was not then shared by the english, five miles away to the southward, and which carried her into basse terre at ten a.m.; that the engagement should not have been begun before all the ships had come into line; and finally, that the fleet should have been formed on the same tack as the english, because, by continuing to stand south, it entered the zone of calms and light airs at the north end of dominica.[ ] de grasse was much dissatisfied with the finding of the court, and was indiscreet enough to write to the minister of marine, protesting against it and demanding a new trial. the minister, acknowledging his protest, replied in the name of the king. after commenting upon the pamphlets that had been so widely issued, and the entire contradiction of their statements by the testimony before the court, he concluded with these weighty words:-- "the loss of the battle cannot be attributed to the fault of private officers.[ ] it results, from the findings, that you have allowed yourself to injure, by ill-founded accusations, the reputation of several officers, in order to clear yourself in public opinion of an unhappy result, the excuse for which you might perhaps have found in the inferiority of your force, in the uncertain fortune of war, and in circumstances over which you had no control. his majesty is willing to believe that you did what you could to prevent the misfortunes of the day; but he cannot be equally indulgent to your unjust imputations upon those officers of his navy who have been cleared of the charges against them. his majesty, dissatisfied with your conduct in this respect, forbids you to present yourself before him. i transmit his orders with regret, and add my own advice to retire, under the circumstances, to your province." de grasse died in january, . his fortunate opponent, rewarded with peerage and pension, lived until . hood was also created a peer, and commanded with distinction in the early part of the wars of the french revolution, winning the enthusiastic admiration of nelson, who served under him; but a sharp difference with the admiralty caused him to be retired before achieving any brilliant addition to his reputation. he died in , at the great age of ninety-two. footnotes: [ ] the curve, a, a', a'', represents the line which hood proposed to follow with his fleet, the wind being supposed east-southeast. the positions b, b, b, refer to the proceedings of a subsequent day and have nothing to do with the diagram at a. [ ] when a fleet is in line ahead, close to the wind, on one tack, and the ships go about together, they will, on the other tack, be on the same line, but not one ahead of the other. this formation was called bow-and-quarter line. [ ] a spring is a rope taken from the stern or quarter of a ship at anchor, to an anchor properly placed, by which means the ship can be turned in a desired direction. [ ] in the council of war of the allied fleets on the expediency of attacking the english squadron anchored at torbay (p. ) an opponent of the measure urged "that the whole of the combined fleets could not bear down upon the english in a line-of-battle abreast, that of course they must form the line-of-battle ahead, and go down upon the enemy singly, by which they would run the greatest risk of being shattered and torn to pieces," etc. (beatson, vol. v. p. ). [ ] in war, as in cards, the state of the score must at times dictate the play; and the chief who never takes into consideration the effect which his particular action will have on the general result, nor what is demanded of him by the condition of things elsewhere, both political and military, lacks an essential quality of a great general. "the audacious manner in which wellington stormed the redoubt of francisco [at ciudad rodrigo], and broke ground on the first night of the investment, the more audacious manner in which he assaulted the place before the fire of the defence had in any way lessened, and before the counterscarp had been blown in, were the true causes of the sudden fall of the place. _both the military and political state of affairs warranted this neglect of rules._ when the general terminated his order for the assault with this sentence, 'ciudad rodrigo _must_ be stormed this evening,' he knew well that it would be nobly understood" (napier's peninsular war). "judging that the honour of his majesty's arms, _and the circumstances of the war in these seas_, required a considerable degree of enterprise, i felt myself justified in departing from the regular system" (sir john jervis's report of the battle of cape st. vincent). [ ] by kempenfeldt's attack upon de guichen's convoy, and the following gale in december, . see p. . [ ] kerguelen: guerre maritime de . letter of de grasse to kerguelen, dated paris. january , . p. . [ ] see pp. , . [ ] see map iv. of the atlantic ocean, p. . [ ] weather quarter is behind, but on the windward side. [ ] april , , off martinique, twenty-four ships to eighteen; january, , thirty to twenty-two; april , , thirty to twenty. [ ] the difference of time from trincomalee to the saints is nine hours and a half. [ ] the account of the transactions from april to april is based mainly upon the contemporary plates and descriptions of lieutenant matthews, r.n., and the much later "naval researches" of capt. thomas white, also of the british navy, who were eye-witnesses, both being checked by french and other english narratives. matthews and white are at variance with rodney's official report as to the tack on which the english were at daybreak; but the latter is explicitly confirmed by private letters of sir charles douglas, sent immediately after the battle to prominent persons, and is followed in the text. [ ] letter of sir charles douglas, rodney's chief-of-staff: "united service journal," , part i. p. . [ ] de grasse calls this distance three leagues, while some of his captains estimated it to be as great as five. [ ] the french, in mid-channel, had the wind more to the eastward. [ ] the positions of the french ships captured are shown by a cross in each of the three successive stages of the battle, b, c, d. [ ] the distance of the weathermost french ships from the "ville de paris," when the signal to form line-of-battle was made, is variously stated at from six to nine miles. [ ] the other two french ships taken were the "ville de paris," which, in her isolated condition, and bearing the flag of the commander-in-chief, became the quarry around which the enemy's ships naturally gathered, and the "ardent," of sixty-four guns, which appears to have been intercepted in a gallant attempt to pass from the van to the side of her admiral in his extremity. the latter was the solitary prize taken by the allied great armada in the english channel, in . [ ] official letter of the marquis de vaudreuil. guérin: histoire de la marine française, vol. v. p. . [ ] see united service journal, , part ii. pp. and following. [ ] see letter of sir howard douglas in united service journal, , part ii. p. ; also "naval evolutions," by same author. the letters of sir samuel hood have not come under the author's eye. [ ] rodney's life, vol. ii. p. . [ ] there were only twenty-five in all. [ ] guérin, vol. v. p. . [ ] rodney's life, vol. ii. p. . [ ] annual register, , p. . [ ] annual register, , p. ; life of admiral keppel, vol. ii. p. . [ ] naval chronicle, vol. xxv. p. . [ ] page . yet here also the gossip of the day, as reflected in the naval atalantis, imputed the chief credit to young, the captain of the flag-ship. sir gilbert blane stated, many years later, "when it was close upon sunset, it became a question whether the chase should be continued. after some discussion between the admiral and captain, at which i was present, the admiral being confined with the gout, it was decided to persist in the same course with the signal to engage to leeward." (united service journal, , part ii. p. .) [ ] rodney was a strong tory. almost all the other distinguished admirals of the day, notably keppel, howe, and barrington, were whigs,--a fact unfortunate for the naval power of england. [ ] rodney's life, vol. ii. p. . [ ] chevalier, p. . [ ] kerguelen: guerre maritime de . letter of de grasse to kerguelen, p. . [ ] troude: batailles navales. it is interesting to note in this connection that one of the ships near the french admiral, when he surrendered, was the "pluton," which, though the extreme rear ship, had nevertheless thus reached a position worthy of the high reputation of her captain, d'albert de rions. [ ] troude, vol. ii. p. [ ] that is, commanders of single ships. chapter xiv. critical discussion of the maritime war of . the war of , between great britain and the house of bourbon, which is so inextricably associated with the american revolution, stands by itself in one respect. it was purely a maritime war. not only did the allied kingdoms carefully refrain from continental entanglements, which england in accordance with her former policy strove to excite, but there was between the two contestants an approach to equality on the sea which had not been realized since the days of tourville. the points in dispute, the objects for which the war was undertaken or at which it aimed, were for the most part remote from europe; and none of them was on the continent with the single exception of gibraltar, the strife over which, being at the extreme point of a rugged and difficult salient, and separated from neutral nations by the whole of france and spain, never threatened to drag in other parties than those immediately interested. no such conditions existed in any war between the accession of louis xiv. and the downfall of napoleon. there was a period during the reign of the former in which the french navy was superior in number and equipment to the english and dutch; but the policy and ambition of the sovereign was always directed to continental extension, and his naval power, resting on inadequate foundations, was ephemeral. during the first three-quarters of the eighteenth century there was practically no check to the sea power of england; great as were its effects upon the issues of the day, the absence of a capable rival made its operations barren of military lessons. in the later wars of the french republic and empire, the apparent equality in numbers of ships and weight of batteries was illusive, owing to the demoralization of the french officers and seamen by causes upon which it is not necessary here to enlarge. after some years of courageous but impotent effort, the tremendous disaster of trafalgar proclaimed to the world the professional inefficiency of the french and spanish navies, already detected by the keen eyes of nelson and his brother officers, and upon which rested the contemptuous confidence that characterized his attitude, and to some extent his tactics, toward them. thenceforward the emperor "turned his eyes from the only field of battle where fortune had been unfaithful to him, and deciding to pursue england elsewhere than upon the seas, undertook to restore his navy, but without reserving to it any share in a strife become more than ever furious.... up to the last day of the empire he refused to offer to this restored navy, full of ardor and confidence, the opportunity to measure itself with the enemy."[ ] great britain resumed her old position as unquestioned mistress of the seas. the student of naval war will therefore expect to find a particular interest in the plans and methods of the parties to this great contest, and especially where they concern the general conduct of the whole war, or of certain large and clearly defined portions of it; in the strategic purpose which gave, or should have given, continuity to their actions from first to last, and in the strategic movements which affected for good or ill the fortunes of the more limited periods, which may be called naval campaigns. for while it cannot be conceded that the particular battles are, even at this day, wholly devoid of tactical instruction, which it has been one of the aims of the preceding pages to elicit, it is undoubtedly true that, like all the tactical systems of history, they have had their day, and their present usefulness to the student is rather in the mental training, in the forming of correct tactical habits of thought, than in supplying models for close imitation. on the other hand, the movements which precede and prepare for great battles, or which, by their skilful and energetic combinations, attain great ends without the actual contact of arms, depend upon factors more permanent than the weapons of the age, and therefore furnish principles of more enduring value. in a war undertaken for any object, even if that object be the possession of a particular territory or position, an attack directly upon the place coveted may not be, from the military point of view, the best means of obtaining it. the end upon which the military operations are directed may therefore be other than the object which the belligerent government wishes to obtain, and it has received a name of its own,--the objective. in the critical consideration of any war it is necessary, first, to put clearly before the student's eye the objects desired by each belligerent; then, to consider whether the objective chosen is the most likely, in case of success, to compass those objects; and finally, to study the merits or faults of the various movements by which the objective is approached. the minuteness with which such an examination is conducted will depend upon the extent of the work which the inquirer proposes to himself; but it will generally conduce to clearness if an outline, giving only the main features unencumbered by detail, should precede a more exhaustive discussion. when such principal lines are thoroughly grasped, details are easily referred to them, and fall into place. the effort here will be confined to presenting such an outline, as being alone fitted to the scope of this work. the principal parties to the war of were, on the one hand, great britain; on the other, the house of bourbon, controlling the two great kingdoms of france and spain. the american colonies, being already engaged in an unequal struggle with the mother-country, gladly welcomed an event so important to them; while in holland was deliberately forced by england into a war from which she had nothing to gain and all to lose. the object of the americans was perfectly simple,--to rid their country out of the hands of the english. their poverty and their lack of military sea power, with the exception of a few cruisers that preyed upon the enemy's commerce, necessarily confined their efforts to land warfare, which constituted indeed a powerful diversion in favor of the allies and an exhausting drain upon the resources of great britain, but which it was in the power of the latter to stop at once by abandoning the contest. holland, on the other hand, being safe from invasion by land, showed little desire for anything more than to escape with as little external loss as possible, through the assistance of the allied navies. the object of these two minor parties may therefore be said to have been the cessation of the war; whereas the principals hoped from its continuance certain changed conditions, which constituted their objects. with great britain also the object of the war was very simple. having been led into a lamentable altercation with her most promising colonies, the quarrel had gone on step by step till she was threatened with their loss. to maintain forcible control when willing adhesion had departed, she had taken up arms against them, and her object in so doing was to prevent a break in those foreign possessions with which, in the eyes of that generation, her greatness was indissolubly connected. the appearance of france and spain as active supporters of the colonists' cause made no change in england's objects, whatever change of objective her military plans may, or should, have undergone. the danger of losing the continental colonies was vastly increased by these accessions to the ranks of her enemies, which brought with them also a threat of loss, soon to be realized in part, of other valuable foreign possessions. england, in short, as regards the objects of the war, was strictly on the defensive; she feared losing much, and at best only hoped to keep what she had. by forcing holland into war, however, she obtained a military advantage; for, without increasing the strength of her opponents, several important but ill-defended military and commercial positions were thereby laid open to her arms. the views and objects of france and spain were more complex. the moral incentives of hereditary enmity and desire of revenge for the recent past doubtless weighed strongly, as in france did also the sympathy of the _salons_ and philosophers with the colonists' struggle for freedom; but powerfully as sentimental considerations affect the action of nations, only the tangible means by which it is expected to gratify them admit of statement and measurement. france might wish to regain her north american possessions; but the then living generation of colonists had too keen personal recollection of the old contests to acquiesce in any such wishes as to canada. the strong inherited distrust of the french, which characterized the americans of the revolutionary era, has been too much overlooked in the glow of gratitude which followed the effectual sympathy and assistance then given; but it was understood at the time, and france felt, that to renew those pretensions might promote, between people of the same race only recently alienated, a reconciliation by just concessions, which a strong and high-minded party of englishmen had never ceased to advocate. she therefore did not avow, perhaps did not entertain, this object. on the contrary, she formally renounced all claim to any part of the continent which was then, or had recently been, under the power of the british crown, but stipulated for freedom of action in conquering and retaining any of the west india islands, while all the other colonies of great britain were, of course, open to her attack. the principal objects at which france aimed were therefore the english west indies and that control of india which had passed into english hands, and also to secure in due time the independence of the united states, after they had wrought a sufficient diversion in her favor. with the policy of exclusive trade which characterized that generation, the loss of these important possessions was expected to lessen that commercial greatness upon which the prosperity of england depended,--to weaken her and to strengthen france. in fact, the strife which should be greater may be said to have been the animating motive of france; all objects were summed up in the one supreme end to which they contributed,--maritime and political superiority over england. preponderance over england, in combination with france, was also the aim of the equally humbled but less vigorous kingdom of spain; but there was a definiteness in the injuries suffered and the objects specially sought by her which is less easily found in the broader views of her ally. although no spaniard then living could remember the spanish flag flying over minorca, gibraltar, or jamaica, the lapse of time had not reconciled the proud and tenacious nation to their loss; nor was there on the part of the americans the same traditional objection to the renewal of spanish sovereignty over the two floridas that was felt with reference to canada. such, then, were the objects sought by the two nations, whose interposition changed the whole character of the american revolutionary war. it is needless to say that they did not all appear among the causes, or pretexts, avowed for engaging in hostility; but sagacious english opinion of the day rightly noted, as embodying in a few words the real ground of action of the united bourbon courts, the following phrase in the french manifesto: "to avenge their respective injuries, and to put an end to that tyrannical empire which england has usurped, and claims to maintain upon the ocean." in short, as regards the _objects_ of the war the allies were on the offensive, as england was thrown upon the defensive. the tyrannical empire which england was thus accused, and not unjustly, of exercising over the seas, rested upon her great sea power, actual or latent; upon her commerce and armed shipping, her commercial establishments, colonies, and naval stations in all parts of the world. up to this time her scattered colonies had been bound to her by ties of affectionate sentiment, and by the still stronger motive of self-interest through the close commercial connection with the mother-country and the protection afforded by the constant presence of her superior navy. now a break was made in the girdle of strong ports upon which her naval power was based, by the revolt of the continental colonies; while the numerous trade interests between them and the west indies, which were injured by the consequent hostilities, tended to divide the sympathies of the islands also. the struggle was not only for political possession and commercial use. it involved a military question of the first importance,--whether a chain of naval stations covering one of the shores of the atlantic, linking canada and halifax with the west indies, and backed by a thriving seafaring population, should remain in the hands of a nation which had so far used its unprecedented sea power with consistent, resolute aggressiveness, and with almost unbroken success. while great britain was thus embarrassed by the difficulty of maintaining her hold upon her naval bases, which were the defensive element of her naval strength, her offensive naval power, her fleet, was threatened by the growth of the armed shipping of france and spain, which now confronted her upon the field which she had claimed as her own, with an organized military force of equal or superior material strength. the moment was therefore favorable for attacking the great power whose wealth, reaped from the sea, had been a decisive factor in the european wars of the past century. the next question was the selection of the points of attack--of the principal _objectives_ upon which the main effort of the assailants should be steadily directed, and of the secondary objectives by which the defence should be distracted and its strength dissipated. one of the wisest french statesmen of that day, turgot, held that it was to the interest of france that the colonies should not achieve their independence. if subdued by exhaustion, their strength was lost to england; if reduced by a military tenure of controlling points, but not exhausted, the necessity of constant repression would be a continual weakness to the mother-country. though this opinion did not prevail in the councils of the french government, which wished the ultimate independence of america, it contained elements of truth which effectually moulded the policy of the war. if benefit to the united states, by effecting their deliverance, were the principal object, the continent became the natural scene, and its decisive military points the chief objectives, of operations; but as the first object of france was not to benefit america, but to injure england, sound military judgment dictated that the continental strife, so far from being helped to a conclusion, should be kept in vigorous life. it was a diversion ready made to the hand of france and exhausting to great britain, requiring only so much support as would sustain a resistance to which the insurgents were bound by the most desperate alternatives. the territory of the thirteen colonies therefore should not be the principal objective of france; much less that of spain. the commercial value of the english west indies made them tempting objects to the french, who adapted themselves with peculiar readiness to the social conditions of that region, in which their colonial possessions were already extensive. besides the two finest of the lesser antilles, guadeloupe and martinique, which she still retains, france then held sta. lucia and the western half of hayti. she might well hope by successful war to add most of the english antilles, and thus to round off a truly imperial tropical dependency; while, though debarred from jamaica by the susceptibilities of spain, it might be possible to win back that magnificent island for an allied and weaker nation. but however desirable as possessions, and therefore as objects, the smaller antilles might be, their military tenure depended too entirely upon control of the sea for them to be in themselves proper objectives. the french government, therefore, forbade its naval commanders to occupy such as they might seize. they were to make the garrisons prisoners, destroy the defences, and so retire. in the excellent military port of fort royal, martinique, in cap français, and in the strong allied harbor of havana, a fleet of adequate size found good, secure, and well-distributed bases; while the early and serious loss of sta. lucia must be attributed to the mismanagement of the french fleet and the professional ability of the english admiral. on shore, in the west indies, the rival powers therefore found themselves about equally provided with the necessary points of support; mere occupation of others could not add to their military strength, thenceforth dependent upon the numbers and quality of the fleets. to extend occupation further with safety, the first need was to obtain maritime supremacy, not only locally, but over the general field of war. otherwise occupation was precarious, unless enforced by a body of troops so large as to entail expense beyond the worth of the object. the key of the situation in the west indies being thus in the fleets, these became the true objectives of the military effort; and all the more so because the real _military_ usefulness of the west indian ports in this war was as an intermediate base, between europe and the american continent, to which the fleets retired when the armies went into winter quarters. no sound strategic operation on shore was undertaken in the west indies except the seizure of sta. lucia by the english, and the abortive plan against jamaica in ; nor was any serious attempt against a military port, as barbadoes or fort royal, possible, until naval preponderance was assured either by battle or by happy concentration of force. the key of the situation, it must be repeated, was in the fleet. the influence of naval power, of an armed fleet, upon the war on the american continent has also been indicated in the opinions of washington and sir henry clinton; while the situation in the east indies, regarded as a field by itself, has been so largely discussed under the head of suffren's campaign, that it needs here only to repeat that everything there depended upon control of the sea by a superior naval force. the capture of trincomalee, essential as it was to the french squadron which had no other base, was, like that of sta. lucia, a surprise, and could only have been effected by the defeat, or, as happened, by the absence of the enemy's fleet. in north america and india sound military policy pointed out, as the true objective, the enemy's fleet, upon which also depended the communications with the mother-countries. there remains europe, which it is scarcely profitable to examine at length as a separate field of action, because its relations to the universal war are so much more important. it may simply be pointed out that the only two points in europe whose political transfer was an object of the war were gibraltar and minorca; the former of which was throughout, by the urgency of spain, made a principal objective of the allies. the tenure of both these depended, obviously, upon control of the sea. in a sea war, as in all others, two things are from the first essential,--a suitable base upon the frontier, in this case the seaboard, from which the operations start, and an organized military force, in this case a fleet, of size and quality adequate to the proposed operations. if the war, as in the present instance, extends to distant parts of the globe, there will be needed in each of those distant regions secure ports for the shipping, to serve as secondary, or contingent, bases of the local war. between these secondary and the principal, or home, bases there must be reasonably secure communication, which will depend upon military control of the intervening sea. this control must be exercised by the navy, which will enforce it either by clearing the sea in all directions of hostile cruisers, thus allowing the ships of its own nation to pass with reasonable security, or by accompanying in force (convoying) each train of supply-ships necessary for the support of the distant operations. the former method aims at a widely diffused effort of the national power, the other at a concentration of it upon that part of the sea where the convoy is at a given moment. whichever be adopted, the communications will doubtless be strengthened by the military holding of good harbors, properly spaced yet not too numerous, along the routes,--as, for instance, the cape of good hope and the mauritius. stations of this kind have always been necessary, but are doubly so now, as fuel needs renewing more frequently than did the provisions and supplies in former days. these combinations of strong points at home and abroad, and the condition of the communications between them, may be called the strategic features of the general military situation, by which, and by the relative strength of the opposing fleets, the nature of the operations must be determined. in each of the three divisions of the field, europe, america, and india, under which for sake of clearness the narrative has been given, the control of the sea has been insisted upon as the determining factor, and the hostile fleet therefore indicated as the true objective. let the foregoing considerations now be applied to the whole field of war, and see how far the same conclusion holds good of it, and if so, what should have been the nature of the operations on either side.[ ] in europe the home base of great britain was on the english channel, with the two principal arsenals of plymouth and portsmouth. the base of the allied powers was on the atlantic, the principal military ports being brest, ferrol, and cadiz. behind these, within the mediterranean, were the dock-yards of toulon and cartagena, over against which stood the english station port mahon, in minorca. the latter, however, may be left wholly out of account, being confined to a defensive part during the war, as the british fleet was not able to spare any squadron to the mediterranean. gibraltar, on the contrary, by its position, effectually watched over detachments or reinforcements from within the straits, provided it were utilized as the station of a body of ships adequate to the duty. this was not done; the british european fleet being kept tied to the channel, that is, to home defence, and making infrequent visits to the rock to convoy supplies essential to the endurance of the garrison. there was, however, a difference in the parts played by port mahon and gibraltar. the former, being at the time wholly unimportant, received no attention from the allies until late in the war, when it fell after a six months' siege; whereas the latter, being considered of the first importance, absorbed from the beginning a very large part of the allied attack, and so made a valuable diversion in favor of great britain. to this view of the principal features of the natural strategic situation in europe may properly be added the remark, that such aid as holland might be inclined to send to the allied fleets had a very insecure line of communication, being forced to pass along the english base on the channel. such aid in fact was never given. in north america the local bases of the war at its outbreak were new york, narragansett bay, and boston. the two former were then held by the english, and were the most important stations on the continent, from their position, susceptibility of defence, and resources. boston had passed into the hands of the americans, and was therefore at the service of the allies. from the direction actually given to the war, by diverting the active english operations to the southern states in , boston was thrown outside the principal theatre of operations, and became from its position militarily unimportant; but had the plan been adopted of isolating new england by holding the line of the hudson and lake champlain, and concentrating military effort to the eastward, it will be seen that these three ports would all have been of decisive importance to the issue. south of new york, the delaware and chesapeake bays undoubtedly offered tempting fields for maritime enterprise; but the width of the entrances, the want of suitable and easily defended points for naval stations near the sea, the wide dispersal of the land forces entailed by an attempt to hold so many points, and the sickliness of the locality during a great part of the year, should have excepted them from a principal part in the plan of the first campaigns. it is not necessary to include them among the local bases of the war. to the extreme south the english were drawn by the _ignis fatuus_ of expected support among the people. they failed to consider that even if a majority there preferred quiet to freedom, that very quality would prevent them from rising against the revolutionary government by which, on the english theory, they were oppressed; yet upon such a rising the whole success of this distant and in its end most unfortunate enterprise was staked. the local base of this war apart was charleston, which passed into the hands of the british in may, , eighteen months after the first expedition had landed in georgia. the principal local bases of the war in the west indies are already known through the previous narrative. they were for the english, barbadoes, sta. lucia, and to a less degree antigua. a thousand miles to leeward was the large island of jamaica, with a dock-yard of great natural capabilities at kingston. the allies held, in the first order of importance, fort royal in martinique, and havana; in the second order, guadeloupe and cap français. a controlling feature of the strategic situation in that day, and one which will not be wholly without weight in our own, was the trade-wind, with its accompanying current. a passage to windward against these obstacles was a long and serious undertaking even for single ships, much more for larger bodies. it followed that fleets would go to the western islands only reluctantly, or when assured that the enemy had taken the same direction, as rodney went to jamaica after the battle of the saints, knowing the french fleet to have gone to cap français. this condition of the wind made the windward, or eastern, islands points on the natural lines of communication between europe and america, as well as local bases of the naval war, and tied the fleets to them. hence also it followed that between the two scenes of operations, between the continent and the lesser antilles, was interposed a wide central region into which the larger operations of war could not safely be carried except by a belligerent possessed of great naval superiority, or unless a decisive advantage had been gained upon one flank. in , when england held all the windward islands, with undisputed superiority at sea, she safely attacked and subdued havana; but in the years - the french sea power in america and the french tenure of the windward islands practically balanced her own, leaving the spaniards at havana free to prosecute their designs against pensacola and the bahamas, in the central region mentioned.[ ] posts like martinique and sta. lucia had therefore for the present war great strategic advantage over jamaica, havana, or others to leeward. they commanded the latter in virtue of their position, by which the passage westward could be made so much more quickly than the return; while the decisive points of the continental struggle were practically little farther from the one than from the other. this advantage was shared equally by most of those known as the lesser antilles; but the small island of barbadoes, being well to windward of all, possessed peculiar advantages, not only for offensive action, but because it was defended by the difficulty with which a large fleet could approach it, even from so near a port as fort royal. it will be remembered that the expedition which finally sat down before st. kitt's had been intended for barbadoes, but could not reach it through the violence of the trade-wind. thus barbadoes, under the conditions of the time, was peculiarly fitted to be the local base and depot of the english war, as well as a wayside port of refuge on the line of communications to jamaica, florida, and even to north america; while sta. lucia, a hundred miles to leeward, was held in force as an advanced post for the fleet, watching closely the enemy at fort royal. in india the political conditions of the peninsula necessarily indicated the eastern, or coromandel, coast as the scene of operations. trincomalee, in the adjacent island of ceylon, though unhealthy, offered an excellent and defensible harbor, and thus acquired first-rate strategic importance, all the other anchorages on the coast being mere open roadsteads. from this circumstance the trade-winds, or monsoons, in this region also had strategic bearing. from the autumnal to the spring equinox the wind blows regularly from the northeast, at times with much violence, throwing a heavy surf upon the beach and making landing difficult; but during the summer months the prevailing wind is southwest, giving comparatively smooth seas and good weather. the "change of the monsoon," in september and october, is often marked by violent hurricanes. active operations, or even remaining on the coast, were therefore unadvisable from this time until the close of the northeast monsoon. the question of a port to which to retire during this season was pressing. trincomalee was the only one, and its unique strategic value was heightened by being to windward, during the fine season, of the principal scene of war. the english harbor of bombay on the west coast was too distant to be considered a local base, and rather falls, like the french islands mauritius and bourbon, under the head of stations on the line of communications with the mother-country. such were the principal points of support, or bases, of the belligerent nations, at home and abroad. of those abroad it must be said, speaking generally, that they were deficient in resources,--an important element of strategic value. naval and military stores and equipments, and to a great extent provisions for sea use, had to be sent them from the mother-countries. boston, surrounded by a thriving, friendly population, was perhaps an exception to this statement, as was also havana, at that time an important naval arsenal, where much ship-building was done; but these were distant from the principal theatres of war. upon new york and narragansett bay the americans pressed too closely for the resources of the neighboring country to be largely available, while the distant ports of the east and west indies depended wholly upon home. hence the strategic question of communications assumed additional importance. to intercept a large convoy of supply-ships was an operation only secondary to the destruction of a body of ships-of-war; while to protect such by main strength, or by evading the enemy's search, taxed the skill of the governments and naval commanders in distributing the ships-of-war and squadrons at their disposal, among the many objects which demanded attention. the address of kempenfeldt and the bad management of guichen in the north atlantic, seconded by a heavy gale of wind, seriously embarrassed de grasse in the west indies. similar injury, by cutting off small convoys in the atlantic, was done to suffren in the indian seas: while the latter at once made good part of these losses, and worried his opponents by the success of his cruisers preying on the english supply-ships. thus the navies, by which alone these vital streams could be secured or endangered, bore the same relation to the maintenance of the general war that has already been observed of the separate parts. they were the links that bound the whole together, and were therefore indicated as the proper objective of both belligerents. the distance from europe to america was not such as to make intermediate ports of supply absolutely necessary; while if difficulty did arise from an unforeseen cause, it was always possible, barring meeting an enemy, either to return to europe or to make a friendly port in the west indies. the case was different with the long voyage to india by the cape of good hope. bickerton, leaving england with a convoy in february, was thought to have done well in reaching bombay the following september; while the ardent suffren, sailing in march, took an equal time to reach mauritius, whence the passage to madras consumed two months more. a voyage of such duration could rarely be made without a stop for water, for fresh provision, often for such refitting as called for the quiet of a harbor, even when the stores on board furnished the necessary material. a perfect line of communications required, as has been said, several such harbors, properly spaced, adequately defended, and with abundant supplies, such as england in the present day holds on some of her main commercial routes, acquisitions of her past wars. in the war of none of the belligerents had such ports on this route, until by the accession of holland, the cape of good hope was put at the disposal of the french and suitably strengthened by suffren. with this and the mauritius on the way, and trincomalee at the far end of the road, the communications of the allies with france were reasonably guarded. england, though then holding st. helena, depended, for the refreshment and refitting of her india-bound squadrons and convoys in the atlantic, upon the benevolent neutrality of portugal, extended in the islands of madeira and cape verde and in the brazilian ports. this neutrality was indeed a frail reliance for defence, as was shown by the encounter between johnstone and suffren at the cape verde; but there being several possible stopping-places, and the enemy unable to know which, if any, would be used, this ignorance itself conferred no small security, if the naval commander did not trust it to the neglect of proper disposition of his own force, as did johnstone at porto praya. indeed, with the delay and uncertainty which then characterized the transmission of intelligence from one point to another, doubt where to find the enemy was a greater bar to offensive enterprises than the often slight defences of a colonial port. this combination of useful harbors and the conditions of the communications between them constitute, as has been said, the main strategic outlines of the situation. the navy, as the organized force linking the whole together, has been indicated as the principal objective of military effort. the method employed to reach the objective, the conduct of the war, is still to be considered.[ ] before doing this a condition peculiar to the sea, and affecting the following discussion, must be briefly mentioned; that is, the difficulty of obtaining information. armies pass through countries more or less inhabited by a stationary population, and they leave behind them traces of their march. fleets move through a desert over which wanderers flit, but where they do not remain; and as the waters close behind them, an occasional waif from the decks may indicate their passage, but tells nothing of their course. the sail spoken by the pursuer may know nothing of the pursued, which yet passed the point of parley but a few days or hours before. of late, careful study of the winds and currents of the ocean has laid down certain advantageous routes, which will be habitually followed by a careful seaman, and afford some presumption as to his movements; but in the data for such precision were not collected, and even had they been, the quickest route must often have been abandoned for one of the many possible ones, in order to elude pursuit or lying-in-wait. in such a game of hide-and-seek the advantage is with the sought, and the great importance of watching the outlets of an enemy's country, of stopping the chase before it has got away into the silent desert, is at once evident. if for any reason such a watch there is impossible, the next best thing is, not attempting to watch routes which may not be taken, to get first to the enemy's destination and await him there; but this implies a knowledge of his intentions which may not always be obtainable. the action of suffren, when pitted against johnstone, was throughout strategically sound, both in his attack at porto praya and in the haste with which he made for their common destination; while the two failures of rodney to intercept the convoys to martinique in and , though informed that they were coming, show the difficulty which attended lying-in-wait even when the point of arrival was known. of any maritime expedition two points only are fixed,--the point of departure and that of arrival. the latter may be unknown to the enemy; but up to the time of sailing, the presence of a certain force in a port, and the indications of a purpose soon to move, may be assumed to be known. it may be of moment to either belligerent to intercept such a movement; but it is more especially and universally necessary to the defence, because, of the many points at which he is open to attack, it may be impossible for him to know which is threatened; whereas the offence proceeds with full knowledge direct to his aim, if he can deceive his opponent. the importance of blocking such an expedition becomes yet more evident should it at any time be divided between two or more ports,--a condition which may easily arise when the facilities of a single dock-yard are insufficient to fit out so many ships in the time allowed, or when, as in the present war, allied powers furnish separate contingents. to prevent the junction of these contingents is a matter of prime necessity, and nowhere can this be done so certainly as off the ports whence one or both is to sail. the defence, from its very name, is presumably the less strong, and is therefore the more bound to take advantage of such a source of weakness as the division of the enemy's force. rodney in at sta. lucia, watching the french contingent at martinique to prevent its union with the spaniards at cap français, is an instance of correct strategic position; and had the islands been so placed as to put him between the french and their destination, instead of in their rear, nothing better could have been devised. as it was, he did the best thing possible under the circumstances. the defence, being the weaker, cannot attempt to block _all_ the ports where divisions of the enemy lie, without defeating his aim by being in inferior force before each. this would be to neglect the fundamental principles of war. if he correctly decide not to do this, but to collect a superior force before one or two points, it becomes necessary to decide which shall be thus guarded and which neglected,--a question involving the whole policy of the war after a full understanding of the main conditions, military, moral, and economic, in every quarter. the defensive was necessarily accepted by england in . it had been a maxim with the best english naval authorities of the preceding era, with hawke and his contemporaries, that the british navy should be kept equal in numbers to the combined fleets of the bourbon kingdoms,--a condition which, with the better quality of the _personnel_ and the larger maritime population upon which it could draw, would have given a real superiority of force. this precaution, however, had not been observed during recent years. it is of no consequence to this discussion whether the failure was due to the inefficiency of the ministry, as was charged by their opponents, or to the misplaced economy often practised by representative governments in time of peace. the fact remains that, notwithstanding the notorious probability of france and spain joining in the war, the english navy was inferior in number to that of the allies. in what have been called the strategic features of the situation, the home bases, and the secondary bases abroad, the advantage upon the whole lay with her. her positions, if not stronger in themselves, were at least better situated, geographically, for strategic effect; but in the second essential for war, the organized military force, or fleet, adequate to offensive operations, she had been allowed to become inferior. it only remained, therefore, to use this inferior force with such science and vigor as would frustrate the designs of the enemy, by getting first to sea, taking positions skilfully, anticipating their combinations by greater quickness of movement, harassing their communications with their objectives, and meeting the principal divisions of the enemy with superior forces. it is sufficiently clear that the maintenance of this war, everywhere except on the american continent, depended upon the mother-countries in europe and upon open communication with them. the ultimate crushing of the americans, too, not by direct military effort but by exhaustion, was probable, if england were left unmolested to strangle their commerce and industries with her overwhelming naval strength. this strength she could put forth against them, if relieved from the pressure of the allied navies; and relief would be obtained if she could gain over them a decided preponderance, not merely material but moral, such as she had twenty years later. in that case the allied courts, whose financial weakness was well known, must retire from a contest in which their main purpose of reducing england to an inferior position was already defeated. such preponderance, however, could only be had by fighting; by showing that, despite inferiority in numbers, the skill of her seamen and the resources of her wealth enabled her government, by a wise use of these powers, to be actually superior at the decisive points of the war. it could never be had by distributing the ships-of-the-line all over the world, exposing them to be beaten in detail while endeavoring to protect all the exposed points of the scattered empire. the key of the situation was in europe, and in europe in the hostile dock-yards. if england were unable, as she proved to be, to raise up a continental war against france, then her one hope was to find and strike down the enemy's navy. nowhere was it so certainly to be found as in its home ports; nowhere so easily met as immediately after leaving them. this dictated her policy in the napoleonic wars, when the moral superiority of her navy was so established that she dared to oppose inferior forces to the combined dangers of the sea and of the more numerous and well-equipped ships lying quietly at anchor inside. by facing this double risk she obtained the double advantage of keeping the enemy under her eyes, and of sapping his efficiency by the easy life of port, while her own officers and seamen were hardened by the rigorous cruising into a perfect readiness for every call upon their energies. "we have no reason," proclaimed admiral villeneuve in , echoing the words of the emperor, "to fear the sight of an english squadron. their seventy-fours have not five hundred men on board; they are worn out by a two years' cruise."[ ] a month later he wrote: "the toulon squadron appeared very fine in the harbor, the crews well clothed and drilling well; but as soon as a storm came, all was changed. they were not drilled in storms."[ ] "the emperor," said nelson, "now finds, if emperors hear truth, that his fleet suffers more in a night than ours in one year.... these gentlemen are not used to the hurricanes, which we have braved for twenty-one months without losing mast or yard."[ ] it must be admitted, however, that the strain was tremendous both on men and ships, and that many english officers found in the wear and tear an argument against keeping their fleets at sea off the enemy's coast. "every one of the blasts we endure," wrote collingwood, "lessens the security of the country. the last cruise disabled five large ships and two more lately; several of them must be docked." "i have hardly known what a night of rest is these two months," wrote he again; "this incessant cruising seems to me beyond the powers of human nature. calder is worn to a shadow, quite broken down, and i am told graves is not much better."[ ] the high professional opinion of lord howe was also adverse to the practice. besides the exhaustion of men and ships, it must also be admitted that no blockade could be relied on certainly to check the exit of an enemy's fleet. villeneuve escaped from toulon, missiessy from rochefort. "i am here watching the french squadron in rochefort," wrote collingwood, "but feel that it is not practicable to prevent their sailing; and yet, if they should get by me, i should be exceedingly mortified.... the only thing that can prevent their sailing is the apprehension that they may get among us, as they cannot know exactly where we are."[ ] nevertheless, the strain then was endured. the english fleets girdled the shores of france and spain; losses were made good; ships were repaired; as one officer fell, or was worn out at his post, another took his place. the strict guard over brest broke up the emperor's combinations; the watchfulness of nelson, despite an unusual concurrence of difficulties, followed the toulon fleet, from the moment of its starting, across the atlantic and back to the shores of europe. it was long before they came to blows, before strategy stepped aside and tactics completed the work at trafalgar; but step by step and point by point the rugged but disciplined seamen, the rusty and battered but well-handled ships, blocked each move of their unpractised opponents. disposed in force before each arsenal of the enemy, and linked together by chains of smaller vessels, they might fail now and again to check a raid, but they effectually stopped all grand combinations of the enemy's squadrons. the ships of were essentially the same as those of . there had doubtless been progress and improvement; but the changes were in degree, not in kind. not only so, but the fleets of twenty years earlier, under hawke and his fellows, had dared the winters of the bay of biscay. "there is not in hawke's correspondence," says his biographer, "the slightest indication that he himself doubted for a moment that it was not only possible, but his duty, to keep the sea, even through the storms of winter, and that he should soon be able to 'make downright work of it.'"[ ] if it be urged that the condition of the french navy was better, the character and training of its officers higher, than in the days of hawke and nelson, the fact must be admitted; nevertheless, the admiralty could not long have been ignorant that the number of such officers was still so deficient as seriously to affect the quality of the deck service, and the lack of seamen so great as to necessitate filling up the complements with soldiers. as for the _personnel_ of the spanish navy, there is no reason to believe it better than fifteen years later, when nelson, speaking of spain giving certain ships to france, said, "i take it for granted not manned [by spaniards], as that would be the readiest way to lose them again." in truth, however, it is too evident to need much arguing, that the surest way for the weaker party to neutralize the enemy's ships was to watch them in their harbors and fight them if they started. the only serious objection to doing this, in europe, was the violence of the weather off the coasts of france and spain, especially during the long nights of winter. this brought with it not only risk of immediate disaster, which strong, well-managed ships would rarely undergo, but a continual strain which no skill could prevent, and which therefore called for a large reserve of ships to relieve those sent in for repairs, or to refresh the crews. the problem would be greatly simplified if the blockading fleet could find a convenient anchorage on the flank of the route the enemy must take, as nelson in and used maddalena bay in sardinia when watching the toulon fleet,--a step to which he was further forced by the exceptionally bad condition of many of his ships. so sir james saumarez in even used douarnenez bay, on the french coast, only five miles from brest, to anchor the in-shore squadron of the blockading force in heavy weather. the positions at plymouth and torbay cannot be considered perfectly satisfactory from this point of view; not being, like maddalena bay, on the flank of the enemy's route, but like sta. lucia, rather to its rear. nevertheless, hawke proved that diligence and well-managed ships could overcome this disadvantage, as rodney also afterward showed on his less tempestuous station. in the use of the ships at its disposal, taking the war of as a whole, the english ministry kept their foreign detachments in america, and in the west and east indies, equal to those of the enemy. at particular times, indeed, this was not so; but speaking generally of the assignment of ships, the statement is correct. in europe, on the contrary, and in necessary consequence of the policy mentioned, the british fleet was habitually much inferior to that in the french and spanish ports. it therefore could be used offensively only by great care, and through good fortune in meeting the enemy in detail; and even so an expensive victory, unless very decisive, entailed considerable risk from the consequent temporary disability of the ships engaged. it followed that the english home (or channel) fleet, upon which depended also the communications with gibraltar and the mediterranean, was used very economically both as to battle and weather, and was confined to the defence of the home coast, or to operations against the enemy's communications. india was so far distant that no exception can be taken to the policy there. ships sent there went to stay, and could be neither reinforced nor recalled with a view to sudden emergencies. the field stood by itself. but europe, north america, and the west indies should have been looked upon as one large theatre of war, throughout which events were mutually dependent, and whose different parts stood in close relations of greater or less importance, to which due attention should have been paid. assuming that the navies, as the guardians of the communications, were the controlling factors in the war, and that the source, both of the navies and of those streams of supplies which are called communications, was in the mother-countries, and there centralized in the chief arsenals, two things follow: first, the main effort of the power standing on the defensive, of great britain, should have been concentrated before those arsenals; and secondly, in order to such concentration, the lines of communication abroad should not have been needlessly extended, so as to increase beyond the strictest necessity the detachments to guard them. closely connected with the last consideration is the duty of strengthening, by fortification and otherwise, the vital points to which the communications led, so that these points should not depend in any way upon the fleet for protection, but only for supplies and reinforcements, and those at reasonable intervals. gibraltar, for instance, quite fulfilled these conditions, being practically impregnable, and storing supplies that lasted very long. if this reasoning be correct, the english dispositions on the american continent were very faulty. holding canada, with halifax, new york, and narragansett bay, and with the line of the hudson within their grip, it was in their power to isolate a large, perhaps decisive, part of the insurgent territory. new york and narragansett bay could have been made unassailable by a french fleet of that day, thus assuring the safety of the garrisons against attacks from the sea and minimizing the task of the navy; while the latter would find in them a secure refuge, in case an enemy's force eluded the watch of the english fleet before a european arsenal and appeared on the coast. instead of this, these two ports were left weak, and would have fallen before a nelson or a farragut, while the army in new york was twice divided, first to the chesapeake and afterward to georgia, neither part of the separated forces being strong enough for the work before it. the control of the sea was thus used in both cases to put the enemy between the divided portions of the english army, when the latter, undivided, had not been able to force its way over the ground thus interposed. as the communication between the two parts of the army depended wholly upon the sea, the duty of the navy was increased with the increased length of the lines of communication. the necessity of protecting the seaports and the lengthened lines of communication thus combined to augment the naval detachments in america, and to weaken proportionately the naval force at the decisive points in europe. thus also a direct consequence of the southern expedition was the hasty abandonment of narragansett bay, when d'estaing appeared on the coast in , because clinton had not force enough to defend both it and new york.[ ] in the west indies the problem before the english government was not to subdue revolted territory, but to preserve the use of a number of small, fruitful islands; to keep possession of them itself, and to maintain their trade as free as possible from the depredations of the enemy. it need not be repeated that this demanded predominance at sea over both the enemy's fleets and single cruisers,--"commerce-destroyers," as the latter are now styled. as no vigilance can confine all these to their ports, the west indian waters must be patrolled by british frigates and lighter vessels; but it would surely be better, if possible, to keep the french fleet away altogether than to hold it in check by a british fleet on the spot, of only equal force at any time, and liable to fall, as it often did, below equality. england, being confined to the defensive, was always liable to loss when thus inferior. she actually did lose one by one, by sudden attack, most of her islands, and at different times had her fleet shut up under the batteries of a port; whereas the enemy, when he found himself inferior, was able to wait for reinforcements, knowing that he had nothing to fear while so waiting.[ ] nor was this embarrassment confined to the west indies. the nearness of the islands to the american continent made it always possible for the offence to combine his fleets in the two quarters before the defence could be sure of his purpose; and although such combinations were controlled in some measure by well-understood conditions of weather and the seasons, the events of and show the perplexity felt from this cause by the ablest english admiral, whose dispositions, though faulty, but reflected the uncertainties of his mind. when to this embarrassment, which is common to the defensive in all cases, is added the care of the great british trade upon which the prosperity of the empire mainly depended, it must be conceded that the task of the british admiral in the west indies was neither light nor simple. in europe, the safety of england herself and of gibraltar was gravely imperilled by the absence of these large detachments in the western hemisphere, to which may also be attributed the loss of minorca. when sixty-six allied ships-of-the-line confronted the thirty-five which alone england could collect, and drove them into their harbors, there was realized that mastery of the channel which napoleon claimed would make him beyond all doubt master of england. for thirty days, the thirty ships which formed the french contingent had cruised in the bay of biscay, awaiting the arrival of the tardy spaniards; but they were not disturbed by the english fleet. gibraltar was more than once brought within sight of starvation, through the failure of communications with england; and its deliverance was due, not to the power of the english navy suitably disposed by its government, but to the skill of british officers and the inefficiency of the spaniards. in the great final relief, lord howe's fleet numbered only thirty-four to the allied forty-nine. which, then, in the difficulties under which england labored, was the better course,--to allow the enemy free exit from his ports and endeavor to meet him by maintaining a sufficient naval force on each of the exposed stations, or to attempt to watch his arsenals at home, under all the difficulties of the situation, not with the vain hope of preventing every raid, or intercepting every convoy, but with the expectation of frustrating the greater combinations, and of following close at the heels of any large fleet that escaped? such a watch must not be confounded with a blockade, a term frequently, but not quite accurately, applied to it. "i beg to inform your lordship," wrote nelson, "that the port of toulon has never been blockaded by me; quite the reverse. every opportunity has been offered the enemy to put to sea, for it is there we hope to realize the hopes and expectations of our country." "nothing," he says again, "ever kept the french fleet in toulon or brest when they had a mind to come out;" and although the statement is somewhat exaggerated, it is true that the attempt to shut them up in port would have been hopeless. what nelson expected by keeping near their ports, with enough lookout ships properly distributed, was to know when they sailed and what direction they took, intending, to use his own expression, to "follow them to the antipodes." "i am led to believe," he writes at another time, "that the ferrol squadron of french ships will push for the mediterranean. if it join that in toulon, it will much outnumber us; but i shall never lose sight of them, and pellew (commanding the english squadron off ferrol) will soon be after them." so it happened often enough during that prolonged war that divisions of french ships escaped, through stress of weather, temporary absence of a blockading fleet, or misjudgment on the part of its commander; but the alarm was quickly given, some of the many frigates caught sight of them, followed to detect their probable destination, passed the word from point to point and from fleet to fleet, and soon a division of equal force was after them, "to the antipodes" if need were. as, according to the traditional use of the french navy by french governments, their expeditions went not to fight the hostile fleet, but with "ulterior objects," the angry buzz and hot pursuit that immediately followed was far from conducive to an undisturbed and methodical execution of the programme laid down, even by a single division; while to great combinations, dependent upon uniting the divisions from different ports, they were absolutely fatal. the adventurous cruise of bruix, leaving brest with twenty-five ships-of-the-line in , the rapidity with which the news spread, the stirring action and individual mistakes of the english, the frustration of the french projects[ ] and the closeness of the pursuit,[ ] the escape of missiessy from rochefort in , of the divisions of willaumez and leissegues from brest in ,--all these may be named, along with the great trafalgar campaign, as affording interesting studies of a naval strategy following the lines here suggested; while the campaign of , despite its brilliant ending at the nile, may be cited as a case where failure nearly ensued, owing to the english having no force before toulon when the expedition sailed, and to nelson being insufficiently provided with frigates. the nine weeks' cruise of ganteaume in the mediterranean, in , also illustrates the difficulty of controlling a fleet which has been permitted to get out, unwatched by a strong force, even in such narrow waters. [illustration: north atlantic ocean.] no parallel instances can be cited from the war of , although the old monarchy did not cover the movements of its fleets with the secrecy enforced by the stern military despotism of the empire. in both epochs england stood on the defensive; but in the earlier war she gave up the first line of the defence, off the hostile ports, and tried to protect all parts of her scattered empire by dividing the fleet among them. it has been attempted to show the weakness of the one policy, while admitting the difficulties and dangers of the other. the latter aims at shortening and deciding the war by either shutting up or forcing battle upon the hostile navy, recognizing that this is the key of the situation, when the sea at once unites and separates the different parts of the theatre of war. it requires a navy equal in number and superior in efficiency, to which it assigns a limited field of action, narrowed to the conditions which admit of mutual support among the squadrons occupying it. thus distributed, it relies upon skill and watchfulness to intercept or overtake any division of the enemy which gets to sea. it defends remote possessions and trade by offensive action against the fleet, in which it sees their real enemy and its own principal objective. being near the home ports, the relief and renewal of ships needing repairs are accomplished with the least loss of time, while the demands upon the scantier resources of the bases abroad are lessened. the other policy, to be effective, calls for superior numbers, because the different divisions are too far apart for mutual support. each must therefore be equal to any probable combination against it, which implies superiority everywhere to the force of the enemy actually opposed, as the latter may be unexpectedly reinforced. how impossible and dangerous such a defensive strategy is, when not superior in force, is shown by the frequent inferiority of the english abroad, as well as in europe, despite the effort to be everywhere equal. howe at new york in , byron at grenada in , graves off the chesapeake in , hood at martinique in and at st. kitt's in , all were inferior, at the same time that the allied fleet in europe overwhelmingly outnumbered the english. in consequence, unseaworthy ships were retained, to the danger of their crews and their own increasing injury, rather than diminish the force by sending them home; for the deficiencies of the colonial dock-yards did not allow extensive repairs without crossing the atlantic. as regards the comparative expense of the two strategies, the question is not only which would cost the more in the same time, but which would most tend to shorten the war by the effectiveness of its action. the military policy of the allies is open to severer condemnation than that of england, by so much as the party assuming the offensive has by that very fact an advantage over the defensive. when the initial difficulty of combining their forces was overcome,--and it has been seen that at no time did great britain seriously embarrass their junction,--the allies had the choice open to them where, when, and how to strike with their superior numbers. how did they avail themselves of this recognized enormous advantage? by nibbling at the outskirts of the british empire, and knocking their heads against the rock of gibraltar. the most serious military effort made by france, in sending to the united states a squadron and division of troops intended to be double the number of those which actually reached their destination, resulted, in little over a year, in opening the eyes of england to the hopelessness of the contest with the colonies and thus put an end to a diversion of her strength which had been most beneficial to her opponents. in the west indies one petty island after another was reduced, generally in the absence of the english fleet, with an ease which showed how completely the whole question would have been solved by a decisive victory over that fleet; but the french, though favored with many opportunities, never sought to slip the knot by the simple method of attacking the force upon which all depended. spain went her own way in the floridas, and with an overwhelming force obtained successes of no military value. in europe the plan adopted by the english government left its naval force hopelessly inferior in numbers year after year; yet the operations planned by the allies seem in no case seriously to have contemplated the destruction of that force. in the crucial instance, when derby's squadron of thirty sail-of-the-line was hemmed in the open roadstead of torbay by the allied forty-nine, the conclusion of the council of war not to fight only epitomized the character of the action of the combined navies. to further embarrass their exertions in europe, spain, during long periods, obstinately persisted in tying down her fleet to the neighborhood of gibraltar; but there was at no time practical recognition of the fact that a severe blow to the english navy in the straits, or in the english channel, or on the open sea, was the surest road to reduce the fortress, brought more than once within measurable distance of starvation. in the conduct of their offensive war the allied courts suffered from the divergent counsels and jealousies which have hampered the movements of most naval coalitions. the conduct of spain appears to have been selfish almost to disloyalty, that of france more faithful, and therefore also militarily sounder; for hearty co-operation and concerted action against a common objective, wisely chosen, would have better forwarded the objects of both. it must be admitted, too, that the indications point to inefficient administration and preparation on the part of the allies, of spain especially; and that the quality of the _personnel_[ ] was inferior to that of england. questions of preparation and administration, however, though of deep military interest and importance, are very different from the strategic plan or method adopted by the allied courts in selecting and attacking their objectives, and so compassing the objects of the war; and their examination would not only extend this discussion unreasonably, but would also obscure the strategic question by heaping up unnecessary details foreign to its subject. as regards the strategic question, it may be said pithily that the phrase "ulterior objects" embodies the cardinal fault of the naval policy. ulterior objects brought to nought the hopes of the allies, because, by fastening their eyes upon them, they thoughtlessly passed the road which led to them. desire eagerly directed upon the ends in view--or rather upon the partial, though great, advantages which they constituted their ends--blinded them to the means by which alone they could be surely attained; hence, as the result of the war, everywhere failure to attain them. to quote again the summary before given, their object was "to avenge their respective injuries, and to put an end to that tyrannical empire which england claims to maintain upon the ocean." the revenge they had obtained was barren of benefit to themselves. they had, so that generation thought, injured england by liberating america; but they had not righted their wrongs in gibraltar and jamaica, the english fleet had not received any such treatment as would lessen its haughty self-reliance, the armed neutrality of the northern powers had been allowed to pass fruitlessly away, and the english empire over the seas soon became as tyrannical and more absolute than before. barring questions of preparation and administration, of the fighting quality of the allied fleets as compared with the english, and looking only to the indisputable fact of largely superior numbers, it must be noted as the supreme factor in the military conduct of the war, that, while the allied powers were on the offensive and england on the defensive, the attitude of the allied fleets in presence of the english navy was habitually defensive. neither in the greater strategic combinations, nor upon the battlefield, does there appear any serious purpose of using superior numbers to crush fractions of the enemy's fleet, to make the disparity of numbers yet greater, to put an end to the empire of the seas by the destruction of the organized force which sustained it. with the single brilliant exception of suffren, the allied navies avoided or accepted action; they never imposed it. yet so long as the english navy was permitted thus with impunity to range the seas, not only was there no security that it would not frustrate the ulterior objects of the campaign, as it did again and again, but there was always the possibility that by some happy chance it would, by winning an important victory, restore the balance of strength. that it did not do so is to be imputed as a fault to the english ministry; but if england was wrong in permitting her european fleet to fall so far below that of the allies, the latter were yet more to blame for their failure to profit by the mistake. the stronger party, assuming the offensive, cannot plead the perplexities which account for, though they do not justify, the undue dispersal of forces by the defence anxious about many points. the national bias of the french, which found expression in the line of action here again and for the last time criticised, appears to have been shared by both the government and the naval officers of the day. it is the key to the course of the french navy, and, in the opinion of the author, to its failure to achieve more substantial results to france from this war. it is instructive, as showing how strong a hold tradition has over the minds of men, that a body of highly accomplished and gallant seamen should have accepted, apparently without a murmur, so inferior a rôle for their noble profession. it carries also a warning, if these criticisms are correct, that current opinions and plausible impressions should always be thoroughly tested; for if erroneous they work sure failure, and perhaps disaster. there was such an impression largely held by french officers of that day, and yet more widely spread in the united states now, of the efficacy of commerce-destroying as a main reliance in war, especially when directed against a commercial country like great britain. "the surest means in my opinion," wrote a distinguished officer, lamotte-picquet, "to conquer the english is to attack them in their commerce." the harassment and distress caused to a country by serious interference with its commerce will be conceded by all. it is doubtless a most important secondary operation of naval war, and is not likely to be abandoned till war itself shall cease; but regarded as a primary and fundamental measure, sufficient in itself to crush an enemy, it is probably a delusion, and a most dangerous delusion, when presented in the fascinating garb of cheapness to the representatives of a people. especially is it misleading when the nation against whom it is to be directed possesses, as great britain did and does, the two requisites of a strong sea power,--a wide-spread healthy commerce and a powerful navy. where the revenues and industries of a country can be concentrated into a few treasure-ships, like the flota of spanish galleons, the sinew of war may perhaps be cut by a stroke; but when its wealth is scattered in thousands of going and coming ships, when the roots of the system spread wide and far, and strike deep, it can stand many a cruel shock and lose many a goodly bough without the life being touched. only by military command of the sea by prolonged control of the strategic centres of commerce, can such an attack be fatal;[ ] and such control can be wrung from a powerful navy only by fighting and overcoming it. for two hundred years england has been the great commercial nation of the world. more than any other her wealth has been intrusted to the sea in war as in peace; yet of all nations she has ever been most reluctant to concede the immunities of commerce and the rights of neutrals. regarded not as a matter of right, but of policy, history has justified the refusal; and if she maintain her navy in full strength, the future will doubtless repeat the lesson of the past. * * * * * the preliminaries of the peace between great britain and the allied courts, which brought to an end this great war, were signed at versailles, january , , an arrangement having been concluded between great britain and the american commissioners two months before, by which the independence of the united states was conceded. this was the great outcome of the war. as between the european belligerents, great britain received back from france all the west india islands she had lost, except tobago, and gave up sta. lucia. the french stations in india were restored; and trincomalee being in the possession of the enemy, england could not dispute its return to holland, but she refused to cede negapatam. to spain, england surrendered the two floridas and minorca, the latter a serious loss had the naval power of spain been sufficient to maintain possession of it; as it was, it again fell into the hands of great britain in the next war. some unimportant redistribution of trading-posts on the west coast of africa was also made. trivial in themselves, there is but one comment that need be made upon these arrangements. in any coming war their permanency would depend wholly upon the balance of sea power, upon that empire of the seas concerning which nothing conclusive had been established by the war. the definitive treaties of peace were signed at versailles, september , . footnotes: [ ] jurien de la gravière: guerres maritimes, vol. ii. p. . [ ] see map of the atlantic ocean, p. . [ ] it may be said here in passing, that the key to the english possessions in what was then called west florida was at pensacola and mobile, which depended upon jamaica for support; the conditions of the country, of navigation, and of the general continental war forbidding assistance from the atlantic. the english force, military and naval, at jamaica was only adequate to the defence of the island and of trade, and could not afford sufficient relief to florida. the capture of the latter and of the bahamas was effected with little difficulty by overwhelming spanish forces, as many as fifteen ships-of-the-line and seven thousand troops having been employed against pensacola. these events will receive no other mention. their only bearing upon the general war was the diversion of this imposing force from joint operations with the french, spain here, as at gibraltar, pursuing her own aims instead of concentrating upon the common enemy,--a policy as shortsighted as it was selfish. [ ] in other words, having considered the objects for which the belligerents were at war and the proper objectives upon which their military efforts should have been directed to compass the objects, the discussion now considers how the military forces should have been handled; by what means and at what point the objective, being mobile, should have been assailed. [ ] orders of admiral villeneuve to the captains of his fleet, dec. , . [ ] letter of villeneuve, january, . [ ] letters and despatches of lord nelson. [ ] life and letters of lord collingwood. [ ] burrows: life of lord hawke. [ ] of this rodney said: "the evacuating rhode island was the most fatal measure that could possibly be adopted. it gave up the best and noblest harbor in america, from whence squadrons, in forty-eight hours, could blockade the three capital cities of america, namely, boston, new york, and philadelphia." the whole letter, private to the first lord of the admiralty, is worth reading. (life of rodney, vol. ii. p. .) [ ] the loss of sta. lucia does not militate against this statement, being due to happy audacity and skill on the part of the english admiral, and the professional incapacity of the commander of the greatly superior french fleet. [ ] the plan of campaign traced by the directory for bruix became impossible of execution; the delay in the junction of the french and spanish squadrons having permitted england to concentrate sixty ships in the mediterranean.--_troude_, vol. iii. p. . [ ] the combined squadrons of france and spain, under bruix, reached brest on their return only twenty-four hours before lord keith, who had followed them from the mediterranean. (james: naval history of great britain.) [ ] the high professional attainments of many of the french officers is not overlooked in this statement. the quality of the _personnel_ was diluted by an inferior element, owing to the insufficient number of good men. "the _personnel_ of our crews had been seriously affected by the events of the campaign of . at the beginning of it was necessary either to disarm some ships, or to increase the proportion of soldiers entering into the composition of the crews. the minister adopted the latter alternative. new regiments, drawn from the land army, were put at the disposal of the navy. the corps of officers, far from numerous at the beginning of hostilities, had become completely inadequate. rear-admiral de guichen met the greatest difficulty in forming the complements, both officers and crews, for his squadron. he took the sea, february , with ships 'badly manned,' as he wrote to the minister." (chevalier: hist. de la marine française, p. .) "during the last war [of ] we had met the greatest difficulty in supplying officers to our ships. if it had been easy to name admirals, commodores, and captains, it had been impossible to fill the vacancies caused by death, sickness, or promotion among officers of the rank of lieutenant and ensign." (chevalier: marine française sous la république, p. .) [ ] the vital centre of english commerce is in the waters surrounding the british islands; and as the united kingdom now depends largely upon external sources of food-supply, it follows that france is the nation most favourably situated to harass it by commerce-destroying, on account of her nearness and her possession of ports both on the atlantic and the north sea. from these issued the privateers which in the past preyed upon english shipping. the position is stronger now than formerly, cherbourg presenting a good channel port which france lacked in the old wars. on the other hand steam and railroads have made the ports on the northern coasts of the united kingdom more available, and british shipping need not, as formerly, focus about the channel. much importance has been attached to the captures made during the late summer manoeuvres ( ) by cruisers in and near the english channel. the united states must remember that such cruisers were near their home ports. their line of coal-supply may have been two hundred miles; it would be a very different thing to maintain them in activity three thousand miles from home. the furnishing of coal, or of such facilities as cleaning the bottom or necessary repairs, in such a case, would be so unfriendly to great britain, that it may well be doubted if any neighboring neutral nation would allow them. commerce-destroying by independent cruisers depends upon wide dissemination of force. commerce-destroying through control of a strategic centre by a great fleet depends upon concentration of force. regarded as a primary, not as a secondary, operation, the former is condemned, the latter justified, by the experience of centuries. index. _alberoni_, cardinal, minister to philip v. of spain, ; naval and general policy of, - ; failure of his schemes, ; dismissed, . _anson_, british admiral, expedition to the pacific, ; captures a french squadron, . _arbuthnot_, british admiral, engagement with french fleet off the chesapeake, - . _armed neutrality_, the, of the baltic powers, . _arnold_, benedict, treason of, ; expedition to james river, . _barbadoes_, strategic value of, , , ; ineffectual attempt of the french against, . _barrington_, british admiral, energy of, ; takes sta. lucia and resists an attack by superior french fleet, ; second in command at battle of grenada, ; refuses the command of the channel fleet, ; a whig in politics, . _battles_, land, austerlitz, , ; blenheim, ; boyne, , - ; camden, , ; ciudad rodrigo, storming of, (note); jena, ; metaurus, , ; plassey, ; savannah, assault on, ; yorktown, capitulation of, . _battles_, naval (_the list of the principal naval battles, with plans, will be found on pp. xxiii, xxiv_), actium, ; agosta, ; boscawen and de la clue, ; byng off minorca, , _plan_ ; cape passaro, , ; chesapeake. - , , ; copenhagen, ; la hougue, - , _plan_ ; lepanto, , ; lowestoft, ; malaga, , , ; mobile, , , , ; navarino, (note); new orleans, - ; nile, , , , , , , , ; pocock and d'aché, - , _plan_ ; port hudson, , ; rio de janeiro, expedition against, ; rodney and langara, , (and note); schoneveldt ; sta. lucia, , , ; st vincent, , , , (note), _plan_ ; suffren and hughes, fifth action, ; trafalgar, , , , (note), , , , , , , ; vigo galleons, . _benbow_, british admiral, sent to west indies, ; treason of his captains, ; killed in battle. . _bickerton_, british admiral, conducts a powerful convoy to the east indies, ; arrived in india, ; activity of, , ; effects of arrival of, , . _blane_, sir gilbert, physician to british fleet, letters of, , , (note), . _blockade_, of french ports by english fleets, (note), , , , , , , (and note), , - , , ; of southern coast of united states, , , (note); napoleon forces england to, ; with consequent effect on american privateering, ; definition of efficient, ; dangers to united states from, , ; offensive and defensive use of, (note); declaration of the armed neutrality concerning, ; position taken off an enemy's port not necessarily a blockade in strict sense of the word, . _boscawen_, british admiral, expedition to india, failure of, ; intercepts french ships off the st. lawrence, ; takes louisburg, ; disperses or destroys french fleet from toulon, . _burgoyne_, british general, expedition from canada, ; effect of his surrender, . _bussy_, french general, second to dupleix in india, ; intrigues with nabob of bengal, ; invades orissa, ; again sent to india during american revolution, ; delayed _en route_, ; reaches india, ; besieged in cuddalore by the english, ; relieved by suffren, . _byng_, sir george, british admiral, sent to mediterranean, ; destroys spanish fleet at cape passaro, ; policy at messina, . _byng_, john, british admiral, sails to relieve port mahon, ; action with the french fleet, - ; returns to gibraltar, is relieved, tried, , and shot, . _byron_, british admiral, commander-in-chief at battle of grenada, - . _cape of good hope_, a half-way naval station, , ; discovery of passage round, , , ; acquired by holland, ; acquired by england during the napoleonic wars, ; english expedition against, ; saved by suffren, - , ; utility to france, , ; suffren's reception at, , . _carlos_ iii., king of the two sicilies, , ; enters into bourbon family compact, ; forced to withdraw his troops by a british commodore, , , ; succeeds to the spanish throne, ; enters into secret alliance with france, , ; losses in seven years' war, , ; again enters alliance with france against england, , . _charles_, archduke, claimant to spanish throne as carlos iii., ; lands at lisbon, ; lands in catalonia and takes barcelona, ; takes and loses madrid, ; antipathy of spaniards to, , ; inherits empire of austria and elected emperor charles vi. of germany, ; makes, as king of spain, secret commercial treaty with england, ; discontented with treaty of utrecht, , ; renounces claim to spanish throne, ; joins quadruple alliance, ; obtains naples and sicily, ; loses naples and sicily, ; dies, leaving no son, ; succeeded by maria theresa, . _charles_ ii., naval policy of, , ; restoration of, ; political motives, ; cedes dunkirk, ; policy of commerce-destroying, ; bargains with louis xiv., ; declares war against holland, ; makes peace with holland, ; forms alliance with holland, ; dies, . _choiseul_, minister to louis xv., ; plans for invading england and scotland, , ; makes close alliance with spain, - ; policy after seven years' war, - ; naval reforms, - ; supports spain in dispute with england over the falkland islands, ; dismissed, . _clerk_, john, work on naval tactics, (and note), - , . _clinton_, sir henry, british general, expedition up the hudson, ; commander-in-chief in america, , , ; opinions as to influence of sea power, , ; sends detachments to the chesapeake, , ; directs cornwallis to occupy yorktown, ; outwitted by washington and rochambeau, . _clive_, robert, afterward lord, letter of. (note); indian career begins, ; retakes calcutta, ; defeats nabob of bengal, takes chandernagore, and wins battle of plassey, ; reduces bengal, . _colbert_ becomes minister under louis xiv., ; commercial and naval policy, - , , , , ; thwarted by the king, ; his trust in the resources of france, . _collingwood_, british admiral, leads a column at trafalgar, ; his conduct at battle of cape st. vincent, , ; reverses nelson's orders after his death, ; loss in his ship at trafalgar, (note); blockading duty off french coast (letters), . _colonies_: origin of, ; character of, ; effect on england of, , , , , - , - , , ; weakness of spain through, , , , , , , , , ; effect of national character on, - , , ; growth of english colonial system, , , , , , , , , - , , , ; colbert's policy, , , ; navy essential to security of, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ; support to sea power by, , , , , , , , , ; dutch, , , ; new york and new jersey seized by english, , ; loss of french colonies, , , , , , , , ; loss of spanish colonies, , - , ; french colonial policy, , , , , , - , , , ; spanish colonial policy, - , ; colonial expansion the characteristic motive of the wars from to , , - , , - ; value of smaller west india islands, , , , ; the english in india, , , , , , , , , ; vernon's and anson's expedition against spanish, ; florida and the bahamas recovered by spain, (note). british north american, character of, , ; extension over all the continent east of the mississippi, , ; quarrel with mother-country, , ; military situation of, - ; alliance with france, ; effect of sea power upon their struggle, , ; object of, , ; policy of france in their struggle, , , ; distribution of colonial possessions at peace of , . _commander-in-chief_, position of a naval, in battle, - ; question raised by action of the due de chartres, ; illustrated by practice of howe, nelson, farragut, - ; orders of french government, . _commerce_, attempts to control by force, , , , , , , , ; trade routes, , , , , , , ; water carriage easier and cheaper than land, ; advantages of rivers and inlets to, , , ; secure seaports and a navy necessary to security of, - , - , , , , ; the basis of a healthy navy, , , , ; war upon (see commerce-destroying); influence of baltic trade upon sea power, , , , , ; effect of central american canal on, , ; effect of physical conditions on, - ; decay of spanish, , - ; effect of national character on, - ; solicitude of english government concerning, , , , , , , , , , , , , , ; the navigation act, ; influence of the wealth of england on history, , , , , , , , ; commercial spirit of the dutch, , , , , , , ; colbert's policy for developing, , , , , , , ; decay of french, under louis xiv., , , , , , , , , - ; improvement of french, under louis xv., , , ; government influence on, , , , , , ; dangers to united states, by blockades, - ; commercial policy of united states, , ; french, in , ; dutch, in , - , ; rivalry of english and dutch, , ; leibnitz's proposition to louis xiv. to seize egypt, , ; influence of dutch wealth, , , , , , ; sufferings of dutch, , , , ; gains to english, by policy of louis xiv. , ; effect of injury to, in hastening war, , ; bearing of, upon war of spanish succession, - , , ; methuen treaty of, with portugal, , ; concession to england of the asiento, or slave trade, , , ; growth of english, during eighteenth century, , - , , , , , , , , ; secret treaty of, made with england by claimant to spanish throne, ; decay of dutch, in early part of eighteenth century, , - , ; english, contraband with spanish america, , , - ; sufferings of, - , , ; sufferings of, - , , , - ; prosperity of english commerce, - , , , , ; effect of commercial interests on the results at yorktown, ; great centre of english, (note); policy of great britain as to neutral, . _commerce-destroying_ (cruising warfare), a strategic question, ; dependence on geographical position, ; diffusion of effort, ; disadvantageous position of united states, , (note); spanish treasure-ships, , , , , , ; english and dutch commerce defy, , , , , , , , , , , , ; charles ii. resorts to it as a substitute for great fleets, ; disastrous results, ; discussion of, as a principal mode of warfare, - ; dependent upon a near base or upon powerful fleets, , , , ; illustrations, - , - ; injurious reaction on the nation relying upon it, ; illustrations, - ; mistaken conclusions drawn from american privateering in , and from the confederate cruisers, , ; effect of great navies, ; illustrations, after battle of solebay, ; after battle of texel, ; decline of dutch navy, , and consequent increase of commerce-destroying by french privateers, ; in the war of - , discussion, - ; in the war of - , - ; in war of - , ; in seven years' war, , , , , , - (discussion), (note); in american revolution, , , , , , (and note), , , , , , , , (and note); french privateering, , , , , , , , , - ; peculiar character of french privateering, - , - , , . _conflans_, french admiral, commands fleet intended for invasion of england, ; sails from brest, ; encounters hawke and is defeated by him, - . _cornwallis_, british general, wins battle of camden, ; overruns southern states, ; marches into virginia, ; takes position at yorktown, ; surrounded by enemies, , capitulates, . _cornwallis_, captain british navy, gallant conduct in hood's action at st. christopher, . _corsica_, island of, naturally italian, ; a dependency of genoa, ; genoa cedes fortified harbors to france, ; whole island ceded to france, ; strategic value, . _cromwell_, oliver, naval policy of, ; issues navigation act, ; condition of navy under, , , , ; takes jamaica, ; takes dunkirk, . _d'aché_, french commodore, reaches india, ; first and second battles with pocock, ; ill-will to the french governor, lally, , ; goes to the isle of france, ; return to the peninsula, and third battle with pocock, ; abandons the peninsula, . _de barras_, french commodore, commands french squadron at newport, and takes part in operations against cornwallis, - . _de la clue_, french commodore, sails from toulon to join brest fleet, ; encounters and beaten by boscawen, . _d'estaing_, french admiral, transferred from the army to the navy, ; long passage from toulon to the delaware, ; fails to attack the british fleet in new york, ; runs british batteries at newport, ; sails in pursuit of howe's fleet, and receives injuries in a gale, ; goes to boston, ; foiled by howe on all points, , ; goes to west indies, ; failure at sta. lucia, ; capture of st. vincent and grenada, ; action with byron's fleet, - ; professional character, , ; ineffectual assault on savannah, ; return to france, . _d'estrées_, french admiral, commands french contingent to the allied fleet at solebay, ; at schoneveldt, ; at the texel, ; equivocal action at the battle of the texel, , ; notice of, . _de grasse_, french admiral, sails from brest for west indies, ; partial action with hood off martinique, , ; takes tobago, and goes thence to san domingo, ; determines to go to chesapeake bay, ; thoroughness of his action, , ; anchors in lynnhaven bay, ; skilful management when opposed by graves, ; share in results at yorktown, ; declines to remain longer in the united states, , , ; return to west indies, and expedition against st. kitt's island, ; outgeneralled by hood, - ; criticisms upon his actions, , - , , , ; return to martinique, ; in command of combined fleet in expedition against jamaica, ; sails from martinique, ; partial action of april , , - ; battle of the saints, - ; surrenders with his flag-ship, ; later career and death, - ; findings of the court-martial on, . _de guichen_, french admiral, wary tactics of, , , ; takes command in west indies, ; actions with rodney, - ; returns to france, , ; chief command of allied fleets in europe, , ; abortive action at torbay, (and note); injuries to convoy under his care, ; rodney's opinion of, ; difficulty in manning his fleet, (note). _d'orvilliers_, french admiral, instructions to, , ; appointed to command brest fleet, ; commander-in-chief at battle of ushant, - ; commands allied fleets in english channel, , (and note); retires from the navy, . _de rions_, d'albert, captain in french navy, leads in the attack on hood's position at st. kitt's, ; suffren's opinion of, ; gallantry at time of de grasse's defeat, (note). _de ternay_, french commodore, commands fleet which convoys rochambeau to america, ; position occupied in newport, - ; washington's memorandum to, . _de vaudreuil_, french commodore, second in command to de grasse, ; conducts partial attack of april , , , ; assumes command after de grasse's capture, . _derby_, british admiral, relieves gibraltar, , (note); retreats before superior allied fleet, . _destouches_, french commodore, engagement with english fleet off the chesapeake, - . _douglas_, sir charles, captain british navy, chief of staff to rodney, (note); letters of, (and note), , ; credit of breaking french line claimed for, ; opinion as to rodney's failure to pursue his success, . _dubois_, cardinal, minister of philippe d'orleans, ; his policy, , , , , ; death, . _duguay-trouin_, french privateer, expedition against rio de janeiro, . _dupleix_, advances the power of france in india, ; his ambition and policy, , , ; problem before him in india, ; foiled by lack of sea power, , ; quarrel with la bourdonnais, ; seizes madras, ; successful defence of pondicherry, ; extends his power in the peninsula, ; is recalled to france, . _duquesne_, french admiral, compares french and dutch officers, ; commands at battle of stromboli, - ; tactics of, - ; commands at battle of agosta, . _egypt_, napoleon's expedition to, , ; leibnitz proposes to louis xiv. to seize, ; commanding commercial and strategic position of, , ; occupation of, by england, , ; importance of, to india, . _elliott_, british general, commands at gibraltar during the great siege, . _england_, see under colonies, commerce, commerce-destroying, geographical position, government, inhabitants, character and number of, naval policy, naval tactics, sea power, strategy. _extent of territory_, its effect upon the sea power of a country, - . _falkland islands_, dispute concerning, . _farragut_, american admiral, at mobile, , , ; at port hudson, ; at new orleans, , ; practice of, as to his position in order of battle, - . _fleuri_, cardinal, minister of louis xv., ; peace policy, , , ; commercial expansion of france under, , ; accord with walpole, , , ; policy, continental rather than maritime, , , , ; supports claimant to polish throne, ; arranges bourbon family compact with spain, , ; acquires bar and lorraine for france, ; allows the navy to decay, , , , ; death, . _france._ see under colonies, commerce, commerce-destroying, geographical position, government, inhabitants, character and number of naval policy, naval tactics, sea-power, strategy. _frederick_, king of prussia, seizes silesia, ; silesia ceded to, ; opens seven years' war, ; desperate struggle of, , ; losses in the war, ; results of the war to, ; partition of poland, . _gardiner's bay_, long island, useful as a base of operations to an enemy of the united states, , station of english fleet, . _geographical position_, its effect upon the sea power of countries, - . _gibraltar_, strategic question, ; taken by rooke, ; strategic value, ; value to england, , , , , , ; offers to restore to spain, , ; attacks on, , , ; siege of, - . _government_, character and policy of, effect upon the sea power of countries, - ; english, - ; dutch, - ; french, - ; united states, - . _graves_, british admiral, commanding in new york, sails to relieve cornwallis, ; out-manoeuvred by de grasse, ; criticisms on, , . _graves_, british captain, afterward admiral, urges rodney to attack french squadron anchored in newport, ; second to nelson at copenhagen, (note); blockading on french coast, . _great britain._ see england. _hannibal._ see second punic war, - . _havana_, strategic value of, , , ; taken by the english, ; restored at peace of paris, , . _hawke_, sir edward, afterward lord, british admiral, distinguishes himself at the battle of toulon, ; captures a french squadron, - ; seizes french shipping in the atlantic, ; relieves byng in the mediterranean, ; blockade of brest, , ; brilliant action in quiberon bay, - ; maxim as to strength of english fleet, . _henry iv._, of france, policy of, , , , . _herbert_, british admiral, commands allied english and dutch fleets at battle of beachy head, . _holland._ see under colonies, commerce, commerce-destroying, geographical position, government, inhabitants, character and number of, naval policy, naval tactics (ruyter's), sea power, strategy. _hood_, sir samuel, afterward lord, british admiral, trait of subordination in, (note); action with de grasse off martinique, ; sent by rodney to america with fourteen ships, , ; second in command in action off chesapeake, ; temporary chief command in west indies, ; brilliant action at st. christopher's island, - ; junction with rodney, ; partial action of april , , - ; at battle of the saints, - , - ; de grasse's flag-ship strikes to his, ; opinion as to rodney's failure to pursue his advantage, ; captures four french ships, ; later career and death, . _hoste_, paul, work on naval tactics, , , , . _howe_, lord, british admiral, naval policy of, ; at philadelphia, ; at new york, ; at newport, ; energy and skill of, , ; commands channel fleet, ; relieves gibraltar, ; a whig in politics, ; opinion as to blockades, . _howe_, sir william, british general, commander-in-chief in america, ; expedition to the chesapeake, , , , ; indolence of, . _hughes_, sir edward, british admiral, arrives in india, ; takes negapatam and trincomalee, ; first meeting with suffren, ; task in india, ; first battle with suffren's squadron, - ; second battle with suffren, - ; contemporary criticisms on, ; third battle with suffren, - ; tactics of, , , , , : slowness of, loses trincomalee, , ; fourth battle with suffren, - ; praise bestowed by, upon his captains, ; goes to bombay from coromandel coast, ; returns to madras, ; supports english siege of cuddalore, ; fifth battle with suffren, ; abandons the field, ; death, . _hyder ali_, sultan of mysore, ; war upon the english, ; denied the aid of the french squadron, ; suffren communicates with, ; visited by suffren, ; negotiations of suffren with, , ; death of, . _inhabitants_, character of, effect upon the sea power of a country, - . _inhabitants_, number of, effect upon the sea power of a country, reserve strength, - . _italy_, geographical position of, ; physical conformation of, , ; necessity for a navy, ; sicilian revolt against spain, , ; spanish possessions in, , ; sardinia taken by allied fleets, ; disposition of spanish provinces in, at peace of , ; sicily transferred to austria, and sardinia to house of savoy, , ; spanish expedition into, ; foundation of bourbon kingdom of the two sicilies, ; spanish operations against austria, , , ; king of naples forced to withdraw troops from spanish army by english fleet, ; disposition of provinces of, at peace of , ; transfer of corsica to france by genoa, , ; acquisition of malta by england, . _jamaica_, taken by english, under cromwell, ; wish of spain to recover, , , ; strategic value of, , , ; combined expedition against, ; frustrated by rodney's victory over de grasse, ; rodney repairs to, after his victory, , . _james ii._, a seaman by profession, , ; commands at battle of lowestoft, as duke of york, ; commands at the battle of solebay, ; deprived of the command, ; succeeds to the throne, ; interest in the navy, , , ; flight from england, ; lands in ireland, ; defeated at the boyne, ; at cape la hougue, ; death, . _jenkins_, captain of a merchant brig, the story of his ears, . _jervis_, sir john, afterward earl st. vincent, british admiral, naval policy of, ; tactics at cape st. vincent, , , , (note); testimony at keppel's court-martial, . _johnstone_, british commodore, sails for cape of good hope, ; commissioner to american congress, (note); attacked by suffren at the cape verde islands, - ; anticipated by suffren at the cape, ; returns unsuccessful to england, . _kempenfeldt_, british admiral, cuts off part of de guichen's convoy, , , , . _keppel_, lord, british admiral, appointed to command channel fleet, ; battle of ushant, - ; head of admiralty and disapproves treaty of peace, ; a whig in politics, . _king_, british commodore, stubborn defence of the "exeter," ; visits suffren at the cape of good hope, . _la bourdonnais_, governor of the isle of france, , ; his active administration, ; prepares to attack english commerce in the east indies, ; takes and ransoms madras, quarrels with dupleix, squadron wrecked, returns to france, and dies, . _l'Étenduère_, french commodore, brilliant defence of, . _lafayette_, marquis de, arrival in america, ; operations in virginia, ; expressions of washington to, as to necessity of naval help, , ; associations of his name to americans, . _la galissonière_, french admiral, commands the fleet in the expedition to minorca, ; defeats byng's attempt to relieve port mahon, - . _lally_, french governor of india, reaches india, ; quarrels with commodore d'aché, ; takes fort st. david, ; besieges madras, but fails, ; fall of french power under, . _langara_, spanish admiral, defeated and captured by rodney, , , ; action at toulon in , . _leibnitz_, proposes to louis xiv. the occupation of egypt, , , , . _louis xiv._, growth of french navy under, ; enmity to holland, ; policy of, , - , , , ; naval policy of, , , , , - , , , , , - , - ; assumes personal government, ; initiates general wars, ; condition of france at accession of, ; commercial policy of, , , , , , ; aggressions of, , ; declares war against holland, ; campaign in holland, - ; evacuates holland, ; sicilian episode, - ; peace with holland, ; declares war against germany, ; against holland, ; supports invasion of ireland, - ; plans invasion of england, - ; concessions by, at peace of ryswick, ; effect of policy of, on sea-power, - ; accepts bequest of spanish throne to his grandson, ; reduced to extremities in war of spanish succession, , ; humiliating concessions at peace of utrecht, - ; exhaustion of france under, ; privateering under, , , , ; death of, . _louis xv._, ascends throne, ; condition of french commerce under, , - , , , , ; condition of french navy, - , , - , , , , , , , ; restoration of the navy, , - ; defensive alliance with spain, , - ; offensive alliance with spain, , ; death, . _louis xvi._, begins to reign, ; naval policy of, - , - , , , ; general policy of, , , , , , , - , - ; treaty with the united states, ; breach with england, . _louisburg_, cape breton island, strategic importance of, , , ; retained by france at peace of utrecht, ; taken by new england colonists, ; restored to france at peace of aix-la-chapelle, ; taken by boscawen, . _madras_, capital of a british presidency in india, ; taken by french, ; exchanged for louisburg at peace of , ; besieged by french in , ; danger from hyder ali in , ; principal british naval station during the struggle, - , , , , , ; danger of roadstead, in northeast monsoon. , , . _mahrattas_, the, position in india of, and war with english, , ; peace with the english, , . _maria theresa_, ascends austrian throne, ; war with prussia, france, and spain, , ; war with prussia, in alliance with france and russia, . _martinique_, french west india island, base for commerce-destroying, , , ; taken by the english, , ; effects of this conquest, ; restored to france at peace of paris, ; principal base of french navy in west indies. , , , ; actions near, , ; strategic position of, , , , . _matthews_, british admiral, commander-in-chief in the mediterranean and minister to sardinia, ; action with combined french and spanish fleets, - ; court-martialled and cashiered, . _mazarin_, cardinal, policy of, , ; death, . _mediterranean sea_, control of, influence on second punic war, - ; strategic points in, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ; advantage of strategic study of, ; analogy to caribbean sea, ; increase of english power in, , , , , , , , , , , , , ; austria established in, ; sardinia given to house of savoy, ; foundation of bourbon kingdom of two sicilies, , strengthens france in, ; english navy in, , , , - , - , - , , , , , , ; france acquires corsica, , ; england loses minorca in american revolution, , . _monk_, british general and admiral, saying about dutch trade, ; commands english fleet in the four days' battle, - ; tactics of, , ; merits of, ; opposition to laying up the heavy ships, ; death, . _morogues_, bigot de, work on naval tactics, , , . _napoleon i._, recommends study of military history, ; egyptian expedition, , ; trafalgar campaign, , , , (note), , , ; favorite objective, ; naval policy, , ; influence of french navy on american privateering in , . _naval policy_, value of reserve force, ; colonial, , in peace, ; in war, ; soldiers commanding ships, ; commerce-destroying and privateering (see commerce-destroying) bourbon family compact, , ; significance of the wars from to , ; dutch, - , - , , , , , - , , , , ; english, - , , , , , , , , , , , - , - , , , , , - , , , , , - , , , , , , , ; french, , , - , , , - , , - , , , , , , , , - , , , - , , , , , - , , , , , (and note), , , , , , , ; maritime inscription, ; leibnitz's proposition to louis xiv., , ; italian, , ; spanish, , , , , , , , , , , , (note), , ; united states, , , , , , , , - , , , , (note). _naval tactics_, unsettled condition of modern, ; qualities of galleys, steamers, and sailing-ships, - ; windward and leeward positions, , change of, from age to age, , , , , ; fireships, , , , ; torpedo-cruisers, ; group formation, ; close-hauled line-of-battle, ; breaking the line, , , , , , , , , ; refusing the van, , , , , , , , ; concentration by defiling, , , , ; concentration by doubling, , , , , , , , , - ; general chase with _mêlée_, , , , , , , , , - , , , , ; french, in eighteenth century, , , , , , - , , , , , , , , , (and note), , , , , - , , ; english, in eighteenth century, - , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , - , , , , , , , , , - , , , - , (and note), - ; monk's, ; ruyter's, , , , , , , ; duquesne's, - , ; herbert's, ; tourville's, , , , , ; rooke's, ; byng's, ; hawke's, , , ; keppel's and d'orvilliers, ; barrington's, ; byron's, - ; d'estaing's, , ; rodney's, - , , , ; de grasse's, , , - , - , - ; arbuthnot and destouches's, ; graves's, , ; suffren's, , , , , , , ; hood's, , ; clerk's work on, , , ; hoste's work on, ; morogues' work on, ; position of commander-in-chief in battle, - ; effect on, of changes in naval material, - , , , , , , (note), (note), - . _navies_, condition of: _british_, under cromwell, ; under charles ii., , ; character of vessels, , ; qualities of officers, , - ; decline of, under charles ii., ; improvement of, by james ii., ; numbers in , ; deterioration under william iii., ; improvement under anne, , , , , ; numbers and condition of, in , , and , , ; inefficiency of officers, , - ; numbers of, - , ; numbers of, in , , ; professional skill of officers in american revolution, (and note), , , , , ; administration of, , , , . _dutch_, prior to , , , ; character of ships, ; professional qualities of officers, , , , , ; duquesne's estimate of dutch officers, ; decline of, after , , ; decline of, during war of spanish succession, , ; practical disappearance of, after , . _french_, ; numbers in , ; numbers in , ; numbers, - , , , , ; administration of, - , ; condition of, at end of louis xiv.'s reign, , ; character of vessels in , , professional qualities of officers in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, , , - , ; decay in number and condition, - , - , , , , , , , , , , , , ; revival of, , - , ; numbers of, in and , ; discipline during war of , , ; numbers in , , ; superior to british in size and batteries of ships, , , ; professional skill of officers, , , , , , , , , , (note); administration of, (and note), , , , ; numbers of, in , ; numbers of, in , . _spanish_, condition of, anterior to , , , , ; in , , ; restoration by alberoni, ; destruction of ships at cape passaro and of dock-yards, , ; numbers of, , ; numbers of, , ; numbers of, in , ; numbers of, in , ; superior to british in size and batteries of ships, ; administration of, (and note), , ; character of the personnel, . _nelson_, horatio, afterward lord, british admiral, tactics at the battle of the nile, ; trafalgar campaign, , (note), , , ; tactics at trafalgar, , , ; enforces navigation act, , ; orders at trafalgar, , ; at battle of cape st. vincent, , , ; celebrated sayings of, , , , , , ; attachment of subordinates to, ; position assumed by him in battle, - . _nile_, battle of the, tactical principles, ; strategic effect, ; french rear at, ; nelson at, . _opdam_, dutch admiral, commands at battle of lowestoft and is killed, , . _orleans_, philippe d', regent of france during minority of louis xv., , ; insecurity of position, ; concessions to england, ; policy of, ; alliance with england against spain, - ; death, . _peace_: _aix-la-chapelle_, , . _breda_, , . _nimeguen_, , . _nystadt_, , . _paris_, , . _ryswick_, , . _utrecht_, , . _versailles_, , . _philip_, duke of anjou, afterward philip v. of spain, spanish throne bequeathed to, ; war declared against, by england, holland, and germany, ; loses gibraltar, ; besieges gibraltar, ; loses barcelona and catalonia, ; driven from madrid, ; recovers all spain, except catalonia, ; acknowledged king of spain by treaty of utrecht, ; deprived of netherlands and italian dependencies, ; enmity to the regent orleans, ; seizes sardinia, ; attacks sicily, ; brought to terms by france and the sea powers, ; makes alliance with the emperor charles vi., ; attacks gibraltar, . _physical conformation_, its effect upon the sea power of countries, - . _pitt_, william, dislike of george ii. to, ; becomes prime minister, ; policy of, , ; prosperity of commerce under, ; offers to restore gibraltar to spain, ; respect for portuguese neutrality, , ; declines mediation of spain, ; waning of his influence, ; purposes war against spain, ; resigns his office, ; his plans adopted by successors, , ; opposes the peace of paris, ; effect of his policy on the history of england, . _pocock_, british admiral, commands british fleet in india and fights three battles with french fleet, - ; commands fleet in combined expedition against havana, , . _port mahon_ and minorca, lost to spain frequently through maritime weakness, , , ; ceded to england in , , ; strategic importance of, , , , ; french expedition against, ; byng defeated in his attempt to relieve, - ; surrender of, to france, ; pitt's offer to exchange gibraltar for, ; restored to england at peace of , ; taken from england in , , ; ceded to spain in , ; again taken by england, . _portugal_, decay in sea power and wealth, ; cedes bombay and tangiers to england, ; dependence on england, , , , , ; methuen treaty, ; alliance with england and holland, , ; advantage of, to england, , - , , ; french and spaniards invade, , , ; england repels the invasion, ; benevolent neutrality of colonial ports to england, , . _ramatuelle_, work on naval tactics, , , - . _rhode island_, occupied by the english in the american revolution, ; attack upon by french and americans, - ; english evacuate, , ; french occupy, , ; french position in, ; strategic value of, , , (note). _richelieu_, cardinal, policy of, , , , ; alliance with spain, . _rochambeau_, french general, arrival in america, ; despatches to de grasse, , ; consultation with washington, , ; marches against cornwallis, . _rodney_, sir george b., afterward lord, british admiral, commands squadron in reduction of martinique, ; commander-in-chief in west indies, ; takes or disperses a spanish squadron, , , (and note); personal and military character, , , , , - ; actions with de guichen, - ; divides his fleet and goes to new york, ; seizes dutch west india islands, ; sends hood with fourteen ships to new york, and returns to england, ; returns to west indies, ; sails in chase of de grasse, ; action of april , , - ; battle of april , , - ; criticism upon his tactics, - ; criticism upon his failure to pursue the beaten enemy, , ; his successes, ; rewards and death, ; opinion as to evacuation of rhode island, (note). _rooke_, sir george, british admiral, relieves londonderry, ; burns french ships at cape la hougue, ; unsuccessful expedition against cadiz, ; destroys the galleons at vigo bay, ; takes gibraltar, ; commands at the battle of malaga, . _rupert_, prince, at four days' battle, , ; commands english fleet at battles of schoneveldt and of the texel, , . _russell_, british admiral, commands allied english and dutch fleets in , ; at battle of la hougue, . _ruyter_, dutch admiral, greatest naval officer of seventeenth century, ; commands at battle of the four days, - ; badly supported by his officers, , , ; tactics of, , - , , , , ; destroys english shipping in the thames, ; strategy of, , , ; commands at the battles of solebay, , schoneveldt, , texel, - ; military character, ; sent to mediterranean with inadequate force, ; commands at battle of stromboli, - ; killed at battle of agosta, . _sea power_, a history of conflicts, ; elements of, . affected by geographical position of countries, - ; by physical conformation, - ; by extent of territory, - ; by number of population, - ; by national character, - ; by policy of government, . policy of england as to, - ; policy of holland, - ; of france, - . influence of colonies on, (see also colonies); weakness of the united states in, ; dependent upon commerce, , (see also commerce); strategic bearing, (see also strategy); policy of richelieu, ; spanish, in , ; dutch, in , ; english, in , ; mistakes of louis xiv., ; colbert's measures, , ; effects of commerce-destroying on, , , , , , , , (note), . (see also commerce-destroying.) influence of, upon napoleon's expedition to egypt, ; upon second punic war, ; upon third anglo-dutch war, , ; upon english revolution, , , , , , ; upon france, , ; upon war of spanish succession, , , , , , - ; upon alberoni's ambitions, , ; upon peter the great, ; in india, , , - , , , , , , , , , , , - , , , , ; upon war of austrian succession, , , , ; upon seven years' war, , - , , , - ; upon portugal, , ; at peace of paris, ; in remote and disordered countries, - ; upon british policy since , - . washington's opinions as to, - ; american revolution, , ; influence of, upon conditions of peace, , . _spain_, geographical position, ; results of maritime weakness of, , , , - , , , , ; dependence of finances upon treasure-ships, , , , , ; effect of national character upon sea power, - , ; unity of aim with austria, , ; policy of richelieu toward, ; condition of, in , , ; condition of navy, in , ; aggressions of louis xiv. on, , ; failure of the austrian line of kings, , , ; alliance with holland and germany against france, ; revolt of sicily against, ; territory lost at peace of nimeguen, ; joins league of augsburg, ; dependence upon dutch and english fleets, ; possessions in year , ; throne of, bequeathed to philip, duke of anjou, ; war of the succession, - ; bourbon line of kings established, ; losses of territory at peace of , ; alberoni's ministry in, - ; grievances against england, - , , , - ; conquers the two sicilies in war of polish succession, ; family compact with france, , , ; war with england, ; possessions in , ; peace of aix-la-chapelle, ; lack of results from war with england, ; enters seven years' war as the ally of france against england, ; loss of colonies and treasures, - ; loss of possessions by peace of paris, , , ; political relations with france, ; dispute with england over falkland islands, ; objects in the war of - , , , , , ; rupture with england and alliance with france, ; inefficiency of navy, (and note), - , , , , ; policy in war of , (note), - ; territorial gains by peace of . (see also colonies, commerce, naval policy.) _sta. lucia_, west india island, taken by english, ; ceded to france at peace of paris, ; strong harbor and strategic position, , , , , , , , , ; taken by admiral barrington, , , , , (note); rodney watches de grasse from, , ; an advanced strategic position, , ; restored to france at peace of , . _strategy_, permanence of its principles, - , , ; illustrations, - ; definition of naval, ; trafalgar campaign, (note); bearing of geographical position on, - ; mediterranean and caribbean seas, - ; bearing of physical conformation of coast on, - ; blockade of coast of confederate states, , ; value of commerce-destroying (see commerce-destroying); word "defence" two distinct ideas, (note); naval, of the british, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , - , , - , , , , , , , , - , - , - , , - ; naval, of the dutch, , , , ; naval, of the french, , , (note), - , , , - , , , , , , , , , , - ; features of war of spanish succession, - ; silent action of sea power, ; general military situation, in , ; england in seven years' war, ; mutual dependence of seaports and fleets, , , , , , , , ; value of colonies, , , , , , , , ; importance of coal, , (note), (note); military situation in america in , - ; general strategic situation in , - ; british difficulties in american revolution, - , - , - ; suffren's naval, , , , , ; situation in india, , - ; hood's naval, ; rodney's naval, , , - , ; influence of trade-winds and monsoons, , , , ; elements essential to all naval wars, ; difficulty of procuring information at sea, ; general discussion of war of , - . (see also naval policy and sea power.) _suffren_, french admiral, criticism on d'estaing's conduct at sta. lucia, , , ; commands leading french ship in d'estaing's battle off grenada, ; criticism on d'estaing's conduct in the battle, ; sails from brest in company with de grasse's fleet, , ; parts company, off the azores, for india, , , ; orders to secure cape of good hope, ; action, with british squadron at the cape verde islands, , ; military discussion of his conduct, - ; arrival in india, ; lack of seaports on which to base operations, , ; first battle with squadron of sir edward hughes, - ; tactics in the action, - ; estimate of the strategic situation in india, , , , , , ; second battle with hughes, - ; tactics in it, - ; strategic action, , , , - , - , - , , ; military character, , , , , , ; third battle with hughes, - ; takes trincomalee, ; activity of, , , , , ; fourth battle with hughes, - ; wreck of two of squadron, ; goes to sumatra, ; returns to trincomalee, ; relieves cuddalore besieged by the english, ; fifth battle with hughes, ; conclusion of peace, ; return to france, ; rewards, ; later career and death, . _tourville_, french admiral, commands at the battle of beachy head, ; sluggish pursuit of the enemy, ; military character, ; celebrated cruise in , ; commands at battle of la hougue, ; tactics and brilliant defence at la hougue, ; destruction of french ships, ; supports the army in catalonia, ; destroys or disperses a great english convoy, ; death, . _trafalgar_, battle of, final act of a strategic combination, , (note); tactics at, , , ; effects of, ; nelson's position at, , ; collingwood's action after nelson's death, . _trincomalee_, in ceylon, dutch influence in, ; passes into the hands of the english, , ; effect upon the contest in india, , (note), , (note), , , , , , , ; strategic value of, , , , , , , , , ; taken by suffren, ; restored to holland at peace of , . _two sicilies_, the, acquired by austria, ; foundation of bourbon kingdom of, ; forced by british fleet to withdraw troops from spanish army, , . _united provinces._ see holland. _vernon_, british admiral, takes porto bello, is repulsed from cartagena and santiago de cuba, . _villeneuve_, french admiral, trafalgar, campaign, , (note), ; at the battle of the nile, ; suicide, . _walpole_, sir robert, prime minister of england, , ; peace policy of, , , ; naval demonstrations, ; struggle with the war party in england, , , ; neutrality causes austria to lose the two sicilies, ; forced into war with spain, ; accord with fleuri, , , ; confidence betrayed by fleuri, ; driven from office, , ; death, . _war_, second punic, influence of sea power upon, - . _wars_, american revolution, -- ; anglo-dutch, second, - ; anglo-dutch, third, england in alliance with france, - ; austrian succession, - ; france against holland, germany, and spain, - , - ; great britain against spain, - ; league of augsburg, - ; maritime war of , - ; polish succession, ; russia and sweden, ; seven years', - ; spanish succession, - , - . _washington_, george, at pittsburg and in braddock's expedition, ; opinion as to the line of the hudson, (note); comments on d'estaing's cruise, (note); despatches to de grasse, ; meeting with rochambeau, ; result of their deliberations, ; marches from new york to virginia, ; opinions as to the influence of sea power on the american revolution, - . _william iii._, naval policy of, , ; becomes ruler of holland, ; general policy, , , , , , , , - , ; expedition to england, ; becomes king of england, , ; difficulties of his position, ; goes to ireland, ; wins the battle of the boyne, ; dies, . +-----------------------------------------------------------+ | typographical errors corrected in text: | | | | page : 'there can be little doubt than an effective' | | replaced with 'there can be little doubt that | | an effective' | | page : perserverence replaced with perseverance | | page : britian replaced with britain | | page : carribean replaced with caribbean | | page : orléans replaced with orleans (twice) | | page : hogue replaced with hougue | | page : carribean replaced with caribbean | | | +-----------------------------------------------------------+