machiavelli with an introduction by henry cust. m.p. volume i the art of war translated by peter whitehorne the prince translated by edward dacres london published by david nutt at the sign of the phoenix long acre edinburgh: t. and a. constable, printers to his majesty to my friend charles whibley h.c. introduction [sidenote: the life of a day.] 'i am at my farm; and, since my last misfortunes, have not been in florence twenty days. i spent september in snaring thrushes; but at the end of the month, even this rather tiresome sport failed me. i rise with the sun, and go into a wood of mine that is being cut, where i remain two hours inspecting the work of the previous day and conversing with the woodcutters, who have always some trouble on hand amongst themselves or with their neighbours. when i leave the wood, i go to a spring, and thence to the place which i use for snaring birds, with a book under my arm--dante or petrarch, or one of the minor poets, like tibullus or ovid. i read the story of their passions, and let their loves remind me of my own, which is a pleasant pastime for a while. next i take the road, enter the inn door, talk with the passers-by, inquire the news of the neighbourhood, listen to a variety of matters, and make note of the different tastes and humours of men. 'this brings me to dinner-time, when i join my family and eat the poor produce of my farm. after dinner i go back to the inn, where i generally find the host and a butcher, a miller, and a pair of bakers. with these companions i play the fool all day at cards or backgammon: a thousand squabbles, a thousand insults and abusive dialogues take place, while we haggle over a farthing, and shout loud enough to be heard from san casciano. 'but when evening falls i go home and enter my writing-room. on the threshold i put off my country habits, filthy with mud and mire, and array myself in royal courtly garments. thus worthily attired, i make my entrance into the ancient courts of the men of old, where they receive me with love, and where i feed upon that food which only is my own and for which i was born. i feel no shame in conversing with them and asking them the reason of their actions. 'they, moved by their humanity, make answer. for four hours' space i feel no annoyance, forget all care; poverty cannot frighten, nor death appal me. i am carried away to their society. and since dante says "that there is no science unless we retain what we have learned" i have set down what i have gained from their discourse, and composed a treatise, _de principalibus_, in which i enter as deeply as i can into the science of the subject, with reasonings on the nature of principality, its several species, and how they are acquired, how maintained, how lost. if you ever liked any of my scribblings, this ought to suit your taste. to a prince, and especially to a new prince, it ought to prove acceptable. therefore i am dedicating it to the magnificence of giuliano.' [sidenote: niccolò machiavelli.] such is the account that niccolò machiavelli renders of himself when after imprisonment, torture, and disgrace, at the age of forty-four, he first turned to serious writing. for the first twenty-six or indeed twenty-nine of those years we have not one line from his pen or one word of vaguest information about him. throughout all his works written for publication, there is little news about himself. montaigne could properly write, 'ainsi, lecteur, je suis moy-mesme la matière de mon livre.' but the matter of machiavelli was far other: 'io ho espresso quanto io so, e quanto io ho imparato per una lunga pratica e continua lezione delle cose del mondo.' [sidenote: the man.] machiavelli was born on the rd of may . the period of his life almost exactly coincides with that of cardinal wolsey. he came of the old and noble tuscan stock of montespertoli, who were men of their hands in the eleventh century. he carried their coat, but the property had been wasted and divided. his forefathers had held office of high distinction, but had fallen away as the new wealth of the bankers and traders increased in florence. he himself inherited a small property in san casciano and its neighbourhood, which assured him a sufficient, if somewhat lean, independence. of his education we know little enough. he was well acquainted with latin, and knew, perhaps, greek enough to serve his turn. 'rather not without letters than lettered,' varchi describes him. that he was not loaded down with learned reading proved probably a great advantage. the coming of the french, and the expulsion of the medici, the proclamation of the republic ( ), and later the burning of savonarola convulsed florence and threw open many public offices. it has been suggested, but without much foundation, that some clerical work was found for machiavelli in or even earlier. it is certain that on july , , he was appointed chancellor and secretary to the dieci di libertà e pace, an office which he held till the close of his political life at fall of the republic in . [sidenote: official life.] the functions of his council were extremely varied, and in the hands of their secretary became yet more diversified. they represented in some sense the ministry for home, military, and especially for foreign affairs. it is impossible to give any full account of machiavelli's official duties. he wrote many thousands of despatches and official letters, which are still preserved. he was on constant errands of state through the florentine dominions. but his diplomatic missions and what he learned by them make the main interest of his office. his first adventure of importance was to the court of caterina sforza, the lady of forlì, in which matter that astute countess entirely bested the teacher of all diplomatists to be. in he smelt powder at the siege at pisa, and was sent to france to allay the irritations of louis xii. many similar and lesser missions follow. the results are in no case of great importance, but the opportunities to the secretary of learning men and things, intrigue and policy, the court and the gutter were invaluable. at the camp of cæsar borgia, in , he found in his host that fantastic hero whom he incarnated in _the prince_, and he was practically an eye-witness of the amazing masterpiece, the massacre of sinigaglia. the next year he is sent to rome with a watching brief at the election of julius ii., and in is again sent to negotiate with the pope. an embassy to the emperor maximilian, a second mission to the french king at blois, in which he persuades louis xii. to postpone the threatened general council of the church ( ), and constant expeditions to report upon and set in order unrestful towns and provinces did not fulfil his activity. his pen was never idle. reports, despatches, elaborate monographs on france, germany, or wherever he might be, and personal letters innumerable, and even yet unpublished, ceased not night nor day. detail, wit, character-drawing, satire, sorrow, bitterness, all take their turn. but this was only a fraction of his work. by duty and by expediency he was bound to follow closely the internal politics of florence where his enemies and rivals abounded. and in all these years he was pushing forward and carrying through with unceasing and unspeakable vigour the great military dream of his life, the foundation of a national militia and the extinction of mercenary companies. but the fabric he had fancied and thought to have built proved unsubstantial. the spoilt half-mutinous levies whom he had spent years in odious and unwilling training failed him at the crowning moment in strength and spirit: and the fall of the republic implied the fall of machiavelli and the close of his official life. he struggled hard to save himself, but the wealthy classes were against him, perhaps afraid of him, and on them the medici relied. for a year he was forbidden to leave florentine territory, and for a while was excluded from the palazzo. later his name was found in a list of anti-medicean conspirators. he was arrested and decorously tortured with six turns of the rack, and then liberated for want of evidence. [sidenote: after his fall.] for perhaps a year after his release the secretary engaged in a series of tortuous intrigues to gain the favour of the medici. many of the stories may be exaggerated, but none make pleasant reading, and nothing proved successful. his position was miserable. temporarily crippled by torture, out of favour with the government, shunned by his friends, in deep poverty, burdened with debt and with a wife and four children, his material circumstances were ill enough. but, worse still, he was idle. he had deserved well of the republic, and had never despaired of it, and this was his reward. he seemed to himself a broken man. he had no great natural dignity, no great moral strength. he profoundly loved and admired dante, but he could not for one moment imitate him. he sought satisfaction in sensuality of life and writing, but found no comfort. great things were stirring in the world and he had neither part nor lot in them. by great good fortune he began a correspondence with his friend francesco vettori, the medicean ambassador at rome, to whom he appeals for his good offices: 'and if nothing can be done, i must live as i came into the world, for i was born poor and learnt to want before learning to enjoy.' before long these two diplomats had co-opted themselves into a kind of secret cabinet of europe. it is a strange but profoundly interesting correspondence, both politically and personally. nothing is too great or too small, too glorious or too mean for their pens. amid foolish anecdotes and rather sordid love affairs the politics of europe, and especially of italy, are dissected and discussed. leo x. had now plunged into political intrigue. ferdinand of spain was in difficulty. france had allied herself with venice. the swiss are the ancient romans, and may conquer italy. then back again, or rather constant throughout, the love intrigues and the 'likely wench hard-by who may help to pass our time.' but through it all there is an ache at machiavelli's heart, and on a sudden he will break down, crying, però se aleuna volta io rido e canto facciol, perchè non ho se non quest' una via da sfogare il mio angoscioso pianto. vettori promised much, but nothing came of it. by the correspondence died away, and the ex-secretary found for himself at last the true pathway through his vale of years. [sidenote: the true life.] the remainder of machiavelli's life is bounded by his books. he settled at his villa at san casciano, where he spent his day as he describes in the letter quoted at the beginning of this essay. in he began to attend the meetings of the literary club in the orti oricellarii, and made new and remarkable friends. 'era amato grandamente da loro ... e della sua conversazione si dilettavano maravigliosamente, tenendo in prezzo grandissimo tutte l'opere sue,' which shows the personal authority he exercised. occasionally he was employed by florentine merchants to negotiate for them at venice, genoa, lucca, and other places. in cardinal medici deigned to consult him as to the government, and commissioned him to write the history of florence. but in the main he wrote his books and lived the daily life we know. in he went to rome to present his history to clement vii., and was sent on to guicciardini. in he was busy once more with military matters and the fortification of florence. on the nd of june he died at florence immediately after the establishment of the second republic. he had lived as a practising christian, and so died, surrounded by his wife and family. wild legends grew about his death, but have no foundation. a peasant clod in san casciano could not have made a simpler end. he was buried in the family chapel in santa croce, and a monument was there at last erected with the epitaph by doctor ferroni--'tanto nomini nullum par elogium.' the first edition of his complete works was published in , and was dedicated to lord cowper. [sidenote: his character.] what manner of man was machiavelli at home and in the market-place? it is hard to say. there are doubtful busts, the best, perhaps, that engraved in the 'testina' edition of , so-called on account of the portrait. 'of middle height, slender figure, with sparkling eyes, dark hair, rather a small head, a slightly aquiline nose, a tightly closed mouth: all about him bore the impress of a very acute observer and thinker, but not that of one able to wield much influence over others.' such is a reconstruction of him by one best able to make one. 'in his conversation,' says varchi, 'machiavelli was pleasant, serviceable to his friends, a friend of virtuous men, and, in a word, worthy to have received from nature either less genius or a better mind.' if not much above the moral standard of the day he was certainly not below it. his habits were loose and his language lucid and licentious. but there is no bad or even unkind act charged against him. to his honesty and good faith he very fairly claims that his poverty bears witness. he was a kind, if uncertain, husband and a devoted father. his letters to his children are charming. here is one written soon before his death to his little son guido.--'guido, my darling son, i received a letter of thine and was delighted with it, particularly because you tell me of your full recovery, the best news i could have. if god grants life to us both i expect to make a good man of you, only you must do your fair share yourself.' guido is to stick to his books and music, and if the family mule is too fractious, 'unbridle him, take off the halter and turn him loose at montepulciano. the farm is large, the mule is small, so no harm can come of it. tell your mother, with my love, not to be nervous. i shall surely be home before any trouble comes. give a kiss to baccina, piero, and totto: i wish i knew his eyes were getting well. be happy and spend as little as you may. christ have you in his keeping.'--there is nothing exquisite or divinely delicate in this letter, but there are many such, and they were not written by a bad man, any more than the answers they evoke were addressed to one. there is little more save of a like character that is known of machiavelli the man. but to judge him and his work we must have some knowledge of the world in which he was to move and have his being. * * * * * [sidenote: state of italy.] at the beginning of the sixteenth century italy was rotten to the core. in the close competition of great wickedness the vicar of christ easily carried off the palm, and the court of alexander vi. was probably the wickedest meeting-place of men that has ever existed upon earth. no virtue, christian or pagan, was there to be found; little art that was not sensuous or sensual. it seemed as if bacchus and venus and priapus had come to their own again, and yet rome had not ceased to call herself christian. [sidenote: superstition.] 'owing to the evil ensample of the papal court,' writes machiavelli, 'italy has lost all piety and all religion: whence follow infinite troubles and disorders; for as religion implies all good, so its absence implies the contrary. to the church and priests of rome we owe another even greater disaster which is the cause of her ruin. i mean that the church has maintained, and still maintains italy divided.' the papacy is too weak to unite and rule, but strong enough to prevent others doing so, and is always ready to call in the foreigner to crush all italians to the foreigner's profit, and guicciardini, a high papal officer, commenting on this, adds, 'it would be impossible to speak so ill of the roman court, but that more abuse should not be merited, seeing it is an infamy, and example of all the shames and scandals of the world.' the lesser clergy, the monks, the nuns followed, with anxious fidelity, the footsteps of their shepherds. there was hardly a tonsure in italy which covered more than thoughts and hopes of lust and avarice. religion and morals which god had joined together, were set by man a thousand leagues asunder. yet religion still sat upon the alabaster throne of peter, and in the filthy straw of the meanest calabrian confessional. and still deeper remained a blind devoted superstition. vitellozzo vitelli, as machiavelli tells us, while being strangled by cæesar borgia's assassin, implored his murderer to procure for him the absolution of that murderer's father. gianpaolo baglioni, who reigned by parricide and lived in incest, was severely blamed by the florentines for not killing pope julius ii. when the latter was his guest at perugia. and when gabrino fondato, the tyrant of cremona, was on the scaffold, his only regret was that when he had taken his guests, the pope and emperor, to the top of the cremona tower, four hundred feet high, his nerve failed him and he did not push them both over. upon this anarchy of religion, morals, and conduct breathed suddenly the inspiring breath of pagan antiquity which seemed to the italian mind to find its finest climax in tyrannicide. there is no better instance than in the plot of the pazzi at florence. francesco pazzi and bernardo bandini decided to kill lorenzo and giuliano de' medici in the cathedral at the moment of the elevation of the host. they naturally took the priest into their confidence. they escorted giuliano to the duomo, laughing and talking, and playfully embraced him--to discover if he wore armour under his clothes. then they killed him at the moment appointed. [sidenote: pagan influence.] nor were there any hills from which salvation might be looked for. philosophy, poetry, science, expressed themselves in terms of materialism. faith and hope are ever the last survivors in the life of a man or of a nation. but in italy these brave comforters were at their latest breath. it is perhaps unfair to accept in full the judgment of northern travellers. the conditions, training, needs of england and germany were different. in these countries courage was a necessity, and good faith a paying policy. subtlety could do little against a two-handed sword in the hands of an angry or partially intoxicated giant. climate played its part as well as culture, and the crude pleasures and vices of the north seemed fully as loathsome to the refined italian as did the tortuous policy and the elaborate infamies of the south to their rough invaders. alone, perhaps, among the nations of europe the italians had never understood or practised chivalry, save in such select and exotic schools as the casa gioiosa under vittorino da feltre at mantua. the oath of arthur's knights would have seemed to them mere superfluity of silliness. _onore_ connoted credit, reputation, and prowess. _virtù_, which may be roughly translated as mental ability combined with personal daring, set the standard and ruled opinion. 'honour in the north was subjective: _onore_ in italy objective.' individual liberty, indeed, was granted in full to all, at the individual's risk. the love of beauty curbed grossness and added distinction. fraud became an art and force a science. there is liberty for all, but for the great ones there is licence. and when the day of trial comes, it is the churchmen and the princes who can save neither themselves nor man, nor thing that is theirs. to such a world was machiavelli born. to whom should he turn? to the people? to the church? to the princes and despots? but hear him:-- 'there shall never be found any good mason, which will beleeve to be able to make a faire image of a peece of marble ill hewed, but verye well of a rude peece. our italian princes beleeved, before they tasted the blowes of the outlandish warre, that it should suffice a prince to know by writinges, how to make a subtell aunswere, to write a goodly letter, to shewe in sayinges, and in woordes, witte and promptenesse, to know how to canvas a fraude, to decke themselves with precious stones and gold, to sleepe and to eate with greater glory then other: to kepe many lascivious persons about them, to governe themselves with their subjects, covetously and proudely: to roote in idlenes, to give the degrees of the exercise of warre for good will, to dispise if any should have shewed them any laudable waie, minding that their wordes should bee aunswers of oracles: nor the sely wretches were not aware that they prepared themselves to be a pray to whome so ever should assaulte them. hereby grew then in the thousand fowre hundred and nintie and fowre yere, the great feares, the sodaine flightes and the marveilous losses: and so three most mighty states which were in italie, have bene dievers times sacked and destroyed. but that which is worse, is where those that remaine, continue in the very same errour, and liev in the verie same disorder and consider not, that those who in olde time would keepe their states, caused to be done these thinges, which of me hath beene reasoned, and that their studies were, to prepare the body to diseases, and the minde not to feare perills. whereby grewe that cæsar, alexander, and all those men and excellent princes in olde time, were the formost amongst the fighters, going armed on foote: and if they lost their state, they would loose their life, so that they lievd and died vertuously.' such was the clay that waited the moulding of the potter's hand. 'posterity, that high court of appeal, which is never tired of eulogising its own justice and discernment,' has recorded harsh sentence on the florentine. it is better to-day to let him speak for himself. [sidenote: _the prince_.] the slender volume of _the prince_ has probably produced wider discussion, more bitter controversy, more varied interpretations and a deeper influence than any book save holy writ. kings and statesmen, philosophers and theologians, monarchists and republicans have all and always used or abused it for their purposes. written in , the first year of machiavelli's disgrace, concurrently with part of the _discorsi_, which contain the germs of it, the book represents the fulness of its author's thought and experience. it was not till after machiavelli's death, that it was published in , by order of clement vii. meanwhile, however, in manuscript it had been widely read and favourably received. [sidenote: its purpose.] the mere motive of its creation and dedication has been the theme of many volumes. machiavelli was poor, was idle, was out of favour, and therefore, though a republican, wrote a devilish hand-book of tyranny to strengthen the medici and recover his position. machiavelli, a loyal republican, wrote a primer of such fiendish principles as might lure the medici to their ruin. machiavelli's one idea was to ruin the rich: machiavelli's one idea was to oppress the poor: he was a protestant, a jesuit, an atheist: a royalist and a republican. and the book published by one pope's express authority was utterly condemned and forbidden, with all its author's works, by the express command of another ( ). but before facing the whirlwind of savage controversy which raged and rages still about _the prince_, it may be well to consider shortly the book itself--consider it as a new book and without prejudice. the purpose of its composition is almost certainly to be found in the plain fact that machiavelli, a politician and a man of letters, wished to write a book upon the subject which had been his special study and lay nearest to his business and bosom. to ensure prominence for such a book, to engage attention and incidentally perhaps to obtain political employment for himself, he dedicated it to lorenzo de' medici, the existing and accepted chief of the state. but far and above such lighter motives stood the fact that he saw in lorenzo the only man who might conceivably bring to being the vast dream of patriotism which the writer had imagined. the subject he proposed to himself was largely, though not wholly, conditioned by the time and place in which he lived. he wrote for his countrymen and he wrote for his own generation. he had heard with his ears and seen with his eyes the alternate rending anarchy and moaning paralysis of italy. he had seen what agricola had long before been spared the sight of. and what he saw, he saw not through a glass darkly or distorted, but in the whitest, driest light, without flinching and face to face. 'we are much beholden,' writes bacon, 'to machiavelli and others that wrote what men do, and not what they ought to do.' he did not despair of italy, he did not despair even of italian unity. but he despaired of what he saw around him, and he was willing at almost any price to end it. he recognised, despite the nominal example of venice, that a republican system was impossible, and that the small principalities and free cities were corrupt beyond hope of healing. a strong central unifying government was imperative, and at that day such government could only be vested in a single man. for it must ever be closely remembered, as will be pointed out again, that throughout the book the prince is what would now be called the government. and then he saw with faithful prophecy, in the splendid peroration of his hope, a hope deferred for near four hundred years, he saw beyond the painful paths of blood and tyranny, a vision of deliverance and union. for at least it is plain that in all things machiavelli was a passionate patriot, and _amo la patria mia più dell' anima_ is found in one of the last of many thousand letters that his untiring pen had written. the purpose, then, of _the prince_ is to lay down rules, within the possibilities of the time, for the making of a man who shall create, increase, and maintain a strong and stable government. this is done in the main by a plain presentation of facts, a presentation condensed and critical but based on men and things as they actually were. the ethical side is wholly omitted: the social and economical almost entirely. the aspect is purely political, with the underlying thought, it may be supposed, that under the postulated government, all else will prosper. [sidenote: the book; new states.] machiavelli opens by discussing the various forms of governments, which he divides into republics and principalities. of the latter some may be hereditary and some acquired. of hereditary states he says little and quotes but one, the duchy of ferrara. he then turns to his true subject, the acquisition and preservation of states wholly new or new in part, states such as he saw himself on every side around him. having gained possession of a new state, he says, you must first extirpate the family of your predecessor. you should then either reside or plant colonies, but not trust to garrisons. 'colonies are not costly to the prince, are more faithful and cause less offence to the subject states: those whom they may injure being poor and scattered, are prevented from doing mischief. for it should be observed that men ought either to be caressed or trampled out, seeing that small injuries may be avenged, whereas great ones destroy the possibility of retaliation: and so the damage that has to be inflicted ought to be such that it need involve no fear of reprisals.' there is perhaps in all machiavelli no better example of his lucid scientific method than this passage. there is neither excuse nor hypocrisy. it is merely a matter of business calculation. mankind is the raw material, the state is the finished work. further you are to conciliate your neighbours who are weak and abase the strong, and you must not let the stranger within your gates. above all look before as well as after and think not to leave it to time, _godere li benefici del tempo_, but, as did the romans, strike and strike at once. for illustration he criticises, in a final and damning analysis, the career of louis xii. in italy. there was no canon of statecraft so absolute that the king did not ignore it, and in inevitable nemesis, there was no ultimate disaster so crowning as not to be achieved. [sidenote: conquests.] after observing that a feudal monarchy is much less easy of conquest than a despotism, since in the one case you must vanquish many lesser lordships while in the other you merely replace slaves by slaves, machiavelli considers the best method of subjugating free cities. here again is eminent the terrible composure and the exact truth of his politics. a conquered free city you may of course rule in person, or you may construct an oligarchy to govern for you, but the only safe way is to destroy it utterly, since 'that name of liberty, those ancient usages of freedom,' are things 'which no length of years and no benefits can extinguish in the nation's mind, things which no pains or forethought can uproot unless the citizens be utterly destroyed.' hitherto the discussion has ranged round the material politics of the matter, the acquisition of material power. machiavelli now turns to the heart of his matter, the proper character and conduct of a new prince in a new principality and the ways by which he shall deal most fortunately with friend and foe. for fortune it is, as well as ability, which go to the making of the man and the maintenance of his power. [sidenote: cæsar borgia.] in the manner of the day moses, cyrus, romulus, and theseus are led across the stage in illustration. the common attribute of all such fortunate masters of men was force of arms, while the mission of an unarmed prophet such as savonarola was foredoomed to failure. in such politics machiavelli is positive and ruthless: force is and must be the remedy and the last appeal, a principle which indeed no later generation has in practice set at naught. but in the hard dry eyes of the florentine secretary stood, above all others, one shining figure, a figure to all other eyes, from then till now, wrapped in mysterious and miasmatic cloud. in the pages of common history he was a tyrant, he was vicious beyond compare, he was cruel beyond the inquisition, he was false beyond the father of lies, he was the antichrist of rome and he was a failure: but he was the hero of niccolò machiavelli, who, indeed, found in cæsar borgia the fine flower of italian politics in the age of the despots. son of the pope, a prince of the church, a duke of france, a master of events, a born soldier, diplomatist, and more than half a statesman, cæsar seemed indeed the darling of gods and men whom original fortune had crowned with inborn ability. machiavelli knew him as well as it was possible to know a soul so tortuous and secret, and he had been present at the most critical and terrible moments of cæsar's life. that in despite of a life which the world calls infamous, in despite of the howling execrations of all christendom, in despite of ultimate and entire failures, machiavelli could still write years after, 'i know not what lessons i could teach a new prince more useful than the example of his actions,' exhibits the ineffaceable impressions that cæsar borgia had made upon the most subtle and observant mind of modern history. [sidenote: cæsar's career.] cæsar was the acknowledged son of pope alexander by his acknowledged mistress vannozza dei cattani. born in , he was an archbishop and a cardinal at sixteen, and the murderer of his elder brother at an age when modern youths are at college. he played his part to the full in the unspeakable scandals of the vatican, but already 'he spoke little and people feared him.' ere long the splendours of the papacy seemed too remote and uncertain for his fierce ambition, and, indeed, through his father, he already wielded both the temporal and the spiritual arms of peter. to the subtlety of the italian his spanish blood had lent a certain stern resolution, and as with julius and sulla the lust for sloth and sensuality were quickened by the lust for sway. he unfrocked himself with pleasure. he commenced politician, soldier, and despot. and for the five years preceding alexander's death he may almost be looked upon as a power in europe. invested duke of romagna, that hot-bed of petty tyranny and tumult, he repressed disorder through his governor messer ramiro with a relentless hand. when order reigned, machiavelli tells us he walked out one morning into the market-place at cesena and saw the body of ramiro, who had borne the odium of reform, lying in two pieces with his head on a lance, and a bloody axe by his side. cæsar reaped the harvest of ramiro's severity, and the people recognising his benevolence and justice were 'astounded and satisfied.' but the gaze of the borgia was not bounded by the strait limits of a mere italian duchy. whether indeed there mingled with personal ambition an ideal of a united italy, swept clean of the barbarians, it is hard to say, though machiavelli would have us believe it. what is certain is that he desired the supreme dominion in italy for himself, and to win it spared neither force nor fraud nor the help of the very barbarians themselves. with a decree of divorce and a cardinal's hat he gained the support of france, the french duchy of valentinois, and the sister of the king of navarre to wife. by largesse of bribery and hollow promises he brought to his side the great families of rome, his natural enemies, and the great condottieri with their men-at-arms. when by their aid he had established and extended his government he mistrusted their good faith. with an infinity of fascination and cunning, without haste and without rest, he lured these leaders, almost more cunning than himself, to visit him as friends in his fortress of sinigaglia. 'i doubt if they will be alive to-morrow morning,' wrote machiavelli, who was on the spot. he was right. cæsar caused them to be strangled the same night, while his father dealt equal measure to their colleagues and adherents in rome. thenceforth, distrusting mercenaries, he found and disciplined out of a mere rabble, a devoted army of his own, and having unobtrusively but completely extirpated the whole families of those whose thrones he had usurped, not only the present but the future seemed assured to him. he had fulfilled the first of machiavelli's four conditions. he rapidly achieved the remaining three. he bought the roman nobles so as to be able to put a bridle in the new 'pope's mouth.' he bought or poisoned or packed or terrorised the existing college of cardinals and selected new princes of the church who should accept a pontiff of his choosing. he was effectively strong enough to resist the first onset upon him at his father's death. five years had been enough for so great an undertaking. one thing alone he had not and indeed could not have foreseen. 'he told me himself on the day on which (pope) julius was created, that he had foreseen and provided for everything else that could happen on his father's death, but had never anticipated that, when his father died, he too should have been at death's door.' even so the fame and splendour of his name for a while maintained his authority against his unnumbered enemies. but soon the great betrayer was betrayed. 'it is well to cheat those who have been masters of treachery,' he had said himself in his hours of brief authority. his wheel had turned full cycle. within three years his fate, like that of charles xii., was destined to a foreign strand, a petty fortress, and a dubious hand. given over to spain he passed three years obscurely. 'he was struck down in a fight at viana in navarre ( ) after a furious resistance: he was stripped of his fine armour by men who did not know his name or quality and his body was left naked on the bare ground, bloody and riddled with wounds. he was only thirty-one.' and so the star of machiavelli's hopes and dreams was quenched for a season in the clouds from which it came. [sidenote: the lesson.] it seems worth while to sketch the strange tempestuous career of cæsar borgia because in the remaining chapters of _the prince_ and elsewhere in his writings, it is the thought and memory of valentinois, transmuted doubtless and idealised by the lapse of years, that largely inform and inspire the perfect prince of machiavelli. but it must not be supposed that in life or in mind they were intimate or even sympathetic. machiavelli criticises his hero liberally and even harshly. but for the work he wanted done he had found no better craftsman and no better example to follow for those that might come after. morals and religion did not touch the purpose of his arguments except as affecting policy. in policy virtues may be admitted as useful agents and in the chapter following that on cæsar, entitled, curiously enough, 'of those who by their crimes come to be princes,' he lays down that 'to slaughter fellow citizens, to betray friends, to be devoid of honour, pity and religion cannot be counted as merits, for these are means which may lead to power but which confer no glory.' cruelty he would employ without hesitation but with the greatest care both in degree and in kind. it should be immediate and complete and leave no possibility of counter-revenge. for it is never forgotten by the living, and 'he deceives himself who believes that, with the great, recent benefits cause old wrongs to be forgotten.' on the other hand 'benefits should be conferred little by little so that they may be more fully relished.' the cruelty proper to a prince (government, for as ever they are identical) aims only at authority. now authority must spring from love or fear. it were best to combine both motives to obedience but you cannot. the prince must remember that men are fickle, and love at their own pleasure, and that men are fearful and fear at the pleasure of the prince. let him therefore depend on what is of himself, not on that which is of others. 'yet if he win not love he may escape hate, and so it will be if he does not meddle with the property or women-folk of his subjects.' when he must punish let him kill. 'for men will sooner forget the death of their father than the loss of their estate.' and moreover you cannot always go on killing, but a prince who has once set himself to plundering will never stop. this is the more needful because the only secure foundation of his rule lies in his trust of the people and in their support. and indeed again and again you shall find no more thorough democrat than this teacher of tyrants. 'the people own better broader qualities, fidelities and passions than any prince and have better cause to show for them.' 'as for prudence and stability, i say that a people is more stable, more prudent, and of better judgment than a prince.' if the people go wrong it is almost certainly the crime or negligence of the prince which drives or leads them astray. 'better far than any number of fortresses is not to be hated by your people.' the support of the people and a national militia make the essential strength of the prince and of the state. [sidenote: national defence.] the chapters on military organisation may be more conveniently considered in conjunction with _the art of war_. it is enough at present to point out two or three observations of machiavelli which touch politics from the military side. to his generation they were entirely novel, though mere commonplace to-day. national strength means national stability and national greatness; and this can be achieved, and can only be achieved, by a national army. the condottiere system, born of sloth and luxury, has proved its rottenness. your hired general is either a tyrant or a traitor, a bully or a coward. 'in a word the armour of others is too wide or too strait for us: it falls off us, or it weighs us down.' and in a fine illustration he compares auxiliary troops to the armour of saul which david refused, preferring to fight goliath with his sling and stone. [sidenote: conduct of the prince.] having assured the external security of the state, machiavelli turns once more to the qualities and conduct of the prince. so closely packed are these concluding chapters that it is almost impossible to compress them further. the author at the outset states his purpose: 'since it is my object to write what shall be useful to whosoever understands it, it seems to me better to follow the practical truth of things rather than an imaginary view of them. for many republics and princedoms have been imagined that were never seen or known to exist in reality. and the manner in which we live and in which we ought to live, are things so wide asunder that he who suits the one to betake himself to the other is more likely to destroy than to save himself.' nothing that machiavelli wrote is more sincere, analytic, positive and ruthless. he operates unflinchingly on an assured diagnosis. the hand never an instant falters, the knife is never blunt. he deals with what is, and not with what ought to be. should the prince be all-virtuous, all-liberal, all-humane? should his word be his bond for ever? should true religion be the master-passion of his life? machiavelli considers. the first duty of the prince (or government) is to maintain the existence, stability, and prosperity of the state. now if all the world were perfect so should the prince be perfect too. but such are not the conditions of human life. an idealising prince must fall before a practising world. a prince must learn in self-defence how to be bad, but like cæsar borgia, he must be a great judge of occasion. and what evil he does must be deliberate, appropriate, and calculated, and done, not selfishly, but for the good of the state of which he is trustee. there is the power of law and the power of force. the first is proper to men, the second to beasts. and that is why achilles was brought up by cheiron the centaur that he might learn to use both natures. a ruler must be half lion and half fox, a fox to discern the toils, a lion to drive off the wolves. merciful, faithful, humane, religious, just, these he may be and above all should seem to be, nor should any word escape his lips to give the lie to his professions: and in fact he should not leave these qualities but when he must. he should, if possible, practise goodness, but under necessity should know how to pursue evil. he should keep faith until occasion alter, or reason of state compel him to break his pledge. above all he should profess and observe religion, 'because men in general judge rather by the eye than by the hand, and every one can see but few can touch.' but none the less, must he learn (as did william the silent, elizabeth of england, and henry of navarre) how to subordinate creed to policy when urgent need is upon him. in a word, he must realise and face his own position, and the facts of mankind and of the world. if not veracious to his conscience, he must be veracious to facts. he must not be bad for badness' sake, but seeing things as they are, must deal as he can to protect and preserve the trust committed to his care. fortune is still a fickle jade, but at least the half our will is free, and if we are bold we may master her yet. for fortune is a woman who, to be kept under, must be beaten and roughly handled, and we see that she is more ready to be mastered by those who treat her so, than by those who are shy in their wooing. and always, like a woman, she gives her favours to the young, because they are less scrupulous and fiercer and more audaciously command her to their will. [sidenote: the appeal.] and so at the last the sometime secretary of the florentine republic turns to the new master of the florentines in splendid exhortation. he points to no easy path. he proposes no mean ambition. he has said already that 'double will that prince's glory be, who has founded a new realm and fortified it and adorned it with good laws, good arms, good friends, and good examples.' but there is more and better to be done. the great misery of men has ever made the great leaders of men. but was israel in egypt, were the persians, the athenians ever more enslaved, down-trodden, disunited, beaten, despoiled, mangled, overrun and desolate than is our italy to-day? the barbarians must be hounded out, and italy be free and one. now is the accepted time. all italy is waiting and only seeks the man. to you the darling of fortune and the church this splendid task is given, to and to the army of italy and of italians only. arm italy and lead her. to you, the deliverer, what gates would be closed, what obedience refused! what jealousies opposed, what homage denied. love, courage, and fixed fidelity await you, and under your standards shall the voice of petrarch be fulfilled: virtu contro al furore prenderà l'arme e fia il combatter corto: chè l'antico valore negl' italici cor non è ancor morto. such is _the prince_ of machiavelli. the vision of its breathless exhortation seemed then as but a landscape to a blind man's eye. but the passing of three hundred and fifty years of the misery he wept for brought at the last, almost in perfect exactness, the fulfilment of that impossible prophecy. [sidenote: the attack.] there is no great book in the world of smaller compass than _the prince_ of machiavelli. there is no book more lucidly, directly, and plainly written. there is no book that has aroused more vehement, venomous, and even truculent controversy from the moment of its publication until to-day. and it is asserted with great probability that _the prince_ has had a more direct action upon real life than any other book in the world, and a larger share in breaking the chains and lighting the dark places of the middle ages. it is a truism to say that machiavellism existed before machiavelli. the politics of gian galeazzo visconti, of louis xi. of france, of ferdinand of spain, of the papacy, of venice, might have been dictated by the author of _the prince_. but machiavelli was the first to observe, to compare, to diagnose, to analyse, and to formulate their principles of government. the first to establish, not a divorce, but rather a judicial separation between the morals of a man and the morals of a government. it is around the purpose and possible results of such a separation in politics, ethics, and religion that the storm has raged most fiercely. to follow the path of that storm through near four centuries many volumes would be needed, and it will be more convenient to deal with the more general questions in summing up the influence of machiavelli as a whole. but the main lines and varying fortunes of the long campaign may be indicated. during the period of its manuscript circulation and for a few years after its publication _the prince_ was treated with favour or at worst with indifference, and the first mutterings were merely personal to the author. he was a scurvy knave and turncoat with neither bowels nor conscience, almost negligible. but still men read him, and a change in conditions brought a change in front. he had in _the prince_, above all in the _discorsi_, accused the church of having ruined italy and debauched the world. in view of the writer's growing popularity, of the reformation and the pagan renaissance, such charges could no longer be lightly set aside. the churchmen opened the main attack. amongst the leaders was cardinal pole, to whom the practical precepts of _the prince_ had been recommended in lieu of the dreams of plato, by thomas cromwell, the _malleus monachorum_ of henry viii. the catholic attack was purely theological, but before long the jesuits joined in the cry. machiavelli was burnt in effigy at ingoldstadt. he was _subdolus diabolicarum cogitationum faber_, and _irrisor et atheos_ to boot. the pope himself gave commissions to unite against him, and his books were placed on the index, together, it must be admitted, with those of boccaccio, erasmus, and savonarola so the company was goodly. but meanwhile, and perhaps in consequence, editions and translations of _the prince_ multiplied apace. the great figures of the world were absorbed by it. charles v., his son, and his courtiers studied the book. catherine de medici brought it to france. a copy of _the prince_ was found on the murdered bodies of henry iii. and henry iv. richelieu praised it. sextus v. analysed it in his own handwriting. it was read at the english court; bacon was steeped in it, and quotes or alludes to it constantly. hobbes and harrington studied it. but now another change. so then, cried innocent gentillet, the huguenot, the book is a primer of despotism and rome, and a grammar for bigots and tyrants. it doubtless is answerable for the massacre of st. bartholomew. the man is a _chien impur_. and in answer to this new huntsman the whole protestant pack crashed in pursuit. within fifty years of his death _the prince_ and machiavelli himself had become a legend and a myth, a haunting, discomforting ghost that would not be laid. machiavellism had grown to be a case of conscience both to catholic and protestant, to theologian, moralist, and philosopher. in spain the author, damned in france for his despotism and popery, was as freshly and freely damned for his civil and religious toleration. in england to the cavaliers he was an atheist, to the roundheads a jesuit. christina of sweden annotated him with enthusiasm. frederick the great published his _anti-machiavel_ brimming with indignation, though it is impossible not to wonder what would have become of prussia had not the prussian king so closely followed in practice the precepts of the florentine, above all perhaps, as voltaire observed, in the publication of the _anti-machiavel_ itself. no doubt in the eighteenth century, when monarchy was so firmly established as not to need machiavelli, kings and statesmen sought to clear kingship of the supposed stain he had besmirched them with. but their reading was as little as their misunderstanding was great, and the florentine secretary remained the mysterious necromancer. it was left for rousseau to describe the book of this 'honnête homme et bon citoyen' as 'le livre des républicains,' and for napoleon, the greatest of the author's followers if not disciples, to draw inspiration and suggestion from his florentine forerunner and to justify the murder of the due d'enghien by a quotation from _the prince_. 'mais après tout,' he said, 'un homme d'etat est-il fait pour être sensible? n'est-ce pas un personnage--complètement excentrique, toujours seul d'un côté, avec le monde de l'autre?' and again 'jugez done s'il doit s'amuser à ménager certaines convenances de sentiments si importantes pour le commun des hommes? peut-il considérer les liens du sang, les affections, les puérils ménagements de la société? et dans la situation où il se trouve, que d'actions séparées de l'ensemble et qu'on blâme, quoiqu'elles doivent contribuer au grand oeuvre que tout le monde n'aperçoit pas? ... malheureux que vous êtes! vous retiendrez vos éloges parce que vous craindrez que le mouvement de cette grande machine ne fasse sur vous l'effet de gulliver, qui, lorsqu'il déplaçait sa jambe, écrasait les lilliputiens. exhortez-vous, devancez le temps, agrandissez votre imagination, regardez de loin, et vous verrez que ces grands personnages que vous croyez violents, cruels, que sais-je? ne sont que des politiques. ils se connaissent, se jugent mieux que vous, et, quand ils sont réellement habiles, ils savent se rendre maîtres de leurs passions car ils vont jusqu'à en calculer les effets.' even in his carriage at waterloo was found a french translation of _the prince_ profusely annotated. [sidenote: the defence.] but from the first the defence was neither idle nor weak. the assault was on the morals of the man: the fortress held for the ideas of the thinker. he does not treat of morals, therefore he is immoral, cried the plaintiff. has he spoken truth or falsehood? is his word the truth and will his truth prevail? was the rejoinder. in germany and italy especially and in france and england in less degree, philosophers and critics have argued and written without stint and without cease. as history has grown wider and more scientific so has the preponderance of opinion leaned to the florentine's favour. it would be impossible to recapitulate the arguments or even to indicate the varying points of view. and indeed the main hindrance in forming a just idea of _the prince_ is the constant treatment of a single side of the book and the preconceived intent of the critic. bacon has already been mentioned. among later names are hobbes, spinoza, leibnitz. herder gives qualified approval, while fichte frankly throws down the glove as _the prince's_ champion. 'da man weiss dass politische machtfragen nie, am wenigsten in einem verderbten volke, mit den mitteln der moral zu lösen sind, so ist es unverständig das buch von fürsten zu verschreien. macchiavelli hatte einen herrscher zu schildern, keinen klosterbruder.' the last sentence may at least be accepted as a last word by practical politicians. ranke and macaulay, and a host of competent germans and italians have lent their thought and pens to solve the riddle in the florentine's favour. and lastly, the course of political events in europe have seemed to many the final justification of the teaching of _the prince_. the leaders of the risorgimento thought that they found in letters, 'writ with a stiletto,' not only the inspirations of patriotism and the aspirations to unity, but a sure and trusted guide to the achievement. germany recognised in the author a schoolmaster to lead them to unification, and a military instructor to teach them of an armed people. half europe snatched at the principle of nationality. for in _the prince_, machiavelli not only begat ideas but fertilised the ideas of others, and whatever the future estimation of the book may be, it stands, read or unread, as a most potent, if not as the dominant, factor in european politics for four hundred years. [sidenote: the _discorsi_.] the _discorsi_, printed in rome by blado, , are not included in the present edition, as the first english translation did not appear until , when almost the entire works of machiavelli were published by an anonymous translator in london. but some account and consideration of their contents is imperative to any review of the florentine's political thoughts. such discorsi and relazioni were not uncommon at the time. the stronger and younger minds of the renaissance wearied of discussing in the lovely gardens of the rucellai the ideas of plato or the allegories of plotinus. the politics of aristotle had just been intelligibly translated by leonardo bruni ( ). and to-day the young ears and eyes of florence were alert for an impulse to action. they saw glimpses, in reopened fields of history, of quarries long grown over where the ore of positive politics lay hid. the men who came to-day to the orti oricellarii were men versed in public affairs, men of letters, historians, poets, living greatly in a great age, with raphael, michael angelo, ariosto, leonardo going up and down amongst them. machiavelli was now in fair favour with the medici, and is described by strozzi as _una persona per sorgere_ (a rising man). he was welcomed into the group with enthusiasm, and there read and discussed the _discorsi_. nominally mere considerations upon the first decade of livy, they rapidly encircled all that was known and thought of policy and state-craft, old and living. [sidenote: their plan.] written concurrently with _the prince_, though completed later, the _discorsi_ contain almost the whole of the thoughts and intents of the more famous book, but with a slightly different application. '_the prince_ traces the progress of an ambitious man, the _discorsi_ the progress of an ambitious people,' is an apt if inadequate criticism. machiavelli was not the first italian who thought and wrote upon the problems of his time. but he was the first who discussed grave questions in modern language. he was the first modern political writer who wrote of men and not of man, for the prince himself is a collective individuality. 'this must be regarded as a general rule,' is ever in machiavelli's mouth, while guicciardini finds no value in a general rule, but only in 'long experience and worthy discretion.' the one treated of policy, the other of politics. guicciardini considered specifically by what methods to control and arrange an existing government. machiavelli sought to create a science, which should show how to establish, maintain, and hinder the decline of states generally conceived. even cavour counted the former as a more practical guide in affairs. but machiavelli was the theorist of humanity in politics, not the observer only. he distinguished the two orders of research. and, during the italian renaissance such distinction was supremely necessary. with a crumbled theology, a pagan pope, amid the wreck of laws and the confusion of social order, _il sue particolare_ and _virtù_, individuality and ability (energy, political genius, prowess, vital force: _virtù_ is impossible to translate, and only does not mean virtue), were the dominating and unrelenting factors of life. niccolò machiavelli, unlike montesquieu, agreed with martin luther that man was bad. it was for both the wittenberger and the florentine, in their very separate ways, to found the school and wield the scourge. in the naked and unashamed candour of the time guicciardini could say that he loathed the papacy and all its works. 'for all that, he adds, 'the preferments i have enjoyed, have forced me for my private ends to set my heart upon papal greatness. were it not for this consideration, i should love martin luther as my second self.' in the _discorsi_, machiavelli bitterly arraigns the church as having 'deprived italians of religion and liberty.' he utterly condemns savonarolà, yet he could love and learn from dante, and might almost have said with pym, 'the greatest liberty of the kingdom is religion. thereby we are freed from spiritual evils, and no impositions are so grievous as those that are laid upon the soul.' [sidenote: religion.] the florentine postulates religion as an essential element in a strong and stable state. perhaps, with gibbon, he deemed it useful to the magistrate. but his science is impersonal. he will not tolerate a church that poaches on his political preserves. good dogma makes bad politics. it must not tamper with liberty or security. and most certainly, with dante, in the _paradiso_, he would either have transformed or omitted the third beatitude, that the meek shall inherit the earth. with such a temperament, machiavelli must ever keep touch with sanity. it was not for him as for aristotle to imagine what an ideal state should be, but rather to inquire what states actually were and what they might actually become. he seeks first and foremost 'the use that may be derived from history in politics'; not from its incidents but from its general principles. his darling model of a state is to be found where dante found it, in the roman republic. the memory and even the substance of dante occur again and again. but dante's inspiration was spiritual: machiavelli's frankly pagan, and with the latter fortune takes the place of god. dante did not love the papacy, but machiavelli, pointing out how even in ancient rome religion was politic or utilitarian, leads up to his famous attack upon the roman church, to which he attributes all the shame and losses, political, social, moral, national, that italy has suffered at her hands. and now for the first time the necessity for italian unity is laid plainly down, and the church and its temporal power denounced as the central obstacles. in religion itself the secretary saw much merit. 'but when it is an absolute question of the welfare of our country, then justice or injustice, mercy or cruelty, praise or ignominy, must be set aside, and we must seek alone whatever course may preserve the existence and liberty of the state.' throughout the _discorsi_, machiavelli in a looser and more expansive form, suggests, discusses, or re-affirms the ideas of _the prince_. there is the same absence of judgment on the moral value of individual conduct; the same keen decision of its practical effect as a political act. but here more than in _the prince_, he deals with the action and conduct of the people. with his passion for personal and contemporary incarnation he finds in the swiss of his day the romans of republican rome, and reiterates the comparison in detail. feudalism, mercenaries, political associations embodied in arts and guilds, the temporal power of the church, all these are put away, and in their stead he announces the new and daring gospel that for organic unity subjects must be treated as equals and not as inferiors. 'trust the people' is a maxim he repeats and enforces again and again. and he does not shrink from, but rather urges the corollary, 'arm the people.' indeed it were no audacious paradox to state the ideal of machiavelli, though he nominally preferred a republic, as a limited monarchy, ruling over a nation in arms. no doubt he sought, as was natural enough in his day, to construct the state from without rather than to guide and encourage its evolution from within. it seemed to him that, in such an ocean of corruption, force _was_ a remedy and fraud no sluttish handmaid. 'vice n'est-ce pas,' writes montaigne, of such violent acts of government, 'car il a quitté sa raison à une plus universelle et puissante raison.' even so the prince and the people could only be justified by results. but the public life is of larger value than the private, and sometimes one man must be crucified for a thousand. despite all prejudice and make-belief, such a rule and practice has obtained from the assemblies of athens to the parliaments of the twentieth century. but machiavelli first candidly imparted it to the unwilling consciences and brains of men, and it is he who has been the chosen scape-goat to carry the sins of the people. his earnestness makes him belie his own precept to keep the name and take away the thing. in this, as in a thousand instances, he was not too darkly hidden; he was too plain. 'machiavelli,' says one who studied the florentine as hardly another had done, 'machiavelli hat gesündigt, aber noch mehr ist gegen ihn gesündigt worden.' liberty is good, but unity is its only sure foundation. it is the way to the unity of government and people that the thoughts both of _the prince_ and the _discorsi_ lead, though the incidents be so nakedly presented as to shock the timorous and vex the prurient, the puritan, and the evil thinker. the people must obey the state and fight and die for its salvation, and for the prince the hatred of the subjects is never good, but their love, and the best way to gain it is by 'not interrupting the subject in the quiet enjoyment of his estate.' even so bland and gentle a spirit as the poet gray cannot but comment, 'i rejoice when i see machiavelli defended or illustrated, who to me appears one of the wisest men that any nation in any age hath produced.' [sidenote: the art of war.] throughout both _the prince_ and the _discorsi_ are constant allusions to, and often long discussions on, military affairs. the army profoundly interested machiavelli both as a primary condition of national existence and stability, and also, as he pondered upon the contrast between ancient rome and the florence that he lived in, as a subject fascinating in itself. his _art of war_ was probably published in . before that date the florentine secretary had had some personal touch both with the theory and practice of war. as a responsible official in the camp before pisa he had seen both siege work and fighting. having lost faith in mercenary forces he made immense attempts to form a national militia, and was appointed chancellor of the nove della milizia. in switzerland and the tyrol he had studied army questions. he planned with pietro navarro the defence of florence and prato against charles v. at verona and mantua in , he closely studied the famous siege of padua. from birth to death war and battles raged all about him, and he had personal knowledge of the great captains of the age. moreover, he saw in italy troops of every country, of every quality, in every stage of discipline, in every manner of formation. his love of ancient rome led him naturally to the study of livy and vegetius, and from them with regard to formations, to the relative values of infantry and cavalry and other points of tactics, he drew or deduced many conclusions which hold good to-day. indeed a german staff officer has written that in reading the florentine you think you are listening to a modern theorist of war. but for the theorist of those days a lion stood in the path. the art of war was not excepted from the quick and thorough transformation that all earthly and spiritual things were undergoing. gunpowder, long invented, was being applied. armour, that, since the beginning, had saved both man and horse, had now lost the half of its virtue. the walls of fortresses, impregnable for a thousand years, became as matchwood ramparts. the mounted man-at-arms was found with wonder to be no match for the lightly-armoured but nimble foot-man. the swiss were seen to hold their own with ease against the knighthood of austria and burgundy. the free companies lost in value and prestige what they added to their corruption and treachery. all these things grew clear to machiavelli. but his almost fatal misfortune was that he observed and wrote in the mid-moment of the transition. he had no faith in fire-arms, and as regards the portable fire-arms of those days he was right. after the artillery work at ravenna, novara, and marignano it is argued that he should have known better. but he was present at no great battles, and pike, spear, and sword had been the stable weapons of four thousand years. these were indeed too simple to be largely modified, and the future of mechanisms and explosives no prophet uninspired could foresee. and indeed the armament and formation of men were not the main intent of machiavelli's thought. his care in detail, especially in fortifications, of which he made a special study, in encampments, in plans, in calculations, is immense. nothing is so trivial as to be left inexact. [sidenote: the new model.] but he centred his observation and imagination on the origin, character, and discipline of an army in being. he pictures the horror, waste, and failure of a mercenary system, and lays down the fatal error in italy of separating civil from military life, converting the latter into a trade. in such a way the soldier grows to a beast, and the citizen to a coward. all this must be changed. the basic idea of this astounding secretary is to form a national army, furnished by conscription and informed by the spirit of the new model of cromwell. all able-bodied men between the ages of seventeen and forty should be drilled on stated days and be kept in constant readiness. once or twice a year each battalion must be mobilised and manoeuvred as in time of war. the discipline must be constant and severe. the men must be not only robust and well-trained, but, above all, virtuous, modest, and disposed to any sacrifice for the public good. so imbued should they be with duty and lofty devotion to their country that though they may rightly deceive the enemy, reward the enemy's deserters and employ spies, yet 'an apple tree laden with fruit might stand untouched in the midst of their encampment.' the infantry should far exceed the cavalry, 'since it is by infantry that battles are won.' secrecy, mobility, and familiarity with the country are to be objects of special care, and positions should be chosen from which advance is safer than retreat. in war this army must be led by one single leader, and, when peace shines again, they must go back contented to their grateful fellow-countrymen and their wonted ways of living. the conception and foundation of such a scheme, at such a time, by such a man is indeed astounding. he broke with the past and with all contemporary organisations. he forecast the future of military europe, though his own italy was the last to win her redemption through his plans. 'taken all in all,' says a german military writer, 'we may recognise machiavelli in his inspired knowledge of the principles of universal military discipline as a true prophet and as one of the weightiest thinkers in the field of military construction and constitution. he penetrated the essence of military technique with a precision wholly alien to his period, and it is, so to say, a new psychological proof of the relationship between the art of war and the art of statecraft, that the founder of modern politics is also the first of modern military classics.' but woe to the florentine secretary with his thoughts born centuries before their time. as in _the prince_, so in the _art of war_, he closes with a passionate appeal of great sorrow and the smallest ray of hope. where shall i hope to find the things that i have told of? what is italy to-day? what are the italians? enervated, impotent, vile. wherefore, 'i lament mee of nature, the which either ought not to have made mee a knower of this, or it ought to have given mee power, to have bene able to have executed it: for now beeing olde, i cannot hope to have any occasion, to be able so to doo: in consideration whereof, i have bene liberall with you who beeing grave young men, may (when the thinges said of me shall please you) at due times, in favoure of your princes, helpe them and counsider them. wherin i would have you not to be afraied, or mistrustfull, because this province seemes to bee altogether given to raise up againe the things deade, as is seene by the perfection that poesie, painting, and writing, is now brought unto: albeit, as much as is looked for of mee, beeing strooken in yeeres, i do mistrust. where surely, if fortune had heretofore graunted mee so much state, as suffiseth for a like enterprise, i would not have doubted, but in most short time, to have shewed to the world, how much the auncient orders availe: and without peradventure, either i would have increased it with glory, or lost it without shame.' [sidenote: _the history of florence_.] in machiavelli was an ageing and disappointed man. he was not popular with any party, but the medici were willing to use him in minor matters if only to secure his adherence. he was commissioned by giulio de medici to write a history of florence with an annual allowance of florins. in he completed his task and dedicated the book to its begetter, pope clement vii. in the history, as in much of his other work, machiavelli enriches the science of humanity with a new department. 'he was the first to contemplate the life of a nation in its continuity, to trace the operation of political forces through successive generations, to contrast the action of individuals with the evolution of causes over which they had but little control, and to bring the salient features of the national biography into relief by the suppression of comparatively unimportant details.' he found no examples to follow, for villani with all his merits was of a different order. diarists and chroniclers there were in plenty, and works of the learned men led by aretino, written in latin and mainly rhetorical. the great work of guicciardini was not published till years after the secretary's death. machiavelli broke away from the chronicle or any other existing form. he deliberately applied philosophy to the sequence of facts. he organised civil and political history. he originally intended to begin his work at the year , the year of the return of cosimo il vecchio from exile and of the consolidation of medicean power on the ground that the earlier periods had been covered by aretino and bracciolini. but he speedily recognised that they told of nothing but external wars and business while the heart of the history of florence was left unbared. the work was to do again in very different manner, and in that manner he did it. throughout he maintains and insistently insinuates his unfailing explanation of the miseries of italy; the necessity of unity and the evils of the papacy which prevents it. in this book dedicated to a pope he scants nothing of his hatred of the holy see. for ever he is still seeking the one strong man in a blatant land with almost absolute power to punish, pull down, and reconstruct on an abiding foundation, for to his clear eyes it is ever the events that are born of the man, and not the man of the events. he was the first to observe that the ghibellines were not only the imperial party but the party of the aristocrats and influential men, whereas the guelphs were the party not only of the church but of the people, and he traces the slow but increasing struggle to the triumph of democracy in the ordinamenti di giustizia ( ). but the triumph was not final. the florentines were 'unable to preserve liberty and could not tolerate slavery.' so the fighting, banishments, bloodshed, cruelty, injustice, began once more. the nobles were in origin germanic, he points out, the people latin; so that a racial bitterness gave accent to their hate. but yet, he adds impartially, when the crushed nobility were forced to change their names and no longer dared be heard 'florence was not only stripped of arms but likewise of all generosity.' it would be impossible to follow the history in detail. the second, seventh and eighth books are perhaps the most powerful and dramatic. outside affairs and lesser events are lightly touched. but no stories in the world have been told with more intensity than those of the conspiracies in the seventh and eighth books, and none have given a more intimate and accurate perception of the modes of thought and feeling at the time. the history ends with the death of lorenzo de medici in . enough has been said of its breadth of scope and originality of method. the spirit of clear flaming patriotism, of undying hope that will not in the darkest day despair, the plangent appeal to italy for its own great sake to rouse and live, all these are found pre-eminently in the history as they are found wherever machiavelli speaks from the heart of his heart. of the style a foreigner may not speak. but those who are proper judges maintain that in simplicity and lucidity, vigour, and power, softness, elevation, and eloquence, the style of machiavelli is 'divine,' and remains, as that of dante among the poets, unchallenged and insuperable among all writers of italian prose. [sidenote: other works.] though machiavelli must always stand as a political thinker, an historian, and a military theorist it would leave an insufficient idea of his mental activities were there no short notice of his other literary works. with his passion for incarnating his theories in a single personality, he wrote the _life of castruccio castracani_, a politico-military romance. his hero was a soldier of fortune born lucca in , and, playing with a free hand, machiavelli weaves a life of adventure and romance in which his constant ideas of war and politics run through and across an almost imaginary tapestry. he seems to have intended to illustrate and to popularise his ideals and to attain by a story the many whom his discourses could not reach. in verse machiavelli was fluent, pungent, and prosaic. the unfinished _golden ass_ is merely made of paragraphs of the _discorsi_ twined into rhymes. and the others are little better. countless pamphlets, essays, and descriptions may be searched without total waste by the very curious and the very leisurely. the many despatches and multitudinous private letters tell the story both of his life and his mind. but the short but famous _novella di belfagor arcidiavolo_ is excellent in wit, satire, and invention. as a playwright he wrote, among many lesser efforts, one supreme comedy, _mandragola_, which macaulay declares to be better than the best of goldoni's plays, and only less excellent than the very best of molière's. italian critics call it the finest play in italian. the plot is not for nursery reading, but there are tears and laughter and pity and anger to furnish forth a copious author, and it has been not ill observed that _mandragola_ is the comedy of a society of which _the prince_ is the tragedy. [sidenote: the end.] it has been said of the italians of the renaissance that with so much of unfairness in their policy, there was an extraordinary degree of fairness in their intellects. they were as direct in thought as they were tortuous in action and could see no wickedness in deceiving a man whom they intended to destroy. to such a charge--if charge it be--machiavelli would have willingly owned himself answerable. he observed, in order to know, and he wished to use his knowledge for the advancement of good. to him the means were indifferent, provided only that they were always apt and moderate in accordance with necessity, a surgeon has no room for sentiment: in such an operator pity were a crime. it is his to examine, to probe, to diagnose, flinching at no ulcer, sparing neither to himself or to his patient. and if he may not act, he is to lay down very clearly the reasons which led to his conclusions and to state the mode by which life itself may be saved, cost what amputation and agony it may. this was machiavelli's business, and he applied his eye, his brains, and his knife with a relentless persistence, which, only because it was so faithful, was not called heroic. and we know that he suffered in the doing of it and that his heart was sore for his patient. but there was no other way. his record is clear and shining. he has been accused of no treachery, of no evil action. his patriotism for italy as a fatherland, a dream undreamt by any other, never glowed more brightly than when italy lay low in shame, and ruin, and despair. his faith never faltered, his spirit never shrank. and the italy that he saw, through dark bursts of storm, broken and sinking, we see to-day riding in the sunny haven where he would have her to be. henry cust. contents page the arte of warre the prince the arte of warre written first in italian by nicholas machiavell and set forthe in englishe by peter whitehorne studient at graies inne with an addicion of other like marcialle feates and experimentes as in a table in the ende of the booke maie appere _menfss. iulij_. to the moste highe, and excellent princes, elizabeth, by the grace of god, quene of englande, fraunce, and irelande, defender of the faithe, and of the churche of englande, and irelande, on yearth next under god, the supreme governour. although commonlie every man, moste worthie and renoumed soveraine, seketh specially to commend and extolle the thing, whereunto he feleth hymself naturally bent and inclined, yet al soche parciallitie and private affection laid aside, it is to bee thought (that for the defence, maintenaunce, and advauncemente of a kyngdome, or common weale, or for the good and due observacion of peace, and administracion of justice in the same) no one thinge to be more profitable, necessarie, or more honourable, then the knowledge of service in warre, and dedes of armes; bicause consideryng the ambicion of the worlde, it is impossible for any realme or dominion, long to continue free in quietnesse and savegarde, where the defence of the sweard is not alwaies in a readinesse. for like as the grekes, beyng occupied aboute triflyng matters, takyng pleasure in resityng of comedies, and soche other vain thinges, altogether neclecting marciall feates, gave occasion to philip kyng of macedonia, father to alexander the great, to oppresse and to bring theim in servitude, under his subjeccion, even so undoubtedly, libertie will not be kepte, but men shall be troden under foote, and brought to moste horrible miserie and calamitie, if thei givyng theim selves to pastymes and pleasure, forssake the juste regarde of their owne defence, and savegarde of their countrie, whiche in temporall regimente, chiefly consisteth in warlike skilfulnesse. and therefore the aunciente capitaines and mightie conquerours, so longe as thei florished, did devise with moste greate diligence, all maner of waies, to bryng their men to the perfect knowledge of what so ever thing appertained to the warre: as manifestly appereth by the warlike games, whiche in old time the princes of grecia ordained, upon the mount olimpus, and also by thorders and exercises, that the aunciente romaines used in sundrie places, and specially in campo martio, and in their wonderful sumptuous theaters, whiche chiefly thei builded to that purpose. whereby thei not onely made their souldiours so experte, that thei obtained with a fewe, in faightyng againste a greate houge multitude of enemies, soche marveilous victories, as in many credible histories are mencioned, but also by the same meanes, their unarmed and rascalle people that followed their campes, gotte soche understandyng in the feates of warre, that thei in the daie of battaile, beeyng lefte destitute of succour, were able without any other help, to set themselves in good order, for their defence againste the enemie, that would seke to hurte theim, and in soche daungerous times, have doen their countrie so good service, that verie often by their helpe, the adversaries have been put to flight, and fieldes moste happely wone. so that thantiquitie estemed nothing more happie in a common weale, then to have in the same many men skilfull in warlike affaires: by meanes whereof, their empire continually inlarged, and moste wonderfully and triumphantly prospered. for so longe as men for their valiauntnesse, were then rewarded and had in estimacion, glad was he that could finde occasion to venter, yea, and spende his life, to benefite his countrie: as by the manly actes that marcus curcius, oracius cocles, and gaius mucius did for the savegarde of rome and also by other innumerable like examples dooeth plainly appeare. but when through long and continuall peace, thei began to bee altogether given to pleasure and delicatenesse, little regardyng marciall feates, nor soche as were expert in the practise thereof: their dominions and estates, did not so moche before increase and prospere, as then by soche meanes and oversight, thei sodainly fell into decaie and utter ruine. for soche truly is the nature and condicion, bothe of peace and warre, that where in governemente, there is not had equalle consideration of them bothe, the one in fine, doeth woorke and induce, the others oblivion and utter abholicion. wherfore, sith the necessitie of the science of warres is so greate, and also the necessarie use thereof so manifeste, that even ladie peace her self, doeth in maner from thens crave her chief defence and preservacion, and the worthinesse moreover, and honour of the same so greate, that as by prose we see, the perfecte glorie therof, cannot easely finde roote, but in the hartes of moste noble couragious and manlike personages, i thought most excellente princes, i could not either to the specialle gratefiyng of your highnesse, the universall delight of all studious gentlemen, or the common utilitie of the publike wealth, imploie my labours more profitablie in accomplishyng of my duetie and good will, then in settyng foorthe some thing, that might induce to the augmentyng and increase of the knowledge thereof: inespecially thexample of your highnes most politike governemente over us, givyng plaine testimonie of the wonderfull prudente desire that is in you, to have your people instructed in this kinde of service, as well for the better defence of your highnesse, theim selves, and their countrie, as also to discourage thereby, and to be able to resist the malingnitie of the enemie, who otherwise would seeke peradventure, to invade this noble realme or kyngdome. when therfore about x. yeres paste, in the emperours warres against the mores and certain turkes beyng in barberie, at the siege and winnyng of calibbia, monesterio and africa, i had as well for my further instruction in those affaires, as also the better to acquainte me with the italian tongue, reduced into englishe, the booke called the arte of warre, of the famous and excellente nicholas machiavell, whiche in times paste he beyng a counsailour, and secretarie of the noble citee of florence, not without his greate laude and praise did write: and havyng lately againe, somwhat perused the same, the whiche in soche continuall broiles and unquietnesse, was by me translated, i determined with my self, by publishyng thereof, to bestowe as greate a gift (sins greater i was not able) emongeste my countrie men, not experte in the italian tongue, as in like woorkes i had seen before me, the frenchemen, duchemen, spaniardes, and other forreine nacions, moste lovyngly to have bestowed emongeste theirs: the rather undoubtedly, that as by private readyng of the same booke, i then felt my self in that knowledge marveilously holpen and increased, so by communicatyng the same to many, our englishemen findyng out the orderyng and disposyng of exploictes of warre therein contained, the aide and direction of these plaine and briefe preceptes, might no lesse in knowledge of warres become incomperable, then in prowes also and exercise of the same, altogether invincible: which my translacion moste gracious soveraine, together with soche other thynges, as by me hath been gathered, and thought good to adde thereunto, i have presumed to dedicate unto youre highnes: not onely bicause the whole charge and furniture of warlike counsailes and preparacions, being determined by the arbitremente of governours and princes, the treatise also of like effecte should in like maner as of right, depende upon the protection of a moste worthie and noble patronesse, but also that the discourse it self, and the woorke of a forrein aucthour, under the passeport and safeconduite of your highnes moste noble name, might by speciall aucthoritie of the same, winne emongest your majesties subjectes, moche better credite and estimacion. and if mooste mightie queen, in this kind of philosophie (if i maie so terme it) grave and sage counsailes, learned and wittie preceptes, or politike and prudente admonicions, ought not to be accompted the least and basest tewels of weale publike. then dare i boldely affirme, that of many straungers, whiche from forrein countries, have here tofore in this your majesties realme arrived, there is none in comparison to bee preferred, before this worthie florentine and italian, who havyng frely without any gaine of exchaunge (as after some acquaintaunce and familiaritie will better appeare) brought with hym moste riche, rare and plentiful treasure, shall deserve i trust of all good englishe lishe hartes, most lovingly and frendly to be intertained, embraced and cherished. whose newe englishe apparell, how so ever it shall seme by me, after a grosse fasion, more fitlie appoincted to the campe, then in nice termes attired to the carpet, and in course clothyng rather putte foorthe to battaile, then in any brave shewe prepared to the bankette, neverthelesse my good will i truste, shall of your grace be taken in good parte, havyng fashioned the phraise of my rude stile, even accordyng to the purpose of my travaile, whiche was rather to profite the desirous manne of warre, then to delight the eares of the fine rethorician, or daintie curious scholemanne: moste humblie besechyng your highnes, so to accept my labour herein, as the first fruictes of a poore souldiours studie, who to the uttermoste of his smalle power, in the service of your moste gracious majestie, and of his countrie, will at al tymes, accordyng to his bounden duetie and allegeaunce, promptlie yeld hym self to any labour, travaile, or daunger, what so ever shal happen. praiyng in the mean season the almightie god, to give your highnes in longe prosperous raigne, perfect health, desired tranquilitie, and against all your enemies, luckie and joifull victorie. your humble subject and dailie oratour, peter whitehorne. the proheme of nicholas machiavell, citezein and secretarie of florence, upon his booke of the arte of warre, unto laurence philippe strozze, one of the nobilitie of florence. there have laurence, many helde, and do holde this opinion, that there is no maner of thing, whiche lesse agreeth the one with the other, nor that is so much unlike, as the civil life to the souldiours. wherby it is often seen, that if any determin in thexercise of that kinde of service to prevaile, that incontinent he doeth not only chaunge in apparel, but also in custome and maner, in voice, and from the facion of all civil use, he doeth alter: for that he thinketh not meete to clothe with civell apparell him, who wil be redie, and promt to all kinde of violence, nor the civell customes, and usages maie that man have, the whiche judgeth bothe those customes to be effeminate, and those usages not to be agreable to his profession: nor it semes not convenient for him to use the civill gesture and ordinarie wordes, who with fasing and blasphemies, will make afraied other menne: the whiche causeth in this time, suche opinion to be moste true. but if thei should consider thauncient orders, there should nothing be founde more united, more confirmable, and that of necessitie ought to love so much the one the other, as these: for as muche as all the artes that are ordeined in a common weale, in regarde or respecte of common profite of menne, all the orders made in the same, to live with feare of the lawe, and of god should be vaine, if by force of armes their defence wer not prepared, which, well ordeined, doe maintain those also whiche be not well ordeined. and likewise to the contrarie the good orders, without the souldiours help, no lesse or otherwise doe disorder, then the habitacion of a sumptuous and roiall palais, although it wer decte with gold and precious stones, when without being covered, should not have wherewith to defende it from the raine. and if in what so ever other orders of cities and kyngdomes, there hath been used al diligence for to maintain men faithfull, peaceable, and full of the feare of god, in the service of warre, it was doubled: if for in what man ought the countrie to seke greater faith, then in him, who must promise to die for the same? in whom ought there to bee more love of peace, then in him, whiche onely by the warre maie be hurte? in whome ought there to bee more feare of god, then in him, which every daie committyng himself to infinite perilles, hath moste neede of his helpe? this necessitie considered wel, bothe of them that gave the lawes to empires, and of those that to the exercise of service wer apoincted, made that the life of souldiours, of other menne was praised, and with all studie folowed and imitated. but the orders of service of war, beyng altogether corrupted, and a greate waie from the auncient maners altered, there hath growen these sinisterous opinions, which maketh men to hate the warlike service, and to flie the conversacion of those that dooe exercise it. albeit i judgeing by the same, that i have seen and redde, that it is not a thyng impossible, to bryng it again to the auncient maners, and to give it some facion of the vertue passed, i have determined to the entente not to passe this my idell time, without doyng some thyng, to write that whiche i doe understande, to the satisfaction of those, who of aunciente actes, are lovers of the science of warre. and although it be a bold thing to intreate of the same matter, wher of otherwise i have made no profession, notwithstanding i beleve it is no errour, to occupie with wordes a degree, the whiche many with greater presumpcion with their deedes have occupied: for as muche as the errours that i maie happen to make by writing, may be without harme to any man corrected: but those the whiche of them be made in doyng cannot be knowen without the ruine of empires. therefore laurence you ought to consider the qualitie of this my laboure, and with your judgement to give it that blame, or that praise, as shall seeme unto you it hath deserved. the whiche i sende unto you, as well to shewe my selfe gratefull, although my habilitie reche not to the benefites, which i have received of you, as also for that beyng the custome to honour with like workes them who for nobilitie, riches, wisedome, and liberalitie doe shine: i knowe you for riches, and nobilitie, not to have many peeres, for wisedome fewe, and for liberalitie none. the arte of warre the table of certain principall thinges, contained in this woorke of machiavel in the firste booke why a good man ought not to exersise warfare as his arte, deedes of armes ought to be used privatly in time of peace for exersise, and in time of warre for necessetie and renoume, the strength of an armie is the footemen, the romaines renued their legions and had men in the flower of their age, whether men of armes ought to be kept, what is requisete for the preparyng of an armie, out of what contrie souldiers ought to be chosen, souldiers ought to bee chosen, by thaucthoritie of the prince, of suche men as be his oune subjectes, the difference of ages, that is to be taken in the chosinge of souldiours for the restoring of an olde power and for the making of a newe, the weapons or power that is prepared, of the naturall subjectes, of a common weale bringeth profit and not hurte, what cause letted the venetians, that they made not a monarchi of the worlde, how an armie maye bee prepared in the countrie, where were no exersise of warre, the custome that the romaines used, in the chosyng of their souldiours, the greater number of men is best, whether the multitude of armed men ar occation of confusion and of dissorder, how to prohibite, that the capitaines make no discension, in the seconde booke what armour the antiquetie used, the occation of the boldenes of the duchemen, whiche maner of armyng menne is better either the duche or romaine fasion, diverse examples of late dayes, an example of tigran, whether the footemen or the horsemen ought to bee estemed moste, the cause whie the romaines were overcome of the parthians, what order, or what vertue maketh, that footemen overcum horsemen, howe the antiquitie exersised their men to learne them to handle their weapons, what the antiquitie estemed moste happie in a common weale, the maner, of maintainyng the order, what a legion is, of grekes called a falange, and of frenchemen catterva, the devision of a legion, and the divers names of orders, the order of batellraye, and the manner of appoincting the battels, how to order, cccc.l. men to doo some severall feate, the fation of a battaile that the suisers make like a crosse, what carriages the capitaines ought to have, and the number of carriages requisite to every band of men, diverse effectes caused of diverse soundes, whereof cometh the utilitie, and the dissorder of the armies that are now a daies, the manner of arminge men, the number of carriages that men of armes and lighte horsemen ought to have, in the thirde booke the greatest dissorder that is used now a dayes in the orderinge of an armie, how the romaines devided their armie in hastati, principi and triarii, the manner that the romaines used to order them selves agayne in the overthrow, the custom of the greekes, a maine battaile of suissers, how manie legions of romaine citesens was in an ordinarie armie, the manner how to pitche a fielde to faighte a battaile, of what number of faighting men an armie oughte to be, the description of a battaile that is a faighting, an exsample of ventidio faighting against the parthians, an example of epaminondas, how the artillerie is unprofitable, how that a maine battaile of suissers cannot ocupie more then fower pikes, how the battailes when thei cum to be eight or ten, maye be receyved in the verie same space, that received the fyve, the armes that the standarde of all tharmie ought to have, divers examples of the antiquetie, in the fowerth booke whether the fronte of the armie ought to bee made large, to how many thinges respecte ought to be had, in the ordringe of an armie, an example of scipio, in what place a capitain maie order his armie with savegarde not to be clene overthrowen, aniball and scipio praised for the orderynge of their armies, cartes used of the asiaticans, diverse examples of the antiquitie, the prudence which the capitaine ought to use, in the accidence that chaunse in faightinge, what a capitaine ought to doo, that is the conqueror, or that is conquered, a capitaine ought not to faighte the battaile, but with advauntage, excepte he be constrained, how to avoide the faightinge of the fielde, advertismentes that the capitaine ought to have, speakyng to souldiers helpeth muche to make them to be curagious and bolde, whether all the armie ought to bee spoken unto, or onely to the heddes thereof, in the fyveth booke the manner how to leade an armie gowinge thorough suspected places, or to incounter the enemie, an example of aniball, wether any thing oughte to bee commaunded with the voise or with the trompet, the occations why the warres made now a dayes, doo impoverish the conquerors as well as the conquered, credite ought not to be given to thinges which stand nothinge with reason, the armie ought not to knowe what the capitaine purposeth to doo, diverse examples, in the sixte booke the maner how to incampe an armie, how brode the spaces and the wayes ought to be within the campe, what waye ought to be used when it is requiset to incampe nere the enemie, how the watche and warde ought to be apoincted in the campe, and what punishmente they ought to have that doo not their dutie, how the romanies prohibited women to be in their armies and idell games to be used, how to incampe accordinge to the nomber of men, and what nomber of menne maie suffise againste, what so ever enemie that wer, how to doo to be assured, of the fideletie of those that are had in suspition, what a capitaine ought to doo beinge beseged of his enemies, example of coriliano and others, it is requiset chiefly for a capitain to kepe his souldiers punished and payed, of aguries, moste excellent advertismentes and pollicies, the occation of the overthrowe of the frenchmen at garigliano, in the seventh booke cities are strong, either by nature or by industrie, the maner of fortificacion, bulwarkes ought not to be made oute of a towne distante from the same, example of genoa, of the countes catherin, the fation of percullesies used in almaine, howe the battelmentes of walles were made at the first, and how thei are made now adaies, the provisions that is mete to bee made, for the defence of a towne, divers pollicies, for the beseginge and defendinge of a toune or fortres, secrete conveing of letters, the defence againste a breache, generall rules of warre, the first booke of the arte of warre of nicholas machiavel, citezein and secretarie of florence, unto laurence philip strozze one of the nobiltie of florence. the first booke forasmuch as i beleve that after death, al men maie be praised without charge, al occasion and suspecte of flatterie beyng taken awaie, i shal not doubte to praise our cosimo ruchellay, whose name was never remembred of me without teares, havyng knowen in him those condicions, the whiche in a good frende or in a citezien, might of his freendes, or of his countrie, be desired: for that i doe not knowe what thyng was so muche his, not excepting any thing (saving his soule) which for his frendes willingly of him should not have been spent: i knowe not what enterprise should have made him afraide, where the same should have ben knowen to have been for the benefite of his countrie. and i doe painly confesse, not to have mette emongest so many men, as i have knowen, and practised withal, a man, whose minde was more inflamed then his, unto great and magnificent thynges. nor he lamented not with his frendes of any thyng at his death, but because he was borne to die a yong manne within his owne house, before he had gotten honour, and accordynge to his desire, holpen any manne: for that he knewe, that of him coulde not be spoken other, savyng that there should be dead a good freende. yet it resteth not for this, that we, and what so ever other that as we did know him, are not able to testifie (seeyng his woorkes doe not appere) of his lawdable qualities. true it is, that fortune was not for al this, so muche his enemie, that it left not some brief record of the readinesse of his witte, as doeth declare certaine of his writinges, and settyng foorthe of amorous verses, wherin (although he were not in love) yet for that he would not consume time in vain, til unto profounder studies fortune should have brought him, in his youthfull age he exercised himselfe. whereby moste plainly maie be comprehended, with how moche felicitie he did describe his conceiptes, and how moche for poetrie he should have ben estemed, if the same for the ende therof, had of him ben exercised. fortune having therfore deprived us from the use of so great a frende, me thinketh there can bee founde no other remedie, then as muche as is possible, to seke to enjoye the memorie of the same, and to repeate suche thynges as hath been of him either wittely saied, or wisely disputed. and for as much as there is nothyng of him more freshe, then the reasonyng, the whiche in his last daies signior fabricio collonna, in his orchard had with him, where largely of the same gentilman were disputed matters of warre, bothe wittely and prudently, for the moste parte of cosimo demaunded, i thought good, for that i was present there with certain other of our frendes, to bring it to memorie, so that reading the same, the frendes of cosimo, whiche thether came, might renewe in their mindes, the remembraunce of his vertue: and the other part beyng sorie for their absence, might partly learne hereby many thynges profitable, not onely to the life of souldiours, but also to civil mennes lives, which gravely of a moste wise man was disputed. therfore i saie, that fabricio collonna retournyng out of lombardie, where longe time greatly to his glorie, he had served in the warres the catholike kyng, he determined, passyng by florence, to rest himself certain daies in the same citee, to visite the dukes excellencie, and to see certaine gentilmen, whiche in times paste he had been acquainted withal. for whiche cause, unto cosimo it was thought beste to bid him into his orchard, not so muche to use his liberalitee, as to have occasion to talke with him at leasure, and of him to understande and to learne divers thinges, accordyng as of suche a man maie bee hoped for, semyng to have accasion to spende a daie in reasonyng of suche matters, which to his minde should best satisfie him. then fabricio came, accordyng to his desire, and was received of cosimo together, with certain of his trustie frendes, emongest whome wer zanoby buondelmonti, baptiste palla, and luigi allamanni, all young men loved of him and of the very same studies moste ardente, whose good qualities, for as muche as every daie, and at every houre thei dooe praise themselves, we will omit. fabricio was then accordyng to the time and place honoured, of all those honours, that thei could possible devise: but the bankettyng pleasures beyng passed, and the tabel taken up, and al preparacion of feastinges consumed, the which are sone at an ende in sight of greate men, who to honorable studies have their mindes set, the daie beyng longe, and the heate muche, cosimo judged for to content better his desire, that it wer well doen, takyng occasion to avoide the heate, to bring him into the moste secret, and shadowest place of his garden. where thei beyng come, and caused to sit, some upon herbes, some in the coldest places, other upon litle seates which there was ordeined, under the shadow of moste high trees, fabricio praiseth the place, to be delectable, and particularly consideryng the trees, and not knowyng some of them, he did stande musinge in his minde, whereof cosimo beeyng a ware saied, you have not peradventure ben acquainted with some of these sortes of trees: but doe not marvell at it, for as muche as there bee some, that were more estemed of the antiquitie, then thei are commonly now a daies: and he tolde him the names of them, and how barnardo his graundfather did travaile in suche kinde of plantyng: fabricio replied, i thought it shuld be the same you saie, and this place, and this studie, made me to remember certaine princes of the kyngdome of naples, whiche of these anncient tillage and shadow doe delight. and staiyng upon this talke, and somewhat standyng in a studdie, saied moreover, if i thought i should not offende, i woud tell my opinion, but i beleeve i shall not, commonyng with friendes, and to dispute of thynges, and not to condemne them. how much better thei should have doen (be it spoken without displeasure to any man) to have sought to been like the antiquitie in thinges strong, and sharpe, not in the delicate and softe: and in those that thei did in the sunne, not in the shadowe: and to take the true and perfecte maners of the antiquitie: not those that are false and corrupted: for that when these studies pleased my romaines, my countrie fell into ruin. unto which cosimo answered. but to avoide the tediousnesse to repeate so many times he saied, and the other answered, there shall be onely noted the names of those that speakes, without rehersing other. then cosimo saied, you have opened the waie of a reasoning, which i have desired, and i praie you that you will speake withoute respecte, for that that i without respecte will aske you, and if i demaundyng, or repliyng shall excuse, or accuse any, it shal not be to excuse, or accuse, but to understande of you the truth. fabricio. and i shall be very well contented to tell you that, whiche i understand of al the same that you shall aske me, the whiche if it shall be true, or no, i wil report me to your judgemente: and i will be glad that you aske me, for that i am to learne, as well of you in askyng me, as you of me in aunswerynge you: for as muche as many times a wise demaunder, maketh one to consider many thynges, and to knowe many other, whiche without havyng been demaunded, he should never have knowen. cosimo. i will retourne to thesame, that you said first, that my graundfather and those your princes, should have doen more wisely, to have resembled the antiquitie in hard thinges, then in the delicate, and i will excuse my parte, for that, the other i shall leave to excuse for you. i doe not beleve that in his tyme was any manne, that so moche detested the livyng in ease, as he did, and that so moche was a lover of the same hardenesse of life, whiche you praise: notwithstandyng he knewe not how to bee able in persone, nor in those of his sonnes to use it, beeyng borne in so corrupte a worlde, where one that would digresse from the common use, should bee infamed and disdained of every man: consideryng that if one in the hottest day of summer being naked, should wallowe hymself upon the sande, or in winter in the moste coldest monethes upon the snowe, as diogenes did, he should be taken as a foole. if one, (as the spartans were wonte to doe) should nourishe his children in a village, makyng them to slepe in the open aire, to go with hedde and feete naked, to washe them selves in the colde water for to harden them, to be able to abide moche paine, and for to make theim to love lesse life, and to feare lesse death, he should be scorned, and soner taken as a wilde beast, then as a manne. if there wer seen also one, to nourishe himself with peason and beanes, and to despise gold, as fabricio doeth, he should bee praised of fewe, and followed of none: so that he being afraied of this present maner of livyng, he left thauncient facions, and thesame, that he could with lest admiracion imitate in the antiquitie, he did. fabricio. you have excused it in this parte mooste strongly: and surely you saie the truthe: but i did not speake so moche of this harde maner of livyng, as of other maners more humaine, and whiche have with the life now a daies greater conformitie. the whiche i doe not beleve, that it hath been difficulte to bryng to passe unto one, who is nombred emongest princes of a citee: for the provyng whereof, i will never seke other, then thexample of the romaines. whose lives, if thei wer well considred, and thorders of thesame common weale, there should therin be seen many thinges, not impossible to induce into a cominaltie, so that it had in her any good thing. cosimo. what thynges are those, that you would induce like unto the antiquitie. fabricio. to honour, and to reward vertue, not to despise povertie, to esteme the maners and orders of warfare, to constrain the citezeins to love one an other, to live without sectes, to esteme lesse the private, than the publike, and other like thinges, that easily might bee with this time accompanied: the which maners ar not difficult to bring to passe, when a man should wel consider them, and entre therin by due meanes: for asmoche as in thesame, the truth so moche appereth, that every common wit, maie easely perceive it: which thing, who that ordeineth, doth plant trees, under the shadowe wherof, thei abide more happie, and more pleasantly, then under these shadowes of this goodly gardeine. cosimo. i will not speake any thyng againste thesame that you have saied, but i will leave it to bee judged of these, whom easely can judge, and i will tourne my communicacion to you, that is an accusar of theim, the whiche in grave, and greate doynges, are not followers of the antiquitie, thinkyng by this waie more easely to be in my entent satisfied. therfore, i would knowe of you whereof it groweth, that of the one side you condempne those, that in their doynges resemble not the antiquitie? of the other, in the warre, whiche is your art, wherin you are judged excellent, it is not seen, that you have indevoured your self, to bryng the same to any soche ende, or any thyng at all resembled therein the auncient maners. fabricio. you are happened upon the poincte, where i loked: for that my talke deserved no other question: nor i desired other: and albeit that i could save my self with an easie excuse, not withstandyng for my more contentacion, and yours, seyng that the season beareth it, i will enter in moche longer reasoning. those men, whiche will enterprise any thyng, ought firste with all diligence to prepare theim selves, to be ready and apte when occasion serveth, to accomplish that, which thei have determined to worke: and for that when the preparacions are made craftely, thei are not knowen, there cannot be accused any man of any negligence, if firste it be not disclosed by thoccasion: in the which working not, is after seen, either that there is not prepared so moche as suffiseth, or that there hath not been of any part therof thought upon. and for as moche as to me there is not come any occasion to be able, to shewe the preparacions made of me, to reduce the servise of warre into his auncient orders, if i have not reduced it, i cannot be of you, nor of other blamed: i beleve this excuse shuld suffise for answere to your accusement. cosimo. it should suffice, when i wer certain, that thoccasion were not come. fabricio. but for that i know, that you maie doubt whether this occasion hath been cum, or no, i will largely (when you with pacience will heare me) discourse what preparacions are necessary first to make, what occasion muste growe, what difficultie doeth let, that the preparacions help not, and why thoccasion cannot come, and how these things at ones, which some contrary endes, is most difficill, and most easie to do. cosimo. you cannot do bothe to me, and unto these other, a thing more thankfull then this. and if to you it shall not be tedious to speake, unto us it shal never be grevous to heare: but for asmoch as this reasonyng ought to be long, i will with your license take helpe of these my frendes: and thei, and i praie you of one thyng, that is, that you will not bee greved, if some tyme with some question of importaunce, we interrupte you. [sidenote: why a good man ought never to use the exercise of armes, as his art.] fabricio. i am moste well contented, that you cosimo with these other younge men here, doe aske me: for that i beleve, that youthfulnes, will make you lovers of warlike thinges, and more easie to beleve thesame, that of me shalbe saied. these other, by reason of havyng nowe their hedde white, and for havyng upon their backes their bloude congeled, parte of theim are wonte to bee enemies of warre, parte uncorrectable, as those, whom beleve, that tymes, and not the naughtie maners, constraine men to live thus: so that safely aske you all of me, and without respecte: the whiche i desire, as well, for that it maie be unto me a little ease, as also for that i shall have pleasure, not to leave in your mynde any doubt. i will begin at your woordes, where you saied unto me, that in the warre, that is my arte, i had not indevoured to bryng it to any aunciente ende: whereupon i saie, as this beyng an arte, whereby men of no maner of age can live honestly, it cannot bee used for an arte, but of a common weale: or of a kyngdome: and the one and the other of these, when thei bee well ordeined, will never consente to any their citezeins, or subjectes, to use it for any arte, nor never any good manne doeth exercise it for his particulare arte: for as moche as good he shall never bee judged, whom maketh an excersise thereof, where purposing alwaies to gaine thereby, it is requisite for hym to be ravenyng, deceiptfull, violente, and to have many qualities, the whiche of necessitie maketh hym not good: nor those menne cannot, whiche use it for an arte, as well the greate as the leaste, bee made otherwise: for that this arte doeth not nourishe them in peace. wherfore thei ar constrained either to thinke that there is no peace, or so moche to prevaile in the tyme of warre, that in peace thei maie bee able to kepe them selves: and neither of these two thoughtes happeneth in a good man: for that in mindyng to bee able to finde himself at all tymes, dooe growe robberies, violence, slaughters, whiche soche souldiours make as well to the frendes, as to the enemies: and in mindyng not to have peace, there groweth deceiptes, whiche the capitaines use to those, whiche hire them, to the entent the warre maie continue, and yet though the peace come often, it happeneth that the capitaines beyng deprived of their stipendes, and of their licencious livyng, thei erecte an ansigne of adventures, and without any pitie thei put to sacke a province. have not you in memorie of your affaires, how that beyng many souldiours in italie without wages, bicause the warre was ended, thei assembled together many companies, and went taxyng the tounes, and sackyng the countrie, without beyng able to make any remedie? have you not red, that the carthagenes souldiours, the first warre beyng ended which thei had with the romaines, under matho, and spendio, twoo capitaines, rebelliously constituted of theim, made more perillous warre to the carthaginens, then thesame whiche thei had ended with the romaines? in the time of our fathers, frances sforza, to the entente to bee able to live honourably in the time of peace, not only beguiled the millenars, whose souldiour he was, but he toke from them their libertie and became their prince. like unto him hath been all the other souldiours of italie whiche have used warfare, for their particulare arte, and albeeit thei have not through their malignitie becomen dukes of milein, so moche the more thei deserve to bee blamed: for that although thei have not gotten so moch as he, thei have all (if their lives wer seen) sought to bring the like thynges to passe. sforza father of fraunces, constrained quene jone, to caste her self into the armes of the king of aragon, havyng in a sodain forsaken her, and in the middest of her enemies, lefte her disarmed, onely to satisfie his ambicion, either in taxyng her, or in takyng from her the kyngdome. braccio with the verie same industrie, sought to possesse the kyngdome of naples, and if he had not been overthrowen and slaine at aquila, he had brought it to passe. like disorders growe not of other, then of soche men as hath been, that use the exercise of warfare, for their proper arte. have not you a proverbe, whiche fortefieth my reasons, whiche saieth, that warre maketh theves, and peace hangeth theim up? for as moche as those, whiche knowe not how to live of other exercise, and in the same finding not enie man to sustayne theym, and havyng not so moche power, to knowe how to reduce theim selves together, to make an open rebellion, they are constrayned of necessetie to robbe in the highe waies, and justice is enforced to extinguishe theim. cosimo. you have made me to esteme this arte of warfare almoste as nothyng, and i have supposed it the moste excellentes, and moste honourableste that hath been used: so that if you declare me it not better, i cannot remaine satisfied: for that when it is thesame, that you saie, i knowe not, whereof groweth the glorie of cesar, of pompei, of scipio, of marcello, and of so many romaine capitaines, whiche by fame are celebrated as goddes. fabricio. i have not yet made an ende of disputyng al thesame, that i purposed to propounde: whiche were twoo thynges, the one, that a good manne could not use this exercise for his arte: the other, that a common weale or a kingdome well governed, did never permitte, that their subjectes or citezeins should use it for an arte. aboute the firste, i have spoken as moche as hath comen into my mynde: there remaineth in me to speake of the seconde where i woll come to aunswere to this your laste question, and i saie that pompey and cesar, and almoste all those capitaines, whiche were at rome, after the laste carthagenens warre, gotte fame as valiaunt men, not as good, and those whiche lived before them, gotte glorie as valiaunte and good menne: the whiche grewe, for that these tooke not the exercise of warre for their arte: and those whiche i named firste, as their arte did use it. and so longe as the common weale lived unspotted, never any noble citezein would presume, by the meane of soche exercise, to availe thereby in peace, breakyng the lawes, spoilyng the provinces, usurpyng, and plaiyng the tyraunte in the countrie, and in every maner prevailyng: nor any of how lowe degree so ever thei were, would goe aboute to violate the religion, confederatyng theim selves with private men, not to feare the senate, or to followe any tirannicall insolence, for to bee able to live with the arte of warre in all tymes. but those whiche were capitaines, contented with triumphe, with desire did tourne to their private life, and those whiche were membres, would be more willyng to laie awaie their weapons, then to take them, and every manne tourned to his science, whereby thei gotte their livyng: nor there was never any, that would hope with praie, and with this arte, to be able to finde theim selves. of this there maie be made concernyng citezeins, moste evidente conjecture, by the ensample of regolo attillio, who beyng capitain of the romaine armies in affrica, and havyng as it wer overcome the carthegenens, he required of the senate, licence to retourne home, to kepe his possessions, and told them, that thei were marde of his housbandmen. whereby it is more clere then the sunne, that if thesame manne had used the warre as his arte, and by meanes thereof, had purposed to have made it profitable unto him, havyng in praie so many provinces, he would not have asked license, to returne to kepe his feldes: for as moche as every daie he might otherwise, have gotten moche more, then the value of al those possessions: but bicause these good men and soche as use not the warre for their arte, will not take of thesame any thing then labour, perilles, and gloris, when thei are sufficiently glorious, thei desire to returne home, and to live of their owne science. concernyng menne of lowe degree, and common souldiours, to prove that thei kepte the verie same order, it doeth appeare that every one willingly absented theim selves from soche exercise, and when thei served not in the warre, thei would have desired to serve, and when thei did serve, thei would have desired leave not to have served: whiche is wel knowen through many insamples, and inespecially seeyng how emonge the firste privileges, whiche the romaine people gave to their citezeins was, that thei should not be constrained against their willes, to serve in the warres. therefore rome so long as it was well governed, whiche was untill the commyng of graccus, it had not any souldiour that would take this exercise for an arte, and therefore it had fewe naughtie, and those few wer severely punished. then a citee well governed, ought to desire, that this studie of warre, be used in tyme of peace for exercise, and in the time of warre, for necessitie and for glorie: and to suffer onely the common weale to use it for an arte, as rome did, and what so ever citezein, that hath in soche exercise other ende, is not good, and what so ever citee is governed otherwise, is not well ordeined. cosimo. i remain contented enough and satisfied of thesame, whiche hetherto you have told, and this conclusion pleaseth me verie wel whiche you have made, and as muche as is loked for touching a common welth, i beleve that it is true, but concerning kinges, i can not tell nowe, for that i woulde beleve that a kinge would have about him, whome particularly should take suche exercise for his arte. fabricio. a kingdome well ordred ought moste of all to avoide the like kinde of men, for only thei, are the destruction of their king, and all together ministers of tiranny, and alledge me not to the contrarie anie presente kingdome, for that i woll denie you all those to be kingdomes well ordered, bicause the kingdomes whiche have good orders, give not their absolute empire unto their king, saving in the armies, for as much as in this place only, a quicke deliberation is necessarie, and for this cause a principall power ought to be made. in the other affaires, he ought not to doe any thing without councell, and those are to be feared, which councell him, leaste he have some aboute him which in time of peace desireth to have warre bicause they are not able without the same to live, but in this, i wilbe a little more large: neither to seke a kingdome altogether good, but like unto those whiche be nowe a daies where also of a king those ought to be feared, whiche take the warre for theire art, for that the strength of armies without any doubte are the foote menne: so that if a king take not order in suche wise, that his men in time of peace may be content to returne home, and to live of their owne trades, it will follow of necessitie, that he ruinate: for that there is not found more perilous men, then those, whiche make the warre as their arte: bicause in such case, a king is inforsed either alwaies to make warre, or to paie them alwaies, or else to bee in perill, that they take not from him his kingdome. to make warre alwaies, it is not possible: to paie them alwaies it can not be: see that of necessitie, he runneth in peril to lese the state. the romaines (as i have saide) so long as they were wise and good, would never permitte, that their citizeins should take this exercise for their arte, although they were able to nurrishe them therin alwaies, for that that alwaies they made warre: but to avoide thesame hurte, whiche this continuall exercise might doe them, seyng the time did not varie, they changed the men, and from time to time toke such order with their legions, that in xv. yeres alwaies, they renewed them: and so thei had their men in the floure of their age, that is from xviij. to xxxiij. yeres, in which time the legges, the handes, and the yes answere the one the other, nor thei tarried not till there strengthe should decaie, and there naghtines increase, as it did after in the corrupted times. for as muche as octavian first, and after tiberius, minding more their own proper power, then the publicke profite, began to unarme the romaine people, to be able easely to commaunde them, and to kepe continually those same armies on the frontries of the empire: and bicause also they judged those, not sufficient to kepe brideled the people and romaine senate, they ordeined an armie called pretoriano, which laie harde by the walles of rome, and was as a rocke on the backe of the same citie. and for as much as then thei began frely to permitte, that suche men as were apoincted in suche exercises, should use the service of warre for their arte, streight waie the insolence of theim grewe, that they became fearful unto the senate, and hurtefull to the emperour, whereby ensued suche harme, that manie were slaine thorough there insolensie: for that they gave, and toke awaie the empire, to whome they thought good. and some while it hapned, that in one self time there were manie emperours, created of divers armies, of whiche thinges proceded first the devision of the empire, and at laste the ruine of the same. therefore kinges ought, if thei wil live safely, to have there souldiours made of men, who when it is time to make warre, willingly for his love will go to the same, and when the peace cometh after, more willingly will returne home. whiche alwaies wilbe, when thei shalbe men that know how to live of other arte then this: and so they ought to desire, peace beyng come, that there prince doo tourne to governe their people, the gentilmen to the tending of there possessions, and the common souldiours to their particular arte, and everie one of these, to make warre to have peace, and not to seke to trouble the peace, to have warre. cosimo. truely this reasonyng of yours, i thinke to bee well considered, notwithstanding beyng almost contrarie to that, whiche till nowe i have thought, my minde as yet doeth not reste purged of all doubte, for as muche as i see manie lordes and gentelmen, to finde them selves in time of peace, thorough the studies of warre, as your matches bee, who have provision of there princes, and of the cominaltie. i see also, almost al the gentelmen of armes, remaine with neir provision, i see manie souldiours lie in garison of cities and fortresses, so that my thinkes, that there is place in time of peace, for everie one. fabricio. i doe not beleve that you beleve this, that in time of peace everie man may have place, bicause, put case that there coulde not be brought other reason, the small number, that all they make, whiche remaine in the places alledged of you, would answer you. what proporcion have the souldiours, whiche are requiset to bee in the warre with those, whiche in the peace are occupied? for as much as the fortreses, and the cities that be warded in time of peace, in the warre are warded muche more, unto whome are joyned the souldiours, whiche kepe in the fielde, whiche are a great number, all whiche in the peace be putte awaie. and concerning the garde of states, whiche are a small number, pope july, and you have shewed to everie man, how muche are to be feared those, who will not learne to exercise any other art, then the warre, and you have for there insolence, deprived them from your garde, and have placed therin swisers, as men borne and brought up under lawes, and chosen of the cominaltie, according to the true election: so that saie no more, that in peace is place for everie man. concerning men at armes, thei al remaining in peace with their wages, maketh this resolution to seme more difficulte: notwithstandyng who considereth well all, shall finde the answere easie, bicause this manner of keping men of armes, is a corrupted manner and not good, the occasion is, for that they be men, who make thereof an arte, and of them their should grow every daie a thousande inconveniencies in the states, where thei should be, if thei were accompanied of sufficient company: but beyng fewe, and not able by them selves to make an armie, they cannot often doe suche grevous hurtes, neverthelesse they have done oftentimes: as i have said of frances, and of sforza his father, and of braccio of perugia: so that this use of keping men of armes, i doe not alowe, for it is a corrupte maner, and it may make great inconveniencies. cosimo. woulde you live without them? or keping them, how would you kepe them? [sidenote: a kinge that hath about him any that are to much lovers of warre, or to much lovers of peace shal cause him to erre.] fabricio. by waie of ordinaunce, not like to those of the king of fraunce: for as muche as they be perilous, and insolent like unto ours, but i would kepe them like unto those of the auncient romaines, whom created their chivalry of their own subjectes, and in peace time, thei sente them home unto their houses, to live of their owne trades, as more largely before this reasoning ende, i shal dispute. so that if now this part of an armie, can live in such exercise, as wel when it is peace, it groweth of the corrupt order. concerning the provisions, which are reserved to me, and to other capitaines, i saie unto you, that this likewise is an order moste corrupted: for as much as a wise common weale, ought not to give such stipendes to any, but rather thei ought to use for capitaines in the warre, their citezeins, and in time of peace to will, that thei returne to their occupations. likewise also, a wise king either ought not to give to suche, or giving any, the occasion ought to be either for rewarde of some worthy dede, or else for the desire to kepe suche a kinde of man, as well in peace as in warre. and bicause you alledged me, i will make ensample upon my self, and saie that i never used the warre as an arte, for as muche as my arte, is to governe my subjectes, and to defende them, and to be able to defende them, to love peace, and to know how to make warre, and my kinge not so muche to rewarde and esteeme me, for my knowledge in the warre, as for the knowledge that i have to councel him in peace. then a king ought not to desire to have about him, any that is not of this condicion if he be wise, and prudently minde to governe: for that, that if he shal have about him either to muche lovers of peace, or to much lovers of warre, they shall make him to erre. i cannot in this my firste reasoning, and according to my purpose saie more, and when this suffiseth you not, it is mete, you seke of them that may satisfie you better. you maie now verie well understand, how difficulte it is to bringe in use the auncient maners in the presente warres, and what preparations are mete for a wise man to make, and what occasions ought to be loked for, to be able to execute it. but by and by, you shall know these things better, if this reasoning make you not werie, conferring what so ever partes of the auncient orders hath ben, to the maners nowe presente. cosimo. if we desired at the first to here your reason of these thinges, truly thesame whiche hetherto you have spoken, hath doubled our desire: wherefore we thanke you for that we have hard, and the rest, we crave of you to here. fabricio. seyng that it is so your pleasure, i will begin to intreate of this matter from the beginning, to the intent it maye be better understode, being able by thesame meane, more largely to declare it. the ende of him that wil make warre, is to be able to fight with every enemy in the fielde and to be able to overcum an armie. to purpose to doe this, it is convenient to ordeine an hoost. to ordein an hoost, their must be found menne, armed, ordered, and as well in the small, as in the great orders exercised, to knowe howe to kepe araie, and to incampe, so that after bringing them unto the enemie, either standing or marching, they maie know how to behave themselves valiantly. in this thing consisteth all the industrie of the warre on the lande, whiche is the most necessarie, and the most honorablest, for he that can wel order a fielde against the enemie, the other faultes that he should make in the affaires of warre, wilbe borne with: but he that lacketh this knowledge, although that in other particulars he be verie good, he shal never bring a warre to honor: for as muche as a fielde that thou winnest, lesing? img doeth cancell all other thy evill actes: so like wise lesing it, all thinges well done of thee before, remaine vaine. therfore, beyng necessarie first to finde the menne, it is requiset to come to the choise of them. they whiche unto the warre have given rule, will that the menne be chosen out of temperate countries, to the intente they may have hardines, and prudence, for as muche as the hote countrey, bredes prudente men and not hardy, the colde, hardy, and not prudente. this rule is good to be geven, to one that were prince of all the world, bicause it is lawfull for him to choose men out of those places, whiche he shall thinke beste. but minding to give a rule, that every one may use, it is mete to declare, that everie common weale, and every kingdome, ought to choose their souldiours out of their owne countrie, whether it be hote, colde, or temperate: for that it is scene by olde ensamples, how that in every countrie with exercise, their is made good souldiours: bicause where nature lacketh, the industry supplieth, the which in this case is worthe more, then nature, and taking them in other places, you shal not have of the choise, for choise is as much to saie, as the best of a province, and to have power to chuse those that will not, as well as those that wil serve. wherfore, you muste take your choise in those places, that are subjecte unto you, for that you cannot take whome you liste, in the countries that are not yours, but you muste take suche as will goe with you. cosimo. yet there maie bee of those, that will come, taken and lefte, and therefore, thei maie be called chosen. [sidenote: oute of what countrie is best to chuse souldiours to make a good election.] fabuicio. you saie the truthe in a certaine maner, but consider the faultes, whiche soche a chosen manne hath in himselfe, for that also many times it hapneth, that he is not a chosen manne. for those that are not thy subjectes, and whiche willyngly doe serve, are not of the beste, but rather of the worste of a province, for as moche as if any be sclanderous, idell, unruly, without religion, fugetive from the rule of their fathers, blasphemours, dise plaiers, in every condicion evill brought up, bee those, whiche will serve, whose customes cannot be more contrarie, to a true and good servise: albeit, when there bee offered unto you, so many of soche men, as come to above the nomber, that you have appoincted, you maie chuse them: but the matter beyng naught, the choise is not possible to be good: also, many times it chaunceth, that thei be not so many, as will make up the nomber, whereof you have nede, so that beyng constrained to take them al, it commeth to passe, that thei cannot then bee called chosen men, but hired souldiours. with this disorder the armies of italie, are made now a daies, and in other places, except in almaine, bicause there thei doe not hire any by commaundemente of the prince, but accordyng to the will of them, that are disposed to serve. then consider now, what maners of those aunciente armies, maie bee brought into an armie of men, put together by like waies. cosimo. what waie ought to bee used then? fabricio. the same waie that i saied, to chuse them of their owne subjectes, and with the auethoritie of the prince. cosmo. in the chosen, shall there bee likewise brought in any auncient facion? fabricio. you know well enough that ye: when he that should commaunde theim, were their prince, or ordinarie lorde, whether he were made chief, or as a citezein, and for the same tyme capitaine, beyng a common weale, otherwise it is harde to make any thyng good. cosimo. why? fabricio. i will tell you a nane: for this time i will that this suffise you, that it cannot be wrought well by other waie. [sidenote: whether it be better to take menne oute of townes or out of the countrie to serve.] cosimo. having then to make this choyse of men in their owne countries, whether judge you that it be better to take them oute of the citie, or out of the countrie? fabricio. those that have written of such matters, doe all agree, that it is best to chuse them out of the countrie, being men accustomed to no ease, nurished in labours, used to stonde in the sunne, to flie the shadow, knowing how to occupy the spade, to make a diche, to carrie a burden, and to bee without any deceite, and without malisiousnes. but in this parte my opinion should be, that beyng two sortes of souldiours, on foote, and on horsebacke, that those on foote, should be chosen out of the countrie, and those on horseback, oute of the cities. [sidenote: of what age souldiours ought to bee chosen.] cosimo. of what age would you choose them? fabricio. i would take them, when i had to make a newe armie, from xvii. to xl. yeres: when it were made alredy, and i had to restore them, of xvii. alwaies. cosimo. i doe not understonde well this distinction. fabricio. i shall tell you: when i should ordaine an hooste to make warre, where were no hooste alredy, it should be necessarie to chuse all those men, which were most fitte and apte for the warre, so that they were of servisable age, that i might bee able to instructe theim, as by me shalbe declared: but when i would make my choise of menne in places, where a powre were alredy prepared, for suppliyng of thesame, i would take them of xvii. yeres: for as much as the other of more age be alredy chosen and apoincted. cosimo. then woulde you prepare a power like to those whiche is in our countrie? fabricio. ye truly, it is so that i would arme them, captaine them, exercise and order them in a maner, whiche i cannot tell, if you have ordred them so. cosimo. then do you praise the keping of order? fabricio. wherefore would you that i should dispraise it? cosimo. bicause many wise menne have alwaies blamed it. fabricio. you speake against all reason, to saie that a wise man blameth order, he maie bee well thought wise, and be nothyng so. cosimo. the naughtie profe, which it hath alwaies, maketh us to have soche opinion thereof. fabricio. take hede it be not your fault, and not the kepyng of order, the whiche you shall knowe, before this reasonyng be ended. cosimo. you shall doe a thyng moste thankfull, yet i will saie concernyng thesame, that thei accuse it, to the entente you maie the better justifie it. thei saie thus, either it is unprofitable, and we trustyng on the same, shall make us to lese our state, or it shall be verteous, and by thesame meane, he that governeth may easely deprive us thereof. thei alledge the romaines, who by meane of their owne powers, loste their libertie. thei alledge the venicians, and the frenche king, whiche venicians, bicause thei will not be constrained, to obeie one of their owne citezeins, use the power of straungers: and the frenche kyng hath disarmed his people, to be able more easely to commaunde them, but thei whiche like not the ordinaunces, feare moche more the unprofitablenesse, that thei suppose maie insue thereby, then any thyng els: the one cause whiche thei allege is, bicause thei are unexperte: the other, for that thei have to serve par force: for asmoche as thei saie, that the aged bee not so dissiplinable, nor apte to learne the feate of armes, and that by force, is doen never any thyng good. [sidenote: by what meanes souldiours bee made bolde and experte.] fabricio. all these reasons that you have rehearsed, be of men, whiche knoweth the thyng full little, as i shall plainly declare. and firste, concernyng the unprofitablenesse, i tell you, that there is no service used in any countrie more profitable, then the service by the subjectes of thesame nor thesame service cannot bee prepared, but in this maner: and for that this nedeth not to be disputed of, i will not lese moche tyme: bicause al thensamples of auncient histores, make for my purpose, and for that thei alledge the lacke of experience, and to use constraint: i saie how it is true, that the lacke of experience, causeth lacke of courage, and constrainte, maketh evill contentacion: but courage, and experience thei are made to gette, with the maner of armyng theim, exercisyng, and orderyng theim, as in proceadyng of this reasonyng, you shall heare. but concernyng constrainte, you ought to understande, that the menne, whiche are conducted to warfare, by commaundement of their prince, thei ought to come, neither altogether forced, nor altogether willyngly, for as moche as to moche willyngnesse, would make thinconveniencies, where i told afore, that he should not be a chosen manne, and those would be fewe that would go: and so to moche constraint, will bring forth naughtie effectes. therefore, a meane ought to be taken, where is not all constrainte, nor all willingnesse: but beyng drawen of a respecte, that thei have towardes their prince, where thei feare more the displeasure of thesame, then the presente paine: and alwaies it shall happen to be a constrainte, in maner mingled with willingnesse, that there cannot growe soche evil contentacion, that it make evill effectes. yet i saie not for all this, that it cannot bee overcome, for that full many tymes, were overcome the romaine armies, and the armie of aniball was overcome, so that it is seen, that an armie cannot be ordained so sure, that it cannot be overthrowen. therefore, these your wise men, ought not to measure this unprofitablenesse, for havyng loste ones, but to beleve, that like as thei lese, so thei maie winne, and remeadie the occasion of the losse: and when thei shall seke this thei shall finde, that it hath not been through faulte of the waie, but of the order, whiche had not his perfeccion and as i have saied, thei ought to provide, not with blamyng the order, but with redressing it, the whiche how it ought to be doen, you shall understande, from poinct to poinct. concernyng the doubte, leste soche ordinaunces, take not from thee thy state, by meane of one, whiche is made hedde therof, i answere, that the armure on the backes of citezeins, or subjectes, given by the disposicion of order and lawe, did never harme, but rather alwaies it doeth good, and mainteineth the citee, moche lenger in suretie, through helpe of this armure, then without. rome continued free cccc. yeres, and was armed. sparta viii.c. many other citees have been disarmed, and have remained free, lesse then xl. for as moche as citees have nede of defence, and when thei have no defence of their owne, thei hire straungers, and the straunges defence, shall hurte moche soner the common weale, then their owne: bicause thei be moche easier to be corrupted, and a citezein that becommeth mightie, maie moche soner usurpe, and more easely bryng his purpose to passe, where the people bee disarmed, that he seketh to oppresse: besides this, a citee ought to feare a greate deale more, twoo enemies then one. thesame citee that useth straungers power, feareth at one instant the straunger, whiche it hireth, and the citezein: and whether this feare ought to be, remember thesame, whiche i rehearsed a little a fore of frances sforza. that citee, whiche useth her own proper power, feareth no man, other then onely her owne citezein. but for all the reasons that maie bee saied, this shall serve me, that never any ordeined any common weale, or kyngdome, that would not thinke, that thei theim selves, that inhabite thesame, should with their sweardes defende it. and if the venicians had been so wise in this, as in all their other orders, thei should have made a new monarchie in the world, whom so moche the more deserve blame, havyng been armed of their first giver of lawes: for havyng no dominion on the lande, thei wer armed on the sea, where thei made their warre vertuously, and with weapons in their handes, increased their countrie. but when thei were driven to make warre on the lande, to defende vicenza, where thei ought to have sent one of their citezens, to have fought on the lande, thei hired for their capitain, the marques of mantua: this was thesame foolishe acte, whiche cut of their legges, from climyng into heaven, and from enlargyng their dominion: and if thei did it, bicause thei beleved that as thei knewe, how to make warre on the sea, so thei mistrusted theim selves, to make it on the lande, it was a mistruste not wise: for as moche as more easely, a capitain of the sea, whiche is used to fight with the windes, with the water, and with men, shall become a capitaine of the lande, where he shall fight with men onely, then a capitaine of the lande, to become a capitain of the sea. the romanies knowyng how to fight on the lande, and on the sea, commyng to warre, with the carthaginens, whiche were mightie on the sea, hired not grekes, or spaniardes, accustomed to the sea, but thei committed thesame care, to their citezeins, whiche thei sent on the land, and thei overcame. if thei did it, for that one of their citezeins should not become a tiraunt, it was a feare smally considered: for that besides thesame reasons, whiche to this purpose, a little afore i have rehearsed, if a citezein with the powers on the sea, was never made a tiraunt in a citee standyng in the sea, so moche the lesse he should have been able to accomplishe this with the powers of the lande: whereby thei ought to se that the weapons in the handes of their citezeins, could not make tirantes: but the naughtie orders of the governement, whiche maketh tirannie in a citee, and thei havyng good governement, thei nede not to feare their owne weapons: thei toke therefore an unwise waie, the whiche hath been occasion, to take from them moche glorie, and moche felicitie. concernyng the erroure, whiche the kyng of fraunce committeth not kepyng instructed his people in the warre, the whiche those your wise men alledge for ensample, there is no man, (his particulare passions laied a side) that doeth not judge this fault, to be in thesame kyngdome, and this negligence onely to make hym weake. but i have made to greate a digression, and peradventure am come out of my purpose, albeit i have doen it to aunswere you, and to shewe you, that in no countrie, there can bee made sure foundacion, for defence in other powers but of their owne subjectes: and their own power, cannot be prepared otherwise, then by waie of an ordinaunce, nor by other waie, to induce the facion of an armie in any place, nor by other meane to ordein an instruction of warfare. if you have red the orders, whiche those first kynges made in rome, and inespecially servio tullo, you shall finde that the orders of the classi is no other, then an ordinaunce, to bee able at a sodaine, to bryng together an armie, for defence of thesame citee. but let us retourne to our choise, i saie againe, that havyng to renewe an olde order, i would take them of xvii. havyng to make a newe armie, i would take them of all ages, betwene xvii. and xl. to be able to warre straight waie. [sidenote: of what science soldiours ought to bee chosen.] cosimo. would you make any difference, of what science you would chuse them? fabricio. the aucthours, which have written of the arte of warre, make difference, for that thei will not, that there bee taken foulers, fishers, cookes, baudes, nor none that use any science of voluptuousnesse. but thei will, that there bee taken plowmen, ferrars, smithes, carpenters, buchars, hunters, and soche like: but i would make little difference, through conjecture of the science, concernyng the goodnesse of the man, notwithstandyng, in as moche as to be able with more profite to use theim, i would make difference, and for this cause, the countrie men, which are used to till the grounde, are more profitable then any other. next to whom be smithes, carpentars, ferrars, masons, wherof it is profitable to have enough: for that their occupacions, serve well in many thynges: beyng a thyng verie good to have a souldiour, of whom maie be had double servise. [sidenote: howe to chose a souldiour.] cosimo. wherby doe thei knowe those, that be, or are not sufficient to serve. fabricio. i will speake of the maner of chusing a new ordinaunce, to make an armie after, for that parte of this matter, doeth come also to be reasoned of, in the election, which should be made for the replenishing, or restoring of an old ordinaunce. i saie therfore, that the goodnesse of one, whiche thou muste chuse for a souldiour, is knowen either by experience, thorough meane of some of his worthy doynges, or by conjecture. the proofe of vertue, cannot be founde in men whiche are chosen of newe, and whiche never afore have ben chosen, and of these are founde either fewe or none, in the ordinaunce that of newe is ordeined. it is necessarie therefore, lackyng this experience, to runne to the conjecture, whiche is taken by the yeres, by the occupacion, and by the personage: of those two first, hath been reasoned, there remaineth to speake of the thirde. and therefore, i saie how some have willed, that the souldiour bee greate, emongest whom was pirrus. some other have chosen theim onely, by the lustinesse of the body, as cesar did: whiche lustinesse of bodie and mynde, is conjectured by the composicion of the members, and of the grace of the countenaunce: and therefore, these that write saie, that thei would have the iyes lively and cherefull, the necke full of sinowes, the breaste large, the armes full of musculles, the fingers long, little beallie, the flankes rounde, the legges and feete drie: whiche partes are wont alwayes to make a manne nimble and strong, whiche are twoo thynges, that in a souldiour are sought above al other. regarde ought to bee had above all thynges, to his customes, and that in hym bee honestie, and shame: otherwise, there shall bee chosen an instrumente of mischief, and a beginnyng of corrupcion: for that lette no manne beleve that in the dishoneste educacion, and filthy minde, there maie take any vertue, whiche is in any parte laudable. and i thinke it not superfluous, but rather i beleve it to bee necessarie, to the entente you maie the better understande, the importaunce of this chosen, to tell you the maner that the romaine consuls, in the beginnyng of their rule, observed in the chosing of their romain legions: in the whiche choise of men, bicause thesame legions were mingled with old souldiours and newe, consideryng the continuall warre thei kepte, thei might in their choise procede, with the experince of the old, and with the conjecture of the newe: and this ought to be noted, that these men be chosen, either to serve incontinently, or to exercise theim incontinently, and after to serve when nede should require. but my intencion is to shew you, how an armie maie be prepared in the countrie, where there is no warlike discipline: in which countrie, chosen men cannot be had, to use them straight waie, but there, where the custome is to levie armies, and by meane of the prince, thei maie then well bee had, as the romaines observed, and as is observed at this daie emong the suisers: bicause in these chosen, though there be many newe menne, there be also so many of the other olde souldiours, accustomed to serve in the warlike orders, where the newe mingled together with the olde, make a bodie united and good, notwithstanding, that themperours after, beginning the staciones of ordinarie souldiours, had appoincted over the newe souldiours, whiche were called tironi, a maister to exercise theim, as appeareth in the life of massimo the emperour. the whiche thyng, while rome was free, not onely in the armies, but in the citee was ordeined: and the exercises of warre, beyng accustomed in thesame, where the yong men did exercise, there grewe, that beyng chosen after to goe into warre, thei were so used in the fained exercise of warfare, that thei could easely worke in the true: but those emperours havyng after put doune these exercises, thei wer constrained to use the waies, that i have shewed you. therefore, comyng to the maner of the chosen romain, i saie that after the romain consulles (to whom was appoincted the charge of the warre) had taken the rule, myndyng to ordeine their armies, for that it was the custome, that either of them should have twoo legions of romaine menne, whiche was the strength of their armies, thei created xxiiii. tribunes of warre, and thei appoincted sixe for every legion, whom did thesame office, whiche those doe now a daies, that we call conestables: thei made after to come together, all the romain men apte to beare weapons and thei put the tribunes of every legion, seperate the one from the other. afterwarde, by lot thei drewe the tribes, of whiche thei had firste to make the chosen, and of thesame tribe thei chose fower of the best, of whiche was chosen one of the tribunes, of the first legion, and of the other three was chosen, one of the tribunes of the second legion, of the other two there was chosen one of the tribunes of the third, and the same last fell to the fowerth legion. after these iiij, thei chose other fower, of which, first one was chosen of the tribunes of the seconde legion, the seconde of those of the thirde, the thirde of those of the fowerth, the fowerth remained to the first. after, thei chose other fower, the first chose the thirde, the second the fowerth, the thirde the fiveth, the fowerth remained to the seconde: and thus thei varied successively, this maner of chosyng, so that the election came to be equall, and the legions wer gathered together: and as afore we saied, this choise might bee made to use straighte waie, for that thei made them of men, of whom a good parte were experiensed in the verie warfare in deede, and all in the fained exercised, and thei might make this choise by conjecture, and by experience. but where a power must be ordeined of newe, and for this to chuse them out of hande, this chosen cannot be made, saving by conjecture, whiche is taken by consideryng their ages and their likelinesse. cosimo. i beleve all to be true, as moche as of you hath been spoken: but before that you procede to other reasonyng, i woll aske of you one thing, which you have made me to remember: saiyng that the chosen, that is to be made where men were not used to warre, ought to be made by conjecture: for asmoche as i have heard some men, in many places dispraise our ordinaunce, and in especially concernyng the nomber, for that many saie, that there ought to bee taken lesse nomber, whereof is gotten this profite, that thei shall be better and better chosen, and men shal not be so moche diseased, so that there maie bee given them some rewarde, whereby thei maie bee more contented, and better bee commaunded, whereof i would understande in this parte your opinion, and whether you love better the greate nomber, than the little, and what waie you would take to chuse theim in the one, and in the other nomber. fabricio. without doubte it is better, and more necessary, the great nomber, then the little: but to speake more plainly, where there cannot be ordeined a great nomber of men, there cannot be ordeined a perfect ordinaunce: and i will easely confute all the reasons of them propounded. i saie therefore firste, that the lesse nomber where is many people, as is for ensample tuscane, maketh not that you have better, nor that the chosen be more excellent, for that myndyng in chosing the menne, to judge them by experience, there shall be founde in thesame countrie moste fewe, whom experience should make provable, bothe for that fewe hath been in warre, as also for that of those, mooste fewe have made triall, whereby thei might deserve to bee chosen before the other: so that he whiche ought in like places to chuse, it is mete he leave a parte the experience, and take them by conjecture. then being brought likewise into soche necessitie, i would understande, if there come before me twentie young men of good stature, with what rule i ought to take, or to leave any: where without doubte, i beleve that every man will confesse, how it is lesse errour to take them al, to arme theim and exercise theim, beyng not able to knowe, whiche of theim is beste, and to reserve to make after more certaine chosen, when in practisyng theim with exercise, there shall be knowen those of moste spirite, and of moste life: which considered, the chusing in this case a fewe, to have them better, is altogether naught. concernyng diseasing lesse the countrie, and men, i saie that the ordinaunce, either evill or little that it bee, causeth not any disease, for that this order doeth not take menne from any of their businesse, it bindeth them not, that thei cannot go to doe any of their affaires: for that it bindeth them onely in the idell daies, to assemble together, to exercise them, the whiche thyng doeth not hurt, neither to the countrie, nor to the men, but rather to yong men it shall bryng delite: for that where vilie on the holy daies thei stande idell in tipplyng houses, thei will go for pleasure to those exercises, for that the handlyng of weapons, as it is a goodly spectacle, so unto yong men it is pleasaunt. concernyng to bee able to paie the lesse nomber, and for this to kepe theim more obediente, and more contented, i answere, how there cannot be made an ordinaunce of so fewe, whiche maie be in maner continually paied, where thesame paiment of theirs maie satisfie them. as for ensample, if there were ordeined a power of v. thousande men, for to paie them after soche sorte, that it might be thought sufficient, to content them, it shal bee convenient to give theim at least, ten thousaunde crounes the moneth: first, this nomber of men are not able to make an armie, this paie is intolerable to a state, and of the other side, it is not sufficiente to kepe men contented, and bounde to be able to serve at al times: so that in doyng this, there shall be spent moche, and a small power kept, whiche shall not be sufficient to defend thee, or to doe any enterprise of thine. if thou shouldest give theim more, or shouldest take more, so moche more impossibilitie it should be, for thee to paie theim: if thou shouldest give them lesse, or should take lesse, so moche the lesse contentacion should be in them, or so moche the lesse profite thei shal bring thee. therfore, those that reason of makyng an ordinaunce, and whilest thei tary at home to paie them, thei reason of a thing either impossible, or unprofitable, but it is necessarie to paie them, when thei are taken up to be led to the warre: albeit, though soche order should somewhat disease those, in time of peace, that are appoincted in thesame, which i se not how, there is for recompence all those benefites, whiche a power brynges, that is ordeined in a countrie: for that without thesame, there is nothyng sure. i conclude, that he that will have the little nomber, to be able to paie them, or for any of the other causes alledged of you, doeth not understande, for that also it maketh for my opinion, that every nomber shall deminishe in thy handes, through infinite impedimentes, whiche men have: so that the little nomber shall tourne to nothing: again havyng thordinaunce greate, thou maiest at thy pleasure use fewe of many, besides this, it must serve thee in deede, and in reputacion and alwaies the great nomber shall give thee moste reputacion. more over, makyng the ordinaunce to kepe menne exercised, if thou appoincte a fewe nomber of men in many countries, the handes of men bee so farre a sonder, the one from the other, that thou canst not without their moste grevous losse, gather them together to exercise them, and without this exercise, the ordinaunce is unprofitable, as hereafter shall be declared. cosimo. it suffiseth upon this my demaunde, that whiche you have saied: but i desire now, that you declare me an other doubt. thei saie, that soche a multitude of armed men, will make confusion, discension and disorder in the countrie where thei are. [sidenote: how to provid againste soche inconveniences as souldiours maie cause.] fabricio. this is an other vaine opinion, the cause wherof, i shall tell you: soche as are ordeined to serve in the warres, maie cause disorder in twoo maners, either betwene them selves, or against other, whiche thinges moste easely maie be withstode, where the order of it self, should not withstande it: for that concernyng the discorde emong theim selves, this order taketh it waie, and doeth not nourishe it, for that in orderyng them, you give them armour and capitaines. if the countrie where you ordein them, bee so unapte for the warre, that there are not armours emong the men of thesame, and that thei bee so united, that thei have no heddes, this order maketh theim moche fearser against the straunger, but it maketh them not any thyng the more disunited, for that men well ordered, feare the lawe beyng armed, as well as unarmed, nor thei can never alter, if the capitaines, which you give them, cause not the alteracion, and the waie to make this, shall be tolde now: but if the countrie where you ordein them, be warlike and disunited, this order onely shal be occasion to unite them: bicause this order giveth them armours profitable for the warre, and heddes, extinguishers of discencion: where their owne armours bee unprofitable for the warres, and their heddes nourishers of discorde. for that so sone as any in thesame countrie is offended, he resorteth by and by to his capitain to make complaint, who for to maintain his reputacion, comforteth hym to revengement not to peace. to the contrary doeth the publike hed, so that by this meanes, thoccasion of discorde is taken awaie, and the occasion of union is prepared, and the provinces united and effeminated, gette utilitie, and maintain union: the disunited and discencious, doe agree, and thesame their fearsnesse, which is wont disordinately to worke, is tourned into publike utilitie. to minde to have them, to doe no hurt against other, it ought to bee considered, that thei cannot dooe this, except by meane of the heddes, whiche governe them. to will that the heddes make no disorder, it is necessarie to have care, that thei get not over them to much auctoritie. and you must consider that this auctoritie, is gotten either by nature, or by accidente: and as to nature, it behoveth to provide, that he which is boren in one place, be not apoincted to the men billed in the same, but be made hedde of those places, where he hath not any naturall aquaintance: and as to the accident, the thing ought to be ordeined in suche maner, that every yere the heddes maie be changed from governement to goverment: for as muche as the continuall auctoritie over one sorte of menne, breedeth among them so muche union, that it maie turne easely to the prejudice of the prince: whiche permutations howe profitable they be to those who have used theim, and hurtefull to them that have not observed theim, it is well knowen by the kingdome of the assirians, and by the empire of the romaines: where is seene, that the same kingdome indured a m. yeres without tumulte, and without any civill warre: whiche preceded not of other, then of the permutations, whiche from place to place everie yere thesame capitaines made, unto whome were apoincted the charge of the armies. nor for any other occasion in the romaine empire, after the bloud of cesar was extinguished, there grewe so many civill warres, betwene the capitaines of the hostes, and so many conspiracies of the forsaied capitaines against the emperours, not onely kepyng continually still those capitaines alwayes in one governement. and if in some of those firste emperoures, of those after, whom helde the empire with reputacion, as adriane, marcus, severus, and soche like, there had been so moche foresight, that thei had brought this custome of chaungyng the capitaines in thesame empire, without doubte it should have made theim more quiete, and more durable: for that the capitaines should have had lesse occasion to make tumultes, the emperours lesse cause to feare, and the senate in the lackes of the successions, should have had in the election of the emperour, more aucthoritie, and by consequence should have been better: but the naughtie custome, either for ignoraunce, or through the little diligence of menne, neither for the wicked, nor good ensamples, can be taken awaie. cosimo. i cannot tell, if with my questionyng, i have as it were led you out of your order, bicause from the chusyng of men, we be entred into an other matter, and if i had not been a little before excused, i should thinke to deserve some reprehension. [sidenote: the nomber of horsemen, that the romanies chose for a legion, and for a consailes armie.] fabricio. let not this disquiete you, for that all this reasonyng was necessary, myndyng to reason of the ordinaunce, the which beyng blamed of many, it was requsite to excuse it, willyng to have this first parte of chusyng men to be alowed. but now before i discend to the other partes, i will reason of the choise of men on horsebacke. of the antiquitie, these were made of the moste richeste, havyng regard bothe to the yeres, and to the qualitie of the man, and thei chose ccc. for a legion, so that the romain horse, in every consulles armie, passed not the nomber of vi. c. cosimo. would you make an ordinaunce of hors, to exercise them at home, and to use their service when nede requires? [sidenote: the choosing and ordering of horsemen, that is to be observed at this present.] fabricio. it is most necessary, and it cannot be doen otherwise, minding to have the power, that it be the owne proper, and not to purpose to take of those, which make thereof an art. cosimo. how would you choose them? fabricio. i would imitate the romans, i would take of the richest, i would give them heads or chief captains, in the same manner, as nowadays to other is given, and i would arm them and exercise them. cosimo. to these should it be well to give some provision? fabricio. yea marie, but so much only as is necessary to keep the horse, for as much as bringing to thy subjects expenses, they might justly complain of thee, therefore it should be necessary, to pay them their charges of their horse. cosimo. what number would you make? and how would you arme them? fabricio. you pass into another matter. i will tell you in convenient place, which shall be when i have told you, how footmen ought to be armed, and how a power of men is prepared, for a day of battle. the second booke [sidenote: howe the romaines armed their souldiers and what weapons thei used.] i beleeve that it is necessarye, men being founde, to arme them, and minding to doo this, i suppose that it is a needefull thing to examine, what armoure the antiquitie used, and of the same to chose the best. the romanes devided their foote men in heavie and lighte armed: those that were light armed, they called by the name of veliti: under this name were understoode all those that threwe with slinges, shot with crossebowes, cast dartes, and they used the most parte of them for their defence, to weare on their heade a murion, with a targaet on their arme: they fought out of the orders, and farre of from the heavie armed, which did weare a head peece, that came downe to their shoulders, a corselet, which with the tases came downe to the knees, and they had the legges and armes, covered with greaves, and vambraces, with a targaet on the left arme, a yarde and a halfe long, and three quarters of a yarde brode, whiche had a hoope of iron upon it, to bee able to sustaine a blowe, and an other under, to the intente, that it being driven to the earth, it should not breake: for to offende, they had girte on their left flanke a swoorde, the length of a yearde and a naile, on their righte side, a dagger: they had a darte in every one of their handes, the which they called pilo, and in the beginning of the fight, they threwe those at the enemie. this was the ordering, and importaunce of the armours of the romanes, by the which they possessed all the world. and although some of these ancient writers gave them, besides the foresayde weapons, a staffe in their hande like unto a partasen, i cannot tell howe a heavy staff, may of him that holdeth a targaet be occupied: for that to handle it with both hands, the targaet should bee an impediment, and to occupye the same with one hande, there can be done no good therewith, by reason of the weightynesse thereof: besides this, to faight in the strong, and in the orders with such long kinde of weapon, it is unprofitable, except in the first front, where they have space enough, to thrust out all the staffe, which in the orders within, cannot be done, for that the nature of the battaile (as in the order of the same, i shall tell you) is continually to throng together, which although it be an inconvenience, yet in so doing they fear lesse, then to stande wide, where the perill is most evident, so that all the weapons, which passe in length a yarde and a halfe, in the throng, be unprofitable: for that, if a man have the partasen, and will occupye it with both handes, put case that the targaet let him not, he can not hurte with the same an enemy, whom is upon him, if he take it with one hande, to the intent to occupy also the targaet, being not able to take it, but in the middest, there remayneth so much of the staff behind, that those which are behinde him, shall let him to welde it. and whether it were true, either that the romans had not this partasen, or that having it, did little good withal, read all the battailes, in the historye thereof, celebrated of titus livius, and you shall see in the same, most seldom times made mencion of partasens, but rather alwaies he saieth, that the dartes being thrown, they laid their hands on their sweardes. therefore i will leave this staffe, and observe, concerning the romanes, the swoorde for to hurte, and for defense the targaet, with the other armours aforesaide. [sidenote: a brave and a terrible thing to the enemies.] the greekes did not arme them selves so heavyly, for their defense, as the romans dyd: but for to offend the enemies, they grounded more on their staves, then on their swoordes, and in especiallye the fallangye of macedonia, which used staves, that they called sarisse, seven yardes and a halfe long, with the which they opened the rankes of their enemies, and they keept the orders in their fallangy. and although some writers saie, that they had also the targaet, i can not tell (by the reasons aforesayde) howe the sarisse and they coulde stande together. besides this, in the battaile that paulus emilius made, with persa king of macedonia, i do not remember, that there is made any mention of targaettes, but only of the sarisse, and of the difficultie that the romane armie had, to overcome them: so that i conjecture, that a macedonicall fallange, was no other wise, then is now a dayes a battaile of suizzers, the whiche in their pikes have all their force, and all their power. the romanes did garnish (besides the armours) the footemen with feathers; the whiche thinges makes the fight of an armie to the friendes goodly, to the enemies terrible. the armour of the horsemen, in the same first romane antiquitie, was a rounde targaet, and they had their head armed, and the rest unarmed: they had a swoorde and a staffe, with an iron head onely before, long and small: whereby it happened, that they were not able to staye the targaet, and the staffe in the incountring broke, and they through being unarmed, were subjecte to hurtes: after, in processe of time, they armed them as the footemen, albeit they used the targaette muche shorter, square, and the staffe more stiffe, and with twoo heades, to the entente, that breaking one of the heades, they mighte prevaile with the other. with these armours as well on foote, as on horsebacke, the romanes conquered all the worlde, and it is to be beleeved, by the fruiet thereof, whiche is seene, that they were the beste appointed armies, that ever were: and titus livius in his history, doeth testifie verye often, where comming to comparison with the enemies armies, he saieth: but the romanes, by vertue, by the kinde of their armours, and piactise in the service of warre, were superiours: and therfore i have more particularly reasoned of the armours of conquerours, then of the conquered. but nowe mee thikes good, to reason onelye of the manner of arming men at this presente. footemen have for their defence, a breast plate, and for to offende, a launce, sixe yardes and three quarters long, which is called a pike, with a swoorde on their side, rather rounde at the poinct, then sharpe. this is the ordinarie arming of footemen nowe a dayes, for that fewe there be, which have their legges armed, and their armes, the heade none, and those fewe, beare insteede of a pike, a halberde, the staffe whereof as you know, is twoo yardes and a quarter long, and it hath the iron made like an axe. betweene them, they have harkebutters, the which with the violence of the fire, do the same office, which in olde time the slingers did, and the crosseboweshoters. this maner of arming, was found out by the dutchemen, inespeciallye of suizzers, whom being poore, and desirous to live free, they were, and be constrayned to fight, with the ambition of the princes of almaine, who being riche, were able to keepe horse, the which the same people could not do for povertye. wherby it grewe, that being on foote, minding to defende them selves from the enemies, that were on horsebacke, it behooveth them to seeke of the aunciente orders, and to finde weapons, whiche from the furie of horses, should defende them: this necessitie hath made either to be maintayned, or to bee founde of them the aunciente orders, without whiche, as everye prudente man affirmeth, the footemen is altogether unprofitable. therefore, they tooke for their weapon the pike, a moste profitable weapon, not only to withstande horses, but to overcome them: and the dutchemen have by vertue of these weapons, and of these orders, taken such boldnesse, that xv. or xx. thousande of them, will assault the greatest nomber of horse that maye be: and of this, there hath beene experience enough within this xxv. yeres. and the insamples of their vertue hath bene so mightie, grounded upon these weapons, and these orders, that sence king charles passed into italie, everye nation hath imitated them: so that the spanish armies, are become into most great reputation. cosimo. which maner of arming, do you praise moste, either these dutchemens, or the auncient romanes? [sidenote: whether the romanes maner in arming of men, be better then the arming of men, that is used nowe a daies.] fabricio. the romane without doubte, and i will tell the commoditie, and the discommoditie of the one, and the other. the dutche footemen, are able to withstande, and overcome the horses: they bee moste speedie to marche, and to be set in araye, being not laden with armours: of the other part, they be subjecte to all blowes, both farre of, and at hande: because they be unarmed, they bee unprofitable unto the battaile on the lande, and to everye fighte, where is strong resistaunce. but the romanes withstoode, and overcame the horses, as well as the dutchemen, they were safe from blowes at hande, and farre of, being covered with armours: they were also better able to charge, and better able to sustaine charges, having targaettes: they might more aptly in the preace fight with the swoorde, then these with the pike, and though the dutchemen have likewise swoordes, yet being without targaets, they become in suche case unprofitable: the romanes might safelye assault townes, having their bodies cleane covered with armour, and being better able to cover themselves with their targaettes. so that they had no other incommoditie, then the waightynesse of their armours, and the pain to cary them: the whiche thinges thei overcame, with accustomyng the body to diseases, and with hardenyng it, to bee able to indure labour. and you knowe, how that in thinges accustomed, men suffer no grief. and you have to understand this, that the footemen maie be constrained, to faight with footemen, and with horse, and alwaies those be unprofitable, whiche cannot either sustain the horses, or beyng able to sustain them, have notwithstandyng neede to feare the footemen, whiche be better armed, and better ordeined then thei. now if you consider the duchemen, and the romaines, you shall finde in the duchemen activitie (as we have said) to overcome the horses, but greate dissavauntage, when thei faighte with menne, ordeined as thei them selves are, and armed as the romaines were: so that there shall be this advauntage more of the one, then of thother, that the romaines could overcome the men, and the horses, the duchemen onely the horses. cosimo. i would desire, that you would come to some more particulare insample, whereby wee maie better understande. [sidenote: an ensample whiche proveth that horsemen with staves, cannot prevaile against footemen with pikes, and what great advauntage the armed have, againste the unarmed. the victory of carminvola against the duchemen.] fabricio. i saie thus, that you shall finde in many places of our histories, the romain footemen to have overcome innumerable horses, and you shall never finde, that thei have been overcome of men on foote, for default that thei have had in their armour, or thorowe the vantage that the enemie hath had in the armours: for that if the maner of their armyng, should have had defaulte, it had been necessarie, that there should folowe, the one of these twoo thynges, either that findyng soche, as should arme theim better then thei, thei should not have gone still forwardes, with their conquestes, or that thei should have taken the straungers maners, and should have left their owne, and for that it folowed not in the one thing, nor in the other, there groweth that ther maie be easely conjectured, that the maner of their armyng, was better then thesame of any other. it is not yet thus happened to the duchemen, for that naughtie profe, hath ben seen made them, when soever thei have chaunsed to faight with men on foote prepared, and as obstinate as thei, the whiche is growen of the vauntage, whiche thesame have incountred in thenemies armours. philip vicecounte of milaine, being assaulted of xviii. thousande suizzers, sent against theim the counte carminvola, whiche then was his capitaine. he with sixe thousande horse, and a fewe footemen, went to mete with them, and incounteryng theim, he was repulsed with his moste greate losse: wherby carminvola as a prudente man, knewe straight waie the puisaunce of the enemies weapons, and how moche against the horses thei prevailed, and the debilitie of the horses, againste those on foote so appoincted: and gatheryng his men together again, he went to finde the suizzers, and so sone as he was nere them, he made his men of armes, to a light from their horse, and in thesame mane, faightyng with them he slue theim all, excepte three thousande: the whiche seyng them selves to consume, without havyng reamedy, castyng their weapons to the grounde, yelded. cosimo. whereof cometh so moche disavauntage? [sidenote: the battailes when thei are a faightyng, doe throng together.] fabricio. i have a little afore tolde you, but seyng that you have not understoode it, i will rehearse it againe. the duchemen (as a little before i saied unto you) as it were unarmed, to defende themselves, have to offende, the pike and the swearde: thei come with these weapons, and with their orders to finde the enemies, whom if thei bee well armed, to defende theim selves, as were the menne of armes of carminvola, whiche made theim a lighte on foote, thei come with the sweard, and in their orders to find them, and have no other difficultie, then to come nere to the suizzers, so that thei maie reche them with the sweard, for that so sone as thei have gotten unto them, thei faight safely: for asmoche as the duch man cannot strike thenemie with the pike, whom is upon him, for the length of the staffe, wherefore it is conveniente for hym, to put the hande to the sweard, the whiche to hym is unprofitable, he beyng unarmed, and havyng against hym an enemie, that is all armed. whereby he that considereth the vantage, and the disavantage of the one, and of the other, shall see, how the unarmed, shall have no maner of remeady, and the overcommyng of the firste faight, and to passe the firste poinctes of the pikes, is not moche difficulte, he that faighteth beyng well armed: for that the battailes go (as you shall better understande, when i have shewed you, how thei are set together) and incounteryng the one the other, of necessitie thei thrust together, after soche sorte, that thei take the one thother by the bosome, and though by the pikes some bee slaine, or overthrowen, those that remain on their feete, be so many, that thei suffice to obtaine the victorie. hereof it grewe, that carminvola overcame them, with so greate slaughter of the suizzers, and with little losse of his. cosimo. consider that those of carminvola, were men of armes, whom although thei wer on foote, thei were covered all with stele, and therefore thei wer able to make the profe thei did: so that me thinkes, that a power ought to be armed as thei, mindyng to make the verie same profe. fabricio. if you should remember, how i tolde you the romaines were armed, you would not thynke so: for as moche as a manne, that hath the hedde covered with iron, the breaste defended of a corselet, and of a targaet, the armes and the legges armed, is moche more apt to defende hymself from the pike, and to enter emong them, then a man of armes on foote. i wil give you a little of a late ensample. there wer come out of cicelie, into the kyngdome of naples, a power of spaniardes, for to go to finde consalvo, who was besieged in barlet, of the frenchemen: there made against theim mounsier de vhigni, with his menne of armes, and with aboute fower thousande duchemen on foote: the duchemen incountered with their pikes lowe, and thei opened the power of the spaniardes: but those beyng holp, by meane of their bucklers and of the agiletie of their bodies, mingled togethers with the duchemen, so that thei might reche them with the swearde, whereby happened the death, almoste of all theim, and the victorie to the spaniardes. every man knoweth, how many duchemen were slaine in the battaile of ravenna, the whiche happened by the verie same occasion: for that the spanishe souldiours, got them within a swerdes length of the duche souldiours, and thei had destroied them all, if of the frenche horsemen, the duchemen on foote, had not been succored: notwithstandyng, the spaniardes close together, brought themselves into a safe place. i conclude therefore, that a good power ought not onely to be able, to withstande the horses, but also not to have fear of menne on foote, the which (as i have many tymes saied) procedeth of the armours, and of the order. [sidenote: how to arme men, and what weapons to appoincte theim, after the romaine maner, and duche facion.] cosimo. tell therefore, how you would arme them? fabricio. i would take of the romaine armours, and of the duchemennes weapons, and i would that the one haulfe, should bee appoincted like the romaines, and the other haulfe like the duchemen: for that if in sixe thousande footemen (as i shall tell you a little hereafter) i should have thre thousande men with targaettes, after the romain maner, and two thousande pikes, and a thousand harkebutters, after the duche facion, thei should sufice me: for that i would place the pikes, either in the fronte of the battaile, or where i should feare moste the horses, and those with the targaetes and sweardes, shall serve me to make a backe to the pikes, and to winne the battaile, as i shall shewe you: so that i beleeve, that a power thus ordayned, should overcome at this daye, any other power. cosimo. this which hath beene saide, sufficeth concerning footemen, but concerning horsemen, wee desire to understand which you thinke more stronger armed, either ours, or the antiquitie. [sidenote: the victorie of lucullo, against tiarane king of armenia; for what pupose horsemen be most requisite.] fabricio. i beleeve that in these daies, having respect to the saddelles bolstered, and to the stiroppes not used of the antiquitie, they stande more stronglye on horsebacke, then in the olde time: i thinke also they arme them more sure: so that at this daye, a bande of men of armes, paysing very muche, commeth to be with more difficultie withstoode, then were the horsemen of old time: notwithstanding for all this, i judge, that there ought not to be made more accompt of horses, then in olde time was made, for that (as afore is sayde) manye times in our dayes, they have with the footemen receyved shame and shall receyve alwayes, where they incounter, with a power of footemen armed, and ordered, as above hath bene declared. tigrane king of armenia, had againste the armie of the romanes, wherof was capitayne lucullo, cl. thousande horsemen, amongest the whiche, were many armed, like unto our men of armes, which they called catafratti, and of the other parte, the romanes were about sixe thousande, with xxv. thousand footemen: so that tigrane seeing the armie of the enemies, saide: these be horses enough for an imbassage: notwithstanding, incountering together, he was overthrowen: and he that writeth of the same fighte, disprayseth those catafratti, declaring them to be unprofitable; for that hee sayeth, because they had their faces covered, they had muche a doe to see, and to offende the enemie, and they falling, being laden with armour coulde not rise up again, nor welde themselves in any maner to prevaile. i say therefore, that those people or kingdomes, whiche shall esteeme more the power of horses, then the power of footemen be alwaies weake, and subjecte to all ruine, as by italie hath been seene in our time, the whiche hath beene taken, ruinated, and over run with straungers, through not other fault, then for having taken litle care, of the service on foote, and being brought the souldiours therof, all on horsebacke. yet there ought to bee had horses, but for seconde, and not for firste foundaion of an armie: for that to make a discovery, to over run and to destroy the enemies countrie, and to keepe troubled and disquieted, the armie of the same, and in their armours alwayes, to let them of their victuals, they are necessary, and most profitable: but concerning for the daye of battaile, and for the fighte in the fielde, whiche is the importaunce of the warre, and the ende, for which the armies are ordeined, they are more meeter to follow the enemie being discomfited then to do any other thing which in the same is to be done, and they bee in comparison, to the footemen much inferiour. cosimo. there is happened unto mee twoo doubtes, the one, where i knowe, that the parthians dyd not use in the warre, other then horses, and yet they devided the worlde with the romanes: the other is, that i woulde that you should shewe, howe the horsemen can be withstoode of footemen, and wherof groweth the strength of these, and the debilitie of those? [sidenote: the reason why footmen are able to overcome horsemen; how footmen maie save them selves from horsemen; the exercise of souldiours, ought to be devided into thre partes; what exercises the auncient common weales used to exercise their youth in, and what commoditie insued thereby; how the antiquitie, learned their yong soldiours, to handell their weapons; what thantiquitie estemed moste happie in a common weale; mouster maisters; for thexercisyng of yong men unexperte.] fabricio. either i have tolde you, or i minded to tell you, howe that my reasoning of the affaires of warre, ought not to passe the boundes of europe: when thus it is, i am not bounde unto you, to make accompte of the same, which is used in asia, yet i muste saye unto you thus, that the warring of the parthians, was altogether contrarye, to the same of the romanes: for as muche as the parthians, warred all on horsebacke, and in the fight, they proceeded confusedlye, and scattered, and it was a maner of fighte unstable, and full of uncertaintie. the romanes were (it maye be sayde) almoste al on foote, and thei fought close together and sure, and thei overcame diversly, the one the other, according to the largenesse, or straightnesse of the situation: for that in this the romaines were superiours, in thesame the parthians, whom might make greate proofe, with thesame maner of warryng, consideryng the region, which thei had to defende, the which was moste large: for as moche as it hath the sea coaste, distant a thousande miles, the rivers thone from thother, twoo or three daies journey, the tounes in like maner and the inhabitauntes few: so that a romaine armie heavie and slowe, by meanes of their armoures, and their orders, could not over run it, without their grevous hurt (those that defended it, being on horsebacke mooste expedite) so that thei were to daie in one place, and to morowe distaunt fiftie miles. hereof it grewe, that the parthians might prevaile with their chivalrie onely, bothe to the ruine of the armie of crassus, and to the perill of thesame, of marcus antonius: but i (as i have told you) doe not intende in this my reasonyng, to speake of the warfare out of europe, therfore i will stand upon thesame, whiche in times past, the romaines ordained, and the grekes, and as the duchemen doe now adaies. but let us se to the other question of yours, where you desire to understande, what order, or what naturall vertue makes, that the footemen overcome the horsmen. and i saie unto you first that the horses cannot go, as the footmen in every place: thei are slower then the footemen to obeie, when it is requisite to alter the order: for as moche, as if it be nedefull, either goyng forward, to turne backwarde, or tournyng backwarde, to go forwarde, or to move themselves standing stil, or goyng to stand still, without doubt, the horsemen cannot dooe it so redilie as the footemen: the horsemen cannot, being of some violence, disordained, returne in their orders, but with difficultie, although thesame violence cease, the whiche the footemen dooe moste easely and quickly. besides this, it happeneth many tymes, that a hardie manne shall be upon a vile horse, and a coward upon a good, whereby it foloweth, that this evill matchyng of stomackes, makes disorder. nor no man doeth marvell, that a bande of footemenne, susteineth all violence of horse for that a horse is a beaste, that hath sence, and knoweth the perilles, and with an ill will, will enter in them: and if you consider, what force maketh theim go forwarde, and what holdeth them backwarde, you shall se without doubt thesame to be greater, whiche kepeth them backe, then that whiche maketh them go forwardes: for that the spurre maketh theim go forwarde, and of the other side, either the swearde, or the pike, kepeth theim backe: so that it hath been seen by the olde, and by the late experience, a bande of footemen to bee moste safe, ye, invinsible for horses. and if you should argue to this, that the heate, with whiche thei come, maketh theim more furious to incounter who that would withstande them, and lesse to regard the pike, then the spurre: i saie, that if the horse so disposed, begin to see, that he must run upon the poincte of the pike, either of himself, he wil refrain the course so that so sone as he shall feele himself pricked, he will stande still atones, or beeyng come to theim, he will tourne on the right, or on the lefte hande. whereof if you wil make experience, prove to run a horse against a walle: you shall finde fewe, with what so ever furie he come withall, will strike against it. cesar havyng in fraunce, to faighte with the suizzers, a lighted, and made every manne a light on foote, and to avoide from the araies, the horses, as a thyng more meete to flie, then to faight. but notwithstandyng these naturall impedimentes, whiche horses have, thesame capitaine, whiche leadeth the footemen, ought to chuse waies, whiche have for horse, the moste impedimentes that maie bee, and seldome tymes it happeneth, but that a manne maie save hymself, by the qualitie of the countrie: for that if thou marche on the hilles, the situacion doeth save thee from thesame furie, whereof you doubt, that thei go withail in the plain, fewe plaines be, whiche through the tillage or by meanes of the woddes, doe not assure thee: for that every hillocke, every bancke, although it be but small, taketh awaie thesame heate, and every culture where bee vines, and other trees, lettes the horses: and if thou come to battaile, the very same lettes happeneth, that chaunceth in marchyng: for as moche as every little impedemente, that the horse hath, abateth his furie. one thyng notwithstandyng, i will not forgette to tell you, how the romaines estemed so moche their orders, and trusted so moche to their weapons, that if thei shuld have had, to chuse either so rough a place to save theim selves from horses, where thei should not have been able, to raunge their orders, or a place where thei should have nede, to feare more of horses, but ben able to deffende their battaile, alwaies thei toke this, and left that: but bicause it is tyme, to passe to the armie, having armed these souldiours, accordyng to the aunciente and newe use, let us see what exercises the romaines caused theim make, before the menne were brought to the battaile. although thei be well chosen, and better armed, thei ought with moste greate studie be exercised, for that without this exercise, there was never any souldiour good: these exercises ought to be devided into three partes, the one, for to harden the bodie, and to make it apte to take paines, and to bee more swifter and more readier, the other, to teach them, how to handell their weapons, the third, for to learne them to kepe the orders in the armie, as well in marchyng, as in faightyng, and in the incampyng: the whiche be three principall actes, that an armie doeth: for asmoche, as if an armie marche, incampe, and faight with order, and expertly, the capitaine leseth not his honoure, although the battaile should have no good ende. therfore, all thauncient common weales, provided these exercises in maner, by custome, and by lawe, that there should not be left behinde any part thereof. thei exercised then their youth, for to make them swift, in runnyng, to make theim readie, in leapyng, for to make them strong, in throwyng the barre, or in wrestlyng: and these three qualities, be as it were necessarie in souldiours. for that swiftnesse, maketh theim apte to possesse places, before the enemie, and to come to them unloked for, and at unwares to pursue them, when thei are discomfaicted: the readinesse, maketh theim apte to avoide a blowe, to leape over a diche, to winne a banke: strength, maketh them the better able to beare their armours, to incounter the enemie, to withstande a violence. and above all, to make the bodie the more apte to take paines, thei used to beare greate burthens, the whiche custome is necessarie: for that in difficulte expedicions it is requisite many tymes, that the souldiour beside his armours, beare vitualles for many daies, and if he were not accustomed to this labour, he could not dooe it: and without this, there can neither bee avoided a perill, nor a victorie gotten with fame. concernyng to learne how to handell the weapons, thei exercised theim, in this maner: thei would have the yong menne, to put on armour, whiche should waie twise as moche, as their field armour, and in stede of a swearde, thei gave them a cudgell leaded, whiche in comparison of a verie swearde in deede, was moste heavie; thei made for every one of them, a poste to be set up in the ground, which should be in height twoo yardes and a quarter, and in soche maner, and so strong, that the blowes should not slur nor hurle it doune, against the whiche poste, the yong man with a targaet, and with the cudgell, as against an enemie did exercise, and some whiles he stroke, as though he would hurte the hedde, or the face, somewhile he retired backe, an other while he made forewarde: and thei had in this exercise, this advertisment, to make theim apt to cover theim selves, and to hurte the enemie: and havyng the counterfaight armours moste heavy, their ordinarie armours semed after unto them more lighter. the romanies, would that their souldiours should hurte with the pricke, and not with the cutte, as well bicause the pricke is more mortalle, and hath lesse defence, as also to thentent that he that should hurt, might lye the lesse open, and be more apt to redouble it, then with cuttes. dooe not marvaile that these auncient men, should thinke on these small thynges, for that where the incounteryng of men is reasoned of, you shall perceive, that every little vauntage, is of greate importaunce: and i remember you the same, whiche the writers of this declare, rather then i to teache you. the antiquitie estemed nothing move happie, in a common weale, then to be in thesame, many men exercised in armes: bicause not the shining of precious stones and of golde, maketh that the enemies submit themselves unto thee, but onely the fear of the weapons: afterwarde the errours whiche are made in other thynges, maie sometymes be corrected, but those whiche are dooen in the warre, the paine straight waie commyng on, cannot be amended. besides that, the knowlege to faight, maketh men more bold, bicause no man feareth to doe that thing, which he thinketh to have learned to dooe. the antiquitie would therefore, that their citezeins should exercise themselves, in all marcial feates, and thei made them to throwe against thesame poste, dartes moche hevier then the ordinarie: the whiche exercise, besides the makyng men expert in throwyng, maketh also the arme more nimble, and moche stronger. thei taught them also to shote in the long bowe, to whorle with the sling: and to all these thynges, thei appoincted maisters, in soche maner, that after when thei were chosen for to go to the warre, thei were now with mynde and disposicion, souldiours. nor there remained them to learn other, then to go in the orders, and to maintain them selves in those, either marchyng, or faightyng: the whiche moste easely thei learned, mingeling themselves with those, whiche had long tyme served, whereby thei knewe how to stande in the orders. cosimo. what exercises would you cause theim to make at this present? [sidenote: the exercises that souldiers ought to make in these daies; the exercise of swimmyng; tiber, is a river runnyng through rome the water wher of will never corrupte; thexercise of vautyng, and the commoditie thereof; an order that is taken in certain countries, concerning exercises of warre; what knowledge a souldiour ought to have; a cohorte is a bande of men; of what nomer and of what kind of armours and weapons, a maine battaile ought to bee, and the distributing and appoinetyng of thesame; veliti are light armed men; thecapitaines that ar appointed to every band of men; twoo orders observed in an armie; how a captain muste instructe muste instructe his souldiours how thei ought to governe themselves in the battaile.] fabricio. a good many of those, whiche have been declared, as runnyng, and wrestlyng, makyng theim to leape, makyng theim to labour in armours, moche heavier then the ordinarie, making them shoote with crosse bowes, and longe bowes, whereunto i would joyne the harkabus, a newe instrument (as you know) verie necessarie, and to these exercises i would use, al the youth of my state, but with greater industrie, and more sollicitatenesse thesame parte, whiche i should have alreadie appoincted to serve, and alwaies in the idell daies, thei should bee exercised. i would also that thei should learne to swimme, the whiche is a thyng verie profitable: for that there be not alwaies bridges over rivers, boates be not alwaies readie: so that thy army not knowyng howe to swime, remaineth deprived of many commodities: and many occasions to woorke well, is taken awaie. the romaines for none other cause had ordained, that the yong men should exercise them selves in campus martius, then onely, for that havyng tiber at hande, thei might, beyng weried with the exercise on lande, refreshe theim selves in the water, and partly in swimmyng, to exercise them selves. i would make also, as the antiquitie, those whiche should serve on horsebacke to exercise, the whiche is moste necessarie, for that besides to know how to ride, thei muste knowe how on horsebacke thei maie prevaile of them selves. and for this thei had ordeined horses of wood, upon the which thei practised, to leape by armed, and unarmed, without any helpe, and on every hande: the whiche made, that atones, and at a beck of a capitain, the horsmen were on foote, and likewise at a token, thei mounted on horsebacke. and soche exercises, bothe on foote and on horsebacke, as thei were then easie to bee doen, so now thei should not be difficult to thesame common weale, or to thesame prince, whiche would cause them to be put in practise of their yong men. as by experience is seen, in certaine citees of the weste countrie, where is kepte a live like maners with this order. thei devide all their inhabiters into divers partes: and every parte thei name of the kinde of those weapons, that thei use in the warre. and for that thei use pikes, halbardes, bowes, and harkebuses, thei call them pike menne, halberders, harkebutters, and archars: therefore, it is mete for all the inhabiters to declare, in what orders thei will be appoincted in. and for that all men, either for age, or for other impedimentes, be not fitte for the warre, every order maketh a choise of men, and thei call them the sworen, whom in idell daies, be bounde to exercise themselves in those weapons, wherof thei be named: and every manne hath his place appoincted hym of the cominaltie, where soche exercise ought to be made: and those whiche be of thesame order, but not of the sworen, are contributaries with their money, to thesame expenses, whiche in soche exercises be necessarie: therfore thesame that thei doe, we maie doe. but our smal prudence dooeth not suffre us, to take any good waie. of these exercises there grewe, that the antiquitie had good souldiours, and that now those of the weste, bee better men then ours: for as moche as the antiquitie exercised them, either at home (as those common weales doe) or in the armies, as those emperours did, for thoccasions aforesaied: but we, at home will not exercise theim, in campe we cannot, bicause thei are not our subjectes, and for that we are not able to binde them to other exercises then thei them selves liste to doe: the whiche occacion hath made, that firste the armies bee neclected, and after, the orders, and that the kyngdomes, and the common weales, in especially italians, live in soche debilitie. but let us tourne to our order, and folowyng this matter of exercises, i saie, how it suffiseth not to make good armies, for havyng hardened the men, made them strong, swift, and handsome, it is nedefull also, that thei learne to stande in the orders, to obeie to signes, to soundes, and to the voice of the capitain: to knowe, standyng, to retire them selves, goyng forwardes, bothe faightyng, and marchyng to maintain those: bicause without this knowlege, withal serious diligence observed, and practised, there was never armie good: and without doubt, the fierce and disordered menne, bee moche more weaker, then the fearfull that are ordered, for that thorder driveth awaie from men feare, the disorder abateth fiercenesse. and to the entente you maie the better perceive that, whiche here folowyng shalbe declared, you have to understande, how every nation, in the orderyng of their men to the warre, have made in their hoste, or in their armie, a principall member, the whiche though thei have varied with the name, thei have little varied with the nomber of the menne: for that thei all have made it, betwene sixe and viii. m. men. this nomber of men was called of the romaines, a legion, of grekes a fallange, of frenchemen caterva: this verie same in our tyme of the suizzers, whom onely of the auncient warfare, kepe some shadowe, is called in their tongue that, whiche in ours signifieththe maine battaile. true it is, that every one of them, hath after devided it, accordyng to their purposes. therefore me thinkes beste, that wee grounde our talke, upon this name moste knowen, and after, according to the aunciente, and to the orders now adaies, the beste that is possible to ordaine it; and bicause the romaines devided their legion, whiche was made betwene five and sixe thousande men, in ten cohortes, i will that wee devide our main battaile, into ten battailes, and that we make it of sixe thousande menne on foote, and we will give to every battaile, ccccl. men, of whiche shall be, cccc. armed with heavie armour, and l. with light armour: the heavie armed, shall be ccc. targettes with sweardes, and shalbe called target men: and c. with pikes, whiche shalbe called ordinarie pikes: the light armed shalbe, l. men armed with harkabuses, crosse bowes, and partisans, and smal targaettes, and these by an aunciente name, were called ordinarie veliti: all of the ten battailes therefore, comes to have three thousande targaet men, a thousande ordinarie pikes, cccc. ordinarie veliti, all whiche make the nomber of fower thousande and five hundred men. and we saied, that we would make the maine battaile of six thousande; therefore there must be added an other thousande, five hundred men, of whiche i will appoinet a thousande with pikes, whom i will call extraordinarie veliti, and thus my menne should come (as a little before i have saied) to bee made halfe of targaetes, and halfe of pikes and other weapons. i would appoinete to everie battaile, or bande of men, a conestable, fower centurions and fouretic peticapitaines, and moreover a hedde to the ordinarie veliti. with five peticapitaines; i would give to the thousande extraordinarie pikes, three conestabelles, ten centurions, and a hundred peticapitaines; to the extraodrinarie veliti, two conestabelles, v. centurions, and l. peticapitaines: i would then apoinet a generall hed, over all the main battaile: i would that every conestable should have an ansigne, and a drum. thus there should be made a manne battaile of ten battailes, of three thousande targaet men, of a thousande ordinarie pikes, of a thousande extraordinarie of five hundred ordinarie veliti, of five hundred extraordinarie, so there should come to bee sixe thousande men, emongeste the whiche there should bee m.d. peticapitaines, and moreover, xv. conestables, with xv. drummes, and xv. ansignes, lv. centurions, x. heddes of the ordinarie veliti, and a capitaine over all the maine battaile with his asigne and drume, and i have of purpose repeated this order the oftener, to the intent, that after when i shall shewe you, the maners of orderyng the battailes, and tharmies, you should not be confounded: i saie therefore, how that, that king, or that common weale, whiche intendeth to ordeine their subjectes to armes, ought to appoincte theim with these armoures and weapons, and with these partes, and to make in their countrie so many maine battailes, as it were able: and when thei should have ordained them, according to the forsaid distribucion, minding to exercise them in the orders, it should suffice to exercise every battaile by it self: and although the nomber of the men, of every one of them, cannot by it self, make the facion of a juste armie, notwithstandyng, every man maie learne to dooe thesame, whiche particularly appertaineth unto hym: for that in the armies, twoo orders is observed, the one, thesame that the men ought to doe in every battaile, and the other that, whiche the battaile ought to doe after, when it is with the other in an armie. and those men, whiche doe wel the first, mooste easely maie observe the seconde: but without knowyng thesame, thei can never come to the knowlege of the seconde. then (as i have saied) every one of these battailes, maie by them selves, learne to kepe the orders of the araies, in every qualitie of movyng, and of place, and after learne to put them selves togethers, to understande the soundes, by meanes wherof in the faight thei are commaunded, to learne to know by that, as the gallics by the whissell, what ought to be doen, either to stande still, or to tourne forward, or to tourne backwarde or whiche waie to tourne the weapons, and the face: so that knowyng how to kepe well the araie, after soche sorte, that neither place nor movyng maie disorder them, understandyng well the commaundementes of their heddes, by meanes of the sounde, and knowyng quickly, how to retourne into their place, these battailes maie after easly (as i have said) beyng brought many together, learne to do that, whiche all the body together, with the other battailes in a juste armie, is bounde to dooe. and bicause soche universall practise, is also not to bee estemed a little, ones or twise a yere, when there is peace, all the main battaile maie be brought together, to give it the facion of an whole armie, some daies exercisyng theim, as though thei should faight a fielde, settyng the fronte, and the sides with their succours in their places. and bicause a capitaine ordeineth his hoste to the fielde, either for coumpte of the enemie he seeth, or for that, of whiche without seyng he doubteth, he ought to exercise his armie in the one maner, and in the other, and to instructe theim in soche sorte, that thei maie knowe how to marche, and to faight, when nede should require, the wyng to his souldiours, how thei should governe theim selves, when thei should happen to be assaulted of this, or of that side: and where he ought to instructe theim how to faight againste the enemie, whom thei should see: he must shewe them also, how the faight is begun, and where thei ought to retire: being overthrowen, who hath to succeade in their places, to what signes, to what soundes, to what voices, thei ought to obeie, and to practise them in soche wise in the battaile, and with fained assaultes, that thei may desire the verie thyng in deede. for that an armie is not made coragious, bicause in thesame be hardie menne, but by reason the orders thereof bee well appoineted: for as moche as if i be one of the first faighters, and do knowe, beyng overcome, where i maie retire, and who hath to succeade in my place, i shall alwaies faight with boldnes, seing my succour at hand. if i shall be one of the seconde faighters, the first being driven backe, and overthrowen, i shall not bee afraied, for that i shall have presuposed that i maie bee, and i shall have desire to be thesame, whiche maie give the victory to my maister, and not to bee any of the other. these exercises bee moste necessarie, where an armie is made of newe, and where the old armie is, thei bee also necessarie: for that it is also seen, how the romaines knew from their infancie, thorder of their armies, notwithstandyng, those capitaines before thei should come to thenemie, continually did exercise them in those. and josephus in his historie saieth, that the continuall exercises of the romaine armies, made that all thesame multitude, whiche folowe the campe for gain, was in the daie of battaile profitable: bicause thei all knewe, how to stande in the orders, and to faight kepyng the same: but in the armies of newe men, whether thou have putte theim together, to faight straight waie, or that thou make a power to faight, when neede requires, without these exercises, as well of the battailes severally by themselves, as of all the armie, is made nothing: wherefore the orders beying necessarie, it is conveniente with double industrie and laboure, to shewe them unto soche as knoweth them not, and for to teache it, many excellent capitaines have travailed, without any respecte. cosimo. my thinkes that this reasoning, hath sumwhat transported you: for asmoche, as havyng not yet declared the waies, with the whiche the battailes bee exercised, you have reasoned of the whole armie, and of the daie of battaile. [sidenote: the chief importance in the exercisyng of bandes of men; three principall for thorderyng of menne into battaile raie; the manner how to bryng a bande of men into battaile raie after a square facion; the better waie for the ordring of a band of men in battaile raie, after the first facion; how to exercise men, and to take soche order, whereby a band of men that were by whatsoever chance disordred maye straighte wai be brought into order againe; what advertisement ought to bee used in tourning about a whole bande of menne, after soche sorte, as though it were but one bodie; how to order a band of menne after soche sort that thei maie make their front againste thenemie of whiche flanke thei list; how a band of man oughte to be ordered, when in marchyng thei should bee constrained to faighton their backes.] fabricio. you saie truth, but surely thoccasion hath been the affection, whiche i beare to these orders, and the grief that i feele, seyng thei be not put in use: notwithstanding, doubt not but that i will tourne to the purpose: as i have saied, the chief importaunce that is in thexercise of the battailes, is to knowe how to kepe well the armies: and bicause i tolde you that one of these battailes, ought to bee made of fower hundred men heavie armed, i wil staie my self upon this nomber. thei ought then to be brought into lxxx. rankes, and five to a ranke: afterward goyng fast, or softly, to knit them together, and to lose them: the whiche how it is dooen, maie bee shewed better with deedes, then with wordes. which nedeth not gretly to be taught, for that every manne, whom is practised in servise of warre, knoweth how this order procedeth, whiche is good for no other, then to use the souldiours to keepe the raie: but let us come to putte together one of these battailes, i saie, that there is given them three facions principally, the firste, and the moste profitablest is, to make al massive, and to give it the facion of two squares, the second is, to make it square with the front horned, the thirde is, to make it with a voide space in the middest: the maner to put men together in the first facion, maie be of twoo sortes, tho together in the first facion, maie be of twoo sortes, thone is to double the rankes, that is, to make the seconde ranke enter into the first, the iiii. into the third, the sixt into the fift, and so foorth, so that where there was lxxx. rankes, five to a ranke, thei maie become xl. rankes, x. to a ranke. afterward cause theim to double ones more in thesame maner, settyng the one ranke into an other, and so there shall remain twentie rankes, twentie men to a ranke: this maketh twoo squares aboute, for as moche as albeit that there bee as many men the one waie, as in the other, notwithstandyng to wardes the hedde, thei joine together, that the one side toucheth the other: but by the other waie, thei be distant the one from the other, at least a yarde and a haulfe, after soche sorte, that the square is moche longer, from the backe to the fronte, then from the one side to thother: and bicause we have at this presente, to speake often of the partes afore, of behinde, and of the sides of these battailes, and of all the armie together, knowe you, that when i saie either hedde or fronte, i meane the parte afore, when i shall saie backe, the part behind, when i shall saie flankes, the partes on the sides. the fiftie ordinarie veliti of the battaile, muste not mingle with the other rankes, but so sone as the battaile is facioned, thei shalbe set a long by the flankes therof. the other waie to set together the battaile is this, and bicause it is better then the firste, i will set it before your ives juste, how it ought to bee ordeined. i beleve that you remember of what nomber of menne, of what heddes it is made, and of what armours thei are armed, then the facion, that this battaile ought to have, is (as i have saied) of twentie rankes, twentie men to a ranke, five rankes of pikes in the front, and fiftene rankes of targaettes on the backe, twoo centurions standying in the fronte, twoo behinde on the backe, who shall execute the office of those, whiche the antiquitie called tergiductori. the conestable with the ansigne, and with the drumme, shall stande in thesame space, that is betwene the five rankes of the pikes, and the fiftene of the targeaettes. of the peticapitaines, there shall stande one upon every side of the ranckes, so that every one, maie have on his side his men, those peticapitaines, whiche shalbe on the left hande, to have their men on the right hand, those peticapitaines, whiche shall be on the right hand, to have their menne on the left hande: the fiftie veliti, muste stande a long the flankes, and on the backe of the battaile. to mynde now, that this battaile maie be set together in this facion, the men goyng ordinarily, it is convenient to order them thus. make the men to be brought into lxxx. rankes, five to a ranke, as a little afore we have said, leavyng the veliti either at the hedde, or at the taile, so that thei stande out of this order: and it ought to be ordeined, that every centurion have behinde his back twentie rankes, and to bee nexte behinde every centurion, five rankes of pikes, and the reste targaettes. the conestable shall stande with the drum, and the ansigne, in thesame space, whiche is betwene the pikes, and the targaettes of the seconde centurion, and to occupie the places of three targaette men. of the peticapitaines, twentie shall stand on the sides of the rankes, of the first centurion, on the lefte hande, and twentie shall stande on the sides of the rankes, of the last centurion on the right hande. and you muste understande, that the peticapitaine, whiche hath to leade the pikes, ought to have a pike, and those that leade the targaettes, ought to have like weapons. then the rankes beyng brought into this order, and mindyng in marchyng, to bryng them into battaile, for to make the hedde, the first centurion must be caused to stande still, with the firste twentie rankes, and the seconde to proceade marchyng, and tournyng on the right hand, he must go a long the sides of the twentie rankes that stande still, till he come to bee even with the other centurion, where he must also stande still, and the thirde centurion to procede marchyng, likewise tournyng on the right hand, and a long the sides of the rankes that stande still, must go so farre, that he be even with the other twoo centurions, and he also standyng still, the other centurion must folowe with his rankes, likewise tournyng on the right hande, a longe the sides of the rankes that stande still, so farre that he come to the hed of the other, and then to stand still, and straight waie twoo centurions onely, shall depart from the front, and go to the backe of the battaile, the whiche cometh to bee made in thesame maner, and with thesame order juste, as a little afore i have shewed you. the veliti muste stande a long, by the flankes of thesame, accordyng as is disposed in the first waie, whiche waie is called redoublyng by right line, this is called redoublyng by flanke: the first waie is more easie, this is with better order, and commeth better to passe, and you maie better correcte it, after your owne maner, for that in redoublyng by righte line, you muste bee ruled by the nomber, bicause five maketh ten, ten twentie, twentie fourtie, so that with redoublyng by right line, you cannot make a hedde of fiftene, nor of five and twentie, nor of thirtie, nor of five and thirtie, but you must go where thesame nomber will leade you. and yet it happeneth every daie in particulare affaires, that it is convenient to make the forwarde with sixe hundred, or eight hundred men, so that to redouble by right line, should disorder you: therefore this liketh me better: that difficultie that is, ought moste with practise, and with exercise to bee made easie. therefore i saie unto you, how it importeth more then any thyng, to have the souldiours to know how to set themselves in araie quickly, and it is necessarie to keepe theim in this battaile, to exercise theim therin, and to make them to go apace, either forward or backward, to passe through difficulte places, without troublyng thorder: for asmoche as the souldiours, whiche can doe this well, be expert souldiours, and although thei have never seen enemies in the face, thei maie be called old souldiours, and contrariwise, those whiche cannot keepe these orders, though thei have been in a thousande warres, thei ought alwaies to be reputed new souldiours. this is, concernyng setting them together, when thei are marching in small rankes: but beyng set, and after beyng broken by some accident or chaunce, whiche groweth either of the situacion, or of the enemie, to make that in a sodaine, thei maie come into order againe, this is the importaunce and the difficultie, and where is nedefull moche exercise, and moche practise, and wherin the antiquitie bestowed moche studie. therefore it is necessarie to doe twoo thynges, firste to have this battaile full of countersignes, the other, to keepe alwaies this order, that those same men maie stand alwaies in the ranke, which thei were firste placed in: as for insample, if one have begon to stande in the seconde, that he stande after alwaie in that, and not onely in that self same rancke, but in that self same place: for the observyng whereof (as i have saied) bee necessarie many countersignes. in especially it is requisite, that the ansigne bee after soche sorte countersigned, that companyng with the other battailes, it maie be knowen from theim, accordyng as the conestable, and the centurions have plumes of fethers in their heddes differente, and easie to be knowen, and that whiche importeth moste, is to ordaine that the peticapitaines bee knowen. whereunto the antiquitie had so moche care, that thei would have nothing els written in their hedde peces, but the nomber that thei were named by, callyng them firste, seconde, thirde, and fourthe xc. and yet thei were not contented with this, but made every souldiour to have written in his targaet, the nomber of the ranke, and the nomber of the place, in whiche ranke he was appoineted. then the menne being countersigned thus, and used to stande betwene these limites, it is an easie thyng, thei beyng disordered, to sett theim all againe quickly into order: considering, that the ansigne standyng still, the centurions, and the peticapitaines maie gesse their places by the iye, and beyng brought the left of the left, the right of the right, with their accustomed distance, the souldiours led by their rule, and by the differences of the cognisances, maie be quickly in their proper places, no otherwise, then as if the boordes of a tunne should bee taken a sunder, whiche beyng first marked, moste easely maie bee set together again, where thesame beyng not countersigned, were impossible to bryng into order any more. these thynges, with diligence and with exercise, are quickely taught, and quickly learned, and beyng learned, with difficultie are forgotten: for that the newe menne, be led of the olde, and with tyme, a province with these exercises, may become throughly practised in the war. it is also necessarie to teache theim, to tourne theim selves all at ones, and when neede requires, to make of the flankes, and of the backe, the fronte, and of the front, flankes, or backe, whiche is moste easie: bicause it suffiseth that every manne doe tourne his bodie, towardes thesame parte that he is commaunded, and where thei tourne their faces, there the fronte commeth to bee. true it is, that when thei tourne to any of the flanckes, the orders tourne out of their proporcion: for that from the breast to the backe, there is little difference, and from the one flancke to the other, there is verie moche distance, the whiche is al contrarie to the ordinarie order of the battaile: therefore it is convenient, that practise, and discrecion, doe place them as thei ought to be: but this is small disorder, for that moste easely by themselves, thei maie remedie it. but that whiche importeth more, and where is requisite more practise, is when a battaile would tourne all at ones, as though it were a whole bodie, here is meete to have greate practise, and greate discrecion: bicause mindyng to tourne, as for insample on the left hande, the left corner must stande still, and those that be next to hym that standeth still, muste marche so softly, that thei that bee in the right corner, nede not to runne: otherwise all thing should be confounded. but bicause it happeneth alwaies, when an armie marcheth from place to place, that the battailes, whiche are not placed in the front, shall be driven to faight not by hedde, but either by flancke, or by backe, so that a battaile muste in a sodaine make of flancke, or of backe, hedde: and mindyng that like battailes in soche cace, maie have their proporcion, as above is declared, it is necessarie, that thei have the pikes on thesame flancke, that ought to be hedde, and the peticapitaines, centurions, and conestables, to resorte accordyngly to their places. therefore to mynde to dooe this, in plasyng them together, you must ordeine the fower skore rankes, of five in a ranke, thus: set all the pikes in the first twentie rankes, and place the peticapitaines thereof, five in the first places, and five in the last: the other three score rankes, whiche come after, bee all of targaettes, whiche come to bee three centuries. therefore, the first and the laste ranke of every centurion, would be peticapitaines, the conestable with the ansigne, and with the drumme, muste stande in the middest of the first centurie of targaettes, and the centurions in the hed of every centurie. the bande thus ordained, when you would have the pikes to come on the left flancke, you must redouble centurie by centurie, on the right flancke: if you would have them to come on the right flancke, you must redouble theim on the lefte. and so this battaile tourneth with the pikes upon a flancke, and the conestable in the middeste: the whiche facion it hath marchyng: but the enemie commyng, and the tyme that it would make of flancke hedde, it nedeth not but to make every man to tourne his face, towardes thesame flancke, where the pikes be, and then the battaile tourneth with the rankes, and with the heddes in thesame maner, as is aforesaied: for that every man is in his place, excepte the centurions, and the centurions straight waie, and without difficultie, place themselves: but when thei in marchyng, should bee driven to faight on the backe, it is convenient to ordein the rankes after soch sorte, that settyng theim in battaile, the pikes maie come behinde, and to doe this, there is to bee kepte no other order, then where in orderyng the battaile, by the ordinarie, every centurie hath five rankes of pikes before, to cause that thei maie have them behind, and in all the other partes to observe thorder, whiche i declared firste. cosimo. you have tolde (if i dooe well remember me) that this maner of exercise, is to bee able to bryng these battailes together into an armie, and that this practise, serveth to be able to order theim selves in the same: but if it should happen, that these ccccl. men, should have to doe an acte seperate, how would you order them? [sidenote: how a battaile is made with twoo hornes; the orderyng of a battaile with a voide space in the middeste.] fabricio. he that leadeth them, ought then to judge, where he will place the pikes, and there to put them, the whiche doeth not repugne in any part to the order above written: for that also, though thesame bee the maner, that is observed to faighte a fielde, together with thother battailes, notwithstandyng it is a rule, whiche serveth to all those waies, wherein a band of menne should happen to have to doe: but in shewyng you the other twoo waies of me propounded, of ordering the battailes, i shal also satisfie you more to your question: for that either thei are never used, or thei are used when a battaile is a lone, and not in companie of other, and to come to the waie of ordering them, with twoo hornes, i saie, that thou oughteste to order the lxxx. rankes, five to a ranke, in this maner. place in the middest, one centurion, and after hym xxv. rankes, whiche muste bee with twoo pikes on the lefte hande, and with three targaettes on the right, and after the first five, there must be put in the twentie folowyng, twentie peticapitaines, all betwene the pikes, and the targaettes, excepte those whiche beare the pike, whom maie stand with the pikes: after these xxv. rankes thus ordered, there is to be placed an other centurion, and behinde hym fiftene rankes of targaettes: after these, the conestable betwene the drum and the ansigne, who also must have after him, other fiftene rankes of targaettes: after this, the thirde centurion must be placed, and behinde hym, xxv. rankes, in every one of whiche, ought to bee three targaettes on the lefte flancke, and twoo pikes on the right, and after the five first rankes, there must be xx. peticapitaines placed betwene the pikes, and the targaettes: after these rankes, the fowerth centurion must folowe. intendying therefore, of these rankes thus ordered, to make a battaile with twoo hornes, the first centurion must stand still, with the xxv. rankes, whiche be behinde him, after the second centurion muste move, with the fiftene rankes of targaettes, that bee behinde hym, and to tourne on the right hande, and up by the right flancke of the xxv. rankes, to go so farre, that he arrive to the xv. ranke, and there to stande still: after, the conestable muste move, with the fiftene rankes of targaettes, whiche be behinde hym, and tournyng likewise on the right hande, up by the right flancke of the fiftene rankes, that wer firste moved, muste marche so farre, that he come to their heddes, and there to stand stil: after, the thirde centurion muste move with the xxv. rankes, and with the fowerth centurion, whiche was behinde, and turnyng up straight, must go a long by the right flanck of the fiftene last rankes of the targaettes, and not to stande still when he is at the heddes of them, but to followe marchyng so farre, that the laste ranke of the xxv. maie come to be even with the rankes behinde. and this dooen, the centurion, whiche was hedde of the firste fiftene rankes of targaettes, must go awaie from thens where he stoode, and go to the backe in the lefte corner: and thus a battaile shall be made of xxv. rankes, after twentie men to a rank, with two hornes, upon every side of the front, one horn, and every one, shall have ten rankes, five to a ranke, and there shall remain a space betwene the twoo hornes, as moche as containeth ten men, whiche tourne their sides, the one to thother. betwene the two hornes, the capitain shall stande, and on every poinct of a horne, a centurion: there shall bee also behinde, on every corner, a centurion: there shal be twoo rankes of pikes, and xx. peticapitaines on every flancke. these twoo hornes, serve to kepe betwene theim the artillerie, when this battaile should have any withit, and the cariages: the veliti muste stande a long the flankes, under the pikes. but mindyng to bring this horned battaile, with a voide space in the middeste, there ought no other to bee doen, then of fiftene rankes, of twentie to a ranke, to take eight rankes, and to place them on the poinctes of the twoo hornes, whiche then of hornes, become backe of the voide space, in this place, the cariages are kept, the capitain standeth, and the ansigne, but never the artillerie, the whiche is placed either in the front, or a long the flankes. these be the waies, that a battaile maie use when it is constrained to passe alone through suspected places: notwithstandyng, the massive battaile without hornes, and without any soche voide place is better, yet purposyng to assure the disarmed, the same horned battaile is necessarie. the suizzers make also many facions of battailes, emong which, thei make one like unto a crosse: bicause in the spaces that is betwen the armes therof, thei kepe safe their harkebuters from the daunger of the enemies: but bicause soche battailes be good to faight by theim selves, and my intente is to shew, how many battailes united, do faight with thenemie, i wil not labour further in describing them. cosimo. my thinkes i have verie well comprehended the waie, that ought to be kept to exercise the men in these battailes: but (if i remember me well) you have saied, how that besides the tenne battailes, you joyne to the maine battaile, a thousande extraordinarie pikes, and five hundred extraordinarie veliti: will you not appoincte these to be exercised? [sidenote: to what purpose the pikes and velite extraordinarie must serve.] fabricio. i would have theim to bee exercised, and that with moste great diligence: and the pikes i would exercise, at leaste ansigne after ansigne, in the orders of the battailes, as the other: for as moche as these should doe me more servise, then the ordinarie battailes, in all particulare affaires: as to make guides, to get booties, and to doe like thynges: but the veliti, i would exercise at home, without bringing them together, for that their office being to faight a sonder, it is not mete, that thei should companie with other, in the common exercises: for that it shall suffice, to exercise them well in the particular exercises. thei ought then (as i firste tolde you, nor now me thynkes no labour to rehearse it againe) to cause their men to exercise them selves in these battailes, whereby thei maie knowe how to kepe the raie, to knowe their places, to tourne quickly, when either enemie, or situacion troubleth them: for that, when thei knowe how to do this, the place is after easely learned, which a battaile hath to kepe, and what is the office thereof in the armie: and when a prince, or a common weale, will take the paine, and will use their diligence in these orders, and in these exercisyng, it shall alwaies happen, that in their countrie, there shall bee good souldiours, and thei to be superiours to their neighbours, and shalbe those, whiche shall give, and not receive the lawes of other men: but (as i have saied) the disorder wherein thei live, maketh that thei neclecte, and doe not esteme these thynges, and therefore our armies be not good: and yet though there were either hed, or member naturally vertuous, thei cannot shewe it. cosimo. what carriages would you, that every one of these battailes should have? [sidenote: neither centurion nor peticapitaine, ought not to ride; what carriages the capitaines ought to have, and the nomber of carrages requisite to every bande of menne.] fabricio. firste, i would that neither centurion, nor peticapitain, should be suffered to ride: and if the conestable would nedes ride, i would that he should have a mule, and not a horse: i would allowe hym twoo carriages, and one to every centurion, and twoo to every three peticapitaines, for that so many wee lodge in a lodgyng, as in the place therof we shall tell you: so that every battaile will come to have xxxvi. carriages, the whiche i would should carrie of necessitie the tentes, the vesselles to seeth meate, axes, barres of iron, sufficient to make the lodgynges, and then if thei can carry any other thyng, thei maie dooe it at their pleasure. cosimo. i beleve that the heddes of you, ordeined in every one of these battailes, be necessarie: albeit, i would doubt, lest that so many commaunders, should confounde all. [sidenote: without many capitaines, an armie cannot be governed; to what purpose ansignes ought to serve; for what purpose drummes oughte to bee used; the propertie that soundes of instrumentes have in mens myndes.] fabricio. that should bee, when it were not referred to one man, but referryng it, thei cause order, ye and without theim, it is impossible to governe an armie: for that a wall, whiche on every parte enclineth, requireth rather to have many proppes, and thicke, although not so strong, then fewe, though thei were strong: bicause the vertue of one a lone, doeth not remedie the ruine a farre of. and therefore in tharmies, and emong every ten men, it is convenient that there bee one, of more life, of more harte, or at leaste wise of more aucthoritie, who with stomacke, with wordes, and with example, maie kepe them constante, and disposed to faight, and these thynges of me declared, bee necessarie in an armie, as the heddes, the ansignes, and the drummes, is seen that wee have theim all in our armies, but none doeth his office. first to mynde that the peticapitaines doe thesame, for whiche thei are ordeined, it is necessarie (as i have said) that there bee a difference, betwene every one of them and their men, and that thei lodge together, doyng their duties, standyng in thorder with them: for that thei placed in their places, bee a rule and a temperaunce, to maintaine the raies straight and steddie, and it is impossible that thei disorder, or disorderyng, dooe not reduce themselves quickly into their places. but we now adaies, doe not use them to other purpose, then to give theim more wages, then to other menne, and to cause that thei dooe some particulare feate: the very same happeneth of the ansigne bearers, for that thei are kept rather to make a faire muster, then for any other warlike use: but the antiquitie used theim for guides, and to bryng theim selves againe into order: for that every man, so sone as the ansigne stoode still, knewe the place, that he kept nere to his ansigne, wherunto he retourned alwaies: thei knewe also, how that the same movyng, or standyng, thei should staie, or move: therfore it is necessarie in an armie, that there be many bodies, and every bande of menne to have his ansigne, and his guide: wherfore havyng this, it is mete that thei have stomackes inough, and by consequence life enough. then the menne ought to marche, accordyng to the ansigne: and the ansigne to move, accordyng to the drumme, the whiche drumme well ordered, commaundeth to the armie, the whiche goyng with paces, that answereth the tyme of thesame, will come to kepe easilie thorders: for whiche cause the antiquitie had shalmes, flutes, and soundes perfectly tymed: for as moche as like as he that daunseth, proceadeth with the tyme of the musick, and goyng with thesame doeth not erre, even so an armie obeiyng, in movyng it self to thesame sounde, doeth not disorder: and therefore, thei varied the sounde, accordyng as thei would varie the mocion, and accordyng as thei would inflame, or quiete, or staie the mindes of men: and like as the soundes were divers, so diversly thei named them: the sounde dorico, ingendered constancie, the sounde frigio, furie: whereby thei saie, that alexander beyng at the table, and one soundyng the sounde frigio, it kendled so moche his minde, that he laied hande on his weapons. all these maners should be necessarie to finde again: and when this should bee difficulte, at least there would not be left behind those that teache the souldiour to obeie, the whiche every man maie varie, and ordeine after his owne facion, so that with practise, he accustome the eares of his souldiours to knowe it: but now adaies of this sounde, there is no other fruicte taken for the moste part, then to make a rumour. cosimo. i would desire to understande of you, if ever with your self you have discourced, whereof groweth so moche vilenesse, and so moche disorder, and so moche necligence in these daies of this exercise? [sidenote: a notable discourse of the aucthour, declaryng whereof groweth so moche vilenes disorder and necligence in these daies, concernyng the exercises of warre.] fabricio. with a good will i will tell you thesame, that i thinke. you knowe how that of the excellente men of warre, there hath been named many in europe, fewe in affric, and lesse in asia: this grewe, for that these twoo laste partes of the worlde, have had not paste one kyngdome, or twoo, and fewe common weales, but europe onely, hath had many kyngdomes, and infinite common weales, where menne became excellent, and did shewe their vertue, accordyng as thei were sette a woorke, and brought before their prince, or common weale, or king that he be: it followeth therefore, that where be many dominions, there rise many valiaunt menne, and where be fewe, fewe. in asia is founde ninus, cirus, artasercses, mithridates: and verie fewe other, that to these maie be compared. in africk, is named (lettyng stande thesame auncient egipt) massinissa, jugurta, and those capitaines, whiche of the carthaginens common weale were nourished, whom also in respecte to those of europe, are moste fewe: bicause in europe, be excellente men without nomber, and so many more should be, if together with those should bee named the other, that be through the malignitie of time extincte: for that the worlde hath been moste vertuous, where hath been moste states, whiche have favoured vertue of necessitie, or for other humaine passion. there rose therfore in asia, fewe excellente menne: bicause thesame province, was all under one kyngdome, in the whiche for the greatnesse thereof, thesame standing for the moste parte of tyme idell, there could not growe men in doynges excellent. to africke there happened the verie same, yet there were nourished more then in asia, by reason of the carthaginens common weale: for that in common weales, there growe more excellent men, then in kingdomes, bicause in common weales for the most part, vertue is honoured, in kyngdomes it is helde backe: wherby groweth, that in thone, vertuous men are nourished, in the other thei are extincte. therefore he that shall consider the partes of europe, shall finde it to have been full of common weales, and of princedomes, the whiche for feare, that the one had of the other, thei wer constrained to kepe lively the warlike orders, and to honor them, whiche in those moste prevailed: for that in grece, besides the kyngdome of the macedonians, there were many common weales, and in every one of theim, were bred moste excellente men. in italie, were the romaines, the sannites, the toscanes, the gallie cisalpini. fraunce, and almainie, wer ful of common weales and princedomes. spaine likewise: and although in comparison of the romaines, there are named fewe other, it groweth through the malignitie of the writers, whom folowe fortune, and to theim for the moste parte it suffised, to honour the conquerours: but it standeth not with reason, that betwene the sannites, and the toscanes, whom fought cl. yeres with the romaine people, before thei wer overcome, there should not growe exceadyng many excellente menne. and so likewise in fraunce, and in spaine: but that vertue, whiche the writers did not celebrate in particuler menne, thei celebrated generally in the people, where thei exalte to the starres, the obstinatenesse that was in them, to defende their libertie. beyng then true, that where bee moste dominions, there riseth moste valiaunt menne, it foloweth of necessitie, that extinguishyng those, vertue is extincte straighte waie, the occasion decaiyng, whiche maketh menne vertuous. therefore, the romaine empire beyng after increased, and havyng extinguished all the common weales, and princedomes of europe, and of afrike, and for the moste part those of asia, it lefte not any waie to vertue, excepte rome: whereby grewe, that vertuous menne began to be as fewe in europe, as in asia: the whiche vertue, came after to the laste caste: for as moche, as all the vertue beyng reduced to roome, so sone as thesame was corrupted, almoste all the worlde came to bee corrupted: and the scithian people, were able to come to spoile thesame empire, the whiche had extinguished the vertue of other, and knewe not howe to maintaine their owne: and after, although through the inundacion of those barberous nacions, thesame empire was devided into many partes, this vertue is not renued: [sidenote: the causes why the aunciente orders are neclected.] the one cause is, for that it greveth theim moche, to take againe the orders when thei are marde, the other, bicause the maner of livyng now adaies, having respect to the christian religion, commaundeth not thesame necessitie to menne, to defende themselves, whiche in olde tyme was: for that then, the menne overcome in warre, either were killed, or remained perpetuall slaves, where thei led their lives moste miserably: the tounes overcome, either were rased, or the inhabiters thereof driven out, their goodes taken awaie, sent dispersed through the worlde: so that the vanquished in warre, suffered all extreme miserie: of this feare, men beyng made afraied, thei wer driven to kepe lively the warlike exercises, and thei honoured soche as were excellente in theim: but nowe adaies, this feare for the moste part is not regarded: of those that are overcom, fewe bee killed, none is kepte longe in prison: for that with facelitie, thei are sette at libertie: the citees also, whiche a thousande tymes have rebelled, are not destroied, the men wherof, are let a lone with their goodes, so that the greateste hurte that is feared, is but a taske: in so moche, that men will not submit them selves to the orders of warre, and to abide alwaies under those, to avoide the perilles whereof thei are little afraied: again these provinces of europe, be under a verie fewe heddes, in respecte as it hath been in times past: for that al fraunce, obeieth one kyng, al spain, an other: italie is in fewe partes, so that the weake citees, are defended with leanyng to hym that overcometh, and the strong states, for the causes aforesaied, feare no soche extreme ruine. cosimo. yet ther hath ben seen many tounes that have ben sacked within this xxv. yeres, and lost their dominions, whose insample, ought to teache other how to live, and to take again some of those old orders. fabricio. you saie true: but if you note what tounes have gone to sacke, you shall not finde that thei have been the heddes of states, but of the members; as was seen sacked tortona, and not milaine: capua, and not napelles, brescia, and not venice, ravenna, and not roome: the whiche insamples maketh those that governe, not to chaunge their purposes, but rather maketh them to stande more in their opinion, to be able to redeme again all thynges with taskes, and for this, thei will not submit theim selves to the troubles of thexercises of warre, semyng unto them partly not necessarie, partly, an intrinsicate matter, whiche thei understande not: those other, whiche bee subjectes to them, whom soche insamples ought to make afraied, have no power to remedie it: and those princes, that have ones loste their estates, are no more able, and those which as yet kept them, know not, nor wil not. bicause thei will without any disease rain by fortune, and not by their vertue: for that in the worlde beyng but little vertue, thei see fortune governeth all thynges. and thei will have it to rule theim, not thei to rule it. and to prove this that i have discoursed to bee true, consider almaine, in the whiche, bicause there is many princedomes, and common weales, there is moche vertue, and all thesame, whiche in the present service of warre is good, dependeth of the insamples of those people: who beyng all gellious of their states, fearing servitude, the which in other places is not feared, thei all maintaine theim selves lordes, and honourable: this that i have saied, shall suffice to shewe the occacions of the presente utilitie, accordyng to my opinion: i cannot tell, whether it seeme thesame unto you, or whether there be growen in you any doubtyng. cosimo. none, but rather i understande all verie well: onely i desire, tournyng to our principall matter, to understande of you, how you would ordein the horses with these battailes, and how many, and how thei should be governed, and how armed. [sidenote: the armyng of horsemen; the weapons that light horsmenne should have; the nombre of horsmen requisite for a maine bataille of six thousand men; the nombre of carrages that men of armes and light horsmen ought to have.] fabricio. you thinke peraventure, that i have left it behinde: whereat doe not marvell, for that i purpose for twoo causes, to speake therof little, the one is, for that the strengthe, and the importaunce of an armie, is the footemen, the other is, bicause this part of service of warre, is lesse corrupted, then thesame of footemen. for that though it be not stronger then the old, yet it maie compare with thesame, nevertheles ther hath been spoken a little afore, of the maner of exercisyng them. and concernyng tharmyng them, i would arme them as thei doe at this present, as wel the light horsemen, as the menne of armes: but the light horsemen, i would that thei should be all crossebowe shuters, with some harkebutters emong them: the whiche though in the other affaires of warre, thei bee little profitable, thei be for this most profitable, to make afraied the countrie menne, and to drive them from a passage, that were kept of them: bicause a harkebutter, shall feare them more, then twentie other armed. but commyng to the nomber, i saie, that having taken in hand, to imitate the service of warre of the romaines, i would not ordein more then three hundred horse, profitable for every maine battaile, of whiche i would that there were cl. men of armes, and cl. light horsmen, and i would give to every one of these partes, a hedde, making after emong them fiftene peticapitaines for a bande, givyng to every one of them a trompet, and a standarde: i would that every ten menne of armes, should have five carriages, and every ten light horsemen twoo, the whiche as those of the footemen, should carrie the tentes, the vesselles, and the axes, and the stakes, and the rest of their other harneis. nor beleve not but that it is disorder, where the menne of armes have to their service fower horse, bicause soche a thyng is a corrupt use: for that the men of armes in almaine, are seen to bee with their horse alone, every twentie of theim, havyng onely a carte, that carrieth after them their necessary thynges. the romaine horsemen, were likewise a lone: true it is, that the triary lodged nere them, whiche wer bound to minister helpe unto theim, in the kepyng of their horses the whiche maie easely be imitated of us, as in the distributyng of the lodgynges, i shall shewe you. thesame then that the romaines did, and that whiche the duchmen doe now a daies, we maie doe also, ye, not doyng it, we erre. these horses ordained and appoincted together with a main battaile, maie sometymes be put together, when the battailes bee assembled, and to cause that betwene theim bee made some sight of assault, the whiche should be more to make them acquainted together, then for any other necessitie. but now of this part, there hath been spoke sufficiently, wherefore let us facion the armie, to be able to come into the field against the enemie, and hope to winne it: whiche thyng is the ende, for whiche the exercise of warre is ordeined, and so moche studie therein bestowed. the thirde booke cosimo. seeing that we chaunge reasonyng, i will that the demaunder be chaunged: bicause i would not be thought presumptuous, the which i have alwaies blamed in other: therfore, i resigne the dictatorship, and give this aucthoritie to hym that will have it, of these my other frendes. zanobi. we would be moste glad, that you should procede, but seyng that you will not, yet tell at leaste, whiche of us shall succede in your place. cosimo. i will give this charge to signor fabricio. fabricio. i am content to take it, and i will that we folowe the venecian custome, that is, that the youngeste speake firste: bicause this beyng an exercise for yong men, i perswade my self, that yong menne, bee moste apt to reason thereof, as thei be moste readie to execute it. cosimo. then it falleth to you luigi: and as i have pleasure of soche a successour, so you shal satisfie your self of soche a demaunder: therefore i praie you, let us tourne to the matter, and let us lese no more tyme. [sidenote: the greateste disorder that is used now a daies in pitching of a fielde; the order how a romain legion was appoincted to faight; the maner that the grekes used in their falangi, when thei fought against their enemies; the order that the suizzers use in their main battailes when thei faight; howe to appoincte a main battaile with armour and weapons, and to order thesame after the greke and romain maner.] fabricio. i am certain, that to mynde to shewe wel, how an armie is prepared, to faight a fielde, it should be necessarie to declare, how the grekes, and the romaines ordeined the bandes of their armies: notwithstandyng, you your selves, beeyng able to rede, and to consider these tnynges, by meanes of the auncient writers. i will passe over many particulars: and i will onely bryng in those thynges, whiche i thinke necessarie to imitate, mindyng at this tyme, to give to our exercise of warre, some parte of perfection: the whiche shall make, that in one instant, i shall shewe you, how an armie is prepared to the field, and how it doeth incounter in the verie faight, and how it maie be exercised in the fained. the greatest disorder, that thei make, whiche ordeine an armie to the fielde, is in giving them onely one fronte, and to binde them to one brunt, and to one fortune: the whiche groweth, of havyng loste the waie, that the antiquitie used to receive one bande within an other: bicause without this waie, thei can neither succour the formoste, nor defende them, nor succede in the faight in their steede: the whiche of the romaines, was moste excellently well observed. therefore, purposyng to shewe this waie, i saie, how that the romaines devided into iii. partes every legion, in hastati, prencipi, and triarii, of which, the hastati wer placed in the first front, or forward of the armie, with thorders thicke and sure, behinde whom wer the prencipi, but placed with their orders more thinne: after these, thei set the triarii, and with so moche thinnes of orders, that thei might, if nede wer, receive betwene them the prencipi, and the hastati. thei had besides these, the slingers, and crosbowshoters, and the other lighte armed, the whiche stoode not in these orders, but thei placed them in the bed of tharmie, betwene the horses and the other bandes of footemen: therefore these light armed, began the faight, if thei overcame (whiche happened seldom times) thei folowed the victorie: if thei were repulced, thei retired by the flanckes of the armie, or by the spaces ordained for soche purposes, and thei brought them selves emong the unarmed: after the departure of whom, the hastati incountered with the enemie, the whiche if thei saw themselves to be overcome, thei retired by a little and little, by the rarenesse of thorders betwene the prencipi, and together with those, thei renued the faight if these also wer repulced, thei retired al in the rarenesse of the orders of the triarii, and al together on a heape, began againe the faight: and then, if thei were overcome, there was no more remeady, bicause there remained no more waies to renue them again. the horses stoode on the corners of the armie, to the likenes of twoo winges to a bodie, and somewhiles thei fought with the enemies horses, an other while, thei rescued the fotmen, according as nede required. this waie of renuyng theim selves three tymes, is almoste impossible to overcome: for that, fortune muste three tymes forsake thee, and the enemie to have so moche strengthe, that three tymes he maie overcome thee. the grekes, had not in their falangi, this maner of renuyng them selves, and although in those wer many heddes, and many orders, notwithstandyng, thei made one bodie, or els one hedde: the maner that thei kepte in rescuyng the one the other was, not to retire the one order within the other, as the romaines, but to enter the one manne into the place of the other: the which thei did in this maner. their falange brought into rankes, and admit, that thei put in a ranke fiftie menne, commyng after with their hedde againste the enemie, of all the rankes the foremoste sixe, mighte faight: bicause their launces, the whiche thei called sarisse, were so long, that the sixt ranke, passed with the hedde of their launces, out of the first ranke: then in faightyng, if any of the first, either through death, or through woundes fell, straight waie there entered into his place, thesame man, that was behinde in the second ranke, and in the place that remained voide of the seconde, thesame man entred, whiche was behind hym in the thirde, and thus successively, in a sodaine the rankes behinde, restored the faultes of those afore, so that the rankes alwaies remained whole, and no place of the faighters was voide, except the laste rankes, the whiche came to consume, havyng not menne behinde their backes, whom might restore theim: so that the hurte that the first rankes suffered, consumed the laste, and the firste remained alwaies whole: and thus these falangi by their order, might soner be consumed, then broken, for that the grosse bodie, made it more immovable. the romaines used at the beginnyng the falangi, and did set in order their legions like unto them: after, this order pleased them not, and thei devided the legions into many bodies, that is, in bandes and companies: bicause thei judged (as a little afore i saied) that thesame bodie, should have neede of many capitaines, and that it should be made of sunderie partes, so that every one by it self, might be governed. the maine battailes of the suizzers, use at this present, all the maners of the falangi, as well in ordryng it grosse, and whole, as in rescuyng the one the other: and in pitchyng the field, thei set the main battailes, thone to the sides of the other: and though thei set them the one behinde the other, thei have no waie, that the firste retiryng it self, maie bee received of the seconde, but thei use this order, to the entent to bee able to succour the one thother, where thei put a maine battaile before, and an other behinde thesame on the right hande: so that if the first have nede of helpe, that then the other maie make forewarde, and succour it: the third main battaile, thei put behind these, but distant from them, a harkebus shot: this thei doe, for that thesaid two main battailes being repulced, this maie make forwarde, and have space for theim selves, and for the repulced, and thesame that marcheth forward, to avoide the justling of the one the other: for asmoche as a grosse multitude, cannot bee received as a little bodie: and therefore, the little bodies beyng destincte, whiche were in a romaine legion, might be placed in soche wise, that thei might receive betwene theim, and rescue the one the other. and to prove this order of the suizzers not to be so good, as the auncient romaines, many insamples of the romain legions doe declare, when thei fought with the grekes falangi, where alwaies thei were consumed of theim: for that the kinde of their weapons (as i have said afore) and this waie of renuyng themselves, could do more, then the massivenesse of the falangi. havyng therefore, with these insamples to ordaine an armie, i have thought good, partly to retaine the maner of armyng and the orders of the grekes falangi, and partely of the romain legions: and therfore i have saied, that i would have in a main battaile, twoo thousande pikes, whiche be the weapons of the macedonicall falangi, and three thousande targaettes with sweardes, whiche be the romain weapons: i have devided the main battaile, into x. battailes, as the romaines their legion into ten cohortes: i have ordeined the veliti, that is the light armed, to begin the faight, as the romaines used: and like as the weapons beyng mingled, doe participate of thone and of the other nacion, so the orders also doe participate: i have ordained, that every battaile shall have v. rankes of pikes in the fronte, and the rest of targaettes, to bee able with the front, to withstande the horses, and to enter easely into the battaile of the enemies on foot, having in the firste fronte, or vawarde, pikes, as well as the enemie, the whiche shall suffice me to withstande them, the targaettes after to overcome theim. and if you note the vertue of this order, you shal se al these weapons, to doe fully their office, for that the pikes, bee profitable against the horses, and when thei come against the footemenne, thei dooe their office well, before the faight throng together, bicause so sone as thei presse together, thei become unprofitable: wherefore, the suizzers to avoide this inconvenience, put after everye three rankes of pikes, a ranke of halberdes, the whiche they do to make roome to the pikes, which is not yet so much as suffiseth. then putting our pikes afore, and the targaettes behinde, they come to withstande the horses, and in the beginning of the fight, they open the rayes, and molest the footemen: but when the fight is thrust together, and that they become unprofitable, the targaettes and swoords succeede, which may in every narowe place be handled. luigi. wee looke nowe with desire to understande, howe you would ordeyne the armie to fighte the fielde, with these weapons, and with these order. [sidenote: the nomber of men that was in a counsulles armie; how the romaines placed their legions in the field; how to order an armie in the fielde to fighte a battaile, according to the minde of the authour; how the extraordinary pikes bee placed in the set battaile; the place where thextraordinarie archars and harkebutters, and the men of armes and lighte horsmen ought to stande when the field is pitched, and goeth to faighte the battaile; the ordinarie archars and harkebutters are placed aboute their owne battailes; the place where the generall hedde of a maine battaile muste stande, when thesame power of men is appoincted to faight; what menne a general capitain of a maine battaile oughte to have aboute hym; the place wher a general capitain of all thearmie must stand when the battaile is ready to be fought and what nomber of chosen men oughte to be aboute hym; how many canons is requisite for an armie, and of what sise they ought to bee; where the artillerie ought to be placed when thearmie is reedie to fight; an armie that were ordered as above is declared, maie in fighting, use the grekes maner, and the roman fashion; to what purpose the spaces that be betwene every bande of men do serve.] fabricio. and i will not nowe shewe you other, then this: you have to understande, how that in an ordinarye romane armie, which they call a consull armie, there were no more, then twoo legions of romane citezens which were sixe hundred horse, and about aleven thousande footemen: they had besides as many more footemen and horsemen, whiche were sente them from their friends and confiderates, whome they divided into twoo partes, and called the one, the right horne and the other the left horne: nor they never permitted, that these aiding footemen, should passe the nomber of the footemen of their legions, they were well contented, that the nomber of those horse shoulde be more then theirs: with this armie, which was of xxii. thousand footemen, and about twoo thousande good horse, a consul executed all affaires, and went to all enterprises: yet when it was needefull to set against a greater force, twoo consulles joyned together with twoo armies. you ought also to note in especially, that in all the three principall actes, which an armie doth that is, to march, to incampe, and to fight, the romanes used to put their legions in the middeste, for that they woulde, that the same power, wherein they most trusted, shoulde bee moste united, as in the reasoning of these three actes, shall be shewed you: those aiding footemen, through the practise they had with the legion souldiours, were as profitable as they, because they were instructed, according as the souldiours of the legions were, and therefore, in like maner in pitching the field, they pitched. then he that knoweth how the romaines disposed a legion in their armie, to fight a field, knoweth how they disposed all: therefor, having tolde you how they devided a legion into three bandes, and how the one bande received the other, i have then told you, how al tharmie in a fielde, was ordained. wherefore, i minding to ordain a field like unto the romaines, as they had twoo legions, i will take ii. main batailes, and these being disposed, the disposicion of all an armie shalbe understode therby: bycause in joyning more men, there is no other to be doen, then to ingrosse the orders: i thinke i neede not to rehearse how many men a maine battaile hath, and howe it hath ten battailes, and what heades bee in a battaile and what weapons they have, and which be the ordinarie pikes and veliti, and which the extraordinarie for that a litle a fore i told you it destinctly, and i willed you to kepe it in memorie as a necessarie thing to purpose, to understande all the other orders: and therfore i will come to the demonstracion of the order without repeating it any more: me thinkes good, that the ten battailes of one main battaile be set on the left flanke, and the tenne other, of the other main battaile, on the right: these that are placed on the left flanke, be ordeined in this maner, there is put five battailes the one to the side of the other in the fronte, after suche sorte, that betweene the one and the other, there remaine a space of three yardes, whiche come to occupie for largenesse cvi. yardes, of ground, and for length thirtie: behinde these five battailes, i would put three other distante by right line from the firste thirtie yardes: twoo of the whiche, should come behinde by right line, to the uttermoste of the five, and the other should kepe the space in the middeste, and so these three, shall come to occupie for bredth and length, as moche space, as the five doeth. but where the five have betwene the one, and the other, a distaunce of three yardes, these shall have a distance of xxv. yardes. after these, i would place the twoo last battailes, in like maner behinde the three by right line, and distaunte from those three, thirtie yardes, and i would place eche of theim, behinde the uttermoste part of the three, so that the space, whiche should remain betwen the one and the other, should be lxviii. yardes: then al these battailes thus ordered, will take in bredth cvi. yardes, and in length cl. thextraordinarie pikes, i would deffende a long the flanckes of these battailes, on the left side, distante from them fiftene yardes, makyng cxliij. rankes, seven to a ranke, after soche sorte, that thei maie impale with their length, all the left sixe of the tenne battailes in thesame wise, declared of me to be ordained: and there shall remain fourtie rankes to keepe the carriages, and the unarmed, whiche ought to remaine in the taile of the armie, distributyng the peticapitaines, and the centurions, in their places: and of the three conestables, i would place one in the hedde, the other in the middeste, the third in the laste ranke, the whiche should execute the office of a tergiductore, whom the antiquitie so called hym, that was appoincted to the backe of the armie. but retournyng to the hedde of the armie, i saie how that i would place nere to the extraordinarie pikes, the veliti extraordinarie, whiche you knowe to be five hundred, and i would give them a space of xxx. yardes: on the side of these likewise on the left hande, i would place the menne of armes, and i would thei should have a space of a cxii. yardes: after these, the light horsemen, to whom i would appoinct as moche ground to stande in, as the menne of armes have: the ordinarie veliti, i would leave about their owne battailes, who should stand in those spaces, whiche i appoincte betwene thone battaile and thother: whom should be as their ministers, if sometyme i thought not good to place them under the extraordinarie pikes: in dooyng or not doyng whereof, i would proceade, accordyng as should tourne best to my purpose. the generall hedde of all the maine battaile, i would place in thesame space, that were betwene the first and the seconde order of the battailes, or els in the hedde, and in thesame space, that is betwene the laste battaile of the firste five, and the extraordinarie pikes, accordyng as beste should serve my purpose, with thirtie or fourtie chosen men about hym, that knewe by prudence, how to execute a commission, and by force, to withstande a violence, and thei to be also betwen the drumme and the ansigne: this is thorder, with the whiche i would dispose a maine battaile, whiche should bee the disposyng of halfe the armie, and it should take in breadth three hundred fourscore and twoo yardes, and in length as moche as above is saied, not accomptyng the space, that thesame parte of the extraordinarie pikes will take, whiche muste make a defence for the unarmed, whiche will bee aboute lxxv. yardes: the other maine battaile, i would dispose on the righte side, after the same maner juste, as i have disposed that on the lefte, leavyng betwene the one main battaile, and thother, a space of xxii. yardes: in the hedde of whiche space, i would set some little carriages of artillerie, behynde the whiche, should stande the generall capitaine of all the armie, and should have about hym with the trumpet, and with the capitaine standerde, twoo hundred menne at least, chosen to be on foote the moste parte, emongest whiche there should be tenne or more, mete to execute all commaundementes, and should bee in soche wise a horsebacke, and armed, that thei mighte bee on horsebacke, and on foote, accordyng as neede should require. the artillerie of the armie, suffiseth ten cannons, for the winning of townes, whose shotte shoulde not passe fiftie pounde: the whiche in the fielde should serve mee more for defence of the campe, then for to fight the battaile: the other artillerie, should bee rather of ten, then of fifteene pounde the shotte: this i would place afore on the front of all the armie, if sometime the countrie should not stande in such wise, that i mighte place it by the flancke in a sure place, where it mighte not of the enemie be in daunger: this fashion of an armie thus ordered, may in fighting, use the order of the falangi, and the order of the romane legions: for that in the fronte, bee pikes, all the men bee set in the rankes, after such sorte, that incountering with the enemie, and withstanding him, maye after the use of the falangi, restore the firste ranckes, with those behinde: on the other parte, if they be charged so sore, that they be constrayned to breake the orders, and to retire themselves, they maye enter into the voide places of the seconde battailes, which they have behinde them, and unite their selves with them, and making a new force, withstande the enemie, and overcome him: and when this sufficeth not, they may in the verie same maner, retire them selves the seconde time, and the third fight: so that in this order, concerning to fight, there is to renue them selves, both according to the greeke maner, and according to the romane: concerning the strength of the armie, there cannot be ordayned a more stronger: for as much, as the one and the other borne therof, is exceedingly well replenished, both with heades, and weapons, nor there remayneth weake, other then the part behinde of the unarmed, and the same also, hath the flanckes impaled with the extraordinarie pikes: nor the enemie can not of anye parte assaulte it, where he shall not finde it well appointed, and the hinder parte can not be assaulted: because there can not bee an enemie, that hath so much puissaunce, whome equallye maye assault thee on everye side: for that hee having so great a power, thou oughtest not then to matche thy selfe in the fielde with him: but when he were three times more then thou, and as well appointed as thou, hee doth weaken him selfe in assaulting thee in divers places, one part that thou breakest, will cause all the reste go to naughte: concerning horses, although he chaunce to have more then thine, thou needest not feare: for that the orders of the pikes, which impale thee, defende thee from all violence of them, although thy horses were repulced. the heades besides this, be disposed in such place, that they may easyly commaunde, and obeye: the spaces that bee between the one battaile, and the other, and betweene the one order, and the other, not onely serve to be able to receyve the one the other, but also to give place to the messengers, whiche should go and come by order of the capitayne. and as i tolde you firste, howe the romanes had for an armie, aboute foure and twentie thousande men, even so this oughte to bee: and as the other souldiours tooke ensample of the legions, for the maner of fighting, and the fashion of the armie, so those souldiours, whiche you shoulde joyne to oure twoo mayne battailes, oughte to take the forme and order of them: whereof having put you an ensample, it is an easye matter to imitate it, for that increasing, either twoo other mayne battailes unto the armie, or as many other souldiours, as they bee, there is no other to bee done, then to double the orders, and where was put tenne battailes on the lefte parte, to put twentie, either ingrossing, or distending the orders, according as the place, or the enemie shoulde compell thee. luigi. surelye sir i imagine in suche wise of this armie, that mee thinkes i nowe see it, and i burne with a desire to see it incounter, and i woulde for nothing in the worlde, that you shoulde become fabius maximus intendyng to kepe the enemie at a baie, and to deferre the daie of battaile: bicause i would saie worse of you, then the romain people saied of hym. [sidenote: the descripcion of a battaile that is a faightyng.] fabricio. doubt not: doe you not heare the artillerie? ours have alredie shotte, but little hurte the enemie: and thextraordinarie veliti, issuyng out of their places together with the light horsemen, moste speadely, and with moste merveilous furie, and greateste crie that maie be, thei assaulte the enemie: whose artillerie hath discharged ones, and hath passed over the heddes of our footemen, without doyng them any hurt, and bicause it cannot shoote the seconde tyme, the veliti, and our horsemen, have nowe gotten it, and the enemies for to defende it, are come fore warde, so that neither our ordinaunce, nor thenemies, can any more doe their office. se with how moche vertue, strengthe and agilitie our men faighteth, and with how moche knowledge through the exercise, whiche hath made them to abide, and by the confidence, that thei have in the armie, the whiche, see, how with the pace therof, and with the men of armes on the sides, it marcheth in good order, to give the charge on the adversarie: see our artillerie, whiche to give theim place, and to leave them the space free, is retired by thesame space, from whens the veliti issued: see how the capitaine incourageth them, sheweth them the victorie certain: see how the veliti and light horsemen bee inlarged, and retourned on the flanckes of tharmie, to seke and view, if thei maie by the flanck, doe any injurie to the adversaries: behold how the armies be affronted. se with how moche valiauntnesse thei have withstode the violence of thenemies, and with how moche silence, and how the capitain commaundeth the menne of armes, that thei sustain, and not charge, and that thei breake not from the order of the footemen: see how our light horsemen be gone, to give the charge on a band of the enemies harkebutters, whiche would have hurt our men by flancke, and how the enemies horse have succoured them, so that tourned betwene the one and the other horse, thei cannot shoote, but are faine to retire behinde their owne battaile: see with what furie our pikes doe also affront, and how the footemen be now so nere together the one to the other, that the pikes can no more be occupied: so that according to the knowlege learned of us, our pikes do retire a little and a little betwen the targaettes. se how in this while a great bande of men of armes of the enemies, have charged our men of armes on the lefte side, and how ours, accordyng to knowlege, bee retired under the extraordinarie pikes, and with the help of those, giving again a freshe charge, have repulced the adversaries, and slain a good part of them: in so moche, that thordinarie pikes of the first battailes, be hidden betwene the raies of the targaettes, thei havyng lefte the faight to the targaet men: whom you maie see, with how moche vertue, securitie, and leasure, thei kill the enemie: see you not how moche by faightyng, the orders be thrust together? that thei can scarse welde their sweardes? behold with how moche furie the enemies move: bicause beyng armed with the pike, and with the swerd unprofitable (the one for beyng to long, the other for findyng thenemie to well armed) in part thei fall hurt or dedde, in parte thei flie. see, thei flie on the righte corner, thei flie also on the lefte: behold, the victorie is ours. have not we wonne a field moste happely? but with more happinesse it should bee wonne, if it were graunted me to put it in acte. and see, how there neded not the helpe of the seconde, nor of the third order, for our first fronte hath sufficed to overcome theim: in this part, i have no other to saie unto you, then to resolve if any doubt be growen you. [sidenote: questions concerning the shotyng of ordinaunce.] luigi. you have with so moche furie wonne this fielde that i so moche mervaile and am so astonied, that i beleve that i am not able to expresse, if any doubt remain in my mynde: yet trustyng in your prudence, i will be so bolde to tell thesame that i understande. tell me firste, why made you not your ordinaunce to shoote more then ones? and why straighte waie you made them to retire into tharmie, nor after made no mension of them? me thought also, that you leveled the artillerie of the enemie high, and appoincted it after your own devise: the whiche might very well bee, yet when it should happen, as i beleve it chaunseth often, that thei strike the rankes, what reamedie have you? and seyng that i have begun of the artillerie, i will finishe all this question, to the intente i nede not to reason therof any more. i have heard many dispraise the armours, and the orders of the aunciente armies, arguyng, how now a daies, thei can doe little, but rather should bee altogether unprofitable, havyng respecte to the furie of the artillerie: bicause, this breaketh the orders, and passeth the armours in soche wise, that it semeth unto them a foolishenesse to make an order, whiche cannot bee kepte, and to take pain to beare a harneis, that cannot defende a man. [sidenote: an aunswere to the questions that were demaunded, concernyng the shoting of ordinaunce; the best remedie to avoide the hurte that the enemie in the fielde maie doe with his ordinaunce; a policie against bowes and dartes; nothyng causeth greater confusion in an armie, than to hinder mennes fightes; nothing more blindeth the sight of men in an armie, then the smoke of ordinaunce; a policie to trouble the enemies sight; the shotte of greate ordinaunce in the fielde, is not moche to bee feared of fotemenne; bicause menne of armes stand closer together then light horsmen, thei ought to remaine behinde the armie till the enemies ordinaunce have done shootyng; the artillerie is no let, why the auncient orders of warfar ought not to be used in these daies.] fabricio. this question of yours (bicause it hath many heddes) hath neede of a long aunswere. it is true, that i made not thartillery to shoote more than ones, and also of thesame ones, i stoode in doubte: the occasion was, for asmoche as it importeth more, for one to take hede not to be striken, then it importeth to strike the enemie. you have to understande, that to purpose that a pece of ordinaunce hurte you not, it is necessarie either to stande where it cannot reche you, or to get behinde a wall, or behinde a banke: other thing there is not that can witholde it: and it is nedefull also, that the one and the other be moste strong. those capitaines whiche come to faight a field, cannot stand behind a wal, or behind bankes, nor where thei maie not be reached: therfore it is mete for them, seyng thei cannot finde a waie to defende them, to finde some mean, by the whiche thei maie be least hurte: nor thei cannot finde any other waie, then to prevente it quickly: the waie to prevent it, is to go to finde it out of hande, and hastely, not at leasure and in a heape: for that through spede, the blowe is not suffered to bee redoubled, and by the thinnesse, lesse nomber of menne maie be hurt. this, a bande of menne ordered, cannot dooe; bicause if thesame marche hastely, it goweth out of order: if it go scattered, the enemie shall have no paine to breake it, for that it breaketh by it self: and therfore, i ordered the armie after soche sorte, that it might dooe the one thyng and the other: for as moche as havyng set in the corners thereof, a thousande veliti, i appoincted that after that our ordinaunce had shotte, thei should issue out together with the light horsemen, to get the enemies artillerie: and therfore, i made not my ordinance to shoote again, to the intente, to give no tyme to the enemie to shoote: bicause space could not be given to me, and taken from other men, and for thesame occasion, where i made my ordinaunce not to shoote the seconde tyme, was for that i would not have suffered the enemie to have shot at al, if i had could: seyng that to mynde that the enemies artillerie be unprofitable, there is no other remedie, but to assaulte it spedely: for as moche as if the enemies forsake it, thou takeste it, if thei will defende it, it is requisite that thei leave it behind, so that being possessed of enemies, and of frendes, it cannot shoote. i would beleve, that with out insamples these reasons should suffice you, yet beyng able to shewe olde ensamples, to prove my saiynges true, i will. ventidio commyng to faight a field with the parthians, whose strength for the moste part, consisted in bowes and arrowes, he suffered theim almoste to come harde to his campe, before he drewe out his armie, the whiche onely he did, to be able quickly to prevent them: and not to give them space to shoote. cesar when he was in fraunce, maketh mencion, that in faighting a battaile with the enemies, he was with so moche furie assaulted of them, that his menne had no time to whorle their dartes, accordyng to the custome of the romaines: wherfore it is seen, that to intende, that a thyng that shooteth farre of, beyng in the field, doe not hurte thee, there is no other remedy, then with as moche celeritie as maie bee, to prevente it. an other cause moved me to procede, without shotyng the ordinaunce, whereat peradventure you will laugh: yet i judge not that it is to be dispraised. ther is nothyng that causeth greater confusion in an armie, then to hinder mennes fightes: whereby many moste puisaunte armies have been broken, by meanes their fighte hath been letted, either with duste, or with the sunne: yet there is nothyng, that more letteth the sight then the smoke that the artillerie maketh in shotyng: therfore, i would thinke that it wer more wisedome, to suffer the enemie to blinde hymself, then to purpose (thou being blind) to go to finde hym: for this cause, either i would not shote, or (for that this should not be proved, considering the reputacion that the artillerie hath) i would place it on the corners of the armie, so that shootyng, it should not with the smoke thereof, blinde the front of thesame, whiche is the importaunce of my men. and to prove that it is a profitable thyng, to let the sight of the enemie, there maie be brought for insample epaminondas, whom to blind the enemies armie, whiche came to faight with hym, he caused his light horsemen, to run before the fronte of the enemies, to raise up the duste, and to lette their sight, whereby he gotte the victorie. and where it semeth unto you, that i have guided the shot of the artillerie, after my owne devise, making it to passe over the heddes of my men, i answer you, that most often tymes, and without comparison, the greate ordinaunce misse the footemen, moche soner than hitte theim: for that the footemen are so lowe, and those so difficult to shoote; that every little that thou raisest theim, thei passe over the heddes of men: and if thei be leveled never so little to lowe, thei strike in the yearth, and the blowe cometh not to theim: also the unevenesse of the grounde saveth them, for that every little hillocke, or high place that is, betwene the men and thordinance, letteth the shot therof. and concernyng horsmen, and in especially men of armes, bicause thei ought to stand more close together, then the light horsemen, and for that thei are moche higher, maie the better be stroken, thei maie, untill the artillerie have shotte, be kepte in the taile of the armie. true it is, that the harkebutters doe moche more hurt, and the field peces, then the greate ordinance, for the whiche, the greatest remedy is, to come to hande strokes quickly: and if in the firste assaulte, there be slaine some, alwaies there shall bee slaine: but a good capitaine, and a good armie, ought not to make a coumpte of a hurte, that is particulare, but of a generall, and to imitate the suizzers, whom never eschue to faight, beyng made afraied of the artillerie: but rather punishe with death those, whiche for feare thereof, either should go out of the ranke, or should make with his body any signe of feare. i made them (so sone as thei had shotte) to bee retired into the armie, that thei might leave the waie free for the battaile: i made no more mencion of theim, as of a thyng unprofitable, the faight beyng begun. you have also saied, that consideryng the violence of this instrument, many judge the armours, and the auncient orders to be to no purpose, and it semeth by this your talke, that men now a daies, have founde orders and armours, whiche are able to defend them against the artillerie: if you knowe this, i would bee glad that you would teache it me: for that hetherto, i never sawe any, nor i beleve that there can any be founde: so that i would understande of soche men, for what cause the souldiours on foote in these daies, weare the breastplate, or the corselet of steele, and thei on horsebacke go all armed: bicause seyng that thei blame the aunciente armyng of men as unprofitable, considryng the artillery, thei ought to despise also this? i would understande moreover, for what occasion the suizzers, like unto the auncient orders, make a battaile close together of sixe, or eight thousande menne, and for what occasion all other have imitated theim, this order bearyng the verie same perill, concernyng the artillerie, that those other should beare, whiche should imitate the antiquitie. i beleve thei should not knowe what to answere: but if you should aske soche souldiours, as had some judgement, thei would aunswere first, that thei go armed, for that though thesame armoure defende theim not from the artillerie: it defendeth them from crossebowes, from pikes, from sweardes, from stones, and from all other hurt, that commeth from the enemies, thei would answere also, that thei went close together, like the suizzers, to be able more easely to overthrow the footemen, to be able to withstand better the horse and to give more difficultie to the enemie to breake them: so that it is seen, that the souldiours have to fear, many other thynges besides the ordinance: from which thynges, with the armours, and with the orders, thei are defended: whereof foloweth, that the better that an armie is armed, and the closer that it hath the orders, and stronger, so moche the surer it is: so that he that is of thesame opinion, that you saie, it behoveth either that he bee of smalle wisedome, or that in this thyng, he hath studied verie little: for as moche as if we see, that so little a parte of the aunciente maner of armyng, whiche is used now a daies, that is the pike, and so little a parte of those orders, as are the maine battailes of the suizzers, dooe us so moche good, and cause our armies to bee so strong, why ought not we to beleve, that the other armours, and thother orders whiche are lefte, be profitable? seyng that if we have no regard to the artillerie, in puttyng our selves close together, as the suizzers, what other orders maie make us more to feare thesame? for as moche as no order can cause us so moche to feare thesame, as those, whiche bryng men together. besides this, if the artillerie of the enemies should not make me afraied, in besiegyng a toune, where it hurteth me with more safegarde, beyng defended of a wall, i beyng not able to prevente it, but onely with tyme, with my artillerie to lette it, after soche sorte that it maie double the blowe as it liste, why should i feare thesame in the field, where i maie quickly prevent it? so that i conclude thus, that the artillerie, according to my opinion, doeth not let, that the aunciente maners cannot be used, and to shewe the auncient vertue: and if i had not talked alreadie with you of this instrument, i would of thesame, declare unto you more at length: but i will remit my self to that, whiche then i saied. luigi. wee maie now understande verie well, how moche you have aboute the artillerie discoursed: and in conclusion, my thinkes you have shewed, that the preventyng it quickly, is the greatest remedie, that maie be had for thesame, beyng in the fielde, and havyng an armie againste you. upon the whiche there groweth in me a doubte: bicause me thinkes, that the enemie might place his ordinaunce in soche wise, in his armie, that it should hurt you, and should be after soche sort garded of the footemen, that it could not be prevented. you have (if you remember your self well) in the orderyng of your armie to faight, made distaunces of three yardes, betwene the one battaile and the other, makyng those distaunces fiftene, whiche is from the battailes, to thextraordinarie pikes: if thenemie, shuld order his armie like unto yours, and should putte the artillerie a good waie within those spaces, i beleve that from thens, it should hurte you with their moste greate safegard: bicause menne can not enter into the force of their enemies to prevent it. [sidenote: a generall rule againste soche thynges as cannot bee withstoode.] fabricio. you doubt moste prudently, and i will devise with my self, either to resolve you the doubte, or shewe you the remedie: i have tolde you, that continually these battailes, either through goyng, or thorowe faightyng, are movyng, and alwaies naturally, thei come to drawe harde together, so that if you make the distaunces of a small breadth, where you set the artillerie, in a little tyme thei be shootte up, after soche sort, that the artillerie cannot any more shoote: if you make theim large, to avoide this perill, you incurre into a greater, where you through those distances, not onely give commoditie to the enemie, to take from you the artillerie, but to breake you: but you have to understande, that it is impossible to keepe the artillerie betwene the bandes, and in especially those whiche go on carriages: for that the artillerie goeth one waie, and shooteth an other waie: so that havyng to go and to shoote, it is necessary, before thei shote, that thei tourne, and for to tourne theim, thei will have so moche space, that fiftie cartes of artillerie, would disorder any armie: therfore, it is mete to kepe them out of the bandes, where thei may be overcome in the maner, as a little afore we have shewed: but admit thei might be kept, and that there might be found a waie betwen bothe, and of soche condicion, that the presyng together of men should not hinder the artillerie, and were not so open that it should give waie to the enemie, i saie, that it is remedied moste easely, with makyng distances in thy armie against it, whiche maie give free passage to the shot of those, and so the violence thereof shall come to be vain, the which maie be doen moste easely: for asmoche, as the enemie mindyng to have his artillerie stand safe, it behoveth that he put them behinde, in the furthest part of the distances, so that the shot of the same, he purposyng that thei hurt not his owne men, ought to passe by right line, and by that very same alwaies: and therefore with givyng theim place, easely thei maie bee avoided: for that this is a generall rule, that to those thynges, whiche cannot be withstoode, there must bee given waie, as the antiquitie made to the eliphantes, and to the carres full of hookes. i beleve, ye, i am more then certaine, that it semeth unto you, that i have ordered and wonne a battaile after my own maner: notwithstanding, i answeer unto you this, when so moche as i have saied hetherto, should not suffice, that it should be impossible, that an armie thus ordered, and armed, should not overcome at the first incounter, any other armie that should bee ordained, as thei order the armies now adaies, whom most often tymes, make not but one front, havyng no targaettes, and are in soche wise unarmed, that thei cannot defende themselves from the enemie at hand, and thei order theim after soche sorte, that if thei set their battailes by flanck, the one to the other, thei make the armie thinne: if thei put the one behind the other, havyng no waie to receive the one the other, thei doe it confusedly, and apt to be easly troubled: and although thei give three names to their armies, and devide them into thre companies, vaward, battaile, and rereward, notwithstandyng it serveth to no other purpose, then to marche, and to distinguis the lodgynges: but in the daie of battaile, thei binde them all to the first brunte, and to the first fortune. luigi. i have noted also in the faightyng of your fielde, how your horsemen were repulced of the enemies horsemen: for whiche cause thei retired to the extraordinaire pikes: whereby grewe, that with the aide of theim, thei withstode, and drave the enemies backe? i beleve that the pikes maie withstande the horses, as you saie, but in a grosse and thicke maine battaile, as the suizzers make: but you in your army, have for the hedde five rankes of pikes, and for the flancke seven, so that i cannot tell how thei maie bee able to withstande them. [sidenote: a battaile how greate so ever it bee, cannot atones occupy above v. rankes of pikes.] fabricio. yet i have told you, how sixe rankes of pikes wer occupied at ones, in the macedonicall falangi, albeit you ought to understande, that a maine battaile of suizzers, if it were made of a thousande rankes, it cannot occupie more then fower, or at the most five: bicause the pikes be sixe yardes and three quarters longe, one yarde and halfe a quarter, is occupied of the handes, wherefore to the firste ranke, there remaineth free five yardes and a half, and a halfe quarter of pike: the seconde ranke besides that whiche is occupied with the hande, consumeth a yarde and half a quarter in the space, whiche remaineth betwene the one ranke and thother: so that there is not left of pike profitable, more then fower yardes and a halfe: to the thirde ranke, by this verie same reason, there remaineth three yardes and a quarter and a halfe: to the fowerth, twoo yardes and a quarter: to the fift one yard and halfe a quarter: the other rankes, for to hurte, be unprofitable, but thei serve to restore these firste rankes, as we have declared, and to bee a fortificacion to those v. then if five of their rankes can withstande the horse, why cannot five of ours withstande theim? to the whiche also there lacketh not rankes behinde, that doeth sustain and make them the very same staie, although thei have no pikes as the other. and when the rankes of thextraordinarie pikes, which are placed on the flanckes, should seme unto you thinne, thei maie bee brought into a quadrante, and put on the flancke nere the twoo battailes, whiche i set in the laste companie of the armie: from the whiche place, thei maie easely altogether succour the fronte, and the backe of the armie, and minister helpe to the horses, accordyng as nede shall require. luigi. would you alwaies use this forme of order, when you would pitche a fielde. [sidenote: an advertiement concernyng the pitchying of a field.] fabricio. no in no wise: for that you ought to varie the facion of the armie, according to the qualitie of the situacion, and the condicion and quantitie of the enemie, as before this reasonyng dooe ende, shall bee shewed certaine insamples: but this forme is given unto you, not so moche as moste strongeste of all, where in deede it is verie strong, as to the intente that thereby you maie take a rule, and an order to learne to knowe the waies to ordeine the other: for as moche, as every science hath his generalitie, upon the whiche a good part of it is grounded. one thing onely i advise you, that you never order an armie, after soche sorte, that those that faight afore, cannot bee sucoured of theim, whiche be set behind: bicause he that committeth this errour, maketh the greateste parte of his armie to bee unprofitable, and if it incounter any strength, it cannot overcome. luigi. there is growen in me, upon this parte a doubte. i have seen that in the placyng of the battailes, you make the fronte of five on a side, the middeste of three, and the last partes of twoo, and i beleve, that it were better to ordain them contrariwise: for that i thinke, that an armie should with more difficultie bee broken, when he that should charge upon it, the more that he should entre into the-same, so moche the stronger he should finde it: and the order devised of you, me thinkes maketh, that the more it is entered into, so moche the weaker it is founde. [sidenote: how the front of the armie ought to bee made; how the middell part of the armie ought to be ordered.] fabricio. if you should remember how to the triarii, whom were the thirde order of the romain legions, there were not assigned more then sixe hundred men, you would doubt lesse, havyng understode how thei were placed in the laste companie: for that you should see, how i moved of this insample, have placed in the last companie twoo battailes, whiche are nine hundred men, so that i come rather (folowyng the insample of the romaine people) to erre, for havyng taken to many, then to fewe: and although this insample should suffice, i will tell you the reason, the which is this. the first fronte of the armie, is made perfectly whole and thicke, bicause it must withstande the brunt of the enemies, and it hath not to receive in it any of their felowes: and for this, it is fitte that it bee full of menne: bicause a fewe menne, should make it weake, either thinnesse, or for lacke of sufficiente nomber: but the seconde companie, for as moche as it must first receive their frendes, to sustain the enemie, it is mete that it have greate spaces, and for this it behoveth, that it be of lesse nomber then the first: for that if it wer of greater nomber, or equall, it should bee conveniente, either not to leave the distaunces, the whiche should be disorder, or leavyng theim, to passe the boundes of thoseafore, the whiche should make the facion of the armie unperfecte: and it is not true that you saie, that the enemie, the more that he entereth into the maine battaile, so moche the weaker he findeth it: for that the enemie, can never faight with the seconde order, except the first be joined with thesame: so that he cometh to finde the middest of the maine battaile more stronger, and not more weaker, havyng to faight with the first, and with the seconde order altogether: the verie same happeneth, when the enemie should come to the thirde companie: for that there, not with twoo battailes, whiche is founde freshe, but with all the maine battaile he must faight: and for that this last part hath to receive moste men, the spaces therof is requisite to be greatest, and that whiche receiveth them, to be the leste nomber. [sidenote: the orderyng of the hinder part of tharmy.] luigi. it pleaseth me thesame that you have told: but answere me also this: if the five first battailes doe retire betwene the three seconde battailes, and after the eight betwene the twoo thirde, it semeth not possible, that the eight beyng brought together, and then the tenne together, maie bee received when thei bee eight, or when thei be tenne in the verie same space, whiche received the five. [sidenote: the retire of the pikes, to place the targaet men.] fabricio. the first thyng that i aunswere is, that it is not the verie same space: for that the five have fower spaces in the middeste, whiche retiryng betwene the thre, or betwene the twoo, thei occupie: then there remaineth thesame space, that is betwene the one maine battaile and other and thesame that is, betwene the battailes, and the extraordinarie pikes, al the whiche spaces makes largenesse: besides this, it is to bee considered, that the battailes kepe other maner of spaces, when thei bee in the orders without beyng altered, then when thei be altered: for that in the alteracion: either thei throng together, or thei inlarge the orders: thei inlarge theim, when thei feare so moche, that thei fall to fliyng, thei thrust them together, when thei feare in soche wise, that thei seke to save them selves, not with runnyng a waie, but with defence: so that in this case, thei should come to be destingueshed, and not to be inlarged. moreover, the five rankes of the pikes, that are before, so sone as thei have begun the faighte, thei ought betwene their battailes to retire, into the taile of the armie, for to give place to the targaet men, that thei maie faighte: and thei goyng into the taile of the armie, maie dooe soche service as the capitain should judge, were good to occupie theim aboute, where in the forward, the faight beyng mingled, thei should otherwise bee altogether unprofitable. and for this the spaces ordained, come to bee for the remnaunte of the menne, wide inough to receive them: yet when these spaces should not suffice, the flankes on the sides be men, and not walles, whom givyng place, and inlargyng them selves, maie make the space to containe so moche, that it maie bee sufficient to receive theim. [sidenote: how the pikes that are placed on the flankes of the armie ought to governe them selves when the rest of the armie is driven to retire.] luigi. the rankes of the extraordinarie pikes, whiche you place on the flanckes of the armie, when the first battailes retire into the second, will you have them to stande still, and remain with twoo homes to the armie? or will you that thei also retire together, with the battailes? the whiche when thei should do, i see not how thei can, havyng no battailes behinde with distaunces that maie receive them. [sidenote: thexercise of the army in generall; the nomber that is mete to be written in the ansigne of every band of men; the degrees of honours in an armie, whiche soche a man ought to rise by, as should bee made a generall capitain.] fabricio. if the enemie overcome theim not, when he inforceth the battailes to retire, thei maie stande still in their order, and hurte the enemie on the flanck, after that the firste battailes retired: but if he should also overcome theim, as semeth reason, beyng so puisaunte, that he is able to repulce the other, thei also ought to retire: whiche thei maie dooe excellently well, although thei have not behinde, any to receive them: bicause from the middest thei maie redouble by right line, entring the one ranke into the other, in the maner whereof wee reasoned, when it was spoken of the order of redoublyng: true it is, that to mynde redoublyng to retire backe, it behoveth to take an other waie, then thesame that i shewed you: for that i told you, that the second ranke, ought to enter into the first, the fowerth into the thirde, and so foorth: in this case, thei ought not to begin before, but behinde, so that redoublyng the rankes, thei maie come to retire backewarde not to tourne forward: but to aunswere to all thesame, that upon this foughten field by me shewed, might of you bee replied. i saie unto you again, that i have ordained you this armie, and shewed this foughten field for two causes, thone, for to declare unto you how it is ordered, the other to shewe you how it is exercised: thorder, i beleve you understande moste well: and concernyng the exersice, i saie unto you, that thei ought to be put together in this forme, as often times as maie be: for as moche as the heddes learne therby, to kepe their battailes in these orders: for that to particulare souldiours, it appertaineth to keepe well the orders of every battaile, to the heddes of the battailes, it appertaineth to keepe theim well in every order of the armie, and that thei knowe how to obeie, at the commaundement of the generall capitain: therefore, it is conveniente that thei knowe, how to joyne the one battaile with thother, that thei maie knowe how to take their place atones: and for this cause it is mete that thansigne of every battaile, have written in some evident part, the nomber therof: as well for to be able to commaunde them, as also for that the capitain, and the souldiours by thesame nomber, maie more easely knowe theim againe: also the maine battailes, ought to be nombred, and to have the nomber in their principal ansigne: therefore it is requisite, to knowe of what nomber the maine battaile shall be, that is placed on the left, or on the right horne of what nombers the battailes bee, that are set in the fronte, and in the middeste, and so foorthe of the other. the antiquitie would also, that these nombers should bee steppes to degrees, of honors of the armies: as for insample, the first degree, is the peticapitain, the seconde, the hedde of fiftie ordinarie veliti, the thirde, the centurion, the fowerth, the hedde of the first battaile, the fifte, of the second, the sixt, of the thirde, and so forthe, even to the tenth battaile, the whiche must be honoured in the seconde place, nexte the generall capitaine of a maine battaile: nor any ought to come to thesame hedde, if first, he have not risen up by all these degrees. and bicause besides these heddes, there be the three conestables of the extraordinarie pikes, and twoo of the extraordinarie veliti, i would that thei should be in the same degree of the conestable of the first battaile: nor i would not care, that there were sixe men of like degree, to thintent, that every one of them might strive, who should doe beste, for to be promised to be hedde of the seconde battaile. then every one of these heddes, knowyng in what place his battaile ought to be sette in, of necessitie it must folowe, that at a sounde of the trompette, so sone as the hedde standarde shall bee erected, all the armie shall be in their places: and this is the first exercise, whereunto an armie ought to bee accustomed, that is to set theim quickly together: and to doe this, it is requisite every daie, and divers times in one daie, to set them in order, and to disorder them. luigi. what armes would you that thansignes of all the armie, shoul'd have beside the nomber? [sidenote: the armes that oughte to bee in the standarde, and in the ansignes of an armie; the second and thirde exercise of an armie; the fowerth exercise of an armie; the soundes of the instrumentes of musicke, that the antiquitie used in their armies; what is signified by the sounde of the trompet.] fabricio. the standarde of the generall capitaine oughte to have the armes of the prince of the armie, all the other, maie have the verie same armes, and to varie with the fieldes, or to varie with the armes, as should seme beste to the lorde of the armie: bicause this importeth little, so that the effect growe, that thei be knowen the one from the other. but let us passe to the other exercise: the which is to make them to move, and with a convenient pace to marche, and to se, that marehyng thei kepe the orders. the third exercise is, that thei learne to handle themselves in thesame maner, whiche thei ought after to handle theimselves in the daie of battaile, to cause the artillerie to shoote, and to bee drawen out of the waie, to make the extraordinarie veliti to issue out, after a likenes of an assault, to retire theim: to make that the firste battailes, as though thei wer sore charged, retire into the spaces of the second: and after, all into the thirde, and from thens every one to retourne to his place: and in soche wise to use theim in this exercise, that to every manne, all thyng maie be knowen, and familiar: the which with practise, and with familiaritie, is brought to passe moste quickly. the fowerth exercise is, that thei learne to knowe by meane of the sounde, and of the ansigne, the commaundemente of their capitaine: for as moche as that, whiche shall be to them pronounced by voice, thei without other commaundemente, maie understande: and bicause the importaunce of this commaundement, ought to growe of the sounde, i shall tell you what soundes the antiquitie used. of the lacedemonians, accordyng as tucidido affirmeth, in their armies were used flutes: for that thei judged, that this armonie, was moste mete to make their armie to procede with gravetie, and with furie: the carthaginens beyng moved by this verie same reason, in the first assaulte, used the violone. aliatte kyng of the lidians, used in the warre the violone, and the flutes: but alexander magnus, and the romaines, used hornes, and trumpettes, as thei, that thought by vertue of soche instrumentes, to bee able to incourage more the myndes of souldiours, and make theim to faight the more lustely: but as we have in armyng the armie, taken of the greke maner, and of the romaine, so in distrihutyng the soundes, we will keepe the customes of the one, and of the other nacion: therefore, nere the generall capitain, i would make the trompettes to stand, as a sounde not onely apt to inflame the armie, but apte to bee heard in all the whole tumoult more, then any other sounde: all the other soundes, whiche should bee aboute the conestables, and the heddes of maine battailes i would, that thei should bee smalle drummes, and flutes, sounded not as thei sounde theim now but as thei use to sounde theim at feastes. the capitaine then with the trompet, should shewe when thei must stande still, and go forward, or tourne backward, when the artillerie must shoote, when the extraordinarie veliti must move, and with the varietie or distinccion of soche soundes, to shewe unto the armie all those mocions, whiche generally maie bee shewed, the whiche trompettes, should bee after followed of the drummes, and in this exercise, bicause it importeth moche, it behoveth moche to exercise the armie. concernyng the horsemen, there would be used likewise trompettes, but of a lesse sounde, and of a divers voice from those of the capitaine. this is as moche as is come into my remembraunce, aboute the order of the armie, and of the exercise of thesame. luigi. i praie you let it not be grevous unto you to declare unto me an other thyng, that is, for what cause you made the light horsmen, and the extraordinarie veliti, to goe with cries, rumours, and furie, when thei gave the charge? and after in the incountering of the rest of tharmie, you shewed, that the thing folowed with a moste greate scilence? and for that i understande not the occasion of this varietie, i would desire that you would declare it unto me. [sidenote: the cries, and rumours, wher with the firste charge is given unto the enemies, and the silence that ought to bee used after, when the faight is ones begunne.] fabricio. the opinion of auncient capitaines, hath been divers about the commyng to handes, whether thei ought with rumour to go a pace, or with scilence to go faire and softely: this laste waie, serveth to kepe the order more sure, and to understande better the commaundementes of the capitaine: the firste, serveth to incourage more the mindes of men: and for that i beleve, that respecte ought to bee had to the one, and to the other of these twoo thynges, i made the one goe with rumour, and thother with scilence: nor me thinkes not in any wise, that the continuall rumours bee to purpose: bicause thei lette the commaundementes, the whiche is a thyng moste pernicious: nor it standeth not with reason, that the romaines used, except at the firste assaulte to make rumour: for that in their histories, is seen many tymes to have happened, that through the wordes, and comfortinges of the capitain the souldiours that ranne awaie, were made to stande to it, and in sundrie wise by his commaundemente, to have varied the orders, the whiche should not have followed, if the rumoures had been louder then his voyce. the fowerth booke luigi. seng that under my governement, a field hath been wonne so honourably, i suppose that it is good, that i tempt not fortune any more, knowyng how variable, and unstable she is: and therefore, i desire to give up my governement, and that zanobi do execute now this office of demaundyng, mindyng to followe the order, whiche concerneth the youngeste: and i knowe he will not refuse this honoure, or as we would saie, this labour, as well for to doe me pleasure, as also for beyng naturally of more stomach than i: nor it shall not make hym afraied, to have to enter into these travailes, where he maie bee as well overcome, as able to conquere. zanobi. i am readie to do what soever shall please you to appoinete me, although that i desire more willingly to heare: for as moche as hetherto, your questions have satisfied me more, then those should have pleased me, whiche in harkenyng to your reasonyng, hath chaunced to come into my remembraunce. but sir, i beleve that it is good, that you lese no tyme, and that you have pacience, if with these our ceremonies we trouble you. fabricio. you doe me rather pleasure, for that this variacion of demaunders, maketh me to knowe the sundrie wittes and sunderie appetites of yours: but remaineth there any thyng, whiche seemeth unto you good, to bee joyned to the matter, that alreadie hath been reasoned of? zanobi. twoo thinges i desire, before you passe to an other parte: the one is, to have you to shewe, if in orderyng armies, there needeth to bee used any other facion: the other, what respectes a capitaine ought to have, before he conducte his men to the faight, and in thesame an accidente risyng or growyng, what reamedie maie be had. [sidenote: to deffende moche the fronte of an armie, is most perillous; what is beste for a capitaine to dooe, where his power is, moche lesse then thenemies power; a general rule; the higher grounde ought to be chosen; an advertisement not to place an armie wher the enemie maie se what the same doeth; respectes for the sonne and winde; the variyng of order and place maie cause the conquered to become victorius; a policie in the ordering of men and pitchyng of a fielde; how to compasse about the enemies power; how a capitaine maie faight and bee as it were sure, not to be overcome; how to trouble the orders of the enemie; what a capitaine oughte to dooe when he hath not so many horsmen as the enemie; a greate aide for horsemen; the policies used betwene aniball and scipio.] fabricio. i will inforce my self to satisfie you, i will not answere now distinctly to your questions: for that whileste i shall aunswere to one, many tymes it will come to passe, that i muste aunswere to an other. i have tolde you, how i have shewed you a facion of an armie, to the intent, that accordyng to thesame, there maie bee given all those facions, that the enemie, and the situacion requireth: for as moche as in this case, bothe accordyng to the power thereof, and accordyng to the enemie, it proceadeth: but note this, that there is not a more perillous facion, then to deffende moche the front of tharmie, if then thou have not a most puisant, and moste great hoste: otherwise, thou oughtest to make it rather grosse, and of small largenesse, then of moche largenes and thin: for when thou hast fewe men in comparison to thenemie, thou oughtest to seke other remedies, as is to ordain thine army in soche a place, wher thou maiest be fortefied, either through rivers, or by meanes of fennes, after soch sort, that thou canst not bee compassed aboute, or to inclose thy self on the flanckes with diches, as cesar did in fraunce. you have to take in this cace, this generall rule, to inlarge your self, or to draw in your self with the front, according to your nomber, and thesame of the enemie. for thenemies being of lesse nomber, thou oughtest to seke large places, havyng in especially thy men well instructed: to the intent thou maiest, not onely compasse aboute the enemie, but to deffende thy orders: for that in places rough and difficulte, beyng not able to prevaile of thy orders, thou commeste not to have any advauntage, hereby grewe, that the romaines almoste alwaies, sought the open fieldes, and advoided the straightes. to the contrarie, as i have said, thou oughtest to doe, if thou hast fewe menne, or ill instructed: for that then thou oughteste to seeke places, either where the little nomber maye be saved, and where the small experience dooe not hurte thee: thou oughtest also to chuse the higher grounde, to be able more easily to infest them: notwithstandyng, this advertisment ought to be had, not to ordaine thy armie, where the enemie maie spie what thou doest and in place nere to the rootes of the same, where the enemies armie maie come: for that in this case, havyng respecte unto the artillerie, the higher place shall gette thee disadvauntage: bicause that alwaies and commodiously, thou mightest of the enemies artillerie bee hurte, without beyng able to make any remedy, and thou couldest not commodiously hurte thesame, beyng hindered by thine owne men. also, he that prepareth an armie to faight a battaile, ought to have respecte, bothe to the sunne, and to the winde, that the one and the other, doe not hurte the fronte, for that the one and the other, will let thee the sight, the one with the beames, and the other with the duste: and moreover, the winde hindereth the weapons, whiche are stroken at the enemie, and maketh their blowes more feable: and concerning the sunne, it sufficeth not to have care, that at the firste it shine not in the face, but it is requisite to consider, that increasyng the daie, it hurte thee not: and for this, it should bee requsite in orderyng the men, to have it all on the backe, to the entente it should have to passe moche tyme, to come to lye on the fronte. this waie was observed of aniball at canne, and of mario against the cimbrians. if thou happen to be moche inferiour of horses, ordaine thine armie emongeste vines, and trees, and like impedimentes, as in our time the spaniardes did, when thei overthrewe the frenchmenne at cirignuola. and it hath been seen many times, with all one souldiours, variyng onely the order, and the place, that thei have become of losers victorers: as it happened to the carthageners, whom havyng been overcome of marcus regolus divers tymes, were after by the counsaill of santippo a lacedemonian, victorious: whom made them to go doune into the plaine, where by vertue of the horses, and of eliphantes, thei were able to overcome the romaines. it semes unto me, accordyng to the auncient insamples that almoste all the excellente capitaines, when thei have knowen, that the enemie hath made strong one side of his battaile, thei have not set against it, the moste strongest parte, but the moste weakest, and thother moste strongest thei have set against the most weakest: after in the beginning the faighte, thei have commaunded to their strongest parte, that onely thei sustaine the enemie, and not to preace upon hym, and to the weaker, that thei suffer them selves to be overcome, and to retire into the hindermoste bandes of the armie. this breadeth twoo greate disorders to the enemie: the firste, that he findeth his strongest parte compassed about, the second is, that semyng unto him to have the victorie, seldome tymes it happeneth, that thei disorder not theim selves, whereof groweth his sodain losse. cornelius scipio beyng in spain, againste asdruball of carthage, and understanding how to asdruball it was knowen, that he in the orderyng the armie, placed his legions in the middest, the whiche was the strongest parte of his armie, and for this how asdruball with like order ought to procede: after when he came to faighte the battaile, he chaunged order, and put his legions on the hornes of the armie, and in the middest, placed all his weakeste men: then commyng to the handes, in a sodain those men placed in the middeste, he made to marche softly, and the hornes of the armie, with celeritie to make forwarde, so that onely the hornes of bothe the armies fought, and the bandes in the middest, through beyng distaunt the one from the other, joyned not together, and thus the strongest parte of scipio, came to faight with the weakest of asdruball, and overcame hym. the whiche waie was then profitable, but now havyng respect to the artillerie, it cannot be used: bicause the same space, whiche should remain in the middest, betwene the one armie and the other, should give tyme to thesame to shoote: the whiche is moste pernicious, as above is saied: therefore it is requisite to laie this waie aside, and to use, as a little afore we saied, makyng all the armie to incounter, and the weakest parte to give place. when a capitaine perceiveth, that he hath a greater armie then his enemie, mindyng to compasse hym aboute, before he be aware let hym ordaine his fronte equall, to thesame of his adversaries, after, so sone as the faight is begun, let hym make the fronte by a little and little to retire, and the flanckes to deffende, and alwaies it shall happen, that the enemie shal find hymself, before he be aware compassed about. when a capitain will faight, as it wer sure not to be broken, let hym ordaine his armie in place, where he hath refuge nere, and safe, either betwene fennes, or betwene hilles, or by some strong citee: for that in this case, he cannot bee followed of the enemie, where the enemie maie be pursued of him: this poincte was used of aniball, when fortune began to become his adversarie, and that he doubted of the valiauntnesse of marcus marcello. some to trouble the orders of the enemie, have commaunded those that were light armed, to begin the faight, and that beyng begunne, to retire betwene the orders: and when the armies were after buckled together, and that the fronte of either of them were occupied in faightyng, thei have made theim to issue out by the flanckes of the battaile, and thesame have troubled and broken. if any perceive hymself to bee inferiour of horse, he maie besides the waies that are alredie shewed, place behinde his horsemen a battaile of pikes, and in faightyng take order, that thei give waie to the pikes, and he shall remain alwaies superiour. many have accustomed to use certain fotemenne lighte armed, to faighte emong horsemen, the whiche hath been to the chivalrie moste greate helpe. of all those, which have prepared armies to the field, be moste praised aniball and scipio, when thei fought in africk: and for that aniball had his armie made of carthaginers, and of straungers of divers nacions, he placed in the first fronte thereof lxxx. elephantes, after he placed the straungers, behinde whom he sette his carthaginers, in the hindermoste place, he putte the italians, in whom he trusted little: the whiche thing he ordained so, for that the straungers havyng before theim the enemie, and behinde beyng inclosed of his men, could not flie: so that being constrained to faight thei should overcome, or wearie the romaines, supposyng after with his freshe and valiaunte men, to be then able easely to overcome the romaines, beeyng wearied. against this order, scipio set the astati, the prencipi, and the triarii, in the accustomed maner, to bee able to receive the one the other, and to rescue the one the other: he made the fronte of the armie, full of voide spaces, and bicause it should not be perceived but rather should seme united, he filled them ful of veliti, to whom he commaunded, that so sone as the eliphantes came, thei should avoide, and by the ordinarie spaces, should enter betwene the legins, and leave open the waie to the eliphauntes, and so it came to passe, that it made vaine the violence of theim, so that commyng to handes, he was superiour. zanobi. you have made me to remember, in alledging me this battaile, how scipio in faighting, made not the astati to retire into thorders of the prencipi, but he devided theim, and made theim to retire in the hornes of the armie, to thintent thei might give place to the prencipi, when he would force forwarde: therfore i would you should tell me, what occasion moved hym, not to observe the accustomed order. [sidenote: cartes full of hookes made to destroie the enemies; the remedy that was used against cartes full of hookes; the straunge maner that silla used in orderyng his army against archelaus; how to trouble in the faighte the armie of the enemies; a policie of caius sulpitius, to make his enemies afraied; a policie of marius againste the duchmenne; a policie of greate importaunce, while a battaile is a faightyng; how horsemen maie bee disordered; how the turke gave the sophie an overthrowe; how the spaniardes overcame the armie of amilcare; how to traine the enemie, to his destruccion; a policie of tullo hostilio and lucius silla in dessemlyng of a mischaunce; sertorius slue a man for telling him of the death of one of his capitaines; howe certaine captaines have staied their men that hath been running awaie; attillius constrained his men that ran awaie to tourne again and to faight; how philip king of macedonia made his men afraied to run awaie; victorie ought with all celeritie to bee folowed; what a capitaine ought to dooe, when he should chaunce to receive an overthrowe; how martius overcame the armie of the carthaginers; a policie of titus dimius to hide a losse, whiche he had received in a faight; a general rule; aniball; scipio; asdruball; a capitaine ought not to faight without advantage, excepte he be constrained; how advauntage maie bee taken of the enemies; furie withstode, converteth into vilenesse; what maner of men a capitaine ought to have about him continually, to consult withall; the condicions of the capitain of the enemies, and of those that are about hym is moste requisite to bee knowen; a timerous army is not to be conducted to faight; how to avoide the faightyng of a fielde.] fabricio. i will tell you. aniball had putte all the strengthe of his armie, in the seconde bande: wherefore scipio for to set againste thesame like strengthe, gathered the prencipi and the triarii together: so that the distaunces of the prencipi, beyng occupied of the triarii, there was no place to bee able to receive the astati: and therefore he made the astati to devide, and to go in the hornes of the armie, and he drewe them not betwene the prencipi. but note, that this waie of openyng the first bande, for to give place to the seconde, cannot bee used, but when a man is superiour to his enemie: for that then there is commoditie to bee able to dooe it, as scipio was able: but beyng under, and repulced, it cannot be doen, but with thy manifest ruine: and therefore it is convenient to have behinde, orders that maie receive thee, but let us tourne to our reasonyng. the auncient asiaticans, emongest other thynges devised of them to hurt the enemies, used carres. the whiche had on the sides certaine hookes, so that not onely thei served to open with their violence the bandes, but also to kill with the hookes the adversaries: against the violence of those, in thre maners thei provided, either thei sustained theim with the thickenesse of the raies, or thei received theim betwene the bandes, as the eliphantes were received, or els thei made with arte some strong resistence: as silla a romaine made againste archelaus, whom had many of these cartes, whiche thei called hooked, who for to sustaine theim, drave many stakes into the grounde, behinde his first bandes of men, whereby the cartes beyng stopped, lost their violence. and the newe maner that silla used against hym in orderyng the armie, is to bee noted: for that he put the veliti, and the horse, behinde, and all the heavie armed afore, leavyng many distaunces to be able to sende before those behinde, when necessite required: whereby the fight beyng begun, with the helpe of the horsemen, to the whiche he gave the waie, he got the victorie. to intende to trouble in the faight the enemies armie, it is conveniente to make some thyng to growe, that maie make theim afraied, either with showyng of newe helpe that commeth, or with showyng thynges, whiche maie represente a terrour unto theim: after soche sorte, that the enemies begiled of that sight, maie be afraied, and being made afraied, thei maie easely bee overcome: the whiche waies minutio rufo used, and accilio glabrione consulls of rome. caius sulpitius also set a greate many of sackes upon mules, and other beastes unprofitable for the warre, but in soche wise ordained, that thei semed men of armes, and he commaunded, that thei should appere upon a hill, while he were a faightyng with the frenchemen, whereby grewe his victorie. the verie same did marius, when he foughte against the duchemen. then the fained assaultes availyng moche, whilest the faight continueth, it is conveniente, that the very assaultes in deede, dooe helpe moche: inespecially if at unwares in the middest of the faight, the enemie might bee assaulted behinde, or on the side: the whiche hardely maie be doen, if the countrie helpe thee not: for that when it is open, parte of thy men cannot bee hid, as is mete to bee doen in like enterprises: but in woddie or hille places, and for this apt for ambusshes parte of thy men maie be well hidden, to be able in a sodain, and contrary to thenemies opinion to assaut him, whiche thyng alwaies shall be occasion to give thee the victorie. it hath been sometyme of greate importaunce, whilest the faighte continueth, to sowe voices, whiche doe pronounce the capitaine of thenemies to be dedde, or to have overcome on the other side of the armie: the whiche many times to them that have used it, hath given the victorie. the chivalrie of the enemies maie bee easely troubled, either with sightes, or with rumours, not used: as creso did, whom put camelles againste the horses of the adversaries, and pirrus sette againste the romaine horsemen eliphantes, the sighte of whiche troubled and disordered them. in our time, the turke discomfited the sophi in persia, and the soldane in surria with no other, then with the noise of harkabuses, the whiche in soche wise, with their straunge rumours, disturbed the horses of those, that the turke mighte easely overcome them: the spaniardes to overcome the armie of amilcare, put in the firste fronte cartes full of towe drawen of oxen, and comming to handes, thei kindeled fire to thesame, wherfore the oxen to flie from the fire, thrust into the armie of amilcar, and opened it. thei are wonte (as we have saied) to begile the enemie in the faight, drawyng him into their ambusshes, where the countrie is commodious for the same purpose, but where it were open and large, many have used to make diches, and after have covered them lightly with bowes and yearth, and lefte certain spaces whole, to be able betnene those to retire: after, so sone as the faight hath been begunne, retiryng by those, and the enemie folowing them, hath fallen in the pittes. if in the faight there happen thee, any accident that maie feare thy souldiours, it is a moste prudente thyng, to knowe how to desemble it, and to pervert it to good, as tullo hostilio did, and lucius silla: whom seyng while thei fought, how a parte of his men wer gone to the enemies side, and how thesame thing had verie moche made afraied his men, he made straighte waie throughout all the armie to be understoode, how all thing proceded, accordyng to his order: the whiche not onely did not trouble the armie, but it increased in them so moche stomack, that he remained victorious. it happened also to silla, that havyng sente certaine souldiours to doe some businesse, and thei beyng slain he saied, to the intent his armie should not be made afraied thereby, that he had with crafte sent theim into the handes of the enemies, for that he had found them nothyng faithfull. sertorius faightyng a battaile in spaine, slue one, whom signified unto hym the death of one of his capitaines, for feare that tellyng the very same to other, he should make theim afraied. it is a moste difficult thyng, an armie beyng now moved to flie, to staie it, and make it to faight. and you have to make this distinccion: either that it is all moved, and then to be impossible to tourne it, or there is moved a parte thereof, and then there is some remedie. many romain capitaines, with making afore those whiche fled, have caused them to staie, making them ashamed of running awaie, as lucius silla did, where alredy parte of his legions beyng tourned to flight, driven awaie by the men of mithridates, he made afore them with a swearde in his hande criyng: if any aske you, where you left your capitaine, saie, we have left hym in boecia, where he faighteth. attillius a consull set againste that ran awaie, them that ranne not awaie, and made them to understande, that if thei would not tourne, thei should be slaine of their frendes, and of their enemies. philip of macedonia understanding how his men feared the scithian souldiours, placed behinde his armie, certaine of his moste trustie horsemen, and gave commission to theim, that thei should kill whom so ever fledde: wherfore, his men mindyng rather to die faightyng, then fliyng, overcame. many romaines, not so moche to staie a flight, as for to give occasion to their men, to make greater force, have whileste thei have foughte, taken an ansigne out of their owne mennes handes, and throwen it emongeste the enemies, and appoincted rewardes to hym that could get it again. i doe not beleve that it is out of purpose, to joyne to this reasonyng those thynges, whiche chaunce after the faight, in especially beyng brief thinges, and not to be left behinde, and to this reasonyng conformable inough. therefore i saie, how the fielde is loste, or els wonne: when it is wonne, the victorie ought with all celeritie to be folowed, and in this case to imitate cesar, and not aniball, whom staiyng after that he had discomfited the romaines at canne, loste the empire of rome: the other never rested after the victorie, but folowed the enemie beyng broken, with greater violence and furie, then when he assalted hym whole: but when a capitaine dooeth loese, he ought to see, if of the losse there maie growe any utilite unto hym, inespecially if there remain any residue of tharmie. the commoditie maie growe of the small advertisment of the enemie, whom moste often times after the victorie, becometh negligent, and giveth thee occasion to oppresse hym, as marcius a romaine oppressed the armie of the carthaginers, whom having slain the twoo scipions, and broken their armie, not estemyng thesame remnaunt of menne, whiche with marcius remained a live, were of hym assaulted and overthrowen: for that it is seen, that there is no thing so moche to bee brought to passe, as thesame, whiche the enemie thinketh, that thou canst not attempte: bicause for the moste parte, men bee hurte moste, where thei doubt leaste: therefore a capitain ought when he cannot doe this, to devise at least with diligence, that the losse bee lesse hurtfull, to dooe this, it is necessarie for thee to use meanes, that the enemie maie not easely folowe thee, or to give him occasion to make delaie: in the first case, some after thei have been sure to lese, have taken order with their heddes, that in divers partes, and by divers waies thei should flie, havyng appoincted wher thei should after assemble together: the which made, that thenemie (fearing to devide the armie) was faine to let go safe either all, or the greatest part of them. in the seconde case, many have cast before the enemie, their dearest thinges, to the entent that he tariyng about the spoile, might give them more laisure to flie. titus dimius used no small policie to hide the losse, whiche he had received in the faight, for asmoche as havyng fought untill night, with great losse of his menne, he made in the night to be buried, the greatest part of them, wherefore in the mornyng, the enemies seyng so many slaine of theirs, and so fewe of the romaines, belevyng that thei had the disavauntage, ran awaie. i trust i have thus confusedly, as i saied, satisfied in good part your demaunde: in dede about the facions of the armies, there resteth me to tell you, how some tyme, by some capitaines, it hath been used to make theim with the fronte, like unto a wedge, judgyng to bee able by soche meane, more easely to open the enemies armie. against this facion, thei have used to make a facion like unto a paire of sheres, to be able betwene thesame voide place, to receive that wedge, and to compasse it about, and to faight with it on every side: whereupon i will that you take this generall rule, that the greatest remedie that is used againste a devise of the enemie, is to dooe willingly thesame, whiche he hath devised that thou shalt dooe perforce: bicause that doyng it willingly, thou doest it with order, and with thy advauntage, and his disadvauntage, if thou shouldest doe it beyng inforced, it should be thy undoyng: for the provyng whereof, i care not to reherse unto you, certain thynges alredy tolde. the adversary maketh the wedge to open thy bandes: if thou gowest with them open, thou disorderest hym, and he disordereth not thee. aniball set the elephantes in the fronte of his armie, to open with theim the armie of scipio. scipio went with it open, and it was the occasion of his victorie, and of the ruine of hym. asdruball placed his strongest men in the middest of the fronte of his armie, to overthrowe scipios menne: scipio commaunded, that by them selves thei should retire and he broke theim: so that like devises when thei are foreseen, bee the causes of the victorie of him, against whom thei be prepared. there remaineth me also, if i remember my self well, to tell you what respectes a capitaine ought to have, before he leade his men to faight: upon whiche i have to tell you firste, how a capitaine ought never to faight a battaile, except he have advauntage, or be constrained. the vantage groweth of the situacion, of the order, of havyng more, or better menne: the necessitie groweth when thou seest how that not faightyng, thou muste in any wise lose, as should bee for lackyng of money, and for this, thy armie to bee ready all maner of waies to resolve, where famishemente is ready to assaulte thee, where the enemie looketh to bee ingrosed with newe men: in these cases, thou oughtest alwaies to faight, although with thy disadvauntage: for that it is moche better to attempte fortune, where she maie favour thee, then not attemptyng, to see thy certaine ruine: and it is as grevous a faulte in this case, in a capitain not to faight, as to have had occasion to overcome, and not to have either knowen it through ignoraunce, or lefte it through vilenesse. the advauntages some tymes the enemie giveth thee, and some tymes thy prudence: many in passyng rivers have been broken of their enemie, that hath been aware thereof, whom hath taried, till the one halfe hath been of the one side, and the other halfe on the other, and then hath assaulted them: as cesar did to the suizzers, where he destroied the fowerth parte of theim, through beyng halfe over a river. some tyme thy enemie is founde wearie, for havyng folowed thee to undescritely, so that findyng thy self freshe and lustie, thou oughtest not to let passe soche an occasion: besides this, if the enemie offer unto thee in the mornyng betymes to faight, thou maiest a good while deferre to issue out of thy lodgyng, and when he hath stoode long in armour, and that he hath loste that same firste heate, with the whiche he came, thou maiest then faight with him. this waie scipio and metellus used in spaine: the one against asdruball, the other against sertorius. if the enemie be deminished of power, either for havyng devided the armie, as the scipions in spain, or for some other occasion, thou oughteste to prove chaunce. the greateste parte of prudent capitaines, rather receive the violence of the enemies, then go with violence to assalte them: for that the furie is easely withstoode of sure and steddie menne, and the furie beyng sustained, converteth lightly into vilenesse: thus fabius did againste the sannites, and against the galles, and was victorious and his felowe decius remained slain. some fearing the power of their enemies, have begun the faight a little before night, to the intent that their men chaunsyng to bee overcome, might then by the helpe of the darkenesse thereof, save theim selves. some havyng knowen, how the enemies armie beyng taken of certaine supersticion, not to faight in soche a tyme, have chosen thesame tyme to faighte, and overcome: the whiche cesar observed in fraunce, againste arionistus, and vespasian in surrie, againste the jewes. the greatest and moste importaunte advertismente, that a capitaine ought to have, is to have aboute hym faithfull menne, that are wise and moste expert in the warre, with whom he must continually consulte and reason of his men, and of those of the enemies, whiche is the greater nomber, whiche is beste armed, or beste on horsebacke, or best exercised, whiche be moste apte to suffer necessitie, in whom he trusteth moste, either in the footemen, or in the horsemen: after thei ought to consider the place where thei be, and whether it be more to the purpose for thenemie, then for him: which of theim hath victualles moste commodious: whether it be good to deferre the battaile, or to faight it: what good might bee given hym, or taken awaie by tyme: for that many tymes, souldiours seyng the warre to be delaied, are greved, and beyng wearie, in the pain and in the tediousnesse therof, wil forsake thee. it importeth above all thyng, to knowe the capitain of the enemies, and whom he hath aboute hym, whether he be rashe, or politike, whether he be fearfull, or hardie: to see how thou maiest truste upon the aidyng souldiours. and above all thyng thou oughtest to take hede, not to conducte the armie to faight when it feareth, or when in any wise it mistrusteth of the victorie: for that the greatest signe to lose, is thei beleve not to be able to winne: and therfore in this case, thou oughtest to avoide the faightyng of the fielde, either with doyng as fabius maximus, whom incampyng in strong places, gave no courage to aniball, to goe to finde hym, or when thou shouldest thinke, that the enemie also in strong places, would come to finde thee, to departe out of the fielde, and to devide the menne into thy tounes to thentent that tediousnesse of winnyng them, maie wearie hym. zanobi. cannot the faightyng of the battaile be otherwise avoided, then in devidyng the armie in sunderie partes and placyng the men in tounes? [sidenote: fabius maximus.] fabricio. i beleve that ones alreadie, with some of you i have reasoned, how that he, that is in the field, cannot avoide to faight the battaile, when he hath an enemie, which will faight with hym in any wise, and he hath not, but one remedie, and that is, to place him self with his armie distant fiftie miles at leaste, from his adversarie, to be able betymes to avoide him, when he should go to finde hym. for fabius maximus never avoided to faight the battaile with aniball, but he would have it with his advauntage: and aniball did not presume to bee able to overcome hym, goyng to finde hym in the places where he incamped: where if he had presupposed, to have been able to have overcome, it had been conveniente for fabius, to have fought the battaile with hym, or to have avoided. [sidenote: philip king of macedonia, overcome by the romaines; how cingentorige avoided the faightyng of the fielde with cesar; the ignorance of the venecians; what is to be doen wher soldiours desire to faight, contrary to their capitaines minde; how to incourage souldiers; an advertisment to make the soldiour most obstinately to faight.] philip kyng of macedonia, thesame that was father to perse, commyng to warre with the romaines, pitched his campe upon a verie high hill, to the entent not to faight with theim: but the romaines wente to find hym on thesame hill, and discomfaited hym. cingentorige capitain of the frenche menne, for that he would not faight the field with cesar, whom contrarie to his opinion, had passed a river, got awaie many miles with his men. the venecians in our tyme, if thei would not have come to have fought with the frenche kyng, thei ought not to have taried till the frenche armie, had passed the river addus, but to have gotten from them as cingentorige, where thei havyng taried knewe not how to take in the passyng of the men, the occasion to faight the battaile, nor to avoide it: for that the frenche men beyng nere unto them, as the venecians went out of their campe, assaulted theim, and discomfited theim: so it is, that the battaile cannot bee avoided, when the enemie in any wise will faight, nor let no man alledge fabius, for that so moche in thesame case, he did flie the daie of battaile, as aniball. it happeneth many tymes, that thy souldiours be willyng to faight, and thou knoweste by the nomber, and by the situacion, or for some other occasion to have disadvauntage, and desirest to make them chaunge from this desire: it happeneth also, that necessitie, or occasion, constraineth thee to faight, and that thy souldiours are evill to be trusted, and smally disposed to faight: where it is necessarie in thone case, to make theim afraied, and in the other to incourage theim: in the firste case, when perswacions suffiseth not, there is no better waie, then to give in praie, a part of them unto thenemie, to thintent those that have, and those that have not fought, maie beleve thee: and it may very wel be doen with art, thesame which to fabius maximus hapned by chaunce. tharmie of fabius (as you knowe) desired to faight with aniballs armie: the very same desire had the master of his horses: to fabius it semed not good, to attempte the faight: so that through soche contrary opinions, he was fain to devide the armie: fabius kept his men in the campe, the other fought, and commyng into great perill, had been overthrowen, if fabius had not rescued him: by the whiche insample the maister of the horse, together with all the armie, knewe how it was a wise waie to obeie fabius. concernyng to incourage theim to faight, it should be well doen, to make them to disdain the enemies, shewyng how thei speake slaunderous woordes of them, to declare to have intelligence with them, and to have corrupted part of them, to incampe in place, where thei maie see the enemies, and make some light skirmishe with them, for that the thyng that is dailie seen, with more facilitie is despised: to shewe theim to bee unworthie, and with an oracion for the purpose, to reprehende them of their cowardnesse, and for to make them ashamed, to tell theim that you will faight alone, when thei will not beare you companie. and you ought above all thyng to have this advertismente, mindyng to make the souldiour obstinate to faight, not to permitte, that thei maie send home any of their substaunce, or to leave it in any place, till the warre bee ended, that thei maie understande, that although fliyng save their life, yet it saveth not theim their goodes, the love whereof, is wonte no lesse then thesame, to make men obstinate in defence. zanobi. you have tolde, how the souldiours maie be tourned to faight, with speakyng to theim: doe you meane by this, that all the armie must bee spoken unto, or to the heddes thereof? [sidenote: it is requisite for excellent capitaines to bee good orators; alexander magnus used openly to perswade his armie; the effecteousnes of speking; souldiours ought to be accustomed to heare their capitaine speake; how in olde time souldiers were threatened for their faltes; enterprises maie the easelier be brought to passe by meanes of religion; sertorius; a policie of silla; a policie of charles the seventh king of fraunce against the englishmen; how souldiers maiebee made to esteme little their enemies; the surest wai to make souldiours moste obstinat to faight; by what meanes obstinatenesse to faighte is increased.] fabricio. to perswade, or to diswade a thyng unto fewe, is verie easie, for that if woordes suffise not, you maie then use aucthoritie and force: but the difficultie is, to remove from a multitude an evill opinion, and that whiche is contrary either to the common profite, or to thy opinion, where cannot be used but woordes, the whiche is meete that thei be heard of every man, mindyng to perswade them all. wherfore, it was requisite that the excellente capitaines were oratours: for that without knowyng how to speake to al the army, with difficultie maie be wrought any good thing: the whiche altogether in this our tyme is laied aside. rede the life of alexander magnus, and you shall see how many tymes it was necessarie for hym to perswade, and to speake publikly to his armie: otherwise he should never have brought theim, beyng become riche, and full of spoile, through the desertes of arabia, and into india with so moche his disease, and trouble: for that infinite tymes there growe thynges, wherby an armie ruinateth, when the capitain either knoweth not, or useth not to speake unto thesame, for that this speakyng taketh awaie feare, in courageth the mindes, increaseth the obstinatenes to faight, discovereth the deceiptes, promiseth rewardes, sheweth the perilles, and the waie to avoide theim, reprehendeth, praieth, threatened, filleth full of hope, praise, shame, and doeth a those thynges, by the whiche the humaine passions are extincte or kendled: wherefore, that prince, or common weale, whiche should appoincte to make a newe power, and cause reputacion to their armie, ought to accustome the souldiours thereof, to heare the capitain to speake, and the capitain to know how to speake unto them. in kepyng desposed the souldiours in old tyme, to faight for their countrie, the religion availed moche, and the othes whiche thei gave them, when thei led theim to warfare: for as moche as in al their faultes, thei threatned them not onely with those punishementes, whiche might be feared of men but with those whiche of god might be looked for: the whiche thyng mingled with the other religious maners, made many tymes easie to the auncient capitaines all enterprises, and will doe alwaies, where religion shall be feared, and observed. sertorius prevailed, by declaryng that he spake with a stagge, the whiche in goddes parte, promised hym the victorie. silla saied, he spoke with an image, whiche he had taken out of the temple of apollo. many have tolde how god hath appered unto them in their slepe, whom hath admonished them to faight. in our fathers time, charles the seventh kyng of fraunce, in the warre whiche he made againste the englishemen, saied, he counsailed with a maide, sent from god, who was called every where the damosell of fraunce, the which was occacion of his victorie. there maie be also used meanes, that maie make thy men to esteme little the enemie, as agesilao a spartaine used, whom shewed to his souldiours, certain persians naked, to the intent that seyng their delicate members, thei should not have cause to feare them. some have constrained their men to faight through necessitie, takyng awaie from them all hope of savyng theim selves, savyng in overcommyng. the whiche is the strongest, and the beste provision that is made, to purpose to make the souldiour obstinate to faight: whiche obstinatenesse is increased by the confidence, and love of the capitaine, or of the countrie. confidence is caused through the armour, the order the late victorie, and the opinion of the capitaine. the love of the countrie, is caused of nature: that of the capitain, through vertue, more then by any other benefite: the necessities maie be many, but that is strongest, whiche constraineth thee; either to overcome, or to dye. the fiveth booke [sidenote: how the romaines marched with their armies; how the romaines ordered their armie when it happened to be assaulted on the waie; how the main battailes ought to marche; the orderyng of an armie after soche sorte, that it maie marche safelie through the enemies countrie and be alwaies in a redines to faight; the place in the armie wher the bowmen and harkabutters are appoincted; the place in the armie wher thextraordinarie pikes are appoincted. the place in the armie wherthe generall capitain must be; where the artillerie must be placed. the light horsmenne must be sente before to discover the countrie and the menne of armes to come behind tharmy; a generall rule concernyng horse; wher the carriages and the unarmed are placed; the waie must be made plaine wher the armie shall marche in order; how many miles a day an armie maie marche in battaile raie, to bee able to incampe before sunne set; the orderyng of the armie, when it is assaulted on the vawarde; the orderyng of tharmie when thenemie commes to assaulte it behinde; how the armie is ordered when it is assaulted of any of the sides; doen when the army is assaulted on twoo sides.] fabricio. i have shewed you, how an armi, is ordained to faight a fielde with an other armie, which is seen pitched against it, and have declared unto you, howe the same is overcome, and after many circumstaunces, i have likewise shewed you, what divers chaunces, maie happen about thesame, so that me thinkes tyme to shewe you now, how an armie is ordered, againste thesame enemie, whiche otherwise is not seen, but continually feared, that he assaulte thee: this happeneth when an armie marcheth through the enemies countrie, or through suspected places. firste, you must understande, how a romaine armie, sent alwaies ordinarely afore, certaine bandes of horsemen, as spies of the waie: after followed the right horne, after this, came all the carriages, whiche to thesame apperteined, after this, came a legion, after it, the carriages therof, after that, an other legion, and next to it, their carriages, after whiche, came the left horne, with the carriages thereof at their backe, and in the laste part, folowed the remnaunte of the chivalrie: this was in effecte the maner, with whiche ordinarily thei marched: and if it happened that the armie were assaulted in the waie on the fronte, or on the backe, thei made straight waie all the carriages to bee drawen, either on the right, or on the lefte side, accordyng as chaunsed, or as thei could beste, havyng respecte to the situacion: and all the men together free from their impedimentes, made hedde on that parte, where the enemie came. if thei were assaulted on the flancke, thei drue the carriages towardes thesame parte that was safe, and of the other, thei made hedde. this waie beyng well and prudently governed, i have thought meete to imitate, sending afore the light horsemen, as exploratours of the countrie: then havyng fower maine battailes i would make them to marche in araie, and every one with their carriages folowyng theim. and for that there be twoo sortes of carriages, that is partainyng to particulare souldiours, and partainyng to the publike use of all the campe, i would devide the publike carriages into fower partes, and to every maine battaile, i would appoinct his parte, deviding also the artillerie into fower partes, and all the unarmed, so that every nomber of armed menne, should equally have their impedimentes. but bicause it happeneth some times, that thei marche through the countrie, not onely suspected, but so daungerous, that thou fearest every hower to be assaulted, thou art constrained for to go more sure, to chaunge the forme of marchyng, and to goe in soche wise prepared, that neither the countrie menne, nor any armie, maie hurte thee, findyng thee in any parte unprovided. in soche case, the aunciente capitaines were wont, to marche with the armie quadrante, whiche so thei called this forme, not for that it was altogether quadrante, but for that it was apte to faight of fower partes, and thei saied, that thei wente prepared, bothe for the waie, and for the faight: from whiche waie, i will not digresse, and i will ordaine my twoo maine battailes, whiche i have taken for to make an armie of, to this effect. mindyng therefore, to marche safely through the enemies countrie, and to bee able to aunswere hym on every side, when at unwares the armie might chaunce to be assaulted, and intendyng therefore, accordyng to the antiquitie, to bryng thesame into a square, i would devise to make a quadrant, that the rome therof should be of space on every part clix. yardes, in this maner. first i would put the flanckes, distant the one flanck from the other, clix. yardes, and i would place five battailes for a flancke, in a raie in length, and distant the one from the other, twoo yardes and a quarter: the whiche shall occupie with their spaces, every battaile occupiyng thirtie yardes, clix. yardes. then betwen the hedde and the taile of these two flanckes, i would place the other tenne battailes, in every parte five, orderyng them after soche sorte, that fower should joyne to the hedde of the right flanck, and fower to the taile of the lefte flancke, leaving betwene every one of them, a distance of thre yardes: one should after joyne to the hedde of the lefte flancke, and one to the taile of the right flancke: and for that the space that is betwene the one flancke and the other, is clix. yardes, and these battailes whiche are set the one to the side of the other by breadth, and not by length, will come to occupie with the distaunces one hundred yardes and a halfe yarde, there shall come betwene theim fower battailes, placed in the fronte on the right flancke, and the one placed in thesame on the lefte, to remaine a space of fiftie and eighte yardes and a halfe, and the verie same space will come to remaine in the battailes, placed in the hinder parte: nor there shall bee no difference, saving that the one space shall come on the parte behind towardes the right horne, and thother shall come on the parte afore, towardes the lefte home. in the space of the lviii. yardes and a halfe before, i would place all the ordinarie veliti, in thesame behinde, the extraordinarie, which wil come to be a thousande for a space, and mindyng to have the space that ought to be within the armie, to be every waie clix. yardes, it is mete that the five battailes, whiche are placed in the hedde, and those whiche are placed in the taile, occupie not any parte of the space, whiche the flanckes keepe: and therefore it shall be convenient, that the five battailes behinde, doe touche with the fronte, the taile of their flanckes, and those afore, with the taile to touche he hedde, after soche sorte, that upon every corner of the ame armie, there maie remaine a space, to receive an other battaile: and for that there bee fower spaces, i would take fower bandes of the extraordinarie pikes, and in every corner i would place one, and the twoo ansignes of the foresaied pikes, whiche shall remain overplus, i would sette in the middest of the rome of this armie, in a square battaile, on the hedde whereof, should stande the generall capitaine, with his menne about him. and for that these battailes ordeined thus, marche all one waie, but faight not all one waie, in puttyng them together, those sides ought to be ordained to faight, whiche are not defended of thother battailes. and therfore it ought to be considered, that the five battailes that be in the front, have all their other partes defended, excepte the fronte: and therfore these ought to bee put together in good order, and with the pikes afore. the five battailes whiche are behinde, have all their sides defended, except the parte behinde, and therefore those ought to bee put together in soche wise, that the pikes come behind, as in the place therof we shall shewe. the five battailes that bee in the right flancke, have all their sides defended, except the right flancke. the five that be on the left flanck, have all their partes defended, excepte the lefte flancke: and therefore in orderyng the battailes, thei ought to bee made, that the pikes maie tourne on the same flanck, that lieth open: and the peticapitaines to stand on the hedde, and on the taile, so that nedyng to faight, all the armour and weapons maie be in their due places, the waie to doe this, is declared where we reasoned of the maner of orderyng the battailes. the artillerie i would devide, and one parte i would place without, on the lefte flancke, and the other on the right. the light horsemen, i would sende afore to discover the countrie. of the menne of armes, i would place part behinde, on the right home, and parte on the lefte, distante about thirtie yardes from the battailes: and concerning horse, you have to take this for a general rule in every condicion, where you ordaine an armie, that alwaies thei ought to be put, either behinde, or on the flanckes of thesame: he that putteth them afore, over against the armie, it behoveth hym to doe one of these twoo thinges, either that he put them so moche afore, that beyng repulced, thei maie have so moche space, that maie give them tyme, to be able to go a side from thy footemen, and not to runne upon them, or to order them in soche wise, with so many spaces, that the horses by those maie enter betwene them, without disorderyng them. nor let no man esteme little this remembraunce, for as moche as many capitaines, whom havyng taken no hede thereof, have been ruinated, and by themselves have been disordered, and broken. the carriages and the unarmed menne are placed, in the rome that remaineth within the armie, and in soche sorte equally devided, that thei maie give the waie easely, to whom so ever would go, either from the one corner to the other, or from the one hedde, to the other of the armie. these battailes without the artillerie and the horse, occupie every waie from the utter side, twoo hundred and eleven yardes and a halfe of space: and bicause this quadrante is made of twoo main battailes, it is convenient to distinguishe, what part thone maine battaile maketh, and what the other: and for that the main battailes are called by the nomber, and every of theim hath (as you knowe) tenne battailes, and a generall hed, i would cause that the first main battaile, should set the first v. battailes therof in the front, the other five, in the left flanck, and the capitain of the same should stande in the left corner of the front. the seconde maine battaile, should then put the firste five battailes therof, in the right flanck, and the other five in the taile, and the hedde capitain of thesame, should stande in the right corner, whom should come to dooe the office of the tergiductor. the armie ordained in this maner, ought to be made to move, and in the marchyng, to observe all this order, and without doubte, it is sure from all the tumultes of the countrie men. nor the capitain ought not to make other provision, to the tumultuarie assaultes, then to give sometyme commission to some horse, or ansigne of veliti, that thei set themselves in order: nor it shall never happen that these tumultuous people, will come to finde thee at the drawyng of the swerd, or pikes poincte: for that men out of order, have feare of those that be in araie: and alwaies it shall bee seen, that with cries and rumours, thei will make a greate assaulte, without otherwise commyng nere unto thee, like unto barking curres aboute a mastie. aniball when he came to the hurte of the romaines into italie, he passed through all fraunce, and alwaies of the frenche tumultes, he took small regarde. mindyng to marche, it is conveniente to have plainers and labourers afore, whom maie make thee the waie plaine, whiche shall bee garded of those horsemen, that are sent afore to viewe the countrie: an armie in this order maie marche tenne mile the daie, and shall have tyme inough to incampe, and suppe before sunne goyng doune, for that ordinarely, an armie maie marche twentie mile: if it happen that thou be assaulted, of an armie set in order, this assaulte cannot growe sodainly: for that an armie in order, commeth with his pace, so that thou maiest have tyme inough, to set thy self in order to faight the field, and reduce thy menne quickly into thesame facion, or like to thesame facion of an armie, which afore is shewed thee. for that if thou be assaulted, on the parte afore, thou needeste not but to cause, that the artillerie that be on the flanckes, and the horse that be behinde, to come before, and place theimselves in those places, and with those distaunces, as afore is declared. the thousande veliti that bee before, must go out of their place, and be devided into ccccc. for a parte, and go into their place, betwene the horse and the hornes of tharmy: then in the voide place that thei shal leave, the twoo ansignes of the extraordinarie pikes muste entre, whiche i did set in the middest of the quadrante of the armie. the thousande veliti, whiche i placed behinde, must departe from thesame place, and devide them selves in the flanckes of the battailes, to the fortificacion of those: and by the open place that thei shal leave, all the carriages and unarmed menne must go out, and place themselves on the backe of the battaile. then the rome in the middeste beyng voided, and every man gone to his place: the five battailes, whiche i placed behinde on the armie, must make forward in the voide place, that is betwene the one and the other flanck, and marche towardes the battailes, that stand in the hedde, and three of theim, muste stande within thirtie yardes of those, with equall distances, betwene the one and the other, and the other twoo shal remain behinde, distaunte other thirtie yardes: the whiche facion maie bee ordained in a sodaine, and commeth almoste to bee like, unto the firste disposicion, whiche of tharmy afore we shewed. and though it come straighter in the fronte, it commeth grosser in the flanckes, whiche giveth it no lesse strength: but bicause the five battailes, that be in the taile, have the pikes on the hinder parte, for the occasion that before we have declared, it is necessarie to make theim to come on the parte afore, mindyng to have theim to make a backe to the front of tharmie: and therfore it behoveth either to make them to tourne battaile after battaile, as a whole body, or to make them quickly to enter betwen thorders of targettes, and conduct them afore, the whiche waie is more spedy, and of lesse disorder, then to make them to turn al together: and so thou oughtest to doe of all those, whiche remain behind in every condicion of assault, as i shal shewe you. if it appere that thenemie come on the part behinde, the first thyng that ought to bee dooen, is to cause that every man tourne his face where his backe stode, and straight waie tharmie cometh to have made of taile, hed, and of hed taile: then al those waies ought to be kept, in orderyng thesame fronte, as i tolde afore. if the enemie come to incounter the right flancke, the face of thy armie ought to bee made to tourne towardes thesame side: after, make all those thynges in fortificacion of thesame hedde, whiche above is saied, so that the horsemen, the veliti, and the artillerie, maie be in places conformable to the hed thereof: onely you have this difference, that in variyng the hed of those, which are transposed, some have to go more, and some lesse. in deede makyng hedde of the right flancke, the veliti ought to enter in the spaces, that bee betwene the horne of the armie, and those horse, whiche were nerest to the lefte flancke, in whose place ought to enter, the twoo ansignes of the extraordinarie pikes, placed in the middest: but firste the carriages and the unarmed, shall goe out by the open place, avoidyng the rome in the middest, and retiryng themselves behinde the lefte flancke, whiche shall come to bee then the taile of the armie: the other veliti that were placed in the taile, accordyng to the principall orderyng of the armie, in this case, shall not move: bicause the same place should not remaine open, whiche of taile shall come to be flancke: all other thyng ought to bee dooen, as in orderyng of the firste hedde is saied: this that is told about the makyng hed of the right flanck, must be understode to be told, havyng nede to make it of the left flanck: for that the very same order ought to bee observed. if the enemie should come grose, and in order to assaulte thee on twoo sides, those twoo sides, whiche he commeth to assaulte thee on, ought to bee made stronge with the other twoo sides, that are not assaulted, doublyng the orders in eche of theim, and devidyng for bothe partes the artillerie, the veliti, and the horse. if he come on three or on fower sides, it is necessarie that either thou or he lacke prudence: for that if thou shalt bee wise, thou wilte never putte thy self in place, that the enemie on three or fower sides, with a greate nomber of men, and in order, maie assault thee: for that mindyng, safely to hurte thee, it is requisit, that he be so great, that on every side, he maie assault thee, with as many men, as thou haste almoste in al thy army: and if thou be so unwise, that thou put thy self in the daunger and force of an enemie, whom hath three tymes more menne ordained then thou, if thou catche hurte, thou canste blame no man but thy self: if it happen not through thy faulte, but throughe some mischaunce, the hurt shall be without the shame, and it shal chaunce unto thee, as unto the scipions in spaine, and to asdruball in italie but if the enemie have not many more men then thou, and intende for to disorder thee, to assaulte thee on divers sides, it shal be his foolishnesse, and thy good fortune: for as moche as to doe so, it is convenient, that he become so thinne in soche wise, that then easely thou maiste overthrow one bande, and withstande an other, and in short time ruinate him: this maner of ordering an armie against an enemie, whiche is not seen, but whiche is feared, is a necessarie and a profitable thing, to accustome thy souldiours, to put themselves together, and to march with soche order, and in marchyng, to order theimselves to faight, accordyng to the first hedde, and after to retourne in the forme, that thei marched in, then to make hedde of the taile, after, of the flanckes, from these, to retourne into the first facion: the whiche exercises and uses bee necessarie, mindyng to have an armie, throughly instructed and practised: in whiche thyng the princes and the capitaines, ought to take paine. nor the discipline of warre is no other, then to knowe how to commaunde, and to execute these thynges. nor an instructed armie is no other, then an armie that is wel practised in these orders: nor it cannot be possible, that who so ever in this time, should use like disciplin shall ever bee broken. and if this quadrante forme whiche i have shewed you, is somewhat difficulte, soche difficultnesse is necessarie, takyng it for an exercise: for as moche as knowyng well, how to set theim selves in order, and to maintaine theim selves in the same, thei shall knowe after more easely, how to stand in those, whiche should not have so moche difficultie. zanobi. i beleve as you saie, that these orders bee verie necessarie, and i for my parte, knowe not what to adde or take from it: true it is, that i desire to know of you twoo thynges, the one, if when you will make of the taile, or of the flancke hedde, and would make them to tourne, whether this be commaunded by the voice, or with the sounde: thother, whether those that you sende afore, to make plain the waie, for the armie to marche, ought to be of the verie same souldiours of your battailes, or other vile menne appoincted, to like exercise. [sidenote: commaundementes of capitaines being not wel understoode, maie be the destruction of an armie; respect that is to be had in commaundementes made with the sounde of the trompet; in commaundmentes made with the voice, what respect is to be had; of pianars.] fabricio. your firste question importeth moche: for that many tymes the commaundementes of capitaines, beyng not well understoode, or evill interpreted, have disordered their armie: therfore the voices, with the whiche thei commaunde in perilles, ought to bee cleare, and nete. and if thou commaunde with the sounde, it is convenient to make, that betwene the one waie and the other, there be so moche difference, that the one cannot be chaunged for the other: and if thou commaundest with the voice, thou oughteste to take heede, that thou flie the general voices, and to use the particulares, and of the particulars, to flie those, whiche maie be interpreted sinisterly. many tymes the saiyng backe, backe, hath made to ruinate an armie; therfore this voice ought not to be used, but in steede therof to use, retire you. if you will make theim to tourne, for to chaunge the hedde, either to flanck, or to backe, use never to saie tourne you, but saie to the lefte, to the right, to the backe, to the front: thus all the other voices ought to be simple, and nete, as thrust on, march, stande stronge, forwarde, retourne you: and all those thynges, whiche maie bee dooen with the voice, thei doe, the other is dooen with the sounde. concernyng those menne, that must make the waies plaine for the armie to marche, whiche is your seconde question, i would cause my owne souldiours to dooe this office, as well bicause in the aunciente warfare thei did so, as also for that there should be in the armie, lesser nomber of unarmed men, and lesse impedimentes: and i would choose out of every battaile, thesame nomber that should nede, and i would make theim to take the instrumentes, meete to plaine the grounde withall, and their weapons to leave with those rankes, that should bee nereste them, who should carrie them, and the enemie commyng, thei shall have no other to doe, then to take them again, and to retourne into their araie. zanobi. who shall carrie thinstrumentes to make the waie plaine withall? fabricio. the cartes that are appoincted to carrie the like instrumentes. zanobi. i doubte whether you should ever brynge these our souldiours, to labour with shovell or mattocke, after soche sorte. [sidenote: the victualles that thantiquitie made provision of, for their armies.] fabricio. all these thynges shall bee reasoned in the place thereof, but now i will let alone this parte, and reason of the maner of the victualing of the armie: for that me thinketh, havyng so moche traivailed theim, it is tyme to refreshe them, and to comfort them with meate. you have to understande, that a prince ought to ordaine his armie, as expedite as is possible, and take from thesame all those thynges, whiche maie cause any trouble or burthen unto it, and make unto hym any enterprise difficulte. emongest those thynges that causeth moste difficultie, is to be constrained to keepe the armie provided of wine, and baked bread. the antiquitie cared not for wine, for that lackyng it, thei dranke water, mingeled with a little vinegre, to give it a taste: for whiche cause, emong the municions of victualles for the hoste, vineger was one, and not wine. thei baked not the breade in ovens, as thei use for citees, but thei provided the meale, and of thesame, every souldiour after his owne maner, satisfied hym self, havyng for condimente larde and baken, the whiche made the breade saverie, that thei made, and maintained theim strong, so that the provision of victualles for the armie, was meale, vineger, larde, and bacon, and for the horses barley. thei had ordinarely heardes of greate beastes and small, whiche folowed the armie, the whiche havyng no nede to bee carried, caused not moche impedimente. of this order there grewe, that an armie in old time, marched somtymes many daies through solitarie places, and difficulte, without sufferyng disease of victualles: for that thei lived of thyngs, whiche easely thei might convey after them. to the contrarie it happeneth in the armies, that are now a daies, whiche mindyng not to lacke wine, and to eate baked breade in thesame maner, as when thei are at home, whereof beyng not able to make provision long, thei remaine often tymes famished, or though thei be provided, it is dooen with disease, and with moste greate coste: therfore i would reduce my armie to this maner of living: and i would not that thei should eate other bread, then that, which by themselves thei should bake. concernyng wine, i would not prohibite the drinkyng thereof, nor yet the commyng of it into the armie, but i would not use indevour, nor any labour for to have it, and in the other provisions, i would governe my self altogether, like unto the antiquitie: the whiche thing, if you consider well, you shall see how moche difficultie is taken awaie, and how moche trouble and disease, an armie and a capitaine is avoided of, and how moche commoditie shall bee given, to what so ever enterprise is to bee dooen. zanobi. we have overcome thenemie in the field, marched afterward upon his countrie, reason would, that spoiles be made, tounes sacked, prisoners taken, therefore i would knowe how the antiquitie in these thynges, governed them selves. [sidenote: the occasions why the warres made nowe adaies, doe impoverishe the conquerors as well as the conquered; the order that the romaines toke, concerning the spoile and the booties that their souldiours gotte; an order that the antiquitie tooke, concernyng their soldiours wages.] fabricio. beholde, i will satisfie you. i beleve you have considered, for that once alredie with some of you i have reasoned, howe these present warres, impoverishe as well those lordes that overcome, as those that leese: for that if the one leese his estate, the other leeseth his money, and his movables: the whiche in olde time was not, for that the conquerour of the warre, waxed ritche. this groweth of keepyng no compte in these daies of the spoiles, as in olde tyme thei did, but thei leave it to the discreacion of the souldiours. this manner maketh twoo moste great disorders: the one, that whiche i have tolde: the other that the souldiour becometh more covetous to spoyle, and lesse observeth the orders: and manie times it hath been seen, howe the covetousnesse of the praye, hath made those to leese, whome were victorious. therefore the romaines whiche were princes of armies, provided to the one and to the other of these inconvenienses, ordainyng that all the spoyle should apertaine to the publicke, and that the publicke after should bestowe it, as shoulde be thought good: and therfore thei had in tharmie the questours, whom were as we would say, the chamberlaines, to whose charge all the spoyle and booties were committed: whereof the consull was served to geve the ordinarie pay to the souldiours, to succour the wounded, and the sicke, and for the other businesse of the armie. the consull might well, and he used it often, to graunte a spoyle to soldiours: but this grauntyng, made no disorder: for that the armie beyng broken all the pray was put in the middest, and distributed by hedde, accordyng to the qualitee of everie man: the which maner thei constituted, to thintente, that the soldiours should attend to overcome, and not to robbe: and the romaine legions overcame the enemies, and folowed them not, for that thei never departed from their orders: onely there folowed them, the horsemenne with those that were light armed, and if there were any other souldiours then those of the legions, they likewyse pursued the chase. where if the spoyle shoulde have ben his that gotte it, it had not ben possible nor reasonable, to have kepte the legions steddie, and to withstonde manie perils; hereby grewe therefore, that the common weale inritched, and every consull carried with his triumphe into the treasurie, muche treasure, whiche all was of booties and spoiles. an other thing the antiquetie did upon good consideration, that of the wages, whiche they gave to every souldiour, the thirde parte they woulde shoulde be laied up nexte to him, whome carried the ansigne of their bande, whiche never gave it them againe, before the warre was ended: this thei did, beyng moved of twoo reasons, the first was to thintente, that the souldiour should thrive by his wages, because the greatest parte of them beyng yonge men, and carelesse, the more thei have, so muche the more without neede thei spende, the other cause was, for that knowyng, that their movabelles were nexte to the ansigne, thei should be constrained to have more care thereof, and with more obstinatenesse to defende it: and this made them stronge and to holde together: all which thynges is necessarie to observe, purposinge to reduce the exercise of armes unto the intier perfection therof. zanobi. i beleeve that it is not possible, that to an armie that marcheth from place to place, there fal not perrilous accidentes, where the industerie of the capitaine is needefull, and the worthinesse of the souldiours, mindyng to avoyde them. therefore i woulde be glad, that you remembring any, would shew them. [sidenote: captaines mai incurre the daunger of ambusshes twoo maner of wayes; how to avoide the perill of ambusshes; howe ambusshes have ben perceived; howe the capitaine of the enemies ought to be esteemed; where men be in greatest perill; the description of the countrey where an army muste marche, is most requiset for a capitaine to have; a most profitable thyng it is for a capitayne to be secrete in all his affaires; an advertisment concernyng the marchyng of an armie; the marching of an armie ought to be ruled by the stroke of the drumme; the condicion of the enemie ought to be considered.] fabricio. i shall contente you with a good will, beyng inespetially necessarie, intendyng to make of this exercise a perfecte science. the capitaines ought above all other thynges, whileste thei marche with an armie, to take heede of ambusshes, wherein they incurre daunger twoo waies, either marchynge thou entrest into them, or thoroughe crafte of the enemie thou arte trained in before thou arte aware. in the first case, mindyng to avoide suche perill, it is necessarie to sende afore double warde, whome may discover the countrey, and so muche the more dilligence ought to be used, the more that the countrey is apte for ambusshes, as be the woddie or hilly countries, for that alwaies thei be layd either in a wodde, or behind a hille: and as the ambusshe not forseene, doeth ruin thee, so forseyng the same, it cannot hurte thee. manie tymes birdes or muche duste have discovered the enemie: for that alwayes where the enemie cometh to finde thee, he shall make great duste, whiche shall signifie unto thee his comyng: so often tymes a capitaine seyng in the places where he ought to passe, doves to rise, or other of those birdes that flie in flockes, and to tourne aboute and not to light, hath knowen by the same the ambusshe of the enemies to be there, and sendynge before his men, and sertainely understandyng it, hath saved him selfe and hurte his enemie. concernyng the seconde case, to be trained in, (which these our men cal to be drawen to the shot) thou ought to take heede, not straight way to beleve those thinges, which are nothyng reasonable, that thei be as they seeme: as shoulde be, if the enemie should set afore thee a praie, thou oughtest to beleeve that in the same is the hooke, and that therin is hid the deceipte. if many enemies be driven away by a fewe of thine, if a fewe enemies assaulte manie of thine, if the enemies make a sodeine flight, and not standynge with reason, alwaies thou oughtest in suche cases to feare deceipte, and oughtest never to beleeve that the enemie knoweth not how to doe his businesse, but rather intendyng that he may begile thee the lesse, and mindyng to stand in lesse peril, the weaker that he is, and the lesse craftier that the enemie is, so muche the more thou oughtest to esteeme him: and thou muste in this case use twoo sundrie poinctes, for that thou oughtest to feare him in thy minde and with the order, but with wordes, and with other outewarde demonstracion, to seeme to dispyse him: because this laste way, maketh that the souldiours hope the more to have the victorie: the other maketh thee more warie, and lesse apte to be begyled. and thou hast to understand, that when men marche thoroughe the enemies countrey, they ar in muche more, and greater perils, then in fayghtyng the fielde: and therefore the capitaine in marchyng, ought to use double diligence: and the first thyng that he ought to doo, is to get described, and payncted oute all the countrie, thorough the which he must marche, so that he maye know the places, the number, the distances, the waies, the hilles, the rivers, the fennes, and all the quallites of them: and to cause this to bee knowen, it is convenient to have with him diversly, and in sundrie maners such men, as know the places, and to aske them with diligence, and to se whether their talke agree, and accordyng to the agreyng therof, to note: he oughte also to sende afore the horsemen, and with them prudente heddes, not so muche to discover the enemie, as to viewe the countrey, to se whether it agree with the description, and with the knowledge that they have of the same. also the guydes that are sente, ought to be kepte with hope of rewarde, and feare of paine. and above all thynges it ought to be provided, that the armie knowe not to what businesse he leadeth them: for that there is nothyng in the warre more profitable, then to keepe secret the thynges that is to be dooen: and to thintente a suddeine assaulte dooe not trouble thy soldiours, thou oughteste to see them to stande reddie with their weapons, because the thynges that ar provided for, offend lesse. manie for to avoyde the confusion of marchyng, have placed under the standerde, the carriages, and the unarmed, and have commaunded them to folow the same, to the intente that in marchyng needyng to staye, or to retire, they might dooe it more easely, which thyng as profitable, i alowe very muche. also in marchyng, advertismente ought to be had, that the one parte of the armie goe not a sunder from the other, or that thoroughe some goyng fast, and some softe, the armie become not slender: the whiche thynges, be occation of dissorder: therfore the heddes muste be placed in suche wise, that they may maintaine the pace even, causing to goe softe those that goe to fast, and to haste forward the other that goe to sloe, the whiche pace can not bee better ruled, then by the stroke of the drumme. the waies ought to be caused to be inlarged, so that alwaies at least a bande of iiii. hundred men may marche in order of battaile. the custome and the qualitie of the enemie ought to be considered, and whether that he wil assaulte thee either in the mornyng, or at none or in the evenynge, and whether he be more puisante with fotemen or horsemen, and accordyng as thou understandest, to ordeine and to provide for thy self. but let us come to some particular accidente. it hapneth sometime, that thou gettyng from the enemie, because thou judgest thy selfe inferiour, and therfore mindynge not to faight with him, and he comyng at thy backe, thou arivest at the banke of a river, passyng over the which, asketh time, so that the enemie is redie to overtake thee and to fayght with thee. some, which chaunsing to bee in suche perill, have inclosed their armie on the hinder parte with a diche, and fillyng the same full of towe, and firyng it, have then passed with the armie without beyng able to be letted of the enemie, he beyng by the same fire that was betwene them held backe. [sidenote: annone of carthage.] zanobi. i am harde of beliefe, that this fyre coulde stay theim, in especially because i remember that i have harde, howe annone of carthage, beyng besieged of enemies, inclosed him selfe on the same parte, with wodde, which he did set on fire where he purposed to make eruption. wherfore the enemies beyng not intentive on the same parte to looke to him, he made his armie to passe over the same flame, causing every man to holde his target before his face for to defend them from the fire, and smoke. [sidenote: nabide a spartayne; quintus luttatius pollecie to passe over a river; how to passe a ryver without a bridge; a polecie of cesar to passe a river, where his enemie beyng on the other side therof sought to lette hym.] fabricio. you saye well: but consider you howe i have saied, and howe annone did: for as muche as i saied that they made a diche, and filled it with towe, so that he, that woulde passe over the same, should be constrained to contende with the diche and with fire: annone made the fire, without the diche, and because he intended to passe over it, he made it not great, for that otherwise without the diche, it shoulde have letted him. dooe you not knowe, that nabide a spartan beyng besieged in sparta of the romaines, set fire on parte of his towne to let the way to the romaines, who alredie wer entred in? and by meane of the same flame not onely hindered their way, but drave them oute: but let us turne to our matter. quintus luttatius a romaine, havyng at his backe the cimbri, and commyng to a river, to thentente the enemie should give him time to passe over, semed to geve time to them to faight with him: and therfore he fained that he would lodge there, and caused trenches to be made, and certaine pavilions to be erected, and sent certayne horsemen into the countrie for forredge: so that the cimbrise beleevyng, that he incamped, they also incamped, and devided them selves into sundrie partes, to provide for victuals, wherof luttatius being aware, passed the river they beyng not able to let him. some for to passe a river havynge no bridge, have devided it, and one parte they have turned behynde their backes, and the other then becomynge shalower, with ease they have passed it: when the rivers be swift, purposyng to have their footemen to passe safely, they place their strongest horses on the higher side, that thei may sustain the water, and an other parte be lowe that may succour the men, if any of the river in passyng should be overcome with the water: they passe also rivers, that be verie deepe, with bridges, with botes, and with barrelles: and therfore it is good to have in a redinesse in an armie wherewith to be able to make all these thynges. it fortuneth sometime that in passyng a river, the enemie standynge agaynst thee on the other banke, doeth let thee: to minde to overcome this difficultie, i know not a better insample to folow, then the same of cesar, whome havynge his armie on the banke of a river in fraunce, and his passage beynge letted of vergintorige a frenche man, the whiche on the other side of the river had his men, marched many daies a longe the river, and the like did the enemie: wherfore cesar incamping in a woddie place, apte to hide men, he tooke out of every legion three cohortes, and made them to tarie in the same place, commaundynge theim that so soone as he was departed, they shoulde caste over a bridge, and should fortefie it, and he with his other menne folowed on the waye: wherfore vergintorige seyng the number of the legions, thinkyng that there was not left anie parte of theim behinde, folowed also his way: but cesar when he supposed that the bridge was made, tourned backewarde, and findynge all thinges in order, passed the river without difficultee. zanobi. have ye any rule to know the foordes? [sidenote: how to know the foordes of a river.] fabricio. yea, we have: alwaies the river, in that parte, whiche is betwene the water, that is stilleste, and the water that runneth fastest, there is least depth and it is a place more meete to be looked on, then any other where. for that alwaies in thesame place, the river is moste shallowest. the whiche thyng, bicause it hath been proved many tymes, is moste true. zanobi. if it chaunce that the river hath marde the foorde, so that the horses sincke, what reamedy have you? [sidenote: howe to escape oute of a straight where the same is besette with enemies; howe lutius minutius escaped out of a strayght wherin he was inclosed of his enemies; howe some capitaynes have suffered them selves to be compassed aboute of their enemies; a polecie of marcus antonius; a defence for the shotte of arrowes.] fabricio. the remedie is to make hardels of roddes whiche must be placed in the bottome of the river, and so to passe upon those: but let us folowe our reasonyng. if it happen that a capitain be led with his armie, betwen two hilles, and that he have not but twoo waies to save hymself, either that before, or that behinde, and those beyng beset of thenemies, he hath for remidie to doe the same, which some have doen heretofore: that which have made on their hinder parte a greate trenche, difficult to passe over, and semed to the enemie, to mynde to kepe him of, for to be able with al his power, without neding to feare behinde, to make force that waie, whiche before remaineth open. the whiche the enemies belevyng, have made theim selves stronge, towardes the open parte, and have forsaken the inclosed and he then castyng a bridge of woode over the trenche, for soche an effect prepared, bothe on thesame parte, with out any impedimente hath passed, and also delivered hymself out of the handes of the enemie. lucius minutus a consul of rome, was in liguria with an armie, and was of the enemies inclosed, betwene certaine hilles, whereby he could not go out: therefore he sente certaine souldiours of numidia on horsebacke, whiche he had in his armie (whom were evill armed, and upon little leane horses) towardes the places that were kepte of the enemies, whom at the first sight made the enemies, to order theim selves together, to defende the passage: but after that thei sawe those men ill apoincted, and accordyng to their facion evill horsed, regardyng theim little, enlarged the orders of their warde, wherof so sone as the numidians wer a ware, givyng the spurres to their horses, and runnyng violently upon theim, passed before thei could provide any remedy, whom beyng passed, destroied and spoiled the countrie after soche sorte, that thei constrained the enemies, to leave the passage free to the armie of lucius. some capitaine, whiche hath perceived hymself to be assaulted of a greate multitude of enemies, hath drawen together his men, and hath given to the enemie commoditie, to compasse hym all about, and then on thesame part, whiche he hath perceived to be moste weake, hath made force, and by thesame waie, hath caused to make waie, and saved hymself. marcus antonius retiryng before the armie of the parthians, perceived how the enemies every daie before sunne risyng, when he removed, assaulted him, and all the waie troubled hym: in so moch, that he determined not to departe the nexte daie, before none: so that the parthians beleving, that he would not remove that daie, retourned to their tentes. whereby marcus antonius might then all the reste of the daie, marche without any disquietnesse. this self same man for to avoide the arrowes of the parthians, commaunded his men, that when the parthians came towardes them, thei should knele, and that the second ranke of the battailes, should cover with their targaettes, the heddes of the firste, the thirde, the seconde, the fowerth the third, and so successively, that all the armie came, to be as it were under a pentehouse, and defended from the shotte of the enemies. this is as moche as is come into my remembraunce, to tell you, which maie happen unto an armie marchyng: therefore, if you remember not any thyng els, i will passe to an other parte. the sixthe booke zanobi. i beleve that it is good, seyng the reasonyng must be chaunged, that baptiste take his office, and i to resigne myne, and wee shall come in this case, to imitate the good capitaines (accordyng as i have nowe here understoode of the gentilman) who place the beste souldiours, before and behinde the armie, semyng unto theim necessarie to have before, soche as maie lustely beginne the faight, and soche as behinde maie lustely sustaine it. now seyng cosimus began this reasonyng prudently, baptiste prudently shall ende it. as for luigi and i, have in this middeste intertained it, and as every one of us hath taken his part willingly, so i beleve not, that baptiste wil refuse it. baptiste. i have let my self been governed hetherto, so i minde to doe still. therfore be contente sir, to folowe your reasonyng, and if we interrupte you with this practise of ours, have us excused. [sidenote: how the grekes incamped; howe the romaines incamped; the maner of the incamping of an armie; the lodging for the generall capitaine.] fabricio. you dooe me, as all readie i have saied, a moste greate pleasure; for this your interrupting me, taketh not awaie my fantasie, but rather refresheth me. but mindyng to followe our matter i saie, how that it is now tyme, that we lodge this our armie, for that you knowe every thyng desireth reste and saftie, bicause to reste, and not to reste safely, is no perfecte reste: i doubte moche, whether it hath not been desired of you, that i should firste have lodged them, after made theim to marche, and laste of all to faight, and we have doen the contrary: whereunto necessitie hath brought us, for that intendyng to shewe, how an armie in going, is reduced from the forme of marching, to thesame maner of faightyng, it was necessarie to have firste shewed, how thei ordered it to faight. but tournyng to our matter, i saie, that minding to have the campe sure, it is requisite that it be strong, and in good order: the industrie of the capitaine, maketh it in order, the situacion, or the arte, maketh it stronge. the grekes sought strong situacions, nor thei would never place theim selves, where had not been either cave, or bancke of a river, or multitude of trees, or other naturall fortificacion, that might defende theim: but the romaines not so moche incamped safe through the situacion, as through arte, nor thei would never incampe in place, where thei should not have been able to have raunged all their bandes of menne, accordyng to their discipline. hereby grewe, that the romaines might kepe alwaies one forme of incamping, for that thei would, that the situacion should bee ruled by them, not thei by the situacion: the which the grekes could not observe, for that beyng ruled by the situacion, and variyng the situacion and forme, it was conveniente, that also thei should varie the maner of incampyng, and the facion of their lodgynges. therefore the romaines, where the situacion lacked strength thei supplied thesame with arte, and with industrie. and for that i in this my declaracion, have willed to imitate the romaines, i will not departe from the maner of their incamping, yet not observyng altogether their order, but takyng thesame parte, whiche semeth unto me, to be mete for this present tyme. i have told you many tymes, how the romaines had in their consull armies, twoo legions of romaine men, whiche were aboute a leven thousande footemen, and sixe hundred horsemen, and moreover thei had an other leven thousande footemen, sente from their frendes in their aide: nor in their armie thei had never more souldiers that were straungers, then romaines, excepte horsemenne, whom thei cared not, though thei were more in nomber then theirs: and in all their doynges, thei did place their legions in the middeste, and the aiders, on the sides: the whiche maner, thei observed also in incampyng, as by your self you maie rede, in those aucthoures, that write of their actes: and therefore i purpose not to shewe you distinctly how thei incamped, but to tell you onely with what order, i at this presente would incampe my armie, whereby you shall then knowe, what parte i have taken out of the romaine maners. you knowe, that in stede of twoo romaine legions, i have taken twoo maine battailes of footemen, of sixe thousande footemen, and three hundred horsemen, profitable for a maine battaile, and into what battailes, into what weapons, into what names i have devided theim: you knowe howe in orderyng tharmie to marche, and to faight, i have not made mencion of other men, but onely have shewed, how that doublyng the men, thei neded not but to double the orders: but mindyng at this presente, to shew you the maner of incampyng, me thinketh good not to stande onely with twoo maine battailes, but to bryng together a juste armie, made like unto the romaines, of twoo maine battailes, and of as many more aidyng men: the whiche i make, to the intent that the forme of the incampyng, maie be the more perfect, by lodgyng a perfecte armie: whiche thyng in the other demonstracions, hath not semed unto me so necessarie. purposing then, to incampe a juste armie, of xxiiii. thousande footemen, and of twoo thousande good horsemenne, beeyng devided into fower maine battailes, twoo of our owne menne, and twoo of straungers, i would take this waie. the situacion beyng founde, where i would incampe, i would erecte the hed standarde, and aboute it, i would marke out a quadrant, whiche should have every side distante from it xxxvii. yardes and a half, of whiche every one of them should lye, towardes one of the fower regions of heaven, as easte, weste, southe, and northe: betwene the whiche space, i would that the capitaines lodgyng should be appoincted. and bicause i beleve that it is wisedom, to devide the armed from the unarmed, seyng that so, for the moste parte the romaines did, i would therefore seperate the menne, that were cumbered with any thing, from the uncombered. i would lodge all, or the greatest parte of the armed, on the side towardes the easte, and the unarmed, and the cumbred, on the weste side, makyng easte the hedde, and weste the backe of the campe, and southe, and northe should be the flanckes: and for to distinguishe the lodgynges of the armed, i would take this waie. i would drawe a line from the hedde standarde, and lead it towardes the easte, the space of ccccc.x. yardes and a half: i would after, make two other lines, that should place in the middeste the same, and should bee as longe as that, but distante eche of theim from it a leven yardes and a quarter: in the ende whereof, i would have the easte gate, and the space that is betwene the twoo uttermoste lines, should make a waie, that should go from the gate, to the capitaines lodging, whiche shall come to be xxii. yardes and a halfe broad, and cccclxxii. yardes and a halfe longe, for the xxxvii. yardes and a halfe, the lodgyng of the capitaine will take up: and this shall bee called the capitaine waie. then there shall be made an other waie, from the southe gate, to the northe gate, and shall passe by the hedde of the capitaine waie, and leave the capitaines lodgyng towardes theaste, whiche waie shalbe ix.c.xxxvii. yardes and a halfe long (for the length therof wilbe as moche as the breadth of all the lodgynges) and shall likewise be xxii. yardes and a half broad, and shalbe called the crosse waie. then so sone as the capitaines lodgyng, were appoincted out, and these twoo waies, there shall bee begun to be appoincted out, the lodginges of our own two main battailes, one of the whiche, i would lodge on the right hand of the capitaines waie, and the other, on the lefte: and therefore passing over the space, that the breadth of the crosse waie taketh, i would place xxxii. lodgynges, on the lefte side of the capitain waie, and xxxii. on the right side, leavyng betwene the xvi. and the xvii. lodgyng, a space of xxii. yardes and a halfe, the whiche should serve for a waie overthwart, whiche should runne overthwarte, throughout all the lodgynges of the maine battailes as in the distributyng of them shall bee seen. [sidenote: the lodgings for the men of armes, and their capitaine; note, which is breadth and whiche length in the square campe; the lodgings for the lighte horsemen, and their capitain; the lodgings for the footemen of twoo ordinary main battailes; the lodgings for the conestables; the nomber of footemen appoincted to every lodging; the lodynges for the chiefe capitaines of the maine battayles and for the treasurers, marshals and straungers; lodginges for the horsemen, of the extraordinarie mayne battailes; the lodgynges for the extraordinarie pykes and veliti; how the artillerie must be placed in the campe; lodgynges for the unarmed men, and the places that are apoineted for the impedimentes of the campe.] of these twoo orders of lodgynges in the beginnyng of the head, whiche shall come to joygne to the crosse waye, i would lodge the capitaine of the men of armes, in the xv. lodgynges, which on everie side foloweth next, their men of armes, where eche main battaile, havyng a cl. men of armes, it will come to ten men of armes for a lodgyng. the spaces of the capitaines lodgynges, should be in bredth xxx. and in length vii. yardes and a halfe. and note that when so ever i sai bredeth, it signifieth the space of the middest from southe to northe, and saiyng length, that whiche is from weste to easte. those of the men of armes, shoulde be xi. yardes and a quarter in length, and xxii. yardes and a halfe in bredeth. in the other xv. lodgynges, that on everie syde should folowe, the whiche should have their beginnyng on the other side of the overthwarte way, and whiche shall have the very same space, that those of the men of armes had, i woulde lodge the light horsemen: wherof beynge a hundred and fiftie, it will come to x. horsemen for a lodgyng, and in the xvi. that remaineth, i woulde lodge their capitaine, gevynge him the verie same space, that is geven to the capitain of the men of armes: and thus the lodginges of the horsemen of two maine battailes, will come to place in the middest the capitaine way, and geve rule to the lodginges of the footemen, as i shall declare. you have noted how i have lodged the ccc. horsemen of everie main battaile with their capitaines, in xxxii. lodgynges placed on the captaine waie, havynge begun from the crosse waie, and how from the xvi. to the xvii. there remaineth a space of xxii. yardes and a halfe, to make awaie overthwarte. mindyng therefore to lodge the xx. battailes, which the twoo ordinarie maine battailes have, i woulde place the lodgyng of everie twoo battailes, behinde the lodgynges of the horsemen, everie one of whiche, should have in length xi. yardes and a quarter, and in bredeth xxii. yardes and a half as those of the horsemens, and shoulde bee joigned on the hinder parte, that thei shoulde touche the one the other. and in every first lodgyng on everie side which cometh to lie on the crosse waie, i woulde lodge the counstable of a battaile, whiche should come to stand even with the lodgyng of the capitayne of the men of armes, and this lodgyng shall have onely of space for bredeth xv. yardes, and for length vii. yardes and a halfe. in the other xv. lodgynges, that on everie side followeth after these, even unto the overthwarte way, i would lodge on everie part a battaile of foote men, whiche beyng iiii. hundred and fiftie, there will come to a lodgyng xxx. the other xv. lodgynges, i woulde place continually on every side on those of the light horse men, with the verie same spaces, where i woulde lodge on everie part, an other battaile of fote men, and in the laste lodgyng, i would place on every parte the conestable of the battaile, whiche will come to joigne with the same of the capitaine of the lighte horsemen, with the space of vii. yardes and a halfe for length, and xv. for bredeth: and so these two firste orders of lodgynges, shal be halfe of horsemen, and halfe of footemen. and for that i woulde (as in the place therof i have tolde you) these horse menne shoulde be all profitable, and for this havynge no servauntes whiche in kepyng the horses, or in other necessarie thynges might helpe them, i woulde that these footemen, who lodge behynde the horse, should bee bounde to helpe to provide, and to keepe theim for their maisters: and for this to bee exempted from the other doynges of the campe. the whiche maner, was observed of the romanies. then leavyng after these lodgynges on everie parte, a space of xxii. yardes and a halfe, whiche shoulde make awaye, that shoulde be called the one, the firste waye on the righte hande, and the other the firste waie on the lefte hand, i woulde pitche on everie side an other order of xxxii. double lodgynges, whiche should tourne their hinder partes the one againste the other with the verie same spaces, as those that i have tolde you of, and devided after the sixtenth in the verie same maner for to make the overthwarte waie, where i would lodge on every side iiii. battailes of footemen, with their constables in bothe endes. then leavyng on every side an other space of xxii. yardes and a halfe, that shoulde make a waie, whiche shoulde be called of the one side, the seconde waie on the right hande, and on the other syde, the seconde way on the lefte hande, i would place an other order on everie side of xxxii. double lodgynges, with the verie same distance and devisions, where i would lodge on everie side, other iiii. battailes with their constables: and thus the horesemenne and the bandes of the twoo ordinarie maine battailes, should come to be lodged in three orders of lodgynges, on the one side of the capitaine waie, and in three other orders of lodgynges on the other side of the capitaine waie. the twoo aidyng maine battels (for that i cause them to be made of the verie same nation) i woulde lodge them on everie parte of these twoo ordinarie maine battailes, with the very same orders of double lodgynges, pitchyng first one order of lodgynges, where should lodge halfe the horsemen, and half the foote men, distance xxii. yardes and a halfe from the other, for to make a way whiche should be called the one, the thirde waie on the right hande, and the other the thirde waie on the lefte hande. and after, i woulde make on everie side, twoo other orders of lodgynges, in the verie same maner destinguesshed and ordeined, as those were of the ordinarie maine battelles, which shall make twoo other wayes, and they all should be called of the numbre, and of the hande, where thei should be placed: in suche wyse, that all this side of the armie, shoulde come to be lodged in xii. orders of double lodgynges, and in xiii. waies, reckenynge captaine waie, and crosse waie: i would there should remayne a space from the lodgynges to the trenche of lxxv. yardes rounde aboute: and if you recken al these spaces, you shall see that from the middest of the capitaines lodgyng to the easte gate, there is dx. yardes. now there remaineth twoo spaces, whereof one is from the capitaines lodgyng to the southe gate, the other is from thense to the northe gate: whiche come to be (either of them measurynge them from the poincte in the middest) cccc.lxxvi. yardes. then takyng out of everie one of these spaces xxxvii. yardes and a halfe, whiche the capitaynes lodgynge occupieth, and xxxiiii. yardes everie waie for a market place, and xxii. yardes and a halfe for way that devides everie one of the saied spaces in the middest, and lxxv. yardes, that is lefte on everie part betweene the lodgynges and the trenche, there remaineth on every side a space for lodginges of ccc. yardes broade, and lxxv. yardes longe, measurynge the length with the space that the captaines lodgynge taketh up. devidynge then in the middest the saied lengthe, there woulde be made on every hande of the capitaine xl. lodgynges xxxvii. yardes and a halfe longe, and xv. broade, whiche will come to be in all lxxx. lodgynges, wherin shall be lodged the heddes of the maine battailes, the treasurers, the marshalles of the fielde, and all those that shoulde have office in the armie, leavyng some voide for straungers that shoulde happen to come, and for those that shall serve for good will of the capitaine. on the parte behinde the capitaines lodgynge, i would have a way from southe to northe xxiii. yardes large, and shoulde be called the bed way, whiche shall come to be placed a longe by the lxxx. lodgynges aforesayd: for that this waie, and the crosseway, shall come to place in the middest betweene them bothe the capitaines lodgynge, and the lxxx. lodgynges that be on the sides therof. from this bed waie, and from over agaynst the captaines lodgyng, i would make an other waie, which shoulde goe from thens to the weste gate, lykewyse broade xxii. yardes and a halfe, and should aunswer in situation and in length to the captaine way, and should be called the market waie. these twoo waies beynge made, i woulde ordeine the market place, where the market shall bee kepte, whiche i woulde place on the head of the market way over against the capitaines lodgynge, and joigned to the head way, and i woulde have it to be quadrante, and woulde assigne lxxxx. yardes and three quarters to a square: and on the right hande and lefte hande, of the saied market place, i would make two orders of lodginges, where everie order shal have eight double lodginges, which shall take up in length, ix. yardes, and in bredeth xxii. yardes and a halfe, so that there shall come to be on every hande of the market place, xvi. lodgynges that shall place the same in the middest which shall be in al xxxii. wherin i woulde lodge those horsemen, which shoulde remaine to the aidyng mayne battailes: and when these should not suffise, i woulde assigne theim some of those lodginges that placeth between them the capitaines lodgynge, and in especially those, that lie towardes the trenche. there resteth now to lodge the pikes, and extraordinarie veliti, that everie main battaile hath, which you know accordynge to our order, how everie one hath besides the x. battailes m. extraordinarie pikes, and five hundreth veliti: so that the twoo cheefe maine battailes, have two thousande extraordinarie pikes, and a thousande extraordinarie veliti, and the ayders as many as those, so that yet there remaineth to be lodged, vi. m. menne, whome i woulde lodge all on the weste side, and a longe the trenche. then from the ende of the hed waye, towardes northe, leavyng the space of lxxv. yardes from them to the trenche, i woulde place an order of v. double lodgynges, whiche in all shoulde take up lvi. yardes in lengthe, and xxx. in bredeth: so that the bredeth devided, there will come to everie lodgyng xi. yardes and a quarter for lengthe, and for bredeth twoo and twentie yardes and a half. and because there shall be x. lodgynges, i will lodge three hundred men, apoinctyng to every lodging xxx. men: leavyng then a space of three and twentie yardes and a quarter, i woulde place in like wise, and with like spaces an other order of five double lodgynges, and againe an other, till there were five orders of five double lodgynges: which wil come to be fiftie lodgynges placed by right line on the northe side, every one of them distante from the trenche lxxv. yardes, which will lodge fifteene hundred men. tournyng after on the lefte hande towardes the weste gate, i woulde pitche in all the same tracte, whiche were from them to the saied gate, five other orders of double lodgynges, with the verie same spaces, and with the verie same maner: true it is, that from the one order to the other, there shall not be more then a xi. yardes and a quarter of space: wherin shall be lodged also fifteene hundred men: and thus from the northe gate to the weste, as the trenche turneth, in a hundred lodginges devided in x. rewes of five double lodgynges in a rowe, there will be lodged all the pikes and extraordinarie veliti of the cheefe maine battayles. and so from the west gate to the southe, as the trenche tourneth even in the verie same maner, in other ten rewes of ten lodgynges in a rewe, there shall be lodged the pikes, and extraordinarie veliti of the aidyng mayne battailes. their headdes or their counstables may take those lodgynges, that shal seeme unto them moste commodious, on the parte towardes the trenche. the artillerie, i woulde dispose throughoute all the campe, a longe the banke of the trenche: and in all the other space that shoulde remaine towardes weste, i woulde lodge all the unarmed, and place all the impedimentes of the campe. and it is to be understoode, that under this name of impedimentes (as you know) the antiquitee mente all the same trayne, and all those thynges, which are necessarie for an armie, besides the souldiours: as are carpenters, smithes, masons, ingeners, bombardiers, althoughe that those might be counted in the numbre of the armed, herdemen with their herdes of motons and beeves whiche for victuallyng of the armie, are requiset: and moreover maisters of all sciences, together with publicke carriages of the publicke munition, whiche pertaine as well to victuallyng, as to armynge. nor i would not distinguishe these lodginges perticularly, only i would marke out the waies which should not be occupied of them: then the other spaces, that betweene the waies shall remaine, whiche shall be fower, i woulde appoincte theim generally for all the saied impedimentes, that is one for the herdemen, the other for artificers and craftes men, the thirde for publicke carriages of victuals, the fowerth for the municion of armour and weapons. the waies whiche i woulde shoulde be lefte without ocupiyng them, shal be the market waie, the head waye, and more over a waie that shoulde be called the midde waye, whiche should goe from northe to southe, and should passe thoroughe the middest of the market waie, whiche from the weste parte, shoulde serve for the same purpose that the overthwarte way doeth on the east parte. and besides this, a waye whiche shall goe aboute on the hinder parte, alonge the lodgynges of the pikes and extraordinarie veliti, and all these wayes shall be twoo and tweentie vardes and a halfe broade. and the artilerie, i woulde place a longe the trenche of the campe, rounde aboute the same. baptiste. i confesse that i understand not, nor i beleeve that also to saye so, is any shame unto me, this beyng not my exercise: notwithstandyng, this order pleaseth me muche: onely i woulde that you shoulde declare me these doubtes: the one, whie you make the waie, and the spaces aboute so large. the other, that troubleth me more, is these spaces, whiche you apoincte oute for the lodgynges, howe they ought to be used. [sidenote: the campe ought to be all waies of one facion.] fabricio. you must note, that i make all the waies, xxii. yardes and a halfe broade, to the intente that thorowe them, maie go a battaile of men in araie, where if you remember wel, i tolde you how every bande of menne, taketh in breadth betwene xviii. and xxii. yardes of space to marche or stande in. nowe where the space that is betwene the trenche, and the lodgynges, is lxxv. yardes broade, thesame is moste necessarie, to the intent thei maie there order the battailes, and the artillerie, bothe to conducte by thesame the praies, and to have space to retire theim selves with newe trenches, and newe fortificacion if neede were: the lodginges also, stande better so farre from the diches, beyng the more out of daunger of fires, and other thynges, whiche the enemie, might throwe to hurte them. concernyng the seconde demaunde, my intent is not that every space, of me marked out, bee covered with a pavilion onely, but to be used, as tourneth commodious to soch as lodge there, either with more or with lesse tentes, so that thei go not out of the boundes of thesame. and for to marke out these lodginges, there ought to bee moste cunnyng menne, and moste excellente architectours, whom, so sone as the capitaine hath chosen the place, maie knowe how to give it the facion, and to distribute it, distinguishyng the waies, devidyng the lodgynges with coardes and staves, in soche practised wise, that straight waie, thei maie bee ordained, and devided: and to minde that there growe no confusion, it is conveniente to tourne the campe, alwaies one waie, to the intente that every manne maie knowe in what waie, in what space he hath to finde his lodgyng: and this ought to be observed in every tyme, in every place, and after soche maner, that it seme a movyng citee, the whiche where so ever it goweth, carrieth with it the verie same waies, the verie same habitacions, and the verie same aspectes, that it had at the firste: the whiche thing thei cannot observe, whom sekyng strong situacions, must chaunge forme, accordyng to the variacion of the grounde: but the romaines in the plaine, made stronge the place where thei incamped with trenches, and with rampires, bicause thei made a space about the campe, and before thesame a ditche, ordinary broad fower yardes and a halfe, and depe aboute twoo yardes and a quarter, the which spaces, thei increased, according as thei intended to tarie in a place, and accordyng as thei feared the enemie. i for my parte at this presente, would not make the listes, if i intende not to winter in a place: yet i would make the trenche and the bancke no lesse, then the foresaied, but greater, accordyng to necessitie. also, consideryng the artellerie, i would intrench upon every corner of the campe, a halfe circle of ground, from whens the artillerie might flancke, whom so ever should seke to come over the trenche. in this practise in knowyng how to ordain a campe, the souldiours ought also to be exercised, and to make with them the officers expert, that are appoincted to marke it out, and the souldiours readie to knowe their places: nor nothyng therein is difficulte, as in the place thereof shall bee declared: wherefore, i will goe forewarde at this tyme to the warde of the campe, bicause without distribucion of the watche, all the other pain that hath been taken, should be vain. baptiste. before you passe to the watche, i desire that you would declare unto me, when one would pitche his campe nere the enemie, what waie is used: for that i knowe not, how a man maie have tyme, to be able to ordaine it without perill. fabricio. you shall understande this, that no capitaine will lye nere the enemie, except he, that is desposed to faight the fielde, when so ever his adversarie will: and when a capitaine is so disposed, there is no perill, but ordinarie: for that the twoo partes of the armie, stande alwaies in a redinesse, to faight the battaile, and thother maketh the lodginges. the romaines in this case, gave this order of fortifiyng the campe, unto the triarii: and the prencipi, and the astati, stoode in armes. this thei did, for as moche as the triarii, beyng the last to faight, might have time inough, if the enemie came, to leave the woorke, and to take their weapons, and to get them into their places. therfore, accordyng unto the romaines maner, you ought to cause the campe to be made of those battailes, whiche you will set in the hinder parte of the armie, in the place of the triarii. but let us tourne to reason of the watche. [sidenote: theantiquitie used no scoutes; the watche and warde of the campe.] i thinke i have not founde, emongest the antiquitie, that for to warde the campe in the night, thei have kepte watche without the trenche, distaunte as thei use now a daies, whom thei call scoutes: the whiche i beleve thei did, thinkyng that the armie might easely bee deceived, through the difficultie, that is in seeyng them againe, for that thei might bee either corrupted, or oppressed of the enemie: so that to truste either in parte, or altogether on them, thei judged it perillous. and therefore, all the strength of the watche, was with in the trenche, whiche thei did withall diligence kepe, and with moste greate order, punished with death, whom so ever observed not thesame order: the whiche how it was of them ordained, i will tell you no other wise, leaste i should bee tedious unto you, beyng able by your self to see it, if as yet you have not seen it: i shall onely briefly tell that, whiche shall make for my purpose, i wold cause to stand ordinarely every night, the thirde parte of the armie armed, and of thesame, the fowerth parte alwaies on foote, whom i would make to bee destributed, throughout all the banckes, and throughout all the places of the armie, with double warde, placed in every quadrante of thesame: of whiche, parte should stande still, parte continually should go from the one corner of the campe, to the other: and this order, i would observe also in the daie, when i should have the enemie nere. [sidenote: dilligence ought to be used, to knowe who lieth oute of the campe, and who they be that cometh of newe; claudius nero; the justice that ought to be in a campe. the fauts that the antiquitie punisshed with death; where greate punishementes be, there oughte likewise to bee great rewardes; it was no marvel that the romaines became mightie princes; a meane to punishe and execute justice, without raising tumultes; manlius capitolinus; souldiours sworen to kepe the discipline of warre.] concernyng the givyng of the watche worde, and renuyng thesame every evening, and to doe the other thynges, whiche in like watches is used, bicause thei are thynges well inough knowen, i will speake no further of them: onely i shall remember one thyng, for that it is of greate importaunce, and whiche causeth great saulfgarde observyng it, and not observyng it, moche harme: the whiche is, that there be observed greate diligence, to knowe at night, who lodgeth not in the campe, and who commeth a newe: and this is an easie thing to see who lodgeth, with thesame order that wee have appoincted: for as moche as every lodgyng havyng the determined nomber of menne, it is an easie matter to see, if thei lacke, or if there be more menne: and when thei come to be absente without lisence, to punishe them as fugetives, and if there bee more, to understande what thei be, what they make there, and of their other condicions. this diligence maketh that the enemie cannot but with difficultie, practise with thy capitaines, and have knowlege of thy counsailes: which thing if of the romaines, had not been diligently observed, claudius nero could not, havyng aniball nere hym, depart from his campe, whiche he had in lucania, and to go and to retourne from marca, without aniball should have firste heard thereof some thyng. but it suffiseth not to make these orders good, excepte thei bee caused to bee observed, with a greate severtie: for that there is nothyng that would have more observacion, then is requisite in an armie: therefore the lawes for the maintenaunce of thesame, ought to be sharpe and harde, and the executour therof moste harde. the romaines punished with death him that lacked in the watch, he that forsoke the place that was given hym to faight in, he that caried any thynge, hidde out of the campe, if any manne should saie, that he had doen some worthy thing in the faight, and had not doen it, if any had fought without the commaundemente of the capitaine, if any had for feare, caste awaie his weapons: and when it happened, that a cohorte, or a whole legion, had committed like fault, bicause thei would not put to death all, thei yet tooke al their names, and did put them in a bagge, and then by lotte, thei drue oute the tenthe parte, and so those were put to death: the whiche punishemente, was in soche wise made, that though every man did not feele it every man notwithstandyng feared it: and bicause where be greate punishementes, there ought to be also rewardes, mindyng to have menne at one instant, to feare and to hope, thei had appoincted rewardes to every worthie acte: as he that faighting, saved the life of one of his citezeins, to hym that firste leapte upon the walle of the enemies toune, to hym that entered firste into the campe of the enemies, to hym that had in faightyng hurte, or slaine the enemie, he that had stroken him from his horse: and so every vertuous act, was of the consulles knowen and rewarded, and openly of every manne praised: and soche as obtained giftes, for any of these thynges, besides the glorie and fame, whiche thei got emongest the souldiours, after when thei returned into their countrie, with solemne pompe, and with greate demonstracion emong their frendes and kinsfolkes, thei shewed them. therefore it was no marveile, though thesame people gotte so moche dominion, having so moche observacion in punishemente, and rewarde towardes theim, whom either for their well doyng, or for their ill doyng, should deserve either praise or blame: of whiche thynges it were convenient, to observe the greater parte. nor i thinke not good to kepe secrete, one maner of punishmente of theim observed, whiche was, that so sone as the offendour, was before the tribune, or consulle convicted, he was of the same lightely stroken with a rodde: after the whiche strikyng, it was lawfull for the offendour to flie, and to all the souldiours to kill hym: so that straight waie, every man threwe at hym either stones, or dartes, or with other weapons, stroke hym in soche wise, that he went but little waie a live, and moste fewe escaped, and to those that so escaped, it was not lawfull for them to retourne home, but with so many incommodities, and soche greate shame and ignomie, that it should have ben moche better for him to have died. this maner is seen to be almoste observed of the suizzers, who make the condempned to be put to death openly, of thother souldiours, the whiche is well considered, and excellently dooen: for that intendyng, that one be not a defendour of an evill doer, the greateste reamedie that is founde, is to make hym punisher of thesame: bicause otherwise, with other respecte he favoureth hym: where when he hymself is made execucioner, with other desire, he desireth his punishemente, then when the execucion commeth to an other. therefore mindyng, not to have one favored in his faulte of the people, a greate remedie it is, to make that the people, maie have hym to judge. for the greater proofe of this, thinsample of manlius capitolinus might be brought, who being accused of the scenate, was defended of the people, so longe as thei were not judge, but becommyng arbitratours in his cause, thei condempned hym to death. this is then a waie to punishe, without raisyng tumultes, and to make justise to be kepte: and for as moche as to bridell armed menne, neither the feare of the lawes, nor of menne suffise not, the antiquitie joined thereunto the aucthoritie of god: and therefore with moste greate ceremonies, thei made their souldiours to sweare, to kepe the discipline of warre, so that doyng contrariewise, thei should not onely have to feare the lawes, and menne, but god: and thei used all diligence, to fill them with religion. [sidenote: women and idell games, were not suffered by the antiquitie, to bee in their armies.] baptiste. did the romaines permitte, that women might bee in their armies, or that there might be used these idell plaies, whiche thei use now a daies. fabricio. thei prohibited the one and thother, and this prohibicion was not moche difficulte: for that there were so many exercises, in the whiche thei kept every daie the souldiours, some whiles particularely, somewhiles generally occupied that thei had no time to thinke, either on venus, or on plaies, nor on any other thyng, whiche sedicious and unproffitable souldiours doe. baptiste. i am herein satisfied, but tell me, when the armie had to remove, what order kepte thei? [sidenote: ordre in the removing the armie by the soundes of a trumpet.] fabricio. the chief trumpet sounded three tymes, at the firste sound, thei toke up the tentes, and made the packes, at the seconde, thei laded the carriage, at the thirde, thei removed in thesame maner aforsaied, with the impedimentes after every parte of armed men, placyng the legions in the middeste: and therefore you ought to cause after thesame sorte, an extraordinarie maine battaile to remove: and after that, the particulare impedimentes therof, and with those, the fowerth part of the publike impedimentes, which should bee all those, that were lodged in one of those partes, whiche a little afore we declared: and therfore it is conveniente, to have every one of them, appointed to a maine battaile, to the entente that the armie removyng, every one might knowe his place in marchyng: and thus every maine battaile ought to goe awaie, with their owne impedimentes, and with the fowerth parte of the publike impedimentes, followyng after in soche maner, as wee shewed that the romaines marched. baptiste. in pitchyng the campe, had thei other respectes, then those you have tolde? [sidenote: respectes to be had for incampyng; how to choose a place to incampe; how to avoide diseases from the armie; the wonderfull commoditie of exercise; the provision of victualles that ought alwaies to bee in a readinesse in an armie.] fabricio. i tell you again, that the romaines when thei encamped, would be able to kepe the accustomed fashion of their maner, the whiche to observe, thei had no other respecte: but concernyng for other consideracions, thei had twoo principall, the one, to incampe theim selves in a wholesome place, the other, to place themselves, where thenemie could not besiege theim, nor take from them the waie to the water, or victualles. then for to avoide infirmitie, thei did flie from places fennie, or subjecte to hurtfull windes: whiche thei knewe not so well, by the qualitie of the situacion, as by the face of the inhabitours: for when thei sawe theim evill coloured, or swollen, or full of other infeccion, thei would not lodge there: concernyng thother respecte to provide not to be besieged, it is requisite to consider the nature of the place, where the friendes lye, and thenemies, and of this to make a conjecture, if thou maiest be besieged or no: and therefore it is meete, that the capitaine be moste experte, in the knowlege of situacions of countries, and have aboute him divers men, that have the verie same expertenes. thei avoide also diseases, and famishment, with causyng the armie to kepe no misrule, for that to purpose to maintain it in health, it is nedefull to provide, that the souldiours maie slepe under tentes, that thei maie lodge where bee trees, that make shadowe, where woodde is for to dresse their meate, that thei go not in the heate, and therefore thei muste bee drawen out of the campe, before daie in summer, and in winter, to take hede that thei marche not in the snowe, and in the froste, without havyng comoditie to make fire, and not to lack necessarie aparel, nor to drink naughtie water: those that fall sicke by chaunce, make them to bee cured of phisicions: bicause a capitain hath no reamedie, when he hath to faight with sicknesse, and with an enemie: but nothing is so profitable, to maintaine the armie in health, as is the exercise: and therfore the antiquitie every daie, made them to exercise: wherby is seen how muche exercise availeth: for that in the campe, it kepeth thee in health, and in the faight victorious. concernyng famishemente, it is necessarie to see, that the enemie hinder thee not of thy victualles, but to provide where thou maieste have it, and to see that thesame whiche thou haste, bee not loste: and therefore it is requisite, that thou have alwaies in provision with the armie, sufficiente victuall for a monethe, and then removyng into some strong place, thou muste take order with thy nexte frendes, that daily thei maie provide for thee, and above al thinges bestowe the victual with diligence, givyng every daie to every manne, a reasonable measure, and observe after soche sorte this poincte, that it disorder thee not: bicause all other thyng in the warre, maie with tyme be overcome, this onely with tyme overcometh thee: nor there shall never any enemie of thyne, who maie overcome thee with famishemente, that will seeke to overcome thee with iron. for that though the victory be not so honourable, yet it is more sure and more certaine: then, thesame armie cannot avoide famishemente, that is not an observer of justice, whiche licenciously consumeth what it liste: bicause the one disorder, maketh that the victualls commeth not unto you, the other, that soche victuall as commeth, is unprofitably consumed: therefore thantiquitie ordained, that thei should spende thesame, whiche thei gave, and in thesame tyme when thei appoincted: for that no souldiour did eate, but when the capitaine did eate: the whiche how moche it is observed of the armies nowe adaies, every manne knoweth, and worthely thei can not bee called menne of good order and sober, as the antiquitie, but lasivious and drunkardes. baptiste. you saied in the beginnyng of orderynge the campe, that you woulde not stande onely uppon twoo maine battailes, but woulde take fower, for to shewe how a juste armie incamped: therfore i would you shoulde tell me twoo thynges, the one, when i shoulde have more or lesse men, howe i ought to incampe them, the other, what numbre of souldiours should suffice you to faight against what so ever enemie that were. [sidenote: howe to lodge in the campe more or lesse menne, then the ordinarie; the nombre of men that an army ought to be made of, to bee able to faighte with the puisantest enemie that is; howe to cause men to do soche a thing as shold bee profitable for thee, and hurtfull to them selves; howe to overcome menne at unwares; how to tourne to commoditie the doynges of soche, as use to advertise thy enemie of thy proceadynges; how to order the campe, that the enemie shal not perceive whether the same bee deminished, or increased; a saiyng of metellus; marcus crassus; how to understand the secretes of thy enemie; a policie of marius, to understande howe he might truste the frenchmen; what some capitaines have doen when their countrie have been invaded of enemies; to make the enemie necligente in his doynges; silla asdruball; the policie of aniball, where by he escaped out of the danger of fabius maximus; a capitayne muste devise how to devide the force of his enemies; how to cause the enemie to have in suspect his most trusty men; aniball coriolanus; metellus against jugurte; a practis of the romayne oratours, to bryng aniball out of credit with antiochus; howe to cause the enemie to devide his power; howe titus didius staied his enemies that wer going to incounter a legion of men that were commyng in his ayde; howe some have caused the enemie to devide his force; a policie to winne the enemies countrie before he be aware; howe to reforme sedicion and discorde; the benefitte that the reputacion of the capitaine causeth, which is only gotten by vertue; the chiefe thyng that a capitayne ought to doe; when paie wanteth, punishment is not to be executed; the inconvenience of not punisshynge; cesar chaunsynge to fall, made the same to be supposed to signifi good lucke; religion taketh away fantasticall opinions; in what cases a capitaine ought not to faight with his enemie if he may otherwyse choose; a policie of fulvius wherby he got and spoyled his enemies campe; a policie to disorder the enemie; a policie to overcome the enemie; a policie; how to beguile the enemie; howe mennonus trained his enemies oute of stronge places to bee the better able to overcom them.] fabricio. to the first question i answer you, that if the armie be more or lesse, then fower or sixe thousande souldiours, the orders of lodgynges, may bee taken awaie or joined, so many as suffiseth: and with this way a man may goe in more, and in lesse, into infinite: notwithstandynge the romaines, when thei joigned together twoo consull armies, thei made twoo campes, and thei tourned the partes of the unarmed, thone against thother. concernyng the second question, i say unto you, that the romaines ordinary armie, was about xxiiii. m. souldiours: but when thei were driven to faight against the greatest power that might be, the moste that thei put together, wer l. m. with this number, thei did set against two hundred thousand frenchemen, whome assaulted them after the first warre, that thei had with the carthageners. with this verie same numbre, thei fought againste anniball. and you muste note, that the romaines, and the grekes, have made warre with fewe, fortefiyng themselves thorough order, and thorough arte: the west, and the easte, have made it with multitude: but the one of these nacions, doeth serve with naturall furie: as doe the men of the west partes, the other through the great obedience whiche those men have to their kyng. but in grece, and in italy, beyng no naturall furie, nor the naturall reverence towardes their king, it hath been necessary for them to learne the discipline of warre, the whiche is of so muche force, that it hath made that a fewe, hath been able to overcome the furie, and the naturall obstinatenesse of manie. therefore i saie, that mindyng to imitate the romaines, and the grekes, the number of l. m. souldiers ought not to bee passed, but rather to take lesse: because manie make confucion, nor suffer not the discipline to be observed, and the orders learned, and pirrus used to saie, that with xv. thousande men he woulde assaile the worlde: but let us pas to an other parte. we have made this our armie to winne a field and shewed the travailes, that in the same fight may happen: we have made it to marche, and declared of what impedimentes in marchyng it may be disturbed: and finally we have lodged it: where not only it ought to take a littell reste of the labours passed, but also to thinke howe the warre ought to be ended: for that in the lodgynges, is handeled many thynges, inespecially thy enemies as yet remainyng in the fielde, and in suspected townes, of whome it is good to be assured, and those that be enemies to overcome them: therfore it is necessarie to come to this demonstracion, and to passe this difficultie with the same glorie, as hitherto we have warred. therfore comynge to particular matters, i saie that if it shoulde happen, that thou wouldest have manie men, or many people to dooe a thyng, whiche were to thee profittable, and to theim greate hurte, as should be to breake downe the wall of their citie, or to sende into exile many of them, it is necessarie for thee, either to beguile them in such wise that everie one beleeve not that it toucheth him: so that succouryng not the one the other, thei may finde them selves al to be oppressed without remedie, or els unto all to commaunde the same, whiche they ought to dooe in one selfe daie, to the intente that every man belevyng to be alone, to whome the commaundement is made, maie thinke to obey and not to remedie it: and so withoute tumulte thy commaundement to be of everie man executed. if thou shouldest suspecte the fidelitie of anie people, and woulde assure thee, and overcome them at unawares, for to colour thy intente more easelie, thou canst not doe better, then to counsel with them of some purpose of thine, desiryng their aide, and to seeme to intende to make an other enterprise, and to have thy minde farre from thinkyng on them: the whiche will make, that thei shall not think on their owne defence, beleevyng not that thou purposest to hurte them, and thei shal geve thee commoditie, to be able easely to satisfie thy desire. when thou shouldest perceive, that there were in thine armie some, that used to advertise thy enemie of thy devises, thou canst not doe better, myndynge to take commoditie by their traiterous mindes, then to commen with them of those thynges, that thou wilte not doe, and those that thou wilt doe, to kepe secret, and to say to doubte of thynges, that thou doubtest not, and those of whiche thou doubtest, to hide: the which shall make thenemie to take some enterprise in hand, beleving to know thy devises, where by easly thou maiest beguile and opresse hym. if thou shouldest intende (as claudius nero did) to deminishe thy armie, sendynge helpe to some freende, and that the enemie shoulde not bee aware therof, it is necessarie not to deminishe the lodgynges, but to maintayne the signes, and the orders whole, makyng the verie same fires, and the verye same wardes throughout all the campe, as wer wont to be afore. lykewise if with thy armie there should joigne new men, and wouldest that the enemie shoulde not know that thou werte ingrosed, it is necessarie not to increase the lodgynges: because keepyng secrete doynges and devises, hath alwaies been moste profitable. wherfore metellus beyng with an armie in hispayne, to one, who asked him what he would doe the nexte daie, answered, that if his sherte knew therof, he would bourne it. marcus craussus, unto one, whome asked him, when the armie shoulde remove, saied beleevest thou to be alone not to here the trumpet? if thou shouldest desire to understande the secretes of thy enemie, and to know his orders, some have used to sende embassadours, and with theim in servauntes aparel, moste expertest men in warre: whom havynge taken occasion to se the enemies armie, and to consider his strengthe and weakenesse, it hath geven them oportunitie to overcome him. some have sente into exile one of their familiars, and by meanes of the same, hath knowen the devises of his adversarie. also like secrettes are understoode of the enemies when for this effecte there were taken any prisoners. marius whiche in the warre that he made with the cimbrie, for to know the faieth of those frenchmen, who then inhabited lombardie, and were in leage with the romaine people, sent them letters open, and sealed: and in the open he wrote, that they shoulde not open the sealed, but at a certaine time, and before the same time demaundyng them againe, and finding them opened, knew thereby that their faithe was not to be trusted. some capitaines, being invaded, have not desired to goe to meete the enemie, but have gone to assaulte his countrey, and constrained him to retorne to defende his owne home: the whiche manie times hath come wel to passe, for that those soldiours beginnyng to fil them selves with booties, and confidence to overcome, shall sone make the enemies souldiours to wexe afraide, when they supposynge theim selves conquerours, shal understand to become losers: so that to him that hath made this diversion, manie times it hath proved well. but onely it may be doen by him, whiche hath his countrey stronger then that of the enemies, because when it were otherwise, he should goe to leese. it hath been often a profitable thyng to a capitaine, that hath been besieged in his lodgynges by the enemie, to move an intreatie of agreemente, and to make truse with him for certaine daies: the which is wonte to make the enemies more necligente in all doynges: so that avaylynge thee of their necligence, thou maiest easely have occacion to get thee oute of handes. by this way silla delivered him selfe twise from the enemies: and with this verie same deceipte, asdruball in hispayne got oute of the force of claudious nero, whome had besieged him. it helpeth also to deliver a man out of the daunger of the enemie, to do some thyng beside the forsaied, that may keepe him at a baye: this is dooen in two maners, either to assaulte him with parte of thy power, so that he beyng attentive to the same faight, may geve commoditie to the reste of thy men to bee able to save theim selves, or to cause to rise some newe accidente, which for the strayngenesse of the thynge, maie make him to marvell, and for this occasion to stande doubtefull, and still: as you knowe howe anniball dyd, who beynge inclosed of fabius maximus, tied in the nighte small bavens kindeled beetweene the hornes of manie oxen, so that fabius astonied at the strangenesse of the same sight, thought not to lette him at all the passage. a capitayne oughte amonge all other of his affaires, with al subtiltie to devise to devide the force of the enemie, either with makyng him to suspecte his owne menne, in whome he trusteth, or to give him occasion, that he maye seperate his menne, and therby to be come more weake. the fyrste way is dooen with keepyng saulfe the thynges of some of those whiche he hath aboute him, as to save in the warre their menne and their possessions, renderynge theim their children, or other their necessaries withoute raunsome. you know that anniball havynge burned all the fieldes aboute rome, he made onely to bee reserved saulfe those of fabius maximus. you know how coriolanus comyng with an armie to rome, preserved the possessions of the nobilitie, and those of the comminaltie he bourned, and sacked. metellus havinge an armie againste jugurte, all the oratours, whiche of jugurte were sente him, were required of him, that they woulde geve him jugurte prisoner, and after to the verie same men writyng letters of the verie same matter, wrought in suche wise, that in shorte tyme jugurte havyng in suspecte all his counsellours, in diverse maners put them to death. anniball beynge fled to antiochus, the romaine oratours practised with him so familiarly, that antiochus beyng in suspecte of him, trusted not anie more after to his counselles. concernyng to devide the enemies men, there is no more certainer waie, then to cause their countrie to be assaulted to the intente that being constrained to goe to defende the same, they maie forsake the warre. this way fabius used havynge agaynst his armie the power of the frenchemen, of the tuscans, umbries and sannites. titus didius havyng a few men in respecte to those of the enemies, and lookynge for a legion from rome, and the enemies purposinge to goe to incounter it, to the intente that they should not goe caused to bee noised through all his armie, that he intended the nexte daie to faighte the field with the enemies: after he used means, that certaine of the prisoners, that he had taken afore, had occasion to runne awaie. who declaryng the order that the consull had taken to faighte the nexte daie, by reason wherof the enemies beyng afraide to deminishe their owne strength, went not to incounter the same legion, and by this way thei wer conducted safe. the which means serveth not to devide the force of the enemies, but to augmente a mans owne. some have used to devide the enemies force, by lettyng him to enter into their countrie, and in profe have let him take manie townes, to the intente that puttynge in the same garrisons, he might thereby deminishe his power, and by this waie havynge made him weake, have assaulted and overcomen him. some other mindyng to goe into one province, have made as though they woulde have invaded an other, and used so much diligence, that sodenly entryng into the same, where it was not doubted that they woulde enter, they have first wonne it, before the ennemie coulde have time to succour it: for that thy enemie beynge not sure, whether thou purposest to tourne backe, to the place fyrste of thee threatned, is constrained not to forsake the one place, to succour the other, and so many times he defendeth neither the one nor the other. it importeth besides the sayde thynges to a capitaine, if there growe sedicion or discorde amonge the souldiours, to knowe with arte howe to extynguishe it: the beste waie is to chastise the headdes of the faultes, but it muste be doen in such wise, that thou maiest first have oppressed them, before they be able to be aware: the way is if they be distante from thee, not onely to call the offenders, but together with theim all the other, to the entente that not beleevynge, that it is for any cause to punishe them, they become not contumelius, but geve commoditie to the execution of the punishemente: when thei be present, thou oughtest to make thy selfe stronge with those that be not in faulte, and by meane of their helpe to punishe the other. when there hapneth discorde amonge them, the beste waye is, to bryng them to the perill, the feare whereof is wonte alwaies to make them agree. but that, which above all other thynge kepeth the armie in unitee, is the reputacion of the capitaine, the whiche onely groweth of his vertue: because neither bloud, nor authoritie gave it ever without vertue. and the chiefe thyng, whiche of a capitain is looked for to be doen, is, to keepe his souldiours punisshed, and paied: for that when so ever the paie lacketh, it is conveniente that the punisshement lacke: because thou canst not correcte a souldiour, that robbeth, if thou doest not paie him, nor the same mindynge to live, cannot abstaine from robbynge: but if thou paiest him and punisshest him not, he beecometh in everie condicion insolente: for that thou becomest of small estimacion, where thou chaunsest not to bee able to maintaine the dignitie of thy degree, and not mainetainyng it, there foloweth of necessitee tumulte, and discorde, whiche is the ruine of an armie. olde capitaines had a troubell, of the which the presente be almoste free, whiche was to interprete to their purpose the sinister auguries: because if there fell a thunderbolte in an armie, if the sunne were darkened or the moone, if there came an erthequake, if the capitaine either in gettyng up, or in lightynge of his horse fell, it was of the souldiours interpreted sinisterously: and it ingendred in them so moche feare, that comynge to faight the fielde, easely they should have lost it: and therefore the aunciente capitaines so sone as a lyke accidente grewe, either they shewed the cause of the same, and redused it to a naturall cause, or they interpreted it to their purpose. cesar fallyng in africa, in comyng of the sea saied, africa i have taken thee. moreover manie have declared the cause of the obscuryng of the moone, and of earthquakes: which thing in our time cannot happen, as well because our men be not so supersticious, as also for that our religion taketh away altogether such opinions: al be it when they should chaunse, the orders of the antiquitie ought to be imitated. when either famishement, or other naturall necessitie, or humaine passion, hath broughte thy enemie to an utter desperation, and he driven of the same, cometh to faight with thee, thou oughtest to stande within thy campe, and as muche as lieth in thy power, to flie the faight. so the lacedemonians did against the masonians, so cesar did against afranio, and petreio. fulvius beyng consul, against the cimbrians, made his horsemen manie daies continually to assaulte the enemies, and considered how thei issued out of their campe for to folow them: wherfore he sette an ambusshe behinde the campe of the cimbrians, and made them to be assaulted of his horsmen, and the cimbrians issuyng oute of their campe for to follow them. fulvio gotte it, and sacked it. it hath ben of great utilitie to a capitaine, havyng his armie nere to the enemies armie, to sende his menne with the enemies ansignes to robbe, and to burne his owne countrey, whereby the enemies beleevynge those to bee menne, whiche are come in their aide, have also runne to helpe to make them the pray: and for this disorderyng them selves, hathe therby given oportunitie to the adversary to overcome them. this waie alexander of epirus used againste the illirans and leptenus of siracusa against the carthaginers and bothe to the one and to the other, the devise came to passe most happely. manie have overcome the enemie, gevyng him occasion to eate and to drinke oute of measure, fayning to have feared, and leaving their campes full of wyne and herdes of cattell, wherof the enemie beyng filled above all naturall use, have then assaulted him, and with his destruction overthrowen him. so tamirus did against cirus, and tiberius graccus agaynst the spaniardes. some have poysoned the wine, and other thynges to feede on, for to be able more easely to overcome them. i saied a littel afore how i founde not, that the antiquetie kepte in the night scoutes abroade, and supposed that they did it for to avoide the hurte, whiche might growe therby: because it is founde, that through no other meane then throughe the watche man, whiche was set in the daie to watche the enemie, hath been cause of the ruin of him, that set him there: for that manie times it hath hapned, that he beyng taken, hath been made perforce to tell theim the token, whereby they might call his felowes, who commyng to the token, have been slaine or taken. it helpeth to beguile the enemie sometime to varie a custome of thine, whereupon he having grounded him self, remaineth ruinated: as a capitaine did once, whome usinge to cause to be made signes to his men for comynge of the enemies in the night with fire, and in the daie with smoke, commaunded that withoute anie intermission, they shoulde make smoke and fire, and after commynge upon them the enemie, they should reste, whome beleevyng to come without beynge seen, perceivyng no signe to be made of beyng discovered, caused (through goeyng disordered) more easie the victorie to his adversarie. mennonus a rodian mindynge to drawe from stronge places the enemies armie, sente one under colour of a fugitive, the whiche affirmed, howe his armie was in discorde, and that the greater parte of them wente awaie: and for to make the thynge to be credited, he caused to make in sporte, certaine tumultes amonge the lodgynges: whereby the enemie thvnkyng thereby to be able to discomfaighte them, assaultynge theim, were overthrowen. [sidenote: the enemie ought not to be brought into extreme desperacion; how lucullus constrained certaine men that ran awaie from him to his enemies, to fayght whether they wold or not.] besides thesaied thynges, regarde ought to be had not to brynge the enemie into extreme desperacion: whereunto cesar had regarde, faightyng with the duchemen, who opened them the waie, seyng, howe thei beyng not able to flie, necessitie made them strong, and would rather take paine to followe theim, when thei fled, then the perill to overcome them, when thei defended them selves. lucullus seyng, how certaine macedonian horsemenne, whiche were with hym, went to the enemies parte, straight waie made to sounde to battaile, and commaunded, that the other men should folowe hym: whereby the enemies beleving, that lucullus would begin the faight, went to incounter the same macedonians, with soche violence, that thei were constrained to defende themselves: and so thei became against their willes, of fugetives, faighters. it importeth also to knowe, how to be assured of a toune, when thou doubteste of the fidelitie thereof, so sone as thou haste wonne the fielde, or before, the whiche certain old insamples maie teache thee. [sidenote: a policie wher by pompey got a towne; how publius valerius assured him self of a towne; a policie that alexander magnus used to be assured of all tracia, which philip kynge of spaine did practise to be asured of england when he wente to sainct quintens; examples for capitaines to winne the hartes of the people.] pompei doubtyng of the catinensians, praied them that thei would bee contente, to receive certaine sicke menne, that he had in his armie, and sendyng under the habite of sicke persones, most lustie menne, gotte the toune. publius valerius, fearyng the fidelitie of the epidannians, caused to come, as who saieth, a pardon to a churche without the toune, and when al the people wer gone for pardon, he shutte the gates, receivyng after none in, but those whom he trusted. alexander magnus, mindyng to goe into asia, and to assure himself of thracia, toke with him all the principall of thesame province, givyng theim provision, and he set over the common people of thracia, men of lowe degree, and so he made the princes contented with paiyng theim, and the people quiete, havyng no heddes that should disquiete them: but emong all the thynges, with the whiche the capitaines, winne the hartes of the people, be the insamples of chastitie and justice, as was thesame of scipio in spaine, when he rendered that yong woman, moste faire of personage to her father, and to her housebande: the whiche made him more, then with force of armes to winne spain. cesar having caused that woodde to bee paied for, whiche he had occupied for to make the listes, about his armie in fraunce, got so moche a name of justice, that he made easier the conquest of thesame province. i cannot tell what remaineth me, to speake more upon these accidentes, for that concerning this matter, there is not lefte any parte, that hath not been of us disputed. onely there lacketh to tell, of the maner of winnyng, and defendyng a toune: the whiche i am readie to doe willingly, if you be not now wearie. baptiste. your humanitie is so moche, that it maketh us to followe our desires, without beyng afraied to be reputed presumptuous, seyng that you liberally offer thesame, whiche we should have been ashamed, to have asked you: therefore, we saie unto you onely this, that to us you cannot dooe a greater, nor a more gratefuller benefite, then to finishe this reasonyng. but before that you passe to that other matter, declare us a doubte, whether it bee better to continewe the warre, as well in the winter, as thei use now adaies, or to make it onely in the sommer, and to goe home in the winter, as the antiquitie did. [sidenote: warre ought not to be made in winter; rough situacions, colde and watrie times, are enemies to the oder of warre; an overthrowe caused by winter.] fabricio. see, that if the prudence of the demaunder were not, there had remained behinde a speciall part, that deserveth consideracion. i answere you againe, that the antiquitie did all thynges better, and with more prudence then wee: and if wee in other things commit some erroure, in the affaires of warre, wee commit all errour. there is nothing more undiscrete, or more perrillous to a capitayne, then to make warre in the winter, and muche more perrill beareth he, that maketh it, then he that abideth it: the reason is this. all the industrie that is used in the discipline of warre, is used for to bee prepared to fighte a fielde with thy enemie, because this is the ende, whereunto a capitayne oughte to goo or endevour him selfe: for that the foughten field, geveth thee the warre wonne or loste: then he that knoweth best how to order it, and he that hath his army beste instructed, hath moste advauntage in this, and maye beste hope to overcome. on the other side, there is nothing more enemie to the orders, and then the rough situacions, or the colde watery time: for that the rough situacions, suffereth thee not to deffende thy bandes, according to thee discipline: the coulde and watery times, suffereth thee not to keepe thy men together, nor thou canst not bring them in good order to the enemy: but it is convenient for thee to lodge them a sunder of necessitie, and without order, being constrayned to obeye to castells, to boroughes, and to the villages, that maye receyve thee, in maner that all thy laboure of thee, used to instructe the army is vaine. nor marvayle you not though now a daies, they warre in the winter, because the armies being without discipline, know not the hurt that it dooth them, in lodging not together, for that it is no griefe to them not to be able to keepe those orders, and to observe that discipline, which they have not: yet they oughte to see howe much harme, the camping in the winter hath caused, and to remember, how the frenchmen in the yeare of oure lorde god, a thousande five hundred and three, were broken at gariliano of the winter, and not of the spaniardes: for as much as i have saide, he that assaulteth, hath more disadvauntage then he that defendeth: because the fowle weather hurteth him not a littell, being in the dominion of others and minding to make warre. for that he is constrayned, either to stande together with his men, and to sustaine the incommoditie of water and colde, or to avoide it to devide his power: but he that defendeth, may chuse the place as he listeth, and tary him with his freshe men: and he in a sodayne may set his men in araye, and goo to find a band of the enemies men, who cannot resiste the violence of them. so the frenchemen were discomfited, and so they shall alwayes be discomfited, which will assaulte in the winter an enemye, whoo hath in him prudence. then he that will that force, that orders, that discipline and vertue, in anye condition availe him not, let him make warre in the fielde in the winter: and because that the romaines woulde that all these thinges, in which they bestowed so much diligence, should availe them, fleedde no otherwise the winter, then the highe alpes, and difficulte places, and whatsoever other thing shoulde let them, for being able to shewe their arte and their vertue. so this suffiseth to your demaund, wherefore we wil come to intreate of the defending and besieging of tounes, and of their situacions and edifications. the seventh booke [sidenote: tounes and fortresses maie be strong twoo waies; the place that now a daies is moste sought to fortifie in; how a toune walle ought to bee made; the walle of a toune ought to bee high, and the diche within, and not without; the thickenes that a toune walle ought to bee of, and the distaunces betwene everie flancker, and of what breadth and deapth the dich ought to bee; how the ordinaunce is planted, for the defence of a toune; the nature of the batterie.] you oughte to knowe, how that tounes and fortresses, maie bee strong either by nature, or by industrie; by nature, those bee strong, whiche bee compassed aboute with rivers, or with fennes, as mantua is and ferrara, or whiche bee builded upon a rocke, or upon a stepe hille, as monaco, and sanleo: for that those that stande upon hilles, that be not moche difficulct to goe up, be now a daies, consideryng the artillerie and the caves, moste weake. and therfore moste often times in building, thei seke now a daies a plain, for to make it stronge with industrie. the firste industrie is, to make the walles crooked, and full of tournynges, and of receiptes: the whiche thyng maketh, that thenemie cannot come nere to it, bicause he maie be hurte, not onely on the front, but by flancke. if the walles be made high, thei bee to moche subjecte to the blowes of the artillerie: if thei be made lowe, thei bee moste easie to scale. if thou makeste the diches on the out side thereof, for to give difficultie to the ladders, if it happen that the enemie fill them up (whiche a great armie maie easely dooe) the wall remaineth taken of thenemie. therefore purposyng to provide to the one and thother foresaid inconveniences, i beleve (savyng alwaies better judgement) that the walle ought to be made highe, and the diche within, and not without. this is the moste strongeste waie of edificacion, that is made, for that it defendeth thee from the artillerie, and from ladders, and it giveth not facilitie to the enemie, to fill up the diche: then the walle ought to be high, of that heighth as shall bee thought beste, and no lesse thick, then two yardes and a quarter, for to make it more difficult to ruinate. moreover it ought to have the toures placed, with distances of cl. yardes betwen thone and thother: the diche within, ought to be at leaste twoo and twentie yardes and a halfe broad, and nine depe, and al the yearth that is digged out, for to make the diche, muste be throwen towardes the citee, and kepte up of a walle, that muste be raised from the bottome of the diche, and goe so high over the toune, that a man maie bee covered behinde thesame, the whiche thing shal make the depth of the diche the greater. in the bottome of the diche, within every hundred and l. yardes, there would be a slaughter house, which with the ordinaunce, maie hurte whom so ever should goe doune into thesame: the greate artillerie that defende the citee, are planted behinde the walle, that shutteth the diche, bicause for to defende the utter walle, being high, there cannot bee occupied commodiously, other then smalle or meane peeses. if the enemie come to scale, the heigth of the firste walle moste easely defendeth thee: if he come with ordinaunce, it is convenient for hym to batter the utter walle: but it beyng battered, for that the nature of the batterie is, to make the walle to fall, towardes the parte battered, the ruine of the walle commeth, finding no diche that receiveth and hideth it, to redouble the profunditie of thesame diche: after soche sorte, that to passe any further, it is not possible, findyng a ruine that with holdeth thee, a diche that letteth thee, and the enemies ordinaunce, that from the walle of the diche, moste safely killeth thee. onely there is this remedie, to fill the diche: the whiche is moste difficulte to dooe, as well bicause the capacitie thereof is greate, as also for the difficultie, that is in commyng nere it, the walle beeyng strong and concaved, betwene the whiche, by the reasons aforesaied, with difficultie maie be entered, havyng after to goe up a breache through a ruin, whiche giveth thee moste greate difficultie, so that i suppose a citee thus builded, to be altogether invinsible. baptiste. when there should bee made besides the diche within, a diche also without, should it not bee stronger? fabricio. it should be without doubt, but mindyng to make one diche onely, myne opinion is, that it standeth better within then without. baptiste. would you, that water should bee in the diches, or would you have them drie? [sidenote: a drie diche is moste sureste.] fabricio. the opinion of men herein bee divers, bicause the diches full of water, saveth thee from mines under grounde, the diches without water, maketh more difficulte the fillyng of them: but i havyng considered all, would make them without water, for that thei bee more sure: for diches with water, have been seen in the winter to bee frosen, and to make easie the winnyng of a citee, as it happened to mirandola, when pope julie besieged it: and for to save me from mines, i would make it so deepe, that he that would digge lower, should finde water. [sidenote: an advertisemente for the buildyng and defending of a toune or fortresse; small fortresses cannot bee defended; a toune of war or fortresse, ought not to have in them any retiring places; cesar borgia; the causes of the losse of the fortresse of furlie, that was thought invincible; howe the houses that are in a toune of war or fortresse ought to be builded.] the fortresses also, i would builde concernyng the diches and the walles in like maner, to the intent thei should have the like difficultie to be wonne. one thyng i will earnestly advise hym, that defendeth a citee: and that is, that he make no bulwarkes without distaunte from the walle of thesame: and an other to hym that buildeth the fortresse, and this is, that he make not any refuge place in them, in whiche he that is within, the firste walle beyng loste, maie retire: that whiche maketh me to give the firste counsaile is, that no manne ought to make any thyng, by meane wherof, he maie be driven without remedie to lese his firste reputacion, the whiche losyng, causeth to be estemed lesse his other doinges, and maketh afraied them, whom have taken upon theim his defence, and alwaies it shall chaunce him this, whiche i saie, when there are made bulwarkes out of the toune, that is to bee defended, bicause alwaies he shall leese theim, little thynges now a daies, beyng not able to bee defended, when thei be subject to the furie of ordinance, in soche wise that lesyng them, thei be beginning and cause of his ruine. when genua rebelled againste king leus of fraunce, it made certaine bulwarkes alofte on those hilles, whiche bee about it, the whiche so sone as thei were loste, whiche was sodainly, made also the citee to be loste. concernyng the second counsaile, i affirme nothyng to be to a fortresse more perilous, then to be in thesame refuge places, to be able to retire: bicause the hope that menne have thereby, maketh that thei leese the utter warde, when it is assaulted: and that loste, maketh to bee loste after, all the fortresse. for insample there is freshe in remembraunce, the losse of the fortresse of furly, when catherin the countesse defended it againste cesar borgia, sonne to pope alexander the vi. who had conducted thether the armie of the king of fraunce: thesame fortresse, was al full of places, to retire out of one into an other: for that there was firste the kepe, from the same to the fortresse, was a diche after soche sorte, that thei passed over it by a draw bridge: the fortresse was devided into three partes, and every parte was devided from the other with diches, and with water, and by bridges, thei passed from the one place to the other: wherefore the duke battered with his artillerie, one of the partes of the fortresse, and opened part of the walle: for whiche cause maister jhon casale, whiche was appoincted to that warde, thought not good to defende that breache, but abandoned it for to retire hymself into the other places: so that the dukes men having entered into that parte without incounter, in a sodaine thei gotte it all: for that the dukes menne became lordes of the bridges, whiche went from one place to an other. thei loste then this fortresse, whiche was thought invinsible, through two defaultes, the one for havyng so many retiryng places, the other, bicause every retiryng place, was not lorde of the bridge thereof. therefore, the naughtie builded fortresse, and the little wisedome of them that defended it, caused shame to the noble enterprise of the countesse, whoe had thought to have abidden an armie, whiche neither the kyng of naples, nor the duke of milaine would have abidden: and although his inforcementes had no good ende, yet notwithstandyng he gotte that honoure, whiche his valiauntnesse had deserved: the whiche was testified of many epigrammes, made in those daies in his praise. therefore, if i should have to builde a fortresse, i would make the walles strong, and the diches in the maner as we have reasoned, nor i would not make therein other, then houses to inhabite, and those i would make weake and lowe, after soche sorte that thei should not let him that should stande in the middest of the market place, the sight of all the walle, to the intente that the capitain might see with the iye, where he maie succour: and that every manne should understande, that the walle and the diche beyng lost, the fortresse were lost. and yet when i should make any retiryng places, i would make the bridges devided in soche wise, that every parte should be lorde of the bridges of his side, ordainyng, that thei should fall upon postes, in the middest of the diche. baptiste. you have saied that littel thynges now a daies can not bee defended, and it seemed unto me to have understoode the contrarie, that the lesser that a thyng wer, the better it might be defended. [sidenote: the fortifiyng of the entrance of a toune.] fabricio. you have not understoode well, because that place cannot be now a daies called stronge, wher he that defendeth it, hath not space to retire with new diches, and with new fortificacions, for that the force of the ordinance is so much, that he that trusteth uppon the warde of one wall and of one fortification only, is deceived: and because the bulwarkes (mindyng that they passe not their ordinarie measure, for that then they shoulde be townes and castels) be not made, in suche wise that men maie have space within them to retire, thei are loste straight waie. therefore it is wisdom to let alone those bulwarkes without, and to fortifie thenterance of the toune, and to kever the gates of the same with turnyngs after suche sort, that men cannot goe in nor oute of the gate by right line: and from the tournynges to the gate, to make a diche with a bridge. also they fortifie the gate, with a percullis, for to bee abell to put therin their menne, when they be issued out to faight, and hapnyng that the enemies pursue them, to avoide, that in the mingelynge together, they enter not in with them: and therfore these be used, the which the antiquitie called cattarratte, the whiche beyng let fall, exclude thenemies, and save the freendes, for that in suche a case, men can do no good neither by bridges nor by a gate, the one and the other beynge ocupied with prease of menne. baptiste. i have seene these perculleses that you speake of, made in almayne of littell quarters of woodde after the facion of a grate of iron, and these percullises of ouers, be made of plankes all massive: i woulde desire to understande whereof groweth this difference, and which be the strongest. [sidenote: battelments ought to be large and thicke and the flanckers large within.] fabricio. i tell you agayne, that the manners and orders of the warre, throughe oute all the worlde, in respecte to those of the antiquitie, be extinguesshed, and in italye they bee altogether loste, for if there bee a thing somewhat stronger then the ordinarye, it groweth of the insample of other countries. you mighte have understoode and these other may remember, with howe muche debilitie before, that king charles of fraunce in the yere of our salvation a thousande cccc. xciiii. had passed into italie, they made the batelmentes not halfe a yarde thicke, the loopes, and the flanckers were made with a litle opening without, and muche within, and with manye other faultes whiche not to be tedious i will let passe: for that easely from thinne battelments the defence is taken awaye, the flanckers builded in the same maner, moste easylye are opened: nowe of the frenchemen is learned to make the battelment large and thicke, and the flanckers to bee large on the parte within, and to drawe together in the middeste of the wall, and then agayn to waxe wider unto the uttermost parte without: this maketh that the ordinaunce hardlye can take away the defence. therfore the frenchmen have, manye other devises like these, the whiche because they have not beene seene of our men, they have not beene considered. among whiche, is this kinde of perculles made like unto a grate, the which is a greate deale better then oures: for that if you have for defence of a gate a massive parculles as oures, letting it fall, you shutte in your menne, and you can not though the same hurte the enemie, so that hee with axes, and with fire, maye breake it downe safely: but if it bee made like a grate, you maye, it being let downe, through those holes and through those open places, defende it with pikes, with crosbowes, and with all other kinde of weapons. baptiste. i have seene in italye an other use after the outelandishe fashion, and this is, to make the carriage of the artillery with the spokes of the wheele crooked towardes the axeltree. i woulde knowe why they make them so: seeming unto mee that they bee stronger when they are made straighte as those of oure wheeles. [sidenote: neither the ditche, wall tillage, nor any kinde of edificacion, ought to be within a mile of a toune of warre.] fabricio. never beleeve that the thinges that differ from the ordinarie wayes, be made by chaunce: and if you shoulde beleeve that they make them so, to shewe fayrer, you are deceaved: because where strength is necessarie, there is made no counte of fayrenesse: but all groweth, for that they be muche surer and muche stronger then ours. the reason is this: the carte when it is laden, either goeth even, or leaning upon the righte, or upon the lefte side: when it goeth even, the wheeles equally sustayne the wayght, the which being equallye devided betweene them, doth not burden much, but leaning, it commeth to have all the paise of the cariage on the backe of that wheele upon the which it leaneth. if the spokes of the same be straight they wil soone breake: for that the wheele leaning, the spokes come also to leane, and not to sustaine the paise by the straightnesse of them, and so when the carte goeth even, and when they are least burdened, they come to bee strongest: when the carte goeth awrye, and that they come to have moste paise, they bee weakest. even the contrarie happeneth to the crooked spokes of the frenche cartes, for that when the carte leaning upon one side poincteth uppon them, because they bee ordinary crooked, they come then to bee straight, and to be able to sustayne strongly al the payse, where when the carte goeth even, and that they bee crooked, they sustayne it halfe: but let us tourne to our citie and fortresse. the frenchemen use also for more safegarde of the gates of their townes, and for to bee able in sieges more easylye to convey and set oute men of them, besides the sayde thinges, an other devise, of which i have not seene yet in italye anye insample: and this is, where they rayse on the oute side from the ende of the drawe bridge twoo postes, and upon either of them they joigne a beame, in suche wise that the one halfe of them comes over the bridge, the other halfe with oute: then all the same parte that commeth withoute, they joygne together with small quarters of woodde, the whiche they set thicke from one beame to an other like unto a grate, and on the parte within, they fasten to the ende of either of the beames a chaine: then when they will shutte the bridge on the oute side, they slacke the chaines, and let downe all the same parte like unto a grate, the whiche comming downe, shuttethe the bridge, and when they will open it, they drawe the chaines, and the same commeth to rise up, and they maye raise it up so much that a man may passe under it, and not a horse, and so much that there maye passe horse and man, and shutte it againe at ones, for that it falleth and riseth as a window of a battelment. this devise is more sure than the parculles, because hardely it maye be of the enemye lette in such wise, that it fall not downe, falling not by a righte line as the parculles, which easely may be underpropped. therfore they which will make a citie oughte to cause to be ordained all the saide things: and moreover aboute the walle, there woulde not bee suffered any grounde to be tilled, within a myle thereof, nor any wall made, but shoulde be all champaine, where should be neither ditch nor banck, neither tree nor house, which might let the fighte, and make defence for the enemie that incampeth. [sidenote: noote; the provision that is meete to be made for the defence of a toune.] and noote, that a towne, whiche hathe the ditches withoute, with the banckes higher then the grounde, is moste weake: for as muche as they make defence to the enemye which assaulteth thee, and letteth him not hurte thee, because easely they may be opened, and geve place to his artillerye: but let us passe into the towne. i will not loose so muche time in shewing you howe that besides the foresayde thinges, it is requisite to have provision of victualles, and wherewith to fight, for that they be thinges that everye man underdeth, and without them, all other provision is vaine: and generally twoo thinges oughte to be done, to provide and to take the commoditie from the enemie that he availe not by the things of thy countrey: therfore the straw, the beastes, the graine, whiche thou canste not receive into house, ought to be destroied. also he that defendeth a towne, oughte to provide that nothing bee done tumultuouslye and disordinatelye, and to take suche order, that in all accidentes everye man maye knowe what he hath to doo. [sidenote: what incoragethe the enemy most that besiegeth a toune; what he that besiegeth and he that defendeth oughte to doo; advertisementes for a besieged towne; howe the romaines vitaled casalino besieged of aniball; a policie for the besieged.] the order that oughte to be taken is thus, that the women, the olde folkes, the children, and the impotent, be made to keepe within doores, that the towne maye be left free, to yong and lustie men, whom being armed, must be destributed for the defence of the same, appointing part of them to the wall, parte to the gates, parte to the principall places of the citie, for to remedie those inconveniences, that might growe within: an other parte must not be bound to any place, but be ready to succour all, neede requiring: and the thing beeing ordained thus, with difficultie tumulte can growe, whiche maye disorder thee. also i will that you note this, in the besieging and defending of a citie, that nothing geveth so muche hoope to the adversarye to be able to winne a towne, as when he knoweth that the same is not accustomed to see the enemie: for that many times for feare onely without other experience of force, cities have bene loste: therefore a man oughte, when he assaulteth a like citie, to make all his ostentacions terrible. on the other parte he that is assaulted, oughte to appoincte to the same parte, whiche the enemie fighteth againste, strong men and suche as opinion makethe not afraide, but weapons onely: for that if the first proofe turne vaine, it increaseth boldenesse to the besieged, and then the enemie is constrained to overcome them within, with vertue and reputacion. the instrumentes wherwith the antiquitie defended townes, where manie: as balistes, onagris, scorpions, arcubalistes, fustibals, slinges: and also those were manie with which thei gave assaultes. as arrieti, towers, musculi plutei, viney, falci, testudeni, in steede of which thynges be now a daies the ordinance, the whiche serve him that bessegeth, and him that defendeth: and therfore i will speake no forther of theim: but let us retourne to our reasonyng and let us come to particular offences. they ought to have care not to be taken by famine, and not to be overcome through assaultes: concernyng famin, it hath ben tolde, that it is requiset before the siege come, to be well provided of vitualles. but when a towne throughe longe siege, lacketh victuals, some times hath ben seen used certaine extraordinarie waies to be provided of their friendes, whome woulde save them: inespeciall if through the middest of the besieged citie there runne a river, as the romaines vittelled their castell called casalino besieged of anibal, whom being not able by the river to sende them other victual then nuttes, wherof castyng in the same great quantitie, the which carried of the river, without beyng abel to be letted, fedde longe time the casalinians. some besieged, for to shew unto the enemie, that they have graine more then inough and for to make him to dispaire, that he cannot, by famin overcome theim, have caste breade oute of the gates, or geven a bullocke graine to eate, and after have suffered the same to be taken, to the intent that kilde and founde full of graine, might shewe that aboundance, whiche they had not. on the other parte excellent capitaines have used sundrie waies to werie the enemie. [sidenote: a policie of fabius in besieging of a toune; a policie of dionisius in besiegynge of a toune.] fabius suffered them whome he besieged, to sowe their fieldes, to the entente that thei should lacke the same corne, whiche they sowed. dionisius beynge in campe at regio, fained to minde to make an agreement with them, and duryng the practise therof he caused him selfe to be provided of their victuales, and then when he had by this mean got from them their graine, he kepte them straight and famished them. [sidenote: howe alexander wanne leucadia.] alexander magnus mindyng to winne leucadia overcame all the castels aboute it, and by that means drivyng into the same citie a great multitude of their owne countrie men, famished them. [sidenote: the besieged ought to take heed of the first brunte; the remedie that townes men have, when the enemies ar entred into the towne; how to make the townes men yeelde.] concernynge the assaultes, there hath been tolde that chiefely thei ought to beware of the firste bronte, with whiche the romaines gotte often times manie townes, assaultyng them sodainly, and on every side: and thei called it _aggredi urbem corona_. as scipio did, when he wanne newe carthage in hispayne: the which brunte if of a towne it be withstoode, with difficultie after will bee overcome: and yet thoughe it should happen that the enemie were entred into the citie, by overcomynge the wall, yet the townes men have some remedie, so thei forsake it not: for as much as manie armies through entring into a toune, have ben repulced or slaine: the remedie is, that the townes men doe keepe them selves in highe places, and from the houses, and from the towers to faight with them: the whiche thynge, they that have entered into the citie, have devised to overcome in twoo manners: the one with openyng the gates of the citie, and to make the waie for the townes men, that thei might safely flie: the other with sendynge foorthe a proclamacion, that signifieth, that none shall be hurte but the armed, and to them that caste their weapons on the grounde, pardon shall be graunted: the whiche thynge hath made easie the victorie of manie cities. [sidenote: how townes or cities are easelie wonne; how duke valentine got the citie of urbine; the besieged ought to take heede of the deciptes and policies of the enemie; how domitio calvino wan a towne.] besides this, the citees are easie to bee wonne, if thou come upon them unawares: whiche is dooen beyng with thy armie farre of, after soche sort, that it be not beleved, either that thou wilte assaulte theim, or that thou canst dooe it, without commyng openly, bicause of the distance of the place: wherefore, if thou secretely and spedely assaulte theim, almoste alwaies it shall followe, that thou shalte gette the victorie. i reason unwillingly of the thynges succeded in our tyme, for that to me and to mine, it should be a burthen, and to reason of other, i cannot tel what to saie: notwithstanding, i cannot to this purpose but declare, the insample of cesar borgia, called duke valentine, who beyng at nocera with his menne, under colour of goyng to besiege camerino, tourned towardes the state of urbin, and gotte a state in a daie, and without any paine, the whiche an other with moche time and cost, should scante have gotten. it is conveniente also to those, that be besieged, to take heede of the deceiptes, and of the policies of the enemie, and therefore the besieged ought not to truste to any thyng, whiche thei see the enemie dooe continually, but let theim beleve alwaies, that it is under deceipte, and that he can to their hurte varie it. domitio calvino besiegyng a toune, used for a custome to compasse aboute every daie, with a good parte of his menne, the wall of the same: whereby the tounes menne, belevyng that he did it for exercise, slacked the ward: whereof domicius beyng aware, assaulted and overcame them. [sidenote: a policie to get a towne.] certaine capitaines understandyng, that there should come aide to the besieged, have apareled their souldiours, under the ansigne of those, that should come, and beyng let in, have gotte the toune. [sidenote: how simon of athens wan a towne; a policie to get a towne; how scipio gotte certaine castels in afrike.] simon of athens set fire in a night on a temple, whiche was out of the toune, wherefore, the tounes menne goyng to succour it, lefte the toune in praie to the enemie. some have slaine those, whiche from the besieged castle, have gone a foragyng, and have appareled their souldiours, with the apparell of the forragers, whom after have gotte the toune. the aunciente capitaines, have also used divers waies, to destroie the garison of the toune, whiche thei have sought to take. scipio beyng in africa, and desiring to gette certaine castles, in whiche were putte the garrisons of carthage, he made many tymes, as though he would assaulte theim, albeit, he fained after, not onely to abstaine, but to goe awaie from them for feare: the whiche aniball belevyng to bee true, for to pursue hym with greater force, and for to bee able more easely to oppresse him, drewe out all the garrisons of theim: the whiche scipio knowyng, sente massinissa his capitaine to overcome them. [sidenote: howe pirrus wan the chiefe citie of sclavonie; a policie to get a towne; how the beseiged are made to yelde; howe to get a towne by treason; a policie of aniball for the betraiyng of a castell; how the besieged maie be begiled; how formion overcame the calcidensians; what the besieged muste take heede of; liberalitie maketh enemies frendes; the diligence that the besieged ought to use in their watche and ward.] pirrus makyng warre in sclavonie, to the chiefe citee of the same countrie, where were brought many menne in garrison, fained to dispaire to bee able to winne it, and tourning to other places, made that the same for to succour them, emptied it self of the warde, and became easie to bee wonne. many have corrupted the water, and have tourned the rivers an other waie to take tounes. also the besieged, are easely made to yelde them selves, makyng theim afraied, with signifiyng unto them a victorie gotten, or with new aides, whiche come in their disfavour. the old capitaines have sought to gette tounes by treason, corruptyng some within, but thei have used divers meanes. sum have sente a manne of theirs, whiche under the name of a fugetive, might take aucthoritie and truste with the enemies, who after have used it to their profite. some by this meanes, have understode the maner of the watche, and by meanes of the same knowledge, have taken the toune. some with a carte, or with beames under some colour, have letted the gate, that it could not bee shutte, and with this waie, made the entrie easie to the enemie. aniball perswaded one, to give him a castle of the romaines, and that he should fain to go a huntyng in the night, makyng as though he could not goe by daie, for feare of the enemies, and tournyng after with the venison, should put in with hym certaine of his menne, and so killyng the watchmen, should give hym the gate. also the besieged are beguiled, with drawyng them out of the toune, and goyng awaie from them, faining to flie when thei assault thee. and many (emong whom was anibal) have for no other intente, let their campe to be taken, but to have occasion to get betwene theim and home, and to take their toune. also, thei are beguiled with fainyng to departe from them, as formion of athens did, who havyng spoiled the countrie of the calcidensians, received after their ambassadours, fillyng their citee with faire promises, and hope of safetie, under the which as simple menne, thei were a little after of formione oppressed. the besieged ought to beware of the men, whiche thei have in suspecte emong them: but some times thei are wont, as well to assure them selves with deserte, as with punishemente. marcellus knoweyng how lucius bancius a nolane, was tourned to favour aniball so moche humanitie and liberalitie, he used towardes him, that of an enemie, he made him moste frendely. the besieged ought to use more diligence in the warde, when the enemie is gone from theim, then when he is at hande. and thei ought to warde those places, whiche thei thinke, that maie bee hurt least: for that many tounes have been loste, when thenemie assaulteth it on thesame part, where thei beleve not possible to be assaulted. and this deceipt groweth of twoo causes, either for the place being strong, and to beleve, that it is invinsible, or through craft beyng used of the enemie, in assaltyng theim on one side with fained alaroms, and on the other without noise, and with verie assaltes in deede: and therefore the besieged, ought to have greate advertisment, and above all thynges at all times, and in especially in the night to make good watche to bee kepte on the walles, and not onely to appoincte menne, but dogges, and soche fiearse mastives, and lively, the whiche by their sente maie descrie the enemie, and with barkyng discover him: and not dogges onely, but geese have ben seen to have saved a citee, as it happened to roome, when the frenchemen besieged the capitoll. [sidenote: an order of alcibiades for the dew keping of watch and warde.] alcibiades for to see, whether the warde watched, athense beeyng besieged of the spartaines, ordained that when in the night, he should lifte up a light, all the ward should lift up likewise, constitutyng punishmente to hym that observed it not. [sidenote: the secrete conveighyng of letters; the defence against a breach; how the antiquitie got tounes by muining under grounde.] isicrates of athens killed a watchman, which slept, saiyng that he lefte him as he found him. those that have been besieged, have used divers meanes, to sende advise to their frendes: and mindyng not to send their message by mouth, thei have written letters in cifers, and hidden them in sundrie wise: the cifers be according, as pleaseth him that ordaineth them, the maner of hidyng them is divers. some have written within the scaberde of a sweard: other have put the letters in an unbaked lofe, and after have baked the same, and given it for meate to hym that caried theim. certaine have hidden them, in the secreteste place of their bodies: other have hidden them in the collor of a dogge, that is familiare with hym, whiche carrieth theim: some have written in a letter ordinarie thinges, and after betwene thone line and thother, have also written with water, that wetyng it or warming it after, the letters should appere. this waie hath been moste politikely observed in our time: where some myndyng to signifie to their freendes inhabityng within a towne, thinges to be kept secret, and mindynge not to truste any person, have sente common matters written, accordyng to the common use and enterlined it, as i have saied above, and the same have made to be hanged on the gates of the temples, the whiche by countersignes beyng knowen of those, unto whome they have been sente, were taken of and redde: the whiche way is moste politique, bicause he that carrieth them maie bee beguiled, and there shall happen hym no perill. there be moste infinite other waies, whiche every manne maie by himself rede and finde: but with more facilitie, the besieged maie bee written unto, then the besieged to their frendes without, for that soche letters cannot be sent, but by one, under colour of a fugetive, that commeth out of a toune: the whiche is a daungerous and perilous thing, when thenemie is any whit craftie: but those that sende in, he that is sente, maie under many colours, goe into the campe that besiegeth, and from thens takyng conveniente occasion, maie leape into the toune: but lette us come to speake of the present winnyng of tounes. i saie that if it happen, that thou bee besieged in thy citee, whiche is not ordained with diches within, as a little before we shewed, to mynde that thenemie shall not enter through the breach of the walle, whiche the artillerie maketh: bicause there is no remedie to lette thesame from makyng of a breache, it is therefore necessarie for thee, whileste the ordinance battereth, to caste a diche within the wall which is battered, and that it be in bredth at leaste twoo and twentie yardes and a halfe, and to throwe all thesame that is digged towardes the toun, whiche maie make banke, and the diche more deper: and it is convenient for thee, to sollicitate this worke in soche wise, that when the walle falleth, the diche maie be digged at least, fower or five yardes in depth: the whiche diche is necessarie, while it is a digging, to shutte it on every side with a slaughter house: and when the wall is so strong, that it giveth thee time to make the diche, and the slaughter houses, that battered parte, commeth to be moche stronger, then the rest of the citee: for that soche fortificacion, cometh to have the forme, of the diches which we devised within: but when the walle is weake, and that it giveth thee not tyme, to make like fortificacions, then strengthe and valiauntnesse muste bee shewed, settyng againste the enemies armed menne, with all thy force. this maner of fortificacion was observed of the pisans, when you besieged theim, and thei might doe it, bicause thei had strong walles, whiche gave them time, the yearth beyng softe and moste meete to raise up banckes, and to make fortificacions: where if thei had lacked this commoditie, thei should have loste the toune. therefore it shall bee alwaies prudently doen, to provide afore hand, makyng diches within the citee, and through out all the circuite thereof, as a little before wee devised: for that in this case, the enemie maie safely be taried for at laisure, the fortificacions beyng redy made. the antiquitie many tymes gotte tounes, with muinyng under ground in twoo maners, either thei made a waie under grounde secretely, whiche risse in the toune, and by thesame entered, in whiche maner the romaines toke the citee of veienti, or with the muinyng, thei overthrewe a walle, and made it ruinate: this laste waie is now a daies moste stronge, and maketh, that the citees placed high, be most weake, bicause thei maie better bee under muined: and puttyng after in a cave of this gunne pouder, whiche in a momente kindelyng, not onely ruinateth a wall, but it openeth the hilles, and utterly dissolveth the strength of them. [sidenote: the reamedie against caves or undermuinynges; what care the besieged ought to have; what maketh a citee or campe difficulte to bee defended; by what meanes thei that besiege ar made afraied; honour got by constancie.] the remedie for this, is to builde in the plain, and to make the diche that compasseth thy citee, so deepe, that the enemie maie not digge lower then thesame, where he shall not finde water, whiche onely is enemie to the caves: for if thou be in a toune, which thou defendest on a high ground, thou canst not remedie it otherwise, then to make within thy walles many deepe welles, the whiche be as drouners to thesame caves, that the enemie is able to ordain against thee. an other remedie there is, to make a cave againste it, when thou shouldeste bee aware where he muineth, the whiche waie easely hindereth hym, but difficultly it is foreseen, beyng besieged of a craftie enemie. he that is besieged, ought above al thinges to have care, not to bee oppressed in the tyme of reste: as is after a battaile fought, after the watche made, whiche is in the mornyng at breake of daie, and in the evenyng betwen daie and night, and above al, at meale times: in whiche tyme many tounes have been wonne, and armies have been of them within ruinated: therefore it is requisite with diligence on all partes, to stande alwaies garded, and in a good part armed. i will not lacke to tell you, how that, whiche maketh a citee or a campe difficult to be defended, is to be driven to kepe sundred all the force, that thou haste in theim, for that the enemie beyng able to assaulte thee at his pleasure altogether, it is conveniente for thee on every side, to garde every place, and so he assaulteth thee with all his force, and thou with parte of thine defendest thee. also, the besieged maie bee overcome altogether, he without cannot bee, but repulced: wherefore many, whom have been besieged, either in a campe, or in a toune, although thei have been inferiour of power, have issued out with their men at a sodaine, and have overcome the enemie. this marcellus of nola did: this did cesar in fraunce, where his campe beeyng assaulted of a moste great nomber of frenchmen, and seeyng hymself not able to defende it, beyng constrained to devide his force into many partes, and not to bee able standyng within the listes, with violence to repulce thenemie: he opened the campe on thone side, and turning towardes thesame parte with all his power, made so moche violence against them, and with moche valiantnes, that he vanquisshed and overcame them. the constancie also of the besieged, causeth many tymes displeasure, and maketh afraied them that doe besiege. pompei beyng against cesar, and cesars armie beeyng in greate distresse through famine, there was brought of his bredde to pompei, whom seyng it made of grasse, commaunded, that it should not bee shewed unto his armie, least it shoulde make them afraide, seyng what enemies they had against theim. nothyng caused so muche honour to the romaines in the warre of aniball, as their constancie: for as muche as in what so ever envious, and adverse fortune thei were troubled, they never demaunded peace, thei never made anie signe of feare, but rather when aniball was aboute rome, thei solde those fieldes, where he had pitched his campe, dearer then ordinarie in other times shoulde have been solde: and they stoode in so much obstinacie in their enterprises, that for to defende rome, thei would not raise their campe from capua, the whiche in the verie same time that roome was besieged, the romaines did besiege. i knowe that i have tolde you of manie thynges, the whiche by your selfe you might have understoode, and considered, notwithstandyng i have doen it (as to daie also i have tolde you) for to be abell to shewe you better by meane therof, the qualitie of this armie, and also for to satisfie those, if there be anie, whome have not had the same commoditie to understand them as you. nor me thinkes that there resteth other to tell you, then certaine generall rules, the whiche you shal have moste familiar, which be these. [sidenote: generall rules of warre.] the same that helpeth the enemie, hurteth thee: and the same that helpeth thee, hurteth the enemie. he that shall be in the warre moste vigilant to observe the devises of the enemie, and shall take moste payne to exercise his armie, shall incurre least perilles and maie hope moste of the victorie. never conducte thy men to faight the field, if first them hast not confirmed their mindes and knowest them to be without feare, and to be in good order: for thou oughteste never to enterprise any dangerous thyng with thy souldiours, but when thou seest, that they hope to overcome. it is better to conquere the enemie with faminne, then with yron: in the victorie of which, fortune maie doe much more then valiantnesse. no purpose is better then that, whiche is hidde from the enemie untill thou have executed it. to know in the warre how to understande occasion, and to take it, helpeth more then anie other thynge. nature breedeth few stronge menne, the industrie and the exercise maketh manie. discipline maie doe more in warre, then furie. when anie departe from the enemies side for to come to serve thee, when thei be faithfull, thei shalbe unto thee alwaies great gaines: for that the power of thadversaries are more deminisshed with the losse of them, that runne awaie, then of those that be slaine, although that the name of a fugetive be to new frendes suspected, to olde odius. better it is in pitchyng the fielde, to reserve behynde the first front aide inoughe, then to make the fronte bigger to disperse the souldiours. he is difficultely overcome, whiche can know his owne power and the same of the enemie. the valiantenesse of the souldiours availeth more then the multitude. some times the situacion helpeth more then the valiantenesse. new and sudden thynges, make armies afrayde. slowe and accustomed thinges, be littell regarded of them. therfore make thy armie to practise and to know with small faightes a new enemie, before thou come to faight the fielde with him. he that with disorder foloweth the enemie after that he is broken, will doe no other, then to become of a conquerour a loser. he that prepareth not necessarie victualles to live upon, is overcome without yron. he that trusteth more in horsemen then in footemen, more in footemen then in horsemen, must accommodate him selfe with the situacion. when thou wilte see if in the daie there be comen anie spie into the campe, cause everie man to goe to his lodgynge. chaunge purpose, when thou perceivest that the enemie hath forseene it. [sidenote: how to consulte.] consulte with many of those thinges, which thou oughtest to dooe: the same that thou wilt after dooe, conferre with fewe. souldiours when thei abide at home, are mainteined with feare and punishemente, after when thei ar led to the warre with hope and with rewarde. good capitaines come never to faight the fielde, excepte necessitie constraine theim, and occasion call them. cause that thenemies know not, how thou wilte order thy armie to faight, and in what so ever maner that thou ordainest it, make that the firste bande may be received of the seconde and of the thirde. in the faight never occupie a battell to any other thyng, then to the same, for whiche thou haste apoineted it, if thou wilt make no disorder. the sodene accidentes, with difficultie are reamedied: those that are thought upon, with facilitie. [sidenote: what thynges are the strength of the warre.] men, yron, money, and bread, be the strengthe of the warre, but of these fower, the first twoo be moste necessarie: because men and yron, finde money and breade: but breade and money fynde not men and yron. the unarmed riche man, is a bootie to the poore souldiour. accustome thy souldiours to dispise delicate livyng and lacivius aparell. this is as muche as hapneth me generally to remember you, and i know that there might have ben saied manie other thynges in all this my reasonynge: as should be, howe and in howe manie kinde of waies the antiquitie ordered their bandes, how thei appareled them, and how in manie other thynges they exercised them, and to have joygned hereunto manie other particulars, the whiche i have not judged necessarie to shew, as wel for that you your self may se them, as also for that my intente hath not been to shew juste how the olde servis of warre was apoincted, but howe in these daies a servis of warre might be ordained, whiche should have more vertue then the same that is used. wherfore i have not thought good of the auncient thynges to reason other, then that, which i have judged to suche introduction necessarie. i know also that i might have delated more upon the service on horsebacke, and after have reasoned of the warre on the sea: for as muche as he that destinguissheth the servis of warre, saieth, how there is an armie on the sea, and of the lande, on foote, and on horsebacke. of that on the sea, i will not presume to speake, for that i have no knowledge therof: but i will let the genoues, and the venecians speake therof, whome with like studies have heretofore doen great thinges. also of horses, i wil speake no other, then as afore i have saied, this parte beynge (as i have declared) least corrupted. besides this, the footemen being wel ordained, which is the puissance of the armie, good horses of necessitie will come to be made. [sidenote: provisions that maie bee made to fill a realme full of good horse; the knowledge that a capitaine oughte to have.] onely i counsel him that would ordayne the exercise of armes in his owne countrey, and desireth to fill the same with good horses, that he make two provisions: the one is, that he destribute mares of a good race throughe his dominion, and accustome his menne to make choise of coltes, as you in this countrie make of calves and mules: the other is, that to thentente the excepted might finde a byer, i woulde prohibet that no man should kepe a mule excepte he woulde keepe a horse: so that he that woulde kepe but one beaste to ride on, shoulde be constrained to keepe a horse: and moreover that no man should weare fine cloathe except he which doeth keepe a horse: this order i under stande hath beene devised of certaine princes in our time, whome in short space have therby, brought into their countrey an excellente numbre of good horses. aboute the other thynges, as much as might be looked for concernynge horse, i remit to as much as i have saied to daie, and to that whiche they use. peradventure also you woulde desire to understand what condicions a capitaine ought to have: wherof i shal satisfie you moste breeflie: for that i cannot tell how to chose anie other man then the same, who shoulde know howe to doe all those thynges whiche this daie hath ben reasoned of by us: the which also should not suffise, when he should not knowe howe to devise of him selfe: for that no man without invencion, was ever excellent in anie science: and if invencion causeth honour in other thynges, in this above all, it maketh a man honorable: for everie invention is seen, although it were but simple, to be of writers celebrated: as it is seen, where alexander magnus is praised, who for to remove his campe moste secretely, gave not warnyng with the trumpette, but with a hatte upon a launce. and was praised also for havyng taken order that his souldiours in buckelynge with the enemies, shoulde kneele with the lefte legge, to bee able more strongly to withstande their violence: the whiche havyng geven him the victorie, it got him also so muche praise, that all the images, whiche were erected in his honour, stoode after the same facion. but because it is tyme to finishe this reasonyng, i wil turne againe to my first purpose, and partly i shall avoide the same reproche, wherin they use to condempne in this towne, such as knoweth not when to make an ende. [sidenote: the auctor retorneth to his first purpose and maketh a littel discorse to make an ende of his reasonyng.] if you remembre cosimus you tolde me, that i beyng of one side an exalter of the antiquitie, and a dispraiser of those, which in waightie matters imitated them not, and of the other side, i havynge not in the affaires of war, wherin i have taken paine, imitated them, you coulde not perceive the occasion: wherunto i answered, how that men which wil doo any thing, muste firste prepare to knowe how to doe it, for to be able, after to use it, when occasion permitteth: whether i doe know how to bryng the servis of warre to the auncient manners or no, i will be judged by you, whiche have hearde me upon this matter longe dispute wherby you may know, how much time i have consumed in these studies: and also i beleeve that you maie imagen, how much desire is in me to brynge it to effecte: the whiche whether i have been able to have doen, or that ever occasion hath been geven me, most easely you maie conjecture: yet for to make you more certaine and for my better justificacion, i will also aledge the occasions: and as much as i have promised, i will partely performe, to shew you the difficultie and the facelitie, whiche bee at this presente in suche imitacions. [sidenote: a prince may easelie brynge to intiere perfection the servis of warre; two sortes of capitaines worthie to bee praysed.] therfore i saie, how that no deede that is doen now a daies emong men, is more easie to be reduced unto the aunciente maners, then the service of warre: but by them onely that be princes of so moche state, who can at least gather together of their owne subjectes, xv. or twentie thousande yong menne: otherwise, no thyng is more difficulte, then this, to them whiche have not soche commoditie: and for that you maie the better understande this parte, you have to knowe, howe that there bee of twoo condicions, capitaines to bee praised: the one are those, that with an armie ordained through the naturalle discipline thereof, have dooen greate thynges: as were the greater parte of the romaine citezeins, and suche as have ledde armies, the which have had no other paine, then to maintaine them good, and to se them guided safely: the other are they, whiche not onely have had to overcome the enemie, but before they come to the same, have been constrained to make good and well ordered their armie: who without doubte deserve muche more praise, then those have deserved, which with olde armies, and good, have valiantely wrought. of these, such wer pelopida, and epaminonda, tullus hostillius, phillip of macedony father of alexander, cirus kyng of the percians, graccus a romaine: they all were driven first to make their armies good, and after to faighte with them: they all coulde doe it, as well throughe their prudence, as also for havynge subjectes whome thei might in like exercises instruct: nor it shuld never have ben otherwise possible, that anie of theim, though they had ben never so good and ful of al excellencie, should have been able in a straunge countrey, full of men corrupted, not used to anie honest obedience, to have brought to passe anie laudable worke. it suffiseth not then in italie, to know how to governe an army made, but first it is necessarie to know how to make it and after to know how to commaunde it: and to do these things it is requisit they bee those princes, whome havyng much dominion, and subjectes inoughe, maie have commoditie to doe it: of whiche i can not bee, who never commaunded, nor cannot commaunde, but to armies of straungers, and to men bounde to other, and not to me: in whiche if it be possible, or no, to introduce anie of those thynges that this daie of me hath ben reasoned, i will leave it to your judgement. albeit when coulde i make one of these souldiours which now a daies practise, to weare more armur then the ordinarie, and besides the armur, to beare their owne meate for two or three daies, with a mattocke: when coulde i make theim to digge, or keepe theim every daie manie howers armed, in fained exercises, for to bee able after in the verie thyng in deede to prevaile? when woulde thei abstaine from plaie, from laciviousnesse, from swearynge, from the insolence, whiche everie daie they committe? when would they be reduced into so muche dissepline, into so much obedience and reverence, that a tree full of appels in the middest of their campe, shoulde be founde there and lefte untouched? as is redde, that in the auncient armies manie times hapned. what thynge maye i promis them, by meane wherof thei may have me in reverence to love, or to feare, when the warre beyng ended, they have not anie more to doe with me? wher of maie i make them ashamed, whiche be borne and brought up without shame? whie shoulde thei be ruled by me who knowe me not? by what god or by what sainctes may i make them to sweare? by those that thei worship, or by those that they blaspheme? who they worship i knowe not anie: but i knowe well they blaspheme all. how shoulde i beleeve that thei will keepe their promise to them, whome everie hower they dispise? how can they, that dispise god, reverence men? then what good fashion shoulde that be, whiche might be impressed in this matter? and if you should aledge unto me that suyzzers and spaniardes bee good souldiours, i woulde confesse unto you, how they be farre better then the italians: but if you note my reasonynge, and the maner of procedyng of bothe, you shall see, howe they lacke many thynges to joygne to the perfection of the antiquetie. and how the suyzzers be made good of one of their naturall uses caused of that, whiche to daie i tolde you: those other are made good by mean of a necessitie: for that servyng in a straunge countrie, and seemyng unto them to be constrained either to die, or to overcome, thei perceivynge to have no place to flie, doe become good: but it is a goodnesse in manie partes fawtie: for that in the same there is no other good, but that they bee accustomed to tarie the enemie at the pike and sweardes poincte: nor that, which thei lacke, no man should be meete to teache them, and so much the lesse, he that coulde not speake their language. [sidenote: the auctor excuseth the people of italie to the great reproche of their prynces for their ignorance in the affaires of warre.] but let us turne to the italians, who for havynge not had wise princes, have not taken anie good order: and for havyng not had the same necessitie, whiche the spaniardes have hadde, they have not taken it of theim selves, so that they remaine the shame of the worlde: and the people be not to blame, but onely their princes, who have ben chastised, and for their ignorance have ben justely punisshed, leesinge moste shamefully their states, without shewing anie vertuous ensample. and if you will see whether this that i say be trew: consider how manie warres have ben in italie since the departure of kyng charles to this day, where the war beyng wonte to make men warlyke and of reputacion, these the greater and fierser that they have been, so muche the more they have made the reputacion of the members and of the headdes therof to bee loste. this proveth that it groweth, that the accustomed orders were not nor bee not good, and of the newe orders, there is not anie whiche have knowen how to take them. nor never beleeve that reputacion will be gotten, by the italians weapons, but by the same waie that i have shewed, and by means of theim, that have great states in italie: for that this forme maie be impressed in simple rude men, of their owne, and not in malicious, ill brought up, and straungers. nor there shall never bee founde anie good mason, whiche will beleeve to be able to make a faire image of a peece of marbell ill hewed, but verye well of a rude peece. [sidenote: a discription of the folishenesse of the italian princes; cesar and alexander, were the formoste in battell; the venecians and the duke of ferare began to have reduced the warfare to the aunciente maners; he that despiseth the servis of warre, despiseth his own welthe.] our italian princes beleved, before thei tasted the blowes of the outlandishe warre, that it should suffice a prince to knowe by writynges, how to make a subtell answere, to write a goodly letter, to shewe in saiynges, and in woordes, witte and promptenesse, to knowe how to canvas a fraude, to decke theim selves with precious stones and gold, to slepe and to eate with greater glorie then other: to keepe many lascivious persones aboute them, to governe theim selves with their subjectes, covetuously and proudely: to rotte in idlenesse, to give the degrees of the exercise of warre, for good will, to despise if any should have shewed them any laudable waie, minding that their wordes should bee aunswers of oracles: nor the sely wretches were not aware, that thei prepared theim selves to bee a praie, to whom so ever should assaulte theim. hereby grewe then in the thousande fower hundred nintie and fower yere, the greate feares, the sodain flightes, and the marveilous losses: and so three most mightie states which were in italie, have been divers times sacked and destroied. but that which is worse, is where those that remaine, continue in the verie same erroure, and live in the verie same disorder, and consider not, that those, who in old time would kepe their states, caused to be dooen these thynges, which of me hath been reasoned, and that their studies wer, to prepare the body to diseases, and the minde not to feare perilles. whereby grewe that cesar, alexander, and all those menne and excellente princes in old tyme, were the formoste emongest the faighters, goyng armed on foote: and if thei loste their state, thei would loose their life, so that thei lived and died vertuously. and if in theim, or in parte of theim, there might bee condempned to muche ambicion to reason of: yet there shall never bee founde, that in theim is condempned any tendernesse or any thynge that maketh menne delicate and feable: the whiche thyng, if of these princes were redde and beleved, it should be impossible, that thei should not change their forme of living, and their provinces not to chaunge fortune. and for that you in the beginnyng of this our reasonyng, lamented your ordinaunces, i saie unto you, that if you had ordained it, as i afore have reasoned, and it had given of it self no good experience, you might with reason have been greved therewith: but if it bee not so ordained, and exercised, as i have saied, it maie be greeved with you, who have made a counterfaite thereof, and no perfecte figure. the venecians also, and the duke of ferare, beganne it, and followed it not, the whiche hath been through their faulte, not through their menne. and therfore i assure you, that who so ever of those, whiche at this daie have states in italie, shall enter firste into this waie, shall be firste, before any other, lorde of this province, and it shall happen to his state, as to the kyngdome of the macedonians, the which commyng under philip, who had learned the maner of settyng armies in order of epaminondas a thebane, became with this order, and with these exercises (whileste the reste of grece stoode in idlenesse, and attended to risite comedes) so puisant, that he was able in few yeres to possesse it all, and to leave soche foundacion to his sonne, that he was able to make hymself, prince of all the world. he then that despiseth these studies, if he be a prince, despiseth his princedome: if he bee a citezein, his citee. wherefore, i lamente me of nature, the whiche either ought not to have made me a knower of this, or it ought to have given me power, to have been able to have executed it: for now beyng olde, i cannot hope to have any occasion, to bee able so to dooe: in consideracion whereof, i have been liberall with you, who beeyng grave yong menne, maie (when the thynges saied of me shall please you) at due tymes in favour of your princes, helpe theim and counsaile them, wherein i would have you not to bee afraied, or mistrustfull, bicause this province seemes to bee altogether given, to raise up againe the thynges dedde, as is seen by the perfeccion that poesie, paintyng, and writing, is now brought unto: albeit, as moche as is looked for of me, beyng strooken in yeres, i do mistruste. where surely, if fortune had heretofore graunted me so moche state, as suffiseth for a like enterprise, i would not have doubted, but in moste shorte tyme, to have shewed to the worlde, how moche the aunciente orders availe: and without peradventure, either i would have increased it with glory, or loste it without shame. * * * * * the ende of the seventh and laste booke of the arte of warre, of nicholas machiavell, citezein and secretarie of florence, translated out of italian into englishe: by peter whitehorne, felow of graise inne. nicholas machiavel, citezein and secretarie of florence, to the readers to thentente that such as rede this booke maie without difficultie understande the order of the battailes, or bandes of men, and of the armies, and lodgynges in the campe, accordynge as they in the discription of theim are apoincted, i thinke it necessarie to shewe you the figure of everie one of them: wherefore it is requiset firste, to declare unto you, by what poinctes and letters, the footemen, the horsemen, and everie other particuler membre are set foorthe. know therfore that .} signifieth {targetmen. '} {pikemen. c} {a capitaine of ten men. v} {veliti ordinarie. (those men that shoot with harcabuses or bowes) r} {veliti extraordinari. c} {a centurion or captaine of a hundred men. k} {a constable or a captaine of a band of fower hundred and fiftie men. h} {the hed captain of a maine battel. g} {the general captaine of the whole armie. t} {the trompet. d} {the drum. b} {the ansigne. s} {the standerde. m} {men of armes. l} {light horsemen. a} {artillerie or ordinance. in the first figure nexte folowyng, is discribed the forme of an ordinarie battaile or bande of fower hundred and fiftie men, and in what maner it is redoubled by flanke. and also how with the verie same order of lxxx. rankes, by chaungyng onely to the hinder parte the five rankes of pikes which were the formost of everie centurie, thei maye likewise in bringyng them in battaile raie, come to bee placed behinde: whiche may be doen, when in marchyng, the enemies should come to assaulte them at their backes: accordynge as the orderyng therof is before declared. fol. . in the seconde figure, is shewed how a battaile or bande of men is ordered, whiche in marchyng should be driven to faight on the flanke: accordyng as in the booke is declared. fol. . in the thirde figure, is shewed how a battaile or bande of men, is ordered with two hornes, fol. , and after is shewed how the same maie be made with a voide place in the middest: accordynge as the orderyng therof, in the booke moste plainely is declared, fol. . in the fowerth figure, is shewed the forme or facion of an armie apoincted to faight the battaile with the enemies: and for the better understandynge thereof, the verie same is plainlier set foorthe in the figure next unto it, wherby the other two figures next folowyng maie the easier be understoode: accordynge as in the booke is expressed. fol. . in the fifte figure, is shewed the forme of a fower square armie: as in the booke is discribed. fol. . in the sixte figure, is shewed howe an armie is brought from a fower square facion, to the ordinarie forme, to faight a fielde: accordyng as afore is declared. fol. . in the seventh figure, is discribed the maner of incamping: according as the same in the booke is declared. fol. . the firste figure this is the maner of ordering of cccc. men, into lxxx. rankes, five to a ranke, to bring them into a iiii square battaile with the pikes on the front, as after foloweth. c c'''' c'''' c'''' c'''' c'''' c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c.... c ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... c ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... c ''''c ''''c ''''c ''''c ''''c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c ....c this is the foresaied lxxx. rankes of iiii. c. men brought into a fower square battaile with the pikes on the fronte. and the fiftie veliti on the sides and on the backe. c c vc''''''''''''''''''cv vc''''''''''''''''''cv vc''''''''''''''''''cv vc''''''''''''''''''cv vc''''''''''''''''''cv vc........dkb.......cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv vc..................cv c v v v v v v v v v v c the seconde figure this is the maner of ordering of cccc. men, into lxxx. rankes, five to a ranke, to bring them into a iiii square battaile with the pikes on the side, as after foloweth. c ccccc ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ''''' ccccc c ccccc ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ccccc c ccccc ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ccccc c ccccc ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ccccc this is the foresaied lxxx. rankes of iiii. c. men brought into a fower square battaile with the pikes on the side. cvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvc cccccccccccccccccccc v...............''''' ...............''''' v...............''''' ...............''''' v...............''''' ...............''''' v...............''''' ...............''''' v...............''''' ...............''''' v...............''''' ...............''''' v...............''''' ...............''''' v...............''''' ...............''''' v...............''''' ...............''''' v...............''''' cccccccccccccccccccc cvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvc the thyrde figure these are the nombers of rankes appoincted to make the horned battaile of, and the square battaile with the voide space in the middest, as after foloweth. ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ............... ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ............... cccccccccccccccccccc.....c...............c ......................... ............... ......................... ............... ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ccccccccccccccccccccc.....c ......................... ......................... ............... ............... ............... ............... ...............d ...............k ...............b ............... ............... ............... ............... ......................... ......................... ccccccccccccccccccccc.....c ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ............... ......................... ............... ......................... ...............ccccccccccccccccccccc.....c ............... ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ............... ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ccccccccccccccccccccc.....c ......................... ......................... ....... ........ ....... ........ ....... ........ ....... d ........ ....... k ........ ....... b ........ ....... ........ ....... ........ ....... ........ ....... ........ ......................... ......................... ccccccccccccccccccccc.....c ''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''''''' the fourth figure a a a a a a llm mcrccc cu,,uccu,,uccu,,uccu,,uccu,,uca llm mrrr,,, vu,,uvvu,,uvvu,,uvvu,,uvvu,,uva llm mrrrdkb vdk bvvdk bvvdk bvvdk bvvdk bv lltksdkb,,, vc..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uv t g llm mrrr,,, vc..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uv lll ktm mrrr,,, vc..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uv .... lsm mcr(,,, cu..uccu..uccu..uccu..uccu..uc llm m ,,, llm m ,,, ..... llm m ,,, dhb llm m ,,, ..... ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, cu..uc cu..uc cu..uc ,,, vu,,uv vu,,uv vu,,uv ,,, vdk bv vdk bv vdk bv cdkbc vu..uv vu..uv vu..uv ,, vu..uv vu..uv vu..uv ,,, vu..uv vu..uv vu..uv ,,, cu..uc cu..uc cu..uc ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, cu,,uc cu,,uc ,,, vu,,uv vu,,uv ,,, vdk bv vdk bv ,,, vu..uv vu..uv dkb vu..uv vu..uv ,,, vu..uv vu..uv c c cu..uc cu..uc the cariages and the unarmed. a a a a a a a cu,,uccu,,uccu,,uccu,,uccu,,uc c ccrcm mll a vu,,uvvu,,uvvu,,uvvu,,uvvu,,uv ,,,rrrm mll m vdk bvvdk bvvdk bvvdk bvvdk bv dkbrrrm mll s vu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uv ,,,dkbm mll llvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uv ,,,rrrtksll ..vu.. vvu..uvvu..uvvu..uvvu..uv ,,,rrrm mtk cu..uccu..uc ..uccu..uccu..uc ,,,rrrm msl ,,, m mll ,,, m mll dhb ,,, m mll .... ,,, m mll ,,, ,,, ,,, cu,,uc cu,,uc cu,,uc ,,, vu,,uv uv,,uv uv,,uv ,,, vdk bv vdk bv vdk bv ,,, vu..uv vu..uv vu..uv cdkbc vu..uv vu..uv vu..uv ,,, vu..uv vu..uv vu..uv ,,, cu..uc cu..uc cu..uc ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, ,,, cu,,uc cu,,uc ,,, vu,,uv uv,,uv ,,, vdk bv vdk bv ,,, vu..uv vu..uv ,,, vu..uv vu..uv dkb vu..uv vu..uv ,,, cu..uc cu..uc c c the fift figure a ) ,,,, c) ,,,, c) ,,,, 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dkb.. .. dkb,, a ,,,,.... ....,,,, a ,,,,.... ....,,,, ) n n nc ) n n nc ) u u uc ) u u uc a ,,,,.... ....,,,, a ,,,,.... .... ....,,,, ,, dkb.. d hb .. dkb,, ,,,,.... .... .. dkb,, a ,,,,.... ....,,,, a ) n n nc ) n n nc ) ,,,, c)....c ) r) rc rc )....c)....c)....c)....c) ,,,, c u ,,,, uu....urrrrrrrrrrrru....uu....uu....uu....uu ,,,, c a u ,,,, uu....urr dkb dkb ru....uu....uu....uu....uu ,,,, u a u dkb uu dkbu rrrrrrrrrrru dkbnu dkbuu dkbuu dkbuu dkb u u ,,,, uu,,,,urr dkb dkb ru,,,,uu,,,,uu,,,,uu,,,,uu ,,,, u u ,,,, uu,,,,u rrrrrrrrrrru,,,,uu,,,,uu,,,,uu,,,,uu ,,,, u a ) ,,,, c),,,,c ) r) rc rc ),,,,u),,,,c),,,,c),,,,c) ,,,, c a mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmtksmmm mmmtksmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm mmmm a a a a a mmmmmmmm cvc)u, ,uc)u, ,uc)u, ,uc)u,,uc)u, mmmmmmmm vvvru, ,urru, ,urru, ,urru,,urru,, mmmmmmmm vvvrudkburrudkburrd k brrdk brrudk mmmtksmmmvvvru. .urru. .urru. .urru..urru.. mmmmmmmm vvvru. .ruur. .urru. .urru..urru.. mmmmmmmm vvv)u. .uc)u. .uc)u. .uc)u..uccu . mmmmmmmm vvv),,,,,c dkbr,,,...r .... .lll vvvr,dkb..r dhb . .m vvvr,,,...r .... ...t vvvr,,,...r .... vvv),,,...c vvv),,,...c vvvr,,,...r )u, ,uc )u,, )vcr,dkb .r ru. ,ur ru,, r,,,...r rudkbur ru,d r,,,...r ru. .ur ru.. r,,,...r ru. .ur ru.. ),,,...c )u. .uc )u. ),,,...c r,,,...r r,dkb..r r,,,...r r,,,...r ),,,...c ),,,...c r,,,...r )u. .uc r,dkb..r ru, ,ur r,,,...r rudkbur r,,,...r ru. .ur ),,, ..c ru. .ur ),,,...c )u. .uc r,,,...r )u. .uc r,,dkb.r r,,,...r r,,,...r ),,, ..c ),,,,,,c r,,,,,,r r, dkb,r r,,,,,,r r,,,,,,r ),,,,,,c a a a a a ,uc)u, ,uc)u, ,uc)u, ,uc)u, ,uc)v) mmmmmmmm ,urru, ,urru, ,urru, ,urru, ,urvvv mmmmmmmm b,rr,dkb,rr,dkb,rr,dkb,rr dkb rvvv mmmmmmmm .urru. .urru. .urru. .urru. .urvvvmmmtkfmmm .urru. .urru. .urru. .urru. .urvvv mmmmmmmm .uc)u. .uc)u. .uc)u. .uccu. .u)vvv mmmmmmmm )...,,cvvv mmmmmmmm .ll.. .... r...,,,rdkb .m. dhb r.dkb, rvvv gs.. .... r...,,,rvvv .... r...,,,rvvv )... ,,cvvv ,uc )u. .uc )... ,,cvvv ,ur ru, ,ur r...,,,rvvv kb,r r,dkb,r r.dkb, rc ) ,ur ru. .ur r...,,,r ,ur ru. .ur r...,,,r ,uc )u. .u) )... ,,c )... ,,c r...,,,r r.dkb, r r...,,,r r...,,,r )...,,,c )...,,,c )u, ,uc r...,, r ru, ,ur r.dkb, r r,dkb,r r...,,,r ru. .ur r...,,,r ru. .ur )... ,,c )u. .uc )... ,,c r...,,,r r.dkb, r r...,,,r r...,,,r )... ,,c ),,, ,,c r,,,,,,r r,dkb, r r,,,,,,r r,,,,,,r ),,, ,,c nicholas machiavel's prince translated out of italian into english by e.d. with some animadversions noting and taxing his errors to the most noble and illustrious, james duke of lenox, earle of march, baron of setrington, darnly, terbanten, and methuen, lord great chamberlain and admiral of scotland, knight of the most noble order of the garter, and one of his majesties most honourable privy counsel in both kingdomes. poysons are not all of that malignant and noxious quality, that as destructives of nature, they are utterly to be abhord; but we find many, nay most of them have their medicinal uses. this book carries its poyson and malice in it; yet mee thinks the judicious peruser may honestly make use of it in the actions of his life, with advantage. the lamprey, they say, hath a venemous string runs all along the back of it; take that out, and it is serv'd in for a choyce dish to dainty palates; epictetus the philosopher, sayes, every thing hath two handles, as the fire brand, it may be taken up at one end in the bare hand without hurt: the other being laid hold on, will cleave to the very flesh, and the smart of it will pierce even to the heart. sin hath the condition of the fiery end; the touch of it is wounding with griefe unto the soule: nay it is worse; one sin goes not alone but hath many consequences. your grace may find the truth of this in your perusal of this author: your judgement shall easily direct you in finding out the good uses of him: i have pointed at his chiefest errors with my best endeavors, and have devoted them to your graces service: which if you shall accept and protect, i shall remain your graces humble and devoted servant, edward dacres. the epistle to the reader. questionless some men will blame me for making this author speak in our vulgar tongue. for his maximes and tenents are condemnd of all, as pernicious to all christian states, and hurtfull to all humane societies. herein i shall answer for my self with the comoedian, _placere studeo bonis quam plurimis, et minimé multos lædere_: i endeavor to give content to the most i can of those that are well disposed, and no scandal to any. i grant, i find him blamed and condemned: i do no less my self. reader, either do thou read him without a prejudicate opinion, and out of thy own judgement taxe his errors; or at least, if thou canst stoop so low, make use of my pains to help thee; i will promise thee this reward for thy labor: if thou consider well the actions of the world, thou shalt find him much practised by those that condemn him; who willingly would walk as theeves do with close lanternes in the night, that they being undescried, and yet seeing all, might surprise the unwary in the dark. surely this book will infect no man: out of the wicked treasure of a mans own wicked heart, he drawes his malice and mischief. from the same flower the bee sucks honey, from whence the spider hath his poyson. and he that means well, shall be here warnd, where the deceitfull man learnes to set his snares. a judge who hath often used to examine theeves, becomes the more expert to sift out their tricks. if mischief come hereupon, blame not me, nor blame my author: lay the saddle on the right horse: but _hony soit qui mal y pense_: let shame light on him that hatcht the mischief. the prince nicholas machiavelli, to the magnificent laurence sonne to peter of medicis health. they that desire to ingratiate themselves with a prince, commonly use to offer themselves to his view, with things of that nature as such persons take most pleasure and delight in: whereupon we see they are many times presented with horses and armes, cloth of gold, pretious stones, and such like ornaments, worthy of their greatness. having then a mind to offer up my self to your magnificence, with some testimony of my service to you, i found nothing in my whole inventory, that i think better of, or more esteeme, than the knowlege of great mens actions, which i have learned by a long experience of modern affairs, and a continual reading of those of the ancients. which, now that i have with great diligence long workt it out, and throughly sifted, i commend to your magnificence. and, however i may well think this work unworthy of your view; yet such is your humanity, that i doubt not but it shall find acceptance, considering, that for my part i am not able to tender a greater gift, than to present you with the means, whereby in a very short time you may be able to understand all that, which i, in the space of many years, and with many sufferances and dangers, have made proof and gaind the knowledge of. and this work i have not set forth either with elegancy of discourse or stile, nor with any other ornament whereby to captivate the reader, as others use, because i would not have it gain its esteem from elsewhere than from the truth of the matter, and the gravity of the subject. nor can this be thought presumption, if a man of humble and low condition venture to dilate and discourse upon the governments of princes; for even as they that with their pensils designe out countreys, get themselves into the plains below to consider the nature of the mountains, and other high places above; and again to consider the plains below, they get up to the tops of the mountains; in like manner to understand the nature of the people, it is fit to be a prince; and to know well the dispositions of princes, sutes best with the understanding of a subject. your magnificence then may be pleased, to receive this small present, with the same mind that i send it; which if you shall throughly peruse and consider, you shall perceive therein that i exceedingly wish, that you may attain to that greatness, which your own fortune, and your excellent endowments promise you: and if your magnificence from the very point of your highness shall sometime cast your eyes upon these inferior places, you shall see how undeservedly i undergoe an extream and continual despight of fortune. the table of the chapters chap. . how many sorts of principalities there are, and how many wayes they are attained to, chap. . of hereditary principalities, chap. . of mixt principalities, chap. . wherefore darius his kingdome, taken by alexander, rebelled not against his successors after alexanders death, chap. . in what manner cities and principalities are to be governed, which before they were conquered, lived under their own laws, chap. . of new principalities that are conquered by ones own armes and valor, chap. . of new principalities gotten by fortune and other mens forces, chap. . concerning those who by wicked means have attaind to a principality, chap. . of the civil principality, chap. . in what manner the forces of all principalities ought to be measured, chap. . concerning ecclesiastical principalities, chap. . how many sorts of military discipline there be; and touching mercenary soldiers, chap. . of auxiliary soldiers, mixt and natives, chap. . what belongs to the prince touching military discipline, chap. . of those things in respect whereof men, and especially princes are prais'd or disprais'd, chap. . of liberality and miserableness, chap. . of cruelty and clemency, and whether it is better to be belov'd or feared, chap. . in what manner princes ought to keep their word, chap. . that princes should take a care not to incur contempt or hatred, chap. . whether the citadels and many other things, which princes make use of, are profitable or dammageable, chap. . how a prince ought to behave himself to gain reputation, chap. . touching princes secretaries, chap. . that flatterers are to be avoyded, chap. . wherefore the princes of italy have lost their states, chap. . how great power fortune hath in humane affairs, and what means there is to resist it, chap. . an exhortation to free italy from the barbarions, the prince written by nicholas machiavelli, secretary and citizen of florence. chap. i how many sorts of principalities there are, and how many wayes they are attained to. all states, all dominions that have had, or now have rule over men, have been and are, either republiques or principalities. principalities are either hereditary, whereof they of the blood of the lord thereof have long time been princes; or else they are new; and those that are new, are either all new, as was the dutchy of millan to francis sforce; or are as members adjoyned to the hereditary state of the prince that gains it; as the kingdom of naples is to the king of spain. these dominions so gotten, are accustomed either to live under a prince, or to enjoy their liberty; and are made conquest of, either with others forces, or ones own, either by fortune, or by valor. chap. ii of hereditary principalities. i will not here discourse of republiques, because i have other where treated of them at large: i will apply my self only to a principality, and proceed, while i weave this web, by arguing thereupon, how these principallities can be governed and maintained. i say then that in states of inheritance, and accustomed to the blood of their princes, there are far fewer difficulties to keep them, than in the new: for it suffices only not to transgress the course his ancestors took, and so afterward to temporise with those accidents that can happen; that if such a prince be but of ordinary industry, he shall allwaies be able to maintain himself in his state, unless by some extraordinary or excessive power he be deprived thereof; and when he had lost it, upon the least sinister chance that befalls the usurper, he recovers it again. we have in italy the duke of ferrara for example hereof, who was of ability to resist the venetians, in the year , and to withstand pope julius in the tenth for no other reason, than because he had of old continued in that rule; for the natural prince hath fewer occasions, and less heed to give offence, whereupon of necessity he must be more beloved; and unless it be that some extravagant vices of his bring him into hatred, it is agreeable to reason, that naturally he should be well beloved by his own subjects: and in the antiquity and continuation of the dominion, the remembrances and occasions of innovations are quite extinguished: for evermore one change leaves a kind of breach or dent, to fasten the building of another. chap. iii of mixt principalities. but the difficulties consist in the new principality; and first, if it be not all new, but as a member, so that it may be termed altogether as mixt; and the variations thereof proceed in the first place from a natural difficulty, which we commonly finde in all new principalities; for men do willingly change their lord, beleeving to better their condition; and this beliefe causes them to take armes against him that rules over them, whereby they deceive themselves, because they find after by experience, they have made it worse: which depends upon another natural and ordinary necessity, forcing him alwaies to offend those, whose prince he newly becomes, as well by his soldiers he is put to entertain upon them as by many other injuries, which a new conquest draws along with it; in such manner as thou findest all those thine enemies, whom thou hast endammaged in the seizing of that principality, and afterwards canst not keep them thy friends that have seated thee in it, for not being able to satisfie them according to their expectations, nor put in practice strong remedies against them, being obliged to them. for however one be very well provided with strong armies, yet hath he alwaies need of the favor of the inhabitants in the countrey, to enter thereinto. for these reasons, lewis the twelfth, king of france, suddenly took milan, and as soon lost it; and the first time lodwick his own forces served well enough to wrest it out of his hands; for those people that had opened him the gates, finding themselves deceived of their opinion, and of that future good which they had promised themselves, could not endure the distastes the new prince gave them. true it is, that countreys that have rebelled again the second time, being recovered, are harder lost; for their lord, taking occasion from their rebellion, is less respective of persons, but cares only to secure himself, by punishing the delinquents, to clear all suspicions, and to provide for himself where he thinks he is weakest: so that if to make france lose milan the first time, it was enough for duke lodwick to make some small stir only upon the confines; yet afterwards, before they could make him lose it the second time, they had need of the whole world together against him, and that all his armies should be wasted and driven out of italy; which proceeded from the forenamed causes: however though both the first and second time it was taken from him. the generall causes of the first we have treated of; it remains now that we see those of the second; and set down the remedies that he had, or any one else can have that should chance to be in those termes he was, whereby he might be able to maintain himself better in his conquest than the king of france did. i say therefore, that these states which by conquest are annexed to the ancient states of their conqueror, are either of the same province and the same language, or otherwise; and when they are, it is very easy to hold them, especially when they are not used to live free; and to enjoy them securely, it is enough to have extinguished the princes line who ruled over them: for in other matters, allowing them their ancient conditions, and there being not much difference of manners betwixt them, men ordinarily live quiet enough; as we have seen that burgundy did, britany, gascony, and normandy, which so long time continued with france: for however there be some difference of language between them, yet can they easily comport one with another; and whosoever makes the conquest of them, meaning to hold them, must have two regards; the first, that the race of their former prince be quite extinguished; the other, that he change nothing, neither in their lawes nor taxes, so that in a very short time they become one entire body with their ancient principality. but when any states are gaind in a province disagreeing in language, manners, and orders, here are the difficulties, and here is there need of good fortune, and great industry to maintain them; and it would be one of the best and livelyest remedies, for the conqueror to goe in person and dwell there; this would make the possession hereof more secure and durable; as the turk hath done in greece, who among all the other courses taken by him for to hold that state, had he not gone thither himself in person to dwell, it had never been possible for him to have kept it: for abiding there, he sees the disorders growing in their beginnings, and forthwith can remedy them; whereas being not there present, they are heard of when they are grown to some height, and then is there no help for them. moreover, the province is not pillaged by the officers thou sendest thither: the subjects are much satisfied of having recourse to the prince near at hand, whereupon have they more reason to love him, if they mean to be good; and intending to do otherwise, to fear him: and forrein princes will be well aware how they invade that state; insomuch, that making his abode there, he can very hardly lose it. another remedy, which is also a better, is to send colonies into one or two places, which may be as it were the keys of that state; for it is necessary either to do this, or to maintain there many horse and foot. in these colonies the prince makes no great expence, and either without his charge, or at a very small rate, he may both send and maintain them; and gives offence only to them from whom he takes their fields and houses, to bestow them on those new inhabitants who are but a very small part of that state; and those that he offends, remaining dispersed and poore, can never hurt him: and all the rest on one part, have no offence given them, and therefore a small matter keeps them in quiet: on the other side, they are wary not to erre, for fear it befalls not them, as it did those that were dispoild. i conclude then, that those colonies that are not chargeable, are the more trusty, give the less offence; and they that are offended, being but poor and scattered, can do but little harme, as i have said; for it is to be noted, that men must either be dallyed and flattered withall, or else be quite crusht; for they revenge themselves of small dammages; but of great ones they are not able; so that when wrong is done to any man, it ought so to be done, that it need fear no return of revenge again. but in lieu of colonies, by maintaining soldiers there, the expence is great; for the whole revenues of that state are to be spent in the keeping of it; so the conquest proves but a loss to him that hath got it, and endammages him rather; for it hurts that whole state to remove the army from place to place, of which annoyance every one hath a feeling, and so becomes enemie to thee; as they are enemies, i wis, who are outraged by thee in their own houses, whensoever they are able to do thee mischief. every way then is this guard unprofitable. besides, he that is in a different province, (as it is said) should make himself head and defender of his less powerfull neighbors, and devise alwaies to weaken those that are more mighty therein, and take care that upon no chance there enter not any foreiner as mighty as himself; for it will alwaies come to pass, that they shall be brought in by those that are discontented, either upon ambition, or fear; as the etolians brought the romans into greece; and they were brought into every countrey they came, by the natives; and the course of the matter is, that so soon as a powerfull stranger enters a countrey, all those that are the less powerfull there, cleave to him, provoked by an envy they beare him that is more mighty than they; so that for these of the weaker sort, he may easily gain them without any pains: for presently all of them together very willingly make one lump with that he hath gotten: he hath only to beware that these increase not their strengths, nor their authorities, and so he shall easily be able by his own forces, and their assistances, to take down those that are mighty, and remain himself absolute arbitre of that countrey. and he that playes not well this part, shall quickly lose what he hath gotten; and while he holds it, shall find therein a great many troubles and vexations. the romans in the provinces they seiz'd on, observed well these points, sent colonies thither, entertained the weaker sort, without augmenting any thing their power, abated the forces of those that were mighty, and permitted not any powerfull forreiner to gain too much reputation there. and i will content my self only with the countrey of greece for example hereof. the achayans and etolians were entertained by them, the macedons kingdome was brought low, antiochus was driven thence, nor ever did the achayans or etolians deserts prevail so far for them, that they would ever promise to enlarge their state, nor the perswasions of philip induce them ever to be his friends, without bringing him lower; nor yet could antiochus his power make them ever consent that he should hold any state in that countrey: for the romans did in these cases that which all judicious princes ought to do, who are not only to have regard unto all present mischiefs, but also to the future, and to provide for those with all industry; for by taking order for those when they are afarre off, it is easie to prevent them; but by delaying till they come near hand to thee, the remedy comes too late; for this malignity is grown incurable: and it befalls this, as the physicians say of the hectick feaver, that in the beginning it is easily cur'd, but hardly known; but in the course of time, not having been known in the beginning, nor cured, it becomes easie to know, but hard to cure. even so falls it out in matters of state; for by knowing it aloof off (which is given only to a wise man to do) the mischiefs that then spring up, are quickly helped; but when, for not having been perceived, they are suffered to increase, so that every one sees them, there is then no cure for them: therefore the romans, seeing these inconvenients afar off, alwaies prevented them, and never sufferd them to follow; for to escape a war, because they knew that a war is not undertaken, but deferred for anothers advantage; therefore would they rather make a war with philip and antiochus in greece, to the end it should not afterwards be made with them in italy, though for that time they were able to avoid both the one and the other, which they thought not good to do: nor did they approve of that saying that is ordinarily in the mouthes of the sages of our dayes, _to enjoy the benefits of the present time_; but that rather, to take the benefit of their valor and wisdome; for time drives forward everything, and may bring with it as well good as evil, and evil as good. but let us return to france, and examine if any of the things prescribed have been done by them: and we will speak of lewis, and not of charles, as of whom by reason of the long possession he held in italy we better knew the wayes he went: and you shall see he did the clean contrary to what should have been done by him that would maintain a state of different language and conditions. king lewis was brought into italy by the venetians ambition, who would have gotten for their shares half the state of lombardy: i will not blame his comming, or the course he took, because he had a mind to begin to set a foot in italy; but having not any friends in the country, all gates being barred against him, by reason of king charles his carriage there, he was constrained to joyn friendship with those he could; and this consideration well taken, would have proved lucky to him, when in the rest of his courses he had not committed any error. the king then having conquered lombardy, recovered presently all that reputation that charles had lost him; genua yeelded to him, the florentines became friends with him; the marquess of mantua, the duke of ferrara, the bentivolti, the lady of furli, the lord of faenza, pesaro rimino, camerino, and piombino, the lucheses, pisans and sienses, every one came and offered him friendship: then might the venetians consider the rashness of the course they had taken, who, only to get into their hands two townes in lombardy, made the king lord of two thirds in italy. let any man now consider with how small difficulty could the king have maintained his reputation in italy, if he had followed these aforenamed rules, and secured and defended those his friends, who because their number was great, and they weak and fearful, some of the church, and others of the venetians were alwaies forced to hold with him, and by their means he might easily have been able to secure himself against those that were mightiest: but he was no sooner got into milan, than he took a quite wrong course, by giving ayd to pope alexander, to seize upon romania, and perceiv'd not that by this resolution he weakned himself, ruining his own friends, and those had cast themselves into his bosom, making the church puissant, by adding to their spiritual power, they gaind their authority, and so much temporal estate. and having once got out of the way, he was constrained to go on forward; insomuch as to stop alexanders ambition, and that he should not become lord of all tuscany, of force he was to come into italy: and this sufficed him not, to have made the church mighty, and taken away his own friends; but for the desire he had to get the kingdome of naples, he divided it with the king of spain: and where before he was the sole arbitre of italy, he brought in a competitor, to the end that all the ambitious persons of that country, and all that were ill affected to him, might have otherwhere to make their recourse: and whereas he might have left in that kingdome some vice-king of his own, he took him from thence, to place another there, that might afterward chace him thence. it is a thing indeed very natural and ordinary, to desire to be of the getting hand: and alwaies when men undertake it, if they can effect it, they shall be prais'd for it, or at least not blam'd: but when they are not able, and yet will undertake it, here lies the blame, here is the error committed. if france then was able with her own power to assail the kingdome of naples, she might well have done it; but not being able, she should not have divided it: and if the division she made of lombardy with the venetians, deserv'd some excuse, thereby to set one foot in italy; yet this merits blame, for not being excused by that necessity. lewis then committed these five faults; extinguisht the feebler ones, augmented the state of another that was already powerful in italy, brought thereinto a very puissant forreiner, came not thither himself to dwell there, nor planted any colonies there: which faults while he liv'd, he could not but be the worse for; yet all could not have gone so ill, had he not committed the sixt, to take from the venetians their state; for if he had not enlarg'd the churches territories nor brought the spaniard into italy, it had bin necessary to take them lower; but having first taken those other courses, he should never have given way to their destruction; for while they had been strong, they would alwaies have kept the others off from venturing on the conquest of lombardy. for the venetians would never have given their consents thereto, unless they should have been made lords of it themselves; and the others would never have taken it from france, to give it them: and then they would never have dar'd to go and set upon them both together. and if any one should say, that king lewis yeelded romania to alexander, and the kingdome of naples to spain, to avoid a war; i answer with the reasons above alledged, that one should never suffer any disorder to follow, for avoiding of a war; for that war is not sav'd, but put off to thy disadvantage. and if any others argue, that the king had given his word to the pope, to do that exploit for him, for dissolving of his marriage, and for giving the cardinals cap to him of roan; i answer with that which hereafter i shall say touching princes words, how they ought to be kept. king lewis then lost lombardy, for not having observ'd some of those termes which others us'd, who have possessed themselves of countries, and desir'd to keep them. nor is this any strange thing, but very ordinary and reasonable: and to this purpose i spake at nantes with that french cardinal, when valentine (for so ordinarily was cæsar borgia pope alexanders son call'd) made himself master of romania; for when the cardinal said to me, that the italians understood not the feats of war; i answered, the frenchmen understood not matters of state: for had they been well vers'd therein, they would never have suffer'd the church to have grown to that greatness. and by experience we have seen it, that the power hereof in italy, and that of spain also, was caused by france, and their own ruine proceeded from themselves. from whence a general rule may be taken, which never, or very seldom fails, _that he that gives the means to another to become powerful, ruines himself_; for that power is caus'd by him either with his industry, or with his force; and as well the one as the other of these two is suspected by him that is grown puissant. chap. iv wherefore darius his kingdome taken by alexander, rebelled not against alexanders successors after his death. the difficulties being consider'd, which a man hath in the maintaining of a state new gotten, some might marvaile how it came to pass, that alexander the great subdued all asia in a few years; and having hardly possessed himself of it, died; whereupon it seemed probable that all that state should have rebelled; nevertheless his successors kept the possession of it, nor found they other difficulty in holding it, than what arose among themselves through their own ambition. i answer, that all the principalities whereof we have memory left us, have been governed in two several manners; either by a prince, and all the rest vassals, who as ministers by his favor and allowance, do help to govern that kingdom; or by a prince and by barons, who not by their princes favor, but by the antiquity of blood hold that degree. and these kinds of barons have both states of their own, and vassals who acknowledge them for their lords; and bare them a true natural affection. those states that are govern'd by a prince and by vassals, have their prince ruling over them with more authority; for in all his countrey, there is none acknowledged for superior, but himself: and if they yeeld obedience to any one else, it is but as to his minister and officer, nor beare they him any particular good will. the examples of these two different governments now in our dayes, are, the turk, and the king of france. the turks whole monarchy is govern'd by one lord, and the rest are all his vassals; and dividing his whole kingdom into divers sangiacques or governments, he sends several thither, and those he chops and changes, as he pleases. but the king of france is seated in the midst of a multitude of lords, who of old have been acknowledg'd for such by their subjects, and being belov'd by them, enjoy their preheminencies; nor can the king take their states from them without danger. he then that considers the one and the other of these two states, shall find difficulty in the conquest of the turks state; but when once it is subdu'd, great facility to hold it. the reasons of these difficulties in taking of the turks kingdom from him, are, because the invader cannot be called in by the princes of that kingdom, nor hope by the rebellion of those which he hath about him, to be able to facilitate his enterprize: which proceeds from the reasons aforesaid; for they being all his slaves, and oblig'd to him, can more hardly be corrupted; and put case they were corrupted, little profit could he get by it, they not being able to draw after them any people, for the reasons we have shewed: whereupon he that assails the turk, must think to find him united; and must rather relie upon his own forces, than in the others disorders: but when once he is overcome and broken in the field, so that he cannot repair his armies, there is nothing else to be doubted than the royal blood, which being once quite out, there is none else left to be feard, none of the others having any credit with the people. and as the conqueror before the victory could not hope in them; so after it, ought he not to fear them. the contrary falls out in kingdoms governed as is that of france: for it is easie to be enterd by the gaining of any baron in the kingdom; for there are alwaies some malecontents to be found, and those that are glad of innovation. those for the reasons alledg'd are able to open thee a way into that state, and to further thy victory, which afterwards to make good to thee, draws with it exceeding many difficulties, as well with those that have ayded thee, as those thou hast supprest. nor is it enough for thee to root out the princes race: for there remaine still those lords who quickly will be the ring-leaders of new changes; and in case thou art not able to content these, nor extinguish them, thou losest that state, whensoever the occasion is offerd. now if thou shalt consider what sort of government that of darius was, thou shalt find it like to the turks dominion, and therefore alexander was necessitated first to defeat him utterly, and drive him out of the field; after which victory darius being dead, that state was left secure to alexander, for the reasons we treated of before: and his successors, had they continued in amity, might have enjoy'd it at ease: nor ever arose there in that kingdome other tumults, than those they themselves stir'd up. but of the states that are order'd and grounded as that of france, it is impossible to become master at such ease: and from hence grew the frequent rebellions of spain, france, and greece against the romans, by reason of the many principalities those states had: whereof while the memory lasted, the romans were alwayes doubtfull of the possession of them; but the memory of them being quite wip't out, by the power and continuance of the empire, at length they enjoy'd it securely; and they also were able afterwards fighting one with another, each of one them to draw after them the greater part of those provinces, according as their authority had gain'd them credit therein: and that because the blood of their ancient lords was quite spent, they acknowledg'd no other but the romans. by the consideration then of these things, no man will marvaile that alexander had so little trouble to keep together the state of asia; and that others have had such great difficulties to maintain their conquest, as pyrrhus, and many others; which proceeds not from the small or great valour of the conquerour, but from the difference of the subject. chap. v in what manner cities and principalities are to be govern'd, which, before they were conquer'd, liv'd under their own laws. when those states that are conquered, as it is said, have been accustomed to live under their own laws, and in liberty, there are three wayes for a man to hold them. the first is to demolish all their strong places; the other, personally to goe and dwell there; the third, to suffer them to live under their own laws, drawing from them some tribute, and creating therein an oligarchy, that may continue it in thy service: for that state being created by that prince, knowes it cannot consist without his aid and force, who is like to doe all he can to maintain it; and with more facility is a city kept by meanes of her own citizens, which hath been us'd before to live free, than by any other way of keeping. we have for example the spartans and the romans; the spartans held athens and thebes, creating there an oligarchy: yet they lost it. the romans to be sure of capua, carthage, and numantia, dismantell'd them quite, and so lost them not: they would have kept greece as the spartans had held them, leaving them free, and letting them enjoy their own laws; and it prospered not with them: so that they were forc'd to deface many cities of that province to hold it. for in truth there is not a surer way to keep them under, than by demolishments; and whoever becomes master of a city us'd to live free, and dismantells it not, let him look himselfe to bee ruin'd by it; for it alwayes in time of rebellion takes the name of liberty for refuge, and the ancient orders it had; which neither by length of time, nor for any favours afforded them, are ever forgotten; and for any thing that can be done, or order'd, unlesse the inhabitants be disunited and dispers'd, that name is never forgotten, nor those customes: but presently in every chance recourse is thither made: as pisa did after so many yeeres that she had been subdu'd by the florentines. but when the cities or the provinces are accustomed to live under a prince, and that whole race is quite extirpated: on one part being us'd to obey; on the other, not having their old prince; they agree not to make one from among themselves: they know not how to live in liberty, in such manner that they are much slower to take armes; and with more facility may a prince gaine them, and secure himselfe of them. but in republiques there is more life in them, more violent hatred, more earnest desire of revenge; nor does the remembrance of the ancient liberty ever leave them, or suffer them to rest; so that the safest way, is, either to ruine them, or dwell among them. chap. vi of new principalities, that are conquer'd by ones own armes and valour. let no man marvaile, if in the discourse i shall make of new principalities, both touching a prince, and touching a state, i shall alledge very famous examples: for seeing men almost alwayes walk in the pathes beaten by others, and proceed in their actions by imitation; and being that others wayes cannot bee exactly follow'd, nor their vertues, whose patterne thou set'st before thee, attain'd unto; a wise man ought alwayes to tread the footsteps of the worthiest persons, and imitate those that have been the most excellent: to the end that if his vertue arrive not thereto, at least it may yeeld some favour thereof, and doe as good archers use, who thinking the place they intend to hit, too farre distant, and knowing how farr the strength of their bow will carry, they lay their ayme a great deale higher than the mark; not for to hit so high with their arrow, but to bee able with the help of so high an aime to reach the place they shoot at. i say, that in principalities wholly new, where there is a new prince, there is more and lesse difficulty in maintaining them, as the vertue of their conquerour is greater or lesser. and because this successe, to become a prince of a private man, presupposes either vertue, or fortune; mee thinks the one and other of these two things in part should mitigate many difficulties; however he that hath lesse stood upon fortune, hath maintain'd himselfe the better. moreover it somewhat facilitates the matter in that the prince is constrain'd, because he hath not other dominions, in person to come and dwell there. but to come to these who by their own vertues, and not by fortune, attain'd to be princes; the excellentest of these are moses, cyrus, romulus, theseus, and such like; and though of moses we are not to reason, he onely executing the things that were commanded him by god; yet merits he well to be admir'd, were it only for that grace that made him worthy to converse with god. but considering cyrus, and the others, who either got or founded kingdomes, we shall find them all admirable; and if there particular actions and lawes be throughly weigh'd, they will not appeare much differing from those of moyses, which he receiv'd from so sovraigne an instructer. and examining their lives and actions, it will not appeare, that they had other help of fortune, than the occasion, which presented them with the matter wherein they might introduce what forme they then pleas'd; and without that occasion, the vertue of their mind had been extinguish'd; and without that vertue, the occasion had been offer'd in vaine. it was then necessary for moses to find the people of israel slaves in Ægypt, and oppress'd by the Ægyptians, to the end that they to get out of their thraldome, should bee willing to follow him. it was fit that romulus should not be kept in albia, but expos'd presently after his birth, that he might become king of rome, and founder of that city. there was need that cyrus should find the persians discontented with the medes government, and the medes delicate and effeminate through their long peace. theseus could not make proof his vertue, had not he found the athenians dispers'd. these occasions therefore made these men happy, and their excellent vertue made the occasion be taken notice of, whereby their countrey became enobled, and exceeding fortunate. they, who by vertuous waies, like unto these, become princes, attain the principality with difficulty, but hold it with much ease; and the difficulties they find in gaining the principality, arise partly from the new orders and courses they are forc'd to bring in, to lay the foundation of their state, and work their own security. and it is to be consider'd, how there is not any thing harder to take in hand, nor doubtfuller to succeed, nor more dangerous to mannage, than to be the chief in bringing in new orders; for this chief finds all those his enemies, that thrive upon the old orders; and hath but luke warme defenders of all those that would do well upon the new orders, which luke-warme temper proceeds partly from fear of the opposers who have the laws to their advantage; partly from the incredulity of the men who truly beleeve not a new thing, unless there be some certain proof given them thereof. whereupon it arises, that whensoever they that are adversaries, take the occasion to assayle, they do it factiously; and these others defend but cooly, so that their whole party altogether runs a hazzard. therefore it is necessary, being we intend throughly to discourse this part, to examine if these innovators stand of themselves, or if they depend upon others; that is, if to bring their work to effect, it be necessary they should intreat, or be able to constrain; in the first case they allwayes succeed ill, and bring nothing to pass; but when they depend of themselves, and are able to force, then seldom it is that they hazzard. hence came it that all the prophets that were arm'd, prevail'd; but those that were unarm'd, were too weak: for besides what we have alledg'd, the nature of the people is changeable, and easie to be perswaded to a matter; but it is hard also to settle them in that perswasion. and therefore it behoves a man to be so provided, that when they beleeve no longer, he may be able to compel them thereto by force. moses, cyrus, theseus, and romulus would never have been able to cause their laws to be obey'd, had they been disarm'd; as in our times it befel fryer jerome savanarola, who perished in his new constitutions, when the multitude began not to beleeve him; neither had he the means to keep them firme, that had beleev'd; not to force beleefe in them that had not beleev'd him. wherefore such men as these, in their proceedings find great difficulty, and all their dangers are in the way, and these they must surmount by their vertue; but having once master'd them, and beginning to be honored by all, when they have rooted those out that envi'd their dignities, they remain powerful, secure, honorable, and happy. to these choice examples, i will add one of less remark; but it shall hold some proportion with them, and this shall suffice me for all others of this kind, which is hiero the siracusan. he of a private man, became prince of siracusa, nor knew he any other ayd of fortune than the occasion: for the siracusans being oppress'd, made choyce of him for their captain, whereupon he deserv'd to be made their prince: and he was of such vertue even in his private fortune, that he who writes of him, sayes, he wanted nothing of reigning, but a kingdom; this man extinguish'd all the old soldiery, ordaind the new; left the old allyances, entertained new; and as he had friendship, and soldiers that were his own, upon that ground he was able to build any edifice; so that he indured much trouble in gaining, and suffered but little in maintaining. chap. vii of new principalities, gotten by fortune, and other mens forces. they who by fortune only become princes of private men, with small pains attain to it, but have much ado to maintain themselves in it; and find no difficulty at all in the way, because they are carried thither with wings: but all the difficulties arise there, after they are plac'd in them. and of such sort are those who have an estate given them for money, by the favor of some one that grants it them: as it befell many in greece, in the cities of jonia, and hellespont; where divers princes were made by darius, as well for his own safety as his glory; as also them that were made emperors; who from private men by corrupting the soldiers, attaind to the empire. these subsist meerly upon the will, and fortune of those that have advanced them; which are two voluble and unsteady things; and they neither know how, nor are able to continue in that dignity: they know not how, because unless it be a man of great understanding and vertue, it is not probable that he who hath always liv'd a private life, can know how to command: neither are they able, because they have not any forces that can be friendly or faithful to them. moreover those states that suddenly fall into a mans hands, as all other things in nature that spring and grow quickly, cannot well have taken root, nor have made their correspondencies so firm, but that the first storm that takes them, ruines them; in case these, who (as it is said) are thus on a sudden clambred up to be princes, are not of that worth and vertue as to know how to prepare themselves to maintain that which chance hath cast into their bosoms, and can afterwards lay those foundations, which others have cast before they were princes. for the one and the other of these wayes about the attaining to be a prince, by vertue, or by fortune, i will alledge you two examples which have been in the dayes of our memory. these were francis sforza, and cæsar borgia; francis by just means and with a great deal of vertue, of a private man got to be duke of millan; and that which with much pains he had gaind, he kept with small ado. on the other side cæesar borgia (commonly termed duke valentine) got his state by his fathers fortune, and with the same lost it; however that for his own part no pains was spar'd, nor any thing omitted, which by a discreet and valorus man ought to have been done, to fasten his roots in those estates, which others armes or fortune had bestowed on him; for (as it was formerly said) he that lays not the foundations first, yet might be able by means of his extraordinary vertues to lay them afterwards, however it be with the great trouble of the architect, and danger of the edifice. if therefore we consider all the dukes progresses, we may perceive how great foundations he had cast for his future power, which i judge a matter not superfluous to run over; because i should not well know, what better rules i might give to a new prince, than the pattern of his actions; and however the courses he took, availd him not, yet was it not his fault, but it proceeded from an extraordinary and extream malignity of fortune. pope alexander the sixt, desiring to make the duke his son a great man, had a great many difficulties, present and future: first he saw no way there was whereby he might be able to make him lord of any state, that was not the churches; and if he turnd to take that from the church, he knew that the duke of milan, and the venetians would never agree to it; for faenza and riminum were under the venetians protection. moreover, he saw that the armes of italy, and those whereof in particular he might have been able to make some use, were in their hands, who ought to fear the popes greatness; and therefore could not any wayes rely upon them: being all in the orsins and colonies hands, and those of their faction. it was necessary then, that those matters thus appointed by them should be disturbed, and the states of italy disordered, to be able safely to master part of them, which he then found easie to do, seeing the venetians upon three considerations had us'd the means to bring the french men back again into italy: which he not only did not withstand, but furthered, with a resolution of king lewis his ancient marriage. the king then past into italy with the venetians ayd, and alexanders consent; nor was he sooner arrived in milan, than the pope had soldiers from him for the service of romania, which was quickly yeelded up to him upon the reputation of the kings forces. the duke then having made himself master of romania, and beaten the colonies, desiring to hold it, and proceed forward, two things hindered him: the one, his own soldiers, which he thought were not true to him; the other, the french mens good wills; that is to say, he feared that the princes soldiers, whereof he had served himself, would fail him, and not only hinder his conquest, but take from him what he had gotten; and that the king also would serve him the same turn. he had experience of the orsini upon an occasion, when after the taking of faenza he assaulted bolonia, to which assault he saw them go very cold. and touching the king, he discovered his mind, when having taken the dutchy of urbin, he invaded tuscany; from which action the king made him retire; whereupon the duke resolved to depend no more upon fortune, and other mens armes. and the first thing he did, was, to weaken the orsini, and colonnies factions in rome: for he gain'd all their adherents that were gentlemen, giving them large allowances, and honoring them according to their qualities with charges and governments; so that in a few months the good will they bare to the parties was quite extinguisht, and wholly bent to the duke. after this, he waited an occasion to root out the orsini, having before dispersed those of the family of colonnia, which fell out well to his hand; and he us'd it better. for the orsini being too late aware, that the dukes and the churches greatness was their destruction, held a council together in a dwelling house of theirs in the country adjoyning to perusia. from thence grew the rebellion of urbin, and the troubles of romania, and many other dangers befell the duke, which he overcame all with the help of the french: and having regained his reputation, trusting neither france, nor any forrein forces, to the end he might not be put to make trial of them again, he betook himself to his sleghts; and he knew so well to disguise his intention, that the orsins, by the mediation of paul orsine, were reconciled to him, to whom the duke was no way wanting in all manner of courtesies whereby to bring them into security, giving them rich garments, money, and horses, til their own simplicities led them all to sinigallia, into his hands. these heads being then pluck'd off, and their partisans made his friends; the duke had laid very good foundations, to build his own greatness on, having in his power all romania with the dutchy of urbin, and gained the hearts of those people, by beginning to give them some relish of their well being. and because this part is worthy to be taken notice of, and to be imitated by others, i will not let it escape. the duke, when he had taken romania, finding it had been under the hands of poor lords who had rather pillag'd their subjects, than chastis'd or amended them, giving them more cause of discord, than of peace and union, so that the whole countrey was fraught with robberies, quarrels, and other sorts of insolencies; thought the best way to reduce them to termes of pacification, and obedience to a princely power, was, to give them some good government: and therefore he set over them one remiro d'orco, a cruel hasty man, to whom he gave an absolute power. this man in a very short time setled peace and union amongst them with very great reputation. afterwards the duke thought such excessive authority serv'd not so well to his purpose, and doubting it would grow odious, he erected a civil judicature in the midst of the countrey, where one excellent judge did preside, and thither every city sent their advocate: and because he knew the rigors past had bred some hatred against him, to purge the minds of those people, and to gain them wholly to himself, he purpos'd to shew, that if there was any cruelty used, it proceeded not from any order of his, but from the harsh disposition of his officers. whereupon laying hold on him, at this occasion, he caus'd his head to be struck off one morning early in the market place at cesena, where he was left upon a gibbet, with a bloody sword by his side; the cruelty of which spectacle for a while satisfied and amaz'd those people. but to return from whence we have digressd: i say, that the duke finding himself very strong, and in part out of doubt of the present dangers, because he was arm'd after his own manner, and had in some good measure suppress'd those forces, which, because of their vicinity, were able to annoy him, he wanted nothing else to go on with his conquest, but the consideration of france: for he knew, that the king, who now, though late, was advis'd of his error, would never suffer him: and hereupon he began to seek after new allyances, and to waver with france, when the french came towards naples against the spaniards, who then besieged gagetta; and his design was only to be out of their danger, which had been effected for him, had pope alexander lived. and thus were his businesses carried touching his present estate. as for the future, he had reason to doubt lest the new successor to the papacy would not be his friend, and would endeavor to take that from him that alexander had bestowed on him; and he thought to provide for this foure waies: first by rooting out the races of all those lords he had dispoyled, whereby to take those occasions from the pope. secondly, by gaining all the gentlemen of rome, whereby he might be able with those to keep the pope in some awe. thirdly, to make the colledge of cardinals as much at his devotion as possibly might be. fourthly, by making of so large conquests, before the popes death, as that he might be able of himself to withstand the first fury of his enemies. three of these fowre at pope alexanders death he had effected, and the fourth he had neare brought to a point. for of those lords he had stript, he put to death as many as he could come at, and very few escap'd him: he gaind him the roman gentlemen: and in the colledge he had made a great faction. and touching his new conquest, he had a designe to become lord of tuscany. and he had possessed himself already of perusia, and pombin, and taken protection of pisa: and so soon as he should have cast off his respect to france (which now he meant to hold no longer) being the french were now driven out of the kingdome of naples by the spaniards, so that each of them was forc'd to buy his friendship at any termes; he was then to leap into pisa. after this lucca and siena were presently to fall to him, partly for envy to the florentines, and partly for fear. the florentines had no way to escape him: all which, had it succeeded with him, as without question it had, the very same year that alexander dy'd, he had made himself master of so great forces, and such reputation, that he would have been able to have stood upon his own bottom, without any dependance of fortune, or resting upon others helps, but only upon his own strength and valor. but alexander dy'd five years after that he had begun to draw forth his sword: and left him setled only in the state of romania, with all his other designes in the ayre, sick unto death, between two very strong armies of his enemies; and yet was there in this duke such a spirit and courage; and he understood so well, how men are to be gaind, and how to be lost, and so firm were the grounds he had laid in a short time, that, had he not had those armies upon his back, or had been in health, he would have carried through his purpose in spight of all opposition; and that the foundations he grounded upon were good, it appeard in that romania held for him above a moneth, and he remained secure in rome, though even at deaths doore: and however the baglioni, vitelli, and orsini came into rome; yet found they none would take their parts against him. and this he was able to have effected, that if he could not have made him pope whom be would, he could have hindred him that he would not should be pope. but had he been in health when alexander dy'd, every thing had gone easily with him; and he told me on that day that julius the second was created pope, that he had fore-thought on all that which could happen, in case his father chanc'd to dye, and for every thing provided its remedy, this onely excepted, that he foresaw not that he should at the same time be brought unto deaths dore also. having then collected all the dukes actions, me thinks i could not well blame him, but rather (as i have here done) set him as a pattern to be followed by all those who by fortune and others armes have been exalted to an empire. for he being of great courage, and having lofty designes, could not carry himself otherwise; and the only obstacle of his purposes was the brevity of alexanders life, and his own sickness. whoever therefore deemes it necessary in his entrance into a new principality, to secure himself of his enemies, and gain him friends, to overcome either by force or by cunning, to make himself beloved, or feared of his people, be followed and reverenced by his soldiers, to root out those that can, or owe thee any hurt, to change the ancient orders with new wayes, to be severe, and yet acceptable, magnanimous, and liberall; to extinguish the unfaithfull soldiery, and create new; to maintain to himself the armities of kings and princes, so that they shall either with favor benefit thee, or be wary how to offend thee; cannot find more fresh and lively examples than the actions of this man. he deserves to be found fault withall for the creation of julius the second, wherein an evil choice was made for him: for, as it is said, not being able to make a pope to his mind, he could have withheld any one from being pope; and should never have consented that any one of those cardinals should have got the papacy, whom he had ever done harme to; or who having attaind the pontificate were likely to be afraid of him: because men ordinarily do hurt either for fear, or hatred. those whom he had offended, were among others, he who had the title of st. peter ad vincula, colonna, st. george, and ascanius; all the others that were in possibility of the popedome, were such as might have feard him rather, except the cardinal of roan, and the spaniards; these by reason of their allyance and obligation with him, the other because of the power they had, having the kingdome of france on their party; wherefore the duke above all things should have created a spanyard pope, and in case he could not have done that, he should have agreed that roan should have been, and not st. peter ad vincula. and whoever beleeves, that with great personages new benefits blot on the remembrance of old injuries, is much deceiv'd. the duke therefore in this election, was the cause of his own ruine at last. till wee come to this seaventh chapter, i find not any thing much blame-worthy, unlesse it be on ground he layes in the second chapter; whereupon hee builds most of this fabrick, viz. that subjects must either be dallyed or flatterd withall, or quite crusht. whereby our author advises his prince to support his authority with two cardinall vertues, dissimulation, and cruelty. he considers not herein that the head is but a member of the body, though the principall; and the end of the parts is the good of the whole. and here he goes against himselfe in the twenty sixt chapter of his rep. . . where hee blames philip of macedon for such courses, terming them very cruell, and against all christian manner of living; and that every man should refuse to be a king, and desire rather to live a private life, than to reigne so much to the ruine of mankind. the life of cæsar borgia, which is here given as a paterne to new princes, we shall find to have been nothing else but a cunning carriage of things so, that he might thereby first deceive and inveigle, and then suppresse all those that could oppose or hinder his ambition. for if you runne over his life, you shall see the father pope alexander the sixt and him, both imbarqued for his advancement, wherein they engag'd the papall authority, and reputation of religion; for faith and conscience these men never knew, though they exacted it of others: there was never promise made, but it was only so farre kept as servd for advantage; liberality was made use of: clemency and cruelty, all alike, as they might serve to worke with their purposes. all was sacrific'd to ambition; no friendship could tye these men, nor any religion: and no marvell: for ambition made them forget both god and man. but see the end of all this cunning: though this cæsar borgia contrived all his businesse so warily, that our author much commends him, and hee had attaind neere the pitch of his hopes, and had provided for each misadventure could befall him its remedy; policy shewd it selefe short-sighted; for hee foresaw not at the time of his fathers death, he himself should bee brought unto deaths doore also. and me thinks this example might have given occasion to our author to confesse, that surely there is a god that ruleth the earth. and many times god cutts off those cunning and mighty men in the hight of their purposes, when they think they have neare surmounted all dangers and difficulties. 'to the intent that the living may know, that the most high ruleth in the kingdome of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will, and setteth up over it the basest of men.' daniel. . . chap. viii concerning those who by wicked meanes have attaind to a principality. but because a man becomes a prince of a private man two wayes, which cannot wholly be attributed either to fortune or vertue, i think not fit to let them passe me: howbeit the one of them may be more largely discoursed upon, where the republicks are treated of. these are, when by some wicked and unlawfull meanes a man rises to the principality; or when a private person by the favour of his fellow citizens becomes prince of his countrey. and speaking of the first manner, it shall be made evident by two examples, the one ancient, the other moderne, without entring otherwise into the justice or merit of this part; for i take it that these are sufficient for any body that is forc'd to follow them. agathocles the sicilian, not of a private man onely, but from a base and abject fortune, got to be king of siracusa. this man borne but of a potter, continued alwayes a wicked life throughout all the degrees of this fortune: neverthelesse he accompanied his lewdnesse with such a courage and resolution, that applying himselfe to military affaires, by the degrees thereof he attained to bee prætour of siracusa, and being setled in that degree, and having determined that he would become prince, and hold that by violence and without obligation to any other, which by consent had been granted him: and to this purpose haveing had some private intelligence touching his designe with amilcar the carthaginian, who was imployd with his army in sicily, one morining gatherd the people together and the senate of syracusa, as if he had some what to advise with them of matters belonging to the commonwealth, and upon a signe given, caus'd his souldiers to kill his senatours, and the richest of the people; who being slaine, he usurp'd the principality of that city without any civill strife: and however he was twice broken by the carthaginians, and at last besieged, was able not onely to defend his own city, but leaving part of his own army at the defence thereof, with the other invaded affrique, and in a short time freed siracusa from the siege, and brought the carthaginians into extreme necessity, who were constraind to accord with him, be contented with the possession of affrique, and quitt sicily to agathocles. he then that should consider the actions and valour of this man, would not see any, or very few things to be attributed unto fortune; seeing that as is formerly sayd, not by any ones favour, but by the degrees of service in warre with many sufferings and dangers, to which he had risen, he came to the principality; and that hee maintained afterwards with so many resolute and hazardous undertakings. yet cannot this be term'd vertue or valour to slay his own citizens, betray his friends, to be without faith, without pitty, without religion, which wayes are of force to gaine dominion, but not glory: for if agathocles his valour bee well weighd, in his enturing upon, and comming off from dangers, and the greatnesse of his courage, in supporting and mastering of adversities, no man can see why he should be thought any way inferiour even to the ablest captaines. notwithstanding his beastly cruelty and inhumanity with innumerable wickednesses, allow not that he should be celebrated among the most excellent men. that cannot then be attributed to fortune or vertue, which without the one or the other was attaind to by him. in our dayes, while alexander the sixth held the sea, oliverotte of fermo, who some few yeeres before had been left young by his parents, was brought up under the care of an uncle of his on the mothers side, called john foliani, and in the beginning of his youth given, by him to serve in the warres under paulo vitelli: to the end that being well instructed in that discipline, he might rise to some worthy degree in the warrs. afterwards when paulo was dead, he served under vitellozzo his brother, and in very short time, being ingenious, of a good personage, and brave courage, he became one of the prime men among the troops he served in: but thinking it but servile to depend upon another, he plotted by the ayd of some citizens of fermo (who lik'd rather the thraldome of their city than the liberty of it) and by the favour of the vitelli, to make himselfe master of fermo; and writ to john foliani, that having been many yeeres from home, he had a mind to come and see him and the city, and in some part take notice of his own patrimony; and because he had not imployd himselfe but to purchase honour, to the end his citizens might perceive, that he had not vainely spent his time, he had a desire to come in good equipage and accompanied with a hundred horse of his friends and servants; and he intreated him that he would be pleasd so to take order, that he might be honourably received by the inhabitants of fermo, which turnd as well to his honor that was his uncle, as his that was the nephew. in this, john faild not in any office of courtesie due to his nephew: and caused him to be well receivd by them of fermo, and lodged him in his own house: where having passed some dayes, and stayd to put in order somewhat that was necessary for his intended villany, he made a very solemne feast, whether he invited john foliani, and all the prime men of fermo: and when all their chear was ended, and all their other entertainments, as in such feasts it is customary, oliverotto of purpose mov'd some grave discourses; speaking of the greatnesse of pope alexander, and cæsar his son, and their undertakings; where unto john and the others making answer, he of a sudden stood up, saying, that those were things to be spoken of in a more secret place, and so retir'd into a chamber, whether john and all the other citizens followd him; nor were they sooner set downe there, than from some secret place therein camp forth diverse souldiers, who slew john and all the others: after which homicide oliverotto got a horsebacke and ravaged the whole towne, and besieged the supreme magistrate in the palace, so that for feare they were all constraind to obey him, and to settle a government, whereof hee made himselfe prince; and they being all dead who, had they been discontented with him, could have hurt him; he strengthned himselfe with new civill and military orders, so that in the space of a yeer that he held the principality, he was not only secure in the city of fermo, but became fearefull to all his neighbours; and the conquest of him would have prov'd difficult, as that of agathocles, had he not let himselfe been deceivd by cæsar borgia, when at sinigallia, as before was said, he took the orsini and vitelli: where he also being taken a yeere after he had committed the parricide, was strangled together with vitellozzo (whome he had had for master both of his vertues and vices.) some man might doubt from whence it should proceed, that agathocles, and such like, after many treacheries and crueltyes, could possibly live long secure in his own countrey, and defend himselfe from his forrein enemies, and that never any of his own citizens conspir'd against him, seeing that by means of cruelty, many others have never been able even in peaceable times to maintaine their states, much lesse in the doubtfull times of warre. i beleeve that this proceeds from the well, or ill using of those cruelties: they may bee termd well us'd (if it bee lawfull to say well of evill) that are put in practice only once of necessity for securities sake, not insisting therein afterwards; but there is use made of them for the subjects profit, as much as may be. but those that are ill us'd, are such as though they bee but few in the beginning, yet they multiply rather in time, than diminish. they that take that first way, may with the help of god, and mens care, find some remedy for their state, as agathocles did: for the others, it is impossible they should continue. whereupon it is to be noted, that in the laying hold of a state, the usurper thereof ought to runne over and execute all his cruelties at once, that he be not forced often to returne to them, and that he may be able, by not renewing of them, to give men some security, and gaine their affections by doing them some courtesies. hee that carries it otherwise, either for fearefullnesse, or upon evill advice, is alwayes constraind to hold his sword drawne in his hand; nor ever can hee rely upon his subjects, there being no possibility for them, because of his daily and continuall injuries, to live in any safety: for his injuries should bee done altogether, that being seldomer tasted, they might lesse offend; his favours should bee bestowd by little, and little to the end they might keep their taste the better; and above all things a prince must live with his subjects in such sort, that no accident either of good or evill can make him vary: for necessity comming upon him by reason of adversities, thou hast not time given thee to make advantage of thy cruelties; and the favours which then thou bestowest, will little help thee, being taken as if they came from thee perforce, and so yeeld no returne of thanks. chap. ix of the civill principality. but comming to the other part, when a principall citizen, not by villany, or any other insufferable violence, but by the favour of his fellow-citizens becomes prince of his native countrey: which we may terme a civill principality; nor to attaine hereunto is vertue wholly or fortune wholly necessary, but rather a fortunate cunning: i say, this principality is climb'd up to, either by the peoples help, or the great mens. for, in every city we finde these two humours differ; and they spring from this, that the people desire not to be commanded nor oppressed by the great ones, and the great ones are desirous to command and oppresse the people: and from these two several appetites, arise in the city one of these three effects, either a principality, or liberty, or tumultuary licentiousnesse. the principality is caused either by the people, or the great ones, according as the one or other of these factions have the occasion offerd; for the great ones seeing themselves not able to resist the people, begin to turne the whole reputation to one among them, and make him prince, whereby they may under his shadow vent their spleenes. the people also, not being able to support the great mens insolencies, converting the whole reputation to one man, create him their prince, to be protected by his authority. he that comes to the principality by the assistance of the great ones, subsists with more difficulty, than he that attaines to it by the peoples favour; for he being made prince, hath many about him, who account themselves his equalls, and therefore cannot dispose nor command them at his pleasure. but he that gaines the principality by the peoples favor, finds himselfe alone in his throne, and hath none or very few neare him that are not very supple to bend: besides this, the great ones cannot upon easie termes be satisfied, or without doing of wrong to others, where as a small matter contents the people: for the end which the people propound to themselves, is more honest than that of the great men, these desiring to oppresse, they only not to be oppressed. to this may be added also, that the prince which is the peoples enemy, can never well secure himselfe of them, because of their multitude; well may hee bee sure of the nobles, they being but a few. the worst that a prince can look for of the people become his enemy, is to be abandoned by them: but when the great ones once grow his enemies, he is not only to feare their abandoning of him, but their making of a party against him also: for there being in them more forecast and craft, they alwayes take time by the forelocks whereby to save themselves, and seeke credit with him who they hope shall get the mastery. the prince likewise is necessitated alwayes to live with the same people, but can doe well enough without the same great men; he being able to create new ones, and destroy them again every day, and to take from them, and give them credit as he pleases: and to cleare this part, i say, that great men ought to be considerd two wayes principally, that is, if they take thy proceedings so much to heart, as to engage their fortunes wholly in thine, in case they lye not alwayes catching at spoyle, they ought to be well honourd and esteem'd: those that bind themselves not to thy fortune, are to be considerd also two wayes; either they doe it for lack of courage, and naturall want of spirit, and then shouldst thou serve thy selfe of them, and of them especially that are men of good advice; for if thy affaires prosper, thou dost thy selfe honour thereby; if crost, thou needst not feare them: but when they oblige not themselves to thee of purpose, and upon occasion of ambition, it is a signe they think more of themselves than of thee: and of these the prince ought to beware, and account of them as his discoverd enemyes: for alwayes in thy adversity they will give a hand too to ruine thee. therefore ought hee that comes to be prince by the peoples favour, keepe them his friends: which he may easily doe, they desiring only to live free from oppression: but he that becomes prince by the great mens favour, against the will of the people, ought above all things to gaine the people to him, which he may easily effect, when he takes upon him their protection: and because men when they find good, where they look for evill, are thereby more endered to their benefactour, therefore growes the people so pliant in their subjection to him, as if by their favours he had attaind his dignity. and the prince is able to gaine them to his side by many wayes, which because they vary according to the subject, no certaine rule can be given thereupon; wherefore we shall let them passe i will only conclude, that it is necessary for a prince to have the people his friend; otherwise in his adversities he hath no helpe. nabis prince of the spartans supported the siege of all greece, and an exceeding victorious army of the romans, and against those defended his native countrey and state, and this suffic'd him alone, that as the danger came upon him, he secur'd himself of a fewer; whereas if the people had been his enemy, this had nothing availd him. and let no man think to overthrow this my opinion with that common proverb, that he who relyes upon the people, layes his foundation in the dirt; for that is true where a private citizen grounds upon them, making his account that the people shall free him, when either his enemyes or the magistrates oppresse him: in this case he should find himself often deceiv'd, as it befell the gracchyes in rome, and in florence george scali: but he being a prince that grounds thereupon, who can command, and is a man of courage, who hath his wits about him in his adversityes, and wants not other preparations, and holds together the whole multitude animated with his valour and orders, shall not prove deceiv'd by them, and shall find he hath layd good foundations. these principalityes are wont to be upon the point of falling when they goe about to skip from the civil order to the absolute: for these princes either command of themselves, or by the magistrate; in this last case their state is more weak and dangerous, because they stand wholly at the will and pleasure of these citizens, who then are set over the magistrates, who especially in adverse times are able with facility to take their state from them either by rising up against them, or by not obeying them; and then the prince is not at hand in those dangers to take the absolute authority upon him: for the citizens and subjects that are accustomed to receive the commands from the magistrates, are not like in those fractions to obey his: and in doubtfull times he shall alwayes have greatest penury of whom he may trust; for such a prince cannot ground upon that which he sees in peaceable times, when the citizens have need of the state; for then every one runs, and every one promises, and every one will venture his life for him, where there is no danger neare; but in times of hazzard, when the state hath need of citizens, there are but few of them then, and so much the more is this experience dangerous, in that it can be but once made. therefore a prudent prince ought to devise a way whereby his citizens alwayes and in any case and quality of time may have need of his government, and they shall alwaies after prove faithfull to him. chap. x in what manner the forces of all principalities ought to be measured. it is requisite in examining the quality of those principalities, to have another consideration of them, that is, if a prince have such dominions, that he is able in case of necessity to subsist of himself, or else whether he hath alwaies need of another to defend him. and to cleer this point the better, i judge them able to stand of themselves, who are of power either for their multitudes of men, or quantity of money, to bring into the field a compleat armie, and joyn battel with whoever comes to assail them: and so i think those alwaies to stand in need of others help, who are not able to appear in the field against the enemy, but are forc'd to retire within their walls and guard them. touching the first case, we have treated already, and shall adde somwhat thereto as occasion shall require. in the second case, we cannot say other, save only to encourage such princes to fortifie and guard their own capital city, and of the countrey about, not to hold much account; and whoever shall have well fortified that town, and touching other matters of governments shall have behaved himself towards his subjects, as hath been formerly said, and hereafter shall be, shall never be assaild but with great regard; for men willingly undertake not enterprises, where they see difficulty to work them through; nor can much facility be there found, where one assails him, who hath his town strong and wel guarded, and is not hated of his people. the cities of germany are very free; they have but very little of the countrey about them belonging to them; and they obey the emperor, when they please, and they stand not in fear, neither of him nor any other potentate about them: for they are in such a manner fortified, that every one thinks the siege of any of them would prove hard and tedious: for all of them have ditches, and rampires, and good store of artillery, and alwaies have their publick cellars well provided with meat and drink and firing for a yeer: besides this, whereby to feed the common people, and without any loss to the publick, they have alwaies in common whereby they are able for a year to imploy them in the labor of those trades that are the sinews and the life of that city, and of that industry whereby the commons ordinarily supported themselves: they hold up also the military exercises in repute, and hereupon have they many orders to maintain them. a prince then that is master of a good strong city, and causeth not himself to be hated, cannot be assaulted; and in case he were, he that should assail him, would be fain to quit him with shame: for the affairs of the world are so various, that it is almost impossible that an army can lie incampt before a town for the space of a whole yeer: and if any should reply, that the people having their possessions abroad, in case they should see them a fire, would not have patience, and the tedious siege and their love to themselves would make them forget their prince: i answer that a prince puissant and couragious, will easily master those difficulties, now giving his subjects hope, that the mischief will not be of durance; sometimes affright them with the cruelty of their enemies, and other whiles cunningly securing himself of those whom he thinks too forward to run to the enemy. besides this by ordinary reason the enemy should burne and waste their countrey, upon his arrival, and at those times while mens minds are yet warme, and resolute in their defence: and therefore so much the less ought a prince doubt: for after some few dayes, that their courages grow coole, the dammages are all done, and mischiefs received, and there is no help for it, and then have they more occasion to cleave faster to their prince, thinking he is now more bound to them, their houses having for his defence been fired, and their possessions wasted; and mens nature is as well to hold themselves oblig'd for the kindnesses they do, as for those they receive; whereupon if all be well weigh'd, a wise prince shall not find much difficulty to keep sure and true to him his citizens hearts at the beginning and latter end of the siege, when he hath no want of provision for food and ammunition. chap. xi concerning ecclesiastical principalities. there remains now only that we treat of the ecclesiastical principalities, about which all the difficulties are before they are gotten: for they are attained to either by vertue, or fortune; and without the one or the other they are held: for they are maintaind by orders inveterated in the religion, all which are so powerfull and of such nature, that they maintain their princes in their dominions in what manner soever they proceed and live. these only have an estate and defend it not; have subjects and govern them not; and yet their states because undefended, are not taken from them; nor their subjects, though not govern'd, care not, think not, neither are able to aliene themselves from them. these principalities then are only happy and secure: but they being sustained by superior causes, whereunto humane understanding reaches not, i will not meddle with them: for being set up and maintained by god, it would be the part of a presumptuous and rash man to enter into discourse of them. yet if any man should ask me whence it proceeds, that the church in temporal power hath attaind to such greatness, seeing that till the time of alexander the sixt, the italian potentates, and not only they who are entituled the potentates, but every baron and lord though of the meanest condition in regard of the temporality, made but small account of it; and now a king of france trembles at the power thereof; and it hath been able to drive him out of italy, and ruine the venetians; and however this be well known, me thinks it is not superstitious in some part to recall it to memory. before that charles king of france past into italy, this countrey was under the rule of the pope, venetians, the king of naples, the duke of milan, and the florentines. these potentates took two things principally to their care; the one, that no forreiner should invade italy; the other that no one of them should inlarge their state. they, against whom this care was most taken, were the pope and the venetians; and to restrain the venetians, there needed the union of all the rest, as it was in the defence of ferrara; and to keep the pope low, they served themselves of the barons of rome, who being divided into two factions, the orsini and colonnesi, there was alwaies occasion of offence between them, who standing ready with their armes in hand in the view of the pope, held the popedome weak and feeble: and however sometimes there arose a couragious pope, as was sextus; yet either his fortune, or his wisdome was not able to free him of these incommodities, and the brevity of their lives was the cause thereof; for in ten years, which time, one with another, popes ordinarily liv'd, with much ado could they bring low one of the factions. and if, as we may say, one had near put out the colonnesi, there arose another enemy to the orsini, who made them grow again, so that there was never time quite to root them out. this then was the cause, why the popes temporal power was of small esteem in italy; there arose afterwards pope alexander the sixt, who of all the popes that ever were, shewed what a pope was able to do with money and forces: and he effected, by means of his instrument, duke valentine, and by the ocasion of the french mens passage, all those things which i have formerly discoursed upon in the dukes actions: and however his purpose was nothing at all to inlarge the church dominions, but to make the duke great; yet what he did, turnd to the churches advantage, which after his death when the duke was taken away, was the heir of all his pains. afterwards succeeded pope julius, and found the church great, having all romania, and all the barons of rome being quite rooted out, and by alexanders persecutions, all their factions worne down; he found also the way open for the heaping up of moneys, never practised before alexanders time; which things julius not only follow'd, but augmented; and thought to make himself master of bolonia, and extinguish the venetians, and chase the french men out of italy: and these designes of his prov'd all lucky to him, and so much the more to his praise in that he did all for the good of the church, and in no private regard: he kept also the factions of the orsins and colonnesi, in the same state he found them: and though there were among them some head whereby to cause an alteration; yet two things have held them quiet; the one the power of the church, which somewhat affrights them; the other because they have no cardinals of their factions, who are the primary causes of all the troubles amongst them: nor shall these parties ever be at rest, while they have cardinals; because they nourish the factions both in rome, and abroad; and the barons then are forced to undertake the defence of them: and thus from the prelates ambitions arise the discords and tumults among the barons. and now hath pope leo his holiness found the popedome exceeding puissant, of whom it is hoped, that if they amplified it by armes, he by his goodness, and infinite other vertues, will much more advantage and dignifie it. chap. xii how many sorts of military discipline there are and touching mercenary soldiers. having treated particularly of the qualities of those principalities, which in the beginning i propounded to discourse upon, and considered in some part the reasons of their well and ill being, and shewd the waies whereby many have sought to gain, and hold them, it remains now that i speak in general of the offences and defences, that may chance in each of the forenamed. we have formerly said that it is necessary for a prince to have good foundations laid; otherwise it must needs be that he go to wrack. the principal foundations that all states have, as well new, as old, or mixt, are good laws, and good armes; and because there cannot be good laws, where there are not good armes; and where there are good armes, there must needs be good laws, i will omit to discourse of the laws, and speak of armes. i say then that the armes, wherewithall a prince defends his state, either are his own, or mercenary, or auxiliary, or mixt. those that are mercenary and auxiliar, are unprofitable, and dangerous, and if any one holds his state founded upon mercenary armes, he shall never be quiet, nor secure, because they are never well united, ambitious, and without discipline, treacherous, among their friends stour, among their enemies cowardly; they have no fear of god, nor keep any faith with men; and so long only defer they the doing of mischief, till the enemy comes to assul thee; and in time of peace thou art despoyled by them, in war by thy enemies: the reason hereof is, because they have no other love, nor other cause to keep them in the field, but only a small stipend, which is not of force to make them willing to hazard their lives for thee: they are willing indeed to be thy soldiers, till thou goest to fight; but then they fly, or run away; which thing would cost me but small pains to perswade; for the ruine of italy hath not had any other cause now a dayes, than for that it hath these many years rely'd upon mercenary armes; which a good while since perhaps may have done some man some service, and among themselves they may have been thought valiant: but so soon as any forrein enemy appeared, they quickly shewed what they were. whereupon charles the king of france, without opposition, made himself master of all italy: and he that said, that the causes thereof were our faults, said true; but these were not those they beleeved, but what i have told; and because they were the princes faults, they also have suffered the punishment. i will fuller shew the infelicity of these armes. the mercenary captains are either very able men, or not: if they be, thou canst not repose any trust in them: for they will alwaies aspire unto their own proper advancements, either by suppressing of thee that art their lord, or by suppressing of some one else quite out of thy purpose: but if the captain be not valorous, he ordinarily ruines thee: and in case it be answered, that whoever shall have his armes in his hands, whether mercenary or not, will do so: i would reply, that armes are to be imployed either by a prince, or common-wealth. the prince ought to go in person, and performe the office of a commander: the republick is to send forth her citizens: and when she sends forth one that proves not of abilities, she ought to change him then; and when he does prove valorous, to bridle him so by the laws, that he exceed not his commission. and by experience we see, that princes and republiques of themselves alone, make very great conquests; but that mercenary armes never do other than harme; and more hardly falls a republick armed with her own armes under the obedience of one of her own citizens, than one that is armed by forrein armes. rome and sparta subsisted many ages armed and free. the swissers are exceedingly well armed, and yet very free. touching mercenary armes that were of old, we have an example of the carthagians, who near upon were oppress'd by their own mercenary soldiers, when the first war with the romans was finished; however the carthagians had their own citizens for their captains. philip of macedon was made by the thebans after epaminondas his death, general of their armies; and after the victory, he took from them liberty. the milaneses when duke philip was dead, entertaind francis sforza into their pay against the venetians, who having vanquisht their enemie at caravaggio, afterwards joyned with them, where by to usurp upon the milaneses his masters. sforza his father, being in joan the queen of naples pay, left her on a sudden disarmed; whereupon she, to save her kingdom, was constraind to cast her self into the king of arrragon's bosome. and in case the venetians and the florentines have formerly augmented their state with these kind of armes, and their own captains, and yet none of them have ever made themselves their princes, but rather defended them: i answer, that the florentines in this case have had fortune much their friend: for of valorous captains, which they might any way fear, some have not been victors, some have had opposition, and others have laid the aim of their ambitions another way. he who overcame not, was john aouto, of whose faith there could no proof be made, being he vanquisht not; but every one will acknowledge, that, had he vanquisht, the florentines were at his discretion. sforza had alwaies the bracceschi for his adversaries, so that they were as a guard one upon another. francis converted all his ambition against lombardy. braccio against the church, and the kingdome of naples. but let us come to that which followed a while agoe. the florentines made paul vitelli their general, a throughly advis'd man, and who from a private fortune had rose to very great reputation: had he taken pisa, no man will deny but that the florentines must have held fast with him; for had he been entertained in their enemies pay, they had no remedy; and they themselves holding of him, of force were to obey him. the venetians, if we consider their proceedings, we shall see wrought both warily and gloriously, while themselves made war, which was before their undertakings by land, where the gentlemen with their own commons in armes behav'd themselves bravely: but when they began to fight by land, they lost their valor, and follow'd the customes of italy; and in the beginning of their enlargement by land, because they had not much territory, and yet were of great reputation, they had not much cause to fear their captains; but as they began to extend their bounds, which was under their commander carminiola, they had a taste of this error: for perceiving he was exceeding valorous, having under his conduct beaten the duke of milan; and knowing on the other side, how he was cold in the war, they judg'd that they could not make any great conquest with him; and because they neither would, nor could cashier him, that they might not lose what they had gotten, they were forced for their own safeties to put him to death. since they have had for their general bartholomew of berganio, robert of st. severin, the count of petilian, and such like: whereby they were to fear their losses, as well as to hope for gain: as it fell out afterwards at vayla, where in one day they lost that, which with so much pains they had gotten in eight hundred years: for from these kind of armes grow slack and slow and weak gains; but sudden and wonderfull losses: and because i am now come with these examples into italy, which now these many years, have been governd by mercenary armes, i will search deeper into them, to the end that their course and progress being better discoverd, they may be the better amended. you have to understand, that so soon as in these later times the yoak of the italian empire began to be shaken off, and the pope had gotten reputation in the temporality, italy was divided into several states: for many of the great cities took armes against their nobility; who under the emperors protection had held them in oppression; and the pope favored these, whereby he might get himself reputation, in the temporality; of many others, their citizens became princes, so that hereupon italy being come into the churches hands as it were, and some few republicks, those priests and citizens not accustomed to the use of armes, began to take strangers to their pay. the first that gave reputation to these soldiers was alberick of como in romania. from his discipline among others descended brachio and sforza, who in their time were the arbitres of italy; after these followed all others, who even till our dayes have commanded the armes of italy; and the success of their valor hath been, that it was overrun by charles, pillaged by lewis, forc'd by ferdinand, and disgrac'd by the swissers. the order which they have held, hath been, first whereby to give reputation to their own armes to take away the credit of the infantry. this they did, because they having no state of their own, but living upon their industry, their few foot gave them no reputation, and many they were not able to maintain; whereupon they reduc'd themselves to cavalery, and so with a supportable number they were entertained and honored: and matters were brought to such termes, that in an army of twenty thousand soldiers you should not find two thousand foot. they had moreover us'd all industry to free themselves and their soldiers of all pains and fear, in their skirmishes, not killing, but taking one another prisoners, and without ransome for their freedom; they repaired not all to their tents by night, nor made palizado or trench thereabout, nor lay in the field in the summer: and all these things were thus contrived and agreed of among them in their military orders, whereby (as is said) to avoid pains and dangers, insomuch as they have brought italy into slavery and disgrace. chap. xiii of auxiliary soldiers, mixt, and native. the auxiliary forces, being the other kind of unprofitable armes, are, when any puissant one is called in, who with his forces comes to assist and defend thee; such as in these later times did pope julius use, who having seen the evil proof of his mercenary soldiers in the enterprize of ferrara, applied himself to the auxiliaries, and agreed with ferdinand king of spain, that with his forces he should aid him. these armes may be profitable and advantagious for themselves; but for him that calls them in, hurtfull; because in losing, thou art left defeated; and conquering, thou becomest their prisoner. and however that of these examples the ancient stories are full fraught; yet will i not part from this of pope julius the second, which is as yet fresh: whose course could not have been more inconsiderate, for the desire he had to get ferrara, putting himself wholly into strangers hands: but his good fortune caused another cause to arise, that hindred him from receiving the fruit of his evil choice; for his auxiliaries being broken at ravenna, and the swissers thereupon arriving, who put the conquerors to flight beyond all opinion, even their own and others, he chanced not to remain his enemies prisoner, they being put to flight, nor prisoner to his auxiliaries, having vanquished by other forces than theirs. the florentines being wholly disarmed, brought ten thousand french to pisa for to take it: by which course they ran more hazzard, than in any time of their troubles. the emperor of constantinople, to oppress his neighbors, brought into greece ten thousand turks, who when the war was ended, could not be got out thence, which was the beginning of greeces servitude under the infidels. he then that will in no case be able to overcome, let him serve himself of these armes; for they are much more dangerous than the mercenaries; for by those thy ruine is more suddenly executed; for they are all united, and all bent to the obedience of another. but for the mercenaries to hurt thee, when they have vanquished, there is no more need of time, and greater occasion, they not being all united in a body, and being found out and paid by thee, wherein a third that thou mak'st their head, cannot suddenly gaine so great authority, that he can endammage thee. in summe, in the mercenaries their sloth and lazinesse to fight is more dangerous: in the auxiliaries their valour. wherefore a wise prince hath alwayes avoyded these kind of armes, and betaken himselfe to his owne, and desired rather to loss with his owne, than conquer with anothers, accounting that not a true victorie which was gotten with others armes. i will not doubt to alleadge cæsar borgia, and his actions. this duke entred into romania with auxiliarie armes, bringing with him all french souldiers: but afterwards not accounting those armes secure, bent himselfe to mercenaries, judging lesse danger to be in those, and tooke in pay the orsini and the vitelli, which afterwards in the proof of them, finding wavering, unfaithful, and dangerous, he extinguishd, and betook himselfe to his owne; and it may easily be perceiv'd what difference there is between the one and the other of these armes, considering the difference that was between the dukes reputation, when he had the french men alone, and when he had the orsini and vitelli; but when he remaind with his own, and stood of himselfe, we shall find it was much augmented: nor ever was it of grate esteeme, but when every one saw, that he wholly possessed his owne armes. i thought not to have parted from the italian examples of late memory; but that i must not let passe that of hiero the siracusan, being one of those i formerly nam'd. this man (as i said before) being made general of the siracusans forces, knew presently that mercenary souldiery was nothing for their profit in that they were hirelings, as our italians are; and finding no way either to hold, or cashier them made them all bee cut to peeces, and afterwards waged warre with his owne men, and none others. i will also call to memory a figure of the old testament serving just to this purpose. when david presented himselfe before saul to goe to fight with goliah the philistins champion, saul to encourage him, clad him with his owne armes, which david when he had them upon back, refused, saying, he was not able to make any proofe of himself therein, and therefore would goe meet the enemy with his own sling and sword. in summe, others armes either fall from thy shoulders, or cumber or streighten thee. charls the seventh, father of lewis the eleventh, having by his good fortune and valour set france at liberty from the english, knew well this necessity of being arm'd with his owne armes, and settled in his kingdome the ordinances of men at armes, and infantry. afterwards king lewis his sonne abolisht those of the infantry, and began to take the swissers to pay; which errour follow'd by the others, is (as now indeed it appeares) the cause of that kingdomes dangers. for having given reputation to the swissers, they have renderd all their own armes contemptible; for this hath wholly ruind their foot, and oblig'd their men at armes to forrein armes: for being accustomed to serve with the swissers, they think they are not able to overcome without them. from whence it comes that the french are not of force against the swissers, and without them also against others they use not to adventure. therefore are the french armies mixt, part mercenaries, and part natives, which armes are farre better than the simple mercenaries or simple auxiliaries, and much inferiour to the natives; and let the said example suffice for that: for the kingdome of france would have been unconquerable, if charles his order had been augmented and maintaind: but men in their small wisdome begin a thing, which then because it hath some favour of good, discovers not the poyson that lurkes thereunder, as i before said of the hectick feavers. wherefore that prince which perceives not mischiefes, but as they grow up, is not truely wise; and this is given but to few: and if we consider the first ruine of the romane empire, we shall find it was from taking the goths first into their pay; for from that beginning the forces of the romane empire began to grow weak, and all the valour that was taken hence was given to them. i conclude then that without having armes of their owne, no principality can be secure, or rather is wholly oblig'd to fortune, not having valour to shelter it in adversity. and it was alwayes the opinion and saying of wise men, that nothing is so weak and unsetled, as is the reputation of power not founded upon ones owne proper forces: which are those that are composed of thy subjects, or citizens, or servants; all the rest are mercenary or auxiliary; and the manner how to order those well, is easie to find out, if those orders above nam'd by me, shall be but run over, and if it shall be but consider'd, how philip alexander the great his father, and in what manner many republicks and princes have armd and appointed themselves, to which appointments i referre my selfe wholly. chap. xiv what belongs to the prince touching military discipline. a prince then ought to have no other ayme, nor other thought, nor take any thing else for his proper art, but warr, and the orders and discipline thereof: for that is the sole arte which belongs to him that commands, and is of so great excellency, that not only those that are borne princes, it maintains so; but many times raises men from a private fortune to that dignity. and it is seene by the contrary, that when princes have given themselves more to their delights, than to the warres, they have lost their states; and the first cause that makes thee lose it, is the neglect of that arte; and the cause that makes thee gaine it, is that thou art experienc'd and approvd in that arte. francis sforza by being a man at armes, of a private man became duke of milan; and his sons by excusing themselves of the troubles and paines belonging to those imployments of princes, became private men. for among other mischiefes thy neglect of armes brings upon thee, it causes thee to be contemnd, which is one of those disgraces, from which a prince ought to keepe himselfe, as hereafter shall be sayd: for from one that is disarmd to one that is armd there is no proportion; and reason will not, that he who is in armes, should willingly yeeld obedience to him that is unfurnishd of them, and that he that is disarmd should be in security among his armed vassalls; for there being disdaine in the one, and suspicion in the other, it is impossible these should ever well cooperate. and therefore a prince who is quite unexperienced in matter of warre, besides the other infelicities belonging to him, as is said, cannot be had in any esteeme among his souldiers, nor yet trust in them. wherefore he ought never to neglect the practice of the arte of warre, and in time of peace should he exercise it more than in the warre; which he may be able to doe two wayes; the one practically, and in his labours and recreations of his body, the other theoretically. and touching the practick part, he ought besides the keeping of his own subjects well traind up in the discipline and exercise of armes, give himselfe much to the chase, whereby to accustome his body to paines, and partly to understand the manner of situations, and to know how the mountaines arise, which way the vallyes open themselves, and how the plaines are distended flat abroad, and to conceive well the nature of the rivers, and marrish ground, and herein to bestow very much care, which knowledge is profitable in two kinds: first he learnes thereby to know his own countrey, and is the better enabled to understand the defence thereof, and afterwards by meanes of this knowledge and experience in these situations, easily comprehends any other situation, which a new he hath need to view, for the little hillocks, vallies, plaines, rivers, and marrish places. for example, they in tuscany are like unto those of other countries: so that from the knowledge of the site of one country, it is easie to attain to know that of others. and that prince that wants this skill, failes of the principall part a commander should be furnisht with; for this shows the way how to discover the enemy, to pitch the camp, to lead their armies, to order their battells, and also to besiege a town at thy best advantage, philopomenes prince of the achayans, among other praises writers give him, they say, that in time of peace, he thought not upon any thing so much as the practise of warre; and whensoever he was abroad in the field to disport himselfe with his friends, would often stand still, and discourse with them, in case the enemies were upon the top of that hill, and we here with our army, whether of us two should have the advantage, and how might we safely goe to find them, keeping still our orders; and if we would retire our selves, what course should we take if they retir'd, how should we follow them? and thus on the way, propounded them all such accidents could befall in any army; would heare their opinions, and tell his owne, and confirme it by argument; so that by his continuall thought hereupon, when ever he led any army no chance could happen, for which he had not a remedy. but touching the exercise of the mind, a prince ought to read histories, and in them consider the actions of the worthiest men, marke how they have behav'd themselves in the warrs, examine the occasions of their victories, and their losses; wherby they may be able to avoyd these, and obtaine those; and above all, doe as formerly some excellent man hath done, who hath taken upon him to imitate, if any one that hath gone before him hath left his memory glorious; the course he took, and kept alwaies near unto him the remembrances of his actions and worthy deeds: as it is said, that alexander the great imitated achilles; cæsar alexander, and scipio cyrus. and whoever reads the life of cyrus, written by xenophon, may easily perceive afterwards in scipio's life how much glory his imitation gaind him, and how much scipio did conforme himselfe in his chastity, affability, humanity, and liberality with those things, that are written by xenophon of cyrus. such like wayes ought a wise prince to take, nor ever be idle in quiet times, but by his paines then, as it were provide himself of store, whereof he may make some use in his adversity, the end that when the times change, he may be able to resist the stormes of his hard fortune. chap. xv of those things, in respect whereof, men, and especially princes, are praised, or dispraised. it now remaines that we consider what the conditions of a prince ought to be, and his termes of government over his subjects, and towards his friends. and because i know that many have written hereupon; i doubt, lest i venturing also to treat thereof, may be branded with presumption, especially seeing i am like enough to deliver an opinion different from others. but my intent being to write for the advantage of him that understands me, i thought it fitter to follow the effectuall truth of the matter, than the imagination thereof; and many principalities and republiques, have been in imagination, which neither have been seen nor knowne to be indeed: for there is such a distance between how men doe live, and how men ought to live; that he who leaves that which is done, for that which ought to be done, learnes sooner his ruine than his preservation; for that man who will professe honesty in all his actions, must needs goe to ruine among so many that are dishonest. whereupon it is necessary for a prince, desiring to preserve himselfe, to be able to make use of that honestie, and to lay it aside againe, as need shall require. passing by then things that are only in imagination belonging to a prince, to discourse upon those that are really true; i say that all men, whensoever mention is made of them, and especially princes, because they are placed aloft in the view of all, are taken notice of for some of these qualities, which procure them either commendations or blame: and this is that some one is held liberal, some miserable, (miserable i say, nor covetous; for the covetous desire to have, though it were by rapine; but a miserable man is he, that too much for bears to make use of his owne) some free givers, others extortioners; some cruell, others pitious; the one a leaguebreaker, another faithfull; the one effeminate and of small courage, the other fierce and couragious; the one courteous, the other proud; the one lascivious, the other chaste; the one of faire dealing, the other wily and crafty; the one hard, the other easie; the one grave, the other light; the one religious, the other incredulous, and such like. i know that every one will confesse, it were exceedingly praise worthy for a prince to be adorned with all these above nam'd qualities that are good: but because this is not possible, nor doe humane conditions admit such perfection in vertues, it is necessary for him to be so discret, that he know how to avoid the infamie of those vices which would thrust him out of his state; and if it be possible, beware of those also which are not able to remove him thence; but where it cannot be, let them passe with lesse regard. and yet, let him not stand much upon it, though he incurre the infamie of those vices, without which he can very hardly save his state: for if all be throughly considerd, some thing we shall find which will have the colour and very face of vertue, and following them, they will lead the to thy destruction; whereas some others that shall as much seeme vice, if we take the course they lead us, shall discover unto us the way to our safety and well-being. the second blemish in this our authours book, i find in his fifteenth chapter: where he instructs his prince to use such an ambidexterity as that he may serve himselfe either of vertue, or vice, according to his advantage, which in true pollicy is neither good in attaining the principality nor in securing it when it is attaind. for politicks, presuppose ethiques, which will never allow this rule: as that a man might make this small difference between vertue, and vice, that he may indifferently lay aside, or take up the one or the other, and put it in practise as best conduceth to the end he propounds himselfe. i doubt our authour would have blamd davids regard to saul when sam. . in the cave he cut off the lap of sauls garment, and spared his head; and afterwards in the . when he forbad abishai to strike him as he lay sleeping. worthy of a princes consideration is that saying of abigal to david sam. . . 'it shall come to passe when the lord shall have done to my lord according to all that he hath spoken concerning thee, and shall have appointed thee ruler over israel, that this shall be no grief to thee, nor offence of heart unto my lord, that thou hast forborne to shed blood, etc.' for surely the conscience of this evill ground whereupon they have either built, or underpropped their tyranny, causes men, as well _metus_ as _spes in longum projicere_, which sets them a work on further mischiefe. chap. xvi of liberality, and miserablenesse. beginning then at the first of the above mentioned qualities, i say that it would be very well to be accounted liberall: neverthelesse, liberality used in such a manner, as to make thee be accounted so, wrongs thee: for in case it be used vertuously, and as it ought to be, it shall never come to be taken notice of, so as to free thee from the infamie of its contrary. and therefore for one to hold the name of liberal among men, it were needfull not to omit any sumptuous quality, insomuch that a prince alwayes so dispos'd, shall waste all his revenues, and at the end shall be forc'd, if he will still maintaine that reputation of liberality, heavily to burthen his subjects, and become a great exactour; and put in practise all those things that can be done to get mony: which begins to make him hatefull to his subjects, and fall into every ones contempt, growing necessitous: so that having with this liberality wrong'd many, and imparted of his bounty but to a few; he feels every first mischance, and runs a hazard of every first danger: which he knowing, and desiring to withdraw himself from, incurs presently the disgrace of being termed miserable. a prince therefore not being able to use this vertue of liberality, without his own damage, in such a sort, that it may be taken notice of, ought, if he be wise, not to regard the name of miserable; for in time he shall alwaies be esteemed the more liberal, seeing that by his parsimony his own revenues are sufficient for him; as also he can defend himself against whoever makes war against him, and can do some exploits without grieving his subjects: so that he comes to use his liberality to all those, from whom he takes nothing, who are infinite in number; and his miserableness towards those to whom he gives nothing, who are but a few. in our dayes we have not seen any, but those who have been held miserable, do any great matters; but the others all quite ruin'd. pope julius the second, however he serv'd himself of the name of liberal, to get the papacy, yet never intended he to continue it, to the end he might be able to make war against the king of france: and he made so many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax, because his long thrift supplyed his large expences. this present king of spain could never have undertaken, nor gone through with so many exploits, had he been accounted liberal. wherefore a prince ought little to regard (that he may not be driven to pillage his subjects, that he may be able to defend himself, that he may not fall into poverty and contempt, that he be not forced to become an extortioner) though he incurre the name of miserable; for this is one of those vices, which does not pluck him from his throne. and if any one should say, cæsar by his liberality obtained the empire, and many others (because they both were, and were esteemd liberal) attaind to exceeding great dignities. i answer, either thou art already come to be a prince, or thou art in the way to it; in the first case, this liberality is hurtful; in the second, it is necessary to be accounted so; and cæsar was one of those that aspired to the principality of rome. but if after he had gotten it, he had survived, and not forborne those expences, he would quite have ruined that empire. and if any one should reply; many have been princes, and with their armies have done great exploits, who have been held very liberal. i answer, either the prince spends of his own and his subjects, or that which belongs to others: in the first, he ought to be sparing; in the second, he should not omit any part of liberality. and that prince that goes abroad with his army, and feeds upon prey, and spoyle, and tributes, and hath the disposing of that which belongs to others, necessarily should use this liberality; otherwise would his soldiers never follow him; and of that which is neither thine, nor thy subjects, thou mayest well be a free giver, as were cyrus, cæsar and alexander; for the spending of that which is anothers, takes not away thy reputation, but rather adds to it, only the wasting of that which is thine own hurts thee; nor is there any thing consumes itself so much as liberality, which whilest thou usest, thou losest the means to make use of it, and becomest poore and abject; or to avoid this poverty, an extortioner and hatefull person. and among all those things which a prince ought to beware of is, to be dispised, and odious; to one and the other of which, liberality brings thee. wherefore there is more discretion to hold the stile of miserable, which begets an infamy without hatred, than to desire that of liberal, whereby to incurre the necessity of being thought an extortioner, which procures an infamy with hatred. chap. xvii of cruelty, and clemency, and whether it is better to be belov'd, or feard. descending afterwards unto the other fore-alledged qualities, i say, that every prince should desire to be held pitiful, and not cruel. nevertheless ought he beware that he ill uses not this pitty. cæsar borgia was accounted cruel, yet had his cruelty redrest the disorders in romania, setled it in union, and restored it to peace, and fidelity: which, if it be well weighed, we shall see was an act of more pitty, than that of the people of florence, who to avoyd the terme of cruelty, suffered pistoya to fall to destruction. wherefore a prince ought not to regard the infamy of cruelty, for to hold his subjects united and faithfull: for by giving a very few proofes of himself the other way, he shall be held more pittiful than they, who through their too much pitty, suffer disorders to follow, from whence arise murthers and rapines: for these are wont to hurt an intire universality, whereas the executions practised by a prince, hurt only some particular. and among all sorts of princes, it is impossible for a new prince to avoyd the name of cruel, because all new states are full of dangers: whereupon virgil by the mouth of dido excuses the inhumanity of her kingdom, saying, _res dura et regni novitas me talia cogunt moliri et latè fines custode tenere._ my hard plight and new state force me to guard my confines all about with watch and ward. nevertheless ought he to be judicious in his giving belief to any thing, or moving himself thereat, nor make his people extreamly afraid of him; but proceed in a moderate way with wisdome, and humanity, that his too much confidence make him not unwary, and his too much distrust intolerable; from hence arises a dispute, whether it is better to be belov'd or feard: i answer, a man would wish he might be the one and the other: but because hardly can they subsist both together, it is much safer to be feard, than be loved; being that one of the two must needs fail; for touching men, we may say this in general, they are unthankful, unconstant, dissemblers, they avoyd dangers, and are covetous of gain; and whilest thou doest them good, they are wholly thine; their blood, their fortunes, lives and children are at thy service, as is said before, when the danger is remote; but when it approaches, they revolt. and that prince who wholly relies upon their words, unfurnished of all other preparations, goes to wrack: for the friendships that are gotten with rewards, and not by the magnificence and worth of the mind, are dearly bought indeed; but they will neither keep long, nor serve well in time of need: and men do less regard to offend one that is supported by love, than by fear. for love is held by a certainty of obligation, which because men are mischievous, is broken upon any occasion of their own profit. but fear restrains with a dread of punishment which never forsakes a man. yet ought a prince cause himself to be belov'd in such a manner, that if he gains not love, he may avoid hatred: for it may well stand together, that a man may be feard and not hated; which shall never fail, if he abstain from his subjects goods, and their wives; and whensoever he should be forc'd to proceed against any of their lives, do it when it is to be done upon a just cause, and apparent conviction; but above all things forbeare to lay his hands on other mens goods; for men forget sooner the death of their father, than the loss of their patrimony. moreover the occasions of taking from men their goods, do never fail: and alwaies he that begins to live by rapine, finds occasion to lay hold upon other mens goods: but against mens lives, they are seldome found, and sooner fail. but where a prince is abroad in the field with his army, and hath a multitude of soldiers under his government, then is it necessary that he stands not much upon it, though he be termed cruel: for unless he be so, he shall never have his soldiers live in accord one with another, nor ever well disposed to any brave piece of service. among hannibals actions of mervail, this is reckoned for one, that having a very huge army, gathered out of several nations, and all led to serve in a strange countrey, there was never any dissention neither amongst themselves, nor against their general, as well in their bad fortune as their good. which could not proceed from any thing else than from that barbarous cruelty of his, which together with his exceeding many vertues, rendred him to his soldiers both venerable and terrible; without which, to that effect his other vertues had served him to little purpose: and some writers though not of the best advised, on one side admire these his worthy actions, and on the otherside, condemn the principal causes thereof. and that it is true, that his other vertues would not have suffic'd him, we may consider in scipio, the rarest man not only in the dayes he liv'd, but even in the memory of man; from whom his army rebel'd in spain: which grew only upon his too much clemency, which had given way to his soldiers to become more licentious, than was well tollerable by military discipline: for which he was reprov'd by fabius maximus in the senate, who termed him the corrupter of the roman soldiery. the locrensians having been destroyed by a lieutenant of scipio's, were never reveng'd by him, nor the insolence of that lieutenant punisht; all this arising from his easie nature: so that one desiring to excuse him in the senate, said, that there were many men knew better how to keep themselves from faults, than to correct the faults of other men: which disposition of his in time would have wrong'd scipio's reputation and glory, had he therewith continu'd in his commands: but living under the government of the senate, this quality of his that would have disgrac'd him not only was conceal'd, but prov'd to the advancement of his glory. i conclude then, returning to the purpose of being feard, and belov'd; insomuch as men love at their own pleasure, and to serve their own turne, and their fear depends upon the princes pleasure, every wise prince ought to ground upon that which is of himself, and not upon that which is of another: only this, he ought to use his best wits to avoid hatred, as was said. chap. xviii in what manner princes ought to keep their words. how commendable in a prince it is to keep his word, and live with integrity, not making use of cunning and subtlety, every one knows well: yet we see by experience in these our dayes, that those princes have effected great matters, who have made small reckoning of keeping their words, and have known by their craft to turne and wind men about, and in the end, have overcome those who have grounded upon the truth. you must then know, there are two kinds of combating or fighting; the one by right of the laws, the other meerly by force. that first way is proper to men, the other is also common to beasts: but because the first many times suffices not, there is a necessity to make recourse to the second; wherefore it behooves a prince to know how to make good use of that part which belongs to a beast, as well as that which is proper to a man. this part hath been covertly shew'd to princes by ancient writers; who say that achilles and many others of those ancient princes were intrusted to chiron the senator, to be brought up under his discipline: the moral of this, having for their teacher one that was half a beast and half a man, was nothing else, but that it was needful for a prince to understand how to make his advantage of the one and the other nature, because neither could subsist without the other. a prince then being necessitated to know how to make use of that part belonging to a beast, ought to serve himself of the conditions of the fox and the lion; for the lion cannot keep himself from snares, nor the fox defend himself against the wolves. he had need then be a fox, that he may beware of the snares, and a lion that he may scare the wolves. those that stand wholly upon the lion, understand not well themselves. and therefore a wise prince cannot, nor ought not keep his faith given when the observance thereof turnes to disadvantage, and the occasions that made him promise, are past. for if men were all good, this rule would not be allowable; but being they are full of mischief, and would not make it good to thee, neither art thou tyed to keep it with them: nor shall a prince ever want lawfull occasions to give colour to this breach. very many modern examples hereof might be alledg'd, wherein might be shewed how many peaces concluded, and how many promises made, have been violated and broken by the infidelity of princes; and ordinarily things have best succeeded with him that hath been nearest the fox in condition. but it is necessary to understand how to set a good colour upon this disposition, and to be able to fain and dissemble throughly; and men are so simple, and yeeld so much to the present necessities, that he who hath a mind to deceive, shall alwaies find another that will be deceivd. i will not conceal any one of the examples that have been of late. alexander the sixth, never did any thing else than deceive men, and never meant otherwise, and alwaies found whom to work upon; yet never was there man would protest more effectually, nor aver any thing with more solemn oaths, and observe them less than he; nevertheless, his cousenages all thriv'd well with him; for he knew how to play this part cunningly. therefore is there no necessity for a prince to be endued with all above written qualities, but it behooveth well that he seem to be so; or rather i will boldly say this, that having these qualities, and alwaies regulating himself by them, they are hurtfull; but seeming to have them, they are advantageous; as to seem pittiful, faithful, mild, religious, and of integrity, and indeed to be so; provided withall thou beest of such a composition, that if need require to use the contrary, thou canst, and knowest how to apply thy self thereto. and it suffices to conceive this, that a prince, and especially a new prince, cannot observe all those things, for which men are held good; he being often forc'd, for the maintenance of his state, to do contrary to his faith, charity, humanity, and religion: and therefore it behooves him to have a mind so disposd, as to turne and take the advantage of all winds and fortunes; and as formerly i said, not forsake the good, while he can; but to know how to make use of the evil upon necessity. a prince then ought to have a special care, that he never let fall any words, but what are all season'd with the five above written qualities, and let him seem to him that sees and hears him, all pitty, all faith, all integrity, all humanity, all religion; nor is there any thing more necessary for him to seem to have, than this last quality: for all men in general judge thereof, rather by the sight, than by the touch; for every man may come to the sight of him, few come to the touch and feeling of him; yvery man may come to see what thou seemest, few come to perceive and understand what thou art; and those few dare not oppose the opinion of many, who have the majesty of state to protect them: and in all mens actions, especially those of princes wherein there is no judgement to appeale unto men, forbeare to give their censures, till the events and ends of things. let a prince therefore take the surest courses he can to maintain his life and state: the means shall alwaies be thought honorable, and commended by every one; for the vulgar is over-taken with the appearance and event of a thing: and for the most part of people, they are but the vulgar: the others that are but few, take place where the vulgar have no subsisteance. a prince there is in these dayes, whom i shall not do well to name, that preaches nothing else but peace and faith; but had he kept the one and the other, several times had they taken from him his state and reputation. in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth chap, our author descends to particulars, perswading his prince in his sixteenth to such a suppleness of disposition, as that upon occasion he can make use either of liberality or miserableness, as need shall require. but that of liberality is to last no longer than while he is in the way to some designe: which if he well weigh, is not really a reward of vertue, how ere it seems; but a bait and lure to bring birds to the net. in the seventeenth chap, he treats of clemency and cruelty, neither of which are to be exercis'd by him as acts of mercy or justice; but as they may serve to advantage his further purposes. and lest the prince should incline too much to clemency, our author allows rather the restraint by fear, than by love. the contrary to which all stories shew us. i will say this only, cruelty may cut of the power of some, but causes the hatred of all, and gives a will to most to take the first occasion offerd for revenge. in the eighteenth chap, our author discourses how princes ought to govern themselves in keeping their promises made: whereof he sayes they ought to make such small reckoning, as that rather they should know by their craft how to turne and wind men about, whereby to take advantage of all winds and fortunes. to this i would oppose that in the fifteenth psal. v. . he that sweareth to his neighbor, and disappointeth him not, though it were to his own hindrance. it was a king that writ it, and me thinks the rule he gave, should well befit both king and subject: and surely this perswades against all taking of advantages. a man may reduce all the causes of faith-breaking to three heads. one may be, because he that promised, had no intention to keep his word; and this is a wicked and malitious way of dealing. a second may bee, because hee that promisd, repents of his promise made; and that is grounded on unconstancy, and lightness in that he would not be well resolved before he entred into covenant. the third may be, when it so falls out, that it lyes not in his power that made the promise to performe it. in which case a man ought to imitate the good debter, who having not wherewithall to pay, hides not himself, but presents his person to his creditor, willingly suffering imprisonment. the first and second are very vitious and unworthy of a prince: in the third, men might well be directed by the examples of those two famous romans, regulus and posthumius. i shall close this with the answer of charles the fifth, when he was pressed to break his word with luther for his safe return from wormes; _fides rerum promissarum etsi toto mundo exulet, tamen apud imperatorem cam consistere oportet_. though truth be banisht out of the whole world, yet should it alwaies find harbour in an emperors breast. [sidenote: _gulielmus xenocarus_ in vit. car. quinti.] chap. xix that princes should take a care, not to incurre contempt or hatred. but because among the qualities, whereof formerly mention is made, i have spoken of those of most importance, i will treat of the others more briefly under these qualityes that a prince is to beware, as in part is above-said, and that he fly those things which cause him to be odious or vile: and when ever he shall avoid this, he shall fully have plaid his part, and in the other disgraces he shall find no danger at all. there is nothing makes him so odious, as i said, as his extortion of his subjects goods, and abuse of their women, from which he ought to forbear; and so long as he wrongs not his whole people, neither in their goods, nor honors, they live content, and he hath only to strive with the ambition of some few: which many waies and easily too, is restrain'd. to be held various, light, effeminate, faint-hearted, unresolv'd, these make him be contemnd and thought base, which a prince should shun like rocks, and take a care that in all his actions there appear magnanimity, courage, gravity, and valor; and that in all the private affairs of his subjects, he orders it so, that his word stand irrevocable: and maintain himself in such repute, that no man may think either to deceive or wind and turn him about: that prince that gives such an opinion of himself, is much esteemed, and against him who is so well esteemed, hardly are any conspiracies made by his subjects, or by forreiners any invasion, when once notice is taken of his worth, and how much he is reverenced by his subjects: for a prince ought to have two fears, the one from within, in regard of his subjects; the other from abroad, in regard of his mighty neighbors; from these he defends himself by good armes and good friends; and alwayes he shall have good friends, if he have good armes; and all things shall alwaies stand sure at home, when those abroad are firme, in case some conspiracy have not disturbed them; and however the forrein matters stand but ticklishly; yet if he have taken such courses at home, and liv'd as we have prescribed, he shall never be able (in case he forsake not himself) to resist all possibility, force and violence, as i said nabis the spartan did: but touching his subjects, even when his affairs abroad are setled, it is to be fear'd they may conspire privily; from which a prince sufficiently secure himself by shunning to be hated or contemned, and keeping himself in his peoples good opinion, which it is necessary for him to compass, as formerly we treated at large. and one of the powerfullest remedies a prince can have against conspiracies, is, not to be hated nor dispised by the universality; for alwaies he that conspires, beleeves the princes death is acceptable to the subject: but when he thinks it displeases them, he hath not the heart to venture on such a matter; for the difficulties that are on the conspirators side, are infinite. by experience it is plain, that many times plots have been laid, but few of them have succeeded luckily; for he that conspires, cannot be alone, nor can he take the company of any, but of those, who he beleeves are malecontents; and so soon as thou hast discover'd thy self to a malecontent, thou givest him means to work his own content: for by revealing thy treason, he may well hope for all manner of favour: so that seeing his gain certain of one side; and on the other, finding only doubt and danger, either he had need be a rare friend, or that he be an exceeding obstinate enemy to the prince, if he keeps his word with thee. and to reduce this matter into short termes: i say, there is nothing but jealousie, fear, and suspect of punishment on the conspirators part to affright him; but on the princes part, there is the majesty of the principality, the laws, the defences of his friends and the state, which do so guard him, that to all these things the peoples good wills being added, it is unpossible any one should be so head-strong as to conspire; for ordinarily where a traytor is to feare before the execution of his mischiefe, in this case he is also to feare afterwards, having the people for his enemy when the fact is commited, and therefore for this cause, not being able to hope for any refuge. touching this matter, many examples might be brought; but i will content my selfe to name one which fell out in the memory of our fathers. annibal bentivolii, grand father of this annibal who now lives, that was prince in bolonia, being slaine by the canneschi that conspir'd against him, none of his race being left, but this john, who was then in swadling clouts; presently the people rose upon this murder, and slew all the canneschi which proceeded from the popular affection, which the family of the bentivolii held then in bolonia: which was so great, that being there remain'd not any, now anniball was dead, that was able to manage the state; and having notice that in florence there was one borne of the bentivolii, who till then was taken for a smiths sonne: the citizens of bolonia went to florence for him, and gave the government of their city to him, which was rul'd by him, untill john was of fit yeares to governe. i conclude then, that a prince ought to make small account of treasons, whiles he hath the people to friend: but if they be his enemies and hate him, he may well feare every thing, and every one. and well ordered states, and discreet princes have taken care withall diligence, not to cause their great men to fall into desperation, and to content the people, and so to maintaine them: for this is one of the most important businesses belonging to a prince. among the kingdomes that are well orderd and governd in our dayes, is that of france, and therein are found exceeding many good orders, whereupon the kings liberty and security depends: of which the chiefe is the parliament, and the authority thereof: for he that founded that kingdome, knowing the great mens ambition and insolence; and judgeing it necessary there should be a bridle to curbe them; and on the other side knowing the hatred of the commonalty against the great ones, grounded upon feare, intending to secure them, would not lay this care wholly upon the king, but take this trouble from him, which he might have with the great men, in case he favourd the commonalty; or with the commonalty, in case he favourd the great men; and thereupon set up a third judge, which was that, to the end it should keep under the great ones, and favour the meaner sort, without any imputation to the king. it was not possible to take a better, nor wiser course then this; nor a surer way to secure the king, and the kingdome. from whence we may draw another conclusion worthie of note, that princes ought to cause others to take upon them the matters of blame and imputation; and upon themselves to take only those of grace and favour. here againe i conclude, that a prince ought to make good esteeme of his nobility; but not thereby to incur the commons hatred: it would seeme perhaps to many, considering the life and death of many romane emperours, that they were examples contrary to my opinion, finding that some have liv'd worthily, and shewd many rare vertues of the minde, and yet have lost the empire, and been put to death by their owne subjects, conspiring against them. intending then to answer these objections, i shall discourse upon the qualities of some emperours, declaring the occasions of their ruine, not disagreeing from that which i have alledgd; and part thereof i will bestow on the consideration of these things, which are worthy to be noted by him that reads the actions of those times: and it shall suffice me to take all those emperours that succeeded in the empire from marcus the philosopher to maximinus, who were mercus and commodus his sonne, pertinax, julian, severus, antonius, caracalla his sonne, macrinus, heliogabalus, alexander, and maximin. and first it is to be noted, that where in the other principalities, they are to contend only with the ambition of the nobles, and the insolence of the people; the romane emperours had a third difficulty, having to support the cruelty and covetousnesse of the souldiers, which was so hard a thing, that it caused the ruine of many, being hard to satisfy the souldiers, and the people; for the people love their quiet, and therefore affect modest princes; and the souldiers love a prince of a warlike courage, that is insolent, cruell, and plucking from every one: which things they would have them exercise upon the people, whereby they might be able to double their stipends, and satisfie their avarice and cruelty: whence it proceeds, that those emperours who either by nature or by art, had not such a reputation, as therewith they could curbe the one and the other, were alwayes ruind: and the most of them, specially those who as new men came to the principality, finding the difficulty of those two different humours, applyed themselves to content the souldiers, making small account of wronging the people, which was a course then necessary; for the princes not being able to escape the hatred of every one, ought first endeavour that they incurre not the hatred of any whole universality; and when they cannot attaine thereunto, they are to provide with all industry, to avoyd the hatred of those universalities that are the most mighty. and therefore those emperors, who because they were but newly call'd to the empire, had need of extraordinary favours, more willingly stuck to the soldiers, than to the people; which neverthelesse turnd to their advantage, or otherwise, according as that prince knew how to maintaine his repute with them. from these causes aforesayd proceeded it, that marcus pertinax, and alexander, though all living modestly, being lovers of justice, and enemies of cruelty, courteous and bountifull, had all from marcus on ward, miserable ends; marcus only liv'd and dy'd exceedingly honoured: for he came to the empire by inheritance, and was not to acknowledge it either from the soldiers, nor from the people: afterwards being accompanyed with many vertues, which made him venerable, he held alwayes whilst he liv'd the one and the other order within their limits, and was never either hated, or contemnd. but pertinax was created emperour against the soldiers wills, who being accustomed to live licentiously under commodus, could not endure that honest course that pertinax sought to reduce them to: whereupon having gotten himself hatred, and to this hatred added contempt, in that he was old, was ruind in the very beginning of his government. whence it ought to be observed, that hatred is gaind as well by good deeds as bad; and therefore as i formerly said, when a prince would maintaine the state, he is often forced not to be good: for when that generality, whether it be the people, or soldiers, or nobility, whereof thou thinkst thou standst in need to maintain thee, is corrupted, it behoves thee to follow their humour, and content them, and then all good deeds are thy adversaries. but let us come to alexander who was of that goodnesse, that among the prayses given him, had this for one, that in fourteen yeers wherein he held the empire, he never put any man to death, but by course of justice; neverthelesse being held effeminate, and a man that suffered himselfe to be ruled by his mother, and thereupon fallen into contempt, the army conspird against him. now on the contrary discoursing upon the qualities of commodus, severus, antonius, caracalla, and maximinus, you shall find them exceeding cruell, and ravinous, who to satisfie their soldiers, forbeare no kinde of injury that could be done upon the people; and all of them, except severus, came to evill ends: for in severus, there was such extraordinary valour, that while he held the soldiers his freinds, however the people were much burthend by him, he might alwayes reigne happily: for his valour rendred him so admirable in the souldiers and peoples sights; that these in a manner stood amazd and astonishd, and those others reverencing and honoring him. and because the actions of this man were exceeding great, being in a new prince, i will briefly shew how well he knew to act the foxes and the lions parts; the conditions of which two, i say, as before, are very necessary for a prince to imitate. severus having had experience of julian the emperours sloth, perswaded his army (whereof he was commander in sclavonia) that they should doe well to goe to rome to revenge pertinax his death, who was put to death by the imperiall guard; and under this pretence, not making any shew that he aspird unto the empire, set his army in march directly towards rome, and was sooner come into italy, than it was knowne he had mov'd from his station. being ariv'd at rome, he was by the senate chosen emperour for feare, and julian slaine. after this beginning, two difficulties yet remaind to severus, before he could make himselfe lord of the whole state; the one in asia, where niger the generall of those armies had gotten the title of emperour, the other in the west with albinus, who also aspird to the empire: and because he thought there might be some danger to discover himselfe enemy to them both, he purposed to set upon niger, and cozen albinus, to whom he writ, that being elected emperour by the senate, he would willingly communicate it with him; and thereupon sent him the title of cæsar, and by resolution of the senate, tooke him to him for his colleague; which things were taken by albinus in true meaning. but afterwards when severus had overcome and slaine niger, and pacified the affaires and in the east, being returned to rome, he complaind in the senate of albinus, how little weighing the benefits received from him, he had sought to slay him by treason, and therefore was he forc'd to goe punish his ingratitude: afterwards he went into france, where he bereft him both of his state and life, whoever then shall in particular examine his actions, shall finde he was a very cruell lion, and as crafty a fox: and shall see that he was alwayes feard and reverenc'd by every one, and by the armies not hated; and shall nothing marvell that he being a new man, was able to hold together such a great empire: for his extraordinary reputation defended him alwayes from that hatred, which the people for his extortions might have conceiv'd against him. but antonius his sonne, was also an exceeding brave man, and endued with most excellent qualities, which causd him to be admird by the people, and acceptable to the souldiers, because he was a warlike man, enduring all kind of travell and paines, despising all delicate food, and all kinde of effeminacy, which gaind him the love of all the armies: neverthelesse his fiercenesse and cruelty were such, and so hideous, having upon many particular occasions put to death a great part of the people of rome, and all those of alexandria, that he grew odious to the world, and began to be feard by those also that were neare about him; so that he was slaine by a centurion in the very midst of his army. where it is to be noted, that these kinde of deaths, which follow upon the deliberation of a resolv'd and obstinate minde, cannot by a prince be avoyded: for every one that feares not to dye, is able to doe it; but a prince ought to be lesse afraid of it because it very seldome falls out. only should he beware not to doe any extreame injury to any of those of whom he serves himself, or that he hath near about him in any imployment of his principality, as antonius did: who had reproachfully slaine a brother of that centurion; also threatned him every day, and neverthelesse entertaind him still as one of the guards of his body, which was a rash course taken, and the way to destruction, as befell him. but let us come to commodus for whom it was very easie to hold the empire, by reason it descended upon him by inheritance, being marcus his sonne, and it had been enough for him to follow his fathers footsteps, and then had he contented both the people and the soldiers: but being of a cruell and savage disposition, whereby to exercise his actions upon the people, he gave himselfe to entertaine armies, and those in all licentiousnesse. on the other part not maintaining his dignity, but often descending upon the stages to combate with fencers, and doing such other like base things, little worthy of the imperiall majesty, he became contemptible in the soldiers sight; and being hated of one part, and despisd of the other, he was conspird against, and slaine. it remaines now, that we declare maximinus his conditions, who was a very warlike man; and the armies loathing alexanders effeminacy, whereof i spake before, when they had slain him, chose this man emperour, who not long continued so, because two things there were that brought him into hatred and contempt; the one because he was very base, having kept cattell in thrace, which was well knowne to every one, and made them to scorne him; the other, because in the beginning of his principality having delayd to goe to rome, and enter into possession of the imperiall throne, he had gaind the infamy of being thought exceeding cruell, having by his prefects in rome, and in every place of the empire, exercisd many cruelties, insomuch that the whole world being provok'd against him to contempt for the basenesse of his blood; on the other side upon the hatred conceiv'd against him for feare of his crulty; first affrica, afterwards the senate, with all the people of rome and all italy, conspired against him, with whom his own army took part; which incamping before aquileya, and finding some difficulty to take the town, being weary of his cruelties, and because they saw he had so many enemies, fearing him the lesse, slew him. i purpose not to say any thing either of heliogabalus, macrinus, or julian, who because they were throughly base, were sudenly extinguished: but i will come to the conclusion of this discourse; and i say, that the princes of our times have lesse of this difficulty to satisfie the soldiers extraordinarily in their government; for notwithstanding that there be some considerations to be had of them, yet presently are those armies dissolved, because none of these princes do use to maintaine any armies together, which are annex'd and inveterated with the governments of the provinces, as were the armies of the romane empire. and therefore if then it was necessary rather to content the soldiers than the people, it was because the soldiers were more powerfull than the people: now is it more necessary for all princes, (except the turk and the souldan) to satisfie their people than their soldiers, because the people are more mighty than they; wherein i except the turk, he alwayes maintaining about his person foot, and horse, upon which depends the safety and strength of his kingdome; and it is necessary that laying aside all other regard of his people, he maintaine these his friends. the souldans kingdome is like hereunto, which being wholy in the souldiers power, he must also without respect of his people keep them his friends. and you are to consider, that this state of the souldans differs much from all the other principalities: for it is very like the papacy, which cannot be termd an hereditary principality: nor a new principality: for the sons of the deceasd prince are not heires and lords thereof, but he that is chosen receives that dignity from those who have the authority in them. and this order being of antiquity, cannot be termd a new principality, because therein are none of those difficulties that are in new ones: for though the prince be new, yet are the orders of that state ancient, and ordaind to receive him, as if he were their hereditary prince. but let us returne to our matter; whosoever shall consider our discourse before, shall perceive that either hatred, or contempt have caus'd the ruine of the afore-named emperors; and shall know also, from it came that part of them proceeding one way, and part a contrary; yet in any of them the one had a happy success, and the others unhappy: for it was of no availe, but rather hurtful for pertinax and alexander, because they were new princes, to desire to imitate marcus, who by inheritance came to the principality: and in like manner it was a wrong to caracalla, commodus, and maximus, to imitate severus, because none of them were endued with so great valor as to follow his steps therein. wherefore a new prince in his principality cannot well imitate marcus his actions; nor yet is it necessary to follow those of severus: but he ought make choyce of those parts in severus which are necessary for the founding of a state; and to take from marcus those that are fit and glorious to preserve a state which is already established and setled. chap. xx whether the citadels and many other things which princes often make use of, are profitable or dammageable. some princes, whereby they might safely keep their state, have disarmed their subjects; some others have held the towns under their dominion, divided into factions; others have maintain'd enmities against themselves; others have appli'd themselves to gain them, where they have suspected at their entrance into the government; others have built fortresses; and others again have ruined and demolished them: and however that upon all these things, a man cannot well pass a determinate sentence, unless one comes to the particulars of these states, where some such like determinations were to be taken; yet i shall speak of them in so large a manner, as the matter of it self will bear. it was never then that a new prince would disarme his own subjects; but rather when he hath found them disarmed, he hath alwaies arm'd them. for being belov'd, those armes become thine; those become faithful, which thou hadst in suspicion; and those which were faithful, are maintaind so; and thy subjects are made thy partisans; and because all thy subjects cannot be put in armes, when thou bestowest favors on those thou armest, with the others thou canst deal more for thy safety; and that difference of proceeding which they know among them, obliges them to thee; those others excuse thee, judgeing it necessary that they have deservd more, who have undergone more danger, and so have greater obligation: but when thou disarmst them, thou beginst to offend them, that thou distrustest them, either for cowardise, or small faith; and the one or the other of those two opinions provokes their hatred against thee; and because thou canst not stand disarmed, thou must then turn thy self to mercenary soldiery, whereof we have formerly spoken what it is, and when it is good; it can never be so much as to defend thee from powerful enemies, and suspected subjects; therefore as i have said, a new prince in a new principality hath alwaies ordaind them armes. of examples to this purpose, histories are full. but when a prince gains a new state, which as a member he adds to his ancient dominions, then it is necessary to disarme that state, unless it be those whom thou hast discoverd to have assisted thee in the conquest thereof; and these also in time and upon occasions, it is necessary to render delicate and effeminate, and so order them, that all the arms of thy state be in the hands of thy own soldiers, who live in thy ancient state near unto thee. our ancestors and they that were accounted sages, were wont to say that it was necessary to hold pistoya in factions, and pisa with fortresses; and for this cause maintaind some towns subject to them in differences, whereby to hold it more easily. this, at what time italy was ballanc'd in a certain manner, might be well done; but mee thinks it cannot now a dayes be well given for a precept; for i do not beleeve, that divisions made can do any good; rather it must needs be, that when the enemy approaches them, cities divided are presently lost; for alwaies the weaker part will cleave to the forrein power, and the other not be able to subsist. the venetians (as i think) mov'd by the aforesaid reasons, maintaind the factions of the guelfes and gibellins, in their townes; and however they never suffered them to spill one anothers blood, yet they nourish'd these differences among them, to the end that the citizens imployd in these quarrels, should not plot any thing against them: which as it proved, never serv'd them to any great purpose: for being defeated at vayla, presently one of those two factions took courage and seizd upon their whole state. therefore such like waies argue the princes weakness; for in a strong principality they never will suffer such divisions; for they shew them some kind of profit in time of peace, being they are able by means thereof more easily to mannage their subjects: but war comming, such like orders discover their fallacy. without doubt, princes become great, when they overcome the difficulties and oppositions that are made against them; and therefore fortune especially when she hath to make any new prince great, who hath more need to gain reputation than an hereditary prince, causes enemies to rise against him, and him to undertake against them: to the end he may have occasion to master them, and know that ladder, which his enemies have set him upon, whereby to rise yet higher. and therefore many think, that a wise prince when he hath the occasion, ought cunningly to nourish some enmity, that by the suppressing thereof, his greatness may grow thereupon. princes, especially those that are new, have found more faith and profit in those men, who in the beginning of their state, have been held suspected, than in those who at their entrance have been their confidents. pandulphus petrucci, prince of siena, governd his state, more with them that had been suspected by him, than with the others. but of this matter we cannot speak at large, because it varies according to the subject; i will only say this, that those men, who in the beginning of a principality were once enemies, if they be of quality so that to maintain themselves they have need of support, the prince might alwaies with the greatest facility gain for his; and they are the rather forced to serve him faithfully, insomuch as they know it is more necessary for them by their deeds to cancel that sinister opinion, which was once held of them; and so the prince ever draws from these more advantage, than from those, who serving him too supinely, neglect his affairs. and seing the matter requires it, i will not omit to put a prince in mind, who hath anew made himself master of a state, by means of the inward helps he had from thence that he consider well the cause that mov'd them that favor'd him to favor him, if it be not a natural affection towards him; for if it be only because they were not content with their former government, with much pains and difficulties shall he be able to keep them long his friends, because it will be impossible for him to content them. by these examples then which are drawn out of ancient and modern affaires, searching into the cause hereof, we shall find it much more easie to gain those men for friends, who formerly were contented with the state, and therefore were his enemies: than those, who because they were not contented therewith, became his fiends, and favor'd him in getting the mastery of it. it hath been the custome of princes, whereby to hold their states more securely, to build citadels, which might be bridles and curbs to those that should purpose any thing against them, and so to have a secure retreat from the first violences. i commend this course, because it hath been used of old; notwithstanding nicholas vitelli in our dayes hath been known to demolish two citadels in the town of castello, the better to keep the state; guidubaldo duke of urbin being to return into his state, out of which he was driven by cæsar borgia, raz'd all the fortresses of that countrey, and thought he should hardlyer lose that state again without them. the bentivolii returning into bolonia, used the like courses. citadels then are profitable, or not, according to the times; and if they advantage thee in one part, they do thee harme in another; and this part may be argued thus. that prince who stands more in fear of his own people than of strangers, ought to build fortresses: but he that is more afraid of strangers than of his people, should let them alone. against the house of sforza, the castle of milan, which francis sforza built, hath and will make more war, than any other disorder in that state: and therefore the best citadel that may be, is not to incurre the peoples hatred; for however thou holdest a fortress, and the people hate thee, thou canst hardly scape them; for people, when once they have taken armes, never want the help of strangers at their need to take ther parts. in our dayes we never saw that they ever profited any prince, unless it were the countess of furli, when count hieronymo of furli her husband was slain; for by means thereof she escap'd the peoples rage, and attended aid from milan, and so recover'd her state: and then such were the times that the stranger could not assist the people: but afterwards they serv'd her to little purpose, when cæsar borgia assaild her, and that the people which was her enemy, sided with the stranger. therefore both then, and at first, it would have been more for her safety, not to have been odious to the people, than to have held the fortresses. these things being well weigh'd then, i will commend those that shall build up fortresses, and him also that shall not; and i will blame him, howsoever he be, that relying upon those, shall make small account of being hated by his people. chap. xxi how a prince ought to behave himself to gain reputation. there is nothing gains a prince such repute as great exploits, and rare tryals of himself in heroick actions. we have now in our dayes ferdinand king of arragon the present king of spain: he in a manner may be termed a new prince; for from a very weak king, he is now become for fame and glory, the first king of christendome, and if you shall wel consider his actions, you shall find them all illustrious, and every one of them extraordinary. he in the beginning of his reign assaild granada, and that exploit was the ground of his state. at first he made that war in security, and without suspicion he should be any waies hindred, and therein held the barons of castiglias minds busied, who thinking upon that war, never minded any innovation; in this while he gaind credit and authority with them, they not being aware of it; was able to maintain with the church and the peoples money all his soldiers, and to lay a foundation for his military ordinances with that long war, which afterwards gaind him exceeding much honor. besides this, to the end he might be able hereamong to undertake greater matters, serving himself alwaies of the colour of religion, he gave himself to a kind of religious cruelty, chasing and dispoyling those jewes out of the kingdome; nor can this example be more admirable and rare: under the same cloke he invaded affrick and went through with his exploit in italy: and last of all hath he assaild france, and so alwaies proceeded on forwards contriving of great matters, which alwaies have held his subjects minds in peace and admiration, and busied in attending the event, what it should be: and these his actions have thus grown, one upon another, that they have never given leisure to men so to rest, as they might ever plot any thing against them. moreover it much avails a prince to give extraordinary proofes of himself touching the government within, such as those we have heard of bernard of milan, whensoever occasion is given by any one, that may effectuate some great thing either of good or evil, in the civil government; and to find out some way either to reward or punish it, whereof in the world much notice may be taken. and above all things a prince ought to endeavor in all his actions to spread abroad a fame of his magnificence and worthiness. a prince also is well esteemed, when he is a true friend, or a true enemy; when without any regard he discovers himself in favor of one against another; which course shall be alwaies more profit, than to stand neuter: for if two mighty ones that are thy neighbors, come to fall out, or are of such quality, that one of them vanquishing, thou art like to be in fear of the vanquisher, or not; in either of these two cases, it will ever prove more for thy profit, to discover thy self, and make a good war of it: for in the first case, if thou discoverest not thy selfe, thou shalt alwaies be a prey to him that overcomes, to the contentment and satisfaction of the vanquisht; neither shalt thou have reason on thy side, nor any thing else to defend or receive thee. for he that overcomes, will not have any suspected friends that give him no assistance in his necessity: and he that loses, receives thee not, because thou wouldest not with thy armes in hand run the hazzard of his fortune. antiochus passed into greece, thereunto induc'd by the etolians, to chace the romans thence: and sent his ambassadors to the achayans, who were the romans friends, to perswade them to stand neuters; on the other side the romans moved them to joyne armes with theirs: this matter came to be deliberated on in the council of the achayans, where antiochus his ambassador encouraged them to stand neuters, whereunto the romans ambassador answerd; touching the course, that is commended to you, as best and profitablest for your state, to wit, not to intermeddle in the war between us, nothing can be more against you: because, not taking either part, you shall remain without thanks, and without reputation a prey to the conqueror. and it will alwaies come to pass that he who is not thy friend, will requite thy neutrality; and he that is thy friend, will urge thee to discover thy self by taking arms for him: and evil advised princes; to avoyd the present dangers, folow often times that way of neutrality, and most commonly go to ruine: but when a prince discovers himself strongly in favor of a party; if he to whom thou cleavest, overcomes; however that he be puissant, and thou remainest at his disposing, he is oblig'd to thee, and there is a contract of friendship made; and men are never so openly dishonest, as with such a notorious example of dishonesty to oppress thee. besides victories are never so prosperous, that the conqueror is like neglect all respects, and especially of justice. but if he to whom thou stickst, loses, thou art received by him; and, while he is able, he aydes thee, and so thou becomest partner of a fortune that may arise again; the second case, when they that enter into the lists together, are of such quality, that thou needest not fear him that vanquisheth, so much the more is it discretion in thee to stick to him; for thou goest to ruine one with his assistance, who ought to do the best he could to save him, if he were well advised; and he overcomming, is left at thy discretion; and it is unpossible but with thy ayd he must overcome. and here it is to be noted, that a prince should be well aware never to joyn with any one more powerfull than himself, to offend another, unless upon necessity, as formerly is said. for when he overcomes, thou art left at his discretion, and princes ought avoid as much as they are able, to stand at anothers discretion. the venetians took part with france against the duke of milan, and yet could have avoided that partaking, from which proceeded their ruine. but when it cannot be avoyded, as it befel the florentines when the pope and the king of spain went both with their armies to lombardy, there the prince ought to side with them for the reasons aforesaid. nor let any state think they are able to make such sure parties, but rather that they are all doubtfull; for in the order of things we find it alwaies, that whensoever a man seeks to avoid one inconvenient, he incurs another. but the principal point of judgement, is in discerning between the qualities of inconvenients, and not taking the bad for the good. moreover a prince ought to shew himself a lover of vertue, and that he honors those that excel in every art. afterwards ought he encourage his citizens, whereby they may be enabled quickly to exercise their faculties as well in merchandise, and husbandry, as in any other kind of traffick, to the end that no man forbear to adorne and cultivate his possessions for fear that he be despoyled of them; or any other to open the commerce upon the danger of heavy impositions: but rather to provide rewards for those that shall set these matters afoot, or for any one else that shall any way amplifie his city or state. besides he ought in the fit times of the year entertain the people with feasts and maskes; and because every city is devided into companies, and arts, and tribes, he ought to take special notice of those bodies, and some times afford them a meeting, and give them some proof of his humanity, and magnificence; yet withall holding firme the majestie of his state; for this must never fail in any case. chap. xxii touching princes secretaries. it is no small importance to a prince, the choyce he makes, of servants being ordinarily good or bad, as his wisdome is. and the first conjecture one gives of a great man, and of his understanding, is, upon the sight of his followers and servants he hath about him, when they prove able and faithful, and then may he alwaies be reputed wise because he hath known how to discern those that are able, and to keep them true to him. but when they are otherwise, there can be no good conjecture made of him; for the first error he commits, is in this choyce. there was no man that had any knowledge of antonio of vanafro, the servant of pandulfus petrucci prince of sicily, who did not esteem pandulfus for a very discreet man, having him for his servant. and because there are three kinds of understandings; the one that is advised by it self; the other that understands when it is informed by another; the third that neither is advised by it self nor by the demonstration of another; the first is best, the second is good, and the last quite unprofitable. therefore it was of necessity, that if pandulfus attaind not the first degree, yet he got to the second; for whenever any one hath the judgement to discerne between the good and the evil, that he does and sayes, however that he hath not his distinction from himself, yet still comes he to take notice of the good or evil actions of that servant; and those he cherishes, and these he suppresses; insomuch that the servant finding no means to deceive his master, keeps himself upright and honest. but how a prince may throughly understand his servant, here is the way that never fails. when thou seest the servant study more for his own advantage than thine, and that in all his actions, he searches most after his own profit; this man thus qualified, shall never prove good servant, nor canst thou ever relie upon him: for he that holds the sterne of the state in hand, ought never call home his cares to his own particular, but give himself wholly over to his princes service, nor ever put him in minde of any thing not appertaining to him. and on the other side the prince to keep him good to him, ought to take a care for his servant, honoring him, enriching, and obliging him to him, giving him part both of dignities and offices, to the end that the many honors and much wealth bestowed on him, may restrain his desires from other honors, and other wealth, and that those many charges cause him to fear changes that may fall, knowing he is not able to stand without his master. and when both the princes and the servants are thus disposed, they may rely the one upon the other: when otherwise, the end will ever prove hurtfull for the one as well as for the other. chap. xxiii that flatterers are to be avoyded. i will not omit one principle of great inportance, being an errour from which princes with much difficulty defend themselves, unlesse they be very discreet, and make a very good choice; and this is concerning flatterers; whereof all writings are full: and that because men please themselves so much in their own things, and therein cozen themselves, that very hardly can they escape this pestilence; and desiring to escape it, there is danger of falling into contempt; for there is no other way to be secure from flattery, but to let men know, that they displease thee not in telling thee truth: but when every one hath this leave, thou losest thy reverence. therefore ought a wise prince take a third course, making choyce of some understanding men in his state, and give only to them a free liberty of speaking to him the truth; and touching those things only which he inquires of, and nothing else; but he ought to be inquisitive of every thing, and hear their opinions, and then afterwards advise himself after his own manner; and in these deliberations, and with every one of them so carrie himself, that they all know, that the more freely they shall speak, the better they shall be liked of: and besides those, not give eare to any one; and thus pursue the thing resolved on, and thence continue obstinate in the resolution taken. he who does otherwise, either falls upon flatterers, or often changes upon the varying of opinions, from whence proceeds it that men conceive but slightly of him. to this purpose i will alledge you a moderne example. peter lucas a servant of maximilians the present emperor, speaking of his majesty, said that he never advised with any body, nor never did any thing after his own way: which was because he took a contrary course to what we have now said: for the emperor is a close man, who communicates his secrets to none, nor takes counsel of any one; but as they come to be put in practise, they begin to be discovered and known, and so contradicted by those that are near about him; and he as being an easy man, is quickly wrought from them. whence it comes that what he does to day, he undoes on the morrow; and that he never understands himself what he would, nor what he purposes, and that there is no grounding upon any of his resolutions. a prince therefore ought alwayes to take counsell, but at his owne pleasure, and not at other mens; or rather should take away any mans courage to advise him of any thing, but what he askes: but he ought well to aske at large, and then touching the things inquird of, be a patient hearer of the truth; and perceiving that for some respect the truth were conceald from him, be displeased thereat. and because some men have thought that a prince that gaines the opinion to bee wise, may bee held so, not by his owne naturall indowments, but by the good counsells he hath about him; without question they are deceivd; for this is a generall rule and never failes, that a prince who of himselfe is not wise, can never be well advised, unlesse he should light upon one alone, wholly to direct and govern him, who himself were a very wise man. in this case it is possible he may be well governd: but this would last but little: for that governor in a short time would deprive him of his state; but a prince not having any parts of nature, being advised of more then one, shall never be able to unite these counsels: of himself shall he never know how to unite them; and each one of the counsellers, probably will follow that which is most properly his owne; and he shall never find the meanes to amend or discerne these things; nor can they fall out otherwise, because men alwayes prove mischievous, unlesse upon some necessity they be forc'd to become good: we conclude therefore, that counsells from whencesoever they proceed, must needs take their beginning from the princes wisdome, and not the wisdome of the prince from good counsells. in this chapter our authour prescribes some rules how to avoyd flattery, and not to fall into contempt. the extent of these two extreames is so large on both sides, that there is left but a very narrow path for the right temper to walke between them both: and happy were that prince, who could light on so good a pilote as to bring him to port between those rocks and those quicksands. where majesty becomes familiar, unlesse endued with a super-eminent vertue, it loses all awfull regards: as the light of the sunne, because so ordinary, because so common, we should little value, were it not that all creatures feele themselves quickned by the rayes thereof. on the other side, _omnis insipiens arrogantiâ et plausibus capitur_, every foole is taken with his owne pride and others flatteryes: and this foole keeps company so much with all great wise men, that hardly with a candle and lantern can they be discernd betwixt. the greatest men are more subject to grosse and palpable flatteries; and especially the greatest of men, who are kings and princes: for many seek the rulers favour. _prov._ . . for there are divers meanes whereby private men are instructed; princes have not that good hap: but they whose instruction is of most importance, so soone as they have taken the government upon them, no longer suffer any reproovers: for but few have accesse unto them, and they who familiary converse with them, doe and say all for favour. isocrat, to nicocles, all are afraid to give him occasion of displeasure, though by telling him truth. to this purpose therefore sayes one; a prince excells in learning to ride the great horse, rather than in any other exercise, because his horse being no flatterer, will shew him he makes no difference between him and another man, and unlesse he keepe his seate well, will lay him on the ground. this is plaine dealing. men are more subtile, more double-hearted, they have a heart and a heart neither is their tongue their hearts true interpreter. counsell in the heart of man is like deepe waters; but a man of understanding will draw it out. _prov._ . . this understanding is most requisite in a prince, inasmuch as the whole globe is in his hand, and the inferiour orbes are swayed by the motion of the highest. and therefore surely it is the honour of a king to search out such a secret: _prov._ . . his counsellours are his eyes and eares; as they ought to be dear to him, so they ought to be true to him, and make him the true report of things without disguise. if they prove false eyes, let him pluck them out; he may as they use glasse eyes, take them forth without paine, and see never a whit the worse for it. the wisdome of a princes counsellours is a great argument of the princes wisdome. and being the choyce of them imports the princes credit and safety, our authour will make him amends for his other errours by his good advice in his chap. whether i referre him. chap. xxiv wherefore the princes of italy have lost their states. when these things above said are well observ'd, they make a new prince seeme as if he had been of old, and presently render him more secure and firme in the state, than if he had already grown ancient therein: for a new prince is much more observd in his action, than a prince by inheritance; and when they are known to bee vertuous, men are much more gaind and oblig'd to them thereby, than by the antiquity of their blood: for men are much more taken by things present, than by things past, and when in the present they find good, they content themselves therein, and seeke no further; or rather they undertake the defence of him to their utmost, when the prince is not wanting in other matters to himself; and so shall he gaine double glory to have given a beginning to a new principality, adornd, and strengthnd it with good lawes, good arms, good friends, and good examples; as he shall have double shame, that is born a prince, and by reason of his small discretion hath lost it. and if we shall consider those lords, that in italy have lost their states in our dayes, as the king of naples, the duke of milan, and others; first we shall find in them a common defect, touching their armes, for the reasons which have been above discoursd at length. afterwards we shall see some of them, that either shall have had the people for their enemies; or be it they had the people to friend, could never know how to assure themselves of the great ones: for without such defects as these, states are not lost, which have so many nerves, that they are able to maintaine an army in the feld. philip of macedon, not the father of alexander the great, but he that was vanquished by titus quintius, had not much state in regard of the greatnesse of the romanes and of greece that assail'd him; neverthelesse in that he was a warlike man and knew how to entertaine the people, and assure himself of the nobles, for many yeares he made the warre good against them: and though at last some town perhaps were taken from him, yet the kingdome remaind in his hands still. wherefore these our princes who for many yeares had continued in their principalities, for having afterwards lost them, let them not blame fortune, but their own sloth; because they never having thought during the time of quiet, that they could suffer a change (which is the common fault of men, while faire weather lasts, not to provide for the tempest) when afterwards mischiefes came upon them, thought rather upon flying from them, than upon their defence, and hop'd that the people, weary of the vanquishers insolence, would recall them: which course when the others faile, is good: but very ill is it to leave the other remedies for that: for a man wou'd never go to fall, beleeving another would come to take him up: which may either not come to passe, or if it does, it is not for thy security, because that defence of his is vile, and depends not upon thee; but those defences only are good, certaine, and durable, which depend upon thy owne selfe, and thy owne vertues. chap. xxv how great power fortune hath in humane affaires, and what meanes there is to resist it. it is not unknown unto me, how that many have held opinion, and still hold it, that the affaires of the world are so governd by fortune, and by god, that men by their wisdome cannot amend or alter them; or rather that there is no remedy for them: and hereupon they would think that it were of no availe to take much paines in any thing, but leave all to be governd by chance. this opinion hath gain'd the more credit in our dayes, by reason of the great alteration of things, which we have of late seen, and do every day see, beyond all humane conjecture: upon which, i sometimes thinking, am in some parte inclind to their opinion: neverthelesse not to extinguish quite our owne free will, i think it may be true, that fortune is the mistrisse of one halfe of our actions; but yet that she lets us have rule of the other half, or little lesse. and i liken her to a precipitous torrent, which when it rages, over-flows the plaines, overthrowes the trees, and buildings, removes the earth from one side, and laies it on another, every one flyes before it, every one yeelds to the fury thereof, as unable to withstand it; and yet however it be thus, when the times are calmer, men are able to make provision against these excesses, with banks and fences so, that afterwards when it swels again, it shall all passe smoothly along, within its channell, or else the violence thereof shall not prove so licentious and hurtfull. in like manner befals it us with fortune, which there shewes her power where vertue is not ordeind to resist her, and thither turnes she all her forces, where she perceives that no provisions nor resistances are made to uphold her. and if you shall consider italy, which is the seat of these changes, and that which hath given them their motions, you shall see it to be a plaine field, without any trench or bank; which had it been fenc'd with convenient vertue as was germany, spain or france; this inundation would never have causd these great alterations it hath, or else would it not have reach'd to us: and this shall suffice to have said, touching the opposing of fortune in generall. but restraining my selfe more to particulars, i say that to day we see a prince prosper and flourish and to morrow utterly go to ruine; not seeing that he hath alterd any condition or quality; which i beleeve arises first from the causes which we have long since run over, that is because that prince that relies wholly upon fortune, runnes as her wheele turnes. i beleeve also, that he proves the fortunate man, whose manner of proceeding meets with the quality of the time; and so likewise he unfortunate from whose course of proceeding the times differ: for we see that men, in the things that induce them to the end, (which every one propounds to himselfe, as glory and riches) proceed therein diversly; some with respects, others more bold, and rashly; one with violence, and th'other with cunning; the one with patience, th'other with its contrary; and every one of severall wayes may attaine thereto; we see also two very respective and wary men, the one come to his purpose, and th'other not; and in like maner two equally prosper, taking divers course; the one being wary the other head-strong; which proceeds from nothing else, but from the quality of the times, which agree, or not, with their proceedings. from hence arises that which i said, that two working diversly, produce the same effect: and two equaly working, the one attains his end, the other not. hereupon depends the alteration of the good; for if to one that behaves himself with warinesse and patience, times and affaires turne so favourably, that the carriage of his businesse prove well, he prospers; but if the times and affaires chance, he is ruind, because he changes not his manner of proceeding: nor is there any man so wise, that can frame himselfe hereunto; as well because he cannot go out of the way, from that whereunto nature inclines him: as also, for that one having alwayes prosperd, walking such a way, cannot be perswaded to leave it; and therefore the respective and wary man, when it is fit time for him to use violence and force, knows not how to put it in practice, whereupon he is ruind: but if he could change his disposition with the times and the affaires, he should not change his fortune. pope julius the second proceeded in all his actions with very great violence, and found the times and things so conformable to that his manner of proceeding that in all of them he had happy successe. consider the first exploit he did at bolonia, even while john bentivolio lived: the venetians were not well contented therewith; the king of spaine likewise with the french, had treated of that enterprise; and notwithstanding al this, he stirrd up by his own rage and fiercenesse, personally undertook that expedition: which action of his put in suspence and stopt spaine and the venetians; those for feare, and the others for desire to recover the kingdome of naples; and on the other part drew after him the king of france; for that king seeing him already in motion, and desiring to hold him his friend, whereby to humble the venetians, thought he could no way deny him his souldiers, without doing him an open injury. julius then effected that with his violent and heady motion, which no other pope with all humane wisdome could ever have done; for if he had expected to part from rome with his conclusions settled, and all his affaires ordered before hand, as any other pope would have done, he had never brought it to passe: for the king of france would have devised a thousand excuses, and others would have put him in as many feares. i will let passe his other actions, for all of them were alike, and all of them prov'd lucky to him; and the brevity of his life never sufferd him to feele the contrary: for had he litt upon such times afterwards, that it had been necessary for him to proceed with respects, there had been his utter ruine; for he would never have left those wayes, to which he had been naturally inclind. i conclude then, fortune varying, and men continuing still obstinate to their own wayes, prove happy, while these accord together: and as they disagree, prove unhappy: and i think it true, that it is better to be heady than wary; because fortune is a mistresse; and it is necessary, to keep her in obedience to ruffle and force her: and we see, that she suffers her self rather to be masterd by those, than by others that proceed coldly. and therefore, as a mistresse, shee is a friend to young men, because they are lesse respective, more rough, and command her with more boldnesse. i have considered the chapter, as representing me a full view of humane policy and cunning: yet me thinks it cannot satisfie a christian in the causes of the good and bad successe of things. the life of man is like a game at tables; skill availes much i grant, but that's not all: play thy game well, but that will not winne: the chance thou throwest must accord with thy play. examine this; play never so surely, play never so probably, unlesse the chance thou castest, lead thee forward to advantage, all hazards are losses, and thy sure play leaves thee in the lurch. the sum of this is set down in ecclesiastes chap. . v. . the race is not to the swift, nor the battell to the strong: neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance hapeneth to them all. our cunning author for all his exact rules he delivere in his books, could not fence against the despight of fortune, as he complaines in his epistle to this booke. nor that great example of policy, duke valentine, whome our author commends to princes for his crafts-master, could so ruffle or force his mistresse fortune, that he could keep her in obedience. man can contribute no more to his actions than vertue and wisdome: but the successe depends upon a power above. surely there is the finger of god; or as prov. . v. . 'the lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the lord.' it was not josephs wisdome made all things thrive under his hand; but because the lord was with him; and that which he did, the lord made it to prosper, gen. . surely this is a blessing proceeding from the divine providence, which beyond humane capacity so cooperateth with the causes, as that their effects prove answerable, and sometimes (that we may know there is something above the ordinary causes) the success returns with such a supereminency of worth, that it far exceeds the vertue of the ordinary causes. chap. xxvi an exhortation to free italy from the barbarians. having then weighed all things above discours'd, and devising with my self, whether at this present in italy the time might serve to honor a new prince, and whether there were matter that might minister occasion to a wise and valorous prince, to introduce such a forme, that might do honor to him, and good to the whole generality of the people in the countrey: me thinks so many things concurre in favor of a new prince, that i know not whether there were ever any time more proper for this purpose. and if as i said, it was necessary, desiring to see moses his vertue, that the children of israel should be inthrald in Ægypt; and to have experience of the magnanimity of cyrus his mind, that the persians should be oppress'd by the medes; and to set forth the excellency of theseus, that the athenians should be dispersed; so at this present now we are desirous to know the valor of an italian spirit, it were necessary italy should be reduc'd to the same termes it is now in, and were in more slavery than the hebrews were; more subject than the persians, more scatterd than the athenians; without head, without order, battered, pillaged, rent asunder, overrun, and had undergone all kind of destruction. and however even in these later dayes, we have had some kind of shew of hope in some one, whereby we might have conjectur'd, that he had been ordained for the deliverance hereof, yet it prov'd afterwards, that in the very height of all his actions he was curb'd by fortune, insomuch that this poore countrey remaining as it were without life, attends still for him that shall heal her wounds, give an end to all those pillagings and sackings of lombardy, to those robberies and taxations of the kingdome, and of tuscany, and heal them of their soars, now this long time gangren'd. we see how she makes her prayers to god, that he send some one to redeem her from these barbarous cruelties and insolencies. we see her also wholly ready and disposed to follow any colours, provided there be any one take them up. nor do we see at this present, that she can look for other, than your illustrious family, to become cheiftain of this deliverance, which hath now by its own vertue and fortune been so much exalted, and favored by god and the church, whereof it now holds the principality: and this shall not be very hard for you to do, if you shall call to mind the former actions, and lives of those that are above named. and though those men were very rare and admirable, yet were they men, and every one of them began upon less occasion than this; for neither was their enterprize more just than this, nor more easie; nor was god more their friend, than yours. here is very great justice: for that war is just, that is necessary; and those armes are religious, when there is no hope left otherwhere, but in them. here is an exceeding good disposition thereto: nor can there be, where there is a good disposition, a giant difficulty, provided that use be made of those orders, which i propounded for aim and direction to you. besides this, here we see extraordinary things without example effected by god; the sea was opened, a cloud guided the way, devotion poured forth the waters, and it rain'd down manna; all these things have concurred in your greatness, the rest is left for you to do. god will not do every thing himself, that he may not take from us our free will, and of that glory that belongs to us. neither is it a marvel, if any of the aforenamed italians have not been able to compass that, which we may hope your illustrious family shall: though in so many revolutions of italy, and so many feats of war, it may seem that the whole military vertue therein be quite extinguisht; for this arises from that the ancient orders thereof were not good; and there hath since been none that hath known how to invent new ones. nothing can so much honor a man rising anew, as new laws and new ordinances devised by him: these things when they have a good foundation given them, and contain in them their due greatness, gain him reverence and admiration; and in italy their wants not the matter wherein to introduce any forme. here is great vertue in the members, were it not wanting in the heads. consider in the single fights that have been, and duels, how much the italians have excel'd in their strength, activity and address; but when they come to armies, they appear not, and all proceeds from the weakness of the chieftaines; for they that understand the managing of these matters, are not obeyed; and every one presumes to understand; hitherto there having not been any one so highly raised either by fortune or vertue, as that others would submit unto him. from hence proceeds it, that in so long time, and in so many battels fought for these last past years, when there hath been an army wholly italian, it alwaies hath had evil success; whereof the river tarus first was witness, afterwards alexandria, capua, genua, vayla, bolonia, mestri. your illustrious family then being desirous to tread the footsteps of these worthyes who redeem'd their countreys, must above all things as the very foundation of the whole fabrick, be furnished with soldiers of your own natives: because you cannot have more faithful, true, nor better soldiers; and though every one of them be good, all together they will become better when they shall find themselves entertained, commanded, and honored by their own prince. wherefore it is necessary to provide for those armes, whereby to be able with the italian valor to make a defence against forreiners. and however the swisse infantry and spanish be accounted terrible; yet is there defect in both of them, by which a third order might not only oppose them, but may be confident to vanquish them: for the spaniards are not able to indure the horse, and the swisse are to feare the foot, when they incounter with them, as resolute in the fight as they; whereupon it hath been seen, and upon experience shall be certain, that the spaniards are not able to beare up against the french cavalery, and the swisses have been routed by the spanish foot. and though touching this last, there hath not been any entire experience had, yet was there some proof thereof given in the battel of ravenna, when the spanish foot affronted the dutch battalions, which keep the same rank the swisses do, where the spaniards with their nimbleness of body, and the help of their targets entred in under their pikes, and there stood safe to offend them, the dutch men having no remedy: and had it not been for the cavalery that rusht in upon them, they had quite defeated them. there may then (the defect of the one and other of these two infantries being discoverd) another kind of them be anew ordained, which may be able to make resistance against the horse, and not fear the foot, which shall not be a new sort of armes, but change of orders. and these are some of those things which ordained a new, gain reputation and greatness to a new prince. therefore this occasion should not be let pass, to the end that italy after so long a time may see some one redeemer of hers appear. nor can i express with what dearness of affection he would be received in all those countreys which have suffered by those forrein scums, with what thirst of revenge, with what resolution of fidelity, with what piety, with what tears. would any gates be shut again him? any people deny him obedience? any envy oppose him? would not every italian fully consent with him? this government of the barbarians stinks in every ones nostrils. let your illustrious family then undertake this worthy exployt with that courage and those hopes wherewith such just actions are to be attempted; to the end that under your colours, this countrey may be enabled, and under the protection of your fortune that saying of petrarch be verifyed. _virtù contr' al fuore prendera l'arme, e fia il combatter corto: che l'antico valore ne gli italici cor non è morto._ vertue against fury shall advance the fight, and it i' th' combate soon shall put to flight: for th' old roman valor is not dead, nor in th' italians brests extinguished. finis note: project gutenberg also has an html version of this file which includes the original illustrations. see -h.htm or -h.zip: (http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/ / / / / / -h/ -h.htm) or (http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/ / / / / / -h.zip) military instructors manual by captain james p. cole, th infantry instructor rd battalion, th provisional training regiment, plattsburg, n.y. and major oliver schoonmaker, th division assistant instructor rd battalion, th provisional training regiment, plattsburg, n.y. to colonel wolf under whose careful supervision so many have received their military training in order that they may show the world in battle the true spirit of american manhood. acknowledgment. to have prepared this book within the time allotted to it, without the assistance of candidates alcott farrar elwell and lyle milton prouse would have been impossible, and grateful recognition is made of their services. not only much of the manual labor, but the preparation of entire chapters, has been in their hands. candidates charles huntington jacobs and michael francis mcaleer have rendered very valuable assistance and we wish to thank the following candidates for the loan of materials used elsewhere, for typewriting and other work: glenn mack ainsworth. philip m. brown. nelson p. bump. edwin g. burrows. philip doremus. walter lane hardenbrook. albert blanchard kellogg. henry pratt mckean. loren ray pierce. harry raphael saftel. roland emery packard. hoyt sherman. introduction. the officer of to-day has big problems to face at short notice. his training has necessarily been so intensive that he cannot absorb a large amount of it. he has little time to make out schedules or even to look over the hasty notes he may have made during his training period, yet he finds himself facing problems which force him to immediate action. this book so condenses and systematizes general military instruction and the work done at plattsburg so that it may be easily utilized in training other troops. no broad claim for originality is made except in the arrangement of all available material; the bibliography makes acknowledgment to all texts so utilized. besides bringing helpful reminders to new officers regarding the elements of modern warfare, much of the material will be found of radical importance, as it is practically new and never before condensed. since under the new army organization the platoon leader virtually has assumed the roll of a captain of a company, it is not enough for him to know simply his own part; he must be ready with all the information that his non-commissioned officers and men should know, and more important still, he must know how to teach them. having little or no time to work over and digest for himself this mass of new material pouring in upon him, the officer may find in this book, material condensed and already arranged. it is hoped that this work will serve to recall to many officers, valuable points of military training which would otherwise be lost, to them in the mass of notes never looked at since the day they were made. more than this, every reader will find help in planning his work, saving thereby precious hours already too full of necessary duties, and will find fresh material for progress in the game of war. it is the purpose of this book to help men who are in the service of the united states, and through them to share in bringing victory. table of contents. page. chapter . schedules chapter . infantry drill regulations chapter . physical training voice culture. chapter . use of modern arms . s.a.f.m. . range practice. . pistol. . bayonet. . machine guns. . grenade instruction. chapter . map sketching chapter . articles of war. (courts-martial.) chapter . army regulations chapter . practice marches field work. chapter . feeding men camping and camp sanitation. chapter . personal hygiene first aid. chapter . signaling chapter . guard duty chapter . company administration chapter . conferences study. small problems in infantry. examinations. chapter . trench warfare . general principles. . siting trenches. . construction. . occupation. conclusion bibliography chapter index chapter . schedules. schedule of instruction, reserve officers' training camp _plattsburg, n.y., august to september , _ organization. | | | issue of equipment. | | drill | organization of | drill | physical | barracks | i.d.r. | m.p.t. | ====================|=================|==================| | | | monday, aug. | | | . - . a.m. | | | . - . p.m. | | | | | | ====================|=================|==================| tuesday, aug. | without arms | . - . a.m. | | . - . a.m. | pgs. - | | pars - | | | --------------- | | | . - . a.m. | | | pars. - | | | | | ====================|=================|==================| | with arms | | | . - . a.m. | | | pars - | . - . a.m. | wednesday, aug. | --------------- | pgs. - | | . - . a.m. | | | par. - | | | | | ====================|=================|==================| | . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | | par. - | pgs. - | | | | thursday, aug. | . - . a.m. | | | pars. - | | | | | | . - . a.m. | | | pars. - | | ====================|=================|==================| | . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | | par. - | pgs. - | | | | friday, aug. | . - . a.m. | | | pars. - | | | | | | . - . a.m. | | | pars. - | | ====================|====================================| saturday, sept. . | as prescribed by senior instructors. ====================|===================================== | | | | musketry | | practice | training | | march | s.a.f.m. | study | conferences =================|================|================|================== | | . - . p.m. | | | par. - | | | par. - - | | | - | | | i.d.r. | =================|================|================|================== | | . - . p.m. | | | par. - | | | s.a.f.m. | . - . p.m. | | | care of arms and | | . - . p.m. | equipment | | par. - | | | i.d.r. | =================|================|================|================== | | . - . p.m. | | | par. - | without arms | . - . p.m. | s.a.f.m. | . - . p.m. . - . a.m. | par. - | -------------- | assembling and | | . - . p.m. | adjusting pack | | par. - | | | i.d.r. | =================|================|================|================== | | | | | | | | | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. | . - . p.m. | . - . p.m. with arms | par. - | par. - | assembling and | | i.d.r. | adjusting pack | | | | | | =================|================|================|================== | | | | | | with arms and | | . - . p.m. | . - . p.m. light pack | . - . p.m. | par. - - | military . - . a.m. | par. - | - | courtesy | | i.d.r. | | | | | | | =================|================|================|================== ====================================================================== schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., september to september , _ | | drill | | drill | physical | | i.d.r. | m.p.t. | ===================|================|===================| monday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. | | pars. - | pgs. - | | - | | ===================|================|===================| tuesday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. | | pars. - | pgs. - | | - | | ===================|================|===================| wednesday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. | | pars. - | pgs. - | | - | | ===================|================|===================| thursday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. | | pars. - | pgs. - | | - | | ===================|================|===================| friday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. | | pars. - | pgs. - | | - | | ===================|====================================| saturday, sept. | as prescribed by senior instructor. ===================|===================================== musketry | | companies training | semaphore | practice march s.a.f.m. | signalling | full kit =================|==================|================= . - . a.m. | | par. - | . - . a.m. | | | =================|==================|================= . - . a.m. | | par. - | . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | | =================|==================|================= . - . p.m. | | par. - | . - . a.m. | | | =================|==================|================= . - . a.m. | | par. - | | . - . a.m. | | =================|==================|================= . - . a.m. | | par. - | . - . a.m. | | | =================|==================|================= ====================================================== schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., september to september , _--(_concluded_) | grenade instruction [a] | bayonet drill | ===================|=========================|==================| | | . - . p.m. | | | lesson | monday, sept. | . - . a.m. | notes on | | | bayonet training | ===================|=========================|==================| | | . - . p.m. | | | lessons and | tuesday, sept. | . - . m. | notes on | | | bayonet training | ===================|=========================|==================| | | . - . p.m. | | | lessons and | wednesday, sept. | . - . a.m. | notes on | | | bayonet training | | | | ===================|=========================|==================| | | . - . p.m. | | | lessons and | thursday, sept. | . - . m. | notes on | | | bayonet training | ===================|=========================|==================| | | . - . p.m. | | | lessons and | friday, sept. | . - . a.m. | notes on | | | bayonet training | ===================|=========================|==================| saturday, sept. | as prescribed by senior instructor. ===================|============================================= voice culture | conferences | study ===================|=========================|==================== | | . - . p.m. | . - . p.m. | pars. - i.d.r . - . m. | par. - i.d.r. | pgs. - | pgs. - m.g.d. | m.g.d. ===================|=========================|==================== | | . - . p.m. | . - . p.m. | par. - i.d.r. | pars. - i.d.r. | pgs. - | pgs. - m.g.d. | m.g.d. ===================|=========================|==================== | physical exam. | . - . p.m. | . - . p.m. | par. - i.d.r. . - . m. | pars. - | part iii--u.s. | part , , , | signal book | u.s.s.b. | ===================|=========================|==================== | | . - . p.m. | . - . p.m. | par. - i.d.r. | pars. - , - | par. - | s.a.f.m. | s.a.f.m. ===================|=========================|==================== | . - . p.m. | . - . p.m. . - . m. | pars. - i.d.r. | par. - - | - s.a.f.m. | s.a.f.m. | | ===================|=========================|==================== ================================================================== [footnote a: as prescribed by senior grenade instructor.] schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., september to september , _ | | | | drill | musketry training | | i.d.r. | s.a.f.m. | ====================|====================|===================| | . - . a.m. | | | pars. - | . - . a.m. | | ------------------ | pars. - | monday, sept. | . - . a.m. | sight setting | | pars. - | and loadings | | ------------------ | | | . - . a.m. | | | pars. - | | ====================|====================|===================| | | . - . a.m. | | | pars. - | tuesday, sept. | same as for monday | sight setting | | | and loadings | ====================|====================|===================| wednesday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. | | pars. - | pars. - | | ------------------ | sight setting | | . - . a.m. | and loadings | | pars. - | | ====================|====================|===================| | . - . a.m. | | thursday, sept. | pars. - | . - . a.m. | | ------------------ | pars. - | | . - . a.m. | sight setting | | pars. - | and loadings | ====================|====================|===================| | . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | friday, sept. | pars. - | pars. - | | | sight setting | | | and loadings | ====================|====================|===================| saturday, sept. | as prescribed by senior instructors. ============================================================== first aid manual, | signaling | n.c.o's and | morse code | practice march privates | (wig wag) | full kit ====================|====================|================== | | | | . - . a.m. | | wounds | . - . a.m. | pgs. - | | | | | | | | ====================|====================|================== | | | | | . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | | ====================|====================|================== | | . - . a.m. | | fractures | . - . a.m. | pgs. - | | | | ====================|====================|================== | | | | | | . - . a.m. | | | | ====================|====================|================== . - . a.m. | | resuscitation | . - . a.m. | pgs. - | | | | ====================|====================|================== ============================================================ schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., september to september , _--(_concluded_) | grenade instruction | drill, physical | | [b] | m.p.t. | =====================|=====================|=================| | | | | | . - . p.m. | monday, sept. | . - . a.m. | pgs. - | | | pgs. - | | | | | | | =====================|=====================|=================| | | | | | | | | . - . p.m. | tuesday, sept. | . - . a.m. | pgs. - | | | pgs. - | | | | | | | =====================|=====================|=================| | | | wednesday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. | | | pgs. - | | | pgs. - | | | | =====================|=====================|=================| | | | | | | | | . - . p.m. | thursday, sept. | . - . a.m. | pgs. - | | | pgs. - | | | | | | | | | | =====================|=====================|=================| | | | | | | | | . - . p.m. | friday, sept. | . - . a.m. | pgs. - | | | pgs. - | | | | | | | | | | | | | =====================|=======================================| saturday, sept. | as prescribed by senior instructors. ============================================================== bayonet drill | conference | study | | ===============|======================|============================ | . - . p.m. | mon. | . - . p.m. | pars. - , | | pars. - , | - i.d.r. | | - i.d.r. . - . p.m. | -------------------- | | ------------------ | . - . p.m. | | . - . p.m. | pars. - s.a.f.m. | | pars. - s.a.f.m. ===============|======================| |===================== | | | . - . p.m. | . - . p.m. | | pars. - i.d.r. . - . p.m. | pars. - i.d.r. | | -------------------- | pgs. - | | . - . p.m. | notes on | | pgs. - | bayonet training | | notes on | | | bayonet training ===============|======================|======|===================== | . - . p.m. | tues.| . - . p.m. | pars. - i.d.r. | | pars. - i.d.r. . - . p.m. | pgs. - | | pgs. - | notes on | | notes on | bayonet training | | bayonet training ===============|======================|======|===================== | . - . p.m. | wed. | . - . p.m. | patrolling, messages,| | patrolling, messages, | orders, etc. | | orders, etc. . - . p.m. | pgs. - f.s.r. | | pgs. - f.s.r. | -------------------- | | -------------------- | . - . p.m. | | . - . p.m. | notes on | | notes on | grenade warfare | | grenade warfare ===============|======================|======|===================== | . - . p.m. |thurs.| . - . p.m. | advance and | | advance and | rear guards | | rear guards | pgs. - f.s.r. | | pgs. - f.s.r. . - . p.m. | -------------------- | | -------------------- | . - . p.m. | | . - . p.m. | training & | | training & | employment of | | employment of | bombers | | bombers =================================================================== =================================================================== [footnote b: as prescribed by senior grenade instructor.] schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., september to september , _ | drill, i.d.r. | musketry training | | | s.a.f.m. | ====================|==================|===================| | | | | | | monday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | | pars. - | pars. - | | close order only | | | | | ====================|==================|===================| | | | tuesday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | | pars. - | pars. - | | close order only | | ====================|==================|===================| | | | wednesday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | | pars. - | pars. - | | close order only | | ====================|==================|===================| | | | thursday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | | pars. - | pars. - | | close order only | | | | | ====================|==================|===================| friday, sept. | . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | | pars. - | pars. - | | close order only | | ====================|==================|===================| saturday, sept. | as prescribed by senior instructors. ============================================================ drill, physical | sketching | study m.p.t. | [c] | ===================|=================|====================== . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. pgs. - , - | . - . p.m. | pgs. - | | notes on bayonet | | training | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | pars. - , i.d.r. ===================|=================|====================== . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. pgs. - , - | . - . p.m. | outposts | | pgs. - , f.s.r. | | pars. - , i.d.r. ===================|=================|====================== . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. pgs. - , - | . - . p.m. | orders | | pgs. - , f.s.r. | | pars. - , i.d.r. ===================|=================|====================== . - . a.m. | . - . a.m. | . - . p.m. pgs. - , - | . - : p.m. | marches | | pgs. - , f.s.r. | | pars. - , - , | | e.f.m. ===================|=================|====================== . - . a.m. | . - : a.m. | . - . p.m. pgs. - , - | . - . p.m. | pars. - , - , | | - , e.f.m. ============================================================ ============================================================ [footnote c: as prescribed by senior instructor in sketching.] _september - , _. construction of trenches. schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., october to october , ._ | drill, i.d.r. | physical | | | m.p.t. | ==================|=================|=====================| monday, oct. | / hour | / hour | | pars. - | pgs. - and | | | arm combinations | ==================|=================|=====================| tuesday, oct. | company | / hour | | / hour | pgs. - and | | pars. - | arm combinations | ==================|=================|=====================| wednesday, oct. | battalion | / hour | | / hour | pgs. - and | | pars. - | arm combinations | ==================|=================|=====================| thursday. oct. | battalion | / hour | | / hour | pgs. - and | | pars. - | arm combinations | ==================|=================|=====================| friday, oct. | battalion | / hour | | / hour | pgs. - and | | pars. - | arm combinations | ==================|=======================================| saturday, oct. |as prescribed by senior instructors. =========================================================== bayonet | range practice | signalling [d] | [e] | ==========|==================|================= / hour | . - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | | ==========|==================|================= / hour | . - . a.m. | hour | . - . p.m. | semaphore and | | wigwag ==========|==================|================= / hour | . - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | | ==========|==================|================= / hour | . - . a.m. | hour | . - . p.m. | semaphore and | | wigwag ==========|==================|================= / hour | . - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | | =============================================== =============================================== [footnote d: per bayonet program.] [footnote e: per schedule senior instructor musketry training.] schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., october to october , _--(_concluded_) | field work | pistol | ==================|==============|=======================| monday, oct. | hour | / hour | | patrolling | nomenclature | | | / hour | | | manual | ==================|==============|=======================| tuesday, oct. | | same as for monday | | | | | | | | | | ==================|==============|=======================| wednesday, oct. | hour | / hour | | patrolling | manual | | | / hour | | | position and aiming | ==================|==============|=======================| thursday, oct. | | same as for wednesday | | | | | | | | | | ==================|==============|=======================| friday, oct. | hour | same as for wednesday | | patrolling | | | | | | | | ==================|==============|=======================| saturday, oct. | as prescribed by senior instructors. ==================|======================================= conference | study | ==========================|===========================|======= hours | . - . p.m. | pars. - , i.d.r. | pars. - , i.d.r. | prob. to situation . | problem , s.p.i. | s.p.i. | | ==========================|===========================|======= hours | . - . p.m. | pars. - , i.d.r. | pars. - , i.d.r. | situation , prob. , to | problem , s.p.i. | end of problem, s.p.i. | | ==========================|===========================|======= hours | . - . p.m. | pars. - , i.d.r. | pars. - , i.d.r. | problem , s.p.i. | problem to situation | | s.p.i. | ==========================|===========================|======= hours | . - . p.m. | pars. - , i.d.r. | pars. - , i.d.r. | prob. to situation , | situation , problem to | s.p.i. | end of problem, s.p.i. | ==========================|===========================|======= hours | . - . p.m. | pars. - , i.d.r. | per later | situation , prob. , to | announcement | end of problem, s.p.i. | | ==========================|===========================|======= ============================================================== schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., october to october , _. | drill, i.d.r. | physical drill | | | m.p.t. | ======================|===============|=====================| monday, october | hour | | | pars. - | | | hour | / hour | | pars. - | pgs. - , - | | - | | ======================|===============|=====================| tuesday, october | hour | | | pars. - | | | hour | / hour | | pars. - | pgs. - , - | | - | | ======================|===============|=====================| wednesday, october | / hour | | | pars. - | | | hour | / hour | | pars. - | pgs. - , - | | - | | ======================|===============|=====================| thursday, october | hour | | | pars. - | | | hour | / hour | | pars. - | pgs. - , - | | - | | ======================|===============|=====================| friday, october | | | ======================|===============|=====================| saturday, october | as prescribed by senior instructors. ============================================================= bayonet | range practice | signaling [f] | [g] | ==========|=================|============ | | | | / hour | - - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | | ==========|=================|============ | | | | / hour | - - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | | ==========|=================|============ | | | | / hour | - - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | / hour | | ==========|=================|============ | | | | / hour | - - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | | ==========|=================|============ | | ========================================= ========================================= [footnote f: per bayonet program.] [footnote g: rifle, pistol, machine gun, estimating distances, etc., as prescribed by senior instructor musketry training.] schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., october to october , _--(_concluded_) | field work | | | (company) [h] | conferences | ======================|=====================|=========================| monday, october | | hours | | | prob. to situation | | | exclusive, s.p.i. | | | pars. - , i.d.r. | ======================|=====================|=========================| tuesday, october | | hours | | | situation , prob. to | | | end of problem, s.p.i. | | | pars. - , i.d.r. | ======================|=====================|=========================| wednesday, october | | hours | | | problem , s.p.i. | | | pars. - , i.d.r. | ======================|=====================|=========================| thursday, october | | hours | | | problem , s.p.i. | | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | | | ======================|=====================|=========================| friday, october | . - . a.m. | | | . - . p.m. | | | advance and rear | | | guards, outposts, | | | patroling, messages | | | and orders | | ======================|===============================================| saturday, october | as prescribed by senior instructors. ======================|================================================ | | study | | =======================|=======|======= . - . p.m. | | problem , s.p.i | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | | | =======================|=======|======= . - . p.m. | | problem , s.p.i. | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | | | =======================|=======|======= . - . p.m. | | problem , s.p.i. | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | =======================|=======|======= . - . p.m. | | problem to | | situation , exclusive | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | =======================|=======|======= | | | | . - . p.m. | | as per later | | announcement | | | | =======================|=======|======= =======================|=======|======= [footnote h: to include conferences and critique on the ground of exercise conducted.] _october - , _. construction of trenches. _october - , _. occupation of the trenches from . a.m. _october , _ to . a.m. _october , ._ _october , _. . a.m.- a.m. conference of trench occupation, a.m. inspection. schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., october to october , _ | drill, i.d.r. | physical drill | | | m.p.t. | ======================|===============|=====================| monday, october | hour | / hour | | pars. - | pgs. - | | | pg. | ======================|===============|=====================| tuesday, october | hour | / hour | | pars. - | pgs. - | | | pg. | ======================|===============|=====================| wednesday, october | hour | / hour | | pars. - | pgs. - | | | pg. | ======================|===============|=====================| thursday, october | hour | / hour | | pars. - | pgs. - | | | pg. | ======================|===============|=====================| friday, october | | | ======================|===============|=====================| saturday, october | as prescribed by senior instructors. ============================================================= bayonet | range practice | signaling [i] | [j] | =============|==================|=========== / hour | . - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | | =============|==================|=========== / hour | . - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | | =============|==================|=========== / hour | . - . a.m. | / hour | . - . p.m. | | | =============|==================|=========== / hour | . - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | | =============|==================|=========== | | =============|==================|=========== ============================================ [footnote i: per bayonet program.] [footnote j: rifle, pistol, machine gun, estimating distances, etc., as prescribed by senior instructor of musketry training.] schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., october to october , _--(_concluded_) | field work | | | [k] | conferences | ======================|=============|=========================| monday, october | | hours | | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | | review problems - | | | s.p.i. | | | | ======================|=============|=========================| tuesday, october | | hours | | | pars. - , i.d.r | | | prob. to situation | | | s.p.i. | | | | ======================|=============|=========================| wednesday, october | | hours | | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | | situation , prob. | | | to end of prob. | ======================|=============|=========================| thursday, october | | hours | | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | | problem , s.p.i. | | | | ======================|=============|=========================| friday, october | | . - . a.m. | | | . - . p.m. | | | companies in attack | | | and defense (to include | | | siting of trenches) | ======================|=============|=========================| saturday, october | as prescribed by senior instructors. ======================|======================================== | | study | | ========================|========|========= hours-- hour daily | | and . - . p.m. | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | prob. to situation , | | s.p.i. | | ========================|========|======== hours-- hour daily | | and . - . p.m. | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | situation , prob. to | | end of prob. s.p.i. | | ========================|========|======== hours-- hour daily | | and . - . p.m. | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | prob. , s.p.i. | | ========================|========|======== hours-- hour daily | | and . - . p.m. | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | problem , s.p.i. | | ========================|========|======== . - . p.m. | | as per later | | announcement | | | | | | ========================|========|======== ========================|========|======== [footnote k: to include conferences and critique on the ground of exercise conducted.] schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., october to november , _ | drill | physical drill | | | | =======================|==================|==================| monday, october | hour | / hour | | attack formation | | | [trench] | | =======================|==================|==================| tuesday, october | hour | / hour | | attack formation | | | [trench] | | =======================|==================|==================| wednesday, october | hour | / hour | | attack formation | | | [trench] | | =======================|==================|==================| thursday, november | hour | / hour | | attack formation | | | [trench] | | =======================|==================|==================| friday, november | | | =======================|==================|=================== saturday, november | as prescribed by senior instructors. =======================|====================================== bayonet | signaling | range practice [l] | [m] | ==============|===========|================= / hour | | . - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | ==============|===========|================= / hour | | . - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | ==============|===========|================= / hour | / hour | . - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | ==============|===========|================= / hour | | . - . a.m. | | . - . p.m. | | ==============|===========|================= | | ==============|===========|================= ============================================ [footnote l: per bayonet program.] [footnote m: rifle, pistol, machine gun, estimating distances, etc., as prescribed by senior instructor of musketry training.] schedule of instruction, plattsburg training camp _plattsburg, n.y., october to november , _--(_concluded_) | field work | conferences | | [n] | | ======================|======================|=======================| monday, october | | hours | | | pars. - , i.d.r. | | | problem , s.p.i. | | | | | | | ======================|======================|=======================| tuesday, october | | hours | | | problem , s.p.i. | | | battle fire training | | | (lesson scheduled | | | later) | ======================|======================|=======================| wednesday, october | | hours | | | problem , s.p.i. | | | battle fire training | | | (lesson scheduled | | | later) | ======================|======================|=======================| thursday, november | | hours | | | problem , s.p.i. | | | battle fire training | | | (lesson scheduled | | | later) | ======================|======================|=======================| friday, november | battalions in attack | | | and defense | | | (field kit) | | ======================|======================|=======================| saturday, november | as prescribed by senior instructors. ======================|=============================================== | | study | | =========================|========|========= hours-- hour daily | | and . - . p.m. | | problem , s.p.i. | | battle fire training | | (lesson scheduled later) | | =========================|========|========= hours-- hour daily | | and . - . p.m. | | problem , s.p.i. | | battle fire training | | (lesson scheduled later) | | =========================|========|========= hours-- hour daily | | and . - . p.m. | | problem , s.p.i. | | battle fire training | | (lesson scheduled later) | | =========================|========|========= hours-- hour daily | | and . - . p.m. | | problem , s.p.i. | | battle fire training | | (lesson scheduled later) | | =========================|========|========= . - . p.m. | | as per later | | announcement[o] | | =========================|========|========= =========================|========|========= [footnote n: to include conferences and critique on the ground of exercise conducted.] [footnote o: during the week each battalion will be given / day's instruction in camouflage under direction senior engineer instructor.] schedules. _november th- th, ._ infantry drill regulations, hours. march in full kit, - / hours. signaling, / hour. physical drill, - / hours, bayonet, - / hours, machine gun instruction, - / hours. field fortification, hours. conferences, hours. study, hours. in the study and conferences the following will be taken up: manual of courts-martial--pp. to end. first aid. personal hygiene. camp sanitation. _november th- th, ._ physical, drill, - / hours. bayonet drill, - / hours. battalion ceremonies, - / hours. battalion march, full kit, - / hours. field fortification and trench warfare, hours. study and conferences, hours. in the study and conference's the following will be taken up: trench warfare. grenades gas attack and defense. communication. _november th- rd, ._ physical, drill, - / hours. bayonet drill, - / hours. infantry drill regulations, - / hours. company administration and army regulations, hours. ceremonies, parades and reviews, hours. chapter . infantry drill regulations. the greatest lesson of the present war is that the keynote of success is discipline. in trenches the direct control of the men is even less than in extended order in open warfare, and only thoroughly disciplined troops with a trusted leader can hope to succeed. the successful officer will show anger or irritation only in rare cases, and then by design: he will know his men individually and be as considerate of them as possible, ready to do himself what he asks to have done; just in administering punishments; clear in giving his commands and insistent that they be carried out promptly; he will learn from drilling his men the quickest way a desired result can be accomplished, and to give the necessary commands in the most effective manner. he will read his infantry drill regulations through each month and will always find something that he never knew or has forgotten. he will always consult it before going to drill. in explaining movements he will use blackboard diagrams in conferences. on the field he will take the fewest possible men and have movement executed by the numbers properly before the other men. then have all the men go through the movement a number of times. the object of each exercise or drill should be explained to the men whenever possible. "success in battle is the ultimate object of all military training." school of the soldier. instruction without arms. the object of the facings and marchings is to give the soldier complete control of his body in drills so that he can move easily and promptly at any command. attention. position of attention.--this is the position a soldier assumes when in ranks or whenever the command _attention_ is given. in the training of anyone nothing equals the importance of a proper posture; it is the very foundation upon which the entire fabric of any successful training must be founded. instructors must persist in the development of this position until the men assume it from habit. at the command, . company (squad, etc.), . attention, the following position is assumed: . heels together and on a line.--if the heels are not on a line, the hips and sometimes even the shoulders, are thrown out of line. . feet turned out equally, forming an angle of degrees.--if the feet are not turned out equally, the result will be the same as above. . knees extended without stiffness.--muscles should be contracted just enough to keep the knees straight. if locked, men tire easily and faint if at attention a long time. . the trunk erect upon the hips, the spine extended throughout its entire length; the buttocks well forward. the position of the trunk, spine and buttocks is most essential. in extending the spine the men must feel that the trunk is being _stretched up_ from the waist until the back is as straight as it can be made. in stretching the spine the _chest_ should be _arched_ and raised, _without_, however, _raising the shoulders or interfering with natural respiration_. . shoulders falling naturally and moved back until they are square. being square, means having the shoulder ridge and the point of the shoulder at right angles to a general anterior-posterior plane running through the body. they should never be forced back of this plane, but out rather in line with it. . arms hanging naturally, thumbs against the seams of the trousers, fingers extended, and back of hand turned out. the arms must not be forcibly extended nor held rigidly; if they are, a compensating faulty curve will occur in the lumbar region. . head erect, chin raised until neck is vertical, eyes fixed upon some object at their own height. every tendency to draw the chin in must be counteracted. . when this position is correctly assumed, the men will be taught to _incline the body forward_ until the weight rests chiefly upon the balls of the feet, heels resting lightly upon the ground. when properly assumed, a vertical line drawn from the top of the head should pass in front of the ear, shoulder and thighs, and find its base at the balls of the feet. every tendency toward rigidity _must be avoided_; all muscles are contracted only enough to maintain this position, which is one of co-ordination, of _physical and mental alertness_, that makes for mobility, activity and grace. a man who faints standing at attention has not taken the proper position. rests. position of rest and at ease.--when men are standing _at rest_ or _at ease_ they must be cautioned to avoid assuming any position that will nullify the object of the position of attention. standing on one leg, folding arms, allowing shoulders or head to droop forward, must be discountenanced persistently until the men form the habit of resting with feet separated but on the same line, hands elapsed behind the back,--head, shoulders and trunk erect, (m.p.t., pp. and .) fall out.--leave ranks. rest.--one foot in place. can talk. at ease.--one foot in place. silence. parade rest.--do not slouch down on right foot. keep chest well up. eyes right, . front.--have it snappy. right face.--to face _in marching_ and advance, turn on the ball of either foot and step off with the other foot in the new line of direction. (do not confuse with the ordinary command, "right face.") right half face.-- degrees, used to show position in right oblique. about face.--have weight well back. not necessary to move right foot after turn is made. hand salute.--manner of rendering is index to manner in which all other duties are performed. forward march.--shift weight to right foot, _mentally_. double time, march.--tendency to go too fast. time it. steps in seconds. take one step quick time, then take up double time. mark time, march.--given as either foot strikes the ground. to resume full step, _forward, march._ half step, march.--all steps and marchings executed from a halt, except right step, begin with left foot. right step, march. backward, march.--executed in quick time only and at trail, without command. inch step. squad, halt.--given as either foot strikes the ground. by the right flank, march.--step off with right foot. to the rear, march.--given as right foot strikes the ground. if marching in double time, turn to the rightabout taking steps, in place, in cadence, and step off with left foot. change step, march.--being in march; given as either foot strikes the ground. manual of arms. purpose.--to make the man so accustomed to the rifle that he handles it without a thought. eight rules govern the carrying of the piece. see paragraph , infantry drill regulations. six rules govern the execution of the manual. see paragraph , infantry drill regulations. commands and cautions. order, arms.--see that all the fingers of the right hand are around the piece. present, arms.--left forearm horizontal and against the body. port, arms.--right forearm horizontal. left forearm against the body. right shoulder, arms.--insist on an angle of degrees. trigger guard in hollow of shoulder. right hand does the work. left shoulder, arms.--right hand in next to last position grasps small of stock. parade, rest.--left hand grasps piece just below stacking swivel. right foot straight back inches. trail, arms.--piece at angle of about degrees, about inches off the ground. rifle salute.--left forearm horizontal. fix bayonet.--parade rest and resume order after bayonet is fixed. unfix bayonet.--parade rest and resume order after bayonet is unfixed. inspection arms.--be sure men glance down in chamber and keep hold of bolt handle. parade, rest can be executed only from order arms, and the command attention follows parade, rest. any movement not in the manual, _e.g._, right, face, breaks the execution of movements by the numbers. the number of counts in the execution of each command must be remembered. distinguish between _raise_ and _carry_ and _throw_. school of the squad. object.--to give basic element, the squad, its first lesson in team work. team work wins battles just as it does football games. avoid keeping men too long at the same movement. composition of squad.-- men and a corporal. never less than nor more than men. fall in.--instructor paces in front of where center is to be. fall out.--if under arms, always preceded by inspection arms. does not mean dismissed. count off.--right file front and rear do not execute eyes right. front and rear rank men count off together. inspection arms.-- right dress, front: ( ) company commander must establish base file or files before giving the command right dress. ( ) right flank men remain facing to front. ( ) be sure first four men are on desired line and rest of company can easily be made to conform. ( ) right guide may be established at any point desired and at command right dress all march to their proper positions without other command, and at the trail. ( ) have men beyond base files step forward until one pace beyond where new line is to be and then dress back on line established. guide right.--keep head and eyes off the ground. close in or open out gradually. take interval, to the right, march, squad, halt.--(at command "to the right") rear rank falls back inches. at march, all face to right and leading man of each rank steps off, followed by the others at four-pace intervals, rear-rank men marching abreast of their file leaders. when halted all face to the front. to reform, assemble to the right (left), march. take distance, march.-- - - - front rank, - - - rear rank, -pace intervals. guide in each four is right. assemble, march.--no. , front rank stands fast. stack arms.--piece of even number front rank: butt between his feet, barrel to front. even number rear rank passes piece to file leader. take arms.--loose pieces are returned by even numbers front rank. if no. of rear rank is absent, no. rear rank takes his place in making or breaking stacks and resumes his post. pieces are never stacked with bayonet fixed. oblique, march.--taught from right half face. half faced to front after obliquing, forward, march. if at half step or mark time while obliquing, oblique, march. in place, halt.--all halt and stand fast without changing position of pieces. resume march.--only given after in place, halt. right turn.--turn on moving pivot is used by subdivisions of a column in executing change of direction. each rank successively and on same ground executes movement. all except pivot man execute two right obliques. no marking time. arriving on new line, all take the half step, glance toward marching flank and take full step without command as last man arrives on the line. right half turn.--executed in similar manner. squads right.--turn on fixed pivot is used in all formations from line into column and the reverse. no half step. right flank man faces to right in marching and marks time. rest of front rank oblique once to new position. step off on th step. squad right about.--front rank twice executes squads right. in rear rank, no. with no. abreast of him on his left and followed in column by the second and first moves straight forward until on prolongation of new line he is to occupy; faces to right in marching and proceeds to place. then all face to the right in marching, mark time and glance toward marching flank. as last man arrives on new line all step off without command on th step. deploying as skirmishers and following the corporal are covered under company extended order. school of the company. the company is the basic fighting and administrative unit, and must be easily handled and capable of promptly carrying out the will of its commander. team work among the squads, so that the company can be easily managed as a whole, is the purpose of company drill. close order drill is for discipline. numerical designations of squads or platoons do not change. center squad is middle or right middle squad of the company. ( - ) men = squad. ( - ) squads = platoon. platoons = company ( men, officers). ( - ) companies = battalion ( , officers and men). battalions = regiment ( , , including medical detachment). regiments = brigade ( , officers and men). brigades = division ( , officers and men). first sergeant when not commanding a platoon is opposite the rd file from outer flank of first platoon, in line of file closers. fall in.--first sergeant paces front of center, facing company. right guide takes post at such point that the center will be paces from and opposite the first sergeant. squad leaders salute and report all present; or private(s) ---- absent. first sergeant does not return salute of squad leaders. captain takes post paces in front of center of company in time to receive report of first sergeant, "sir, all present or accounted for," or names of unauthorized absentees. e.g. a man in hospital might be reported absent by squad leader if he did not know where he was, but first sergeant would know, and would not report him absent. captain returns salute of first sergeant who then takes his post _without command_. platoon movements in platoon column. _leading platoon, c.o._ on right into line ... right turn. column right ... right turn. right front into line ... continue. (caution) if halted, forward. _rear platoon, c.o._ on right into line ... continue. (caution) if halted, forward. column right ... continue. (caution) if halted, forward. right front into line ... right oblique questions which come up in daily military life. it is well to have a solution on hand. ( ) the company is in line reversed,-- th squad where st squad should be. bring the company into proper line, - - - ; - - - ; - - - ; - - - . ( ) you are platoon leader. your platoon is drilling separately and you get assembled in company line. - - - ; - - - ; - - - ; - - - . what commands do you give to get the platoon into line properly arranged? ( ) you are in charge of the company and find yourself marching into the company street in reverse order. what commands do you give to correct this? ( ) you are marching your company to the rear along a road through a narrow cut. suddenly around a bend comes an ambulance. to let it pass, you must immediately reduce your marching front. what is the quickest method? (this can be used also in arranging the advance party of the outguard.) ( ) you are marching your company in company front, and wish to march in column of platoons. what do you command? answers. ( ) right (left) by squads. column left (right). squads right (left) company, halt. ( ) forward; march. on left into line; platoon; halt. ( ) on right (left) into line. ( ) squads right; march. by the left flank; march. ( ) right by squads; march. platoons left front into line; double time; march. on the o.d. shirt collar insignia is worn as follows: "on the right side, in the middle of the collar, the letters (u.s.), (u.s.r.), (u.s.n.a.), and the insignia of rank; the letters one inch from the end of the collar and the insignia of rank one-half inch from letters." "on the left side in the middle of the collar, and one inch from the end, the insignia of the arm of the service." _for second lieutenants._ on the right side, in the middle of the collar, and one inch from the end, the letters (u.s.), (u.s.r.), (u.s.n.a.). on the left side, in the middle of the collar and one inch from the end, the insignia of the arm of service. when the star spangled banner is played, an officer in uniform if uncovered stands at attention. if covered he salutes. an officer "presents his compliments" only to his juniors. . company right, march; company, halt; forward march. being in line to turn. right-flank man is pivot. right guide steps back at command march, and marks time. . platoons right, march; company, halt; forward march. line to column platoons, reverse. guides must be covering. . squads right, march; company, halt. line to column squads, reverse. line of platoon to column platoons, reverse. . right turn, march; forward, march. line to change direction. right guide is pivot. men do not glance toward flank. rear rank begins oblique on same ground as front rank. all take full step at command, forward, march. . column right, march. first platoon leader, right turn. other platoon leaders (if halted), forward; (if marching), cautions, continue the march. all platoons execute right turn on same ground. column of platoons to change direction. . column right, march. column squads to change direction. . platoons, column right, march. column squads to line of platoons. . squads right, column right, march. right by squads, march. line to column squads and change direction. right guide posts himself and takes short steps. right squad conforms. . squads right, platoons, column right, march. platoons right by squads, march. line to line of platoons. guide same as in . . squads right about, march; company, halt. to face or march to the rear. _about face_; forward, march. to the rear a few paces. . on right into line, march; company, halt, front. column platoons or squads to line to side. if executed in double time, leading squad marches double time until halted. . right front into line, march; company, halt, front. column platoons or squads to line (front). in double time, halting and aligning are omitted. guide is toward side of first unit in line. if halted, leader of leading unit commands, forward. . platoons, right front into line, march; company, halt, front. column squads to column platoons. line of platoons to company line. . route step, march. muzzles kept elevated. ranks cover, preserve distances. (if halted, at rest.) at ease, march. silence preserved. (halted, at ease.) . right by twos, march. all but right files of leading squad execute in place, halt. right by files, march. to diminish the front in column squads. . squads right front into line, march. twos right front into line, march. twos or files, to column squads. leading file or files halt. n.b.--if right by twos, then left into line or reverse. dismiss the company.--first sergeant places himself paces to front. paces from nearest flank, salutes, faces toward opposite flank, commands, inspection arms, port arms, dismissed. to fall in company when it cannot be formed by squads.--inspection arms. right shoulder arms. roll call. each man as name is called, executes order arms. for muster, commands are: open ranks, march, front. (at command open ranks, rear rank drops back steps, counts.) (as mustering officer approaches) right shoulder arm's. attention to muster. each man, as name is called, answers "here" and comes to order arms. company commander is on right flank, in same place as "prepare for inspection." in aligning company.--captain places himself paces from and facing the flank toward which dress is made, verifies alignment and commands front. (platoon leaders same position for platoon alignment.) to march squad without unnecessary commands.--the corporal commands, _follow me_. men always at ease. squad conform to pace of corporal, and carry pieces as he does. in line or skirmish line, no. front rank follows in trace of corporal at paces. others guide on no. . as skirmishers, march.--at run. rear rank men on right of file leaders. all conform to corporals gait. in squad alone, skirmish line is formed on no. , front rank, corporal ahead when advancing, in rear when halted. regular interval in skirmish line / pace = yard per man. squad deployed = paces. any number of paces may be specified, _e.g._ as skirmishers, at paces, march. assemble, march.--men form on corporal. if he continues to advance, move in double time, form and follow. do not assemble while marching to rear. kneel.--left forearm and left lower leg form straight line. lie down.--on both knees, then both elbows. rise.--stand on point marked by both knees. (when deployed, may sit instead of kneel.) loadings and firings.--loadings are executed only in line and skirmish line. firings are always executed at a halt. when kneeling and lying down in double rank, rear rank does not load, aim or fire. in both cease firing and suspend firing pieces are loaded and locked. (sec. , i.d.r., april, , is incorrect.) . aiming.--target carefully pointed out. . sight-setting announced. (battle sight if none announced.) . (if by volley), ready, aim, squad fire. to continue volley firing, aim, squad fire. volley fire is used against large, compact enemy or in fire of position. fire at will.--normally employed in attack and defense; shots per minute at effective ranges ( to , yards); to shots per minute at close ranges (up to yards). clip fire: used ( ) to steady men. ( ) to produce a short burst of fire. unload.--safety lock up. extended order. a squad acting alone, as one out on a patrol or for instruction, the corporal acts as the leader of a small platoon leading the advance, and in rear when halted. men come to trail as they come on the skirmish line. on halting, a deployed line faces front (direction of real or assumed enemy), and takes cover. corporal cautions.--by the right flank (if halted). corporal steps out looking back to get his -pace interval. squad halt. left face.--base squad deploys as soon as it has room. guide of a deployed squad is center without command. captain indicates point on which corporal of base squad is to march. company right is executed as explained for front rank of company, but at / pace intervals. deployments. _from line, to form skirmish line to front._ as skirmishers, guide right, march.-- . if marching, corporal commands, follow me. corporal of base squad moves straight to front, deploys as soon as possible and advances until company, halt, is given. other squads move to left front and place squads on the line. if guide is center, other corporals on right of center squad move to the right, and squads on the left to the left, and bring their squads on the line. if guide is left, other corporals move to right front. . if at halt, base squad deploys abreast of its corporal, paces in front of the former line, as soon as it has room. other squads are conducted by the left flank, to their places. to deploy from column of squads, forming skirmish line to the front.--if at a halt, base squad deploys abreast of its corporal paces in front of its former position. if marching, base squad deploys and moves straight to the front. if guide is right, other corporals move to left front and place squads on line. if guide is center, corporals in front move to right (if at a halt, to right rear), the corporals in rear of center squad move to left and come on line in succession. column of twos or files are deployed by same commands in same manner. if deployment in an oblique direction is desired, the captain points out desired direction. column of squads may be turned to the flank or rear and then deployed. assemble, march.--in skirmish line, men assemble at a run, to their places individually. squads do not assemble and march to places as units as do platoons. platoons, assemble.--men assemble individually on the run, in their platoons and are then marched to relative position on base platoon as indicated by position or command of captain. platoon columns.--platoon leaders should be sure to go through center of platoon. platoon guides in rear. columns should be yards apart, or more. (used to take advantage of few favorable routes where cover is poor or ground difficult.) squad columns.--men oblique and follow squad leader. no advantage in cover, but used to advance more quickly over rough or brush grown ground. (it might be desirable to teach men to take squad columns from column of squads.) in assembling from platoon or squad columns, the men reform by platoons or squads and are conducted by their leaders to point indicated by captain. _thin lines_ are used to cross wide stretches under artillery fire or heavy, long range rifle fire which cannot be profitably returned. no. 's forward, march. first line is led by platoon leader, right platoon. second line is led by platoon guide, right platoon. third line is led by platoon leader, next platoon, etc. quick time, unless conditions otherwise demand. captain points out new line.--original intervals preserved. disadvantage.--serious loss of control over company. advantage.--offers less definite target and is less likely to draw fire. being in skirmish line. by platoon ( platoons, squads, men, etc.), from the right, rush.--leader of rush usually platoon leader. ( ) selects new line. ( ) cease firing. ( ) prepare to rush. ( ) follow me. ( ) commence firing. when whole company rushes, it is led by captain. platoon leader lead their platoons. commands. commands should be so given as to be distinctly heard by all the men who have to execute them. it is unfair to expect good execution of a slovenly command or one that cannot be heard. a sufficient interval should be allowed between the preparatory command and the command of execution, proportioned to the size of the command, so that each man has time to grasp the movement before execution is required. school of the battalion. basis.-- companies to a battalion. arrangement.--right to left by rank of captains. after formation order is not kept with reference to rank of captains. number.--from right to left in whatever direction. center.--actual center or right center company. band.--places itself as if it were an adjoining battalion on right. dressing.--each company is dressed by its captain who places himself on the flank toward which the dress is to be made. in battalion line beside the guide (or beside flank file of the front rank if guide is not in line) facing front. in column of companies-- paces from the guide and facing down the line. to form the battalion. other than ceremonies.--column of squads. adjutant does not take his post until companies are formed. each captain halts company and salutes adjutant. adjutant returns salutes and when last captain has saluted, faces major and reports "sir, the battalion is formed." he joins major without command. for ceremonies.--or when directed, battalion is formed in line. adjutant places himself paces to right of right company and facing in direction line is to extend. guides precede companies on line by paces. adjutant causes guides to cover. companies are halted one pace in rear of line and dressed to right against arm of guide. when guides of left company have been posted, adjutant by shortest route moves to post facing battalion midway between post of major and center of battalion. adjutant commands: . guides, . posts, . present, . arms. he then faces about and reports, "sir, the battalion is formed." major commands, "take your post, sir." to dismiss the battalion.--dismiss your companies. to rectify the alignment.--see infantry drill regulations, paragraphs - . to rectify the column.--see infantry drill regulations, paragraph . helpful hints to beginners.--these hold good with few exceptions. when in column of squads; first command of captain begins with word "column." when in column of companies; first command of captain begins with word "squads." in column of squads.-- major: _on right (left) into line._ first captain: squads right. (captain marches beside right guide.) rear captains: continue to march (if halted, forward). major: _march_. rear captains: (upon uncovering preceding company) squads right. major: _battalion_. first captain: company. major: _halt_. first captain: right dress, front. rear captains: (coming on line). company halt, right dress, front. major: _right (left) front into line._ first captain: column right. rear captains: column half right. major: _march_. first captain: (halts and allows company to pass him and form column of squads to right.) squads left, company halt, left dress, front. rear captains: when company in column of squads arrives one pace in rear of the right flank of the company that has formed in line. column half right, march. the captain then takes paces beyond the flank of the last company in line, allows company to pass him, and as rear guide reaches him, commands: squads left, march, company halt, left dress, front. major: _line of companies at_ (seven) paces, guide left (right). (close on first company from column of squads is no longer used in battalion drill.) first captain: continue to march (if halted, forward). rear captains: column half right. major: _march_. rear captains: (when company reaches a position paces to the flank of the leading company.) column half right. major: _battalion_. all captains: company. major: _halt_. major: _column of companies, first company_ squads right (left). first captain: squads right. rear captains: continue to march (if halted, forward.). as each company reaches the point where the first company formed line the captain commands: squads right, march. in column of companies or close column of companies.-- major: _on right (left) into line._ first captain: right turn. rear captains: continue to march (if halted, forward). major: _march_. rear captains: each captain takes paces beyond the left flank of the company that has just executed the turn and commands: right turn, march. major: _battalion_. first captain: company. major: _halt_. first captain: right dress, front. rear captains: (as they come on line.) company halt, right dress, front. major: _right (left) front into line._ first captain: company. second capt: right by squads. third and fourth captains: squads right. major: _march_. first captain: halt, left dress, front. rear captains: column half left, march, column half right march. taking paces from the flank of the company last on line and allowing the company to pass by him until the rear guide reaches him, captain commands: squads left, march, company halt, left dress, front. major: _close on first company_ (never any other). first captain: company. rear captains: continue to march (if halted, forward). major: _march_. first captain: halt. rear captains: as each successive company closes to paces from the company immediately in front, the captain commands: company halt. major: _extend on fourth company._ (never any other.) first captain: continue to march (if halted, forward). rear captains: company. major: _march_. rear captains: halt. then as each company in rear of the leading company gets the proper distance (company front plus paces) the captain commands: forward march. close column not extended in double time. major: _column of squads, first company_ squads right (left). first captain: squads right. rear captains: continue to march (if halted, forward). as each company reaches the point where the first company formed column of squads, the captain commands: squads right, march. major: _column right (left)._ first captain: right turn. rear captains: continue to march (if halted, forward). major: _march_. first captain: when the marching flank of the company is one pace from the new line the captain commands: forward march. rear captains: other companies march squarely up to the turning point and each changes direction at the captain's command: right turn, march, forward, march. line of companies or close line of companies. major: _battalion right (left)._ first captain: column right. flank captains: column half right. major: _march_. flank captains: when each company has moved paces to the flank of the base company the command is: column half right, march. the companies are then marched echeloned with an interval of paces. major: _battalion_. first captain: company. major: _halt_. flank captains: continue to march. as each company comes into line with the base company the captain commands: company, halt. major: _close on first (fourth) company._ _extend on first (fourth) company._ both movements executed in the same manner. first captain: (if marching.) halt. (if halted, cautions "stand fast.") flank captains: squads right. major: _march._ flank captains: right oblique, march. (when the company has closed sufficiently): forward march, squads left, march. (then as the company comes on the line with first company): company, halt. major: _column of squads, first (fourth) company, forward._ first captain: forward. flank captains: column half right (left). major: _march._ flank captains: as their companies come onto the line behind the leading company (at . paces) the captain commands: column half right, march. in battalion line. major: _close on first (fourth) company._ first captain: stand fast (caution). second captain: squads right, column right. third and fourth captains: squads right, column half right. major: _march._ second, third and fourth captains: as each company reaches a point paces behind the company just preceding it into close column, the command is given: column half right, march. (cautioning "guide left" when closing on first company--"guide right" when closing on fourth company): squads left, march, company, halt. major: _halt._ first captain: right dress, front. rear captains: (as they come on the line): company halt, right dress, front. [illustration: plate no. a. co. i--n.e. proper arrangement of shelter tents.] [illustration: plate no. b. layout of equipment for inspection. tent pins should be laid in echelon three inches apart.] inspections. (kitchen and mess inspections have been covered under feeding men.) daily inspection of the barracks should be made and rigid discipline enforced as to the floors being kept clean, scrubbed once a week, bedding and bed clothes aired out of doors every tuesday, shoes cleaned and kept in order under bunks, lockers under bunks, toilet articles and books all kept in order. sheets, comforters and blankets should be shaken out, folded as for pack and laid on top of pillow until afternoon, each day. in inspecting men every week see that hair is kept short and feet clean and in good condition, toe nails trimmed. insist on woolen socks. equipment must be inspected carefully, each week, to see that it is in good condition. special points of company inspection. after open ranks, march, given from usual position in front of company, the captain takes his post paces in front of right guide, facing to the left and commands: . front. . prepare for inspection. the lieutenants are paces in front of the center of their respectives platoons, facing to front. if equipment is also to be inspected, commands are as follows: . close ranks. . march. stack arms. backward, march. take interval to the right, march. company, halt. . unsling equipment. . open packs. close packs. sling equipment. battalion inspection. at command, prepare for inspection, given by the major, each captain commands, open ranks. they do not salute when the major and inspector approach. the lieutenants take their places as in company inspection. each captain commands: company attention. prepare for inspection. lieutenants face about and stand at ease, after being inspected or passed. after inspection: close ranks, march. rest. regimental inspection. commands mean and principles are same as for battalion. (look up post of colonel, par. , infantry drill regulations.) ceremonies. battalion review. after battalion is formed in line, major faces front. when reviewing officer halts, major turns about and commands: present arms; turns to front and salutes. major turns about; commands order arms, and again faces front. when reviewing officer is within paces, the major salutes, takes post on the right and accompanies him. on arriving at the right of the line again, major salutes, halts, takes his post in front of battalion and commands: pass in review. squads right, march. major and staff execute eyes right and take post on right of reviewing officer remaining until battalion has passed, when he salutes and rejoins it. double time is given by major when the battalion comes to its original starting place and the battalion passes in review as before except that eyes right is omitted and major salutes only when he leaves reviewing officer. major and staff may be dismounted at discretion of commanding officer. battalion parade. when band sounds off, the reviewing officer and his staff stands, if dismounted, with arms folded: if mounted they remain at attention at a convenient distance in front of the center and facing the battalion. the battalion is not presented for battalion parade. the lieutenants take posts in front of center of their platoons at captain's command for dressing his company on the line. after guides posts, the adjutant commands: (to battalion) parade rest. (to band) sound off. battalion, attention. present arms. at conclusion of national anthem adjutant reports: sir: the parade is formed. the major directs: _take your post, sir_. major then commands: _order arms_. at conclusion of manual of arms, major directs: _receive the reports, sir_. captains report "'c' company present or accounted for," or "'c' company, officer, enlisted men are absent." publish the orders, sir: after publishing them, adjutant commands: officers, center, march. at command center, officers face center: at command march, march to center and halt, facing front. commands forward and halt are given by senior officer. left officer of center company is guide and marches on the major. halt at paces from major, salute and come down with the major. at command officers posts, march, officers face about at command "posts" and are conducted by senior officer who halts them paces from line. officers, halt. posts, march. face outward at command, posts, step off with pace intervals. lieutenants go to their posts by shortest route, in rear of company. regimental parade. lieutenants remain in file closers. at command, officers center, captains remain at their posts with their companies. regimental review. regiment formed in line or line of masses. colonel commands: pass in review. each major commands: , _squads right_; , _march_. if in line of masses, colonel commands: "pass in review." major of right battalion commands: _column of squads, first company squads, right, march_. fire direction is the function of the captain and higher commanders. above the grade of captain and direction is principally tactical. with a captain it implies the ability to issue correct fire orders to meet given situations in order that the fire of the company may be as effective as possible. fire control is the combined product of the fire unit commanders and the firers. the fire unit is the platoon. fire discipline means strict attention to the signals and orders of the commander, and is the faculty developed in the men by instruction and training, of commencing, ceasing, or diminishing fire, or of concentrating it upon a defined object in obedience to the deliberate will of the commander. note.--it is to be remembered that all grades of commanders are supposed to be familiar with the duties of all below them. in issuing orders all officers, in addition to announcing where they will be found will give the location of the next higher commander. the authorities for statements under the platoon leader and below are not given after each statement but the paragraphs from which they are deduced are given under the heading for each grade. this course was thought necessary to avoid repetition. i. the colonel. position--( , , --i.d.r.) . advancing to the battlefield: as (a) independent commander ordinarily with the advance guard in order that he may: . receive information promptly. . personally see the situation (reconnoiter). . order the deployment. . begin the action strictly in accordance with his own wishes. (b) subordinate commander ( , i.d.r.). after receiving his order for the action, precedes his command as far as possible in order to: . personally reconnoiter the ground. . be prepared to issue his orders promptly. note--for a discussion of the position of leaders see subject v. . during the action; such as will enable him to: (a) observe the progress of events. (b) receive and transmit messages and orders. (c) be in constant, direct, and easy communication with the reserve. ( , i.d.r.) duties: a. after having received his orders, the regimental commander leads his regiment forward in a column, or in line of columns, until the time arrives for issuing the regimental order, he then: ( , i.d.r.) b. assigns targets and sectors or tasks to battalions and special units. ( , and , i.d.r.) c. provides for necessary reconnaissance to front and flank. ( , i.d.r.) d. announces his position and also that of the next higher commander. e. controls the reserve as the tactical situation demands. ( , i.d.r.) f. regulates ammunition supply. ( , f.s.r. and , i.d.r.) see also full discussion of the ammunition supply in subject viii. note--the colonel is assisted in the performance of his duties by the regimental staff. ii. the major. the battalion is the attack unit whether acting alone or as part of a larger force. ( , i.d.r.) position: (the general rules for a colonel apply) . where he can best: a. direct the reinforcing of the firing line from the support. ( , i.d.r.) b. observe the progress of events, ( , i.d.r.) c. maintain contact with regimental headquarters. ( , i.d.r.) . on the firing line when all the supports have joined. ( , i.d.r.) (see subject v.) general. duties: . conducts his battalion according to sector and mission assigned him. . directs first disposition of battalion by tactical orders, giving subordinates-- a. information of the enemy. b. position of supporting and neighboring troops. c. the general object to be attained. d. the special problem for each company ( , i.d.r.) (this includes making the primary apportionment of the target.) ( , i.d.r.) e. if practicable, the point or time at which the fire fight is to open. ( , i.d.r.) f. orders for flank protection and reconnaissance, unless specifically provided for by higher authority. ( , and , i.d.r.) g. his position and that of the next higher commander. . controls supports, dispatches reinforcements from support to firing line. ( and , i.d.r.) . controls subsequent movements by suitable orders or commands. ( , i.d.r.) . regulates ammunition supply--(see subject viii, also pars. - , f.s.r.) (the combat train is the immediate reserve supply of the battalion.) a. is responsible for the proper use of the combat train. b. insures maintenance of the prescribed allowance at all times. c. causes combat trains to march immediately in rear of the battalion unless directed otherwise. ( , i.d.r.) d. when battalion deployed on his own initiative, indicates whether extra ammunition shall be issued. ( , i.d.r.) e. when battalion deployed pursuant to orders from higher authority, causes issue of extra ammunition unless specifically ordered not to do so. ( , , i.d.r.) f. when combat wagons are emptied, directs them to proper rendezvous to be refilled. ( , i.d.r.) g. sees that combat wagons and belts of men are refilled as soon as possible after an engagement. ( , i.d.r.) . maintains contact with adjoining troops. ( i.d.r.) . may harmonize ranges used by the companies on the firing line. . determines when bayonets shall be fixed. ( , i.d.r.) . subject to orders from higher authority, determines the point from which the charge to be made. ( , i.d.r.) . orders the charge. ( , i.d.r.) special. . _in attack_: a. may select formation in which companies advance. ( , i.d.r.) b. designates-- . the direction of the objective. ( , i.d.r.) . the companies for the firing line. . the companies for the support. . the order and front of the companies in the firing line. . the right or left company of the firing line as the base company. . may indicate when the advance by rushes is to start. ( , i.d.r.) . _in defense_: a. describes front of each company. ( , i.d.r.) b. assigns sector of fire. ( , , i.d.r.) c. locates fire, communicating and cover trenches. d. directs preparation of obstacles. e. assigns companies to construct trenches and obstacles. f. details troops to occupy trenches. ( , i.d.r.) g. causes firing line and supports to fix bayonets when a charge by the enemy is imminent. ( , i.d.r.) h. seeks opportunities for counter attacks. ( , i.d.r.) iii. battalion staff. positions: battalion adjutant } battalion sergeant major } with major. mounted orderlies--both with major (one with major and one with adjutant) until horses are sent to rear when both may be with the horses or one take the horses and the other remain with the major, as he may direct. duties: all assist the major in any way directed, by a. reconnaissance. ( , i.d.r., , f.s.r.) b. observation of the firing line. c. maintaining contact with regimental headquarters. d. maintaining contact with the support. e. receiving, communicating, and sending visual signals from and to front and rear. f. observing fire effect and progress of events. g. keeping copies of all orders, messages, and other data necessary, for his war diary. ( , f.s.r.) when there is only one range finder to the battalion, the battalion sergeant major is the battalion range taker. when not actually engaged in taking ranges, he assists the major as above or, preferably, he may be charged with the duty of maintaining communication with the companies of the firing line. the major designates a sergeant to take charge of the battalion combat train. under the major's direction, he a. conducts combat train as far to the front with the battalion as directed. b. issues ammunition to the battalion. c. takes combat train to rendezvous for refilling, under direction of the regimental commander. d. rejoins battalion, if it is not in action, or, if it be engaged, joins or establishes communication with the regimental reserve. ( , and , i.d.r.) (this sergeant is not provided for in the present organization. recommendation has been made to the war department that he be included in the tables of organization.) iv. the captain. (the fire director.) position: _where he can best:_ . control his four platoons. ( , i.d.r.) . observe fire effect. ( , i.d.r.) . see the major and platoon chiefs. ( , i.d.r.) duties: _before fire action:_ . conducts his company to place of deployment assigned by the major's orders ( , i.d.r.) in best manner. ( , i.d.r.) . designates target, and allots part to each platoon. ( and , i.d.r.) (see overlapping method, page , subject v. fire tactics.) . determines the range. ( and , i.d.r.) . announces the sight setting. } . indicates class of fire and } ( , i.d.r.) . time to open fire. } . informs the subordinates as to the location of the battalion commander, and, when necessary, announces his own position. _during the action:_ . observes fire effect. ( , , , i.d.r., and , s.a.f.m.) . corrects material errors in sight setting. ( , i.d.r.) . prevents exhaustion of ammunition supply. ( , , , i.d.r.) . distributes ammunition received from rear. ( , i.d.r.) . provides for the collection and distribution of the ammunition of the dead and wounded. ( , i.d.r.) . is on the alert for the major's signals or commands. ( and , i.d.r.) . in the absence of express directions from the major, if commanding a flank company, determines when advances by rushes shall be attempted. ( , i.d.r.) . indicates size of fractions to rush. ( , i.d.r.) . leads a rush by entire company. ( , i.d.r.) . leads the charge. ( , i.d.r.) . when necessary, designates new platoon leaders and sees that new squads are organized and new squad leaders designated to replace those disabled. ( , , i.d.r.) v. buglers. position: join the captain when the company deploys. ( , i.d.r.) duties: ( , i.d.r.) . _one bugler_-- a. observes the enemy. b. observes the target. c. observes for fire effect. d. watches platoon leaders for signals. e. transmits signals to platoon leaders. . _the other_-- a. watches the major for signals and repeats them back. b. transmits information to the major. . both-- a. repeat bugle signals "charge." ( , i.d.r.) b. carry field glasses, message pads, pencils and signal flags. (i.u.a.e.m., , i.d.r.) c. act as messengers. all of the above implies that they must be proficient in: a. signaling--hand, arm and letter codes. b. observation for fire effect. c. location and definition or description of targets. d. bugle calls. vi. range estimators. five or six officers or men, selected from the most accurate estimators in the company are designated "range finders." ( , i.d.r.) the term "range finder" is a misnomer as a range finder is an instrument. the school uses the term "range estimator" when applied to an individual. the attention of the war department has been called to this. the range estimators are given special training in the estimation of ranges. when an action is pending, the captain receives from the major the primary apportionment of the target or sector of fire. ( , i.d.r.) the captain returns to the company, and, avoiding dangerous grouping, assembles the platoon leaders and range estimators, and points out to both the target of the battalion and company. the range estimators immediately begin their estimation of the range to the company target; the captain meanwhile continues with his instructions to the platoon leaders. the instructions to the platoon leaders completed, the range estimators announce to the captain either their individual estimates, or the mean of their estimates as deduced by one of the estimators. the range estimators then take their customary posts ( , i.d.r.), and the captain indicates to the platoon leaders the range to be used. the range estimators act in an advisory capacity to the captain. the mean of their estimates will usually be the most accurate deduction available in battle. the adoption by the captain of the range thus determined, however, is not obligatory. range estimators should be ready to signal their estimates of the range to the platoon leaders at any time during the action. vii. the platoon leader. (the fire controller.) position: where he can best: . control the squads constituting his platoon. ( , i.d.r.) . observe the target and fire effect. ( , , , i.d.r., and , s.a.f.m.) . observe the captain for signals or commands. ( , , i.d.r.) duties: ( , , , , - , , - , , , , i.d.r.) controls the fire of his platoon and in his fire orders. . receives his orders from the company commander. . if necessary, may indicate the fire position that has been ordered. . announces sight setting. . points out designated target to his platoon, if practicable, otherwise to his corporals only, or . when the target cannot be seen, indicates an aiming target. ( and , i.d.r., call this an aiming "point", but the occasions upon which infantry would use an aiming "point" are so rare that it is believed aiming "target" is a more accurate term as it includes both point and line.) . assigns target so as to insure that the entire front or sector given him by the company commander will be covered with fire. . gives class of fire. . announces rate of fire. . if commanding a flank platoon, details a man to watch for signals from the combat patrols. . when his corporals have signaled that their squads are ready to fire, signals the captain by looking toward him and holding up his hand. . when captain signals a "commence firing", repeats same to the corporals. thereafter: . observes for fire effect. . when platoon is not firing, insures that the front assigned is kept under constant observation for any appearance of the enemy or any change of position. . changes sight-setting of his platoon when necessary. . regulates rate of fire. . increases rate of fire when large and distinct targets appear and decreases it when the target becomes small and indistinct. . prevents decrease in rate of fire when-- ( ) changing sight-setting, ( ) preparing for rushes, ( ) fixing bayonets, ( ) transmitting firing data to supports, ( ) distributing ammunition. . increases the rate of fire to cover the advance of adjacent units. for this purpose progress and movements of adjoining units are kept under observation. . maintains direction of advance of his platoon in rushing, so as not to blanket fire of adjacent units. . is on the alert for captain's commands or signals, for this purpose he may use his platoon guide. . may use his platoon guide to observe adjoining units. . must understand all signals. . leads his platoon in advancing and charging. . prevents changing fire to unauthorized targets. . insures distribution of ammunition brought up from the rear and the collection and distribution of same from the dead and wounded. ( , i.d.r.). . in coming up with re-enforcements, he takes over the duties of disabled platoon leaders of the platoon into which his men have dropped, or it may be some other section of the line needs his service in which case he goes there. . endeavors to preserve the integrity of squads, designates new squad leaders to replace those disabled, organizes new squads when necessary, sees that every man is placed in a squad and takes every opportunity for restoring order in the firing line. ( , , i.d.r.) . in "advance by thin lines", leads odd numbered lines. ( , i.d.r.). viii. the first sergeant. commands a platoon, never a guide. guides. general rules: . guides must be resourceful, have good health, vigorous physique, keen eyesight, presence of mind and courage, with good judgment, military training and experience. they must be able to read maps, make sketches and send clear and concise messages. . equipment.--guides are equipped with whistle, watch, compass, message book, knife, pencil, wire cutters, map, pace scale and glasses if possible. . as instructors they go where needed. . as file closers they insure steadiness and promptness in the ranks. . in column of subdivisions the guide of the leading subdivision is charged with the step and direction. close order.--the guides of the right and left, or leading and rear, platoons, are the right and left, or leading and rear guides respectively of the company when it is in line or in column of squads. other guides are in the line of file closers. in platoon movements the post of the platoon guide is at the head of the platoon, if the platoon is in column, and on the guiding flank if in line. when a platoon has two guides their original assignment to flanks of the platoon does not change. the guides of a column of squads place themselves on the flank opposite the file closers. to change the guides and file closers to the other flank, the captain commands: . _file closers on left (right) flank;_ . march. the file closers dart through the column; the captain and guides change. in column of squads, each rank preserves the alignment toward the side of the guide. men in the line of file closers do not execute the loadings or firings. guides and enlisted men in the line of file closers execute the manual of arms during the drill unless specially excused, when they remain at the order. during ceremonies they execute all movements. in taking intervals and distances.--unless otherwise directed, the right and left guides, at the first command, place themselves in the line of file closers, and with them take a distance of paces from the rear rank. in taking intervals, at the command "march", the file closers face to the flank and each steps off with the file nearest him. in _assembling_ the guides and file closers resume their places in line. to form the company.--at the sounding of the assembly the first sergeant takes position paces in front of where the center of the company is to be, faces it, draws saber, and commands "fall in". the right guide of the company places himself, facing to the front, where the right of the company is to rest, and at such point that the center of the company will be paces from and opposite the first sergeant; the squads form in their proper places on the left of the right guide, superintended by the other sergeants, who then take their posts. for the instruction of platoon leaders and guides, the company, when small, may be formed in single rank. in this formation close order movements only are executed. the single rank executes all movements as explained for the front rank of the company. alignments.--the alignments are executed as prescribed in the school of the squad, the guide being established instead of the flank file. the rear-rank man of the flank file keeps his head and eyes to the front and covers his file leader. at each alignment the captain places himself in prolongation of the line, paces from and facing the flank toward which the dress is made, verifies the alignment and commands: "front". platoon leaders take a like position when required to verify the alignments. in "company right" the right guide steps back on the command "march", aligning the first two men next to him as he does so, to establish the correct line. in "platoon right" the captain announces the guide and the guides cover promptly. in "right turn" the right guide is the pivot of the front rank. in "column right" the right flank man of the leading squad is the pivot, _not the guide_. in "right by squads" the right guide (when he has posted himself in front of the right squad) takes four short steps and then resumes the full step. the right squad conforms. "squads right about." if the company or platoons are in column of squads, file closers turn about toward the column and take posts. if in line, each darts through the nearest interval between squads. the right and left guides place themselves in the new front rank. file closers on facing about, maintain their relative positions. when the company executes "about face", guides place themselves in the new front rank. in "right front into line, double time" halting and aligning commands are omitted. guide is toward side of the first unit. in "take interval" or "take distance" guides drop back at the first command. in "squads right" or "platoons, column right" interior guides of platoons cross the company. a good rule for beginners is always to cross over (except in "column right"). guide of a company in line is right (unless otherwise announced). guide of a platoon in line is right. guide of a battalion in line is center. guide of a line of subdivisions is center. guide of a deployed line is center. guide of a squad is toward the side of the guide of the company. guide of successive formations into line is toward the point of rest. file closers remain on the same side of the company except when in so doing they would be left in front of the company. if the battalion is in line, the guide away from the point of rest (in each company) comes to the "right shoulder arms" at the command to dress. at the command "eyes right", guides who are charged with the direction do not execute "eyes right", but simply salute. at "retreat" guides unarmed stand at "attention". only officers salute. in "stack arms" the right guide should align the stacks. in squads (acting alone) the corporal is the guide; number of the front rank, if the corporal is not in line. the guides of rear units are charged with the step, trace and distance. exercise for guides.--lay out a course of arbitrary distance; yards will answer the purpose. instruct the guides to march the course as they would if they were guiding a company, but being sure to count their steps (a pebble transferred to the left hand at steps is often found useful). result.--the number of steps will range from to . after getting the number of steps taken by each man, show them that they should have taken steps and that each man took too long a step. have them march back guiding on two points in line as before, cautioning them to cut down the length of the step to inches from the start, and not to wait until they get half way down the course and find that they have less than steps. result.--all of the men, even after the caution, will have taken too long a step. instructor times the guides both ways, and calls attention to the fact that in all cases the cadence was under steps per minute. after repeating above as much as desired have the men march in pairs, one man keeping time and the other counting steps and marching on two points. they may check up every seconds if desired. ix. platoon guides. position: . behind the firing line, on left of platoon leader. ( , i.d.r.) . advancing in line--behind center of platoon. ( and , i.d.r.) to insure prompt and orderly advance. . "advance by thin lines"--lead even numbered lines. ( , i.d.r.) . advancing in squad or platoon column--in rear. duties: ( , , , , , , , and , i.d.r.) . the platoon leader's assistant and may be assigned any duty the platoon leader sees fit. . keeps adjoining units under observation. . watches firing line. . checks every breach of fire discipline. . prevents skulking, men leaving the ranks at any time to care for wounded, etc. . designates new squad leaders and organizes new squads when necessary. . attaches men that have become separated from squads to other squads. . insures prompt and orderly advance. . on joining firing line from the support takes over duties of sergeants disabled. . may receive and transmit signals to the captain. . if the platoon leader is disabled, he takes over his duties. hence he should know what the platoon leader is doing and how. . when taking over the duties of the platoon leader he calls the senior corporal of his platoon out to act as guide. x. corporal. position: . marching in line, as center skirmisher of squad ( , i.d.r.) or . when skirmish line is halted, immediately behind his squad. note.--the school has recommended to the war department that the infantry drill regulations be changed to provide that the corporal's position be as prescribed above and in paragraph , page . duties: paragraphs , , , , , , and , i.d.r., cover in general the corporal's duties. the squad leader (corporal) controls the fire of his squad, he must understand the duties of the private and in issuing his fire orders: . receives his instructions from the platoon leader. . points out indicated objective to his squad. . takes as the squad target that portion of the platoon target which corresponds to the position of the squad in the platoon. . announces sight setting. . announces class and rate of fire. . when his squad is ready to fire looks toward the platoon leader and holds up his hand. at the platoon leader's signal to commence firing he sees that the squad opens fire. thereafter: . makes all fire from the shoulder. . makes all use ordered rate of fire. . insures that all fire at designated objective. . prevents slighting of invisible portions of the target for more visible parts. . prevents men from changing fire to unauthorized targets not in the assigned front or sector. . maintains constant observation to the front; when squad is firing, for effect of fire--when squad is not firing, for appearance of enemy. . insures prompt obedience to orders to suspend and cease firing. . makes men utilize ground to fullest extent for concealment in firing and advancing. . in sight-setting, changing sights and fixing bayonets, has front rank perform operation first (rear-rank men increasing rate of fire) and then the rear-rank follow while the front-rank men make up for loss of fire for the rear rank, thus insuring that the rate of fire for the squad does not fall off. . prevents increasing vulnerability of squad while preparing for a rush, and rushes as soon after cease firing as possible. . when other squads of his platoon, are rushing, or the platoon which is covering the same target as is his platoon, is rushing he has his squad increase its rate of fire to make up for lost fire effect of the rushing element. . in rushing causes men to spring to feet running at full speed, all men to drop to the ground at the same time, and those who are in rear to crawl up to the line. . when re-enforcing the firing line, takes over the duties of disabled squad leaders. for this purpose his squad may drop into line at one place and he may move to the next squad on the right or left where there is a squad leader needed. if there are no vacancies caused by disabled squad leaders, he drops into line and assists the squad leaders who are there. . prevents decreasing rate of fire when men are transmitting data to arriving supports. . prevents wasting of ammunition. . prevents use of rounds in right pocket section of belts except on order of an officer. . distributes ammunition of dead and wounded and ammunition brought up from the rear. . prevents decreasing the rate of fire while ammunition is being distributed. . looks to the rear only at his platoon leader's whistle "attention." pays no attention to any other except suspend firing. . takes his position in rear of his squad when it is firing and remains there, where he can control its fire, and only crawls into line and adds his rifle when all control is lost. (short ranges.) . to control his squad he does not walk up and down behind his squad but rolls along behind his line and keeps down. . leads his squad in moving to the front or rear. . must know thoroughly the drill regulation signals and have a good practical knowledge of the theory of fire. . in rushing, maintains the direction of advance of his squad so as not to blanket the fire of squads in his rear. . takes advantage of every lull in the action and every favorable opportunity to reorganize his squad and get it more under control. . checks every breach of fire discipline, abates excitement, and prevents any man from leaving the squad to go to the rear for any purpose whatsoever. . if called out of line to act as guide, notifies designated private ( , i.d.r.) to take command of squad. xi. the private. position: deployed in line: one man per yard ( , i.d.r.), unless a greater extension is directed in the order for deployment. ( , i.d.r.) duties: ( , , , , , , , , - , , , , , , , , , , , i.d.r., and , s.a.f.m.) the individual soldier must be trained: . to recognize targets from description quickly. . to describe and define targets. . to use rear sight in describing targets. . to use horizontal and vertical clock systems, singly or in combination in describing target. . to set sights quickly and accurately as ordered. . to bring piece to shoulder, aim carefully and deliberately from habit, and to reload quickly. . to fire at the ordered rate. (par. , standard for field firing.) . to fire at the part of the designated objective which corresponds to his position in the firing line. . to continue firing in the designated sector and not to change therefrom unless ordered. . not to slight invisible parts of the target for more visible ones. . to maintain constant observation to the front. . to utilize folds of ground for concealment in advancing and firing. . to select firing positions. . to understand effects of visibility and the selection of backgrounds. . to fire from all positions, from behind hillocks, trees, heaps of earth and rocks, depressions, gullies, ditches, doorways and windows. . to obey promptly orders to suspend and cease firing. . to ignore whistle signals, except suspend firing. . to watch closely for the expected target after having suspended firing. . to obey promptly all orders from his squad leader. . to drop into the nearest interval when reinforcing the firing line and obey the orders of the nearest squad leader. . to transmit firing data to men of the supports coming into the line rapidly and accurately, without decreasing his rate of fire. . to call for range and target when reinforcing the firing line. . to have confidence in his own ability to hit. . to a system of sight setting and fixing bayonets in order that there may be no cessation of fire in the unit during this operation. . to prepare for rushes without decreasing fire of the unit unduly. . to avoid unnecessary movement in preparing for rushes. . to spring forward at command "rush" or "follow me" without preliminary rising. . to avoid bunching in rushing. . not to swerve to the right or left in search of cover but to advance in a straight line, in order not to blanket the fire of men in his rear. . to drop quickly at end of rush and crawl up to line if in rear of it. . to remain with his own company, but if he accidentally becomes detached from his company or squad to join the nearest one. . to maintain silence except when transmitting or receiving firing data and charging. . to retain presence of mind. . to be careful not to waste ammunition. . to use the thirty rounds of ammunition in the right pocket section of the belt only upon the order of an officer. . to remain with the firing line after bringing up ammunition. . to utilize ammunition of dead and wounded. . never to attempt to care for dead or wounded during the action. . to have confidence in his ability to use the bayonet. . to a firm determination to close with the enemy. . to preserve the line in charging. . to understand that a charge should be slow and steady (the faster men must not run away from the slower ones). . to form up immediately after the charge and follow the enemy with fire, not attempting a disorganized pursuit. . to understand that it is suicidal to turn his back to an enemy and that, if he cannot advance, he must intrench and hold on until dark. . to count distant groups of object or beings. . to recognize service targets. . never to fire until he understands what the target is, at what part he is to fire, and with what sight setting. packs. instructions for assembling the infantry equipment, model of . . the cartridge belt.--(a) to assemble the belt. place the adjusting strap on the ground, eyeleted edge to the front; place the pocket sections on the ground in prolongation of the adjusting strap, pockets down, tops of pockets to the front; insert end of adjusting strap in outer loop of metal guide, from the upper side, carry it under the middle bar and up through the inner loop; engage the wire hook on the end of adjusting strap in the eyelets; provided on the inner surface of the belt. (b) to adjust the belt. adjust the belt to fit loosely about the waist--i.e., so that when buckled it may rest well down over the hip bones on the sides of the body and below the pit of the abdomen in front. care should be taken that the adjustment be made equally from both ends of the adjusting strap, so that the center eyelet will be in the middle of the belt. (c) to fill the belt. unsnap the flap of the pocket and the interior retaining strap; lay the retaining strap out flat in prolongation of the pocket, insert a clip of cartridges, points of bullets up, in front of the retaining strap; press down until the base of the clip rests on the bottom of the pocket; pass the retaining strap over the bullet points and fasten it to the outside of the pocket by means of the fastener provided; insert a second clip of cartridges, points of bullets down, in rear of the first clip; press down until the points of the bullets rest on the bottom of the pocket; close the flap of the pocket and fasten by means of the fastener provided. the remaining nine pockets are filled in like manner. . to attach the first-aid pouch.--attach the pouch under the second pocket of the right section of the belt by inserting one hook of the double-hook attachment in the eyelet, from the inside of the belt; pinch the base of the pocket, bringing eyelets close together, and insert the other hook in the same manner in the adjoining eyelet. place the first-aid packet in the pouch and secure the cover. . to attach the canteen cover.--attach the canteen cover to the belt under the rear pocket of the right section in the same manner as the first-aid pouch. place the canteen and cup (assembled) in the cover and secure the flaps. . to attach the pack carrier to the haversack.--spread the haversack on the ground, inner side down, outer flap to the front (fig. ); place the buttonholed edge of the pack carrier on the buttonholed edge of the haversack, lettered side of carrier up; buttonholes of carrier superimposed upon the corresponding ones of the haversack; lace the carrier to the haversack by passing the ends of the coupling strap down through the corresponding buttonholes of the carrier and haversack nearest the center of the carrier, bringing the ends up through the next buttonholes and continuing to the right and left, respectively, to the sides. . to attach the cartridge belt to the haversack.--place the haversack and pack carrier (assembled) on the ground, inner side down (fig. ); place the cartridge belt, pockets down, tops to the front, along the junction of the haversack and carrier; insert hook on rear of belt suspender in the center eyelet of the adjusting strap, so that the end of the hook will be on the outside of the belt; insert hooks on ends of front belt suspenders in the eyelets between the second and third pockets from the outer ends of the belt, so that the end of the hooks will be on the outside of the belt. . to attach the bayonet scabbard to the haversack.--attach the scabbard by passing its lower end through the loop provided on the side of the haversack body, then engage the double-hook attachment in the eyelets on the outer flap on the haversack, inserting the hooks from the inside. place the bayonet in the scabbard. . to attach the intrenching tool carrier to the haversack.--fold the outer flap of the haversack over so that the meat-can pouch is uppermost; pass the intrenching tool carrier underneath the meat-can pouch and engage the double-hook attachment in the eyelets in the flap provided, inserting the hooks from the underside. place the intrenching tool in the carrier and secure. place the meat-can, knife, fork, and spoon in the meat-can pouch. the equipment is now assembled and is never disassembled except to detach the pack carrier and its contents as hereinafter provided for. to assemble the full equipment. (_with rations._) place the assembled equipment on the ground, suspender side of haversack down, pockets of cartridge belt up, haversack spread out, inside flap and pack carrier extended their full length to the rear (fig. ). place three cartons of hard bread in the center of the haversack body, the lower one on the line of attachment of the inside flap; lay the remaining carton of hard bread, the condiment can and the bacon can on the top of these, the condiment can and the bacon can at the bottom, top of the bacon can to the front; the socks and toilet articles are rolled, towel on the outside, into a bundle of the same approximate dimensions as a carton of hard bread, and are placed in front of the two rows thus formed. the inside flap of the haversack is folded over these articles, the end of the flap being turned in so that the flap, thus shortened, extends about inches beyond the top of the upper row; the sides of the haversack are folded over the sides of the rows; the upper binding straps are passed through the loops on the outside of the inside flap, each strap through the loop opposite the point of its attachment to the haversack body, and fastened by means of the buckle on the opposite side, the strap being passed through the opening in the buckle next to its attachment, over the center bar, and back through the opening of the buckle away from its attachment; the strap is pulled tight to make the fastening secure; the outer flap of the haversack is folded over and fastened by means of the lower haversack binding strap and the buckle on the inside of the outer flap; the strap is pulled tight, drawing the outer flap snugly over the filled haversack. the haversack is now packed and the carrier is ready for the reception of the pack (fig. ). if one haversack ration and one emergency ration are carried in lieu of two haversack rations, the haversack is packed in the manner described above, except that two cartons of hard bread and the bacon can form the bottom layer, the bacon can on the bottom; the condiment can, the emergency ration, and the toilet articles form the top layer. if one emergency ration is carried in addition to the two haversack rations, it is packed on top of the top layer. to make the pack (fig. ).--spread the shelter half on the ground and fold in the triangular ends, forming an approximate square from the half, the guy on the inside; fold the poncho once across its shortest dimension, then twice across its longest dimension, and lay it in the center of the shelter half; fold the blanket as described for the poncho and place it on the latter; place the shelter tent pins in the folds of the blanket, in the center and across the shortest dimension; fold the edges of the shelter half snugly over the blanket and poncho and, beginning on either of the short sides, roll tightly and compactly. this forms the pack. to assemble the pack (fig. ).--place the pack in the pack carrier and grasp the lower suspension rings, one in each hand; place the right knee against the bottom of the roll; pull the carrier down and force the pack up close against the bottom of the packed haversack; without removing the knee, pass the lower carrier binding strap over the pack and secure it by means of the opposite buckle; in a similar manner secure the lower haversack binding strap and then the upper carrier binding strap. engage the snap hook on the pack suspenders in the lower suspension rings. the equipment is now assembled and packed as prescribed for the full equipment. to assemble the full equipment. (_without rations._) place the assembled equipment on the ground as heretofore described; fold up the inside flap of the haversack so that its end will be on a line with the top of the haversack body; fold up the lower haversack strap in the same manner. to make up the pack.--fold the poncho, blanket and shelter half, and make up the pack as heretofore prescribed, except that the condiment and bacon can (the former inside the latter) and the toilet articles and socks are rolled in the pack. in this case the pack is rolled, beginning on either of the long sides instead of the short sides, as heretofore described. to assemble the pack.--place the pack on the haversack and pack carrier, its upper end on a line with the upper edge of the haversack body; bind it to the haversack and carrier by means of the haversack and pack binding straps; fold down the outer flap on the haversack and secure it by means of the free end of the middle haversack banding strap and the buckle provided on the underside of the flap; engage the snap hooks of the pack suspenders in the lower suspension rings. the equipment is now packed and assembled (fig. ). to adjust the equipment to the soldier.--put on the equipment, slipping the arms one at a time through the pack suspenders as through the sleeves of a coat; by means of the adjusting buckles on the belt suspenders, raise or lower the belt until it rests well down over the hip bones on the sides and below the pit of the abdomen in front; raise or lower it in rear until the adjusting strap lies smoothly across the small of the back; by means of the adjusting buckles on the pack suspenders, raise or lower the load on the back until the top of the haversack is on a level with the top of the shoulders, the pack suspenders, from their point of attachment to the haversack to the line of tangency with the shoulder, being horizontal. _the latter is absolutely essential to the proper adjustment of the load_. the position of the belt is the same whether filled or empty. to assemble the full equipment less the pack. (_with rations._) (fig. .) detach the carrier from, the haversack; place the rest of the equipment on the ground as heretofore described; place the four cartons of hard bread, the bacon can, the condiment can, and the toilet articles in one row in the middle of the haversack body, the toilet articles at the top, the bacon can at the bottom, top to the front, the row extending from top to bottom of the haversack; fold the inside flap over the row thus formed; fold the sides of the haversack up and over; pass the three haversack binding straps through the loops on the inside flap and secure by means of the buckles on the opposite side of the haversack; pass the lower haversack binding strap through the small buttonhole in the lower edge of the haversack, fold the outer flap of the haversack over the whole and secure by means of the buckle on its underside and the lower haversack binding strap. pass the haversack suspension rings through the contiguous buttonholes in the lower edge of the haversack and engage the snap hooks on the ends of the pack suspenders. if one haversack ration and one emergency ration are carried in lieu of two haversack rations, the haversack is packed in the manner described above, except that one emergency ration is substituted for two of the cartons of hard bread. if one emergency ration is carried in addition to the two haversack rations, it is packed on top of the layer. to assemble the full equipment less the pack. (_without rations._) detach the carrier from the haversack; place the rest of the equipment on the ground as heretofore described; fold up the inside flap of the haversack until its upper end is on a line with the top of the haversack body; fold the sides of the haversack over, pass the three haversack binding straps through the loops on the inside flap and secure by means of the buckles on the opposite side of the haversack; pass the lower haversack binding strap through the small buttonhole in the lower edge of the haversack; place the condiment and bacon can (the former inside the latter) and the toilet articles and socks in the bottom of the pouch thus formed; fold the outer flap of the haversack over the whole and secure by means of the buckle on its underside and the lower haversack binding strap. pass the haversack suspension rings through the contiguous buttonholes in the lower edge of the haversack and engage the snap hooks on the ends of the pack suspenders. to adjust the equipment to the soldier.--put on the equipment as prescribed for the full equipment. adjust the cartridge belt as prescribed for the full equipment. adjust the pack suspenders so that the top of the haversack is on a level with the top of the shoulders. to discard the pack without removing the equipment from the body. unsnap the pack suspenders from the suspension rings and snap them into the eyelets on top of the belt and in rear of the rear pockets of the right and left pocket sections; support the bottom of the pack with the left hand and with the right hand grasp the coupling strap at its middle and withdraw first one end, then the other; press down gently on the pack with both hands and remove it. when the pack has been removed, lace the coupling strap into the buttonholes along the upper edge of the carrier. adjust the pack suspenders. for illustration of how packs are made up and carried, see privates' manual, chapter . care of equipment. leather.-- . keep leather clean. use material furnished by ordnance department, or castile soap and water. . oil leather frequently to keep it pliable. use neatsfoot oil, viscol or harness soap. . dry in the shade; never in the sun or in artificial heat. always store in a cool, dry place without artificial heat. shoe polishes are almost always injurious. woolen clothes.--wash in tepid or cold water with a non-alkaline soap; do not wring it out; dry in the shade. mending.--always keep equipment ready for use. cloth equipment.--dry cleaning.--scrub with a stiff brush frequently. washing.--only under the direction of an officer. dissolve piece of q.m. soap (not yellow), in cups of water. one cup will clean the equipment of one man. apply with a brush and lather well. rub soap directly on persistent spots. wash off in cold water and dry in the shade. instructions on making packs. four methods: full equipment with rations. full equipment without rations. full equipment less pack, with rations. full equipment less pack, without rations. haversack, weight - / carrier cartridge belt, canteen, weight - / suspenders mess rations weight - / mess pouch gun clothing ------- adjusting cartridge belt.-- . fits loosely around waist. . resting on hips. . hole between buckles. insert ammunition: first, clip in front, points up, fastened with retaining strap, second clip points down. first aid pouch under th pocket, left. canteen under rear pocket, right. bayonet between rd and th pocket, left. (new bayonet scabbard fastens on haversack.) distribution of intrenching tools in the squads. no. rear of each odd-numbered squad ... bolo no. rear of each even-numbered squad ... hand axe. no. rear of each squad ... pick mattock. nos. , and front of each squad ... shovels no. rear of each squad ... wire cutter. chapter . physical training. only the carefully trained and conditioned man can make victory possible. for this reason the first and most important concern of a nation at war is the physical training of its soldiers. the setting-up exercises are the basis for all other activities and their disciplinary value is almost as great as their physical value. physical training.--each period should include exercises for all parts of the body. following the setting-up exercises the following should be given in the order named: marching, jumping, double timing, gymnastic contests, and concluding or restorative exercises. rifle exercises have for their purpose the development of "handiness" with the piece. they should be used moderately and with frequent rests, for they develop big muscles at the expense of agility--a muscle bound man cannot use his strength. bayonet training in addition to its military value calls into play every muscle of the body and makes for alertness, agility, quick perception, decision, aggressiveness and confidence. time schedule. a.m. (begins / hour p.m. (end / hour after breakfast): before retreat): . disciplinary exercises, . bayonet training, minutes. minutes. . starting positions, . games and contests, minute. minutes. . setting up exercises, alternating daily with: minutes. . bombing practice, . marching and marching minutes. exercises, to . conditioning exercises, minutes. minutes. . jumping, to minutes. double timing. . double timing, minutes vaulting and overcoming obstacles. . rifle practice, minutes. instructions must be: . an inspiration to the men. . well prepared themselves. . stripped for action. . an example to the men. . must make drill attractive. . never have men overdo. temper the exercises to the endurance of the weakest man. . accompany every exercise with the proper breathing. . see that the men are clothed according to the season. . have the drills short and snappy. . have frequent rests at the beginning--less frequent as work progresses. the platoon is the best unit for physical drills. formations.--when exercising in small squads, the men "fall in" in a single rank and, after having "counted off" by fours, threes or twos, as the instructor may direct, distance is taken at the command: take distance, march, squad halt. at "march" no. moves forward, being followed by the other numbers at intervals of four paces. halt is commanded when all have taken their distances. at the discretion of the instructor the distance may be any number of paces, the men being first cautioned to that effect. when distance is taken from the double rank, no. of the rear rank follows no. of the front rank, and he is in turn followed by the other numbers of the rear rank. if the instructor desires the files to cover, he commands: in file _cover_. nos. stand fast, the others moving to the right with the side step, until the nos. are covered. to return to the original formation, the instructor commands: assemble march. no. of the front rank stands fast and the other members move forward to their original places. _second formation._ to the right and left. take interval, march. _front rank:_ _rear rank:_ no. , steps right step. no. , steps right step. no. , steps right step. no. , stands fast. no. , stands fast. no. , steps left step. no. , steps left step. no. , steps left step. commands. kinds of commands, and how given.--there are two kinds, _preparatory_ and _executive_. the _preparatory command_ describes and specifies what is desired and the _executive command_ calls what has been described into action. the tone of the command should always be animated, distinct, and of a loudness proportioned to the number of men for whom it is intended. instructors should cultivate a proper command, as its value as a tributary to the success of any military drill cannot be overestimated. after an exercise has been described, its various movements or parts should be performed at _executive words_, which indicate not only the movement that is desired but the manner of the execution. thus: . trunk forward, . bend, . recover (or raise), here the word _bend_ is drawn to indicate moderately slow execution; the recovery being a little faster, the word _recover_ should be spoken to indicate it. the word recover should always be used to bring the men back to the original position. if it is desired to continue an exercise, the command exercise should be used and the cadence or rhythm should be indicated by words or numerals. if numerals are used, they should equal the number of movements composing the exercise. thus an exercise of two movements will be repeated at _one, two_; one of four movements will require four counts, etc. the numeral or word preceding the command halt should always be given with a rising inflection in order to prepare the men for the command halt. thus: . thrust arms forward, . exercise one, two, one, two, one, halt. if any movement of any exercise is to be performed with more energy than the others, the word or numeral corresponding to that movement should be emphasized. first lesson.--a. disciplinary exercises. . attention; . at ease; . rest; . facings. b. starting positions. (m.p.t., pp. to .) c. setting-up exercises (every exercise has two motions)[p]: . arms forward, . raise. swing arms downward and forward. . hands on hips, . place. rise on toes. ( .) . hands on hips, . place. bend head backward; same, forward. ( .) . hands on hips, . place. turn trunk right; same, left. ( .) . arms to thrust, . raise. half bend knees slowly. ( .) . hands on hips, . place. bend trunk forward. ( .) . arms to thrust, . raise. raise and lower shoulders. ( .) . hands on hips, . place. bend trunk sideward, right; same, left. ( .) . arms forward, . raise. stretch arms sideward. ( .) . hands on hips, . place. bend trunk backward. ( .) . hands on hips, . place. raise knees forward alternatingly. ( .) . breathing exercise: inhale, raising arms sideward; exhale, lowering arms. d. marching exercises: . marching in column in quick time and halting. . same, marking time, marching forward and halting. . same, marching on toes. [footnote p: note.--jumping and double-timing exercises and contests should not be included in the first week's work. bracketed numbers refer to pages in "manual of physical training," where similar exercises are illustrated and described.] second lesson.--a. disciplinary exercises. same as in first lesson. b. starting positions. c. setting-up exercises (every exercise has two motions): . arms forward, . raise. swing arms sideward. . hands on hips, . place. rise on toes. ( .) . hands on hips, . place. turn head right; same, left. ( .) . hands on shoulders, . place. turn trunk sideward, right; same, left. ( .) . hands on hips, . place. full bend knees, slowly. ( .) . hands on hips, . place. bend trunk forward. ( .) . arms to thrust, . raise. move shoulders forward and backward. ( .) . arms sideward, . raise. bend trunk sideward, right; same, left. ( .) . from attention. stretch arms forward and sideward. . hands on hips, . place. bend trunk backward. ( .) . hands on hips, . place. extend right and left leg forward. ( .) . breathing exercise: inhale, raising arms sideward and upward; exhale, lowering arms sideward. d. marching exercises: . marching in column in quick time, mark time, marching in quick time and halting. ( .) . marching on toes. ( .) . marching on toes and rocking. e. jumping exercises: . rise on toes and arms forward, raise. swing arms downward and bend knees; swing arms forward and extend knees, and recover attention. . jumping in place. ( .) f. double timing: . double timing, change to quick time and halting. ( .) g. concluding exercises: . breathing exercise, raising and lowering arms sideward. third lesson.--a disciplinary exercises, as in first lesson. b. starting positions. c. setting-up exercises: . arms forward, . raise. swing arms downward and sideward. ( motions.) . hands on hips, . place. rise on right and left toes, alternatingly. ( motions.) ( .) . hands on hips, . place. bend head forward and backward. ( motions.) ( .) . arms sideward, . raise. turn trunk right and left. ( motions.) ( .) . hands on hips, . place. rise on toes and full bend knees slowly. ( motions.) ( .) . fingers in rear of head, . place. bend trunk forward. ( motions.) ( .) . arms to thrust, . raise. move shoulders forward, upward, backward, and recover. ( motions.) . hands on shoulders, . place. bend trunk sideward, right, and left. ( motions.) ( .) . from attention. stretch arms sideward, upward, sideward, and recover. ( motions.) . hands on shoulders, . place. bend trunk backward. ( motions.) ( .) . hands on hips, place. extend right and left leg backward. ( motions.) . breathing exercise: inhale, raising arms forward, upward; and exhale, lowering arms sideward, down. d. marching exercises: . marching in quick time, raising knees. ( .) . thrusting arms sideward. e. jumping exercises: . standing broad jump. . three successive broad jumps. f. double timing: . double timing. ( .) . double timing, marking time in the double and forward. . double timing and halting from the double. g. gymnastic contests. two of these games should be included in each lesson. see pp. - . h. concluding exercises: . breathing exercise, as in . fourth lesson.--a. disciplinary exercises, as in first lesson. b. starting positions. c. setting-up exercises: . hands on shoulders, . place. extend arms forward; swing sideward, forward, and recover. ( motions.) . hands on hips, . place. rise on toes quickly. ( motions.) ( .) . hands on hips, . place. turn head right and left. ( motions.) ( .) . arms upward, . raise. turn trunk right and left. ( motions.) . hands on hips, . place. half bend knees, quickly. ( motions.) ( .) . arms sideward, . raise. bend trunk forward. ( motions.) . hands on shoulders, . place. move elbows forward, and stretch backward. ( motions.) ( .) . arms upward, . raise. bend trunk sideward, right and left. ( motions.) . from attention. stretch, arms forward, sideward, upward, sideward, forward, and recover. ( motions.) . arms sideward, . raise. bend trunk backward. ( motions.) . hands on hips, . place. extend legs sideward. ( motions.) . breathing exercise: . inhale, raising arms forward, upward; exhale, lowering arms sideward. d. marching exercises: . marching in quick time, raising knees, and rising on toes of other foot. . raising heels. . thrusting arms sideward. e. jumping exercises: . three successive standing broad jumps. . jumping in place, raising knees. f. double timing: . double timing. . raising heels. . double timing, sideward, crossing legs. g. gymnastic contests. h. concluding exercises: . swing arms forward, upward, relaxed. . breathing exercise, as in . fifth lesson.--a. disciplinary exercises. b. starting positions. c. setting-up exercises: . arms to thrust. thrust arms upward; swing downward; forward; upward, and recover. ( motions.) ( .) . hands in rear of head. rise on toes and rock. ( motions.) ( .) . hands on hips. bend head forward and backward. ( motions.) . hands on shoulders. turn trunk right and left, stretching arms sideward. ( motions.) ( .) . full bend knees. hands on ground between knees, squatting position, extend right and left leg backward, alternatingly. ( motions.) ( .) . hands on shoulders. bend trunk forward and stretch arms sideward. ( motions.) ( .) . from attention. curl shoulders forward and stretch backward. ( motions.) ( .) . hands on shoulders. bend trunk sideward, right and left, extending arms sideward. ( motions.) ( .) . from attention. flex forearms vertically; extend upward; flex and recover. ( motions.) ( .) . hands on shoulders. bend trunk backward, stretching arms sideward. ( motions.) ( .) . from attention. raise arms forward and extend leg forward; stretch arms sideward, extending leg backward; move arms and leg to first position and recover attention. ( motions.) ( .) . breathing exercise: raise arms sideward; upward; and lower laterally quickly. ( motions.) d. marching exercises: . march in quick time and swing extended leg forward, ankle high. . raising knee and hopping on other foot. . from arms forward. swing arms upward. e. jumping exercises: . standing hop, step and jump. . preliminary running broad jumps. . broad jump from a walking start of four paces. ( .) f. double timing. . double timing. . double timing sideward, crossing leg in front. . double timing, raising knees. g. gymnastic contests. h. concluding exercises: . bend trunk forward and backward, relaxed. . breathing exercise, as in . for further work for recruits and work to be given trained soldiers, see special regulation no. , "field physical training of the soldier." to prevent grumbling, keep men at work. idle men are the ones who growl. the french consider periods spent in the trenches as periods of rest; instead of letting the men go on pass when relieved, they restore discipline by close order drill. the physical benefit is less than half of physical exercises. there should be mental exertion in every exercise. but the most important part is the disciplinary benefit. the exercises must teach men to jump at commands, and by this means must make the organization a homogeneous mass. the principal thing in the position of attention is "chest lifted; and arched." there should be a stretch upward at the waist. the position should give the impression of a man as proud of himself as he can be. this is a bluff which works, not only by making a good first impression on others, but by causing the man himself to live up to it. insist on precision. especially when men are losing interest, don't let the work sag, but make it interesting by requiring concentration. at the beginning of each exercise, wake the men up by calling them to attention until they do it well, giving the facings, etc. commands.--there is a tone at which each voice carries best. each man must find it for himself. to make commands understood, enunciate carefully with lips and teeth. sound especially first and last letters of words. officer's posture adds to effect of command. his personality is impressed on his men largely by his voice. preparatory command should be vibrant and cheerful--not a harsh tone that grates on the men and antagonizes them. the command of execution must be short and sharp; drill can be made or marred by it. marching.--a cadence faster than a minute adds snap to marching, but snap can not be gained in proportion as the cadence is run up. snap is attained chiefly by the proper gait. soldiers should march, not with knees always slightly bent, but should straighten them smartly at the end of each step. this adds drive to the step, and gives the men confidence and a mob spirit of courage. after long drill at attention, this spirit can be carried into extended order work. marching exercises are useful and can be greatly varied. the command "exercise" should always be given as the left foot strikes the ground. "exercise" is a command of execution, and the first movement should be executed at once when it is given. the count "one" is given when this first position is reached. the command to stop all marching exercises is "quick time--march." in all exercises the instructor should cultivate the ability to pick mistakes. he can develop this until he can watch much larger groups than at first. voice culture. mastery of the voice is a necessity for every officer; for without it the giving of commands will soon make his throat look and feel like a piece of raw hamburg steak. quality of voice is more effective than quantity. brute force may produce a roar that has tremendous volume at a short distance; but the sound will not carry unless it is so placed that it gets the benefit of the resonance spaces in the head. if the tone is produced properly, so that it has the singing quality necessary in all right commands, quantity of tone will come of itself. this singing quality has nothing to do with music; it may be attained by a man who can hardly distinguish a bar of music from a bar of soap. it depends upon three principles, which are very simple in themselves but can not be applied without careful practise. the first covers proper use of the breath. air must be drawn into the lungs by expanding the diaphragm and abdomen, a process best seen in the natural breathing of a man who is lying on his back with all muscles relaxed. filling the upper part of the lungs by raising the chest puts the work on the comparatively small muscles between the ribs; but filling the base of the lungs by pulling downward brings into play the diaphragm, the largest muscle in the body. the sensation which accompanies proper deep control of the breath is as if the tone were not pushed out of the mouth, but drawn in and upwards. it is partly described by the phrases of singing teachers, "drawn tone" and "singing on the breath." the diaphragm must not only relieve the muscles between the ribs, but, still more important, the small muscles of the throat. the second great principle of voice production is that the throat must be perfectly relaxed. any tension there interferes with the free vibration which is essential for strong and resonant tone. this relaxation is most easily gained by drawing the chin in slightly, loosening the muscles under it. the base of the tongue can be relaxed by rolling the letter "r," even to the extent of making two syllables of such words as "gr-rand." talking with the teeth closed loosely will also help to ease incorrect, tension about the throat. if the throat is properly relaxed, there will be no sensation in it during the production of the voice. any sensation between the diaphragm and the resonance chambers of the head is a sign of wrong and harmful tension. the use of these resonance chambers is required by the third principle--that the tone must be reinforced by resonance in all the hollow spaces of the head. these are found in the nose, above the palate and even above the eyes. they have the same effect as the sounding board of a musical instrument, in giving quality to the tone. the best way to put this principle into practice is to learn the sensation of the clear and ringing tone which is produced by proper placing of the voice. exercises containing the letters "m" and "n" will give this effect. this does not mean that the sound should be nasal; it should be made in the nose, but not through it. another way to increase resonance is to think of crying the words rather than talking them. a slightly whining intonation or a sound like that of a laugh has more ring to it than an ordinary flat talking tone. these principles should not be neglected because they are simple. they can not be mastered without work, and unless they are mastered the voice will not be heard at a distance and will not last under the work of giving commands. further suggestions on the manner of giving commands will be found under physical training. chapter . use of modern arms. [illustration: plate # ] small arms firing. under this heading we have many phases of the training and exercises given to our armed forces. it has been found best to use simple every day methods to get the best results. there are two principal factors--the rifle and the pistol. the former only will be taken up now. the scheme is to make the soldier a good shot singly and collectively, in time of peace and in time of war. the course of instruction at this camp was arranged as follows: (a) nomenclature and care of the rifle. (b) sighting drills. (c) position and aiming drills. (d) deflection and aiming drills. (e) range practice. (f) estimating distance drill. (g) combat firing. (a) every man should be taught the names of the principal parts (see cut) of the rifle and how to clean and keep it clean. (b) if time permits, the sighting bar described on page , s.a.f.m. should be used. to illustrate the normal and peep sight make a drawing on a blackboard of page , s.a.f.m. using a sand bag or some convenient rest for the rifle. the instructor sights it on some object showing the normal and peep sight. using the above rests have a marker hold a disk against a large piece of paper towards which the rifle is pointed. there is a pin hole in the center of the bull's eye on the disk. the range should be about feet, and the bull's eye about inch in diameter. the marker moves it about until the man sighting tells him to "hold," at which time he marks the center with the point of a pencil. this is done three times, the three points are then connected. the triangle thus formed is then used by the instructor to show the man whether he took too much or too little front sight or whether he leaned to one side or the other while aiming. use for this exercise both the normal and peep sight. to show the effect of canting the piece use a sight setting of , yards, take out the bolt, aim the rifle while lying on a sand bag at a -inch bull's eye feet away. then look through the bore of the rifle and have the place where the target would be approximately hit by a bullet marked. cant the piece to the right and aim at the same bull's eye. then look through the bore of the rifle and mark the place where the bullet would approximately strike the target. the last mark would be lower and to the right of the first mark. it should be readily seen that in canting the piece to the right your sight is to the right of its original position--that is right windage. also by canting it to the right your elevation is lowered, that is, lessened. canting the piece to the left would make the bullet strike low and to the left. (c) preliminary command "position and aiming drill," command of execution "squad (platoon, or company) ready." at the command "ready" each man faces half right and carries the right foot about foot to the right, in such a position that will insure the greatest firmness and steadiness, raises the piece and drops it into the left hand at the balance, left thumb along the stock, muzzle at the height of the breast. if kneeling or sitting the position of the piece is similar--if kneeling the left forearm rests on the left thigh--if sitting the elbows are supported by the knees. if lying down the left hand steadies and supports the piece at the balance, the toe of the butt resting on the ground, the muzzle off the ground. from the position of ready the four exercises--position, aiming, trigger squeeze, and rapid fire--are given. these exercises given on pages - , s.a.f.m. should be carefully studied. do not leave it to the sergeant, etc., to do--give your company your own instruction when practicable, and in time of battle they will know you and you will know them, and there will grow up between you that mutual understanding which is necessary for the real success of any undertaking. do not forget to give these exercises in all positions of firing, namely, standing, sitting, kneeling, and prone. (d) a change of one point of windage at the yard range will change the point struck by the bullet of the next shot inches. if right windage is taken the bullet will strike to the right, if left windage is taken it will strike to the left: number of range. windage. direction. inches change. point right or left point right or left point right or left point right or left point right or left remember to take windage in the direction you want the bullet to strike. a change of yards in your sight setting raises or lowers the point struck by the bullet of the next shot at the yards range inch: number inches range. change in sight. change on target. yards yards yards yards yards yards yards (e) range practice. target details must be thoroughly familiar with paragraphs - , s.a.f.m. scorers must be familiar with the method of recording scores. the following schedule is the one that was followed at this camp: slow fire. =====+==========+=====+======+==========+====================+========== range| time |shots|target| position | sights |ammunition -----|----------|-----|------|----------|--------------------|---------- | no limit | | a | prone | leaf | guard | no limit | | a | kneeling | leaf | guard | no limit | | a | standing | leaf | guard | no limit | | a | prone | leaf, battles | service | no limit | | a | kneeling | leaf, battles | service | no limit | | a | prone | leaf, battles | service | no limit | | a | sitting | leaf, battles | service =====+==========+=====+======+==========+====================+========== rapid fire. =====+=========+=====+=======+========================+======+========== range| time |shots|target |position |sights|ammunition -----|---------|-----|-------|------------------------|------|---------- | min | | d | prone | leaf | service | min. | | h | prone | leaf | service | min. | | d | kneeling from standing | leaf | service | min. | | h | prone from standing | leaf | service | '- " | | d | prone from standing | leaf | service | '- " | | h | prone from standing | leaf | service =====+=========+=====+=======+========================+======+========== at each range with the rapid fire additional shots should be fired with the battle sight and with half the allotted time. (f) a course should be laid off in an open field. the base should be marked. at least natural objects whose distances are to be estimated should be placed so that they are clearly visible from the base. the objects should be men standing, kneeling or prone, and should be placed from to , yards from the base. each company should be conducted to the base and extended along it, backs towards the objects, in single rank. each man should have a pencil and paper. the objects whose distances are to be estimated are pointed out by the company commander and the men told to estimate and record their estimates. at the conclusion of the exercise, the company commander should read off the correct distances, and have each man figure his per cent of error. it is important that the men know the correct distances while the objects are still in view. for record, paragraph , s.a.f.m. should be followed. remember that there are four principal ways to estimate distances by: , it cannot be more than a certain distance, and it cannot be less than a certain distance--take the mean; , divide the distance into a certain number of familiar lengths; select a halfway point, estimate this and multiply by ; , estimate the distance along a parallel line, as a road having well defined objects; , take the mean of several estimates. (g) in combat the platoon is the fire unit. the fire of the company, battalion or regiment is nothing more than the combined fire of all the fire units. the enemy can be imaginary, outlined or represented. the exercise must be conducted under an assumed tactical situation. the commander must lead his men according to the assumptions made by the umpire. signals are used to indicate the enemy's actions, strength, etc. the situation should be simple, and after the exercise a critique should be held on the ground. combat practice with ball ammunition against disappearing targets, and at estimated ranges, gets excellent results. the officer conducting the exercise will prohibit the advance if it would be impossible were the enemy real. have every man play the game. a point to be remembered is that for battle sight the sight slide must be as far to the rear as it will go. if it is part way up the leaf, the drift correction cut in the slot upon which it moves will throw it to the left, and left windage will be taken. point blank range is yards. battle sight is set for this distance because this is the extreme range at which a bullet would strike a man kneeling between the rifle and the target. [illustration: plate # .] pistol. nomenclature and care.--the soldier is first taught the nomenclature of the parts of the pistol. ordinance pamphlet no. gives this information, (see cut of pistol.) manual for the pistol. . the pistol being in the holster: . raise, . pistol. at the command raise, unbutton the flap of the holster with the right hand and grasp the stock, back of hand outward. at the command pistol, draw the pistol from the holster, reverse it, muzzle up, the hand holding the stock with the thumb and last three fingers; forefinger outside of the guard; barrel to the rear, and inclined to the front at an angle of about thirty degrees; hand as high as the neck and six inches in front of the point of the right shoulder. this is the position of raise pistol, and it may be similarly taken from any position. . to withdraw magazine, pistol in any position: . withdraw. . magazine. at the command magazine, place pistol, barrel down, in left hand and clasp barrel in full grip of left hand, thumb clasped over barrel in front of trigger guard, butt of pistol up, barrel pointing to the left front and slightly downward. with tip of right forefinger press stud releasing magazine and then place tip of same finger under projection at front of magazine base. raise magazine about an inch then close thumb and second finger on sides of magazine, giving a secure grasp with which it can be withdrawn from socket, placed inside belt (in pocket of shirt or otherwise disposed of without throwing it away). right hand then grasps stock, back of hand to the left. . to open chamber, the pistol in any position: . open. . chamber. carry the pistol to the left hand (if not already there) barrel to the left, front end of slide grasped between the thumb and forefinger of left hand; right hand grasping stock, back of hand up; right thumb under slide stop. hold left hand steady and push forward with right hand till slide reaches end of stroke; engage slide stop, and come to raise pistol. should the pistol be cocked and locked, it will be unlocked so that the slide can move. . to close chamber, being at raise pistol, chamber open: . close. . chamber. at the command chamber, release slide top with right thumb and let hammer down gently. to let hammer down, pull downward with point of right thumb till hammer presses against grip safety and forces it home; then while continuing this pressure on hammer, pull trigger; and while continuing pull on trigger, let the hammer down. while letting hammer down, grasp stock firmly between the palm and last three fingers to prevent pistol rotating in hand. . to insert magazine, pistol being in any position, no magazine in socket: . insert. . magazine. lower pistol into left hand as in withdrawn magazine, grasp magazine with tip of right forefinger on projection at base of magazine, withdraw from pocket and insert in pistol. to make sure that magazine is home, strike base of magazine with palm of right hand. bring the pistol to the position of raise pistol. . to return pistol, being at raise pistol: . return. . pistol. lower the pistol and raise the flap of the holster with the right thumb; insert the pistol in the holster and push it down; button the flap with the right hand. if the pistol be loaded and cocked the command. . lock, . pistol must precede the command "return." . to load, having loaded magazine in pistol, pistol in any position, chamber empty: . load. . pistol. place pistol in left hand, barrel down, butt of pistol up, barrel pointing to left front and downward, slide grasped between thumb and forefinger. push forward with right hand until the slide is fully open, then release slide allowing it to move forward and load cartridge into chamber. come to raise pistol. if the last shot in the magazine has been fired, to reload; same command, but execute withdrawn magazine, insert magazine, close chamber. as soon as the pistol is loaded, it will be immediately locked by the commands. . lock. . pistol. should the command for locking pistol be inadvertently omitted it will be locked without command. . to unload pistol, being in any position, loaded: execute by the commands, withdraw magazine, open chamber, close chamber, insert magazine. . to inspect pistol, it being in the holster: . inspection. . pistol. execute, raise pistol. to inspect the pistol more minutely, add . withdraw. . magazine. . open. . chamber. to avoid accidents, individual men out of ranks, in barracks or camp will first withdraw magazine then open chamber whenever the pistol is removed from the holster for cleaning, for examination, or for any other purpose. accidental discharges will not occur if the above rule is always observed, and failure to observe it must be considered a military offense, whether or not accident results. . whenever men fall in ranks with the automatic pistol the officer or non-commissioned officer in charge will command: . raise, . pistol; . withdraw, . magazine; . open, . chamber; . close, . chamber. . insert, . magazine. . return, . pistol. when falling in the above commands are given after chamber of rifles have been opened and closed, and the order resumed--the rifle being held against the left wrist. the commander of any company or detachment thereof is responsible for giving the necessary commands to put the pistols in a safe condition. . the pistol with cartridge in chamber is habitually carried cocked and locked, whether in the hand or in the holster. the hammer will not be lowered while a cartridge is in the chamber. . in campaign, the pistol should habitually be carried with a magazine in the socket, loaded with seven ball cartridges, chamber empty, hammer down. the extra magazines should also be loaded with seven ball cartridges each. when action seems imminent, the pistol should be loaded by command. it may then be returned by command to the holster till the time for its use arrives. . recruits are first taught the motions of loading and firing without using cartridges. however, the automatic action and the effect of ball cartridges in operating the slide cannot be taught without firing ball cartridges. practice without cartridges is very necessary to acquire facility in the exact movements of the manual and in aiming, holding and trigger squeeze. to execute the movements without cartridges, first withdraw magazine, open chamber, and examine both pistols and magazines to assure that none contain ball cartridges. . all the movements in loading pistol should be practiced without looking at it. in order to do this successfully it is necessary to know exactly where the magazines are carried so the hand may find them without fumbling. also, since the projection at the front of the magazine base is on the same side as the bullets, and the magazine must be inserted in the socket with these to the front, the magazine should be carried in the pocket with the projection to the left and should be withdrawn from the pocket with the same grasp as is prescribed for withdrawn magazine. . this manual must be practiced with all the precision and exactness required for the manual for the rifle. accidents will be reduced to a minimum and familiarity with the pistol gained. position stand firmly on both feet, body perfectly balanced and erect and turned at such an angle as is most comfortable when the arm is extended toward the target; the feet far enough apart (about to inches) as to insure steadiness; weight of body borne equally upon both feet; right arm fully extended but not locked; left arm hanging naturally. the grip.--grasp the stock as high as possible with the thumb and last three fingers, the forefinger alongside the trigger guard, the thumb extended along the stock. the barrel hand and fore-arm should be as nearly in one line as possible when the weapon is pointed toward the target. the grasp should not be so tight as to cause tremors but should be firm enough to avoid losing grip. the lower the stock is grasped the greater will be the movement or jump of the muzzle caused by recoil. if the hand be placed so that the grasp is on one side of the stock, the recoil will cause a rotary movement of the weapon toward the opposite side. the releasing of the sear causes a slight movement of the muzzle, generally to the left. the position and pressure of the thumb along the stock overcomes much of this movement. to do uniform shooting the weapon must be held with exactly the same grip for each shot, not only must the hand grasp the stock at the same point for each shot, but the tension of the grip must be uniform. the trigger squeeze.--the trigger must be squeezed in the same manner as in rifle firing. the pressure of the forefinger on the trigger should be steadily increased and should be straight back, not sideways. the pressure should continue to that point beyond which the slightest movement will release the sear. then when the aim is true, the additional pressure is applied and the pistol fired. when the pistol is fired the greatest effort should be taken to hold the pistol to the mark as nearly as possible. this will be of great benefit in automatic firing. position and aiming drills.--the squad is formed with an interval of one pace between files. black pasters are used as aiming points. the pasters are ten paces distant from the squad. the instructor command, . raise, . pistol and cautions "position and aiming drill." the men take the position prescribed in paragraph . at the command, . squad, . fire, slowly extend the arm till it is nearly horizontal, the pistol directed at a point; about six inches below the bull's-eye. at the same time put the forefinger inside the trigger guard and gradually feel the trigger. inhale enough air to comfortably fill the lungs and gradually raise the piece until the line of sight is directed at the point of aim, _i.e._, just below the bull's-eye at six o'clock. while the sights are directed upon the mark, gradually increase the pressure on the trigger until it reaches that point where the slightest additional pressure will release the sear. then, when the aim is true, the additional pressure necessary to fire the piece is given so smoothly as not to derange the alignment of the sights. the weapon will be held on the mark for an instant after the hammer falls and the soldier will observe what effect, if any, the squeezing of the trigger has had on his aim. when the soldier has become proficient in taking the proper position the exercise is conducted "at will." quick fire.--being at the raise pistol, chamber and magazine empty, . quick fire exercise, . one. lower the forearm until it is nearly horizontal, pistol pointing at the target, . two. thrust the pistol forward to the position of aim, snapping the pistol just before the arm reaches its full extension. then look through sights to verify the pointing. . three. return to raise pistol and cock the pistol. in this exercise the soldier must keep his eyes fixed upon the mark. he should constantly practice pointing the pistol until he acquires the ability to direct it on the mark in the briefest interval of time and practically without the aid of the sights. in other words, the pistol in this exercise is accurately pointed instead of accurately aimed. in night firing pointing the pistol is the only method that can be used. after careful practice in this exercise it is surprising what good results can be obtained at night. this exercise should then be practiced from the position of the pistol in the holster instead of raise pistol. classes of fire: . slow fire.--as described above. target l or a or improvised target. . quick fire.--being at raise pistol, pistols locked, at the command "commence firing" fire and return to raise pistol after each shot following the principles of quick fire exercise. target e, five yards apart, one for each man firing. this firing should be done by the numbers as described in quick fire exercise. . automatic fire (target e).--being at raise pistol, pistols locked. at the command "commence firing" empty the magazine in seven seconds, keeping the arm extended. target e, yards apart, one for each man firing. . trench fire (target e).--two lines of targets. the first line is composed of f targets, yards apart, one figure for each man firing. the second line is composed of two e figures, one yard apart, for each man firing, placed in a trench immediately in rear of the figures of the first line. this gives for each firer a group of three figures, one placed on top at the near edge of the trench and the other two in the trench immediately in rear. in case a trench is not available the rifle pit can be used. a gutter, sunken road, embankment, or hedge can be used for this purpose so long as trench fire is simulated. [illustration: plate # . trench target course for the automatic pistol.] the firing line advances at a walk from yards takes up a double time yards from trench, fires one shot at the double time when within ten yards of the first target continues to the trench and fires the remaining six shots, automatic fire, at the two targets in the trench in rear of the first line target. score (target e, bobbing).--a score will be seven shots. targets will be marked after the men in the firing line have completed their scores. all loading and firing should be done by command. course: . slow fire.-- yards. minimum of one maximum of five scores. . quick fire.-- yards. minimum of one maximum of three scores. . automatic fire.-- yards. minimum of one maximum of three scores. . trench fire.--minimum of one maximum of three scores. bayonet training. a. the functions of bayonet training are: . to teach the correct use of the bayonet until it becomes instinctive. . to develop the fighting spirit. . to develop speed, accuracy, and coördination. b. general principles: . fencing, in modern combat, is out of the question. almost every fight will consist of but one or two motions. hence the class must be taught that the best defence is the quickest offensive. . every available means of offence, with hands and feet as well as with rifle and bayonet, is a part of bayonet training. . teamwork is essential. men must be taught, especially in the combat, to exercise, to seize every opportunity to act together. . personal control during combat, especially at night, will be nearly impossible. control should be practiced, therefore, in the form of clear instructions delivered to the men before assault, and fulfilled individually. . in every assault and combat exercise, the men must be taught never to leave an enemy alive, or who may be alive, behind them. c. technique of bayonet combat: . the _point_ is the main reliance. its use should be practiced in every possible situation, until a correct choice or combination of long point, short point, and jab, and the execution thereof, becomes a matter of instinct. . the point must always be directed at a definite target. the most vulnerable points of the body are: lower abdomen, base of the neck, small of the back (on either side of the spine), chest, and thighs. bony parts of the trunk must be avoided by accurate aim. . the use of the rifle as a club, swinging or striking, is valuable only: a. when the point is not available. b. in sudden encounters at close quarters, when a sharp butt swing to the crotch may catch an opponent unguarded. c. after parrying a swinging butt blow, when a butt strike to the jaw is often the quickest possible riposte. the use of butt swings overhead or sidewise to the head or neck, is to be avoided; they are slow, inaccurate, easily parried or side-stepped, and leave the whole body unguarded. after every butt blow a thrust must immediately follow, since no butt blow, of itself, is apt to be fatal. . the parries must be regarded and practiced chiefly as means of opening the opponent's guard; hence, a thrust must immediately follow each parry. . the foot movements shown in the old manual are useful only to promote quickness and steadiness. they should, therefore, be practiced in combination with the points and butt blows, and so combined can be executed in the oblique directions as well as at right angles. the left foot moves in the direction of the thrust. d. manual of the bayonet: there are only exercises to learn in the new bayonet drill: . _guard_.--point of the bayonet directed at the opponent's throat, the rifle held easily and naturally with both hands, barrel inclined slightly to the left, right hand at the height of the navel and grasping the small of the stock, left hand holding the rifle at a convenient position above the lower band, so that the left arm is slightly bent, making an angle of about degrees. the legs should be well separated and in an easy position. lean forward, on your toes, left knee slightly bent, right foot flat on the ground and turned to the right front. remember in this position to have your eye on your opponent, do not restrain your muscles, keep them taut, but flexible. . "_high port_."--the hands hold the rifle as in guard; the left wrist level with, and directly in front of the left shoulder; the right hand above the right groin and on level with the navel. remember that the barrel in this position is to the rear. this position is assumed on the advance without command. . "_long point_."--being in the position of "guard," grasp the rifle firmly, vigorously deliver the point to the full extent of the left arm, butt along side and close to the right forearm; body inclined forward; left knee well bent, right leg braced, and weight of the body pressed well forward with the fore part of the right foot, heel raised. the right hand gives the power to the point, while the left guides it. if a point is made in the oblique direction the left foot should move in that direction. this exercise is done in counts. at the point is made; at , the withdrawal; at , resume the guard. the withdrawal must be straight back, and not with the downward motion, until the right hand is well behind the hip. . _right (left) parry_.-- . straighten the left arm, without bending the wrist or twisting the rifle in the hand, and force the rifle forward far enough to the right (left) to ward off the opponent's weapon, . resume "guard." remember to keep your eyes on the weapon to be parried. . _short point_.-- . shift the left hand quickly toward the muzzle and draw the rifle back to the full extent of the right arm, butt either high or low as a low or high point is to be made. . deliver the point vigorously to the full extent of the left arm. . withdrawal. . resume the "guard." . _jab point_.-- . shift the left hand quickly toward the muzzle, draw the rifle back, and shift the right hand up the rifle and grasp it above the rear sight, at the same time bringing the rifle to an almost vertical position close to the body. bend the knees. . straighten the knees, jab the point of the bayonet upward into the throat or under the chin of the opponent--chiefly by a body movement. . withdrawal. . carry the rifle forward with the left hand, grasping the small of the stock with the right. . resume guard. remember in the first motion to have the hands at least inches apart. . _butt swing--butt strike_--out.-- . swing the butt up at the opponent's ribs, forearms, etc., using a full arm blow, bringing the rifle to a horizontal position over the left shoulder, butt to the front. . advance the rear foot, and dash the butt into the opponent's face. . advance the rear foot and at the same time slash the bayonet down on the opponent's head or neck. . resume the "guard." (the easiest guard to a swing at the crotch is simply to get the left knee in the opponent's right.) e. progressive exercises: . the class works in pairs with scabbards on bayonets. one man alternately in each pair signals; the other promptly executes the movement, at the target, designated by the signal. the following signals are suggested: the hand, placed against the body, indicates the target. long point--back of hand outward. short point--palm of hand outward. jab point--hand horizontal against chin, palm down. high port--fist against left breast. parry right (left)--hand waved to right (left). butt swing--fist against crotch. butt strike--fist against jaw. instead of signals, thrusting sticks are then used. these are strong wands having a padding of paper and burlap over one end and a rope ring tied to the other. points and butt swings are executed at the padding and rings, respectively, as these are presented. the man holding the stick must remember to stand to one side of the man with the bayonet. . as in first exercise.--one man thrusts with a stick: the other parries. . thrusts are practiced at dummies, first from a distance of five feet, then by advancing two paces or more. to simulate fighting conditions, a frame is then arranged in which dummies are slung on ropes passed over pullies, and so manipulated that as the man withdraws his bayonet from one dummy another swings at, him from a different direction. . as soon as proficiency has been gained in the above exercises, the assault practice is taken up. a. _a course is laid out as follows:_ ( ) a fire trench about yards long, well _revetted_. ( ) yards in front of the trench, smooth wire entanglements. ( ) yards further, another trench, parallel to the first, yards long, feet deep and feet wide. in this trench prone dummies are placed, one per yard. ( ) yards further, dummies, hung on frames, parallel to the trenches. ( ) yards further, a hurdle feet high and yards long, parallel to the trenches. ( ) yards further, a low trip wire, stretched parallel to the trenches. ( ) yards further, dummies, hung on frames, parallel to the trenches. ( ) yards further, a large trench, yards long, feet deep, feet wide, containing prone dummies, per yard. b. _procedure:_ each platoon, in turn, enters the first trench at skirmish intervals, bayonets fixed. on signal, all move out at a walk, guiding carefully in line on a leader previously designated. after passing each obstacle, the line is again carefully formed. on each of the swinging dummies one of the seven movements of the manual is used; a long or short point is used on each prone dummy. all go down into the last trench together, with a good loud yell, point of the bayonet level with the toe, and land on the dummies in the bottom, stabbing as they land. this course should be repeated several times at quick time, then at double time, and finally at a run. remember that in the advance the rifle is carried at high port. . combat exercises (to be used in conjunction with the assault practice): a. _equipment for each man:_ thrusting stick or other wooden rod with wooden ball or thick padding covering one end. (old rifles with spring-bayonets are even better.) plastron. baseball mask. pair of broadsword or single stick gloves. b. _procedure_: the class is formed in two lines of about equal numbers, facing each other, about fifty paces apart, with intervals in each line of about two paces. a leader is designated for each line. the instructor stands at one end of the space between; an assistant at the other end. on the instructor's whistle, the lines advance, guiding carefully on their leaders. when about ten paces apart, they charge, each seeking to break and roll up the opposing line. sticks are carried and used as rifles with bayonets fixed. any other use disqualifies. use of the butt is barred. one thrust on the plastron or mask, or two hits on the extremities, disables the recipient, who must promptly retire--or be retired. the combat continues until the second whistle, blown not more than seconds after contact; when they cease fighting promptly, separate, and form as before. c. _criticism:_ after each combat, the instructor will criticize the manner of advance and of fighting, especially the alignment kept in the advance and the team work in combat, and the advantage taken of opponents' mistakes. he counts the casualties and awards the decision. he must continually urge the men never to lag behind nor advance ahead of the line, never to allow large gaps to occur in the line, and always to seize the advantage given by opponents who disregard these principles. d. _the terrain for this exercise_ should be frequently varied. it may also be conducted at night, the opposing sides being clearly distinguished.[q] [footnote q: the last exercise was devised and perfected by m. jules leslabay, master of fencing, harvard r.o.t.c., . it is more completely described in his "manual of bayonet training."] machine guns. . properties of the machine guns are divided into three general classes: mode of action, fire, and inconspicuousness. (a) the mode of action.--the machine gun acting only by its fire can prepare an attack or repulse an offensive movement, but it does not conquer ground. the latter role is almost exclusively that of infantry which is fitted for crossing all obstacles. when it will suffice to act by fire, employ the machine gun in preference to infantry, preserving the latter for the combined action of movement and fire. by the employment of the machine gun economize infantry, reserving a more considerable portion of it for manoeuvre purposes. (b) fire.--machine gun fire produces a sheath, dense, deep but narrow. the increase of the width of the sweeping fire gives to the sheath a greater breadth, but when the density becomes insufficient, the effect produced is very weak. machine gun fire will have its maximum power upon an objective of narrow front and great depth. with the infantry fighting normally in thin lines the preceding conditions will generally only be realized when these lines are taken in the flank. "the fire of the machine gun parallel to the probable front of the enemy--a flanking fire--must therefore be the rule." the fire perpendicular to the front will be employed generally on certain necessary points of passage as, bridges, roads, defiles, cuts, roadways, communicating trenches, etc., where the enemy is generally forced to take a deep formation with a narrow front, or where he is in massed formation. (c) inconspicuousness.--by reason of its small strength the machine gun section can utilize the smallest cover, and can consequently hide from the enemy; the machine gun therefore, more than the infantry, has the chance to act by surprise. the opening of the fire by surprise will be the rule; the machine gun will avoid revealing itself upon objectives not worth the trouble. flank action and surprise are the two conditions to try for under all circumstances. . offensive reinforcement of a front momentarily stationary.--the machine guns assisted by small elements of infantry cover thoroughly the getting in hand of the main body, the machine guns presenting to the enemy a line of little vulnerability. the machine guns assist in securing the possession of the ground previously taken, and will permit time to prepare for the resumption of the forward movement. preparation of the attack--machine gun fire completes the preparation done by the artillery, either by acting on the personnel or by opening breaches in the accessary defenses. at times the machine guns alone may be charged with the preparation of the attack where it is necessary to act very quickly as in pursuit, exploitation of a success. whatever the situation, concentrate the machine gun fire on one or several points. machine guns cover the flanks of attacking troops. they follow the advance of these troops remaining on the flanks, so as to be able to fire instantly on all points from which an attack might come. machine guns will likewise be employed in intervals created intentionally or accidentally between units. it is here a powerful weapon which can rapidly be put into action by the commander. the personnel and material must be protected as far as possible from the effects of fire. . defensive.--it is here that the flanking fire is especially necessary. in the defensive preparation of a position the machine guns must be so placed that they will provide along the front several successive fire barriers. the machine guns must be ready at all times to stop by instantaneous fire all hostile attack. in order to have machine gun protection at all, it is absolutely necessary that they be protected from bombardment. this is best done by the following: place the machine guns under solid cover; make their emplacement invisible; echelon the machine guns in depth. the cover must be placed where it can be hidden from the sight of the enemy, such as a counter slope, a position where it is impossible to blend it, relief with an accentuated slope of the ground, woods, brush, etc. it is essential that the principal parts of the machine gun casemate be prepared in the rear. only in this manner will the work be done solidly and rapidly. while the machine gunners and helpers do the excavating, specialists in rear prepare the parts for assembling. the latter are then transported to the position and, the casemate is established, hiding the work with the greatest care from enemy observation. remember that it is of the utmost importance that the machine gun be invisible, so the firing emplacements must be made outside of the shelter, but near enough for the gun to be brought out instantly and put into action. all communicating trenches leading to the firing emplacement must be concealed. enough emplacements should be built to avoid firing daily from the emplacements especially reserved for cases of attack. do not place too many machine guns in the first line; in case of a violent bombardment they are sure to be destroyed. the object to be attained is to install the machine guns in conditions such that if the enemy penetrates our first line, by aid of his bombardment or asphyxiating gas, his infantry, as it advances, comes under the fire of machine guns echeloned previously in depth, under whose fire it must stop. it is not a matter of sweeping a wide sector, but of giving over certain strips of ground flanking fire which will cut down surely the enemy's waves when they push forward. the commander should, therefore, divide between the first line and the terrain in rear, the machine guns which he controls, organizing for each particular case a firing emplacement in accord with the surrounding ground and the purpose in view. general rules for installation. machine gunners must under no circumstances abandon their positions. they must, when necessary, allow themselves to be surrounded and defend themselves in their place to the end. in many cases the heroism and tenacity of a few machine gunners have permitted the rapid retaking of a lost position. to provide for this resistance to a finish, the machine gun emplacements must fulfil the following conditions: . be surrounded by a wire entanglement of irregular trace and as invisible as possible. . in the enclosure thus created having several firing emplacements, in case one or more becomes useless. . the personnel must have all the means for protection against gas and have in addition rations, water and abundant ammunition. employment of fire and instruction. the more grazing the fire of a machine gun the more effective it is. this causes the principal employment of the machine gun to be at distances where the trajectory is flattest, that is under or , yards. however, the effort to obtain a grazing fire must not exclude long distance fire. this latter will always be justified when directed upon important objectives, or necessary points of passage. for this fire to have some efficacy, it is necessary to calculate the range with the greatest precision. on the defensive indirect fire will be employed sometimes to annoy the supply, reliefs, etc. to give results, great quantities of ammunition will have to be expended. all of the officers and non-commissioned officers and as many men as possible must be capable of firing the machine gun, so that at the time of an attack no gun will remain idle for want of personnel. it is, moreover, essential to keep up the training of the personnel by having them fire at least twice a month, and, if possible, once a week. resume. machine guns must be utilized in the greatest measure in order to _economize the infantry._ seek to employ them always in a, _flank fire_. conceal them so as to get _surprise fire_. _echelon_ them and _shelter_ them so as to avoid their premature destruction. points before firing. . thoroughly overhaul the gun to see that no part is deficient, and that the mechanism works freely. . see that the barrel is clean and dry. . see that the barrel mouthpiece is tight. . see that small hole in gas regulator is to the rear. . thoroughly oil all working parts, especially the cam slot and exterior of the bolt, and the striker post and piston. . weigh and adjust the mainspring. . see that the mounting is firm. . examine the magazines and ammunition. . see that the spare parts and oil reserve are handy. points during firing . during a temporary cessation of fire, re-oil all working parts. . replace a partly emptied magazine with a full one. . examine the mounting to see that it is firm. . see that empty magazines are refilled without delay. points after firing. . unload. . oil the bore and chamber, piston rod and gas cylinder. . sort out live rounds from empty cases. . see that mainspring is eased. . thoroughly clean and oil the gun on returning to quarters. clean the bore daily for several days. it is of the greatest importance that the points before, during, and after firing, should be carefully attended to as otherwise the number of stoppages will be unnecessarily increased. nine out of ten stoppages are due to want of care. immediate action must become instinctive and automatic. grenade instruction. introduction.--war, as it is being fought on the western front, has brought to light many new weapons; but no other weapon that this struggle has brought forth exceeds the grenade in importance. it is not a new weapon, but its present importance is entirely new. its extensive use has grown out of conditions on the western front; conditions which have never been seen previous to this war. the fact that armies have taken to "digging themselves in" has necessitated the use of some other weapon than the rifle. the rifle with its flat trajectory is of little use against an enemy who is completely hidden from view and who can go on existing under ground. hence the reversion to the ancient grenade--but with all its modern improvements. the grenade has shown itself to be the weapon that can solve the problem of seeking out an enemy who is under ground; its trajectory is high and its fire is plunging, so that it can be thrown from a place of concealment and protection and into a place equally well concealed from ordinary view. the importance of the grenade may be judged from its extensive use by both the allies and the germans; and also by the formations now adopted by both british and french armies for the purpose of exploiting its use. in a british battalion the normal percentage of expert bombers is . in the french company per cent of the men are devoted to grenade work. a grenade has been defined as a slow moving, high trajectory missile containing high explosive and exploding by contact or time fuse. grenades may be divided roughly into two classes-- , hand grenades, and , rifle grenades, and each of these classes may be subdivided as regards means of explosion, into , time fuse, or , percussion grenades. among the time-fuse hand grenades may be mentioned the mills no. , stokes bomb, smoke bombs, fumite bombs, etc. the mills is easily the most important and has come to be the standard adopted by the allies. the percussion grenade is little used--the most important among those of this type is the so-called "mushroom," named from its shape. chief among the rifle grenades may be mentioned the mills no. , the hale no. and the newton no. . just as the mills hand grenade has become the standard, so has the mills rifle grenade attained that pre-eminence. a more detailed description of the various sorts of grenades cannot be attempted in this brief space; but one or two diagrams at the close of the chapter may serve to clarify the subject to some extent. any course in grenade training should have a three-fold purpose: st. to give the individual a practical knowledge of the working of the grenades in use. nd. to teach him how to throw them. rd. to make him acquainted with the general principles of organization and the execution of a grenade attack, either as a separate operation or as a part of a general attack. the time spent on any such course of training is a matter to be settled in the light of local considerations; but for purposes of preliminary training of a great number of men a period of two weeks is usually sufficient, with time allotted according to some such plan as this: ( ) separate half-hour sessions of practice in throwing from various positions and at the various targets; ( ) hours of study and a like amount of time spent in a conference for the purpose of clearing up matters that are hazy. in this brief time (only hours) the foundation may be laid for a more thorough training of the specialists later on. in any such course the use of dummy grenades should always precede the use of any live ones; and men should be taught caution above all other things. this is a point easily lost sight of when men are using only dummies; but it is well worth remembering, for obvious reasons. first: giving the individual a practical knowledge of the working of the grenades in use.--the differences in the construction and the uses of hand and rifle grenades should be brought out clearly. the various sorts of grenades should be explained and men should not forget the importance of knowing the grenades of the enemy as well as our own. this knowledge may one day prove of no little importance. as has already been stated, the mills no. is the standard among hand grenades of the allies. it conforms to the general description of hand grenades; _i.e._, it is an egg-shaped projectile, more or less hollow, and loaded with a charge of explosive. besides this it has an apparatus for setting off the bursting charge. it weighs pound ounces approximately, and ounces of this is high explosive. the shell being of serrated cast-iron, an explosion will scatter a sort of shrapnel over an area equal to three times the height. no more need be said of the effectiveness of such a weapon. among rifle grenades the mills is also the standard more or less, although the french make great use of a rifle grenade that fits over the muzzle of the rifle, fired by ball cartridge, in contrast to the mills no. , which has a rod running down the barrel of the rifle and which is propelled by the explosion of a blank cartridge. the maximum range of this grenade with a - / -inch stem is yards, the gun being fired at an angle of degrees. the newton improved (a rifle grenade which explodes on contact) has a range of yards; the hale no. also explodes on contact and has a range of - yards. [illustration: plate # ] second: instruction in throwing.--as previously stated the use of dummy grenades should precede the use of any live ones. due precautions should be taken at all times, even when working with dummy grenades, for a habit of carelessness is not to be tolerated with this sort of weapon. men should be instructed to throw from standing, kneeling and prone positions; although this last-named position is little used. distance is important but accuracy is essential. men should always be taught to throw at a definite target, even when throwing in the open during preliminary work. the men may work in groups, one group throwing and the other returning. this method keeps all hands occupied and furnishes a medium for a little competition, which is a very helpful thing in training of this sort. a manual of the following sort may be of use in acquiring the proper sort of throw. . pick up the grenade with the left hand. . prepare to throw--face to the right and transfer the grenade to the right hand. . take aim--left hand and arm extended up and straight toward the target, right hand and arm behind the thrower in the same plane as the left. . withdraw pin with left hand. . throw--use a straight overhead motion and do not bend the arm at the elbow. it is not a baseball throw. the tendency for most of us americans is to follow a perfectly natural habit--try to use the baseball throw. this is to be discouraged for several reasons, the chief one being that the grenade weighs about a pound and a half, whereas our baseball weighs only a third of this amount. then, too, it often happens in the trenches that a grenade duel will last for hours. under such circumstances the last grenade may decide the issue and endurance will be a mighty telling factor. hence, the insistence upon the overhead throw. the preliminary throwing should take place in the open but always with a definite target, an outline of a section of trench being the best sort of target. another excellent idea is to have a target arranged according to the diagram shown herewith and to keep score. this procedure will also add incentive for competition and will produce results. after men have thrown in the open for a sufficient period, they should proceed to the next stage: this is the stage of throwing in a cage or from behind and over obstacles. there are three distinct phases of this feature of the training: ( .) the thrower sees the target but must throw over an obstacle. ( .) the target is invisible; the thrower is aided by an observer and a periscope; the observer notes the fall of the grenades and gives directions as follows--"so many yards right or left" or "shorten or lengthen so many yards." ( .) actual throwing in trenches. this stage immediately precedes that of "working up a trench." third: instruction in grenade organization.--men should be given a certain amount of theoretical instruction as to the composition of the armies now on the western front; this in order that they may see the part that grenadiers and bombers are playing in the struggle. they should be shown the organization of the british infantry and how the first section of each platoon is composed exclusively of bombers and--rifle grenadiers; they should also be taught how the bombers and grenadiers are concentrated in the french organization. the typical bombing squad consists of or men and a leader who take positions as follows: and , bayonet men; , first thrower; , first carrier; , leader; , rifle bomber; , second thrower; , second carrier; , rifle bomber. one of these bayonet men may be reserved to act as a sniper. the leader acts as an observer and directs the work of the bombers. the rifle bombers outrange the hostile bombers and also afford protection on the flanks. every man must be taught his job and must be thoroughly instructed in the work of the squad as a whole in order that each man may be able to fill any position and that there may be perfect teamwork. [illustration: plate # ] points to remember. . men should always have a definite target for their throwing--an outline of a trench is usually to be preferred. . caution in handling grenades should be made a habit. . accuracy is essential. . training should be progressive, both for men and organizations. . keep up competition among the men; rivalry will increase practice and men will throw grenades for recreation. this will get results. let two men throw at each other. a good shot will make the other man move. . insist upon the straight overhead throw. it is less tiresome and when developed properly will give equal accuracy with any other method. . teamwork in a bombing squad is essential. . under new methods of warfare every infantryman is a bomber; but specialists must be trained. . officer must be a real leader and the best fighter in his platoon. . qualification tests should be arranged and the better qualified men taken for special training in this art. chapter . map sketching. map sketching is an important factor in trench warfare to-day as it is in a war of movement. a fairly accurate map will indicate more than many words and in much less time. time is the great factor in war. instruction must also be rapid. here are ten lessons which would occupy a week if taken morning and afternoon. the aim of the instruction as in company rifle shooting is to train many men to do a satisfactory job, not to make a few finished topographers. neatness, accuracy and initiative are cardinal points. for the instructor, reference should be made to _grieves'_ "_military sketching and map reading_", nd edition, if he desires to supplement any points given here. lesson . (class room--four hours.) _problem--map reading._ study the conventional signs found in the "manual for non-commissioned officers and privates of infantry of the army of the u.s.," , page , or in grieves, pages - . these conventional signs are not universal and must be used only as indications of the general practice. in map sketching in the field few conventional signs are used, and the items of importance are written on the map, such as woods, cultivated, hedge, swamp, etc. taking up map scales.--there are three ways of indicating the relation between the actual distance on the ground and the space the same distance occupies on the map: . the graphic scale is a straight line divided into units, as miles, yards, feet or meters, which represents the actual ground distance. thus if " = mile the line would be six inches long and marked at one end and mile at the other, three inches being marked / mile, etc. it is important to always have this graphic scale on a map so that if the paper gets wet or is stretched from its original size the scale will change in the same proportion. . a statement in words or figures, e.g., inches equal one mile, meaning that inches measured anywhere on the map represent mile on the actual ground. . the representative fraction (generally known abbreviated as r.f.) having a number above the line that shows the unit length on the map and below the line the number of units which are in the corresponding actual ground distance. for example, if " = mile, then the r.f. is: " (map distance) ----------------------------------- , " ( mile--ground distance) if " = mile the r.f. is: " (map distance) ----------------------------------- or ------- , " ( mile--ground distance) if " = mile: " -------- or ------- " if " = mile: " --------- or ------ " in reading a map one must know the scale and also where the north is. this is always indicated by an arrow pointing either to the magnetic north or the true north. if to the magnetic north the needle will have but one barb away from the true north. the angle between the magnetic and the true north is the declination. placing the map in proper relation to the ground so that points of the compass coincide on map and ground is called _orienting the map_. in map work there is one vital point to remember; practically all the ground surface is in its present form as a result of water action . look for the water courses, that is the drainage system. it will give the general slope of the land. . look for the high points between the water courses, remembering that there is always a valley then a hill then a valley again continued in succession. . finally locate towns, railroads, main highways and work down to the minor details. in measuring a map to get the actual distances on the ground, copy the graphic scale on any piece of paper and apply this directly or if your distances exceed your scale use the edge of a piece of paper and then apply it to the graphical scale on the map. lesson . (field work--five hours.) _problem--stride scale map making_. producing a map from the actual ground requires certain instruments. the second lesson takes up the preparation of the stride scale on the alidade and the different kinds of maps, made in military sketching. the alidade is a triangular ruler with one or more working scales on it beside other measurements. the _working scale_ is, for infantry, the stride or the space of ground covered from left foot to left foot again in walking, reduced to the proper map distance. this varies with individuals of course. any scale of units, however, can be used as, horse trot, telegraph poles, etc. the working scale for each man is made by having him step off a measured course, say yards. the ground should not be too even as a general average is needed, moreover the pace must be the natural gait of the individual under ordinary circumstances. let him count the course three times then average the three results for the final estimate. now to convert this into a working scale for the alidade made on a scale of six inches to the mile; take the case of a man who takes strides in yards: yards = , inches , ÷ = , or his stride in inches then strides = mile or " on the scale. it is better to have a scale of , strides which is easily done by the proportion: , sts. : sts. : : x : x = . now draw a line . inches long and a diagonal line from it; divide this diagonal line into equal parts for each paces at any convenient scale and draw a line from the end of the tenth part to the end of the . inches line; draw lines parallel to this line from each of the divisions. the . " line is then divided into equal parts; each of these parts may be divided in the same manner into tenths. your scale is ready to be pasted or transferred to the alidade and each . . inches on the map will equal , of your strides on the ground, or about - / miles ( , yards). there are two general classes of sketches: . road sketch.--a traverse (passing over) made along a definite rout showing all features of military importance for a distance of or yards on each side of the road. a road sketch is always made on a scale of inches to mile. . area sketch.--a map of a definite locality. there are kinds of area sketches according to opportunity for observation: (a) position sketch--when access may be had to the whole area. (b) outpost sketch--where part of the ground must be mapped without passing over it. this form is applicable particularly to trench warfare. intersection and resection are used to locate points within the enemy's lines. (c) place sketch--when sketch must be made from one point, as when the proximity of the enemy would prevent any movement; as from trench observation stations, etc.; also an elaboration of the _landscape_ or _horizon_ sketch which is used everywhere in the trenches today. from one point an actual outline of the opposite trench and background is made in perspective, reference points on the horizon being marked on the edge of a pad at arm's length. these marks are then prolonged on the paper and the horizon is sketched. in like manner the middle distance and the foreground come under observation and are put on in one below the other. time must be allowed the men to make their stride scales and to paste or transfer them to their alidades. [illustration: plate # ] lesson . (field work--five hours.) the problem is to make a position sketch about one mile square closing the traverse. first considering the sketch board, compass, pencils, etc.; next the orienting, sighting and pacing; finally the uses of intersection and resection and in making allowance for error. the sketch board should be about to inches square, being used with or without a tripod. a cheap camera tripod is excellent. the board should have a compass attached so that it will remain in the same relative position on the board. if iron thumb tacks are used avoid getting them too near the compass. a hard pencil must be used to obtain good results. the paper must be smooth and where possible covered with another sheet fastened on but one side which will readily fold back when one desires to work on the sketch. by always placing the board so that the compass reads north it will be oriented correctly. care must be used when near electric wires or masses of metal as automobiles, railroad tracks, etc., which will attract the needle from its true azimuth (n. and s. direction) and thus throw off the whole map. in such cases it is far better to back sight and use the compass only at intervals to verify the sights. this brings up the matter of sighting. it is important to make long shots thus reducing the amount of individual error. in taking a sighting point make sure it can be recognized when reached and make sure to look at the reverse side in order to recognize it in case of back sighting if necessary. always carry several large-headed pins using one at your present station and resting the side of the alidade against it, swinging the other end for sighting. after sighting and lining the sight on your sketch, step off evenly to pace the distance. time is always a factor in military mapping and where possible make mental notes as you go along as to where roads or other important features are located, so that you can place them in their proper place on the map when you have reached the next station. it is well always to set a good pace for here time can be readily saved. making an _intersection_ is very simple. for as the sketcher moves along he ties his map together by sighting at any prominent object near his area, running these lines very lightly and only where he assumes the points to lie on his map. an abbreviation on the line or a number referring to a list off to one side will answer to recall the object. at any other station where the same point can be seen a similar line is drawn and where the two lines cross will be the location of the object. in the case of three lines not crossing at the same point take the middle of the triangle so formed. _resection_ is just the reverse of this process. the mapper wants to know where he is located on the map. if he is properly oriented and can aim at two points on the ground which he has located on the map, he places a pin at one of these locations on the map and aims with the alidade at the object on the ground drawing a line towards himself; this is repeated with the other known point and where the two lines cross on the map will be the point he is standing at. in intersection the greatest accuracy is obtained by running the rays so as to meet as nearly as possible at right angles. in running a traverse the sketcher must expect to find some error at his closing point. this error must be distributed over the whole traverse so as not to have all the error concentrated at one point. lesson . (field work--four hours.) problem.--make a simple sketch, containing topographical details using the traverse made during the preceding lesson. use of conventional signs should be emphasized and the appreciation of features of military importance impressed. a tendency is to put in details to a point of confusion. judgment must be developed to choose telling points. a sharp pencil is always needed in sketching; in putting in the topographical details special attention must be given to the pencil. keep the point sharp and make clear, distinct signs. lesson . (class room--four hours.) problem.--contours, the vertical interval, use of the slope board, map distance, visibility and profiles. a contour is an imaginary line on the surface of the earth all points of which have the same elevation from a base or datum level, sea level usually being this base. slice an apple into pieces / -inch thick; where the cuts come may represent the contour lines. take these individual slices, beginning at the bottom and outline them on a sheet of paper with a pencil (having run a nail through the apple first to keep each piece in place). the resulting circles will represent the apple's outline at / -inch intervals. contours are always at equal elevations from each other, and the vertical interval (known by the abbreviation v.i.) is the measure between successive contour lines. in military maps the v.i. is always the same for each map scale: inch to the mile, the v.i. is feet. inch to the mile, the v.i. is feet. inch to the mile, the v.i. is feet. inch to the mile, the v.i. is feet. note that the v.i. changes in proportion to the scale, a map on a inch to the mile scale is times as large as one on a scale of inch to the mile, while the v.i. is / as great, hence the former shows times as many contours as the latter. map distance means the horizontal distance between two contour lines on a map and indicates a certain degree of slope. as the scale increases the v.i. decreases in proportion and the m.d. therefore remains the same for the same degree of slope whatever the scale of the map. by computation we find that a one degree slope rises one foot for every . feet horizontal distance, so a one degree slope would have a foot rise in , feet horizontal distance, this distance equals . of an inch on the map if the scale is " to mile. the term "map distance" is also loosely used to denote distance between points as measured on the map. care should be taken to distinguish between these two meanings. distances between contours, scale " to mile: / ° slope = . ", ° slope =. ", ° slope =. ", ° slope =. ". these distances are already on the alidade and if you get a slope of ° with the slope board and have the distance from your station on the map to the point of aim either by pacing, intersection or resection, apply the m.d. scale as many times as it will go. this will give the number of contour lines crossing the traverse and the difference in elevation. the spacing of the contours may not be even between your station and the point of aim in which case the position of the contours must be estimated by eye. if your elevation above the datum or sea level is unknown at the start assume any elevation which is great enough to put the datum lower than the lowest spot of the area to be sketched. the sketching board is easily made to serve as a slope board in this manner. hang a plumb bob about an inch below the center of a straight edge of the board while pointing at the horizon, using the back of the board. mark a point . " directly below and draw a semicircle through it with the same radius. now mark the point below the center zero and from it divide the arc using chords one tenth of an inch long. this will give a scale reading in degrees. by sighting along the top of the board at some object at the height of the eye from the ground the degree of slope is shown by the plumb bob on the scale below. care must be exercised to prevent the wind from disturbing the reading. a protractor may be used in the same manner by sighting along the top and using a plumb bob to record the angle. in reading maps it is important to know whether points are visible from each other due to intervening ridges or other topographical features. this can be told by laying off accurately the distance on the map between the points in question and using as datum the lowest of the points, then draw vertical lines, from the higher points, making them in proportion to their elevation with any convenient scale. draw a line between the first and last points and, if the intervening vertical cuts this line the second point is not visible from the first. take for example, two points a and b, , yards apart, by the map, a feet and b feet above sea level, the intervening point c is feet above sea level and yards from b. as b is the lowest we will call its elevation zero or at datum, then elevation of a is feet and c feet. [illustration: plate # ] another method of deciding visibility is by proportion. measure the distance between the three points a, b, and c, and obtain their elevations above the datum (lowest of the ) and using similar triangles. take the same case as above, letting x represent the point above which the view is clear at , yards from point a, the line of sight passes through this point. (a--b) : (b--c) : : (elev. a) : x solving, x = . now, since the ground at point c is feet above the base and the line of sight passes within . feet of the base at this place, an observer at a is unable to see b. the matter of profiling is very simple. merely mark where the contours cut the edge of a piece of co-ordinate paper and extend the proper elevations, then pass a line through these points, remembering that the surface of the ground has a natural curve. lesson . (field work--five hours.) problem.--by use of the slope scale on the sketch board and the contour interval scale on the alidade, each man will secure vertical data on the flat sketch made in the fourth lesson. certain critical elevations will be determined and marked with red flags before hand. the elevations of two points on the ground will be furnished, one as the datum and the other as a check. draw in contours of this sketch with the help of drainage lines and elevations already secured. the chief points to be considered are to take slopes from points established on the sketch; to take several sights and average the angle of slope; to properly lay off the elevation by using the slope scale on the alidade; and finally to put in the contours along these lines of sight _on the spot_ thus allowing for difference in topography between the point of sight and the station from which the elevation is taken. careful note must be made of the drainage systems as these are the keynotes to the sketch and finally the contours are connected together, keeping in mind always that no contour stops unless it makes a closed curve or goes off the map. remember also that contours make fingers pointing up stream and are blunt around hill sides. contours cross streams to opposite points and break at roads, continuing on the other side. uniform slopes have equally-spaced contours. do not try to measure every slope, two intersecting elevation sights on a hill will check the height. put the intervening contours in by eye. lesson . (classroom--four hours.) problem.--completing the map sketch previously made and making a landscape sketch. it is important to complete a map and no matter how good it is, if certain points are omitted, the value of the work is very much decreased. the sketcher must clear the sketch of all unnecessary lines and notes and make his lettering clear on the map. be sure that the following items are on the sketch before it is turned in. . location of the ground shown. . line of magnetic north shown by an arrow, and if declination is known, the true north also. . graphic scale and representative fraction--r.f. . vertical interval--v.i. . sketcher's name and organization to which he belongs. . date. a landscape sketch is a place sketched with details shown in perspective. the horizon is always of military importance and should be shown as well as intervening crests, woods, houses, etc. landscape sketching in trench warfare is a necessary accomplishment of the observer. the beginner will at first be confused by a mass of details, but he must note only the outline of the features sketched. first draw the sky line and crests, then fill in the other details with fewest lines possible. unnecessary shading tends to detract from the clearness of the sketch. there will be great difficulty in getting the perspective, note the size of objects, the further away they are the smaller they seem. make them so. in making the sketch, hold the pad in front with one eye closed, the upper edge of the pad horizontal; a string inches long is tied to the pad and held between the teeth to insure the same distance from the eye each time. moreover, if it is desired to locate objects by deflection of an angle from a reference point, this can be done by using _mils_. one mil is - of a circle. at inches a half-inch interval subtends mils. [illustration: plate # ] the paper is oriented by bringing the sector desired along the upper edge of the pad. the points desired are then in proper positions, both horizontally and vertically. place a mark at the upper edge for points desired. the sky line should be located first. now carry these lines down, having drawn three horizontal lines about / inch apart, beginning with the highest point on the top line. marks locating the other features are likewise transposed in vertical and horizontal portions. now draw sky line connecting transposed marks, then such other points as crests, trenches, houses, etc. after practice most other features can be drawn in without reorienting, the sky line having been drawn. the vertical elevation should be slightly exaggerated. objects in the background should be drawn in lightly while nearby features are indicated by _heavy lines_. avoid details, draw only silhouette, shade only in showing woods. lesson . (field work--five hours.) problem.--make complete area sketch including contours, with no data furnished other than the initial elevation. before commencing the work summarize the important points involved. . if possible select a base line. . locate as many points by intersection as possible. . make traverse by road, check locations by resection. . at good observation points observe and complete the sketch as far as possible. at each station keep the following points in view: . back sight on previous station. . select new sighting point ahead. . determine elevation by slope board. . put in contours where possible noting the drainage and critical points of the general slope and the terrain. . put in details along traverse just made of all topographical features of military importance. . determine your present elevation. . make as many shots for intersection as you can and mark them. . look for possible resection shots. lessons and . (field work--nine hours.) problem.--make a road sketch of about miles with scale of inches to the mile, v.i. feet. this should include details of military importance to a distance of yards on either side of the road. keep in mind these points: . start carefully and give attention to every part of the map. . keep the board properly oriented. . watch the water drainage systems. . put down all necessary details at each _setup_. . note high hills and towns not on immediate route, condition of roads, fences, cultivation, hedges, cuts and fills, bridges (kind and length), railroads, telegraph and telephone lines, schools, churches, etc., notice particularly woods and points of concealment for hostile troops. do the work at each station for elevation, contours and the noting of necessary details so that the sketch will be complete as you go along. make certain that the title of the sketch, scale, orientation, etc., are all clearly indicated, for a road map may have to be completed by another or may be called for suddenly when it will be useless without these details. remember there are but two things absolutely essential to a good road sketch; a good traverse and the location of the drainage system in its relation to this traverse. with this control approximate contours can be drawn by anyone having a knowledge of the principles of topography. never plot unimportant details. prominent buildings and farm houses are of value for locating oneself. woods and orchards are shown for tactical reasons but no one can expect to show every fence, ditch or bit of cover that might hide a patrol. map reading. (gettysburg " map--hunterstown sheet.) plattsburg barracks, n.y., sept. , : . what is the shortest distance by road from biglersville to texas? . describe the road between texas and table rock. . is it a cut or a fill along the railroad about / mile east of granite hill station? . what is meant by on chestnut hill? . can a man on the summit of hill (about one mile southwest of plainview) be seen from the town of plainview? . point out two fords on the conewago river. . where is the highest point on the road from plainview to heidlersburg? . describe the fences along the road from texas to table rock station. . is hill s.w. from d. wert visible from henderson meeting house? . of what material is the bridge at bridge school house constructed? harvard college: . can a sentinel standing at see road fork (about , yards south)? . an enemy patrol is marching north on the - road, and has crossed the stream ( yards north of .) can this patrol see the red outguard at from any point between stream and cross roads ? . can the sentinel at see the road fork ( , yards southwest from )? . can the sentinel at see the cross roads (about , yards southeast)? assuming the height of a man as ' " above the ground and trees and buildings as ' ". . is the ground at road fork near d. wirt visible to a patrol on hill ? if not what is the obstructing point? turn in profile, using cross section paper. . disregarding trees, is a man standing on bridge near bridge s.h. visible from hill ? solve by any method desired indicating the method. . make a profile from location of the letter "u" of chestnut hill near center mills to hill , - / miles to the south. . is the location of the letter "b" of beatrich visible from "u" of chestnut hill? if not what obstructs? . can a man on hill see a man at cross roads in hunterstown (disregard trees)? . to a man standing at the point where contour crosses the road just south of , where does the roadbed first become invisible? . when the point arrives at hill can it see the road fork to the northwest? . when the flank patrol reaches benders church cross roads can it see an enemy patrol at the house midway on the road - one mile to the northeast? . looking north along the center mills road from hill , where does the road first become invisible? . what does / mean? . what direction is the general drainage system on this sheet? chapter . helpful references to the articles of war. (extracted from m.c.m. and guide to the articles of war--waumbaugh's lectures.) military law is the body of rules that governs members of the army. military law is based upon the articles of war approved by congress, august , , effective march , . this body of rules defines: ( ) punishable offenses of members of the army. ( ) the method of determining guilt. ( ) punishment. the present articles of war are revisions of those from the revolution. article . definitions: ( ) the word "officer" shall be construed to refer to a commissioned officer (and no one else). ( ) the word "soldier" to include non-commissioned officer or any other enlisted man. article . persons subject to military law: ( ) all officers and soldiers of the regular army. ( ) all volunteers in the service of the u.s. ( ) all other persons lawfully called, drafted or ordered into such service. ( ) west point cadets. ( ) officers and soldiers of the marine corps when detached for service with the army, by order of the president. ( ) all retainers to the camp, or accompanying or serving with the army in time of war, both within and without territorial jurisdiction of u.s. ( ) all persons under sentence by court-martial. articles - . courts martial classified: (a) general courts martial. appointed by ( ) president, ( ) commanding officer of department or territorial division. ( ) commanding officer of separate army division brigade. ( ) commanding officer of district or force empowered by president. jurisdiction. over all persons subject to military law as regards all offenses punishable by military law. sentence. everything. (b) special courts martials ( to officers inclusive). appointed by ( ) commanding officer of district, garrison, fort or camp. ( ) commanding officer of brigade, detached battalion. jurisdiction. over any person subject to military law (except an officer), and for any crime not capital. (only soldiers excluding those having certificate of eligibility for promotion.) sentence. ( ) no power to adjudge dishonorable discharge. ( ) no confinement in excess of six ( ) months. ( ) no forfeiture of pay in excess of six ( ) months. (c) summary courts martial (one ( ) officer). appointed by ( ) commanding officer of garrison, fort, camp, etc. ( ) commanding officer of regiment, detached battalion, etc. (n.b.) when but one ( ) officer is present with command he shall be the summary court martial. jurisdiction. ( ) only privates holding no certificate of eligibility for promotion--and ( ) for crimes not capital. sentence. ( ) confinement not over months. ( ) no dishonorable discharge. ( ) no punishment over one ( ) month without higher authority. method of entering a charge against a man: example: charge: violation of the ---- article of war. specification: in that (rank, name, organization) did at (place) on or about (date) etc. (brief description of offence committed). signed (name) (rank and branch of service) in cases where there are more than one charge the number of each a.w. is put down in the charge. a description of each offence is put down separately under specification. note that double lines are drawn under charge, single line under specification. general remarks: the three ( ) courts martial are alike in the following: (a) composed only of officers of army or marine corps on detached service with the army by order of the president. (b) pass upon both law and fact. (c) criminal courts only. (d) unable to promulgate any finding that does not require approval of appointing authority. the three ( ) courts martial differ in the following: (a) number of members. (b) appointing authority. (c) punishments. article . order of voting: members in general or special courts martial shall vote from junior to senior. article . limitations upon prosecutions: military offences fall into three ( ) groups: ( ) war desertion, mutiny, murder. have no limitations. ( ) burglary, etc. (a w. ) and frauds against government (a.w. ). prosecution limited to years. ( ) all other offences. years. in some cases the statute of limitations is suspended (a.w. ), especially in cases of absence from the united states. * * * * * the following articles of war are the important ones for officers to be acquainted with in the ordinary course of his duties: article . fraudulent enlistment: punishment: court martial. "any person procuring himself to be enlisted by means of willful misrepresentation or concealment as to his qualifications for enlistment and shall receive pay or allowance," ... this offense requires two ( ) steps: ( ) misrepresentation or concealment. ( ) receiving pay or allowances. article . desertion: punishment: (wartime) death or court martial. (peacetime) court martial. "any person--who deserts or attempts to desert in time of war ... death or such other punishment as the court martial may direct ... any other time any punishment except death." essential features are: ( ) an intent not to return. ( ) an overt act of separation from duty. drunkenness tends to show absence of the intent. minority is no defense. enlistment while in desertion does not remove the charge of desertion. article . absence without leave: punishment: court martial. "any person who fails to repair at the fixed time to duty, or goes from same without leave of absence, or absents himself from his command, guard, quarters, station or camp without proper leave...." does not require to prove intent, yet persons ignorant of military law, drunk or victims of mistake are dealt with gently. article . disrespect toward president, vice-president, congress, secretary of war, governors, legislatures: punishment: (officer) dismissal from the service, (soldier) court martial. "any officer who uses contemptuous or disrespectful words against the president, etc.... any other person subject to military law who so offends." contemptuous language is objectionable and liable to court martial whether ( ) used in public or private. ( ) in official or private capacity. ( ) written or spoken. ( ) true or untrue. article . disrespect toward a superior officer: punishment: court-martial. "any person subject to military law who behaves himself with disrespect toward his superior officer...." unlike article , disrespect toward a superior officer requires no words--acting or neglecting to act (such as rudeness or failure to salute) are enough. article . assaulting or willfully disobeying superior officer: punishment: death or court-martial. ( ) "any person subject to military law who on any pretense whatsoever, strikes his superior officer--lifts a weapon, or offers violence against him, being in the execution of his office." ( ) "or willfully disobeys any lawful command of his superior officer." drunkenness here tends to show absence of the essential willfullness. self defense is not forbidden nor violence to suppress mutiny. article . insubordinate conduct toward a non-commissioned officer: punishment: court-martial. ( ) "any soldier who assaults or attempts or threatens to strike or assault." ( ) "or willfully disobeys the lawful order of a non-commissioned officer while in the execution of his office." ( ) "or uses threatening or insulting language." ( ) "or behaves in an insubordinate or disrespectful manner." drunkenness will not have the effect here of showing an absence of willfullness. article . disorders: punishment: court-martial. "all officers and non-commissioned officers have power to quell disorders and to order officers who take part in the same into arrest, and other persons into arrest or confinement. whosoever, being so ordered: ( ) refuses to obey. ( ) draws a weapon. ( ) otherwise threatens or does violence shall be punished." this is one instance (except a.w., , mutiny) where even a corporal might order a general into arrest. this is the only instance: ( ) where anyone other than a commissioned officer can put an officer under arrest. ( ) where anyone other than an officer can order, arrest or confinement of a soldier except on power given by c.o. article . breaking arrest: punishment: (officer) dismissal, (soldier) court-martial. "any officer charged with crime shall be placed in arrest by c.o.... in exceptional cases ... confined." "a soldier charged with crime ... shall be placed in confinement ... when charged with minor offense placed in arrest." "any person placed in arrest ... shall be restricted to barracks, quarters, tent, unless limits are enlarged by proper authority." "an officer or any other person breaking his arrest or who escapes from confinement before being set at liberty by proper authority shall be punished by...." to break arrest is punishable even though a person is innocent of the charge or ought to have been released. article . misbehavior before the enemy: punishment: death or court-martial. "any officer or soldier who: ( ) misbehaves before the enemy--runs away, or shamefully abandons post. ( ) or speaks words inducing others to do so. ( ) or quits his post or colors to plunder or pillage. ( ) occasions false alarms in camp or quarters shall suffer ...." the word "enemy" implies "any hostile body" such as a mob or riot crowd. article . neglect of military property: punishment: make good the loss and court-martial. "any person subject to military law who willfully or through neglect suffers to be lost, damaged, or wrongfully disposed of, any military property belonging to united states of america--shall make good the loss and...." article . waste or unlawful disposal of property issued to soldiers: punishment: court-martial. "any soldier who sells or wrongfully disposes of any property issued for military service shall be punished...." article . drunk on duty: punishment: (war time) dismissal and court-martial, (peace time) court-martial. "any officer ... drunk on duty shall ... in time of war be dismissed ... and any other person subject to military law, drunk on duty ... shall be punished...." article . misbehavior of a sentinel: punishment: (war time) death or court-martial, (peace time) court-martial. "any sentinel found: ( ) drunk. ( ) asleep. ( ) or who leaves before being regularly relieved shall be punished...." article . murder or rape: punishment: death or life imprisonment. "any person who commits murder or rape shall suffer death or life imprisonment as the court-martial may direct." no person shall be tried for murder or rape committed in the limits of the u.s.a. in time of peace. this is left to civil courts. article . various crimes: punishment: court-martial. "any person who commits ( ) manslaughter, ( ) mayhem (cutting), ( ) arson, ( ) burglary, ( ) larceny, ( ) embezzlement, ( ) perjury, ( ) assault with intent to commit any felony. ( ) assault with intent to do bodily harm. shall be punished...." definition of these crimes is left to local law. article . frauds against the government: punishment: court-martial. article of war no. is equivalent to prohibiting any person subject to military law from defrauding or attempting, or conspiring to defraud the government of the u.s.a.--also from stealing, embezzling any government property. article . conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman: punishment: dismissal. "any officer or cadet convicted of unbecoming conduct shall be dismissed...." misconduct may be official or unofficial. article . general article, the catch all: punishment: court-martial. "... all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good military discipline. all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service. all crimes and offences not capital shall be taken cognizance of by ( ) general, ( ) special, ( ) summary court-martials according to the nature and degree of the offense and punished.... article of war covers all crimes and is handy when no other article of war fits. it is wise, however, to use this article sparingly on charges, finding if possible the exact article necessary to cover the case at hand." examples. problem : charge.--violation of ---- article of war. specification.--in that private john doe, company c. st regiment infantry, did at albany, new york, on or about september th, , dress himself in the uniform of a st lieutenant and attend a dance at odd fellows hall. (signed) john hancock, captain, st infantry. under what article of war, if any, does this belong? problem : charge.--violation of ---- and ---- articles of war. specification.--in that sergeant james hopkins, company h, th infantry, did at franconia, n.h., on or about july th return to barracks intoxicated. in that sergeant james hopkins, moreover, refused to appear at reveille july th. (signed) william hitchcock, captain, th infantry. under what articles of war do these offenses belong? what kind of court-martial required? problem : charge.--violation of ---- article of war. specification.--in that captain george jones, th infantry did at laconia, maine, on or about august , , make a speech in which he stated that the reichstag of germany was a more efficient and democratic body than the united states congress. (signed) albert smith, major, th infantry. under what article of war does this offense belong? no. articles of war. punishment. . fraudulent enlistment court martial . desertion war: death or court martial peace: except death . absence without leave court martial . disrespect to presidents officer: dismissal vice-president, secretary soldier: court martial of war, congress, etc. . disrespect to superior officer court martial . assaulting or disobeying death or court martial superior officer . insubordination to a court martial non-commissioned officer . arrest or confinement officer: dismissal of accused persons soldier: court martial . misbehavior before the enemy death or court martial . loss, etc., military property make good the loss and court martial . loss of military property court martial issued to soldiers . drunk on duty { officers-- { war: dismissal { peace: court martial { soldiers: court martial . misbehavior of sentinel { war: death or { peace: court martial (except death) . various crimes court martial . frauds against the government court martial . conduct unbecoming an officer dismissal . general article court martial (general or special) chapter . notes on army regulations . obedience required in the military service--strict and prompt. . authority exercised with firmness, kindness and justice--prompt and lawful punishment. . abusive language or conduct by superiors forbidden. . respect to superiors will be extended upon all occasions, whether on duty or not. . remarks by officers or soldiers upon others in the military service, whether praise or censure, public or private, written or spoken, is prohibited. any effort to affect legislation for a personal favor will be entered against a man's military record. . furloughs not granted to men about to be discharged. not more than five per cent of a company shall be absent at one time. . men on furlough may not leave the united states. . for men in foreign countries furlough can begin on date of reaching united states. . no payments made to men while on furlough. arms not to be taken on furlough or while reporting sick. (n.b.--there will unquestionably be a modification of this ruling, as the custom abroad is to have every man keep his complete equipment with him whenever possible.) . desertion. property lost or destroyed will be charged against deserter. . abandoned clothes turned over to quartermaster. personal effects sold and credited to united states. . reward of $ for apprehension and delivery of deserter or military prisoner. . costs of apprehension will be charged against deserter. . no pay or clothes drawn by soldier awaiting trial on charge of desertion. . will be restored to duty only by court martial or authority competent to order trial. . absent without leave. enlisted man forfeits all pay and allowances while away. soldier will not be charged with desertion until commanding officer has reason to believe he intended to desert. absence of less than hours will not be noted upon the muster roll. . discharge of enlisted man only . by order of president or secretary of war. . by order of general court martial. . by order of united states court or justice or judge, on writ of habeas corpus. . by command of territorial department. . by disability in line of duty. . by sentence of civil court. . by purchase. (n.b.--in time of war it is probable that the last two methods would not be effective for discharge from the service.) . final statements. the company commander will furnish each enlisted man a final statement (or duplicate) or a full statement in writing explaining why such final statement is not furnished. no final statement will be furnished a soldier who has forfeited all pay and allowances or who has no deposits due him. . certificate will give . character certified by company commander. . whether recommended for re-enlistment. in case of negative opinion, the soldier should be notified at least days prior to discharge. in that case the company commander shall convene a board of three officers (if possible) to determine what kind of discharge shall be given. the soldier will be given a hearing. . loss of discharge certificate. discharge certificates will not be made in duplicate. upon proper proof of loss or destruction without fault of person entitled to it, the war department will issue a certificate of service, showing date of enlistment and discharge from the army and character given in original certificate. discharge certificates should never be forwarded to the war department in correspondence unless called for. . physical disability certificate issued when an enlisted man is permanently unfitted for service, in line of duty. certificates of disability not made in duplicate. . death of soldier. . effects are secured. . nearest relatives notified. . adjutant general of army notified. in active service the war department requires the following reports: . report of company commander to adjutant general, covering death and disposal of remains. . report of surgeon or company commander embodying a. cause of death. b. whether in line of duty. c. whether due to another soldier's misconduct. . inventory of effects in duplicate. . effects, when not claimed within reasonable time, sold and credited to united states. no authority for officers to pay debts of dead soldiers. trinkets will not be sold but sent to the adjutant general's office. . effects will be delivered, if called for, to legal representative of deceased after arrears are paid. . medal of honor. authorized by congress to be awarded to officers and men for extreme acts of gallantry in action, beyond line of duty. recommendations will be considered by standard of extraordinary merit, and must have incontestible proof. . certificate of merit. granted by president to any enlisted man in the service for distinguished acts in line of duty, on recommendation of company commander, based upon statement of eye witness, preferably the immediate company commander. $ permanent additional pay is allowed. . quarters. name of each soldier on bunk. arms on rack. accoutrements hung up by the belts. . saturday inspection preceded by thorough policing. leaders of squads will see that everything is clean. . neglect of rooms or furniture by officer or soldier a military offense. all necessary costs shall be paid by him. . destruction of tableware or kitchen utensils by soldiers will be charged against their pay. . chiefs of squads are responsible . for cleanliness of men. . for their proper equipment for duty. . for their proper dress when going "on pass." . premises shall be policed daily after breakfast. . company commander will see that public property held by men is kept in good order, and missing or spoiled articles paid for. . arms shall not be taken down without proper supervision and by order of commissioned officer. no changing of parts or finish. tompions (muzzle plugs) in small arms forbidden. . accountability and responsibility--both devolve upon persons entrusted with public property. responsibility without accountability devolves upon one to whom property is entrusted, but who does not have to make returns therefor. responsibility does not end until property has been given back to accountable officer and a receipt taken, or he has been relieved by regulations or by orders. accountability without responsibility occurs when an officer holds proper memorandum receipts for property delivered to others. example.--the company commander is accountable and responsible for the rifles turned over to his company. he is accountable without responsibility when each enlisted man has been issued a rifle and has signed a receipt for it. each enlisted man is then responsible for his rifle, without accountability, until he returns it in proper condition. in general, therefore: accountability requires evidence of the disposition that has been made of property. responsibility implies possession, and requires return of the property or payment for it. . loss of public property by neglect of any officer or soldier shall be paid by him, at such rates as a survey of the property may determine. charges will be made only after conclusive proof, and not without a survey if the soldier demands one. signing the payroll will be regarded as an acknowledgment of the justice of the charge. . ration is the allowance of food for one person or animal for one day. . forfeiture of ration is made when a soldier overstays furlough. . pay for continuous service is credited a soldier if he enlists within three months after honorable discharge. for privates an increase of $ per month is allowed up to and including the third enlistment, beyond this $ per month increase given up to and including the seventh enlistment. for non-commissioned officers the increase of $ per month continues to and includes the seventh enlistment. no increased pay is given after the seventh enlistment to private or non-commissioned officer. . allotments (revised by act of congress, october, ). the new law does away with future pensions. allotments may be made to: . family. . bank. for married men or those with dependents, such as children, parents divorced wives, whose support is required by court order, allotments are compulsory, and must not be less than $ a month and not more than one-half of his pay. the company commander is responsible for finding who comes under this rule. by this arrangement soldiers cannot shirk the support of dependents. the government will double the amount allotted by each soldier, to a limit of $ . a month. in cases where the soldier allots half of his pay the government will add to the allotment according to the following scale, even though it more than doubles the amount paid by the soldier: class a. wife, no child, $ . wife, one child, $ . wife, two children, $ . . for each additional child, $ more. no wife living, one child, $ . two children, $ . . three children, $ . four children, $ . for each additional child, $ . class b. one parent, $ . two parents, $ . each grandchild, brother, sister or additional dependent, $ . nurses can make allotment. when both a and b classes are in need of allotment from a soldier's pay, and he has allotted half of his pay to class a, he may allot an additional one-seventh of his pay for the support of class b dependents, and the government will pay the sums listed above to the class b dependents, to the limit of $ a month. payments under this act were begun november , . in case less than one-half of a soldier's pay is allotted, the secretary of war may require the allotment to be increased up to one-half of the pay. compensation for death or disability in line of duty. in all cases must be applied for. in case of death, monthly compensation shall be as follows per month: widow, $ . widow and child, $ . widow and children, $ . . each additional child, $ . one child alone, $ . two children, $ . three children, $ . each additional child, $ . widowed mother, $ . for transportation of body, $ . no women can receive compensation from two sources. the government will continue to pay compensation to a dependent wife until her death or remarriage, and to children until they are years old, unless they are insane or helpless, in which case it will continue to pay the compensation during such incapacity. in case of total disability, compensation will be as follows per month: soldier alone, $ . with wife, no child, $ . with wife, one child, $ . with wife, two children, $ . three children or more, $ . no wife living, one child, $ . no wife living, each additional child, $ . soldier and widowed mother, $ . in case of total disability where attendance is needed, $ per month will be added to the compensation, unless the soldier is blind, bedridden, or has lost both feet or hands, in which case the compensation will be $ per month, with no extra allowance for attendance. in case of partial disability, compensation will be a percentage of the amount paid in case of total disability. these annuities continue only during the life of the person for whom they are first paid. additional insurance.--uniform compensation for all ranks can go only to blood relations. in case of death or disability in line of duty, it is paid in monthly instalments for years. insurance is from $ , to $ , in multiples of $ . the rate is exceedingly low. insurance must be applied for within days after entering the service. premiums are paid monthly, quarterly or yearly from the pay of the insured man. after the war this insurance must be converted within five years into a policy either of straight life insurance, -year payment or endowment, maturing at the age of . in case of death when there is no blood relationship, the reserve value, according to the american insurance mortality tables, is paid to the estate. none of these payments can be attached for debt, nor legal action started against them except in a united states court. the maximum lawyer's fee in any such case is $ . . deposits of not less than $ may be made by an enlisted man (not retired) to any quartermaster. deposit book, signed by quartermaster and company commander, given to man who makes the deposit. this book is not transferable. . a lost deposit book is not replaced without an affidavit of the soldier, testifying that he has not sold nor assigned it. . payment made only on final statement. the soldier should be informed of the importance of keeping the deposit book. . withdrawal of deposit when discharged or furloughed to reserve. . interest on sum greater than $ is per cent. . forfeiture due to desertion, but not by sentence of court martial. deposits not exempt from liabilities due the united states. . officers and men lose pay while confined by civil authorities. . furloughed to reserve or discharged, a soldier is given a final statement in duplicate. this must be presented to be valid. . transportation and subsistence is allowed to the point of enlistment, or for the same distance. not subject to deduction for debts due the united states. . discharged soldier under charge of fraudulent enlistment is not entitled to transportation and subsistence. . transfer of claims on the government made by an enlisted man are only recognized after discharge or furlough to the reserve. they must be in writing and must be endorsed by a commissioned officer or other responsible person known to the quartermaster. . no one is allowed to accompany sick or wounded from the battle line to the rear except those specifically authorized. . ammunition lost or used without orders or not in line of duty shall be charged to the soldier using it. notes on the laws of war. (from manual for commanders of infantry platoons, translated from the french at the army war college, . war department document no. .) the laws of war were instituted under the generous error that certain well-organized peoples had entirely emerged from barbarism and that they considered themselves bound by the placing of their signatures to international conventions, freely agreed to. an infinite number of acts minutely and officially investigated have established that our troops and our nation should never count on the observance of these laws and that the atrocities committed prove to be not only individual violations dishonoring merely the perpetrator, but violations premeditated and ordered in cold blood by the commanders with the moral support of the heads of the enemy nation. these laws are nevertheless repeated here in order that: . the knowledge of how the war should have been conducted may develop in the heart of each man the sentiment of hate (applicable only to foes such as we actually have), that in no case should a chief of platoon tolerate any intercourse between his men and the enemy other than that of the rifle; this duty is explicit and not to be departed from except in the case of the wounded and prisoners incapable of doing harm. . that every violator of these laws, taken in the act, shall be the subject of an immediate report with witnesses, then sent to the division headquarters to be tried as to the facts of the case. the laws of war resulted from the geneva convention, from the declaration of st. petersburg (petrograd), and from the different hague conventions. all these diplomatic papers were signed by germany, austria-hungary, turkey and bulgaria. the following are the principal articles: protect the wounded on the field of battle from pillage and from bad treatment; respect ambulances and evacuation convoys; respect the personnel exclusively concerned with the transportation, treatment and guarding of wounded; do not treat this personnel as prisoners of war if it falls into the hands of the enemy; but return such personnel, as well as material, when its retention shall be no longer necessary for the care of the wounded prisoners. refrain from employing any projectile which weighs less than grams that is either explosive or loaded with incendiary or inflammable material, from all projectiles having for their sole object the spreading of asphyxiating or harmful gases, all expanding bullets or those which will easily flatten out inside the human body, such as jacketed bullets whose jacket does not entirely cover the core or is nickel. forbid the use of poisons or of poisoned arms, killing or wounding an enemy who has thrown down his arms and surrendered; declarations that there will be no quarter; refrain from bombarding towns and cities which are not defended, from firing on churches, historical monuments, edifices devoted to the arts, to science, to charity, to sick and wounded and which are marked by a conspicuous signal known to the enemy. prisoners should be treated as to rations, housing and clothing the same as troops of the country which has captured them. all their personal belongings, except their arms and military papers, should be left in their possession. the following should be inviolate: the emissary--that is to say, an individual authorized by a belligerent to enter into talks with the authorities of the other side and coming under a white flag; also his trumpeter, his standard bearer, and his interpreter. he loses his inviolability if it is proven that he has profited by his privilege to provoke or commit treachery. an undisguised military man can never be treated as a spy. chapter . practice marches. "special attention should be paid to the fitting of shoes and the care of the feet." (i.d.r., .) short marches from to miles should be made daily and at a uniform rate until the troops become hardened. particular attention must always be paid to the rate of march--it is imperative for the leading element to keep a uniform rate per hour. be careful and see to it that your troops march on the right-hand side of the road, and during halts, no one, not even officers, must be permitted on the left. keep closed up, and during the last mile of your march have your company sing some real snappy song, and they will come in in jubilant spirits. keep the muzzles of your rifles always elevated on the march so that men marching in rear wont be bothered. on the march the first halt is for minutes taken after minutes of marching. the men should be taught to use this time to adjust their clothing and equipment, and answer the calls of nature. do not halt where there are houses, etc., on this first halt, as a great many men want to relieve themselves. the succeeding halts are for minutes after minutes of marching--except of course during a forced march--when you would march for a longer period. during rainy or very hot weather the halts should be made oftener. do not have any straggling, remember if a man falls out he must have a certificate signed by an officer stating the cause. have one officer march in rear of the company. be careful about the use of water. have your men take a good drink early in the morning just after reveille, and on the march use their canteen sparingly. one canteen of water must last one man one day. do not allow men to drink until after the second halt. on reaching camp the kitchens are put up, latrines are dug, and tents are pitched. when everything has been tended to each man should give his feet a good salt water bath. put them in the water and let them remain there for minutes. do not dry them by rubbing, but sponge them--this will harden the feet. this should be done for the first three days, after which it can be dispensed with. a change of socks daily should be made, take one pair of socks from the pack, and wash out the dirty pair. try to avoid night marching. the leading company in each regiment regulates the rate of march. "the marching efficiency of an organization is judged by the amount of straggling and elongation and the condition of the men at the end of the march." (i.d.r., .) remember a sanitary squad should be detailed daily to police the immediate vicinity after each halt. field work. field work will be classified under the following heads: orders, deployment, fire, attack, defense, leadership, communications, night operations, patrols, advance guards, rear guards, flank guards, camp, march outpost, and outpost. (a) an order is the will of the commander expressed verbally or in writing to his subordinates. it should be clear, concise and to the point. a field order should be given as follows: . information of the enemy and supporting troops. . general plan of the commander. . dispositions of the troops. . instructions for the trains. . place where messages are to be sent. (b) do not deploy too early. it is very fatiguing, and has a tendency to disorganize the skirmish line. the major designates the companies to be on the firing line, and those to remain in support. the distance between the firing line and support is from to yards. the support should be as close as possible under cover. (c) fire direction is the function of the company commander. he gives each platoon its sector or objective, determines the range, target, indicates the class of fire, and the time to open fire. fire control is given to platoon commanders. the platoon is the fire unit. "fire control implies the ability to stop firing, change the sight setting and target, and resume a well directed fire. the best troops are those that submit longest to fire control." fire discipline is the function of the individual soldier. "it implies that in a firing line without leaders, each man retains his presence of mind and directs effective fire upon the target." (d) the troops march in column of squads until under the observation of the enemy. platoon columns are used in crossing ground where there is cover. squad columns are used across the artillery zone. at approximately yards a skirmish line is formed. thin lines may then be used to advance to the attack. remember the major has assigned each company in the firing line an objective. be sure to watch out for flank protection. if the major has forgotten to have combat patrols on the exposed flank or flanks, it is up to the flank company to send out a combat patrol. this patrol should be slightly in advance of the front line, and off to the right or left. the advance is made by a fraction rushing forward. these rushes are from to yards. when a rush is made the remaining troops fire faster. the firing line should not be reinforced by less than a platoon. the major determines when to fix bayonets. the front rank men fix bayonets first, the rear rank men fire faster, then the rear rank men fix bayonets while the front rank fire faster. a battalion is the smallest unit in the firing line to inaugurate a charge. remember the battalion is the attack unit. in changing sight setting follow same plan as fixing bayonet, _i.e._, each front rank first, the rear rank man firing faster, etc. (e) defense.--in defense the line is usually stronger and the support weaker than in the attack. do not give up your ground unless you have written orders from the high command. watch out for flank protection by combat patrols. (f) leadership.--a good leader should possess self reliance, initiative, aggressiveness, superior knowledge, and have a conception of teamwork. make your work a game in which each man has a part to play. reward merit and give the disagreeable things to be done to the "knockers." a leader must know his men. never give them a job to do that you couldn't do yourself. train yourself to estimate the situation quickly and calmly. have your men well disciplined, well drilled, well equipped, and well dressed. it might be called unmilitary by some of the sterner characters in our service, but we believe by occasionally drawing comparisons to something real amusing--a good joke--you show your men that the "old man" is really made of human stuff. be sympathetic, and it has been shown by experience that, for some slight breach of discipline a "little talk" in the orderly room does the most good, and is the best form of punishment. do your work cheerfully, and your men will do likewise. keep yourself abreast of the times in all matters military--remember your men look to you in time of action and excitement and you must be ready to deliver the goods. work out and plan your orders, etc., simply. morale is the greatest asset an organization can have. keep all your troubles and have the men keep theirs within the company. have _esprit de corps_. the real successful leader knows and plays the game. (g) communications.--communication is maintained by wireless, telegraph, telephone, signals, runners, carrier pigeons, aeroplanes, motor cars, patrols, and connecting files. each unit usually maintains communication with the next higher command, and with similar commands on the flanks. (h) night operations.--they are used to minimize losses from hostile fire, to escape observation, and to gain time. the ground to be traversed at night should be carefully looked over in daylight. some distinctive badge should be worn by our troops. the bayonet is chiefly used at night. avoid firing. the enemy should be surprised. place obstacles in front of your own lines at night. usually yards is the maximum range to fire at night. (i) patrols.--"a commander may be excused for being defeated, but never for being surprised." patrols. commander selects leader, strength, gives it a mission, when to report back, and where to send messages. he gives it a number if more than one patrol is sent out, information of the enemy, and location of any friendly patrols that may be or have been sent out. patrol leader is then allowed to ask questions. _patrol leader_.--he should have a compass, watch, pencil, note-book, knife, and a map of the country. he should then do the following: . assemble his men. . inspect them. a. to see if they are fit for this duty. b. that they have no valuable maps or papers, that their equipment does not rattle or shine. c. rations and water. . he repeats the instruction that he has received. . he explains any signals that are to be used. . designates a rallying point in case they are scattered. . details a second in command. . takes a formation that will favor the escape of at least one man. _conduct of the patrol_.-- . move cautiously but not timidly. . do not flinch or show consciousness of it in case you become suddenly aware that you are under the observation of the enemy. not knowing that you are aware of his presence he will let you come on, and suddenly, when you see cover, make a dash for it and escape. . do not get lost. . do not allow yourself to think of the enemy as being in one direction only. . in entering or passing through woods take an extended skirmish line formation. . in passing any short defile bridge or ford, send one man ahead. . if you suspect the presence of the enemy under certain cover, a good way to find out is to let one man approach within a reasonable distance and then, acting as though he had been discovered, turn and run. this will generally draw his fire. . keep quiet. forbid unnecessary talking. . from time to time select suitable rallying points in case you become separated. . remember that you do not fight unless in self defense. _report_.-- . do not report the presence of small patrols unless you have been ordered to do so. locate the main body or a large command. . determine his strength, kind of troops and movements. . remember the indispensable qualities of a report are: accuracy as to facts, simplicity, clearness, legibility and correct spelling. surmises must not be given as facts. separate what you know and what has been told you. a report should not be expressed carelessly in ten words when it could be clearly stated in twenty. send a sketch if practicable. . do not send a verbal message. . address it to c.o. support or c.o. advance guard, etc., not to the commander of a certain body of troops. give date, place and time. . remember to state what you intend to do. . in hostile country send two messages by different routes. in friendly country one will suffice. . when the capture of your message is likely, give messenger a false one that will be easily found and conceal the true message carefully. _return_.-- . do not return over the same route as you avoid ambuscade and widen your field of reconnaissance. . report any special features of military value that you have seen to your c.o. . compliment your men. (j) _advance guard._--"an advance guard is a detachment of the main body which precedes it and covers it on the march" (i.d.r. ). the commander of troops designates the advance guard, the distance between it and the main body, and also designates a commander. the advance guard commander if he has more than a battalion designates the reserve, support, distance between them. if the advance guard is a battalion or less it would have no reserve, and in that case the advance guard commander would designate the support, advance party, and the distance between them. in the former case the support commander would designate the advance party, and the distance between the support and the advance party. in both cases the advance party commander designates the point, and the distance between the point and the advance party. usually it is the duty of the advance party to send out flank patrols. the strength varies from / to / of the main body. remember "the formation of the advance guard must be such that the enemy will first be met by a patrol, then in turn by one or more larger detachments, each capable of holding the enemy until the next in rear has time to deploy before coming under effective fire." the advance guard must be aggressive. do not put up with a cautious point. have a double connecting file, and if possible every yards. "each element of the column sends the necessary connecting files to its front." on the road in order are: point--advance party--support--reserve (if there is one)--main body. have the point precede the advance party, all the remaining elements follow the one ahead. this has been found by experience to be the best method of getting "there." (k) _rear guards_.--"a rear guard is a detachment detached to protect the main body from attack in the rear." "the general formation is that of the advance guard reversed." i.e. rear point, rear party, support, and main body. "in retreat a column is preceded by a body of troops designated 'leading troops,' whose principle duty is to clear the road of obstacles and to facilitate the withdrawal of the command." (l) _flank guards_.--as their name imply protect the flanks. they should be in constant communication with the column. their formation usually conforms to that of patrols. (m) _camps_.--the four principal factors to be considered in the selection of the camp site are: near a good road or roads, have good drainage, plenty of room to accommodate your troops, and have a good water supply. immediately after camp is made sinks are dug for the disposal of excreta. one should be dug for each company on the opposite flank from the kitchen for the disposal of human excreta, and one near the kitchen for the disposal of wastes, etc., that cannot be burned around the kitchen. (n) _march outpost_.--a march outpost is usually an advance guard halted, with observers in each unit on the alert. a cossack post might be established on a good near by observation point. the march outpost is the protection furnished the main body at short halts, or on making camp before the outpost is established. (o) _outpost_.--the outpost may be best illustrated by circles: each support is numbered from right to left. each outguard in each support is numbered from right to left. each sentinel post in each outguard is numbered from right to left. outguards are divided into three classes, cossack posts, sentry squads and packets. a cossack post consists of men, posted in observation near the posts of the remaining three. a sentry squad consists of one squad, posts a double sentinel post in observation near the post of the squad. a picket consists of two or more squads not exceeding half a company. it furnishes cossack posts, sentry squads, sentinel posts, and patrols. it is usually placed at the more important points of the outguard line, as a road fork, etc. the post furnished by pickets may be as far as yards away. there should be also a sentinel post near the picket in observation. if the outguard consists of two or more companies there is a reserve. the reserve is held at some suitable point, where it can readily support the line. the reserve maintains connection with the main body and the support. the support occupies the line to be held. this line should be entrenched. the support maintains communication with its outguards and with each support on its flanks. it also sends out the necessary reconnoitering patrols. the outguards furnish sentinel posts and maintain communication with them, and with the outguards on each flank. it is the duty of the support commander to inspect his line and make such changes in the outguards as he deems necessary, then to report to the outpost commander with a sketch if practicable of his line when his dispositions are completed. the outpost commander should inspect the line, order such changes as he deems necessary, and report with a sketch of the outpost line to the commander of troops when his outpost has taken up its position. "the support commander must practice the greatest economy on men consistent with the requirements of practical security." instead of using outguards along the whole front, part of it may be covered by patrols. [illustration: plate # diagram of outpost line] outline of field service regulations. land forces of u.s. regular army. organized land militia. volunteer forces. how grouped: mobile army. coast artillery. mobile army: for offensive operations against enemy and so requires maximum degree of mobility. basis of organization the division, a self-contained unit composed of all necessary arms and services. coast artillery: ( ) permanent fortifications for defense against naval attack. ( ) semi-permanent fortifications for protection of permanent from raiders. ( ) organization of mobile troops to prevent landing of enemy. military information. essential: ( ) to enable war department to estimate equipment and size of force necessary. ( ) to enable commander properly to estimate the situation in the field of operations. transmission of information. wire, signaling, radio and messenger: message.--concise, written information sent by messenger or wire. source always given.--"heard" separated from "seen." report.--formal account of some enterprise. war diary.--record of events kept in campaigns. maps. reconnaissance: the work of individuals or units in gathering information. to keep contact with the enemy--to be acquainted with the terrain; to protect flanks and rear and guard against surprise. reconnaissance begins on entering theater of operations and lasts through campaign. effected by patrols and air craft. indications of enemy: tracks on road. abandoned camps and clothing. infantry, thick, low cloud of dust. cavalry, high, thin cloud of dust. artillery and wagons, broken cloud. determination of enemy forces: timing past a given point. cavalry (walk), per minute. cavalry (trot), per minute. infantry, per minute. artillery and wagons, per minute. security: those measures taken to protect a command from enemy observation, annoyance and surprise. obtained by covering the front with detachments. march.--advance, flank and rear guards. camp.--outposts. march and camp detachments.--to give warning and resist attack until such time as detachment in rear can deploy. advance guard: detachment from main body to cover its advance. against surprise for information. push back small bodies. check enemy's advance until deployment in rear. seize good position and locate enemy lines. remove obstacles. strength - to - of entire command. divisions of advance guard: cavalry point. infantry point. advance party. support. reserve. leading troops: a detachment protecting the head of a column in retreat. rear guard: detachments protecting the rear of a retreating column. formation like that of advance guard. flank patrols: detachments for protecting the flanks of marching column. march outpost: detachments for protection of column halted on march. formation, that of the marching protection. outpost: the detachments forming the protection for a force in camp or bivouac. divisions of outpost: reserve. line of supports. line of outguards. pickets. sentinel posts: sentry squads. cossack posts. sentinels. detached posts (from support). hours of special danger: evening and dawn; thus good times to relieve outposts. examining post: intelligence and a place where prisoners, etc., are brought in. orders: the expression of the will of a commander, either written or verbal. letters of instruction--plans of the superior leaders. field orders: regulate tactical and strategical actions of troops. general orders include: ( ) all necessary detailed instructions. ( ) all standing instructions (avoid repetition). ( ) proceedings of general and special courts-martial. special orders: relate to assignment and movement of individuals, not necessary to be communicated to the whole command. bearers of verbal orders must _repeat._ field orders: ( ) heading.--title, place, date, hour and number. ( ) distribution of troops.--division of command. ( ) body: (a) information of enemy and supporting troops. (b) general plan of commander. (c) detailed tactical dispositions to carry out general plan. (d) instructions for trains--also the positions of ammunition and dressing stations. ( ) ending.--authentication and method of sending. marches and convoys: successful march.--that which places troops at destination on time, and in best possible condition. rates of march: infantry.-- to - / miles per hour. cavalry.-- miles (walk), miles (trot), miles (gallop). artillery.--(same.) average marches: infantry.-- - miles per day. cavalry.-- miles per day. artillery.-- - miles per day. load of pack mules equals pounds. march orders, state: ( ) object of march. ( ) distribution of troops. ( ) order of march of main body. ( ) manner of forming the column. halts: first hour, minutes' rest. each successive hour, a -minute rest. weather conditions create exceptions to above rule. marches in peace: ( ) changing station. ( ) practice. in war: ( ) concentration. ( ) in presence of enemy. ( ) forced marches. ( ) night marches. convoys (on land): those trains by which supplies are forwarded to an army from depots, etc., in the rear--also trains bringing supplies collected by requisition. security furnished by an escort: ( ) advance guard. ( ) main body. ( ) flank guard when necessary. ( ) rear guard. favorable places for attacking convoys: through woods defile. over hedges. sharp bends. ascending or descending slopes. farming corral, watering. whenever conditions are such that escort cannot quickly prepare for defense. conducting prisoners: foot soldiers to every prisoners. infantry: the principal arm, charged with the main field work. its role is the role of the entire force and its success is the success of the whole force. artillery: the close supporting arm of the infantry. its targets are those most dangerous in the eyes of the infantry. cavalry: reconnaissance--supports the other arms and is valuable in pursuit. combat: offensive. defensive. (a) temporary. (b) passive defense. combat principles: fire superiority. unity of command. simple and direct plans and methods. all troops necessary to mission must be assigned at beginning. detachments justifiable only when they can contribute directly to success of main battle. some reserves must be kept. flank protection and reconnaissance. fire superiority: must be gained early and maintained. frontage of units: depth in formation for combat rather than extension of line. reserves: fresh troops must be on hand to ( ) give fire line impetus. ( ) to penetrate enemy lines. ( ) to fill gaps and help reorganization. ( ) to meet counter attacks. plan of action: mission of army is to win battle. offensive action must be the rule. when enemy is near every available means must be taken to gain information, in order to prepare for deployment. offensive combat: the attack develops into parts. ( ) assaulting hostile position at selected points. ( ) threaten or assault all other parts of enemy line in order to hold enemy from reinforcing operations. enveloping attack: advantage of converging fire upon position. holding attack: an attack for holding enemy in one place, while assaults made at another point. assaults: the local concentrated offensive. pursuit: only by energetic pursuit can the full fruit of victory be gleaned. its purpose is to cause the greatest loss in personnel and morale possible cavalry and artillery active. defensive combat: passive defense--to gain time, or to hold certain points pending results in other parts of the line. defense seeking a favorable decision--a parrying of blows while seeking a favorable opening. counter attack the crisis of this form. counter attack--made by launching reserves at the flank, while the enemy is fully committed to the attack. defensive positions: requisites: clear field of fire. flanks naturally secure. extent of ground suitable to strength of force. effective corps for reserves. good lines of retreat. good communication. position in readiness: a position intended to resist the advance of an enemy in the immediate vicinity information of whose movements is not full enough to warrant definite action. withdrawal from action: troops most readily disengaged from the enemy should be withdrawn first. demands highest order of skill in troop leadership. covering positions--those positions chosen to cover the retreating force. retreat--a step by step opposition to the enemy's advance on a prearranged plan. delaying actions: . advance delayed as long as possible, consistent with safe withdrawal. . delayers must hold position. night combat: offensive advisable. . where fire superiority is impossible by day. . to avoid heavy losses by advance to assaulting position by day. . to capture posts or patrols. . to surprise for moral effect. defensive: obstacles in front of position. trenches heavily manned and supports drawn close. shelter: troops under canvas--in camp. troops on ground without canvas--bivouac. troops in huts or villages--cantonment. tactical considerations are paramount in the selection of camp sites in the theater of operations. selection of camp site: . suitably large to accommodate command. . water supply sufficient and accessible. . good roads to and in camp. . wood and grass forage near at hand. . sandy subsoil for drainage. . hot weather shade--cold protection. to maintain the efficiency of a command, troops must have adequate shelter. sanitary considerations around camp: latrines on opposite side of camp from kitchens. short camps, straddle trenches. long camps, trenches by by with seats. have latrines screened. burn the trenches out daily and keep covered. wash boxes and paint with tar. questions and answers on f.s.r. . how are the land forces of the u.s. organized? _ans_.--the _mobile army_ consisting of regular army, organized land militia when called to federal service, drafted army, volunteers and the field artillery and the _coast artillery._ basis of organization is the division composed of all arms and self-sufficient. several divisions may be grouped into a field army, to which are attached field army troops. these are organized into a brigade for purpose of supply and administration when necessary through numbers. coast artillery is charged with the care and use of land and coast fortifications, including submarine mines and torpedo defenses. . what is the object of collecting military information? _ans_.--to enable the war department to decide upon the size of army or expedition, the proportions of different arms, the character of clothing, equipment, etc., needed for any operation. information collected by the gen. staff in time of peace should include geography, physical resources, and military strength of the various nations. . define reconnaisance. _ans_.--reconnaisance is used to designate the work of troops or individuals when gathering information in the field. it is necessary during combat for the tactical use of troops. it is carried on by: (a) aero squadron; (b) independent cavalry; (c) divisional cavalry; (d) by infantry as reconnoitering patrols. . what are some indications of the presence of the enemy? _ans_.--clothing or material on roads or in abandoned camps. a thick, low cloud of dust indicates infantry. a high, thin cloud cavalry. a broken cloud artillery or wagon trains. how would you determine from these indications what the number and organization of the enemy might be? _ans_.--estimate strength by length of time it takes to pass a given point. assuming that infantry in column of squads occupies half a yard per man, cavalry in column of fours yard per trooper, and artillery in single column yards per gun or caisson, a given point would be passed in one minute by about: infantry, cavalry at walk, cavalry at trot, guns or caissons. . suppose on patrol and safely concealed for sighting the enemy at no great distance, by what rough method would you ascertain the approximate strength of the force assuming it to be composed of infantry, cavalry and artillery? see answer no. . . what is the composition and arrangement of the advance guard? _ans_.--all arms of the service. in open country much cavalry and field artillery, the latter seldom assigned to command smaller than a brigade. also machine guns, ambulance company if the force is large and engineers for purpose of removing obstacles to the march. large command; advance cavalry, support, reserve. small command; point, advance party, support, reserve. strength should be / to / , depending on size of command and character of terrain. advance guard increases in size proportionately with size of command. why? . define: (a) outguard; they constitute small detachments farthest to the front and nearest to the enemy. (b) cossack post; observation group at indicated point consisting of four men, post single sentinel. (c) picket; small command up to platoon placed in line of outguards at more important points such as road forks. . what is an order? _ans_.--orders are used by commanders of divisions and separate brigades for regulating the movement and supply of field trains, fixing position of distributing points for rations and forage, in short, have to do with supplies of all kinds, especially food. form: the heading. the distribution of troops (in certain orders). the body. the ending. the body contains: . information about the enemy and our supporting troops. . general plan of the commander. . disposition of the troops. . instructions for the trains. . where the commander may be found or messages are to be sent. . during an advance what is the general order of advance of a column? _ans_.--cavalry and horse artillery. infantry and light artillery. engineering and signal troops. trains. . what is the average march per day of various arms? _ans_.--infantry, miles per day. infantry in large bodies, miles per day. cavalry, miles per day. field artillery, to miles per day. horse artillery, same as cavalry, to which it may be attached. forced marches are from to miles for infantry. . how is the escort distributed in guarded convoys? _ans._--advance guard, with advance cavalry to miles ahead. main body may be opposite most important point of the train, usually opposite its center. section of infantry at head and tail of train. flank guard--if necessary. rear guard-- / of escort. what places are most favorable for attacking convoy? when passing through woods, defile, or over bridge, when going around sharp bends in the road; when convoy is forming corral. . discuss uses of the various arms in combat. _ans._--infantry: the most important arm, charged with the main work of the battle. artillery: supporting arm of infantry. its target is the opposing arm most dangerous to the infantry. cavalry: reconnaisance before combat, support of other arms during combat. . what is the difference between the attack and the assault? _ans._--in combat where the force is as large or larger than a division, a simultaneous advance against the entire hostile front is out of the question. attack is made up of a number of local combats. some where enemy is engaged with view to driving him out. this is called the assault. other parts of attack with fewer troops simply to keep the enemy from coming to the support of those troops of the assaulted lines. the entire advance against the enemy is the attack. after the firing lines have advanced some distance the weak and the strong points of the enemy's lines are disclosed. the weak points of course are selected. . discuss the manner in which a pursuit should be carried out? _ans._--if enemy commences withdrawal before front lines have given way, troops in action push forward until enemy in their front are driven away. cavalry and horse artillery are thrown against flanks of retreating enemy, or on their front. purpose to further disorganize the enemy, beat him to bridges, defiles, etc. in meantime reserve is sent into the pursuit, while troops engaged are assembling to constitute a new reserve. general scheme is to keep in continuous contact with enemy, giving him no chance to reorganize. boldness necessary. . what are the different kinds of defense, and what is the purpose of each? _ans._--(a) passive; to retain position for specified time with or without combat, or to prevent enemy from carrying position. (b) defense seeking favorable decision; troops forced temporarily to assume the defensive, with intention of assuming the offensive at first favorable opportunity. . what is the purpose of the counter attack? _ans._--to win victory, stave off defeat or prevent lines from being entered. it may be launched either at the enemy's strong or weak points depending on conditions. if enemy are beaten off and disorganized at some point, it may be good opportunity to follow up the advantage by counter attack. also at other points where weakness develops. counter attack is made at strength of enemy to prevent him from penetrating the defensive position. . how should advance position be organized and held? _ans._--force should not be so weak that it can be driven back to main body before it accomplishes its purpose, nor so strong that it will hold out too long, thereby committing the entire force to action in advance line instead of the line selected. trenches. what is position in readiness? troops placed in readiness for action where it is intended to resist the advance of enemy in immediate vicinity, but knowledge of his movements not yet sufficiently definite to decide upon plan of action. preliminary to taking up offensive, or more usually to taking up and occupying defensive position. hasten deployment when time comes. . if it becomes necessary to withdraw troops from action state steps necessary to insure the safety of troops during the withdrawal and retreat. _ans._--last reserves should be used. if none, troops least pressed used to cover withdrawal. cavalry and artillery used unsparingly. depends on the terrain. first covering position well to the rear so as not to suffer demoralization. on flanks of line of retreat. there should also be facilities to withdraw the occupying force. firing line made as strong as possible, minimum of reserves held. use m.g. perhaps successive covering points necessary further to rear before advance of enemy can be checked. when a few miles to the rear, or far enough to free troops from all contact with the enemy, reorganize. step-by-step opposition useless. number of covering positions should be reduced to the minimum. retreat; trains at once put into march. other forces at once put into order of march. all roads used, separate roads for divisions. effective rear guard from troops whose strength and morale is least impaired. divisional cavalry and as much artillery as can effectively be used. use artillery at long range to keep the enemy deployed, destroy bridges, etc. chapter . feeding men. in camp.--you will usually have plenty of food but continual inspecting is necessary to have it properly cared for, prepared and served. the kitchen must be kept clean: company commanders inspect daily and insist on the following: . have cooks and enlisted men come to attention at the command of the first man who sees you approach. . have all refrigerators opened, and put your head in far enough to detect any bad odors. . check the bill of fare and see that food not consumed one day is utilized later--waste bread for bread pudding, for example. . see that doors close properly, that windows are screened and roof is tight--allow no flies. . have floors, tables and refrigerators scrubbed daily. . have the ground around the mess shack raked and thoroughly policed. towels hung out to dry must be so hung as not to fall to the ground. raked ground does not allow flies to build undisturbed. . taste the coffee and look in the coffee bins. . inspect pans, knives, meat grinder (have latter taken apart for you occasionally). . see that the mess sergeant looks after the incinerator properly; that he makes the cooks use what he tells them to. cooks should not be allowed to help themselves to things; the mess sergeant should weigh out or set out just what is to be used each day. . have the food served hot and in individual portions as far as possible; see that the food is not put on the table too soon. . during each month talk with an old soldier, a raw recruit and a non-commissioned officer about the mess to see what the men think of it. on the march.--( . i.d.r., - .) if portable kitchens accompany troops, the men should fall in in single file and be helped to food as they pass by in companies. for individual cooking.--rations issued might be: carton of hard-tack, ration of bacon, potato, tablespoons of rice, heaping tablespoon of coffee, sugar. fires for individual cooking are best made out of small dried twigs to produce a hot fire large enough for a group of four men. there are two methods of cooking with the issue mess-kit. first method: each man cooking for himself. as there are but two cooking utensils, the tin cup and the frying pan, the cooking must be systematized in order to cook four articles on the two utensils. to do this, the rice is first cooked in the tin cup filling the tin cup one-third full of water throwing in the rice. the water is brought to a boil and boiled until the individual grains of rice are soft through. the tin cup is then removed from the fire, the water poured off, and the cup covered with the lid of the mess tin, the rice being allowed to steam. in the meantime, the bacon should be fried in the frying pan, the grease being saved. when the rice is well steamed, it is turned out in the lid of the meat can, then the bacon placed on top of it. the tin cup is washed out and the man is then ready to fry his potato and boil his coffee. the cup is filled two-thirds full of water and the coffee placed in it and boiled until the desired strength is attained. to prevent the coffee from boiling over, a canteen of water should be handy and water thrown in whenever the coffee begins to boil over. when the coffee is strong enough, the addition of cold water will settle the grounds. in the meantime, cut the potatoes very thin and fry them in the bacon grease and the meal is ready: hard-tack, potatoes, rice, bacon and coffee. second method: squads of four may specialize; one man to collect the frying pans and fry all the bacon, another the potatoes, another the rice and coffee, and the other for collection of wood. either method may be followed. mess-kits should be cleaned immediately after using, sand being used for scouring. mess-kits must be cleaned thoroughly. in the trenches.--usually rations and stores will be carried up to the trenches by the supports and the reserves. if this is not possible and it becomes necessary that men from the front line trenches be employed, not more than per cent of the men in the firing line are to be away from the trenches at the same time. rations and cooking: (a) ration parties from the support and reserve trenches will be made up in complete units, _i.e._, platoons or companies. (b) the company mess sergeant will accompany the ration parties for his company and will report his arrival to the company commander. (c) great care is to be taken that ration and carrying parties make as little noise as possible. (d) cooking if possible will be done behind the front line trenches, and should be concentrated by sections or companies. steps must be taken to insure that as little smoke as possible is made by the cook's fires. (e) waste in any form will be discouraged. (f) arrangements should be made to insure that soup or some hot drink be available for the men between midnight and a.m. each company commander must see that timely requisitions for rations are made and to have no delays at meal times. food should be brought up in tin boilers about the size of wash boilers so that two men can handle one of them easily without a relief. in front line, men send mess kit relayed from hand to hand to these boilers at stations in each platoon or section and they are relayed back. sometimes men in the front line are relieved for a few minutes. always carry hours rations. camping and camp sanitation. general principles: great care must be exercised in selecting a camp site, but it must never be forgotten that the tactical situation is of paramount importance. the following principles govern the selection: ( ) sufficient supply of pure water. ( ) good roads, but not too near a main highway on account of dust and noise. ( ) wood and forage must be obtainable. the ground should: ( ) give ample room without crowding. ( ) have porous soil. ( ) have high elevation to make site dry. avoid: ( ) marshy ground and mosquitoes. ( ) woods or dense vegetation. ( ) ravines or depressions in terrain or dry stream beds subject to sudden freshets. water must be obtainable: ( ) arrange immediately where to obtain (a) drinking and cooking water. (b) water for animals. (c) water for bathing and washing. in the case of running water, the point furthest up-stream shall be guarded for drinking and cooking water. bathing shall be done at a point furthest down-stream. successful military camping depends upon three ( ) things: ( ) discipline. ( ) cooking. ( ) sanitation. discipline means control; it means order. nowhere are these more essential. confusion is loss of control, loss of time, and loss of respect by the men. upon arrival at a favorable camp site get the men off their feet. do not wait around. as c.o. have your decisions made and the work organized, so that each squad will be under a leader. keep squads together, allowing none to stray off until the work is done, then let everyone rest except the sentinels. do not omit to post sentinels over the water supply and at important points, even though you have not decided upon the exact location of camp. organize the work by platoons or squads and rotate, if camp is to be made every few days. discipline in camp means more than order and dispatch, however, men must understand that they are under discipline when off duty--that they cannot disregard sanitary measures, eat promiscuously, destroy property, vegetation, or timber and must police the grounds at all times. papers, cigarette butts, and newspapers, should never be allowed on the ground near camp. eatables should never be kept in tents to draw vermin. where possible, in dry weather, the company street should be wet down to keep the dust out of the tents. have men ditch around tents immediately upon making camp. though it may seem somewhat of a hardship, a sudden down pour of rain, will recompense them for this labor many times over. in ditching the tents, completely circle them, for if this is not done a great deal of rain will come in the front of the tent. food means everything to a soldier. the camp cooking is a barometer of the organized efficiency and of the enlisted men's attitude. nothing else can do so much to help or hinder. the company commander should realize the controlling power exercised by the company cook and keep the matter in his own hands. he should accept no excuse for burnt or dirty food. if officers mess with their companies they will appreciate the attitude of the men and be able to judge the real situation. officers will be well repaid for doing this, as it gives them an idea of the food that is being served their men. in the mechanical details of preparing food, the fire is of first importance. a quick method of cooking is by laying a pair of large green logs on the surface of the ground just wide enough to place the pots between them, so that the bottom of the pots will be resting upon them. build a fire between these logs, making sure to place the logs parallel to the direction of the wind. a pit may be dug, with a sloping bottom, and across this may be placed the pots, and if iron rails are available, the utensils may be placed on these. for longer stays this pit may be lined with stone. stones retain the heat and less wood is required. four trenches radiating from a central chimney will give one flue whatever may be the direction of the wind. (for more specific data on the subject of fires and camp cooking, see manual for army cooks--u.s.a.--also notes in i.d.r., pp. - .) make a rule never to allow food to remain in tin cans after opening them. remember to place kitchen near available water supply and furthest from latrines, horse picket lines, or dumps of any kind. sanitation comes last in the thoughts of the enlisted man, but it is no less important for that. the first requisite is cleanliness. food receptacles must be scoured and covers and cracks in tin ware scraped as well as scalding the tins themselves. have boiling hot water in tanks (galvanized iron ash cans are good) for men to wash mess kits in after meals. one can should contain soapy water so as to cut the grease from the dishes, and the second tank should contain clean, boiling water for scalding the kits. scraps of food should be scraped from the mess tins before immersing them in water, otherwise washing water becomes filled with small particles of food. wiping cloths will greatly add to the convenience of the men and takes but a short time to make them clean and fit for use again. care must be exercised over three kinds of waste: ( ) garbage. ( ) kitchen slops. ( ) excreta. garbage can be burned in the kitchen fires. it should never stand exposed to the air, but should be tightly covered in iron cans, and should be disposed of every twenty-four hours. kitchen help have an aversion to prompt disposal of garbage and need watching. fly traps should be made of muslin and used freely about the kitchen. kitchen slops, fats, greasy water, etc., must be drained into covered pits, never allowing them to be tossed on the ground around the cook tent. a hole dug and partially filled with stones with a barrel placed upside down on them, makes a very good receptacle for kitchen slops. the barrel should be placed so that the inverted top will be a little way beneath the surface of the ground. a hole should be bored in the bottom of the barrel and a funnel inserted, through which the slops may be poured. if the soil is porous, a trough may be dug and covered with mosquito netting or cheese cloth, and the water poured through this and allowed to drain off. excreta is the most deadly form of waste, and too much care cannot be exercised in disposing of it. impress upon every man that he must cover completely with dirt all excreta so that flies may not have a chance to approach it. for short stops and while working in the field "straddle," latrines are the best. these are shallow trenches the width of a shovel, about inches wide, and several feet in length. for long stops a deep latrine is dug of the following dimensions: feet wide, feet deep by feet long. two posts with crotches, driven at the ends of this trench, supporting a substantial pole to make a seat * * * for convenience a hand rail placed in front of this improvised seat will add to the comfort of the men. a more permanent latrine is made by covering the pit with a wooden box, in the top of which are cut holes of the necessary diameter. to these holes should be fitted spring covers which will shut down tightly. a wooden frame boarded around this arrangement makes a satisfactory enclosure. a urinal made of two long boards joined together to form a v-shaped trough and drained by a pipe into the pit completes the whole. a pitch sufficient for rapid drainage should be given the urinal trough. when necessary to utilize separate urinals, a hole filled with stone and sprinkled daily with quicklime is sufficient for short periods. at night there should be a galvanized iron can placed in each company street and emptied before reveille each morning. this can must be disinfected by burning out, as must be the latrines when earth or sand is not used as a covering each time. pits must be covered daily with quicklime, ashes, earth and filled when within two ( ) feet of the surface. their position should be distinctly marked so as to prevent reopening. it is a safe rule never to use an old camp ground, but select a new one, even if less conveniently located. camp sites should be changed if it is found that the soil is becoming polluted, or if the ground is cut up and dusty from constant use. the condition in which a camp site is left by an organization will clearly indicate the efficiency and discipline in a command. chapter . personal hygiene and first aid. this is a purely arbitrary grouping of topics for the purpose of saving space. either of the topics mentioned could be treated at length; detailed information will be found in any of the reference books mentioned in the bibliography. personal hygiene means "the preservation of health by attention to the care of the body;" it is determined by the formation of correct habits. cleanliness of person, clothing and bedding should become a habit of life with the soldier; but some men will always require watching and admonition. these habits are: personal cleanliness; regulation of diet; avoidance of excesses (eating, drinking and sexual matters); wearing suitable clothing; keeping the bodily processes at work (kidneys, bowels and skin); taking sufficient exercise, preferably in the open air; rest of body and mind, with recreation for the latter; maintaining the surroundings in which one lives in a cleanly state. bathing is easily the most important requirement in matters of personal hygiene; men should bathe as often as conditions of life in barracks and camp will permit. on the march a vigorous "dry rub" with a coarse towel will often prove an excellent substitute when water is not available. _teeth_ should be cleaned at least twice daily. _clothing_ should be kept clean, particularly underclothing. _diet_ is not a matter which a soldier can determine to any extent for himself; but he can follow a certain few precautions: . don't eat hurriedly; chew the food properly. . don't overload the stomach. . don't eat green or overripe fruit. . don't eat anything while away from camp or barracks, whose materials or manner of preparation seem questionable. . don't bring a "grouch" to the table with you. . don't eat on the march; don't drink too much water on the march. sexual indulgence is a matter to be handled tactfully, but with absolute frankness. men should be taught that it is not a matter of necessity; that their health will not suffer by any lack of it; that they themselves will be the sufferers for any violations of rules of health. the procedure directed by the war department for purposes of combatting infection is as follows: . that physical inspections of enlisted men be made twice each month for the detection of venereal disease. . that any soldier who exposes himself to infection shall report for cleansing and preventive treatment immediately upon return to camp or garrison. . that any soldier who fails so to report, if found to be suffering from a venereal infection, shall be brought to trial by court martial for neglect of duty. . that men so infected shall be confined strictly to the limits of the post during the infectious stages of the disease. . that all officers serving with troops shall do their utmost to encourage healthful exercises and physical recreation and to supply opportunities for cleanly social and interesting mental occupations for the men under their command. . that company and medical officers shall take advantage of favorable opportunities to point out the misery and disaster that follow upon moral uncleanliness; and the fact that venereal disease is never a trivial affair. with a great many men these precautions and measures will not be necessary but for the sake of those who are ignorant or neglectful, proper steps should at all times be taken. exercise.--a sufficient amount of exercise to maintain health is ordinarily provided by military drills and other duties requiring active movement. but this should be regarded only as the minimum of exercise; athletic work should be encouraged (and this will be done by the present activities of those "higher up"); bayonet training will be found an excellent medium of accomplishing a double purpose; calisthenics should be short but snappy and vigorous. a vigorous policy of an officer as regards things of this sort will ward off a great many minor ills and particularly "colds," which are often the result of poor ventilation. cleanliness of surroundings.--men should be taught that cleanliness of surroundings is not merely for purposes of inspection; but that it is absolutely necessary where a great number of men are living together in close quarters. quarters should be well policed; the company street should be kept clean; refuse of all sorts should be kept in receptacles provided for that purpose and frequently removed. a police squad appointed daily should be charged with this work, and the corporal of the same made responsible for the condition of quarters and the company street. preventable diseases.--men should be given a certain amount of theoretical knowledge of preventable diseases. these matters will be taken care of to a large extent by the medical corps; but men should be taught just what precautions are necessary to avoid recourse to the hospital. venereal diseases have already been touched upon. typhoid fever is a germ disease and communicable. vaccination is the first preventive; protection of water supply is the second; thorough disposal of wastes is a third; and sharp punishment for violation of sanitary regulations is a fourth. habits of personal cleanliness will do much to prevent any such disease. dysentery is very common in field service, but may be prevented by same methods as for typhoid fever, save for vaccination; men suffering from this malady should be isolated, if possible, and utmost precaution taken to prevent spread of the disease. malaria is a mosquito disease; get rid of mosquitoes and then you will get rid of the carrier of the germs. quinine may act as a preventive. cases should be isolated, if possible. tonsilitis and colds may be combatted very effectively by proper precautions as to ventilation. measles.--very important but little known; isolation recommended. there are many other diseases concerning which the men should be instructed, but lack of space prevents further treatment of them. they should be taught the proper treatment of blistered feet, for they incapacitate a great many men; the chief causes are ill-fitting shoes and our old friend "uncleanliness." shoes are the most important article of clothing of the infantryman; each man should have one pair well broken in for marching, and two other pairs. socks should be soft, smooth and without holes--also _clean_. further steps for the prevention of blisters are; hardening of the skin by appropriate baths for the feet; soaping the feet; or adopting some other means of reducing the friction of the foot against the sock. _treatment_--wash the feet; open the blister at the lowest point, with a clean needle; dress with vaseline or other ointment and protect with adhesive plaster, care being taken not to shut out the air. zinc oxide plaster is excellent. sterilize a needle; thread it with a woolly thread and run it through blister, leaving ends projecting about one-half inch; this will act as a wick and dry up blister in short time. first aid.--explain to the men the uses of the first aid packet and of the pouch carried by the medical corps. (this pouch is being replaced by web-belts with pockets.) wounds may be classed as ordinary cuts, inside wounds, lacerated, punctured and poisoned wounds. for ordinary minor wounds--iodine and exposure to the air are usually sufficient. _war wounds_ are usually caused by something having an explosive effect and may be accompanied by hemorrhage, shock and even loss of function; they may be arterial or venous. poisoned wounds are of two sorts; external and internal. diagnosis tag.--this tag placed on a soldier shows wound, name, rank, regiment, treatment received, etc. this tag should be carefully read before further treatment is accorded. treatment of wounds.--the compress, of the first aid packet will always prove of help. bleeding wounds.--the bandage of the first aid packet will stop all ordinary bleeding; but in aggravated cases the bleeding may be stopped by pressure on the artery, between the wound and the heart. this may be done by hand or by means of the forceps in the medical pouch. the points of compression should be learned and located; in front of the ear just above the socket of the jaw; in the neck in front of the strongly marked muscle reaching from behind the ear to the upper part of the breast bone; in the hollow behind the collar bone; just behind the inner border of the larger muscle of the arm; the femoral artery at the middle of the groin where the artery passes over the bone. bleeding may also be stopped to some extent by elevating the wounded part. a tourniquet may be improvised by using the compress, running a stick or the bayonet through the band, and taking up the slack by twisting. poisoned wounds.--for a _snakebite_ make a tight constriction just above the wound; make an incision at the bite and suck out the poison. _do it quickly_. if this is impossible, follow the same plan but give a stimulant; repeatedly loosen the constriction and let a little of the poison into the system at a time to be neutralized. in cases of chemical poisoning do not follow the usual method of treating poisoning. _do not make the patient vomit_, but give him something fat or albuminous such as raw eggs or milk. this forms mercurial albuminate. _ptomaine_ poisoning (symptoms are headache, cramps, nausea, high fever and chills, etc.). drink salt water, vomit and repeat the procedure to clean out the stomach. a purgative should also be taken. ice cream and milk kept too long are frequent causes of this sort of poisoning, as are dishes kept in the icebox over night. fainting, heat exhaustion and shock are all of the same class; symptoms are the same--weak pulse, paleness and low temperature, tendency to fall to ground. often follows taking too much water on the march. treatment should be in nature of stimulant; make patient lie down, get blood to his head, wrap him in blankets, give him hot drinks, etc. sunstroke.--symptoms and treatment are different. patient has a high temperature. keep his head high and feet low; disrobe him and pour cold water on him; keep him in a cool place until temperature lowers to ; then remove cold water and temperature will go down itself. do not apply cold water too long as the temperature may go to sub-normal which is just as dangerous as a temperature abnormally high. burns and scalds.--air should be shut out; otherwise treat like blister, care being taken not to remove skin. do not put on anything that will stick and do not try to remove anything that has a tendency to stick; put on linseed oil and water, cotton and a loose bandage. freezing and frostbites.--use ice water and snow to start with. keep the patient cool until he is thawed out. massage and gradually work up to a warmer temperature. fractures are of three kinds; simple, compound and comminuted. simple: bones do not penetrate the skin (may be single or double). compound: bones penetrate the skin and cause infection. comminuted: bone is shattered. indications of a fracture are: pain, redness, swelling and mobility where it ought not to be. treatment.--find out the kind of fracture. paint the wound and put on first aid packet; replace the clothes and splint the break. splints should not be too long so as to cause any friction or annoyance to the patient. they may be made out of any available material, such as rifle, bayonet, shingle, piece of board, scabbard, etc. bind them firmly but not too tightly. artificial respiration.--this subject is worthy of more treatment than it can be accorded here. any text on first aid will explain thoroughly the schaefer method, which is now the standard method in the army. points to be remembered in this method are; remove foreign articles from the mouth; curl the little finger over the th rib; avoid the pelvic bones; hold the arms straight and apply the pressure by means of the whole body brought forward; take care not to break a rib; do not give up too soon. trench foot.--this is due to long standing with legs and feet in wet clothes. there are three types: mild: symptoms are numbness and a slight swelling. medium: additional symptom of a bluing of the leg; also large blisters. severe: gangrene sets in. tight clothes help to bring on these things. keep the shoes, socks and breeches loose; keep the clothes dry; furnish the men with hot food in the trenches and so keep up the circulation. _do not use grease_. trench foot can be avoided by proper treatment, and punishment should follow upon its contraction. chapter . signaling. this chapter proposes to cover a large amount of ground in a small compass; hence treatment must be brief. a more liberal treatment will be found at different sources; here a few suggestions and hints will be given. semaphore.--time spent, hours: sessions / hours, session hour, conference hours. it is easy to say "just learn the semaphore," but to learn it quickly and well is another matter. a few suggestions as to the methods followed by others will usually prove helpful. learn the semaphore by what may be called the "cycle" method, _i.e._, teach and illustrate how the successive letters are formed by moving the arm or arms around the body in a clockwise direction through successive stages. there are a few exceptions to the rule as will be pointed out; but they only serve as a few landmarks and help to fix the whole matter more firmly in mind. first cycle.-- arm. a to g. one arm always at the interval. be sure to make the "d" with right arm straight overhead--then it is more distinct at a distance. (plate.) second cycle.-- arms. h to n, inclusive, with exception of j. one arm always in the a position. in making i always be sure that the left hand is at the a position. some men insist in making this letter wrong by crossing the body with the left hand uppermost. this is very awkward and also very indistinct at a distance. p changes arms but retains same relative position of flags. third cycle.-- arms. t and u. right arm in position of c. letter u actually resembles that letter. third cycle.-- arms. o to s. one arm always in b position. in letter o, left arm is in b position; in all others, right arm. fourth cycle.-- arms. t and u. right arm in position of c. letter u actually resembles that letter. doubles.--l, u, r, n. these letters are keys to many others and should be promptly learned. opposites.--v and k, o and w, q and y, s and m, z and h, x and i, m follows l in cycle and is opposite of s, s follows e in cycle and is opposite of m, k precedes l in cycle and is opposite of v. figures are first letters of alphabet, preceded by crossing flags overhead. instructing.--this plan of teaching the semaphore will be found very helpful, for it helps to reason out the alphabet for the student. by fixing firmly in mind a few things the student can soon reason out the alphabet for himself by a very logical plan. second step.--after the men have been taught the alphabet they should either pair off and one man send to the other, or one man should be selected to send for the entire class. at first only letters should be sent until the men have learned the alphabet thoroughly. in this way the key characters of the alphabet can be fixed in mind, as well as their relation to the other letters. third step.--the men should next be paired off and instructed to send simple messages to each other. you should insist that there be no other communication between the men than by means of their flags. fourth step.--proceed to simple qualification tests, four men working in two pairs and the pairs alternating in sending and receiving. one man of first pair should read for his companion to send. on the other end, one man should read and the other copy. the distances should be such as to preclude the possibility of conversation. forty letters per minute is a fair test; or this system may be followed: have a good signalman send combinations of letters each to the whole class. the men should read these and write them down, _one combination at a time_. time limit should be minutes. [illustration: plate ] wig wag.--time spent: same as semaphore course. the alphabet can be found in any standard signal book, or in the "manual for non-commissioned officers and privates." the dots are made to the right of the body, the dashes to the left; interval at the end of a word by dipping the flag once to the front, at the end of a sentence by dipping it twice, and at the end of a message by dipping it three times. the alphabet should be learned first according to the same general plan as in the semaphore; _i.e._, the key letters to certain combinations should first be learned. the following grouping of letters may be found helpful: e i s h; t m o; a u v; n d b; r f l; k c y; w p j; g z q. the instructor can find many other groupings that will aid him. it should also be pointed out that each number from one to ten consists of five characters, and that each succeeding number follows the previous one according to a regular method. after the men have studied the alphabet sufficiently, have them send to each other, limiting the work at first to letters only. then gradually work up to the point where they may send simple messages. make them rely upon the flags for communicating during the practice. do not permit conversation--separate the men by a considerable distance. in both wig wag and semaphore instruction the same plan should be followed as in teaching a foreign language; _i.e._, confine all communication to the medium under study. qualification tests are similar to those for the semaphore, except that less speed can be exacted; characters per minute or combinations of letters each to be received and written down in minutes. in both the semaphore and the wig wag men should be taught the conventional signals used in field work. these can be found in any manual on the subject. points to remember. the semaphore is a quicker means of communication than the wig wag; but the wig wag can be used in a prone position under shelter. lanterns can be used at night for semaphoring. acetylene lamps can be used at night in place of the wig wag. in this case a short flash represents a dot, a long flash a dash. a few men in each company should be developed into expert signalers; some men always show aptitude for this sort of thing. frequent use should be made of signaling in field work. letter codes. infantry. for use with general service code or semaphore hand flags. --------------+---------------------------+---------------------------- letter of | if signaled from the rear | if signaled from the firing alphabet | to the firing line | line to the rear --------------+---------------------------+---------------------------- am | ammunition going forward. | ammunition required. ccc | charge (mandatory at | am about to charge if | all times). | no instructions to the | | contrary. cf | cease firing | cease firing. dt | double time or "rush." | double time or "rush." f | commence firing. | fb | fix bayonets. | fl | artillery fire is causing | | us losses. | g | move forward. | preparing to move forward. hhh | halt. | k | negative. | lt | left. | o | what is the (r.n., etc.)? | what is the (r.n., etc.)? (ardois and | interrogatory. | interrogatory. semaphore | | only). | | | | ..--.. | what is the (r.n., etc.)? | what is the (r.n., etc.)? (all methods | interrogatory. | interrogatory. but ardois | | and | | semaphore). | | p | affirmative. | affirmative. rn | range. | range. rt | right. | right. sss | support going forward. | support needed. suf | suspend firing. | suspend firing. t | target. | target --------------+---------------------------+---------------------------- arm signals. the following arm signals are prescribed. in making signals either arm may be used. officers who receive signals on the firing line "retreat back" at once to prevent misunderstandings. forward march.--carry the hand to the shoulder; straighten and hold the arm horizontally, thrusting it in direction of march. this signal is also used to execute quick time from double time. halt.--carry the hand to the shoulder; thrust the hand upward and hold the arm vertically. double time, march.--carry the hand to the shoulder; rapidly thrust the hand upward the full extent of the arm several times. squads right, march.--raise the arm laterally until horizontal; carry it to a vertical position above the head and swing it several times between the vertical and horizontal positions. squads left, march.--raise the arm laterally until horizontal; carry it downward to the side and swing it several times between the downward and horizontal positions. squads right about, march (if in close order) or, to the rear, march (if in skirmish line).--extend the arm vertically above the head; carry it laterally downward to the side and swing it several times between the vertical and downward positions. change direction or column right (left), march.--the hand on the side toward which the change of direction is to be made is carried across the body to the opposite shoulder, forearm horizontal; then swing in a horizontal plane, arm extended, pointing in the new direction. as skirmishers, march.--raise both arms laterally until horizontal. as skirmishers, guide center, march.--raise both arms laterally until horizontal; swing both simultaneously upward until vertical and return to the horizontal; repeat several times. as skirmishers, guide right (left), march.--raise both arms laterally until horizontal; hold the arm on the side of the guide steadily in the horizontal position: swing the other upward until vertical and return it to the horizontal; repeat several times. assemble, march.--raise the arm vertically to its full extent and describe horizontal circles. range, or change elevation.--to announce the range, extend the arm, toward the leaders or men for whom the signal is intended, fist closed; by keeping the fist closed battle sight is indicated; by opening and closing the fist, expose thumb and fingers to a number equal to the hundreds of yards; to add yards describe a short horizontal line with forefinger. _to change elevation_, indicate the _amount of increase or decrease_ by fingers as above; point upward to indicate increase and downward to indicate decrease. what range are you using? or what is the range?--extend the arms toward the person addressed, one hand open, palm to the front, resting on the other hand, fist closed. are you ready? or i am ready.--raise the hand, fingers extended and joined, palm toward the person addressed. commence firing.--move the arm extended in full length, hand palm down, several times through a horizontal arc in front of the body. fire faster.--execute rapidly the signal "commence firing." fire slower.--execute slowly the signal "commence firing." to swing the cone of fire to the right, or left.--extend the arm in full length to the front, palm to the right (left); swing the arm to right (left), and point in the direction of the new target. fix bayonet.--simulate the movement of the right hand in "fix bayonet." suspend firing.--raise and hold the forearm steadily in a horizontal position in front of the forehead, palm of the hand to the front. cease firing.--raise the forearm as in _suspend firing_ and swing it up and down several times in front of the face. platoon.--extend the arm horizontally toward the platoon leader; describe small circles with the hand. squad.--extend the arm horizontally toward the platoon leader; swing the hand, up and down from the wrist. rush.--same as _double time_. the signals platoon and squad are intended primarily for communication between the captain and his platoon leaders. the signal platoon or squad indicates that the platoon commander is to cause the signal which follows to be executed by platoon or squad. chapter . guard duty. time spent: study, hours. conference, hours. formal guard mounting. guards are divided roughly into four classes: . exterior--(which come more properly under head of field service). . interior--their purpose is to preserve order, protect property and enforce police regulations. . military police--also treated of in field service. . provost guards--used in the absence of military police to aid civil authorities in preserving order among soldiers beyond the interior guard. here we are concerned chiefly with interior guards. we shall make up a brief summary of what an officer must know and what he ought to teach his non-coms. and men. also we shall touch upon the subject of guard duty as it has been changed by trench warfare. an officer ought to have a good grasp of the following subjects relative to guard duty: . guard mounting (both formal and informal). . posting reliefs. . preparation and running of rosters. . general orders--also special orders at post no. . . duties of the following in reference to guard duty: . commanding officer. . officer of the day. . adjutant. . sergeant major. . commander of the guard. . sergeant of the guard. . corporal of the guard. . musicians. . orderlies and color sentinels. . privates of the guard. . compliments of the guard. . prisoners: general. garrison. awaiting trial. awaiting result of trial. how is an officer arrested? can an enlisted man arrest him? how is a non-com. arrested? how is a soldier arrested? how is a civilian arrested? (see a.w. no. .) an officer ought to-teach to his non-coms. as much of the above as is consistent with time and other demands; he ought to teach to his privates all that is necessary to the proper discharge of their duties in this connection. formal guard mounting.--here follow a few reminders that may help the reader to keep the ceremony in mind: . weather conditions permitting, guard mounting takes place every day at the discretion of the c.o. . tour of duty is hours; there are reliefs, hours on and hours off. no organization is detailed for guard duty more than once in days if this can be prevented. ceremony.-- . the band takes post, its left paces to the right of where the right of the guard is to be. . adjutant's call.--the adjutant marches to the parade ground (sergeant major on his left) and takes post paces in front of and facing the center of where the guard is to rest. the sergeant major continues on, marches by the left flank and takes post paces to the left of the band and facing in the direction the line is to extend. . the details are marched to the parade ground by the senior non-commissioned officers, halted and dressed as follows: first detail.--non-commissioned officer.-- . detail; . halt. the detail is halted against the left arm of the sergeant major; the non-commissioned officer steps out, faces the sergeant major at a distance slightly greater than the front of the detail and commands: . right; . dress. the detail dresses on the line formed by the sergeant major and the commander of the detail. . front. the commander of the detail salutes and reports: "the detail is correct" (or otherwise). when the report is made the sergeant major returns the salute. the commander of the detail passes by the right of the guard and takes post in rear of the right file of his detail. other details.--non-commissioned officers.-- . detail; . halt; . right; . dress; . front. each commander of a detail halts his detail, dresses it on the general line, salutes and reports as does the first; then takes his post in a similar manner. should the commander of a detail not be a non-commissioned officer he passes by the right of the guard and retires. . sergeant major.--he takes one step to the right, draws sword and verifies the detail, and then commands: "count off." he completes the last squad if necessary and indicates the division into platoons: then takes his post and commands: . open ranks; . march. this is executed as laid down in the infantry drill regulations. . front. he then moves parallel to the front rank until opposite the center, turns to the right, halts half-way to the adjutant, salutes and reports: "sir, the details are correct" (or otherwise). . adjutant: "take your post." (adjutant draws saber.) . sergeant major.--faces about, approaches to within two paces of the center of the guard, turns; to the right and moves three paces beyond the left of the guard, turns to the left, halts on the line of the front rank, faces about and brings his sword to the order. (when the sergeant major has reported the officer of the guard takes his post, as shown in the diagram, and draws saber.) . adjutant.-- . officer (officers) and non-commissioned officers; . front and center; . march. at "center" the officer carries saber; at "march" the officer advances and halts paces from the adjutant, remaining at the carry; non-commissioned officers pass by the flank, move along the front and form in order of rank from right to left, paces behind the officer, remaining at the right shoulder. if there is no officer of the guard the non-commissioned officers halt paces from the adjutant. the adjutant assigns them to their positions in order of rank--commander of the guard; leader of the first platoon; leader of the second platoon, etc., and commands: . officer (officers) and non-commissioned officers; . posts; . march. at the command "march" they take their posts as prescribed in the school of the company with open ranks (platoon leaders paces in front of center of their platoons). . adjutant: "inspect your guard, sir." . officer of the guard.--faces about and commands: "prepare for inspection." . adjutant (after the inspection is ended, and after posting himself paces in front of and facing center of the guard--at the same time the new officer of the day takes position about paces behind the adjutant, facing the guard, and with the old officer of the day pace in rear and paces to the right): . parade; . rest; . sound off. (the band, playing passes in front of the officer of the guard to the left of the line, returns to its post and ceases to play.) . guard; . attention; . close ranks; . march. (as in the school of the company.) . present; . arms. he then faces the new officer of the day, salutes, and reports: "sir, the guard is formed." . new officer of the day (returning salute): "march the guard in review, sir." . adjutant.--he carries saber, faces about, brings the guard to the order and commands: " . at trail, platoons right; . march; . guard; . halt." the band takes post paces in front of the first platoon, the adjutant paces from the flank and abreast of the commander of the guard, and the sergeant major paces from the flank of the second platoon. adjutant commands: " . pass in review; . forward; . march." . commander of the guard (as the guard reaches a position paces from the officer of the day): . eyes; . right; (at paces beyond the officer of the day) . front. at paces beyond the officer of the day the adjutant and the sergeant-major halt, salute and retire. . commander of the guard (as the adjutant and the sergeant major retire): . platoons, right by squads; . march. the guard is then marched to its post; the old guard is then relieved and sentinels posted according to the principles laid down in the manual of interior guard duty. (see diagrams at the end of this chapter.) guard duty in the trenches.--it differs from guard duty as we are accustomed to it. the challenge is not "who is there?" but rather a sudden and imperative "hands up." the party challenged throws up his hands and gives the countersign in a low voice. sentinels are posted in the front line and in the line of dugouts, one at each entrance to a dugout to give immediate warning. watchers are posted at places having a good range of view; at night they keep watch over the parapets rather than through the loopholes since the latter afford only a narrow range of view. auto riflemen ( or to a post) are used as watchers, one being on duty at a time. they should have a favorable background to provide concealment. [illustration: plate ] [illustration: plate a.] chapter . company administration. company administration is a very broad subject and can be really learned only by experience. however, this chapter will attempt to point out a few suggestions and practices that may prove of some assistance, particularly to the new officer. we shall treat briefly of the first organization of the company; then we shall try to reproduce in some slight measure the actual work of a day in camp (more particularly of a training camp such as plattsburg); then finally we shall treat of the orderly room and some of the problems that come up in army paper work. notes on organization. (by major w.h. waldron, twenty-ninth infantry.) . prepare in advance to receive men assigned to company. (a) detail one of the lieutenants in charge of the company mess. duties.--secure the necessary kitchen and dining room equipment and prepare everything to start the mess; make up a bill-of-fare for a week based on the ration components and supplies available; secure the rations and issue them to the cooks daily. train a mess sergeant in the duties that fall to him. in fine, this lieutenant will have complete charge of the company mess, the cooking, and serving of the meals, training of cooks and men detailed for duty in connection with the mess. (b) detail the other lieutenant in charge of property. duties.--procure all the articles of individual and company equipment from the regimental supply officer. get into the company storeroom and prepare it for issue. train the company supply sergeant in the duties that will fall to him. (c) this leaves the company commander free to organize the orderly room and make the necessary preparations to receive the men as they report. if in cantonment.--lay out the quarters into platoon sections and subdivide these into squads, allowing space for platoon leaders and guides. starting at the end of the quarters plainly mark each squad section, beds, four on each side of the aisle with the number of the squad--first squad, second squad, etc. if in tents.--number the tents, one for each squad, leaving two tents in the center for platoon leaders, guides, etc. prepare a sheet having a space for each squad, large enough to enter eight names in it. prepare a measuring post where the men can be measured for height as they report. . men reporting: (a) when the men arrive they will be sent to regimental headquarters direct. there they will receive their assignment to a company. when so assigned they will be directed to join the company. (b) a table on which is spread the squad assignment sheet is located at the head of the company street. nearby is located the measuring post. when a man reports, look him over, receive him in the company, make him feel at home. make him feel that he is welcome. this little act will pay you large dividends in contentment and company _esprit de corps_ later on. turn him over to the man in charge of the measuring post to get his height. assign him to a squad corresponding to his height. enter his name in the squad space to which he is assigned and send him to the section of the cantonment designated for that particular squad. detail a few of the first men who report for duty to assist in this work. say you have squads. they will run in height about as follows: st squad, over feet; nd, feet; rd, feet; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches; th, feet inches. if there are more squads put them in the feet to feet inches class. (c) as soon as practicable place one member of the squad in charge for the ensuing hours, change this detail every day until every man of the squad has had an opportunity to demonstrate his ability. this will assist you greatly in the selection of your non-commissioned officers. (d) should the entire company be assigned in a body, line them up in a row according to height and assign them to squads. place the most likely looking man in each squad in charge for the time being. . issue of equipment: (a) the articles of camp equipment, bedding and poncho should be issued as soon as practicable. these are necessary for the immediate comfort of the men. (b) hold the articles of personal equipment for issue later on. do not dump the entire equipment on a man all at once. there is nine-tenths of it that he knows nothing about. he does not know what it is for. as the training progresses you can issue it to him, an article or two at a time until he has finally gotten all of it. before issuing an article, explain at a company formation, what it is for, the purpose it serves and where it is carried. (c) uniforms and clothing should be procured as soon as practicable. the commanding officer will indicate whether or not the clothing will be requisitioned for in bulk or on individual clothing slips. the supply officer will provide a quartermaster publication which shows the sizes of clothing by the numbers. seek out a couple of tailors in the company, have them measure the men and make a record of the sizes of clothing that they require. shoes will have to be fitted to each man. make them large enough. the average recruit will want to wear a shoe at least one size too small for him. when he gets the pack on and drags it around all day his feet will swell and fill his small shoes to the bursting point. do not let the men decide what size shoes they will wear; you decide it for them and make them plenty big. this work of measuring the men can be started right out the first day. the captain that gets in his requisition first, properly made out, will be the first to get his clothing. . organization: (a) as soon as practicable get the company organized into permanent squads. try out squad leaders for a few days. you will soon be able to select the men that you will want for non-commissioned officers. be careful in their selection so that you will not have to make many changes. don't be in too much of a hurry about making sergeants; try them out as corporals first. try to get a good man and start him in as mess sergeant. a man with hotel experience, especially the kitchen and dining room end of the business, give him a trial. your lieutenant in charge of the mess can tell in a day or two how he stacks up. make it plain that the men detailed from day to day are merely acting non-commissioned officers and that you are merely placing them in charge to give them an opportunity to demonstrate their ability. it's better to work this proposition out in a systematic manner than it is to jump in and make a lot of non-commissioned officers that you will have to break later on to make way for better men. give your acting non-commissioned officers all the responsibility you can. assign tasks with their squads and see how they get away with it. (b) at one of the first formations explain the rules of camp sanitation and personal cleanliness and the necessity for their strict observance. (c) start right out with a system of rigid inspections so that the men will acquire habits of cleanliness and tidiness of their surroundings. once this is acquired it is easily maintained. the reverse of this statement is equally true. let a company get started in a slovenly, untidy manner and it is difficult to get it back on the right track again. (d) as soon as uniforms are issued have every man dispose of his civilian clothing, dress suit cases, trunks, etc. there is no place for them in the cantonments or tents. strip right down to uniforms and allow no civilian clothing around. (e) before issuing rifles provide places for their safe keeping in cantonments. if wooden trunks are used, a wire staple driven into the upright of the bed at the height of the slacking swivel forms an excellent support; simply hook the slacking swivel into the staple. (f) get every man interested in the company. be personally interested in every man yourself. do not permit any swearing at the men or around the barracks. explain the idea of military courtesy and the salute and insist on its being carried out at all times. by doing all of these things and systematizing your work of training and instruction right from the start you lay the foundation for a "good company." fifteen good companies make a "good regiment" and so on up to the division, and that's what we want "good divisions"--the basis of which lies in the "good company" which you are going to command. day's routine.--the day's routine will soon develop and cannot be a stereotyped thing. it will be determined to a large extent by local conditions. but in all training camps some such model as the following will no doubt be followed: reveille: first call, . a.m. march, . a.m. assembly, . a.m. at first call the non-commissioned officer in charge of quarters, or some other charged with that duty, will go through the barracks and awaken the men. after a short time this may be dispensed with. mess: first call (followed by mess call), . a.m. assembly, . a.m. allow the men approximately minutes for breakfast and the privilege of returning individually--this for purposes of attending to the calls of nature. sick call, . a.m.--have the non-commissioned officer in charge of quarters put through this call; the sick will report to the orderly room, be entered on the sick report and marched to the hospital by the same non-commissioned officer. all men answering sick call should be questioned as to the nature of their trouble and its cause; men who are trying to dodge work should be caught up with. care should be exercised in making out the sick report; be careful what you put on it and where you put it. the sick report will be treated further under "paper work." morning instruction: first call, . a.m. assembly, . a.m. recall, . m. utilize this time according to the schedule laid down by higher authorities. it will no doubt be insisted that the schedule be closely adhered to; but this can be done without completely destroying individual initiative. mess: first call (followed by mess call), . p.m. assembly, . p.m. allow minutes for noon mess. the men may not consume it all; but judgment must be used in this matter. after mess have the company formed and marched back to barracks. this plan should be followed for a time, at least, particularly with "green" men purely for disciplinary purposes. afternoon instruction: first call, . p.m. assembly, . p.m. recall, , p.m. same general procedure as for morning work. sick call, . p.m.--when the sick report is sent to the hospital in the afternoon, it is customary to make a new entry for all men who are in the hospital. in this way a running account is kept and quickly referred to without running all through the book. the time from recall to retreat at . or thereabouts can usually be used to advantage in cleaning up and getting ready for this ceremony. retreat.--(formal--on the parade grounds). first call, . p.m. assembly, . p.m. retreat, . p.m. mess: first call, followed by mess call, . p.m. assembly, . p.m. school call (except saturdays), . p.m. tattoo, . p.m. call to quarters, . p.m. taps, . p.m. at taps lights should be out and absolute quiet should prevail. this rule should be insisted upon from the very beginning of the training period. a check roll call is often taken at taps and the company reported to the officer of the day. likewise, the company is reported to the officer of the day at reveille, retreat and mess formations; however, these things are determined entirely by local conditions. sundays and holidays.--calls are / hour later, except retreat, tattoo, call to quarters and taps. in case an entertainment is given on the post, taps usually follow its close by a half hour. details for any day should be published at retreat formation the day previous; bulletins and notices should also be published to the company at this formation. paper work.--paper work in the army is generally viewed askance. a certain amount of it is absolutely necessary, but the amount can be reduced by careful attention to the way in which the work is done. a good first sergeant and a good company clerk will take a load of trouble off the shoulders of the company commander in this respect; but usually these men must be trained. instructions on the blank forms should be carefully read the first time a certain paper is made out. attend to all paper work promptly and make a note of anything that cannot be handled immediately. do not let anything get into the company files until it has been o.k'd. by the company commander or initialed by the officers. have a basket for the company commander and one for the other officers where they may expect to find matters that are of interest to them. get reports, requisitions and other papers in on time. do not wait until they are called for. establish a daily, as well as a monthly, system of doing things in the orderly room and then stick to it as nearly as possible. have a file for: . general orders, post and w.d. . special orders. . memorandums, bulletins and notices may be included under this head. . company orders. . document file (copies of letters, etc.). the needs for files will be determined largely by local conditions. the point is to have things where they can be found readily under an appropriate heading; and to have them accessible to others besides the company clerk. keep a copy of everything, as nearly as possible, but do not clutter up your company files with unimportant items. keep your orderly room looking as neat as possible. military correspondence.--a very important feature of army paper work. neatness, brevity and clarity are to be sought--ceremonial forms are avoided. references to army regulations: paragraphs , , , , , , , , , (g.o. w.d.). a letter consists of three parts; heading, body and signature. the heading consists of designation of the command, place and date, all placed in the upper right-hand corner. at the left, and with a margin of about an inch, should be: from: to: subject: a double space should be left between these lines. the body should be divided into numbered paragraphs, each paragraph treating of but one topic. the lines should be single-spaced, but a double space should be left between the paragraphs. the signature should be made without any unnecessary forms. any good treatise on this subject will show the proper forms for a military letter. indorsements follow the signature in succession on the same page or on added pages. they are very brief, follow a prescribed form and, if necessary, are paragraphed in the same way as the letter. letters should be made in three, four, five or six copies, according to destination. they should always be handled through military channels; time will be lost if you try to dodge it. morning report.--this is a complete record of daily events and should be kept with great care. it is submitted daily to the proper authority, checked and returned. any standard work on this subject will show the proper method of making entries. be sure to make entry of all events affecting your company, its numbers or condition. if there is no change, say so. ration return.--this form is made out in duplicate for periods of from days to a month. in case men join the company after the ration return has been submitted for a given period, one ration for each man for each day from date of joining to date of submitting next return, may be drawn on the next return. the same plan is followed in making deductions for men in the hospital or absent from the company. for ration allowances see a.r. - . sick report.--a commissioned officer of the company and the medical officer sign on one line following the last entry for the occasion. neither may encroach on the territory of the other and both enter their opinions as to whether the sickness is in line of duty. no erasures are allowed. duty roster.--for any roster the key word should be "equality of all duties." it means the difference between contentment and dissatisfaction among your men. keep an exact list of men available for every duty and detail them in exact rotation; adjust to complete satisfaction any little differences that arise. let the men know that you want to give them a square deal and they will respond. the longest man off duty is the first man to be called. in the regular service the roster covers guard duty and other duties, notably kitchen, police and other fatigue work. monthly return.--the form is self explanatory. read the instructions on the blanks before filling them in. by keeping in the company a record of events you can easily fill out the return properly when the time comes. service record.--references in army regulations: paragraphs , , , , , , , , , . article . the service record is a complete personal history of the soldier and follows him wherever he goes. it contains: a descriptive list, report of assignment, record of prior service, current enlistment, military record, record of allotments, clothing account and settlement, deposits, indorsements (this latter to give reasons for change of status or station of the soldier). discharge.--discharges are of three kinds: honorable, dishonorable and plain discharge. the first is on a white sheet and entitles the soldier to re-enlist; the second is on a yellow sheet and is given following sentence of a general court-martial; the third is on a blue sheet and is given on account of physical disability--it does not entitle the soldier to re-enlist. final statement, a.r., art. .--the final statement is issued to every enlisted man upon his discharge unless he has forfeited all pay and allowances and has no deposits due him. the final statement is not to be prepared on the type-writer. money amounts shall be written in both figures and words. the final statement should show the amount due the soldier for: additional pay; clothing; deposits; pay detained; miscellaneous causes. it also should show the amounts due the united states by the soldier for various reasons. in addition it should also state the period covered by the last pay of the soldier. officers signing and certifying to the various entries are responsible. muster roll. a.r. article .--the muster roll is made bi-monthly and great care should be taken in its preparation to make it both correct and complete. all officers and enlisted men are taken up on the muster roll from the date of receipt of notice of assignment. the following are entered on the rolls: . commissioned officers belonging to the organization, in order of rank. . commissioned officers attached to the organization, in order of rank. . non-commissioned officers in order of grade. . all others except musicians and privates, alphabetically arranged in order of grade. . musicians. . privates. all names, except those entered by rank, are entered in alphabetical order with the last name first. the names of enlisted men attached to the company are borne on a detachment roll. this is not true of officers attached to an organization, however. remarks should be entered according to the model which can be obtained from the adjutant general's office. all changes should be noted which affect the status of the soldier. an excellent idea for retaining this data is to keep a separate card for each man and to enter thereon anything that affects his status. pay roll. a.r. - .--the pay roll is made out monthly in triplicate, one copy being retained and two copies being sent to the quartermaster. on the pay roll there are four certificates to be signed: . the commander of the organization examines the roll carefully and certifies that all entries are correct. . the inspecting and mustering officer signs certifying that all are present or accounted for--or notes exceptions. . the commanding officer witnesses the payment of each man and certifies to that effect. . the commanding officer certifies that the duplicate and triplicate are exact copies of the original. names.--the last name is entered first; _e.g._, smith, john a. but the soldier signs as follows: john a. smith. losses.--the losses should follow immediately on the next line after the last entry. they include those by reason of: discharge, transfer, retirement, desertion and the fact that the man has been dropped. each officer should check his knowledge and be sure that he knows the purpose of, and is familiar with the following papers: (references are to army regulations and to adjutant and quartermaster forms.) ( ) morning report (a.r. ). ( ) daily sick report (a.r. ), ( a.g.o.). ( ) duty roster (a.r. ), ( a.g.o.). ( ) company fund book (a.r. ), ( q.m.c.). ( ) delinquency record (a.r. ), ( q.m.c.). ( ) property responsibility: quartermaster (a.r. ), ( cc q.m.c.). ordnance (a.r. ), ( c q.m.c.). ( ) descriptive list, military record and clothing account (a.r. ), ( a.g.o.). ( ) memorandum receipts (a.r. ), ( a.g.o.). ( ) abstract record of memorandum receipts (par. , g.o., , ), ( b a.g.o.). ( ) summary court records (a.r. ), ( a.g.o.). ( ) statement of clothing charged to enlisted man ( b q.m.c.). ( ) abstract of clothing ( q.m.c.). ( ) company target records ( a.g.o.). ( ) individual clothing slips ( q.m.c.). ( ) files of orders (a.r. ). ( ) correspondence book with index (a.r. ). ( ) document file. ( ) record of rifles (p. , ordnance pamphlet no. ). ( ) record of sizes of clothing (g.o. , ). ( ) company return (a.r. ), ( a.g.o.). ( ) muster roll (a.g. ). ( ) returns (a.g. ). ( ) return of casualties. ( ) pay roll ( q.m.c.). as well as numerous other forms for special occasions which are not here listed. except for the morning report, sick report, duty roster, correspondence book and various files, practically all the afore-mentioned records are now kept at regimental headquarters instead of in the company orderly room. chapter . conferences. (time-- hours each day in afternoon.) . know your subject and be thoroughly prepared. . have an outline to refer to, showing main points you wish to cover. . do not allow a man to give an entire chapter in reply to a question. make your questions short and specific--and require answers to be the same. . get every man on his feet at least once every day. . have a laugh every little while--keep the men awake. . vary your system of calling on men so that no one will know when he is likely to be called on. . avoid reading to the men. . require men to put things on the blackboard when possible. . in case of a conference for which no time has been given for preparation, use all possible schemes to get the points home without having either a lecture or a study period. allot--a definite time and require definite results--_e.g._, allow minutes for a rough map showing the placing of a picket-- minutes for an outline of a certain chapter, etc. . never forget that there are sides to every conference--what you plan to give and what you plan to get. you must test the men to see how well they know the work but you must also make sure that every man knows it when he goes out even if he didn't when he came in. study. the study period usually comes after a full day in the open, and the warm air and artificial light soon make the most ardent soldier doze off into cat-naps. something must be done to counteract these influences and keep the men on the job. the terror of the next day's conference will not do it, as that time seems safely distant, with all night ahead. assign the men three to five questions on the work to be studied, which will be asked in conference and which require a pretty general knowledge of the subject. every man will then have a definite objective and a certain minimum of attainment for the evening. or reverse the process and let each of the class write several questions about what they have studied. the following day let these questions, with the names of the men who asked them, be read before the class and answered. the effect of reading the name of the writer is to insure careful preparation of the question and study of the subject. a good question can hardly be asked without a basis of knowledge, and a foolish question condemns its author. another plan is to let the men, whenever possible, instruct the class. announce that any man may be called upon to take charge, and the uncertainty will keep everyone studying. this plan will also give the men valuable practice in teaching others. their periods of instruction, of course, must be limited, and unsatisfactory parts of their work reviewed before the conference is dismissed. another way to stimulate study is to have a short discussion, talk or quiz just before the close of the study hour, when the men, if left to themselves, will incline to look at their watches more often than at their books. a brief explanation of the work assigned, with emphasis upon a few especially important points, makes good use of this closing time, especially when the men are required to write down the points emphasized. syllabus: small problems for infantry. (references, f.s.r., p. - , - .) first problem: advance guard and point: a. definition and function.--small patrol sent ahead from advance party for disclosing enemy's position and strength, in time for larger bodies to make suitable defensive and offensive dispositions. function primarily warning; but to give specific information, it may have to fight and thus feel enemy out. b. principles: . formed zig-zag; distance from advance party =? . controlled by leader of advance party. . speed must be great enough not to impede the main column. must not halt at first sign of enemy, nor go off on a flank. . interest and co-operation of inferiors, by adequate explanation of situation and of individual duties ("repeats"). . rules for estimating numerical strength of the moving body of troops (cf., f.s.r., sec. ). . point as a "march outpost" (=?) when the column is halted. only then may the a.g. point make any lateral arrangement of its members (cf. above). second problem: advance guard connecting file, cf., f.s.r., reference above: a. definition and function.--two men (usually) for liaison en route where elements too widely separated or roads too curved and wooded. distance to yards apart. b. principles: . constant touch with elements before and behind. . relay both ways messages sent to or from remoter parts of the column. speed and accuracy of signaling. . guide to be forward in daytime, at night on the main body. third problem: advance guard flank patrol, pp. - : a. definition and function.--for protecting a marching column from attack, by warning it on the basis of information gained in reconnaissance. interval between men depends on circumstances. b. principles: . start from near head of the column, _i.e._, from smallest element in the advance guard that can afford to cut down its numbers. . speed rather than safety, to keep abreast of own column and to force the enemy to disclose himself by firing on f.p. rather than on main body. . sent to investigate suspicious areas, _e.g._ in woods, behind houses. . action in case of firing on main body; advance and counterfire, deployed. . get-away man in rear of column. . _stick to the job_: no wandering or chasing of enemy beyond range of column. job is to warn and protect against flank attack. fourth problem: platoon as advance party: a. definition and function: body of infantry, amounting to / to / the support (depending on the number of cavalry ahead) cf., f.s.r., p. . duty.--to back up the point and the advance cavalry (if any) if fired upon; remove enemy bodies and other obstacles. b. principles: . describe general mission to inferiors. . explain individual duties to inferiors. . send out point and connecting files. . form in platoon; zig-zag. . keep going; prosecute engagements briskly, not to delay main column. . procedure under fire: deploys and drops, when fired upon; looks for enemy's direction and assigns target and range. advance under cover if any, when fire light; when heavy seek to divert fire to you away from main body of advance guard to facilitate latter's disposition for advance to your support. seek to drive off a weaker enemy, and to hold off a stronger. . speedy decisions. value of imaginary situations, while on the march; and planning your commands. fifth problem: combat patrol: a. definition and function.--contrasted with covering detachment, which is large enough to offer considerable resistance, the combat patrol is primarily to _warn_, especially against flank attacks. size varies widely because of looseness in definition, _e.g._, men might be _covering detachment_ for a regiment, but a combat patrol for a brigade. b. principles: . comparison of thin line versus thin column, regarding: (a) vulnerability, (b) fatigue, (c) tactical advantage, when engagement materializes, (e) control of movement and of fire. . agent between advance and main body. . attack any enemy of reasonable size that attacks main body. . corn as concealment versus corn as obstruction to sight. . vulnerability of charging cavalry. . lieutenant as tactical chief, sergeant as disciplinarian, in a platoon; except when? . messages concise, not ambiguous, written versus oral? repeats. . limitations of use of map. vegetation changes; errors in contouring. sixth problem and seventh problem: two pickets: a. definition and function.--outpost contrasted with advance guard in that former is stationed around a camp or bivouac, while latter precedes a marching column. to check enemy attempting to attack main body, and hold him till larger force is able to deploy. consists of outpost reserve, outpost line of supports, line of outguards (pickets, sentry squads, and cossack posts), plus sentinels, patrols, etc. picket ordinarily merely warns of an attack, but may offer resistance. b. principles: . smooth posting of outpost very desirable; influence of delay on spirits of men, after day's march. . outpost support sends out pickets. . picket sends out sentry squads, cossack posts, sentinels, etc. . provisional dispositions by leaders of outguard elements; importance of good sketch; intrenchments? . confirmation and alteration by higher officers; especially changes at night regarding layout and manning. fire ineffective at night except at short ranges. . roster =? . instructions regarding enemy's position and strength, and the friendly outguards to right and left. . mode of numbering elements (from right to right). arrangement for smooth withdrawal of each element upon stronger one. . disposition of strangers; use for information. . need of explicit arrangements in case of attack in day or night. . sleep near arms. eighth problem--cossack post and sentry squad: a. definition and function: . cossack post: men in charge of a corporal (usually) primarily to observe and warn; secondarily to keep concealed, and intercept strangers who might be useful to enemy or to us. . sentry squad: men in charge of a corporal. duties similar but strength is greater. posts double sentinel. . post important enough for a cossack post is often doubled into a sentry squad at night. b. principles: . opportunity to "pick off" enemies ought to be ignored until position of c.p. or s.s. or of its supporting body has unquestionably been learned by enemy. then fire away. . _stop_ enemy's patrolling. is as important as to _force_ your own observation. . advantages of s.s. over c.p. for night work: (a) strength, (b) sureness, (c) adequacy of observation before firing alarm. . use of prisoners, and papers on dead bodies. . value of imagining yourself in position of enemy commander in deciding what enemy dispositions you will combat him with. ninth problem: reconnoitering patrol: a. definition and function.--gather information in the field. no resistance unless compelled. concealment and flight rather than resistance by fire: opposite of "covering detachment." b. principles. . judgment in deciding what equipment is appropriate to the particular patrol. . sketch copies; contours as guides for concealed route. . fight only in self defence. . how to question hidden sentinel without disclosing his position to enemy. . judicious choice of cover in approaching destination. . dating and placing of messages. . rate of passage of troops: "rule of - - ." tenth problem--visiting patrol: a. definition and function: two men or more sent from supports and pickets liaison between adjoining outguards. more useful at night, because of reduced visibility of terrain between outguards. . inform the sending body of conditions at sentinel posts. . prevent enemy from penetrating lines between posts. . exchange information between adjoining posts. . take back captured strangers to commander. . reenforce feeling of mutual support among the isolated sentinels. b. principles. . keen sight and hearing; silence. . need of signals. both countersign and check--countersign. . equipment; nothing that rattles or glistens. . disposition: leader in front, because of need for quick decision. . distance not over two miles even in most open country. . danger of startling a friend sentinel by unwarned approach. eleventh problem--detached post: a. definition and function.--posted where connection cannot be easily maintained with other elements of outpost. sent usually by outpost reserve or by main body, and retires to them, rather than to the line of supports. function same as element of outpost proper,--_observation, resistance, reconnaissance_; but less resistance than _warning_. may be as small as men, or as large as a support, depending on location and importance of detached position. b. principles. . established under precautions, because of danger of enemy breaking between the main body and the detached post. . entrenchment: what time of day? what other circumstances? treatment of bridges? night? . requisitioning order: need of payment; for justice, for military advantage later (reassure farmers through whose territory you will need to pass and keep supplied). twelfth problem--requisitioning detachment or patrol: a. definition and function.--a patrol may have any mission: here it is sent to take (on payment) the provender designated. a.r.d. sent by commander with specific instructions, is legal; a raid for booty illegal. (see f.s.r., sec, .) b. principles. . preparation essential. . sending of men singly or in pairs across open spaces. . deliberate start on _wrong_ road to deceive enemy scouts. . not to fire unless obliged,--until return trip. thirteenth problem--a contact patrol: a. definition and function.--a small patrol sent out from a stationary body of troops, usually at night, to find out whether enemy is starting a retreat. (compact formation in column.) b. principles. . travel light, but prepare to spend some time lying still. . route rear and parallel to a road, but not on it. . do not attack enemy patrols unless necessary. . get through enemy line of observation and watch support or larger body. . return together when you have definite information. do not send single messengers. fourteenth problem.--a small outguard: the principles used in are same as those listed under - ; and should be clinched by assigning yourself the problem of completely arranging an outpost for a brigade to be encamped or bivouacked at some assigned position on the hunter's town sheet. exchange solutions, for mutual criticism. examinations. the following examinations, given at the second plattsburg training camp, will enable students of military matters to form some idea as to where they stand in their grasp of the subject: plattsburg training camp: . explain the "position of the soldier." (par. , i.d.r.) . being at parade rest, explain position of right foot. (par. , i.d.r.) . explain the "hand salute." (par. , i.d.r.) . ( ) give length of full step (a) in quick time, (b) in double time. ( ) how is the full step measured? (par. , i.d.r.) . explain "halt" from quick time. (par. , i.d.r.) . explain position of butt of rifle at "order arms" standing. (par. , i.d.r.) . explain position of left forearm at present arms. (par. , i.d.r.) . at parade rest under arms (rifle), explain position of left hand. (par. , i.d.r.) . the squad being in line explain "squad right." (par. , i.d.r.) . the company in line, give commands and explain "to dismiss the company." (par. , i.d.r.) * * * * * . being in any formation assembled, give commands and explain movements for deploying the squad as skirmishers. (par. , i.d.r.) . when deployed as skirmishers (a) how do the men march? (b) how are the pieces carried? (c) who is the guide? (d) what is the normal interval between skirmishers? (e) what is the length of the front of the squad when deployed at normal intervals? (par. , i.d.r.) . in what formations are the loadings executed? (par. , i.d.r.) . at the preparatory command for forming skirmish line, what does each squad leader do? (par. , i.d.r.) . in what direction does a deployed line face on halting? (par. .) . being in skirmish line, explain the movement "platoon columns." march. (par. , i.d.r.) . what is the purpose of the advance in a succession of thin lines? (par. , i.d.r.) . name three classes of fire. which class is normally employed in action? (par. - - , i.d.r.) . why is it necessary to have proper distribution of fire? (par. , i.d.r.) . explain briefly the functions of platoon leaders, platoon guides and squad leaders in the fire fight. (par. , i.d.r.) . explain the position of parade rest (without arms). (par. , i.d.r.) . being in the position of the soldier, explain the position of the heels, feet and knees. (par. , i.d.r.) . give the commands for and explain the execution of "right face." . being at a halt, give the commands for moving forward in quick time and explain the execution thereof. (par. , i.d.r.) . (a) being in march in quick time, give the commands necessary to march in double time and explain the execution thereof, (par. , i.d.r.) (b) what is the length of step and the rate of steps per minute in double time? (par. , i.d.r.) . at "right shoulder arms": (a) explain the position of the trigger guard. (par. , i.d.r.) (b) what is the position of the barrel? (par. , i.d.r.) . in the rifle salute (right shoulder arms), describe the position of the: (a) left forearm on first count, (par. , i.d.r.) (b) left hand on first count. (par. , i.d.r.) . explain the position of the left forearm on the second count of right shoulder arms from order arms. (par. , i.d.r.) . the squad being in line explain "squad right about." (par. , i.d.r.) . explain the execution of "right by squads," march. (par. , i.d.r.) . what are the two general classes of military information? (par. , f.s.r.) . what do you understand by the term "reconnaissance?" (par. , f.s.r.) . (a) name the various kinds of patrols. (note to par. , f.s.r.) (b) what are the advantages of small patrols over strong patrols? (par. , f.s.r.) . what governs the formation adopted by the patrol? (par. , f.s.r.) . what is a field message? (par. , f.s.r.) . (a) what is the function of an advance guard? (par. , f.s.r.) (b) what of a flank guard? (par. , f.s.r.) . (a) what is an outpost? (par. , f.s.r.) (b) how are the outguards classified? (par. , f.s.r.) . define a successful march. (par. , f.s.r.) . what rules govern the halts of a column of troops on the march? (par. , f.s.r.) . (a) from a certain point off the road you observe a column of troops marching on the road. you can distinguish that these troops are infantry in column of squads. it requires minutes for them to pass a given point. how much infantry is in the column? (par. , f.s.r.) (b) the day is still, no wind blowing, further to the rear you can see a broken cloud of dust extending in prolongation of the road but cannot see the cause. what does this indicate? (par. , f.s.r.) * * * * * harvard college. school of the soldier: . define depth, distance, interval, front, base, point of rest, deployment, pace. (i.d.r. definitions.) . (a) what is the guide of the leading subdivision, in column of subdivisions, charged with? (par. , i.d.r.) (b) what is the guide of the subdivisions in rear charged with? (par. , i.d.r.) . what are orders, commands and signals. (par. , , i.d.r.) . describe position of the soldier or attention (without arms.) (i.d.r. .) . what are the rests? describe each. (par. , i.d.r.) . describe about face. (par. , i.d.r.) . (a) being at a halt, or marching in quick time, to march in double time. describe commands and how executed. (par. , i.d.r.) (b) marching in double time, to resume quick time. describe commands and how executed. (par. , i.d.r.) . what are the rules that govern the carrying of the piece? (par. , i.d.r.) . what general rules govern the execution of the manual of arms? (par. , i.d.r.) . give the rate per minute and length of the half step and full step in quick and double time. (par. , i.d.r.) . what are the arm signals for: column left, march; halt; as skirmishers, march; assemble, march; suspend firing; range, yards; fix bayonets. (par. , i.d.r.) . explain the execution of the command "right dress." (par. , i.d.r.) * * * * * school of the squad: . to suspend firing: give the commands and describe execution. same, to cease firing. (par. - , i.d.r.) . describe in detail the execution of "squads right." (par. , i.d.r.) . give the commands and explain execution for taking intervals. how does it differ from taking distances? (pars. , , , , i.d.r.) . describe in detail "right oblique, march." (par. , i.d.r.) . explain the use of "in place, halt." (par. , i.d.r.) . when can the following commands be used: resume march. (par. , i.d.r.) oblique march. (par. , i.d.r.) by the right flank, march. (par. , i.d.r.) take arms. (par. , i.d.r.) . describe by what commands and in what manner a squad is formed. . (a) being in line, give the commands and describe the movements for turning on a moving pivot. (b) being in line, give the commands and describe the movements for turning on a fixed pivot. . being in any formation, assembled, give the commands and describe the movements for deploying as skirmishers. * * * * * school of the company: . give the proper commands for the following movements: (a) company being in line, to march to the front in column of squads. (par. , i.d.r.) (b) company being in line, to form column of squads to the flank. (par. , i.d.r.) (c) company being in line, to form skirmish line. (par. , , , i.d.r.) (d) company being in column of squads, to form line to the right so the leading squad shall be on the right of the line. (par. , i.d.r.) . being in line, to align the company. give the commands and explain the movement. (pars. , , i.d.r.) . the company having gone from line into column of squads by the command: "squads right, march," state the position of the captain, two lieutenants and right and left guides. (pars. , and plate ii, i.d.r.) . show by diagram: (a) a company of two platoons in column of platoons, (b) a company of three platoons in line of platoons. (plate ii, i.d.r.) . what commands are given to form the company? . (a) who is the pivot in executing "company left?" (b) who is the pivot in executing "left turn?" military science and tactics. minor tactics. map: gettysburg--antietam (hunterstown sheet). first problem: an advance party--situation i: _your battalion_ and the _machine gun_ company occupy _center mills_, in enemy's country. the remainder of the _harvard regiment_ is encamped _two miles north of center mills_. the battalion has an outguard _at j. fohl, yards southeast_ of center mills. _it is mid-winter;_ there is _no snow_, but the _streams are frozen_. at . a.m., feb., , your battalion and the machine gun company are _hurriedly assembled, pieces are loaded_, and the column, _your company in the lead_, is marched out of town, over the southeast road. your captain calls the _officers and non-commissioned officers_ to the head of the company and gives the following verbal order: _a blue force, estimated at one battalion with machine guns, is marching north from granite hill sta. blue patrols have been reported in vicinity of henderson meeting house ( yards north of hunterstown). there are no red troops south of here. our battalion and the machine gun company are going to take up a position on the - hills, which flank this road, about miles south of here. this company will be the advance guard. the main body, which is the rest of our column, follows at yards. lieutenant allen, your platoon ( st) and the second platoon will constitute the_ advance party. _the third and fourth platoons will form the_ support, _and will follow the advance party at yards. here is a map for you. follow this road (pointing and indicating on map) through j. fohl-- - --bridge s.h., to crossroads , where you will halt and establish a_ march outpost. _i will be with the support. when we reach the outguard at j. fohl the column will halt and the advance guard will move out. posts._ the column halts at the outguard. you are lieutenant allen. required: your instructions, and dispositions in detail. situation ii: the _advance party_ has just cleared roadfork when it is fired upon from the woods along the stream about _ yards southeast_. there are probably _ rifles firing upon you_. the enemy's fire is well-directed. the _point_ has crossed the first bridge, yards south of . the _support_ has halted; but is not under fire. required: your instructions and dispositions. second problem: an advance guard point--situation i: the situation is the same as in the first problem. you are the commander of the point. required: your instructions and dispositions as the _point_ clears the outguard. required: the _point_ has just crossed the first bridge yards southeast of , when you hear firing and observe that the _advance party_ is being fired upon from the woods directly east of you. a few moments later you note a few dismounted men crossing the island about yards to the east. the firing has ceased. required: your instructions and dispositions. situation iii: the _advance guard_ has resumed its march. when the point reaches bridge s.h., it is fired upon from the woods yards to the east. about ten cavalrymen are hurriedly mounting, others are already riding into the woods. required: your instructions and dispositions. third problem: an advance guard flank patrol-- situation: the situation is the same as in the _first problem_, and follows _situation iii, second problem_. when the _advance party_ is two hundred yards from the roadfork where unimproved road leads northeast, about yards southeast of bridge s.h., lieutenant allen gives the following instructions to corporal adams, d squad: _corporal, about fifteen blue cavalry have been driven back through those woods (pointing out woods to east). when we reach the roadfork in front of us take your squad and comb the woods until you reach southern edge. from there go east until you observe the crossroads ( ) which are about yards beyond. return over first improved road running southwest to the crossroads ( ) about - / miles south of here and just under the hilltop, where you will rejoin advance party._ you are corporal adams. required: your instructions, dispositions, and route of the patrol. map reading. visibility problems. map: gettysburg--antietam (hunterstown sheet). note.--_observation points and are the hills referred to in the first problem under minor tactics._ _where one point is invisible from another, state points of interference._ _problem _. can a sentinel standing at see the roadfork (about yards south)? _problem _. an enemy patrol is marching north on the - road, and has crossed the stream ( yards north of ). can this patrol see the red outguard at from any point between stream and crossroads ? _problem _. can the sentinel at see the roadfork ( yards southwest from )? _problem _. can the sentinel at see the crossroads (about yards southeast)? * * * * * general situation--hunterstown sheet. the _harvard regiment_ camps the night of may -june on opossum creek just west of friends grove s.h. (a- ) in hostile territory. the regiment is part of a brigade, the remainder of the brigade being in camp one day's march north of center mills. problem i: an advance guard point: at daylight of june st the regimental commander receives the following message from brigade headquarters: "our aeroplanes report a large force of the enemy near hunterstown. move at once on hunterstown. develop the strength of this enemy and locate his exact position. i will send reinforcements to you by motor-train if necessary." officers call is sounded, and this information transmitted to all the officers of the regiment. the _first battalion_ is designated as _advance guard_ and ordered to move out at once by crossroads and , and road forks and towards hunterstown. major a, commanding the first battalion, designates the first two platoons of "d" company as advance party and c company and the remainder of d company as support. lieut. x, commanding the advance party, calls up all his non-commissioned officers and explains the situation to them. he then says: "sergeant mason, take men and move out on that road (pointing) as the point. at crossroads and road forks semaphore w.w. and i will indicate the direction. the remainder of these two platoons will be the advance party. i will be with it. move out." you are sergeant mason. (_a_) what instructions, and information do you give the point before you reach crossroads ? after passing crossroads about yards one of your men reports about a squad of hostile cavalry on the road south of road fork , yards east of you. (_b_) what do you do? problem ii: an advance guard connecting file: situation as in preceding problem. after the advance party has moved out about yards, captain y, commanding the support, says: "smith, you take jones and move out as connecting file." after smith and jones have moved about yards, he says: "donnelly, you take burke and move out as connecting file." you are donnelly. (_a_) what instructions do you give burke before reaching crossroads ? after passing crossroads you go about yards without seeing the connecting file in rear of you. (_b_) what do you do? problem iii: an advance guard flank patrol: situation as in preceding problem. on arriving at crossroads lieut. x commanding the advance party calls up sergeant clifford and says: "sergeant, the point has just reported a squad of hostile cavalry about a mile down this road (pointing toward road fork ). take _your squad_ and scout down this road. i will take the next road to the left leading to hunterstown. rejoin me on that road." you are sergeant clifford. (_a_) what formation do you adopt for your patrol? nothing happens until you arrive near road fork , when you hear firing from the woods southwest of you. this fire is not directed toward you. there is evidently about a squad firing. you can see no enemy in any direction. (_b_) what do you do? problem iv: platoon as an advance party: general situation same as before. you are lieut. x commanding the advance party. you have arrived near the small orchard southeast of road fork . a sharp fire is suddenly opened from the woods to the southeast, apparently from a _squad or small platoon_. (_a_) give your orders and dispositions. after firing about a minute the fire of the enemy stops. you move out into the road and can see no sign of your point or connecting files. the support is closing up on you. (_b_) what do you do? visibility problems: (_a_) can a man on hill see a man at crossroads in hunterstown? (disregard trees.) (_b_) a man stands at the point where contour crosses the road followed in above problem, just south of hill . where does the roadbed first become invisible? * * * * * map: gettysburg--- antietam (hunterstown sheet). first problem: a connecting file--situation i: the harvard regiment is in camp in hostile country the night may - in the corn field yards east of boyd s.h., just northeast of cross roads . the line of outguards extends approximately through boyd s.h., hill , mcelheny. at . a.m.; may st, the regimental commander receives the following telephone message from brigade headquarters at gettysburg (just off the map to the south)--an enemy force estimated strength one regiment is in camp miles north of center mills. his patrols were seen yesterday by our advance cavalry near guernsey and center mills. it is reliably reported that this force will march by center mills and guernsey on biglersville to-morrow morning to destroy a large amount of rolling stock at that point. move at once toward center mills to stop and drive back this force. officers call is sounded. the situation is explained to the officers and they are told to have their companies ready to move at . a.m. the st battalion is designated as advance guard. the advance guard is directed to move across the field to road fork thence north by the main road. the _first platoon_ of "a" company is designated as advance party. "b" company and the remainder of "a" company form the support. as the advance party moves out captain smith commanding the support, says to private long, "long, you and williams move out as connecting files. this is a dark night so be careful to keep connection both front and rear." before long is out of sight; he says, "scott, you and hunt move out as connecting files following long." you are scott. required: (a) what instructions do you give hunt? (b) what do you do up to the time you reach the main road at ? situation ii: after you have passed road fork in _table rock_ about yards you notice that hunt who has been watching to the rear does not seem to be alert. you look back and can see no sign of the connecting file in rear of you. it is still dark. required: what do you do? second problem: an advance guard point--general situation same as in problem i: sergeant hill and four men constitute the point. the situation has been explained to sergeant hill by the advance party commander. about daylight the point arrives at crossroads . a sharp fire evidently from about a squad is received from the house on the rise yards north along the road. you are sergeant hill. required: what do you do? third problem: an advance guard flank patrol--situation i--general situation same as problem i: up to daylight no flank patrols have been sent out. when the support reaches table rock the support commander calls corporal bell and says to him "corporal take your squad as a flank patrol up this road to the right. take the left hand road at the first two road forks and follow the road past the church and school-house until you reach this road again about - / miles north of here. report every thing you have seen when you rejoin. your squad consists of seven men besides yourself." required: (a) the disposition of your squad on the march. (b) what do you do when you hear the firing near crossroads ? fourth problem: platoon as advance party--situation--general situation same as in the first problem: when you arrive at a point about yards south of hill you hear firing yards north of you. you cannot see who is firing nor can you see the point. you are lieutenant clark commanding the advance party. required: what do you do? visibility problems: (a) when the point arrives at hill can it see the crossroads to the northeast? (b) when the flank patrol reaches benders' church crossroads can it see an enemy patrol at the house midway on the road - one mile to the northeast? (c) looking north along the center mills road from hill where does the road first become invisible? * * * * * map: hunterstown sheet. general situation: the harvard regiment encamped on the night of july - at biglerville (b- ) in hostile territory. the remainder of the brigade of which the regiment is a part is in camp miles west of biglerville. problem i: at daylight, july , the regimental commander receives the following message from brigade headquarters: "it is reported that the enemy is in force near heidlersburg. move on heidlersburg at once; locate the position of the enemy, and develop his strength. reinforcements will be sent you, if necessary." this information is transmitted to all officers of the regiment. the first battalion is ordered to move out at once as advance guard on biglerville- - road toward heidlersburg. major dunn, commanding first battalion, designates the first two platoons of c company as advance party, and d company and the remainder of c company as support. lieut. gibbs, commanding the advance party, explains the situation to his non-commissioned officers, and then orders: "sergeant dow, take four men and move out on that road (indicating road to heidlersburg) as point. the remainder of these two platoons will be the advance party and will follow you at yards. i shall be with it. move out." you are sergt. dow. how do you place your men, and what information and instructions do you give the point before you pass the orchard east of biglerville? situation : you are still sergt. dow. the point has reached crossroads . you are informed by a farmer living at crossroads that about half an hour before there were some soldiers half a mile north of on the road to center mills. he says he does not know where they went. what do you do? problem ii: the advance party has arrived at crossroads . information has come to lieut. gibbs, both from the point and from the farmer direct, that red soldiers have been seen on road to north leading to center mills. lieut. gibbs on arrival at sends out a squad under sergt. jones to patrol north on the center mills road half a mile, then east by farm road to corner, then by fence south of house and barn to opossum creek and down creek to main road again. the advance party then proceeds about yards easterly from , when the point signals "enemy in small numbers in creek bottom due north." (a) what does lieut. gibbs and the advance party do? (b) what does he tell the point to do? (c) what does the flank patrol under sergt. jones do? problem iii: because of the action taken in problem ii the reds have ceased to menace the left flank of the advance guard: (a) what does the advance party and its commander do? (b) what does he tell the point to do? another situation--problem iv: enemy is in the vicinity of hunterstown. your brigade has marched south through guernsey to road fork , and has turned east, and is about to camp in grass field north of road - , - of a mile west of . your battalion is to form the outpost. you are its major. where do you post: (a) the outpost reserve? (b) the outpost supports? (c) the outguards? (note: the sector up to and including the road center mills-- - --bridge s.h. is covered by another brigade to your left.) problem v: on the same general scheme as in problem iv. you are sergt. robinson of support no. . you are ordered by its commander to move out with squads to form a picket, outguard no. , putting out observation posts on the road about half a mile south of the support. (a) state what directions you give to your picket and how you move to your position. (b) where do you post the picket and its observation posts? (c) what orders and instructions do you give on arrival at the place selected? chapter . trench warfare. general principles. . defense may be made in depth by all organizations, down to and including the platoon, or it may be made laterally. . the smallest active segment, be it only three men, must have a chief and a second in command, who is responsible for the proper upkeep and defense of the segment. all occupants of active segments must know all instructions which should be simple. . any troops in charge of a portion of trench must never abandon it, no matter what happens, even if surrounded. . all ground lost must be retaken at once by immediate counter attack launched by the unit which lost the ground. as a matter of fact a counter attack is difficult for a platoon or company; it is really necessary for it to be made by a battalion. . each company must provide for emplacements for mine throwers to be served by the artillery and for pneumatic guns to be served by their own men. instructions to be issued by battalion commander. . disposition of companies in sector assigned (best done by sketch showing sectors assigned to companies). . special orders to companies (concerns field of fire to be obtained not only in own sector, but also in those adjoining it). . improvement of defense. (brief reports from company commanders to be followed by work being done on order of battalion commander after inspection.) . organization of watching (not sentry duty) (by company commander under supervision of battalion commander). . organization of observation (not sentry duty) (by company commander under supervision of battalion commander). . organization of supply (procuring, routing, etc., of tools, ammunition, food, water, etc.), (by company commander under supervision of battalion commander). . organization of liaison (communication) (runners, telephone, telegraph visual signaling, pigeons, etc., by company commander under the supervision of battalion commander). _all telephonic communication must be in code_. . organization of supplies to include amounts to be expected daily from the rear. . knowledge of enemy must be imparted to company commanders in order to assist them in making their dispositions. . frequent reports to be made of existing conditions at the front for information of higher commanders. . lateral defense of boyaux must not be overlooked. . wide turning movements are not possible. enveloping movements are possible only on local attacks against small portions of the hostile line after it has been pierced. all main attacks are confined to purely frontal attacks. . the most important obstacle is barbed wire entanglements. . communication (liaison) between and co-ordination and co-operation of, the different elements of a command is of the utmost importance. . artillery co-operates more closely than ever with infantry. its reconnaissance officers accompany infantry lines in order to obtain information. _there is a certain number of artillery observers attached to each battalion of infantry_. the general method of attack is to smother the defense with a torrent of explosive shells, kept up incessantly for one or more days, and shatter the defense so they will offer but slight resistance to the infantry; then rush forward with the infantry and seize the positions while the enemy is demoralized, and consolidate them before reenforcements can be brought up. the artillery bombardment is necessary to prepare the way for the infantry advance. it has for its objects: ( ) to destroy the hostile artillery, wire entanglements and infantry trenches. ( ) to produce curtains of fire and prevent bringing up reenforcements. _light guns are assigned to_ each battalion of infantry, subject only to orders of regimental and battalion commanders concerned. save under exceptional circumstances the light gun is always attached to the machine gun company for the attack. the essential role of the light gun is to destroy with direct fire the visible machine guns; they are employed separately and not grouped. the infantry is divided into two classes: holding troops--and attacking or shock troops. holding troops are those doing routine or trench duty; shock troops are picked organizations of young and vigorous men and are kept in camps well behind the battle front. holding troops are two weeks in and two weeks out of the trenches. all specialist groups, _i.e._, machine gun companies, etc., are officered, allowing company and battalion commanders to concentrate them, if the situation requires. _they play the normal part in combat if they do not receive special instructions._ attack of a defensive position. unity of command in depth must be preserved everywhere, unless there is an imperative reason for doing otherwise. the front of each regiment should be divided between two or three battalions. _each battalion commander having to look after a front of from to yards, can exercise efficient control of his command._ in preparing for an assault, seniors must take steps to organize it and make all necessary preparations themselves, and not leave all the responsibility with the juniors. in the assault each unit must know its special task beforehand, and it should be rehearsed in rear of the line of trenches. each commander must know the exact time he is to start and must start on time. the first waves of men are placed at or pace interval. chief of section can command only a front of to paces and it is necessary to form the section in two ( ) waves. the first containing the grenadiers and automatic riflemen, the latter in the center. the second wave contains the riflemen and rifle grenadiers, the latter in the center. if the terrain is cut up by woods, villages, etc., the proportion of grenadiers may be increased by taking them from the sections in support and the automatic riflemen sent back to the second wave. if the distance to cross exceeds or yards, the number of automatic riflemen should be increased. _two or three sections are usually placed abreast on the company front, which thus covers two to three hundred yards._ the support sections follow the leading sections of their company at about yards, marching in two lines, if possible in two lines of squad columns at yard intervals. the first wave of the support is usually formed of the one-half section of specialists. the echeloning of the specialists in front is also the most favorable formation to progress by rushes in a terrain cut up by shell holes. the chief of section is between the two ( ) waves of his section. the captain is usually in front of the support sections. the support sections are closely followed by a powerful line of machine guns, which are thrown into the fight when needed to reenforce the leading units. "trench cleaners" usually march immediately after the leading sections and may be taken from the support sections. they are armed with pistols, knives and hand grenades. the captain can use his section complete, or take out the specialists and use them for a particular purpose. the specialists carry only the weapons of their specialty and have their loads lightened. the ordinary riflemen carry the usual packs and equipment. officers no longer lead the assault, but direct it. they are equipped with the rifle and bayonet, the same as the enlisted man. each unit of the first wave of the attack is given a definite objective. different waves must not break upon the first wave. fire is opened by the assaulting troops only at short ranges, the advance being protected by a curtain of artillery fire. the advancing line makes use of shell holes and all other available cover. when the first section reaches its objective it is joined by the half section of riflemen; it immediately organizes the captured ground. attacking from trenches.--the commanders of brigades and battalions, with the commander of the artillery detailed to support them, study on the ground the artillery plan so far as it affects them. immediately after the advance of the infantry begins, the artillery supporting it commences an intense bombardment with the object of forcing the enemy to take cover. at the moment laid down in the table of artillery fire the barrage lifts clear of the trench and the infantry rush in and capture it. the infantry must be taught that their success depends upon their getting within yards of the barrage before it lifts, in order that they may reach the trenches before the enemy can man them. the secret of a successful assault is exact synchronization of the movements of the infantry with those of the barrage. the pace of a barrage depends, to a certain extent, on the pace of the infantry, which varies with the condition of the ground, the length of the advance, the number of enemy trenches to be crossed, etc. it may be from to yards per minute. the pace of the barrage should be quicker at first, and should gradually slow down as the men become exhausted, in order to give them time to get close to the barrage and pull themselves together for the final rush. in an attack each unit must have sufficient driving power in itself to carry it through to its objective and enable it to hold its ground when it gets there. when a number of trenches have to be carried, considerable depth will be required, and the frontage must be reduced. a brigade usually has a front in attack of to yards, but this may be increased to , or , yards. a battalion should have a front of to yards. the battalion must be organized in depth in a series of waves. two companies are usually put abreast in the first line and the others in the second line. each company in both lines attacks in column of platoons at about yards' distance, with intervals of three to five paces between men, so there would be eight lines of waves, of two platoons each. the th and th platoons, the two in rear forming the eighth wave, are usually not employed in the attack, but are left behind as a nucleus to form on in case of heavy casualties. the front line must not be less than yards from the enemy's front line. the leading two or three waves are likely to meet machine gun fire, and generally move in extended order. not more than two waves can be accommodated in one trench. subsequent waves will move in line or in line of section columns in single file. russian saps must be run out as far as possible across "no man's land" to be opened up immediately after the assault, as approach trenches. ladders or steps are necessary to assist the leading waves in leaving the trenches, as they must move in lines. provision must be made for bridges over the first line trenches for the rear waves. in the original assault line will be more suitable for both leading and rear waves. in later stages it is better for the rear waves to move in small and handy columns. in the original assault the distance between waves may be to yards; in later stages they may follow each other at yards. in the original assault, zero, or the time for the assault to begin, may be fixed for the moment at which our barrage lifts from the enemy front trench, the infantry timing their advance so as to be close under our barrage before it lifts. in the later stages zero must be the moment at which our barrage commences, and this commencement will be the signal for the infantry to leave their trenches. each wave is assigned its own objective. all watches must be synchronized in order that all units may start off at the appointed time. the first wave is composed of bombers and rifle grenade men, and attacks the enemy's first line of trenches. it must go straight through to its objective, following the artillery barrage as closely as possible. the second and third waves, composed of riflemen with bayonets and lewis guns, re-enforce the first wave after the latter has occupied the enemy's first line trench, and attack the second line trench. the fourth wave takes up tools, ammunition and sand bags and assists in consolidating the line. the fifth wave is a mopping-up party to clear the enemy's dugouts. the sixth wave comprises battalion headquarters and has two lewis guns, kept for a special purpose. the seventh and eighth waves, if used, seize and consolidate the enemy's third line trench. bombing squads ( non-commissioned officer and men) are on the flank of each attacking wave. battalion bombers are assigned a special task. all movements must be over the top of the ground. the pace throughout should be a steady walk, except for the last or yards, when the line should break into a steady double time, finishing up the last yards with a rush. barrage is continued or minutes after the objective has been reached. mopping parties must be trained with great care under selected officers. they should always wear a distinguishing mark. they must at once dispose of any occupants who may have emerged from their dugouts, and picket the dugout entrances. the ultimate unit in the assault is the platoon. it must be organized and trained as a self-contained unit, capable of producing the required proportion of riflemen, bombers, rifle bombers, lewis gunners, and carriers, all trained to work in combination. assaulting troops should have twelve hours of daylight in the trenches before the assault begins, to enable them to get acquainted with the ground and get some rest. all ranks must be given a hot meal, including hot tea or coffee, before the assault. take every precaution to prevent the enemy from realizing that the assault is about to take place. bayonets must not be allowed to show. no increase in rate of artillery fire. no unusual movements must be made in the trenches, and there must be no indication of the impending assault until the barrage is dropped. when the trench has been taken, it should be consolidated at once to prevent counterattack. to protect this consolidation, throw out an outpost line, the posts consisting of one non-commissioned officer and riflemen with a lewis gun, about to yards apart and to yards beyond the line. these posts should be established in shellholes, which are to be converted into fire trenches, protected by wire entanglements, as soon as possible. approach trenches toward the enemy should be blockaded and hand and rifle grenadiers posted to guard them. the main captured trench should be converted at once into a fire trench facing the enemy. if it is badly knocked to pieces, a new trench may be constructed or yards in front of the captured line. the commander must reorganize in depth to provide supports and reserves for counterattacks. situation reports should be sent back frequently. rough sketches are better than messages. tanks follow infantry as closely as possible to deal with strong points. they are employed in sections of four. machine guns may be used to provide covering fire for attacking infantry, cover its withdrawal if the attack fails, fill gaps in the assaulting lines, assist in the consolidation of positions and repel counterattacks. lewis guns are of great value in knocking out hostile machine guns. they usually move on the flanks of the second wave of assault. later they are used to back up patrols and to hold the outpost line while the garrison line is being consolidated. as soon as consolidation begins, wire entanglements should be constructed. every effort should be made to secure the objective against recapture. any men available should be used to continue the offensive. all commanders down to and including company commanders must keep some portion of their command as a reserve. the company commander needs his reserve to work around points which are holding against the leading lines, to protect his flanks in case the companies on his right and left are delayed in their advance and to exploit his success and gain ground to the front. he must keep it well in hand behind the company. battalion reserves must start with the assaulting column and get across "no man's land" as soon as possible; they must not get out of hand. such a reserve is usually checked in the vicinity of the enemy's front line trench, where it can be thrown in to assist the advance or extend a flank as needed. the brigade reserve is kept well in hand just clear of the friendly front line and support trenches. reserves of companies and battalions must start moving over the top of the ground with the rest of the assaulting troops. defense of trenches.--the latest methods consist in constructing, supporting and strong points at the most favorable points to be held, such as villages, woods, etc. these are separated by intervals not too great for mutual support. they are of such resisting power that they must be taken before the attack can progress. in the intervals between them fire and communicating trenches are constructed, but these are only held lightly. dummy trenches may be placed in these intervals. lines of the various works are so traced that they bring enfilading fire on troops attacking adjacent positions. the lines need not be continuously occupied, but the obstacles extend in an unbroken line along the whole front. wire entanglements are set in front of important positions in belts feet wide, in two or three rows, each yards apart. each supporting point usually is occupied by a battalion, and consists of a series of trenches formed into strong points, each held by a garrison of one or more platoons or a company. the supporting points are from to yards in depth and have a front of to , yards. the first line of strong points is occupied by one or two companies in firing and cover trenches, while the remainder of the battalion occupies the support and reserve trenches. bomb-proofs are built along the cover trenches and are connected with the firing trenches. approach trenches are protected on both flanks by wire entanglements. strong points in support and reserve trenches are prepared for an all-around defense and divided into two or more separate strong points by wire entanglements. a body of infantry attacked is to oppose to the assailant its high powered weapons, machine guns, automatic rifles, rifle grenades and hand grenades and to reserve for the counter attack the grenadiers and riflemen. there is always one line upon which the resistance must be made with the greatest energy; for its defense the following methods have been found successful. machine guns should be placed where they can secure the best flanking fire, and every one put out of action should immediately be replaced by an automatic rifle. if machine gun barrage fire is to play its role successfully at the moment of assault, the guns must survive the bombardment. their protection is secured by placing them under shelter during the bombardment and making their emplacements as nearly invisible as possible. they should be echeloned in depth as far as practicable. they are generally placed in re-entrants of the firing trenches and cover the intervals between the adjoining supporting and strong points. where the ground will permit they are often placed in concealed positions to yards in front of the trenches, to break up attacks made by hostile infantry. not too many should be placed in the front line, and they should be echeloned in depth so as to confuse their disposition. the value of machine guns depends on the possibility of using them suddenly for brief periods, and in using them as long as they are effective. machine guns disposed for flanking fire must be well covered by grenadiers; this is also true of automatic rifles. automatic rifles, rifle grenades and hand grenades are used to constitute a barrage to keep back the enemy. the entire front should be defended by a barrage of hand grenades, while the barrage of automatic rifles and rifle grenades is superposed farther to the front, up to yards. all riflemen and those grenadiers not employed in forming barrages are reserved to make a counterattack. companies on the second line operate on similar principles; machine guns, automatic rifles and rifle grenades are arranged so as to cover every portion of the first line that might be invaded. after a short preparation by fire from these, the grenadiers and riflemen make the counterattack. the captains in charge of the two lines are responsible for the arrangement of the machine guns, automatic rifles and rifle grenades, the distribution of barrages and the distribution of groups for the counterattack. the real strength of the defense consists, not in holding the fire and cover trenches, nor even the support trenches, but in holding the supporting and strong points until the counterattack can be launched. liaison.--the question of liaison in battle is of the utmost importance, and complete co-ordination of the different arms is absolutely necessary. each battalion sends an officer or non-commissioned officer and a cyclist to the colonel, and each colonel sends a soldier to the battalion commander. the principal means of communication are the telephone, telegraph, wireless, aeroplane, mounted messengers, autos and motorcycles; and at the front runners, visual signals, rockets and carrier pigeons. each battalion commander is connected by telephone with each company commander, with the artillery observers, with the artillery commander, with his own colonel and with the adjacent battalions on either side. the signallers of assaulting companies move with the company commander. all signallers should be given a special training in repeating a message several times to a known back station which may not be able to reply forward. at the commencement of the assault the pigeons and pigeon carriers must be kept back at battalion headquarters, and sent forward as soon as the position has been gained. runners can be relied upon when all other means fail. they must be trained with their companies. runners should be lightly equipped and wear a distinctive mark. they must be familiar with all the principal routes to all the principal centers within their battalion sector. the quicker they go the safer they are. company and platoon runners must go forward with their respective commanders. messages to be carried long distances will be relayed. never send a verbal message by a runner; ignore any received; all messages must be written. company and battalion commanders must be prepared to assist artillery liaison officers in getting their messages back. liaison officers must be exchanged by all the assaulting battalions with the battalion on either flank. trench orders.--(battalion): trenches are usually divided into a certain number of bays; the number of men to defend these bays depends upon the length of trench allotted to each company. each section is detailed to guard a certain number of bays. non-commissioned officers and men must always wear their equipment by day and night. every company will "stand to" arms daily one-half hour before dusk and one-half hour before dawn, and will remain until dismissed by the company commander. the enemy's trenches are so close that it is very important for the men to have their rifle sights always at battle sight, so that there will be no necessity to alter their sights in case of alarm. by night all bayonets are to be fixed and half of the men on duty in the trenches are to be sitting on the firing platform with their rifles by their side. in case of attack, especially at night, it should be impressed upon the men that they fire low. section commanders are responsible that the men under their command have sufficient standing room for the purpose of firing over the parapet. they must have a clear field of fire, and not only be able to see the enemy trenches but the ground in the immediate vicinity of their trench. when making new trenches parapets should be at least five feet thick at the top in order to be bullet proof. repairs or alterations of the parapet should be reported at once by the section commander to the platoon commander, who will report it to superior authority. repairing of trenches, fatigue, etc., will be carried on either by day or night according to company arrangement. certain hours will be allotted for these tasks and no man is to be employed upon any kind of work out of these hours. no man should leave his post in the trenches at any time without the permission of the non-commissioned officer in charge of that post. at night there should be at least one sentry post to each ten yards of parapet. at night, double sentries should be posted if possible, and no sentry should be kept on duty for longer than an hour at a time. the arrangement should be such that when one sentry is doing his last half hour, his comrade will be doing his first half hour. sentries at night should always have their rifles resting on the parapet, ready to fire at a moment's notice. as few sentries as possible should be posted by day, so as to give as much rest as possible to the remainder of the men. by day any existing loop-holes may be used by a sentry for observation purposes, but this must be strictly prohibited at night, when the sentry must look over the parapet. if a sentry is continually fired at, the section commander will post him in another position, but not too far from his original position. there is no excuse for a man going to sleep on sentry duty; if he is sick he should report the fact to the non-commissioned officer, who will report to superior authority. an armed party of the enemy approaching the trench under a flag of truce should be halted at a distance, ordered to lay down their arms, and the matter at once reported to the company commander. if the party fails to halt when ordered to do so, or does not convey a flag of truce, they should be fired upon. an unarmed party should be halted in the same way. it is not necessary to challenge at night; open fire at once. this is modified only by special instructions. men especially picked for listening patrols and sharp-shooters will be given special privileges. all loud talking must be checked at night by officers and non-commissioned officers. all working parties must wear their equipment and carry their rifles. all picks and shovels will be returned after use to the company store room. ration parties and parties carrying materials for repairs, etc., need not wear their equipment or carry rifles; they should be accompanied by a fully armed non-commissioned officer as an escort. not more than men are to be away from the company at one time; one non-commissioned officer and four men per platoon. rifles must be kept clean and in good condition while in the trenches. they will be cleaned every morning during an hour appointed by the company commander for the purpose. platoon commanders will be responsible that section commanders superintend this work. all rifles except those used by sentries are to be kept in racks during the day. trenches must be kept in sanitary condition. platoon commanders will be responsible for the latrines in their sections of the trenches. all water for drinking and cooking is to be taken from a water cart or tank provided for this purpose. stretcher bearers will be stationed at a place designated by the commanding officer. no soldier will be buried nearer than yards from the trenches. in every platoon a non-commissioned officer will be detailed for duty by day; he will do no night duty. he will post the day sentries and see that they are on the alert and carry out their orders correctly. he will be responsible for the cleanliness of his lines and will frequently visit the latrines. he will see that all loose ammunition is collected. the platoon commander will always send a non-commissioned officer to draw rations and he will be responsible for their delivery. the passing along of messages by word of mouth will not be used. all messages should be written. special instructions will be issued as to precautions against gas. selection of site. (a) fire trench should be selected with due regard to tactical requirements and the economy of men. (b) every fire trench should have a good field of fire, at least yards. (c) the trenches should have the best possible cover. (d) the forward position on a slope for the first line has the best advantage. the support trench should be on the reverse slope from to yards in rear of the first line to prevent direct observation and to be practically free from artillery fire. the reserve trench is usually from / to mile in rear of the first line. remember that the first line, the support line, and the reserve line are all fire trenches. do not put them on a crest. (e) the communicating trenches (boyaux) should be zigzagged, wide and deep, and should follow the low ground. the longest straight trench should not exceed thirty paces. the angle made by each turn should be less than degrees. (f) the fire trenches should have salients and re-entrants so as to flank the wire entanglements. the bays are usually feet long with feet of traverse. (g) there are two problems in the siting of trenches, one for those to be constructed under fire and another for those that will be constructed without any danger from fire. trenches built under fire are usually made by connecting up individual shelters made by the front line when forced to halt. trenches built under quiet conditions can be laid out according to the best possible plan. trench construction. several kinds of difficulties face the trench digger: sand, clay, water and bullets. in order to overcome them he must be familiar with the general arrangement of a trench, the principles which govern its construction and the standard trench as it has been worked out in the present war at the cost of thousands of lives. general arrangement.--a position is a combination of trenches, consisting of: the fire trench, or first line, nearest the enemy; the cover trench, just behind the first line, where all but sentinels of the fire trench garrison are held in dugouts or shelters; the support trench, from to yards in rear of the cover trench, and the reserve, from to , yards still further to the rear. the support trench is placed far enough from the first line to prevent the enemy from shelling both trenches at once. by a concentration of artillery fire and a determined advance of the hostile infantry the first line may be captured. the support trench must be so organized that it will then act as a line of resistance upon which the enemy's advance will break. lieutenant colonel azan of the french army says: "as long as the support trenches are strongly held, the position is not in the hands of the enemy." [illustration: plate # ] the reserve is usually a _strong point_, so organized that it can maintain independent resistance for several days if necessary, should the enemy obtain control of adjacent areas. where possible trenches should be on reverse slopes, with the exception of the first line; but usually the outline of a trench is determined in actual combat, or is a part of hostile trench converted. under these circumstances it cannot be arranged according to tactical ideals. artillery and the automatic gun are the determining factors in trench warfare to-day. the effect of artillery fire must be limited in its area as far as possible, and trenches are, therefore, cut by _traverses_, which are square blocks of earth not less than nine feet square, left every feet along the trench. they should overlap the width of the trench by at least one yard, thereby limiting the effect of shell burst to a single _bay_, the -foot length of firing trench between two traverses. sharp angles have the same effect as traverses, but angles of more than degrees cannot be utilized in this way. the sides of the trench are kept as nearly perpendicular as possible, to give the maximum protection from shell burst and the fall of high angle projectiles. the _parados_, the bank of earth to the rear of the trench, has been developed during the war to give protection from flying fragments of shells exploding to the rear, and to prevent the figure of a sentinel from being outlined through a loop-hole against the sky. the _berm_, a ledge or shelf left between the side of the trench and the beginning of the parados, has come into general use in order to take the weight of the parados off the earth at the immediate edge of the trench, and so prevent the reverse slope from caving in easily under bombardment or heavy rain. [illustration: plate # a] automatic guns have made it necessary to break the line of the trench at every opportunity, in order to secure a flanking fire for these arms. auto-rifles and machine guns have tremendous effectiveness only in depth, and flanking fire gives them their greatest opportunity. trench construction.--the methods of building trenches are the same whether the work is carried on under fire or not. in an attack, upon reaching the limit of advance, the men immediately dig themselves in, and later connect these individual holes to make a continuous line of trench. most of the digging must be done at night, and must be organized to obtain the most work with the least confusion. there are three ways of increasing the efficiency of the men. in the first of these, squad shifts, the squad leader divides his men into reliefs and gives each man a limited period of intensive work. reliefs may be made by squads or by individuals. the second way of increasing efficiency is to induce competition among the man and squads, thus making the work a game in which each soldier's interest will be aroused in the effort to do better than the others. the third method is to assign a fixed amount of work to each man. an average task, which all ought to accomplish in a given time, is found by experience, and those who finish before their time is up are relieved from further work during that shift, and allowed to return to their shelters. continual care must be used to check up the tools on hand, as the men are prone to leave them where they were working rather than carry them back and forth to work. each unit must guard its property from appropriation by neighbors on its flanks. system of laying out trenches.--the trace of the trench is first staked out, particularly at traverses and corners when the work is to be done at night. measurements should be exact, and the men should be required to line the limits of each trench so as not to exceed them in digging. all sod should be taken up carefully and used on the parapet for concealment or on the berm to make a square back wall for the dirt of the parapet. if possible this should be done with the parados wall, so as to make it as inconspicuous as possible from the front. men should begin to dig at the center of the trench and throw the dirt as far out on the sides as possible, so that as they go deeper the earth can be thrown just over the berm. the slope of the sides will be kept steep and the men prevented from widening the trench as they dig. in sandy soil the sides of the trench should be allowed to reach their angle of repose (which is wider at the top than required), then the trench walls supported with _revettments_ to the proper width, which are filled in behind with sand. always dig to full depth before beginning to revet, as it is impossible to dig deeper afterwards without loosening the revetting. revettments.--every trench at points needs support, and this _revetting_ may be done with any of the following materials: sod; corduroy of logs laid lengthwise; sand bags (size in. x in. x in.); galvanized iron; chicken wire and cloth made in a frame about six feet long; _hurdles_, wicker mats made by driving three-inch stakes into the ground, leaving uprights as high above the ground as the depth of the trench, then weaving withes and slender saplings between the uprights; expanded metal; _gabions_, cylindrical baskets made like hurdles except that the stakes are driven in a circle; _fascines_, bundles of faggots about inches in diameter by feet long. the faggots are laid together on a horse or between stakes driven in the ground, then "choked," or bound tightly together, by a rope feet inches long with loops at each end, tightened with two stiff levers. the bundle is then bound with wire at intervals of two feet. the circumference of a fascine should be inches. [illustration: plate # ] capt. powell of the c.e.f. found during months' service in the trenches, that a separate construction for the bottom and firing step from that of the parapet made repair much simpler when the trench was damaged by shell fire. the upper part of the trench usually suffers most, while the bottom section, if unattached, often remains intact and the drainage system needs only to be cleared out. if the portion above the firing step is one piece with that below, however, the whole trench has to be reconstructed. there is nothing more important than the supports used to keep revetting in place. with sods, sand bags, concrete and gabions, a proper arrangement in the first place will make other support unnecessary. sod should be placed carefully, with a slope of not more than one inch on four, with the vegetation uppermost. this type is least affected by rain. sand bags should be used like brickwork, laid in alternate headers (binders) and stretchers. their use should be confined as far as possible to emergency and repair work, because after a few weeks the bags rot and cannot be moved about. if the trench wall has been demolished by artillery fire, the particles of cloth make digging out the bottom of the trench a very difficult matter. concrete work has been used extensively by the germans, but the chips fly like bullets under shell explosion, and the concrete cracks and disintegrates in severe weather. it is used in the bottom of trenches for drainage and for the firing step. gabions may be set into the wall of the trench and filled with earth, or used at corners to prevent the wearing down of the edge, which reduces the protective effect of the trench. set in at a slight angle they will hold the side without further re-enforcement. with the other forms of revetting some secondary support is required. this is usually furnished by sinking stakes into the bottom of the trench and securing their upper ends to a "dead man"--a stake or log sunk in the ground more than three feet away. the tendency is to sink the dead men too near to the trench, and to attach too many wires to one of them. it is important to sink the stakes at least one foot below the bottom of the trench. by digging holes for them instead of driving them in directly, the sides of the trench need not be disturbed by the concussion of driving the stakes. this is especially important in sandy soils. stakes should be placed about two feet apart. dead men should be buried deeply enough to prevent cutting by shell explosions. trench armament.--a few machine guns are set in concealed emplacements along the trench to cover important salients. the automatic rifle is used over the parapet. besides these there is the rifle grenade and trench mortar. the rifle grenade has a simple emplacement. after securing the proper elevation, the butt of the rifle is placed between posts or blocks of wood and the muzzle rested against a log on the wall of the trench. a trench mortar emplacement is dug in the rear wall of the trench, or a shell hole is utilized, care being taken to conceal it from aerial observation. loopholes.--loopholes are still much in use for observation, but they are employed less and less for firing, as they are difficult to conceal from the enemy and almost useless when the enemy is close. they should cut the parapet diagonally, not directly to the front, and should be concealed by vegetation and by a curtain over the opening when they are not in use. sheet steel plates with small peep holes are used on the parapet. they are set up with a slope to the rear to deflect bullets. trench bottoms.--in clay or hard soil special arrangements must be made for drainage. where possible the trench should have a convex surface and should be smooth. a rough bottom means delay in reliefs, and possible injuries. where trenches are used for long periods board walks should be constructed. under these drains or sink holes can be placed to collect water. a sink hole may be constructed by digging a pit filled with small stones, or a barrel may be sunk into the ground and filled with stone. where there is not sufficient slope to carry off the water, or at the lowest point of a drainage system, a water hole should be dug in front of the trench large enough to handle the drainage water. [illustration: plate # ] communication trench (or boyau).--running to the rear and joining the different parallel resistance trenches are communication trenches or boyaux. these are for transportation of men and material as well as for communication. communication trenches should be made wide enough to allow travel for men with loads, should be at least seven feet deep and as smooth as possible on the bottom. rough places will delay traffic. they are dug with turns every or yards to prevent their being swept by gun fire. when boyaux are built by night sharp zig-zag corners should be used, or the angles will not be acute and protection will be lost. during daylight when the directions can be seen, the construction may be a serpentine curve, with no stretch of more than yards visible from one point. boyaux are sometimes used for lateral defence and often emplacements for automatic guns are arranged to cover stretches of them. bombing stations are placed near by to protect the guns and to clear the boyau of the enemy. at these points the boyau is left straight for a short distance in front. where provision is made for lateral or frontal defence by rifle fire, firing steps are constructed. if this is inconvenient for movement along the boyau, individual emplacements must be made in the side wall for firing. sentry posts are dug at right angles to the boyau. arrangements for passage of men moving in opposite directions may be made by extending short spurs at the corners, enlarging the boyau at the bends, digging niches or passing points here and there, or constructing island traverses with the boyau running around on each side. [illustration: plate # ] every boyau should be marked where it meets a trench with a sign indicating the place and trench. without this messengers, reliefs and re-enforcements may easily be lost in the maze of trenches. latrines should be run out about feet from boyaux at points directly in rear of lateral trenches. if possible they should be placed so that men cannot enter them without passing near the platoon leaders. this will prevent men from leaving the front line, under the pretense of going to latrines, during bombardments or mining operations. the trench leading to a latrine should be constructed like a boyau, and the pit should be close to the side nearest the enemy, to give the best possible protection from shell fire. there are three types of trench latrines: deep boxes which are covered and have rough seats; short straddle trenches or trenches equipped with a single horizontal bar, and portable cans, used where the ground or the limited space make it impossible to dig pits. these cans should be emptied daily into holes behind the trenches, which are covered after the cans are emptied into them. urinals should be separate from the latrines. they may be either holes about three feet deep filled with stone, troughs with a covered pit at the end, or portable cans. shelters. for the protection of men not actually on duty three forms of shelters are used. the _splinter-proof_ is a form of light shelter whose covering affords protection only against splinters. these are usually on the reserve line. about inches to inches of earth over a roof of logs or planks will afford protection from splinters and shrapnel. curved sheets of iron may also be used. the _deep shelter_ or _bomb-proof_ is a chamber constructed by digging from the surface and constructing a roof. to protect against eight-inch shells the top of the chamber should be twenty feet below the surface. heavy beams or sections of railroad iron are laid across the roof. above them is a layer of earth several feet thick; then another layer of timber extending to undisturbed ground on the sides with concrete, crushed stone, metal, etc., above to make a percussion surface for exploding projectiles that penetrate the upper layer of earth. this layer fills in the rest of the space to the level of the ground. [illustration: plate no. .] shelters should not exceed six feet in width, but can be of any length. this will prevent the crushing in of the roof timber by the explosion of a projectile buried in the upper layer of earth. the principles of constructing shelters will be considered under "dugouts," as they are similar for the two types. dugouts are chambers tunnelled into the ground with twenty feet or more of undisturbed earth above them. they are used in the cover trenches and sometimes in the first line. enough of them must be built to shelter the garrison of each sector, allowing one man per yard of front. they must also be built for machine gun and trench mortar detachments. sentries must be stationed in observation posts which command the ground in front of each dugout. they must be connected with the dugouts by telephone or speaking tube. position.--dugouts must always be on the side of the trench toward the enemy. this prevents flying shells from falling into the entrances. they should connect with lateral trenches, not with boyaux, as men at the entrance obstruct traffic through the boyaux. entrances and exits must be well concealed, with not less than five feet of head cover. this should be provided with a bursting layer. all dugouts must have at least two openings, one on the opposite side of the traverse or angle from the other. it is well to have an exit behind the parados leading to a surprise position for a machine gun and bombers. all openings must have a sill inches to inches high, to prevent water from entering the dugout. galleries leading to dugouts should be built at an incline of degrees. their dimensions should be feet inches by feet. frames are of squared timber. the sill and two side posts should be not less than inches square, and the frames in the passageways feet inches by feet inches. they must be placed at right angles to the slope of the gallery, with distance pieces between uprights. in treacherous soil the frames rest on sills. steps in the passageway are foot broad and foot high. bomb-traps, extensions of the gallery about feet long, should be dug beyond the point where the entrance to the dugout chamber leads off from the gallery. these will catch bombs thrown in from the surface and protect the chamber from the effects of their explosion. interior. the standard section is feet by feet, to allow for bunks on each side. frames of by timber spaced feet inches apart support the sides and roof. roof planking should be inches thick, and the sides should be covered with - / inch plank or corrugated iron. two shovels and two picks for emergencies should always be kept in each dugout. the construction of the chamber should be that of a very strong box, so that it will stand strain, if necessary, from within as well as from without. depots for supplies must be near the headquarters of the platoon, company, battalion and regiment. shelters may be made with ammunition boxes set into the side of the trench. places should be provided for the following: food, ammunition for rifles and auto-rifles, grenades, rockets, tools and other supplies. places must also be arranged in the front line for ammunition, rockets and hand and rifle grenades. telephones. communication is established as speedily as possible with the various units. in the forward trenches wires do not last long under bombardment and fire left open along the side of the trench, where quick repairs can be made. all soldiers must be taught to respect these wires and to care for them when they are found under foot or hanging. conduits are dug for wires to battalion and regimental headquarters, and these are fairly safe from shell fire. departure parallel. in preparing for an advance upon the enemy, a straight line trench without traverses, and with steps at the end for exit to the surface, is built in front of the first line trench. this line of departure is generally brought within about yards of the hostile line by means of _saps_, short trenches run out from the front line to the new parallel. since this line of departure can be seen by the enemy, it is sometimes better to construct steps in the front line trench itself, or when possible to build a _russian sap_. this is a tunnel very near the ground, which can be broken through at a moment's notice when troops are ready to advance. machine gun emplacements.--shell-holes with a good field of fire and emplacements along boyaux are the best location for machine guns. few guns are placed in the front line, and these only at strong points in the line, which command a maximum field of effectiveness. shell-holes may be imitated for machine gun emplacements, but in any case they should be connected by underground passage with the trenches. thus when trenches are destroyed by bombardment the machine guns remain intact. the field of fire for each machine gun should be carefully determined and marked by three stakes, one for the position of the gun, the other two for the limits of the field of fire. using these as guides, the gun can be fired correctly at night. during the day it is never left in place nor fired from its actual emplacement. [illustration: no. ] listening posts.--these stations are usually carried out to the edge of the entanglements nearest the enemy. the listening station must be large enough for half a squad, and often has an automatic rifle and grenade thrower. there should be not more than two posts for each battalion. they are not occupied during the day. they are hard to defend and easily captured by a raiding party which cuts the wire to one of the flanks and comes in from the rear. the boyau leading to the post should be zig-zagged. the post itself should be deep enough for good head cover. wire entanglements.--the object of the entanglement is not to stop completely the advance of the enemy, but to delay him at close range under machine gun, auto rifle and rifle fire, and within range of grenades and bombs. entanglements should be concealed as much as possible from the enemy's trenches and from aerial observation. if possible, they should be placed on a reverse slope or in a dead angle. they should be from to yards in front of the trench, so that artillery fire directed upon the trench will not be effective on the wire. at the same time the wire must not be far enough advanced so that the enemy's raiding parties can cut the entanglements. wire entanglements are classified as high entanglements, low entanglements and loose wire. high entanglements are strung on metal or wood posts about four feet high, both wire and posts being painted for camouflage. the driving of posts must be muffled, and metal screw posts are used when near the enemy's line. posts are placed in two parallel lines, two yards apart, spaced alternately so that the posts in one line are opposite the middle of the interval in the other. tracing entanglements is done by a sergeant followed by two stake placers, two holders and two drivers, who in turn are followed by men attaching wire. two men carry each roll of wire, and each pair (there are twelve pairs in all) strings one wire. a panel between stakes is composed of four strands. each wire should be wrapped around each post. the same arrangement of panels should run between the two lines of posts. the entanglements are in three lines about yards apart, the nearest being yards from the front line trench. the entanglement nearest the enemy should be constructed first, so that men always work nearest their own trenches. all wire entanglements should be at all points commanded by the flanking fire of machine guns. high entanglements (known as abatis) may be made by felling trees toward the enemy, and similar entanglements made of brushwood are useful in emergency. low entanglements are formed of pickets two feet high, - / inches in diameter, wired in all directions. vegetation renders the entanglement invisible from the enemy and from aerial observation. this type may also be placed in shallow excavations which are concealed from the enemy and partly protected from artillery fire. sharpened stakes, with their points hardened by fire, driven obliquely into the ground, may also be used. loose wire in the form of loops of small diameter fastened to stakes, or wire laid along the ground and attached at the ends, or spirals of barbed wire in racks, is used for entanglements. it is reported that this form is coming into considerable use, but the details have not been published. such entanglements are much harder to locate by aerial observation. * * * * * the following are a number of criticisms made by lieut. henri poire of the french army, detailed as instructor at plattsburg, upon the system of field works constructed by the th and th provisional training regiments. the ground was of loose sand, with some gravel at a depth of about six feet. . dimensions of trenches as laid out were not followed. (a) bottom of trenches behind firing steps too narrow. (b) firing step too deep. it should never be more than feet inches below berm of parapet. (c) parapet much too thin in most cases. it should be at least three feet thick. (d) communication trenches (boyaux) generally too narrow. (e) islands in communication trenches should never be less than x yards--otherwise one shell will demolish the entire passageway. . revettment work not well anchored. in some cases too many wires from supports fastened to one dead man. another fault is that dead men were not buried deeply enough in the ground, nor far enough back from the trench. in one case a dead man (a stake) supported all four sides of an island in a communication trench. the destruction of this post would have completely blocked every passage around the island. furthermore, dead men rot quickly and tend to break off. it is necessary, therefore, to have a number of them, each holding only a portion of the weight. all projecting branches and irregularities along a trench should be removed by occupying troops. . too many loop-holes. except for snipers, riflemen and automatic riflemen fire over the parapet. . machine gun loop-holes not wide enough. they should not be less than inches wide. there must be vegetation planted in front and a curtain hung over the loop-holes to prevent detection. the growing plants in front will be easily swept away at the first discharge. . remember never to imitate shell-holes until after a real bombardment by the enemy. . the dugouts made were never deep enough and afforded no protection. in fact it would be far better to have none than to be caught inside when a shell exploded in a shallow one, because the confinement of the explosion would intensify the effect. . shelters were all too wide. six feet is the maximum. the platoon headquarters dugout should be of the same width as the trench, not over three feet, but as long as necessary. company headquarters is six feet wide and of whatever depth required. . in digging, not enough care was used to conceal the fresh earth from the enemy. make false emplacements to utilize this dirt; also dig dummy trenches about one foot deep, leaving the sides sharp so that they will show clearly on aerial photographs. . in using plants as camouflage, distinct care must be exercised not to put growing plants too freely nor to place them where they never existed. the actual ground conditions must be copied. . some latrines were not arranged with the stools close beneath the wall nearest the enemy. this caused the loss of protection, which it is imperative to consider, as many casualties occur here. . too many listening posts. they are easily captured by hostile fighting patrols. there should never be more than two listening posts to a battalion. . the observation stations in many instances had no good field of fire or were outlined against the sky on the crest of some rise. the site for an observation post should always be placed over the crest and have a good field of fire for use in case of attack. occupation. i. relief in the trenches. a. the two main classes of relief: . general relief. applied to the relief of a whole position manned by a division or more. executed when large units are going to "full rest" in the rear or being removed from one part of the front to another. executed in the same way as interior relief; i.e., by successive relief of the battalions involved. . interior relief. applied to the relief of one sector or portion of a sector manned by a brigade or less. b. general principles of relief: . interior relief is executed about once every six days; more frequently when the stay in the trenches is particularly arduous, less frequently when it is unusually comfortable. . the battalion is the relieving unit. . it is advisable to arrange the relief between units which have friendly relations to one another; e.g., battalions of the same regiment; and, so far as possible, to assign each unit to the same trenches on each relief. this promotes continuity of effort. . relief is executed at night; the hour must be varied; secrecy is imperative. . prompt execution is essential, to prevent fatigue of the troops and congestion of the boyaux. c. the mechanism of relief: . reconnaissance, hours in advance, by the captain of each relieving company, accompanied by his platoon leaders and non-commissioned officers. he ascertains: ( ) the plan of occupation; i.e., the dispositions and duties of the unit to be relieved. ( ) the shelter accommodations. ( ) work being done and proposed. ( ) condition of the wire and other defences. ( ) the available water supply. ( ) artillery support. ( ) communications. ( ) the location, amount and condition of stores. ( ) danger points. ( ) all available information of the enemy; his habits, location of his snipers, what work he is doing. ( ) the ways and means of liaison, both lateral and from front to rear. to the success of this reconnaissance, the closest co-operation between all officers of the companies relieving and relieved, is indispensable. . the march from billets to the trenches: (a) transportation, by auto-trucks and wagons, is utilized to a point as near the lines as possible, to carry the packs of the men, the auto rifles, extra ammunition and other heavy equipment. when the distance is great the men themselves should be carried by auto-truck; this saves time and fatigue. the men will carry rifles loaded and locked, full cartridge belts, gas masks, and all other lighter equipment, with rations for hours at least. grenades will be secured in the trenches. electric torches will be carried by company and platoon commanders. (b) the strictest discipline must be maintained. on arrival within sight of the enemy, noise and smoking (or other lights) will be prohibited. (c) guides, from the company to be relieved, will meet the relieving company promptly at a point definitely agreed upon in advance. . the march through the boyaux (communicating trenches): (a) distance; often as much three or four miles. (b) order of march: company in single file, captain at the head; each platoon leader at the head of his platoon; a non-commissioned officer at rear of each platoon. (c) the column must be kept closed up. each man must consider himself a connecting file, guiding on the head, and behave accordingly. a guide should accompany the commander of the last platoon. (d) rate of march: roughly, about yards per minute. it takes men about minutes to pass a given point. (e) route and right of way: the first line and support trenches will never be used as roads. separate boyaux should, if possible, be assigned to the troops relieving and relieved. in no case will one company cross the path of another. in case of two columns meeting, one moving forward, the other to the rear, the former has the right of way. . no man of the unit in occupation will leave his post until he has actually been relieved and has transmitted all orders and information relative to that post. . liaison must be established, immediately on arrival, with the units on the flanks and with headquarters in the rear. captains must make sure that their runners are thoroughly acquainted with the routes of communication. . as soon as relief is accomplished both captains will report that fact to their respective commanders. . the relieving commander then inspects his trenches. he ascertains that all his watchers are at their posts and that the balance of his men know their posts and duties and are prepared to assume them quickly. . the duties of the relieved commander are: ( ) to turn over his sector thoroughly policed and in good condition as regards its construction and the new work, if any, in progress. ( ) to turn over his supplies in good condition and fully accounted for. ( ) after reporting the relief, to march his men back to billets as promptly and secretly as possible, in column of files, platoon leaders in the rear of their platoons, a non-commissioned officer and guide at the head of each. ( ) on the evening preceding relief, to send his cooks back to billets so that his men may be provided with a hot meal immediately on arrival. d. if an attack occurs during the march through the boyaux, to or from relief, the company affected occupies the nearest defensive position and at once notifies its battalion commander. if an attack occurs during the actual process of relief, the senior officer present takes command. ii. the stay in the trenches. a. the four objects of a trench commander: . security of his sector. . protection of his troops. . constant and accurate observation. . a continuous offensive. b. his plan of defense: . general principles of defense: (a) arrangement in depth. the most dependable defense is in prearranged counter attacks. the system of defense must react like a helical spring. (b) tenacity of defense. . each unit must be prepared to hold its post to the last extremity. . orders to withdraw will never be obeyed unless unmistakably valid. . all ground lost must be retaken at once in counter attack by the unit which lost it. (c) apportionment of responsibility. each active segment must have a commander responsible for its defense, upkeep and sanitation, and the discipline and instruction of his men. . basis: (a) the plan of defense turned over by the preceding commander. this will usually suffice for the first hours after relief. (b) general information of the enemy's lines, dispositions, and intentions, based chiefly on aerial photographs. c. organization of defense: . allocation of front. (the front of an american battalion will average about , yards.) diagrams: a. the regiment. b. the battalion. c. the company. d. the platoon. . distribution of effectives. determined chiefly by the terrain and by . . employment of the several arms: (a) machine guns. crew of men per gun. (furnished by detachments of a machine gun company.) located by the infantry commander, in concealed emplacements behind the first line, to deliver successive barrages from flanking positions. effective range: up to yards. (b) automatic rifles. crew of men per rifle. usually posted to enfilade the entanglements of the first line. they concentrate the fire effect of from to riflemen. effective range: up to yards. (c) rifle grenadiers. located near enough to first line to hold the enemy trenches under fire and deliver effective barrages near the mouths of our own communicating trenches. should be located near observation posts so that their fire can be promptly corrected. (d) trench mortars. located similarly to (c). manned by riflemen. (e) bombers. one supply man to each grenadiers. used for protection of auto-rifles, in counter attacks, for protection of communicating trenches and fighting in close quarters. (f) riflemen. posted to deliver frontal fire. grouped according to the plan of counter attacks. (g) as many men as possible should be instructed in the use of the enemy's weapons. d. liaison: (a) by telephone. quickest and most accurate. maintained between each platoon and its company headquarters, and between adjoining companies. especially subject to destruction in bombardment. wireless and ground telegraphy are used only between brigade and division headquarters. (b) by runners ("liaison agents"). five detailed from each company to battalion headquarters; one sent to each adjoining company headquarters; one from each platoon to company headquarters; four or five on duty at each platoon headquarters; five from each machine gun company to battalion headquarters. messages sent by them should, if practicable, be written and signed, and should be receipted for by the addressee. (c) by rockets and flares. quickest means of liaison with the artillery in rear. (d) domestic (message carrying) grenades. (e) dogs and carrier pigeons. sent out to the rear from battalion headquarters. (f) one searchlight--with a radius of miles--is furnished to each company. (g) noise. klaxon signals, etc., give warning of gas attacks. e. observation: (a) observers: . must be men of infinite patience, keen hearing and eyesight. . they are located behind the first line in positions combining good view with concealment. . each is provided with a panoramic map, made from aeroplane photographs, of the enemy's trenches. on this must be promptly noted every slightest change in the trace, height of parapet, etc., of the enemy's line. such notes greatly assist in locating machine gun emplacements. . each observer will also record in a note book everything of importance, with the time observed. . a report of changes, with an abstract of observer's notes, is forwarded daily to regimental headquarters. (b) watchers (sentinels): . stationed, one near the door of each dugout, in the first line, support and intermediate trenches. . they must be carefully concealed. . they must watch over the parapet (never through slits or loopholes) so as to have unrestricted view. . they are furnished with signal rockets and flares for prompt communication with the artillery, and have authority to use them. . double sentinels are posted at night. (c) listening posts: . located, usually in shell holes, just inside the entanglements. connected with front line by tunnels. protected from grenades by heavy gratings, when possible, and by concealment. . occupied by men ( in command), in reliefs. usually occupied only at night unless our trenches are on a reverse slope. . chief function is protection of the entanglements. (d) microphone posts.--installed usually behind the first line. intercept the enemy's telephone and ground-telegraph messages and any loud conversation in his trenches. (e) fixed patrols.--generally remain in shell holes in front of our entanglements. (f) reconnoitering patrols: . composed of from to men, commanded by a non-commissioned officer. sent out at night only. . the company commander must promptly notify commanders of adjoining companies of the dispatch of these patrols, their time of departure, route and probable time of return. . men should be assigned to this duty by roster. f. trench work: . constant battle with the elements, care for drainage, revettment, sanitation and storage. . repair of the effects of bombardment. . new work, for better security, communication and observation. . work in the open. (a) usually consists of repair or rearrangement of wire entanglements, digging new listening posts, etc. (b) effected by parties detailed by roster. (c) they are guarded by fighting patrols, composed like reconnaissance patrols. their best protection is in silence and concealment. (d) adjoining companies must be notified of their dispatch, location and probable time of return. (e) this work, like all operations conducted outside the protection of the trenches, offers a valuable tonic to the morale. g. offensive operations: . sniping: (a) snipers constitute one of the most dependable and productive agencies of attrition. (b) the best shots of the company are especially trained and assigned for this duty exclusively. (c) they operate in pairs and post themselves to cover any exposed portions of the enemy's trenches, especially his communicating trenches. (d) they should be well supplied with all necessary special equipment; _e.g._, sniperscopes, telescopic sights, painted headgear, etc. . mining operations. . raiding: (a) object of raids: destruction of the enemy's defenses, disturbance of his morale, collection of prisoners and information. (b) the personnel of raiding parties will usually include: a commander and second in command, bayonet men, bombers, engineers, signal men, stretcher bearers. their numbers and proportions are regulated by the nature and difficulty of the task. (c) co-ordination with the artillery barrage is the essential of their success. the limit of advance, extent of operations, and time of return will therefore be set in advance and rigidly adhered to. h. role of the trench commander: . inspections: the men will be formally inspected twice daily at the general "stand to" by the company commander. particular attention will be paid to the health of the men, condition of their feet and their clothing. each man must have at least one pair of dry socks always available. arms, gas masks, and other equipments will also be rigidly inspected. . roster: the company commander will carefully supervise the preparation of the duty roster. an obviously equal distribution of the arduous duties involved in trench life is essential to the maintenance of morale. . reports and records: (additional to those already required by regulations.) log book, report of casualties, wind report (daily), bombardment report (daily), intelligence report, which will include observer's notes and changes (twice daily), and a daily report of work completed and undertaken. . "one principle which the trench commander should never forget is the necessity for his frequent presence in the midst of his men. * * * direct contact with the troops on as many occasions as possible is the most certain way to gain their confidence." [illustration] [illustration] duties of the company commander. . to inspect the sector his company is to occupy, one day in advance of occupying it. . to assign segments to the platoons. . to prepare a plan of defense. . to connect by liaison with the companies on his flanks. . to have an agent or runner at battalion headquarters. . to prepare a plan for counter attacks. . to report to the battalion commander when his company has taken up its position: (a) its situation. (b) security. (c) liaison. (d) state of position left by predecessor. (e) defense of sector. (f) plan of counter attacks. . to inspect the trenches frequently to see that everything is in proper condition and that his men are in jubilant spirits. . to have platoon guides report to battalion headquarters on the date for the relief of his company and act as guides to the company that relieves him. . to keep a special log book in which the following are kept: (a) work completed by his unit. (b) work under way. (c) work proposed. . turn over to his successor: (a) measures taken for security. (b) plan of attacks. (c) plan of counterattacks. . have one officer on duty at all times. . "stand to" will take place one ( ) hour before daylight, and all available men will attend. there will be a thorough inspection. rapid loading will be practiced. the firing position of every man will be tested to see if he can hit the bottom of our wire. gas helmets will be inspected. . time table--allot hours of work, rest and meals. . supplies--make timely requisitions for them--be especially watchful about meals and rations--have no delays. . to have one watcher and one relief on duty near company headquarters at all times. . to get a good field of fire to the front and cover the sectors of each company on flanks. . (subject to change) red rocket-artillery barrage wanted. white rocket gas attack. . to report twice daily all changes in wind direction. . to report to battalion commander when relieved. duties of platoon leaders as officers on duty with company. . report with old officer at company headquarters. . make frequent inspections of all trenches occupied by company. . visit each listening post; at least once during tour of duty. . visit all sentinels and receive their reports. . see that one non-commissioned officer per platoon is on duty. . receive reports of non-commissioned officers after they have posted sentinels. . at end of tour hand over to new officer all orders, a report of work in progress, and any useful information. . report with new officer at company headquarters on completion of tour. . to report anything unusual to company headquarters. . to send dead and wounded to dressing station trenches. . to send patrols to front at night. duties of platoon leaders. . must accompany company commander on inspection of trenches one day previous to occupying them. . make necessary reliefs for his men in his segment. . make a plan of defense and counterattack for his position or approve the one left there. . establish sniping posts and arrange reliefs. . establish listening posts and arrange reliefs. . assign non-commissioned officer to duty with platoon and arrange relief. . instruct every man as to his place in case of attack. . establish liaison with platoons on both flanks; and one runner to company headquarters. . have one platoon guide report to company headquarters on day his platoon is to be relieved. . on completion of posting his platoon, report to his company commander. . turn over to platoon relieving him all orders and data pertaining to his position. . be especially attentive to rigid military discipline; _i.e._, every soldier to be neat; equipment must be clean at all times; to render the required salute when not observing or firing at the enemy. . have one non-commissioned officer on duty at all times. . to inspect rifles, equipment and latrines twice daily. (a) to have at least one latrine in working order at all times. (b) to have a sentry on duty at each platoon dugout at all times. (c) establish one observation post in daytime. . in front line trenches: (a) no smoking or talking to be allowed at night. (b) every man to wear his equipment except packs. (c) have rifle within reaching distance. (d) all reliefs to be within kicking distance of soldier on duty. . inspect at "stand to" and report results to company headquarters, especially if each man has rounds of ammunition and necessary grenades and bombs. . to be especially attentive to sanitation and care of the men's feet. . to have one ( ) watcher and relief on duty at all times near platoon dugouts. . to get a good field of fire to his front and to cover the sector of each platoon on his flanks. . make requisition for material. . to see that all of his men are properly fed. . report to company commander when relieved. . must know what every man is doing at all times. duties of non-commissioned officer on duty (each platoon). . to make frequent inspections of the position occupied by his platoon. . to be responsible that each soldier knows his duties. . to report anything of special importance to officer on duty. . on being relieved to report with the new non-commissioned officer to the officer on duty. . after posting sentinels to report "all is well" to officer on duty. . explain to his sentinel his duties, the position of section and platoon commanders and of sentries on either side; and to caution his sentries when friendly patrols are out, the probable time and place of return. . bayonets will always be fixed in front line trenches. . at night time to have double sentinel. . to see that each sentinel in daytime has a periscope. . rifles to be loaded; no cartridge shall be in the chamber except when necessary to shoot. . to report to company headquarters any change in direction of wind. patrols. . usual orders about patrols. . always go out at night via the listening post; tell the men in the listening post your mission and probable time of return. sentinels. . to sound klaxon horn on approach of gas attack. . to report immediately to non-commissioned officer on duty any change in direction of wind. . in cold weather to work bolt frequently to keep it from freezing. . at night to challenge only in case of necessity, and then only in a low tone. challenge "_hands up._" . number of posts depends on assumed nearness of enemy and local conditions. normally one per platoon by day and three double sentinels per platoon at night. . relief kept close at hand. report "all is well," or otherwise, when officer passes. . screened from observation. . remain standing unless height of parapet renders this impossible. machine guns. . non-commissioned officer and one ( ) watcher on duty at all times. . except in emergency they will not be fired from their regular emplacements. . unless emplacements are well concealed, guns will not be mounted except between evening and morning "stand to." . before dusk each gun will be sighted on some particular spot either in front of or behind the enemy's line. . range cards will be prepared and kept with each gun. snipers. . sniping post consists of one ( ) observer and one ( ) rifleman with relief of two ( ) men posted close by. . sniping post should be well concealed. . daily report from each post, of (a) any work done by enemy. (b) enemy seen; place, uniform, apparent age, physique, equipment. (c) any other information of interest. . sniper to be appointed from each section. . must be intelligent, alert, good scout, good shot, courageous. . snipers should spend hours in trenches with those of command which theirs is to relieve, before relief takes place. . no night work required of these men since they must be constantly on the alert during the day. organization of a platoon--rifle company--table no. platoon platoon headquarters lieut. sgt. privates. st section | d section | d section | th section hand bombers |rifle grenadiers| riflemen | auto-riflemen ----------------+----------------+-------------------+-------------------- teams, each | team of | sgt. | sgt. and corps. leader | grenadiers | squads of | teams, each thrower | carriers | men each | gunner carrier | (may be | extra | carriers scout | subdivided) | riflemen[r] | corps. | corps. | sgt. and cpl. | sgt. and cpls. pvts. st cl. | pvt. st cl. | pvts. st cl. | pvts. st cl. pvts. | pvts. | pvts. | pvts. total-- | total-- | total-- | total-- [footnote r: runners: attached to d section and th squad. with platoon commander when company is in extended order formation.] _suggested organization of platoon in close order and for administration._ st squad | d squad | d squad | th squad | ---------------+-----------------+-----------------+----------------| bomber section | / auto rifle | / auto rifle | | (less bomber | section i.e., | section i.e., | grenadier | team) | cpl and teams | cpl and teams | section | | | | | corp | cpl. | cpl. | cpl. | pvts. | pvts. | pvts. | pvts. | | | | (extra cpl. in | | | | file closers) | ---------------+-----------------+-----------------+----------------+ th squad | th squad | th squad | ---------------+-----------------+-----------------| rifle squad | rifle squad | bomber team | | | plus extra | | | riflemen[s] | | | | cpl. | cpl. | cpl. | pvts. | pvts. | pvts. | | | | | | | ---------------+-----------------+-----------------+ right guide--automatic gun sgt. left guide--rifle sgt. chief of platoon--lieut. file closer or acting st sgt.--sgt.-asst. note.--if desirable the mechanics and privates (signalmen) who are not assigned to platoons regularly, can be used to fill the blank files in the d and d squads. [footnote s: runners: attached to d section and th squad. with platoon commander when company is in extended order formation.] deployments. general principles: (a) the following plans for deployment are not to be regarded as rigid. the positions of the various squads depends upon tactical considerations. (b) the platoon in attack will be used only for accomplishment of its offensive mission. moppers-up, additional carriers, etc., will be furnished by other organizations. a. being in line, to form single skirmish line to the front. . as skirmishers (so many) paces, guide right (left or center). . march. executed as described in pars. and , i.d.r. normal interval to be ordered, or paces. this formation to be regarded as exceptional. b. being in column of squads, to form single skirmish line. same command as in (a). executed as described in para and , i.d.r. c. being in line to form double skirmish line to the front (_i.e._, to take the "formation for attack" in the diagram.) . in two lines. . as skirmishers (so many) paces, guide right (left or center). march. executed according to the principles in pars. and , i.d.r., except that at the command march the even-numbered squads stand fast while the odd-numbered squads form the first line by deploying on the base squad as in the case of deployment in single line. similarly, the even-numbered squads form the second line by deploying on their base squad after the odd-numbered squads have moved forward about paces. [illustration: normal battalion formation in attack] d. being in line or column of squads to deploy in line of squad columns in one or two lines. use same commands and execute in same manner as described in (a), (b), (c), except that in the command "squad columns" is substituted for "as skirmishers," and in the execution each corporal on approaching the line forms his squad in "squad column" instead of deploying it as skirmishers. _e.g._ . in two lines-- . squad columns (so many) paces, guide right (left or center)-- . march. this gives a "formation of approach" as the french describe it, or as an "artillery formation" as the british describe it; which may be used directly or indirectly (by means of echelons) for advancing when not liable to infantry fire. [illustration: plate # ] e. being in above formation to vary the intervals. . squad columns (so many) paces, . guide right (left or center). executed in the same manner as similar movement described in i.d.r. . general principles of the platoon formation in the assault of fortified positions in trenches. (points of resistance, etc.). . the platoon is now a complete fighting unit within itself. it contains riflemen, bombers, auto-riflemen, and rifle grenadiers. with this combination the platoon commander has, under his immediate control, all the different kinds of fire available to the infantry. [illustration: plate # ] . this formation was developed so that the platoon commander could meet the different contingencies that arise from being opposed by points of resistance in a "trench-to-trench" attack or the "semi-open-warfare;" that is the secondary stage of a push. . when strong opposition develops, the principle on which the platoon works is to develop or surround the point of resistance, the platoon acting either alone or in conjunction with neighboring platoons. the four different kinds of fire are then used to their best advantages to silence or diminish the enemy fire thus making this manoeuvre possible. . in order to obtain success it is first necessary to impress on the officers and men that the primary advantage of the entire formation is its mobility, and the scope it gives to the initiative of the platoon section, squad and team leaders. in studying this formation it is first necessary to free the mind of all parade ground formations and to feel that there is nothing to hinder any desired movement of the sections, so long as the movement is not contrary to the operation orders for the attack. until this idea is grasped thoroughly no progress can be made. . there is no typical or "normal formation." the one given at the beginning of this instruction here is a drill or parade ground formation, and while it may be used under actual conditions of warfare, it is simply utilized at this time as a basis from which the necessary variations may be worked out. in an attack, every platoon in the battalion may use a different formation. . the formation to be used is decided upon after a careful study of air-photographs. as far as possible all points of resistance are picked out and the best method of meeting the situations that may arise are then considered. the platoon is then arranged so as to best facilitate this manoeuvre. it must be realized that there will be other platoons on the flanks and in the rear, and their dispositions must be studied with a view of their probable bearing on the points of resistance. . in order to know how to get results it is first necessary to have a very clear conception of the uses and limitations of the different weapons in the platoon. briefly they can be used in the following ways: (a) the auto-rifles open up a point blank fire on the strong point as soon as it is discovered. their function is to either draw the fire of the enemy or to silence him by a hit or forcing him to take cover. their work may be compared to the work of the field artillery in a barrage. they cover the movement of the infantry across the open. the auto rifles so place themselves at such points that their line of fire will in no way interfere with the manoeuvre of the commander of the platoon or the remaining units of the platoon interfere with the effective use of the auto rifles of the platoon. (b) the rifle grenadiers advance at once just as close as possible, but at all costs to within effective grenade range. they then take cover in shell holes, trenches, etc., and open up a rapid fire. they are the long distance howitzers of the platoon and are very valuable. by a well placed grenade the whole resistance may be overcome. this section usually works around a flank. (c) the riflemen work up by squad as far as practicable and to a flank, when an opportunity presents itself, the squad opens fire in such a manner as to protect advance of other squads or teams. (d) the bombers endeavor to get well around behind the enemy and taking advantage of cover get to within bomb range. they may be compared to the close range howitzers or trench mortars. when all four sections are in action at proper ranges, the opposition can probably last but a short time, and as soon as the machine guns cease fire the platoon, especially the riflemen, go after the remainder of the garrison with the bayonet. [illustration: plate # ] it may happen that the barrage put up will so demoralize the enemy that the riflemen can advance before his machine guns are even put out of action. this operation allows the rifle men to get in with the bayonet, if the resistance is not sooner overcome. when the different sections are getting to their places, they usually find enough shell holes or old trenches to obtain cover. they should not move as entire sections, but as small groups of three or four at a time. . after the encircling movement has once begun, the platoon commander loses all control, and the action is then conducted by the section, squad or team leaders. they must be trained to act on their own initiative, as further orders are rarely practicable. the resistance will finally be overcome, either because the enemy will retreat or surrender under the menace of encirclement, or by the losses caused by our fire or by the attack at close range of our bombers or else by the final assault with the bayonet led by our riflemen. it must be remembered that under an artillery barrage it is never possible to issue verbal orders, so the sections must be trained to understand and obey the arm signals of its officer, or more often to work without orders. . a sequence of command must be arranged in each section, squad and team down to the last man. remarks regarding the forming of wave from close order. the sketch of deployment attached is an illustration of one of the formations that may be adopted. it is given as an example. any other wave formation may be practically as easily formed up. the platoon commander simply calls out the squads he wants in the first line. _it must not be imagined that this transition from close order to extended is done in the field when actually under fire or as a result of surprise._ before the platoon goes into an attack it is all arranged so as to allow it to be changed with ease from column of sections at extended intervals (formation for approach) to the wave formation decided upon. this arrangement is made when the platoon is miles to the rear. when the change is made from column of sections to the wave formation there must be no crossing of sections as they go to their places. some of the many questions a platoon commander should ask himself on taking over a trench, and at frequent intervals afterwards. . _i am here for two purposes: to hold this line under all circumstances, and to do as much damage as possible to the enemy? am i doing all i can to make this line as strong as possible? am i as_ offensive _as i might be with organized snipers, sniperscopes, rifle grenades, catapults, etc., and patrols?_ . do i connect up all right with the platoons on my right and left? do i know the position of my nearest support? . does every man know his firing position and can he fire from it, over the parapet, at the foot of the wire? . where are my s.a.a. and bomb stores? are they under cover from the weather? . do all my men know their duties in case of attack--bombers especially? . are all my rifles and ammunition clean and in good order? have all the men got rifle covers? are the magazines kept charged? . is my wire strong enough? . are my parapets and traverses bullet-proof everywhere? . where are my sally ports? . where are my listening posts? are my listening patrols properly detailed? . what points in front particularly require patrolling at night? . are my sentries in their right places? are they properly posted by n.c.o's.? have they received proper instructions? . have i got the s.o.s. message in my pocket, and do i know the orders regarding its use? . are the trenches as clean and as sanitary as they might be? are live rounds and cases properly collected? are my bags for refuse and empties in position? . are my trenches as dry as i might make them? . am i doing all i can to prevent my men getting "trench feet"? . how can i prevent my parapets and dugouts from falling in? . have i got at least one loophole, from which men can snipe, for every section? have i pointed out to section commanders the portion of the enemy's trench they are responsible for keeping under fire, and where his loopholes are? . have my men always got their smoke helmets on and are they in good order? . are the arrangements, in case of gas attack, complete and known to all ranks? . are the orders as to wearing equipment carried out? . are my men using wood from the defences as firewood? . are my men drinking water from any but authorized sources? . _i am here for two purposes: to hold this line under all circumstances, and i do as much damage as possible to the enemy? am i doing all i can to make this line as strong as possible? am i as_ offensive _as i might be with organized snipers, sniperscopes, rifle grenades, catapults, etc., and patrols?_ defensive measure against gas attacks. i. introduction. a. general considerations: in the absence of suitable means of protection the poison gases used in war are extremely deadly and the breathing of only very small quantities of them may cause death or serious injury. this being the case, it is essential that not the slightest time should be lost in putting on the anti-gas device on the gas alarm being given. it cannot be too strongly insisted on that the measures to meet hostile gas attacks afford _perfect protection_, and if they are carried out properly no one will suffer from gas poisoning. the whole basis of protecting troops against gas lies (a) in keeping the appliances in perfect working order; (b) in learning to adjust them rapidly under all conditions, and (c) in ensuring that every man is given immediate warning. these results can only be attained: ( ) by frequent and thorough inspection of all protective appliances. ( ) by thorough instruction and training in their use. ( ) by every man understanding and complying with all standing orders on the subject of defense against gas. if these are effectually carried out, there is nothing to fear from hostile gas attacks. officers must impress this on their men, as an important object of all anti-gas instruction should be to inspire complete confidence in the efficacy of the methods which are adopted. b. nature of gas attacks: ( ) gas clouds: this method of making a gas attack is entirely dependent on the direction of the wind. the gas is carried up to the trenches compressed in steel cylinders. these are dug in at the bottom of the trench and connected with pipes leading out over the parapet. when the valves of the cylinders are opened, the gas escapes with a hissing sound, which, on a still night, can frequently be heard at a considerable distance. it mixes with the air and is carried by the wind towards the opposing trenches, spreading out as it goes forward. a continuous wave of gas and air is thus formed, the color of which may vary: (a) because of the weather conditions. in very dry air it may be almost transparent and slightly greenish in color, while in damp weather it forms a white cloud. (b) because it may be mixed with smoke of any color. a cloud attack can only take place when there is a steady but not too strong wind blowing from the enemy's lines towards our own. a wind between and miles an hour is the most likely condition. an -mile wind will carry the gas cloud twice as quickly as a man walks rapidly. gas attacks may occur at any time of the day, but are most likely to be made during the night or in the early morning. gentle rain is without appreciable effect on a gas attack, but strong rain washes down the gas. fogs have hardly any effect and may, in fact, be taken advantage of to make an attack unexpectedly. water courses and ponds are no obstruction to a gas cloud. the gas used by the enemy is generally a mixture of chlorine and phosgene, both of which are strongly asphyxiating. the gases are heavier than air, and therefore, tend to flow along the ground and into trenches, shelters, craters and hollows. the gas cloud may flow round slight eminences, thus leaving patches of country which remain free from gas. chlorine and phosgene strongly attack the mucous membranes of the respiratory organs, causing bad coughing. in strong concentrations of gas, or by longer exposure to low concentrations, the lungs are injured and breathing becomes more and more difficult and eventually impossible, so that the unprotected man dies of suffocation. death is sometimes caused by two or three breaths of the gas. even when very dilute, chlorine can be recognized by its peculiar smell, which is like chloride of lime, but stronger and more irritating. both chlorine and phosgene also exert a strongly corrosive action on metals, so that the metal parts of arms must be carefully protected by greasing them. the speed with which the gas cloud approaches depends entirely on the wind velocity. gas attacks have been made with wind velocities varying from to miles per hour, _i.e._, from - / to yards per second. in a -mile wind, the gas would reach trenches yards distant in seconds. gas attacks have been made on fronts varying from to miles; their effects at points up to miles behind the front trenches have been sufficiently severe to make it necessary to wear helmets. ( ) gas projectiles: the use of these is not entirely dependent on the direction of the wind. in gas projectiles such as shells, hand grenades, and trench mortar bombs, a part or the whole of the explosive charge is replaced by a liquid which is converted into gas by the explosion. the explosive force and noise of detonation of these projectiles is less than that of the ordinary kind, and a large number of them are usually discharged into a comparatively small space. after the explosion, the irritant chemicals form a small gas cloud, though some may sink to the ground and remain active for a considerable time. for using gas shells, the best condition is calm, or a wind of low velocity. gas projectiles can be used in all types of country. woods, bushes, corn fields and clumps of buildings may hold the gas active for a considerable time. two kinds of shell gases are used by the enemy, viz., lachrymators, which mainly affect the eyes, and poison gases, which may affect the eyes and are just as deadly as the gases used in the form of clouds. ( ) tear, or lachrymatory shells: these shells on explosion drive the liquid chemical which they contain into the air as a mist. they cause the eyes to water strongly and thereby gradually put men out of action. their actual smell may be slight. large concentrations of lachrymators begin to affect the lungs and cause sickness, coughing and general irritation. ( ) poison shells: besides the comparatively harmless lachrymators the enemy also uses projectiles which contain a gas, the action of which is very similar to that of phosgene. because of their slight detonation, these shells are liable to be mistaken for blinds, but they emit large quantities of a gas which attacks the lungs strongly and is very dangerous, and even in slight cases may cause serious after effects. ( ) smoke: the enemy may make use of smoke, either in the form of a cloud or emitted from shells and bombs. smoke may be used with gas or between gas clouds; it may also be used alone to distract attention from a real discharge of gas, to cover the advance of infantry, or merely as a false gas attack. ( ) mine and explosion gases: the poisonous gases which occur in mines, and which are formed in large quantities when high explosive goes off in an enclosed space, _e.g._, from a direct hit in a shelter, or on the explosion of a charge in a mine, are not protected against by the ordinary anti-gas appliances. the chief of these gases is carbon monoxide. protection against such gases will not be considered in these notes. officers are held responsible that all the anti-gas appliances for protecting their men are maintained in perfect condition, and that all ranks under their command are thoroughly trained in the use of these appliances and in all other measures which may affect their safety against gas. summary of protective measures: (a) provision to each man of individual protective devices. (b) arrangement for the inspection of those appliances and training in their use and instruction in all other measures of gas defense. (c) provision of protected and gas-proof shelters. (d) weather observations to determine periods when the conditions are favorable to a hostile gas attack. (e) arrangement of signals and messages; for immediate warning of a gas attack. (f) provision of appliances for clearing gas from trenches and shelters. c. protection of shelters: ( ) methods of protection: protection of dugouts, cellars, buildings, etc., is given if all entrances are closed by well-fitting doors or by blankets sprayed with hypo. solution. practically no gas passes through a wet blanket, and the protection depends on getting a good joint at the sides and bottom of a doorway, so as to stop all draughts. this can be effected by letting the blanket rest on battens, fixed with a slight slope, against the door frame. the blanket should overlap the outer sides and a fold should lie on the ground at the bottom. a pole is fastened to the blanket, which allows the latter to be rolled up on the frame and causes it to fall evenly. wherever possible, particularly where there is likely to be movement in and out of the shelter, two blankets fitted in this way but sloping in opposite directions should be provided. there should be an interval of at least three feet between the two frames, and the larger this vestibule is made the more efficient is the dugout. when not in use, the blankets should be rolled up and held so that they can be readily released, and should be sprayed occasionally with water or a little vermorel sprayer solution. if the blankets became stiff from a deposit of chemicals, they should be sprayed with water. all ranks must be taught how to use gas-proof dugouts, _e.g._, how to enter a protected doorway quickly, replacing the blanket immediately, and carrying in as little outside air as possible. the protection afforded by these means is just as complete against lachrymatory gases as it is against cloud gas and poisonous shell gases. ( ) shelters which should be protected: the following should always be protected: medical aid posts and advanced dressing stations; company, battalion and brigade headquarters; signal shelters and any other place where work has to be carried out during a gas attack. in addition to the above, it is desirable to protect all dugouts, cellars and buildings within the shell area, particularly those of artillery personnel. it should be noted, however, that the protection of dugouts for troops in the front line of trenches is usually inadvisable on account of the delay involved in getting men out in time of attack. it is desirable to protect stretcher bearers' dugouts with a view to putting casualties in them. d. protection of weapons and equipment: arms and ammunition and the metal parts of special equipment (_e.g._, telephone instruments) must be carefully protected against gas by greasing them or keeping them completely covered. otherwise, particularly in damp weather, they may rust or corrode so badly as to refuse to act. a mineral oil must be used for this purpose. the following in particular should be protected: ( ) small arms and s.a.a. machine guns and rifles must be kept carefully cleaned and well oiled. the effects of corrosion of ammunition are of even more importance than the direct effects of gas upon machine guns and rifles. ammunition boxes must be kept closed. vickers belts should be kept in their boxes until actually required for use. the wooden belt boxes are fairly gas-tight, but the metal belt boxes should be made gas-tight by inserting strips of flannelette in the joint between the lid and the box. lewis magazines should be kept in some form of box, the joints of which are made as gas-tight as possible with flannelette. a recess should be made, high up in the parapet if possible, for storing ammunition and guns. a blanket curtain, moistened with water or sprayer solution, will greatly assist in keeping the gas out. ( ) hand and rifle grenades: unboxed grenades should be kept covered as far as possible. all safety pins and working parts, especially those made of brass, should be kept oiled to prevent their setting from corrosion by the gas. ( ) light trench mortars and their ammunition: as far as the supply of oil permits, the bore and all bright parts of light trench mortars and their spare parts should be kept permanently oiled. when not in use, mortars should be covered with sacking or similar material. unboxed ammunition should be kept covered as far as possible and the bright parts oiled immediately after arrival. ammunition which has been in store for some time should be used up first. sentries must be prepared to give the alarm on the first appearance of gas, as a few seconds delay may involve very serious consequences. signals must be passed along by all sentries as soon as heard. the earliest warning of a gas attack is given: (a) by the noise of the gas escaping from the cylinders. (b) by the appearance of a cloud of any color over the enemy's trenches. if the attack takes place at night, the cloud will not be visible from a distance. (c) by the smell of the gas in listening posts. ( ) action to be taken in the trenches on gas alarm: (a) respirators to be put on immediately by all ranks (a helmet, if no box respirator is available). (b) rouse all men in trenches, dug-outs and mine shafts, warn officers and artillery observation posts and all employed men. (c) artillery support to be called for by company commanders by means of prearranged signals. (d) warn battalion headquarters and troops in rear. (e) all ranks stand to arms in the front trenches and elsewhere where the tactical situation demands. (f) blanket curtains at entrances to protected shelters to be let down and carefully fixed. (g) movement to cease except where necessary. ( ) action to be taken in billets and back areas: (a) all men in cellars or houses to be roused. (b) the blanket curtains of protected collars, etc., to be let down and fixed in position. (c) box respirators to be put on immediately, the gas is apparent. h. action during a gas attack: ( ) protective measures: there should be as little moving about and talking as possible in the trenches. men must be made to realize that with the gas now used by the enemy, observance of this may be essential for their safety. when an attack is in progress, all bodies of troops or transport on the move should halt and all working parties cease work until the gas cloud has passed. if a relief is going on, units should stand fast as far as possible until the gas cloud has passed. supports and parties bringing up bombs should only be moved up if the tactical situation demands it. if troops in support or reserve lines of trenches remain in, or go into, dug-outs, they must continue to wear their anti-gas appliances. officers and n.c.o's must on no account remove or open up the masks of the box respirators or raise their helmets to give orders. the breathing tube may be removed from the mouth when it is necessary to speak, but it must be replaced. men must always be on the look-out to help each other in case an anti-gas device is damaged by fire or accident. when a man is wounded, he must be watched to see that he does not remove his respirator or helmet until he is safely inside a protected shelter; if necessary, his hands should be tied. men must be warned that if they are slightly gassed before adjusting their respirators or helmets they must not remove them. the effect will wear off. ( ) tactical measures: from the point of view of protection against gas, nothing is gained by men remaining in unprotected dug-outs or by moving to a flank or to the rear. it is, therefore, desirable that on tactical and disciplinary grounds all men in the front line of trenches should be forbidden to do these things. in support or reserve lines where there are protected dug-outs, it is advisable for men to stay in them unless the tactical situation makes it desirable for them to come out. nothing is gained by opening rapid rifle fire unless the enemy's infantry attacks. a slow rate of fire from rifles and occasional short bursts of fire from machine guns will lessen the chance of their jamming from the action of the gas and tends to occupy and steady the infantry. it should be remembered that the enemy's infantry cannot attack while the gas discharge is in progress and is unlikely to do so for an appreciable time--at least minutes--after it has ceased. it is, in fact, a common practice for the enemy infantry to retire to the second and third line of trench whilst gas is being discharged. there is, therefore, no object in opening an intense s.o.s. barrage of artillery on "no man's land" during the actual gas cloud and it is advisable that the warning to the artillery of a gas attack should be a signal differing from the ordinary s.o.s. signal, as the latter may have to be sent later if an infantry attack develops. it must be remembered that smoke may be used by the enemy at the same time as, or alternately with, the gas and that under cover of a smoke cloud he may send out assaulting or raiding parties. a careful look-out must, therefore, be kept; hostile patrols or raiders may be frustrated by cross-fire of rifles and machine guns and should an assault develop the ordinary s.o.s. procedure should be carried out. i. precautions against gas shells: owing to the small explosion which occurs with these shells, they are liable to be mistaken for blinds, and even when the gas is smelt men may not realize its possibly dangerous character at once and so may delay putting on respirators or helmets until too late. men sleeping in dug-outs may be seriously affected unless they are roused. men in the open air are unlikely to be seriously affected by poison gas shells, provided they put on respirators or helmets on first experiencing the gas. the following points should therefore be attended to: (i) all shells which explode with a small detonation or appear to be blind should be regarded with particular attention; the respirator or helmet should be put on at the first indication of gas and blanket protection of shelters adjusted. (ii) arrangements must be made for giving a _local_ alarm in the event of a sudden and intense bombardment with poison gas shells, but care must be taken that this alarm is not confused with the main alarm. strombos horns must on no account be used to give warning of a gas shell bombardment. (iii) all shelters in the vicinity of an area bombarded with poison gas shells must be visited and any sleeping men roused. (iv.) box respirators or helmets should continue to be worn throughout the area bombarded with poison gas shells until the order is given by the local unit commander for their removal. lachrymatory or "tear" shells are frequently used by the enemy for the purpose of hindering the movements of troops, for preventing the bringing up of supports, or for interfering with the action of artillery. owing to the deadly nature of poison gas shells, however, the precautions given in paragraph above, must be taken for all gas shells. the goggles are intended for use after lachrymatory bombardments only, in cases where the irritant gas persists in the neighborhood. k. action subsequent to a gas attack: . general: the most important measure to be taken after a cloud gas attack is to prepare for a further attack. the enemy frequently sends several successive waves of gas at intervals varying from a few minutes up to several hours and it is therefore necessary to be on the alert to combat this procedure. the following measures should be adopted as soon as the gas cloud has passed: (a) removal of respirators.--anti-gas fans should be used to assist in clearing the trenches of gas, so as to admit of respirators being removed. respirators and helmets must not be removed until permission has been given by the company commander. a sharp look out must be kept for a repetition of the gas attack, as long as the wind continues in a dangerous quarter. . movement: owing to the enemy gas sometimes causing bad after effects, which are intensified by subsequent exertion, the following points should be attended to: (a) no man suffering from the effects of gas, however slightly, should be allowed to walk to the dressing station. (b) the clearing of the trenches and dugouts should not be carried out by men who have been affected by the gas. (c) after a gas attack, troops in the front trenches should be relieved of all fatigue and carrying work for hours by sending up working parties from companies in rear. (d) horses which have been exposed to the gas should not be worked for hours if it can be avoided. . clearing dugouts and other shelters: it is essential that no dugout be entered after a gas attack event with box respirators or helmets adjusted, until it has been ascertained that it is free from gas. the only efficient method of clearing dugouts from gas is by thorough ventilation. the older method of spraying is not efficient. an appreciable quantity of gas may be retained in the clothing of men exposed to gas attacks and also in bedding, coats, etc., left in shelters. precaution should, therefore, be taken to air all clothing. . ventilation: _natural ventilation_.--unless a shelter has been thoroughly ventilated by artificial means, as described below, it must not be slept in or occupied without wearing respirators, until at least hours after a gas attack. it must not be entered at all without respirators on for at least hours. the above refers to cloud gas attacks. in the case of gas shell bombardments the times cannot be definitely stated, as they depend on the nature of the gas used and the severity of the bombardment. with lachrymatory gases the times after which shelters can be used without discomfort may be considerably longer than those mentioned above. _ventilation by fire_.--all kinds of shelters can be efficiently and rapidly cleared of gas by the use of fires. shelters with two openings are the easiest to ventilate and where possible, dugouts with only one entrance should have a second opening made, even a very small one, to assist in ventilation. in dugouts provided with a single exit at the end of a short passage, the best results are obtained if the fire is placed in the center of the floor of the dugout and at a height of about inches. in dugouts provided with a single exit at the end of a long and nearly horizontal passage, the best results are obtained if the fire is placed about one-third of the distance from the inner end of the passage. in dugouts provided with two or more exits, the fire should be placed at the inner end of one of the exit passages. in general, pound of dry wood per cubic feet of air space is sufficient for clearance of any gas. the best fuel is split wood, but any fuel which does not smoulder or give off thick smoke can be used. the materials for the fire, _e.g._, the split wood, newspaper, and a small bottle of paraffine for lighting purposes, should be kept in a sand bag, enclosed in a biscuit tin provided with a lid. an improvised brazier should be kept ready for use. the fire must be kept burning for at least ten minutes and the atmosphere in the shelter should be tested from time to time. _ventilation by fanning_.--dugouts can be ventilated by producing air currents in them by means of special anti-gas fans. if no anti-gas fans are available, ventilation can be assisted by flapping with improvised fans such as sand bags, ground sheets, etc. . cleaning of arms and ammunition: rifles and machine guns must be cleaned after a gas attack and then re-oiled. oil cleaning will prevent corrosion for hours or more, but the first available opportunity must be taken to dismantle machine guns and clean all parts in boiling water containing a little soda. if this is not done, corrosion continues slowly even after oil cleaning and may ultimately put the gun out of action. after a gas attack, s.a.a. should be carefully examined. all rounds affected by gas must be replaced by new cartridges immediately and the old ones cleaned and expended as soon as possible. all hand and rifle grenades exposed to the gas should have their safety-pins and working parts cleaned and re-oiled. all bright parts of light trench mortars, together with all accessories and spare parts exposed to the gas, must be cleaned and wiped dry as soon as possible after the attack and in any case within hours, after which they should be thoroughly coated afresh with oil. the same applies to ammunition which may have been exposed to the gas. ammunition which, for any reason, had not been oiled, must be cleaned and oiled and expended as soon as possible. for details regarding the cleaning of guns and artillery ammunition and signal equipment, see paragraphs and . . treatment of shell holes: in the neighborhood of shelters or battery positions where gas from shell holes is causing annoyance, the holes and the ground round them should be covered with at least a foot of fresh earth. shell holes so treated should not be disturbed, as the chemical is not thereby destroyed and only disappears slowly. concealment from aerial observers. a. . an aeroplane cannot conduct reconnaissance at a height of less than , feet without being within easy range of anti-aircraft artillery; nor of less than , feet without coming into range of machine-gun and rifle fire. . to be observed from such heights, objects on the ground must be distinguished by: (a) motion. (b) color contrast. (c) line contrast, or (d) shadows. b. concealment: . (a) on warning of hostile aircraft, troops on the march should withdraw to the side of the road (if possible, into shade), or lie down flat in the road and remain motionless. (b) if it is necessary to continue the march, this should be done in broken detachments, which are far less distinct than continuous column. (c) troops in a trench should crouch down in the shadowy side and remain motionless. (d) faces should never be turned up, as the high lights on cheek-bones and foreheads then show up distinctly. (e) bright metal on arms, equipment and headgear must be kept covered. . artillery wagon-trains, etc., should if possible be halted promptly on warning. when halted, their neutral coloring protects them. . trenches are best concealed: (a) by avoiding, in construction, a too regular outline, and following as far as possible the contours of the ground. (b) by coloring the parapet and parados to match the ground. this may be done most quickly by painted canvas; if the latter is not available, by planting or strewing the loose earth with surrounding herbage. in this work care must be taken not to make the covering itself too conspicuous by brightness or monotony of coloring. (c) by covering the trench itself, where convenient, with a thin material, colored like the parapet and parados. (d) by avoiding all overt movement of troops in the trenches under observation. . buildings, _e.g._, ammunition dumps, hangars, etc., can be completely concealed by being painted the color of the ground they stand on and fitted with canvas curtains, similarly painted and stretched from the eaves to the ground at a horizontal angle of degrees. these curtains completely eliminate shadows. . success in each work of concealment by camouflage is best assured by the assistance of an aeroplane observer to test and correct it. * * * * * orders governing intrenchment problems at second plattsburg training camp. headquarters plattsburg training camp, plattsburg barracks, new york. september , . divisional entrenching problem. general situation: the salmon river forms the boundary line between two states, the "blue" on the north and the "red" on the south. war has been declared and the red army is mobilizing near keeseville. mobilization by the first blue army at plattsburg has been completed. special situation, blue: our advanced troops are holding the line of the salmon river against strong detachments of the red army. the commanding general of the blue army has decided to establish a second position on the line, _bluff point to the bend_ ( ) _in the saranac river_. the following order is issued by the division commander: headquarters, st div., plattsburg, n.y. sept., ' , : a.m. field orders, no. . . our advanced troops are holding the line of the salmon river. . this division and brigade division will entrench along the line: _bluff point_--_chateaugay branch railroad_--_saranac river_ ( ). . (a) the chief of artillery will prepare the positions, and lines of communication for his brigade, determine his sectors, and submit his plan of action. (b) the st brig. and bns. th inf. will entrench the sector, _saranac river_ ( ) to _sand road_, exclusive. the nd brig. will entrench the sector _sand road to bluff point_, both inclusive. the supports will entrench on the line, _saranac river_ ( )--_cliff haven_. (c) the reserve-- brig. div. less bns., will construct crossings on the _saranac river_--under direction of the chief of engineers, and prepare them for defense. (d) the chief of engineers will supply tools for entrenching and lay out the lines of entrenchments. he will repair the following trunk roads: _peru road_, _sand road_, _lake-shore road_; and construct a transverse trunk line road from _pulp mill to o'connell's farm_, and the necessary tram lines. the engineer depot for stores and material will be established at _plattsburg barracks_. (e) the chief signal officer will establish necessary lines of communication, utilizing equipment at _plattsburg barracks, central station_. aero squadron at _chazy_. . (a) the chief medical officer will establish his dressing stations in the _butts_ of the rifle range and in ravine on _o'connell's farm_. a field hospital will be established at the _lozier works_. (b) ammunition train and supply train will be parked in the _fair ground_. ammunition distributing stations at railroad spurs, _plattsburg barracks_, and _o'connell's farm_. the division ordnance officer will locate the ammunition dumps along transverse trunk line road. (c) field trains, until further orders, at north end of _plattsburg barracks reservation_. distributing point, _plattsburg railroad station_--regimental supply stations: _saranac river_ ; intersection _peru road_ and _rifle range road_, _sand hole_ in _rifle range_, _sand road on o'connell's farm_, _ravine on o'connell's farm_. (d) the commander of trains will establish traffic regulations for all roads. . messages to _statistical office_. wolf, major general. official copy: j.a. baer, genl. staff, chief of staff. copies to: brig. and regt. commanders. c. of e. div. q.m. c.s.o. c.m.o. div. o.o. c. of tr. * * * * * headquarters, st brigade, st division, plattsburg barracks, n.y. rd sept., , p.m. field orders no. . . strong detachments of the red army, now mobilizing at _keeseville_, are south of the _salmon river_. our advance troops are holding the line of the _salmon river_. . our division and one brigade, nd division, will entrench and occupy the line _bluff point-chateaugay branch (d. & h.r.r.), saranac river_ ( ). this brigade, reinforced by two battalions, th infantry, will entrench and occupy the sector, _saranac river_ ( ), _sand road_, exclusive. . (a) the st and nd battalions, th infantry will entrench and occupy the sector from the _saranac river_ to a point yards east. (b) the th infantry, the sector from a point yards east of the _saranac river_, connecting with the trenches of the th infantry, to a point yards east of _peru road_. (c) the th infantry, the sector from a point yards east of the _peru road_, and connecting with the trenches of the th infantry, to the _sand road_ exclusive. (d) the brigade machine gun battalion will organize and maintain strong points along line regimental reserves. the c.o. of this organization will, at once, consult with the regimental commanders relative to preparation of machine gun emplacements and probable need for re-enforcements within their respective sectors. (e) the brigade signalmen will establish telephonic communications between brigade and regimental headquarters. . (a) the regimental commanders and senior officers of the two battalions, th infantry, will at once report to the chief engineer of the division for plan of entrenchments in their respective sectors. (b) tools and materials for entrenching will be supplied at the trench sites. . messages to brigade headquarters near _peru road_, east savoy hotel. goodrich, brigadier general, commanding. official copy: wm. kirby, major of cavalry, u.s.r., adjutant. copies to: c.o., th infantry. c.o., th infantry. c.o., st and nd battalions, th infantry. c.o., brigade m.g. co. headquarters, st division. headquarters, st battalion, th infantry plattsburg barracks, n.y. oct. , . field orders no. . blue print of trenches; scale inches equals mile. . the enemy strongly occupies a line of trenches immediately _south_ of the _chateaugay branch railroad_, the center of their line being about opposite the center sector of our first line of trench, _sand road-target range fence_, their line of trenches being within yards of the railroad at that point, and then retiring slightly from the railroad to the _east_ and _west_. the th infantry occupies the section of trenches directly to the east of us and the th infantry occupies the section of trenches directly to the west of us. . this battalion will take up a defensive position in the nearly completed line of trenches, _sand road-target range fence_, and as rapidly as possible complete the trench system in the following order of work: a. deepen all trenches to at least three feet. b. construct latrines. c. provide cover. d. revet work previously done. . a. front lines, _i.e._, fire, communicating and support trenches: company "b" will occupy the _east_ sector, _i.e._, _sand road_ to _belgium boyau_, inclusive, including _slum boyau_ and the salient at _south_ end reserve trench immediately in rear of _east_ end of support trench. company "c" will occupy the _central_ sector, _i.e._, from _east_ sector (_belgium boyau_, exclusive), to _cardona boyau_, inclusive, including _poire boyau_. company "a" will occupy the _west_ sector, _i.e._, from _central_ sector (_cardona boyau_, exclusive), to and including salient near _southwest_ corner of _target range fence_. b. reserve line: company "d" will occupy the line from the _target range fence_ on the _west_ to a point yards _east_ of the _verdun salient_, one-half of the company occupying the sector, _target range fence_, to a point yards _east_ of the _rams horn boyau_, including _rams horn boyau_, and the other half of the company occupying the sector from a point yards _east_ of the _rams horn boyau_ to a point yards _east_ of the _verdun salient_. c. machine guns: headquarters, st platoon and st platoon machine gun company, will report to the commanding officer, company "a," for assignment to the shell craters (converted) and dugouts (constructed for machine guns), four in all, in the _west_ sector. headquarters, nd platoon and third section ( nd platoon) machine gun company, will report to the commanding officer, company "c," for assignment to the shell crater (converted), and dugout (constructed for machine gun), two in all, in the _central_ sector. fourth section ( nd platoon), machine gun company, will report to the commanding officer, company "b," for assignment to the shell crater (converted), two in all, in the _east_ sector. d. trench mortars: two trench mortars have been assigned to the _central_ sector and the commanding officer, company "c," is charged with the construction of emplacements therefor and the manning of them. . a. dressing stations have been established in the _butts_ of the rifle range and in ravine on _o'connell's farm_. b. ammunition distributing points are located at _plattsburg barracks_ and _o'connell's farm_. c. regimental supply stations are located at _saranac river_ ( ), intersection _peru road_ and _rifle range road_, _sand hole in rifle range_, _sand road_ on _o'connell's farm_, and _ravine_ on _o'connell's farm_. . battalion headquarters are located in dugout in _support_ trench (west tremont), midway between _rams horn_ and _poire boyaux_, to which place messages will be sent. boschen, captain, th infantry, commanding. copies to: c.o., th infantry. c.o., companies a, b, c and d. c.o., m.g. company. c.o., headquarters company. r.s.o. * * * * * hdqtrs. st batt., th infty., plattsburg bcks., n.y., _oct. , ._ field orders no. . dispositions: a. the assignment of companies to sectors is as announced in field orders no. , these headquarters. b. company commanders are charged with the details of occupation of the trenches and the proper disposition of the "specialists" (bombers, grenadiers, auto-riflemen, etc.), directing particular attention to the active and passive areas of their sectors. . fields of fire: company commanders must arrange for and obtain the best fields of fire in their own sectors, and provide for protection of visible areas in adjoining sectors by lateral fire. . improvements or changes in trenches: company commanders before making any changes or improvements in trenches will render to battalion headquarters brief recommendations of changes desired. these recommendations will be submitted at . a.m. and . p.m., after which hours the battalion commander will inspect and if deemed necessary will be ordered. . organization for watching and observation: a. each company commander will organize a system for watching the enemy by day and will establish look-out posts for this purpose; this system will be augmented at night by patrols if necessary. b. the watching of the enemy must be continuous and long occupation of the sector will not warrant any laxity. . organization for supply: a. company commanders will make the necessary details for obtaining supplies; these details to be in charge of mess or supply sergeants and will not exceed three squads for each lettered company. b. _food_: machine guns details and members of the medical corps assigned to each sector are attached to the lettered companies for rations. c. cooked food will be at the _food station_ at . a.m., . a.m. and . p.m. daily, and will be distributed at that point. d. company commanders will detail the mess sergeant, with an appropriate detail (about squads) to proceed to _food station_, which is located at the wire entanglement on the _west_ side of the _target range_ about yards _north of brigade headquarters_. e. the details mentioned above will proceed via trenches, leaving same at junction of _tipperary_ trench and _rams horn_ boyau in the following order: co. d: detail will clear junction _rams horn_ boyau and _tipperary_ trench at . a.m., . a.m. and . p.m. co. a: detail will clear junction _tremont_ trench, and _rams horn_ boyau at . a.m., . a.m. and . p.m., proceeding via _rams horn_ boyau. co. b: detail will clear junction _tremont_ trench, and _poire_ boyau at . a.m., . a.m. and . p.m., proceeding via _poire_ boyau and _tipperary_ trench. co. c: detail will clear junction _tremont_ trench and _slum_ boyau at . a.m., . a.m. and . p.m., proceeding via _slum_ boyau and _tipperary_ trench. f. these details will return to their respective sectors via the indicated routes, moving in reverse order at five-minute intervals, and company commanders will make necessary arrangements for distribution of food within their respective sectors. g. company commanders will cause the necessary police after each meal to insure sanitary condition of trenches. h. food containers will be held in company until the next meal hour when they will be returned to the _food station_. i. _water_: water wagon will be at the _food station_ from . a.m. to . p.m. daily. j. containers for water will be furnished by regimental supply officer at the _food station_. k. all men will carry full canteens of water when entering the trenches. l. company commanders will detail the mess sergeant, with an appropriate detail (about squads), to proceed to the _food station_ to procure water in containers; these details will proceed via the routes indicated in paragraph , section "e": co. d, . p.m.; co. a, . p.m.; co. b, . p.m.; co. c, . p.m. m. these details will return to their respective sectors in reverse order at five-minute intervals. n. _miscellaneous_: details for obtaining tools, ammunition, trench supplies, etc., will be arranged for as required. o. requisitions for miscellaneous supplies required will be submitted by company commanders to the regimental supply officer not later than . p.m., october , . . organization for liaison: a. the signal officer will establish necessary telephonic communications. b. each organization will detail one runner to report to the battalion commander at regimental headquarters at . a.m. c. four runners will be detailed for duty with each company headquarters and one runner will be detailed for duty with each platoon headquarters. these runners should be lightly equipped and wear a distinctive mark. d. at least two men per section must be able to act as guides to all company headquarters of the battalion. e. verbal messages will not be sent by runners; all messages must be written. f. company commanders, or their representatives, will report daily at battalion headquarters at . p.m. g. there must be accurate communication between platoons in company, and companies in battalion, in order to insure co-ordinated action. . defense: a. immediately after the occupation of the trenches, company commanders will make a careful estimate of all tactical situations presented in their sectors and will plan for a stubborn defense. care must be exercised in providing for defense in depth and lateral defense. the front line trenches of each sector will be held until actually entered by the enemy, and no sector will be abandoned until the occupants are actually forced out. b. the main line of resistance will be the support trenches (_tremont_) and special attention must be given to the preparation for defense. if the front line trenches of any sector be captured by the enemy there will be no withdrawal from any other sector of the front line trenches for the purpose of establishing a continuous line in the support trench. c. the company commander of the reserve will organize parties for counterattacks and these parties will be held in readiness at convenient points to insure prompt movement to the front. d. continuous occupation of the trenches without fire action must not cause a feeling of security and result in being surprised by the enemy. . stand to: "stand to" will take place at . a.m. and . p.m., daily. at this formation every available man will be present. rifles, ammunition, equipment, clothing, etc., will be inspected. rapid loading will be practiced. the firing position of every man will be tested to see whether he can hit the bottom edge of our wire. gas helmets and respirators will be inspected if worn. after "stand to" in the morning and before "stand to" in the evening rifles will be thoroughly cleaned and oiled. . trench orders: a. current "trench standing orders" recently published from brigade headquarters are in force. b. during the occupation of the trenches it will be assumed that, the trenches are under the observation and fire of the enemy and all movement in the trenches will be conducted accordingly. all movements of troops, either individuals or groups, will be via the trenches at all times. c. no one will be allowed to go overland between trenches or to enter the trenches by the flank. all persons will enter the trenches from the reserve trenches and no visitors will be allowed in the trenches except on passes issued from the regimental headquarters. d. commanding officers, companies a and b, are responsible for the posting of the necessary sentinels along the flanks of the position (during the day), with instructions covering the provisions contained in paragraph , sections "b" and "c." . reports: a. company commanders will submit by . p.m., october , , a report showing the dispositions and plan of defense of their respective sectors. b. frequent reports of information obtained and any change of conditions at the front will be made to battalion headquarters when necessary. boschen, _captain, th infantry._ _commanding._ copies to: c.o. th infty. c.o. cos, a, b, c and d. c.o. m.g. co. c.o., hdq. co. r.s.o. company organization (in detail): company headquarters: captain, commanding company, first lieutenant (senior), second in command, first sergeant, armed with pistol, mess sergeant, armed with rifle, supply sergeant, armed with rifle, corporal, company clerk, armed with rifle, mechanics, armed with rifle, wagoners (from supply company), cooks, armed with rifle, buglers, armed with pistol, privates, first class, company agent and signalmen. _equipment_: rifles, pistols, automatic rifles (for replacement), trench knives (to be distributed as needed), bicycles. following from supply company: rolling kitchen, -mule; combat wagon, -mule; ration and baggage wagon, -mule; ration cart, -mule; water cart, -mule; mules, draft. _ platoons, each organized as follows_ (numbered to in company): headquarters: first lieutenant; st and th platoons commanded by first lieutenants; nd and rd platoons commanded by second lieutenants, armed with pistol. sergeant, assistant to platoon commander, armed with pistol and rifle. _equipment_: rifle, pistols. st section: bombers and rifle grenadiers: sergeant, armed with pistol and rifle, corporals, armed with pistol and rifle, trained as rifle grenadier; remainder trained as bombers, privates, first class, armed with pistol and rifle, and remainder with rifle only; trained as rifle grenadier, and remainder as bombers. privates, armed with rifles; trained as rifle grenadiers, remainder trained as bombers. _equipment_: rifles, pistols. nd section: riflemen: corporals, armed with pistols and rifles, privates, first class, armed with rifle, privates, armed with rifle, _equipment_: rifles, pistols. rd section: riflemen: corporals, armed with pistol and rifle, privates, first class, armed with rifle, privates, armed with rifle. _equipment_: rifles, pistols. th section: auto-riflemen: sergeant, armed with pistol and rifle, corporal, armed with pistol and rifle, privates, first class; armed with rifle, armed with pistols; auto-rifle gunners, including extra, privates, armed with rifle. _equipment_: rifles, pistols, auto-rifles. note.--sections numbered from to in company. personnel: commissioned: captain first lieutenants second lieutenants ---- total ==== enlisted: first sergeant mess sergeant supply sergeant sergeants corporals mechanics wagoners (from supply company) ( ) cooks buglers privates, first class privates ----- total ===== equipment: rifles pistols auto rifles trench knives bicycles from supply company: rolling kitchen, -mule combat wagon, -mule ration and baggage wagon, -mule ration cart, -mule water cart, -mule mules, draft ==== trench standing orders. . duties.--a. one officer per company and one non-commissioned officer per platoon will always be on duty. during their tour of duty they will not be in their dugouts. they will frequently visit all trenches occupied by their units. every listening post will be visited at least once by an officer during his tour of duty. b. the officer and non-commissioned officer on duty will, when his tour of duty is completed, turn over to the officer or non-commissioned officer relieving him all orders, a report of the work in progress, if any, and any other information of use. c. at night the officer and non-commissioned officer on duty will frequently patrol the trench line, to see that the sentries are alert and to receive any reports they may desire to make. d. the-non-commissioned officer coming on duty will go round and post new sentinels with the non-commissioned officer coming off duty. e. the length of the tour of duty will depend upon the number of officers and non-commissioned officers on duty. normally each tour should be, by night, two hours; by day, four hours. this may be modified, however, so that all officers and non-commissioned officers will have an equal amount of this duty while in the trenches. f. non-commissioned officers, after posting sentinels, will report "all is well" or otherwise to the officers on duty. g. no man will be detailed for a duty in the trench without being given suitable warning of this duty and be informed at which hour he will come on duty. h. the company commander will be responsible for sending any report required by battalion headquarters. . sentries.--a. the number of sentry posts required will depend on the assumed propinquity or distance of the enemy, strength of obstacles, ease with which sentry posts can be re-enforced and other local conditions. normally by day this should be one sentinel for each platoon and at night three double sentinels for each platoon. there must be sentries enough to insure alarm being given promptly in case of attack and that local resistance is sufficient until help can arrive. b. the next relief will remain within an easy distance of the sentry on post, usually in shelters provided for this purpose. c. every sentry is to be regularly posted by a non-commissioned officer who will explain to him his duties and ascertain that the sentry is aware of the position of the section and platoon commanders and of the sentries on either side, and whether there are any patrols or working parties out in front. d. every sentinel will report when an officer passes his post, "all is well," or otherwise. e. every sentinel by day will be provided with a head-cover to blend with the ground (this may be improvised), and while observing the ground to the front will remain perfectly still. an empty sand bag or some other suitable material may be utilized for this purpose. . patrols.--a. it is the duty of all the troops holding the front lines to establish a command of the ground in front of their parapet up to the enemy's wire. this can be done by extended and constant patrolling by night and reconnaissance by day so that the ground is thoroughly well known to as large a portion as possible of officers and men and so no enemy can move or remain in his front by night or day without detection. one of the particular duties of these patrols is to observe the condition of the wire entanglements. b. every patrol must have definite orders as to its mission; broadly speaking, patrols may be divided into two classes: ( ) reconnoitering patrols, ( ) fighting patrols. c. the first duty of reconnoitering patrols is to obtain the information for which they are sent out. they fight only in self-defense or if any especially favorable opportunity arises to inflict loss upon the enemy without prejudice to their mission. they usually consist of two to six men, under an officer or non-commissioned officer. d. fighting patrols are sent out for the express purpose of causing loss or damage to the enemies by such means as engaging the enemy's patrols or working parties, or by raiding saps, listening posts or trenches. for identification purposes they should always endeavor to secure at least one prisoner. their strength depends upon the resistance they are likely to meet with. e. company commanders are responsible for the orders given to patrols, subject to any instructions which may be issued by higher authority. they are also responsible that all troops, whom it concerns, including companies on both flanks, are warned when and where patrols will be out, length of time they will be out, and of the points to which they will return. f. information gained by patrols is of little value unless transmitted quickly to those whom it concerns. patrol reports will be made out by the commander of the patrol immediately upon his return and sent at once to the company commander unless orders to the contrary have been given. . stand to.--a. "stand to" will take place one-half hour after a relief has been posted and one-half hour before being relieved. at this parade every available man will be present. rifles, equipment, clothing, etc., will be inspected. firing steps will be tested as soon as practicable after reliefs have been posted to see that each man can fire on the foot of the nearest part of the wire entanglement which he is required to cover by his fire. the same procedure will be gone through at the "stand to" one-half hour before being relieved. other "stand tos" may be ordered in the discretion of the company commander. these should be sufficiently often to insure that every man turns out promptly and knows his place in case of attack. . machine guns.--a. the concealment of machine gun emplacements is important. consequently, it is only at night or in case of attack that machine gun crews will occupy their defense emplacements. at night guns should take up other position than their defense emplacements and fire a stated number of rounds in order to test out the guns and mislead the enemy as to their numbers and real emplacements, after which they will at once go back to their defense emplacements. b. the guns and their crews will be tactically under the orders of the company commander in whose sector they are located, but no alteration will be made by him in their disposition or arcs of fire; he will, however, bring before the senior machine gun instructor any suggestions for improvements in machine gun dispositions for defense. c. two men per gun will always be on duty with the guns. d. range cards will be prepared and kept with each gun. e. officers and non-commissioned officers in charge of guns will remain in close proximity to the guns. they will frequently inspect their guns, emplacements, etc. they are responsible for cleanliness and maintenance of the emplacements. f. machine gun commanders are responsible for guns always being ready for action, and that emplacements are clear of all material except such as is required for the service of the guns; that embrasures or loopholes are kept clear of all obstructions which may interfere with fire or view. . reliefs.--a. reconnaisance. prior to taking over the line of trenches the company commander, accompanied by his senior first lieutenant and first sergeant, will reconnoiter the trenches. b. points to be noted by the company commanders. the following points will be specially noted by company commanders before taking over trenches: . plan of occupation (number of men holding lines to be taken over, their distribution and duties). . shelter accommodations. . work being done and proposed. . conditions of the wire and defenses generally. . information as to the enemy, his habits, snipers, and the work he is doing, etc. . water supply. . artillery support. . communications. . danger points. . location and condition of stores. . liaison. . guides.--a. arrangements will be made between the company commanders of the incoming and outgoing companies as to the rendezvous where guides will be provided by the latter to conduct the incoming troops to the trenches. b. one guide per platoon, one for each company and one for battalion headquarters will be provided. these guides must know the exact spot where they will meet the relief troops and the best way to conduct the units to the particular section of the trench they will occupy. . smoking and talking.--a. after leaving the rendezvous there will be no smoking and talking until arrival in trenches. strictest march discipline will be enforced on the way to and from the trenches. . procedure on arrival at trenches.--a. the troops being relieved will not leave the trenches until the relieving troops are in position and the new sentries have been posted, all trench stores have been handed over and receipted for, and orders to move have been received from the company commander. b. platoon commanders will at once personally see that all sentinels are properly posted, that the non-commissioned officer is on duty, that every man knows his place in case of attack, and that both flanks of his platoon are in liaison with the adjoining platoon. c. when reliefs are completed, platoon commanders will report to that effect to the company commander. d. men will not be dismissed until the company commander has received the reports from all of his platoon commanders that everything is in order. . log books.--a. each company commander will keep a log book in which will be entered: . work done. . number of men working. . hours worked. . any information obtained from sentries, patrols, or other sources. they will also enter in this book a list of any trench stores that come into their possession. . equipment.--a. equipment will be worn in the front trenches. haversacks, packs, and trench tools need not be worn, these will be left in the shelters. in support and reserve trenches, they will be worn at the discretion of the company commander. b. ration and carrying parties will wear equipment and carry rifles unless otherwise ordered. c. pieces will be assumed to be loaded and locked at all times. d. in the firing trenches bayonets will be fixed at night. e. non-commissioned officers and men of the firing line will at all times be in possession of their rifles and bayonets. the rifles of men in the support and reserve trenches or dugouts will be where they can be quickly seized, even in the dark. . stretcher bearers.--a. stretcher bearers will be stationed at a point designated by the company commander. . discipline.--a. sleeping in the firing trenches will not be permitted. b. no man will enter the firing trench, except in discharge of his duty, unless so ordered by his company or platoon commander. c. sentries will remain standing unless the height of the parapet renders this impossible. d. saluting and standing at attention, etc., will be as carefully adhered to as when in camp except that sentinel will not let this interfere with their duties. . rations and cooking.--a. cooking will be done in the rear of the reserve at a point to be designated. b. company quartermaster sergeants will accompany ration parties, which will be limited in size to the actual needs for bringing up cooked rations from the point where cooking is done, to the trenches. at no time should this exceed ten per cent of the effective strength of the unit from which sent. c. care will be taken that as little noise as possible be made by these carrying parties. . sanitation.--a. the importance of strict attention to sanitation will be impressed upon all ranks. b. the commanding officer of each unit is responsible for sanitation in his sector. he will make frequent inspections of latrines, refuse pits and trenches to ascertain that no unsanitary conditions exist. c. latrines will be constructed in the trenches, excreta kept covered at all times and such disinfectants as may be provided will be used at regular intervals. when filled within eighteen inches of the top, pits will be filled with earth and labeled. d. urinal cans will be provided and men required to use these cans and contents will be emptied as often as necessary into deep pits at least one hundred yards from the trenches. empty tin cans, particles of food and other refuse will be collected in receptacles kept in the trenches for that purpose and carried to the rear and buried in pits. this is usually done at night. emergency dumps for companies (material). . any large shell crater will do for these or holes can be dug ' x ,' x ' deep. contents of dump. rolls barbed wire. coils french accordion wire. long screw stakes. short screw stakes. prepared wire blocks (gooseberries). stores for company. very flares. s.o.s. rockets. verminal sprayers. strombos horn. (gas alarm) rubber boots. periscopes. revolver ammunition. log book. set maps. set air photos. defense scheme. . these are taken over and signed for. each dugout must have a gas blanket and some form of gas alarm (usually empty shell case.) stores at battalion headquarters. strombos horn. verminal sprayers. very flares. s.o.s. rockets. revolver ammunition. ground flares. [illustration: plate # ] conclusion. the present army of the united states had its inception at plattsburg in . the first regiment of the business mens' training camp will go down in history as the first chapter of preparedness. the training camps of , not only at plattsburg, but at various other places throughout the united states, constituted the second chapter. we are just finishing chapter three in the officers' training camps of . this book brings together the essential points of the instruction given at the second and probably the last of the officers' training camps at plattsburg, in such a way that an officer may refresh his memory when he is about to take up with his men any of the subjects covered. it is hardly necessary to add that no attempt has been made to cover fully any branch of the work. the bibliography provides for further study and the books in it should be at every officer's command. as the war progresses many changes will be made; not only will methods change but some branches now considered essential may be cast aside as useless. nothing but work can make the pages of any military book have real meaning. this book gives what are now considered the essentials of military training. if it has brought to the conscientious officer points he might otherwise have forgotten to the detriment of his command, it will have served its purpose. bibliography. chapter ii. i.d.r. balck "tactics" vol. . infantry. howell "lectures on the swiss army." bjornstadt "lectures on the german army." "drill and field training" (english)--imperial army series. "instructions on the offensive conduct of small units." war department, may, . "notes on the methods of attack and defense to meet the conditions of modern warfare." army war college, april, . privates manual. (moss.) "instructions for assembling the infantry pack," ordnance department. pamphlet no. manual of military training. (moss.) chapter iii. physical training. "manual of physical training." (koehler.) "field physical training of the soldier." special regulation no. . voice culture. (robert lloyd.) (in lecture form.) chapter iv. small arms firing manual. bull's eye scorebook. u.s. marines scorebook. "how to shoot." (moss.) "notes on training for rifle fire in trench warfare." army war coll., april, . "the rifle in war." (eames.) "suggestions to military riflemen." (whelen.) "musketry" sheets from first camp, plattsburg, new york. "control of the firing line." army service school. "musketry training." (pickering.) "a synopsis of the rifle in war." army service schools. british--"aids in musketry." "fire problems." (pilcher.) "fire orders"--"direction and control"--"musketry"--imperial army series. "lecture and lessons on musketry and instructions for officers and n.c.o.s. musketry diagrams." (clutterbuck.) "notes on bayonet training." army war college, march, . "british manual of the bayonet." ordnance pamphlet no. and no. . (pistol.) "notes on bombing." (mcclintock.) "notes on grenade training"--plattsburg training camp. "notes on grenade warfare." army war college. chapter v. military sketching and map heading. "military map reading." (sherrill.) "military sketching and map reading." (grieves.) "an officer's notes" (parker.) "topography." (sherrill.) engineers field manual. "manual of infantry training." (moss.) "training manual in topography, map reading and reconnaissance." (by major spalding, u.s.a.) "military sketching and map reading." (capt. barnes.) chapter vi. articles of war. "a guide to the articles of war." (professor eugene waumbaugh.) manual of courts martial. chapter vii. army regulations. "manual for commanders of infantry platoons." translated from the french by the army war college, , war department document no. . a.r., . chapter viii. (field work.) "notes on field fortification." army service schools, . "e.f.m." and addendum thereto. "elements of trench warfare." (waldron.) "field entrenchments." (solano.) "scouting and patrolling." (waldron.) "scout instruction." (mckenney.) "scout's handwork." (mckenney.) "the nd matabele war." (baden powell.) "aids to scouting." (baden powell.) "manual of military training." (moss.) "small problems in infantry." (bjornstadt.) "s.m. tactics." "a military primer." (marshall & simonds.) "technique of modern tactics." (von allen.) "night movements." (burnett.) "night operations for infantry." (dawkins.) chapter ix. (feeding men.) "manual for army cooks." "mess sergeant's handbook." (holbrook.) "mess officer's assistant." "mess account book." (frink.) "handling the straight army ration." (holbrook.) "manual of military training." (moss.) "field service." (moss.) chapter x. (personal hygiene and first aid.) "manual of military training." (moss.) "lectures on military sanitation and management of sanitation service," army service schools. "lectures" delivered at plattsburg training camp, . "elements of military hygiene." (ashburn.) "red cross pamphlet on first aid." "manual for non-coms. and privates." chapter xi. (signaling.) "united states signal book." "infantry drill regulations." chapter xii. (guard duty.) "manual of interior guard duty." chapter xiii. (company administration.) "company administration." (waldron.) "army paper work." (perrin-smith pub. co.) "notes on organizations." (waldron.) "synopsis of work done at st plattsburg camp." (farley.) "army paper work." (moss.) "army regulations." chapter xiv. (conferences. study. s.p.i. examinations.) "examinations in military science," harvard university, . chapter xv. (trench warfare.) "field fortifications." (lt. henri poire.) plattsburg, n.y., . "the french automatic rifle." (capt. gene loriot.) "notes on liaison in modern warfare." "notes on the method of attack and defense to meet the conditions of modern warfare." "machine gun tactics." (applin.) "grenades, hand and rifle." (solano.) "training for the trenches." (vickers.) "studies in leading troops." (vernois.) "tactical decisions and orders." (buddecke.) "problems in leading troops--army service schools." "battle orders." (von kiesling.) " problems." (morrison.) "tactical principles and problems." (hanna.) "technique of modern tactics." (bond and mcdonough.) "estimating tactical situations." (fitch.) the book department, army service schools, fort leavenworth, kansas, or the united states infantry association, washington, d.c., will get any books available. index. chapter . page. schedules; chapter . infantry drill regulations; school of the soldier; instruction without arms; attention; position of; heels together and on a line; feet turned out equally, forming angle of degrees; knees extended without stiffness; trunk erect upon hips; shoulders falling naturally; arms hanging naturally; head erect, chin raised; rests; position of rest and at ease; fall out; rest; at ease; parade rest; eyes right; right face; right half face; about face; hand salute; forward march; double time, march; mark time, march; half step, march; right step, march; squad, halt; by right flank, march; to the rear, march; change step, march; manual of arms; purpose; commands and cautions; order, arms; present, arms; port, arms; right shoulder, arms; left shoulder, arms; parade, rest; trail, arms; rifle salute; fix bayonet; unfix bayonet; inspection arms; school of the squad; object; composition of squad; fall in; fall out; count off; inspection arms--right dress, front; guide right; take interval; to reform; take distance; assemble, march; stack arms; take arms; oblique, march; in place, halt; resume march; right turn; right half turn; squads right; squad right about; school of the company; object; composition; fall in; platoon movements; leading platoon; rear platoon; questions which come up in daily military life; answers; insignia; for second lieutenants; company right, march; platoons right, march; squads right, march; right turn, march; column right, march; platoons, column right, march; squads right, column right, march; squads right, platoons, column right, march; squads right about, march; right into line, march; right front into line, march; platoons, right front into line, march; route step, march; right by twos, march; squads right front into line, march; dismiss the company; to fall in company when it cannot be formed by squads; for muster; in aligning company; to march squad without unnecessary commands; as skirmishers, march; assemble, march; kneel; lie down; rise; loadings and firings; arming; sight-setting announced; fire at will; clip fire; unload; extended order; corporal cautions; left face; company right; deployments; as skirmishers, guide right, march; to deploy from column or squad; assemble, march; platoons, assemble; platoons, columns; squad columns; no. 's forward, march; captain points out new line; disadvantage; advantage; being in skirmish line; by platoon; commands; school of the battalion; basis; arrangement; number; center; band; dressing; to form the battalion; other than ceremonies; for ceremonies; to dismiss the battalion; to rectify the alignment; to rectify the column; helpful hints to beginners; in column of squads; in column of companies; line of companies; in battalion line; inspections; special points of company; battalion inspection; regimental inspection; ceremonies; battalion review; battalion parade; regimental parade; regimental review; fire direction; fire control; fire discipline; the colonel; position; duties; the major; position; the general; duties; special; battalion staff; positions; duties; position; duties: before fire action; during the action; buglers; position; duties; must be proficient in; range estimators; platoon leader; position; duties; thereafter; first sergeant; guides; general rules; equipment; close order; taking intervals and distances; to form the company; alignments; exercise for; result; platoon guides; position; duties; corporal; position; duties; thereafter; the private; position; duties; packs; cartridge belt; to attach first-aid pouch; to attach canteen cover; to attach pack carrier to haversack; to attach cartridge belt to haversack; to attach bayonet scabbard to haversack; to attach intrenching tool carrier to haversack; to assemble the full equipment (without rations); to make the pack; to assemble the pack; to assemble the full equipment (with rations); to make the pack; to assemble the pack; to adjust to the soldier; to assemble full equipment, less the pack (with rations); to assemble full equipment, less the pack (without rations); to discard pack without removing equipment from body; care of equipment; leather; woolen clothes; mending; cloth equipment--dry cleaning; washing; instructions on making packs; methods; adjusting cartridge belt; distribution of intrenching tools in the squad; chapter . physical training; physical training; bayonet training; time schedule; formations; second formation; commands; kinds of and how given; first lesson; second lesson; third lesson; fourth lesson; fifth lesson; voice culture; chapter . use of modern arms; small arms firing; slow fire; rapid fire; pistol; nomenclature and care; manual for the pistol; position; the grip; the trigger squeeze; position and aiming drills; quick fire; classes of fire; slow fire; quick fire; automatic fire; trench; score; course; slow fire; quick fire; automatic fire; trench fire; bayonet training; functions of; general practice; technique of bayonet combat; manual of the bayonet; progressive exercises; machine guns; mode of action; fire; inconspicuousness; offensive reinforcement of a front momentarily stationary; defensive; general rules for installation; employment of fire and instruction; resume; points before firing; points during firing; points after firing; grenade instruction; introduction; working of grenades in use; instruction in throwing; instruction in grenade organization; points to remember; chapter . map sketching; class room--map reading; taking up map scales; field work--strict scale map making; road sketch; area sketch; problem; class room--problem; field work--problem; class room--problem; field work--problem; problem; map reading; chapter . helpful references to the articles of war; military law; article ; definitions; article ; persons subject to military law; articles - ; courts martial classified; method of entering a charge against a man; specification; general remarks; article ; order of voting; article ; limit upon prosecutions; article ; fraudulent enlistment; article ; desertion; article ; absence without leave; article ; disrespect toward president and others; article ; disrespect toward a superior officer; article ; assaulting or wilfully disobeying superior officer; article ; insubordinate conduct toward a non-commissioned officer; article ; disorders; article ; breaking arrest; article ; misbehavior before the enemy; article ; neglect of military property; article ; waste or unlawful disposal of property issued to soldiers; article ; drunk on duty; article ; misbehavior of sentinel; article ; murder or rape; article ; various crimes; article ; frauds against the government; article ; conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman; article ; general articles, the catch all; examples; problem ; problem ; problem ; chapter . notes on army regulations; authority exercised; abusive language; respect to superiors; remarks by officers; furloughs; men on furloughs; men in foreign countries; no payments; desertion; abandoned clothes; reward; costs of apprehension; no pay or clothes; will be restored; absent without leave; discharge of enlisted men; final statements; certificate; loss of discharge certificate; physical disability certificate; death of soldier; effects; will be delivered; medal of honor; certificate of merit; quarters; saturday; neglect of rooms; destruction of tableware; chiefs of squads; premises; company commanders; arms; accountability and responsibility; example; loss of public property; ration; forfeiture; pay; allotments; class a; class b; compensation for death or disability; additional insurance; deposits; a lost deposit book; payment; withdrawal of deposits; interest; forfeiture; officers and men; furloughed to reserve; transportation; discharged soldier; transfer of claims; notes on the laws of war; chapter . practice marches; field work; an order; do not deploy too early; fire direction; the troops; defense; leadership; communications; night operations; patrols; leader; conduct of; report; return; advance guard; rear guard; flank guard; camps; march outpost; outpost; outline of field service regulations; land forces of u.s.; military information; transmission of information; questions and answers on; chapter . feeding men; in camp; on the march; for individual cooking; in the trenches; rations and cooking; camping and camp sanitation; general principles; chapter . personal hygiene and first aid; personal hygiene; bathing; sexual indulgence; exercise; cleanliness of surroundings; preventable diseases; typhoid fever; dysentery; malaria; tonsilitis and colds; measles; first aid; grounds; poisoned wounds; diagnosis tag; treatment of wounds; bleeding wounds; fainting, heat exhaustion and shock; sunstroke; burns and scalds; freezing and frostbites; fractures; treatment; artificial respiration; trench foot; chapter . signaling; semaphore; first cycle; second cycle; third cycle; fourth cycle; doubles; instructing; second step; third step; fourth step; wig wag; points to remember; letter codes; arm signals; forward, march; halt; double time, march; squads right, march; squads left, march; squads right about, march; change direction or column right, march; as skirmishers, march; as skirmishers, guide center, march; as skirmishers, guide right, march; assemble, march; range, or change elevation; what range are you using?; are you ready?; commence firing; fire faster; fire slower; to swing the cone of fire; fix bayonet; suspend firing; cease firing; platoon; squad; rush; chapter . guard duty; guards; formal guard mounting; ceremony; first detail; other details; sergeant major; adjutant; , , officer of the guard; new officer of the day; commander of the guard; guard duty in the trenches; chapter . company administration; notes on organization; prepare in advance to receive men; duties; if in cantonments; if in tents; men reporting; issue of equipment; organization; day's routine; reveille; mess; , sick call; , morning instruction; afternoon instruction; retreat; school call; tattoo; call to quarters; taps; sundays and holidays; details; paper work; military correspondence; morning report; ration return; sick report; duty roster; monthly return; service record; discharge; final statement; muster roll; pay roll; names; losses; chapter . conferences; study; syllabus: small problems for infantry; examinations; military science and tactics; minor tactics; chapter . trench warfare; general principles; instructions to be issued by battalion commander; attack of a defensive position; attacking from trenches; defense of trenches; liaison; trench orders; selection of site; trench construction; , general arrangement; system of laying out trenches; revettments; sod; sand bags; concrete work; gabions; trench armament; loopholes; trench bottoms; communication trench; latrines; shelters; dugouts; sentries; position; entrances; galleries; bomb-traps; interior; depots for supplies; telephones; departure parallel; machine gun emplacements; listening posts; wire entanglements; high entanglements; tracing entanglements; low entanglements; loose wire; criticisms by lieut henri poire; occupation; two main classes of relief; general principles of relief; mechanism of relief; attack during the march; the stay in the trenches; four objects of a trench commander; his plan of defense; organization of defense; liaison; observation; trench work; offensive operations; rule of the trench commander; duties of the company commander; duties of platoon leaders as officers on duty; duties of platoon leaders; in front line trenches; duties of non-commissioned officer on duty; patrols; sentinels; machine guns; snipers; organization of a platoon; deployments; normal battalion formation in attack; general principles of the platoon formation in assault of fortified positions; remarks regarding forming of wave from close order; some questions a platoon commander should ask himself; defensive measure against gas attacks; general considerations; nature of gas attacks; gas clouds; gas projectiles; tear or lachrymatory shells; poison shells; smoke; mine and explosion gases; protection of shelters; methods of protection; shelters which should be protected; protection of weapons and equipment; small arms and s.a.a.; hand and rifle grenades; light trench mortars; action to be taken in trenches on gas alarm; action to be taken in billets and back areas; action during gas attack; protective measures; tactical measures; precautions against gas shells; action subsequent to a gas attack; general; movement; clearing dugouts and other shelters; ventilation; natural; by fire; by fanning; cleaning arms and ammunition; treatment of shell holes; concealment from aerial observers; orders governing intrenchment problems; company organization; company headquarters; headquarters; personnel; commissioned; enlisted; equipment; trench standing orders; duties; sentries; patrols; stand to; machine guns; reliefs; guides; smoking and talking; procedure on arrival at trenches; log books; equipment; stretcher bearers; discipline; rations and cooking; sanitation; emergency dumps for companies (material); contents of dump; stores for company; stores at battalion headquarters; conclusion; bibliography; transcriber's note: there is no author cited on the book's title page; however, the book's spine shows "a field officer" page numbers in this book are indicated by numbers enclosed in curly braces, e.g. { }. they have been located where page breaks occurred in the original book. for its index, a page number has been placed only at the start of that section. footnotes have been renumbered sequentially and moved to the end of their respective chapters. the book's index has a number of references to footnotes, e.g. the "(_note_)" entry under "boer war." in such cases, check the referenced page to see which footnote(s) are relevant. lectures on land warfare a tactical manual for the use of infantry officers an examination of the principles which underlie the art of warfare, with illustrations of the principles by examples taken from military history, from the _battle of thermopylae_ b.c. , to the _battle of the sambre_ november - , london william clowes and sons, ltd. jermyn street, s.w. first printed march, {vii} preface the lectures in this volume are based upon the official text-books issued by the imperial general staff and upon the works of recognised authorities on the art of warfare. the aim of the author is to examine the principles which underlie the art of warfare, and to provide illustrations from military history of the _successes_ which have attended knowledge and intelligent application of text-book principles, and of the _disasters_ which have accompanied ignorance or neglect of the teaching provided by the text-books. the "dry bones" of the official publications are clothed with materials which may be supplemented at will by the student of military history, and the lectures may thus, it is hoped, be of assistance to infantry officers, either in the course of their own studies, or as a convenient groundwork upon which the instruction of others may be based. the scope of the work may be gathered from the table of contents and from the index, and it will be seen that the general principles underlying the art of warfare are included in the scheme, while advantage has been taken of the revision of the official text-books to incorporate in the lectures the lessons gained from the experience of leaders in the great war. upwards of citations are made of "battle incidents," and, as an example of the author's methods, attention may perhaps be directed to the reinforcement of the text-book principle of co-operation and mutual support by the citation of an instance, on the grand {viii} scale, by army corps (during the _first battle of the marne_), and on the minor scale, by tanks, bombers, aircraft, and riflemen (during the _first battle of the somme_); to the successful application of established principles by the advanced guard commander at _nachod_, and to the neglect of those principles by "jeb" stuart at _evelington heights_, and by the prussian advanced guard commanders in ; and to the value of musketry training by instancing the successes achieved at the _heights of abraham_, at _bunker hill_, _coruña_, and at _fredericksburg_, which were repeated during the _retreat from mons_ and at the _second battle of the somme_. while every effort has been made to achieve accuracy in citation, and to avoid ambiguity or error in the enunciation of principles, the author will be very grateful if his readers will notify to him (at the address of the publishers) any inaccuracies or omissions which may come under their notice. london, march, . {ix} table of contents pages chronological list of battles cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv-xvii publications cited in the lectures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix the art of warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - principles of war--popular fallacies--authorities quoted in support of fixed principles (gen. b. taylor, c. s. army; marshal foch; marshal haig)--necessity for study (gen. sir e. b. hamley; marshal french; marshal foch; napoleon)--"common sense" (abraham lincoln and jefferson davis; general grant)--"higher ranks" fallacy (col. henderson; gen. sir e. b. hamley)--necessity for study proved (col. henderson). strategy and tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - definitions--theatre of operations the kingdom of strategy; field of battle the province of tactics--tactics subservient to strategy (lord roberts's advance; first battle of somme; first battle of cambrai; gen. lew wallace at the monocacy; marshal grouchy at wavre)--moral--idiosyncracies of leaders (napoleon at austerlitz; wellington at sauroren; lee and jackson _versus_ abraham lincoln)--national moral (foch, quoted)--discipline and mobility (battle of hastings)--marching power (stonewall jackson)--time--weather--health--human nature (fabius and roman people; mcclellan and his government; thomas at nashville; roberts in south africa)--the spirit of france ("nous sommes trahis" of and cheers of the poilus in )--great britain--america--lord roberts's previous warning ("germany strikes when germany's hour has struck")--col. henderson on moral of british and american troops--"the contemptible little army"--the new armies (tribute from marshal haig endorsed by marshal foch)--changes in methods of warfare--value of official text-books. the battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - the battle is the "only argument" of war--characteristics of the battle (issue uncertain; human factor; value of reserves; superiority at point of attack)--lee's "partial attacks" at malvern hill of no avail--phases of the battle--information and the initiative (salamanca; first battle of the marne; battle of baccarat)--development of the battle (surprise; "like a bolt from the blue" as at chancellorsville or first battle of cambrai; marshal foch on value of surprise)--the decisive blow--arbela. {x} how battles are influenced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - commander's influence by his orders and by his employment of reserves--subordinates must "bring to fruit the scheme of the higher command"--the "fog of battle"--information--co-operation (on grand scale at first battle of the marne; on minor scale at gneudecourt)--fire tactics--value of withholding fire (heights of abraham; bunker hill; fredericksburg; retreat from mons)--enfilade and reverse fire (the bluff in ypres salient)--movement--advancing under fire--withdrawing under fire in "delaying action"--holding on (untimely surrender at soissons; stubborn defence at first and second battles of ypres; trônes wood; bourlon village; polygon wood; givenchy)--covering fire--fire and movement inseparably associated. types of battle action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - three distinct systems--the defensive battle seldom effects positive results (gettysburg; fredericksburg)--the offensive battle (marlborough; frederick the great; napoleon; wellington; grant; franco-prussian war; battle of blenheim described)--the defensive-offensive battle (marengo; austerlitz; dresden; vittoria; orthez; toulouse; waterloo; final battles of the great war; battle of waterloo described)--opportunities for "restoring" the battle (antietam)--chancellorsville a great defensive-offensive battle--passing from the "guard" to the "thrust" (second battle of the marne). the attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - culminating point of all manoeuvres--quick decision required or "position warfare" will supervene--second battle of the somme--methods of attack--two plans--decisive blow on pre-determined spot or in direction ascertained by fighting--strength of the attack--disposition of the troops--forward body, supports and local reserves--general reserve--the commander's plans--the position of assembly (banks's single column defeated by forrest in red river valley)--the attacking force (st. privat; plevna)--the decisive attack--advantages and disadvantages of frontal and flank attacks--decisive attack must be followed up (gettysburg; chattanooga)--detailing the units--artillery in attack (verneville; colenso; mobility and protection of modern artillery)--cavalry in attack (appomattox and paardeberg; ramadie; bagdadieh; gaines's mill; gettysburg; first battle of cambrai; battle of amiens; second battle of le cateau; archangel front; battle of the sambre)--royal engineers--medical arrangements--supply--commander's position--battle reports--reorganisation and pursuit ("success must be followed up until the enemy's power is ruined.") formation of infantry for the attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . - the platoon (square and diamond formations; ground scouts; flank scouts; behind a barrage)--the platoon commander ("appreciating the situation")--the company--the company commander--the battalion--the battalion commander (personal examples; monchy le preux; battle of cambrai; second battle of the somme). {xi} defensive action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - counter-attack the soul of defence--reasons for adopting defensive attitude (chancellorsville)--defensive-offensive battles (marengo, austerlitz, and waterloo)--obligatory defensive--(nachod; thermopylae; horatius codes; second battle of the somme; rorke's drift; le quesnoy)--voluntary occupation for future use (salamanca; soissons; hal and tubize)--delaying action--the offensive spirit--defence in modern warfare--inventions have strengthened the defence (quotations from marshals foch and french and from "f. s. r.")--position warfare and its characteristics--entrenchments (torres vedras)--defensive systems--choosing a position (framework of artillery and machine guns filled in with defensive posts manned by infantry)--the outpost zone--the battle position--the "semi-permanent" system--pill-boxes and concrete forts--common characteristics of defensive action--the active defence--position must suit plans--must not be too extensive or too narrow (condé-mons-binche line; retreat from mons; ypres)--field of fire--flanks--cover--artillery positions--depth--lateral communications--lines of withdrawal--changes of base (retreat from mons; seven days' battle; campaign in the wilderness)--luring victorious enemy away from battlefield (grouchy at wavre)--line for decisive counter-attack (ramillies; belgians behind river gette)--dividing the troops--troops to hold the position--rôle of local reserves (talavera; fredericksburg)--general reserve for decisive counter-attack (spottsylvania)--artillery positions--division into sectors--position of general reserve (second battle of the somme)--position and action of the cavalry (roliça, chancellorsville; gettysburg; sadowa; rezonville; balaclava; first battle of le cateau; retreat from mons; cugny; no german cavalry available in second battle of the somme to counteract defensive action of british squadrons)--rallying place--reorganisation and pursuit after decisive counter-attack. protection and reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - marshal foch on "surprise"--detachments provided to protect main body--close connection between protection and reconnaissance--radius of reconnoitre increased by aircraft--position warfare (air photographs; observation posts; patrols; raiding parties; entrenchments; box respirators; camouflage)--manoeuvre warfare (protection from aircraft; advanced guard; flank guard; rear guard; outposts). the advanced guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - "i never expected it" a disgraceful admission--every moving force requires a guard--strength (numbers employed depend upon size of force protected and tactical situation; strategical advanced guard enables tactical advanced guard to be reduced)--distance--in advances (dash and resolution required but interests of main body paramount)--in retreats--training must be realistic--tactical principles (vanguard for reconnaissance; main guard for resistance; communication essential; error at sulphur springs; success at fredericksburg and first battle of the marne; false tactics of prussian advanced guards in - ; excellent work at nachod)--advanced guard problems (seven examples, including "jeb" stuart at evelington heights). {xii} flank attacks and flank guards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - vulnerability of flanks and necessity for guards--who furnishes them--tactics similar to those prescribed for advanced guards--lines of communications--convoys--raids on the lines of communications (gen. turner ashby; "jeb" stuart; stonewall jackson's skill; col. madritov's raid; sannah's post; ramdam). the rear guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - nature of rear guard work--strength--composition-- distribution--distance--tactical principles (rear party watches; main guard fights for time; sannah's post)--training--eye for ground (napoleon; gen. r. e. lee)--examples of rear guard work (first battle of le cateau and the retreat from mons; second battle of the somme; les boeufs; le quesnoy; roliça; coruña; value of musketry; bristow station; j. v. moreau). outposts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - outposts prevent interference with plans and provide security by observation and resistance--strength--observation (aircraft; mobile patrols; outpost companies)--resistance (infantry, artillery, and machine guns; sentry groups, piquets, supports, and reserves)--distance (effective fire of various arms the controlling factor)--outpost commander--information and orders--the outpost line of resistance--the outpost company (piquets, supports, detached posts, reserves; the piquet commander; patrols; sentry groups)--day and night work--disasters through neglect of tactical principles (chateau of chambord; tweefontein)--battle outposts (broenbeek; fredericksburg). tactical reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - reconnaissance for attack--intelligence officers--reconnaissance by raids--position warfare--reconnaissance for defence--position warfare. night operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - reason for operations by night (secrecy; frederick the great's coat)--night marches (direction; protection; secrecy; connection)--"rules of thumb"--night advances (surprise; direction; position of deployment; connection)--night assaults (first battle of the somme; serre hill; vimy ridge; messines-wytschaete; villers brétonneux; morlancourt; spottsylvania)--limitations of night assaults--smoke and its advantages and disadvantages--successful and unsuccessful night assaults (rappahannock station--peiwar kotal--tel-el-kebir; stormberg; magersfontein)--position of deployment--distinguishing badges, etc.--watchword--precautions against checks--secrecy--"rules of thumb." {xiii} fighting in close country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - restrictions on view and on movement--advantages for attack against defence--savage warfare (isandhlwana; rorke's drift; tofrik; toski; teutoberger wald)--civilised warfare (villages and woods attract troops; gravelotte; spicheren; worth; the wilderness; sedan; defence of bazeilles; noisseville)--attack on woods (tanks; gauche; villers guislain; messines)--advancing from captured position--defence of woods--fighting patrols--attack on villages (tanks; light mortars)--defence of villages (delaying action; providing a "funnel"). characteristics of the various arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . - close combination of all arms required--infantry (extent and limitations of mobility; the decisive arm in battle; the rifle and bayonet; the lewis gun; ranges of rifles and machine guns; grenades; hand grenades; rifle grenades; light mortars; machine guns)--mounted troops (cavalry; mounted rifles; cyclists)--artillery--light artillery (pack guns; pack howitzers; horse artillery: field guns; field howitzers)--light guns against aircraft and tanks--medium artillery--(medium guns; medium howitzers)--heavy artillery (heavy guns; heavy howitzers)--super-heavy artillery (super-heavy guns; super-heavy howitzers)--table of artillery ranges--mortars and light mortars--royal engineers--tanks--aircraft (aeroplanes; kite balloons)--gas--smoke. operation orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - orders should be written when possible--should be "fool proof"--ambiguity to be avoided--the enemy are . . . my intention is . . . you will--initiative not to be hampered. index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - {xv} chronological table of battles pages defence of sublician bridge (legendary) pass of thermopylae (b.c. ) battle of arbela (b.c. ) ------ cannae (b.c. ) defeat of varus by arminius (a.d. ) - battle of stamford bridge (sept. , ) ------ hastings (oct. , ) - ------ blenheim (aug. , ) - ------ ramillies (may , ) , ------ malplaquet (sept. , ) ------ leuthen (dec. , ) heights of abraham (sept. , ) battle of bunker hill (june , ) ------ ettlingen (july - , ) ------ marengo (june , ) , ------ hohenlinden (dec. , ) ------ austerlitz (dec. , ) - , , , ------ jena (oct. , ) ------ roliça (aug. , ) , ------ coruña (jan. , ) - ------ talavera (july - , ) lines of torres vedras (oct.-nov. ) - battle of salamanca (july , ) , ------ vittoria (june , ) ------ sauroren (july , ) ------ dresden (aug. - , ) , ------ orthez (feb. , ) defence of soissons (march , ) , battle of toulouse (april , ) ----- quatre bras (june , ) ------ ligny (june , ) , , - ------ waterloo (june , ) , - , , ------ wavre (june - , ) , ------ balaclava (oct. , ) shenandoah valley campaign ( ) , , , battle of mcdowell (may , ) ------ cross keys (june , ) seven days' battle (june-july, ) , battle of gaines's mill (june , ) , ------ malvern hill (july - , ) , - , , , {xvi} battle of evelington heights (july , ) - ------ bull run ( ) (aug. , ) ------ antietam (sept. , ) , , ------ fredericksburg (nov. , ) , , , , , , - ------ chancellorsville (may - , ) , , , , , ------ gettysburg (july - , ) , , , - , ------ sulphur springs (oct. , ) ------ bristow station (oct. , ) ------ rappahannock station (nov. , ) ------ chattanooga (nov. , ) - ------ pleasant hill (april, ) ------ the wilderness (may , ) , , , , - , - , ------ monocacy (july , ) ------ nashville (dec. - , ) ------ appomattox (april , ) , ------ nachod (june , ) , , ------ sadowa (july , ) ------ spicheren (aug. , ) - , ------ worth (aug. , ) , , ------ colombey (aug. , ) - ------ rezonville (aug. , ) ------ gravelotte (aug. , ) ------ verneville (aug. , ) ------ st. privat (aug. , ) ------ noisseville (aug. , ) ------ sedan (sept. , ) , ------ metz (oct. , ) ------ chambord (dec. , ) ------ plevna (dec. , ) ------ peiwar kotal (dec. , ) ------ isandhlwana (jan. , ) , ------ rorke's drift (jan. , ) - , ------ tel-el-kebir (sept. , ) - ------ tofrik (march , ) ------ toski (aug. , ) ------ adowa (feb. , ) ------ stormberg (dec. , ) ------ magersfontein (dec. - , ) ------ colenso (dec. , ) ------ ramdam (feb. , ) ------ paardeberg (feb. , ) , ------ sannah's post (march , ) , ------ tweefontein (dec. , ) ------ the yalu (may , ) - the great war battle of le gateau (aug. ) ------ river gette (aug. ) condé-mons-binche (aug. - , ) battle of charleroi (aug. , ) ------ baccarat (aug. , ) retreat from mons (aug. ) , , - , , , , {xvii} first battle of the marne (sept. ) - , - , , first battle of ypres (oct. -nov. , ) , , - , second battle of ypres (april -may , ) , , defence of verdun (feb.-aug. ) , battle of ypres salient (march , ) first battle of the somme (july -nov. , ) , , , , , , , , , - battle of serre hill (feb. - , ) - ------ messines (june , ) , , chemin des dames (april-july, ) battle of vimy (april , ) ------ arras (april -june , ) monchy le preux (april , ) third battle of ypres (sept. , ) - , battle of broenbeek (oct. , ) first battle of cambrai (nov. , ) , , , , , the piave line (italy) (nov. , ) second battle of the somme (march -april , ) , , , - , , , , , , , , - , battle of villers-brétonneux (april - , ) ------ morlancourt (june , ) second battle of the marne (july , ) battle of amiens (aug. - , ) , ------ bapaume (aug. -sept. , ) ------ havrincourt and epehy (sept. - , ) second battle of cambrai (sept. -oct. , ) , battle of flanders (sept. -oct. , ) second battle of le cateau (oct. - , ) , , battle of the selle (oct. - , ) ------ sambre (nov. - , ) , , armistice day (nov. , ) , mesopotamia battle of ramadie (sept. - , ) ------ bagdadieh (march , ) - north russia archangel province (aug.-sept. ) - {xix} publications cited in the lectures "field service regulations," parts i. and ii. "infantry training," parts i. and ii. clery, major-general sir c. f., k.c.b.: "minor tactics." creasy, sir edward: "fifteen decisive battles at the world." foch, maréchal ferdinand: "principles of war." french of ypres, field-marshal earl, k.p.: " ." grant, general ulysses s., united states army: "memoirs." haig of bemersyde, field-marshal earl, k.t.: "sir d. haig's dispatches." haking, lieut.-general sir r. c. b., g.b.e.: "staff bides, etc." hamley, general sir e. b., k.c.b.: "operations of war." henderson, colonel g. f. r., c.b.: "stonewall jackson." "the science of war." napier, sir william francis patrick, k.c.b.; "history of the peninsular war." "ole luk-oie." _see_ swinton. swinton, major-general e. d., c.b.: "the green curve." taylor, general r., confederate states army: "destruction and reconstruction." { } lectures on land warfare the art of warfare "the art of war, like every other art, possesses its theory, its principles; otherwise, it would not be an art."--marshal foch. the art of war, like any other art, is based upon certain fixed principles, and there is no short cut which hurries the student to his goal. the long and laborious line of study is the only safe way, and there are many pitfalls to be avoided on the road. one of these pitfalls is dug by those who maintain, whenever a new war breaks out, that all previous warlike knowledge must be thrown on the scrap-heap and attention paid only to the problems of the hour. another is the alluring trap that warfare is "merely a matter of common sense"; and a third is the oft-expressed idea that knowledge is required of the general, and that compliance with orders is sufficient for the subaltern officer. knowledge of principles essential.--with regard to the first of these difficulties, the opinions of recognised authorities on the art of warfare may be consulted. "the cardinal principles on which the art of war is based are few and unchangeable, resembling in this the code of morality; but their application varies with the theatre of the war, the genius and temper of the people engaged, and the kind of arms employed" (general r. taylor, c.s. army). "although the manifold inventions of modern times have given to warfare { } a wider scope and fresh materials, it remains obedient to the same laws as in the past; but it applies these laws with means more numerous, more powerful, and more delicate" (marshal foch). "this war has given us no new principles; but different mechanical appliances--and in particular the rapid improvement and multiplication of aeroplanes, the use of immense numbers of machine guns and lewis guns, the employment of vast quantities of barbed wire as effective obstacles, the enormous expansion of artillery, and the provision of great masses of motor transport--have introduced new problems of considerable complexity concerning the effective co-operation of the different arms and services. much thought has had to be bestowed upon determining how new devices could be combined in the best manner with the machinery already working" (marshal haig). the laws of war are not in themselves difficult to understand, but their successful application on the field of battle requires that they should be carefully studied and considered in all their aspects. "the mind can only be trained to this by close study of campaigns, and by the solution of definite problems on maps and on the ground" (general sir e. b. hamley). "a lifelong experience of military study and thought has taught me that the principle of the tactical employment of troops must be instinctive. i know that in putting the science of war into practice it is necessary that its main tenets should form, so to speak, part of one's flesh and blood. in war there is little time to think, and the right thing to do must come like a flash--it must present itself to the mind as perfectly _obvious_" (marshal french). the same idea is expressed by the generalissimo of the largest victorious force that was ever controlled by one mind. "generally speaking, grave situations partially obscure even a bright intellect. it is therefore with a fully equipped mind that one ought to start in order to make war or even to understand { } war. no study is possible on the battlefield; one does there simply what one _can_ in order to apply what one knows. in order to _do_ even a little one has to know a great deal, and to know it well. . . . the right solution imposes itself; namely, the application, according to circumstances, of fixed principles. . . . incapacity and ignorance cannot be called extenuating circumstances, for knowledge is within the reach of all" (marshal foch); and in the words of napoleon's own maxim: "the only way to learn the art of war is to read and _re-read_ the campaigns of the great captains." the "common-sense" fallacy.--the fallacy that warfare is "merely a matter of common sense" has been exposed by colonel g. f. r. henderson, in his contrast of the conduct of the american civil war of - , when it was controlled by president lincoln and his cabinet in washington, and when it was handed over without reserve to a professional soldier in the field (general grant). few mortals have possessed "common sense" in greater abundance than abraham lincoln, and yet he permitted interference with his generals' plans, which were frequently brought to nought by such interference, and but for a like hindrance of the confederate generals by jefferson davis this well-intentioned "common sense" would have been even more disastrous. "men who, aware of their ignorance, would probably have shrunk from assuming charge of a squad of infantry in action had no hesitation whatever in attempting to direct a mighty army" (henderson, "stonewall jackson"). in june, , the confederate armies were scattered from strasburg (in the valley) to fredericksburg (in spottsylvania); general hooker, commanding the army of the potomac in the field, begged to be allowed to attack lee's corps in detail. success was certain, but permission was refused. the one and only idea of the federal government was to keep the army of the potomac between lee and the federal capital. { } the "higher ranks" fallacy.--the same writer has also protested vehemently against the idea that the practice of strategy in the field is confined to the higher ranks. "every officer in charge of a detached force or flying column, every officer who for the time being has to act independently, every officer in charge of a patrol, is constantly brought face to face with strategical considerations; and success or failure, even where the force is insignificant, will depend upon his familiarity with strategical principles" ("the science of war"). in the same way, general sir e. b. hamley, in "the operations of war explained," points out that a commander who cannot look beyond the local situation is not competent to command a detachment, however small. in addition, it must be remembered that superior knowledge of the art of war, thorough acquaintance with duty, and large experience, seldom fail to command submission and respect. troops fight with marked success when they feel that their leader "knows his job," and in every army troops are the critics of their leaders. the achievements of jackson's forces in the _shenandoah valley campaign_ of were almost superhuman, but under stonewall jackson the apparently impossible tasks were undertaken and achieved. general ewell, one of jackson's commanders, stated that he shivered whenever one of stonewall's couriers approached him. "i was always expecting him to order me to assault the north pole! but, if he _had_ ordered, we should have done it!" the necessity for study.--it is not pretended by any sane writer that study alone will make a perfect officer, for it is universally recognised that no amount of theoretical training can supply the knowledge gained by direct and immediate association with troops in the field; nor is it claimed that study will make a dull man brilliant, or confer resolution and rapid decision on one who is timid and irresolute by nature. but "the quick, { } the resolute, the daring, deciding and acting rapidly, as is their nature, will be all the more likely to decide and act correctly in proportion as they have studied the art they are called upon to practise" ("the science of war"). theory, applied to the profession of arms, is to some a word of most obnoxious sound, but it is obnoxious only to those who refuse to listen to the advice, or to take warning from the practice, of napoleon, of wellington, of foch, and of many of the most famous generals of history. "a man thoroughly penetrated with the spirit of napoleon's warfare would hardly fail in all circumstances to make his enemy's communications his first objective; and if wellington's tactical methods had become a second nature to him it would be strange indeed if he were seduced into delivering a purely frontal attack. . . . the same tactical principles regulate the combat of a large force and a small, and it is the thorough grasp of the principles, combined with courage and coolness, that makes a capable leader, whether of a platoon or an army corps" ("the science of war"). { } strategy and tactics definitions.--strategy and tactics have often been treated by non-military writers as if they were independent branches of the soldier's profession, but while they may indeed be separately defined it will be found in practice that they cannot be separately considered. the theatre of operations is the kingdom of strategy, the province of tactics is the field of battle, but when the battlefield is reached it so far transcends in importance every other point in the theatre of operations that no _tactical_ end is worth aiming at in preference to striking with all available strength at the field force of the enemy, and this, it will be seen, is the goal of all _strategical_ combinations. "strategy must ever be striving for tactical success; tactics must ever keep in mind the strategical situation and must constantly aim at creating fresh strategical opportunities. tactics without strategy resembles a man without legs; strategy without tactics is like a man without arms" (general sir e. b. hamley). "to seek out the enemy's armies--the centre of the adversary's power--in order to beat and destroy them; to adopt, with this sole end in view, the direction and tactics which will lead to it in the quickest and safest way: such is the whole mental attitude of modern war. no strategy can henceforth prevail over that which aims at ensuring tactical results, victory by fighting" (marshal foch). local successes on the _field of battle_ often have effects that are felt throughout the _theatre of operations_. lord roberts's advance on pretoria relieved the pressure on kimberley in the west and on ladysmith in the east, and these centres are upwards of miles apart. _the { } first battle of the somme_ (july , ) not only relieved the pressure on verdun but held in position large enemy forces which would otherwise have been employed against our allies in the east. general byng's surprise attack at cambrai (november , ) was followed by a determined counter-attack by the germans on november , which appeared to nullify the results achieved from november to ; but "there is evidence that german divisions intended for the italian theatre were diverted to the cambrai front, and it is probable that the further concentration of german forces against italy was suspended for at least two weeks at a most critical period, when our allies were making their first stand on the piave line" (sir d. haig's dispatches). a tactical defeat may sometimes be risked to serve a strategic end. in june, , general hunter was operating with a federal army in the shenandoah valley, and owing to shortage of supplies was forced to fall back. in so doing he uncovered the national capital, and general early was sent by the confederate commander-in-chief to capture washington. general grant took immediate steps to protect the capital by the dispatch of troops, and to further this end, general lew wallace,[ ] on his own initiative, confronted early's corps at the _monocacy_ on july , . he met the enemy and was defeated, but he delayed early's corps until the troops sent by grant were in position. "if early had been but one day _earlier_ he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the reinforcements i had sent. general wallace contributed on this occasion, by the defeat of the troops under him, a greater benefit to the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by means of a victory" (grant's "memoirs"). a tactical success may be not only useless, but actually inopportune, if it is out of accord with the plans of the higher command. on the morning of june , , marshal grouchy was in { } pursuit of the prussians whom napoleon had defeated on june at ligny. although urged "to march to the sound of the cannon" (at waterloo), grouchy pushed on eastwards, where he found thielmann's prussian corps of , men holding the passage across the dyle at wavre. the _battle of wavre_ was begun at p.m. on june , and by a.m. on the next day grouchy was victorious. but his victory was barren. his tactical achievement was useless to the higher command and had exposed his own force to considerable danger. as he sat down to pen a vainglorious dispatch to the emperor, he received the news that napoleon was a fugitive and the imperial army defeated and scattered. grouchy's feeble and false manoeuvres had permitted blücher to join forces with wellington. to the emperor's dismay it was the prussians who came from the eastward to the sound of the cannon: "c'est les prussiens qui viennent!" moral.--it is seen that strategy may be defined as the art of concentrating troops at the required strength, at the required time, at the required place, for the purpose of overthrowing the enemy's main armies; while tactics may be defined as the art of arranging and handling troops so concentrated for the purpose of defeating the enemy when encountered. but although strategy may be considered as the art of bringing an opponent to battle, and tactics as the art of defeating him in action, there are excluded from these definitions many considerations which influence a commander in the field. the art of war does not commence with a strategical reconnaissance from the air, or the saddle, to ascertain whether, and if so in what locality and in what strength, hostile troops are being concentrated. from information so obtained, the physical force of an enemy may indeed be determined; but "in war (said napoleon) moral force is to the physical (that is, to numbers and { } armament) as three to one," and upwards of a hundred years later the same idea has again been expressed. "to understand war you must go beyond its instruments and materials; you must study in the book of history, conscientiously analysed, armies, troops in movement and in action, with their needs, their passions, their devotions, their capacities of all kinds. that is the essence of the subject, that is the point of departure for a reasonable study of the art of war" (marshal foch). and while dealing with moral force it must be remembered that the moral force of opposing leaders of nations or of armies is at least as important as that of the nations or armies themselves, for a war is a struggle between human intelligences rather than between masses of men. "there have been soldiers' battles but never a soldiers' campaign" ("the science of war"). "it was not the roman legions which conquered gaul, it was caesar. it was not the french army which reached the weser and the inn, it was turenne" (napoleon). a commander must, therefore, take into account the character, the moral fibre, as well as the ability and the means at the disposal of his adversary. he must project his mind to his adversary's council chamber, and putting himself in his place must conjecture how a man of that character and of that ability will act under the given circumstances. history supplies many examples of mental activity of this kind.[ ] napoleon predicted the impetuous onset of the russian left wing against his right at _austerlitz_, dec. , , because he knew the temperament of the tsar alexander. at austerlitz, the most brilliant of all his battles, napoleon had , troops and was confronted by , austrians and russians drawn up on the heights of pratzen. his plan was to draw the weight of the russian attack against his right--which was so disposed as to invite the headstrong and { } self-confident tsar "to administer a lesson in generalship to napoleon"--and then to launch a superior attack against the heights, which contained a village and a knoll, the key to the position; and finally to hurl his general reserve in a decisive counter-attack on the russians when they were involved in battle with his right wing. when the rattle of musketry and booming of the guns showed that his right was engaged, napoleon launched murat, bernadotte, and soult against the allied centre; when soult was master of the village and the knoll, and as the broken remnants of the enemy's centre were streaming down the reverse slopes of the pratzen ridge, the french centre wheeled round to the right and threw itself upon the flank and rear of the russians, who were still heavily engaged in their original attack. these operations were completely successful and over , of the opposing armies were accounted for. wellington defeated soult at sauroren in the pyrenees (july , ) by taking advantage of a minor incident. he had ridden forward to see the disposition of the french forces, and as his men cheered him all along the line, he turned to his staff and said, "soult is a very cautious commander. he will delay his attack to find out what those cheers mean; that will give time for the sixth division to arrive and i shall beat him"--and the event turned out exactly as he had predicted. generals r. e. lee and t. j. jackson frequently played upon the nervousness of president lincoln for the safety of washington, and by threatening to cross the potomac induced him to withdraw troops that were advancing against richmond. national moral.--the moral fibre of the nation and of the troops must also be taken into consideration. "the common theory that, in order to win, an army must have superiority of rifles and cannon, better bases, more wisely chosen positions, is radically false. for it leaves out of account the most important part of the { } problem, that which animates it and makes it live, man--with his moral, intellectual, and physical qualities" (marshal foch). discipline and morality.--the discipline, courage, and endurance of the troops, as well as the cause for which they are fighting, are at least of equal importance to their armament and numbers. "if their discipline and leading be defective, providence seldom sides with the big battalions . . . and troops that cannot march are untrustworthy auxiliaries" ("the science of war"). "an army which cannot march well is almost certain to be outmanoeuvred. a general whose strategy is based upon time calculations that are rendered inaccurate by the breakdown of the marching power of his troops runs grave risk of disaster. it is therefore necessary that the question of marching should be studied, not only by generals and staff officers, but by regimental officers and men. it is on the latter that the hardships and exertions fall, and their cheerful endurance can best be ensured by teaching them the great results attainable by an army which can move faster and further than its adversary, as well as the dangers incurred by an army which allows itself to be out-marched. . . . superior mobility alone enabled frederick the great to move 'like a panther round an ox' so as to place his army across the enemy's flank. the discipline of his troops enabled him to apply the principles of combination" (general sir e. b. hamley). "nothing compensates for absence of discipline; and the constant watchfulness that is necessary in war, even when danger seems remote, can only be secured by discipline, which makes of duty a habit" (general r. taylor, c.s. army). at the _battle of hastings_ (oct. , ) lack of discipline and disobedience of orders changed the fate of the english nation and brought about the norman conquest. harold, the english king, had defeated the forces of harold hadraade, { } king of norway, at stamford bridge in yorkshire (sept. , ). four days later, duke william of normandy landed in pevensey bay, with , horse and foot. harold hastened south to meet him with troops exhausted by battle and marching. after halting six days in london to collect reinforcements, the english force entrenched itself on the hill of sautlache and awaited attack. the normans were unable to penetrate the abattis, but they gained the victory which changed the whole history of the english race by the stratagem of a feigned retreat. harold's undisciplined auxiliaries, contrary to direct orders (which were obeyed by the "regular" troops in the centre), swarmed out of the palisades in pursuit of the fleeing normans, who suddenly turned about and penetrated the english lines mingled with the discomfited auxiliaries. had the "irregulars" shown the same sense of discipline as the "regulars" there had been no norman conquest. with regard to marching, general t. j. jackson once observed, in reply to an allusion to his severe marching, that "it is better to lose one man in marching than five in fighting." acting on this principle he invariably surprised his enemy, the most notable instances being his surprise of milroy at mcdowell, of banks and fremont in the valley, of mcclellan's right at gaines's mill, of pope at the second manassas, and his last and greatest of hooker at chancellorsville. time.--time is often a supreme factor in warfare, and the superior mobility of troops will gain for their commander a great strategical advantage. reserves are of little value if they cannot be concentrated at the right spot at the right moment, and steamships, railways, and mechanical transport thus play an important part in war. the mobility of infantry is often the deciding factor in battle, and campaigns have been won by the legs of soldiers as much as by their arms. { } weather.--the weather is an important factor in war, and its influence appears to have increased in modern times. mists and fogs militate against observation by aircraft, and poor visibility interferes with the work of artillery. roads are broken up by the weight of modern traffic, and in a shelled area the craters become impassable after a few days rain, making the supply of food, stores and ammunition a serious problem. such conditions multiply the difficulties of attack, as the ground of the encounter consists principally of hastily dug trenches which become running streams of mud; and they assist the defence, as the pursuit is delayed, while the ground behind the defending force is less liable to be churned up by shell fire. the bad weather of september, , caused a delay in the allied advance against sailly-saillesel and le transloy and made it necessary to abandon the plan at the moment when previous successes seemed to have brought it within the grasp of the commanders. as the season advanced and the bad weather continued the plans of the allies had to be reduced, and the brilliant successes already achieved afforded some indication of what might have been accomplished had the weather permitted the plans to be carried out as originally intended. health.--"wars may be won or lost by the standard of health and moral of the opposing forces. moral depends to a very large extent upon the feeding and general well-being of the troops. badly supplied troops will invariably be low in moral, and an army ravaged by disease ceases to be a fighting force. the feeding and health of the fighting forces are dependent upon the rearward services, and so it may be argued that with the rearward services rests victory or defeat" (marshal haig). human nature.--human nature is affected by discipline, fear, hunger, confidence in or distrust of leaders, and by a variety of other influences, and human { } nature is more important than armament and numbers. "no great deeds have ever been performed by an army in which the qualities of courage and steadfast endurance are wanting" (general sir e. b. hamley), and the steadfast endurance of a nation and of its leaders is also a factor of supreme importance. time occupied in preparation for battle, or in manoeuvring for the "weather gauge," is seldom wasted; but it involves the risk of a weak-kneed executive yielding to popular clamour. against the strategical and tactical genius of hannibal, quintus fabius maximus invoked the aid of time to afford him opportunities to strike. his "fabian tactics" have become proverbial, and earned for him at the time the opprobrious epithet "cunctator," which the epigram[ ] of ennius has immortalised in his honour. popular clamour led to a division of authority with varro, and to the disaster of _cannae_ (b.c. ). general g. b. mcclellan was recalled from the army of the potomac on account of his failure to convert the drawn battle of the _antietam_ (sept. , ) into a victory, and the army was handed over to general burnside, who suffered defeat at _fredericksburg_ (dec. , ) with terrible slaughter. "but the stout heart of the american nation quickly rallied, and inspired by the loyal determination of abraham lincoln the united states turned once more to their apparently hopeless task" (colonel g. f. r. henderson). mcclellan's forte was organisation, and although at first slow in the field, he had assembled and trained a magnificent fighting force, with which he was "feeling his way to victory." he suffered defeat indeed at _gaines's mill_ (june , ), the first act in the drama of the _seven days' battle around richmond_. day after day he fell back through swamp and forest, battling with lee's victorious troops. but there was no further disaster. under the most adverse and dispiriting circumstances the army of the potomac fairly held their own until { } they reached the impregnable position of malvern hill. there mcclellan turned at bay and repulsed with heavy slaughter the disjointed attacks of the army of northern virginia. he had withdrawn his army intact and had effected a change of base, unknown to the confederate general staff, from the york river to the james. this proved his strategic power, as did the dispositions at _malvern hill_ (july , ) his tactical ability, and his work was accomplished in spite of the intrigues of politicians and the opposition of the executive, and in face of the military genius of generals r. e. lee and t. j. jackson. at the antietam he forced the confederates to give battle, and although tactically indecisive, the engagement caused the withdrawal of lee's army into virginia. mcclellan's successors were far less competent, and the magnificent army of the potomac met with frequent disasters, until it formed the solid nucleus of the forces of general meade, which inflicted upon lee his first defeat and saved the union at _gettysburg_ (july - , ), and finally under grant, in conjunction with the armies of the west, crushed the life out of the confederacy at _appomattox_. general g. h. thomas, in command of the u.s. army of the cumberland, refused battle with the confederates in nashville until he had prepared cavalry and made every other arrangement for pursuit. constancy of purpose was the salient feature of thomas's military character. he would not fight until he was ready. the civil authorities urgently demanded that he should advance. so great was the tension that grant finally sent general j. a. logan to supersede thomas; but before logan arrived thomas had won the _battle of nashville_ (dec. - , ), the most crushing victory of the war. lord roberts landed in cape town on jan. , , and popular expectation was degenerating into impatience when a co-ordinated advance of french's cavalry and the sixth and ninth infantry divisions { } resulted in the relief of beleagured cities distant from the field of battle, and in the surrender on the field of cronje's force at _paardeberg_ (feb. , ), on the anniversary of majuba. the spirit of france.--in all calculations on which a declaration of war is based the moral fibre of the actual and potential enemy nations is fully considered. it is difficult to imagine that the headquarters staff of the german and austrian armies failed to bring under review the moral of the nations against whom their armies were to be launched in july, . the spirit of france had shown no signs of deterioration, but was to be quelled by a rapid advance through neutral territories, to bring about a bewildered collapse, as in , before the russian mobilisation was complete, and "nous sommes trahis" was again to be heard from the disheartened troops. but the calm determination of the commander and his generals in the dark days of august, , prevented the bewildered collapse, and the _defence of verdun_ from february to august, , and the cheers of the _poilus_, as they recaptured the _chemin des dames_ in april-july, , replaced the capitulation of sedan and of metz and the "nous sommes trahis" of . great britain.--britain was not expected to take an active part in the struggle, and if she did the affairs of ireland, the suffragette movement, and the general decadence of the nation would prevent a whole-hearted prosecution of the war. a small force only could be sent to europe; it would be swallowed up in the "bewildered collapse," and no reinforcements could be spared. the extent of the miscalculation is shown in mr. lloyd george's speech in the house of commons on july , , in which the prime minister stated that the british empire had put , , men under arms, had raised , , , pounds in taxes and loans, and had suffered upwards of , , casualties on land and { } sea. it was also shown that during the last two years of the war the british armies had borne the brunt of the heaviest fighting on the western front in france and at the same time had destroyed the armed forces of the turkish empire in the east. the risk of compelling britain to take part was undertaken, and the first great strategical blunder of the war was committed. america.--in the third year of the war america had gradually been brought into the arena, and a further miscalculation arrayed the hundred millions of a free and united nation against the autocracies of central europe. lord roberts.--other brains than german had considered the possibility of an armed conflict in europe. for many years lord roberts had advocated universal military service in the united kingdom, as a procedure beneficial in itself, and imperative on account of the clear intentions of the headquarters staff of the german army. "germany strikes when germany's hour has struck," was his warning note, and although apparently unheeded by the nation, his warning was not without effect upon the training of the regular army. colonel henderson.--military writers in the united kingdom had also considered the possibility of a conflict with the armed forces of germany, and in all their treatises the moral of the nation was passed under review. colonel g. f. r. henderson, in "the science of war," had even envisaged a struggle in which not only the troops of britain and the overseas dominions but those of the united states would take part, and his estimate of the moral of the race on both sides of the atlantic, and in both hemispheres, was fully justified by the events of the war. colonel henderson found in the race something more than toughness in its moral fibre, for he adds, "tactical ability is the birthright of { } our race. . . . in a conflict on the vastest scale (the american civil war) the tactics of the american troops, at a very early period, were superior to those of the prussians in . in strategy, controlled as it was on both sides by the civil governments and not by the military chiefs, grave errors were committed, but on the field of battle the racial instinct asserted itself. nor were the larger tactical manoeuvres even of an improvement on those of the american campaigns. . . . but in , skobeleff, the first of european generals to master the problem of the offensive, knew the american war 'by heart,' and in his successful assaults on the turkish redoubts he followed the plan of the american generals on both sides, when attempting to carry such positions; to follow up the assaulting columns with fresh troops, without waiting for the first column to be repulsed." after the civil war, general forrest, a cavalry leader of the confederate states army, was asked to what he attributed his success in so many actions. he replied: "well, i reckon i got there first with the most men," thereby stating in a nutshell the key to the art of war. "at nachod, the austrian commander had numbers on his side, yet he sent into action part only of his forces, and it was by numbers that he was beaten" (marshal foch). with regard to the moral of the race colonel henderson makes this emphatic statement: "in the last nine months of the american civil war, time and again, according to all precedent, one side or the other ought to have been whipped, but it declined to be anything of the sort. the losses show this. this was due in no small measure to the quality which the troops on both sides inherited from the stock that furnished his infantry to the duke of wellington. never to know when they were beaten was a characteristic of both north and south." the contemptible little army.--in place of the general decadence of the british race, upon which the german staff appear to have relied, this characteristic { } quality of endurance was exhibited by french's "contemptible little army" during the _retreat from mons_ in august, , at the _first battle of ypres_ (october , ), and at the _second battle of ypres_ (april , ). of his "contemptible little army" marshal french writes in his book, " ": "the british army had indeed suffered severely, and had performed a herculean task in reaching its present position in such fighting form, and its _moral_ had withstood the ordeal. i think the germans were probably justified in doubting our offensive powers, but the thing they forgot was the nation from which we spring." the new armies.--from to the new armies, raised, equipped, and trained during the war, and representing the empire in arms, displayed the same inherent quality, and disproved for ever the charge of decadence that had been brought against the british race. "that these troops should have accomplished so much under such conditions, and against an army and a nation whose chief concern for so many years had been preparation for war, constitutes a feat of which the history of our nation records no equal. . . . troops from every part of the british isles and from every dominion and quarter of the empire, whether regulars, territorials, or men of the new armies, have borne a share in the battle. . . . among all the long roll of victories borne on the colours of our regiments, there has never been a higher test of the endurance and resolution of our infantry. they have shown themselves worthy of the highest traditions of our race, and of the proud records of former wars" (sir d. haig's dispatch, december , ). "our new and hastily trained armies have shown once again that they are capable of meeting and beating the enemy's best troops, even under conditions which favoured his defence to a degree which it required the greatest endurance, determination, and heroism to { } overcome" (sir d. haig's dispatch, december , ). "it is no disparagement of the gallant deeds performed on other fronts to say that, in the stubborn struggle for the line of hills which stretches from wytschaete to passchendaele, the great armies that to-day are shouldering the burden of our empire have shown themselves worthy of the regiments which, in october and november of , made ypres take rank for ever amongst the most glorious of british battles" (sir d. haig's dispatch, december , ). "the british infantryman has always had the reputation of fighting his best in an uphill battle, and time and again in the history of our country, by sheer tenacity and determination of purpose, has won victory from a numerically superior foe. thrown once more upon the defensive by circumstances over which he had no control, but which will not persist, he has shown himself to possess in full measure the traditional qualities of his race" (sir d. haig's dispatch, july , ). "throughout this long period of incessant fighting against greatly superior numbers the behaviour of all arms of the british forces engaged was magnificent. what they achieved is best described in the words of the french general (maistre) under whose orders they came, who wrote of them: 'they have enabled us to establish a barrier against which the hostile waves have beaten and shattered themselves. cela aucun des témoins français ne l'oubliera'" (sir d. haig's dispatch, december , ). after four years of fighting, at the close of a defensive campaign of the utmost severity, protracted by the efforts of the enemy from march -july , , the new armies passed from the guard to the thrust. they were everywhere victorious, and in nine pitched battles they captured upwards of , prisoners and , guns. "in order to estimate the ardour and endurance of these troops during this final stage, it will be enough to mention the dates and importance of the main events-- { } "_battle of amiens_ (aug. - ) in which the iv. army took , prisoners and more than guns. "_battle of bapaume_ (aug. -sept. ) iii. army and left wing of iv. army: , prisoners, guns. "_battle of the scarpe_ (aug. -sept. ) i. army: , prisoners, guns. "_battle of haerincourt and epéhy_ (sept. - ) iv. and iii. armies: , prisoners, guns. "_battle of cambrai and the hindenburg line_ (sept. -oct. ) iv., iii., and i. armies. ended in the breaking of the hindenburg line and in the capture of , prisoners and guns. "_battle of flanders_ (sept. -oct. ) ii. army: , prisoners, guns. "_battle of le cateau_ (oct. - ) iv., iii., and i. armies: , prisoners, guns. "_battle of the selle_ (oct. - ) iv. and iii. armies: , prisoners, guns. "_battle of the sambre_ (nov. - ) iv., iii., and i. armies: , prisoners, guns." (marshal foch.) changes in method.--the principles which underlie the art of war would thus appear to be based on constant factors, but the methods of their application are susceptible to change, for in their application the principles are subject to the influence of successive inventions. gunpowder abolished the bow and arrow and the knight in armour; the bayonet affixed to the musket superseded the pike; the rifle outranged the musket; the breech-loader and the magazine attachment progressively increased the rate of fire; smokeless powder rendered a firing line almost invisible; the flat trajectory of the small-arms bullet increased the danger-zone in an advance; the increased power, mobility, and accuracy of the field gun[ ] rendered certain { } formations obsolete in the attack; the general advance in the rate and accuracy of fire from rifles, machine guns, and artillery made attack on a strongly organised position possible only when surprise in the time and place of the thrust neutralises the advantages of the defence, or when an overwhelming barrage of shells and bullets covers the advance and smothers the enemy's resistance. the advent of a third service, by the addition of the air to the sea and land services, increased the facilities for reconnaissance[ ] and added to the difficulties of concealing movement during the hours of daylight. these and similar influences have brought about changes in certain respects, amongst which the most pronounced is the increased use of field entrenchments, and tactical methods have been evolved to meet the necessities of the case, or modified to suit the new requirements.[ ] but no inventions can shift the burden of war from the shoulders of the infantryman. "despite the enormous development of mechanical invention in every phase of warfare, the place which the infantryman has always held as the main substance and foundation of an army is as secure to-day as in any period of history. the infantryman remains the backbone of defence and the spearhead of the attack. at no time has the reputation of the british infantryman been higher, or his achievement more worthy of his renown. . . . immense as the influence of mechanical devices may be, they cannot by themselves decide a campaign. their true _rôle_ is that of assisting the infantryman. . . . they cannot replace him. only by the rifle and bayonet of the infantryman can the decisive victory be won" (sir d. haig's dispatches). { } the text-books.--changes in tactical methods are recorded from time to time in circulars issued by the general staff, to be embodied eventually in the official text-books. these text-books ("infantry training" and "field service regulations") are the foundation upon which the study of infantry tactics should be based, and of these books colonel g. f. r. henderson has left behind him the following opinion: "that portion of our own text-books which refers to infantry in attack and defence is merely the essence of tactics. there is no single sentence that is not of primary importance, no single principle laid down that can be violated with impunity, no single instruction that should not be practised over and over again." after four years of warfare, in which the principles enunciated in the text-books had been put to the most searching of all tests (_i.e._ practical application in war), the general staff of the army was able to preface a list of its recent publications with the following exhortation: "it must be remembered that the principles laid down in field service regulations and in infantry training are still the basis of all sound knowledge." at the close of the final victorious campaign, marshal haig emphasised the truth of this claim: "the longer the war lasted the more emphatically has it been realised that our original organisation and training were based on correct principles. the danger of altering them too much, to deal with some temporary phase, has been greater than the risk of adjusting them too little. . . . the experience gained in this war alone, without the study and practice of lessons learned from other campaigns, could not have sufficed to meet the ever-changing tactics which have characterised the fighting. there was required also the sound basis of military knowledge supplied by our training manuals and staff colleges." [ ] author of "ben hur." [ ] for an example in military fiction, see _the second degree_ in "the green curve." [ ] "unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem." [ ] the term "field gun" was limited to the -pounder until the _boer war_, when heavy guns were used as mobile artillery. in the great war, mechanical transport brought into the field of battle guns of the largest calibre. quick-firing field guns were first used by the abyssinians against the italians at the battle of adowa (february , ). [ ] reconnoitring balloons were first used by the army of the potomac at the battle of fredericksburg (december , ). aeroplanes were used in warfare for the first time in , during the italo-turkish campaign in tripoli, north africa. [ ] heavily armoured cars, known as "tanks," were introduced during the first battle of the somme, september , . { } the battle "theoretically, a well conducted battle is a decisive attack successfully carried out."--marshal foch. "the art of war, in order to arrive at its aim (which is to impose its will upon the enemy), knows but one means, the destruction of the adversary's organised forces. so we arrive at the battle, the only argument of war, the only proper end that may be given to strategical operations, and we begin by establishing the fact that to accomplish the aim of war the battle cannot be purely defensive. the results of a defensive battle are exclusively negative; it may check the enemy in his march; it may prevent him from achieving his immediate aim; but it never leads to his destruction, and so is powerless to achieve the wished-for victory. therefore, every defensive battle must terminate with an offensive action or there will be no result" (marshal foch). characteristics of the battle.--no two battles are precisely similar, but there are certain characteristics common to every battle. in the first place, the issue is almost always uncertain, for events which no human sagacity could provide against may occur to defeat the wisest plans. the best chances, therefore, are on the side of the commander who is provided with sufficient means to achieve his object, who forms his plans with the greatest sagacity, and executes them with the greatest ability. decisive success has followed the combinations of great commanders, and in the long run victory pays homage to knowledge of the principles which underlie the art of war. { } in the second place, the human factor always plays its part in battle. troops lacking in discipline are liable to panic in face of a sudden disaster, and even the best troops are liable to become unsteady if their flank is gained. in the third place, a comparatively small body of fresh troops thrown into action at the right moment against greater numbers, if the latter are exhausted by fighting, may achieve a success out of all proportion to their numbers. for this reason a prudent commander will endeavour to retain under his control some portion of his reserves, to be thrown in after his adversary has exhausted his own reserve power. to be superior at the point of attack is the art of warfare in a nutshell, and for this reason attacks on separate points of a position must be properly synchronised to be effective. the unbeaten enemy will otherwise possess a mobile reserve with which to reinforce threatened points. the attacks must be so timed that he throws them in piecemeal or fails to reach the point mainly threatened. mcclellan's position with the army of the potomac on _malvern hill_ (july , ) was a desperate position to attack in front, but it could have been turned on the right. the hill dominated the ground to the north, and also the road on which lee's army of northern virginia was approaching, and was crowned with numerous heavy guns, against which lee's artillery was powerless. it was lee's intention to open with an attack by a division, supported by two brigades, on the right of the position, and when this force was at grips with the army of the potomac, to assault the centre with a bayonet charge. about p.m. the sound of cheering was heard near the right of the position, and mistaking this for the signal, general d. h. hill launched the attack on the centre. the first line of defence was carried, but the northern army was unoccupied in the other parts of the line, and reinforcements quickly { } beat off the attack with heavy loss. after this attack had failed, magruder's division arrived in position and the attack on the right flank was delivered with similar results. both attacks were carried out with superb courage, but partial blows of this nature are without the first elements of success, and mcclellan's movements were not again molested. phases of the battle.--there are three principal phases of every battle. information must be obtained by observation and by fighting; advantage must be taken of information so obtained to strike where the blow or blows will be most effective; success obtained by fighting must be developed until the enemy is annihilated. _information and the initiative_.--much work requires to be done in the air and on the land before the rival armies come face to face. aircraft and the independent cavalry (advanced mounted troops and fast tanks detached from divisions for the purpose), endeavour to ascertain whether, and if so in what locality and in what strength, troops are being concentrated by the enemy. from information so obtained the headquarters staff are able to conjecture the intentions and aims of the enemy, and the extent to which their own intentions and aims have been perceived by the enemy. after the enemy is encountered this information is at the service of the commander of the troops, but it will generally require to be supplemented by fighting. on each side the commander will be striving to obtain the _initiative_, to impose his will upon his opponent, for the commander who loses the initiative is compelled to conform to the plans and movements of his adversary, instead of bringing into operation plans and movements better suited to his own purposes. each is scheming to obtain or retain the liberty of manoeuvre, in the same way as, in the days of sailing ships, a naval commander strove to get the "weather gauge" in every encounter. the initiative won by the strategy of one commander { } is sometimes wrested from him by the tactics of his adversary. this was exemplified at the _battle of salamanca_ (july , ). wellington, the generalissimo of the anglo-portuguese forces, had decided to withdraw behind the river tormes to the stronghold ciudad rodrigo, and had dispatched his train to that centre. the french commander (marmont), in his eagerness to intercept wellington's line of retreat, moved part of his force to the heights of miranda, thus threatening wellington's right and rear, but leaving a gap of two miles between the detached force and his main army. wellington noted the fresh disposition of marmont's army through his telescope, and exclaiming, "that will do!" he abandoned all idea of the withdrawal which had been forced upon him by marmont's previous manoeuvres, and hurled part of his force against the detached body (which was defeated before marmont could send assistance) and at the same time barred the progress of the main army, which was forced to leave the field. wellington afterwards declared, "i never saw an army receive such a beating." if the spanish general in alliance with wellington had not, contrary to the most explicit instructions, evacuated the castle of alba de tormes (which commanded the fords over which the french retreated), "not one-third of marmont's army would have escaped" (napier). as at salamanca, where the liberty of manoeuvre which had been won by the strategy of marmont was wrested from him by the tactics of wellington, so at the final phase of the _first battle of the marne_ (september, ), the initiative was regained by tactical adroitness. rapidity of action was the great german asset, while that of russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. to obtain a quick decision the germans went to every length. of the main routes for the invasion of france chosen for their armies, two led through the neutral territories of luxemburg and belgium, and only one through france, and their advance there broke { } down, almost at the first, at the only point where it was legitimately conducted, for the german armies failed to pierce the french front at the gap of charmes (vosges), and their defeat at the _battle of baccarat_ (august , ) led to the decisive defeat at the first battle of the marne. they then abandoned, for the moment, all hopes of a quick decision in a war of manoeuvre and retiring to their prepared lines of defence on the aisne, relied upon methodically prepared and regularly constructed trench systems, and upon the hand grenade, the trench mortar, and the other weapons of close combat, for superiority in a long campaign of trench siege warfare, which endured until the collapse of russia in freed for an offensive movement on the requisite scale in upwards of , , men. at the _first battle of the marne_, the five german armies, which were following up the franco-british left and centre, were extended from amiens to verdun, but on september , , the german i. army (general von kluck) was so placed by the impetuosity of the march that a wide gap separated it from the remainder of the german forces. to the north-west of paris a new french army, collected from the metropolitan garrison and from the south-eastern frontier, had been assembled and pushed out in motor transports by the zeal and intelligence of the military governor of paris (general gallieni); and to avoid this menace to his flank and line of communications, and to regain touch with the other german armies, one of which (under the crown prince) was unsuccessfully engaged in battle, general von kluck adopted the extremely hazardous course of a flank march, across the front of the franco-british left wing. upon receiving intelligence of this manoeuvre from the air service in paris, general joffre, seeing the opportunity of gaining the initiative, ordered an advance to the attack on september , and the first battle of the marne, which resulted from this order, changed the character of the fighting on the { } western front. the decisive blow was strategical rather than tactical. it was delivered on a battlefield of , square miles, and involved, throughout that area, a struggle of six great armies, numbering in all , troops, against a similar number of armies of at least equal strength. no counter-attack on such a scale had previously been delivered in any campaign, and the scarcely interrupted advance of the german armies received a permanent check, while the strategic aim of the german staff, namely, the speedy annihilation in the field of the franco-british armies, had to be definitely abandoned. development of the battle.--the "atmosphere" of battle is thus depicted in "the science of war": "when two armies are face to face and one is superior in numbers to the other, the commander of the smaller army is confronted by two problems. if the superior army is not yet concentrated, or is so distributed that the different parts cannot readily support each other, it may be defeated in detail. if the superior army is already concentrated, its commander may be induced, by one means or another, to make detachments, and thus to be weak everywhere. the first problem is solved by rapidity of manoeuvre, surprise marches, secrecy, feints to bewilder the adversary in his concentration, and action on unexpected lines. the second, by skilful threatening of points for the defence of which the adversary will detach forces; by concealment of his dispositions; and by drawing the adversary into terrain where part only of his superior forces can be employed." "the power of striking 'like a bolt from the blue' is of the greatest value in war. surprise was the foundation of almost all the great strategical combinations of the past, as it will be of those to come. the first thought and the last of the great general is to outwit his adversary and to strike where he is least expected. to what federal soldier did it occur on the { } morning of _chancellorsville_ (may - , ) that lee, confronted by , northerners, would detach stonewall jackson with more than half his own force of , to attack his adversary in the rear" ("the science of war"). surprise was the chief cause of success in the _first battle of cambrai_ (november , ) when general sir julian byng launched the iii. army at dawn against the highly organised defensive position known as the "hindenburg line." the wire entanglements in front of this position were exceptionally deep, and had not been broken by gun-fire. behind them the germans were resting in apparent security and such information as they were able to obtain by raiding reconnaissances was not corroborated by the fierce and prolonged artillery bombardment which was at that time regarded as the inseparable prelude to an attack in force. the advance was preceded by battalions of tanks, with infantry in close support, and was followed by cavalry, to round up fugitives and disorganise reinforcements. the artillery had previously been strengthened and was directed against the support and reserve lines, to prevent the germans from massing for counter-attacks and to break up their formations. aircraft carried out reconnaissance during the battle from a low altitude and harassed the defenders with fire action. an advance was made into the strongest part of the german defensive system on a twenty-mile front to a depth of five miles, and secured upwards of , prisoners, guns, and considerable quantities of stores and materials, and although after-events neutralised the initial successes, the advance of november , , will ever remain an example of the value of surprise in war. "surprise strikes with terror even those who are by far the stronger. a new weapon of war may ensure it, or a sudden appearance of a force larger than the adversary's, or a concentration of forces upon a point at which the adversary is not ready instantaneously to parry the blow. but if the methods { } be various, the aim is always to produce the same moral effect upon the enemy--terror--by creating in him at the swift apparition of unexpected and incontestably powerful means, the sentiment of impotence, the conviction that he cannot conquer--that is to say, that he is conquered. and this supreme blow of unexpected vigour need not be directed upon the whole of the enemy's army. for an army is an animate and organised being, a collection of organs, of which the loss even of a single one leads to death" (marshal foch). at almost any period of the battle, and in almost every phase of fighting, surprise can be brought about by a sudden and unexpected outburst of effective machine gun or other form of fire. "a sudden effective fire will have a particularly demoralising effect on the enemy; it is often advantageous, therefore, to seek for surprise effects of this sort by temporarily withholding fire" ("infantry training, "). the decisive blow.--the preparatory action and the development usually take the form of a converging movement of separated forces, so timed as to strike the adversary's front and flank simultaneously, in order to threaten the enemy's line of communications, for the line of supply is as vital to the existence of an army as the heart to the life of a human being. "perhaps no situation is more pitiable than that of a commander who has permitted an enemy to sever his communications. he sees the end of his resources at hand, but not the means to replenish them" (general sir e. b. hamley). the decisive blow will be delivered by the general reserve, which will be secretly concentrated and launched as secretly as possible; and the commander of the whole force will so distribute his troops that about half his available force can be kept in hand for this decisive blow, on a part of the enemy's front if sufficient penetration has been effected, or on a flank. the point chosen becomes the vital { } point, and success there means success at all points. once routed, the enemy must be relentlessly pursued and prevented from regaining order and moral. a battle was fought in the year b.c. , nearly , years ago, at arbela,[ ] in mesopotamia, the eastern theatre of operations in the great war of - , and it deserves study to show the eternal nature of the main principles which underlie the art of war. alexander the great invaded the territories of darius, king of the medes and persians, with the strategic aim of defeating his adversary's main armies in a decisive battle. the macedonian forces were preceded by an advanced guard of cavalry, and from information obtained by the vanguard, alexander was made aware of the strength and position of the persian forces. by a careful reconnaissance of the ground in company with his corps commanders, alexander was able to forestall a projected movement, and by advancing in two lines of battle in such a way that his troops could at any moment be thrown into a compact figure fringed with spears, which formed an impenetrable hedge against cavalry, he found a remedy for the disadvantages of the ground, which afforded no protection to either of his flanks. after advancing in these two lines alexander manoeuvred his troops into a phalanx, or wedge-shaped figure, and this wedge he drove into the masses of the enemy to force the wings asunder. in spite of local reverses in parts of the field, the depth and weight of the main attack carried it through the enemy's forces: the survivors were captured or dispersed, and the victory was complete. [ ] the site of this battle was probably gaugamela, about miles from the present arbil, which is miles from mosul, on the baghdad road. { } how battles are influenced once troops are launched in battle their success or failure depends upon such influences as the commander can bring to bear, upon the co-operation of his subordinate commanders, and upon the moral and training of the troops engaged. the commander's influence is shown, first in his orders for the operations, and later by the method in which he employs the forces retained in his hand for the decisive blow. personal control, by the commander, of troops committed to battle, is not only impossible but should be unnecessary, as such control and leading is the function of his subordinates, who should be fully acquainted with his intentions and must be trusted to carry them into execution. other, and more important, duties have to be undertaken by the commander, and it is essential that he should not allow his attention to be diverted from his main object by local incidents, which are matters for his subordinates to deal with. "a sound system of command is based upon three facts: an army cannot be effectively controlled by direct orders from headquarters; the man on the spot is the best judge of the situation; intelligent co-operation is of infinitely more value than mechanical obedience" ("the science of war"). a campaign resolves itself into a struggle between human intelligences. each commander will endeavour to defeat his adversary in battle, and his principal weapon is his general reserve. if he can exhaust the reserve power of his adversary, while maintaining his own intact, he can proceed to victory at his own time, and he will endeavour to exhaust the hostile reserves by causing { } them to be thrown in piecemeal, in ignorance of the spot where the decisive blow is to fall. during the campaign on the western front in the allies were able to conserve their strength throughout the attacks from march to july , and when they passed from the guard to the thrust they extended their front of attack from day to day, calculating correctly that this gradual extension would mislead the enemy as to where the main blow would fall, and would cause him to throw in his reserves piecemeal. "the subordinate commanders must bring to fruit with all the means at their disposal the scheme of the higher command, therefore they must, above all, understand that thought and then make of their means the use best suited to circumstances--of which, however, they are the only judge. . . . the commander-in-chief cannot take the place of his subordinates--he cannot think and decide for them. in order to think straight and to decide rightly it would be necessary for him to see through their eyes, to look at things from the place in which they actually stand, to be everywhere at the same moment" (marshal foch). students of military history will remember that the prussian commander-in-chief and his chief staff officer, during the highly successful campaign of - , did not come within sound of the guns until five pitched battles had been fought by their subordinate commanders. outside the fog of battle, with its absorbing interests and distractions, the commander can retain his sense of proportion[ ] and can decide where and when he will make his final effort. news of the battle reaches him from his immediate subordinates, and from the accounts of successes and failures he is able to judge the weaknesses and strength of his own and his adversary's dispositions, to use part of his reserves as reinforcements, { } if he must, or to husband them with confidence in the success of the operations, until the time comes for him to launch them for the final blow. information.--in order that the commander's influence may be exerted to the best advantage it is essential that all vital information should reach him promptly, and that his orders should be communicated without delay. subordinate commanders must keep their superiors and commanders of neighbouring units regularly informed as to the progress of the battle, and of important changes in the situation as they occur. runners, who can be trusted to carry a verbal message or written order, are attached to each unit engaged and to its headquarters. higher units than battalions can usually depend on the signal service for intercommunication, but whenever necessary, a supply of runners and mounted orderlies must be available for their use. this ensures co-operation, and enables mutual support to be rendered. information received must be transmitted at once to all whom it concerns, and orders received from superiors must be communicated without delay to commanders of all units affected. co-operation.--"co-operation when in contact with the enemy is no easy matter to bring about. there are, however, three means of overcoming the difficulty: constant communication between the units; thorough reconnaissance of the ground over which the movements are to be made; clear and well-considered orders" ("the science of war"). each commander who issues orders for attack or defence should assemble his subordinate commanders, if possible in view of the ground over which the troops are to operate, explain his orders, and satisfy himself that each subordinate understands his respective task. "combination depends on the efficiency of the chain of control connecting the brain of the commander through all grades down to the { } corporal's squad; on the intelligence of subordinate leaders in grasping and applying the commander's plans; on the discipline which ensures intelligent obedience to the directing will; and on the mobility which gives rapid effect to that will, and permits advantage to be taken of fleeting opportunities. every fresh development in the means of transmitting orders and information rapidly, permits of an extension of the commander's influence, and makes more perfect combination possible and over wider areas" (general sir e. b. hamley). even when, and particularly when, forces are engaged in battle, reconnaissance must be carried on and information gained must be communicated at once. it will frequently happen that a suitable moment for the decisive attack, or decisive counter-stroke, will be found only after long and severe fighting. systematic arrangements for obtaining, sifting, and transmitting information throughout the battle are therefore of the highest importance. information must be gained not only by troops and aircraft actually engaged, but by supports and reserves, who will often be able to see what is invisible to the forward troops. in such cases, more than in any other, information must be communicated at once. by intelligent observation superintending commanders can co-operate with one another, can anticipate situations as they develop, and decide at the time what steps will be necessary to meet them. a general reconnaissance will be in progress during every modern battle by observers in aircraft and in observation balloons. in addition, local reconnaissance by means of patrols and scouts will usually discover an opening that might otherwise be lost, and may warn a commander of an intended movement against him, which might otherwise develop into a disagreeable surprise. co-operation and mutual support were developed in their highest form by the allied corps commanders in the _first battle of the marne_ (august-september, ). { } in this campaign close on , , troops were engaged on both sides, and the corps commanders, particularly those of the french vi. army (manoury), iii. army (sarrail), and the military governor of paris (gallieni), were continuously in touch with one another, and frequently rendered assistance, unasked, by fire and by movement. co-operation of a novel kind was exhibited on a minor scale during the first battle of the somme. an attack was launched on _gueudecourt_ (september , ) by the st division, and a protecting trench was captured as a preliminary to the larger movement. a tank, followed up by infantry bombers, proceeded along the parapet of the trench firing its machine guns, while an aeroplane swooped over the trench firing its lewis guns. the survivors in the trench surrendered, and the garrison was collected by supporting infantry, who advanced in response to signals from the aeroplane. fire tactics.--it has already been noted that the battle is the only argument of war; it is also the final test of training, and on the battlefield no part of the syllabus is more severely tested than that devoted to _musketry_. the fire tactics of an army, its combination of fire and movement, the direction and control by the leaders and the fire discipline of the rank and file, make for success or failure on the field of battle. the fire must be directed by the fire unit commander against an objective chosen with intelligence and accurately defined; it must be controlled by the sub-unit commander, who must be able to recognise the objectives indicated, to regulate the rate of fire, and to keep touch with the state of the ammunition supply. fire discipline must be maintained, so that there is the strictest compliance with verbal orders and signals, and application on the battlefield of the habits inculcated during the training period. the time when fire is to be opened is often left to the discretion of the fire-unit commander, but, generally speaking, fire should be opened by an { } attacking force only when a further advance without opening fire is impossible; and even in defence, when access to the ammunition reserve is likely to be far easier than in an attack, withholding fire until close range is reached is generally more effective than opening at a longer range. the tactical value of a withering fire at close range from a hitherto passive defender has again and again been proved in battle. on the _heights of abraham_ (september , ) general wolfe had assembled his troops and he awaited montcalm's attack. not a shot was fired by the defenders until the attacking force was within forty paces, and three minutes later a bayonet charge into the broken foe swept the french helplessly before it. at the _battle of bunker hill_ (june , ) the american colonists inflicted a loss of per cent. on the assaulting british force, by reserving their fire "until the badges and buttons of the tunics could be clearly identified." at the _battle of fredericksburg_ (december , ) general meagher's irish brigade of the u.s. army of the potomac assaulted marye's hill, , strong. the defending confederates reserved their fire until the assailants were yards from their position and drove them off with a loss of out of the , . in august, , the british regular army, during the _retreat from mons_, reserved their fire until the germans arrived at the most deadly point of their rifles' trajectory, and again and again drove off all except the dead and mortally wounded. throughout the great war, troops fully trained in the british system of musketry and using the short magazine lee enfield rifle, proved beyond dispute the values of the system and of the weapon. in a review of the methods adopted to check the great german offensive in the spring of , a circular issued by the general staff states: "rapid rifle fire was the decisive factor in these operations. the men had confidence in their rifles and knew how to use them." superiority of fire can only be gained by the close { } co-operation of the artillery and infantry at every stage of the battle, and unless infantry co-operate, the artillery is not likely to produce any decisive effect. long-range machine-gun fire is an important auxiliary to the artillery in covering and supporting the advance of attacking infantry. enfilade fire, the most telling of all, is more easily brought to bear than of old owing to the increase in the effective range and in the rate of fire. supports and local reserves will usually co-operate most effectively with forward troops by bringing fire to bear upon the flank of such bodies of the enemy as are holding up a movement by frontal fire. during the counter-attack for the recapture of _the bluff_, in the ypres salient (march , ) by troops of the rd and th divisions, the right and centre gained their objectives. the left attacking party, at the first attempt, failed to reach the german trenches, but those who had penetrated to the german line on the right realised the situation and brought a lewis gun to bear on the enemy's line of resistance, completely enfilading his trenches, and thus enabling the left company to reach its goal. movement.--the influence of movement is inseparable from that of fire, as it enables fire to be opened and is a means of escaping the full effects of fire; while it is often possible to move one unit only in conjunction with the fire of another. it can also be used to relieve one unit from the effects of fire concentrated upon it by moving another unit against the enemy. a steady and rapid advance of troops has the twofold effect of closing to a range from which an ascendency in the fire-fight can be secured, and also of reducing the losses of the advancing force, for if the troops remained stationary in the open under heavy fire, at a known range, the losses would clearly be greater than if they advanced, and would be suffered without gaining ground towards the objective, while the closer the { } assaulting line gets to the objective, and the steadier its advance, the less confidence will the enemy have in their power to stem the advance, and the fewer casualties will be suffered in consequence. no "sealed pattern" is laid down as to the movement and formation of infantry under fire, but certain definite principles are put forward in the text-books. where security is the first need, as in the case of protecting forces (advanced, flank, or rear guards), movement should be effected by bounds from one tactical position to another under covering fire from supporting troops; where the objective is the primary consideration, security must be subordinated to the need of reaching the objective. against artillery fire, or long-range infantry fire, the formation recommended by the text-books is small shallow columns, each on a narrow front, such as platoons in fours or sections in file, arranged on an irregular front, so that the range from the enemy's guns to each is different. troops coming suddenly under such fire will avoid casualties more easily by moving forward and outwards in this way rather than by remaining under such cover as may be improvised in a position the exact range of which is obviously known to the enemy. against effective machine-gun or rifle fire deployment into line, or into "arrowhead" formation with the flanks thrown well back, is preferable to a single line extended at so many paces interval, as it is scarcely more vulnerable and is infinitely easier to control. in retiring, losses are generally heavier than in advancing, or in maintaining a fire-fight from the position gained until a diversion by supporting troops enables a further bound to be made. the enemy is generally able to deliver a well-directed stream of lead against retiring troops, mainly because he is less harassed by the return fire. retirements must therefore be carried out on the principle of alternate bounds under covering fire of co-operating bodies, which withdraw, in their turn, under covering fire from the troops they have protected. { } such alternate retirements are the essence of rear-guard tactics, but, although certain other phases of battle action justify the withdrawal of troops, it must always be remembered that a position held against counter-attack is better than a position captured by assault, for it is a position that does not require to be assaulted. it is often impossible to predict the value of resistance at a particular point, and the fate of a nation may depend upon a platoon commander's grit in holding on at all costs. in the campaign of , brigadier-general moreau was sent to the _fortress of soissons_, with instructions to hold the town. his garrison consisted of about , all arms, with guns. at . a.m. on march , the fortress was bombarded by winzingerode's russians and bülow's prussians, and at p.m. an assault was delivered. this was easily repulsed and a counter-attack threw back the assailants to their own lines. the bombardment was resumed until p.m., when the garrison had a total loss of killed and wounded. during the night the besiegers sent a flag of truce to moreau, and on march that general capitulated with all the honours of war "in order to preserve , fighting men for the emperor." his action cost napoleon his throne, for had moreau held out the emperor would have crushed his most implacable foe, blücher (who escaped from the toils in which he was enmeshed, _viâ_ the bridge at soissons), and the campaign would have been at an end. if moreau had exhausted all the means of defence, as the regulations of war ordain, he could certainly have held out for another hours, and as heavy firing was audible in the vicinity it should have been clear to him that help was at hand. at the _first battle of ypres_ (october -november , ) the regular army of the united kingdom, at the outset, was filling so extensive a gap in the defensive line, that in many parts there was but one rifle for yards of front, and there were neither local nor general reserves. the { } assaulting german forces greatly outnumbered the defenders and brought up machine guns and artillery in overpowering strength. the british artillery was not only overweighted but was so short of ammunition that marshal french was compelled to limit their daily number of rounds. but the line was held, and a counter-attack, headed by the nd battalion of the worcestershire regiment, on october , with the bayonet, restored the line at _gheluvelt_, at the most critical moment of the battle, and the germans did not get through the defences. this stubborn resistance threw the germans behind their entrenchments, and the "advance to calais" was stemmed by french's "contemptible little army." at the _second battle of ypres_ (april -may , ) surprise in the time and nature of the attack, by the secret concentration of forces and the introduction of poison gas, gained an initial advantage for the germans and left the british flank uncovered. a canadian division counter-attacked on the german flank, and by may the allies had regained many of the captured positions. during the first battle of the somme troops of the royal west kent and the queen's regiments effected a lodgment in _trônes wood_ (july , ). they maintained their position all night in the northern corner of the wood, although completely surrounded by the enemy, and assisted in the final capture and clearance of the wood at a.m. the next day. similar instances occurred in _bourlon village_ (november - , ) when parties of the th east surrey regiment held out in the south-east corner of the village, during a german counter-attack, and maintained their position until touch was re-established with them hours later; and in a group of fortified farms south of _polygon wood_ (september , ) during the third battle of ypres, when two companies of the argyll and sutherland highlanders held out all night, although isolated from the rest of the rd and th divisions, until a renewed attack { } cleared the district of hostile forces. on april , , during the germans' desperate endeavours to break through the investing allies' lines, the ruins of _givenchy_ were held by the th west lancashire (territorial) division, and the right edge of the neck through which von arnim and von quast hoped to extend, in order to widen the wedge into the valley of the lys, was firmly held, while the left edge (the messines ridge) was recaptured by a counter-attack by the th division. the centre of the line was also stoutly held by the guards' and other divisions, many of which had suffered heavy losses in the v. army during the german attack in the last week of march. after days of the most stubborn fighting (march -april , ) of which the _attack on the lys_ had formed part, marshal sir d. haig issued an order of the day emphasising the value of holding each position at all costs. "every position must be held to the last man. there must be no retirement. . . . the safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alike upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment. . . . victory will belong to the side which holds out longest." sir d. haig's after-order, on april , (st. george's day), awarded special praise to the troops under his command. the number of divisions employed by the germans from march to april , , against the british alone was (approximately , , troops), and many of them were thrown in twice or three times. "in resisting the heavy blows which such a concentration of troops has enabled the enemy to direct against the british army, all ranks, arms, and services have behaved with a gallantry, courage, and resolution for which no praise can be too high" (haig's dispatch). covering fire.--the energetic and determined support of the infantry by fire is the main duty of machine-gun units throughout the whole course of the battle. in the attack, machine-gun platoons, lewis gun sections, { } or rifle sections detailed to give covering fire, must take care to select as targets those bodies of the enemy whose fire is chiefly checking the advance. machine-gun platoons are sometimes brigaded, and at others left to battalion commanders, and their action after a temporary success in providing covering fire may depend upon their tactical distribution at the time. infantry platoons detailed to give covering fire must join in the advance as soon as their own fire ceases to be effective in aiding the forward troops, unless definite orders to the contrary have been received. fire and movement.--it is thus seen that fire and movement are inseparably associated, and judiciously employed in combination they enable infantry to achieve its object in battle, to bring such a superiority of fire to bear as to make an advance to close quarters possible, so that the enemy may be induced to surrender or may be overwhelmed by a bayonet assault; and to prepare by similar means for further advances, until the enemy is entirely hemmed in or completely routed. [ ] in fiction, this point (that the generalissimo must not allow his sense of proportion to be distorted by local successes or reverses) is clearly brought out in _the point of view_, a story in "the green curve" by ole-luk-oie (general swinton). { } types of battle action a battle must practically always be of the nature of attack and defence, but the attitude originally assumed by either of the opposing forces may be reversed during an engagement. a vigorous counter-attack by an army offering battle in a defensive position may throw the adversary on the defensive, while an assailant may fight a delaying action in one part of the field, although in another part his action may be essentially offensive. there are three distinct systems of battle action: the entirely defensive; the entirely offensive; and the combined, or defensive-offensive system. the defensive battle has seldom effected positive results, except, perhaps, at _gettysburg_ (july - , ), where meade permitted lee to break his forces against a strong position, with the result that the army of northern virginia had to withdraw, and the invasion of the north came to an end. it must, however, be borne in mind that general lee was badly served by his subordinate, and general meade's success was largely due to this factor. on the second day of gettysburg (july , ), general j. b. hood's st division of general j. longstreet's i. army corps was deploying round the left of the federal army south of the round tops. he saw a chance to strike and requested permission from longstreet. hood's plan was the only one which gave a reasonable chance of decisive victory with the troops available. longstreet, in obedience to the letter of his orders, but contrary to their spirit, refused to sanction hood's advance. longstreet's failure to seize a fleeting opportunity sounded the death-knell of the confederate cause. { } burnside was defeated at _fredericksburg_ (december - , ) by purely defensive tactics, but lee had intended to follow up his victory by a decisive counter-blow, which burnside escaped by extricating the army of the potomac before the blow fell. success, even to the limited degree achieved by meade or lee, seldom follows the adoption of purely defensive tactics. "there is no such thing as an 'impregnable position,' for any position the defence of which is merely passive is bound to be carried at last by a manoeuvring enemy" (marshal foch). the offensive battle.--the entirely offensive system has been employed by many of the greatest commanders, including marlborough at _blenheim_ (august , ), _ramillies_ (may , ), and _malplaquet_ (september , ); frederick the great, notably at _leuthen_ (december , ); napoleon, wellington, and grant, as also by the prussian generals at almost every engagement in the campaigns of and - . the disadvantage of the system is that lack of success may entail not only a local disaster but the wreck and annihilation of the whole army. at the _battle of blenheim_ (august , ), marlborough, "the greatest captain of his age," had concentrated his forces with those of prince eugene of savoy the previous day and commanded an army of , men with guns. he was confronted by the joint armies of marshal tallard and the elector of bavaria, amounting to , men with guns. it was necessary for marlborough to attack before villeroy joined the enemy, or to withdraw until a more favourable opportunity presented itself. the right flank of his opponents rested on high hills, which were protected by detached posts, and the left flank on the danube, while opposite the centre was the marshy valley of the river nebel, with several branches running through the swampy ground. marlborough decided that a battle { } was absolutely necessary and he attacked the next day. like hannibal, he relied principally on his cavalry for achieving his decisive success, and this predilection was known to the opposing commanders. he attacked the enemy's right and left wings, and when heavily engaged with varying fortunes launched his decisive attack against the centre, where the difficulties of the ground caused it to be least expected. marlborough lost , killed and , wounded. the vanquished armies were almost destroyed, at least , being accounted for, with , killed, , wounded and missing, and , prisoners. the defensive-offensive battle.--the defensive-offensive system consists in taking up a position which the enemy must attack, and in delivering a decisive counter-stroke when the adversary has exhausted his strength. this system has been employed in almost every campaign. by such means napoleon achieved his classic victories of _marengo_ (june , ), _austerlitz_ (december , ), and _dresden_ (august , ); and wellington his peninsular victories at _vittoria_ (june , ), _orthez_ (february , ), and _toulouse_ (april , ), in addition to his final triumph at _waterloo_ (june , ); and it was the method adopted by marshal foch in the decisive campaign of , which endured from march until the armistice in november. at the _battle of waterloo_ (june , ), the decisive counter-stroke was delivered, in accordance with wellington's pre-arranged plan, by a force coming from a distance to the scene of action. on the morning of june , when wellington resolved to make a stand at waterloo, he was aware that the prussians, who were mostly young troops, had been beaten at ligny; that napoleon had, before that battle, over , men, and that he himself had, all told, , , of whom , , including the king's german legion, were { } british. yet he withdrew from quatre bras with the full determination of standing at waterloo and of fighting napoleon's army, if marshal blücher would come to his assistance with one army corps. napoleon attacked on june with , men and guns, against wellington's , men with guns, at a.m., but he was unable to shift the line or break through the squares. at . p.m. one of blücher's corps was delivering the promised counter-attack against napoleon's line of communications. soon after p.m. wellington and blücher met at la belle alliance, napoleon's headquarters before the battle, and the pursuit was in full swing. opportunities for restoring the battle and for turning impending defeat into a crushing victory are frequently offered during an engagement. general lee's thin lines at _antietam_ or _sharpsburg_ (september , ), slowly fed by men jaded by heavy marching, were sorely pressed, but there was a lull in the federal attack when hooker's advance was checked. had general mcclellan at that moment thrown in "his last man and his last horse" in a vigorous reinforcing attack, _antietam_ would not have been a drawn battle, and lee would not have retired at his leisure into virginia. lee's great victory at _chancellorsville_ (may - , ), although marred by the accident which deprived him of stonewall jackson, was a striking instance of the success of the defensive-offensive system at the hands of a great commander, who defeated , troops with less than half that number, by a containing defence with , men and a decisive counter-stroke with the remainder. but while this combined system is regarded by most authorities as the best, when circumstances warrant its adoption, it is the highest test of generalship to seize the right moment to pass from the guard to the thrust. this is the problem which confronted marshal foch, the generalissimo of the allied forces, during the great { } german offensive movement on the western front in . the defensive _rôle_ endured from march until july , , and although many local counter-attacks were made along the whole battle front, the allies did not pass from the guard to the thrust until the decisive counter-stroke was commenced in the _second battle of the marne_ (july , ) on a front of miles from fontenoy to belleau, which drove the germans back across the marne on july . the second battle of the marne (july , ).--the great german offensive of march-june, , was renewed on july , when the artillery preparation opened shortly after midnight and troops were poured across the marne in small boats and over pontoon bridges. the attack was not unexpected. adequate reserves were ready and in place, and a heavy counter-bombardment on the german troops in their positions of assembly, close to their front-line trenches, caused heavy casualties. the germans succeeded in penetrating the french and american positions in parts of the -mile front to a maximum depth of miles south-west of reims, but on the plains of champagne little progress was made and the attack lost its momentum. during the attack of march , , the advance was not held up until it was within striking distance of its ultimate objective, and the offensive on the aisne in may, , secured an advance of miles. captured documents showed that the attack of july east of reims was intended to reach the marne at eperney and chalons, an advance of miles. a feature of the earlier days of the battle was a spirited counter-attack near fossoy (on the extreme left of the german forces) by a division of the american army which thrust the germans behind their first line and captured upwards of , prisoners, the ground regained in the river bend being consolidated and held by the american division. the battle continued for three days before the german { } attack was brought to a standstill, and at . a.m. on july a counter-attack by the french, american, and italian forces changed the whole aspect of the campaign, and led to the final triumph of the allies and to the downfall of the central powers. { } the attack "surprise is at all times the assailant's strongest weapon."--"field service regulations," vol. ii. ( ). the aim of every commander who possesses the power of manoeuvre is to seek out the enemy and destroy his organised forces. the attack is the culminating point of all manoeuvres to this end, and every commander will endeavour to achieve his aim by a sudden and unexpected assault on a part of the enemy's defences. the achievement of this aim is only possible when a commander has assembled a sufficient force for his purpose, and has obtained, by reconnaissance and by fighting, information as to the vulnerability of the hostile position. the commander will then endeavour to break the enemy's formation so suddenly as to disconcert all his plans; to retain a compact force with which to follow up the blow without giving the enemy a moment's breathing space; to drive a wedge into the heart of his disordered masses, forcing his wings asunder; and to pursue and annihilate the scattered forces of the enemy. "unless a decision is quickly obtained in the opening weeks of a modern campaign the opposing armies tend to become immobile, chiefly owing to the great power conferred on the defence by modern armaments. the armies will then be distributed in great depth, and the attackers are faced with the necessity of breaking through not one position only, but a series of positions, extending back to a depth of several miles" ("infantry training, "). penetration, followed by the sundering of the franco-british armies, was clearly the intention of the german { } high command in the _second battle of the somme_, which opened on march , . the german armies had entrenched themselves after the first battle of the marne (september, ), and for months had been confronted by the allied nations of britain, france, and belgium, reinforced at the close by portuguese troops and by the national army of the united states. within the investing lines of the western front the german armies were besieged, the barrier reaching from the belgian coast to the frontier of switzerland, while the armies of austria-hungary were similarly penned in by the army of italy, from switzerland to the adriatic. the internal collapse of russia, in , enabled von hindenburg to assume the offensive, with upwards of , , men released from the eastern front, and part of this reserve power was projected, with the austro-hungarian armies, in a fierce attack on the italian lines. the success of this manoeuvre continued until reinforcements were dispatched from other parts of the allied lines, and a diversion in the region of cambrai by the british iii. army, under sir julian byng (november , ), prevented the dispatch of further german reserve power to the italian front, and necessitated a counter-thrust in france. the battlefields of france again resumed their importance as the vital point in the theatre of operations, and in the spring of , profiting by the improved positions and prospects in the west, ludendorff attempted to break through the investing lines on a -mile front. the attack was heralded by a terrific bombardment, and culminated in a desperate thrust against the british armies north and south of the river somme, the points of penetration aimed at being the british right, where it was linked up with the french on the river oise, in the neighbourhood of la fère, and the british line of communications in the neighbourhood of amiens. the whole british line opposite the thrust was hurled back and the territory regained by the franco-british { } advance on the somme in july, , was recaptured by the german armies. but this was not a battle for towns or territory, as the german hammer blows were intended to drive a wedge between the british and french armies, to roll up the british flank northwards to the sea-coast and the french flank southwards to paris, and to capture the main line of communication between these northern and southern armies. by skilful reinforcement of threatened points, marshal haig frustrated the primary object of the attack, and by the aid of the french armies the whole line fell back, disputing the ground with the utmost resolution, and maintaining the line without losing touch between the south and north. the german wedge was thrust in, but every attempt to effect a breach and to pour through the line was frustrated by the allies. during the battle the french and british armies became intermingled, and to preserve unity of control a generalissimo was appointed in the person of general foch, who had commanded the french ix. army at the first battle of the marne in september, , and the french armies of the somme during the advance in july, . general pershing, commanding the army of the united states, gave a free hand to the generalissimo to incorporate american troops wherever they might be needed in the field, and marshal haig and general retain remained in command of the british and french armies. methods of attack.--the object of every attack is to break down the enemy's resistance by the weight and direction of fire and to complete his overthrow by assault, by the delivery of a decisive blow with as large a portion as possible of the attacking force against a selected point or portion of the enemy's position. the term "decisive attack" does not imply that the influence of other attacks is indecisive, but rather that it is the culmination of gradually increasing pressure relentlessly applied to the enemy from the moment when contact with him is first obtained. { } two plans of attack.--there are two plans of attack. in the first, the direction in which the decisive blow is to be delivered is determined beforehand; an adequate force is detailed and pushed forward for this purpose, and at the same time another part of the force is detailed to attack another portion of the enemy's position, to keep his attention there, to pin his troops in position, to prevent him sending reinforcements to the part mainly threatened, and ultimately to drive home with the successful assault of the main attack. the rest of the force is small and is retained in general reserve to meet emergencies. in the second plan, a general action is developed by a part of the attacking force and the remainder is retained in general reserve, to be thrown in when the opportunity arrives, at the right time and in the right place. in this case, the "remainder" is not less than half the available force. the first plan can be adopted when the commander of the attacking force has definite information as to the extent of the enemy's position, when he knows where its flanks rest and when he knows the approximate strength of the forces arrayed against him. it must also be possible, without undue risk, to divide the attacking force into parties of such strength that neither can be overwhelmed by the enemy in detail, and it is to be noted that in the case of a serious check there is only a small general reserve to restore the battle. the second plan can be adopted when information is incomplete, and owing to the strong force retained by the commander in general reserve, the situation can be exploited and developed by fighting without undue risk. strength of the attack.--it must always be remembered that a commander can never be too strong when making an attack, for he can never be perfectly sure of what force he may encounter, or at what moment the adversary may make a counter-attack. an attack { } on an enemy presupposes a superiority of force at the place where the attack is made, for war is but the art of being stronger than the enemy at the right place at the right time, and for an attack to have a reasonable hope of success the attackers, at the point where the penetration takes place, must be superior. disposition of the troops.--each phase of the attack will normally require three separate bodies of troops for its execution: a _forward body_ to seek out for, and when located attack, the enemy along the whole front of the sector allotted to it and by relentless pressure to wear down the enemy's resistance in order to discover the weak portions of the defence; _supports_ to penetrate the weak portions of the defence and forthwith to attack the flanks and rear of those portions of the defence which are holding up the attack; with local reserves for dealing with local counter-attacks; and a _general reserve_ by means of which the commander exploits success or retrieves failure. the forward body, the supports, and the local reserves.--the paramount duty of all leaders in the firing line is to get their troops forward, and if every leader is imbued with the determination to close with the enemy, he will be unconsciously assisting his neighbour also, for, as a rule, the best method of supporting a neighbouring unit is to advance. but an attack is often held up by well-directed machine-gun fire, and by determined and well-trained riflemen in concealed or well-prepared positions. the tactics to be pursued under these circumstances are thus outlined in "infantry training, ": "when forward troops are held up by the enemy's organised fire at close ranges they must keep him pinned to his ground and absorb his attention by maintaining a vigorous fire and working their way closer when opportunity offers. it will be the duty of the supports to turn the flank of, and enfilade, that portion of the enemy's defences where a garrison is opposing { } the forward body. to achieve this, supports may have to quit their direct line of advance and follow in the wake of a neighbouring unit, which is able to advance. it must constantly be borne in mind that pressure should be brought on the enemy by supporting troops in places where the attack is progressing rather than where it is held up, never by the mere reinforcement or thickening up of a line of troops who have been unable to advance. there must be no slackening of pressure, meanwhile, by the forward troops who are temporarily held up, or the defenders will be able to turn their attention to the flanking attacks which are being directed against them." the local reserves are for local counter-attacks by fire or movement against similar efforts by the local reserves of the enemy. in modern campaigns this work is effectively carried out by the overhead fire of machine guns distributed in depth, and the mobile local reserves may thus consist of smaller units detached for the purpose by the forward body or by the supports. during the great german offensive in the spring of the _attacks on the somme and the lys_ were constantly held up by the vigour and tenacity of the franco-british defence, and to meet the necessities of the case the following instructions were issued by the german general staff: "if the assaulting troops are held up by machine-gun fire they are to lie down and keep up a steady rifle fire, while supports in the rear and on the flank try to work round the flanks and rear of the machine-gun nests which are holding up the attack. meanwhile, the commander of the battalion which is responsible for the attack is to arrange for artillery and light trench-mortar support, and should protect his own flanks from machine-gun fire by means of smoke." the general reserve.--in a modern campaign against civilised troops it will seldom, or never, happen that the efforts of the forward body, supports, and local reserves will annihilate the enemy and so prevent him from regaining cohesion and fighting power. even if { } every part of the position against which an assault is delivered is captured and held, the enemy will not, by that means alone, cease to exist as a fighting force, and if he is permitted to withdraw with a semblance of order and moral the work of the attacking force will be of little avail. the destruction of the enemy and not the mere capture of the ground of the encounter is the ultimate aim of the commander. he will, therefore, accept the best available opportunity for the destruction of the enemy by overwhelming them in some part of the battlefield during the successful operations of his attacking force. it may, however, happen that the efforts of the attacking force are generally unsuccessful and the enemy may be on the point of gaining the upper hand. by means of the general reserve the commander exploits the success or retrieves the failure of the attacking force. the commander will have selected some point or position in the enemy's defensive system against which he can direct his decisive attack. this point cannot, as a rule, be determined until it has been revealed by the successes of the forward body and the supports, and when it has been selected it must be struck unexpectedly and in the greatest possible strength. while, therefore, the forward body, supports, and local reserves must be adequate in numbers for the task allotted to them, a commander will generally retain about half his available force for the delivery of the decisive attack, and when this decisive blow has been delivered the reserve will carry on the pursuit of the beaten enemy until such time as other infantry, or cavalry, or tanks, have caught up and passed them. if the attacking troops fail to obtain their objective the commander has at his disposal the means of relieving exhausted troops and of dealing with the "decisive counter-attack" of the enemy. the commander's plans.--once troops are committed to the assault the commander is powerless to divert them to another purpose. his control is exercised in { } the correct interpretation or adaptation of his original plan by his subordinate commanders. before launching his troops to the attack in accordance with the decisions arrived at from information received, the commander will assemble his subordinates and the representatives of co-operating arms or formations in order that his plans may be explained. this conference should be held at such a time as will enable his subordinates to explain their _rôle_ to the sub-unit commanders. wherever possible the conference should be preceded by a personal reconnaissance of the ground over which the attack is to be made, otherwise a map of the district concerned must be substituted for the actual view. the commander will be influenced in his plans by the state of the campaign at the time of the decision to attack. in the opening stages of a campaign in a thickly populated country, and generally throughout a campaign in less settled districts, a war of manoeuvre will lead to the "encounter battle," and the objective to be aimed at will be limited only by the power of endurance of his troops, the weather conditions, and the possibility of supplying his victorious troops with ammunition and food. under other conditions, the objective will be subject to further limitations, as the defensive position will be organised in great depth, and while effective penetration will thus be more difficult to achieve it must, of necessity, be accompanied by widening in proportion to its depth in order that space for manoeuvre and facility for communication may be secured. the infantry attack will be conducted on the same lines in both forms of battle, but the greater the organisation of the defensive position the more limited will be the depth to which the attack can be carried on and the greater difficulty will there be in launching reserves in pursuit. the position of assembly.--a column in march formation will very rarely move to its attack position, or "jumping-off place," from column of route except { } where there are concealed lines of approach to the spot. a position of assembly will therefore be assigned, and this will be chosen with a view to cover for the troops and facilities for the issue of food and hot drink, the distribution of ammunition and the filling of water bottles. as a general rule, it is left to the battalion commander to select positions of assembly for each of his companies. when large bodies of troops are assembled with a view to immediate action, it must always be remembered that large forces cannot be moved by a single road if all arms are to be brought into action at the right moment. in april, , general banks, with , u.s. troops, moved from grand ecore to _pleasant hill_ in the red river valley. although lateral roads existed, his column marched on one main road only, and twenty miles separated his front and rear. as he came into action with general forrest, of the confederate army, the head of his column was defeated and thrown back again and again by forces inferior in total strength, but superior on the field of the encounter. had general banks used two or more parallel roads, which were available for his use, the confederates on the spot would have been quickly overpowered. the attacking force.--the commander must decide against which portion or portions of the hostile position, or along which lines of advance, his fire attack shall be developed. as the object of this movement is to pin the enemy to his position, to wear down his resistance generally, and particularly at the point where the decisive attack is to be delivered, as well as to effect a lodgment in the position, it is clear that the greater the extent of the objective the better, and one or both flanks should be threatened if possible. but whenever a fire attack is developed it must be in sufficient strength to occupy the enemy's attention fully and it must be carried through with vigour once begun. one { } to three rifles per yard of the objective to be assailed is generally regarded as the requisite strength of the forward body, supports, and local reserves. at _st. privat_ (august , ) a first and second line made a frontal attack and came under fire of the french chassepots, to which their own shorter-ranged rifles could make no effective reply. the lines pressed on, but were ultimately brought to a standstill through lack of reinforcements, which could have been sent up against the flank of the fire position which was holding up the attack, under cover of the fire of the troops in position, and would thus have carried the forward body to the assault. equally unsuccessful was osman pasha's attempt to break through the investing lines at _plevna_ (december , ). with , troops he pierced the russian lines, and another resolute effort would have carried the sortie through the investing forces. but the , supports could not get out of the town as the bridges and gates were blocked with fugitives and wagons. the decisive attack.--the commander must also decide the point and direction of the decisive attack. this will be made on a part of the front or on a flank, and it may be predetermined in accordance with information concerning the hostile dispositions, or it may have to be ascertained by further fighting. the advantages of a _frontal attack_ are that, if successful, the enemy's force is broken in two parts, the separated wings may be driven back in divergent directions and overwhelmed in detail, and a decisive victory is thus obtained. the disadvantages are that the force assaulting a part of the enemy's front draws upon itself the concentrated fire of the whole hostile line, and unless the fire attack can master this fire the decisive blow will be held up, while an unsuccessful frontal attack invites the enemy to advance and to envelop the assailants. the advantages of a _flank attack_ are that { } the enemy's line of retreat is threatened, and only the threatened flank can concentrate its fire on the assailant. the disadvantages of a flank attack are that the enveloping troops have to face a similar danger on their own outer flank, for upon this point the defender will almost certainly direct his counter-stroke, and for this reason a decisive blow on the enemy's flank must be followed up by strong reserves. the flank chosen for attack will be that which affords the best opportunities for converging fire from the supporting artillery, which gives the best line of advance for the infantry, and where success will have the most decisive results, the last depending mainly on the extent to which the enemy's line of retreat is threatened. where the various requisites are in conflict, the flank affording the greatest advantages for converging fire from the artillery will be chosen. nothing destroys the moral of men in action so speedily and effectually as a flank attack, and except by this method good infantry will seldom be beaten. a decisive attack, to be completely successful, must be followed up by fresh troops before the assaulting waves have been checked. lee had crossed the potomac and desired "to defeat the last army of the federals in the east and drive the northern government from washington." the battle of _gettysburg_ lasted three days (july - , ). on the first, the army of northern virginia was uniformly successful; on the second, the fortunes of battle swayed to and fro; on the third, lee decided to make a napoleonic decisive attack with half his available troops against meade's centre. but the spirited attack of the first , , after penetrating the line, was checked, and the remaining , did not arrive in support, so that the attack died down, was repulsed, and withdrew in disorder. at _chattanooga_ (november , ) grant's decisive attack was successful, although delivered against a part of the position which appeared to be impregnable, on account of the strength of the attack, through { } distribution in depth; , men were hurled against the entrenchments in three lines, and the support of the third line carried the waves of the attack through the defences. detailing the units.--the commander will detail the units for carrying out the fire attack, which will generally require one to three rifles per yard of the objective. this force will be placed under a definite commander, who will distribute it into a forward body to develop the attack in the firing line; supports, to enable the forward body to assault the position; and local reserves to maintain or restore the advantages gained, their main function being to repel counter-attacks by similar bodies of the enemy and to maintain the offensive spirit. the commander will also detail the units for carrying out the decisive attack, which will require three to five rifles per yard of the portion of the position against which it is projected. this force, under a definite commander, is distributed for the attack in depth, so that the strength and weight of the blow carries it home against all opposition. the force is retained by the commander of the whole attacking troops, to be thrown in at the right time and in the right place. it also remains in hand to restore the battle in case of an unexpected check, or to cover the withdrawal of the remainder of the troops if it is desired to break off the engagement. the artillery.--the position of the artillery will be settled in consultation with the artillery commander, the decision resting on the objects in view, which are, to assist the infantry in its advance by keeping down hostile gun and rifle fire--therefore, in the initial stages, a commanding position is required; during the decisive stage concentration on the objective of the decisive blow is required; and after the successful assault guns may be required to be hurried forward to repel { } counter-attacks, to break down protracted opposition, and to complete the rout by harassing the fleeing enemy. when the attack is directed against a position the defence of which is known to have been elaborately organised, a pre-arranged covering fire in the form of an artillery barrage, lifted in successive stages as the attack advances, may require to be organised some time before the attack is launched. it will be necessary to detail an escort for the guns, unless the distribution of the troops for the attack already provides such protection. at the _battle of verneville_ (august , ) the th prussian corps artillery had been pushed forward against the french position at armandvillers-folie. the fire of the french infantry caused a loss of officers and other ranks, and one battery was disabled, before the guns were withdrawn. there was no infantry escort to keep the attacking riflemen at a distance. at the _battle of colenso_ (december , ) two batteries of field artillery advanced into action without an escort, and without previous reconnaissance unlimbered on a projecting spit of land in a loop of the tugela river. frontal fire from hidden trenches on the opposite bank and enfilade fire from a re-entrant flank killed all the horses and the greater part of the personnel, and although the utmost gallantry was shown by all ranks ten of the twelve guns were left in boer hands. infantry regimental officers and battalion commanders must be acquainted with the amount of ammunition carried by their accompanying artillery, in order that ammunition may not be wasted by calling for fire on targets of secondary importance. all reserves, whether they have been specially detailed or not for the purpose, must of their own accord make every effort to assist in getting forward guns and ammunition. one of the outstanding lessons of the war of - is the possibility of placing even the heaviest artillery close behind the infantry fighting line owing to the mobility afforded by motor traction and to the security against { } counter-attack provided by the deadly fire of the magazine rifles and machine guns of their escort, and of the lewis guns allotted to the batteries themselves. the cavalry.--the opportunities for cavalry action in an attack depend upon the character of the defensive operations. against a highly organised defensive position there will be no openings for mounted troops until a wide penetration gives space for manoeuvre. before the attack during an "encounter battle" the cavalry will have been out on reconnaissance in front of the attacking force; during the attack they may be called on to assist by dismounted fire action, and by local counter-strokes as mounted troops (against cavalry, or against infantry disorganised by the breakdown of a movement), but must not be allowed to impair their speed or freshness; after the successful assault the pursuit is their special duty, not necessarily on the heels of the enemy, but on lines parallel to their retreat, to hamper his movements, to round up stragglers, and to threaten their communications. generally speaking, such a position as is required will be found on a flank, or slightly in advance of a flank of the attacking force. "cavalry make it possible for a general to adopt the most skilful of all manoeuvres, the converging attack, and properly handled, as at _appomattox_ or _paardeberg_, to bring about the crowning triumph of grand tactics, the hemming in a force so closely that it has either to attack at a disadvantage or to surrender" (henderson). in the mesopotamian campaign a surprise attack of general sir s. maude's forces on september - , , against the turkish forces assembling near _ramadie_, miles north-west of baghdad, was converted into the surrender of the turkish commander and about , all arms by the enveloping tactics of the anglo-indian cavalry division. a similar manoeuvre on march , , by the cavalry of the mesopotamian field force (commanded at that time by general sir w. r. marshall, { } who succeeded after general maude's death from cholera), resulted in the surrender of over , turks, including a divisional commander, miles north-west of hit. the prisoners were fugitives from the battle of _baghdadieh_, and the cavalry were astride their communications. "on the morning of the armistice (november , ) two british cavalry divisions were on the march east of the scheldt, and before orders to stop reached them they had already gained a line miles in front of our infantry outposts. there is no doubt that, had the advance of the cavalry been allowed to continue, the enemy's disorganised retreat would have been turned into a rout" (sir d. haig's dispatches). the absence of cavalry at the critical moment has often decided the issue of a campaign. after the action of _gaines's mill_ (june , ) general j. e. b. stuart was dispatched by lee with the confederate cavalry on a false scent to white house, south of the york river, to which base lee believed mcclellan to be retreating. but mcclellan had shifted his base to harrison's landing, on the james river, and the confederate cavalry did not regain touch with the army of the potomac until july , two days after the failure of lee's attack on malvern hill. had stuart been available with his cavalry throughout that critical period mcclellan's huge trains would have fallen an easy prey to the confederate horsemen, and the roads through the forests and swamps to malvern hill could have been blocked. absence of cavalry before the first day of _gettysburg_ (july , ) hampered the confederate leaders, and lack of information caused them to act with unnecessary caution when boldness would have carried everything before them. general stuart had once more been sent away on a raiding expedition. after the victorious attack of general early's division a handful of general buford's u.s. cavalry enabled the defeated st corps of meade's army to save their guns and to retire unmolested. a thousand { } confederate sabres would have brushed buford aside, and july would have been disastrous to the national cause. during the german offensive of march-july, , "even two or three well-trained cavalry divisions might have driven a wedge between the french and british armies. their presence could not have failed to have added greatly to the difficulties of our task" (sir d. haig's dispatches). during the _battle of cambrai_ (november , ) a squadron of the fort garry horse crossed the scheldt canal, and after capturing a german battery and dispersing a large body of infantry, maintained itself by rifle fire in a sunken road until nightfall, when it withdrew to the british lines with its prisoners. during the _battle of amiens_ (august - , ) the cavalry were concentrated behind the battle front by a series of night marches, and on the first day of the battle they advanced miles from their position of assembly. throughout the battle they rendered most gallant and valuable service. during the second _battle of le cateau_ (october - , ) cavalry were instrumental in harassing the enemy in his retreat and preventing him from completing the destruction of the railway, and when the infantry were held up by heavy machine-gun fire from cattigny wood and clary "a dashing charge by the fort garry horse gained a footing in cattigny wood and assisted our infantry to press forward. further east, dragoon guards and canadian cavalry were instrumental in the capture of hennechy, reumont, and troisvilles" (sir d. haig's dispatches). in the early stages of the campaign in _north russia_ (august-september, ) a handful of cavalry on either bank of the north dwina river could have kept the bolshevik forces constantly on the run, and could have prevented the successive reorganisation of their demoralised forces, which the slower progress of the pursuing infantry was unable to accomplish. a few squadrons of cavalry could have dispersed the whole { } bolshevik force in the archangel province. tanks are usefully employed in the pursuit, as artillery, the only effective enemy of the tank, is unlikely to remain in action with the rearward troops of a disorganised enemy; and a new terror has been added to the pursuit by the advent of self-propelled, man-carrying aircraft, armed with machine guns and bombs, and possibly even with light quick-firing artillery. during the final stages of the victorious _allied advance_ in november, , the retreating german armies were continuously harassed from the air. "throughout the day (november , ) the roads, packed with the enemy's troops and transport, afforded excellent targets to our airmen, who took full advantage of their opportunities, despite the unfavourable weather. over guns, which bombs and machine-gun fire from the air had forced the enemy to abandon, were captured by a battalion of the th division in the field near le presau" (sir d. haig's dispatches). the royal engineers.--the position and employment of the royal engineers will be determined by the commander who issues orders for the attack, and as the main function of this corps in the attack is the removal or bridging of obstacles to the advance, and the strengthening of the position when captured, the royal engineers will probably remain with the troops to which the decisive attack is entrusted. medical arrangements.--the position of hospitals and clearing stations will be settled in consultation with the s.m.o. aid posts and advanced dressing stations will be established under battalion arrangements in connection with the medical officer of the units concerned. supply.--the position of the train, with its reserve supplies of ammunition and of food for men and horses, will depend upon facilities for communication with the attacking force and upon security against artillery fire { } or surprise attack from the air or land. the position will probably be well in rear, and at the junction of roads leading forward to the attacking troops. rations will be brought up to units under arrangements by the commanders of the battalion or other units concerned. the commander's position.--the position of the commander who issues the orders for the attack must be fixed, and must be made known to subordinate commanders, as it will be the place to which reports will be sent. in the case of a small force the commander will generally stay with the general reserve; if the force is fairly large, and composed of all arms, he will probably be on the main artillery position; but in the case of a large force he should be well out of reach of the distraction of local incidents. if the commander of a large force moves from his stated position he must leave a senior officer of his staff to represent him on the spot and to forward urgent communications to him in his changed position. in the case of a small force a commander who vacates his stated position must arrange to leave a runner in the position stated as his headquarters, in order that messages may reach him without delay. battle reports.--the successful exploitation of success depends largely on the accuracy of the information gained by the commander from all parts of the battlefield. reports are required from all who have information to impart and they should be made out on previously prepared message cards, stating the exact position of the sender at the time of the report; the progress made by the unit under the command of the sender, or by neighbouring or other units whose action has been observed; the degree of the enemy's resistance; enemy movements; and the plans of the officer making the report and the method to be adopted in carrying out such plans. { } reorganisation and pursuit.--once a successful assault has been delivered, subordinate commanders must immediately regain control of their commands, and must see that the fleeing enemy is pursued by fire, while local reserves follow up and secure the position against counter-attack. superior commanders must take steps to organise the pursuit, to cut off the enemy's line of retreat, and to complete his overthrow. no victory is ever complete if the enemy is permitted to retire unmolested from the field of battle, and given time to recover order and moral. "never let up in a pursuit while your troops have strength to follow" was a favourite maxim of stonewall jackson. the pursuit is the task of the infantry until it is taken over by aircraft, cavalry, and tanks, and the limits to which the infantry will carry the pursuit will be fixed by the commander, who will bear in mind the principle that "success must be followed up until the enemy's power is ruined" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). if the fruits of victory are to be secured the work must be put in hand whilst the enemy is still reeling under the shock of defeat. a few hours' delay gives him time to recover his equilibrium, to organise a rearguard, and to gain several miles on his rearward march. in modern warfare motor transport may enable the comparatively immobile infantry to achieve the mobility of cavalry, if arrangements for embussing them have previously been made, and in a few hours infantry may thus be transported beyond the reach of pursuit. { } formation of infantry for the attack "only by the rifle and bayonet of the infantryman can the decisive victory be won."--marshal haig. the formations in which infantry move to the attack must be such as will enable them to achieve their object by the combination of fire and movement. for this purpose, the forward troops must be furnished with supports belonging to the same unit as themselves, in order that a connected leading may produce a joint action of the whole. the platoon.--the smallest unit which can be divided into independent bodies, each capable of fire and movement, is the platoon, the four sections of which can pin the enemy to his position by fire and can manoeuvre round his flanks. the normal distribution of the platoon for the attack is either the square or the diamond formation. in the _square formation_, two sections are forward covering the frontage allotted to the platoon, and the remaining two sections are in support, in such formation as may keep them in readiness for instant manoeuvre with due regard to the avoidance of unnecessary loss. in the _diamond formation_, one section leads to reconnoitre and to pin down the enemy, while the remaining three sections are held in readiness to manoeuvre for the decisive attack at the point in the enemy's defence which offers the best prospect of success. the diamond formation is that best suited to an attack in an encounter battle, when the nature of the enemy's dispositions are imperfectly known. it possesses the great advantage of preserving { } the power of manoeuvre for three-quarters of the platoon until the action of the leading section has developed the situation. in each case (except when the attack is launched against a highly organised defensive position), the forward sections will be preceded by _ground scouts_, to find the most covered line of advance and the best fire positions, and to guard against ambush. these ground scouts advance until checked, when they remain in observation until joined by the leading sections. during the early stages of the attack in an encounter battle _flank scouts_ may be required until such time as the deployment of the platoon renders them unnecessary. against a highly organised defensive system platoons may not be able to advance to the attack without a barrage, and it is essential that all movements should conform exactly to the timing of the barrage and that the troops should keep under the back edge of the shrapnel curtain, so as to deliver their assault before the enemy has time to bring rifles and machine guns into play. under such circumstances, ground scouts must be dispensed with. such a position will not be attacked without careful previous reconnaissance and the lines of advance will have been chosen beforehand. the square formation will be that usually adopted for attacks on highly organised defensive positions, with the two rifle sections forward and the two lewis-gun sections in support. the lewis-gun sections are thus able to protect the flanks of the rifle sections, and to deal with isolated enemy machine guns, or concealed bodies of riflemen, which might come into action with reverse or enfilade fire after the forward sections have passed over the occupied ground. the platoon commander.--the platoon commander must explain the situation to his subordinates and point out the line of advance. he should usually move with the forward sections during the preparatory { } phase of an attack, and when the forward sections have been committed to the attack he should assume control of the supporting sections and move with them. if his platoon is in support, he will thus be with the forward sections before the platoon is involved in the fight. the success of infantry in the attack depends not only on dash, control, and leading, but upon the intelligent co-operation of support commanders, who must keep themselves acquainted with the course of the battle by intelligent observation and will thus possess an "appreciation of the situation" before involving their men in action, and can direct the supports to the right spot at the right time, to influence the battle by fire and by movement, without hesitation or delay. the company.--the normal distribution of the company, when acting with other companies of the battalion, is two platoons forward and two in support. to meet the expectation of a stubborn resistance, or to cover an unusually extensive frontage, three platoons may be forward, with one in support; and where information as to the enemy's dispositions is lacking, but strong opposition is unlikely, one platoon may be forward with three in support, thus enabling the company commander to use any or all the supports to influence the attack on obtaining information as to the point in the enemy's position which offers the best prospect of success. when the frontage allotted to a company is above the normal, the leading platoons should not endeavour to cover the whole front, but gaps should be left between them; otherwise the men will be so widely extended as to deprive the leaders of the power of control. when a company is acting independently, the normal formation will be two platoons forward, with one in support, and one in reserve. the company commander.--the company commander will allot the tasks and the frontages of his { } platoons and give orders as to their distribution, and must state where he will be himself during the attack. his position will be determined by the necessity of keeping informed throughout the attack of the situation and of the progress of his platoons, and he is responsible that all essential information on these points is passed back to the battalion commander. he must also keep in touch with companies on his flanks, sending out patrols for this purpose, if necessary; and must use every opportunity afforded by the fire or smoke provided by other units or arms to get forward or round the enemy's flanks. he will use his supporting platoons to push through where the resistance is weak in order to turn the flank of those portions of the enemy which are holding up the advance. as soon as this temporary phase has been brought to a successful conclusion the company commander must reorganise his platoons and secure their advance on the objective. when the objective has been gained the position must be consolidated and patrols sent out to prevent surprise. the battalion.--the distribution of the battalion depends entirely upon the nature of the task allotted to it. where the enemy's dispositions are known and considerable resistance is anticipated in the earlier stages of the attack, the battalion will normally be distributed with two companies forward, one in support and one in reserve. the forward body should thus be strong enough to develop the attack to such a point that a decisive blow can be delivered by the supports against the main resistance, and the reserve company is in hand for the completing stages of the action or for stabilising the local battle. where the enemy's dispositions and the degree of resistance are still the subject of conjecture, one company only may be forward, with two in support, so that the main strength of the battalion will not be committed to any definite _rôle_ before it is needed and before the situation of the enemy is discovered. { } the battalion commander.--"the powers of personal control of a battalion commander upon the field of battle are limited, and success will depend, in a great measure, on the clearness of the orders which commit his leading companies to the attack" ("infantry training, "). the battalion commander should be supplied with any details concerning the enemy and of co-operating troops. he must understand his objective, the limits of his frontage, and the extent of help which he will receive from the other arms. in addition to such information as is supplied regarding the enemy's strength and dispositions, particularly with regard to wire (or other obstacles) and machine guns, he must ascertain the best positions of assembly for his companies, the best lines of approach to the objective, the most covered line of advance for his supports and reserves, and the best position for his own headquarters during each stage of the attack. in his orders for the attack he will reveal all information concerning the movements and dispositions of the enemy and of co-operating troops and arms; he will allot tasks to the companies and to the machine-gun platoon (if not brigaded) and will define the frontage of the forward companies; he will also detail the assembly positions, give compass-bearings for the advance, describe the action of other arms in support, make the necessary signalling arrangements, notify the zero hour, arrange for the synchronisation of watches, notify his own position before, during, and after the attack, and indicate the point to which reports are to be sent, notify the medical arrangements, and issue instructions as to the collection of stragglers, the escort and destination of prisoners, the supply of ammunition, and the equipment to be worn. the quartermaster will receive orders as to the bringing up of rations during the battle. before issuing to the attack a proportion of officers and other ranks will be detailed to remain behind, to replace casualties when the engagement is over. { } the position of the battalion commander will be chosen with a view to keeping in touch with the progress of the attack in all its stages and of influencing the fight by means of the reserves. personal control is difficult to exercise once troops are committed to the fight, but opportunities for rapid decision were frequently offered to battalion commanders in the great war, and seized with a success which transformed a check into a victory. in a battalion commander of the coldstream guards, seeing his command disorganised by fire and resistance, by personal example rallied and reorganised the waves of the attack and added the necessary momentum to the assault, which then reached its objective. on april , , the commander of a battalion of the royal newfoundland regiment witnessed the launching of a local counter-attack by the germans on the village of _monchy-le-preux_, and by a rapid advance with the fighting portion of his headquarters, staved off the attack until the arrival of reinforcements from the th brigade enabled it to be driven back in disorder. on november , , during the german counter-attack from fontaine notre dame to tadpole copse, in the northern sector of the _cambrai_ zone, the germans forced their way into our foremost positions, and opened a gap between the / th and / th london regiments. local counter-attacks led by the two battalion commanders with all available men, including the personnel of their respective headquarters, once more restored the situation. in march, , during the most critical period of the german thrust at amiens, a battalion commander of the border regiment again and again, on horseback and on foot, personally restored the situation. { } defensive action "the soul of the defence is the counter-attack."--marshal foch. defensive action may be initiated by a commander in the field, or it may be imposed upon him by the enemy, and a commander may rely upon fortification to assist him in defeating the enemy, or he may employ manoeuvre to effect or to postpone a decision. a commander may desire to pin the enemy to an attack upon a fortified position, garrisoned by a portion only of his force, while he detaches another (and probably greater) portion to attack the enemy from an unexpected quarter. an outstanding example of this form of action is exhibited in the _battle of chancellorsville_ (may - , ), where lee kept at bay hooker's army of , with one-third of his force and detached stonewall jackson with , men to attack the federal rear. action of this kind is peculiarly effective, but it requires a secrecy which modern aircraft would almost certainly unveil, and if the manoeuvre failed to escape observation it would probably result in disaster both to the retaining force and to the detached troops. a different form of the combination of defence with manoeuvre is the defensive-offensive battle, with examples of which the history of warfare is amply supplied--marengo, austerlitz, and waterloo being typical battles of this nature. in this form of defensive action a commander invites the enemy to attack a well-chosen position, and after exhausting the enemy's strength and holding up the assault, the commander passes from the guard to the thrust and overwhelms { } the exhausted foe by an irresistible and sustained counter-attack with all the means at his disposal. a position is sometimes occupied as a matter of necessity, sometimes merely as a matter of tactical prudence. at _nachod_ (june , ) the prussian advanced guard hurriedly established a defensive position and kept at bay the whole austrian army, while the prussian army emerged in security from a defile and manoeuvred into battle array. the _pass of thermopylae_ was occupied in b.c. by , greeks under leonidas, king of sparta, to withstand the persian hosts of xerxes, and although the greek force was destroyed by an attack from the rear (through the disclosure of a secret path by a renegade in the persian service), the resistance offered to the "invincible" persians emboldened the greeks in their future encounters, and led to the ultimate defeat of the invaders. according to the legendary history of rome, horatius cocles and two companions defended the _sublician bridge_ over the tiber against lars porsena and the whole army of the etruscans. this legendary heroism was equalled or surpassed during the _second battle of the somme_ (march , ). "the bridges across the crozat and somme canals were destroyed, though in some cases not with entire success, it being probable that certain of them were still practicable for infantry. instances of great bravery occurred in the destruction of these bridges. in one case, when the electrical connection for firing the demolition charge had failed, the officer responsible for the destruction of the bridge personally lit the instantaneous fuse and blew up the bridge. by extraordinary good fortune he was not killed" (sir d. haig's dispatches). at _rorke's drift_ (january , ) a force of other ranks of the th regiment, under lieutenants chard and bromhead, with about hospital cases, drove off the repeated attacks of , zulus, part of cetewayo's army which had surprised and annihilated the garrison { } at _isandhlwana_ earlier the same day. an astounding feat of arms was performed by a small body of troops during the withdrawal of the british army in face of the overwhelming german attack at the _second battle of the somme_. a detachment of about officers and men of the st brigade, th division, was detailed to cover the withdrawal of their division at _le quesnoy_ (march , ). under the command of their brigade-major (captain e. p. combe, m.c.) the detachment successfully held the enemy at bay from early morning until p.m., when the eleven survivors withdrew under orders, having accomplished their task. there are many instances of the occupation of an area for an actual or potential tactical purpose. before the _battle of salamanca_ (july , ) a spanish force had been detached by wellington to cover a ford of the river tormes by occupying the castle of alba de tormes, but the force was withdrawn without wellington's knowledge, and marmont's defeated army retired unmolested over the ford to the fortress of valladolid. in the campaign of , napoleon placed a garrison of , in the _fortress of soissons_, but on march , , the garrison capitulated without exhausting all the means of defence as the regulations of war ordain, and the bridge at soissons enabled blücher and bülow to unite their forces across the river aisne. in the waterloo campaign, wellington stationed , men at _hal_ and _tubize_, miles from his right on the field of battle at waterloo, to repel a possible turning movement and to form a rallying point if his centre was broken, and with , men took up a position astride the nivelle-brussels and charleroi-brussels roads which met at mont st. jean. he was deprived of the services of this detachment and modern criticism has been directed against this disposition of his forces. it is, however, permissible to suggest that the security of his right flank, and the possession of a rallying point, inspired him with the confidence which enabled him to { } withstand the sustained attacks of napoleon until the arrival of blücher's corps permitted him to overwhelm his adversary. a further form of defensive action is the occupation of a series of extemporised positions and the orderly withdrawal to a further series before the actual assault of the enemy, resistance being combined with manoeuvre for the purpose of delaying the enemy's advance or of holding up his pursuit. delaying action of this kind is commonly employed in rearguard fighting, when the object to be gained is time rather than position, and the offensive action of the defender is limited to local counter-attacks at favourable or desperate moments. but the guiding principle in all defensive operations, including delaying action, must be that "when an enemy has liberty of manoeuvre, the passive occupation of a position, however strong, can rarely be justified, and always involves the risk of crushing defeat" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). the offensive spirit.--although there are many forms of defensive action the soul of the defence in every case is a vigorous offensive spirit. in the active defence, the decisive counter-attack, ending in the overthrow of the enemy, is the manoeuvre originally in view when the defensive _rôle_ is adopted. in the passive defence against superior numbers. local counter-attacks end with the recapture of a tactical point or the repulse of a determined assault, and in the delaying action they overwhelm by surprise fire or assault a detached force which has advanced with such rapidity as to enable the defenders, without undue risk, to cut off and annihilate the isolated enemy body. whatever the tactical situation, it is by the vigour of the offensive spirit alone that success may be achieved in the face of a determined enemy. modern warfare.--in modern warfare the defensive position plays a part of increasing importance, owing { } to the great power conferred on the defence by modern armaments. "machine guns and barbed wire permit the rapid organisation of defensive points of a value which cannot be disputed. in particular, they have given to a trench, or to a natural obstacle, a solidity which permits a front to be extended in a manner unsuspected before this war; they permit the prompt consolidation of a large system that is easy to hold" (marshal foch). "the modern rifle and machine gun add tenfold to the relative power of the defence as against the attack. it has thus become a practical operation to place the heaviest artillery in position close behind the infantry fighting line, not only owing to the mobility afforded by motor traction but also because the old dread of losing the guns before they could be got away no longer exists" (marshal french). it is thus possible to hold the forward positions of a highly organised defensive system with a minimum of exposure to loss, the extra strength of the position counterbalancing the reduction in numbers, but a preference for defensive action of this kind may generally be regarded as an admission that a victorious outcome of the campaign is not anticipated at the time of its adoption in the theatre in which it is employed. "it is of paramount importance that in those parts of a theatre of operations where a commander aims at decision a war of movement must never be allowed to lapse into position warfare so long as a further advance is possible. position warfare can never of itself achieve victory" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). however strong entrenchments may be they will not defeat the adversary's main armies, nor can they withstand indefinitely the attacks of a determined and well-armed enemy. it is scarcely even probable that an army behind entrenchments can by that means alone inflict such losses on its assailants as will enable the initiative, or liberty of manoeuvre, to be regained and the assailant's main armies to be defeated. the operations on both sides { } are in the nature of a siege, and however prolonged the siege, the advantage will be gained in the long run by superiority of aggressive action in the air and over and under the ground. in addition to the absence of opportunity for the grand offensive there are two further points of difference between defensive action in position warfare and the defence in a war of manoeuvre. the first of these is the inevitable absence of flanks to be assailed, as the operations necessitate a connected line of strong points from sea to sea, or from the sea to the impassable barrier of neutral territory. mounted troops are therefore doomed to inaction in their most important sphere, until the lines have been breached and the enemy is forced to retreat, and the opportunities for delivering flank attacks are meanwhile confined to the infantry, and will be due to irregularities in the alignment of the strong points, upon which enfilade fire may be brought to bear. the second point of difference is the abundance of time at the disposal of commanders for developing and rehearsing elaborate systems of attack and defence, and for obtaining detailed plans of the hostile works, through continuous reconnaissance by the air service. in most countries there must be, of necessity, a prolonged period of inactivity on both sides in a position war, owing to the severity of winter conditions, or to the occurrence of the rainy season, and during that period it will seldom be possible to penetrate the enemy's main defences on such a scale as to bring about the grand offensive. but this is a period of inactivity in appearance rather than in fact, for no defensive system is ever perfect, no strong point but needs further consolidation, new trenches are constantly constructed or improved, and fresh areas are covered with wire entanglements. guns of all calibres, underground mines and light mortars are ever at work, demolishing, wounding, and killing, while lachrymatory and asphyxiating shell-fire is to be expected at all times. on a smaller scale, snipers on both sides have a daily bag, and { } observers are ever at their posts noting every change, however insignificant, and every new piece of work; "listening posts" are detecting hostile plans, while patrols are collecting information and raiding parties are reconnoitring, destroying defences, and inflicting losses, it being the first principle of a raid that it should result in greater losses to the enemy than to the troops which carry it out. entrenchments.--entrenchments have been employed in the defence from the earliest times. the roman walls in britain, the great wall of china, the earthworks in the russian war of - , in the american civil war of - , in the russo-turkish war of , and the russo-japanese war of - are notable examples. but in no war previous to that of - have they played so important a part. one of the most famous series of entrenchments in previous wars were those constructed in by colonel r. fletcher, of the royal engineers, at _torres vedras_. these fortifications extended for miles and contained closed works, mounting guns, and behind these lines wellington amassed stores and reinforcements until the retreat of masséna enabled him to resume the initiative. in front of these lines everything that could support the french armies had been removed; behind them wellington's forces were well provided in every respect. on october , , masséna was confronted by the entrenchments, the existence of which had been kept a profound secret, while their strength prevented them from being carried by assault. before the end of october a portuguese spy wrote to wellington: "heaven forgive me if i wrong the french in believing they have eaten my cat" (napier). during the night of november - , masséna broke up his camp and withdrew. but it was not the lines of torres vedras which won back the peninsula. spain and portugal were saved by the bold march northwards { } to vittoria. "in six weeks wellington marched, with , men, miles, passed six great rivers, gained one decisive battle, invested two fortresses, and drove , veteran french troops from spain" (napier). defensive systems.--"whether it is the intention of the commander to resume the offensive at an early date or whether it is likely that the defensive system will be occupied for a considerable period, the principles on which the construction of all defences should be undertaken are the same. all defensive systems should be planned from the outset in such a way that they can easily be adapted to the requirements of a prolonged defence. the ground must be thoroughly reconnoitred and should at the first be divided into a series of tactical posts and defended localities. these posts should be self-supporting, but should be so sited that the garrisons mutually support each other by fire. the gaps between the posts must be covered by the fire of the garrison of the posts, and machine guns may also be sited to bring fire to bear from positions in rear and to the flanks" ("infantry training, "). this principle must govern the choice of the position to be defended as well as the organisation of the position for defence, and troops detailed for the defence of an area must continue to improve the defensive arrangements in that area until such time as the offensive is resumed. choosing a position.--the framework of the modern defence consists of artillery and machine guns; into this framework are fitted the defence posts or defended localities garrisoned by infantry, who are responsible for holding their ground at all costs and for inflicting the greatest possible loss on the enemy. a commander will require a position which affords elasticity for increasing the resistance as the attackers penetrate the defences, and depth will thus be essential. he will require a position wide enough to prevent the whole of his front being masked by a retaining attack of a part of the { } enemy's forces while a strong flank attack is simultaneously delivered; and in a war of manoeuvre he will require facilities for the decisive counter-attack. the depth of the position will develop automatically in a war of position, but it must always be sufficient to enable troops to assemble in rear of the forward position before moving up and to afford rest to troops when withdrawn from the front line. the width of the position will generally depend upon the strength of the defending force, the guiding principle being to keep about half the force in general reserve; if, therefore, the remainder of the force is insufficient for the purpose of holding the defences the position is too wide for the tactical requirements of the active defence. in position warfare, however, a defensive system must necessarily be extended beyond the limits that are practicable in the active defence, and the numbers available for the garrison are supplemented by denying ground to the attack by means of obstacles, the removal of which is prevented by machine-gun and rifle fire. the outpost zone.--for the active defence of a position the defensive system will consist of an outpost zone and a battle position. the outpost zone is garrisoned by a protective force which keeps a constant watch on the enemy and absorbs the first shock of the attack, watch being kept by means of well-concealed sentry posts on the line of observation, supported by a chain of small self-contained defensive posts, while resistance is offered by a series of self-contained, mutually supporting defence posts on the outpost line of resistance. the battle position.--the battle position will be established in the area in which the commander decides to fight out the battle and break the enemy's attack. it therefore forms the keystone of the whole defensive position and must be organised in depth to afford elasticity for defensive action. "in principle, in order to protect { } the battle position from being obliterated by a preliminary bombardment, it should be beyond effective range of the enemy's mortars" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). the semi-permanent system.--when a campaign is prolonged in any area without decisive results a war of position may be developed by one or both of the combatants. in such cases the outpost zone is developed into an intricate trench system, with protective avenues leading from front to rear and with deep dugouts to protect the garrison from artillery fire. the battle position will probably coincide with the outpost zone, the trenches being used for the purposes of observation until the fire positions are manned to resist an assault. in parts of the line on the western front of the great war, "pill-box" forts, constructed of concrete, took the place of continuous lines of trenches. these machine-gun forts were garrisoned, according to size, by groups from to strong, and were echeloned in plan, to sweep all approaches, and together to command with their mutually supporting fire the whole area over which they were spread, the intervening ground being entangled with wire so placed as to invite attacking troops into places where flanking fire may be poured into them. the advantages of the pill-box system over the continuous line of strong points are principally defensive. fewer men are required for them than for the trench systems, and there is less liability of loss from artillery fire. but there are certain grave disadvantages. well-directed artillery fire is liable to destroy some of the pill boxes, and a direct hit from a heavy gun will possibly put a larger fort out of action, thus crippling the defence by the removal of a peg on which the whole scheme depends. supports and reserves are necessarily far in rear and must be brought up through the open to repel successful attacks, while a defensive scheme { } composed entirely on the pill-box plan is less suitable for aggressive action than entrenchments, there being fewer facilities for assembling troops prior to the attack. common characteristics.--whatever the system of defence or phase of warfare, every commander must guard his flanks and keep in touch with neighbouring units. he must always be ready to assist a neighbouring commander by enfilade fire or by a relieving counter-attack; or to throw back a defensive flank in the event of a neighbouring post being captured by the enemy. each post, occupied for the defence (except in delaying actions, where manoeuvre takes the place of a settled resistance), forms a self-contained centre of resistance, capable of all-round fire, and the duty of the garrison is to defend the area allotted to it to the last man and the last round. the active defence.--the active defence may be considered according to the reason which prompted the commander of the force to occupy the position. it may have been deliberately chosen as a position which the enemy must attack, and in the hope of delivering during that attack a crushing and decisive counter-blow; or it may have been chosen of necessity, to meet an attack by deployment on the ground of the encounter, with the same hope of delivering a decisive counter-stroke when the opportunity arrives. there is little difference in the steps to be taken by the commander, as in the first case a general reserve is specially detailed for the counter-stroke; and in the second, the position will be held with as few troops as the tactical situation permits, in order to provide as large a general reserve as possible for the grand offensive. a commander will be influenced by many considerations in his choice of a defensive position:-- (i) _the position must suit the plan of operations_; it must be "in the enemy's way," and this the commander must be able to judge from the map. it is { } to be noted that to bar the enemy's way it is not always essential to get astride his lines of advance, as a position on parallel lines, threatening his flank and rear, cannot be ignored by the enemy, unless he is strong enough to detach a part of his force to mask the defender's position, while he proceeds to his objective with his main army. "it was a mistake to assume that in order to cover turin one had to stand astride the road leading to that town; the armies united at dego would have covered turin, because they would have stood on the flank of the road leading to that town" (napoleon). (ii) _the position must not be too extensive_ for the troops at the disposal of the commander, and this will be governed by the extent of the line to be actually held. it will consist of a series of mutually supporting tactical points, which can be held as "pivots on which to hinge the defence of the position," and the object must be to obtain the maximum of fire effect on all ground over which the enemy can advance with the minimum of exposure to his fire. a rough-and-ready rule is that unless one rifle per yard of the frontage occupied can be supplied by the "troops to hold the position" (which should not exceed one-half the available force) then the position is too extensive and should be narrowed. on the other hand, too narrow a front may enable the enemy to develop, early in the engagement, strong flank attacks, which may make the position untenable before the time is ripe for the assumption of the offensive. the _condé-mons-binche_ line held on august - , , by sir j. french's army (i. corps, general sir d. haig; ii. corps, general sir h. l. smith-dorrien) had a total width of miles, and the troops at disposal, including general sir e. h. h. allenby's cavalry division, consisted of about , all arms. the frontage actually held did not exhaust half this force at the rate of one rifle per yard, and a position in rear had also been selected, between jerlain and maubeuge, with a frontage of miles. the _retreat from mons_ was { } due not to the excessive width of frontage, but to the success of the german attack on the french v. corps at charleroi (august , ), which left the right flank of the british army "in the air," while two german corps were working round the left flank. the british iii. corps (general sir w. p. pulteney) did not arrive until the retreat was in full swing. at the _first battle of ypres_ (october , ) many parts of the line were held with one rifle for yards, and there were no supports or local or general reserves. yet the line was not only maintained but a counter-attack at gheluvelt thrust the attacking germans behind their entrenchments. (iii) _there must be a clear field of fire_ to prevent the enemy approaching unmolested within effective range, and particularly within close range, from which the enemy will endeavour to establish an ascendency in the fire-fight. (iv) _the flanks must be secure_, or at least as strong as possible. a flank resting on a deep river or a marsh may be regarded as secure, and a flank extending to the sea, or to the boundary of a neutral state. a flank on high ground which commands all approaches and provides means of distant observation may be called strong. it is a great advantage if one flank can be posted so strongly as to compel the enemy to make his main attack on the other, as this will enable the defender to forecast the direction of the decisive attack and to dispose his general reserve to meet and overwhelm it. (v) _there should be facilities for cover_ on the position and concealed avenues of approach from the rear. a crest affords cover on the reverse slopes and woods provide concealment, while time enables artificial means to be adopted. tactical cover can be provided by cavalry and advanced troops in the early stages of manoeuvre-battle, and in removing this cover the troops can withdraw in such a way as to lure the enemy on { } to a false position. they can also induce premature deployments by the enemy, and movements across the front of the real position. (vi) _there should be good artillery positions_ to provide effective fire on all hostile avenues of approach, and counter-battery work on hostile artillery positions. there should also be firm ground and good roads for the movement of guns, and an absence of landmarks for the enemy to range on. guns of the heaviest calibre take part in all modern battles, their disposition being settled in conference with the artillery commander. a battery of field artillery requires yards frontage for its six guns, and there is usually an interval of yards between batteries. (vii) _there must be depth_ to allow for the disposal and movement of the supports and reserves, and for manoeuvres to recapture the forward defences, or to issue to the counter-attack. (viii) _there must be good lateral and frontal communication_ in order that any part of the line can be quickly reinforced. a position astride an unfordable stream, or high ridge or deep ravine should therefore be avoided. at the _battle of dresden_ (august , ) the allies were encamped on the left bank of the elbe. their forces were posted on the heights, but the position was cut transversely by a deep ravine, so that the left wing was isolated from the centre and right. this vicious disposition did not escape the penetrating eye of napoleon, who attacked their isolated wing with superior forces and routed it completely, with the capture of , prisoners, before any assistance could arrive. the task of creating lateral communications, if none exist, is of the utmost importance, as they enable a commander to achieve the primary object of every military manoeuvre, to meet the enemy with superior forces at the desired point. (ix) _there should be good lines of withdrawal_, and these should be horizontal, or only slightly oblique, to { } the main position, and not parallel with the general alignment. this is a point of the first importance, for if the lines of communication lead straight to the rear a force that is overwhelmed by the attack can withdraw to selected positions and towards its base, if it can keep the line intact and prevent its flanks being turned. a wide base, with alternative lines of approach, is of the greatest value, and when there is undue risk of the lines of communication to a base being intercepted, an alternative base, with lines of withdrawal thereto from the unexposed flank, is an acceptable safeguard, as the defence can be protracted while the withdrawing force concentrates upon the changed base. such a change of base was effected by marshal french during the _retreat from mons_, and amongst many historical examples may be quoted general mcclellan's transfer of the _army of the potomac_ from the york to the james river in july, , during the _seven days' battle around richmond_. general grant changed his base no fewer than five times during the _campaign in the wilderness_ (may, ), from washington to orange and alexandria railroad, then to fredericksburg on the rappahannock, then to port royal, further east on that river, then to white house on the pamunkey (a branch of the york river), and finally to the james river. "his army was always well supplied, even his enormous numbers of wounded were carried straight away to the base and thence to washington, without any difficulty, and he had no obstacles whatever to fight against as regards either feeding his army or keeping up the supply of ammunition" (henderson). in withdrawing a defeated wing it may even be advantageous to rally the troops at a point distant from the field of battle, and to cause the pursuer, uncertain as to the direction of the retreat, to make detachments which can be overthrown by sudden counter-attacks, or to lure a pursuer from the field where their presence is required, as grouchy was lured after napoleon's defeat of the prussians at ligny { } (june , ). the object of napoleon's attack on the allies was the separation of wellington's anglo-belgian force from the prussian army under blücher, and after the defeat of the latter at ligny the emperor directed marshal grouchy to pursue the prussians and to drive them eastwards. grouchy conducted a leisurely pursuit and engaged an insignificant part of the prussian army (_the battle of wavre_, june - , ), while the main body of the prussians moved westwards and assisted in the overthrow of napoleon at waterloo. (x) _there should be favourable ground and a good line of advance for the decisive counter-attack_. in order, therefore, to overthrow the enemy, a position should not be chosen behind an impassable feature which neither side can cross. at _ramillies_ (may , ), one wing of the enemy was posted behind a marsh, where it was both unassailable and unable to attack. marlborough, therefore, ignored that wing entirely, and bringing his whole force against the remaining wing, won easily a decisive victory. the only occasions when an impassable feature is welcome are in the passive defence of a small force against overwhelming odds (as was seen in august, , when the belgians occupied a position behind the _river gette_), and in the delaying action of a rear-guard fighting for time for the main body to get away. in such cases a decisive counter-attack is not contemplated. occupation of a defensive position.--the framework of the _defence_ is provided by artillery and machine-gun fire; the backbone of the _offence_ is the infantry. the commander will _divide the troops_ into (a) _troops to hold the position_, and (b) _general reserve_, the golden rule being to make (a) as small as the tactical situation permits in order that (b) may be as large as possible, and its work absolutely decisive. under no circumstances { } should the general reserve be much below half the available force. of these two portions, the _troops to hold the position_ consist of infantry occupying a series of mutually supporting tactical strong points, not necessarily continuous, and of irregular alignment so as to cover with the defender's fire not only the ground over which the enemy can advance, but the front and flanks of neighbouring strong points. this line will be strengthened, as and when necessary, by throwing in the supports, and it will be assisted at critical moments by the local reserves, which, coming up unseen, will deliver local counter-attacks on the assaulting enemy, and will thus restore the battle at threatened points by relieving the pressure on the front line. their work completed they will be rallied and withdrawn again into local reserve, and it is highly important that they should be kept well under control, or their successful efforts may be neutralised by local reserves of the attacking force. at _talavera_ (july , ) a portion of the british force followed up the repulsed french columns too far, and being in turn broken and driven back, was pursued closely by the enemy and retired in disorder to the position. at the battle of _fredericksburg_ (december , ) two brigades emerged from the confederate position and drove meade's division of the army of the potomac out of their lines. but they rushed on with reckless impetuosity and were finally driven back with heavy loss. local counter-attacks keep alive an offensive spirit in the defenders, exhaust the enemy's powers, draw his reserves into the battle, and thus prepare the opportunity for the decisive counter-attack. the local reserves of flank sections should usually be echeloned in rear of the flank, which can thus be protected at need by determined counter-attacks on the flank of the enveloping force. _the general reserve is for the decisive counter-attack_ and is held for this purpose in the hands of the { } commander of the whole force, in order that it may be used to crush and overthrow the enemy's main attack. the opportunity for this effort is generally obtained only when the enemy has thrown into action his own general reserve for the decisive attack, and has received a check. a bold and resolute counter-attack at that moment is bound to achieve a decisive success. but the assumption of the _grand offensive should not be confined to the general reserve alone_. commanders of sections of the defence who are permitted by the local situation to do so, must at once join in the decisive counter-attack, unless express orders to the contrary have been received; and any definite success obtained must be the signal for the whole force to press the enemy with the utmost vigour. this opportunity will be fleeting, and there must be no delay in seizing it. every preparation must therefore be made in anticipation of the opportunity so that a pre-arranged plan may be put into execution. "to initiate a counter-attack on a large scale without due time for preparation, co-ordination, and movement of troops is to court failure, with heavy casualties and resulting demoralisation" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). that the soul of the defence is the counter-attack was shown at the battle of _spottsylvania_ (may , ). general hancock's corps (from grant's combined armies) had assaulted and captured part of lee's entrenchments in the wilderness of virginia; , men had assaulted and captured the salient, taking , prisoners; they then pressed forward, and sweeping everything before them, drove a wedge right into the confederate position. "but lee, recognising the weakness of the salient, had caused another line of entrenchments to be constructed about half a mile in rear. by this second line the federals were suddenly brought up. the confusion was very great, the battalions had intermingled in the excitement of the charge, and the officers could neither make their orders { } heard nor form their men for another rush. lee threw in his reserves. he made a tremendous counter-attack. every single battalion he could collect was ordered to attack, and the vigour of the blow was such that the whole of these , men were driven back beyond the first line of entrenchments, and the confederates recaptured their first position" (henderson). _he will select positions for the artillery_, in consultation with the commander of that arm, the objects in view being: to command lines of approach so that the assailant may be shelled and forced to deploy early and so to indicate his plan of attack; to delay the advance; to combine with the infantry in the close defence of the main position; to support local counter-attacks; to destroy hostile batteries by counter-battery work; and to combine eventually in the decisive counter-attack. the increased mobility of guns of the heaviest calibre owing to motor traction, and the increased defensive power of the protective quick-firing small arms, enable guns to be placed close behind the infantry firing line without undue risk of capture. _he will divide the position into sectors_, each garrisoned by a distinct unit, under a definite commander. the mutually supporting tactical points (farmsteads, villages, woods, ridges, knolls, etc.) will usually be held in groups, under group commanders, with definite subordinate commanders, and the group commander will probably control the local reserves of that group, with which he can assist any of the units in times of need. the units from which such groups are formed will usually be complete sections. _he will decide the position of the general reserve_. this will be the locality best suited for the advance to the decisive counter-attack, if it is to be delivered from a distance; or near the point where the enemy's decisive attack is expected, if it is intended to hurl the general reserve into the flank and rear of the enemy's main { } attack while it is heavily engaged with the troops holding the position. as surprise is essential to success, the position of the general reserve should be concealed as long as possible. the position of the general reserve will depend upon the ascertained intentions of the enemy. at the _second battle of the somme_ (march , ) the intentions of the german commander were ascertained during the first day's fighting. "as by this time (_i.e._ the evening of march ) it had become clear that practically the whole of the enemy's striking force had been committed to this one battle, my plans already referred to for collecting reserves from other parts of the british front were put into immediate execution. by drawing away local reserves and thinning out the front not attacked, it was possible to reinforce the battle by eight divisions before the end of the month" (sir d. haig's dispatches). _he must decide the position_, and to some extent the action, of the cavalry. before defensive action in a war of manoeuvre the cavalry have been out on reconnaissance, and during the early stages they have endeavoured to lure the assailants on to a false position. during the battle they will frustrate the efforts of opposing mounted troops, will protect a vulnerable flank, and will assist generally by dismounted fire action. after the victorious counter-attack they will emerge in pursuit. in case of a reverse they will delay the enemy's victorious advance by fire action and by mounted tactics to protect the withdrawing forces from the depredations of hostile cavalry. a position near a flank will usually be occupied. there have been many examples of protection by cavalry of a force that has been worsted. after the _combat of roliça_ (august , ) general delaborde retreated by alternate masses, protecting his movements by short, vigorous charges of cavalry. at _chancellorsville_ (may , ), and on the first day of _gettysburg_ (july , ), a handful of united states { } cavalry held up the pursuit and staved off disaster. at _königgratz_ (_sadowa_), (july , ), the charges of the austrian cavalry drove back the prussian horse and enabled benedek's defeated troops to get back in safety. at _rezonville_ (august , ) von bredow's cavalry brigade was ordered to charge the french batteries and their infantry escort, in order to give some breathing time for the hard-pressed prussian infantry. the charge was successful and the time was gained, but as at _balaclava_ (october , ) there were few survivors from "von bredow's todtenritt" (death ride). after the battle of _le cateau_ (august , ) and during the _retreat from mons_, the british cavalry, under general allenby, effectively held off the enemy and enabled the british troops to move unmolested. during the great german offensive in the spring of the withdrawal of the troops at _cugny_ (march , ) was made possible by a brilliant mounted charge by a squadron of the th cavalry brigade, which broke through the german line, taking over prisoners, and sabring a large number of the enemy. during the retreat in that area units of the nd and rd cavalry divisions proved so effective in delaying the enemy's advance that other units were horsed during the progress of the battle in order to increase the supply of cavalry. "without the assistance of mounted troops, skilfully handled and gallantly led, the enemy could scarcely have been prevented from breaking through the long and thinly held front of broken and wooded ground before the french reinforcements had had time to arrive. . . . the absence of hostile cavalry at this period was a marked feature of the battle. had the german command had at their disposal even two or three well-trained cavalry divisions, a wedge might have been driven between the french and british armies. their presence could not have failed to have added greatly to the difficulties of our task" (sir d. haig's dispatches). { } _he must select a rallying place_ in rear of the main position from which to recapture the front line, as general lee recovered the "salient" in the wilderness of virginia. _he must arrange for the reorganisation_ of his victorious forces and for the pursuit and complete overthrow of the enemy. { } protection and reconnaissance "surprise consists in the hard fact that the enemy suddenly appears in considerable numbers without his presence having been known to be so near for want of information; and without it being possible to assemble against him for want of protection."--marshal foch. every commander of a force, however large or small, is responsible for the protection of his command against surprise, and a force can only be regarded as secure from surprise when protection is furnished in every direction from which interference is possible. detachments are therefore provided by every commander, their duty being to warn him if hostile forces are discovered in the vicinity of such forces, and to gain time, at all risks and at any sacrifice, for the commander of the troops they protect to carry out his plans unimpeded by the enemy. "a mission of protection does not necessarily imply a defensive attitude, it will often be better performed by an offensive" (marshal foch). there is the closest connection between reconnaissance and protection. it is only by finding out the location, strength and movements of the enemy that a commander can decide how best to protect his troops, and the forces he employs to protect his troops against surprise will very largely prevent the enemy finding out his own strength and dispositions. detailed and timely information about the enemy and the theatre of operations is a necessary factor in war and the value of the information depends on whether it can reach the authorities in time to be of use. facilities for reconnaissance have been enormously increased by the introduction of man-carrying, self-propelled aircraft. before their introduction reconnaissance { } at a distance from the forward troops was limited by the speed and endurance of the cavalryman's horse, and by the skill of the cavalry scout in penetrating the preventive screen of hostile cavalry, and in escaping the net spread out to catch him on the return journey. his radius of operations was comparatively small, that of the aërial observer is practically unlimited, as his machine will carry him over the hostile area, and unless he is driven down by opposing aircraft, or crippled by defensive fire from the ground, he returns in a comparatively short space of time to his base, with his budget of news, and may bring with him a series of photographs. position warfare.--when opposing forces are entrenched at no great distance from one another, photographs taken from the air lead to the discovery of new works from which the intentions of the enemy can be predicted. on the western front in the great war, photographs taken from the air revealed the construction in the german training area of actual sectors of british trenches in facsimile, thus indicating the rehearsal of an attack on a definite part of the line. hostile aircraft are prevented from carrying out similar observational journeys, the resistance of defending squadrons is overcome, and whenever a favourable target is presented, casualties are caused by bullets and bombs. observers report all suspicious movements and changes in trench construction, and from photographs taken at daily intervals maps of hostile trenches are constructed and revised. infantry patrols and raiding parties are sent out by night and by day, and information is gleaned from the uniforms and badges of captured prisoners as to the distribution of hostile troops, while changes in the plan of trenches, in the siting of wire entanglements, or in the emplacements of guns and mortars are duly noted. in addition, troops in observation posts, in or ahead of the front line, in favourable and unsuspected { } localities, are constantly observing the enemy, and sentries over all posts containing troops are ready at all times of the day and night to alarm the local garrisons. resistance is afforded by a series of mutually supporting strong points, sufficiently garrisoned by troops who guard against surprise and hold their ground against attack. entrenchments, with dug-outs and shelters, provide protection from fire, and barbed wire entanglements prevent unbroken rushes by the enemy, and entice him into openings that are swept by rifle and machine-gun fire. box respirators and other appliances nullify the effects of gas, and camouflage disguises the position of trenches, troops, guns, and dumps, and so screens them from observation and direct bombardment, while it provides unsuspected means of observing the enemy's movements. manoeuvre warfare.--in a war of manoeuvre the steps taken to obtain security against surprise vary with the situation of the troops. hostile aircraft flying high from the ground are dealt with by counter-attack by armed aeroplanes, but as aërial fighting requires space for manoeuvre hostile machines flying within , feet of the ground must be dealt with by machine gun, lewis gun, or concentrated rifle fire, except in cases where it is essential to conceal from the enemy that a certain position or locality is occupied, and where the troops are so well hidden as to escape detection unless they open fire. movement is easily detected by low-flying aeroplanes, and in fair weather troops can be recognised as hostile or friendly by an observer at feet, while movements of formed bodies on a road are visible at , feet. troops remaining stationary in shaded places may easily escape observation, and if small bodies in irregular formation lie face downwards they are difficult to detect, even in the open. when a force is in movement, detachments move with it to afford protection in every direction from which interference { } is possible; and when a force is at rest, detachments with similar duties secure it from disturbance and keep off attack until it can be met or developed without disadvantage. these phases are dealt with under the headings of "the advanced guard," "flank attacks and flank guards," "the rear guard," and "outposts." { } the advanced guard "fabius, the saviour of rome, used to say that a commander could not make a more disgraceful excuse than to plead, 'i never expected it.' it is, in truth, a most shameful reason for any soldier to urge. imagine everything, expect everything."--seneca, "_de ira._" every moving body of troops must be protected by detachments, the force detached to precede the advance being known as an advanced guard, and when a body of troops so protected halts, the responsibility for protection during the halts remains with the troops which have been protecting the march until they are relieved, the commander of the advanced guard exercising his discretion as to halting at once or moving forward to occupy a position which may be of more tactical advantage. strength.--the strength of this guard depends on the proximity of the enemy, but it must always be strong enough to brush aside slight opposition, so that the advance of the force it is covering may not be delayed by small hostile forces, and to resist the enemy, when encountered in strength, for such time as will enable the force it is covering to prepare to meet or deliver an attack. no general rule as to the numerical strength of an advanced guard can be given, as the number of troops required depends almost entirely upon the tactical situation and the country through which the protected force is passing. it should, however, whenever possible be composed of a complete unit or formation under its own commander, and it is found in practice that an advanced guard will seldom be less than one-eighth or more than a quarter of the whole { } force. when a large force is advancing in several columns on parallel roads it will be preceded by a "strategical advanced guard," which protects the front and flanks of all the columns. the "tactical advanced guard" provided by each column may then be reduced in strength. distance.--the distance at which it moves ahead of the force it is covering depends upon the nature of the country through which the force is moving, upon the strength of the main body, and upon the tactical situation, but it must always be sufficient to enable the main body to deploy, to get into battle formation--unmolested by the enemy's artillery, if required to do so. it is clear, therefore, that the larger the main body the greater the distance must be, as more time will be required for deployment. the advanced guard of a brigade of infantry, with artillery, would move at a distance of to miles between the main guard and the main body, with the mounted patrols of the vanguard to miles ahead of the main body. these mounted patrols would discover the presence of an enemy, and with the supports of the vanguard would feel for his strength and ascertain his dispositions. the main guard would either assist in brushing him away or would resist, in the best available position, any attempts to attack the main body while the latter formed up for battle. in advances.--infantry forming part of an advanced guard to a force advancing must always act with dash and resolution, but their action must always be regulated by the one motive of complying with the intentions of the commander of the force they are covering. any action contemplated by the advanced guard commander must therefore be considered from the point of view of its effects upon the plans of the commander of the main body, but if these plans are not known, the guiding principle will be _to regulate his action solely in the interests { } of the force he is covering_, and by driving in the advanced troops of the enemy he will obtain information which will assist his superior in coming to a decision, without interfering with his liberty of action, whereas hesitation and delay may give the initiative to the enemy. for this reason, a wide turning movement by the advanced guard troops is seldom possible, as time is thereby lost and the front of the main body is uncovered. "the ruling factor should be the discovery of some tactical locality held by the enemy, the capture of which will compel his whole line to fall back. if this point can be discovered the whole energies of the advanced guard should be directed against it alone, and elsewhere a defensive attitude should be adopted, to avoid surprise of or interference with the main body" (general r. c. b. haking). it must always be assumed that the enemy will have taken all the necessary steps to protect himself and to hamper reconnaissance by an adversary. if, therefore, hostile troops are known to be in a certain locality, opposition must be expected before that locality is reached, and study of the map should enable the advanced guard commander to determine the approximate neighbourhood in which opposition may be expected. in retreats.--while it is clear that a force advancing towards the enemy must always be preceded by an advanced guard it must not be forgotten that a force withdrawing from the enemy must also be so protected, even when it is moving in or towards friendly territory. such a force will not only prevent the main body being surprised by an energetic enemy, pursuing swiftly and getting round to attack where he is least expected, but will also prevent the main body being delayed by obstacles, and can delay the pursuit by preparing bridges, etc., for demolition, which can be completed by the rear guard when the main body has passed over { } them. it can also reconnoitre the route to be followed, so that the main body can proceed without delay. training.--in formulating any scheme for the exercise of troops in advanced guard work all officers and other ranks should be made to understand the nature of the scheme, and should be informed (a) whether the force is advancing or retreating, whether it is moving before or after action with the enemy, and whether it is in a friendly or a hostile country; (b) what is known of the enemy; (c) the direction and objective of the march; (d) the general intentions of the commander of the main body; and (e) the general instructions issued to the commander of the advanced guard. "unless such exercises are carried out in a practical manner, young officers and inexperienced n.c.o.'s will get the impression that an advanced guard consists merely of a procession of small bodies of infantry, strung out at fixed intervals on a single road. it is of the highest importance that the training should be carried out on the lines that would be adopted in action" (g.h.q. circular). tactical principles.--"speed of advance is the first consideration when not in contact with the enemy. hence an advanced guard will move on a narrow front along roads and other channels of communication, with such distances between advanced and supporting bodies as to avoid possibility of surprise. when in contact with, or in the vicinity of, the enemy, security and speed of advance are equal considerations. hence the advanced guard should move by bounds on a broad fighting front across country" ("infantry training, "). before an advanced guard commander moves off in compliance with his instructions he will take certain steps in accordance with these tactical principles. he will divide his troops into two portions, known as the _vanguard_ and the _main guard_, and as the duties of the { } vanguard are reconnaissance in general, as well as the protection in particular of the main guard, it will contain a large proportion of mobile troops, with infantry for assault and resistance, and engineers for clearing the way through or over obstacles. aircraft, in advance of the vanguard, not only increase the area under search and expedite the discovery of the enemy, but prevent surprise and assist the advanced guard as a whole by close co-operation in feeling for and fighting the enemy when encountered. "in order to reconnoitre one must compel the enemy to show himself wherever he may be. to this end he has to be attacked until the extent of his position has been clearly defined. but the attack is made with the intention not to bring on an action. the skirmishing lines will advance, but they must be able to disengage themselves at a given moment. pressure is exercised from a distance without allowing the forces exerting that pressure to become tied up" (marshal foch). the duty of the main guard is resistance, that is to say, fighting. it will therefore consist mainly of infantry, with artillery and machine guns, and the troops will move in the order in which they will come into action. the vanguard will be preceded by scouts, special attention being paid to roads and tracks parallel with the advance. this screen is followed by the remainder of the vanguard, in collected formation, until it is in contact with or in the vicinity of the enemy, with protection at all times against local surprise. the main guard follows, in touch with the vanguard, and with local protection. both portions have definite commanders, and the commander of the whole advanced guard will probably move with the supports of the vanguard. the commander will also determine the _relative distances_ between the vanguard and the main guard, these being regulated by the strength of the advanced guard, and being based upon the necessity of one part supporting the other. the distance of the { } advanced guard ahead of the main body may have been mentioned in the operation orders, but if it is left to the discretion of the advanced guard commander he will be guided solely by the interests of the force he is covering, and his decision will be influenced by the nature of the country (whether it is open, or intersected by woods, hedges, sunken roads, etc., which make observation even by aircraft a matter of great difficulty) and by the tactical situation, such distance being chosen as will suit these conditions, while admitting the fulfilment of the objects in view, viz.:--to obtain information concerning the enemy and to prevent hostile reconnaissance; to prevent surprise and delay; and to enable the main body to deploy into battle formation without interruption by the enemy's fire. it is also the duty of the commander to ensure _communication_ between the various parts of the advanced guard and between that force and the main body, by arranging for mounted orderlies and cyclists, signallers and connecting files, in addition to the contact patrols furnished by the air service, and to such telegraphic and telephonic communication as can be provided in the field by the signals. this is of the first importance, as the action of the commanders of the advanced guard and of the main body will depend on information received, and not only must information be gained by every available means, but it must also be communicated without delay to all concerned while it is fresh and before it becomes stale. it must also be remembered that negative information (_e.g._ that such and such a village has been thoroughly searched and no trace of the enemy found) is at least of equal value to positive information. the repetition or confirmation of information already sent are also of importance, as it is clearly of value to a commander to know positively that the enemy is still absent, or still present, at a certain time in a certain locality. in the american civil war, during an encounter battle between { } advanced troops, the commander of the cavalry of the united states army held up the confederate advanced troops. a sharp fight took place at _sulphur springs_ (october , ) and the united states cavalry commander became so absorbed in the battle that he failed to send information to headquarters, and general meade did not learn that he was in contact with the army of northern virginia until late in the afternoon. in the campaign of _fredericksburg_, general r. e. lee, with the army of northern virginia, was confronted by general burnside, with the army of the potomac. on november , , a patrol of confederate cavalry discovered burnside's troops moving eastwards, and another patrol brought news the same day that gunboats and transports had entered acguia creek on the potomac. these two pieces of information, collected at points miles distant from one another, gave lee an insight into his opponent's design. information gained by aircraft on september and , , and communicated immediately to general joffre, led to the discovery of the flank march across the franco-british front by the german i. army, and to the decisive counter-attack at the _first battle of the marne_ (september , ). the advanced guard commander must be careful how he becomes seriously engaged, and must avoid any enterprise not strictly in accordance with the known intentions of the commander of the main body. the tendency to independent action of this kind, which militates against the success of the best laid plans, was very observable in the early battles of the franco-prussian war of - . actions were hastily entered on by advanced guards, maintained with varying success by the gradual arrival of reinforcements, and finally concluded with barren results and losses in excess of those inflicted. at the _battle of spicheren_ (august , ) the advanced guard of the th prussian division commenced the battle, which had to { } be sustained for three hours by battalions against . during the next three hours more battalions arrived, and at the conclusion of the battle only battalions and batteries in all had come into action against a whole french corps, and there were two french corps within reach of the one engaged. had these "marched to the sound of the cannon," as napoleon would have marched, the th prussian division would have been unable to extricate itself without complete disaster. at the _battle of worth_ (august , ) the prussian crown prince had expressed his intention not to engage the french on that day. yet the advanced guard of the v. corps brought on a battle into which the bavarian corps was perforce drawn. the crown prince sent word for the action to be discontinued, but the advanced troops were so seriously involved in the battle that reinforcements had to be sent into action. although tactically successful the battle was out of accord with the settled plans of the commander-in-chief. in the same way the advanced guard of the vii. prussian corps, contrary to the letter and the spirit of the orders of the commander of the i. army, precipitated an action at _colombey_ (august , ). other troops were drawn into the fight, and finally the whole of the i. army was engaged in a battle which its commander not only disapproved but had expressly forbidden. the battle had no tactical or strategical results, and heavy losses were sustained on both sides. "precipitate action of this kind prevents the troops being engaged in the most advantageous manner. for when a small force is engaged against a larger one it becomes necessary, as reinforcements arrive, to move them up to support some point already hard pressed, and the whole force is thus used up and disseminated, instead of being employed collectively where an effective blow may be struck. thus the direction of the fight is surrendered to the enemy, as at spicheren and colombey. the french positions were so strong that the german { } reinforcements as they arrived were frittered away in support of troops already engaged, and the state of the latter during the action was frequently very critical. at colombey the battle resolved itself into a desperate struggle along the front of the french position, where the prussians made little impression, while their losses considerably exceeded those inflicted on the french" (clery). it is thus seen that the commander of the advanced guard must limit his aggressive action in accordance with his instructions and with the tactical and strategical requirements of the force he is covering. but his action in _protecting_ the main body is unfettered by any considerations of prudence, and must ever be vigorous and resolute, any risks being taken that ensure the safety of the main body. on the morning of the _battle of nachod_ (june , ) the advanced guard of general steinmetz's v. corps (of the army of the crown prince of prussia) was in bivouacs on a plateau, after emerging from a long and narrow defile through which the main body must march to the open country beyond. about a.m. the cavalry of the vanguard was checked by the advanced troops of the vi. austrian corps. it was imperative that the prussian advanced guard should hold the plateau until the main body had extricated itself from the defile. by the rapid and accurate fire of the infantry and horse artillery, and the co-operation of the cavalry against the austrian squadrons, the thin line was maintained for more than three hours. less than battalions of infantry, with squadrons of cavalry and batteries of light artillery, kept in check battalions, squadrons, and batteries. had the advanced guard suffered itself to be driven back on the main body in the defile a disaster could scarcely have been avoided, and owing to the steadfast endurance of the advanced guard the main body was able to drive the austrian corps from the field. advanced guard problems.--the advanced guard commander must be able to appreciate without delay { } the situation which confronts his force, and to solve the problem before him with regard solely to the interests of the force he is covering. (a) if the vanguard is held up by the enemy who is ascertained to be inferior in strength to the advanced guard, the commander will transmit information to the main body and will attack vigorously to disperse the enemy, in order that the movements of the main body may not be delayed. a fire attack would be organised on the front of the enemy, supported by close-range artillery fire, and a turning movement with lewis guns and rifles on one or both flanks. if the enemy held to a covered position they could be ejected by rifle bombers or light mortars from a flank, while artillery and machine guns prevented aimed fire at the attacking force. (b) if fire is opened on the vanguard and definite information as to the strength and dispositions of the enemy cannot be ascertained, such information as had been gained would be transmitted and a bold procedure would be adopted in order that the information might be supplemented as quickly as possible. the commander would reinforce his vanguard with infantry from the main guard, and should be able to force the enemy to disclose his position and strength, but unless ordered to do so would take care not to become so involved in action that the main body would be compelled to come up and extricate them. (c) if the enemy is encountered when the advanced guard commander knows that it is the intention of his superior to deliver an attack the information would be transmitted with an outline of the steps taken in seizing and securing all tactical points that will be of service to the main body. the advanced guard would work on a wider front than would otherwise be used by a force of that strength, and the artillery would be posted with a view to its position being adopted as the main artillery position. { } (d) if, under similar circumstances, the intention not to be drawn into a decisive engagement is known by the advanced guard commander he would limit his activities to reconnaissance of the enemy's position and numbers, and while hampering the enemy and preventing him from finding out particulars concerning the main body, he must take care not to become involved in a general engagement. (e) a case may easily occur in which vigorous action is demanded, whether the commander of the main body intends to attack at once or to defer an engagement. such a situation would arise if the vanguard discovered the approach of the enemy towards a ridge or other position of tactical advantage, and if the advanced guard commander could, by a rapid advance, forestall the enemy in the occupation of such a position, his failure to do so, or hesitation in waiting for explicit orders to do so, would be a grave neglect of duty. (f) in the american civil war a tactical blunder of another kind, due to the impetuosity of the commander of the independent cavalry of the army of northern virginia, prevented the southern commander from obtaining a great strategical advantage over the army of the potomac. the latter force had been withdrawn by general mcclellan, after the seven days' battle around richmond, to a secure position at malvern hill, where the assaults of the army of northern virginia were beaten back with heavy losses. mcclellan continued the withdrawal and had reached harrison's landing on the james river. the independent cavalry of the southern army had previously been dispatched on a false scent, but at a.m. on july touch was regained with the northern forces, which were sighted from _evelington heights_ (july , ), a commanding ridge within two miles of the bivouacs of the army of the potomac, which was resting in apparent security, with inadequate precautions against surprise. general j. e. b. stuart, the confederate cavalry commander, { } reached evelington heights with , sabres and carbines and one light howitzer, and the whole army of the potomac, , all arms, was in bivouacs in full view from the heights, and it was clear that his presence was not suspected. the nearest column of the force he was covering was six miles away, and there remained about ten hours of daylight. it is easy to see, after the event, that this was a case where "silence is golden." stuart should have sent the information to lee and to every column commander, urging them to press on at all speed, while he occupied the heights with his dismounted men with the determination to hold his position with fire action, if discovered, until the arrival of one or more columns of the army of northern virginia. but he failed to appreciate the situation, and forgetting the larger question, he seized the opportunity to spread panic in the ranks of the army of the potomac, and opened fire with his one light howitzer. the northerners recovered from the panic caused by this unexpected attack, when it was realised that only one gun was in action against them, and attacked and captured the heights, and were strongly entrenched there before the nearest confederate column arrived. (g) among the examples of advanced guard work in marshal foch's "principles of war" is a problem for a battalion as the advanced guard of a brigade. "what is the problem the battalion commander has to solve? it consists in preparing for the brigade to go into action against an enemy who may debouch from bettwiller. what does the brigade require for such an action? it requires the _space_ necessary for the full employment of its forces, and the _time_ necessary for their arrival and deployment. in order to achieve that double task the battalion commander orders his troops to occupy _the whole space necessary_, and places them in points where they may hold on for the _necessary time_." { } flank attacks and flank guards "a man thoroughly penetrated with the spirit of napoleon's warfare would hardly fail to make his enemy's communications his first objective."---col. g. f. r. henderson. the flanks are the most vulnerable points of an army, for an attack upon these points subjects the defenders to enfilade fire, and is delivered by troops arrayed in attack formation against an enemy that is not in a position to repel the attack. the consequences of a successful flank attack are so far-reaching that every effort will be made by a commander to bring about such a consummation in order that he may sever his adversary's communications, bring him to the end of his resources, and deprive him of the means of replenishing them. if, therefore, there is any possibility of a column on the march being attacked in flank a force must be detached to protect that flank, and if both flanks are exposed to attack both must be similarly protected. the flank is the most vulnerable part of a moving column, and an attack driven home upon that part has every prospect of success, for it will be delivered by a force that is distributed in depth against a force that is protracted in width after changing front to meet the attack, and the absence of depth in the defending force will deprive the defence of the principal source of strength in resisting attack. an independent column is liable to attack on either of its flanks, unless the nature of the country through which it is passing provides security for one or the other in the form of an impenetrable feature (such as a wide, { } trackless marsh), or an impassable barrier (such as a neutral frontier). the outer columns of a force moving on parallel routes will have an exposed flank, while their inner flank is protected by maintaining touch with the neighbouring column. flank guards may be furnished by the main body, or by the advanced guard, and this point will be made clear in the orders for the operations. their composition, strength, and distribution, and the interval at which they move on the flank of the main body, are similar to those of an advanced guard, while their action under all circumstances is governed by the same tactical considerations, the principle underlying every action of a flank guard commander being compliance with the known intentions of the commander of the main body, and the sacrifice of the interests of the flank guard to preserve the interests of the main body. the same duties of reconnaissance and protection have also to be carried out, and communication with the main body has to be maintained. for the purposes of reconnaissance and communication aircraft are even more effective than in advanced guard work, while observation patrols supplement and confirm the reports of aërial observers. the work of protection varies with the nature of the country through which the guard and the main body are moving at the particular time. in open country the flank guard may be keeping pace with the main body at a regularly maintained interval, and on parallel lines. in close country, and in hilly or mountainous districts, it may be necessary to occupy a successive series of tactical positions on the exposed flank, any of which can be reinforced and held at need to safeguard the passage of the main body. in order that the whole column may be protected, from the head of the main body to the train in rear, unbroken touch must be maintained both with the advanced and the rear guard, and incursions between these forces and itself must be prevented by the flank guard. { } in addition to the protection of a column on the march, flank guard work is of the highest importance on the lines of communications and in the protection of convoys. on the _lines of communications_ raids from the air or land may always be expected in manoeuvre warfare, and one flank is usually more vulnerable than the other. a _convoy_, when parked, is liable to attack from any quarter; and when on the march it may be assailed from any direction, especially when the adversary can detach mounted troops, or infantry rendered mobile by motor transport, or raiding bodies carried in aircraft. frequently, however, one flank only of the lines of communications is vulnerable owing to the geographical or tactical situation, and the work of protecting traffic or convoys on the lines of communications is flank guard work, with due precautions against surprise from all quarters, the main guard remaining with the convoy and securing its safe arrival at its destination, rather than seeking an encounter with the enemy. the most efficient way to protect a convoy is to piquet the road daily with troops sent out from posts on the line; but when it is necessary to send a convoy by a route which cannot be protected in this way a special escort must be provided. the commander of an escort will not engage the enemy if his task can be accomplished without fighting. if fighting is inevitable the enemy should be engaged as far from the convoy as possible, and it will not be halted and parked, except as a last resort. in the case of mechanical transport the whole of the escort will be carried in motor vehicles, and except where parallel roads are in existence, little can be done to secure flank protection while on the move. a portion of such escort will move with the convoy and a portion will be sent ahead to secure any bridges or defiles which have to be passed, the outlet of any defile being secured before the convoy is permitted to enter the defile. in the case of a horsed convoy the escort will usually consist of infantry, with a proportion { } of mobile troops. small advanced and rear guards will be detailed and sufficient men will be posted along the column to ensure order and easy communication. the remainder of the escort will usually move on that flank from which attack is most likely. the far-ranging raid on the lines of communications was a notable feature of the american civil war. it was freely employed on both sides and was often harmful to the object of the attack and usually profitable to the raiders, especially to those of the south, by reason of the replenishment of stores. general turner ashby, the dashing cavalry leader in the shenandoah valley, was a constant source of terror to the northern generals, and his death while protecting the movements to _cross keys_ (june , ) was a terrible blow to stonewall jackson, who employed his mounted troops with more skill than any other commander, confederate or federal. general r. e. lee possessed a great cavalry leader in j. e. b. stuart, "but cool-headed as he was, lee appears to have been fascinated by the idea of throwing a great body of horsemen across his enemy's communications, spreading terror among his supply trains, cutting his telegraphs and destroying his magazines. yet in hardly a single instance did such expeditions inflict more than temporary discomfort on the enemy; and the confederate armies were led more than once into false manoeuvres for want of the information which only the cavalry could supply. lee at _malvern hill_ and _gettysburg_, and, on the side of the north, hooker at _chancellorsville_, and grant at _spottsylvania_, owed defeat in great measure to the absence of their mounted troops on raiding excursions. in the valley, on the contrary, success was made possible because jackson kept his cavalry to its legitimate duty" (henderson "stonewall jackson"). in the russo-japanese war a column of cossacks, under colonel madritov, made a bold raid on the communications of the japanese i. army in the last days of april, . the raid involved a { } ride of miles and was carried out in entire ignorance of the imminent attack upon general zasulich's force by the japanese i. army at the _battle of the yalu_ (may , ). on arrival at his objective colonel madritov found nothing to attack, as the base of the japanese i. army had been shifted from the korean frontier to a shorter sea base at the yalu mouth. on his return he found his general in disordered flight, and had his small force been available at the battle of the yalu it could have protected the retreat to hamatan and feng-hwang-cheng. raids and attacks outside the centre of operations, however daring, have no permanent value. in the south african war a disaster to a convoy at _sannah's post_, or _koorn spruit_ (march , ), was caused by the absence of precautions in front of a retreating force, the wagons being permitted to enter a defile (the spruit crossed the road at right-angles and was held by the boers) before the exit had been secured. earlier in the same campaign a convoy of wagons was lost at _ramdam_ (february , ). an ambushed force of boers killed all the transport animals and the wagons were abandoned. no escort had been provided for the convoy, which entered the ambushed area without previous reconnaissance. throughout the south african war the activities of de wet emphasised the vulnerability of the lines of communications. where the tactical situation permits, arrangements should be made to protect the lines of communications by offensive action. an engagement may be invited in a suitable position, the protecting troops holding the raiders with a delaying action while reinforcements are summoned to converge on the battlefield for the purpose of surrounding and exterminating the raiders. { } the rear guard a rear guard is essential to a force advancing in order to pick up the stragglers, to keep off marauders, and to prevent surprise by an energetic enemy who may detach a force for a surprise attack on the rear of the advancing column. but its most important work is the protection of a retreating force, and this work will vary in difficulty with the freshness and enterprise of the enemy and the spirit and determination of the force that is being pursued. generally speaking, rear guard fighting against an unexhausted enemy is the most difficult and most dangerous of all military enterprises. when a rear guard halts to fight it is being separated every minute from the main body, which is moving away from it, while every minute brings reinforcements to the enemy. the work requires great tactical skill, as it is the duty of the commander to delay pursuit by occupying positions from which he withdraws at the last moment, without becoming involved in a general engagement, from the meshes of which it may be necessary for the main body to return and extricate him. the work also requires great moral courage, as it is the duty of the commander to risk the loss of his force if by so doing he is adopting the only means of saving the main body. strength.--the strength of the rear guard will depend upon the energy, strength, and closeness of the pursuit, the condition of the main body (and whether it is withdrawing voluntarily or upon compulsion after an unsuccessful engagement) and upon the nature of the country, but it will generally amount to not less than { } one-fifth or more than one-third of the whole force, and will be selected, as a rule, from those who have been least severely engaged. composition.--its composition depends upon the work to be performed, and this calls for detachments of all arms of the land service, in addition to _aircraft_, which can prevent surprise by reconnaissance over the hostile area and can harass the pursuing columns by day and by night by fire-action with lewis guns and bombs. _mounted troops_ are required to extend the area watched and to prolong the resistance by reason of their superior mobility, in addition to their counter-action as cavalry. _artillery_ are required to open long-range fire on the enemy's columns and so to cause delay by deployment; and to concentrate upon them while in, or emerging from, a defile. _infantry_ and _machine-gun platoons_ are required for prolonged fire-fights and local counter-attacks, during which sudden bursts of machine and lewis-gun fire will do the greatest execution. _engineers_ provide sappers for the creation of obstacles and traps, and for the demolition of bridges and viaducts. _mechanical transport_ may be required to add to the mobility of the infantry. the _medical service_ is called upon to provide attention and ambulances for the wounded and for the sick and worn-out troops. distribution.--the rear guard is divided into two parts--the rear party and the main guard. the _rear party_ consists, like the vanguard of the advanced guard, of patrols and supports; the rest of the force forms the _main guard_, and marches in the order in which the troops are required, viz.: artillery (with escort), mounted troops (if any remain over from the rear party), infantry, medical services and ambulances, and the sappers of the royal engineers. the guns can thus open fire whenever required, and the sappers, who are furthest away from the pursuit, will have the longer time to prepare obstacles and demolitions, the { } latter being completed by the rear party. communication must always be secured and maintained between the rear party and the main guard, and between the rear guard and the main body. distance.--the distance at which the rear guard works is governed by the duty it has to perform, viz.: to permit the withdrawal of the main body to be carried out without interruption by the enemy, and to effect this it will usually be necessary for the machine gun and infantry platoons of the main guard to keep within effective range of positions from which hostile artillery might molest the main body. the commander will probably remain with this part of his force, as its work is of the highest importance; in any case his position must be made known and there should be definite commanders of the rear party and the main guard. but while the distance separating the rear guard from the main body must be sufficient, it must not be too great, or the enemy may penetrate between it and the main body, and not only will the rear guard be cut off and liable to destruction but it will cease to protect the main body. tactical principles.--the tactical work of a rear guard is carried out according to the following principles:-- _the rear party watches_, and it must watch _all_ the roads and tracks by which the pursuing force can advance, and is responsible that the enemy does not get round the flanks (which may or may not be specially protected by flank guards). reconnaissance by aircraft for the discovery of intended outflanking movements is probably of greater value in rear guard work than in any other military action. the rear party also resists the hostile advanced troops as long as possible, withdrawing before it is outflanked. "an outflanking manoeuvre is specially convenient when attacking a rear guard, for the latter cannot fulfil its mission once it has been turned" (marshal foch). { } _the main guard fights for time_. if the withdrawal is more or less unmolested, or if such pursuit as is offered can be dealt with by the rear party, the main guard can continue its march, taking care not to close in on the main body; and while falling back it can demolish bridges, create obstacles, prepare ambushes, and so on, employing all devices (within the laws of war) for delaying the enemy. when hotly pursued it must gain time at all costs for the army it is covering, and must not allow itself to be driven back on to the main body; or it will hamper that force and cease to protect it. time can be gained by compelling the enemy to halt to reconnoitre a position, by making him deploy into attack formation, and by making him go out of his way in order to envelop a flank. but before an attack reaches a position in such strength as to ensure success, and before the enveloping force can achieve its object, sub-divisions of the main guard will withdraw in succession under covering fire from those still in the line, which also withdraw in their turn under covering fire from the sub-divisions in their new positions, to tactical points further back, from which again they cover the withdrawal of the forces which had protected their own movement. certain points must be noted about the positions chosen for these successive fire-fights, and the choice of the positions is so difficult that an experienced staff officer should be specially detailed for the work, positions chosen must be in the enemy's way and the lines of withdrawal to them must not converge; they must be easy to defend and difficult to attack; the flanks must be secure from direct attack and effective enfilade fire, necessitating a wide detour (and consequent gain of time from the enemy) before they can be threatened; long-range artillery fire on the lines of approach should be possible in order to delay and break up the enemy's advance; and each position chosen for the next line of resistance should be unseen by the { } pursuing enemy, and sufficiently far away from the line last occupied to induce him to resume his march formation. this will necessitate a repetition on the part of the enemy of all the stages of the attack--the discovery and the report on the position, the decision to attack, and the deployment into attack formation. it will often be of advantage for a rear guard to take up a delaying position one or two hours before dark, as the enemy will then have to attack with darkness approaching and may wish to defer the attack until daylight, thus gaining several hours for the protected force. "the first position taken up by a rear guard after an unsuccessful fight must be held longer, as a rule, than the subsequent positions, because when once the defeated army has got well away along the roads and has regained some semblance of organisation, the march continues without interruption unless some obstacle has to be crossed" (general haking, "staff rides"). it can also be noted that as it is seldom the intention of the rear guard commander to deliver a decisive counter-attack, he can detail a very large proportion of his force to hold the successive positions, with local reserves, for purely local counter-attacks; and for the same reason, an obstacle in front of his position (which would make that position unsuitable for the active defence, as it would prevent the advance of the general reserve to the decisive counter-attack) is most welcome in the delaying action of a rear guard fighting for time for its main body. when at length a line of resistance is evacuated, the heavy artillery will be withdrawn first to move to a distant fire position, then the slow moving infantry and the light artillery (under the protective fire of the aircraft and mobile troops), and last the cavalry and other mobile troops, who by reason of their superior mobility, can hang on to the last and can protect the flanks of the rear guard as they fall back, before { } resuming their work as a rear party, observing and resisting the advanced troops of the pursuing force. during a close pursuit the rear guard commander will be called upon to exercise all his faculties and to exert all his tactical ability in handling his command. one of the most anxious times before him will be when the main body is passing through a defile, as such a passage will not only delay its march but will make its columns particularly vulnerable and helpless. in the case of defiles napoleon's maxim must be borne in mind: "it is contrary to the principles of war to let one's parks and heavy artillery enter a defile if the other end is not held also." at _sannah's post_ (march , ) the train was permitted to enter a defile caused by the banks of the koorn river without the previous occupation of that defile, and all the wagons were captured. this not only emphasises the necessity for an advanced guard in retreat, but points to the need of tactical knowledge on the part of the rear guard commander, especially in mountainous country or in terrain cut up by woods and marshes, where the train is liable to cause delays, as the withdrawing force is compelled to march in a long drawn column. extra time must be gained by the main guard to enable the main body to emerge from the defile. the rear guard commander must therefore adapt his plans to suit the country through which the main body has to pass, as well as the country in which he will himself fight delaying actions. a good map and ability to use it, and close co-operation with the main body, must be determining factors for success or failure. training.--when troops are being exercised in rear guard work opportunities should be taken to explain the difficulties of choosing suitable positions, of withdrawing from them when involved in battle, of the paramount necessity for mutual support, and of accepting { } any risk that may be required to safeguard the main body. stress should be laid upon the importance of fire tactics (the judicious combination of fire and movement), the greatest of all factors in a successful rear guard battle, and upon the ability to read and understand a map, an essential qualification in all movements of troops and indispensable in rear guard fighting. from the map a platoon commander must be able to predict the probable line of the enemy's advance against the line of resistance as well as the best route to be taken when, at length, he withdraws his platoon to another fire position in rear; while he must be prepared to throw his platoon in local counter-attack on the flank or rear of an assaulting party that has become detached from its supports and therefore affords a fleeting opportunity for a local fighting success, and a rapid advance for this purpose along a route unseen to the foe, a speedy reorganisation after victory, and a rapid withdrawal to the point of issue, or to a line in rear, can best be achieved by use of the map and reconnaissance of the ground of the encounter. eye for ground.--one of the secrets of napoleon's extraordinary successes was his "eye for ground." "it was not until i went to jena and austerlitz that i really grasped what an important part an eye for ground like napoleon's, or blindness as to ground like his opponent's at both those battles, may play in grand tactics, that is, the art of generalship" (colonel g. f. r. henderson, "the science of war"). the same was true of general r. e. lee, particularly in the wilderness campaign, when it was not only the entrenchments but the natural features of the ground on which he relied in his defensive tactics. "his eye for ground must have been extraordinary. the campaign was fought over a very large area, an area of very close country, with few marked natural features; and yet in the midst of woods, jungles, and streams, with very little time at his disposal, he always seems to have selected positions than which none could have been stronger" (colonel g. f. r. henderson, "the science of war"). examples of rear guard work.--during the retreat from mons the rear guard of the ii. corps of the british expeditionary force delayed the pursuit by the daring and devotion of its cavalry and artillery, and by subordinating its plans to the interests of the main body enabled the corps commander (general sir h. smith-dorrien) not only to throw off the pursuit but to effect a junction with the other wing of the british army. the retreat took place after the first _battle of le cateau_ (august , ), and during the period of the retreat the insecurity of the british army through the breakdown of a co-operating force rendered it liable to disaster. but the moral of marshal french and his commanders, the stubborn fighting instincts of the british race, and the excellence of the musketry training of the regular army in times of peace, prevented the retreat from becoming a rout. the care taken in training the troops in fire tactics, and particularly in reloading with "eyes on the mark and butts to the shoulder," was most abundantly justified. the accuracy and volume of the rifle fire deceived the enemy as to the nature of the troops employed against them, and the dismounted troops and infantry with their rifles were reported as "battalions of machine gunners." during the _second battle of the somme_ (march, ), the british iii, and v. armies fought a series of rear guard battles, and the enemy's advance was made at a very heavy cost. "units retreated stubbornly from one position to another as they found them turned and threatened with isolation; but at many points fierce engagements were fought, and whenever the enemy attempted a frontal attack he was beaten off with loss" (sir d. haig's dispatches). the machine gun proved its effectiveness again and again during the british { } withdrawal, and twelve machine guns of the rd division, posted in _les boeufs_ (march , ), held up the enemy's advance from morval at a critical period, and enabled the division to reach the position assigned to it. the losses inflicted on the enemy by machine-gun and rifle and lewis-gun bullets were so heavy that by march von below's xvii. army was described in german dispatches as "quite exhausted." during the same battle a detachment of about officers and other ranks, under the command of the brigade-major of the st brigade, held the enemy at bay from early morning until p.m. at _le quesnoy_ (march , ) and enabled the th division to retire to its destined position. at the _combat of roliça_ (august , ) the french general delaborde was outnumbered by the anglo-portuguese forces under sir a. wellesley, and being driven from his first and second positions he withdrew to the mountains. during his retreat "he brought every arm into action at the proper time . . . and retreated by alternative masses, protecting his movements by short, vigorous charges of cavalry . . . and he fell back, disputing the ground, to quinta de bugagliera" (napier). in december, , and january, , general sir john moore withdrew to coruña before the armies of napoleon (and when the emperor returned to madrid, before those of marshal soult). "he conducted his long and arduous retreat with sagacity, intelligence, and fortitude" (napier), and it is interesting to note that as in the retreat from mons in and at the second battle of the somme in , so in the rear-guard actions which preceded the embarkation of sir john moore's army, the musketry of the british troops was the deciding factor: "the english muskets were all new, the ammunition fresh; and whether from the peculiar construction of the muskets, the physical strength and coolness of the men, or all combined, { } the english fire is the most destructive known" (napier). at _bristow station_ (october , ) during general meade's campaign in northern virginia (after his defeat of general lee at gettysburg, july - , ), a surprise attack by stuart's cavalry and infantry from general rode's division caused the withdrawal of the federal troops. general warren covered the retirement and eventually withdrew his own forces unmolested after beating off several attacks with close-range musket fire. jean victor moreau, one of the greatest generals of the french republic, became a general of division at the age of , and by his skill in extricating his forces from apparently certain disaster established in retreat a far greater reputation for generalship than his brilliant victories secured for him. in the spring of he defeated latour at _rastatt_ and the archduke charles at _ettlingen_, and drove the austrians back to the danube, but owing to the defeat and retreat of jourdan he was compelled to regain the rhine in a desperate and apparently hopeless effort. yet he not only preserved his army intact but brought with him over , prisoners. in he again saved his army from destruction when hard pressed by the russians and austrians in italy. retreat was by no means his only or favourite manoeuvre, as he subsequently gained victory after victory over the austrians in the campaign of , drove them back behind the river inn, and won the decisive victory of _hohenlinden_ (december , ), where the austrians and their bavarian allies lost , men and guns against a total loss of , on the side of the french. { } outposts opposing forces come into conflict through the encounter of the advanced guards of moving columns; through the approach of a pursuing force to the rear guard of a retreating enemy; through the attack of a moving force on an enemy in position; and through the renewal of an engagement which has died down between opposing forces. every commander will endeavour to prevent interference with his plans and future movements, and while striving to surprise and outwit the enemy he will exert every endeavour to prevent the application of this vital principle by the enemy. the commander of a force that is at rest will require security for that force in order that its rest may be undisturbed, and he will require the security to be assured in order that his plans for the overthrow of the enemy may be developed. he will, therefore, detach a portion of his force to ensure this security by observation, to prevent the secret occupation of localities the hostile possession of which will interfere with his plans; and by resistance to hostile movements he will secure the rest of the main body. the force detailed to protect troops at rest is known as outposts, and their duty is to preserve the security of the main body. outposts protect the main body from surprise by observation, and if attacked they gain time by resistance until the commander of the main body can put his plans into execution by the occupation of the position in which he intends to receive attack. observation is carried out by aircraft, by patrols (mobile troops by day and infantry by night), and by sentries; resistance is provided by sentry groups and by troops { } in defensive positions, called the piquets, which have other troops as supports. in certain cases a local reserve and a general reserve are also provided. strength.--work in the outpost line is most exhausting. not a man or a horse should be employed there if their services can be dispensed with, and although the number of troops allotted for the work depends almost entirely upon the nature of the country and the tactical situation, it is laid down in the text-books that if an unnecessarily large proportion of the whole force is so employed the force will suffer in efficiency. it can also be seen that although the work is of the first importance and fraught with the greatest difficulties, it is clearly possible for a comparatively small body of troops to carry it out. observation requires intelligence and vigilance rather than numbers; resistance can be provided by the delaying action on a wide front of small numbers of skilled troops with the relative advantage conferred upon them in defence by machine guns and small arms, and with the assurance of support from their main body close at hand. observation.--a force can only be regarded as secure from surprise when every body of the enemy within striking distance is so closely watched that it can make no movement by night or day without its becoming known immediately to the observers of the outposts. by day the outpost commander will carry out reconnaissance some distance ahead of his position by means of aircraft and patrols of mounted troops and cyclists, while the commander of each outpost company keeps the approaches to the position under observation by sentries, so posted as to see and hear unobserved by a hostile force. by night, the aircraft and mounted troops are unable to render much assistance as moving patrols, and the work of reconnaissance and observation falls upon the platoons of the outpost companies. { } resistance.--for the purposes of resistance the outpost commander will rely upon his infantry and upon such artillery and machine guns as may be allotted to him, and if the area he is occupying is that in which the commander of the main body will meet attack the outposts will be provided with a greater proportion of artillery and machine guns. resistance is offered by the entrenchment of each sentry group in an all-round post, and depth and elasticity are given to the defence by the establishment of entrenched piquets in selected, mutually supporting positions commanding with their fire every avenue of approach, covering the flanks of neighbouring piquets, and so arranged in plan as to bring converging fire upon the enemy as he advances to the attack. these piquet positions will be strengthened, when required, by the supports, who will either assist in manning the defences of the piquets or will occupy similarly prepared defensive posts on the flank. local reserves may sometimes be required for local counter-attacks, and in certain cases a general reserve is provided. the degree of resistance to be offered by the sentry groups depends on the tactical situation and will be specified by the outpost commander. in certain cases the sentry groups are permitted in face of a heavy attack to fall back to the piquets, but if they do so they must be warned of the danger of arriving headlong on the piquet only just ahead of the enemy. in consequence of this danger such retirements are rarely permissible at night. the piquets are generally posted on the outpost line of resistance, in which case they hold their positions to the last man and the last round, until further orders are received from the commander of the force protected. distance.--the distance of the outpost position from the troops protected is regulated by the time the latter will require to prepare for action and by the importance of preventing the enemy's field artillery from { } approaching within effective range of the ground on which these troops will deploy if attacked. heavy guns and mortars, although motor traction gives them great mobility, are unlikely to accompany the enemy's advanced guard, and preparation to withstand or prevent their fire will not usually be required from outpost troops. the effective range of shrapnel is , yards, the limit of the effective range of machine guns is , yards, and of lewis guns and rifles the effective limit is , yards. the position on which the main body will deploy will thus be protected from the shrapnel of field artillery, if the possible fire-positions of that arm are brought under effective fire from machine guns , yards from the position of deployment, with lewis guns and rifles about yards further forward. on the other hand, especially in the case of small forces (against which artillery will not be likely to be sent), the distance must not be such as would permit of the outposts being cut off, or as would necessitate the employment of an undue proportion of men on outpost duty. the outpost commander.--before halting, a commander should first decide on his dispositions in case of attack, and then arrange the quartering of his command and the general position of the outposts. in the case of a small independent force the commander of the force will usually himself detail the whole of the outpost troops, and will either retain the command in his own hand or appoint an officer to command them, in such a case the disposition of the troops will probably be that of a perimeter camp, preparation being made against attack from all directions. in the case of large bodies outpost troops will usually consist of all arms, and a definite commander will always be appointed. this commander will, when necessary, divide the outpost line into sectors, delegating responsibility for the holding of each sector to the commander of a subordinate unit or formation, and defining the limits { } of sectors by distinctive features such as trees, cottages, or streams. the tops of hills or the bottoms of valleys are not suitable as tactical boundaries, and roads should be inclusive to one or other sector, for a road used as a boundary may be neglected by one of the commands it divides under the impression that it is the duty of the other command to patrol it. information and orders.--the outpost commander must have definite information on the following points:-- i. what is known of the enemy and information concerning friendly bodies of troops working against the enemy. ii. the intentions of the commander of the force he is protecting, where the main body will rest and the period it will stay there, and whether it is intended to engage the enemy if he advances, and if so on what position. iii. the general line of the outposts, the troops at disposal for the work, and whether there are other troops on the left and right. iv. the hour at which the outposts are to be relieved and the place to which reports are to be sent. after receiving the above information he will give such orders as are immediately necessary for protection against surprise. he will then allot the task of observation to his mobile troops and will decide on a line of resistance for the outpost troops. he will co-ordinate his arrangements with those of neighbouring outpost commanders and will ensure that no ground on his flanks remains unwatched. the outpost commander will then issue orders to his subordinate commanders on the following points:-- ( ) information concerning the enemy and his own troops so far as they affect the outposts. ( ) the general line to be occupied and his frontage and limits of each subordinate commander. ( ) the distribution of the mobile troops, artillery, and machine guns. { } ( ) instructions as to the degree of resistance to be offered and the general line of the outpost line of resistance. ( ) special arrangements by night. ( ) regulations as to smoking, fires, and cooking. ( ) the hour at which the outposts will be relieved. ( ) the place to which reports are to be sent. ( ) instructions as to the accommodation of the reserves (if any are provided) and whether the supports (and reserves, if any) may take off accoutrements, etc. when he receives information that the outposts are in position, he will transmit the information to the commander who appointed him. the outpost line of resistance.--retirements under fire to a supporting line are dangerous, especially at night. as a general rule, therefore, the piquets should be posted on the outpost line of resistance. co-operation, intercommunication, and the exercise of command will be facilitated by placing the piquets along well-defined natural features, or in the vicinity of roads. but the tactical situation may demand that the line adopted should afford facilities for a most stubborn resistance as well as facilities for observation, and the former necessity will far outweigh the latter. if the force is likely to remain halted for several days, especially if the operations are likely to lapse into position warfare, commanding ground is of great value to the artillery, and the outpost line of resistance will probably develop into the outpost zone of a defensive position. on the other hand, if halted for only one night, artillery will not be largely employed, and commanding ground is not essential. the outpost company.--the outpost company is the outpost infantry unit, the company commander providing piquets, supports, and detached posts as required. upon receiving his orders the commander will move his command, with due precautions against { } surprise, to the allotted ground where the men will be halted under cover. before proceeding to the part of the line assigned to him the commander of the outpost company will detail a force to precede his advance and cover his operations, and the force so pushed forward will not be withdrawn until his piquets have entrenched themselves. by the map he can decide the number of piquets he will require, in accordance with the number of roads to be watched, the facilities for resistance, and the requirements for patrolling. the extent of frontage allotted to an outpost company depends upon the number of avenues of approach (roads and tracks, and open, unfenced country) to be watched, and under ordinary circumstances a frontage up to , or , yards may be allotted to a company with platoons at fighting strength. each piquet should consist of a complete unit and should be posted on a good defensive position. the support (or supports, if more than one is detailed for the company frontage) should also be composed of a complete unit, and should generally be posted to yards in rear of the piquets, with good lines of approach to each. _detached posts_ may be required, to watch an extreme flank, or to occupy a position in front of the sentry line, where the enemy might otherwise collect unseen for the attack or initiate steps for hostile reconnaissance. a further use is to deal with traffic through the line, where a main road has no piquet upon it. the outpost company commander must inform his piquet commander, and his immediate superior, of his position, as all reports received by the piquets require to be sent to him, and his superior commander will need to keep in communication with him at all times. the first duty of a piquet commander (who is almost invariably a platoon commander) is to consolidate his position by entrenchment and by all available means, and to prepare a range card, so that the enemy may not approach without heavy loss; and if the piquet has a support ordered to reinforce it in case { } of attack, the entrenchments must be constructed to accommodate the supporting troops (including the sentry groups thrown out, if these have been ordered to withdraw to the piquet in case of a heavy attack). the commander must impress on all men of his piquet the importance of gaining a clear mental picture of their surroundings while daylight lasts, so that they may the more easily find their way about by night. on his way to the position the piquet commander will decide from the map what roads he has to watch and where sentries will need to be posted, and he will provide from his platoon, patrols and sentries (with the necessary reliefs for the patrols), will detail the various duties, and will make the necessary sanitary arrangements. his sentries should be posted as expeditiously as possible, and his patrols sent out at once. the number of patrols to be furnished depends upon the nature of the country, and as each patrol requires two reliefs, their number should not be greater than circumstances demand. the duties of infantry patrols are to search the ground and buildings, etc., for about , yards in front of the sentry line, to find out whether the enemy is there or not, and if the enemy is found to be close at hand to watch his movements and report frequently. the number of sentry groups depends upon the nature of the country and the height of the line of observation, but between them the groups must be answerable for the whole of the ground in front of their piquet (up to its junction on the left and right with neighbouring piquets). a sentry group consists of men under a n.c.o. ( on duty and off), and groups are usually posted not more than yards from their piquet, and hold their ground unless ordered to withdraw. if invisible from their piquet a connecting sentry should be posted by the piquet commander. sentry groups required for night dispositions only will not be posted until after dark. in order to prevent the men of the piquet being unnecessarily disturbed at night the n.c.o. and { } men of each relief must be made to bivouac together, apart from other reliefs and from the remainder of the piquet. a sentry will always be posted over the piquet, to watch the sentry groups and connecting sentries, and ready to alarm the piquet at any moment of need. patrols consist as a rule of a complete unit of to men under a n.c.o., and should be formed of men trained as scouts, although it will sometimes be possible to use only single scouts for this purpose, owing to the vigilance of the enemy. standing patrols may also have to be furnished, if required to watch some special point, particularly at night, or at the junction of roads converging towards the piquet line, at cross roads, etc., when they are out of sight of the sentries. the piquet will stand to arms, every man in his allotted place, an hour before dawn, and will remain alert until the patrols (which are invariably sent out about that time) have reported absence of movement by the enemy. outposts are generally relieved at dawn, so that the force is doubled at the hour of danger. all troops in the outpost line must entrench themselves, if posted as sentries, or in the piquet or support positions, and must be ready at any moment to resist a sudden attack. a detachment of royal engineers will usually be available to superintend the consolidation of the main position. day and night work.--by day, the work of an outpost line will consist in reconnaissance of the approaches for some miles by the aircraft and mounted troops and cyclists, while infantry, with artillery and machine guns, hold the line of resistance. by night, the mounted troops will be withdrawn, except such "cossack posts" (standing patrols of mounted troops) and "vedettes" (mounted sentries), as it may be deemed necessary to leave established in front of the line, while aircraft will have much difficulty in discerning movement. the whole work of observation and resistance therefore falls on the infantry, who may be in their day { } position or may be withdrawn to the reverse slope of a ridge, in order to obtain a sky line by night upon which to train their rifles. neglect of the principles of war is almost inevitably followed by disaster, and protection is the first of the tactical principles. during the later stages of the franco-prussian war a french force of the strength of a brigade was billeted in the _chateau of chambord_ (december , ), which stands in a large park, near blois. no outpost precautions were taken, and the chateau was captured by two companies of prussian infantry. the minor disasters suffered by british arms in the south african war were almost entirely due to neglect of the warnings contained in the official text-books. in spite of the established superiority of the boers in mobility and vigilance the most elementary precautions against surprise were frequently neglected. at _tweefontein_ (december , ) a force of yeomanry was surprised in an unprotected camp by a mobile force of boers, and heavy losses were suffered. the mystic atmosphere of christmas eve was insufficient protection against the militancy of christian de wet. battle outposts.--when a battle dies down at night, or when the forces are in close proximity and a battle is imminent, the whole of the troops must be kept in readiness for instant action. protection by outposts in the normal formation is generally impossible and can only be provided by patrols, who keep touch with the enemy without causing unnecessary alarms or looking for purposeless encounters, and by sentries over the forward troops, which take the place of the piquets. the troops must be ready at any moment to repel attacks with bullets and bayonets. unless otherwise ordered, the patrols should refrain altogether from aggressive action and should confine their operations to secret observation of the enemy. it is, however, essential that touch with the enemy { } should be maintained as advances, withdrawals, and other surprise movements, are usually prepared and often carried out under cover of darkness when hostile troops are within striking distance. in the american civil war, by losing touch with the northern army, the southern army permitted it to escape although it had been very severely mauled. during the third battle of ypres (july -november , ) the allies renewed the attack on a six-mile front from zonnebeke to langemarck (the junction of the franco-british armies in flanders). this action, known as the _battle of broenbeck_, or _brombeek_ (october , ), was marked by the successful repulse of counter-attacks by the st battalion royal newfoundland regiment through the correct employment of battle outposts. germans massing for the counter-attack in taube farm were pinned by lewis-gun and rifle fire, while a message sent to the supporting artillery caused the annihilation of the enemy; another attacking force was destroyed by lewis-gun and rifle fire, before it was launched. a defensive flank was also formed under heavy fire, and from this flank a further counter-attack was similarly dealt with. the casualties of the newfoundlanders throughout this battle were killed, missing, and wounded out of a total strength of all ranks, and the losses inflicted by them probably exceeded . after the _battle of fredericksburg_ (december , ) the army of the potomac under gen. burnside eluded the vigilance of gen. r. e. lee, who had defeated it on december , . burnside withdrew (december , ) across the potomac to stafford heights with the whole of his army, under cover of a heavy storm. if special orders had been given by the outpost commanders for constant and vigorous patrolling, and if scouts had been instructed to penetrate the federal lines from time to time at all risks, burnside could have been attacked at a disadvantage while on the move and should have been driven into the potomac. { } during the battle itself a confederate brigade was surprised in its own front line through failure to patrol a triangular wood which jutted out in front of the position and screened the brigade on the left with which touch was not maintained. at all times of action with enemy forces all ground to the front or flank must be kept under close observation, or surprise may lead to disaster. { } tactical reconnaissance reconnaissance during battle has been dealt with under "influences on the battle" and in other lectures, and owing to the close connection between the two subjects a number of points concerning reconnaissance in general have been noted in dealing with protection. it has also been seen that observation by aircraft, patrols, and sentries is essential to protection both in position warfare and the war of manoeuvre, and that reconnaissance is the essence of protection. there remain, however, two forms of reconnaissance that have not yet been considered, namely: the reconnaissance of a position with a view to attacking it, and the reconnaissance of an unoccupied position with a view to occupying it for defence. reconnaissance for attack.--the first of these is the constant duty of all commanders in the line during position warfare, and it is carried out by patrols and raiding parties, who provide information which supplements the photographs and reports of the air service, and enables a commander to arrive at a decision. in a war of manoeuvre reconnaissance by the air service is equally important, and it is supplemented by the work of the patrols of the advanced guard, but principally by that of specially selected intelligence officers, working in conjunction with, or independent of, the vanguard. such officers would be in possession of information which it might not be possible to reveal to the commander of the patrols of the vanguard, and their special training would give an added value to their report. the chief { } points to be ascertained concerning a hostile position are:-- i. the extent of the position occupied. ii. weak points of the position. iii. points, the capture of which would facilitate enfilade or reverse fire, and would thus render the rest of the position untenable. iv. best line of attack. v. supporting positions, for covering, converging, enfilade, and traversing fire. it should be possible to gather this information without alarming the enemy, or giving notice of impending attack. information on further points can be gained by fighting, and _reconnaissance by raids_ is a common feature of position warfare. by such means additional information can be gained, as to:-- vi. names of regiments holding the position, judged from identity discs, badges, buttons, etc. vii. whether preparations are being made for an attack (discoverable by ear as well as eye), or bombardment, etc. (from examination of shell dumps, etc.). viii. position of machine guns (pill-boxes or other), mortars, etc. ix. condition of intervening ground and of the wire entanglements. x. effects of recent bombardments. xi. moral of the enemy. reconnaissance for occupation.--in the reconnaissance of a position with a view to occupying it for the purposes of receiving attack, the points to be noted are:-- i. the best line for the establishment of a series of mutually supporting tactical points to be held by the infantry. { } ii. the best means of protecting the flanks. iii. the best position for the artillery and machine guns. iv. the tactical key to the position. v. the line from which attack may be expected. vi. the best line for the counter-attack. vii. the positions for the supports and reserves. and, additionally, in the case of a war of manoeuvre:-- viii. the best position for the cavalry. ix. alternative positions in rear from which, after reorganisation, to recapture the front line, with the best line of withdrawal to them. additional information would be required in position warfare as to the best lines for avenues communicating from the old to the new position, and as to the time required to consolidate the new position against attack (including the conversion of the parados into parapet, etc.). { } night operations there are several reasons why darkness is preferable to daylight in certain military operations. secrecy is usually the aim of all movement, and the increased power of observation due to the advent of the air service has caused an increase in the necessity for certain movements being made during the hours of darkness. in all night operations (except marches undertaken by night to avoid the heat of the day) surprise is the main object; secrecy of preparation is therefore essential, and steps must be taken to prevent discovery of the intended movement, and to prevent the information leaking out through the indiscretion of subordinates. orders will be communicated beforehand only to those officers from whom action is required, and until the troops reach the position of assembly no more should be made known to them than is absolutely necessary. it may even be advisable, in order to deceive spies, that misleading orders should originally be given out. secrecy of intention as well as of preparation is essential. frederick the great is reported to have said, "if i thought my coat knew my plans i would burn it!" night marches.--night marches are the movement of columns in march formation, and their object may be merely to avoid the heat of the day; but they are also one of the chief means by which a commander can outwit, deceive, and surprise the enemy--the principal aim of the strategist--by outflanking his position, by anticipating him in the occupation of a locality, or by eluding him by the secret withdrawal of a force which appeared to be in a situation favourable to his plans. { } forces may also be secretly concentrated to decide the issue of a battle that is imminent, or of a battle that has begun in daylight. long marches of this nature rarely culminate in an attack, and when shorter movements are made with such an object in view, the "march" may be said to terminate when the position of assembly is reached, and from that point to become an "advance" or an "assault." there are certain essentials to success:-- i. _direction_ towards the objective must always be maintained. the route must therefore be reconnoitred beforehand, and marked by the advanced guard during the march, and if there are any intricacies in the route, such as deviations from a well-defined road, local guides should be secured. across open country a general direction can be maintained by means of the stars, and when these are not visible, by the compass. (see chapter viii., "manual of map reading.") ii. _protection_ against surprise attacks must be provided by advanced, flank, and rear guards, but (except in the obvious case of columns of mounted troops only) mounted troops will not be employed in this service. the advanced guard will be small, and will usually consist of patrols within yards of the column, followed by connecting files, with the rest of the advanced guard in collective formation. the rear guard will also be smaller and nearer than during a daylight march. flanks will usually be protected by small bodies holding tactical positions, posted by the advanced guard, and withdrawn by the rear guard. iii. _secrecy_ must be maintained, and orders issued as late as possible, and the preparations carried on without ostentation. the march { } itself must be conducted in absolute silence and without lights of any kind. care must be taken to prevent or muffle sounds, and horses likely to neigh must be left with the train. in the case of a march to elude the enemy, outposts will remain in position until daylight and will be secretly withdrawn, to rejoin the column at the first opportunity, and bivouac fires, etc., will be kept burning. iv. _connection_.--every commander must have and must maintain a fixed place in the column, and an orderly officer must be detached from each unit to headquarters, so that instructions may be conveyed to such commanders at all times. units must be closed up, and the usual distances lessened or dispensed with, and connection must be maintained between units and their sub-divisions. the pace should be uniform, but not more than miles an hour can be expected on a dark night, including halts. the time and periods of halts should be arranged before starting, and units must regain any distance lost before halting. after crossing or clearing an obstacle the column should advance its own length and then be halted until reported to be closed up again, and staff officers should be detailed to superintend these matters. in addition to these general principles there are certain axioms, which must become "rules of thumb" with all concerned:-- an officer must march in rear of each unit. all ranks must be informed what to do in case of alarm or attack. fire will not be opened without orders. magazines will be charged, but no cartridge placed in the chamber. there must be absolute silence, no smoking, no lights. { } when halted, men may lie down in their places, but must not quit the ranks. night advances.--night advances are the movement of deployed troops to gain ground towards the hostile position with a view to delivering an assault at dawn. they may take place as a preliminary to an engagement, or to continue one already begun with increased prospects of success. in the first case they are usually the sequel to a night march, and in either case they are generally followed by an attack at dawn. surprise is the main object, even when they are undertaken for the purpose of gaining ground difficult to cross in daylight, from which to renew an engagement, as frequently happens during a campaign in a war of manoeuvre, while such advances are common features of position warfare. in any case the ground won must be consolidated immediately, as a counter-attack at or before dawn may always be expected, and if the ground offers difficulties for entrenching, the necessary materials must be carried by the troops. successive advances of this nature may enable the troops to reach a jumping-off place for the final assault, and such advances may be made on successive nights, the ground won being defended meanwhile against counter-attacks. unless troops are already deployed for the advance, a position of assembly will need to be selected, with a further position of deployment; but these positions sometimes coincide. the deployment will be, as a rule, into shallow columns on a narrow frontage at deploying intervals, in order that the final deployment of the leading columns into the forward troops of the attack may take place without delay when the moment for the assault arrives. on reaching the objective of the advance these columns would deploy into line, and each unit would entrench itself on the new position. as it is essential for success that _direction_ should be maintained and _connection_ preserved, the ground over which the advance is to be made must be { } examined beforehand and landmarks noted, and touch must be kept by means of ropes or any available device. care must also be taken in consolidating the position that the entrenchments have a general alignment towards the enemy and that they are so sited as to protect from enfilade fire. night assaults.--night assaults are delivered by troops already deployed into attack formation. it is an established tactical principle that "when the conditions of the fire-fight are likely to be favourable, it is probably better to accept the inevitable casualties that must result from a struggle for fire supremacy, rather than adopt the undoubted hazards of a night assault." these conditions are frequently so unfavourable in position warfare, owing to the strength of consolidated positions and to the increasing accuracy and density of artillery fire, that assaults are made of necessity in the hours of darkness, in preference to those of daylight. during the _battle of the somme_ (july - , ) a night advance was made by seven divisions on a front of about miles. the troops moved out in the early hours of july , for a distance of about , yards, and lined up in the darkness below a crest some to yards from the enemy's trenches. their advance was covered by strong patrols and their correct deployment had been ensured by white tapes laid out on the ground earlier in the night of july - . the whole movement was carried out unobserved and without touch being lost in any case. the assault was delivered at . a.m., when there was just sufficient light to be able to distinguish friend from foe at short range, and along the whole front attacked the troops were preceded by an effective artillery barrage. they swept over the enemy's first-line trenches and consolidated their position in the defences beyond. on the night of february - , , the nd division attacked and captured , yards of trench { } line at the foot of the _serre hill_. the division formed up after dark and the attack began at . p.m., the objective was captured, and at a.m. a determined counter-attack was repulsed. the capture of the _vimy ridge_ by canadian troops was due to an assault launched some time before dawn on april , : and the british victory of messines (june , ) to an assault launched at . a.m. in the latter case the wytschaete-messines position, "one of the germans' most important strongholds on the western front, consisted of forward defences with an elaborate and intricate system of well-wired trenches and strong points, forming a defensive belt over a mile in depth, and the germans had omitted no precautions to make the position impregnable" (sir d. haig's dispatches). nineteen deep mines under this position were fired at . a.m., and this was the signal for the assault, which was immediately successful and was carried out under intense artillery protecting fire. by nightfall of june the whole position had been recaptured, heavy losses inflicted, and over , prisoners taken at a comparatively slight cost, by the ii. army, under general sir h. c. o. plumer. during the german offensive in a counter-attack by three brigades was launched by night against the village of _villers brétonneux_. the attack was launched at p.m. on the night of april - . by daybreak the village was surrounded, and by the afternoon it was entirely recaptured with upwards of , prisoners. among the offensive operations which preceded the general advance of the allies in july, , was a highly successful night attack by the nd australian division, on a front of about miles, south of _morlancourt_ (june , ). at . a.m. on may , , one of general ulysses grant's corps, under general hancock, assaulted "the salient," part of general robert lee's entrenchments in the wilderness of virginia (_spottsylvania_). , men were assembled and a night advance was made, { } directed by compass, on an unusually dark and stormy night, with part of the line of the advance densely wooded. the assault was ordered for a.m., but a dense fog delayed the signal until . a.m. when the order was given, one of the divisions had some difficulty in making its way through a wood and marsh, but contrived to keep up with the others, and reached the abattis at the same time. the assault resulted in the capture of , prisoners and inflicted losses with the bayonet of over , , with a total loss to the assailants of about , . this manoeuvre consisted of a night march by compass of a whole corps to a position of assembly within , yards of the hostile outposts, of an advance before dawn, and of a final assault of , troops. the captured salient was afterwards retaken by the confederates by a decisive counter-attack, rendered possible by the provision, in rear of the salient, of a second line of entrenchments (see _battle of spottsylvania_). owing to the risks of confusion and the limitations imposed on the attacking movement, night assaults do not now carry the same comparative advantages over daylight attacks as was the case before the introduction of _smoke_. hence they will be restricted to attacks on a very limited objective, as in the case of raids or attempts to capture special tactical localities. but by employing smoke only two elements of surprise can be achieved. the _direction_ and _weight_ of the blow are concealed, but the appearance of smoke will warn the enemy to expect an attack, and the _time_ of the blow is thus revealed. smoke will probably be employed extensively in modern warfare and, except against an ill-trained and undisciplined enemy, assaults by night will generally be undertaken to gain tactical points, to drive in advanced troops and outposts, to capture advanced and detached posts, to rush an isolated force guarding a bridge or defile, and in carrying out enterprises of a similar nature, in order to gain advantages { } for further operations in daylight. when more important assaults are made, a larger force than a brigade will seldom be thrown against a single objective, although a series of objectives may be simultaneously attacked with success over a wide front. a night assault was delivered by two federal brigades on the confederate bridgehead at _rappahannock station_ (november , ). one of the brigades was ultimately repulsed, but the other penetrated the confederate position and cut off the retreat. upwards of , of the defenders were captured or killed, and the small remnant evacuated the bridgehead. in the second afghan war, general sir f. roberts marched up to the high passes leading out of the kurram into the interior of afghanistan, with a column of , all ranks and guns. he was opposed by the amir's force of about , men with guns at _peiwar kotal_ (december , ). sir f. roberts detached the greater part of his force to occupy the heights on the flank of the afghan position and attacked at daylight. the night march and subsequent attack were completely successful. the enemy was defeated with great loss and all his guns captured, the british losses being killed and wounded. _tel-el-kebir_ was an example of a night march in battle formation of a force of , infantry, , cavalry, and guns, to attack an entrenched position at dawn, the object being to surprise the enemy and to cross the danger zone without exposing the assaulting troops to a prolonged fire action. it resulted in a victory which decided the egyptian campaign, and added the nile valley to the british empire. sir garnet wolesley's force advanced in four columns marching abreast, with its left resting on the railway, and was successfully carried out, the troops reaching a position, varying from to yards distance from the objective, the assault being delivered at the conclusion of the march. the egyptian army, under arabi pasha, fought steadily, and again and again renewed the fight, after falling back { } within their entrenchments, but their flank was turned and the whole position captured. the british loss was only all ranks, and the egyptians lost upwards of , killed and wounded, the remaining , being dispersed or captured. a daylight advance and assault of so strong a position could not have been successfully carried through at so small a cost to the attacking troops. in the south african war there were two examples of the unsuccessful night attack. major-general gatacre essayed a night march followed by a night attack upon the boers' position at _stormberg_ (december , ), but he was misled by his guides in unknown ground and was himself surprised by the boers and forced to retire with a loss of over officers and other ranks. on the following day lord methuen delivered an attack upon cronje's position between the upper modder river and the kimberley road. in a night attack on _magersfontein hill_ (december , ) the highland brigade came under heavy fire while still in assembly formation and lost its brigadier (a. g. wauchope) and officers and other ranks. in the later stages of the south african war, however, night marches followed by raids were employed with marked success, particularly in the eastern transvaal in november and december, . except when the assaulting troops are already in position, it will be necessary to choose positions of assembly and of deployment, and to precede the advance in the preliminary stages by lines of scouts, ahead and on the flanks, within yards of the following troops. on arrival at the jumping-off place these advanced scouts will await the arrival of the assaulting force, and they should be directed to mark the ground for the various units. a scout from each forward platoon can thus mark the inner flank on which his platoon will rest, and the direction of the whole line will be assured. the troops will usually advance, during the earlier { } stages, in shallow columns on narrow frontages, at deploying intervals, and may maintain this formation until the halted line of scouts is reached. owing to the frequent necessity for halts to correct intervals, etc., and the inherent difficulties of movements by night in open formations, no greater rate than mile an hour can be counted on. when several objectives are in view a corresponding series of positions of assembly and deployment will be required, and care must be taken that the various advancing forces do not converge. owing to the difficulty of recognition, a distinguishing mark will usually be worn by the troops engaged, a watchword will usually be adopted and made known to all ranks, and the commander and staff should wear easily distinguishable badges. if hostile patrols are encountered it is essential that they should be silenced, and any one encountered who is deficient of the badge and ignorant of the watchword should be similarly treated. the risk of an assault being held up by unforeseen obstacles must also be provided against, and engineers or pioneer infantry should be present for removing such obstacles. if fire is opened by the enemy it is clear that all hope of surprise has vanished, and the troops must then press on at all costs; for if they advance as rapidly as possible they have a reasonable prospect of achieving their object, whereas a halt will increase the enemy's power of resistance, and withdrawal will almost certainly end in disaster. in order that secrecy may be observed, details of the assault will usually be withheld from all except superior commanders from whom action is required, until the position of assembly is reached; but before the troops leave that position all ranks must be made to understand the objective in general, the particular task of the unit, and the formation to be adopted at the position of deployment. in addition to this information, and to a knowledge of the general tactical principles involved, { } there are certain axioms which must become "rules of thumb" with all ranks:-- fire must not be opened without orders. magazines must be charged but no cartridge placed in the chamber. until daylight the bayonet only to be used. absolute silence to be maintained until the signal for the assault is given. no smoking; no lights. if obstacles are encountered each man will lie down in his place until they are removed. if hostile fire is opened, all ranks must press on at once with the utmost spirit and determination and overpower the enemy with the bayonet. { } fighting in close country close country has a marked influence on tactics owing to the restrictions it imposes on view and on movement. forest, jungle, and bush, mountains and ravines, rivers and streams are natural obstacles, while cultivation adds woods and plantations, fences and hedges, high growing crops, farm houses, villages and towns, with sunken roads below the surface of the adjoining land, and civilisation brings in its train a network of railways and canals with embankments and bridges, and the natural difficulties of close country are thereby increased. the obstruction to movement is more or less constant, except in "continental" climates, where frost and snow render movement possible in winter over the deepest rivers or marshes, and over roads and tracks which are scarcely practicable in the summer season. the obstruction to view is greater when trees and hedges are in leaf than when the leaves have fallen. when the advantages and disadvantages of fighting in close country are weighed in the balance there appears to be a distinct tendency in favour of the attack over the defence. an attacking force can usually obtain cover in the early stages of the action and loss can therefore be avoided in approaching the objective, while the screening of its movements and dispositions generally enables the attacking force to surprise the defence as to the direction and weight of the blow to be delivered. troops fighting in close country are often unable to see what is going on around them, and the "sense of security" is lessened by the knowledge that a flank may be successfully assailed without warning. this favours the { } attack more than the defence, as the counter-attack, which is the soul of all defensive operations, requires previous organisation to be thoroughly effective. savage warfare.--in savage warfare the inherent difficulties of fighting in close country are often increased by the disparity of numbers on the side of the civilised troops and by the fanatical courage of the savages. discipline, self-reliance, vigilance, and judgment in the application of the principles of war, are required to overcome these added difficulties. a vigorous offensive, strategical as well as tactical, is _always_ the best method of conducting operations in savage warfare, and for the purpose of protection vigilance must be exercised to an even greater degree than in any other form of warfare. at _isandhlwana_ (january , ) the british camp at the foot of isandhlwana hill was surprised and overwhelmed by a zulu army, , strong, and almost the whole of the garrison killed; and yet in the evening of the same day all ranks ( sick being included in that number) beat off the repeated attacks of , zulus at _rorke's drift_. in the operations after the fall of khartoum a desert column under major-general sir j. mcneill was surprised in dense bush while constructing a zeriba at _tofrik_ (march , ), but after twenty minutes' fierce fighting the mahdist arabs were driven off with more than , killed. in the operations in upper egypt against the invading mahdists a vigorous strategical and tactical offensive led to the _battle of toski_ (august , ) and resulted in the defeat and complete destruction of the invaders, with but slight loss to the anglo-egyptian force under general sir f. w. grenfell. at the beginning of the christian era three well-disciplined roman legions were decoyed into the fastnesses of the _teutoberger wald_ (a.d. ) and there attacked and annihilated by the cherusci, a saxon tribe, under their king arminius, and this defeat of quintilius varus is included by sir edward creasey among the { } "fifteen decisive battles of the world." fighting in close country against more or less savage tribes is frequently the task of british troops in east and west africa, while the indian frontier constantly requires to be defended by expeditions against tribal levies in hilly and mountainous districts. in "field service regulations" (part ii.), , the peculiarities of various savage races by whom the outposts of the british empire are liable to be assailed are carefully noted. in civilized warfare.--the military history of europe and america abounds with accounts of fierce fighting in close country. in all ages woods and villages play an important part in war. they form natural magnets for troops operating in their neighbourhood. the fact of their being easily visible, and named on maps, causes them to be adopted as objectives in the attack or as boundaries in the defence, and in all operations troops are instinctively drawn towards them in search of cover, or to obtain water, supplies, and shelter. their situation is also likely to make them of tactical importance, as woods are frequently on the slopes of hills and may be occupied in a defensive scheme to force an assailant to deploy before reaching the main position, while villages are naturally situated on roads, which must be guarded as they are the normal avenues of approach for all troops. in position warfare the wood and the village are of the highest importance, and whenever they are situated along the alignment, or near the front, of a defensive position, they may always be assumed to be occupied and strongly organised as part of a series of mutually supporting tactical points. the names of woods, large and small, and of the most insignificant villages, were of everyday occurrence in reports on the fighting on the western front in the great war as the scene of furious encounters, of attacks and counter-attacks, and there are references to copses, woods, and forests in marshal haig's dispatches. it { } appears, however, to be generally admitted that close country in general, and woods and villages in particular, favour delaying action rather than a protracted defence, and in position warfare the advantages are therefore in favour of the attack on account of the facilities offered for surprise through the concealment of movement. there are many instances of successful delaying action in woods and villages. some of the characteristics of such fighting were exemplified in the franco-prussian war. at the _battle of gravelotte_ (august , ) the bois de vaux, on the left of the french position, induced marshal bazaine to mass his reserves on that flank, as it appeared to invite attack; whereas he was defeated by a turning movement on the _other_ flank. during an attack through the bois de vaux a prussian infantry battalion became so scattered that all cohesion was lost, a common danger in wood fighting. at the earlier _battle of spicheren_ (august , ), however, two battalions maintained their order and cohesion in pfaffen wood, and by moving through it in narrow columns were able to debouch in good order. a tendency to loss of discipline through loss of control was exemplified at the same battle. other prussian troops had captured gifert wood and the officers were unable to organise an attack on a further position through the reluctance of the troops to leave the shelter of the wood. at the _battle of worth_ (august , ) two french battalions held up the attack of , prussians for over an hour in the niederwald, although no fortifications were employed; the difficulty of debouching from a captured wood was then experienced by the prussians, as the farther edge was kept under heavy fire by french troops in the neighbouring elsasshausen copse. a decisive counter-attack cannot usually be organised in such warfare, although lee managed to employ , troops for that purpose with complete success at the _battle of the wilderness_ (may - , ). local { } counter-attacks, however, are the normal incidents of defensive operations in woods, and in the niederwald, at the _battle of worth_, several spirited counter-attacks were made by the th french regiment. villages are even more attractive to troops than woods, and they figure in all battles as local centres of resistance. one of the most spirited defences of a village took place at the _battle of sedan_ (september , ) when a heroic struggle was maintained by french marine infantry in the village of _bazeilles_, and after the white flag had been hoisted over the fortress of sedan the fight was stubbornly maintained at the village of balan, the second line of defence of the bazeilles position. visitors to the battlefield of sedan are shown a little inn with the title, _a la dernière cartouche_, in commemoration of the struggle. a highly successful night attack was made by the french on the village of _noisseville_ (august , ), the normal difficulties of defending the village being increased by the surprise and the darkness. the attack on woods.--the opening stages of the attack on a wood resemble those in the attack on any other position, but once the outer fringe is gained the potential advantages offered by the narrow field of view and fire must be exploited to the full and surprise at weak points must be achieved. flank attacks are exceptionally deadly under these circumstances, as they may succeed before the other defending troops are aware of the threatened attack, but the utmost precaution is necessary to avoid traps, and scouts must precede all movement, while advances must be made by rapid bounds to avoid aimed fire at close range. supports and reserves must follow close to the forward troops in order to preserve cohesion and to afford immediate help. machine guns and light mortars are of very great value to give close support, the latter taking the place of artillery and inflicting losses on { } stockaded defenders. small woods should usually be attacked from the flanks under heavy fire from artillery until the attack turns inwards, while machine guns and lewis guns are posted to prevent reinforcements reaching the wood and to cut off the retreat of the defenders. during the german counter-attacks at cambrai (november -december , ) _tanks_ were effectively employed in wood and village fighting, and were in a great measure responsible for the capture of _gauche wood_, acting in co-operation with dismounted indian cavalry of the th cavalry division and with the guards' division; but although they reached the outskirts of _villers guislain_ they were forced to withdraw, as the supporting infantry were unable to co-operate owing to the fire of the enemy's machine guns. at the _battle of messines_ (june , ) a tank enabled the infantry to proceed with the advance by overcoming the machine guns posted in fanny's farm. generally speaking, however, tanks are unable to manoeuvre in woods, owing to the many insuperable obstructions, and their sphere of usefulness is limited by the availability of rides or other cleared avenues of approach. during the fighting for the interior of the wood "reconnaissance during battle" is of the highest importance, and the flanks of the attacking force will need to be specially guarded, on account of the liability to counter-attack. touch must also be kept, to avoid loss of direction. in the _advance from the captured position_ great tactical skill is required, and if the defenders have established a fire position within close range it may only be possible to issue from the wood when co-operating troops have cleared or neutralised that position. it may even be necessary to hold the rear edge against counter-attack and to debouch, after reorganisation, from both flanks or from the opposite edge, to advance in two bodies against the flanks of the fire position under harassing fire from the troops in the further edge. if the fire position is to be carried by direct assault, or if { } it can be got under control and the advance is to be continued, the successful troops must be reorganised within the wood (care being taken to avoid concentration in salients) and must deploy before advancing, to bound forward in one rush until clear of the wood. defence of a wood.--the outer edge of a wood is particularly vulnerable, but some portions of it must of necessity be occupied for purposes of observation and resistance (particularly at night), while the unoccupied portions are heavily entangled and made subject to enfilade fire from the occupied positions, machine and lewis guns being particularly suitable for the defensive positions, in concealed and strengthened emplacements. the perimeter should be divided into sections garrisoned by complete units under definite commanders. lines of defence must also be established in the interior, and lateral communications opened up through the trees, with easily distinguished marks to direct troops issuing to counter-attacks, and time will be saved by making several tracks rather than one wide road. the second line of defence should contain an all-round defensive position from which all avenues of approach can be swept by machine and lewis guns, and this position should also provide facilities for sorties to counter-attack. if the wood is too far from the outpost zone of the defence to serve as a factor in the scheme steps must be taken to neutralise the advantages offered to an attacking force in a concealed avenue of approach, either by the use of gas, or by bringing such a fire on the exits from the wood that a debouching enemy may suffer heavy loss or annihilation. in most cases, an attacking force will be harassed, and a show of opposition will be made, in such a wood by _fighting patrols_, and obstacles can be placed in the near edge, with entanglements outside, so planned as to induce the attacking force to collect in lanes enfiladed by machine guns. { } the attack on villages.--there are three phases in the attack on a village as in the attack on a wood. in the fight for the outer edge, the front will probably be harassed by a fire attack, while one or both flanks are assaulted by all four sections of the platoon, under cover of fire from machine guns and lewis guns. the second phase may require reorganisation before the attack on the village itself, during which, reconnaissance, co-operation, and dispatch of information, are of the highest importance. all captured points must be immediately consolidated and the attack must be prosecuted with the utmost vigour. troops must be trained to enter buildings from the rear, and to advance along the right edge of roads, close to the walls and buildings there, to make hostile fire difficult without undue exposure. light mortars and rifle bombs, which can be fired into windows partially barricaded, or to fall behind street barricades, are an important adjunct to the rifle and bayonet, and machine guns and lewis guns will have many opportunities in assisting or repelling a counter-attack and of keeping down the enemy's fire from a commanding position at the end of a street. _the tank_ is at its best in this form of warfare, as it can surmount or demolish almost any street barricade, and can be followed up at once by the infantry, but it must always be regarded as an auxiliary to the infantry, and not as a principal. in the third phase, the advance from the captured village, while the supports are "mopping up" such of the garrison as have survived the capture, previous reorganisation and deployment will probably be as essential as in wood fighting, and during all the phases of the struggle in woods and villages sudden counter-attacks must always be expected and local reserves to repel them must be provided. in issuing from the village, rapid bounds to points from which the fire positions in rear can be brought under control will also be required. { } defence of a village.--it is difficult to avoid the inclusion of villages in a scheme of defence on account of the facilities afforded for water, cover, and shelter, but while villages assist in the delaying action they are liable to become "shell traps" in a prolonged defence, unless there is good cellarage accommodation, while the local effect of a bursting shell is also increased. there are certain principles common to all defensive action in village fighting:-- ( ) the garrison should consist of a definite unit or formation under a definite commander. ( ) the forward troops should be posted in front of the edge of the village, partly because of the vulnerability of the actual edge to artillery fire but mainly to prevent the attack from establishing itself in the forward buildings. in the case of a small village it will often be advantageous to occupy positions on the flanks commanding the edge by fire, with a view to enticing the attack into the "funnel" thus provided. ( ) supports and reserves must be centralised in order that they may be readily available for instantaneous local counter-attacks, by which means alone a village can be defended against a determined enemy. ( ) houses should be loopholed and windows sand-bagged, while house-to-house communication must be improvised to increase the defenders' power of manoeuvre. ( ) the interior of the village should be defended by the cross fire of machine guns and lewis guns, but while churches and halls, and the inner edge of village greens and of squares, should be prepared for determined resistance, such places should not be occupied as billets, owing to the risk of loss from artillery bombardment. ( ) the natural difficulties of maintaining control in village fighting require to be counteracted by increased effort and vigilance on the part of all leaders, and special arrangements must be made for collecting information in report centres, the position of which must be made known to all ranks in the defending force. { } characteristics of the various arms "the full power of an army can be exerted only when all its parts act in close combination, and this is not possible unless the members of each arm understand the characteristics of the other arms. each has its special characteristics and functions, and is dependent on the co-operation of the others" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). "an intelligent understanding of 'the other man's job' is the first essential of successful co-operation."--marshal haig. infantry "infantry is the arm which in the end wins battles" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). the speed with which infantry can advance, and the distance which can be covered in one day, are the only limits to the striking power of well-trained infantry. in the great war these limits were largely removed by the use of mechanical transport, and this means of transportation will be used increasingly in modern warfare, in order to bring fresh troops into or near the scene of action, or to expedite the removal of exhausted troops from the battlefield. against these natural limits to mobility are the compensating advantages of the power of infantry to move into and over almost any ground by day or by night, and the rapidity with which trained infantrymen can find or improvise cover. the main object of battle is to close with the enemy and to destroy him by killing or capture, and it is this power to close with the enemy which makes infantry the decisive arm in battle. the rifle and bayonet.--the rifle is the principal infantry weapon, and the british "short-magazine { } lee-enfield" rifle is the best rifle in action. a trained rifleman can fire aimed shots in a minute, reloading with the butt in the shoulder and eyes on the mark. with the bayonet affixed the rifle is the principal weapon of close combat for delivering or repelling an assault, and in night assaults infantry depend entirely upon the bayonet. the entrenching tool, carried by all other ranks, is an invaluable adjunct to the rifle bullet and to the bayonet. in a war of manoeuvre, when infantry are frequently compelled to improvise defences on the field of battle, by night as well as by day, the value of the entrenching tool can scarcely be exaggerated. in position warfare, and in the organisation of an area for prolonged defence in a war of manoeuvre, heavier tools and materials of all kinds are available for the consolidation of the defences, but for the rapid construction of temporary defences by day or by night the entrenching tool alone has been proved to be highly effective. when troops are "digging themselves in" at night with this weapon care must be taken that some system is adopted to obtain a more or less regular line facing in the right direction. by the extension of the men of an infantry section at arm's length facing the enemy, and by moving the two men on each flank two paces outwards, and the two centre men two paces backwards, and then causing the section to dig "on the line of their toes," there will result (even on the darkest night) a short fire trench with a central traverse. this sectional trench can be connected at the first opportunity with trenches dug by other sections similarly extended. during the _retreat from mons_ (august-september, ) the "contemptible little army," under marshal french, frequently obtained, by means of the entrenching tool alone, shelter from bullets, and a system of fire trenches which cost the pursuing germans hundreds of lives and materially delayed their movements. { } the lewis gun.--the lewis gun is an automatic rifle, firing the same ammunition as the s.-m.-l.-e. rifle, and two lewis-gun sections are included in each infantry platoon. the rate of fire is increased by the automatic action of the gun, the maximum rate permitting a drum of rounds to be fired in less than ten seconds, while one or two rounds only may be fired if so required. the mobility of the lewis-gun sections is the same as that of other sections of the infantry platoon. ranges of rifles and machine guns _close_ range. up to yards. _effective_ range. over yards up to , yards. _long_ range. over , yards up to , yards. grenades.--hand grenades and rifle grenades are adjuncts to the rifle and bayonet and the lewis gun. their principal use is in clearing fortified posts, especially in position warfare. the _hand grenade_, or bomb thrown by hand, is limited in range by the skill and strength of the thrower, and to yards may be regarded as the maximum distance. the _rifle grenade_ is effective up to about yards, and is generally employed to provide a local barrage or to search cover. in the latter case, a high angle of descent is used as with mortars or howitzers. light mortars.--the _light mortar section_ is an integral part of every infantry battalion, and although sometimes brigaded for special purposes the sections normally work with their own battalions. a section of light mortars, firing -lb. bombs, consists of officer and other ranks, and requires horses and g.s. limbered wagon. owing to the high angle of descent the bombs can be fired behind, and can search, high cover, while the mortars themselves are not very conspicuous objects and can be { } readily moved for short distances, while they "come into action" in seconds. the comparatively slow flight of the bombs, however, enables the enemy to discover the location of the mortars, and necessitates the use of expedients to avoid counter-artillery fire. a maximum rate of to rounds a minute can be maintained for two or three minutes, if ammunition is available, and at an angle of degrees a range of yards can be obtained. machine guns.--"the principal characteristic of the machine gun is its power of delivering a concentrated volume of fire which can be sustained almost indefinitely, subject to limitations of ammunition supply. the ease with which the gun can be concealed in action and its fire controlled enable advantage to be taken of surprise effect" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). the _machine-gun platoon_ is an integral part of every infantry battalion, but in attack machine guns are frequently grouped for the purpose of providing overhead or other covering fire, while in defence they form, with the artillery, the framework into which the defensive dispositions are fitted, and by reason of their fire-power machine guns enable a commander to economise in the number of infantry allotted to a purely defensive _rôle_. the ranges are those given above for rifles and lewis guns, and the rate of fire is about times that of a rifle, while , to , rounds may be fired continuously at a moment of need. mounted troops cavalry.--the principal characteristic of cavalry is its mobility. this enables it to attack unexpectedly; to defend with determination while retaining the power to break off an action more easily than infantry; to gain information and to afford protection at a considerable distance from the force protected; and to confirm { } and exploit the success obtained in battle. "cavalry is capable, if required, of undertaking most operations for which infantry would usually be employed, but the demands made by the care of horses reduce the number of rifles which can actually be placed in action; and it therefore lacks depth in comparison with similar infantry formations" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). the cavalry arms are the lance and sword for mounted action; horse artillery usually work with cavalry, and the arms employed by cavalry for dismounted action are the rifle, the machine gun, and the hotchkiss rifle. examples of the employment of cavalry in modern warfare are given throughout the "lectures." mounted rifles.--the characteristics and methods of employment of mounted rifles are similar to those of cavalry, with the exception that they are not equipped for mounted action. mounted rifles, like cavalry, enable a commander to extend his attack or defence in a manner that is most bewildering to infantry, and attempts by infantry to outflank a defending force of mounted rifles are generally frustrated by the mobility of the defending force, as was exemplified in the south african war of - . cyclists.--under favourable conditions cyclists possess greater mobility than cavalry, and they can develop greater fire-power, as no horse-holders are required. they are, however, dependent upon roads, they are vulnerable on the move, they cannot fight without dismounting, and they must return to their bicycles after action; whereas cavalry horse-holders can meet dismounted troopers at a prearranged spot. artillery "the _rôle_ of artillery is to assist the other arms in breaking down opposition, and to afford all possible { } support to the infantry, with whom the eventual decision rests" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). all classes of artillery are included in modern military operations. motor traction enables the heaviest guns to be brought to the battlefield and to be removed when a commander decides to withdraw from battle, while the increase in the defensive power of obstacles and small arms fire, combined with the increase in mobility afforded by motor traction, enables all but super-heavy artillery (which require a railway mounting) to be placed close behind the infantry in attack and defence. it is, however, obvious that the closest support can be given by the guns that are weakest in shell-power, on account of the superiority in mobility possessed by the lighter guns. in modern warfare a great proportion of the work of artillery is carried out, of necessity, in the hours of darkness, owing to the frequency of movement by night to avoid aërial observation, and to the consequent use of indirect artillery fire to inflict losses during such movements. the artillery personnel therefore requires to be relieved with greater frequency than in the days before the use of aircraft. the growth of artillery during the war was symbolical of the continual changes in the methods of warfare, its numbers and power increasing out of all proportion to the experience of previous wars. "the pieces of light and medium artillery with which we took the field in august, , were represented at the date of the armistice by , guns and howitzers of all natures, including pieces of the heaviest calibre" (sir d. haig's dispatches). "from the commencement of our offensive in august, , to the conclusion of the armistice some , tons of artillery ammunition were expended by the british armies on the western front. for the fortnight from august to september , our daily average expenditure exceeded { } , tons, while for the three days of the crucial battle on september , , and (_second battle of cambrai_) nearly , tons of ammunition were fired by our artillery" (sir d. haig's dispatches). in the table of artillery ranges on p. , the effective ranges of light artillery firing h.e. shell are based on the use of no. fuse. "the invention of a new fuse known as ' ,' which was first used at the _battle of arras_ (april -june , ), enabled wire entanglements to be easily and quickly destroyed, and so modified our methods of attacking organised positions. by bursting the shell the instant it touched the ground, and before it had become buried, the destructive effect of the explosion was greatly increased. it became possible to cut wire with a far less expenditure of time and ammunition, and the factor of surprise was given a larger part in operations" (sir d. haig's dispatches). artillery is classed under the designations light, medium, heavy, and super-heavy. light guns.--_pack guns_, with a calibre of . inches, are weakest in shell-power, but they possess a mobility greater than any other artillery and can be moved in country which would present insuperable obstacles to wheeled traffic. _pack howitzers_, with a calibre of . inches, are particularly valuable in close country, the high angle of descent enabling the attack or defence to search the steepest cover. _horse artillery guns_, firing a -pound shell, are the most mobile of all wheeled artillery and are normally employed with mounted troops. all ranks of the royal horse artillery are mounted, and its mobility is scarcely less than that of cavalry. _field guns_, with a calibre of inches, firing an -pound shell, are the principal artillery weapon of a field army. although inferior in mobility to pack or horse artillery, they have greater shell-power and afford the principal support to infantry in closing with or repelling the enemy. their power to inflict casualties { } by enfilade fire with shrapnel makes them specially suitable in the defence, and the accuracy of modern weapons enables them to co-operate in the attack with covering fire, under the protection of which infantry may advance unimpeded to the assault. in addition to their normal functions, and to their employment in counter-battery work, they can be employed in the reduction of defences by bombardment with high explosive shells, in neutralising an area by the use of gas shells, or in providing artificial cover by the production of _smoke_. _field howitzers_, with a calibre of . inches, have increased offensive power and practically the same mobility as field guns. light guns are the principal weapons for protection against _aircraft_ and for defence against _tanks_. the tank is powerless against artillery, and its most effective enemy is light artillery. during the _first battle of the somme_ a new terror was added to the british attack by the introduction of the tank, which surmounted inequalities in the ground, crushed the wire defences, and crossed the trenches. although accompanied by infantry, it was regarded as an all-conquering and decisive factor. at one period of the battle, however, a number of tanks were placed out of action by a single field gun, manned and fired with the greatest gallantry by a single german artillery officer, who fired point-blank at each tank as it surmounted the crest of a rise. infantry were in close support, and a single lewis-gun section could have prevented the use of the field gun. medium guns.--medium guns, firing a -pound shell, are principally employed in counter-battery work and in fulfilling the functions of -pound field guns at a greater range and with greater force. _medium howitzers_ occupy the same relative position, their offensive power being greater than that of the field howitzer. { } heavy guns.--heavy guns of -inch calibre, firing a shell of pounds, are used against targets beyond the range of light and medium guns, and with greater effect. _heavy howitzers_, of -inch or . -inch calibre, are principally employed against covered batteries and strong defences, or for destroying wire entanglements with instantaneous fuses. super-heavy guns.--super-heavy guns of a calibre of . inches and upwards are usually carried on railway mountings, and while they possess a high muzzle velocity, considerable shell-power, and a high degree of mobility (which enables them to come into action in any part of the battlefield where suitable rails have been laid), their arc of fire is very restricted and their "life" is short. _super-heavy howitzers_, of -inch or -inch calibre, possess similar advantages and disadvantages to super-heavy guns. their normal use is the destruction of permanent defences, the breaking down of bridges, etc. the -inch weapon is also used on tractor-drawn mountings and is highly effective in counter-battery work. the table on p. is based upon particulars given on p. of "field service regulations," vol. ii. ( ). royal engineers "all arms are responsible for the construction of their own works of defence. it is the duty of the royal engineers to assist them by engineer reconnaissances, plans, advice, technical supervision, provision of materials and the construction of works requiring special technical skill. . . . although trained as fighting troops, engineers should be regarded as reserves to be used only as a last resource; casualties in their ranks are not easy to replace, and they may become needlessly involved in the fighting and lost for work which may have an important bearing on the operations" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). { } table of artillery ranges weapon effective range (yds.) _light artillery_ h.e. shell shrapnel pack guns ( . in.) , , pack howitzers ( . in.) , horse artillery guns ( pr.) , , field guns ( pr.) , , field howitzers ( . in.) , _medium artillery_ medium guns ( pr.) , -- medium howitzers ( in.) , _heavy artillery_ heavy guns ( in.) / , heavy howitzers ( in.) , -- " " ( . in) , _super-heavy artillery_ super-heavy guns ( . in.) , -- " " ( in.) , -- " " ( in.) , -- super-heavy howitzers ( in.) , " " ( in) , weapon maximum range (yds.) _light artillery_ h.e. shell shrapnel pack guns ( . in.) , , pack howitzers ( . in.) , horse artillery guns ( pr.) , , field guns ( pr.) , , field howitzers ( . in.) , _medium artillery_ medium guns ( pr.) , , medium howitzers ( in.) , _heavy artillery_ heavy guns ( in.) / , / , heavy howitzers ( in.) , " " ( . in) , _super-heavy artillery_ super-heavy guns ( . in.) , , " " ( in.) , , " " ( in.) , -- super-heavy howitzers ( in.) , " " ( in) , the maximum range of _medium mortars_ is , yards; of _light mortars_ yards. { } carey's force.--during the _second battle of the somme_ "a mixed force, including details, stragglers, schools personnel, tunnelling companies, army troops companies, field survey companies, and canadian and american engineers, had been got together and organised by major-gen. p. g. grant, the chief engineer to the v. army. on march these were posted by general grant, in accordance with orders given by the v. army commander, on the line of the old amiens defences between mezières, marcelcave, and hamel. subsequently, as general grant could ill be spared from his proper duties, he was directed to hand over command of his force to major-gen. g. g. s. carey. except for general carey's force there were no reinforcements of any kind behind the divisions, which had been fighting for the most part since the opening of the battle. . . . on march our line from marcelcave to the somme was manned by carey's force, with the st cavalry division in close support. . . . on march the greater part of the british front south of the somme was held by carey's force, assisted by the st cavalry division and such troops of the divisions originally engaged as it had not yet been found possible to withdraw. in rear of these troops, a few of the divisions of the v. army were given a brief opportunity to reassemble" (sir d. haig's dispatches). tanks tanks are moving fortresses containing light artillery, machine guns, and rifles, and while capable of inflicting heavy losses by fire they can also destroy obstacles, weapons, and personnel. their garrisons are protected against the fire of small arms and from shrapnel bullets, but they are very vulnerable to other forms of artillery fire. their mobility and radius of action are governed by the amount of petrol carried and by the physical endurance of the crew, but except over deep cuttings, { } broad streams, swamps, very heavily shelled ground, rocky and mountainous country, or in thick woods they can move without difficulty. "the power of delivering successful surprise attacks against almost any type of defences is one of the most important advantages of the use of tanks in large numbers" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). during the _first battle of the somme_ (september -november , ) "our new heavily armoured cars, known as 'tanks,' now brought into action for the first time, successfully co-operated with the infantry, and coming as a surprise to the enemy rank and file, gave valuable help in breaking down their resistance. . . . these cars proved of great value on various occasions, and the personnel in charge of them performed many deeds of remarkable valour" (sir d. haig's dispatches). aircraft two classes of aircraft are used in the field. aeroplanes, which are self-propelled and have an almost unlimited radius of action; and kite balloons, which, in favourable weather, can be towed by a lorry and can be moved frequently without loss of efficiency. aeroplanes are of the greatest value for reconnaissance and inter-communication, and not only obtain, and return to their base with, information of the highest value, but facilitate personal reconnaissance of the battlefield by commanders and staff officers. their offensive and defensive action is also very great and the moral effect of their offensive action is of the highest value. although aeroplane squadrons are mobile units they lose efficiency if the units are moved too frequently. the action of aircraft in various phases of fighting is dealt with throughout the lectures. kite balloons carry two observers, who can remain in telephonic communication with the ground up to a { } height of , feet. inflated balloons can be moved in favourable weather at a maximum speed of miles an hour while at a height of about feet. their extreme vulnerability to artillery fire prevents their use close to the battle front. gas "the advisability of employing gas as a military weapon is a matter for consideration by the authorities concerned before a campaign begins. once authorised, however, and assuming that weather conditions are favourable, gas may be expected to play a part in every action. . . . the different methods in which gas can be employed make it a weapon which can be used by all arms, thus _artillery_ deal with gas shells, _infantry_ with light mortar gas bombs, _aircraft_ with aërial gas bombs, and _engineers_ with all methods of use that call for special manipulation" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). gas was introduced by the germans during the _second battle of ypres_ (april -may , ), and the numerous experiments and trials necessary before gas can be used, and the great preparations which have to be made for its manufacture, show that its employment was not the result of a desperate decision, but had been prepared for deliberately. during the _first battle of the somme_ (september -november , ) "the employment by the enemy of gas and liquid flame as weapons of offence compelled us not only to discover ways to protect our troops from their effects, but also to devise means to make use of the same instruments of destruction. . . . since we have been compelled, in self-defence, to use similar methods, it is satisfactory to be able to record, on the evidence of prisoners, of documents captured, and of our own observation, that the enemy has suffered heavy casualties from our gas attacks, while the means of protection adopted by us { } have proved thoroughly effective" (sir d. haig's dispatches). smoke smoke can be discharged from _artillery_ shells, artillery or _infantry_ mortar bombs, infantry rifle grenades, smoke candles, _aircraft_ bombs, _engineers'_ stationary generators, or the exhaust pipe of _tanks_. it is used to conceal movement for the purposes of surprise or for reducing casualties, and can be so employed as to impose night conditions on the enemy while one's own troops retain the natural visibility; but while the weight and direction of an intended blow may thus be hidden from the enemy a warning is given of the time of its delivery. it is possible, however, to mystify, as well as to surprise, the enemy by the use of smoke, and its strategical and tactical value will ensure its adoption in modern warfare. in the closing battles of the great war "the use of smoke shells for covering the advance of our infantry and masking the enemy's positions was introduced and employed with increasing frequency and effect" (sir d. haig's dispatches). { } operation orders combatant officers of every rank are required to issue orders of some kind or other, and orders for operations should always be committed to paper when circumstances permit. the object of an operation order is to bring about a course of action in accordance with the intentions of the commander, and with full co-operation between all units. operation orders of a complicated nature are unlikely to be required from the pen of infantry officers in the junior ranks, and the rules for drafting orders are stated in detail in the official text-books, for the use of officers of the ranks that will be required to issue them. the general principles underlying orders of all kinds are that they should be "fool proof," and it has been remarked that the writer of orders should always remember that at least one silly ass will try to misunderstand them. they must, therefore, be void of all ambiguity, and while containing every essential piece of information, and omitting everything that is clearly known already to the recipients, they should be confined to facts, and conjecture should be avoided. "an operation order must contain just what the recipient requires to know and nothing more. it should tell him nothing which he can and should arrange for himself, and, especially in the case of large forces, will only enter into details when details are absolutely necessary. any attempt to prescribe to a subordinate at a distance anything which he, with a fuller knowledge of local conditions, should be better able to decide on the spot, is likely to cramp his initiative in dealing with unforeseen developments, and will be avoided. in { } particular, such expressions as 'will await further orders' should be avoided" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). apart from the standing rules as to the printing of names of places in block type, including a reference to the map used, dating and signing the orders, numbering the copies, and stating the time and method of issue, etc., the general tenour of all operation orders will always be: _the enemy are. . . . my intention is. . . . you will. . . ._ in other words, all that is known about the enemy, and of our own troops, that is essential for the purposes of the order, should be revealed; then the general intention of the commander who issues the orders; then the part in the operations that is to be played by the recipient. but the method of attaining the object will be left to the utmost extent possible to the recipient, with due regard to his personal characteristics. "it is essential that subordinates should not only be able to work intelligently and resolutely in accordance with brief orders or instructions, but should also be able to take upon themselves, whenever necessary, the responsibility of departing from, or of varying, the orders they may have received" ("field service regulations," vol. ii. ( )). { } index active defence, the, - adowa, battle of, (_note_) advanced guard, the, - distance, information, - in advances, in retreats, - , main guard, - nachod, night, problems, - strategical, strength of, - tactical, tactics of, - , - training, vanguard, - advances, night, - advancing under fire, - aërial observation, (_note_) , - photographs, aircraft, characteristics of, , , - advanced guard, communication by, , , flank guard, gas, outposts, - , position warfare, - protection by, , - protection from, pursuit by, , rear guard, , reconnaissance by, , , , , - , , smoke, alexander the great, allenby, general viscount, g.c.b., , america and the great war, american attack at fossoy, american civil war, , (_see also_ battles by name.) amiens, battle of, , , antietam, battle of, , , appomattox, battle of, , "appreciation of the situation," arabi pasha, arbela, battle of, archangel province, - archduke charles, argyll and sutherland highlanders, - armandvillers-folie, armies, the new, - arminius, victory of, - armistice day, , army, contemptible little, - of north virginia, , - of the cumberland, of the potomac, , - , arras, battle of, art of warfare, - artillery, characteristics of, - barrage, development of, - effective range, escorts, - gas shells, growth of, - heavy, , in attack, - , in defence, , in retreat, , light, - medium, mobility of, - outpost, , pack, positions, ranges, smoke shells, super-heavy, , ashby, gen. turner, c.s.a., assaults by night, - assembly, position of, - , attack, the, - aircraft in, artillery in, - battalion in, - cavalry, - close country, - company in, - co-operation, - , - , decisive, - , - disposition of troops, engineers, fire, flank, formation for, - forward body, - frontal, - general reserve, - holding, , , , , , , , local reserve, - medical arrangements, methods of, opening fire, - platoon in, - reconnaissance for, - smoke, strength of, - supply, - supports, - two plans of, villages, woods, - attacking force, the, - austerlitz, battle of, - , , australians at morlancourt, avenues, communicating, baccarat, battle of, bagdadieh, battle of, - balaclava charge, balloons, observation by, , - banks, gen., u.s.a., bapaume, battle of, barrage, the, base, the, , battalion in attack, - battle, the, - characteristics of, - decisive blow, - development of the, - influences on the, - information, - initiative, - outposts, - phases of the, - position, the, - reports, the defensive, - the defensive-offensive, - the encounter, the offensive, - types of, - bavaria, elector of, bayonet, the, - in night operations, bazaine, maréchal, bazeilles, defence of, benedek, marshal, bernadotte, marshal, blenheim, battle of, - blücher, marshal, , , , bluff, the (ypres), boer war, (_note_) bois de vaux, bombs, light mortar, - (_see also_ grenades.) border regiment, bourlon village, bristow station, british efforts, - , - moral, - broenbeek, bromhead, lieut., bülow, general von, bunker hill, battle of, burnside, gen., u.s.a., , , , - byng of vimy, gen. lord, g.c.b., , cambrai, first battle of, , - , , , , second battle of, , camouflage, canadian cavalry, engineers, infantry at vimy, canadians at ypres, cannae, battle of, carey, maj.-gen. g. g. s., c.b., carey's force, cattigny wood, cavalry, characteristics of, - cossack posts, in attack, - in defence, - in pursuit, - , in retreat, - , , - mesopotamian campaign, - outposts, protection by, - , raids by, - reconnaissance by, , , , - , , - vedettes, cetewayo, - chambord, chateau de, chancellorsville, battle of, , , , , , changes in warfare, - characteristics of the various arms, - chard, lieut., charleroi, battle of, chattanooga, battle of, - chemin des dames, civilised warfare, - clery, lieut.-gen. sir c. f. (_quoted_): advanced guard tactics, - close country, fighting in, - coldstream guards, colenso, battle of, colombey, battle of, combe, capt. e. p., m.c., commander, battalion, - company, - outpost company, - piquet, - platoon, - , - commander's influence, - orders, - plans, - position, "common sense" fallacy, , communication, , , - communications, lateral, lines of, - company in attack, - outpost, - condé-mons-binche line, connection by night, "contemptible little army," the, - , convoys, - co-operation, - , coruña, - cossack posts, counter attack, decisive, , , - local, , , , , cover, - , covering fire, - cronje, gen. (paardeberg), cross keys, battle of, crown prince of prussia ( ), ( ), crozat canal, cugny, cumberland, army of the, cyclists, characteristics of, davis, jefferson, day outposts, - daylight and night attacks, decisive attack, the, - , - counter attack, , , - defence in close country, - of villages, of woods, defensive action, - , battle, - flank, system, defensive-offensive battle, - defiles, definitions, - delaborde, général, , delaying action, , - , - deployment, position of, - depth of a position, detached posts, , de wet, , diamond formation, direction by night, discipline, value of, - dresden, battle of, , early, general., c.s. army, east surrey regiment, embussing point, encounter battle, , engineers, royal, characteristics, gas, smoke, entrenching tool, entrenchments, - , , epehy, battle of, ettlingen, battle of, eugène of savoy, evelington heights, - fabius maximus, , fallacies exposed, - fanny's farm, field artillery, characteristics of, - of battle, - of fire, fighting in close country, - fire attack, - and movement, covering, - opening, , - , , overhead, tactics, - flame projectors, flanders, battle of, flank attacks, , - guard tactics, guards, - , scouts, flanks in defence, security of, fletcher, col. sir r., bart., foch, maréchal, , - , (_quoted_):-- advanced guard tactics, , art of war, british victories in , - defence in modern warfare, definitions, fully equipped mind, - human factor in war, - moral, nachod, outflanking a rear guard, principles of war, - protection by attack, soul of the defence, subordinate commanders, surprise, - , well conducted battle, fog of battle, fontenoy-belleau attack, formations for the attack, - forrest, general, c. s. army, , fort garry horse, forward body, the, - fossoy, american attack at, france, spirit of, franco-prussian war, , - (_see also_ battles by name.) frederick the great, , , fredericksburg, battle of, , , , , , , french of ypres, field-marshal earl, k.p., - , - , , , (_quoted_):-- "contemptible little army," defence in modern warfare, necessity for study, frontage of outpost company, frontal attack, - gaines's mill, battle of, , gallieni, général, , gas, , , , - gatacre, maj.-gen. sir w. f., k.c.b., gaugamela, (note) general reserve, in attack, - in defence, - , - george, rt. hon. d. lloyd-, o.m. (_quoted_): british efforts, - , - gette river, gettysburg, battle of, , , , - , - , , gheluvelt, , gifert wood, givenchy, grant, maj.-gen. p. g., c.b., grant, general u. s., u.s.a., , , , , - , , , - gravelotte, battle of, "green curve," the, , grenades, hand and rifle, grenfell, gen. sir f. w., k.c.b., grouchy, maréchal, - , - ground, eye for, - scouts, guards' division, , , gueudecourt, haerincourt and epehy, battle of, haig of bemersyde, field-marshal earl, k.t., (_quoted_):-- artillery, - canal bridges, carey's force, cavalry in defence, cavalry in the war, - fuse no. , gas, - hang on! health and moral, infantry the backbone, new armies, - "other man's job," principles of war, rearward services, reserves in , rifle and bayonet, smoke, surprise, tanks, haking, lieut.-gen. sir r. c. b., g.b.e. (_quoted_):-- advanced guards, rear guards, hal and tubize, hamley, gen. sir e. b., k.c.b. (_quoted_):-- communications, co-operation, - courage, definitions, "higher ranks" fallacy, mobility, study required, hancock, gen., u.s.a., hand grenades, hannibal, harold ii., king, - harrison's landing, hastings, battle of, - health and moral, heavy artillery, , heights of abraham, henderson, col. g. f. r., c.b. (_quoted_):-- abraham lincoln, atmosphere of battle, - british and american troops, - cavalry, "common sense" fallacy, co-operation, - discipline, eye for ground, - flank attacks, grant's bases, soldiers' battles, sound system of command, spottsylvania, - study necessary, - value of text-books, hennechy, "higher ranks" fallacy, hill, gen. d. h., c.s. army, - hindenburg, marshal von, hindenburg line, battle of the, , hohenlinden, battle of, hood, gen. j. b., c.s. army, hooker, gen., u.s.a., , , , horatius cocles, horse artillery, characteristics of, , hotchkiss rifles, howitzers, , , , human nature in war, - hunter, gen., u.s.a., infantry, characteristics of, - information in battle, - , , - initiative, the, - , - intelligence officers, - isandhlwana, - , italo-turkish campaign, (_note_) jackson, gen. t. j., c.s. army, ("stonewall" jackson), , , , , , joffre, maréchal, , jourdan, maréchal, kimberley, relief of, kite balloons, - königgratz, battle of, koorn spruit, , ladysmith, relief of, la fère, lancashire territorials, le cateau, first battle of, , second battle of, , lee, general r. e., c.s. army, , , , , , , , - , , , , , - , , - , - leonidas, le quesnoy, les boeufs, - leuthen, battle of, lewis guns, characteristics of, liberty of manoeuvre, - , , - , , - , , light mortars, - , ligny, battle of, , , - lincoln, abraham, , , lines of communications, - of observation, , of resistance, , local reserves, attack, - defence, , outposts, , rear guards, logan, gen. j. a., u.s.a., london regiment, longstreet, gen. j., c.s. army, losses reduced by movement, - ludendorff, lys, attack on the, , mcclellan, gen. j. b., u.s.a., - , - , , , , machine guns, characteristics of, in attack, - , in close country, - in defence, - , in outposts, , in retreats, - range of, mcneill, maj.-gen. sir j., k.c.b., madritov, colonel, - magersfontein, battle of, mahdist arabs, main guard (advanced guard), (rear guard), - maistre, general (_quoted_):-- british valour, malplaquet, battle of, malvern hill, battle of, , - , , - , manassas, battles of, manoeuvre, liberty of, - manoury, général, map reading, , , marches, night, - marching power of troops, - marengo, battle of, , marlborough, duke of, - , marmont, maréchal, , marne, first battle of the, - , - , , , second battle of the, - marshall, gen. sir w. r., k.c.b., - marye's hill, masséna, maréchal, maude, gen. sir s., k.c.b., mcdowell, battle of, meade, gen., u.s.a., , , , , , meagher's irish brigade, mechanical transport, - , , medical arrangements (attack), mesopotamia, , - message cards, messines, battle of, , methods of attack, methuen, field-marshal lord, g.c.b., mobility, value of, - , monchy-le-preux, monocacy, battle of, mons, retreat from, , , - , , , - , moore, gen. sir j., k.c.b., - moral, - moreau, brig.-gen., général j. v., morlancourt, mortars, , , - , mounted troops, characteristics of, - movement and fire, - in close country, murat, maréchal, musketry, - , - nachod, battle of, , napier, sir w. f. p. (_quoted_):-- rear guards, - torres vedras, - napoleon, emperor, , , - , , , , , , , (_quoted_):-- caesar and turenne, c'est les prussiens, moral force, - read and re-read, to cover turin, nashville, battle of, national moral, - new armies, the, - newfoundland regiment, the royal, , niederwald, - night advances, - assaults, - entrenching, marches, - operations, - outposts, - nile valley, noisseville, norman conquest, - observation, line of, , posts, obstacles, offensive battle, the, - spirit, operation orders, - orders, - orthez, battle of, osman pasha, outpost zone, the, , outposts, - aircraft, artillery, battle outposts, - cavalry, , commander, - company, - day, - distance, frontage, information, - line of observation, , line of resistance, , machine guns, , night, - observation by, , orders, - outpost company, - outpost zone, patrols, , - piquets, position warfare, , reconnaissance by, reserves, resistance by, , sentry groups, - strength, withdrawal of, paardeberg, battle of, , pack artillery, characteristics of, , passive defence, patrols, fighting, from outposts, , - raiding, peiwar kotal, battle of, penetration by attack, - pétain, maréchal, pfaffen wood, phalanx, the, photographs, aërial, piave line, the, pill-box forts, - pioneer infantry, piquets, platoon in attack, - in defence, pleasant hill, plevna, battle of, plumer, field-marshal lord, g.c.b., polygon wood, - position, choice of a, - defensive, - warfare, - , - , , , - , , potomac, army of the, - , - , , principles of warfare, - protection and reconnaissance, - by night, pulteney, gen. sir w. p., k.c.b., pursuit, , quatre bras, battle of, quebec, queen's regiment, raids, , , rallying place, ramadie, battle of, ramdam, ramillies, battle of, , range cards, ranges of artillery, of small arms, of mortars, rappahannock station, rastatt, rear guard, - aircraft, artillery, cavalry, composition, distance, distribution, - examples, - infantry, main guard, - machine guns, mechanical transport, medical arrangements, night, positions, - rear party, - royal engineers, strength, - tactics, , , - training, - reconnaissance and protection, - , by raids, during battle, for attack, - for defence, - intelligence officers, - tactical, - reorganisation after attack, and pursuit, report centres, reports, battle, on positions, - reserve, general, in attack, - in defence, - outposts, local, - , , , , , resistance, line of, , retiring under fire, - retreat from mons, , - , , , - , lines of, - tactics in, - reumont, rezonville, rifle, the british, , - rifle grenade, the, roberts, field-marshal earl, k.g., - , (_quoted_):-- "germany strikes," roliça, combat at, , roman walls, rorke's drift, - , royal engineers, characteristics of, , defence, horse artillery, in attack, , outposts, retreats, west kent regiment, runners, russia, collapse of, north (campaign), - russian war of - , russo-japanese war, , - russo-turkish war, , sadowa, battle of, st. privat, battle of, salamanca, battle of, , salient, the ( ), , (ypres), sambre, battle of the, sannah's post, , sarrail, général, sauroren, battle of, savage warfare, - scarpe, battle of the, scouts (platoon), secrecy, , - , , , , - , - sectors of defence, sedan, battle of, selle, battle of the, semi-permanent defences, - seneca _quoted_: (surprise), sentry groups, , - serre hill, - seven days' battle, the, , sharpsburg, battle of, , , shenandoah valley campaign, , , , signals, , "silence is golden," skobeleff, general michael dimitrievitch, smith-dorrien, gen. sir h. l., g.c.b., , smoke, , - , , snipers, soissons, fortress of, , soldiers' battles, somme, first battle of the, , , , - , , , - second battle of the, - , , - , , , , , - , soult, maréchal, , south african war, - . (_see also_ battles by name.) spicheren, battle of, - , spottsylvania, battle of, - , , - square formation in attack, stafford heights, stamford bridge, battle of, stormberg, strategical advanced guard, strategy defined, , and tactics, - stuart, gen. j. e. b., c.s. army ("jeb" stuart), , - , , . study, necessity for, - , - sublician bridge, sulphur springs, super-heavy artillery, , supply, , supports in attack, - , in close country, defence, outposts, - surprise, value of, , - , , fire, , historical examples, , , , - , , , tactical advanced guard, reconnaissance, - tactics and strategy, - definition of, , subservient to strategy, - tadpole copse, talavera, battle of, tallard, maréchal, tanks, characteristics of, , - in close country, , , , taube farm, taylor, gen. r., c.s. army (_quoted_):-- cardinal principles, discipline, tel-el-kebir, battle of, - territorial troops, , teutoberger wald, - text-books, value of, theatre of operations, - thermopylae, battle of, thielmann's corps (wavre), thomas, gen. g. h., u.s.a., time, value of, tofrik, battle of, torres vedras, lines of, - toski, battle of, toulouse, battle of, trench warfare, - trenches, fire, troisvilles, trônes wood, tubize and hal, tweefontein, types of battle action, - valley campaign, the, , , , vanguard, the, - varus, defeat of, - vedettes, verdun, defence of, verneville, battle of, view, in close country, village fighting, - , - balan, bazeilles, bourlon, givenchy, noisseville, villers-guislain, villers-brétonneux, villages, attack on, defence of, vimy ridge, visibility from air, vittoria, battle of, , von below, general, von bredow's "todtenritt," von kluck, general, wallace, gen. lew, u.s.a., warfare, art of, - savage, - warren, gen., u.s.a., watchword at night, waterloo, battle of, , - , , - , - wauchope, brig-gen. a. g., wavre, battle of, , weather, wellington, field-marshal duke of, k.g., , , , , - , - , wilderness, battle of the, - , , - , william the conqueror, wire, wolfe, gen. james, wolseley, field-marshal viscount, k.p., - wood fighting, - bois de vaux, elsasshausen copse, gauche, gifert, niederwald, - pfaffen, polygon, - tadpole copse, trônes, woods, attack on, - defence of, worcestershire regiment, worth, battle of, , - wytschaete ridge, , yalu, battle of the, ypres, first battle of, , , - , second battle of, , , , third battle of, , zero hour, zulu war, - none proofreaders team the art of war by baron de jomini, general and aid-de-camp of the emperor of russia. a new edition, with appendices and maps. translated from the french by capt. g.h. mendell, corps of topographical engineers, u.s. army, and lieut. w.p. craighill, corps of engineers, u.s. army. originally published in preface. in the execution of any undertaking there are extremes on either hand which are alike to be avoided. the rule holds in a special manner in making a translation. there is, on the one side, the extreme of too rigid adherence, word for word and line for line, to the original, and on the other is the danger of using too free a pen. in either case the sense of the author may not be truly given. it is not always easy to preserve a proper mean between these extremes. the translators of jomini's summary of the principles of the art of war have endeavored to render their author into plain english, without mutilating or adding to his ideas, attempting no display and making no criticisms. to persons accustomed to read for instruction in military matters, it is not necessary to say a word with reference to the merits of jomini. to those not thus accustomed heretofore, but who are becoming more interested in such subjects, (and this class must include the great mass of the american public,) it is sufficient to say, and it may be said with entire truth, that general jomini is admitted by all competent judges to be one of the ablest military critics and historians of this or any other day. the translation now presented to the people has been made with the earnest hope and the sincere expectation of its proving useful. as the existence of a large, well-instructed standing army is deemed incompatible with our institutions, it becomes the more important that military information be as extensively diffused as possible among the people. if by the present work the translators shall find they have contributed, even in an inconsiderable degree, to this important object, they will be amply repaid for the care and labor expended upon it. to those persons to whom the study of the art of war is a new one, it is recommended to begin at the article "strategy," chapter iii., from that point to read to the end of the second appendix, and then to return to chapters i. and ii. it should be borne in mind that this subject, to be appreciated, must be studied, map in hand: this remark is especially true of strategy. an acquaintance with the campaigns of napoleon i. is quite important, as they are constantly referred to by jomini and by all other recent writers on the military art. u.s. military academy, west point, n.y. january, . contents. translators' preface. definitions of the branches of the art of war. chapter i. the relation of diplomacy to war. art. i.--offensive wars to recover rights. art. ii.--wars which are politically defensive, and offensive in a military view. art. iii.--wars of expediency. art. iv.--wars with or without allies. art. v.--wars of intervention. art. vi.--wars of invasion, through a desire of conquest or for other causes. art. vii.--wars of opinion. art. viii.--national wars. art. ix.--civil and religious wars. art. x.--double wars, and the danger of undertaking two at the same time. chapter ii. military policy. art. xi.--military statistics and geography. art. xii.--different causes which have an influence over the success of a war. art. xiii.--the military institutions of states. art. xiv.--the command of armies and the supreme control of operations. art. xv.--the military spirit of nations and the morale of armies. chapter iii. strategy. definition of strategy and tactics. the fundamental principle of war. art. xvi.--the system of offensive or defensive operations. art. xvii.--the theater of operations. art. xviii.--bases of operations. art. xix.--strategic lines and points, decisive points of the theater of war, and objective points of operation. art. xx.--fronts of operations, strategic fronts, lines of defense, and strategic positions. art. xxi.--zones and lines of operations. art. xxii.--strategic lines of maneuver. art. xxiii.--means of protecting lines of operations by temporary bases or strategic reserves. art. xxiv.--the old and new systems of war. art. xxv.--depots of supply, and their relations to operations. art. xxvi.--frontiers, and their defense by forts and intrenched lines.--wars of sieges. art. xxvii.--intrenched camps and têtes de ponts in their relation to strategy. art. xxviii.--strategic operations in mountainous countries. art. xxix.--grand invasions and distant expeditions. epitome of strategy. chapter iv. grand tactics and battles. art. xxx.--positions and defensive battles. art. xxxi.--offensive battles and orders of battle. art. xxxii.--turning maneuvers, and too extended movements in battle. art. xxxiii.--unexpected meeting of two armies on the march. art. xxxiv.--surprises of armies. art. xxxv.--attack of cities, intrenched camps or lines, and coups de main generally. chapter v. several operations of a mixed character, which are partly in the domain of strategy and partly of tactics. art. xxxvi.--diversions and great detachments. art. xxxvii.--passage of rivers and other streams. art. xxxviii.--retreats and pursuits. art. xxxix.--cantonments and winter quarters. art. xl.--descents, or maritime expeditions. chapter vi. logistics, or the practical art of moving armies. art. xli.--a few remarks on logistics in general. art. xlii.--reconnoissances, and other means of gaining accurate information of the enemy's movements. chapter vii. formation and employment of troops for battle. art. art. xliii--posting troops in line of battle. art. xliv.--formation and employment of infantry. art. xlv.---formation and employment of cavalry. art. xlvi.---formation and employment of artillery. art. xlvii.--employment of the three arms together. conclusion. supplement. appendix. second appendix. sketch of the principal maritime expeditions. summary of the art of war. definition of the art of war. the art of war, as generally considered, consists of five purely military branches,--viz.: strategy, grand tactics, logistics, engineering, and tactics. a sixth and essential branch, hitherto unrecognized, might be termed _diplomacy in its relation to war_. although this branch is more naturally and intimately connected with the profession of a statesman than with that of a soldier, it cannot be denied that, if it be useless to a subordinate general, it is indispensable to every general commanding an army: it enters into all the combinations which may lead to a war, and has a connection with the various operations to be undertaken in this war; and, in this view, it should have a place in a work like this. to recapitulate, the art of war consists of six distinct parts:-- . statesmanship in its relation to war. . strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion. . grand tactics. . logistics, or the art of moving armies. . engineering,--the attack and defense of fortifications. . minor tactics. it is proposed to analyze the principal combinations of the first four branches, omitting the consideration of tactics and of the art of engineering. familiarity with all these parts is not essential in order to be a good infantry, cavalry, or artillery officer; but for a general, or for a staff officer, this knowledge is indispensable. chapter i. statesmanship in its relation to war. under this head are included those considerations from which a statesman concludes whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable, and determines the various operations necessary to attain the object of the war. a government goes to war,-- to reclaim certain rights or to defend them; to protect and maintain the great interests of the state, as commerce, manufactures, or agriculture; to uphold neighboring states whose existence is necessary either for the safety of the government or the balance of power; to fulfill the obligations of offensive and defensive alliances; to propagate political or religious theories, to crush them out, or to defend them; to increase the influence and power of the state by acquisitions of territory; to defend the threatened independence of the state; to avenge insulted honor; or, from a mania for conquest. it may be remarked that these different kinds of war influence in some degree the nature and extent of the efforts and operations necessary for the proposed end. the party who has provoked the war may be reduced to the defensive, and the party assailed may assume the offensive; and there may be other circumstances which will affect the nature and conduct of a war, as,-- . a state may simply make war against another state. . a state may make war against several states in alliance with each other. . a state in alliance with another may make war upon a single enemy. . a state may be either the principal party or an auxiliary. . in the latter case a state may join in the struggle at its beginning or after it has commenced. . the theater of war may be upon the soil of the enemy, upon that of an ally, or upon its own. . if the war be one of invasion, it may be upon adjacent or distant territory: it may be prudent and cautious, or it may be bold and adventurous. . it may be a national war, either against ourselves or against the enemy. . the war may be a civil or a religious war. war is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the art; but great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the operations to be undertaken, which should depend upon the circumstances of the case. for example: two hundred thousand french wishing to subjugate the spanish people, united to a man against them, would not maneuver as the same number of french in a march upon vienna, or any other capital, to compel a peace; nor would a french army fight the guerrillas of mina as they fought the russians at borodino; nor would a french army venture to march upon vienna without considering what might be the tone and temper of the governments and communities between the rhine and the inn, or between the danube and the elbe. a regiment should always fight in nearly the same way; but commanding generals must be guided by circumstances and events. to these different combinations, which belong more or less to statesmanship, may be added others which relate solely to the management of armies. the name military policy is given to them; for they belong exclusively neither to diplomacy nor to strategy, but are still of the highest importance in the plans both of a statesman and a general. article i. offensive wars to reclaim rights. when a state has claims upon another, it may not always be best to enforce them by arms. the public interest must be consulted before action. the most just war is one which is founded upon undoubted rights, and which, in addition, promises to the state advantages commensurate with the sacrifices required and the hazards incurred. unfortunately, in our times there are so many doubtful and contested rights that most wars, though apparently based upon bequests, or wills, or marriages, are in reality but wars of expediency. the question of the succession to the spanish crown under louis xiv. was very clear, since it was plainly settled by a solemn will, and was supported by family ties and by the general consent of the spanish nation; yet it was stoutly contested by all europe, and produced a general coalition against the legitimate legatee. frederick ii., while austria and france were at war, brought forward an old claim, entered silesia in force and seized this province, thus doubling the power of prussia. this was a stroke of genius; and, even if he had failed, he could not have been much censured; for the grandeur and importance of the enterprise justified him in his attempt, as far as such attempts can be justified. in wars of this nature no rules can be laid down. to watch and to profit by every circumstance covers all that can be said. offensive movements should be suitable to the end to be attained. the most natural step would be to occupy the disputed territory: then offensive operations may be carried on according to circumstances and to the respective strength of the parties, the object being to secure the cession of the territory by the enemy, and the means being to threaten him in the heart of his own country. every thing depends upon the alliances the parties may be able to secure with other states, and upon their military resources. in an offensive movement, scrupulous care must be exercised not to arouse the jealousy of any other state which might come to the aid of the enemy. it is a part of the duty of a statesman to foresee this chance, and to obviate it by making proper explanations and giving proper guarantees to other states. article ii. of wars defensive politically, and offensive in a military point of view. a state attacked by another which renews an old claim rarely yields it without a war: it prefers to defend its territory, as is always more honorable. but it may be advantageous to take the offensive, instead of awaiting the attack on the frontiers. there are often advantages in a war of invasion: there are also advantages in awaiting the enemy upon one's own soil. a power with no internal dissensions, and under no apprehension of an attack by a third party, will always find it advantageous to carry the war upon hostile soil. this course will spare its territory from devastation, carry on the war at the expense of the enemy, excite the ardor of its soldiers, and depress the spirits of the adversary. nevertheless, in a purely military sense, it is certain that an army operating in its own territory, upon a theater of which all the natural and artificial features are well known, where all movements are aided by a knowledge of the country, by the favor of the citizens, and the aid of the constituted authorities, possesses great advantages. these plain truths have their application in all descriptions of war; but, if the principles of strategy are always the same, it is different with the political part of war, which is modified by the tone of communities, by localities, and by the characters of men at the head of states and armies. the fact of these modifications has been used to prove that war knows no rules. military science rests upon principles which can never be safely violated in the presence of an active and skillful enemy, while the moral and political part of war presents these variations. plans of operations are made as circumstances may demand: to execute these plans, the great principles of war must be observed. for instance, the plan of a war against france, austria, or russia would differ widely from one against the brave but undisciplined bands of turks, which cannot be kept in order, are not able to maneuver well, and possess no steadiness under misfortunes. article iii. wars of expediency. the invasion of silesia by frederick ii., and the war of the spanish succession, were wars of expediency. there are two kinds of wars of expediency: first, where a powerful state undertakes to acquire natural boundaries for commercial and political reasons; secondly, to lessen the power of a dangerous rival or to prevent his aggrandizement. these last are wars of intervention; for a state will rarely singly attack a dangerous rival: it will endeavor to form a coalition for that purpose. these views belong rather to statesmanship or diplomacy than to war. article iv. of wars with or without allies. of course, in a war an ally is to be desired, all other things being equal. although a great state will more probably succeed than two weaker states in alliance against it, still the alliance is stronger than either separately. the ally not only furnishes a contingent of troops, but, in addition, annoys the enemy to a great degree by threatening portions of his frontier which otherwise would have been secure. all history teaches that no enemy is so insignificant as to be despised and neglected by any power, however formidable. article v. wars of intervention. to interfere in a contest already begun promises more advantages to a state than war under any other circumstances; and the reason is plain. the power which interferes throws upon one side of the scale its whole weight and influence; it interferes at the most opportune moment, when it can make decisive use of its resources. there are two kinds of intervention: . intervention in the internal affairs of neighboring states; . intervention in external relations. whatever may be said as to the moral character of interventions of the first class, instances are frequent. the romans acquired power by these interferences, and the empire of the english india company was assured in a similar manner. these interventions are not always successful. while russia has added to her power by interference with poland, austria, on the contrary, was almost ruined by her attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of france during the revolution. intervention in the external relations of states is more legitimate, and perhaps more advantageous. it may be doubtful whether a nation has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another people; but it certainly has a right to oppose it when it propagates disorder which may reach the adjoining states. there are three reasons for intervention in exterior foreign wars,--viz.: , by virtue of a treaty which binds to aid; , to maintain the political equilibrium; , to avoid certain evil consequences of the war already commenced, or to secure certain advantages from the war not to be obtained otherwise. history is filled with examples of powers which have fallen by neglect of these principles. "a state begins to decline when it permits the immoderate aggrandizement of a rival, and a secondary power may become the arbiter of nations if it throw its weight into the balance at the proper time." in a military view, it seems plain that the sudden appearance of a new and large army as a third party in a well-contested war must be decisive. much will depend upon its geographical position in reference to the armies already in the field. for example, in the winter of napoleon crossed the vistula and ventured to the walls of königsberg, leaving austria on his rear and having russia in front. if austria had launched an army of one hundred thousand men from bohemia upon the oder, it is probable that the power of napoleon would have been ended; there is every reason to think that his army could not have regained the rhine. austria preferred to wait till she could raise four hundred thousand men. two years afterward, with this force she took the field, and was beaten; while one hundred thousand men well employed at the proper time would have decided the fate of europe. there are several kinds of war resulting from these two different interventions:-- . where the intervention is merely auxiliary, and with a force specified by former treaties. . where the intervention is to uphold a feeble neighbor by defending his territory, thus shifting the scene of war to other soil. . a state interferes as a principal party when near the theater of war,--which supposes the case of a coalition of several powers against one. . a state interferes either in a struggle already in progress, or interferes before the declaration of war. when a state intervenes with only a small contingent, in obedience to treaty-stipulations, it is simply an accessory, and has but little voice in the main operations; but when it intervenes as a principal party, and with an imposing force, the case is quite different. the military chances in these wars are varied. the russian army in the seven years' war was in fact auxiliary to that of austria and france: still, it was a principal party in the north until its occupation of prussia. but when generals fermor and soltikoff conducted the army as far as brandenburg it acted solely in the interest of austria: the fate of these troops, far from their base, depended upon the good or bad maneuvering of their allies. such distant excursions are dangerous, and generally delicate operations. the campaigns of and furnish sad illustrations of this, to which we shall again refer in article xxix., in discussing the military character of these expeditions. it follows, then, that the safety of the army may be endangered by these distant interventions. the counterbalancing advantage is that its own territory cannot then be easily invaded, since the scene of hostilities is so distant; so that what may be a misfortune for the general may be, in a measure, an advantage to the state. in wars of this character the essentials are to secure a general who is both a statesman and a soldier; to have clear stipulations with the allies as to the part to be taken by each in the principal operations; finally, to agree upon an objective point which shall be in harmony with the common interests. by the neglect of these precautions, the greater number of coalitions have failed, or have maintained a difficult struggle with a power more united but weaker than the allies. the third kind of intervention, which consists in interfering with the whole force of the state and near to its frontiers, is more promising than the others. austria had an opportunity of this character in , but failed to profit by it: she again had the opportunity in . napoleon had just collected his forces in saxony, when austria, taking his front of operations in reverse, threw herself into the struggle with two hundred thousand men, with almost perfect certainty of success. she regained in two months the italian empire and her influence in germany, which had been lost by fifteen years of disaster. in this intervention austria had not only the political but also the military chances in her favor,--a double result, combining the highest advantages. her success was rendered more certain by the fact that while the theater was sufficiently near her frontiers to permit the greatest possible display of force, she at the same time interfered in a contest already in progress, upon which she entered with the whole of her resources and at the time most opportune for her. this double advantage is so decisive that it permits not only powerful monarchies, but even small states, to exercise a controlling influence when they know how to profit by it. two examples may establish this. in , the elector maurice of saxony boldly declared war against charles v., who was master of spain, italy, and the german empire, and had been victorious over francis i. and held france in his grasp. this movement carried the war into the tyrol, and arrested the great conqueror in his career. in , the duke of savoy, victor amadeus, by declaring himself hostile to louis xiv., changed the state of affairs in italy, and caused the recall of the french army from the banks of the adige to the walls of turin, where it encountered the great catastrophe which immortalized prince eugene. enough has been said to illustrate the importance and effect of these opportune interventions: more illustrations might be given, but they could not add to the conviction of the reader. article vi. aggressive wars for conquest and other reasons. there are two very different kinds of invasion: one attacks an adjoining state; the other attacks a distant point, over intervening territory of great extent whose inhabitants may be neutral, doubtful, or hostile. wars of conquest, unhappily, are often prosperous,--as alexander, cæsar, and napoleon during a portion of his career, have fully proved. however, there are natural limits in these wars, which cannot be passed without incurring great disaster. cambyses in nubia, darius in scythia, crassus and the emperor julian among the parthians, and napoleon in russia, furnish bloody proofs of these truths.--the love of conquest, however, was not the only motive with napoleon: his personal position, and his contest with england, urged him to enterprises the aim of which was to make him supreme. it is true that he loved war and its chances; but he was also a victim to the necessity of succeeding in his efforts or of yielding to england. it might be said that he was sent into this world to teach generals and statesmen what they should avoid. his victories teach what may be accomplished by activity, boldness, and skill; his disasters, what might have been avoided by prudence. a war of invasion without good reason--like that of genghis khan--is a crime against humanity; but it may be excused, if not approved, when induced by great interests or when conducted with good motives. the invasions of spain of and of differed equally in object and in results: the first was a cunning and wanton attack, which threatened the existence of the spanish nation, and was fatal to its author; the second, while combating dangerous principles, fostered the general interests of the country, and was the more readily brought to a successful termination because its object met with the approval of the majority of the people whose territory was invaded. these illustrations show that invasions are not necessarily all of the same character. the first contributed largely to the fall of napoleon; the second restored the relation between france and spain, which ought never to have been changed. let us hope that invasions may be rare. still, it is better to attack than to be invaded; and let us remember that the surest way to check the spirit of conquest and usurpation is to oppose it by intervention at the proper time. an invasion, to be successful, must, be proportioned in magnitude to the end to be attained and to the obstacles to be overcome. an invasion against an exasperated people, ready for all sacrifices and likely to be aided by a powerful neighbor, is a dangerous enterprise, as was well proved by the war in spain, ( ,) and by the wars of the revolution in , , and . in these latter wars, if france was better prepared than spain, she had no powerful ally, and she was attacked by all europe upon both land and sea. although the circumstances were different, the russian invasion of turkey developed, in some respects, the same symptoms of national resistance. the religious hatred of the ottoman powerfully incited him to arms; but the same motive was powerless among the greeks, who were twice as numerous as the turks. had the interests of the greeks and turks been harmonized, as were those of alsace with france, the united people would have been stronger, but they would have lacked the element of religious fanaticism. the war of proved that turkey was formidable only upon the frontiers, where her bravest troops were found, while in the interior all was weakness. when an invasion of a neighboring territory has nothing to fear from the inhabitants, the principles of strategy shape its course. the popular feeling rendered the invasions of italy, austria, and prussia so prompt. (these military points are treated of in article xxix.) but when the invasion is distant and extensive territories intervene, its success will depend more upon diplomacy than upon strategy. the first step to insure success will be to secure the sincere and devoted alliance of a state adjoining the enemy, which will afford reinforcements of troops, and, what is still more important, give a secure base of operations, depots of supplies, and a safe refuge in case of disaster. the ally must have the same interest in success as the invaders, to render all this possible. diplomacy, while almost decisive in distant expeditions, is not powerless in adjacent invasions; for here a hostile intervention may arrest the most brilliant successes. the invasions of austria in and might have ended differently if prussia had interfered. the invasion of the north of germany in was, so to speak, permitted by austria. that of rumelia in might have ended in disaster, had not a wise statesmanship by negotiation obviated all chance of intervention. article vii. wars of opinion. although wars of opinion, national wars, and civil wars are sometimes confounded, they differ enough to require separate notice. wars of opinion may be intestine, both intestine and foreign, and, lastly, (which, however, is rare,) they may be foreign or exterior without being intestine or civil. wars of opinion between two states belong also to the class of wars of intervention; for they result either from doctrines which one party desires to propagate among its neighbors, or from dogmas which it desires to crush,--in both cases leading to intervention. although originating in religious or political dogmas, these wars are most deplorable; for, like national wars, they enlist the worst passions, and become vindictive, cruel, and terrible. the wars of islamism, the crusades, the thirty years' war, the wars of the league, present nearly the same characteristics. often religion is the pretext to obtain political power, and the war is not really one of dogmas. the successors of mohammed cared more to extend their empire than to preach the koran, and philip ii., bigot as he was, did not sustain the league in france for the purpose of advancing the roman church. we agree with m. ancelot that louis ix., when he went on a crusade in egypt, thought more of the commerce of the indies than of gaining possession of the holy sepulcher. the dogma sometimes is not only a pretext, but is a powerful ally; for it excites the ardor of the people, and also creates a party. for instance, the swedes in the thirty years' war, and philip ii. in france, had allies in the country more powerful than their armies. it may, however, happen, as in the crusades and the wars of islamism, that the dogma for which the war is waged, instead of friends, finds only bitter enemies in the country invaded; and then the contest becomes fearful. the chances of support and resistance in wars of political opinions are about equal. it may be recollected how in associations of fanatics thought it possible to propagate throughout europe the famous declaration of the rights of man, and how governments became justly alarmed, and rushed to arms probably with the intention of only forcing the lava of this volcano back into its crater and there extinguishing it. the means were not fortunate; for war and aggression are inappropriate measures for arresting an evil which lies wholly in the human passions, excited in a temporary paroxysm, of less duration as it is the more violent. time is the true remedy for all bad passions and for all anarchical doctrines. a civilized nation may bear the yoke of a factious and unrestrained multitude for a short interval; but these storms soon pass away, and reason resumes her sway. to attempt to restrain such a mob by a foreign force is to attempt to restrain the explosion of a mine when the powder has already been ignited: it is far better to await the explosion and afterward fill up the crater than to try to prevent it and to perish in the attempt. after a profound study of the revolution, i am convinced that, if the girondists and national assembly had not been threatened by foreign armaments, they would never have dared to lay their sacrilegious hands upon the feeble but venerable head of louis xvi. the girondists would never have been crushed by the mountain but for the reverses of dumouriez and the threats of invasion. and if they had been permitted to clash and quarrel with each other to their hearts' content, it is probable that, instead of giving place to the terrible convention, the assembly would slowly have returned to the restoration of good, temperate, monarchical doctrines, in accordance with the necessities and the immemorial traditions of the french. in a military view these wars are fearful, since the invading force not only is met by the armies of the enemy, but is exposed to the attacks of an exasperated people. it may be said that the violence of one party will necessarily create support for the invaders by the formation of another and opposite one; but, if the exasperated party possesses all the public resources, the armies, the forts, the arsenals, and if it is supported by a large majority of the people, of what avail will be the support of the faction which possesses no such means? what service did one hundred thousand vendeans and one hundred thousand federalists do for the coalition in ? history contains but a single example of a struggle like that of the revolution; and it appears to clearly demonstrate the danger of attacking an intensely-excited nation. however the bad management of the military operations was one cause of the unexpected result, and before deducing any certain maxims from this war, we should ascertain what would have been the result if after the flight of dumouriez, instead of destroying and capturing fortresses, the allies had informed the commanders of those fortresses that they contemplated no wrong to france, to her forts or her brave armies, and had marched on paris with two hundred thousand men. they might have restored the monarchy; and, again, they might never have returned, at least without the protection of an equal force on their retreat to the rhine. it is difficult to decide this, since the experiment was never made, and as all would have depended upon the course of the french nation and the army. the problem thus presents two equally grave solutions. the campaign of gave one; whether the other might have been obtained, it is difficult to say. experiment alone could have determined it. the military precepts for such wars are nearly the same as for national wars, differing, however, in a vital point. in national wars the country should be occupied and subjugated, the fortified places besieged and reduced, and the armies destroyed; whereas in wars of opinion it is of less importance to subjugate the country; here great efforts should be made to gain the end speedily, without delaying for details, care being constantly taken to avoid any acts which might alarm the nation for its independence or the integrity of its territory. the war in spain in is an example which may be cited in favor of this course in opposition to that of the revolution. it is true that the conditions were slightly different; for the french army of was made up of more solid elements than that of the radicals of the isla de leon. the war of the revolution was at once a war of opinion, a national war, and a civil war,--while, if the first war in spain in was thoroughly a national war, that of was a partial struggle of opinions without the element of nationality; and hence the enormous difference in the results. moreover, the expedition of the duke of angoulême was well carried out. instead of attacking fortresses, he acted in conformity to the above-mentioned precepts. pushing on rapidly to the ebro, he there divided his forces, to seize, at their sources, all the elements of strength of their enemies,--which they could safely do, since they were sustained by a majority of the inhabitants. if he had followed the instructions of the ministry, to proceed methodically to the conquest of the country and the reduction of the fortresses between the pyrenees and the ebro, in order to provide a base of operations, he would perhaps have failed in his mission, or at least made the war a long and bloody one, by exciting the national spirit by an occupation of the country similar to that of . emboldened by the hearty welcome of the people, he comprehended that it was a political operation rather than a military one, and that it behooved him to consummate it rapidly. his conduct, so different from that of the allies in , deserves careful attention from all charged with similar missions. in three months the army was under the walls of cadiz. if the events now transpiring in the peninsula prove that statesmanship was not able to profit by success in order to found a suitable and solid order of things, the fault was neither in the army nor in its commanders, but in the spanish government, which, yielding to the counsel of violent reactionaries, was unable to rise to the height of its mission. the arbiter between two great hostile interests, ferdinand blindly threw himself into the arms of the party which professed a deep veneration for the throne, but which intended to use the royal authority for the furtherance of its own ends, regardless of consequences. the nation remained divided in two hostile camps, which it would not have been impossible to calm and reconcile in time. these camps came anew into collision, as i predicted in verona in ,--a striking lesson, by which no one is disposed to profit in that beautiful and unhappy land, although history is not wanting in examples to prove that violent reactions, any more than revolutions, are not elements with which to construct and consolidate. may god grant that from this frightful conflict may emerge a strong and respected monarchy, equally separated from all factions, and based upon a disciplined army as well as upon the general interests of the country,--a monarchy capable of rallying to its support this incomprehensible spanish nation, which, with merits not less extraordinary than its faults, was always a problem for those who were in the best position to know it. article viii. national wars. national wars, to which we have referred in speaking of those of invasion, are the most formidable of all. this name can only be applied to such as are waged against a united people, or a great majority of them, filled with a noble ardor and determined to sustain their independence: then every step is disputed, the army holds only its camp-ground, its supplies can only be obtained at the point of the sword, and its convoys are everywhere threatened or captured. the spectacle of a spontaneous uprising of a nation is rarely seen; and, though there be in it something grand and noble which commands our admiration, the consequences are so terrible that, for the sake of humanity, we ought to hope never to see it. this uprising must not be confounded with a national defense in accordance with the institutions of the state and directed by the government. this uprising may be produced by the most opposite causes. the serfs may rise in a body at the call of the government, and their masters, affected by a noble love of their sovereign and country, may set them the example and take the command of them; and, similarly, a fanatical people may arm under the appeal of its priests; or a people enthusiastic in its political opinions, or animated by a sacred love of its institutions, may rush to meet the enemy in defense of all it holds most dear. the control of the sea is of much importance in the results of a national invasion. if the people possess a long stretch of coast, and are masters of the sea or in alliance with a power which controls it, their power of resistance is quintupled, not only on account of the facility of feeding the insurrection and of alarming the enemy on all the points he may occupy, but still more by the difficulties which will be thrown in the way of his procuring supplies by the sea. the nature of the country may be such as to contribute to the facility of a national defense. in mountainous countries the people are always most formidable; next to these are countries covered with extensive forests. the resistance of the swiss to austria and to the duke of burgundy, that of the catalans in and in , the difficulties encountered by the russians in the subjugation of the tribes of the caucasus, and, finally, the reiterated efforts of the tyrolese, clearly demonstrate that the inhabitants of mountainous regions have always resisted for a longer time than those of the plains,--which is due as much to the difference in character and customs as to the difference in the natural features of the countries. defiles and large forests, as well as rocky regions, favor this kind of defense; and the bocage of la vendée, so justly celebrated, proves that any country, even if it be only traversed by large hedges and ditches or canals, admits of a formidable defense. the difficulties in the path of an army in wars of opinions, as well as in national wars, are very great, and render the mission of the general conducting them very difficult. the events just mentioned, the contest of the netherlands with philip ii. and that of the americans with the english, furnish evident proofs of this; but the much more extraordinary struggle of la vendée with the victorious republic, those of spain, portugal, and the tyrol against napoleon, and, finally, those of the morea against the turks, and of navarre against the armies of queen christina, are still more striking illustrations. the difficulties are particularly great when the people are supported by a considerable nucleus of disciplined troops. the invader has only an army: his adversaries have an army, and a people wholly or almost wholly in arms, and making means of resistance out of every thing, each individual of whom conspires against the common enemy; even the non-combatants have an interest in his ruin and accelerate it by every means in their power. he holds scarcely any ground but that upon which he encamps; outside the limits of his camp every thing is hostile and multiplies a thousandfold the difficulties he meets at every step. these obstacles become almost insurmountable when the country is difficult. each armed inhabitant knows the smallest paths and their connections; he finds everywhere a relative or friend who aids him; the commanders also know the country, and, learning immediately the slightest movement on the part of the invader, can adopt the best measures to defeat his projects; while the latter, without information of their movements, and not in a condition to send out detachments to gain it, having no resource but in his bayonets, and certain safety only in the concentration of his columns, is like a blind man: his combinations are failures; and when, after the most carefully-concerted movements and the most rapid and fatiguing marches, he thinks he is about to accomplish his aim and deal a terrible blow, he finds no signs of the enemy but his camp-fires: so that while, like don quixote, he is attacking windmills, his adversary is on his line of communications, destroys the detachments left to guard it, surprises his convoys, his depots, and carries on a war so disastrous for the invader that he must inevitably yield after a time. in spain i was a witness of two terrible examples of this kind. when ney's corps replaced soult's at corunna, i had camped the companies of the artillery-train between betanzos and corunna, in the midst of four brigades distant from the camp from two to three leagues, and no spanish forces had been seen within fifty miles; soult still occupied santiago de compostela, the division maurice-mathieu was at ferrol and lugo, marchand's at corunna and betanzos: nevertheless, one fine night the companies of the train--men and horses--disappeared, and we were never able to discover what became of them: a solitary wounded corporal escaped to report that the peasants, led by their monks and priests, had thus made away with them. four months afterward, ney with a single division marched to conquer the asturias, descending the valley of the navia, while kellermann debouched from leon by the oviedo road. a part of the corps of la romana which was guarding the asturias marched behind the very heights which inclose the valley of the navia, at most but a league from our columns, without the marshal knowing a word of it: when he was entering gijon, the army of la romana attacked the center of the regiments of the division marchand, which, being scattered to guard galicia, barely escaped, and that only by the prompt return of the marshal to lugo. this war presented a thousand incidents as striking as this. all the gold of mexico could not have procured reliable information for the french; what was given was but a lure to make them fall more readily into snares. no army, however disciplined, can contend successfully against such a system applied to a great nation, unless it be strong enough to hold all the essential points of the country, cover its communications, and at the same time furnish an active force sufficient to beat the enemy wherever he may present himself. if this enemy has a regular army of respectable size to be a nucleus around which to rally the people, what force will be sufficient to be superior everywhere, and to assure the safety of the long lines of communication against numerous bodies? the peninsular war should be carefully studied, to learn all the obstacles which a general and his brave troops may encounter in the occupation or conquest of a country whose people are all in arms. what efforts of patience, courage, and resignation did it not cost the troops of napoleon, massena, soult, ney, and suchet to sustain themselves for six years against three or four hundred thousand armed spaniards and portuguese supported by the regular armies of wellington, beresford, blake, la romana, cuesta, castaños, reding, and ballasteros! if success be possible in such a war, the following general course will be most likely to insure it,--viz.: make a display of a mass of troops proportioned to the obstacles and resistance likely to be encountered, calm the popular passions in every possible way, exhaust them by time and patience, display courtesy, gentleness, and severity united, and, particularly, deal justly. the examples of henry iv. in the wars of the league, of marshal berwick in catalonia, of suchet in aragon and valencia, of hoche in la vendée, are models of their kind, which may be employed according to circumstances with equal success. the admirable order and discipline of the armies of diebitsch and paskevitch in the late war were also models, and were not a little conducive to the success of their enterprises. the immense obstacles encountered by an invading force in these wars have led some speculative persons to hope that there should never be any other kind, since then wars would become more rare, and, conquest being also more difficult, would be less a temptation to ambitious leaders. this reasoning is rather plausible than solid; for, to admit all its consequences, it would be necessary always to be able to induce the people to take up arms, and it would also be necessary for us to be convinced that there would be in the future no wars but those of conquest, and that all legitimate though secondary wars, which are only to maintain the political equilibrium or defend the public interests, should never occur again: otherwise, how could it be known when and how to excite the people to a national war? for example, if one hundred thousand germans crossed the rhine and entered france, originally with the intention of preventing the conquest of belgium by france, and without any other ambitious project, would it be a case where the whole population--men, women, and children--of alsace, lorraine, champagne, and burgundy, should rush to arms? to make a saragossa of every walled town, to bring about, by way of reprisals, murder, pillage, and incendiarism throughout the country? if all this be not done, and the germans, in consequence of some success, should occupy these provinces, who can say that they might not afterward seek to appropriate a part of them, even though at first they had never contemplated it? the difficulty of answering these two questions would seem to argue in favor of national wars. but is there no means of repelling such an invasion without bringing about an uprising of the whole population and a war of extermination? is there no mean between these contests between the people and the old regular method of war between permanent armies? will it not be sufficient, for the efficient defense of the country, to organize a militia, or landwehr, which, uniformed and called by their governments into service, would regulate the part the people should take in the war, and place just limits to its barbarities? i answer in the affirmative; and, applying this mixed system to the cases stated above, i will guarantee that fifty thousand regular french troops, supported by the national guards of the east, would get the better of this german army which had crossed the vosges; for, reduced to fifty thousand men by many detachments, upon nearing the meuse or arriving in argonne it would have one hundred thousand men on its hands. to attain this mean, we have laid it down as a necessity that good national reserves be prepared for the army; which will be less expensive in peace and will insure the defense of the country in war. this system was used by france in , imitated by austria in , and by the whole of germany in . i sum up this discussion by asserting that, without being a utopian philanthropist, or a condottieri, a person may desire that wars of extermination may be banished from the code of nations, and that the defenses of nations by disciplined militia, with the aid of good political alliances, may be sufficient to insure their independence. as a soldier, preferring loyal and chivalrous warfare to organized assassination, if it be necessary to make a choice, i acknowledge that my prejudices are in favor of the good old times when the french and english guards courteously invited each other to fire first,--as at fontenoy,--preferring them to the frightful epoch when priests, women, and children throughout spain plotted the murder of isolated soldiers. article ix. civil wars, and wars of religion. intestine wars, when not connected with a foreign quarrel, are generally the result of a conflict of opinions, of political or religious sectarianism. in the middle ages they were more frequently the collisions of feudal parties. religious wars are above all the most deplorable. we can understand how a government may find it necessary to use force against its own subjects in order to crush out factions which would weaken the authority of the throne and the national strength; but that it should murder its citizens to compel them to say their prayers in french or latin, or to recognize the supremacy of a foreign pontiff, is difficult of conception. never was a king more to be pitied than louis xiv., who persecuted a million of industrious protestants, who had put upon the throne his own protestant ancestor. wars of fanaticism are horrible when mingled with exterior wars, and they are also frightful when they are family quarrels. the history of france in the times of the league should be an eternal lesson for nations and kings. it is difficult to believe that a people so noble and chivalrous in the time of francis i. should in twenty years have fallen into so deplorable a state of brutality. to give maxims in such wars would be absurd. there is one rule upon which all thoughtful men will be agreed: that is, to unite the two parties or sects to drive the foreigners from the soil, and afterward to reconcile by treaty the conflicting claims or rights. indeed, the intervention of a third power in a religious dispute can only be with ambitious views. governments may in good faith intervene to prevent the spreading of a political disease whose principles threaten social order; and, although these fears are generally exaggerated and are often mere pretexts, it is possible that a state may believe its own institutions menaced. but in religious disputes this is never the case; and philip ii. could have had no other object in interfering in the affairs of the league than to subject france to his influence, or to dismember it. article x. double wars, and the danger of undertaking two wars at once. the celebrated maxim of the romans, not to undertake two great wars at the same time, is so well known and so well appreciated as to spare the necessity of demonstrating its wisdom. a government maybe compelled to maintain a war against two neighboring states; but it will be extremely unfortunate if it does not find an ally to come to its aid, with a view to its own safety and the maintenance of the political equilibrium. it will seldom be the case that the nations allied against it will have the same interest in the war and will enter into it with all their resources; and, if one is only an auxiliary, it will be an ordinary war. louis xiv., frederick the great, the emperor alexander, and napoleon, sustained gigantic struggles against united europe. when such contests arise from voluntary aggressions, they are proof of a capital error on the part of the state which invites them; but if they arise from imperious and inevitable circumstances they must be met by seeking alliances, or by opposing such means of resistance as shall establish something like equality between the strength of the parties. the great coalition against louis xiv., nominally arising from his designs on spain, had its real origin in previous aggressions which had alarmed his neighbors. to the combined forces of europe he could only oppose the faithful alliance of the elector of bavaria, and the more equivocal one of the duke of savoy, who, indeed, was not slow in adding to the number of his enemies. frederick, with only the aid of the subsidies of england, and fifty thousand auxiliaries from six different states, sustained a war against the three most powerful monarchies of europe: the division and folly of his opponents were his best friends. both these wars, as well as that sustained by alexander in , it was almost impossible to avoid. france had the whole of europe on its hands in , in consequence of the extravagant provocations of the jacobins, and the utopian ideas of the girondists, who boasted that with the support of the english fleets they would defy all the kings in the world. the result of these absurd calculations was a frightful upheaval of europe, from which france miraculously escaped. napoleon is, to a certain degree, the only modern sovereign who has voluntarily at the same time undertaken two, and even three, formidable wars,--with spain, with england, and with russia; but in the last case he expected the aid of austria and prussia, to say nothing of that of turkey and sweden, upon which he counted with too much certainty; so that the enterprise was not so adventurous on his part as has been generally supposed. it will be observed that there is a great distinction between a war made against a single state which is aided by a third acting as an auxiliary, and two wars conducted at the same time against two powerful nations in opposite quarters, who employ all their forces and resources. for instance, the double contest of napoleon in against austria and spain aided by england was a very different affair from a contest with austria assisted by an auxiliary force of a given strength. these latter contests belong to ordinary wars. it follows, then, in general, that double wars should be avoided if possible, and, if cause of war be given by two states, it is more prudent to dissimulate or neglect the wrongs suffered from one of them, until a proper opportunity for redressing them shall arrive. the rule, however, is not without exception: the respective forces, the localities, the possibility of finding allies to restore, in a measure, equality of strength between the parties, are circumstances which will influence a government so threatened. we now have fulfilled our task, in noting both the danger and the means of remedying it. chapter ii. military policy. we have already explained what we understand by this title. it embraces the moral combinations relating to the operations of armies. if the political considerations which we have just discussed be also moral, there are others which influence, in a certain degree, the conduct of a war, which belong neither to diplomacy, strategy, nor tactics. we include these under the head of _military policy_. military policy may be said to embrace all the combinations of any projected war, except those relating to the diplomatic art and strategy; and, as their number is considerable, a separate article cannot be assigned to each without enlarging too much the limits of this work, and without deviating from my intention,--which is, not to give a treatise on theses subjects, but to point out their relations to military operations. indeed, in this class we may place the passions of the nation to be fought, their military system, their immediate means and their reserves, their financial resources, the attachment they bear to their government or their institutions, the character of the executive, the characters and military abilities of the commanders of their armies, the influence of cabinet councils or councils of war at the capital upon their operations, the system of war in favor with their staff, the established force of the state and its armament, the military geography and statistics of the state which is to be invaded, and, finally, the resources and obstacles of every kind likely to be met with, all of which are included neither in diplomacy nor in strategy. there are no fixed rules on such subjects, except that the government should neglect nothing in obtaining a knowledge of these details, and that it is indispensable to take them into consideration in the arrangement of all plans. we propose to sketch the principal points which ought to guide in this sort of combinations. article xi. military statistics and geography. by the first of these sciences we understand the most thorough knowledge possible of the elements of power and military resources of the enemy with whom we are called upon to contend; the second consists in the topographical and strategic description of the theater of war, with all the obstacles, natural or artificial, to be encountered, and the examination of the permanent decisive points which may be presented in the whole extent of the frontier or throughout the extent of the country. besides the minister of war, the commanding general and his chief of staff should be afforded this information, under the penalty of cruel miscalculations in their plans, as happens frequently in our day, despite the great strides civilized nations have taken in statistical, diplomatic, geographical, and topographical sciences. i will cite two examples of which i was cognizant. in , moreau's army, entering the black forest, expected to find terrible mountains, frightful defiles and forests, and was greatly surprised to discover, after climbing the declivities of the plateau that slope to the rhine, that these, with their spurs, were the only mountains, and that the country, from the sources of the danube to donauwerth, was a rich and level plain. the second example was in . napoleon and his whole army supposed the interior of bohemia to be very mountainous,--whereas there is no district in europe more level, after the girdle of mountains surrounding it has been crossed, which may be done in a single march. all european officers held the same erroneous opinions in reference to the balkan and the turkish force in the interior. it seemed that it was given out at constantinople that this province was an almost impregnable barrier and the palladium of the empire,--an error which i, having lived in the alps, did not entertain. other prejudices, not less deeply rooted, have led to the belief that a people all the individuals of which are constantly armed would constitute a formidable militia and would defend themselves to the last extremity. experience has proved that the old regulations which placed the elite of the janissaries in the frontier-cities of the danube made the population of those cities more warlike than the inhabitants of the interior. in fact, the projects of reform of the sultan mahmoud required the overthrow of the old system, and there was no time to replace it by the new: so that the empire was defenseless. experience has constantly proved that a mere multitude of brave men armed to the teeth make neither a good army nor a national defense. let us return to the necessity of knowing well the military geography and statistics of an empire. these sciences are not set forth in treatises, and are yet to be developed. lloyd, who wrote an essay upon them, in describing the frontiers of the great states of europe, was not fortunate in his maxims and predictions. he saw obstacles everywhere; he represents as impregnable the austrian frontier on the inn, between the tyrol and passau, where napoleon and moreau maneuvered and triumphed with armies of one hundred and fifty thousand men in , , and . but, if these sciences are not publicly taught, the archives of the european staff must necessarily possess many documents valuable for instruction in them,--at least for the special staff school. awaiting the time when some studious officer, profiting by those published and unpublished documents, shall present europe with a good military and strategic geography, we may, thanks to the immense progress of topography of late years, partially supply the want of it by the excellent charts published in all european countries within the last twenty years. at the beginning of the french revolution topography was in its infancy: excepting the semi-topographical map of cassini, the works of bakenberg alone merited the name. the austrian and prussian staff schools, however, were good, and have since borne fruit. the charts published recently at vienna, at berlin, munich, stuttgart, and paris, as well as those of the institute of herder at fribourg, promise to future generals immense resources unknown to their predecessors. military statistics is not much better known than geography. we have but vague and superficial statements, from which the strength of armies and navies is conjectured, and also the revenue supposed to be possessed by a state,--which is far from being the knowledge necessary to plan operations. our object here is not to discuss thoroughly these important subjects, but to indicate them, as facilitating success in military enterprises. article xii. other causes which exercise an influence upon the success of a war. as the excited passions of a people are of themselves always a powerful enemy, both the general and his government should use their best efforts to allay them. we have nothing to add to what has been said on this point under the head of national wars. on the other hand, the general should do every thing to electrify his own soldiers, and to impart to them the same enthusiasm which he endeavors to repress in his adversaries. all armies are alike susceptible of this spirit: the springs of action and means, only, vary with the national character. military eloquence is one means, and has been the subject of many a treatise. the proclamations of napoleon and of paskevitch, the addresses of the ancients to their soldiers, and those of suwaroff to men of still greater simplicity, are models of their different kinds. the eloquence of the spanish juntas, and the miracles of the madonna del pilar, led to the same results by very different means. in general, a cherished cause, and a general who inspires confidence by previous success, are powerful means of electrifying an army and conducing to victory. some dispute the advantages of this enthusiasm, and prefer imperturbable coolness in battle. both have unmistakable advantages and disadvantages. enthusiasm impels to the performance of great actions: the difficulty is in maintaining it constantly; and, when discouragement succeeds it, disorder easily results. the greater or less activity and boldness of the commanders of the armies are elements of success or failure, which cannot be submitted to rules. a cabinet and a commander ought to consider the intrinsic value of their troops, and that resulting from their organization as compared with that of the enemy. a russian general, commanding the most solidly organized troops in europe, need not fear to undertake any thing against undisciplined and unorganized troops in an open country, however brave may be its individuals.[ ] concert in action makes strength; order produces this concert, and discipline insures order; and without discipline and order no success is possible. the russian general would not be so bold before european troops having the same instruction and nearly the same discipline as his own. finally, a general may attempt with a mack as his antagonist what it would be madness to do with a napoleon. the action of a cabinet in reference to the control of armies influences the boldness of their operations. a general whose genius and hands are tied by an aulic council five hundred miles distant cannot be a match for one who has liberty of action, other things being equal. as to superiority in skill, it is one of the most certain pledges of victory, all other things being equal. it is true that great generals have often been beaten by inferior ones; but an exception does not make a rule. an order misunderstood, a fortuitous event, may throw into the hands of the enemy all the chances of success which a skillful general had prepared for himself by his maneuvers. but these are risks which cannot be foreseen nor avoided. would it be fair on that account to deny the influence of science and principles in ordinary affairs? this risk even proves the triumph of the principles, for it happens that they are applied accidentally by the army against which it was intended to apply them, and are the cause of its success. but, in admitting this truth, it may be said that it is an argument against science; this objection is not well founded, for a general's science consists in providing for his side all the chances possible to be foreseen, and of course cannot extend to the caprices of destiny. even if the number of battles gained by skillful maneuvers did not exceed the number due to accident, it would not invalidate my assertion. if the skill of a general is one of the surest elements of victory, it will readily be seen that the judicious selection of generals is one of the most delicate points in the science of government and one of the most essential parts of the military policy of a state. unfortunately, this choice is influenced by so many petty passions, that chance, rank, age, favor, party spirit, jealousy, will have as much to do with it as the public interest and justice. this subject is so important that we will devote to it a separate article. footnotes: [footnote : irregular troops supported by disciplined troops may be of the greatest value, in destroying convoys, intercepting communication, &c., and may--as in the case of the french in --make a retreat very disastrous.] article xiii. military institutions. one of the most important points of the military policy of a state is the nature of its military institutions. a good army commanded by a general of ordinary capacity may accomplish great feats; a bad army with a good general may do equally well; but an army will certainly do a great deal more if its own superiority and that of the general be combined. twelve essential conditions concur in making a perfect army:-- . to have a good recruiting-system; . a good organization; . a well-organized system of national reserves; . good instruction of officers and men in drill and internal duties as well as those of a campaign; . a strict but not humiliating discipline, and a spirit of subordination and punctuality, based on conviction rather than on the formalities of the service; . a well-digested system of rewards, suitable to excite emulation; . the special arms of engineering and artillery to be well instructed; . an armament superior, if possible, to that of the enemy, both as to defensive and offensive arms; . a general staff capable of applying these elements, and having an organization calculated to advance the theoretical and practical education of its officers; . a good system for the commissariat, hospitals, and of general administration; . a good system of assignment to command, and of directing the principal operations of war; . exciting and keeping alive the military spirit of the people. to these conditions might be added a good system of clothing and equipment; for, if this be of less direct importance on the field of battle, it nevertheless has a bearing upon the preservation of the troops; and it is always a great object to economize the lives and health of veterans. none of the above twelve conditions can be neglected without grave inconvenience. a fine army, well drilled and disciplined, but without national reserves, and unskillfully led, suffered prussia to fall in fifteen days under the attacks of napoleon. on the other hand, it has often been seen of how much advantage it is for a state to have a good army. it was the care and skill of philip and alexander in forming and instructing their phalanxes and rendering them easy to move, and capable of the most rapid maneuvers, which enabled the macedonians to subjugate india and persia with a handful of choice troops. it was the excessive love of his father for soldiers which procured for frederick the great an army capable of executing his great enterprises. a government which neglects its army under any pretext whatever is thus culpable in the eyes of posterity, since it prepares humiliation for its standards and its country, instead of by a different course preparing for it success. we are far from saying that a government should sacrifice every thing to the army, for this would be absurd; but it ought to make the army the object of its constant care; and if the prince has not a military education it will be very difficult for him to fulfill his duty in this respect. in this case--which is, unfortunately, of too frequent occurrence--the defect must be supplied by wise institutions, at the head of which are to be placed a good system of the general staff, a good system of recruiting, and a good system of national reserves. there are, indeed, forms of government which do not always allow the executive the power of adopting the best systems. if the armies of the roman and french republics, and those of louis xiv. and frederick of prussia, prove that a good military system and a skillful direction of operations may be found in governments the most opposite in principle, it cannot be doubted that, in the present state of the world, the form of government exercises a great influence in the development of the military strength of a nation and the value of its troops. when the control of the public funds is in the hands of those affected by local interest or party spirit, they may be so over-scrupulous and penurious as to take all power to carry on the war from the executive, whom very many people seem to regard as a public enemy rather than as a chief devoted to all the national interests. the abuse of badly-understood public liberties may also contribute to this deplorable result. then it will be impossible for the most far-sighted administration to prepare in advance for a great war, whether it be demanded by the most important interests of the country at some future time, or whether it be immediate and necessary to resist sudden aggressions. in the futile hope of rendering themselves popular, may not the members of an elective legislature, the majority of whom cannot be richelieus, pitts, or louvois, in a misconceived spirit of economy, allow the institutions necessary for a large, well-appointed, and disciplined army to fall into decay? deceived by the seductive fallacies of an exaggerated philanthropy, may they not end in convincing themselves and their constituents that the pleasures of peace are always preferable to the more statesmanlike preparations for war? i am far from advising that states should always have the hand upon the sword and always be established on a war-footing: such a condition of things would be a scourge for the human race, and would not be possible, except under conditions not existing in all countries. i simply mean that civilized governments ought always to be ready to carry on a war in a short time,--that they should never be found unprepared. and the wisdom of their institutions may do as much in this work of preparation as foresight in their administration and the perfection of their system of military policy. if, in ordinary times, under the rule of constitutional forms, governments subjected to all the changes of an elective legislature are less suitable than others for the creation or preparation of a formidable military power, nevertheless, in great crises these deliberative bodies have sometimes attained very different results, and have concurred in developing to the full extent the national strength. still, the small number of such instances in history makes rather a list of exceptional cases, in which a tumultuous and violent assembly, placed under the necessity of conquering or perishing, has profited by the extraordinary enthusiasm of the nation to save the country and themselves at the same time by resorting to the most terrible measures and by calling to its aid an unlimited dictatorial power, which overthrew both liberty and law under the pretext of defending them. here it is the dictatorship, or the absolute and monstrous usurpation of power, rather than the form of the deliberative assembly, which is the true cause of the display of energy. what happened in the convention after the fall of robespierre and the terrible committee of public safety proves this, as well as the chambers of . now, if the dictatorial power, placed in the hands of a few, has always been a plank of safety in great crises, it seems natural to draw the conclusion that countries controlled by elective assemblies must be politically and militarily weaker than pure monarchies, although in other respects they present decided advantages. it is particularly necessary to watch over the preservation of armies in the interval of a long peace, for then they are most likely to degenerate. it is important to foster the military spirit in the armies, and to exercise them in great maneuvers, which, though but faintly resembling those of actual war, still are of decided advantage in preparing them for war. it is not less important to prevent them from becoming effeminate, which may be done by employing them in labors useful for the defense of the country. the isolation in garrisons of troops by regiments is one of the worst possible systems, and the russian and prussian system of divisions and permanent corps d'armée seems to be much preferable. in general terms, the russian army now may be presented as a model in many respects; and if in many points its customs would be useless and impracticable elsewhere, it must be admitted that many good institutions might well be copied from it. as to rewards and promotion, it is essential to respect long service, and at the same time to open a way for merit. three-fourths of the promotions in each grade should be made according to the roster, and the remaining fourth reserved for those distinguished for merit and zeal. on the contrary, in time of war the regular order of promotion should be suspended, or at least reduced to a third of the promotions, leaving the other two-thirds for brilliant conduct and marked services. the superiority of armament may increase the chances of success in war: it does not, of itself, gain battles, but it is a great element of success. every one can recall how nearly fatal to the french at bylau and marengo was their great inferiority in artillery. we may also refer to the great gain of the heavy french cavalry in the resumption of the cuirass, which they had for so long thrown aside. every one knows the great advantage of the lance. doubtless, as skirmishers lancers would not be more effectual than hussars, but when charging in line it is a very different affair. how many brave cavalry soldiers have been the victims of the prejudice they bore against the lance because it was a little more trouble to carry than a saber! the armament of armies is still susceptible of great improvements; the state which shall take the lead in making them will secure great advantages. there is little left to be desired in artillery; but the offensive and defensive arms of infantry and cavalry deserve the attention of a provident government. the new inventions of the last twenty years seem to threaten a great revolution in army organization, armament, and tactics. strategy alone will remain unaltered, with its principles the same as under the scipios and cæsars, frederick and napoleon, since they are independent of the nature of the arms and the organization of the troops. the means of destruction are approaching perfection with frightful rapidity.[ ] the congreve rockets, the effect and direction of which it is said the austrians can now regulate,--the shrapnel howitzers, which throw a stream of canister as far as the range of a bullet,--the perkins steam-guns, which vomit forth as many balls as a battalion,--will multiply the chances of destruction, as though the hecatombs of eylau, borodino, leipsic, and waterloo were not sufficient to decimate the european races. if governments do not combine in a congress to proscribe these inventions of destruction, there will be no course left but to make the half of an army consist of cavalry with cuirasses, in order to capture with great rapidity these machines; and the infantry, even, will be obliged to resume its armor of the middle ages, without which a battalion will be destroyed before engaging the enemy. we may then see again the famous men-at-arms all covered with armor, and horses also will require the same protection. while there is doubt about the realization of these fears, it is, however, certain that artillery and pyrotechny have made advances which should lead us to think of modifying the deep formation so much abused by napoleon. we will recur to this in the chapter on tactics. we will here recapitulate, in a few words, the essential bases of the military policy which ought to be adopted by a wise government. . the prince should receive an education both political and military. he will more probably find men of administrative ability in his councils than good statesmen or soldiers; and hence he should be both of the latter himself. . if the prince in person does not lead his armies, it will be his first duty and his nearest interest to have his place well supplied. he must confide the glory of his reign and the safety of his states to the general most capable of directing his armies. . the permanent army should not only always be upon a respectable footing, but it should be capable of being doubled, if necessary, by reserves, which should always be prepared. its instruction and discipline should be of a high character, as well as its organization; its armament should at least be as good as that of its neighbors, and superior if possible. . the matériel of war should also be upon the best footing, and abundant. the reserves should be stored in the depots and arsenals. national jealousy should not be allowed to prevent the adoption of all improvements in this matériel made in other countries. . it is necessary that the study of the military sciences should be encouraged and rewarded, as well as courage and zeal. the scientific military corps should be esteemed and honored: this is the only way of securing for the army men of merit and genius. . the general staff in times of peace should be employed in labors preparatory for all possible contingencies of war. its archives should be furnished with numerous historical details of the past, and with all statistical, geographical, topographical, and strategic treatises and papers for the present and future. hence it is essential that the chief of this corps, with a number of its officers, should be permanently stationed at the capital in time of peace, and the war-office should be simply that of the general staff, except that there should be a secret department for those documents to be concealed from the subalterns of the corps. . nothing should be neglected to acquire a knowledge of the geography and the military statistics of other states, so as to know their material and moral capacity for attack and defense, as well as the strategic advantages of the two parties. distinguished officers should be employed in these scientific labors, and should be rewarded when they acquit themselves with marked ability. . when a war is decided upon, it becomes necessary to prepare, not an entire plan of operations,--which is always impossible,--but a system of operations in reference to a prescribed aim; to provide a base, as well as all the material means necessary to guarantee the success of the enterprise. . the system of operations ought to be determined by the object of the war, the kind of forces of the enemy, the nature and resources of the country, the characters of the nations and of their chiefs, whether of the army or of the state. in fine, it should be based upon the moral and material means of attack or defense which the enemy may be able to bring into action; and it ought to take into consideration the probable alliances that may obtain in favor of or against either of the parties during the war. . the financial condition of a nation is to be weighed among the chances of a war. still, it would be dangerous to constantly attribute to this condition the importance attached to it by frederick the great in the history of his times. he was probably right at his epoch, when armies were chiefly recruited by voluntary enlistment, when the last crown brought the last soldier; but when national levies are well organised money will no longer exercise the same influence,--at least for one or two campaigns. if england has proved that money will procure soldiers and auxiliaries, france has proved that love of country and honor are equally productive, and that, when necessary, war may be made to support war. france, indeed, in the fertility of her soil and the enthusiasm of her leaders, possessed sources of temporary power which cannot be adopted as a general base of a system; but the results of its efforts were none the less striking. every year the numerous reports of the cabinet of london, and particularly of m. d'yvernois, announced that france was about to break down for want of money, while napoleon had , , francs[ ] in the vaults of the tuileries, all the while meeting the expenses of the government, including the pay of his armies. a power might be overrunning with gold and still defend itself very badly. history, indeed, proves that the richest nation is neither the strongest nor the happiest. iron weighs at least as much as gold in the scales of military strength. still, we must admit that a happy combination of wise military institutions, of patriotism, of well-regulated finances, of internal wealth and public credit, imparts to a nation the greatest strength and makes it best capable of sustaining a long war. a volume would be necessary to discuss all the circumstances under which a nation may develop more or less strength, either by its gold or iron, and to determine the cases when war may be expected to support war. this result can only be obtained by carrying the army into the territory of the enemy; and all countries are not equally capable of furnishing resources to an assailant. we need not extend further the investigation of these subjects which are not directly connected with the art of war. it is sufficient for our purpose to indicate their relations to a projected war; and it will be for the statesman to develop the modifications which circumstances and localities may make in these relations. footnotes: [footnote : it will be recollected that the author wrote this many years ago, since which time the inventive genius of the age has been attentively directed to the improvement of fire-arms. artillery, which he regarded as almost perfect, has certainly undergone important improvements, and the improved efficiency of small arms is no less marked, while we hear nothing now of perkins's steam-guns; and as yet no civilized army has been organized upon the plan the author suggests for depriving these destructive machines of their efficiency.--translators.] [footnote : there was a deficit in the finances of france at the fall of napoleon. it was the result of his disasters, and of the stupendous efforts he was obliged to make. there was no deficit in .] article xiv. the command of armies, and the chief control over operations. is it an advantage to a state to have its armies commanded in person by the monarch? whatever may be the decision on this point, it is certain that if the prince possess the genius of frederick, peter the great, or napoleon, he will be far from leaving to his generals the honor of performing great actions which he might do himself; for in this he would be untrue to his own glory and to the well-being of the country. as it is not our mission to discuss the question whether it is more fortunate for a nation to have a warlike or a peace-loving prince, (which is a philanthropic question, foreign to our subject,) we will only state upon this point that, with equal merit and chances in other respects, a sovereign will always have an advantage over a general who is himself not the head of a state. leaving out of the question that he is responsible only to himself for his bold enterprises, he may do much by the certainty he has of being able to dispose of all the public resources for the attainment of his end. he also possesses the powerful accessory of his favor, of recompenses and punishments; all will be devoted to the execution of his orders, and to insure for his enterprises the greatest success; no jealousy will interfere with the execution of his projects, or at least its exhibition will be rare and in secondary operations. here are, certainly, sufficient motives to induce a prince to lead his armies, if he possess military capacity and the contest be of a magnitude worthy of him. but if he possess no military ability, if his character be feeble, and he be easily influenced, his presence with the army, instead of producing good results, will open the way for all manner of intrigues. each one will present his projects to him; and, as he will not have the experience necessary to estimate them according to their merits, he will submit his judgment to that of his intimates. his general, interfered with and opposed in all his enterprises, will be unable to achieve success, even if he have the requisite ability. it may be said that a sovereign might accompany the army and not interfere with his general, but, on the contrary, aid him with all the weight of his influence. in this case his presence might be productive of good results, but it also might lead to great embarrassment. if the army were turned and cut off from its communications, and obliged to extricate itself, sword in hand, what sad results might not follow from the presence of the sovereign at head-quarters! when a prince feels the necessity of taking the field at the head of his armies, but lacks the necessary self-confidence to assume the supreme direction of affairs, the best course will be that adopted by the prussian government with blücher,--viz.; he should be accompanied by two generals of the best capacity, one of them a man of executive ability, the other a well-instructed staff officer. if this trinity be harmonious, it may yield excellent results, as in the case of the army of silesia in . the same system might apply in the case where the sovereign judges it proper to intrust the command to a prince of his house, as has frequently happened since the time of louis xiv. it has often occurred that the prince possessed only the titular command, and that an adviser, who in reality commanded, was imposed upon him. this was the case with the duke of orleans and marsin at the famous battle of turin, afterward with the duke of burgundy and vendôme at the battle of audenarde, and, i think, also at ulm with the archduke ferdinand and mack. this system is deplorable, since no one is responsible for what is done. it is known that at the battle of turin the duke of orleans exhibited more sagacity than marsin, and it became necessary for the latter to show full secret authority from the king before the prince would yield his judgment and allow the battle to be lost. so at ulm the archduke displayed more skill and courage than mack, who was to be his mentor. if the prince possess the genius and experience of the archduke charles, he should be invested with the untrammeled command, and be allowed full selection of his instruments. if he have not yet acquired the same titles to command, he may then be provided with an educated general of the staff, and another general distinguished for his talent in execution; but in no case will it be wise to invest either of these counselors with more authority than a voice in consultation. we have already said that if the prince do not conduct his armies in person, his most important duty will be to have the position of commander well filled,--which, unfortunately, is not always done. without going back to ancient times, it will be sufficient to recall the more modern examples under louis xiv. and louis xv. the merit of prince eugene was estimated by his deformed figure, and this drove him (the ablest commander of his time) into the ranks of the enemy. after louvois' death, tallard, marsin, and villeroi filled the places of turenne, condé, and luxembourg, and subsequently soubise and clermont succeeded marshal saxe. between the fashionable selections made in the saloons of the pompadours and dubarrys, and napoleon's preference for mere soldiers, there are many gradations, and the margin is wide enough to afford the least intelligent government means of making rational nominations; but, in all ages, human weaknesses will exercise an influence in one way or another, and artifice will often carry off the prize from modest or timid merit, which awaits a call for its services. but, leaving out of consideration all these influences, it will be profitable to inquire in what respects this choice of a commander will be difficult, even when the executive shall be most anxious to make it a judicious one. in the first place, to make choice of a skillful general requires either that the person who makes the selection shall be a military man, able to form an intelligent opinion, or that he should be guided by the opinions of others, which opens the way to the improper influence of cliques. the embarrassment is certainly less when there is at hand a general already illustrious by many victories; but, outside of the fact that every general is not a great leader because he has gained a battle, (for instance, jourdan, scherer, and many others,) it is not always the case that a victorious general is at the disposition of the government. it may well happen that after a long period of peace, there may not be a single general in europe who has commanded in chief. in this case, it will be difficult to decide whether one general is better than another. those who have served long in peace will be at the head of their arms or corps, and will have the rank appropriate for this position; but will they always be the most capable of filling it? moreover, the intercourse of the heads of a government with their subordinates is generally so rare and transient, that it is not astonishing they should experience difficulty in assigning men to their appropriate positions. the judgment of the prince, misled by appearances, may err, and, with the purest intentions, he may well be deceived in his selections. one of the surest means of escaping this misfortune would seem to be in realizing the beautiful fiction of fénélon in telemachus, by finding a faithful, sincere, and generous philocles, who, standing between the prince and all aspirants for the command, would be able, by means of his more direct relations to the public, to enlighten the monarch in reference to selections of individuals best recommended by their character and abilities. but will this faithful friend never yield to personal affections? will he be always free from prejudice? suwaroff was rejected by potemkin on account of his appearance, and it required all the art of catherine to secure a regiment for the man who afterward shed so much luster upon the russian arms. it has been thought that public opinion is the best guide; but nothing could be more dangerous. it voted dumouriez to be a cæsar, when he was ignorant of the great operations of war. would it have placed bonaparte at the head of the army of italy, when he was known only by two directors? still, it must be admitted that, if not infallible, public sentiment is not to be despised, particularly if it survive great crises and the experience of events. the most essential qualities for a general will always be as follow:--first, _a high moral courage, capable of great resolutions_; secondly, _a physical courage which takes no account of danger_. his scientific or military acquirements are secondary to the above-mentioned characteristics, though if great they will be valuable auxiliaries. it is not necessary that he should be a man of vast erudition. his knowledge may be limited, but it should be thorough, and he should be perfectly grounded in the principles at the base of the art of war. next in importance come the qualities of his personal character. a man who is gallant, just, firm, upright, capable of esteeming merit in others instead of being jealous of it, and skillful in making this merit conduce to his own glory, will always be a good general, and may even pass for a great man. unfortunately, the disposition to do justice to merit in others is not the most common quality: mediocre minds are always jealous, and inclined to surround themselves with persons of little ability, fearing the reputation of being led, and not realizing that the nominal commander of an army always receives almost all the glory of its success, even when least entitled to it. the question has often been discussed, whether it is preferable to assign to the command a general of long experience in service with troops, or an officer of the staff, having generally but little experience in the management of troops. it is beyond question that war is a distinct science of itself, and that it is quite possible to be able to combine operations skillfully without ever having led a regiment against an enemy. peter the great, condé, frederick, and napoleon are instances of it. it cannot, then, be denied that an officer from the staff may as well as any other prove to be a great general, but it will not be because he has grown gray in the duties of a quartermaster that he will be capable of the supreme command, but because he has a natural genius for war and possesses the requisite characteristics. so, also, a general from the ranks of the infantry or cavalry may be as capable of conducting a campaign as the most profound tactician. so this question does not admit of a definite answer either in the affirmative or negative, since almost all will depend upon the personal qualities of the individuals; but the following remarks will be useful in leading to a rational conclusion:-- . a general, selected from the general staff, engineers, or artillery, who has commanded a division or a corps d'armée, will, with equal chances, be superior to one who is familiar with the service of but one arm or special corps. . a general from the line, who has made a study of the science of war, will be equally fitted for the command. . that the character of the man is above all other requisites in a commander-in-chief. finally, he will be a good general in whom are found united the requisite personal characteristics and a thorough knowledge of the principles of the art of war. the difficulty of always selecting a good general has led to the formation of a good general staff, which being near the general may advise him, and thus exercise a beneficial influence over the operations. a well-instructed general staff is one of the most useful of organizations; but care must be observed to prevent the introduction into it of false principles, as in this case it might prove fatal. frederick, when he established the military school of potsdam, never thought it would lead to the "right shoulder forward" of general ruchel,[ ] and to the teaching that the oblique order is the infallible rule for gaining all battles. how true it is that there is but a step from the sublime to the ridiculous! moreover, there ought to exist perfect harmony between the general and his chief of staff; and, if it be true that the latter should be a man of recognized ability, it is also proper to give the general the choice of the men who are to be his advisers. to impose a chief of staff upon a general would be to create anarchy and want of harmony; while to permit him to select a cipher for that position would be still more dangerous; for if he be himself a man of little ability, indebted to favor or fortune for his station, the selection will be of vital importance. the best means to avoid these dangers is to give the general the option of several designated officers, all of undoubted ability. it has been thought, in succession, in almost all armies, that frequent councils of war, by aiding the commander with their advice, give more weight and effect to the direction of military operations. doubtless, if the commander were a soubise, a clermont, or a mack, he might well find in a council of war opinions more valuable than his own; the majority of the opinions given might be preferable to his; but what success could be expected from operations conducted by others than those who have originated and arranged them? what must be the result of an operation which is but partially understood by the commander, since it is not his own conception? i have undergone a pitiable experience as prompter at head-quarters, and no one has a better appreciation of the value of such services than myself; and it is particularly in a council of war that such a part is absurd. the greater the number and the higher the rank of the military officers who compose the council, the more difficult will it be to accomplish the triumph of truth and reason, however small be the amount of dissent. what would have been the action of a council of war to which napoleon proposed the movement of arcola, the crossing of the saint-bernard, the maneuver at ulm, or that at gera and jena? the timid would have regarded them as rash, even to madness, others would have seen a thousand difficulties of execution, and all would have concurred in rejecting them; and if, on the contrary, they had been adopted, and had been executed by any one but napoleon, would they not certainly have proved failures? in my opinion, councils of war are a deplorable resource, and can be useful only when concurring in opinion with the commander, in which case they may give him more confidence in his own judgment, and, in addition, may assure him that his lieutenants, being of his opinion, will use every means to insure the success of the movement. this is the only advantage of a council of war, which, moreover, should be simply consultative and have no further authority; but if, instead of this harmony, there should be difference of opinion, it can only produce unfortunate results. accordingly, i think it safe to conclude that the best means of organizing the command of an army, in default of a general approved by experience, is-- st. to give the command to a man of tried bravery, bold in the fight, and of unshaken firmness in danger. d. to assign, as his chief of staff, a man of high ability, of open and faithful character, between whom and the commander there may be perfect harmony. the victor will gain so much glory that he can spare some to the friend who has contributed to his success. in this way blücher, aided by gneisenau and muffling, gained glory which probably he would not have been able to do of himself. it is true that this double command is more objectionable than an undivided one when a state has a napoleon, a frederick, or a suwaroff to fill it; but when there is no great general to lead the armies it is certainly the preferable system. before leaving this important branch of the subject, another means of influencing military operations--viz.: that of a council of war at the seat of government--deserves notice. louvois for a long time directed from paris the armies of louis xiv., and with success. carnot, also, from paris directed the armies of the republic: in he did well, and saved france; in his action was at first very unfortunate, but he repaired his faults afterward by chance; in he was completely at fault. it is to be observed, however, that both louvois and carnot individually controlled the armies, and that there was no council of war. the aulic council, sitting in vienna, was often intrusted with the duty of directing the operations of the armies; and there has never been but one opinion in europe as to its fatal influence. whether this opinion is right or wrong, the austrian generals alone are able to decide. my own opinion is that the functions of such a body in this connection should be limited to the adoption of a general plan of operations. by this i do not mean a plan which should trace out the campaign in detail, restricting the generals and compelling them to give battle without regard to circumstances, but a plan which should determine the object of the campaign, the nature of the operations, whether offensive or defensive, the material means to be applied to these first enterprises, afterward for the reserves, and finally for the levies which may be necessary if the country be invaded. these points, it is true, should be discussed in a council of both generals and ministers, and to these points should the control of the council be limited; for if it should not only order the general in command to march to vienna or to paris, but should also have the presumption to indicate the manner in which he should maneuver to attain this object, the unfortunate general would certainly be beaten, and the whole responsibility of his reverses should fall upon the shoulders of those who, hundreds of miles distant, took upon themselves the duty of directing the army,--a duty so difficult for any one, even upon the scene of operations. footnotes: [footnote : general ruchel thought at the battle of jena that he could save the army by giving the command to advance the right shoulder in order to form an oblique line.] article xv. the military spirit of nations, and the morale of armies. the adoption of the best regulations for the organization of an army would be in vain if the government did not at the same time cultivate a military spirit in its citizens. it may well be the case in london, situated on an island and protected from invasion by its immense fleets, that the title of a rich banker should be preferred to a military decoration; but a continental nation imbued with the sentiments and habits of the tradesmen of london or the bankers of paris would sooner or later fall a prey to its neighbors. it was to the union of the civic virtues and military spirit fostered by their institutions that the romans were indebted for their grandeur; and when they lost these virtues, and when, no longer regarding the military service as an honor as well as a duty, they relinquished it to mercenary goths and gauls, the fall of the empire became inevitable. it is doubtless true that whatever increases the prosperity of the country should be neither neglected nor despised; it is also necessary to honor the branches of industry which are the first instruments of this prosperity; but they should always be secondary to the great institutions which make up the strength of states in encouraging the cultivation of the manly and heroic virtues. policy and justice both agree on this point; for, whatever boileau may say, it is certainly more glorious to confront death in the footsteps of the cæsars than to fatten upon the public miseries by gambling on the vicissitudes of the national credit. misfortune will certainly fall upon the land where the wealth of the tax-gatherer or the greedy gambler in stocks stands, in public estimation, above the uniform of the brave man who sacrifices his life, health, or fortune to the defense of his country. the first means of encouraging the military spirit is to invest the army with all possible social and public consideration. the second means is to give the preference to those who have rendered services to the state, in filling any vacancies in the administrative departments of the government, or even to require a certain length of military service as a qualification for certain offices. a comparison of the ancient military institutions of rome with those of russia and prussia, is a subject worthy of serious attention; and it would also be interesting to contrast them with the doctrines of modern theorists, who declare against the employment of officers of the army in other public functions, and who wish for none but rhetoricians in the important offices of administration.[ ] it is true that many public employments demand a special course of study; but cannot the soldier, in the abundant leisure of peace, prepare himself for the career he would prefer after having fulfilled his debt to his country in the profession of arms? if these administrative offices were conferred upon officers retired from the army in a grade not lower than that of captain, would it not be a stimulant for officers to attain that rank, and would it not lead them, when in garrisons, to find their recreations elsewhere than in the theaters and public clubs? it may be possible that this facility of transfer from the military to the civil service would be rather injurious than favorable to a high military spirit, and that to encourage this spirit it would be expedient to place the profession of the soldier above all others. this was the early practice of the mamelukes and janissaries. their soldiers were bought at the age of about seven years, and were educated in the idea that they were to die by their standards. even the english--so jealous of their rights--contract, in enlisting as soldiers, the obligation for the whole length of their lives, and the russian, in enlisting for twenty-five years, does what is almost equivalent. in such armies, and in those recruited by voluntary enlistments, perhaps it would not be advisable to tolerate this fusion of military and civil offices; but where the military service is a temporary duty imposed upon the people, the case is different, and the old roman laws which required a previous military service of ten years in any aspirant for the public employments, seem to be best calculated to preserve the military spirit,--particularly in this age, when the attainment of material comfort and prosperity appears to be the dominant passion of the people. however this may be, still, in my opinion, under all forms of government, it will be a wise part to honor the military profession, in order to encourage the love of glory and all the warlike virtues, under the penalty of receiving the reproaches of posterity and suffering insult and dependency. it is not sufficient to foster the military spirit among the people, but, more than that, it is necessary to encourage it in the army. of what avail would it be if the uniform be honored in the land and it be regarded as a duty to serve in the army, while the military virtues are wanting? the forces would be numerous but without valor. the enthusiasm of an army and its military spirit are two quite different things, and should not be confounded, although they produce the same effects. the first is the effect of passions more or less of a temporary character,--of a political or religious nature, for instance, or of a great love of country; while the latter, depending upon the skill of the commander and resulting from military institutions, is more permanent and depends less upon circumstances, and should be the object of the attention of every far-seeing government.[ ] courage should be recompensed and honored, the different grades in rank respected, and discipline should exist in the sentiments and convictions rather than in external forms only. the officers should feel the conviction that resignation, bravery, and faithful attention to duty are virtues without which no glory is possible, no army is respectable, and that firmness amid reverses is more honorable than enthusiasm in success,--since courage alone is necessary to storm a position, while it requires heroism to make a difficult retreat before a victorious and enterprising enemy, always opposing to him a firm and unbroken front. a fine retreat should meet with a reward equal to that given for a great victory. by inuring armies to labor and fatigue, by keeping them from stagnation in garrison in times of peace, by inculcating their superiority over their enemies, without depreciating too much the latter, by inspiring a love for great exploits,--in a word, by exciting their enthusiasm by every means in harmony with their tone of mind, by honoring courage, punishing weakness, and disgracing cowardice,--we may expect to maintain a high military spirit. effeminacy was the chief cause of the ruin of the roman legions: those formidable soldiers, who had borne the casque, buckler, and cuirass in the times of the scipios under the burning sun of africa, found them too heavy in the cool climates of germany and gaul; and then the empire was lost. i have remarked that it is not well to create a too great contempt for the enemy, lest the _morale_ of the soldier should be shaken if he encounter an obstinate resistance. napoleon at jena, addressing lannes' troops, praised the prussian cavalry, but promised that they would contend in vain against the bayonets of his egyptians. the officers and troops must be warned against those sudden panics which often seize the bravest armies when they are not well controlled by discipline, and hence when they do not recognize that in order is the surest hope of safety. it was not from want of courage that one hundred thousand turks were beaten at peterwardein by prince eugene, and at kagoul by romanzoff: it was because, once repulsed in their disorderly charges, every one yielded to his personal feelings, and because they fought individually, but not in masses and in order. an army seized with panic is similarly in a state of demoralization; because when disorder is once introduced all concerted action on the part of individuals becomes impossible, the voice of the officers can no longer be heard, no maneuver for resuming the battle can be executed, and there is no resource but in ignominious flight. nations with powerful imaginations are particularly liable to panics; and nothing short of strong institutions and skillful leaders can remedy it. even the french, whose military virtues when well led have never been questioned, have often performed some quick movements of this kind which were highly ridiculous. we may refer to the unbecoming panic which pervaded the infantry of marshal villars after having gained the battle of friedlingen, in . the same occurred to napoleon's infantry after the victory of wagram and when the enemy was in full retreat. a still more extraordinary case was the flight of the th semi-brigade, fifteen hundred strong, at the siege of genoa, before a platoon of cavalry. two days afterward these same men took fort diamond by one of the most vigorous assaults mentioned in modern history. still, it would seem to be easy to convince brave men that death comes more quickly and more surely to those who fly in disorder than to those who remain together and present a firm front to the enemy, or who rally promptly when their lines have been for the instant broken. in this respect the russian army may be taken as a model by all others. the firmness which it has displayed in all retreats is due in equal degrees to the national character, the natural instincts of the soldiers, and the excellent disciplinary institutions. indeed, vivacity of imagination is not always the cause of the introduction of disorder: the want of the habit of order often causes it, and the lack of precautions on the part of the generals to maintain this order contributes to it. i have often been astonished at the indifference of most generals on this point. not only did they not deign to take the slightest precaution to give the proper direction to small detachments or scattered men, and fail to adopt any signals to facilitate the rallying in each division of the fractions which may be scattered in a momentary panic or in an irresistible charge of the enemy, but they were offended that any one should think of proposing such precautions. still, the most undoubted courage and the most severe discipline will often be powerless to remedy a great disorder, which might be in a great degree obviated by the use of rallying-signals for the different divisions. there are, it is true, cases where all human resources are insufficient for the maintenance of order, as when the physical sufferings of the soldiers have been so great as to render them deaf to all appeals, and when their officers find it impossible to do any thing to organize them,--which was the case in the retreat of . leaving out these exceptional cases, good habits of order, good logistical precautions for rallying, and good discipline will most frequently be successful, if not in preventing disorder, at least in promptly remedying it. it is now time to leave this branch, of which i have only desired to trace an outline, and to proceed to the examination of subjects which are purely military. footnotes: [footnote : for instance, in france, instead of excluding all officers from the privilege of the elective franchise, it should be given to all colonels; and the generals should be eligible to the legislature. the most venal deputies will not be those from military life.] [footnote : it is particularly important that this spirit should pervade the officers and non-commissioned officers: if they be capable, and the nation brave, there need be no fear for the men.] chapter iii. strategy. definition of strategy and the fundamental principle of war. the art of war, independently of its political and moral relations, consists of five principal parts, viz.: strategy, grand tactics, logistics, tactics of the different arms, and the art of the engineer. we will treat of the first three branches, and begin by defining them. in order to do this, we will follow the order of procedure of a general when war is first declared, who commences with the points of the highest importance, as a plan of campaign, and afterward descends to the necessary details. tactics, on the contrary, begins with details, and ascends to combinations and generalization necessary for the formation and handling of a great army. we will suppose an army taking the field: the first care of its commander should be to agree with the head of the state upon the character of the war: then he must carefully study the theater of war, and select the most suitable base of operations, taking into consideration the frontiers of the state and those of its allies. the selection of this base and the proposed aim will determine the zone of operations. the general will take a first objective point: he will select the line of operations leading to this point, either as a temporary or permanent line, giving it the most advantageous direction; namely, that which promises the greatest number of favorable opportunities with the least danger. an army marching on this line of operations will have a front of operations and a strategic front. the temporary positions which the corps d'armée will occupy upon this front of operations, or upon the line of defense, will be strategic positions. when near its first objective point, and when it begins to meet resistance, the army will either attack the enemy or maneuver to compel him to retreat; and for this end it will adopt one or two strategic lines of maneuvers, which, being temporary, may deviate to a certain degree from the general line of operations, with which they must not be confounded. to connect the strategic front with the base as the advance is made, lines of supply, depots, &c. will be established. if the line of operations be long, and there be hostile troops in annoying proximity to it, these bodies may either be attacked and dispersed or be merely observed, or the operations against the enemy may be carried on without reference to them. if the second of these courses be pursued, a double strategic front and large detachments will be the result. the army being almost within reach of the first objective point, if the enemy oppose him there will be a battle; if indecisive, the fight will be resumed; if the army gains the victory, it will secure its objective point or will advance to attain a second. should the first objective point be the possession of an important fort, the siege will be commenced. if the army be not strong enough to continue its march, after detaching a sufficient force to maintain the siege, it will take a strategic position to cover it, as did the army of italy in , which, less than fifty thousand strong, could not pass mantua to enter austria, leaving twenty-five thousand enemies within its walls, and having forty thousand more in front on the double line of the tyrol and frioul. if the army be strong enough to make the best use of its victory, or if it have no siege to make, it will operate toward a second and more important objective point. if this point be distant, it will be necessary to establish an intermediate point of support. one or more secure cities already occupied will form an eventual base: when this cannot be done, a small strategic reserve may be established, which will protect the rear and also the depots by temporary fortifications. when the army crosses large streams, it will construct _têtes de pont_; and, if the bridges are within walled cities, earth-works will be thrown up to increase the means of defense and to secure the safety of the eventual base or the strategic reserve which may occupy these posts. should the battle be lost, the army will retreat toward its base, in order to be reinforced therefrom by detachments of troops, or, what is equivalent, to strengthen itself by the occupation of fortified posts and camps, thus compelling the enemy to halt or to divide his forces. when winter approaches, the armies will either go into quarters, or the field will be kept by the army which has obtained decisive success and is desirous of profiting to the utmost by its superiority. these winter campaigns are very trying to both armies, but in other respects do not differ from ordinary campaigns, unless it be in demanding increased activity and energy to attain prompt success. such is the ordinary course of a war, and as such we will consider it, while discussing combinations which result from these operations. strategy embraces the following points, viz.:-- . the selection of the theater of war, and the discussion of the different combinations of which it admits. . the determination of the decisive points in these combinations, and the most favorable direction for operations. . the selection and establishment of the fixed base and of the zone of operations. . the selection of the objective point, whether offensive or defensive. . the strategic fronts, lines of defense, and fronts of operations. . the choice of lines of operations leading to the objective point or strategic front. . for a given operation, the best strategic line, and the different maneuvers necessary to embrace all possible cases. . the eventual bases of operations and the strategic reserves. . the marches of armies, considered as maneuvers. . the relation between the position of depots and the marches of the army. . fortresses regarded as strategical means, as a refuge for an army, as an obstacle to its progress: the sieges to be made and to be covered. . points for intrenched camps, _tétes de pont,_ &c. . the diversions to be made, and the large detachments necessary. these points are principally of importance in the determination of the first steps of a campaign; but there are other operations of a mixed nature, such as passages of streams, retreats, surprises, disembarkations, convoys, winter quarters, the execution of which belongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy. the maneuvering of an army upon the battle-field, and the different formations of troops for attack, constitute grand tactics. logistics is the art of moving armies. it comprises the order and details of marches and camps, and of quartering and supplying troops; in a word, it is the execution of strategical and tactical enterprises. to repeat. strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations. grand tactics is the art of posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. its operations may extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops. it is true that many battles have been decided by strategic movements, and have been, indeed, but a succession of them; but this only occurs in the exceptional case of a dispersed army: for the general case of pitched battles the above definition holds good. grand tactics, in addition to acts of local execution, relates to the following objects:-- . the choice of positions and defensive lines of battle. . the offensive in a defensive battle. . the different orders of battle, or the grand maneuvers proper for the attack of the enemy's line. . the collision of two armies on the march, or unexpected battles. . surprises of armies in the open field. . the arrangements for leading troops into battle. . the attack of positions and intrenched camps. . _coups de main_. all other operations, such as relate to convoys, foraging-parties, skirmishes of advanced or rear guards, the attack of small posts, and any thing accomplished by a detachment or single division, may be regarded as details of war, and not included in the great operations. the fundamental principle of war. it is proposed to show that there is one great principle underlying all the operations of war,--a principle which must be followed in all good combinations. it is embraced in the following maxims:-- . to throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising one's own. . to maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one's forces. . on the battle-field, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance to overthrow. . to so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with energy. this principle has too much simplicity to escape criticism: one objection is that it is easy to recommend throwing the mass of the forces upon the decisive points, but that the difficulty lies in recognizing those points. this truth is evident; and it would be little short of the ridiculous to enunciate such a general principle without accompanying it with all necessary explanations for its application upon the field. in article xix. these decisive points will be described, and in articles from xviii. to xxii. will be discussed their relations to the different combinations. those students who, having attentively considered what is there stated, still regard the determination of these points as a problem without a solution, may well despair of ever comprehending strategy. the general theater of operations seldom contains more than three zones,--the right, the left, and the center; and each zone, front of operations, strategic position, and line of defense, as well as each line of battle, has the same subdivisions,--two extremities and the center. a direction upon one of these three will always be suitable for the attainment of the desired end. a direction upon one of the two remaining will be less advantageous; while the third direction will be wholly inapplicable. in considering the object proposed in connection with the positions of the enemy and the geography of the country, it will appear that in every strategic movement or tactical maneuver the question for decision will always be, whether to maneuver to the right, to the left, or directly in front. the selection of one of these three simple alternatives cannot, surely, be considered an enigma. the art of giving the proper direction to the masses is certainly the basis of strategy, although it is not the whole of the art of war. executive talent, skill, energy, and a quick apprehension of events are necessary to carry out any combinations previously arranged. we will apply this great principle to the different cases of strategy and tactics, and then show, by the history of twenty celebrated campaigns, that, with few exceptions, the most brilliant successes and the greatest reverses resulted from an adherence to this principle in the one case, and from a neglect of it in the other. of strategic combinations. article xvi. of the system of operations. war once determined upon, the first point to be decided is, whether it shall be offensive or defensive; and we will first explain what is meant by these terms. there are several phases of the offensive: if against a great state, the whole or a large portion of whose territory is attacked, it is an _invasion_; if a province only, or a line of defense of moderate extent, be assailed, it is the ordinary offensive; finally, if the offensive is but an attack upon the enemy's position, and is confined to a single operation, it is called the taking the _initiative_. in a moral and political view, the offensive is nearly always advantageous: it carries the war upon foreign soil, saves the assailant's country from devastation, increases his resources and diminishes those of his enemy, elevates the _morale_ of his army, and generally depresses the adversary. it sometimes happens that invasion excites the ardor and energy of the adversary,--particularly when he feels that the independence of his country is threatened. in a military point of view, the offensive has its good and its bad side. strategically, an invasion leads to deep lines of operations, which are always dangerous in a hostile country. all the obstacles in the enemy's country, the mountains, rivers, defiles, and forts, are favorable for defense, while the inhabitants and authorities of the country, so far from being the instruments of the invading army, are generally hostile. however, if success be obtained, the enemy is struck in a vital point: he is deprived of his resources and compelled to seek a speedy termination of the contest. for a single operation, which we have called the taking the _initiative_, the offensive is almost always advantageous, particularly in strategy. indeed, if the art of war consists in throwing the masses upon the decisive points, to do this it will be necessary to take the initiative. the attacking party knows what he is doing and what he desires to do; he leads his masses to the point where he desires to strike. he who awaits the attack is everywhere anticipated: the enemy fall with large force upon fractions of his force: he neither knows where his adversary proposes to attack him nor in what manner to repel him. tactically, the offensive also possesses advantages, but they are less positive, since, the operations being upon a limited field, the party taking the initiative cannot conceal them from the enemy, who may detect his designs and by the aid of good reserves cause them to fail. the attacking party labors under the disadvantages arising from the obstacles to be crossed before reaching the enemy's line; on which account the advantages and disadvantages of the tactical offensive are about equally balanced. whatever advantages may be expected either politically or strategically from the offensive, it may not be possible to maintain it exclusively throughout the war; for a campaign offensive in the beginning may become defensive before it ends. a defensive war is not without its advantages, when wisely conducted. it may be passive or active, taking the offensive at times. the passive defense is always pernicious; the active may accomplish great successes. the object of a defensive war being to protect, as long as possible, the country threatened by the enemy, all operations should be designed to retard his progress, to annoy him in his enterprises by multiplying obstacles and difficulties, without, however, compromising one's own army. he who invades does so by reason of some superiority; he will then seek to make the issue as promptly as possible: the defense, on the contrary, desires delay till his adversary is weakened by sending off detachments, by marches, and by the privations and fatigues incident to his progress. an army is reduced to the defensive only by reverses or by a positive inferiority. it then seeks in the support of forts, and in natural or artificial barriers, the means of restoring equality by multiplying obstacles in the way of the enemy. this plan, when not carried to an extreme, promises many chances of success, but only when the general has the good sense not to make the defense passive: he must not remain in his positions to receive whatever blows may be given by his adversary; he must, on the contrary, redouble his activity, and be constantly upon the alert to improve all opportunities of assailing the weak points of the enemy. this plan of war may be called the defensive-offensive, and may have strategical as well as tactical advantages.. it combines the advantages of both systems; for one who awaits his adversary upon a prepared field, with all his own resources in hand, surrounded by all the advantages of being on his own ground, can with hope of success take the initiative, and is fully able to judge when and where to strike. during the first three campaigns of the seven years' war frederick was the assailant; in the remaining four his conduct was a perfect model of the defensive-offensive. he was, however, wonderfully aided in this by his adversaries, who allowed him all the time he desired, and many opportunities of taking the offensive with success. wellington's course was mainly the same in portugal, spain, and belgium, and it was the most suitable in his circumstances. it seems plain that one of the greatest talents of a general is to know how to use (it may be alternately) these two systems, and particularly to be able to take the initiative during the progress of a defensive war. article xvii. of the theater of operations. the theater of a war comprises all the territory upon which the parties may assail each other, whether it belong to themselves, their allies, or to weaker states who may be drawn into the war through fear or interest. when the war is also maritime, the theater may embrace both hemispheres,--as has happened in contests between france and england since the time of louis xiv. the theater of a war may thus be undefined, and must, not be confounded with the theater of operations of one or the other army. the theater of a continental war between france and austria may be confined to italy, or may, in addition, comprise germany if the german states take part therein. armies may act in concert or separately: in the first case the whole theater of operations may be considered as a single field upon which strategy directs the armies for the attainment of a definite end. in the second case each army will have its own independent theater of operations. the _theater of operations_ of an army embraces all the territory it may desire to invade and all that it may be necessary to defend. if the army operates independently, it should not attempt any maneuver beyond its own theater, (though it should leave it if it be in danger of being surrounded,) since the supposition is that no concert of action has been arranged with the armies operating on the other fields. if, on the contrary, there be concert of action, the theater of operations of each army taken singly is but a zone of operations of the general field, occupied by the masses for the attainment of a common object. independently of its topographical features, each theater upon which one or more armies operate is composed, for both parties, as follows:-- . of a fixed base of operations. . of a principal objective point. . of fronts of operations, strategic fronts, and lines of defense. . of zones and lines of operations. . of temporary strategic lines and lines of communications. . of natural or artificial obstacles to be overcome or to oppose to the enemy. . of geographical strategic points, whose occupation is important, either for the offensive or defensive. . of accidental intermediate bases of operations between the objective point and the primary base. . of points of refuge in case of reverse. for illustration, let us suppose the case of france invading austria with two or three armies, to be concentrated under one commander, and starting from mayence, from the upper rhine, from savoy or the maritime alps, respectively. the section of country which each of these armies traverses may be considered as a zone of the general field of operations. but if the army of italy goes but to the adige without concerted action with the army of the rhine, then what was before but a zone becomes for that army a theater of operations. in every case, each theater must have its own base, its own objective point, its zones and lines of operations connecting the objective point with the base, either in the offensive or the defensive. it has been taught and published that rivers are lines of operations _par excellence._ now, as such a line must possess two or three roads to move the army within the range of its operations, and at least one line of retreat, rivers have been called lines of retreat, and even lines of maneuver. it would be much more accurate to say that rivers are excellent lines of supply, and powerful auxiliaries in the establishment of a good line of operations, but never the line itself. it has also been maintained that, could one create a country expressly to be a good theater of war, converging roads would be avoided, because they facilitate invasion. every country has its capital, its rich cities for manufactures or trade; and, in the very nature of things, these points must be the centers of converging routes. could germany be made a desert, to be molded into a theater of war at the pleasure of an individual, commercial cities and centers of trade would spring up, and the roads would again necessarily converge to these points. moreover, was not the archduke charles enabled to beat jourdan in by the use of converging routes? besides, these routes are more favorable for defense than attack, since two divisions retreating upon these radial lines can effect a junction more quickly than two armies which are pursuing, and they may thus united defeat each of the pursuing masses separately. some authors have affirmed that mountainous countries abound in strategic positions; others have maintained that, on the contrary, these points are more rare among the alps than in the plains, but also that if more rare they are more important and more decisive. some authors have represented that high ranges of mountains are, in war, inaccessible barriers. napoleon, on the contrary, in speaking of the rhetian alps, said that "an army could pass wherever a man could put his foot." generals no less experienced than himself in mountain-warfare have united with him in this opinion, in admitting the great difficulty of carrying on a defensive war in such localities unless the advantages of partisan and regular warfare can be combined, the first to guard the heights and to harass the enemy, the second to give battle at the decisive points,--the junctions of the large valleys. these differences of opinion are here noticed merely to show the reader that, so far from the art having reached perfection, there are many points that admit of discussion. the most important topographical or artificial features which make up the theater of a war will, in succeeding portions of this chapter, be examined as to their strategic value; but here it may be proper to remark that this value will depend much upon the spirit and skill of the general. the great leader who crossed the saint-bernard and ordered the passage of the splugen was far from believing in the impregnability of these chains; but he was also far from thinking that a muddy rivulet and a walled inclosure could change his destiny at waterloo. article xviii. bases of operations. a base of operations is the portion of country from which the army obtains its reinforcements and resources, from which it starts when it takes the offensive, to which it retreats when necessary, and by which it is supported when it takes position to cover the country defensively. the base of operations is most generally that of supply,--though not necessarily so, at least as far as food is concerned; as, for instance, a french army upon the elbe might be subsisted from westphalia or franconia, but its real base would certainly be upon the rhine. when a frontier possesses good natural or artificial barriers, it may be alternately either an excellent base for offensive operations, or a line of defense when the state is invaded. in the latter case it will always be prudent to have a second base in rear; for, although an army in its own country will everywhere find a point of support, there is still a vast difference between those parts of the country without military positions and means, as forts, arsenals, and fortified depots, and those other portions where these military resources are found; and these latter alone can be considered as safe bases of operations. an army may have in succession a number of bases: for instance, a french army in germany will have the rhine for its first base; it may have others beyond this, wherever it has allies or permanent lines of defense; but if it is driven back across the rhine it will have for a base either the meuse or the moselle: it might have a third upon the seine, and a fourth upon the loire. these successive bases may not be entirely or nearly parallel to the first. on the contrary, a total change of direction may become necessary. a french army repulsed beyond the rhine might find a good base on béfort or besançon, on mézières or sedan, as the russian army after the evacuation of moscow left the base on the north and east and established itself upon the line of the oka and the southern provinces. these lateral bases perpendicular to the front of defense are often decisive in preventing the enemy from penetrating to the heart of the country, or at least in rendering it impossible for him to maintain himself there. a base upon a broad and rapid river, both banks being held by strong works, would be as favorable as could be desired. the more extended the base, the more difficulty will there be in covering it; but it will also be more difficult to cut the army off from it. a state whose capital is too near the frontier cannot have so favorable a base in a defensive war as one whose capital is more retired. a base, to be perfect, should have two or three fortified points of sufficient capacity for the establishment of depots of supply. there should be a _tête de pont_ upon each of its unfordable streams. all are now agreed upon these principles; but upon other points opinions have varied. some have asserted that a perfect base is one parallel to that of the enemy. my opinion is that bases perpendicular to those of the enemy are more advantageous, particularly such as have two sides almost perpendicular to each other and forming a re-entrant angle, thus affording a double base if required, and which, by giving the control of two sides of the strategic field, assure two lines of retreat widely apart, and facilitate any change of the line of operations which an unforeseen turn of affairs may necessitate. the quotations which follow are from my treatise on great military operations:-- "the general configuration of the theater of war may also have a great influence upon the direction of the lines of operations, and, consequently, upon the direction of the bases. [illustration: fig. .] "if every theater of war forms a figure presenting four faces more or less regular, one of the armies, at the opening of the campaign, may hold one of these faces,--perhaps two,--while the enemy occupies the other, the fourth being closed by insurmountable obstacles. the different ways of occupying this theater will lead to widely different combinations. to illustrate, we will cite the theater of the french armies in westphalia from to , and that of napoleon in , both of which are represented in fig. , p. . in the first case, the side a b was the north sea, b d the line of the weser and the base of duke ferdinand, c d the line of the main and the base of the french army, a c the line of the rhine, also guarded by french troops. the french held two faces, the north sea being the third; and hence it was only necessary for them, by maneuvers, to gain the side b d to be masters of the four faces, including the base and the communications of the enemy. the french army, starting from its base c d and gaining the front of operations f g h, could cut off the allied army i from its base b d; the latter would be thrown upon the angle a, formed by the lines of the rhine, the ems, and the sea, while the army e could communicate with its bases on the main and rhine. "the movement of napoleon in on the saale was similar. he occupied at jena and naumburg the line f g h, then marched by halle and dessau to force the prussian army i upon the sea, represented by the side a b. the result is well known. "the art, then, of selecting lines of operations is to give them such directions as to seize the communications of the enemy without losing one's own. the line f g h, by its extended position, and the bend on the flank of the enemy, always protects the communications with the base c d; and this is exactly the maneuvers of marengo, ulm, and jena. "when the theater of war does not border upon the sea, it is always bounded by a powerful neutral state, which guards its frontiers and closes one side of the square. this may not be an obstacle insurmountable like the sea; but generally it may be considered as an obstacle upon which it would be dangerous to retreat after a defeat: hence it would be an advantage to force the enemy upon it. the soil of a power which can bring into the field one hundred and fifty or two hundred thousand troops cannot be violated with impunity; and if a defeated army made the attempt, it would be none the less cut off from its base. if the boundary of the theater of war should be the territory of a weak state, it would be absorbed in this theater, and the square would be enlarged till it reached the frontiers of a powerful state, or the sea. the outline of the frontiers may modify the shape of the quadrilateral so as to make it approach the figure of a parallelogram or trapezoid, as in figure . in either case, the advantage of the army which has control of two faces of the figure, and possesses the power of establishing upon them a double base, will be still more decided, since it will be able more easily to cut the enemy off from the shortened side,--as was the case with the prussian army in , with the side b d j of the parallelogram formed by the lines of the rhine, the oder, the north sea, and the mountainous frontier of franconia." [illustration: fig. .] the selection of bohemia as a base in goes to prove the truth of my opinion; for it was the perpendicularity of this base to that of the french army which enabled the allies to neutralize the immense advantages which the line of the elbe would otherwise have afforded napoleon, and turned the advantages of the campaign in their favor. likewise, in , by establishing their base perpendicularly upon the oka and kalouga, the russians were able to execute their flank march upon wiazma and krasnoi. if any thing further be required to establish these truths, it will only be necessary to consider that, if the base be perpendicular to that of the enemy, the front of operations will be parallel to his line of operations, and that hence it will be easy to attack his communications and line of retreat. it has been stated that perpendicular bases are particularly favorable in the case of a double frontier, as in the last figures. critics may object to this that it does not agree with what is elsewhere said in favor of frontiers which are salient toward the enemy, and against double lines of operations with equality of force. (art. xxi.) the objection is not well founded; for the greatest advantage of a perpendicular base consists in the fact that it forms such a salient, which takes in reverse a portion of the theater of operations. on the other hand, a base with two faces by no means requires that both should be occupied in force: on the contrary, upon one of them it will be sufficient to have some fortified points garrisoned by small bodies, while the great bulk of the force rests upon the other face,--as was done in the campaigns of and . the angle of nearly ninety degrees formed by the portion of the rhine from constance to basel, and thence to kehl, gave general moreau one base parallel and another perpendicular to that of his antagonist. he threw two divisions by his left toward kehl on the first base, to attract the attention of the enemy to that point, while he moved with nine divisions upon the extremity of the perpendicular face toward schaffhausen, which carried him in a few days to the gates of augsburg, the two detached divisions having already rejoined him. in , napoleon had also the double base of the rhine and main, forming almost a right re-entrant angle. he left mortier upon the first and parallel one, while with the mass of his forces he gained the extremity of the perpendicular base, and thus intercepted the prussians at gera and naumburg by reaching their line of retreat. if so many imposing facts prove that bases with two faces, one of them being almost perpendicular to that of the enemy, are the best, it is well to recollect that, in default of such a base, its advantages may be partially supplied by a change of strategic front, as will be seen in article xx. another very important point in reference to the proper direction of bases relates to those established on the sea-coast. these bases may be favorable in some circumstances, but are equally unfavorable in others, as may be readily seen from what precedes. the danger which must always exist of an army being driven to the sea seems so clear, in the ease of the establishment of the base upon it, (which bases can only be favorable to naval powers,) that it is astonishing to hear in our day praises of such a base. wellington, coming with a fleet to the relief of spain and portugal, could not have secured a better base than that of lisbon, or rather of the peninsula of torres-vedras, which covers all the avenues to that capital on the land side. the sea and the tagus not only protected both flanks, but secured the safety of his only possible line of retreat, which was upon the fleet. blinded by the advantages which the intrenched camp of torres-vedras secured for the english, and not tracing effects to their real causes, many generals in other respects wise contend that no bases are good except such as rest on the sea and thus afford the army facilities of supply and refuge with both flanks secured. fascinated by similar notions, colonel carion-nizas asserted that in napoleon ought to have posted half of his army in bohemia and thrown one hundred and fifty thousand men on the mouths of the elbe toward hamburg; forgetting that the first precept for a continental army is to establish its base upon the front farthest _from_ the sea, so as to secure the benefit of all its elements of strength, from which it might find itself cut off if the base were established upon the coast. an insular and naval power acting on the continent would pursue a diametrically opposite course, but resulting from the same principle, viz.: _to establish the base upon those points where it can be sustained by all the resources of the country, and at the same time insure a safe retreat._ a state powerful both on land and sea, whose squadrons control the sea adjacent to the theater of operations, might well base an army of forty or fifty thousand men upon the coast, as its retreat by sea and its supplies could be well assured; but to establish a continental army of one hundred and fifty thousand men upon such a base, when opposed by a disciplined and nearly equal force, would be an act of madness. however, as every maxim has its exceptions, there is a case in which it may be admissible to base a continental army upon the sea: it is, when your adversary is not formidable upon land, and when you, being master of the sea, can supply the army with more facility than in the interior. we rarely see these conditions fulfilled: it was so, however, during the turkish war of and . the whole attention of the russians was given to varna and bourghas, while shumla was merely observed; a plan which they could not have pursued in the presence of a european army (even with the control of the sea) without great danger of ruin. despite all that has been said by triflers who pretend to decide upon the fate of empires, this war was, in the main, well conducted. the army covered itself by obtaining the fortresses of brailoff, varna, and silistria, and afterward by preparing a depot at sizeboli. as soon as its base was well established it moved upon adrianople, which previously would have been madness. had the season been a couple of months longer, or had the army not come so great a distance in , the war would have terminated with the first campaign. besides permanent bases, which are usually established upon our own frontiers, or in the territory of a faithful ally, there are eventual or temporary bases, which result from the operations in the enemy's country; but, as these are rather temporary points of support, they will, to avoid confusion, be discussed in article xxiii. article xix. strategic lines and points, decisive points of the theater of war, and objective points of operations. strategic lines and points are of different kinds. some receive this title simply from their position, which gives them all their importance: these are permanent geographical strategic points. others have a value from the relations they bear to the positions of the masses of the hostile troops and to the enterprises likely to be directed against them: such are strategic points of maneuver, and are eventual. finally, there are points which have only a secondary importance, and others whose importance is constant and immense: the latter are called decisive strategic points. every point of the theater of war which is of military importance, whether from its position as a center of communication, or from the presence of military establishments or fortifications, is a geographical strategic point. a distinguished general affirms that such a point would not necessarily be a strategic point, unless situated favorably for a contemplated operation. i think differently; for a strategic point is such essentially and by nature, and, no matter how far distant it may be from the scene of the first enterprises, it may be included in the field by some unforeseen turn of events, and thus acquire its full importance. it would, then, be more accurate to state that all strategic points are not necessarily decisive points. lines are strategic either from their geographical position or from their relation to temporary maneuvers. the first class may be subdivided as follows,--viz.: geographic lines which by their permanent importance belong to the decisive points[ ] of the theater of war, and those which have value merely because they connect two strategic points. to prevent confusion, we will elsewhere treat of strategic lines in their relations to maneuvers,--confining ourselves here to what relates to the _decisive and objective points_ of the zone of operations upon which enterprises occur. although these are most intimately connected, since every objective point ought necessarily to be one of the decisive points of the theater of war, there is nevertheless a distinction between them; for all decisive points cannot be at the same time the objective of operations. we will, then, define the first, in order to be more easily guided in our selection of the second. i think the name of _decisive strategic point_ should be given to all those which are capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the result of the campaign or upon a single enterprise. all points whose geographical position and whose natural or artificial advantages favor the attack or defense of a front of operations or of a line of defense are included in this number; and large, well-located fortresses occupy in importance the first rank among them. the decisive points of a theater of war are of several kinds. the first are the geographic points and lines whose importance is permanent and a consequence of the configuration of the country. for example, take the case of the french in belgium: whoever is master of the line of the meuse will have the greatest advantages in taking possession of the country; for his adversary, being outflanked and inclosed between the meuse and the north sea, will be exposed to the danger of total ruin if he give battle parallel to that sea.[ ] similarly, the valley of the danube presents a series of important points which have caused it to be looked upon as the key of southern germany. those points the possession of which would give the control of the junction of several valleys and of the center of the chief lines of communication in a country are also _decisive geographic points_. for instance, lyons is an important strategic point, because it controls the valleys of the rhone and saône, and is at the center of communications between france and italy and between the south and east; but it would not be a _decisive_ point unless well fortified or possessing an extended camp with _têtes de pont_. leipsic is most certainly a strategic point, inasmuch as it is at the junction of all the communications of northern germany. were it fortified and did it occupy both banks of the river, it would be almost the key of the country,--if a country has a key, or if this expression means more than a decisive point. all capitals are strategic points, for the double reason that they are not only centers of communications, but also the seats of power and government. in mountainous countries there are defiles which are the only routes of exit practicable for an army; and these may be decisive in reference to any enterprise in this country. it is well known how great was the importance of the defile of bard, protected by a single small fort, in . the second kind of decisive points are accidental points of maneuver, which result from the positions of the troops on both sides. when mack was at ulm, in , awaiting the approach of the russian army through moravia, the decisive point in an attack upon him was donauwerth or the lower lech; for if his adversaries gained it before him he was cut off from his line of retreat, and also from the army intended to support him. on the contrary, kray, who, in , was in the same position, expected no aid from bohemia, but rather from the tyrol and from the army of mélas in italy: hence the decisive point of attack upon him was not donauwerth, but on the opposite side, by schaffhausen, since this would take in reverse his front of operations, expose his line of retreat, cut him off from his supporting army as well as from his base, and force him upon the main. in the same campaign the first objective point of napoleon was to fall upon the right of mélas by the saint-bernard, and to seize his line of communications: hence saint-bernard, ivrea, and piacenza were decisive points only by reason of the march of mélas upon nice. it may be laid down as a general principle that the decisive points of maneuver are on that flank of the enemy upon which, if his opponent operates, he can more easily cut him off from his base and supporting forces without being exposed to the same danger. the flank opposite to the sea is always to be preferred, because it gives an opportunity of forcing the enemy upon the sea. the only exception to this is in the case of an insular and inferior army, where the attempt, although dangerous, might be made to cut it off from the fleet. if the enemy's forces are in detachments, or are too much extended, the decisive point is his center; for by piercing that, his forces will be more divided, their weakness increased, and the fractions may be crushed separately. the decisive point of a battle-field will be determined by,-- . the features of the ground. . the relation of the local features to the ultimate strategic aim. . the positions occupied by the respective forces. these considerations will be discussed in the chapter on battles. objective points. there are two classes of objective points,--objective _points of maneuver_, and _geographical objective points_. a geographical objective point may be an important fortress, the line of a river, a front of operations which affords good lines of defense or good points of support for ulterior enterprises. _objective points of maneuver_, in contradistinction to _geographical objectives_, derive their importance from, and their positions depend upon, the situation of the hostile masses. in strategy, the object of the campaign determines the objective point. if this aim be offensive, the point will be the possession of the hostile capital, or that of a province whose loss would compel the enemy to make peace. in a war of invasion the capital is, ordinarily, the objective point. however, the geographical position of the capital, the political relations of the belligerents with their neighbors, and their respective resources, are considerations foreign in themselves to the art of fighting battles, but intimately connected with plans of operations, and may decide whether an army should attempt or not to occupy the hostile capital. if it be concluded not to seize the capital, the objective point might be a part of the front of operations or line of defense where an important fort is situated, the possession of which would render safe the occupation of the neighboring territory. for instance, if france were to invade italy in a war against austria, the first objective point would be the line of the ticino and po; the second, mantua and the line of the adige. in the defensive, the objective point, instead of being that which it is desirable to gain possession of, is that which is to be defended. the capital, being considered the seat of power, becomes the principal objective point of the defense; but there may be other points, as the defense of a first line and of the first base of operations. thus, for a french army reduced to the defensive behind the rhine, the first objective would be to prevent the passage of the river; it would endeavor to relieve the forts in alsace if the enemy succeeded in effecting a passage of the river and in besieging them: the second objective would be to cover the first base of operations upon the meuse or moselle,--which might be attained by a lateral defense as well as one in front. as to the objective points of _maneuvers_,--that is, those which relate particularly to the destruction or decomposition of the hostile forces,--their importance may be seen by what has already been said. the greatest talent of a general, and the surest hope of success, lie in some degree in the good choice of these points. this was the most conspicuous merit of napoleon. rejecting old systems, which were satisfied by the capture of one or two points or with the occupation of an adjoining province, he was convinced that the best means of accomplishing great results was to dislodge and destroy the hostile army,--since states and provinces fall of themselves when there is no organized force to protect them. to detect at a glance the relative advantages presented by the different zones of operations, to concentrate the mass of the forces upon that one which gave the best promise of success, to be indefatigable in ascertaining the approximate position of the enemy, to fall with the rapidity of lightning upon his center if his front was too much extended, or upon that flank by which he could more readily seize his communications, to outflank him, to cut his line, to pursue him to the last, to disperse and destroy his forces,--such was the system followed by napoleon in his first campaigns. these campaigns proved this system to be one of the very best. when these maneuvers were applied, in later years, to the long distances and the inhospitable regions of russia, they were not so successful as in germany: however, it must be remembered that, if this kind of war is not suitable to all capacities, regions, or circumstances, its chances of success are still very great, and it is based upon principle. napoleon abused the system; but this does not disprove its real advantages when a proper limit is assigned to its enterprises and they are made in harmony with the respective conditions of the armies and of the adjoining states. the maxims to be given on these important strategic operations are almost entirely included in what has been said upon decisive points, and in what will be stated in article xxi. in discussing the choice of lines of operations. as to the choice of objective points, every thing will generally depend upon the aim of the war and the character which political or other circumstances may give it, and, finally, upon the military facilities of the two parties. in cases where there are powerful reasons for avoiding all risk, it may be prudent to aim only at the acquisition of partial advantages,--such as the capture of a few towns or the possession of adjacent territory. in other cases, where a party has the means of achieving a great success by incurring great dangers, he may attempt the destruction of the hostile army, as did napoleon. the maneuvers of ulm and jena cannot be recommended to an army whose only object is the siege of antwerp. for very different reasons, they could not be recommended to the french army beyond the niemen, five hundred leagues from its frontiers, because there would be much more to be lost by failure than a general could reasonably hope to gain by success. there is another class of decisive points to be mentioned, which are determined more from political than from strategic considerations: they play a great part in most coalitions, and influence the operations and plans of cabinets. they may be called _political objective points_. indeed, besides the intimate connection between statesmanship and war in its preliminaries, in most campaigns some military enterprises are undertaken to carry out a political end, sometimes quite important, but often very irrational. they frequently lead to the commission of great errors in strategy. we cite two examples. first, the expedition of the duke of york to dunkirk, suggested by old commercial views, gave to the operations of the allies a divergent direction, which caused their failure: hence this objective point was bad in a military view. the expedition of the same prince to holland in --likewise due to the views of the english cabinet, sustained by the intentions of austria on belgium--was not less fatal; for it led to the march of the archduke charles from zurich upon manheim,--a step quite contrary to the interests of the allied armies at the time it was undertaken. these illustrations prove that political objective points should be subordinate to strategy, at least until after a great success has been attained. this subject is so extensive and so complicated that it would be absurd to attempt to reduce it to a few rules. the only one which can be given has just been alluded to, and is, that either the political objective points should be selected according to the principles of strategy, or their consideration should be postponed till after the decisive events of the campaign. applying this rule to the examples just given, it will be seen that it was at cambray or in the heart of france that dunkirk should have been conquered in and holland delivered in ; in other words, by uniting all the strength of the allies for great attempts on the decisive points of the frontiers. expeditions of this kind are generally included in grand diversions,--to be treated of in a separate article. footnotes: [footnote : i may be reproached with inaccuracy of expression,--since a line cannot be a _point_, and yet i apply to lines the name of decisive or objective points. it seems almost useless to remark that _objective_ points are not geometric points, but that the name is a form of expression used to designate the object which an army desires to attain.] [footnote : this only applies to continental armies, and not to the english, who, having their base on antwerp or ostend, would have nothing to fear from an occupation of the line of the meuse.] article xx. fronts of operations, strategic fronts, lines of defense, and strategic positions. there are some parts of the military science that so closely resemble each other, and are so intimately allied, that they are frequently confounded, although they are decidedly distinct. such are _fronts of operations, strategic fronts, lines of defense_, and _strategic positions_. it is proposed in this article to show the distinction between them and to expose their relations to each other. fronts of operations and strategic fronts. when the masses of an army are posted in a zone of operations, they generally occupy strategic positions. the extent of the front occupied toward the enemy is called the _strategic front_. the portion of the theater of war from which an enemy can probably reach this front in two or three marches is called the _front of operations_. the resemblance between these two fronts has caused many military men to confound them, sometimes under one name and sometimes under the other. rigorously speaking, however, the strategic front designates that formed by the actual positions occupied by the masses of the army, while the other embraces the space separating the two armies, and extends one or two marches beyond each extremity of the strategic front, and includes the ground upon which the armies will probably come in collision. when the operations of a campaign are on the eve of commencing, one of the armies will decide to await the attack of the other, and will undertake to prepare a line of defense, which may be either that of the strategic front or more to the rear. hence the strategic front and line of defense may coincide, as was the case in and upon the rhine, which was then a line of defense for both austrians and french, and at the same time their strategic front and front of operations. this occasional coincidence of these lines doubtless leads persons to confound them, while they are really very different. an army has not necessarily a line of defense, as, for example, when it invades: when its masses are concentrated in a single position, it has no strategic front, but it is never without a front of operations. the two following examples will illustrate the difference between the different terms. at the resumption of hostilities in , napoleon's front of operations extended at first from hamburg to wittenberg; thence it ran along the line of the allies toward glogau and breslau, (his right being at löwenberg,) and followed along the frontier of bohemia to dresden. his forces were stationed on this grand front in four masses, whose strategic positions were interior and central and presented three different faces. subsequently, he retired behind the elbe. his real line of defense then extended only from wittenberg to dresden, with a bend to the rear toward marienberg, for hamburg and magdeburg were beyond the strategic field, and it would have been fatal for him to have extended his operations to these points. the other example is his position about mantua in . his front of operations here really extended from the mountains of bergamo to the adriatic sea, while his real line of defense was upon the adige, between lake garda and legnago: afterward it was upon the mincio, between peschiera and mantua, while his strategic front varied according to his positions. the front of operations being the space which separates the two armies, and upon which they may fight, is ordinarily parallel to the base of operations. the strategic front will have the same direction, and ought to be perpendicular to the principal line of operations, and to extend far enough on either flank to cover this line well. however, this direction may vary, either on account of projects that are formed, or on account of the attacks of the enemy; and it quite frequently happens that it is necessary to have a front perpendicular to the base and parallel to the original line of operations. such a change of strategic front is one of the most important of all grand maneuvers, for by this means the control of two faces of the strategic field may be obtained, thus giving the army a position almost as favorable as if it possessed a base with two faces. (see art. xviii.) the strategic front of napoleon in his march on eylau illustrates these points. his pivots of operations were at warsaw and thorn, which made the vistula a temporary base: the front became parallel to the narew, from whence he set out, supported by sierock, pultusk, and ostrolenka, to maneuver by his right and throw the russians on elbing and the baltic. in such cases, if a point of support in the new direction can be obtained, the strategic front gives the advantages referred to above. it ought to be borne in mind in such maneuvers that the army should always be sure of regaining its temporary base if necessary; in other words, that this base should be prolonged behind the strategic front, and should be covered by it. napoleon, marching from the narew by allenstein upon eylau, had behind his left thorn, and farther from the front of the army the _tête de pont_ of praga and warsaw; so that his communications were safe, while benningsen, forced to face him and to make his line parallel to the baltic, might be cut off from his base, and be thrown back upon the mouths of the vistula. napoleon executed another very remarkable change of strategic front in his march from gera upon jena and naumburg in . moreau made another in moving by his right upon augsburg and dillingen, fronting the danube and france, and thereby forcing kray to evacuate the intrenched camp at ulm. the change of the strategic front to a position perpendicular to the base may be a temporary movement for an operation of a few days' duration, or it may be for an indefinite time, in order to profit by important advantages afforded by certain localities, to strike decisive blows, or to procure for the army a good line of defense and good pivots of operations, which would be almost equivalent to a real base. it often happens that an army is compelled to have a double strategic front, either by the features of the theater of war, or because every line of offensive operations requires protection on its flanks. as an example of the first, the frontiers of turkey and spain may be cited. in order to cross the balkan or the ebro, an army would be obliged to present a double front,--in the first case, to face the valley of the danube; in the second, to confront forces coming from saragossa or leon. all extensive countries necessitate, to a greater or less degree, the same precaution. a french army in the valley of the danube will require a double front as soon as the austrians have thrown sufficient troops into the tyrol or bohemia to give rise to any anxiety. those countries which present a narrow frontier to the enemy are the only exception, since the troops left on the frontier to harass the flanks of the enemy could themselves be cut off and captured. this necessity of double strategic fronts is one of the most serious inconveniences of an offensive war, since it requires large detachments, which are always dangerous. (see article xxxvi.) of course, all that precedes relates to regular warfare. in a national or intestine war the whole country is the scene of hostilities. nevertheless, each large fraction of an army having a defined aim would have its own strategic front determined by the features of the country and the positions occupied by the large bodies of the enemy. thus, suchet in catalonia and massena in portugal each had a strategic front, while the front of some other corps of the army was not clearly defined. lines of defense. lines of defense are classified as strategical and tactical. strategical lines of defense are subdivided into two classes: . permanent lines of defense, which are a part of the defensive system of a state, such as the line of a fortified frontier; . eventual lines of defense, which relate only to the temporary position of an army. the frontier is a permanent line of defense when it presents a well-connected system of obstacles, natural and artificial, such as ranges of mountains, broad rivers, and fortresses. thus, the range of the alps between france and piedmont is a line of defense, since the practicable passes are guarded by forts which would prove great obstacles in the way of an army, and since the outlets of the gorges in the valleys of piedmont are protected by large fortresses. the rhine, the oder, and the elbe may also be considered as permanent lines of defense, on account of the important forts found upon them. every river of any considerable width, every range of mountains, and every defile, having their weak points covered by temporary fortifications, may be regarded as _eventual lines of defense_, both strategic and tactical, since they may arrest for some time the progress of the enemy, or may compel him to deviate to the right or left in search of a weaker point,--in which case the advantage is evidently strategic. if the enemy attack in front, the lines present an evident tactical advantage, since it is always more difficult to drive an army from its position behind a river, or from a point naturally and artificially strong, than to attack it on an open plain. on the other hand, this advantage must not be considered unqualified, lest we should fall into the system of positions which has been the ruin of so many armies; for, whatever may be the facilities of a position for defense, it is quite certain that the party which remains in it passive and receiving all the attacks of his adversary will finally yield.[ ] in addition to this, since a position naturally very strong[ ] is difficult of access it will be as difficult of egress, the enemy may be able with an inferior force to confine the army by guarding all the outlets. this happened to the saxons in the camp of pirna, and to wurmser in mantua. strategic positions. there is a disposition of armies to which the name of strategic position may be applied, to distinguish from tactical positions or positions for battle. strategic positions are those taken for some time and which are intended to cover a much greater portion of the front of operations than would be covered in an actual battle. all positions behind a river or upon a line of defense, the divisions of the army being separated by considerable distances, are of this class, such as those of napoleon at rivoli, verona, and legnago to overlook the adige. his positions in in saxony and silesia in advance of his line of defense were strategic. the positions of the anglo-prussian armies on the frontier of belgium before the battle of ligny, ( ,) and that of massena on the limmat and aar in , were also strategic. even winter quarters, when compact and in face of the enemy and not protected by an armistice, are strategic positions,--for instance, napoleon on the passarge in . the daily positions taken up by an army beyond the reach of the enemy, which are sometimes spread out either to deceive him or to facilitate movements, are of this class. this class also includes positions occupied by an army to cover several points and positions held by the masses of an army for the purposes of observation. the different positions taken up on a line of defense, the positions of detachments on a double front of operations, the position of a detachment covering a siege, the main army in the meanwhile operating on another point, are all strategic. indeed, all large detachments or fractions of an army may be considered as occupying strategic positions. the maxims to be given on the preceding points are few, since fronts, lines of defense, and strategic positions generally depend upon a multitude of circumstances giving rise to infinite variety. in every case, the first general rule is that the communications with the different points of the line of operations be thoroughly assured. in the defense it is desirable that the strategic fronts and lines of defense should present both upon the flanks and front formidable natural or artificial obstacles to serve as points of support. the points of support on the strategic front are called _pivots of operations_, and are practical temporary bases, but quite different from pivots of maneuver. for example, in verona was an excellent pivot of operations for all napoleon's enterprises about mantua for eight months. in dresden was his pivot. pivots of maneuver are detachments of troops left to guard points which it is essential to hold, while the bulk of the army proceeds to the fulfillment of some important end; and when this is accomplished the pivot of maneuver ceases to exist. thus, ney's corps was the pivot of napoleon's maneuver by donauwerth and augsburg to cut mack from his line of retreat. a pivot of operations, on the contrary, is a material point of both strategical and tactical importance, serves as a point of support and endures throughout a campaign. the most desirable quality of a line of defense is that it should be as short as possible, in order to be covered with facility by the army if it is compelled to take the defensive. it is also important that the extent of the strategic front should not be so great as to prevent the prompt concentration of the fractions of the army upon an advantageous point. the same does not altogether apply to the front of operations; for if it be too contracted it would be difficult for an army on the offensive to make strategic maneuvers calculated to produce great results, since a short front could be easily covered by the defensive army. neither should the front of operations be too extended. such a front is unsuitable for offensive operations, as it would give the enemy, if not a good line of defense, at least ample space to escape from the results of a strategic maneuver even if well planned. thus, the beautiful operations of marengo, ulm, and jena could not have produced the same results upon a theater of the magnitude of that of the russian war in , since the enemy, even if cut off from his line of retreat, could have found another by adopting a new zone of operations. the essential conditions for every strategic position are that it should be more compact than the forces opposed, that all fractions of the army should have sure and easy means of concentrating, free from the intervention of the enemy. thus, for forces nearly equal, all central or interior positions would be preferable to exterior ones, since the front in the latter case would necessarily be more extended and would lead to a dangerous division of force. great mobility and activity on the part of the troops occupying these positions will be a strong element of security or of superiority over the enemy, since it renders possible rapid concentration at different and successive points of the front. an army should never long occupy any strategic point without making selection of one or two tactical positions, for the purpose of there concentrating all the disposable force, and giving battle to the enemy when he shall have unveiled his designs. in this manner napoleon prepared the fields of rivoli and austerlitz, wellington that of waterloo, and the archduke charles that of wagram. when an army either camps or goes into quarters, the general should be careful that the front be not too extended. a disposition which might be called the strategic square seems best, presenting three nearly-equal faces, so that the distance to be passed over would be about equal for all the divisions in concentrating upon the common center to receive an attack. every strategic line of defense should always possess a tactical point upon which to rally for defense should the enemy cross the strategic front. for instance, an army guarding a bank of a river, not being able to occupy in force the whole line, ought always to have a position in rear of the center selected, upon which to collect all his divisions, so as to oppose them united to the enemy when he has succeeded in effecting a passage. for an army entering a country with the purpose either of subjugation or of temporary occupation, it would always be prudent, however brilliant may have been its earlier successes, to prepare a line of defense as a refuge in case of reverse. this remark is made to complete the subject: the lines themselves are intimately connected with temporary bases, and will be discussed in a future article, (xxiii.) footnotes: [footnote : this does not refer to intrenched camps, which make a great difference. they are treated of in article xxvii.] [footnote : it is a question here of positions of camps, and not of positions for battle. the latter will be treated of in the chapter devoted to grand tactics, (article xxx.)] article xxi. zones and lines of operations. a zone of operations is a certain fraction of the whole theater of war, which may be traversed by an army in the attainment of its object, whether it act singly or in concert with other and secondary armies. for example, in the plan of campaign of , italy was the zone of the right, bavaria that of the center, franconia that of the left army. a zone of operations may sometimes present but a single _line of operations_, either on account of the configuration of the country, or of the small number of practicable routes for an army found therein. generally, however, a zone presents several _lines of operations_, depending partly upon the plans of the campaign, partly upon the number of great routes of communication existing in the theater of operations. it is not to be understood from this that every road is of itself a _line of operations_,--though doubtless it may happen that any good road in a certain turn of affairs may become for the time-being such a line; but as long as it is only traversed by detachments, and lies beyond the sphere of the principal enterprises, it cannot truly be called the real line of operations. moreover, the existence of several routes leading to the same front of operations, and separated by one or two marches, would not constitute so many lines of operations, but, being the communications of the different divisions of the same army, the whole space bounded by them would constitute but a single line. the term _zone of operations_ is applied to a large fraction of the general theater of war; the term _lines of operations_ will designate the part of this fraction embraced by the enterprises of the army. whether it follow a single or several routes, the term _strategic lines_ will apply to those important lines which connect the decisive points of the theater of operations either with each other or with the front of operations; and, for the same reason, we give this name to those lines which the army would follow to reach one of these decisive points, or to accomplish an important maneuver which requires a temporary deviation from the principal line of operations. _lines of communications_ designate the practicable routes between the different portions of the army occupying different positions throughout the zone of operations. for example, in , after the accession of austria to the grand coalition, three allied armies were to invade saxony, one bavaria, and another italy: so that saxony, or rather the country between dresden, magdeburg, and breslau, formed the zone of operations of the mass of the forces. this zone had three _lines of operations_ leading to leipsic as an objective: the first was the line of the army of bohemia, leading from the mountains of erzgebirge by dresden and chemnitz upon leipsic; the second was the line of the army of silesia, going from breslau by dresden or by wittenberg upon leipsic; the third was that of bernadotte from berlin by dessau to the same objective point. each of these armies marched upon two or more adjacent parallel routes, but it could not be said that there were as many lines of operations as roads. the principal line of operations is that followed by the bulk of the army, and upon which depots of provisions, munitions, and other supplies are echeloned, and over which, if compelled, it would retreat. if the choice of a zone of operations involves no extensive combinations, since there can never be more than two or three zones on each theater, and the advantages generally result from the localities, it is somewhat different with lines of operations, as they are divided into different classes, according to their relations to the different positions of the enemy, to the communications upon the strategic field, and to the enterprises projected by the commander. _simple lines of operations_ are those of an army acting from a frontier when it is not subdivided into large independent bodies. _double lines of operations_ are those of two independent armies proceeding from the same frontier, or those of two nearly equal armies which are commanded by the same general but are widely separated in distance and for long intervals of time.[ ] _interior lines of operations_ are those adopted by one or two armies to oppose several hostile bodies, and having such a direction that the general can concentrate the masses and maneuver with his whole force in a shorter period of time than it would require for the enemy to oppose to them a greater force.[ ] _exterior lines_ lead to the opposite result, and are those formed by an army which operates at the same time on both flanks of the enemy, or against several of his masses. _concentric lines of operations_ are those which depart from widely-separated points and meet at the same point, either in advance of or behind the base. _divergent lines_ are those by which an army would leave a given point to move upon several distinct points. these lines, of course, necessitate a subdivision of the army. there are also _deep lines_, which are simply _long lines_. the term _maneuver-lines_ i apply to momentary strategic lines, often adopted for a single temporary maneuver, and which are by no means to be confounded with the real _lines of operations_. _secondary lines_ are those of two armies acting so as to afford each other mutual support,--as, in , the army of the sambre and meuse was secondary to the army of the rhine, and, in , the army of bagration was secondary to that of barclay. _accidental lines_ are those brought about by events which change the original plan and give a new direction to operations. these are of the highest importance. the proper occasions for their use are fully recognized only by a great and active mind. there may be, in addition, _provisional_ and _definitive lines of operations_. the first designate the line adopted by an army in a preliminary, decisive enterprise, after which it is at liberty to select a more advantageous or direct line. they seem to belong as much to the class of temporary or eventual strategic lines as to the class of lines of operations. these definitions show how i differ from those authors who have preceded me. lloyd and bulow attribute to these lines no other importance than that arising from their relations to the depots of the army: the latter has even asserted that when an army is encamped near its depots it has no lines of operations. the following example will disprove this paradox. let us suppose two armies, the first on the upper rhine, the second in advance of dusseldorf or any other point of this frontier, and that their large depots are immediately behind the river,--certainly the safest, nearest, and most advantageous position for them which could possibly be adopted. these armies will have an offensive or defensive object: hence they will certainly have lines of operations, arising from the different proposed enterprises. . their defensive territorial line, starting from their positions, will extend to the second line which they are to cover, and they would both be cut off from this second line should the enemy establish himself in the interval which separates them from it. even if mélas[ ] had possessed a year's supplies in alessandria, he would none the less have been cut off from his base of the mincio as soon as the victorious enemy occupied the line of the po. . their line would be double, and the enemy's single if he concentrated his forces to defeat these armies successively; it would be a double exterior line, and the enemy's a double interior, if the latter divided his forces into two masses, giving them such directions as to enable him to concentrate all his forces before the two armies first referred to could unite. bulow would have been more nearly right had he asserted that an army on its own soil is less dependent on its primitive line of operations than when on foreign ground; for it finds in every direction points of support and some of the advantages which are sought for in the establishment of lines of operations; it may even lose its line of operations without incurring great danger; but that is no reason why it has no line of operations. observations upon the lines of operations in the wars of the french revolution. at the beginning of this terrible and ever-varying struggle, prussia and austria were the only avowed enemies of france, and italy was included in the theater of war only for purposes of reciprocal observation, it being too remote for decisive enterprises in view of the end proposed. the real theater extended from huningue to dunkirk, and comprised three zones of operations,--the first reaching along the rhine from huningue to landau, and thence to the moselle; the center consisting of the interval between the meuse and moselle; the third and left was the frontier from givet to dunkirk. when france declared war, in april, , her intention was to prevent a union of her enemies; and she had then one hundred thousand men in the zones just described, while austria had but thirty-five thousand in belgium. it is quite impossible to understand why the french did not conquer this country, when no effectual resistance could have been made. four months intervened between the declaration of war and the concentration of the allied troops. was it not probable that an invasion of belgium would have prevented that of champagne, and have given the king of prussia a conception of the strength of france, and induced him not to sacrifice his armies for the secondary object of imposing upon france another form of government? when the prussians arrived at coblentz, toward the end of july, the french were no longer able to invade. this _rôle_ was reserved for the allies; and it is well known how they acquitted themselves. the whole force of the french was now about one hundred and fifteen thousand men. it was scattered over a frontier of one hundred and forty leagues and divided into five corps d'armée, and could not make a good defense; for to paralyze them and prevent their concentration it was only necessary to attack the center. political reasons were also in favor of this plan of attack: the end proposed was political, and could only be attained by rapid and vigorous measures. the line between the moselle and meuse, which was the center, was less fortified than the rest of the frontier, and, besides, gave the allies the advantage of the excellent fortress of luxembourg as a base. they wisely adopted this plan of attack; but the execution was not equal to the conception. the court of vienna had the greatest interest in the war, for family reasons, as well as on account of the dangers to which a reverse might subject her provinces. for some reason, difficult to understand, austria co-operated only to the extent of thirty battalions: forty-five thousand men remained as an army of observation in brisgau, on the rhine, and in flanders. where were the imposing armies she afterward displayed? and what more useful disposition could have been made of them than to protect the flanks of the invading army? this remarkable conduct on the part of austria, which cost her so much, may account for the resolution of prussia to retire at a later period, and quit the field, as she did, at the very moment when she should have entered it. during the campaign the prussians did not exhibit the activity necessary for success. they spent eight days uselessly in camp at kons. if they had anticipated dumouriez at the little islands, or had even made a more serious effort to drive him from them, they would still have had all the advantage of a concentrated force against several scattered divisions, and could have prevented their junction and overthrown them separately. frederick the great would have justified the remark of dumouriez at grandpré,--that, if his antagonist had been the great king, he (dumouriez) would already have been driven behind châlons. the austrians in this campaign proved that they were still imbued with the false system of daun and lascy, of covering every point in order to guard every point. the fact of having twenty thousand men in brisgau while the moselle and sarre were uncovered, shows the fear they had of losing a village, and how their system led to large detachments, which are frequently the ruin of armies. forgetting that the surest hope of victory lies in presenting the strongest force, they thought it necessary to occupy the whole length of a frontier to prevent invasion,--which was exactly the means of rendering invasion upon every point feasible. i will further observe that, in thin campaign, dumouriez foolishly abandoned the pursuit of the allies in order to transfer the theater from the center to the extreme left of the general field. moreover, he was unable to perceive the great results rendered possible by this movement, but attacked the army of the duke of saxe-teschen in front, while by descending the meuse to namur he might have thrown it back upon the north sea toward meuport or ostend, and have destroyed it entirely in a more successful battle than that of jemmapes. the campaign of affords a new instance of the effect of a faulty direction of operations. the austrians were victorious, and recovered belgium, because dumouriez unskillfully extended his front of operations to the gates of rotterdam. thus far the conduct of the allies deserves praise: the desire of reconquering these rich provinces justified this enterprise, which, moreover, was judiciously directed against the extreme right of the long front of dumouriez. but after the french had been driven back under the guns of valenciennes, and were disorganized and unable to resist, why did the allies remain six months in front of a few towns and permit the committee of public safety to organize new armies? when the deplorable condition of france and the destitution of the wreck of the army of dampierre are considered, can the parades of the allies in front of the fortresses in flanders be understood? invasions of a country whose strength lies mainly in the capital are particularly advantageous. under the government of a powerful prince, and in ordinary wars, the most important point is the head-quarters of the army; but under a weak prince, in a republic, and still more in wars of opinion, the capital is generally the center of national power.[ ] if this is ever doubtful, it was not so on this occasion. paris was france, and this to such an extent that two-thirds of the nation had risen against the government which oppressed them. if, after having beaten the french army at famars, the allies had left the dutch and hanoverians to observe what remained of it, while the english and the austrians directed their operations upon the meuse, the sarre, and the moselle, in concert with the prussians and a part of the useless army of the upper rhine, a force of one hundred and twenty thousand men, with its flanks protected by other troops, could have been pushed forward. it is even probable that, without changing the direction of the war or running great risks, the dutch and hanoverians could have performed the duty of observing maubeuge and valenciennes, while the bulk of the army pursued the remains of dampierre's forces. after gaining several victories, however, two hundred thousand men were engaged in carrying on a few sieges and were not gaining a foot of ground. while they threatened france with invasion, they placed fifteen or sixteen bodies of troops, defensively, to cover their own frontier! when valenciennes and mayence capitulated, instead of falling with all their forces upon the camp at cambray, they flew off, excentrically, to dunkirk on one side and landau on the other. it is not less astonishing that, after making the greatest efforts in the beginning of the campaign upon the right of the general field, they should have shifted them afterward to the extreme left, so that while the allies were operating in flanders they were in no manner seconded or aided by the imposing army upon the rhine; and when, in its turn, this army took up the offensive, the allies remained inactive upon the sambre. do not these false combinations resemble those of soubise and broglie in , and all the operations of the seven years' war? in the phase of affairs is wholly changed. the french from a painful defensive pass to a brilliant offensive. the combinations of this campaign were doubtless well considered; but it is wrong to represent them as forming a new system of war. to be convinced of this, it is only necessary to observe that the respective positions of the armies in this campaign and in that of were almost identical, and the direction of the operations is quite the same. the french had four corps, which constituted two armies, as the king of prussia had four divisions, which composed two armies. these two large bodies took a concentric direction leading on brussels, as frederick and schwerin had adopted in on prague. the only difference between the two plans is that the austrian troops in flanders were not so much scattered as those of brown in bohemia; but this difference is certainly not favorable to the plan of . the position of the north sea was also unfavorable for the latter plan. to outflank the austrian right, pichegru was thrown between the sea and the mass of the enemy,--a direction as dangerous and faulty as could be given to great operations. this movement was the same as that of benningsen on the lower vistula which almost lost the russian army in . the fate of the prussian army, cut off from its communications and forced upon the baltic, is another proof of this truth. if the prince of coburg had acted with ability, he could easily have made pichegru suffer for this audacious maneuver, which was performed a month before jourdan was prepared to follow it up. the center of the grand austrian army intended to act upon the offensive was before landrecies; the army was composed of one hundred and six battalions and one hundred and fifty squadrons; upon its right flank flanders was covered by the corps d'armée of clairfayt, and upon the left charleroi was covered by that of the prince de kaunitz. the gain of a battle before landrecies opened its gates; and upon general chapuis was found a plan of the diversion in flanders: only _twelve battalions_ were sent to clairfayt. a long time afterward, and after the french were known to have been successful, the corps of the duke of york marched to clairfayt's relief; but what was the use of the remainder of the army before landrecies, after it was obliged by a loss of force to delay invasion? the prince of coburg threw away all the advantages of his central position, by allowing the french to concentrate in belgium and to beat all his large detachments in detail. finally, the army moved, leaving a division at cateau, and a part having been sent to the prince de kaunitz at charleroi. if, instead of dividing this grand army, it had been directed upon turcoing, there would have been concentrated there one hundred battalions and one hundred and forty squadrons; and what must then have been the result of this famous diversion of pichegru, cut off from his own frontiers and shut up between the sea and two fortresses? the plan of invasion adopted by the french had not only the radical error of exterior lines: it also failed in execution. the diversion on courtray took place on april , and jourdan did not arrive at charleroi till the d of june,--more than a month afterward. here was a splendid opportunity for the austrians to profit by their central position. if the prussian army had maneuvered by its right and the austrian army by its left,--that is, both upon the meuse,--the state of affairs would have been different. by establishing themselves in the center of a line of scattered forces they could have prevented the junction of the different fractions. it may be dangerous in a battle to attack the center of a close line of troops when it can be simultaneously sustained by the wings and the reserves; but it is quite different on a line of three hundred miles in extent. in prussia and spain retired from the coalition, and the principal theater of war was shifted from the rhine to italy,--which opened a new field of glory for the french arms. their lines of operations in this campaign were double; they desired to operate by dusseldorf and manheim. clairfayt, wiser than his predecessors, concentrated his forces alternately upon these points, and gained victories at manheim and in the lines of mayence so decisive that they caused the army of the sambre and meuse to recross the rhine to cover the moselle, and brought pichegru back to landau. in the lines of operations on the rhine were copied from those of and those in flanders in , but with different results. the armies of the rhine, and of the sambre and meuse, set out from the extremities of the base, on routes converging to the danube. as in , they were exterior lines. the archduke charles, more skillful than the prince of coburg, profited by his interior lines by concentrating his forces at a point nearer than that expected by the french. he then seized the instant when the danube covered the corps of latour, to steal several marches upon moreau and attack and overwhelm jourdan: the battle of wurzburg decided the fate of germany and compelled the army of moreau to retreat. bonaparte now commences in italy his extraordinary career. his plan is to separate the piedmontese and austrian armies. he succeeds by the battle of millesimo in causing them to take two exterior strategic lines, and beats them successively at mondovi and lodi. a formidable army is collected in the tyrol to raise the siege of mantua: it commits the error of marching there in two bodies separated by a lake. the lightning is not quicker than napoleon. he raises the siege, abandons every thing before mantua, throws the greater part of his force upon the first column, which debouches by brescia, beats it and forces it back upon the mountains: the second column arrives upon the same ground, and is there beaten in its turn, and compelled to retire into the tyrol to keep up its communications with the right. wurmser, upon whom these lessons are lost, desires to cover the two lines of roveredo and vicenza; napoleon, after having overwhelmed and thrown the first back upon the lavis, changes direction by the right, debouches by the gorges of the brenta upon the left, and forces the remnant of this fine army to take refuge in mantua, where it is finally compelled to surrender. in hostilities recommence: the french, punished for having formed two exterior lines in , nevertheless, have three upon the rhine and the danube. the army on the left observes the lower rhine, that of the center marches upon the danube, switzerland, flanking italy and swabia, being occupied by a third army as strong as both the others. _the three armies could be concentrated only in the valley of the inn_, eighty leagues from their base of operations. the archduke has equal forces: he unites them against the center, which he defeats at stockach, and the army of switzerland is compelled to evacuate the grisons and eastern switzerland. the allies in turn commit the same fault: instead of following up their success on this central line, which cost them so dearly afterward, they formed a double line in switzerland and on the lower rhine. the army of switzerland is beaten at zurich, while the other trifles at manheim. in italy the french undertake a double enterprise, which leaves thirty-two thousand men uselessly employed at naples, while upon the adige, where the vital blows were to be given or received, their force is too weak and meets with terrible reverses. when the army of naples returns to the north, it commits the error of adopting a strategic direction opposed to moreau's, and suwaroff, by means of his central position, from which he derives full profit, marches against this army and beats it, while some leagues from the other. in , napoleon has returned from egypt, and every thing is again changed, and this campaign presents a new combination of lines of operations; one hundred and fifty thousand men march upon the two flanks of switzerland, and debouch, one upon the danube and the other upon the po. this insures the conquest of vast regions. modern history affords no similar combination. the french armies are upon interior lines, affording reciprocal support, while the austrians are compelled to adopt an exterior line, which renders it impossible for them to communicate. by a skillful arrangement of its progress, the army of the reserve cuts off the enemy from his line of operations, at the same time preserving its own relations with its base and with the army of the rhine, which forms its secondary line. fig. demonstrates this truth, and shows the respective situations of the two parties. a and a a indicate the front of operations of the armies of the rhine and of the reserve; b and b b, that of kray and mélas; c c c c, the passes of the saint-bernard, of the simplon, of the saint-gothard, and of the splugen; d indicates the two lines of operations of the army of the reserve; e, the two lines of retreat of mélas; h j k, the french divisions preserving their line of retreat. it may thus be seen that mélas is cut off from his base, and that, on the contrary, the french general runs no risk, since he preserves all his communications with the frontiers and with his secondary lines. [illustration: fig. . the stratigic field of .] the analysis of the memorable events just sketched shows clearly the importance of a proper selection of lines of maneuver in military operations. indeed, discretion on this point may repair the disasters of defeat, destroy the advantages of an adversary's victory, render his invasion futile, or assure the conquest of a province. by a comparison of the combinations and results of the most noted campaigns, it will be seen that the lines of operations which have led to success have been established in conformity to the fundamental principle already alluded to,--viz.: that _simple and interior lines enable a general to bring into action, by strategic movements, upon the important point, a stronger force than the enemy_. the student may also satisfy himself that those which have failed contained faults opposed to this principle. an undue number of lines divides the forces, and permits fractions to be overwhelmed by the enemy. maxims on lines of operations. from the analysis of all the events herein referred to, as well as from that of many others, the following maxims result:-- . if the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive point of the theater of operations the greatest possible force, the choice of the line of operations, being the primary means of attaining this end, may be regarded as the fundamental idea in a good plan of a campaign. napoleon proved this by the direction he gave his armies in on donauwerth and in on gera,--maneuvers that cannot be too much studied by military men. of course, it is impossible to sketch in advance the whole campaign. the objective point will be determined upon in advance, the general plan to be followed to attain it, and the first enterprise to be undertaken for this end: what is to follow will depend upon the result of this first operation and the new phases it may develop. . the direction to be given to this line depends upon the geographical situation of the theater of operations, but still more upon the position of the hostile masses upon this strategic field. _in every case, however, it must be directed upon the center or upon one of the extremities. only when the assailing forces are vastly preponderating would it be otherwise than a fatal error to act upon the center and the two extremities at the same time_.[ ] it may be laid down as a general principle, that, if the enemy divide his forces on an extended front, the best direction of the maneuver-line will be upon his center, but in every other case, when it is possible, the best direction will be upon one of the flanks, and then upon the rear of his line of defense or front of operations. the advantage of this maneuver arises more from the opportunity it affords of taking the line of defense in reverse than from the fact that by using it the assailant has to contend with but a part of the enemy's force. thus, the army of the rhine in , gaining the extreme left of the line of defense of the black forest, caused it to yield almost without an effort. this army fought two battles on the right bank of the danube, which, although not decisive, yet, from the judicious direction of the line of operations, brought about the invasion of swabia and bavaria. the results of the march of the army of the reserve by the saint-bernard and milan upon the extreme right of mélas were still more brilliant. . even when the extremity of the enemy's front of operations is gained, it is not always safe to act upon his rear, since by so doing the assailant in many cases will lose his own communications. to avoid this danger, the line of operations should have a geographic and strategic direction, such that the army will always find either to its rear or to the right or left a safe line of retreat. in this case, to take advantage of either of these flank lines of retreat would require a change of direction of the line of operations, (maxim .) the ability to decide upon such a direction is among the most important qualities of a general. the importance of a direction is illustrated by these examples. if napoleon in , after passing the saint-bernard, had marched upon asti or alessandria, and had fought at marengo without having previously protected himself on the side of lombardy and of the left bank of the po, he would have been more thoroughly cut off from his line of retreat than mélas from his; but, having in his possession the secondary points of casale and pavia on the side of the saint-bernard, and savona and tenda toward the apennines, in case of reverse he had every means of regaining the var or the valais. in , if he had marched from gera directly upon leipsic, and had there awaited the prussian army returning from weimar, he would have been cut off from the rhine as much as the duke of brunswick from the elbe, while by falling back to the west in the direction of weimar he placed his front before the three roads of saalfeld, schleiz, and hof, which thus became well-covered lines of communication. if the prussians had endeavored to cut him off from these lines by moving between gera and baireuth, they would have opened to him his most natural line,--the excellent road from leipsic to frankfort,--as well as the two roads which lead from saxony by cassel to coblentz, cologne, and even wesel. . two independent armies should not be formed upon the same frontier: such an arrangement could be proper only in the case of large coalitions, or where the forces at disposal are too numerous to act upon the same zone of operations; and even in this case it would be better to have all the forces under the same commander, who accompanies the principal army. . as a consequence of the last-mentioned principle, with equal forces on the same frontier, a single line of operations will be more advantageous than a double one. . it may happen, however, that a double line will be necessary, either from the topography of the seat of war, or because a double line has been adopted by the enemy, and it will be necessary to oppose a part of the army to each of his masses. . in this case, interior or central lines will be preferable to exterior lines, since in the former case the fractions of the army can be concentrated before those of the enemy, and may thus decide the fate of the campaign.[ ] such an army may, by a well-combined strategic plan, unite upon and overwhelm successively the fractions of the adversary's forces. to be assured of success in these maneuvers, a body of observation is left in front of the army to be held in check, with instructions to avoid a serious engagement, but to delay the enemy as much as possible by taking advantage of the ground, continually falling back upon the principal army. . a double line is applicable in the case of a decided superiority of force, when each army will be a match for any force the enemy can bring against it. in this case this course will be advantageous,--since a single line would crowd the forces so much as to prevent them all from acting to advantage. however, it will always be prudent to support well the army which, by reason of the nature of its theater and the respective positions of the parties, has the most important duty to perform. the principal events of modern wars demonstrate the truth of two other maxims. the first is, that two armies operating on interior lines and sustaining each other reciprocally, and opposing two armies superior in numbers, should not allow themselves to be crowded into a too contracted space, where the whole might be overwhelmed at once. this happened to napoleon at leipsic.[ ] the second is, that interior lines should not be abused by extending them too far, thus giving the enemy the opportunity of overcoming the corps of observation. this risk, however, may be incurred if the end pursued by the main forces is so decisive as to conclude the war,--when the fate of these secondary bodies would be viewed with comparative indifference. . for the same reason, two converging lines are more advantageous than two divergent. the first conform better to the principles of strategy, and possess the advantage of covering the lines of communication and supply; but to be free from danger they should be so arranged that the armies which pass over them shall not be separately exposed to the combined masses of the enemy, before being able to effect their junction. . divergent lines, however, may be advantageous when the center of the enemy has been broken and his forces separated either by a battle or by a strategic movement,--in which case divergent operations would add to the dispersion of the enemy. such divergent lines would be interior, since the pursuers could concentrate with more facility than the pursued. . it sometimes happens that an army is obliged to change its line of operations in the middle of a campaign. this is a very delicate and important step, which may lead to great successes, or to equally great disasters if not applied with sagacity, and is used only to extricate an army from an embarrassing position. napoleon projected several of these changes; for in his bold invasions he was provided with new plans to meet unforeseen events. at the battle of austerlitz, if defeated, he had resolved to adopt a line of operations through bohemia on passau or ratisbon, which would have opened a new and rich country to him, instead of returning by vienna, which route lay through an exhausted country and from which the archduke charles was endeavoring to cut him off. frederick executed one of these changes of the line of operations after the raising of the siege of olmutz. in napoleon commenced the execution of a bolder maneuver, but one which was favored by the localities. it was to base himself upon the fortresses of alsace and lorraine, leaving the route to paris open to the allies. if mortier and marmont could have joined him, and had he possessed fifty thousand more men, this plan would have produced the most decisive results and have put the seal on his military career. . as before stated, the outline of the frontiers, and the geographical character of the theater of operations, exercise a great influence on the direction to be given to these lines, as well as upon the advantages to be obtained. central positions, salient toward the enemy, like bohemia and switzerland, are the most advantageous, because they naturally lead to the adoption of interior lines and facilitate the project of taking the enemy in reverse. the sides of this salient angle become so important that every means should be taken to render them impregnable. in default of such central positions, their advantages may be gained by the relative directions of maneuver-lines, as the following figure will explain. c d maneuvering upon the right of the front of the army a b, and h i upon the left flank of g f, will form two interior lines i k and c k upon an extremity of the exterior lines a b, f g, which they may overwhelm separately by combining upon them. such was the result of the operations of , , and . [illustration: fig. . k /\ / \ / \ / \ f lllllllllllll g / \ a llllllllllllll b / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ h ttttttttttttt i c tttttttttttttt d ] . the general configuration of the bases ought also to influence the direction to be given to the lines of operations, these latter being naturally dependent upon the former. it has already been shown that the greatest advantage that can result from a choice of bases is when the frontiers allow it to be assumed parallel to the line of operations of the enemy, thus affording the opportunity of seizing this line and cutting him from his base. but if, instead of directing the operations upon the decisive point, the line of operations be badly chosen, all the advantages of the perpendicular base may be lost, as will be seen by referring to the figure on page . the army e, having the double base a c and c d, if it marched toward f, instead of to the right toward g h, would lose all the strategic advantages of its base c d. the great art, then, of properly directing lines of operations, is so to establish them in reference to the bases and to the marches of the army as to seize the communications of the enemy without imperiling one's own, and is the most important and most difficult problem in strategy. . there is another point which exercises a manifest influence over the direction to be given to the line of operations; it is when the principal enterprise of the campaign is to cross a large river in the presence of a numerous and well-appointed enemy. in this case, the choice of this line depends neither upon the will of the general nor the advantages to be gained by an attack on one or another point; for the first consideration will be to ascertain where the passage can be most certainly effected, and where are to be found the means for this purpose. the passage of the rhine in , by jourdan, was near dusseldorf, for the same reason that the vistula in was crossed by marshal paskevitch near ossiek,--viz., that in neither case was there the bridge-train necessary for the purpose, and both were obliged to procure and take up the rivers large boats, bought by the french in holland, and by the russians at thorn and dantzic. the neutrality of prussia permitted the ascent of the river in both cases, and the enemy was not able to prevent it. this apparently incalculable advantage led the french into the double invasions of and , which failed because the double line of operations caused the defeat of the armies separately. paskevitch was wiser, and passed the upper vistula with only a small detachment and after the principal army had already arrived at lowicz. when an army is sufficiently provided with bridge-trains, the chances of failure are much lessened; but then, as always, it is necessary to select the point which may, either on account of its topography or the position of the enemy, be most advantageous. the discussion between napoleon and moreau on the passage of the rhine in is one of the most curious examples of the different combinations presented by this question, which is both strategic and tactical. since it is necessary to protect the bridges, at least until a victory is gained, the point of passage will exercise an influence upon the directions of a few marches immediately subsequent to the passage. the point selected in every case for the principal passage will be upon the center or one of the flanks of the enemy. a united army which has forced a passage upon the center of an extended line might afterward adopt two divergent lines to complete the dispersion of the enemy, who, being unable to concentrate, would not think of disturbing the bridges. if the line of the river is so short that the hostile army is more concentrated, and the general has the means of taking up after the passage a front perpendicular to the river, it would be better to pass it upon one of the extremities, in order to throw off the enemy from the bridges. this will be referred to in the article upon the passage of rivers. . there is yet another combination of lines of operations to be noticed. it is the marked difference of advantage between a line at home and one in a hostile country. the nature of the enemy's country will also influence these chances. let us suppose an army crosses the alps or the rhine to carry on war in italy or germany. it encounters states of the second rank; and, even if they are in alliance, there are always rivalries or collisions of interest which will deprive them of that unity and strength possessed by a single powerful state. on the other hand, a german army invading france would operate upon a line much more dangerous than that of the french in italy, because upon the first could be thrown the consolidated strength of franco, united in feeling and interest. an army on the defensive, with its line of operations on its own soil, has resources everywhere and in every thing: the inhabitants, authorities, productions, towns, public depots and arsenals, and even private stores, are all in its favor. it is not ordinarily so abroad. lines of operations in rich, fertile, manufacturing regions offer to the assailants much greater advantages than when in barren or desert regions, particularly when the people are not united against the invader. in provinces like those first named the army would find a thousand necessary supplies, while in the other huts and straw are about the only resources. horses probably may obtain pasturage; but every thing else must be carried by the army,--thus infinitely increasing the embarrassments and rendering bold operations much more rare and dangerous. the french armies, so long accustomed to the comforts of swabia and lombardy, almost perished in in the bogs of pultusk, and actually did perish in in the marshy forests of lithuania. . there is another point in reference to these lines which is much insisted upon by some, but which is more specious than important. it is that on each side of the line of operations the country should be cleared of all enemies for a distance equal to the depth of this line: otherwise the enemy might threaten the line of retreat. this rule is everywhere belied by the events of war. the nature of the country, the rivers and mountains, the morale of the armies, the spirit of the people, the ability and energy of the commanders, cannot be estimated by diagrams on paper. it is true that no considerable bodies of the enemy could be permitted on the flanks of the line of retreat; but a compliance with this demand would deprive an army of every means of taking a step in a hostile country; and there is not a campaign in recent wars, or in those of marlborough and eugene, which does not contradict this assertion. was not general moreau at the gates of vienna when fussen, scharnitz, and all the tyrol were in possession of the austrians? was not napoleon at piacenza when turin, genoa, and the col-di-tenda were occupied by the army of mélas? did not eugene march by way of stradella and asti to the aid of turin, leaving the french upon the mincio but a few leagues from his base? observations upon interior lines--what has been said against them. some of my critics have disputed as to the meaning of words and upon definitions; others have censured where they but imperfectly understood; and others have, by the light of certain important events, taken it upon themselves to deny my fundamental principles, without inquiring whether the conditions of the case which might modify the application of these principles were such as were supposed, or without reflecting that, even admitting what they claimed to be true, a single exception cannot disprove a rule based upon the experience of ages and upon natural principles. in opposition to my maxims upon interior lines, some have quoted the famous and successful march of the allies upon leipsic. this remarkable event, at first glance, seems to stagger the faith of those who believe in principles. at best, however, it is but one of those exceptional cases from which nothing can be inferred in the face of thousands of opposed instances. moreover, it is easy to show that, far from overthrowing the maxims it has been brought to oppose, it will go to establish their soundness. indeed, the critics had forgotten that in case of a considerable numerical superiority i recommended double lines of operations as most advantageous, particularly when concentric and arranged to combine an effort against the enemy at the decisive moment. now, in the allied armies of schwarzenberg, blücher, bernadotte, and benningsen, this case of decided superiority is found. the inferior army, to conform to the principles of this chapter, should have directed its efforts against one of the extremities of his adversary, and not upon the center as it did: so that the events quoted against me are doubly in my favor. moreover, if the central position of napoleon between dresden and the oder was disastrous, it must be attributed to the misfortunes of culm, katzbach, and dennewitz,--in a word, to faults of execution, entirely foreign to the principles in question. what i propose is, to act offensively upon the most important point with the greater part of the forces, but upon the secondary points to remain on the defensive, in strong positions or behind a river, until the decisive blow is struck, and the operation ended by the total defeat of an essential part of the army. then the combined efforts of the whole army may be directed upon other points. whenever the secondary armies are exposed to a decisive shock during the absence of the mass of the army, the system is not understood; and this was what happened in . if napoleon, after his victory at dresden, had vigorously pursued the allies into bohemia, he would have escaped the disaster at culm, have threatened prague, and perhaps have dissolved the coalition. to this error may be added a fault quite as great,--that of fighting decisive battles when he was not present with the mass of his forces. at katzbach his instructions were not obeyed. he ordered macdonald to wait for blücher, and to fall upon him when he should expose himself by hold movements. macdonald, on the contrary, crossed his detachments over torrents which were hourly becoming more swollen, and advanced to meet blücher. if he had fulfilled his instructions and napoleon had followed up his victory, there is no doubt that his plan of operations, based upon interior strategic lines and positions and upon a concentric line of operations, would have met with the most brilliant success. the study of his campaigns in italy in and in france in shows that he knew how to apply this system. there is another circumstance, of equal importance, which shows the injustice of judging central lines by the fate of napoleon in saxony,--viz.: _that his front of operations was outflanked on the right, and even taken in reverse, by the geographical position of the frontiers of bohemia_. such a case is of rare occurrence. a central position with such faults is not to be compared to one without them. when napoleon made the application of these principles in italy, poland, prussia, and france, he was not exposed to the attack of a hostile enemy on his flanks and rear. austria could have threatened him in ; but she was then at peace with him and unarmed. to judge of a system of operations, it must be supposed that accidents and chances are to be as much in favor of as against it,--which was by no means the case in , either in the geographic positions or in the state of the respective forces. independently of this, it is absurd to quote the reverses at katzbach and dennewitz, suffered by his lieutenants, as proof capable of destroying a principle the simplest application of which required these officers not to allow themselves to be drawn into a serious engagement. instead of avoiding they sought collisions. indeed, what advantage can be expected from the system of central lines, if the parts of the army which have been weakened in order to strike decisive blows elsewhere, shall themselves seek a disastrous contest, instead of being contented with being bodies of observation?[ ] in this case it is the enemy who applies the principle, and not he who has the interior lines. moreover, in the succeeding campaign, the defense of napoleon in champagne, from the battle of brienne to that of paris, demonstrates fully the truth of these maxims. the analysis of these two celebrated campaigns raises a strategic question which it would be difficult to answer by simple assertions founded upon theories. it is, whether the system of central lines loses its advantages when the masses are very large. agreeing with montesquieu, that the greatest enterprises fail from the magnitude of the arrangements necessary to consummate them, i am disposed to answer in the affirmative. it is very clear to me that an army of one hundred thousand men, occupying a central zone against three isolated armies of thirty or thirty-five thousand men, would be more sure of defeating them successively than if the central mass were four hundred thousand strong against three armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each; and for several good reasons:-- . considering the difficulty of finding ground and time necessary to bring a very large force into action on the day of battle, an army of one hundred and thirty or one hundred and forty thousand men may easily resist a much larger force. . if driven from the field, there will be at least one hundred thousand men to protect and insure an orderly retreat and effect a junction with one of the other armies. . the central army of four hundred thousand men requires such a quantity of provisions, munitions, horses, and _matériel_ of every kind, that it will possess less mobility and facility in shifting its efforts from one part of the zone to another; to say nothing of the impossibility of obtaining provisions from a region too restricted to support such numbers. . the bodies of observation detached from the central mass to hold in check two armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each must be very strong, (from eighty to ninety thousand each;) and, being of such magnitude, if they are drawn into a serious engagement they will probably suffer reverses, the effects of which might outweigh the advantages gained by the principal army. i have never advocated exclusively either a concentric or eccentric system. all my works go to show the eternal influence of principles, and to demonstrate that operations to be successful must be applications of principles. divergent or convergent operations may be either very good or very bad: all depends on the situation of the respective forces. the eccentric lines, for instance, are good when applied to a mass starting from a given point, and acting in divergent directions to divide and separately destroy two hostile forces acting upon exterior lines. such was the maneuver of frederick which brought about, at the end of the campaign of , the fine battles of rossbach and leuthen. such were nearly all the operations of napoleon, whose favorite maneuver was to unite, by closely-calculated marches, imposing masses on the center, and, having pierced the enemy's center or turned his front, to give them eccentric directions to disperse the defeated army.[ ] on the other hand, concentric operations are good in two cases: . when they tend to concentrate a scattered army upon a point where it will be sure to arrive before the enemy; . when they direct to the same end the efforts of two armies which are in no danger of being beaten separately by a stronger enemy. concentric operations, which just now seem to be so advantageous, may be most pernicious,--which should teach us the necessity of detecting the principles upon which systems are based, and not to confound principles and systems; as, for instance, if two armies set out from a distant base to march convergently upon an enemy whose forces are on interior lines and more concentrated, it follows that the latter could effect a union before the former, and would inevitably defeat them; as was the case with moreau and jourdan in , opposed to the archduke charles. in starting from the same points, or from two points much less separated than dusseldorf and strasbourg, an army may be exposed to this danger. what was the fate of the concentric columns of wurmser and quasdanovitch, wishing to reach the mincio by the two banks of lake garda? can the result of the march of napoleon and grouchy on brussels be forgotten? leaving sombref, they were to march concentrically on this city,--one by quatre-bras, the other by wavre. blücher and wellington, taking an interior strategic line, effected a junction before them, and the terrible disaster of waterloo proved to the world that the immutable principles of war cannot be violated with impunity. such events prove better than any arguments that a system which is not in accordance with the principles of war cannot be good. i lay no claim to the creation of these principles, for they have always existed, and were applied by cæsar, scipio, and the consul nero, as well as by marlborough and eugene; but i claim to have been the first to point them out, and to lay down the principal chances in their various applications. footnotes: [footnote : this definition has been criticized; and, as it has given rise to misapprehension, it becomes necessary to explain it. in the first place, it must be borne in mind that it is a question of _maneuver-lines_, (that is, of strategic combinations,) and not of great routes. it must also be admitted that an army marching upon two or three routes, near enough to each other to admit of the concentration of the different masses within forty-eight hours, would not have two or three lines of operations. when moreau and jourdan entered germany with two armies of , men each, being independent of each other, there was a double line of operations; but a french army of which only a detachment starts from the lower rhine to march on the main, while the five or six other corps set out from the upper rhine to march on ulm, would not have a double line of operations in the sense in which i use the term to designate a maneuver. napoleon, when he concentrated seven corps and set them in motion by bamberg to march on gera, while mortier with a single corps marched on cassel to occupy hesse and flank the principal enterprise, had but a single general line of operations, with an accessory detachment. the territorial line was composed of two arms or radii, but the operation was not double.] [footnote : some german writers have said that i confound central positions with the line of operations,--in which assertion they are mistaken. an army may occupy a central position in the presence of two masses of the enemy, and not have interior lines of operations: these are two very different things. others have thought that i would have done better to use the term _radii of operations_ to express the idea of double lines. the reasoning in this case is plausible if we conceive the theater of operations to be a circle; but, as every radius is, after all, a line, it is simply a dispute about words.] [footnote : this assertion has been disputed. i think it is correct; for mélas, confined between the bormida, the tanaro, and the po, was unable to recruit for his army, barely able to maintain a communication by couriers with his base, and he certainly would have been obliged to cut his way out or to surrender in case he had not been reinforced.] [footnote : the capture of paris by the allies decided the fate of napoleon; but he had no army, and was attacked by all europe, and the french people had, in addition, separated their cause from his. if he had possessed fifty thousand more old soldiers, he would have shown that the capital was at his head-quarters.] [footnote : the inferiority of an army does not depend exclusively upon the number of soldiers: their military qualities, their _morale_, and the ability of their commander are also very important elements.] [footnote : when the fractions of an army are separated from the main body by only a few marches, and particularly when they are not intended to act separately throughout the campaign, these are central strategic positions, and not lines of operations.] [footnote : in the movements immediately preceding the battle of leipsic, napoleon, strictly speaking, had but a single line of operations, and his armies were simply in central strategic positions; but the principle is the same, and hence the example is illustrative of lines of operations.] [footnote : i am well aware that it is not always possible to avoid a combat without running greater risks than would result from a check; but macdonald might have fought blücher to advantage if he had better understood napoleon's instructions.] [footnote : it will not be thought strange that i sometimes approve of concentric, and at other times divergent, maneuvers, when we reflect that among the finest operations of napoleon there are some in which he employed these two systems alternately within twenty-four hours; for example, in the movements about ratisbon in .] article xxii. strategic lines. mention has already been made of strategic lines of maneuvers, which differ essentially from lines of operations; and it will be well to define them, for many confound them. we will not consider those strategic lines which have a great and permanent importance by reason of their position and their relation to the features of the country, like the lines of the danube and the meuse, the chains of the alps and the balkan. such lines can best be studied by a detailed and minute examination of the topography of europe; and an excellent model for this kind of study is found in the archduke charles's description of southern germany. the term _strategic_ is also applied to all communications which lead by the most direct or advantageous route from one important point to another, as well as from the strategic front of the army to all of its objective points. it will be seen, then, that a theater of war is crossed by a multitude of such lines, but that at any given time those only which are concerned in the projected enterprise have any real importance. this renders plain the distinction between the general line of operations of a whole campaign, and these _strategic_ lines, which are temporary and change with the operations of the army. besides territorial strategic lines, there are _strategic lines of maneuvers_. an army having germany as its general field might adopt as its zone of operations the space between the alps and the danube, or that between the danube and the main, or that between the mountains of franconia and the sea. it would have upon its zone a single line of operations, or, at most, a double concentric line, upon interior, or perhaps exterior, directions,--while it would have successively perhaps twenty strategic lines as its enterprises were developed: it would have at first one for each wing which would join the general line of operations. if it operated in the zone between the danube and the alps, it might adopt, according to events, the strategic line leading from ulm on donauwerth and ratisbon, or that from ulm to the tyrol, or that which connects ulm with nuremberg or mayence. it may, then, be assumed that the definitions applied to lines of operations, as well as the maxims referring to them, are necessarily applicable to strategic lines. these may be _concentric_, to inflict a decisive blow, or _eccentric_, after victory. they are rarely _simple_, since an army does not confine its march to a single road; but when they are double or triple, or even quadruple, they should be _interior_ if the forces be equal, or _exterior_ in the case of great numerical superiority. the rigorous application of this rule may perhaps sometimes be remitted in detaching a body on an exterior line, even when the forces are equal, to attain an important result without running much risk; but this is an affair of detachments, and does not refer to the important masses. strategic lines cannot be interior when our efforts are directed against one of the extremities of the enemy's front of operations. the maxims above given in reference to lines of operations holding good for strategic lines, it is not necessary to repeat them, or to apply them to particular examples; but there is one, however, which deserves mention,--viz.: that it is important generally, in the selection of these temporary strategic lines, not to leave the line of operations exposed to the assaults of the enemy. even this may, however, be done, to extricate the army from great danger, or to attain a great success; but the operation must be of short duration, and care must have been taken to prepare a plan of safe retreat, by a sudden change of the line of operations, if necessary, as has already been referred to. we will illustrate this by the campaign of waterloo. the prussian army was based upon the rhine, its line of operations extended from cologne and coblentz on luxembourg and namur; wellington's base was antwerp, and his line of operations the short road to brussels. the sudden attack by napoleon on flanders decided blücher to receive battle parallel to the english base, and not to his own, about which he seemed to have no uneasiness. this was pardonable, because he could always have a good chance of regaining wesel or nimeguen, and even might seek a refuge in antwerp in the last extremity; but if the army had not had its powerful maritime allies it would have been destroyed. beaten at ligny, and seeking refuge at gembloux and then at wavre, blücher had but three strategic lines to choose from: that which led directly to maestricht, that farther north on venloo, or the one leading to the english army near mont st. jean. he audaciously took the last, and triumphed by the application of interior strategic lines,--which napoleon here, perhaps for the first time in his life, neglected. it will readily be seen that the line followed from gembloux by wavre to mont st. jean was neither a line of operations of the prussian army nor a line of battle, but a _strategic line of maneuver_, and was interior. it was bold, because he exposed fully his own natural line of operations. the fact that he sought a junction with the english made his movement accord with the principles of war. a less successful example was that of ney at dennewitz. leaving wittenberg, and going in the direction of berlin, he moved to the right to gain the extreme left of the allies, but in so doing he left his primitive line of retreat exposed to the attacks of an enemy superior in force. his object was to gain communication with napoleon, whose intention was to join him by herzberg or luckau; but ney should from the beginning have taken all logistic and tactical means of accomplishing this change of strategic line and of informing his army of it. he did nothing of this kind,--either from forgetfulness, or on account of the feeling of aversion he had to any thing like a retreat,--and the severe losses at dennewitz were the result. napoleon in gave one of the best illustrations of these different combinations of strategic lines. his general line of operations extended from the apennines to verona. when he had driven wurmser upon roveredo and determined to pursue him into the tyrol, he pushed on in the valley of the adige to trent and the lavis, where he learned that wurmser had moved by the brenta on the frioul, doubtless to take him in reverse. there were but three courses open to him,--to remain in the narrow valley of the adige at great risk, to retreat by verona to meet wurmser, or the last,--which was sublime, but rash,--to follow him into the valley of the brenta, which was encircled by rugged mountains whose two passages might be held by the austrians. napoleon was not the man to hesitate between three such alternatives. he left vaubois on the lavis to cover trent, and marched with the remainder of his forces on bassano. the brilliant results of this bold step are well known. the route from trent to bassano was not the line of operations of the army, but a _strategic line of maneuver_ still bolder than that of blücher on wavre. however, it was an operation of only three or four days' duration, at the end of which time napoleon would either beat or be beaten at bassano: in the first case, he would open direct communication with verona and his line of operations; in the second, he could regain in great haste trent, where, reinforced by vaubois, he could fall back either upon verona or peschiera. the difficulties of the country, which made this march audacious in one respect, were favorable in another; for even if wurmser had been victorious at bassano he could not have interfered with the return to trent, as there was no road to enable him to anticipate napoleon. if davidovitch on the lavis had driven vaubois from trent, he might have embarrassed napoleon; but this austrian general, previously beaten at roveredo, and ignorant of what the french army was doing for several days, and thinking it was all upon him, would scarcely have thought of resuming the offensive before napoleon beaten at bassano would have been on his retreat. indeed, if davidovitch had advanced as far as roveredo, driving vaubois before him, he would there have been surrounded by two french armies, who would have inflicted upon him the fate of vandamme at culm. i have dwelt on this event to show that a proper calculation of time and distances, joined to great activity, may lead to the success of many adventures which may seem very imprudent. i conclude from this that it may be well sometimes to direct an army upon a route which exposes its line of operations, but that every measure must be taken to prevent the enemy from profiting by it, both by great rapidity of execution and by demonstrations which will deceive him and leave him in ignorance of what is taking place. still, it is a very hazardous maneuver, and only to be adopted under an urgent necessity. article xxiii. means of protecting a line of operations by temporary bases or strategic reserves. when a general enters a country offensively, he should form eventual or temporary bases,--which, of course, are neither so safe nor so strong as his own frontiers. a river with _têtes de ponts_, and one or two large towns secure from a _coup de main_ to cover the depots of the army and to serve as points of assembling for the reserve troops, would be an excellent base of this kind. of course, such a line could not be a temporary base if a hostile force were near the line of operations leading to the real base on the frontiers. napoleon would have had a good real base on the elbe in if austria had remained neutral; but, she having joined his enemies, this line was taken in reverse, and became but a pivot of operations, favorable indeed for the execution of a single enterprise, but dangerous for a prolonged occupation, particularly in case of a serious reverse. as every army which is beaten in an enemy's country is exposed to the danger of being cut off from its own frontiers if it continues to occupy the country, these distant temporary bases are rather temporary points of support than real bases, and are in a measure eventual lines of defense. in general, we cannot expect to find in an enemy's country safe positions suitable even for a temporary base; and the deficiency must be supplied by a strategic reserve,--which is purely a modern invention. its merits and demerits deserve notice. strategic reserves. reserves play an important part in modern warfare. from the executive, who prepares national reserves, down to the chief of a platoon of skirmishers, every commander now desires a reserve. a wise government always provides good reserves for its armies, and the general uses them when they come under his command. the state has its reserves, the army has its own, and every corps d'armée or division should not fail to provide one. the reserves of an army are of two kinds,--those on the battle-field, and those which are intended to recruit and support the army: the latter, while organizing, may occupy important points of the theater of war, and serve even as strategic reserves; their positions will depend not only on their magnitude, but also on the nature of the frontiers and the distance from the base to the front of operations. whenever an army takes the offensive, it should always contemplate the possibility of being compelled to act on the defensive, and by the posting of a reserve between the base and front of operations the advantage of an active reserve on the field of battle is gained: it can fly to the support of menaced points without weakening the active army. it is true that to form a reserve a number of regiments must be withdrawn from active service; but there are always reinforcements to arrive, recruits to be instructed, and convalescents to be used; and by organizing central depots for preparation of munitions and equipments, and by making them the rendezvous of all detachments going to and coming from the army, and adding to them a few good regiments to give tone, a reserve may be formed capable of important service. napoleon never failed to organize these reserves in his campaigns. even in , in his bold march on the noric alps, he had first joubert on the adige, afterward victor (returning from the roman states) in the neighborhood of verona. in ney and augereau played the part alternately in the tyrol and bavaria, and mortier and marmont near vienna. in napoleon formed like reserves on the rhine, and mortier used them to reduce hesse. at the same time, other reserves were forming at mayence under kellermann, which took post, as fast as organized, between the rhine and elbe, while mortier was sent into pomerania. when napoleon decided to push on to the vistula in the same year, he directed, with much ostentation, the concentration of an army on the elbe sixty thousand strong, its object being to protect hamburg against the english and to influence austria, whose disposition was as manifest as her interests. the prussians established a similar reserve in at halle, but it was badly posted: if it had been established upon the elbe at wittenberg or dessau, and had done its duty, it might have saved the army by giving prince hohenlohe and blücher time to reach berlin, or at least stettin. these reserves are particularly useful when the configuration of the country leads to double fronts of operations: they then fulfill the double object of observing the second front, and, in case of necessity, of aiding the operations of the main army when the enemy threatens its flanks or a reverse compels it to fall back toward this reserve. of course, care must be taken not to create dangerous detachments, and whenever these reserves can be dispensed with, it should be done, or the troops in the depots only be employed as reserves. it is only in distant invasions and sometimes on our own soil that they are useful: if the scene of hostilities be but five or six marches distant from the frontier, they are quite superfluous. at home they may generally be dispensed with: it is only in the case of a serious invasion, when new levies are organizing, that such a reserve, in an intrenched camp, under the protection of a fortress which serves as a great depot, will be indispensable. the general's talents will be exercised in judging of the use of these reserves according to the state of the country, the length of the line of operations, the nature of the fortified points, and the proximity of a hostile state. he also decides upon their position, and endeavors to use for this purpose troops which will not weaken his main army so much as the withdrawal of his good troops. these reserves ought to hold the most important points between the base and front of operations, occupy the fortified places if any have been reduced, observe or invest those which are held by the enemy; and if there be no fortress as a point of support, they should throw up intrenched camps or _têtes de ponts_ to protect the depots and to increase the strength of their positions. all that has been said upon pivots of operations is applicable to temporary bases and to strategic reserves, which will be doubly valuable if they possess such well-located pivots. article xxiv. the old system of wars of position and the modern system of marches. _by the system of positions_ is understood the old manner of conducting a methodical war, with armies in tents, with their supplies at hand, engaged in watching each other; one besieging a city, the other covering it; one, perhaps, endeavoring to acquire a small province, the other counteracting its efforts by occupying strong points. such was war from the middle ages to the era of the french revolution. during this revolution great changes transpired, and many systems of more or less value sprang up. war was commenced in as it had been in : the french encamped near their strong places, and the allies besieged them. it was not till , when assailed from without and within, that this system was changed. thoroughly aroused, france threw one million men in fourteen armies upon her enemies. these armies had neither tents, provisions, nor money. on their marches they bivouacked or were quartered in towns; their mobility was increased and became a means of success. their tactics changed also: the troops were put in columns, which were more easily handled than deployed lines, and, on account of the broken character of the country of flanders and the vosges, they threw out a part of their force as skirmishers to protect and cover the columns. this system, which was thus the result of circumstances, at first met with a success beyond all expectation: it disconcerted the methodical austrian and prussian troops as well as their generals. mack, to whom was attributed the success of the prince of coburg, increased his reputation by directing the troops to extend their lines to oppose an open order to the fire of skirmishers. it had never occurred to the poor man that while the skirmishers made the noise the columns carried the positions. the first generals of the republic were fighting-men, and nothing more. the principal direction of affairs was in the hands of carnot and of the committee of public safety: it was sometimes judicious, but often bad. carnot was the author of one of the finest strategic movements of the war. in he sent a reserve of fine troops successively to the aid of dunkirk, maubeuge, and landau, so that this small force, moving rapidly from point to point, and aided by the troops already collected at these different points, compelled the enemy to evacuate france. the campaign of opened badly. it was the force of circumstances, and not a premeditated plan, which brought about the strategic movement of the army of the moselle on the sambre; and it was this which led to the success of fleurus and the conquest of belgium. in the mistakes of the french were so great that they were imputed to treachery. the austrians, on the contrary, were better commanded by clairfayt, chateler, and schmidt than they had been by mack and the prince of coburg. the archduke charles, applying the principle of interior lines, triumphed over moreau and jourdan in by a single march. up to this time the fronts of the french armies had been large,--either to procure subsistence more easily, or because the generals thought it better to put all the divisions in line, leaving it to their commanders to arrange them for battle. the reserves were small detachments, incapable of redeeming the day even if the enemy succeeded in overwhelming but a single division. such was the state of affairs when napoleon made his _début_ in italy. his activity from the beginning worsted the austrians and piedmontese: free from useless incumbrances, his troops surpassed in mobility all modern armies. he conquered the italian peninsula by a series of marches and strategic combats. his march on vienna in was rash, but justified by the necessity of overcoming the archduke charles before he could receive reinforcements from the rhine. the campaign of , still more characteristic of the man, marked a new era in the conception of plans of campaign and lines of operations. he adopted bold objective points, which looked to nothing less than the capture or destruction of whole armies. the orders of battle were less extended, and the more rational organization of armies in large bodies of two or three divisions was adopted. the system of modern strategy was here fully developed, and the campaigns of and were merely corollaries to the great problem solved in . tactically, the system of columns and skirmishers was too well adapted to the features of italy not to meet with his approval. it may now be a question whether the system of napoleon is adapted to all capacities, epochs, and armies, or whether, on the contrary, there can be any return, in the light of the events of and , to the old system of wars of position. after a comparison of the marches and camps of the seven years' war with those of the _seven weeks'_ war,--as napoleon called the campaign of ,--or with those of the three months which elapsed from the departure of the army from boulogne in till its arrival in the plains of moravia, the reader may easily decide as to the relative merits of the two systems. the system of napoleon was _to march twenty-five miles a day, to fight, and then to camp in quiet_. he told me that he knew no other method of conducting a war than this. it may be said that the adventurous character of this great man, his personal situation, and the tone of the french mind, all concurred in urging him to undertakings which no other person, whether born upon a throne, or a general under the orders of his government, would ever dare to adopt. this is probably true; but between the extremes of very distant invasions, and wars of position, there is a proper mean, and, without imitating his impetuous audacity, we may pursue the line he has marked out. it is probable that the old system of wars of positions will for a long time be proscribed, or that, if adopted, it will be much modified and improved. if the art of war is enlarged by the adoption of the system of marches, humanity, on the contrary, loses by it; for these rapid incursions and bivouacs of considerable masses, feeding upon the regions they overrun, are not materially different from the devastations of the barbarian hordes between the fourth and thirteenth centuries. still, it is not likely that the system will be speedily renounced; for a great truth has been demonstrated by napoleon's wars,--viz.: that remoteness is not a certain safeguard against invasion,--that a state to be secure must have a good system of fortresses and lines of defense, of reserves and military institutions, and, finally, a good system of government. then the people may everywhere be organized as militia, and may serve as reserves to the active armies, which will render the latter more formidable; and the greater the strength of the armies the more necessary is the system of rapid operations and prompt results. if, in time, social order assumes a calmer state,--if nations, instead of fighting for their existence, fight only for their interests, to acquire a natural frontier or to maintain the political equilibrium,--then a new right of nations may be agreed upon, and perhaps it will be possible to have armies on a less extensive scale. then also we may see armies of from eighty to one hundred thousand men return to a mixed system of war,--a mean between the rapid incursions of napoleon and the slow system of positions of the last century. until then we must expect to retain this system of marches, which has produced so great results; for the first to renounce it in the presence of an active and capable enemy would probably be a victim to his indiscretion. the science of marches now includes more than details, like the following, viz.: the order of the different arms in column, the time of departure and arrival, the precautions to be observed in the march, and the means of communication between the columns, all of which is a part of the duties of the staff of an army. outside and beyond these very important details, there is a science of marches in the great operations of strategy. for instance, the march of napoleon by the saint-bernard to fall upon the communications of mélas, those made in by donauwerth to cut off mack, and in by gera to turn the prussians, the march of suwaroff from turin to the trebbia to meet macdonald, that of the russian army on taroutin, then upon krasnoi, were decisive operations, not because of their relation to logistics, but on account of their strategic relations. indeed, these skillful marches are but applications of the great principle of throwing the mass of the forces upon the decisive point; and this point is to be determined from the considerations given in article xix. what was the passage of the saint-bernard but a line of operations directed against an extremity of the strategic front of the enemy, and thence upon his line of retreat? the marches of ulm and jena were the same maneuvers; and what was blücher's march at waterloo but an application of interior strategic lines? from this it may be concluded that all strategic movements which tend to throw the mass of the army successively upon the different points of the front of operations of the enemy, will be skillful, as they apply the principle of overwhelming a smaller force by a superior one. the operations of the french in from dunkirk to landau, and those of napoleon in , , and , are models of this kind. one of the most essential points in the science of modern marches, is to so combine the movements of the columns as to cover the greatest strategic front, when beyond the reach of the enemy, for the triple object of deceiving him as to the objective in view, of moving with ease and rapidity, and of procuring supplies with more facility. however, it is necessary in this case to have previously arranged the means of concentration of the columns in order to inflict a decisive blow. this alternate application of extended and concentric movements is the true test of a great general. there is another kind of marches, designated as _flank marches_, which deserves notice. they have always been held up as very dangerous; but nothing satisfactory has ever been written about them. if by the term _flank marches_ are understood tactical maneuvers made upon the field of battle in view of the enemy, it is certain that they are very delicate operations, though sometimes successful; but if reference is made to ordinary strategic marches, i see nothing particularly dangerous in them, unless the most common precautions of logistics be neglected. in a strategic movement, the two hostile armies ought to be separated by about two marches, (counting the distance which separates the advanced guards from the enemy and from their own columns.) in such a case there could be no danger in a strategic march from one point to another. there are, however, two cases where such a march would be altogether inadmissible: the first is where the system of the line of operations, of the strategic lines, and of the front of operations is so chosen as to present the flank to the enemy during a whole operation. this was the famous project of marching upon leipsic, leaving napoleon and dresden on the flank, which would, if carried out, have proved fatal to the allies. it was modified by the emperor alexander upon the solicitations of the author. the second case is where the line of operations is very long, (as was the case with napoleon at borodino,) and particularly if this line affords but a single suitable route for retreat: then every flank movement exposing this line would be a great fault. in countries abounding in secondary communications, flank movements are still less dangerous, since, if repulsed, safety may be found in a change of the line of operations. the physical and moral condition of the troops and the more or less energetic characters of the commanders will, of course, be elements in the determination of such movements. the often-quoted marches of jena and ulm were actual flank maneuvers; so was that upon milan after the passage of the chiusella, and that of marshal paskevitch to cross the vistula at ossiek; and their successful issue is well known. a tactical maneuver by the flank in the presence of the enemy is quite a different affair. ney suffered for a movement of this kind at dennewitz, and so did marmont at salamanca and frederick at kolin. nevertheless, the celebrated maneuver of frederick at leuthen was a true flank movement, but it was covered by a mass of cavalry concealed by the heights, and applied against an army which lay motionless in its camp; and it was so successful because at the time of the decisive shock daun was taken in flank, and not frederick. in the old system of marching in column at platoon distance, where line of battle could be formed to the right or left without deployment, (by a right or left into line,) movements parallel to the enemy's line were not _flank marches_, because the flank of the column was the real front of the line of battle. the famous march of eugene within view of the french army, to turn the lines of turin, was still more extraordinary than that of leuthen, and no less successful. in these different battles, the maneuvers were tactical and not strategic. the march of eugene from mantua to turin was one of the greatest strategic operations of the age; but the case above referred to was a movement made to turn the french camp the evening before the battle. article xxv. depots of supplies, and their relation to marches. the subject most nearly connected with the system of marches is the commissariat, for to march quickly and for a long distance food must be supplied; and the problem of supporting a numerous army in an enemy's country is a very difficult one. it is proposed to discuss the relation between the commissariat and strategy. it will always be difficult to imagine how darius and xerxes subsisted their immense armies in thrace, where now it would be a hard task to supply thirty thousand men. during the middle ages, the greeks, barbarians, and more lately the crusaders, maintained considerable bodies of men in that country. cæsar said that war should support war, and he is generally believed to have lived at the expense of the countries he overran. the middle ages were remarkable for the great migrations of all kinds, and it would be interesting to know the numbers of the huns, vandals, goths, and mongols who successively traversed europe, and how they lived during their marches. the commissariat arrangements of the crusaders would also be an interesting subject of research. in the early periods of modern history, it is probable that the armies of francis i., in crossing the alps into italy, did not carry with them large stores of provisions; for armies of their magnitude, of forty or fifty thousand men, could easily find provisions in the rich valleys of the ticino and po. under louis xiv. and frederick ii. the armies were larger; they fought on their own frontiers, and lived from their storehouses, which were established as they moved. this interfered greatly with operations, restricting the troops within a distance from the depots dependent upon the means of transportation, the rations they could carry, and the number of days necessary for wagons to go to the depots and return to camp. during the revolution, depots of supply were abandoned from necessity. the large armies which invaded belgium and germany lived sometimes in the houses of the people, sometimes by requisitions laid upon the country, and often by plunder and pillage. to subsist an army on the granaries of belgium, italy, swabia, and the rich banks of the rhine and danube, is easy,--particularly if it marches in a number of columns and does not exceed one hundred or one hundred and twenty thousand men; but this would be very difficult in some other countries, and quite impossible in russia, sweden, poland, and turkey. it may readily be conceived how great may be the rapidity and impetuosity of an army where every thing depends only on the strength of the soldiers' legs. this system gave napoleon great advantages; but he abused it by applying it on too large a scale and to countries where it was impracticable. a general should be capable of making all the resources of the invaded country contribute to the success of his enterprises: he should use the local authorities, if they remain, to regulate the assessments so as to make them uniform and legal, while he himself should see to their fulfillment. if the authorities do not remain, he should create provisional ones of the leading men, and endow them with extraordinary powers. the provisions thus acquired should be collected at the points most convenient for the operations of the army. in order to husband them, the troops may be quartered in the towns and villages, taking care to reimburse the inhabitants for the extra charge thus laid upon them. the inhabitants should also be required to furnish wagons to convey the supplies to the points occupied by the troops. it is impossible to designate precisely what it will be prudent to undertake without having previously established these depots, as much depends upon the season, country, strength of the armies, and spirit of the people; but the following may be considered as general maxims:-- . that in fertile and populous regions not hostile, an army of one hundred to one hundred and twenty thousand men, when so far distant from the enemy as to be able safely to recover a considerable extent of country, may draw its resources from it, during the time occupied by any single operation. as the first operation never requires more than a month, during which time the great body of the troops will be in motion, it will be sufficient to provide, by depots of provisions, for the eventual wants of the army, and particularly for those of the troops obliged to remain at a particular point. thus, the army of napoleon, while half of it was besieging ulm, would need bread until the surrender of the city; and if there had been a scarcity the operation might have failed. . during this time every effort should be made to collect the supplies obtained in the country, and to form depots, in order to subserve the wants of the army after the success of the operation, whether it take a position to recruit or whether it undertake a new enterprise. . the depots formed either by purchase or forced requisitions should be echeloned as much as possible upon three different lines of communication, in order to supply with more facility the wings of the army, and to extend as much as possible the area from which successive supplies are to be drawn, and, lastly, in order that the depots should be as well covered as possible. to this end, it would be well to have the depots on lines converging toward the principal line of operations, which will be generally found in the center. this arrangement has two real advantages: first, the depots are less exposed to the attempts of the enemy, as his distance from them is thereby increased; secondly, it facilitates the movements of the army in concentrating upon a single point of the line of operations to the rear, with a view of retaking the initiative from the enemy, who may have temporarily assumed the offensive and gained some advantage. . in thinly-settled and unproductive regions the army will lack its most necessary supplies: it will be prudent, in this case, not to advance too far from its depots, and to carry with it sufficient provisions to enable it, if compelled to do so, to fall back upon its lines of depots. . in national wars where the inhabitants fly and destroy every thing in their path, as was the case in spain, portugal, russia, and turkey, it is impossible to advance unless attended by trains of provisions and without having a sure base of supply near the front of operations. under these circumstances a war of invasion becomes very difficult, if not impossible. . it is not only necessary to collect large quantities of supplies, but it is indispensable to have the means of conveying them with or after the army; and this is the greatest difficulty, particularly on rapid expeditions. to facilitate their transportation, the rations should consist of the most portable articles,--as biscuit, rice, &c.: the wagons should be both light and strong, so as to pass over all kinds of roads. it will be necessary to collect all the vehicles of the country, and to insure good treatment to their owners or drivers; and these vehicles should be arranged in parks at different points, so as not to take the drivers too far from their homes and in order to husband the successive resources. lastly, the soldier must he habituated to carry with him several days' rations of bread, rice, or even of flour. . the vicinity of the sea is invaluable for the transportation of supplies; and the party which is master on this element can supply himself at will. this advantage, however, is not absolute in the case of a large continental army; for, in the desire to maintain communications with its depots, it may be drawn into operations on the coast, thus exposing itself to the greatest risks if the enemy maneuver with the mass of his forces upon the extremity opposite the sea. if the army advance too far from the coast, there will be danger of its communications being intercepted; and this danger increases with the progress of the army. . a continental army using the sea for transportation should base itself on the land, and have a reserve of provisions independent of its ships, and a line of retreat prepared on the extremity of its strategic front opposed to the sea. . navigable streams and canals, when parallel to the line of operations of the army, render the transportation of supplies much easier, and also free the roads from the incumbrances of the numerous vehicles otherwise necessary. for this reason, lines of operations thus situated are the most favorable. the water-communications themselves are not in this case the lines of operations, as has been asserted: on the contrary, it is essential that the troops should be able to move at some distance from the river, in order to prevent the enemy from throwing back the exterior flank upon the river,--which might be as dangerous as if it were the sea. in the enemy's country the rivers can scarcely ever be used for transportation, since the boats will probably be destroyed, and since a small body of men may easily embarrass the navigation. to render it sure, it is necessary to occupy both banks,--which is hazardous, as mortier experienced at dirnstein. in a friendly country the advantages of rivers are more substantial. . in default of bread or biscuit, the pressing wants of an army may be fed by cattle on the hoof; and these can generally be found, in populous countries, in numbers to last for some little time. this source of supply will, however, be soon exhausted; and, in addition, this plan leads to plunder. the requisitions for cattle should be well regulated; and the best plan of all is to supply the army with cattle purchased elsewhere. i will end this article by recording a remark of napoleon which may appear whimsical, but which is still not without reason. he said that in his first campaigns the enemy was so well provided that when his troops were in want of supplies he had only to fall upon the rear of the enemy to procure every thing in abundance. this is a remark upon which it would be absurd to found a system, but which perhaps explains the success of many a rash enterprise, and proves how much actual war differs from narrow theory. article xxvi. the defense of frontiers by forts and intrenched lines.--wars of sieges. forts serve two principal purposes: first, to cover the frontiers; secondly, to aid the operations of the campaign. the defense of frontiers is a problem generally somewhat indeterminate. it is not so for those countries whose borders are covered with great natural obstacles, and which present but few accessible points, and these admitting of defense by the art of the engineer. the problem here is simple; but in open countries it is more difficult. the alps and the pyrenees, and the lesser ranges of the crapacks, of riesengebirge, of erzgebirge, of the böhmerwald, of the black forest, of the vosges, and of the jura, are not so formidable that they cannot be made more so by a good system of fortresses. of all these frontiers, that separating france and piedmont was best covered. the valleys of the stura and suza, the passes of argentine, of mont-genèvre, and of mont-cenis,--the only ones considered practicable,--were covered by masonry forts; and, in addition, works of considerable magnitude guarded the issues of the valleys in the plains of piedmont. it was certainly no easy matter to surmount these difficulties. these excellent artificial defenses will not always prevent the passage of an army, because the small works which are found in the gorges may be carried, or the enemy, if he be bold, may find a passage over some other route hitherto deemed impracticable. the passage of the alps by francis i.,--which is so well described by gaillard,--napoleon's passage of the saint-bernard, and the splugen expedition, prove that there is truth in the remark of napoleon, _that an army can pass wherever a titan can set his foot_,--a maxim not strictly true, but characteristic of the man, and applied by him with great success. other countries are covered by large rivers, either as a first line or as a second. it is, however, remarkable that such lines, apparently so well calculated to separate nations without interfering with trade and communication, are generally not part of the real frontier. it cannot be said that the danube divides bessarabia from the ottoman empire as long as the turks have a foothold in moldavia. the rhine was never the real frontier of france and germany; for the french for long periods held points upon the right bank, while the germans were in possession of mayence, luxembourg, and the _têtes de ponts_ of manheim and wesel on the left bank. if, however, the danube, the rhine, rhone, elbe, oder, vistula, po, and adige be not exterior lines of the frontier, there is no reason why they should not be fortified as lines of permanent defense, wherever they permit the use of a system suitable for covering a front of operations. an example of this kind is the inn, which separates bavaria from austria: flanked on the south by the tyrolese alps, on the north by bohemia and the danube, its narrow front is covered by the three fortified places of passau, braunau, and salzburg. lloyd, with some poetic license, compares this frontier to two impregnable bastions whose curtain is formed of three fine forts and whose ditch is one of the most rapid of rivers. he has exaggerated these advantages; for his epithet of "impregnable" was decidedly disproved by the bloody events of , , and . the majority of the european states have frontiers by no means so formidable as that of the alps and the inn, being generally open, or consisting of mountains with practicable passes at a considerable number of points. we propose to give a set of general maxims equally applicable to all cases. when the topography of a frontier is open, there should be no attempt to make a complete line of defense by building too many fortresses, requiring armies to garrison them, and which, after all, might not prevent an enemy from penetrating the country. it is much wiser to build fewer works, and to have them properly located, not with the expectation of absolutely preventing the ingress of the enemy, but to multiply the impediments to his progress, and, at the same time, to support the movements of the army which is to repel him. if it be rare that a fortified place of itself absolutely prevents the progress of an army, it is, nevertheless, an embarrassment, and compels the army to detach a part of its force or to make _détours_ in its march; while, on the other hand, it imparts corresponding advantages to the army which holds it, covers his depots, flanks, and movements, and, finally, is a place of refuge in case of need. fortresses thus exercise a manifest influence over military operations; and we now propose to examine their relations to strategy. the first point to be considered is their location; the second lies in the distinction between the cases where an army can afford to pass the forts without a siege, and those where it will be necessary to besiege; the third point is in reference to the relations of an army to a siege which it proposes to cover. as fortresses properly located favor military operations, in the same degree those which are unfortunately placed are disadvantageous. they are an incubus upon the army which is compelled to garrison them and the state whose men and money are wasted upon them. there are many in europe in this category. it is bad policy to cover a frontier with fortresses very close together. this system has been wrongly imputed to vauban, who, on the contrary, had a controversy with louvois about the great number of points the latter desired to fortify. the maxims on this point are as follow:-- . the fortified places should be in echelon, on three lines, and should extend from the frontiers toward the capital.[ ] there should be three in the first line, as many in the second, and a large place in the third, near the center of the state. if there be four fronts, this would require, for a complete system, from twenty-four to thirty places. it will be objected that this number is large, and that even austria has not so many. it must be recollected that france has more than forty upon only a third of its frontiers, (from besançon to dunkirk,) and still has not enough on the third line in the center of the country. a board convened for the purpose of considering the system of fortresses has decided quite recently that more were required. this does not prove that there were not already too many, but that certain points in addition should be fortified, while those on the first line, although too much crowded, may be maintained since they are already in existence. admitting that france has two fronts from dunkirk to basel, one from basel to savoy, one from savoy to nice, in addition to the totally distinct line of the pyrenees and the coast-line, there are six fronts, requiring forty to fifty places. every military man will admit that this is enough, since the swiss and coast fronts require fewer than the northeast. the system of arrangement of these fortresses is an important element of their usefulness. austria has a less number, because she is bordered by the small german states, which, instead of being hostile, place their own forts at her disposal. moreover, the number above given is what was considered necessary for a state having four fronts of nearly equal development. prussia, being long and narrow, and extending from königsberg almost to the gates of metz, should not be fortified upon the same system as france, spain, or austria. thus the geographical position and extent of states may either diminish or increase the number of fortresses, particularly when maritime forts are to be included. . fortresses should always occupy the important strategic points already designated in article xix. as to their tactical qualities, their sites should not be commanded, and egress from them should be easy, in order to increase the difficulty of blockading them. . those which possess the greatest advantages, either as to their own defense or for seconding the operations of an army, are certainly those situated on great rivers and commanding both banks. mayence, coblentz, and strasbourg, including kehl, are true illustrations and models of this kind. places situated at the confluence of two great rivers command three different fronts, and hence are of increased importance. take, for instance, modlin. mayence, when it had on the left bank of the main the fort of gustavusburg, and cassel on the right, was the most formidable place in europe, but it required a garrison of twenty-five thousand men: so that works of this extent must be few in number. . large forts, when encompassing populous and commercial cities, are preferable to small ones,--particularly when the assistance of the citizens can be relied on for their defense. metz arrested the whole power of charles v, and lille for a whole year delayed eugene and marlborough. strasbourg has many times proved the security of french armies. during the last wars these places were passed without being besieged by the invading forces, because all europe was in arms against france; but one hundred and fifty thousand germans having in their front one hundred thousand french could not penetrate to the seine with impunity, leaving behind them these well-fortified points. . formerly the operations of war were directed against towns, camps, and positions; recently they have been directed only against organized armies, leaving out of consideration all natural or artificial obstacles. the exclusive use of either of these systems is faulty: the true course is a mean between these extremes. doubtless, it will always be of the first importance to destroy and disorganize all the armies of the enemy in the field, and to attain this end it may be allowable to pass the fortresses; but if the success be only partial it will be unwise to push the invasion too far. here, also, very much depends upon the situation and respective strength of the armies and the spirit of the nations. if austria were the sole antagonist of france, she could not follow in the footsteps of the allies in ; neither is it probable that fifty thousand french will very soon risk themselves beyond the noric alps, in the very heart of austria, as napoleon did in .[ ] such events only occur under exceptional circumstances. . it may be concluded from what precedes,-- st, that, while fortified places are essential supports, abuse in their application may, by dividing an army, weaken it instead of adding to its efficiency; d, that an army may, with the view of destroying the enemy, pass the line of these forts,--always, however, leaving a force to observe them; d, that an army cannot pass a large river, like the danube or the rhine, without reducing at least one of the fortresses on the river, in order to secure a good line of retreat. once master of this place, the army may advance on the offensive, leaving detachments to besiege other places; and the chances of the reduction of those places increase as the army advances, since the enemy's opportunities of hindering the siege are correspondingly diminished. . while large places are much the most advantageous among a friendly people, smaller works are not without importance, not to arrest an enemy, who might mask them, but as they may materially aid the operations of an army in the field. the fort of königstein in was as useful to the french as the fortress of dresden, because it procured a _tête de pont_ on the elbe. in a mountainous country, small, well-located forts are equal in value to fortified places, because their province is to close the passes, and not to afford refuge to armies: the little fort of bard, in the valley of aosta, almost arrested napoleon's army in . . it follows that each frontier should have one or two large fortresses as places of refuge, besides secondary forts and small posts to facilitate military operations. walled cities with a shallow ditch may be very useful in the interior of a country, to contain depots, hospitals, &c, when they are strong enough to resist the attacks of any small bodies that may traverse the vicinity. they will be particularly serviceable if they can be defended by the militia, so as not to weaken the active army. . large fortified places which are not in proper strategic positions are a positive misfortune for both the army and state. . those on the sea-coast are of importance only in a maritime war, except for depots: they may even prove disastrous for a continental army, by holding out to it a delusive promise of support. benningsen almost lost the russian armies by basing them in on königsberg,--which he did because it was convenient for supply. if the russian army in , instead of concentrating on smolensk, had supported itself on dunaburg and riga, it would have been in danger of being forced into the sea and of being cut off from all its bases. the relations between sieges and the operations of active armies are of two kinds. an invading army may pass by fortified places without attacking them, but it must leave a force to invest them, or at least to watch them; and when there are a number of them adjacent to each other it will be necessary to leave an entire corps d'armée, under a single commander, to invest or watch them as circumstances may require. when the invading army decides to attack a place, a sufficient force to carry on the siege will be assigned to this duty; the remainder may either continue its march or take a position to cover the siege. formerly the false system prevailed of encircling a city by a whole army, which buried itself in lines of circumvallation and contravallation. these lines cost as much in labor and expense as the siege itself. the famous case of the lines of turin, which were fifteen miles in length, and, though guarded by seventy-eight thousand french, were forced by prince eugene with forty thousand men in , is enough to condemn this ridiculous system. much as the recital of the immense labors of cæsar in the investment of alise may excite our admiration, it is not probable that any general in our times will imitate his example. nevertheless, it is very necessary for the investing force to strengthen its position by detached works commanding the routes by which the garrison might issue or by which the siege might be disturbed from without. this was done by napoleon at mantua, and by the russians at varna. experience has proved that the best way to cover a siege is to beat and pursue as far as possible the enemy's forces which could interfere. if the besieging force is numerically inferior, it should take up a strategic position covering all the avenues by which succor might arrive; and when it approaches, as much of the besieging force as can be spared should unite with the covering force to fall upon the approaching army and decide whether the siege shall continue or not. bonaparte in , at mantua, was a model of wisdom and skill for the operations of an army of observation. intrenched lines. besides the lines of circumvallation and contravallation referred to above, there is another kind, which is more extended than they are, and is in a measure allied to permanent fortifications, because it is intended to protect a part of the frontiers. as a fortress or an intrenched camp may, as a temporary refuge for an army, be highly advantageous, so to the same degree is the system of intrenched lines absurd. i do not now refer to lines of small extent closing a narrow gorge, like fussen and scharnitz, for they may be regarded as forts; but i speak of extended lines many leagues in length and intended to wholly close a part of the frontiers. for instance, those of wissembourg, which, covered by the lauter flowing in front, supported by the rhine on the right and the vosges on the left, seemed to fulfill all the conditions of safety; and yet they were forced on every occasion when they were assailed. the lines of stollhofen, which on the right of the rhine played the same part as those of wissembourg on the left, were equally unfortunate; and those of the queich and the kinzig had the same fate. the lines of turin, ( ,) and those of mayence, ( ,) although intended as lines of circumvallation, were analogous to the lines in question in their extent and in the fate which befell them. however well they may be supported by natural obstacles, their great extent paralyzes their defenders, and they are almost always susceptible of being turned. to bury an army in intrenchments, where it may be outflanked and surrounded, or forced in front even if secure from a flank attack, is manifest folly; and it is to be hoped that we shall never see another instance of it. nevertheless, in our chapter on tactics we will treat of their attack and defense. it may be well to remark that, while it is absurd to use these extended lines, it would be equally foolish to neglect the advantages to be derived from detached works in increasing the strength of a besieging force, the safety of a position, or the defense of a defile. footnotes: [footnote : the memorable campaign of is evidence of the value of such a system. if the porte had possessed masonry forts in the defiles of the balkan and a good fortress toward faki, the russians would not have reached adrianople, and the affair would not have been so simple.] [footnote : still, napoleon was right in taking the offensive in the frioul, since the austrians were expecting a reinforcement from the rhine of twenty thousand men, and of course it was highly important to beat the archduke charles before this force joined him. in view of the circumstances of the case, napoleon's conduct was in accordance with the principles of war.] article xxvii. the connection of intrenched camps and têtes de ponts with strategy. it would be out of place here to go into details as to the sites of ordinary camps and upon the means of covering them by advanced guards, or upon the advantages of field-fortifications in the defense of posts. only fortified camps enter into the combinations of grand tactics, and even of strategy; and this they do by the temporary support they afford an army. it may be seen by the example of the camp of buntzelwitz, which saved frederick in , and by those of kehl and dusseldorf in , that such a refuge may prove of the greatest importance. the camp of ulm, in , enabled kray to arrest for a whole month the army of moreau on the danube; and wellington derived great advantages from his camp of torres-vedras. the turks were greatly assisted in defending the country between the danube and the balkan mountains by the camp of shumla. the principal rule in this connection is that camps should be established on strategic points which should also possess tactical advantages. if the camp of drissa was useless to the russians in , it was because it was not in a proper position in reference to their defensive system, which should have rested upon smolensk and moscow. hence the russians were compelled to abandon it after a few days. the maxims which have been given for the determination of the great decisive strategic points will apply to all intrenched camps, because they ought only to be placed on such points. the influence of these camps is variable: they may answer equally well as points of departure for an offensive operation, as _têtes de ponts_ to assure the crossing of a large river, as protection for winter quarters, or as a refuge for a defeated army. however good may be the site of such a camp, it will always be difficult to locate it so that it may not be turned, unless, like the camp of torres-vedras, it be upon a peninsula backed by the sea. whenever it can be passed either by the right or the left, the army will be compelled to abandon it or run the risk of being invested in it. the camp of dresden was an important support to napoleon for two months; but as soon as it was outflanked by the allies it had not the advantages even of an ordinary fortress; for its extent led to the sacrifice of two corps within a few days for want of provisions. despite all this, these camps, when only intended to afford temporary support to an army on the defensive, may still fulfill this end, even when the enemy passes by them, provided they cannot be taken in reverse,--that is, provided all their faces are equally safe from a _coup de main_. it is also important that they be established close to a fortress, where the depots may be safe, or which may cover the front of the camp nearest to the line of retreat. in general terms, such a camp on a river, with a large _tête de pont_ on the other side to command both banks, and near a large fortified city like mayence or strasbourg, is of undoubted advantage; but it will never be more than a temporary refuge, a means of gaining time and of collecting reinforcements. when the object is to drive away the enemy, it will be necessary to leave the camp and carry on operations in the open country. the second maxim as to these camps is, that they are particularly advantageous to an army at home or near its base of operations. if a french army occupied an intrenched camp on the elbe, it would be lost when the space between the rhine and elbe was held by the enemy; but if it were invested in an intrenched camp near strasbourg, it might with a little assistance resume its superiority and take the field, while the enemy in the interior of france and between the relieving force and the intrenched army would have great difficulty in recrossing the rhine. we have heretofore considered these camps in a strategic light; but several german generals have maintained that they are suitable to cover places or to prevent sieges,--which appears to me to be a little sophistical. doubtless, it will be more difficult to besiege a place when an army is encamped on its glacis; and it maybe said that the forts and camps are a mutual support; but, according to my view, the real and principal use of intrenched camps is always to afford, if necessary, a temporary refuge for an army, or the means of debouching offensively upon a decisive point or beyond a large river. to bury an army in such a camp, to expose it to the danger of being outflanked and cut off, simply to retard a siege, would be folly. the example of wurmser, who prolonged the defense of mantua, will be cited in opposition to this; but did not his army perish? and was this sacrifice really useful? i do not think so; for, the place having been once relieved and revictualed, and the siege-train having fallen into the hands of the austrians, the siege was necessarily changed into a blockade, and the town could only be taken by reason of famine; and, this being the case, wurmser's presence ought rather to have hastened than retarded its surrender. the intrenched camp of the austrians before mayence in would, indeed, have prevented the siege of the place, if the french had possessed the means of carrying on a siege, as long as the rhine had not been crossed; but as soon as jourdan appeared on the lahn, and moreau in the black forest, it became necessary to abandon the camp and leave the place to its own means of defense. it would only be in the event of a fortress occupying a point such that it would be impossible for an army to pass it without taking it, that an intrenched camp, with the object of preventing an attack upon it, would be established; and what place in europe is upon such a site? so far from agreeing with these german authors, on the contrary, it seems to me that a very important question in the establishment of these camps near fortified places on a river, is whether they should be on the same bank as the place, or upon the other. when it is necessary to make a choice, by reason of the fact that the place cannot be located to cover both banks, i should decidedly prefer the latter. to serve as a refuge or to favor a debouch, the camp should be on the bank of the river toward the enemy; and in this, case the principal danger to be feared is that the enemy might take the camp in reverse by passing the river at some other point; and if the fortress were upon the same bank us the camp, it would be of little service; while if upon the other bank, opposite to the camp, it would be almost impossible to take the latter in reverse. for instance, the russians, who could not hold for twenty-four hours their camp of drissa, would have defied the enemy for a long time if there had been a fortification on the right bank of the dwina, covering the rear of the camp. so moreau for three months, at kehl, withstood all the efforts of the archduke charles; while if strasbourg had not been there upon the opposite bank his camp would easily have been turned by a passage of the rhine. indeed, it would be desirable to have the protection of the fortified place upon the other bank too; and a place holding both banks would fulfill this condition. the fortification of coblentz, recently constructed, seems to introduce a new epoch. this system of the prussians, combining the advantages of intrenched camps and permanent works, deserves attentive consideration; but, whatever may be its defects, it is nevertheless certain that it would afford immense advantages to an army intended to operate on the rhine. indeed, the inconvenience of intrenched camps on large rivers is that they are only very useful when beyond the river; and in this case they are exposed to the dangers arising from destruction of bridges (as happened to napoleon at essling,)--to say nothing of the danger of losing their provisions and munitions, or even of a front attack against which the works might not avail. the system of detached permanent works of coblentz has the advantage of avoiding these dangers, by protecting the depots on the same bank as the army, and in guaranteeing to the army freedom from attack at least until the bridges be re-established. if the city were upon the right bank of the rhine, and there were only an intrenched camp of field-works on the left bank, there would be no certainty of security either for the depots or the army. so, if coblentz were a good ordinary fortress without detached forts, a large army could not so readily make it a place of refuge, nor would there be such facilities for debouching from it in the presence of an enemy. the fortress of ehrenbreitstein, which is intended to protect coblentz on the right bank, is so difficult of access that it would be quite easy to blockade it, and the egress of a force of any magnitude might be vigorously disputed. much has been recently said of a new system used by the archduke maximilian to fortify the intrenched camp of linz,--by masonry towers. as i only know of it by hearsay and the description by captain allard in the _spectateur militaire_, i cannot discuss it thoroughly. i only know that the system of towers used at genoa by the skillful colonel andreis appeared to me to be useful, but still susceptible of improvements,--which the archduke seems to have added. we are told that the towers of linz, situated in ditches and covered by the glacis, have the advantage of giving a concentrated horizontal fire and of being sheltered from the direct shot of the enemy. such towers, if well flanked and connected by a parapet, may make a very advantageous camp,--always, however, with some of the inconveniences of closed lines. if the towers are isolated, and the intervals carefully covered by field-works, (to be thrown up when required,) they will make a camp preferable to one covered by ordinary redoubts, but not so advantageous as afforded by the large detached forts of coblentz. these towers number thirty-two, eight of which are on the left bank, with a square fort commanding the perlingsberg. of these twenty-four on the right bank, some seven or eight are only half-towers. the circumference of this line is about twelve miles. the towers are between five hundred and six hundred yards apart, and will be connected, in case of war, by a palisaded covered way. they are of masonry, of three tiers of guns, with a barbette battery which is the principal defense, mounting eleven twenty-four pounders. two howitzers are placed in the upper tier. those towers are placed in a wide and deep ditch, the _déblais_ of which forms a high glacis which protects the tower from direct shot; but i should think it would be difficult to protect the artillery from direct fire. some say that this has cost about three-fourths of what a complete bastioned enceinte, necessary to make linz a fortress of the first rank, would have cost; others maintain that it has not cost more than a quarter as much as a bastioned work, and that it subserves, besides, an entirely different object. if these works are to resist a regular siege, they are certainly very defective; but, regarded as an intrenched camp to give refuge and an outlet upon both banks of the danube for a large army, they are appropriate, and would be of great importance in a war like that of , and, if existing then, would probably have saved the capital. to complete a grand system, it would perhaps have been better to encircle linz with a regular bastioned line, and then to have built seven or eight towers between the eastern salient and the mouth of the traun, within a direct distance of about two and a half miles, so as to have included for the camp only the curved space between linz, the traun, and the danube. then the double advantage of a fortress of the first rank and a camp under its guns would have been united, and, even if not quite so large, would have answered for a large army, particularly if the eight towers on the left bank and the fort of perlingsberg had been preserved. tÊtes de ponts. _têtes de ponts_ are the most important of all field-works. the difficulties of crossing a river, particularly a large one, in the face of the enemy, demonstrate abundantly the immense utility of such works, which can be less easily dispensed with than intrenched camps, since if the bridges are safe an army is insured from the disastrous events which may attend a rapid retreat across a large river. _têtes de ponts_ are doubly advantageous when they are as it were _keeps_ for a large intrenched camp, and will be triply so if they also cover the bank opposite to the location of the camp, since then they will mutually support each other. it is needless to state that these works are particularly important in an enemy's country and upon all fronts where there are no permanent works. it may be observed that the principal difference between the system of intrenched camps and that of _têtes de ponts_ is that the best intrenched camps are composed of detached and closed works, while _têtes de ponts_ usually consist of contiguous works not closed. an intrenched line to admit of defense must be occupied in force throughout its whole extent, which would generally require a large army; if, on the contrary, the intrenchments are detached closed works, a comparatively small force can defend them. the attack and defense of these works will be discussed in a subsequent part of this volume. article xxviii. strategic operations in mountains. a mountainous country presents itself, in the combinations of war, under four different aspects. it may be the whole theater of the war, or it may be but a zone; it may be mountainous throughout its whole extent, or there may be a line of mountains, upon emerging from which the army may debouch into large and rich plains. if switzerland, the tyrol, the noric provinces, some parts of turkey and hungary, catalonia and portugal, be excepted, in the european countries the mountains are in single ranges. in these cases there is but a difficult defile to cross,--a temporary obstacle, which, once overcome, is an advantage rather than an objection. in fact, the range once crossed and the war carried into the plains, the chain of mountains may be regarded as an eventual base, upon which the army may fall back and find a temporary refuge. the only essential precaution to be observed is, not to allow the enemy to anticipate the army on this line of retreat. the part of the alps between france and italy, and the pyrenees, (which are not so high, though equally broad,) are of this nature. the mountains of bohemia and of the black forest, and the vosges, belong to this class. in catalonia the mountains cover the whole country as far as the ebro: if the war were limited to this province, the combinations would not be the same as if there were but a line of mountains. hungary in this respect differs little from lombardy and castile; for if the crapacks in the eastern and northern part are as marked a feature as the pyrenees, they are still but a temporary obstacle, and an army overcoming it, whether debouching in the basin of the waag, of the neytra, or of the theiss, or in the fields of mongatsch, would have the vast plains between the danube and the theiss for a field of operations. the only difference would be in the roads, which in the alps, though few in number, are excellent, while in hungary there are none of much value. in its northern part, this chain, though not so high, becomes broader, and would seem to belong to that class of fields of operations which are wholly mountainous; but, as its evacuation may be compelled by decisive operations in the valleys of the waag or the theiss, it must be regarded as a temporary barrier. the attack and defense of this country, however, would be a strategic study of the most interesting character. when an extremely mountainous country, such as the tyrol or switzerland, is but a zone of operations, the importance of these mountains is secondary, and they must be observed like a fortress, the armies deciding the great contests in the valleys. it will, of course, be otherwise if this be the whole field. it has long been a question whether possession of the mountains gave control of the valleys, or whether possession of the valleys gave control of the mountains. the archduke charles, a very intelligent and competent judge, has declared for the latter, and has demonstrated that the valley of the danube is the key of southern germany. however, in this kind of questions much depends upon the relative forces and their arrangement in the country. if sixty thousand french were advancing on bavaria in presence of an equal force of austrians, and the latter should throw thirty thousand men into the tyrol, intending to replace them by reinforcements on its arrival on the inn, it would be difficult for the french to push on as far as this line, leaving so large a force on its flanks masters of the outlets of scharnitz, fussen, kufstein, and lofers. but if the french force were one hundred and twenty thousand men, and had gained such successes as to establish its superiority over the army in its front, then it might leave a sufficient detachment to mask the passes of the tyrol and extend its progress as far as linz,--as moreau did in . thus far we have considered these mountainous districts as only accessory zones. if we regard them as the principal fields of operations, the strategic problem seems to be more complicated. the campaigns of and are equally rich in instruction on this branch of the art. in my account of them i have endeavored to bring out their teachings by a historical exposition of the events; and i cannot do better than refer my readers to it. when we consider the results of the imprudent invasion of switzerland by the french directory, and its fatal influence in doubling the extent of the theater of operations and making it reach from the texel to naples, we cannot too much applaud the wisdom of france and austria in the transactions which had for three centuries guaranteed the neutrality of switzerland. every one will be convinced of this by carefully studying the interesting campaigns of the archduke charles, suwaroff, and massena in , and those of napoleon and moreau in . the first is a model for operations upon an entirely mountainous field; the second is a model for wars in which the fate of mountainous countries is decided on the plains. i will here state some of the deductions which seem to follow from this study. when a country whose whole extent is mountainous is the principal theater of operations, the strategic combinations cannot be entirely based upon maxims applicable in an open country. transversal maneuvers to gain the extremity of the front of operations of the enemy here become always very difficult, and often impossible. in such a country a considerable army can be maneuvered only in a small number of valleys, where the enemy will take care to post advanced guards of sufficient strength to delay the army long enough to provide means for defeating the enterprise; and, as the ridges which separate these valleys will be generally crossed only by paths impracticable for the passage of an army, transversal marches can only be made by small bodies of light troops. the important natural strategic points will be at the junction of the larger valleys or of the streams in those valleys, and will be few in number; and, if the defensive army occupy them with the mass of its forces, the invader will generally be compelled to resort to direct attacks to dislodge it. however, if great strategic maneuvers in these cases be more rare and difficult, it by no means follows that they are less important. on the contrary, if the assailant succeed in gaining possession of one of these centers of communication between the large valleys upon the line of retreat of the enemy, it will be more serious for the latter than it would be in an open country; since the occupation of one or two difficult defiles will often be sufficient to cause the ruin of the whole army. if the attacking party have difficulties to overcome, it must be admitted that the defense has quite as many, on account of the necessity of covering all the outlets by which an attack in force may be made upon the decisive points, and of the difficulties of the transversal marches which it would be compelled to make to cover the menaced points. in order to complete what i have said upon this kind of marches and the difficulties of directing them, i will refer to what napoleon did in to cut off mack from ulm. if this operation was facilitated by the hundred roads which cross swabia in all directions, and if it would have been impracticable in a mountainous country, for want of transversal routes, to make the long circuit from donauwerth by augsburg to memmingen, it is also true that mack could by these same hundred roads have effected his retreat with much greater facility than if he had been entrapped in one of the valleys of switzerland or of the tyrol, from which there was but a single outlet. on the other hand, the general on the defensive may in a level country concentrate a large part of his forces; for, if the enemy scatter to occupy all the roads by which the defensive army may retire, it will be easy for the latter to crush these isolated bodies; but in a very mountainous country, where there are ordinarily but one or two principal routes into which other valleys open, even from the direction of the enemy, the concentration of forces becomes more difficult, since serious inconveniences may result if even one of these important valleys be not observed. nothing can better demonstrate the difficulty of strategic defense in mountainous regions than the perplexity in which we are involved when we attempt simply to give advice in such cases,--to say nothing of laying down maxims for them. if it were but a question of the defense of a single definite front of small extent, consisting of four or five converging valleys, the common junction of which is at a distance of two or three short marches from the summits of the ranges, it would be easier of solution. it would then be sufficient to recommend the construction of a good fort at the narrowest and least-easily turned point of each of these valleys. protected by these forts, a few brigades of infantry should be stationed to dispute the passage, while half the army should be held in reserve at the junction, where it would be in position either to sustain the advanced guards most seriously threatened, or to fall upon the assailant with the whole force when he debouches. if to this be added good instructions to the commanders of the advanced guards, whether in assigning them the best point for rendezvous when their line of forts is pierced, or in directing them to continue to act in the mountains upon the flank of the enemy, the general on the defensive may regard himself as invincible, thanks to the many difficulties which the country offers to the assailant. but, if there be other fronts like this upon the right and left, all of which are to be defended, the problem is changed: the difficulties of the defense increase with the extent of the fronts, and this system of a cordon of forts becomes dangerous,--while it is not easy to adopt a better one. we cannot be better convinced of these truths than by the consideration of the position of massena in switzerland in . after jourdan's defeat at stockach, he occupied the line from basel by schaffhausen and rheineck to saint-gothard, and thence by la furca to mont-blanc. he had enemies in front of basel, at waldshut, at schaffhausen, at feldkirch, and at chur; bellegarde threatened the saint-gothard, and the italian army menaced the simplon and the saint-bernard. how was he to defend such a circumference? and how could he leave open one of these great valleys, thus risking every thing? from rheinfelden to the jura, toward soleure, it was but two short marches, and there was the mouth of the trap in which the french army was placed. this was, then, the pivot of the defense. but how could he leave schaffhausen unprotected? how abandon rheineck and the saint-gothard? how open the valais and the approach by berne, without surrendering the whole of switzerland to the coalition? and if he covered each point even by a brigade, where would be his army when he would need it to give battle to an approaching force? it is a natural system on a level theater to concentrate the masses of an army; but in the mountains such a course would surrender the keys of the country, and, besides, it is not easy to say where an inferior army could be concentrated without compromising it. after the forced evacuation of the line of the rhine and zurich, it seemed that the only strategic point for massena to defend was the line of the jura. he was rash enough to stand upon the albis,--a line shorter than that of the rhine, it is true, but exposed for an immense distance to the attacks of the austrians. if bellegarde, instead of going into lombardy by the valtellina, had marched to berne or made a junction with the archduke, massena would have been ruined. these events seem to prove that if a country covered with high mountains be favorable for defense in a tactical point of view, it is different in a strategic sense, because it necessitates a division of the troops. this can only be remedied by giving them greater mobility and by passing often to the offensive. general clausewitz, whose logic is frequently defective, maintains, on the contrary, that, movements being the most difficult part in this kind of war, the defensive party should avoid them, since by such a course he might lose the advantages of the local defenses. he, however, ends by demonstrating that a passive defense must yield under an active attack,--which goes to show that the initiative is no less favorable in mountains than in plains. if there could be any doubt on this point, it ought to be dispelled by massena's campaign in switzerland, where he sustained himself only by attacking the enemy at every opportunity, even when he was obliged to seek him on the grimsel and the saint-gothard. napoleon's course was similar in in the tyrol, when he was opposed to wurmser and alvinzi. as for detailed strategic maneuvers, they may be comprehended by reading the events of suwaroff's expedition by the saint-gothard upon the muttenthal. while we must approve his maneuvers in endeavoring to capture lecourbe in the valley of the reuss, we must also admire the presence of mind, activity, and unyielding firmness which saved that general and his division. afterward, in the schachenthal and the muttenthal, suwaroff was placed in the same position as lecourbe had been, and extricated himself with equal ability. not less extraordinary was the ten days' campaign of general molitor, who with four thousand men was surrounded in the canton of glaris by more than thirty thousand allies, and yet succeeded in maintaining himself behind the linth after four admirable fights. these events teach us the vanity of all theory _in details_, and also that in such a country a strong and heroic will is worth more than all the precepts in the world. after such lessons, need i say that one of the principal rules of this kind of war is, not to risk one's self in the valleys without securing the heights? shall i say also that in this kind of war, more than in any other, operations should be directed upon the communications of the enemy? and, finally, that good temporary bases or lines of defense at the confluence of the great valleys, covered by strategic reserves, combined with great mobility and frequent offensive movements, will be the best means of defending the country? i cannot terminate this article without remarking that mountainous countries are particularly favorable for defense when the war is a national one, in which the whole people rise up to defend their homes with the obstinacy which enthusiasm for a holy cause imparts: every advance is then dearly bought. but to be successful it is always necessary that the people be sustained by a disciplined force, more or less numerous: without this they must finally yield, like the heroes of stanz and of the tyrol. the offensive against a mountainous country also presents a double case: it may either be directed upon a belt of mountains beyond which are extensive plains, or the whole theater may be mountainous. in the first case there is little more to be done than this,--viz.: make demonstrations upon the whole line of the frontier, in order to lead the enemy to extend his defense, and then force a passage at the point which promises the greatest results. the problem in such a case is to break through a cordon which is strong less on account of the numbers of the defenders than from their position, and if broken at one point the whole line is forced. the history of bard in , and the capture of leutasch and scharnitz in by ney, (who threw fourteen thousand men on innspruck in the midst of thirty thousand austrians, and by seizing this central point compelled them to retreat in all directions,) show that with brave infantry and bold commanders these famous mountain-ranges can generally be forced. the history of the passage of the alps, where francis i. turned the army which was awaiting him at suza by passing the steep mountains between mont-cenis and the valley of queyras, is an example of those _insurmountable_ obstacles which can always be surmounted. to oppose him it would have been necessary to adopt a system of cordon; and we have already seen what is to be expected of it. the position of the swiss and italians at suza was even less wise than the cordon-system, because it inclosed them in a contracted valley without protecting the lateral issues. their strategic plan ought to have been to throw troops into these valleys to defend the defiles, and to post the bulk of the army toward turin or carignano. when we consider the _tactical_ difficulties of this kind of war, and the immense advantages it affords the defense, we may be inclined to regard the concentration of a considerable force to penetrate by a single valley as an extremely rash maneuver, and to think that it ought to be divided into as many columns as there are practicable passes. in my opinion, this is one of the most dangerous of all illusions; and to confirm what i say it is only necessary to refer to the fate of the columns of championnet at the battle of fossano. if there be five or six roads on the menaced front, they should all, of course, be threatened; but the army should cross the chain in not more than two masses, and the routes which these follow should not be divergent; for if they were, the enemy might be able to defeat them separately. napoleon's passage of the saint-bernard was wisely planned. he formed the bulk of his army on the center, with a division on each flank by mont-cenis and the simplon, to divide the attention of the enemy and flank his march. the invasion of a country entirely covered with mountains is a much greater and more difficult task than where a dénouement may be accomplished by a decisive battle in the open country; for fields of battle for the deployment of large masses are rare in a mountainous region, and the war becomes a succession of partial combats. here it would be imprudent, perhaps, to penetrate on a single point by a narrow and deep valley, whose outlets might be closed by the enemy and thus the invading army be endangered: it might penetrate by the wings on two or three lateral lines, whose outlets should not be too widely separated, the marches being so arranged that the masses may debouch at the junction of the valleys at nearly the same instant. the enemy should be driven from all the ridges which separate these valleys. of all mountainous countries, the tactical defense of switzerland would be the easiest, if all her inhabitants were united in spirit; and with their assistance a disciplined force might hold its own against a triple number. to give specific precepts for complications which vary infinitely with localities, the resources and the condition of the people and armies, would be absurd. history, well studied and understood, is the best school for this kind of warfare. the account of the campaign of by the archduke charles, that of the campaigns which i have given in my history of the wars of the revolution, the narrative of the campaign of the grisons by ségur and mathieu dumas, that of catalonia by saint-cyr and suchet, the campaign of the duke de rohan in valtellina, and the passage of the alps by gaillard, (francis i.,) are good guides in this study. article xxix. grand invasions and distant expeditions. there are several kinds of distant expeditions. the first are those which are merely auxiliary and belong to wars of intervention. the second are great continental invasions, through extensive tracts of country, which may be either friendly, neutral, doubtful, or hostile. the third are of the same nature, but made partly on land, partly by sea by means of numerous fleets. the fourth class comprises those beyond the seas, to found, defend, or attack distant colonies. the fifth includes the great descents, where the distance passed over is not very great, but where a powerful state is attacked. as to the first, in a strategic point of view, a russian army on the rhine or in italy, in alliance with the german states, would certainly be stronger and more favorably situated than if it had reached either of these points by passing over hostile or even neutral territory; for its base, lines of operations, and eventual points of support will be the same as those of its allies; it may find refuge behind their lines of defense, provisions in their depots, and munitions in their arsenals;--while in the other case its resources would be upon the vistula or the niemen, and it might afford another example of the sad fate of many of these great invasions. in spite of the important difference between a war in which a state is merely an auxiliary, and a distant invasion undertaken for its own interest and with its own resources, there are, nevertheless, dangers in the way of these auxiliary armies, and perplexity for the commander of all the armies,--particularly if he belong to the state which is not a principal party; as may be learned from the campaign of . general koutousoff advanced on the inn to the boundaries of bavaria with thirty thousand russians, to effect a junction with mack, whose army in the mean time had been destroyed, with the exception of eighteen thousand men brought back from donauwerth by kienmayer. the russian general thus found himself with fifty thousand men exposed to the impetuous activity of napoleon with one hundred and fifty thousand, and, to complete his misfortune, he was separated from his own frontiers by a distance of about seven hundred and fifty miles. his position would have been hopeless if fifty thousand men had not arrived to reinforce him. the battle of austerlitz--due to a fault of weyrother--endangered the russian army anew, since it was so far from its base. it almost became the victim of a distant alliance; and it was only peace that gave it the opportunity of regaining its own country. the fate of suwaroff after the victory of novi, especially in the expedition to switzerland, and that of hermann's corps at bergen in holland, are examples which should be well studied by every commander under such circumstances. general benningsen's position in was less disadvantageous, because, being between the vistula and the niemen, his communications with his base were preserved and his operations were in no respect dependent upon his allies. we may also refer to the fate of the french in bohemia and bavaria in , when frederick the great abandoned them and made a separate peace. in this case the parties were allies rather than auxiliaries; but in the latter relation the political ties are never woven so closely as to remove all points of dissension which may compromise military operations. examples of this kind have been cited in article xix., on political objective points. history alone furnishes us instruction in reference to distant invasions across extensive territories. when half of europe was covered with forests, pasturages, and flocks, and when only horses and iron were necessary to transplant whole nations from one end of the continent to the other, the goths, huns, vandals, normans, arabs, and tartars overran empires in succession. but since the invention of powder and artillery and the organization of formidable standing armies, and particularly since civilization and statesmanship have brought nations closer together and have taught them the necessity of reciprocally sustaining each other, no such events have taken place. besides these migrations of nations, there were other expeditions in the middle ages, which were of a more military character, as those of charlemagne and others. since the invention of powder there have been scarcely any, except the advance of charles viii. to naples, and of charles xii. into the ukraine, which can be called distant invasions; for the campaigns of the spaniards in flanders and of the swedes in germany were of a particular kind. the first was a civil war, and the swedes were only auxiliaries to the protestants of germany; and, besides, the forces concerned in both were not large. in modern times no one but napoleon has dared to transport the armies of half of europe from the rhine to the volga; and there is little danger that he will be imitated. apart from the modifications which result from great distances, all invasions, after the armies arrive upon the actual theater, present the same operations as all other wars. as the chief difficulty arises from these great distances, we should recall our maxims on deep lines of operations, strategic reserves, and eventual bases, as the only ones applicable; and here it is that their application is indispensable, although even that will not avert all danger. the campaign of , although so ruinous to napoleon, was a model for a distant invasion. his care in leaving prince schwarzenberg and reynier on the bug, while macdonald, oudinot, and wrede guarded the dwina, victor covered smolensk, and augereau was between the oder and vistula, proves that he had neglected no humanly possible precaution in order to base himself safely; but it also proves that the greatest enterprises may fail simply on account of the magnitude of the preparations for their success. if napoleon erred in this contest, it was in neglecting diplomatic precautions; in not uniting under one commander the different bodies of troops on the dwina and dnieper; in remaining ten days too long at wilna; in giving the command of his right to his brother, who was unequal to it; and in confiding to prince schwarzenberg a duty which that general could not perform with the devotedness of a frenchman. i do not speak now of his error in remaining in moscow after the conflagration, since then there was no remedy for the misfortune; although it would not have been so great if the retreat had taken place immediately. he has also been accused of having too much despised distances, difficulties, and men, in pushing on as far as the kremlin. before passing judgment upon him in this matter, however, we ought to know the real motives which induced him to pass smolensk, instead of wintering there as he had intended, and whether it would have been possible for him to remain between that city and vitebsk without having previously defeated the russian army. it is doubtless true that napoleon neglected too much the resentment of austria, prussia, and sweden, and counted too surely upon a _dénouement_ between wilna and the dwina. although he fully appreciated the bravery of the russian armies, he did not realize the spirit and energy of the people. finally, and chiefly, instead of procuring the hearty and sincere concurrence of a military state, whose territories would have given him a sure base for his attack upon the colossal power of russia, he founded his enterprise upon the co-operation of a brave and enthusiastic but fickle people, and besides, he neglected to turn to the greatest advantage this ephemeral enthusiasm. the fate of all such enterprises makes it evident that the capital point for their success, and, in fact, the only maxim to be given, is "never to attempt them without having secured the hearty and constant alliance of a respectable power near enough the field of operations to afford a proper base, where supplies of every kind may be accumulated, and which may also in case of reverse serve as a refuge and afford new means of resuming the offensive." as to the precautions to be observed in these operations, the reader is referred to articles xxi. and xxii., on the safety of deep lines of operations and the establishment of eventual bases, as giving all the military means of lessening the danger; to these should be added a just appreciation of distances, obstacles, seasons, and countries,--in short, accuracy in calculation and moderation in success, in order that the enterprise may not be carried too far. we are far from thinking that any purely military maxims can insure the success of remote invasions: in four thousand years only five or six have been successful, and in a hundred instances they have nearly ruined nations and armies. expeditions of the third class, partly on land, partly by sea, have been rare since the invention of artillery, the crusades being the last in date of occurrence; and probably the cause is that the control of the sea, after having been held in succession by several secondary powers, has passed into the hands of england, an insular power, rich in ships, but without the land-forces necessary for such expeditions. it is evident that from both of these causes the condition of things now is very different from that existing when xerxes marched to the conquest of greece, followed by four thousand vessels of all dimensions, or when alexander marched from macedonia over asia minor to tyre, while his fleet coasted the shore. nevertheless, if we no longer see such invasions, it is very true that the assistance of a fleet of men-of-war and transports will always be of immense value to any army on shore when the two can act in concert. still, sailing-ships are an uncertain resource, for their progress depends upon the winds,--which may be unfavorable: in addition, any kind of fleet is exposed to great dangers in storms, which are not of rare occurrence. the more or less hostile tone of the people, the length of the line of operations, and the great distance of the principal objective point, are the only points which require any deviation from the ordinary operations of war. invasions of neighboring states, if less dangerous than distant ones, are still not without great danger of failure. a french army attacking cadiz might find a tomb on the guadalquivir, although well based upon the pyrenees and possessing intermediate bases upon the ebro and the tagus. likewise, the army which in besieged komorn in the heart of hungary might have been destroyed on the plains of wagram without going as far as the beresina. the antecedents, the number of disposable troops, the successes already gained, the state of the country, will all be elements in determining the extent of the enterprises to be undertaken; and to be able to proportion them well to his resources, in view of the attendant circumstances, is a great talent in a general. although diplomacy does not play so important a part in these invasions as in those more distant, it is still of importance; since, as stated in article vi., there is no enemy, however insignificant, whom it would not be useful to convert into an ally. the influence which the change of policy of the duke of savoy in exercised over the events of that day, and the effects of the stand taken by maurice of saxony in , and of bavaria in , prove clearly the importance of securing the strict neutrality of all states adjoining the theater of war, when their co-operation cannot be obtained. epitome of strategy * * * * * the task which i undertook seems to me to have been passably fulfilled by what has been stated in reference to the strategic combinations which enter ordinarily into a plan of campaign. we have seen, from the definition at the beginning of this chapter, that, in the most important operations in war, _strategy_ fixes the direction of movements, and that we depend upon _tactics_ for their execution. therefore, before treating of these mixed operations, it will be well to give here the combinations of grand tactics and of battles, as well as the maxims by the aid of which the application of the fundamental principle of war may be made. by this method these operations, half strategic and half tactical, will be better comprehended as a whole; but, in the first place, i will give a synopsis of the contents of the preceding chapter. from the different articles which compose it, we may conclude that the manner of applying the general principle of war to all possible theaters of operations is found in what follows:-- . in knowing how to make the best use of the advantages which the reciprocal directions of the two bases of operations may afford, in accordance with article xviii. . in choosing, from the three zones ordinarily found in the strategic field, that one upon which the greatest injury can be done to the enemy with the least risk to one's self. . in establishing well, and giving a good direction to, the lines of operations; adopting for defense the concentric system of the archduke charles in and of napoleon in ; or that of soult in , for retreats parallel to the frontiers. on the offensive we should follow the system which led to the success of napoleon in , , and , when he directed his line upon the extremity of the strategic front; or we might adopt his plan which was successful in , , and , of directing the line of operations upon the center of the strategic front: all of which is to be determined by the respective positions of the armies, and according to the maxims presented in article xxi. . in selecting judicious eventual lines of maneuver, by giving them such directions as always to be able to act with the greater mass of the forces, and to prevent the parts of the enemy from concentrating or from affording each other mutual support. . in combining, in the same spirit of centralization, all strategic positions, and all large detachments made to cover the most important strategic points of the theater of war. . in imparting to the troops the greatest possible mobility and activity, so as, by their successive employment upon points where it may be important to act, to bring superior force to bear upon fractions of the hostile army. the system of rapid and continuous marches multiplies the effect of an army, and at the same time neutralizes a great part of that of the enemy's, and is often sufficient to insure success; but its effect will be quintupled if the marches be skillfully directed upon the decisive strategic points of the zone of operations, where the severest blows to the enemy can be given. however, as a general may not always be prepared to adopt this decisive course to the exclusion of every other, he must then be content with attaining a part of the object of every enterprise, by rapid and successive employment of his forces upon isolated bodies of the enemy, thus insuring their defeat. a general who moves his masses rapidly and continually, and gives them proper directions, may be confident both of gaining victories and of securing great results therefrom. the oft-cited operations of and prove these truths most satisfactorily, as also does that ordered by carnot in , already mentioned in article xxiv., and the details of which may be found in volume iv. of my history of the wars of the revolution. forty battalions, carried successively from dunkirk to menin, maubeuge, and landau, by reinforcing the armies already at those points, gained four victories and saved france. the whole science of marches would have been found in this wise operation had it been directed upon the decisive strategic point. the austrian was then the principal army of the coalition, and its line of retreat was upon cologne: hence it was upon the meuse that a general effort of the french would have inflicted the most severe blow. the committee of public safety provided for the most pressing danger, and the maneuver contains half of the strategic principle; the other half consists in giving to such efforts the most decisive direction, as napoleon did at ulm, at jena, and at ratisbon. the whole of strategy is contained in these four examples. it is superfluous to add that one of the great ends of strategy is to be able to assure real advantages to the army by preparing the theater of war most favorable for its operations, if they take place in its own country, by the location of fortified places, of intrenched camps, and of _têtes de ponts_, and by the opening of communications in the great decisive directions: these constitute not the least interesting part of the science. we have already seen how we are to recognize these lines and these decisive points, whether permanent or temporary. napoleon has afforded instruction on this point by the roads of the simplon and mont-cenis; and austria since has profited by it in the roads from the tyrol to lombardy, the saint-gothard, and the splugen, as well as by different fortified places projected or completed. chapter iv. grand tactics and battles. battles are the actual conflicts of armies contending about great questions of national policy and of strategy. strategy directs armies to the decisive points of a zone of operations, and influences, in advance, the results of battles; but tactics, aided by courage, by genius and fortune, gains victories. grand tactics is the art of making good combinations preliminary to battles, as well as during their progress. the guiding principle in tactical combinations, as in those of strategy, is to bring the mass of the force in hand against a part of the opposing army, and upon that point the possession of which promises the most important results. battles have been stated by some writers to be the chief and deciding features of war. this assertion is not strictly true, as armies have been destroyed by strategic operations without the occurrence of pitched battles, by a succession of inconsiderable affairs. it is also true that a complete and decided victory may give rise to results of the same character when there may have been no grand strategic combinations. the results of a battle generally depend upon a union of causes which are not always within the scope of the military art: the nature of the order of battle adopted, the greater or less wisdom displayed in the plan of the battle, as well as the manner of carrying out its details, the more or less loyal and enlightened co-operation of the officers subordinate to the commander-in-chief, the cause of the contest, the proportions and quality of the troops, their greater or less enthusiasm, superiority on the one side or the other in artillery or cavalry, and the manner of handling these arms; but it is the _morale_ of armies, as well as of nations, more than any thing else, which makes victories and their results decisive. clausewitz commits a grave error in asserting that a battle not characterized by a maneuver to turn the enemy cannot result in a complete victory. at the battle of zama, hannibal, in a few brief hours, saw the fruits of twenty years of glory and success vanish before his eyes, although scipio never had a thought of turning his position. at rivoli the turning-party was completely beaten; nor was the maneuver more successful at stockach in , or at austerlitz in . as is evident from article xxxii., i by no means intend to discourage the use of that maneuver, being, on the contrary, a constant advocate of it; but it is very important to know how to use it skillfully and opportunely, and i am, moreover, of opinion that if it be a general's design to make himself master of his enemy's communications while at the same time holding his own, he would do better to employ strategic than tactical combinations to accomplish it. there are three kinds of battles: st, defensive battles, or those fought by armies in favorable positions taken up to await the enemy's attack; d, offensive battles, where one army attacks another in position; d, battles fought unexpectedly, and resulting from the collision of two armies meeting on the march. we will examine in succession the different combinations they present. article xxx. positions and defensive battles. when an army awaits an attack, it takes up a position and forms its line of battle. from the general definitions given at the beginning of this work, it will appear that i make a distinction between _lines of battle_ and _orders of battle_,--things which have been constantly confounded. i will designate as a _line of battle_ the position occupied by battalions, either deployed or in columns of attack, which an army will take up to hold a camp and a certain portion of ground where it will await attack, having no particular project in view for the future: it is the right name to give to a body of troops formed with proper tactical intervals and distances upon one or more lines, as will be more fully explained in article xliii. on the contrary, i will designate as an _order of battle_ an arrangement of troops indicating an intention to execute a certain maneuver; as, for example, the parallel order, the oblique order, the perpendicular order. this nomenclature, although new, seems necessary to keeping up a proper distinction between two things which should by no means be confounded.[ ] from the nature of the two things, it is evident that the _line of battle_ belongs especially to defensive arrangements; because an army awaiting an attack without knowing what or where it will be must necessarily form a rather indefinite and objectless line of battle. _order of battle_, on the contrary, indicating an arrangement of troops formed with an intention of fighting while executing some maneuver previously determined upon, belongs more particularly to offensive dispositions. however, it is by no means pretended that the line of battle is exclusively a defensive arrangement; for a body of troops may in this formation very well proceed to the attack of a position, while an army on the defensive may use the oblique order or any other. i refer above only to ordinary cases. without adhering strictly to what is called the system of a war of positions, an army may often find it proper to await the enemy at a favorable point, strong by nature and selected beforehand for the purpose of there fighting a defensive battle. such a position may be taken up when the object is to cover an important objective point, such as a capital, large depots, or a decisive strategic point which controls the surrounding country, or, finally, to cover a siege. there are two kinds of positions,--the _strategic_, which has been discussed in article xx., and the _tactical_. the latter, again, are subdivided. in the first place, there are intrenched positions occupied to await the enemy under cover of works more or less connected,--in a word, intrenched camps. their relations to strategic operations have been treated in article xxvii., and their attack and defense are discussed in article xxxv. secondly, we have positions naturally strong, where armies encamp for the purpose of gaining a few days' time. third and last are open positions, chosen in advance to fight on the defensive. the characteristics to be sought in these positions vary according to the object in view: it is, however, a matter of importance not to be carried away by the mistaken idea, which prevails too extensively, of giving the preference to positions that are very steep and difficult of access,--quite suitable places, probably, for temporary camps, but not always the best for battle-grounds. a position of this kind, to be really strong, must be not only steep and difficult of access, but should be adapted to the end had in view in occupying it, should offer as many advantages as possible for the kind of troops forming the principal strength of the army, and, finally, the obstacles presented by its features should be more disadvantageous for the enemy than for the assailed. for example, it is certain that massena, in taking the strong position of the albis, would have made a great error if his chief strength had been in cavalry and artillery; whilst it was exactly what was wanted for his excellent infantry. for the same reason, wellington, whose whole dependence was in the fire of his troops, made a good choice of position at waterloo, where all the avenues of approach were well swept by his guns. the position of the albis was, moreover, rather a strategic position, that of waterloo being simply a battle-ground. the rules to be generally observed in selecting tactical positions are the following:-- . to have the communications to the front such as to make it easier to fall upon the enemy at a favorable moment than for him to approach the line of battle. . to give the artillery all its effect in the defense. . to have the ground suitable for concealing the movements of troops between the wings, that they may be massed upon any point deemed the proper one. . to be able to have a good view of the enemy's movements. . to have an unobstructed line of retreat. . to have the flanks well protected, either by natural or artificial obstacles, so as to render impossible an attack upon their extremities, and to oblige the enemy to attack the center, or at least some point of the front. this is a difficult condition to fulfill; for, if an army rests on a river, or a mountain, or an impenetrable forest, and the smallest reverse happens to it, a great disaster may be the result of the broken line being forced back upon the very obstacles which seemed to afford perfect protection. this danger--about which there can be no doubt--gives rise to the thought that points admitting an easy defense are better on a battle-field than insurmountable obstacles.[ ] . sometimes a want of proper support for the flanks is remedied by throwing a crotchet to the rear. this is dangerous; because a crotchet stuck on a line hinders its movements, and the enemy may cause great loss of life by placing his artillery in the angle of the two lines prolonged. a strong reserve in close column behind the wing to be guarded from assault seems better to fulfill the required condition than the crotchet; but the nature of the ground must always decide in the choice between the two methods. full details on this point are given in the description of the battle of prague, (chapter ii. of the seven years' war.) . we must endeavor in a defensive position not only to cover the flanks, but it often happens that there are obstacles on other points of the front, of such a character as to compel an attack upon the center. such a position will always be one of the most advantageous for defense,--as was shown at malplaquet and waterloo. great obstacles are not essential for this purpose, as the smallest accident of the ground is sometimes sufficient: thus, the insignificant rivulet of papelotte forced ney to attack wellington's center, instead of the left as he had been ordered. when a defense is made of such a position, care must be taken to hold ready for movement portions of the wings thus covered, in order that they may take part in the action instead of remaining idle spectators of it. the fact cannot be concealed, however, that all these means are but palliatives; and the best thing for an army standing on the defensive is to _know_ how to take the offensive at a proper time, and _to take it_. among the conditions to be satisfied by a defensive position has been mentioned that of enabling an easy and safe retreat; and this brings us to an examination of a question presented by the battle of waterloo. would an army with its rear resting upon a forest, and with a good road behind the center and each wing, have its retreat compromised, as napoleon imagined, if it should lose the battle? my own opinion is that such a position would be more favorable for a retreat than an entirely open field; for a beaten army could not cross a plain without exposure to very great danger. undoubtedly, if the retreat becomes a rout, a portion of the artillery left in battery in front of the forest would, in all probability, be lost; but the infantry and cavalry and a great part of the artillery could retire just as readily as across a plain. there is, indeed, no better cover for an orderly retreat than a forest,--this statement being made upon the supposition that there are at least two good roads behind the line, that proper measures for retreat have been taken before the enemy has had an opportunity to press too closely, and, finally, that the enemy is not permitted by a flank movement to be before the retreating army at the outlet of the forest, as was the case at hohenlinden. the retreat would be the more secure if, as at waterloo, the forest formed a concave line behind the center; for this re-entering would become a place of arms to receive the troops and give them time to pass off in succession on the main roads. when discussing strategic operations, mention was made of the varying chances which the two systems, the _defensive_ and the _offensive_, give rise to; and it was seen that especially in strategy the army taking the initiative has the great advantage of bringing up its troops and striking a blow where it may deem best, whilst the army which acts upon the defensive and awaits an attack is anticipated in every direction, is often taken unawares, and is always obliged to regulate its movements by those of the enemy. we have also seen that in tactics these advantages are not so marked, because in this case the operations occupy a smaller extent of ground, and the party taking the initiative cannot conceal his movements from the enemy, who, instantly observing, may at once counteract them by the aid of a good reserve. moreover, the party advancing upon the enemy has against him all the disadvantages arising from accidents of ground that he must pass before reaching the hostile line; and, however flat a country it may be, there are always inequalities of the surface, such as small ravines, thickets, hedges, farm-houses, villages, &c., which must either be taken possession of or be passed by. to these natural obstacles may also be added the enemy's batteries to be carried, and the disorder which always prevails to a greater or less extent in a body of men exposed to a continued fire either of musketry or artillery. viewing the matter in the light of these facts, all must agree that in tactical operations the advantages resulting from taking the initiative are balanced by the disadvantages. however undoubted these truths may be, there is another, still more manifest, which has been demonstrated by the greatest events of history. every army which maintains a strictly defensive attitude must, if attacked, be at last driven from its position; whilst by profiting by all the advantages of the defensive system, and holding itself ready to take the offensive when occasion offers, it may hope for the greatest success. a general who stands motionless to receive his enemy, keeping strictly on the defensive, may fight ever so bravely, but he must give way when properly attacked. it is not so, however, with a general who indeed waits to receive his enemy, but with the determination to fall upon him offensively at the proper moment, to wrest from him and transfer to his own troops the moral effect always produced by an onward movement when coupled with the certainty of throwing the main strength into the action at the most important point,--a thing altogether impossible when keeping strictly on the defensive. in fact, a general who occupies a well-chosen position, where his movements are free, has the advantage of observing the enemy's approach; his forces, previously arranged in a suitable manner upon the position, aided by batteries placed so as to produce the greatest effect, may make the enemy pay very dearly for his advance over the space separating the two armies; and when the assailant, after suffering severely, finds himself strongly assailed at the moment when the victory seemed to be in his hands, the advantage will, in all probability, be his no longer, for the moral effect of such a counter-attack upon the part of an adversary supposed to be beaten is certainly enough to stagger the boldest troops. a general may, therefore, employ in his battles with equal success either the offensive or defensive system; but it is indispensable,-- st, that, so far from limiting himself to a passive defense, he should know how to take the offensive at favorable moments; d, that his _coup-d'oeil_ be certain and his coolness undoubted; d, that he be able to rely surely upon his troops; th, that, in retaking the offensive, he should by no means neglect to apply the general principle which would have regulated his order of battle had he done so in the beginning; th, that he strike his blows upon decisive points. these truths are demonstrated by napoleon's course at rivoli and austerlitz, as well as by wellington's at talavera, at salamanca, and at waterloo. footnotes: [footnote : it is from no desire to make innovations that i have modified old terms or made new. in the development of a science, it is wrong for the same word to designate two very different things; and, if we continue to apply the term _order of battle_ to the disposition of troops in line, it must be improper to designate certain important maneuvers by the terms _oblique order of battle_, _concave order of battle_, and it becomes necessary to use instead the terms _oblique system of battle_, &c. i prefer the method of designation i have adopted. the _order of battle_ on paper may take the name _plan of organization_, and the ordinary formation of troops upon the ground will then be called _line of battle_.] [footnote : the park of hougoumont, the hamlet of la haye sainte, and the rivulet of papelotte were for ney more serious obstacles than the famous position of elchingen, where he forced a passage of the danube, in , upon the ruins of a burnt bridge. it may perhaps be said that the courage of the defenders in the two cases was not the same; but, throwing out of consideration this chance, it must be granted that the difficulties of a position, when properly taken advantage of, need not be insurmountable in order to render the attack abortive. at elchingen the great height and steepness of the banks, rendering the fire almost ineffectual, were more disadvantageous than useful in the defense.] article xxxi. offensive battles, and different orders of battle. we understand by offensive battles those which an army fights when assaulting another in position.[ ] an army reduced to the strategic defensive often takes the offensive by making an attack, and an army receiving an attack may, during the progress of the battle, take the offensive and obtain the advantages incident to it. history furnishes numerous examples of battles of each of these kinds. as defensive battles have been discussed in the preceding article, and the advantages of the defensive been pointed out, we will now proceed to the consideration of offensive movements. it must be admitted that the assailant generally has a moral advantage over the assailed, and almost always acts more understandingly than the latter, who must be more or less in a state of uncertainty. as soon as it is determined to attack the enemy, some order of attack must be adopted; and that is what i have thought ought to be called _order of battle_. it happens also quite frequently that a battle must be commenced without a detailed plan, because the position of the enemy is not entirely known. in either case it should be well understood that there is in every battle-field a decisive point, the possession of which, more than of any other, helps to secure the victory, by enabling its holder to make a proper application of the principles of war: arrangements should therefore be made for striking the decisive blow upon this point. the decisive point of a battle-field is determined, as has been already stated, by the character of the position, the bearing of different localities upon the strategic object in view, and, finally, by the arrangement of the contending forces. for example, suppose an enemy's flank to rest upon high ground from which his whole line might be attained, the occupation of this height seems most important, tactically considered; but it may happen that the height in question is very difficult of access, and situated exactly so as to be of the least importance, strategically considered. at the battle of bautzen the left of the allies rested upon the steep mountains of bohemia, which province was at that time rather neutral than hostile: it seemed that, tactically considered, the slope of these mountains was the decisive point to be held, when it was just the reverse, because the allies had but one line of retreat upon reichenbach and gorlitz, and the french, by forcing the right, which was in the plain, would occupy this line of retreat and throw the allies into the mountains, where they might have lost all their _matériel_ and a great part of the personnel of their army. this course was also easier for them on account of the difference in the features of the ground, led to more important results, and would have diminished the obstacles in the future. the following truths may, i think, be deduced from what has been stated: . the topographical key of a battle-field is not always the tactical key; . the decisive point of a battle-field is certainly that which combines strategic with topographical advantages; . when the difficulties of the ground are not too formidable upon the strategic point of the battle-field, this is generally the most important point; . it is nevertheless true that the determination of this point depends very much upon the arrangement of the contending forces. thus, in lines of battle too much extended and divided the center will always be the proper point of attack; in lines well closed and connected the center is the strongest point, since, independently of the reserves posted there, it is easy to support it from the flanks: the decisive point in this case is therefore one of the extremities of the line. when the numerical superiority is considerable, an attack may be made simultaneously upon both extremities, but not when the attacking force is equal or inferior numerically to the enemy's. it appears, therefore, that all the combinations of a battle consist in so employing the force in hand as to obtain the most effective action upon that one of the three points mentioned which offers the greatest number of chances of success,--a point very easily determined by applying the analysis just mentioned. the object of an offensive battle can only be to dislodge the enemy or to cut his line, unless it is intended by strategic maneuvers to ruin his army completely. an enemy is dislodged either by overthrowing him at some point of his line, or by outflanking him so as to take him in flank and rear, or by using both these methods at once; that is, attacking him in front while at the same time one wing is enveloped and his line turned. to accomplish these different objects, it becomes necessary to make choice of the most suitable order of battle for the method to be used. at least twelve orders of battle may be enumerated, viz.: . the simple parallel order; . the parallel order with a defensive or offensive crotchet; . the order reinforced upon one or both wings; . the order reinforced in the center; . the simple oblique order, or the oblique reinforced on the attacking wing; and . the perpendicular order on one or both wings; . the concave order; . the convex order; . the order by echelon on one or both wings; . the order by echelon on the center; . the order resulting from a strong combined attack upon the center and one extremity simultaneously. (see figs. to .) [illustration: fig. .[ ] a ttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt ____________________________|____________________________ b ] each of these orders may be used either by itself or, as has been stated, in connection with the maneuver of a strong column intended to turn the enemy's line. in order to a proper appreciation of the merits of each, it becomes necessary to test each by the application of the general principles which have been laid down. for example, it is manifest that the parallel order (fig. ) is worst of all, for it requires no skill to fight one line against another, battalion against battalion, with equal chances of success on either side: no tactical skill is needed in such a battle. there is, however, one important case where this is a suitable order, which occurs when an army, having taken the initiative in great strategic operations, shall have succeeded in falling upon the enemy's communications and cutting off his line of retreat while covering its own; when the battle takes place between them, that army which has reached the rear of the other may use the parallel order, for, having effected the decisive maneuver previous to the battle, all its efforts should now be directed toward the frustration of the enemy's endeavor to open a way through for himself. except for this single case, the parallel order is the worst of all. i do not mean to say that a battle cannot be gained while using this order, for one side or the other must gain the victory if the contest is continued; and the advantage will then be upon his side who has the best troops, who best knows when to engage them, who best manages his reserve and is most favored by fortune. [illustration: fig. . | | | | a | |b tttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt | | ______________________|________________________| b ] the parallel order with a crotchet upon the flank (fig. ) is most usually adopted in a defensive position. it may be also the result of an offensive combination; but then the crotchet is to the front, whilst in the case of defense it is to the rear. the battle of prague is a very remarkable example of the danger to which such a crotchet is exposed if properly attacked. [illustration: fig. . a ttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt ____|___ ___________________|____________________ b ____|___ ] the parallel order reinforced upon one wing, (fig. ,) or upon the center, (fig. , page ,) to pierce that of the enemy, is much more favorable than the two preceding ones, and is also much more in accordance with the general principles which have been laid down; although, when the contending forces are about equal, the part of the line which has been weakened to reinforce the other may have its own safety compromised if placed in line parallel to the enemy. [illustration: fig. . a tttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt ________|________ _________________ b _________________ ] [illustration: fig. .] the oblique order (fig. ) is the best for an inferior force attacking a superior; for, in addition to the advantage of bringing the main strength of the forces against a single point of the enemy's line, it has two others equally important, since the weakened wing is not only kept back from the attack of the enemy, but performs also the double duty of holding in position the part of his line not attacked, and of being at hand as a reserve for the support, if necessary, of the engaged wing. this order was used by the celebrated epaminondas at the battles of leuctra and mantinea. the most brilliant example of its use in modern times was given by frederick the great at the battle of leuthen. (see chapter vii. of treatise on grand operations.) [illustration: fig. . c | \ | \ | \| tttttttttttttttttttttttttt/| / | / | / | c | b-| | | | | | | | ] [illustration: fig. . | | | | | ___________a______________ | | | | | | | | | | | | | |-b b-| | | | | | | | | | | ] the perpendicular order on one or both wings, as seen in figs. and , can only be considered an arrangement to indicate the direction along which the primary tactical movements might be made in a battle. two armies will never long occupy the relative perpendicular positions indicated in these figures; for if the army b were to take its first position on a line perpendicular to one or both extremities of the army a, the latter would at once change the front of a portion of its line; and even the army b, as soon as it extended itself to or beyond the extremity of a, must of necessity turn its columns either to the right or the left, in order to bring them near the enemy's line, and so take him in reverse, as at c, the result being two oblique lines, as shown in fig. . the inference is that one division of the assailing army would take a position perpendicular to the enemy's wing, whilst the remainder of the army would approach in front for the purpose of annoying him; and this would always bring us back to one of the oblique orders shown in figures and . the attack on both wings, whatever be the form of attack adopted, may be very advantageous, but it is only admissible when the assailant is very decidedly superior in numbers; for, if the fundamental principle is to bring the main strength of the forces upon the decisive point, a weaker army would violate it in directing a divided attack against a superior force. this truth will be clearly demonstrated farther on. [illustration: fig. .] the order concave in the center (fig. ) has found advocates since the day when hannibal by its use gained the battle of cannæ. this order may indeed be very good when the progress of the battle itself gives rise to it; that is, when the enemy attacks the center, this retires before him, and he suffers himself to be enveloped by the wings. but, if this order is adopted before the battle begins, the enemy, instead of falling on the center, has only to attack the wings, which present their extremities and are in precisely the same relative situation as if they had been assailed in flank. this order would, therefore, be scarcely ever used except against an enemy who had taken the convex order to fight a battle, as will be seen farther on. [illustration: fig. , _bis_.] an army will rarely form a semicircle, preferring rather a broken line with the center retired, (fig. , _bis_.) if several writers may be believed, such an arrangement gave the victory to the english on the famous days of crécy and agincourt. this order is certainly better than a semicircle, since it does not so much present the flank to attack, whilst allowing forward movement by echelon and preserving all the advantages of concentration of fire. these advantages vanish if the enemy, instead of foolishly throwing himself upon the retired center, is content to watch it from a distance and makes his greatest effort upon one wing. essling, in , is an example of the advantageous use of a concave line; but it must not be inferred that napoleon committed an error in attacking the center; for an army fighting with the danube behind it and with no way of moving without uncovering its bridges of communication, must not be judged as if it had been free to maneuver at pleasure. [illustration: fig. .] the convex order with the center salient (fig. ) answers for an engagement immediately upon the passage of a river when the wings must be retired and rested on the river to cover the bridges; also when a defensive battle is to be fought with a river in rear, which is to be passed and the defile covered, as at leipsic; and, finally, it may become a natural formation to resist an enemy forming a concave line. if an enemy directs his efforts against the center or against a single wing, this order might cause the ruin of the whole army.[ ] the french tried it at fleurus in , and were successful, because the prince of coburg, in place of making a strong attack upon the center or upon a single extremity, divided his attack upon five or six diverging lines, and particularly upon both wings at once. nearly the same convex order was adopted at essling, and during the second and third days of the famous battle of leipsic. on the last occasion it had just the result that might have been expected. [illustration: fig. a tttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ b _____ _______ ] the order by echelon upon the two wings fig. is of the same nature as the perpendicular order, (fig. ,) being, however, better than that, because, the echelons being nearest each other in the direction where the reserve would be placed, the enemy would be less able, both as regards room and time, to throw himself into the interval of the center and make at that point a threatening counter-attack. [illustration: fig. a tttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt ___|___ ___|__ __|___ _____ _____ _____b b_____ _____ _____ ] the order by echelon on the center (fig. ) may be used with special success against an army occupying a position too much cut up and too extended, because, its center being then somewhat isolated from the wings and liable to overthrow, the army thus cut in two would be probably destroyed. but, applying the test of the same fundamental principle, this order of attack would appear to be less certain of success against an army having a connected and closed line; for the reserve being generally near the center, and the wings being able to act either by concentrating their fire or by moving against the foremost echelons, might readily repulse them. if this formation to some extent resembles the famous triangular wedge or _boar's head_ of the ancients, and the column of winkelried, it also differs from them essentially; for, instead of forming one solid mass,--an impracticable thing in our day, on account of the use of artillery,--it would have a large open space in the middle, which would render movements more easy. this formation is suitable, as has been said, for penetrating the center of a line too much extended, and might be equally successful against a line unavoidably immovable; but if the wings of the attacked line are brought at a proper time against the flanks of the foremost echelons, disagreeable consequences might result. a parallel order considerably reinforced on the center might perhaps be a much better arrangement, (figs. and ;) for the parallel line in this case would have at least the advantage of deceiving the enemy as to the point of attack, and would hinder the wings from taking the echelons of the center by the flank. this order by echelons was adopted by laudon for the attack of the intrenched camp of buntzelwitz. (treatise on grand operations, chapter xxviii.) in such a case it is quite suitable; for it is then certain that the defensive army being forced to remain within its intrenchments, there is no danger of its attacking the echelons in flank. but, this formation having the inconvenience of indicating to the enemy the point of his line which it is desired to attack, false attacks should be made upon the wings, to mislead him as to the true point of attack. [illustration fig .] the order of attack in columns on the center and on one extremity at the same time (fig. ) is better than the preceding, especially in an attack upon an enemy's line strongly arranged and well connected. it may even be called the most reasonable of all the orders of battle. the attack upon the center, aided by a wing outflanking the enemy, prevents the assailed party falling upon the assailant and taking him in flank, as was done by hannibal and marshal saxe. the enemy's wing which is hemmed in between the attacks on the center and at the extremity, having to contend with nearly the entire opposing force, will be defeated and probably destroyed. it was this maneuver which gave napoleon his victories of wagram and ligny. this was what he wished to attempt at borodino,--where he obtained only a partial success, on account of the heroic conduct of the russian left and the division of paskevitch in the famous central redoubt, and on account of the arrival of baggavout's corps on the wing he hoped to outflank. he used it also at bautzen,--where an unprecedented success would have been the result, but for an accident which interfered with the maneuver of the left wing intended to cut off the allies from the road to wurschen, every arrangement having been made with that view. it should be observed that these different orders are not to be understood precisely as the geometrical figures indicate them. a general who would expect to arrange his line of battle as regularly as upon paper or on a drill-ground would be greatly mistaken, and would be likely to suffer defeat. this is particularly true as battles are now fought. in the time of louis xiv. or of frederick, it was possible to form lines of battle almost as regular as the geometrical figures, because armies camped under tents, almost always closely collected together, and were in presence of each other several days, thus giving ample time for opening roads and clearing spaces to enable the columns to be at regular distances from each other. but in our day,--when armies bivouac, when their division into several corps gives greater mobility, when they take position near each other in obedience to orders given them while out of reach of the general's eye, and often when there has been no time for thorough examination of the enemy's position,--finally, when the different arms of the service are intermingled in the line of battle,--under these circumstances, all orders of battle which must be laid out with great accuracy of detail are impracticable. these figures have never been of any other use than to indicate approximate arrangements. if every army were a solid mass, capable of motion as a unit under the influence of one man's will and as rapidly as thought, the art of winning battles would be reduced to choosing the most favorable order of battle, and a general could reckon with certainty upon the success of maneuvers arranged beforehand. but the facts are altogether different; for the great difficulty of the tactics of battles will always be to render certain the simultaneous entering into action of the numerous fractions whose efforts must combine to make such an attack as will give good ground to hope for victory: in other words, the chief difficulty is to cause these fractions to unite in the execution of the decisive maneuver which, in accordance with the original plan of the battle, is to result in victory. inaccurate transmission of orders, the manner in which they will be understood and executed by the subordinates of the general-in-chief, excess of activity in some, lack of it in others, a defective _coup-d'oeil militaire_,--every thing of this kind may interfere with the simultaneous entering into action of the different parts, without speaking of the accidental circumstances which may delay or prevent the arrival of a corps at the appointed place. hence result two undoubted truths: . the more simple a decisive maneuver is, the more sure of success will it be; . sudden maneuvers seasonably executed during an engagement are more likely to succeed than those determined upon in advance, unless the latter, relating to previous strategic movements, will bring up the columns which are to decide the day upon those points where their presence will secure the expected result. waterloo and bautzen are proofs of the last. from the moment when blücher and bulow had reached the heights of frichermont, nothing could have prevented the loss of the battle by the french, and they could then only fight to make the defeat less complete. in like manner, at bautzen, as soon as ney had reached klix, the retreat of the allies during the night of the th of may could alone have saved them, for on the st it was too late; and, if ney had executed better what he was advised to do, the victory would have been a very great one. as to maneuvers for breaking through a line and calculations upon the co-operation of columns proceeding from the general front of the army, with the intention of effecting large detours around an enemy's flank, it may be stated that their result is always doubtful, since it depends upon such an accurate execution of carefully-arranged plans as is rarely seen. this subject will be considered in art. xxxii. besides the difficulty of depending upon the exact application of an order of battle arranged in advance, it often happens that battles begin without even the assailant having a well-defined object, although the collision may have been expected. this uncertainty results either from circumstances prior to the battle, from ignorance of the enemy's position and plans, or from the fact that a portion of the army may be still expected to arrive on the field. from these things many people have concluded that it is impossible to reduce to different systems the formations of orders of battle, or that the adoption of either of them can at all influence the result of an engagement,--an erroneous conclusion, in my opinion, even in the cases cited above. indeed, in battles begun without any predetermined plan it is probable that at the opening of the engagement the armies will occupy lines nearly parallel and more or less strengthened upon some point; the party acting upon the defensive, not knowing in what quarter the storm will burst upon him, will hold a large part of his forces in reserve, to be used as occasion may require; the assailant must make similar efforts to have his forces well in hand; but as soon as the point of attack shall have been determined, the mass of his troops will be directed against the center or upon one wing of the enemy, or upon both at once. whatever may be the resulting formation, it will always bear a resemblance to one of the figures previously exhibited. even in unexpected engagements the same thing would happen,--which will, it is hoped, be a sufficient proof of the fact that this classification of the different systems or orders of battle is neither fanciful nor useless. there is nothing even in napoleon's battles which disproves my assertion, although they are less susceptible than any others of being represented by lines accurately laid down. we see him, however, at rivoli, at austerlitz, and at ratisbon, concentrating his forces toward the center to be ready at the favorable moment to fall upon the enemy. at the pyramids he formed an oblique line of squares in echelon. at leipsic, essling, and brienne he used a kind of convex order very like fig. . at wagram his order was altogether like fig. , bringing up two masses upon the center and right, while keeping back the left wing; and this he wished to repeat at borodino and at waterloo before the prussians came up. at eylau, although the collision was almost entirely unforeseen on account of the very unexpected return and offensive movement of the russians, he outflanked their left almost perpendicularly, whilst in another direction he was endeavoring to break through the center; but these attacks were not simultaneous, that on the center being repulsed at eleven o'clock, whilst davoust did not attack vigorously upon the left until toward one. at dresden he attacked by the two wings, for the first time probably in his life, because his center was covered by a fortification and an intrenched camp, and, in addition, the attack of his left was combined with that of vandamme upon the enemy's line of retreat. at marengo, if we may credit napoleon himself, the oblique order he assumed, resting his right at castel ceriole, saved him from almost inevitable defeat. ulm and jena were battles won by strategy before they were fought, tactics having but little to do with them. at ulm there was not even a regular battle. i think we may hence conclude that if it seems absurd to desire to mark out upon the ground orders of battle in such regular lines as would be used in tracing them on a sketch, a skillful general may nevertheless bear in mind the orders which have been indicated above, and may so combine his troops on the battle-field that the arrangement shall be similar to one of them. he should endeavor in all his combinations, whether deliberately arranged or adopted on the spur of the moment, to form a sound conclusion as to the important point of the battle-field; and this he can only do by observing well the direction of the enemy's line of battle, and not forgetting the direction in which strategy requires him to operate. he will then give his attention and efforts to this point, using a third of his force to keep the enemy in check or watch his movements, while throwing the other two-thirds upon the point the possession of which will insure him the victory. acting thus, he will have satisfied all the conditions the science of grand tactics can impose upon him, and will have applied the principles of the art in the most perfect manner. the manner of determining the decisive point of a battle-field has been described in the preceding chapter, (art. xix.) having now explained the twelve orders of battle, it has occurred to me that this would be a proper place to reply to several statements made in the memoirs of napoleon published by general montholon. the great captain seems to consider the oblique order a modern invention, a theorist's fancy,--an opinion i can by no means share; for the oblique order is as old as thebes and sparta, and i have seen it used with my own eyes. this assertion of napoleon's seems the more remarkable because napoleon himself boasted of having used, at marengo, the very order of which he thus denies the existence. if we understand that the oblique order is to be applied in the rigid and precise manner inculcated by general ruchel at the berlin school. napoleon was certainly right in regarding it as an absurdity; but i repeat that a line of battle never was a regular geometrical figure, and when such figures are used in discussing the combinations of tactics it can only be for the purpose of giving definite expression to an idea by the use of a known symbol. it is nevertheless true that every line of battle which is neither parallel nor perpendicular to the enemy's must be oblique of necessity. if one army attacks the extremity of another army, the attacking wing being reinforced by massing troops upon it while the weakened wing is kept retired from attack, the direction of the line must of necessity be a little oblique, since one end of it will be nearer the enemy than the other. the oblique order is so far from being a mere fancy that we see it used when the order is that by echelons on one wing, (fig. .) as to the other orders of battle explained above, it cannot be denied that at essling and fleurus the general arrangement of the austrians was a concave line, and that of the french a convex. in these orders parallel lines may be used as in the case of straight lines, and they would be classified as belonging to the parallel system when no part of the line was more strongly occupied or drawn up nearer to the enemy than another. laying aside for the present further consideration of these geometrical figures, it is to be observed that, for the purpose of fighting battles in a truly scientific manner, the following points must be attended to:-- . an offensive order of battle should have for its object to force the enemy from his position by all reasonable means. . the maneuvers indicated by art are those intended to overwhelm one wing only, or the center and one wing at the same time. an enemy may also be dislodged by maneuvers for outflanking and turning his position. . these attempts have a much greater probability of success if concealed from the enemy until the very moment of the assault. . to attack the center and both wings at the same time, without having very superior forces, would be entirely in opposition to the rules of the art, unless one of these attacks can be made very strongly without weakening the line too much at the other points. . the oblique order has no other object than to unite at least half the force of the army in an overwhelming attack upon one wing, while the remainder is retired to the rear, out of danger of attack, being arranged either in echelon or in a single oblique line. the different formations, convex, concave, perpendicular, or otherwise, may all be varied by having the lines of uniform strength throughout, or by massing troops at one point. . the object of the defense being to defeat the plans of the attacking party, the arrangements of a defensive order should be such as to multiply the difficulties of approaching the position, and to keep in hand a strong reserve, well concealed, and ready to fall at the decisive moment upon a point where the enemy least expect to meet it. . it is difficult to state with precision what is the best method to use in forcing a hostile army to abandon its position. an order of battle would be perfect which united the double advantages of the fire of the arms and of the moral effect produced by an onset. a skillful mixture of deployed lines and columns, acting alternately as circumstances require, will always be a good combination. in the practical use of this system many variations must arise from differences in the _coup-d'oeil_ of commanders, the _morale_ of officers and soldiers, their familiarity with maneuvers and firings of all sorts, from varying localities, &c. . as it is essential in an offensive battle to drive the enemy from his position and to cut him up as much as possible, the best means of accomplishing this is to use as much material force as can be accumulated against him. it sometimes happens, however, that the direct application of main force is of doubtful utility, and better results may follow from maneuvers to outflank and turn that wing which is nearest the enemy's line of retreat. he may when thus threatened retire, when he would fight strongly and successfully if attacked by main force. history is full of examples of the success of such maneuvers, especially when used against generals of weak character; and, although victories thus obtained are generally less decisive and the hostile army is but little demoralized, such incomplete successes are of sufficient importance not to be neglected, and a skillful general should know how to employ the means to gain them when opportunity offers, and especially should he combine these turning movements with attacks by main force. . the combination of these two methods--that is to say, the attack in front by main force and the turning maneuver--will render the victory more certain than the use of either separately; but, in all cases, too extended movements must be avoided, even in presence of a contemptible enemy. . the manner of driving an enemy from his position by main force is the following:--throw his troops into confusion by a heavy and well-directed fire of artillery, increase this confusion by vigorous charges of cavalry, and follow up the advantages thus gained by pushing forward masses of infantry well covered in front by skirmishers and flanked by cavalry. but, while we may expect success to follow such an attack upon the first line, the second is still to be overcome, and, after that, the reserve; and at this period of the engagement the attacking party would usually be seriously embarrassed, did not the moral effect of the defeat of the first line often occasion the retreat of the second and cause the general in command to lose his presence of mind. in fact, the attacking troops will usually be somewhat disordered, even in victory, and it will often be very difficult to replace them by those of the second line, because they generally follow the first line at such a distance as not to come within musket-range of the enemy; and it is always embarrassing to substitute one division for another in the heat of battle, at the moment when the enemy is putting forth all his strength in repelling the attack. these considerations lead to the belief that if the general and the troops of the defensive army are equally active in the performance of their duty, and preserve their presence of mind, if their flanks and line of retreat are not threatened, the advantage will usually be on their side at the second collision of the battle; but to insure that result their second line and the cavalry must be launched against the victorious battalions of the adversary at the proper instant; for the loss of a few minutes may be irreparable, and the second line may be drawn into the confusion of the first. . from the preceding facts may be deduced the following truth: "that the most difficult as well as the most certain of all the means the assailant may use to gain the victory consists in strongly supporting the first line with the troops of the second line, and these with the reserve, and in a proper employment of masses of cavalry and of batteries, to assist in striking the decisive blow at the second line of the enemy; for here is presented the greatest of all the problems of the tactics of battles." in this important crisis of battles, theory becomes an uncertain guide; for it is then unequal to the emergency, and can never compare in value with a natural talent for war, nor be a sufficient substitute for that intuitive _coup-d'oeil_ imparted by experience in battles to a general of tried bravery and coolness. the simultaneous employment of the largest number of troops of all arms combined, except a small reserve of each which should be always held in hand,[ ] will, therefore, at the critical moment of the battle, be the problem which every skillful general will attempt to solve and to which he should give his whole attention. this critical moment is usually when the first line of the parties is broken, and all the efforts of both contestants are put forth,--on the one side to complete the victory, on the other to wrest it from the enemy. it is scarcely necessary to say that, to make this decisive blow more certain and effectual, a simultaneous attack upon the enemy's flank would be very advantageous. . in the defensive the fire of musketry can be much more effectively used than in the offensive, since when a position is to be carried it can be accomplished only by moving upon it, and marching and firing at the same time can be done only by troops as skirmishers, being an impossibility for the principal masses. the object of the defense being to break and throw into confusion the troops advancing to the attack, the fire of artillery and musketry will be the natural defensive means of the first line, and when the enemy presses too closely the columns of the second line and part of the cavalry must be launched against him. there will then be a strong probability of his repulse. footnotes: [footnote : in every battle one party must be the assailant and the other assailed. every battle is hence offensive for one party and defensive for the other.] [footnote : the letter a in this and other figures of the twelve orders indicates the defensive army, and b the offensive. the armies are represented each in a single line, in order not to complicate the figures too much; but it should be observed that every order of battle ought to be in two lines, whether the troops are deployed in columns of attack, in squares, or checkerwise.] [footnote : an attack upon the two extremities might succeed also in some cases, either when the force was strong enough to try it, or the enemy was unable to weaken his center to support the wings. as a rule, a false attack to engage the center, and a strong attack against one extremity, would be the best method to use against such a line.] [footnote : the great reserves must, of course, be also engaged when it is necessary; but it is always a good plan to keep back, as a final reserve, two or three battalions and five or six squadrons. moreau decided the battle of engen with four companies of infantry; and what kellermann's cavalry accomplished at marengo is known to every reader of history.] article xxxii. turning maneuvers, and too extended movement in battles. we have spoken in the preceding article of maneuvers undertaken to turn an enemy's line upon the battle-field, and of the advantages which may be expected from them. a few words remain to be said as to the wide détours which these maneuvers sometimes occasion, causing the failure of so many plans seemingly well arranged. it may be laid down as a principle that any movement is dangerous which is so extended as to give the enemy an opportunity, while it is taking place, of beating the remainder of the army in position. nevertheless, as the danger depends very much upon the rapid and certain _coup-d'oeil_ of the opposing general, as well as upon the style of warfare to which he is accustomed, it is not difficult to understand why so many maneuvers of this kind have failed against some commanders and succeeded against others, and why such a movement which would have been hazardous in presence of frederick, napoleon, or wellington might have entire success against a general of limited capacity, who had not the tact to take the offensive himself at the proper moment, or who might himself have been in the habit of moving in this manner. it seems, therefore, difficult to lay down a fixed rule on the subject. the following directions are all that can be given. keep the mass of the force well in hand and ready to act at the proper moment, being careful, however, to avoid the danger of accumulating troops in too large bodies. a commander observing these precautions will be always prepared for any thing that may happen. if the opposing general shows little skill and seems inclined to indulge in extended movements, his adversary may be more daring. a few examples drawn from history will serve to convince the reader of the truth of my statements, and to show him how the results of these extended movements depend upon the characters of the generals and the armies concerned in them. in the seven years' war, frederick gained the battle of prague because the austrians had left a feebly-defended interval of one thousand yards between their right and the remainder of their army,--the latter part remaining motionless while the right was overwhelmed. this inaction was the more extraordinary as the left of the austrians had a much shorter distance to pass over in order to support their right than frederick had to attack it; for the right was in the form of a crotchet, and frederick was obliged to move on the arc of a large semicircle to reach it. on the other hand, frederick came near losing the battle of torgau, because he made with his left a movement entirely too extended and disconnected (nearly six miles) with a view of turning the right of marshal daun.[ ] mollendorf brought up the right by a concentric movement to the heights of siptitz, where he rejoined the king, whose line was thus reformed. the battle of rivoli is a noted instance in point. all who are familiar with that battle know that alvinzi and his chief of staff weyrother wished to surround napoleon's little army, which was concentrated on the plateau of rivoli. their center was beaten,--while their left was piled up in the ravine of the adige, and lusignan with their right was making a wide _détour_ to get upon the rear of the french army, where he was speedily surrounded and captured. no one can forget the day of stockach, where jourdan conceived the unfortunate idea of causing an attack to be made upon a united army of sixty thousand men by three small divisions of seven thousand or eight thousand men, separated by distances of several leagues, whilst saint-cyr, with the third of the army, (thirteen thousand men,) was to pass twelve miles beyond the right flank and get in rear of this army of sixty thousand men, which could not help being victorious over these divided fractions, and should certainly have captured the part in their rear. saint-cyr's escape was indeed little less than a miracle. we may call to mind how this same general weyrother, who had desired to surround napoleon at rivoli, attempted the same maneuver at austerlitz, in spite of the severe lesson he had formerly received. the left wing of the allied army, wishing to outflank napoleon's right, to cut him off from vienna, (where he did not desire to return,) by a circular movement of nearly six miles, opened an interval of a mile and a half in their line. napoleon took advantage of this mistake, fell upon the center, and surrounded their left, which was completely shut up between lakes tellnitz and melnitz. wellington gained the battle of salamanca by a maneuver very similar to napoleon's, because marmont, who wished to cut off his retreat to portugal, left an opening of a mile and a half in his line,--seeing which, the english general entirely defeated his left wing, that had no support. if weyrother had been opposed to jourdan at rivoli or at austerlitz, he might have destroyed the french army, instead of suffering in each case a total defeat; for the general who at stockach attacked a mass of sixty thousand men with four small bodies of troops so much separated as to be unable to give mutual aid would not have known how to take proper advantage of a wide detour effected in his presence. in the same way, marmont was unfortunate in having at salamanca an adversary whose chief merit was a rapid and practiced tactical _coup-d'oeil_. with the duke of york or moore for an antagonist, marmont would probably have been successful. among the turning maneuvers which have succeeded in our day, waterloo and hohenlinden had the most brilliant results. of these the first was almost altogether a strategic operation, and was attended with a rare concurrence of fortunate circumstances. as to hohenlinden, we will search in vain in military history for another example of a single brigade venturing into a forest in the midst of fifty thousand enemies, and there performing such astonishing feats as richepanse effected in the defile of matenpoet, where he might have expected, in all probability, to lay down his arms. at wagram the turning wing under davoust contributed greatly to the successful issue of the day; but, if the vigorous attack upon the center under macdonald, oudinot, and bernadotte had not rendered opportune assistance, it is by no means certain that a like success would have been the result. so many examples of conflicting results might induce the conclusion that no rule on this subject can be given; but this would be erroneous; for it seems, on the contrary, quite evident that, by adopting as a rule an order of battle well closed and well connected, a general will find himself prepared for any emergency, and little will be left to chance; but it is specially important for him to have a correct estimate of his enemy's character and his usual style of warfare, to enable him to regulate his own actions accordingly. in case of superiority in numbers or discipline, maneuvers may be attempted which would be imprudent were the forces equal or the commanders of the same capacity. a maneuver to outflank and turn a wing should be connected with other attacks, and opportunely supported by an attempt of the remainder of the army on the enemy's front, either against the wing turned or against the center. finally, strategic operations to cut an enemy's line of communications before giving battle, and attack him in rear, the assailing army preserving its own line of retreat, are much more likely to be successful and effectual, and, moreover, they require no disconnected maneuver during the battle. footnotes: [footnote : for an account of these two battles, see chapters ii. and xxv. of the treatise on grand military operations.] article xxxiii. unexpected meeting of two armies on the march. the accidental and unexpected meeting of two armies on the march gives rise to one of the most imposing scenes in war. in the greater number of battles, one party awaits his enemy in a position chosen in advance, which is attacked after a reconnoissance as close and accurate as possible. it often happens, however,--especially as war is now carried on,--that two armies approach each other, each intending to make an unexpected attack upon the other. a collision ensues unexpected by both armies, since each finds the other where it does not anticipate a meeting. one army may also be attacked by another which has prepared a surprise for it,--as happened to the french at rossbach. a great occasion of this kind calls into play all the genius of a skillful general and of the warrior able to control events. it is always possible to gain a battle with brave troops, even where the commander may not have great capacity; but victories like those of lutzen, luzzara, eylau, abensberg, can only be gained by a brilliant genius endowed with great coolness and using the wisest combinations. there is so much chance in these accidental battles that it is by no means easy to lay down precise rules concerning them; but these are the very cases in which it is necessary to keep clearly before the mind the fundamental principles of the art and the different methods of applying them, in order to a proper arrangement of maneuvers that must be decided upon at the instant and in the midst of the crash of resounding arms. two armies marching, as they formerly did, with all their camp-equipage, and meeting unexpectedly, could do nothing better at first than cause their advanced guard to deploy to the right or left of the roads they are traversing. in each army the forces should at the same time be concentrated so that they may be thrown in a proper direction considering the object of the march. a grave error would be committed in deploying the whole army behind the advanced guard; because, even if the deployment were accomplished, the result would be nothing more than a badly-arranged parallel order, and if the enemy pressed the advanced guard with considerable vigor the consequence might be the rout of the troops which were forming. (see the account of the battle of rossbach, treatise on grand operations.) in the modern system, when armies are more easily moved, marching upon several roads, and divided into masses which may act independently, these routs are not so much to be feared; but the principles are unchanged. the advanced guard must always be halted and formed, and then the mass of the troops concentrated in that direction which is best suited for carrying out the object of the march. whatever maneuvers the enemy may then attempt, every thing will be in readiness to meet him. article xxxiv. of surprises of armies. i shall not speak here of surprises of small detachments,--the chief features in the wars of partisan or light troops, for which the light russian and turkish cavalry are so well adapted. i shall confine myself to an examination of the surprise of whole armies. before the invention of fire-arms, surprises were more easily effected than at present; for the reports of artillery and musketry firing are heard to so great a distance that the surprise of an army is now next to an impossibility, unless the first duties of field-service are forgotten and the enemy is in the midst of the army before his presence is known because there are no outposts to give the alarm. the seven years' war presents a memorable example in the surprise of hochkirch. it shows that a surprise does not consist simply in falling upon troops that are sleeping or keeping a poor look-out, but that it may result from the combination of a sudden attack upon, and a surrounding of, one extremity of the army. in fact, to surprise an army it is not necessary to take it so entirely unawares that the troops will not even have emerged from their tents, but it is sufficient to attack it in force at the point intended, before preparations can be made to meet the attack. as armies at the present day seldom camp in tents when on a march, prearranged surprises are rare and difficult, because in order to plan one it becomes necessary to have an accurate knowledge of the enemy's camp. at marengo, at lutzen, and at eylau there was something like a surprise; but this term should only be applied to an entirely unexpected attack. the only great surprise to be cited is the case of taroutin, in , where murat was attacked and beaten by benningsen. to excuse his imprudence, murat pretended that a secret armistice was in force; but there was really nothing of the kind, and he was surprised through his own negligence. it is evident that the most favorable manner of attacking an army is to fall upon its camp just before daybreak, at the moment when nothing of the sort is expected. confusion in the camp will certainly take place; and, if the assailant has an accurate knowledge of the locality and can give a suitable tactical and strategic direction to the mass of his forces, he may expect a complete success, unless unforeseen events occur. this is an operation by no means to be despised in war, although it is rare, and less brilliant than a great strategic combination which renders the victory certain even before the battle is fought. for the same reason that advantage should be taken of all opportunities for surprising an adversary, the necessary precautions should be used to prevent such attacks. the regulations for the government of any well-organized army should point out the means for doing the last. article xxxv. of the attack by main force of fortified places, intrenched camps or lines.--of coups de main in general. there are many fortified places which, although not regular fortresses, are regarded as secure against _coups de main_, but may nevertheless be carried by escalade or assault, or through breaches not altogether practicable, but so steep as to require the use of ladders or some other means of getting to the parapet. the attack of a place of this kind presents nearly the same combinations as that of an intrenched camp; for both belong to the class of _coups de main_. this kind of attack will vary with circumstances: st, with the strength of the works; d, with the character of the ground on which they are built; d, with the fact of their being isolated or connected; th, with the morale of the respective parties. history gives us examples of all of these varieties. for examples, take the intrenched camps of kehl, dresden, and warsaw, the lines of turin and mayence, the intrenchments of feldkirch, scharnitz, and assiette. here i have mentioned several cases, each with varying circumstances and results. at kehl ( ) the intrenchments were better connected and better constructed than at warsaw. there was, in fact, a _tête de pont_ nearly equal to a permanent fortification; for the archduke thought himself obliged to besiege it in form, and it would have been extremely hazardous for him to make an open attack upon it. at warsaw the works were isolated, but of considerable relief, and they had as a keep a large city surrounded by loopholed walls, armed and defended by a number of desperate men. dresden, in , had for a keep a bastioned enceinte, one front of which, however, was dismantled and had no other parapet than such as was suited to a field-work. the camp proper was protected by simple redoubts, at considerable distances apart, very poorly built, the keep giving it its sole strength.[ ] at mayence and at turin there were continuous lines of circumvallation; but if in the first case they were strong, they were certainly not so at turin, where upon one of the important points there was an insignificant parapet with a command of three feet, and a ditch proportionally deep. in the latter case, also, the lines were between two fires, as they were attacked in rear by a strong garrison at the moment when prince eugene assailed them from without. at mayence the lines were attacked in front, only a small detachment having succeeded in passing around the right flank. the tactical measures to be taken in the attack of field-works are few in number. if it seems probable that a work may be surprised if attacked a little before day, it is altogether proper to make the attempt; but if this operation may be recommended in case of an isolated work, it is by no means to be expected that a large army occupying an intrenched camp will permit itself to be surprised,--especially as the regulations of all services require armies to stand to their arms at dawn. as an attack by main force seems likely to be the method followed in this case, the following simple and reasonable directions are laid down:-- . silence the guns of the work by a powerful artillery-fire, which at the same time has the effect of discouraging the defenders. . provide for the troops all the materials necessary (such as fascines and short ladders) to enable them to pass the ditch and mount the parapet. . direct three small columns upon the work to be taken, skirmishers preceding them, and reserves being at hand for their support. . take advantage of every irregularity of the ground to get cover for the troops, and keep them sheltered as long as possible. . give detailed instructions to the principal columns as to their duties when a work shall have been carried, and as to the manner of attacking the troops occupying the camp. designate the bodies of cavalry which are to assist in attacking those troops if the ground permits. when all these arrangements are made, there is nothing more to be done but to bring up the troops to the attack as actively as possible, while a detachment makes an attempt at the gorge. hesitancy and delay in such a case are worse than the most daring rashness. those gymnastic exercises are very useful which prepare soldiers for escalades and passing obstacles; and the engineers may with great advantage give their attention to providing means for facilitating the passage of the ditches of field-works and climbing their parapets. among all the arrangements in cases of this kind of which i have read, none are better than those for the assault of warsaw and the intrenched camp of mayence. thielke gives a description of laudon's dispositions for attacking the camp of buntzelwitz, which, although not executed, is an excellent example for instruction. the attack of warsaw may be cited as one of the finest operations of this sort, and does honor to marshal paskevitch and the troops who executed it. as an example not to be followed, no better can be given than the arrangements made for attacking dresden in . among attacks of this class may be mentioned the memorable assaults or escalades of port mahon in , and of berg-op-zoom in ,--both preceded by sieges, but still brilliant _coups de main_, since in neither case was the breach sufficiently large for a regular assault. continuous intrenched lines, although seeming to have a better interconnection than lines of detached works, are more easily carried, because they may be several leagues in extent, and it is almost impossible to prevent an enemy from breaking through them at some point. the capture of the lines of mayence and wissembourg, which are described in the history of the wars of the revolution, (chapters xxi. and xxii.,) and that of the lines of turin by eugene of savoy in , are excellent lessons for study. this famous event at turin, which has been so often referred to, is so familiar to all readers that it is unnecessary to recall the details of it; but i cannot pass it by without remarking how easily the victory was bought and how little it should have been expected. the strategic plan was certainly admirable; and the march from the adige through piacenza to asti by the right bank of the po, leaving the french on the mincio, was beautifully arranged, but its execution was exceedingly slow. when we examine the operations near turin, we must confess that the victors owed more to their good fortune than to their wisdom. it required no great effort of genius upon the part of prince eugene to prepare the order he issued to his army; and he must have felt a profound contempt for his opponents to execute a march with thirty-five thousand allied troops of ten different nations between eighty thousand frenchmen on the one side and the alps on the other, and to pass around their camp for forty-eight hours by the most remarkable flank march that was ever attempted. the order for the attack was so brief and so devoid of instruction that any staff officer of the present day ought to write a better. directing the formation of eight columns of infantry by brigade in two lines, giving them orders to carry the intrenchments and to make openings through them for the passage of the cavalry into the camp, make up the sum total of all the science exhibited by eugene in order to carry out his rash undertaking it is true he selected the weak point of the intrenchment; for it was there so low that it covered only half the bodies of its defenders. but i am wandering from my subject, and must return to the explanation of the measures most suitable for adoption in an attack on lines. if they have a sufficient relief to make it difficult to carry them by assault, and if on the other hand they may be outflanked or turned by strategic maneuvers, it is far better to pursue the course last indicated than to attempt a hazardous assault. if, however, there is any reason for preferring the attack by assault, it should be made upon one of the wings, because the center is the point most easily succored. there have been cases where an attack on the wing was expected by the defenders, and they have been deceived by a false attack made at that point, while the real attack took place at the center, and succeeded simply because unexpected. in these operations the locality and the character of the generals engaged must decide as to the proper course to be pursued. the attack may be executed in the manner described for intrenched camps. it has sometimes happened, however, that these lines have had the relief and proportions of permanent works; and in this case escalade would be quite difficult, except of old earthen works whose slopes were worn away from the lapse of time and had become accessible for infantry of moderate activity. the ramparts of ismail and praga were of this character; so also was the citadel of smolensk, which paskevitch so gloriously defended against ney, because he preferred making his stand at the ravines in front, rather than take shelter behind a parapet with an inclination of scarcely thirty degrees. if one extremity of a line rests upon a river, it seems absurd to think of penetrating upon that wing, because the enemy collecting his forces, the mass of which would be near the center, might defeat the columns advancing between the center and the river and completely destroy them. this absurdity, however, has sometimes been successful; because the enemy driven behind his lines rarely thinks of making an offensive return upon the assailant, no matter how advantageous it might seem. a general and soldiers who seek refuge behind lines are already half conquered, and the idea of taking the offensive does not occur to them when their intrenchments are attacked. notwithstanding these facts, i cannot advise such a course; and the general who would run such a risk and meet the fate of tallard at blenheim could have no just cause of complaint. very few directions can be given for the defense of intrenched camps and lines. the first is to be sure of having strong reserves placed between the center and each wing, or, to speak more accurately, on the right of the left wing and on the left of the right wing. with this arrangement succor can be easily and rapidly carried to a threatened point, which could not be done were there but one central reserve. it has been suggested that three reserves would not be too many if the intrenchment is very extensive; but i decidedly incline to the opinion that two are quite enough. another recommendation may be given, and it is of great importance,--that the troops be made to understand they must by no means despair of finally defending a line which may be forced at one point; because, if a good reserve is at hand, it may take the offensive, attack the assailant, and succeed in driving him out of the work he may have supposed in his power. coups de main. these are bold enterprises undertaken by a detachment of an army for the capture of posts of different strength or importance.[ ] they partake of the nature both of surprises and attacks by main force, for both these methods may be employed in carrying an attempt of this sort to a successful issue. although _coups de main_ seem to be entirely tactical operations, their importance certainly depends on the relations of the captured posts to the strategic combinations in hand. it will become necessary, therefore, to say a few words with reference to coups de main in article xxxvi., when speaking of detachments. however tiresome these repetitions may seem, i am obliged to state here the manner of executing such operations, as it is evidently a part of the subject of the attack of intrenchments. i do not pretend to say that the rules of tactics apply to these operations; for their name, _coups de main_, implies that ordinary rules are not applicable to them. i desire only to call attention to them, and refer my readers to the different works, either historical or didactic, where they are mentioned. i have previously stated that important results may often follow from these enterprises. the capture of sizeboli in , the unsuccessful attack of general petrasch upon kehl in , the remarkable surprises of cremona in , of gibraltar in , and of berg-op-zoom in , as well as the escalades of port mahon and badajos, give an idea of the different kinds of _coup de main_. some are effected by surprise, others by open force. skill, stratagems, boldness, on the part of the assailant, and fear excited among the assailed, are some of the things which have an influence upon the successful issue of _coups de main_. as war is now waged, the capture of a post, however strong, is no longer of the same importance as formerly unless it has a direct influence upon the results of a great strategic operation. the capture or destruction of a bridge defended by intrenchments, that of a large convoy, of a small fort closing important passes, like the two attacks which were made in upon the fort of lucisteig in the grisons; the capture of leutasch and scharnitz by ney in ; finally, the capture of a post not even fortified, but used as a great depot of provisions and munitions much needed by the enemy;--such are the enterprises which will justify the risks to which a detachment engaging in them may be exposed. posts have been captured by filling up the ditches sometimes with fascines, sometimes with bags of wool; and manure has been used for the same purpose. ladders are generally necessary, and should always be prepared. hooks have been used in the hands and attached to the shoes of soldiers, to help them in climbing rocky heights which commanded the intrenchment. an entrance was effected through the sewers at cremona by prince eugene. in reading such facts, we must draw from them not rules, but hints; for what has been done once may be done again. footnotes: [footnote : the number of defenders at dresden the first day (august ) was twenty-four thousand, the next day, sixty-five thousand, and the third day, more than one hundred thousand.] [footnote : the distinction between the importance and the strength of a post must be observed; for it may be very strong and of very little importance, and vice aversá.] chapter v. of several mixed operations, which are in character partly strategical and partly tactical. article xxxvi. of diversions and great detachments. the operations of the detachments an army may send out have so important a bearing on the success of a campaign, that the duty of determining their strength and the proper occasions for them is one of the greatest and most delicate responsibilities imposed upon a commander. if nothing is more useful in war than a strong detachment opportunely sent out and having a good _ensemble_ of operations with the main body, it is equally certain that no expedient is more dangerous when inconsiderately adopted. frederick the great regarded it as one of the essential qualities of a general to know how to make his adversary send out many detachments, either with the view of destroying them in detail or of attacking the main body during their absence. the division of armies into numerous detachments has sometimes been carried to so great an extent, and with such poor results, that many persons now believe it better to have none of them. it is undoubtedly much safer and more agreeable for an army to be kept in a single mass; but it is a thing at times impossible or incompatible with gaining a complete or even considerable success. the essential point in this matter is to send out as few detachments as possible. there are several kinds of detachments. . there are large corps dispatched to a distance from the zone of operations of the main army, in order to make diversions of greater or less importance. . there are large detachments made in the zone of operations to cover important points of this zone, to carry on a siege, to guard a secondary base, or to protect the line of operations if threatened. . there are large detachments made upon the front of operations, in face of the enemy, to act in concert with the main body in some combined operation. . there are small detachments sent to a distance to try the effect of surprise upon isolated points, whose capture may have an important bearing upon the general operations of the campaign. i understand by diversions those secondary operations carried out at a distance from the principal zone of operations, at the extremities of a theater of war, upon the success of which it is sometimes foolishly supposed the whole campaign depends. such diversions are useful in but two cases, the first of which arises when the troops thus employed cannot conveniently act elsewhere on account of their distance from the real theater of operations, and the second is that where such a detachment would receive strong support from the population among which it was sent,--the latter case belonging rather to political than military combinations. a few illustrative examples may not be out of place here. the unfortunate results for the allied powers of the anglo-russian expedition to holland, and of that of the archduke charles toward the end of the last century, (which have been referred to in article xix.,) are well known. in , napoleon was occupying naples and hanover. the allies intended an anglo-russian army to drive him out of italy, while the combined forces of england, russia, and sweden should drive him from hanover, nearly sixty thousand men being designed for these two widely-separated points. but, while their troops were collecting at the two extremities of europe, napoleon ordered the evacuation of naples and hanover, saint-cyr hastened to effect a junction with massena in the frioul, and bernadotte, leaving hanover, moved up to take part in the operations of ulm and austerlitz. after these astonishing successes, napoleon had no difficulty in retaking naples and hanover. this is an example of the failure of diversions. i will give an instance where such an operation would have been proper. in the civil wars of , if the allies had sent twenty thousand men to la vendée, they would have accomplished much more than by increasing the numbers of those who were fighting fruitlessly at toulon, upon the rhine, and in belgium. here is a case where a diversion would have been not only very useful, but decisive. it has already been stated that, besides diversions to a distance and of small bodies, large corps are often detached in the zone of operations of the main army. if the employment of these large corps thus detached for secondary objects is more dangerous than the diversions above referred to, it is no less true that they are often highly proper and, it may be, indispensable. these great detachments are chiefly of two kinds. the first are permanent corps which must be sometimes thrown out in a direction opposite to the main line of operations, and are to remain throughout a campaign. the second are corps temporarily detached for the purpose of assisting in carrying out some special enterprise. among the first should be especially enumerated those fractions of an army that are detached either to form the strategic reserve, of which mention has been made, or to cover lines of operation and retreat when the configuration of the theater of the war exposes them to attack. for example, a russian army that wishes to cross the balkan is obliged to leave a portion of its forces to observe shumla, routchouk, and the valley of the danube, whose direction is perpendicular to its line of operations. however successful it may be, a respectable force must always be left toward giurgevo or krajova, and even on the right bank of the river toward routchouk. this single example shows that it is sometimes necessary to have a double strategic front, and then the detachment of a considerable corps must be made to offer front to a part of the enemy's army in rear of the main army. other localities and other circumstances might be mentioned where this measure would be equally essential to safety. one case is the double strategic front of the tyrol and the frioul for a french army passing the adige. on whichever side it may wish to direct its main column, a detachment must be left on the other front sufficiently strong to hold in check the enemy threatening to cut the line of communications. the third example is the frontier of spain, which enables the spaniards to establish a double front,--one covering the road to madrid, the other having saragossa or galicia as a base. to whichever side the invading army turns, a detachment must be left on the other proportioned in magnitude to the enemy's force in that direction. all that can be said on this point is that it is advantageous to enlarge as much as possible the field of operations of such detachments, and to give them as much power of mobility as possible, in order to enable them by opportune movements to strike important blows. a most remarkable illustration of this truth was given by napoleon in the campaign of . obliged as he was to leave a corps of fifteen thousand men in the valley of the adige to observe the tyrol while he was operating toward the noric alps, he preferred to draw this corps to his aid, at the risk of losing temporarily his line of retreat, rather than leave the parts of his army disconnected and exposed to defeat in detail. persuaded that he could be victorious with his army united, he apprehended no particular danger from the presence of a few hostile detachments upon his communications. great movable and temporary detachments are made for the following reasons:-- . to compel your enemy to retreat to cover his line of operations, or else to cover your own. . to intercept a corps and prevent its junction with the main body of the enemy, or to facilitate the approach of your own reinforcements. . to observe and hold in position a large portion of the opposing army, while a blow is struck at the remainder. . to carry off a considerable convoy of provisions or munitions, on receiving which depended the continuance of a siege or the success of any strategic enterprise, or to protect the march of a convoy of your own. . to make a demonstration to draw the enemy in a direction where you wish him to go, in order to facilitate the execution of an enterprise in another direction. . to mask, or even to invest, one or more fortified places for a certain time, with a view either to attack or to keep the garrison shut up within the ramparts. . to take possession of an important point upon the communications of an enemy already retreating. however great may be the temptation to undertake such operations as those enumerated, it must be constantly borne in mind that they are always secondary in importance, and that the essential thing is to be successful at the decisive points. a multiplication of detachments must, therefore, be avoided. armies have been destroyed for no other reason than that they were not kept together. we will here refer to several of these enterprises, to show that their success depends sometimes upon good fortune and sometimes upon the skill of their designer, and that they often fail from faulty execution. peter the great took the first step toward the destruction of charles xii. by causing the seizure, by a strong detachment, of the famous convoy lowenhaupt was bringing up. villars entirely defeated at denain the large detachment prince eugene sent out in under d'albermale. the destruction of the great convoy laudon took from frederick during the siege of olmutz compelled the king to evacuate moravia. the fate of the two detachments of fouquet at landshut in , and of fink at maxen in , demonstrates how difficult it is at times to avoid making detachments, and how dangerous they may be. to come nearer our own times, the disaster of vandamme at culm was a bloody lesson, teaching that a corps must not be thrust forward too boldly: however, we must admit that in this case the operation was well planned, and the fault was not so much in sending out the detachment as in not supporting it properly, as might easily have been done. that of fink was destroyed at maxen nearly on the same spot and for the same reason. diversions or demonstrations in the zone of operations of the army are decidedly advantageous when arranged for the purpose of engaging the enemy's attention in one direction, while the mass of the forces is collected upon another point where the important blow is to be struck. in such a case, care must be taken not only to avoid engaging the corps making the demonstration, but to recall it promptly toward the main body. we will mention two examples as illustrations of these facts. in , moreau, wishing to deceive kray as to the true direction of his march, carried his left wing toward rastadt from kehl, whilst he was really filing off his army toward stockach; his left, having simply shown itself, returned toward the center by fribourg in brisgau. in , napoleon, while master of vienna, detached the corps of bernadotte to iglau to overawe bohemia and paralyze the archduke ferdinand, who was assembling an army in that territory; in another direction he sent davoust to presburg to show himself in hungary; but he withdrew them to brunn, to take part in the event which was to decide the issue of the campaign, and a great and decisive victory was the result of his wise maneuvers. operations of this kind, so far from being in opposition to the principles of the art of war, are necessary to facilitate their application. it readily appears from what goes before that precise rules cannot be laid down for these operations, so varied in character, the success of which depends on so many minute details. generals should run the risk of making detachments only after careful consideration and observation of all the surrounding circumstances. the only reasonable rules on the subject are these: send out as few detachments as possible, and recall thorn immediately when their duty is performed. the inconveniences necessarily attending them may be made as few as practicable, by giving judicious and carefully-prepared instructions to their commanders: herein lies the great talent of a good chief of staff. one of the means of avoiding the disastrous results to which detachments sometimes lead is to neglect none of the precautions prescribed by tactics for increasing the strength of any force by posting it in good positions; but it is generally imprudent to engage in a serious conflict with too large a body of troops. in such cases ease and rapidity of motion will be most likely to insure safety. it seldom happens that it is right for a detachment to resolve to conquer or die in the position it has taken, whether voluntarily or by order. it is certain that in all possible cases the rules of tactics and of field-fortification must be applied by detachments as well as by the army itself. since we have included in the number of useful cases of detachments those intended for _coups de main_, it is proper to mention a few examples of this kind to enable the reader to judge for himself. we may call to mind that one which was executed by the russians toward the end of with the view of taking possession of sizeboli in the gulf of bourghas. the capture of this feebly-fortified gulf, which the russians rapidly strengthened, procured for them in case of success an essential _point d'appui_ beyond the balkan, where depots could be established in advance for the army intending to cross those mountains: in case of failure, no one was compromised,--not even the small corps which had been debarked, since it had a safe and certain retreat to the shipping. in like manner, in the campaign of , the _coup de main_ attempted by the austrians for the purpose of taking possession of kehl and destroying the bridge whilst moreau was returning from bavaria, would have had very important consequences if it had not failed. in attempts of this kind a little is risked to gain a great deal; and, as they can in no wise compromise the safety of the main army, they may be freely recommended. small bodies of troops thrown forward into the zone of the enemy's operations belong to the class of detachments that are judicious. a few hundred horsemen thus risked will be no great loss if captured; and they may be the means of causing the enemy great injury. the small detachments sent out by the russians in , , and were a great hinderance to napoleon's operations, and several times caused his plans to fail by intercepting his couriers. for such expeditions officers should be selected who are bold and full of stratagems. they ought to inflict upon the enemy all the injury they can without compromising themselves. when an opportunity of striking a telling blow presents itself, they should not think for a moment of any dangers or difficulties in their path. generally, however, address and presence of mind, which will lead them to avoid useless danger, are qualities more necessary for a partisan than cool, calculating boldness. for further information on this subject i refer my readers to chapter xxxv. of the treatise on grand operations, and to article xlv. of this work, on light cavalry. article xxxvii. passage of rivers and other streams. the passage of a small stream, over which a bridge is already in place or might be easily constructed, presents none of the combinations belonging to grand tactics or strategy; but the passage of a large river, such as the danube, the rhine, the po, the elbe, the oder, the vistula, the inn, the ticino, &c, is an operation worthy the closest study. the art of building military bridges is a special branch of military science, which is committed to pontoniers or sappers. it is not from this point of view that i propose to consider the passage of a stream, but as the attack of a military position and as a maneuver. the passage itself is a tactical operation; but the determination of the point of passage may have an important connection with all the operations taking place within the entire theater of the war. the passage of the rhine by general moreau in is an excellent illustration of the truth of this remark. napoleon, a more skillful strategist than moreau, desired him to cross at schaffhausen in order to take kray's whole army in reverse, to reach ulm before him, to cut him off from austria and hurl him back upon the main. moreau, who had already a bridge at basel, preferred passing, with greater convenience to his army, in front of the enemy, to turning his extreme left. the tactical advantages seemed to his mind much more sure than the strategical: he preferred the certainty of a partial success to the risk attending a victory which would have been a decisive one. in the same campaign napoleon's passage of the po is another example of the high strategic importance of the choice of the point of crossing. the army of the reserve, after the engagement of the chiusella, could either march by the left bank of the po to turin, or cross the river at crescentino and march directly to genoa. napoleon preferred to cross the ticino, enter milan, effect a junction with moncey who was approaching with twenty thousand men by the saint-gothard pass, then to cross the po at piacenza, expecting to get before mélas more certainly in that direction than if he came down too soon upon his line of retreat. the passage of the danube at donauwerth and ingolstadt in was a very similar operation. the direction chosen for the passage was the prime cause of the destruction of mack's army. the proper strategic point of passage is easily determined by recollecting the principles laid down in article xix.; and it is here only necessary to remind the reader that in crossing a river, as in every other operation, there are permanent or geographical decisive points, and others which are relative or eventual, depending on the distribution of the hostile forces. if the point selected combines strategic advantages with the tactical, no other point can be better; but if the locality presents obstacles exceedingly difficult to pass, another must be chosen, and in making the new selection care should be taken to have the direction of the movement as nearly as possible coincident with the true strategic direction. independently of the general combinations, which exercise a great influence in fixing the point of passage, there is still another consideration, connected with the locality itself. the best position is that where the army after crossing can take its front of operations and line of battle perpendicular to the river, at least for the first marches, without being forced to separate into several corps moving upon different lines. this advantage will also save it the danger of fighting a battle with a river in rear, as happened to napoleon at essling. enough has been said with reference to the strategical considerations influencing the selection of the point of crossing a river. we will now proceed to speak of the passage itself. history is the best school in which to study the measures likely to insure the success of such operations. the ancients deemed the passage of the granicus--which is a small stream--a wonderful exploit. so far as this point is concerned, the people of modern days can cite much greater. the passage of the rhine at tholhuys by louis xiv. has been greatly lauded; and it was really remarkable. in our own time, general dedon has made famous the two passages of the rhine at kehl and of the danube at hochstadt in . his work is a model as far as concerns the details; and in these operations minute attention to details is every thing. more recently, three other passages of the danube, and the ever-famous passage of the beresina, have exceeded every thing of the kind previously seen. the two first were executed by napoleon at essling and at wagram, in presence of an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men provided with four hundred pieces of cannon, and at a point where the bed of the stream is broadest. general pelet's interesting account of them should be carefully read. the third was executed by the russian army at satounovo in , which, although not to be compared with the two just mentioned, was very remarkable on account of the great local difficulties and the vigorous exertions made to surmount them. the passage of the beresina was truly wonderful. my object not being to give historical details on this subject, i direct my readers to the special narratives of these events. i will give several general rules to be observed. . it is essential to deceive the enemy as to the point of passage, that he may not accumulate an opposing force there. in addition to the strategic demonstrations, false attacks must be made near the real one, to divide the attention and means of the enemy. for this purpose half of the artillery should be employed to make a great deal of noise at the points where the passage is not to be made, whilst perfect silence should be preserved where the real attempt is to be made. . the construction of the bridge should be covered as much as possible by troops sent over in boats for the purpose of dislodging the enemy who might interfere with the progress of the work; and these troops should take possession at once of any villages, woods, or other obstacles in the vicinity. . it is of importance also to arrange large batteries of heavy caliber, not only to sweep the opposite bank, but to silence any artillery the enemy might bring up to batter the bridge while building. for this purpose it is convenient to have the bank from which the passage is made somewhat higher than the other. . the proximity of a large island near the enemy's bank gives great facilities for passing over troops in boats and for constructing the bridge. in like manner, a smaller stream emptying into the larger near the point of passage is a favorable place for collecting and concealing boats and materials for the bridge. . it is well to choose a position where the river makes a re-entering bend, as the batteries on the assailant's side can cross their fire in front of the point where the troops are to land from the boats and where the end of the bridge is to rest, thus taking the enemy in front and flank when he attempts to oppose the passage. . the locality selected should be near good roads on both banks, that the army may have good communications to the front and rear on both banks of the river. for this reason, those points where the banks are high and steep should be usually avoided. the rules for preventing a passage follow as a matter of course from those for effecting it, as the duty of the defenders is to counteract the efforts of the assailants. the important thing is to have the course of the river watched by bodies of light troops, without attempting to make a defense at every point. concentrate rapidly at the threatened point, in order to overwhelm the enemy while a part only of his army shall have passed. imitate the duke of vendôme at cassano, and the archduke charles at essling in ,--the last example being particularly worthy of praise, although the operation was not so decidedly successful as might have been expected. in article xxi. attention was called to the influence that the passage of a river, in the opening of a campaign, may have in giving direction to the lines of operations. we will now see what connection it may have with subsequent strategic movements. one of the greatest difficulties to be encountered after a passage is to cover the bridge against the enemy's efforts to destroy it, without interfering too much with the free movement of the army. when the army is numerically very superior to the enemy, or when the river is passed just after a great victory gained, the difficulty mentioned is trifling; but when the campaign is just opening, and the two opposing armies are about equal, the case is very different. if one hundred thousand frenchmen pass the rhine at strasbourg or at manheim in presence of one hundred thousand austrians, the first thing to be done will be to drive the enemy in three directions,--first, before them as far as the black forest, secondly, by the right in order to cover the bridges on the upper rhine, and thirdly, by the left to cover the bridges of mayence and the lower rhine. this necessity is the cause of an unfortunate division of the forces; but, to make the inconveniences of this subdivision as few as possible, the idea must be insisted on that it is by no means essential for the army to be separated into three equal parts, nor need these detachments remain absent longer than the few days required for taking possession of the natural point of concentration of the enemy's forces. the fact cannot be concealed, however, that the case supposed is one in which the general finds his position a most trying one; for if he divides his army to protect his bridges he may be obliged to contend with one of his subdivisions against the whole of the enemy's force, and have it overwhelmed; and if he moves his army upon a single line, the enemy may divide his army and reassemble it at some unexpected point, the bridges may be captured or destroyed, and the general may find himself compromised before he has had time or opportunity to gain a victory. the best course to be pursued is to place the bridges near a city which will afford a strong defensive point for their protection, to infuse all possible vigor and activity into the first operations after the passage, to fall upon the subdivisions of the enemy's army in succession, and to beat them in such a way that they will have no further desire of touching the bridges. in some cases eccentric lines of operations may be used. if the enemy has divided his one hundred thousand men into several corps, occupying posts of observation, a passage may be effected with one hundred thousand men at a single point near the center of the line of posts, the isolated defensive corps at this position may be overwhelmed, and two masses of fifty thousand men each may then be formed, which, by taking diverging lines of operations, can certainly drive off the successive portions of the opposing army, prevent them from reuniting, and remove them farther and farther from the bridges. but if, on the contrary, the passage be effected at one extremity of the enemy's strategic front, by moving rapidly along this front the enemy may be beaten throughout its whole extent,--in the same manner that frederick tactically beat the austrian line at leuthen throughout its length,--the bridges will be secure in rear of the army, and remain protected during all the forward movements. it was in this manner that jourdan, having passed the rhine at dusseldorf in , on the extreme right of the austrians, could have advanced in perfect safety toward the main. he was driven away because the french, having a double and exterior line of operations, left one hundred and twenty thousand men inactive between mayence and basel, while clairfayt repulsed jourdan upon the lahn. but this cannot diminish the importance of the advantages gained by passing a river upon one extremity of the enemy's strategic front. a commander-in-chief should either adopt this method, or that previously explained, of a central mass at the moment of passage, and the use of eccentric lines afterward, according to the circumstances of the case, the situation of the frontiers and bases of operations, as well as the positions of the enemy. the mention of these combinations, of which something has already been said in the article on lines of operations, does not appear out of place here, since their connection with the location of bridges has been the chief point under discussion. it sometimes happens that, for cogent reasons, a double passage is attempted upon a single front of operations, as was the case with jourdan and moreau in . if the advantage is gained of having in case of need a double line of retreat, there is the inconvenience, in thus operating on the two extremities of the enemy's front, of forcing him, in a measure, to concentrate on his center, and he may be placed in a condition to overwhelm separately the two armies which have crossed at different points. such an operation will always lead to disastrous results when the opposing general has sufficient ability to know how to take advantage of this violation of principles. in such a case, the inconveniences of the double passage may be diminished by passing over the mass of the forces at one of the points, which then becomes the decisive one, and by concentrating the two portions by interior lines as rapidly as possible, to prevent the enemy from destroying them separately. if jourdan and moreau had observed this rule, and made a junction of their forces in the direction of donauwerth, instead of moving eccentrically, they would probably have achieved great successes in bavaria, instead of being driven back upon the rhine. article xxxviii. retreats and pursuits. retreats are certainly the most difficult operations in war. this remark is so true that the celebrated prince de ligne said, in his usual piquant style, that he could not conceive how an army ever succeeded in retreating. when we think of the physical and moral condition of an army in full retreat after a lost battle, of the difficulty of preserving order, and of the disasters to which disorder may lead, it is not hard to understand why the most experienced generals have hesitated to attempt such an operation. what method of retreat shall be recommended? shall the fight be continued at all hazards until nightfall and the retreat executed under cover of the darkness? or is it better not to wait for this last chance, but to abandon the field of battle while it can be done and a strong opposition still made to the pursuing army? should a forced march be made in the night, in order to get as much start of the enemy as possible? or is it better to halt after a half-march and make a show of fighting again? each of these methods, although entirely proper in certain cases, might in others prove ruinous to the whole army. if the theory of war leaves any points unprovided for, that of retreats is certainly one of them. if you determine to fight vigorously until night, you may expose yourself to a complete defeat before that time arrives; and if a forced retreat must begin when the shades of night are shrouding every thing in darkness and obscurity, how can you prevent the disintegration of your army, which does not know what to do, and cannot see to do any thing properly? if, on the other hand, the field of battle is abandoned in broad daylight and before all possible efforts have been made to hold it, you may give up the contest at the very moment when the enemy is about to do the same thing; and this fact coming to the knowledge of the troops, you may lose their confidence,--as they are always inclined to blame a prudent general who retreats before the necessity for so doing may be evident to themselves. moreover, who can say that a retreat commenced in the daylight in presence of an enterprising enemy may not become a rout? when the retreat is actually begun, it is no less difficult to decide whether a forced march shall be made to get as much the start of the enemy as possible,--since this hurried movement might sometimes cause the destruction of the army, and might, in other circumstances, be its salvation. all that can be positively asserted on this subject is that, in general, with an army of considerable magnitude, it is best to retreat slowly, by short marches, with a well-arranged rear-guard of sufficient strength to hold the heads of the enemy's columns in check for several hours. retreats are of different kinds, depending upon the cause from which they result. a general may retire of his own accord before fighting, in order to draw his adversary to a position which he prefers to his present one. this is rather a prudent maneuver than a retreat. it was thus that napoleon retired in from wischau toward brunn to draw the allies to a point which suited him as a battle-field. it was thus that wellington retired from quatre-bras to waterloo. this is what i proposed to do before the attack at dresden, when the arrival of napoleon was known. i represented the necessity of moving toward dippoldiswalde to choose a favorable battle-field. it was supposed to be a retreat that i was proposing; and a mistaken idea of honor prevented a retrograde movement without fighting, which would have been the means of avoiding the catastrophe of the next day, (august , .) a general may retire in order to hasten to the defense of a point threatened by the enemy, either upon the flanks or upon the line of retreat. when an army is marching at a distance from its depots, in an exhausted country, it may be obliged to retire in order to get nearer its supplies. finally, an army retires involuntarily after a lost battle, or after an unsuccessful enterprise. these are not the only causes having an influence in retreats. their character will vary with that of the country, with the distances to be passed over and the obstacles to be surmounted. they are specially dangerous in an enemy's country; and when the points at which the retreats begin are distant from the friendly country and the base of operations, they become painful and difficult. from the time of the famous retreat of the ten thousand, so justly celebrated, until the terrible catastrophe which befell the french army in , history does not make mention of many remarkable retreats. that of antony, driven out of media, was more painful than glorious. that of the emperor julian, harassed by the same parthians, was a disaster. in more recent days, the retreat of charles viii. to naples, when he passed by a corps of the italian army at fornovo, was an admirable one. the retreat of m. de bellisle from prague does not deserve the praises it has received. those executed by the king of prussia after raising the siege of olmutz and after the surprise at hochkirch were very well arranged; but they were for short distances. that of moreau in , which was magnified in importance by party spirit, was creditable, but not at all extraordinary. the retreat of lecourbe from engadin to altorf, and that of macdonald by pontremoli after the defeat of the trebbia, as also that of suwaroff from the muttenthal to chur, were glorious feats of arms, but partial in character and of short duration. the retreat of the russian army from the niemen to moscow--a space of two hundred and forty leagues,--in presence of such an enemy as napoleon and such cavalry as the active and daring murat commanded, was certainly admirable. it was undoubtedly attended by many favorable circumstances, but was highly deserving of praise, not only for the talent displayed by the generals who directed its first stages, but also for the admirable fortitude and soldierly bearing of the troops who performed it. although the retreat from moscow was a bloody catastrophe for napoleon, it was also glorious for him and the troops who were at krasnoi and the beresina,--because the skeleton of the army was saved, when not a single man should have returned. in this ever-memorable event both parties covered themselves with glory. the magnitude of the distances and the nature of the country to be traversed, the resources it offers, the obstacles to be encountered, the attacks to be apprehended, either in rear or in flank, superiority or inferiority in cavalry, the spirit of the troops, are circumstances which have a great effect in deciding the fate of retreats, leaving out of consideration the skillful arrangements which the generals may make for their execution. a general falling back toward his native land along his line of magazines and supplies may keep his troops together and in good order, and may effect a retreat with more safety than one compelled to subsist his army in cantonments, finding it necessary to occupy an extended position. it would be absurd to pretend that a french army retiring from moscow to the niemen without supplies of provisions, in want of cavalry and draft horses, could effect the movement in the same good order and with the same steadiness as a russian army, well provided with every thing necessary, marching in its own country, and covered by an immense number of light cavalry. there are five methods of arranging a retreat:-- the first is to march in a single mass and upon one road. the second consists in dividing the army into two or three corps, marching at the distance of a day's march from each other, in order to avoid confusion, especially in the _matériel_. the third consists in marching upon a single front by several roads nearly parallel and having a common point of arrival. the fourth consists in moving by constantly converging roads. the fifth, on the contrary, consists in moving along diverging roads. i have nothing to say as to the formation of rear-guards; but it is taken for granted that a good one should always be prepared and well sustained by a portion of the cavalry reserves. this arrangement is common to all kinds of retreats, but has nothing to do with the strategic relations of these operations. an army falling back in good order, with the intention of fighting as soon as it shall have received expected reinforcements or as soon as it shall have reached a certain strategic position, should prefer the first method, as this particularly insures the compactness of the army and enables it to be in readiness for battle almost at any moment, since it is simply necessary to halt the heads of columns and form the remainder of the troops under their protection as they successively arrive. an army employing this method must not, however, confine itself to the single main road, if there are side-roads sufficiently near to be occupied which may render its movements more rapid and secure. when napoleon retired from smolensk, he used the second method, having the portions of his army separated by an entire march. he made therein a great mistake, because the enemy was not following upon his rear, but moving along a lateral road which brought him in a nearly perpendicular direction into the midst of the separated french corps. the three fatal days of krasnoi were the result. the employment of this method being chiefly to avoid incumbering the road, the interval between the departure of the several corps is sufficiently great when the artillery may readily file off. instead of separating the corps by a whole march, the army would be better divided into two masses and a rear-guard, a half-march from each other. these masses, moving off in succession with an interval of two hours between the departure of their several army-corps, may file off without incumbering the road, at least in ordinary countries. in crossing the saint-bernard or the balkan, other calculations would doubtless be necessary. i apply this idea to an army of one hundred and twenty thousand or one hundred and fifty thousand men, having a rear-guard of twenty thousand or twenty-five thousand men distant about a half-march in rear. the army may be divided into two masses of about sixty thousand men each, encamped at a distance of three or four leagues from each other. each of these masses will be subdivided into two or three corps, which may either move successively along the road or form in two lines across the road. in either case, if one corps of thirty thousand men moves at five a.m. and the other at seven, there will be no danger of interference with each other, unless something unusual should happen; for the second mass being at the same hours of the day about four leagues behind the first, they can never be occupying the same part of the road at the same time. when there are practicable roads in the neighborhood, suitable at least for infantry and cavalry, the intervals may be diminished. it is scarcely necessary to add that such an order of march can only be used when provisions are plentiful; and the third method is usually the best, because the army is then marching in battle-order. in long days and in hot countries the best times for marching are the night and the early part of the day. it is one of the most difficult problems of logistics to make suitable arrangements of hours of departures and halts for armies; and this is particularly the case in retreats. many generals neglect to arrange the manner and times of halts, and great disorder on the march is the consequence, as each brigade or division takes the responsibility of halting whenever the soldiers are a little tired and find it agreeable to bivouac. the larger the army and the more compactly it marches, the more important does it become to arrange well the hours of departures and halts, especially if the army is to move at night. an ill-timed halt of part of a column may cause as much mischief as a rout. if the rear-guard is closely pressed, the army should halt in order to relieve it by a fresh corps taken from the second mass, which will halt with this object in view. the enemy seeing eighty thousand men in battle-order will think it necessary to halt and collect his columns; and then the retreat should recommence at nightfall, to regain the space which has been lost. the third method, of retreating along several parallel roads, is excellent when the roads are sufficiently near each other. but, if they are quite distant, one wing separated from the center and from the other wing may be compromised if the enemy attacks it in force and compels it to stand on the defensive. the prussian army moving from magdeburg toward the oder, in , gives an example of this kind. the fourth method, which consists in following concentric roads, is undoubtedly the best if the troops are distant from each other when the retreat is ordered. nothing can be better, in such a case, than to unite the forces; and the concentric retreat is the only method of effecting this. the fifth method indicated is nothing else than the famous system of eccentric lines, which i have attributed to bulow, and have opposed so warmly in the earlier editions of my works, because i thought i could not be mistaken either as to the sense of his remarks on the subject or as to the object of his system. i gathered from his definition that he recommended to a retreating army, moving from any given position, to separate into parts and pursue diverging roads, with the double object of withdrawing more readily from the enemy in pursuit and of arresting his march by threatening his flanks and his line of communications. i found great fault with the system, for the simple reason that a beaten army is already weak enough, without absurdly still further dividing its forces and strength in presence of a victorious enemy. bulow has found defenders who declare that i mistake his meaning, and that by the term _eccentric retreat_ he did not understand a retreat made on several diverging roads, but one which, instead of being directed toward the center of the base of operations or the center of the country, should be eccentric to that focus of operations, and along the line of the frontier of the country. i may possibly have taken an incorrect impression from his language, and in this case my criticism falls to the ground; for i have strongly recommended that kind of a retreat to which i have given the name of the parallel retreat. it is my opinion that an army, leaving the line which leads from the frontiers to the center of the state, with a view of moving to the right or the left, may very well pursue a course nearly parallel to the line of the frontiers, or to its front of operations and its base. it seems to me more rational to give the name of parallel retreat to such a movement as that described, designating as eccentric retreat that where diverging roads are followed, all leading from the strategic front. however this dispute about words may result, the sole cause of which was the obscurity of bulow's text, i find fault only with those retreats made along several diverging roads, under pretense of covering a greater extent of frontier and of threatening the enemy on both flanks. by using these high-sounding words _flanks_, an air of importance may be given to systems entirely at variance with the principles of the art. an army in retreat is always in a bad state, either physically or morally; because a retreat can only be the result of reverses or of numerical inferiority. shall such an army be still more weakened by dividing it? i find no fault with retreats executed in several columns, to increase the ease of moving, when these columns can support each other; but i am speaking of those made along diverging lines of operations. suppose an army of forty thousand men retreating before another of sixty thousand. if the first forms four isolated divisions of about ten thousand men, the enemy may maneuver with two masses of thirty thousand men each. can he not turn his adversary, surround, disperse, and ruin in succession all his divisions? how can they escape such a fate? _by concentration_. this being in direct opposition to a divergent system, the latter falls of itself. i invoke to my support the great lessons of experience. when the leading divisions of the army of italy were repulsed by wurmser, bonaparte collected them all together at roverbella; and, although he had only forty thousand men, he fought and beat sixty thousand, because he had only to contend against isolated columns. if he had made a divergent retreat, what would have become of his army and his victories? wurmser, after his first check, made an eccentric retreat, directing his two wings toward the extremities of the line of defense. what was the result? his right, although supported by the mountains of the tyrol, was beaten at trent. bonaparte then fell upon the rear of his left, and destroyed that at bassano and mantua. when the archduke charles gave way before the first efforts of the french armies in , would he have saved germany by an eccentric movement? was not the salvation of germany due to his concentric retreat? at last moreau, who had moved with a very extended line of isolated divisions, perceived that this was an excellent system for his own destruction, if he stood his ground and fought or adopted the alternative of retreating. he concentrated his scattered troops, and all the efforts of the enemy were fruitless in presence of a mass which it was necessary to watch throughout the whole length of a line of two hundred miles. such examples must put an end to further discussion.[ ] there are two cases in which divergent retreats are admissible, and then only as a last resource. first, when an army has experienced a great defeat in its own country, and the scattered fragments seek protection within the walls of fortified places. secondly, in a war where the sympathies of the whole population are enlisted, each fraction of the army thus divided may serve as a nucleus of assembly in each province; but in a purely methodical war, with regular armies, carried on according to the principles of the art, divergent retreats are simply absurd. there is still another strategical consideration as to the direction of a retreat,--to decide when it should be made perpendicularly to the frontier and toward the interior of the country, or when it should be parallel to the frontier. for example, when marshal soult gave up the line of the pyrenees in , he had to choose one of two directions for his retreat,--either by way of bordeaux toward the interior of france, or by way of toulouse parallel to the frontier formed by the pyrenees. in the same way, when frederick retired from moravia, he marched toward bohemia instead of returning to silesia. these parallel retreats are often to be preferred, for the reason that they divert the enemy from a march upon the capital of the state and the center of its power. the propriety of giving such a direction to a retreat must be determined by the configuration of the frontiers, the positions of the fortresses, the greater or less space the army may have for its marches, and the facilities for recovering its direct communications with the central portions of the state. spain is admirably suited to the use of this system. if a french army penetrates by way of bayonne, the spaniards may base themselves upon pampeluna and saragossa, or upon leon and the asturias; and in either case the french cannot move directly to madrid, because their line of operations would be at the mercy of their adversary. the frontier of the turkish empire on the danube presents the same advantages, if the turks knew how to profit by them. in france also the parallel retreat may be used, especially when the nation itself is not divided into two political parties each of which is striving for the possession of the capital. if the hostile army penetrates through the alps, the french can act on the rhone and the saône, passing around the frontier as far as the moselle on one side, or as far as provence on the other. if the enemy enters the country by way of strasbourg, mayence, or valenciennes, the same thing can be done. the occupation of paris by the enemy would be impossible, or at least very hazardous, so long as a french army remained in good condition and based upon its circle of fortified towns. the same is the case for all countries having double fronts of operations.[ ] austria is perhaps not so fortunately situated, on account of the directions of the rhetian and tyrolean alps and of the river danube. lloyd, however, considers bohemia and the tyrol as two bastions connected by the strong curtain of the river inn, and regards this frontier as exceedingly well suited for parallel movements. this assertion was not well sustained by the events of the campaigns of , , and ; but, as the parallel method has not yet had a fair trial on that ground, the question is still an open one. it seems to me that the propriety of applying the parallel method depends mainly upon the existing and the antecedent circumstances of each case. if a french army should approach from the rhine by way of bavaria, and should find allies in force upon the lech and the iser, it would be a very delicate operation to throw the whole austrian army into the tyrol and into bohemia, with the expectation of arresting in this way the forward movement to vienna. if half the austrian army is left upon the inn to cover the approaches to the capital, an unfortunate division of force is the consequence; and if it is decided to throw the whole army into the tyrol, leaving the way to vienna open, there would be great danger incurred if the enemy is at all enterprising. in italy, beyond the mincio, the parallel method would be of difficult application on the side of the tyrol, as well as in bohemia against an enemy approaching from saxony, for the reason that the theater of operations would be too contracted. in prussia the parallel retreat may be used with great advantage against an army debouching from bohemia upon the elbe or the oder, whilst its employment would be impossible against a french army moving from the rhine, or a russian army from the vistula, unless prussia and austria were allies. this is a result of the geographical configuration of the country, which allows and even favors lateral movements: in the direction of its greatest dimension, (from memel to mayence;) but such a movement would be disastrous if made from dresden to stettin. when an army retreats, whatever may be the motive of the operation, a pursuit always follows. a retreat, even when executed in the most skillful manner and by an army in good condition, always gives an advantage to the pursuing army; and this is particularly the case after a defeat and when the source of supplies and reinforcements is at a great distance; for a retreat then becomes more difficult than any other operation in war, and its difficulties increase in proportion to the skill exhibited by the enemy in conducting the pursuit. the boldness and activity of the pursuit will depend, of course, upon the character of the commanders and upon the _physique_ and _morale_ of the two armies. it is difficult to prescribe fixed rules for all cases of pursuits, but the following points must be recollected:-- . it is generally better to direct the pursuit upon the flank of the retreating columns, especially when it is made in one's own country and where no danger is incurred in moving perpendicularly or diagonally upon the enemy's line of operations. care must, however, be taken not to make too large a circuit; for there might then be danger of losing the retreating enemy entirely. . a pursuit should generally be as boldly and actively executed as possible, especially when it is subsequent to a battle gained; because the demoralized army may be wholly dispersed if vigorously followed up. . there are very few cases where it is wise to make a bridge of gold for the enemy, no matter what the old roman proverb may say; for it can scarcely ever be desirable to pay an enemy to leave a country, unless in the case when an unexpected success shall have been gained over him by an army much inferior to his in numbers. nothing further of importance can be added to what has been said on the subject of retreats, as far as they are connected with grand combinations of strategy. we may profitably indicate several tactical measures which may render them more easy of execution. one of the surest means of making a retreat successfully is to familiarize the officers and soldiers with the idea that an enemy may be resisted quite as well when coming on the rear as on the front, and that the preservation of order is the only means of saving a body of troops harassed by the enemy during a retrograde movement. rigid discipline is at all times the best preservative of good order, but it is of special importance during a retreat. to enforce discipline, subsistence must be furnished, that the troops may not be obliged to straggle off for the purpose of getting supplies by marauding. it is a good plan to give the command of the rear-guard to an officer of great coolness, and to attach to it staff officers who may, in advance of its movements, examine and select points suitable for occupation to hold the enemy temporarily in check. cavalry can rally so rapidly on the main body that it is evidently desirable to have considerable bodies of such troops, as they greatly facilitate the execution of a slow and methodical retreat, and furnish the means of thoroughly examining the road itself and the neighborhood, so as to prevent an unexpected onset of the enemy upon the flanks of the retreating columns. it is generally sufficient if the rear-guard keep the enemy at the distance of half a day's march from the main body. the rear-guard would run great risk of being itself cut off, if farther distant. when, however, there are defiles in its rear which are held by friends, it may increase the sphere of its operations and remain a full day's march to the rear; for a defile, when held, facilitates a retreat in the same degree that it renders it more difficult if in the power of the enemy. if the army is very numerous and the rear-guard proportionally large, it may remain a day's march in rear. this will depend, however, upon its strength, the nature of the country, and the character and strength of the pursuing force. if the enemy presses up closely, it is of importance not to permit him to do so with impunity, especially if the retreat is made in good order. in such a case it is a good plan to halt from time to time and fall unexpectedly upon the enemy's advanced guard, as the archduke charles did in at neresheim, moreau at biberach, and kleber at ukerath. such a maneuver almost always succeeds, on account of the surprise occasioned by an unexpected offensive return upon a body of troops which is thinking of little else than collecting trophies and spoils. passages of rivers in retreat are also operations by no means devoid of interest. if the stream is narrow and there are permanent bridges over it, the operation is nothing more than the passage of a defile; but when the river is wide and is to be crossed upon a temporary military bridge, it is a maneuver of extreme delicacy. among the precautions to be taken, a very important one is to get the parks well advanced, so that they may be out of the way of the army; for this purpose it is well for the army to halt a half-day's march from the river. the rear-guard should also keep at more than the usual distance from the main body,--as far, in fact, as the locality and the respective forces opposed will permit. the army may thus file across the bridge without being too much hurried. the march of the rear-guard should be so arranged that it shall have reached a position in front of the bridge just as the last of the main body has passed. this will be a suitable moment for relieving the rear-guard by fresh troops strongly posted. the rear-guard will pass through the intervals of the fresh troops in position and will cross the river; the enemy, coming up and finding fresh troops drawn up to give him battle, will make no attempt to press them too closely. the new rear-guard will hold its position until night, and will then cross the river, breaking the bridges after it. it is, of course, understood that as fast as the troops pass they form on the opposite bank and plant batteries, so as to protect the corps left to hold the enemy in check. the dangers of such a passage in retreat, and the nature of the precautions which facilitate it, indicate that measures should always be taken to throw up intrenchments at the point where the bridge is to be constructed and the passage made. where time is not allowed for the construction of a regular _tête de pont_, a few well-armed redoubts will be found of great value in covering the retreat of the last troops. if the passage of a large river is so difficult when the enemy is only pressing on the rear of the column, it is far more so when the army is threatened both in front and rear and the river is guarded by the enemy in force. the celebrated passage of the beresina by the french is one of the most remarkable examples of such an operation. never was an army in a more desperate condition, and never was one extricated more gloriously and skillfully. pressed by famine, benumbed with cold, distant twelve hundred miles from its base of operations, assailed by the enemy in front and in rear, having a river with marshy banks in front, surrounded by vast forests, how could it hope to escape? it paid dearly for the honor it gained. the mistake of admiral tschitchagoff doubtless helped its escape; but the army performed heroic deeds, for which due praise should be given. we do not know whether to admire most the plan of operations which brought up the russian armies from the extremities of moldavia, from moscow, and from polotzk to the beresina as to a rendezvous arranged in peace,--a plan which came near effecting the capture of their formidable adversary,--or the wonderful firmness of the lion thus pursued, who succeeded in opening a way through his enemies. the only rules to be laid down are, not to permit your army to be closely pressed upon, to deceive the enemy as to the point of passage, and to fall headlong upon the corps which bars the way before the one which is following the rear of your column can come up. never place yourself in a position to be exposed to such danger; for escape in such a case is rare. if a retreating army should strive to protect its bridges either by regular _têtes de font_, or at least by lines of redoubts to cover the rear-guard, it is natural, also, that the enemy pursuing should use every effort to destroy the bridges. when the retreat is made down the bank of a river, wooden houses may be thrown into the stream, also fire-ships and mills,--a means the austrians used in against jourdan's army, near neuwied on the rhine, where they nearly compromised the army of the sambre and the meuse. the archduke charles did the same thing at essling in . he broke the bridge over the danube, and brought napoleon to the brink of ruin. it is difficult to secure a bridge against attacks of this character unless there is time for placing a stockade above it. boats may be anchored, provided with ropes and grappling-hooks to catch floating bodies and with means for extinguishing fire-boats. footnotes: [footnote : ten years after this first refutation of bulow's idea, the concentric retreat of barclay and bagration saved the russian army. although it did not prevent napoleon's first success, it was, in the end, the cause of his ruin.] [footnote : in all these calculations i suppose the contending forces nearly equal. if the invading army is twice as strong as the defensive, it may be divided into two equal parts, one of which may move directly upon the capital, while the other may follow the army retiring along the frontier. if the armies are equal, this is impossible.] article xxxix. of cantonments, either when on the march, or when established in winter quarters. so much has been written on this point, and its connection with my subject is so indirect, that i shall treat it very briefly. to maintain an army in cantonments, in a war actively carried on, is generally difficult, however connected the arrangement may be, and there is almost always some point exposed to the enemy's attacks. a country where large towns abound, as lombardy, saxony, the netherlands, swabia, or old prussia, presents more facilities for the establishment of quarters than one where towns are few; for in the former case the troops have not only convenient supplies of food, but shelters which permit the divisions of the army to be kept closely together. in poland, russia, portions of austria and france, in spain and in southern italy, it is more difficult to put an army into winter quarters. formerly, it was usual for each party to go into winter quarters at the end of october, and all the fighting after that time was of a partisan character and carried on by the advanced troops forming the outposts. the surprise of the austrian winter quarters in upper alsace in , by turenne, is a good example, from which may be learned the best method of conducting such an enterprise, and the precautions to be taken on the other side to prevent its success. the best rules to be laid down on this subject seem to me to be the following. establish the cantonments very compactly and connectedly and occupying a space as broad as long, in order to avoid having a too extended line of troops, which is always easily broken through and cannot be concentrated in time; cover them by a river, or by an outer line of troops in huts and with their position strengthened by field-works; fix upon points of assembly which may be reached by all the troops before the enemy can penetrate so far; keep all the avenues by which an enemy may approach constantly patrolled by bodies of cavalry; finally, establish signals to give warning if an attack is made at any point. in the winter of , napoleon established his army in cantonments behind the passarge in face of the enemy, the advanced guard alone being hutted near the cities of gutstadt, osterode, &c. the army numbered more than one hundred and twenty thousand men, and much skill was requisite in feeding it and keeping it otherwise comfortable in this position until june. the country was of a favorable character; but this cannot be expected to be the case everywhere. an army of one hundred thousand men may find it not very difficult to have a compact and well-connected system of winter quarters in countries where large towns are numerous. the difficulty increases with the size of the army. it must be observed, however, that if the extent of country occupied increases in proportion to the numbers in the army, the means of opposing an irruption of the enemy increase in the same proportion. the important point is to be able to assemble fifty thousand or sixty thousand men in twenty-four hours. with such an army in hand, and with the certainty of having it rapidly increased, the enemy may be held in check, no matter how strong he may be, until the whole army is assembled. it must be admitted, however, that there will always be a risk in going into winter quarters if the enemy keeps his army in a body and seems inclined to make offensive movements; and the conclusion to be drawn from this fact is, that the only method of giving secure repose to an army in winter or in the midst of a campaign is to establish it in quarters protected by a river, or to arrange an armistice. in the strategic positions taken up by an army in the course of a campaign, whether marching, or acting as an army of observation, or waiting for a favorable opportunity of taking the offensive, it will probably occupy quite compact cantonments. the selection of such positions requires great experience upon the part of a general, in order that he may form correct conclusions as to what he may expect the enemy to do. an army should occupy space enough to enable it to subsist readily, and it should also keep as much concentrated as possible, to be ready for the enemy should he show himself; and these two conditions are by no means easily reconciled. there is no better arrangement than to place the divisions of the army in a space nearly a square, so that in case of need the whole may be assembled at any point where the enemy may present himself. nine divisions placed in this way, a half-day's march from each other, may in twelve hours assemble on the center. the same rules are to be observed in these cases as were laid down for winter quarters. article xl. descents. these are operations of rare occurrence, and may be classed as among the most difficult in war when effected in presence of a well-prepared enemy. since the invention of gunpowder and the changes effected by it in navies, transports are so helpless in presence of the monstrous three-deckers of the present day, armed as they are with a hundred cannon, that an army can make a descent only with the assistance of a numerous fleet of ships of war which can command the sea, at least until the debarkation of the army takes place. before the invention of gunpowder, the transports were also the ships of war; they were moved along at pleasure by using oars, were light, and could skirt along the coasts; their number was in proportion to the number of troops to be embarked; and, aside from the danger of tempests, the operations of a fleet could be arranged with almost as much certainty as those of an army on land. ancient history, for these reasons, gives us examples of more extensive debarkations than modern times. who does not recall to mind the immense forces transported by the persians upon the black sea, the bosporus, and the archipelago,--the innumerable hosts landed in greece by xerxes and darius,--the great expeditions of the carthaginians and romans to spain and sicily, that of alexander into asia minor, those of cæsar to england and africa, that of germanicus to the mouths of the elbe,--the crusades,--the expeditions of the northmen to england, to france, and even to italy? since the invention of cannon, the too celebrated armada of philip ii. was the only enterprise of this kind of any magnitude until that set on foot by napoleon against england in . all other marine expeditions were of no great extent: as, for example, those of charles v. and of sebastian of portugal to the coast of africa; also the several descents of the french into the united states of america, into egypt and st. domingo, of the english to egypt, holland, copenhagen, antwerp, philadelphia. i say nothing of hoche's projected landing in ireland; for that was a failure, and is, at the same time, an example of the difficulties to be apprehended in such attempts. the large armies kept on foot in our day by the great states of the world prevent descents with thirty or forty thousand men, except against second-rate powers; for it is extremely difficult to find transportation for one hundred or one hundred and fifty thousand men with their immense trains of artillery, munitions, cavalry, &c. we were, however, on the point of seeing the solution of the vast problem of the practicability of descents in great force, if it is true that napoleon seriously contemplated the transportation of one hundred and sixty thousand veterans from boulogne to the british isles: unfortunately, his failure to execute this gigantic undertaking has left us entirely in the dark as to this grave question. it is not impossible to collect fifty french ships-of-the-line in the channel by misleading the english; this was, in fact, upon the point of being done; it is then no longer impossible, with a favorable wind, to pass over the flotilla in two days and effect a landing. but what would become of the army if a storm should disperse the fleet of ships of war and the english should return in force to the channel and defeat the fleet or oblige it to regain its ports? posterity will regret, as the loss of an example to all future generations, that this immense undertaking was not carried through, or at least attempted. doubtless, many brave men would have met their deaths; but were not those men mowed down more uselessly on the plains of swabia, of moravia, and of castile, in the mountains of portugal and the forests of lithuania? what man would not glory in assisting to bring to a conclusion the greatest trial of skill and strength ever seen between two great nations? at any rate, posterity will find in the preparations made for this descent one of the most valuable lessons the present century has furnished for the study of soldiers and of statesmen. the labors of every kind performed on the coasts of france from to will be among the most remarkable monuments of the activity, foresight, and skill of napoleon. it is recommended to the careful attention of young officers. but, while admitting the possibility of success for a great descent upon a coast so near as the english to boulogne, what results should be expected if this armada had had a long sea-voyage to make? how could so many small vessels be kept moving, even for two days and nights? to what chances of ruin would not so many frail boats be exposed in navigating the open seas! moreover, the artillery, munitions of war, equipments, provisions, and fresh water that must be carried with this multitude of men require immense labor in preparation and vast means of transportation. experience has shown clearly the difficulties attending such an expedition, even for thirty thousand men. from known facts, it is evident that a descent can be made with this number of men in four cases:-- st, against colonies or isolated possessions; d, against second-rate powers which cannot be immediately supported from abroad; d, for the purpose of effecting a temporary diversion, or to capture a position which it is important to hold for a time; th, to make a diversion, at once political and military, against a state already engaged in a great war, whose troops are occupied at a distance from the point of the descent. it is difficult to lay down rules for operations of this character. about the only recommendations i can make are the following. deceive the enemy as to the point of landing; choose a spot where the vessels may anchor in safety and the troops be landed together; infuse as much activity as possible into the operation, and take possession of some strong point to cover the development of the troops as they land; put on shore at once a part of the artillery, to give confidence and protection to the troops that have landed. a great difficulty in such an operation is found in the fact that the transports can never get near the beach, and the troops must be landed in boats and rafts,--which takes time and gives the enemy great advantages. if the sea is rough, the men to be landed are exposed to great risks; for what can a body of infantry do, crowded in boats, tossed about by the waves, and ordinarily rendered unfit by sea-sickness for the proper use of their arms? i can only advise the party on the defensive not to divide his forces too much by attempting to cover every point. it is an impossibility to line the entire coast with batteries and battalions for its defense; but the approaches to those places where large establishments are to be protected must be closed. signals should be arranged for giving prompt notice of the point where the enemy is landing, and all the disposable force should be rapidly concentrated there, to prevent his gaining a firm foothold. the configuration of coasts has a great influence upon descents and their prosecution. there are countries where the coasts are steep and present few points of easy access for the ships and the troops to be landed: these few places may be more readily watched, and the descent becomes more difficult. finally, there is a strategical consideration connected with descents which may be usefully pointed out. the same principle which forbids a continental army from interposing the mass of its forces between the enemy and the sea requires, on the contrary, that an army landing upon a coast should always keep its principal mass in communication with the shore, which is at once its line of retreat and its base of supplies. for the same reason, its first care should be to make sure of the possession of one fortified harbor/ or at least of a tongue of land which is convenient to a good anchorage and may be easily strengthened by fortifications, in order that in case of reverse the troops may be re-embarked without hurry and loss. chapter vi. logistics; or, the practical art of moving armies. article xli. a few remarks on logistics in general. is logistics simply a science of detail? or, on the contrary, is it a general science, forming one of the most essential parts of the art of war? or is it but a term, consecrated by long use, intended to designate collectively the different branches of staff duty,--that is to say, the different means of carrying out in practice the theoretical combinations of the art? these questions will seem singular to those persons who are firmly convinced that nothing more remains to be said about the art of war, and believe it wrong to search out new definitions where every thing seems already accurately classified. for my own part, i am persuaded that good definitions lead to clear ideas; and i acknowledge some embarrassment in answering these questions which seem so simple. in the earlier editions of this work i followed the example of other military writers, and called by the name of _logistics_ the details of staff duties, which are the subject of regulations for field-service and of special instructions relating to the corps of quartermasters. this was the result of prejudices consecrated by time. the word _logistics_ is derived, as we know, from the title of the _major général des logìs_, (translated in german by _quartiermeister_,) an officer whose duty it formerly was to lodge and camp the troops, to give direction to the marches of columns, and to locate them upon the ground. logistics was then quite limited. but when war began to be waged without camps, movements became more complicated, and the staff officers had more extended functions. the chief of staff began to perform the duty of transmitting the conceptions of the general to the most distant points of the theater of war, and of procuring for him the necessary documents for arranging plans of operations. the chief of staff was called to the assistance of the general in arranging his plans, to give information of them to subordinates in orders and instructions, to explain them and to supervise their execution both in their _ensemble_ and in their minute details: his duties were, therefore, evidently connected with all the operations of a campaign. to be a good chief of staff, it became in this way necessary that a man should be acquainted with all the various branches of the art of war. if the term _logistics_ includes all this, the two works of the archduke charles, the voluminous treatises of guibert, laroche-aymon, bousmard, and ternay, all taken together, would hardly give even an incomplete sketch of what logistics is; for it would be nothing more nor less than the science of applying all possible military knowledge. it appears from what has been said that the old term _logistics_ is insufficient to designate the duties of staff officers, and that the real duties of a corps of such officers, if an attempt be made to instruct them in a proper manner for their performance, should be accurately prescribed by special regulations in accordance with the general principles of the art. governments should take the precaution to publish well-considered regulations, which should define all the duties of staff officers and should give clear and accurate instructions as to the best methods of performing these duties. the austrian staff formerly had such a code of regulations for their government; but it was somewhat behind the times, and was better adapted to the old methods of carrying on war than the present. this is the only work of the kind i have seen. there are, no doubt, others, both public and secret; but i have no knowledge of their existence. several generals--as, for instance, grimoard and thiebaut--have prepared manuals for staff officers, and the new royal corps of france has issued several partial sets of instructions; but there is nowhere to be found a complete manual on the subject. if it is agreed that the old _logistics_ had reference only to details of marches and camps, and, moreover, that the functions of staff officers at the present day are intimately connected with the most important strategical combinations, it must be admitted that logistics includes but a small part of the duties of staff officers; and if we retain the term we must understand it to be greatly extended and developed in signification, so as to embrace not only the duties of ordinary staff officers, but of generals-in-chief. to convince my readers of this fact, i will mention the principal points that must be included if we wish to embrace in one view every duty and detail relating to the movements of armies and the undertakings resulting from such movements:-- . the preparation of all the material necessary for setting the army in motion, or, in other words, for opening the campaign. drawing up orders, instructions, and itineraries for the assemblage of the army and its subsequent launching upon its theater of operations. . drawing up in a proper manner the orders of the general-in-chief for different enterprises, as well as plans of attack in expected battles. . arranging with the chiefs of engineers and artillery the measures to be taken for the security of the posts which are to be used as depots, as well as those to be fortified in order to facilitate the operations of the army. . ordering and directing reconnoissances of every kind, and procuring in this way, and by using spies, as exact information as possible of the positions and movements of the enemy. . taking every precaution for the proper execution of movements ordered by the general. arranging the march of the different columns, so that all may move in an orderly and connected manner. ascertaining certainly that the means requisite for the ease and safety of marches are prepared. regulating the manner and time of halts. . giving proper composition to advanced guards, rear-guards, flankers, and all detached bodies, and preparing good instructions for their guidance. providing all the means necessary for the performance of their duties. . prescribing forms and instructions for subordinate commanders or their staff officers, relative to the different methods of drawing up the troops in columns when the enemy is at hand, as well as their formation in the most appropriate manner when the army is to engage in battle, according to the nature of the ground and the character of the enemy.[ ] . indicating to advanced guards and other detachments well-chosen points of assembly in case of their attack by superior numbers, and informing them what support they may hope to receive in case of need. . arranging and superintending the march of trains of baggage, munitions, provisions, and ambulances, both with the columns and in their rear, in such manner that they will not interfere with the movements of the troops and will still be near at hand. taking precautions for order and security, both on the march and when trains are halted and parked. . providing for the successive arrival of convoys of supplies. collecting all the means of transportation of the country and of the army, and regulating their use. . directing the establishment of camps, and adopting regulations for their safety, good order, and police. . establishing and organizing lines of operations and supplies, as well as lines of communications with these lines for detached bodies. designating officers capable of organizing and commanding in rear of the army; looking out for the safety of detachments and convoys, furnishing them good instructions, and looking out also for preserving suitable means of communication of the army with its base. . organizing depots of convalescent, wounded, and sickly men, movable hospitals, and workshops for repairs; providing for their safety. . keeping accurate record of all detachments, either on the flanks or in rear; keeping an eye upon their movements, and looking out for their return to the main column as soon as their service on detachment is no longer necessary; giving them, when required, some center of action, and forming strategic reserves. . organizing marching battalions or companies to gather up isolated men or small detachments moving in either direction between the army and its base of operations. . in case of sieges, ordering and supervising the employment of the troops in the trenches, making arrangements with the chiefs of artillery and engineers as to the labors to be performed by those troops and as to their management in sorties and assaults. . in retreats, taking precautionary measures for preserving order; posting fresh troops to support and relieve the rear-guard; causing intelligent officers to examine and select positions where the rear-guard may advantageously halt, engage the enemy, check his pursuit, and thus gain time; making provision in advance for the movement of trains, that nothing shall be left behind, and that they shall proceed in the most perfect order, taking all proper precautions to insure safety. . in cantonments, assigning positions to the different corps; indicating to each principal division of the army a place of assembly in case of alarm; taking measures to see that all orders, instructions, and regulations are implicitly observed. an examination of this long list--which might easily be made much longer by entering into greater detail--will lead every reader to remark that these are the duties rather of the general-in-chief than of staff officers. this truth i announced some time ago; and it is for the very purpose of permitting the general-in-chief to give his whole attention to the supreme direction of the operations that he ought to be provided with staff officers competent to relieve him of details of execution. their functions are therefore necessarily very intimately connected; and woe to an army where these authorities cease to act in concert! this want of harmony is often seen,--first, because generals are men and have faults, and secondly, because in every army there are found individual interests and pretensions, producing rivalry of the chiefs of staff and hindering them in performing their duties.[ ] it is not to be expected that this treatise shall contain rules for the guidance of staff officers in all the details of their multifarious duties; for, in the first place, every different nation has staff officers with different names and rounds of duties,--so that i should be obliged to write new rules for each army; in the second place, these details are fully entered into in special books pertaining to these subjects. i will, therefore, content myself with enlarging a little upon some of the first articles enumerated above:-- . the measures to be taken by the staff officers for preparing the army to enter upon active operations in the field include all those which are likely to facilitate the success of the first plan of operations. they should, as a matter of course, make sure, by frequent inspections, that the _matériel_ of all the arms of the service is in good order: horses, carriages, caissons, teams, harness, shoes, &c. should be carefully examined and any deficiencies supplied. bridge-trains, engineer-tool trains, _matériel_ of artillery, siege-trains if they are to move, ambulances,--in a word, every thing which conies under the head of _matériel_,--should be carefully examined and placed in good order. if the campaign is to be opened in the neighborhood of great rivers, gun-boats and flying bridges should be prepared, and all the small craft should be collected at the points and at the bank where they will probably be used. intelligent officers should examine the most favorable points both for embarkations and for landings,--preferring those localities which present the greatest chances of success for a primary establishment on the opposite bank. the staff officers will prepare all the itineraries that will be necessary for the movement of the several corps of the army to the proper points of assemblage, making every effort to give such direction to the marches that the enemy shall be unable to learn from them any thing relative to the projected enterprise. if the war is to be offensive, the staff officers arrange with the chief engineer officers what fortifications shall be erected near the base of operations, when _têtes de ponts_ or intrenched camps are to be constructed there. if the war is defensive, these works will be built between the first line of defense and the second base. . an essential branch of logistics is certainly that which relates to making arrangements of marches and attacks, which are fixed by the general and notice of them given to the proper persons by the chiefs of staff. the next most important qualification of a general, after that of knowing how to form good plans, is, unquestionably, that of facilitating the execution of his orders by their clearness of style. whatever may be the real business of a chief of staff, the greatness of a commander-in-chief will be always manifested in his plans; but if the general lacks ability the chief of staff should supply it as far as he can, having a proper understanding with the responsible chief. i have seen two very different methods employed in this branch of the service. the first, which may be styled the old school, consists in issuing daily, for the regulation of the movements of the army, general instructions filled with minute and somewhat pedantic details, so much the more out of place as they are usually addressed to chiefs of corps, who are supposed to be of sufficient experience not to require the same sort of instruction as would be given to junior subalterns just out of school. the other method is that of the detached orders given by napoleon to his marshals, prescribing for each one simply what concerned himself, and only informing him what corps were to operate with him, either on the right or the left, but never pointing out the connection of the operations of the whole army.[ ] i have good reasons for knowing that he did this designedly, either to surround his operations with an air of mystery, or for fear that more specific orders might fall into the hands of the enemy and assist him in thwarting his plans. it is certainly of great importance for a general to keep his plans secret; and frederick the great was right when he said that if his night-cap knew what was in his head he would throw it into the fire. that kind of secrecy was practicable in frederick's time, when his whole army was kept closely about him; but when maneuvers of the vastness of napoleon's are executed, and war is waged as in our day, what concert of action can be expected from generals who are utterly ignorant of what is going on around them? of the two systems, the last seems to me preferable. a judicious mean may be adopted between the eccentric conciseness of napoleon and the minute verbosity which laid down for experienced generals like barclay, kleist, and wittgenstein precise directions for breaking into companies and reforming again in line of battle,--a piece of nonsense all the more ridiculous because the execution of such an order in presence of the enemy is impracticable. it would be sufficient, i think, in such cases, to give the generals special orders relative to their own corps, and to add a few lines in cipher informing them briefly as to the whole plan of the operations and the part they are to take individually in executing it. when a proper cipher is wanting, the order may be transmitted verbally by an officer capable of understanding it and repeating it accurately. indiscreet revelations need then be no longer feared, and concert of action would be secured. . the army being assembled, and being in readiness to undertake some enterprise, the important thing will be to secure as much concert and precision of action as possible, whilst taking all the usual precaution's to gain accurate information of the route it is to pursue and to cover its movements thoroughly. there are two kinds of marches,--those which are made out of sight of the enemy, and those which are made in his presence, either advancing or retiring. these marches particularly have undergone great changes in late years. formerly, armies seldom came in collision until they had been several days in presence of each other, and the attacking party had roads opened by pioneers for the columns to move up parallel to each other. at present, the attack is made more promptly, and the existing roads usually answer all purposes. it is, however, of importance, when an army is moving, that pioneers and sappers accompany the advanced guard, to increase the number of practicable roads, to remove obstructions, throw small bridges over creeks, &c., if necessary, and secure the means of easy communication between the different corps of the army. in the present manner of marching, the calculation of times and distances becomes more complicated: the columns having each a different distance to pass over, in determining the hour of their departure and giving them instructions the following particulars must be considered:-- , the distances to be passed over; , the amount of _matériel_ in each train; , the nature of the country; , the obstacles placed in the way by the enemy; , the fact whether or not it is important for the march to be concealed or open. under present circumstances, the surest and simplest method of arranging the movements of the great corps forming the wings of an army, or of all those corps not marching with the column attached to the general head-quarters, will be to trust the details to the experience of the generals commanding those corps,--being careful, however, to let them understand that the most exact punctuality is expected of them. it will then be enough to indicate to them the point to be reached and the object to be attained, the route to be pursued and the hour at which they will be expected to be in position. they should be informed what corps are marching either on the same roads with them or on side-roads to the right or left in order that they may govern themselves accordingly; they should receive whatever news there may be of the enemy, and have a line of retreat indicated to them.[ ] all those details whose object it is to prescribe each day for the chiefs of corps the method of forming their columns and placing them in position are mere pedantry,--more hurtful than useful. to see that they march habitually according to regulation or custom is necessary; but they should be free to arrange their movements so as to arrive at the appointed place and time, at the risk of being removed from their command if they fail to do so without sufficient reason. in retreats, however, which are made along a single road by an army separated into divisions, the hours of departure and halts must be carefully regulated. each column should have its own advanced guard and flankers, that its march may be conducted with the usual precautions: it is convenient also, even when they form part of a second line, for the head of each column to be preceded by a few pioneers and sappers, provided with tools for removing obstacles or making repairs in case of accidents; a few of these workmen should also accompany each train: in like manner, a light trestle-bridge train will be found very useful. . the army on the march is often preceded by a general advanced guard, or, as is more frequent in the modern system, the center and each wing may have its special advanced guard. it is customary for the reserves and the center to accompany the head-quarters; and the general advanced guard, when there is one, will usually follow the same road: so that half the army is thus assembled on the central route. under these circumstances, the greatest care is requisite to prevent obstructing the road. it happens sometimes, however, when the important stroke is to be made in the direction of one of the wings, that the reserves, the general head-quarters, and even the general advanced guard, may be moved in that direction: in this case, all the rules usually regulating the march of the center must be applied to that wing. advanced guards should be accompanied by good staff officers, capable of forming correct ideas as to the enemy's movements and of giving an accurate account of them to the general, thus enabling him to make his plans understandingly. the commander of the advanced guard should assist the general in the same way. a general advanced guard should be composed of light troops of all arms, containing some of the _élite_ troops of the army as a main body, a few dragoons prepared to fight on foot, some horse-artillery, pontoniers, sappers, &c., with light trestles and pontoons for passing small streams. a few good marksmen will not be out of place. a topographical officer should accompany it, to make a sketch of the country a mile or two on each side of the road. a body of irregular cavalry should always be attached, to spare the regular cavalry and to serve as scouts, because they are best suited to such service. . as the army advances and removes farther from its base, it becomes the more necessary to have a good line of operations and of depots which may keep up the connection of the army with its base. the staff officers will divide the depots into departments, the principal depot being established in the town which can lodge and supply the greatest number of men: if there is a fortress suitably situated, it should be selected as the site of the principal depot. the secondary depots may be separated by distances of from fifteen to thirty miles, usually in the towns of the country. the mean distance apart will be about twenty to twenty-five miles. this will give fifteen depots upon a line of three hundred miles, which should be divided into three or four brigades of depots. each of these will have a commander and a detachment of troops or of convalescent soldiers, who regulate the arrangements for accommodating troops and give protection to the authorities of the country, (if they remain;) they furnish facilities for transmitting the mails and the necessary escorts; the commander sees that the roads and bridges are kept in good order. if possible, there should be a park of several carriages at each depot, certainly at the principal one in each brigade. the command of all the depots embraced within certain geographical limits should be intrusted to prudent and able general officers; for the security of the communications of the army often depends on their operations.[ ] these commands may sometimes become strategic reserves, as was explained in art. xxiii.; a few good battalions, with the assistance of movable detachments passing continually between the army and the base, will generally be able to keep open the communications. . the study of the measures, partly logistical and partly tactical, to be taken by the staff officers in bringing the troops from the order of march to the different orders of battle, is very important, but requires going into such minute detail that i must pass it over nearly in silence, contenting myself with referring my readers to the numerous works specially devoted to this branch of the art of war. before leaving this interesting subject, i think a few examples should be given as illustrations of the great importance of a good system of logistics. one of these examples is the wonderful concentration of the french army in the plains of gera in ; another is the entrance of the army upon the campaign of . in each of these cases napoleon possessed the ability to make such arrangements that his columns, starting from points widely separated, were concentrated with wonderful precision upon the decisive point of the zone of operations; and in this way he insured the successful issue of the campaign. the choice of the decisive point was the result of a skillful application of the principles of strategy; and the arrangements for moving the troops give us an example of logistics which originated in his own closet. it has been long claimed that berthier framed those instructions which were conceived with so much precision and usually transmitted with so much clearness; but i have had frequent opportunities of knowing that such was not the truth. the emperor was his own chief staff officer. provided with a pair of dividers opened to a distance by the scale of from seventeen to twenty miles in a straight line, (which made from twenty-two to twenty-five miles, taking into account the windings of the roads,) bending over and sometimes stretched at full length upon his map, where the positions of his corps and the supposed positions of the enemy were marked by pins of different colors, he was able to give orders for extensive movements with a certainty and precision which were astonishing. turning his dividers about from point to point on the map, he decided in a moment the number of marches necessary for each of his columns to arrive at the desired point by a certain day; then, placing pins in the new positions, and bearing in mind the rate of marching that he must assign to each column, and the hour of its setting out, he dictated those instructions which are alone enough to make any man famous. ney coming from the shores of lake constance, lannes from upper swabia, soult and davoust from bavaria and the palatinate, bernadotte and augereau from franconia, and the imperial guard from paris, were all thus arranged in line on three parallel roads, to debouch simultaneously between saalfeld, gera, and plauen, few persons in the army or in germany having any conception of the object of these movements which seemed so very complicated. in the same manner, in , when blücher had his army quietly in cantonments between the sambre and the rhine, and wellington was attending _fêtes_ in brussels, both waiting a signal for the invasion of france, napoleon, who was supposed to be at paris entirely engrossed with diplomatic ceremonies, at the head of his guard, which had been but recently reformed in the capital, fell like a thunderbolt upon charleroi and blücher's quarters, his columns arriving from all points of the compass, with rare punctuality, on the th of june, in the plains of beaumont and upon the banks of the sambre. (napoleon did not leave paris until the th.) the combinations described above were the results of wise strategic calculations, but their execution was undoubtedly a masterpiece of logistics. in order to exhibit more clearly the merit of these measures, i will mention, by way of contrast, two cases where faults in logistics came very near leading to fatal consequences. napoleon having been recalled from spain in by the fact of austria's taking up arms, and being certain that this power intended war, he sent berthier into bavaria upon the delicate duty of concentrating the army, which was extended from braunau as far as strasbourg and erfurt. davoust was returning from the latter city, oudinot from frankfort; massena, who had been on his way to spain, was retiring toward ulm by the strasbourg route; the saxons, bavarians, and wurtembergers were moving from their respective countries. the corps were thus separated by great distances, and the austrians, who had been long concentrated, might easily break through this spider's web or brush away its threads. napoleon was justly uneasy, and ordered berthier to assemble the army at ratisbon if the war had not actually begun on his arrival, but, if it had, to concentrate it in a more retired position toward ulm. the reason for this alternative order was obvious. if the war had begun, ratisbon was too near the austrian frontier for a point of assembly, as the corps might thus be thrown separately into the midst of two hundred thousand enemies; but by fixing upon ulm as the point of rendezvous the army would be concentrated sooner, or, at any rate, the enemy would have five or six marches more to make before reaching-it,--which was a highly-important consideration as the parties were then situated. no great talent was needed to understand this. hostilities having commenced, however, but a few days after berthier's arrival at munich, this too celebrated chief of staff was so foolish as to adhere to a literal obedience of the order he had received, without conceiving its obvious intention: he not only desired the army to assemble at ratisbon, but even obliged davoust to return toward that city, when that marshal had had the good sense to fall back from amberg toward ingolstadt. napoleon, having, by good fortune, been informed by telegraph of the passage of the inn twenty-four hours after its occurrence, came with the speed of lightning to abensberg, just as davoust was on the point of being surrounded and his army cut in two or scattered by a mass of one hundred and eighty thousand enemies. we know how wonderfully napoleon succeeded in rallying his army, and what victories he gained on the glorious days of abensberg, siegberg, landshut, eckmühl, and ratisbon, that repaired the faults committed by his chief of staff with his contemptible logistics. we shall finish these illustrations with a notice of the events which preceded and were simultaneous with the passage of the danube before the battle of wagram. the measures taken to bring to a specified point of the island of lobau the corps of the viceroy of italy from hungary, that of marmont from styria, that of bernadotte from linz, are less wonderful than the famous imperial decree of thirty-one articles which regulated the details of the passage and the formation of the troops in the plains of enzersdorf, in presence of one hundred and forty thousand austrians and five hundred cannon, as if the operation had been a military _fête_. these masses were all assembled upon the island on the evening of the th of july; three bridges were immediately thrown over an arm of the danube one hundred and fifty yards wide, on a very dark night and amidst torrents of rain; one hundred and fifty thousand men passed over the bridges, in presence of a formidable enemy, and were drawn up before mid-day in the plain, three miles in advance of the bridges which they covered by a change of front; the whole being accomplished in less time than might have been supposed necessary had it been a simple maneuver for instruction and after being several times repeated. the enemy had, it is true, determined to offer no serious opposition to the passage; but napoleon did not know that fact, and the merit of his dispositions is not at all diminished by it. singularly enough, however, the chief of staff, although he made ten copies of the famous decree, did not observe that by mistake the bridge of the center had been assigned to davoust, who had the right wing, whilst the bridge on the right was assigned to oudinot, who was in the center. these two corps passed each other in the night, and, had it not been for the good sense of the men and their officers, a dreadful scene of confusion might have been the result. thanks to the supineness of the enemy, the army escaped all disorder, except that arising from a few detachments following corps to which they did not belong. the most remarkable feature of the whole transaction is found in the fact that after such a blunder berthier should have received the title of prince of wagram. the error doubtless originated with napoleon while dictating his decree; but should it not have been detected by a chief of staff who made ten copies of the order and whose duty it was to supervise the formation of the troops? another no less extraordinary example of the importance of good logistics was afforded at the battle of leipsic. in fighting this battle, with a defile in rear of the army as at leipsic, and in the midst of low ground, wooded, and cut up by small streams and gardens, it was highly important to have a number of small bridges, to prepare the banks for approaching them with ease, and to stake out the roads. these precautions would not have prevented the loss of a decisive battle; but they would have saved the lives of a considerable number of men, as well as the guns and carriages that were abandoned on account of the disorder and of there being no roads of escape. the unaccountable blowing up of the bridge of lindenau was also the result of unpardonable carelessness upon the part of the staff corps, which indeed existed only in name, owing to the manner of berthier's management of it. we must also agree that napoleon, who was perfectly conversant with the logistical measures of an offensive campaign, had then never seriously thought what would be proper precautions in the event of defeat, and when the emperor was present himself no one thought of making any arrangement for the future unless by his direction. to complete what i proposed when i commenced this article, it becomes necessary for me to add some remarks with reference to reconnoissances. they are of two kinds: the first are entirely topographical and statistical, and their object is to gain a knowledge of a country, its accidents of ground, its roads, defiles, bridges, &c., and to learn its resources and means of every kind. at the present day, when the sciences of geography, topography, and statistics are in such an advanced state, these reconnoissances are less necessary than formerly; but they are still very useful, and it is not probable that the statistics of any country will ever be so accurate that they may be entirely dispensed with. there are many excellent books of instruction as to the art of making these reconnoissances, and i must direct the attention of my readers to them. reconnoissances of the other kind are ordered when it is necessary to gain information of the movements of the enemy. they are made by detachments of greater or less strength. if the enemy is drawn up in battle-order, the generals-in-chief or the chiefs of staff make the reconnoissance; if he is on the march, whole divisions of cavalry may be thrown out to break through his screen of posts. footnotes: [footnote : i refer here to general instructions and forms, which are not to be repeated every day: such repetition would be impracticable.] [footnote : the chiefs of artillery, of engineers, and of the administrative departments all claim to have direct connection with the general-in-chief, and not with the chief of staff. there should, of course, be no hinderance to the freest intercourse between these high officers and the commander; but he should work with them in presence of the chief of staff, and send him all their correspondence: otherwise, confusion is inevitable.] [footnote : i believe that at the passage of the danube before wagram, and at the opening of the second campaign of , napoleon deviated from his usual custom by issuing a general order.] [footnote : napoleon never did this, because he maintained that no general should ever think seriously of the possibility of being beaten. in many marches it is certainly a useless precaution; but it is often indispensable.] [footnote : it may be objected that in some wars, as where the population is hostile, it may be very difficult, or impracticable, to organize lines of depots. in such cases they will certainly be exposed to great dangers; but these are the very cases where they are most necessary and should be most numerous. the line from bayonne to madrid was such a line, which resisted for four years the attacks of the guerrillas,--although convoys were sometimes seized. at one time the line extended as far as cadiz.] article xlii. of reconnoissances and other means of gaining correct information of the movements of the enemy. one of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war would be to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the enemy's proceedings. in fact, how can any man say what he should do himself, if he is ignorant what his adversary is about? as it is unquestionably of the highest importance to gain this information, so it is a thing of the utmost difficulty, not to say impossibility; and this is one of the chief causes of the great difference between the theory and the practice of war. from this cause arise the mistakes of those generals who are simply learned men without a natural talent for war, and who have not acquired that practical _coup-d'oeil_ which is imparted by long experience in the direction of military operations. it is a very easy matter for a school-man to make a plan for outflanking a wing or threatening a line of communications upon a map, where he can regulate the positions of both parties to suit himself; but when he has opposed to him a skillful, active, and enterprising adversary, whose movements are a perfect riddle, then his difficulties begin, and we see an exhibition of the incapacity of an ordinary general with none of the resources of genius. i have seen so many proofs of this truth in my long life, that, if i had to put a general to the test, i should have a much higher regard for the man who could form sound conclusions as to the movements of the enemy than for him who could make a grand display of theories,--things so difficult to put in practice, but so easily understood when once exemplified. there are four means of obtaining information of the enemy's operations. the first is a well-arranged system of espionage; the second consists in reconnoissances made by skillful officers and light troops; the third, in questioning prisoners of war; the fourth, in forming hypotheses of probabilities. this last idea i will enlarge upon farther on. there is also a fifth method,--that of signals. although this is used rather for indicating the presence of the enemy than for forming conclusions as to his designs, it may be classed with the others. spies will enable a general to learn more surely than by any other agency what is going on in the midst of the enemy's camps; for reconnoissances, however well made, can give no information of any thing beyond the line of the advanced guard. i do not mean to say that they should not be resorted to, for we must use every means of gaining information; but i do say that their results are small and not to be depended upon. reports of prisoners are often useful, but it is generally dangerous to credit them. a skillful chief of staff will always be able to select intelligent officers who can so frame their questions as to elicit important information from prisoners and deserters. the partisans who are sent to hang around the enemy's lines of operations may doubtless learn something of his movements; but it is almost impossible to communicate with them and receive the information they possess. an extensive system of espionage will generally be successful: it is, however, difficult for a spy to penetrate to the general's closet and learn the secret plans he may form: it is best for him, therefore, to limit himself to information of what he sees with his own eyes or hears from reliable persons. even when the general receives from his spies information of movements, he still knows nothing of those which may since have taken place, nor of what the enemy is going finally to attempt. suppose, for example, he learns that such a corps has passed through jena toward weimar, and that another has passed through gera toward naumburg: he must still ask himself the questions, where are they going, and what enterprise are they engaged in? these things the most skillful spy cannot learn. when armies camped in tents and in a single mass, information of the enemy's operations was certain, because reconnoitering-parties could be thrown forward in sight of the camps, and the spies could report accurately their movements; but with the existing organization into corps d'armée which either canton or bivouac, it is very difficult to learn any thing about them. spies may, however, be very useful when the hostile army is commanded by a great captain or a great sovereign who always moves with the mass of his troops or with the reserves. such, for example, were the emperors alexander and napoleon. if it was known when they moved and what route they followed, it was not difficult to conclude what project was in view, and the details of the movements of smaller bodies needed not to be attended to particularly. a skillful general may supply the defects of the other methods by making reasonable and well-founded hypotheses. i can with great satisfaction say that this means hardly ever failed me. though fortune never placed me at the head of an army, i have been chief of staff to nearly a hundred thousand men, and have been many times called into the councils of the greatest sovereigns of the day, when the question under consideration was the proper direction to give to the combined armies of europe; and i was never more than two or three times mistaken in my hypotheses and in my manner of solving the difficulties they offered. as i have said before, i have constantly noticed that, as an army can operate only upon the center or one extremity of its front of operations, there are seldom more than three or four suppositions that can possibly be made. a mind fully convinced of these truths and conversant with the principles of war will always be able to form a plan which will provide in advance for the probable contingencies of the future. i will cite a few examples which have come under my own observation. in , when people in france were still uncertain as to the war with prussia, i wrote a memoir upon the probabilities of the war and the operations which would take place. i made the three following hypotheses:-- st. the prussians will await napoleon's attack behind the elbe, and will fight on the defensive as far as the oder, in expectation of aid from russia and austria; d. or they will advance upon the saale, resting their left upon the frontier of bohemia and defending the passes of the mountains of franconia; d. or else, expecting the french by the great mayence road, they will advance imprudently to erfurt. i do not believe any other suppositions could be made, unless the prussians were thought to be so foolish as to divide their forces, already inferior to the french, upon the two directions of wesel and mayence,--a useless mistake, since there had not been a french soldier on the first of these roads since the seven years' war. these hypotheses having been made as above stated, if any one should ask what course napoleon ought to pursue, it was easy to reply "that the mass of the french army being already assembled in bavaria, it should be thrown upon the left of the prussians by way of grera and hof, for the gordian knot of the campaign was in that direction, no matter what plan they should adopt." if they advanced to erfurt, he could move to gera, cut their line of retreat, and press them back along the lower elbe to the north sea. if they rested upon the saale, he could attack their left by way of hof and gera, defeat them partially, and reach berlin before them by way of leipsic. if they stood fast behind the elbe, he must still attack them by way of gera and hof. since napoleon's direction of operations was so clearly fixed, what mattered it to him to know the details of their movements? being certain of the correctness of these principles, i did not hesitate to announce, _a month before the war_, that napoleon would attempt just what he did, and that if the prussians passed the saale battles would take place at jena and naumburg! i relate this circumstance not from a feeling of vanity, for if that were my motive i might mention many more of a similar character. i have only been anxious to show that in war a plan of operations may be often arranged, simply based upon the general principles of the art, without much attention being of necessity given to the details of the enemy's movements. returning to our subject, i must state that the use of spies has been neglected to a remarkable degree in many modern armies. in the staff of prince schwarzenberg had not a single sou for expenditure for such services, and the emperor alexander was obliged to furnish the staff officers with funds from his own private purse to enable them to send agents into lusatia for the purpose of finding out napoleon's whereabouts. general mack at ulm, and the duke of brunswick in , were no better informed; and the french generals in spain often suffered severely, because it was impossible to obtain spies and to get information as to what was going on around them. the russian army is better provided than any other for gathering information, by the use of roving bodies of cossacks; and history confirms my assertion. the expedition of prince koudacheff, who was sent after the battle of dresden to the prince of sweden, and who crossed the elbe by swimming and marched in the midst of the french columns as far, nearly, as wittenberg, is a remarkable instance of this class. the information furnished by the partisan troops of generals czernicheff, benkendorf, davidoff, and seslawin was exceedingly valuable. we may recollect it was through a dispatch from napoleon to the empress maria louisa, intercepted near châlons by the cossacks, that the allies were informed of the plan he had formed of falling upon their communications with his whole disposable force, basing his operations upon the fortified towns of lorraine and alsace. this highly-important piece of information decided blücher and schwarzenberg to effect a junction of their armies, which the plainest principles of strategy had never previously brought to act in concert except at leipsic and brienne. we know, also, that the warning given by seslawin to general doctoroff saved him from being crushed at borovsk by napoleon, who had just left moscow in retreat with his whole army. doctoroff did not at first credit this news,--which so irritated seslawin that he effected the capture of a french officer and several soldiers of the guard from the french bivouacs and sent them as proofs of its correctness. this warning, which decided the march of koutousoff to maloi-yaroslavitz, prevented napoleon from taking the way by kalouga, where he would have found greater facilities for refitting his army and would have escaped the disastrous days of krasnoi and the beresina. the catastrophe which befell him would thus have been lessened, though not entirely prevented. such examples, rare as they are, give us an excellent idea of what good partisan troops can accomplish when led by good officers. i will conclude this article with the following summary:-- . a general should neglect no means of gaining information of the enemy's movements, and, for this purpose, should make use of reconnoissances, spies, bodies of light troops commanded by capable officers, signals, and questioning deserters and prisoners. . by multiplying the means of obtaining information; for, no matter how imperfect and contradictory they may be, the truth may often be sifted from them. . perfect reliance should be placed on none of these means. . as it is impossible to obtain exact information by the methods mentioned, a general should never move without arranging several courses of action for himself, based upon probable hypotheses that the relative situation of the armies enables him to make, and never losing sight of the principles of the art. i can assure a general that, with such precautions, nothing very unexpected can befall him and cause his ruin,--as has so often happened to others; for, unless he is totally unfit to command an army, he should at least be able to form reasonable suppositions as to what the enemy is going to do, and fix for himself a certain line of conduct to suit each of these hypotheses.[ ] it cannot be too much insisted upon that the real secret of military genius consists in the ability to make these reasonable suppositions in any case; and, although their number is always small, it is wonderful how much this highly-useful means of regulating one's conduct is neglected. in order to make this article complete, i must state what is to be gained by using a system of signals. of these there are several kinds. telegraphic signals may be mentioned as the most important of all. napoleon owes his astonishing success at ratisbon, in , to the fact of his having established a telegraphic communication between the head-quarters of the army and france. he was still at paris when the austrian army crossed the inn at braunau with the intention of invading bavaria and breaking through his line of cantonments. informed, in twenty-four hours, of what was passing at a distance of seven hundred miles, he threw himself into his traveling-carriage, and a week later he had gained two victories under the walls of ratisbon. without the telegraph, the campaign would have been lost. this single fact is sufficient to impress us with an idea of its value. it has been proposed to use portable telegraphs. such a telegraphic arrangement, operated by men on horseback posted on high ground, could communicate the orders of the center to the extremities of a line of battle, as well as the reports of the wings to the head-quarters. repeated trials of it were made in russia; but the project was given up,--for what reason, however, i have not been able to learn. these communications could only be very brief, and in misty weather the method could not be depended upon. a vocabulary for such purposes could be reduced to a few short phrases, which might easily be represented by signs. i think it a method by no means useless, even if it should be necessary to send duplicates of the orders by officers capable of transmitting them with accuracy. there would certainly be a gain of rapidity.[ ] attempt of another kind was made in , at the battle of fleurus, where general jourdan made use of the services of a balloonist to observe and give notice of the movements of the austrians. i am not aware that he found the method a very useful one, as it was not again used; but it was claimed at the time that it assisted in gaining him the victory: of this, however, i have great doubts. it is probable that the difficulty of having a balloonist in readiness to make an ascension at the proper moment, and of his making careful observations upon what is going on below, whilst floating at the mercy of the winds above, has led to the abandonment of this method of gaining information. by giving the balloon no great elevation, sending up with it an officer capable of forming correct opinions as to the enemy's movements, and perfecting a system of signals to be used in connection with the balloon, considerable advantages might be expected from its use. sometimes the smoke of the battle, and the difficulty of distinguishing the columns, that look like liliputians, so as to know to which party they belong, will make the reports of the balloonists very unreliable. for example, a balloonist would have been greatly embarrassed in deciding, at the battle of waterloo, whether it was grouchy or blücher who was seen coming up by the saint-lambert road; but this uncertainty need not exist where the armies are not so much mixed. i had ocular proof of the advantage to be derived from such observations when i was stationed in the spire of gautsch, at the battle of leipsic; and prince schwarzenberg's aid-de-camp, whom i had conducted to the same point, could not deny that it was at my solicitation the prince was prevailed upon to emerge from the marsh between the pleisse and the elster. an observer is doubtless more at his ease in a clock-tower than in a frail basket floating in mid-air; but steeples are not always at hand in the vicinity of battle-fields, and they cannot be transported at pleasure. there is still another method of signaling, by the use of large fires kindled upon elevated points of the country. before the invention of the telegraph, they afforded the means of transmitting the news of an invasion from one end of the country to the other. the swiss have made use of them to call the militia to arms. they have been also used to give the alarm to winter quarters and to assemble the troops more rapidly. the signal-fires may be made still more useful if arranged so as to indicate to the corps of the army the direction of the enemy's threatening movements and the point where they should concentrate to meet him. these signals may also serve on sea-coasts to give notice of descents. finally, there is a kind of signals given to troops during an action, by means of military instruments. this method of signals has been brought to greater perfection in the russian army than in any other i know of. while i am aware of the great importance of discovering a sure method of setting in motion simultaneously a large mass of troops at the will of the commander, i am convinced that it must be a long time before the problem is solved. signals with instruments are of little use except for skirmishers. a movement of a long line of troops may be made nearly simultaneous by means of a shout begun at one point and passed rapidly from man to man; but these shouts seem generally to be a sort of inspiration, and are seldom the result of an order. i have seen but two cases of it in thirteen campaigns. footnotes: [footnote : i shall be accused, i suppose, of saying that no event in war can ever occur which may not be foreseen and provided for. to prove the falsity of this accusation, it is sufficient for me to cite the surprises of cremona, berg-op-zoom, and hochkirch. i am still of the opinion, however, that such events even as these might always have been anticipated, entirely or in part, as at least within the limits of probability or possibility.] [footnote : when the above was written, the magnetic telegraph was not known.--translators.] chapter vii. of the formation of troops for battle, and the separate or combined use of the three arms. article xliii. posting troops in line of battle. having explained in article xxx. what is to be understood by the term _line of battle_, it is proper to add in what manner it is to be formed, and how the different troops are to be distributed in it. before the french revolution, all the infantry, formed in regiments and brigades, was collected in a single battle-corps, drawn up in two lines, each of which had a right and a left wing. the cavalry was usually placed upon the wings, and the artillery--which at this period was very unwieldy--was distributed along the front of each line. the army camped together, marching by lines or by wings; and, as there were two cavalry wings and two infantry wings, if the march was by wings four columns were thus formed. when they marched by lines, (which was specially applicable to flank movements,) two columns were formed, unless, on account of local circumstances, the cavalry or a part of the infantry had camped in a third line,--which was rare. this method simplified logistics very much, since it was only necessary to give such orders as the following:--"the army will move in such direction, by lines or by wings, by the right or by the left." this monotonous but simple formation was seldom deviated from; and no better could have been devised as war was carried on in those days. the french attempted something new at minden, by forming as many columns as brigades, and opening roads to bring them to the front in line,--a simple impossibility. if the labor of staff officers was diminished by this method of camping and marching by lines, it must be evident that if such a system were applied to an army of one hundred thousand or one hundred and fifty thousand men, there would be no end to the columns, and the result would be the frequent occurrence of routs like that of rossbach. the french revolution introduced the system of divisions, which broke up the excessive compactness of the old formation, and brought upon the field fractions capable of independent movement on any kind of ground. this change was a real improvement,--although they went from one extreme to the other, by returning nearly to the legionary formation of the romans. these divisions, composed usually of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, maneuvered and fought separately. they were very much extended, either to enable them to subsist without the use of depots, or with an absurd expectation of prolonging the line in order to outflank that of the enemy. the seven or eight divisions of an army were sometimes seen marching on the same number of roads, ten or twelve miles distant from each other; the head-quarters was at the center, with no other support than five or six small regiments of cavalry of three hundred or four hundred men each, so that if the enemy concentrated the mass of his forces against one of these divisions and beat it, the line was pierced, and the general-in-chief, having no disposable infantry reserve, could do nothing but order a retreat to rally his scattered columns. bonaparte in his first italian campaign remedied this difficulty, partly by the mobility of his army and the rapidity of his maneuvers, and partly by concentrating the mass of his divisions upon the point where the decisive blow was to fall. when he became the head of the government, and saw the sphere of his means and his plans constantly increasing in magnitude, he readily perceived that a stronger organization was necessary: he avoided the extremes of the old system and the new, while still retaining the advantages of the divisional system. beginning with the campaign of , he organized corps of two or three divisions, which he placed under the command of lieutenant-generals, and formed of them the wings, the center, and the reserve of his army.[ ] this system was finally developed fully at the camp of boulogne, where he organized permanent army corps under the command of marshals, who had under their orders three divisions of infantry, one of light cavalry, from thirty-six to forty pieces of cannon, and a number of sappers. each corps was thus a small army, able at need to act independently as an army. the heavy cavalry was collected in a single strong reserve, composed of two divisions of cuirassiers, four of dragoons, and one of light cavalry. the grenadiers and the guard formed an admirable infantry reserve. at a later period-- --the cavalry was also organized into corps of three divisions, to give greater unity of action to the constantly-increasing masses of this arm. this organization was as near perfection as possible; and the grand army, that brought about such great results, was the model which all the armies of europe soon imitated. some military men, in their attempts to perfect the art, have recommended that the infantry division, which sometimes has to act independently, should contain three instead of two brigades, because this number will allow one for the center and each wing. this would certainly be an improvement; for if the division contains but two brigades there is an open space left in the center between the brigades on the wings: these brigades, having no common central support, cannot with safety act independently of each other. besides this, with three brigades in a division, two may be engaged while the third is held in reserve,--a manifest advantage. but, if thirty brigades formed in ten divisions of three brigades are better than when formed in fifteen divisions of two brigades, it becomes necessary, in order to obtain this perfect divisional organization, to increase the numbers of the infantry by one-third, or to reduce the divisions of the army-corps from three to two,--which last would be a serious disadvantage, because the army-corps is much more frequently called upon to act independently than a division, and the subdivision into three parts is specially best for that[ ]. what is the best organization to be given an army just setting out upon a campaign will for a long time to come be a problem in logistics; because it is extremely difficult to maintain the original organization in the midst of the operations of war, and detachments must be sent out continually. the history of the grand army of boulogne, whose organization seemed to leave nothing farther to be desired, proves the assertion just made. the center under soult, the right under davoust, the left under ney, and the reserve under lannes, formed together a regular and formidable battle-corps of thirteen divisions of infantry, without counting those of the guard and the grenadiers. besides these, the corps of bernadotte and marmont detached to the right, and that of augereau to the left, were ready for action on the flanks. but after the passage of the danube at donauwerth every thing was changed. ney, at first reinforced to five divisions, was reduced to two; the battle-corps was divided partly to the right and partly to the left, so that this fine arrangement was destroyed. it will always be difficult to fix upon a stable organization. events are, however, seldom so complicated as those of ; and moreau's campaign of proves that the original organization may sometimes be maintained, at least for the mass of the army. with this view, it would seem prudent to organize an army in four parts,--two wings, a center, and a reserve. the composition of these parts may vary with the strength of the army; but in order to retain this organization it becomes necessary to have a certain number of divisions out of the general line in order to furnish the necessary detachments. while these divisions are with the army, they may be attached to that part which is to receive or give the heaviest blows; or they may be employed on the flanks of the main body, or to increase the strength of the reserve. bach of the four great parts of the army may be a single corps of three or four divisions, or two corps of two divisions each. in this last case there would be seven corps, allowing one for the reserve; but this last corps should contain three divisions, to give a reserve to each wing and to the center. with seven corps, unless several more are kept out of the general line in order to furnish detachments, it may happen that the extreme corps may be detached, so that each wing might contain but two divisions, and from these a brigade might be occasionally detached to flank the march of the army, leaving but three brigades to a wing. this would be a weak order of battle. these facts lead me to conclude that an organization of the line of battle in four corps of three divisions of infantry and one of light cavalry, with three or four divisions for detachments, would be more stable than one of seven corps, each of two divisions. but, as every thing depends upon the strength of the army and of the units of which it is composed, as well as upon the character of the operations in which it may be engaged, the arrangement may be greatly varied. i cannot go into these details, and shall simply exhibit the principal combinations that may result from forming the divisions in two or three brigades and the corps in two or three divisions. i have indicated the formation of two infantry corps in two lines, either one behind the other, or side by side. (see figures from to inclusive.) _different formations of lines of battle for two corps of infantry._ [illustration: fig. . two corps deployed, one behind the other.] first corps. ----- ----- ^ ----- ----- d division. | st division. second corps. ----- ----- ^ ----- ----- d division. | st division. [illustration: fig. . two corps formed side by side.] second corps. ^ first corps. | ----- ----- | ----- ----- st division. | st division. | ----- ----- | ----- ----- d division. | d division. [illustration: fig. . two corps of divisions of brigades each.] first corps. ----- ----- ----- ^ ----- ----- ----- d division. | st division. second corps. ----- ----- ----- ^ ----- ----- ----- d division. | st division. [illustration: fig. . two corps side by side.] second corps. ^ first corps. | ----- ----- ----- | ----- ----- ----- st division. | st division. | ----- ----- ----- | ----- ----- ----- d division. | d division. [illustration: fig. . corps of divisions of brigades each.] first corps. d division. st division. ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- second corps. d division. st division. ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- [illustration: fig. . corps of divisions of brigades each, placed side by side.] second corps. ^ first corps. | st division. | st division. ----- ----- | ----- ----- ----- | ----- | d division. | d division. ----- ----- | ----- ----- ----- | ----- _formation of two corps of three divisions of two brigades each._ [illustration: fig. .] first corps. ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- d division. | d division. | st division. second corps. ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- d division. | d division. | st division. [illustration: fig. .] second corps. ^ first corps. ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- | ---- ---- ^ ---- ---- d division. | st division | d division. | st division | ---- ---- | ---- ---- d division. | d division. [illustration: fig. .] d corps. ^ st corps. | ---- ---- | ---- ---- st division.| st division. | ---- ---- | ---- ---- d division. | d division. | ---- ---- | ---- ---- d division. | d division. * * * * * _two corps of three divisions of three brigades each._ [illustration: fig. . two divisions in the st line, and one in the d line.] first corps. ^ ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- d division. | st division. ---- ---- ---- d division. second corps. ^ ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- d division. | st division. ---- ---- ---- d division. [illustration: fig. . same order with d brigade as reserve, and the corps side by side.] second corps. ^ first corps. | d division. ^ st division. | d division. ^ st division. ---- ---- | ---- ---- | ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- | ---- | ---- | | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- d division. | d division. [illustration: _shallower formation: twelve brigades in the first line, and six in the second line._ fig. .] second corps. ^ first corps. | d division. ^ st division. | d division. ^ st division. ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- | ---- ---- ---- d division. | d division. * * * * * note.--in all these formations the unit is the brigade in line; but these lines may be formed of deployed battalions, or of battalions in columns of attack by divisions of two companies. the cavalry attached to the corps will be placed on the flanks. the brigades might be so drawn up as to have one regiment in the first line and one in the second. the question here presents itself, whether it is ever proper to place two corps one behind the other, as napoleon often did, particularly at wagram. i think that, except for the reserves, this arrangement may be used only in a position of expectation, and never as an order of battle; for it is much better for each corps to have its own second line and its reserve than to pile up several corps, one behind the other, under different commanders. however much one general may be disposed to support a colleague, he will always object to dividing up his troops for that purpose; and when in the general of the first line he sees not a colleague, but a hated rival, as too frequently happens, it is probable he will be very slow in furnishing the assistance which may be greatly needed. moreover, a commander whose troops are spread out in a long line cannot execute his maneuvers with near so much facility as if his front was only half as great and was supported by the remainder of his own troops drawn up in rear. the table below[ ] will show that the number of men in an army will have great influence in determining the best formation for it, and that the subject is a complicated one. in making our calculations, it is scarcely necessary to provide for the case of such immense masses being in the field as were seen from to , when a single army contained fourteen corps varying in strength from two to five divisions. with such large numbers nothing better can be proposed than a subdivision into corps of three divisions each. of these corps, eight would form the main body, and there would remain six for detachments and for strengthening any point of the main line that might require support. if this system be applied to an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men, it would be hardly practicable to employ divisions of two brigades each where napoleon and the allies used corps. if nine divisions form the main body,--that is, the wings and the center,--and six others form the reserve and detachments, fifteen divisions would be required, or thirty brigades,--which would make one hundred and eighty battalions, if each regiment contains three battalions. this supposition brings our army up to one hundred and forty-five thousand foot-soldiers and two hundred thousand in all. with regiments of two battalions there would be required one hundred and twenty battalions, or ninety-six thousand infantry; but if each regiment contains but two battalions, each battalion should be one thousand men strong, and this would increase the infantry to one hundred and twenty thousand men and the entire army to one hundred and sixty thousand men. these calculations show that the strength of the minor subdivisions must be carefully considered in arranging into corps and divisions. if an army does not contain more than one hundred thousand men, the formation by divisions is perhaps better than by corps. an example of this was napoleon's army of . having now endeavored to explain the best method of giving a somewhat permanent organization to the main body of an army, it will not be out of place for me to inquire whether this permanency is desirable, and if it is not advantageous to deceive the enemy by frequently changing the composition of corps and their positions. i admit the advantage of thus deceiving the enemy; but it may be gained while still retaining a quite constant organization of the main body. if the divisions intended for detachments are joined to the wings and the center,--that is, if those parts contain each four divisions instead of three,--and if one or two divisions be occasionally added to the wing which is likely to bear the brunt of an engagement, each wing will be a corps properly of four divisions; but detachments will generally reduce it to three, and sometimes two, while it might, again, be reinforced by a portion of the reserve until it reached five divisions. the enemy would thus never know exactly the strength of the different parts of the line. but i have dwelt sufficiently on these details. it is probable that, whatever be the strength and number of the subdivisions of an army, the organization into corps will long be retained by all the great powers of europe, and calculations for the arrangement of the line of battle must be made upon that basis. the distribution of the troops in the line of battle has changed in recent times, as well as the manner of arranging the line. formerly it was usually composed of two lines, but now of two lines and one or more reserves. in recent[ ] conflicts in europe, when the masses brought into collision were very large, the corps were not only formed in two lines, but one corps was placed behind another, thus making four lines; and, the reserve being drawn up in the same manner, six lines of infantry were often the result, and several of cavalry. such a formation may answer well enough as a preparatory one, but is by no means the best for battle, as it is entirely too deep. the classical formation--if i may employ that term--is still two lines for the infantry. the greater or less extent of the battle-field and the strength of an army may necessarily produce greater depth at times; but these cases are the exceptions, because the formation of two lines and the reserves gives sufficient solidity, and enables a greater number of men to be simultaneously engaged. when an army has a permanent advanced guard, it may be either formed in front of the line of battle or be carried to the rear to strengthen the reserve;[ ] but, as has been previously stated, this will not often happen with the present method of forming and moving armies. each wing has usually its own advanced guard, and the advanced guard of the main or central portion of the army is naturally furnished by the leading corps: upon coming into view of the enemy, these advanced bodies return to their proper positions in line of battle. often the cavalry reserve is almost entirely with the advanced guard; but this does not prevent its taking, when necessary, the place fixed for it in the line of battle by the character of the position or by the wishes of the commanding general. from what has been stated above, my readers will gather that very great changes of army organization took place from the time of the revival of the art of war and the invention of gunpowder to the french revolution, and that to have a proper appreciation of the wars of louis xiv., of peter the great, and of frederick ii., they should consider them from the stand-point of those days. one portion of the old method may still be employed; and if, by way of example, it may not be regarded as a fundamental rule to post the cavalry on the wings, it may still be a very good arrangement for an army of fifty or sixty thousand men, especially when the ground in the center is not so suitable for the evolutions of cavalry as that near the extremities. it is usual to attach one or two brigades of light cavalry to each infantry corps, those of the center being placed in preference to the rear, whilst those of the wings are placed upon the flanks. if the reserves of cavalry are sufficiently numerous to permit the organization of three corps of this arm, giving one as reserve to the center and one to each wing, the arrangement is certainly a good one. if that is impossible, this reserve may be formed in two columns, one on the right of the left wing and the other on the left of the right wing. these columns may thus readily move to any point of the line that may be threatened.[ ] the artillery of the present day has greater mobility, and may, as formerly, be distributed along the front, that of each division remaining near it. it may be observed, moreover, that, the organization of the artillery having been greatly improved, an advantageous distribution of it may be more readily made; but it is a great mistake to scatter it too much. few precise rules can be laid down for the proper distribution of artillery. who, for example, would dare to advise as a rule the filling up of a large gap in a line of battle with one hundred pieces of cannon in a single battery without adequate support, as napoleon did successfully at wagram? i do not desire to go here into much detail with reference to the use of this arm, but i will give the following rules:-- . the horse-artillery should be placed on such ground that it can move freely in every direction. . foot-artillery, on the contrary, and especially that of heavy caliber, will be best posted where protected by ditches or hedges from sudden charges of cavalry. it is hardly necessary for me to add--what every young officer should know already--that too elevated positions are not those to give artillery its greatest effect. flat or gently-sloping ground is better. . the horse-artillery usually maneuvers with the cavalry; but it is well for each army-corps to have its own horse-artillery, to be readily thrown into any desired position. it is, moreover, proper to have horse-artillery in reserve, which may be carried as rapidly as possible to any threatened point. general benningsen had great cause for self-congratulation at eylau because he had fifty light guns in reserve; for they had a powerful influence in enabling him to recover himself when his line had been broken through between the center and the left. . on the defensive, it is well to place some of the heavy batteries in front, instead of holding them in reserve, since it is desirable to attack the enemy at the greatest possible distance, with a view of checking his forward movement and causing disorder in his columns. . on the defensive, it seems also advisable to have the artillery not in reserve distributed at equal intervals in batteries along the whole line, since it is important to repel the enemy at all points. this must not, however, be regarded as an invariable rule; for the character of the position and the designs of the enemy may oblige the mass of the artillery to move to a wing or to the center. . in the offensive, it is equally advantageous to concentrate a very powerful artillery-fire upon a single point where it is desired to make a decisive stroke, with a view of shattering the enemy's line to such a degree that he will be unable to withstand an attack upon which the fate of the battle is to turn. i shall at another place have more to say as to the employment of artillery in battles. footnotes: [footnote : thus, the army of the rhine was composed of a right wing of three divisions under lecourbe, of a center of three divisions under saint-cyr, and of a left of two divisions under saint-suzanne, the general-in-chief having three divisions more as a reserve under his own immediate orders.] [footnote : thirty brigades formed in fifteen divisions of two brigades each will have only fifteen brigades in the first line, while the same thirty brigades formed in ten divisions of three brigades each may have twenty brigades in the first line and ten in the second. but it then becomes necessary to diminish the number of divisions and to have but two in a corps,--which would be a faulty arrangement, because the corps is much more likely to be called upon for independent action than the division.] [footnote : every army has two wings, a center, and a reserve,--in all, four principal subdivisions,--besides accidental detachments. below are some of the different formations that may be given to infantry. st. in regiments of two battalions of eight hundred men each:-- div's. brig's. batt'ns. men. four corps of two divisions each, and three divisions for detachments.................. = = = , four corps of three divisions each, and three divisions for detachments................... = = = , seven corps of two divisions each, and one corps for detachments....................... = = = , d. in regiments of three battalions, brigades of six battalions:-- div's. brig's. batt'ns. men. four corps of two divisions each, besides detachments,............................... = = , four corps of three divisions each, besides detachments................................ = = = , eight corps of two divisions each............ = = = , if to these numbers we add one-fourth for cavalry, artillery, and engineers, the total force for the above formations may be known. it is to be observed that regiments of two battalions if eight hundred men each would become very weak at the end of two or three months' campaigning. if they do not consist of three battalions, then each battalion should contain one thousand men.] [footnote : the term _recent_ here refers to the later wars of napoleon i.--translators.] [footnote : as the advanced guard is in presence of the enemy every day, and forms the rear-guard in retreat, it seems but fair at the hour of battle to assign it a position more retired than that in front of the line of battle.] [footnote : this disposition of the cavalry, of course, is made upon the supposition that the ground is favorably situated for it. this is the essential condition of every well-arranged line of battle.] article xliv. formation and employment of infantry. infantry is undoubtedly the most important arm of the service, since it forms four-fifths of an army and is used both in the attack and defense of positions. if we must admit that, next to the genius of the general, the infantry arm is the most valuable instrument in gaining a victory, it is no less true that most important aid is given by the cavalry and artillery, and that without their assistance the infantry might at times be very seriously compromised, and at others could achieve only partial success. we shall not here introduce those old discussions about the shallow and the deep formations, although the question, which was supposed decided, is far from being settled absolutely. the war in spain and the battle of waterloo have again given rise to disputes as to the relative advantages of fire and the shallow order, and of columns of attack and the deep order. i will give my own opinion farther on. there must, however, be no misconception on this subject. the question now is not whether lloyd was right in wishing to add a fourth rank, armed with pikes, to the infantry formation, with the expectation of producing more effect by the shock when attacking, or opposing a greater resistance when attacked. every officer of experience knows the difficulty of moving in an orderly manner several deployed battalions in three ranks at close order, and that a fourth rank would increase the disorder without adding any advantage. it is astonishing that lloyd, who had seen service, should have insisted so much upon the material advantage to be gained by thus increasing the mass of a battalion; for it very rarely happens that such a collision between opposing troops takes place that mere weight decides the contest. if three ranks turn their backs to the enemy, the fourth will not check them. this increase in the number of ranks diminishes the front and the number of men firing upon the defensive, whilst in the offensive there is not near so much mobility as in the ordinary column of attack. it is much more difficult to move eight hundred men in line of battle in four ranks than in three: although in the former case the extent of front is less, the ranks cannot be kept properly closed. lloyd's proposal for remedying this diminution of front is so absurd that it is wonderful how a man of talents could have imagined it. he wishes to deploy twenty battalions, and leave between them one hundred and fifty yards, or an interval equal to their front. we may well ask what would befall those battalions thus separated. the cavalry may penetrate the intervals and scatter them like dust before the whirlwind. but the real question now is, shall the line of battle consist of deployed battalions depending chiefly upon their fire, or of columns of attack, each battalion being formed in column on the central division and depending on its force and impetuosity? i will now proceed to sum up the particulars bearing upon a decision of the question in hand. there are, in fact, only five methods of forming troops to attack an enemy:--l, as skirmishers; , in deployed lines, either continuous or checkerwise; , in lines of battalions formed in column on the central divisions; , in deep masses; , in small squares. the skirmishing-order is an accessory; for the duties of skirmishers are, not to form the line of battle, but to cover it by taking advantage of the ground, to protect the movements of columns, to fill up intervals, and to defend the skirts of a position. these different manners of formation are, therefore, reducible to four: the shallow order, where the line is deployed in three ranks; the half-deep order, formed of a line of battalions in columns doubled on the center or in battalion squares; the mixed order, where regiments are partly in line and partly in column; finally, the deep order, composed of heavy columns of battalions deployed one behind the other. [illustration: fig. .[ ] deployed order in two lines. ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ] the formation into two deployed lines with a reserve was formerly used to a great extent: it is particularly suitable on the defensive. these deployed lines may either be continuous, (fig. ,) or checkerwise, or in echelons. [illustration: fig. . twelve battalions in columns of attack in two lines, with skirmishers in the intervals. -----...-----...-----...-----...-----...----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----...-----...-----...-----...-----...----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ] a more compact order is shown in fig. , where each battalion is formed into a column of attack, being by divisions upon the central division. it is really a line of small columns in the three-rank formation, a battalion with four divisions[ ] will have twelve ranks in such a column as shown above: there are in this way too many non-combatants, and the column presents too good a mark for the artillery. to remedy in part these inconveniences, it has been proposed, whenever infantry is employed in columns of attack, to form it in two ranks, to place only three divisions of a battalion one behind the other, and to spread out the fourth as skirmishers in the intervals of the battalions and upon the flanks: when the cavalry charges, these skirmishers may rally behind the other three divisions. (see fig. .) each battalion would thus have two hundred more men to fire, besides those thrown into the two front ranks from the third. there would be, also, an increase of the whole front. by this arrangement, while having really a depth of but six men, there would be a front of one hundred men, and four hundred men who could discharge their fire-arms, for each battalion. force and mobility would both be obtained.[ ] a battalion of eight hundred men, formed in the ordinary manner in a column of four divisions, has about sixty files in each division, of which the first alone--and only two ranks of that--discharge their pieces. bach battalion would deliver, therefore, one hundred and twenty shots at a volley, whilst formed in the manner shown in fig. it would deliver four hundred. [illustration: fig. .] while searching after methods of obtaining more fire when necessary, we must not forget that a column of attack is not intended to fire, and that its fire should be reserved until the last; for if it begins to fire while marching, the whole impulsive effect of its forward movement is lost. moreover, this shallower order would only be advantageous against infantry, as the column of four divisions in three ranks--forming a kind of solid square--would be better against cavalry. the archduke charles found it advantageous at essling, and particularly at wagram, to adopt this last order, which was proposed by myself in my chapter on the general principles of war, published in . the brave cavalry of bessières could make no impression upon these small masses. to give more solidity to the column proposed, the skirmishers might, it is true, be recalled, and the fourth division reformed; but this would be a two-rank formation, and would offer much less resistance to a charge than the three-rank formation,--particularly on the flanks. if to remedy this inconvenience it is proposed to form squares, many military men believe that when in two ranks squares would not resist so well as columns. the english squares at waterloo were, however, only in two ranks, and, notwithstanding the heroic efforts of the french cavalry, only one battalion was broken. i will observe, in conclusion, that, if the two-rank formation be used for the columns of attack, it will be difficult to preserve that in three ranks for deployed lines, as it is scarcely possible to have two methods of formation, or, at any rate, to employ them alternately in the same engagement. it is not probable that any european army, except the english, will undertake to use deployed lines in two ranks. if they do, they should never move except in columns of attack. i conclude that the system employed by the russians and prussians, of forming columns of four divisions in three ranks, of which one may be employed as skirmishers when necessary, is more generally applicable than any other; whilst the other, of which mention has been made, would be suitable only in certain cases and would require a double formation. [illustration: fig. .] there is a mixed order, which was used by napoleon at the tagliamento and by the russians at eylau, where, in regiments of three battalions, one was deployed to form the first line, and two others to the rear in columns. (see fig. .) this arrangement--which belongs also to the half-deep order--is suitable for the offensive-defensive, because the first line pours a powerful fire upon the enemy, which must throw him into more or less confusion, and the troops formed in columns may debouch through the intervals and fall with advantage upon him while in disorder. this arrangement would probably be improved by placing the leading divisions of the two battalions of the wings upon the same line with the central deployed battalion. there would thus be a half-battalion more to each regiment in the first line,--a by no means unimportant thing for the delivery of fire. there may be reason to fear that, these divisions becoming actively engaged in firing, their battalions which are formed in column to be readily launched against the enemy may not be easily disengaged for that purpose. the order may be useful in many cases. i have therefore indicated it. [illustration: fig .] [illustration: fig .] the order in very deep masses (see figs. and ) is certainly the most injudicious. in the later wars of napoleon, twelve battalions were sometimes deployed and closed one upon the other, forming thirty-six ranks closely packed together. such masses are greatly exposed to the destructive effects of artillery, their mobility and impulsion are diminished, while their strength is not increased. the use of such masses at waterloo was one cause of the french being defeated. macdonald's column was more fortunate at wagram, but at a great sacrifice of life; and it is not probable that this column would have been victorious had it not been for the successes of davoust and oudinot on the left of the archduke's line. when it is decided to risk such a mass, the precaution should certainly be taken of placing on each flank a battalion marching in file, so that if the enemy should charge the mass in flank it need not be arrested in its progress. (see fig. .) under the protection of these battalions, which may face toward the enemy, the column may continue its march to the point it is expected to reach: otherwise, this large mass, exposed to a powerful converging fire which it has no means of returning, will be thrown into confusion like the column at fontenoy, or broken as was the macedonian phalanx by paulus emilius. squares are good in plains and to oppose an enemy who has a superiority in cavalry. it is agreed that the regimental square is best for the defensive, and the battalion square for the offensive. (see figs. , , .) [illustration: fig. . division in battalion squares.] [illustration: fig. . the same division in long battalion squares.] [illustration: fig. . squared of regiments of three battalions.] the figures may be perfect squares, or elongated to give a large front and pour a heavier column of fire in the direction of the enemy. a regiment of three battalions will thus form a long square, by wheeling the center battalion half to the right and half to the left. in the turkish wars squares were almost exclusively used, because hostilities were carried on in the vast plains of bessarabia, moldavia, or wallachia, and the turks had an immense force of cavalry. but if the seat of war be the balkan mountains or beyond them, and their irregular cavalry be replaced by an army organized according to the proportions usual in europe, the importance of the square will disappear, and the russian infantry will show its superiority in rumelia. however this may be, the order in squares by regiments or battalions seems suitable for every kind of attack, when the assailant has not the superiority in cavalry and maneuvers on level ground advantageous for the enemy's charges. the elongated square, especially when applied to a battalion of eight companies, three of which would march in front and one on each side, would be much better to make an attack than a deployed battalion. it would not be so good as the column proposed above; but there would be less unsteadiness and more impulsion than if the battalion marched in a deployed line. it would have the advantage, also, of being prepared to resist cavalry. squares may also be drawn up in echelons, so as entirely to unmask each other. all the orders of battle may be formed of squares as well as with deployed lines. it cannot be stated with truth that any one of the formations described is always good or always bad; but there is one rule to the correctness of which every one will assent,--that a formation suitable for the offensive must possess the characteristics of _solidity, mobility_, and _momentum_, whilst for the defensive _solidity_ is requisite, and also the power of delivering _as much fire as possible_. this truth being admitted, it remains yet to be decided whether the bravest troops, formed in columns but unable to fire, can stand long in presence of a deployed line firing twenty thousand musket-balls in one round, and able to fire two hundred thousand or three hundred thousand in five minutes. in the later wars in europe, positions have often been carried by russian, french, and prussian columns with their arms at a shoulder and without firing a shot. this was a triumph of _momentum_ and the moral effect it produces; but under the cool and deadly fire of the english infantry the french columns did not succeed so well at talavera, busaco, fuentes-de-onore, albuera, and waterloo. we must not, however, necessarily conclude from these facts that the advantage is entirely in favor of the shallow formation and firing; for when the french formed their infantry in those dense masses, it is not at all wonderful that the deployed and marching battalions of which they were composed, assailed on all sides by a deadly fire, should have been repulsed. would the same result have been witnessed if they had used columns of attack formed each of a single battalion doubled on the center? i think not. before deciding finally as to the superiority of the shallow order, with its facility for firing, over the half-deep order and its momentum, there should be several trials to see how a deployed line would stand an assault from a formation like fig. , (page .) these small columns have always succeeded wherever i have seen them tried. is it indeed an easy matter to adopt any other order when marching to attack a position? can an immense deployed line be moved up into action while firing? i think no one will answer affirmatively. suppose the attempt made to bring up twenty or thirty battalions in line, while firing either by file or by company, to the assault of a well-defended position: it is not very probable they would ever reach the desired point, or, if they did, it would be in about as good order as a flock of sheep. what conclusions shall be drawn from all that has been said? . if the deep order is dangerous, the half-deep is excellent for the offensive. . the column of attack of single battalions is the best formation for carrying a position by assault; but its depth should be diminished as much as possible, that it may when necessary be able to deliver as heavy a column of fire as possible, and to diminish the effect of the enemy's fire: it ought also to be well covered by skirmishers and supported by cavalry. . the formation having the first line deployed and the second in columns is the best-suited to the defensive. . either of them may be successful in the hands of a general of talent, who knows how to use his troops properly in the manner indicated in articles xvi. and xxx. since this chapter was first written, numerous improvements have been made in the arms both of infantry and artillery, making them much more destructive. the effect of this is to incline men to prefer the shallower formations, even in the attack. we cannot, however, forget the lessons of experience; and, notwithstanding the use of rocket-batteries, shrapnel-shot, and the perkins musket, i cannot imagine a better method of forming infantry for the attack than in columns of battalions. some persons may perhaps desire to restore to infantry the helmets and breastplates of the fifteenth century, before leading them to the attack in deployed lines. but, if there is a general return to the deployed system, some better arrangement must be devised for marching to the attack than long, continuous lines, and either columns must be used with proper distances for deployment upon arriving near the enemy's position, or lines drawn up checkerwise, or the march must be by the flanks of companies,--all of which maneuvers are hazardous in presence of an enemy who is capable of profiting by the advantages on his side. a skillful commander will use either, or a combination of all, of these arrangements, according to circumstances. experience long ago taught me that one of the most difficult tactical problems is that of determining the best formation of troops for battle; but i have also learned that to solve this problem by the use of a single method is an impossibility. in the first place, the topography of different countries is very various. in some, as champagne, two hundred thousand men might be maneuvered in deployed lines. in others, as italy, switzerland, the valley of the rhine, half of hungary, it is barely possible to deploy a division of ten battalions. the degree of instruction of the troops, and their national characteristics, may also have an influence upon the system of formation. owing to the thorough discipline of the russian army and its instruction in maneuvers of every kind, it may maintain in movements in long lines so much order and steadiness as to enable it to adopt a system which would be entirely out of the question for the french or prussian armies of the present day. my long experience has taught me to believe that nothing is impossible; and i do not belong to the class of men who think that there can be but one type and one system for all armies and all countries. to approximate as nearly as we can to the solution of the problem, it seems to me, we ought to find out:-- . the best method of moving when in sight of the enemy, but beyond his reach; . the best method of coming to close quarters with him; . the best defensive order. in whatever manner we may settle these points, it seems desirable in all cases to exercise the troops-- . in marching in columns of battalions doubled on the center, with a view to deployment, if necessary, when coming into musket-range, or even to attack in column; . in marching in continuous deployed lines of eight or ten battalions; . in marching in deployed battalions arranged checkerwise,--as these broken lines are more easily moved than continuous lines; . in moving to the front by the flanks of companies; . in marching to the front in small squares, either in line or checkerwise; . in changing front while using these different methods of marching; . in changes of front executed by columns of companies at full distance, without deployment,--a more expeditious method than the others of changing front, and the one best suited to all kinds of ground. of all the methods of moving to the front, that by the flanks of companies would be the best if it was not somewhat dangerous. in a plain it succeeds admirably, and in broken ground is very convenient. it breaks up a line very much; but by accustoming the officers and privates to it, and by keeping the guides and color-bearers well aligned, all confusion can be avoided. the only objection to it is the danger to which the separated companies are exposed of being ridden down by cavalry. this danger may be avoided by having good cavalry scouts, and not using this formation too near the enemy, but only in getting over the first part of the large interval separating the two armies. at the least sign of the enemy's proximity the line could be reformed instantly, since the companies can come into line at a run. whatever precautions may be taken, this maneuver should only be practiced with well-disciplined troops, never with militia or raw troops. i have never seen it tried in presence of an enemy,--but frequently at drills, where it has been found to succeed well, especially in changing front. i have also seen attempts made to march deployed battalions in checkerwise order. they succeeded well; whilst marches of the same battalions in continuous lines did not. the french, particularly, have never been able to march steadily in deployed lines. this checkered order would be dangerous in case of an unexpected charge of cavalry. it may be employed in the first stages of the movement forward, to make it more easy, and the rear battalions would then come into line with the leading ones before reaching the enemy. moreover, it is easy to form line at the moment of the charge, by leaving a small distance only between the leading and following battalions; for we must not forget that in the checkered order there are not two lines, but a single one, which is broken, to avoid the wavering and disorder observed in the marches of continuous lines. it is very difficult to determine positively the best formation for making a serious and close attack upon an enemy. of all the methods i have seen tried, the following seemed to succeed best. form twenty-four battalions in two lines of battalions in columns doubled on the center ready for deployment: the first line will advance at charging-pace toward the enemy's line to within twice musket-range, and will then deploy at a run; the voltigeur-companies of each battalion will spread out in skirmishing-order, the remaining companies forming line and pouring in a continued fire by file; the second line of columns follows the first, and the battalions composing it pass at charging-step through the intervals of the first line. this maneuver was executed when no enemy was present; but it seems to me an irresistible combination of the advantages of firing and of the column. besides these lines of columns, there are three other methods of attacking in the half-deep order. the first is that of lines composed of deployed battalions with others in column on the wings of those deployed, (fig. , page .) the deployed battalions and the leading divisions of those in column would open fire at half musket-range, and the assault would then be made. the second is that of advancing a deployed line and firing until reaching half musket-range, then throwing forward the columns of the second line through the intervals of the first. the third is the order in echelons, mentioned on page , and shown in fig. on that page. finally, a last method is that of advancing altogether in deployed lines, depending on the superiority of fire alone, until one or the other party takes to its heels,--a case not likely to happen. i cannot affirm positively which of these methods is the best; for i have not seen them used in actual service. in fact, in real combats of infantry i have never seen any thing but battalions deployed commencing to fire by company, and finally by file, or else columns marching firmly against the enemy, who either retired without awaiting the columns, or repulsed them before an actual collision took place, or themselves moved out to meet the advance. i have seen _mêlées_ of infantry in defiles and in villages, where the heads of columns came in actual bodily collision and thrust each other with the bayonet; but i never saw such a thing on a regular field of battle. in whatever manner these discussions terminate, they are useful, and should be continued. it would be absurd to discard as useless the fire of infantry, as it would be to give up entirely the half-deep formation; and an army is ruined if forced to adhere to precisely the same style of tactical maneuvers in every country it may enter and against every different nation. it is not so much the mode of formation as the proper combined use of the different arms which will insure victory. i must, however, except very deep masses, as they should be entirely abandoned. i will conclude this subject by stating that a most vital point to be attended to in leading infantry to the combat is to protect the troops as much as possible from the fire of the enemy's artillery, not by withdrawing them at inopportune moments, but by taking advantage of all inequalities and accidents of the ground to hide them from the view of the enemy. when the assaulting troops have arrived within musket-range, it is useless to calculate upon sheltering them longer: the assault is then to be made. in such cases covers are only suitable for skirmishers and troops on the defensive. it is generally quite important to defend villages on the front of a position, or to endeavor to take them when held by an enemy who is assailed; but their importance should not be overestimated; for we must never forget the noted battle of blenheim, where marlborough and eugene, seeing the mass of the french infantry shut up in the villages, broke through the center and captured twenty-four battalions which were sacrificed in defending these posts. for like reasons, it is useful to occupy clumps of trees or brushwood, which may afford cover to the party holding them. they shelter the troops, conceal their movements, cover those of cavalry, and prevent the enemy from maneuvering in their neighborhood. the case of the park of hougoumont at the battle of waterloo is a fine example of the influence the possession of such a position, well chosen and strongly defended, may have in deciding the fate of a battle. at hochkirch and kolin the possession of the woods was very important. footnotes: [footnote : in this and subsequent figures we suppose a division of twelve battalions.] [footnote : the word _division_ being used to designate four or five regiments, as well as two companies of a battalion, there is danger of confusion in its use.] [footnote : in the russian army the skirmishers are taken from the third rank of each division,--which makes the column eight men in depth, instead of twelve, and gives more mobility. to facilitate rallying the skirmishers on the columns, it would be, perhaps, better to take the whole fourth division for that purpose, thus giving nine ranks, or three divisions of three ranks, against infantry, while against cavalry there would be twelve ranks.] article xlv. cavalry. the use a general should make of his cavalry depends, of course, somewhat upon its numerical strength as compared with that of the whole army, and upon its quality. even cavalry of an inferior character may be so handled as to produce very great results, if set in action at proper moments. the numerical proportion of cavalry to infantry in armies has varied greatly. it depends on the natural tastes of nations making their people more or less fit for good troopers. the number and quality of horses, also, have something to do with it. in the wars of the revolution, the french cavalry, although badly organized and greatly inferior to the austrian, performed wonders. in i saw what was pompously called the cavalry reserve of the army of the rhine,--a weak brigade of barely fifteen hundred horses! ten years later i saw the same reserve consisting of fifteen thousand or twenty thousand horses,--so much had ideas and means changed. as a general rule, it may be stated that an army in an open country should contain cavalry to the amount of one-sixth its whole strength; in mountainous countries one-tenth will suffice. the principal value of cavalry is derived from its rapidity and ease of motion. to these characteristics may be added its impetuosity; but we must be careful lest a false application be made of this last. whatever may be its importance in the _ensemble_ of the operations of war, cavalry can never defend a position without the support of infantry. its chief duty is to open the way for gaining a victory, or to render it complete by carrying off prisoners and trophies, pursuing the enemy, rapidly succoring a threatened point, overthrowing disordered infantry, covering retreats of infantry and artillery. an army deficient in cavalry rarely obtains a great victory, and finds its retreats extremely difficult. the proper time and manner of bringing cavalry into action depend upon the ideas of the commander-in-chief, the plan of the battle, the enemy's movements, and a thousand other circumstances which cannot be mentioned here. i can only touch upon the principal things to be considered in its use. all are agreed that a general attack of cavalry against a line in good order cannot be attempted with much hope of success, unless it be supported by infantry and artillery. at waterloo the french paid dearly for having violated this rule; and the cavalry of frederick the great fared no better at kunnersdorf. a commander may sometimes feel obliged to push his cavalry forward alone, but generally the best time for charging a line of infantry is when it is already engaged with opposing infantry. the battles of marengo, eylau, borodino, and several others prove this. there is one case in which cavalry has a very decided superiority over infantry,--when rain or snow dampens the arms of the latter and they cannot fire. augereau's corps found this out, to their sorrow, at eylau, and so did the austrian left at dresden. infantry that has been shaken by a fire of artillery or in any other way may be charged with success. a very remarkable charge of this kind was made by the prussian cavalry at hohenfriedberg in . a charge against squares of good infantry in good order cannot succeed. a general cavalry charge is made to carry batteries of artillery and enable the infantry to take the position more easily; but the infantry must then be at hand to sustain the cavalry, for a charge of this character has only a momentary effect, which must be taken advantage of before the enemy can return offensively upon the broken cavalry. the beautiful charge of the french upon gosa at the battle of leipsic, october , is a fine example of this kind. those executed at waterloo with the same object in view were admirable, but failed because unsupported. the daring charge of ney's weak cavalry upon prince hohenlohe's artillery at jena is an example of what may be done under such circumstances. general charges are also made against the enemy's cavalry, to drive it from the field of battle and return more free to act against his infantry. cavalry may be successfully thrown against the flank or rear of an enemy's line at the moment of its being attacked in front by the infantry. if repulsed, it may rally upon the army at a gallop, and, if successful, it may cause the loss of the enemy's army. this operation is rarely attempted, but i see no reason why it should not be very good; for a body of cavalry well handled cannot be cut off even if it gets in rear of the enemy. this is a duty for which light cavalry is particularly fitted. in the defensive, cavalry may also produce very valuable results by opportune dashes at a body of the enemy which has engaged the opposing line and either broken it through or been on the point of doing so. it may regain the advantages lost, change the face of affairs, and cause the destruction of an enemy flushed and disordered by his own success. this was proved at eylau, where the russians made a fine charge, and at waterloo by the english cavalry. the special cavalry of a corps d'armée may charge at opportune moments, either to co-operate in a combined attack, or to take advantage of a false movement of the enemy, or to finish his defeat by pressing him while in retreat. it is not an easy matter to determine the best mode of attacking, as it depends upon the object in view and other circumstances. there are but four methods of charging,--in columns, in lines at a trot, in lines at a gallop, and in open order,--all of which may be successfully used. in charges in line, the lance is very useful; in _mêlées_, the saber is much better: hence comes the idea of giving the lance to the front rank, which makes the first onslaught, and the saber to the second rank, which finishes the encounter usually in individual combats. pistol-firing is of very little use except for outpost-duty, in a charge as foragers, or when light cavalry desires to annoy infantry and draw its fire previous to a charge. i do not know what the carbine is good for; since a body of cavalry armed with it must halt if they wish to fire with any accuracy, and they are then in a favorable condition for the enemy to attack. there are few marksmen who can with any accuracy fire a musket while on horseback and in rapid motion. i have just said that all the methods of charging may be equally good. it must not be understood, however, that impetuosity always gives the advantage in a shock of cavalry against cavalry: the fast trot, on the contrary, seems to me the best gait for charges in line, because every thing depends, in such a case, upon the _ensemble_ and good order of the movement,--things which cannot be obtained in charges at a fast gallop. galloping is proper against artillery when it is important to get over the ground as rapidly as possible. in like manner, if the cavalry is armed with sabers, it may take the gallop at two hundred yards from the enemy's line if it stands firmly to receive the attack. but if the cavalry is armed with the lance, the fast trot is the proper gait, since the advantageous use of that weapon depends upon the preservation of good order: in a _mêlée_ the lance is almost useless. if the enemy advances at a fast trot, it does not seem prudent to gallop to meet him; for the galloping party will be much disordered, while the trotting party will not. the only advantage of the gallop is its apparent boldness and the moral effect it produces; but, if this is estimated at its true value by the enemy, it is reasonable to expect his firm and compact mass to be victorious over a body of horsemen galloping in confusion. in their charges against infantry the turks and mamelukes showed the small advantage of mere impetuosity. no cavalry will penetrate where lancers or cuirassiers at a trot cannot. it is only when infantry is much disordered, or their fire poorly maintained, that there is any advantage in the impetuous gallop over the steady trot. to break good squares, cannon and lancers are required, or, better still, cuirassiers armed with lances. for charges in open order there are no better models for imitation than the turks and the cossacks. whatever method be adopted in charging, one of the best ways of using cavalry is to throw several squadrons opportunely upon the flanks of an enemy's line which is also attacked in front. that this maneuver may be completely successful, especially in charges of cavalry against cavalry, it should be performed at the very moment when the lines come in collision; for a minute too soon or too late its effect may be lost. it is highly important, therefore, that a cavalry commander should have a quick eye, sound judgment, and a cool head. much discussion has taken place about the proper manner of arming and organizing cavalry. the lance is the best arm for offensive purposes when a body of horsemen charge in line; for it enables them to strike an enemy who cannot reach them; but it is a very good plan to have a second rank or a reserve armed with sabers, which are more easily handled than the lance in hand-to-hand fighting when the ranks become broken. it would be, perhaps, better still to support a charge of lancers by a detachment of hussars, who can follow up the charge, penetrate the enemy's line, and complete the victory. the cuirass is the best defensive armor. the lance and the cuirass of strong leather doubled seem to me the best armament for light cavalry, the saber and iron cuirass the best for heavy cavalry. some military men of experience are inclined even to arm the cuirassiers with lances, believing that such cavalry, resembling very much the men-at-arms of former days, would bear down every thing before them. a lance would certainly suit them better than the musketoon; and i do not see why they should not have lances like those of the light cavalry. opinions will be always divided as to those amphibious animals called dragoons. it is certainly an advantage to have several battalions of mounted infantry, who can anticipate an enemy at a defile, defend it in retreat, or scour a wood; but to make cavalry out of foot-soldiers, or a soldier who is equally good on horse or on foot, is very difficult. this might have been supposed settled by the fate of the french dragoons when fighting on foot, had it not been seen that the turkish cavalry fought quite as well dismounted as mounted. it has been said that the greatest inconvenience resulting from the use of dragoons consists in the fact of being obliged at one moment to make them believe infantry squares cannot resist their charges, and the next moment that a foot-soldier armed with his musket is superior to any horseman in the world. this argument has more plausibility than real force; for, instead of attempting to make men believe such contradictory statements, it would be much more reasonable to tell them that if brave cavalry may break a square, brave foot-soldiers may resist such a charge; that victory does not always depend upon the superiority of the arm, but upon a thousand other things; that the courage of the troops, the presence of mind of the commanders, the opportuneness of maneuvers, the effect of artillery and musketry fire, rain,--mud, even,--have been the causes of repulses or of victories; and, finally, that a brave man, whether on foot or mounted, will always be more than a match for a coward. by impressing these truths upon dragoons, they will believe themselves superior to their adversaries whether they fight on foot or on horseback. this is the case with the turks and the circassians, whose cavalry often dismount to fight on foot in a wood or behind a cover, musket in hand, like foot-soldiers. it requires, however, fine material and fine commanders to bring soldiers to such perfection in knowledge of their duties. the conviction of what brave men can accomplish, whether on foot or mounted, doubtless induced the emperor nicholas to collect the large number of fourteen or fifteen thousand dragoons in a single corps, while he did not consider napoleon's unfortunate experiment with french dragoons, and was not restrained by the fear of often wanting a regiment of these troops at some particular point. it is probable that this concentration was ordered for the purpose of giving uniformity to the instruction of the men in their duties as foot and mounted soldiers, and that in war they were to be distributed to the different grand divisions of the army. it cannot be denied, however, that great advantages might result to the general who could rapidly move up ten thousand men on horseback to a decisive point and bring them into action as infantry. it thus appears that the methods of concentration and of distribution have their respective advantages and disadvantages. a judicious mean between the extremes would be to attach a strong regiment to each wing of the army and to the advanced guard, (or the rear-guard in a retreat,) and then to unite the remaining troops of this arm in divisions or corps. every thing that was said with reference to the formation of infantry is applicable to cavalry, with the following modifications:-- . lines deployed checkerwise or in echelons are much better for cavalry than full lines; whilst for infantry lines drawn up checkerwise are too much disconnected, and would be in danger if the cavalry should succeed in penetrating and taking the battalions in flank. the checkerwise formation is only advantageous for infantry in preparatory movements before reaching the enemy, or else for lines of columns which can defend themselves in every direction against cavalry. whether checkered or full lines be used, the distance between them ought to be such that if one is checked and thrown into confusion the others may not share it. it is well to observe that in the checkered lines the distance may be less than for full lines. in every case the second line should not be full. it should be formed in columns by divisions, or at least there should be left the spaces, if in line, of two squadrons, that may be in column upon the flank of each regiment, to facilitate the passage through of the troops which have been brought up. . when the order of columns of attack doubled on the center is used, cavalry should be formed in regiments and infantry only in battalions. the regiments should contain six squadrons, in order that, by doubling on the center into divisions, three may be formed. if there are only four squadrons, there can be but two lines. . the cavalry column of attack should never be formed _en masse_ like that of infantry; but there should always be full or half squadron distance, that each may have room to disengage itself and charge separately. this distance will be so great only for those troops engaged. when they are at rest behind the line of battle, they may be closed up, in order to cover less ground and diminish the space to be passed over when brought into action. the masses should, of course, be kept beyond cannon-range. . a flank attack being much more to be apprehended by cavalry than in a combat of infantry with infantry, several squadrons should be formed in echelons by platoons on the flanks of a line of cavalry, which may form to the right or left, to meet an enemy coming in that direction. . for the same reason, it is important to throw several squadrons against the flanks of a line of cavalry which is attacked in front. irregular cavalry is quite as good as the regular for this purpose, and it may be better. . it is also of importance, especially in cavalry, that the commander-in-chief increase the depth rather than the extent of the formation. for example, in a deployed division of two brigades it would not be a good plan for one brigade to form in a single line behind the other, but each brigade should have one regiment in the first line and one in the second. each unit of the line will thus have its own proper reserve behind it,--an advantage not to be regarded as trifling; for in a charge events succeed each other so rapidly that it is impossible for a general to control the deployed regiments. by adopting this arrangement, each general of brigade will be able to dispose of his own reserve; and it would be well, also, to have a general reserve for the whole division. this consideration leads me to think that five regiments would make a good division. the charge may then be made in line by brigades of two regiments, the fifth serving as a general reserve behind the center. or three regiments may form the line, and two may be in column, one behind each wing. or it may be preferable to use a mixed order, deploying two regiments and keeping the others in column. this is a good arrangement, because the three regiments, formed in columns by divisions behind the center and flanks of the line, cover those points, and can readily pass the line if it is beaten back. (see fig. .) [illustration: fig. . cavalry division of five regiments. cavalry deployed should be in checkered order rather than in full lines.] . two essential points are regarded as generally settled for all encounters of cavalry against cavalry. one is that the first line must sooner or later be checked; for, even upon the supposition of the first charge being entirely successful, it is always probable that the enemy will bring fresh squadrons to the contest, and the first line must at length be forced to rally behind the second. the other point is that, with troops and commanders on both sides equally good, the victory will remain with the party having the last squadrons in reserve in readiness to be thrown upon the flank of the enemy's line while his front is also engaged. attention to these truths will bring us to a just conclusion as to the proper method of forming a large mass of cavalry for battle. whatever order be adopted, care must be taken to avoid deploying large cavalry corps in full lines; for a mass thus drawn up is very unmanageable, and if the first line is checked suddenly in its career the second is also, and that without having an opportunity to strike a blow. this has been demonstrated many times. take as an example the attack made by nansouty in columns of regiments upon the prussian cavalry deployed in front of chateau-thierry. in opposing the formation of cavalry in more than two lines, i never intended to exclude the use of several lines checkerwise or in echelons, or of reserves formed in columns. i only meant to say that when cavalry, expecting to make a charge, is drawn up in lines one behind the other, the whole mass will be thrown into confusion as soon as the first line breaks and turns.[ ] with cavalry still more than with infantry the _morale_ is very important. the quickness of eye and the coolness of the commander, and the intelligence and bravery of the soldier, whether in the _mêlée_ or in the rally, will oftener be the means of assuring a victory than the adoption of this or that formation. when, however, a good formation is adopted and the advantages mentioned above are also present, the victory is more certain; and nothing can excuse the use of a vicious formation. the history of the wars between and has renewed the old disputes upon the question whether regular cavalry will in the end get the better over an irregular cavalry which will avoid all serious encounters, will retreat with the speed of the parthians and return to the combat with the same rapidity, wearing out the strength of its enemy by continual skirmishing. lloyd has decided in the negative; and several exploits of the cossacks when engaged with the excellent french cavalry seem to confirm his opinion. (when i speak of excellent french cavalry, i refer to its impetuous bravery, and not to its perfection; for it does not compare with the russian or german cavalry either in horsemanship, organization, or in care of the animals.) we must by no means conclude it possible for a body of light cavalry deployed as skirmishers to accomplish as much as the cossacks or other irregular cavalry. they acquire a habit of moving in an apparently disorderly manner, whilst they are all the time directing their individual efforts toward a common object. the most practiced hussars can never perform such service as the cossacks, tscherkesses, and turks do instinctively. experience has shown that irregular charges may cause the defeat of the best cavalry in partial skirmishes; but it has also demonstrated that they are not to be depended upon in regular battles upon which the fate of a war may depend. such charges are valuable accessories to an attack in line, but alone they can lead to no decisive results. from the preceding facts we learn that it is always best to give cavalry a regular organization, and furnish them long weapons, not omitting, however, to provide, for skirmishing, &c., an irregular cavalry armed with pistols, lances, and sabers. whatever system of organization be adopted, it is certain that a numerous cavalry, whether regular or irregular, must have a great influence in giving a turn to the events of a war. it may excite a feeling of apprehension at distant parts of the enemy's country, it can carry off his convoys, it can encircle his army, make his communications very perilous, and destroy the _ensemble_ of his operations. in a word, it produces nearly the same results as a rising _en masse_ of a population, causing trouble on the front, flanks, and rear of an army, and reducing a general to a state of entire uncertainty in his calculations. any system of organization, therefore, will be a good one which provides for great enlargement of the cavalry in time of war by the incorporation of militia; for they may, with the aid of a few good regular squadrons, be made excellent partisan soldiers. these militia would certainly not possess all the qualities of those warlike wandering tribes who live on horseback and seem born cavalry-soldiers; but they could in a measure supply the places of such. in this respect russia is much better off than any of her neighbors, both on account of the number and quality of her horsemen of the don, and the character of the irregular militia she can bring into the field at very short notice. twenty years ago i made the following statements in chapter xxxv. of the treatise on grand military operations, when writing on this subject:-- "the immense advantages of the cossacks to the russian army are not to be estimated. these light troops, which are insignificant in the shock of a great battle, (except for falling upon the flanks,) are terrible in pursuits and in a war of posts. they are a most formidable obstacle to the execution of a general's designs,--because he can never be sure of the arrival and carrying out of his orders, his convoys are always in danger, and his operations uncertain. if an army has had only a few regiments of these half-regular cavalry-soldiers, their real value has not been known; but when their number increases to fifteen thousand or twenty thousand, their usefulness is fully recognized,--especially in a country where the population is not hostile to them. "when they are in the vicinity, every convoy must be provided with a strong escort, and no movement can be expected to be undisturbed. much unusual labor is thus made necessary upon the part of the opponent's regular cavalry, which is soon broken down by the unaccustomed fatigue. "volunteer hussars or lancers, raised at the time of war breaking out, may be nearly as valuable as the cossacks, if they are well officered and move freely about from point to point." in the hungarians, transylvanians, and croats, austria has resources possessed by few other states. the services rendered by mounted militia have proved, however, that this kind of cavalry may be very useful, if for no other purpose than relieving the regular cavalry of those occasional and extra duties to be performed in all armies, such as forming escorts, acting as orderlies, protecting convoys, serving on outposts, &c. mixed corps of regular and irregular cavalry may often be more really useful than if they were entirely composed of cavalry of the line,--because the fear of compromising a body of these last often restrains a general from pushing them forward in daring operations where he would not hesitate to risk his irregulars, and he may thus lose excellent opportunities of accomplishing great results. footnotes: [footnote : to disprove my statement, m. wagner cites the case of the battle of ramillies, where marlborough, by a general charge of cavalry in fall lines, succeeded in beating the french drawn up checkerwise. unless my memory deceives me, the allied cavalry was at first formed checkered in two lines; but the real cause of marlborough's success was his seeing that villeroi had paralyzed half his army behind anderkirch and gette, and his having the good sense to withdraw thirty-eight squadrons from this wing to reinforce his left, which in this way had twice as many cavalry as the french, and outflanked them. but i cheerfully admit that there may be many exceptions to a rule which i have not laid down more absolutely than all others relating to cavalry tactics,--a tactics, by the way, as changeable as the arm itself.] article xlvi. employment of artillery. artillery is an arm equally formidable both in the offensive and defensive. as an offensive means, a great battery well managed may break an enemy's line, throw it into confusion, and prepare the way for the troops that are to make an assault. as a defensive means, it doubles the strength of a position, not only on account of the material injury it inflicts upon the enemy while at a distance, and the consequent moral effect upon his troops, but also by greatly increasing the peril of approaching near, and specially within the range of grape. it is no less important in the attack and defense of fortified places or intrenched camps; for it is one of the main reliances in modern systems of fortification. i have already in a former portion of this book given some directions as to the distribution of artillery in a line of battle; but it is difficult to explain definitely the proper method of using it in the battle itself. it will not be right to say that artillery can act independently of the other arms, for it is rather an accessory. at wagram, however, napoleon threw a battery of one hundred pieces into the gap left by the withdrawal of massena's corps, and thus held in check the austrian center, notwithstanding their vigorous efforts to advance. this was a special case, and should not be often imitated. i will content myself with laying down a few fundamental rules, observing that they refer to the present state of artillery service, ( .) the recent discoveries not yet being fully tested, i shall say little with reference to them. . in the offensive, a certain portion of the artillery should concentrate its fire upon the point where a decisive blow is to be struck. its first use is to shatter the enemy's line, and then it assists with its fire the attack of the infantry and cavalry. . several batteries of horse-artillery should follow the offensive movements of the columns of attack, besides the foot-batteries intended for the same purpose. too much foot-artillery should not move with an offensive column. it may be posted so as to co-operate with the column without accompanying it. when the cannoneers can mount the boxes, it may have greater mobility and be advanced farther to the front. . it has already been stated that half of the horse-artillery should be held in reserve, that it may be rapidly moved to any required point.[ ] for this purpose it should be placed upon the most open ground, whence it can move readily in every direction. i have already indicated the best positions for the heavy calibers. . the batteries, whatever may be their general distribution along the defensive line, should give their attention particularly to those points where the enemy would be most likely to approach, either on account of the facility or the advantage of so doing. the general of artillery should therefore know the decisive strategic and tactical points of the battle-field, as well as the topography of the whole space occupied. the distribution of the reserves of artillery will be regulated by these. . artillery placed on level ground or ground sloping gently to the front is most favorably situated either for point-blank or ricochet firing: a converging fire is the best. . it should be borne in mind that the chief office of all artillery in battles is to overwhelm the enemy's troops, and not to reply to their batteries. it is, nevertheless, often useful to fire at the batteries, in order to attract their fire. a third of the disposable artillery may be assigned this duty, but two-thirds at least should be directed against the infantry and cavalry of the enemy. . if the enemy advance in deployed lines, the batteries should endeavor to cross their fire in order to strike the lines obliquely. if guns can be so placed as to enfilade a line of troops, a most powerful effect is produced. . when the enemy advance in columns, they may be battered in front. it is advantageous also to attack them obliquely, and especially in flank and reverse. the moral effect of a reverse fire upon a body of troops is inconceivable; and the best soldiers are generally put to flight by it. the fine movement of ney on preititz at bautzen was neutralized by a few pieces of kleist's artillery, which took his columns in flank, checked them, and decided the marshal to deviate from the excellent direction he was pursuing. a few pieces of light artillery, thrown at all hazards upon the enemy's flank, may produce most important results, far overbalancing the risks run. . batteries should always have supports of infantry or cavalry, and especially on their flanks. cases may occur where the rule may be deviated from: wagram is a very remarkable example of this. . it is very important that artillerists, when threatened by cavalry, preserve their coolness. they should fire first solid shot, next shells, and then grape, as long as possible. the infantry supports should, in such a case, form squares in the vicinity, to shelter the horses, and, when necessary, the cannoneers. when the infantry is drawn up behind the pieces, large squares of sufficient size to contain whatever they should cover are best; but when the infantry is on the flanks, smaller squares are better. rocket-batteries may also be very efficient in frightening the horses. . when infantry threatens artillery, the latter should continue its fire to the last moment, being careful not to commence firing too soon. the cannoneers can always be sheltered from an infantry attack if the battery is properly supported. this is a case for the co-operation of the three arms; for, if the enemy's infantry is thrown into confusion by the artillery, a combined attack upon it by cavalry and infantry will cause its destruction. . the proportions of artillery have varied in different wars. napoleon conquered italy in with forty or fifty pieces,--whilst in he invaded russia with one thousand pieces thoroughly equipped, and failed. these facts show that any fixed rule on the subject is inadmissible. usually three pieces to a thousand combatants are allowed; but this allowance will depend on circumstances. the relative proportions of heavy and light artillery vary also between wide limits. it is a great mistake to have too much heavy artillery, whose mobility must be much less than that of the lighter calibers. a remarkable proof of the great importance of having a strong artillery-armament was given by napoleon after the battle of eylau. the great havoc occasioned among his troops by the numerous guns of the russians opened his eyes to the necessity of increasing his own. with wonderful vigor, he set all the prussian arsenals to work, those along the rhine, and even at metz, to increase the number of his pieces, and to cast new ones in order to enable him to use the munitions previously captured. in three months he doubled the _matériel_ and _personnel_ of his artillery, at a distance of one thousand miles from his own frontiers,--a feat without a parallel in the annals of war. . one of the surest means of using the artillery to the best advantage is to place in command of it a general who is at once a good strategist and tactician. this chief should be authorized to dispose not only of the reserve artillery, but also of half the pieces attached to the different corps or divisions of the army. he should also consult with the commanding general as to the moment and place of concentration of the mass of his artillery in order to contribute most to a successful issue of the day, and he should never take the responsibility of thus massing his artillery without previous orders from the commanding general. footnotes: [footnote : greater mobility is now given to foot-artillery by mounting the men on the boxes.] article xlvii. of the combined use of the three arms. to conclude this summary in a proper manner, i ought to treat of the combined use of the three arms; but i am restrained from so doing by considering the great variety of points necessary to be touched upon if i should attempt to go into an examination of all the detailed operations that would arise in the application of the general rules laid down for each of the arms. several authors--chiefly german--have treated this subject very extensively, and their labors are valuable principally because they consist mainly of citations of numerous examples taken from the actual minor engagements of the later wars. these examples must indeed take the place of rules, since experience has shown that fixed rules on the subject cannot be laid down. it seems a waste of breath to say that the commander of a body of troops composed of the three arms should employ them so that they will give mutual support and assistance; but, after all, this is the only fundamental rule that can be established, for the attempt to prescribe for such a commander a special course of conduct in every case that may arise, when these cases may be infinitely varied, would involve him in an inextricable labyrinth of instructions. as the object and limits of this summary do not allow me to enter upon the consideration of such details, i can only refer my readers to the best works which do treat of them. i have said all i can properly say when i advise that the different arms be posted in conformity with the character of the ground, according to the object in view and the supposed designs of the enemy, and that they be used simultaneously in the manner best suited to them, care being taken to enable them to afford mutual support. a careful study of the events of previous wars, and especially experience in the operations of war, will give an officer correct ideas on these points, and the ability to use, at the right time and place, his knowledge of the properties of the three arms, either single or combined. conclusion. i am constrained to recapitulate the principal facts which may be regarded as fundamental in war. war in its _ensemble_ is not a science, but an art. strategy, particularly, may indeed be regulated by fixed laws resembling those of the positive sciences, but this is not true of war viewed as a whole. among other things, combats may be mentioned as often being quite independent of scientific combinations, and they may become essentially dramatic, personal qualities and inspirations and a thousand other things frequently being the controlling elements. the passions which agitate the masses that are brought into collision, the warlike qualities of these masses, the energy and talent of their commanders, the spirit, more or less martial, of nations and epochs,[ ]--in a word, every thing that can be called the poetry and metaphysics of war,--will have a permanent influence on its results. shall i be understood as saying that there are no such things as tactical rules, and that no theory of tactics can be useful? what military man of intelligence would be guilty of such an absurdity? are we to imagine that eugene and marlborough triumphed simply by inspiration or by the superior courage and discipline of their battalions? or do we find in the events of turin, blenheim, and ramillies maneuvers resembling those seen at talavera, waterloo, jena, or austerlitz, which were the causes of the victory in each case? when the application of a rule and the consequent maneuver have procured victory a hundred times for skillful generals, and always have in their favor the great probability of leading to success, shall their occasional failure be a sufficient reason for entirely denying their value and for distrusting the effect of the study of the art? shall a theory be pronounced absurd because it has only three-fourths of the whole number of chances of success in its favor? the _morale_ of an army and its chief officers has an influence upon the fate of a war; and this seems to be due to a certain physical effect produced by the moral cause. for example, the impetuous attack upon a hostile line of twenty thousand brave men whose feelings are thoroughly enlisted in their cause will produce a much more powerful effect than the attack of forty thousand demoralized or apathetic men upon the same point. strategy, as has already been explained, is the art of bringing the greatest part of the forces of an army upon the important point of the theater of war or of the zone of operations. tactics is the art of using these masses at the points to which they shall have been conducted by well-arranged marches; that is to say, the art of making them act at the decisive moment and at the decisive point of the field of battle. when troops are thinking more of flight than of fight, they can no longer be termed active masses in the sense in which i use the term. a general thoroughly instructed in the theory of war, but not possessed of military _coup-d'oeil_, coolness, and skill, may make an excellent strategic plan and be entirely unable to apply the rules of tactics in presence of an enemy: his projects will not be successfully carried out, and his defeat will be probable. if he be a man of character, he will be able to diminish the evil results of his failure, but if he lose his wits he will lose his army. the same general may, on the other hand, be at once a good tactician and strategist, and have made all the arrangements for gaining a victory that his means will permit: in this case, if he be only moderately seconded by his troops and subordinate officers, he will probably gain a decided victory. if, however, his troops have neither discipline nor courage, and his subordinate officers envy and deceive him,[ ] he will undoubtedly see his fine hopes fade away, and his admirable combinations can only have the effect of diminishing the disasters of an almost unavoidable defeat. no system of tactics can lead to victory when the _morale_ of an army is bad; and even when it may be excellent the victory may depend upon some occurrence like the rupture of the bridges over the danube at essling. neither will victories be necessarily gained or lost by rigid adherence to or rejection of this or that manner of forming troops for battle. these truths need not lead to the conclusion that there can be no sound rules in war, the observance of which, the chances being equal, will lead to success. it is true that theories cannot teach men with mathematical precision what they should do in every possible case; but it is also certain that they will always point out the errors which should be avoided; and this is a highly-important consideration, for these rules thus become, in the hands of skillful generals commanding brave troops, means of almost certain success. the correctness of this statement cannot be denied; and it only remains to be able to discriminate between good rules and bad. in this ability consists the whole of a man's genius for war. there are, however, leading principles which assist in obtaining this ability. every maxim relating to war will be good if it indicates the employment of the greatest portion of the means of action at the decisive moment and place. in chapter iii. i have specified all the strategic combinations which lead to such a result. as regards tactics, the principal thing to be attended to is the choice of the most suitable order of battle for the object in view. when we come to consider the action of masses on the field, the means to be used may be an opportune charge of cavalry, a strong battery put in position and unmasked at the proper moment, a column of infantry making a headlong charge, or a deployed division coolly and steadily pouring upon the enemy a fire, or they may consist of tactical maneuvers intended to threaten the enemy's flanks or rear, or any other maneuver calculated to diminish the confidence of the adversary. each of these things may, in a particular case, be the cause of victory. to define the cases in which each should be preferred is simply impossible. if a general desires to be a successful actor in the great drama of war, his first duty is to study carefully the theater of operations, that he may see clearly the relative advantages and disadvantages it presents for himself and his enemies. this being done, he can understandingly proceed to prepare his base of operations, then to choose the most suitable zone of operations for his main efforts, and, in doing so, keep constantly before his mind the principles of the art of war relative to lines and fronts of operations. the offensive army should particularly endeavor to cut up the opposing army by skillfully selecting objective points of maneuver; it will then assume, as the objects of its subsequent undertakings, geographical points of more or less importance, depending upon its first successes. the defensive army, on the contrary, should endeavor, by all means, to neutralize the first forward movement of its adversary, protracting operations as long as possible while not compromising the fate of the war, and deferring a decisive battle until the time when a portion of the enemy's forces are either exhausted by labors, or scattered for the purpose of occupying invaded provinces, masking fortified places, covering sieges, protecting the line of operations, depots, &c. up to this point every thing relates to a first plan of operations; but no plan can provide with certainty for that which is uncertain always,--the character and the issue of the first conflict. if your lines of operations have been skillfully chosen and your movements well concealed, and if on the other hand your enemy makes false movements which permit you to fall on fractions of his army, you maybe successful in your campaign, without fighting general battles, by the simple use of your strategic advantages. but if the two parties seem about equally matched at the time of conflict, there will result one of those stupendous tragedies like borodino, wagram, waterloo, bautzen, and dresden, where the precepts of grand tactics, as indicated in the chapter on that subject, must have a powerful influence. if a few prejudiced military men, after reading this book and carefully studying the detailed and correct history of the campaigns of the great masters of the art of war, still contend that it has neither principles nor rules, i can only pity them, and reply, in the famous words of frederick, that "a mule which had made twenty campaigns under prince eugene would not be a better tactician than at the beginning." correct theories, founded upon right principles, sustained by actual events of wars, and added to accurate military history, will form a true school of instruction for generals. if these means do not produce great men, they will at least produce generals of sufficient skill to take rank next after the natural masters of the art of war. footnotes: [footnote : the well-known spanish proverb, _he was brave on such a day_, may be applied to nations as to individuals. the french at rossbach were not the same people as at jena, nor the prussians at prentzlow as at dennewitz.] [footnote : the unskillful conduct of a subordinate who is incapable of understanding the merit of a maneuver which has been ordered, and who will commit grave faults in its execution, may produce the same result of causing the failure of the plans of an excellent commander.] supplement to the summary of the art of war. my summary of the art of war, published in , to assist in the military instruction of the hereditary grand duke of russia, contained a concluding article that was never printed. i deem it expedient to give it now in the form of a supplement, and add a special article upon the means of acquiring a certain and ready strategic _coup-d'oeil_. it is essential for the reader of my summary to understand clearly that in the military science, as in every other, the study of details is easy for the man who has learned how to seize the fundamental features to which all others are secondary. i am about to attempt a development of these elements of the art; and my readers should endeavor to apprehend them clearly and to apply them properly. i cannot too often repeat that the theory of the great combinations of war is in itself very simple, and requires nothing more than ordinary intelligence and careful consideration. notwithstanding its simplicity, many learned military men have difficulty in grasping it thoroughly. their minds wander off to accessory details, in place of fixing themselves on first causes, and they go a long way in search of what is just within their reach if they only would think so. two very different things must exist in a man to make him a general: _he must know how to arrange a good plan of operations, and how to carry it to a successful termination_. the first of these talents may be a natural gift, but it may also be acquired and developed by study. the second depends more on individual character, is rather a personal attribute, and cannot be created by study, although it may be improved. it is particularly necessary for a monarch or the head of a government to possess the first of these talents, because in such case, although he may not have the ability to execute, he can arrange plans of operations and decide correctly as to the excellence or defects of those submitted to him by others. he is thus enabled to estimate properly the capacity of his generals, and when he finds a general producing a good plan, and having firmness and coolness, such a man may be safely trusted with the command of an army. if, on the other hand, the head of a state is a man of executive ability, but not possessing the faculty of arranging wise military combinations, he will be likely to commit all the faults that have characterized the campaigns of many celebrated warriors who were only brave soldiers without being at all improved by study. from the principles which i have laid down, and their application to several famous campaigns, my readers will perceive that the theory of the great combinations of war may be summed up in the following truths. the science of strategy consists, in the first place, in knowing how to choose well a theater of war and to estimate correctly that of the enemy. to do this, a general must accustom himself to decide as to the importance of decisive points,--which is not a difficult matter when he is aided by the hints i have given on the subject, particularly in articles from xviii. to xxii. the art consists, next, in a proper employment of the troops upon the theater of operations, whether offensive or defensive. (see article xvii.) this employment of the forces should be regulated by two fundamental principles: the first being, _to obtain by free and rapid movements the advantage of bringing the mass of the troops against fractions of the enemy; the second, to strike in the most decisive direction_,--that is to say, in that direction where the consequences of his defeat may be most disastrous to the enemy, while at the same time his success would yield him no great advantages. the whole science of great military combination is comprised in these two fundamental truths. therefore, all movements that are disconnected or more extended than those of the enemy would be grave faults; so also would the occupation of a position that was too much cut up, or sending out a large detachment unnecessarily. on the contrary, every well-connected, compact system of operations would be wise; so also with central strategic lines, and every strategic position less extended than the enemy's. the application of these fundamental principles is also very simple. if you have one hundred battalions against an equal number of the enemy's, you may, by their mobility and by taking the initiative, bring eighty of them to the decisive point while employing the remaining twenty to observe and deceive half of the opposing army. you will thus have eighty battalions against fifty at the point where the important contest is to take place. you will reach this point by rapid marches, by interior lines, or by a general movement toward one extremity of the hostile line. i have indicated the cases in which one or the other of these means is to be preferred. (see pages and following.) in arranging a plan of operations, it is important to remember _"that a strategic theater, as well as every position occupied by an army, has a center and two extremities."_ a theater has usually three zones,--a right, a left, and a central. in choosing a zone of operations, select one,-- , that will furnish a safe and advantageous base; , in which the least risk will be run by yourself, while the enemy will be most exposed to injury; , bearing in mind the antecedent situations of the two parties, and, , the dispositions and inclinations of the powers whose territories are near the theater of war. one of the zones will always be decidedly bad or dangerous, while the other two will be more or less suitable according to circumstances. the zone and base being fixed upon, the object of the first attempts must be selected. this is choosing an objective of operations. there are two very different kinds: some, that are called _territorial or geographical objectives_, refer simply to an enemy's line of defense which it is desired to get possession of, or a fortress or intrenched camp to be captured; _the others, on the contrary, consist entirely in the destruction or disorganization of the enemy's forces, without giving attention to geographical points of any kind_. this was the favorite objective of napoleon.[ ] i can profitably add nothing to what i have already written on this point, (page ;) _and, as the choice of the objective is by far the most important thing in a plan of operations_, i recommend the whole of article xix., (pages and following.) the objective being determined upon, the army will move toward it by one or two lines of operations, care being taken to conform to the fundamental principle laid down, and to avoid double lines, unless the character of the theater of war makes it necessary to use them, or the enemy is very inferior either in the number or the quality of his troops. article xxi. treats this subject fully. if two geographical lines are used, it is essential to move the great mass of the forces along the most important of them, and to occupy the secondary line by detachments having a concentric direction, if possible, with the main body. the army, being on its way toward the objective, before arriving in presence of the enemy and giving battle, occupies daily or temporary strategic positions: the front it embraces, or that upon which the enemy may attack, is its front of operations. there is an important consideration with reference to the direction of the front of operations and to changes it may receive, which i have dwelt upon in article xx., (page .) the fundamental principle requires, even when the forces are equal, that the front be less extensive than the enemy's,--especially if the front remains unchanged for some time. if your strategic positions are more closely connected than the enemy's, you can concentrate more rapidly and more easily than he can, and in this way the fundamental principle will be applied. if your positions are interior and central, the enemy cannot concentrate except by passing by the mass of your divisions or by moving in a circle around them: he is then exactly in a condition not to be able to apply the fundamental principle, while it is your most obvious measure. but if you are very weak and the enemy very strong, a central position, that may be surrounded on all sides by forces superior at every point, is untenable, unless the enemy's corps are very far separated from each other, as was the case with the allied armies in the seven years' war; or unless the central zone has a natural barrier on one or two of its sides, like the rhine, the danube, or the alps, which would prevent the enemy from using his forces simultaneously. in case of great numerical inferiority it is, nevertheless, wiser to maneuver upon one of the extremities than upon the center of the enemy's line, especially if his masses are sufficiently near to be dangerous to you. it was stated above that strategy, besides indicating the decisive points of a theater of war, requires two things:-- st, that the principal mass of the force be moved against fractions of the enemy's, to attack them in succession; d, that the best direction of movement be adopted,--that is to say, one leading straight to the decisive points already known, and afterward upon secondary points. to illustrate these immutable principles of strategy, i will give a sketch of the operations of the french at the close of . (see plate iii.) it will be recollected that the allies had ten principal corps on the frontier of france from the rhine to the north sea. the duke of york was attacking dunkirk. (no. .) marshal freytag was covering the siege. (no. .) the prince of orange was occupying an intermediate position at menin. (no. .) the prince of coburg, with the main army, was attacking maubeuge, and was guarding the space between that place and the scheldt by strong detachments. (no. .) clairfayt was covering the siege. (no. .) benjouski was covering charleroi and the meuse, toward thuin and charleroi, the fortifications of which were being rebuilt. (no. .) another corps was covering the ardennes and luxembourg. (no. .) the prussians were besieging landau. (no. .) the duke of brunswick was covering the siege in the vosges. (no. .) general wurmser was observing strasbourg and the army of the rhine. (no. .) the french, besides the detachments in front of each of the hostile corps, had five principal masses in the camps of lille, douai, guise, sarre louis, and strasbourg, (a, b, c, d, e.) a strong reserve, (g,) composed of the best troops drawn from the camps of the northern frontier, was intended to be thrown upon all the points of the enemy's line in succession, assisted by the troops already in the neighborhood, (i, k, l, m.) this reserve; assisted by the divisions of the camp of cassel near dunkirk, commenced its operations by beating corps and , under the duke of york; then that of the dutch, (no. ,) at menin; next that of clairfayt, ( ,) before maubeuge; finally, joining the army of the moselle toward sarre louis, it beat the duke of brunswick in the vosges, and, with the assistance of the army of the rhine, (f,) drove wurmser from the lines of wissembourg. the general principle was certainly well applied, and every similar operation will be praiseworthy. but, as the austrians composed half the allied forces, and they had their lines of retreat from the points , , and upon the rhine, it is evident that if the french had collected three of their large corps in order to move them against benjouski at thuin, (no. ,) and then fallen upon the prince of coburg's left by the charleroi road, they would have thrown the imperial army upon the north sea, and would have obtained immense results. the committee of public safety deemed it a matter of great importance that dunkirk should not be permitted to fell into the hands of the english. besides this, york's corps, encamped on the downs, might be cut off and thrown upon the sea; and the disposable french masses for this object were at douai, lille, and cassel: so that there were good reasons for commencing operations by attacking the english. the principal undertaking failed, because houchard did not appreciate the strategic advantage he had, and did not know how to act on the line of retreat of the anglo-hanoverian army. he was guillotined, by way of punishment, although he saved dunkirk; yet he failed to cut off the english as he might have done. it will be observed that this movement of the french reserve along the whole front was the cause of five victories, neither of which had decisive results, _because the attacks were made in front_, and because, when the cities were relieved, the allied armies not being cut through, and the french reserve moving on to the different points in succession, none of the victories was pushed to its legitimate consequences. if the french had based themselves upon the five fortified towns on the meuse, had collected one hundred thousand men by bold and rapid marches, had fallen upon the center of those separated corps, had crushed benjouski, assailed the prince of coburg in his rear, beaten him, and pursued him vigorously as napoleon pursued at ratisbon, and as he wished to do at ligny in , the result would have been very different. i have mentioned this example, as it illustrates very well the two important points to be attended to in the strategic management of masses of troops; that is, their employment at different points in succession and at decisive points.[ ] every educated military man will be impressed by the truths educed, and will be convinced that the excellence of maneuvers will depend upon their conforming to the principle already insisted upon; that is to say, the great part of the force must be moved against one wing or the center, according to the position of the enemy's masses. it is of importance in battles to calculate distances with still greater accuracy; for the results of movements on the battle-field following them more rapidly than in the case of strategic maneuvers, every precaution must be taken to avoid exposing any part of the line to a dangerous attack from the enemy, especially if he is compactly drawn up. add to these things calmness during the action; the ability to choose positions for fighting battles in the manner styled the defensive with _offensive returns_, (art. xxx.;) the simultaneous employment of the forces in striking the decisive blow, (see pages from to ;) the faculty of arousing the soldiers and moving them forward at opportune moments; and we have mentioned every thing which can assist, as far as the general is concerned, in assuring victories, and every thing which will constitute him a skillful tactician. it is almost always easy to determine the decisive point of a field of battle, but not so with the decisive moment; and it is precisely here that genius and experience are every thing, and mere theory of little value. it is important, also, to consider attentively article xlii., which explains how a general may make a small number of suppositions as to what the enemy may or can do, and as to what course of conduct he shall himself pursue upon those hypotheses. he may thus accustom himself to be prepared for any eventuality. i must also call attention to article xxviii., upon great detachments. these are necessary evils, and, if not managed with great care, may prove ruinous to the best armies. the essential rules on this point are, to make as few detachments as possible, _to have them readily movable_, to draw them back to the main body as soon as practicable, and to give them good instructions for avoiding disasters. i have nothing to say relative to the first two chapters on military policy; for they are themselves nothing more than a brief summary of this part of the art of war, which chiefly concerns statesmen, but should be thoroughly understood by military men. i will, however, invite special attention to article xiv., relating to the command of armies or to the choice of generals-in-chief,--a subject worthy the most anxious care upon the part of a wise government; for upon it often depends the safety of the nation. we may be confident that a good strategist will make a good chief of staff for an army; but for the command in chief is required a man of tried qualities, of high character and known energy. the united action of two such men as commander-in-chief and chief of staff, when a great captain of the first order cannot be had, may produce the most brilliant results. footnotes: [footnote : the objective may be in some degree _political_,--especially in cases of wars of intervention in the affairs of another country; but it then really becomes geographical.] [footnote : the operations mentioned show the advantage of employing masses at the decisive point, not because it was done in , but because it was not done. if napoleon had been in carnot's place, he would have fallen with all his force upon charleroi, whence be would have attacked the left of the prince of coburg and cut his line of retreat. let any one compare the results of carnot's half-skillful operations with the wise maneuvers of saint-bernard and jena, and be convinced.] note upon the means of acquiring a good strategic coup-d'oeil. the study of the principles of strategy can produce no valuable practical results if we do nothing more than keep them in remembrance, never trying to apply them, with map in hand, to hypothetical wars, or to the brilliant operations of great captains. by such exercises may be procured a rapid and certain strategic _coup-d'oeil_,--the most valuable characteristic of a good general, without which he can never put in practice the finest theories in the world. when a military man who is a student of his art has become fully impressed by the advantages procured by moving a strong mass against successive fractions of the enemy's force, and particularly when he recognizes the importance of constantly directing the main efforts upon decisive points of the theater of operations, he will naturally desire to be able to perceive at a glance what are these decisive points. i have already, in chapter iii., page , of the preceding summary, indicated the simple means by which this knowledge may be obtained. there is, in fact, one truth of remarkable simplicity which obtains in all the combinations of a methodical war. it is this:--_in every position a general may occupy, he has only to decide whether to operate by the right, by the left, or by the front_. to be convinced of the correctness of this assertion, let us first take this general in his private office at the opening of the war. his first care will be to choose that zone of operations which will give him the greatest number of chances of success and be the least dangerous for him in case of reverse. as no theater of operations can have more than three zones, (that of the right, that of the center, and that of the left,) and as i have in articles from xvii. to xxii. pointed out the manner of perceiving the advantages and dangers of these zones, the choice of a zone of operations will be a matter of no difficulty. when the general has finally chosen a zone within which to operate with the principal portion of his forces, and when these forces shall be established in that zone, the army will have a front of operations toward the hostile army, which will also have one. now, these fronts of operations will each have its right, left, and center. it only remains, then, for the general to decide upon which of these directions he can injure the enemy most,--for this will always be the best, especially if he can move upon it without endangering his own communications. i have dwelt upon this point also in the preceding summary. finally, when the two armies are in presence of each other upon the field of battle where the decisive collision is to ensue, and are upon the point of coming to blows, they will each have a right, left, and center; and it remains for the general to decide still between these three directions of striking. let us take, as an illustration of the truths i have mentioned, the theater of operations, already referred to, between the rhine and the north sea. (see fig. .) although this theater presents, in one point of view, four geographical sections,--viz.: the space between the rhine and the moselle, that between the moselle and the meuse, that between the meuse and the scheldt, and that between the last river and the sea,--it is nevertheless true that an army of which a a is the base and b b the front of operations will have only three general directions to choose from; for the two spaces in the center will form a single central zone, as it will always have one on the right and another on the left. [illustration: fig. .] the army b b, wishing to take the offensive against the army cc, whose base was the rhine, would have three directions in which to operate. if it maneuvered by the extreme right, descending the moselle, (toward d,) it would evidently threaten the enemy's line of retreat toward the rhine; but he, concentrating the mass of his forces toward luxembourg, might fall upon the left of the army d and compel it to change front and fight a battle with its rear toward the rhine, causing its ruin if seriously defeated. if, on the contrary, the army b wished to make its greatest effort upon the left, (toward e,) in order to take advantage of the finely-fortified towns of lille and valenciennes, it would be exposed to inconveniences still more serious than before. for the army cc, concentrating in force toward audenarde, might fall on the right of b, and, outflanking this wing in the battle, might throw it upon the impassable country toward antwerp between the scheldt and the sea,--where there would remain but two things for it to do: either to surrender at discretion, or cut its way through the enemy at the sacrifice of half its numbers. it appears evident, therefore, that the left zone would be the most disadvantageous for army b, and the right zone would be inconvenient, although somewhat favorable in a certain point of view. the central zone remains to be examined. this is found to possess all desirable advantages, because the army b might move the mass of its force toward charleroi with a view of cutting through the immense front of operations of the enemy, might overwhelm his center, and drive the right back upon antwerp and the lower scheldt, without seriously exposing its own communications. when the forces are chiefly concentrated upon the most favorable zone, they should, of course, have that direction of movement toward the enemy's front of operations which is in harmony with the chief object in view. for example, if you shall have operated by your right against the enemy's left, with the intention of cutting off the greater portion of his army from its base of the rhine, you should certainly continue to operate in the same direction; for if you should make your greatest effort against the right of the enemy's front, while your plan was to gain an advantage over his left, your operations could not result as you anticipated, no matter how well they might be executed. if, on the contrary, you had decided to take the left zone, with the intention of crowding the enemy back upon the sea, you ought constantly to maneuver by your right in order to accomplish your object; for if you maneuvered by the left, yourself and not the enemy would be the party thrown back upon the sea in case of a reverse. applying these ideas to the theaters of the campaigns of marengo, ulm, and jena, we find the same three zones, with this difference, that in those campaigns the central direction was not the best. in , the direction of the left led straight to the left bank of the po, on the line of retreat of mélas; in , the left zone was the one which led by the way of donauwerth to the extreme right, and the line of retreat of mack; in , however, napoleon could reach the prussian line of retreat by the right zone, filing off from bamberg toward gera. in , napoleon had to choose between a line of operations on the right, leading to the sea-shore toward nice and savona, that of the center, leading by mont-cenis toward turin, and that of the left, leading to the line of communications of mélas, by way of saint-bernard or the simplon. the first two directions had nothing in their favor, and the right might have been very dangerous,--as, in fact, it proved to massena, who was forced back to genoa and there besieged. the decisive direction was evidently that by the left. i have said enough to explain my ideas on this point. the subject of battles is somewhat more complicated; for in the arrangements for these there are both strategical and tactical considerations to be taken into account and harmonized. a position for battle, being necessarily connected with the line of retreat and the base of operations, must have a well-defined strategic direction; but this direction must also depend somewhat upon the character of the ground and the stations of the troops of both parties to the engagement: these are tactical considerations. although an army usually takes such a position for a battle as will keep its line of retreat behind it, sometimes it is obliged to assume a position parallel to this line. in such a case it is evident that if you fall with overwhelming force upon the wing nearest the line of retreat, the enemy may be cut off or destroyed, or, at least, have no other chance of escape than in forcing his way through your line. i will here mention as illustrations the celebrated battle of leuthen in , of which i have given an account in the history of frederick's wars, and the famous days of krasnoi, in the retreat from moscow in . [illustration: fig. .] the annexed figure ( ) explains the combination at krasnoi. the line a a is napoleon's line of retreat toward c. he took the position b b to cover his line. it is evident that the principal mass of koutousoff's army d d should have moved to e e in order to fall on the right of the french, whose army would have been certainly destroyed if it had been anticipated at c; for everybody knows in what a state it was while thus fifteen hundred miles from its true base. there was the same combination at jemmapes, where dumouriez, by outflanking the austrian left, instead of attacking their right, would have entirely cut them off from the rhine. at the battle of leuthen frederick overwhelmed the austrian left, which was in the direction of their line of retreat; and for this reason the right wing was obliged to take refuge in breslau, where it capitulated a few days later. in such cases there is no cause for hesitation. the decisive point is that wing of the enemy which is nearest his line of retreat, and this line you must seize while protecting your own. when an enemy has one or two lines of retreat perpendicular to and behind his position of battle, it will generally be best to attack the center, or that wing where the obstacles of the ground shall be the least favorable for the defense; for in such a case the first consideration is to gain the battle, without having in view the total destruction of the enemy. that depends upon the relative numerical strength, the _morale_ of the two armies, and other circumstances, with reference to which no fixed rules can be laid down. finally, it happens sometimes that an army succeeds in seizing the enemy's line of retreat before fighting a battle, as napoleon did at marengo, ulm, and jena. the decisive point having in such case been secured by skillful marches before fighting, it only remains to prevent the enemy from forcing his way through your line. you can do nothing better than fight a parallel battle, as there is no reason for maneuvering against one wing more than the other. but for the enemy who is thus cut off the case is very different. he should certainly strike most heavily in the direction of that wing where he can hope most speedily to regain his proper line of retreat; and if he throws the mass of his forces there, he may save at least a large portion of them. all that he has to do is to determine whether this decisive effort shall be toward the right or the left. it is proper for me to remark that the passage of a great river in the presence of a hostile army is sometimes an exceptional case to which the general rules will not apply. in these operations, which are of an exceedingly delicate character, the essential thing is to keep the bridges safe. if, after effecting the passage, a general should throw the mass of his forces toward the right or the left with a view of taking possession of some decisive point, or of driving his enemy back upon the river, whilst the latter was collecting all his forces in another direction to seize the bridges, the former army might be in a very critical condition in case of a reverse befalling it. the battle of wagram is an excellent example in point,--as good, indeed, as could be desired. i have treated this subject in article xxxvii., (pages and following.) a military man who clearly perceives the importance of the truths that have been stated will succeed in acquiring a rapid and accurate _coup-d'oeil_. it will be admitted, moreover, that a general who estimates them at their true value, and accustoms himself to their use, either in reading military history, or in hypothetical cases on maps, will seldom be in doubt, in real campaigns, what he ought to do; and even when his enemy attempts sudden and unexpected movements, he will always be ready with suitable measures for counteracting them, by constantly bearing in mind the few simple fundamental principles which should regulate all the operations of war. heaven forbid that i should pretend to lessen the dignity of the sublime art of war by reducing it to such simple elements! i appreciate thoroughly the difference between the directing principles of combinations arranged in the quiet of the closet, and that special talent which is indispensable to the individual who has, amidst the noise and confusion of battle, to keep a hundred thousand men co-operating toward the attainment of one single object. i know well what should be the character and talents of the general who has to make such masses move as one man, to engage them at the proper point simultaneously and at the proper moment, to keep them supplied with arms, provisions, clothing, and munitions. still, although this special talent, to which i have referred, is indispensable, it must be granted that the ability to give wise direction to masses upon the best strategic points of a theater of operations is the most sublime characteristic of a great captain. how many brave armies, under the command of leaders who were also brave and possessed executive ability, have lost not only battles, but even empires, because they were moved imprudently in one direction when they should have gone in the other! numerous examples might be mentioned; but i will refer only to ligny, waterloo, bautzen, dennewitz, leuthen. i will say no more; for i could only repeat what has already been said. to relieve myself in advance of the blame which will be ascribed to me for attaching too much importance to the application of the few maxims laid down in my writings, i will repeat what i was the first to announce:--"_that war is not an exact science, but a drama full of passion_; that the moral qualities, the talents, the executive foresight and ability, the greatness of character, of the leaders, and the impulses, sympathies, and passions of the masses, have a great influence upon it." i may be permitted also, after having written the detailed history of thirty campaigns and assisted in person in twelve of the most celebrated of them, to declare that i have not found a single case where these principles, correctly applied, did not lead to success. as to the special executive ability and the well-balanced penetrating mind which distinguish the practical man from the one who knows only what others teach him, i confess that no book can introduce those things into a head where the germ does not previously exist by nature. i have seen many generals--marshals, even--attain a certain degree of reputation by talking largely of principles which they conceived incorrectly in theory and could not apply at all. i have seen these men intrusted with the supreme command of armies, and make the most extravagant plans, because they were totally deficient in good judgment and were filled with inordinate self-conceit. my works are not intended for such misguided persons as these, but my desire has been to facilitate the study of the art of war for careful, inquiring minds, by pointing out directing principles. taking this view, i claim credit for having rendered valuable service to those officers who are really desirous of gaining distinction in the profession of arms. finally, i will conclude this short summary with one last truth:-- "the first of all the requisites for a man's success as a leader is, that he be perfectly brave. when a general is animated by a truly martial spirit and can communicate it to his soldiers, he may commit faults, but he will gain victories and secure deserved laurels." [blank page] second appendix to the summary of the art of war. on the formation of troops for battle. happening to be in paris, near the end of , a distinguished person did me the honor to ask my opinion as to whether recent improvements in fire-arms would cause any great modifications in the manner of making war. i replied that they would probably have an influence upon the details of tactics, but that, in great strategic operations and the grand combinations of battles, victory would, now as ever, result from the application of the principles which had led to the success of great generals in all ages,--of alexander and cæsar as well as of frederick and napoleon. my illustrious interlocutor seemed to be completely of my opinion. the heroic events which have recently occurred near sebastopol have not produced the slightest change in my opinion. this gigantic contest between two vast intrenched camps, occupied by entire armies and mounting two thousand guns of the largest caliber, is an event without precedent, which will have no equal in the future; for the circumstances which produced it cannot occur again. moreover, this contest of cannon with ramparts, bearing no resemblance to regular pitched battles fought in the center of a continent, cannot influence in any respect the great combinations of war, nor even the tactics of battles. the bloody battles of the alma and inkermann, by giving evidence of the murderous effect of the new fire-arms, naturally led me to investigate the changes which it might be necessary to make on this account in the tactics for infantry. i shall endeavor to fulfill this task in a few words, in order to complete what was published on this point twenty years ago in the summary of the art of war. the important question of the influence of musketry-fire in battles is not new: it dates from the reign of frederick the great, and particularly from the battle of mollwitz, which he gained (it was said) because his infantry-soldiers, by the use of cylindrical rammers in loading their muskets, were able to fire three shots per minute more than their enemies.[ ] the discussion which arose at this epoch between the partisans of the shallow and deep orders of formation for troops is known to all military students. the system of deployed lines in three ranks was adopted for the infantry; the cavalry, formed in two ranks, and in the order of battle, was deployed upon the wings, or a part was held in reserve. the celebrated regulation for maneuvers of fixed the deployed as the only order for battle: it seemed to admit the use of battalion-columns doubled on the center only in partial combats,--such as an attack upon an isolated post, a village, a forest, or small intrenchments.[ ] the insufficient instruction in maneuvers of the troops of the republic forced the generals, who were poor tacticians, to employ in battle the system of columns supported by numerous skirmishers. besides this, the nature of the countries which formed the theaters of operations--the vosges, alps, pyrenees, and the difficult country of la vendée--rendered this the only appropriate system. how would it have been possible to attack the camps of saorgio, figueras, and mont-cenis with deployed regiments? in napoleon's time, the french generally used the system of columns, as they were nearly always the assailants. in , i published, at glogau in silesia, a small pamphlet with the title of "summary of the general principles of the art of war," in which i proposed to admit for the attack the system of lines formed of columns of battalions by divisions of two companies; in other words, to march to the attack in lines of battalions closed in mass or at half-distance, preceded by numerous skirmishers, and the columns being separated by intervals that may vary between that necessary for the deployment of a battalion and the minimum of the front of one column. what i had recently seen in the campaigns of ulm, austerlitz, jena, and eylau had convinced me of the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of marching an army in deployed lines in either two or three ranks, to attack an enemy in position. it was this conviction which led me to publish the pamphlet above referred to. this work attracted some attention, not only on account of the treatise on strategy, but also on account of what was said on tactics. the successes gained by wellington in spain and at waterloo with troops deployed in lines of two ranks were generally attributed to the murderous effect of the infantry-fire, and created doubt in some minds as to the propriety of the use of small columns; but it was not till after that the controversies on the best formation for battle wore renewed by the appearance of a pamphlet by the marquis of chambray. in these discussions, i remarked the fatal tendency of the clearest minds to reduce every system of war to absolute forms, and to cast in the same mold all the tactical combinations a general may arrange, without taking into consideration localities, moral circumstances, national characteristics, or the abilities of the commanders. i had proposed to use lines of small columns, especially in the attack: i never intended to make it an exclusive system, particularly for the defense. i had two opportunities of being convinced that this formation was approved of by the greatest generals of our times. the first was at the congress of vienna, in the latter part of : the archduke charles observed "that he was under great obligations for the summary i had published in , which general walmoden had brought to him in from silesia." at the beginning of the war of , the prince had not thought it possible to apply the formation which i had proposed; but at the battle of essling the contracted space of the field induced him to form a part of his army in columns by battalions, (the landwehr particularly,) and they resisted admirably the furious charges of the cuirassiers of general d'espagne, which, in the opinion of the archduke, they could not have done if they had been deployed. at the battle of wagram, the greater part of the austrian line was formed in the same way as at essling, and after two days of terrible fighting the archduke abandoned the field of battle, not because his army was badly beaten, but because his left was outflanked and thrown back so as to endanger his line of retreat on hungary. the prince was satisfied that the firm bearing of his troops was in part due to this mixture of small columns with deployed battalions. the second witness is wellington; although his evidence is, apparently, not so conclusive. having been presented to him at the congress of verona in , i had occasion to speak to him on the subject of the controversies to which his system of formation for battle (a system to which a great part of his success had been attributed) had given rise. he remarked that he was convinced the manner of the attack of the french upon him, in columns more or less deep, was very dangerous against a solid, well-armed infantry having confidence in its fire and well supported by artillery and cavalry. i observed to the duke that these deep columns were very different from the small columns which i proposed,--a formation which insures in the attack steadiness, force, and mobility, while deep masses afford no greater mobility and force than a deployed line, and are very much more exposed to the ravages of artillery. i asked the illustrious general if at waterloo he had not formed the hanoverian, brunswick, and belgian troops in columns by battalions. he answered, "yes; because i could not depend upon them so well as upon the english." i replied that this admission proved that he thought a line formed of columns by battalions was more firm than long deployed lines. he replied, "they are certainly good, also; but their use always depends upon the localities and the spirit of the troops. a general cannot act in the same manner under all circumstances." to this illustrious evidence i might add that napoleon himself, in the campaign of , prescribed for the attack the formation of the infantry in columns by divisions of two companies in two ranks, as the most suitable,--which was identically what i had proposed in . the duke of wellington also admitted that the french columns at waterloo, particularly those of their right wing, were not small columns of battalions, but enormous masses, much more unwieldy and much deeper. if we can believe the prussian accounts and plans of the battle, it would seem that ney's four divisions were formed in but four columns, at least in their march to the attack of la haye sainte and the line extending from this farm to the papelotte. i was not present; but several officers have assured me that at one time the troops were formed in columns by divisions of two brigades each, the battalions being deployed behind each other at six paces' interval. this circumstance demonstrates how much is wanting in the military terms of the french. we give the same name of _division_ to masses of four regiments and to fractions of a battalion of two companies each,--which is absurd. let us suppose, for example, that napoleon had directed on the th of june, , the formation of the line in columns by divisions and by battalions, intending that the regulation of should be followed. his lieutenants might naturally have understood it very differently, and, according to their interpretation of the order, would have executed one of the following formations:-- . either the four divisions of the right wing would have been formed in four large masses, each one of eight or twelve battalions, (according to the strength of the regiments,) as is indicated in this figure for eight battalions.[ ] . or each division would have been formed in eight or twelve columns of battalions by divisions of two platoons or companies, according to the system i have proposed, as in this figure, viz.:-- i do not mean to assert positively that this confusion of words led to the deep masses at waterloo; but it might have done so; and it is important that in every language there should be two different terms to express two such different things as a _division_ of twelve battalions and a _division_ of a quarter of a battalion. struck with what precedes, i thought it proper to modify my summary already referred to, which was too concise, and in my revision of it i devoted a chapter to the discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the different formations for battle. i also added some considerations relative to a mixed system used at eylau by general benningsen, which consisted in forming a regiment of three battalions by deploying the central one, the other two being in column on the wings. * * * * * after these discussions, i drew the conclusions:-- . that wellington's system was certainly good for the defensive. . that the system of benningsen might, according to circumstances, be as good for the offensive as for the defensive, since it was successfully used by napoleon at the passage of the tagliamento. . that the most skillful tactician would experience great difficulty in marching forty or fifty deployed battalions in two or three ranks over an interval of twelve or fifteen hundred yards, preserving sufficient order to attack an enemy in position with any chance of success, the front all the while being played upon by artillery and musketry. i have never seen any thing of the kind in my experience. i regard it as impossible, and am convinced that such a line could not advance to the attack in sufficiently good order to have the force necessary for success. napoleon was in the habit of addressing his marshals in these terms:--"take your troops up in good order, and make a vigorous assault upon the enemy." i ask, what means is there of carrying up to the assault of an enemy forty or fifty deployed battalions as a whole in good order? they will reach the enemy in detachments disconnected from each other, and the commander cannot exercise any control over the mass as a whole. i saw nothing of this kind either at ulm, jena, eylau, bautzen, dresden, culm, or leipsic; neither did it occur at austerlitz, friedland, katzbach, or dennewitz. i am not aware that wellington, in any of his battles, ever marched in deployed lines to the attack of an enemy in position. he generally awaited the attack. at vittoria and toulouse he gained the victory by maneuvers against the flanks; and at toulouse soult's right wing was beaten while descending the heights to attack. even at waterloo, what fate would have befallen the english army if, leaving the plateau of mont saint-jean, it had marched in deployed order to attack napoleon in position on the heights of la belle alliance? i will be pardoned for these recapitulations, as they seem to be necessary to the solution of a question which has arisen since my summary of the art of war was written. some german generals, recognizing fully the advantages derived in from the system of columns of battalions, have endeavored to add to its value by dividing up the columns and increasing their number, so as to make them more shallow and to facilitate their deployment. with this view, they propose, instead of forming four divisions or companies one behind the other, to place them beside each other, not deployed, but in small columns. that is, if the battalion consists of four companies of two hundred and forty men each, each company is to be divided into four sections of sixty each: one of these sections will be dispersed as skirmishers, and the other three, in two ranks, will form a small column; so that the battalion, instead of forming one column, will form four, and the regiment of three battalions will form twelve small columns instead of three-- [illustration: d battalion. d battalion. st battalion. --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ------ --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ------ --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ------ --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---] it is certain that it would be easier to march such a line against the enemy than if deployed; but these diminutive columns of sixty skirmishers and one hundred and eighty men in the ranks would never present the same order and solidity as a single column of a battalion. still as the system has some advantages, it deserves a trial; and, indeed, it has already been practiced in prussia and austria. the same formation applies equally to battalions of six or eight companies. in this case the battalion would not be formed by companies, but by divisions of two companies,--that is, in three or four columns, according to the number of companies. two serious inconveniences appear to me to attach to each of these formations. if vigorously charged by cavalry, these small subdivisions would be in great danger; and even in attacking the enemy's line, if driven back and pursued, disorder would be more likely to occur than in the columns of battalions. still, either of them may be employed, according to circumstances, localities, and the _morale_ of the troops. experience alone can assign to each its proper value. i am not aware whether the austrians applied these columns of companies at custozza and novara, or whether these maneuvers have only been practiced in their camps of instruction. be that as it may, there is another not less important question to be considered:-- "will the adoption of the rifled small-arms and improved balls bring about any important changes in the formation for battle and the now recognized principles of tactics?" if these arms aided the allies at the alma and inkermann, it was because the russians were not provided with them; and it must not be forgotten that in a year or two all armies will alike be furnished with them, so that in future the advantage will not be confined to one side. what change will it make in tactics? will whole armies be deployed as skirmishers, or will it not still be necessary to preserve either the formation of lines deployed in two or three ranks, or lines of battalions in columns? will battles become mere duels with the rifle, where the parties will fire upon each other, without maneuvering, until one or the other shall retreat or be destroyed? what military man will reply in the affirmative? it follows, therefore, that, to decide battles, maneuvers are necessary, and victory will fall to the general who maneuvers most skillfully; and he cannot maneuver except with deployed lines or lines of columns of battalions, either whole or subdivided into columns of one or two companies. to attempt to prescribe by regulation under what circumstances either of these systems is to be applied would be absurd. if a general and an army can be found such that he can march upon the enemy in a deployed line of forty or fifty battalions, then let the shallow order be adopted, and the formation in columns be confined to the attack of isolated posts; but i freely confess that i would never accept the command of an army under this condition. the only point for a regulation for the formation for battle is to forbid the use of very deep columns, because they are heavy, and difficult to move and to keep in order. besides, they are so much exposed to artillery that their destruction seems inevitable, and their great depth does not increase in any respect their chances of success. if the organization of an army were left to me, i would adopt for infantry the formation in two ranks, and a regimental organization according with the formation for battle. i would then make each regiment of infantry to consist of three battalions and a depot. each battalion should consist of six companies, so that when in column by division the depth would be three divisions or six ranks. this formation seems most reasonable, whether it is desired to form the battalion in columns of attack by divisions on the center of each battalion, or on any other division. the columns of attack, since the depth is only six ranks, would not be so much exposed to the fire of artillery, but would still have the mobility necessary to take the troops up in good order and launch them upon the enemy with great force. the deployment of these small columns could be executed with great ease and promptitude; and for the forming of a square a column of three divisions in depth would be preferable in several respects to one of four or six divisions. in the russian service each battalion consists of four companies of two hundred and fifty men each; each company being as strong as a division in the french organization. the maneuver of double column on the center is not practicable, since the center is here merely an interval separating the second and third companies. hence the column must be simple, not on the center, but on one of the four companies. something analogous to the double column on the center would be attained by forming the first and fourth companies behind the second and third respectively; but then the formation would be in two lines rather than in column; and this is the reason why i would prefer the organization of the battalion in six companies or three divisions. by dividing each of the four companies into two platoons, making eight in all, the formation of _double column on the center_ might be made on the fourth and fifth platoons as the leading division; but then each division would be composed of two platoons belonging to different companies, so that each captain would have half of the men of his company under the command of another officer, and half of his own division would be made up of another company. such an arrangement in the attack would be very inconvenient; for, as the captain is the real commander, father, and judge of the men of his own company, he can always obtain more from them in the way of duty than any stranger. in addition, if the double column should meet with a decided repulse, and it should be necessary to reform it in line, it would be difficult to prevent disorder, the platoons being obliged to run from one side to the other to find their companies. in the french system, where each battalion consists of eight companies, forming as many platoons at drill, this objection does not exist, since each company is conducted by its own captain. it is true that there will be two captains of companies in each division; but this will be rather an advantage than the reverse, since there will be a rivalry and emulation between the two captains and their men, which will lead to greater display of bravery: besides, if necessary, the senior captain is there, to command the division as a whole. it is time to leave these secondary details and return to the important question at issue. since i have alluded to the system adopted by wellington, it is proper to explain it so that it can be estimated at its true value in the light of historical events. in spain and portugal, particularly, wellington had under his command a mass of troops of the country, in which he placed but little confidence in regular formation in a pitched battle, on account of their want of instruction and discipline, but which were animated by a lively hatred of the french and formed bodies of skirmishers useful in harassing the enemy. having learned by experience the effects of the fury and impetuosity of the french columns when led by such men as massena and ney, wellington decided upon wise means of weakening this impetuosity and afterward securing a triumph over it. he chose positions difficult to approach, and covered all their avenues by swarms of spanish and portuguese riflemen, who were skilled in taking advantage of the inequalities of the ground; he placed a part of his artillery on the tactical crest of his position, and a part more to the rear, and riddled the advancing columns with a murderous artillery and musketry fire, while his excellent english infantry, sheltered from the fire, were posted a hundred paces in rear of the crest, to await the arrival of these columns; and when the latter appeared on the summit, wearied, out of breath, decimated in numbers, they were received with a general discharge of artillery and musketry and immediately charged by the infantry with the bayonet. this system, which was perfectly rational and particularly applicable to spain and portugal, since he had there great numbers of this kind of troops and there was a great deal of rough ground upon which they could be useful as marksmen, needed some modifications to make it applicable to belgium. at waterloo the duke took his position on a plateau with a gentle slope like a glacis, where his artillery had a magnificent field of fire, and where it produced a terrible effect: both flanks of this plateau were well protected. wellington, from the crest of the plateau, could discover the slightest movement in the french army, while his own were hidden; but, nevertheless, his system would not have prevented his losing the battle if a number of other circumstances had not come to his aid. every one knows more or less correctly the events of this terrible battle, which i have elsewhere impartially described. i demonstrated that its result was due neither to the musketry-fire nor to the use of deployed lines by the english, but to the following accidental causes, viz.:-- . to the mud, which rendered the progress of the french in the attack painful and slow, and caused their first attacks to be less effective, and prevented their being properly sustained by the artillery. . to the original formation of very deep columns on the part of the french, principally on the right wing. . to the want of unity in the employment of the three arms: the infantry and cavalry made a number of charges alternating with each other, but they were in no case simultaneous. . finally and chiefly, to the unexpected arrival of the whole prussian army at the decisive moment on the right flank, if not the rear, of the french. every experienced military man will agree that, in spite of the mud and the firmness of the english infantry, if the mass of the french infantry had been thrown on the english in columns of battalions immediately after the great charge of cavalry, the combined army would have been broken and forced back on antwerp. independently of this, if the prussians had not arrived, the english would have been compelled to retreat; and i maintain that this battle cannot justly be cited as proof of the superiority of musketry-fire over well-directed attacks in columns. from all these discussions we may draw the following conclusions, viz.:-- . that the improvements in fire-arms will not introduce any important change in the manner of taking troops into battle, but that it would be useful to introduce into the tactics of infantry the formation of columns by companies, and to have a numerous body of good riflemen or skirmishers, and to exercise the troops considerably in firing. those armies which have whole regiments of light infantry may distribute them through the different brigades; but it would be preferable to detail sharp-shooters alternately in each company as they are needed, which would be practicable when the troops are accustomed to firing: by this plan the light-infantry regiments could be employed in the line with the others; and should the number of sharp-shooters taken from the companies be at any time insufficient, they could be reinforced by a battalion of light infantry to each division. . that if wellington's system of deployed lines and musketry-fire be excellent for the defense, it would be difficult ever to employ it in an attack upon an enemy in position. . that, in spite of the improvements of fire-arms, two armies in a battle will not pass the day in firing at each other from a distance: it will always be necessary for one of them to advance to the attack of the other. . that, as this advance is necessary, success will depend, as formerly, upon the most skillful maneuvering according to the principles of grand tactics, which consist in this, viz.: in knowing how to direct the great mass of the troops at the proper moment upon the decisive point of the battle-field, and in employing for this purpose the simultaneous action of the three arms. . that it would be difficult to add much to what has been said on this subject in chapters iv. and v.; and that it would be unreasonable to define by regulation an absolute system of formation for battle. . that victory may with much certainty be expected by the party taking the offensive when the general in command possesses the talent of taking his troops into action in good order and of boldly attacking the enemy, adopting the system of formation best adapted to the ground, to the spirit and quality of his troops, and to his own character. finally, i will terminate this article with the following remark: that war, far from being an exact science, is a terrible and impassioned drama, regulated, it is true, by three or four general principles, but also dependent for its results upon a number of moral and physical complications. footnotes: [footnote : it is probable that baron jomini here refers to iron, instead of cylindrical, ramrods. before , all european troops used wooden ramrods; and the credit of the invention of iron ones is attributed by some to the prince of anhalt, and by others to prince leopold of dessau. the prussians were the first to adopt the iron ramrod, and at the date of the battle of mollwitz ( ) it had not been introduced into the austrian service. frederick did not adopt the cylindrical ramrod till , thirty-six years after the battle of mollwitz. the advantage of the cylindrical ramrod consisted in this,--that the soldier in loading saved the time necessary to turn the ramrod; but obviously this small economy of time could never have enabled him to load three times while the enemy loaded once,--all other things being equal.--translators.] [footnote : columns by battalions closed in mass seemed only to be intended to use in long columns on the march, to keep them closed, in order to facilitate their deployment.] [footnote : we suppose each regiment to consist of two battalions: if there should be three in each regiment, the deep column would then consist of twelve lines of either twenty-four or thirty-six ranks, while in the next figure there would be twelve battalions on the line instead of eight, the depth not being increased.] sketch of the principal maritime expeditions. i have thought it proper to give here an account of the principal maritime expeditions, to be taken in connection with maxims on descents. the naval forces of egypt, phoenicia, and rhodes are the earliest mentioned in history, and of them the account is confused. the persians conquered these nations, as well as asia minor, and became the most formidable power on both land and sea. about the same time the carthaginians, who were masters of the coast of mauritania, being invited by the inhabitants of cadiz, passed the straits, colonized boetica and took possession of the balearic isles and sardinia, and finally made a descent on sicily. the greeks contended against the persians with a success that could not have been expected,--although no country was ever more favorably situated for a naval power than greece, with her fifty islands and her great extent of coast. the merchant marine of athens produced her prosperity, and gave her the naval power to which greece was indebted for her independence. her fleets, united with those of the islands, were, under themistocles, the terror of the persians and the rulers of the east. they never made grand descents, because their land-forces were not in proportion to their naval strength. had greece been a united government instead of a confederation of republics, and had the navies of athens, syracuse, corinth, and sparta been combined instead of fighting among each other, it is probable that the greeks would have conquered the world before the romans. if we can believe the exaggerated traditions of the old greek historians, the famous army of xerxes had not less than four thousand vessels; and this number is astonishing, even when we read the account of them by herodotus. it is more difficult to believe that at the same time, and by a concerted movement, five thousand other vessels landed three hundred thousand carthaginians in sicily, where they were totally defeated by gelon on the same day that themistocles destroyed the fleet of xerxes at salamis. three other expeditions, under hannibal, imilcon, and hamilcar, carried into sicily from one hundred to one hundred and fifty thousand men: agrigentum and palermo were taken, lilybæum was founded, and syracuse besieged twice. the third time androcles, with fifteen thousand men, landed in africa, and made carthage tremble. this contest lasted one year and a half. alexander the great crossed the hellespont with only fifty thousand men: his naval force was only one hundred and sixty sail, while the persians had four hundred; and to save his fleet alexander sent it back to greece. after alexander's death, his generals, who quarreled about the division of the empire, made no important naval expedition. pyrrhus, invited by the inhabitants of tarentum and aided by their fleet, landed in italy with twenty-six thousand infantry, three thousand horses, and the first elephants which had been seen in italy. this was two hundred and eighty years before the christian era. conqueror of the romans at heraclea and ascoli, it is difficult to understand why he should have gone to sicily at the solicitation of the syracusans to expel the carthaginians. recalled, after some success, by the tarentines, he recrossed the straits, harassed by the carthaginian fleet: then, reinforced by the samnites or calabrians, he, a little too late, concluded to march on rome. he in turn was beaten and repulsed on beneventum, when he returned to epirus with nine thousand men, which was all that remained of his force. carthage, which had been prospering for a long time, profited by the ruin of tyre and the persian empire. the punic wars between carthage and rome, now the preponderating power in italy, were the most celebrated in the maritime annals of antiquity. the romans were particularly remarkable for the rapidity with which they improved and increased their marine. in the year b.c. their boats or vessels were scarcely fit to cross to sicily; and eight years after found regulus conqueror at ecnomos, with three hundred and forty large vessels, each with three hundred rowers and one hundred and twenty combatants, making in all one hundred and forty thousand men. the carthaginians, it is said, were stronger by twelve to fifteen thousand men and fifty vessels. the victory of ecnomos--perhaps more extraordinary than that of actium--was the first important step of the romans toward universal empire. the subsequent descent in africa consisted of forty thousand men; but the greater part of this force being recalled to sicily, the remainder was overthrown, and regulus, being made prisoner, became as celebrated by his death as by his famous victory. the great fleet which was to avenge him was successful at clypea, but was destroyed on its return by a storm; and its successor met the same fate at cape palinuro. in the year b.c. the romans were defeated at drepanum, and lost twenty-eight thousand men and more than one hundred vessels. another fleet, on its way to besiege lilybæum, in the same year, was lost off cape pactyrus. discouraged by this succession of disasters, the senate at first resolved to renounce the sea; but, observing that the power of sicily and spain resulted from their maritime superiority, it concluded to arm its fleets again, and in the year lutatius catullus set out with three hundred galleys and seven hundred transports for drepanum, and gained the battle in the Ægates islands, in which the carthaginians lost one hundred and twenty vessels. this victory brought to a close the first punic war. the second, distinguished by hannibal's expedition to italy, was less maritime in its character. scipio, however, bore the roman eagles to cartagena, and by its capture destroyed forever the empire of the carthaginians in spain. finally, he carried the war into africa with a force inferior to that of regulus; but still he succeeded in gaining the battle of zama, imposing a shameful peace on carthage and burning five hundred of her ships. subsequently scipio's brother crossed the hellespont with twenty-five thousand men, and at magnesia gained the celebrated victory which surrendered to the mercy of the romans the kingdom of antiochus and all asia. this expedition was aided by a victory gained at myonnesus in ionia, by the combined fleets of rome and rhodes, over the navy of antiochus. from this time rome had no rival, and she continued to add to her power by using every means to insure to her the empire of the sea. paulus emilius in the year b.c. landed at samothrace at the head of twenty-five thousand men, conquered perseus, and brought macedonia to submission. twenty years later, the third punic war decided the fate of carthage. the important port of utica having been given up to the romans, an immense fleet was employed in transporting to this point eighty thousand foot-soldiers and four thousand horses; carthage was besieged, and the son of paulus emilius and adopted son of the great scipio had the glory of completing the victory which emilius and scipio had begun, by destroying the bitter rival of his country. after this triumph, the power of rome in africa, as well as in europe, was supreme; but her empire in asia was for a moment shaken by mithridates. this powerful king, after seizing in succession the small adjacent states, was in command of not less than two hundred and fifty thousand men, and of a fleet of four hundred vessels, of which three hundred were decked. he defeated the three roman generals who commanded in cappadocia, invaded asia minor and massacred there at least eighty thousand roman subjects, and even sent a large army into greece. sylla landed in greece with a reinforcement of twenty-five thousand romans, and retook athens; but mithridates sent in succession two large armies by the bosporus and the dardanelles: the first, one hundred thousand strong, was destroyed at chæronea, and the second, of eighty thousand men, met a similar fate at orchomenus. at the same time, lucullus, having collected all the maritime resources of the cities of asia minor, the islands, and particularly of rhodes, was prepared to transport sylla's army from sestos to asia; and mithridates, from fear, made peace. in the second and third wars, respectively conducted by murena and lucullus, there were no descents effected. mithridates, driven step by step into colchis, and no longer able to keep the sea, conceived the project of turning the black sea by the caucasus, in order to pass through thrace to assume the offensive,--a policy which it is difficult to understand, in view of the fact that he was unable to defend his kingdom against fifty thousand romans. cæsar, in his second descent on england, had six hundred vessels, transporting forty thousand men. during the civil wars he transported thirty-five thousand men to greece. antony came from brundusium to join him with twenty thousand men, and passed through the fleet of pompey,--in which act he was as much favored by the lucky star of cæsar as by the arrangements of his lieutenants. afterward cæsar carried an army of sixty thousand men to africa; they did not, however, go in a body, but in successive detachments. the greatest armament of the latter days of the roman republic was that of augustus, who transported eighty thousand men and twelve thousand horses into greece to oppose antony; for, besides the numerous transports required for such an army, there were two hundred and sixty vessels of war to protect them. antony was superior in force on land, but trusted the empire of the world to a naval battle: he had one hundred and seventy war-vessels, in addition to sixty of cleopatra's galleys, the whole manned by twenty-two thousand choice troops, besides the necessary rowers. later, germanicus conducted an expedition of one thousand vessels, carrying sixty thousand men, from the mouths of the rhine to the mouths of the ems. half of this fleet was destroyed on its return by a storm; and it is difficult to understand why germanicus, controlling both banks of the rhine, should have exposed his army to the chances of the sea, when he could have reached the same point by land in a few days. when the roman authority extended from the rhine to the euphrates, maritime expeditions were rare; and the great contest with the races of the north of europe, which began after the division of the empire, gave employment to the roman armies on the sides of germany and thrace. the eastern fraction of the empire still maintained a powerful navy, which the possession of the islands of the archipelago made a necessity, while at the same time it afforded the means. the first five centuries of the christian era afford but few events of interest in maritime warfare. the vandals, having acquired spain, landed in africa, eighty thousand strong, under genseric. they were defeated by belisarius; but, holding the balearic isles and sicily, they controlled the mediterranean for a time. at the very epoch when the nations of the east invaded europe, the scandinavians began to land on the coast of england. their operations are little better known than those of the barbarians: they are hidden in the mysteries of odin. the scandinavian bards attribute two thousand five hundred vessels to sweden. less poetical accounts assign nine hundred and seventy to the danes and three hundred to norway: these frequently acted in concert. the swedes naturally turned their attention to the head of the baltic, and drove the varangians into russia. the danes, more favorably situated with respect to the north sea, directed their course toward the coasts of france and england. if the account cited by depping is correct, the greater part of these vessels were nothing more than fishermen's boats manned by a score of rowers. there were also _snekars_, with twenty banks or forty rowers. the largest had thirty-four banks of rowers. the incursions of the danes, who had long before ascended the seine and loire, lead us to infer that the greater part of these vessels were very small. however, hengist, invited by the briton vortigern, transported five thousand saxons to england in eighteen vessels,--which would go to show that there were then also large vessels, or that the marine of the elbe was superior to that of the scandinavians. between the years and , three new expeditions, under ida and cridda, gained england for the saxons, who divided it into seven kingdoms; and it was not until three centuries had elapsed ( ) that they were again united under the authority of egbert. the african races, in their turn, visited the south of europe. in , the moors crossed the straits of gibraltar, under the lead of tarik. they came, five thousand strong, at the invitation of count julian; and, far from meeting great resistance, they were welcomed by the numerous enemies of the visigoths. this was the happy era of the caliphs, and the arabs might well pass for liberators in comparison with the tyrants of the north. tarik's army, soon swelled to twenty thousand men, defeated rodrigo at jerez and reduced the kingdom to submission. in time, several millions of the inhabitants of mauritania crossed the sea and settled in spain; and if their numerous migrations cannot be regarded as descents, still, they form one of the most curious and interesting scenes in history, occurring between the incursions of the vandals in africa and the crusades in the east. a revolution not less important, and one which has left more durable traces, marked in the north the establishment of the vast empire now known as russia. the varangian princes, invited by the novgorodians, of whom rurik was the chief, soon signalized themselves by great expeditions. in , oleg is said to have embarked eighty thousand men in two thousand boats on the dnieper: they passed the falls of the river and debouched in the black sea, while their cavalry followed the banks. they proceeded to constantinople, and forced leo the philosopher to pay tribute. forty years subsequently, igor took the same route with a fleet said to have consisted of ten thousand boats. near constantinople his fleet, terrified by the effects of the greek fire, was driven on the coast of asia, where the force was disembarked. it was defeated, and the expedition returned home. not discouraged, igor re-established his fleet and army and descended to the mouths of the danube, where the emperor romanus i. sent to renew the tribute and ask for peace, ( .) in , svatoslav, favored by the quarrel of nicephorus with the king of bulgaria, embarked sixty thousand men, debouched into the black sea, ascended the danube, and seized bulgaria. recalled by the petchenegs, who were menacing kiew, he entered into alliance with them and returned into bulgaria, broke his alliance with the greeks, and, being reinforced by the hungarians, crossed the balkan and marched to attack adrianople. the throne of constantine was held by zimisces, who was worthy of his position. instead of purchasing safety by paying tribute, as his predecessors had done, he raised one hundred thousand men, armed a respectable fleet, repulsed svatoslav at adrianople, obliged him to retreat to silistria, and took by assault the capital of the bulgarians. the russian prince marched to meet him, and gave battle not far from silistria, but was obliged to re-enter the place, where he sustained one of the most memorable sieges recorded in history. in a second and still more bloody battle, the russians performed prodigies of valor, but were again compelled to yield to numbers. zimisces, honoring courage, finally concluded an advantageous treaty. about this period the danes were attracted to england by the hope of pillage; and we are told that lothaire called their king, ogier, to france to be avenged of his brothers. the first success of these pirates increased their fondness for this sort of adventure, and for five or six years their bands swarmed on the coasts of france and britain and devastated the country. ogier, hastings, regner, and sigefroi conducted them sometimes to the mouths of the seine, sometimes to the mouths of the loire, and finally to those of the garonne. it is even asserted that hastings entered the mediterranean and ascended the rhone to avignon; but this is, to say the least, doubtful. the strength of their fleets is not known: the largest seems to have been of three hundred sail. in the beginning of the tenth century, rollo at first landed in england, but, finding little chance of success against alfred, he entered into alliance with him, landed in neustria in , and advanced from rouen on paris: other bodies marched from nantes on chartres. repulsed here, rollo overran and ravaged the neighboring provinces. charles the simple saw no better means of delivering his kingdom of this ever-increasing scourge than to offer rollo the fine province of neustria on condition that he would marry his daughter and turn christian,--an offer which was eagerly accepted. thirty years later, rollo's step-son, annoyed by the successors of charles, called to his aid the king of denmark. the latter landed in considerable force, defeated the french, took the king prisoner, and assured rollo's son in the possession of normandy. during the same interval ( to ) the danes exhibited even greater hostility toward england than to france, although they were much more assimilated to the saxons than to the french in language and customs. ivar, after pillaging the kingdom, established his family in northumberland. alfred the great, at first beaten by ivar's successors, succeeded in regaining his throne and in compelling the submission of the danes. the aspect of affairs changes anew: sweyn, still more fortunate than ivar, after conquering and devastating england, granted peace on condition that a sum of money should be paid, and returned to denmark, leaving a part of his army behind him. ethelred, who had weakly disputed with sweyn what remained of the saxon power, thought he could not do better to free himself from his importunate guests than to order a simultaneous massacre of all the danes in the kingdom, ( .) but sweyn reappeared in the following year at the head of an imposing force, and between and three successive fleets effected disembarkations on the coast, and unfortunate england was ravaged anew. in , sweyn landed at the mouth of the humber and again swept over the land like a torrent, and the english, tired of obedience to kings who could not defend them, recognized him as king of the north. his son, canute the great, had to contend with a rival more worthy of him, (edmund ironside.) returning from denmark at the head of a considerable force, and aided by the perfidious edric, canute ravaged the southern part of england and threatened london. a new division of the kingdom resulted; but, edmund having been assassinated by edric, canute was finally recognized as king of all england. afterward he sailed to conquer norway, from which country he returned to attack scotland. when he died, he divided the kingdom between his three children, according to the usage of the times. five years after canute's death, the english assigned the crown to their anglo-saxon princes; but edward, to whom it fell, was better fitted to be a monk than to save a kingdom a prey to such commotions. he died in , leaving to harold a crown which the chief of the normans settled in france contested with him, and to whom, it is said, edward had made a cession of the kingdom. unfortunately for harold, this chief was a great and ambitious man. the year was marked by two extraordinary expeditions. while william the conqueror was preparing in normandy a formidable armament against harold, the brother of the latter, having been driven from northumberland for his crimes, sought support in norway, and, with the king of norway, set out with thirty thousand men on five hundred vessels, and landed at the mouth of the humber. harold almost entirely destroyed this force in a bloody battle fought near york; but a more formidable storm was about to burst upon his head. william took advantage of the time when the anglo-saxon king was fighting the norwegians, to sail from st. valery with a very large armament. hume asserts that he had three thousand transports; while other authorities reduce the number to twelve hundred, carrying from sixty to seventy thousand men. harold hastened from york, and fought a decisive battle near hastings, in which he met an honorable death, and his fortunate rival soon reduced the country to submission. at the same time, another william, surnamed bras-de-fer, robert guiscard, and his brother roger, conquered calabria and sicily with a handful of troops,( to .) scarcely thirty years after these memorable events, an enthusiastic priest animated europe with a fanatical frenzy and precipitated large forces upon asia to conquer the holy land. at first followed by one hundred thousand men, afterward by two hundred thousand badly-armed vagabonds who perished in great part under the attacks of the hungarians, bulgarians, and greeks, peter the hermit succeeded in crossing the bosporus, and arrived before nice with from fifty to sixty thousand men, who were either killed or captured by the saracens. an expedition more military in its character succeeded this campaign of religious pilgrims. one hundred thousand men, composed of french, burgundians, germans, and inhabitants of lorraine, under godfrey of bouillon, marched through austria on constantinople; an equal number, under the count of toulouse, marched by lyons, italy, dalmatia, and macedonia; and bohemond, prince of tarentum, embarked with a force of normans, sicilians, and italians, and took the route by greece on gallipolis. this extensive migration reminds us of the fabulous expeditions of xerxes. the genoese, venetian, and greek fleets were chartered to transport these swarms of crusaders by the bosporus or dardanelles to asia. more than four hundred thousand men were concentrated on the plains of nice, where they avenged the defeat of their predecessors. godfrey afterward led them across asia and syria as far as jerusalem, where he founded a kingdom. all the maritime resources of greece and the flourishing republics of italy were required to transport these masses across the bosporus and in provisioning them during the siege of nice; and the great impulse thus given to the coast states of italy was perhaps the most advantageous result of the crusades. this temporary success of the crusaders became the source of great disasters. the mussulmans, heretofore divided among themselves, united to resist the infidel, and divisions began to appear in the christian camps. a new expedition was necessary to aid the kingdom which the brave noureddin was threatening. louis vii. and the emperor conrad, each at the head of one hundred thousand crusaders, marched, as their predecessors had done, by the route of constantinople, ( .) but the greeks, frightened by the recurring visits of these menacing guests, plotted their destruction. conrad, who was desirous of being first, fell into the traps laid for him by the turks, and was defeated in detachments in several battles by the sultan of iconium. louis, more fortunate, defeated the turks on the banks of the mender; but, being deprived of the support of conrad, and his army being annoyed and partially beaten by the enemy in the passage of defiles, and being in want of supplies, he was confined to attalia, on the coast of pamphylia, where he endeavored to embark his army. the means furnished by the greeks were insufficient, and not more than fifteen or twenty thousand men arrived at antioch with the king: the remainder either perished or fell into the hands of the saracens. this feeble reinforcement soon melted away under the attacks of the climate and the daily contests with the enemy, although they were continually aided by small bodies brought over from europe by the italian ships; and they were again about to yield under the attacks of saladin, when the court of rome succeeded in effecting an alliance between the emperor frederick barbarossa and the kings of france and england to save the holy land. the emperor was the first to set out. at the head of one hundred thousand germans, he opened a passage through thrace in spite of the formal resistance of the greeks, now governed by isaac angelus. he marched to gallipolis, crossed the dardanelles, and seized iconium. he died in consequence of an imprudent bath in a river, which, it has been pretended, was the cydnus. his son, the duke of swabia, annoyed by the mussulmans and attacked by diseases, brought to ptolemais scarcely six thousand men. at the same time, richard coeur-de-lion[ ] and philip augustus more judiciously took the route over the sea, and sailed from marseilles and genoa with two immense fleets,( .) the first seized cyprus, and both landed in syria,--where they would probably have triumphed but for the rivalry which sprang up between them, in consequence of which philip returned to france. twelve years later, a new crusade was determined upon, ( .) part of the crusaders embarked from provence or italy; others, led by the count of flanders and the marquis of montferrat, proceeded to venice, with the intention of embarking there. the party last mentioned were persuaded by the skillful dandolo to aid him in an attack upon constantinople, upon the pretext of upholding the rights of alexis angelus, the son of isaac angelus, who had fought the emperor frederick and was the successor of those comnenuses who had connived at the destruction of the armies of conrad and louis vii. twenty thousand men had the boldness to attack the ancient capital of the world, which had at least two hundred thousand defenders. they assailed it by sea and land, and captured it. the usurper fled, and alexis was replaced upon the throne, but was unable to retain his seat: the greeks made an insurrection in favor of murzupha, but the latins took possession of constantinople after a more bloody assault than the first, and placed upon the throne their chief, count baldwin of flanders. this empire lasted a half-century. the remnant of the greeks took refuge at nice and trebizond. a sixth expedition was directed against egypt by john of brienne, who, notwithstanding the successful issue of the horrible siege of damietta, was obliged to give way before the constantly-increasing efforts of the mussulman population. the remains of his splendid army, after a narrow escape from drowning in the nile, deemed themselves very fortunate in being able to purchase permission to re-embark for europe. the court of rome, whose interest it was to keep up the zeal of christendom in these expeditions, of which it gathered all the fruits, encouraged the german princes to uphold the tottering realm at jerusalem. the emperor frederick and the landgrave of hesse embarked at brundusium in , at the head of forty thousand chosen soldiers. the landgrave, and afterward frederick himself, fell sick, and the fleet put in at tarentum, from which port the emperor, irritated by the presumption of gregory ix., who excommunicated him because he was too slow in the gratification of his wishes, at a later date proceeded with ten thousand men, thus giving way to the fear inspired by the pontifical thunders. louis ix., animated by the same feeling of fear, or impelled, if we may credit ancelot, by motives of a higher character, set out from aigues-mortes, in , with one hundred and twenty large vessels, and fifteen hundred smaller boats, hired from the genoese, the venetians and the catalans; for france was at that time without a navy, although washed by two seas. this king proceeded to cyprus, and, having there collected a still larger force, set out, according to joinville's statement, with more than eighteen hundred vessels, to make a descent into egypt. his army must have numbered about eighty thousand men; for, although half of the fleet was scattered and cast away upon the coast of syria, he marched upon cairo a few months later with sixty thousand fighting-men, twenty thousand being mounted. it should be stated that the count of poictiers had arrived also with troops from france. the sad fortune experienced by this splendid army did not prevent the same king from engaging in a new crusade, twenty years later,( .) he disembarked upon that occasion at the ruins of carthage, and besieged tunis. the plague swept off half his army in a few months, and himself was one of its victims. the king of sicily, having arrived with powerful reinforcements at the time of louis's death, and desiring to carry back the remains of the army to his island of sicily, encountered a tempest which caused a loss of four thousand men and twenty large ships. this prince was not deterred by this misfortune from desiring the conquest of the greek empire and of constantinople, which seemed a prize of greater value and more readily obtained. philip, the son and successor of saint louis, being anxious to return to france, would have nothing to do with that project. this was the last effort. the christians who were abandoned in syria were destroyed in the noted attacks of tripoli and ptolemais: some of the remnants of the religious orders took refuge at cyprus and established themselves at rhodes. the mussulmans, in their turn, crossed the dardanelles at gallipolis in , and took possession, one after the other, of the european provinces of the eastern empire, to which the latins had themselves given the fatal blow. mohammed ii., while besieging constantinople in , is said to have had his fleet transported by land with a view to placing it in the canal and closing the port: it is stated to have been large enough to be manned by twenty thousand select foot-soldiers. after the capture of this capital, mohammed found his means increased by all those of the greek navy, and in a short time his empire attained the first rank of maritime powers. he ordered an attack to be made upon rhodes and upon otranto on the italian main, whilst he proceeded to hungary in search of a more worthy opponent (hunniades.) repulsed and wounded at belgrade, the sultan fell upon trebizond with a numerous fleet, brought that city to sue for terms, and then proceeded with a fleet of four hundred sail to make a landing upon the island of negropont, which he carried by assault. a second attempt upon rhodes, executed, it is stated, at the head of a hundred thousand men, by one of his ablest lieutenants, was a failure, with loss to the assailants. mohammed was preparing to go to that point himself with an immense army assembled on the shores of ionia, which vertot estimates at three hundred thousand men; but death closed his career, and the project was not carried into effect. about the same period england began to be formidable to her neighbors on land as well as on the sea; the dutch also, reclaiming their country from the inroads of the sea, were laying the foundations of a power more extraordinary even than that of venice. edward iii. landed in france and besieged calais with eight hundred ships and forty thousand men. henry v. made two descents in and : he had, it is stated, fifteen hundred vessels and only thirty thousand men, of whom six thousand were cavalry. all the events we have described as taking place, up to this period, and including the capture of constantinople, were before the invention of gunpowder; for if henry v. had cannon at agincourt, as is claimed by some writers, they were certainly not used in naval warfare. from that time all the combinations of naval armaments were entirely changed; and this revolution took place--if i may use that expression--at the time when the invention of the mariner's compass and the discovery of america and of the cape of good hope were about to turn the maritime commerce of the world into new channels and to establish an entirely new system of colonial dependencies. i shall not mention in detail the expeditions of the spaniards to america, or those of the portuguese, dutch, and english to india by doubling the cape of good hope. notwithstanding their great influence upon the commerce of the world,--notwithstanding the genius of gama, albuquerque, and cortez,--these expeditions, undertaken by small bodies of two or three thousand men against tribes who knew nothing of fire-arms, are of no interest in a military point of view. the spanish navy, whose fame had been greatly increased by this discovery of a new world, was at the height of its splendor in the reign of charles v. however, the glory of the expedition to tunis, which was conquered by this prince at the head of thirty thousand fine soldiers transported in five hundred genoese or spanish vessels, was balanced by the disaster which befell a similar expedition against algiers, ( ,) undertaken when the season was too far advanced and in opposition to the wise counsels of admiral doria. the expedition was scarcely under way when the emperor saw one hundred and sixty of his ships and eight thousand men swallowed up by the waves: the remainder was saved by the skill of doria, and assembled at cape metafuz, where charles v. himself arrived, after encountering great difficulties and peril. while these events were transpiring, the successors of mohammed were not neglecting the advantages given them by the possession of so many fine maritime provinces, which taught them at once the importance of the control of the sea and furnished means for obtaining it. at this period the turks were quite as well informed with reference to artillery and the military art in general as the europeans. they reached the apex of their greatness under solyman i., who besieged and captured rhodes ( ) with an army stated to have reached the number of one hundred and forty thousand men,--which was still formidable even upon the supposition of its strength being exaggerated by one-half. in , mustapha and the celebrated dragut made a descent upon malta, where the knights of rhodes had made a new establishment; they carried over thirty-two thousand janissaries, with one hundred and forty ships. john of valetta, as is well known, gained an enduring fame by repulsing them. a more formidable expedition, consisting of two hundred vessels and fifty-five thousand men, was sent in to the isle of cyprus, where nicosia was taken and famagosta besieged. the horrible cruelties practiced by mustapha increased the alarm occasioned by his progress. spain, venice, naples, and malta united their naval forces to succor cyprus; but famagosta had already surrendered, notwithstanding the heroic defense of bragadino, who was perfidiously flayed alive by mustapha's order, to avenge the death of forty thousand turks that had perished in the space of two years spent on the island. the allied fleet, under the orders of two heroes, don john of austria, brother of philip ii., and andrea doria, attacked the turkish fleet at the entrance of the gulf of lepanto, near the promontory of actium, where antony and augustus once fought for the empire of the world. the turkish fleet was almost entirely destroyed: more than two hundred vessels and thirty thousand turks were captured or perished, ( .) this victory did not put an end to the supremacy of the turks, but was a great check in their career of greatness. however, they made such vigorous efforts that as large a fleet as the former one was sent to sea during the next year. peace terminated this contest, in which such enormous losses were sustained. the bad fortune of charles v. in his expedition against algiers did not deter sebastian of portugal from wishing to attempt the conquest of morocco, where he was invited by a moorish prince who had been deprived of his estates. having disembarked upon the shores of morocco at the head of twenty thousand men, this young prince was killed and his army cut to pieces at the battle of alcazar by muley abdulmalek, in . philip ii., whose pride had increased since the naval battle of lepanto on account of the success he had gained in france by his diplomacy and by the folly of the adherents of the league, deemed his arms irresistible. he thought to bring england to his feet. the invincible armada intended to produce this effect, which has been so famous, was composed of an expeditionary force proceeding from cadiz, including, according to hume's narrative, one hundred and thirty-seven vessels, armed with two thousand six hundred and thirty bronze cannon, and carrying twenty thousand soldiers, in addition to eleven thousand sailors. to these forces was to be added an army of twenty-five thousand men which the duke of parma was to bring up from the netherlands by way of ostend. a tempest and the efforts of the english caused the failure of this expedition, which, although of considerable magnitude for the period when it appeared, was by no means entitled to the high-sounding name it received: it lost thirteen thousand men and half the vessels before it even came near the english coast. after this expedition comes in chronological order that of gustavus adolphus to germany,( .) the army contained only from fifteen to eighteen thousand men: the fleet was quite large, and was manned by nine thousand sailors; m. ancillon must, however, be mistaken in stating that it carried eight thousand cannon. the debarkation in pomerania received little opposition from the imperial troops, and the king of sweden had a strong party among the german people. his successor was the leader of a very extraordinary expedition, which is resembled by only one other example mentioned in history: i refer to the march of charles x. of sweden across the belt upon the ice, with a view of moving from sleswick upon copenhagen by way of the island of funen,( .) he had twenty-five thousand men, of whom nine thousand were cavalry, and artillery in proportion. this undertaking was so much the more rash because the ice was unsafe, several pieces of artillery and even the king's own carriage having broken through and been lost. after seventy-five years of peace, the war between venice and the turks recommenced in . the latter transported an army of fifty-five thousand men, in three hundred and fifty vessels, to candia, and gained possession of the important post of canea before the republic thought of sending succor. although the people of venice began to lose the spirit which made her great, she still numbered among her citizens some noble souls: morosini, grimani, and mocenigo struggled several years against the turks, who derived great advantages from their numerical superiority and the possession of canea. the venetian fleet had, nevertheless, gained a marked ascendency under the orders of grimani, when a third of it was destroyed by a frightful tempest, in which the admiral himself perished. in , the siege of candia began. jussuf attacked the city furiously at the head of thirty thousand men: after being repulsed in two assaults, he was encouraged to attempt a third by a large breach being made. the turks entered the place: mocenigo rushed to meet them, expecting to die in their midst. a brilliant victory was the reward of his heroic conduct: the enemy were repulsed and the ditches filled with their dead bodies. venice might have driven off the turks by sending twenty thousand men to candia; but europe rendered her but feeble support, and she had already called into active service all the men fit for war she could produce. the siege, resumed some time after, lasted longer than that of troy, and each campaign was marked by fresh attempts on the part of the turks to carry succor to their army and by naval victories gained by the venetians. the latter people had kept up with the advance of naval tactics in europe, and thus were plainly superior to the mussulmans, who adhered to the old customs, and were made to pay dearly for every attempt to issue from the dardanelles. three persons of the name of morosini, and several mocenigos, made themselves famous in this protracted struggle. finally, the celebrated coprougli, placed by his merits at the head of the ottoman ministry, resolved to take the personal direction of this war which had lasted so long: he accordingly proceeded to the island, where transports had landed fifty thousand men, at whose head he conducted the attack in a vigorous manner.( .) in this memorable siege the turks exhibited more skill than previously: their artillery, of very heavy caliber, was well served, and, for the first time, they made use of trenches, which were the invention of an italian engineer. the venetians, on their side, greatly improved the methods of defense by mines. never had there been seen such furious zeal exhibited in mutual destruction by combats, mines, and assaults. their heroic resistance enabled the garrison to hold out during winter: in the spring, venice sent reinforcements and the duke of feuillade brought a few hundreds of french volunteers. the turks had also received strong reinforcements, and redoubled their efforts. the siege was drawing to a close, when six thousand frenchmen came to the assistance of the garrison under the leadership of the duke of beaufort and navailles,( .) a badly-conducted sortie discouraged these presumptuous young men, and navailles, disgusted with the sufferings endured in the siege, assumed the responsibility, at the end of two months, of carrying the remnant of his troops back to france. morosini, having then but three thousand exhausted men to defend a place which was open on all sides, finally consented to evacuate it, and a truce was agreed upon, which led to a formal treaty of peace. candia had cost the turks twenty-five years of efforts and more than one hundred thousand men killed in eighteen assaults and several hundred sorties. it is estimated that thirty-five thousand christians of different nations perished in the glorious defense of the place. the struggle between louis xiv., holland, and england gives examples of great maritime operations, but no remarkable descents. that of james ii. in ireland ( ) was composed of only six thousand frenchmen, although de tourville's fleet contained seventy-three ships of the line, carrying five thousand eight hundred cannon and twenty-nine thousand sailors. a grave fault was committed in not throwing at least twenty thousand men into ireland with such means as were disposable. two years later, de tourville had been conquered in the famous day of la hogue, and the remains of the troops which had landed were enabled to return through the instrumentality of a treaty which required their evacuation of the island. at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the swedes and russians undertook two expeditions very different in character. charles xii., wishing to aid the duke of holstein, made a descent upon denmark at the head of twenty thousand men, transported by two hundred vessels and protected by a strong squadron. he was really assisted by the english and dutch navies, but the expedition was not for that reason the less remarkable in the details of the disembarkation. the same prince effected a descent into livonia to aid narva, but he landed his troops at a swedish port. peter the great, having some cause of complaint against the persians, and wishing to take advantage of their dissensions, embarked (in ) upon the volga: he entered the caspian sea with two hundred and seventy vessels, carrying twenty thousand foot-soldiers, and descended to agrakhan, at the mouths of the koisou, where he expected to meet his cavalry. this force, numbering nine thousand dragoons and five thousand cossacks, joined him after a land-march by way of the caucasus. the czar then seized derbent, besieged bakou, and finally made a treaty with one of the parties whose dissensions at that time filled with discord the empire of the soofees: he procured the cession of astrabad, the key of the caspian sea and, in some measure, of the whole persian empire. the time of louis xv. furnished examples of none but secondary expeditions, unless we except that of richelieu against minorca, which was very glorious as an escalade, but less extraordinary as a descent. [in , an english fleet sailed from portsmouth: this was joined by a portion of the squadron from martinico. the whole amounted to nineteen ships of the line, eighteen smaller vessels of war, and one hundred and fifty transports, carrying ten thousand men. the expedition besieged and captured havana.--trs.] the spaniards, however, in , made a descent with fifteen or sixteen thousand men upon algiers, with a view of punishing those rovers of the sea for their bold piracies; but the expedition, for want of harmonious action between the squadron and the land-forces, was unsuccessful, on account of the murderous fire which the troops received from the turkish and arab musketeers dispersed among the undergrowth surrounding the city. the troops returned to their vessels after having two thousand men placed _hors de combat_. the american war ( ) was the epoch of the greatest maritime efforts upon the part of the french. europe was astonished to see this power send count d'estaing to america with twenty-five ships of the line, while at the same time m. orvilliers, with a franco-spanish fleet of sixty-five ships of the line, was to cover a descent to be effected with three hundred transports and forty thousand men, assembled at havre and st. malo. this new armada moved back and forth for several months, but accomplished nothing: the winds finally drove it back to port. d'estaing was more fortunate, as he succeeded in getting the superiority in the antilles and in landing in the united states six thousand frenchmen under rochambeau, who were followed, at a later date, by another division, and assisted in investing the english army under cornwallis at yorktown, ( :) the independence of america was thus secured. france would perhaps have gained a triumph over her implacable rival more lasting in its effects, had she, in addition to the display made in the english channel, sent ten ships and seven or eight thousand men more to india with admiral suffren. during the french revolution, there were few examples of descents: the fire at toulon, emigration, and the battle of ushant had greatly injured the french navy. hoche's expedition against ireland with twenty-five thousand men was scattered by the winds, and no further attempts in that quarter were made. ( .) at a later date, bonaparte's expedition to egypt, consisting of twenty-three thousand men, thirteen ships, seventeen frigates, and four hundred transports, obtained great successes at first, which were followed by sad reverses. the turks, in hopes of expelling him, landed fifteen thousand men at aboukir, but were all captured or driven into the sea, notwithstanding the advantages this peninsula gave them of intrenching themselves and waiting for reinforcements. this is an excellent example for imitation by the party on the defensive under similar circumstances. the expedition of considerable magnitude which was sent out in to st. domingo was remarkable as a descent, but failed on account of the ravages of yellow fever. since their success against louis xiv., the english have given their attention more to the destruction of rival fleets and the subjugation of colonies than to great descents. the attempts made in the eighteenth century against brest and cherbourg with bodies of ten or twelve thousand men amounted to nothing in the heart of a powerful state like france. the remarkable conquests which procured them their indian empire occurred in succession. having obtained possession of calcutta, and then of bengal, they strengthened themselves gradually by the arrival of troops in small bodies and by using the sepoys, whom they disciplined to the number of one hundred and fifty thousand. the anglo-russian expedition to holland in was composed of forty thousand men, but they were not all landed at once: the study of the details of the operations is, however, quite interesting. in , abercrombie, after threatening ferrol and cadiz, effected a descent into egypt with twenty thousand englishmen. the results of this expedition are well known. general stuart's expedition to calabria, ( ,) after some successes at maida, was for the purpose of regaining possession of sicily. that against buenos ayres was more unfortunate in its results, and was terminated by a capitulation. in , lord cathcart attacked copenhagen with twenty-five thousand men, besieged and bombarded the city, and gained possession of the danish fleet, which was his object. in , wellington appeared in portugal with fifteen thousand men. after gaining the victory of vimeira, and assisted by the general rising of the portuguese, he forced junot to evacuate the kingdom. the same army, increased in numbers to twenty-five thousand and placed under moore's command, while making an effort to penetrate into spain with a view of relieving madrid, was forced to retreat to corunna and there re-embark, after suffering severe losses. wellington, having effected another landing in portugal with reinforcements, collected an army of thirty thousand englishmen and as many portuguese, with which he avenged moore's misfortunes by surprising soult at oporto, (may, ,) and then beating joseph at talavera, under the very gates of his capital. the expedition to antwerp in the same year was one of the largest england has undertaken since the time of henry v. it was composed of not less than seventy thousand men in all,--forty thousand land-forces and thirty thousand sailors. it did not succeed, on account of the incapacity of the leader. a descent entirely similar in character to that of charles x. of sweden was effected by thirty russian battalions passing the gulf of bothnia on the ice in five columns, with their artillery. their object was to take possession of the islands of aland and spread a feeling of apprehension to the very gates of stockholm. another division passed the gulf to umeå, (march, .) general murray succeeded in effecting a well-planned descent in the neighborhood of tarragona in , with the intention of cutting suchet off from valencia: however, after some successful operations, he thought best to re-embark. the expedition set on foot by england against napoleon after his return from elba in was remarkable on account of the great mass of _matériel_ landed at ostend and antwerp. the anglo-hanoverian army contained sixty thousand men, but some came by land and others were disembarked at a friendly port. the english engaged in an undertaking in the same year which may be regarded as very extraordinary: i refer to the attack on the capital of the united states. the world was astonished to see a handful of seven or eight thousand englishmen making their appearance in the midst of a state embracing ten millions of people, taking possession of its capital, and destroying all the public buildings,--results unparalleled in history. we would be tempted to despise the republican and unmilitary spirit of the inhabitants of those states if the same militia had not risen, like those of greece, rome, and switzerland, to defend their homes against still more powerful attacks, and if, in the same year, an english expedition more extensive than the other had not been entirely defeated by the militia of louisiana and other states under the orders of general jackson. if the somewhat fabulous numbers engaged in the irruption of xerxes and the crusades be excepted, no undertaking of this kind which has been actually carried out, especially since fleets have been armed with powerful artillery, can at all be compared with the gigantic project and proportionate preparations made by napoleon for throwing one hundred and fifty thousand veterans upon the shores of england by the use of three thousand launches or large gun-boats, protected by sixty ships of the line[ ]. from the preceding narrative the reader will perceive what a difference there is in point of difficulty and probability of success between descents attempted across a narrow arm of the sea, a few miles only in width, and those in which the troops and _matériel_ are to be transported long distances over the open sea. this fact gives the reason why so many operations of this kind have been executed by way of the bosporus. * * * * * [the following paragraphs have been compiled from authentic data:-- in , the french government sent an expedition to algiers, composed of an army of thirty-seven thousand five hundred men and one hundred and eighty pieces of artillery. more than five hundred vessels of war and transports were employed. the fleet sailed from toulon. in , france sent a fleet of twenty-two vessels to vera cruz. the castle of san juan d'ulloa fell into their hands after a short bombardment. a small force of about one thousand men, in three columns, took the city of vera cruz by assault: the resistance was slight. in , the united states caused a descent to be made upon the coast of mexico, at vera cruz, with an army of thirteen thousand men, under the command of general scott. one hundred and fifty vessels were employed, including men-of-war and transports. the city of vera cruz and the castle of san juan d'ulloa speedily fell into the possession of the forces of the united states. this important post became the secondary base of operations for the brilliant campaign which terminated with the capture of the city of mexico. in commenced the memorable and gigantic contest between russia on the one side and england, france, sardinia, and turkey on the other. several descents were made by the allied forces at different points of the russian coast: of these the first was in the baltic sea. an english fleet sailed from spithead, under the command of sir charles napier, on the th of march, and a french fleet from brest, under the command of vice-admiral parseval deschênes, on the th of april. they effected a junction in the bay of barosund on the th of june. the allied fleet numbered thirty ships and fifty frigates, corvettes, and other vessels. the naval commanders wished to attack the defenses of bomarsund, on one of the aland isles, but, after a reconnoissance, they came to the conclusion that it was necessary to have land-forces. a french corps of ten thousand men was at once dispatched to bomarsund under general baraguay-d'hilliers, and the place was speedily reduced. later in the same year, the great expedition to the crimea was executed; and with reference to it the following facts are mentioned, in order to give an idea of its magnitude:-- september , , an army of fifty-eight thousand five hundred men and two hundred pieces of artillery was landed near eupatoria, composed of thirty thousand french, twenty-one thousand five hundred english, and seven thousand turks. they were transported from varna to the place of landing by three hundred and eighty-nine ships, steamers, and transports. this force fought and gained the battle of the alma, (september ,) and thence proceeded to sebastopol. the english took possession of the harbor of balaklava and the french of kamiesch: these were the points to which subsequent reinforcements and supplies for the army in the crimea were sent. november , at the battle of inkermann, the allied army numbered seventy-one thousand men. at the end of january, , the french force was seventy-five thousand men and ten thousand horses. up to the same time, the english had sent fifty-four thousand men to the crimea, but only fifteen thousand were alive, present, and fit for duty. february , the french numbered eighty-five thousand; the english, twenty-five thousand fit for duty; the turks, twenty-five thousand. may , , general la marmora arrived at balaklava with fifteen thousand sardinians. in the latter part of may, an expedition of sixteen thousand men was sent to kertch. in august, the french force at sebastopol had risen to one hundred and twenty thousand men. september , the final assault took place, which resulted in the evacuation of the place by the russians. the allies had then in battery more than eight hundred pieces of artillery. the fleet which co-operated with the land-forces in the artillery attack of october , , consisted of twenty-five ships. there were present and prepared to attack in september, , thirty-four ships. october, , an expeditionary force of nine thousand men was sent to kinburn, which place was captured. marshal vaillant, in his report, as minister of war, to the french emperor, says there were sent from france and algeria three hundred and ten thousand men and forty thousand horses, of which two hundred and twenty-seven thousand men returned to france and algeria. the marshal's report gives the following striking facts, (he refers only to french operations:-) the artillery _matériel_ at the disposal of the army of the east comprised one thousand seven hundred guns, two thousand gun-carriages, two thousand seven hundred wagons, two millions of projectiles, and nine million pounds of powder. there were sent to the army three thousand tons of powder, seventy millions of infantry-cartridges, two hundred and seventy thousand rounds of fixed ammunition, and eight thousand war-rockets. on the day of the final assault there were one hundred and eighteen batteries, which during the siege had consumed seven million pounds of powder. they required one million sand-bags and fifty thousand gabions. of engineer materials, fourteen thousand tons were sent. the engineers executed fifty miles of trenches, using eighty thousand gabions, sixty thousand fascines, and one million sand-bags. of subsistence, fuel, and forage, five hundred thousand tons were sent. of clothing, camp-equipage, and harness, twelve thousand tons. hospital stores, six thousand five hundred tons. provision-wagons, ambulances, carts, forges, &c, eight thousand tons. in all, about six hundred thousand tons. it is not thought necessary to add similar facts for the english, sardinian, and turkish armies. in , the spaniards made a descent upon morocco with a force of forty thousand infantry, eleven squadrons of cavalry, and eighty pieces of artillery, using twenty-one vessels of war with three hundred and twenty-seven guns, besides twenty-four gun-boats and numerous transports. in , a force of english and french was landed on the coast of china, whence they marched to pekin and dictated terms of peace. this expedition is remarkable for the smallness of the numbers which ventured, at such a great distance from their sources of supply and succor, to land upon a hostile shore and penetrate into the midst of the most populous empire in the world. the french expedition to syria in was small in numbers, and presented no remarkable features. toward the close of the year , the government of the united states sent an expedition of thirteen thousand men to port royal, on the coast of south carolina, one of the seceding states. the fleet of war-vessels and transports sailed from hampton roads, under command of captain dupont, and was dispersed by a violent gale: the losses of men and _matériel_ were small, however, and the fleet finally reached the rendezvous. the defenses of the harbor having been silenced by the naval forces, the disembarkation of the land-troops took place, general sherman being in command. england, france, and spain are now (january , ) engaged in an expedition directed against mexico. the first operations were the capture, by the spanish forces, of vera cruz and its defenses: the mexicans offered no resistance at that point. the future will develop the plans of the allies; but the ultimate result of a struggle (if, indeed, one be attempted by the mexicans) cannot be doubted, when three of the most powerful states of europe are arrayed against the feeble and tottering republic of mexico.] footnotes: [footnote : richard sailed from england with twenty thousand foot and five thousand horsemen, and landed in normandy, whence he proceeded by land to marseilles. we do not know what fleet he employed to transport his troops to asia. philip embarked at genoa on italian ships, and with a force at least as large as that of richard.] [footnote : see the account of the expedition to the crimea.--translators.] index a. abercrombie's descent on egypt, . accidental lines, . action, concert of, how secured, . active armies and sieges, relation between, . advanced guard, , . attack of the enemy's, in retreats, . in armies meeting unexpectedly, . in battle, , . advance, line of, how determined, . advantages of awaiting invasion, . of elevated points for observation, . aggressive wars for conquest, . agincourt, order of battle at, . albis, position of, . alcazar, battle of, . alexander the great, , . alfred the great, . algiers, french descent on, in , . spanish descent on, . alise, investment of, by cæsar, . allies, at bautzen, . defeat of, at zurich, . error of, in , , . failure of diversion of, in , . in war, . march of, upon leipsic, . alps, passage of, by francis i., . american revolution, french maritime efforts during, . anglo-russian expedition to holland, . angoulême, duke of, expedition of, . antony, retreat of, from media, . antwerp, english expedition to, . archduke charles, . concentric retreat of, in , . interior lines of, . opinion of, as to small-column formation, . opinion of, as to the valley of the danube, . success of, , . archduke ferdinand, . armada, spanish, , , . armament, french, at eylau and marengo, . superior, importance of, , . armies, auxiliary, . central, observations on, . command of, . french, in the revolution, . how to act, . in intrenchments, . in peace, how preserved, . large, fitness of central lines for, . large, organization of, . meeting unexpectedly, advanced guard in, . morale of, , , . movements of, points to be attended to in, - . of french revolution, how subsisted, . of louis xiv. and frederick ii., how subsisted, . of napoleon, operations of, . promotions in, . standing, effect of, on distant invasions, . surprises of, . two, on interior lines, . two, on the same frontier, . unexpected meeting of two, . armor, defensive, for cavalry, . arms and organization of cavalry, , . arms for irregular cavalry, . army, best means of organizing the command of, . army corps, system of, . army, defensive, proper course for, . defensive, when it has the advantage, . head-quarters of, when the most important point, . how perfected, . importance of a good, . number of men in, often determines battle-formation for, . army of boulogne, . of four corps, . of seven corps, . offensive, proper course for, . of invasion, line of defense important to, . of the rhine in , . permanent, necessary condition of, . proportion of cavalry in, . pursuing, has the advantage, . artillerists, directions for, in battle, . artillery, concentration of fire of, in offensive line of battle, . employment of, - . heavy, in defensive line of battle, . importance of, to infantry, . matériel of the french army in the crimea, . napoleon's, at wagrani, , . post of, in line of battle, . proportion of, . protection of infantry from the enemy's, . rules for use of, in battle, - . use of, in the offensive, . who should command, . art of war, definition of, . principal parts of, . assailant, advantages of, . assailant's best means of victory, . assault, beat formation of infantry for, . of field-works, instances of well-arranged, . athens, naval power of, . attack, cavalry column of, . close, formation for, . column of, in two lines, . columns of, , . columns of, of single battalions, . five methods of forming troops for, . formation for, at turin, . in columns, order of, . in front, . in rear, . of field-works, directions for, , . of fortified places, . of intrenched lines, . on flank, . on sank, cavalry, . when order in squares suitable for, . attacks and marches, arrangements of, . in half-deep order, . audenarde, battle of, . augustus, armament of, . aulic council, . austerlitz, , , . napoleon's order of battle at, . austria, course of, in the french revolution, . force of, in the french revolution, . fortresses of, . interest of, in the french revolution, . intervention of, in , . austrian army, situation of, in , . camp before mayence, . order at essling and fleurus, . austrians, surprise of, by turenne, . why victorious in , . austria's adaptation to parallel retreats, . authority of counselors, . b. balloons, difficulties in use of, , . how they might be useful, . used at fleurus, . barbarossa, . bard, fort of, , . importance of defile of, . base of operations, where to be established, . bases of operations, definition of, of operations, how to be chosen, , . of operations, plurality of, . on the sea, , . temporary or eventual, . temporary, when necessary, . with two faces, . bassano, napoleon's march on, . battalions, deployed, in checkerwise order, . battalion squares, . batteries, . battle, advanced guard in, , . calculation of distances in, . classification of orders of, useful, . combinations of, . concave order of, . convex order of, . critical moment of, . decisive moment of, . defensive arrangements for, . battle-field, decisive point of, how determined, . decisive point of, . strategic point of, when important, . battle-formation in small columns, . influence of topography upon, . battle, formation of troops for, - . influence of orders of, on result of engagements, . line of, arrangement of cavalry in, . line of, before the french revolution, . line of, definition of, . line of, distribution of troops in, . line of, post of artillery in, . lines of, for two infantry corps, different formations of, - . oblique order of, . of agincourt, . of alcazar, . of audenarde, . of austerlitz, , , , . of bautzen, , , . of blenheim, . of cannæ, . of crécy, . of ecnomos, . of essling, , , , . of fossano, . of jena, , , . of leipsic, , , , , , . of lepanto, . of leuthen, , , , . of millesimo, . of mollwitz, . of prague, , . of ramillies, . of rivoli, , , . of torgau, . of turin, . of ulm, , . of ulm, won by strategy, . of waterloo, , , , , , , , , , , , - , , , . offensive, object of, . offensive order of, . order of, . order of, at leipsic, . order of, definition of, . orders of, . parallel order of, . reinforced, . when suitable, . with crotchet, . perpendicular order of, . position for, . posting troops in line of, . results of, depend on what, . rules for use of artillery in, - . battle-order for cavalry, . battle-orders, various, . battles, . defensive, . elements of uncertainty regarding, . great difficulty of tactics of, . influence of musketry-fire in, . offensive, . of napoleon, orders of, . rules for scientific, . success in, depends on maneuvering, . three kinds of, . what may interfere with success of, . bautzen, battle of, , . french at, . bellegarde, . benningsen, movement of, in , . benningsen's artillery reserve at eylau, . base on königsberg in , . position in , . mixed system at eylau, . beresina, passage of, , . berg-op-zoom, assault of, . berthier at leipsic, . berthier's error at wagram, . error in campaign of , . blenheim, battle of, . blücher, , . "boar's head" of the ancients, . bonaparte's career in italy, . expedition to egypt, . borodino, napoleon's order of battle at, . boulogne, army of, . camp of, . bravery, first requisite for a leader, . bridges, how to secure, against fire-ships, &c., . in retreats, . means of destroying, . protection of, after passage, . bridge-trains, importance of, . brienne, napoleon's order of battle at, . buntzelwitz, camp of, . burgundy, duke of, . c. cæsar's investment of alise, . maritime expeditions, . campaign, napoleon's, of , . of , . of , . of , . of , napoleon's error in, . of the spaniards in flanders, . of the swedes in germany, . campaigns in mountains, instances of, . in winter, . of and , . camp at kehl, . intrenched, influence of, . intrenched, on which side of a river, . intrenched, on river, . of boulogne, . of drissa, . camps and lines, intrenched, defense of, . fortified, . intrenched, connection of, with strategy, . intrenched, instances of, , . intrenched, maxims on, , . intrenched, prussian system of, . intrenched, use of, . intrenched, where to be established, . strategic square for, . candia, siege of, , . turkish descent on, . cannæ, order of battle at, . cantonment of napoleon on the passarge, . cantonments, . duty of staff officers in, . rules for establishing, . selection of positions for, . canute, . capitals as strategic points, . capital, when the center of power, . capture of posts, means for, . when important, . carbine, in cavalry-charges, . carnot, . operations of, . carthage, destruction of, . carthaginians, expeditions of, , . cavalry, . advantages of large corps of, . arms and organization of, , . arrangement of, in line of battle, . at ramillies, . battle-order for, . best formation of infantry against, . charge at hohenfriedberg, . charge, general, . charges, four kinds of, . charges of the turks, . defensive armor for, . divisions of five regiments, . duties of, . encounters of, against cavalry, . flank charges of, . formations of, - . importance of, in retreats, . importance of, to infantry, . influence of, in a war, , . in the defensive, . irregular, . light, advantages of, . militia as, , . morale of, . must be supported by infantry, . proportion of, in an army, . reserves, , . when it should charge a line of infantry, . center, when proper point of attack, . central armies, . line of napoleon in saxony, . lines, application of, to large masses, . position, when untenable, . chæronea, . charges, irregular cavalry, . charles v. of spain, expedition of, . viii., retreat of, to naples, . x. of sweden, expedition of, . xii. of sweden, descent of, on denmark, . checkerwise formation of cavalry, . order, infantry, . chief of staff, , . china, english and french expedition to, . choice of objective points, . circumvallation, lines of, . civil wars, . clairfayt, victories of, . clausewitz, erroneous assertion of, . opinion of, as to movements in mountainous countries, . coalition against france in , . frederick the great, , . louis xiv., . coasts, influence of, on descents, . coblentz, fortification of, , . towers of, . coburg, prince of, , . column of attack, cavalry, . of attack in two lines, . columns of attack, , , . of attack of single battalions, . of four divisions in three ranks, . combinations of battle, . strategic, . combined use of the three arms, , , . commander, difficulty of selecting, . essential qualities for a, . importance of, . commander, first care of, on taking the field, . of artillery, duties of, . command of an army, best means of organizing, . of armies, . commissariat, connection of, with system of marches, . of louis xiv. and frederick ii., . the, and strategy, . committee of public safety, . concave order of battle, . concentration of artillery-fire, . in retreat, advantages of, . concentric lines, . retreats, instances of, , . system, . concert of action, how secured, . in action, importance of, . conquest, difficulties of, in national wars, - . wars for, instances of, . conrad iii., crusade of, . constantinople, expeditions against, by the russians, . siege of, by the crusaders, . siege of, by mohammed ii., . contempt for the enemy, . contravallation, lines of, . control of operations, . convergent operations, . converging lines more advantageous than divergent, . continuous intrenched lines, . control of the sea, importance of, in an invasion, . convex order of battle, . copenhagen, siege of, . cordon system, . corps, organization by, likely to be permanent, . organization of an army in four, . organization of an army in seven, . system of, . two, one behind the other, . cossacks, , , , . council of war at seat of government, . councils of war, value of, . counselors, authority of, . coup-d'oeil, strategic, - . coups de main, . instances of, , . crécy, order of battle at, . crimea, details of the allied expedition to, - . crimean war, . critical moment of battles, . crossing a river in presence of an enemy, . crotchet, parallel order of battle with, . crotchets, danger of, . crusade of , . crusades, , - . cuirass, , . cuirassiers, . culm, . cyprus, turkish expedition against, . d. danes, incursions of, , . danger of two wars at once, . dangers of auxiliary armies, . danube, napoleon's passage of, . valley of, key of southern germany, . decisive direction, . moment of battle, . point at bautzen, . point, how affected by arrangement of forces, . point of battle-field, . point of battle-field, how determined, , . points, . points, defiles as, . points of the theater of war, . deep columns, . at waterloo, . masses, , . order, disadvantages of, . defeat, . of the french at waterloo, causes of, . defense, in mountainous countries, . line of, important to an army of invasion, . line of, should be short, . of frontiers, . of intrenched camps and lines, . rivers, mountains, and defiles as eventual lines of, . second lines of, . should not be passive, . tactical, of switzerland, . maxims for frontier, , . defensive armor for cavalry, . army has the advantage, when, . army, proper course for, . arrangements for battle, . battles, . best formation of infantry for, . cavalry in, . characteristics of infantry formation for, . in descents, duty of, . line of battle, heavy artillery in, . defensive movements, when advised, . -offensive war, . or offensive system, either may be employed, . the, in a level country, . war, , . defiles as decisive points, . as eventual lines of defense, . in retreats, . definitive lines, . dennewitz, ney's error at, . deployed battalions in checkerwise order, . lines in two ranks, . lines, two, formation of infantry in, . depots, establishment of, on march, . command of, . lines of, . of supplies, . of supplies, general maxims, . secondary, , . descents, . cases where made, . difficulties of, . duty of defensive in, . effect of modern inventions on, . more extensive in ancient times, . precautions after landing, . rules for conducting, . d'estaing's fleet, . detached orders of napoleon, . works, importance of, . detachments, field of operations of, should be large, . four kinds of, . great, , , . great, instances of, , . great, why made, , . multiplication of, must be avoided, . necessary when there is a double strategic front, . of napoleon in , . precise rules for, cannot be laid down, . requisites in officers of, . small, how useful, . detachment to form strategic reserve, illustration of, . détours, , . difficulty of applying theories in war, . diplomacy in invasions, . direction, lines of, their importance illustrated, . of lines of operations, . discipline, importance of, . importance of, in retreats, . distances in battle, calculation of, . distant expeditions, . invasions across extensive territories, . invasions, maxim for, . invasions to aid an ally, . distribution of troops in line of battle, . divergent lines, . duke of york's expedition to dunkirk, . to holland in , . dumouriez, errors of, in , , . dunkirk, expedition to, . duties of cavalry, . of staff officers, - . duty of a general, . of statesmen in offensive wars, . diversions in zone of operations, when advantageous, . division, improper use of the term, . divisions, cavalry, of five regiments, . defects of system of, . remedied by napoleon, . formation by, when preferable, . organization of, , . system of, . doctoroff, warning given to, in , by seslawin, . double line of operations, when applicable, . when necessary, . lines of operations, , . when advantageous, . lines to be avoided, . passages of rivers, . strategic front, . wars, . wars of napoleon, . dragoons, . concentration of, by emperor nicholas, . drepanum, . dresden, . intrenched camp at, , . napoleon's order of battle at, . victory at, . drissa, camp of, , . divergent lines, when advantageous, . operations, . retreats, when admissible, . diversions, . instances of, . when useful, . e. eccentric lines, . retreat. bulow's use of the term, . eccentric system, . echelon, order of battle by, . echelons, order in, . squares in, . ecnomos, victory of, . edward iii. of england, . egypt, expedition of john of brienne against, . ehrenbreitstein, . elchingen, ney at, . elective governments, weakness of, . elevated points, advantage of, for observation, . elongated squares, , . employment of artillery, - . encounters of cavalry against cavalry, . enemy, bodies of, near line of operations, . contempt for, . how dislodged, . how to drive from his position, , . should not be paid to leave a country, . enemy's movements, importance of knowing, . england controls the sea, . invasion of, by sweyn, . projected invasion of, by napoleon, , , . england's attack on washington in , . english and french expedition to china, . english, descents of, on france, . expedition against napoleon in , . expedition in against havana, . maritime expeditions, - . squares at waterloo, . enthusiasm, importance of, . not military spirit, . epaminondas, . error of napoleon in campaign of , . error of the allies in , , . errors in strategy, . essential bases of military policy, . essling, , , , . napoleon at, . napoleon's order of battle at, . order of battle at, , . eugene at turin, . march of, . eventual bases, . lines of defense, . expediency, wars of, . expedition of prince koudacheff, . to the crimea, details of, - . expeditions, assistance of fleets in, . distant, . marine, in modern times, . maritime, - . of the ancients, . of the middle ages, . partly on land, partly by sea, . extended movements, when dangerous, . exterior lines of operations, . extermination, wars of, . eylau, , , , . french armament at, . napoleon's march on, . napoleon's order of battle at, . russian artillery reserve at, . russian order at, . f. famous retreats, instances of, . field, strategic, of , . field-works, directions for attack of, , . instances of well-arranged assaults on, . final reserves, . financial considerations, . fire-arms, influence of improvements in, on war, , , . fire-signals, how used, . flank attack, . attack, cavalry, . charges of cavalry, . marches, , . marches, where inadmissible, . tactical maneuver by, . flanks of companies, movement by, , . protection of, in tactical positions, . fleets, assistance of, in expeditions, . fleurus, , , . balloons used at, . order of battle at, . foot-artillery in line of battle, . in the offensive, . forests, advantages of, in retreats, . formation by divisions, when preferable, . for attack at turin, . for battle in small columns, . for battle, napoleon's system, , . for battle often determined by size of army, . for battle, prussian and austrian system, . for close attack, . of infantry for attack, five methods of, . in two ranks, . of troops for battle, - . formations of cavalry, - . of lines of battle for two infantry corps, - . various, for infantry, . fortification of coblentz, , . fortifications, remark upon, . fortified camps, . places, attack of, . places on the sea-coast, importance of, . places, when a misfortune, . fortresses at mayence, . greatest advantages of, . large, when preferable, . number and position of, . of france and austria, . on frontiers, . relation of, to strategy, , . forts in a mountainous country, . purposes of, . fossano, battle of, . four-rank formation of infantry, . france adapted to parallel retreats, . coalition against, in , . course and error of, in , . fortresses of, . intention of, when declaring war in , . invasions of, by the english, . francis i., passage of the alps by, . frederick the great, , . at leuthen, . at prague, . at torgau, . commissariat of, . defensive-offensive operations of, . maneuver of, at leuthen, . military genius of, . frederick ii., crusade of, . french and english expedition to china, . french armies in the revolution, . armies, situation of, in , . at bautzen, . at fleurus, why successful, . at waterloo, . capture of vera cruz by, in , . causes of defeat of, at waterloo, . cavalry, . columns at waterloo, . defeat of, at stockach, . descent on algiers in , . errors in , . expedition to syria, . in bohemia in , . invasions of and , . french, maritime efforts of, during american revolution, . operations in italy, . operations of, at close of , - . operations of, in , . order at essling and fleurus, . order at minden, . plan in , error of, . revolution, - . revolution, armies of, how subsisted, . revolution, course of austria in, . revolution, course of prussia in, , . revolution, interest of austria in, . revolution, lines of operations in the wars of, . revolution, relation of italy to, . revolution, relation of prussia and austria to, . revolution, theater of operations in, . revolution, zones of operations in, . frontier defenses, maxims for, , . when a permanent line of defense, . frontiers, defense of, . disadvantage of fortresses on, . how to be fortified, . mountains as, . rivers as, . front of operations, , . of operations, extent of, . of operations, how varied, . strategic, change of, . strategic, not to be too extended, . fronts of operations, . fronts, strategic, . fundamental principle of war, . maxims of, . principles for employment of troops, . g. gallop, when best for cavalry charge, , . general advanced guard, how composed, . cavalry charge, . general, essential qualities of a, . importance of a skillful, . one of the greatest talents of, . qualities of a skillful, . what constitutes a, . general principle of war, manner of applying, . staff, employment of, in time of peace, . staff, usefulness of, . genoa, panic at siege of, . geography, military, . geographical objective points, . germanicus, expedition of, . girondists, , . gosa, french charge on, . governments, elective, weakness of, . should not be unprepared for war, . grand tactics, , , . principles of, . great detachments, , , . instances of, , . why made, , . grouchy, . guard, advanced, , . in battle, , . in unexpected battles, . gunpowder, effect of invention of, on distant invasions, . gustavus adolphus, expedition of, . h. half-deep order, infantry-formation, . attacks in, . halts and departures in retreats, hours of, . halts in retreats to relieve rear-guards, . hannibal at cannæ, . at zama, . harold, , . head-quarters of the army, when the most important point, . heights to be secured in mountainous countries, . hengist, . henry v. of england, descents of, on france, . hoche's expedition to ireland, . hochkirch, . surprise of, . hohenfriedberg, . hohenlinden, , . holland, expedition to, . horse-artillery in line of battle, . in the offensive, . houchard, . hougoumont, . hungary, strategic character of the mountains of, . hypotheses as to the enemy's movements, . hypotheses of the author in , . how events justified them, . i. igor, expeditions of, . illustrations of importance of logistics, - . improvements in fire-arms, effect of, on infantry formations, . effects of, on war, , , . industrial pursuits secondary to heroic virtues, , . infantry, battle-formation of, in two lines, . best formation of, for assault, . best formation of, for the defensive, . cavalry must be supported by, . checkerwise formation, . formation of, in two deployed lines, . formations, effect of improvements in fire-arms on, . importance of, . in three-rank formation, . in what movements should be exercised, . lines of battle for, - . mixed order, . mounted, . needs support of cavalry and artillery, . protection of, from enemy's artillery, . squares, , . supports of artillery, , . three-rank formation of, . various formations for, . when a line of, should be charged by cavalry, . information from partisans, . of enemy's movements, rules for gaining, , . of the enemy's movements, four means of acquiring, . initiative, advantages of, . institutions, military, . interior and simple lines, advantage of, . interior lines, observations on, . of archduke charles, . of operations, . of operations, why preferable, . should not be too much extended, . two armies on, . intervention, instances of, - . kinds of, . reasons for, . wars of, . wars of, essentials in, . intestine wars, . intrenched camp, on which side of a river, . intrenched camps and lines, defense of, . connection of, with strategy, . how differ from têtes deponts, . influence of, . instances of, , . maxims on, , . on river, . prussian system of. . use of, . where to be established, . intrenched lines, , . attack of, . continuous, . intrenched positions, . intrenchments, armies in, invaded country, how made to contribute to success, . invasion, advantage and disadvantage of, . advantages of awaiting, . army of, line of defense important to, . control of the sea important in, . difficult in national wars, . how rendered feasible, . of a mountainous country, . of england contemplated by napoleon, , , . of turkey by russia, . two kinds of, . wars of, when advantageous, . invasions, diplomacy in, . distant, across extensive territories, . distant, effect of standing armies on, . distant, how affected by invention of gunpowder, . distant, maxim for, . distant, to aid an ally, . how to be carried on, . neutrality of states adjoining the theater of war important in, . of neighboring states, . of spain, . when excusable, . investing a city, false system of, . force, how strengthened, . irregular cavalry, . arms for, . islamism, wars of, . italy, operations of the french in, , . parallel retreats in, . relation of, in the french revolution, . ivar, expedition of, . j. james ii., expedition of, in ireland, . jemmapes, . jena, battle of, won by strategy, . maneuvers at, . napoleon's march on, . ney's charge at, . jourdan, . at stockach, . balloons used by, at fleurus, . jourdan's passage of the rhine in , . julian, retreat of, from parthia, . k. kagoul, panic at, . katzbach, . kehl, intrenchments at, , , . kolin, . koudacheff's expedition, . koutousoff, . krasnoi, combination at, . kray, . kunnersdorf, . l. lance, importance of, . when best for cavalry, . when useful, . lender, bravery the first requisite for, . league, wars of the, . leipsic as a decisive and strategic point, . battle of, , , , . march of the allies upon, . march on, modified, . / napoleon's order of battle at, . order of battle at, . lepanto, battle of, . leuthen, battle of, , , . maneuver of frederick at, . level country, defensive in, light cavalry, advantages of, . ligny, . line of advance, how determined, . of battle, arrangement of cavalry in, . of battle before the french revolution, . of battle, definition of, . of battle, defensive, heavy artillery in, . of battle, distribution of troops in, . of battle, offensive, concentration of artillery fire in, . of battle, posting troops in, . line of battle, post of artillery in, . of defense important to an army of invasion, . of defense should be short, . of operations, double, when necessary, . of operations, how protected, . of operations, single, when advantageous, . of retreat, , - . lines and camps, intrenched, defense of, . and points, strategic, . central, application of, to large masses, . deployed, in two ranks, . double, to be avoided, . eccentric, . interior, observations on, . interior, two armies on, . intrenched, , . intrenched, attack of, . of battle for two infantry corps, different formations of, - . of circumvallation, . of contravallation, . of defense, second, . of defense, eventual, . of defense, permanent, . of defense, strategical and tactical, . of depots, . of direction, importance of, illustrated, . of maneuver, importance of, . of operations, - . of operations at home and in hostile countries, contrasted, . of operations, best direction of, . of operations, change of, . of operations, converging and divergent, . of operations, double, . of operations, double, when advantageous, . of operations, great art of directing, . of operations, how established, . of operations, how influenced, . of operations, illustration of, by strategic field of , . of operations in fertile and barren countries, contrasted, . of operations in the wars of the french revolution, . of operations, maxims on, . of operations, rivers as, . of operations, selecting of, . lines of operations, to have a geographic and strategic direction, . of stollhofen, . of turin, . of turin, capture of, . parallel, . strategic, , . strategic, of napoleon in , . linz, towers of, . lloyd's proposed fourth rank in infantry formation, . logistics, , - . derivation of the term, . faulty, instances of, - . illustration of importance of, - . of battle of leipsic, . principal points of, - . louis vii., crusade of, . ix., crusade of, . ix., expedition of, to tunis, . xiv., coalition against, . xiv., commissariat of, . louvois, . lyons as a strategic and decisive point, . m. macdonald's column at wagram, , . error at katzbach, . mack, , . at ulm, . magnesia, victory of, . malplaquet, . malta, descent of mugtapha on, . maneuvering, success in battle depends on, . maneuver line, , . lines, . lines of, their importance, . objective points of, . pivots of, . tactical, by flank, . turning, , . maneuvers, , , . at ulm and jena, . for breaking through a line, . must conform to strategic principles, . objective points of, . of napoleon in , . simplest, most likely to be successful, . strategic lines of, . sudden, generally better than predetermined, . transversal, . maneuvers, turning, rules for, . mantua, siege of, . wurmser at, . march, establishment of depots on, . marches and attacks, arrangements of, . effects of systems of, . flank, . instructions to generals commanding corps in, , . particulars to be considered in, . system of, , . rapid, . rules for, - . transversal, in mountainous countries, . two kinds of, . marengo, french armament at, . napoleon's order of battle at, . maritime expeditions, - . marmont at salamanca, . marsin, . masonry towers, archduke maximilian's system of defense by, . massena, position of, in switzerland in , , . massena's position of the albis, . matériel of war, . should be inspected by staff officers, . maurice of saxony, . maxim for distant invasions, . maxims for frontier defenses, , . of fundamental principle of war, . on intrenched camps, , . on lines of operations, - . on operations in mountainous countries, . on strategic fronts, , . on strategic operations, . relative to supplies, - . mayence, austrian camp before, . fortresses at, . intrenched camp at, . mexico, expedition against, in , . middle ages, expeditions of the, . military education important to a ruler, . geography and statistics, importance of a knowledge of, . geography, lloyd's essay on, . institutions, . institutions of rome, . instruments, signals by, . operations influenced by a cabinet, . policy, . policy, essential bases of, . sciences, study of. . spirit, how encouraged, . spirit, how maintained, . spirit of nations, . statistics and geography, . militia as cavalry, , . millesimo, effect of the battle of, . minden, french order at, . mithridates, , . mixed order, infantry formation, . system of benningsen at eylau, . modern inventions, effect of, on character of naval armaments, . marine expeditions, . mohammed ii., . molitor, general, . mollwitz, battle of, . montesquieu, opinion of, as to great enterprises, . moors, invasion of europe by, . morale of armies, , , . of cavalry, . moreau at engen, . base of operations of, in , . retreat of, in , . moreau's diversion toward kastadt in , . passage of the rhine in , , . morocco, spanish descent on, in , . moscow, retreat of the french from, . mountain-campaigns, instances of, . mountainous countries as principal fields of operations, . countries, cavalry in, . countries, defense in, . countries, heights to be secured in, . countries, strategic defense in, . countries, strategic positions of, . countries, the offensive in, . countries, transversal marches in, . country, character of a war in, . country, forts in a, . country, invasion of a, . mountains as eventual lines of defense, . as frontiers, . campaigns in, . importance of, when secondary, , . of european countries, relation of, to warlike operations, . strategic operations in, . mounted infantry, . militia, . movement by flanks of companies, , . movements, extended, when dangerous, . in which infantry should be exercised, . of armies, points to be attended to, - . of the enemy, rules for gaining information of, , . murat, surprise of, at taroutin, . murray's descent in , . musketry-fire better for defensive, . influence of, in battles, . n. nansouty's charge at chateau-thierry, . naples, french army at, . napoleon, , , , , , , , , . and grouchy at waterloo, , . at austerlitz, . at essling, . at ligny, . at ratisbon, . at wagram, . double wars of, . english expedition against, in , . his own chief staff officer, . operations of the armies of, . napoleon's artillery, . artillery at wagram, . base of operations in , - . battles, orders of, . bold maneuvers in , . campaign of , . cantonment on the passarge, . central lines in saxony, . central position in , why disastrous, . changes of line of operations, . choice of objective points, . concentric retreat in , . defense in champagne in , . detachments in , . error after his victory at dresden, . error in the campaign of , . favorite objective, . front of operations in , . front of operations in , . infantry, panic of, at wagram, . line of defense in , . logistics in and , , . march on bassano, . napoleon's march on eylau, . march on jena in , . march on naumburg in , . march to königsberg, . mode of issuing orders, . motives and necessities, . operations, comments on, . order at the tagliamento, . passages of the danube, , . passage of the saint-bernard, . passage of the po in , . projected invasion of england, , , . reserves, . retreat from smolensk, . return from egypt in , . rule for the passage of an army, . strategic lines in , , . strategic positions, . system of formation for battle, , . system of marches, . victories and disasters, lesson taught by them, . national wars, character of, in mountainous countries, . wars, definition of, . wars, difficulties of conquest in, - . wars, effect of the nature of the country in, . wars, how prevented, , . wars, how success attained in, . wars, invasion difficult in, . wars, military precepts for, . nations, military spirit of, . nature and extent of war, how influenced, . naumburg, napoleon's march on, . naval armaments, effect of modern inventions on, . neutrality of states adjoining theater of war, important in invasions, . ney, , , . at bautzen, . at dennewitz, . at elchingen, . at jena, . nicholas i., concentration of dragoons by, . o. objective point, how held, . point, manner of approach to, . point of napoleon in , . point, selection of, . points, geographical, . points, how chosen, . objective points in strategy, how determined, . points of maneuver, , . points of operations, . points, political, . objectives of operations, , . objects of war, . oblique order, , . order, antiquity of, . order assumed by napoleon at marengo, . order of battle, . offensive, advantage of the, in strategy, . army, proper course for, . battle, object of, . battles, . characteristics of infantry formation for, . line of battle, concentration of artillery-fire in, . movements, when advised, . or defensive system, either may be employed, . order of battle, . system to be followed in, . the, disadvantages of, in tactical operations, . the, in mountainous countries, . use of artillery in, . war, , . war, duty of staff officers in, . war, reserves, how posted in, , . wars, duty of statesmen in, . wars, how conducted, . wars to reclaim rights, . oleg, expedition of, . open positions, . operations, base of, where to be established, . bases of, definition of, . how to be chosen, , . plurality of, . change of lines of, . control of, . divergent and convergent, , . double lines of, , , . exterior lines of, . fronts of, , , . in mountainous countries, maxims on, . interior lines of, . line of, how protected, . lines of, , . lines of, converging and divergent, . lines of, how established, . lines of, how influenced, . lines of, maxims on, . military, influenced by a cabinet, . objective points of, . objectives of, , . of and , , . of the french at the close of , - . pivots of, . simple lines of, . system of, . system of, how to be judged, . system of, necessary in war, . theater of, , . theater of, between the rhine and the north sea, - . theater of, how divided, . zone of, . zone of, how to select, . zones of, , . opinion, public, danger of, . wars of, . orchomenus, . order, checkerwise, battalions deployed in, . half-deep, attacks in, . half-deep, infantry formation, . importance of, . in deep masses, infantry formation, , . in echelons, . in squares, when suitable for attack, . mixed, infantry formation, , oblique, , . of attack in columns, . of battle, . of battle at agincourt, . at cannæ, . at crécy, . at essling, , . at fleurus, . at leipsic, . at mollwitz, . at passage of a river, . by echelon, . convex, . definition of, . oblique, . offensive, . of the generals of the republic, . of infantry as skirmishers, . shallow, infantry, . orders, best mode of issuing, . how issued by napoleon, . inaccurate transmission of, . of battle, . of battle, classification of, useful, . orders of battle, influence of, on result of engagements, . of napoleon's battles, . should be clear, . two methods of issuing, , . organization and arms of cavalry, , . by corps, likely to be permanent, . of an army in four corps, . in seven corps, . of divisions, , . of very large armies, . p. panics, cause and remedy of, . instances of, . officers and troops to be warned against, . parallel lines, . order of battle, . order of battle reinforced, . order of battle, when suitable, . order of battle with crotchet, . retreat, . retreats, countries adapted to, , . retreats, when preferable, . partisans, information from, . partisan troops, services of, illustrated, . paskevitch's passage of the vistula in , . passage of an army, napoleon's rule for, . of a river, best position for, . of the beresina, , . of the danube by napoleon, . of the rhine in , . of the saint-bernard by napoleon, . of rivers, , . of rivers, double, . of rivers, famous modern, . of rivers in retreats, , . of rivers in retreats, rules for, . of rivers, rules for, . of rivers, rules for preventing, . peninsular war, . perfect army, essential conditions of, . permanent lines of defense, . perpendicular order of battle, . peter the great, expedition of, against persia, . peter the hermit, . peterwardein, panic at, . philip ii. of spain, . pichegru, movements of, in , . pistol-firing, in cavalry charges, . pivots of maneuver, . pivots of operations, . points, decisive, . decisive and objective, . decisive geographic, . decisive, how affected by arrangement of forces, . decisive, of battle-field, now determined, . decisive strategic, . of operations, objective, . political objective points, . objective points subordinate to strategy, . wars, . po, napoleon's passage of, in , . portable telegraphs, . port mahon, assault of, . port royal, expedition of u.s. government to, . position, defensive, means of retreat to be considered in, . for battle, . how to drive an enemy from, , . strong, essentials for, . system of wars of, . tactical, protection of flanks in, . positions, . for cantonments, selection of, . intrenched, . open, . strategic, , , , . tactical, . tactical, rules for selecting, . two kinds of, , . post, capture of, when important, . posting troops in line of battle, . posts, means for capture of, . prague, battle of, , . preservation of armies in time of peace, . prince, duty of, when not conducting his armies, . prince eugene, , , , . of coburg, error of, in , . principle of decisive points of maneuver, . principles of strategy, . of strategy always the same, . promotions in armies, . protection by trees and brushwood, . provisional lines, . prussia, course of, in the french revolution, , . parallel retreat in, . relation of, in the french revolution, . prussian army at waterloo, . reserves in , . system of forming columns, . system of intrenched camps, . public opinion, danger of, . punic wars, , . pursuit, rules for, . pursuits, . pyramids, napoleon's order of battle at, . pyrrhus, descent of, on italy, . q. qualities of a skillful general, . r. ramillies, . ramrods, . rapid marches, . ratisbon, napoleon at, . napoleon's order of battle at, . rear, attack in, . rear-guard in retreat, . rear-guards in retreat, . rear-guard in retreat, duty of, in passage of rivers, . reconnoissances, . give but limited information, . to gain information of the enemy's movements, . religion, wars of, . reports of prisoners, . reserve, cavalry, . final, . horse-artillery, advantages of, . reserves, cavalry, . importance of, , . in offensive war, how posted, , . nature of, . of napoleon, . prussian, in , . strategic, , . retreat along converging roads, along diverging roads, . along parallel roads, . by several corps, . difficulty of deciding method of, . five methods of arranging, . in single mass, when preferable, . line of, , - . means of, to be considered in a defensive position, . parallel, . well effected, should be rewarded, . retreats, . at night, . attack of the enemy's advanced guard in, . bridges in, . by diverging roads, danger of, . cavalry in, . circumstances influencing, , . concentration in, . concentric, instances of, , . defiles in, . divergent, when admissible, . duty of staff officers in, . firmness of russians in, . halts in, to relieve rear-guard, . hours of departures and halts in, . in daylight, . instances of famous, . measures to insure success of, , . parallel, countries adapted to, , . parallel, when preferable, . passage of rivers in, , . prince de ligne's remark on, . rear-guard in, , . should be slow, . various kinds of, . reverse fire, . rhine, passages of, , , . rhodes, capture of, by the turks, . richard coeur-de-lion, . richelieu, expedition of, against minorca, . river, best position for passage of, . crossing of, in presence of an enemy, . order of battle at passage of, . rivers as eventual lines of defense, . as frontiers, . as lines of operations, . double passage of, . famous modern passages of, . passage of, , . passage of, in retreats, , . rules for, . points of passage of, in presence of an enemy, . rules for passage of, . rules for preventing passage of, . rivoli , . napoleon's order of battle at, . rocket-batteries, use of, . rollo, . roman legions, cause of the ruin of, . nation, cause of the decline of, . romans, naval expeditions of, . rome, military institutions of, . rossbach, . ruler, a, should be able to arrange plans of operations, . rules for conducting descents, . for fighting battles scientifically, . for gaining information of enemy's movements, , . for offensive or defensive operations, . for passage of rivers, . for passage of a river in retreat, . for pursuit, . for preventing passage of rivers, . for use of artillery in battle, - . to be observed in selecting tactical positions, . russian army, firmness of, in retreats, . army, skirmishers in, . base in and , . cavalry, . expeditions in , . order at eylau, . retreat in , . system of forming columns, . russians, early maritime expeditions of, , . s. saber, when best for cavalry, . when useful, . saint-bernard, napoleon's passage of, . saint-cyr at stockach, . saxons, expedition of, . saxony, napoleon's central lines in, in , . savoy, duke of, . scandinavians, . science of marches, essential point in, . of marches, includes what, . sciences, military, study of, . scipio, . sea-coast as a base of operations, , . sea, control of, held by england, . control of, important in an invasion, . secondary lines, . sebastian of portugal, descent of, on morocco, . sebastopol, . secondary depots, , . shallow order, . order, infantry, . shumla, camp of, . siege, how covered, . of candia, , . of copenhagen, . of mantua, . sieges and active armies, relations between, . duty of staff officers in, . wars of, . signaling by fires, . signals by military instruments, . simultaneous shouts as, . system of, . simple and interior lines, advantage of, . lines of operations, . simultaneous shouts as signals, . single line of operations, when preferable, . sizeboli, capture of, . skill, superiority in, . skirmishers, , . skirmishing-order, . small detachments, how useful, . smolensk, napoleon's retreat from, . southern germany, valley of the danube the strategic key of, . sovereign as commander, . spain adapted to parallel retreats, . and portugal, wellington's tactics in, . invasions of, . war in, in , . spanish armada, , , . capture of vera cruz by, . descent on algiers, . descent on morocco in , . spies, . best course for, . difficulties in their way, . use of, neglected in many modern armies, . when especially useful, . squares in echelons, . infantry, , , . in two ranks, . staff, chief of, , chief of, how selected, . general, usefulness of, . officers and general must act in concert, . officers, duties of, should be defined, . officers, duty of, in offensive war, . officers should inspect matériel, . officers, summary of duties of, - . standing armies, effect of, on distant invasions, . state, how rendered secure, . statesmanship, relation of, to war, . statesmen, duty of, in offensive war, . statistics, military, . st. domingo, expedition to, in , . stockach, , . defeat of the french at, . strategic defense in mountainous countries, . stollhofen, lines of, . strategical and tactical lines of defense, . strategic combinations, . combinations, when better than tactical, . coup-d'oeil, - . field of , . front and line of defense may coincide, . front, change of, . front, double, . front not to be too extended, . front of napoleon in his march on eylau, . fronts, . fronts, maxims on, . lines, , . lines and points, . lines at waterloo, . lines of maneuvers, . lines of napoleon in , , . operations in mountains, . operations, maxims on, . point, leipsic as a, . lyons as a, . point of a battle-field, when important, . points, capitals as, . position, essential conditions for, . positions, , , , . positions of mountainous countries, . positions of napoleon, . reserves, , . square for camps, . strategy, , . advantage of the offensive in, . and the commissariat, . battles of ulm and jena won by, . connection of intrenched camps with, . connection of têtes de ponts with, . definition of, . directs movements, tactics executes them, . errors in, . how it should be studied, . illustration of, by operations of , - . illustrations of, - . in what it consists, . objective points in, how determined, . one great end of, . points embraced by, . political objective points subordinate to, . principles of, . principles of, always the same, . province of, . relation of fortresses to, , . science of marches in, . system of, developed in , . the art of, . strong position, essentials for a, . study of strategy, how made profitable, . successful retreat, how to insure, , . surprises of armies, . difficulty of, . suwaroff, , . suwaroff's expedition in switzerland, . supplies, depots of, , . suza, position of swiss and italians at, . svatoslav, expedition of, . sweyn, , . switzerland, invasion of, by french directory, . massena in, in , . suwaroff in, . tactical defense of, . syria, french expedition to, . system, concentric or eccentric, . of corps, . of divisions, . of marches, . of marches, effects of, . of marches, includes what, . of marches, relation of, to commissariat, . of marches the result of circumstances, . of operations, . of operations, how to be judged, . of signals, . of strategy developed in , . of wars, change of, . of wars of position, . systems modified by forms of government, . t. tactical combinations, guiding principle in, . defense of switzerland, . operations, disadvantages of the offensive in, . position, protection of flanks in, . tactical positions, . positions, rules for selecting, . tactics, . executes movements, strategy directs them, . grand, , . of battles, great difficulty of, . of wellington in spain and portugal, . tagliamento, napoleon's order at, . taroutin, surprise of murat at, . telegraphs, portable, . temporary bases, . bases, when necessary, . têtes de ponts, . connection of, with strategy, . how differ from intrenched camps, . theater of operations, , . of operations between the rhine and north sea, - . of operations, how composed, . of operations, how divided, . of operations in the french revolution, . of war, border of the, , . of war, decisive points of the, . of war, definition of, . theories, difficulty of applying, in war, . use of, in war, . thirty years' war, . three-rank formation of infantry, , . topographical and statistical reconnoissances, . torgau, battle of, . torres-vedras, camp of, . intrenched camp at, . towers, masonry, . of coblentz, . of linz, . transversal maneuvers, . marches in mountainous countries, . trees, clumps of, should be occupied, . troops, distribution of, in line of battle, . employment of, . trot, when best for cavalry charge, , . turenne's surprise of the austrian cantonments, . turin, battle of, . intrenched camp at, . lines of, , . turkey, invasion of, . turkish war of and , . wars, squares in, , . turks, cavalry charge of, . naval expeditions of, , , . turning maneuvers, , , . maneuver, rules for, . two corps, one behind the other, . two-rank formation, . two wars at once, danger of, . u. ulm, battle of, . battle of, won by strategy, . camp of, . maneuvers at, . uncertainty regarding battles, elements of, . unexpected battles, advanced guard in, . meeting of two armies, . united states, capture of vera cruz by, . english expeditions against, in and , , . expedition to port royal, . use of spies neglected in many modern armies, . of the three arms combined, . v. vandals, . vandamme's disaster at culm, lesson of, . venice, , . vera cruz captured by the spaniards, . taken by the french, . taken by the united states, . vessels, roman, . scandinavian, . victories, french, of , why indecisive, . victory, assailant's best means of, . on what it depends, , . when it may be expected, . villages, importance of, on front of a position, . villars's infantry, panic among, . vistula, passage of, by paskevitch, . w. wagram, , , , , , . macdonald's column at, , . napoleon's artillery at, , . napoleon's order of battle at, . panic at, . war an art, . border of the theater of, , . character of, from middle ages to french revolution, . circumstances which influence result of, . council of, at seat of government, . councils of, . decisive points of the theater of, . defensive-offensive, . definition of the art of, . fundamental principle of, , . governments should not be unprepared for, . how to be conducted, . influence of cavalry in a, , . influence of improvements in fire-arms on, , , . manner of applying general principle of, . matériel of, . maxims of fundamental principles of, . nature and extent of, how influenced, . not an exact science, , . objects of, . of the crimea, . offensive and defensive, definition of, . offensive, duty of staff officers in, . operations of, how directed, . principal parts of the art of, . relation of statesmanship to, . theater of, definition, . use of theories in, . warsaw, intrenchments at, . wars, aggressive, for conquest, . change of system of, . civil, . defensive politically, offensive militarily, . double, . for conquest, instances of, . intestine, . natural character of, in mountainous countries, . national, definition of, . national, difficulties of conquest in, - . national, effect of nature of the country on, . national, how prevented, , . national, invasion difficult in, . offensive, how conducted, . offensive, to reclaim rights, . of expediency, . kinds of, . of extermination, . of intervention, . of intervention, essentials in wars of, . of intervention, military chances in, . of invasion, when advantageous, . of opinion, . of opinion, character of, . of opinion, instances of, . of opinion, military precepts for, . of position, system of, . of religion, . of sieges, . political, . political part of, how modified, . punic, , . turkish, squares in, , . when most just, . with or without allies, . waterloo, , , , , - , . blücher at, . campaign of, , . english squares at, formations at, . french at, . napoleon's order of battle at, . ney at, , . strategic lines at, . wellington's position at, , . wellington, , , , , , , , , . and blücher at waterloo, , . at salamanca, . at torres-vedras, . defensive-offensive operations of, . wellington's position at waterloo, . weyrother, , . william the conqueror, , . winkelried, column of, . winter campaigns, . quarters, countries adapted to, . quarters, when dangerous, . quarters, when strategic, . woods, importance of possession of, . wurmser at mantua, . eccentric retreat of, in , . error of, . x. xerxes, . army of, . z. zama, battle of, . zimisces, . zone of operations, , , . of operations, how to select, . of operations in , . zones of operations in the french revolution, . zurich, defeat of the allies at, . the reality of war the reality of war a companion to clausewitz by major stewart l. murray late gordon highlanders popular edition edited by a. hilliard atteridge london hodder and stoughton warwick square, e.c. hugh rees, ltd. regent street, s.w. _reprinted in _ editor's preface great books, the masterpieces of the special branch of knowledge with which they deal, are often very big books; and busy men, who have not unlimited time for reading, find it helpful to have some one who will give them a general summary of a famous writer's teaching, and point out the most important passages in which the author himself embodies the very essence of his argument. this is what major murray has done for the most important work on war that was ever written. he does not give a mere dry summary of its contents. he sets forth, in language so plain that even the civilian reader or the youngest soldier can read it with interest, the essence of the teaching of clausewitz, and he embodies in his book the most striking passages of the original work. he adds to each section of his subject some useful criticisms, and at the end of the book he sums up the effect of recent changes on the practice of war. the book is a popular manual of the realities of war, which should be read not only by soldiers, but by every one who takes an intelligent interest in the great events of our time. as to the practical value of the writings of clausewitz, it may be well to quote here the words of mr. spenser wilkinson, the professor of military history at oxford, from his introduction to the original edition of major murray's work: "clausewitz was a prussian officer who first saw fighting as a boy in , and whose experience of war lasted until , when the great war ended. he was then thirty-five and spent the next fifteen years in trying to clear his mind on the subject of war, which he did by writing a number of military histories and a systematic treatise 'on war.' at the age of fifty he tied his manuscripts into a parcel, hoping to work at them again on the conclusion of the duties for which he was ordered from home. a little more than a year later he died at breslau of cholera, and the papers, to which he had never put the finishing touch, were afterwards published by his widow. "part of the value of his work is due to the exceptional opportunities which he enjoyed. when the war of began he had long been the personal adjutant of one of the prussian princes, and an intimate friend of scharnhorst, who was probably the greatest of napoleon's contemporaries. in the period of reorganization which followed the peace of tilsit he made the acquaintance of gneisenau, and of almost all the officers who made their mark in the subsequent wars of liberation. during the years of preparation he was scharnhorst's assistant, first in the ministry of war and then on the general staff. during the campaign of he served with the russian army as a staff officer. thus his experience during the four years of the wars of liberation was that of one who was continually behind the scenes, always in touch with the governments and generals, and therefore better able than any one not so favourably placed to see everything in its proper perspective, and to follow and appreciate the considerations which directed the decisions both of statesmen and of the commanders of armies. his personal character was of the finest mould, and his writings have the sincerity, the absence of which makes it so difficult to rely upon those of napoleon. "the ultimate test of the value of books is time. when clausewitz died, the two books on war which were thought the best were those of the archduke charles of austria and general jomini. to-day the book of clausewitz, 'on war,' easily holds the first place. it is the least technical of all the great books on war; from beginning to end it is nothing but common sense applied to the subject, but for that reason it is the hardest to digest, because common sense or a man's natural instinctive judgment on any subject is exceedingly hard to analyse and put into words. an exceptionally gifted man can go through this process, but few can follow it for any length of time without a distinct effort. "almost every good institution has arisen out of the effort to provide a remedy for some evil, but in the imperfection of human nature nearly every institution brings with it fresh evils, which in their turn have to be counteracted. the modern spirit, with its hatred of nepotism and its belief in knowledge, has grafted the examination system upon every form of education from the lowest to the highest. the british army shares in the benefits and in the disadvantages of the system, of which, in the case of an officer, the danger to be guarded against is that it tends to accustom a man to rely rather on his memory than his intelligence, and to lean more on other people's thinking than on his own. clausewitz aimed at producing the very opposite result. he does not offer specific solutions of the various problems of war lest officers, in moments when their business is to decide and to act, should be trying to recall his precepts instead of using their eyes and their wits. his purpose rather is to enable them to understand what war is. he believed that if a man had accustomed himself to think of war as it really is, had got to know the different elements which go to make it up, and to distinguish those that are important from those that are comparative trifles, he would be more likely to know of himself what to do in a given situation, and would be much less likely to confuse himself by trying to remember what some general, long since dead, did on some occasion in which after all the position was by no means the same as that in which he finds himself." what is said here of the soldier actually engaged in war, is true also even of the onlooker who takes a patriotic interest in the progress of a war in which his country is involved. unless he has a clear idea of the real character of modern war, and the principles on which success or failure depend, he will be utterly unable to grasp the significance of the events of which he reads each day. and it is of real importance that in time of war every citizen should judge soundly the course of events, for opinion influences action, and public opinion is made up of the ideas of the units who compose the public. in this connection it is well to bear in mind a point that is often overlooked, a point on which clausewitz insists in a singularly convincing passage--namely, the fact that one of the main objects of a nation waging war is to force the enemy's population into a state of mind favourable to submission. this fact is sufficient proof of the importance of public opinion being well informed not only as to the course of events, but also as to the principles that give to these events their real significance. contents chapter i page the life of clausewitz chapter ii the influence of clausewitz on modern policy and war chapter iii the writings of clausewitz chapter iv the theory and the practice of war chapter v the magnitude of the effort required in a modern national war chapter vi public opinion in war chapter vii the nature of war chapter viii war as policy chapter ix strategy chapter x the execution of strategy chapter xi tactics chapter xii changes since the days of clausewitz chapter i the life of clausewitz in an endeavour, such as the present, to interest the british public in even the greatest military writer, the first necessity is to show that he was not a mere theorist or bookworm. the wide and varied experience which the british officer gradually gains in so many different parts of the world shows up the weak points of most theories, and produces a certain distrust of them. also a distrust of theory is undoubtedly one of our national characteristics. hence, in order to appeal to the british officer or civilian, a writer must be a practical soldier. such was general clausewitz: a practical soldier of very great experience in the long series of wars to , and one present throughout that most awful of all campaigns, napoleon's russian campaign in . "general karl von clausewitz was born near magdeburg in , and entered the prussian army as fahnenjunker in . he served in the campaigns of - on the rhine. in he entered the military school at berlin as an officer, and remained there till . he here attracted the notice of scharnhorst. in the campaign of he served as aide-de-camp to prince augustus of prussia, was present at the battle of jena, and saw that awful retreat which ended a fortnight later in the surrender at prentzlau. being wounded and captured, he was sent into france as a prisoner till the end of the war." "on his return (in november, ) he was placed on general scharnhorst's staff, and employed on the work then going on for the reorganization of the prussian army. in clausewitz entered the russian service, was employed on the general staff, and was thus able to gain much experience in the most gigantic of all the struggles of his time." "in the spring campaign of (battles of lutzen, bautzen, etc.), he, as a russian officer, was attached to blucher's staff; during the winter campaign he found employment as chief-of-the-staff to count walmoden, who fought against davoust on the lower elbe, and the splendid action of the goerde was entirely the result of his able dispositions. in he again entered the prussian service, and was chief-of-the-staff to the iii. army corps (thielman), which at ligny formed the left of the line of battle, and at wavre covered the rear of blucher's army." "in addition to this, we may say, considerable practical training (note, enormous and varied indeed compared to any obtainable in the present day), he also possessed a comprehensive and thorough knowledge of military history, and also an uncommonly clear perception of general history" (von caemmerer). after the peace he was employed in a command on the rhine. in he became major-general, and was made director of the military school at berlin. here he remained for some years. this was the chief period of his writings. as general von caemmerer, in his "development of strategical science," puts it: "this practical and experienced, and at the same time highly cultured soldier, feels now, in peaceful repose, as he himself confesses, the urgent need to develop and systematize the whole world of thought which occupies him, yet also resolves to keep secret till his death the fruit of his researches, in order that his soul, which is thirsting for _truth_, may be safely and finally spared all temptations from subordinate considerations." in he was appointed director of artillery at breslau, and, having no more time for writing, sealed up and put away his papers, unfinished as they were. in the same year he was appointed chief-of-the-staff to field-marshal gneisenau's army. in the winter of that year war with france was considered imminent, and clausewitz had prospects of acting as chief of the general staff of the commander-in-chief gneisenau. he then drew up two plans for war with france, which bear the stamp of that practical knowledge of war and adaptation of means to ends which distinguish his writings. in the same year the war scare passed away, the army of gneisenau was disbanded, and clausewitz returned to breslau, where after a few days he was seized with cholera, and died in november, , aged only . his works were published after his death by his widow. chapter ii the influence of clausewitz on modern policy and war from the day of their publication until now the influence of the writings of clausewitz has been steadily growing, till to-day it is impossible to over-estimate the extent of that influence upon modern military and political thought, especially in germany. as general von caemmerer, in his "development of strategical science," says: "karl von clausewitz, the pupil and friend of scharnhorst and the confidant of gneisenau, is in germany generally recognized as the most prominent theorist on war, as the real philosopher on war, to whom our famous victors on the more modern battlefields owe their spiritual training." field-marshal moltke was "his most distinguished pupil," and adapted the teaching of clausewitz to the conditions of to-day. general von der goltz, in the introduction to his great work, "the nation in arms," thus describes the veneration which he inspires: "a military writer who, after clausewitz, writes upon the subject of war, runs the risk of being likened to a poet who, after goethe, attempts a _faust_, or, after shakespeare, a _hamlet_. everything important that can be told about the nature of war can be found stereotyped in the works which that great military genius has left behind him. although clausewitz has himself described his book as being something as yet incomplete, this remark of his must be taken to mean that he, too, was subject to the fate of all aspiring spirits, and was forced to feel that all he attained lay far beneath his ideal. for us, who knew not what that ideal was, his labours are a complete work. i have, accordingly, not attempted to write anything new, or of universal applicability about the science of warfare, but have limited myself to turning my attention to the military operations of our own day." one can hardly imagine a stronger tribute of admiration. and, as moltke was clausewitz's most distinguished pupil, so also are all those trained in the school of moltke pupils of clausewitz, including the most eminent of modern german military writers, such as general von blume, in his "strategy"; von der goltz, in his "nation in arms" and "the conduct of war," who trained the turkish general staff for the campaign of against greece and the battle of pharsalia, etc.; general von boguslawski; general von verdy du vernois, the father of the study of applied tactics; general von schlichting, in his "tactical and strategical principles of the present"; general meckel, who trained the japanese staff, etc., etc. we all remember the telegram sent to general meckel by marshal oyama after the battle of liao-yang: "we hope you are proud of your pupils." some time ago, when asked to give a lecture at aldershot to the officers of the nd division on clausewitz, it struck me that it would be very interesting, anxious as we all were then to know the causes of the wonderful japanese efficiency and success, if i could obtain a pronouncement from general meckel how far he had been influenced in his teaching by clausewitz. my friend herr von donat did me the favour to write to general von caemmerer and ask him if he could procure me such a pronouncement which i might publish. general meckel, whose death both japan and germany have since had to mourn, most kindly consented, and i esteem it a great honour to be allowed to quote part of his letter. he said: "i, like every other german officer, have, consciously or unconsciously, instructed in the spirit of clausewitz. clausewitz is the _founder_ of that theory of war which resulted from the napoleonic. i maintain that _every one_ who nowadays either makes or teaches war in a modern sense, bases himself upon clausewitz, even if he is not conscious of it." this opinion of general meckel, to whose training of the japanese general staff the success of the japanese armies must be largely attributed, is most interesting. it is not possible to give a stronger or more up-to-date example of the magnitude of the influence of clausewitz. in this connection i should like to make a short quotation from "the war in the far east," by the _times_ military correspondent. in his short but suggestive chapter on "clausewitz in manchuria" he says: "but as all save one of the great battles in manchuria have been waged by the japanese in close accordance with the spirit and almost the letter of clausewitz's doctrine, and as the same battles have been fought by the russians in absolute disregard of them (though his works had been translated into russian by general dragomiroff long before the war), it is certainly worth showing how reading and reflection may profit one army, and how the neglect of this respectable practice may ruin another." "clausewitz in manchuria"! that brings us up to date. it is a far cry for his influence to have reached, and triumphed. reflections clausewitz wrote his book expressly for statesmen as well as soldiers. we may be sure, therefore, that the influence of clausewitz on the continent has penetrated the realm of policy little less widely than the realm of war. from this thought arise many reflections. it will be sufficient here to suggest one. i would suggest that we should regard every foreign statesman, especially in germany, as, consciously or unconsciously, a disciple of clausewitz. that is to say, we should regard him as a man who, underneath everything else, underneath the most pacific assurances for the present, considers war an unalterable part of policy. he will regard war as part of the ordinary intercourse of nations, and occasional warlike struggles as inevitable as commercial struggles. he will consider war also as an instrument of policy, which he himself may have to use, and to be studied accordingly. he will consider it not as a thing merely for speeches, but for practical use in furthering or defending the interests of his state. he will regard war as the means by which some day his nation shall impose its will upon another nation. he will be prepared to wait and wait, to make "every imaginable preparation," and finally to let loose war in its most absolute and ruthless character, war carried out with the utmost means, the utmost energy, and the utmost effort of a whole nation-in-arms, determined to achieve its political object and compel submission to its will by force. to talk to such a man of "the evils of war," or of "the burden of armaments"; or to propose to him "disarmament" or "reduction of armed forces," and so forth can only appear to him as the result of "imperfect knowledge." he will not say so, but he will think so, and act accordingly. to the partially instructed opponent of such a man one can only say, "let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall." chapter iii the writings of clausewitz the writings of clausewitz are contained in nine volumes, published after his death in , but his fame rests chiefly on his three volumes "on war," which have been translated by colonel j. j. graham (the last edition edited by colonel f. n. maude, and published by messrs. kegan paul, london). clausewitz calls them "a collection of materials," "a mass of conceptions not brought into form," and states that he intended to revise, and throw the whole into more complete shape. we must lament that he did not live to complete his revision. but, on the other hand, it is perhaps possible that this unfinished state is really an advantage, for it leaves us free to apply his great maxims and principles and mode of thought to the ever-varying conditions of the present and future, unhampered by too complete a crystallization of his ideas written before more modern conditions of railways, telegraphs, and rapid long-ranging arms of precision, etc., arose. it is perhaps this unfinished state which renders clausewitz so essentially in touch with, and a part of, the onward movement and evolution of military thought. for his great aim was "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," without preconception or favour, as far as he could go--essentially "a realist" of war--and what better aim can we set before ourselves? as sir arthur helps has so well put it in his "friends in council," every man needs a sort of central stem for his reading and culture. i wish here to say why i think that clausewitz is admirably adapted to form such a main stem in the military culture of british officers. in the first place there is a lofty sort of tone about his writings which one gradually realizes as one reads them, and which i will not attempt to describe further than by saying that they stamp themselves as the writings of a gentleman of fine character. in the second place it is a book which "any fellow" can read, for there is nothing to "put one off," nothing abstruse or mathematical or formal, no formulæ or lines and angles and technical terms, such as in other writers, jomini, hamley, etc. clausewitz is free from all such pedantries, which for my part, and i dare say for the part of many others, often "put one off" a book, and made one instinctively feel that there was something wrong, something unpractical about it, which rendered it hardly worth the sacrifice of time involved in its study. there is in clausewitz nothing of that kind at all. all those lines and angles and formulæ he dismisses in a few pages as of little practical importance. in the third place clausewitz only goes in for experience and the practical facts of war. as he somewhat poetically puts it, "the flowers of speculation require to be cut down low near the ground of experience, their proper soil."[ ] he is the great apostle of human nature and character as being everything in war. "all war supposes human weakness, and against that it is directed."[ ] i believe that the british officer will find himself in sympathy with the great thinker on war, who asserts that "_of_ _all military virtues energy in the conduct of operations has always conduced most to glory and success of arms_."[ ] in the fourth place, to the practical mind will appeal his denunciation of all elaborate plans, because _time_ is required for all elaborate combinations, and time is just the one thing that an active enemy will not give us,--and his consequent deduction that all plans must be of the simplest possible form. his famous sentence, "_in war all things are simple, but the simple are difficult_,"[ ] gives the key to his writings, for to _overcome those simple yet great difficulties he regards as the art of war_, which can only be done by the military virtues of perseverance, energy, and boldness. in the fifth place he does not want men to be bookworms, for he says: "_theory is nothing but rational reflection upon all the situations in which we can be placed in war_."[ ] and we can all reflect, without reading too many books. also he says: "much reading of history is not required for the above object. the knowledge of a few separate battles, _in their details_, is more useful than a general knowledge of several campaigns. on this account it is more useful to read detailed narratives and journals than regular works of history."[ ] he wants history in detail, not a general smattering and a loose application thereof, which fault he strongly denounces. and he expressly states that the history of the very latest war is the most useful. all of which is very practical, and in accord with what we feel to be true. as he pictures war, "_the struggle between the spiritual and moral forces_ on _both_ sides is the centre of all,"[ ] and to this aspect of the subject he gives much more attention than jomini and most of jomini's disciples. he has freed us once for all from all formalism. the formation of character, careful, practical, detailed study, and thorough preparation in peace, the simplest plans carried out with the utmost perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness in war--these are the practical fruits of his teaching. therefore, i say again, that i do not think that the british officer could possibly find a more interesting or a better guide for the main stem of his reading than clausewitz, nor any one that will appeal to his practical instincts of what is _true_ half so well. i do not believe that he could possibly do better than with clausewitz as main stem, and a detailed study of the latest campaigns and modern technicalities as the up-to-date addition required to transform knowledge into action. i trust that every reader of clausewitz will agree with me in this. chapter iv the theory and the practice of war "moltke, the most gifted pupil of clausewitz," "moltke, who knew clausewitz's book well, and often liked to describe him as the theoretical instructor." as chaucer would say, "what needeth wordes more?" clausewitz has treated practically every chief branch of strategy and tactics (except, of course, the present-day developments of railways, telegraphs, quick-firing guns, smokeless powder, universal service armies, etc.). the whole of his bulky work "on war" is full of interesting and sometimes eloquent and almost poetical passages, of concentrated, pregnant, and far-reaching thoughts on every subject. through all these it is, of course, impossible to follow him in any introduction. one can really do no more than urge all to read clausewitz for themselves, to go to the fountain-head, to the master-work itself. in the short space to which i have restricted myself, i propose, therefore, to concentrate on a few of his leading ideas, reluctantly leaving out many others which are really almost just as good. theory and practice one of the things for which we are most deeply indebted to clausewitz is that he has shown us clearly the proper place of theory in relation to practice. "it should educate the mind of the future leader in war, or, rather, guide him in his _self-instruction_, but _not_ accompany him on to the battlefield; just as a sensible tutor forms and enlightens the opening mind of a youth without therefore keeping him in leading-strings all his life."[ ] again, "in real action most men are guided by the tact of judgment, which hits the object more or less accurately, according as they possess more or less genius. this is the way in which all great generals have acted, and therein partly lay their greatness and their genius, in that they always hit upon what was right by this tact. thus also it will always be in _action_, and so far this tact is amply sufficient. but when it is a question not of acting one's self, but of convincing others _in consultation_, then all depends upon clear conceptions and demonstrations and the inherent relations; and so little progress has been made in this respect that most deliberations are merely a contention of words, resting on no firm basis, and ending either in every one retaining his own opinion, or in a compromise from mutual considerations of respect, a middle course really without any value. clear ideas on these matters are not, therefore, wholly useless."[ ] how true this is any one will admit who reflects for a moment upon the great diversity of opinions on almost every subject held in our army, just because of this want of a central theory common to all. in the domain of tactics it is evident that this holds good even as in strategy, for a common central theory of war will produce a more or less common way of looking at things, from which results more or less common action towards the attainment of the common object. rejection of set and geometrical theories "it should educate the mind of the future leader in war" is what clausewitz demands from a useful theory; but he most expressly and unreservedly rejects every attempt at a method "by which definite plans for wars or campaigns are to be given out all ready made as if from a machine."[ ] he mocks at bülow's including at first in the one term "base" all sorts of things, like the supply of the army, its reinforcements and equipments, the security of its communications with the home country, and lastly the security of its line of retreat, and then fixing the extent of the base, and finally fixing an angle for the extent of that base: "and all this was done merely to obtain a pure geometrical result utterly useless" (von caemmerer). for the same reason jomini's principle of the inner line does not satisfy him, owing to its mere geometrical nature, although he right willingly acknowledges "that it rests on a sound foundation, on the truth that the combat is the only effectual means in war" (von caemmerer). all such attempts at theory seem to him therefore perfectly useless, "because they strive to work with fixed quantities, while in war everything is _uncertain_, and all considerations must reckon with all kinds of variable quantities; because they only consider _material_ objects, while every action in war is saturated with _moral_ forces and effects; lastly, because they deal only with the action of _one_ party, while war is a constant reciprocal effect of _both_ parties" (von caemmerer). "pity the warrior," says clausewitz, "who is contented to crawl about in this beggardom of rules." "pity the theory which sets itself in opposition to the mind"[ ] (note, the moral forces). a theory to be practically useful clausewitz insists that a useful theory cannot be more than a thorough knowledge of military history and "reflection upon all the situations in which we can be placed in war." "what genius does must be just the best of all rules, and theory cannot do better than to show just how and why it is so." "it is an analytical investigation of the subject which leads to exact knowledge: and if brought to bear on the results of experience, which in our case would be military history, to a _thorough_ familiarity with it. if theory investigates the subjects which constitute war; if it separates more distinctly that which at first sight seems amalgamated; if it explains fully the properties of the means; if it shows their probable effects; if it makes evident the nature of objects; _if it brings to bear all over the field of war the light of essentially critical investigation_,--then it has fulfilled the chief duties of its province. it becomes then a guide to him who wishes to make himself acquainted with war from books; it lights up the whole road for him, facilitates his progress, educates his judgment, and shields him from error."[ ] knowledge must be thorough this clausewitz considers most important. he says that "knowledge of the conduct of war ... _must pass completely into the mind_, and almost cease to be something objective." for in war "the moral reaction, the ever-changing form of things makes it necessary for the chief actor to carry _in himself_ the whole mental apparatus of his knowledge, in order that anywhere and at every pulse-beat he may be capable of giving the requisite decision _from himself_. knowledge must, by this complete assimilation with his own mind and life, be converted into real power." * * * * * so much for clausewitz, therefore, as the greatest yet the simplest and least theoretical of theorists on war. mark well his comforting dictum that "theory is nothing but rational reflection upon all the situations in which we can be placed in war." that is a task which we have all more or less attempted. therefore we are all more or less theorists. the only question is that of comparative "thoroughness" in our reflections. and it is essentially this "thoroughness" in investigation and reflection towards which clausewitz helps us. like every other habit, the _habit_ of military reflection gradually grows with use; till, fortified and strengthened by detailed knowledge, it gradually becomes power. reflections the theory of war is simple, and there is no reason why any man who chooses to take the trouble to read and reflect carefully on one or two of the acknowledged best books thereon, should not attain to a fair knowledge thereof. he may with reasonable trouble attain to such knowledge of the theory of war as will enable him to follow with intelligent appreciation the discussions of experienced soldier or soldiers. such knowledge as will prevent his misunderstanding the experienced soldier's argument from pure ignorance, and such knowledge as will enable him to understand the military reasons put forward and the military object proposed. to the opinion of such a man all respect will be due. thus, and thus only. it is indeed the plain duty of all who aspire to rule either thus to qualify themselves to understand, or else to abstain from interference with, the military interests of the state. chapter v the magnitude of the effort required in a modern national war this point is here illustrated with more detail from clausewitz than may seem necessary to some, because it is precisely the point regarding modern war which is least understood in this country. "the complete overthrow of the enemy is the natural end of the art of war." "as this idea must apply to both the belligerent parties, it must follow, that there can be no suspension in the military act, and peace cannot take place until one or other of the parties concerned is completely overthrown." this is what clausewitz means by absolute war, that is war carried to its absolute and logical conclusion with the utmost force, the utmost effort and the utmost energy. he then proceeds to show that war, owing "to all the natural inertia and friction of its parts, the whole of the inconsistency, the vagueness and hesitation (or timidity) of the human mind," usually takes a weaker or less absolute form according to circumstances. "all this, theory must admit, but it is its duty to give the foremost place to the absolute form of war, and to use that form as a general point of direction." he then proceeds to show that war finally took its absolute form under napoleon. to-day we may say that war takes its absolute form in the modern great national war, which is waged by each belligerent with the whole concentrated physical and mental power of the nation-in-arms. this requires to be gone into a little more in detail, for it is a most important point. clausewitz in book viii. approaches this part of his subject by an historical survey of war from the time of the roman empire to that of napoleon. he shows how as the feudal system gradually merged into the later monarchical states of europe, armies gradually became less and less national, more and more mercenary. omitting this, we arrive at the seventeenth century. he says: "the end of the seventeenth century, the time of louis xiv., is to be regarded as the point in history at which the standing military power, such as it existed in the eighteenth century, reached its zenith. that military force was based on enlistment and money. states had organized themselves into complete unities; and the governments, by commuting the personal services of their subjects into money payments, had concentrated their whole power in their treasuries. through the rapid strides in social improvements, and a more enlightened system of government, this power had become very great in comparison with what it had been. france appeared in the field with a standing army of a couple of hundred thousand men, and the other powers in proportion." armies were supported out of the treasury, which the sovereign regarded partly as his privy purse, at least as a resource belonging to the government, and not to the people. relations with other states, except with respect to a few commercial subjects, mostly concerned only the interests of the treasury or of the government, not those of the people; at least ideas tended everywhere in that way. the cabinets therefore looked upon themselves as the owners and administrators of large estates, which they were continually seeking to increase, without the tenants on those estates being particularly interested in this improvement. the people, therefore, who in the tartar invasions were everything in war, who in the old republics and in the middle ages were of great consequence, were in the eighteenth century absolutely nothing directly. in this manner, in proportion as the government separated itself more from the people, and regarded itself as the state, war became more and more exclusively a business of the government, which it carried on by means of the money in its coffers and the idle vagabonds it could pick up in its own and neighbouring countries. the army was a state property, very expensive, and not to be lightly risked in battle. "in its signification war was only diplomacy somewhat intensified, a more vigorous way of negotiating, in which battles and sieges were substituted for diplomatic notes." "plundering and devastating the enemy's country were no longer in accordance with the spirit of the age." "they were justly looked upon as unnecessary barbarity." "war, therefore, confined itself more and more, both as regards means and ends, to the army itself. the army, with its fortresses and some prepared positions, constituted a state in a state, within which the element of war slowly consumed itself. all europe rejoiced at its taking this direction, and held it to be the necessary consequence of the spirit of progress." so think many in this country to-day. they are only a hundred years behind the times. "the plan of a war on the part of the state assuming the offensive in those times consisted generally in the conquest of one or other of the enemy's provinces; the plan of the defender was to prevent this. the plan of campaign was to take one or other of the enemy's fortresses, or to prevent one of our own being taken; it was only when a battle became unavoidable for this purpose that it was sought for and fought. whoever fought a battle without this unavoidable necessity, from mere innate desire of gaining a victory, was reckoned a general with too much daring." for armies were too precious to be lightly risked. "winter quarters, in which the mutual relations of the two parties almost entirely ceased, formed a distinct limit to the activity which was considered to belong to one campaign." "as long as war was universally conducted in this manner, all was considered to be in the most regular order." "thus there was eminence and perfection of every kind, and even field-marshal daun, to whom it was chiefly owing that frederick the great completely attained his object, and maria theresa completely failed in hers, notwithstanding that could still pass for a great general." beyond this stage of military thought, many in this country have not yet advanced. * * * * * "thus matters stood when the french revolution broke out; austria and prussia tried their diplomatic art of war; this very soon proved insufficient. whilst, according to the usual way of seeing things, all hopes were placed on a very limited military force in , such a force as no one had any conception of made its appearance. war had suddenly become again an affair of the people, and that of a people numbering thirty millions, every one of whom regarded himself as a citizen of the state." "_by this participation of the people in the war_, instead of a cabinet and an army, a whole nation with its natural weight came into the scale. henceforth the means available--the efforts which might be called forth--had no longer any definite limits; the energy with which the war itself might be conducted had no longer any counterpoise, and consequently the danger to the adversary had risen to the extreme." if only our politicians could learn this old lesson of the french revolution! for many, too many, of them appear to derive their ideas of war to-day from some dim reminiscent recollections of school histories of the wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. to continue: "after all this was perfected by the hand of bonaparte, this military power based on the strength of the whole nation, marched over europe, smashing everything in pieces so surely and certainly, that where it only encountered the old-fashioned armies the result was not doubtful for a moment. "a reaction, however, awoke in due time. in spain the war became of itself an affair of the people." in austria. in russia. "in germany prussia rose up the first, made the war a national cause, and without either money or credit, and with a population reduced one-half, took the field with an army twice as strong as in . the rest of germany followed the example of prussia sooner or later." "thus it was that germany and russia, in the years and , appeared against france with about a million of men." "under these circumstances the energy thrown into the conduct of war was quite different." "in eight months the theatre of war was removed from the oder to the seine. proud paris had to bow its head for the first time; and the redoubtable bonaparte lay fettered on the ground." "therefore, since the time of bonaparte, war, through being, first on one side, then again on the other, an affair of the whole nation, has assumed quite a new nature, or rather it has approached much nearer to its real nature, to its absolute perfection. the means then called forth had no visible limit, the limit losing itself in the energy and enthusiasm of the government and its subjects. by the extent of the means, and the wide field of possible results, as well as by the powerful excitement of feeling which prevailed, energy in the conduct of war was immensely increased; the object of its action was the downfall of the foe; and not until the enemy lay powerless on the ground was it supposed to be possible to stop, or to come to any understanding with regard to the mutual objects of the contest. "thus, therefore the element of war, freed from all conventional restrictions, broke loose with all its natural force. the cause was the participation of the people in this great affair of state, and this participation arose partly from the effects of the french revolution on the internal affairs of other countries, partly from the threatening attitude of the french towards all nations. "now, whether this will be the case always in future, whether all wars hereafter in europe will be carried on with the whole power of the states, and, consequently, _will only take place on account of great interests closely affecting the people_, would be a difficult point to settle. but every one will agree with us that, at least, _whenever great interests are in dispute_, mutual hostility will discharge itself in the same manner as it has done in our times." reflections this is so true, that every war since the days of clausewitz has made its truth more apparent. since he wrote, the participation of the people in war has become, not a revolutionary fact, but an organized fact, an ordinary fact in the everyday life of nations. to-day every state except great britain, securely based on the system of the universal training of its sons to arms, stands ready to defend its interests with the whole concentrated power, physical, intellectual, and material, of its whole manhood. consequently, european war, as clausewitz foresaw, "will only take place on account of great interests closely affecting the people." the character of such war will be absolute, the object of its action will be the downfall of the foe, and not till the foe (be it great britain or not) lies powerless on the ground will it be supposed possible to stop. in the prosecution of such a national war the means available, the energy and the effort called forth, will be without limits. such must be the conflicts of nations-in-arms. yet, even now, so many years after clausewitz wrote, in the hope, as he himself stated, "to iron out many creases in the heads of strategists and statesmen," the great transformation in the character of modern war, due to the participation of the people therein, has not yet been adequately realized by many men in this country _who ought to know_. it is earnestly to be hoped that they will endeavour to adjust their minds, as regards war, to the fact that we are living, not in the eighteenth century, but in the twentieth, and that they will consider that war has once for all become an affair of the people, that our opponents will be a people-in-arms, using the uttermost means of their whole manhood to crush us, and that disaster can only be prevented by a like utmost effort on our part, by an effort regardless of everything except self-preservation. chapter vi public opinion in war "war belongs, not to the province of arts and sciences, but to the province of social life. it is a conflict of great interests which is settled by bloodshed, and only in that respect is it different from others. it would be better, instead of comparing it with any art, to liken it to trade, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities; and it is still more like state policy, which again, on its part, may be looked upon as a kind of trade on a great scale. besides, state policy is the womb in which war is developed, in which its outlines lie hidden in a rudimentary state, like the qualities of living creatures in their germs."[ ] these conflicts of interest can bring about gradually such a state of feeling that "even the most civilized nations may burn with passionate hatred of each other." it is an unpleasant fact for the philosopher, for the social reformer, to contemplate, but history repeats and repeats the lesson. still more, "it is quite possible for such a state of feeling to exist between two states that a very trifling political motive for war may produce an effect quite disproportionate--in fact, a perfect explosion." "war is a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its elements--hatred and animosity--which may be looked upon as blind instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason. "the first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second, more the general and his army; the third more the government. _the passions which break forth in war must already have a latent existence in the peoples._ "these three tendencies are deeply rooted in the nature of the subject. a theory which would leave any one of them out of account would immediately become involved in such a contradiction with the reality, that it might be regarded as destroyed at once by that alone."[ ] clausewitz is the great thinker, the great realist, the great philosopher of war. his aim was, free from all bias, to get at _the truth of things_. his view of war as a social act, as part of the intercourse of nations, so that occasional warlike struggles can no more be avoided than occasional commercial struggles, is a view which requires to be most carefully pondered over by every statesman. it is based upon the essential fundamental characteristics of human nature, which do not alter. it is not to be lightly set aside by declamation about the blessings of peace, the evils of war, the burden of armaments, and such-like sophistries. to submit without a struggle to injustice or to the destruction of one's vital interests is not in passionate human nature. nor will it ever be in the nature of a virile people. it is indeed to be most sincerely hoped that _arbitration_ will be resorted to more and more as a means of peacefully settling all non-vital causes of dispute. but arbitration has its limits. for _no great nation will ever submit to arbitration any interest that it regards as absolutely vital_. the view of war, therefore, as a social act, as part of the intercourse of nations, with all that it implies, appears to be the only one which a statesman, however much he may regret the fact, can take. it has, therefore, been brought forward here at once, as it underlies the whole subject and is essential to all clear thought thereon. so much for the influence of public opinion in producing war. now for its influence in and during war. "there are three principal objects in carrying on war," says clausewitz. "(_a_) to conquer and destroy the enemy's armed force. "(_b_) to get possession of the material elements of aggression, and of the other sources of existence of the hostile army. "(_c_) _to gain public opinion._[ ] "to attain the first of these objects, the chief operation must be directed against the enemy's principal army, for it must be beaten before we can follow up the other two objects with success. "in order to seize the material forces, operations are directed against those points at which those resources are chiefly concentrated: principal towns, magazines, great fortresses. on the road to these the enemy's principal force, or a considerable part of his army, will be encountered. "public opinion is ultimately gained by great victories, and by the possession of the enemy's capital."[ ] this almost prophetic (as it was in his day) recognition by clausewitz of the vast importance of gaining public opinion _as one of the three great aims in war_, is fundamental. it is just one of those instances of his rare insight into the principles and development of modern national war which make his book of such great and enduring value to us. for since his day europe has become organized into great industrial nations, democracy and popular passion have become more and more a force to be reckoned with, and the gaining and preserving of public opinion in war has become more and more important. it has, in fact, become the statesman's chief business during a great modern national war. it has become necessary for him to study intently war in its relation to industry, and to the industrial millions over whom he presides, or over whom he may preside. reflections ( ) in the time of clausewitz we in britain were a nation of , , , practically self-supporting, and governed by an aristocracy. to-day we are a crowded nation of , , dependent upon over-sea sources for three-fourths of our food, for our raw materials, for our trade, for our staying power, _and_ we are governed by a democracy. in a modern democratic state it will only be possible to carry on the most just and unavoidable war so long as the hardships brought on the democracy by the war do not become intolerable. to prevent these hardships from thus becoming intolerable to the people, to public opinion, will be the task of the modern statesman during war, and this can only be done by wise prevision and timely preparation. _it requires the internal organization of the industrial state for war._ it appears to the _writer_ that internal organization can be subdivided as follows:-- i. an adequate gold reserve. ii. the protection of our ships carrying raw material, food, and exports during their passage on the high seas from the places of origin to the consumers: (a) by the few available cruisers which could be spared from the fighting fleets, assisted by a thoroughly well thought out and prepared scheme of national indemnity (_vide_ blue book thereon); (b) by insuring the distribution to the consumers of food and raw material, after it has arrived in the country, by preparing a thorough organization which would deal with the blocking of any of the principal ports of arrival, and by guarding the vulnerable points of our internal lines of communications to and from the shipping centres. iii. organization of poor law system to bring immediate relief by selling at peace price food to those unable to pay war prices owing to (a) normal poverty ( , , to , , souls), (b) out-of-works, due to effect of war on trade. work and wages the state _must_ guarantee during modern war, and before the state _can_ guarantee these, it is absolutely necessary that it should satisfy itself that the above preparations are actually _in being_. this pre-supposes a more earnest study of the industrial effects of a great national war than has yet been given to the subject by our political leaders. for in the warfare of the present and future the importance of gaining and preserving public opinion, as pointed out by clausewitz, cannot be over-estimated. it is as fundamentally important _to safeguard our own public opinion as it is to attack, weaken, and gain over that of the enemy_. this has not yet passed the stage of thought. but good thoughts are no better than good dreams unless they be put into action. we are waiting for the statesman to do it. there is no great difficulty. ( ) in arousing the national spirit to the requisite height of patriotic self-denial and self-sacrifice, in elevating, preserving, and safe-guarding public opinion during a great national struggle, much may be hoped for from the patriotism of our press. only in fairness to those whose patriotism is self-originating and spontaneous, it must be made compulsory upon all, so that no journal may suffer loss of circulation or pecuniary injury thereby. ( ) there lies a practical task immediately to the hand of our statesmen if they will seriously set themselves to the task of improving the _moral_ of our nation by reforming our education _curriculum_, on the leading principle that the moral is to the physical as three to one in life, and that therefore character-building must be its chief aim. then they will do much towards strengthening us for war, towards carrying out clausewitz's idea of the gaining and preserving of our public opinion in war. chapter vii the nature of war "it is necessary for us to commence with a glance at the nature of the whole, because it is particularly necessary that, in the consideration of any of the parts, the whole should be kept constantly in view. we shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of war used by publicists. we shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a duel. war is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. if we would conceive as a unit the countless numbers of duels which make up a war, we shall do so best by supposing two wrestlers. each strives by physical force to throw his adversary, and thus to render him incapable of further resistance. "violence arms itself with the inventions of arts and science in order to contend against violence. self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible, and _hardly worth mentioning_, termed _usages of international law_, accompany it without essentially impairing its power. "violence, that is to say physical force, is therefore _the means_; the compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate _object_. in order to attain this object fully the enemy must first be disarmed: and this is, correctly speaking, the real aim of hostilities in theory."[ ] now, "philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skilful method of disarming and overcoming an adversary without causing great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war. however plausible this may appear, _still it is an error which must be extirpated_, for in such dangerous things as war _the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are just the worst_. as the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the co-operation of the intelligence, it follows that _he who uses force unsparingly without reference to the quantity of bloodshed_, must _obtain a superiority if his adversary does not act likewise_." "to introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation would be an absurdity." "we therefore repeat our proposition, that _war is an act of violence which in its application knows no bounds_." the political nature of war in endeavouring briefly to describe clausewitz's method of looking at war, one is continually confronted by the difficulty of selecting a few leading ideas out of so many profound thoughts and pregnant passages. however, a selection must be made. i assign the first place to his conception of war as a part of policy, because that is fundamentally necessary to understand his practical way of looking at things. this point of view is as necessary for the strategist as for the statesman, indeed for every man who would understand the nature of war. for otherwise it is impossible to understand the military conduct of many campaigns and battles, in which the political outweighed the military influence, and led to action incomprehensible almost from a purely military point of view. history is full of such examples. clausewitz clearly lays down: "_war is only a continuation of state policy by other means._ this point of view being adhered to will introduce much more unity into the consideration of the subject, and things will be more easily disentangled from each other."[ ] "it is only thus that we can obtain a clear conception of war, for the political view is the _object_, war is the _means_, and the means must always include the object in our conception." "each (nation or government) strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to its will."[ ] owing to the great importance of this point of view, so little understood in this country, i have devoted the next chapter to it alone, so as to bring out clausewitz's view more in detail. we can, therefore, pass on for the present. the culminating point of victory secondly, i select his doctrine of the culminating point of victory, because that is essential in order to understand his division of all wars into two classes, according to how far the attack is likely to be able to extend into the hostile country before reaching its culminating point, where reaction may set in.[ ] "the conqueror in a war is not always in a condition to subdue his adversary completely. often, in fact almost _universally, there is a culminating point of victory_. experience shows this sufficiently."[ ] as the attack or invasion progresses it becomes weaker even from its successes, from sieges or corps left to observe fortified places, from the troops required to guard the territory gained, and the lengthening line of communications, from the fact that we are removing further from our resource while the enemy is falling back upon and drawing nearer to his, from the danger of other states joining in to prevent the utter destruction of the defeated nation, from the rousing of the whole nation in extremity to save themselves by a people's war, from the slackening of effort in the victorious army itself, etc., etc. leoben, friedland, austerlitz, moscow, are instances of such a culminating point, and probably in the late russo-japanese war harbin would have proved so, too, if peace had not intervened. clausewitz continues: "it is necessary to know how far it (our preponderance) will reach, in order not to go beyond that point and, instead of fresh advantage, reap disaster." he defines it as "_the point at which the offensive changes into the defensive_," and says, "to overstep this point is more than simply a useless expenditure of power yielding no further results, it is a _destructive_ step which causes reaction, and the reaction is, according to all experience, productive of most disproportionate effects."[ ] the reader will find it an interesting exercise to search for this culminating point of victory in historical campaigns, and mark the result where it has been overstepped and where it has not been overstepped. the two classes of wars from this consideration of the culminating point of victory follow the two classes into which clausewitz divides all wars. "the two kinds of war are, first, those in which the object is the complete _overthrow of the enemy_, whether it be that we aim at his destruction politically, or merely at disarming him and forcing him to conclude peace on our terms; and, _next_, those in which our aim is merely to make some conquests on the frontiers of his country, either for the purpose of retaining them permanently, or of turning them to account as matters for exchange in the settlement of peace."[ ] all wars, therefore, are wars for the complete destruction of the enemy, _i.e._ "unlimited object," or wars with a "limited object." in the plan of a war it is necessary to settle which it is to be in accordance with our powers and resources of attack compared with the enemy's resources for defence, and where our culminating point of victory is likely to be, on this side of the enemy's capital or beyond it. if the former--then the plan should be one with a "limited object," such as the crimea, manchuria, etc.; if the latter--then the plan should aim at the enemy's total destruction, such as most of napoleon's campaigns, or the allies in , , , or as , or . as clausewitz says: "_now, the first, the grandest, and most decisive act of judgment which the statesman and general exercises, is rightly to understand in this respect the war in which he engages_, not to take it for something or to wish to make of it something which, by the nature of its relations, it is impossible for it to be. _this, therefore, is the first and most comprehensive of all strategical questions._"[ ] in clausewitz's two plans for war with france in ,[ ] this difference is plain. in the first plan, he considered prussia, austria, the german confederation, and great britain united as allies against france,--and with this great superiority of numbers he plans an attack by two armies, each of , men, one marching on paris from belgium, one on orleans from the upper rhine. in the second plan the political conditions had meanwhile changed; austria and great britain were doubtful, and clausewitz held it accordingly dubious if prussia and the german confederation alone could appear before paris in sufficient strength to guarantee victory in a decisive battle, and with which it would be permissible to venture even beyond paris. so he proposed to limit the object to the conquest of belgium, and to attack the french vigorously the moment they entered that country. which strict limitation of the object within the means available to attain it is characteristic of clausewitz's practical way of looking at things. in each plan, however, a vigorous offensive aiming at a decisive victory was to be adopted. preparation for war the third place, in respect to its present-day importance, i assign to clausewitz's clear statement that-- "if we have clearly understood the result of our reflections, then the activities belonging to war divide themselves into two principal classes, into such as are only _preparations for war_ and into _the war itself_. this distinction must also be made in theory." nothing could be more clearly stated than this, or place in greater honour peace preparations. like his doctrine of the importance of gaining public opinion in war, it is one of those almost prophetic utterances which make clausewitz the germ of modern military evolution. clausewitz, unlike jomini who did not, foresaw to a certain extent (probably owing to his employment in organizing the new prussian short-service army after ) the nation-in-arms of the present day. and, since his time, the greater the forces which have to be prepared, the greater has become the value of preparation for war. it has been continually growing, till to-day it has obtained such overwhelming importance that one may almost say that a modern war is practically (or nearly so) decided _before_ war breaks out, according to which nation has made the greatest and most thorough peace preparations. clausewitz elsewhere speaks of "every imaginable preparation." we may nowadays almost go so far as to say that preparation is war, and that that nation which is beaten in preparation is already beaten before the war breaks out. a failure to understand this fact is a fundamental error at the root of the idea of war as held by civilians, for many of them think that speeches are a substitute for preparations. it is plain that these three ideas of clausewitz regarding the nature of war, its political nature, the distinction between wars with an unlimited object and a limited object, and preparations in peace-time, are as much matters for the statesman as for the soldier, and require study and reflection on the part of the former as much as on the part of the latter. friction in war i place friction here before the more detailed consideration of actual war, of war in itself, because it is that which distinguishes war on paper from real war, the statesman's and soldier's part from the part of the soldier only, and is therefore to be fitly treated midway between the two. friction in war is one of clausewitz's most characteristic ideas. he always looks at everything from that point of view, and as friction and the fog of war, and their influence on human nature will always be the chief characteristic of real war as distinguished from theoretical war or war on paper, it is chiefly this habit or mode of thought which makes his writings of such great and permanent value. it is also a habit which we ought sedulously to cultivate in ourselves. "_in war everything is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult_,"[ ] runs his famous saying. why is the simplest thing difficult? because of the friction of war. and how can that friction be minimized? only by force of character, and the military virtues of discipline, perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness. hence the great emphasis which he always and everywhere lays upon character and these military virtues as the deciding factors in war. "_friction is the only conception which in a general way corresponds to that which distinguishes real war from war on paper_," he says. each individual of the army "keeps up his own friction in all directions." "the danger which war brings with it, the bodily exertions which it requires, augment this evil so much that they may be regarded as the greatest causes of it."[ ] "_this enormous friction is everywhere brought into contact with chance_, and thus facts take place upon which it was impossible to calculate, their chief origin being chance. as an instance of one such chance take the weather. here the fog prevents the enemy from being discovered in time,--a battery from firing, or a report from reaching the general. the rain (mud) prevents a battalion from arriving,--or the cavalry from charging effectively, because it had stuck fast in the heavy ground." and so on. consider for examples the foggy mornings of jena or austerlitz, of eylau, the katzbach, grosbeeren, dennewitz, pultusk, dresden, sadowa; or the mud of poland, the snow of russia, or, latest, the mud of manchuria. "_activity in war is movement in a resistant medium._" "_the knowledge of friction is a chief part of that so often talked of experience in war_, which is required in a good general." "it is therefore this friction which makes that which appears easy in war so difficult in reality."[ ] in considering any situation in war we must therefore always add to the known circumstances--friction. war itself in clausewitz's way of looking at war itself i assign at once the first place to his doctrine, "_the destruction of the enemy's military force is the leading principle of war_, and for the whole chapter of positive action _the direct way to the aim_."[ ] this dictum, repeated in many different forms, underlies his whole conception of war. all the old theoretical ideas about threatening by manoeuvring, conquering by manoeuvring, forcing the enemy to retreat by manoeuvring, and so forth, in which his predecessors entangled strategy, and from which even the archduke charles and jomini had not completely freed themselves, he brushes aside by "our assertion is that only great tactical results can lead to great strategical results."[ ] thus he leads and concentrates our thoughts in strategy on the central idea of victory in battle, and frees us once for all from the obscuring veil of lines and angles and geometrical forms by which other writers have hidden that truth. "philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skilful method of overcoming and disarming an adversary without causing great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war. however plausible this may appear, _it is an error which must be extirpated_, for, in such dangerous things as war, _the errors which spring from a spirit of benevolence are just the worst_."[ ] for "he who uses force unsparingly without reference to the quantity of bloodshed, _must_ obtain the superiority if his adversary does not act likewise." and the "worst of all errors in wars" is still the idea of war too commonly held by civilians in this country, as witness the outcries which greeted every loss during the south african war, which shows how much clausewitz is needed as a tonic to brace their minds to the reality. "war is an act of violence which in its application knows no bounds." "let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed; if a bloody slaughter be a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more respect to war (for avoiding unnecessary war), but not for making the sword we wear blunt and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity, till some one steps in with a sword that is sharp, and lops off the arm from our body." simple plans the second place i assign to his doctrine of _the simplest plans_, because time is required for the completion of complicated evolutions, but "a bold, courageous, resolute enemy will not let us have _time_ for wide-reaching skilful combination."[ ] "by this it appears to us that the advantage of simple and direct results over those that are complicated is conclusively shown." "we must not lift the arm too far for the room given to strike," or the opponent will get his thrust in first. "whenever this is the case, we must ourselves choose the shorter." "therefore, far from making it our aim to gain upon the enemy by complicated plans, _we must always rather endeavour to be beforehand with him by the simplest and shortest_." strategic lines the salient and re-entrant frontiers, the subtle distinctions between the numerous kinds of strategic lines, and lines of operation, and lines of manoeuvre, etc., etc., etc., which in jomini and his predecessors and followers play so great, so pedantic, and so confusing a part,--for these clausewitz has little respect. in his chapter on "the geometrical element,"[ ] he says, "we therefore do not hesitate to regard it as an established truth that _in strategy more depends upon the number and magnitude of the victorious battles than on the form of the great lines by which they are connected_."[ ] of course he does not altogether leave out such considerations, but the above sentence shows how he regards them as only of minor importance. he therefore frees us from a great deal of pedantry, and takes us back to the heart of things. friction has been already dealt with, so no more need be said here, except about its components. danger "an ordinary character never attains to complete coolness" in danger. "danger in war belongs to its friction, and a correct idea of it is necessary for truth of perception, and therefore it is brought under notice here."[ ] bodily exertion clausewitz says that bodily exertion and fatigue in war "put fetters on the action of the mind, and wear out in secret the powers of the soul." "like danger, they belong to the fundamental causes of friction."[ ] to one who, like clausewitz, had seen the retreat from moscow, the awful passage of the beresina, and the battle of the nations round leipzig, bodily exertion could not be overlooked. had he not seen bodily exertion and hardship break up the grand army into a small horde of stragglers, and destroy the army of kutusoff in almost an equal measure, in , as well as practically ruin the spirit, and largely break up the great army of napoleon in ? as for the effects of bodily exertion on the mind, purpose, and resolution of the general, compare benningsen at eylau after thirty-six hours in the saddle, or napoleon at dresden, by which he lost all the results of his victory. information in war "_the foundation of all our ideas and actions_," but "in a few words, _most reports are false_." "when in the thick of war itself one report follows hard upon the heels of another, it is fortunate if these reports in contradicting each other show a certain balance of probability." in another passage, in order to illustrate this perpetual uncertainty under which all decisions in war have to be made, he compares two opposing commanders to two men fighting in a dark room and groping uncertainly for one another. "these things which as elements meet together in the atmosphere of war and make it a _resistant medium for every activity_, we have designated danger, bodily exertion, information, and friction."[ ] he never loses sight of this; it pervades everything he writes. the moral and physical "and therefore the most of the subjects which we shall go through in this book are composed _half of physical, half of moral causes and effects_, and we might say that the physical are almost no more than the wooden handle, whilst the moral are the noble metal, the real bright polished weapon."[ ] pages might be filled with extracts showing his opinion that the moral is everything in war, but the reader is already convinced of that. compare napoleon's in war, "the moral is to the physical as three to one." clausewitz regards all military questions from this point. his psychological attitude is what chiefly characterizes clausewitz from all writers who came before him, and which makes his deductions so realistic, so interesting and so valuable for all who come after him. tension and rest in war in order not to weary the reader i will bring this chapter to a conclusion with one or two extracts relating to "tension and rest; the suspension of the act in warfare." this is explanatory of those frequent halts which take place in a campaign, which appear at first sight contradictory to the absolute theory of war. these halts are due to many causes, such as preparations, exhaustion, uncertainty, irresolution, friction, waiting for reinforcements, etc. in this connection one must remember that war is "a chain of battles all strung together, one of which always brings on another." but they seldom follow each other immediately; there is usually a certain pause between. as soon as one battle is gained, strategy makes new combinations in accordance with the altered circumstances to win the next. whilst these new combinations are being developed, or perhaps considered, there may be a greater or less suspension of the act, a longer or shorter halt in the forward movement. then another spring forward. clausewitz has a great many interesting things to say on this subject.[ ] "if there is a suspension of the act in war, that is to say, if neither party for the moment wills anything positive, there is _rest_, and for the moment equilibrium.... as soon as ever one of the parties proposes to himself a new positive object, and commences active steps towards it, even if it is only by preparations, and as soon as the enemy opposes this, there is _tension_ of the powers; this lasts until the decision takes place.... this decision, the foundation of which lies always in the battle-combinations which are made on each side, ... is followed by a movement in one or other direction." "it may so happen that both parties, at one and the same time, not only feel themselves too weak to attack, but are so in reality." "wild as is the nature of war it still wears the claims of human weakness, and the contradiction we see here, that man seeks and creates dangers which he fears at the same time, will astonish no one." "if we cast a glance at military history in general, there we find so much the opposite of an incessant advance towards the aim, that _standing still_ and _doing nothing_ is quite plainly the _normal condition_ of an army in the midst of war, _acting_ the _exception_. this must almost raise a doubt as to the correctness of our conception. but if military history has this effect by the great body of its events, so also the latest series of wars redeem the view. the war of the french revolution shows only too plainly its reality, and only proves too plainly its necessity. in that war, and especially in the campaigns of bonaparte, the conduct of war attained to that unlimited degree of energy which we have represented as the natural law of the element. this degree is therefore possible, and if it is possible then it is necessary." reflections ( ) "hardly worth mentioning"! so that is how clausewitz regards international law, clausewitz to whom in germany "our most famous victors on the more modern battlefields owe their spiritual training," and on whom "everybody who to-day either makes or teaches modern war bases himself, even if he is not conscious of it." and we must regard nearly every foreign statesman as, consciously or unconsciously, a disciple of clausewitz. it is, therefore, high time that we should cease to pin our faith on international law, or think that it can in any way protect us, if we neglect strongly to protect ourselves. power and expediency are the only rules that the practical politicians of foreign countries recognize, and the only question they ask themselves is, "have we got sufficient power to do this," and if so, "is it expedient to do it?" ( ) treaties, too, what reliance can we place upon them for any length of time? none whatever. for treaties are only considered binding as long as the interests of _both_ contracting parties remain the same. directly circumstances change, and they change constantly, the most solemn treaties are torn up, as russia tore up the treaty of paris, or as austria tore up the treaty of berlin. all history is full of torn-up treaties. and as it has been so it will be. the european waste-paper basket is the place to which all treaties eventually find their way, and a thing which can any day be thrown into a waste-paper basket is, indeed, a poor thing on which to hang our national safety. only in ourselves can we trust. therefore no treaties at present existing should be allowed in any way to alter or lessen our preparations to enable us to fight _alone_ when necessary. ( ) it cannot be too often repeated, or too much insisted on, that the success or failure of a state policy is dependent upon the amount of armed force behind it. for upon the amount of armed force behind a policy depends the greater or less amount of resistance, of friction, which that policy will meet with on the part of other nations. the prestige of a nation depends upon the general belief in its strength. the less its prestige, the more it will be checked and foiled by its rivals, till at last perhaps it is goaded into a war which would have been prevented if its prestige, or armed force, had been greater. on the other hand, the greater its prestige, its armed force, the more reasonable and inclined to a fair compromise are its rivals found. so that the greater the prestige, the armed force, of our nation is, the more likely is it that all our negotiations will be settled by peaceful compromise, and the longer we shall enjoy peace. therefore, under this consideration, those who would reduce our national forces are deeply mistaken, for such action would imperil our prestige, imperil our negotiations, imperil our peace, and perhaps lead eventually to a war that we might otherwise have avoided. therefore no such deeply mistaken economy for us. a few hundred thousand pounds saved would be dear economy indeed if it led, as well it might, to the payment before many years of a war indemnity of £ , , or so. better the evils we know than the far greater evils we know not of. ( ) surprise in war is what we have to fear. there are two sorts of national surprise that we must consider. these are (a) the _surprise by actual hostilities_ taking place before the actual declaration of war, such as the japanese surprise and practical destruction of the fighting force of the russian fleet at port arthur; (b) the _surprise by superior preparation_, silently carried out till all is ready for a decisive blow, whilst we are not ready for equally efficient defence, and then a declaration of war before we have time to get properly ready, as the surprise in this sense of france by germany in . (a) every successful example is always copied, and usually on a larger scale. we may be quite certain that our rivals have taken to heart the lesson of port arthur. it is possible that our next war will open with a similar night attack on our fleet, either just before, or simultaneously with the declaration of war. if it is successful, or even partially successful, it may produce the most grave results, as in the russo-japanese war. it _may_ render possible a naval action with almost equal forces, in which our opponents _might_ be victorious. the invasion of this country on a gigantic scale by , men or more would then follow as a certainty. this is not a probability, but a possibility which requires to be kept in our view. (b) _the surprise by superior preparation_, as i term it, for want of a better name, is a danger to which we are peculiarly liable. as lord salisbury said, "the british constitution is a bad fighting machine," and it is made an infinitely worse fighting machine by the lack of interest which our politicians appear to take in all that appertains to war. hence they are always liable to oppose, as excessive, preparations which are in reality the minimum consistent with national safety. consequently our preparations for war, controlled as they are by those who have no special knowledge of war, are always apt to be insufficient, as were those of france in . in former days this did not perhaps so very much matter, although it resulted in the unnecessary loss of hundreds of thousands of british lives and hundreds of millions of british treasure. but still we were able, at this somewhat excessive price, to "muddle through," owing to the heroic efforts of our soldiers and sailors to make bricks without straw and retrieve the mistakes of our policy. for our opponents then conducted war in such a slow way as to give us time to repair _after_ the outbreak of war our lack of preparation _before_ it. but opposed to a modern nation-in-arms, guided by statesmen and led by generals brought up in the school of napoleon, clausewitz, and moltke--all will be different. in such a war the national forces brought into play are so immense that it is only possible to do so efficaciously if everything has been most carefully prepared and organized beforehand. it is not _possible_ to improvise such organization of national force _after_ the war has begun, for there cannot be sufficient time. if our rival makes adequate preparation before the war to bring to bear in that war the _whole_ of its national force, material, moral, and physical, while we only prepare to bring to bear a _small portion_ thereof, then there will be no time afterwards for us to repair our negligence. the war will be conducted with the utmost energy, and the aim will be to utilize to the utmost the superiority obtained by superior preparation, so as to make the decision as rapid as possible before we have time to recover from the effects of our surprise. that is the danger we have to fear, and to keep ever in mind. chapter viii war as policy "war," says clausewitz, "is only a continuation of state policy by other means." the first question that at once arises in the mind is what is meant by policy. we may safely lay down that state policy is the defence and furtherance of the interests of the nation as a whole amidst the play of the conflicting tendencies towards rest and towards acquisition, and that its instruments are the pen and the sword. there can, of course, be any degree of consistency or fickleness, of strength or weakness, of success or failure, in the policy of a state. clausewitz expressly stated that he hoped "to iron out many creases in the heads of strategists and statesmen," such, for instance, as the idea that it is possible to consider either policy or war as independent of the other. it is only possible to obtain a proper conception of policy if we regard it as continuous both in peace and war, using sometimes peace negotiations, sometimes war negotiations, as circumstances require, to attain the political object. war is only a part of policy, a continuance of the previous negotiations; but the instrument is now the sword and not the pen. as clausewitz says, "_in one word, the art of war, in its highest point of view, is policy; but no doubt a policy which fights battles instead of writing notes._" war is merely a means whereby a nation attempts to impose its will upon another nation in order to attain a political object. this object is settled by policy, which also orders the war, determines what sort of war it is to be, with what means and resources and expenditure it is to be waged, when its object has been attained, and when it is to cease. in fact, policy prepares, leads up to, orders, supports, guides, and stops the war. as clausewitz said, "_all the leading outlines of a war are always determined by the cabinet--that is, by a political, not a military functionary._" unity of thought is only to be obtained by "the conception that war is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself." "and how can we conceive it to be otherwise? does the cessation of diplomatic notes stop the political relations between different nations and governments? is not war merely another kind of writing and language for political thoughts?" "accordingly war can never be separated from political intercourse; and if, in the consideration of the matter, this is done in any way, all the threads of the different relations are, to a certain extent, broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object." "if war belongs to policy, it will naturally take its character from policy. if the policy is grand and powerful, so will also be the war, and this may be carried to the point at which war attains to its absolute form." "only through this kind of view war recovers unity; only by it can we see _all_ wars of _one_ kind, and it is only through it that the judgment can obtain the true and perfect basis and point of view from which _great plans_ may be traced out and determined upon." "there is upon the whole nothing more important in life than to find out the _right_ point of view from which things should be looked at and judged of, and then to keep to that point; for we can only apprehend the mass of events in their unity from _one_ standpoint; and it is only the keeping to one point of view that guards us from inconsistency." "we can only look at policy here as the representative of the interests generally of the whole community," and "_wars are in reality only the expressions or manifestations of policy itself_." to the student of history this unity of conception is equally necessary, for it supplies the key to many a military puzzle. without it we can never understand, for instance, napoleon's conduct in , , ; nor without it can we see the compelling reason of many battles, apparently fought against military judgment, such, for instance, as borodino, leipzig, sedan, etc. we have to remember that these and many other battles, as, for instance, ladysmith, were fought from a political, not a military, motive. it is a well-known fact that the strategist frequently has to alter and adapt his plans so as to suit overmastering political necessity. yet many people have failed to draw therefrom the generalization of clausewitz that "war is only a continuation of state policy by other means." but having got it now, let us hold fast to it, with all its consequences. some knowledge of war necessary for statesmen "from this point of view there is no longer in the nature of things a necessary conflict between the political and military interests, and where it appears it is therefore to be regarded as _imperfect knowledge_ only. that policy makes demands upon the war which it cannot respond to, would be contrary to the supposition that _it knows the instrument it is going to use_, therefore contrary to a natural and _indispensable supposition_." "_none of the principal plans which are required for a war can be made without an insight into the political relations_; and in reality when people speak, as they often do, of the prejudicial influence of policy on the conduct of a war, they say in reality something very different to what they intend. it is not this influence, but the policy itself which should be found fault with. if policy is right, if it succeeds in hitting the object, then it can only act on the war also with advantage; and if this influence of policy causes a divergence from the object, the cause is to be looked for in a mistaken policy. "it is only when policy promises itself a wrong effect from certain military means and measures, an effect opposed to their nature, that it can exercise a prejudicial effect on war by the course it prescribes. just as a person in a language with which he is not conversant sometimes says what he does not intend, _so policy, when intending right, may often order things which do not tally with its own views_. "_this has happened times without end, and it shows that a certain knowledge of the nature of war is essential to the management of political intercourse._" the war minister "before going further we must guard ourselves against a false interpretation of which this is very susceptible. we do not mean to say that this acquaintance with the nature of war is the _principal_ qualification for a war minister. elevation, superiority of mind, strength of character, these are the principal qualifications which he must possess; a knowledge of war may be supplied in one way or another." policy and the means to carry out that policy must harmonize "_if war is to harmonize entirely with the political views, and policy to accommodate itself to the means available for war_, there is only one alternative to be recommended when the statesman and soldier are not combined in one person (note, as william of orange, frederick the great, or napoleon), which is to make the chief commander an _ex-officio_ member of the cabinet, that he may take part in its councils and decisions on important occasions." "the influence of any military man except the general-in-chief in the cabinet is extremely dangerous; it very seldom leads to able, vigorous action." reflections we shall conclude this chapter with a few reflections on the preceding dicta of clausewitz, with which it is hoped that the reader will agree. firstly, then, it is clearly apparent that war is subordinate to policy, is an instrument of policy, is a part of policy, just as much as diplomatic negotiations are a part of policy. secondly, a statesman, however good at peaceful administration he may be, who is ignorant of war is, therefore, ignorant of one part of his profession; that part which deals with the preparing, ordering, guiding, and controlling of war. as clausewitz says, "it is an _indispensable supposition_ that policy knows the instrument it is going to use." it is a mistake to suppose, when diplomatic relations between two states cease, and war breaks out, that therefore the political negotiations cease, for they do not, but are merely continued in another form--in the form of war. the statesman still retains control, and uses the military events as they occur to attain his object. he is still responsible for the success of the warlike, as well as of the peaceful, policy of the nation. thirdly, it is a disputed point how far the influence of policy is theoretically allowable during the course of actual operations, _i.e._ after the war has actually begun. moltke's opinion was that policy should only act at the beginning and at the end of a war, and should keep clear during the actual operations. clausewitz, however, holds that the two are so intimately related that the political influence cannot be lost sight of even during actual operations. between two such authorities we may well hesitate to give a definite opinion, and must seek for the middle way. undoubtedly, in history policy often has really affected the actual operations, as in , , , , macmahon's march to sedan, or bismarck's interference to hurry on the siege of paris in , or ladysmith in the boer war, and in many other cases. that, we must admit. we must also admit that its interference frequently produces a weakening effect on the operations. clausewitz says that that only occurs when the policy itself is wrong. perhaps. but the safest middle way rule appears to be this, that policy should be dominant at the beginning and end of a war, but during actual operations the statesman should exercise the greatest possible restraint, and avoid all interference, except when demanded by _overwhelming political necessity_. fourthly, a politician is bound to study war. he is bound to study war as well as diplomacy, his two instruments. if he only studies how to use one of his two instruments, he will be a poor statesman indeed. it is plain that he must study war, so that he may not try to use an instrument of which he knows nothing. it is not meant, of course, that a politician should study all the details of naval and military matters, but only that he should study the general principles of war, and the means, resources, and forces required to attain the political object of war, through the submission of the enemy. fifthly, in order that the object and the means of policy may harmonize, it is necessary that the one to whom the national interests are entrusted should study the principles of war, so that _he may keep his policy proportionate to the means of enforcing it_. that is to say, he must not propose or commit the nation to a policy which is likely to be strongly opposed by another power, unless he has from careful study and enquiry made certain that he has sufficient armed force at his disposal, in case the opposing nation suddenly challenges his policy and declares war. he should not even consider a policy without _at the same time_ considering with his military and naval advisers the nation's means of enforcing that policy if challenged to do so. he must not think of embarking upon a war, or of provoking another nation to do so, till he has carefully provided sufficient armed force to give a reasonable prospect, if not a certainty, of success. otherwise, sixthly, as our next contest will be with a nation-in-arms, as the war will be in its character absolute, as its object will be the downfall of the foe, as not until the foe (whether it be great britain or not) lies powerless upon the ground will it be supposed possible to stop, as we shall have to contend against the utmost means, the utmost energy, the utmost efforts of a whole people-in-arms,--these points deserve the most serious consideration of every politician who aspires to guide the destinies of the anglo-saxon race. chapter ix strategy clausewitz defines strategy as "_the use of the battle to gain the object of the war_." war is "a chain of battles all strung together, one of which always brings on another."[ ] the great thing in strategy is to win these battles one after the other till the enemy submits. "_the best strategy is always to be very strong, first, generally; secondly, at the decisive point._"[ ] "in such an aspect we grant that the superiority of numbers is the most important factor in the result of a battle, only it must be sufficiently great to be a counterpoise to all the other co-operating circumstances. the direct result of all this is that the _greatest possible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive point_.[ ] whether the troops thus brought up are sufficient or not, we have then done in this respect all that our means allowed. this is _the first great principle of strategy_, as well suited for greeks or persians, or for englishmen, or mahrattas, as for french or germans." it sounds so simple, and yet how many times has it not been done. how many generals have been ruined in consequence! superiority in numbers what is required for strategic certainty clausewitz says, "it is a fact that we may search modern military history in vain for a battle (except leuthen or rosbach) in which an army has beaten another double its own strength, an occurrence by no means uncommon in former times. bonaparte, the greatest general of modern days, in all his great victorious battles, with one exception, that of dresden , had managed to assemble an army superior in numbers, or at least very little inferior, to that of his opponent, and when it was impossible for him to do so, as at leipzig, brienne, laon, waterloo, he was beaten."[ ] "from this we may infer, in the present state of europe, that it is very difficult for the most talented general to gain a victory over an enemy double his strength. now, if we see that double numbers are such a weight in the scale against even the greatest generals, we may be sure that in ordinary cases, in small as well as in great combats, an important superiority of numbers, but which need not be over _two to one_, will be sufficient to _ensure the victory_, however disadvantageous other circumstances may be."[ ] the double superiority of numbers at the decisive point is, therefore, the ideal of strategy. "_the superiority of numbers is, therefore, to be regarded as the fundamental idea, always to be aimed at, before all_, and as far as possible." if strategy has done this, then it has done its utmost duty. it is then for the tactician to make the most of this superiority thus provided by strategy, and win the victory. strategy then repeats the operation with new combinations suited to the altered circumstances to win the next battle, and so on, till the hostile armed force is destroyed. this _superiority of numbers_ in battle as the _first principle of strategy_ we require, on all occasions in season and out of season, to repeat and repeat. at present we have not the numbers we shall want. we must get them. otherwise we are bound to be inferior in numbers, and "the best strategy" will be possible for our enemies and impossible for us. this rests with our statesmen. the decisive point if the double superiority, or as near the double as possible, at the decisive point is the ideal of strategy ... what is the decisive point? here we owe another debt to clausewitz. jomini, even after napoleon, confuses us with three different sorts of decisive points in a theatre of war, but clausewitz clears the air by asserting only _one_. "but whatever may be the central point of the enemy's power against which we are to direct our ultimate operations, _still the conquest and destruction of his army is the surest commencement_ and, _in all cases, the most essential_."[ ] here we have it in a nutshell; wherever the enemy's main force is there is the decisive point, against which we must concentrate all our forces. "there are," said napoleon, "many good generals in europe, but they see too many things at one time. _as for me, i see only one thing, the enemy's chief army, and i concentrate all my efforts to destroy it._" the simultaneous use of all the forces "the rule," says clausewitz, "which we have been endeavouring to set forth is, therefore, that all the forces which are available and destined for a strategic object should be _simultaneously_ applied to it. and this application will be all the more complete the more everything is compressed into one act and one moment."[ ] this he calls "_the law of the simultaneous employment of the forces in strategy_."[ ] "in strategy we can never employ too many forces."[ ] "what can be looked upon in tactics as an excess of force must be regarded in strategy as a means of giving expansion to success." "_no troops should be kept back as a strategic reserve_," but every available man hurried up to the first battlefield, fresh levies being meanwhile formed in rear. as an instance of what not to do, prussia, in , kept back , men in brandenburg and east prussia; they might, if present at jena, have turned defeat into victory, but they were useless afterwards.[ ] a fault so often made may be made again. concentration "it is impossible to be too strong at the decisive point," said napoleon. to concentrate every available man and gun at the decisive point so as to attain superiority there, is not an easy thing, for the enemy will be making a similar attempt. "the calculation of time and space appears the most essential thing to this end. but the calculation of time and space, though it lies universally at the foundation of strategy, and is to a certain extent its daily bread, is still neither the most difficult nor the most decisive one." "much more frequently the relative superiority, that is the skilful assemblage of superior forces at the decisive point, has its foundation in the right appreciation of those points, in the judicious distribution which by that means has been given to the forces from the very first, and in _the resolution to sacrifice the unimportant to the advantage of the important_. in this respect frederick the great and bonaparte are especially characteristic."[ ] "there is no simpler and more imperative rule for strategy than _to keep all the forces concentrated. no portion to be separated from the main body unless called away by some urgent necessity._ on this maxim we stand firm, and look upon it as a fact to be depended upon."[ ] "_the concentration of the whole force_ (_i.e._ within supporting distance) _should be the rule_, and _every separation or division is an exception which must be justified_."[ ] of course, this does not mean that all the troops are to be kept concentrated in one mass upon one road, but within supporting distance, for he expressly states, "_it is sufficient now if the concentration takes place during the course of the action._"[ ] this doctrine, qualified by the last sentence, makes clausewitz the germ of modern military thought, for the last sentence leaves room for all the modern developments of new roads, railways, telegraphs, wire and wireless, and so forth. therefore in war, according to clausewitz, concentration, concentration, concentration, and _every division or detachment is an evil which can only be justified by urgent necessity_. here again we find a simple truth, which, however, the history of all wars shows us to be very difficult to carry out. hence the value of keeping such an imperative maxim always in our minds. the first pitched battle "the more a general takes the field in the true spirit of war, as well as of every other contest, that he must and _will_ conquer, the more will he strive to throw every weight into the scale in the first battle, and hope and strive to win everything by it. napoleon hardly ever entered upon a war without thinking of conquering his enemy at once in the first battle."[ ] "_at the very outset of war we must direct all our efforts to gain the first battle_, because an unfavourable issue is always a disadvantage to which no one would willingly expose himself, and also because the first decision, though not the only one, still will have the more influence on subsequent events the greater it is in itself."[ ] "the law of the simultaneous use of the forces in strategy lets the principal result (which need not be the final one) take place almost always at the commencement of the great act."[ ] a great victory thus won at the outset will upset all the enemy's plan of campaign and allow us to carry out our own. the first pitched battle is, therefore, the crisis of the rival strategies, and towards its favourable decision all our preparations, all our forces, and all our energies should be directed. this is a point that civilians seem to find hard to grasp. witness all our history, with inadequate forces at the beginning of every war, as even in the latest of our wars--that in south africa. it is a point which our statesmen should very seriously consider. the difficulty of concentrating superior numbers for the first battle is that the enemy will be, or should be, of the same opinion, and will be making equal efforts to win the first battle. so, then, the crisis will be all the more acute, the battle greater, and the result greater. "_we would not avoid showing at once that the bloody solution of the crisis, the effort for the destruction of the enemy's main force, is the first-born son of war._"[ ] till this is done, the first great victory gained, strategy should think of nothing else. then, and only then, a further combination in accordance with the altered circumstances to win the next. "for we maintain that, with few exceptions, _the victory at the decisive point will carry with it the decision on all minor points_"[ ] over the whole theatre of war. therefore nothing else matters for long, and to victory in the first great battle "everything else must be sacrificed." for concentration can only be obtained by sacrifice. pursuit "once the great victory is gained, the next question is not about rest, not about taking breath, not about re-organizing, etc., but only of pursuit, of fresh blows wherever necessary, of the capture of the enemy's capital, of the attack of the armies of his allies, or whatever else appears as a rallying point for the enemy."[ ] clausewitz points out that this is very difficult, and that to compel his exhausted troops vigorously to pursue till nightfall requires great force of will on the part of the equally exhausted commander. we need only remember that napoleon himself at the supreme crisis of his fate, being physically tired, failed to pursue the allies after his victory at dresden, , whereby he lost all the fruits of his victory, and indeed his last chance of ultimate success. summary of strategic principles leaving out, for the sake of shortness, the rest of his strategical thoughts, i hasten to conclude this sketch with a glance at clausewitz's admirable summary[ ] of strategic principles:-- "_the first and most important maxim which we can set before ourselves is to employ_ all _the forces which we can make available with the_ utmost energy. even if the result is tolerably certain in itself, it is extremely unwise not to make it _perfectly certain_. "_the second principle is to concentrate our forces as much as possible at the point where the_ decisive _blow is to be struck. the success at that point will compensate for all defeats at secondary points._ "_the third principle is not to lose time. rapidity and surprise are the most powerful elements of victory._ "_lastly, the fourth principle is to_ follow up the success _we gain with the_ utmost energy. _the pursuit of the enemy when defeated is the only means of gathering up the fruits of victory._ "the first of these principles is the foundation of all the others. _if we have followed the first principle, we can venture any length with regard to the three others without risking our all._ it gives the means of _continually creating new forces behind us_, and with new forces every disaster may be repaired. _in this, and not in going forward with timid steps, lies that prudence which may be called wise._" these great principles are everything in war, and "due regard being paid to these principles, the form (_i.e._ the geometrical element) in which the operations are carried on is in the end of little consequence." "therefore i am perfectly convinced that whoever calls forth all his powers to appear _incessantly with new masses_, whoever adopts _every imaginable means of preparation_, whoever _concentrates his force at the decisive point, whoever thus armed pursues a great object with resolution and energy_, has done all that can be done in a general way for the strategical conduct of the war, and that, unless he is altogether unfortunate in battle, will undoubtedly be victorious in the same measure that his adversary has fallen short of this exertion and energy." reflections when we have got these great simple leading principles of strategy firmly into our heads, the next question is how to make use of our knowledge. for principles are no use unless we apply them. on consideration it appears that there are three ways in which we can all apply these principles with advantage. i. it will prove a very interesting and strengthening mental exercise to apply these few leading principles to every campaign we read about, to search for indications of their application in the strategy of each belligerent, how far each commander succeeded, and how far failed to carry them out in their entirety, and where, when, and why he succeeded or failed, and the results of doing or not doing so. also to search for the interaction of the political motive of the war on the military operations, and to see how far the belligerent statesmen gained or failed to gain their political object, according to the comparative degree of preparation they had made for it, and the magnitude of effort which they made or did not make to support it with the whole means of the nation, material, moral and physical. also to see how far the national spirit was aroused or not, and the causes thereof, and to note the greater or less energy, resolution and boldness which was consequently infused into the war. also to note how the thorough application of these great simple principles of strategy shortens the war and thereby reduces its cost ( to ), and how the neglect of them by statesmen, despite their fortitude afterwards, lengthens a war and adds to its cost enormously (south africa, etc.). used thus, these principles give us a theoretically correct ground for criticism. ii. these principles also give us a theoretically correct ground for anticipating what the action of our opponents in any future war will be, the measure of the forces they will bring to bear, how they will direct those forces, and the amount of energy, resolution, and boldness with which they will use them against us. it is an axiom always to assume that the enemy will do the best and wisest thing, and to prepare accordingly. iii. these principles also give us a theoretically correct ground for our own counter-preparations. we require to take the most dangerous war which is probable or possible, and make every imaginable preparation to carry out these principles therein. in such a case how are we going to render it possible for our generals to win, and thus save the nation from the irreparable consequences and the huge war indemnity of £ , , or so, which would follow defeat? how are we going to do it? how are we going to render it possible for our generals to employ the best strategy? the ideal of strategy, always to be aimed at, is the double superiority of numbers. how are we going to give our generals that? if we cannot do that, how are we going to give them even any superiority _at all_, so that they may be able to carry out the first principle of strategy? how? or are we going to make no _adequate preparations_ for these three eventualities, and when one of them suddenly comes ask our generals to save us from the fate we have brought upon ourselves, by performing the impossible? it is in this way that a statesman should use these few great simple principles of strategy in order to attain his political object and safeguard the interests of the nation. chapter x the execution of strategy now, as clausewitz teaches it, the theory of war is easy enough to understand. there is no reason--one might almost say no excuse--why every one, soldier or statesman, should not know it fairly well. the great leading principles of strategy are few and simple. there is no reason why every one, soldier and statesman, should not understand and know these few simple principles thoroughly, and have them at his finger ends ready to apply them to the consideration of any military question, past, present, or future. so far all is easy. but when it is a question of carrying out in actual war this easy theory, these simple strategical principles, then it is quite a different matter, then it is a matter of the very greatest difficulty. this is a difference which the mind always finds very hard to grasp, as witness the denunciations with which any failure in execution by a general, no matter how great the real difficulties with which he had to contend, is nearly always greeted. observers rarely make allowances for these difficulties, very largely probably because they do not understand them. the present chapter is devoted to these difficulties of execution in war. the genius for war in clausewitz's great chapter on "the genius for war"[ ] he sets forth the difficulties which confront a general, the character and genius, the driving and animating force, required to overcome the friction of war. it is impossible to abstract it adequately; i can only advise all to read it for themselves. but i will endeavour to give an idea of it. after discussing the various sorts of courage required by a general, physical before danger and moral before responsibility, the strength of body and mind, the personal pride, the patriotism, the enthusiasm, etc., he comes to the unexpected. "_war_," he says, "_is the province of uncertainty. three-fourths of those things upon which action in war must be calculated are hidden more or less in the clouds of great uncertainty._ here, then, above all other, a fine and penetrating mind is called for, to grope out the truth by the tact of its judgment." mark this point, that three-fourths of the things that we as critics after the event know, when all information of the situation has been collected and published, were unknown to the general who had to decide, or only dimly guessed at from a number of contradictory reports. "from this uncertainty of all intelligence and suppositions, _this continual interposition of chance_." "now, if he is to get safely through _this perpetual conflict with the unexpected_, two qualities are indispensable; in the first place _an understanding which, even in the midst of this intense obscurity, is not without some traces of inner light_, which _lead to the truth_, and then _the courage to follow this faint light_. the first is expressed by the french phrase _coup d'oeil_; the second is resolution." "resolution is an _act of courage in face of responsibility_." "the forerunner of resolution is an act of the mind making plain the necessity of venturing and thus influencing the will. this quite peculiar direction of the mind, which conquers every other fear in man by the fear of wavering or doubting, is what makes up resolution in strong minds." the vital importance of firmness and resolution, so strongly urged by clausewitz, will be apparent to all if we reflect how even the strongest characters have been ruined by a temporary fit of vacillation in war. compare, for instance, york _v._ wartenburg's masterly exposition of napoleon's ruinous, suicidal vacillation in at dresden. also there is required "_the power of listening to reason in the midst of the most intense excitement_, in the storm of the most violent passions." "but to keep to the result of by-gone reflections in opposition to the stream of opinions and phenomena which the present brings with it, is just the difficulty." "here nothing else can help us but an imperative maxim which, independent of reflection, at once controls it: that maxim is, _in all doubtful cases to adhere to the first opinion and not to give it up till a clear conviction forces us to do so_." "but as soon as difficulties arise, and that must always happen when great results are at stake, then the machine, the army itself, begins to offer a sort of passive resistance, and to overcome this the commander must have great force of will." driving power, such as napoleon's. and also "the heart-rending sight of the bloody sacrifice, which the commander has to contend with in himself." "these are the weights which the courage and intelligent faculties of the commander have to contend with and overcome, if he is to make his name illustrious." if he is to prevent the downfall of his country. reflections ( ) in connection with these difficulties i would like to put forward a suggestion as to criticism of a general's action in war, which though not exactly clausewitz's, is a corollary from clausewitz. it is this. in reading a war with the clearness and after-knowledge of history nearly all defeats are easily seen to be due to the non-observance of one or other of the few leading principles of strategy referred to in the previous chapter. but we must assume that the defeated general was _familiar_ with that principle, and that his _will_ was to carry it out. what, then, were the difficulties, the friction, which, on any particular day or days, overcame his will and made him sacrifice the principle? this is where most critics fail us. here seems the matter to search for. and could a stronger resolution have enabled him to overcome those difficulties, that friction? and if so, how and by what means? but we must first discover the difficulties and uncertainties of the particular day when his will gave way. take the manchurian campaign as an instance. if we could only have a military history of the campaign of or that of manchuria, written in the form of a series of "appreciations of the situation," so that we know nothing but what the general knew at the time as we read, and if the true state of affairs could be withheld from us till the end, this, i think, would be very instructive and helpful. it would be a more difficult way of writing a military history, but i think that the extra trouble would be repaid by the extra value. so at least it appears. ( ) if we reflect upon the enormous difficulties, so strikingly brought out by clausewitz, which _our_ generals have to contend with and _overcome_ in actual war, it should surely teach us to curb our criticism. it should surely also make us resolve in future to try to aid them as far as is in our power at home, and not thoughtlessly to increase their already stupendous burdens. in the past we at home have much to accuse ourselves of, much to regret. in the past often have we added to the difficulties of our generals, often have we greatly weakened their chances, and increased those of their opponents, often have we, unintentionally, through ignorance cast a weight into the scale against our country. ( ) the ignorance of the public regarding the conduct of war constitutes for us a very serious national danger. if this ignorance were less pronounced, if our statesmen understood the vast importance of information to the enemy, and the equal importance to our generals that this information the enemy should not obtain, then the public craving for information regarding every detail of what occurs in the field, and the demand for the wide publication thereof, would certainly be repressed. nothing occurs in any of our campaigns which is not immediately made known; reports of actions with the fullest details as to the troops engaged, and the casualties that have befallen them, appear in the columns of the press within a few hours of their occurrence. _any efforts, therefore, of our generals_ in the field to maintain _secrecy as to strength, intentions, and movements are deliberately_, though probably unintentionally, _counteracted by their own countrymen_. this is due to pure ignorance of war, no doubt, but the effect of this ignorance is as bad as if it were due to evil intention. in fairness, however, we must admit that, in the past, the immense value of reticence has not been fully appreciated by some of our soldiers themselves, and it were well if, in the future, more attention were directed to the importance of secrecy. the results of such almost criminal stupidity may not be apparent when we are fighting with a savage foe, but if we ever have, as we undoubtedly some day shall have, the misfortune to find ourselves engaged with a civilized power, we may be certain that not only will the operations be indefinitely prolonged, _and their cost enormously increased_, but their successful issue will be for us highly problematical. in this connection it must be remembered that every great power has secret agents in every country, including great britain, and that it will be easy for such a secret agent to telegraph in cypher or in some agreed code to an agent in a neutral state all war information published here, who will telegraph it on at once to the hostile general, who will thus get, within a very short time of its publication in london, perhaps just exactly the information he requires to clear up the strategical or tactical situation for him, and enable him to defeat the combinations of our generals. as a case in point, take macmahon's march on sedan to relieve metz in , where secrecy was absolutely necessary for success, but which became known to the germans by the english newspapers.--result, sedan. that this cannot be allowed is plain. it is believed that the patriotism of our press will welcome any necessary measure to this end if it is made compulsory upon all.[ ] chapter xi tactics some will probably feel inclined to ask what clausewitz, who wrote more than eighty years ago, can possibly have to say about tactics which can be valuable in the twentieth century. it was said by napoleon that tactics change every ten years, according, of course, to the progress of technicalities, etc. weapons indeed change, but there is one thing that never changes, and that is human nature. the most important thing in tactics, the man behind the gun, never alters; in his heart and feelings, his strength and weakness, he is always much the same. therefore, clausewitz's tactical deductions, founded on the immense and varied data supplied by the desperate and long-continued fighting of the revolutionary and napoleonic wars, permeated as they are by his all-pervading psychological or moral view, can never lose their value to us. it is true, no doubt, that our rifles of to-day can be used with effect at a distance ten times as great as the old smooth bores of clausewitz's day, our shrapnel five times as far as his cannon, and that cover and ground play a far more important part now than then, and so on. all these things, of course, considerably modify the tactics of clausewitz. not so much, however, as some text-books would lead us to suppose, which always seem to assume clear ground and clear weather. for, after all, how many combats are fought on ground where there is a very restricted field of fire (_vide_ herbert's "defence of plevna," etc.), or at night? how many battles are fought during rain, or snow, or mist, or fog, which destroys all long range? compare the tremendous fighting with "bullets, bayonets, swords, hand-grenades, and even fists," of nogi's attempt to cut the russian line of retreat at mukden, with the hand-to-hand fighting of eylau, friedland, borodino, or with the desperate efforts of the french in to open their line of retreat through maro-jaroslawitz, where all day the masses of troops fought hand-to-hand in the streets, "the town was taken and retaken seven times, and the rival nations fought with the bayonet in the midst of the burning houses" (alison). when it comes to push of pike, as in all great decisions between equally resolute adversaries it is bound to do, the difference between the fighting of clausewitz's day and ours is but small. the most recent instances of all, the hand-to-hand fighting in manchuria, take us back to the napoleonic struggles. therefore, despite the eighty years that have intervened, the writings of clausewitz are still valuable from a tactical point of view, always considering of course the difference in weapons, because of the human heart in battle. his ideas on tactics have largely filtered through his german pupils into our textbooks, minus the psychological or moral note, so that it is not necessary to go at length into the subject, or give a number of extracts. it would be wearisome. i will, however, give a few passages at haphazard as illustrations. flank attacks the endeavour to gain the enemy's line of retreat, and protect our own, on which so much learned erudition has been spent by various writers, he regards as a natural instinct, which will always produce itself both in generals and subalterns. "from this arises, in the whole conduct of war, and especially in great and small combats, a perfect instinct, which is the security of our own line of retreat and the seizure of the enemy's; this follows from the conception of victory, which, as we have seen, is something beyond mere slaughter. in this effort we see, therefore, the first immediate purpose in the combat, and one which is quite universal. no combat is _imaginable_ in which this effort, either in its double or single form, is not to go hand in hand with the plain and simple stroke of force. even the smallest troop will not throw itself upon the enemy without thinking of its line of retreat, and in most cases it will have an eye upon that of the enemy."[ ] "this is a great _natural law_ of the combat," "and so becomes the pivot upon which all strategical and tactical manoeuvres turn." reserves--destructive and decisive act the combat he regards as settled by whoever has the preponderance of moral force at the end; that is, in fresh or only partly used up troops. the combat itself he divides into a destructive and a decisive act. during the long destructive act, or period of fire preparation, the troops engaged gradually wear each other out, and gradually almost cease to count as factors in the decision. "after a fire combat of some hours' duration, in which a body of troops has suffered severe losses--for instance, a quarter or one-third of its numbers--the _débris_ may for the time be looked upon as a heap of cinders. for the men are physically exhausted; they have spent their ammunition; many have left the field with the wounded, though not themselves wounded (compare, for instance, eylau and the battles); the rest think they have done their part for the day, and if they get beyond the sphere of danger, do not willingly return to it. the feeling of courage with which they originally started has had the edge taken off, the longing for the fight is satisfied, the original organization is partly destroyed, and the formations broken up." "so that the amount of moral force lost may be estimated by the amount of the reserves used up, almost as with a foot rule."[ ] this goes on till, "in all probability, only the untouched reserve and some troops which, though they have been in action, have suffered very little, are in reality to be regarded as serviceable, and the remainder (perhaps four-sixths) may be looked upon for the present as a "caput mortuum." therefore the art of the commander he regards as "economy of force" during the destructive period; that is, to employ as few troops as possible, by taking advantage of ground, cover, etc., "to use a smaller number of men in the combat with firearms than the enemy employs," so that a smaller proportionate number of his own are reduced to a "heap of cinders" and more are left, more moral force, for the decision. "hundreds of times," he says, "a line of fire has maintained its own against one twice its strength" (_e.g._ the boers). to do this and yet obtain a good fire-effect demands very skilful handling of the troops, both on the part of the chief and subordinate leaders. with the preponderance thus obtained the commander at last starts the decision. "towards the close of a battle the line of retreat is always regarded with increased jealousy, therefore a threat against that line is always a potent means of bringing on the decision (liao-yang, mukden). on that account, when circumstances permit, the plan of battle will be aimed at that point from the very first." or, "if this wear and tear and exhaustion of the forces has reached a certain pitch, then a rapid advance in concentrated masses on one side against the line of battle of the other" (_i.e._ the napoleonic breaking the centre, of recent years thought almost hopeless, but revived in manchuria with success, in the case of nodzu breaking the centre at mukden). from what precedes it is evident that, as in the preparatory acts, the utmost economy of forces must prevail, so in the decisive act to win the mastery through _numbers_ must be the ruling idea. just as in the preparatory acts endurance, firmness and coolness are the first qualities, so in the decisive act boldness and fiery spirit must predominate. "the difference between these two acts will never be completely lost as respects the whole." "this is the way in which our view is to be understood; then, on the one hand, it will not come short of the reality, and on the other it will direct the attention of the leader of a combat (be it great or small, partial or general) to giving each of the two acts of activity its due share, so that there may be neither precipitation nor negligence. "_precipitation_ there will be if space and time are not allowed for the destructive act. _negligence_ in general there will be if a complete decision does not take place, either from want of moral courage or from a wrong view of the situation."[ ] duration of the combat "even the resistance of an ordinary division of , or , men of all arms, even if opposed to an enemy considerably superior in numbers, will last several hours, if the advantages of country are not too preponderating. and if the enemy is only a little or not at all superior in numbers, the combat will last half a day. a corps of three or four divisions will prolong it to double that time; an army of , or , men to three or four times." "these calculations are the result of experience."[ ] as general von caemmerer points out, if these calculations were adhered to in present-day german manoeuvres, as they are now in all war games, tactical exercises, and staff rides, the dangerous dualism of their training, the difference between theory and manoeuvre practice, would cease. attack and defence i have left to the last the consideration of three or four disputed points in clausewitz. in considering these i shall quote a good deal from general von caemmerer's "development of strategical science," as in such matters it is best to quote the most recent authors of established reputation. the most important of these, and the most disputed, is clausewitz's famous dictum that "the defensive is the stronger form of making war." "the defence is the stronger form of war with a negative object; the attack is the weaker form with a positive object."[ ] general von caemmerer says, "it is strange, we germans look upon clausewitz as indisputably the deepest and acutest thinker upon the subject of war; the beneficial effect of his intellectual labours is universally recognized and highly appreciated; but the more or less keen opposition against this sentence never ceases. and yet that sentence can as little be cut out of his work 'on war' as the heart out of a man. our most distinguished and prominent military writers are here at variance with clausewitz. "now, of course, i do not here propose to go into such a controversy. i only wish to point out that clausewitz, in saying this, only meant the defensive-offensive, the form in which he always regards it, both strategically and technically, in oft-repeated explanations all through his works. for instance-- "it is a first maxim never to remain perfectly passive, but to fall upon the enemy in front and flank, even when he is in the act of making an attack upon us."[ ] and again-- "_a swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive--the flashing sword of vengeance--is the most brilliant point in the defensive._ he who does not at once think of it at the right moment, or rather he who does not from the first include this transition in his idea of the defensive, will never understand its superiority as a form of war."[ ] von caemmerer comments thus: "and this conception of the defence by clausewitz has become part and parcel of our army--everywhere, strategically and tactically, he who has been forced into a defensive attitude at once thinks how he can arrange a counter-attack. i am thus unable to see how the way in which clausewitz has contrasted attack and defence could in any way paralyse the spirit of enterprise." von caemmerer also justly remarks that, as clausewitz always insisted both in strategy and tactics, neither attack nor defence is pure, but oscillates between the two forms; and as the attack is frequently temporarily reduced to defend itself, and also as no nation can be sure of never being invaded by a superior coalition, it is most desirable to encourage a belief in the strength of the defence, if properly used. in this i think that wellington would probably have agreed. certainly austerlitz and waterloo were examples of battles such as clausewitz preferred. still, one must admit that clausewitz's chapter on "the relations of the offensive and defensive to each other in tactics," book vii. chapter , is the least convincing chapter of his work. strategically, the argument is stronger. it always seems to me that we must remember that clausewitz had taken part in the defensive-offensive in its strongest, most absolute and unlimited form, on the greatest possible scale--the moscow campaign and the ruin (consummated before a single flake of snow fell) of the grand army. if he had lived to complete the revision of his works, it always seems to me that he would have made his theory undeniable by stating that the defensive is the strongest form of war, _if unlimited by space_. what, for instance, would have happened if the japanese had tried to march through siberia on to st. petersburg? but, after all, which of the two is absolutely the stronger form of war, attack or defence, is merely a theoretical abstraction, for, practically, the choice is always settled for us by the pressing necessity of circumstances. and, in this connection, let us always bear in mind clausewitz's dictum: "a swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive--the flashing sword of vengeance--is the most brilliant point in the defensive." the inner line a second disputed point is clausewitz's alleged preference, as a rule, for the inner line in strategy. but it is necessary to remember that that was only due to the conditions of his time, before railways and telegraphs, when it was difficult to communicate between columns acting on concentric lines. and he is not in any way wedded to the inner line, like jomini, but _only_ when circumstances are favourable. he has many sentences from which we may infer that, had he lived in railway and telegraph days, his strategy, like moltke's, his most distinguished pupil, would have aimed at envelopment as a rule. for to bring up troops rapidly by several railways necessitates a broad strategic front, and clausewitz especially lays down rapidity as his second great principle, and says-- "if the concentration of the forces would occasion detours and loss of time, and the danger of advancing by separate lines is not too great, then the same may be justifiable on these grounds; for _to effect an unnecessary concentration of the forces_ would be contrary to the second principle we have laid down (_i.e._ 'to act as swiftly as possible')."[ ] also: "such separation into several columns as is absolutely necessary must be made use of for the disposition of the tactical attack in the enveloping form, _for that form is natural to the attack, and must not be disregarded without good reason_."[ ] also: "_it is sufficient now if the concentration takes place during the action._" so that while the conditions of his time led clausewitz to prefer close concentration and the inner line, like napoleon, yet his reflections led him to propound the germ of the strategy of moltke. substitute for clausewitz's close concentration this: "as close concentration, the combined movements regulated by telegraph, as is compatible with the utmost use of the railways and the greatest rapidity" (as he would certainly have said), and we arrive at moltke's strategy. frontal attacks a third disputed point is his belief in the superior tactical efficiency, under favourable circumstances, of the napoleonic method of breaking the enemy's line in the centre. breaking the line by a frontal attack was, of course, much easier in clausewitz's napoleonic day than it is with the long-ranging arms of our day, and it is only natural that clausewitz in his writings should give it the full tactical importance which it then deserved. his book would not be true to the tactical conditions of his day had he not done so, with rivoli, austerlitz, salamanca, eckmuhl, etc., before his mind. but it seems hardly correct to accuse him of over-partiality to frontal attacks, for he has examined both frontal and enveloping attacks most fairly, giving to each their relative advantages and disadvantages, and concluding: "the envelopment may lead directly to the _destruction_ of the enemy's army, if it is made with very superior numbers and succeeds. if it leads to victory the early results are _in every case_ greater than by breaking the enemy's line. breaking the enemy's line can only lead indirectly to the destruction of the enemy's army, and its effects are hardly shown so much on the first day, but rather strategically afterwards,"[ ] by forcing apart on different lines of retreat the separated fragments of the beaten army. "the breaking through the hostile army by massing our principal force against one point, _supposes an excessive length of front on the part of the enemy_; for in this form of attack the difficulty of occupying the remainder of the enemy's force with few troops is greater, because the enemy's forces nearer to the principal point of attack can easily join in opposing it. now in an attack upon the centre there are such forces on both sides of the attack; in an attack upon a flank, only on one side. the consequence of this is that such a central attack may easily end in a very disadvantageous form of combat, _through a convergent counter-attack_." which is exactly our modern difficulty. "the choice between these two forms of attack must therefore be made according to the existing conditions of the moment. length of front, the nature and direction of the line of retreat, the military qualities of the enemy's troops, and the characteristics of their general, lastly the ground must determine the choice." speaking generally he regards the _concentric_ enveloping form of tactical attack aiming at the enemy's line of retreat as the most efficacious and natural. "on the field of battle itself ... the enveloping form must always be considered the most effectual."[ ] and the _eccentric_ or frontal counter-attack at the extended enveloping attack as the most efficacious and natural form of the defence, such as napoleon's counter-attacks at austerlitz or dresden, or wellington's at salamanca. "and we think that one means is at least as good as the other."[ ] * * * * * now i think that these extracts sufficiently defend clausewitz from the imputation of too great a belief in frontal attacks, and considering the frequent success of such napoleonic attacks in his day, he gives a very fair summing up of the relative advantages and disadvantages thereof, and indeed such as might be written in the present day. indeed the quite abnormal conditions of the boer war produced such a feeling against frontal attacks, and so much loose talk of their being extinct, that it is very useful to turn to clausewitz for a reminder that breaking the centre, whenever the condition he postulates, namely _over-extension of front_ on the enemy's part, is present, will always remain one of the two great forms of decisive attack open to a commander. and as in our day the forces are so enormous that to reach the hostile flank becomes more difficult, and the extension of front becomes so gigantic (a front of several armies on a line of forty to seventy miles perhaps), it is well to consider whether breaking the enemy's centre will not again offer the most advantageous form for the final decisive act, coupled of course, as clausewitz says it always must be, with a strong flank attack. and in these gigantic battles of the future, such as liao-yang and mukden, which we must consider typical of the future, battles which must take several days, during which the troops in the first line become utterly exhausted and used up,--a decisive attack on the centre can well be imagined after the hostile reserves have been decoyed away over a day's march by a strong flank attack. as, for example, nogi's flank attack round mukden followed by nodzu's decisive breaking the centre and capture of mukden itself. so that far from thinking clausewitz's remarks about frontal attacks and breaking the line to be obsolete, it rather appears from the great russo-japanese battles that they are worthy of close study in view of the future. tactical versus strategical envelopment a fourth disputed point is the preference of clausewitz, owing to his insistence on the greatest concentration possible with proper regard for the circumstances, for the tactical envelopment arranged on or near the field to strategical envelopment with divided forces arranged beforehand. in this matter i will again quote general v. caemmerer, who disagrees with him, and says: "clausewitz proclaims the oblique front as the most effective strategic form of attack, ... that is to say, when the whole army with one united front falls upon the strategic _flank_ of the enemy, and, if victorious, cuts him from his line of retreat. but where such a situation cannot be brought about, where our advance has brought us before the strategic _front_ of the enemy, then he sees in the tactical envelopment, in the formation of an offensive flank, the proper means of effectively preparing to push the enemy from his line of retreat, and he distinctly explains that tactical envelopment need not at all be the _consequence_ of strategical envelopment, and need not at all be prepared long beforehand by a corresponding advance of divided forces." clausewitz says, "the consequence of this is that battles fought with enveloping lines, or even with an oblique front, which should properly result from an advantageous relation of the lines of communication, are commonly the result of a moral and physical preponderance."[ ] also "he should therefore only advance with his columns on such a width of front as will admit of their all coming into action together." "such separation into several columns should be made use of for the disposition of the tactical attack in the enveloping form" (_i.e._ by troops within a day's march of each other). "but it must be only of a tactical nature, for a strategic envelopment, when a great blow is to be struck, is a complete waste of power." general v. caemmerer comments: "he is thus of opinion that the lateral movement of part of the army against the flank of the enemy could without any difficulty still be carried out as initiated by the plan of battle; and in order to understand this idea we must again bear in mind the difference between the fire-effect of then and now. in those days a comparatively short movement made it still possible for a considerable portion of the army to gain the defenders' flank; to-day a lengthy and troublesome operation would be necessary for the same object, and its successful execution would only be counted upon if the defender remained entirely passive, and would neither think of a counter-stroke nor of a corresponding movement of his forces to the threatened flank." without going into this controversy i will, however, quote the excellent reason given by clausewitz for his preference for tactical as opposed to strategical envelopment: "one peculiarity of the offensive battle is the uncertainty, in most cases, as to the position (note, and strength) of the enemy; it is a complete groping about amongst things that are unknown (austerlitz, wagram, hohenlinden, jena, katzbach). the more this is the case the more concentration of forces becomes paramount, and turning a flank to be preferred to surrounding."[ ] it is also well to recollect how many famous generals had been ruined in clausewitz's experience through over-extension or dispersion of their forces. the crushing defeats of napoleon's marshals in the winter of , macdonald at the katzbach, oudinot at gros beeren, ney at dennewitz, which neutralized napoleon's great victory at dresden and began his ruin, were all chiefly owing to this cause. and the weather may, again, have as great influence in shortening resistance and allowing troops to be overwhelmed before the too-distant reinforcements arrive, as it had in those battles. if the weather then prevented the old muskets going off, and enabled the attack to rush the defence, so now a fog, rain, mist, or snow, by restricting the field of view and fire, may produce the same results. when one thinks of the number of great battles fought in such weather, as they may well be again, one sees an additional reason for carefully considering clausewitz's warning. far from relegating his preference for the tactical as opposed to the strategical envelopment to the region of the obsolete, because of our improved armament, it seems right to give it full weight as a corrective to a perceivable tendency to elevate strategical envelopment (after königgrätz) into a formula for victory. if in the past many great generals have been ruined by over-extension, so may they be again. against this tendency clausewitz will for ever lift his voice. also it remains to be considered, with the huge armies of to-day and the future, such armies as at liao-yang and mukden, such armies as may possibly one day join issue in afghanistan, whether strategical envelopment will be practicable, or whether tactical envelopment, such as general kuroki's tactical enveloping movement on yentai, and the russian line of retreat at liao-yang, or general nogi's tactical enveloping dash northward on hsinminting and the railway at mukden, will not be preferable. perhaps, as a compromise, one might call such a movement strategical-tactical, and so avoid the dispute by jugglery of words. i have not attempted to do more than roughly indicate that the solution of these four disputed tactical questions in clausewitz is to be sought in a study of the latest campaign, as he would have said himself; that is, the campaign in manchuria. for, as the _times_ correspondent in the xlvth chapter, "clausewitz in manchuria," of his book "the war in the far east," observes, "it will be abundantly clear to any one who has followed the great battles in manchuria that the spirit of clausewitz has presided over japanese victories and wept over russian defeats." chapter xii changes since the days of clausewitz in reading clausewitz it is, first, the great principles of the nature of war founded on human nature, which alter not; and, secondly, it is his spirit and practical way of looking at things that we want to assimilate and apply to the problems of to-day, to which end it is necessary to read him always with the changed conditions of to-day in our minds, and think what he would have said under the circumstances. these changes are chiefly:-- ( ) the improved net-work of roads. ( ) railways. ( ) telegraphs, wire and wireless. ( ) improved arms. ( ) aviation ( ) universal service armies. the improved net-work of roads the improved net-work of roads in europe (not, of course, in manchuria, or in afghanistan where we have to consider our future strategy, but in europe), as general v. caemmerer puts it, "now offers to the movements of armies everywhere a whole series of useful roads where formerly one or two only were available," easier gradients, good bridges instead of unreliable ones, etc. so that the march-discipline of that day when concentrated for battle, artillery and train _on_ the roads, infantry and cavalry _by the side_ of the roads, has disappeared. such close concentration is therefore now not possible, as we move all arms _on_ the road, and an army corps with train, or two without, is the most that we can now calculate on bringing into action in one day on one road. railways "railways have, above all, completely altered the term 'base,'" remarks v. caemmerer. "railways carry in a few days men, horses, vehicles, and materials of all kinds from the remotest district to any desired point of our country, and nobody would any longer think of accumulating enormous supplies of all kinds at certain fortified points on his own frontier with the object of basing himself on those points. one does not base one's self any longer on a distinct district which is specially prepared for that object, but upon the whole country, which has become one single magazine, with separate store-rooms. so the term 'base' has now to be considered in this light." it is only when operating in savage or semi-savage countries, where there are no railways, that the old idea of a base applies. as we penetrate deeper and further from our own country into the enemy's, and as a small raiding party can demolish the railway line so as to stop all traffic for days or weeks, it becomes far more necessary than it ever was in clausewitz's day to guard our communications. and armies become more and more sensitive to any attack upon their communications. also "such a line cannot easily be changed, and consequently those celebrated changes of the line of communication in an enemy's country which napoleon himself, on some occasion, declared to be the ablest manoeuvre in the art of war, could scarcely be carried out any more" (v. caemmerer). also concentration by means of several railways demands a broad strategic front, which produces that separation of corps or armies which prepares the way for strategical envelopment, and so on. general von der goltz, in his "conduct of war," says: "the more recent treatises on the conduct of war on a large scale are principally taken up with the mobilization and strategical concentration of armies, a department of strategy which only began to play an important part in modern times. it is the result of a dense net-work of railways in western europe which has rendered it possible to mass large bodies of troops in a surprisingly brief time. each power tries to outdo its neighbours in this respect, ... which gives an opportunity to the strategical specialist to show off his brilliant qualities.... consequently it is now frequently assumed that the whole conduct of war is comprised in this one section of it." this over-estimate is of course an error, which, however, requires to be pointed out. telegraphs the telegraph has very greatly reduced the danger of separation. the great advantage of the inner line in the day of napoleon and of clausewitz was that separated forces could only communicate by mounted messengers, so if the enemy got between them they could not communicate at all, nor act in concert. this the telegraph has completely altered, for as the field telegraph can now be laid as quickly as an army can advance, the most widely separated bodies of troops can every day arrange combined operations by telegraph through, if necessary, a point one hundred or four hundred miles in rear. so that to-day the chief advantage of the inner line has gone, while its chief disadvantage, the possibility of being surrounded, remains. maps we now possess complete detailed ordnance maps of every country in europe, kept up to date by the latest alterations, whereas in the days of clausewitz maps were of the very roughest character, and quite unreliable in comparison. improved arms smokeless powder, quick-firing and long-ranging artillery and rifles, the infantry field of effective fire being ten times, the artillery five times what it was in clausewitz's time, have all to be borne in mind when reading the tactical part of his writings. in consequence, also, cover and the tactical use of ground are of far greater importance now than then, etc., etc., etc. aviation the recent wonderful developments in aviation will obviously almost revolutionize "information in war." to what extent, it is as yet impossible to say. each year will teach us more. the nation-in-arms the nation-in-arms as the common foundation of all armies (except our own), brought up by railways, vastly increases the numbers in a modern battle from what they were in clausewitz's day. compare austerlitz, dresden, leipzig and waterloo, with liao-yang and mukden. it should be so with us also, for as general von der goltz says in "the conduct of war": "the best military organization is that which renders available all the intellectual and material resources of the country in event of war. _a state is not justified in trying to defend itself with only a portion of its strength, when the existence of the whole is at stake._" in great britain the difference which the introduction of this nation-in-arms principle has made in our military strength compared with that of our future opponents, a difference relatively far greater against us than it was in napoleon's and clausewitz's day, is as yet hardly realized by the people, or by our statesmen. people forget the wastage of war, and the necessity for a constant flow of troops to repair that wastage. as von der goltz puts it: "it is characteristic of the strategical offensive that the foremost body of troops of an army, the portion which fights the battles, amounts to only a comparatively small fraction, frequently only _a quarter or even one-eighth_, of the total fighting strength employed, whilst the fate of the whole army throughout depends upon the success or failure of this fraction. _attacking armies melt away like snow in the spring._" to condense his remarks: "in spite of the most admirable discipline, the prussian guard corps lost to men in the marches between the attack on st. privat and the battle of sedan." "napoleon crossed the niemen in with , men, but reached moscow only three months later with only , ." in the spring of , the french crossed the pyrenees with , men, but still marshal massena in the end only brought , men up to the lines of torres vedras, near lisbon, where the decision lay. again, in , the russians put , men in the field, but had barely , left when, at adrianople, a skilfully concluded peace saved them before their weakness became apparent and a reaction set in. in the russians led , across the danube, but they only brought , men--of whom only , were effective, the rest being sick--to the gates of constantinople. in the germans crossed the french frontier with , men, but after only a six weeks' campaign brought but , men to paris. and so on. the result of it all is simple--that a people which is not based on the modern principle of the nation-in-arms cannot for long rival or contend with one that is, for it can neither put an equal (still less a superior) army into the field at the outset (_vide_ clausewitz's first principle), nor even maintain in the field the _inferior_ army it does place there, because it cannot send the ever-required fresh supplies of trained troops. sooner or later this must tell. sooner or later a situation must arise in which the nation based on the obsolete voluntary system _must_ go down before a nation based on the nation-in-arms principle. circumstances change with time, and, as wise lord bacon said long ago, "he that will not adopt new remedies must expect new evils." may we adopt the remedy before we experience the evil! the moral and spiritual forces in war but though these changed conditions must, of course, _modify_ clausewitz's details in many important particulars, still (to complete our circle and leave off where we started) i repeat that, as human nature never changes, and as the moral is to the physical as three to one in war, clausewitz, as the great realistic and practical philosopher on the actual nature of war, as _the chief exponent of the moral and spiritual forces in war_, will ever remain invaluable in the study of war. consider what unsurpassed opportunities he had for observing and reflecting on the influence of enthusiasm and passion, of resolution and boldness, of vacillation and weakness, of coolness and caution, of endurance and hardship, of patriotism and freedom, of ambition and of glory--on war, either by his own experience or by conversation with other equally experienced soldiers, during that long period of almost endless wars between and . the fervour and enthusiasm and boundless energy of the revolution, which drove the french forward, smashing everything before them, at the beginning; the ambition, military glory, plunder and greed, which animated them later on; the patriotism, religious and loyal devotion, and stern endurance, which nerved the russian hosts then as now; that awful moscow winter campaign, when human nature rose to its highest and sank to its lowest, when the extremes of heroic endurance and selfish callousness were visible side by side; the magnificent uprising of the spirit of liberty and freedom from intolerable oppression in germany, which gave to the prussian recruits and landwehr the same driving force that revolutionary enthusiasm had formerly given to the french; the passing, therefore, in of the moral superiority, the greater driving force, from the french to the allies. clausewitz saw all this; he conversed intimately with such men as scharnhorst and gneisenau, who saw and guided it, too. all his friends had seen it also. no wonder, then, that such an unexampled series of warlike phenomena deeply impressed his reflective mind with the supreme importance of the moral and spiritual factors in war. his opportunities for long-continued observation of warlike phenomena were far greater than those of any writer since his day, and it is to be hoped they will remain so. for we have no desire to see another series of wars such as the napoleonic. it is fortunate for us that there was then such a man as clausewitz to sum up for us so simply and so clearly the accumulated experiences of those long, long years of carnage and devastation. _printed by hazell, watson & viney, ld., london and aylesbury._ footnotes: [ ] book iv. chap. . [ ] book iv. chap. . [ ] book iv. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] summary of instruction to h.r.h. the crown prince. [ ] summary of instruction, p. . [ ] book ii. chap. . [ ] book ii. chap. . [ ] prefatory "notice" by clausewitz. [ ] book ii. chap. . [ ] book ii. chap. . [ ] book ii. chap. . [ ] book ii. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] by gaining public opinion, clausewitz means, to force the enemy's population into a state of mind favourable to submission. [ ] summary of instruction to h.r.h. the crown prince. [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] author's "introduction." [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book vii. chap. . [ ] book vii. chap. . [ ] book vii. chap. . [ ] book viii. chaps. , and . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book viii. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book iv. chap. . [ ] book iv. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book iv. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book vii. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book iii. chaps. - . [ ] book ii. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book v. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book viii. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book vi. chap. . [ ] book v. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book iii. chap. . [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] book viii. chap. . [ ] book viii. chap. . [ ] summary of instruction to h.r.h. the crown prince. [ ] book i. chap. . [ ] this warning as to the consequences of allowing information to be published freely which would be helpful to an enemy was written five years ago. in the present war the prudent reticence of our press, and its loyal co-operation with the government in depriving the enemy of any helpful information, show that the lesson here insisted on has been learned.--editor's note. [ ] book iv. chap. . [ ] book iv. chap. . [ ] "guide to tactics," vol. iii. pp. - . [ ] book iv. chap. . [ ] book vi. chap. . [ ] summary of instruction to h.r.h. the crown prince. [ ] book vi. chap. . [ ] book viii. chap. . [ ] book vii. chap. . [ ] summary of instruction, "guide to tactics," par. . [ ] book vi. chap. . [ ] book vii. chap. . [ ] book vii. chap. . [ ] book vii. chap. . transcriber's notes: punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed. simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced quotation marks retained. ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. page : paragraph ends with: "otherwise," rather than with a period. archive (https://archive.org/) nore: images of the original pages are available through internet archive. see https://archive.org/details/bookofwarmilitar caltiala transcriber's note: text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_). changes made are listed at the end of the text. the book of war the military classic of the far east translated from the chinese by captain e. f. calthrop, r.f.a. london john murray, albemarle st., w. contents page introduction the articles of suntzu i. preliminary reckoning ii. operations of war iii. the attack by stratagem iv. the order of battle v. the spirit of the troops vi. emptiness and strength vii. battle tactics viii. the nine changes ix. movement of troops x. ground xi. nine grounds xii. assault by fire xiii. the employment of spies the sayings of wutzu introduction i. the government of a country ii. estimation of the enemy iii. control of the army iv. qualities of the general v. suiting the occasion vi. encouragement of the troops the book of war introduction i written in the fifth century b.c., suntzu and wutzu still remain the most celebrated works on war in the literature of china. while the chariot has gone, and weapons have changed, these ancient masters have held their own, since they deal chiefly with the fundamental principles of war, with the influence of politics and human nature on military operations; and they show in a most striking way how unchanging these principles are. when these books were written, china was a conglomerate of principalities in continual ferment. personal ambition and intrigue, and not the wishes of the people, were the main factors in these wars. patriotism, or a popular cause, could not, therefore, be relied on to maintain the _moral_ of the levies. instead of these, what may be called the force of despair is pointed out as the most powerful agent in giving cohesion and energy to an army. the general is urged to take a vigorous offensive; and to act at a distance from his base, where defeat means disaster, and where desertion is minimised owing to the distance from home. he should, in fact, burn his boats before an action, or, in chinese phrase, act as one who removes the ladder from under those mounted upon the roof. on the other hand, every care must be taken not to render the enemy desperate; and, as an instance of this, sun observes that an opponent should on no account be completely surrounded. a loop-hole of escape weakens the resolution of the general and the energy of his troops. it is interesting to notice that _moral_, or the spirit of the troops, is thus considered a determining factor in war. the chinese are perhaps unusually affected by climatic conditions. as is well known, the umbrella was part of a soldier's equipment; and for the same reasons, the sunny side of high ground is recommended as most suitable for defence, tactical considerations permitting. the large number of bannermen in the chinese army was out of all proportion to the service of standards in providing rallying points. the chief use of banners was to maintain the spirit of the troops. a forest of banners, held erect, gave a feeling of liveliness and security to the ranks, in the same way as a military band, and when sun remarks that the march of an army should be calm like the forest, he is using a simile that is not inappropriate. probably owing to the fact that the profession of arms has never been highly regarded in china, we find that the ruler of the state did not usually take the field, but employed a professional to command the army--one of the masters of war who wandered from state to state at that time with the secrets of victory to impart to the highest bidder. the question of political interference with the general in the field naturally arises under these conditions. the two sages point out, that to unite the nation under firm and just government is the business of the ruler and necessary to victory; but that the general is the best judge of the questions that arise on a distant field, and that all interference with him causes delay and disaster. war meaning ravage, it was essential that the operations should be conducted in the enemy's territory. once there, however, a vigorous offensive is no longer advised. "at first behave with the discretion of a maiden" is the counsel of sun. the enemy must be induced to take the initiative, and when he is worn out by marching, or makes a false move, "then," says the master, "dart in like a rabbit." unlike the tactics of the japanese, in whom the spirit of attack burns so strongly, those of suntzu and wutzu are essentially of the offensive-defensive order--manoeuvre before fighting, and non-committal until the enemy has shown his hand. the business of the general is to avoid encounter in battle until the enemy is no longer capable of offering a successful resistance. the masters do not make, however, the mistake of advocating a passive defensive. suntzu lays down that the division of the forces which this strategy involves, is to be everywhere weak, rendering the army liable to be taken in detail by the concentrated forces of the enemy. it is rather the defence which avoids battle by mobility and manoeuvre, induces the enemy by stratagem to divide his forces, or act in conformity with our wishes, and then falls upon him. with regard to the tactics of the battlefield, the pitched battle, or, in other words, the frontal attack, is considered unworthy of the skilful general. the plan of attack should consist, broadly speaking, in the division of the army into two forces. the enemy is "attracted and engaged by one force, and defeated with the other;" and here we have the containing or secondary attack, and the main or reserve force which decides the battle of to-day--a most striking instance of the continuity of military principles. considerable space is devoted to the influence of ground on war. the passage of defiles and rivers is still conducted in the same way. the many large rivers of china naturally affected military operations; and, among other axioms, it is laid down that the passage of a river should not be disputed, as the enemy will probably give up the attempt, and make the passage untouched at some other point, but that he should be attacked when half his force is across the stream. again, an army should not encamp on a river below the enemy, as it is thereby liable to be inundated, or to have its water poisoned; or the enemy may come down stream and make a sudden attack. while both writers were professional soldiers, they show a fine disinterestedness by repeatedly pointing out that even successful war brings evil in its train. wu remarks that "few are those who have gained power on earth by many victories," and he is insistent that war should not be undertaken until a careful comparison of the two sides shows that victory is certain; and he adds, "the army which conquers makes certain of victory and then attacks, while the army that is defeated fights in the hope of success." hence the importance they assign to intelligence of the enemy, and to the spy; and as the sages dealt with war between members of the same race, the work of spies was greatly facilitated. the spy was treated with great honour by his countrymen, and the fact that many of the national heroes of china were spies, shows that the part that they played was not forgotten. they frequently toiled for years, and rose to high rank in the enemy's service; and thus, by wrong counsel and by spreading mistrust in his ranks, they became a two-edged sword in the hands of the general. "wonderful, indeed, is their power," exclaims sun; but he also reminds us that their management is the most difficult and delicate duty of the general. ii sun and wu are perhaps held in even greater reverence in japan than in china, where war is looked upon as a troublesome phase in national life, and victory in battle is not considered the greatest achievement of a state. far otherwise is it in japan; and successive generations of her soldiers have been brought up on sun and wu. like other arts, mystery was formerly supposed to surround the art of war, a belief that was encouraged by the strategist; and for a considerable time, the few copies of this book, that were brought over from china to japan, were jealously guarded by their possessors. later, as they became known, an army of japanese commentators arose--for chinese literature is thought compressed, to be unfolded in the mind of the reader. to-day sun and wu have given way to the scientific works of european writers, but their sayings have become proverbs, and their influence undoubtedly helped the japanese to victory in the late war. belief in the importance of a knowledge of the enemy and his resources, of preparation and training, had grown out of a long study of these ancient masters; and since it was the vital importance of a successful issue to the japanese which, after all, fired their resolution and carried them through, they proved the sage's words that it is the energy, born of despair, that wins the victory. iii little is known of the life of either master. they were in no sense patriots but professional strategists, continually changing their employer. chinese history tells a famous story about sun. a certain ruler asked sun to give a practical demonstration of his principles in the neighbourhood of the palace, and entrusted him with the women of the court for this purpose. during the operations, the leader of one of the sides did not obey the master's instructions, and her execution was ordered. she happened to be the king's favourite wife, but sun pointed out that the king's wish that her life should be spared was a case of political interference with the general in the field; and the sentence was carried out. wu is represented as a person of low moral character. on two separate occasions, for fear of giving rise to suspicion, he killed one of his wives who belonged to a state with which his employer at the time was at war; and, graver still in the eyes of the chinese historian, he was not present at the death-bed of his mother. e. f. c. note. the translator is indebted to major j. c. somerville for his kind help and criticism. the articles of suntzu i preliminary reckoning the words of sun the master:-- to all nations war is a great matter. upon the army death or life depend: it is the means of the existence or destruction _of the state_. therefore it must be diligently studied. now, in war, besides stratagem and the situation, there are five indispensable matters. the first is called the way;[ ] the second, heaven; the third, earth; the fourth, the leader; the fifth, law. the _way_ or the proper conduct of man. if the ruling authority be upright, the people are united: fearless of danger, their lives are at the service of their lord. _heaven._ yin and yang;[ ] heat and cold; time and season. _earth._ distance; nature; extent; strategic position. the _leader_. intelligence; truth; benevolence; courage and strictness. _law._ partition and ordering of troops. these things must be known by the leader: to know them is to conquer; to know them not is to be defeated. further, with regard to these and the following seven matters, the condition of the enemy must be compared with our own. the seven matters are:-- the virtue of the prince; the ability of the general; natural advantages; the discipline of the armies; the strength of the soldiers; training of the soldiers; justice both in reward and punishment. knowing these things, i can foretell the victor. if a general under me fight according to my plans, he always conquers, and i continue to employ him; if he differ from my plans, he will be defeated and dismissed from my service. wherefore, with regard to the foregoing, considering that with us lies the advantage, and the generals agreeing, we create a situation which promises victory; but as the moment and method cannot be fixed beforehand, the plan must be modified according to circumstances. war is a thing of pretence: therefore, when capable of action, we pretend disability; when near to the enemy, we pretend to be far; when far away, we pretend to be near. allure the enemy by giving him a small advantage. confuse and capture him. if there be defects, give an appearance of perfection, and awe the enemy. pretend to be strong, and so cause the enemy to avoid you. make him angry, and confuse his plans. pretend to be inferior, and cause him to despise you. if he have superabundance of strength, tire him out; if united, make divisions in his camp. attack weak points, and appear in unexpected places. these are the secrets of the successful strategist, therefore they must not be made known beforehand. at the reckoning in the sanctuary before fighting, victory is to the side that excels _in the foregoing matters_. they that have many of these will conquer; they that have few will not conquer; hopeless, indeed, are they that have none. if the condition of both sides with regard to these matters be known, i can foretell the victor. ii operations of war sun the master said:-- now the requirements of war are such that we need a thousand light chariots with four horses each; a thousand leather-covered chariots, and one hundred thousand armoured men; and we must send supplies to distant fields. wherefore the cost at home and in the field, the entertainment of guests, glue and lacquer for repairs, and necessities for the upkeep of waggons and armour are such that in one day a thousand pieces of gold are spent. with that amount a force of one hundred thousand men can be raised:--you have the instruments of victory. but, even if victorious, let the operations long continue, and the soldiers' ardour decreases, the weapons become worn, and, if a siege be undertaken, strength disappears. again, if the war last long, the country's means do not suffice. then, when the soldiers are worn out, weapons blunted, strength gone and funds spent, neighbouring princes arise and attack that weakened country. at such a time the wisest man cannot mend the matter. for, while quick accomplishment has been known to give the victory to the unskilful, the skilful general has never gained advantage from lengthy operations. in fact, there never has been a country which has benefited from a prolonged war. he who does not know the evils of war will not reap advantage thereby. he who is skilful in war does not make a second levy, does not load his supply waggons thrice. war material and arms we obtain from home, but food sufficient for the army's needs can be taken from the enemy. the cost of supplying the army in distant fields is the chief drain on the resources of a state: if the war be distant, the citizens are impoverished. in the neighbourhood of an army prices are high, and so the money of the soldiers and followers is used up. likewise the state funds are exhausted, and frequent levies must be made; the strength of the army is dissipated, money is spent, the citizen's home swept bare: in all, seven-tenths of his income is forfeited. again, as regards state property, chariots are broken, horses worn out, armour and helmet, arrow and bow, spear, shield, pike and fighting tower, waggon and oxen used and gone, so that six-tenths of the government's income is spent. therefore the intelligent general strives to feed on the enemy; one bale of the enemy's rice counts as twenty from our own waggons; one bundle of the enemy's forage is better than twenty of our own. incitement must be given to vanquish the enemy. they who take advantage of the enemy should be rewarded. they who are the first to lay their hands on more than ten of the enemy's chariots should be rewarded; the enemy's standard on the chariots exchanged for our own; the captured chariots mixed with our own chariots and taken into use. the accompanying warriors must be treated well, so that, while the enemy is beaten, our side increases in strength. now the object of war is victory; not lengthy operations, even skilfully conducted. the good general is the lord of the people's lives, the guardian of the country's welfare. iii the attack by stratagem sun the master said:-- now by the laws of war, better than defeating a country by fire and the sword, is to take it without strife. better to capture the enemy's army intact than to overcome it after fierce resistance. better to capture the "lu,"[ ] the "tsu" or the "wu" whole, than to destroy them in battle. to fight and conquer one hundred times is not the perfection of attainment, for the supreme art is to subdue the enemy without fighting. wherefore the most skilful warrior outwits the enemy by superior stratagem; the next in merit prevents the enemy from uniting his forces; next to him is he who engages the enemy's army; while to besiege his citadel is the worst expedient. a siege should not be undertaken if it can possibly be avoided. for, before a siege can be commenced, three months are required for the construction of stages, battering-rams and siege engines; then a further three months are required in front of the citadel, in order to make the "chuyin."[ ] wherefore the general is angered, his patience exhausted, his men surge like ants against the ramparts _before the time is ripe_, and one-third of them are killed to no purpose. such are the misfortunes that sieges entail. therefore the master of war causes the enemy's forces to yield, but without fighting; he captures his fortress, but without besieging it; and without lengthy fighting takes the enemy's kingdom. without tarnishing his weapons he gains the complete advantage. this is the assault by stratagem. by the rules of war, if ten times as strong as the enemy, surround him; with five times his strength, attack; with double his numbers, divide. if equal in strength, exert to the utmost, and fight; if inferior in numbers, manoeuvre _and await the opportunity_; if altogether inferior, offer no chance of battle. a determined stand by inferior numbers does but lead to their capture. the warrior is the country's support. if his aid be entire, the country is of necessity strong; if it be at all deficient, then is the country weak. now a prince may embarrass his army in three ways, namely:-- ignorant that the army in the field should not advance, to order it to go forward; or, ignorant that the army should not retreat, order it to retire. this is to tie the army as with a string. ignorant of military affairs, to rule the armies in the same way as the state. this is to perplex the soldiers. ignorant of the situation of the army, to settle its dispositions. this is to fill the soldiers with distrust. if the army be perplexed and distrustful, then dangers from neighbouring princes arise. the army is confounded, and offered up to the enemy. there are five occasions when victory can be foretold:-- when the general knows the time to fight and when not to fight; or understands when to employ large or small numbers; when government and people are of one mind; when the state is prepared, and chooses the enemy's unguarded moment for attack; when the general possesses ability, and is not interfered with by his prince. these five things are the heralds of victory. it has been said aforetime that he who knows both sides has nothing to fear in a hundred fights; he who is ignorant of the enemy, and fixes his eyes only on his own side, conquers, and the next time is defeated; he who not only is ignorant of the enemy, but also of his own resources, is invariably defeated. iv the order of battle sun the master said:-- the ancient masters of war first made their armies invincible, then waited until the adversary could with certainty be defeated. the causes of defeat come from within; victory is born in the enemy's camp. skilful soldiers make defeat impossible, and further render the enemy incapable of victory. but, as it is written, the conditions necessary for victory may be present, but they cannot always be obtained. if victory be unattainable, we stand on the defensive; if victory be sure, we attack. deficiency compels defence; super-abundance permits attack. the skilful in defence crouch, hidden in the deepest shades; the skilful in attack push to the topmost heaven.[ ] if these precepts be observed, victory is certain. a victory, even if popularly proclaimed as such by the common folk, may not be a true success. to win in fight, and for the kingdom to say, "well done," does not mark the summit of attainment. to lift an autumn fleece[ ] is no proof of strength; the eyes that only see the sun and moon are not the eagle's; to hear the thunder is no great thing. as has been said aforetime, the able warrior gains the victory without desperate and bloody engagements, and wins thereby no reputation for wisdom or brave deeds. to fight is to win, for he attacks only when the enemy has sown the seeds of defeat. moreover, the skilful soldier in a secure position does not let pass the moment when the enemy should be attacked. the army that conquers makes certain of victory, and then seeks battle. the army destined to defeat, fights, trusting that chance may bring success to its arms. the skilful leader is steadfast in the "way"; upholds the law, and thereby controls the issue. touching the laws of war, it is said: first, the rule; second, the measure; third, the tables; fourth, the scales; fifth, the foretelling of victory. for the rule is the survey of land; the measure tells the amount of that land's produce; the tables its population; from the scales their weight or quality is made known; and then can we calculate victory or defeat. the army that conquers as against the army destined to defeat, is as a beam against a feather in the scales. the attack of conquering forces is as the outburst of long-pent-up waters into sunken valleys. such are the orders of battle. v the spirit of the troops sun the master said:-- the control of large numbers is possible, and like unto that of small numbers, if we subdivide them. by means of drum, bell and flag,[ ] the direction of large forces in battle is possible, and like unto the direction of small forces. by the skilful interchange of normal and abnormal manoeuvres are the armies certainly preserved from defeat. the enemy is crushed, like the fall of a grindstone upon an egg, by knowledge of his strength and weakness, and by the employment of truth and artifice. moreover, in battle the enemy is engaged with the normal and defeated by the abnormal force.[ ] the abnormal force, skilfully handled, is like the heaven and earth, eternal; as the tides and the flow of rivers, unceasing; like the sun and moon, for ever interchanging; coming and passing, as the seasons. there are five notes; but by combinations, innumerable harmonies are produced. there are but five colours; but if we mix them, the shades are infinite. there are five tastes, but if we mix them there are more flavours than the palate can distinguish.[ ] in war there are but two forces, the normal and the abnormal; but they are capable of infinite variation. their mutual interchange is like a wheel, having neither beginning or end. they are a mystery that none can penetrate. as the rush of rock-shouldering torrents, so is the spirit of the troops. like the well-judged flight of the falcon, in a flash crushing its quarry, so should the stroke be timed. wherefore the spirit of the good fighter is terrifying, his occasions sudden; like the stretched cross-bow, whose string is released at the touch of the trigger. in the maze and tumult of the battle, there is no confusion; in the thick of action the battle array is impenetrable. if discipline be perfect, disorder can be simulated; if truly bold, we can feign fear; if really strong, we can feign weakness. we simulate disorder by subdivision; fear, by spirit; weakness, by battle formation. we set the enemy in motion by adopting different formations to which he must conform. if we offer the enemy a point of advantage, he will certainly take it: we give him an advantage, set him in motion and then fall upon him. wherefore the good fighter seeks victory from spirit, and does not depend entirely upon the skill of his men. he is careful in his choice, and leaves the rest to battle force; yet, when an opening or advantage shows, he pushes it to its limits. as a log or rock which, motionless on flat ground, yet moves with ever-increasing force when set on an incline, so await the opportunity, and so act when the opportunity arrives. if the general be skilful, the spirit of his troops is as the impetus of a round stone rolled from the top of a high mountain. vi emptiness and strength sun the master said:-- to be the first in the field, and there to await the enemy, is to husband strength. to be late, and hurrying to advance to meet the foe, is exhausting. the good fighter contrives to make the enemy approach; he does not allow himself to be beguiled by the enemy. by offering an apparent advantage, he induces the enemy to take up a position that will cause his defeat; he plants obstructions to dissuade him from acting in such a way as to threaten his own dispositions. if the enemy be at rest in comfortable quarters, harass him; if he be living in plenty, cut off his supplies; if sitting composedly awaiting attack, cause him to move. this may be done by appearing where the enemy is not, and assaulting unexpected points. if we go where the enemy is not, we may go a thousand leagues without exhaustion. if we attack those positions which the enemy has not defended, we invariably take them: but on the defence we must be strong, even where we are not likely to be attacked. against those skilful in attack, the enemy does not know where to defend: against those skilful in defence, the enemy does not know where to attack. now the secrets of the art of offence are not to be easily apprehended, as a certain shape or noise can be understood, of the senses; but when these secrets are once learnt, the enemy is mastered. we attack, and the enemy cannot resist, because we attack his insufficiency; we retire, and the enemy cannot pursue, because we retire too quickly. again, when we are anxious to fight, but the enemy is serenely secure behind high walls and deep moats; we attack some such other place that he must certainly come out to relieve. when we do not want to fight, we occupy an unfortified line; and prevent the enemy from attacking by keeping him in suspense. by making feints, and causing the enemy to be uncertain as to our movements, we unite, whilst he must divide. we become one body; the enemy being separated into ten parts. we attack the divided ten with the united one. we are many, the enemy is few, and in superiority of numbers there is economy of strength. the place selected for attack must be kept secret. if the enemy know not where he will be attacked, he must prepare in every quarter, and so be everywhere weak. if the enemy strengthen his front, he must weaken his rear; if he strengthen his right, his left is weakened; and if he strengthen his left, his right is weakened. everywhere to make preparations, is to be everywhere weak. the enemy is weakened by his extended preparations, and we gain in strength. having decided on the place and day of attack, though the enemy be a hundred leagues away, we can defeat him. if the ground and occasion be not known, the front cannot help the rear; the left cannot support the right, nor the right the left, nor the rear the front. for on occasion, the parts of the army are two score leagues apart, while a distance of four or five leagues is comparatively close. the soldiers of wu[ ] are less than the soldiers of yueh; but as superiority in numbers does not of necessity bring victory, i say, then, that we may obtain the victory. if the enemy be many in number, prevent him from taking advantage of his superiority, and ascertain his plan of operations. provoke the enemy and discover the state of his troops; feint and discover the strength of his position. flap the wings, and unmask his sufficiency or insufficiency. by constant feints and excursions, we may produce on the enemy an impression of intangibility, which neither spies nor art can dispel. the general makes his plans in accordance with the dispositions of the enemy, and puts his hosts in motion; but the multitude cannot appreciate the general's intention; they see the signs of victory, but they cannot discover the means. if a victory be gained by a certain stratagem, do not repeat it. vary the stratagem according to circumstances. an army may be likened to water. water leaves dry the high places, and seeks the hollows. an army turns from strength and attacks emptiness. the flow of water is regulated by the shape of the ground; victory is gained by acting in accordance with the state of the enemy. the shape of water is indeterminate; likewise the spirit of war is not fixed. the leader who changes his tactics in accordance with his adversary, and thereby controls the issue, may be called the god of war. among the five elements[ ] there is no settled precedence; the four seasons come and go; the days are long and short; and the moon waxes and wanes. _so in war there is no fixity._ vii battle tactics sun the master said:-- for the most part, military procedure is as follows:-- the general receives orders from his lord; assembles and settles harmony among the forces, and takes the field. there is nothing more difficult than battle tactics. their difficulty lies in the calculation of time and distance, and the reversal of misfortune. to make the enemy take a circuitous route by a show of gain, and then, whilst starting after him, to arrive before him, is to be a master of the art of manoeuvre. the operations of an army may reap advantage; the wrangles of a multitude are fraught with peril. employing our whole force at one time in order to gain advantage over the enemy, we may not have time enough to gain our object. if we push on with a portion of the force only, the transport is lost. discarding helmet and armour; stopping neither day nor night; marching double distance; doing double work; and finally contending with the enemy at a distance of a hundred leagues: results in the loss of the general. since the strong men arrive first, and the tired drop in rear, only one-tenth of the forces is available. a forced march of fifty leagues to secure an advantage may result in failure to the leader of the vanguard, for only half his men will arrive. after a forced march of thirty leagues to secure an advantage, only two-thirds of the army will be available. further, a lack of ammunition, of supplies, or of stores, may lead to disaster. the ruler who is ignorant of the designs of neighbouring princes, cannot treat with them. he who is ignorant of mountain and forest, defile and marsh, cannot lead an army. he who does not employ a guide, cannot gain advantage from the ground. disguise your movements; await a favourable opportunity; divide or unite according to circumstance. let your attack be swift as the wind; your march calm like the forest;[ ] your occupation devastating as fire. in defence, as a mountain rest firm; like darkness impenetrable to the enemy. let your movements be swift as the lightning. let as many as possible take part in the plunder: distribute the profit from the captured territory. so he who understands the crooked and the straight way conquers. these are the methods of battle tactics. according to the ancient books on war, the drum and bell are used, because the voice does not carry; the flag is used to assist the sight. the use of bell, drum, banner and flag is to attract the united attention of eye and ear. when all are united, the strong are not left to go forward alone, the cowardly are not free to retreat unrestricted. in this way can a multitude be used. therefore in night fighting, beacons and drums are largely used; in day fighting, a great number of banners and flags and the enemy's eyes and ears are confounded. we thus awe his army, and defeat his general's ambition. in the morning the spirits are keen; at midday there is a laziness; in the evening a desire to return. wherefore, he who uses his soldiers well, avoids the time when the spirits are keen; but attacks the enemy when he is languid or seeking his camp. thus should the nature of energy be turned to account. to oppose confusion with order, clamour with quiet, is to have the heart under control. to await an enemy from a distance, to oppose hunger with satiety, rest with fatigue, is the way to husband strength. do not attack where lines of banners wave, nor the serried ranks of battle spread, but patiently await your time. do not attack an enemy on high ground, nor one who has high ground at his back. do not pursue an enemy who is imitating flight; do not attack a spirited enemy. if the enemy offer an allurement, do not take it. do not interfere with an enemy who has struck camp, and is about to retire. when surrounding an enemy, allow him an outlet. do not press a desperate enemy. these are the methods of employing troops. viii the nine changes sun the master said:-- in general, the procedure of war is:--the leader, having received orders from his lord, assembles the armies. do not camp on marshy or low-lying ground; enter into friendly relations with neighbouring states; do not linger in a far country; use stratagem in mountainous and wooded country; on death ground, fight. there are always roads that must be avoided; forces that must not be attacked; castles that must not be besieged; ground that must not be chosen for encounter; orders from the lord that must not be obeyed. the general who knows the nine changes understands the use of troops; on the contrary, he who does not understand them, can make no use of his topographical knowledge. in the management of armies, if the art of the nine changes be understood, a knowledge of the five advantages is of no avail. the wise man considers well both advantage and disadvantage. he sees a way out of adversity, and on the day of victory to danger is not blind. in reducing an enemy to submission, inflict all possible damage upon him; make him undertake useless adventures; also make neighbouring rulers move as you would desire them by tempting them with gain. wherefore in the conduct of war do not depend on the enemy's not coming, but rely on your own preparations; do not count on the enemy not attacking your fortress, but leave nothing undefended. generals must be on their guard against these five dangerous faults:-- blind impetuosity, which leads to death. over-cautiousness, which leads to capture. quick temper, which brings insult. a too rigid propriety, which invites disgrace. over-regard for the troops, which causes inconvenience. these five faults in the leader are disastrous in war. the overthrow of the army and the slaughter of the general arise from them. therefore they must be carefully considered. ix movement of troops sun the master said:-- touching the disposal of troops and observation of the enemy in relation to mountain warfare:-- cross mountains and camp in valleys, selecting positions of safety. place the army on high ground, and avoid an enemy in high places. in relation to water:-- after crossing waters, pass on immediately to a distance. when the enemy is crossing a stream, do not meet and engage him in the waters, but strike when half his force has passed over. do not advance on an enemy near water, but place the army on high ground, and in safety. do not fight when the enemy is between the army and the source of the river. with regard to marshes:-- cross salty marshes quickly; do not linger near them. if by chance compelled to fight in the neighbourhood of a marsh, seek a place where there is water and grass, and trees in plenty in the rear. in open country place the army in a convenient place with rising ground in the right rear; so that while in front lies death, behind there is safety. such is war in flat country. huangti, by observing these things, gained the victory over four princes. as a rule, the soldiers prefer high ground to low. they prefer sunny places to those the sun does not reach. if the health of the troops be considered, and they are encamped on high and sunny ground, diseases will be avoided, and victory made certain. if there be rising ground, encamp on its sunny side and in front of it; for thereby the soldiers are benefited, and the ground used to our advantage. if, owing to rains in the upper reaches, the river become turbulent, do not cross until the waters have quieted. steep and impassable valleys; well-like places; confined places; tangled impenetrable ground; swamps and bogs; narrow passages with pitfalls:--quickly pass from these, and approach them not. cause the enemy to approach near to them, but keep yourself from these places; face them, so that the enemy has them in his rear. if there be near to the army, precipices, ponds, meres, reeds and rushes, or thick forests and trees, search them thoroughly. these are places where the enemy is likely to be in ambush. when the enemy is close, but quiet, he is strong in reliance on natural defences. if the enemy challenge to fight from afar, he wishes you to advance. if the enemy be encamped in open country, it is with some special object in view. movement among the trees shows that the enemy is advancing. broken branches and trodden grass, as of the passing of a large host, must be regarded with suspicion. the rising of birds shows an ambush. startled beasts show that the enemy is stealthily approaching from several sides. high, straight spurts of dust betoken that chariots are coming. long, low masses of dust show the coming of infantry. here and there, thin and high columns of dust are signs that firewood and fodder are being collected. small clouds of dust moving to and fro are signs that the enemy is preparing to encamp for a short time. busy preparations and smooth words show that the enemy is about to advance to attack. big words, and the spurring forward of horsemen, are signs that the enemy is about to retire. an advance of the light chariots to the flanks of the camp is a sign that the enemy is coming forth to fight. without consultation, suddenly to desire an armistice, is a mark of ulterior design. the passing to and fro of messengers, and the forming up of troops, show that the enemy has some movement on foot. an advance, followed by sudden retirement, is a lure to attack. when the enemy use their weapons to rest upon, they are hungry. if the drawers of water drink at the river, the enemy is suffering from thirst. disregard of booty that lies ready at hand is a sign of exhaustion. the clustering of birds round a position shows that it is unoccupied. voices calling in the night betoken alarm. disorder in the army is a sign that the general is disregarded. a changing about of flags and banners is a sign that the army is unsettled. if the officers be angry, it is because the soldiers are tired, _and slow to obey_. the killing of horses for food shows that the enemy is short of provisions. when the cooking-pots are hung up on the wall and the soldiers turn not in again, the enemy is at an end of his resources. exceeding graciousness and familiarity on the part of the general show that he has lost the confidence of the soldiers. frequent rewards show that discipline is at an end. frequent punishments are a sign that the general is in difficulties. the general who first blusters, and then is obsequious, is without perception. he who offers apologies and hostages is anxious for a truce. when both sides, eager for a fight, face each other for a considerable time, neither advancing nor retiring, the occasion requires the utmost vigilance and circumspection. numbers are no certain mark of strength. even if incapable of a headlong assault, if the forces be united, and the enemy's condition ascertained, victory is possible. he who without taking thought makes light of the enemy is certain to be captured. if a general who is strange to the troops punish them, they cease to obey him. if they are not obedient, they cannot be usefully employed. if the troops know the general, but are not affected by his punishments, they are useless. by humane treatment we obtain obedience; authority brings uniformity. thus we obtain victory. if the people have been trained in obedience from the beginning, they respect their leader's commands. if the people be not early trained to obedience, they do not respect their leader's commands. orders are always obeyed, if general and soldiers are in sympathy. x ground sun the master said:-- with regard to the different natures of ground there are:-- open ground; broken ground; suspended ground; defiles; precipices; far countries. open ground is that where either side has liberty of movement: be quick to occupy any high ground in the neighbourhood and consider well the line of supplies. broken ground. advance is easy, but retreat from it is difficult. here, if the enemy be not prepared, we may win: but should he be prepared, and defeat us, and retreat be impossible, then there is disaster. suspended ground. the side that takes the initiative is under a disadvantage. here, if the enemy offer some allurement, we should not advance: but rather, by feigning retreat, wait until he has put forth half his force. then we may attack him with advantage. defiles, make haste to occupy; garrison strongly and await the enemy. should the enemy be before you, and in strength, do not engage him; but if there be unoccupied points, attack him. in precipitous ground quickly occupy a position on a sunny height, and await the enemy. if the enemy be before you, withdraw and do not attack him. if distant from the enemy, and the forces be equal, to take the initiative is disadvantageous. now, these are the six kinds of ground. it is the duty of generals to study them. again, there are six calamities among the troops, arising, not from defect of ground, or lack of opportunity, but from the general's incapacity. these are: repulse, relaxation, distress, disorganisation, confusion and rout. if troops be sent to attack an enemy of equal quality, but ten times their number, they retire discomfited. strong soldiers with weak officers cause relaxation. able officers with feeble soldiers cause distress. enraged senior officers, who fall upon the enemy without orders, and obey not the general because he does not recognise their abilities, produce disorganisation. weak and amiable generals, whose directions and leadership are vague, whose officers' and men's duties are not fixed, and whose dispositions are contradictory, produce confusion. generals, who are unable to estimate the enemy, who oppose small numbers to large, weakness to strength, and who do not put picked men in the van of the army, cause it to be routed. these six things lead to defeat. it is the duty of the general to study them carefully. ground is the handmaid of victory. ability to estimate the enemy, and plan the victory; an eye for steepness, command and distances: these are the qualities of the good general. whosoever knows these things, conquers; he who understands them not, is defeated. if victory be certain from the military standpoint, fight, even if the lord forbid. if defeat be certain from the military standpoint, do not fight, even though the lord commands it. the general who advances, from no thought of his own glory, or retires, regardless of punishment; but only strives for the people's welfare, and his lord's advantage, is a treasure to the state. the good general cares for his soldiers, and lovingly treats them as his children; as a consequence they follow him through deep valleys, and are beside him in death. nevertheless, over-care for the soldiers may cause disobedience; over-attention may make them unserviceable; over-indulgence may produce disorder: they become like spoilt children, and cannot be used. he who is confident of his own men, but is ignorant that the enemy should not be attacked, has no certainty of victory. he who knows that the enemy may be attacked with advantage, but knows not his own men, has no certainty of victory. confidence in the troops, right judgment when to attack the enemy, but ignorance of the ground, bring uncertain victory. the wise soldier, once in motion, does not waver, and is never at a loss. as has been said: "know thyself; know the enemy; fear not for victory." also, if the season and the opportunity be realised, and the ground known, complete victory is certain. xi the nine grounds sun the master said:-- in respect to the conduct of war there are:-- distracting ground; disturbing ground; ground of contention; intersecting ground; path-ridden ground; deeply-involved ground; difficult ground; enclosed ground; death ground. at all times, when the prince fights in his own territory, it is called distracting[ ] ground. that ground a short way inside the enemy's border is called disturbing ground. ground giving advantage to whichever side is in possession, is called ground of contention. ground to which either side has access, is called intersecting ground. ground between three provinces first possession of which enables the peoples of the earth to be controlled, is called path-ridden ground. the interior of the enemy's country with many of his fortified towns in rear, is called deeply-involved ground. mountain and forest, precipices, ravines, marsh and swamp, all places where passage is hard, are called difficult ground. a narrow entrance and winding outlet, where a small number can oppose a large force, is called enclosed ground. that ground where delay means disaster, is called death ground. wherefore, do not fight on distracting ground; do not linger on disturbing ground. if the enemy be in possession of disputed ground, do not attack. in intersecting ground, do not interrupt the highways. at the crossing of highways, cultivate intercourse. when deeply involved, levy and store up the enemy's property. quickly depart from difficult ground. on enclosed ground, use stratagem. on death ground, fight. the skilful fighters of old were at pains to disconnect the enemy's front and rear; they cut asunder small and large forces of the enemy; prevented mutual help between his officers and men; spread mistrust between high and low. they scattered the enemy, and prevented him from concentrating; if his soldiers were assembled, they were without unity. if there be a chance of victory, move; if there be no chance of success, stand fast. if i were asked how a powerful and united force of the enemy should be met, i would say: lay hands on what the enemy cherishes and he will conform to our desires. in war, above all, speed sustains the spirit of the troops. strike before the enemy is ready; and attack his unpreparedness from an unexpected quarter. with regard to war in foreign lands. when strangers in a far country the soldiers are united and are proof against defeat. plunder fertile plains so that the army is fed; be careful of the health of the soldiers; do not tire them uselessly; unite their minds; store up strength; plan well and secretly. if there be no refuge the soldiers will not fly from death. if there be no alternative but death, the soldiers exert themselves to the utmost. in desperate places, soldiers lose the sense of fear. if there be no place of refuge, there will be no wavering. if deeply involved in the enemy's country, there is unity. if it be unavoidable, the soldiers will fight their hardest. even without warnings they are vigilant; they comply without insistence; without stipulations they are tractable; without explicit instructions they will trust the general and obey him. prohibit the discussion of signs and omens, and remove the soldiers' doubts; then to the moment of death they will be undistracted. riches are denied the soldiers, not because money is a bad thing; old age is forbidden them, but not because long life is evil. hardships and danger are the proper lot of the soldier. when the order for attack is given, the collars of those who are sitting may be wet with tears; tears may roll down the cheeks of those reclining; yet these men, in a desperate place, will fight with the courage of chu and kuei. soldiers should be used like the snakes on mt. chang; which, if you hit on the head, the tail will strike you; if you hit the tail, the head will strike you; if you strike its middle, head and tail will strike you together. should any one ask me whether men can be made to move like these snakes, i say, yes. the men of wu and yueh hate each other; yet, if they cross a river in the same boat and a storm overtake them, they help each other like the two hands. the horses may be tied, and the chariot wheels sunk in the mud; but that does not prevent flight. universal courage and unity depend on good management. the best results from both the weak and strong are obtained by a proper use of the ground. the skilful warrior can lead his army, as a man leads another by the hand, because he places it in a desperate position. the general should be calm, inscrutable, just and prudent. he should keep his officers and men in ignorance of his plans, and inform no one of any changes or fresh departures. by changing his camps, and taking devious and unexpected routes, his plans cannot be guessed. as one taking away the ladder from under those mounted upon the roof, so acts the general when his men are assembled to fight. he penetrates into the heart of the enemy's country and then divulges his plans. he drives the army hither and thither like a flock of sheep, knowing not whither they go. therefore the general should assemble the armies, and place them in a desperate position. the different natures of the nine grounds; the suiting of the means to the occasion; the hearts of men: these are things that must be studied. when deep in the interior of a hostile country, there is cohesion; if only on the borders, there is distraction. to leave home and cross the borders is to be free from interference. on distracting ground, unite the soldiers' minds. on disturbing ground, keep together. on disputed ground, try to take the enemy in rear. on intersecting ground, look well to the defences. on path-ridden ground, cultivate intercourse. on deeply-involved ground be careful of supplies. on difficult ground, do not linger. on enclosed ground, close the path of escape. on death ground, show the soldiers that there is no chance of survival. it is the nature of soldiers to defend when surrounded, to fight with energy when compelled thereto, to pursue the enemy if he retreat. he cannot treat with other rulers who knows not their ambitions. he who knows not mountain and forest; cliffs; ravines; lakes and marshes; cannot conduct an army. he who does not use guides, cannot take advantage of the ground. he who has not a complete knowledge of the nine grounds, cannot gain military dominion. the great general, when attacking a powerful nation, prevents the enemy from concentrating his hosts. he overawes the enemy so that other states cannot join against him. he does not struggle for the favour of other states; nor is he careful of their rights. he has confidence in himself, and awes the enemy. therefore he easily takes the fortress, or reduces the country to subjection. in the bestowal of rewards, or in his orders, he is not bound by ancient rule. he manages his forces as though they were one man. orders should direct the soldiers; but while what is advantageous should be made known, what is disadvantageous should be concealed. if the forces be plunged into danger, there is survival; from death ground there is retrieval; for the force in danger gains the victory. discover the enemy's intentions by conforming to his movements. when these are discovered, then, with one stroke, the general may be killed, even though he be one hundred leagues distant. when war is declared, close the barriers; destroy passports; prevent the passage of the enemy's spies; conduct the business of the government with vigilance. take immediate advantage of the enemy's weakness; discover what he most values, and plan to seize it. shape your plans according to rule, and the circumstances of the enemy. at first behave with the discretion of a maiden; then, when the enemy gives an opening, dart in like a rabbit. the enemy cannot defend himself. xii assault by fire sun the master said:-- there are five ways of attack by fire: the first is called barrack burning; the second, commissariat burning; the third, equipment burning; the fourth, store burning; the fifth, the company burning. the moment for the fire assault must be suitable. further, appliances must always be kept at hand. there is a time and day proper for the setting and carrying out of the fire assault; namely: such time as the weather is dry; and a day when the moon is in the quarters of the stars chi, pi, i, chen: for these are days of wind. regard well the developments that will certainly arise from the fire, and act upon them. when fire breaks out inside the enemy's camp, thrust upon him with all speed from without; but if his soldiers be quiet, wait, and do not attack. when the fire is at its height, attack or not, as opportunity may arise. if the opportunity be favourable, set fire to the enemy's camp, and do not wait for it to break out from within. when fire breaks out on the windward side, do not attack from the leeward. wind that rises in the day lasts long. wind that rises in the night time quickly passes away. the peculiarities of the five burnings must be known, and the calendar studied, and, if the attack is to be assisted, the fire must be unquenchable. if water is to assist the attack, the flood must be overwhelming. water may isolate or divide the enemy; fire may consume his camp; but unless victory or possession be obtained, the enemy quickly recovers, and misfortunes arise. the war drags on, and money is spent. let the enlightened lord consider well; and the good general keep the main object in view. if no advantage is to be gained thereby, do not move; without prospect of victory, do not use the soldiers; do not fight unless the state be in danger. war should not be undertaken because the lord is in a moment of passion. the general must not fight because there is anger in his heart. do not make war unless victory may be gained thereby; if there be prospect of victory, move; if there be no prospect, do not move. for passion may change to gladness, anger passes away; but a country, once overturned, cannot be restored; the dead cannot be brought to life. wherefore it is written, the enlightened lord is circumspect, and the good general takes heed; then is the state secure, and the army victorious in battle. xiii the employment of spies sun the master said:-- calling , men to arms, and transporting them a hundred leagues, is such an undertaking that in one day , taels of the citizens' and nobles' money are spent; commotions arise within and without the state; carriers fall down exhausted on the line of march of the army; and the occupations of , [ ] homes are upset. again, for years the armies may face each other; yet the issue may depend on a single day's victory. wherefore, by grudging slight expense in titles and salaries to spies, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's circumstances, is to be without humanity. such a person is no general; he is no assistance to his lord; he is no master of victory. the enlightened ruler and the wise general who act, win, and are distinguished beyond the common, are informed beforehand. this knowledge is not to be got by calling on gods and demons; nor does it come of past experience nor calculation. it is through men that knowledge of the enemy is gained. now the five kinds of spies are these: village spies, inner spies, converted spies, death spies, living spies. if these five means be employed simultaneously, none can discover their working. this is called the mysterious thread: it is the lord's treasure. village spies are such people of the country as give information. inner spies are those of the enemy's officials employed by us. converted spies are those of the enemy's spies in our pay. death[ ] spies are sent to misinform the enemy, and to spread false reports through our spies already in the enemy's lines. living spies[ ] return to report. in connection with the armies, spies should be treated with the greatest kindness; and in dealing out reward, they should receive the most generous treatment. all matters relating to spies are secret. without infinite capacity in the general, the employment of spies is impossible. their treatment requires benevolence and uprightness. except they be observed with the closest attention, the truth will not be obtained from them. wonderful indeed is the power of spies. there is no occasion when they cannot be used. if a secret matter be spoken of before the time is ripe, the spy who told the matter, and the man who repeated the same, should be put to death. if desirous of attacking an army; of besieging a fortress; or of killing a certain person; first of all, learn the names of the general in charge; of his right-hand[ ] men; of those who introduce visitors to the presence; of the gate keeper and the sentries. then set the spies to watch them. seek out the enemy's spies who come to spy on us; give them money; cause them to be lodged and cared for; and convert them to the service. through them we are enabled to obtain spies among the enemy's villagers and officials. by means of the converted spy, we can construct a false story for the death spy to carry to the enemy. it is through the converted spy that we are able to use the five varieties, to their utmost advantage; therefore he must be liberally treated. in ancient times the rise to power of the province of yin was due to ichih, who was sent to the country of hsia. likewise during the foundation of the state of chu, luya lived among the people of shang. wherefore, intelligent rulers and wise generals use the cleverest men as spies, and invariably acquire great merit. the spy is a necessity to the army. upon him the movement of the army depends. the sayings of wutzu introduction now wu, albeit clothed in the raiment of a scholar, was a man skilled in the art of war. and wen, lord of wei, came unto him and said:-- "i am a man of peace, caring not for military affairs." and wu said:-- "your actions are witnesses of your mind; why do your words say not what is in your heart? "you do prepare and dress hides and leather through the four seasons, ornamenting them with red lacquer and the figures of panthers and elephants; which give not warmth in winter, neither in summer, coolness. moreover, you make halberds, [ ] feet long, and pikes feet long, and leather (covered) chariots so large as to fill up the gateways, wheels with ornament, and naves capped with leather. now, these are neither beautiful to the eye nor light in the chase; i know not for what use my lord makes these things. "but, although provided with these instruments of war, if the leader be not competent, a brooding hen might as well strike a badger, or a dog with young challenge the tiger: the spirit of encounter may be present, but there is no end but death. "in ancient times, the prince chengsang cultivated virtue, and put away military things, and his kingdom fell. "the prince yuhu put his trust in numbers, and delighted in war and was driven from the throne. "therefore the enlightened ruler should ponder over these things; encourage learning and virtue in the kingdom, and be prepared against war from without. "to hesitate before the enemy is not a cause for righteousness; remorse for the fallen is not true humanity." and when lord wen heard these words, he himself spread a seat, and his wife offered up a cup, and wu was appointed general before the altar. now, in the defence of hsihe against different states there were fought seventy-six great fights, of which sixty-four were complete victories, and the remainder undecided. and the kingdom grew and stretched , leagues on every side, which was all due to the virtue of wu. i the government of a country and wu the master said:-- the mighty rulers of old first trained their retainers, and then extended their regard to their outlying feudatories. there are four discords:-- discord in the state: then never make war. discord in the army: then do not strike camp. discord in the camp: then do not advance to attack. discord in the battle array: then seek not to decide the issue. therefore, wise rulers who would employ their subjects in great endeavours, should first establish harmony among them. lend not a ready ear to human counsellors, but lay the matter before the altar; seek inside the turtle,[ ] and consider well the time and season. then, if all be well, commit ourselves to the undertaking. if the people know that their lord is careful of their lives, and laments their death beyond all else; then, in the time of danger, the soldiers advance, and, advancing, find glory in death; and in survival after retreat, dishonour. the master said:-- the way must follow the only true path: righteousness lies at the root of achievement and merit. the object of stratagem is to avoid loss and gain advantage. the object of government is to guard enterprise and to preserve the state. if conduct depart from the way, and the undertaking accord not with righteousness, then disaster befalls the mighty. therefore, wise men maintain order by keeping in the way, and governing with righteousness; they move with discretion, and with benevolence they make the people amenable. if these four virtues be practised, there is prosperity; if they be neglected, there is decay. for, when lord tang of cheng defeated lord chieh, the people of hsia rejoiced, and when wu of chou defeated lord chou, the people of yin were not discomfited. and this was because it was ordained by providence and human desire. the master said:-- in the government of a country and command of an army, the inculcation of propriety, stimulation of righteousness, and the promotion of a sense of shame are required. when men possess a sense of shame, they will attack with resolution when in strength, and when few in number defend to the last. but while victory is easy in attack, it is difficult in defence. now, of the fighting races below heaven; those who gained five victories have been worn out; those who have won four victories have been impoverished; three victories have given dominion; two victories have founded a kingdom; and upon one victory an empire has been established. for those who have gained power on earth by many victories are few; and those who have lost it, many. the master said:-- the causes of war are five:-- first, ambition; second, profit; third, overburdened hate; fourth, internal disorder; fifth, famine. again, the natures of war are five:-- first, a righteous war; second, a war of might; third, a war of revenge; fourth, a war of tyranny; fifth, an unrighteous war. the prevention of tyranny and the restoration of order is just; to strike in reliance on numbers is oppression; to raise the standard for reasons of anger is a war of revenge; to quit propriety, and seize advantage is tyranny; when the state is disordered and the people worn out, to harbour designs, and set a multitude in motion, is a war of unrighteousness. there is a way of overcoming each of these five. righteousness is overcome by propriety; might by humanity; revenge by words; tyranny by deception; unrighteousness by strategy. lord wen asked and said:-- "i would know the way to control an army, to measure men, and make the country strong." wu answered and said:-- "the enlightened rulers of antiquity respected propriety between sovereign and people; established etiquette between high and low; settled officials and citizens in close accord; gave instruction in accordance with custom; selected men of ability, and thereby provided against what should come to pass. "in ancient times, prince huan of chi assembled , men at arms, and became chief among the princes; prince wen of chin put , mighty men in the van, and gained his ambition; prince mu of chin gathered together , invincibles, and subdued his neighbouring foes. wherefore, the princes of powerful states must consider their people, and assemble the valiant and spirited men by companies. "those who delight to attack, and to display their valour and fealty should be formed in companies. "those skilful in scaling heights, or covering long distances, and who are quick and light of foot must be collected in companies. "retainers who have lost their rank, and who are desirous of displaying their prowess before their superiors should be gathered into companies. "those who have abandoned a castle, or deserted their trust, and are desirous of atoning for their misconduct, should be collected and formed into companies. "these five bodies form the flower of the army. with , of such troops, if they issue from within, an encompassing enemy can be burst asunder; if they enter from without, a castle can be overthrown." lord wen asked and said:-- "i desire to know how to fix the battle array, render defence secure, and attack with certainty of victory." wu answered and said:-- "to see with the eye is better than ready words. yet, i say, if the wise men be put in authority and the ignorant in low places, then the army is already arranged. "if the people be free from anxiety about their estates, and love their officials, then defence is already secure. "if all the lieges be proud of their lord, and think ill of neighbouring states, then is the battle already won." the lord wen once assembled a number of his subjects to discuss affairs of state: and none could equal him in wisdom, and when he left the council chamber his face was pleased. then wu advanced and said:-- in ancient times, lord chuang of chu once consulted with his lieges, and none were like unto him in wisdom; and when the lord left the council chamber his countenance was troubled. then the duke shen asked and said: "why is my lord troubled?" and he answered: "i have heard that the world is never without sages, and that in every country there are wise men; that good advisers are the foundation of an empire; and friends of dominion. now, if i, lacking wisdom, have no equal among the multitude of my officers, dangerous indeed is the state of chu. it grieves me that whereas prince chuang of chu was troubled in a like case my lord should be pleased." and hearing this lord wen was inwardly troubled. ii estimation of the enemy and lord wen said to wu:-- "chin threatens us on the west; chu surrounds us on the south; chao presses us in the north; chi watches us in the east; yen stops our rear, and han is posted in our front. thus, the armies of six nations encompass us on every side, and our condition is very unpropitious. canst thou relieve my anxiety?" wu answered and said:-- "the path of safety of a state lies first of all in vigilance. now my lord has already taken warning, wherefore misfortunes are yet distant. "let me state the habits of these six countries. the forces of chi are weighty but without solidity; the soldiers of chin are scattered, and fight each of his own accord: the army of chu is well ordered, but cannot endure: the soldiers of yen defend well, but are without dash: the armies of the three chins are well governed, but cannot be used. "the nature of chi is stubborn and the country rich, but prince and officials are proud and luxurious, and neglectful of the common people; government is loose and rewards not impartial; in one camp there are two minds; the front is heavy, but the rear is light. therefore it is ponderous without stability. to attack it, the force must be divided into three parts, and, by threatening it on three sides, its front can be broken. "the nature of chin is strong, the country rugged, and the government firm; rewards and punishments just, the people indomitable, and all have the fighting spirit; wherefore, when separated, each fights of his own accord. "to defeat this people, they must first be tempted by gain to leave their cause, so that the soldiers, greedy of profit, desert their general: then, taking advantage of their disobedience, their scattered forces can be chased, ambushes laid, favourable opportunities taken, and their general captured. "the nature of chu is weak, its territory wide, the government weak, and the people exhausted; the troops are well ordered but of short endurance. "the way to defeat them is to assault their camp, throw it into confusion and crush their spirit, advance softly, and retire quickly; tire them out, avoid a serious encounter, and they may be defeated. "the nature of yen is straightforward; its people are cautious, loving courage and righteousness, and without guile; wherefore they defend but are not daring. "the way to defeat them is to draw close and press them; tease them and pass to a distance; move quickly, and appear in the rear, thus causing bewilderment to their officers and fear in their ranks. our chariots and horsemen will act with circumspection and avoid encounter. thus their general can be captured. "the three chins are the middle kingdom: their nature is peaceful and their rule just. their people are tired of war; their troops are trained, but their leaders are despised; pay is small, and the soldiers lack the spirit of sacrifice, thus they are well governed but cannot be used. "the way to defeat them is to threaten them from afar. if a multitude attack--defend; if they retreat--pursue, and tire them out. "in every army there are mighty warriors with strength to lift the censer, swifter of foot than the war horse; who can take the enemy's standard, or slay his general. if such men be selected, and set apart, cared for and honoured, they are the life of the army. "those who use the five arms[ ] with skill, who are clever, strong and quick, and careless of the enemy, should be given rank and decoration, and used to decide the victory. their parents and families should be cared for, encouraged by rewards, and kept in fear of punishment. these men consolidate the battle array; their presence causes endurance. "if these men be well selected, double their number can be defeated." and lord wen said:-- "it is good!" wu the master said:-- "in the estimation of the enemy there are eight cases when, without consulting the oracles, he may be attacked. "first, an enemy who, in great wind and cold, has risen early, started forth across ice and rivers, and braved stress and hardships. "second, an enemy who, in the height of summer, and in great heat, has risen early, has travelled incessantly, is hungry and without water, and is striving to reach a distance. "third, an enemy who has been encamped long in one place, who is without provisions, when the farmers are vexed and indignant, who has suffered frequent calamities, and whose officers are unable to establish confidence. "fourth, when the enemy's funds are exhausted, fuel and fodder scarce; when the heavens have been overcast by long continued rain; when there is the desire to loot, but no place to loot withal. "fifth, when their numbers are few; when water is scarce; when men and horses are scourged by pestilence, and from no quarter is succour at hand. "sixth, when night falls, and the way is yet far; when officers and men are worn out and fearful, weary and without food, and have laid aside their armour and are resting. "seventh, when the general's authority is weak, the officials false, and the soldiers unsettled; when their army has been alarmed, and no help is forthcoming. "eighth, when the battle formation is not yet fixed, or camp pitched; when climbing a hill, or passing through a difficult place; when half is hidden and half exposed. "an enemy in these situations may be smitten without hesitation. "there are six enemies, that, without consulting oracles, should be avoided. "first, wide and vast territories, and a large and rich population. "second, where the officials care for the people, and bestow bountiful favours and rewards. "third, where rewards are well deserved, punishment accurately apportioned, and operations undertaken only when the time is fitting. "fourth, where merit is recognised and given rank, wise men appointed, and ability employed. "fifth, where the troops are many and their weapons excellent. "sixth, when help is at hand on every side, or from a powerful ally. "for, if the enemy excel in the foregoing, he must be avoided without hesitation. as it is written, if it be judged good, advance; if it be known to be difficult, retreat." and lord wen asked and said:-- "i desire to know how the interior of the enemy can be known from his outer appearance; the form of his camp by observing his advance, and how victory may be determined?" and wu answered and said:-- "if the coming of the enemy be reckless like roaring waters, his banners and pennons disordered, and horses and men frequently looking behind, then ten can be struck with one. panic will certainly seize them. "before the various princes have assembled, before harmony has been established between lord and lieges, before ditches have been dug, or regulations established, and the army is alarmed; wishing to advance, but unable; wishing to retreat, but unable: then the force can strike twice their numbers, and in a hundred fights there is no fear of retreat." lord wen asked:-- "how can the enemy be certainly defeated?" wu answered and said:-- "make certain of the enemy's real condition and quickly strike his weak point; strike an enemy who has just arrived from afar, before his ranks are arranged; or one who has eaten and has not completed his dispositions; or an enemy who is hurrying about, or is busily occupied; or has not made favourable use of the ground, or has let pass the opportunity; or one who has come a long distance, and those in rear are late and have not rested. "strike an enemy who is half across waters; or who is on a difficult or narrow road; or whose flags and banners are in confusion; or who is frequently changing position; or whose general is not in accord with the soldiers; or who is fearful. "all such should be assaulted by the picked men; and the remainder of the army should be divided, and follow after them. they may be attacked at once without hesitation." iii control of the army lord wen said:-- "what is of first importance in operations of war?" wu answered and said:-- "lightness, of which there are four natures, weight, of which there are two natures, and confidence must be clearly comprehended." and wen said:-- "what are these?" and wu answered:-- "if the way be easy, the horses are light of foot; if the horses be light of foot, the chariots travel freely; if the chariots travel easily, men can ride in them without difficulty; if the men be free to move, the fight prospers. if the difficult and easy ways be known, the horses are lightened; if the horses be fed at proper intervals, the chariots are swift; if there be plenty of oil on the axles of the chariots, the riders are quickly conveyed; if the spears be sharp and the armour strong, the men make the fight easy. "large rewards in advance, heavy punishment in retreat, and impartiality in their bestowal are required. "he who well understands these things is the master of victory." and lord wen asked and said:-- "by what means can the army gain the victory?" and wu answered:-- "the foundation of victory is good government." again, wen asked and said:-- "is it not determined by numbers?" and wu replied:-- "if laws and orders be not clear; if rewards and punishments be not just; if the bell be sounded and they halt not, or drum be beaten and men do not advance; even if there be a hundred thousand men at arms, they are of no avail. "where there is order, then there is propriety at rest, and dignity in motion; none can withstand the attack, and retreat forbids pursuit; motion is regulated, and movements to right and left are made in answer to the signal; if the ranks be cut asunder, formation is preserved; if scattered, they are maintained; in fortune or in danger, there is unity; if a number be collected, they cannot be separated; they may be used but not wearied; in whatever situation they are placed, nothing under heaven can withstand them. the army may be called a father and his children." and wu said:-- "in marching, movements and halts must be properly adjusted, suitable occasions for rationing not missed; the strength of men and horses not exhausted. if these three things be observed, the commands of the superior can be carried out; if the commands of the superior be carried out, order is maintained. if advances and halts be without method, victualling unsuitable, horses and men tired and weary--neither unsaddled or housed--it is because the orders cannot be obeyed; if the orders be set aside, there is disorder in the camp, and in battle--defeat." wu the master said:-- "on that depository of corpses, the battlefield, if there be certain expectation of death, there is life; if there be happy expectation of life, there is death. the good general is like unto one sitting in a leaking ship, or lying under a burning roof; the wisest man cannot contrive against him; the strongest man cannot destroy his composure; and the enemy's onslaught can be withstood. for procrastination is the greatest enemy of the general; disasters to the army are born of indecision." wu the master said:-- "men meet their death from lack of ability or unskilfulness. wherefore training is the first requirement of war. one man with a knowledge of war can teach ten; ten men skilled in war can teach one hundred; one hundred can teach one thousand; one thousand can teach ten thousand; and ten thousand men can train an army. "an enemy from a distance should be awaited, and struck at short range; an enemy that is tired should be met in good order; hunger should be opposed by full bellies; the battle formation should be round or square, the men should kneel or stand; go or remain; move to the right or left; advance or retire; concentrate or disperse; close or extend when the signal is given. "all these changes must be learnt, and the weapons distributed. this is the business of the general." wu the master said:-- "in the teaching of war, spears are given to the short; bows and catapults to the tall; banners and standards to the strong; the bell and drum to the bold; fodder and provisions to the feeble; the arrangement of the plan to the wise. men of the same district should be united; and groups and squads should help each other. at one beat of the drum the ranks are put in order; at two beats of the drum, formation will be made; at three beats of the drum, food will be issued; at four beats of the drum, the men will prepare to march; at five beats of the drum, ranks will be formed; when the drums beat together, then the standards will be raised." and lord wen asked and said:-- "what is the way of marching and halting an army?" and wu answered:-- "natural ovens and dragons' heads should be avoided. natural ovens are the mouths of large valleys. dragons' heads are the extremities of large mountains. the green dragons (banners) should be placed on the left, and the white tigers on the right; the red sparrows in front; the snakes and tortoises behind; the pole star (standard) above; and the soldiers will look to the standard. "when going forth to battle, the direction of the wind must be studied; if blowing in the direction of the enemy, the soldiers will be assembled and follow the wind; if a head wind, the position will be strengthened, and a wait made for the wind to change." and lord wen asked and said:-- "in what way should horses be treated?" and wu answered and said:-- "the places where they are kept should be made comfortable; fodder should be suitable and timely. in winter their stables should be warmed, and in summer sheltered from the heat; their coats clipped, their feet carefully pared, their attention directed so that they be not alarmed, their paces regulated, and their going and halting trained; horses and men should be in accord, and then the horses can be used. the harness, the saddle, bit, bridle, and reins must be strong; if the horse be without vice at the beginning, he can be used to the end; if the horse be hungry it is good; if his belly be full, his value decreases; if the sun be falling and the way still long, dismount frequently. for it is proper that the men be worked, but the horses must be used with discretion, so that they may be prepared should the enemy suddenly attack us. "if these things be well known, then there is free passage under heaven." iv qualities of the general wu the master said:-- "the leader of the army is one who is master of both arms and letters. he who is both brave and tender can be entrusted with troops. "in the popular estimation of generals, courage alone is regarded; nevertheless, courage is but one of the qualifications of the leader. courage is heedless in encounter; and rash encounter, which is ignorant of the consequences, cannot be called good. "there are five matters which leaders must carefully consider. "first, reason; second, preparation; third, determination; fourth, vigilance; fifth, simplicity. "with reason, a multitude can be controlled like a small number. "preparedness sees an enemy outside the gate. "determination before the enemy has no thought of life. "even after a victory, vigilance behaves as before the first encounter. "simplicity ensures few regulations, and preserves order. "when the leader receives his orders, he forthwith departs. not until the enemy has been vanquished does he speak of return. this is the duty of the general. "wherefore, from the day of departure of the army, the general seeks glory in death, and dreams not of return in dishonour." wu the master said:-- "in war there are four important influences. "first, spirit; second, ground; third, opportunity; fourth, force. "the military value of the nation's forces--of one hundred times ten thousand fighting men--depends upon the personality of one man alone; this is called the influence of spirit. "when the road is steep and narrow, when there are famous mountains and fastnesses where ten men can defend and one thousand cannot pass them by; such is the influence of ground. "when spies have been skilfully sown, and mounted men pass to and from the enemy's camp, so that his masses are divided, his sovereign and ministers vexed with each other, and superiors and inferiors mutually censorious; this is the moment of opportunity. "when the linch-pins are secure, the oars and sweeps ready for use in the boats, the armed men trained for war, and the horses exercised, we have what is called the influence of force. "he who understands these four matters has the qualifications of a general. furthermore, dignity, virtue, benevolence, courage, are needed to lead the troops, to calm the multitude, to put fear in the enemy, to remove doubts. when orders are issued, the subordinates do not defy them. wheresoever the army is, that place the enemy avoids. if these four virtues be present, the country is strong; if they be not present, the country is overthrown. "of such is the good general." wu the master said:-- "the use of drums and bells is to attract the ear; of flags, standards, and banners to strike the eye; of laws and penalties to put fear in the heart. "to attract the ear the sound must be clear; to strike the eye the colours must be bright. the heart is awed by punishment, therefore punishment must be strict. "if these three matters be not ordered, the state may, peradventure, be preserved, but defeat by the enemy is certain. therefore, as it has been said (if these three things be present), there is no departing from the commands of the general; when he orders, there is no going back from death." wu the master said:-- "the secret of war is, first, to know who is the enemy's general, and to judge his ability. if our plans depend on his dispositions, then success will be achieved without toil. "if their general be stupid, and heedlessly trustful, he may be enticed by fraud; if he be avaricious and careless of his fame, he may be bribed with gifts. if he make unconsidered movements without plan, he should be tired out and placed in difficulties. if the superiors be wealthy and proud, and the inferiors avaricious and resentful, they should be set against each other. an enemy that is undetermined, now advancing and then retreating, whose soldiers have nought wherein to put their trust, should be alarmed, and put to flight. "when an enemy thinks lightly of the general, and desires to return home, the easy roads should be blocked, and the difficult and narrow roads opened; await their coming and capture them. "if their advance be easy and retreat difficult, await their coming and then advance against them. "if their advance be difficult and retreat easy, then press and strike them. "an army that is camped in marshy ground, where there are no water-courses, and long and frequent rains, should be inundated. "an army that is camped in wild marshes, covered with dark and overhanging grass and brambles, and swept by frequent high winds, should be overthrown by fire. "an army that has halted long without moving; whose general and soldiers have grown careless, and neglect precautions, should be approached by stealth, and taken by surprise." lord wen asked, saying:-- "if the two armies be facing each other, and the name of the enemy's general unknown, in what manner can we discover it?" and wu answered and said:-- "a brave man of low degree, lightly but well equipped, should be employed. he should think only of flight and naught of advantage. then, if he observe the enemy's pursuit, if there be first a halt and then an advance, order is established. if we retreat and the enemy pursue, but pretend not to be able to overtake us, see an advantage but pretend not to be aware of it, then their general may be called a wise general, and conflict with him must be avoided. if their army be full of uproar; their banners and standards disordered, their soldiers going about or remaining of their own accord, some in line, others in column; if such an enemy be eager to pursue, and see an advantage which they are desperate to seize, then their general is a fool: even if there be a host, they may be taken." v suiting the occasion lord wen asked and said:-- "if strong chariots, good horses, strong and valiant soldiers suddenly meet the enemy, and are thrown into confusion, and ranks broken, what should be done?" and wu answered and said:-- "in general, the method of fighting is to effect order in daylight by means of flags and banners, pennons and batons; at night by gongs and drums, whistles and flutes. if a signal be made to the left, the troops move to the left; if to the right, they move to the right. advance is made at the sound of the drum; halt at the sound of the gong; one blast of the whistle is for advance, two for the rally. if those who disobey be cut down, the forces are subject to authority. if officers and soldiers carry out orders, a superior enemy cannot exist; no position is impregnable in the attack." lord wen asked and said:-- "what is to be done if the enemy be many and we be few?" and wu answered and said:-- "avoid such an enemy on open ground, and meet him in the narrow way; for, as it is written, if is to stand against , , there is naught better than a pass; if are to hold against , there is nothing better than a steep place; if , are to strike , , there is nothing better than a difficult place. if a small force, with beat of gong and drum, suddenly arise in a narrow way, even a host will be upset. wherefore it is written: 'he who has a multitude seeks the plain, and he who has few seeks the narrow way.'" and lord wen asked and said:-- "a mighty host, strong and courageous, which is on the defence with a mountain behind, a precipice between, high ground on the right, and a river on the left, with deep moats, and high walls, and which has artillery; whose retreat is like the removal of a mountain, advance like the hurricane, and whose supplies are in abundance, is an enemy against whom long defence is difficult. in effect, what should be done in such a case?" and wu answered and said:-- "this indeed is a great question, whose issue depends, not upon the might of chariot and horse, but upon the schemes of a wise man. "let , chariots and , horse, well equipped and with foot-men added to them, be divided into five armies, and a road allotted to each army. "then if there be five armies, and each army take a different road, the enemy will be puzzled, and know not in what quarter to be prepared. if the enemy's defence be strong and united, send envoys quickly to him to discover his intention. if he listen to our advices, he will strike camp and withdraw. but, if he listen not to our advice, but strikes down the messenger, and burns his papers, then divide and attack from five quarters. if victorious, do not pursue; if defeated, flee to a distance. if feigning retreat, proceed slowly, and, if the enemy approach, strike swiftly. "one army will hold the enemy in front, with another cut his rear, two more with gags in their mouths[ ] will attack his weak point, whether on the right or on the left. if five armies thus make alternate onslaughts, success is certain. "this is the way to strike strength." and lord wen asked and said:-- "if the enemy draw near and encompass us, and we would retreat, but there is no way, and in our multitude there is fear, what should be done?" and wu answered and said:-- "in such a case, if we be many and they be few, divide and fall upon them; if the enemy be many and we be few, use stratagem and act according to opportunity; and if opportunities be untiringly seized, even if the enemy be many, he will be reduced to subjection." lord wen asked and said:-- "if, in a narrow valley with steep places on either side, the enemy be met, and they are many and we are few, what should be done?" and wu answered and said:-- "if they be met among hills, woods, in deep mountains, or wide fens, advance quickly, retire swiftly, and hesitate not. if the enemy be suddenly met among high mountains or deep valleys, be the first to strike the drum and fall upon them. let bow and cross bow advance; shoot and capture; observe the state of their ranks; and, if there be confusion, do not hesitate to strike." lord wen asked and said:-- "if the enemy be suddenly met in a narrow place with high mountains on either side, and advance and retreat are alike impossible, what should be done in such a case?" and wu answered and said:-- "this is called war in valleys where numbers are of no avail. the ablest officers should be collected, and set against the enemy. men light of foot and well armed should be placed in front; the chariots divided; the horsemen drawn up, and placed in ambush on four sides, with many leagues between, and without showing their weapons. then, the enemy will certainly make his defence firm, and neither advance or retreat. whereupon, the standards will be raised, and the ranks of banners shown, the mountains left, and camp pitched in the plain. "the enemy will then be fearful, and should be challenged by chariot and horse, and allowed no rest. "this is the method of fighting in valleys." and lord wen asked and said:-- "if the enemy be met in a marsh where the water is out, so that the wheels of the chariots sink in, and the shafts be covered, and the chariots and horsemen overcome by the waters, when there are no boats or oars, and it is impossible either to advance or retreat, what should be done in such a case?" and wu answered and said:-- "this is called water fighting. chariots and horsemen cannot be used, and they must be put for a time on one side. go up to the top of a high place, and look out to the four quarters. then the state of the waters will certainly be seen; their extent, and the deep places and shallows fully ascertained. then, by stratagem, the enemy may be defeated. "if the enemy should cross the waters he should be engaged when half over." and lord wen asked and said:-- "if there has been long continued rain so that the horses sink, and the chariots cannot move; if the enemy appear from four quarters, and the forces are frightened, what is the course in such a case?" and wu answered and said:-- "when wet and overcast, the chariots should halt; when fine and dry, they should arise. seek height, and avoid low places; drive the strong chariots, and choose well the road on which to advance or halt. if the enemy suddenly arise, immediately pursue them." lord wen asked and said:-- "if our fields and pastures be suddenly pillaged, and our oxen and sheep taken, what should be done?" and wu answered and said:-- "lawless enemies that arise are to be feared; defend well and do not reply. when, at sunset, they seek to withdraw, they will certainly be overladen and fearful. striving to return quickly to their homes, connection will be lost. then if they be pursued and attacked, they can be overthrown." wu the master said:-- "the way of attacking the enemy and investing his castle is as follows:-- "when the outlying buildings have been taken, and the assaulting parties enter the innermost sanctuary, make use of the enemy's officials, and take charge of their weapons. let the army on no account fell trees or enter dwellings, cut the crops, slay the six domestic animals, or burn the barns; and show the people that there is no cruel desire. those who wish to surrender, should be received and freed from anxiety." vi encouragement of the troops and lord wen asked and said:-- "if punishment be just and reward impartial, is victory thereby gained?" and wu answered and said:-- "i cannot speak of all the things that concern justice and impartiality, but on these alone dependence cannot be placed. "if the people hear the word of command, or listen to the order with rejoicing; if, when the army be raised, and a multitude assembled, they go forth gladly to the fight; if, in the tumult of the fight, when blade crosses blade, the soldiers gladly die; upon these three things can the lord of the people place his trust." and lord wen said:-- "how can this be brought about?" and wu answered and said:-- "seek out merit, advance and reward it, and encourage those without fame." accordingly lord wen set seats in the garden of the palace in three rows, and made a feast unto his chief retainers. in the first row were set those of chief merit, and on the table were placed the best meats and precious utensils. those of medium merit were set in the middle row, and the utensils on the table were fewer in number. those without merit were set in the last row, and utensils of no value were put before them. and when the feast was over, and they had all departed, the parents, wives, and children of those with merit were given presents outside the gates of the palace according to their degree. further, messengers were sent yearly with gifts to condole with the parents of those who had lost a son in the service of the state, and to show that they were had in remembrance. and after this was carried out for three years, the people of chin gathered an army, and came as far as the western river. and when the soldiers of wei heard this, without waiting for orders, they armed themselves and fell upon them; and they that went forth were , in number. and lord wen called wu and said:-- "the words that you spoke unto me, have they not indeed been carried out?" and wu answered and said:-- "i have heard that there are men, great and small; souls, grand and feeble. "as a trial, let , men, without merit, be collected, and placed under my command against the country of chin. if we fail, the state will be the laughing-stock among the princes, and its power under heaven will be lost. if a desperate robber be hidden in a wide plain, and , men be pursuing him, their glances will be furtive like the owl, looking backward like the wolf, for they are in fear of harm from a sudden onslaught. "one desperate man can put fear in the hearts of a thousand. now, if this host of , men become as a desperate thief, and are led against chin, there is nought to fear." on hearing these words lord wen agreed, and adding further chariots and , horse, the hosts of chin were overthrown, all being due to the encouragement of the troops. on the day before the battle wu gave orders to the forces, saying:-- "the army will attack the enemy's chariots, horse and foot, in accordance with our commands. if the chariots do not capture the enemy's chariots, or the horse those of the enemy's, or the foot the enemy's footmen, even if their army be overthrown, no merit will be gained." therefore on the day of the battle, the orders were simple, and fear of wei shook the heavens. index a abnormal manoeuvres, , advance, followed by retirement, a lure, advantages, the five, ally, war to be avoided, if enemy has powerful, altar, wu made general before, ; difficult matters to be laid before, ambition, one of five causes of war, ambush, likely places for enemy to be in, ammunition, lack of, may cause disaster, anger of officers, cause of, ; not a fit reason for battle, animals, the six domestic, to be preserved by besiegers, apologies, what implied, by general who offers, archers, employment of, in sieges, , _note_ armies, five, alternate onslaughts by, armistice, what betokened by sudden desire for, armour, cost of upkeep of, ; and of renewing, ; condition of, an influence in battle, arms, profession of, not highly regarded in china, ; the five, , _note_ army, control of the, - ; orderly, likened to father and children, articles of suntzu, - assault, by stratagem, attack, proportionate number required for, ; on undefended positions, ; place of, to be kept secret, ; five ways of, by fire, - ; eight cases of, ; reckless, b banners, use of, to inspirit troops, ; used, in day fighting, ; enemy's lines not to be attacked where waving, - ; changing of, ; to be entrusted to strong men, ; wutzu on attraction of, , barrack burning, batons, in day fighting, battle, the order of, - beacons, in night fighting, beasts, startled, indicate stealthy approach, bell, use of, in war, ; a signal to halt, , _note_; wutzu on, ; to be entrusted to the bold, ; use of, attracts ear, benevolence, quality needed by general, birds, rising of, indicates ambush, ; clustering of, round position, shows it unoccupied, bluster in general, bogs, movement of troops regarding, booty, exhaustion betrayed by disregard of, bows, weapons for tall men, broken ground, burning barrack, commissariat, equipment, store, and company, - c calamities, six, among troops, camp, safe position for, ; skilful changes of, castle, wutzu's counsel for investing, catapults, weapons for tall men, causes of war, cautiousness-over, one of five dangerous faults for general, chang mt., illustration of snakes of, changes, the nine, - chariots, number of, required, - ; cost of renewing, ; rewards for taking from enemy, ; advance of light, ; great size of, ; axles of, to be well oiled, cheng, lord tang, of, chengsang, prince, chi, estimation of forces of, ; nature of, chieh, lord, chin, nature of, ; unsuccessfully opposes wei, - chins, the three, - china, profession of arms not highly regarded in, ; large rivers of, affect military operations, chinese, greatly affected by climate, chinese literature, place of suntzu and wutzu in, chinese wars, patriotism not a factor in, chou, wu, of, chu, courage of, ; foundation of state of, ; want of endurance of army of, chuang, of chu, holds consultation, chuyin, use of, in sieges, , and _note_ circumspection, circumstances requiring, cohesion of troops, in interior of hostile country, colours must be bright, in war, commander, professional, in china, commissariat burning, confidence, importance of, in operations, contention, ground of, continuity of military principles illustrated, control of army, - converted spies, cooking pots may betray end of resources, - cost of war, ; of supplying army at distance, courage, universal, dependent on good management, ; not the only attribute necessary to general, ; but nevertheless essential, cowardly, place of the, in action, d daylight fighting, use of flags, banners, pennons, and batons in, death, when only alternative, ensures exertion, death ground, ; fighting on, ; soldiers must recognise conditions of, death spies, , declaration of war, action following, decoration for skill in five arms, defeat, internal causes of, ; skilful soldiers make impossible, ; army destined to, trusts in chance, ; causes of, - defence, long, difficulties in, defensive warfare, when victory unattainable, ; skill in, - deficiency, defence compelled by, despair, energy born of, wins victory, desperate enemy not to be pressed, determination, one of five important matters for general, , dignity, essential for general, discipline, one of seven important matters in war, ; perfection of, leads to simulation, discussion of omens, forbidden, disorder, a cause of defeat, disputed ground, action regarding, distracting ground, action regarding, disturbing ground, action regarding, dragons, green (banners), dragons' heads (mountain extremities), drum, use of, ; in night fighting, ; sounds for advance, ; meaning of different beats of, ; to be entrusted to the bold, ; wutzu on the, , dust, spurts, masses, columns and clouds of, meaning of, e ear, to be attracted in war, earth, one of five indispensable matters in war, , ; the ninth, , and _note_ elements, five, , and _note_ emptiness and strength, - enclosed ground, ; stratagem to be used on, ; action regarding, enemies, six to be avoided, - equipment, umbrella part of chinese soldier's, estimation of enemy, ; wutzu on, - exhaustion, result of lateness in field, ; avoided by good tactics, ; shown by disregard of booty, expectation of life or death, eye, to be struck in war, f famine, a cause of war, faults, five, dangerous for generals, feast, given by wen to guests with high, medium, and deficient merit, feints, use of, , fens, advance in wide, fighting races, consequences of victories by, fire, five modes of assault by, - ; attack on enemy in overgrown marsh land by, flag, use of, in war, ; in day fighting, ; change of, ; wutzu on use of, flanking (or reserve) force, flat country, disposal of troops in, flutes, wutzu on use of, fodder, charge of, given to the feeble, food, taken from enemy, ; obtained by skilful general, ; killing of horses for, ; attack on enemy without, ; charge of, given to the feeble, force, one of four important influences in war, , foreign lands, war in, formation-battle, frontal attack, g general, interference with, ill-advised, ; ability of, one of seven important matters, ; skilful, is steadfast in "way" and "law," ; as "god of war" changes tactics, ; must know the nine changes, ; five faults dangerous for, ; what implied by exceeding graciousness of, ; blustering and obsequious, ; strange to troops, ; weak and amiable, ; calamities due to defects in, ; unable to estimate enemy, ; anxious for people's welfare, ; must be calm, inscrutable, just, and prudent, ; conceals plans, ; must have topographical knowledge and use guides, ; bestows rewards discreetly, ; is not actuated by anger, ; should be in accord with soldiers, ; must not procrastinate, ; wutzu on qualities of, - ; five matters important for, ; of the enemy to be appraised, ; action in accordance with judgment of enemy's, ; how to judge enemy's, - gongs, use of, in war, government of a country, - ; object of, ; good, foundation of victory, ground, influence of, in war, ; marshy, to be avoided for camp, ; action in mountainous and wooded, ; disposal of troops on high, marshy, flat, sunny, steep, boggy, and tangled, - ; object of enemy encamped on open, ; suntzu on, - ; open, - ; broken, ; suspended, ; defiles in, ; precipitous, ; the handmaid of victory, ; results from good use of, ; one of four important influences in war, , ; inundation of enemy on marshy, grounds, the nine, - ; action with regard to, ; knowledge of, necessary to general, guests, entertainment of, costly in war, guides, employment of, necessary, , h halberd, one of the five arms, , _note_ halberds, great length of, - harness, must be strong in all details, health of troops, consideration for, heat, attack on enemy who has endured, heaven, one of five indispensable matters in war, , heaven, the ninth, , _note_ highways, when not to interrupt, horses, killed for food, ; care for, ; treatment of, - hsia, hsihe, defence of, huangti, cause of victory by, humane treatment ensures obedience, hunger, how shown, by use of weapons, ; how to meet, in case of enemy, i ichih, ignorance, three ways of, embarrassing to armies, ; of enemy causes defeat, impartiality, wutzu on, impetuosity, blind, dangerous fault in general, indispensable matters, five, suntzu on, indulgence, ill effects of, influences, four important, in war, initiative, disadvantage of, on suspended ground, inner spies, internal disorder, a cause of war, intersecting ground, ; action on, inundation of enemy, on marshy ground, invincible, how ancient masters made armies, involved ground, , ; action regarding, , j japan, sun and wu revered in, japanese tactics, unlike chinese, ; commentators on chinese literature, javelin, one of the five arms, , _note_ justice, importance of, in rewards and punishment, ; wutzu on, k kingdom, the middle, - kuei, courage of, l lateness in field, cause of exhaustion, law, the, one of five indispensable matters in war, ; includes partition and ordering of troops, ; for defeating a country, or taking it, without strife, ; touching the rule, measure, tables, and scales, and the foretelling of victory, leader, one of five indispensable matters in war, . (_see_ general) letters, general should be master of, light esteem of enemy, result of, lightness, importance of, in operations, ; four natures of, - literature, chinese, place of suntzu and wutzu in, ; japanese commentators on, ; thought compressed in, living spies, , lu, number of men in, , _note_ luya, m manoeuvre, battle avoided by, ; normal and abnormal, , ; master in art of, march, forced, ; should be calm, like forest, marshes, unsuitable for camp, ; disposal of troops regarding, ; attack by fire of enemy encamped in, ; inundation of enemy in, measure, the second law of war, meres, ambush to be expected in, merit, recognition of, by enemy, ; to be sought, advanced, and rewarded, ; lord wen discriminates between guests with and without, messengers, enemy's movements revealed by, midday, time for spirits of troops to flag, middle kingdom, the, - might, war of, modification of military plans, moon, in quarters suitable for attack by fire, - moral of troops, ; use of banners to maintain, motion of troops, dignified, mountain warfare, disposal of troops in, mountains, advance among, movement of troops, - mu, prince of chin, example of, mysterious thread, the, mystery, supposed to surround art of war, n night, fighting in, ; voices calling in, nine changes, the, - nine grounds, the, - ; action with regard to, ; knowledge of, necessary to general, normal manoeuvres, , numbers, proportionate, needed to attack and to divide, ; subdivision of, ; superiority of, an economy of strength, ; no certain mark of strength, ; prince yuhu's trust in, ; tactics regarding differences in, ; of no avail in war in valleys, o obedience ensured by humane conduct, ; early training in, obsequiousness in general, officers, when angered by soldiers, ; weak with strong soldiers, and _vice versa_, officials, who have care for people, omens, discussion of, to be forbidden, open ground, movement on, - opportunity, one of four important influences in war, , oracles, cases for attack, when needless to consult, order of battle, the, - order, importance of, outlet, for retiring enemy, ; from enclosed ground, ovens, natural (mouths of valleys), p pass, when to meet enemy in, passages, narrow, avoidance of, path-ridden ground, - patriotism, not a factor in chinese wars, penalties, wutzu on, pennons, wutzu on use of, pestilence, attack on enemy who endures, pike, one of five arms, , _note_ pillage by enemy, wutzu on, plan of campaign, modifications in, pole star (standard), population, told by tables of laws of war, ; division of, into military groups, , _note_; cases of enemy's large, precipitous ground, occupation of, preparation, one of five important matters for general, - pretence, war a thing of, procedure, military, procrastination, evil of, in war, profit, a cause of war, punishment, frequent, what betokened by, ; when ordered by strange general, q qualities, of the general, - r rank, for those skilful in five arms, reason, one of five important matters for general, regard-over, for troops, dangerous fault, relaxation of troops, repulse, resulting from general's incapacity, requirements of war, - reserve (or flanking) force, rest, propriety in, rewards, justice in according, ; for those who take advantage of enemy, ; frequent, show lack of discipline, ; general's freedom in bestowing, ; for families of skilful in five arms, ; consequence of enemy's wise bestowal of, ; in advance, ; to be given to merit, revenge, war of, riches, why denied to soldiers, right-hand men, , and _note_ righteous war, righteousness, overcome by propriety, ; at root of achievement and merit, rivers of china affect operations, ; encampment on, inundation, and poisoning of, ; not to be crossed when turbulent, ; observation of drawers from, roads to avoid, rule, as to survey of land, ; general above, in bestowing rewards, ; modified by circumstances, s sanctuary, reckoning in, before fighting, scales, in laws of war, secret of war, wutzu on, secret, ground of approaching attack to be kept, shen, duke, shield, one of five arms, , _note_ siege, not to be undertaken, if avoidable, ; misfortunes entailed by, simplicity, one of five important matters for leader, , simulation, use of, situation, important matter in war, snakes (banners), soldiers, training of, ; strength of, sparrows, red (banners), spears, weapons for short men, spies, estimation of, in china, ; suntzu on power of, - ; on titles and salaries to, ; five kinds of, ; of enemy, ; skillfully sown, spirit of troops, - ; compared to torrent, ; good fighter seeks victory from, ; keen in morning, ; sustained by speed, ; influence of, stables, care of, standard of takeda shingen, , _note_ standards to be entrusted to strong men, ; wutzu on use of, strata, chinese division of earth and sky into nine, , _note_ stratagem, the attack by, - ; use of, on enclosed ground, ; importance of, in war, strategy, secrets of, ; how to outwit enemy by, ; assault by, ; in offering apparent advantage, ; not to be repeated, if victorious, steep place, advantage of, store burning, strength, first in field husbands, ; economy of, ; ways of husbanding, strong, place of, with cowardly, sun. (_see_ suntzu.) sunny ground, suntzu, place of, in chinese literature, ; on march of army, ; on offensive action, ; tactics of, unlike japanese, ; disinterested comments on war by, - ; revered in japan, ; influence of, in late japanese war, ; not patriot, but strategist, ; story told of, - ; articles of, - ; on five indispensable matters, ; on operations of war, - ; on attack by stratagem, - ; on order of battle, - ; on spirit of troops, - ; on emptiness and strength, - ; on battle tactics, - ; on the nine changes, - ; on movement of troops, - ; on ground, - ; on the nine grounds, - ; on assault by fire, - ; on the employment of spies, - surprise, case of enemy taken by, survey of land, suspended ground, swamps, movements regarding, sympathy, between general and soldiers, ; consequences of, - t tables of population, tactics, skill in change of, ; difficulty of military, ; battle, - takeda shingen, words on standard of, , _note_ tang, lord, of cheng, temper, quick, dangerous fault in general, tigers, white (banners), tortoises (banners), training, one of seven important military matters, ; wutzu esteems first requirement in war, transport, loss of, through bad tactics, trees, movement among, - truce, apologies betray anxiety for, tsu, number of men in, , _note_ turtle, enquiry by, , and _note_ tyranny, war of, u umbrella, part of chinese soldier's equipment, uniformity, brought about by authority, unity results from position of troops in enemy's land, unrighteous war, v valleys, movement of troops regarding steep, ; advance in, ; war in, victory, how to foretell, ; instruments of, ; the object of war, , ; five heralds of, ; skillful soldiers ensure, ; not always real success, ; how to calculate, ; spirit, great factor in, ; ground handmaid of, ; good government foundation of, vigilance, when especially necessary, ; one of five important matters for general, , village spies, virtue of the prince, one of seven important matters, ; essential for general, virtues, the five, comprised in "the way," , _note_ voices in night, signification of, in war, w waggons, cost of upkeep of, war, evils in train of, - ; a thing of pretence, ; requirements of, - ; quick accomplishment of, desirable, , ; evils of, should be realised, ; victory--not long operations--object of, ; supreme art of, ; no fixity in spirit of, ; action on declaration of, ; five causes of, ; five natures of, ; ways of overcoming five natures of, water, army likened to, ; troops in relation to, ; observation of drawers of, ; isolation or division of enemy by, - ; attack on enemy who lacks, ; striking of enemy when half across, , way, the, an indispensable matter in war, ; skillful leader steadfast in, ; wutzu on, - weapons, the five, , _note_; condition of enemy's important, ; distribution of, to tall, short, strong, bold, feeble, and wise, wei, wen, lord of, ; army of, opposes that of chin, - ; victory by, wen, prince of chin, example of, wen, lord of wei, questions wutzu, ; result of questioning by, ; addresses further questions, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ; treatment by, of guests with great, medium, and deficient merit, ; proposal by wutzu to, whistles, wutzu on use of, wind, question of, in assault by fire, ; attack on enemy who has encountered, ; direction of, to be studied, woods, advance among, words, big or smooth, meaning of, wu, number of men in, , _note_ wu, soldiers of, ; hatred between men of, and those of yueh, wutzu, place of, in chinese literature, ; offensive-defensive tactics of, ; comments disinterestedly on war, - ; revered in japan, ; influence of, in late japanese war, ; not patriot, but strategist, ; instance of low moral character of, ; sayings of, - ; a scholar, but skilled in war, ; made general before altar, ; on controlling army, selecting men, and strengthening country, - ; on distribution of men, ; on battle array, ; gives instance of lord chuang of chu, ; sayings on estimation of the enemy, - ; on eight cases of attack, ; on six enemies to avoid, - ; on judgment of enemy's condition, ; on best time for attack, - ; on control of army, - ; on maintenance of order, ; on expectation of life or death, ; on training, ; on treatment of horses, ; on qualities of general, - ; on four important influences of war, ; on use of bells, drums, flags, standards, banners, laws, and penalties, ; on secret of war, ; advice for case of troops in confusion, ; on numerical differences, ; on division of troops into five armies, - ; on differences of position, ; on war in valleys, ; on water fighting, ; on fighting after long rain, ; on pillage by enemy, ; on investing a castle, ; on impartiality, ; success of counsels of, y yang, principle in chinese philosophy, , _note_ yen, estimation of soldiers of, - ; nature of, yin, principle in chinese philosophy, , _note_ yin, province of, yin, even number, , _note_ yueh, continually at war with wu, , _note_ yuhu, prince, printed at the edinburgh press, and young street footnotes: [ ] the five virtues of humanity, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and faith are known as the way. [ ] the yin and yang are the two principles into which natural phenomena are divided in chinese philosophy. yin is the masculine, active, or light principle, and yang is the feminine, passive, or dark principle. in this connection, day and night, rain, mist and wind are designated. [ ] the chinese army consisted of , , the "lu" of , "tsu" of , and the "wu" of men. [ ] the "chuyin" was a large tower or work constructed to give command over the interior of the enemy's fortress. high poles were also erected, from the top of which archers, each encased in an arrow-proof box and raised by a rope and pulley, shot at the besieged. [ ] literally th heaven, and th earth. the chinese divided the earth and sky each into strata. [ ] an animal's coat is thinnest in autumn. [ ] the drum was used to beat the assembly and in the advance, the bell as a signal to halt. flags were of two kinds, signalling flags and distinguishing banners. [ ] the normal and the abnormal refer to what in modern phrase are termed the frontal or holding force and the flanking or surprise force. [ ] the five cardinal tastes are, acridity, bitterness, sourness, sweetness and saline taste. [ ] sun, as has been said, was a man of wu. wu and yueh were continually at war. [ ] wood, fire, earth, metal and water. [ ] this passage was written on the standard of takeda shingen, one of japan's most famous generals. [ ] this and the following are so called because the men are continually thinking of, and slipping back to their homes. [ ] the population was divided, for military purposes, into groups of eight families. in time of war, each group sent one man into the field, furnished his wants, and provided for his family. therefore if , men are taken, , homes are affected. [ ] so called because they are put to death when the enemy finds out that he has been tricked. [ ] messengers and others, who do not disguise their identity, are included under this heading. [ ] literally, right and left men, _i.e._ they who sat on either side. [ ] all numbers connected with weapons were yin, that is to say--even, or belonging to the negative principle of chinese philosophy from their connection with death. [ ] the back of a turtle was burnt, and the answer was ascertained by the manner in which the shell split. [ ] halberd, shield, javelin, pike, and short pike. [ ] silently. * * * * * * transcriber's note: every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as possible. oe ligatures have been expanded. the following is a list of changes made to the original. the first line is the original line, the second the corrected one. page : reap advantage; the wrangles of a multitude are frought with peril. reap advantage; the wrangles of a multitude are fraught with peril. page : chi answered and said:-- wu answered and said:-- page : "by what means can the army gain the victory? "by what means can the army gain the victory?" page : and lord wu asked and said:-- and lord wen asked and said:-- elements of military art and science: or, course of instruction in strategy, fortification, tactics of battles, &c. embracing the duties of staff, infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers. adapted to the use of volunteers and militia. third edition. with critical notes on the mexican and crimean wars. by h. wager halleck, a.m., major general, u.s.a. new york: d. appleton & company, & broadway. london: little britain . entered, according to the act of congress, in the year , by d. appleton & company, in the clerk's office of the district court of the united states for the southern district of new york. contents page preface i. introduction.--dr. wayland's arguments on the justifiableness of war briefly examined. ii. strategy.--general divisions of the art.--rules for planning a campaign.--analysis of the military operations of napoleon. iii. fortifications.--their importance in the defence of states proved by numerous historical examples. iv. logistics.--subsistence.--forage.--marches.--convoys.-- castrametation. v. tactics.--the twelve orders of battle, with examples of each.--different formations of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers on the field of battle, with the modes of bringing troops into action. vi. military polity.--the means of national defence best suited to the character and condition of a country, with a brief account of those adopted by the several european powers. vii. defence of our sea-coast.--brief description of our maritime fortifications, with an examination of the several contests that have taken place between ships and forts, including the attack on san juan d'ulloa, and on st. jean d'acre. viii. our northern frontier defences.--brief description of the fortifications on the frontier, and an analysis of our northern campaigns. ix. army organization.--staff and administrative corps.--their history, duties, numbers, and organization. x. army organization.--infantry and cavalry.--their history, duties, numbers, and organization. xi. army organization.--artillery.--its history and organization, with a brief notice of the different kinds of ordnance, the manufacture of projectiles, &c. xii. army organization.--engineers.--their history, duties, and organization,--with a brief discussion, showing their importance as a part of a modern army organization. xiii. permanent fortifications. historical notice of the progress of this art.--description of the several parts of a fortress, and the various methods of fortifying a position. xiv. field engineering.--field fortifications.--military communications.--military bridges.--sapping, mining, and the attack and defence of a fortified place. xv. military education.--military schools of france, prussia, austria, russia, england, &c.--washington's reasons for establishing the west point academy.--rules of appointment and promotion in foreign services.--absurdity and injustice of our own system. explanation of plates preface the following pages were hastily thrown together in the form of lectures, and delivered, during, the past winter, before the lowell institute of boston. they were written without the slightest intention of ever publishing them; but several officers of militia, who heard them delivered, or afterwards read them in manuscript, desire their publication, on the ground of their being useful to a class of officers now likely to be called into military service. it is with this view alone that they are placed in the hands of the printer. no pretension is made to originality in any part of the work; the sole object having been to embody, in a small compass, well established military principles, and to illustrate these by reference to the events of past history, and the opinions and practice of the best generals. small portions of two or three of the following chapters have already appeared, in articles furnished by the author to the new york and democratic reviews, and in a "report on the means of national defence," published by order of congress. h.w.h. may, . elements of military art and science. chapter i. introduction. our distance from the old world, and the favorable circumstances in which we have been placed with respect to the other nations of the new world, have made it so easy for our government to adhere to a pacific policy, that, in the sixty-two years that have elapsed since the acknowledgment of our national independence, we have enjoyed more than fifty-eight of general peace; our indian border wars have been too limited and local in their character to seriously affect the other parts of the country, or to disturb the general conditions of peace. this fortunate state of things has done much to diffuse knowledge, promote commerce, agriculture, and manufactures; in fine, to increase the greatness of the nation and the happiness of the individual. under these circumstances our people have grown up with habits and dispositions essentially pacific, and it is to be hoped that these feelings may not soon be changed. but in all communities opinions sometimes run into extremes; and there are not a few among us who, dazzled by the beneficial results of a long peace, have adopted the opinion that war in any case is not only useless, but actually immoral; nay, more, that to engage in war is wicked in the highest degree, and even _brutish_. all modern ethical writers regard _unjust_ war as not only immoral, but as one of the greatest of crimes--murder on a large scale. such are all wars of mere ambition, engaged in for the purpose of extending regal power or national sovereignty; wars of plunder, carried on from mercenary motives; wars of propagandism, undertaken for the unrighteous end of compelling men to adopt certain religious or political opinions, whether from the alleged motives of "introducing a more orthodox religion," or of "extending the area of freedom." such wars are held in just abhorrence by all moral and religious people: and this is believed to be the settled conviction of the great mass of our own citizens. but in addition to that respectable denomination of christians who deny our right to use arms under any circumstances, there are many religious enthusiasts in other communions who, from causes already noticed, have adopted the same theory, and hold _all_ wars, even those in self-defence, as unlawful and immoral. this opinion has been, within the last few years, pressed on the public with great zeal and eloquence, and many able pens have been enlisted in its cause. one of the most popular, and by some regarded one of the most able writers on moral science, has adopted this view as the only one consonant with the principles of christian morality. it has been deemed proper, in commencing a course of lectures on war, to make a few introductory remarks respecting this question of its justifiableness. we know of no better way of doing this than to give on the one side the objections to war as laid down in dr. wayland's moral philosophy, and on the other side the arguments by which other ethical writers have justified a resort to war. we do not select dr. wayland's work for the purpose of criticizing so distinguished an author; but because he is almost the only writer on ethics who advocates these views, and because the main arguments against war are here given in brief space, and in more moderate and temperate language than that used by most of his followers. i shall give his arguments in his own language. "i. all wars are contrary to the revealed will of god." it is said in reply, that if the christian religion condemns all wars, no matter how just the cause, or how necessary for self-defence, we must expect to find in the bible some direct prohibition of war, or at least a prohibition fairly implied in other direct commandments. but the bible nowhere prohibits war: in the old testament we find war and even conquest positively commanded, and although war was raging in the world in the time of christ and his apostles, still they said not a word of its unlawfulness and immorality. moreover, the fathers of the church amply acknowledge the right of war, and directly assert, that when war is justly declared, the christian may engage in it either by stratagem or open force. if it be of that highly wicked and immoral character which some have recently attributed to it, most assuredly it would be condemned in the bible in terms the most positive and unequivocal. but it has been said that the use of the sword is either directly or typically forbidden to the christian, by such passages as "thou shalt not kill," (deut. v. ,) "i say unto you, that ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also," (matt. v. ,) &c. if these passages are to be taken as literal commands, as fanatics and religious enthusiasts would have us believe, not only is war unlawful, but also all our penal statutes, the magistracy, and all the institutions of the state for the defence of individual rights, the protection of the innocent, and the punishment of the guilty. but if taken in conjunction with the whole bible, we must infer that they are hyperbolical expressions, used to impress strongly on our minds the general principle of love and forgiveness, and that, so far as possible, we over come evil with good. can any sober-minded man suppose, for a moment, that we are commanded to encourage the attacks of the wicked, by literally turning the left cheek when assaulted on the right, and thus induce the assailant to commit more wrong? shall we invite the thief and the robber to persevere in his depredations, by literally giving him a cloak when he takes our coat; and the insolent and the oppressor to proceed in his path of crime, by going two miles with him if he bid us to go one? again, if the command, "thou shalt not kill," is to be taken literally, it not only prohibits us from engaging in just war, and forbids the taking of human life by the state, as a punishment for crime; it also forbids, says dr. leiber, our taking the life of any animal, and even extends to the vegetable kingdom,--for undoubtedly plants have life, and are liable to violent death--to be _killed_. but dr. wayland concedes to individuals the right to take vegetable and animal life, and to society the right to punish murder by death. this passage undoubtedly means, thou shalt not unjustly kill,--thou shalt do no murder; and so it is rendered in our prayer-books. it cannot have reference to war, for on almost the next page we find the israelites commanded to go forth and smite the heathen nations,--to cast them out of the land,--to utterly destroy them,--to show them no mercy, &c. if these passages of the bible are to be taken literally, there is no book which contains so many contradictions; but if taken in connection with the spirit of other passages, we shall find that we are permitted to use force in preventing or punishing crime, whether in nations or in individuals; but that we should combine love with justice, and free our hearts from all evil motives. ii. all wars are unjustifiable, because "god commands us to love every man, alien or citizen, samaritan or jew, as ourselves; and the act neither of society nor of government can render it our duty to violate this command." it is true that no act of society can make it our duty to violate any command of god: but is the above command to be taken literally, and as forbidding us to engage in just war? is it not rather intended to impress upon us, in a forcible manner, that mutual love is a great virtue; that we should hate no one, not even a stranger nor an enemy, but should treat all with justice, mercy, and loving-kindness? if the meaning attempted to be given to this command in the above quotation be the true one, it is antagonistical not only to just war, but to civil justice, to patriotism, and to the social and domestic affections. but are we bound to love all human beings alike; that is, to the same degree? does the bible, as a whole, inculcate such doctrine? on the contrary, christ himself had his _beloved_ disciple,--one whom he loved pre-eminently, and above all the others; though he loved the others none the less on that account. we are bound to love our parents, our brothers, our families first, and above all other human beings; but we do not, for this reason, love others any the less. a man is not only permitted to seek first the comfort and happiness of his own family, but if he neglect to do so, he is worse than an infidel. we are bound to protect our families against the attacks of others; and, if necessary for the defence of their lives, we are permitted to take the life of the assailant; nay more, we are bound to do so. but it does not follow that we _hate_ him whom we thus destroy. on the contrary, we may feel compassion, and even love for him. the magistrate sentences the murderer to suffer the penalty of the law; and the sheriff carries the sentence into execution by taking, in due form, the life of the prisoner: nevertheless, both the magistrate and the sheriff may have the kindest feelings towards him whom they thus deprive of life. so it is in the external affairs of the state. next to my kindred and my neighbors do i love my countrymen. i love them more than i do foreigners, because my interests, my feelings, my happiness, my ties of friendship and affection, bind me to them more intimately than to the foreigner. i sympathize with the oppressed greek, and the enslaved african, and willingly contribute to their relief, although their sufferings affect me very remotely; but if my own countrymen become oppressed and enslaved, nearer and dearer interests are affected, and peculiar duties spring from the ties and affections which god has formed. if my countrymen be oppressed, my neighbors and kindred will be made unhappy and suffering; this i am bound to take all proper measures in my power to prevent. if the assailant cannot be persuaded by argument to desist from his wicked intentions, i unite with my fellow-citizens in forcibly resisting his aggressions. in doing this i am actuated by no feelings of hatred towards the hostile forces; i have in my heart no malice, no spirit of revenge; i have no desire to harm individuals, except so far as they are made the instruments of oppression. but as instruments of evil, i am bound to destroy their power to do harm. i do not shoot at my military enemy from hatred or revenge; i fight against him because the paramount interests of my country cannot be secured without destroying the instrument by which they are assailed. i am prohibited from exercising any personal cruelty; and after the battle, or as soon as the enemy is rendered harmless, he is to be treated with kindness, and to be taken care of equally with the wounded friend. all conduct to the contrary is regarded by civilized nations with disapprobation. that war does not properly beget personal malignity but that, on the contrary, the effects of mutual kindness and courtesy on the battle-field, frequently have a beneficial influence in the political events of after years, may be shown by innumerable examples in all history. soult and wellington were opposing generals in numerous battles; but when the former visited england in , he was received by wellington and the whole british nation with the highest marks of respect; and the mutual warmth of feeling between these two distinguished men has contributed much to the continuance of friendly relations between the two nations. and a few years ago, when we seemed brought, by our civil authorities, almost to the brink of war by the northeastern boundary difficulties, the pacific arrangements concluded, through the intervention of general scott, between the governors of maine and new brunswick, were mainly due to ancient friendships contracted by officers of the contending armies during our last war with great britain. iii. "it is granted that it would be better for man in general, if wars were abolished, and all means, both of offence and defence, abandoned. now, this seems to me to admit, that this is the law under which god has created man. but this being admitted, the question seems to be at an end; for god never places man under circumstances in which it is either wise, or necessary, or innocent, to violate his laws. is it for the advantage of him who lives among a community of thieves, to steal; or for one who lives among a community of liars, to lie?" the fallacy of the above argument is so evident that it is scarcely necessary to point out its logical defects. my living among a community of thieves would not justify me in stealing, and certainly it would be no reason why i should neglect the security of my property. my living among murderers would not justify me in committing murder, and on the other hand it would be no reason why i should not fight in the defence of my family, if the arm of the law were unable to protect them. that other nations carry on unjust wars is no reason why we should do likewise, nor is it of itself any reason why we should neglect the means of self-defence. it may seem, to us short-sighted mortals, better that we were placed in a world where there were no wars, or murders, or thefts; but god has seen fit to order it otherwise. our duties and our relations to our fellow-men are made to suit the world as it is, and not such a world as we would make for ourselves. we live among thieves: we must therefore resort to force to protect our property--that is, to locks, and bars, and bolts; we build walls thick and high between the robber and our merchandise. and more: we enact laws for his punishment, and employ civil officers to forcibly seize the guilty and inflict that degree of punishment necessary for the prevention of other thefts and robberies. we live among murderers: if neither the law nor the ordinary physical protections suffice for the defence of our own lives and the lives of our innocent friends, we forcibly resist the murderer, even to his death, if need be. moreover, to deter others from like crimes, we inflict the punishment of death upon him who has already taken life. these relations of individuals and of society are laid down by all ethical writers as in accordance with the strictest rules of christian morality. even dr. wayland considers it not only the right, but the duty of individuals and of society to resort to these means, and to enact these laws for self-protection. let us extend the same course of reasoning to the relations of different societies. we live among nations who frequently wage unjust wars; who, disregarding the rights of others, oppress and rob, and even murder their citizens, in order to reach some unrighteous end. as individuals, we build fences and walls for the protection of our grounds and our merchandise; so, as a nation, we build ships and forts to protect our commerce, our harbors, and our cities. but the walls of our houses and stores are useless, unless made so strong and high that the robber cannot break through or scale them without great effort and personal danger; so our national ships and forts would be utterly useless for protection, unless fully armed and equipped. further: as individuals and as societies we employ civil officers for the protection of our property and lives, and, when necessary, arm them with the physical means of executing the laws, even though the employment of these means should cost human life. the prevention and punishment of crime causes much human suffering; nevertheless the good of community requires that crime should be prevented and punished. so, as a nation, we employ military officers to man our ships and forts, to protect our property and our persons, and to repel and punish those who seek to rob us of our life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. national aggressions are far more terrible in their results than individual crime; so also the means of prevention and punishment are far more stupendous, and the employment of these means causes a far greater amount of human suffering. this may be a good reason for greater _caution_ in resorting to such means, but assuredly it is no argument against the _moral right_ to use them. iv. war is unjustifiable because unnecessary: " st. the very fact that a nation relied solely upon the justice of its measures, and the benevolence of its conduct, would do more than any thing else to prevent the occurrence of injury. the moral sentiment of every community would rise in opposition to injury inflicted upon the just the kind, and the merciful." the moral duty of nations in this respect is the same as that of individuals. active benevolence and forbearance should be employed, so far as may be proper; but there are points at which forbearance ceases to be a virtue. if we entirely forbear to punish the thief, the robber, and the murderer, think you that crime will be diminished? reason and experience prove the contrary. active benevolence and kindness should always attend just punishment, but they were never designed to prohibit it. the laws of god's universe are founded on justice as well as love. "the moral sentiment of every community rises in opposition to injury inflicted upon the just, the kind, and the merciful;" but this fact does not entirely prevent wicked men from robbing and murdering innocent persons, and therefore wise and just laws require that criminals shall be punished, in order that those who are dead to all moral restraints may be deterred from crime through fear of punishment. " d. but suppose the [national] injury to be done. i reply, the proper appeal for moral beings, upon moral questions, is not to physical force, but to the consciences of men. let the wrong be set forth, but be set forth in the spirit of love; and in this manner, if in any, will the consciences of men be aroused to justice." argument, and "appeals to the consciences of men" should always be resorted to in preference to "physical force;" but when they fail to deter the wicked, force must be employed. i may reason with the robber and the murderer, to persuade him to desist from his attempt to rob my house, and murder my family; but if he refuse to listen to moral appeals, i employ physical force,--i call in the strong arm of the law to assist me; and if no other means can be found to save innocent life that is assailed, the life of the assailant must be sacrificed. "if," says puffendorf, "some one treads the laws of peace under his feet, forming projects which tend to my ruin, he could not, without the highest degree of impudence, (impudentissime,) pretend that after this i should consider him as a sacred person, who ought not to be touched; in other words, that i should betray myself, and abandon the care of my own preservation, in order to give way to the malice of a criminal, that he may act with impunity and with full liberty. on the contrary, since he shows himself unsociable towards me, and since he has placed himself in a position which does not permit me safely to practice towards him the duties of peace, i have only to think of preventing the danger which menaces me; so that if i cannot do this without hurting him, he has to accuse himself only, since he has reduced me to this necessity." _de jure nat. et gent_, lib. ii., ch. v., § . this same course of reasoning is also applied to the duties of a nation towards its enemy in respect to war. " d. but suppose this method fail. why, then, let us suffer the evil." this principle, if applied to its full extent, would, we believe, be subversive of all right, and soon place all power in the hands of the most evil and wicked men in the community. reason with the nation that invades our soil, and tramples under foot our rights and liberties, and should it not desist, why, then, suffer the evil! reason with the murderer, and if he do not desist, why, then, suffer him to murder our wives and our children! reason with the robber and the defaulter, and if they will not listen, why, then, let them take our property! we cannot appeal to the courts, for if their decisions be not respected, they employ _force_ to _compel_ obedience to their mandates. but dr. wayland considers the law of benevolence to forbid the use of force between men. he forgets this, it is true, in speaking of our duties towards our fellow-men of the same _society_, and even allows us to punish the murderer with death; but towards the foreigner he requires a greater forbearance and benevolence than towards our neighbor; for if another nation send its armies to oppress, and rob, and murder us by the thousand, we have no right to employ physical force either to prevent or to punish them, though we may do so to prevent or punish a neighbor for an individual act of the same character. the greater the scale of crime, then, the less the necessity of resorting to physical force to prevent it! " th. but it may be asked, what is to prevent repeated and continued aggression? i answer, first, not instruments of destruction, but the moral principle which god has placed in the bosom of every man. i think that obedience to the law of god, on the part of the injured, is the surest preventive against the repetition of injury. i answer, secondly, suppose that acting in obedience to the law of benevolence will not prevent the repetition of injury, will acting on the principle of retaliation prevent it?" again; "i believe aggression from a foreign nation to be the intimation from god that we are disobeying the law of benevolence, and that this is his mode of teaching nations their duty, in this respect, to each other. so that aggression seems to me in no manner to call for retaliation and injury, but rather to call for special kindness and good-will." this argument, if such it can be called, is equally applicable to individual aggressions. we are bound to regard them as intimations of our want of benevolence, and to reward the aggressors for the intimations! is it true, that in this world the wicked only are oppressed, and that the good are always the prospered and happy? even suppose this true, and that i, as a sinful man, deserve god's anger, is this any reason why i should not resist the assassin, and seek to bring him to punishment? the whole of this argument of dr. wayland applies with much greater force to municipal courts than to war. v. "let us suppose a nation to abandon all means both of offence and of defence, to lay aside all power of inflicting injury, and to rely for self-preservation solely upon the justice of its own conduct, and the moral effect which such a course of conduct would produce upon the consciences of men. * * * * how would such a nation be protected from external attack, and entire subjugation? i answer, by adopting the law of benevolence, a nation would render such an event in the highest degree improbable. the causes of national war are, most commonly, the love of plunder and the love of glory. the first of these is rarely, if ever, sufficient to stimulate men to the _ferocity necessary to war_, unless when assisted by the second. and by adopting as the rule of our conduct the law of benevolence, all motive arising from the second cause is taken away. there is not a nation in europe that could be led on to war against a harmless, just, forgiving, and defenceless people." history teaches us that societies as well as individuals have been attacked again and again notwithstanding that they either would not or could not defend themselves. did mr. white, of salem, escape his murderers any the more for being harmless and defenceless? did the quakers escape being attacked and hung by the ancient new englanders any the more because of their non-resisting principles? have the jews escaped persecutions throughout christendom any the more because of their imbecility and non-resistance for some centuries past? poland was comparatively harmless and defenceless when the three great european powers combined to attack and destroy the entire nation, dividing between themselves the polish territory, and enslaving or driving into exile the polish people. "oh, bloodiest picture in the book of time, sarmatia fell, unwept, without a crime!" we need not multiply examples under this head; all history is filled with them. let us to-morrow destroy our forts and ships of war, disband our army and navy, and apply the lighted torch to our military munitions and to our physical means of defence of every description; let it be proclaimed to the world that we will rely solely upon the consciences of nations for justice, and that we have no longer either the will or the ability to defend ourselves against aggression. think you that the african and asiatic pirates would refrain, any the more, from plundering our vessels trading to china, because we had adopted "the law of benevolence?" would england be any the more likely to compromise her differences with us, or be any the more disposed to refrain from impressing our seamen and from searching our merchant-ships? experience shows that an undefended state, known to suffer every thing, soon becomes the prey of all others, and history most abundantly proves the wisdom and justice of the words of washington--"if we desire to secure peace, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war." but let us bring this case still nearer home. let it be known to-morrow that the people of boston or new york have adopted the strictly non-resisting principle, and that hereafter they will rely solely on the consciences of men for justice; let it be proclaimed throughout the whole extent of our union, and throughout the world, that you have destroyed your jails and houses of correction, abolished your police and executive law officers, that courts may decide justice but will be allowed no force to compel respect to their decisions, that you will no longer employ walls, and bars, and locks, to secure your property and the virtue and lives of your children; but that you will trust solely for protection to "the law of active benevolence." think you that the thieves, and robbers, and murderers of philadelphia, and baltimore, and new orleans, and the cities of the old world, will, on this account, refrain from molesting the peace of new york and boston, and that the wicked and abandoned men now in these cities, will be the more likely to turn from the evil of their ways? assuredly, if this "law of active benevolence," as dr. wayland denominates the rule of non-resistance, will prevent nations from attacking the harmless and defenceless, it will be still more likely to prevent individuals from the like aggressions; for the moral sense is less active in communities than where the responsibility is individual and direct. throughout this argument dr. wayland assumes that all wars are wars of aggression, waged for "plunder" or "glory," or through "hatred" or "revenge," whereas such is far from being true. he indeed sometimes speaks of war as being _generally_ of this character; at others he speaks of it as being _always_ undertaken either from a spirit of aggression or retaliation. take either form of his argument, and the veriest schoolboy would pronounce it unsound: viz., _all_ wars are undertaken either for aggression or retaliation; aggression and retaliation are forbidden by god's laws;--therefore, _all_ wars are immoral and unjustifiable. or, wars are _generally_ undertaken either for aggression or retaliation; aggression and retaliation are forbidden by god's laws--therefore, _all_ wars are immoral and unjustifiable. vi. "let any man reflect upon the amount of pecuniary expenditure, and the awful waste of human life, which the wars of the last hundred years have occasioned, and then we will ask him whether it be not evident, that the one-hundredth part of this expense and suffering, if employed in the honest effort to render mankind wiser and better, would, long before this time, have banished wars from the earth, and rendered the civilized world like the garden of eden? if this be true, it will follow that the cultivation of a military spirit is injurious to a community, inasmuch as it aggravates the source of the evil, the corrupt passions of the human breast, by the very manner in which it attempts to correct the evil itself." much has been said to show that war begets immorality, and that the cultivation of the military spirit has a corrupting influence on community. and members of the clergy and of the bar have not unfrequently so far forgotten, if not truth and fact, at least the common courtesies and charities of life, as to attribute to the military profession an unequal share of immorality and crime. we are declared not only parasites on the body politic, but professed violators of god's laws--men so degraded, though unconsciously, that "in the pursuit of justice we renounce the human character and assume that of the beasts;" it is said that "murder, robbery, rape, arson, theft, if only plaited with the soldier's garb, go unwhipped of justice."[ ] it has never been the habit of the military to retort these charges upon the other professions. we prefer to leave them unanswered. if demagogues on the "stump," or in the legislative halls, or in their fourth of-july addresses, can find no fitter subjects "to point a moral or adorn a tale," we must be content to bear their misrepresentations and abuse. [footnote : sumner's oration.] unjust wars, as well as unjust litigation, are immoral in their effects and also in their cause. but just wars and just litigation are not demoralizing. suppose all wars and all courts of justice to be abolished, and the wicked nations as well as individuals to be suffered to commit injuries without opposition and without punishment; would not immorality and unrighteousness increase rather than diminish? few events rouse and elevate the patriotism and public spirit of a nation so much as a just and patriotic war. it raises the tone of public morality, and destroys the sordid selfishness and degrading submissiveness which so often result from a long-protracted peace. such was the dutch war of independence against the spaniards; such the german war against the aggressions of louis xiv., and the french war against the coalition of . but without looking abroad for illustration, we find ample proof in our own history. can it be said that the wars of the american revolution and of , were demoralizing in their effects? "whence do americans," says dr. lieber, "habitually take their best and purest examples of all that is connected with patriotism, public spirit, devotedness to common good, purity of motive and action, if not from the daring band of their patriots of the revolution?" the principal actors in the military events of the revolution and of , held, while living, high political offices in the state, and the moral tone which they derived from these wars may be judged of by the character stamped on their administration of the government. these men have passed away, and their places have, for some time, been filled by men who take their moral tone from the relations of peace. to the true believer in the efficacy of _non-resistance,_ and in the demoralizing influence of all wars, how striking the contrast between these different periods in our political history! how infinitely inferior to the rulers in later times were those, who, in the blindness of their infatuation, appealed to physical force, rather than surrender their life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness! let us trace out this contrast:-- in the earlier ages of our republic, and under the rule of those whose moral character had been corrupted by war, party spirit ran higher and was less pure than at later periods in our history. the object of the principal leaders of the great political parties was then to render the opinions of the opposite party odious: now, their only object is to sustain their own opinions by argument. then, each party claimed to itself an exclusive love of country, and stigmatized the other as aliens and the natural enemies of the state: now, they both practise great forbearance, love, and charity, towards political opponents. then, men obtained place through intrigue and corruption, and a universal scramble for the loaves and fishes of office on the one side, and a universal political proscription on the other, were regarded as the natural results of an election: now, this disgusting strife for office has ceased; men no longer seek place, but wait, like cincinnatus, to be called from their ploughs; and none are proscribed for opinion's sake. then, in electing men to office the most important social and constitutional principles were forgotten or violated: now, we have the august spectacle of a nation-choosing its rulers under the guidance of strict moral principle. then, the halls of congress were frequently filled with demagogues, and tiplers, and the _small men_ of community: now, the ablest and best of the country are always sought for as representatives. then, the magnates of party were the mere timid, temporizing slaves of expediency, looking, not to the justice and wisdom of their measures, but to their probable popularity with then sneaking train of followers: now, they rely for respect and support upon the judgment of the honest and enlightened. then, the rank and file of party were mere political hirelings, who sold their manhood for place, who reviled and glorified, and shouted huzzas and whispered calumnies, just as they were bidden; they could fawn upon those who dispensed political patronage with a cringing servility that would shame the courtiers of louis xiv., or the parasites and hirelings of walpole: now, all political partisans, deriving their moral tone from the piping times of peace, are pure, disinterested patriots, who, like the roman farmer, take office with great reluctance, and resign it again as soon as the state can spare their services. then, prize-fighters, and blacklegs, and gamblers, having formed themselves into political clubs, were courted by men high in authority, and rewarded for their dirty and corrupting partisan services by offices of trust and responsibility: now, no man clothed with authority would dare to insult the moral sense of community by receiving such characters in the national councils, or by bestowing public offices upon these corrupt and loathsome dregs of society. such, the advocates of non resistance would persuade us, are the legitimate results in this country of war on the one hand and of a long-protracted peace on the other. but there are men of less vivid imaginations, and, perhaps, of visions less distorted by fanatical zeal, who fail to perceive these results, and who even think they see the reverse of all this. these men cannot perceive any thing in the lives of washington, hamilton, and knox, to show that they were the less virtuous because they had borne arms in their country's service: they even fail to perceive the injurious effects of the cultivation of a military spirit on the military students of west point, whose graduates, they think, will compare favorably in moral character with the graduates of yale and cambridge. nay, more, some even go so far as to say that our army, as a body, is no less moral than the corresponding classes in civil life; that our common soldiers are as seldom guilty of riots, thefts, robberies, and murders, as similarly educated men engaged in other pursuits; that our military officers are not inferior in moral character to our civil officers, and that, as a class, they will compare favorably with any other class of professional men--with lawyers, for example. in justification of these opinions--which may, perhaps, be deemed singularly erroneous--they say, that in the many millions of public money expended during the last forty years, by military officers, for the army, for military defences, and for internal improvements, but a single graduate of west point has proved a defaulter, even to the smallest sum, and that it is exceedingly rare to see an officer of the army brought into court for violating the laws. but even suppose it true that armies necessarily diffuse immorality through community, is it not equally true that habitual submission to the injustice, plunder, and insult of foreign conquerors would tend still more to degrade and demoralize any people? with regard to "pecuniary expenditures" required in military defence, many absurd as well as false statements have been put forth. with respect to our own country, the entire amounts expended, under the head of war department, whether for indian pensions, for the purchase of indian lands, the construction of government roads, the improvement of rivers and harbors, the building of breakwaters and sea-walls, for the preservation of property, the surveying of public lands, &c., &c.; in fine, every expenditure made by officers of the army, under the war department, is put down as "expenses for military defence." similar misstatements are made with respect to foreign countries: for example, the new fortifications of paris are said to have already cost from fifty to seventy-five millions of dollars, and as much more is said to be required to complete them. indeed, we have seen the whole estimated cost of those works stated at two hundred and forty millions of dollars, or twelve hundred millions of francs! the facts are these: the works, when done, will have cost about twenty-eight millions. we had the pleasure of examining them not long since, in company with several of the engineer officers employed on the works. they were then three-fourths done, and had cost about twenty millions. we were assured by these officers that the fortifications proper would be completed for somewhat less than the original estimate of twenty-eight millions. had we time to enter into details, other examples of exaggeration and misrepresentation could be given. but it is not to be denied that wars and the means of military defence have cost vast amounts of money. so also have litigation and the means deemed requisite for maintaining justice between individuals. it has been estimated that we have in this country, at the present time, thirty thousand lawyers, without including pettifoggers. allowing each of these to cost the country the average sum of one thousand dollars, and we have the annual cost to the country, for lawyers, thirty millions of dollars. add to this the cost of legislative halls and legislators for making laws; of court-houses, jails, police offices, judges of the different courts, marshals, sheriffs justices of the peace, constables, clerks, witnesses, &c., employed to apply and enforce the laws when made; the personal loss of time of the different plaintiffs and defendants, the individual anxiety and suffering produced by litigation; add all these together, and i doubt not the result for a single year will somewhat astonish these modern economists. but if all the expenditures of this nature that have been made for the last fifty years, in this individual "war of hate," be added together, we have no doubt a very fruitful text might be obtained for preaching a crusade against law and lawyers! but could any sane man be found to say that, on account of the cost of maintaining them, all laws and lawyers are useless and should be abolished? if, therefore, these vast sums of money are deemed necessary to secure justice between individuals of the same nation, can we expect that the means of international justice can be maintained without expenditures commensurate with the object in view? if we cannot rely exclusively upon the "law of active benevolence" for maintaining justice between brothers of the same country, can we hope that, in the present state of the world, strangers and foreigners will be more ready to comply with its requisitions? the length of the preceding remarks admonishes us to greater brevity in the further discussion of this subject. it is objected to war, that men being rational beings, should contend with one another by argument, and not by force, as do the brutes. to this it is answered, that force properly begins only where argument ends. if he who has wronged me cannot be persuaded to make restitution, i apply to the court,--that is, to _legal_ force,--to compel him to do me justice. so nations ought to resort to _military force_ only when all other means fail to prevent aggression and injury. but war often fails to procure redress of grievances, or to prevent repeated and continued aggression. so does a resort to civil force; but such a resort is none the less proper and just on that account. but in war the innocent party is sometimes the sufferer, while the guilty triumph. so it often is in civil life: god, for some wise purpose, sometimes permits the wicked to triumph for a season. but in all wars one party must be in the wrong, and frequently the war is unjust on both sides. so in suits at law, one party is necessarily wrong, and frequently both resort to the civil tribunals in hopes of attaining unrighteous ends. but nations do not resort to tribunals, like individuals, to settle their differences. for the reason that it is believed a tribunal of this character--a congress of nations, as it has been called,--would be more productive of evil than of good. by such an arrangement the old and powerful european monarchies would acquire the authority to interfere in the domestic affairs of the weaker powers. we see the effects of establishing such a tribunal in the so-called holy alliance, whose influence is regarded by the friends of liberty as little less dangerous than the holy inquisition. moreover, such a tribunal would not prevent war, for military force would still be resorted to to enforce its decisions. for these and other reasons, it is deemed better and safer to rely on the present system of international law. under this system, and in this country, a resort to the arbitrament of war is not the result of impulse and passion,--a yielding to the mere "bestial propensities" of our nature; it is a deliberate and solemn act of the legislative power,--of the representatives of the national mind, convened as the high council of the people. it is this power which must determine when all just and honorable means have been resorted to to obtain national justice, and when a resort to military force is requisite and proper. if this decision be necessarily unchristian and barbarous, such, also, should we expect to be the character of other laws passed by the same body, and under the same circumstances. a declaration of war, in this country, is a law of the land, made by a deliberative body, under the high sanction of the constitution. it is true that such a law may be unjust and wrong, but we can scarcely agree that it will necessarily be so. the distinction between war, as thus duly declared, and "international lynch-law" is too evident to need comment. but it is said that the benefits of war are more than counterbalanced by the evils it entails, and that, "most commonly, the very means by which we repel a despotism from abroad, only establishes over us a military despotism at home." much has been said and written about _military_ despotism; but we think he who studies history thoroughly, will not fail to prefer a military despotism to a despotism of mere politicians. the governments of alexander and charlemagne were infinitely preferable to those of the petty civil tyrants who preceded and followed them; and there is no one so blinded by prejudice as to say that the reign of napoleon was no better than that of robespierre, danton, and the other "lawyers" who preceded him, or of the bourbons, for whom he was dethroned. "cæsar," says a distinguished senator of our own country, "was rightfully killed for conspiring against his country; but it was not he that destroyed the liberties of rome. that work was done by the profligate politicians without him, and before his time; and his death did not restore the republic. there were no more elections: rotten politicians had destroyed them; and the nephew of cæsar, as heir to his uncle, succeeded to the empire on the principle of hereditary succession." "and here history appears in her grand and instructive character, as philosophy teaching by example: and let us not be senseless to her warning voice. superficial readers believe it was the military men who destroyed the roman republic! no such thing! it was the politicians who did it!--factious, corrupt, intriguing politicians--destroying public virtue in their mad pursuit after office--destroying their rivals by crime--deceiving and debauching the people for votes--and bringing elections into contempt by the frauds and violence with which they were conducted. from the time of the gracchi there were no elections that could bear the name. confederate and rotten politicians bought and sold the consulship. intrigue and the dagger disposed of rivals. fraud, violence, bribes, terror, and the plunder of the public treasury commanded votes. the people had no choice; and long before the time of cæsar, nothing remained of republican government but the name and the abuse. read plutarch. in the 'life of cæsar,' and not three pages before the crossing of the rubicon, he paints the ruined state of the elections,--shows that all elective government was gone,--that the hereditary form had become a necessary relief from the contests of the corrupt,--and that in choosing between pompey and cæsar, many preferred pompey, not because they thought him republican, but because they thought he would make the milder king. even arms were but a small part of cæsar's reliance, when he crossed the rubicon. gold, still more than the sword, was his dependence; and he sent forward the accumulated treasures of plundered gaul, to be poured into the laps of rotten politicians. there was no longer a popular government; and in taking all power himself, he only took advantage of the state of things which profligate politicians had produced. in this he was culpable, and paid the forfeit with his life. but in contemplating his fate, let us never forget that the politicians had undermined and destroyed the republic, before he came to seize and to master it." we could point to numerous instances, where the benefits of war have more than compensated for the evils which attended it; benefits not only to the generations who engaged in it, but also to their descendants for long ages. had rome adopted the non-resistance principle when hannibal was at her gates, we should now be in the night of african ignorance and barbarism, instead of enjoying the benefits of roman learning and roman civilization. had france adopted this principle when the allied armies invaded her territories in , her fate had followed that of poland. had our ancestors adopted this principle in , what now had been, think you, the character and condition of our country? dr. lieber's remarks on this point are peculiarly just and apposite. "the continued efforts," says he, "requisite for a nation to protect themselves against the ever-repeated attacks of a predatory foe, may be infinitely greater than the evils entailed by a single and energetic war, which forever secures peace from that side. nor will it be denied, i suppose, that niebuhr is right when he observes, that the advantage to rome of having conquered sicily, as to power and national vigor, was undeniable. but even if it were not so, are there no other advantages to be secured? no human mind is vast enough to comprehend in one glance, nor is any human life long enough to follow out consecutively, all the immeasurable blessings and the unspeakable good which have resolved to mankind from the ever-memorable victories of little greece over the rolling masses of servile asia, which were nigh sweeping over europe like the high tides of a swollen sea, carrying its choking sand over all the germs of civilization, liberty, and taste, and nearly all that is good and noble. think what we should have been had europe become an asiatic province, and the eastern principles of power and stagnation should have become deeply infused into her population, so that no process ever after could have thrown it out again! has no advantage resulted from the hebrews declining any longer to be ground in the dust, and ultimately annihilated, at least mentally so, by stifling servitude, and the wars which followed their resolution? the netherlands war of independence has had a penetrating and decided effect upon modern history, and, in the eye of all who value the most substantial parts and elementary ideas of modern and civil liberty, a highly advantageous one, both directly and through great britain. wars have frequently been, in the hands of providence, the means of disseminating civilization, if carried on by a civilized people--as in the case of alexander, whose wars had a most decided effect upon the intercourse of men and extension of civilization--or of rousing and reuniting people who had fallen into lethargy, if attacked by less civilized and numerous hordes. frequently we find in history that the ruder and victorious tribe is made to recover as it were civilization, already on the wane with a refined nation. paradoxical as it may seem at first glance, it is, nevertheless, amply proved by history, that the closest contact and consequent exchange of thought and produce and enlargement of knowledge, between two otherwise severed nations, is frequently produced by war. war is a struggle, a state of suffering; but as such, at times, only that struggling process without which--in proportion to the good to be obtained, or, as would be a better expression for many cases, to the good that is to be borne--no great and essential good falls ever to the share of man. suffering, merely as suffering, is not an evil. our religion, philosophy, every day's experience, prove it. no maternal rejoicing brightens up a mother's eve without the anxiety of labor." one word more, and we must leave this subject. it has been said by some that the duties of patriotism are less binding upon us than upon our ancestors; that, whatever may have been the practice in years that are past the present generation can in no manner bear arms in their country's cause, such a course being not only _dishonorable_, but in the eye of the christian, _wicked_, and even _infamous_! it is believed, however, that such are not the general opinions and sentiments of the religious people of this country. our forefathers lighted the fires of religion and patriotism at the same altar; it is believed that their descendants have not allowed either to be extinguished, but that both still burn, and will continue to burn, with a purer and brighter flame. our forefathers were not the less mindful of their duty to their god, because they also faithfully served their country. if we are called upon to excel them in works of charity, of benevolence, and of christian virtue, let it not be said of us that we have forgotten the virtue of patriotism.[ ] [footnote : for further discussion of this subject the reader is referred to lieber's political ethics, part ii., book vii. chap. ; paley's moral and political philosophy; legare's report of june , , in the house of representatives; mackintosh's history of the revolution of , chap. x.; bynkershock; vatel; puffendorf; clausewitz; and most other writers on international law and the laws of war. dr. wayland's view of the question is advocated with much zeal by dymond in his inquiry into the accordancy of war with the principles of christianity; jay's peace and war; judd's sermon on peace and war; peabody's address, &c.; coue's tract on what is the use of the navy? sumner's true grandeur of nations.] chapter ii. strategy war has been defined, "a contest between nations and states carried on by force." but this definition is by some considered defective, inasmuch as it would exclude all civil wars. when war is commenced by attacking a nation in peace, it is called _offensive_, and when undertaken to repel invasion, or the attacks of an enemy, it is called _defensive_. a war may be essentially defensive even where we begin it, if intended to prevent an attack or invasion which is under preparation. besides this general division of war, military writers have made numerous others, such as-- _wars of intervention_, in which one state interferes in favor of another. this intervention may either have respect to the _internal_ or to the _external_ affairs of a nation. the interference of russia in the affairs of poland, of england in the government of india, austria and the allied powers in the affairs of france during the revolution and under the empire, are examples under the first head. the intervention of the elector maurice of saxony against charles v., of king william against louis xiv., in , of russia and france in the seven years' war, of russia again between france and austria, in , and between france and prussia, in , are examples under the second head. most liberal-publicists consider intervention in the internal affairs of nations as indefensible; but the principle is supported by the advocates of the old monarchies of europe. _wars of insurrection_ to gain or to regain liberty; as was the case with the americans in , and the modern greeks in . _wars of independence_ from foreign dictation and control as the wars of poland against russia, of the netherlands against spain, of france against the several coalitions of the allied powers, of the spanish peninsula against france and of china and india against england. the american war of partook largely of this character, and some judicious historians have denominated it the war of independence, as distinguished from the war of the revolution. _wars of opinion_, like those which the vendeans have sustained in support of the bourbons, and those france has sustained against the allies, as also those of propagandism, waged against the smaller european states by the republican hordes of the french revolution. to this class also belong-- _religious wars_, like those of islamism, of the crusades, and of the reformation. _wars of conquest_, like those of the romans in gaul, of the english in india, of the french in egypt and africa, and of the russians in circassia. _national wars_, in which the great body of the people of a state engage, like those of the swiss against austria and the duke of burgundy, of the catalans in , of the americans against england, of the dutch against phillip ii., and of the poles and circassians against russia. _civil wars_, where one portion of the state fights against the other, as the war of the roses in england, of the league in france, of the guelphs and ghibelines in italy, and of the factions in mexico and south america. it is not the present intention to enter into any discussion of these different kinds of war, but rather to consider the general subject, and to discuss such general principles and rules as may be applicable to all wars. war in its most extensive sense may be regarded both as a _science_ and an _art_. it is a science so far as it investigates general principles and institutes an analysis of military operations; and an art when considered with reference to the practical rules for conducting campaigns, sieges, battles, &c. so is engineering a science so far as it investigates the general principles of fortification, and also artillery, in analyzing the principles of gunnery; but both are arts when considered with reference to the practical rules for the construction, attack, and defence of forts, or for the use of cannon. this distinction has not always been observed by writers on this subject, and some have asserted that strategy is the _science_, and tactics the _art_ of war. this is evidently mistaking the general distinction between science, which investigates principles, and art, which forms practical rules. in popular language, however, it is usual to speak of _the military art_ when we refer to the general subject of war, and of _the military sciences_ when we wish to call attention more particularly to the scientific principles upon which the art is founded. we shall here consider the military art in this general sense, as including the entire subject of war. as thus defined, the military art may be divided into four distinct branches, viz.: st. _strategy_; d. fortification, or _engineering_; d. _logistics_; th. _tactics_. several general treatises on this art add another branch, called _the policy of war_, or the relations of war with the affairs of state. _strategy_ is defined to be the art of directing masses on decisive points, or the hostile movements of armies beyond the range of each other's cannon. _engineering_ embraces all dispositions made to enable troops to resist a superior force the longest time possible; and also the means resorted to by the opposing army to overcome these material obstacles. _logistics_ embraces the practical details of moving and supplying armies. _tactics_ is the art of bringing troops into action, or of moving them in the presence of an enemy, that is, within his view, and within the reach of his artillery. all these are most intimately connected. a fault in tactics may occasion the loss of strategic lines; the best combined manoeuvres on the field of battle may lead to no decisive results, when the position, or the direction of the operation is not strategic; sometimes not only battles, but entire campaigns, are lost through neglect of the engineer's art, or faults in his dispositions; again, armies would be of little use without the requisite means of locomotion and of subsistence. . _strategy_ regards the theatre of war, rather than the field of battle. it selects the important points in this theatre, and the lines of communication by which they may be reached; it forms the plan and arranges the general operations of a campaign; but it leaves it to the engineers to overcome material obstacles and to erect new ones; it leaves to logistics the means of supporting armies and of moving them on the chosen lines; and to tactics, the particular dispositions for battle, when the armies have reached the destined points. it is well to keep in mind these distinctions, which may be rendered still more obvious by a few illustrations. the point where several lines of communications either intersect or meet, and the centre of an arc which is occupied by the enemy, are strategic points; but tactics would reject a position equally accessible on all sides, especially with its flanks exposed to attack. sempronius at trebbia and varro at cannae, so placed their armies that the carthagenians attacked them, at the same time, in front, on the flanks, and in rear; the roman consuls were defeated: but the central strategic position of napoleon at rivoli was eminently successful. at the battle of austerlitz the allies had projected a _strategic_ movement to their left, in order to cut off napoleon's right from vienna; weyrother afterwards changed his plans, and executed a corresponding _tactical_ movement. by the former there had been some chance of success, but the latter exposed him to inevitable destruction. the little fort of koenigsten, from its advantageous position, was more useful to the french, in , than the vast works of dresden. the little fort of bard, with its handful of men, was near defeating the operations of napoleon in , by holding in check his entire army; whereas, on the other hand, the ill-advised lines of ticino, in , caused an army of , french to be defeated by only , men under prince eugene of savoy. war, as has already been said, may be either offensive or defensive. if the attacking army be directed against an entire state, it becomes a war of _invasion_. if only a province, or a military position, or an army, be attacked, it is simply regarded as taking the _initiative_ in offensive movements. _offensive_ war is ordinarily most advantageous in its moral and political influence. it is waged on a foreign soil, and therefore spares the country of the attacking force; it augments its own resources at the same time that it diminishes those of the enemy; it adds to the moral courage of its own army, while it disheartens its opponents. a war of invasion may, however, have also its disadvantages. its lines of operation may become too _deep_, which is always hazardous in an enemy's country. all the natural and artificial obstacles, such as mountains, rivers, defiles, fortifications, &c., are favorable for defence, but difficult to be overcome by the invader. the local authorities and inhabitants oppose, instead of facilitating his operations; and if patriotism animate the defensive army to fight for the independence of its threatened country, the war may become long and bloody. but if a political diversion be made in favor of the invading force, and its operations be attended with success, it strikes the enemy at the heart, paralyzes all his military energies, and deprives him of his military resources, thus promptly terminating the contest. regarded simply as the initiative of movements, the offensive is almost always the preferable one, as it enables the general to choose his lines for moving and concentrating his masses on the decisive point. the first and most important rule in offensive war is, to keep your forces as much concentrated as possible. this will not only prevent misfortune, but secure victory,--since, by its necessary operation, you possess the power of throwing your whole force upon any exposed point of your enemy's position. to this general rule some writers have laid down the following exceptions:-- st. when the food and forage of the neighborhood in which you act have been exhausted and destroyed, and your magazines are, from any cause, unable to supply the deficiency, one of two things must be done; either you must go to places where these articles abound, or you must draw from them your supplies by _detachments_. the former is rarely compatible with your plan, and necessarily retards its execution; and hence the preference which is generally given to the latter. d. when reinforcements are about to join you, and this can only be effected by a march through a country actually occupied by hostile corps, or liable to be so occupied, you must again waive the general rule, and risk one party for the security of the other; or, (which may be better,) make such movements with your main body as shall accomplish your object. d. when you have complete evidence of the actual, or probable insurrection in your favor, of a town or province of your enemy, or of a division of his army, you must support this inclination by strong _detachments_, or by movements of your main body. napoleon's operations in italy, in - , furnish examples of what is here meant. th. when, by dispatching a _detachment_, you may be able to intercept a convoy, or reinforcement, coming to the aid of your enemy. these are apparent rather than real exceptions to the rule of concentration. this rule does not require that _all the army should occupy the same position_. far from it. concentration requires the main body to be in immediate and supporting reach: small detachments, for temporary and important objects, like those mentioned, are perfectly legitimate, and in accordance with correct principles. napoleon's position in spain will serve as an illustration. a hand, placed on the map of that country, will represent the position of the invading forces. when opened, the fingers will represent the several detachments, thrown out on important strategic lines, and which could readily be drawn in, as in closing the hand, upon the principal and central mass, preparatory to striking some important blow. "if, as we have seen, it be the first great rule for an army acting on the offensive principle, to keep its forces _concentrated_, it is, no doubt, the second, _to keep them fully employed._ is it your intention to seize a particular province of your enemy? to penetrate to his capital? or to cut him off from his supplies? whatever measure be necessary to open your route to these objects must be _promptly_ taken; and if you mean to subsist yourself at his expense, your movements must be more rapid than his. give him time to _breathe_,--and above all, give him time to _rest_, and your project is blasted; his forages will be completed, and his magazines filled and secured. the roads of approach will be obstructed, bridges destroyed, and strong points everywhere taken and defended. you will, in fact, like burgoyne, in , reduce yourself to the necessity of bleeding at every step, without equivalent or use." "such cannot be the fate of a commander who, knowing all the value of acting on the offensive, shakes, by the vigor and address of his first movements, the moral as well as physical force of his enemy,--who, selecting his own time, and place, and mode of attack, confounds his antagonist by enterprises equally hardy and unexpected,--and who at last leaves to him only the alternative of resistance without hope, or of flying without resistance." the british army, in the war of the american revolution, must have been most wretchedly ignorant of these leading maxims for conducting offensive war. instead of concentrating their forces on some decisive point, and then destroying the main body of our army by repeated and well-directed blows, they scattered their forces over an immense extent of country, and became too weak to act with decision and effect on any one point. on the other hand, this policy enabled us to call out and discipline our scattered and ill-provided forces. the main object in _defensive_ war is, to protect the menaced territory, to retard the enemy's progress, to multiply obstacles in his way, to guard the vital points of the country, and--at the favorable moment, when the enemy becomes enfeebled by detachments, losses, privations, and fatigue--to assume the offensive, and drive him from the country. this combination of the defensive and offensive has many advantages. the enemy, being forced to take the defensive in his turn, loses much of the moral superiority due to successful offensive operations. there are numerous instances of this kind of war, "the defensive-offensive," as it is sometimes called, to be found in history. the last four campaigns of frederick the great of prussia, are examples which may serve as models. wellington played a similar part in the spanish peninsula. to merely remain in a defensive attitude, yielding gradually to the advances of the enemy, without any effort to regain such positions or provinces as may have fallen into his power, or to inflict on him some fatal and decisive blow on the first favorable opportunity; such a system is always within the reach of ignorance, stupidity, and cowardice; but such is far from being the true fabian system of defensive war. "instead of finding security only in flight; instead of habitually refusing to look the enemy in the face; instead of leaving his march undisturbed; instead of abandoning, without contest, points strong by nature or by art;--instead of all this, the true war of defence seeks every occasion to meet the enemy, and loses none by which it can annoy or defeat him; it is always awake; it is constantly in motion, and never unprepared for either attack or defence. when not employed in efforts of courage or address, it incessantly yields itself to those of labor and science. in its front it breaks up roads or breaks down bridges; while it erects or repairs those in its rear: it forms abbatis, raises batteries, fortifies passes, or intrenches encampments; and to the system of deprivation adds all the activity, stratagem, and boldness of _la petite guerre_. dividing itself into detachments, it multiplies its own attacks and the alarms of the enemy. collecting itself at a single point, it obstructs his progress for days, and sometimes for weeks together. does it even abandon the avenues it is destined to defend? it is but for the purpose of shielding them more securely, by the attack of his hospitals, magazines, convoys, or reinforcements. in a word, by adopting the maxim, that the _enemy must be made to pay for whatever he gains_, it disputes with him every inch of ground, and if at last it yields to him a victory, it is of that kind which calls forth only his sighs." in discussing the subject of strategy, certain technical terms are employed, such as _theatre of war; theatre of operations; base of operations_, or the line from which operations start; _objective points_, or points to which the operations are directed; _line of operations_, or the line along which an army moves; _key points_, or points which it is important for the defensive army to secure; _line of defence,_ or the line which it is important to defend at all hazards: and in general, _strategic points, strategic lines, strategic positions, &c._ as these terms are very generally used in military books, it may be well to make ourselves thoroughly acquainted with their import. after defining these terms and explaining their meaning and application, it is deemed best to illustrate their use by reference to well-known and striking historical examples. _the theatre of a war_ embraces not only the territory of the two belligerent powers, but also that of their allies, and of such secondary powers as, through fear or interest, may be drawn into the contest. with maritime nations it also embraces the seas, and sometimes crosses to another continent. some of the wars between france and england embraced the two hemispheres. _the theatre of operations_, however, is of a more limited character, and should not be confounded with the theatre of war. in general, it includes only the territory which an army seeks, on the one hand, to defend, and on the other, to invade. if two or more armies be directed towards the same object, though by different lines, their combined operations are included in the same theatre but if each acts independently of the others, and seeks distinct and separate objects, each must have its own independent theatre of operations. a war between france and austria may embrace all italy and germany, but the theatre of operations may be limited to only a portion of these countries. should the oregon question lead to hostilities between the united states and england, the theatre of war would embrace the greater part of north america and the two oceans, but the theatre of operations would probably be limited to canada and our northern frontier, with naval descents upon our maritime cities. the first point to be attended to in a plan of military operation is to select a good _base_. many circumstances influence this selection, such as mountains, rivers, roads, forests, cities, fortifications, military dépôts, means of subsistence, &c. if the frontier of a state contain strong natural or artificial barriers, it may serve not only as a good base for offensive operations, but also as an excellent line of defence against invasion. a single frontier line may, however, be penetrated by the enemy, and in that case a second or third base further in the interior becomes indispensable for a good defence. a french army carrying on military operations against germany would make the rhine its first base; but if driven from this it would form a second base on the meuse or moselle, a third on the seine, and a fourth on the loire; or, when driven from the first base, it would take others perpendicular to the front of defence, either to the right, on béfort and besançon, or to the left, on mézières and sedan. if acting offensively against prussia and russia, the rhine and the main would form the first base the elbe and the oder the second, the vistula the third, the nieman the fourth, and the dwina and the dnieper the fifth. a french army operating against spain would have the pyrenees for its first base; the line of the ebro for a second, resting its wings on the gulf of gascony and the mediterranean. if from this position it advance its left, possessing itself of the kingdom of valencia, the line of the sierra d'estellas becomes its third base of operations against the centre of spain. a base may be parallel, oblique, or perpendicular to our line of operations, or to the enemy's line of defence. some prefer one plan and some another; the best authorities, however, think the oblique or perpendicular more advantageous than the parallel; but we are not often at liberty to choose between these, for other considerations usually determine the selection. in , the french forces first moved perpendicular to their base on the main, but afterwards effected a change of front, and moved on a line oblique or nearly parallel to this base. they had pursued the same plan of operations in the seven years' war. the russians, in , based perpendicularly on the oka and the kalouga, and extended their flank march on wiozma and krasnoi; in , the allies, based perpendicularly on bohemia, succeeded in paralyzing napoleon's army on the elbe. an american army moving by lake champlain, would be based perpendicular on the great line of communication between boston and buffalo; if moving from the new england states on quebec and montreal, the line of operations would be oblique; and if moving from the niagara frontier by lake ontario and the st. lawrence, the line would be nearly parallel both to our base and to the enemy's line of defence--an operation, under the circumstances, exceedingly objectionable. any point in the theatre of operations which gives to the possessor an advantage over his opponent, is regarded as _strategic_. their geographical position and political and military character, give them a greater or less influence in directing the campaign. these points are occupied by the defensive army, and attacked by the offensive; if on or near the base, they become the _key_ points for the former, and the _objective_ points for the latter.[ ] there are also between these two a greater or less number of strategic points, which have an important though inferior influence upon the result of the war. [footnote : it may be well to remark that a strategic point is not necessarily a geometrical point; an entire province, or a considerable portion of a geographical frontier, is, in military language, sometimes denominated a _point_. in the same way, strategic lines, instead of being mathematical lines, are frequently many miles in width.] the first object of the french in attacking belgium, is to gain possession of the meuse, as this position would give them a decided advantage in any ulterior operations. in attacking southern germany, the course of the danube offers a series of points which exercise an important influence on the war. for northern germany, leipsic and the country bordering on the saale and the elbe, are objects often fiercely contested by the french and other belligerent powers. in a war between this country and england, montreal and the points on the st. lawrence between montreal and quebec, would become objects of the highest importance, and their possession would probably determine the result of the war. the capital of a state, from its political importance as well as its military influence, is almost always a decisive strategic point, and its capture is therefore frequently the object of an entire campaign. the possession of genoa, turin, alexandria, milan, &c., in , both from their political and military importance, had a decided influence upon the results of the war in these several states. in the same way venice, rome, and naples, in , vienna, in the campaigns of and , berlin, in , madrid, in , and paris, in and . if hannibal had captured the capital immediately after the battle of cannae;, he would thus have destroyed the roman power. the taking of washington, in , had little or no influence on the war, for the place was then of no importance in itself, and was a mere nominal capital. it, however, greatly influenced our reputation abroad, and required many brilliant successes to wash the blot from our national escutcheon. _lines of defence_ in strategy are either permanent or temporary. the great military frontiers of a state, especially when strengthened by natural and artificial obstacles, such as chains of mountains, rivers, lines of fortresses, &c., are regarded as permanent lines of defence. the alpine range between france and piedmont, with its fortified passes; the rhine, the oder, and the elbe, with their strongly-fortified places; the pyrenees, with bayonne at one extremity and perpignon at the other; the triple range of fortresses on the belgian frontier--are all permanent lines of defence. the st. lawrence river is a permanent line of defence for canada; and the line of lake champlain, the upper st. lawrence, and the lakes, for the united states. temporary lines of defence are such as are taken up merely for the campaign. napoleon's position in saxony, in ; the line of the allies in belgium, in ; the line of the marne, in , are examples of temporary lines of defence. it will be seen from these remarks that lines of defence are not necessarily bases of operation. _strategic positions_ are such as are taken up during the operations of a war, either by a _corps d'armée_ or grand detachment, for the purpose of checking or observing an opposing force; they are named thus to distinguish them from tactical positions or fields of battle. the positions of napoleon at rivoli, verona, and legnano, in and , to watch the adige; his positions on the passarge, in , and in saxony and silesia in front of his line of defence, in ; and massena's positions on the albis, along the limmat and the aar, in , are examples under this head. before proceeding further it may be well to illustrate the strategic relations of lines and positions by the use of diagrams. (fig. .) the army at a covers the whole of the ground in rear of the line dc perpendicular to the line ab, the position of the enemy being at b. (fig. .) aj being equal to bj, a will still cover every thing in rear of dc. (fig. .) if the army a is obliged to cover the point _a_, the army b will cover all the space without the circle whose radius is _a_ b; and of course a continues to cover the point _a_ so long as it remains within this circle _a_ b. _a line of operations_ embraces that portion of the theatre of war which an army or _corps d'armée_ passes over in attaining its object; _the front of operations_ is the front formed by the army as it advances on this line. when an army acts as a single mass, without forming independent corps, the line it follows is denominated a _simple line of operations_. if two or more corps act in an isolated manner, but against the same opposing force, they are said to follow _double_ or _multiple lines_. the lines by which moreau and jourdan entered germany in , were double lines; but napoleon's advance by bamberg and gera, in , although moving in seven distinct _corps d'armée,_ formed but a single line of operations. _interior lines of operations_ are those followed by an army which operates between the enemy's lines in such a way as to be able to concentrate his forces on one of these lines before the other can be brought to its assistance. for example, napoleon's line of operations in , between the marne and the seine, where he manoeuvred with so much skill and success against the immensely superior forces of the allies. _exterior lines_ present the opposite results; they are those which an army will form in moving on the extremities of the opposing masses. for example, the lines of the marne and the seine, followed by the army of silesia and the grand austro-russian army, in the campaign of . burgoyne's line of operations, in , was double and exterior. _concentric lines_ are such as start from distant points, and are directed towards the same object, either in the rear or in advance of their base. if a mass leaves a single point and separates into several distinct corps, taking divergent directions, it is said to pursue _eccentric lines_. lines are said to be _deep_, when the end to be attained is very distant from the base. the lines followed by a secondary or auxiliary force are denominated _secondary lines_. the lines pursued by the army of the sombre-et-meuse in , and by bagration in , were _secondary lines_, as the former were merely secondary to the army of the rhine, and the latter to that of barclay. _accidental lines_ are those which result from a change in the primitive plan of campaign, which give a new direction to the operations. these are of rare occurrence, but they sometimes lead to important results. the direction given to a line of operations depends not only on the geographical situation of the country, but also on the positions occupied by the enemy. the general plan of campaign is frequently determined on previous to beginning operations, but the choice of lines and positions must ordinarily result from the ulterior events of the war, and be made by the general as these events occur. as a general rule, _a line of operations should be directed upon the centre_, or _one of the extremities of the enemy's line of defence_; unless our forces be infinitely superior in number, it would be absurd to act against the front and extremities at the same time. if the configuration of the theatre of operations be favorable to a movement against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence, this direction maybe best calculated to lead to important results. (fig. .) in the army of the rhine was directed against the extreme left of the line of the black forest; the army of reserve was directed by the st. bernard and milan on the extreme right and rear of melas's line of defence: both operations were most eminently successful. (fig. .) it may be well to remark that it is not enough merely to gain the extremity and rear of the enemy, for in that case it may be possible for him to throw himself on our communications and place us in the very dilemma in which we had hoped to involve him. to avoid this danger it is necessary to give such a direction to the line of operations that our army shall preserve its communications and be able to reach its base. thus, if napoleon, in , after crossing the alps, had marched by turin on alexandria and received battle at marengo, without having first secured lombardy and the left of the po, his own line of retreat would have been completely cut off by melas; whereas, by the direction which he gave to his line of operations he had, in case of reverse, every means for reaching either the var or the valois. (fig. .) again, in , if he had marched directly from gera to leipsic, he would have been cut off from his base on the rhine; whereas, by turning from gera towards weimar, he not only cut off the prussians from the elbe, but at the same time secured to himself the roads of saalfield, schleitz, and hoff, thus rendering perfectly safe his communications in his rear. (fig. .) we have said that the configuration of the ground and the position of the hostile forces may _sometimes_ render it advisable to direct our line of operations against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence; but, _as a general rule_ a central direction will lead to more important results. this severs the enemy's means of resistance, and enables the assailant to strike, with the mass of his force, upon the dissevered and partially paralyzed members of the hostile body. (fig. .) such a plan of operations enabled napoleon, in the italian campaigns of and , to pierce and destroy, with a small force, the large and successive armies which austria sent against him. in his operations were both interior and central: in they were most eminently central: in , by the central operations in the vicinity of ratisbonne, he defeated the large and almost victorious army of the archduke charles: in , from his central position between the marne and seine, with only seventy thousand men against a force of more than two hundred thousand, he gained numerous victories, and barely failed of complete success. again in , with an army of only one hundred and twenty thousand men against an allied force of two hundred and twenty thousand, by his central advance on charleroi and ligny, he gained a most decided advantage over the enemy--an advantage lost by the eccentric movement of grouchy: and even in , his central position at dresden would have secured him most decisive advantages, had not the faults of his lieutenants lost these advantages in the disasters of kulm and the katzbach. for the same frontier it is objectionable to form more than one army; grand detachments and corps of observation may frequently be used with advantage, but double or multiple lines of operation are far less favorable than one simple line. it may however sometimes occur that the position of the enemy's forces will be such as to make this operation the preferable one. in that case, interior lines should always be adopted, unless we have a vast superiority in number. double exterior lines, with corps several days' march asunder, must be fatal, if the enemy, whether acting on single or double interior lines, take advantage of his position to concentrate his masses successively against our isolated forces. the roman armies under the consuls flaminius and servilius opposed hannibal on exterior lines, the one by florence and arrezzio, and the other by modena and ariminum. hannibal turned the position of flaminius and attacked the roman armies separately, gaining a complete and decisive victory. such also was the character of the operations of the french in , under pichegru and jourdan; they met with a bloody and decisive defeat. again in , the french armies under jourdan and moreau, pursued exterior lines; the archduke charles, from his interior position, succeeded in defeating both the opposing generals, and forcing them to retreat. if the two armies united had pursued a single line, the republican flag had been carried in triumph to vienna. _converging_ lines of operation are preferable, under most circumstances, to diverging lines. care should be taken, however, that the point of meeting be such that it may not be taken as a strategic position by the enemy, and our own forces be destroyed in detail, before they can effect a junction. in the main body of the austrians, under alvinzi, advanced against napoleon, on three separate lines, intending to concentrate at rivoli, and then attack the french in mass; but napoleon took his strategic position at rivoli, and overthrew the enemy's corps as they successively appeared. in the same way the archduke charles took an interior position, between moreau and jourdan, in , and prevented them from concentrating their forces on a single point. wurmser and quasdanowich attempted to concentrate their forces on the mincio, by moving on the opposite shores of lake garda; but napoleon took an interior position and destroyed them. in blucher and wellington, from their interior position, prevented the junction of napoleon and grouchy. _diverging_ lines may be employed with advantage against an enemy immediately after a successful battle or strategic manoeuvre; for by this means we separate the enemy's forces, and disperse them; and if occasion should require it, may again concentrate our forces by converging lines. such was the manoeuvre of frederick the great, in , which produced the battles of rosbach and leuthen; such also was the manoeuvre of napoleon at donawert in , at jena in , and at ratisbon in . _interior_ lines of operations, when properly conducted, have almost invariably led to success: indeed every instance of failure may be clearly traced to great unskilfulness in their execution, or to other extraneous circumstances of the campaign. there may, however, be cases where it will be preferable to direct our forces on the enemy's flank; the geographical character of the theatre of war, the position of other collateral forces, &c., rendering such a direction necessary. but as a general rule, interior and central lines, for an army of moderate forces, will lead to decisive results. napoleon's italian campaigns in and , the campaign of the archduke charles in , napoleon's campaigns of and against austria, and of and against prussia and russia, of in spain, his manoeuvres in , between the battle of brienne and that of paris, and his operations previous to the battle of ligny in , are all brilliant examples under this head. to change the line of operations, in the middle of a campaign, and follow _accidental lines_, is always a delicate affair, and can only be resorted to by a general of great skill, and with disciplined troops. in such a case it may be attended with important results. it was one of napoleon's maxims, that "a line of operations, when once chosen, should never be abandoned." this maxim, however, must sometimes be disregarded by an army of undisciplined troops, in order to avoid entire destruction; but the total abandonment of a line of operations is always attended with great loss, and should be regarded as a mere choice of evils. a regular army can always avoid this result, by changing the direction of its line; thus frequently gaining superior advantages in the new theatre of action. if the plan of this change be the result of a good _coup d'oeil_, and it be skilfully executed, the rear of the operating army will be secure from the enemy; and moreover, he will be left in doubt respecting its weak points. but such is the uncertainty of this manoeuvre, that it is very rarely taken by the best troops, unless actually forced upon them. if the army be of incongruous materials, generally a change of direction will be less advantageous than to entirely abandon the line, and save as many as possible of the troops for some new plan of operations. (maxim .) if, however, the undisciplined army be sustained by fortifications, it can take up the _accidental line of operations_ in the same manner, and with the same probability of success, as is done by a regular force. we have examples of accidental lines in the operations of the king of prussia, after the battle of hohenkirchen, and of washington, in new-jersey, after the action of princeton. this is one of the finest in military history. napoleon had projected a change in his line of operations, in case he lost the battle of austerlitz; but victory rendered its execution unnecessary. again in he had planned an entire change of operations; but the want of co-operation of the forces under mortier and marmont forced him to abandon a plan which, if properly executed, had probably defeated the allies. jomini pronounced it one of the most brilliant of his military career. having explained the principal terms used in strategy, let us trace out the successive operations of war in their usual strategic relations. we will suppose war to be declared, and the army to be just entering upon a campaign. the political and military authorities of the state determine upon the nature of the war, and select the theatre of its enterprises. the chief selects certain points, on or near the borders of the seat of war, where his troops are to be assembled, and his _materiel_ collected. these points, together, form his base of operations. he now selects some point, within the theatre of the war, as the first object of his enterprises, and chooses the line of operations most advantageous for reaching this objective point. the temporary positions taken on this line become strategic positions, and the line in his rear, a line of defence. when he arrives in the vicinity of his first object, and the enemy begins to oppose his enterprises, he must force this enemy to retreat, either by an attack or by manoeuvres. for this purpose he temporarily adopts certain lines of manoeuvre, which may deviate from his general line of operations. the ulterior events of the campaign may possibly cause him to make these new, or accidental lines, his lines of operations. the approach of hostile forces may cause him to detach secondary corps on secondary lines; or to divide his army, and pursue double or multiple lines. the primitive object may also be relinquished, and new ones proposed, with new lines and new plans of operations. as he advances far from his primitive base, he forms new depots and lines of magazines. he may encounter natural and artificial obstacles. to cross large rivers in the face of an enemy is a hazardous operation; and he requires all the art of the engineer in constructing bridges, and securing a safe passage for his army. if a fortified place is to be taken, he will detach a siege corps, and either continue his march with the main army, or take a strategic position to cover this siege. thus napoleon, in , with an army of only , combatants, could not venture to penetrate into austria, with mantua and its garrison of , men in his rear, and an austrian force of , before him. but in the great superiority of his army enabled him to detach forces to besiege the principal fortresses of silesia, and still to continue his operations with his principal forces. the chief of the army may meet the enemy under circumstances such as to induce or compel him to give battle. if he should be victorious, the enemy must be pursued and harassed to the uttermost. if he should be defeated, he must form the best plan, and provide the best means of retreat. if possible, he must take shelter in some line of fortifications, and prepare to resume the offensive. lines of intrenchment and temporary works may sometimes serve him as a sufficient protection. finally, when the unfavorable season compels him to suspend his operations, he will go into winter cantonments, and prepare for a new campaign. such are the ordinary operations of war: its relations to strategy must be evident, even to the most superficial reader. not unfrequently the results of a campaign depend more upon the strategic operations of an army, than upon its victories gained in actual combat. tactics, or movements within the range of the enemy's cannon, is therefore subordinate to the _choice of positions_: if the field of battle be properly chosen, success will be decisive, and the loss of the battle not disastrous; whereas, if selected without reference to the principles of the science, the victory, if gained, might be barren, and defeat, if suffered, totally fatal: thus demonstrating the truth of napoleon's maxim, that success is oftener due to the genius of the general, and to the nature of the theatre of war, than to the number and bravery of the soldiers. (maxim , .) we have a striking illustration of this in the french army of the danube, which, from the left wing of general kray, marched rapidly through switzerland to the right extremity of the austrian line, "and by this movement alone conquered all the country between the rhine and danube without pulling a trigger." again, in , the army of mack was completely paralyzed, and the main body forced to surrender, at ulm, without a single important battle. in , the prussians were essentially defeated even before the battle of jena. the operations about heilesberg, in , the advance upon madrid, in , the manoeuvres about ratisbon, in , the operations of the french in , and the first part of the campaign of , against vastly superior numbers, are all familiar proofs of the truth of the maxim. strategy may therefore be regarded as the most important, though least understood, of all the branches of the military art.[ ] [footnote : strategy may be learned from didactic works or from general military histories. there are very few good elementary works on this branch of the military art. the general treatises of the archduke charles, and of general wagner, in german, (the former has been translated into french,) are considered as the best. the discussions of jomini on this subject in his great work on the military art, are exceedingly valuable; also the writings of rocquancourt, jacquinot de presle, and gay de vernon. the last of these has been translated into english, but the translation is exceedingly inaccurate. the military histories of lloyd, templehoff, jomini, the archduke charles, grimoard, gravert, souchet, st. cyr, beauvais, laverne, stutterheim, wagner, kausler, gourgaud and montholon, foy, mathieu dumas, ségur, pelet, koch, clausewitz, and thiers, may be read with great advantage. napier's history of the peninsular war is the only english history that is of any value as a _military_ work: it is a most excellent book. alison's great history of europe is utterly worthless to the military man; the author is ignorant of the first principles of the military art, and nearly every page is filled with the grossest blunders. we subjoin the titles of a few of the best works that treat of strategy, either directly or in connection with military history. _principes de la stratégie, &c._, par le prince charles, traduit de l'allemand, vols. in vo. this is a work of great merit. the technical terms, however, are very loosely employed. _précis de l'art de la guerre_, par le baron jomini. his chapter on strategy embodies the principles of this branch of the art. _grundsätze der strategic_, von wagner. _cours elémentaire d'art et d'histoire militaire_, par rocquancourt. this work contains much valuable information connected with the history of the art of war; but it is far too diffuse and ill-arranged for an elementary book. _cours d'art et d'histoire militaire_, par jacquinot de presle. this work is especially designed for cavalry officers, and the other branches of military service are but very briefly discussed. de vernon's treatise on the science of war and fortification contains much valuable information; but, as an elementary book, it has the same objections as that of rocquancourt. _history of the seven years' war_, by lloyd and templehoff. the military writings of lloyd and templehoff are valuable as connected with the history of strategy; but many of the principles laid down by these writers are now regarded as erroneous. _mémoires de napoléon_. the memoirs of napoleon, as dictated by himself to gourgaud and montholon, have been translated into english. it is hardly necessary to remark that they contain all the general principles of military art and science. no military man should fail to study them thoroughly. the matter is so condensed, and important principles are embodied in so few words, that they are not easily understood by the ordinary reader, and probably will never be popular with the multitude. _essai général de tactique_, par guibert. a work very popular in its day, but now far less valuable than the writings already mentioned. _ausführliche beschreibung der schlacht des pirmasens_, von gravert. regarded by military men as a valuable historical fragment. _mémoires sur les campagnes en espagne_. souchet. _mémoires de gouvion st. cyr._ _statistique de la guerre_, par reveroni st. cyr. _première campagnes de la revolution_, par grimoard. _victoires et conquêtes_. beauvais. _campagnes de suwarrow_. laverne. _histoire de la guerre de la péninsule_. foy. _précis des evénements militaires_. mathieu dumas. _histoire de napoléon et de la grande armée en _. ségur _mémoires sur la guerre de _. pelet. _la campagne de _. koch. _vom kriege--die feldzügge, &c._ clausewitz. _la révolution, le consulat et l'empire._ thiers. _mémoires sur la guerre de --sur la campagne du vice roi en italie, en et ; histoire de la guerre en allemagne en ; histoire des campagnes de et , en france_. vaudoncourt. _essai sur l'art militaire, &c._ carion-nisas. _histoire de l'expédition en russie en _. chambray. _war in spain, portugal, and the south of france_. john jones. _peninsular war_. napier. _notices of the war of _. armstrong all the above are works of merit; but none are more valuable to the military man than the military histories of jomini and kausler, with their splendid diagrams and maps.] chapter iii. fortifications. _fortifications, or engineering_, may be considered with reference to the defence of states and the grand operation of armies; or with reference to the details of the construction, and attack, and defence of forts, and the influence of field-works on the tactical manoeuvres of armies. it is proposed to speak here only of its general character, as a branch of the military art, without entering into any professional discussion of details. the connection of fortification and strategy may be considered under two distinct heads: st, the choice of sites for constructing fortresses for defence; d, their influence in offensive operations, and the determination of the question whether they can be passed with safety, or whether the attacking force will be under the necessity of besieging them. the centre and extremities of _a base of operations_ should always be secured either by natural or artificial obstacles. this base is generally chosen so that fortifications will be necessary for strengthening only a part of the line. but if a frontier, like the side of france towards belgium, be destitute of natural obstacles, the artificial means of defence must be proportionally increased. great care should be taken that permanent fortifications be made only on such places as may favor military operations. if otherwise, the troops detached from the active army for garrisoning them, will only tend to weaken this force without any corresponding advantages. in this way, fortifications may become actually injurious to defence. a number of the european fortresses which were built before the subject of strategy was properly understood, are now regarded as utterly useless, from their ill-advised positions. whether a fortress may be safely passed with merely blockading or observing it, depends very much upon the nature of the war, and the numbers and position of the defensive army. the allies, in , invading france with a million of soldiers, assisted by the political diversion of factions and bourbonists within the kingdom, and treason in the frontier fortresses, and even in the ranks of napoleon's army, could conduct their military operations on a very different plan from that which would be adopted by either austria, prussia, russia, england, spain, portugal, holland, italy, and the german powers, if singly waging war with the french. napoleon sometimes detached a corps to observe a fortress which threatened his line of operations or of manoeuvre; at others, he delayed his advance till the place could be reduced. "an army," says jomini, "may sometimes penetrate between places on an open frontier, to attack the enemy's forces in the field, taking care at the same time to _observe_ these places; but no invading army can cross a great river, like the danube, the rhine, or the elbe, without reducing at least one of the fortresses on that river, so as to secure a line of retreat; but being in possession of such a place, it can continue the offensive, while its _matériel de siège_ successively reduces the other places." in case the main army is obliged to remain and cover the besieging corps, it should take some central position, where it can command all the avenues of approach, and fall with vigor on the enemy, should he attempt to raise the siege. napoleon's operations before mantua, in , offer the finest model for imitation. the old system of intrenched camps and lines of contravallation is unsuited to the spirit of modern warfare. in ancient times, and more particularly in the middle ages, too much importance was attached to tactical positions, and not enough to strategic points and lines. this gave to fortifications a character that never properly belonged to them. from the middle ages down to the period of the french revolution, wars were carried on mainly by the system of positions--one party confining their operations to the security of certain important places, while the other directed their whole attention to the siege and capture of these places. but carnot and napoleon changed this system, at the same time with the system of tactics, or rather, returned from it to the old and true system of strategic operations. some men, looking merely at the fact that a _change_ was made, but without examining the _character_ of that change, have rushed headlong to the conclusion that fortified places are now utterly useless in war, military success depending entirely upon a good system of marches. on this subject, general jomini, the great military historian of the wars of the french revolution, remarks that "we should depend entirely upon neither organized masses, nor upon material obstacles, whether natural or artificial. to follow exclusively either of these systems would be equally absurd. the true science of war consists in choosing a just medium between the two extremes. the wars of napoleon demonstrated the great truth, that distance can protect no country from invasion, but that a state, to be secure, must have a good system of fortresses, and a good system of military reserves and military institutions." in all military operations _time_ is of vast importance. if a single division of an army can be retarded for a few hours only, it not unfrequently decides the fate of the campaign. had the approach of blucher been delayed for a few hours, napoleon must have been victorious at the battle of waterloo. an equilibrium can seldom be sustained for more than six or seven hours between forces on the field of battle; but in this instance, the state of the ground rendered the movements so slow as to prolong the battle for about twelve hours; thus enabling the allies to effect a concentration in time to save wellington. many of napoleon's brilliant victories resulted from merely bringing troops to bear suddenly upon some decisive point. rivoli in - , marengo in , ulm in , jena in , ratisbon in , brienne in , and ligny in , are familiar examples. but this concentration of forces, even with a regular army, cannot be calculated on by the general with any degree of certainty, unless his communications are perfectly secure. and this difficulty is very much increased where the troops are new and undisciplined. when a country like ours is invaded, large numbers of such troops must suddenly be called into the field. not knowing the designs of the invaders, much time will be lost in marches and countermarches; and if there be no safe places of resort the operations must be indecisive and insecure. to a defensive army fortifications are valuable as points of repose, upon which the troops, if beaten, may fall back, and shelter their sick and wounded, collect their scattered forces, repair their materials, and draw together a new supply of stores and provisions; and as rallying points, where new troops may be assembled with safety, and the army, in a few days, be prepared to again meet the enemy in the open field. without these defences, undisciplined and inexperienced armies, when once routed, can seldom be rallied again, except with great losses. but when supported by forts, they can select their opportunity for fighting, and offer or refuse battle according to the probability of success; and, having a safe place of retreat, they are far less influenced by fear in the actual conflict. the enemy, on the other hand, being compelled either to besiege or _observe_ these works, his army will be separated from its magazines, its strength and efficiency diminished by detachments, and his whole force exposed to the horrors of partisan warfare. it has therefore been estimated by the best military writers, that an army supported by a judicious system of fortifications, can repel a land force _six_ times as large as itself. every government should prepare, in time of peace, its most prominent and durable means of defence. by securing in a permanent manner its important points, it will enable a small force to retain possession of these places against a greatly superior army, for a considerable length of time. this serves the same purpose as a battle gained; for, in the beginning of a war of invasion, the economy of time is of the utmost importance to the defensive party, enabling it to organize and prepare the great military resources of the state. in all mountainous frontiers, or sides of states bordering on large rivers, or chains of lakes, there will necessarily be but few points by which an invader can penetrate into the interior of the country. let us suppose that, for a frontier of moderate extent, there are _five_ passes, or avenues through which the enemy may approach the interior. to effectually defend these approaches against the invading army will require, for each, an army of ten thousand men. not being able to decide positively on the plans of the enemy, all these communications must be defended at the same time. this requires a defending army of fifty thousand men. let us now suppose each of these passes to be fortified in such a way, that one thousand men will be able to hold the enemy in check, and force him to resort to the operations of a siege; or, at least, to retard his advance till an active army can be organized in the interior, and prepared to meet him in the field. we here see that five thousand men, by means of fortifications, can accomplish the same defensive object as fifty thousand men without these artificial means of security. but let us enter a little more into the details of frontier defences, and examine the character of the several systems which have been successively proposed or adopted. frontiers are divided into four distinct classes, according as the state may be open on one or more sides, or bounded by mountains, large rivers and lakes, or by the sea. an open frontier is the most difficult of defence; and while there exists a perfect uniformity among military men upon the vast importance of fortifying such a frontier, there is an equal diversity of opinion respecting the best manner of arranging these works. we shall here mention three general systems of arranging forts for the defence of an open country, each of which has been advocated at different times, and afterwards received various modifications and additions. these three systems comprise the main features of all others worthy of much consideration. they are:-- st. the system of continuous lines, proposed by montalembert. d. a system of three lines of detached works, strongly recommended by d'arçon and others. d. a system proposed by vauban, and advocated by rogniat, consisting of lines of very strong works, placed at considerable distances from each other and covering large _intrenched camps_. the first of these systems was proposed in , and for a time attracted considerable notice in france, but has long since been discarded, as being utterly incompatible with the principles of the military art. a writer, however, of some pretensions in this country, recommends its adoption for the defence of baltimore and the shores of the chesapeake. the same author would dispense entirely with our present system of fortifications on the sea-coast, and substitute in their place wooden martello towers! this would be very much like building gun ships at pittsburg and memphis, for the defence of the ohio and the mississippi rivers, and sending out duck-boats to meet the enemy on the atlantic! in the second system, the works on the extreme frontier are to be placed about thirty or forty miles apart, and those of the second and third lines respectively thirty or forty miles in rear of the first and second lines, and opposite the intervals. in the third system, first recommended by vauban and more recently by rogniat, the works are to be arranged in the same manner as in that of d'arçon, but the distance between them is to be from seventy to one hundred miles, and each fort arranged for covering a large intrenched camp. either of these last two systems is well suited to the defence of an open frontier. the former is applied to the side of france towards belgium, and the latter, with certain modifications, to the defence of western germany. the first line of fortifications on the northern frontier of france consists of dunkirk, lille, valenciennes, condé, quesnoy, rocroi, charlemont, mézières, and sedan; the second line, of calais, andres, st. omer, béthune, arras, douai, chambrai, landrecies, and avesnes; the third line, of boulogne, montreuil, hesdin, abbeville, amiens, bapaume, peronne, ham, and laon. for mountainous frontiers it is deemed necessary to secure all the important passes with small redoubts or military works, and to defend with strong forts the grand interior strategic points on which these communications are directed. for a frontier of moderate extent there may be some six or eight gorges in the mountains by which an army might penetrate; but it will always be found that these roads concentrate on two or three points in the great valleys below. take, for example, the frontier of france towards switzerland and italy. the passes of the mountains are secured by the little works of fort l'ecluse, fort pierre-châtel, fort barraux, briançon, mont dauphin, colmars, entrevaux, and antibes; while besançon, grenoble, and toulon, form a second line; and lyons a grand central dépôt. where a great river or chain of lakes forms the boundary of a state, the system of defence will be much the same as that of an open land frontier, the works of the first line being made to secure the great bridges or ferries by which the enemy might effect a passage; those of the second line, to cover the passes of the highlands that generally approach more or less near the great watercourse; and those of the third line, far enough in rear to protect the great internal communications of the country. let us take, for example, the side of france bordering on the rhine. wissembourg and lauterbourg, fort louis, haguenau, strasbourg, schelstadt, neuf-brisach, and huneguen, cover the several passages of the river; while bitche, phalsbourg, and béfort form a second line; thionville, metz, and toul, a third line; and verdun a grand central dépôt. the following are the principal objects proposed to be accomplished by fortifications on a sea-coast. st. to close all important harbors to an enemy, and secure them to the navy of the country. d. to prevent the enemy from forming an establishment on our shores, from which, by his naval superiority, he might destroy our commerce and keep the whole frontier in continual alarm. d. to cover our great cities against a maritime attack and bombardment. th. to cover our ship-yards and great naval depots. th. to prevent, as much as possible, the great avenues of interior navigation from being blockaded by naval means at their entrance into the ocean. th. to give to our navy facilities for protecting our coast trade from the enemy's ships of war, and our internal communications, which lie near the coast, from maritime descents. let us notice how france has attempted to accomplish this object. the mediterranean frontier has fort quarré, fort st. marguérite, st. tropez, brigançon, the forts of point man, of l'ertissac, and of langoustier, toulon, st. nicholas, castle of if, marseilles, tour de boue, aigues-montes, fort st. louis, fort brescou, narbonne, château de salces, perpignan, collioure, fort st. elme, and port vendre. toulon is the great naval dépôt for this frontier, and marseilles the great commercial port. both are well secured by strong fortifications. the atlantic frontier has bayonne; the forts of royan, grave, medoc, paté, &c., on the gironde; rochefort, with the forts of chapus, lapin, aix, oleron, &c., to cover the roadstead; la rochelle, with the forts of the isle of ré; sables, with the forts of st. nicholas, and des moulines, isle dieu, belle isle, fort du pilier, mindin, ville martin; quiberon, with fort penthièvre; l'orient, with its harbor defences; fort cigogne; brest, with its harbor defences; st. malo, with forts cézembre, la canchée, l'anse du verger, and des rimains; cherbourg, with its defensive forts and batteries; havre, dieppe, boulogne, calais, and dunkirk. cherbourg, brest, and rochefort, are great naval dépôts; and havre, nantes, and bordeaux, the principal commercial ports. many of the works above enumerated are small in extent and antiquated in their construction, and some of them quite old and dilapidated nevertheless, they have heretofore been found sufficient for the defence of the naval depots and commercial seaports of france against the superior naval forces of her neighbor. omitting for the present all discussion of sea-coast defences, let us examine more particularly the character and influence of fortifications on land frontiers. all military writers agree that fortifications have heretofore exerted a great, and frequently a decisive, influence on the operations of a war. those of france are frequently referred to as proofs of this influence. but, while all are disposed to allow that these works contributed much in former times to the defence of states, yet some have said that modern improvements in the mode of attack have rendered forts far less valuable than formerly. such, however, is not the case. improvements in the mode of attack have not kept pace with the facilities of locomotion; and, although fortifications do not now usually sustain a siege of as _many days_ as in former times, still, as compared with the relative lengths of campaigns in ancient and modern wars, the _proportional_ length of sieges is now even _greater_ than formerly. when the same is accomplished in a campaign of seven weeks as was formerly done in a war of seven years, it is not necessary that fortified places should hold out a very long time. a place that can sustain a siege of a month is now deemed sufficiently strong for ordinary campaigns; for by the end of that time the defensive army will either be destroyed, or be able to come to its succor. in either case a longer defence would not be required. a reference to the most important sieges of the last century or two will show that forts are, on an average, capable of sustaining a siege for more than that length of time. lille, in , held the allies in check for a whole year; and again, in , compelled the austrians to raise the siege after an unsuccessful attack of fifteen days. antwerp, in , sustained a siege of fourteen months against greatly superior forces; in carnot defended the citadel of this place for four months, and until an armistice had been concluded between the contending parties; in , it sustained, with a garrison of only , men and pieces of ordnance, a siege of twenty-five days, against a force of , men and cannon. namur, near the end of the seventeenth century, sustained a siege of ten weeks. ismaïl, in , sustained a siege of more than two months against the russians. maestricht, in , sustained a siege of nearly two weeks; and again, in , sustained a blockade and siege of nearly two months. magdeburg, in the thirty years' war, resisted the army of wallenstein for seven months; and in - , although garrisoned by only , men, it for a long time resisted the overwhelming forces of the allies. dantzic, at the same time, sustained a siege against superior forces for more than nine months. landau, in , sustained a siege of nine months. valenciennes and mayence, in , each sustained a siege of about three months. charleroi, fort vauban, and l'ecluse, in , each sustained a siege of about thirty days. quesnoy, in , sustained a siege of about three weeks. rosas, in , sustained a siege of some seventy days. mantua, in - , protected from invasion, for eight months, the tyrol and the heart of the austrian monarchy. kehl and huninguen, in , sheltered moreau for three months against all the efforts of the archduke charles. st. jean d'acre, in , sustained a siege of sixty days of open trench. ulm, in , held moreau in check for more than a month. genoa, in , sustained a blockade of sixty and a siege of forty days. saragossa in sustained a close siege of near two months; and in it was again besieged for two months. rosas in sustained a siege of thirty days. gerona in sustained a siege and blockade of seven months, nearly four of them being of open trench. mequinenza (a very small work) in sustained a siege of more than two weeks. astorga in sustained a siege of thirty days; twenty-four being of open trench. lerida in sustained a siege of thirty days, two weeks being of open trench. ciudad rodrigo in sustained a siege of two months. almeida in sustained a siege of more than a month. tortosa in sustained a siege of six months. tarragona in sustained a siege of nearly two months. badajos in sustained a siege of more than forty days open trench. lerida in sustained a siege of two weeks open trench. saguntum in sustained a siege of a month. valencia in - sustained a siege of two months ciudad rodrigo in sustained a blockade of several months, and a close siege of two weeks. badajos in sustained twenty-one days of open trenches. burgos in sustained thirty-three days of open trenches. st. sebastian in sustained a siege and blockade of nearly three months, with fifty-nine days of open trenches. pampeluna in sustained a siege of more than four months. monzon in - also sustained a siege of more than four months. this list might be increased with numerous other examples, to show that even poorly fortified towns are capable of defending themselves, on an average, for more than a month. these examples, be it remembered, are nearly all taken from a period of history since any material improvements have been made in the art of attack. since the time of vauban the improvements in attack have not kept pace with the increased means of defence. moreover, these examples are taken from the sieges of towns defended mainly by old and antiquated works, and entirely incapable of offering the same resistance as detached fortifications, with all the modern improvements. the value of fortifications, as land defences, is sufficiently proved by showing their general capability of resisting an invader, even for a limited period; thus affording us time and opportunity to provide other means of security. but it must not be inferred that forts besieged _en règle_ will necessarily fall after so many days. such is far from being the case. the besieged have usually great advantages over the besiegers; and unless the latter are vastly superior in number, or the work is of a very inferior character, or the garrison is destitute of the requisite means and energy to resist an attack, they will not be taken. mezieres was not taken in ; nor marseilles in ; nor peronne in ; nor landrecies in ; nor metz in ; nor montauban in ; nor lerida in ; nor maestricht in ; nor vienna in , and again in ; nor turin in ; nor conde in ; nor lille in ; nor landau in ; nor ulm in ; nor saragossa in ; nor burgos in . this list might be extended almost indefinitely with the names of places that could be reduced neither by force nor by starvation. but, as has already been noticed, some have asserted that fortifications have become of little comparative importance, under the new system of warfare introduced during the wars of the french revolution. on this subject let us consult the opinions of the best military judges of the present century. napoleon says of fortifications, "they are an excellent means of retarding, fettering, enfeebling, and disquieting a conquering foe." "the possession of strategic points," says the archduke charles, "is decisive in military operations; and the most efficacious means should, therefore, be employed to defend points whose preservation is the country's safeguard. this object is accomplished by fortifications, inasmuch as they can resist, for a given time, with a small number of troops, every effort of a much larger force; fortifications should, therefore, be regarded as the basis of a good system of defence." "it should be a maxim of state policy in every country, to fortify, in time of peace, all such points, and to arrange them with great care, so that they can be defended by a small number of troops. for the enemy, knowing the difficulty of getting possession of these works, will look twice before he involves himself in a war." "establishments which can secure strategic advantages are not the works of a moment; they require time and labor. he who has the direction of the military forces of a state, should, in time of peace, prepare for war." "the proper application or neglect of these principles will decide the safety or the ruin of the state." "fortifications arrest the enemy in the pursuit of his object, and direct his movements on less important points;--he must either force these fortified lines, or else hazard enterprises upon lines which offer only disadvantages. in fine, a country secured by a system of defences truly strategic, has no cause to fear either the invasion or the yoke of the enemy; for he can advance to the interior of the country only through great trouble and ruinous efforts. of course, lines of fortifications thus arranged cannot shelter a state against all reverses; but these reverses will not, in this case, be attended by total ruin; for they cannot take from the state the means nor the time for collecting new forces; nor can they ever reduce it to the cruel alternative of submission or destruction." "fortifications," says jomini, "fulfil two objects of capital importance,-- st. the protection of the frontiers; and d. assisting the operations of the army in the field." "every part of the frontiers of a state should be secured by one or two great places of refuge, secondary places, and even small posts for facilitating the active operations of the armies. cities girt with walls and slight ditches may often be of great utility in the interior of a country, as places of deposit, where stores, magazines, hospitals, &c., may be sheltered from the incursions of the enemy's light troops. these works are more especially valuable where such stores, in order not to weaken the regular army by detachments, are intrusted to the care of raw and militia forces." it is not supposed that any system of fortifications can hermetically close a frontier; "but, although they of themselves can rarely present an absolute obstacle to the advance of the hostile army, yet it is indisputable that they straiten its movements, change the direction of its marches, and force it into detachments; while, on the contrary, they afford all the opposite advantages to the defensive army; they protect its marches, favor its debouches, cover its magazines, its flanks, and its movements, and finally furnish it with a place of refuge in time of need." these opinions were uttered, be it remembered, long since the period at which modern military quacks date the downfall of fortifications as inland defences, by men, too, who were not engineers, and consequently had no professional predilections in favor of fortifications. the archduke charles, as a general, knew no rival but napoleon, and general jomini is universally regarded as the first military historian of the age. the truth of their remarks on fortifications is most fully confirmed by the military histories of germany and france. for a long period previous to the thirty years' war, its strong castles and fortified cities secured the german empire from attacks from abroad, except on its extensive frontier, which was frequently assailed, but no enemy was able to penetrate to the interior till a want of union among its own princes opened its strongholds to the swedish conqueror; nor then, did the cautious gustavus adolphus venture far into its territories till he had obtained possession of all the military works that might endanger his retreat. again, in the seven years' war, when the french neglected to secure their foothold in germany, by placing in a state of defence the fortifications that fell into their power, the first defeat rendered their ground untenable, and threw them from the elbe back upon the rhine and the mayne. they afterwards took the precaution to fortify their positions, and to secure their magazines under shelter of strong places, and, consequently, were enabled to maintain themselves in the hostile country till the end of the war, notwithstanding the inefficiency of their generals, the great reverses they sustained in the field, the skill and perseverance of the enemy they were contending with, and the weak and vacillating character of the cabinet that directed them. but this system of defence was not so carefully maintained in the latter part of the eighteenth century, for at the beginning of the french revolution, says jomini, "germany had too few fortifications; they were generally of a poor character, and improperly located." france, on the contrary, was well fortified: and although without armies, and torn in pieces by domestic factions, (we here use the language of the archduke,) "she sustained herself against all europe; _and this was because her government, since the reign of louis xiii_., _had continually labored to put her frontiers into a defensive condition agreeably to the principles of strategy_; starting from such a system for a basis, she subdued every country on the continent that was not thus fortified; and this reason alone will explain how her generals sometimes succeeded in destroying an army, and even an entire state, merely by a strategic success." this may be illustrated by reference to particular campaigns. in , when the duke of brunswick invaded france, she had no armies competent to her defence. their numbers upon paper were somewhat formidable, it is true, but the license of the revolution had so loosened the bonds of discipline as to effect an almost complete disorganization. "it seemed, at this period," says the historian, "as if the operations of the french generals were dependent upon the absence of their enemies: the moment they appeared, the operations were precipitately abandoned." but france had on her eastern frontier a triple line of good fortresses, although her miserable soldiery were incapable of properly defending them. the several works of the first and second lines fell, one after another, before the slow operations of a prussian siege, and the duke of brunswick was already advancing upon the third, when dumourier, with only twenty-five thousand men, threw himself into this line, and by a well-conducted war of positions, placing his raw and unsteady forces behind unassailable intrenchments, succeeded in repelling a disciplined army nearly four times as numerous as his own. had no other obstacle than the french troops been interposed between paris and the prussians, all agree that france must have fallen. in the campaign, of , the french army in flanders were beaten in almost every engagement, and their forces reduced to less than one half the number of the allies. the french general turned traitor to his country, and the national guards deserted their colors and returned to france. the only hope of the republicans, at this crisis, was vauban's line of flemish fortresses. these alone saved france. the strongholds of lille, condé, valenciennes, quesnoy, landrecies, &c., held the austrians in check till the french could raise new forces and reorganize their army. "the important breathing-time which the sieges of these fortresses," says an english historian, "afforded to the french, and the immense advantage which they derived from the new levies which they received, and fresh organization which they acquired during that important period, is a signal proof of the vital importance of fortresses in contributing to national defence. napoleon has not hesitated to ascribe to the three months thus gained the salvation of france. it is to be constantly recollected that the republican armies were then totally unable to keep the field; that behind the frontier fortresses there was neither a defensive position, nor a corps to reinforce them; and that if driven from their vicinity, the capital was taken and the war concluded." in the following year, , when france had completed her vast armaments, and, in her turn, had become the invading power, the enemy had no fortified towns to check the progress of the republican armies; which, based on strong works of defence, in a few weeks overran flanders, and drove the allies beyond the rhine. in the campaign of , when the army of moreau had been forced into a precipitate retreat by the admirable strategic operations of the archduke charles, the french forces owed their safety to the fortifications on the rhine. these works arrested the enemy's pursuit and obliged him to resort to the tedious operations of sieges; and the reduction of the french advanced posts alone, kehl and huninguen, poorly as they were defended, employed all the resources of the austrian army, and the skill of their engineers, from early in october till late in february. kehl was at first assaulted by a force _four_ times as numerous as the garrison; if the enemy had succeeded, he would have cut off moreau's retreat, and destroyed his army. fortunately the place was strong enough to resist all assaults; and moreau, basing himself on the fortresses of alsace, his right covered by huninguen, neuf-brisach, and béfort, and his left by the iron barrier of the netherlands, effectually checked the waves of austrian success. let us now turn to the campaigns of napoleon. in his first campaign in italy, , the general was directed "to seize the forts of savona, compel the senate to furnish him with pecuniary supplies, and to surrender the keys of gavi, a fortress perched on the rocky height commanding the pass of the bocchetta." setting out from savona, he crossed the mountains at a weak point between the alps and the apennines, and succeeded in piercing the enemy's line of defence. the king of sardinia, jealous of austrian influence, had refused to permit the austrian army to garrison his line of fortifications. napoleon, profiting by his victorious attitude, the mutual jealousy of austria and sardinia, and the intrigues of his diplomatists, soon gained possession of these important works. "_these sardinian fortresses_," he wrote to the directory, "_at once put the republicans in possession of the keys of the peninsula_." basing himself on coni, mondovi, ceva, gavi, and alessandria, with tortosa as his dépôt of magazines, he advanced against lombardy. now basing himself on the adda and po, with the fortress of pizzighettone as the dépôt of his magazines, he advanced upon the line of the adige. pechiera became his next dépôt, and he now had four fortresses in echelon between him and his first dépôt of magazines; and, after the fall of mantua, basing himself on the po, he advanced against the states of the church, making ferrara and then ancona, his places of dépôt. from the solid basis of the fortresses of piedmont and lombardy, "he was enabled to turn his undivided attention to the destruction of the austrians, and thus commence, with some security, that great career of conquest which he already meditated in the imperial dominions." in this campaign of , after scouring his base, he fortified palma-nuova, osapo, &c., repaired the old fortifications of klagenfurth, and, as he advanced, established, to use his own words, "a good _point d'appui_ at every five or six marches." afterwards, when the austrians had nearly wrested italy from the weak grasp of napoleon's successors, the french saved their army in the fortress of genoa and behind the line of the var, which had been fortified with care in - . numerous attempts were made to force this line, the advanced post of fort montauban being several times assaulted by numerous forces. but the austrian columns recoiled from its murderous fire of grape and musketry, which swept off great numbers at every discharge. again the assault was renewed with a vast superiority of numbers, and again "the brave men who headed the column almost perished at the foot of the intrenchment; and, after sustaining a heavy loss, they were compelled to abandon the enterprise." while the forces on the var thus stayed the waves of austrian success, massena, in the fortifications of genoa, sustained a blockade of sixty, and a siege of forty days, against an army five times as large as his own; and when forced to yield to the stern demands of famine, he almost dictated to the enemy the terms of the treaty. these two defences held in check the _élite_ of the austrian forces, while the french reserve crossed the alps, seized the important points of the country, and cut off the austrian line of retreat. "but even after the victory of marengo," says napoleon, "i did not consider the whole of italy reconquered, until all the fortified places between me and the mincio should be occupied by my troops. i gave melas permission to return to mantua, on condition of his surrendering all these fortresses." he now directed chasseloup de laubat and his engineers to repair and remodel the fortifications of verona, legnano, pechiera, mantua, the line of the adda, milan, alessandria,[ ] roco d'aufo, genoa, and several smaller works; thus forming a quadruple line of defence against austrian aggression in italy. these works were of great service to the french in , enabling massena with fifty thousand men to hold in check the archduke charles with more than ninety thousand, while napoleon's grand army, starting from the solid base of the rhine, traversed germany and seized upon the capital of austria. [footnote : more than twenty millions of money were appropriated for this place alone.] the neglect of the prussians to place their country in a state of military defence, previous to declaring war against napoleon in , had a most disastrous influence upon the campaign. napoleon, on the other hand, occupied and secured all the important military positions which he had captured in the preceding campaign. "the prussians," said he, "made no preparations for putting into a state of defence the fortifications on their first line, not even those within a few marches of our cantonments. while i was piling up bastion upon bastion at kehl, cassel, and wesel, they did not plant a single palisade at magdeburg, nor put in battery a single cannon at spandau." the works on the three great lines of the oder, the elbe, and the weser, had they been properly repaired, garrisoned, and defended, were sufficient to have held in check the french, even after the great victory of jena, till the newly-organized forces, acting in concert with the russian army, could re-establish the prussian monarchy in its ancient greatness. profiting by the neglect of the prussians, napoleon seized upon the great defensive works of the country, which, to his great joy, were readily surrendered into his hands by the old and inefficient generals who commanded them; and french garrisons were almost immediately established in the fortresses of stettin, custrin, glogau, magdeburg, spandau, hameln, nieubourg, &c. "spandau," said he in the th bulletin, "is an inestimable acquisition. in our hands it could sustain two months of operations. but such was the general confusion, that the prussians had not even armed its batteries." the possession of these fortifications inclined the scale at eylau. all the historians of the war notice their influence on the campaigns of friedland and tilsit. these prussian fortresses were retained by napoleon at the treaty of tilsit. the campaign of proved the wisdom of this policy, as they effectually prevented prussia from joining austria in rekindling the flames of war. and again in , these works might have produced a decided influence on the campaign, had not the political perfidy of austria, and the treason of the french generals, prevented napoleon from profiting by the advantages of his position. the influence of the fortifications of spain upon the peninsular campaigns has often been alluded to by historians. those works which had been given up to napoleon previous to the opening of hostilities, contributed very much to the success of his arms; while those which had been retained by spain and her allies contributed in an equal degree to fetter and embarrass his operations. some of these, like saragossa, tarragona, gerona, tortosa, &c. &c., with their broken walls and defective armaments, kept the enemy in check for months; and, by compelling the french to resort to the tedious operations of sieges, did much to weaken the french power in the peninsula. the influence of the fortifications of the french frontiers in furnishing a secure basis for the successful operations of napoleon into the enemy's territory, has already been noticed. if these fortresses of france, after the disasters of and ' , failed to save the nation, the cause must be sought for in the peculiar features of the invasion itself, rather than any lack of military influence in the french defences. as has been already remarked, a million of disciplined men, under consummate leaders, were here assailing a single state, impoverished by the fatal war in russia,--torn in pieces by political factions,--deserted by its sworn allies,--its fortresses basely betrayed into the enemy's hands, and its military power paralyzed by the treason of generals with their entire armies. its only hope was in the fortresses which had remained faithful; and napoleon said at st. helena, that if he had collected together the garrisons of these few fortresses and retired to the rhine, he could have crushed the allies even after their entrance into paris. but political considerations prevented the operation. again in , napoleon, even after the defeat of waterloo, possessed lines of defence sufficiently strong to resist all attempts at invasion. but again the want of co-operation on the part of the government at paris, and the treason of his own generals, forced his second abdication. if he had retained the command of the army, and the nation had seconded his efforts, the allies would never have reached paris. but the new government presented the disgraceful spectacle of opening the way for the enemies of their country. "france," said napoleon, "will eternally reproach the ministry with having forced her whole people to pass under the caudine-forks, by ordering the disbanding of an army that had for twenty-five years been its country's glory, _and by giving up to our astonished enemies our still invincible fortresses_." history fully supports napoleon's opinion of the great danger of penetrating far into a hostile country to attack the capital, even when that capital is without fortifications. the fatal effects of such an advance, without properly securing the means of retreat, is exemplified by his own campaign of , in russia. if, after the fall of smolensk, he had fortified that place and vitepsk, which by their position closed the narrow passage comprised between the dnieper and the dwina, he might in all probability, on the following spring, have been able to seize upon moscow and st. petersburg. but leaving the hostile army of tschkokoff in his rear, he pushed on to moscow, and when the conflagration of that city cut off his hopes of winter quarters there, and the premature rigor of the season destroyed the horses of his artillery and provision-trains, retreat became impossible, and the awful fate of his immense army was closed by scenes of horror to which there is scarcely a parallel in history. this point might be still further illustrated by the russian campaign of charles xii., in - , the fatal advance of the french army on lisbon, in the peninsular war, and other examples of the same character. even single works sometimes effect the object of lines of fortifications, and frustrate the operations of an entire army. thus, lille suspended for a whole year the operations of prince eugene and marlborough; the siege of landrecies gave villars an opportunity of changing the fortunes of the war; pavia, in , lost france her monarch, the flower of her nobility, and her italian conquests; metz, in , arrested the entire power of charles v., and saved france from destruction; prague, in , brought the greatest warrior of his age to the brink of ruin; st. jean d'acre, in , stopped the successful career of napoleon; burgos, in , saved the beaten army of portugal, enabled them to collect their scattered forces, and regain the ascendancy; strasburg has often been, the bulwark of the french against germany, saving france from invasion, and perhaps subjugation. in nearly the language of napoleon, (memoirs, vol. ix.,) if vienna had been fortified in , the battle of ulm would not have decided the fate of the war. again, in , if this capital had been fortified, it would have enabled the archduke charles, after the disaster of eckmuhl, by a forced retreat on the left of the danube, to form a junction with the forces of general hiller and the archduke john. if berlin had been fortified in , the army routed at jena would have rallied there and been joined by the russians. if madrid had been strongly fortified in , the french army, after the victories of espinosa, tudela, burgos, and sommo-sierra, would not have marched towards that capital, leaving in rear of salamanca and valladolid, both the english army of general moore and the spanish army of romana. if moscow had been fortified in , its conflagration would have been avoided, for, with strong defensive works, and the army of kutusoff encamped on its ramparts, its capture would have been impossible. had not constantinople been well fortified, the empire of constantine must have terminated in the year , whereas the standard of the prophet was not planted there until . this capital was therefore indebted to its walls for eight hundred years of existence. during this period it was besieged fifty-three times, but only one of these sieges was successful. the french and venetians took it, but not without a very severe contest. paris has often owed its safety to its walls. in the normans besieged it for two years without effect. in the dauphin besieged it in vain. in edward, king of england, encamped at montrouge, devastated the country to its walls, but recoiled from before it, and retired to chartres. in it repulsed the attack of charles vii. in the count of charlerois surrounded the city, but was unsuccessful in his attacks. in it repulsed the army of the duke of bourgone, who had already ravaged its precincts. in , when attacked by charles v., it again owed its safety to its walls. in and it repulsed the armies of henry iii. and henry iv. in and several succeeding years the inhabitants of paris owed their safety to its walls. if this capital had been strongly fortified in and , the allied armies would not have dared to attempt its investment. but it is deemed unnecessary to further specify examples; the whole history of modern warfare is one continued proof of the importance of fortifications as a means of national defence, and as an auxiliary in offensive military operations. our illustrations have been mostly drawn from european wars, but our own brief history, as will be shown hereafter, is not without its proofs. the use and importance of field-fortifications, intrenched camps, &c., as well as the class of military works called coast-defences, will be discussed hereafter.[ ] [footnote : the use of fortifications in the defence of states is discussed by ternay, vauban, cormontaigne, napoleon, the archduke charles, jomini, fallot, and, incidentally, by most of the military historians of the wars of the french revolution. the names of such standard works as give the detailed arrangements of fortifications will be mentioned hereafter.] chapter iv. logistics. iii. we have defined _logistics_ to be that branch of the military art which embraces all the practical details of moving and supplying armies. the term is derived from the title of a french general officer, _(major-général des logis,)_ who was formerly charged with directing the marches, encampments, and lodging of the troops. it has been still further extended by recent military writers, and many of them now regard logistics as a distinct and important branch of the art. we shall here consider logistics as including the military duties ordinarily attributed to the pay, subsistence, clothing, medical, hospital, and transportation departments; in fine, of all the civil and civico-military corps of the army. we shall therefore discuss under this head, the preparation of all the necessary materials for fitting out troops for a campaign and for putting them in motion; the regulating of marches, convoys, the means of transport for provisions, hospitals, munitions, and supplies of all kinds; the preparation and protection of magazines; the laying out of camps and cantonments; in fine, every thing connected with preparing, moving, and guarding the _impedimenta_ of an army. the officers connected with this branch of service must consult with the engineers in every thing relating to the defence of their depots, magazines, camps, cantonments, communications, and the passage of rivers, and in all that relates to their connection with the attack and defence of places: but in all that relates to strategy and tactics they must receive instructions directly from the chief of the staff of the army, who will have the general direction of every thing connected with logistics. before commencing the operations of the campaign, or beginning the execution of the plans decided upon at head-quarters, this officer should satisfy himself respecting the condition of the various materials belonging to the different departments of the army;--the horses and horse equipments, carriages, caissons, ponton and artillery equipages, siege equipages, moveable hospitals, engineer and artillery utensils, clothing, and munitions of all kinds; he must supply whatever may be wanting, and provide means for the transportation of every thing. _subsistence_.--the art of subsisting troops during active operations in a hostile country, is one of the most difficult subjects connected with war; and it is a question well worthy of study, both for the statesman and the warrior, how darius and xerxes, philip and alexander, in ancient times--and the greek emperors and the barbarians--and, later still, the crusaders of the middle ages, contrived to support the immense masses of men which they led to war. cæsar has said that war should be made to support war; and some modern generals have acted upon this principle to the extreme of supporting their armies entirely at the expense of the country passed over. others have adopted either in part or entirely the principle of regular magazines. louis xiv. and frederick ii. fought mostly on their own frontiers, and followed the system of regular dépôts and supplies. but the revolutionary armies of france made war without magazines, subsisting, sometimes on the inhabitants, sometimes by requisitions levied on the country passed over, and at others by pillage and marauding. napoleon found little difficulty in supporting an army of a hundred or a hundred and twenty thousand men in italy, suabia, and on the rich borders of the rhine and the danube; but in spain, poland, and russia, the subject of subsistence became one of extreme embarrassment. all depots of provisions and other supplies for an army are denominated _magazines_; these are divided into _principal, secondary,_ and _provisional_. the first are usually on the base of operations; the second, on the line of operations; and the last in the immediate vicinity of the troops, and contain supplies for a few days only. the system of _magazines_ is objected to by some, because it fetters the movements of an army, and makes its military operations subordinate to the means of supply. moreover, as the movements of an army must be so arranged as to cover these magazines, their establishment at given points reveals to the enemy our plan of campaign. on the other hand, the system of _requisitions_, either for immediate supplies or for secondary magazines, gives far greater velocity and impetuosity to an active army; and if it be so regulated as to repress pillage, and be levied with uniformity and moderation, it may be relied on with safety in well-cultivated countries; but in more barren and less populous districts, an army without magazines, especially in case of a prolonged stay or a forced retreat, will be exposed to great suffering and loss, if not to total destruction. before commencing a campaign the general should make himself acquainted with all the resources of the country to be passed over--determine the amount of supplies which it may be necessary to take with him, and the amount that can be obtained by requisitions; these requisitions being levied in a uniform and legal manner, and through the existing local authorities. in great wars of invasion it is sometimes impracticable, at least for a time, to provide for the immense forces placed on foot, by any regular system of magazines or of ordinary requisitions: in such cases their subsistence is entirely intrusted to the troops themselves, who levy contributions wherever they pass. the inevitable consequences of this system are universal pillage and a total relaxation of discipline; the loss of private property and the violation of individual rights, are followed by the massacre of all straggling parties, and the ordinary peaceful and non-combatant inhabitants are converted into bitter and implacable enemies. in this connection the war in the spanish peninsula is well worthy of study. at the beginning of this war napoleon had to choose between methodical operations, with provisions carried in the train of his army, or purchased of the inhabitants and regularly paid for; and irregular warfare, with forced requisitions--war being made to support war. the question was thoroughly discussed. on the one hand, by sacrificing three or four millions of francs from the french treasury, he would have been able to support his troops without requisitions, would have maintained good order and discipline in his armies, and by the distribution of this money among a people poor and interested, he would have made many partisans. he could then have offered them, with a firm and just hand, the olive or the sword. but then the drafts upon the french treasury, had the war been a protracted one, would have been enormous for the support of an army of , men in spain. moreover, the hostile and insurrectionary state of the local authorities rendered regular and legal requisitions almost impossible; and the want of navigable rivers, good roads, and suitable transport, rendered problematical the possibility of moving a sufficient quantity of stores in an insurrectionary country. besides, no great detachments could have been made to regulate the administration of the provinces, or to pursue the insurgent corps into the fastnesses of the mountains. in fine, by this system, he would have effected a military occupation of spain without its subjugation. on the other hand, by marching rapidly against all organized masses, living from day to day upon the local resources of the country, as he had done in italy, sparing his reserves for the occupation and pacification of the conquered provinces; this mode promised more prompt and decisive results than the other. napoleon, therefore, determined to adopt it for his active masses, employing the system of magazines and regular requisitions so far as practicable. in favorable parts of the country, soult and souchet, with smaller armies, succeeded in obtaining in this way regular supplies for a considerable length of time, but the others lived mainly by forced requisitions levied as necessity required. this sometimes gave place to great excesses, but these were principally the faults of subordinate officers who tolerated them, rather than of napoleon, who punished such breaches of discipline, when they were known to him, with great severity. he afterwards declared that, "had he succeeded he would have indemnified the great mass of the spanish people for their losses, by the sale of the hoarded wealth of the clergy, which would have rendered the church less powerful, and caused a more just division of property; thus the evil of the war would have been forgotten in the happy triumph of public and private interest over the interest of an ambitious and exclusive clergy." the following maxims on subsistence have the sanction of the best military writers: st. regular magazines should be formed, so far as practicable, for the supplies of an army; the levying of requisitions being resorted to only where the nature of the war, and the requisite rapidity of marches, render these absolutely necessary to success. d. dépôts should be formed in places strengthened by nature or art, defended by small corps, or garrisons, and situated in positions least liable to attack. d. all great dépôts should be placed on navigable rivers, canals, railways, or practical roads, _communicating with the line of operations_, so that they may be transported with ease and rapidity, as the army advances on this line. th. an army should never be without a supply for ten or fifteen days, otherwise the best chances of war may be lost, and the army exposed to great inconveniences. templehoff says that the great frederick, in the campaign of , always carried in the prussian provision-train _bread_ for _six_, and _flour_ for _nine days_, and was therefore never at a loss for means to subsist his forces, in undertaking any sudden and decisive operation. the roman soldier usually carried with him provisions for fifteen days. napoleon says, "experience has proved that an army ought to carry with it a month's provisions, ten days' food being carried by the men and baggage-horses and a supply for twenty days by the train of wagons; so that at least four hundred and eighty wagons would be required for an army of forty thousand men; two hundred and forty being regularly organized, and two hundred and forty being obtained by requisition. for this purpose there would be a battalion of three companies for the military stores of each division, each company having its establishment for forty wagons, twenty being furnished by the commissariat, and twenty obtained by requisition. this gives for each division one hundred and twenty wagons, and for each army, four hundred and eighty. each battalion for a provision-train should have two hundred and ten men." th. an army, while actually in motion, can find temporary resources, unless in a sterile country, or one already ravaged by war, or at the season of the year when the old crops are nearly exhausted and the new ones not ready for harvest; but, even supposing the army may in this way be partially or wholly supplied, while in motion, it nevertheless frequently happens that it may remain for some days in position, (as the french at austerlitz and ulm;) a supply of hard bread for some ten days will therefore be important to subsist the army till a regular commissariat can be established. th. "supplies of bread and biscuit," says napoleon, "are no more essential to modern armies than to the romans; flour, rice, and pulse, may be substituted in marches without the troops suffering any harm. it is an error to suppose that the generals of antiquity did not pay great attention to their magazines; it may be seen in caesar's commentaries, how much he was occupied with this care in his several campaigns. the ancients knew how to avoid being slaves to any system of supplies, or to being obliged to depend on the purveyors; but all the great captains well understood the art of subsistence." _forage_ is a military term applied to food of any kind for horses or cattle,--as grass, hay, corn, oats, &c.; and also to the operation of collecting such food. forage is of two kinds, _green_ and _dry_; the former being collected directly from the meadows and harvest-fields, and the latter from the barns and granaries of the farmers, or the storehouses of the dealers. the animals connected with an army may be subsisted by regular magazines, by forced requisitions, or by authorized _foraging_ [ ] as has already been remarked, it is not always politic, or even possible, to provide regular magazines for the entire supplies of an army during the active operations of a campaign. on account of the great expense and difficulty of transporting forage, the general of an army is more frequently under the necessity of resorting to requisitions, or forced contributions as they are called, and to foraging, for the subsistence of his animals, than to provide food for his men. nor are requisitions and foragings for this object so objectionable as in the other case, being far less likely to produce general want and distress among the non-combatant inhabitants. [footnote : this term is sometimes, though improperly, applied to the operation of forcibly collecting food for the troops.] the commanding officer of troops should always use his best endeavors to obtain his forage by purchase of the inhabitants, or by requisitions on the local authorities; and even where these means are impracticable, the foraging parties should be strictly directed to make their levies with uniformity and due moderation. accurate accounts should be kept of the kinds and quantities of all produce and other property taken, so that it may be regularly distributed and accounted for. under no circumstances should individuals be permitted to appropriate to themselves more than their _pro rata_ allowance. foraging parties may sometimes attain their object in a peaceful manner, by representing to the inhabitants the nature of their instructions and the necessity of obtaining immediate supplies. even where no recompense is proposed, it may be well to offer certificates to the effect that such articles have been taken for the use of the army. these certificates, even when of no value in themselves, frequently tend to appease excited passions and allay insurrections. in defensive war, carried on in one's own country, it is often necessary to seize upon private property and appropriate it to the public service: in all such cases the certificates of the foraging officers become proofs of individual claims against the government. no foraging party should ever be sent out till after the country has been properly reconnoitred. a good military escort and vanguard should always accompany and precede the foragers, for protection against the enemy's light cavalry and an insurgent militia. trustworthy troops must be placed in the villages and hamlets of the country to be foraged, in order to prevent the foragers from engaging in irregular and unauthorized pillage. officers of the staff and administrative corps are sent with the party to see to the proper execution of the orders, and to report any irregularities on the part of the troops. in case any corps engage in unauthorized pillage, due restitution should be made to the inhabitants, and the expense of such restitution deducted from the pay and allowances of the corps by whom such excess is committed. a few examples of this kind of justice will soon restore discipline to the army, and pacify the inhabitants of the country occupied. experience is the best guide in estimating the amount of hay or grain that may be taken from a given field: the produce of an acre is, of course, very different for different soils and climates. in distributing the burdens to the several pack-horses and wagons employed in conveying the forage to the army, it is important for the foraging officers to know the relative weight and bulk of each article. ordinary pressed hay in this country will average about . lbs. per cubic foot. wheat . . . weighs. . lbs. per bushel. rye . . . . " . . . . " " maize or indian corn . " " barley . . . " . . . . " " oats . . . . " . . . . " " meal, flour, and ground feed of all kinds, are purchased by the pound. as it would be exceedingly dangerous to send forward the regular train of the army for the conveyance of forage collected by these foraging parties, the country wagons and pack-horses are usually pressed into service for this purpose. troops of horse are sometimes sent into the vicinity of meadows and grain-fields for temporary subsistence: in such cases the horses and cattle may be farmed in the neighborhood, and the grass and grain issued in regular rations, immediately as taken from the field; but in no case should the animals be turned out to pasture. in a country like ours, where large bodies of new and irregular forces are to be suddenly called into the field in case of war, it is important to establish very rigid rules in relation to forage and subsistence; otherwise the operations of such troops must be attended with great waste of public and private property, the want of means of subsistence, the consequent pillage of the inhabitants, and a general relaxation of discipline. regular troops are far less liable to such excesses than inexperienced and undisciplined forces. _marches_.--marches are of two kinds: st. route marches,-- d. marches within reach of the enemy. the former belong to the domain of strategy; the latter to that of tactics; both, however, are connected with logistics in every thing that concerns the means of their execution. when an army is moving on a line of operations, it should be in as many columns as the facility of subsistence, celerity of movement, the nature of the roads, &c., may require. large columns cannot move with the same rapidity as smaller ones, nor can they be so readily subsisted. but when an army is within striking distance of the enemy, concentration becomes more important than celerity, and the forces must be kept in mass, or at least within supporting distances of each other. we find only two instances in the seven years' war, in which frederick attempted attacks by several columns at considerable distances from each other; and in both these instances (at torgau and at namiest, against laudon, during the siege of olmutz) he was unsuccessful. his usual mode was to bring his columns near together as he approached the enemy, and to form his troops into line at the moment of attack. such was his order of march at prague, kollin, rosbach, leuthen, zornsdorf, and kunersdorf. the following is one of frederick's orders respecting marches, (october d, .) "the army will, as usual, march in three columns by lines. the first column will consist of the first line; the second, of the second line; and the third, of the reserve. the wagons, and hospital wagons, of regiments, will follow their corps. the batteries of heavy calibre will follow the infantry brigades to which they are assigned. on passing woods, the regiments of cavalry will march between two infantry corps." "each column will have a vanguard of one light battalion and ten squadrons of hussars or dragoons. they will be preceded by three wagons carrying plank-bridges. the rear-guard is charged with taking up these bridges after the army has defiled over them." "the parks will be divided among the columns, to avoid the embarrassment resulting from a great many wagons being together in a body." "if any thing should happen to the second and third columns, the king will be instantly apprized of it; he will be found at the head of the first column. should any thing occur to the rear-guard, the same will be instantly communicated to lieutenant-general zeithen, who will be with the rear-guard of the first column." "the officers will take care that the soldiers march with equal step, and that they do not stray to the right or left, and thus uselessly fatigue themselves and lose their distances." "when orders are given to form the line, the wagons will file out of the columns to the left, and will march to be parked," &c. the position of the baggage, when near the enemy, will depend on the nature of the march. if the march be to the front, it will be in rear of the column; if the march be by the flank, and the enemy be on the outer flank, the baggage will be on the inner one, most remote from danger; if the march be in retreat, the baggage will be in advance of the army. in either case it should be strongly guarded. it was in direct violation of this rule that general hull, in the campaign of , on reaching the miami of the lake, (maumee,) embarked his baggage, stores, sick, convalescent, and "even the instructions of his government and the returns of his army," on board the cuyahoga packet, and dispatched them for detroit, while the army, with the same destination, resumed its march by land. the result of thus sending his baggage, stores, official papers, &c., _without a guard, and on the flank nearest the enemy,_ was just what might have been anticipated:--in attempting to pass the british post of malden the whole detachment was attacked and captured, "by a subaltern and six men, in a small and open boat." to prevent a surprise, detachments of light troops should be always thrown out in front, on the flanks, and in rear of the column, denominated from their position, _advanced-guard, flankers,_ and _rear-guard._ these scan the country which is to be passed over by the column, watch the enemy's motions, and give notice of his approach in time to allow the main force to choose a suitable field of battle, and to pass from the order of march to that of combat. the strength and composition of these detachments depend upon the nature of the ground, and the character and position of the enemy. in case of an attack they retire slowly, and on joining the main body, take their assigned position in the line of battle. in an open country the order of march presents but little difficulty; but in a broken country, and especially in the vicinity of the enemy, a march cannot be conducted with too many precautions. before engaging in a _defile_ it should be thoroughly examined, and sufficient detachments sent out to cover the main body from attack while effecting the passage. a neglect of these precautions has sometimes led to the most terrible disasters. in military operations very much depends upon the rapidity of marches. the roman infantry, in scipio's campaigns in africa, frequently marched a distance of twenty miles in five hours, each soldier carrying from fifty to eighty pounds of baggage. septimius severus, gibbon states, marched from vienna to rome, a distance of eight hundred miles, in forty days. cæsar marched from rome to the sierra-morena, in spain, a distance of four hundred and fifty leagues, in twenty-three days! napoleon excelled all modern generals in the celerity of his movements. others have made for a single day as extraordinary marches as the french, but for general activity during a campaign they have no rivals in modern history. a few examples of the rapidity of their movements may not be without interest. in a part of napoleon's army left verona after having fought the battle of st. michaels, on the th of january, then marched all night upon rivoli, fought in the mountains on the th, returned to mantua on the th, and defeated the army of provera on the morning of the th,--thus, in less than four days, having marched near fifty leagues, fought three battles, and captured more than twenty thousand prisoners! well might he write to the directory that his soldiers had surpassed the much vaunted rapidity of cæsar's legions. in the campaign of , macdonald, wishing to prevent the escape of loudon, in a single day marched forty miles, crossing rivers, and climbing mountains and glaciers. in the grand french army broke up their camp at boulogne, in the early part of september, and in two weeks reached their allotted posts on the rhine, averaging daily from twenty-five to thirty miles. during the same campaign the french infantry, pursuing the archduke ferdinand in his retreat from ulm, marched thirty miles a day in dreadful weather, and over roads almost impassable for artillery. again, in the campaign of , the french infantry pursued the prussians at the rate of from twenty-five to thirty miles per day. in the advanced posts of napoleon's army pursued sir john moore's army at the rate of twenty-five miles a day, in the midst of winter. napoleon transported an army of fifty thousand men from madrid to astorga with nearly the same rapidity, marching through deep snows, across high mountains, and rivers swollen by the winter rains. the activity, perseverance, and endurance of his troops, during these ten days' march, are scarcely equalled in history. in , the activity of the french forces under clausel was truly extraordinary. after almost unheard-of efforts at the battle of salamanca, he retreated forty miles in a little more than twelve hours! in , napoleon's army marched at the rate of ten leagues a day, besides fighting a battle every twenty-four hours. wishing to form a junction with other troops, for the succor of paris, he marched his army the distance of seventy-five miles in thirty-six hours; the cavalry marching night and day, and the infantry travelling _en poste_. on his return from elba, in , his guards marched fifty miles the first day after landing; reached grenoble through a rough and mountainous country, a distance of two hundred miles, in six days, and reached-paris, a distance of six hundred miles, in less than twenty days! the marches of the allied powers, during the wars of the french revolution, were much less rapid than those of the armies of napoleon. nevertheless, for a single day the english and spaniards have made some of the most extraordinary marches on record. in , on the day of the battle of talavera, general crawford, fearing that wellington was hard pressed, made a forced march with three thousand men the distance of sixty-two miles in twenty-six hours! the spanish regiment of romana, in their march from jutland to spain, marched the extraordinary distance of fifty miles in twenty-one hours. cavalry, for a single day, will march a greater distance than infantry; but for a campaign of several months the infantry will march over the most ground. in the russian campaign of napoleon, his cavalry failed to keep pace with the infantry in his forced march on moskwa. but in the short campaigns of and , the cavalry of murat displayed the most wonderful activity, and effected more extraordinary results than any mounted troops of modern ages. the english cavalry, however, have made one or two short marches with a rapidity truly extraordinary. in wellington's cavalry in india marched the distance of sixty miles in thirty-two hours. but the march of the english cavalry under lord lake, before the battle of furruckabad, is, if we can trust the english accounts, still more extraordinary than any thing recorded of the romans or the french--it is said that he marched _seventy miles in twenty-four hours!!!_ as a general rule, troops marching for many days in succession will move at the rate of from fifteen to twenty miles per day. in forced marches, or in pursuit of a flying enemy, they will average from twenty to twenty-five miles per day. and for only two or three days in succession, with favorable roads, thirty miles per day may be calculated on. marches beyond this are unusual, and, when they do occur, are the result of extraordinary circumstances. _convoy_.--a convoy consists of provisions, military munitions, &c., sent from one point to another, under the charge of a detachment of troops, called an _escort_. when regular depots and magazines are established, with proper relations to the line of operations, convoys requiring particular escorts are seldom necessary, because the position of the army will cover the space over which the magazines are to be moved. but in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, or in a country whose inhabitants are hostile or insurrectionary, precautions of this kind should always be resorted to. the size and composition of the escort must depend upon the nature of the country and the imminence of the danger. the ground to be passed over should be previously reconnoitred, and the line of march be taken up only after the most satisfactory reports. when once put in motion, the convoy should be thoroughly hemmed in by flankers, to give warning to the escort of the approach of the enemy. small parties of cavalry are detached on all sides, but particularly in advance. the main body of the escort is concentrated on the most exposed point of the convoy while the other sides are guarded by subdivisions. in case of an attack by a large party, the baggage wagons may be formed into a kind of defensive field-work, which, with one or two pieces of light artillery, can in this way resist a pretty strong effort to destroy or carry away the convoy. as a general rule, it is better to supply the wants of an army by small successive convoys than by periodical and large ones. even should some of the former be captured their loss would not be materially felt; but a large periodical convoy offers so great a temptation to the enterprise of the enemy, and is so difficult to escort, that he will venture much to destroy it, and its loss may frustrate our plans of a siege or of an important military operation. if the prussian army, when besieging olmutz, had observed this rule, the capture of a convoy would not have forced them to raise the siege and to retreat. napoleon estimates that an army of , men in position will require the daily arrival of from four to five hundred wagon loads of provisions. the difficulty of moving provisions, baggage, &c., in a retreat, is always very great, and the very best generals have frequently failed on this point. indeed, the best concerted measures will sometimes fail, amid the confusion and disorder consequent upon a retreat with an able and active enemy in pursuit. in such a case, the loss of the provision-trains in a sterile or unfriendly country may lead to the most terrible disasters. we will allude to two examples of this kind: the retreat of the english from spain in , and that of the french from russia in . when sir john moore saw that a retreat had become necessary to save his army from entire destruction, he directed all the baggage and stores to be taken to the rear, and every possible arrangement to be made for their preservation and for the regular supplies of the army. but the want of discipline in his troops, and more especially the want of a proper engineer organization to prepare the requisite means for facilitating his own marches, and impeding the enemy's pursuit, prevented his plans from being fully carried into execution. much suffering and great losses were consequently inflicted upon his troops; a large portion of his baggage and military stores was captured, and even the treasure of his army, amounting to some , dollars, was abandoned through the ignorance and carelessness of the escorting officer. in napoleon's march into russia, his plans had been so admirably combined, that from mentz to moscow not a single estafette or convoy, it is said, was carried off in this campaign; nor was there a day passed without his receiving intelligence from france. when the retreat was begun, (after the burning of moscow,) he had six lines of magazines in his rear; the st, at smolensk, ten days' march from moscow; those of the d line at minsk and wilna, eight marches from smolensk; those of the d line at kowno, grodno, and bialystok; those of the th line at elbing, marienwerder, thorn, plock, modlin, and warsaw; those of the th line at dantzic, bamberg, and posen; those of the th line at stettin, custrin, and glogau. when the army left moscow it carried with it provisions sufficient for twenty days, and an abundance of ammunition, each piece of artillery being supplied with three hundred and fifty rounds; but the premature cold weather destroyed thirty thousand horses in less than three days, thus leaving the trains without the means of transportation or suitable escorts for their protection: the horrible sufferings of the returning army now surpassed all description. the officer selected to escort convoys should be a man of great prudence, activity, and energy, for frequently very much depends upon the safe and timely arrival of the provisions and military stores which he may have in charge. _castrametation_.--castrametation is, strictly speaking, the art of laying out and disposing to advantage the several parts of the camp of an army. the term is sometimes more extensively used to include all the means for lodging and sheltering the soldiers during a campaign, and all the arrangements for cooking, &c., either in the field or in winter quarters. a camp, whether composed of tents or barracks, or merely places assigned for bivouacking, must be divided and arranged in such a way that the several divisions shall be disposed as they are intended to be drawn up in order of battle; so that, on any sudden alarm, the troops can pass from it promptly, and form their line of battle without confusion. suitable places must also be assigned for cooking, for baggage, and for provisions, military stores, and ammunitions. the extent of the color front of a camp depends much on the character of the ground and the means of defence, but as a general rule, it should never exceed the position which the army would occupy in the line of battle. the different arms should be encamped in the same order as that of battle; this order of course depending on the nature of the battle-ground. a _corps d'armeé_ is composed of battalions of infantry, squadrons of cavalry, batteries of artillery, and companies of engineer troops, and the art of encampments consists in arranging each of these elements so as to satisfy the prescribed conditions. the choice of ground for a camp must be governed, st, by the general rules respecting military positions, and, d, by other rules peculiar to themselves, for they may be variously arranged in a manner more or less suitable on the same position. that the ground be suitable for defence, is the first and highest consideration. it should also be commodious and dry: moist ground in the vicinity of swamps and stagnant waters, would endanger the health of the army: for the same reason it should not be subject to overflow or to become marshy by heavy rains, and the melting of snow. the proximity of good roads, canals, or navigable streams, is important for furnishing the soldiers with all the necessaries of life. the proximity of woods is also desirable for furnishing firewood, materials for huts, for repairs of military equipments, for works of defence, &c. good water within a convenient distance, is also an essential element in the choice of ground for a camp; without this the soldiers' health is soon undermined. the proximity of running streams is also important for the purposes of washing and bathing, and for carrying off the filth of the camp. the camp should not be so placed as to be enfiladed or commanded by any point within long cannon range; if bordering on a river or smaller stream, there should be space enough between them to form in order of battle; the communications in rear should offer the means of retreating in case of necessity, but should not afford facilities to the enemy to make his attack on that side. if the camp is to be occupied for a considerable length of time, as for _cantonments_ or _winter-quarters_, the greater must be the care in selecting its position and in the arrangement for the health and comfort of the soldiers. in the latter case, (of winter-quarters,) the engineer's art should always be called in play to form intrenchments, lines of abattis, inundations, &c., to render the position as difficult of access to the enemy as possible. a _bivouac_ is the most simple kind of camp. it consists merely of lines of fires, and huts for the officers and soldiers. these huts may be made of straw, of wood obtained from the forest, or by dismantling houses and other buildings in the vicinity of the camp, and stripping them of their timbers, doors, floors, &c. troops may be kept in bivouac for a few days, when in the vicinity of the enemy, but the exposure of the soldier in ordinary bivouacs, especially in the rainy seasons or in a rigorous climate, is exceedingly destructive of human life, and moreover leads to much distress to the inhabitants of the country occupied, in the destruction of their dwellings and the most common necessaries of life. if the position is to be occupied for any length of time, the huts should be arranged like tents, according to a regular system, and made comfortable for the troops. such should always be the system adopted in camps of practice or manoeuvre, in cantonments, winter-quarters, or in intrenched positions. we have adopted in our service the system of encamping in tents. these may do very well under the ordinary circumstances; but in the active operations of a campaign they are exceedingly objectionable, as greatly encumbering the baggage-trains. it would seem preferable to resort to bivouacs for the temporary camp of a single night, and to construct a regular system of huts where a position is to be occupied for any length of time. this may be regarded as a general rule, but in certain countries and climates, the tent becomes almost indispensable. napoleon's views on this subject are certainly interesting, if not decisive of the question: "tents," says he, "are not wholesome. it is better for the soldier to bivouac, because he can sleep with his feet towards the fire; he may shelter himself from the wind with a few boards or a little straw. the ground upon which he lies will be rapidly dried in the vicinity of the fire. tents are necessary for the superior officers, who have occasion to read and consult maps, and who ought to be ordered never to sleep in a house--a fatal abuse, which has given rise to so many disasters. all the european nations have so far followed the example of the french as to discard their tents; and if they be still used in camps of mere parade, it is because they are economical, sparing woods, thatched roofs, and villages. the shade of a tree, against the heat of the sun, and any sorry shelter whatever, against the rain, are preferable to tents. the carriage of the tents for each battalion would load five horses, who would be much better employed in carrying provisions. tents are a subject of observation for the enemies' spies and officers of the staff: they give them an insight into your numbers, and the position that you occupy; and this inconvenience occurs every day, and every instant in the day. an army ranged in two or three lines of bivouac is only to be perceived at a distance by the smoke, which the enemy may mistake for the vapor of the atmosphere. it is impossible to count the number of fires; it is easy, however, to count the number of tents, and to trace out the position that they occupy." the guarding of camps is a very important matter, and requires much attention. the _camp-guard_ consists of one or two rows of sentinels placed around the camp, and relieved at regular intervals. the number of rows of sentinels, and the distance between each man, will depend upon the character of the ground and the degree of danger apprehended. detachments of infantry and cavalry, denominated picquets, are also thrown out in front and on the flanks, which, in connection with the camp-guards, serve to keep good order and discipline in and around the camp, to prevent desertions, intercept reconnoitering parties, and to give timely notice of the enemy's approach. still larger detachments, denominated _grand-guards_, are posted in the surrounding villages, farm-houses, or small field-works, which they occupy as outposts, and from which they can watch the movements of the enemy, and prevent any attempts to surprise the camp. they detach patrols, videttes, and sentries, to furnish timely notice of danger. they should never be so far from the camp as to be beyond succor in case of sudden attack. outposts, when too far advanced, are sometimes destroyed without being able to give notice of the enemy's approach. in encamping troops in winter-quarters, it is sometimes necessary to scatter them over a considerable extent of ground, in order to facilitate their subsistence. in such a case, the arrangement of guards requires the utmost care. a chain of advanced posts should be placed several miles' distance from the line of camp; these posts should be supported by other and larger detachments in their rear, and concentrated on fewer points; and the whole country around should be continually reconnoitered by patrols of cavalry. the manner in which napoleon quartered and wintered his army on the passarge, in - , furnishes a useful lesson to military men, both in the matters of encampment and subsistence. an immense army of men were here quartered and subsisted, in a most rigorous climate, with a not over fertile soil, in the midst of hostile nations, and in the very face of a most powerful enemy. a roman army invariably encamped in the same order, its troops being always drawn up in the same battle array. a roman staff-officer who marked out an encampment, performed nothing more than a mechanical operation; he had no occasion for much genius or experience. the form of the camps was a square. in later times, they sometimes, in imitation of the greeks, made them circular, or adapted them to the ground. the camp was always surrounded with a ditch and rampart, and divided into two parts by a broad street, and into subdivisions by cross-streets and alleys. each tent was calculated to hold ten privates and a petty officer. in the middle ages, the form of the camp did not differ very essentially from that of the romans, the variation consisting principally in the interior arrangements, these arrangements being made to correspond to the existing mode of forming a line of battle. the details of this system may be found in the military work of machiavelli. the art of fixing a camp in modern times is the same as taking up a line of battle on the same position. of all the projectile machines must be in play and favorably placed. the position must neither be commanded, out-fronted, nor surrounded; but on the contrary ought, as far as possible, to command and out-front the enemy's position. but even in the same position there are numerous modes of arranging an encampment, or of forming a line of battle, and to select the best of these modes requires great experience, _coup d'oeil_, and genius. in relation to this point napoleon makes the following remarks:-- "ought an army to be confined to one single encampment, or ought it to form as many as it has corps or divisions? at what distance ought the vanguard and the flankers to be encamped? what frontage and what depth ought to be given to the camp? where should the cavalry, the artillery, and the carriages be distributed? should the army be ranged in battle array, in several lines? and if it should, what space should there be between those lines? should the cavalry be in reserve behind the infantry, or should it be placed upon the wings? as every piece has sufficient ammunition for keeping up its fire twenty-four hours, should all the artillery be brought into action at the beginning of the engagement, or should half of it be kept in reserve?" "the solution of these questions depends on the following circumstances:-- st. on the number of troops, and the numbers of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, of which the army is composed. d. on the relation subsisting between the two armies. d. on the quality of the troops. th. on the end in view. th. on the nature of the field. and th. on the position occupied by the enemy, and on the character of the general who commands them. nothing absolute either can or ought to be prescribed on this head. in modern warfare there is no natural order of battle." "the duty to be performed by the commander of an army is more difficult in modern armies, than it was in those of the ancients. it is also certain that his influence is more efficacious in deciding battles. in the ancient armies the general-in-chief, at a distance of eighty or a hundred toises from the enemy, was in no danger; and yet he was conveniently placed, so as to have an opportunity of directing to advantage all the movements of his forces. in modern armies, a general-in-chief, though removed four or five hundred toises, finds himself in the midst of the fire of the enemy's batteries, and is very much exposed; and still he is so distant that several movements of the enemy escape him. in every engagement he is occasionally obliged to approach within reach of small-arms. the effect of modern arms is much influenced by the situation in which they are placed. a battery of guns, with a great range and a commanding position that takes the enemy obliquely, may be decisive of a victory. modern fields of battle are much more extended than those of the ancients, whence it becomes necessary to study operations on a large scale. a much greater degree of experience and military genius is requisite for the direction of a modern army than was necessary for an ancient one." figure represents a camp (on favorable ground) of a grand-division of an army, composed of two brigades or twelve battalions of infantry, twelve squadrons of cavalry, five batteries of artillery, and three companies of engineers. figure represents the details of a camp of a battalion of infantry composed of eight companies. figure is the camp of a squadron of cavalry. figure is the camp of two batteries of foot artillery, or two companies of foot engineers. figure is the camp of two batteries of mounted artillery, or two companies of mounted sappers and pontoniers. on undulating or broken ground the arrangement and order of the general camp, as well as the details of the encampment of each arm, would admit of much variation.[ ] [footnote : there are many valuable remarks on the various subjects comprised under the head of logistics, in the works of jomini, grimoard, thiebault, boutourlin, guibert, laroche amyon, bousmard, ternay, vauchelle, odier, audouin, bardin, chemevrieres, daznan, ballyet, dremaux, dupre d'aulnay, morin, and in the published regulations and orders of the english army.] chapter v. tactics. iv. tactics.--we have defined tactics to be the art of bringing troops into action, or of moving them in the presence of the enemy;--that is, within his view, and within the reach of his artillery. this branch of the military art has usually been divided into two parts: st. grand tactics, or the tactics of battles; and d. elementary tactics, or tactics of instruction.[ ] [footnote : "it does not come within the view of this work to say any thing of the merely mechanical part of the art; because it must be taken for granted, that every man who accepts the command of an army knows at least the alphabet of his trade. if he does not, (unless his enemy be as ignorant as himself,) defeat and infamy await him. without understanding perfectly what are called _the evolutions_, how is it possible that a general can give to his own army that order of battle which shall be most provident and skilful in each particular case in which he may be placed? how know which of these evolutions the enemy employs against him? and, of course, how decide on a counter-movement which may be necessary to secure victory or avoid defeat? the man who shall take the command of an army without perfectly understanding this elementary branch, is no less presumptuous than he who should pretend to teach greek without knowing even his letters. if we have such generals, let them, for their own sakes, if not for their country's, put themselves immediately to school."] a _battle_ is a general action between armies. if only a small portion of the forces are engaged it is usually denominated a _combat_, an _affair_, an _action_, a _skirmish_, &c., according to the character of the conflict. the art of combining and conducting battles of all descriptions has been designated by the name of grand tactics. battles may be arranged into three classes; st. _defensive_ battles, or those given in a chosen position by an army waiting the attack of the enemy. d. _offensive_ battles, or those made by an army which attacks the enemy in position. d. the _mixed_ or _unforeseen_ battles, given by two armies meeting while on the march. i. when an army awaits the attack, it takes its position and forms its line of battle according to the nature of the ground and the supposed character and strength of the enemy's forces. such is usually the case when an army wishes to cover a siege, protect a capital, guard dépôts of provisions and military stores, or some important strategic point. the general relations of positions with strategy and engineering have already been considered; we will now discuss merely their relations to battles. the first condition to be satisfied by a tactical position is, that its debouches shall be more favorable for falling on the enemy when he has approached to the desired point, than those which the enemy can have for attacking our line of battle. d. the artillery should have its full effect upon all the avenues of approach. d. we should have good ground for manoeuvring our own troops unseen, if possible, by the enemy. th. we should have a full view of the enemy's manoeuvres as he advances to the attack. th. we should have the flanks of our line well protected by natural or artificial obstacles. th. we should have some means of effecting a retreat without exposing our army to destruction. it is very seldom that all these conditions can be satisfied at the same time; and sometimes the very means of satisfying one, may be in direct violation of another. a river, a forest, or a mountain, which secures a flank of a line of battle, may become an obstacle to a retreat, should the defensive forces be thrown back upon that wing. again, the position may be difficult of attack in front or on the wings, and at the same time unfavorable for retreat. such was wellington's position at waterloo. the park of hougomont, the hamlet of haye sainte, and the marshy rivulet of papelotte, were serious obstacles against the attacking force; but the marshy forest of soignies in rear, with but a single road, cut off all hope of retreat. ii. according to the strategic relations of the contending forces in a campaign, will it be determined whether we are to await the enemy, or to seek him out and attack him wherever he may be found. we may sometimes be obliged to make the attack at all hazards, for the purpose of preventing the junction of two corps, or to cut off forces that may be separated from the main body by a river, &c. as a general rule the attacking force has a moral superiority over the defensive, but this advantage is frequently more than counterbalanced by other conditions. the main thing in an _offensive_ battle is to seize upon the decisive point of the field. this point is determined by the configuration of the ground, the position of the contending forces, the strategic object of the battle; or, by a combination of these. for example, when one wing of the enemy rests on a height that commands the remainder of his line, this would seem the decisive point to be attacked, for its occupation would secure the greatest advantages; but this point may be so very difficult of access, or be so related to the strategic object as to render its attack out of the question. thus it was at the battle of bautzen: the left of the allies rested on the mountains of bohemia, which were difficult of attack, but favorable for defence; moreover, their only line of retreat was on the right, which thus became the point of attack for the french, although the topographical and tactical key of the field was on the left. iii. it frequently happens in modern warfare that battles result from the meeting of armies in motion, both parties acting on the offensive. indeed, an army that is occupying a defensive position may, on the approach of the enemy, advance to meet him while on the march. battles of this kind may partake of the mixed character of offensive and defensive actions, or they may be of the nature of a surprise to both armies. to this class belong the battles of rosbach, eylau, lutzen, luzzara, abensberg, &c. surprises were much more common in ancient than in modern times, for the noise of musketry and the roar of artillery, belonging to the posts or wings assailed, will prevent any general surprise of an army. moreover, the division into separate masses, or _corps d'armée,_ will necessarily confine the surprise to a part, at most, of the forces employed. nevertheless, in the change given to military terms, a surprise may now mean only an unexpected combination of manoeuvres for an attack, rather than an actual falling upon troops unguarded or asleep. in this sense marengo, lutzen, eylau, &c. are numbered with surprises. benningsen's attack on murat at zarantin in was a true surprise, resulting from the gross negligence and carelessness of the king of naples. an _order of battle_ is the particular disposition given to the troops for a determined manoeuvre on the field of battle. a _line of battle_ is the general name applied to troops drawn up in their usual order of exercise, without any determined manoeuvre; it may apply to defensive positions, or to offensive operations, where no definitive object has been decided on. military writers lay down twelve orders of battle, viz.: st. the simple parallel order; d. the parallel order with a crotchet; d. the parallel order reinforced on one or both wings; th. the parallel order reinforced on the centre; th. the simple oblique order; th. the oblique order reinforced on the assailing wing; th. the perpendicular order on one or both wings; th. the concave order; th. the convex order; th. the order by echelon on one or both wings; th. the order by echelon on the centre; th. the combined orders of attack on the centre and one wing at the same time. (figure .)[ ] the simple parallel order is the worst possible disposition for a battle, for the two parties here fight with equal chances, and the combat must continue till accident, superior numbers, or mere physical strength decides the day; skill can have little or no influence in such a contest. [footnote : in the plans, b is the army in position, and a the attacking force arranged according to the different orders of battle. to simplify the drawings, a single line represents the position of an army, whereas, in practice, troops are usually drawn up in three lines. each figure represents a grand division of twelve battalions.] (figure .) the parallel order with a crotchet on the flank, is sometimes used in a defensive position, and also in the offensive with the crotchet thrown forward. malplaquet, nordlingen, prague, and kolin, are examples of this order. wellington, at waterloo, formed the parallel order with the retired crotchet on the right flank. (figure .) a line of battle parallel to the enemy's, if strongly reinforced on one point, is according to correct principles, and may in certain cases secure the victory; but it has many inconveniences. the weak part of the line being too near the enemy, may, notwithstanding its efforts to the contrary, become engaged, and run the risk of a defeat, and thereby counterbalance the advantages gained by the strong point. moreover, the reinforced part of the line will not be able to profit by its success by taking the enemy's line in flank and rear, without endangering its connection with the rest of the line. (figure ) represents the parallel order reinforced on the centre. the same remarks are applicable to this as to the preceding. these two orders were frequently used by the ancients: as at the battle of zama, for example; and sometimes by modern generals. turenne employed one of them at ensheim. (figure ) is the simple oblique order. (figure ) is the oblique order, with the attacking wing reinforced. this last is better suited for an inferior army in attacking a superior, for it enables it to carry the mass of its force on a single point of the enemy's line, while the weak wing is not only out of reach of immediate attack, but also holds the remainder of the enemy's line in check by acting as a reserve ready to be concentrated on the favorable point as occasion may require. the most distinguished examples under this order are the battles of leuctra and mantinea, under the celebrated epaminondas; leuthen, under frederick; the pyramids, marengo, and jena, under napoleon. (figure .) an army may be perpendicular upon a flank at the beginning of a battle, as was the army of frederick at rosbach, and the russian army at kunersdorff; but this order must soon change to the oblique. an attack upon both wings can only be made when the attacking force is vastly superior. at eylau, napoleon made a perpendicular attack on one wing at the same time that he sought to pierce the enemy's centre. (figure .) the concave order may be used with advantage in certain cases, and in particular localities. hannibal employed it at the battle of cannæ, the english at crecy and agincourt, and the austrians at essling, in . (figure .) the convex order is sometimes formed to cover a defile, to attack a concave line, or to oppose an attack before or after the passage of a river. the romans formed this order at the battle of cosilinum; the french at ramilies in , at fleurus in , at essling in , and at the second and third days of leipsic in , and at brienne in . (figure .) the order by echelon on one wing may be frequently employed with advantage; but if the echelon be made on both wings, there is the same objection to its use as to the perpendicular order on both wings. at dresden, napoleon attacked both wings at the same time; this is the only instance in his whole history of a similar attack, and this was owing to peculiar circumstances in the ground and in the position of his troops. (figure .) the echelon order on the centre alone may be employed with success against an army formed in a thin or too extended line of battle, for it would be pretty certain to penetrate and break the line. the echelon order possesses in general very great advantages. the several corps composing the army may manoeuvre separately, and consequently with greater ease. each echelon covers the flank of that which precedes it; and all may be combined towards a single object, and extended with the necessary _ensemble_. at the battle of the pyramids, napoleon formed the oblique order in echelon by squares. portions of his forces were arranged in echelon in some of his other battles. (figure .) the combined order in columns on the centre and one extremity at the same time, is better suited than either of the preceding for attacking a strong contiguous line. napoleon employed this order at wagram, ligny, bautzen, borodino, and waterloo. it is impossible to lay down, as a general rule, which of these orders of battle should be employed, or that either should be exclusively followed throughout the whole battle. the question must be decided by the general himself on the ground, where all the circumstances may be duly weighed. an order well suited to one position might be the worst possible in another. tactics is in this respect the very reverse of strategy--the latter being subject to more rigid and invariable rules. but whatever the plan adopted by the attacking force, it should seek to dislodge the enemy, either by piercing or turning his line. if it can conceal its real intentions, and deceive him respecting the true point of attack, success will be more certain and decisive. a turning manoeuvre may frequently be employed with advantage at the same time with the main attack on the line. the operations of davoust at wagram, and richepanse at hohenlinden, are good examples under this head. the manoeuvre is, however, a difficult one, and unless executed with skill, may lead to disasters like the turning manoeuvres of the austrians at rivoli and austerlitz, and of the french under jourdan at stackach, and under marmont at salamanca. we will now discuss the particular manner of arranging the troops on the line of battle, or the manner of employing each arm, without entering, however, much into the detailed tactics of formation and instruction. we shall begin with _infantry_, as the most important arm on the battle-field. there are four different ways of forming infantry for battle: st, as tirailleurs, or light troops; d, in deployed lines; d, in lines of battalions, ployed on the central division of each battalion, or formed in squares; th, in deep masses. these different modes of formation are reduced to four separate systems: st, the thin formation of two deployed lines; d, a line of battalions in columns of attack on the centre, or in squares by battalions; d, a combination of these two, or the first line deployed, and the second in columns of attack; and th, the deep formation of heavy columns of several battalions. the tirailleurs are merely accessories to the main forces, and are employed to fill up intervals, to protect the march of the columns, to annoy the enemy, and to manoeuvre on the flanks. st. formerly the line of battle for infantry was very generally that of two deployed lines of troops, as shown in fig. . but reason and experience have demonstrated that infantry in this thin or light order, can only move very slowly; that in attempting rapid movements it breaks and exhibits great and dangerous undulations, and would be easily pierced through by troops of a deeper order. hence it is that the light formation is only proper when the infantry is to make use of its fire, and to remain almost stationary. d. if the formation of a line of battalions in columns of attack be employed, the depth and mobility will depend upon the organization or habitual formation of this arm. in our service a battalion is supposed to be composed of ten companies, each formed in three ranks. the two flank companies are designed for tirailleurs. this would give a column of four divisions, and consequently twelve files deep; and as only two of these files could employ their fire, there would be much too large a portion of non-combatants exposed to the enemy's artillery. in practice, however, we employ the two-rank formation, which, if the flank companies be detached, would give a column of attack eight files in depth, which is not objectionable. if however, the flank companies should be present in the battalion, the depth of the column would still be ten files. in the french service, each battalion is composed of four divisions, formed in either two or three ranks. the two-rank formation is the one habitually employed. if all the companies be present, and the formation in three ranks, the depth of column will be twelve files; if in two ranks the depth will be eight, files. if the flank companies be detached, the depth of column will be, for three ranks nine files, and for two ranks six files. (figs. and .) in the russian service each, battalion has four divisions of three ranks each. but the third rank is employed as tirailleurs, which gives a depth of column of eight files. the employment of the third rank for tirailleurs is deemed objectionable on account of the difficulty of rallying them on the column. for this reason, the best authorities prefer detaching an entire division of two companies. the formation of squares is exceedingly effective in an open country, and against an enemy who is superior in cavalry. formerly very large squares were employed, but they are now formed either by regiment or by battalion. the former are deemed best for the defensive, and the latter for offensive movements. the manner of arranging these is shown in figure . d. the mixed system, or the combination of the two preceding, has sometimes been employed with success. napoleon used this formation at tagliamento, and the russians at eylau. each regiment was composed of three battalions, the first being deployed in line, and the other two formed in columns of attack by division in rear of the two extremities, as shown in fig. . it may in some cases be better to place the second and third battalions in line with the first, and on the two extremities of this battalion, in order to prolong the line of fire. the centre of the line of each regiment would be less strong, however, than when the two battalions by column are placed in rear of the other which is deployed. this mixed system of formation has many advocates, and in certain situations may be employed with great advantage. th. the deep order of heavy columns of several battalions is objectionable as an habitual formation for battle, inasmuch as it exposes large masses of men to the ravages of artillery, and diminishes the mobility and impulsion of an attack without adding greatly to its force. macdonald led a column of this kind at the battle of wagram with complete success, although he experienced enormous losses. but ney's heavy columns of attack at waterloo failed of success, and suffered terribly from the concentric fire of the enemy's batteries. whenever deep columns are employed, jomini recommends that the grand-division of twelve battalions should have one battalion on each flank, (fig. ,) marching by files, in order to protect its flanks from the enemy's attacks. without this defence a column of twelve battalions deep becomes an inert mass, greatly exposed to be thrown into disorder or broken, as was the column of fontenoy, and the macedonian phalanx by paulus emillus. a grand-division is sometimes arranged in two columns by brigade, as is represented in figure . these are less heavy than a single column of grand-division by battalion, but are subject to nearly the same objections. all offensive operations on the field of battle require _mobility, solidity_, and _impulsion_; while, on the other hand, all defensive operations should combine _solidity_ with _the greatest possible amount of fire_. troops in motion can make but little use of their fire-arms, whatever may be their formation. if in very large masses, they move slower and are more exposed; but the moral effect of these large moveable columns is such, that they frequently carry positions without ever employing their fire. the french columns usually succeeded against the austrian and prussian infantry, but the english infantry could not so easily be driven from their ground; hey also employed their fire to greater advantage, as was shown at talavera, busaco, fuente de honore, albuera and waterloo. the smaller columns and the mixed formation were always most successful against such troops. from these remarks we must conclude-- st. that the very thin as well as the very deep formation is objectionable under ordinary circumstances, and can seldom be employed with safety. d. that the attack by battalions in columns by division is the best for carrying a position; the column should, however, be diminished in depth as much as possible, in order both to increase its own fire and to diminish its exposure to the fire of the enemy; moreover, it should be well covered by tirailleurs and supported by cavalry. d. that the mixed formation of the first line deployed and the second in columns of battalion by division is the best for defence. th. that either of the last two may be employed in the offensive or defensive, according to the nature of the ground, the character of the general, and the character and position of the troops. squares are always good against cavalry. troops should be habituated to all these formations, and accustomed to pass rapidly from one to another in the daytime or at night. none, however, but disciplined troops can do this: hence the great superiority of regulars on the field of battle, where skilful manoeuvres frequently effect more than the most undaunted courage. the arm next in importance on the battle-field is _cavalry_. the principal merit of this arm consists in its _velocity_ and _mobility_. cavalry has little solidity, and cannot of itself defend any position against infantry; but in connection with the other arms, it is indispensable for beginning a battle, for completing a victory, and for reaping its full advantage by pursuing and destroying the beaten foe. there are four different modes of forming cavalry, the same as for infantry: st in deployed lines; d, a line of regiments in column of attack on the centre; d, the mixed formation; and th, the deep formation of several columns. st. the thin formation was deemed objectionable for infantry, on account of its liability to be penetrated by cavalry. the same objection does not hold so forcibly with respect to this latter arm; but full lines are deemed less advantageous than lines deployed checker-wise or in echelon. in either case the distance between the lines should be sufficient to prevent the second line from coming in contact with the first, in case the latter receives a slight check. this distance need not be so great in lines deployed checker-wise, as when they are full, or in echelon. d. the second system of formation, that is, a line of columns of attack on the central division for infantry, is by battalion, but for cavalry, by regiment. if the regiment is composed of eight squadrons, the column will contain four lines, two squadrons forming a division; but if composed of only six squadrons, the column will contain only three lines, and consequently will be six files in depth. in either case the distance between the lines should be that of a demi-squadron, when the troops are drawn up in battle array; but when charging, the divisions may close to a less distance. d. in forming a grand division of two brigades, by the third or mixed system, two regiments may be deployed in the first line, and three formed in columns of attack in rear of the flanks and centre, as is shown in fig. , the sixth being held in reserve. this formation is deemed a good one. th. the fourth system, of deep columns of cavalry, is entirely unsuited for the charge, and this formation can only be employed for troops drawn up in reserve. the flanks of lines or columns of cavalry are always much exposed, and squadrons should therefore be formed in echelon on the right and left, and a little in rear of the main body, in order to protect the flanks from the attacks of the enemy's horse. irregular cavalry is usually employed for this purpose. in the formation of a grand division in line of battle, care should be taken not to give too great an extent to the command of the generals of brigade. if the formation be in two lines, neither brigade should form an entire line, but each should form a wing of the division, two regiments of the same brigade being placed in rear of each other. this rule is an important one, and should never be neglected. it may also be laid down as a maxim, in the formation of cavalry on the battle-field, that the first line after the charge, even if most successful, may require reforming in rear of the second line, and that this last should be prepared to act in the front line after the first onset. the success of the battle frequently depends upon the charge of the final reserve of cavalry on the flanks of lines already engaged. it is on account of this frequent manoeuvring of the cavalry on the battle-field, its reforming for repeated charges, that great bodies deployed in full lines are principally objected to. they cannot be handled with the facility and rapidity of columns of regiments by divisions. the attack of nansouty's cavalry, formed in this way, on the prussian cavalry, deployed in advance of chateau-thierry, in , is a good proof of this. cavalry may be brought to a charge-- st, in columns; d, in line; and d, in route, or at random, _(à la déban-dade.)_ these may also be varied by charging either at a trot or a gallop. all these modes have been employed with success. in a regular charge in line the lance offers great advantages; in the melee the sabre is the best weapon; hence some military writers have proposed arming the front rank with lances, and the second with sabres, the pistol and the carabine are useless in the charge, but may sometimes be employed with advantage against convoys, outposts, and light cavalry; to fire the carabine with any effect, the troop must be at a halt. in all charges in line, especially against cavalry, the fast trot is deemed preferable to the gallop, on account of the difficulty of keeping up the alignment when the speed is increased. lances are utterly useless in a melée, and in employing troops armed in this way, it is of the greatest importance to keep them in order and in line. in charging with the sabre against artillery the gallop may sometimes be employed, for velocity here may be more important than force. we will now consider the formation and use of _artillery_ on the field of battle. it may be laid down as a fundamental principle, that the fire of artillery should be directed on that part of the enemy's line which we design to pierce; for this fire will not only weaken this point, but will also aid the attack of the cavalry and infantry when the principal efforts are directed towards the intended point. in the defence, the artillery is usually distributed throughout the whole line, on ground favorable for its fire; but the reserve should be so placed that it can easily be brought to bear on the point where the enemy will be most likely to direct his principal attack. artillery placed on a plain, or with ground slightly inclined in front, and using the point-blank or ricochet fire, is the most effective; very high points are unfavorable if possible, the concentric fire should be employed against the enemy's columns of attack. the position of the english artillery on the field of waterloo, and the use of the concentric fire, furnishes one of the best examples for the disposition of this arm to be found in modern military history. the proper use of artillery on the battle-field is against the enemy's infantry and cavalry, consequently only a small part of it should be employed to respond to the fire of the enemy's batteries; not more than one third at most can be spared for this object. if possible, batteries should be established so as to take the enemy's line in flank, either by an oblique or enfilading fire. a direct fire against columns of attack, with a few light pieces thrown out to take it in flank at the same time, will always be advantageous. a direct and flank fire was employed with success by kleist against the column of ney at the battle of bautzen; the french marshal was forced to change his direction. batteries should always be well secured on the flanks, and constantly sustained by infantry or cavalry. if attacked by cavalry, the artillery should keep up its fire as long as possible, first with ball, and then with grape when the enemy arrives within a suitable distance. the same rule will apply to attacks of infantry, except that the fire of solid shot at a great distance is much less effective than against mounted troops. the _engineer troops_ are employed on the field of battle principally by detachments, acting as auxiliaries to the other arms. each regiment of infantry should have a detachment of sappers armed with axes to act as pioneers, for the removal of obstacles that may impede its advance. these sappers are of the utmost importance, for without them an entire column might be checked and thrown into confusion by impediments which a few sappers with their axes would remove in a very short time. detachments of engineer troops must also act in concert with the cavalry and artillery for the same purpose as above. in establishing the batteries of artillery, in opening roads for their manoeuvres, and in arranging material obstacles for their defence, the axes, picks, and shovels of the sappers are of infinite value. fieldworks, bridges, and bridge-defences, frequently have a decisive influence upon the result of a battle, but as these are usually arranged previous to the action, they will be discussed in another place. in the attack and defence of these field-works, the engineer troops play a distinguished part. the consideration of this part of the subject, though perhaps properly belonging to the tactics of battles, will also be postponed to another occasion. we will now discuss the employment of the combined arms on the field of battle. before the french revolution, all the infantry, formed by regiments and brigades, was united in a single body and drawn up in two lines. the cavalry was placed on the two flanks, and the artillery distributed along the entire line. in moving by wings, they formed four columns, two of cavalry and two of infantry: in moving by a flank, they formed only two very long columns; the cavalry, however, sometimes formed a third and separate column in flank movements, but this disposition was rarely made. the french revolution introduced the system of grand divisions composed of the four arms combined; each division moved separately and independently of the other. in the wars of the empire, napoleon united two or more of these divisions into a _corps d'armée,_ which formed a wing, the centre, or reserve of his grand army. in addition to these divisions and _corps d'armée,_ he had large reserves of cavalry and artillery, which were employed as distinct and separate arms. if the forces be sufficiently numerous to fight by _corps d'armée,_ each corps should have its own reserve, independent of the general reserve of the army. again, if the forces be so small as to act by grand divisions only, each division should then have _its_ separate reserve. an army, whether composed of separate corps or of grand divisions, usually forms, on the field of battle, a centre, two wings, and a reserve. each corps or division acts by itself, with its infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineer troops. the reserve of cavalry may be formed in rear of the centre or one of the wings. in small forces of fifty or sixty thousand men, the cavalry may act with advantage on the wings, in the manner of the ancients. if the reserve of this arm be large enough to form three separate bodies, it may _itself_ very properly be formed into a centre and wings. if it be formed into two columns only, they may be placed in rear of the openings between the centre and the wings of the main force. the reserve of artillery is employed either to reinforce the centre or a wing, and in the defensive is frequently distributed throughout the whole line of battle. in offensive operations, it may be well to concentrate as much fire as possible on the intended point of attack. the mounted artillery either acts in concert with the cavalry, of is used to reinforce that arm; the light-foot acts with the infantry, and the batteries of heavy calibre are distributed along the line, or concentrated on some important point where their fire may be most effectual. they reach the enemy's forces at a distance, and arrest the impulsion of his attack. they may also be employed to draw the fire of his artillery; but their movements are too slow and difficult for a reserve. the order of succession in which the different arms are engaged in a battle, depends upon the nature of the ground and other accidental circumstances, and cannot be determined by any fixed rules. the following, however, is most frequently employed, and in ordinary cases may be deemed good. the attack is first opened by a cannonade; light troops are sent forward to annoy the enemy, and, if possible, to pick off his artillerists. the main body then advances in two lines: the first displays itself in line as it arrives nearly within the range of grape-shot; the second line remains in columns of attack formed of battalions by division, at a distance from the first sufficient to be beyond the reach of the enemy's musketry, but near enough to support the first line, or to cover it, if driven back. the artillery, in the mean time, concentrates its fire on some weak point to open a way for the reserve, which rushes into the opening and takes the enemy in flank and rear. the cavalry charges at the opportune moment on the flank of the enemy's columns or penetrates an opening in his line, and cutting to pieces his staggered troops, forces them into retreat, and completes the victory. during this time the whole line of the enemy should be kept occupied, so as to prevent fresh troops from being concentrated on the threatened point. the following maxims on battles may be studied with advantage:-- st. _general battles_ are not to be fought but under the occurrence of one of the following circumstances: when you are, from any cause, decidedly superior to the enemy; when he is on the point of receiving reinforcements, which will materially effect your relative strength; when, if not beaten or checked, he will deprive you of supplies or reinforcements, necessary to the continuance or success of your operations; and, generally, when the advantage of winning the battle will be greater than the disadvantage of losing it. d. whatever may be your reason for risking a general battle, you ought to regard as indispensable preliminaries,--a thorough knowledge of the ground on which you are to act; an ample supply of ammunition; the most perfect order in your fire-arms; hospital dépôts regularly established, with surgeons, nurses, dressings, &c., sufficient for the accommodation of the wounded; points of rendezvous established and known to the commanders of corps; and an entire possession of the passes in your own rear. d. the battle being fought and _won_, the victory must be followed up with as much alacrity and vigor, as though nothing had been gained,--a maxim very difficult of observance, (from the momentary disobedience which pervades all troops flushed with conquest,) but with which an able general will never dispense. no one knew better the use of this maxim than napoleon, and no one was a more strict and habitual observer of it. th. the battle being fought and _lost_, it is your first duty to do away the _moral_ effect of defeat,--the want of that self-respect and self-confidence, which are its immediate followers, and which, so long as they last, are the most powerful auxiliaries of your enemy. it is scarcely necessary to remark that, to effect this object,--to reinspire a beaten army with hope, and to reassure it of victory,--we must not turn our backs on an enemy, without sometimes presenting to him our front also;--we must not confide our safety to mere flight, but adopt such measures as shall convince him that though wounded and overpowered, we are neither disabled nor dismayed; and that we still possess enough both of strength and spirit to punish his faults, should he commit any. do you operate in a covered or mountainous country?--avail yourself of its ridges and woods; for by doing so you will best evade the pressure of his cavalry. have you defiles or villages to pass?--seize the heads of these, defend them obstinately, and make a show of fighting another battle. in a word, let no error of your enemy, nor any favorable incident of the ground, escape your notice or your use. it is by these means that your enemy is checked, and your troops inspirited; and it was by these that frederick balanced his surprise at hohenkirchen, and the defeat of his plans before olmutz. the movement of our own washington, after losing the battle of brandywine, was of this character. he hastily recrossed the schuylkill with the professed intention of seeking the enemy and renewing the combat, which was _apparently_ prevented only by a heavy and incessant fall of rain. a rumor was now raised that the enemy, while refusing his left wing, was rapidly advancing upon his right, to intercept our passage of the river, and thus gain possession of philadelphia. this report justified a retreat, which drew from the general repeated assurances, that in quitting his present position and giving to his march a retrograde direction, it was not his object to avoid, but to follow and to fight the enemy. this movement, though no battle ensued, had the effect of restoring the confidence as well of the people as of the army.[ ] [footnote : there are innumerable works in almost every language on elementary tactics; very few persons, however, care to read any thing further than the manuals used in our own service. our system of infantry, cavalry, and artillery tactics is generally taken from the french; and also the course of engineer instruction, so far as matured, for sappers, miners, and pontoniers, is based on the french manuals for the varied duties of this arm. on grand tactics, or tactics of battles, the military and historical writings of general jomini abound in most valuable instructions. napoleon's memoirs, and the writings of rocquancourt, hoyer, decker, okouneff, roguiat, jocquinot-de-presle, guibert, duhesme, gassendi, warnery, baron bohan, lindneau, maiseroy, miller, and ternay, are considered as being among the best authorities.] chapter vi. military polity and the means of national defence. _military polity_.--in deciding upon a resort to arms, statesmen are guided by certain general rules which have been tacitly adopted in the intercourse of nations: so also both statesmen and generals are bound by rules similarly adopted for the conduct of hostile forces while actually engaged in military operations. in all differences between nations, each state has a right to decide for itself upon the nature of its means of redress for injuries received. previous to declaring open and public war, it may resort to some other forcible means of redress, short of actual war. these are:-- st. laying an embargo upon the property of the offending nation. d. taking forcible possession of the territory or property in dispute. d. resorting to some direct measure of retaliation. th. making reprisals upon the persons and things of the offending nation. it is not the present purpose to discuss these several means of redress, nor even to enter into any examination of the rights and laws of public war, when actually declared; it is intended to consider here merely such military combinations as are resorted to by the state in preparation for defence, or in carrying on the actual operations of a war. in commencing hostilities against any other power, we must evidently take into consideration all the political and physical circumstances of the people with whom we are to contend: we must regard their general character for courage and love of country; their attachment to their government and political institutions; the character of their rulers and their generals; the numbers, organization, and discipline of their armies; and particularly the relations between the civil and military authorities in the state, for if the latter be made entirely subordinate, we may very safely calculate on erroneous combinations. we must also regard their passive means of resistance, such as their system of fortifications, their military materials and munitions, their statistics of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, and especially the geographical position and physical features of their country. no government can neglect, with impunity, these considerations in its preparations for war, or in its manner of conducting military operations. napoleon's system of carrying on war against the weak, effeminate, and disorganized italians required many modifications when directed against the great military power of russia. moreover, the combinations of eylau and friedland were inapplicable to the contest with the maddened guerrillas of minos, animated by the combined passions of hatred, patriotism, and religious enthusiasm. military power may be regarded either as absolute or relative: the absolute force of a state depending on the number of its inhabitants and the extent of its revenues; the relative force, on its geographical and political position, the character of its people, and the nature of its government. its military preparations should evidently be in proportion to its resources. wealth constitutes both the apprehension and the incentive to invasion. where two or more states have equal means of war, with incentives very unequal, an equilibrium cannot exist; for danger and temptation are no longer opposed to each other. the preparation of states may, therefore, be equal without being equivalent, and the smaller of the two may be most liable to be drawn into a war without the means of sustaining it. the numerical relation between the entire population of a state, and the armed forces which it can maintain, must evidently vary with the wealth and pursuits of the people. adam smith thinks that a country purely agricultural may, at certain seasons, furnish for war one-fifth, or even in case of necessity one-fourth, of its entire population. a commercial or manufacturing country would be unable to furnish any thing like so numerous a military force. on this account small agricultural states are sometimes able to bring into the field much larger armies than their more powerful neighbors. during the seven years' war, frederick supported an army equal to one-twentieth of the entire prussian population, and at the close of this memorable contest one-sixth of the males capable of bearing arms had actually perished on the field of battle. but the number of troops that may be brought into the field in times of great emergency is, of course, much greater than can be supported during a long war, or as a part of a permanent military establishment. montesquieu estimates that modern nations are capable of supporting, without endangering their power, a permanent military force of about one-hundredth part of their population. this ratio differs but little from that of the present military establishments of the great european powers. great britain, with a population of about twenty-five millions, and a general budget of $ , , , supports a military and naval force of about , effective and , non-effective men, , in all, at an annual expense of from seventy to eighty millions of dollars. russia, with a population of about seventy millions, supports an active army of , men, with an immense reserve, at an expense of about $ , , , out of a general budget of $ , , ; that is, the expense of her military establishment is to her whole budget as to . austria, with a population of thirty-five millions, has an organized peace establishment of , , (about , in active service,) and a reserve of , , at an expense of $ , , , out of a general budget of $ , , . prussia, with a population of about fifteen millions, has from , to , men in arms, with a reserve of , , at an annual expense of more than $ , , , out of a general budget of about $ , , . france, with a population of near thirty-five millions, supports a permanent establishment of about , men, at an expense of seventy or eighty millions of dollars, out of a total budget of $ , , . france has long supported a permanent military force of from one-hundredth to one hundred-and-tenth of her population, at an expense of from one-fourth to one-fifth of her whole budget. the following table, copied from the "spectateur militaire," shows the state of the army at six different periods between and . it omits, of course, the extraordinary levies of the wars of the revolution and of the empire. _table_. budget. army. dates. population. remarks. of state. of the army. peace war estab. estab. livres. livres. men. men. , , , , , , , , francs. francs. ordinance of , , , , , , , , report of , , , , , , , , minister of war. report of , , , , , , , , , minister of war. , , , , , , , , - budget of . estimated , , , , , , , , , expenses of . from these data we see that the great european powers at the present day maintain, in time of peace, military establishments equal to about one-hundredth part of their entire population. the geographical position of a country also greatly influences the degree and character of its military preparation. it may be bordered on one or more sides by mountains and other obstacles calculated to diminish the probability of invasion; or the whole frontier may be wide open to an attack: the interior may be of such a nature as to furnish security to its own army, and yet be fatal to the enemy should he occupy it; or it may furnish him advantages far superior to his own country. it may be an island in the sea, and consequently exposed only to maritime descents--events of rare occurrence in modern times. again, a nation may be placed between others who are interested in its security, their mutual jealousy preventing the molestation of the weaker neighbor. on the other hand, its political institutions may be such as to compel the others to unite in attacking it in order to secure themselves. the republics of switzerland could remain unmolested in the midst of powerful monarchies; but revolutionary france brought upon herself the armies of all europe. climate has also some influence upon military character, but this influence is far less than that of education and discipline. northern nations are said to be naturally more phlegmatic and sluggish than those of warmer climates; and yet the armies of gustavus adolphus, charles xii., and suwarrow, have shown themselves sufficiently active and impetuous, while the greeks, romans, and spaniards, in the times of their glory, were patient, disciplined, and indefatigable, notwithstanding the reputed fickleness of ardent temperaments. for any nation to postpone the making of military preparations till such time as they are actually required in defence, is to waste the public money, and endanger the public safety. the closing of an avenue of approach, the security of a single road or river, or even the strategic movement of a small body of troops, often effects, in the beginning, what afterwards cannot be accomplished by large fortifications, and the most formidable armies. had a small army in , with a well-fortified depot on lake champlain, penetrated into canada, and cut off all reinforcements and supplies by way of quebec, that country would inevitably have fallen into our possession. in the winter of - , napoleon crossed the vistula, and advanced even to the walls of königsberg, with the austrians in his rear, and the whole power of russia before him. if austria had pushed forward one hundred thousand men from bohemia, on the oder, she would, in all probability, says the best of military judges, jomini, have struck a fatal blow to the operations of napoleon, and his army must have been exceedingly fortunate even to regain the rhine. but austria preferred remaining neutral till she could increase her army to four hundred thousand men. she then took the offensive, and was beaten; whereas, with one hundred thousand men brought into action at the favorable moment, she might, most probably, have decided the fate of europe. "defensive war," says napoleon, "does not preclude attack, any more than offensive war is exclusive of defence," for frequently the best way to counteract the enemy's operations, and prevent his conquests, is, at the very outset of the war, to invade and cripple him. but this can never be attempted with raw troops, ill supplied with the munitions of war, and unsupported by fortifications. such invasions must necessarily fail. experience in the wars of the french revolution has demonstrated this; and even our own short history is not without its proof. in , the conquest of canada was determined on some time before the declaration of war; an undisciplined army, without preparation or apparent plan, was actually put in motion, eighteen days previous to this declaration, for the canadian peninsula. with a disciplined army of the same numbers, with an efficient and skilful leader, directed against the vital point of the british possessions at a time when the whole military force of the provinces did not exceed three thousand men, how different had been the result! while, therefore, the permanent defences of a nation must be subordinate to its resources, position, and character, they can in no case be dispensed with. no matter how extensive or important the temporary means that may be developed as necessity requires, there must be some force kept in a constant state of efficiency, in order to impart life and stability to the system. the one can never properly replace the other; for while the former constitutes the basis, the latter must form the main body of the military edifice, which, by its strength and durability, will offer shelter and protection to the nation; or, if the architecture and materials be defective, crush and destroy it in its fall. the permanent means of military defence employed by modern nations, are-- st. an army; d. a navy; d. fortifications. the first two of these could hardly be called permanent, if we were, to regard their _personnel_; but looking upon them as institutions or organizations, they present all the characteristics of durability. they are sometimes subjected to very great and radical changes; by the hot-house nursing of designing ambition or rash legislation, they may become overgrown and dangerous, or the storms of popular delusion may overthrow and apparently sweep them away. but they will immediately spring up again in some form or other, so deeply are they rooted in the organization of political institutions. its army and navy should always be kept within the limits of a nation's wants; but pity for the country which reduces them in number or support so as to degrade their character or endanger their organization. "a government," says one of the best historians of the age, "which neglects its army, under whatever pretext, is a government culpable in the eyes of posterity, for it is preparing humiliations for its flag and its country, instead of laying the foundation for its glory." one of our own distinguished cabinet ministers remarks, that the history of our relations with the indian tribes from the beginning to the present hour, is one continued proof of the necessity of maintaining an efficient military force in time of peace, and that the treatment we received for a long series of years from european powers, was a most humiliating illustration of the folly of attempting to dispense with these means of defence. "twice," says he, "we were compelled to maintain, by open war, our quarrel with the principal aggressors. after many years of forbearance and negotiation, our claims in other cases were at length amicably settled; but in one of the most noted of these cases, it was not without much delay and imminent hazard of war that the execution of the treaty was finally enforced. no one acquainted with these portions of our history, can hesitate to ascribe much of the wantonness and duration of the wrongs we endured, to a knowledge on the part of our assailants of the scantiness and inefficiency of our military and naval force." "if," said mr. calhoun, "disregarding the sound dictates of reason and experience, we, in peace, neglect our military establishment, we must, with a powerful and skilful enemy, be exposed to the most distressing calamities." these remarks were made in opposition to the reduction of our military establishment, in , below the standard of thirteen thousand. nevertheless, the force was reduced to about six or seven thousand; and we were soon made to feel the consequences. it is stated, in a report of high authority, that if there had been two regiments available near st. louis, in , the war with black hawk would have been easily avoided; and that it cannot be doubted that the scenes of devastation and savage warfare which overspread the floridas for nearly seven years would also have been avoided, and some thirty millions have been saved the country, if two regiments had been available at the beginning of that conflict.[ ] [footnote : we may now add to these remarks, that if our government had occupied the country between the nueces and the rio grande with a well-organized army of twelve thousand men, war with mexico might have been avoided; but to push forward upon matamoras a small force of only two thousand, in the very face of a large mexican army was holding out to them the strongest inducements to attack us. the temporary economy of a few thousands in reducing our military establishment to a mere handful of men, again results in a necessary expenditure of many millions of dollars and a large sacrifice of human life.] we must, in this country, if we heed either the dictates of reason or experience, maintain in time of peace a skeleton military and naval force, capable of being greatly expanded, in the event of danger, by the addition of new troops. much energy and enterprise will always be imparted to an army or navy by the addition of new forces. the strength thus acquired is sometimes in even a far greater ratio than the increase of numbers. but it must be remembered that these new elements are, of themselves, far inferior to the old ones in discipline, steady courage, and perseverance. no general can rely on the accuracy of their movements in the operations of a campaign, and they are exceedingly apt to fail him at the critical moment on the field of battle. the same holds true with respect to sailors inexperienced in the discipline and duties of a man-of-war. there is this difference, however: an army usually obtains its recruits from men totally unacquainted with military life, while a navy, in case of sudden increase, is mainly supplied from the merchant marine with professional sailors, who, though unacquainted with the use of artillery, &c., on ship-board, are familiar with all the other duties of sea life, and not unused to discipline. moreover, raw seamen and marines, from being under the immediate eye of their officers in time of action, and without the possibility of escape, fight much better than troops of the same character on land. if years are requisite to make a good sailor, surely an equal length of time is necessary to perfect the soldier; and no less skill, practice, and professional study are required for the proper direction of armies than for the management of fleets. but some have said that even these skeletons of military and naval forces are entirely superfluous, and that a brave and patriotic people will make as good a defence against invasion as the most disciplined and experienced. such views are frequently urged in the halls of congress, and some have even attempted to confirm them by historical examples. there are instances, it is true, where disorganized and frantic masses, animated by patriotic enthusiasm, have gained the most brilliant victories. here, however, extraordinary circumstances supplied the place of order, and produced an equilibrium between forces that otherwise would have been very unequal; but in almost every instance of this kind, the loss of the undisciplined army has been unnecessarily great, human life being substituted for skill and order. but victory, even with such a drawback, cannot often attend the banners of newly raised and disorderly forces. if the captain and crew of a steamship knew nothing of navigation, and had never been at sea, and the engineer was totally unacquainted with his profession, could we expect the ship to cross the atlantic in safety, and reach her destined port? would we trust our lives and the honor of our country to their care? would we not say to them, "first make yourselves acquainted with the principles of your profession, the use of the compass, and the means of determining whether you direct your course upon a ledge of rocks or into a safe harbor?" war is not, as some seem to suppose, a mere game of chance. its principles constitute one of the most intricate of modern sciences; and the general who understands the art of rightly applying its rules, and possesses the means of carrying out its precepts, may be morally certain of success. history furnishes abundant proofs of the impolicy of relying upon undisciplined forces in the open field. almost every page of napier's classic history of the peninsular war contains striking examples of the useless waste of human life and property by the spanish militia; while, with one quarter as many regulars, at a small fractional part of the actual expense, the french might have been expelled at the outset, or have been driven, at any time afterwards, from the peninsula. at the beginning of the french revolution the regular army was abolished, and the citizen-soldiery, who were established on the th of july, , relied on exclusively for the national defence. "but these three millions of national guards," says jomini, "though good supporters of the decrees of the assembly, were nevertheless useless for reinforcing the army beyond the frontiers, and utterly incapable of defending their own firesides." yet no one can question their individual bravery and patriotism; for, when reorganized, disciplined, and properly directed, they put to flight the best troops in europe. at the first outbreak of this revolution, the privileged classes of other countries, upholding crumbling institutions and rotten dynasties, rushed forth against the maddened hordes of french democracy. the popular power, springing upward by its own elasticity when the weight of political oppression was removed, soon became too wild and reckless to establish itself on any sure basis, or even to provide for its own protection. if the attacks of the enervated enemies of france were weak, so also were her own efforts feeble to resist these attacks. the republican armies repelled the ill-planned and ill-conducted invasion by the duke of brunswick; but it was by the substitution of human life for preparation, system, and skill; enthusiasm supplied the place of discipline; robbery produced military stores; and the dead bodies of her citizens formed _épaulements_ against the enemy. yet this was but the strength of weakness; the aimless struggle of a broken and disjointed government; and the new revolutionary power was fast sinking away before the combined opposition of europe, when the great genius of napoleon, with a strong arm and iron rule, seizing upon the scattered fragments, and binding them together into one consolidated mass, made france victorious, and seated himself on the throne of empire. no people in the world ever exhibited a more general and enthusiastic patriotism than the americans during the war of our own revolution. and yet our army received, even at that time, but little support from irregular and militia forces in the open field. washington's opinions on this subject furnish so striking a contrast to the congressional speeches of modern political demagogues, who, with boastful swaggers, would fain persuade us that we require no organization or discipline to meet the veteran troops of europe in the open field, and who would hurry us, without preparation, into war with the strongest military powers of the world--so striking is the contrast between the assertions of these men and the letters and reports of washington, that it may be well for the cool and dispassionate lover of truth to occasionally refresh his memory by reference to the writings of washington. the following brief extracts are from his letters to the president of congress, december, : "the saving in the article of clothing, provisions, and a thousand other things, by having nothing to do with the militia, unless in cases of extraordinary exigency, and such as could not be expected in the common course of events, would amply support a large army, which, well officered, would be daily improving, instead of continuing a destructive, expensive, and disorderly mob. in my opinion, if any dependence is placed on the militia another year, congress will be deceived. when danger is a little removed from them they will not turn out at all. when it comes home to them, the well-affected, instead of flying to arms to defend themselves, are busily employed in removing their families and effects; while the disaffected are concerting measures to make their submission, and spread terror and dismay all around, to induce others to follow their example. daily experience and abundant proofs warrant this information. short enlistments, and a mistaken dependence upon our militia, have been the origin of all our misfortunes, and the great accumulation of our debt. the militia come in, you cannot tell how; go, you cannot tell when; and act, you cannot tell where; consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last, at a critical moment." these remarks of washington will not be found too severe if we remember the conduct of our militia in the open field at princeton, savannah river, camden, guilford court-house, &c., in the war of the revolution; the great cost of the war of as compared with its military results; the refusal of the new england militia to march beyond the lines of their own states, and of the new-york militia to cross the niagara and secure a victory already won; or the disgraceful flight of the southern militia from the field of bladensburg. but there is another side to this picture. if our militia have frequently failed to maintain their ground _when drawn up in the open field_, we can point with pride to their brave and successful defence of charleston, mobile, new orleans, fort mchenry, stonington, niagara, plattsburg, in proof of what may be accomplished by militia in connection with fortifications. these examples from our history must fully demonstrate the great value of a militia when properly employed as a defence against invasion, and ought to silence the sneers of those who would abolish this arm of defence as utterly useless. in the open field militia cannot in general be manoeuvred to advantage; whereas, in the defence of fortified places their superior intelligence and activity not unfrequently render them even more valuable than regulars. and in reading the severe strictures of washington, greene, morgan, and others, upon our militia, it must be remembered that they were at that time entirely destitute of important works of defence; and the experience of all other nations, as well as our own, has abundantly shown that a newly-raised force cannot cope, _in the open field_, with one subordinate and disciplined. here _science_ must determine the contest. habits of strict obedience, and of simultaneous and united action, are indispensable to carry out what the higher principles of the military profession require. new and undisciplined forces are often confounded at the evolutions, and strategic and tactical combinations of a regular army, and lose all confidence in their leaders and in themselves. but, when placed behind a breastwork, they even overrate their security. they can then coolly look upon the approaching columns, and, unmoved by glittering armor and bristling bayonets, will exert all their skill in the use of their weapons. the superior accuracy of aim which the american has obtained by practice from his early youth, has enabled our militia to gain, under the protection of military works, victories as brilliant as the most veteran troops. the moral courage necessary to await an attack behind a parapet, is at least equal to that exerted in the open field, where _movements_ generally determine the victory. to watch the approach of an enemy, to see him move up and display his massive columns, his long array of military equipments, his fascines and scaling-ladders, his instruments of attack, and the professional skill with which he wields them, to hear the thunder of his batteries, spreading death all around, and to repel, hand to hand, those tremendous assaults, which stand out in all their horrible relief upon the canvass of modern warfare, requires a heart at least as brave as the professional warrior exhibits in the pitched battle. but we must not forget that to call this force into the open field,--to take the mechanic from his shop, the merchant from his counter, the farmer from his plough,--will necessarily be attended with an immense sacrifice of human life. the lives lost on the battle-field are not the only ones; militia, being unaccustomed to exposure, and unable to supply their own wants with certainty and regularity, contract diseases which occasion in every campaign a most frightful mortality. there is also a vast difference in the cost of supporting regulars and militia forces. the cost of a regular army of twenty thousand men for a campaign of six months, in this country, has been estimated, from data in the war-office, at a hundred and fifty dollars per man; while the cost of a militia force, under the same circumstances, making allowance for the difference in the expenses from sickness, waste of camp-furniture, equipments, &c., will be two hundred and fifty dollars per man. but in short campaigns, and in irregular warfare, like the expedition against black hawk and his indians in the northwest, and during the hostilities in florida, "the expenses of the militia," says mr. secretary spencer, in a report to congress in , "invariably exceed those of regulars by _at least three hundred per cent_." it is further stated that "_fifty-five thousand militia_ were called into service during the black hawk and florida wars, and that _thirty millions of dollars have been expended in these conflicts_!" when it is remembered that during these border wars our whole regular army did not exceed twelve or thirteen thousand men, it will not be difficult to perceive why our military establishment was so enormously expensive. large sums were paid to sedentary militia who never rendered the slightest service. again, during our late war with great britain, of less than three years' duration, _two hundred and eighty thousand muskets were lost,_--the average cost of which is stated at twelve dollars,--making an aggregate loss, in muskets alone, _of three millions and three hundred and sixty thousand dollars_, during a service of about two years and a half;--resulting mainly from that neglect and waste of public property which almost invariably attends the movements of newly-raised and inexperienced forces. facts like these should awaken us to the necessity of reorganizing and disciplining our militia. general knox, when secretary of war, general harrison while in the senate, and mr. poinsett in , each furnished plans for effecting this purpose, but the whole subject has been passed by with neglect. permanent fortifications differ in many of their features from either of the two preceding elements of national defence. they are passive in their nature, yet possess all the conservative properties of an army or navy, and through these two contribute largely to the active operations of a campaign. when once constructed they require but very little expenditure for their support. in time of peace they withdraw no valuable citizens from the useful occupations of life. of themselves they can never exert an influence corrupting to public morals, or dangerous to public liberty; but as the means of preserving peace, and as obstacles to an invader, their influence and power are immense. while contributing to the economical support of a peace establishment, by furnishing drill-grounds, parades, quarters, &c.; and to its efficiency still more, by affording facilities both to the regulars and militia for that species of artillery practice so necessary in the defence of water frontiers; they also serve as safe dépôts of arms and the immense quantity of materials and military munitions so indispensable in modern warfare. these munitions usually require much time, skill, and expense in their construction, and it is of vast importance that they should be preserved with the utmost care. maritime arsenals and depots of naval and military stores on the sea-coast are more particularly exposed to capture and destruction. here an enemy can approach by stealth, striking some sudden and fatal blow before any effectual resistance can be organized. but in addition to the security afforded by harbor fortifications to public property of the highest military value, they also serve to protect the merchant shipping, and the vast amount of private wealth which a commercial people always collect at these points. they furnish safe retreats, and the means of repair for public vessels injured in battle, or by storms, and to merchantmen a refuge from the dangers of sea, or the threats of hostile fleets. moreover, they greatly facilitate our naval attacks upon the enemy's shipping; and if he attempt a descent, their well-directed fire will repel his squadrons from our harbors, and force his troops to land at some distant and unfavorable position. the three means of permanent defence which have been mentioned, are, of course, intended to accomplish the same general object; but each has its distinct and proper sphere of action, and neither can be regarded as antagonistical to the others. any undue increase of one, at the expense of the other two, must necessarily be followed by a corresponding diminution of national strength. we must not infer, however, that all must be maintained upon the same footing. the position of the country and the character of the people must determine this. england, from her insular position and the extent of her commerce, must maintain a large navy; a large army is also necessary for the defence of her own coasts and the protection of her colonial possessions. her men-of-war secure a safe passage for her merchant-vessels, and transport her troops in safety through all seas, and thus contribute much to the acquisition and security of colonial territory. the military forces of the british empire amount to about one hundred and fifty thousand men, and the naval forces to about seven hundred vessels of war,[ ] carrying in all some fifteen thousand guns and forty thousand men. france has less commerce, and but few colonial possessions. she has a great extent of sea-coast, but her fortifications secure it from maritime descents; her only accessible points are on the land frontiers. her army and navy, therefore, constitute _her_ principal means of defence. her army numbers some three hundred and fifty thousand men, and her navy about three hundred and fifty vessels,[ ] carrying about nine thousand guns and thirty thousand men. russia, austria, prussia, sweden, and other continental powers, have but little commerce to be protected, while their extensive frontiers are greatly exposed to land attacks: their fortifications and armies, therefore, constitute their principal means of defence. but for the protection of their own seas from the inroads of their powerful maritime neighbor, russia and austria support naval establishments of a limited extent. russia has, in all, some one hundred and eighty vessels of war, and austria not quite half that number.[ ] [footnote : these numbers include _all_ vessels of war, whether in commission, building, or in ordinary.] the united states possess no colonies; but they have a sea-coast of more than three thousand miles, with numerous bays, estuaries, and navigable rivers, which expose our most populous cities to maritime attacks. the northern land frontier is two thousand miles in extent, and in the west our territory borders upon the british and mexican possessions for many thousand miles more. within these limits there are numerous tribes of indians, who require the watchful care of armed forces to keep them at peace among themselves as well as with us. our authorized military establishment amounts to , men, and our naval establishment consists of seventy-seven vessels of all classes, carrying , guns, and , men.[ ] this is certainly a very small military and naval force for the defence of so extended and populous a country, especially one whose political institutions and rapidly-increasing power expose it to the distrust and jealousy of most other nations. [footnote : since these pages were put in the hands of the printer, the above numbers have been nearly doubled, this increase having been made with special reference to the present war with mexico.] the fortifications for the defence of our sea-coast and land frontiers will be discussed hereafter.[ ] [footnote : jomini's work on the military art contains many valuable remarks on this subject of military polity: also the writings of clausewitz, dupin, lloyd, chambray, tranchant de laverne, and rudtorfer. several of these questions are also discussed in rocquancourt, carion-nisas, de vernon, and other writers on military history. the several european annuaires militaires, or army registers, and the french and german military periodicals, contain much valuable matter connected with military statistics.] chapter vii. sea-coast defences. the principal attacks which we have had to sustain, either as colonies or states, from civilized foes, have come from canada. as colonies we were continually encountering difficulties and dangers from the french possessions. in the war of the revolution, it being one of national emancipation, the military operations were more general throughout the several states; but in the war of the attacks were confined to the northern frontier and a few exposed points along the coast. in these two contests with great britain, boston, new york, philadelphia, baltimore, washington, charleston, savannah, mobile, and new orleans, being within reach of the british naval power, and offering the dazzling attraction of rich booty, have each been subjected to powerful assaults. similar attacks will undoubtedly be made in any future war with england. an attempt at permanent lodgment would be based either on canada or a servile insurrection in the southern states. the former project, in a military point of view, offers the greatest advantages, but most probably the latter would also be resorted to for effecting a diversion, if nothing more. but for inflicting upon us a sudden and severe injury by the destruction of large amounts of public and private property, our seaport towns offer inducements not likely to be disregarded. this mode of warfare, barbarous though it be, will certainly attend a conflict with any great maritime power. how can we best prepare in time of peace to repel these attacks? immediately after the war of a joint commission of our most distinguished military and naval officers was formed, to devise a system of defensive works, to be erected in time of peace for the security of the most important and the most exposed points on our sea-coast. it may be well here to point out, in very general terms, the positions and character of these works, mentioning only such as have been completed, or are now in course of construction, and such as are intended to be built as soon as congress shall grant the requisite funds. there are other works projected for some future period, but as they do not belong to the class required for immediate, use, they will not be referred to. maine. beginning at the northeastern extremity of our coast, we have, for eastport and wiscasset, projected works estimated to carry about fifty guns. nothing has yet been done to these works. next portland, with works carrying about forty or fifty guns, and fort penobscot and batteries, carrying about one hundred and fifty guns. these are only partly built. new hampshire. defences of portsmouth and the vicinity, about two hundred guns. these works are also only partly built. massachusetts. projected works east of boston, carrying about sixty guns. these are not yet commenced. works for defence of boston harbor carry about five hundred guns. these are nearly three-quarters completed. those of new bedford harbor carry fifty guns: not yet begun. rhode island. newport harbor,--works carry about five hundred guns, nearly completed. connecticut. new london harbor, new haven, and the connecticut river. the first of these nearly completed; the two latter not yet begun. new york. the works projected for the defence of new york harbor are estimated to carry about one thousand guns. these works are not yet one-half constructed. pennsylvania. the works projected for the defence of the delaware bay and philadelphia will carry about one hundred and fifty guns. they are not one-quarter built. maryland and virginia. baltimore and annapolis--these works will carry some two hundred and fifty guns. the works for the chesapeake bay will carry about six hundred guns; and those for the potomac river about eighty guns. these are more than one-half completed. north carolina. the works at beaufort and smithville carry about one hundred and fifty guns. they are essentially completed. south carolina. the works for the defence of charleston carry some two hundred guns. they are one-half constructed. georgia. the defences of savannah carry about two hundred guns and are nearly three-quarters finished. florida. the works projected for the defence of st. augustine, key west, tortugas, and pensacola will carry some eight or nine hundred guns. those at st. augustine and pensacola are essentially completed, but those at key west and tortugas are barely begun. alabama. the works for the defence of mobile will carry about one hundred and sixty guns. these are nearly constructed. louisiana. the works for the defence of new orleans will carry some two hundred and fifty or three hundred guns; they are nearly completed. the works north of the chesapeake cost about three thousand dollars per gun; those south of that point about six thousand dollars per gun. this difference in cost is due in part to the character of the soil on which the fortifications are built, and in part to the high prices paid in the south for materials and workmanship. * * * * * having pointed out the character and condition of our system of sea-coast defences, let us briefly examine how far these works may be relied on as a means of security against a maritime descent. to come to a proper conclusion on this subject, let us first examine the three or four great maritime descents attempted by the english during the wars of the french revolution; a period at which the great naval superiority of england over other nations, gave her the title of _mistress of the seas_. let us notice what have been the results of the several attempts made by this power at maritime invasions, and the means by which such attacks have been repelled. in , a maritime expedition was fitted out against quiberon, at an expense of eight millions of dollars. this port of the french coast had then a naval defence of near thirty sail, carrying about sixteen hundred guns. lord bridport attacked it with fourteen sail of the line, five frigates, and some smaller vessels, about fifteen hundred guns in all, captured a portion of the fleet, and forced the remainder to take shelter under the guns of the fortifications of l'orient. the french naval defence being destroyed, the british now entered quiberon without opposition. this bay is said by brenton, in his british naval history, to be "the finest on the coast of france, or perhaps in the world, for landing an army." besides these natural advantages in favor of the english, the inhabitants of the surrounding country were in open insurrection, ready to receive the invaders with open arms. a body of ten thousand troops were landed, and clothing, arms, &c., furnished to as many more royalist troops; but the combined forces failed in their attack upon st. barbe, and general hoche, from his intrenchments, with seven thousand men, held in check a body of eighteen thousand, penned up, without defences, in the narrow peninsula. reinforced by a new debarkation, the allies again attempted to advance, but were soon defeated, and ultimately almost entirely destroyed. in , the english and russians made a descent upon holland with fourteen ships of the line and ten frigates, carrying about eleven hundred guns and a great number of transports, with an army of thirty-six thousand men. the dutch naval defences consisted of eight ships of the line, three fifty-four gun ships, eight forty-eight gun ships and eight smaller frigates, carrying in all about twelve hundred guns; but this force contributed little or nothing to the defence, and was soon forced to hoist the hostile flag. the defensive army was at first only twelve thousand, but the republicans afterwards increased it to twenty-two thousand, and finally to twenty-eight thousand men. but notwithstanding this immense naval and military superiority, and the co-operation of the orange party in assisting the landing of their troops, the allies failed to get possession of a single strong place; and after a loss of six thousand men, were compelled to capitulate. "such," says alison, "was the disastrous issue of the greatest expedition which had yet sailed from the british harbors during the war." in , nelson, with three ships of the line, two frigates, and thirty-five smaller vessels, made a desperate attack upon the harbor of boulogne, but was repulsed with severe loss. passing over some unimportant attacks, we come to the descent upon the scheldt, or as it is commonly called, the walcheren expedition, in . this expedition, though a failure, has often been referred to as proving the expediency of maritime descents. the following is a brief narrative of this expedition:-- napoleon had projected vast fortifications, dock-yards, and naval arsenals at flushing and antwerp for the protection of a maritime force in the scheldt. but no sooner was the execution of this project begun, than the english fitted out an expedition to seize upon the defences of the scheldt, and capture or destroy the naval force. flushing, at the mouth of the river, was but ill-secured, and antwerp, some sixty or seventy miles further up the river, was entirely defenceless; the rampart was unarmed with cannon, dilapidated, and tottering, and its garrison consisted of only about two hundred invalids and recruits. napoleon's regular army was employed on the danube and in the peninsula. the british attacking force consisted of thirty-seven ships of the line, twenty-three frigates, thirty-three sloops of war, twenty-eight gun, mortar, and bomb vessels, thirty-six smaller vessels, eighty-two gunboats, innumerable transports, with over forty thousand troops, and an immense artillery train; making in all, says the english historian, "an hundred thousand combatants." a landing was made upon the island of walcheren, and siege laid to flushing, which place was not reduced till eighteen days after the landing; the attack upon the water was made by seven or eight ships of the line, and a large flotilla of bomb vessels, but produced no effect. the channel at the mouth of the river was too broad to be defended by the works of flushing, and the main portion of the fleet passed out of reach of the guns, and ascended the scheldt part way up to antwerp. but in the mean time, the fortifications of that place had been repaired, and, after a fruitless operation of a whole month in the river, the english were gradually forced to retreat to walcheren, and finally to evacuate their entire conquest. the cost of the expedition was immense, both in treasure and in life. it was certainly very poorly managed. but we cannot help noticing the superior value of fortifications as a defence against such descents. they did much to retard the operations of the enemy till a defensive army could be raised. the works of flushing were never intended to close up the scheldt, and of course could not intercept the passage of shipping; but they were not reduced by the english naval force, as has sometimes been alleged. col. mitchel, of the english service, says that the fleet "kept up so tremendous a fire upon the batteries, that the french officers who had been present at austerlitz and jena declared that the cannonade in these battles had been a mere _jeu d'enfans_ in comparison. yet what was the effect produced on the defences of the place by this fire, so formidable, to judge by the sound alone? the writer can answer the question with some accuracy, for he went along the entire sea-line the very day after the capitulation, and found no part of the parapet injured so as to be of the slightest consequence, and only one solitary gun dismounted, evidently by the bursting of a shell, and which could not, of course, have been thrown from the line of battle ships, but must have been thrown from the land batteries."[ ] [footnote : the batteries constructed in the siege of this place were armed with fifty-two heavy guns and mortars.] but it may be said that although great naval descents on a hostile coast are almost always unsuccessful, nevertheless a direct naval attack upon a single fortified position will be attended with more favorable results; and that our seaport towns, however fortified, will be exposed to bombardment and destruction by the enemy's fleets. in other words, that in a direct contest between ships and forts the former will have at least an equal chance of success. let us suppose a fair trial of this relative strength. the fort is to be properly constructed and in good repair; its guns in a position to be used with effect; its garrison skilful and efficient; its commander capable and brave. the ship is of the very best character, and in perfect order; the crew disciplined and courageous; its commander skilful and adroit; the wind, and tide, and sea--all as could be desired.[ ] the numbers of the garrison and crew are to be no more than requisite, with no unnecessary exposure of human life to swell the lists of the slain. the issue of this contest, unless attended with extraordinary and easily distinguishable circumstances, would be a fair test of their relative strength. [footnote : these conditions for a battery are easily satisfied, but for the ship, are partly dependent on the elements, and seldom to be wholly attained.] what result should we anticipate from the nature of the contending forces? the ship, under the circumstances we have supposed, can choose her point of attack, selecting the one she may deem the most vulnerable; but she herself is everywhere vulnerable; her men and guns are much concentrated, and consequently much exposed. but in the fort the guns and men are more distributed, a fort with an interior area of several acres not having a garrison as large as the crew of a seventy-four-gun ship. all parts of the vessel are liable to injury; while the fort offers but a small mark,--the opening of the embrasures, a small part of the carriage, and now and then a head or arm raised above the parapet,--the ratio of exposed surfaces being not less than _twenty to one_. in the vessel the guns are fired from an oscillating deck, and the balls go at random; in the fort the guns are fired from an immoveable platform, and the balls reach their object with unerring aim. there is always more or less motion in the water, so that the ship's guns, though accurately pointed at one moment, at the next will be thrown entirely away from the object, even when the motion is too slight to be otherwise noticed; whereas in the battery the guns will be fired just as they are pointed; and the motion of the vessel will merely vary to the extent of a few inches the spot in which the shot is received. in the fort the men and guns are behind impenetrable walls of stone and earth; in the vessel they are behind frail bulwarks, whose splinters are equally destructive with the shot. the fort is incombustible; while the ship may readily be set on fire by incendiary projectiles. the ship has many points exposed that may be called vital points. by losing her rudder, or portions of her rigging, or of her spars, she may become unmanageable, and unable to use her strength; she may receive shots under water, and be liable to sink; she may receive hot shot, and be set on fire: these damages are in addition to those of having her guns dismounted and her people killed by shots that pierce her sides and scatter splinters from her timbers; while the risks of the battery are confined to those mentioned above--namely, the risk that the gun, the carriage, or the men may be struck. the opinions of military writers, and the facts of history, fully accord with these deductions of theory. some few individuals mistaking, or misstating, the facts of a few recent trials, assert that modern improvements in the naval service have so far outstripped the progress in the art of land defence, that a floating force is now abundantly able to cope, upon equal terms, with a land battery. ignorant and superficial persons, hearing merely that certain forts had recently yielded to a naval force, and taking no trouble to learn the real facts of the case, have paraded them before the public as proofs positive of a new era in military science. this conclusion, however groundless and absurd, has received credit merely from its novelty. let us examine the several trials of strength which have taken place between ships and forts within the last fifty years, and see what have been the results. in a considerable french squadron attacked cagliari, whose fortifications were at that time so dilapidated and weak, as scarcely to deserve the name of defences. nevertheless, the french fleet, after a bombardment of three days, was most signally defeated and obliged to retire. in two british ships, "the fortitude of seventy-four, and the juno frigate of thirty-two guns," attacked a small town in the bay of martello, corsica, which was armed with one gun in barbette, and a garrison of thirty men. after a bombardment of two and a half hours, these ships were forced to haul off with considerable damage and loss of life. the little tower had received no injury, and its garrison were unharmed. here were _one hundred and six guns_ afloat against _one_ on shore; and yet the latter was successful. in nelson attacked the little inefficient batteries of santa crux, in teneriffe, with eight vessels carrying four hundred guns. but notwithstanding his great superiority in numbers, skill, and bravery, he was repelled with the loss of two hundred and fifty men, while the garrison received little or no damage. a single ball from the land battery, striking the side of one of his vessels, instantly sunk her with near a hundred seamen and marines! in , a french flotilla of fifty-two brigs and gunboats, manned with near seven thousand men, attacked a little english redoubt on the island of marcou, which was armed with two thirty-two-pounders, two six-pounders, four four-pounders, and two carronades, and garrisoned with two hundred and fifty men. notwithstanding this great disparity of numbers, the little redoubt sunk seven of the enemy's brigs and gunboats, captured another, and forced the remainder to retreat with great loss; while the garrison had but one man killed and three wounded. in , the french, with three frigates and six thousand men, attacked the poorly-constructed works of porto ferrairo, whose defensive force was a motley garrison of fifteen hundred corsicans, tuscans, and english. here the attacking force was _four_ times as great as that of the garrison; nevertheless they were unsuccessful after several bombardments and a siege of five months. in july of the same year, , admiral saumarez, with an english fleet of six ships of the line and two smaller vessels, carrying in all five hundred and two guns, attacked the spanish and french defences of algesiras. supposing the floating forces of the contending parties to be equal, gun for gun, (which is certainly a very fair estimate for the attacking force, considering the circumstances of the case,) we have a french land-battery of only twelve guns opposed by an english floating force of one hundred and ninety-six guns. notwithstanding this inequality of nearly _seventeen_ to _one_, the little battery compelled the superior naval force to retreat with great loss. shortly after this, the french and spanish fleets attacked the same english squadron with a force of nearly _three_ to _one_, but met with a most signal defeat; whereas with a land-battery of only _one_ to _seventeen_, the same party had been victorious. what proof can be more decisive of the superiority of guns on shore over those afloat! in the english garrison of diamond rock, near port royal bay, with only one hundred men and some fifteen guns, repelled a french squadron of two seventy-four-gun ships, a frigate, and a brig, assisted by a land attack of two hundred troops. there was not a single man killed or wounded in the redoubt, while the french lost fifty men! the place was afterwards reduced by famine. in a french battery on cape licosa, of only two guns and a garrison of twenty-five men, resisted the attacks of a british eighty-gun ship and two frigates. the carriage of one of the land-guns failed on the second shot, so that, in fact, only _one_ of them was available during the action. here was _a single piece of ordnance_ and a garrison of _twenty-five men,_ opposed to a naval force of _over one hundred and fifty guns_ and about _thirteen hundred men._ and what effects were produced by this strange combat? the attacking force lost _thirty-seven_ men killed and wounded, the eighty-gun ship was much disabled, while the fort and garrison escaped entirely unharmed! what could not be effected by force was afterwards obtained by negotiation. in a french land-battery of only _three_ guns, near fort trinidad, drove off an english seventy-four-gun ship, and a bomb-vessel. in leghorn, whose defences were of a very mediocre character, and whose garrison at that time was exceedingly weak, was attacked by an english squadron of six ships, carrying over three hundred guns, and a land force of one thousand troops. the whole attempt was a perfect failure. "in , when the english advanced against antwerp," says colonel mitchell, an english historian, "fort frederick, a small work of only two guns, was established in a bend of the polder dyke, at some distance below lillo. the armament was a long eighteen-pounder and a five and a half inch howitzer. from this post the french determined to dislodge the english, and an eighty-gun ship dropped down with the tide and anchored near the flanders shore, about six hundred yards from the british battery. by her position she was secured from the fire of the eighteen-pounder, and exposed to that of the howitzer only. as soon as every thing was made tight her broadside was opened; and if noise and smoke were alone sufficient to ensure success in war, as so many of the moderns seem to think, the result of this strange contest would not have been long doubtful, for the thunder of the french artillery actually made the earth to shake again; but though the earth shook, the single british howitzer was neither dismounted nor silenced; and though the artillery-men could not, perfectly exposed as they were, stand to their gun while the iron hail was striking thick and fast around, yet no sooner did the enemy's fire slacken for a moment than they sprang to their post, ready to return at least one shot for eighty. this extraordinary combat lasted from seven o'clock in the morning till near twelve at noon, when the french ship, having had forty-one men killed and wounded, her commander being in the list of the latter, and having besides sustained serious damage in her hull and rigging, returned to antwerp without effecting any thing whatever. the howitzer was not dismounted, the fort was not injured,--there being in fact nothing to injure,--and the british had only one man killed and two wounded." it is unnecessary to further specify examples from the wars of the french revolution; the whole history of these wars is one continued proof of the superiority of fortifications as a maritime frontier defence. the sea-coast of france is almost within stone's throw[ ] of the principal british naval depots; here were large towns and harbors, filled with the rich commerce of the world, offering the dazzling attraction of rich booty. the french navy was at this time utterly incompetent to their defence; while england supported a maritime force at an annual expense of near _ninety millions of dollars._ her largest fleets were continually cruising within sight of these seaports, and not unfrequently attempting to cut out their shipping. "at this period," says one of her naval historians, "the naval force of britain, so multiplied and so expert from long practice, had acquired an intimate knowledge of their (the french) harbors, their bays and creeks; her officers knew the depth of water, and the resistance likely to be met with in every situation." on the other hand, these harbors and towns were frequently stripped of their garrisons by the necessities of distant wars, being left with no other defence than their fortifications and militia. and yet, notwithstanding all this, they escaped unharmed during the entire contest. they were frequently attacked, and in some instances the most desperate efforts were made to effect a permanent lodgment; but in no case was the success at all commensurate with the expense of life and treasure sacrificed, and no permanent hold was made on either the maritime frontiers of france or her allies. this certainly was owing to no inferiority of skill and bravery on the part of the british navy, as the battles of aboukir and trafalgar, and the almost total annihilation of the french marine, have but too plainly proven. why then did these places, escape? we know of no other reason, than that _they were fortified_; and that the french knew how to defend their fortifications. the british maritime expeditions to quiberon, holland, boulogne, the scheldt, constantinople, buenos ayres, &c., sufficiently prove the ill-success, and the waste of life and treasure with which they must always be attended. but when her naval power was applied to the destruction of the enemy's marine, and in transporting her land forces to solid bases of operations on the soil of her allies, in portugal and belgium, the fall of napoleon crowned the glory of their achievements. [footnote : only eighteen and a half miles across the channel at the narrowest place.] let us now examine the several british naval attacks on our own forts, in the wars of the revolution and of . in sir peter parker, with a british fleet of nine vessels, carrying about two hundred and seventy[ ] guns, attacked fort moultrie, in charleston harbor, which was then armed with only twenty-six guns, and garrisoned by only three hundred and seventy-five regulars and a few militia. in this contest the british were entirely defeated, and lost, in killed and wounded, two hundred and five men, while their whole two hundred and seventy guns killed and wounded only thirty-two men in the fort. of this trial of strength, which was certainly a fair one, cooper in his naval history, says:--"it goes fully to prove the important military position that ships cannot withstand forts, when the latter are properly armed, constructed, and garrisoned. general moultrie says only thirty rounds from the battery were fired, and was of opinion that the want of powder alone prevented the americans from destroying the men-of-war." [footnote : these vessels _rated_ two hundred and fifty-four guns, but the number actually carried is stated to have been two hundred and seventy.] in a british fleet of four vessels, carrying ninety-two guns, attacked fort boyer, a small redoubt, located on a point of land commanding the passage from the gulf into the bay of mobile. this redoubt was garrisoned by only one hundred and twenty combatants, officers included; and its armament was but twenty small pieces of cannon, some of which were almost entirely useless, and most of them poorly mounted "in batteries hastily thrown up, and leaving the gunners uncovered from the knee upward," while the enemy's land force, acting in concert with the ships, consisted of twenty artillerists with a battery of two guns, and seven hundred and thirty marines, indians, and negroes. his ships carried five hundred and ninety men in all. this immense disparity of numbers and strength did not allow to the british military and naval commanders the slightest apprehension "that four british ships, carrying ninety-two guns, and a land force somewhat exceeding seven hundred combatants, could fail in reducing a small work mounting only twenty short carronades, and defended by a little more than a hundred men, unprovided alike with furnaces for heating shot, or casements to cover themselves from rockets and shells." nevertheless, the enemy was completely repulsed; one of his largest ships was entirely destroyed, and men were killed and wounded on board the other; while our loss was only eight or nine. here a naval force of _five_ to _one_ was repelled by the land-battery. again, in , a barbette battery of one four-pounder and two eighteen-pounder guns at stonington, repelled a british fleet of one hundred and thirty-four guns. during the engagement the americans exhausted their ammunition, and spiked their eighteen-pounders, and only one of them was afterwards used. two of the enemy's ships, carrying one hundred and twelve guns, were engaged during the whole time of attack, and during much of this time bombarded the town from a position beyond reach of the land-battery. they were entirely too far off for the four-pounder gun to be of any use. supposing the two eighteen-pounders to have been employed during the whole action, and also all the guns of the fleet, _one_ eighteen-pounder on land must have been more than equivalent to _sixty-seven_ guns afloat, for the ships were so much injured as to render it necessary for them to withdraw. the british loss was twenty killed, and more than fifty wounded. ours was only two killed and six wounded.[ ] [footnote : perkins says two killed and six wounded. holmes says six wounded, but makes no mention of any killed.] the fleet sent to the attack of baltimore, in , consisted of forty sail, the largest of which were ships of the line, carrying an army of over six thousand combatants. the troops were landed at north point, while sixteen of the bomb-vessels and frigates approached within reach of fort mchenry, and commenced a bombardment which lasted twenty-five hours. during this attack, the enemy threw "fifteen hundred shells, four hundred of which exploded within the walls of the fort, but without making any impression on either the strength of the work or the garrison," and the british were compelled to retire with much loss. in , a squadron of british ships, stationed off the mouths of the mississippi, for the purpose of a blockade, ascended the river as high as fort st. philip, which is a small work capable of an armament of only twenty guns in all. a heavy fire of shot and shells was continued with but few and short pauses for nine days and nights, but making no impression either on the fort or garrison, they retreated to their former position at the mouth of the river. there is but a single instance in the war of , where the enemy's vessels succeeded in reducing a fort; and this has sometimes been alluded to, by persons ignorant of the real facts of the case, as a proof against the ability of our fortifications to resist naval attacks. even if it were a case of decided failure, would this single exception be sufficient to overthrow the weight of evidence on the other side? we allude to the reduction of the so-called fort washington by the british fleet that ascended the potomac in , to assist in the disgraceful and barbarous operation of burning the capitol and destroying the archives of the nation. fort washington was a very small and inefficient work, incorrectly planned by an incompetent french engineer; only a small part of the fort was then built, and it has not yet been completed. the portion constructed was never, until very recently, properly prepared for receiving its armament, and at the time of attack could not possibly have held out a long time. but no defence whatever was made. capt. gordon, with a squadron of eight sail, carrying one hundred and seventy-three guns, under orders "to ascend the river as high as fort washington, and try upon it the experiment of a bombardment," approached that fort, and, upon firing a single shell, which did no injury to either the fort or the garrison, the latter deserted the works, and rapidly retreated. the commanding officer was immediately dismissed for his cowardice. an english naval officer, who was one of the expedition, in speaking of the retreat of the garrison, says: "we were at loss to account for such an extraordinary step. the position was good and the capture would have cost us at least fifty men, and more, had it been properly defended; besides, an unfavorable wind and many other chances were in their favor," &c. the fleet ascended the river to alexandria, but learning soon afterwards that batteries were preparing at white house and indian head to cut off its retreat, it retired, in much haste, but not without injury. some have also pretended to find in modern european history a few examples contradictory of the relative power which we have here assigned to ships and forts. overlooking the numerous and well-authenticated examples, where forts of small dimensions and of small armament have repelled large fleets, they would draw their conclusions from the four or five instances where fleets have gained (as was at first supposed) a somewhat doubtful victory over forts. but a careful and critical examination of the facts in these cases, will show that even these are no exceptions to the general rule of the superiority of guns ashore over guns afloat. the only instances where it has ever been pretended by writers of any note, that ships have gained advantage, are those of the attack on copenhagen in ; the passage of the dardanelles, in ; the attack on algiers, in ; the attack on san juan d'ulloa, in ; and the attack on st. jean d'acre, in . let us examine these examples a little in detail:-- _copenhagen_.--the british fleet sent to attack copenhagen, in , consisted of fifty-two sail, eighteen of them being line-of-battle ships, four frigates, &c. they sailed from yarmouth roads on the th of march, passed the sound on the th, and attacked and defeated the danish line on the d of april. the sound between cronenberg and the swedish coast is about two and a half miles wide, (vide fig. .) the batteries of cronenberg and elsinore were lined with one hundred pieces of cannon and mortars; but the swedish battery had been much neglected, and then mounted only six guns. nevertheless, the british admiral, to avoid the damage his squadron would have to sustain in the passage of this wide channel, defended by a force scarcely superior to a single one of his ships, preferred to attempt the difficult passage of the belt; but after a few of his light vessels, acting as scouts, had run on rocks, he returned to the sound. he then tried to negotiate a peaceful passage, threatening, however, a declaration of war if his vessels should be fired upon. it must be remembered that at this time england was at peace with both denmark and sweden, and that no just cause of war existed. hence, the admiral inferred that the commanders of these batteries would be loath to involve their countries in a war with so formidable a power as england, by commencing hostilities, when only a free passage was asked. the danish commander replied, that he should not permit a fleet to pass his post, whose object and destination were unknown to him. he fired upon them, as he was bound to do by long-existing commercial regulations, and not as an act of hostility against the english. the swedes, on the contrary, remained neutral, and allowed the british vessels to lie near by for several days without firing upon them. seeing this friendly disposition of the swedes, the fleet neared their coast, and passed out of the reach of the danish batteries, which opened a fire of balls and shells; but all of them fell more than two hundred yards short of the fleet, which escaped without the loss of a single man. the swedes excused their treachery by the plea that it would have been impossible to construct batteries at that season, and that, even had it been possible, denmark would not have consented to their doing so, for fear that sweden would renew her old claim to one half of the rich duties levied by denmark on all ships passing the strait. there may have been some grounds for the last excuse; but the true reason for their conduct was the fear of getting involved in a war with england. napoleon says that, even at that season, a few days would have been sufficient for placing a hundred guns in battery, and that sweden had much more time than was requisite. and with a hundred guns on each side of the channel, served with skill and energy, the fleet must necessarily have sustained so much damage as to render it unfit to attack copenhagen. on this passage, we remark:-- st. the whole number of guns and mortars in the forts of the sound amounted to only one hundred and six, while the fleet carried over seventeen hundred guns; and yet, with this immense superiority of more than _sixteen_ to _one_, the british admiral preferred the dangerous passage of the belt to encountering the fire of these land-batteries. d. by negotiations, and threatening the vengeance of england, he persuaded the small swedish battery to remain silent and allow the fleet to pass near that shore, out of reach of cronenberg and elsinore. d. it is the opinion of napoleon and the best english writers, that if the swedish battery had been put in order, and acted in concert with the danish works, they might have so damaged the fleet as to render it incapable of any serious attempt on copenhagen. we now proceed to consider the circumstances attending the attack and defence of copenhagen itself. the only side of the town exposed to the attack of heavy shipping is the northern, where there lies a shoal extending out a considerable distance, leaving only a very narrow approach to the heart of the city, (fig. ) on the most advanced part of this shoal are the crown-batteries, carrying in all eighty-eight guns.[ ] the entrance into the baltic between copenhagen and salthorn, is divided into two channels by a bank, called the middle ground, which is situated directly opposite copenhagen. to defend the entrance on the left of the crown-batteries, they placed near the mouth of the channel four ships of the line, one frigate, and two sloops, carrying in all three hundred and fifty-eight guns. to secure the port and city from bombardment from the king's channel, (that between the middle ground and town,) a line of floating defences were moored near the edge of the shoal, and manned principally by volunteers. this line consisted of old hulls of vessels, block-ships, prames, rafts, &c., carrying in all six hundred and twenty-eight guns--a force strong enough to prevent the approach of bomb-vessels and gunboats, (the purpose for which it was intended,) but utterly incapable of contending with first-rate ships of war; but these the danes thought would be deterred from approaching by the difficulties of navigation. these difficulties were certainly very great; and nelson said, beforehand, that "the wind which might carry him in would most probably not bring out a crippled ship." had the danes supposed it possible for nelson to approach with his large vessels, the line of floating defences would have been formed nearer copenhagen, the right supported by batteries raised on the isle of amack. "in that case," says napoleon, "it is probable that nelson would have failed in his attack; for it would have been impossible for him to pass between the line and shore thus lined with cannon." as it was, the line was too extended for strength, and its right too far advanced to receive assistance from the battery of amack. a part of the fleet remained as a reserve, under admiral parker, while the others, under nelson, advanced to the king's channel. this attacking force consisted of eight ships of the line and thirty-six smaller vessels, carrying in all eleven hundred guns, (without including those in the six gun-brigs, whose armament is not given.) one of the seventy-four-gun ships could not be brought into action, and two others grounded; but, lord nelson says, "although not in the situation assigned them, yet they were so placed as to be of great service." this force was concentrated upon _a part_ of the danish line of floating defences, the whole of which was not only inferior to it by three hundred and eighty-two guns, but so situated as to be beyond the reach of succor, and without a chance of escape. the result was what might have been expected. every vessel of the right and centre of this outer danish line was taken or destroyed, except one or two small ones, which cut and run under protection of the fortifications. the left of the line, being supported by the crown-battery, remained unbroken. a division of frigates, in hopes of providing an adequate substitute for the ships intended to attack the batteries, ventured to engage them, but "it suffered considerable loss, and, in spite of all its efforts, was obliged to relinquish this enterprise, and sheer off." [footnote : some writers say only sixty-eight or seventy; but the english writers generally say eighty-eight. a few, (apparently to increase the brilliancy of the victory,) make this number still greater.] the danish vessels lying in the entrance of the channel which leads to the city, were not attacked, and took no material part in the contest. they are to be reckoned in the defence on the same grounds that the british ships of the reserve should be included in the attacking force. nor was any use made of the guns on shore, for the enemy did not advance far enough to be within their range. the crown-battery was _behind_ the danish line, and mainly masked by it. a part only of its guns could be used in support of the left of this line, and in repelling the direct attacks of the frigates, which it did most effectually. but we now come to a new feature in this battle. as the danish line of floating defences fell into the hands of the english, the range of the crown-battery enlarged, and its power was felt. nelson saw the danger to which his fleet was exposed, and, being at last convinced of the prudence of the admiral's signal for retreat, "made up his mind to weigh anchor and retire from the engagement." to retreat, however, from his present position, was exceedingly difficult and dangerous. he therefore determined to endeavor to effect an armistice, and dispatched the following letter to the prince-regent: "lord nelson has directions to spare denmark when no longer resisting; but if the firing is continued on the part of denmark, lord nelson must be obliged to set on fire all the floating batteries he has taken, without the power to save the brave danes who have defended them." this produced an armistice, and hostilities had hardly ceased, when three of the english ships, including that in which nelson himself was, struck upon the bank. "they were in the jaws of destruction, and would never have escaped if the batteries had continued their fire. they therefore owed their safety to this armistice." a convention was soon signed, by which every thing was left _in statu quo_, and the fleet of admiral parker allowed to proceed into the baltic. edward baines, the able english historian of the wars of the french revolution, in speaking of nelson's request for an armistice, says: "this letter, which exhibited a happy union of policy and courage, was written at a moment when lord nelson perceived that, in consequence of the unfavorable state of the wind, the admiral was not likely to get up to aid the enterprise; that _the principal batteries_ of the enemy, and the ships at the mouth of the harbor, _were yet untouched;_ that two of his own division had grounded, and others were likely to share the same fate." campbell says these batteries and ships "_were still unconquered._ two of his [nelson's] own vessels were grounded and exposed to a heavy fire; others, if the battle continued, might be exposed to a similar fate, while he found it would be scarcely practicable to bring off the prizes under the fire of the batteries." with respect to the fortifications of the town, a chronicler of the times says they were of no service while the action lasted. "they began to fire when the enemy took possession of the abandoned ships, but it was at the same time the parley appeared." the danish commander, speaking of the general contest between the two lines, says: "the crown-battery did not come at all into action." an english writer says distinctly: "the works (fortifications) of copenhagen were absolutely untouched at the close of the action." colonel mitchel, the english historian, says: "lord nelson never fired a shot at the town or fortifications of copenhagen; he destroyed a line of block-ships, prames, and floating batteries that defended the sea approach to the town; and the crown prince, seeing his capital exposed, was willing to finish by armistice a war, the object of which was neither very popular nor well understood. what the result of the action between copenhagen and the british fleet might ultimately have been, is therefore altogether uncertain. the bombardment of copenhagen by nelson, as it is generally styled, is therefore, like most other oracular phrases of the day, a mere combination of words, without the slightest meaning." the british lost in killed and wounded nine hundred and forty-three men; and the loss of the danes, according to their own account, which is confirmed by the french, was but very little higher. the english, however, say it amounted to sixteen or eighteen hundred; but let the loss be what it may, it was almost exclusively confined to the floating defences, and can in no way determine the relative accuracy of aim of the guns ashore and guns afloat. the facts and testimony we have adduced, prove incontestably-- st. that of the fleet of fifty-two sail and seventeen hundred guns sent by the english to the attack upon copenhagen, two ships carrying one hundred and forty-eight guns were grounded or wrecked; seven ships of the line, and thirty-six smaller vessels, carrying over one thousand guns, were actually brought into the action; while the remainder were held as a reserve to act upon the first favorable opportunity. d. that the danish line of floating defences, consisting mostly of hulls, sloops, rafts, &c., carried only six hundred and twenty-eight guns of all descriptions; that the fixed batteries supporting this line did not carry over eighty or ninety guns at most; and that both these land and floating batteries were mostly manned and the guns served by _volunteers_. d. that the fixed batteries in the system of defence were either so completely masked, or so far distant, as to be useless during the contest between the fleet and floating force. th. that the few guns of these batteries which were rendered available by the position of the floating defences, repelled, with little or no loss to themselves, and some injury to the enemy, a vastly superior force of frigates which attacked them. th. that the line of floating defences was conquered and mostly destroyed, while the fixed batteries were uninjured. th. that the fortifications of the city and of amack island were not attacked, and had no part in the contest. th. that, as soon as the crown-batteries were unmasked and began to act, nelson prepared to retreat, but, on account of the difficulty of doing so, he opened a parley, threatening, with a cruelty unworthy of the most barbarous ages, that, _unless the batteries ceased their fire upon his ships, he would burn all the floating defences with the danish prisoners in his possession;_ and that this armistice was concluded just in time to save his own ships from destruction. th. that, consequently, the battle of copenhagen cannot be regarded as a contest between ships and forts, or a triumph of ships over forts: that, so far as the guns on shore were engaged, they showed a vast superiority over those afloat--a superiority known and confessed by the english themselves. _constantinople_.--the channel of the dardanelles is about twelve leagues long, three miles wide at its entrance, and about three-quarters of a mile at its narrowest point. its principal defences are the outer and inner castles of europe and asia, and the castles of sestos and abydos. constantinople stands about one hundred miles from its entrance into the sea of marmora, and at nearly the opposite extremity of this sea. the defences of the channel had been allowed to go to decay; but few guns were mounted, and the forts were but partially garrisoned. in constantinople not a gun was mounted, and no preparations for defence were made; indeed, previous to the approach of the fleet, the turks had not determined whether to side with the english or the french, and even then the french ambassador had the greatest difficulty in persuading them to resist the demands of duckforth. the british fleet consisted of six sail of the line, two frigates, two sloops, and several bomb-vessels, carrying eight hundred and eighteen guns, (besides those in the bomb-ships.) admiral duckforth sailed through the dardanelles on the th of february, , with little or no opposition. this being a turkish festival day, the soldiers of the scanty garrison were enjoying the festivities of the occasion, and none were left to serve the few guns of the forts which had been prepared for defence. but while the admiral was waiting on the sea of marmora for the result of negotiations, or for a favorable wind to make the attack upon constantinople, the fortifications of this city were put in order, and the turks actively employed, under french engineers and artillery officers, in repairing the defences of the straits. campbell, in his naval history, says:--"admiral duckforth now fully perceived the critical situation in which he was placed. he might, indeed, succeed, should the weather become favorable, in bombarding constantinople; _but unless the bombardment should prove completely successful in forcing the turks to pacific terms, the injury he might do to the city would not compensate for the damage which his fleet must necessarily sustain. with this damaged and crippled fleet, he must repass the dardanelles, now rendered infinitely stronger than they were when he came through them_." under these circumstances the admiral determined to retreat; and on the d of april escaped through the dardanelles, steering midway of the channel, with a favorable and strong current. "this escape, however," says baines, "was only from destruction, but by no means from serious loss and injury. * * * * in what instance in the whole course of our naval warfare, have ships received equal damage in so short a time as in this extraordinary enterprise?" in detailing the extent of this damage, we will take the ships in the order they descended. the first had her wheel carried away, and her hull much damaged, but escaped with the loss of only three men. a stone shot penetrated the second, between the poop and quarter deck, badly injured the mizzen-mast, carried away the wheel, and did other serious damage, killing and wounding twenty men. two shot struck the third, carrying away her shrouds and injuring her masts; loss in killed and wounded, thirty. the fourth had her mainmast destroyed, with a loss of sixteen. the fifth had a large shot, six feet eight inches in circumference, enter her lower deck; loss fifty-five. the sixth, not injured. the seventh, a good deal damaged, with a loss of seventeen. the eighth had no loss. the ninth was so much injured that, "had there been a necessity for hauling the wind on the opposite tack, she must have gone down:" her loss was eight. the tenth lost twelve. the eleventh was much injured, with a loss of eight--making a total loss in repassing the dardanelles, of one hundred and sixty-seven; and in the whole expedition two hundred and eighty-one, exclusive of two hundred and fifty men who perished in the burning of the ajax. such was the effect produced on the british fleet, sailing with a favorable wind and strong current past the half-armed and half-manned forts of the dardanelles. duckforth himself says, that "had he remained before constantinople much longer--till the forts had been completely put in order--no return would have been open to him, and the unavoidable sacrifice of the squadron must have been the consequence." scarcely had the fleet cleared the straits, before it (the fleet) was reinforced with eight sail of the line; but, even with this vast increase of strength, the english did not venture to renew the contest. they had effected a most fortunate escape. general jomini says that if the defence had been conducted by a more enterprising and experienced people, the expedition would have cost the english their whole squadron. great as was the damage done to the fleet, the forts themselves were uninjured. the english say their own fire did no execution, the shot in all probability not even striking their objects--"the rapid change of position, occasioned by a fair wind and current, preventing the certainty of aim." the state of the batteries when the fleet first passed, is thus described in james's naval history: "some of them were dilapidated, and others but partially mounted and poorly manned." and alison says: "they had been allowed to fall into disrepair. the castles of europe and asia, indeed, stood in frowning majesty, to assert the dominion of the crescent at the narrowest part of the passage, but their ramparts were antiquated, their guns in part dismounted, and such as remained, though of enormous calibre, little calculated to answer the rapidity and precision of an english broadside." much has been said because the fortifications of the dardanelles did not hermetically seal that channel, (an object they were never expected to accomplish, even had they been well armed and well served;) but it is forgotten, or entirely overlooked, that twelve _turkish line-of-battle -ships, two of them three-deckers, with nine frigates, were with their sails bent and in apparent readiness, filled with troops, and lying within the line of fortifications; and yet this naval force effected little or nothing against the invaders._ it is scarcely ever mentioned, being regarded of little consequence as a means of defence; and yet the number of its guns and the expense of its construction and support, could hardly have fallen short of the incomplete and half-armed forts, some of which were as ancient as the reign of amurath! _algiers._--the following narrative of the attack on algiers, in , is drawn from the reports of the english and dutch admirals, and other official and authentic english papers. the attack was made by the combined fleets, consisting of five sail of the line, eighteen or twenty frigates and smaller vessels, besides five bomb-vessels and several rocket-boats, carrying in all about one thousand guns. the armament of some of the smaller vessels is not given, but the guns of those whose armaments are known, amount to over nine hundred. the harbor and defences of algiers had been previously surveyed by captain warde, royal navy, under lord exmouth's direction; and the number of the combined fleet was arranged according to the information given in this survey--just so many ships, and no more, being taken, as could be employed to advantage against the city, without being needlessly exposed. moreover, the men and officers had been selected and exercised with reference to this particular attack. from the survey of captain warde, and the accompanying map, it appears that the armament of all the fortifications of algiers and the vicinity, counting the water fronts and the parts that could flank the shore, was only two hundred and eighty-four guns of various sizes and descriptions, including mortars. but not near all of these could act upon the fleet as it lay. other english accounts state the number of guns actually opposed to the fleet at from two hundred and twenty to two hundred and thirty. some of these were in small and distant batteries, whereas nearly all the fleet was concentrated on the mole-head works. (fig. .) supposing only one broadside of the ships to have been engaged, the ratio of the forces, as expressed by the number of guns, must have been about as to . this is a favorable supposition for the ships; for we know that several of them, from their position and a change of anchorage, brought both broadsides to bear; moreover, at no one time could _all_ the guns of the water fronts of the batteries bear on the attacking ships. the algerine shipping in the harbor was considerable, including several vessels of war, but no use was made of them in defence, and nearly all were burnt. the attacking ships commanded some of the batteries, and almost immediately dismounted their guns. the walls of the casemated works were so thin as to be very soon battered down. most of the algerine guns were badly mounted, and many of them were useless after the first fire. they had no furnaces for heating shot, and, as "they loaded their guns with loose powder, put in with a ladle," they could not possibly have used hot shot, even had they constructed furnaces. the ships approached the forts, and many of them anchored in their intended position, without a shot being fired from the batteries. the action commenced at a quarter before three, and did not entirely cease till half-past eleven. the ships then took advantage of the land breeze, and, by warping and towing off, were able to get under sail and come to anchor beyond reach of the land-batteries. negotiations were again opened, and the dey surrendered the christian slaves and yielded to the terms of the treaty. during the contest, the fleet "fired nearly one hundred and eighteen tons of powder, and fifty thousand shot, (weighing more than five hundred tons of iron,) besides nine hundred and sixty thirteen and ten-inch shells, (thrown by the bomb-vessels,) and the shells and rockets from the flotilla." the vessels were considerably crippled, and their loss in killed and wounded amounted to eight hundred and eighty-three. the land batteries were much injured, and a large part of their guns dismounted. their loss is not known; the english confess they could obtain no account of it, but suppose it to have been very great. this seems more than probable; for, besides those actually employed in the defence, large numbers of people crowded into the forts to witness the contest. so great was this curiosity, that, when the action commenced, the parapets were covered with the multitude gazing at the manoeuvres of the ships. to avoid so unnecessary and indiscriminate a slaughter, lord exmouth (showing a humanity that does him great credit) motioned with his hand to the ignorant wretches to retire to some place of safety. this loss of life in the batteries, the burning of the buildings within the town and about the mole, the entire destruction of their fleet and merchant vessels anchored within the mole and in the harbor, had a depressing effect upon the inhabitants, and probably did more than the injuries received by the batteries in securing an honorable conclusion to the treaty. we know very well that these batteries, though much injured, _were not silenced_ when lord exmouth took advantage of the land breeze and sailed beyond their reach. the ships retired-- st, because they had become much injured, and their ammunition nearly exhausted; d, in order to escape from a position so hazardous in case of a storm; and d, to get beyond the reach of the algerine batteries. lord exmouth himself gives these as his reasons for the retreat, and says, "the land wind saved me many a gallant fellow." and vice-admiral von de capellan, in his report of the battle, gives the same opinion: "_in this retreat_" says he, "which, from want of wind and the damage suffered in the rigging, was very slow, _the ships had still to suffer much from the new-opened and redoubled fire of the enemy's batteries_; at last, the land breeze springing up," &c. an english officer, who took part in this affair, says: "it was well for us that the land wind came off, or we should never have got out; and god knows what would have been our fate, had we remained all night." the motives of the retreat cannot, therefore, be doubted. had the arabs set themselves zealously at work, during the night, to prepare for a new contest, by remounting their guns, and placing others behind the ruins of those batteries which had fallen,--in other words, had the works now been placed in hands as skilful and experienced as the english, the contest would have been far from ended. but (to use the words of the board of defence) lord exmouth relied on the effects produced on the people by his dreadful cannonade; and the result proves that he was right. his anxiety to clear the vessels from the contest shows that there was a power still unconquered, which he thought it better to leave to be restrained by the suffering population of the city, than to keep in a state of exasperation and activity by his presence. what was this power but an unsubdued energy in the batteries? the true solution of the question is, then, not so much the amount of injury done on the one side or the other--particularly as there was on one side a city to suffer as well as the batteries--as the relative efficiency of the parties when the battle closed. all political agitation and popular clamor aside, what would have been the result had the fight been continued, or even had lord exmouth renewed it next morning? these are questions that can be answered only on conjecture; but the manner the battle ended certainly leaves room for many doubts whether, had the subsequent demands of lord exmouth been rejected, he had it in his power to enforce them by his ships; whether, indeed, if he had renewed the fight, he would not have been signally defeated. on the whole, we do not think that this battle, although it stands pre-eminent as an example of naval success over batteries, presents an argument to shake the confidence which fortifications, well situated, well planned, and well fought, deserve, as the defences of a seaboard. we cannot help regarding these conclusions as just, when we reflect upon all the circumstances of the case. the high character, skill, and bravery of the attacking force; their immense superiority in number of guns, with no surplus human life to be exposed; the antiquated and ill-managed works of defence, the entire want of skill of the algerine artillerists, and the neglect of the ordinary means of preparation; the severe execution which these ill-served guns did upon the enemy's ships,--an execution far more dreadful than that effected by the french or dutch fleets in their best-contested naval battles with the ships of the same foe,--from these facts, we must think that those who are so ready to draw from this case conclusions unfavorable to the use of land-batteries as a means of defence against shipping, know but little of the nature of the contest. an english historian of some note, in speaking of this attack, says:--"it is but little to the purpose, unless to prove what may be accomplished by fleets against towns exactly so circumstanced, placed, and governed. algiers is situated on an amphitheatre of hills, sloping down towards the sea, and presenting therefore the fairest mark to the fire of hostile ships. but where is the capital exactly so situated that we are ever likely to attack? and as to the destruction of a few second-rate towns, even when practicable, it is a mean, unworthy species of warfare, by which nothing was ever gained. the severe loss sustained before algiers must also be taken into account, because it was inflicted by mere algerine artillery, and was much inferior to what may be expected from a contest maintained against batteries manned with soldiers instructed by officers of skill and science, not only in working the guns, but in the endless duty of detail necessary for keeping the whole of an artillery material in a proper state of formidable efficiency." _san juan d'ulloa._--the following facts, relative to the attack on san juan d'ulloa by the french, in , are drawn principally from the report of a french engineer officer who was one of the expedition. the french fleet consisted of four ships, carrying one hundred and eighty-eight guns, two armed steamboats, and two bomb-ketches with four large mortars. the whole number of guns, of whatever description, found in the fort was one hundred and eighty-seven; a large portion of these, however, were for land defence. (fig. .) when the french vessels were towed into the position selected for the attack, "it was lucky for us," says the french officer in his report, "that the mexicans did not disturb this operation, which lasted nearly two hours, and that they permitted us to commence the fire." "we were exposed to the fire of one twenty-four-pounder, five sixteen-pounders, seven twelve-pounders, one eight-pounder, and five eighteen-pounder carronades--_in all nineteen pieces only_." if these be converted into equivalent twenty-four-pounders, in proportion to the weight of the balls, the whole nineteen guns will be _less than twelve twenty-four pounders_. this estimate is much too great, for it allows three eight-pounders to be equal to one twenty-four-pounder, and each of the eighteen-pounder carronades to be three quarters the power of a long twenty-four-pounder; whereas, at the distance at which the parties were engaged, these small pieces were nearly harmless. two of the powder magazines, from not being bomb-proof, were blown up during the engagement, by which three of the nineteen guns on the water front of the castle were dismounted; thus reducing the land force to _an equivalent of ten twenty-four-pounders_. the other sixteen guns were still effective when abandoned by the mexicans. the cannonade and bombardment continued about six hours, eight thousand two hundred and fifty shot and shells being fired at the fort by the french. the principal injury received by the work was from the explosion of the powder magazine. but very few guns were dismounted by the fire of the french ships, and only three of these on the water front. the details of the condition of the ships and fort are given in the report of the french officer,[ ] but it is unnecessary to repeat them here. [footnote : vide also house doc. no. , twenty-sixth congress, first session] in general terms, it appears from the above-mentioned report, that the number of guns actually brought into action by the floating force, (counting only one broadside of the ship,) amounted to _ninety-four guns, besides four heavy sea-mortars_; that the whole number so employed in the fort was only _nineteen, including the smallest calibres_; that these guns were generally so small and inefficient, that their balls would not enter the sides of the ordinary attacking frigates; the principal injury sustained by the castle was produced by the explosion of powder magazines injudiciously placed and improperly secured; that the castle, though built of poor materials, was but slightly injured by the french fire; that the mexicans proved themselves ignorant of the ordinary means of defence, and abandoned their works when only a few of their guns had been dismounted; that notwithstanding all the circumstances in favor of the french, their killed and wounded, in proportion to the guns acting against them, was upwards of _four times_ as great as the loss of the english at the battle of trafalgar! _st. jean d'acre_.--the narratives of the day contained most exaggerated accounts of the english attack on st. jean d'acre; now, however, the principal facts connected with this attack are fully authenticated. for the amount of the fleet we quote from the british official papers, and for that of the fort, from the pamphlet of lieutenant-colonel matuszewiez. these statements are mainly confirmed by the narratives, more recently published, of several english and french eye-witnesses. the fortifications were built of poor materials, antiquated in their plans, and much decayed. their entire armament amounted to only two hundred guns, some of which were merely field-pieces. the water fronts were armed with one hundred cannon and sixteen mortars, those of the smaller calibre included. (fig. .) when approached by the british fleet, the works were undergoing repairs, and, says commodore napier, "were fast getting into a state of preparation against attack." the british fleet consisted of eight ships of the line, carrying six hundred and forty-six guns; six frigates, carrying two hundred and thirty-six guns; four steamers, carrying eighteen guns; and two or three other vessels, whose force is not given. "only a few guns," says napier, "defended the approach from the northward," and most of the ships came in from that direction. the western front was armed with about forty cannon; but opposed to this were six ships and two steamers, carrying about five hundred guns. their fire was tremendous during the engagement, but _no breach was made_ in the walls. the south front was armed in part by heavy artillery and in part by field-pieces. this front was attacked by six ships and two steamers, carrying over two hundred guns. the eastern front was armed only with light artillery; against this was concentrated the remainder of the fleet, carrying about two hundred and forty guns. the guns of the works were so poorly mounted, that but few could be used at all; and these, on account of the construction of the fort, could not reach the ships, though anchored close by the walls. "only five of their guns," says napier, "placed in a flanking battery, were well served, and never missed; but they were pointed too high, and damaged our spars and rigging only." the stone was of so poor a quality, says the narrative of colonel matuszewiez, that the walls fired upon presented on the exterior a shattered appearance, but they were nowhere seriously injured. in the words of napier, "_they were not breached, and a determined enemy might have remained secure under the breastworks, or in the numerous casemates, without suffering much loss_." the accidental explosion of a magazine within the fort, containing six thousand casks of powder, laid in ruins a space of sixty thousand square yards, opened a large breach in the walls of the fortifications, partially destroyed the prisons, and killed and wounded a thousand men of the garrison. this frightful disaster, says the french account, hastened the triumph of the fleet. the prisoners and malefactors, thus released from confinement, rushed upon the garrison at the same time with the mountaineers, who had besieged the place on the land side. the uselessness of the artillery, the breaches of the fort, the attacks of the english, all combined to force the retreat of the garrison, "in the midst of scenes of blood and atrocious murders." we will close this account with the following extract of a speech of the duke of wellington, in the house of lords, feb. , : "he had had," he said, "a little experience in services of this nature; and he thought it his duty to warn their lordships, on this occasion, that they must not always expect that ships, however well commanded, or however gallant their seamen might be, were capable of commonly engaging successfully with stone walls. he had no recollection, in all his experience, except the recent instance on the coast of syria, of any fort being taken by ships, excepting two or three years ago, when the fort of san juan d'ulloa was captured by the french fleet. this was, he thought, the single instance that he recollected, though he believed that something of the sort had occurred at the siege of havana, in . the present achievement he considered one of the greatest of modern times. this was his opinion, and he gave the highest credit to those who had performed such a service. it was, altogether, a most skilful proceeding. he was greatly surprised at the small number of men that was lost on board the fleet; and, on inquiring how it happened, he discovered that it was because the vessels were moored within one-third of the ordinary distance. the guns of the fortress were intended to strike objects at a greater distance; and the consequence was, that the shot went over the ships that were anchored at one-third the usual distance. by that means, they sustained not more than one-tenth of the loss which they would otherwise have experienced. not less than five hundred pieces of ordnance were directed against the walls, and the precision with which the fire was kept up, the position of the vessels, and, lastly, the blowing up of the large magazine--all aided in achieving this great victory in so short a time. he had thought it right to say thus much, because he wished to warn the public against supposing that such deeds as this could be effected every day. he would repeat that this was a singular instance, in the achievement of which undoubtedly great skill was manifested, but which was also connected with peculiar circumstances, which they could not hope always to occur. it must not therefore be expected, as a matter of course, that all such attempts must necessarily succeed." having completed our examination of the ability of land batteries to cope, gun for gun, with a naval force, let us consider, for a few moments, the objection which is sometimes made to the use of fortifications for the defence of the sea-coast, viz.: _that our maritime cities and arsenals can be better and more economically secured by a home squadron_. we have already alluded to the impossibility of substituting one means of defence for another. the efficiency of the bayonet can in no way enable us to dispense with artillery, nor the value of engineer troops in the passage of rivers, and the attack and defence of forts, render cavalry the less necessary in other operations of a campaign. to the navy alone must we look for the defence of our shipping upon the high seas; but it cannot replace fortifications in the protection of our harbors, bays, rivers, arsenals, and commercial towns. let us take a case in point. for the defence of new york city, it is deemed highly important that the east river should be closed to the approach of a hostile fleet at least fifteen or twenty miles from the city, so that an army landed there would have to cross the westchester creek, the bronx, harlem river, and the defiles of harlem heights--obstacles of great importance in a judicious defence. throg's neck is the position selected for this purpose; cannon placed there not only command the channel, but, from the windings of the river, sweep it for a great distance above and below. no other position, even _in_ the channel itself, possesses equal advantages. hence, if we had only naval means of defence, it would be best, were such a thing possible, to place the floating defences themselves on this point. leaving entirely out of consideration the question of relative _power, position_ alone would give the superior efficiency to the fort. but there are other considerations no less important than that of position. fort schuyler can be garrisoned and defended in part by the same militia force which will be employed to prevent the march of the enemy's army on the city. on the other hand, the crews of the floating defences must be seamen; they will consequently be of less value in the subsequent land operations. moreover, forts, situated as this is, can be so planned as to bring to bear upon any part of the channel a greater number of guns than can be presented by any hostile squadron against the corresponding portion of the fort. this result can be obtained with little difficulty in narrow channels, as is done in most of the other works for the defence of new york, the works for boston, newport, philadelphia, baltimore, charleston, savannah, new orleans, &c., and an approximation to it is not incompatible with the defence of the broader estuaries, like the chesapeake. but we will suppose that there are no such points of land, in the inlets to our harbors, and that we rely for defence upon a naval force exclusively. let us leave out of consideration the security of all our other harbors and our commerce on the high seas, and also the importance of having at command the means of attacking the enemy's coast, in the absence of his fleet. we take the single case of the attack being made on new york harbor, and that our whole fleet is assembled there. now, if this fleet be equal in number to the enemy, the chances of success may be regarded as equal; if inferior, the chances are against us--for an attacking force would probably be of picked men and of the best materials. but here the consequences of victory are very unequal: the enemy can lose his squadron only, while we put in peril both our squadron and the objects it is intended to defend. if we suppose our own naval force superior to that of the enemy, the defence of this harbor would in all respects be complete, provided this force never left the harbor. but, then, all the commerce of the country upon the ocean must be left to its fate; and no attempt can be made to react offensively upon the foe, unless we can control the chances of finding the enemy's fleets within his ports, and the still more uncertain chance of keeping him there; the escape of a single vessel being sufficient to cause the loss of our harbor. these remarks are based upon the supposition that we have but the single harbor of new york; whereas portland, portsmouth, boston, newport, the delaware, the chesapeake, charleston, savannah, pensacola, mobile, new orleans, and numerous other places, are equally open to attack, and therefore must be equally defended, for we know not to which the enemy will direct his assaults. if he come to one of these in the absence of our fleet, his object is attained without resistance; or, if his whole force be concentrated upon one but feebly defended, we involve both fleet and harbor in inevitable ruin. could our fleet be so arranged as to meet these enterprises? "as it cannot be denied that the enemy can select the point of attack out of the whole extent of coast, where is the prescience that can indicate the spot? and if it cannot be foretold, how is that ubiquity to be imparted that shall always place our fleet in the path of the advancing foe? suppose we attempt to cover the coast by cruising in front of it, shall we sweep its whole length--a distance scarcely less than that which the enemy must traverse in passing from his coast to ours? must the gulf of mexico be swept, as well as the atlantic; or shall we give up the gulf to the enemy? shall we cover the southern cities, or give them up also? we must unquestionably do one of two things--either relinquish a great extent of coast, confining our cruisers to a small portion only, or include so much that the chances of intercepting an enemy would seem to be out of the question." "on the practicability of covering a small extent of coast by cruising in front of it--or, in other words, the possibility of anticipating an enemy's operations, discovering the object of movements of which we get no glimpse and hear no tidings, and seeing the impress of his footsteps on the surface of the ocean--it may be well to consult experience." the naval power of spain under philip ii. was almost unlimited. with the treasures of india and america at his command, the fitting out of a fleet of one hundred and fifty or two hundred sail, to invade another country, was no very gigantic operation. nevertheless, this naval force was of but little avail as a coast defence. its efficiency for this purpose was well tested in . england and holland attacked cadiz with a combined fleet of one hundred and seventy ships, which entered the bay of cadiz without, on its approach to their coast, being once seen by the spanish navy. this same squadron, on its return to england, passed along a great portion of the spanish coast without ever meeting with the slightest opposition from the innumerable spanish floating defences. in , a french fleet of twenty ships, and a land force of twenty-two thousand men, sailed from brest to the english coast, without meeting with any opposition from the superior british fleet which had been sent out, under sir john norris, on purpose to intercept them. the landing of the troops was prevented by a storm, which drove the fleet back upon the coast of france to seek shelter. in , a french fleet of twenty-five sail of the line, and many smaller vessels, sailed from brest for america. nine of these soon afterwards returned to france, and the others proceeded to the gulf of st. lawrence. an english fleet of seventeen sail of the line and some frigates had been sent out to intercept them; but the two fleets passed each other in a thick fog, and all the french vessels except two reached quebec in safety. in , a french fleet, blockaded in the port of dunkirk by a british force under commodore bogs, seizing upon a favorable opportunity, escaped from the enemy, attacked the coast of scotland, made a descent upon carrickfergus, and cruised about till february, , without meeting a single british vessel, although sixty-one ships of the line were then stationed upon the coasts of england and france, and several of these were actually in pursuit. in , when the french attempted to throw the army of hoche into ireland, the most strenuous efforts were made by the british navy to intercept the french fleet in its passage. the channel fleet, of near thirty sail of the line, under lord bridport, was stationed at spithead; sir roger curtis, with a smaller force, was cruising to the westward; vice-admiral colpoys was stationed off brest, with thirteen sail of the line; and sir edward pellew (afterwards lord exmouth) watched the harbor, with a small squadron of frigates. notwithstanding this triple floating bulwark, as it was called--one fleet on the enemy's coast, a second in the downs, and a third close on their own shores--the french fleet of forty-four vessels, carrying a land force of twenty-five thousand men, reached bantry bay in safety! this fleet was eight days on the passage, and three more in landing the troops; and most of the vessels might have returned to brest in safety, had it not been for disasters by storms, for only _one_ of their whole number was intercepted by the vast naval force which england had assembled for that express object. "the result of this expedition," says alison, "was pregnant with important instructions to the rulers of both countries. to the french, as demonstrating the extraordinary risks which attend a maritime expedition, in comparison with a land campaign; the small number of forces which can be embarked on board even a great fleet; and the unforeseen disasters which frequently, on that element, defeat the best concerted enterprises. to the english, as showing that _the empire of the seas does not always afford security against invasion;_ that, in the face of superior maritime forces, her possessions were for sixteen days at the mercy of the enemy; and that neither the skill of her sailors nor the valor of her armies, but the fury of the elements, saved them from danger in the most vulnerable part of their dominions. while these considerations are fitted to abate the confidence in invasion, they are calculated, at the same time, to weaken an overweening confidence in naval superiority, and to demonstrate that _the only base upon which certain reliance can be placed_, even by an insular power, _is a well-disciplined army and the patriotism of its own subjects_." subsequent events still further demonstrated the truth of these remarks. in the following year, a french squadron of two frigates and two sloops, passed the british fleets with perfect impunity, destroyed the shipping in the port of ilfracombe, and safely landed their troops on the coast of wales. again, in , the immense british naval force failed to prevent the landing of general humbert's army in the bay of killala; and, in the latter part of the same year, a french squadron of nine vessels and three thousand men escaped sir j.b. warren's squadron, and safely reached the coast of ireland. as a further illustration, we quote from the report of the board of national defence in . the toulon fleet, in , consisting of about twenty sail of the line and twenty smaller vessels of war, and numerous transports, making in all, three hundred sail and forty thousand troops, slipped out of port and sailed to malta. "it was followed by nelson, who, thinking correctly that they were bound for egypt, shaped his course direct for alexandria. the french, steering towards candia, took the more circuitous passage; so that nelson arrived at alexandria before them, and, not finding them there, returned, by way of caramania and candia, to sicily, missing his adversary in both passages. sailing again for alexandria, he found the french fleet at anchor in aboukir bay, and, attacking them there, achieved the memorable victory of the nile. when we consider the narrowness of the sea; the numerous vessels in the french fleet; the actual crossing of the two fleets on a certain night; and that nelson, notwithstanding, could see nothing of the enemy himself, and hear nothing of them from merchant vessels, we may judge of the probability of waylaying our adversary on the broad atlantic." "the escape of another toulon fleet in ; the long search for them in the mediterranean by the same able officer; the pursuit in the west indies; their evasion of him among the islands; the return to europe; his vain efforts subsequently, along the coast of portugal, in the bay of biscay, and off the english channel; and the meeting at last at trafalgar, brought about only because the combined fleets, trusting to the superiority that the accession of several reinforcements had given, were willing to try the issue of a battle--these are instances, of the many that might be cited, to show how small is the probability of encountering upon the ocean an enemy who desires to avoid a meeting, and how little the most untiring zeal, the most restless activity, the most exalted professional skill and judgment, can do to lessen the adverse chances. for more than a year nelson most closely watched his enemy, who seems to have got out of port as soon as he was prepared to do so, and without attracting the notice of any of the blockading squadron. when out, nelson, perfectly in the dark as to the course villeneuve had taken, sought for him in vain on the coast of egypt. scattered by tempests, the french fleet again took refuge in toulon; whence it again put to sea, when refitted and ready, joining the spanish fleet at cadiz." "on the courage, skill, vigilance, and judgment, acceded on all hands to belong in a pre-eminent degree to the naval profession in this country, this system of defence relies to accomplish, against a string of chances, objects of importance so great that not a doubt or misgiving as to the result is admissible. it demands of the navy to do perfectly, and without fail, that which, to do at all, seems impossible. the navy is required to know the secret purposes of the enemy, in spite of distance, and the broken intercourse of a state of war, even before these purposes are known to the leader who is to execute them; nay, more, before the purpose itself is formed. on an element where man is but the sport of storms, the navy is required to lie in wait for the foe at the exact spot and moment, in spite of weather and seasons; to see him in spite of fogs and darkness." "finally, after all the devices and reliances of the system are satisfactorily accomplished, and all the difficulties subdued, it submits to the issue of a single battle, on equal terms, the fate of the war, having no hope or reserve beyond." "the proper duty of our navy is, not coast or river defence; it has a more glorious sphere--that of the _offensive_. in our last war, instead of lying in harbor, and contenting themselves with keeping a few more of the enemy's vessels in watch over them than their own number--instead of leaving the enemy's commerce in undisturbed enjoyment of the sea, and our commerce without countenance or aid, they scattered themselves over the wide surface of the ocean, penetrated to the most remote seas, everywhere acting with the most brilliant success against the enemy's navigation. and we believe, moreover, that in the amount of the enemy's property thus destroyed, of american property protected or recovered, and in the number of hostile ships kept in pursuit of our scattered vessels, ships evaded if superior, and beaten if equal--they rendered benefits a thousand-fold greater, to say nothing of the glory they acquired for the nation, and the character they imparted to it, than any that would have resulted from a state of passiveness within the harbors. confident that this is the true policy as regards the employment of the navy proper, we doubt not that it will in the future be acted on, as it has been in the past; and that the results, as regards both honor and advantage, will be expanded commensurately with its own enlargement. in order, however, that the navy may always assume and maintain that active and energetic deportment, in offensive operations, which is at the same time so consistent with its functions, and so consonant with its spirit, we have shown that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence." a few remarks on the relative cost of ships and forts, and the economy of their support, and we will close this discussion. we do not regard this question, however, as a matter of any great importance, for it can seldom be decisive in the choice of these two means of defence. no matter what their relative cost may be, the one cannot often be substituted for the other. there are some few cases, however, where this might be taken into consideration, and would be decisive. let us endeavor to illustrate our meaning. for the defence of new york city, the narrows and east river must be secured by forts; ships cannot, in this case, be substituted. but let us suppose that the _outer_ harbor of new york furnishes no favorable place for the debarkation of troops, or that the place of debarkation is so far distant that the troops cannot reach the city before the defensive forces can be prepared to repel them. this outer harbor would be of great importance to the enemy as a shelter from storms, and as a place of debarkation or of rendezvous preparatory to a forcible passage of the narrows; while to us its possession would not be absolutely essential, though very important. strong fortifications on sandy hook, and one of the shoals, might probably be so constructed as to furnish a pretty sure barrier to the entrance of this outer harbor; on the other hand, a naval force stationed within the inner harbor, and acting under the protection of forts at the narrows, might also furnish a good, though perhaps less certain protection for this outer roadstead. here, then, we might well consider the question of relative cost and economy of support of the proposed fortifications, and of a home squadron large enough to effect the same object, and to be kept continually _at home_ for that special purpose. if we were to allow it to go to sea for the protection of our commerce, its character and efficiency as a _harbor_ defence would be lost. we can therefore regard it only as a local force--fixed within the limits of the defence of this particular place--and our estimates must be made accordingly. the average durability of ships of war in the british navy, has been variously stated at seven and eight years in time of war, and from ten to twelve and fourteen years in time of peace. mr. perring, in his "brief inquiry," published in , estimates the average durability at about eight years. his calculations seem based upon authentic information. a distinguished english writer has more recently arrived at the same result, from estimates based upon the returns of the board of admiralty during the period of the wars of the french revolution. the data in our own possession are less complete; the appropriations for _building_ and _repairing_ having been so expended as to render it impossible to draw any accurate line of distinction. but, in the returns now before us, there are generally separate and distinct amounts of the _timbers_ used for these two purposes; and consequently, so far as this (the main item of expense) is concerned, we may form pretty accurate comparisons. according to edge, (pp. , ,) the average cost of timber, for hulls, masts, and yards, in _building_ an english gun ship, is £ , . let us now compare this cost of timber for _building_, with that of the same item for _repairs_, for the following fifteen ships, between and . the list would have been still further enlarged, but the returns for other ships during some portion of the above period are imperfect: ============================================================ name of ship. |no. of| when | repaired from | cost. |guns. |built.| | ------------------------------------------------------------ vengeance,...........| | -- | to | £ , ildefonso,...........| | -- | to | , scipio,..............| | -- | to | , tremendous,..........| | -- | to | , elephant,............| | -- | to | , spencer,.............| | | to | , romulus,.............| | -- | to | , albion,..............| | | to | , donegal,.............| | -- | to | , implacable,..........| | -- | to | , illustrious,.........| | | to | , northumberland,......| | -- | to | , kent,................| | -- | to | , sultan,..............| | | to | , sterling castle,.....| | -- | to | , ------------------------------------------------------------ this table, although incomplete, gives for the above fifteen ships, during a period of less than twenty years, the cost of _timber alone_ used in their repair, an average of about $ , each. more timber than this was used, in all probability, upon the same vessels, and paid for out of the funds appropriated "for such as may be ordered in course of the year to be repaired." but the amount specifically appropriated for timber for these fifteen ships, would, in every twelve or fifteen years, equal the entire _first cost_ of the same items. if we add to this amount, the cost of labor required in the application of timber to the operations of repair, and take into consideration the expense of other materials and labor, and the decayed condition of many of the ships at the end of this period, we should not be surprised to find the whole sum _expended_ under these heads to equal the first cost, even within the minimum estimate of seven years. the whole cost of timber used for hulls, masts, and yards, in building between and , was £ , , ; in repairs and "ordinary wear and tear," £ , , ; making an annual average of $ , , for building timber, and $ , , for that used in repairs. a large portion of the vessels _built_ were intended to replace others which had been lost, or were so decayed as to be broken up. but it may be well to add here, the actual supplies voted for the sea-service, and for wear and tear, and the extraordinary expenses in building and repairing of ships from to . =============================================================== | | for the wear|ext. expenses| for entire | | year | and tear of |for building,| sea-service. | | | ships. |repairing,&c.| | |---------------------------------------------------| | | £ , , | £ , | £ , , | | | , , | , | , , | | | , , | , | , , | | | , , | , | , , | | | , , | , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | | | , , | , , | , , | --------------------------------------------------------------- it appears from this table that the appropriations for the service, during the first fifteen years of the present century, amounted to a little less than _ninety millions_ of dollars per annum; and for the wear and tear of ships, and "the extraordinary expenses in building and repairing ships, &c.," the annual appropriations amounted to near _thirty millions_. our own naval returns are also so imperfect that it is impossible to form any very accurate estimate of the relative cost of construction and repairs of our men-of-war. the following table, compiled from a report of the secretary of the navy, in , (senate doc. no. , th congress,) will afford data for an approximate calculation:-- ====================================================================== name of no. total cost when cost of repaired ship. of of building, completed. repairs, between. guns. exclusive of exclusive armament, of stores, ordnance, &c. &c. &c. &c. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- delaware, $ , $ , and n. carolina, , , and constitution, , , and united states , , and brandywine, [ ] , [ ] , and potomac, [ ] , [ ] , and concord, , , and falmouth, , , and john adams, , , and boston, , , and st. louis, , , and vincennes, , , and vandalia, , , and lexington, ? , , and warren, ? , , and fairfield, , , and natches,[ ] ? , , and boxer, , , and enterprise, , , and grampus, , , and dolphin, , , and shark, , , and ---------------------------------------------------------------------- [footnote : returns incomplete.] [footnote : broken up in .] it appears from the above table, that the cost of constructing ships of the line is about $ , per gun; of frigates, $ , per gun; of smaller vessels of war, a little less than $ , per gun: making an average cost of vessels of war to be _more than six thousand dollars per gun._ and the expense of repairs for these vessels is _more than seven per cent. per annum_ on their first cost. we have as yet had but little experience in the use of war-steamers. the fulton, four guns, built in -' , cost three hundred and thirty-three thousand seven hundred and seventy dollars and seventy-seven cents; the mississippi and missouri, ten guns each, built in , cost about six hundred thousand dollars a piece; making an average cost for war-steamers of _over sixty thousand dollars per gun._ the cost of repairs of steam ships will be much greater than those for vessels of war; but we have not yet had sufficient experience to determine the exact amount. it has been estimated, however, by competent judges, that when kept, the expense of repairs will at least equal twelve per cent. of the first cost. the expense of keeping them in commission is enormously great. "their engines," says the secretary of the navy, in his annual report in , "consume so much fuel as to add enormously to their expenses; and the necessity that they should return to port, after short intervals of time, for fresh supplies, renders it impossible to send them on any distant service. they cannot be relied on as cruisers, and are altogether too expensive for service in time of peace. i have therefore determined to take them out of commission, and substitute for them other and less expensive vessels." the average cost of permanent fortifications is but _little more than three thousand dollars per gun_. and it must be obvious, from the nature of the materials of which they are constructed, that the expense of their support must be inconsiderable. it is true that for some years past a large item of annual expenditure for fortifications has been under the head of "repairs;" but much of this sum is for alterations and enlargements of temporary and inefficient works, erected anterior to the war of . some of it, however, has been for actual repairs of decayed or injured portions of the forts; these injuries resulting from the nature of the climate, the foundations, the use of poor materials and poor workmanship, and from neglect and abandonment. but if we include the risk of abandonment at times, it is estimated, upon data drawn from past experience, that _one-third of one per cent. per annum_, of the first cost, will keep in perfect repair any of our forts that have been constructed since the last war. but it is unnecessary to further discuss this question we repeat what has already been said, no matter what may be the relative cost of ships and forts, the one, as a general thing, cannot be substituted for the other. each has its own sphere of action, and each will contribute, in its own way, to the national defence; and any undue increase of one, at the expense of the other, will be attended by a corresponding diminution of national power.[ ] [footnote : for further information concerning our system of sea-coast defences, the reader is referred to house doc. , twenty-sixth congress, second session; senate doc. , twenty-eighth congress, second session; and to the annual reports of the chief engineer.] chapter viii. our northern frontier defences. in discussing engineering as a branch of the military art, we spoke of the use of fortifications on land frontiers, and their influence on the strategic operations of a campaign. a brief notice was also given of the different systems that have been proposed for arranging these defensive works. let us now apply this discussion to our northern frontier. the principle laid down by napoleon and jomini, "that fortifications should always be constructed on important strategic points," is undoubtedly the correct one: but how to determine these points is a question that will often perplex the patience and try the skill of the engineer; yet determine them he must, or his fortifications will be worse than useless; for a fort improperly located, like a cannon with its fire reversed on its own artillerists, will be sure to effect the destruction of the very forces it was designed to protect. the selection of positions for fortifications on our northern frontier must have reference to three distinct classes of objects, viz.: the security, _first_, of the large frontier towns, where much public and private property is exposed to sudden dashing expeditions of the foe, made either on land or by water; _second_, of lake harbors, important as places of refuge and security to our own ships, or to the enemy's fleets while engaged in landing troops or furnishing supplies to an invading army; _third_, of all strategic points on the probable lines of offensive or defensive operations. these objects are distinct in their nature, and would seem to require separate and distinct means for their accomplishment; nevertheless, it will generally be found that positions selected with reference to one of these objects equally fulfil the others, so intimately are they all connected. to determine the strategic points of a probable line of military operations is therefore the main thing to be attended to in locating fortifications. that such points of maximum importance are actually marked out by the peaceful or hostile intercourse of nations cannot be doubted. the _relative_ importance of cities and towns is less varied by the fluctuations of commerce on a land frontier than on the sea-coast. the ever-changing system of "internal improvements," by furnishing new highways and thoroughfares for the transportation of the products of manufacturers and agriculture, either continually varies the relative standing of the seaports already opened, or opens new ones for the exportation of these products, and the importation of foreign articles received in exchange. but these "internal improvements" are seldom carried so far as to connect together two separate and distinct countries, and consequently the principal places on the dividing line usually retain their relative importance, no matter how often they may have declined during times of hostility, or again flourished with the increased commercial intercourse which results from peace. the principal european places of traffic near the frontiers have remained the same for ages, and in all probability ages hence the great frontier marts will be nearly the same as at present. this stability of rank among border towns is not confined to commercial influence; the same holds true with respect to that established by intercourse of a hostile character. military history teaches us that lines of hostile operations, and the fields upon which the principal battles between any two countries have been fought, are nearly the same, no matter how remote the periods of comparison. these points and lines, so important in commerce as well as in war, result from the natural features of the ground, and we ought therefore to expect that they would be as little liable to sudden changes as the character of the earth itself. from these remarks it will readily be perceived that there are three distinct methods of determining the strategic points between this country and canada: st, by an examination of the topography of the two countries; d, by tracing out the main channels of commercial intercourse; d, by reviewing the lines of their military operations. the last method is the least liable to error, and perhaps is the most easily understood, inasmuch as it is sometimes difficult to point out the precise degree of connection between prospective military lines and the channels of commerce, or to show why these two have a fixed relation to the physical features of the country. in the present instance, moreover, this method furnishes ample data for the formation of our decision, inasmuch as the campaigns between this country and canada have been neither few in number nor unimportant in their character and results. in tracing out the main features of the early wars upon our northern frontier, it must be borne in mind that nearly the same portion of country which is now possessed by the english, was then occupied by the french, and that the english possessions in north america included the present middle and northern states. at the period of the american revolution the french and english had completely changed ground, the armies of the former operating in the "states," while the english were in possession of canada. the first expedition to be noticed against that portion of the country, was conducted by samuel argall, who sailed from virginia in , with a fleet of eleven vessels, attacked the french on the penobscot, and afterwards the st. croix. in , sedgwick, at the head of a small new england army, attacked the french on the penobscot, and overrun all arcadia. in , during the contest between charles ii. and louis xiv., it was proposed to march the new england troops across the country by the kennebec or penobscot, and attack quebec; but the terrors and difficulties of crossing "over rocky mountains and howling deserts" were such as to deter them from undertaking the campaign. in , count frontenac, governor of canada, made a descent into new york to assist the french fleet in reducing that province. his line of march was by the river sorrel and lake champlain. an attack upon montreal by the iroquois soon forced him to return; but in the following january a party of french and indians left montreal in the depth of a canadian winter, and after wading for two and twenty days, with provisions on their backs, through snows and swamps and across a wide wilderness, reached the unguarded village of schenectady. here a midnight war-whoop was raised, and the inhabitants either massacred or driven half-clad through the snow to seek protection in the neighboring towns. in , a congress of the colonies, called to provide means for the general defence, assembled at new york, and resolved to carry war into canada: an army was to attack montreal by way of lake champlain, and a fleet to attempt quebec by the st. lawrence. the former advanced as far as the lake, when the quarrels of the commanding officers defeated the objects of the expedition. the massachusetts fleet of thirty-four vessels, (the largest carrying forty-four guns each,) and two thousand men, failed to reduce quebec, though the defences of that place were then of the slightest character, and armed with only twenty-three guns. in , and again in , port royal was attacked by costly expeditions fitted out by the eastern colonies; and again, in , a land force of fifteen hundred men advanced against montreal by lake champlain; but nothing of importance was effected by either expedition. in , lord bolingbroke planned the conquest of canada. the land forces, numbering five thousand men in all, were separated into two distinct armies, the one sent against detroit, and the other against montreal by lake champlain; while a fleet of fifteen ships of war, forty transports, and six store-ships, carrying a land force of six thousand five hundred men, was to attack quebec. the maritime expedition failed to reach its destination, and after losing a part of the fleet and more than a thousand men in the st. lawrence, this part of the project was abandoned. nor was any thing important accomplished by either division of the land forces. the same plan of campaign was followed in . an army of four thousand men marched against montreal by lake champlain, but on hearing of the failure of the naval expedition and of the concentration of the french forces on the river sorel, they retired towards albany. the next expedition of any importance was the naval one of against louisburg. for the attack of this place the colonies raised about four thousand men, and one hundred small vessels and transports, carrying between one hundred and sixty and two hundred guns. they were afterwards joined by ten other vessels carrying near five hundred guns. this attacking force now, according to some of the english writers, consisted of six thousand provincials, and eight hundred seamen, and a combined naval force of near seven hundred guns. the troops landed, and laid siege to the town. the garrison of the fortifications of louisburg consisted of six hundred regulars and one thousand breton militia, or, according to some writers, of only twelve hundred men in all. the armament of these works was one hundred and one cannon, seventy-six swivels, and six mortars. auxiliary to the main works were an island-battery of thirty twenty-two-pounders, and a battery on the main land armed with thirty large cannon. frequent attempts were made to storm the place, but the most persevering efforts were of no avail, many of the new englanders being killed and wounded, and their boats destroyed, while the garrison remained unharmed. at length, after a siege of forty-nine days, want of provisions and the general dissatisfaction of the inhabitants, caused the garrison to surrender. when the new englanders saw the strength of the works, and the slight impression which their efforts had produced, they were not only elated but greatly astonished at their success. it should be noticed, that in the above attack the number of guns in the fleet was almost _three_ times as great as that of all the forts combined; and yet the _naval_ part of the attack was unsuccessful. the besieging army was more than _four_ times as great as all the garrisons combined; and yet the place held out forty-nine days, and at last was surrendered through the want of provisions and the disaffection of the citizens. this place was soon afterwards restored to the french. we see that, thus far in these wars, the english were vastly superior in strength and numbers, yet the result of the several campaigns was decidedly in favor of the french, who not only retained their possessions in the north, but extended their jurisdiction to the mouth of the mississippi, and laid claim to the whole country west of the alleghany mountains. this success must be attributed, not to any superiority of the canadians in bravery, but to the higher military character of their governors, _and more especially to their fortifications_, which were constructed in situations most judiciously selected, to influence the indians and facilitate incursions into the english colonies. the french pursued interior and central lines, while the english followed exterior and divergent lines. the disparity of numbers was always very great. at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the whole population of the colonies amounted to upwards of one million of souls, while that of both canada and louisiana did not exceed fifty-two thousand. but the french possessions, though situated at the extremities of a continent and separated by an almost boundless wilderness, were nevertheless connected by a line of military posts, strong enough to resist the small arms that could then be brought against them. this fort-building propensity of the french became a matter of serious alarm to the colonies, and in the legislature of new york especially protested against it in an address to the crown. while the military art was stationary in england, france had produced her four great engineers--errard, pagan, vauban, and cormontaigne; and nowhere has the influence of their system of military defence been more strikingly exhibited than in the security it afforded to the canadian colony, when assailed by such vastly superior british forces. still further accessions were now made to these english forces by large reinforcements from the mother country, while the canadians received little or no assistance from france; nevertheless they prolonged the war till , forcing the english to adopt at last the slow and expensive process of reducing all their fortifications. this will be shown in the following outline of the several campaigns. very early in , a considerable body of men was sent from great britain to reinforce their troops in this country. these troops were again separated into four distinct armies. the _first_, consisting of near two thousand men, marched to the attack of fort du quesne, but was met and totally defeated by one-half that number of french and indians. the _second_ division, of fifteen hundred, proceeded to attack fort niagara by way of oswego, but returned without success. the _third_, of three thousand seven hundred men, met and defeated dieskau's army of twelve hundred regulars and six hundred canadians and indians, in the open field, but did not attempt to drive him from his works at ticonderoga and crown point. the _fourth_, consisting of three thousand three hundred men and forty-one vessels, laid waste a portion of nova scotia; thus ending the campaign without a single important result. it was commenced under favorable auspices, with ample preparations, and a vast superiority of force; _but this superiority was again more than counterbalanced by the faulty plans of the english, and by the fortifications which the french had erected, in such positions as to give them a decided advantage in their military operations._ washington early recommended the same system of defence for the english on the ohio; and, after braddock's defeat, advised "the erection of small fortresses at convenient places to deposit provisions in, by which means the country will be eased of an immense expense in the carriage, and it will also be a means of securing a retreat if we should be put to the rout again." but this advice of washington was unheeded, and the campaign of was based upon the same erroneous principles as the preceding one. the _first_ division, of three thousand men, was to operate against fort du quesne; the _second_, of six thousand men, against niagara; the _third_, of ten thousand men, against crown point; and a _fourth_, of two thousand men, was to ascend the kennebec river, destroy the settlements on the chaudiere, and, by alarming the country about quebec, produce a diversion in favor of the third division, which was regarded as the main army, and was directed along the principal line of operations. the entire french forces at this time consisted of only three thousand regulars and a body of canadian militia. nevertheless, the english, with forces nearly _six times_ as numerous, closed the campaign without gaining a single advantage. we here see that the french, with very inferior forces, still continued successful in every campaign, uniformly gaining advantage over their enemy, and gaining ground upon his colonies. by the possession of forts william henry, ticonderoga, and crown point, they completely commanded lake george and lake champlain, which afforded the shortest and easiest line of communication between the british colonies and canada. by means of their forts at montreal, frontenac, detroit, &c., they had entire dominion of the lakes connecting the st. lawrence with the mississippi, and canada with louisiana; moreover, by means of fort du quesne and a line of auxiliary works, their ascendency over the indians on the ohio was well secured. but experience had at length taught the english wherein lay the great strength of their opponents, and a powerful effort was now to be made to displace the french from their fortresses, or at least to counterbalance these works by a vast and overwhelming superiority of troops. in , a british fleet of fifteen ships of the line, eighteen frigates, and many smaller vessels, and a land force of twelve thousand effective men, were sent to attempt the reduction of the fortifications of louisburg; but they failed to effect their object. in the forces sent against this place consisted of twenty ships of the line and eighteen frigates, with an army of fourteen thousand men. the harbor was defended by only five ships of the line, one fifty-gun ship, and five frigates, three of which were sunk across the mouth of the basin. the fortifications of the town had been much neglected, and in general had fallen into ruins. the garrison consisted of only two thousand five hundred regulars, and six hundred militia. notwithstanding that the number of guns of the british fleet exceeded both the armaments of the french ships and of all the forts, these british ships did not risk an attack, but merely acted as transports and as a blockading squadron. even the french naval defence, and the outer works commanding the harbor, were reduced by the temporary land-batteries which wolfe erected; and the main work, although besieged by an inequality of forces of nearly _five_ to _one_, held out for two months, and even then surrendered through the fears and petitions of the non-combatant inhabitants, and not because it had received any material injury from the besiegers. the defence, however, had been continued long enough to prevent, for that campaign, any further operations against canada. the whole number of the english land forces in this campaign was computed at fifty thousand men, of which more than forty thousand were in the field. the _first_ division, of nine thousand men, was directed against fort du quesne, whose garrison did not exceed as many hundred. the _second_ division, of sixteen thousand effective troops, proceeded against ticonderoga and crown point; while a detachment of three thousand men captured fort frontenac, then garrisoned by only one hundred and ten men. the whole force of the french amounted to only five thousand; the english attempted to drive them from their works by storm, but were repulsed with a loss of near two thousand men, while their opponents were scarcely injured. the _third_ division acted, as has just been stated, in concert with the naval force against louisburg. in , the _western_ division of the english army, consisting of a strong body of indians, and five thousand troops, wasted the whole season in reducing fort niagara, which was garrisoned by only six hundred men. the _central_ column of thirteen thousand men was sufficiently successful to enable it to winter at crown point. the _eastern_ division of eight thousand men under wolfe ascended the st. lawrence with a fleet of twenty-two ships, thirteen frigates, and fourteen sloops, and smaller vessels, carrying one thousand nine hundred and ninety guns, and five thousand five hundred and ninety seamen. the naval defence of quebec consisted of eight frigates, carrying two hundred and ten guns; the land forces numbered about nine thousand, and the fortifications were armed with ninety-four guns and five mortars, only a part of which could be brought to bear upon the anchorage ground. several attempts were made by the combined forces to carry these works, but they proved equally unsuccessful. although the english fleet carried _twenty times_ as many guns as the forts, their inability to reduce these works was acknowledged. the siege had continued for two months, and still the fortifications were uninjured. general wolfe himself distinctly stated, that, in any further attempt to carry the place, the "guns of the shipping could not be of much use;" and the chief engineer of the expedition gave it as his opinion, that "the ships would receive great damage from the shot and bombs of the upper batteries, without making the least impression upon them." under these circumstances it was finally determined to endeavor to decoy montcalm from his works, and make him risk a battle in the open field. in an evil hour, the french consented to forego the advantages of their fortifications, and the contest was finally decided on the plains of abraham, with forces nearly equal in number. both wolfe and montcalm fell in this battle, but the former on the field of victory; and five days afterwards the inhabitants of quebec, weakened and dispirited by their losses, surrendered the town, although its fortifications were still unharmed. the french, in this campaign, had relinquished all idea of opposing the enemy in the open field, and confined their efforts to retard the advance of the english till france could send troops to their relief; but no such relief came, and when the campaign of opened, the little french army was concentrated at montreal. as the english divisions advanced, one by oswego, one by lake champlain, and the third by quebec, they afforded to the french a fine opportunity for the strategic movement from a centre against converging lines; but the garrison was too weak to hope for success in either direction, and therefore awaited the enemy within their works. montreal, being but slightly fortified, was soon reduced, and with it fell the french empire erected in this country at infinite labor and expense. at the first outbreak of the american revolution, it was so obviously important to get possession of the military works commanding the line of lake champlain, that expeditions for this purpose were simultaneously fitted out by massachusetts and connecticut. the garrisons of these works were taken by surprise. this conquest, says botta, the able and elegant historian of the revolution, "was no doubt of high importance, but it would have had a much greater influence upon the course of the whole war, if these fortresses, _which are the bulwarks of the colonies_, had been defended in times following, with the same prudence and valor with which they had been acquired." in the campaign of , an army of two thousand seven hundred and eighty-four effective men, with a reserve of one thousand at albany, crossed the lake and approached the fortress of st. john's about the st of september. the work was garrisoned by only about five or six hundred regulars, and some two hundred militia. this was the only obstacle to prevent the advance of our army into the very heart of canada; to leave it unreduced in rear would cut off all hope of retreat. allen had already made the rash and foolish attempt, and his whole army had been destroyed, and he himself made prisoner. the reduction of this place was therefore deemed absolutely necessary, but was not effected till the d of november, and after a long and tedious siege. this delay decided the fate of the campaign; for, although montreal fell immediately afterwards, the season was so far advanced that a large portion of our troops, wearied with their sufferings from cold and want of clothing, now demanded their discharge. the eastern division, of one thousand men under arnold, crossing the country by the kennebeck and chaudiere, through difficulties and suffering almost unparalleled, arrived opposite quebec on the th of november. the place was at this time almost without defence, and, had arnold possessed a suitable pontoon equipage, it might easily have been taken by surprise. but by the time that the means for effecting a passage could be prepared, and a junction could be effected between the two american armies, quebec was prepared to sustain their attack. the result of that attack is too well known to require a repetition here. early the next season it was deemed necessary to withdraw the american army from canada. this retreat of undisciplined troops, in the presence of vastly superior numbers of the enemy, would have been extremely hazardous had it not been effected on a line of forts which were held by our own troops. as it was we sustained no considerable loss. carleton pursued on rapidly, to co-operate with general howe, who was now lying at new york with over one hundred ships and about thirty-five thousand troops; but he received a decided check from the guns of ticonderoga, and retired again to canada. by the british plan of campaign in , the entire force of their northern army was to concentrate at albany. one division of fifteen hundred men, including indians, advanced by oswego, wood creek, and the mohawk; but fort stanwix, with a garrison of only six hundred men, arrested their progress and forced them to return. another, leaving new york, ascended the hudson as far as esopus; but its progress was so much retarded by the small forts and water-batteries along that river, that it would have been too late to assist burgoyne, even if it could possibly have reached albany. the principal division of the enemy's army, numbering about nine thousand men, advanced by the champlain route. little or no preparations were made to arrest its progress. the works of ticonderoga were so out of repair as to be indefensible on the flanks. its garrison consisted of only fifteen hundred continental troops, and about as many militia, over whom the general had no control. their supply of provisions was exhausted, and only one man in ten of the militia had bayonets to their guns. under these circumstances it was deemed best to withdraw the garrison six days after the investment. burgoyne now advanced rapidly, but with so little precaution as to leave his communications in rear entirely unprotected. being repulsed by the american forces collected at saratoga, his line of supplies cut off by our detached forts, his provisions exhausted, his troops dispirited, and his indian allies having deserted him, retreat became impossible, and his whole army was forced to capitulate. this campaign closed the military operations on our northern frontier during the war of the revolution. we now come to the war of . in the beginning of this war the number of british regulars in the canadas did not exceed three thousand men, who were scattered along a frontier of more than nine hundred miles in extent. in the whole of upper canada there were but seven hundred and twenty men, and at montreal, three rivers, and on the whole line of the sorel the whole defensive force amounted to only thirteen hundred and thirty men, and the garrison of quebec was so small, that no detachment could be made without great inconvenience and danger. the fortifications of isle aux noix, then emphatically the key of central canada, was without a garrison during nearly the whole of the first campaign. under these circumstances an american force of fifteen hundred or two thousand men marching rapidly from albany, might readily have broken the enemy's line of defence, and cut off all upper canada from supplies and reinforcements from england by way of quebec. let us see what course was pursued. on the st of june an army of two thousand men was collected at dayton, in ohio, placed under the command of an imbecile old officer of the revolution, and directed by detroit against the canadian peninsula. the dilatory march, absurd movements, and traitorous surrender of hull's army to a british force of three hundred regulars and four hundred militia, are but too well known. another american army of about ten thousand men was afterwards raised in the west; the main division of this army under harrison marched by three separate routes to invade canada by way of malden; but they failed to reach their destination, and wintered behind the river portage. the eastern army was collected at albany in the early part of the summer and placed under the command of general dearborn, another old officer of the revolution. instead of pushing this force rapidly forward upon the strategic line of lake champlain, the general was directed to divide it into three parts, and to send one division against the niagara frontier, a _second_ against kingston, and a _third_ against montreal. these orders were dispatched from washington the th of june, nearly a month after hull had begun his march from dayton. dearborn's army, on the first of september, consisted of six thousand five hundred regulars and seven thousand militia--thirteen thousand five hundred in all: six thousand three hundred for the niagara frontier, two thousand two hundred at sacketts harbor, and five thousand for lake champlain. even with this absurd plan of campaign and faulty division of the forces, we might have succeeded if the general had acted with energy, so exceedingly weak were the canadian means of defence; but instead of taking advantage of his superiority in numbers and the favorable circumstances of the time, he entered into an armistice with the british general, and his whole army of thirteen thousand five hundred men lay inactive till the th of october, when the absurd project of crossing the niagara at lewiston failed, because the new-york militia had _constitutional scruples_ against crossing a river so long as the enemy were on the other side. the lake champlain column, consisting of three thousand regulars and two thousand militia, a considerable portion of which had been collected as early as the first of august, had in four months advanced as far as la cole river, a distance of about two hundred miles from albany. the unimportant action at this place terminated the campaign, and the army of the north returned to winter-quarters. all the early part of the campaign of , on the northern frontier, was spent in a war of detachments, in which our troops captured fort george and york, and repelled the predatory excursions of the enemy. in these operations our troops exhibited much courage and energy, and the young officers who led them, no little skill and military talent. but nothing could have been more absurd than for a general, with superior forces in the vicinity of an enemy, to act only by detachments at a time when his opponents were daily increasing in number. this useless war of outposts and detachments was continued till july, when general dearborn was recalled, and general wilkinson, another old officer of the revolution, put in his place. it was now determined to make a push for montreal, with the combined forces of the northern army. wilkinson, with , men, descended the st. lawrence, but did not reach prescott till the th of november, thus affording to the english plenty of leisure to prepare for his reception. hampton, another old officer of the revolution, ascended lake champlain with another column of , men, but refused to form any co-operation with wilkinson, and after the unimportant combat of chrystler's field, the whole army again retired to winter-quarters. in the mean time the army of the west, under harrison, who was assisted by the military skill and science of mccrea and wood, and the bravery of croghan and johnson, held in check the british and indians; and the battle of the thames and the victory of lake erie formed a brilliant termination to the campaign in that quarter. had such victories been gained on the montreal or eastern portion of the frontier, they would have led to the most important results. the plan of operations for the campaign of was of the same diverse and discordant character as before. but the command of the troops had now fallen into the hands of young and energetic officers, and brown, assisted by such men as wood, mccrea, scott, ripley, miller, soon gained the victories of fort erie, chippewa, and lundy's lane; while mccomb and mcdonough drove back the enemy from the line of lake champlain. with these operations terminated the northern campaign of , the last which has been conducted on that frontier. let us now turn to the system of works projected for the defence of this line. the first works are at the falls of st. mary, on the western extremity of the line. the second works are at mackinaw. the third works are at the foot of lake huron. the fourth works are near detroit. the fifth works are near buffalo. the sixth works are at the mouth of the niagara river. the seventh works are at oswego. the eighth works are at sacketts harbor. the ninth works are below ogdensburg. the tenth works are at rouse's point. the eleventh works are near the head-waters of the kennebec or the penobscot. the twelfth works are at calais, on the st. croix. all these works are small, and simple in their character, well calculated to assist the operations of armed forces in the field, but incapable of resisting a protracted siege. they are entirely different in their character from those on the coast, the latter being intended principally for the use of our citizen-soldiery, in the defence of our seaport towns, while the former are intended merely as auxiliaries to the operations of more disciplined troops. this system of defence for our northern frontier has been much commented on by men professing some knowledge of the military art, and various opinions have been advanced respecting its merits. some have thought that more and larger works should be placed on the western extremity of this line; others attach by far the greatest importance to the central or montreal portion of the frontier; while others, again, attach a higher value to the eastern extremity of the line. these last would have us concentrate our main forces on the head-waters of the kennebec and the penobscot, and then advance upon quebec, a distance of some miles, along the isolated carriage-road, through the valley of the chaudiere. here is only a single road, but little travelled, and penetrating a wide and almost uninhabited wilderness. general jomini says emphatically, that _a line of operations should always offer two or three roads for the movement of an army in the sphere of its enterprises_,--an insuperable objection to the kennebec route, except as a diversion to the main attack. but there are still stronger objections to this route, than its want of feasibility for the transportation of the main army; for even should that army succeed in reaching quebec in safety, the expedition would be entirely without military results, unless that fortress could be immediately reduced,--a contingency which would be extremely doubtful under the most favorable circumstances; and even should we be ever so fortunate in our operations, the siege of such a place would occupy a considerable length of time. it would be throwing our forces along the most difficult line of operations, against the strongest point in the enemy's line of defence, and making the success of the whole plan depend upon the contingency of a reduction, in a few days, of one of the strongest fortresses in the world. what principle in military science would justify such a plan of campaign? we are fully aware of the great advantages to be derived from the reduction of quebec; and we are also aware of the great difficulties to be encountered in any attempt to accomplish that object. it may, and probably will ere long, be made to surrender to our arms; but it would be utter folly to base our military operations on the contingency of a short and successful siege. by advancing upon montreal by the lake champlain route, we could cut off the canadian forces in the west from all reinforcements; and then, as circumstances might direct, could besiege quebec, or attack the enemy in the field, or perhaps, manoeuvring as the french did at the siege of mantua, accomplish both objects at the same time. we have seen that it was one of napoleon's maxims that _an army should choose the shortest and most direct line of operations, which should either pierce the enemy's line of defence, or cut off his communications with his base_. it is the opinion of men of the best military talent in our army that the lake champlain line satisfies all these conditions at the same time;--that it is the most direct, most feasible, and most decisive line which can be pursued in case of operations against canada; and that it is indispensable to success in war that this line be well fortified in time of peace. all agree that the st. lawrence above quebec constitutes the _key_ point of the enemy's defence, and the _objective_ point towards which all our operations should be directed. to reach this point, all our boards of engineers have deemed it best to collect our troops at albany and advance by lake champlain, a distance of only two hundred miles. besides the advantages of a good water communication the whole distance for the transportation of military stores, there are several roads on each side, all concentrating on this line within our own territory. it has already been shown by the brief sketch of our northern wars, that this line has been the field of strife and blood for _fifteen campaigns_. nature has marked it out as our shortest and easiest line of intercourse with canada, both in peace and war. military diversions will always be made on the eastern and western extremities of this frontier, and important secondary or auxiliary operations be carried on by the eastern and western routes; but until we overthrow the whole system of military science as established by the romans, revived by frederick and practised and improved by napoleon, the _central and interior line_, under all ordinary circumstances, will furnish the greatest probabilities of success. if the line of lake champlain is, as we have endeavored to show, the most important line in the north; its security by fortifications is a matter of the greatest interest. the works recommended by the board, consist of a single fort, costing $ , , at rouse's point, on the extreme frontier, and unfortified dépôts at plattsburg and albany. but is this sufficient to accomplish the object? if the hostile army should pass the extreme frontier barrier, what is to retard his advance,--what defensive works are to protect the débouché of the northern canal, or even to save the great central dépôt? we know of no foreign engineer who has recommended less than _three_ lines of fortifications for the security of a land frontier; and napoleon, the archduke charles, and general jomini, agree in recommending at least this number of lines. there may be circumstances that render it unnecessary to resort to a three-fold defence throughout the whole extent of our northern frontier; but upon our main line of communication with canada,--a line of maximum importance both to us and to the enemy, we know of no reason for violating the positive rules of the art,--rules which have been established for ages; and sanctioned by the best engineers and greatest generals of modern times. ticonderoga has more than once stayed the waves of northern invasion; and we know of no change in the art of war, or in the condition of the country, that renders less important than formerly the advantages of an intermediate point of support between albany and the canadian lines. indeed it would seem that the connection of the hudson with the lake by the northern canal had even increased the value of such a point. it would seem, moreover, that the great value of a central dépôt near albany would warrant a resort to the best means of security which can be afforded by defensive works. here we already have one of our largest arsenals of construction; here are to be located magazines for the collection and deposit, in time of peace, of gunpowder; here, in time of war, is to be formed the grand military dépôt for our whole northern armies; and here is the point of junction of the lines of communication of our northern and eastern states, and the great central rallying point where troops are to be collected for the defence of our northern frontier, or for offensive operations against canada. such a place should never be exposed to the _coup-de-main_ of an enemy. the chance operations of a defensive army are never sufficient for the security of so important a position. we do not here pretend to say what its defences should be. perhaps strong _têtes-de-pont_ on the mohawk and hudson rivers, and detached works on the several lines of communication, may accomplish the desired object; perhaps more central and compact works may be found necessary. but we insist on the importance of securing this position by _some_ efficient means. the remarks of napoleon, (which have already been given,) on the advantages to be derived from fortifying such a central place, where the military wealth of a nation can be secured, are strikingly applicable to this case. but let us look for a moment at what is called the _western_ plan of defence for our northern frontier. certain writers and orators of the western states, in their plans of military defence, would have the principal fortifications of the northern frontier established on lake erie, the detroit river, the st. clair, and lake huron; and the money proposed for the other frontier and coast works, expended in establishing military and naval dépôts at memphis and pittsburg, and in the construction of a ship-canal from the lower illinois to lake michigan,--for the purpose of obtaining the naval control of the northern lakes. it is said that british military and steam naval forces will ascend the st. lawrence to lake ontario; that to counteract these operations we must build an opposition steam-navy at pittsburg and memphis, and collect out troops on the ohio and mississippi, ascend the mississippi and illinois, lake michigan, lake huron, and the georgian bay, cross over to the ottawa by french river and lake nipissing, or moon river and the muskago, then descend the ottawa river to montreal. but as there might be some difficulty in conveying their war-steamers over some twelve or fifteen portages between the georgian bay and the ottawa, and as the upper waters of that river are not navigable by such craft, it has, by some of the military writers before alluded to, been deemed preferable to descend lake huron, st. clair river and lake, run the gauntlet past the british forts on the detroit, descend lake erie and the niagara[ ] into lake ontario, so as to meet the english as they come steaming up the st. lawrence! [footnote : how they are to pass the falls was not determined either by harry bluff or the memphis convention.] it is agreed upon all sides that the british must first collect their forces at quebec, and then pass along the line of the st. lawrence and lake ontario to reach the niagara and detroit frontiers. our boards of engineers have deemed it best to collect troops on the champlain line, and, by penetrating between montreal and quebec, separate the enemy's forces and cut off all the remainder of canada from supplies and reinforcements from england. but it has been discovered by certain western men that to cut the _trunk_ of a tree is not the proper method of felling it: we must climb to the _top_ and pinch the buds, or, at most, cut off a few of the smaller limbs. to blow up a house, we should not place the mine under the foundation, but attach it to one of the shingles of the roof! we have already shown that troops collected at albany may reach the great strategic point on the st. lawrence by an easy and direct route of _two hundred miles_; but forces collected at pittsburg and memphis must pass over a difficult and unfrequented route of _two thousand miles_. our merchant marine on the lakes secures to us a naval superiority in that quarter at the beginning of a war; and our facilities for ship-building are there equal if not superior to any possessed by the enemy. the only way, therefore, in which our ascendency on the lakes can be lost, is by the introduction of steam craft from the atlantic. the canals and locks constructed for this object will pass vessels of small dimensions and drawing not over eight and a half feet water. how are we to prevent the introduction of these atlantic steamers into our lakes? shall we, at the first opening of hostilities, march with armed forces upon the enemy's line of artificial communication and blow up the locks of their ship-canals, thus meeting the enemy's marine at the very threshold of its introduction into the interior seas; or shall we build opposition steam-navies at pittsburg and memphis, some two thousand miles distant, and then expend some forty or fifty millions[ ] in opening an artificial channel to enable them to reach lake ontario, after its borders have been laid waste by the hostile forces? very few disinterested judges would hesitate in forming their opinion on this question.[ ] [footnote : the construction of the illinois ship-canal, for vessels of eight and a half feet draught, is estimated at fifteen millions; to give the same draught to the mississippi and lower illinois, would require at least ten millions more; a ship canal of the corresponding draught around niagara falls, will cost, say, ten millions; the navy yard at memphis, with docks, storehouses, &c., will cost about two millions, and steamers sent thence to the lakes will cost about fifty thousand dollars per gun. on the other hand, the military defences which it is deemed necessary to erect in time of peace for the security of the champlain frontier, will cost only about two thousand dollars per gun; the whole expenditure not exceeding, at most, two millions of dollars! it is not to be denied that a water communication between the mississippi and the northern lakes will have great commercial advantages, and that, in case of a protracted war, auxiliary troops and military stores may be drawn from the valley of the mississippi to assist the north and east in preventing any great accessions to the british military forces in the canadas. we speak only of the policy of expending vast sums of money on this _military_ (?) _project_, to the neglect of matters of more immediate and pressing want. we have nothing to say of its character as a _commercial project_, or of the ultimate military advantages that might accrue from such a work. we speak only of the present condition and wants of the country, and not of what that condition and those wants may be generations hence!] [footnote : there are no books devoted exclusively to the subjects embraced in this chapter; but the reader will find many remarks on the northern frontier defences in the histories of the war of , in congressional reports, (vide house doc. , xxvith congress, d session; and senate doc., no. , xxviiith congress, d session,) and in numerous pamphlets and essays that have appeared from the press within the last few years.] chapter ix. army organization--staff and administrative corps. by the law of the th of december, , on the organization of the public force of france, the army was defined, "a standing force drawn from the public force, and designed to act against external enemies." [_une force habituelle extraite de la force publique, et destinée essentiellement à agir contre les ennemis du dehors_.] in time of peace, the whole organized military force of the state is intended when we speak of _the army_; but in time of war this force is broken up into two or more fractions, each of which is called an _army_. these armies are usually named from the particular duty which may be assigned to them--as, _army of invasion, army of occupation, army of observation, army of reserve, &c._; or from the country or direction in which they operate--as, _army of the north, of the south, of mexico, of canada, of the rhine, &c._; or from the general who commands it--as, the _army of soult, army of wellington, army of blücher, &c._ all modern armies are organized on the same basis. they are made up of a staff and administrative departments, and four distinct arms--infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers; each having distinct duties, but all combining to form one and the same military body. in the actual operations of a campaign, these forces are formed into _corps d'armée_, each _corps d'armée_ being composed of two or more _grand-divisions_; each grand-division, of two or more _brigades_; and each brigade, of several _companies, squadrons_, or _batteries_. in speaking of an army in the field, it is sometimes supposed to be divided into two classes of men--the _staff_ and _the line_. we here include in the first class-- all officers, of whatever arm, above the rank of colonel; all officers of the staff corps of whatever grade, and all officers attached to the staff as aides, &c.; all officers of the administrative departments; all officers of artillery and engineer staffs; the corps of geographical or topographical engineers, and the guards. in the second class are included all troops, of whatever arm, which belong to the active army, in infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers. all troops on detached service, such as recruiting, guarding posts and depots, escorting convoys, &c., as well as all sedentary corps, garrisons of fortified places, &c., are not regarded in this classification as composing any part of the _line_ of the army. _troops of the line_ is a term applied only to such troops as form the principal line on the battle-field, viz:--the heavy infantry and heavy cavalry. these are technically called _infantry of the line_, and _cavalry of the line_. in this sense of the term, light infantry, light cavalry or dragoons, artillery, and engineers, are not classed as troops of the _line_. but this distinction is now pretty much fallen into disuse, and the division of an army into staff and administrative departments, and four arms of service--infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers--is now regarded as the most convenient, from being precise and definite in its meaning. the _general staff_ of an army includes all general officers of the army, and such officers of lower grades as are attached to this general duty, instead of serving with troops, or on special administrative duty. the general officers are-- st, the _generalissimo_, or commander-in -chief; d, _generals_, or marshals, as they are called in france, or field-marshals and generals of infantry and cavalry, as they are called in england and the northern states of europe; d, _lieutenant-generals_; th, _generals of division_, or major-generals, as they are called in england; th, _generals of brigade_, or brigadier-generals, as they are sometimes called;--colonels, majors, captains, lieutenants, ensigns, and cornets or cadets, are also either attached to the staff, or form a part of the _staff corps_. the titles of "adjutant-general," and of "inspector-general," are given to staff officers selected for these special services, either in the general staff or in the several _corps d'armée_. no special rank is attached to these offices themselves, and the grade of those who hold them is fixed by some special rule, or by their general rank in the army. in the war of the revolution, washington held the rank of general, and in the rank of lieutenant-general. in the war of , the highest grade held by any of our officers was that of general of division, or major-general, as it was called. the highest grade in our army at the present time is called major-general--a title that properly belongs, not to the general of an army, but to the chief of staff. hamilton had this title when chief of washington's staff; berthier and soult when chief of napoleon's staff, the former till the close of the campaign of , and the latter in the waterloo campaign. general jomini first greatly distinguished himself as chief of ney's staff, and afterwards on the staff of the emperor of russia. other generals have owed much of their success to the chiefs of their staff:--pichegru to regnier, moreau to dessoles, kutusof to toll, barclay to diebitsch, and blücher to sharnharst and gneisenau. the _generalissimo_ or commander-in-chief of an army is the person designated by the law of the land to take charge of the organized military forces of the state. in this country the president, through his secretary of war, exercises this general command. in england, wellington acts in the capacity of commander-in-chief of all the british military forces. in france, the minister of war, under the king, has this general direction. in other european services, some prince of the blood, or distinguished general, exercises the functions of generalissimo. an active army in the field should be commanded by a _general_, or, as is done in some european countries, by a marshal. these may be regarded as of assimilated rank. a _corps d'armée_ should, be commanded by a _lieutenant-general_. this rule is almost universal in europe. the number of marshals in france under napoleon was so great, that officers of this grade were often assigned to _corps d'armée_. a grand division of an army should be commanded by a _general of division_. in england, the assimilated grade is that of major-general, and in france at the present time, the younger lieutenant-generals, or the _maréchaux-de-camp_, command divisions. a brigade should be commanded by a _brigadier-general_. at the present time in the french service, _maréchaux-de-camp_ act as commanders of brigades. the several _corps d'armée_ are designated by numbers, st, d, d, &c., and in the same way the several divisions in each _corps d'armée_, and the several brigades in each division. when the number of troops are placed on a war footing, each _corps d'armée_ ordinarily contains from twenty to thirty thousand men. the command of these several _corps d'armée_, divisions, and brigades, is taken by the officers of the corresponding grades according to seniority of rank, and without reference to arms, unless otherwise directed by the generalissimo, who should always have the power to designate officers for special commands. the _chief of staff_ of an army is usually selected from the grade next below that of the general commanding, and receives the title, for the time being, which is used to designate this special rank. in some european armies, and formerly in our own service, this officer was called major-general. in france, if the generalissimo commands in person, a marshal is made chief of staff with the temporary title of _major-général_; but if a marshal commands the army, a lieutenant -general or _maréchal-de-camp_ becomes chief of staff with the title of _aide-major-général_. the chiefs of staff of _corps d'armée_ and of divisions, are selected in precisely the same way. the position assigned by the commanding general for the residence of his staff, is denominated the _general head-quarter of the army_; that of a _corps d'armée_ staff, the _head-quarters of_ [ st or d, &c.] _corps d'armée_; that of a division, the _head-quarters of_ [ st or d, &c.] _division_, [ st or d, &c.] _corps d'armée_. the petty staffs of regiments, squadrons, &c., consisting of an adjutant, sergeant-major, &c., are especially organized by the commandants of the regiments, &c., and have no connection whatever with the general staff of an army. of course, then, they are not embraced in the present discussion. the subordinate officers of the staff of an army, in time of war, are charged with important and responsible duties connected with the execution of the orders of their respective chiefs. but in time of peace, they are too apt to degenerate into fourth-rate clerks of the adjutant-general's department, and mere military dandies, employing their time in discussing the most unimportant and really contemptible points of military etiquette, or criticising the letters and dispatches of superior officers, to see whether the wording of the report or the folding of the letter exactly corresponds to the particular regulation applicable to the case. such was the character given to the first staff of wellington, and a similar class of men composed the staff of the army of italy when it was abolished by napoleon and a new one formed in its place. there are also some officers of this stamp in our own service, but they are regarded by the army with universal contempt. the staff of our army requires a new and different organization, and should be considerably enlarged. the following is the composition of a regularly organized general staff in the french service, for an army of forty or fifty thousand men divided into two _corps d'armée_ and a reserve. st. the marshal (or general) commanding-in-chief; and one colonel or lieutenant-colonel, one major, three captains and three subalterns, as aides-de-camp. d. a lieutenant-general as chief-of-staff, with the title of _major-general_, assisted by one colonel or lieutenant-colonel, three majors, five captains, and one subaltern, as aides-de-camp. d. three lieutenant-generals, commanding the _corps d'armée_ and reserve. each of these will be assisted by aides in the same way as the _major-general_, and each will also have his regularly-organized staff of _corps d'armée_, with a general of division or general of brigade as chief. th. six or nine generals commanding divisions, each having his own distinct and separately organized staff. in the french army, the staff of an officer commanding a division is composed of one colonel, two majors, three captains, and six subalterns. th. twelve or more generals of brigade, each having one captain, and one subaltern for aides. th. there is also attached to the staff of the general-in-chief of the army, the commandants of artillery and engineers, with several subordinates, inspector-generals, and the ranking officers of each of the administrative departments, with their assistants. the generals select their aides and assistants from the staff corps, or from either of the four arms of service. the troops of these arms may be distributed as follows: battalions of infantry, , men. squadrons of horse, . . , " batteries of artillery, ( mounted and foot,) . , " companies of sappers, of pontoniers,[ ] and of artificers, . . . . . , " ------ , " [footnote : one bridge-equipage is required for each _corps d'armée_.] if we add to these the staff, and the several officers and employés of the administrative departments, we have an army of nearly fifty thousand men. this, it will be remembered, is the organization of an army in the field; in the entire military organization of a state, the number of staff officers will be still higher. in , france, with a military organization for about three hundred and twenty thousand men, had eighteen marshals, two hundred and twenty-five lieutenant-generals, five hundred and thirty-eight _maréchaux-de-camp_, and four hundred and eighty-three brigadiers. a similar organization of the general staff was maintained by napoleon. at present the general staff of the french army consists of nine marshals, (twelve in time of war;) eighty lieutenant-generals in active service, fifty-two in reserve, and sixty two _en retraite_--one hundred and ninety-four in all; one hundred and sixty _maréchaux-de-camp_ in active service, eighty-six in reserve, and one hundred and ninety _en retraite_--four hundred and thirty-six in all. the officers of the staff-corps are: thirty colonels, thirty lieutenant-colonels, one hundred majors, three hundred captains, and one hundred lieutenants. those of other european armies are organized on the same basis. it will be seen from these remarks that the organization of our own general staff is exceedingly defective, and entirely unsuited to the object for which it is created. we have two brigadier-generals for the command of two brigades, and one general of division, with the title of major-general, who acts in the fourfold capacity of general commanding the army, lieutenant-general, general of division, and chief of staff of the army. but as it is impossible with this number to maintain a proper organization, the president (with the advice and consent of the senate) has, from time to time, increased this number to three major-generals, and nine brigadier-generals, and numerous officers of staff with lower grades. nearly all these officers are detached from their several regiments and corps, thus injuring the efficiency of regiments and companies; and we have in our service, by this absurd mode of supplying the defects of our system of organization by brevet rank, the anomaly of _officers being generals, and at the same time not generals; of holding certain ranks and grades, and yet not holding these ranks and grades!_ let congress do away this absurd and ridiculous system, and establish a proper and efficient organization of the general staff, and restore the grades of general and lieutenant-general. in the war of , instead of resorting to a proper organization when an increase of the general staff was required, we merely multiplied the number of major-generals and generals of brigade by direct appointment, or by conferring brevet rank. it is now conceded that there never was a more inefficient general staff than that with which our army was cursed during the war; and the claims of brevet rank have ever since been a source of endless turmoils and dissatisfaction, driving from the army many of its noblest ornaments. in the event of another war, it is to be hoped that congress will not again resort to the ruinous system of . possibly it may by some be objected to the creation of generals, lieutenant-generals, &c., that it increases the expense of the army and the number of its officers. this need not be. the number, pay, &c., may remain the same, or nearly the same, as at present. but by increasing the grades you avoid in a considerable measure the difficulties of seniority claims and brevet rank--the principal curses of our present system. if we merely increase the number of each existing grade, giving a part of these rank above their name and office, we merely multiply evils. but we will leave this subject for the present, and recur to the general discussion of staff duties. the following remarks of jomini on the importance of the staff of an army are worthy of attention. "a good staff," says he, "is, more than all, indispensable to the constitution of an army; for it must be regarded as the nursery where the commanding general can raise his principal supports--as a body of officers whose intelligence can aid his own. when harmony is wanting between the genius that commands, and the talents of those who apply his conceptions, success cannot be sure; for the most skilful combinations are destroyed by faults in execution. moreover, a good staff has the advantage of being more durable than the genius of any single man; it not only remedies many evils, but it may safely be affirmed that it constitutes for the army the best of all safeguards. the petty interests of coteries, narrow views, and misplaced egotism, oppose this last position: nevertheless, every military man of reflection, and every enlightened statesman, will regard its truth as beyond all dispute; for a well-appointed staff is to an army what a skilful minister is to a monarchy--it seconds the views of the chief, even though it be in condition to direct all things of itself; it prevents the commission of faults, even though the commanding general be wanting in experience, by furnishing him good councils. how many mediocre men of both ancient and modern times, have been rendered illustrious by achievements which were mainly due to their associates! reynier was the chief cause of the victories of pichegru, in ; and dessoles, in like manner, contributed to the glory of moreau. is not general toll associated with the successes of kutusof? diebitsch with those of barclay and witgenstein? gneisenau and muffling with those of blücher? numerous other instances might be cited in support of these assertions." "a well-established staff does not always result from a good system of education for the young aspirants; for a man may be a good mathematician and a fine scholar, without being a good warrior. the staff should always possess sufficient consideration and prerogative to be sought for by the officers of the several arms, and to draw together, in this way, men who are already known by their aptitude for war. engineer and artillery officers will no longer oppose the staff, if they reflect that it will open to them a more extensive field for immediate distinction, and that it will eventually be made up exclusively of the officers of those two corps who may be placed at the disposal of the commanding general, and who are the most capable of directing the operations of war." "at the beginning of the wars of the revolution," says this able historian elsewhere, "in the french army the general staff, which is essential for directing the operations of war, had neither instruction nor experience." the several adjutant-generals attached to the army of italy were so utterly incompetent, that napoleon became prejudiced against the existing staff-corps, and virtually destroyed it, drawing his staff-officers from the other corps of the army. in his earlier wars, a large portion of staff duties were assigned to the engineers; but in his later campaigns the officers of this corps were particularly required for the sieges carried on in germany and spain, and considerable difficulty was encountered in finding suitable officers for staff duty. some of the defects of the first french staff-corps were remedied in the latter part of napoleon's career, and in it was reorganized by marshal saint-cyr, and a special school established for its instruction. some european nations have established regular staff-corps, from which the vacancies in the general staff are filled; others draw all their staff-officers from the corps of the army. a combination of the two systems is preferred by the best judges. jomini recommends a regular staff-corps, with special schools for its instruction; but thinks that its officers should be drawn, at least in part, from the other corps of the army: the officers of engineers and artillery he deems, from their instruction, to be peculiarly qualified for staff duty. the policy of holding double rank at the same time in the staff and in the corps of the army, as is done in our service, is pronounced by all competent judges as ruinous to an army, destroying at the same time the character of the staff and injuring the efficiency of the line. the following remarks on the character and duties of general-officers of an army, made at the beginning of the war of , are from the pen of one of the ablest military writers this country has yet produced:-- "generals have been divided into three classes,--_theorists_, who by study and reflection have made themselves acquainted with all the rules or maxims of the art they profess; _martinets_, who have confined their attention merely to the mechanical part of the trade; and _practical men_, who have no other or better guide than their own experience, in either branch of it. this last description is in all services, excepting our own, the most numerous, but with us gives place to a fourth class, viz., men destitute alike of _theory_ and of _experience_." "self-respect is one thing, and presumption another. without the former, no man ever became a good officer; under the influence of the latter, generals have committed great faults. the former is the necessary result of knowledge; the latter of ignorance. a man acquainted with his duty can rarely be placed in circumstances new, surprising, or embarrassing; a man ignorant of his duty will always find himself constrained to _guess_, and not knowing how to be right by _system_, will often be wrong by _chance_." "these remarks are neither made nor offered as applying exclusively to the science of war. they apply to all other sciences; but in these, errors are comparatively harmless. a naturalist may amuse himself and the public with false and fanciful theories of the earth; and a metaphysician may reason very badly on the relations and forms of matter and spirit, without any ill effect but to make themselves ridiculous. their blunders but make us merry; they neither pick pockets, nor break legs, nor destroy lives; while those of a general bring after them evils the most compounded and mischievous,--the slaughter of an army--the devastation of a state--the ruin of an empire!" "in proportion as ignorance may be calamitous, the reasons for acquiring instruction are multiplied and strengthened. are you an _honest_ man? you will spare neither labor nor sacrifice to gain a competent knowledge of your duty. are you a man of _honor_? you will be careful to avoid self-reproach. does your bosom glow with the holy fervor of _patriotism_? you will so accomplish yourself as to avoid bringing down upon your country either insult or injury." "nor are the more selfish impulses without a similar tendency. has _hunger_ made you a soldier? will you not take care of your bread! is _vanity_ your principle of action? will you not guard those mighty blessings, your epaulets and feathers! are you impelled by a love of _glory_ or a love of _power_? and can you forget that these coy mistresses are only to be won by intelligence and good conduct?" "but the _means_ of instruction, say you, where are they to be found? our standing army is but a bad and ill-organized militia, and our militia not better than a mob. nor have the defects in these been supplied by lycées, prytanées, and polytechnic schools. the morbid patriotism of some, and the false economy of others, have nearly obliterated every thing like military knowledge among us." "this, reader, is but one motive the more for reinstating it. thanks to the noble art of printing! you still have _books_ which, if _studied_, will teach the art of war." "_books_! and what are they but the dreams of pedants? they may make a mack, but have they ever made a xenophon, a cæsar, a saxe, a frederick, or a bonaparte? who would not laugh to hear the cobbler of athens lecturing hannibal on the art of war?" "true; but as you are not hannibal, listen to the cobbler. xenophon, cæsar, saxe, frederick, and napoleon, have all thought well of books, and have even composed them. nor is this extraordinary, since they are but the depositories of maxims which genius has suggested, and experience confirmed; since they both enlighten and shorten the road of the traveller, and render the labor and genius of past ages tributary to our own. _these_ teach most emphatically, that the secret of successful war is not to be found in mere _legs_ and _arms_, but in the _head_ that shall direct them. if this be either ungifted by nature, or uninstructed by study and reflection, the best plans of manoeuvre and campaign avail nothing. the two last centuries have presented many revolutions in military character, all of which have turned on this principle. it would be useless to enumerate these. we shall quote only the greatest and the last--_the troops of frederick!_ how illustrious under him! how contemptible under his successors! yet his system was there; his double lines of march at full distance; his oblique order of battle; his simple lines of manoeuvre in the presence of an enemy; his wise conformation of an _état-major;_--all, in short, that distinguished his practice from that of ordinary men, survived him; but the head that truly comprehended and knew how to apply these, died with frederick. what an admonition does this fact present for self-instruction,--for unwearied diligence,--for study and reflection! nor should the force of this be lessened by the consideration that, after all, unless nature should have done her part of the work,--unless to a soul not to be shaken by any changes of fortune--cool, collected, and strenuous--she adds a head fertile in expedients, prompt in its decisions, and sound in its judgments, no man can ever merit the title of a _general_." the celebrated marshal saxe has made the following remarks on the necessary qualifications to form a good general. the most indispensable one, according to his idea, is valor, without which all the rest will prove nugatory. the next is a sound understanding with some genius: for he must not only be courageous, but be extremely fertile in expedients. the third is health and a robust constitution. "his mind must be capable of prompt and vigorous resources; he must have an aptitude, and a talent at discovering the designs of others, without betraying the slightest trace of his own intentions; he must be, _seemingly_, communicative, in order to encourage others to unbosom, but remain tenaciously reserved in matters that concern his own army; he must, in a word, possess activity with judgment, be able to make a proper choice of his officers, and never deviate from the strictest line of military justice. old soldiers must not be rendered wretched and unhappy by unwarrantable promotions, nor must extraordinary talents be kept back to the detriment of the service on account of mere rules and regulations. great abilities will justify exceptions; but ignorance and inactivity will not make up for years spent in the profession." "in his deportment he must be affable, and always superior to peevishness or ill-humor; he must not know, or at least seem not to know, what a spirit of resentment is; and when he is under the necessity of inflicting military chastisement, he must see the guilty punished without compromise or foolish humanity; and if the delinquent be from among the number of his most intimate friends, he must be doubly severe towards the unfortunate man. for it is better, in instances of correction, that one individual should be treated with rigor (by orders of the person over whom he may be supposed to hold some influence) than that an idea should go forth in the army of public justice being sacrificed to private sentiments." "a modern general should always have before him the example of manlius; he must divest himself of personal sensations, and not only be convinced himself, but convince others, that he is the organ of military justice, and that what he does is irrevocably prescribed. with these qualifications, and by this line of conduct, he will secure the affections of his followers, instill into their minds all the impulses of deference and respect; he will be feared, and consequently obeyed." "the resources of a general's mind are as various as the occasions for the exercise of them are multiplied and checkered: he must be perfectly master of the art of knowing how to support an army in all circumstances and situations; how to apply its strength, or be sparing of its energy and confidence; how to post all its different component parts, so as not to be forced to give or receive battle in opposition to settled plans. when once engaged, he must have presence of mind enough to grasp all the relative points of disposition and arrangement, to seize favorable moments for impression, and to be thoroughly conversant in the infinite vicissitudes that occur during the heat of a battle; on a ready possession of which its ultimate success depends. these requisites are unquestionably manifold, and grow out of the diversity of situations and the chance medley of events that produce their necessity." "a general to be in perfect possession of them, must on the day of battle be divested of every thought, and be inaccessible to every feeling, but what immediately regards the business of the day; he must reconnoitre with the promptitude of a skilful geographer, whose eye collects instantaneously all the relative portions of locality, and feels his ground as it were by instinct; and in the disposition of his troops he must discover a perfect knowledge of his profession, and make all his arrangements with accuracy and dispatch. his order of battle must be simple and unconfused, and the execution of his plan be as quick as if it merely consisted in uttering some few words of command; as, _the first line will attack! the second will support it! or, such a battalion will advance and support the line._" "the general officers who act under such a general must be ignorant of their business indeed, if, upon the receipt of these orders, they should be deficient in the immediate means of answering them, by a prompt and ready co-operation. so that the general has only to issue out directions according to the growth of circumstances, and to rest satisfied that every division will act in conformity to his intentions; but if, on the contrary, he should so far forget his situation as to become a drill-sergeant in the heat of action, he must find himself in the case of the fly in the fable, which perched upon a wheel, and foolishly imagined that the motion of the carriage was influenced by its situation. a general, therefore, ought on the day of battle to be thoroughly master of himself, and to have both his mind and his eye riveted to the immediate scene of action. he will by these means be enabled to see every thing; his judgment will be unembarrassed, and he will instantly discover all the vulnerable points of the enemy. the instant a favorable opening offers, by which the contest may be decided, it becomes his duty to head the nearest body of troops, and, without any regard to personal safety, to advance against the enemy's line. [by a ready conception of this sort, joined to a great courage, general dessaix determined the issue of the battle of marengo.] it is, however, impossible for any man to lay down rules, or to specify with accuracy all the different ways by which a victory may be obtained. every thing depends upon a variety of situations, casualties of events, and intermediate occurrences, which no human foresight can positively ascertain, but which may be converted to good purposes by a quick eye, a ready conception, and prompt execution." "prince eugene was singularly gifted with these qualifications, particularly with that sublime possession of the mind, which constitutes the essence of a military character." "many commanders-in-chief have been so limited in their ideas of warfare, that when events have brought the contest to issue, and two rival armies have been drawn out for action, their whole attention has devolved upon a straight alignment, an equality of step, or a regular distance in intervals of columns. they have considered it sufficient to give answers to questions proposed by their aides-de-camp, to send orders in various directions, and to gallop themselves from one quarter to another, without steadily adhering to the fluctuations of the day, or calmly watching for an opportunity to strike a decisive blow. they endeavor, in fact, to do every thing, and thereby do nothing. they appear like men whose presence of mind deserts them the instant they are taken out of the beaten track, or reduced to supply unexpected calls by uncommon exertions; and from whence, continues the same sensible writer, do these contradictions arise? from an ignorance of those high qualifications without which the mere routine of duty, methodical arrangement, and studied discipline must fall to the ground, and defeat themselves. many officers spend their whole lives in putting a few regiments through a regular set of manoeuvres; and having done so, they vainly imagine that all the science of a real military man consists in that acquirement. when, in process of time, the command of a large army falls to their lot, they are manifestly lost in the magnitude of the undertaking, and, from not knowing how to act as they ought, they remain satisfied with doing what they have partially learned." "military knowledge, as far as it regards a general or commander-in-chief, may be divided into two parts, one comprehending mere discipline and settled systems for putting a certain number of rules into practice; and the other originating a sublimity of conception that method may assist, but cannot give." "if a man be born with faculties that are naturally adapted to the situation of a general, and if his talents do not fit the extraordinary casualties of war, he will never rise beyond mediocrity." "it is, in fact, in war as it is in painting, or in music. perfection in either art grows out of innate talent, but it never can be acquired without them. study and perseverance may correct ideas, but no application, no assiduity will give the life and energy of action; these are the works of nature." "it has been my fate (observes the marshal) to see several very excellent colonels become indifferent generals. i have known others, who have distinguished themselves at sieges, and in the different evolutions of an army, lose their presence of mind and appear ignorant of their profession, the instant they were taken from that particular line, and be incapable of commanding a few squadrons of horse. should a man of this cast be put at the head of an army, he will confine himself to mere dispositions and manoeuvres; to them he will look for safety; and if once thwarted, his defeat will be inevitable, because his mind is not capable of other resources." "in order to obviate, in the best possible manner, the innumerable disasters which must arise from the uncertainty of war, and the greater uncertainty of the means that are adopted to carry it on, some general rules ought to be laid down, not only for the government of the troops, but for the instruction of those who have the command of them. the principles to be observed are: that when the line or the columns advance, their distances should be scrupulously observed; that whenever a body of troops is ordered to charge, every proportion of the line should rush forward with intrepidity and vigor; that if openings are made in the first line, it becomes the duty of the second instantly to fill up the chasms." "these instructions issue from the dictates of plain nature, and do not require the least elucidation in writing they constitute the a, b, c of soldiers. nothing can be more simple, or more intelligible; so much so, that it would be ridiculous in a general to sacrifice essential objects in order to attend to such minutiæ. his functions in the day of battle are confined to those occupations of the mind, by which he is enabled to watch the countenance of the enemy; to observe his movements, and to see with an eagle's or a king of prussia's eye, all the relative directions that his opponents take. it must be his business to create alarms and suspicions among the enemy's line in one quarter, while his real intention is to act against another; to puzzle and disconcert him in his plans; to take advantage of the manifold openings which his feints have produced, and when the contest is brought to issue, to be capable of plunging with effect upon the weakest part, and carrying the sword of death where its blow is certain of being mortal. but to accomplish these important and indispensable points, his judgment must be clear, his mind collected, his heart firm, and his eyes incapable of being diverted, even for a moment, by the trifling occurrences of the day." the _administrative service_ of an army is usually divided into several distinct departments, as-- pay department. subsistence " clothing " medical "} } these in our service are united. hospital " barrack "}these in our service are combined fuel "}in one, called the quartermaster's transportation "}department recruiting " military justice, or court martial department. it was intended to enter into the history, organization, and use of each of these civico-military departments of an army; but our limits are such as to preclude any thing like so detailed a discussion as would be necessary for a proper understanding of the subject. we therefore pass from the staff directly to the _line_ or rather the four principal arms of an army organization.[ ] [footnote : of works that treat directly of staff organization and duties, those of grimoard, thiébault, boutourlin, labaume, are esteemed among the best. the writings of jomini, napoleon, rocquancourt, vauchelle, odier, scharnhorst, also contain much valuable information on this subject. the following list of books may be referred to for further information on the subjects alluded to in this chapter: _aide-mémoire des officiers généraux et supérieurs et des capitaines._ _précis de l'art de la guerre._ jomini. _mémoires de napoléon._ montholon et gourgaud. _cours élémentaire d'art et d'histoire militaires._ rocquancourt. _cours élémentaire d'administration militaire._ vauchelle. _droite élémentaire d'art militaire, &c._ gay de vernon. _annuaire militaire historique, &c._ sicard. _cours abrégé d'administration militaire._ bernier. _cours d'administration militaire, &c._ odier. _de l'administration de l'armée d'espagne._ odier. _de l'organization de la force armée en france._ carion-nisas. _elémens de l'art militaire, &c._ cugnot. _mémoires sur la guerre._ feuquiéres. _cours d'art militaire et d'histoire._ jacquinot de presle. _cours d'art militaire._ fallot. _théorie de l'officier supérieur._ léorier. _histoire de l'administration de la guerre._ audouin. _instructions diverses a l'usage de l'école d'application du corps royal d'état-major._ _handbuch für offiziere, &c._ scharnhorst. having omitted all discussion of the several departments of the administrative service of an army organization, it is not deemed necessary to give the names of books of reference on the subjects of pay, courts-martial, medicinal and hospital departments, &c., &c.] chapter x army organization.[ ]--infantry and cavalry _infantry_.--infantry constitutes, in active service, by far the most numerous portion of an army; in time of peace its duties are simple, and, in most countries, of little comparative importance; but in our country the continually recurring difficulties on the indian frontiers, render this arm peculiarly necessary and important, even in time of general peace. from the nature of infantry service--no peculiar technical knowledge (we speak of the privates and officers of the lower grades) being so absolutely indispensable as in the other arms--the soldier may in a short time be trained and instructed in his duties. for this reason the ratio of infantry in a peace establishment is ordinarily much less than in active service, this arm being always capable of great expansion when occasion requires. [footnote : in discussing our own organization, it may be well to compare it with the armies of some of the principal nations of europe. our limits will not allow us to go very much into details, nor to make a comparison with more than a single european power. we shall select france, inasmuch as her army organization has served as a model for the rest of europe, and is still, in some respects, superior to most others.] in the early periods of society, and in countries where horses abounded, men have usually preferred fighting on horseback; but civilization and a more thorough acquaintance with war has always increased the importance of infantry. the hebrews, and also the egyptians, employed this arm almost exclusively. the asiatics generally employed both infantry and cavalry, but with the greeks the _infantry_ was the favorite arm. even their kings and generals usually fought on foot. the romans conquered the world mainly with their infantry. this arm was also considered of the greatest importance by the ancient germans and gauls; but the migration of the huns and other mongolic tribes mounted on small and fleet horses, and the acquaintance formed by the franks of northern spain with the moors, who were mounted on beautiful horses from arabia and the plateau of asia, introduced a taste for cavalry in western europe. this taste was still further cultivated under the feudal system, for the knights preferred fighting on horseback to serving on foot. during the crusades the infantry fell into disrepute. but the invention of gunpowder changed the whole system of warfare, and restored to infantry its former importance. "the romans," says napoleon in his memoirs, "had two infantries; the first, lightly armed, was provided with a missile weapon; the second, heavily armed, bore a short sword. after the invention of powder two species of infantry were still continued: the arquebusiers, who were lightly armed, and intended to observe and harass the enemy; and the pikemen, who supplied the place of the heavy-armed infantry. during the hundred and fifty years which have elapsed since vauban banished lances and pikes from all the infantry of europe, substituting for them the firelock and bayonet, all the infantry has been lightly armed...... there has been since that time, properly speaking, only one kind of infantry: if there was a company of chasseurs in every battalion, it was by way of counterpoise to the company of grenadiers; the battalion being composed of nine companies, one picked company did not appear sufficient. if the emperor napoleon created companies of voltigeurs armed like dragoons, it was to substitute them for those companies of chasseurs. he composed them of men under five feet in height, in order to bring into use that class of the conscription which measured from four feet ten inches to five feet; and having been until that time exempt, made the burden of conscription fall more heavily on the other classes. this arrangement served to reward a great number of old soldiers, who, being under five feet in height, could not enter into the companies of grenadiers, who on account of their bravery, deserved to enter into a picked company: it was a powerful incentive to emulation to bring the giants and pigmies into competition. had there been men of different colors in the armies of the emperor, he would have composed companies of blacks and companies of whites: in a country where there were cyclops or hunchbacks, a good use might be made of companies of cyclops, and others of hunchbacks." "in , the french army as composed of regiments of the line and battalions of chasseurs; the chasseurs of the cevennes, the vivarais, the alps, of corsica, and the pyrenees, who at the revolution formed half brigades of light infantry; but the object was not to have two different sorts of infantry, for they were raised alike, instructed alike, drilled alike; only the battalions of chasseurs were recruited by the men of the mountainous districts, or by the sons of the garde-chasse; whence they were more fit to be employed on the frontiers of the alps and pyrenees; and when they were in the armies of the north, they were always detached, in preference, for climbing heights or scouring a forest; when these men were placed in line, in a battle, they served very well as a battalion of the line, because they had received the same instructions, and were armed and disciplined in the same manner. every power occasionally raises, in war-time, irregular corps, under the title of free or legionary battalions, consisting of foreign deserters, or formed of individuals of a particular party or faction; but that does not constitute two sorts of infantry. there is and can be but one. if the apes of antiquity must needs imitate the romans, it is not light-armed troops that they ought to introduce, but heavy-armed soldiers, or battalions armed with swords; for all the infantry of europe serve at times as light troops." most european nations, for reasons probably similar to those of napoleon, keep up this nominal division of _infantry of the line_ and _light infantry_; but both are usually armed and equipped alike, and both receive the same organization and instruction. the light infantry are usually made up from the class of men, or district of country, which furnishes the greatest number of riflemen and sharpshooters. in france, the light infantry is best supplied by the hunters of the ardennes, the vosges, and the jura districts; in austria, by the croates and tyrolese; in prussia, by the "försters," or woodsmen; and in russia, by the cossacks. our own western hunters, with proper discipline, make the best tirailleurs in the world. light infantry is usually employed to protect the flanks of the main army, to secure outposts, to reconnoitre the ground, secure avenues of approach, deceive the enemy by demonstrations, and secure the repose of the other troops by patrolling parties. they usually begin a battle, and afterwards take their places in the line, either on the flanks, or in the intervals between the larger bodies. the battle of jena furnishes a good example of the use of french light infantry; and at the battle of waterloo, the prussian tirailleurs were exceedingly effective in clearing the ground for the advance of blücher's heavy columns. the attack of floh-hug by augereau, of vierzehn heilegen by suchet, of iserstaedt by desjardins, are models well worthy of study. the infantry of the line acts in masses, and, on the field of battle, constitutes the principal fighting force. its formations and the manner of engaging it have already been discussed under the head of tactics. the importance of infantry is due, in considerable part, to the fact that it can be used everywhere--in mountains or on plains, in woody or open countries, in cities or in fields, on rivers or at sea, in the redoubt or in the attack of the breach; the infantry depends only on itself, whereas the other arms must depend in a considerable degree on the efficiency of their materials and the will and strength of brute force; and when the snows of russia or the deserts of egypt deprive their animals of the means of sustenance, they become perfectly useless. foot-soldiers, in olden times, were armed with a spear and sometimes with a sword, arrows, lance, and sling. at present they are armed with a gun and bayonet, and sometimes with a sword. in some european services, a few of the foot-soldiers are armed with a pike. some of the light troops used as sharpshooters carry the rifle, but this weapon is useless for the great body of infantry. the short-sword is more useful as an instrument for cutting branches, wood, &c., than for actual fighting. the infantry have no defensive covering, or at least very little. the helmet or cap serves to protect the head, and the shoulders are somewhat defended by epaulets. it has often been proposed in modern times to restore the ancient defensive armor of the foot-soldier; but this would be worse than useless against fire-arms, and moreover would destroy the efficiency of these troops by impeding their movements. the strength of this arm depends greatly upon its discipline; for if calm and firm, a mass of infantry in column or in square is almost impenetrable. the bayonet was introduced by vauban in the wars of louis xiv., and after the years and ' , the pike was totally suppressed in the french army. this measure was warmly opposed by marshal montesquieu, and the question was discussed by him and marshal vauban with an ability and learning worthy of these great men. the arguments of vauban were deemed most conclusive, and his project was adopted by the king. this question has been agitated by military writers in more recent times, puységur advocating the musket, and folard and lloyd contending in favor of restoring the pike. even in our own service, so late as the war of , a distinguished general of the army strongly urged the use of the pike, and the fifteenth (and perhaps another regiment) was armed and equipped in part as _pikemen_; but experience soon proved the absurdity of the project. napoleon calls the infantry the _arm of battles_ and the _sinews of the army_. but if it be acknowledged, that, next to the talent of the general-in-chief, the infantry is the first instrument of victory, it must also be confessed that it finds a powerful support in the cavalry, artillery, and engineers, and that without these it would often be compromised, and could gain but a half success. the french infantry is divided into one hundred regiments of three battalions each, a battalion being composed of seven companies. there are also several other battalions of chasseurs, zuaves, &c., being organized especially for service in africa, and composed in part of native troops. in our own army we have eight regiments of infantry, each regiment forming a single battalion of ten companies. the flank companies are intended for light infantry. in all properly organized armies the infantry constitutes from three-fourths to four-fifths of the entire active force in the field, and from two-thirds to three-fourths, say about seven-tenths of the entire military establishment. in time of peace this proportion may be slightly diminished. _cavalry._--the use of cavalry is probably nearly as old as war itself. the egyptians had cavalry before the time of moses, and the israelites often encountered cavalry in their wars with their neighbors, though they made no use of this arm themselves until the time of solomon. the greeks borrowed their cavalry from the asiatics, and especially from the persians, who, according to xenophon, held this arm in great consideration. after the battle of platea, it was agreed by assembled greece that each power should furnish one horseman to every ten foot-soldiers. in sparta the poorest were selected for this arm, and the cavalry marched to combat without any previous training. at athens the cavalry service was more popular, and they formed a well-organized corps of twelve hundred horsemen. at thebes also this arm had consideration in the time of epaminondas. but the cavalry of thessaly was the most renowned, and both philip and alexander drew their mounted troops from that country. the romans had made but little progress in this arm when they encountered the thessalians, who fought in the army of pyrrhus. they then increased their cavalry, but it was not numerous till after their wars with the carthaginians. scipio organized and disciplined the roman cavalry like that of the numidians. this arm was supplied from the ranks of the richest citizens, and afterwards formed an order intermediary between the senate and the people, under the name of _knights_. at a later period, the cavalry of the gauls was particularly good. the franks were without cavalry when they made their first irruption into gaul. under the reign of childeric i. we see for the first time the "cavaliers francs" figure as a part of the national forces. at the battle of tours the cavalry and infantry were in the proportion of one to five, and under pepin and charlemagne their numbers were nearly equal. under charles the bald armies were composed entirely of cavalry, and during the middle ages the knights disdained the foot service, and fought only on horseback. after the introduction of artillery, cavalry was still employed, though to little advantage. gustavus adolphus was the first to perceive the real importance of this arm in modern warfare, and he used it with great success. but it was left for seidlitz to perfect it under the direction of frederick the great. marshal saxe very justly remarked, that cavalry is the "_arme du moment,_" for in almost every battle there are moments when a decisive charge of cavalry will gain the victory, but if not made at the instant it may be too late. the efficiency of cavalry depends upon the moral impression which it makes on the enemy, and is greater in proportion to the size of the mass, and the rapidity of its motion. this last quality enables a commander to avail himself immediately of a decisive moment, when the enemy exposes a weak point, or when disorder appears in his ranks. but this requires a bold and active spirit, which shrinks not from responsibility, and is able to avail itself with quickness and decision of every opportunity. if it be remembered that it is essential that this _coup d'oeil_, so rare and so difficult to acquire, be accompanied by a courage and vigor of execution which nothing can shake, we shall not be astonished that history furnishes so few good cavalry generals, and that this arm so seldom does such execution as it did under frederick and napoleon, with seidlitz and murat as commanders. the soldier gains great _velocity_ by the use of the horse in war; but in other respects he is the loser. the great expense and care required of the cavalier to support his horse; the difficulty experienced in surmounting ordinary obstacles, and in using his fire-arms to advantage, are all prejudicial to success. the unequal size of the horse, and the great diversity in his strength and breed, have rendered it necessary to divide this arm into _light_ and _heavy_ cavalry, and a mixed class called _dragoons_. the heavy cavalry is commonly used in masses where _force_ is mainly requisite; the lighter troops are used singly and in small detachments, where rapidity of movement is most desired. the _heavy_ cavalry are divided into carabiniers, cuirassiers, and sometimes lancers. the two latter are frequently united, the cuirassiers being armed with the lance. these troops are seldom used for scouts, vanguards, and convoys; but are frequently employed to sustain the light cavalry. their main duty is "_to appear on the field of battle and make the decisive charges_." the _light_ cavalry is composed of chasseurs, or troopers, hussars, and lancers. the latter, when composed of large men and mounted on heavy horses, are attached to the heavy cavalry. the _dragoons_ were formerly a mixed body of horse and foot, but it being found impossible to unite these two distinct arms in one, and the attempt having destroyed the usefulness of the body to act in either capacity, the term was applied to a mixed kind of cavalry between the heavy and the light horse. in more recent wars they have also been instructed as infantry and employed as foot-soldiers, till horses could be found in the enemy's country with which to mount them. but we believe there is no instance in more modern wars in which they have been employed at the same time in both capacities. this term is, very improperly, applied to all our cavalry; and some of the congressional wiseacres have recently experimented on one of our so-called regiments of _dragoons_, by dismounting it one year, selling its horses at auction, and changing its arms and equipments, and again, the next year, purchasing new horses, arms, and equipments for remounting it; and all this for _economy!_ the roman cavalry at first wore a round shield and helmet, the rest of their body being nearly uncovered. their arms were a sword and long thin javelin, or lance, with an iron head. they afterwards reduced the shield to a much smaller size, and made square, and their lance was greatly increased in size and length, and armed at both ends. in other respects they were armed in the same way as infantry. the use of the lance and the shield at the same time, of course rendered both nearly worthless. the roman cavalry was superior to that of their enemies, except, perhaps, the light cavalry of the parthians. the heavy armor which was sometimes worn by the ancients, like the _gens d'armes_ of the middle ages, rendered them greatly inferior to infantry in a close engagement. tigranes, king of armenia, brought an army of one hundred and fifty thousand horse into the field, against the roman general lucullus, who had only about six thousand horse and fifteen thousand foot. but the armenian cavalry, called _cataphratti_ were so overburdened with armor, that when they fell from their horses they could scarcely move or make any use of their arms. they were routed by a mere handful of roman infantry. the modern cavalry is much lighter, and, by dispensing with armor, shields, &c., it can move with much greater rapidity. a modern cavalry horse carries a weight of from two hundred and fifty to three hundred pounds, viz.: heavy light cavalry. cavalry. the rider, . . . . lbs. his arms and equipments, . . . his horse equipments, . . . two days' rations of provisions and grain, ----------------- the horse moves per minute-- at a walk, from yards to at a trot, at a gallop, but on a march over the ordinary average of good and bad roads, cavalry will walk about one hundred yards per minute, and at an easy trot, two hundred. an ordinary day's march for cavalry is about thirty miles, but on a forced march this arm can march fifty miles within the twenty-four hours. a single horseman, or a small detachment, can easily exceed this distance. "light cavalry," says napoleon, in his memoirs, "ought to reconnoitre and watch the motions of the enemy, considerably in advance of the army; it is not an appendage to the infantry: it should be sustained and protected especially by the cavalry of the line. rivalry and emulation have always existed between the infantry and cavalry: light cavalry is indispensable to the vanguard, the rearguard, and the wings of the army; it, therefore, cannot properly be attached to, and forced to follow the movements of any particular corps of infantry. it would be more natural to attach it to the cavalry of the line, than to leave it in dependence upon the infantry, with which it has no connection; but it should be independent of both." "if the light cavalry is to form vanguards, it must be organized into squadrons, brigades, and divisions, for the purpose of manoeuvring; for that is all vanguards and rearguards do: they pursue or retreat by platoons, form themselves into several lines, or wheel into column, or change their position with rapidity for the purpose of outfronting a whole wing. by a combination of such evolutions, a vanguard, of inferior numbers, avoids brisk actions and general engagements, and yet delays the enemy long enough to give time for the main army to come up, for the infantry to deploy, for the general-in-chief to make his dispositions, and for the baggage and parks to file into their stations. the art of a general of the vanguard, or of the rear-guard, is, without hazarding a defeat, to hold the enemy in check, to impede him, to compel him to spend three or four hours in moving a single league: tactics point out the methods of effecting these important objects, and are more necessary for cavalry than for infantry, and in the vanguard, or the rear-guard, than in any other position. the hungarian insurgents, whom we saw in , , and , were pitiful troops. if the light troops of maria theresa's times became formidable, it was by their excellent organization, and, above every thing, by their numbers. to imagine that such troops could be superior to wurmser's hussars, or to the dragoons of latour, or to the archduke john, would be entertaining strange ideas of things; but neither the hungarian insurgents, nor the cossacks, ever formed the vanguards of the austrian and russian armies; because to speak of a vanguard or a rear-guard, is to speak of troops which manoeuvre. the russians considered a regiment of cossacks who had been trained worth three regiments untrained. every thing about these troops is despicable, except the cossack himself, who is a man of fine person, powerful, adroit, subtle, a good horseman, and indefatigable; he is born on horseback, and bred among civil wars; he is in the field, what the bedouin is in the desert, or the barbet in the alps; he never enters a house, never lies in a bed; and he always changes his bivouac at sunset, that he may not pass a night in a place where the enemy may possibly have observed him." "two mamelukes kept three frenchmen at bay, because they were better armed, better mounted, and better exercised; they had two pairs of pistols, a _tromblon_, a carbine, a helmet with a visor, a coat of mail, several horses, and several men on foot to attend them. but a hundred french did not fear a hundred mamelukes; three hundred were more than a match for an equal number; and one thousand would beat fifteen hundred: so powerful is the influence of tactics, order, and evolutions! murat, leclerc, and lasalle, cavalry generals, presented themselves to the mamelukes in several lines: when the latter were upon the point of outfronting the first line, the second came to its assistance on the right and left; the mamelukes then stopped, and wheeled, to turn the wings of this new line: this was the moment seized for charging them; they were always broken." "the duty of a vanguard, or a rear-guard, does not consist in advancing or retiring, but in manoeuvring. it should be composed of a good light cavalry, supported by a good reserve of cavalry of the line, by excellent battalions of foot, and strong batteries of artillery: the troops must be well trained; and the generals, officers, and soldiers, should all be equally well acquainted with their tactics, each according to his station. an undisciplined troop would only embarrass the advanced guard." "it is admitted that for facility in manoeuvring, the squadron should consist of one hundred men, and that every three or four squadrons should have a superior officer." "it is not advisable for all the cavalry of the line to wear cuirasses: dragoons, mounted upon horses of four feet nine inches in height, armed with straight sabres, and without cuirasses, should form a part of the heavy cavalry; they should be furnished with infantry-muskets, with bayonets: should have the _shakot_ of the infantry, pantaloons covering the half-boot-buskin, cloaks with sleeves, and portmanteaus small enough to be carried slung across the back when the men are on foot. cavalry of all descriptions should be furnished with fire-arms, and should know how to manoeuvre on foot. three thousand light cavalry, or three thousand cuirassiers, should not suffer themselves to be stopped by a thousand infantry posted in a wood, or on ground impracticable to cavalry; and three thousand dragoons ought not to hesitate to attack two thousand infantry, should the latter, favored by their position, attempt to stop them. "turenne, prince eugene of savoy, and vendome, attached great importance to dragoons, and used them successfully. the dragoons gained great glory in italy, in and . in egypt and in spain, during the campaigns of and , a degree of prejudice sprung up against them. the divisions of dragoons had been mustered at compiegne and amiens, to be embarked without horses for the expedition of england, in order to serve on foot until they should be mounted in that country. general baraguay d'hilliers, their first inspector, commanded them; he had them equipped with gaiters, and incorporated with them a considerable number of recruits, whom he exercised in infantry manoeuvres alone. these were no longer cavalry regiments: they served in the campaign of on foot, until after the battle of jena, when they were mounted on horses taken from the prussian cavalry, three-fourths of which were unserviceable. these combined circumstances injured the dragoons; but in and their divisions acquired honor in rivalling the cuirassiers. dragoons are necessary for the support of light cavalry in the vanguard, the rear-guard, and the wings of an army; cuirassiers are little adapted for van and rearguards: they should never be employed in this service but when it is requisite to keep them in practice and accustom them to war." napoleon further recommends that light cavalry be divided into two kinds, chasseurs or troopers, and light horse; and the heavy to be composed of dragoons and cuirassiers; the troopers to be mounted on horses of ft in.; light cavalry on horses of ft. or in.; dragoons on horses of ft. in.; and cuirassiers on horses of ft. or in.; which employ horses of all kinds for mounting the troops. all cavalry must receive the same instruction; and all should be capable, in case of need, of performing any of the duties of mounted troops. the shock is the principal effect produced by this arm; therefore, the greater the velocity the greater must be this effect, provided the troops can be kept in mass. but it is found, by experience, that it is impossible to preserve them in line when put to the height of their speed. the best authorities therefore prefer, as we have said elsewhere, the charge at the trot, or at any rate the gallop should not be taken up till within a very short distance of the enemy. the charge of a compact mass at a trot is much greater than that of a wavering one at a gallop. on the field of battle the cavalry of the line is considered as the arm of the shock, to break through any corps that may be in opposition; but it is unable of itself to resist a shock, and therefore should on no account wait to receive the charge of another body of mounted troops. it was on this account that frederick directed his cavalry officers, under the severest penalties, never to receive a charge, but always to meet the attacking force half way. this is the only mode of preventing defeat. a good infantry can always sustain itself against the charges of cavalry. at the battle of auerstedt, in , davoust ordered the divisions of gudin to form squares to resist the prussian cavalry, which, by means of a fog, had gained a most advantageous position. blücher led his cavalry in repeated and impetuous charges, but all was in vain; the french infantry presented a front of iron. at the combat of krasnoi, in , the cavalry of grouchy, nansonty, and bordesoult, attacked and overthrew the dragoons of clarkof, but the russian infantry under neveroffskoi sustained itself against the repeated charges of vastly superior numbers of these french horse. at the battle of molwitz, the grenadiers sustained the charges of the enemy's cavalry, although the cavalry of the great frederick had already been completely overthrown. but when the infantry is engaged with the infantry of the enemy, the charges of cavalry are generally successful, and sometimes decide the fate of the battle, as was the case at rosbach, zornsdorf, wurtsburg, marengo, eylau, borodino, &c. cavalry may also be very efficacious against infantry in wet weather, when the rain or snow renders it impossible for the foot soldiers to use their fire-arms to advantage, as was the case with the corps of augereau, at eylau, and with the austrian left, at the battle of dresden. again, if the infantry be previously weakened, or thrown into disorder by the fire of batteries. the charge of the russian cavalry at hohenfriedberg, in , is a remarkable example of this kind. cavalry should always be immediately sustained in its efforts either by infantry or other bodies of horse; for as soon as the charge is made, the strength of this arm is for a time exhausted, and, if immediately attacked, defeat becomes inevitable. the charge of the cavalry of ney on prince hohenlohe at the battle of jena, and of the french horse on gossa at leipsic, are fine examples of the successful charges of cavalry when properly sustained. kunnersdorf and waterloo are examples of the disastrous consequences of leaving such charges without support. the choice of the field of battle is sometimes such as to render cavalry almost useless. such was the case at the battle of cassano, between the duke of vendome and the prince eugene. the field was so cut up by the adda and the canals of rittorto and pendina, that prince eugene could make no use of his horse. if, when master of the bridge of rittorto, he had been able to charge the french with a body of cavalry, there had been no doubt of his complete success. after a battle, and in the pursuit of a flying enemy, cavalry is invaluable. if napoleon had possessed a suitable number of mounted troops, with an able commander, at the battles of lutzen and ligny, the results of these victories had been decisive; whereas they were really without consequence. on the other hand, the prussian army in , after the battle of jena, and napoleon's army in at waterloo, were completely cut to pieces by the skilful use of cavalry in the pursuit of a defeated and dispirited foe. the want of good cavalry was severely felt in the war of the american revolution. had washington possessed a few good squadrons of horse, his surprise and defeat in the lines of brooklyn, and the consequent loss of new york, had never taken place. the efficient employment of a few good squadrons of cavalry might readily have prevented the defeat at bladensburg, and the loss of the capitol, in . in a well-organized army, the cavalry should be from one-fourth to one-sixth of the infantry, according to the nature of the war.[ ] [footnote : to gain a competent knowledge of the duties connected with the two arms of service mentioned in this chapter, the officer should make himself thoroughly acquainted with scott's system of infantry tactics, for the united states' infantry, or at least with major cooper's abridged edition of infantry tactics, and with the system of cavalry tactics, adopted in our army; also with the directions for the use of these two arms in a campaign, and their employment on the battle-field, given in the writings of jomini, decker, okouneff, rocquancourt, and jacquinot de presle.] the following books may be referred to for further information respecting the history, organization, use, and instruction of infantry and cavalry:-- _essai général de tactique._ guibert. _considérations générales sur l'infanterie française,_ par un général en rétraite. a work of merit. _de l'infanterie,_ par l'auteur de l'histoire de l'expédition de russie. _histoire de la guerre de la peninsule._ foy. this work contains many interesting and valuable remarks on the french and english systems of tactics, and particularly on the tactics of infantry. _cours d'art et d'histoire militaires._ jacquinot de presle. _art de la guerre._ rogniat. _instruction destinée aux troupes légères,_ &c., redigée sur une instruction de frederick ii. à ses officiers. _english infantry regulations._ _ordonnance_ (french) _pour l'exercice et les manoeuvres de l'infanterie,_ par le commission de manoeuvres. _aide-mémoires des officiers généraux et supérieurs, et des capitaines._ _essai sur l'histoire générale de l'art militaire._ carion-nisas. _histoire de la milice française._ daniel. _cours élémentaire d'art et d'histoire militaires._ rocquancourt. _traité élémentaire d'art militaire,_ &c. gay de vernon. _introduction à l'étude de l'art de la guerre._ la roche-amyou. _tactique des trois armes._ decker. _examen raisonné des trois armes,_ &c. okouneff. the last two are works of great merit. the writings of okouneff, however, are very diffuse. _instruction pour le service de l'infanterie légère._ guyard. _instruction de l'infanterie,_ &c. schauenbourg. _traité de tactique._ ternay et koch. _mécanism des manoeuvres de guerre de l'infanterie polonaise._ vroniecki. _traité sur l'infanterie légère._ beurmann. _english cavalry regulations._ _ordonnance_ (french) _sur l'exercice et les évolutions de la cavalerie._ _les troupes à cheval de france,_ &c. de bourge. _avant-postes de cavalerie légère._ brack. the author served with distinction under lassale, colbert, maison, pujol, and excelmans. _réflexions sur l'emploi de la cavalerie,_ &c. caraman. _observations sur l'ordonnance, &c., de la cavalerie._ dejean. _tactique de la cavalerie._ itier. _eléments de tactique pour la cavalerie,_ par mottin de la balme. a work of rare merit. _de l'emploi de la cavalerie à la guerre._ schauenbourg. _rémarques sur la cavalerie._ warnery. this work has long enjoyed a high reputation among the cavalry officers of the european services. the paris edition is enriched with notes by a french general officer. _nachrichten und betrachtungen über die thaten und schicksale der reiterei,_ &c. this work discusses the operations of cavalry in the campaigns of frederick the great and of napoleon, down to the battle of lutzen in . _examen du livret provisoire,_ &c. marbot. _le spectateur militaire,_ contains many essays by cavalry officers on the various questions connected with the organization and use of this arm. _die gefechtslehre der beiden verbundenen waffen-kavallerie und reitenden artillerie._ decker. _manuel de l'officier._ ruhle de lilienstern. _aide-mémoire, à l'usage des officiers de cavalerie._ _journal de l'infanterie et de la cavalerie._ _traité de tactique pour les officiers d'infanterie et de cavalerie._ _histoire des exploits et des vicissitudes de la cavalerie prussienne._ coutz. chapter xi. army organization.--artillery. _artillery_.--previous to the invention of gunpowder in the thirteenth century, the machines of war were divided between two classes of military men, the engineers (_engignours_, as they were called in the middle ages) and the artillery, (_artilliers_, as they were formerly called,) the latter being particularly charged with the management of the lighter and more portable projectile machines, such as the balistas and arco-balistas, which were used for throwing different kinds of arrows--_flêches, viretons, carreaux, matras_, &c., while the former managed the battering-rams, cranes, helipoles, &c. and, indeed, for a long time after the discovery of gunpowder, this distinction was kept up, and the artillery retained all the more ordinary projectile machines, while the engineers constructed and managed the more ponderous weapons of attack and defence. but the new artillery was gradually introduced, without, however, immediately displacing the old, and there were for a time, if we may be allowed the expression, _two_ artilleries, the one employing the old projectile machines, and the other those of the new invention. the latter were called _canoniers_, to distinguish them from the former, who still retained the name of _artilliers_. the first cannon were invented in the early part of the fourteenth century, or, perhaps, among the arabs as early as the middle of the thirteenth century, but they were not much known in europe till about . cannon are said to have been employed by the moors as early as , and by the french in . the english used artillery at the battle of crecy in . both cannon and the ancient projectile machines were employed at the siege of aiguillon in , at zara in , at rennes in , and at naples in . at this last siege the ancient balista was employed to throw into the castle of naples barrels of infectious matter and mutilated limbs of prisoners of war. we read of the same thing being done in spain at a later period. cannon in france were at first called _bombards_ and _couleuverines_, but were afterwards named from certain figures marked on them, such as _serpentines, basilisks, scorpions,_&c. in the infancy of the art they were made small, weighing only from twenty to fifty pounds, and were mounted on small moveable carriages. this species of fire-arms became quite numerous about the beginning of the fifteenth century. they were followed by heavier pieces, used in the attack and defence of towns. this siege artillery continued to be increased in dimensions till, towards the latter part of the fifteenth century, they reached such an enormous size as to be almost useless as a military machine. louis xi. had an immense piece constructed at tours, in , which, it was said, carried a ball from the bastille to charenton, (about six miles!) its caliber was that of five hundred pounds. it was intended for experiment, and burst on the second discharge. the famous culverin of bolduc was said to carry a ball from that city to bommel. the culverin of nancy, made in , was more than twenty-three feet in length. there is now an ancient cannon in the arsenal at metz of about this length, which carries a ball of one hundred and forty pounds. cannon balls were found at paris as late as , weighing near two hundred pounds, and from twelve to sixteen inches in diameter. at the siege of constantinople in , there was a famous metallic bombard which threw stone balls of an incredible size; at the siege of bourges in , a cannon was used which, it was said, threw stone balls "of the size of mill-stones." the gantois, under arteville, made a bombard fifty feet in length, whose report was heard at a distance of ten leagues! the first cannon were made of wood, and covered with sheet-iron, or embraced by iron rings: longitudinal bars of iron were afterwards substituted for the wooden form. towards the end of the fourteenth century, brass, tin, copper, wrought and cast iron, were successively used for this purpose. the bores of the pieces were first made in a conical shape, and it was not until a much later period that the cylindrical form was introduced. in the wars between the spaniards and moors in the latter part of the fifteenth century, very great use was made of artillery in sieges and battles. ferdinand the catholic had at this time, probably, a larger artillery train than any other european power. the spanish cannon, generally very large, were composed of iron bars about two inches in breadth, held together by bolts and rings of the same metal. the pieces were firmly attached to their carriages, and incapable of either horizontal or vertical movement. the balls thrown by them were usually of marble, though sometimes of iron. many of the pieces used at the siege of baza, in , are still to be seen in that city, and also the cannon balls then in use. some of the latter are fourteen inches in diameter, and weigh one hundred and seventy-five pounds. the length of the cannon was about twelve feet. these dimensions are a proof of a slight improvement in this branch of military science, which was, nevertheless, still in its infancy. the awkwardness of artillery at this period may be judged of by its slowness of fire. at the siege of zeteuel, in , five "bombards," as the heavy pieces of ordnance were then called, were able to discharge only forty shot in the course of a day; and it is noticed as a remarkable circumstance at the siege of albahar, that two batteries discharged one hundred and forty balls in the course of the twenty-four hours! in the italian wars between france and spain, in the beginning of the sixteenth century, the difficulty of moving the heavy cannon then in use was so great that only a very small number of pieces were brought upon the battle-field. at the battle of cerignola, in , the number of cannon in the french army was only thirteen. indeed, during the greater part of this century, four or five pieces were considered sufficient for an ordinary army in the field, and many agreed to the doctrine of machiavelli, that the only legitimate use of artillery was in the attack and defence of places. but in the wars of henry iv. of france, this arm of service was again increased, and the troops which this king destined against the house of austria had an artillery train of fifty pieces. great improvements were also made about this period in the manufacture of powder, and all kinds of fire-arms. sully gave greater development to this arm of service, improving its materials, and increasing its efficiency. then, as at most other periods, the french were in advance of most other nations in artillery. it was near the close of the sixteenth or the beginning of the seventeenth century, that the heavy and ill-shaped artillery began to give place to more wieldy and useful pieces. a certain m. de linar demonstrated, in the latter part of the sixteenth century, that cannon twelve feet in length would give a greater range than those seventeen feet in length, the calibre being the same; but some years elapsed before advantage was taken of this discovery. in , gustavus adolphus caused experiments to be made to verify this point, and, on being convinced of its truth, caused his batteries to be furnished with shorter and lighter pieces. this great king introduced, about the same time, a new and lighter kind of artillery, made of sheet iron and leather. each piece had its chamber formed of thin metal and embraced by strong iron rings; over these was placed a form of hardened leather, which was again encircled with rings and held compactly together. these pieces were mounted on light carriages, so that two men could easily manoeuvre them. it was said that they would fire from eight to ten rounds without requiring repairs. gustavus made use of them in all his military operations from to the time of his death. they did him excellent service on numerous occasions; being so very light they could be easily transported, and, on the field of battle, their movements could be made to conform to the movements of his troops. as cannon and small arms were gradually introduced into general use, various inventions and improvements were proposed and introduced from time to time. cannon were constructed with two or more barrels; some were arranged for being loaded in the breech, and others at the mouth of the piece; two pieces were sometimes connected by horizontal timbers, which revolved about a vertical axis, so that the recoil of one piece would bring the other into battery; and various other arrangements of this description, which have recently been revived and some of them patented as new inventions. the small arms employed at this period were much the same as those used at the present day, except the matchlock, which afterwards gave place to flint-locks. arms of this description were sometimes made to be loaded at the breach, and guns with two, three, and even as many as eight barrels, were at one time in fashion. in the _musée de l'artillerie_ at paris may be found many arms of this kind, which have been reproduced in this country and england as new inventions. in this museum are two ancient pieces, invented near the end of the sixteenth or the beginning of the seventeenth century, which very nearly correspond with _colt's patent_, with the single exception of the lock![ ] [footnote : it is not to be inferred that the modern _improvements_ (as they are called) are copied from the more ancient _inventions_. two men of different ages, or even of the same age, sometimes fall upon the same identical discovery, without either's borrowing from the other.] the _materiel_ of artillery employed in modern warfare is divided into two general classes: st. _siege artillery_, or such as is employed in the attack and defence of places. d. _field artillery_, or such as is used in battle, or in the field-operations of an army. . _siege artillery_ is composed of _mortars, large howitzers, paixhan guns_ or _columbiads_,[ ] and _all cannon_ of _a large calibre._ in our service this class of ordnance includes the twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty-two, and forty-two-pounder guns, the eight, ten, and thirteen-inch mortars, the sixteen-inch stone mortar, the twenty-four-pounder coehorn mortar, the twenty-four-pounder carronade, and the eight, ten, and twelve-inch howitzers. [footnote : these pieces were first invented by colonel bomford, of the u.s. army, and used in the war of . the dimensions of these guns were first taken to europe by a young french officer, and thus fell into the hands of general paixhan, who immediately introduced them into the french service. they were by this means first made known to the rest of europe, and received the name of the person who introduced them into the european services, rather than that of the original inventor. all these facts are so fully susceptible of proof, that europeans now acknowledge themselves indebted to us for the invention; even general paixhan gives up all claim to originality in his gun, and limits himself to certain improvements which he introduced. the original gun, which was invented by colonel bomford, and whose dimensions were carried to general paixhan in france, is now lying at the ordnance dépôt, in new york harbor.] all these, except the smaller mortars, are made of cast iron. this substance is less tenacious than wrought iron or bronze, and the cannon made of it are, on this account, much heavier than of the other materials; but for the naval service, and the attack and defence of fortifications, the weight required to secure the necessary strength is not very objectionable. wrought iron and bronze are much more expensive and less durable. moreover, the difficulty of forging wrought iron in masses of sufficient size has been such as to prevent its being brought into general use for artillery. numerous attempts have been made, at different periods, to construct large guns of this material, but none have yet been successful. improvements which are now making in the manufacture of wrought iron, may render this the preferable material for the smaller pieces of artillery; but the best informed military men deem it objectionable for the heavier cannon, both on account of its cost and the imperfection of its manufacture. even should the latter objection be removed, its cost must prevent its general application to the construction of siege artillery. charlatans in military science, both in this country and in europe, bring this subject up every fifteen or twenty years as a new _invention_, and flaming notices of the _improvement_, and predictions of the revolution it is to effect in the art of war, are circulated in the newspapers to "gull" a credulous public; and after some fifty or one hundred thousand dollars have been squandered on some court-favorite, the whole matter ends in the explosion of the "_improvement_," and probably the destruction of the "_inventor_," and perhaps also of his spectators. let us be distinctly understood on this subject. there may be _inventions_ and _improvements_ in the manufacture of wrought iron, but there is nothing _new_ in its _application_ to the construction of cannon, for it has been used for this purpose as long ago as the first invention of the art. . _field artillery_ is composed of the smaller guns and howitzers. in our service this class of cannon includes the six and twelve-pounder guns, and the twelve and twenty-four-pounder howitzers. all these are now made of bronze. this material is more expensive than cast-iron, but its superior tenacity renders it more useful where great weight is objectionable. improvements in the manufacture of cast iron may render it safe to employ this metal in the construction of field-pieces. it is also possible the wrought iron may be forged in masses large enough, and the cost be so reduced as to bring it into use for field-pieces. it is here important to combine strength with lightness, and additional expense may very properly be incurred to secure this important object. the _projectiles_ now in use are solid shot, shells, strap-shot, case or canister-shot, grape-shot, light and fire-balls, carcasses, grenades, and rockets. _solid shot_ are now almost invariably made of cast iron,[ ] formed in moulds of sand or iron. this projectile is used under almost every circumstance, whether in the battle-field or in the attack and defence of places, and is the only one that is effectual against the stone walls of forts. _hot shot_ are used against shipping and wooden structures of every description. red-hot balls were first employed by the king of poland, in , but, on account of the difficulty of heating them with rapidity, and the danger of loading the piece with them, this kind of projectile was not in general use till a much later period. it was at first supposed that the expansion of the metal would be so great, when heated to a red or white heat, as to prevent the ball from entering the piece; it is found, however, that the windage is still sufficient for loading with facility. these red-hot balls are principally used to fire wooden buildings, ships, and other combustible matter. they are therefore much used as a projectile for coast defence, and all fortifications on the seaboard should be provided with furnaces and grates, arranged so as to heat them with facility and rapidity. [footnote : in mexico, where iron is scarce, copper is used for shot and shells; but it is a poor substitute.] there are several kinds of _hollow-shot_ and _shells_, called _bombs, howitzes, grenades_, &c. they are made of cast iron, and usually in a spherical shape, the cavity being concentric with the exterior surface. the cavity was formerly made eccentric with the exterior, under the belief that the heavier side would always strike first. the rotary motion of the shell during its flight rendered this precaution of no use. fire is communicated to the combustible matter within the shell by means of a fuse, which is so regulated that the explosion shall take place at the desired moment. hollow-shot are used with advantage to destroy ordinary buildings, ships, earthwork, and thin walls of masonry; they, however, are of little avail in breaking the massive walls of well-constructed forts. howitzes and grenades are particularly effective against cavalry and columns of infantry, and are much employed on the battle-field; they are also much used in the attack and defence of places. we find that as early as the spaniards made use of a projectile similar to the modern bomb. "they threw from their engines large globular masses, composed of certain inflammable ingredients mixed with gunpowder, which, scattering long trains of light," says an eye-witness, "in their passage through the air, filled the beholders with dismay, and descending on the roofs of edifices, frequently occasioned extensive conflagration." in the siege of constantinople by mahomet ii., shells were used, and also mortars of enormous size. in valturus proposed to throw, with a kind of mortar, "globes of copper filled with powder." in , an artificer of venloo burned wachtendeck by throwing bombs into the place. a similar attempt had just been made at berg-op-zoom. the use of this projectile became quite common in france under louis xiii. howitzes were not much used till the seventeenth century. they are of german origin, and the howitzer first bore the name of _hausmitz_. the _strap-shot_ consists of a round ball attached to a _sabot_ of the same calibre, by means of two strips of tin passing over the shot at right angles, and fastened to a third, which is soldered around the sabot. one end of the sabot is arranged for attaching it to the cartridge, the other being hollowed out to receive the shot. the supposed advantages of this arrangement are, st, a diminution of the windage; d, the gun may be loaded with greater rapidity; and, d, the cartridge is transported with greater safety. the _case_ or _canister-shot_ is prepared by filling a tin canister with grape-shot or musket-balls, and attaching it to the cartridge by means of a sabot. there being two sizes of grape-shot, and one of musket-balls, we have three kinds of canister-shot calculated to reach at different distances. the three sizes of shot are frequently mixed in the same canister. this projectile is particularly effective against lines of infantry and cavalry, when the distance is short. the _grape-shot_ is composed of small balls arranged round an upright pin attached to a plate of wood or iron. the concave cast-iron plate is preferable, as it increases the range of the shot. the balls are covered with canvass, and thoroughly confined by a quilting of strong twine. this shot is used for the same purposes as the canister. _light_ and _fire-balls_ are formed of an oval case of sacking, filled with combustible matter, and attached to a culot of cast-iron. the whole is covered with a net of spun-yarn. light-balls are used to light up our own works, and are not armed; fire-balls being employed to light up the works or approaches of an enemy, it is necessary to arm them with pistol-barrels, in order to prevent, any one from extinguishing them. when made of very combustible materials, and used for setting fire to wooden structures, they are denominated _incendiary balls_. _carcasses_ are employed for the same purpose as incendiary balls; they are of two kinds: st, the _shell-carcass_; and, d, the _ribbed-carcass_. the first is composed of a spherical shell, cast with five fuse-holes, one being at the top, and the other four in a plane perpendicular to this and at right angles with each other; the shell is filled with matter highly combustible. the second is formed of iron ribs connected by iron straps, and attached at the ends to culots of the same material, the whole being filled with combustible composition. this is more expensive than the shell carcass, and cannot be fired with as great accuracy; it is now seldom used. carcasses may be armed in the same manner as fire-balls. _smoke_ and _suffocating balls_ are used to drive an enemy from galleries and mines. they are thrown by hand. the _personnel_ of the french artillery was for a long time retained, together with the engineers, under the general direction of the "grand master of cross-bows." in the master-general of artillery was made independent of the grand-master of cross-bows; but previous to the reign of louis xiv., the artillery troops had no organization as a separate corps. in six companies of _canoniers_ were created, and soon after two companies of _bombardiers_. in the first regiment of fusiliers was changed into a _royal regiment of artillery_, and both the canoniers and bombardiers were eventually incorporated with it. the staff of artillery, towards the close of this reign, was composed of one grand-master, sixty lieutenants, sixty commissaries, and eighty _officiers-pointeurs_. in the artillery was divided into five battalions and stationed at metz, strasbourg, grenoble, perpignan, and la fère, where they established schools of theory and practice. in the artillery was organized into seven regiments, each regiment having its own separate school. this organization continued without any remarkable change till the revolution. during the earlier campaigns of the french revolution it is impossible to trace out the changes that took place in army organization, every thing was then so irregular and confused, the troops of different arms being frequently united together. in the campaign of there were some six or seven regiments of foot artillery, and ten companies of horse. this arm was greatly increased during the subsequent campaigns, and its organization was completely remodelled by napoleon on his elevation to the head of the government. the _personnel_ of the artillery was then composed of a general staff, nine regiments of foot and six of horse. in it was reduced to eight regiments of foot and four of horse. the _personnel_ of artillery in modern army organization is divided into four classes: the _staff, guards, artificers,_ and _troops_. i. the _staff_, or _ordnance_, as it is called in our service, is charged with the construction of all the materials of artillery, and the collection of powder and military stores. as the lives of persons using these materials, and, in a considerable degree, the success of war, depend upon the nature and quality of the stores thus manufactured and collected, it is obvious that the members of this branch of the artillery service should possess high and peculiar qualifications. in the french army the artillery staff is composed of two hundred and eighty-three officers of different grades: also twenty-four officers of the general staff are attached to this service. in our army the _ordnance_ is composed of twenty-eight officers of different grades. ii. _artillery-guards._--these in our service are divided into two classes: st. _military store-keepers._ d. _ordnance sergeants._ both are alike charged with the care and preservation of the artillery property and stores at the several garrisons, arsenals, and magazines. in our army we have fifty-eight of these guards, viz: fifteen commissioned military store-keepers, and forty-three ordnance sergeants. we seldom have more than this number of permanent posts; each one can therefore be supplied with an artillery guard for the care of the artillery stores. in the french service there are three hundred and fifteen of these artillery guards; they are divided into three classes. iii. _artificers._--this class of men are employed in the construction and repairs of military materials. in most of our arsenals and armories it is thought to be best to employ unenlisted workmen, by the piece or contract. nevertheless a limited number of enlisted men of this description are found to be both useful and necessary. we have three hundred and thirty of these in our army, viz: two hundred and fifty enlisted "ordnance men," and eighty "artificers" attached to the regiments. in the french army they have for the service of the arsenals and establishments, one hundred and forty-nine "ouvriers," and twelve "artificers;" there are also three hundred and sixty "ouvriers" and seventeen "armuriers" attached to the corps of artillery, making in all five hundred and thirty-eight. iv. _artillery troops._--artillery, as an arm of service, is divided in the same manner as its _materiel_; the _field_-artillery being intended for field service, and the garrison or _siege_-artillery, for the attack and defence of places. the troops of the artillery corps of a modern army usually do duty either in the field, or in sieges, or garrison, as occasion may require. when employed in the service of a campaign, artillery is usually divided into two classes: st. _foot_ artillery; and d. _horse_ artillery. in the early history of artillery, as has already been shown, but few pieces were ever brought upon the battle-field. charles viii. crossed the alps with a pretty large train; but a part of these were hand-guns, and but very few of the larger pieces were ever brought into battle; indeed, it was then thought that this arm would be of little use except in sieges. at the battle of gravelines the army of philip ii. had only seventeen pieces of artillery; and at the battle of ivry the french had only four pieces of cannon, and two culverins: the army of the league had also only four pieces. at the battle of moncontour the opposing armies had but eight pieces each. gustavus adolphus of sweden not only improved the character of artillery, but also gave to it great development as an arm of service. at the battle of bréetenfield he had one hundred pieces of artillery, great and small, and at the camp of nuremberg he numbered about three hundred. this king also made a more skilful use of his cannon by uniting them more in mass than had been done by his predecessors; his system was nevertheless very imperfect. in the disposition of this arm on the field of battle, a vast improvement was made by condé, turenne, and prince eugene of savoy. frederick the great also made great use of this arm, and was the first to introduce horse artillery. this mode of using field-pieces has peculiar properties which in many circumstances render it an invaluable arm. the promptness and rapidity of its movements enable it to act with other troops without embarrassing them. the french soon introduced into their army the improvements made by the king of prussia, and in the celebrated gribeauval appeared. he improved the form of the cannon and greatly diminished the weight of field artillery, giving it an organization which has been but slightly changed since his time. the successive improvements in artillery have for a long time constituted a prominent feature in war. the power of this arm to throw projectiles to a great distance, and to overturn and destroy opposing obstacles, renders it a necessary arm on the battle-field, and a strong barrier and safeguard of states. it is an essential element in all army organization. in our army we have four regiments of artillery, forming the basis of forty batteries. in the french service there are fourteen regiments, forming the basis of two hundred and six field batteries. the term _battery_, when applied to artillery as an arm of service, refers to a permanent organization of a certain number of cannon, with the men and other accessaries required to serve them. this is the unit of force in this arm. the regimental organization is a mere nominal arrangement, for in actual service artillery acts by batteries, and never by regiments. its strength is therefore invariably estimated by the number of its batteries. a battery is ordinarily composed of six pieces, two of them being howitzers. the lighter batteries would, in our service, be formed of six-pounder guns and twelve-pounder howitzers; and the heavier of twelve-pounder guns and twenty-four-pounder howitzers. these heavy batteries would usually form the reserve. each piece being attended by its caisson, this formation would give twelve carriages to each battery, six for the guns and six for the caissons. the extra caissons form a part of the reserve, and move with the train. in some foreign services a battery is composed of eight pieces with their caissons. this arm admits of three formations--_in column, in battle_, and _in battery_. in column it ordinarily moves by sections of two pieces, each piece being followed or preceded by its caisson. columns of half-batteries are sometimes formed, and also columns of single pieces; but the latter ought never to be employed except in cases of necessity in passing a narrow defile, and at a distance from the enemy. in order of battle, the pieces are drawn up in line, their caissons forming a second line, at the distance of a few paces. when in order of battery, the pieces are formed in the same way as for battle, except that the guns are directed towards the enemy and prepared for firing. the movements and manoeuvres of foot artillery correspond with those of infantry, and of mounted artillery with those of cavalry, a battery being regarded as a battalion or squadron, of which the pieces form the platoons. mounted batteries can seldom move with greater rapidity than the trot, except in cases of emergency, and even then the gallop can be kept up only for a very short time; but this is of no great importance, as the batteries never accompany cavalry in the charge. the french and german writers discuss artillery as employed in battle, under two distinct heads-- st, as an arm of preparation, and d, as an arm of succor. i. as an arm of preparation it serves, st, to protect the deploying of the other troops; d, to disorganize the enemy's masses, and to facilitate the action of infantry and cavalry, by weakening the intended points of attack; d, to force an enemy to evacuate a position by overthrowing obstacles with which he has covered himself; th, to keep up the action till the other troops can be prepared to strike the decisive blow. the force of this arm depends upon the rapidity and accuracy of its fire; rash valor is therefore far less desirable in artillery than skill, patience, and cool courage. artillery always acts at a distance, and in mass; single pieces are seldom employed, except to cover reconnoitring parties, or to sustain the light infantry in a skirmish. mounted batteries sometimes approach within two or three hundred yards of the enemy's infantry; but this is only done with a strong support of other troops, and to prepare the way for a charge of cavalry. the batteries do not accompany the charge, but they should always follow up and complete the success; mounted batteries are particularly useful in pursuit. if murat, in , had accompanied his attacks upon neveroffskoi's retreating columns of sixty thousand infantry by two or three batteries of mounted artillery, the whole column must have been captured or destroyed. artillery, on the field of battle, is very liable to allow its fire to be drawn, and its projectiles wasted, while the enemy is at too great a distance to be reached. it is a very common thing in a battle, to employ two or three pieces of heavy calibre at the beginning of the fight, in order to provoke the opposing batteries to open their fire before the proper time. the waste of material is not the only loss attending this error; the troops are fatigued and disheartened, while the courage and confidence of their opponents are always revived by a weak and inaccurate fire. to avoid such an error the commanding officer of a battery of artillery should be perfectly familiar with the effective ranges of his pieces, and accustomed to form a correct estimate of distances. for this purpose the eye should be frequently practised in time of peace in estimating the ranges for different calibres. the effective range of a -pounder field-piece is about . . . . . . yds. " " " " " " " " " " " " howitzer, " " " " " " " " " " " " grape and case shot is from . . . . . . to " even at these distances the aim is usually so inaccurate that a large portion of the projectiles are lost. in the attack on spires, a whole column of artillery expended its fire while at a distance of yards from the enemy, who, of course, received little or no injury. in firing from fortifications, the aim is far more accurate, and the artillery may therefore be employed to advantage as soon as the enemy comes within the longest range. ii. as an arm of succor, the artillery serves, st, to give impulsive force to the attacking columns; d, to assist in arresting, or at least in retarding, the offensive movements of an enemy; d, to protect the avenues of approach, and to defend obstacles that cover a position; and, th, to cover a retrograde movement. mounted artillery is, like cavalry, much the most effective in attack; but batteries of foot are better calculated for defence. the cannoniers are so armed as to be capable of defending their pieces to the last extremity; they therefore cannot be easily captured by opposing columns of infantry. "as to pretending to rush upon the guns," says napoleon, "and carry them by the bayonet, or to pick off the gunners by musketry, these are chimerical ideas. such things do sometimes happen; but have we not examples of still more extraordinary captures by a _coup de main?_ as a general rule, there is no infantry, however intrepid it may be, that can, without artillery, march with impunity the distance of five or six hundred toises, against two well-placed batteries ( pieces) of cannon, served by good gunners; before they could pass over two-thirds of the way, the men would be killed, wounded, or dispersed. * * * * a good infantry forms, no doubt, the sinews of an army; but if it were required to fight for a long time against a very superior artillery, its good quality would be exhausted, and its efficiency destroyed. in the first campaigns of the wars of the revolution, what france had in the greatest perfection was artillery; we know not a single instance in which twenty pieces of cannon, judiciously placed, and in battery, were ever carried by the bayonet. in the affair at valmy, at the battles of jemmapes, nordlingen, and fleurus, the french had an artillery superior to that of the enemy, although they had often only two guns to one thousand men; but that was because their armies were very numerous. it may happen that a general, more skilful in manoeuvring, more expert than his adversary, and commanding a better infantry, may obtain successes during a part of a campaign, although his artillery may be far inferior to that of his opponent; but on the critical day of a general engagement, his inferiority in point of metal will be severely felt." history furnishes us numerous examples of the use of artillery in protecting avenues of approach:--such as the defile of köesen at the battle of auerstedt; the avenues between the redoubts of pultowa, &c., &c. when an army is forced to retreat, it covers its rear by that portion of its cavalry and mounted artillery which has suffered least during the battle. by placing the squadrons of horse and the light batteries in echelon, the retiring column may be well protected. the artillery, by using the prolonge, may also continue its retreat while in battery and firing. it was in this way that at the battle of albuera, in , the french artillery on the left wing held in check the right and centre of the anglo-spaniards till the army effected its retreat; the artillery then retired in echelons, by batteries and fractions of batteries, under the protection of the cavalry. we have already discussed, under the general head of tactics, the position and use of artillery on the battle-field a few additional remarks must suffice. as a general rule, batteries should be placed in positions from which they can employ their fire to advantage, and also be free to move in any direction that the progress of the battle may require. advantage should always be taken of natural or artificial obstacles, such as hedges, clumps of trees, logs, mounds of earth, &c., to cover and conceal the guns till the moment they open their fire. elevated positions are, contrary to the common opinion, generally unfavorable, for artillery cannot fire to advantage at any considerable angle of depression. the slopes in front should be of considerable length, otherwise the balls would do very little execution upon that portion of the column of attack which occupied the valley. the ground should also be smooth, for if rough the balls will either bury themselves in the earth, or ricochet at a high angle of deflection, thus destroying a considerable part of the effect of the fire. the counterforts or spurs of hills are favorable for artillery, as they enable it to see, with an enfilading fire, the slopes of the principal range. batteries should seldom be placed so as to fire over other troops, for they will not only be intimidated by this fire, but also exposed to the opposing fire of the enemy's artillery. a large number of pieces should never be crowded into the same place, but an interval should be left between the guns of forty or fifty feet, according to the locality. the most favorable position for this arm in ordinary ground, is in the intervals between the regiments or brigades of the line, and far enough in advance of this line not to draw upon the other troops the fire of the enemy's artillery. the flanks of the line are also favorable for the action of this arm. sometimes artillery has been employed to form a part of the line of battle; but such instances are exceptions, and can never be comprised in general rules. whenever this disposition has been made, it has resulted from the defective character of the other arms, or from some peculiar circumstance in the battle which enabled a bold and skilful commander to deviate from the ordinary rules of tactics. such was the case with napoleon at wagram. in saxony, in , he was several times obliged to substitute his artillery to supply the want of other arms. in the defence and attack of field-works, and in the passage of rivers, artillery plays an important and indispensable part; but it here becomes an auxiliary to the dispositions of the engineers, or at least acts in concert with that arm. the troops of artillery, in all well-regulated army organizations, should equal about two-thirds of the cavalry, or one-seventh of the infantry.[ ] [footnote : to qualify himself for the duties connected with his arm of service, the artillery officer must make himself thoroughly acquainted with--. _the instruction for united states field artillery, horse and foot; capt. anderson's instruction for garrison artillery; kinsley's notes on pyrotechny; knowlton's notes on gunpowder_,&c.; and the writings of thiroux and piobert on theoretical and practical instruction, and the writings of jomini, decker, and okotmeff, on the use of this arm on the field of battle. the following list of books of reference may be of use to those who wish to make themselves perfectly familiar with all the branches of artillery. _histoire général de l'artillerie_. brunet. _l'artillerie à cheval dans les combats de cavalerie_. par un officier de l'artillerie prussienne. _considérations et experiences sur le tir des obus à bulles_. bormann. _essai sur les obusiers_. dusaert. _essai sur l'organisation de l'artillerie_. le bourg. _traité sur l'artillerie_, (traduit de l'allemand.) rouvroy. _bombardier français_. bélidor. _mémoires d'artillerie_. st. rémy. _essai sur l'usage de l'artillerie dans la guerre de campagne et celle de siége_. dupuget. _mémoires sur les nouveaux systèmes d'artillerie_. st. aubin. _treatise on artillery_. müller. _artificial fire-works_. jones. _table de tir les canons et obusiers_. lombard. _on gunpowder_. antoni. _recherches sur l'artillerie en général_. texier de norbec. _déscription de l'art de fabriquer les canons_. monge. _procédés de la fabrication des armes blanches_. vandermonde. _manuel de l'artilleur_. durtubie. _traité du mouvement des projectiles_. lombard. _treatise on artillery_. scheel. (translated from the german.) _traité pratique des feux d'artifice_. morel. _manuel du canonnier marin_. cornibert. _new principles of gunnery_. robins. _mémoires sur la fabrication des armes portatives_. cotty. _recherches sur la poudre_. cossigny. _supplement_. cossigny. _fabrication de la poudre_. renaud. _american artillerist's companion_. toussard. _tables des portées des canons et canonades de la marine_. cornilwert. _traité d'artifices de guerre_. bigot. _traité élémentaire de la fabrication des bouches à feu_. dartein. _traité de l'art de fabriquer la poudre à canon_. bottée et riffault. _l'art du salpétrier_. bottée et riffault. _dictionary of artillery_. hoyer. (german.) _new experiments on gunnery_. hutton--(hutton's tracts.) _des bois propres au service des arsenaux_. herbin de halles. _instruction sur le service de l'artillerie_. hulot. _manoeuvres de force_. bigot. _balistique_. obenheim. _treatise on artillery_. german. scharnhorst. (translated into french, .) _essai sur l'art de pointer_. poumet. _réflexions sur la fabrication des bouches à feu_. lamartillière. _mémoire sur la planchette du canonnier_. obenheim. _aide-mémoire_. gassendi. _observations on the use of artillery at the sieges of badajos, st. sebastian, &c_. _treatise on artillery_. lallemand. _elémens de pyrotechnie_. ruggieri. _nouvelle force maritime_. paixhans. _dictionnaire d'artillerie_. cotty. _recherches balistiques_. coste. _poudres fulminantes_. vergnaud. _manuel de la métallurgie du fer_. culman. _pyrotechnic militaire,_ (traduit de l'allemand, par r. de peretsdorff.) _journal des sciences militaires_. _pyrotechny_. cutbush. _traité élémentaire d'artillerie_. decker. _fusées de guerre_. montgery. _documens sur la matière à canons_. hervé. _observations sur le nouveau système d'artillerie_. allix. _système d'artillerie de campagne_. allix. _pocket gunner_. adye. _on the rocket system_. congreve. _essai sur l'art des fontes_. serres. _receuil de mémoires sur la poudre à canon_. proust. _mémorial de l'artilleur marin_. michel. _observations sur le nouveau système de l'artillerie_. poumet. _mémorial d'artillerie_. _british gunner_. spearman. _régles de pointage à bord des vaisseaux_. montgery. _manuel du maître de forges_. landrin. _naval gunnery_. douglass. _métallurgie du fer_ (traduit de l'allemand, par culman.) karsten. _aide-mémoire à l'usage des officers d'artillerie_. (strasbourg.) _traité de l'organisation et de la tactique de l'artillerie,_ (traduit de l'allemand par peretsdorff.) grewenitz. _supplement au dictionnaire d'artillerie_. cotty. _memoir on gunpowder_. braddock. _manuel de l'armurier_. paulin-desormeaux. _journal des armes spéciales_. _cours sur le service des officiers dans les fonderies_. serres. _expériences sur la fabrication et la durée des bouches à feu en fer et bronze,_ (traduit de l'allemand par peretsdorff.) meyer. _applications du fer aux constructions de l'artillerie_. thierry. _aide-mémoire d'art militaire_. lebas. _mémorial à l'usage de l'armée belge_. _instructions and regulations for the service and management of heavy ordnance in the british service_. _experiences sur les principes du tir,_ faites à metz, en . _traité d'artillerie théorique et pratique_. piobert. _aide-mémoire à l'usage des officiers d'artillerie,_ (avec approbation du comité d'artillerie.) _manuel d'artillerie à l'usage des officiers de la république helvétique._ bonaparte, (napoleon louis.) _expériences comparatives entre des bouches à feu en fonte de fer, d'origine franzaise, anglaise et suédoise,_ faites à gavres, en . _expériences faites à brest en_ , _sur les canons._ paixhans. _essai sur l'organisation de l'artillerie._ le bourg. _expériences sur des projectiles creux,_ faites en , ' , ' . _instruction pratique sur l'emploi des projectiles,_ (traduit de l'allemand par peretsdorff.) decker. _effects of heavy ordnance as applied to ships of war._ simmons. _expériences sur les poudres de guerre,_ faites à esquerdes, en , ' , ' , and ' . maguin. _cours d'artillerie à l'usage des sous-officiers._ de crépy. _instruction théorique et pratique d'artillerie,_ à l'usage des élèves de st. cyr. thiroux. _cours sur le service des officiers d'artillerie dans les forges._ _manuel historique de la technologie des armes à feu,_ (traduit de l'allemand par m. rieffel.) meyer. _formules rélatives aux effets du tir sur affût._ poisson. _manuel de l'artificer._ vergnaud. _etat actuel de l'artillerie de campagne de toutes les puissances de l'europe,_ (traduit par mazé; ire partie, artillerie anglaise.) jacobi. (six other parts have been published in german, containing descriptions of the french, belgian, hessian, wirtemburg, nassau, and swedish systems.) _introduction à l'étude de l'artillerie._ madelaine. _cours sur le service des officiers d'artillerie dans les fonderies. description de la fabrication des bouches ù feu à la fonderie royale de liège._ huguenin. _poudre ù canon._ timmerhans. _procédés de fabrication dans les forges,_ (extrait du cours sur le service des officiers dans les forges.) _renseignements sur le matériel de l'artillerie navale de la grande bretagne._ zeni et des hays. _théorie des affûts et des voitures de l'artillerie._ migout et bergery _artillerist's manual._ griffith. _handbuch für die k.k. oesterreichische artillerie offiziere,_ (manual for the austrian artillery officers.) _sammlung von steindruckzeichnungen der preussischen artillerie,_ _mit erläuterungen_, (collection of plates of the prussian artillery, with explanatory text.) _histoire des fusées de guerre._ _ordnance manual_, for the use of the officers of the united states army. _experiments on gunpowder_. capt. mordecai. _pyrotechny_, for the use of the cadets at the united states military academy. kinsley. _notes on gunpowder, percussion powder, cannon, and projectiles_. lt. knowlton.] chapter xii. army organization--engineers. _engineers_.--the term _engineer_ is derived from the unclassical latin word _ingenium_, which was applied both to a _machine_ and the _mind_ or _skill_ of the person who devised or constructed it. it was philip augustus, say the french writers, who first introduced engineers (_engigneurs_, or _engignours_, as they were called) into france, and restored the art of sieges. the engineers of that age were seldom charged with the construction of works of military defence, but, like archimedes at syracuse, and longinus at palmyra, they directed their attention principally to devising implements of war and the most effective manner of using them. engines of war were at that time divided between the _engigneurs_ and the _artilliers_; the former being charged with the heavier machines, and the latter with the smaller weapons used for throwing projectiles. after the invention of gunpowder, the old battering-rams, cranes, helipoles, &c., disappeared, and with them the _engigneurs_, or masters of engines. the new inventions were united with the few old projectile machines that remained in the artillery, and the engineers were for a time left almost without employment. the revival of the art of fortification was very slow, and the modern system scarcely began to be developed till near the sixteenth century. we must omit for the present giving even an outline of the history of military engineering, and pass to the troops of this arm, as constituting an essential element of an army organization. the subject of fortification, and the history of its various changes, will be examined in the next chapter. the engineers, in modern army organization, constitute the fourth arm of service, as, compared with artillery, their relative numbers are about as two to three. they are divided in the same manner as the artillery, viz.:-- st, the staff; d, guards, or fort-keepers; d, artificers; and th, the troops. i. the officers constituting the staff of this corps are charged in time of peace with planning, constructing, and repairing all fortifications and other defensive works; the construction and preparation of all military materials, and stores connected with this arm; and (in our service) with the disbursements of money connected with these operations: in time of war they are charged with the attack and defence of military works, the laying out and construction of field defences, redoubts, intrenchments, roads, &c.; in the attack they form a part of the vanguard, to remove obstructions; and in retreat they form a part of the rear-guard, to erect obstacles, destroy roads, bridges, &c., so as to retard an enemy's pursuit. from the important character of these duties as connected with the means essential to a national defence, and the vast amount of money expended in these operations, it is evident that a high order of acquirements should be deemed necessary to qualify one to perform the duties of a military engineer. this officer requires a knowledge of chemistry, to guide his choice of materials for mortars, cements, and mastics; of mineralogy and geology, for selecting stone; of botany, for timber and the means of preventing its decay; of mathematics, in laying out his work and calculating the thickness and stability of his walls, embankments, &c.; of mechanical philosophy, in constructing his machinery; of military engineering, in his plans of fortifications; and of all the higher branches of military science, in selecting positions for these works, such that they shall have the proper relations to the means of national defence, and to the grand operations of armies in the field. the avenues to appointment to this corps are guarded, in most european armies, with special care, to prevent the influence of money, politics, or family connections; and in our own army it is now specified by law of congress, that the vacancies shall be filled only from the most distinguished graduates of the military academy. formerly our service suffered most severely from the employment of incompetent persons, introduced through political influence from civil life, and foreign charlatans, the refuse of european armies. many of our earlier military works (as will be mentioned hereafter) were modelled upon systems for a long time discarded by the profession in europe, and even some of those which have been constructed within the last thirty years are made of such wretched materials and workmanship, that they are already crumbling into ruins. while the existing laws and regulations seem well calculated to prevent the recurrence of similar abuses and errors, it nevertheless can be shown that the organization of this arm of our service requires modifications and extensions to give it the requisite degree of efficiency, and to economize the public expenditures. the wars of louis xiv. first led to a regular military organization, and a regular system of defence. in these wars the engineers received great development, and have ever since occupied a prominent position as parts of an army organization. we therefore find in all the great sieges and battles of this era a large and continually increasing number of engineers and engineer troops, this force being gradually augmented as the true principles of war became better understood, and as the wants of the service required. even in the earliest of these battles we find the engineers taking a prominent and distinguished part. in the war of , twenty-four engineers were killed and wounded at the siege of philipsbourg, eighteen at namur, eight at huy, ten at charleroi, eight at ath, thirty at barcelona, &c. such losses were good proofs of the usefulness of these officers, and before this war was closed, their number was increased to six hundred; and in the army contained eight brigades of engineers and four companies of miners. the engineer corps being partially disbanded in the early part of the french revolution, great difficulty was experienced in reorganizing it and in finding competent men to supply the places of those who had been driven into exile or sacrificed during the reign of terror. energy and activity, combined with republican zeal, could supply the place of skill in the other arms, but the science of the engineer could not be acquired in a day. in , the staff of the engineer corps consisted of four hundred and forty-nine officers, without including the general officers, commanding departments, or those connected with the engineer troops. the same organization was continued in . the engineer staff of the french army now numbers four hundred and thirty-two officers. we have in our service forty-three engineer officers, for staff duty, who are now engaged in the construction and repairs of some sixty or seventy fortifications, and other works of a civil and military character. ii. _engineer guards_, or _fort-keepers_, are a class of men charged with the general care of forts, and all public property deposited in the several engineer dépôts and garrisons, and in the public works during their construction. there are five hundred and fifty of these "_gardes du genie_" in the french army, who rank next the sub-lieutenants of engineers, and are assimilated with the sub-lieutenants of infantry in the hospitals, marches, &c. _in our service we have no engineer guards or fort-keepers._ this defect in our organization has been the cause of serious inconvenience, and the consequent waste of public property. the expense of hiring civil agents for this purpose has more than trebled the cost of supporting a suitable number of non-commissioned guards to maintain the good order and efficiency of our forts, in the absence of engineer officers, and to preserve and keep in repair the military implements and stores connected with this department of the army. it has already been shown that we have fifty-eight of these guards for the artillery service, and it really seems somewhat singular that the engineers, with a much greater amount of public property in their charge, are allowed no assistants of this kind. iii. _engineer artificers_ are a class of men employed in the practical operations of constructing forts and other military defences, and in making and repairing all the implements used by the engineer troops in the operations of sapping and mining, in crossing rivers, in constructing field-defences, and in the attack and defence of fieldworks. as very few new fortifications are now required in france, the services of engineer artificers are less necessary and important than in our service, where large sums of money are annually expended upon military defences, there are, however, in the french army a corps of engineer artificers, consisting of eight officers and a cadre of fifty-four non-commissioned officers, with a variable number of privates, organized into two companies. _but in our army we have no regular engineer artificers!_ in our artillery service we have three hundred and thirty enlisted artillery artificers. if these are useful and necessary to the artillery service, which no one doubts, for still stronger reasons would it be advantageous to the public service to employ at least an equal number of enlisted engineer artificers on our fortifications; for the annual expenditure of public money is here much greater than in the corresponding branch of the artillery service. iv. _engineer troops_ are divided into three classes-- st, _sappers and pioneers_; d, _miners_; and d, _pontoniers_. in the french army of , there were four battalions of sappers, consisting of officers and , men. in , napoleon organized five battalions of these troops, consisting of officers and , men. even this number was found insufficient in his campaigns in germany and spain, and he was obliged to organize an additional number of sappers from the italian and french auxiliaries. the pioneers were then partly attached to other branches of the service. there is, at present, in the french army a considerable number of sappers or pioneers detached for the service of the infantry regiments, three companies of _sapeurs-conducteurs_, and forty-two companies of _sapeurs_. in the french army of , there were six companies of miners, consisting of officers and men. in , napoleon increased these troops to nine companies, containing officers and men. the present french peace establishment contains six companies of miners, organized much the same as under napoleon. in the french army of there were two regiments of pontoniers, of officers and men. but this number was found too small in the remaining campaigns, and the deficiency was temporarily supplied by organizing sailors for these duties. in the present french army organization, there are eleven companies of pontoniers, forming a regiment of sixty-three officers. _we have in our service no sappers, miners, or pontoniers_, and, in case of war, would be found without the means of executing any military works, or performing any military operation which would require engineer troops. in the preliminary stages of army organization under louis xiv., infantry troops were detailed as sappers, and instructed in these duties by the engineers. this irregularity of service soon caused difficulties and losses, and the evils springing from it were so great, that vauban urged the propriety of a separate organization. in he officially recommended to the king to establish a regiment of twelve hundred sappers and _ouvriers_, and in a subsequent report on the value of these troops, used the following language: "they would be useful in peace as well as in war, and would be the means of saving much in all fortifications where they should be employed. in fact, i have not the least doubt that they would save annually to the king much more than their pay. i assert all i have said on this subject with as much confidence as if i had seen the result; and i can, with the same certainty, add, that this small troop will be the means of saving large numbers of good engineers and brave officers and soldiers, from the stern necessity to which we are reduced of exposing, almost always, the laborers and those who support them; which necessity would not arise had we at command a sufficient number of this kind of workmen well instructed. to such a degree have i felt the necessity of sappers, at every siege at which i have been present, that i have always had reason to repent of not having more urgently solicited the creation of this company." such are the views of the greatest of military engineers, a man who fought one hundred and forty battles, conducted fifty-eight sieges, and built or repaired three hundred fortifications. his anticipations of the usefulness of engineer troops were fully realized, and they have ever since received the most careful attention, and now form, as has just been shown, one of the most important and efficient arms in the french service. the fortifications constructed by the engineers, as organized by vauban, have ever since constituted one of the principal elements of the french military power. in the wars of napoleon there are innumerable instances in illustration of the delays and disasters attending the operations of armies not supplied with engineer troops; and, on the other hand, the advantages resulting from their services when properly organized and instructed. we have already pointed out the influence which the fortifications in the hands of the french exerted on the results of these wars, and the fatal consequences to the allies of neglecting these works of national defence. every student of military history will immediately call to mind the influence of savona, coni, mondovi, ceva, govi, alessandria, tortona, pizzighitone, peschiera, mantua, palma-nuova, osopo, klagenfurth, &c., in the campaigns of - ; of genoa, port bard, the fortifications of the var, ulm, ingoldstadt, &c., in ; of milan, turin, mantua, roco d'aufo, genoa, alessandria, &c., in ; the importance of kehl, cassel, wesel, &c., to the french in , and the fatal consequences to the prussians in that campaign, of their total and culpable neglect of their own fortifications. all military historians speak of the influence of fortifications in the peninsular campaigns: those which had been given up to napoleon previous to the opening of hostilities, contributed very much to the success of his arms, while those which were retained by spain and her allies, contributed in an equal degree to hamper and embarrass his operations. some of these, like saragossa and tarragona, with their broken walls and defective armaments, kept the enemy in check some sixty days each, and did much to weaken the french power in the peninsula. temporary or field-fortifications also had an important influence here. the lines of torres-vedras, the field-works of ronda, the intrenched camps of the pyrenees, bayonne, toulouse, &c., are examples under this head. in fact, field-works played a most important part in all of napoleon's wars. we might mention the redoubt of montenotte, the intrenchments at milesimo, the batteries of lobau, the field-defences of hougomont, la haye-sainte, and papelotte at waterloo, and numerous other cases equally striking. just before the battle of waterloo, wellington employed some eighteen thousand peasants and two thousand horses, under the direction of british officers of engineers. in speaking of these defences, colonel pasley says: "it may be easily conceived that to have directed such a great body of workmen to proper advantage, by means of a few officers of engineers, would have been impossible, but for the system adopted of subdividing the various works among the non-commissioned officers and privates of the engineer troops, each of whom was made responsible for laying out the details of his own portion, and for the direction of a party of from twenty to one hundred men, or even more, according to circumstances." but to return to the peninsular war. these campaigns exhibit in strong colors the advantages derived, on the one side, from a well-organized engineer corps, and the losses, delays, and defects suffered on the other, until the defects of the organization were remedied. napoleon entered spain with a well-appointed army, and soon, through strategy and well-directed force, gained possession of the important fortresses of the peninsula; seizing in this way the strategic routes and important geographical points, he was enabled to retain possession of the country for eight years, in spite of the numerous forces arrayed against him, the absence of himself and his best generals in germany, and the great inefficiency of joseph and of many of his generals. these fortifications were old, and of strength inferior to modern works of defence, but it required years and the expenditure of millions in blood and treasure to expel from the country those who had possession of them. for the first five years of this war the english struggled with a most imperfect army organization.[ ] when "the first serious siege," says napier, was undertaken by the british army, "to the discredit of the english government, no army was ever so ill provided with the means of prosecuting such an enterprise. the engineer officers were exceedingly zealous; and many of them were well versed in the theory of their business. but the ablest trembled when reflecting on their utter destitution of all that belonged to real service. without a corps of sappers and miners, without a single private who knew how to carry on an approach under fire, they were compelled to attack fortresses defended by the most warlike, practised, and scientific troops of the age." [footnote : in a letter dated february th, , wellington wrote to the secretary of state as follows:--"i would beg leave to suggest to your lordship the expediency of adding to the engineer establishment a corps of sappers and miners. it is inconceivable with what disadvantages we undertake any thing like a siege for want of assistance of this description. there is no french _corps d'armée_ which has not a battalion of sappers and a company of miners; but we are obliged to depend for assistance of this description upon the regiments of the line; and although the men are brave and willing, they want the knowledge and training which are necessary. many casualties among them consequently occur, and much valuable time is lost at the most critical period of the siege."] "the best officers and finest soldiers were obliged to sacrifice themselves in a lamentable manner, to compensate for the negligence and incapacity of a government, always ready to plunge the nation into war, without the slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success. the sieges carried on by the british in spain were a succession of butcheries; because the commonest materials, and the means necessary to their art, were denied the engineers." colonel j.t. jones writes in nearly the same terms of the early sieges in the peninsula, and with respect to the siege of badajos, adds in express terms, that "a body of sappers and miners, and the necessary fascines and gabions, would have rendered the reduction of the work certain."[ ] soon after this siege a body of engineer troops arrived from england, but their number was insufficient, and wellington, having learned by sad experience the importance of engineer troops, ordered a body of two hundred volunteers to be detached from the line, "and daily instructed in the practice of sapping, making and laying fascines and gabions, and the construction of batteries, &c." the siege of ciudad rodrigo, which immediately followed this organization, was conducted with greater skill and success than any other till nearly the close of the war; and all military writers have attributed this result to the greater efficiency of the engineer force engaged in the siege. this arm was now gradually increased, and the last year of the war the engineer force with the english army in the field consisted of seventy-seven officers, seven assistant-engineers and surveyors, four surgeons and assistants, one thousand six hundred and forty-six sappers, miners, artificers, &c., one thousand three hundred and forty horses and one hundred and sixty carriages. [footnote : colonel pasley states that only _one and a half yards of excavation_, per man, was executed _in a whole night_, by the untrained troops in the peninsular war; whereas an instructed sapper can easily accomplish this _in twenty minutes_, and that it has been done by one of his most skilful sappers, at chatham, _in seven minutes!_] during all this time the french furnished their armies in spain with well-organized engineer forces. we have endeavored to form a comparison of the number of french engineers and artillerists employed on these peninsular sieges. but from the loose manner in which these details are usually given by historians, it is almost impossible to distinguish between the two. both are not unfrequently given under the same head, and when a distinction is apparently kept up, only the engineer _staff_ is mentioned under the head of engineers--the sappers, miners, artificers, the train, &c., all being put down as artillery. in the following table we have endeavored to arrange them as is done in our own army. the trains of both arms are left out, for frequently that of one arm performed the duties of the other. moreover, in our service a portion of these duties of engineer and artillery trains is performed by the quartermaster's department. for those who wish to know the exact organization of the french engineer train, we give it as it existed in , viz.:--seven troops, each troop consisting of three officers, one hundred and forty-one non-commissioned officers and privates, two hundred and fifty horses, and fifty wagons, conveying five thousand two hundred and seventy intrenching tools, one thousand seven hundred cutting tools, one thousand eight hundred and two artificers' tools, two hundred and fifty-three miners' tools, and eight thousand three hundred and eighteen kilogrammes' weight of machinery and stores, each article being made to a particular pattern. the pioneers in spain acted sometimes with one arm and sometimes with the other, and we have assigned them accordingly in the table. the pontoniers, however, in our service are included with the engineers; we have therefore put them, in our table, in the same column with the engineers. _____________________________________________________________________ | engineer |artillery staff,| total | total of |staff, sappers,| horse and foot | of | artillery | miners, | artillery, |engineers, |staff, horse | pontoniers, | ouvriers, and | sappers, | and foot |and pioneers. | pioneers. | miners, |artillery, name of siege. |________________________________|pontoniers,|ouvriers, | | | | | and | and |offic. | men. |offic. | men. | pioneers. | pioneers. _______________|_______|_______|_______|________|___________|____________ saragossa, | | | | | | rosas, | | | -- | -- | | girona, | | | | | | astorga, | | | | | | lerida, | | | | | | meguinenza, | | | -- | -- | | st ciudad | | | | | | rodrigo, | | | -- | -- | | almeida, | | | -- | -- | | tortosa, | | | | | | tarragona, | | | | | | olivensa, | | | -- | -- | | st badajos, | | | | | | tarifa, | | | | | | peniscola, | | | | | | d ciudad | | | | | | rodrigo, | | | | | | d badajos, | | | -- | -- | | burgos, | | | | | | castio udiales, | | | | | | st. sebastian, | | | | | | ________________|_______|_______|_______|________|___________|____________ from this table it appears that the ratio of the two arms at these sieges, making the comparison on the basis of our own organization, is about the same as for the present french army in algeria, or a little more than five of engineers to six of artillery. thus far we have spoken of the field-operations of engineer troops in connection with fortifications, alluding only incidentally to the use of military bridges and the passage of rivers. in the early wars of the french revolution the want of pontoniers was severely felt, and from the deficiency of this branch of service, the operations of the french generals were on several occasions very much restricted. the evil was afterwards remedied in a great degree by the introduction of several battalions of ponioniers in the regular army organization. on many occasions, during his wars, did napoleon feel and acknowledge the importance of these troops; but on none, perhaps, was this importance more clearly shown than in the passage of the beresina during his retreat from moscow with the wreck of his army. the russians had cut the bridge of borisow and taken position in great strength on the right bank of the river, both at this point and below; the french, wearied with long and difficult marches, destitute of artillery, provisions, and military stores, with a wide and deep river in front, and a powerful enemy on their flank and rear, benumbed by the rigors of a merciless climate, and dispirited by defeat--every thing seemed to promise their total destruction. "general eblé," says an english general officer, in his remarks on this retreat, "who, from the beginning of the campaign, had made all the arrangements for the equipment and construction of military bridges, was specially charged with the important duty of providing for the passage of this river; and he discharged that duty with a degree of forecast and ability to which certainly napoleon owed his escape and the wreck of his army its safety. general eblé had begun to prepare, at smolensko, for the difficulties which he foresaw in this operation. he formed, with every care, a train sufficient for the transport of all the tools and stores that might be required; and, further to provide against casualties and accidents, every man belonging to the companies of pontoniers was obliged to carry from smolensko a tool or implement of some kind, and a proportion of nails: and fortunate was it for the army that he did so; for such was the difficulty in getting through the carriages containing stores, that only two forge-wagons and six caissons of tools and nails could be preserved. to these the general added a quantity of iron-work taken from the wheels of carriages that were abandoned on the march. much was sacrificed to bring off these valuable materials for making clamps and fastenings, but, as segur observes, that exertion '_sauva l'armée_.'" but it is not always in the possession of a thing that we are most likely to appreciate its utility; the evils and inconveniences resulting from the want of it not unfrequently impress us most powerfully with its importance and the advantages to be derived from its possession. a few examples of this nature, drawn from military history, may be instructive. we need not go back to the disastrous passage of the vistula by charles xii., the failure of marlborough to pass the dyle, and eugene to cross the adda in , nor of the three unsuccessful attempts of charles of lorraine to cross the rhine in . the wars following the french revolution are sufficiently replete with useful instruction on this subject.[ ] [footnote : before recurring to these, it might be useful to give one example, as it is often referred to, in the campaign of . it was deemed important for the success of the campaign to attack the prince of baden in his camp at friedlingen. accordingly, a bridge was thrown across the rhine at huningen, the passage effected, and the victory gained. but villars was several times on the point of losing all for want of a sufficient ponton equipage. having but a _single_ bridge, the passage was necessarily slow; the artillery and stores were frequently interrupted by the infantry hurrying to the field of battle; disorder ensued, and the whole movement was retarded; villars could bring only a small part of his artillery into action, and towards the close of the battle the infantry were in want of ammunition: moreover, the whole operation had nearly failed from the attempt of the enemy to destroy this bridge, but the skill of the french pontoniers saved it. we here remark, st, the passage secured to villars an important victory; d, from having an inefficient bridge-equipage his whole army was placed in great peril, and the operation had nearly failed; d, if the prince of baden had possessed a skilful corps to oppose that of villars, this single bridge would have been destroyed, and the army cut to pieces; th, the skill of the little corps of french pontoniers saved the bridge, and of consequence, the army.] in so great was the disorder in the direction of affairs, that the boats of the bridges across the wahal and the rhine were disposed of for commercial purposes; and in the beginning of , says jomini, "the conquerors of belgium and holland had not even a bridge equipage, at a time too when the success of the campaign depended solely on the means of crossing a river." a few boats were procured from the wahal and the meuse, and others manufactured in the forests of the moselle; but "these operations consumed precious time, and _four months_ thus passed away in preparations." even after other things were all ready, the army was obliged to wait thirty days for the arrival of boats for ponton bridges; during this delay the austrians strengthened their position, and with very little exertion they might easily have prevented the passage. in , profiting by the errors of the former campaigns, the french collected more suitable bridge equipages, and the two armies passed the rhine at neuweid and kehl without loss or delay. the latter of these passages has often been referred to as a model for such operations, and certainly does credit to the general who directed it. but moreau's bridge equipage having been destroyed during this disastrous campaign, his operations the following year were considerably delayed in preparing a new one, and even then he was under the necessity of seizing all private boats that could be found within reach; but the difficulty of collecting and using boats of all sizes and descriptions was so great as entirely to defeat his plan of surprising the enemy on the opposite bank of the river. the necessity of co-operating with hoche admitted of no further delay, and he was now obliged to force his passage in the open day, and in face of the enemy. undertaken under such circumstances, "the enterprise was extremely sanguinary, and at one time very doubtful;" and had it failed, "moreau's army would have been ruined for the campaign." napoleon's celebrated passage of the po, at placentia, shows plainly how important it is for a general to possess the means of crossing rivers. "i felt the importance of hastening the enterprise in order not to allow the enemy time to prevent it. but the po, which is a river as wide and deep as the rhine, is a barrier difficult to be overcome. we had no means of constructing a bridge, and were obliged to content ourselves with the means of embarkation found at placentia and its environs. lannes, chief of brigade, crossed in the first boats, with the advanced guard. the austrians had only ten squadrons on the other side, and these were easily overcome. the passage was now continued without interruption, but very slowly. _if i had had a good ponton-equipage, the fate of the enemy's army had been sealed; but the necessity of passing the river by successive embarkations saved it."_ in the campaign of , the archduke attempted to pass the aar, and attacked the french on the opposite side, but for want of suitable equipage his operation was delayed till the enemy had collected sufficient forces to intercept the passage; he was now obliged to enter into a stipulation for a suspension of hostilities, and to withdraw his bridges. the operations of the french in the campaign of , led to the most glorious results, but their execution was attended with the greatest difficulties. the passage of the alps was greatly facilitated by the ability of the chief engineer, marescot, and the skill of the troops under his command; and the facility of passing rivers afforded napoleon by his pontoniers, had an important influence upon the success of the campaign. "the army of the reserve had many companies of pontoniers and sappers; the pontons of course could not be taken across the st. bernard, but the pontoniers soon found materials on the po and tesin for constructing bridge equipages." moreau's army in the same year profited well by his pontoniers, in the passages of the inn, the salza, the traun, the alza, &c., and in the pursuit of the austrian army--a pursuit that has but a single parallel example in modern history. the facility with which napoleon crossed rivers, made forced marches, constructed redoubts, fortified depots, and grasped the great strategic points of the enemy in the campaign of , resulted from the skilful organization of his army, and the efficiency given to the forces employed in these important operations. the engineer staff of the french army at this period, consisted of four hundred and forty-nine officers, and there were four battalions of sappers, of one hundred and twenty officers and seven thousand and ninety-two men; six companies of miners, of twenty-four officers and five hundred and seventy-six men; and two regiments of pontoniers, of thirty-eight officers and nine hundred and sixty men. on the contrary, the enemy's neglect of these things is one of the most striking of the many faults of the war, and his ill-directed efforts to destroy the great wooden bridge across the danube, and the successful operations of the french sappers in securing it, formed one of the principal turning points in the campaign. the same organization enabled the french to perform their wonderfully rapid and decisive movements in the prussian campaign of , and the northern operations of . in , napoleon's army crossed, with the most wonderful rapidity, the inn, the salza, the traun, and other rivers emptying into the danube, and reached vienna before the wonder-stricken austrians could prepare for its defence. it was then necessary for the french to effect a passage of the danube, which was much swollen by recent rains and the melting snow of the mountains. considering the depth and width of the river, the positions of the enemy, and his preparations to oppose a passage, with the disastrous consequences that would result to the french from any failure in its execution; taking all these things into consideration, jomini pronounced it "one of the most hazardous and difficult of all the operations of war." here the fate of the army depended, apparently, upon the skill and efficiency of the engineers and pontoniers, and nobly did they discharge the trust reposed in them. when the pontons failed, tressel-bridges were substituted, and even fifty-four enormous boats were put in requisition. so skilfully were these operations conducted, that napoleon's immense army crossed over in safety, directly in the face of a superior enemy, and the same day fought the memorable battle of esling. forced to retire before numbers vastly superior to his own, napoleon concentrated his forces on the island of lobau, and intrenched his position. surrounded by the broad and deep channel of the danube, and watched by numerous and skilful enemies, it required the most constant activity and the greatest good fortune to effect a passage. here the skill and efficiency of the engineers shone conspicuously; a number of bridges were thrown across the river in the face of the austrians, and against obstacles almost insurmountable; the whole french army passed in safety, and soon put the finishing stroke to that brilliant campaign. so high an estimate did napoleon attach to the construction of these bridges, that, when the passage was completed, he offered to place bertrand, the constructing engineer, though of comparatively low rank, at the head of the french _corps du genie_. on many occasions during the retreat in - , from the beresina to the left of the rhine, across the niemen, the vistula, the oder, the elbe, and the numerous other rivers which divide that immense country, the french derived vast advantages from the experience and skill of their engineers and pontoniers, several times whole corps escaping through their means from the grasp of their pursuers. when, however, the disasters of this retreat had absorbed most of the material of the army, and had sadly thinned the ranks of men of skill and experience, they sustained many severe, and, in other circumstances, unnecessary losses. of this character we may mention the passage of the elster by the bridge of lindnau, where, through the ignorance and carelessness of those charged with the mines, and through the want of suitable bridge arrangements, thousands of brave men were buried in the muddy waters of this small river. so sensibly did napoleon feel this want of bridge equipages, in the winter of - , that he addressed to his minister of war, on this subject, the following remarkable words: "if i had had pontons, i should have already annihilated the army of schwartzenberg, and closed the war; i should have taken from him eight or ten thousand wagons, and his entire army in detail; but for want of the proper means i could not pass the seine." again, on the d of march he wrote: "if i had had a bridge equipage this morning, blücher's army had been lost." whoever will examine the details of the operations of this campaign, will be convinced of the full force of these remarks. in spain in , sir john moore, in order to assist the native forces, had penetrated so near the army of napoleon, that retreat became exceedingly difficult, and he was several times on the point of being lost. the english army was at this time very deficient in engineer troops, and moore suffered much for want of miners to destroy bridges, and pontoniers to construct new ones. in order to cover his retreat and impede the advance of the french, the commander-in-chief, says napier, "directed several bridges to be destroyed, but the engineers [for want of miners and miner's tools] failed of success in every attempt." in soult's retreat, in , he crossed the duero at oporto, and destroyed the bridges so as to cut off the pursuit of wellington. but while soult, deceived by treachery in his own corps, neglected to guard the river with proper vigilance, wellington collected boats at different points, crossed over his army, surprised the french, and, had it not been for the singular delay and indecision of general murray, would most certainly have forced the entire army to capitulate; as it was, his operation produced a decided influence on the campaign, and effected the safety of beresford's corps. soult destroyed his artillery and baggage, and hastily retreated through the mountain passes; but his army was again arrested at the river cavado, and placed on the very brink of destruction, when the brave and skilful dulong succeeded in effecting a passage at the ponte nova; the same daring officer opened, on the same day, a way for the further escape of the french across the misarella by the saltador. in the pursuit of massena, in , it was important to the english to cross the guadiana, and attack the french before badajos could be put in a state of defence. beresford was directed by wellington to pass this river at jerumina, where the portuguese had promised to furnish pontons; but they neglected to fulfil their engagement, and the army had to wait till capt. squire, an able and efficient officer of engineers, could construct other means for effecting a passage. every thing was done that genius could devise and industry execute; nevertheless, the operations of the army were greatly delayed--"_a delay,_" says the historian, "_that may be considered as the principal cause of those long and bloody operations which afterwards detained lord wellington more than a year on the frontiers of portugal._" we might prolong these remarks by discussing the passages of the ceira and alva, and their influence on the pursuit of massena; wellington's passage of the tagus, and his retreat from burgos in ; the passage of the adour and garonne in ; and the failure of the mines to blow up the bridges of saltador, alcantara, &c.; but a sufficient number of examples, it is believed, has already been adduced to show the advantage of maintaining a properly organized and instructed body of sappers, miners, and pontoniers, and the fatal results attending the want of such troops, as a component part of an army organization. it has already been remarked that the infantry of an army must always form the basis of the apportionment; and by the general rule laid down by military writers, the cavalry should be from one-fourth to one-sixth of the infantry, according to the character of the war; the artillery about two-thirds of the cavalry, or one-seventh of the infantry; and the engineers from one-half to three-fourths of the artillery,--say about two-thirds. the staff and administrative corps must vary according to the nature of the organization, and the character of the theatre of war. the former ought to be from two to five in a thousand, and the latter from twenty-five to seventy-five,[ ] as a general rule. these ratios would give for a good army organization; staff, about ................................... administrative service--pay, medical, commissary, quarter-master, &c. ............................. infantry, ...................................... cavalry, ....................................... artillery, ...................................... engineers, ...................................... ----- total, ................... , in a broken country, and against savage and undisciplined foes, like the indians in this country, the natives opposed to the english in india, to the french in algeria, or to the russians in circassia, the cavalry, artillery, and engineers would be diminished, and the infantry and administrative corps proportionably increased; the former because light troops are always preferable against an undisciplined foe, and the latter because of the difficulty of moving and procuring supplies in new and uncultivated countries. the french forces in algeria, in , amounted to about sixty thousand men, in the following proportion:-- staff, ................................... . administrative, &c., ................... . infantry, .............................. . cavalry, ................................ . artillery, .............................. . engineers, .............................. . --------- men. [footnote : this supposes the teamsters, wagon-masters, hospital-servants, &c., to be enlisted men, and not persons hired for the occasion as is done in our army.] in small peace establishments the relative proportion of infantry and cavalry should be much less than when prepared for the field, because troops for these two arms can be much more readily formed in case of emergency, than for those which require more scientific information, and technical skill and instruction. the staff and engineers are evidently the most difficult to be formed in case of war, and next to these the artillery and administrative corps. in this country we can maintain, in time of peace, only the framework of an army, looking to our citizen soldiery to form, in case of need, the great mass of our military force. this is the starting point in our military system, and the basis of our army organization. let us see whether this principle is carried out in practice. for every thousand men in our present organization[ ] we have, for the staff, administrative, [ ] infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers, ---- [footnote : these numbers are the real rather than the _nominal_ proportions, many of our officers being called _staff_, who properly belong to one of the other classes.] [footnote : much of the administrative duty in our army is done by unenlisted men, or by soldiers detached from their companies. where such is the case, the ratio of this branch of the service ought to be no higher than is represented above.] we see from this table, that while our artillery is nearly six times as numerous as in ordinary armies, our staff is less by one-half, and our engineers not more than one-half what ought to be their proportion in a war establishment. to this excess of artillery over infantry and cavalry in our army in time of peace there is no objection, inasmuch as the latter could be more easily expanded in case of war than the artillery. but for a still stronger reason our staff and engineers should also be proportionally increased, instead of being vastly diminished, as is actually the case. experience in the first campaigns of the american revolution strongly impressed on the mind of washington the absolute necessity of forming a regular and systematic army organization. but so difficult was it to obtain properly instructed engineers, that he was obliged to seek his engineer officers in the ranks of foreign adventurers, and to make drafts from the other arms of service, and have them regularly instructed in the duties of engineer troops, and commanded by the officers of this corps. an order, in his own handwriting, giving the details of this temporary arrangement, is dated march th, . until men are enlisted for the purpose, companies of sappers and miners shall be formed by drafts from the line. "the duties of the companies of sappers and miners," he continues, "shall be under the direction of the engineers, to construct field-works of every kind, and all works necessary for the attack or defence of places, as circumstances may require. on a march in the vicinity of an enemy, a detachment of the companies of sappers and miners shall be stationed at the head of the column, directly after the vanguard, for the purpose of opening and mending the roads, and removing obstructions," &c. &c. the great difficulties encountered by washington in instructing his inexperienced forces in the more difficult branches of the art, made him the more earnest, in after years, to impress on us how important it was for us _in peace to prepare for war._ the preparation here meant is not the keeping up, in time of peace, of a large standing army, ever ready to take the field; but rather the formation of a small body, educated and practised in all the scientific and difficult parts of the profession; a body which shall serve as the _cadre_ or framework of a large army, capable of imparting to the new and inexperienced soldiers of the republic that skill and efficiency which has been acquired by practice. how far have we accomplished this object, and what will be the probable operations in case of another contest with a european power? new and inexperienced troops will be called into the field to oppose a veteran and disciplined army. from these troops we shall expect all the bravery and energy resulting from ardent patriotism and an enthusiastic love of liberty. but we cannot here expect much discipline, military skill, or knowledge of the several branches of the military art. the peaceful habits of our citizens tend but little to the cultivation of the military character. how, then, are we to oppose the hostile force? must human blood be substituted for skill and preparation, and dead bodies of our citizens serve as epaulements against the inroads of the enemy? to some extent, we fear it must be the case; but not entirely so, for government has not altogether neglected to make preparation for such an event. fortifications have been planned or erected on the most important and exposed positions; military materials and munitions have been collected in the public arsenals; a military school has been organized to instruct in the military sciences; there are regularly kept up small bodies of infantry and cavalry, weak in numbers, but capable of soon making good soldiers of a population so well versed as ours is in the use of the musket and the horse; an artillery force, proportionally much larger, is also regularly maintained, with a sufficient number of men and officers to organize and make good artillery-men of citizens already partially acquainted with the use of the cannon. but an acquaintance with infantry, cavalry, and artillery duties is not the only practical knowledge requisite in war. in the practical operations of an army in the field, rivers are to be crossed, bridges suddenly erected and suddenly destroyed, fieldworks constructed and defended, batteries captured and destroyed; fortifications are to be put in order and defended, or to be besieged and recaptured; trenches must be opened, mines sprung, batteries established, breaches made and stormed; trous-de-loup, abattis, palisades, gabions, fascines, and numerous other military implements and machinery are to be constructed. have our citizens a knowledge of these things, or have we provided in our military establishment for a body of men instructed and practised in this branch of the military art, and capable of imparting to an army the necessary efficiency for this service? unfortunately this question must be answered in the negative; and it is greatly to be feared that the future historian will have to say of us, as napier has said of the english:--"_the best officers and soldiers were obliged to sacrifice themselves in a lamentable manner, to compensate for the negligence and incapacity of a government always ready to plunge the nation into a war, without the slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success. their sieges were a succession of butcheries; because the commonest materials, and the means necessary to their art, were denied the engineers_."[ ] [footnote : the subjects discussed in this chapter are also treated by most authors on military organization and military history, and by the several writers on military engineering. allent, vauban, cormontaigne, rocquancourt, pasley, douglas, jones, belmas, napier, gay de vernon, may be referred to with advantage. pasley, douglas, jones, and napier, speak in the strongest terms of the importance of engineer troops in the active operations of a war, and of the absolute necessity of organizing this force in time of peace. a list of books of reference on military engineering will be given at the close of the following chapters. while these pages are passing through the press, congress has authorized the president to raise _one company_ of engineer troops! this number is altogether too small to be of any use in time of war.] chapter xiii. permanent fortifications. _fortification_ is defined,--the art of disposing the ground in such a manner as to enable a small number of troops to resist a larger army the longest time possible. if the work be placed in a position of much importance, and its materials be of a durable character, it is called permanent; if otherwise, it receives the appellation of _field_, or _temporary_. fieldworks are properly confined to operations of a single campaign, and are used to strengthen positions which are to be occupied only for a short period. generally these works are of earth, thrown up by the troops in a single day. they are intimately connected with a system of permanent fortifications, but from the facility of their construction, no provision need be made for them before the actual breaking out of war. indeed, they could not well be built before hostilities commenced, as their locality in each case must be determined by the position of the hostile forces. having already described the general influence of permanent fortifications as a means of national defence, we shall here speak merely of the principles of their construction. it is not proposed to enter into any technical discussion of matters that especially belong to the instruction of the engineer, but merely to give the nomenclature and use of the more important parts of a military work; in a word, such general information as should belong to officers of every grade and corps of an army. the first species of fortification among the ancients was of course very simple, consisting merely of an earthen mound, or palisades. a wall was afterwards used, and a ditch was then added to the wall. it was found that a straight wall could be easily breached by the enemy's battering-rams; to remedy this evil, towers were built at short intervals from each other, forming a broken line of salient and re-entering parts. these towers or salient points gradually assumed a shape approximating to the modern bastion. after the invention of gunpowder and the application of cannon to the attack and defence of places, it became necessary to arrange earthen ramparts behind the thin walls of the ancient works, for the reception of the new artillery. moreover these walls were soon found inadequate to resist the missiles of the besiegers, and it became necessary to replace them by parapets of earth. in order to cover the retaining walls of these parapets from the besieging batteries, it was also found to be necessary to lower these walls as much as possible, and to raise the counterscarps. the traces or plans of the works, however, received no material change till about the close of the fifteenth century. it is not known who first changed the ancient towers into bastions. some attribute it to an italian, and with considerable show of reason, for a bastion was built at turin as early as . achmet pacha, it is said, fortified otranto in this way, in , but whether the system was previously known among the turks cannot be determined. others attribute the invention to ziska, the celebrated leader of the hussites. it is most probable that the transition from the tower to the bastion was a very gradual one, and that the change was perfected in several countries at about the same time. fortifications, like other arts and sciences, greatly flourished in italy under the medicis, and that country furnished europe with its most skilful engineers. catharine of medicis introduced into france many of her countrymen, distinguished in this profession; among these may be named bellamat, bephano, costritio, relogio, vorganno, the two marini, campi, and hieronimo, who built several important places and directed the sieges of others. these able foreigners were rivalled by some distinguished french engineers, who laid the foundation of the "_corps du genie_" which has since become a school of military instruction for the world. among the early french engineers may be distinguished lafontaine de serré, feuquières, and st. remy. pedro navarro had been appointed a member of this corps, but his attention was more specially directed to mining, and we do not learn that he distinguished himself in the construction of any fortification. in germany, in the beginning of the sixteenth century, albert durer distinguished himself as a writer on fortification; his book is remarkable as containing the germs of many of the improvements which were made by those who followed him. this is the more to be wondered at as he was not a professed engineer. after him followed spekel, a native of strasburg, who died in . his writings are valuable as showing the state of the art at that time, and the changes which he himself introduced. he was an engineer of much practical knowledge and experience, having assisted at the sieges of malta, golletta, vienna, jula, nicosia, famagusta, &c. the first french engineer who wrote on fortification was errard de bar-le-duc, who published near the close of the sixteenth century. as an engineer, he was rivalled by chatillon, a man of distinguished merit. errard fortified amiens, built a part of the castle of sedan, and a portion of the defences of calais. under the reign of louis xiii., desnoyers, deville, pagan, and fabre were greatly distinguished. deville published in . he was a man of much learning and experience; but he is said to have adopted, both in his theory and practice, the principles of the italian school, with most of its errors. pagan began his military career while young, and became _maréchal de champ_ at the age of , when, having the misfortune to become blind, he was compelled to relinquish his brilliant hopes. he was the ablest engineer of his age, and was also greatly distinguished in other branches of science. in his plans he inclined to the dutch rather than the italian school of fortification. he published in . at the close of the sixteenth century, the dutch had been forced to resort to military defences to protect themselves against the aggressions of the spaniards. as the dutch were inferior in other military means, fortification became one of the vital resources of the country. their works, however, thrown up in much haste, were in many respects defective, although well adapted to the exigencies of the time. freytag, their principal engineer, wrote in . some of his improvements were introduced into france by pagan. he was preceded by marolois, (a cotemporary of pagan,) who published in . in germany, rimpler, a saxon, wrote on fortification in . he was a man of great experience, having served at the sieges of candia, phillipsburg, bonn, riga, bremen, dansburg, bommeln, &c. he fell at the siege of vienna in . his writings are said to contain the groundwork of montalembert's system. in italy, after the time of tartaglia, marchi, campi, &c., we find no great improvement in this art. several italians, however, distinguished themselves as engineers under the spaniards. the fortifications of badajos are a good example of the state of the art in italy and spain a that epoch. the citadel of antwerp, built by two italian engineers, pacciotti and cerbelloni, in , has become celebrated for the siege it sustained in . the age of louis xiv. effected a great revolution in the art of fortification, and carried it to such a degree of perfection, that it has since received but slight improvement. the years and are interesting dates in the history of this art, as having given birth respectively to vauban and coehorn. the former was chief engineer of france under louis xiv., and the latter held a corresponding position under the dutch republic. coehorn's ideas upon fortification are conceived with an especial view to the marshy soil of his own country, and, although well suited to the object in view, are consequently of less general application than those of his more distinguished cotemporary and rival. the best specimens of his mode of construction that exist at the present day, are the fortresses of manheim, bergen-op-zoom, nimiguen, and breda. coehorn was followed in holland by landsberg, an able and practical engineer, who to much reading added extensive experience, having himself served at sixteen sieges. his system was in many respects peculiar, both in trace and relief; it dispensed with the glacis, and all revertments of masonry. his plans could be applied only to marshy soils. the first edition of his work was published in . but the career of vauban forms the most marked and prominent era in the history of fortification; it constitutes the connecting link between the rude sketches of the earlier engineers, and the well-established form which the art has since assumed. in his earlier works we find many of the errors of his predecessors; but a gradual change seems to have been wrought in his mind by reflection and experience, and these faults were soon remedied and a new and distinct system developed. vauban has left no treatise upon his favorite art, and his ideas upon fortification have been deduced from his constructions, and from detached memoirs left among his papers. the nature of his labors, and the extent of his activity and industry, may be imagined from the fact that he fought one hundred and forty battles, conducted fifty-eight sieges, and built or repaired three hundred fortifications. his memoirs, found among his manuscript papers, on various military and political subjects, are numerous, and highly praised even at the present day. but his beautiful and numerous constructions, both of a civil and military character, are real monuments to his genius. the best illustrations of his principles of fortification occur at lille, strasbourg, landau, givet, and neuf-brisack. his writings on mines, and the attack and defence of places, are, by the profession, regarded as classic. his improvements in the existing method of attack gave great superiority to the arms of his countrymen, and even enabled him to besiege and capture his rival coehorn, in his own works. he died in , and was soon succeeded by cormontaigne. the latter did not attempt the introduction of any new system, but limited himself to improving and perfecting the plans of his illustrious predecessors. his improvements, however, were both extensive and judicious, and are sufficient to entitle him to the place he holds as one of the ablest military engineers the world has ever produced. his works on the subject of fortification, besides being elegantly written, contain the most valuable information of any works we have. his most admired constructions are to be found at metz, thionville, and bitche. the beautiful crown works of billecroix, at metz, are perfect models of their kind. cormontaigne died in . cotemporary with him were sturin and glasser. the former deviated but slightly from the systems of his predecessors, but the latter invented several ingenious improvements which gave him great reputation. next follows rosard, a bavarian engineer; and frederick augustus, king of poland, who devoted himself particularly to this art. the former casemated only the flanks of his works, but the latter introduced casemate fire more extensively than any one who had preceded him. in france, belidor and de filey published about the middle of the last century. they were both able engineers but their systems were inferior to that of cormontaigne. in de la chiche introduced a system of fortification in many respects original. he raised his covered-ways so as to conceal all his masonry, and casemated a great portion of his _enceinte_. for exterior defence, he employed direct fire from his barbettes, and curvated fire from his casemates; the direct fire of the latter secured his ditches. next to de la chiche follows montalembert, who published in . he was a man of much experience and considerable originality, but of no great ability as an engineer. most of his ideas were derived from de la chiche and the german school of rimpler. his plans have generally been rejected by his own countrymen, but they still have advocates among the germans. general virgin, a distinguished swedish engineer, wrote in . his idea of strongly fortifying the smaller towns to the comparative neglect of the larger cities, constitutes one of the principal novelties in his system. in , reveroni devised a system in which the casemates of montalembert were employed, but his guns were so arranged as to be employed in barbette while the besiegers were at a distance, and afterwards to be used for casemated fire. the casemate gun-carriage, which formed a part of his invention, was ingenious, but never much employed in practice. bousmard, a french emigrant, published in . he adopted the general trace of vauban, but introduced modifications in the details essentially different from those of cormontaigne. some of these modifications are very valuable improvements, while others are of a more doubtful character. bousmard is, on the whole, a very able writer, and his works should be found in the library of every military engineer. carnot's celebrated treatise was published in . he was evidently a man of genius, and during his career at the head of the war department of france, numerous and very important improvements were made in the several branches of the military art, and especially in strategy. his work on fortification exhibits much originality and genius, but it is doubtful whether it has very much contributed to the improvement of this art. his ideas have been very severely, and rather unfairly criticised by the english, and particularly by sir howard douglas. chasseloup de laubat early distinguished himself as an engineer of much capacity and talent. he followed napoleon in nearly all his campaigns, and conducted many of his sieges. he remodelled the fortifications of northern italy and of the lower rhine. he published in . the improvements which he introduced are numerous and valuable, and he probably contributed more to advance his art, and to restore the equilibrium between attack and defence, than any other engineer since cormontaigne. after the fall of napoleon and the partition of his empire, the allies mutilated or destroyed the constructions of chasseloup, so that, it is believed, no perfect specimen of his system remains. the cotemporaries of chasseloup were mostly engaged in active field service and sieges, and few had either leisure or opportunity to devote themselves to improvements in permanent fortification. choumara published in . his system contains much originality, and his writings give proof of talent and genius. he has very evidently more originality than judgment, and it is hardly probable that his system will ever be generally adopted in practice. the metz system, as arranged by noizet, as a theoretical study, is undoubtedly the very best that is now known. it, however, requires great modifications to suit it to different localities. for a horizontal site, it is probably the most perfect system ever devised. it is based on the system of vauban as improved by cormontaigne, and contains several of the modifications suggested by modern engineers. it is applied in a modified form to the new fortifications of paris. baron rohault de fleury has introduced many modifications of the ordinary french system in his new defences of lyons. we have seen no written account of these works, but from a hasty examination in , they struck us as being too complicated and expensive. the new fortifications of western germany are modifications of rempler's system, as improved by de la chiche and montalembert. it is said that general aster, the directing engineer, has also introduced some of the leading principles of chasseloup and carnot. the english engineers have satisfied themselves with following in the track of their continental neighbors, and can offer no claims to originality. of the system of fortification now followed in our service we must decline expressing any opinion; the time has not yet arrived for subjecting it to a severe and judicious criticism. but of the system pursued previous to , we may say, without much fear of contradiction, that a worse one could scarcely have been devised. instead of men of talent and attainments in military science, most of our engineers were then either foreigners, or civilians who owed their commissions to mere political influence. the qualifications of the former were probably limited to their recollection of some casual visit to two or three of the old european fortresses; and the latter probably derived all their military science from some old military book, which, having become useless in europe, had found its way into this country, and which they had read without understanding, and probably without even looking at its date. the result was what might have been anticipated--a total waste of the public money. we might illustrate this by numerous examples. a single one, however, must suffice. about the period of the last war, eight new forts were constructed for the defence of new york harbor, at an expense of some two millions of dollars. six of these were _circular_, and the other two were _star forts_--systems which had been discarded in europe for nearly two thousand years! three of these works are now entirely abandoned, two others are useless, and large sums of money have recently been expended on the other three in an attempt to remedy their faults, and render them susceptible of a good defence. moreover, a number of the works which were constructed by our engineers before that corps was made to feel the influence of the scientific education introduced through the medium of the military academy--we say, a considerable number of our fortifications, constructed by engineers who owed their appointment to political influence, are not only wrong in their plans, but have been made of such wretched materials and workmanship that they are already crumbling into ruins. a fortification, in its most simple form, consists of a mound of earth, termed, the _rampart_, which encloses the space fortified; a _parapet_, surmounting the rampart and covering the men and guns from the enemy's projectiles; a _scarp wall,_ which sustains the pressure of the earth of the rampart and parapet, and presents an insurmountable obstacle to an assault by storm; a wide and deep _ditch_, which prevents the enemy from approaching near the body of the place; a _counterscarp wall_, which sustains the earth on the exterior of the ditch; a _covered way_, which occupies the space between the counterscarp and a mound of earth called a _glacis_, thrown up a few yards in front of the ditch for the purpose of covering the scarp of the main work. the work by which the space fortified is immediately enveloped, is called the _enceinte_, or _body of the place_. other works are usually added to the enceinte to strengthen the weak points of the fortification, or to lengthen the siege by forcing the enemy to gain possession of them before he can breach the body of the place: these are termed _outworks_, when enveloped by the covered way, and _advanced works_, when placed exterior to the covered way, but in some way connected with the main work; but if entirely beyond the glacis, and not within supporting distance of the fortress, they are called _detached works_. in a bastioned front the principal outwork is the _demi-lune_, which is placed in front of the curtain; it serves to cover the main entrance to the work, and to place the adjacent bastions in strong re-enterings. the _tenaille_ is a small low work placed in the ditch, to cover the scarp wall of the curtain and flanks from the fire of the besieger's batteries erected along the crest of the glacis. the _places of arms_, are points where troops are assembled in order to act on the exterior of the work. the _re-entering places of arms_, are small redans arranged at the points of junction of the covered ways of the bastion and demi-lune. the _salient places of arms_ are the parts of the covered way in front of the salients of the bastion and demi-lune. small permanent works, termed _redoubts_, are placed within the demi-lune and re-entering places of arms for strengthening those works. works of this character constructed within the bastion are termed _interior retrenchments;_ when sufficiently elevated to command the exterior ground, they are called _cavaliers._ _caponniers_ are works constructed to cover the passage of the ditch from the tenaille to the gorge of the demi-lune, and also from the demi-lune to the covered way, by which communication may be maintained between the enceinte and outworks. _posterns_ are underground communications made through the body of the place or some of the outworks. _sortie-passages_ are narrow openings made through the crest of the glacis, which usually rise in the form of a ramp from the covered way, by means of which communication may be kept up with the exterior. these passages are so arranged that they cannot be swept by the fire of the enemy. the other communications above ground are called _ramps, stairs,_ &c. _traverses_ are small works erected on the covered way to intercept the fire of the besieger's batteries. _scarp_ and _counterscarp_ galleries are sometimes constructed for the defence of the ditch. they are arranged with loop-holes, through which the troops of the garrison fire on the besiegers when they have entered the ditch, without being themselves exposed to the batteries of the enemy. in sea-coast defences, and sometimes in a land front for the defence of the ditch, embrasures are made in the scarp wall for the fire of artillery; the whole being protected from shells by a bomb-proof covering over head: this arrangement is termed a _casemate_. sometimes double ramparts and parapets are formed, so that the interior one shall fire over the more advanced; the latter in this case is called _a faussebraie_. if the inner work be separated from the other it is called a _retrenchment_[ ] and if in addition it has a commanding fire, it is termed, as was just remarked, a _cavalier_. [footnote : the term _retrenchment_ implies an interior work, which is constructed within or in rear of another, for the purpose of strengthening it; the term _intrenchment_, on the contrary, implies an independent work, constructed in the open field, without reference to any other adjoining work.] the _capital_ of a bastion is a line bisecting its salient angle. all the works comprehended between the capitals of two adjacent bastions is termed a _front_: it is taken as the unit in permanent fortification. fig. represents the ground plan of a modern bastioned front, of a regular and simple form, on a horizontal site. _a, a, a_--is the enceinte, or body of the place. _b_--the bastions. _c_--the main ditch. _d_--the covered ways. _e_--the re-entering places of arms. _f_--the salient places of arms. _g_--the demi-lune. _h_--the demi-lune ditch. _j_--the demi-lune redoubt. _l_--the ditch of the demi-lune redoubt. _m_--the redoubt of the re-entering places of arms. _n_--the ditches of the redoubts. _o_--the tenaille. _p_--the double caponier. _a_--the traverses. _b_--the sortie-passages. _c_--stairs. _d_--cut in the demi-lune to flank the redoubt of the re-entering place of arms. fig. represents a section through the line _mn'_ of the preceding figure. _a_--is the rampart. _b_--the parapet. _c_--the ditch. _d_--the scarp wall. _e_--the counterscarp wall. _f_--the glacis. _g_--the covered way. _h_--the terre-plain. _j_--the parade. sometimes half embrasures are cut in the earthen parapet of a fort, so as to sink the gun below the crest, and thus more effectually cover the men from the enemy's fire. but guns in embrasure have a far less extended field of fire than when mounted in barbette; moreover, the embrasures present openings through which an enemy may penetrate in an assault. owing to these objections, they are employed only for the protection of particular points; that is, where it is important to cover the artillerists from the enemy's fire, or where the guns are to be used merely to protect a ditch, or to enfilade a road, &c. the bottom of the embrasure is called the _sole_, the sides are called _cheeks_, and the mass of earth between two embrasures, the _merlon_. embrasures may be made either direct or oblique, according as the fire is required to be perpendicular or oblique to the parapet. a _coverport_ is a small outwork of any convenient form, erected immediately in front of a gateway, to screen it from the enemy's fire. a _counterguard_ is a more extensive work, constructed in front of a part of the fortress itself, or of some other outwork of greater importance, which it is intended to cover. these are sometimes called _coverfaces_, from their situation and object; but the former term is most commonly used. sometimes outworks, called _tenaillons_, consisting of one long and one short face, are placed on each side of the demi-lune of a front of fortification, for the purpose of prolonging the siege. (fig. .) small, or _demi_-tenaillons, are frequently so arranged as to cover only one-half of the demi-lune, and then a _bonnet_ constructed in front of the salient of the demi-lune. (fig. .) in this case the bonnet is flanked by the short faces of the demi-tenaillons; these short faces are themselves flanked by the demi-lune, while the bastions flank the long faces. a _horn-work_ consists of a front of fortification, and two wings resting on the faces of bastions of a front of the fortress. it sometimes has also a demi-lune or bonnet, as in the case of demi-tenaillons. (fig. .) a _crown-work_ consists of two fronts of fortification, and two wings. (fig. .) it is sometimes made _double_, and even _triple_. these works are also employed as advanced works, and placed entirely in front of the glacis. they have generally been added to a fortress for the purpose of occupying some important piece of ground not included within the limits of the main work. they may be constructed with covered ways, and sometimes it may be found advantageous to secure them by retrenchments. a _detached work_ may be made in any form deemed best suited to the site. being but remotely connected with the fortress, the latter will exercise but slight influence on the character of its plan or construction. they are usually of limited extent and slight relief, partaking much of the nature of field-works.[ ] [footnote : the general principles of permanent fortification may be best learned from the writings of cormontaigne, st. paul de noizet, and laurillard-fallot. a list of valuable books of reference on the several branches of military engineering will be given at the close of the next chapter.] chapter xiv. field-engineering. _field-engineering_ includes the making of military reconnaissances, temporary fortifications, and military roads; the planning and construction of military bridges; the attack and defence of military works;--in fine, all the various duties of engineer troops, either in the operations of a campaign, or in the dispositions on the battle-field. _military reconnaissance._--by this term is meant an examination of a portion of the theatre of war, to ascertain its military character and resources. if the examination be made of a large district of country, and for an entire campaign, the reconnaissance is _general_; if made for collecting detailed information respecting a proposed line of march, the passage of a river, the position of an enemy, &c., it is termed _special_. in making a general reconnaissance, great care should be taken to collect accurate information respecting the general topography of the country; the character of the mountains, forests, and water-courses; the nature of the roads, canals, and railways; the quality of the soil, and the amount of provisions and forage it produces; the population and character of the cities, towns, and villages, the commercial and manufacturing resources of every part of the country, and the means of transportation to be found in each district. the plan of military operations will be based on the information thus obtained, and any serious error in the reconnaissance may involve the results of the campaign, and even the fate of the war. in a special reconnaissance, not only accurate but minute information will be required: the character of the roads must be given in detail; the nature of the water-courses, their depth and velocity; the position and character of bridges, and fords;--in fine, a full description of all obstacles to be encountered, and the means that can be made available for overcoming these obstacles. a reconnoitring officer may usually derive much valuable information from the published maps and descriptions of the country to be examined; additional matters of detail may be obtained from woodsmen, hunters, and fishermen; and also from the innkeepers and local authorities of the district. but the officer should always verify this information, so far as practical, by personal examination. in making a reconnaissance in the vicinity of an enemy, he must be supported by a strong escort of mounted troops, and in all his operations the greatest precaution will be requisite to ensure success. some simple instrument, such as a pocket sextant, or compass, will be sufficient to enable the reconnoitring officer to measure, with considerable accuracy, the height of mountains, the width of streams, &c., and an ordinary scale and dividers will enable him to make a suitable military sketch. _temporary fortification._--it has been stated in the preceding chapter that temporary fortifications are properly confined to the operations of a single campaign, and are used to strengthen positions which are to be occupied only for a short period; and that they are usually made of earth, thrown up by the troops in a single day. temporary fortifications, as a part of field-engineering, may therefore be regarded rather as an _arm_ than an _art_. the principles of their construction are derived, of course, from the theory of permanent fortification, but in applying these principles to practice in the field, much greater latitude is allowed than in the exact scientific arrangement of permanent works. the purpose of field-works (or intrenchments, as they are commonly called) is to arrest, or at least to impede, the march of the attacking foe; to shelter the defensive troops from the missive weapons of the assailants, and to detain them in a position where they will be exposed to the fire of the defensive force. the numerical and positive strength of the assailed may be much less than that of the assailant, and yet an equilibrium exist; the material obstacles compensating for the difference in numbers. intrenchments, though inert masses, must therefore be regarded as most valuable and important accessaries in the defence of a position. intrenchments consist either of _lines_ of works made to cover extended positions, or of _detached_ works designed simply to defend the ground they occupy. the former generally present a front against the enemy in but one direction, while the latter are usually closed on all their sides. the following figures have been employed for the plan of simple intrenchments, viz.: the polygon, redan, lunette, mitre, star-fort, and bastion. _square_ or _polygonal redoubts_ are the most common forms given to field-works, on account of the ease of their construction. but they have many defects. there is a sector without fire in front of each salient, and the ditches are without protection. the latter objection also holds good against all circular works. the _redan_ (fig. ) is frequently used to cover a point in rear, as a bridge, a ford, or a defile. when used alone, its gorge should be closed by palisades. its ditches are unprotected. the _lunette_ (fig. ) has nearly the same defects as the redan. the _mitre_, or _priest-cap,_ (fig. ,) may be employed with advantage when a cross-fire is required on the capital of the work. the _star-fort_ has all the defects, without the merit of simplicity, which belong to the polygonal redoubt. the _bastion-fort_ (fig. ) more fully satisfies the conditions of a good defence than any other plan; but it is less simple and easy of execution. it is usually composed of four or five fronts, but it may be applied to a polygon of any number of sides. for the details of the construction of these several works, we must refer to the special treatises on field-fortification. lines of intrenchments may be made either continuous or with intervals. in adopting either plan, the engineer should avail himself of all the natural obstacles presented by the position, so as to diminish the labor of erecting artificial means of defence. the simplest arrangement for a continuous intrenchment is the _cremaillière_ or indented line. when applied to an irregular site, or used to connect together distant and detached works, the indented line may be regarded as a good disposition. mitres and redans, connected by straight curtains, are sometimes employed, as also a combination of large and small redans, forming alternate salient and re-entering angles. a continuous line of bastions is preferable to any other arrangement, when there is plenty of time for their construction. lines with intervals are frequently formed of alternate lunettes and square redoubts. other detached works may be employed in the same way. this manner of intrenching a position has several advantages, with disciplined troops. the first shock of the assailant is sustained by the detached works, and when he attempts to penetrate in the intervals, his flanks become exposed to a deadly cross fire. these intervals also allow the assailed to act on the offensive, by charging the enemy at the opportune moment. but with raw and militia forces it will be safer to resort to continuous lines. if cavalry form any part of the defensive force, it will be absolutely necessary to leave intervals through which these troops may charge. a vertical section of all intrenchments is of the same general form; the dimensions will, of course, vary with the nature of the soil, and the time and means employed in their construction. the minimum dimensions that can be used with any considerable advantage are given in fig. . in laying out field-works advantage should be taken of all available artificial obstacles, such as hedges, walls, houses, outbuildings, &c. a thickset hedge may be rendered defensible by throwing up against it a slight parapet of earth. stone fences may be employed in the same way. walls of masonry may be pierced with loop-holes and arranged for one or two tiers of fire. the walls of houses are pierced in the same manner, and a projecting wooden structure, termed a _machicoulis gallery_, is sometimes made from the floor of the second story, to enable the assailed to fire down upon their opponents. this arrangement is frequently employed to advantage in wooden blockhouses against a savage foe; but it is of little avail when exposed to the fire of artillery. some have proposed galleries of this description in permanent works of masonry, but the project is too obviously absurd to merit discussion. in addition to the parapet of an intrenchment, a good engineer will always find time and means for constructing other artificial obstacles, such as trous-de-loup, abattis, palisades, stockades, fraises, chevaux-de-frise, crows'-feet, mines, &c. _trous-de-loup_ are pits dug in the earth in the form of an inverted truncated cone, some six feet in diameter, and about the same number of feet in depth. they are usually placed a few yards in front of the ditch, and concealed by some slight covering. _abattis_ are tops and large limbs of trees arranged along the glacis of a work; the ends of the branches are lopped off and sharpened. _palisades_ are stakes some eight or ten feet long, with one end fastened in the ground and the other made sharp. they are placed in juxtaposition and connected together by horizontal riband-pieces. this arrangement is frequently placed at the foot of the counterscarp. when the timbers are large and the work is intended as a part of a primary defence, it is called a _stockade_; when the stakes are placed at the foot of the scarp, either horizontally or inclined, they receive the name of _fraises_. a _cheval-de-frise_ consists of a horizontal piece of timber armed with wooden or iron lances, which project some eight or ten feet. it is much employed against cavalry, and on rocky soils serves as a substitute for palisades. _crows'-feet_ are small wooden or iron forms filled with sharp spikes. they are thrown, with their points upward, on ground which is to be passed over by cavalry. _mines_ are sometimes used in connection with intrenchments, but more commonly in the attack and defence of permanent works. they will be noticed further on. fieldworks which are to be occupied for a considerable length of time will usually have their steeper slopes revetted, and be arranged with scarp and counterscarp, galleries, traverses, blindages, &c. such works hold an intermediary rank between temporary and permanent fortification. as examples of the importance of field fortifications and of the manner of organizing them, the reader is referred to the celebrated battle of fontenoy, in , where the carefully-arranged intrenchments of marshal saxe enabled the french to repel, with immense destruction, the attacks of greatly superior numbers; to the battle of fleurus, in , where the prince of waldeck exposed himself to a most disastrous defeat "by neglecting the resources of fortification and other indispensable precautions;" to the battle of malplaquet, in , where marshal villars, by neglecting to occupy and intrench the farm that closed the passage between the woods of sars and lanière, exposed himself to a disastrous defeat; to the operations of , where general custine, by neglecting to intrench the heights that covered bingen, as the engineers had recommended, exposed himself to those terrible disasters which forced him to a precipitate retreat; to the works of wervike, which, by a vigorous resistance on the th of september, , saved the dutch army from total destruction; to the intrenched camp of ulm, in , which for six weeks held in check the victorious army of moreau; to the intrenched lines of torres vedras, in , which saved from destruction the english army of wellington; to the field-defences of hougomont, which contributed so much to the victory of waterloo, &c. _military communications._--the movements of armies are always much embarrassed by forests, marshes, and water-courses, and nothing contributes more to the dispatch of military operations than the means of opening practical and easy communication through these various obstacles. it is not necessary here to enter into any detailed discussion of the manner of constructing military communications through forests or marshes. in a new country like ours, where almost every one has had some experience in road-making, no very great technical knowledge is required for the construction of temporary works of this character; but much professional skill and experience will be requisite for the engineers who make the preliminary reconnaissances, and fix the location of these roads. water-courses may be crossed by means of fords, on the ice, or by ferries and bridges. when temporary bridges or ferries are constructed by the army in the field, they are classed under the general head of _military bridges_, or more properly, _pontoniering_. where the depth of the stream is not great, the current slight, and the bottom smooth and hard, the passage may be effected by _fording_. if the bottom be of mud, or large stones, the passage will be difficult and dangerous, even where the depth and current are favorable. under favorable circumstances infantry can ford a stream where the depth is not greater than four feet; cavalry to a depth of four or five feet; but artillery, and engineer trains, cannot go to a depth of more than two and a half feet, without greatly exposing their ammunition and military stores the fords should be accurately staked out before the passage is attempted, and ropes ought to be stretched across the stream, or cavalry and small boats stationed below, to prevent the loss of life. ice may be crossed by infantry, in small detachments. its strength may be increased by covering it with boards, or straw, so as to distribute the weight over a greater surface. by sprinkling water over the straw, and allowing it to freeze, the mass may be made still more compact. but large bodies of cavalry, and heavy artillery, cannot venture on the ice unless it be of great thickness and strength. an army can never trust, for any length of time, to either fords or ice; if it did a freshet or a thaw would place it in a most critical state. military bridges will, therefore, become its only safe reliance for keeping open its communications. military bridges are made with trestles, rafts, boats, and other floating bodies. rope bridges are also sometimes resorted to by troops for passing rivers. _trestle bridges_ are principally used for crossing small streams not more than seven or eight feet in depth: they also serve to connect floating bridges with the shore, in shallow water. the form of the trestle is much the same as that of an ordinary _carpenter's horse,_ i.e., a horizontal beam supported by four inclined legs. these trestles are placed in the stream, from twelve to twenty feet apart, and connected by string-pieces, (or _balks_ as they are termed in technical language,) which are covered over with plank. the action of the current against the bridge may be counteracted by anchors and cables, or by means of boxes or baskets attached to the legs of the trestles, and filled with stones. a more substantial form may be given to the bridge by substituting for the trestles, piles, or the ordinary framed supports so much used in the newer parts of our country. for examples of the use of bridges of this description we would refer to caesar's celebrated bridge across the rhine; the passage of the scheldt in by the spaniards; the passage of the lech in by gustavus adolphus; the passage of the danube in by marshal saxe; the great bridge across the var during napoleon's italian campaigns; the passage of the lech in by lecourbe; the bridges across the piava, the isonso, &c., in the subsequent operations of the army in italy; the celebrated passage of the danube at the island of lobau in ; the passage of the agueda in by the english; the passages of the dwina, the moscowa, the dneiper, the beresina, &c., in the campaign of ; the repairing of the bridge near dresden, and the passage of the elbe in , &c. _rafts_ formed of timbers, casks, barrels, &c., are frequently used as military bridges. they may be made to bear almost any weight, and will answer for the passage of rivers of any depth and width, provided the current be not rapid. where the bridge is to be supported by rafts made of solid timbers, these timbers should be first placed in the water, to ascertain their natural position of stability, and then the larger ends cut away on the under side, so as to present the least possible resistance to the action of the current. they are afterwards lashed together by strong rope or withe lashing, or fastened by cross-pieces let into the timbers, and held firm by bolts, or wooden pins. these rafts are kept in place by anchors and cables placed up and down stream. the roadway is formed in nearly the same manner as for a bridge supported on trestles. empty casks, and other floating bodies, may be substituted in place of logs in the construction of rafts. for examples of the use of rafts in the construction of military bridges, we would refer to the passage of the seine in by count charolais; the passage of the meuse in , by alexander farnése; the passage of the vistula in , the borysthenese in , and the sound in , by charles xii.; the passage of the adige in ; the passage of the po in ; and the subsequent military operations in the spanish peninsula. military bridges are frequently made of _boats_, and the ordinary river-craft found in the vicinity of the intended passage. flat-bottomed boats are the most suitable for this purpose, but if these cannot be obtained, keel boats will serve as a substitute. when these water-craft are of very unequal sizes, (as is frequently the case,) two smaller ones may be lashed together to form a single support; they can be brought to the same level by means of stone ballast. the gunwales must be suitably arranged for supporting the balks, or else frameworks should be erected for this purpose from the centre of the boat. the arrangement of the roadway, anchors, &c., is the same as before. a _bridge-equipage_ made to follow an army in its movements in the field, is generally composed of light skiffs or batteaux, and the necessary timbers, planks, anchors, &c., for forming the roadway, and keeping the bridge in its position. all these articles are constructed especially for this purpose. all the wood-work should be of tough and well-seasoned timber, so as to impose no unnecessary weight on the wagon trains. the bateaux should also be made of strong and light materials. for convenience in transportation, these boats are sometimes made with hinges so as to fold up. the ribs are usually of oak, and the sides and bottom of pine. instead of plank, a covering of tin, copper, india-rubber, &c., has sometimes been substituted. floating supports of this character are often made in compartments, so as to prevent their sinking when injured by the enemy's projectiles. indian-rubber pontons may be folded up into a small space, and their slight weight renders them convenient for transportation. on navigable streams a part of the bridge resting on one or two bateaux should be so arranged that it can be shipped out of its place, forming a _draw_ for the passage of river-craft. indeed, it would be well, even where the river is not navigable, to form a draw for the passage of trees, and other floating bodies, sent down by the enemy against the bridge. an ordinary bridge-equipage of bateaux, or light pontons, for crossing a river of from three to four hundred yards in width, and of moderate current, will require a train of from sixty to eighty wagons.[ ] under favorable circumstances, and with a well-instructed corps of pontoniers, the bridge may be thrown across the river, and prepared for the passage of an army in a few hours at most.[ ] after the troops have passed over, the bridge may be taken up, and replaced on the wagons in from a quarter to half an hour. [footnote : the number of wagons in a ponton train will be greatly diminished if it be found that indian-rubber boats may be used as supports for the bridge. the engineer department of our army are making experiments to determine this point.] [footnote : in , three bridges of bateaux were thrown across the po, near placentia, each fifteen hundred feet in length, and entirely completed in eight hours. in , two bridges of bateaux were thrown across the rhine, at wesel, in half an hour; again, in the same year, a third bridge was thrown across this river near dusseldorf, in six hours. in , col. birago, of the austrian army, arrived on the bank of the weisgerben arm of the danube, with his bridge-equipage, at a round trot, and immediately began the construction of his bridge, without any previous preparation or examination. in less than three-quarters of an hour the bridge was completed, and three loaded four-horse wagons passed over on a trot, followed by a column of infantry.] the following examples will serve to illustrate the use of different kinds of boat-bridges in military operations:--the passage of the rhine, in , by villars; the passage of the dnieper and the bog, in , by the russians; the passage of the danube, in , by marshal saxe; the passage of the rhine, near cologne, in , by the prince of clermont; the passage of the rhine, in , by jourdan; the passage of the rhine, at kehl, in , by moreau; and again the same year, at weissenthurn, and at neuwied, by jourdan; the bridges across the rhine, at the sieges of kehl and huninguen, in ; the passage of the limmat, in , by massena; the passages of the mincio, the adige, the brenta, the piava, &c., in ; the passages of these rivers again in ; the passages of the narew, in , by the russians; the several passages of the danube, in , by the french and austrian armies; the passages of the tagus and douro, in , by the english; the passages of the niemen, the dwina, the moskwa, and the beresina, in , by the french; and of the great rivers of germany and france, in and . a floating body, propelled from one bank to the other by the current of the stream, is termed a _flying-bridge._ the usual mode of establishing a ferry of this kind, is to attach the head of the boat by means of a cable and anchor to some point near the middle of the stream. by steering obliquely to the current, the boat may be made to cross and recross at the same point. a single passage may be made in the same way, by the action of the current without the cable and anchor, but the boat in this case will be carried some distance down the stream. rowboats are employed for crossing over infantry by successive debarkations; but this process is too slow for the passage of a large force; it may very well be resorted to as auxiliary to other means. steam craft are so common at the present day on all navigable streams, that an army in the field will frequently be able to avail itself of this means of passing the larger rivers. but, in a hostile country, or in one already passed over by the enemy, it will not be safe to rely with confidence upon obtaining craft of this character. a well-organized army will always carry in its train the means of effecting a certain and speedy passage of all water-courses that may intercept its line of march. flying-bridges or rowboats were employed in the passage of the dwina, in , by the swedes; the passage of the po, in , by prince eugene; the passage of the rhine, at huninguen, in ; jourdan's passage of the rhine in ; moreau's passage in ; the sieges of kehl and huninguen in ; massena's passage of the limmat, and soult's passage of the linth, in ; the passage of the rhine, at lucisteig in ; the passage of the po, by the french, just before the battle of marengo; and others in italy, germany, and spain, in the subsequent campaigns of napoleon. military bridges have sometimes been formed of ropes, cables stretched across the stream, and firmly attached at each end to trees, or posts let into the earth. if the shore is of rock, rings with staples let into the stone form the best means for securing the ends of the main ropes. plank are laid on these cables to form the roadway. the ropes forming the "side-rail" of the bridge are passed over trestles at each shore, and then fastened as before. short vertical ropes attach the main supports to these side ropes, in order that they may sustain a part of the weight passing over the bridge. constructions of this character are fully described in douglas's essay on military bridges. for example, see the passage of the po, near casal, in , by the swiss; the bridge thrown over the clain by admiral coligni, at the siege of poitiers, in ; the operations of the prince of orange against ghent and bruges, in ; the passage of the tagus, at alcantara, in , by the english; the bridge constructed across the zezere, by the french, in ; the bridge thrown across the scarpe, near douai, in ; the experiments made at fêre in , &c. the passage of a river in the presence of an enemy, whether acting offensively or in retreat, is an operation of great delicacy and danger. in either case the army is called upon to show the coolest and most determined courage, for its success will depend on its maintaining the strictest discipline and good order. in the case of a retreat the bridge should be covered by field intrenchments, called a _tête de pont_, and defended by a strong guard. if the river be of moderate width, the enemy may be kept at a distance by heavy batteries on the opposite shore. as soon as the passage is effected by the main body, the bridge, if permanent, will be blown up, or otherwise destroyed by the miners, and if floating, will be swung round to the other shore. the rear-guard will pass over in rowboats, or the end pontons detached for that purpose. an army retreating in the face of an enemy should never rely upon one single bridge, no matter what may be its character: for the slightest accident happening to it might expose the whole army to inevitable destruction. the passage of a river by main force, against an enterprising and active enemy on the opposite shore, is always an operation of the greatest difficulty, and not unfrequently accompanied with the most bloody results. the most effectual method of accomplishing this object is by stratagem. demonstrations are made at several points at the same time: bodies of troops are thrown across, after nightfall, in rowboats or by flying-bridges, to get possession of the opposite bank. the vanguard of light cavalry may cross by swimming. the pontoniers should have their bridge equipage in readiness near the intended point of passage, so that it can be thrown across with the greatest possible rapidity, while the advanced guards are still able to keep the enemy at a distance. under favorable circumstances the pontoniers will have the bridge in readiness for the passage of the army before the enemy can collect his troops upon the threatened point. cannon-balls and hollow shot are the most effectual means for destroying an enemy's bridge when our batteries can be planted within reach. when this cannot be done, we must resort to fire-boats, floating rafts, &c., to accomplish our object. operations of this kind carried on in the night, are most likely to succeed. to protect bridges from the action of these floating bodies, stockades, or floating chevaux-de-frise are constructed across the stream at some distance above the bridge; strong cables, or chains stretched directly across the river, or with an angle up stream, may be used in place of stockades, or in conjunction with them. guards should be stationed above the bridge, with boats, ropes, grapnels, &c., for the purpose of arresting all floating bodies and drawing thorn ashore, or directing them safely through the _draw_ in the bridge arrangement. the troops especially charged with the construction and management of the various kinds of military bridges, are denominated _pontoniers_. the duties of these troops are arduous and important, and, in a country like ours, intersected by numerous water-courses, the success of a campaign will often depend upon their skill and efficiency. _sapping_.--this is a general term applied to the operations of forming trenches, along which troops may approach a work without being exposed to the fire of the besieged. in addition to the ordinary sapping-tools, such as shovels, picks, gabion-forks, &c., used in constructing trenches, there will also be required a considerable amount of sapping materials, such as gabions, fascines, sap-fagots, sandbags, &c. the _gabion_ is a cylindrical basket of twigs, about two feet in diameter, and some three feet in length, and without a bottom. it is made by driving into the ground, in a circular form, a number of small pickets about an inch in diameter, and of the length required for the gabion. twigs are wattled between the pickets like ordinary basket-work, and fastened at the ends by withs or packthread. gabions are used in forming saps, batteries, blindages, powder-magazines, and in revetting the steep slopes of field-works. the _fascine_ is a bundle of twigs closely bound up, from nine to twelve inches in diameter, and from ten to fifteen or twenty feet in length. the largest are sometimes called _saucissons_. in making a fascine, straight twigs about the thickness of a man's finger are laid side by side, and firmly compressed together by a strong rope or chain attached to the extremities of two levers. while held in this position the twigs are firmly bound together by withs or cords. fascines are used in constructing trenches, batteries, &c., and for filling up wet ditches. the _sap-fagot_ is a strong fascine about ten inches in diameter and two feet in length, with a picket inserted through the middle. it is used in the double sap in connection with gabions. _sand-bags_ are usually made of coarse canvass. when filled with earth they are some six or eight inches in diameter, and from eighteen inches to two feet in length. from their perishable nature, they are used only when other materials cannot be procured, and where it is important to place the troops speedily under cover from the enemy's fire. bales of wool, cotton, hay, straw, &c., may be employed in sapping for the same purposes as the above materials, when they can be procured in sufficient quantity. pork and flour barrels, which are usually in abundance in a camp, are frequently filled with sand and used for forming magazines, blindages, &c., in field-works. a trench constructed in ordinary soil beyond the range of the enemy's grape, is called a _simple sap_, or ordinary trench. the earth is thrown up on the side towards the place besieged, so as to form a kind of parapet to cover the men in the trench. the labor is here executed under the supervision of engineer soldiers, by working parties detached from the other arms. fig. represents a vertical section of a simple sap. when within range of the enemy's grape, the _flying sap_ is resorted to in order to place the workmen speedily under cover. in this operation, gabions are placed in juxtaposition on the side towards the besieged work, and filled with all possible speed by the workmen. three rows of fascines are usually placed on the top of the gabions to increase the height. the most difficult part of the flying sap is executed by engineer troops, and the trench is completed by the ordinary working parties. fig. represents a section of this sap. the _full-sap_ is employed when the works of the besiegers are within range of musketry, or when the grape fire of the besieged is so deadly that the flying sap can no longer be used. this is a difficult operation, and unless executed with great care and by well-instructed engineer troops, the construction of the trench will be attended with an immense loss of life. the work must be executed under cover of a _sap-roller,_ which is a cylindrical mass of fascines, wool, or cotton, some two feet in diameter. on very smooth ground a ball-proof shelter on wheels might be used as a substitute. the sap-roller being placed along the line of the trench so as to cover the sapper in front, who is armed with a musket-proof headpiece and cuirass, this sapper commences the sap by placing a gabion on the line of the proposed trench and fills it with earth, working on his hands and knees. having filled the first gabion, he pushes forward the sap-roller and places a second one next the first, stopping the open joint between the two with a stop-fagot. the second gabion being filled in the same manner as the first, others are successively established. when the first sapper has advanced a few feet, he is followed by a second, also in defensive armor, who increases the excavation and embankment; this sapper is then followed in the same way by a third and a fourth, after which the trench will be sufficiently advanced to be turned over to the ordinary workmen. the sap-fagots may be removed when the embankment becomes thick enough to resist grape. fig. represents a plan and section of a full-sap. when the direction of the trench is such that the men are exposed on both sides, it will be necessary to throw up an embankment both to the right and left. this operation is called the _double sap,_ and is executed by two parties of sappers, working side by side. in this sap it will be necessary to frequently change the direction of the trench, or to throw up traverses, in order to cover the men at a distance from the sap-roller. wing-traverses, on the side of the trench which is least exposed, some times serve the same purpose as a double sap. _mines_.--by _mining_, as a military term, we understand the operations resorted to for the demolition, with powder, of a military structure of any description. the term _mine_ is applied both to the excavation charged with powder for the purpose of producing an explosion, and to the communications which lead to this excavation. the place in which the charge of powder is lodged is called the _chamber_, the communication by which this place is reached the _gallery_, and the excavation made by the explosion is termed the _crater_. the form of the crater caused by an explosion in ordinary soils is assumed to be a truncated cone, the diameter, _c d_, (fig. ,) of the lower circle being one-half the diameter, _a b_, of the upper circle. this form has never been ascertained to be exactly correct, but the theoretical results deduced from a mathematical discussion of this figure have been fully verified in practice. the radius, _p b_, of the upper circle is termed the _crater radius_; the line _o p_, drawn from the centre of the charge perpendicular to the surface where the explosion takes place, is termed the _line of least resistance_; the line _o b_, drawn from the centre of the powder to any point in the circumference of the upper circle, is termed the _radius of explosion_. when the crater radius is equal to the line of least resistance, the mine is termed _common_; when this radius is greater than the line of least resistance, the mine is termed _overcharged_; and when the radius is less, _undercharged_. a mine of small dimensions, formed by sinking a shaft in the ground, is termed a _fougasse_. the term _camouflet_ is applied to a mine used to suffocate the enemy's miner, without producing an explosion. small mines made in rock or masonry, merely for the purpose of excavation, without any considerable external explosion, are called _blasts_. from experiments made on common mines, whose line of least resistance did not exceed fifteen feet, it has been ascertained that the tenacity of the earth is completely destroyed around the crater to a distance equal to the crater radius, and that empty galleries would be broken in at once and a half that distance. it has also been proved by experiment, that the crater radius in overcharged mines may be increased to six times the line of least resistance, but not much beyond this; that within this limit the diameter of the crater increases nearly in the ratio of the square roots of the charge; and that empty galleries may be destroyed by overcharged mines at the distance of four times the line of least resistance. by means of the deductions of physico-mathematical theory, and the results of experiments, rules have been determined by which the miner can calculate, with much accuracy, the charge necessary to produce a required result in any given soil. in the earlier stages of the history of this art, mines were only used to open breaches and demolish masses of masonry; but in later times they have been employed as important elements in the attack and defence of places. an isolated wall, only two or three feet thick, may readily be demolished by exploding one or two casks of powder placed in contact with its base. if the wall be five or six feet thick, the charges should be placed under the foundation. for walls of still greater thickness it will be best to open a gallery to the centre of the wall, a foot or two above its base, and place the powder in chambers thus excavated. revetment walls may be overturned by placing the charges at the back of the wall, about one-third or one-quarter of the way up from the base. if placed too near the base, a breach will be made in the wall without overturning it. to demolish a bridge of masonry the powder should be lodged in chambers excavated in the centre of the piers. when there is not time for excavating these chambers in the piers, a trench may be cut over the key of the arch, in which the powder is placed and exploded; or, the casks of powder may be suspended immediately under the arch, with the same results. where a saving of powder is of consequence, small chambers may be excavated in the haunches of the arch, and the mine carefully _tamped_ before firing it. bridges of wood may be destroyed by suspending casks of powder under the principal timbers, or attaching them to the supports. palisading, gates, doors, &c., may be destroyed in the same way, by suspending casks or bags of powder against their sides; or still more effectually, by burying the charges just beneath their base. to demolish a tower, magazine, or house, of masonry, place charges of powder under the piers and principal walls of the building. in wooden structures the powder should be placed under, or attached to the principal supports. where time is wanting to effect these arrangements, a building may be blown down by placing a large mass of powder in the interior. the powder may be economized, in this case, by putting it in a strong case, which should be connected with the walls of the building on all sides by wooden props. special treatises on military mining contain full instructions for regulating the size and position of the charge for the various cases that may be met with in the practical operations of field-engineering. as applied to the attack and defence of a fortified place, mines are divided into two general classes--_offensive_ and _defensive_ mines. the former are employed by the besiegers to overthrow the scarps and counterscarps of the place, to demolish barriers, palisades, walls, and other temporary means of defence, and to destroy the mines of the besieged. the latter are employed by the opposite party to blow up the besiegers' works of attack, and to defend the passage of ditches against an assault. small mines called _fougasses_ may be employed for the last named object. the _shell-fougasse_ is composed of a wooden box filled with one or more tiers of shells, and buried just below the surface of the earth. sometimes a quantity of powder is placed under the shells, so as to project them into the air previous to their explosion. the _stone fougasse_ is formed by making a funnel-shaped excavation, some five or six feet deep, and placing at the bottom a charge of powder enclosed in a box, and covered with a strong wooden shield; several cubic yards of pebbles, broken stone, or brickbats, are placed against the shield, and earth well rammed round, to prevent the explosion from taking place in the wrong direction. these mines are fired by means of powder hose, or by wires connected with a galvanic battery. the defensive mines employed to blow up the besiegers' works, are generally common mines with the lines of least resistance seldom greater than fifteen feet. all the main galleries and principal branches of mines for a permanent fortification are constructed at the same time with the other portions of the work, leaving only the secondary branches, chambers, &c., to be made during the siege. for the general arrangement of these galleries, and the precautions necessary for their protection from the operations of the besiegers, reference must be made to treatises specially devoted to the discussion of this subject. mines can seldom be employed with advantage in works of slight relief, and liable to an assault. but if judiciously arranged in the plan of their construction, and well managed during the operations of the siege, they contribute very materially to the length of the defence. _attack and defence_.--this subject admits of two natural divisions: st, of intrenchments, and d, of permanent works. i. intrenchments maybe attacked either by _surprise_, or by _open force_. in either case the operations should be based on exact information of the strength of the works and the number and character of the garrison--information that can be obtained from spies, deserters, and prisoners, and confirmed by examinations or reconnaissances made by officers of engineers. by these means a pretty accurate knowledge may be obtained of the natural features of the ground exterior to the works; their weak and strong points; and their interior arrangements for defence. in an attack by surprise, the troops should consist of a storming party and a reserve of picked men. the attacking column is preceded by a company of sappers armed with axes, shovels, picks, crowbars, &c.; bags of powder are also used for blowing down gates, palisades, &c. all the operations must be carried on with the utmost dispatch. the time most favorable for a surprise is an hour or two before day, as at this moment the sentinels are generally less vigilant, and the garrison in a profound sleep; moreover, the subsequent operations, after the first surprise, will be facilitated by the approach of day. under certain circumstances, it may be advisable to make false attacks at the same time with the true one, in order to distract the attention of the garrison from the true point of danger. but false attacks have, in general, the objection of dividing the forces of the assailants as well as of the assailed. in all attacks by surprise, secrecy is the soul of the enterprise. in an open assault, if artillery be employed, the troops should be drawn up in a sheltered position, until the fire of the works is silenced, and breaches effected in the parapet. but if the bayonet alone be resorted to, the troops are immediately brought forward at the beginning of the assault. the attack is begun by a storming party of picked men: they are preceded, as before, by a body of sappers, provided with necessary means for removing obstacles, and followed by a second detachment of engineers, who will widen the passages, and render them more accessible to the main body of troops who now advance to the assistance of the storming party. if the assailants should be arrested at the counterscarp by obstacles which must be removed before any farther progress can be made, the infantry troops of the detachment display and open a fire upon the assailed, in order to divert their fire from the sappers. a few pieces of light artillery, on the flanks of the column, may sometimes be employed for this purpose with great advantage. the storming party should always be provided with scaling-ladders, planks, fascines, &c., for crossing the ditch, and mounting the scarp. if the counterscarp be revetted with masonry, the troops must either descend by ladders, or fill up the ditch with fascines, bales of straw, bundles of wool, &c.: if not revetted, a passage for the troops into the ditch will soon be formed by the shovels of the sappers. when the ditch is gained, shelter is sought in a dead angle till the means are prepared for mounting the scarp, and storming the work. if the scarp be of earth only, the sappers will soon prepare a passage for the escalade; but if revetted with masonry, the walls must be breached with hollow shot, or scaled by means of ladders. in the defence, the strictest vigilance should be at all times exerted to guard against a surprise: sentinels are posted on all the most commanding points of the work; all the avenues of approach are most thoroughly guarded; and patroles are constantly scouring the ground in all directions. at night all these precautions are redoubled. light and fire-balls are thrown out in front of the work to light up the ground, and discover the movements and approach of the enemy. each man should have his particular post assigned to him, and be thoroughly instructed in the duties he will have to perform. all auxiliary arrangements, such as palisades, abattis, &c., should be defended with the utmost obstinacy; the longer the enemy is held in check by these obstacles, the longer will he be exposed to the grape and musketry of the main work. when he assaults the parapet, he will be opposed by the bayonet in front and a well-aimed fire in flank. while in the ditch, or as he mounts the scarp, hollow projectiles, incendiary preparations, stones, logs, &c., will be rolled down upon his head. but when the assaulting column has gained the top of the scarp, the bayonet forms the most effective means of resistance. the measures resorted to in the attack and defence of the larger class of field-works, will necessarily partake much of the nature of the operations employed in the attack and defence of permanent fortifications. ii. the attack and defence of a fortress may be carried on either by a regular siege, or by irregular operations and an assault. the latter plan has sometimes been adopted when the works of the place were weak and improperly defended; where the time and means were wanting for conducting a regular siege; or where the assailants were ignorant of the means proper to be resorted to for the reduction of the fortress. such operations, however, are usually attended by an immense sacrifice of human life, and the general who neglects to employ all the resources of the engineer's art in carrying on a siege, is justly chargeable with the lives of his men. in the siege of cambrai, louis xiv., on the solicitation of du metz, but contrary to the advice of vauban, ordered the demi-lune to be taken by assault, instead of waiting for the result of a regular siege. the assault was made, but it was unsuccessful, and the french sustained great losses. the king now directed vauban to take the demi-lune by regular approaches, which was done in a very short time, and with a loss of _only five men!_ again, at the siege of ypres, the generals advised an assault before the breaches were ready. "you will gain a day by the assault," said vauban, "but you will lose a thousand men." the king directed the regular works to be continued, and the next day the place was taken with but little loss to the besiegers. but a work may be of such a character as to render it unnecessary to resort to all the works of attack which would be required for the reduction of a regular bastioned fort, on a horizontal site. for example: the nature of the ground may be such as to enable the troops to approach to the foot of the glacis, without erecting any works whatever; of course, all the works up to the third parallel may in this case be dispensed with without any violation of the rules of a siege. again, the point of attack may be such that the other parts of the place will not flank the works of approach; here a single line of _boyaux_ and short parallels may be all-sufficient. but for the purpose of discussion, we will here suppose the place besieged to be a regular bastioned work on a horizontal site, (fig. .) the operations of the siege may be divided into three distinct periods. st. the preliminary operations of the attack and defence previous to the opening of the trenches. d. the operations of the two parties from the opening of the trenches to the establishment of the third parallel. d. from the completion of the third parallel to the reduction of the place. _first period._ the object of the _investment of the place_ is to cut off all communication between the work and the exterior, thus preventing it from receiving succors, provisions, and military munitions, and also to facilitate a close reconnoissance of the place by the engineers, who should always accompany the investing corps, and pursue their labors under its protection. this corps should be composed chiefly of light troops--cavalry, light infantry, horse artillery, "brigades of engineers and mounted sappers,"--who march in advance of the besieging army, and, by a sudden movement, surround the work, seize upon all the avenues of approach, and carry off every thing without the work that can be of service either to the garrison or to the besiegers. to effect this object, the enterprise must be conducted with secrecy and dispatch. the investing corps is now distributed around the work in the most favorable positions for cutting off all access to it, and also to prevent any communication with the exterior by detachments from the garrison, and even single individuals are sent out to give intelligence to a succoring army or to reconnoitre the operations of the besieging corps. these posts and sentinels, called the _daily cordon_, are placed some mile or mile and a half from the work, and beyond the reach of the guns. but in the night-time these posts are insufficient to accomplish their object, and consequently as soon as it is dark the troops move up as close to the work as possible without being exposed to the fire of musketry. this arrangement constitutes the _nightly cordon_. by the time the main army arrives the reconnoissance will be sufficiently complete to enable the chief engineer to lay before the general the outline of his plan of attack, so as to establish the position of his depots and camp. these will be placed some two miles from the work, according to the nature of the ground. as they occupy a considerable extent of ground around the work, it will generally be necessary to form intrenchments strong enough to prevent succors of troops, provisions, &c., from being thrown into the place, and also to restrain the excursions of the garrison. the works thrown up between the camp and besieged place are termed the _line of countervallation_, and those on the exterior side of the camp form the _line of circumvallation_. these lines are generally about six hundred yards apart. it is not unusual in modern warfare to dispense with lines of circumvallation, (except a few detached works for covering the parks of the engineers and artillery,) and to hold the succoring army in check by means of an opposing force, called the _army of observation_. the measures of defence resorted to by the garrison will, of course, be subordinate, in some degree, to those of attack. as soon as any danger of an investment is apprehended, the commanding general should collect into the place all the necessary provisions, forage, military munitions, &c., to be found in the surrounding country; all useless persons should be expelled from the garrison; a supply of timber for the works of the engineers and artillery, fascines, gabions, palisades, &c., prepared; all ground within cannon range around the work levelled; hedges and trees cut down; holes filled up; temporary buildings demolished or burnt; and all obstacles capable of covering an enemy and interrupting the fire of the work, removed. during this period the engineer troops and working parties detached from the other arms will be most actively employed. as soon as the investing corps makes its appearance, bodies of light troops are thrown out to cut off reconnoitring parties, and, if possible, to draw the enemy into ambush. to facilitate these exterior operations, and to prevent a surprise, several guns of long range are placed on the salients of the bastions and demi-lunes, and others, loaded with grape, in the embrasures of the flanks, so as to sweep the ditches. about one-third of the garrison may be employed in exterior operations, and the other two-thirds in arranging the means of defence in the interior. _second period._--as soon as the engineers have completed their reconnaissances and determined on the front of attack, and all the other preparations are made, the general will direct the opening of the trenches. the ground being previously marked out, battalions of light troops, termed _guards of the trenches_, as soon as it is dark, are placed about thirty yards in front of the first parallel, (a. fig. ,) with smaller sections, and sentinels about the same distance further in advance. these guards lie down, or otherwise conceal themselves from the fire of the work. the engineer troops and detachments of workmen being first marched to the dépôts and supplied with all the necessary tools for carrying on the work, now commence their labors under the protection of these guards. by daybreak the construction of the first parallel, and the trenches connecting it with the dépôts, will be sufficiently advanced to cover the men from the fire of the place; the guards will therefore be withdrawn, and the workmen continue their labors during the day to give the trenches the proper size and form. the _parallels_ are the long lines of trench which envelop the besieged work, and serve both as covered ways for the circulation of the besiegers, and as means of defence against sorties from the garrison; they are therefore arranged with banquettes for musketry fire. the boyaux are trenches run in a zigzag direction along the capitals of the front of attack, and are intended exclusively for the circulation of the troops; they have no banquettes. the first parallel is about six hundred yards from the place, and consequently beyond the reach of grape. it is constructed by the _simple sap_. after the first night, the guards, instead of advancing in front of the work, are placed in the trenches. the second parallel (b) is made some three hundred or three hundred and fifty yards from the place, and being much exposed to grape, the _flying-sap_ is employed in its construction. batteries (h) are established between the first and second parallels to silence the fire of the demi-lunes of the collateral bastions, and others (i) near the second parallel, to enfilade the faces of the front of attack. these are armed in part with mortars and in part with heavy siege-pieces. the works are now gradually pushed forward to the third parallel, (c), which is constructed about sixty yards from the salients of the place. as the operations of the besiegers are here greatly exposed to musketry fire, the trenches are constructed by the _full-sap_. the third parallel, having to contain the guards of the trenches, and being of less development than the two preceding, is made much wider. the second parallel now contains the reserve, and the first parallel becomes the dépôt of materials. _demi-parallels_ (g) are frequently established between the second and third, to be occupied by detachments of guards. the operations of defence during this period are so directed as to harass the workmen in the trenches and retard the advance of the works of attack. garrison pieces of long range and large howitzers are brought forward on the salients of the bastions and demi-lunes of attack, so as to fire in ricochet along the capitals on which the boyaux must be pushed: light and fire-balls are thrown out as soon as it becomes dark, to light up the ground occupied by the besiegers, thus exposing them to the fire of the work and to the attacks of the sortie parties. these parties are composed of light troops who charge the guards and compel the workmen to abandon their sapping tools and stand upon the defence. they are most effective when the besiegers commence the second parallel, as the guards in the first parallel are not so immediately at hand to protect the workmen. when the sortie detachment has driven these workmen from the trenches, instead of pursuing them into the first parallel, it will display itself in battle order to cover the engineer troops, (who should always accompany the detachment in this enterprise,) while they fill up the trenches and destroy the implements of the besiegers. when the guards of the trenches appear in force, the detachment will retire in such a way, if possible, as to draw the enemy within range of the grape and musketry of the collateral works. these sorties, if successful, may be frequently repeated, for they tend very much to prolong the siege. the best time for making them is an hour or two before day, when the workmen and guards are fatigued with the labors of the night. while the besiegers are establishing their enfilading batteries, a strong fire of solid shot and shells will be concentrated on the points selected for their construction. the garrison will also labor during this period to put the work into a complete state of defence: constructing all necessary palisadings, traverses, blindages, barriers; and strengthening, if necessary, the covering of the magazines. _third period._--after the completion of the third parallel, the crowning of the covered way may be effected by storm, by regular approaches, or (if the work is secured by defensive mines) by a subterranean warfare. in the first case stone mortar-batteries are established in front of the third parallel, which, on a given signal, will open their fire in concert with all the enfilading and mortar batteries. when this fire has produced its effect in clearing the outworks, picked troops will sally forth and carry the covered way with the bayonet, sheltering themselves behind the traverses until the sappers throw up a trench some four or five yards from the crest of the glacis, high enough to protect the troops from the fire of the besieged. it may afterwards be connected with the third parallel by boyaux. when the covered way is to be crowned by regular approaches, a _double sap_ is pushed forward from the third parallel to within thirty yards of the salient of the covered way; the trench is then extended some fifteen or twenty yards to the right or left, and the earth thrown up high enough to enable the besiegers to obtain a plunging fire into the covered way, and thus prevent the enemy from occupying it. this mound of earth is termed a _trench cavalier_, (o). boyaux are now pushed forward to the crowning of the covered way and the establishing of breach batteries, (j). descents are then constructed into the ditches, and as soon as these batteries have made a breach into the walls of the bastions and outworks, the boyaux are pushed across the ditches and lodgments effected in the breaches. the demi-lune is first carried; next the demi-lune redoubt and bastion; and lastly, the interior retrenchments and citadel. in some cases the breaches are carried by assault, but the same objection is applicable here as in the storming of the covered way; _time is gained, but at an immense expense of human life._ if the place is defended by mines it will be necessary for the besiegers to counteract the effects of these works by resorting to the slow and tedious operations of a subterranean warfare. in this case a fourth trench is formed in front of the third parallel; shafts are sunk in this, about six yards apart, for establishing overcharged mines; as soon as the galleries of the besieged are destroyed by the explosion of these mines, the covered way is attacked by storm; other mines are established on the _terre-plain_ of the covered way to destroy the entrance to the galleries, and thus deprive the besieged of the use of their entire system of mines. the measures of defence during this period must embrace every thing calculated to retard the works of the besiegers. this may be most effectually accomplished by maintaining a constant fire of grape and musketry on the heads of the sap, and throwing grenades, shells, &c., into the trenches, to harass and destroy the workmen. as the musketry fire of the besiegers now becomes very destructive to the artillerists at the guns, strong musket-proof blinds are arranged to mask the mouths of the embrasures when the guns are not in battery, and also sloping blindages to cover the men when serving at the pieces. the possession of the outworks should be disputed inch by inch, and when the besiegers have reached the ditch of the body of the place, sorties, and every species of projectile, should be employed to drive off the sappers, and to retard the construction of their works. in fine, all the resources of the engineer's art should be put in requisition for the defence of the breach, and the final assault should be vigorously resisted by the bayonet, and by a well-sustained fire from all the collateral works. with respect to the relative strength of the opposing forces it may be well to remark, that if the fortress is properly constructed the garrison will be able to resist a besieging army _six times_ as numerous as itself. such is the estimate of the best engineers.[ ] [footnote : a good knowledge of the several subjects discussed in this chapter may be derived from the writings of vauban, cormontaigne, and noizet de st. paul, on the attack and defence of places and field fortification; the several _manuels_ used in the french service on sapping, mining, and pontoniering; col. pasley's experiments on the operations of a siege, sapping, mining, &c.; douglas's work on military bridges; macauley's work on field fortification; and professor mahan's _treatise on field fortification._ this last is undoubtedly the very best work that has ever been written on field fortification, and every officer going into the field should supply himself with a copy. the following are recommended as books of reference on subjects discussed in the three preceding chapters. _mémorial pour la fortification permanente et passagère._ cormontaigne. _défense des places._ cormontaigne. _attaque des places._ cormontaigne. _attaque des places._ vauban. _traité des mines._ vauban. _mémorial pour la castrametation et la fortification passagère._ lafitte-clavé. _exercice sur les fortifications._ davigneau. _mémorial de l'officier du genie._ a periodical of rare merit, containing most valuable military and scientific matter. it is conducted by officers of the french corps of engineers. it has already reached its fourteenth number, each number forming a volume. _traité complet de fortification._ noizet de st. paul. _traité d'art militaire et de la fortification._ gay de vernon. _art de la guerre._ rogniat. _essai général de fortification, &c._ bousmard. _aide-mémoire portatif à l'usage des officiers du génie._ laisné. a very valuable and useful book. _aide-mémoire de l'ingénieur militaire._ grivet. _cours d'art militaire._ laurillard fallot. _cours de fortification, &c._ lavart. _le livre de la guerre._ perrot. _journaux des siéges dans la péninsule._ belmas. _journal of sieges in spain._ john jones. both of the above are works of great value. _cours d'art militaire et de fortification militaire._ françois. _architettura militare._ marchi. _essai sur la fortification._ baltard. _la fortification._ bar-le-duc. _elémens de fortification._ bellaire. _la science des ingénieurs._ bélidor. _l'art universel des fortifications._ bitainvieu. _nouvelle manière de fortifier les places._ blondel. _les sept siéges de lille._ brun lavaine. _défense des places fortes._ carnot. _mémoire sur la fortification._ carnot. _défense de saragosse._ cavallero. _mémoires sur la fortification._ choumara. _nouvelle fortification._ coehorn. _théorie de la fortification._ cugnot. _des fortifications,_ &c. &c. darçon. _relation de la defense de dantzik._ d'artois. _les fortifications._ deville. _péribologie._ dilich. _de la fortification permanente._ dufour. a work of merit. _essai sur la défense des états par les fortifications._ duviviet. _attaque et défense des places du camp de st. omer. _l'école de la fortification._ fallois. _introduction à la fortification._ de fer. _précis de la défense de valenciennes._ ferrand. _traité théorique,_ &c. foissac-latour. _examen detaillé,_ &c. foissac-latour. _les ouvrages militaires de fosse. _instruction sur la fortification,_ &c. gaillard. _mémoires pour l'attaque et défense d'une place._ goulon. _siége of peschiera._ henin. _journal du siége de philisbourg. _précis du siége de dantzick._ kirgener. _deuxième défense de badajos._ lamare. _fortification, et l'attaque et défense des places._ lebloud. _oeuvres de lefebvre. _l'architecture des forteresses._ mandar. _traité sur l'art des siéges._ mazeroy. _la sûreté des états par le moyen des forteresses._ maigret. _défense d'ancone._ mangourit. _fortification._ marolois. _siege de turin._ mengin. _recherches sur l'art défensif,_ &c. michaloz. _la fortification de campagne,_ &c. miller. _l'art défensif,_ &c. montalembert. _journaux des siéges de flandre. _relations des siéges en europe,_ &c, musset-fathay. a very valuable and interesting work. _relation du siége de metz. _relation du siége d'anvers. _les siéges de jaffa et de st. jean d'acre. _les siéges de saragosse et de tortose._ rogniat. _siége de dantzick._ sainte-susanne. _mémoire sur la fortification permanente.--_séa. _le siége de constantine._ _elémens de fortification._ trincano. _des places fortes._ valazé. _essay on military bridges._douglas. a valuable work. _guide du pontonier._ drieu. _mémoire sur la guerre souterraine._ contèle. _traité des mines._ etienne. _traité de l'art du mineur._ geuss. _traité de fortification souterraine._ gillot. _traité pratique et théorique des mines._ lebrun. _nouveau traité des mines,_ &c. prudhomme. _manuel du sapeur._ used in the french service. _manuel du mineur._ " "" _manuel du pontonier. " "" _essay on field fortifications._ pleydell. _elements of field fortifications._ lochee. _rélation du siége de grave et mayence._ _siéges de génes._ thiébault. _traité de fortification souterraine._ mouze. _militairische mittheilungen._ xilander. _die befestigung der statten._ hauser. _abhandlung über die befestigungskunst,_&c. hauser _versuch über die verschanzungskunst._ muller. _course of elementary fortification. _pasley. this is a work of much detail--useful, no doubt, to an uneducated engineer soldier, but to an officer at all acquainted with his profession, it must seem ridiculously minute. to the above list might be added a long list of books on that branch of the engineer's art called _constructions_; but as this part of the profession is, in some degree, common both to the civil and military engineer, it is not deemed necessary to include works of this character in a list of books strictly military.] chapter xv. military education appointment and promotion. with the romans, six years' instruction was required to make a soldier; and so great importance did these ancient conquerors of the world attach to military education and discipline, that the very name of their army was derived from the verb _to practise._ modern nations, learning from experience that military success depends more upon skill and discipline than upon numbers, have generally adopted the same rule as the romans; and nearly all of the european powers have established military schools for the education of their officers and the instruction of their soldiers. france, which has long taken the lead in military science, has six military schools for the instruction of officers, containing in all more than one thousand pupils, and numerous division and regimental schools for the sub-officers and soldiers. prussia maintains some twelve general schools for military education, which contain about three thousand pupils, and also numerous division, brigade, garrison, and company schools for practical instruction. austria has some fifty military schools, which contain in all about four thousand pupils. russia has thirty-five engineer and artillery technical schools, with about two thousand pupils; twenty-five military schools for the noblesse, containing eight thousand seven hundred pupils; _corps d'armee_ schools, with several thousand pupils; regimental schools, with eleven thousand pupils; and brigade-schools, with upwards of one hundred and fifty-six thousand scholars;--making in all about two hundred thousand pupils in her military schools! england has five military schools of instruction for officers, number of pupils not known; a military orphan school, with about twelve thousand pupils; and numerous dépôt and regimental schools of practice. the smaller european powers--belgium, sardinia, naples, spain, portugal, denmark, sweden, wurtemberg, bavaria, baden, have each several military schools, with a large number of pupils. it is seen from these statistics, that the european powers are not so negligent in educating their officers, and in instructing and disciplining their soldiers, as some in this country would have us believe. washington, hamilton, knox, pickering, and others, learning, by their own experience in the war of the american revolution, the great necessity of military education, urged upon our government, as early as , the importance of establishing a military academy in this country, but the subject continued to be postponed from year to year till . in , the subaltern grade of _cadet_ was created by an act of congress, the officers of this grade being attached to their regiments, and "furnished at the public expense with the necessary books, instruments, and apparatus" for their instruction. but this plan of educating young officers at their posts was found impracticable, and in his last annual message, dec. th, , washington urged again, in strong language, the establishment of a military academy, where a regular course of military instruction could be given. "whatever argument," said he, "may be drawn from particular examples, superficially viewed, a thorough examination of the subject will evince that the art of war is both comprehensive and complicated; that it demands much previous study; and that the possession of it in its most improved and perfect state is always of great moment to the security of a nation." the subject was however postponed from time to time, till march, , when a bill was passed establishing the _military academy_. it was at first on a small scale, and its course of instruction meager and deficient. it gradually became enlarged, but lingered along, with no great improvement, till , when capt. patridge was dismissed from the superintendency, and col. thayer put in charge. from this period we date the commencement of the success and reputation which the military academy has since enjoyed. this institution, as now organized, consists of one cadet from each congressional district, and a few at large, making an average of two hundred and thirty-seven. the course of instruction is four years, after which time the cadet is sent to his regiment or corps, with higher rank if there are vacancies, but if there are no vacancies, he goes as a cadet, with the brevet rank of the next higher grade. the examination for admission to the institution is a very limited one, being confined to the elementary branches of an english education. the annual course at the academy is divided into two distinct periods, the first extending from june till september, and the second from september to the following june. during the first period, the cadets leave their barracks and encamp in tents, and are made subject to the police and discipline of an army in time of war. in addition to the thorough and severe course of practical exercises and drills in the different arms during these three summer months of each year, they are made to perform the same tours of guard-duty, night and day, as is required of the common soldier in time of actual war. this continues till the first of september of each year, when the cadets return to their barracks, and for the remaining nine months devote themselves to the prescribed course of scientific and military studies, intermixed with military exercises and practical operations in the laboratory and on the field. to test the progress of the cadets in their studies, there are held semi-annual public examinations. these examinations are strict and severe, and all who fail to come up to the fixed standard are obliged to withdraw from the institution, to allow some one else from the same district to make the trial. during their course of studies the cadets, as warrant-officers of the army, draw pay barely sufficient to defray their necessary expenses. the allowance to each is twenty-six dollars per month, but none of this is paid to the cadet, but is applied to the purchase of books, fuel, lights, clothing, board, &c. this institution furnishes each year to the army about forty subaltern officers, thoroughly instructed in all the theoretical and practical duties of their profession. after completing this course, the cadet is usually promoted from the grade of warrant-officer to that of a commissioned officer, and is immediately put on duty with his regiment or corps. this system of appointment to the army has produced the most satisfactory results, and has received the commendation of our best military men, and the approbation of all our presidents and most able statesmen. nevertheless, it has occasionally met with strong opposition; this opposition springing in part from a want of proper information respecting the character and working of the system, and in part from the combined efforts of those who from negligence or incapacity have failed to pass their examinations for promotion, and of those who, from a conscious want of qualifications or merit, feel assured that they cannot obtain commissions in the army so long as this system of merit, as fixed by examination, shall exist. hence the effort to destroy the military academy and to throw the army entirely open to _political_ appointment. several legislative bodies, acting under these combined influences, have passed resolutions, giving various objections to the military academy, and recommending that it be abolished. the objections made by the legislatures of tennessee, ohio, connecticut, new hampshire, and maine, are mostly founded on false information, and may be readily answered by reference to the official records of the war-office. but it is not the present object to enter into a general discussion of the charges against that institution, except so far as they are connected with the importance of military education, and the rules of military appointment and promotion. it has been alleged by many of the opponents of the west point academy, that military instruction is of little or no advantage to a general;--that in the wars of napoleon, and in the american revolution, and the american war of , armies were generally led to victory by men without a military education, and unacquainted with military science;--and that in the event of another war in this country, we must seek our generals in the ranks of civil life, rather than among the graduates of our military academy. the objection here made to military education will hold with equal force against education in any other profession. we sometimes find men who have become eminent in the pulpit and at the bar, or in medicine and the sciences, without ever having enjoyed the advantages of an education in academic or collegiate halls, and perhaps even without that preliminary instruction usually deemed necessary for professional pursuits. shall we therefore abolish all our colleges, theological seminaries, schools of law and medicine, our academies and primary schools, and seek for our professional men among the uneducated and the ignorant? if professional ignorance be a recommendation in our generals, why not also in our lawyers and our surgeons? if we deem professional instruction requisite for the care of our individual property and health, shall we require less for guarding the honor and safety of our country, the reputation of our arms, and the lives of thousands of our citizens? but in reality, were not these men to whom we have alluded eminent in their several professions _in spite of,_ rather than _by means of_ their want of a professional education? and have not such men, feeling the disadvantages under which they were forced to labor, been almost without exception the advocates of education in others? but is it true that most of the generals of distinction in the more recent wars were men destitute of military education,--men who rose from the ranks to the pinnacle of military glory, through the combined influence of ignorance of military science and contempt for military instruction? let us glance at the lives of the most distinguished of the generals of the french revolution, for these are the men to whom reference is continually made to prove that the military academy is an unnecessary and useless institution, the best generals being invariably found in the ranks of an army, and _not_ in the ranks of military schools. facts may serve to convince, where reasoning is of no avail. napoleon himself was a pupil of the military schools of brienne and paris, and had all the advantages of the best military and scientific instruction given in france. dessaix was a pupil of the military school of effiat, with all the advantages which wealth and nobility could procure. davoust was a pupil of the military school of auxerre, and a fellow-pupil with napoleon in the military school of paris. kleber was educated at the military school of bavaria. eugene beauharnais was a pupil of st. germain-en-loye, and had for his military instructor the great captain of the age. his whole life was devoted to the military art. berthier and marmont were both sons of officers, and, being early intended for the army, they received military educations. lecourbe had also the advantages of a military education before entering the army. pichegru and duroc were pupils of the military school of brienne. drouet was a pupil of the artillery school. foy was first educated in the college of soissons, and afterwards in the military schools of la fère and chalons. carnot, called the "organizer of french victory," received a good early education, and was also a pupil of the engineer school of mézières. several of the distinguished french generals at first received good scientific and literary educations in the colleges of france, and then acquired their military instruction in the subordinate grades of the army; and by this means, before their promotion to responsible offices, acquired a thorough practical instruction, founded on a basis of a thorough preliminary education. such was suchet, a pupil of the college of lisle-barbe; lannes, a pupil of the college of lectoure; and mortier, who was most carefully educated at cambrai; lefebvré and murat were both educated for the church, though the latter profited but little by his instruction; moreau and joubert were educated for the bar; massena was not a college graduate, but he received a good preliminary education, and for several years before he entered the army as an officer, he had enjoyed all the advantages afforded by leisure and affluent circumstances; ney, though poor, received a good preliminary education, and entered a notary's office to study a profession. hoche was destitute of the advantages of early education, but, anxious to supply this deficiency, he early distinguished himself by his efforts to procure books, and by his extraordinary devotion to military studies. by several years devoted in this way to professional studies and the practical duties of a subordinate grade in the army, hoche acquired a military knowledge which early distinguished him among the generals of the french revolution. soult and gouvion-saint-cyr, being of parents in limited circumstances, had not the advantages of extensive education, but close and diligent application, an ardent ambition, and strong and powerful intellect, combined with long years of service in the practical operations of the field, at length enabled these men to overcome all obstacles, and force their way to the higher walks of their professions. but both knew from experience the advantages of military instruction, and the importance of professional education in the army, and they have consequently both been the warmest friends and strongest advocates of the military schools of france. the polytechnic school was established too late to furnish officers for any of the earlier wars of napoleon; but in his last campaigns he began to reap the advantages of an institution which had been under his fostering care, and bertrand, dode, duponthon, haxo, rogniat, fleury, valazé, gourgaud, chamberry, and a host of other distinguished young generals, fully justified the praises which the emperor lavished on his "_poulet aux oeufs d'or"_--the hen that laid him golden eggs! in our own revolutionary war, generals washington, hamilton, gates, schuyler, knox, alexander, (lord stirling,) the two clintons, the lees, and others, were men of fine education, and a part of them of high literary and scientific attainments; washington, gates, charles lee, the clintons, and some others, had considerable military experience even before the war: nevertheless, so destitute was the army, generally, of military science, that the government was under the necessity of seeking it in foreigners--in the la fayettes, the kosciuskos, the steubens, the de kalbs, the pulaskis, the duportails--who were immediately promoted to the highest ranks in our army. in fact the officers of our scientific corps were then nearly all foreigners. but, say the opponents of the academy, military knowledge and education are not the only requisites for military success; youthful enterprise and efficiency are far more important than a mere acquaintance with military science and the military art: long service in garrison, combined with the indolent habits acquired by officers of a peace-establishment, so deadens the enterprise of the older officers of the army, that it must inevitably result, in case of war, that military energy and efficiency will be derived from the ranks of civil life. we are not disposed to question the importance of youthful energy in the commander of an army, and we readily admit that while seeking to secure to our service a due degree of military knowledge, we should also be very careful not to destroy its influence by loading it down with the dead weights of effete seniority. but we do question the wisdom of the means proposed for supplying our army with this desired efficiency. minds stored with vast funds of professional knowledge, and the rich lore of past history; judgments ripened by long study and experience; with passions extinguished, or at least softened by the mellowing influence of age--these may be best suited for judges and statesmen, for here there is time for deliberation, for the slow and mature judgment of years. but for a general in the field, other qualities are also required. not only is military knowledge requisite for _directing_ the blow, but he must also have the military energy necessary for _striking_ that blow, and the military activity necessary for parrying the attacks of the enemy. a rapid _coup d'oeil_ prompt decision, active movements, are as indispensable as sound judgment; for the general must _see_, and _decide_, and _act_, all in the same instant. accordingly we find that most great generals of ancient and modern times have gained their laurels while still young. philip of macedon ascended the throne at the age of twenty-two, and soon distinguished himself in his wars with the neighboring states. at the age of forty-five he had conquered all greece. he died at forty-seven. alexander the great had defeated the celebrated theban band at the battle of cheronea, and gained a military reputation at the age of eighteen. he ascended the throne of his father philip before twenty, and at twenty-five had reached the zenith of his military glory, having already conquered the world. he died before the age of thirty-two. julius caesar commanded the fleet sent to blockade mitylene, where he greatly distinguished himself before the age of twenty-two. he soon after held the important offices of tribune, quæstor, and edile. he had completed his first war in spain, and was made consul at rome before the age of forty. he twice crossed the rhine, and conquered all gaul, and had twice passed over to britain, before the age of forty-five; at fifty-two he had won the field of pharsalia, and attained the supreme power. he died in the fifty-sixth year of his age, the victor of five hundred battles, and the conqueror of a thousand cities. hannibal joined the carthaginian army in spain at twenty-two, and was made commander-in-chief at twenty-six. victorious in spain and france, he crossed the alps and won the battle of cannæ before the age of thirty-one. scipio africanus, (the elder,) at the age of sixteen distinguished himself at the battle of ticinus; at twenty was made edile, and soon after pro-consul in spain; at twenty-nine he won the great battle of zama, and closed his military career. scipio africanus (the younger) also distinguished himself in early life; at the age of thirty six he had conquered the carthaginian armies and completed the destruction of carthage. gengis-khan succeeded to the domain of his father at the age of thirteen, and almost immediately raised an army of thirty thousand men, with which he defeated a numerous force of rebels, who had thought to take advantage of his extreme youth to withdraw from his dominion. he soon acquired a military reputation by numerous conquests, and before the age of forty had made himself emperor of mogul. charlemagne was crowned king at twenty-six, conquered aquitania at twenty-eight, made himself master of france and the greater part of germany at twenty-nine, placed on his brows the iron crown of italy at thirty-two, and conquered spain at thirty-six. gonsalvo de cordova, the "great captain," entered the army at fifteen, and before the age of seventeen had acquired a brilliant military reputation, and was knighted by the king himself on the field of battle; at forty-one he was promoted over the heads of older veterans and made commander-in-chief of the army in italy. henry iv. of france was placed at the head of the huguenot army at the age of sixteen, at nineteen he became king of navarre; at forty he had overthrown all his enemies, placed himself on the throne of france, and become the founder of a new dynasty. montecuculi, at the age of thirty-one, with two thousand horse, attacked ten thousand swedes and captured all their baggage and artillery; at thirty-two he gained the victory of triebel, at forty-nine defeated the swedes and saved denmark, and at fifty-three defeated the turks at the great battle of st. gothard. in his campaigns against the french at a later age, he made it his chief merit, "not that he conquered, but that he was not conquered." saxe entered the army at the early age of twelve, and soon obtained the command of a regiment of horse; at twenty-four he became _maréchal-de-camp_, at forty-four marshal of france, and at forty-nine gained the celebrated victory of fontenoy. he died at the age of fifty-four. vauban entered the army of condé as a cadet at the age of seventeen, at twenty was made a lieutenant, at twenty-four he commanded two companies, at forty-one was a brigadier, at forty-three a _maréchal-de-camp_, and at forty-five commissaire-général of all the fortifications of france. at the age of twenty-five he had himself conducted several sieges, and had assisted at many others. turenne entered the army before the age of fourteen; he served one year as a volunteer, four years as a captain, four years as a colonel, three years as a major-general, five years as a lieutenant-general, and became a marshal of france at thirty-two. he had won all his military reputation by the age of forty. prince maurice commanded an army at the age of sixteen, and acquired his military reputation in very early life. he died at fifty-eight. the great condé immortalized his name at the battle of rocroi, in which, at the age of twenty-two, he defeated the spaniards. he had won all his great military fame before the age of twenty-five. prince eugene of savoy was a colonel at twenty-one, a lieutenant-field-marshal at twenty-four, and soon after, a general-field-marshal. he gained the battle of zenta at thirty-four, and of blenheim at forty-one. at the opening of the war of , he again appeared at the head of the army at the advanced age of sixty-nine, but having lost the vigor and fire of youth, he effected nothing of importance. peter the great of russia was proclaimed czar at ten years of age; at twenty he organized a large army and built several ships; at twenty-four he fought the turks and captured asoph; at twenty-eight he made war with sweden; at thirty he entered moscow in triumph after the victory of embach, and the capture of noteburg and marienburg; at thirty-one he began the city of st. petersburg; at thirty-nine he was defeated by the turks and forced to ransom himself and army. his latter years were mostly devoted to civil and maritime affairs. he died at the age of fifty-five. charles the xii. of sweden ascended the throne at the age of fifteen, completed his first successful campaign against denmark at eighteen, overthrew eighty thousand russians at narva before nineteen, conquered poland and saxony at twenty-four, and died at thirty-six. frederick the great of prussia ascended the throne at twenty-eight, and almost immediately entered on that career of military glory which has immortalized his name. he established his reputation in the first silesian war, which he terminated at the age of thirty. the second silesian war was terminated at thirty-three; and at forty-three, with a population of five millions, he successfully opposed a league of more than one hundred millions of people. prince henry of prussia served his first campaign as colonel of a regiment at sixteen; at the age of thirty-one he decided the victory of prague, and the same year was promoted to the command of a separate army. the military reputation he acquired in the seven years' war was second only to that of frederick. cortes had effected the conquest of mexico, and completed his military career, at the age of thirty-six. sandoval, the most eminent of his great captains, died at the age of thirty-one. he had earned his great renown, and closed his military achievements, before the age of twenty-five. pizarro completed the conquest of peru at thirty-five, and died about forty. lord clive began his military career at twenty-two, and had reached the zenith of his military fame at thirty-five; he was raised to the peerage at thirty-six, and died at fifty. hastings began his military service at about twenty-five, and became governor of bengal at forty. napoleon was made a lieutenant at seventeen, a captain at twenty, _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty-four, general of brigade at twenty-five, and commander-in-chief of the army of italy at twenty-six. all his most distinguished generals were, like him, young men, and they seconded him in his several campaigns with all the energy and activity of youthful valor and enthusiasm. dessaix entered the army at fifteen; at the opening of the war he quickly passed through the lower grades, and became a general of brigade before the age of twenty-five, and a general of division at twenty-six; he died before the age of thirty-two, with a reputation second only to that of napoleon. kleber did not enter the army till later in life, but he quickly passed through the subordinate grades, and was made a general of brigade at thirty-eight, a general of division at forty, and general-in-chief of an army at forty-one: he died at forty-six. on his death, and in napoleon's absence, ménau, aged and inefficient, succeeded by right of seniority to the command of the army of egypt. its utter ruin was the almost immediate consequence. massena first entered the army at seventeen, but soon married a rich wife, and retired to civil life. he returned to the army at the opening of the revolution, and in two years, before the age of thirty-five, was promoted to the rank of general of division. he immediately acquired that high reputation which he sustained through a long career of military glory. soult became a sub-lieutenant at twenty-two, a captain at twenty-four; the following year he passed through the several grades of _chef-de-bataillon_, colonel, and general of brigade, and became general of division at twenty-nine. davoust was a sub-lieutenant at seventeen, a general of brigade at twenty-three, and general of division at twenty-five. eugene beauharnais entered the army at a very early age. he became _chef-de-bataillon_ at nineteen, colonel at twenty-one, general of brigade at twenty-three, and viceroy of italy at twenty-five. he soon proved himself one of napoleon's ablest generals. at twenty-eight he commanded the army of italy, and at thirty-one gained great glory in the russian campaign, at the head of the fourth _corps d'armée._ gouvion-saint-cyr enured the army at the beginning of the revolution, and passing rapidly through the lower grades, became a general of brigade at twenty-nine, and a general of division at thirty. suchet became a _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty, general of brigade at twenty-five, major-general of brune's army at twenty-seven, and general of division and of a _corps d'armée_ at twenty-eight. oudinot became a captain at twenty-three, _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty-four, general of brigade at twenty-five, and general of division at twenty-eight. ney was a captain at twenty-three, adjutant-general at twenty-six, general of brigade at twenty-seven, and general of division at twenty-nine. lannes was a colonel at twenty-seven, general of brigade at twenty-eight, and very soon after general of division. joubert became adjutant-general at twenty-five, general of brigade at twenty-six, general of division at twenty-eight, and general-in-chief of the army of italy at twenty-nine. he died at thirty. victor was a _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty-seven, general of brigade at twenty-nine, and general of division at thirty-two. murat was a lieutenant at twenty, and passing rapidly through the lower grades, he became a general of brigade at twenty-five, and a general of division at twenty-seven. mortier was a captain at twenty-three, adjutant-general at twenty-five, general of brigade at thirty, and general of division at thirty-one. macdonald was a colonel at twenty-seven, a general of brigade at twenty-seven, and a general of division at thirty. marmont was a captain at twenty-one, _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty-two, general of brigade at twenty-four, inspector general at twenty-seven, and general-in-chief of an army at thirty-two. bernadotte was a colonel at twenty-eight, general of brigade at twenty-nine, and general of division at thirty. lefebvre was made a captain at the organization of the army in ; he became a general of brigade at thirty-eight, and general of division at thirty-nine. bessières entered the army at twenty-six, became a colonel at thirty, general of brigade at thirty-two, and general of division at thirty-four. he died at forty-seven. duroc was a captain at twenty-three, _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty-six, colonel and _chef-de-brigade_ at twenty-seven, and general of division at thirty. he died at forty-one. this list might be still further extended with the same results, but names enough have been given to show that the generals who assisted napoleon in his immortal campaigns were all, with scarcely an exception, _young men_, still burning with the fires of youthful ardor and enthusiasm. the grade of marshal was not created till after napoleon became emperor. on ascending the throne of the empire, he nominated to this rank eighteen of the most distinguished generals of france. some of these were generals of the earlier wars of the revolution, and had never served under him. others were younger men, several being only thirty-four, thirty-five, and thirty-six years of age. the mean age of all was forty-four. he afterwards made seven more marshals, whose mean age was forty-three. these appointments, however, were regarded as rewards for _past_ services, rather than as a grade from which service was expected, for several of the older marshals were never called into the field after their promotion. having noticed the ages of the principal generals who commanded in the armies of napoleon, let us look for a moment at those who opposed him. in the campaign of the enemy's forces were directed by beaulieu, then nearly eighty years of age; wurmser, also an octogenarian, and alvinzi, then over seventy: these had all three distinguished themselves in earlier life, but had now lost that youthful energy and activity so essential for a military commander. in the campaign of the general-in-chief of the austrian forces was melas, an old general, who had served some fifty years in the army; he had distinguished himself so long ago as the seven years' war, but he had now become timid and inefficient, age having destroyed his energy. in the campaign of the french were opposed by kutusof, then sixty, and mack, then fifty-three; the plan of operations was drawn up by still more aged generals of the aulic council. in the campaign of the french were opposed by the duke of brunswick, then seventy-one, hohenlohe, then sixty, and mollendorf, kleist, and massenbach, old generals, who had served under the great frederick,--men, says jomini, "exhumed from the seven years' war,"--"whose faculties were frozen by age,"--"who had been buried for the last ten years in a lethargic sleep." in the campaign of the french were opposed by kamenski, then eighty years of age, benningsen, then sixty, and buxhowden, then fifty-six. the allies now began to profit by their experience, and in the austrian army was led by the young, active, skilful, and energetic archduke charles; and this campaign, although the commander-in-chief was somewhat fettered by the foolish projects of the old generals of the aulic council, and thwarted by the disobedience of his brother, was nevertheless the most glorious in the austrian annals of the wars of the revolution. at the opening of the campaign of the emperor alexander, young, (only thirty-five,) active, intelligent, and ambitious, had remodelled his army, and infused into it his own energy and enthusiastic love of glory. he was himself at its head, and directed its operations. kutusof was for a short time the nominal commander-in-chief, and exhibited an activity unusual at his age, but he was surrounded by younger generals--barclay-de-tolley, and miloradowich, then forty-nine, wintzengerode, then forty-three, schouvalof, then thirty-five, and the archduke constantine, then thirty-three,--generals who, at the heads of their corps, and under the young emperor and his able staff of young officers, in the two succeeding campaigns, rolled back the waves of french conquest, and finally overthrew the french empire. wellington, who led the english in these campaigns, was of the same age as napoleon, and had been educated at the same time with him in the military schools of france. the austrians were led by schwartzenburg, then only about thirty, and the prussians by yorck, bulow, and blücher. the last of these was then well advanced in life, but all his movements being directed by younger men,--scharnhorst and gneisenau,--his operations partook of the energy of his able chiefs of staff. in the campaign of , napoleon was opposed by the combinations of wellington and gneisenau, both younger men than most of his own generals, who, it is well known, exhibited, in this campaign, less than in former ones, the ardent energy and restless activity which had characterized their younger days. never were napoleon's, plans better conceived, never did his troops fight with greater bravery; but the dilatory movements of his generals enabled his active enemies to parry the blow intended for their destruction. in the american war of , we pursued the same course as austria, prussia, and russia, in their earlier contests with napoleon, _i.e._, to supply our armies with generals, we dug up the beaulieus, the wurmsers, the alvinzis, the melases, the macks, the brunswicks, and the kamenskis of our revolutionary war; but after we had suffered sufficiently from the hulls, the armstrongs, the winchesters, the dearborns, the wilkinsons, the hamptons, and other veterans of the revolution, we also changed our policy, and permitted younger men--the jacksons, the harrisons, the browns, the mcreas, the scotts,[ ] the ripleys, the woods, the mccombs, the wools, and the millers--to lead our forces to victory and to glory. in the event of another war, with any nation capable of opposing to us any thing like a powerful resistance, shall we again exhume the veterans of former days, and again place at the head of our armies respectable and aged inefficiency; or shall we seek out youthful enterprise and activity combined with military science and instruction? the results of the war, the honor of the country, the glory of our arms, depend, in a great measure, upon the answer that will be given to this question. [footnote : scott had acquired his military reputation, and attained the rank of major-general at twenty-eight.] but it may be asked, how are we to secure this combination of military instruction and military energy; how are we to fill the higher grades of our army with young and active men possessing due military instruction and talent? the question is not a difficult one, and our government can easily attain the desired object, if it will only set at work honestly, disregarding all party prejudices and the mercenary and selfish interests of its own members and advisers. other governments have pointed out to us the way. it is this: let _merit_ be the main test for all appointments and promotions in the army. let one or more of the subordinate grades be thrown open to the youth of the whole country, without distinction as to birth, or wealth, or politics; let them be kept on probation in this subordinate grade, and be thoroughly instructed in all that relates to the military profession; after strict examination let them be promoted to the vacancies in the higher grades as rapidly as they shall show themselves qualified for the duties of those grades, merit and services being here as elsewhere the only tests. the first part of this rule is already accomplished by the military academy. one young man is selected from each congressional district, on an average, once in about two years, the selection being made by the representative of the district; these young men are made warrant officers in the army, and sent to a military post for instruction; frequent and strict examinations are instituted to determine their capacity and fitness for military service; after a probation of a certain length of time, the _best_ are selected for commission in the army, relative rank and appointments to corps being made strictly with reference to merit; birth, wealth, influence of political friends--all extraneous circumstances being excluded from consideration. what can be more truly and thoroughly democratic than this? what scheme can be better devised to supply our army with good officers, and to exclude from the military establishment the corrupting influence of party politics, and to prevent commissions in the army from being given to "the sons of wealthy and influential men, to the almost total exclusion of the sons of the poor and less influential men, regardless alike of qualifications and of merit?" unfortunately for the army and for the country this system ends here, and all further advancement is made by mere seniority, or by executive favoritism, the claims of merit having but little or no further influence. indeed, executive patronage is not infrequently permitted to encroach even upon these salutary rules of appointment, and to place relatives and political friends into the higher ranks of commissioned officers directly from civil life, "regardless alike of qualifications and of merit," while numbers "of sons of the poor and less influential men," who have served a probation of four or five years in military studies and exercises, and have proved themselves, in some thirty examinations made by competent boards of military officers, to be most eminently qualified for commissions, are passed by in utter neglect! our army is much more open to this kind of favoritism and political partiality, than that of almost any of the governments of europe, which we have been accustomed to regard as aristocratic and wholly unfriendly to real merit. in the prussian service, in time of peace, the government can appoint no one, even to the subordinate grade of ensign, till he has followed the courses of instruction of the division or brigade-school of his arm, and has passed a satisfactory examination. and, "no ensign can be promoted to a higher grade till after his promotion has been agreed to by the superior board or commission of examiners at berlin, and his name has been placed on the list of those whose knowledge and acquirements (_connaissances_) render them qualified (_aptes_) for the responsible duties of their profession. the nomination to the grade of second-lieutenant is not, even after all these conditions are fulfilled, left to the choice of the government. when a vacancy occurs in this grade, the subaltern officers present to the commandant of the regiment a list of three ensigns who have completed their course of study; the commandant, after taking the advice of the superior officers of the regiment, nominates the most meritorious of these three to the king, who makes the appointment." the government can appoint to the engineers and artillery only those who have been instructed as _élèves_ in the berlin school of cadets and the school of artillery and engineers, and these appointments must be made in the order in which the pupils have passed their final examination. in these corps the lieutenants and second captains can be promoted to a higher grade only after they have passed a satisfactory examination. no political influence, nor even royal partiality, can interfere with this rule. even in the arbitrary monarchies of austria and russia it is deemed necessary to subject all military appointments and promotions, in the peace establishments, to certain fixed rules. in the austrian army all sub-lieutenants must be taken from the military schools, or the specially-instructed corps of cadets and imperial guards; from this grade to that of captain all promotions are made by the commandants of regiments and corps on the advice of the other superior officers. above the grade of captain all nominations for promotion are made to the emperor by the aulic council, in the order of seniority of rank, except the claims of superior merit interfere. "in the russian army," says haillot, "no one, not even a prince of the imperial family, can reach the grade of officer till he has satisfactorily passed his several examinations, or finished the severe novitiate to which the cadets in the corps are subjected." promotion below the grade of colonel is made partly by seniority, and partly by merit; above that grade, by selection alone. in the british service, rank in the line of the army is obtained by purchase, and the higher grades are in this way filled with young men of energy and enterprise; but this efficiency is gained by injustice to the poor man, who is without the means of purchasing rank. in some respects it is preferable to our ruinous system of exclusive seniority and executive favoritism, but far more objectionable than that based on merit. wellington has recently said that the system of exclusive seniority would soon utterly destroy the efficiency of the army, by preventing young men from reaching the higher grades. "at first," says an officer of some distinction in the british navy, in speaking of promotions in that arm of service, "it certainly looks very hard to see old stagers grumbling away their existence in disappointed hopes; yet there can be little doubt that the navy, and, of course, the country at large, are essentially better served by the present system of employing active, young, and cheerful-minded officers, than they ever could be by any imaginable system by seniority. it must not be forgotten, indeed, that at a certain stage of the profession, the arrangement by which officers are promoted in turn is already made the rule, and has long been so: but, by a wise regulation, it does not come into operation before the rank of post-captain be attained. antecedent to this point, there must occur ample opportunities of weeding out those persons, who, if the rule of mere seniority were adopted, would exceedingly embarrass the navy list." we fully agree with this writer respecting the evils of a system of exclusive seniority, but not respecting the best means of remedying these evils. in england, where the wealthy and aristocratic classes govern the state, they may very well prefer a system of military appointment and promotion based exclusively on wealth and political influence; but in this country we are taught to consider _merit_ as a claim much higher than wealth, or rank, or privilege. the various changes in the rules of appointment and promotion in the french service, and the various results of these changes, both on the character of the army and the welfare of the state, are so instructive that we regret that our limits will not allow us to enter into a full discussion of them. we can give only a very brief outline. previous to the revolution, military appointment and promotion were wholly subject to the rules of nobility, certain grades in the army belonging of right to certain grades of the _noblesse_; merit and service being excluded from consideration. but the constituent assembly changed this order of things, and established the rule that three-fourths of the sub-lieutenants be appointed by selection, _after a concours_, and the other quarter be appointed from the sub-officers, alternately by seniority and selection, without _concours_; the captains and lieutenants by seniority; the colonels and lieutenant-colonels two-thirds by seniority and one-third by selection; _maréchaux-de-camp_ and lieutenant-generals one-half by seniority and one-half by selection. in the grades were still further opened to selection, and in the turbulent times that followed, a part of them were even thrown open to election by the soldiers. but in the combined system of merit and seniority, with certain improvements, was restored. in and the wars that followed, _merit_ was the only qualification required, and bonaparte, moreau, and other young generals were actually placed in command of their seniors in rank. military talent and military services, not rank, were the recognised claims for promotion, the _baptism of blood_, as it was called, having equalized all grades. bonaparte, in leaving egypt, paid no attention to seniority of rank, but gave the command to kleber, who was then only a general of brigade, while menou was a general of division. everybody knows that on the death of kleber, general menou succeeded in the command; and that egypt, saved by the _selection_ of kleber, was lost by the _seniority_ of menou. napoleon formed rules for promotion, both for peace and war, based on merit. his peace regulations were much the same as the system of ; his field regulations, however, from the circumstances of the times, were almost the only ones used. the following extract from the _reglement de campagne_ of , (title xx.,) gives the spirit of this system:--"the next day after an action the generals of brigade will present to the generals of division the names of all such as have distinguished themselves in a particular manner; the generals of division will immediately report these to the commander-in-chief, and also the names of the generals and superior officers whose conduct has contributed most to secure success, so that the general-in-chief may immediately inform his majesty." on the restoration of the bourbons there were also restored many of the ancient privileges and claims of rank by the officers of the _maison militaire du roi,_ and court favoritism was substituted for merit and service. but the revolution of produced a different order of things. "the laws now regulate military promotion; the king can appoint or promote only in conformity to legal prescriptions; and even in the exercise of this prerogative, he is wise enough to restrain himself by certain fixed rules, which protect him from intrigues, and from the obsessions of persons of influence, and of party politicians." would that the same could always be said of the executive of this country in making appointments and promotions in the army. the existing laws and regulations of the french service differ slightly for different corps, but the general rule is as follows: no one can be appointed to the grade of officer in the army who has not graduated at one of the military schools, or has not served at least two years as a sub-officer in a _corps d'armée_. in time of peace, no one can be promoted to the rank of lieutenant, captain, or major, (_chef-d'escadron_ and _chef-de-bataillon_,) till he has served two years in the next lower grade; no one can be made lieutenant-colonel till he has served four years, nor be made colonel till he has served three years, in the next lower grade; no one can be made _maréchal-de-camp_, lieutenant-general, or marshal of france, till he has served two years in the next lower grade. these numbers are all diminished one half in time of war. for the grades of first-lieutenant and captain, two-thirds of the promotions are by seniority, and one-third by selection; for the _chef-de-bataillon_ and _chef-d'escadron_, one-half by seniority and one-half by selection; for all the other grades by selection only. in time of war, one-half of the promotions to the grades of first-lieutenant and captain are filled by selection, and all the promotions to other grades in this way. for promotion by selection, a list of the authorized candidates for each grade is made out every year by inspectors, and boards of examiners appointed _ad hoc_, and the name, qualifications, and particular claim are given of each officer admitted to the _concours_. the recommendations of these inspectors and examiners are almost invariably followed by the government in its selections. this combined system of seniority and merit secures a gradual promotion to all, and at the same time enables officers of great talents and acquirements to attain the higher grades while still young and efficient. merit need not, therefore, always linger in the subaltern grades, and be held subordinate to ignorance and stupidity, merely because they happen to be endowed with the privileges of seniority. moreover, government is precluded from thrusting its own favorites into the higher grades, and placing them over the heads of abler and better men. if such a system of appointment were introduced into our army, and fixed by legal enactments, and no one were allowed to receive a commission till he had either distinguished himself in the field, or had passed an examination before a board of competent officers, we are confident that better selections would be made in the appointments from civil life than have been within the last ten years by the present system of political influence. it would scarcely be possible to make worse selections.[ ] and if the combined system of seniority and examination were pursued in promoting the subalterns already in service, it certainly would produce less injustice, and give greater efficiency to the army, than the present one of exclusive seniority and brevet rank, obtained through intrigue and political influence, or high military appointments bestowed as a reward for dirty and corrupt party services. as a military maxim, _secure efficiency, by limiting the privileges of rank; exclude favoritism, by giving the power of selection to boards of competent officers, totally independent of party politics_. such a system has been for some time pursued in the medical department of our army; it has produced the most satisfactory results; stupidity, ignorance, and aged inefficiency have been _overslaughed_, and will soon entirely disappear from that corps; they have been replaced by young men of activity, talent, character, intelligence, and great professional skill. is it less important to have competent military officers to command where the lives of thousands, the honor of our flag, the safety of the country depend upon their judgment and conduct, than it is to have competent surgeons to attend the sick and the wounded? [footnote : to show the working of this system of political appointments, we would call attention to a single fact. on the formation of an additional regiment of dragoons in , _thirty_ of its officers were appointed from civil life, and only _four_ from the graduates of the military academy. of those appointed to that regiment from civil life, _twenty-two_ have already been dismissed or resigned, (most of the latter to save themselves from being dismissed,) and only _eight_ of the whole _thirty_ political appointments are now left, their places having been mainly supplied by graduates of the military academy. in case of another increase of our military establishment, what course will our government pursue? will it again pass by the meritorious young officers of our army,--graduates of the military academy,--who have spent ten or twelve of the best years of their life in qualifying themselves for the higher duties of their profession, and place over their heads civilians of less education and inferior character--men totally ignorant of military duties, mere pothouse politicians, and the base hirelings of party,--those who screech the loudest in favor of party measures, and degrade themselves the most in order to serve party ends?--and by thus devoting the army, like the custom-house and post-office, to political purposes, will it seek to increase that vast patronage of the executive which is already debasing individual morality, and destroying the national character? should any administration of the government be so unmindful of the interests and honor of the country as to again pursue such a course, it is to be hoped that the sword of political justice will not long slumber in its scabbard.] we wish to call particular attention to this subject. it deserves attention at all times, but at the present moment it more especially demands a close and candid consideration. the higher grades of our peace establishment are now filled with men so far advanced in life that, in case of an increase of the army, many of them must undoubtedly be either passed over, or put on a retired list. sooner or later some change of this kind will undoubtedly be made. it is demanded by the good of service, even in time of peace; and in time of war, it will be absolutely necessary to the success of our arms.[ ] but the great danger is that the change may be made for the worse--that all the appointments and promotions to the higher grades will be made through political influence, thus converting the army and navy into political engines. let proper measures be taken to prevent so dangerous a result; let executive patronage in the army be limited by wholesome laws, like those in france and prussia; and let military merit and services, as determined by boards of competent military officers, be the only recognised claims to appointment and promotion, thus giving to the poor and meritorious at least an equal chance with the man of wealth and the base hireling of party. in actual service the system of exclusive seniority cannot exist; it would deaden and paralyze all our energies. taking advantage of this, politicians will drive us to the opposite extreme, unless the executive authority be limited by wholesome laws, based on the just principles of _merit_ and _service_. [footnote : even at the present moment, in ordering troops to texas, where immediate and active service is anticipated, it is found necessary to break up regiments and send only the young and efficient officers into the field, leaving most of the higher officers behind with mere nominal commands. very many of the officers now in texas are acting in capacities far above their nominal grades, but without receiving the rank, pay, and emoluments due to their services.] but the importance of maintaining in our military organization a suitable system of military instruction is not confined to the exigencies of our actual condition. it mainly rests upon the absolute necessity of having in the country a body of men who shall devote themselves to the cultivation of military science, so as to be able to compete with the military science of the transatlantic powers. it is not to be expected that our citizen soldiery, however intelligent, patriotic, and brave they may be, can make any very great progress in military studies. they have neither the time nor opportunities for such pursuits, and if they can acquire a practical acquaintance with elementary tactics--the mere alphabet of the military art--it is as much as can reasonably be expected of them. as a general rule, the militia are individually more capable and intelligent than the men who compose a regular army. but they must of necessity be inferior in practical professional knowledge. technical education is necessary in every pursuit of life. it is possible that the lawyer may succeed in some particular cases without a knowledge of law, but he will probably have few clients if he remain ignorant of the laws and precedents that govern the courts. the unlearned chemist may succeed in performing some single experiment, but his progress will be slow and uncertain if he neglect to make himself familiar with the experiments and discoveries of his predecessors. learning, when applied to agriculture, raises it from a mere mechanical drudgery to the dignity of a science. by analyzing the composition of the soil we cultivate, we learn its capacity for improvement, and gain the power to stimulate the earth to the most bountiful production. how different the results attending the labors of the intelligent agriculturist, guided by the lamp of learning, from those of the ignorant drudge who follows the barren formula of traditional precepts! as applied to manufactures and the mechanical arts, learning develops new powers of labor, and new facilities for subsistence and enjoyment. personal comforts of every kind are greatly increased, and placed within the reach of the humbler classes; while at the same time the "appliances of art are made to minister to the demands of elegant taste, and a higher moral culture." as applied to commerce, it not only greatly increases the facilities for the more general diffusion of civilization and knowledge, but is also vastly influential in harmonizing the conflicting interests of nations. nor is learning less humanizing and pacific in its influence when applied to the military art. "during the dark ages which followed the wreck of the roman power, the military science by which that power had been reared, was lost with other branches of learning. when learning revived, the military art revived with it, and contributed not a little to the restoration of the empire of mind over that of brute force. then, too, every great discovery in the art of war has a life-saving and peace-promoting influence. the effects of the invention of gunpowder are a familiar proof of this remark; and the same principle applies to the discoveries of modern times. by perfecting ourselves in military science, paradoxical as it may seem, we are therefore assisting in the diffusion of peace, and hastening on the approach of that period when swords shall be beaten into ploughshares and spears into pruning-hooks." appendix. since the first edition of this work was published, two important wars have been commenced and terminated--that between the united states and the republic of mexico, and that between russia and the western powers of europe--and another is now being waged between france and austria, upon the old battle fields of northern italy. in issuing a new edition of these elements of military art and science, it is deemed proper to refer to these wars, and to apply the principles here discussed to the military operations carried on in mexico and in the crimea. it is proposed to do this in the form of notes to the several chapters. the war in italy being still undetermined, and the details of the several battles which have already been fought being but imperfectly known, it is obviously improper to attempt to criticize their strategic character or tactical arrangement. h.w.h. new york, _july_, . note to chapter ii.--strategy. in the invasion of mexico, the united states formed four separate armies, moving on _four distinct lines of operation:_ st. the "army of the west," under general kearny, moving from st. louis on new mexico and california; d. the "army of the centre," under general wool, moving from san antonio de bexar on chihuahua; d. the "army of occupation," on the rio grande, under general taylor, moving from corpus christi on matamoras, monterey, and saltillo; and th. the "main army," under general scott, moving from vera cruz on the capital of mexico. the army of the west, under general kearny, moved upon a separate and distinct line of operations, having no strategic relations to the other three; its objects were the conquest and occupation of new mexico and upper california. the first was readily accomplished; but the general then detached so large a force to operate on chihuahua after the diversion of wool's column, that his expedition to california must have utterly failed without the assistance of the naval forces in the pacific. the lines of taylor and wool were evidently ill chosen, being so distant as to afford the enemy an opportunity to take a central position between them. fortunately wool proceeded no further than monclova, and then turned off to occupy parras, thus coming under the immediate command of general taylor. the latter fought the battles of palo alto and resaca de la palma, and sustained the siege of fort brown; then crossing the rio grande at matamoras, he captured monterey, and, forming a junction with wool, defeated the army of santa anna at buena vista. this battle ended the campaign, which, however brilliantly conducted, was entirely without strategic results. scott landed his army near the island of sacrificios without opposition, and immediately invested vera cruz, which surrendered after a short siege and bombardment. having thus secured his base, he immediately advanced to the city of puebla, meeting and defeating the army of santa anna at cerro gordo. remaining some time at puebla to reinforce his army, he advanced into the valley of mexico, and after the brilliant victories of contreras, churubusco, molino del rey, and chapultepec, captured the city and terminated the war. with respect to the double line of operations of taylor and scott it may be sufficient to remark, that santa anna, from his central position, fought, with the same troops, the battles of buena vista and cerro gordo. it should also be remarked, that the line of operations of the army of the rio grande was not approved by either scott or taylor, nor, it is believed, by any other officer of our army. scott's line of operations, however, was truly strategic, and in turning the mexican flank by lake chalco and the pedregal, he exhibited the skill of a great general. the war in the crimea, from the limited extent of the theatre of operations, afforded but little opportunity for the display of strategic skill on either side. nevertheless, the movements of both parties, prior to the investment and siege of sebastopol, are fair subjects for military criticism with respect to the plans of operation. when the allies landed their troops at the old fort, three plans were open for the consideration of the russian general: st. to destroy or close the harbors of balaklava, kamiesch, kazatch and strelitzka, and, garrisoning sebastopol with a strong force, to occupy with the rest of his army the strong plateau south of the city, and thus force the allies to besiege the strong works on the north. d. having closed the harbors on the south, and secured sebastopol from being carried by the assault of any detachment of the allies, to operate on their left flank, annoying and harassing them with his cossacks, and thus delay them many days in the difficult and precarious position which they would have occupied. d. to advance with his whole force and offer them battle at the alma. the last and least advantageous of these plans was adopted, and as the garrison of sebastopol, during the battle, consisted of only four battalions and the sailors of the fleet, it might, considering the weakness of its works, have been easily carried by a detachment of the allied forces. for the allies at the alma two plans presented themselves: st. to turn the russian left, cut him off from sebastopol, and occupy that city in force. d. to turn the russian right, and, throwing him back upon sebastopol, cut him off from all external succor. neither plan was fully carried out. the column of general bosquet turned the russian left and decided his retreat; but no strategic advantage was taken of the victory. the battle was fought on the th of september, and by noon of the th the allies had only advanced to the balbeck, a distance of a little more than ten miles in six days! on the th they regained their communication with the fleet at balaklava, without attempting to occupy sebastopol, and having exposed themselves to destruction by an ill-conducted flank march. fortunately for the allies, the russians failed to avail themselves of the advantages which the enemy had thus gratuitously afforded. the fleet having entered the open harbor of balaklava, the allies now commenced the labor of landing and moving up their siege material and of opening their trenches, while the russians prepared their fortifications on the south of sebastopol for resisting the operations of that gigantic siege which stands without a parallel in history. note to chapter iii.--fortifications. in the war between the united states and mexico, the latter had no fortifications on her land frontiers, and, with the single exception of vera cruz, her harbors were entirely destitute of defensive works. the americans, therefore, had no obstacles of this kind to overcome on three of their lines of operation; and, when scott had reduced vera cruz, his line of march was open to the capital. moreover, nearly every seaport on the gulf and pacific coast fell into our hands without a blow. had the landing of scott been properly opposed, and vera cruz been strongly fortified and well defended, it would have been taken only after a long and difficult siege. moreover, had the invading army encountered strong and well-defended fortifications on the line of march to mexico, the war would, necessarily, have been prolonged, and possibly with a different result. the russian fortifications in the baltic prevented the allies from attempting any serious operations in that quarter, and those in the black sea confined the war to a single point of the heracleidan chersonese. had russia relied exclusively upon her fleet to prevent a maritime descent, and left sebastopol entirely undefended by fortifications, how different had been the result of the crimean war. this subject will be alluded to again in the notes on sea-coast defences, and permanent fortifications. note to chapter iv.--logistics. the war in mexico exhibited, in a striking manner, our superiority over the enemy in this branch of the military art. no army was better supplied than ours in all matters of subsistence, clothing, medical and hospital stores, and in means of transportation. two points, however, are worthy of remark in this connection: st. the great waste of material, which resulted from the employment of raw troops under short enlistments, and commanded by officers appointed from civil life, who were without experience and destitute of military instruction; and, d. the immense expense of transportation, which was due in part to the above cause and in part to the employment, in the administrative departments, of civilians who were utterly ignorant of the rules and routine of military service. this war was conducted on the system of magazines and provisions carried in the train of the army, or purchased of the inhabitants and regularly paid for, forced requisitions being seldom resorted to, and then in very moderate quantities. the wisdom of this plan was proved by the general good order and discipline of our troops, and the general good-will of the non-combatant inhabitants of the country which was passed over or occupied by the army. the war in the crimea proved most conclusively the vast superiority of the french administrative system over that of the english--of the military over a civil organization of the administrative corps of an army. the french troops before sebastopol were regularly, cheaply, and abundantly supplied with every requisite of provisions, clothing, munitions, medical stores, military utensils, and hospital and camp equipages; while the english army, notwithstanding an immense expenditure of money, was often paralyzed in its operations by the want of proper military material, and not unfrequently was destitute of even the necessaries of life. instead of profiting by this lesson, the recent tendency of our own government has been (especially in supplying the army in utah) to imitate the sad example of the english, and to convert the supplying of our armies into a system of political patronage to be used for party purposes. if fully carried out, it must necessarily result in the ruin of the army, the robbery of the treasury, and the utter corruption of the government. note to chapter v.--tactics. the war in mexico, from the small number of troops engaged, and the peculiar character of the ground in most cases, afforded but few opportunities for the display of that skill in the tactics of battle which has so often determined the victory upon the great fields of europe. nevertheless, the history of that war is not without useful lessons in the use which may be made of the several arms in the attack and defence of positions. the limit assigned to these notes will admit of only a few brief remarks upon these battles. the affairs of palo alto and resaca de la palma properly constitute only a single battle. in the first, which was virtually a cannonade, the lines were nearly parallel, and arista's change of front to an oblique position during the engagement, was followed by a corresponding movement on the part of general taylor. being made sensible of the superiority of the american artillery, the mexican general fell back upon the ravine of resaca de la palma, drawing up his troops in a concave line to suit the physical character of the ground. the americans attacked the whole line with skirmishers, and with dragoons supported by light artillery, and the charge of a heavy column of infantry decided the victory. general taylor's operations at monterey partook more of the nature of an attack upon an intrenched position than of a regular battle upon the field. no doubt worth's movement to the right had an important influence in deciding the contest, but the separation of his column from the main body, by a distance of some five miles, was, to say the least, a most hazardous operation. the mexicans, however, took no advantage of the opening to operate between the separate masses into which the american army was divided. the loss which the mexicans inflicted upon us resulted more from the strength of their position than from any skilful use of their defensive works. in the battle of buena vista, the efforts of santa anna were principally directed to turning the american left. if he had concentrated his masses more upon the centre at the plateau, the success gained in the early part of the contest would probably have been decisive. the american right at la angostura was made almost inaccessible by the deep ravines in its front, and the skilful use made of the artillery from this point enabled general taylor to gain the victory, even after his left had been completely turned, and a portion of the volunteers had actually fled from the field. the manner in which scott handled his troops in the various battles on his line of march from vera cruz to the capital, proved him to be one of the best generals of the age. at cerro gordo he so completely turned santa anna's left as to cut off his line of retreat, and nearly destroyed his army, the general himself barely escaping capture. the turning of valencia's position by the village of san geronimo, at the battle of contreras, and the charge by riley's columns of infantry, were movements well planned and admirably executed, as were also the rapid pursuit of santa anna to churubusco, and the flank and rear attacks by the brigades of pierce and shields. the victory of molino del rey was mostly won with the musket, without very material assistance from heavy artillery, and was one of the most brilliant but dearly bought achievements of the war. the assault upon chapultepec was preceded by a long and heavy cannonade, which produced a decided moral effect upon the enemy and greatly facilitated the assault. with respect to the battles of the crimean war, only that of the alma is subject to the tactical criticism of ordinary battles; those of balaklava, inkerman, and the tchernaya, were of the nature of sorties made to prevent an assault of the unfinished works of defence, and to prolong the operations of the siege. they must therefore be judged as such, and not according to the ordinary rules applicable to contests in the open field. at the battle of the alma the russians were attacked in position, the two lines of battle being nearly parallel. according to the original plan of attack, the turks and bosquet's division was to turn the russian left, while the main attack was made upon the centre. but, on account of the division of command in the allied army, there was no concert of action. the heavy column of bosquet probably decided the victory, although the battle was general throughout the whole line. the english army advanced in columns of brigades at deploying distances, its right connected with the french, and its left protected by a line of skirmishers, of cavalry and horse artillery. with respect to the formation and use of troops in the other battles, it may be remarked that the charge of the english light cavalry at balaklava was apparently without necessity or object, and led to its inevitable destruction. in the battle of inkerman the russians directed their main attack upon the english right and centre, with false attacks upon the french left and towards balaklava. but these false attacks, as is usual in such cases, were not conducted with sufficient energy and decision, and bosquet was thus enabled to perceive the real intentions of the enemy upon the english portion of the line and move to its assistance. moreover, the main body of the russians moved in too heavy and unwieldy masses, which exposed them to terrible losses, and rendered impossible a rapid and effective deployment of their numerical force. the same criticism is applicable to their formation at the battle of the tehernaya. note to chapter vi.--means of national defence. on the invasion of mexico by the united states, the former republic had a large army of tolerably good troops, though badly officered, still worse equipped, and almost destitute of proper military stores; but she was entirely wanting in two important elements of national defence--fortifications and a navy. her weakness was shown by the rapid and easy conquest of almost the entire country. we have already remarked that the fortifications of russia confined the theatre of war to a single point of the crimea, and limited the military operations of the allies to the prolonged and only partially successful siege of sebastopol. note to chapter vii.--sea-coast defences. allusion has already been made to the weakness of mexico, resulting from her want of sea-coast defences, as shown by the war between that republic and the united states. this would have been still more manifest had she possessed any thing like a commercial marine, exposed to capture by our naval forces. as it was, the mexican war afforded not a single contest between ships and forts, no opposition being made to the occupation of mexican ports by our naval force. the only coast defence, the castle of san juan d'ulica was not attacked, but after the bombardment and capture of vera cruz, it surrendered without a blow. the crimean war, on the contrary, exhibited in a most marked degree the importance of a well-fortified sea-coast. notwithstanding the immense force of the combined fleets of england and france, no naval attack was made upon either cronstadt or sebastopol, and the large naval force of russia proved utterly useless as a defence against a maritime descent. there was, indeed, a simulachre of a "naval cannonade" on the latter place on the th of october, , intended as a diversion of the attention and strength of the garrison from the land side, where the real struggle for predominance was going on between the besieged and the besiegers. the inutility of this attempt was so manifest that no serious naval attack was undertaken, notwithstanding that the allies were ready to bring to bear upon the antiquated and ill-armed russian works the most powerful naval armaments the world had ever seen. the results of this "simulachre of a naval cannonade," as it has been called, is worthy of note. the details are taken from major barnard's able pamphlet on "the dangers and defences of new york," and commander dahlgren's interesting and valuable work on "shells and shell guns." "the allied fleet consisted of french, british, and turkish ships-of-the-line (some few of which had auxiliary steam power), and a number of side-wheel steamers to tow these; and carried in all about , guns. it was opposed by about guns from the works. the fleet kept itself (in general) at a respectable distance (from to yards); too far to inflict any material injury with its armament ( -pounders, with a moderate proportion of -inch shell-guns) upon the works;--too far to receive much from the inefficient armament of the russian works." "the only exception to this remark applies to the detached english squadron under sir edmund lyons, consisting of the _agamemnon_, _sanspareil_, _london_, _arethusa_, and _albion_, the first-named of which vessels took a position at or yards from fort constantine, while the others stretched along at about the same distance from fort constantine, the 'wasp tower,' and 'telegraph battery.' dahlgren describes the result as follows:--" "the _agamemnon_ was very seriously maltreated, though not to such an extent as to impair her power of battery or engine. she was on fire several times; was struck by shot or shells; and, singular to say, only lost , while her second, just by, lost men. the _albion_ suffered still more, and in an hour was towed out crippled, and on fire in more than one place, with a loss of men. the crews of the _london_ and _arethusa_, fared rather better, but the ships nearly as ill; and they too remained in station but a little time after the _albion_. the _queen_ was driven off soon after she got into her new position, in great danger; and the _rodney_ had the bare satisfaction of getting aground and afloat after experiencing some damage." "the value of the small works on the cape and bluffs, was clearly defined in these results; being above the dense cloud of smoke that enveloped the ships and the lower forts, their aim was not embarrassed, while the seamen labored under the difficulty of firing, with an inconvenient elevation, at objects that they saw but seldom, and then but dimly and briefly. as a consequence, three line-of-battle ships and a frigate were driven off very shortly and in great peril, and a fourth badly cut up; while the _agamemnon_ lay opposed to one of the heaviest sea-forts with two tiers of casemates, and at the end of five-hours came off with comparatively little loss." "whatever superiority of effect the batteries on the heights may have had (and we have so few details about these works that we can draw no sure conclusion from this mere naked statement of damages received by the vessels), it evidently was not for want of being _hit_ often enough (smoke or no smoke), that the _agamemnon_ escaped with so little injury. she 'was struck by shot and shells;' and it is only due to the inefficiency of the projectiles by which she was struck, that she was not destroyed." "with respect to the damages received by fort constantine, dahlgren says:--" "the distance of the _agamemnon_ and _sanspareil_ from fort constantine ( th october, ), was assumed to be about yards; lord raglan states it to have been rather less. these two ships could bring to bear about guns, and the firing from them probably lasted some four hours. there can be no doubt that it inflicted much damage, for the russian commander-in-chief-admits it in his official report; but not sufficient to impair the strength of the masonry, and far short of effecting a breach in it." "at bomarsund, the results were rather different:--three -pounders of cwt. (guns of inferior weight), were landed from a ship's spar deck, and placed in battery at yards from the north tower--the masonry of good quality and - / feet thick. in eight hours, the wall between two embrasures was cut through from top to bottom, offering a practicable breach, to effect which shot and shells were fired, being at the rate of one round from the battery in rather less than a minute; or, from each gun, one in - / minutes. the tower surrendered." "it seems almost incredible that three pieces should be able to accomplish fully that which eighty-seven pieces utterly failed to do, the distances from the object being alike--particularly when it is considered that many of the latter were of greater calibre, and most of them employed much heavier charges where the calibres were similar. the guns of the ship, if fired at the same rate as those of the battery, which was not unusually rapid (one round in two and three-fourth minutes), would have discharged some seven thousand seven hundred shot and shells in the course of the four hours, supposing no interruption; a number which, if properly applied, would appear, from the results of three guns, to have been sufficient to breach the wall of the fort in fourteen places; whereas they did not effect a single breach, which is abundant proof of the lack of accuracy. they must either have been dispersed over the surface of the fort, or else missed it altogether, and this could have been due only to a want of the precision which was attained by the battery. the constantly preferred complaint of motion in the ships was not to be urged, because on the day of cannonading sebastopol, there was scarcely a breath of wind, and the ships were too large to be easily moved by the swell, unless very considerable. that the fort did no greater damage to the ships than it received from them, proves no more than that its fire was quite as illy directed, and the calibres too low. it is said that the _agamemnon_ was struck in the hull by two hundred and forty shot and shells, which must have been but a small portion of what was fired, though sufficient to be decisive, if, as already observed, the calibre had been heavier." here, then, a number of projectiles thrown from the ships, which were sufficient, had they been thrown from a land battery, according to the result at bomarsund, to produce fourteen practicable breaches, failed not only to produce a single breach, but even "to impair the strength of the masonry." the reason of this is obvious. that degree of precision of fire by which a breach is effected by a land battery is utterly unattainable from a floating structure, for the motion of the water, even in the calmest days, is quite sufficient to prevent accuracy of aim at an object at a distance, as in this case, of seven and eight hundred yards. with respect to the action of the shot and shells upon the _agamemnon_, it is to be remarked that we have as yet had no fair trial of the power of the fire of modern shell-guns of large calibre from land batteries against ships of war. the russians had some of them in their fleet, and at sinope, with their shell-guns, they blew up two turkish frigates _in fifteen minutes_. it does not appear that in the crimean war they had yet provided their fortifications with the modern armaments, for where shells were thrown from their sea-coast batteries, they were in every instance of inferior calibre. with respect to the naval attack upon kinburn, which has been referred to as showing the importance of floating batteries as an auxiliary to ships in reducing harbor defences, we have no official reports of the russians from which to derive accurate information of the strength of the works attacked. dahlgren, drawing his information from the official accounts of the "english and french admirals," describes the works and their location is follows:-- "the boug and the dnieper issue into a large basin, formed partly by the projection of the main shore, partly by a long narrow strip of sand-beach, which continues from it and takes a north-westerly direction until it passes the promontory of otchakov, where it terminates, and from which it is separated by the channel, whereby the waters of the estuary empty into the black sea." "the distance between the spit or extremity of this tongue and the point of otchakov, or the main shore opposite, is about two miles; but the water is too shoal to admit of the passage of large vessels of war, except in the narrow channel that runs nearest to the spit and its northern shore. here, therefore, are placed the works designed to command the entrance. they are three in number. near the extreme point of the spit is a covered battery built of logs, which are filled in and overlaid with sand,--pierced for eighteen guns, but mounting only ten." "advancing further along the beach is a circular redoubt, connected with the spit battery by a covered way. this work, built of stone, and riveted with turf, is open, and said to be the most substantial of the three; it has eleven cannon, and within is a furnace for heating shot." "further on, and where the beach has widened considerably, is fort kinburn, a square bastioned work, extending to the sea on the south, and to the waters of the estuary on the north. it is casemated in part, though but few of these embrasures were armed,--its chief force being in the pieces _en barbette, _and some nine or ten mortars. the masonry, though solid, is represented by an eye-witness not to be bomb-proof, and so dilapidated by age that the mortar was falling out from the interstices, leaving the stone to disintegrate. the interior space was occupied by ranges of wooden buildings, slightly constructed and plastered over." "this fort is said to be armed with sixty pieces. the english admiral states, that all three of the works mounted eighty-one guns and mortars. the calibres are not given officially, but stated in private letters to be -pounders and -pounders." "the above description will quite justify the further remark as to these works:--" "they were inferior in every respect, and manifestly incapable of withstanding any serious operation by sea or land. the main fort was particularly weak in design, and dilapidated; all of them were indifferently armed and garrisoned." "so much for the works. as to the character of the armament brought to the assault, the same authority says:--" "the allied force was admirably adapted to the operation, embracing every description of vessel, from the largest to the smallest, and all propelled by steam. there were screw-liners, and like vessels of inferior class, side-wheel steamers, screw gunboats, floating-batteries, mortar-vessels, etc., each armed in what was considered the most approved manner. and this truly formidable naval force carried _besides_ 'some thousand troops' on board, all designed to attack these 'dilapidated' works of kinburn." "without going into the particulars, we simply give dahlgren's account of the affair:--" "the french floating-batteries (_devastation, lave_, and _tonnante_) steamed in to make their first essay, anchoring some six or seven hundred yards off the s.e. bastion of fort kinburn, and at . opened fire, supported by the mortar-vessels, of which six were english, by the gunboats, five french and six english, and by the steamer _odin_, ." "the heavy metal of the floating-batteries (said to be twelve -pounders on the broadside of each) soon told on the walls of the fort; and the vertical fire was so good that the french admiral attributed to it, in great part, the speedy surrender of the place. the gunboats also made good ricochet practice, which was noticed to be severe on the barbette batteries." "the russian gunners, in nowise daunted by this varied fire, plied their guns rapidly in return, directing their attention chiefly to the floating-batteries, which were nearest." "exactly at noon, the admirals steamed in with the _royal albert _, , _algiers_, , _agamemnon_, , and _princess royal_, , with the four french liners in close order, taking position in line, ranging n.w. and s.e., about one mile from the fort, in twenty-eight feet water." "at the same time, a squadron of steam-frigates, under rear-admirals stewart and pellion, dashed in through the passage to the basin, opening fire on the spit and central batteries in passing, and anchoring well inside of fort nicholaiev and otchakov. the attack seaward was completed by the _acre_, , _curaçoa_, , _tribune_, , and _sphynx_, , opening on the central battery; while the _hannibal_, , _dauntless_, , and _terrible_, , assailed that on the spit. to this storm of shot and shells, the russians could not reply long. in the spit battery, the sand falling through between the logs, displaced by shot and shells, choked the embrasures, and blocked up the guns. in the fort, the light wooden buildings were in flames at an early hour; then the walls began to crumble before the balls which came from every quarter, front, flank, and rear; and as the guns were disabled successively, the return became feeble, until few were in condition to be fired, the central redoubt alone discharging single guns at long intervals. the russian commander, however, made no sign of surrender; but the admirals, seeing that his fire had ceased, and further defence was unavailing, hoisted the white flag at . p.m., upon which the works were given up on honorable terms." "the garrison consisted of about fourteen hundred men; their loss is differently stated,--the french admiral says eighty wounded,--another, forty-three killed and one hundred and fourteen wounded." "the english suffered the least, having but two men wounded; besides two killed and two wounded in the _arrow_, by the bursting of her two -pounder lancaster guns." "the superiority of the allied vessels in number and calibre of ordnance was very decided; they must have had at least six hundred and fifty pieces in play, chiefly -pounders, and -inch shell guns, with a fair proportion of -pounders and mortars, besides the -pounders of the french floating batteries. to which the russians could only reply with eighty-one cannon and mortars, and no guns of heavier calibre than -pounders, while many were lower. the great disparity in offensive power was not compensated to the works by the advantage of commanding position, the russian fort and redoubt being upon nearly the same level with the ships' batteries, and also very deficient in proper strength. on the other hand, the depth of water did not allow the liners to approach nearer than one mile; and thus their fire was by no means so intense as it would have been at shorter range." "this was the sole occasion in which the floating batteries had an opportunity of proving their endurance; which was the question of most importance, as no one could doubt the effect of long -pounders, or -pounders, when brought within a few hundred yards of masonry, and able to retain the steadiness indispensable to a breaching fire." "no siege operation had ever embraced batteries of such power, for though the english had employed long -pounders at sebastopol, yet the distance from the objects exceeded a thousand yards; and the concentration of fire, so far as any opinion can be formed from the published statements, was far inferior to that of the thirty-six -pounders, in the broadsides of the three batteries anchored in close order." "they were hulled repeatedly by shot; one of them (the _devastation_), it is said, sixty-seven times, without any other effect on the stout iron plates than to dint them, at the most, one and a half inches,--still, there were ten men killed and wounded in this battery by shot and shell which entered the ports,--and the majority of damage to the french personnel (twenty-seven men) occurred in the three floating-batteries." major barnard, in commenting upon this affair, says that it "proves nothing, unless it be, that dilapidated, and ill-designed, and ill-constructed works, armed with inferior calibres, cannot contend against such an overwhelming array of force as was here displayed. * * * the fort of kinburn surrendered, _not because_ it was breached--not because the defenders were so far diminished by their losses as to be unable to protract the contest,--but simply because the guns and gunners, exposed in all possible ways, were put hors-du-combat, and the calibres (of the guns in kinburn) were incapable of doing any great damage to the vessels, at the distance they were stationed." the guns in the low _open_ batteries were exposed to a ricochet and vertical fire, to which latter the french admiral attributed, in good part, the surrender of the place. the buildings behind the batteries, built of wood, "slightly constructed and plastered over," were set on fire, and the heat and smoke must have rendered the service of the guns almost impracticable. nevertheless, out of a garrison of , , only were killed and wounded--a very small loss under all the circumstances. if the works had been well-constructed casemates, covering the men from the ricochet and vertical fires and the sharpshooters of the troops who invested the land fronts, the loss of the garrison would have been still less; and if they had been armed with heavier projectiles, much greater damage would have been inflicted upon the attacking force. with respect to the use of floating-batteries in this case, commander dahlgren very judiciously remarks:-- "the use that can be made of floating-batteries, as auxiliaries in attacking shore-works, must depend on further confirmation of their asserted invulnerability. it may be that the performance at kinburn answered the expectation of the french emperor as regards offensive power, for that is a mere question of the battering capacity of the heaviest calibres, which is undoubted; but the main issue, which concerns their endurance, cannot be settled by the impact of -pounder shot, fired at and yards. far heavier projectiles will in future be found on all seaboard fortifications; and the ingenuity of the artillerist may also be exerted more successfully than at kinburn. still, it is not to be doubted that the floating-battery is a formidable element in assailing forts, even if its endurance falls short of absolute invulnerability; and the defence will do well to provide against its employment." the works at bomarsund were taken by means of _land-batteries_, which breached the exposed walls of the towers and main works. an auxiliary fire was opened upon the water front by the fleet, but it produced very little effect. but after the work had been reduced, an experimental firing was made by the _edinburgh_, armed with the largest and most powerful guns in the british navy. in speaking of the effects of the siege batteries upon the walls of bomarsund, and the experimental fire of the _edinburgh_, sir howard douglas remarks:-- "this successful operation (of the land batteries) is very generally, but erroneously, stated to have been effected by the fire of the ships, and it is even strongly held up as a proof of what ships can do, and ought to attempt elsewhere." "but the results of the experimental firing at the remnant of the fort, which, unless the previous firing of the ships during the attack was absolutely harmless, must have been somewhat damaged, and moreover shaken by the blowing-up of the contiguous portions, do not warrant this conclusion, even should the attacking ships be permitted, like the _edinburgh_, to take up, quietly and coolly, positions within yards, and then deliberately commence and continue their firing, without being fired at! the firing of the _edinburgh_, at , yards, was unsatisfactory. shot and shells were fired, from the largest and most powerful guns in the british navy (viz., from the lancaster gun of cwt., with an elongated shell of lbs.;--from -pounders of cwt., and -pounders of cwt., solid shot guns;--from -inch shell guns of cwt., with hollow shot of lbs.;--from -inch shell guns of and cwt., with hollow shot of lbs.), and did but little injury to the work. at yards, shot, shells, and hollow shot were fired. a small breach was formed in the facing of the outer wall, of extremely bad masonry, and considerable damage done to the embrasures and other portions of the wall; but no decisive result was obtained--no practicable breach formed, by which the work might be assaulted, taken, and effectually destroyed, although shot and shells ( , lbs. of metal) were fired into the place, first at , , and then at yards." surely, this "naval attack," taken in connection with the true facts of the capture of kinburn, the abortive attempt of the british fleet in the pacific upon the russian works of petropauloski, is not calculated to affect the well established opinion of the ability of forts to resist maritime attacks. few are now disposed to dispute the general superiority of guns ashore over guns afloat; but some think that works of masonry are incapable of resisting the heavy and continuous fire which may now be brought against it by fleets and floating-batteries, and would therefore extend the area of the works and rely mainly upon earthen parapets, with guns in barbette. this conclusion they form from the results of the maritime attack on kinburn, and of the land-batteries on bomarsund. major barnard, in his valuable work on "the dangers and defences of new york," draws a very different conclusion from these attacks, and contends that they abundantly prove the capability of well-constructed stone masonry to resist the fire of ships and floating-batteries, if the latter are opposed by proper armaments in the forts; moreover, that they proved the superiority of casemated forts over low open batteries, with guns in barbette, in covering the garrison from the effects of a vertical and ricochet fire. unquestionably the masonry at bomarsund was poorly constructed; nevertheless, the fire of the shipping produced very little effect upon it. it is also equally certain that kinburn was taken, not by a breaching fire, but mainly by the effects of vertical and ricochet fires. with respect to our own system of sea-coast defences, it may be remarked, that, since this chapter was written, the works mentioned therein as having been commenced, have been gradually advanced towards completion, and that the acquisition of texas and california, and the settlement of oregon and washington territory, by greatly extending our line of maritime defence, have rendered necessary the fortification of other points. it should also be noted that while the value and necessity of these works are generally admitted, and while the general outline of the system is almost universally approved, many are of the opinion that the increased facilities for naval attacks, and the immense power of modern maritime expeditions, like that upon sebastopol, render it necessary to more strongly fortify the great naval and commercial ports of new york and san francisco--one the _key point_ of the atlantic, and the other of the pacific coast. perhaps the system adopted by our boards of engineers may be open to the objection that they have adopted _too many_ points of defence, without giving sufficient prominence to our great seaports, which are necessarily the strategic points of coast defence. however this may have been _at the time the system was adopted_, there can be no question that the relative strength of the works designed for the different points of our coast does not correspond to _the present_ relative importance of the places to be defended, and the relative temptations they offer to an enemy capable of organizing the means of maritime attack. on this subject we quote from the work of major barnard:-- "while the means of maritime attack have of late years assumed a magnitude and formidableness not dreamed of when our defensive system was planned, and our country has so increased in population, wealth and military resources, that no enemy can hope to make any impression by an invasion of our territory,--our great maritime places like new york, have, on the other hand, increased in even greater proportion, in every thing that could make them objects of attack." "the works deemed adequate in former years for the defence of new york could not, therefore, in the nature of things, be adequate at the present day." "the recent war of england and france against russia may illustrate my meaning; for it has taught us what to expect were either of these nations to wage war against the united states." "no invasion of territory, no attempt at territorial conquest was made, or thought of; for it was well foreseen that no decisive results would flow from such means. the war consisted exclusively in attacks upon maritime places--great seaports--seats of commercial and naval power. such places, by their vast importance to the well-being and prosperity of a nation--by the large populations and immense amount of wealth concentrated in them, and by their exposure to maritime attack, offer themselves at once as points at which the most decisive results may be produced. cronstadt, sebastopol, sweaborg, kinburn, odessa, kertch, petropauloski, and other places of less note, were in succession or simultaneously objects of attack; while such as the first named became, indeed, the true seats of war." "around sebastopol assailed and assailant gathered their resources, and on the result of the arduous struggle may be said to have turned the issue of the war. had it not been so decided _there_, cronstadt would have been the next field of combat,--for which, indeed, the allies had made the most enormous preparations." "is it not _certain_ that in future all war of maritime powers against the united states, will take a similar course? all territorial invasion being out of the question, it is against our _great_ seaports and strategic points of coast defence--such as new york, new orleans, and san francisco--pre-eminently new york,--that an enemy will concentrate his efforts. against these he will prepare such immense armaments, --against these he will call into existence special agencies of attack, which (unless met by an inexpugnable defensive system) shall _insure_ success." "the mere defense of the city against _ordinary fleets_, is no longer the question; but _through the defensive works to be here erected, the nation is to measure its strength against the most lavish use of the resources of a great maritime power, aided by all that modern science and mechanical ingenuity in creating or inventing means of attack, can bring against them_; in short, in fortifying new york, _we are really preparing the battle-field on which the issue of future momentous contests is to be decided_." a few, however, object to the system at present adopted, on the ground that casemated works do not offer sufficient resistance to ships and floating-batteries, and that earthen works, covering a greater area, will accomplish that object much more effectually, while their longer land fronts will be more difficult of reduction by siege. it cannot be doubted that earthen batteries, with guns in barbette, can, as a general rule, be more easily taken by assault, that they are more exposed to vertical and ricochet firing, and more expose their gunners to be picked off by sharpshooters. moreover, they give but a very limited fire upon the most desirable point, as the entrance to a harbor. on the other hand, it has not been proved that masonry-casemated works, when properly constructed and properly armed, will not effectually resist a naval cannonade, whether from ships or floating-batteries. the results of recent wars, and of the west point experiments by general totten, would seem to prove them abundantly capable of doing this. against such proofs the mere _ad captandum_ assertion of their incapacity can have but little weight--certainly not enough to justify the abandonment of a system approved by the best military authorities of this country and europe, and sanctioned by long experience. major barnard, in speaking of the capacity of masonry casemated forts to resist the fire of a hostile armament, and of the propriety of abandoning them for earthen batteries in our system of coast defences, uses the following forcible language:--"when we bear in mind that the hostile 'floating batteries,' of whatever description, will themselves be exposed to the most formidable projectiles that can be thrown from shore batteries,--that when they choose to come to 'close quarters,' to attempt to breach, _their_ 'embrasures' present openings through which deluges of grape, canister, and musket balls can be poured upon the gunners; and consider what experience has so far shown, and reason has taught us, with regard to the casemate,--we need not be under apprehension that our casemated works will be battered down; nor doubt that they will, as they did in russia, answer the important purposes for which they were designed." "it only remains to show the _necessity_ of such works. it, in general, costs much less to place a gun behind an earthen parapet, than to build a masonry structure covered with bomb-proof arches, in which to mount it. all authorities agree that an open barbette battery (grivel's very forcible admission has been quoted), on a low site, and to which vessels can approach within or yards, is utterly inadmissible. it may safely be said, that in nine cases out of ten, the sites which furnish the efficient raking and cross fires upon the channels, are exactly of this character; and indeed it very often happens that there are _no others_." "when such sites _are_ found, it rarely happens that they afford room for sufficient number of guns in open batteries. hence the necessity of putting them tier above tier, which involves, of course, the casemated structure. such works, furnishing from their lower tier a low, raking fire, and (if of several tiers) a plunging fire from their barbettes, offer as favorable emplacements for guns as can be contrived, and afford to their gunners a degree of security quite as great as _can_ be given to men thus engaged." "on subjects which have a mere speculative importance, there is no danger in giving rein to speculation; but on those of such real and intense practical importance as the security against hostile aggression of the great city and port of new york, it is not admissible to set aside the experience of the past, or the opinions of the best minds who have devoted themselves to such subjects. a means of defence, sanctioned by its being confided in to protect the great ports of europe--which _has_ protected the great ports of russia against the most formidable naval armament that ever floated on the ocean, has a claim upon our confidence which mere criticism cannot diminish; and a claim to be adhered to in place of all new 'systems,' until time and trial shall have _necessitated_ (not merely justified) the change." "if, then, we refer to the practice of other nations, to find what has been judged necessary for the defence of important ports,--to experience, to find how such defensive systems have stood the test of actual trial,--we may draw useful conclusions with regard to what is now required to defend new york. we shall find at _sebastopol_--a narrow harbor, which owed its importance to its being the great naval dépôt of russia on the black sea--an array of guns, about of which were placed in five 'masonry-casemated' works (several of them of great size), and the remainder in open batteries. these defensive works fulfilled their object, and sustained the attack of the allied fleet, on the th of october, , without sensible damage." "the facility with which seaports are attacked by fleets--the enormous preparations required--the great risks encountered in landing a besieging army on the coast of a formidable enemy (while, for protection against the _former_ species of attack, costly works are necessary, and against the latter, field works and men can, in emergency, afford protection), naturally caused the russians to make these water defences their _first_ object. yet, though almost unprotected on the land side, sebastopol resisted, for a whole year, an attack on that quarter; and illustrated how, with plenty of men and material, an energetic and effectual _land defence_ may be improvised, where the _sea defence_ is provided for, as thoroughly as it was at that place." "let cronstadt be another example. great as was the importance of its defence to russia, it was not greater,--it was by no means _as great_, as that of new york to our own country. this port, and military and naval dépôt, was defended (in its main approach) by upwards of guns, of which were mounted in five 'masonry-casemated' works; the remainder in an open barbette battery, which enfiladed the main channel. this number is formidable in itself; yet the same number mounted in new york harbor would not afford anything like such a formidable defence as was found at cronstadt, owing to its great area, and long line of approach, compared with the latter." "_these works fulfilled their object._ they protected the great port and dépôt of cronstadt and the capital of the empire from invasion. for two successive years did the mighty armaments of france and england threaten; but they were overawed by the frowning array of 'casemated castles' which presented itself, and declined the contest." "let us turn our eyes now to the great naval dépôt of france. after the almost incredible expenditure lavished here, in creating a harbor facing the shores of her great rival, england, and an equally profuse expenditure in providing all that constitutes a great naval dépôt, we may suppose that the best means, without regard to cost, which the science of man could devise, would be employed here to make this great seat of naval power secure against the formidable means of attack possessed by the great maritime power most likely to be the assailant. the means there employed are (so far as regards mere _harbor_ defence) precisely the same (viz., casemated works in several tiers, combined with open batteries where the locations are favorable); and the application of means is the same as we have found so successful in russia,--the same which constitute the system of harbor defence of new york." captain mcclelland, in his official report to the war department, on the siege of sebastopol, uses language equally strong and pertinent:-- "the permanent defences of sebastopol against an attack by water, although inferior in material and the details of construction to our own most recent works, proved fully equal to the purpose for which they were intended. indeed, the occurrences on the pacific, the baltic, and the black sea, all seem to establish beyond controversy, the soundness of the view so long entertained by all intelligent military men, that well constructed fortifications must always prove more than a match for the strongest fleet." "it is deemed that a calm consideration of the events so hastily and imperfectly narrated in the preceding pages must lead all unprejudiced persons among our countrymen to a firm conviction on two vital points:" " st. that our system of permanent coast defences is a wise and proper one, which ought to be completed and armed with the least possible delay." " d. that mere individual courage cannot suffice to overcome the forces that would be brought against us, were we involved in an european war, but that it must be rendered manageable by discipline, and directed by that consummate and mechanical skill which can only be acquired by a course of education, instituted for the special purpose, and by long habit." "in the day of sailing-vessels the successful siege of sebastopol would have been impossible. it is evident that the russians did not appreciate the advantages afforded by steamers, and were unprepared to sustain a siege." "this same power of steam would enable european nations to disembark upon our shores even a larger force than that which finally encamped around sebastopol. to resist such an attack, should it ever be made, our cities and harbors must be fortified, and those fortifications must be provided with guns, ammunition, and instructed artillerists. to repel the advance of such an army into the interior, it is not enough to trust to the number of brave but undisciplined men that we can bring to bear against it. an invading army of , or , men could easily be crushed by the unremitting attacks of superior numbers; but when it comes to the case of more than , disciplined veterans, the very multitude brought to bear against them works its own destruction; because, if without discipline and instruction, they cannot be handled, and are in their own way. we cannot afford a moscow campaign." "our regular army never can, and, perhaps, never ought to be, large enough to provide for all the contingencies that may arise, but it should be as large as its ordinary avocations in the defence of the frontier will justify; the number of officers and non-commissioned officers should be unusually large, to provide for a sudden increase; and the greatest possible care should be bestowed upon the instruction of the special arms of the artillery and engineer troops. the militia and volunteer system should be placed upon some tangible and effective basis; instructors furnished them from the regular army, and all possible means taken to spread sound military information among them. in the vicinity of our sea-coast fortifications, it would be well to provide a sufficient number of volunteer companies with the means of instruction in heavy artillery, detailing officers of the regular artillery for instructors." on this subject of instructing our volunteers and militia in the use of sea-coast batteries, we add the following quotation from major barnard's pamphlet:-- "one of the main causes of inefficiency in coast batteries, which has given color to the idea that they may be passed, or even _attacked_ with impunity, i conceive to be the want of _skill_ and _care_ in the use of the guns. the result is a prodigious smoke, and a prodigious throwing away of balls, and very little damage done. this has been, however, by no means a _peculiarity_ of coast defences. the same system of random firing has hitherto prevailed, both in the use of small arms in land and of heavy ordnance in sea battles; nor has it occurred apparently to even the greatest masters of the art of war, to ask why, for one man wounded, or for one effective shot in a vessel's hull, so many thousands of shot should be thrown uselessly into the air." "but this question is _now_ asked, both in the use of the soldier's rifled musket, and in the management of ships' guns, as well as of artillery of all kinds." "it is at last discovered that it is of more importance to teach the soldier to direct his piece with accuracy of aim, than to perform certain motions on parade with the precision of an automaton. the same idea is now infused into all the departments of military and naval science, and is a _necessary_ result of the recent great improvements in the construction of arms. in short, the truth has at last become apparent that the old-fashioned system of random firing, though perhaps like the 'charge of the six hundred' at balaklava, 'bien magnifique, _n'est pas la guerre_.'" "it is of the utmost importance that we should apply this principle to the management of our sea-coast batteries, and give it a practical effect. the _volunteers_ of our cities will constitute _mainly_, in time of war, the gunners of our forts and manipulators of our sea-coast guns. in time of war, they will probably be exercised in these duties. but it is most desirable that we should have at _all times_ a body of gunners, practised in these exercises. the result would be, not only to give to our _citizens_, as well as citizen-soldiers, confidence in the defences provided for their security, but it would disseminate military knowledge, and an intelligent idea of the bearing and objects of the different defensive works. to carry out this idea, it would be desirable that there should be at each considerable seaport town, a sufficient garrison of _artillery_ troops to aid in the instruction of the volunteers. in the present condition of the army _this_ cannot be hoped; but perhaps it might, at least, be found practicable to detail an artillery officer or two for the purpose." note to chapter viii.--our northern frontier defences. the author has seen nothing since this chapter was written to induce him to change the views therein expressed with respect to the superior strategic importance of the line of lake champlain, both as a line of military operations, and as a line of defence. the mutual commercial interests of the united states and the canadas render a war between the two countries less probable than formerly; nevertheless, such an event is by no means impossible, and common prudence should induce us to prepare in the best possible manner for such a contingency. note to chapters ix., x., xi. and xii.--army organization. since these chapters were written, several important changes have been made in our army organization. the rank of lieutenant-general (at least, by brevet) has been revived, the staff, administrative corps, infantry and cavalry have been increased, and a company of engineer troops organized. but this company is mainly employed at west point for instruction of the cadets in the several branches of military engineering, and thus serves to supply a deficiency long felt in the system of education at the military academy. the want, however, of troops of this arm for the construction, care, and preservation of our permanent fortifications, and for the general duties of field engineering, still remains to be supplied. of all the arms of military organization, this one most requires instruction in time of peace; it cannot be supplied at the moment a war is declared. in speaking of our present army organization, as compared with those of the different european powers which he was sent to examine and report upon, captain mcclelland says:-- "our force of artillery is large in proportion to the other arms of service, while the number of our engineer troops is ridiculously and shamefully small; it is, therefore, more than probable that in any future siege it will be easy for the artillery to construct their own batteries, while the engineers will be sufficiently burdened by the construction of the other works of attack; we have now, at last, the germ of an artillery school of practice; i would then suggest, for the consideration of the secretary, the propriety of causing the artillery to construct their own batteries. the position and armament of siege batteries should be determined by consultation between the engineers and the artillery, the former having the preponderating voice, in order to secure the necessary harmony and connection between all parts of the works of attack. this change," he says, "will require to be introduced into the artillery manual and course of instruction everything in relation to the preparation of the fascines, gabions, platforms, and magazines, the dimensions of batteries, manner of arranging, working parties, etc." with regard to the suggestion of captain mcclellan, it is sufficient to remark, that it seeks to remedy one evil by introducing another equally as great and equally as objectionable. the defect in our present army organization is that one of its arms is too small for the duties which, from the very nature of military service, naturally and properly belong to it; and it surely is no remedy for this defect to permanently transfer a part of these duties to another arm. as well might it be said, if our artillery force were "ridiculously and shamefully small" in proportion to the infantry and cavalry, that the field batteries should be permanently transferred to those arms, and that light artillery tactics should be comprised in our infantry and cavalry manuals. there are certain duties which the military experience of ages has shown to properly and almost necessarily belong to each particular arm of an army organization, and every attempt to make one branch perform the appropriate duties of another has invariably destroyed its efficiency for either service. suppose our medical corps were "ridiculously and shamefully small" in proportion to our pay department, shall our paymasters perform the duties of surgery, and be instructed in the use of the scalpel and amputating instruments! this is, perhaps, an extreme case, but it serves to illustrate the principle. the defect referred to by captain mcclelland, and which has so often been pointed out by our best military men, cannot be obviated by any transfer or assignment, whether temporary or permanent, of the appropriate duties of one corps to another. indeed, such a measure would only tend to make this defect permanent, and to convert a temporary into a lasting evil. it can readily be remedied by legislative action, but in no other way. the executive action suggested would be deprecated by all. moreover, the evil is now so obvious and so generally admitted, that there can be little doubt that congress will soon perceive the importance of applying the only proper and effective remedy. note to chapter xiii.--permanent fortifications. although the general principles of the plan and arrangement of a permanent fortification, as established by the great masters of this branch of military science, remain the same; nevertheless, the vast improvements which have, within the last few years, been made in projectiles, require some changes in the details of defensive works of this character. these changes consist mainly in an increased thickness of stone and earthen parapets and of the covering of magazines, in the arrangement of embrasures, and in protecting the garrison from an enemy's sharpshooters. the introduction of heavier siege guns, and of heavier ordnance on ships of war, and especially on those propelled by steam, require much larger ordnance in forts designed for the defence of harbors. in the russian war, sweaborg was made to suffer from a distant bombardment which left her fortifications intact. these modifications in the arrangements and armaments of forts are absolutely necessary in order to restore the relative power of defence against the improvements made in the means of attack. they can very easily be introduced without changing the form or general character of the works, and they are really so very essential that, without them, a fort constructed or years ago, and well suited to the then existing state of the military art, will be likely to offer no very considerable resistance to modern siege batteries or well organized maritime attacks. some have gone much further in their estimate of the effect produced by the increased size and force of military projectiles, and boldly assert that masonry works of strong relief can no longer be used, and that the increased range of small arms requires an entire change of the bastioned front, with lines more extended. with respect to the effect of the increased range of small arms, it is very natural that a superficial observer should adopt the opinion that this improvement must be followed by an extension of the lines of a defensive military work; but a close study of the subject will probably lead to a different conclusion. such at least is the opinion of the ablest military engineers of europe. the lines of the bastioned front now generally in use, were really too long for a good defence with the arms in use at the time it was adopted; and, in theory, the "rampart gun" was to be relied upon for the defence of certain exposed points. but this weapon is no longer in use; its place, however, is better supplied by the increased range of the musket and rifle. the latter weapon is almost invaluable for defending the approaches to a permanent work. with respect to the breaching of stone masonry by siege batteries, it has long been an established principle that all masonry exposed to the fire of land batteries should be masked by earthen works. the neglect of this rule caused the fall of bomarsund. those who so readily draw, from the results of that siege, the inference that the present mode of fortifying land fronts must be abandoned, exhibit their ignorance of military engineering. the facts do not justify their conclusions. with respect to sea fronts, which can be reached only by guns afloat, the case is very different. they are usually casemates of masonry, not masked by earthen works. whether the increased efficiency of projectiles thrown by ships and floating batteries now require a resort to this mode of protecting masonry on the water fronts of fortifications, is a question well worthy of discussion. this subject has already been alluded to in the note on sea-coast defences, and it is there shown that no facts have yet been developed which require or authorize any change in our present system. note to chapter xiv.--field engineering. as mexico had no permanent fortifications to be besieged, the war in that country afforded very little practice in that branch of engineering which is connected with the attack and defence of permanent works, particularly sapping and mining. the only operation resembling a siege was the investment and bombardment of vera cruz, and it is worthy of remark that if general scott had stormed that place, weak as it was, he must have lost a large number of his men, while from his trenches and batteries he reduced it with scarcely the sacrifice of a single life. nor did either party in this war make much use of field works in the attack and defence of positions. nevertheless, no one can read the history of the war without appreciating the important influence which fort brown had upon general taylor's defence of the left bank of the rio grande. again if we compare our loss in other mexican battles with that which the americans sustained in their attacks upon monterey, churubusco, molino del key, and chapultepec,--places partially secured by field works--we shall be still more convinced of the value of temporary fortifications for the defence of military positions, although it was manifest that the mexicans neither knew how to construct nor how to defend them. nor was there much practice in this war in the use of military bridges, for, with the exception of the rio grande, our armies had no important rivers to cross. we must not, however, omit to note the important fact that general taylor was unable to take advantage of the victories of palo alto and resacade la palma to pursue and destroy the army of arista, _because_ he had no pontoon equipage to enable him to follow them across the rio grande. it should also be remarked that even a very small bridge equipage would have been of very great use in crossing other streams and ravines during the operations of this war. one of our cavalry officers writes:-- "on our march from matamaras to victoria and tampico, in and , we had infinite difficulty in bridging boggy streams (there being no suitable timber), and in crossing ravines with vertical banks; a few ways of the birago trestles would have saved us many days and a vast amount of labor. in the operations in the valley of mexico, our movements, checked as they so often were by impassable wet ditches and sometimes by dry ravines, would have been rendered so much more free and rapid by the use of the birago trestles, that our successes could have been gained at far less cost, and probably with more rapidity than they were." with regard to military reconnaissance, the splendid achievements of lee and others connected with the operations of general scott, proved the value and importance of this particular branch of field engineering. but field engineering, as a branch or arm of the military service, received its greatest development and most brilliant application in the crimean war, particularly in the siege of sebastopol, and the measures resorted to by general todtleben to defend that place against the attack of superior forces. a brief sketch of these defensive works may be of interest to the reader:-- when the allies reached balaklava, sebastopol was defended on the south side only by a loop-holed wall about four feet and a half thick, and from eighteen to twenty feet high, and a semicircular redoubt with two stories of loop-holes, and five guns in barbette. these works would have afforded some protection against a _coup-de-main_ by infantry and cavalry, but could have offered no very considerable obstacle to a combined attack of these arms with artillery. the russian engineer commenced his operations for strengthening this position by occupying the most important points in his line of defence with detached field works of sufficient relief to resist an assault, and generally closed at the gorge. these works were afterwards connected by re-entering lines of a weaker profile, which served to enfilade the ravines and to flank the advanced works. the old wall was strengthened with earth, and rifle-pits for sharpshooters were constructed at a considerable distance in front. the most important points of the main line of defence were: st. the flag-staff bastion. d. the central bastion. d. the malakoff. th. the redan. th. the little redan. the command of the first was about fifteen feet, its ditch thirty feet wide and from twelve to fifteen feet deep. a portion of the scarp was provided with palisades some ten feet high. the construction of the central bastion was similar to that of the flag-staff, but weaker in profile. the relief of the other works was still less. the command of the malakoff was about fourteen feet, its ditch eighteen feet wide and twelve feet deep. the thickness of parapet in these works was generally about eighteen feet, and the bombproofs were covered with timber eighteen inches thick and six feet of earth. the loop-holed walls connecting these works were covered by a rampart and parapet, or entirely replaced by a simple parapet. many of the embrasures were revetted with the common boiler iron ships' water-tanks filled with earth. the same material was sometimes used for traverses. rope mantelets were used to protect the artillerists at the pieces from rifle balls and small grape. great attention was given to the construction of bombproofs to cover the men from vertical firing. these were sometimes under the rampart and the second line of defence (where there was one), often under special traverses, or entirely under ground, and occasionally excavated in the solid rock. some had fireplaces and chimneys, and were well ventilated. interior slopes were revetted with gabions, crowned by fascines and sand bags. gabions were also employed to repair the damage caused by the enemy's artillery. abattis, military pits, caltrops and spikes, stuck through planks, and explosive machines were employed in front of different parts of the defences. mines were resorted to in front of the flag-staff bastion to retard the french approaches. they were made in rocky soil with craters from twelve to fifteen feet deep. the russian counter-approaches generally consisted of fleches, united by a simple trench. captain mcclelland, one of our officers sent to the crimea, from whose valuable report most of the foregoing details are gathered, adds the following remarks upon these works of defence:-- "from the preceding hasty and imperfect account of the defences of sebastopol, it will appear how little foundation there was for the generally-received accounts of the stupendous dimensions of the works, and of new systems of fortifications brought into play. the plain truth is, that these defences were simple temporary fortifications of rather greater dimensions than usual, and that not a single new principle of engineering was developed. it is true, that there were several novel minor details, such as the rope mantelets, the use of iron tanks, etc., but the whole merit consisted in the admirable adaptation of well-known principles to the peculiar locality and circumstances of the case. neither can it be asserted that the plans of the various works were perfect. on the contrary, there is no impropriety in believing that if todtleben were called upon to do the same work over again, he would probably introduce better close flanking arrangements." "these remarks are not intended to, nor can they, detract from the reputation of the russian engineer. his labors and their results will be handed down in history as the most triumphant and enduring monument of the value of fortifications, and his name must ever be placed in the first rank of military engineers. but, in our admiration of the talent and energy of the engineer, it must not be forgotten that the inert masses which he raised would have been useless without the skilful artillery and heroic infantry who defended them. much stronger places than sebastopol have often fallen under far less obstinate and well-combined attacks than that to which it was subjected. there can be no danger in expressing the conviction that the siege of sebastopol called forth the most magnificent defence of fortifications that has ever yet occurred." we will now pass to the works of attack. when the allies decided that the works of sebastopol could not be carried by a simple cannonade and assault, but must be reduced by a regular siege, the first thing to be considered was to secure the forces covering the siege works from lateral sorties and the efforts of a relieving army. the field works planned for this purpose were not of any great strength, and many of them "were only undertaken when a narrow escape from some imminent danger had demonstrated their necessity." the french line of defence consisted of eight pentagonal redoubts, connected by an infantry parapet. the english seemed to attach but little importance to field works for the defence of their position; the terrible slaughter at inkerman was the natural consequence of this neglect. in describing the engineering operations of the allies at this siege. captain mcclelland says:-- "in regard to the detailed execution of the french attacks, little or nothing novel is to be observed. even when coolly examining the direction of their trenches, after the close of the siege, it was very rare that a faulty direction could be detected; they always afforded excellent cover, and were well defiladed; in some cases the excavation of the double direct sap was carried to the depth of six and a half feet in the solid rock! the execution of many of the saps and batteries was worthy of a school of practice. in the parallels, bombproofs were provided as temporary hospitals, offices for the generals on duty, etc. they did not use the sapper armor. the use of the sap-roller was often attempted, but it could be employed only during the latter part of the attack upon the malakoff, when the fire of the russian artillery was nearly extinguished by the mortars; before that, as soon as a sap-roller was placed in position--some thirty guns would be brought to bear upon it, the result being its immediate destruction. it may justly be said of the french approaches, that they admirably carried into practice their system of sapping. the technical skill and patient courage evinced by their officers and men in pushing forward such excellent approaches, under a most deadly fire, is worthy of all commendation, and is such as might have been expected from the antecedents of their corps of engineers." "with regard to the english, the case was different; it seemed as if they systematically abandoned the excellent system taught and perfected with so much care at chatham. whenever the ground was difficult, their trenches generally ceased to afford shelter; a shallow excavation in the rock, and a few stones thrown up in front, appeared to be all that was considered necessary in such cases. they were often faulty in direction as well as in profile, being not unfrequently badly defiladed, or not gaining ground enough and entirely too cramped; nor were they pushed as close to the redan as they ought to have been before giving the assault. in too many cases the expression '_tâtonnement_ of the french would seem to convey the best idea of their operations. their batteries, however, were very well constructed. the magazines, platforms, etc., were usually similar to those adopted at chatham, although unnecessary deviations were sometimes complained of. they employed neither armor nor the full sap, sometimes the half-full, but generally the flying-sap were employed." it may also be added, that, at the time of the assault, the french approaches had been pushed to the distance of thirty-two paces of the counterscarp of the malakoff, while the english had scarcely reached within two hundred and twenty-five yards of the ditch of the redan. this description of the operations of the english at the siege of sebastopol carries the professional reader directly back to their sieges in the spanish peninsula. it certainly is very strange that a great nation leading the van of civilization should, after such experience, have neglected to provide its army with a proper number of engineer officers and engineer troops, well instructed in the peculiar and difficult duties of that arm. what excuse can ever be offered for substituting human life for professional skill in the operations of a siege, when that skill may so readily be acquired in time of peace, and is always so necessary an element of a good military organization! while every one admits that the siege of sebastopol proved the immense importance of fieldworks against land attacks, some would conclude from the operations of that siege that good earthen works of a large development are better suited for the defence of a large city than permanent fortifications with masonry revetments, and which will necessarily have a less extended line of fire and less capacity for men and military stores. we quote the remarks of captain mcclelland on this point, and also make a short extract from the recently published journal of the siege of sebastopol by general niel. captain mcclelland says:-- "this would seem to be the proper place to notice a popular fallacy, which, for a time at least, gained extensive credence. it was, that the siege of sebastopol proved the superiority of temporary (earthen) fortifications over those of a permanent nature. it is easy to show that it proved nothing of the kind; but that it only proved that temporary works in the hands of a brave and skillful garrison are susceptible of a longer defence than was generally supposed. they were attacked as field works never were before, and were defended as field works never had been defended. the main difference between properly constructed permanent fortifications (intended to resist a siege) and temporary works, is that the latter seldom present an insuperable obstacle against assault, while the former always do. in addition, permanent works have a better command over the adjacent country, and are more carefully and perfectly planned. the masonry walls, which render an assault impossible, cannot be seen from the distance, and can be destroyed only by establishing batteries on the crest of the glacis, or the edge of the ditch; the earthen parapet alone being visible beyond that point, they may, until the besiegers arrive there, be regarded in the same light as field works, with the difference that the garrison are not harassed by the necessity of being constantly prepared to repel an assault." "now, in the siege of sebastopol, the trenches of the besiegers never reached the edge of the ditch; so that, had the fortification been a permanent one, the most difficult, slow, and dangerous part of the siege remained to be undertaken, viz., the crowning of the covered way, the establishment of the breach batteries, the descent and passage of the ditch, and the assault of the breach; in other words, at the moment when the weakness of the temporary works became apparent and fatal, the true strength of the permanent defences would have commenced coming into play." "assuming the progress of the attack to have been as rapid as it was under existing circumstances, the besiegers, on the th of september, would not yet have been in a condition to crown the covered way, the siege would certainly have extended into the winter; and it may even be doubted whether the place would eventually have fallen, until the allies were in sufficient force to invest the north as well as the southside." general neil remarks:-- "struck by the length of the siege of sebastopol, certain foreign officers have expressed the opinion that masonry-revetted scarps are not of incontestable utility in fortified places." "sebastopol, a vast retrenched camp, defended by field fortifications of strong profile, derived its principal strength from an armament such as could only exist in an extensive maritime arsenal, and from a large army which always preserved its free communications with the interior of russia." "if the enceinte had been provided with good revetted scarps; if it had been necessary to breach these, and subsequently have been compelled to penetrate through difficult passages, in rear of which the heads of our columns would have met an army, sebastopol would have been an impregnable fortress." "when we compare, in effect, the works of attack at sebastopol with those of an ordinary siege, we will see that on the th of september, , the day of the last assault, we had only executed, after the greatest effort, the besieging works which precede the crowning of the covered way; we had not then, as yet, entered upon that period of the works of a siege which is the most difficult and the most murderous; and there was no occasion to engage ourselves in them, since the ditches and parapets of the enceinte were not insurmountable, as the sequel has proved." "the difficulty consisted in conquering the russian army upon a position prepared long beforehand for its defence, quite as much as in surmounting the material obstacle of the fortification." "our places of arms being established at thirty metres from the besieged works, we were able to choose our own time for action, and to throw ourselves unexpectedly upon the enemy when the fire of our artillery had forced him to shelter himself, up to the last minute, behind his numerous blindages; to have gone further would have been inviting the initiative in the attack on the part of the russian army." "the absence of scarp walls, which would have secured the place from escalade, did not exercise a less influence upon the defence; for the besieged were compelled to keep permanently at the gorges of the works, strong reserves, in readiness to repulse the assault, which they saw themselves menaced with from the commencement of the siege." "finally, it can be remarked, that these reserves, which were decimated night and day by the concentric fire of our batteries, were able to issue out from the enceinte through wide debouches, without having to pass through the narrow defiles which are formed by the drawbridges of revetted places; they were, then, a permanent threat for the besiegers, who were exposed to seeing their trenches unexpectedly invaded by the greater part of the russian army." "neither side, consequently, was in a position analogous to that which is presented in the siege of a fortified place, protected from insult by good masonry scarps.'" (note to page .) and again, page , the same authority remarks: "now, it (the russian army) is no longer able to escape from the concentric fires of our batteries; for, _not being protected by masonry scarps_, it is obliged constantly to keep united strong reserves, in order to repulse the assault with which it is at every instant menaced'" note to chapter xv.--military education, &c. with regard to the subjects discussed in this chapter it will, perhaps, be sufficient to remark that the mexican war incontestably proved the value of the west point military academy; for the superior efficiency of properly-educated officers over those who had been appointed from civil life without any knowledge of the profession they were called upon to practice, fully satisfied the country of the importance of that institution, and even silenced the clamors of the few who refused to be convinced. the recent abortive attempt to give efficiency to our navy by means of a retired list, has, it is feared, destroyed for a time all hopes of introducing this very necessary measure into our military service; although it is very certain that without this we can never have our system of promotion placed upon an effective and satisfactory basis, which shall give efficiency to the army by rewarding merit, while it prevents injustice by closing the avenues of political favoritism. the mexican war also most abundantly proved that our objections to the system of military appointment were well founded, and it is hoped that the more recent abuses of that system will call public attention to the necessity of a change; for if military office continue to be conferred for partisan services, it will soon destroy the integrity as well as the efficiency of our army. explanation of plates figs. , , .--used to illustrate the strategic relations of the armies a and b. fig. .--line of operations directed against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence, as was done by napoleon in the marengo campaign. fig. .--napoleon's plan of campaign in , for the army of the rhine, and the army of reserve. fig. shows the plan adopted by napoleon in the campaign of , to preserve his communications. fig. illustrates the same thing in the campaign of . fig. .--interior and central line of operations. fig. represents a camp of a grand division of an army. the distance from the front row of tents to the line of camp-guards should be from to feet; thence to the line of posts, from to feet; thence to the line of sentinels, from to feet. in many cases, the line of posts between the camp-guards and sentinels may be dispensed with. the distance between battalions will be from to feet; and the same between squadrons and batteries. fig. .--details of encampment for a battalion of infantry. the width of company streets will depend upon the strength of a company, and will be so arranged that the front of the camp shall not exceed the length of the battalion, when drawn up in line of battle. this width will be from to feet. the distance between the tents of each row will be or feet; the distance between the tents of one company and those of another, from to feet. fig. is the camp of a squadron of cavalry. a single company encamping alone, would be arranged in the same way as an entire squadron. the horses are picketed in two lines parallel to the tents, and at a distance from them of about feet. the forage is placed between the tents. a squadron of two companies will occupy a front of about feet. the fires, or company kitchens, should be or feet in rear of the non-commissioned officers' tents. fig is the camp of two batteries of foot artillery, or two companies of foot engineers. [the plan of encampment for artillery, as given in the "instruction of u.s. field artillery, horse and foot," may be employed where a single battery encamps by itself, or where only the skeleton of companies is maintained; but it will be found exceedingly inconvenient, where a full battery, with a large train, encamps on the same line with other troops. the plan we have given is that which is employed in most european services.] fig. .--in this plan for mounted artillery and engineers, the fires are so arranged as to expose the ammunition as little as possible to the sparks from the kitchens. fig. .--simple parallel order of battle. .--parallel order, with a crochet on the flank. .--parallel order, reinforced on a wing. .--parallel order, reinforced on the centre. .--simple oblique order. .--oblique order, reinforced on the assailing wing. .--perpendicular order. .--concave order. .--convex order. .--order by echelon on a wing. .--order by echelon on the centre. .--combined order of attack. .--formation of infantry by two deployed lines. , .--- arrangements corresponding to depth of column. .--formation by squares. .--mixed formation of three battalions. .--deep formation of heavy columns. .--formation in columns by brigade. .--formation of two brigades of cavalry, by the mixed system. .--passage of the sound by the british fleet, in . .--attack on copenhagen. .--attack on algiers. .--attack on san juan d'ulloa. .--attack on st. jean d'acre. .--plan of a regular bastioned front of a fortification. .--section of do. do. .--tenaillons. fig. .--demi-tenaillons, with a bonnet. .--a horn-work. .--a crown-work. .--a redan. .--a lunette. .--a mitre or priest-cap. .--a bastioned fort. .--vertical section of a field intrenchment. .--simple sap. .--flying sap. .--full sap. .--crater of a military mine. .--plan of the attack of a regular bastioned work. [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] [illustration] books for collectors _with frontispieces and many illustrations_ _large crown vo, cloth._ chats on english china. by arthur hayden. chats on old furniture. by arthur hayden. chats on old prints. (how to collect and value old engravings.) by arthur hayden. chats on costume. by g. woolliscroft rhead. chats on old lace and needlework. by e. l. lowes. chats on oriental china. by j. f. blacker. chats on old miniatures. by j. j. foster, f.s.a. chats on english earthenware. by arthur hayden. chats on autographs. by a. m. broadley. chats on pewter. by h. j. l. j. massÉ, m.a. chats on postage stamps. by fred. j. melville. chats on old jewellery and trinkets. by maciver percival. chats on cottage and farmhouse furniture. by arthur hayden. chats on old coins. by fred. w. burgess. chats on old copper and brass. by fred. w. burgess. chats on household curios. by fred. w. burgess. chats on old silver. by arthur hayden. chats on japanese prints. by arthur davison ficke. chats on military curios. by stanley c. johnson. _in preparation._ chats on bargains. by charles e. jerningham. chats on old clocks and watches. by arthur hayden. london: t. fisher unwin, ltd. new york: f. a. stokes company. chats on military curios [illustration: bronze medallion of the duke of wellington.] _frontispiece._ chats on military curios by stanley c. johnson m.a., d.sc., f.r.e.s. with eighty illustrations new york frederick a. stokes company publishers to g. m. j. this book is gratefully dedicated (_all rights reserved_) printed in great britain contents page list of illustrations chapter i introduction preliminary considerations--where to search for curios--what to search for--specializing--undesirable curios--the catalogue of the royal united service museum--public collections of military curios chapter ii regimental nomenclature household cavalry--dragoon guards--cavalry--artillery --engineers--guards--infantry, both past and present nomenclature--other units chapter iii regimental crests the fascination of regimental crests--how to plan a collection of crests--the changes which crests undergo--the meaning of crests--mottoes on crests, and their meanings chapter iv military uniforms the growth of uniforms--the effect of the decline in armour on uniforms--the part played by elizabeth--uniforms in the time of the civil war--in charles ii's reign--james ii--the first two georges--uniforms in the peninsular war--the close-fitting uniforms of george iv--the changes which were brought about in william iv's time--later changes-- peculiarities of the military dress of to-day chapter v armour the scarcity of good armour--considerations for the collector--counterfeit armour--the twelve periods in armour--the characteristics of each period--glossary chapter vi weapons buying specimens--storing them--hand culverins--the serpentin--the wheel-lock--the flint-lock--the rifle--swords--the effect of armour on swords--swords with historical associations--other weapons chapter vii early british war medals how to arrange a collection of medals--factors which influence the value of a medal--the earliest medals--the first english medal--the first english military medal--the forlorn hope medal--the dunbar medal--the culloden medal--medals granted by the honourable east india company--the pope's medal, --the emperor francis ii of germany's medal, --the seringapatam medal--the egyptian medal, --the rodriguez medal--the nepaul medal--the maida medal--the peninsular officers' medal chapter viii military medals struck by the mint campaign medals considered--waterloo--burmah--china-- cabul--jellalabad--scinde--meanee--sobroan--the men's peninsular medal--punjab--indian general service medals-- south africa, - ; also - --baltic--crimea--indian mutiny--abyssinia--new zealand--later awards chapter ix military decorations awarded for special services the necessity for special awards--the victoria cross--the order of merit--the "distinguished conduct in the field" award--the distinguished service order--the meritorious service award--the long service and good conduct award--the "best shot" medal--volunteer decorations--other decorations chapter x military medallions general considerations--the "lost wax" process--hadrian's medallions--renaissance examples--simon, the medallist--wyon's work--public collections--some noted medallions described chapter xi military prints the period - --works including military prints--where to search for bargains--the kind of print most sought after--works including fine military prints--bunbury-- gillray chapter xii memorial brasses of military interest classes of military brasses--rubbings and how to make them--floor brasses, their characteristics--palimpsest brasses--what may be learnt from brasses--mural tablets chapter xiii autographs of great soldiers the fascination of autograph collecting--points which influence the value of an autograph--autographs classified--a "schomberg" letter--the notes scribbled by airey at balaclava--general hints--prices of autographs chapter xiv war postage stamps the earliest war stamps--stamps used in the crimean war--the british army post office corps--the sudan expedition--the south african campaign--the great war--recent war stamps and post-marks--indian war stamps--other war stamps chapter xv war money french obsidional notes--mafeking notes--the napoleonic assignats--charles ii and university plate--mints at carlisle, beeston, scarborough, newark, colchester, and pontefract--irish gun money chapter xvi curios made by prisoners of war objects recently made in holland--the napoleonic prisoners at norman cross, perth, dartmoor, stapleton, liverpool, and greenland valleyfield chapter xvii miscellaneous military curios considerations respecting miscellaneous curios--battlefield souvenirs--regimental colours--odds and ends of dress equipment--books and newspapers of military interest--royal souvenirs--official military documents--gruesome relics--relics of the great war chapter xviii a history of one's collection reasons for compiling a history of one's collection--the part played by photographs--armour suggested as an example--material for grangerizing bibliography index illustrations list of plates a bronze medallion of the duke of wellington _frontispiece_ page queen victoria's chocolate box sent to the soldiers fighting in south africa, princess mary's christmas box sent to the soldiers fighting in france and belgium, badge of the queen's (royal west surrey regiment) nd foot badge of the duke of edinburgh's (wiltshire regiment) badge of the king's (liverpool regiment) badge of the royal warwickshire regiment badge of the royal dublin fusiliers badge of the royal fusiliers (city of london regiment) badge of the seaforth highlanders ( th battalion) badge of the royal regiment of artillery some regimental buttons a horse amulet bearing the device of the royal fusiliers helmet plate of the royal marine light infantry a sleeve from a coat of the old nd (south middlesex) volunteer regiment a belt buckle from the same regiment a flint-lock pistol the action part of the above the barrel of a gun ornamented with a twin head of minerva an old powder-flask a south african pom-pom shell and a martini-henri cartridge cartridges as used in the great war. from left to right: german, french, belgian, and british an old sword with straight cross-guards an italian dagger having a replica of the famous column of st. mark for grip royalist badge worn by the partisans of charles i the crimean medal the general service medal, - the afghan medal south african medal, - the indian mutiny medal the china medal, - the egyptian medal, - the sutlej medal the punjab medal the third indian general service medal the queen and king's south african medals, - (the same reverse was used for both pieces) a check to corsican assurance by cruikshank napoleon's carriage arriving at the london museum by cruikshank a singular trait of buonaparte's favourite mameluke by cruikshank a battlefield souvenir picked up on the plains of flanders (the same helmet is shown with and without the cloth covering) a battlefield souvenir bearing verses showing the bloodthirsty nature of the tyrolese peasant and soldier an old mug bearing the famous picture depicting "the death of wolfe" a soldier's communication posted during the south african war a similar communication from "somewhere in france" a post-card received from a soldier in france bearing stereotyped greetings money of the great rebellion, - ( . newark sixpence-- . colchester gold half unite-- . pontefract two-shilling piece-- . ormond half-crown-- . dublin crown of charles ii) gun money of james ii ( . sixpence-- . sixpence-- . shilling-- . shilling-- . half-crown-- . half-crown-- . half-crown-- . half-crown) gun money of james ii ( . shilling-- . shilling-- . half-crown-- . half-crown-- . half-crown-- . crown-- . crown-- . limerick farthing) paper money of the french republic, obsidional half-franc note of epernay obsidional franc note of epernay a newspaper poster which told of welcome news a set of bone dominoes carved by prisoners taken in the napoleonic wars, and interned in the neighbourhood of peterborough an interesting broadside printed at the famous catnach press, being one of a series describing incidents in the life of a soldier illustrations in the text armour headgear weapons a medallion struck in honour of julius cÆsar medallion commemorating the victory of the battle of the boyne medallion commemorating the fall of james ii two marlborough medallions medallion commemorating the battle of oudenarde medallion commemorating the surrender of lille medallion commemorating the battle of dunblane medallion commemorating the battle of dettingen medallion commemorating the battle of minden the oldest english brass facsimile of a portion of a letter written by cromwell to lenthall, announcing the victory of naseby autograph letter written by napoleon iii to william i of germany after the battle of sedan some autographs of noted soldiers some historic post-marks used on military correspondence a cutting from "the times" of november , _acknowledgment_ _the author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to dr. philip nelson for the loan of the valuable coins which figure in the illustrations on pages , , and ; to mr. tom satterthwaite for the loan of many of the medals depicted in these pages; to mr. leonard baggott for the loan of arms; to messrs. henry sotheran for permission to reproduce three cruikshank prints; to messrs. spink & son for permission to reproduce the royalist badge; also to mr. edwin johnson, b.sc., and mr. james pryor for the loan of various curios included in the following pages._ _the author also wishes to state that in forming his own collection of military curios he has gained much helpful assistance from "the connoisseur"; from c. h. ashdown's "british and foreign arms and armour"; from j. h. mayo's "medals and decorations of the british army and navy"; from d. h. irwin's "war medals and decorations"; from ralph nevill's "british military prints"; from edward beaumont's works dealing with brasses; and from the authorities of the royal united service museum._ chapter i introduction preliminary considerations--where to search for curios--what to search for--specializing--undesirable curios--the catalogue of the royal united service museum--public collections of military curios for centuries past the collection of military curios has been the select pastime of men of title and soldiers of rank. lately, however, owing to the war and the great spread of interest in all things pertaining to it, the circle of collectors has considerably widened, until to-day few things are more treasured by connoisseurs than the thousand and one souvenirs and emblems which emanate from our army. most forms of collecting require the expenditure of much capital, but this is not one of the drawbacks which confront the seeker after military curios. for a few pence an old-fashioned bayonet can be picked up; a rifle bearing a date in last century will cost but a trifle more, whilst such odds and ends as badges and tunic buttons may be had for almost nothing. of course, a good deal depends on knowing where to search for treasures. the old curiosity shops are capital hunting-grounds, but second-hand dealers who make a practice of buying up the contents of whole houses are even better. these people seem to get an accumulation of odd material which is difficult to classify, and therefore hard to sell. it is hidden away among these effects that the collector will probably alight upon his finest discoveries. some of our own experiences in the matter of bargain finding may be worth detailing. at rag fair, last christmas, we were asked half a guinea for six perfect but very much begrimed medals, one of which was for the defence of lucknow. needless to add, the set was worth many pounds when cleaned and fitted with fresh ribbons. on a stall in farringdon road we recently picked up a few helmet badges, some of which bore the old regimental numbers used prior to , at twopence apiece. and elsewhere a few weeks back we chanced upon a bag full of military buttons, for which the dealer asked a shilling. if we wish to form our collections quickly the best plan will be to get in touch with one of the first-class firms who regularly keep an exhaustive stock of military curios, and who can supply almost anything we need; but for our part we prefer to enter upon the work slowly and pick up treasures here and there at tempting prices. doubtless there are capital hunting-grounds where bargains may be found in almost every town, but in london our favourite haunts are rag fair, held on fridays in the caledonian meat market; the stalls in farringdon road, hounsditch, and middlesex street; the shops in praed street; and, lastly, charing cross road--the latter only for books and prints. of course a good deal of material may be obtained cheaply by keeping an eye on the bargain advertisements found in certain newspapers. _the bazaar, exchange and mart_, for instance, regularly contains notices of guns, medals, autographs, and such-like objects for sale, often at prices ridiculously low. it is thus clear that there is no lack in the sources of supply if only we can get in touch with them. with many forms of collecting there is a certain sameness about the things collected which is apt to produce monotony: with military curios, however, the treasures cover so wide a field that no such drawback can exist. the following list will give a fair idea of the different objects which come within our present range:-- medals, helmet and cap-badges, tunic buttons, armour pieces, firearms, weapons of all kinds as long as they have a military connection, medallions struck to celebrate military events, autographs of famous soldiers, original documents relating to army work, military pictures and prints, newspaper cuttings referring to military matters, obsolete uniforms including such fragments as sabre-taches, gorgets, epaulettes, etc., and, lastly, stamps and post-marks which have franked the correspondence of soldiers on active service. the list is a somewhat lengthy one, and to endeavour to amass a representative collection of all the things enumerated would be a formidable task. it is, therefore, much the wisest plan either to collect the above objects in a general way, specializing at the same time in two or three definite directions, or else to collect everything possible pertaining to one definite regiment. the latter method is, of course, the one which appeals most to army men and their immediate friends. those of us who elect to confine our attentions to regimental collecting should first procure a history of the regiment selected. from this work we shall then be able to find out what battles our chosen unit has fought in; what particular history it possesses; what noted soldiers have brought it fame; where it has been quartered from time to time; what customs specially belong to it; what changes have been made in its dress, and so forth. such knowledge will afford us much help; it will teach us what objects to seek for and what to pass over. we shall not be led to search, say, for a ghuznee medal if our chosen regiment was formed later than , nor shall we hunt through the files of _the times_ for wellington's dispatches concerning the battle of waterloo if our regiment took no part in the campaign. * * * * * there are one or two kinds of military curios which we should not attempt to collect. first, we should avoid all such large objects as take up more house-room than we can afford to spare them, and secondly, we should refrain from accepting objects the genuineness of which it is impossible to verify. concerning this latter class, it may be appropriate to mention that we have never visited the battlefield of waterloo without meeting a particularly eloquent man who always tells us that he has just had the good fortune to dig up some trophy or other of the famous fight. naturally he is prepared to let us share in his good fortune, and consequently names a price for the article. needless to say, the country of origin of the trophy is germany, and the date of construction some time in the twentieth century. probably, other battlefields besides the one at waterloo are infested with unscrupulous curio vendors, so that the collector will be well advised if he refrains from purchasing any article unless properly authenticated--especially on battlefields. [illustration: queen victoria's chocolate box sent to the soldiers fighting in south africa, .] [illustration: princess mary's christmas box sent to the soldiers fighting in france and belgium, .] in many branches of collecting comprehensive catalogues have been published which enable the student to classify, arrange, and price every piece among his treasures. with military curios, however, no such publications exist, but a very useful guide is the official catalogue issued by the royal united service museum in whitehall. the museum itself is well worth frequent visits, for it is only by constant inspection of such exhibits as those displayed in this gallery that we can get to know of the existence of certain curios and of the shape, texture, and pattern of others. the museum possesses particularly fine exhibits of medals, even of the earlier types; of uniforms, especially head-pieces; of regimental banners, and such weapons as swords and rifles. the united service museum is by no means the only treasure-house of interest to collectors of military curios. the tower of london, the wallace collection, and the rotunda at woolwich, each possess much that is worth inspecting in the way of armour and weapons, whilst the british museum has a collection of medals which is almost unique. the traveller on the continent will find many instructive exhibits in the musée d'artillerie at paris, the rijks museum at amsterdam, and the national museum at copenhagen. chapter ii regimental nomenclature household cavalry--dragoon guards--cavalry--artillery--engineers --guards--infantry, both past and present nomenclature--other units the composition of the british army is a matter concerning which the lay reader knows but little. as many regiments will be mentioned by name in the following pages, it is very necessary that the various divisions be given in tabulated form for purposes of reference. without such a list the collecting of badges, crests, and other devices cannot be performed methodically nor can we study the various forms of dress with anything like precision. the following list consists of one hundred and fourteen units, many of which may be sub-divided into regulars, territorials, and cadets. where such sub-divisions exist separate badges are worn. it must also be mentioned that each battalion in certain regiments boasts of a distinct device of its own. the different badges worn to-day in the king's army are therefore considerably above two hundred in number:-- household cavalry: st life guards. nd life guards. royal horse guards. dragoon guards: st dragoon guards (king's). nd dragoon guards (queen's bays). rd dragoon guards (prince of wales's). th dragoon guards (royal irish). th dragoon guards (princess charlotte of wales's). th dragoon guards (carabineers). th dragoon guards (princess royal's). cavalry: st royal dragoons. nd dragoons (royal scots greys). rd king's own hussars. th queen's own hussars. th royal irish lancers. th inniskilling dragoons. th queen's own hussars. th king's royal irish hussars. th queen's royal lancers. th prince of wales's own royal hussars. th prince albert's own hussars. th prince of wales's royal lancers. th hussars. th king's hussars. th the king's hussars. th the queen's lancers. th duke of cambridge's own lancers. th queen mary's own hussars. th queen alexandra's own royal hussars. th hussars. st empress of india's lancers. royal artillery. royal engineers. guards: grenadier guards. coldstream guards. scots guards. irish guards. welsh guards. infantry: (n.b.--following each horizontal mark the old regimental nomenclature is appended. it will be seen that in many cases two of the old regiments were joined together to form one of the new.) royal scots (lothian regiment)-- st or royal scots. queen's (royal west surrey)-- nd or queen's royal. buffs (east kent)-- rd east kent. king's own (royal lancaster)-- th or king's own. northumberland fusiliers-- th or northumberland foot regiment. royal warwickshire regiment-- th or st warwickshire foot regiment. royal fusiliers (city of london regiment)-- th regiment of foot or royal fuzileers.[ ] [ ] the old spelling is retained. king's (liverpool regiment)-- th or king's regiment. norfolk regiment-- th east norfolk. lincolnshire regiment-- th north lincolnshire. devonshire regiment-- th north devonshire. suffolk regiment-- th or east suffolk. prince albert's (somersetshire light infantry)-- th or st somersetshire. prince of wales's own (west yorkshire regiment)-- th or buckinghamshire regiment. east yorkshire regiment-- th yorkshire (east riding). bedfordshire regiment-- th or bedfordshire regiment. leicestershire regiment-- th or leicestershire regiment. royal irish regiment-- th or royal irish regiment. alexandra, princess of wales's own (yorkshire regiment)-- th or st yorkshire (north riding). lancashire fusiliers-- th or east devonshire. royal scots fusiliers-- st or royal north british fuzileers. cheshire regiment-- nd or cheshire regiment. royal welsh fusiliers-- rd or royal welsh fuzileers. south wales borderers-- th or warwickshire regiment. king's own scottish borderers-- th or king's own borderers. cameronians (scottish rifles)-- th or cameronians; also perthshire volunteers. royal inniskilling fusiliers-- th or inniskilling regiment. gloucestershire regiment-- th or north gloucestershire; also st or south gloucestershire. worcestershire regiment-- th worcestershire; also th or herefordshire. east lancashire regiment-- th or cambridgeshire regiment; also th or nd nottinghamshire regiment. east surrey regiment-- st or huntingdonshire regiment; also th or glasgow lowland regiment. duke of cornwall's light infantry-- nd or cornwall regiment; also th or south devonshire regiment. duke of wellington's (west riding regiment)-- th regiment; also rd or st yorkshire (west riding regiment). (this is the only regiment named after a person not of royal blood.) border regiment-- th or cumberland; also th or westmoreland regiment. royal sussex regiment-- th or sussex regiment. hampshire regiment-- th or north hampshire; also th or south hampshire. south staffordshire regiment-- th or st staffordshire; also th or staffordshire volunteers. dorsetshire regiment-- th dorsetshire; also th or west norfolk. prince of wales's volunteers (south lancashire regiment)-- th or nd somersetshire; also nd regiment. welsh regiment-- st regiment of foot; also th or south lincolnshire. black watch (royal highlanders)-- nd or royal highland regiment; also rd highland regiment. oxfordshire and buckinghamshire light infantry-- rd or monmouthshire regiment; also nd or oxfordshire regiment. essex regiment-- th or east essex; also th or west essex regiment. sherwood foresters (nottinghamshire and derbyshire regiment)-- th or nottinghamshire. loyal north lancashire regiment-- th or lancashire regiment; also st regiment. northamptonshire regiment-- th northamptonshire; also th rutlandshire. princess charlotte of wales's (royal berkshire regiment)-- th or hertfordshire regiment; also th or berkshire regiment. queen's own (royal west kent regiment)-- th or west kent; also th or queen's own regiment. king's own (yorkshire light infantry)-- st or nd yorkshire (west riding). king's (shropshire light infantry)-- rd or shropshire regiment; also bucks volunteers. duke of cambridge's own (middlesex regiment)-- th or west middlesex; also th or east middlesex. king's royal rifle corps-- th or royal american regiment. duke of edinburgh's (wiltshire regiment)-- nd or wilts regiment; also prince of wales's tipperary regiment. manchester regiment-- rd or west suffolk; also th regiment. prince of wales's (north staffordshire regiment)-- th or nd staffordshire; also th regiment york and lancaster regiment-- th or nd yorkshire north riding regiment; also th york and lancaster regiment. durham light infantry-- th or durham regiment. highland light infantry-- st and th highland regiment. seaforth highlanders (ross-shire buffs, the duke of albany's)-- nd; also th highland regiment. gordon highlanders-- th highland regiment; also nd regiment. queen's own cameron highlanders-- th regiment of cameron highlanders. royal irish rifles-- rd regiment; also royal county down regiment. princess victoria's (royal irish fusiliers)-- th or prince of wales's own irish regiment; also th regiment. connaught rangers-- th regiment or connaught rangers; also th regiment. princess louise's (argyll and sutherland highlanders)-- st regiment; also rd regiment. prince of wales's leinster regiment (royal canadians)-- th or his royal highness the prince regent's county of dublin regiment. royal munster fusiliers-- st or duke of york's irish regiment; also th regiment. royal dublin fusiliers-- nd regiment. rifle brigade-- th regiment. [illustration: badge of the queen's (royal west surrey regiment) nd foot.] [illustration: badge of the duke of edinburgh's (wiltshire regiment).] [illustration: badge of the king's (liverpool regiment).] [illustration: badge of the royal warwickshire regiment.] other units: royal marine artillery. royal marine infantry. army service corps. royal army medical corps. army veterinary corps. army ordnance corps. army pay corps. chapter iii regimental crests the fascination of regimental crests--how to plan a collection of crests--the changes which crests undergo--the meaning of crests--mottoes on crests, and their meanings the crest or badge worn by a soldier is probably one of his most cherished possessions, for it is at once the symbol of his regiment and the mascot which urges him on to fame and victory. it is but little wonder, then, that such emblems, so jealously preserved, should prove of deep interest to the collector of military curios. in our own case, and we suppose it was much the same in those of our readers, army crests fascinated us long before we had a clear perception of what an army really was. in our early school-days, buttons bearing the various regimental devices attracted us; later our collection extended a welcome to cap-badges whilst to-day it contains such treasures as the crests on waist-belts, crossbelt-plates, helmets, collar-plates, and even those on the metal flaps of sabretaches. a collection of regimental badges should be planned on scientific lines, otherwise the treasured possessions will lose much of their interest. in the first place, the various specimens should be classified: buttons should be arranged in one group, cap-badges in another, belt-plates in another, and so on. the second grouping should be based upon the standing of the regimental unit. all the buttons worn by the regular army, for instance, should be placed in one sub-division; all those of the territorial army in another; and, as obsolete specimens are still procurable, sub-divisions should be reserved for the volunteer force, the old militia, and special forces which have been raised on special occasions. of course the badges should be arranged according to the precedence accorded to the regiments for which they stand; thus, in the case of the regular army, the household cavalry should receive priority and be followed by the dragoon guards; then the cavalry of the line should take third place, whilst the fourth and fifth places should be given to the royal artillery and royal engineers. the guards should be placed sixth, and the infantry of the line seventh. badges of each of these divisions should then be arranged according to the seniority of the regiment. the army list and the chapter on "regimental nomenclature" will give valuable help on this point. finally, where regiments possess various badges for the different companies, these must be arranged in numerical order. in planning a collection, it is well to remember that badges are constantly changing their patterns, not in fundamental ways, it is true, but in ways which are quite sufficient to add zest to the hobby of collecting. battle honours, for instance, have been frequently added in the past, whilst many changes are sure to take place in the future, on this score alone, as a result of the great war with germany. after the boer war, additions were made to the scrolls which encircle many regimental badges, and the same may be said of the peninsular, marlborough's wars, and every great campaign in which the british army has figured. thus it is clear that a collection of devices such as we have here in mind is full of interest, not only from the military and antiquarian but also the historical point of view. [illustration: badge of the royal dublin fusiliers. badge of the royal fusiliers (city of london regiment). badge of the seaforth highlanders ( th battalion). badge of the royal regiment of artillery.] in addition to the gradual changes which have arisen, it must be mentioned that in the names of many regiments underwent changes and the badges suffered material alterations in consequence. before the year in question, each army unit was known by its number and the crests bore distinguishing numerals. thus the wiltshire badge, which to-day depicts the duke of edinburgh's monogram within a circle, bore the figures " " instead up till . the collector will find these early devices of much interest, but, as a rule, they are fairly hard to obtain. unless the collector has ideas of his own as to how the badges should be mounted, it will be a capital plan to cover a board with black velvet and pin the medal emblems to it. when complete, the board should be framed with a moulding having a fairly deep rebate. the effect will be pleasing; the frame can be used as a wall ornamentation, and, what is most important, the badges themselves will be protected, as far as possible, from the deteriorating influences of the atmosphere. * * * * * a study of the designs given on the crests forms, of course, an interesting pastime. probably the first point which the student will notice is that certain specimens bear the king's sign--e.g. the king's dragoon guards and the grenadier guards--consequently, all such badges must inevitably suffer alteration on the demise of the reigning sovereign. all royal regiments, with a single exception, bear the royal crown, though crowns of various types are borne by other units than royal ones. light infantry regiments invariably display a horn. grenades form part of the devices worn by the grenadier guards, the royal artillery, and the fusilier regiments. most of the irish units display the harp, and the welsh the dragon, but in connection with this latter class, it must be mentioned that the buffs (east kent) are also proud of a dragon; this, however, was given them for services rendered in china. britannia, one of our most cherished allegorical figures, is seen on but a single crest: that of the norfolks. it was awarded to this unit for gallantry at almanza in . the spaniards in the peninsular war nicknamed the men of this regiment the "holy boys," as they mistook the figure of britannia for that of the virgin mary. a castle and key figure on many regimental devices. all those which display them fought at gibraltar and received permission to incorporate these objects in their crest in memory of the services which they performed there. a striped rose forms part of a great many badges. it is a sign of the union after the war of the roses. animals are favourite emblems. the lion, the symbol of our island race, naturally figures most frequently, but elephants, horses, tigers, and stags are great favourites. it is not always possible to tell why such and such a regiment has chosen a particular animal for incorporation in its device, but, more often than not, the design may be traced back to the family escutcheon of a nobleman who had some hand in raising the unit. a case in point is the cat encircled by the motto _sans peur_, which the men of the th battalion of the seaforth highlanders wear on their caps. this creature has long ornamented the crest of the house of sutherland, and the sutherlands claim guardianship over this particular unit. in other cases, an animal has been selected because it is specially appropriate. for instance, the sherwood foresters, soldiers who recall robin hood and the good old-fashioned chase, display an ambling stag, whilst regiments associated with long service in india have adopted an elephant or tiger. but the most appropriate badge of all is that worn by the royal army medical corps. in this instance, we have a snake coiled around a rod. the snake, as every reader knows, was the particular mascot carried by Æsculapius, the god of healing, whilst the same reptile was used by moses in the wilderness to free the children of israel from the ailments which proved so troublesome to them. the fleeting horse, borne by the king's own hussars, the fifth dragoon guards, and the royal fusiliers, is the white horse of hanover, and was incorporated in the crests to remind us of services rendered against the jacobites. the paschal lamb on the "queen's" was the badge of catherine of braganza, wife of charles ii. the sphinx, as every one knows, indicates special services in egypt. * * * * * the mottoes incorporated in certain of the regimental crests are not without interest. the following, with their english equivalents, are worth noting:-- pro rege et patria--for king and country. quis separabit?--who shall separate? quo fata vocant--whither fate calls. spectemur agendo--let us be judged by our actions. nemo me impune lacessit--no one provokes me with impunity. nec aspera terrent--difficulties do not terrify us. mente et manu--with mind and hand. pristinæ virtutis memores--the memory of former valour. viret in æternum--flourishes for ever. quo fas et gloria ducunt--where right and glory lead. vel exuviæ triumphant--arms surely triumphant. semper fidelis--always faithful. virtutis namurcensis præmium--the reward of valour at namur. omnia audax--to dare all. nisi dominus frustra--without god, it is vain. virtutis fortuna comes--fortune the friend of valour. primus in indis--first in the indies. gwell angau na chyurlydd--rather death than shame. aucto splendore resurgo--i rise with increased splendour. celer et audax--swift and bold. cuidich'n righ--assist the king. faugh-a-ballach--clear the way. in arduis fidelis--in danger, faithful. [illustration: some regimental buttons.] chapter iv military uniforms the growth of uniforms--the effect of the decline in armour on uniforms--the part played by elizabeth--uniforms in the time of the civil war--in charles ii's reign--james ii--the first two georges--uniforms in the peninsular war--the close-fitting uniforms of george iv--the changes which were brought about in william iv's time--later changes--peculiarities of the military dress of to-day one of the most interesting tasks which the collector of military curios can set himself is to trace out, by all available means, the growth of army uniforms from earliest times to the present day. in prosecuting such self-imposed work, the sources of information which will have to be studied are almost without limit, ranging from contemporary drawings, prints, statues, the writings of such chroniclers as stowe, to, of course, the actual uniforms themselves. our knowledge of the metamorphoses of military dress is very imperfect, and this research work will be all the more valuable in consequence. at first thought it is a little surprising to learn that the earliest official mention of a distinguishing uniform for english soldiers occurs among the ordinances of henry viii, but when we consider that armour in various styles was largely used until tudor times, the fact is not so striking. isolated instances of uniformed soldiers can be traced before this period; hannibal, we know, raised the famous white and crimson spanish regiments, and then, of course, there were the crusaders, who wore the ordinary clothes of the times, ornamented with crosses of distinctive colours. with the decline of armour, retainers went into battle robed in the cloth liveries of their masters, whilst the mercenaries wore the usual dress of civilians. the drawback to such an arrangement was obvious. men could never tell who were their friends and who their foes, and unnecessary slaughter was consequently committed. it was not long before leaders provided their followers with scarves of distinctive colours; sometimes they were appropriately chosen, at others they were merely distinctive. but even this plan gave little satisfaction, for our history books of the period are crowded with tales of men who donned the enemy's colours and were thus able to surprise their opponents. [illustration: helmet plate of the royal marine light infantry.] as a result of these conditions, henry viii decided to clothe some, at least, of his soldiers in distinctive uniforms; he selected white coats emblazoned with the red cross of st. george. speaking of other soldiers of this reign, probably later levies, stubbs remarks that the doublets which they wore "reached down to the middle of the thighs, though not always quite so low, being so hard quilted, stuffed, bombasted, and sewed as they can neither work nor yet well play in them, through the excessive heat and the stiffness thereof. therefore are they forced to wear them loose about them. they are stuffed with four, five, or six pounds of bombast at the least, and made of satin, taffeta, silk, grograine, gold, silver, and what not." from the antiquarian's point of view this dress must have indeed proved attractive, though the soldier of to-day will hardly recognize any redeeming features in it. [illustration: a horse amulet bearing the device of the royal fusiliers.] elizabeth, as all students of history know, paid great attention to dress; not only in matters concerning her own person, but also in those affecting her court and followers. accordingly, we find that a decree, ordering a body of lancashire men to be raised for service in ireland, stated that "the soldiers shall be given convenient doublets and hose and also a cassock of some motley or other sad green colour or russet; also every soldier to have five shillings to provide a mantle in ireland besides his livery coat." another interesting quotation, taken from lawrence archer's "british army records," mentions sir john harrington as stating that an officer's kit in elizabeth's time consisted of-- cassock of broad cloth. canvass doublet with silk lining and buttons. shirts. bands. pairs of stockings at s. d. each. pairs of shoes. pair of venetians with silver lace (i.e. trousers). when the civil war broke out, the royalists or cavaliers wore a very picturesque though hardly serviceable uniform; it consisted of a doublet of silk, satin, or velvet with large loose sleeves slashed up the front, the collar covered by a falling band of lace, whilst a short cloak was carelessly worn on one shoulder. long breeches tucked into boots, the uppers of which were loose and curled over,[ ] added to the picturesque appearance of the warriors. a flemish beaver, with a distinctive hatband and an elaborate feather, was the usual headgear. the silk doublet, it should be added, was often replaced by a buff coat in war-time. [ ] apparently this slovenly looking boot was used in order to prevent the leg from being crushed in a battle charge. the commonwealth, of course, brought sober clothing which, at least, was more protective and useful than that associated with the tudor and stuart periods. in charles ii's time the military uniform, as we know it to-day, began to materialize. it is true that during the early part of charles's reign the soldiers wore the pre-commonwealth styles, but when the king began to form certain regiments, which still exist at the present moment, a need for definite uniforms became manifest. thus, in , the earl of oxford raised the horse guards and provided them with a picturesque blue uniform, and in the third buffs was formed and soon earned for itself this distinctive name as its accoutrements were fashioned from buffalo leather. james ii introduced few changes. it is worth mentioning, however, that wigs became fashionable in this period, and large hats adorned with waving feathers were worn to suit the style of coiffure. sewn into the crown of these hats, skull caps made of iron were frequently found. in , according to a contemporary authority, the coats and breeches of the sergeants and ordinary soldiers were, in most cases, grey, whilst the coats of drummer boys were purple. the shape of these costumes followed the civilian styles of the period. when anne came to the throne, armour which had not been entirely abolished completely died out, and the foot soldiers wore a comfortable scarlet coat with distinctive facings, a cocked hat, breeches, and long black gaiters reaching just above the knees, with a strap below the knee to hold them in position. the cavalry also wore a cocked hat and large boots. some officers wore a wide-brimmed hat, turned up on two sides and decked with gay feathers.[ ] [ ] luard, "a history of the dress of the british soldier," p. . the first two georges introduced many ideas from abroad, the most striking of which was the mitre helmet, worn even to-day by certain central european regiments. the men who were provided with this headgear were certainly picturesque in appearance; the royal fusiliers, for instance, wore a high mitred helmet, elaborately ornamented with regimental devices, a long tail coat, buttoned back at the front in a way which is reminiscent of the present french infantry, knee breeches, cloth leggings, and a plain bandolier carrying a bag, much after the fashion of a sabretache. with the exception of his hat, which was clumsy and gave no protection either against weather or onslaughts, his uniform was comfortable though weighty. george iii discarded the low boots and leggings for knee-boots, but these were soon given up for low boots and long trousers. the buttons on the uniform of the heavy dragoons, also, were replaced by hooks and eyes, whilst the light dragoons lost nearly all theirs. in addition, their helmet was replaced by a felt shako. curiously enough, the hussar, who wore five rows of heavy buttons on his jacket and five more rows on the little pelisse which he slung loosely over his left arm, was allowed to keep all his cumbersome ornamentation. the peninsular war brought many changes, but these were more variations of the set styles than complete alterations in shapes and colours, probably the result of requiring large quantities of outfits for the war, in the quickest possible time. luard, writing of this period, says[ ]: "the officers of the army of the peninsula ran into great extremes of fashion; and as there was a difficulty, frequently, in procuring articles of dress exactly according to regulations, considerable latitude was of necessity granted. an officer of the th dragoons, who was very fond of being gaily dressed, was always searching for silver lace, and whenever he went into a town and returned to the camp, on being questioned regarding what articles of food were to be procured, invariably answered: 'i don't know, but i found some silver lace.'" [ ] luard, "a history of the dress of the british soldier," p. . directly following the napoleonic wars it was felt prudent for the sake of peace to garrison a british army of occupation in france. four cavalry regiments crossed the channel, the th, th, th, and rd light dragoons being selected. the dress which these soldiers wore was a jacket similar to that of the ordinary light dragoons, but with the addition, for the officers, of an embroidered cuff and collar, a pair of enormous epaulettes, and an aiguillette. the cap was very high with a square top, made of cane covered with cloth of the colour of the facings of the regiment, a brass plate in front and a plume at the top of it. the privates' dress corresponded to that of the officers, but brass scales were worn on the shoulders instead of epaulettes. the cossack shape of trousers was worn by the officers, very full around the waist but gradually tapering down to the foot.[ ] [ ] luard, "a history of the dress of the british soldier," p. . george iv, as is popularly known, gave much thought to matters of dress. he held that wrinkles in a uniform entirely spoiled all appearance of correct military bearing. the soldiers of his time were therefore expected to put on their clothes and have all fullness cut out. luard says that the consequence was that the coats of the privates, as well as those of the officers, were made so tight that freedom of action was much restricted, and the infantry could with difficulty handle their muskets, whilst the cavalry could scarcely do sword exercise. there is no doubt that, though the uniforms of this date were uncomfortable, they were of a smart and attractive appearance. the officers in the rifle corps, for instance, wore a tight-fitting green outfit with silver facings, relieved by a bright scarlet belt. the boots were of black leather, and reached almost up to the knees. the hat was somewhat like the highland bonnets of to-day. the officers in the th hussars were a trifle more showy in appearance. they had a blue coat with gilt-braided plastron, and a pelisse on the left arm. the trousers were red and skin-tight, and fastened under the instep to keep them from creeping up the leg. the hat was a shako surmounted by a large dark plume. in the st foot guards the officer's coat was red, and had tails; there were epaulettes on the shoulders and a white bandolier across the breast. the hat was a high-decked shako of glossy material. william iv's reign was marked by the rise and subsequent decline of enormous bear-skins. william also decreed that the whole of the army, with the exception of the artillery and riflemen, should be dressed in scarlet, the national colour. when victoria came to the throne she restored the blue dress to the light dragoons, but not to the lancers nor to the th regiment. the household cavalry were given helmets with weeping plumes fixed to the apexes. a little later "pill-boxes" became fashionable amongst the majority of the regiments. in most of the distinctive and, in many cases, historic facings were taken from the various regiments, and blue was given to the royal regiments and white to the others. the change seems to us, who look at the matter in the light of the antiquarian and historian, as a retrograde one, which should be deprecated in every way. to-day all the regiments of the regular british army wear scarlet uniforms, with the following exceptions:-- . _blue uniforms_--royal horse guards; th dragoon guards; king's own hussars; queen's own hussars; royal irish lancers; king's irish hussars; queen's royal lancers; prince of wales's own hussars; prince albert's own hussars; prince of wales's royal lancers; th, th, th, th, th, and th hussars; th and st lancers; royal artillery; royal marine infantry; army service corps; royal army medical corps; army veterinary corps; army ordnance corps; army pay corps. . _green uniforms_--cameronians; king's royal rifle corps; royal irish rifles; rifle brigade. in the above notes we have merely given a rough sketch of the growth of the military uniform as it has affected the british soldier. to elaborate this information by tracing the various changes, both great and small, which have been applied to army clothing is a work of intense interest and historical value. the task is best undertaken by the curio collector, who can build up the necessary knowledge from his self-made collection of military prints, illustrated books, photographs, and actual uniforms. we do not suggest that any one reader should undertake the whole task himself; it is far better to select a particular regiment or a class of regiment, or even a particular article of dress, and trace its history with minute precision. the results achieved in this way would indeed prove valuable. before concluding this chapter the following questions bearing on military dress may prove of interest; they are typical of the thousand and one queries which the student should ask himself:-- . why do the drummers in the guards wear fleurs-de-lys on their tunics? . which regiments still wear black in memory of wolfe? . why do the northumberland fusiliers wear a red and white feather hackle in their caps? . why does the gloucester regiment wear a badge on both the back and front of their hats? . why has the "flash" survived with the royal welsh fusiliers? . why does the privilege exist with the oxfordshire and buckinghamshire light infantry of wearing shirt collars with the uniform? [illustration: a sleeve from a coat of the old nd (south middlesex) volunteer regiment.] [illustration: a belt buckle from the same regiment.] chapter v armour the scarcity of good armour--considerations for the collector--counterfeit armour--the twelve periods in armour--the characteristics of each period--glossary there is much that is fascinating in the study of armour, and the seeker after military curios will do well to consider the advisability of making a collection of armour pieces. in praise of this particular form of treasure-hunting we could write a good deal, but, as space is necessarily limited, it will be wise to content ourselves, at the outset, with stating the drawbacks rather than the advantages which attend this hobby. in the first case, really good complete suits of period armour are scarce, and consequently command enormous sums. of course there is no reason why detached pieces should not be collected: these can be obtained freely and at reasonable prices. probably the best bargains are to be had at country-house sales, where the specimens are not sufficiently numerous to warrant the attendance of london dealers. but the smaller bric-à-brac shops, especially those off the beaten track, often contain oddments which may be picked up at tempting prices. the second drawback concerns questions of space. armour collecting takes up a good deal of room and, in these days of small suburban houses and town flats, it is not every one who can house such treasures without causing them untold damage. the third point is the most serious of all; it may be stated briefly. there are so many dangerous forgeries to be met with that the untutored collector may become bewildered and so lose his love for the hobby. upon the continent there are thriving factories where armour, of the rarest kinds, is imitated, not for sale as reproductions but in order to cheat the uninitiated. the antique appearance is imparted to the bright metal surfaces by artfully smearing with lithographic ink and then dabbing with muriatic acid. the ink protects the parts which it covers from the corrosive action of the acid, and when the metal is subsequently washed and greased it has the exact appearance of an aged piece of armour, eaten and worn by time. how is the amateur to detect such worthless specimens when he runs across them? under the title of "forgeries that were not forged," _the connoisseur_,[ ] a few years ago, made some very pertinent remarks on this subject. "foreign museums are not entirely free from the presence of forgeries," the article began; "in paris may be seen suits and parts of suits which will not satisfy the connoisseur in the matter of freedom from faking. at berlin at least one suit will strike the observer as decidedly not what it claims to be. at stockholm, among the interesting objects in the lifrustkammer are many pieces which one regrets are not real. and if in public collections many pieces arouse scepticism, how much more so is it the case with private collections, where all the geese are swans." [ ] may , p. . "in the tower of london, on the upper shelf of one of the cases, is a row of helms and helmets described as copies or trophy work. these certainly exemplify the expression 'forgeries that were not forged.' they were bought for the national collection between the years and , and were then no doubt considered valuable examples of ancient armour. one, indeed, figured at manchester in among the treasures of art. in them we may observe every rule of the construction of real armour violated, and further insulted by artificial rust and injuries. "it may be asked, in the words of the song, 'how shall i my true love know?' and seeing how much more trouble is taken to deceive than to detect deceit, it is difficult to lay down any complete system of defence for the collector from the ever-increasing attacks of the forger." it is certain, however, that the best way of detecting forgeries is to get acquainted with the styles of armour that were worn at certain periods, to find out what processes were available for constructing the armour at these periods, what uses each section of the armour was put to, and how it was fitted on to the rest of the suit. of course, a good deal may be learnt from visits to public collections. the uninitiated collector is, therefore, advised to study the specimens shown in the tower, the royal united service museum, the wallace collection, and the rotunda at woolwich. on the continent there are many fine displays, not only of armour but also of weapons, notably at the musée d'artillerie, paris, the industrial museum of vienna, the copenhagen national museum, and the rijks museum at amsterdam. these are all well worth inspecting. * * * * * having discussed matters concerned with the collecting of armour, we will now turn to questions relating to the actual armour itself. armour may be conveniently divided into twelve periods, as follows[ ]:-- i. pre-norman. ii. norman period to . iii. the chain mail period, - . iv. chain mail reinforced, - . v. the cyclas period, - . vi. the studded and splintered armour period, - . vii. the camail and jupon period, - . viii. the surcoatless period, - . ix. the tabard period, - . x. the transition period, - . xi. maximilian armour, - . xii. the half-armour period, after . [ ] there are various ways of classifying armour, but we have here followed (class i excepted) ashdown in "british and foreign arms and armour." [illustration: armour headgear] =the pre-norman period= is, in reality, composed of a number of preparatory eras which paved the way for the norman period, the first to use complete suits of protective covering. the greeks with their boeotian helms and cuirasses, the romans with their "skullcap" helmets, the saxons and danes with their head, chest, and leg coverings, all led up to the armour as we see it depicted by the bayeux tapestry. this period is of little interest to collectors, as specimens are quite unobtainable. =the norman period= introduced the peculiar but distinctive helmet, conical in shape and provided with a nose protection or "nasal." the body covering was worn from head to toes, the feet and legs being enveloped in "chausses" made of a pliable substance provided with a generous supply of metal studs. the shield was, of course, an important feature of the norman dress; it was more or less heart-shaped, and bent so as to fit round the body. =the chain mail period.=--between and the armour suit underwent considerable changes. the norman conical helmet gave place to the heaume, which usually had a flat surface, squared at the top, curved lines under the chin, and peepholes or ocularia in front. a surcoat or tunic, without sleeves, which was fitted over the usual armour, was also a feature of this era. but, of course, the introduction of chain mail was the outstanding point of interest. =chain mail reinforced.=--this period saw the gradual introduction of heaumes with curved crowns, often bearing ornamental devices, or ailettes to protect the shoulders and neck, of banded mail, and of chain mail reinforced with sections of plate. =the cyclas period.=--"probably at no time in the history of defensive armour," says ashdown,[ ] "has it presented a more picturesque appearance than during the brief ten years of the cyclas period. fitting closely to the figure, the various garments followed the outlines of the human form, and in no parts showed any marked peculiarities or eccentricities. the evolution of the style was undoubtedly derived from the experience gained during the chain mail period, when that defence was proved to be ineffectual against the terrible effects of lance and sword. both of these weapons, even if they did not actually pierce the mail, either bruised the body or broke bones, and thereby incapacitated the wearer; while the protection afforded by the loosely hanging folds of the surcoat of previous periods, especially against sword-cuts, had been duly noted. hence, during the cyclas period we meet with the introduction of multitudinous coverings, whereby the lance, the sword, and the arrow were opposed by plate and mail, and by various padded garments of a textile nature." [ ] "british and foreign arms and armour," p. . [illustration: a flint-lock pistol.] [illustration: the action part of the above.] =the studded and splintered armour period.=--this form of armour directly owes its introduction to the conflicts between the english and french, and the ideas for improvement which were prompted by actual experience on the battlefield. the style was none other than a piecing together of the best features of chain mail, plate, and cuir-bouilli. the bascinets of this time were unusual, having much the appearance of metal hoods, provided or not provided with visors. the surcoat and the chausses were essential features of the period. =the camail and jupon period.=--this is probably one of the most interesting and picturesque periods in the history of armour. the headgear was usually pointed and fitted down closely over the ears, but left the face free. laced to the helmet and falling over the shoulders was a plastron of camail which protected the throat and neck from violence. the jupon was a garment which covered the body from the camail to just above the knees. it consisted of whatever material the wearer thought was the most impervious to blows, with, usually, a velvet covering, embroidered with a heraldic device. =the surcoatless period= is easily recognized, as it was the earliest period in which a full set of armour was worn with no textile covering placed over it.[ ] a feature of note was the loss of the camail throat-guard and the introduction of a light sheet-metal gorget. the camail was, undoubtedly, an efficient safeguard, but it was extremely weighty and so caused much inconvenience to the wearer. [ ] ashdown, "british and foreign arms and armour," p. . =the tabard period= saw the introduction of many changes, which had for their object the greater protection of the armoured soldier; but the most distinguishing feature was the arrival of the tabard, a kind of sleeved surcoat, which covered the wearer down to the knees. it was of no fighting value, but gave dignity to those who displayed it. the salade also belongs to this period, both those with and those without visors, as well as the pauldron, a protection for the elbow, and the palette, which shielded the underneath portion of the shoulder-joint. =the transition period= brought helmets which, by reason of their movable visors, cheek-pieces, and mentonnières, gave greater safety to the head. but the period is more readily distinguished by the mail skirt, which was worn suspended from the waist. of this period ashdown writes: "very important alterations occurred in armour of this period, differentiating it from that of the preceding. the great pauldrons, exaggerated coudières, and general angularity, and one might almost say prickliness, of the later tabard period was modified to a smoother and rounder style, while it lost entirely that remarkable beauty of form which, however much distorted by fanciful additions, characterized the gothic armour as a whole. the beautiful flutings and ornamental curves disappeared to make way for a heavy, cumbersome style indicative of german stolidity, and in direct antagonism to the mobile quickness and agility suggested by the majority of suits dating from the latter half of the previous century."[ ] [ ] "british and foreign arms and armour," p. . =maximilian armour.=--with the gradual employment of gunpowder even the best kinds of armour lost their military value, and, consequently, the sixteenth century saw a decline in the use of steel suits for purposes of warfare. there was no reason, however, why steel-clad men should not continue to be seen at tilting tournaments, even though the arquebus had proved its value in dealing death and destruction. consequently we find that armour was still used during this century at these functions of chivalry, and it was the kind favoured by emperor maximilian which was mostly worn--hence the name. its outstanding features were excessive ornamentation and artistic finish. =the half-armour period.=--this is the period during which steel dress was gradually dying out. "the period exhibits a brutal strength and crudity in armour which forcibly suggests boiler-plate work. the defences were simply made to cover the vital parts of the body with the maximum amount of efficiency, without any consideration whatever for gracefulness of outline or beauty of surface."[ ] the metal covering of these times was obviously fashioned with the idea of making a compromise between protection and mobility, and it gradually dwindled until the head alone was safeguarded. [ ] ashdown, "british and foreign arms and armour," p. . so passed away the armour which, as james i once said, was a very useful invention, for it saved not only the wearer from being killed, but it was so hampering that it prevented him from killing any one else. * * * * * many technical terms are used in armoury which need explaining. the following are those which occur most frequently:-- =barded.=--a horse fully armoured. =bascinet.=--a helmet which protected the back of the head and neck. =brassarts.=--plate armour for the upper part of the arm, reaching from the shoulder to the elbow, sometimes in a single piece, sometimes in a series of overlapping plates. =brigandine.=--armour worn at one time by brigands--hence the name. it consisted of a foundation of quilted leather, upon which was sewn a number of small metal plates, and thus formed a good defence for the body against the sword and the pike. =burgonet.=--a fifteenth-century helmet, usually round to fit the head, but provided with a peak to protect the eyes. =cabasset.=--like the morion, it was a simple metal hat with a dome-shaped crown and a brim. it had no visor, gorget, neck-guard, etc. =chain mail.=--a covering which consisted of an endless number of rings laced one into the other. each ring had four others threaded into it. the individual rings were known as "grains d'orge." =chamfrien.=--the metal covering for a horse's face; often provided with a spike. =chausses.=--the metal leggings used in armour. =corslet.=--a suit of armour worn chiefly by pikemen. the word was used, not only to denote the body covering but the whole outfit from head to knees. =coudière.=--an elbow guard. =crinière.=--a number of plates hooked together to guard a horse's neck; it rested on the mane. =cuirass.=--armour for the breast and back, consisting of two plates united at the sides of the body. they were originally fashioned out of leather (_cuir_ = leather). =espalière.=--covering for the shoulders and the upper part of the arm. =gauntlet.=--the protection used for covering the hands. =genouillière.=--flexible knee pieces with joints reminiscent of those possessed by lobsters. =gorget.=--a protection for the throat; it also sustained the weight of the whole armour outfit. =greeves.=--plate armour for the legs. =haubergeon.=--a coat made probably of plate or chain mail but without sleeves. =hauberk.=--this was a complete covering of mail from head to foot, consisting of a hood joined to a jacket, with sleeves, breeches, stockings, and shoes of double chain mail, to which were added gauntlets. =heaume.=--a head covering, introduced in the chain-mail period. (see p. ). =hufden.=--a head piece which fitted closely round the skull; it was worn by archers in queen elizabeth's time. =jazeran.=--a hauberk which was covered with overlapping plates. =mentonnière.=--a portion of the head piece which protected the chin and the lower part of the face. =morion.=--see cabasset. =ocularium.=--the peep-hole of the helmet. =palette.=--a shield or covering used to protect the arm and shoulder-joint. =pauldrons.=--pieces of armour for the shoulders; the origin of epaulettes. =plate mail.=--this consisted of a number of small lamenæ of metal, commonly iron, which were so arranged as to slightly overlap like the scales of a fish. usually a leather foundation was provided. =poitrinal.=--the covering for a horse's hindquarters; a guard against sword slashes. =pot.=--a cabasset or morion. =rerebrace.=--a protection for the part between the elbows and shoulders. =rondelle.=--a guard for the inner side of the arm which wields the weapon. =salade.=--a light casque, sometimes provided with a visor, but without crest. =sollerets.=--overlapping plates which formed the shoe of an armed knight. cf. chausses. =tapul.=--the perpendicular ridge down the middle of a breastplate. =targe.=--a shield. =tassets.=--a series of flexible plates hooked to the skirt of the cuirass, protecting the thighs. =visor.=--the movable face-guard of a helmet. [illustration: the barrel of a gun ornamented with a twin head of minerva.] [illustration: an old powder-flask.] chapter vi weapons buying specimens--storing them--hand culverins--the serpentin--the wheel-lock--the flint-lock--the rifle--swords--the effect of armour on swords--swords with historical associations--other weapons of all the antiques which are to be found in an average bric-à-brac shop there is probably nothing upon which the dealer is so ignorant as the class of military curio which comes under the head of weapons; as a consequence, we find that the ruling prices for these relics of the battlefield are either excessively dear or ridiculously cheap. there is nothing in this state of things to cause the collector of weapons to grumble, for if he be wise he will add to his treasures when a bargain is to be had, but not when specimens are dear. the process makes collecting a somewhat slow business, but it enables us to get together a whole host of interesting things at a very small cost. a few weeks ago the writer spent an afternoon in going round to the antique shops in a certain quarter of london. here are some of the prices which he was asked, and which he considers were out of reason. for a rifle used by kruger's men, £ ; worth at the most half this sum. for a rifle and bayonet said to have been used at waterloo, £ . for a sixteenth-century sword, s. the sword was so heavy that it would have almost fetched this price as old metal. for an eighteenth-century flint-lock, not in good condition, £ . needless to add, that while the writer was not impelled to purchase the flint-lock, he snapped up the sword eagerly. the collector of weapons must be very careful how he stores his treasures. to leave, say, a bayonet where it can be handled by children is almost a criminal act; to buy a firearm and not examine the charging chamber immediately is, if anything, a trifle more unscrupulous. thoughtlessness has accounted for a good many tragedies, and so it ought to be the determination of the curio-hunter to see that his treasures are stored out of harm's way. swords, bayonets, rifles, and other lengthy weapons are conveniently kept on the walls of living-rooms, and if placed horizontally and fairly high up are safe and ornamental. smaller things, such as daggers and pistols, are better preserved in glass cases. steel implements which, when exposed continuously to the air, are apt to deteriorate, should be carefully cleaned and then coated with a thin layer of copal varnish. if the varnish be painted on sparingly and no patches are left uncoated, the metal will remain bright permanently, and only require an occasional dusting. if the specimen which is to be treated is rusty, it should be carefully gone over previously with emery, but should it have a chased, engraved, or damascened surface, it will be advisable to soak it in benzine for a week or more, and then give it a rubbing until a sufficient polish has been obtained. [illustration: a south african pom-pom shell and a martini-henri cartridge.] [illustration: cartridges as used in the great war. (from left to right: german, french, belgian, and british.)] * * * * * of the weapons with which we shall deal in these pages, probably firearms are the most interesting. such implements have been in use among armies for many centuries, but as cannon and other large pieces possess little interest for the collector, on account of their size, it will be convenient to omit the earliest firearms and speak first of hand culverins. this weapon consisted of a small tube of ½ to ¾ in. internal diameter, fixed to a straight piece of wood or welded to an iron handle. at the close of the fifteenth century it was extensively employed. in culverins were in the army of edward iv, after his landing at ravenspur, yorkshire. the smallest hand patterns, weighing lb., were used on horseback, whilst heavier weapons of sixty odd pounds' weight were manipulated by foot soldiers and fired from trestles or tripods.[ ] [ ] see article on "firearms" in _chambers's encyclopædia_. the culverin may be seen in a variety of makes; some possess a touch-hole and flash-pan at the side, whilst the earlier kinds have no flash-pan at all. in some the barrel is circular, whilst in others it is hexagonal or octagonal. of course, specimens are only to be found in museums, and are seldom obtainable for private collections. early in the sixteenth century the culverin gave place to the serpentin, which, in turn, was slightly modified and became the famous match-lock. to fire the culverin, the attendant had to stand with a lighted match over the touch-hole, but in the serpentin the igniter was gripped by a lever which descended into the flash-pan. the match-lock had the flash-pan covered by a lid, which gave a certain amount of protection to the sparking action in wet or windy weather. the next innovation was the wheel-lock, a weapon which possessed a metal disc provided with a serrated edge. by winding up the disc and using the trigger to release it, it was possible to make the serrated wheel fly round at a considerable rate. as the rough teeth revolved, they scraped against a piece of flint and so produced sparks, which flew into the flash-pan and caused ignition of the powder charge. the system was certainly an ingenious one, but the cost of making these elaborate pieces of mechanism militated against the general use of the wheel-lock for army purposes. after the wheel-lock came the flint-lock. this style of arm possessed a hammer which was provided with a "flint-cock." when released, the flint and the steel came into violent contact, and produced sparks which flew into the touch-powder. the flint-lock was commonly used in the netherlands, and was brought to england by william of orange, remaining in use until .[ ] specimens are obtainable for private collections, but early patterns are of some rarity and fairly expensive. the later history of the hand firearm used in the army is interesting. "in a patent was taken out for making rifles in england. in the first half of the next century benjamin robins, a gunsmith, who died in , made an alteration in the centre of gravity in the rifle by placing it nearer the forepart, and he also made the bullets oval instead of round. he discovered the true theory of the rifle: 'that the spinning of a rifle ball, like the rotation of an arrow, kept the axis of either in the same direction throughout their flight, and, to a great extent, prevented the irregularities caused by the inequalities in the substance of the bullet when driven from a shot-gun or musket.' but strangely enough robins, though by far the ablest writer on projectiles of his own and many succeeding generations, exercised but a slight influence on his contemporaries. the government of his day was not moved by his representations, or convinced by his theory. the ministers of that day were slow in adopting improvements, a common failing of ministers as a body, and riflemen were unknown among english troops until the necessity for them was made evident in the american war. the rifle was necessary to the existence of the backwoodsmen. practice made them excellent shots, and when the colonial irregulars were able to obtain suitable cover, regular troops could not stand before them. after a time foreign aid was resorted to. hessian, hanoverian, and danish riflemen were engaged to serve against the revolted colonists; and it was not until upwards of ten years after the independence of america was recognized that the first english rifle regiment was formed."[ ] [ ] see article on "firearms" in _chambers's encyclopædia_. [ ] w. g. clifford, "peeps at the british army," p. . during the first half of the nineteenth century all infantry regiments, with the exception of the rifle corps, were served with smooth-bored muskets, but after the minié rifle was universally used. this weapon showed a distinct advance, but it had one serious drawback--it was heavy, as many of the men who fought in the crimea learned by bitter experience. in the long enfield rifle, a much lighter implement, was given to our soldiers. this was followed in by the short pattern enfield; in by the snider; in by the martini-henri; in by the enfield-martini; in by the lee-metford, mark i, and the mark ii in ; whilst to-day the service pattern is the lee-enfield, mark iii. * * * * * swords are interesting weapons from the collector's point of view. as the antique specimens were stoutly made, of material that did not easily perish, it is quite possible to buy them, two or three hundred years old, at no very great cost. it is not an easy matter to detect the date of a sword, but the armed figures on old prints, drawings, coins, etc., often hint at the period of construction. the bayeux tapestry, for instance, enables us to see that the norman pattern was of simple design, being straight, rather short, tapering and double-edged, whilst the handle was merely a grip with but little protection. this shape of sword, it may be said, was used for some three or four hundred years, and even in the majority of the specimens were much the same. it is true that by this time the quillons were becoming curved towards the blade, probably so that a slash would be arrested before it reached the knuckle of the soldier who received the blow. of the sword of this period ashdown writes: "the sword was attached to the belt at the uppermost part of the scabbard, and hung perpendicularly at the left side. it generally had a wheel pommel and a swelling grip, with quillons either straight or drooping slightly towards the blade. the latter was about an inch and a half broad at the hilt, thirty inches in length, and tapered to the point, while the section was either of a flattened or a lozenge shape. it was double-edged, and had a grip of varying dimensions, ranging from four inches in length to an extent which, in some examples, almost suggests a two-handed weapon, or the hand-and-a-half or bastard sword of a later period. the pommel, grip, and scabbard were at times elaborately enriched with a profusion of ornament. a new weapon was introduced at this period, the misericorde or dagger of mercy, used for dispatching a fallen foe whose wounds were beyond all surgical aid. it was a straight dagger, with no guard as a rule, and having both the hilt and scabbard curiously ornamented; the blade had but one edge, the section being triangular."[ ] [ ] "arms and armour," p. . [illustration: weapons . sword of time of norman conquest. . sword of fifteenth century. . court sword of eighteenth century. . basket of cavalry sword, nineteenth century. . cutlas sabre, fifteenth century. . glaive. . bill. . halberd. . pole axe-head. . head of two-handed sword. ] as armour became more developed so changes appeared in the sword. the implement of medium weight was no longer serviceable against well-tempered metal suits; accordingly, the sword became heavy and ponderous, so that it might smash where it would not be able to cut. so heavy were specimens made that they needed two hands to wield them, and as this prevented a shield being supported, the quillons were so shaped as to give extra protection. this was the origin of the basket hilts of present patterns. [illustration: an old sword with straight cross-guards.] [illustration: an italian dagger having a replica of the famous column of st. mark for grip.] some swords are worthy of note on account of their shape and age, but others claim attention by reason of their historical associations. in the royal united service museum there are many that are worth seeing from the latter point of view. one in particular may be mentioned. the exhibit bears the following inscription: "sword of admiral villeneuve, commander-in-chief of the combined fleets of france and spain, surrendered to lord collingwood at the battle off cape trafalgar, october , . it was offered to captain atcherley, of the marines. atcherley refused to accept it, and took villeneuve in his boat that he might surrender to captain pellew. admiral villeneuve, having been taken prisoner, was sent to england, where he was detained until may , ." * * * * * beyond firearms and swords the collector may find many treasures among such weapons as daggers, bayonets, lances, battle-axes, pikes, spears, boomerangs, assegais, and native clubs. it should always be remembered, however, that the weapons used by british forces, past and present, are of more interest and value than those coming from savage races. chapter vii early british war medals how to arrange a collection of medals--factors which influence the value of a medal--the earliest medals--the first english medal--the first english military medal--the forlorn hope medal--the dunbar medal--the culloden medal--medals granted by the honourable east india company--the pope's medal, --the emperor francis ii of germany's medal, --the seringapatam medal--the egyptian medal, --the rodriguez medal--the nepaul medal--the maida medal--the peninsular officers' medal the dignity which enshrines a collection of war medals is something greater and fuller than that which can be ascribed to almost any other branch of curio collecting. coins, china, furniture, and prints are all fascinating in their way, but none seem to have the same depth of interest as is possessed by the average collection of war medals. to handle one of these tokens of strife and bloodshed is to call up feelings of reverence and honour for the man who spent his energies so freely in earning it, and it is probably on account of this extrinsic quality that war medals are so highly prized among connoisseurs. with many forms of collecting, the different specimens that are available are so numerous as to be overwhelming, but this drawback cannot act as a deterrent to the would-be medal collector. british medals have been fashioned with a sparing hand, and their number is more or less limited. many of them, it is true, are extremely costly, whilst a select few are quite prohibitive in price--a matter which, perhaps, adds to the zest of collecting. the best method of storing these treasures is to follow the plan adopted by coin-collectors, and to range them on trays in the shallow drawers of coin-cabinets. where the pieces are few in number, it is a good plan to mount them on a board covered with black velvet, and to frame them just as one does a picture. to have no particular method of keeping them, to leave them lying loose in drawers, or to place them as casual ornaments in curio or china cabinets is decidedly wrong, for a few scratches, a fall, or a little rough handling will often reduce considerably the value of a specimen. for the benefit of the uninitiated, it may be well to mention that not only does the value of a medal depend upon its state of preservation--that is to say, whether it is in mint condition, slightly rubbed, much worn, scratched, battered, re-engraved, etc.--but also upon the number of clasps that go with it. it must not be thought that collectors tolerate the indiscriminate adding of clasps to claspless medals. a medal that was awarded with, say, one additional honour cannot be turned into a three-clasp decoration by purchasing two clasps from a dealer and placing them upon the slide ribbon. the medal in question, if it be less than a hundred years old, has the name of the original possessor engraved upon the flange, and by turning to the medal rolls the number of clasps issued with the particular decoration can be found. another factor which affects the value of a medal is the regiment to which it was issued. a medal given to a private in a crack regiment will possess a greater value than an identical medal awarded to a private in a less noted one. the rank of the recipient is also taken into account; this, however, is perhaps only natural. [illustration: royalist badge worn by the partisans of charles i.] * * * * * medals were known to the ancients. the greeks, for instance, have left behind them many interesting specimens which can still be seen in our public museums, but none of them were given as recompenses for military bravery. the ordinary soldier of these early days had no status, and therefore received no rewards, whilst the leaders were given crowns of laurel, bracelets, and neck chains of gold for the services they rendered. it was queen elizabeth who first thought of giving medals to british fighting men, and it was the crews of the ships which sailed out to meet the armada that received them. the first medals to be given for military, as distinct from naval, honours were struck by charles i. probably the very earliest award made by this king was the medal presented to sir robert welch, an officer in the royalist cavalry, whose bravery in recovering the standard from the parliamentary forces at edge hill excited the admiration of every member in his party. charles gave orders for many other medals to be struck, but most of them were presented to officers holding high posts who had performed special services in times of peace as well as war. many of these decorations were fashioned in single copies, and as practically none of them bore any inscriptions beyond the title and motto of the king, it is impossible to ascribe them to any definite act of military value. they were all oval in shape, whilst the designs showed considerable artistic merit. all these medals were intended to be worn suspended around the neck, or fixed brooch-like in the hat. usually, the ribbons which were worn with them could be selected by the possessor at will, no fixed pattern being officially decreed, as obtains in present times. as may be expected, specimens belonging to this early period are now extremely costly, but they are often obtainable at public sales. a fine collection of them may be inspected in the medal-room at the british museum. charles i evidently had great faith in the value of decorations, for we find that towards the latter part of his reign he instituted a general medal, known popularly as the forlorn hope medal, which was to be awarded much on the lines which regulate the granting of the victoria cross to-day. the warrant which announced these awards ran as follows:-- "charles r. trusty and well beloved, we greet you well, whereas we have received information that those soldiers which have been forward to serve us in the forlorn-hope, are not looked upon according to their merited valour and loyal service. we do, therefore, require, that from henceforward, the commander-in-chief both of horse and foot, which lead up the forlorn-hope upon whom also we mean to bestow special tokens of our princely favour, do signify in writing the names of those soldiers whom they find most forward in serving us, their king and country, that care may be taken to reward their deservings and make them specially known to all our good subjects. for which end we have thought fit to require sir william parkhurst, kt., and thomas bushell, esq., wardens of the mint, to provide from time to time certain badges of silver, containing our royal image, and that of our dearest son, prince charles, to be delivered to wear on the breast of every man who shall be certified under the hands of their commander-in-chief to have done us faithful service in the forlorn-hope. "and we do, therefore, most straightly command that no soldier at any time do sell, nor any of our subjects presume to buy, or wear, any of these said badges, other than they to whom we shall give the same, and that under such pain and punishment as the council of war shall think fit to inflict if any shall presume to offend against this our royal command. and we further require the said commanders and wardens of our mint to keep several registers of the names of those, and of their country, for whom they shall give their certificate. given at our court, at oxford, the th day of may, ." it is unfortunate that what records were presumably kept, under these orders, were destroyed by a disastrous fire which took place at oxford in . thus we neither know how many specimens of the forlorn hope medal were distributed, nor do we even know for certain the exact design it bore. a number of identical copies exist of a medallion bearing the profile of king charles on the obverse, and that of prince charles on the reverse, and this is usually considered to be the award in question. the dunbar medal, the next to call for attention, is of special interest, as it was the first british award to be given to every member of the fighting forces, whether man or officer. this attractive decoration was struck in in two sizes, a small gold piece for officers and a large copper one for distribution among the ranks. both bore the same design, namely, cromwell's profile and the inscription "word.at.dunbar. the lord of hosts. septem. y. . .," on the obverse, and a view, in exaggerated perspective, of parliament in full assembly on the reverse. a curious letter, referring to the design of this medal, and written by the protector, is still extant. it explains that cromwell while in scotland received a visit from the artist chosen by parliament to execute the design. the artist went to beg a few sittings of the great leader with a view to producing a faithful portrait-likeness. but cromwell was extremely loath to allow his features to be displayed upon the medal, and advanced all manner of excuses, probably owing to feelings of over-sensitiveness. in the end he was prevailed upon, and the medal bore his profile as stated above. this incident is of special interest, as historians have seldom, if ever, mentioned in discussing the character of this able soldier that one of his qualities was modesty. * * * * * after dunbar came a lengthy period during which many medals were struck; they were all, however, of an individual character, being awarded to leaders for personal services. culloden, which was fought on april , , was the next event to call for a special issue of medals. to commemorate the young pretender's rout, oval medals in gold and silver were struck. it is presumed that the gold pieces were awarded to leaders of the highest rank, whilst the silver ones went to those of lesser importance. it is certain, however, that no awards were made to the common soldiers. the design was remarkably bold and imposing; the obverse bore a simple profile of the duke of cumberland with short curly hair and the word "cumberland," whilst the reverse showed an unclothed full-length figure of apollo, looking to the left. the inscription "actum est ilicet perut" and, also in latin, "battle of culloden, april th, ," appeared on the reverse. this medal was one of the first to be issued with a definitely prescribed pattern for the ribbon. the warrant effecting its issue stated that "it was to be worn round the necks of officers by means of a crimson ribbon having a narrow green border." the medal is exceedingly rare, but of the few copies known to exist one, fortunately, may be seen among the treasures of the british museum, and another in the royal united service museum. * * * * * the history of british and indian medals is so interwoven that it is impossible to study the first without knowing something of the latter. it may even be claimed that much which affected the fashioning and awarding of late eighteenth-century decorations given by the authorities at bombay has since been copied by our authorities at home. the most obvious point bearing on this contention deals with the shape of the medals. before the indian examples, all of which were circular, were struck, the british patterns invariably appeared oval in form, whilst most of the subsequent issues have been circular. again, the allegorical designs of patriotic themes, which our most recent medals bear, had their early origin in the sepoy tableaux which decorated the reverse of the indian medals. the reverse side of british medals before the indian specimens were issued usually depicted the features of a royal personage, a coat of arms, or, perhaps, a sailing vessel. but the greatest influencing factor of the indian medals was the method of granting them. every soldier from the highest general down to the lowest fighter received an award. in england quite a different custom prevailed. with the single exception of the dunbar medal, no english soldier was ever awarded a royal medal until waterloo, unless his conduct had been unusually brave and he had merited some special recognition. the controversy which raged round wellington's campaigns as to whether the ordinary men as a class should or should not receive decorations was finally settled by remembering the sepoys of india. if it were good for these soldiers to receive them, then our british fighting men must have them as well. such was the popular opinion which prevailed. [illustration: the crimean medal.] * * * * * the pioneer medal from india is usually spoken of as the decoration awarded for services at poona, but, as no specimens are known to exist, there is reasonable doubt as to whether the decoration was ever struck. the records, however, state plainly that the bombay council decided to give medals to all the officers among the grenadier-sepoys who went with colonel egerton to quell a native rising in poona. in , a campaign in deccan took place against tippoo sahib and his father. a medal was afterwards minted by the honourable east india company and presented to all officers and men forming the bengal army. there were gold and silver specimens, vast numbers of both being struck. the obverse showed britannia, leaning forward, offering a wreath to a fort flying a british flag. the reverse bore a persian inscription. a second encounter with tippoo sahib, known as the mysore campaign, took place in - . the medals which were subsequently struck for the officers and men who served under colonel cockerell were made in gold and silver and were intended to be worn around the neck, suspended by a yellow silk cord. the obverse depicted a sepoy grasping a half-unfurled british flag, trampling at the same time on the enemy's colours; the reverse bore the inscription, "for services in mysore, a.d. - ." if medals were ever dearly won, those of the mysore campaign seem to have been, for many stories have been told of the great daring shown by cockerell's men. thomas carter in his work on "war medals" writes as follows: "one of the most dashing exploits in the war of mysore was the capture of bangalore, the second city in the dominions of tippoo. it was enclosed by a high wall and a deep ditch, and the gate was covered by a close thicket of indian thorns. the attack was made without any examination of the ground, and the troops in advancing and endeavouring to force an entrance were exposed to a destructive fire of musketry. colonel moorhouse, one of the best officers in the service, fell mortally wounded. at length, lieutenant ayre, a man of diminutive stature, succeeded in forcing his way through the shattered gate; which gallant action being observed by general meadows, he shouted to the stormer, 'well done! now, whiskers, try, if you can, to follow and support the little gentleman.' this animated appeal succeeded: the troops rushed through the gate into the town and drove out the enemy at the point of the bayonet." it is now necessary to speak of two medals of a slightly different nature to any of the foregoing. in mentioning the first, we must recall the work undertaken by the th lancers in , when one section of the regiment went to corsica and, landing, captured the bastia, whilst another section went forward to the italian coast and entered the harbour of civitavecchia. for the protection thus afforded him, pope pius vi gave a dozen of the officers gold medals suitably inscribed. these decorations, it must be added, were not officially recognized in england, and the recipients received no permission to wear them when in uniform. in the year , another case of british soldiers receiving a foreign decoration occurred. in this instance, emperor francis ii of germany was the donor of a gold medal and a chain pendant to each of eight officers of the th light dragoons. the emperor had fallen into a precarious position at villiers-en-crouché, a small settlement near cambray, and, had it not been for the heroic and persistent efforts of the english, he would certainly have been captured by the french, who were massed in great numbers. the awards were made as a thank-offering for his lucky escape. unlike the pope's decorations, those of francis ii were recognized by the english army authorities, and the recipients were allowed to wear them when parading in full dress. the following letter may be quoted in reference to the matter[ ]:-- "to lord dorchester, colonel of the th dragoons. _may , ._ my lord,--the emperor of germany having been pleased to present each of the officers of the th regiment, under your lordship's command, who distinguished themselves in so gallant a manner by their spirited attack upon the enemy, with a very inferior force, on the th april, , near cambray, a gold medal has been struck by his imperial majesty's orders, on the occasion, as a particular mark of the sense he entertained of the signal service thereby rendered to the allied army. i have therefore the honour, by order of his royal highness the commander-in-chief to signify to your lordship his majesty's pleasure that the above-mentioned officers shall be permitted to wear the said medals constantly with their uniforms, as an honorary badge of their bravery in the field of action, and an inducement to all others to imitate, on every favourable occasion, their glorious example. i have, etc., wm. fawcett, _adjutant-general_." [ ] d. h. irwin, "war medals," p. . from this time until the peninsular campaign almost all the medals which we have to record--many of them of a highly interesting nature--were awarded to native troops by the honourable east india company. the first, dated , reminds us of the gradual expansion of the british empire. it was struck to commemorate the capture of ceylon from the dutch, - . the medal was made in gold and silver in calcutta and was given, probably exclusively, to the bengal native artillery--one of those sections of the native indian army of which the east india company was justly proud. the medal was unusually plain, there being no pictorial design, but merely the inscription, "for service at the island of ceylon, a.d. - ," on the obverse, and a persian inscription on the reverse. it may be said that questions were asked by those in authority as to how so severe a pattern came to be chosen, and the reply was given that as no exceptional feats occurred during the campaign, a simple design was deemed most suitable. the reason seems unconvincing. [illustration: the general service medal, - .] [illustration: the afghan medal.] [illustration: south african medal, - .] the siege and capture of seringapatam, which culminated in the death of that arch-enemy, tippoo sahib, was the occasion for issuing a madras medal, according to a general order dated july , . gold pieces were given to senior officers, silver gilt pieces to field officers, silver pieces to junior officers, bronze pieces to the rank and file of the british force, and tin pieces to sepoys. the design was attractive: on the obverse appeared a landscape view of our gallant men storming seringapatam, whilst a lion overwhelming a tiger filled the reverse. the medal was not made in calcutta, as was usually the case with the indian decorations, but at birmingham. collectors have often been at a loss to know how the indian awards were intended to be worn. in reference to the seringapatam distinction, mayo, in "medals and decorations of the british army and navy," says: "there is no doubt that they were issued unmounted, and as no directions had been given by the authorities the details as to ribbon and mountings devolved on the recipients, who exercised their own discretion and taste. it is, however, probable that the european officers wore them as the gold medals for the peninsular and other campaigns were worn--i.e. round the neck, or at the button-hole, according to rank. some added a clasp bearing the word seringapatam. "three patterns of ribbon, at least, appear to have been used, viz. red with blue borders, yellow watered, and plain red. that the first was used under some sort of authority is gathered from a discussion which took place between the madras government and the commander-in-chief in , on the occasion of the distribution of the medals awarded to the native troops in the first burmese war. the commander-in-chief had proposed that a piece of red ribbon with blue borders should be issued with each medal. the government assented to the issue of the ribbon but objected to the pattern on the ground of its resemblance to the waterloo ribbon. to this the commander-in-chief replied that the ribbon he had proposed was common to all medals granted by his majesty in modern times, and was considered to be the medal ribbon of england. he added: 'the medals of seringapatam and java are both suspended from it, and both are so worn with the sanction of his majesty.' this is authoritative evidence of the medal being worn with the only military ribbon then in use. "lord harris, who commanded at seringapatam, wore his medal, gold, suspended round his neck by the red, blue-bordered ribbon, as the gold medal was worn by general officers. a bust of his lordship was exhibited at the royal military exhibition, at chelsea in . this showed the medal worn round the neck, with a clasp inscribed 'seringapatam.'" a second seringapatam medal, almost similar in design to the first, was struck in and presented to british as well as native troops by order of the east india company. this decoration was made at calcutta. the next medal takes us to egypt and recalls to mind a number of desperate encounters between the english and french. in the year an army of , british soldiers, under sir ralph abercrombie, had been assembled in the peninsula. the french were already massed there in great numbers, being more than double our strength. on march , , a bloody contest took place at alexandria, and abercrombie fell mortally wounded. reinforcements were necessary, and these were supplied by the east india company, which dispatched an expeditionary force of native troops with commendable promptitude. on returning to india in , the government of bombay promised the men a campaign medal--that is to say, a medal would be granted to each individual who set out to fight for the british cause. nine years elapsed before the medal was struck, but it is gratifying to know that specimens were given to the descendants of all soldiers whose demise had taken place in the meantime. sixteen gold and , silver copies were struck at a cost of r. . . the obverse of this award showed a sepoy holding a union jack, whilst in the background the tents of the indian camp were revealed. a persian inscription filled the exergue (i.e. the section of the circular face of the medal cut off from the rest by a straight line). the reverse revealed a wooden british ship nearing the coast, presumably of egypt. the date, mdccci, was added. the turkish sultan, also, gave a medal to the british soldiers who took part in this campaign. it is usually spoken of as "the order of the crescent." these early years of the nineteenth century brought the english into many unfortunate conflicts with our present allies, the french. no sooner was strife at an end in egypt than we once more met our gallant rivals, this time in the islands of rodrigues, bourbon, and mauritius. it was in the years - , under the command of general j. abercromby, who led the th and th madras infantry, also the th bombay infantry, and vice-admiral bertie, who brought a squadron of ships, that a strong force met and defeated the french. the medal which was afterwards awarded to all natives who took part in the engagement was inscribed, "this medal was conferred in commemoration of the bravery and fidelity exhibited by the sepoys of the english company in the capture of the islands of rodrigues, bourbon, and mauritius in the year of hegira, ." the date as reckoned by the english calendar was also given. the obverse revealed a sepoy standing with our national flag in one hand and a rifle in the other. a cannon was shown just behind him, whilst the background depicted an expanse of sea. gold and silver pieces were struck by the calcutta mint. the following order in council of the year is of interest:-- "on the occasion of the approaching return from the late french islands of the volunteers from bengal, fort st. george, and bombay, to the presidencies to which they respectively belong, his excellency the vice-president in council considers it to be no less an act of justice than of indispensable duty to record the high sense he entertains of the services performed by the native soldiery, who were employed in concert with his majesty's troops in the reduction of the islands of rodriguez, bourbon, and mauritius. he is pleased to signify his approbation of the distinguished merits of the volunteers by conferring honorary medals on all the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, troopers, sepoys, gaulundauze, and gun lascars employed on that service." closely following on the declaration of peace in the three above-mentioned islands of the indian ocean came trouble with the dutch in java. as was usual, a joint army of home and native troops was dispatched to the scene of conflict. a victory was gained in , and on february , , seven thousand medals were struck by the east india company at calcutta, for distribution among the indian troops. the british regiments, the th, th, th, th, and th foot, took part in the expedition but, following the usual custom, received no awards. the particulars of this indian medal were as follows: obverse--sepoys storming fort cornelis, upon which was prominently displayed a flagstaff bearing a british flag above, presumably, a dutch flag with the word cornelis printed above the scene. reverse--a persian inscription and august mdcccx. java conquered. xxvi. the nepaul medal was the next to be struck by the honourable east india company. it bears the date of . in granting this award, a departure was made from the usual custom of giving a decoration to every soldier, or his heirs, who actually set out from home with an expeditionary force. in this case, the medal was granted, first, to officers who reached the fighting area and, second, to the men who conducted themselves with conspicuous bravery. mayo says that the feeling was probably gaining ground that too many medals were being struck and their value was becoming lessened in consequence. this he suggests was the reason for restricting the number on this occasion. the obverse of the nepaul medal showed a stirring picture of hills, strongly fortified, with cannon in the foreground and an array of bayonets just coming into view. the reverse consisted of a persian inscription. after nepaul, a long period followed during which no campaign medals were awarded to indian troops. certain individual awards were made to officers, but as in each case less than twenty pieces were struck, we consider it unnecessary to record them in detail. at this point we must retrace our steps to the year and speak of the battle of maida, which may be described as an outlying encounter in the napoleonic campaigns. to celebrate sir john stuart's victory over the forces led by general regnier, a medal was struck and presented to thirteen of the highest officers. the award in itself was unimportant, but as it was practically the first royal medal to be given to british soldiers since the time of culloden, it must be looked upon as an epoch-making decoration. we must admit that nelson's men at trafalgar had received awards, and certain regiments which took part in various napoleonic wars were provided with coveted distinctions, but in every case they were planned and paid for by private individuals and so cannot rank in any way as royal medals. it is perhaps interesting to record, in parenthesis, that the trafalgar medals were given to the recipients by an engineer of birmingham named matthew boulton. the last award to be described in this chapter is the peninsular medal. two sizes, both in gold, were struck and presented to officers. no men received them. the designs of both were: obverse--britannia, seated on a globe, holding out a palm; a couchant lion beside her. reverse--a laurel wreath framing the name of one of the following battles: roleia, vimeira, sahagun, benevente, corunna, martinique, talavera, guadaloupe, busaco, barrosa, fuentes d'onoro, albuera, java, ciudad rodrigo, badajoz, salamanca, fort detroit, vittoria, pyrenees, st. sebastian chateauguay, nivelle, nive, orthes, and toulouse. the name and rank of the recipient was engraved upon the edge. the larger medal was awarded to general officers and was provided with an attachment for wearing around the neck, a crimson ribbon with blue edging being specified. the smaller medal was given to junior officers who took command in cases where their superior-commanders had been disabled. this award was provided with a buckle and ribbon as above and was intended for wear upon the breast. both the large and small medals were conferred for service in one engagement. for a second or third engagement bars were provided. these, it may be added, in parenthesis, were the first bars given to british soldiers. when an officer received distinctions in more than three engagements he was awarded the peninsular cross instead of the foregoing circular medals. this distinction was struck in gold and had much the same shape and design as was afterwards selected for the victoria cross. the lion on the former, however, faces to the right, whilst on the latter it looks to the left. in this chapter we have traced the history of british medals from their inception in the reign of elizabeth down to the stormy times of the duke of wellington. the period was marked by the paucity of awards made to british troops. popular opinion, however, was gradually forcing its influence during the latter years of the period upon the authorities who withheld them, and the following chapter shows how agitations coming from non-military quarters caused a complete change of policy in the granting of these coveted distinctions. [illustration: the indian mutiny medal.] chapter viii military medals struck by the mint campaign medals considered--waterloo--burmah--china--cabul-- jellalabad--scinde--meeanee--sobraon--the men's peninsular medal--punjab--indian general service medals--south africa, - ; also - --baltic--crimea--indian mutiny--abyssinia-- new zealand--later awards in these days when the deeds of brave men, whether they be of high or low rank, are acclaimed with equal praise, it is extremely difficult to understand the feelings which actuated the authorities a hundred or more years ago when awarding military medals. parliament, though it was supposed to represent the masses, decided time after time in these early years of the nineteenth century that decorations were only meant for soldiers of rank and that the common men had neither claim nor title to them. the usual plea was that the ordinary soldier had been paid for his services, and there the nation's obligation to him was at an end. somehow or other, the authorities seem to have shut their eyes to the fact that the same argument could be applied with equal force to the commanders of the army. it is somewhat lamentable to note that even so grand a soldier as the duke of wellington argued in favour of withholding rewards from the rank and file, and his opinion, we may be sure, had great influence in certain high quarters. but in spite of the decided opinions held by those in authority, there was a strong party of agitators who opposed these narrow views. to them must be accredited much, for in face of every conceivable obstacle they left no stone unturned until the coveted awards were shared by men as well as commanders. in the early days which followed waterloo this little band displayed particular activity. "are our ordinary soldiers, fresh home from the belgian battlefields, to go unrewarded as the peninsular heroes have done?" was their constant cry. the people took up the matter, and only when absolutely forced to did parliament agree to strike a medal for all ranks of the victorious army. the official decree ran as follows:-- "the prince regent has been graciously pleased in the name and on behalf of his majesty to command that in commemoration of the brilliant and decisive victory of waterloo, a medal shall be conferred upon every officer, non-commissioned officer, and soldier upon that occasion. by command of his royal highness the prince regent. frederick, _commander-in-chief_." undoubtedly the innovation of rewarding the rank and file as well as the officers created much satisfaction. the people openly displayed their approval, the soldiers were pleased beyond measure, and the press spoke of the change as a step in the right direction; such, at any rate, is the impression one gathers from reading articles bearing on the matter in contemporary numbers of the _quarterly review_. the waterloo medal bore on the obverse a profile of george and the inscription "george p. regent." on the reverse was a winged figure of victory seated upon a rectangular scroll bearing the word "waterloo," and the date "june , ." the reverse design was obviously copied from a coin of elias which is exhibited in the british museum. the ribbon was of red silk flanked with blue edges. this material was passed through a circular ring and not through a horizontal slot, as is customary to-day. the award was received by all grades of men who were present at the battle of ligny, june th; quatre bras, june th; waterloo, june th; as well as by certain forces which were posted in the rear of the battlefield on june th. certain german troops were also decorated with this award. the collector will often come across specimens of this medal, which are provided with slots instead of rings for holding the ribbon in position. many of the original recipients preferred this latter method of attachment and made the alteration themselves. such specimens, therefore, are not in strict accordance with the official pattern and are in consequence of less value than the unaltered kind. some ten years elapsed before the next medal, styled the first burmah medal, - , was struck. this being an indian award, no royal features were portrayed. on the obverse was a palm-tree and an army storming an eastern city, probably rangoon; there was also a persian inscription in the exergue. on the reverse, a lion was encountering a white elephant, and a british flag waved prominently in the background. the decoration was struck in gold for officers, and silver for men of other standing. for the first time with indian medals, a definite ribbon, red and blue, was prescribed. the earliest award to bear the head of queen victoria was the china medal of . the features portrayed on this specimen were similar to those shown on a medallion executed by william wyon in , and struck to commemorate victoria's first visit to the city of london as queen. her majesty evinced a great liking for this rendering of her features, and consequently it was used for the coinage, the postage stamps, and, lastly, the medals. the reverse side revealed a group of arms of various kinds. the ribbon was red, edged with yellow. it was given both to soldiers and sailors. this award may be confused with a later china medal of the same design. the earlier pattern, however, bears the year under the word china in the exergue, whilst the - pattern has no date at all. also, no bars were furnished with the earlier specimen, but as many as six may be found on the latter. writing of the thrilling incidents which crowded the first campaign, carter describes one of them in the following words: "the west gate had been blown in by captain pears, the commanding engineer. a body of tartars, having been driven into one division of the western outwork, refused to surrender, when most of them were either shot or destroyed in the burning houses, several of which had been set on fire by the enemy or by the british guns. major-general bartley subsequently proceeded with a body of troops consisting of the th and part of the th regiment, when a hot engagement ensued with about one thousand tartars, who, under cover of some enclosures, opened a destructive fire on the soldiers as they were filing round the walls. the leading division of the th dashed down the ramparts, while the th pushed on. as a result, the enemy was soon dispersed, although some fought with great desperation. "from the sun becoming so overpowering it was found impossible to move with men already fatigued by their exertions, many of whom died from the intense heat. the troops, therefore, remained in occupation of the gates until six o'clock, when several parties were pushed into the tartar city and to the public offices. on passing through the city and suburbs, the painful spectacle presented itself of hundreds of the dead bodies of men, women, and children lying in the houses, numerous families having destroyed themselves sooner than outlive the disgrace of their city being captured by foreigners." the second chinese war resulted from a cumulation of depredatory movements on the part of the natives, but the capture of the _arrow_, a vessel flying the british flag, was directly responsible for the declaration of hostilities. the next medal struck at the mint was awarded to the soldiers who took arms in , in cabul. the obverse bore the wyon head of victoria, whilst the reverse was issued in four patterns as follows:-- . a wreath encircling the inscription "candahar, ." . a wreath encircling the word "ghuznee," and another encircling the word "cabul." . a wreath encircling the inscription "candahar, ghuznee, cabul, ." . a wreath encircling the inscription "cabul, ." the ribbon attached to all the varieties was of the rainbow pattern which has since become familiar on indian medals. a native medal was also struck at the mint for distribution among the indian troops. instead of victoria's bust a trophy of arms surmounting the inscription "invicta, mdcccxlii," filled the obverse side. after cabul came the jellalabad rising. to celebrate the victories of this campaign, a medal was struck at calcutta and distributed to all soldiers who took part in the various actions. the design was considered unsatisfactory; the obverse bore a simple mural crown, the upper edge of which resembled the embattled coping of a castle, whilst the reverse showed the date "vii april ," in bold but plain lettering. in consequence of the dissatisfaction which the medal caused, another was struck by the mint in london and sent out to the troops in . an order was issued at the same time stating that all recipients of the calcutta award could have their decoration changed for the london award on making formal application. curiously enough, the soldiers who had grumbled at the pattern of the earlier medal showed little desire to become recipients of the newer piece, and in only a few cases was the exchange made. the london striking is consequently somewhat rare. the mint medal bore the wyon head of victoria surrounded with the words "victoria vindex," whilst the rear showed a graceful figure of victory, with wings, holding a flag and a laurel wreath. the words "jellalabad, vii april mdcccxlii" encircled the figure. the rainbow ribbon of india suspended the medal. the early forties were troublous times in india. hardly twelve months after jellalabad had been fought and won, a medal was earned by our brave troops in the province of scinde. referring to this campaign, mayo quotes the following interesting letter:-- "colonial office, downing street. _ th july, ._ my lord, i have the honour to acquaint your lordships, that the queen, being desirous of commemorating the signal success obtained by the force under the command of major-general sir charles napier, in scinde, has been graciously pleased to command that a medal, to resemble as nearly as possible that proposed for the troops employed in afghanistan, should be conferred upon the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers in her majesty's service, who were engaged in the battles of meeanee and hyderabad. without anticipating the course which the court of directors of the east india co. may propose to take for commemorating the success of the company's troops in scinde, i think it nevertheless right to add that her majesty would readily permit the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the company's army to whom the court of directors might think proper to grant medals in commemoration of the battles of meeanee and hyderabad to wear such medals in all parts of her majesty's dominions. i have etc., stanley, _the presidency of the indian board_." the mint medal issued in march bore the wyon head of victoria, with the words "victoria regina" on the obverse, but of the reverse there were three patterns. the first showed a laurel wreath and crown encircling the word "meeanee"; the second had the word "hyderabad" substituted; whilst the third gave both battles, namely "meeanee and hyderabad." the rainbow ribbon was again employed. before turning to the next medal, it is pleasant to recall the duke of wellington's brief eulogy of sir charles napier's campaign, which he addressed to the house of lords. "sir charles napier moved his troops through the desert against hostile forces, he transported his guns under circumstances of extreme difficulty and in a most extraordinary manner, and he cut off a retreat of the enemy which rendered it impossible for them ever to regain their positions." meeanee was fought on february th, and hyderabad on march , . [illustration: the china medal, - .] [illustration: the egyptian medal, - .] two years after scinde, the sutlej campaign was waged between british troops and sikhs. the mint medal struck to commemorate our victories was the second award to carry clasps or bars--the officers' peninsular medal being the first. the obverse again showed wyon's head of victoria: the reverse displayed a stirring picture of victory holding out a wreath, with a stack of arms at her feet. the words "army of the sutlej" encircled the allegory. of the exergue on the reverse, there were four different types: the first read "moodkee, "; the second, "ferozeshuhur, "; the third, "aliwal, "; and the fourth, "sobraon, ." the general order which regulated the granting of this decoration stated that soldiers who took part in more than one engagement were to receive the medal engraved with the name of their earliest encounter, whilst bars were to be added for subsequent victories. from this it is clear that the sobraon medal cannot be found with any bars. bars, the decree stated, were to be worn in the following order, counting upwards from the medal: ferozeshuhur, aliwal, and sobraon. naturally, no bars for moodkee were issued. curious as it may seem, the next decoration to be struck by the mint was the rankers' peninsular medal. it will be remembered that on the conclusion of wellington's campaign in spain two gold pieces were issued for officers, but that no awards were presented to the ordinary soldiers. this arrangement pleased neither the men nor the officers, who knew how much the country was indebted to the rank and file. as a consequence, the question of the men's medal was constantly discussed in parliament. in , the matter was thoroughly debated upon in the lower house, but the opposers urged with a certain amount of success that wellington had decided years ago that no award should be granted. sir charles napier's answer to this lame argument was to the point. "it is never too late to do a good thing," he retorted amidst the applause of his followers. two years later, in , the matter was again before the house, and, probably because queen victoria was somewhat partial to the granting of distinctions when merited, a favourable decision was arrived at. the men were to have the medal so long withheld from them, as the following general order of june , , explains:-- "her majesty having been graciously pleased to command that a medal should be struck to record the services of her fleets and armies during the wars commencing , and ending in , and that one should be conferred upon every officer, non-commissioned officer and soldier of the army who was in any battle or siege, to commemorate which medals have been struck by command of her majesty's royal predecessors and have been distributed to the general or superior officers of the general armies and corps of troops engaged, in conformity with the regulations of the army at that time in force...." the order was somewhat lengthy and involved, but its chief clauses were: (_a_) men should receive medals and clasps for all engagements figuring on the superior officers' medals and clasps of - , and (_b_) relatives of men since deceased could claim the award on production of sufficient title. the medals were issued to , claimants in . in , the duke of richmond suggested that the troops in egypt, who had fought with great bravery, should also receive the distinction, and the queen graciously consented to recognize their services. in this case, however, the relatives of dead soldiers could not claim the award. there is much about the rankers' peninsular medal which is unsatisfactory. in the first place, the reverse bears the figure of victoria crowning the duke of wellington. as he took no part in many of the contributory campaigns, and as his veto so long delayed the granting of the decoration, some other design would have been more appropriate. again, the date placed in the exergue, - , is much too vague. and lastly, the head of victoria on the obverse has often caused confusion, as she did not ascend the throne until some three years after the campaign had come to a welcome close. the punjab award, - , is probably one of the most artistic pieces of work emanating from the london mint. on the obverse was the familiar wyon head of victoria, surrounded by the words "victoria regina," whilst on the reverse was a stirring tableau representing sikhs presenting their arms to major-general sir walter raleigh gilbert at rawul pindee. the ribbon was blue, striped with two narrow lines of yellow. there were three clasps: chilianwala, mooltan, and goojerat. the most desperate encounter in this campaign was the battle of chilianwala, during which the brigade under brigadier pennycuick and lieutenant-colonel brookes was led to make a disastrous charge owing to a misunderstanding. the th regiment suffered terribly, and their medals are now extremely valuable in consequence. in , queen victoria, in furtherance of her policy of rewarding unrecognized actions of the past, decided to issue an indian general service medal to cover the following feats of arms:-- storm of allighur--september , . battle of delhi--september , . battle of assaye--september , . siege of asseerghur--october , . battle of laswarree--november , . battle of argaum--november , . siege and storm of gawilghur--december , . defence of delhi--october . battle of deig--november , . capture of deig--december , . war of nepaul-- . battle of kirkee and battle and capture of poona--november . battle of seetabuldee and battle and capture of nagpoor--november and december . battle of maheidpoor--december , . defence of corygaum--january , . war in ava-- - . siege and storm of bhurtpoor--january . the following are the particulars of the medal:-- _obverse_--wyon's head of victoria, with the inscription "victoria regina." _reverse_--victory, seated. a palm-tree in front of her. _ribbon_--sky blue. _clasps_--twenty-three in number. it is curious to note that the reverse bears the date - , though the above list of engagements restricts the years to - . this is due to the fact that the list was revised after the dies had been put in hand, and certain of the earlier battles were deleted on the advice of the duke of wellington. a second indian general service medal was issued in and subsequently as conditions demanded. it should be mentioned that the authorities had grown to view the constant striking of fresh medals for indian service with a certain amount of disfavour, and the standard design was introduced in order to prevent a multiplicity of patterns. the measure may have proved satisfactory to those in authority, but it certainly had grave disadvantages of a more or less obvious character. the ribbon, for instance, was similar through all the years of the issue, and when worn with undress or civilian clothes conveyed little meaning. the following clasps were issued:-- pegu; persia; north-west frontier; umbeyla; bhootan; looshai; perak, ; jowaki, ; naga, ; burma, , , and ; sikkim, ; hazara, and ; chin-lushai, ; samana, ; north-west frontier, ; hunza, ; lushgai, ; wazeristan, . the value of the piece varies considerably, according to the clasps provided with it. the description of the second indian general service award is:-- _obverse_--wyon's head of victoria, with the inscription "victoria regina." _reverse_--victory crowning a naked warrior. _ribbon_--three strips of red and two of blue, all of equal width. another general medal, first issued in the early fifties, was the south african medal. it will be remembered that in - certain british regiments were engaged in putting down kaffir risings. when a decoration was struck for them, queen victoria decreed that the soldiers who fought in the earlier kaffir risings in and - should also receive the award. the design, which was the same for all, bore the wyon head on the obverse, and a crouching lion with the words "south africa" and the date " " on the reverse. the ribbon was orange, streaked with four blue lines. for the campaign, the th, nd, and th foot regiments were decorated. for the - campaign, the recipients were the th dragoon guards, the rifle brigade, the th, th, th, th, th, and st foot regiments. for the - campaign, the following were honoured: the nd, th, th, rd, th, rd, th, st foot, the rifle brigade, the th lancers, and various marines. by noting the recipient's regiment, engraved on the medal edge, it is possible, in most cases, to decide for which particular campaign the award was made. it may be convenient to state here that the south african decoration was re-issued in - . the design was similar to the original, except that the exergue contained a picture of kaffir arms instead of the date " ." with this issue clasps bearing the following years were given: , , , - , - , and - - . the next medal was that presented for the baltic. it was given largely to the navy, but the army received its share, as the letter here quoted from mayo plainly shows:-- "admiralty, _june , _. her majesty having been graciously pleased to signify her commands that a medal shall be granted to the officers and crews of her majesty's ships as well as to such officers and men of her majesty's army as were employed in the operations in the baltic in the years - , the lords commissioners of the admiralty hereby give notice of the same." the obverse of the award was again embellished by the familiar head engraved by wyon, whilst the reverse depicted britannia seated. the inscription "baltic, - ," surrounded her. the ribbon was yellow, flanked with narrow edges of blue. after the baltic came the crimea award. this is certainly one of the finest productions which the london mint has ever given us. the well-known picture of victoria filled the obverse, whilst a splendid allegorical group, depicting victory crowning a roman soldier, ornamented the reverse. the clasps were more decorative than usual, taking the form of elongated oak-leaves held in position by minute acorns. they were five in number and bore the designations of alma, balaklava, inkerman, sebastopol, and azoff (the latter only for naval victories). the ribbon was light blue, edged with yellow. the medal commands but a very low price--considering how important was the victory which it commemorates--unless it bears the bar for balaklava. if provided with this honour, and engraved for one of the cavalry regiments which took part in the famous charge, its value is considerable. the last award to be paid for by the honourable east india company was the indian mutiny medal of - . this, of course, is one of the finest pieces which could enter the medallist's collection, yet it is procurable for a very modest sum, unless it bears the clasp for the defence of lucknow, when it is somewhat costly. the obverse shows victoria's profile, as before, whilst the reverse displays britannia seated on a lion, with the word "india" printed around the edge. the ribbon is silver grey, with two bars of red. the clasps are five in number: delhi, defence of lucknow, relief of lucknow, lucknow, and central india. the medal was presented, generally, to soldiers in the th lancers and the bengal horse artillery, besides many civilians. in - , a medal for abyssinia was minted. in some measure it was an interesting award, as the usual head of victoria was superseded by another design, engraved by j. s. wyon and a. b. wyon. in this case the royal features were portrayed within a small circle, which was surrounded by a star having nine points. in the angles formed by the points of the star the letters a-b-y-s-s-i-n-i-a were printed. the reverse was a simple circular wreath. there were no clasps, and the ribbon--silver grey and red in colour--was passed through a circular ring, joined to the medal by a royal crown fashioned in silver. in , a much-belated decoration was struck for distribution among the soldiers and sailors who fought against the maoris in new zealand in - and - . the expeditionary force was landed in , in order to uphold the rights of british settlers, who complained that after purchasing allotments of land they were denied their title. the maori chiefs disclaimed all knowledge of such practices, but when a british magistrate presented a formal complaint to a certain wairau chief, he was murdered. this seems to have been a signal for other native chiefs to rise and maltreat the europeans generally. the british force, it may be added, only arrived in time to prevent a wholesale massacre of the settlers from the motherland. the obverse of the medal bore a new head of victoria, wearing widow's weeds; the reverse showed a wreath, and the inscription "new zealand, virtutis honor: - ." for reasons which are not clear, a few pieces were struck bearing no date. the ribbon was blue and red. * * * * * as the historical incidents relating to the medals of recent issue are generally known, it will only be necessary in the following cases to describe the designs of the medals themselves. =canada=, - .--yet another profile of queen victoria, with inscription "victoria regina et imperatrix." on the reverse, a wreath of maple-leaves and a canadian ensign. clasps--fenian raid, ; fenian raid, ; red river, . ribbon--two bars of red and one of grey. =ashanti=, - .--still another profile of queen victoria, with inscription "victoria regina." the reverse bore a group of british soldiers fighting savages in a wood, the work of e. j. poynter, r.a. clasps--coomassie; - ; - ; ; - . ribbon--yellow and black. =afghanistan=, - .--another profile of queen victoria, with inscription "victoria regina et imperatrix." on the reverse, a fine picture of indian soldiers proceeding through a mountain pass, in which an elephant is prominently displayed. the sketch was made by randolph caldecott. clasps--ali musjid; peiwar-kotal; charasia; ahmed khel; kabul; kandahar. ribbon--green and plum. [illustration: the sutlej medal.] [illustration: the punjab medal.] [illustration: the third indian general service medal.] =cape of good hope general service.=--on the obverse, victoria with widow's weeds and small crown. on the reverse, the words "cape of good hope," surmounting a lion and unicorn. clasps--bechuanaland; basutoland; transkei. ribbon--blue and yellow. =egypt=, - .--head of victoria, as on the ashanti medal, on obverse, and sphinx, with inscription "egypt, ," on the reverse. clasps--alexandria; tel-el-kebir; suakin; el teb; tamaai; el teb-tamaai; the nile, - ; abou klea; kirbekan; suakin, ; tofrek; gemaizah; toski, . ribbon--grey and blue. =north-west canada=, .--obverse, as for egypt. reverse, maple wreath, and inscription "north-west canada, ." clasp--saskatchewan. ribbon--grey with two red stripes. =west africa=, - .--head as in previous case. reverse, british soldiers fighting savages in a forest. seventeen clasps. ribbon--black and yellow. =matabeleland=, .--a fresh head of victoria on the obverse, and a wounded lion, with the inscription "matabeleland" on the reverse. no clasps. ribbon--orange and blue in seven stripes. =central africa=, - .--medal as for west africa. one clasp. "central africa, - ." ribbon--plum, silver, and black. =third india general service medal=, - .--victoria in widow's weeds on obverse, and a british and indian soldier grasping a standard on reverse. six clasps. ribbon--yellow green and plum red. =sudan=, .--head and shoulders profile of victoria on obverse, and on reverse a winged figure of victory grasping a flag in either hand and "sudan" printed beneath her feet. no clasps. ribbon--a thin red stripe separating two wide bars of yellow and black. there is also a khedive's sudan medal which british soldiers have permission to wear. =east and central africa=, - .--obverse, as for sudan. reverse, britannia pointing to the rising sun. a lion accompanies her. clasps--lubwa's uganda; - ; ; uganda, . ribbon--orange and red in two wide bars. =china=, .--victoria in profile on obverse; a pile of arms, a shield, a palm-tree, and the latin quotation "armis exposcere pacem" on the reverse. clasps--taku forts; defence of the legations; relief of pekin. ribbon--a wide red band flanked with yellow edges. =first south africa=, - .--the queen's head on the obverse, as in previous case. victory offering a laurel crown to an army of british soldiers. twenty-six clasps. ribbon--orange flanked with blue, which in turn is flanked with red. =second south africa=, - .--the first campaign medal to bear king edward's profile. reverse, as for previous award. clasps--south africa, ; south africa, . ribbon--equal strips of green, silver, and orange. =ashanti=, .--obverse, as for second south africa. reverse, a lion trampling on native weapons, and a scroll with the word "ashanti." clasp--kumassi. ribbon--three strips of black and two of green. =east african general service=, - .--obverse, as before. reverse, victory, with a lion, pointing to the rising sun. fourteen clasps. ribbon--black, yellow, and green bars. =fourth india general service=, - .--obverse, as before. reverse and ribbon, as for the third india general service medal. clasp--waziristan, - . ribbon--three strips of crimson and two of green. =tibet=, - .--obverse, as before. reverse, the heights of tibet crowned by a fortress. clasp--gyantse. ribbon--green, silver, and plum colour. chapter ix military decorations awarded for special services the necessity for special awards--the victoria cross--the order of merit--the "distinguished conduct in the field" award--the distinguished service order--the meritorious service award--the long service and good conduct award--the "best shot" medal--volunteer decorations--other decorations the reader who has noted the facts set out in the two previous chapters will remember how, in the earliest days of medal awarding, the general plan was to decorate none but the soldiers who had performed exceptional service, and that, as time wore on, the idea developed into granting medals to all who took part in warfare, irrespective of the merits of each individual. the latter plan must certainly be considered the more satisfactory, for personal bravery is so frequent a quality displayed on the battlefield that all who take part in these life-and-death struggles should, of necessity, receive a token of the king's recognition. but though the granting of campaign medals was a step in the right direction, it tended to level up the ordinary brave soldier and the soldier possessing exceptional merit, and this, of course, was a principle unsympathetic to english feeling. accordingly, we find that running side by side with the campaign medals are decorations for special merit. undoubtedly the most popular and the most coveted of all such awards is the v.c. the victoria cross was instituted by a royal warrant of january , --during the crimean war, in fact--and its inception was largely due to the thoughtfulness of queen victoria and the prince consort. the cross itself is severe and plain in design, but loses nothing on this account; it was formerly struck from the metal of old cannon taken in the campaign against the russians, but to-day we can only claim that its metal composition once formed part of artillery pieces of some kind or other. the pattern is too well known to need description, but it may be added that the shape and design were modelled on the peninsular gold cross. the ribbon is crimson for the army and blue for the navy. the victoria cross may be won by soldiers of all ranks; when awarded to non-commissioned officers and privates it carries with it an annuity of £ , though this sum may be increased in special cases. if the medal be sold during the life-time of the recipient the pension can be withdrawn, and if the possessor be convicted in the civil or military courts for any but trivial offences, the same punishment may be enforced. there are many rules regulating the granting of this coveted award; the following are perhaps the most interesting:-- "it is ordained that the cross shall only be awarded to those officers or men who have served us in the presence of the enemy, and shall then have performed some signal act of valour or devotion to their country. "it is ordained with a view to place all persons on a perfectly equal footing in relation to eligibility for the decoration, that neither rank, nor long service, nor wounds, nor any other circumstance or condition whatsoever, save the merit of conspicuous bravery, shall be held to establish a sufficient claim to the honour. "it is ordained that in the event of a gallant and daring act having been performed by a squadron not under in number, or by a brigade, regiment, troop, or company in which the admiral, general, or other officer commanding such force may deem that all are equally brave and distinguished, and that no special selection can be made by them; then in such case, the admiral, general, or other officer commanding, may direct, that for any such body of sailors or soldiers, one officer shall be selected by the officers engaged for the decoration; and in like manner one petty officer or non-commissioned officer shall be selected by the petty officers and non-commissioned officers engaged; and two seamen or private soldiers or marines shall be selected by the seamen or private soldiers or marines engaged respectively for the decoration, and the names of those selected shall be transmitted ... to the admiral or general officer commanding, who shall in due manner confer the decoration as if the acts were done under his own eye." there has been much discussion of late as to whether bars are ever awarded with the victoria cross. undoubtedly, these additional marks of valour are at times given, but instances where they have been received are rare. it should perhaps be stated definitely, that where a second act of sufficient bravery is performed before the cross is conferred, details of the second act are engraved with details of the first upon the rear of the medal, but where the second act is carried out after the medal has been conferred, a bar is awarded and the £ grant increased to £ . the fourth clause of the royal warrant of january , , makes this point quite clear:-- "it is ordained that any one who after having received the cross shall again perform an act of bravery which, if he had not received such cross, would have entitled him to it, such further act shall be recorded by a bar attached to the ribbon by which the cross is suspended, and for every additional act of bravery an additional bar may be added." the brave deeds which have been rewarded by grants of the victoria cross make thrilling reading, but space cannot be spared here for recounting the most stirring of them. a brief description of each award is given in mr. d. hastings irwin's book "war medals and decorations," whilst mr. philip a. wilkin's "history of the victoria cross" also contains much valuable information. before turning to the next medal, it may be interesting to add that crosses are often granted after death; a case in point was that of lord roberts's son who fell at colenso in . another decoration awarded for bravery is the order of merit, which was instituted in . unlike other awards, it was divided into three classes; the third class being granted for the first conspicuous act of gallantry, the second class for a repetition of such act, and the first class for a third instance. the decoration was made in three patterns, each of which was one and a half inches in diameter. the shape was an eight-rayed star. the centre of the award consisted of two crossed swords, around which was written "reward for valour," on a background of blue enamel. the first-class decoration was made in gold and bore a gold wreath; the second-class was silver with a gold wreath; and the third-class, silver with a silver wreath. all were to be worn on the left breast. a money grant formed part of the award, and it is worth noting that the widow of a recipient drew the annuity for three years after her husband's death. a third decoration for bravery is the "distinguished conduct in the field" award. this was instituted by royal warrant on june , , for sergeants, and by a later warrant (december , ) for all non-commissioned officers and privates. the decoration was given to mark "the sovereign's sense of the distinguished service and gallant conduct in the field of the army then serving in the crimea" and since. by an amending warrant of february , , a bar could be earned by performing a subsequent act of gallantry. the methods of selecting recipients was as follows:-- the commanding officer of each cavalry regiment could, if he thought fit, select one sergeant, two corporals, and four privates for decoration, whilst an officer of an infantry regiment could select one sergeant, four corporals, and ten privates. the award originally carried with it a grant of £ in the case of sergeants, £ in the case of corporals, and £ in the case of privates--sums which were banked until the time when the soldiers took their discharge. the medal was fashioned in silver; the obverse bore a military trophy of arms in the centre of which was the shield of the reigning sovereign, whilst the reverse was lettered "for distinguished conduct in the field." the ribbon was red, blue, and red in equal strips. it was worn on the left breast. the medal, as now awarded, bears a profile of the reigning monarch instead of the trophy of arms, and recipients are offered either a gratuity of £ on discharge, or an increase of sixpence per day on their pension allowance. in , the "distinguished service order" was instituted. the initial royal warrant affecting this order, under date of september , , said: "whereas we have taken into our royal consideration that the means of adequately rewarding the distinguished service of officers in our naval and military services who have been honourably mentioned in dispatches are limited. now, for the purpose of attaining an end so desirable as that of rewarding individual instances of meritorious or distinguished service in war, we have instituted a new naval and military order of distinction which we are desirous should be highly prized by the officers of our naval and military services." [illustration: the queen and king's south african medals, - . (the same reverse was used for both pieces.)] the order consists of a gold cross shaped out of a circle of conspicuous and pleasing design. the metal is gold, but the surface is enamel-coated. the predominant colouring is white, but a gold edging, a green wreath, and a red centre lend effectiveness to the design. both faces are decorated, the obverse with a crown, and the reverse with the royal cypher. the ribbon, which is crimson edged with blue, is bounded both top and bottom by a gold bar. the last award to be mentioned here for brave conduct is the meritorious service medal, which is now superseded by the "distinguished conduct in the field" medal. this award received royal sanction in for the army, and in for the marines. the warrant said:-- "we deem it expedient to afford a greater encouragement to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of our army who may have distinguished themselves, or who may have given good, faithful, and efficient service. "it is our further will and pleasure that a sum not exceeding £ , a year be distributed for the purpose of granting annuities as rewards for distinguished or meritorious service to sergeants who are now, or who may be hereafter in the service, either while serving or after discharge with or without pension, in sums not exceeding £ : which may be held during service, and together with pension." the medal earned but little popularity as it was awarded, not only for bravery, but for exemplary conduct in peace times. now the "distinguished conduct in the field" medal was preferred in cases of bravery, and the "long service and good conduct" medal was preferred in cases of exemplary conduct: thus its use was limited, and the authorities withdrew it a few years after the first issue. the long service and good conduct medal was the earliest award which could be earned in times of peace. it was first issued on july , , by william iv. the obverse bore a military trophy of arms and the king's escutcheon, whilst the reverse was inscribed "for long service and good conduct." the most recent copies bear a profile of the royal sovereign on the obverse. the ribbon is crimson. the medal was intended for non-commissioned officers and men who had been discharged in receipt of gratuities after serving twenty-one years in the infantry or twenty-four in the cavalry. to-day, eighteen years' exemplary service only is required, and there is a gratuity of £ on discharge. special regulations at the outset affected the granting of the "long service" medal to the marines. the commandant of the division of royal marines, the warrant ran, may annually recommend a certain number of men of meritorious conduct for the "good conduct and long service" medal with a gratuity as follows:-- sergeant who shall have served ten years as such £ . corporal who shall have served seven years as such, £ . private, £ . the men to be recommended must have completed twenty-one years of actual service, have borne an irreproachable character, and have never been convicted by a court-martial. in a decoration was instituted for the "best shot" in the infantry regiments. it was awarded annually by competition, and carried with it a money grant of £ . as the award was discontinued in , specimens are rare, and seldom available for purchase. the obverse of the medal bore poynter's draped profile of victoria, whilst the reverse showed fame placing a wreath on the head of a warrior. the earlier copies are found in bronze, the later ones in silver. the ribbon was somewhat gaudy, consisting of seven strips, three narrow ones of black, white, and black, then a wide one of red, and finally three more narrow ones of black, white, and black. * * * * * volunteer decorations are numerous and one or two collectors of our acquaintance have specialized in them and gathered together series of much value and interest. the earliest volunteer specimens which we have seen are those which came from corps raised during the napoleonic times of trouble, especially those which dated from the period when an invasion of england was feared. at this time there were some hundreds of volunteer corps throughout the land, many of them were only small organizations, it is true, but the old lists tell us that the volunteers aggregated some , men in all. the force as a whole was well organized and well equipped, and proficiency was encouraged by the granting of medals and decorations. these awards were not granted by royal warrant but by the patrons of each corps, though official sanction was always obtained previously. on this account we may look upon the medals as properly authenticated specimens well worth collecting. most of the volunteer medals which we have seen of this period bear dates between and , whilst many of them are highly artistic and ornamental. we have seen specimens given by the following corps--the names are worth mentioning if only to show the quarters in which the bodies were raised:-- the bank of england volunteers. the bermondsey volunteers. the broad street ward volunteers. the essex volunteer cavalry. hans town association volunteers. loyal cork volunteers. sadler's sharpshooters. walthamstow volunteers. of recent volunteer awards the volunteer officers' decoration is probably the best known. the royal warrant which proclaimed its issue, under date of july , , said:-- "whereas it is our royal desire to reward for long and meritorious service of officers of proved capacity in our volunteer force: now for the purpose of attaining this end, we have instituted, constituted, and created, and by these presents to us, our heirs and successors, constitute and create a new decoration which we are desirous should be highly prized by officers of our volunteer force: and we are graciously pleased to make, ordain and establish the following rules and ordinances for the government of the same which shall from henceforth be observed and kept." then followed eight clauses, of which the following is the chief:-- "it is ordained that no person shall be eligible for this decoration nor be nominated thereto unless he is or was a commissioned officer and has served twenty years in our volunteer force, is recommended by the commanding officer of the corps in which he has served, and is duly certified by the district military authorities in which the corps is located as having been an efficient and thoroughly capable officer, in every way deserving of such decoration: provided nevertheless and we do hereby declare that half of any time during which an officer of our volunteer force may have served in the ranks of our said force shall reckon as qualifying service towards the twenty years required as aforesaid." the decoration consisted of a striking oval badge: the edge was a silver oak wreath, whilst the royal cypher and crown, in outline, filled the centre. a green ribbon was provided with a silver bar flanking its topmost edge. two years after the officers' decoration received sanction a similar award, known as the "volunteer long service medal," was provided primarily for the men. the medal was granted to all volunteers--including officers who had served in the ranks, but who had not qualified for the previous medal--on completion of twenty years' service in the volunteer force, provided that they were actually serving on january , , and that the commanding officer recommended such award. service in the militia or imperial yeomanry could be reckoned towards the required period of years. the obverse of the medal bore a profile of the reigning sovereign (in the case of queen victoria, the bust was designed much after the style of that chosen for the jubilee silver coinage); the reverse consisted of a scroll, with the words "for long service in the volunteer force" arranged among palm and laurel sprays. the medal was silver, and the ribbon green. the last decoration with which we shall deal at length is the national rifle association's medal, which was awarded to the best shot in the volunteer force. there were three pieces, one each of gold, silver, and bronze, which could be competed for annually. the awards were instituted in the year . the medal was of very fine design. the obverse revealed a bygone english soldier in possession of a bow, and a volunteer holding a rifle; both figures were standing. the reverse bore a circular wreath, within which the words "the national rifle association" and the date were inscribed. * * * * * there are other decorations which it is well to mention by name. they are:-- . the imperial yeomanry long service medal, which demands ten years' service and ten trainings. . the militia long service medal, which is granted to non-commissioned officers and men who have served eighteen years and completed fifteen trainings. . the territorial force efficiency medal, which has taken the place of one of the volunteer medals mentioned above. . the jubilee medal. . the coronation medal. . the military cross, awarded for distinguished and meritorious service. chapter x military medallions general considerations--the "lost wax" process--hadrian's medallions--renaissance examples--simon, the medallist--wyon's work--public collections--some noted medallions described from the days when roman militarism dominated the world down to the present time, the deeds of successful soldiers have been commemorated by the striking of medallions. needless to say these metal pieces, which so admirably recall the outstanding events in war and soldiery, are highly prized by antiquarians, and the labour spent in gathering together a collection of them is richly rewarded. medallions have been fashioned from all the usual metals, but gold, silver, copper, bronze, and lead have been generally employed. the processes followed in making them have been as numerous as the metals: ordinary casting was, at one time, the favourite method, but striking, engraving, and hand modelling have all been employed in turn. mediæval medallists often resorted to the "lost wax"[ ] process, and extremely fine work they were enabled to turn out by this means. [ ] perhaps it will be well to briefly explain this system of founding, as it is not generally understood. adeline in "the art dictionary," p. , describes it as follows:-- "a process of bronze founding in which the core is covered with an accurate representation of the object to be cast in wax, the wax being of the intended thickness of the metal. the wax is then coated with a porous clay, and the whole mass is put in a pit and baked. during the process of baking the wax melts and runs off through apertures left for the purpose. the space left after the wax is melted is occupied by the metal. this, the oldest method of bronze founding, is probably the best, and in the present day it is being pretty generally adopted. in the method, which for some time has been in vogue, the core was made of the exact size of the object to be cast and afterwards pared down, so as to leave space for the metal to run in between the core and the mould." the earliest medallions date from very remote times, but the hadrian era may be considered the period in which these souvenirs of memorable actions first became popular. from hadrian's time to the fall of the roman empire they were struck to commemorate every deed of note, but after the decline we hear little of them until the renaissance, when such italian artists as pisano and guaciolotti revived their popularity. from the renaissance onwards, the art of medallion-making flourished in italy under the guidance of benvenuto cellini, of albert dürer in germany, and of jacques primavera in france, but it was not until the time of henry viii that english workers turned their attention to this pleasing way of marking important military and civil events. of course, we find medallions commemorating glorious deeds which took place in periods other than those mentioned; in such cases, the pieces were probably struck long after the occurrence took place. it is a little difficult to know what specimens to include and what to exclude from a collection of medallions, as there are no official issues, and as any metal worker can flood the market with original designs of his own or with facsimiles of rare and ancient strikings of bygone artists. personally, we think that any medallion which is artistically fashioned and which commemorates an event of interest to us is worth adding to the collection, but, of course, we must learn to know the difference between an original and a counterfeit specimen. this, however, is too intricate a science to explain here, but can be learnt from works written by numismatists, with a fair amount of application. no catalogues exist of the english medallions issued since henry viii's time, but the pieces which are the most interesting were struck by:-- . simon, who grew to fame in the reign of charles ii. he engraved the royal seals and executed many fine medallions. . rawlings. . the wyon family. william wyon, the most renowned of at least three engravers of this family, engraved the royal seals, the peninsular medals, and the dies for the first postage stamps, besides many medallions of a military and civil interest. collectors of these metal souvenirs should examine the exhibits in the british museum and the royal united service museum, whilst an occasional glance in the windows of messrs. spink & sons in piccadilly will often reveal specimens of more than ordinary interest. this well-known firm issue a monthly circular which contains much of interest to the reader who is intent on adding valuable specimens to his collection. a few illustrations depicting some of the most noted medallions may be given with advantage. the specimen below, one of the oldest in existence, was struck in gold to commemorate the glorious deeds of julius cæsar. speaking of the medallion, plutarch says:-- "julius cæsar, on his return to rome, after having won a successful issue at the battle of pharsalus, was named the 'liberator, the head of the fatherland, the permanent dictator,' and received for the first time, the title of emperor. the senators, wishing to reward him for the humane treatment which he accorded those who fought against him, during the civil wars, erected a temple of mercy, circular in shape, supported by six columns, in the middle of which is the figure of 'concord' holding in the right hand the horn of plenty and in the left a spear." [illustration] the first medallion given on this page was struck to commemorate the victory gained by william iii at the battle of the boyne. the obverse shows a familiar portrait of the king, whilst the reverse depicts him in the act of crossing the river at the head of his troops. [illustration] the next medallion shows james ii on the obverse, and an orange-tree laden with fruit by the side of an old oak, falling to the ground, on the reverse. the piece was evidently struck to commemorate the fall of james ii, and the supremacy of the house of orange. [illustration] the fourth medallion is one of the numerous specimens which were struck to do honour to marlborough and his victorious army. the obverse shows prince eugène and the duke, who are likened to the roman deliverers, castor and pollux. on the reverse, a picture representing the rout of the french and the surrender of marshal tallard at blenheim is given. [illustration] [illustration] the fifth piece illustrated here was struck to commemorate the battle of ramilies. on one side the battle is represented at the moment of victory; on the other is an emblematic representation of the union of england and holland. behind the figure of england, on a pillar inscribed with the first three letters of his name, stands a bust of marlborough, and opposite is another of d'ouwerkerke. [illustration] another specimen in the marlborough series is given below. the obverse represents marlborough and eugène as castor and pollux whilst the reverse presents a view of the battle and town of oudenarde. [illustration] [illustration] the medallion given at the foot of the previous page was struck to commemorate the surrender of lille in . victory is shown, on the front face, taking the civic crown from the head of a prostrate female, who represents the city of lille, whilst the under face depicts britannia, with the Ægis, striking france with terror. the eighth medallion commemorates the battle of dumblane. [illustration] the ninth medallion was struck in honour of the victory gained at the battle of dettingen on june , , whilst the tenth, given below, commemorates the victory of minden, gained on august , . [illustration] [illustration: a check to corsican assurance. by cruikshank.] chapter xi military prints the period - --works including military prints--where to search for bargains--the kind of print most sought after--works including fine military prints--bunbury--gillray in the following notes we do not propose to go deeply into the lore of print collecting, as the matter is too involved for treatment in these pages, and also because such admirable books as "chats on old prints," by arthur hayden, already cover the ground. here we propose to talk of military prints as they affect the general collector of military curios. printed pictures of soldiers and soldiery are to be found dating back almost to the days of caxton, but those coming within the period - seem to be the most interesting. probably this is due, in the main, to three reasons. first, the period was one of much military unrest, and people's interests were largely centred on the army. secondly, the costumes of the various regiments were attractive and showy, and lent themselves to pictorial treatment. and thirdly, the art of printing had reached a stage when reproductions were no longer so expensive as to be almost prohibitive in price. most of the prints which we have seen of this period were originally published as illustrations to books, a good number were issued as sets in portfolios, whilst a few were sold separately. the books which contain these military pictures, especially when the latter are coloured, fetch high prices, but fortunately the collector can become conversant with these gems of the printer's art in such treasure-houses as the british museum and the south kensington museum. those of us who can afford to buy perfect copies of such illustrated works will find admirable collections for sale at messrs. maggs brothers, in the strand; messrs. robson & co., in coventry street, w.c.; and messrs. henry sotheran & co., in piccadilly. but though these works, illustrated with military prints, are costly, the collector of moderate means may gather together quite an extensive collection of the pictures, torn from the complete works, at no great outlay. it may seem surprising to all of us who are curio-lovers but it is a fact that there are still people who are so ignorant of the value of books and pictures that they will snatch out the illustrations from priceless volumes and sell the former for a few coppers, throwing away the letterpress. only the other day we were talking with a friendly collector who showed us a batch of ackermann's coloured plates which he had obtained for a few pence each, although the actual value was, at the least, half a guinea per copy. the collector, therefore, must be on the look-out for bargains of this nature; he will find them in the portfolios which usually encumber the doorways of the second-hand booksellers in charing cross road, praed street, museum street, shaftesbury avenue, and the stalls along farringdon road. in these interesting quarries he will assuredly make discoveries from time to time; so he will if he keeps an eye on establishments of a similar nature in the outskirts of london. [illustration: napoleon's carriage arriving at the london museum. by cruikshank.] a few general words on the value of military prints may be of interest. those which depict types of soldiers are generally more sought after than those representing battle scenes; those of noted commanders are, of course, valuable, but representations of little-known commanders, wearing perhaps court rather than military dress, are not in much demand. pictures in which soldiers play a minor part are also of little interest to the collector of military curios, as there is always a possibility that the uniforms have been drawn more with the idea of being picturesque than accurate. machine-coloured pictures are, of course, highly treasured, as they give a much better idea of the uniforms than do monochromes. when hand-coloured there is no guarantee of correct impression; in fact such pictures are often glaringly misleading. * * * * * having made these preliminary remarks, it may be well to point out some of the best-known works containing military prints. "the british military library," published not later than , in two volumes, contains some score or more of accurately drawn plates representing types of the british army. they are well executed, though the figures appear a trifle stiff and wooden. spooner's "military and naval uniforms," by mansion and eschauzier, seventy plates in colour, dating from . these are probably some of the finest representations of early nineteenth-century uniforms that the collector can possess. the dresses are accurately depicted, but the artists do not excel when drawing galloping horses. ackermann's "costumes of the british and indian armies," by various artists. some sixty odd coloured plates, dating from . the plates include not only the uniforms of the regular army, but also the indian army and the volunteer force. this is a very fine collection. cannon's "historical records of the british army." a monumental work in sixty-eight volumes, but the coloured plates are occasionally found loose. the pictures are in two series: (_a_) cavalry, and (_b_) infantry; they depict regimental dress of the period - . w. heath's "military costumes of the british cavalry." a set of sixteen coloured plates, of the year . e. hull's "costumes of the british army in ." some seventy odd lithographs of fairly pleasing character. they appear to be drawn with complete accuracy. "military costumes of europe." a work published in two volumes in . nearly a hundred coloured plates are included, about a quarter of which are of british uniforms. thomas rowlandson's "loyal volunteers of london" ( ). a most interesting work full of coloured plates showing the uniforms of the non-regular units at the close of the eighteenth century. students of military dress should pay special attention to this interesting gallery of pictures. lieutenant-colonel luard's "history of the dress of the british soldier." fifty uncoloured and not very attractive plates ( ). the work contains much interesting matter in the letterpress, however, and the plates, though plain, are useful to students of military dress. ralph nevill's "british military prints" is of recent production. (_the connoisseur_ publishing co., , s.). this work contains a sumptuous array of coloured and uncoloured reproductions of old prints, many of which are far more attractive than the originals. it is a book that the student should undoubtedly possess. * * * * * so far, the prints of which we have spoken have all been of a serious nature, but the period under consideration was marked by the rise of two clever caricaturists, named henry bunbury and james gillray, who require some mention. the works of these two artists are but little known, in spite of the fact that some authorities consider them equal to any of the satirical efforts of the famous hogarth. bunbury and gillray are of interest to the collector of military prints because many of their pictures dealt with soldiers and soldiering. we cannot claim that the detail of the uniforms which figure in all the pictures of these two artists are absolutely correct, but they certainly do not display any glaring errors which are likely to mislead. bunbury was a friend of sir joshua reynolds and also of hoppner, he thus moved in the artists' circle of the day. "during the time he was living in suffolk, he was prominently associated with the county militia; and no doubt it was at this period that ideas for humorous military sketches presented themselves. 'the militia meeting,' 'recruits,' and 'the deserter' may be mentioned among these, while a story is told in connection with another sketch that is characteristic of bunbury's readiness with his pencil. a young private of his regiment applied for a pass in order to visit the lady of his affections. the application having come before mr. bunbury, he not only signed the pass, but drew a comical sketch on the permit, representing the meeting of the amorous couple, to the great amusement of the officers to whom the pass was presented. "in , political relations between england and america were very strained, in consequence of which militia camps were formed in various parts of the country. henry bunbury, as an officer of the suffolk militia, was ordered to join his camp at coxheath. all sorts of caricatures from all sorts of pencils (most of them anonymous) satirize the military mania of the time. naturally bunbury was not behind the rest, and many sketches of a military character, evidently drawn by him at this time, are still in existence. bunbury's wonderful talent in making these sketches of a martial kind appears to have been recognized at the time, for an exhibition of his military drawings was organized in and held at somerset house."[ ] [ ] herbert ewart, in _the connoisseur_, june , pp. - . gillray, the second artist mentioned above, was the son of a soldier who fought at fontenoy, and thus his thoughts were constantly turned to military subjects. though his satirical drawings dealt with the various topics of the day--his works were published between and --he seems to have lost no opportunity of showing his spleen for the french, and napoleon in particular. we have a long list of such artistic effusions of which the following may be mentioned: . fighting for the dunghill: or jack tar settling citoyen françois. . buonaparte, hearing of nelson's victory, swears by his sword to extirpate the english from off the earth. . general result of buonaparte's attack upon ibrahim bey's rear guard. . britannia between death and the doctor. . the surrender of ulm: or buonaparte and general mack coming to a right understanding. . the new dynasty: or the little corsican gardener planting a royal pippin-tree. . apotheosis of the corsican phoenix. in the foregoing, we have merely touched upon the subject of collecting military prints, but enough has been said in these few pages to show that this branch of curio-hunting is full of fascination and deep interest and is well worth the attention, not only of readers who possess artistic feeling, but of those who are desirous of adding to their store of knowledge concerning the military dress of bygone periods. [illustration: a singular trait of buonaparte's favourite mameluke. by cruikshank.] chapter xii memorial brasses of military interest classes of military brasses--rubbings, and how to make them--floor brasses: their characteristics--palimpsest brasses--what may be learnt from brasses--mural tablets in many of our churches and public buildings are to be found numerous memorial brasses which possess undoubted interest for the collector of military curios. these memorials of the dead largely fall into two classes: those which are let into floors, and those which are fixed to walls. the former class, as a rule, are of some antiquity, are memorials to individuals rather than to groups of soldiers, and are to be found almost entirely in churches. the latter class are modern, are often erected to a number of soldiers, and are located in such public buildings as town halls and guild halls as well as churches. the floor brasses, as a rule, are flat but often deeply engraved, whilst the mural tablets are lightly engraved and frequently embellished with a sculptured framework. to obtain facsimiles of memorial brasses, many collectors take "rubbings" of them, much after the fashion that children imitate coins by superimposing a sheet of paper and running a soft pencil over the covered surface. the necessary outfit for making a rubbing consists, first and foremost, of a permit obtained from the proper authorities, a supply of heel-ball, as sold by any leather dealer or cobbler, a small clothes brush, a duster, and some paper. the latter must not be too flimsy nor too stout, and it must be large enough to cover the brass. a roll of light grey wallpaper usually serves admirably, but there are times when the width of the roll is too narrow for the brass. in these cases, a full-size sheet of paper as used by printers should be procured. the first operation is to wipe away all dust and foreign matter from the metal surface; this is a very necessary precaution when the tablet is a floor-inset the next thing is to place the sheet of paper in position; if the memorial is fixed to the wall, the sheet must be held by an assistant, or at the expense of much arm-aching by the person who does the rubbing; if the tablet is let into the floor, two weights placed at the head of the brass serve the purpose admirably. the actual rubbing should be performed by drawing the heel-ball lightly across the brass. the movement should always be made in the same direction, or the lines will appear scratchy and confusing. it is best to complete a little patch first, and not go over the whole area before finishing any part of it; if this be done, there will be more chance of completing the work without shifting the paper. it is not a bad idea to force the paper by means of the palm of the hand into the recesses of the brass before commencing to rub; this will help to keep the sheet from moving. some collectors make their rubbings intensely dark, that is, they do not leave off when the brown stage has been reached. others are content to stop rubbing when the detail is just visible, completing the work at home by filling all the flat areas with a wash of indian ink. either plan is good, but the former is more useful in cases where the tracery is involved, whilst the latter provides a somewhat smarter effect when carefully executed. rubbings may be stored in cardboard tubes, one in each tube, but many enthusiasts mount their black pictures on canvas and rollers. the latter plan is certainly the better one, but it is an expensive and tedious business which will not appeal to all. small rubbings, it need hardly be added, make capital pictures for framing, looking very attractive if a white margin is preserved, and the frame made of a narrow black moulding. * * * * * floor brasses were first used on the continent, many originating in flanders and some in brittany. the earliest specimens in england date from the thirteenth century, though beaumont states that the finest specimens belong to the fourteenth century. he also mentions that the fifteenth-century specimens were small, thin, and more ornate, whilst in the sixteenth century the art became debased by a surfeit of commonplace specimens. the majority of the english brasses are located in the eastern counties and the home counties, where, in fact, stone was not easily and cheaply obtained. the most curious of all floor brasses, the same writer states,[ ] are those which are called palimpsests. these were originally laid down to the memory of a certain individual, but were subsequently taken up, re-engraved, and then used to commemorate some one else. nearly all are post-reformation--a fact which speaks for itself. [ ] beaumont, in "memorial brasses," p. . after the dissolution of the monasteries, the abbeys fell into decay, and any engraver who wanted a brass appears to have taken it from the nearest ruin and adapted it to his requirements. palimpsest brasses were readapted in three ways:-- . plates were re-engraved on the reverse side. . the old figure was used again without alteration, a new inscription and shield (if any) being added. . the original engraving was modified, fresh lines and shading being introduced to adapt it to contemporary fashion. one of the finest examples of this latter kind of palimpsest brasses is a specimen which was made to honour the memory of sir walter and lady curson, at waterperry, oxon. the original was engraved in , but subsequently altered to suit the style of armour and costume which prevailed in . another interesting palimpsest is mentioned by fairbank.[ ] "it occurs in ticehurst church, sussex. it has been made use of to commemorate john wyborne, esquire, and his two wives. the second wife, his widow, made her will in , and she ordered a stone to be placed over herself and her husband; and this is what the executors did. they took a small slab bearing a brass figure of a man in armour, which had been engraved about ; there was no room for figures of the two wives of the same size as the figure already there, so they had a small figure placed on each side, little larger than half the size of the central one, and replaced the original inscription by one commemorating john wyborne, who died , and his two wives; their figures were engraved about ." [ ] f. r. fairbank, in _the connoisseur_. [illustration: the oldest english brass. to the memory of sir john d'abernon. date . at guildford, surrey.] * * * * * brasses are of great educational value in so much as many reveal interesting points in connection with matters concerning dress and armour. but the student is warned against putting too much trust in the dates which they bear, for specimens were often laid down before the death of the person whose memory they perpetuate. the date of death and the style of decoration might thus be, in such cases, at variance historically. beaumont says:[ ]-- "examples of this feature are to be found at thame, oxon, and lambourne, berks. this is especially noticeable in the case of shroud brasses, which were generally engraved and fixed during the lifetime of the person commemorated, the object being to remind him of his final bourne; in these cases blank spaces were usually left for the insertion of the date of death." [ ] "memorial brasses," p. . [illustration: a battlefield souvenir picked up on the plains of flanders. (the same helmet is shown with and without the cloth covering.)] the earliest english brasses were shaped around the figures they portrayed, and if canopies or frames were added, these were fitted in separate pieces. all foreign brasses and later english ones, however, were cut into rectangular pieces. these and other such indications are the surest guides to the true date of construction. among the thousands of brasses in this country, many of which are of military interest, the following are worthy of mention:-- . at felbrigge, to the memory of sir symon ffelbrygge; date, . he is dressed in plate armour, and holds the royal standard. his garter is prominently shown. a canopy surmounts his figure. . at trumpington. this is a favourite specimen with cambridge undergraduates. . at trotton, sussex, to the memory of thomas camoys and elizabeth, his consort; date, . camoys achieved fame at agincourt; his wife was a mortimer. a canopy surmounts each figure. . at west hanney, to the memory of humfrie cheynie; date, . this brass is peculiar; the figure, which is small, stands on a metal rectangle bearing a scriptural text. a rectangular metal frame is placed around the figure, but at some distance. . at ilminster, to the memory of nicholas and dorothy wadham; date, . nicholas is given a ringed cuirass and lamboys over his mail skirt. he stands upon a tablet bearing an inscription which explains that he was the founder of wadham college, oxford. of later mural tablets we need say but little, for there is hardly a cathedral or parish church in the kingdom which is not the proud possessor of one or more specimens. as a rule, these memorials point to the valorous deeds which soldiers of the neighbourhood have performed for their king and country. the south african war, it will be remembered, added considerably to their number, whilst the conflict now raging has already made its contributions. chapter xiii autographs of great soldiers the fascinations of autograph collecting--points which influence the value of an autograph--autographs classified--a "schomberg" letter--the notes scribbled by airey at balaklava--general hints--prices of autographs ninety-nine out of every hundred autographs which find their way into collectors' albums are said to be those of actresses, who are popular favourites to-day but not to-morrow. as a consequence, autograph collecting is seldom considered a serious hobby worthy of the attention of serious-minded people. this seems a great pity, for if letters and documents written and signed by real celebrities are collected, not only may much pleasure be gained from the pastime, but a great deal of instruction as well. the wise collector will find that his best plan is to specialize in one definite direction, and if he follows our advice he will limit his interests to autographs of great soldiers. perhaps he will argue that military signatures are so seldom met with, and so expensive to obtain when they are offered for sale, that his treasures will not accumulate fast enough. this, however, is a matter on which he need have no fears, especially now that the great european conflict has created so vast an output of military correspondence. the value of an autograph naturally depends on a number of factors. the eminence of the writer is, of course, the first consideration, but the price will also depend on whether the signature is normally written, whether it was written before notoriety came to the writer, and the state of preservation of both paper and ink. can the celebrity be considered a prolific letter-writer? this is another question which influences the value of an autograph, for according to the rarity of an individual's signatures, so will the price be affected. we say, above, that the eminence of a writer is the first consideration in deciding the value of his signature. we should be very diffident, however, at explaining just what factors make for eminence. it certainly is not rank alone, nor even ability; perhaps we may best describe it as being in the "public eye." the autograph-hunter does not seek for signatures alone: he casts around for entire letters, documents, and signed papers of every description; it is thus clear that the importance of the communication plus the autograph should be taken into account when pricing treasures. for the sake of convenience, we may classify the specimens in our collections under the following heads:-- . signatures, unaccompanied by other written matter. . signatures appended to short letters or documents; the body of the matter being typed, printed, or written by a private secretary. . signatures appended to short letters or documents which have been wholly written by the celebrity in question. (such are known to collectors as holographs.) . as no. , but letters or documents of some length. [illustration: facsimile of a portion of the letter written by cromwell to lenthall, speaker of the house of commons, announcing the victory of naseby. (_from the original in the british museum._)] of the above four classes, the specimens coming within the first are obviously the least valuable, for they are the most frequently met. copies may be found on the fly-leaves of books, on photographs of celebrities, etc. the second class, unfortunately, is gradually ousting the third class, since the typewriter is speedily becoming universally used for all but private letters. specimens in the second class are worth a trifle more than those in the first, and a great deal less than those of the third. specimens in class are those which the average collector should aim most at securing; those in class are a trifle too unwieldy for all but the advanced collector. [illustration: a battlefield souvenir. the mug bears two verses of poetry which are somewhat significant, as they reveal the character of the tyrolese peasant and soldier. translated, they run as follows:-- eagle, tyrolese eagle, why are you so red? is it from the sunshine? is it from the red sparkling wine? it is from the red blood of my enemies that i am so red. there are, of course, many ways of arranging an autograph collection, but on no account should the specimens be fixed to the album without adding comments on both the subject-matter of the ms. and the identity of the author. the following letter is given as a specimen. the original is to be found in the royal united service museum:-- "lisburne, _ th march, _. gentlemen, i have this day written another for the battering gunns and morters to be sent over hither. but now having the matter under further consideration doe think it expedient and necessary for their majesties service to send an express herewith. and it is to direct you immediately on receipt hereof to cause eight guns of eighteen and twenty foure pounders with all their equepage, furniture and stores with a good proporcon of boms to be shipped on board a very good, light and nimble saylor. and that the capt. or master be ordered to sayle with them directly for the lough of bellfast. for that wee cannot undertake with any sort of reasonable accomodacon the siege of the fort of charlemount untill those gunns arrive here. and with worke i would gladly have furnished before his majesties coming hither wherefore i pray use all dilligence and expedicon in dispatching away thence the said shipps so fraighted as is herein afore expressed. i am, gentlemen, your very loving friend and servant, schomberg." the letter, we must add, is written in a splendidly clear hand by a clerk, and signed by schomberg. it therefore belongs to class above. under such a document, we might comment as follows: note the quaint grammatical forms, also the spelling which clearly shows that orthography was not an exact science two hundred odd years ago. the use of capital letters is also curious. lastly, we may point out the apparently effeminate ending given to the letter. as to the identity of schomberg, we might write: "marshall schomberg was one of william iii's generals who took part in the irish campaign against james ii. he captured carrickfergus, belfast, newry, and dundalk, although his troops consisted of raw levies. during the battle of the boyne he assisted william in gaining a brilliant victory, but was unfortunately slain towards the end of the encounter." * * * * * [illustration: _translation._ my dear brother, not being allowed to die among my troops, it only remains for me to place my sword in the hands of your majesty. i am your majesty's good brother, napoleon. sedan, _sept. , _. autograph letter written by napoleon iii to william i of germany after the battle of sedan.] as one would expect, the subject-matter of a letter greatly affects its value. the following epistle, written by lord dorchester, is therefore of more than ordinary consideration.[ ] [ ] the original may be seen in the royal united service museum. "culford, _dec. th, _. dear fox, i was only in town for four days and besides the hurry which always attends such a visit to london, i was under the necessity of going to court on wednesday, thursday and friday, which put it out of my power to call on you. from the contemptible effort of the insurrection itself in point of numbers and characters of persons concerned, to the wish of which no importance could have been attached in the minds of the public, but for the unfortunate murder of the worthy and truly respectable lord ----, and for the still more contemptible preparation of arms, or plan of operations on the part of the rebels, it did not appear to me that any blame could be attached either to the civil or military departments of the irish government for not having taken more efficient precautionary measures. from the documents you transmitted to me, it is clear that no blame can be imputed to you, and from my intimate knowledge of some of the persons confidentially employed in the civil line, i should with difficulty believe any charge of want of activity or capacity in that quarter. it is certainly a mark of weakness in a government to create unnecessary alarms, and it has the ill effect of shaking the public confidence. in this business, however, the irish administration appears rather to have erred on the other side, but i am persuaded that this error proceeded from a recollection of the mischiefs which a very contrary line of conduct had produced a few years ago in that unfortunate country. i shall send your papers by the coach by my porter in town, and direct him to forward them to you. believe me, with great regard, dear fox, most faithfully yours, cornwallis." of still greater value are the following priceless notes, scribbled in pencil during action, by major-general sir richard airey, k.c.b., q.m.g., and sent to the earl of lucan who commanded the cavalry division at balaklava, october , . "(_a_) cavalry to take ground to left of nd line of redouts occupied by turks. rd. airey, _q.m.-genl_." "(_b_) cavalry to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover heights. they will be supported by infantry which has been ordered to advance on two fronts. r. airey." "(_c_) lord raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, follow the enemy and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. troop of horse artillery may accompany. french cavalry is on your left. immediate. r. airey."[ ] [ ] these three most interesting autograph notes are also to be seen in the royal united service museum. before concluding these notes we may give some general hints. preserve all facsimile signatures which are to be found; they are useful for purposes of comparison when doubtful originals come along. the signature should never be cut from a document; the whole sheets should be preserved. an original letter ought not to be pasted on to the album. it is far better to fix it in position by slipping it under "ears" or bands of paper pasted to the pages. to restore a faded signature, dab it carefully with a solution of hot tincture of gall containing a trace of dissolved potassium chlorate. when dry, dab it with a pad moistened in ordinary lime water. the process is simple, but it is well to experiment on a useless specimen before treating valuable ones. valuable documents which are torn and perhaps crumbling may be prevented from deteriorating further by sandwiching between two sheets of glass, and binding with passe-partout edging. in deciding whether a document is genuine or not, the composition of the ink and the texture of the paper should be taken into consideration. forgers find great difficulty in matching papers made more than fifty years ago. great care should be used to discriminate between the autographs of people possessing similar names (e.g. kitchener, the writer on cookery matters, must not be confounded with kitchener, the soldier). [illustration: william of orange. duke of wellington. general wolfe. earl roberts. king albert of belgium. general sir ralph abercromby. george washington. some autographs of noted soldiers.] * * * * * lastly, it may be useful to give a list of some of the prices realized by military and allied autographs at public sales, etc., in order that the collector may gain some rough idea of the value of his treasures. (a.l.s. means autograph letter, signed; d.s. means document, signed; l.s. means letter, the signature only of which is in the handwriting of the celebrity.) _abercromby, sir ralph._--british general; killed in egypt, . d.s., s. d. a.l.s., with portrait attached, £ . _allen, capt. wm._--of the niger expedition. a.l.s., s. _alva, ferd. alvarez, duke of._--spanish general; oppressed the netherlands; executed the counts egmont and horn. l.s., two guineas. _amalfi, duke of._--imperial marshal commander-in-chief after wallenstein. died, . l.s., s. _anne, queen._--d.s., a privy council letter; signed also by buckingham, schomberg, and nine other peers, s. d. _auchmuty, sir samuel._--english general; died, . d.s., s. _barkstead, colonel john._--cromwell's governor of the tower, executed . d.s., s. d. _barrington, viscount._--secretary of war; died, . a.l.s., s. d. _beaver, p. capt._--with nelson at trafalgar. a.l.s., s. d. _blücher._--the famous prussian field-marshal. l.s., s. _bonaparte, c. louis napoleon._--emperor. a.l.s., two guineas. _burnaby, capt. fred._--author of "a ride to khiva." a.l.s., s. d. _charles i._--king of england. d.s., £ s. _cromwell, oliver._--d.s., £ . _dorchester, lord guy carleton._--l.s., s. _egmont and horn, counts._--executed by duke of alva. l.s., signed by both. sixteen guineas. _gordon, general._--killed in the soudan. a.l.s., two guineas. _kempenfelt, admiral._--perished in the royal george. d.s., one guinea.[ ] [ ] h. t. scott, "autograph collecting," part iii. [illustration: an old mug bearing the famous picture depicting "the death of wolfe."] chapter xiv war postage stamps the earliest war stamps--stamps used in the crimean war--the british army post office corps--the sudan expedition--the south african campaign--the great war--recent war stamps and post-marks--indian war stamps--other war stamps among the many thousand varieties of postage stamps which philatelists treasure few can compare in point of interest with those which have carried letters from the firing line to the fireside. such specimens are sought after not merely by the stamp-collector, but by the general collector of military curios. war postage stamps date back to the middle of the sixteenth century, their originator being a certain johann von taxis who, a few years before the death of martin luther, obtained permission to carry letters from civilians in germany to members of a german expeditionary force then fighting in italy. the frank marks which this royal prince applied to the correspondence entrusted to him, constitute the first war postage stamps of which we have any record. of british war stamps, probably the earliest specimens are those which came to england on the letters written by the soldiers who fought in the crimea. soon after the british army was landed on the shores of the black sea, the government sent out eleven postal officials, who established a head office at constantinople and branch depots at balaklava and scutari. the staff was properly equipped with all the necessary impedimenta for maintaining a postal service between the expeditionary army and the people at home. letters from england were received and transmitted to the various regimental headquarters; mails for the mother-country were gathered in and sent on their journey westwards, whilst supplies of unused adhesive stamps were retailed to the soldiers at the three offices mentioned above. the stamps which the officials sold comprised the following then current british specimens:-- d. red, issue, no perforations, with small crown as watermark. d. reddish-brown, issue, perforated, with large crown as watermark. d. blue, issue, no perforations, with small crown as watermark. d. blue, issue, perforated, with large crown as watermark. d. rose-carmine, issue, with large garter as watermark. d. lilac, issue, with embossed head. specimens of the above which franked the correspondence of members of the crimean expeditionary force may be recognized by the distinctive obliteration marks which were as follows:-- . a crown placed between two stars with straight bars above and below, the whole forming an oval. . a star placed between the cyphers; then as no. . . a circle containing the inscription "post office, british army," together with the date. [illustration: a soldier's communication posted during the south african war.] [illustration: a similar communication from "somewhere in france."] in , a british army post office corps was formed by colonel du plat taylor for service under general wolseley in egypt. the men were chosen from the old th middlesex, a regiment better known as the post office volunteers. the party landed at alexandria, but soon proceeded to ismailia where a base was established. from these headquarters a number of field offices sprang up, but their positions altered as the army moved forward. there is no doubt that the duties performed by this postal corps gave much satisfaction, both to the troops and the authorities at home, for its services were again requisitioned when the suakim expedition set out under the leadership of sir gerald graham. the stock of stamps taken to egypt consisted of the current d. lilac and ½d. blue of england, but those used during the expedition were obliterated by a hand stamp bearing either a number of dots shaped to form a small lozenge, or a circle containing the inscription "british army post office, egypt," and the date. obliterations bearing dates in belong to the suakim expedition. when kitchener went to the sudan in , the egyptian government set up a postal department at wadi haifa camp for the special use of the british and egyptian forces. the stamps sold on this occasion were the current egyptian labels, but they were overprinted with the word "soudan" in both french and arabic. unfortunately, many forged overprints have been added to genuine egyptian stamps of the higher values, so that collectors must be cautious when purchasing specimens. of the work of the army post office corps in south africa during the last boer war much interesting matter could be written. mr. f. j. melville gives the following description in his capital book "the postage stamp in war" (price one shilling). "major sturgeon was succeeded in the command of the army postal corps by his second in command, captain viall. on the death of the latter in , captain g. w. treble of the london postal service took the command, which he held at the outbreak of the south african war in , aided by captain w. price (now colonel w. price, c.m.g., in command of the army post office with the british expeditionary force in france) and lieutenant h. m'clintock, these latter officers belonging to the secretary's office of the g.p.o., london. a first portion of the company with captain treble left england with general buller and his staff, and the rest followed on october st, and several further detachments went out with later contingents. in south africa they had a very wide area to cover. at the outset captain treble established himself with the headquarters of the inspector-general of communications in cape colony, and moved about keeping in close touch with the movements of the forces, an important part of his duties being to forward to the various offices the information necessary to ensure the correct circulation of the mails. captain price was at cape town, and lieutenant m'clintock at pietermaritzburg. "the british military mails were made up in the london g.p.o. in special bags addressed to the army post office, and sent to the g.p.o. at cape town, in which building the detachment of the army postal corps under captain price had established its base office. the bags containing military mails were handed over to the army base post office at cape town, whence they were distributed to the various military post offices established at the centres of the troops, and to field post offices with each brigade or division in the field. in the return direction the soldiers' letters were handed in at field post offices and forwarded through various channels, sometimes ordinary and ofttimes military, to the base at cape town, whence they were dispatched to england in the ordinary way." early in , the average weekly mail from london to the field forces was bags of letters, post-cards, etc., and boxes of parcels; the incoming mail from the field forces was bags of letters per week. in a letter dated from cape town, february th, from lieutenant preece, who went out with reinforcements for the army post office corps in february, are some interesting glimpses of the difficulties of the work of this service:-- "price, of the post office corps, met us and told us (captain) palmer was to leave at once for kimberley with men, (captain) labouchere and (lieutenant) curtis to proceed on to natal with men, and i was to take the remainder ashore here (cape town) and stop to help at the base. at . on monday morning i marched off with my men to the main barracks, and bade good-bye to the good ship _canada_ and her merry cargo. after lodging the men in barracks i went off to the g.p.o., where i found price and his men ensconced in one huge wing, overwhelmed with work, and at breaking-down point. the mails every week increase now, and we have , pieces of mail matter to sort and distribute every week, over a country larger than france, among a shifting population of soldiers, each of whom expects to get his letters as easily as he gets his rations. it is a vast job, and we have done wonderfully so far with a totally inadequate staff." for readers who require further details of the army post office arrangements during the boer war, it may be mentioned that the contemporary reports of the postmaster-general contain very full and interesting accounts. such reports, if out of print, can usually be perused in the better-class public libraries. the stamps which franked the soldiers' letters were usually of the british lilac penny variety, bearing the familiar head of queen victoria, whilst the obliterations were circular or hexagonal, and contained the inscription "army post office, south africa." but the bulk of the letters reached england with no adhesive stamp, the words, "on active service, no stamps available," proving a sufficient passport in cases where supplies were genuinely unprocurable. envelopes which are stampless, but which bear one or other of the south african field postmarks, command a fair value, and copies should figure in every collection specially devoted to war stamps. when bloemfontein fell into the hands of the british the stock of orange free state adhesives was overprinted v.r.i. and, later on, e.r.i., and when the union jack was unfurled in pretoria the stamps of the south african republic were provided with similar overprints. all these labels were used by the civilians as well as the military authorities; and as many of the soldiers posted their communications in the ordinary letter-boxes, it is impossible to decide which possess a war interest and which do not. among the most treasured adhesives provided by the south african war are the "mafeking besieged" issues. as is well known, certain of these were produced by a photographic process and revealed the portrait of general baden-powell. gibbons urges collectors to be wary in purchasing copies, as numerous well-executed forgeries emanated from kimberley and cape town, and many officers and men returning home from the front were swindled by the dishonest dealers. [illustration: some historic post-marks used on military correspondence. . and . crimean postmarks. . napier's abyssian expedition, - . . egyptian campaign, . . dongola expedition. . and . south african war, . . british army in france, . . canadian " " . indian " " ] on the outbreak of the european war in august , the army post office corps again became active, and the quantity of letters and parcels which it was called upon to handle from the very outset must be described as prodigious. it is quite impossible to record all the varieties of british military stamps and post-marks which have resulted from these hostilities, but they may be classified under the following heads:-- . stamps of the united kingdom bearing postmarks indicating use in france, belgium, and other foreign countries. . post-marks of the army post office at the base or in the field. there are numerous varieties. . censor marks applied to envelopes, etc. . postmarks applied to correspondence from prisoners of war and aliens' camps. of course, many interesting colonial varieties have also resulted from the war. the following are among the most highly prized:-- . gold coast stamps obliterated with post-marks from togoland. . german colonials from samoa overprinted g.r.i. . new zealand stamps bearing the overprint "samoa." . german colonials from togo overprinted "anglo-french occupation." . canadian stamps obliterated with post-marks bearing the inscription "canadian overseas expeditionary force." . indian stamps overprinted i.e.f. (indian expeditionary force). whilst speaking of indian stamps, it may be appropriate to mention that the army postal service possessed by our troops in this asiatic empire is probably the most carefully planned in the whole world. from a field service manual[ ] on "posts and telegraphs" we have been able to glean a few details respecting the organization and establishment of the indian military post offices. in times of peace, a stock of tents and equipment sufficient for the supply of three base post offices, first-class field post offices, second-class field post offices, and for the supervising staff is kept in store at lahore in the charge of the postal department of the punjab. [ ] quoted from _stamp collecting_, december , . on the outbreak of war the military postal service is organized by the director-general of posts and telegraphs in india according to the requirements of the army authorities. the supervising staff is selected by him from a roll of european volunteers for such service maintained in his office, the full war establishment consisting of directors or deputy-directors, assistant-directors, inspectors, and postmasters. the rest of the establishment is selected by the postmaster-general of the punjab. one director or deputy-director, two assistant-directors, and four inspectors constitute the normal postal personnel of an expeditionary force. they wear the ordinary field service uniform of the indian army according to their respective ranks, distinguished by the word "post" on the shoulder-straps. the following extracts from the indian army order, no. , dated november , , are of interest:-- " . the director or deputy-director, or, in his absence, the postmaster-general under whose orders he is to work, should, on receipt of the first intimation that a force is to be mobilized, take the earliest opportunity to consult the general officer appointed to command the force, as to the postal requirements of the force in respect of the number of field post offices, the classes of postal business to be undertaken, the establishment to be provided, etc. as far as possible, the wishes of the general officer commanding should be carried out. " . the director-general will arrange that the treasury nearest to the base office is supplied with about ten times its normal supply of ordinary postage stamps (including post-cards and envelopes) together with a suitable supply of service stamps (including post-cards and envelopes); and that a sufficient stock is maintained throughout the campaign. the base post office should thus be in a position to supply at once the postage stamps required in the field post offices. if there is no treasury at hand, a sufficient supply of postage stamps of all descriptions must be kept at the base post office. the base post office will be supplied with an iron safe, or two, if necessary. " . the requisite stamps, scales, bags, and other articles of stock sufficient for six months' requirements will be furnished to the base post office for its own use, and for distribution, under the orders of the director or deputy-director, to field post offices. section b shows the books, forms, stamps, etc., required for field post offices. all books, forms, and articles of stock should be packed in the prescribed mule trunks, each of which, when packed, should not exceed one maund in weight. the books, forms, and stamps required by the base post office will be the same as those used by a head office in india performing the same classes of business; but in addition to the ordinary stamps it will be supplied with a special 'postage cancelled' stamp." * * * * * of foreign war stamps, the international quarrels of the last fifty years have produced quite an interesting array. envelopes posted in paris during the siege of bearing the words "par ballon monté" are much prized by collectors. less sought after are the alsace and lorraine stamps which were primarily issued for use by the invading german troops of . their low price is probably due to the fact that the dies were printed from long after the stamps were withdrawn from currency. from the balkans we, of course, have many specimens which enrich our collections. italy, also, has given us war stamps bearing the overprints "bengasi" and "tripoli di barberia." if we turn to the united states, many interesting postal relics will be discovered of the civil war, whilst numerous varieties of more recent stamps from the states are to be found showing post-marks referring to the spanish war in the philippines and cuba. then there are japanese adhesives which were used in china during the fighting which led to the peace of shimonoseki, and, of course, the japanese issues which the troops used whilst engaging the russians must not be overlooked. lastly, we may point to south and central america, a continent where war labels are almost as plentiful as those issued in times of peace. [illustration: a post-card received from a soldier in france bearing stereotyped greetings.] in the foregoing notes we have merely indicated, in a general way, the sources from which war stamps have emanated. sufficient, however, has been said to show that these relics of strife and bloodshed provide material for the collector of a highly fascinating character. chapter xv war money french obsidional notes--mafeking notes--the napoleonic assignats--charles ii and university plate--mints at carlisle, beeston, scarborough, newark, colchester, and pontefract--irish gun money just as there are many postage stamps which owe their origin to the stern necessities of war, so there are a great number of coins, tokens, notes, etc., which have found their way into circulation as a result of the belligerent attitude of armies. all such examples of war money are extremely interesting and well worth collecting. the conflict which is raging at the time of writing has already produced a certain amount of war money, notably in the northern part of france. in this area many small towns and villages have found themselves despoiled of their metal currency, with the consequence that paper money has been issued, under authority, to meet the temporary demands of the outraged inhabitants. among the illustrations of this book, two such paper notes, coming from epernay, are included; it is safe to say that in time to come these and similar issues will be much sought for. another interesting case of paper money which owed its inception to the needs of war is the mafeking currency, issued by baden-powell during the famous siege by the boers, which lasted from october , , to may , . the face value of the mafeking notes was £ , s., s., and s., but copies now change hands at considerably enhanced prices. the issue of paper money is no new idea; the french resorted to the practice in napoleon's time, as they had also done during the life of the republic which came into being on september , . this latter body issued notes, termed "assignats," of five different denominations, ranging in value from about a sovereign to forty pounds. the assignats, it may be stated, were dishonoured by the succeeding government, and people who held them lost their money. the writer possesses a few specimens which were given him, many years ago, by an old french lady whose family had fallen from affluence to humble circumstances solely through the dishonouring of these paper notes. but the most interesting war currency which we have so far discovered is the obsidional money of the great rebellion of - . historical data of this period is too well known to need repetition here, and it is sufficient to say that charles, after he suffered defeat at naseby, was forced to withdraw his troops to certain castles and towns throughout the land. from these strongholds he made occasional sallies, but a depleted exchequer always hampered his movements. [illustration: money of the great rebellion, - . ( . newark sixpence-- . colchester gold half unite-- . pontefract two-shilling piece-- . ormond half-crown-- . dublin crown of charles ii.)] in order to obtain sufficient money to finance the army, charles begged the universities of oxford and cambridge to give him their collections of plate, which he intended to melt down and recast as silver currency. "the university of oxford and the majority of its colleges sent their plate, which was safely conveyed to the king, but that of the university of cambridge was not sent, although many of the individual colleges contributed theirs. the treasures of st. john's and magdalen, however, never reached their destination, but were seized by cromwell whilst in transit to nottingham."[ ] charles had many wealthy followers, however, and these were only too ready to help on the cause of the royalists by sacrificing their silver ware. [ ] dr. nelson, "obsidional money of the great rebellion," p. . with such supplies of metal the king was able to establish mints at carlisle, beeston castle, scarborough, lathom house, newark, colchester, and pontefract. the money supplied by these mints was used for paying the soldiers and buying material; it was also more or less honoured in the surrounding villages. "the coins were usually struck upon irregular pieces of plate, cut from trenchers, platters, cups, etc., of silver, in place of being struck upon flans specially prepared by melting down the plate. this is only what one would expect, under the trying circumstances in which the various garrisons found themselves placed. that this was the case is clearly proved by the many examples existing, upon which traces of the original decoration are still visible, in some instances even, particularly upon examples issued at scarborough, the rim of the dish being still to be seen at the edge of the piece."[ ] [ ] dr. nelson, "obsidional money of the great rebellion," p. . dr. philip nelson tells us that about christmas-time, , the inhabitants of carlisle were asked to take their silver plate to the mint, situated in the town, which they cheerfully did. the quantity of silver plate which was so obtained amounted to , oz. it was made up of the following items, which possess for the reader of to-day both a pathetic and an amusing interest. the item of "widdow orpheur, four spoons," truly a case of the widow's mite, and sir henry fletcher's tankard, tumbler, and wine "bowles" strike us as being particularly worthy of note. _may the th_ a list of all the plaite brought in to be coyned with the weight thereof. will: atkinson. alder one winde mill boule, a oz. trencher salt & three spoones wt / widdow craister one beare boule one beaker one wine boule and six spoones wt / julien aglionby one boule wt / edmond kidd bowles wt / thomas kidd one boule wt / will: wilson tenner one bowle one beaker wt / thomas lowrie spoones wt robert sewell one spoone wt / collnell kirkebride one bowle spoones wt mary carlile one bowle and spoones wt / edward dalton one bowle one tumbler & peeces of broken plate wt / mrs chambers beare boules and one wine boule wt / mr glaisters beare bowles & spoones wt / widdow baines junior one bowle spoones wt / / thomas jackson one bowle & spoones wt / / thomas monke one bowle wt josph jefferson one bowle wt mr edward orpheur one bowle spoons wt / john orbell bowles one gilt bowle and spoones wt / widdow orpheur spoons wt / mr edward fountaìne one bowle one salt and spoones wt / mr richard wilson gilt bowle wt / thomas craggill wine bowles and silver spoons wt henry monke one beaker spoons wt / thomas tallentyre one bowle spoones wt / captaine aglionby one bowle wt / / sir thomas glemham candlesticks wt / mr george barwicke one bowle spoones wt / robert james one bowle wt / isabeil holliday one sugardish wt / sir henry fletcher one tankard one salt tumbler wine bowles spoones wt / / capt: cape beare bowles gilt salts one colledge pott one can gilt one gilt beaker wt mr fredericke tonstall one dozen / of plate wt mrs tullie spoones wt / john tomlinson one bowle wt edward james one bowle wt / / sr will: dalston one greate salt one lesser salt one bowle spoones wt / mr leo: dykes one bowle one tankard spoones wt / mr lewis west bowle wt / / sr tho: dacre bowles wt / capt johnson one tankard one salt wt the citties plate flaggons gilt bowles one gilt salt beare bowles wt -------------- / / received in plate oz - / - / at s per oz delivered to mr dykes i resting in or hands i - - stamped out of oz. - / - / at s per oz gayned by coyning at s per oz lost in meltynge and working (endorsed) may the th . a note of plate coyned the carlisle money had the appearance of roughly made coinage, but that coming from the beeston mint was innocent of even such resemblance. at this mint, thin pieces of silver were cut into fragments, weighed and then stamped with whatever value tallied with the weight. thus we find not only two-shilling pieces, shilling pieces, and so on, but sevenpenny pieces, tenpenny pieces, and pieces valued at thirteen-pence. there was, we may add, but one face to all these coins. the beeston money did not bear any wording to show that it was coined at this castle, but simply bore a stamped impression of the castle gateway. the scarborough mint was no better equipped than that at beeston, and what we have said of the latter applies also to the former. there is just this to be mentioned of the scarborough pieces: "the reverse of the coins is blank, save for the few specimens which bear engraved upon them the words obs-scarborough- , which engraving, however, may possibly not be contemporary with the siege, but may have been added subsequently, as a memorial, about the date of the restoration."[ ] [ ] dr. nelson, "obsidional money of the great rebellion," p. . the newark money was much better fashioned. it was not circular nor irregular, but lozenge-shaped. the front faces usually bore the royal crown, the letters c.r., and the value in pence, whilst the rear faces showed the date and the words obs-newark. there were no coins for odd amounts as there were at beeston. [illustration: gun money of james ii. ( . sixpence-- . sixpence-- . shilling-- . shilling-- . half-crown-- . half-crown-- . half-crown-- . half-crown.)] colchester turned out various grades of money. the gold half-unite was circular and of fairly good workmanship, but the silver shilling and the silver nine-penny piece were shaped variously and poor in quality. the best coinage of all came from pontefract, where the siege money was struck not only for charles i but also for charles ii. the designs were all enclosed within a circle, but the shape of the metal was circular, lozenge-shaped, and hexagonal. both faces of the coins were ornamented. * * * * * other siege money which we must note came from ireland, and grew out of the rebellion, headed by phelim o'neill, which rose in , when some forty thousand men, women, and children were cruelly massacred by the confederated catholics. this self-constituted body--followers of charles--drew up many decrees: we need mention here but one:-- "it is this day ordered by this assembly, that coin and plate shall be raised and established in this kingdom, according to the rates and values hereafter mentioned, and that there shall be forthwith coined the sum of four thousand pounds, to pass currant in and through this kingdom, according to a proclamation." accordingly, special coinage was struck at kilkenny, bandon, kinsale, youghal, and cork, whilst lord inchquin and the marquis of ormond minted money which was popularly named after them. the inchquin coins possess no claims to beauty nor even good workmanship, but the ormond money is certainly bold in design and fair in construction. another interesting case of war money being coined arose out of the appearance of james ii in ireland during the early part of the year . james had previously issued a patent for minting money to sir john knox, but on arriving in ireland he seized the latter's coining apparatus and set up his own mints in dublin and limerick. a most interesting proclamation which he published in the year explained the measures he proposed to adopt for debasing the coinage; we give it _in extenso_:-- "whereas, for remedy of the present scarcity of money in this our kingdom, and that our standing forces may be the better paid and subsisted, and that our subjects of this realm may be the better enabled to pay and discharge the taxes, excise, customs, rents, and other debts and duties, which are or shall be hereafter payable to us: we have ordered a certain quantity of copper and brass money to be coyned to pass currant in this our kingdom during our pleasure, in six penny pieces: each piece having on one side the effigies or figure of our head, with this inscription round jacobus ii dei gratia, and upon the other side, the stamp or impression of cross-sceptres and a crown between j.r. with vi above, the month wherein they are coyned below, with this inscription round, mag. brit. fran. & hiber. rex. , and fringed round, each of the said pieces to be of the metal of copper and brass; all which pieces of money we have thought fit, by the advice of our privy council, to make currant money within this our kingdom. we do therefore hereby publish and declare, by the advice aforesaid, that the said pieces of copper and brass coyned, or hereafter to be coyned by our said order marked and stampt as aforesaid, shall pass during our pleasure, as currant money amongst all our subjects within our realm, and in all payments to be made either to us, or from us, or to or from any of our subjects within this kingdom, according to the rates following: that is to say, each of the said pieces called six penny pieces, marked and stamped as aforesaid, to pass for six pence: the said pieces to pass at the rates aforesaid, for the interest which hereafter shall fall due for such mortgages and debts due by records, bills, bonds, or obligations, and likewise for any of the said principal debts so secured where the debtor or his goods are, or shall be taken in execution for the same, and we do hereby strictly charge and command all and every of our subjects of this kingdome to take and receive in all payments to be made to them (excepting as aforesaid) the said pieces of money according to the rates aforesaid, hereby declaring that such of our subjects within this kingdom as shall refuse the said pieces of copper and brass money at the rates aforesaid (excepting as aforesaid) being tendered to them for payment, shall be punished according to the utmost rigour of the law, as contemners of our royal prerogative and command. provided always, that this our proclamation shall not be construed, to oblige any merchant or merchants, importing any goods into this kingdom, to receive upon the first sale of such goods so imported, any of the said copper or brass money: and whereas we have caused the said copper and brass money to be made currant money for present necessity, and therefore do not intend that the same shall continue for any long time. we do, by this our royal proclamation, promise and engage to all our subjects here that as soon as the said money shall be decried and made null, that we shall thereupon receive from all and every our subjects within this kingdom such proportion of the said money as shall be, and remain in their respective hands at the time the same shall be so decried and made null: and at the same time either allow for the same to them the value thereof, at the rates aforesaid, out of what rent, duties or debts, they respectively shall owe to us, or to make them full satisfaction for the same according to the rates aforesaid, in gold or silver of the currant coyne of this kingdom. given at our court, at dublin-castle, the eighteenth day of june, , and in the fifth year of our reign. by the king." [illustration: gun money of james ii. ( . shilling-- . shilling-- . half-crown-- . half-crown-- . half-crown-- . crown-- . crown-- . limerick farthing.)] a certain amount of trouble was, of course, experienced by the king in obtaining sufficient supplies of metal to meet his somewhat rapacious lust for coining. after his own stores were exhausted he cast around for additional supplies and the following candid letter reveals his method of procedure:-- "our will and pleasure is, that you forthwith deliver to the commissioners of the mint those two brass canons now lying in the court of this our castle marked etc. weighing etc. and for soe doeing this shall be your warrant. given at our court at dublin-castle, this eleventh day of july, , and in the fifth year of our reign. to our trusty and wel-beloved cozen and counsellor justin lord viscount mount cashel, master general of our ordnance." this second letter, dealing with the same matter, is also worthy of note:-- "sir, we have great occasion for his majesty's use to procure as much hamered or forged copper and brass as your parts can afford, and judging by the decay of trade and desolation of the country, that there may bee a great deale in your district or port, we desire you, by yourself and officers, to inform us presently what quantity you may bee able to furnish us with, and what the currant prices are of each. and whatever you can gett, buy at the best rates you can, and as soon as you have four or five hundred weight pray send it to us the commissioners of his majesty's mint, at the mint-house in capel-street, dublin, and what you pay shall bee allowed you in your accounts at the custom house, so doing you'll oblige, yours, &c." a third letter, which we give below, was written by one of the king's emissaries who, with other trusty servants, was sent out to scour the country for further supplies of metal suitable for coining into gun-money. "limerick, _jan. the th, _. sir, last tuesday, the carriages parted from hence with six thousand six hundred weight of gunn mettle, six hundred a quarter and two pounds of fine pewter, and a thousand weight of steele, they will be eleven or twelve days a goeing because the roads are very deep--the pewter cost ten pence per pound, and steele six pence. you may expect very soone a farther supply of mettle for i have made an agreement with two eminent dealers from corke who have five or six thousand weight of copper and brass which they are to send here. i must have an order from the lords of the treasury, for sending it to your mint: there are foure or five broken bells in the country, which i can have if you send an order for seizing them for the king's use: there is an useless cannon at gallway, and one or two at kingsaile: i forgot to send you some of our coyne as you desired, by the next occasion i will not faile. i cannot buy fine pewter now under eleven or twelve pence the pound, for they say that you give fourteen or fifteen pence in dublin, the rates for carriage from hence to dublin is eight shillings the hundred weight. i rest your humble servant, wat plunkett. to john trindar esq." summing up james's treatment of the coinage in ireland, dr. nelson says: "such a debasement of a country's coinage as we have seen above must ever be regarded as a sign of national weakness: also, from the sense of insecurity so engendered, it must inevitably bring disaster in its train, and such a fate overtook the cause of james alike in ireland and in england. it was doubtless the intention of king james to redeem his gun-money coins, month by month, as opportunity permitted. circumstances, however, decreed otherwise, as after the battle of the boyne he departed for france and was compelled to leave his adherents to their fate."[ ] [ ] dr. nelson, "the coinage of ireland in copper, tin, and pewter," p. . with the advent of william and mary, the gun-money of james was re-valued at rates which were practically ruinous to those who held any but small quantities of it. the proclamation ran as follows:-- "having taken into our consideration the great oppressions and abuses committed by our enemies in this our kingdom of ireland, by coyning and making currant brass money of copper or mixt metal, and raising the value thereof to an extravagant height, thereby to enable them to continue the war against us, and to impoverish our loving subjects in our said kingdom: we have therefore thought it necessary to put stop thereto, and to the end that such part of the said copper or mix't metal money, which remains in the hands of our said subjects, may not be wholly lost, we have thought fit to reduce the former value of the said copper money, to the value or standard of the like copper money formerly currant in this our kingdom, and accordingly we do hereby will and require all our subjects, within our said kingdom of ireland, to take and receive all such copper or mix't metal money, lately coined in the mint erected in our city of dublin, at the several and respective valuations following, and that the same do pass currant in exchange of money, and for all manner of goods and provisions whatsoever, and shall be received by all the officers and collectors of our customs, excise, or other branches of our revenue accordingly, viz. "the large half-crown of copper money, together with the crown pieces, of like metal and weight, lately stamp'd shall pass at one penny sterling. "the small half-crown of copper, lately stamp'd shall pass at three farthings. "the large copper shilling shall pass at a half-penny sterling. "the small shilling, lately stamped, and sixpence, shall pass each at one farthing. "and our will and pleasure is, that all such pewter pence, as have been lately coyned in the said mint, shall pass for half-pence, and all the half-pence of the like metal, stamped in the said mint, shall pass currant for farthings. "which several sorts of coyn shall be deemed as currant money at the rates before mentioned, in all payments whatsoever within this our kingdom. given at our camp by dublin, this tenth day of july, , in the second year of our reign." [illustration: paper money of the french republic, .] in the limited space at our disposal, we have not been able to give more than an outline sketch of the various moneys under discussion. the student, however, will find detailed accounts of every coin issued during the great rebellion, and later by james ii in ireland, in dr. philip nelson's two most interesting works, (_a_) "the obsidional money of the great rebellion," and (_b_) "the copper coinage of ireland." chapter xvi curios made by prisoners of war objects recently made in holland--the napoleonic prisoners at norman cross, perth, dartmoor, stapleton, liverpool, and greenland valleyfield ever since the days when enemy soldiers and sailors were first interned for protracted periods of time, it has been a practice for the incarcerated men to while away the tedium by making little odds and ends of things as souvenirs. their wares are often of extreme interest, as they help us to gain some idea of the class of people who have been interned on particular occasions and the ability and skill they possessed. at the present moment, objects of no little interest are gradually finding their way into england, which have been made by the men interned in holland who evacuated antwerp after its fall, and, no doubt, many will be the treasures which our brave soldiers will bring back with them when they are freed from the concentration camps in germany. needless to say, all such curios will be valued by the collector more and more as time rolls on. in the present chapter, we shall confine our remarks to the handiwork of the french and spanish prisoners captured during the napoleonic wars, because sufficient of it has been preserved to engage the attention of the treasure-hunter. one word of caution is necessary, at the outset: such objects are easily counterfeited, and, on this account, must only be bought from reputable people unless documentary proof of genuineness is forthcoming. the napoleonic prisoners were quartered in various districts of england, and for many years on end, thus our statements can only be made generally. the chief settlement was at norman cross, near peterborough, and, though the huge and dingy buildings which served as prisons no longer stand, the place is marked by a cross which was unveiled on july , . the craft of the peterborough prisoners ranked high, as visitors to the local museums will readily acknowledge. their wares were chiefly made out of the beef-bones left over from their rations. the writer treasures a most exquisitely made set of dominoes carved from bone and ornamented by brush, quill, and knife which came from this settlement. a photograph of the set is given among the illustrations of the present work, but the delicate tracery and the coloured panels of the box have lost much of their charm in the process of reproduction. there is nothing unfinished about the dominoes; each is perfectly squared and the dots are scooped out and coloured with black enamel. when one remembers that the tools at the disposal of the workers were few and primitive, their productions must be accepted as truly marvellous. another example of the work of these men which is worth mentioning is to be seen in the peterborough museum; it consists of a miniature bone or perhaps ivory guillotine, perfect in every detail. [illustration: obsidional half-franc note of epernay.] [illustration: obsidional franc note of epernay.] perhaps it will be well to mention that the inhabitants of peterborough displayed much interest in the frenchmen's art, and a regular market was held daily within the prison walls from ten to midday, whilst history records that as much as two hundred pounds was given in a week for these curios. at perth, another of the concentration centres, the products of the prisoners consisted of carved boxes, wooden and bone puzzles, toys and strawplait goods. indeed, the skill which the men displayed in this latter class of production was so high that it outclassed all local work of a similar nature. from straw which was dipped in various coloured dyes these clever workmen made tableaux of a most gorgeous nature and framed them with carefully shaped pieces of wood. they also dug up the clay in the courtyards and modelled it into little statuettes of sailors, soldiers, and people of notoriety, whilst they cut pieces from their clothes and worked them into ornamental slippers. their ingenuity did not stop here, for they forged bank-notes to while away their tedious hours, and foisted them on to those who came to the prison market. in this matter the following quotation from the _perth courier_ of september , , is interesting:[ ]-- "we are sorry to learn that the forgery of notes of various banks is carried on by prisoners at the depôt, and that they find means to throw them into circulation by the assistance of profligate people who frequent the market. the eagerness of the prisoners to obtain cash is very great, and as they retain all they procure they have drained the place almost entirely of silver, so that it has become a matter of difficulty to get change of a note. "last week a woman coming from the market at the depôt was searched by an order of captain moriarty, when there was found about her person pieces of base money in imitation of bank tokens (of which the prisoners are suspected to have been the fabricators), to the amount of £ s. after undergoing examination, the woman was committed to gaol." [ ] here quoted from abell, "prisoners of war in britain." the perth prisoners earned for themselves a very bad name, for not only did they counterfeit bank-notes, copies of which are still to be found by collectors, but they fell to all sorts of dishonest practices. a favourite ruse of theirs was to bargain with a customer and then offer to wrap up the goods which were about to change hands. the wrapping-up process was completed out of the unwary purchaser's view, but instead of enclosing the curio they included a lump of clay or piece of wood of similar shape. if the customer came back to complain, the seller was seldom found, and even when he was discovered it took a deal of threatening and verbal eloquence to obtain redress from the defaulter, whose one security was the iron railings which separated him from the outside world. the prisoners at dartmoor also made knick-knacks, but the governor here forbade the sale of woollen mittens, gloves, straw hats or bonnets, plaited straw, shoes, and articles made out of prison stores. at stapleton, outside bristol, the bootmakers of the neighbourhood complained of the sale of shoes in the prison market the prison-made article, however, was usually more a thing of ornamentation than of use, and so the bootmakers' complaint seems somewhat unwarranted. at liverpool, the frenchmen made trinkets, crucifixes, card-boxes, toys, snuff-boxes, horsehair rings, and hair watch-chains, using their own hair in the manufacture of the two latter articles. at the greenland valleyfield prison, the making of straw into strawplait was for a while a profitable pastime, as the following passage shows:[ ]-- "the employer gave out the straw and paid for the worked article, three sous per 'brasse,' a little under six feet. some men could make twelve 'brasses' a day. beaudoin (a sergeant-major of the st line regiment) set to work at it, and in the course of a couple of months became an adept. after four years came the remonstrance of the country people that this underpaid labour by untaxed men was doing infinite injury to them; the government prohibited the manufacture and much misery among the prisoners resulted. from this prohibition resulted the outside practice of smuggling straw into the prison and selling it later as the manufactured article; and a very profitable industry it must have been, for we find that, during the trial of matthew wingrave in , for engaging in the strawplait trade with the prisoners at valleyfield, it came out that wingrave, who was an extensive dealer in the article, had actually moved up there from bedfordshire on purpose to carry on the trade and had bought cornfields for the purpose." [ ] abell, "prisoners of war in britain," p. . thus it is clear that the curios made by prisoners of war embrace a wide range of interesting objects, and that there is much fascination to be had in collecting them. the reader who would know more of the lives, the romances, and the sufferings of these unfortunate men should read francis abell's capital book bearing the title "prisoners of war in britain." [illustration: a newspaper poster which told of welcome news.] [illustration: a set of bone dominoes carved by prisoners taken in the napoleonic wars and interned in the neighbourhood of peterborough.] chapter xvii miscellaneous military curios considerations respecting miscellaneous curios--battlefield souvenirs--regimental colours--odds and ends of dress equipment-- books and newspapers of military interest--royal souvenirs-- official military documents--gruesome relics--relics of the great war among the most acceptable military curios are those which may be classed as miscellaneous; they range from fragments of "black marias" to chocolate tins, and prussian helmets to early copies of the army list. treasures which come under this head are to be found at almost every turn--in sale-rooms, in the shop windows of second-hand dealers, in cottages and mansions, in local museums--almost everywhere, in fact. curiously enough, the military treasures which may be described as miscellaneous are usually to be picked up very cheaply, for there is a much smaller demand for them than there is for such groups of things as medals, firearms, and armour and, of course, the price is regulated by the demand. there is one axiom which must be always kept in view when purchasing odd military curios. it is not sufficient to know, in our own minds, that a certain article is genuine; we must know enough to be able to prove the fact to other collectors or else the "selling-price" value of the treasure will be little more than nothing. of course, with such things as medals, autographs, weapons, etc., it is merely the work of an expert to say whether a certain specimen is genuine or not, but no amount of careful examination can ever decide the authenticity of a certain souvenir said to belong, perhaps, to wellington, or the genuineness of a shot which was supposed to have caused the death of such and such a great soldier. relics of this nature must be backed with good documentary evidence or their value can be but trifling. a case in point may be given by way of an example:-- a soldier recently showed the writer a pocket-knife, bearing the coat-of-arms of cologne, which he picked up on the battlefield of ypres. the soldier naturally valued the knife for its associations, but as a military curio its worth was no more than that of a second-hand, much used, pocket-knife since he could in no way prove how he found it. * * * * * for the sake of method, we have grouped the miscellaneous curios with which we shall deal under certain heads, the first of which is "battlefield souvenirs." these trophies of war are, of course, full of interest; the present conflict has given us a good many specimens such as prussian helmets, german infantry caps, and shells of various calibre. they should all be highly prized as long as they are in good condition and their identity can be established. there are many interesting battlefield souvenirs to be seen in the royal united service museum. one is the railway-station board from tel-el-kebir, which stood in the midst of the fighting on september , , when the british, , strong, attacked and stormed arabi's entrenchments defended by , egyptians. another is a leaden ball found on the spot where major-general james wolfe received his mortal wound on the plains of abraham at the taking of quebec, . a third souvenir is a grape shot found on an embankment on the island of capri, and believed to have been one of those used by the french in the siege of the island. capri, it may be said, was held by the british under sir hudson lowe from to . in the latter year, king murat of naples sent a force of french troops, under general lemarque, to besiege the island, and took it after thirteen days' siege. yet another souvenir which may be described as from the battlefield is an officer's memorandum book. captain f. w. lyons, of the south staffordshire regiment, had this book in his breast-pocket whilst attacking the stockade on the tumbiling river, in penang, in , when it was struck by a bullet with no worse result to captain lyons than a severe bruise on the chest. a fifth exhibit is a piece of the gate of hougomont, which was riddled with bullets during the fighting at waterloo. the last to be mentioned here is a gun used in mafeking during the siege. this gun, so the description added to the exhibit runs, was made in the railway workshops at mafeking during the siege. the core is a steel steam-pipe, round which were lapped bars of iron, which were hammered and turned into their present condition. the trunnions and breech are castings of brass. for the castings, a blast furnace was improvised out of an iron water-tank lined with fire-bricks, the draught being forced through the pipe of a vacuum brake off a railway carriage. the shells of the gun were similarly cast, and were loaded with powder, and exploded by a slow match which was ignited by the flame of the discharge. the powder was also manufactured in mafeking. on one occasion the breech blew out, and was repaired and fixed with the stout iron holding-bands which may be seen connecting the breech to the trunnion-block. the gun was nicknamed "the wolf" after colonel baden-powell, whose nickname this was among the people of the north. =regimental colours.=--under this heading a number of most interesting relics of the battlefield may be grouped. it is true that specimens are never available for the private collector of military curios, but as most cathedrals and many museums possess examples, we cannot pass them over without some mention. the royal united service museum houses a score or more of these trophies of war, but probably the most attractive are the following:-- . drapeau du ^e régiment, formerly le régiment la fére, formed in , taken at bastia, . it is one of the earliest french colours known to be in existence. it is white, with a tri-colour of blue, white, and red in the upper canton, showing that it belonged to the st battalion. it has also a tri-colour border of blue, white, and red on either of the three edges. . drapeau des volontaires du département de la corse, - . also taken at bastia in . it is a tri-colour of blue, white, and red, the blue being on the top, and then the colours white and red. on the one side, within a wreath, are the words "viver, liber. i. o. morire," in gold, evidently the corsican patois for "je meurs pour vivre libre," and on the reverse "republica francese." . a guidon of the nd regiment, , taken in wellington's victory over the french at salamanca. it was brought home and laid at the feet of his royal highness the prince regent by captain lord clinton, th light dragoons, aide-de-camp to the earl of wellington. . a quartette of guidons of the rd light dragoons, circa - , believed to have led the regiment in its celebrated charge at talavera in . the regiment was in anson's brigade, which was ordered by sir arthur wellesley to attack villatte's division, and the rd, starting at a canter and increasing their speed as they advanced, rode headlong against the enemy, but in a few minutes came upon the brink of a hollow cleft, which was not perceptible at a distance. the regiment plunged down without a check, men and horses rolling over each other in dreadful confusion. the survivors mounted the opposite bank, by twos and threes, and rallying passed through the midst of villatte's columns, which poured in a fire from each side, and fell upon a brigade of french chasseurs in the rear. the combat was fierce, but short; for fresh troops came up when the rd, already overmatched, could scarcely hold up against the chasseurs. the regiment lost two hundred and seven men and officers, or about half the number that went into action. the facings of the regiment being crimson the first guidon was, as usual, of that hue. for distinction's sake, though hardly in accordance with the regulations, the other guidons were blue. it is impossible to decide with exact certainty the date when they were made, but probably soon after the regiment was renumbered, in .[ ] [ ] the description of these colours are those given with the exhibits. =odds and ends of dress equipment.=--of curios coming within this class the collector should be able to gather quite an abundance of valuable material, ranging from, say, royalist powder-flasks to the sashes worn by celebrated soldiers on historic occasions. the royal united service museum, that treasure-house of military curios, has the following interesting exhibits worthy of mention under this head:-- . the dress worn by tippoo sahib, sultan of mysore, during the siege of seringapatam, in . it is thickly padded with leather, and the head-dress, which has the appearance of green velvet, is in reality a very effective helmet. . a cavalry cloak which belonged to captain nolan, th hussars, who fell in the charge at balaklava. captain nolan was a.d.c. to the quartermaster-general, when he conveyed to brigadier-general the earl of cardigan the famous order for the charge of the light brigade. . an officer's silk sash used in supporting sir john moore when carried in a blanket from the battlefield of coruña to the citadel after he was mortally wounded on january , . . a civilian's hat worn by lieutenant-general sir thomas picton, who commanded the third division at the battle of vittoria, june , , when the french army was totally defeated by the allied armies. he wore the civilian head-dress owing to inflammation of the eyes. . a saddle used by field-marshal prince blücher von wahlstadt at the battle of waterloo. . an umbrella of king prempeh, who was taken prisoner by the british troops under colonel sir francis scott at coomassie in . the umbrella was presented to her late majesty queen victoria.[ ] [ ] the descriptions are those given with the exhibits at the museum. =books and newspapers of military interest.=--in this class quite a wide range of matter is to be found. books on military subjects containing fine illustrations, especially when coloured, are always valuable, and if more than seventy or eighty years old are never likely to depreciate in worth. when the illustrations depict army dress or refer to implements of warfare, the books should be especially prized. volumes having for the subjects the descriptions of battles or accounts of tactics are, however, not sought for, as a rule. the army list must not be forgotten. early copies--the first appeared in --are eagerly snapped up whenever offered for sale--as many soldiers of rank endeavour to secure complete sets of them. [illustration: light horse volunteers, of london and westminster. the committee of this corps', considering with serious attention the present critical, situation of the country, and conceiving that every well-wisher to its constitution and government would be desirous of affording his individual support at this period, (and particularly should his majesty's endeavours to conclude a safe and honourable peace with our enemies prove ineffectual), have thought it proper to make known to the public the following abstract of the rules and regulations unanimously agreed to by the corps, viz.--this corps, instituted in , and revived in , consists, when complete, of gentlemen, commanded by two field officers, six captains, six lieutenants, six cornets, and an adjutant, chosen from among themselves and commissioned by his majesty; subject to be called out in case of invasion, appearance of invasion, or insurrection, and to do duty in the metropolis only, or within the distance of ten miles. when not on actual service, all matters are regulated by a committee of twelve privates and nine officers; and in case of death or resignation, a private may be elected to any rank in the corps. the first expense for uniforms, arms, accoutrements and horse furniture, does not amount to l, and the annual subscription is only ten guineas, which may be considered as amply compensated by the following advantages:-- every gentleman is taught riding, fencing, and the swords exercise on horseback by the best masters, in the pay of the corps. he is exempted from the militia, the tax for one horse, and the powder tax (if he chooses to avail himself of that privilege), and also the ballot for the proposed supernumerary militia and cavalry. his horse is broke and kept in constant exercise at the stables of the corps (should he prefer sending him there), where he stands at less expense than at livery. there are no expensive meetings, and the attendance at such as are occasionally appointed by the committee, is always optional. the corps is composed in general of men of extensive business, and the hours of exercise are regulated in such a manner as seldom to prove of any inconvenience. it is only necessary to attend the drills till a certificate of being fit for duty is obtained from the commanding officer. the civil and military regulations of the corps more at large may be perused by applying to the secretary, or any gentleman of the committee. _no. , strand_, by order, _nov_, , . edw. hughes, sec. a cutting from _the times_ of november , , which is of much interest, as it shows that problems of recruiting were just as difficult of solution a century and a quarter ago as they are to-day.] newspapers containing news of special military interest are worth obtaining. the issues of _the times_ which tell of the successes of trafalgar and waterloo are notoriously valuable, but the reprinted copies must not be mistaken for the original leaflets. there is, of course, no need to confine one's collection to copies of _the times_. in this matter, the news contained by the journal is more to be considered than the dignity of the journal itself. =royal souvenirs.=--in the time of waterloo the soldier in the ranks received few of the little considerations which we now feel are the hero's just reward. tommy was paid for his work and there the matter ended. to-day, however, the position has changed. we, who stay at home, can hardly think enough of those who are fighting our battles: such is the spirit shown by every one from the king down to the humblest citizen living within the realm. with such a feeling abroad it is not to be wondered at that members of the royal family have, in recent times, made little presents to our fighting men, knowing full well how much the recipients will treasure them. under this heading we may mention the queen victoria chocolate tin which the late queen gave to soldiers in the boer war, the chocolate or tobacco tin which princess mary presented, full of good things, to the soldiers during christmas, , and lastly the christmas card which the king and queen sent to the fighting men on land and sea at the same festive season. these and all such souvenirs are, of course, to be highly prized by the collector. =official military documents.=--undoubtedly a good many documents of a military bearing are to be found if collectors only know where to search for them. the more important papers, such as plans of battlefields and commanders' messages, are naturally prized by those who own them, but there is a wide field for the collector among the documents of lesser importance. within this class we should include all kinds of official correspondence, passports to enter fortified towns, passes to enable journalists to penetrate beyond certain lines, and proclamations, printed and otherwise. it will thus be seen that the scope of the collection is almost without limit. a good many treasures coming under this head are to be found in the whitehall museum, already spoken of. two are worthy of special notice. the first is a pass issued to lieutenant j. whiteley, th foot, when a french prisoner of war at verdun, dated december , . it runs as follows:-- "place de verdun. _permission de sortir de la place._ il est permit à mr. whitley, prisonnier de guerre de sortir de la place par les portes, chaussée de metz, à condition de rentrer chaque jour avant leur fermeture. la présente permission est pour lui seul. verdun, décembre, . le commandant du dépôt des prisonniers de guerre anglais." (_signature illegible._) the above is interesting in so much as it enables us to gather that those who were unfortunate enough to be taken prisoner by the french were treated as men of honour and with as few irksome restrictions as possible. the second treasure is a map of the theatre of war (the waterloo campaign, ) saturated with the blood of lieutenant-general sir thomas picton, who was killed during the battle. the map was taken from the pocket of his coattee on the following morning by his servant, henry barnes. * * * * * so far we have marshalled our curios under certain more or less convenient headings, but some of them refuse all attempts at classification; they are no less attractive on this account, however. were we to reserve a space for gruesome relics, the following exhibit, to be seen in the royal united service museum, would certainly deserve mention. it is the king of ashanti's execution bowl, which formed part of the spoils taken from prempeh by the expedition under colonel sir francis scott in . the bowl, which is of brass, resembles an ordinary bath-tub in appearance and size, and is about five feet in diameter. on the rim are four small lions and a number of knobs, evidently intended as an ornamentation, and would appear to be of moorish origin. there is a gap in the continuity of knobs to allow a space for the victim to insert his neck preparatory to execution. the bowl was fully described by bowdich in his account of ashanti in . coomassie, where the bowl was taken, means the city of death; it possessed three places of execution--one at the palace for private executions, one on the parade ground for public executions, and a third, named bantama, where the bowl was found, for fetish sacrifices. any great public occasion was seized upon as an excuse for human sacrifice, such as the harvest festival, at which large numbers of victims were offered. the king also went every quarter to pay homage to the shade of his ancestors at bantama, and on each occasion the death of twenty men over the great bowl was demanded. the blood of the victims was allowed to putrefy in the bowl, the leaves of certain herbs being added; it was considered a very valuable fetish medicine. king prempeh was accustomed to watching the sacrifices seated in a chair with the queen-mother seated on a stool on his left, being sheltered from the sun by a large umbrella.[ ] [ ] "museum catalogue," p. . before concluding this chapter on miscellaneous curios, it may be well to give a list of suggested objects, bearing on the great war, which might be reasonably included in a collection of war mementoes and relics:-- blue-books and similar official correspondence, both british and foreign. copies of newspapers containing accounts of the outstanding incidents of the war. photographs of the greater events, i.e. the sinking of the _blücher_. recruiting posters. posters describing hostile and friendly aircraft. printed proclamations. letters from soldiers at the front. war postage stamps, including the various red cross stamps. the king and queen's christmas card to the soldiers. princess mary's chocolate box. various kinds of ammunition used by the allies and the enemy. aeroplane darts. permits given to journalists to enter the various battle zones. official stamps of the press censor. cartoons from _punch_. paper money issued owing to the hostilities. portions of uniforms, i.e. prussian helmets, buttons and badges of british and foreign soldiers. souvenirs made by interned soldiers. toys constructed by belgian refugees, and composite flags made by combining the devices of the various allies. [illustration: an interesting broadside printed at the famous catnach press, being one of a series describing incidents in the life of a soldier.] chapter xviii a history of one's collection reasons for compiling a history of one's collection--the part played by photographs--armour suggested as an example--material for grangerizing in this concluding chapter we have a suggestion to make to the collector of ample leisure moments; briefly, it is that he should draw up a history of his treasures. such a work has many valuable advantages; first, it helps to co-ordinate the pieces which our collection contains; second, it provides work of a fascinating nature; third, it leads us to hunt through books and collections and so increases our knowledge; and fourth, it provides us with a kind of catalogue of our treasures which should prove of value for insurance and other purposes of identification. collectors of most kinds of curios are able to keep their specimens in methodical array. the philatelist, for instance, preserves his stamps within the covers of one or more albums; the print-lover places his pictures in portfolios, whilst the china-collector uses a cabinet for housing his treasures. the collector of military curios, however, cannot adopt any of these methodical arrangements, for it is impossible to assemble, we will say, armour, postage stamps, medals, and badges with any pretence of order. this is where the history of one's collection steps in; it describes the pieces and explains where each is to be found. * * * * * the first stage in making such a history consists in procuring photographs or well-executed drawings of every specimen in our collection. photographs are, of course, much more useful than drawings, and as nearly every house boasts of a camera nowadays the former should not be hard to obtain. the prints should be mounted in a loose-leaf album, the pages of which must be much larger than the prints. mounting may be performed in many ways, but it will be well to use a photographic paste, to use it sparingly, and to paste the whole of the backs of the prints. the third step consists in adding written matter under and around the prints. this data should describe not only the article portrayed, that is to say, its use, its sequence among other similar things, its composition, and so on, but also where and how it was personally obtained, what was paid for it, and in what particular place it is kept. personally, we do not think that a history should be limited to an account of the pieces figuring in our collection, but that a welcome should be extended to brief descriptions, both written and pictorial, of specimens which we hope to obtain as well as interesting specimens which we can never hope to obtain owing to their unique condition. the wider history will prove more complete and, therefore, more valuable; it will also serve as an indicator of the things which we do not yet possess but which are procurable by the average collector. * * * * * by way of an example, let us say that the reader has a small collection of armour and weapons and that he proposes to draw up a history of these interesting objects. the first thing would be to photograph each of the specimens in his collection and to mount them in an album as described above. naturally, there would be many periods unrepresented in the collection, and pictures of these he should endeavour to find among the magazines and books that are available. as a discovery is made it should be carefully cut out and added to the history. of course, when an additional piece of armour or a weapon is procured, its photograph should replace any print of a similar article which may already figure in the album. the grangerite, for such is the name given to a person who creates a history on these lines, is often spoken of as one who mutilates valuable books to give birth to a volume of his own. we may say at once that we do not suggest that mutilation of any kind should be countenanced. the grangerite who needs extra illustrations can find material, in abundance, for his work in all sorts of quarters without tearing prints from volumes of worth. the old book-shop with its penny boxes and print portfolios provides all the pictures that are necessary in the ordinary way whilst back numbers of _the connoisseur_ are veritable gold-mines when representations of any kind of curio are needed. but the grangerite must learn to search for material in all sorts of unexpected quarters. armour, in many cases, adorns the heroes which grace our public statues in london (e.g. the black prince at westminster), therefore, he should procure picture post-cards of such monuments. again, many coins bear allegorical figures which include arms and armour in various forms. in this matter it is worth mentioning that the british museum has on sale a large stock of picture post-cards depicting the coins reposing in its galleries. these, of course, the grangerite should procure. lastly, we may mention that royal seals, church brasses, and even postage stamps often portray the warrior in shining armour and are worth noting by the grangerite. * * * * * such, in outline, is the task of drawing up a history of one's collection. the work is fascinating and the _magnum opus_, when perfected, is of considerable value. need more be said? bibliography bibliography works dealing with military crests, badges, uniforms, etc. ackermann, r. costumes of the british and indian armies. a collection of coloured plates. . army clothing regulations. part i. regular forces. (wyman.) . atkinson, j. a. a picturesque representation of the naval, military, and miscellaneous costumes of great britain: with coloured plates. . colnaghi,--. costumes of the army of the british empire according to the regulations of . . crests of the british army. a coloured chart issued by gale and polden. price s. crests of the british army. (six packets of crests arranged in book form.) gale and polden. price s. fairbairn, j. crests of the families of great britain and ireland. fores. yeomanry costume: with illustrations. . fox-davies, a. c. armorial families, . th edition. many coloured plates and otherwise profusely illustrated. (a valuable work, especially for students desirous of noting the early connection between noble families and regiments.) hull, e. costumes of the british army in : many plates. . knight and butters. crests of great britain and ireland. vols. lawrence-archer, j. the british army: its records, badges, devices, etc. . lienhardt and humbert. les uniformes de l'armée française. luard, john. a history of dress of the british soldier. . martens and norie. costumes of the british army and volunteer corps. coloured plates. . military uniforms under the head of "uniforms." article in _encyclopædia britannica_. (a capital survey of the subject.) perry, o. l. ranks and badges in the army. . smith, c. h. costumes of the british army. (a fine collection of coloured plates.) . spooner. costumes of the british army: with many coloured plates, by m. a. hayes. vols. . uniforms of europe, past and present. four coloured plates depicting about army dresses. _encyclopædia britannica_, th edition, vol. . walton, colonel c. british army. (regimental dress histories.) works dealing with arms and armour. anderson, j. ancient scottish weapons. (edinburgh.) . armour. a capital survey of the subject in _chambers's encyclopædia_. arrows and arrow makers. (published by judd and detweiler, washington.) . ashdown, c. h. british and foreign arms and armour. . azan, p. les premières mitrailleuses, - . . belloc, hilaire. the book of the bayeux tapestry. . berthelot, m. p. e. explosive materials, to which is added a short sketch of gunpowder. (new york.) . bethel, a. h. modern guns and gunnery. blanch, h. j. a century of guns. . bond, h. treatise on military small arms. . boutell. arms and armour. . brett, e. j. pictorial record of arms and armour. . burton. the book of the sword. . calvert, a. f. spanish arms and armour: an account of the royal armoury of madrid. . (not a mere guide-book.) campbell, lord a. notes on swords from culloden. . catalogue of the museum of artillery in the rotunda, woolwich. . (stationery office publication.) church, w. c. american arms and ammunition. article in _scribner's monthly_, vol. xxix. p. . clephan, r. c. defensive armour and weapons and engines of war of mediæval times and of the renaissance. . demmin, auguste. illustrated history of arms and armour. . (about two thousand illustrations, making the work a most useful reference book.) diener, schoenberg alfons. die waffen der wartburg mit waffen und marken. abbildungen auf tafeln in orthochromatischem lichtdruck. (berlin.) . dillon, viscount. guide to tower of london, with a description of the armoury. . egerton, w. a description of indian and oriental armour. . ffoulkes, charles. armour and weapons. . ffoulkes, charles. european arms and armour in the university of oxford. . plates. ffoulkes, charles. the armourer and his craft from the eleventh to the sixteenth century. . diagrams and plates. firearms. a capital survey of the subject in _chambers's encyclopædia_. forgeries that were not forged. article in _the connoisseur_, vol. iii. p. . gardner, j. s. armour in england. (portfolio monographs.) . gardner, j. s. foreign armour in england. (portfolio monographs.) . gaythorpe, h. notes on the rampside sword. . greener, w. w. the gun and its development. . hartley, c. gasquoine. the madrid royal armoury. article in _the connoisseur_, vol. iv. p. . hendley, t. h. damascening on steel and iron. . hewitt, j. ancient armour and weapons in europe, vols. . hutton, a. the sword and the centuries. . joly, h. l. japanese sword mounts. . keller, m. l. the anglo-saxon weapon. names treated archæologically and etymologically. . kelly, francis m. arms and armour at the national gallery. article in _the connoisseur_, vol. iii. p. . kimball, w. w. small arms of european armies. article in _scribner's monthly_, vol. vi. p. . laking, guy f. catalogue of oriental arms and armour in the wallace collection. . list of books and photographs in the national art library illustrating armour and weapons. (victoria and albert museum.) . maindron, g. r. m. les armes. . marks, e. c. r. evolution of modern small arms. . mason, v. l. new weapons of the united states army. article in _the century magazine_, vol. , p. . mayne, c. b. the infantry weapon and its use in war. . meyrick. ancient armour in europe. . nugent, w. t. art ornamentation upon armour. article in _the magazine of art_, vol. , p. . sandars, horace. the weapons of the iberians. . sandringham arms and armour. (the indian collection presented to edward vii, when prince of wales. - .) . sargeaunt, b. e. weapons: a brief discourse on hand weapons other than firearms. . sawyer, c. w. firearms in american history, - . . seton-karr, sir henry. ammunition. article in _encyclopædia britannica_, th edition, vol. . text-book of small arms. (government publication.) . treatise on ammunition: especially for army service. (stationery office publication.) . walsh, j. h. weapons of war. westropp, m. s. d. arms and armour. . wilkinson. engines of war. works dealing with medals, decorations, and medallions adams, j. h. some rare napoleonic medals. article in _cosmopolitan_, vol. , p. . armand, a. les médailleurs italiens des quinzième et seizième siècles. vols. . carter, t. war medals of the british army, . (historical as well as technical information.) catalogue of the bowles collection, at bristol, of tokens, coins, and medals. bristol. . catalogue of the coins, tokens, medals, dies, and seals in the museum of the mint. vols. . elvin, c. n. handbook of the orders of chivalry, war medals, and other decorations. . fabriczy, c. von. italian medals. . fisher, j. f. american medals. (mass. hist. coll. d. series , .) grueber, h. a. guide to the exhibition of english medals in the british museum, . hawkins, e. medallic illustrations of the history of great britain and ireland to the death of george ii. vols. . irwin, d. h. war medals and decorations issued to the british forces since . (this book is specially recommended.) list of books and pamphlets in the national art library (victoria and albert museum) on coins and medals. . mayo, j. h. medals and decorations of the british army and navy. vols. . (most of the actual documents relating to the issue of the various medals are quoted verbatim.) medallions. notice des monuments exposés dans le département des médailles. bibliothèque nationale, paris. . medals of honor as a recognition of gallantry. article in _harper's weekly_, april , . medals of the british army. a coloured chart issued by gale and polden. price s. myer, i. the waterloo medal. (philadelphia.) . patrick r. w. c. catalogue of the medals of scotland. . poole, stanley lane-. coins and medals. . poole, stanley lane-. coins and medals: their place in history and art. . simon, t. medals, coins, great seals, impressions from the works of t. simon, - . . simonis, j. l'art du médailleur en belgique. . (brussels.) spink & son. hints to collectors of coins and medals. . steward, w. augustus. war medals and their histories. . steward, w. augustus. war medals won by boys. article in _the boy's own paper_, vol. xxxvii. p. . tancred, g. historical record of medals conferred on the british navy, army, and auxiliary forces. . weber, f. p. medals of the nineteenth century relating to england by foreign artists. . whalley, j. l. gold war medals. . works dealing with military prints (the collector of military prints will find many interesting items listed under the head of "crests, badges, and uniforms.") ashton, john. english caricature and satire on napoleon i. . british volunteers, or a general history of the formation and establishment of the volunteer and associated corps. with coloured plates. . broadley, a. m. napoleon in caricature, - . . campion, g. b. principal evolutions of the royal horse artillery. coloured plates. . cannon, r. historical records of the british army. contains a sumptuous collection of coloured reprints representing the various regiments of the army. . connolly, t. j. w. history of the royal sappers and miners. coloured plates. . cruikshank, g. life of napoleon, by w. h. ireland, and plates by g. cruikshank. . daubrawa, h. de. costumes of the indian army. coloured plates. . davenport, lieutenant-colonel. the light horse drill for the volunteer corps. uncoloured plates. (a valuable work.) . dayes, e. the first regiment of the foot guards. coloured plates. (also companion volumes of the second and third regiments.) ewart, herbert. henry brinbury, caricaturist. article in _the connoisseur_, vol. vi. p. . gillray, james. caricatures, comprising the best political and humorous satires of the reign of george iii. (six hundred large engravings.) . gunn, maurice j. print restoration and picture cleaning. (with chapters on "print fakes and their detection" and "prints to collect.") hayden, arthur. chats on old prints. heath, w. a collection of coloured plates of the costumes of the british cavalry and infantry regiments. . nevill, ralph. british military prints. (a valuable guide for collectors of military pictures.) . works dealing with military brasses beaumont, edward. ancient memorial brasses. . beaumont, edward. three interesting hampshire brasses. (reprinted from the hampshire field club society's papers.) . boutell, c. monumental brasses and slabs. . boutell, c. the monumental brasses of great britain. . brasses of england. (antiquary's books.) . druitt, h. manual of costume as illustrated by monumental brasses. . fisher, thomas. drawings of brasses in some kentish churches. . griffin, ralph. some indents of lost brasses in kent, canterbury cathedral, rochester cathedral, saltwood church. . gunther, r. f. a description of brasses and other funeral monuments in the chapel of magdalen college, oxford. . haines. a manual of monumental brasses. . hudson. the brasses of northamptonshire. . macklin, herbert. monumental brasses. . macklin, herbert. the brasses of england. . stoke d'abernon manor house. (describes the oldest brass in england.) article in _the country home_, vol. i. p. . stothard. monumental effigies of great britain. . suffling, ernest r. english church brasses of the thirteenth to seventeenth centuries. (contains over two hundred illustrations.) transactions of the monumental brass society, . waller. a series of monumental brasses. . ward, j. brasses. (cambridge shilling manual.) . works dealing with autographs broadley, a. m. chats on autographs. . scott, henry t. autograph collecting. scott, h. t. rational autograph collecting. article in _the connoisseur_, vol. i. p. . works dealing with war postage stamps armstrong, d. b. postage stamps of war. . johnson, stanley c. peeps at postage stamps. . (chapter xiii.) melville, fred j. chats on postage stamps. . melville, fred j. the postage stamp in war. . nankivell, edward j. south african war stamps. article in _the connoisseur_, vol. i. p. . works of a miscellaneous character of interest to collectors of military curios abell, francis. prisoners of war in britain, - . . (includes an interesting account of objects made by prisoners during their confinement.) alexander, sir j. e. life of the duke of wellington. vols. . atkinson, captain j. the a b c of the army. . baily, j. t. herbert. napoleon. (published by _the connoisseur_.) barnard. companion to english history. (middle ages.) . (especially the chapters on "costume, military and civil"; and also "the growth of firearms.") broadley, a. m. the collectanea napoleonica: being a catalogue of the collection of autographs, historical documents, broadsides, caricatures, drawings, maps, music, portraits, naval and military views, etc., relating to napoleon i and his times, - . formed by a. m. broadley. . catalogue of the royal united service museum. . (not only a catalogue but a reference book containing much useful information on military curios.) clifford, w. g. the british army. (the "peeps" series.) . cope cornford, l. the black watch: the story of the regiment. (wayfarers' library.) . de lacy lacy, c. the history of the spur. (issued by _the connoisseur_.) fortescue. a history of the british army. . freeth, frank. some old english delft dishes. article in _the connoisseur_, vol. iii. p. . grose. military antiquities, . (though some of the information contained in this volume has been discredited, the work is, none the less, one that the student should carefully note.) hodgkin, john e. rariora collected between - . vols. (published by sampson, low, marston.) hood, george. famous fighting regiments. johnson, stanley c. saturday with my camera. (chapter xxxiii, which deals with the photography of curios such as medals, brasses, etc.) king albert's book. a tribute to the belgian king and people from representative men and women throughout the world. hodder and stoughton. . price s. lillingston, leonard w. the art of extra-illustration. article in _the connoisseur_, vol. iv. p. . lillingston, leonard w. the catnach press. article in _the connoisseur_, vol. iii. p. . lumsden, sir p. lumsden of the guides. (publisher, mr. murray.) morris and jordan. an introduction to the study of local history and antiquities. . nelson, philip, dr. the copper coinage of ireland. . nelson, philip, dr. the obsidional money of the rebellion. . scott, s. the british army: its origin, progress, and equipment, . smith, sir harry. the autobiography of. (publisher, mr. murray.) willoughby, leonard. naworth castle. (an account of the military curios of the castle.) article in _the country home_, vol. vi. p. . willson, beckles. portraits and relics of general wolfe. article in _the connoisseur_, vol. xxiii. p. . index index abyssinian medal, airey's balaklava notes, - american war, use of rifles in, armour, armour, decline of, armour, drawbacks in collecting, armour, effects of, on swords, armour, forged, - armour, glossary of terms, - armour, periods in, army list, army post office corps, , - autographs of noted soldiers, autographs, the care of, autographs, the price of, - autographs, the value of, ashantis, king of, execution bowl, - assignats, badges, - badges, mottoes on, - badges, mounting and preserving, badges, special distinctions borne by, - balaklava notes, - baltic medal, bargains advertised in newspapers, bargains in armour, battlefield souvenirs, , - battle honours, battle of boyne, medallion, bayeux tapestry, bayonet, beeston siege money, bengasi stamps, "best-shot" medal, "black marias," black prince, statue of, blenheim, medallion, blücher, saddle used by, blue uniforms, bone objects made by prisoners, - books containing fine military prints, - book which saved soldier's life, brass, oldest english, british museum, , , , bunbury, - burmah medal, buttons, camail armour, camoys, thomas and elizabeth, brass to the memory of, carlisle siege money, cavalier's dress, ceylon medal, chain-mail period, chain-mail reinforced, cheynie, humfrie, brass to the memory of, china medal, chocolate box, colchester siege money, colours, regimental, commonwealth, dress of, copenhagen national museum, coronation medal, crimea medal, crimea war, , cromwell and medals, cromwell, letter written by, culloden medal, culverins, - curios of the great war enumerated, - cyclas period, d'abernon, sir john, brass to memory of, dartmoor, prisoners at, deccan medal, decorations, the need for special, detecting forged armour, dettingen medallion, distinguished conduct in the field decoration, , distinguished service order, documents, official, dorchester, lord, letter written by, dress, dunbar medal, dunblane medallion, early medallions, edge hill, battle of, egyptian medal, - egypt, military post office in, - enfield-martini rifles, enfield rifles, epernay paper money, fall of james ii, medallion, ffelbrygge, sir symon, brass to the memory of, flash, fleurs-de-lys on tunics, flint-lock, , floor brasses, - forged armour, - forlorn-hope medal, francis ii of germany, medal awarded by, ghuznee medal, , gillray, - glossary of terms in armour, - gloucester regiment, double badge worn by, grangerizing, grape-shot from capri, great rebellion, money of, greenland valleyfield, prisoners at, green uniforms, guidons, gun money, gun used in mafeking, hackles worn by northumberland fusiliers, half-armour period, helmets, - holographs, hougomont, portion of gate of, household cavalry, uniform of, hyderabad medal, i.e.f. stamps, indian general service medal, indian mutiny medal, indian postal arrangements on active service, - industrial museum, vienna, interned soldiers in holland, irish siege money, java medal, jellalabad medal, - jubilee medal, julius cæsar medallion, jupon period in armour, kruger rifle, lee-enfield rifles, lee-metford rifles, lille, surrender of, medallion, liverpool, prisoners at, long service medal, lost-wax process, lucknow medals, , mafeking, gun used in, mafeking paper money, mafeking stamps, maida medal, martini-henri rifles, mary's, princess, christmas box, match-lock, - mauritius medal, maximilian armour, medallists, - medal, the first british, medals, growth in awarding of, medals, care of, medals, recent campaign, - meeanee medal, meritorious service decoration, military cross, militia, badges of the, militia medal, minié rifles, moore, sir john, the sash of, mottoes on badges, - mural tablets, musée d'artillerie, paris, , musket, mysore medal, napoleon iii, letter written by, napoleonic prisoners, napoleonic wars, influence on uniforms of, naseby, letter referring to the battle of, national museum, copenhagen, nepaul medal, newark siege money, newspapers containing military dispatches, new zealand medal, norman armour, norman cross, prisoners at, obsidional money, order of merit, ordinance, the first, regulating uniforms, oudenarde medallion, palimpsests, "par ballon monté" correspondence, peninsular medal, , , , peninsular war, influence on uniforms, perth, prisoners at, poona medal, pope pius vi, medal awarded by, post-marks, , post office volunteers, precedence in the army, prempeh, umbrella belonging to, pre-norman armour, punjab medal, rag fair, ramilies medallion, recruiting notice, regimental collecting, regimental colours, regular army, badges of, restoring autographs, rifles, rifle-corps uniform, rifles, inventor of, rijks museum, amsterdam, , rotunda, woolwich, , royal army medical corps, badge of, royal fusiliers uniform, royal united service museum, , , , , , , , , rubbings, how to make, - st. george, red cross on uniforms, salamanca, battle of, scarborough siege money, schomberg, letter by, scinde medal, seaforth highlanders, badge of, sedan, letter referring to the battle of, seringapatam medal, - serpentin, simon, the medallist, snider rifles, south african medal, south african war, , south kensington museum, spanish war, stamps of the, - stamps used in crimean war, stapleton, prisoners at, storing weapons, straw-plait made by prisoners, studded and splintered armour, sudan campaign, surcoatless period armour, surrender of lille, medallion, sutlej medal, swords, , , swords, historic, tabard period in armour, talavera, battle of, taxis, johann von, letter-carrier, tel-el-kebir railway name plate, territorial army, badges of the, territorial medals, thame, brass at, ticehurst, brass at, tippo sahib, dress worn by, tower of london, , - transition period in armour, tripoli di barberia stamps, uniforms, blue, uniforms, green, uniforms, influence of ann on, ; of charles ii, ; of elizabeth, ; of george iii, ; of george iv, ; of james ii, ; of queen victoria, ; of william iv, uniforms, earliest, - victoria cross, - volunteer decorations, - volunteer force, badges of the, v.r.i. stamps, wadham, nicholas and dorothy, brass to memory of, wadi halfa post office, wallace collection, , war stamps, recent, waterloo, , , waterloo, bayonet used at, waterloo medal, waterperry, brass at, wheel-locks, william and mary re-valued the gun money, wiltshire regiment badge, wolfe, bullet which killed, wyon's medallions, yeomanry decorations, young pretender's defeat, medallion commemorating the, unwin brothers, limited, the gresham press, woking and london transcriber's notes: . italics has been converted to _text_. . bold has been converted to =text=. sun tzu on the art of war the oldest military treatise in the world translated from the chinese by lionel giles, m.a. ( ) [this is the basic text of sun tzu on the art of war. it was extracted from mr. giles' complete work as titled above. the commentary itself, which, of course includes this work embedded within it, has been released as project gutenberg's ebook # .] i. laying plans . sun tzu said: the art of war is of vital importance to the state. . it is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected. . the art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field. . these are: ( ) the moral law; ( ) heaven; ( ) earth; ( ) the commander; ( ) method and discipline. , . the moral law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger. . heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. . earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. . the commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness. . by method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure. . these five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail. . therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:-- . ( ) which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the moral law? ( ) which of the two generals has most ability? ( ) with whom lie the advantages derived from heaven and earth? ( ) on which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? ( ) which army is stronger? ( ) on which side are officers and men more highly trained? ( ) in which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment? . by means of these seven considerations i can forecast victory or defeat. . the general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in command! the general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:--let such a one be dismissed! . while heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules. . according as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one's plans. . all warfare is based on deception. . hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. . hold out baits to entice the enemy. feign disorder, and crush him. . if he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. if he is in superior strength, evade him. . if your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. . if he is taking his ease, give him no rest. if his forces are united, separate them. . attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected. . these military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand. . now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. the general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! it is by attention to this point that i can foresee who is likely to win or lose. ii. waging war . sun tzu said: in the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. such is the cost of raising an army of , men. . when you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. if you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. . again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the state will not be equal to the strain. . now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue. . thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. . there is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. . it is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on. . the skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice. . bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. thus the army will have food enough for its needs. . poverty of the state exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished. . on the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and high prices cause the people's substance to be drained away. . when their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions. , . with this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated; while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue. . hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. one cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one's own store. . now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards. . therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. the captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept. . this is called, using the conquered foe to augment one's own strength. . in war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns. . thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril. iii. attack by stratagem . sun tzu said: in the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. so, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them. . hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. . thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. . the rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. the preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more. . the general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. such are the disastrous effects of a siege. . therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. . with his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. this is the method of attacking by stratagem. . it is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. . if equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. . hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force. . now the general is the bulwark of the state; if the bulwark is complete at all points; the state will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the state will be weak. . there are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:-- . ( ) by commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. this is called hobbling the army. . ( ) by attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. this causes restlessness in the soldier's minds. . ( ) by employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. this shakes the confidence of the soldiers. . but when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. this is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away. . thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: ( ) he will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. ( ) he will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces. ( ) he will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks. ( ) he will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared. ( ) he will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign. . hence the saying: if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. if you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. if you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. iv. tactical dispositions . sun tzu said: the good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy. . to secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. . thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. . hence the saying: one may know how to conquer without being able to do it. . security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive. . standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength. . the general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete. . to see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence. . neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole empire says, "well done!" . to lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear. . what the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. . hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage. . he wins his battles by making no mistakes. making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated. . hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. . thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory. . the consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success. . in respect of military method, we have, firstly, measurement; secondly, estimation of quantity; thirdly, calculation; fourthly, balancing of chances; fifthly, victory. . measurement owes its existence to earth; estimation of quantity to measurement; calculation to estimation of quantity; balancing of chances to calculation; and victory to balancing of chances. . a victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain. . the onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. v. energy . sun tzu said: the control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers. . fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals. . to ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken-- this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect. . that the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg--this is effected by the science of weak points and strong. . in all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory. . indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as heaven and earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more. . there are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. . there are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen. . there are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted. . in battle, there are not more than two methods of attack--the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers. . the direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. it is like moving in a circle--you never come to an end. who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination? . the onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course. . the quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim. . therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision. . energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the releasing of a trigger. . amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat. . simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength. . hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions. . thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. he sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it. . by holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him. . the clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not require too much from individuals. hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy. . when he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. for it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down. . thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. so much on the subject of energy. vi. weak points and strong . sun tzu said: whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted. . therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him. . by holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near. . if the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can force him to move. . appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected. . an army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not. . you can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended.you can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked. . hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack. . o divine art of subtlety and secrecy! through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands. . you may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy. . if we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. all we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve. . if we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. all we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way. . by discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy's must be divided. . we can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few. . and if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits. . the spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few. . for should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. if he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak. . numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations against us. . knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight. . but if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. how much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred li apart, and even the nearest are separated by several li! . though according to my estimate the soldiers of yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. i say then that victory can be achieved. . though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success. . rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots. . carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient. . in making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains. . how victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot comprehend. . all men can see the tactics whereby i conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved. . do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances. . military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards. . so in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak. . water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing. . therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions. . he who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain. . the five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make way for each other in turn. there are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing. vii. maneuvering . sun tzu said: in war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign. . having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before pitching his camp. . after that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult. the difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain. . thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of deviation. . maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous. . if you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. on the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores. . thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, doing a hundred li in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy. . the stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination. . if you march fifty li in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal. . if you march thirty li with the same object, two-thirds of your army will arrive. . we may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost. . we cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors. . we are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. . we shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make use of local guides. . in war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed. . whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by circumstances. . let your rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness that of the forest. . in raiding and plundering be like fire, in immovability like a mountain. . let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt. . when you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men; when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery. . ponder and deliberate before you make a move. . he will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. such is the art of maneuvering. . the book of army management says: on the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums. nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags. . gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point. . the host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. this is the art of handling large masses of men. . in night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army. . a whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. . now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp. . a clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. this is the art of studying moods. . disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art of retaining self-possession. . to be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:--this is the art of husbanding one's strength. . to refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:--this is the art of studying circumstances. . it is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill. . do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen. . do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. do not interfere with an army that is returning home. . when you surround an army, leave an outlet free. do not press a desperate foe too hard. . such is the art of warfare. viii. variation in tactics . sun tzu said: in war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces . when in difficult country, do not encamp. in country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. do not linger in dangerously isolated positions. in hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. in desperate position, you must fight. . there are roads which must not be followed, armies which must be not attacked, towns which must not be besieged, positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed. . the general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops. . the general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account. . so, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the five advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men. . hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together. . if our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes. . if, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune. . reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; and make trouble for them, and keep them constantly engaged; hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point. . the art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable. . there are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: ( ) recklessness, which leads to destruction; ( ) cowardice, which leads to capture; ( ) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults; ( ) a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame; ( ) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble. . these are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of war. . when an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults. let them be a subject of meditation. ix. the army on the march . sun tzu said: we come now to the question of encamping the army, and observing signs of the enemy. pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the neighborhood of valleys. . camp in high places, facing the sun. do not climb heights in order to fight. so much for mountain warfare. . after crossing a river, you should get far away from it. . when an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream. it will be best to let half the army get across, and then deliver your attack. . if you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader near a river which he has to cross. . moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun. do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. so much for river warfare. . in crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them quickly, without any delay. . if forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass near you, and get your back to a clump of trees. so much for operations in salt-marches. . in dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with rising ground to your right and on your rear, so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. so much for campaigning in flat country. . these are the four useful branches of military knowledge which enabled the yellow emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns. . all armies prefer high ground to low and sunny places to dark. . if you are careful of your men, and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind, and this will spell victory. . when you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the slope on your right rear. thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilize the natural advantages of the ground. . when, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it subsides. . country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running between, deep natural hollows, confined places, tangled thickets, quagmires and crevasses, should be left with all possible speed and not approached. . while we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on his rear. . if in the neighborhood of your camp there should be any hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed out and searched; for these are places where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking. . when the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on the natural strength of his position. . when he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for the other side to advance. . if his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a bait. . movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is advancing. the appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious. . the rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming. . when there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area, it betokens the approach of infantry. when it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have been sent to collect firewood. a few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the army is encamping. . humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is about to advance. violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he will retreat. . when the light chariots come out first and take up a position on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle. . peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot. . when there is much running about and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has come. . when some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure. . when the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from want of food. . if those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the army is suffering from thirst. . if the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted. . if birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. clamor by night betokens nervousness. . if there is disturbance in the camp, the general's authority is weak. if the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. if the officers are angry, it means that the men are weary. . when an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food, and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing that they will not return to their tents, you may know that they are determined to fight to the death. . the sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file. . too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his resources; too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress. . to begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence. . when envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce. . if the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, the situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection. . if our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be made. what we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength, keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements. . he who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is sure to be captured by them. . if soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be practically useless. if, when the soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are not enforced, they will still be useless. . therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity, but kept under control by means of iron discipline. this is a certain road to victory. . if in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad. . if a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his orders being obeyed, the gain will be mutual. x. terrain . sun tzu said: we may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: ( ) accessible ground; ( ) entangling ground; ( ) temporizing ground; ( ) narrow passes; ( ) precipitous heights; ( ) positions at a great distance from the enemy. . ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called accessible. . with regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of supplies. then you will be able to fight with advantage. . ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called entangling. . from a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. but if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue. . when the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first move, it is called temporizing ground. . in a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an attractive bait, it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage. . with regard to narrow passes, if you can occupy them first, let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy. . should the army forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned. . with regard to precipitous heights, if you are beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up. . if the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away. . if you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a battle, and fighting will be to your disadvantage. . these six are the principles connected with earth. the general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them. . now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from natural causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. these are: ( ) flight; ( ) insubordination; ( ) collapse; ( ) ruin; ( ) disorganization; ( ) rout. . other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another ten times its size, the result will be the flight of the former. . when the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result is insubordination. when the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result is collapse. . when the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or not he is in a position to fight, the result is ruin. . when the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not clear and distinct; when there are no fixes duties assigned to officers and men, and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter disorganization. . when a general, unable to estimate the enemy's strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be rout. . these are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully noted by the general who has attained a responsible post. . the natural formation of the country is the soldier's best ally; but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, constitutes the test of a great general. . he who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into practice, will win his battles. he who knows them not, nor practices them, will surely be defeated. . if fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not fight even at the ruler's bidding. . the general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace, whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom. . regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death. . if, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose. . if we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory. . if we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory. . if we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory. . hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss. . hence the saying: if you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know heaven and know earth, you may make your victory complete. xi. the nine situations . sun tzu said: the art of war recognizes nine varieties of ground: ( ) dispersive ground; ( ) facile ground; ( ) contentious ground; ( ) open ground; ( ) ground of intersecting highways; ( ) serious ground; ( ) difficult ground; ( ) hemmed-in ground; ( ) desperate ground. . when a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground. . when he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it is facile ground. . ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is contentious ground. . ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground. . ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, so that he who occupies it first has most of the empire at his command, is a ground of intersecting highways. . when an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground. . mountain forests, rugged steeps, marshes and fens--all country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground. . ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground. . ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without delay, is desperate ground. . on dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. on facile ground, halt not. on contentious ground, attack not. . on open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way. on the ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies. . on serious ground, gather in plunder. in difficult ground, keep steadily on the march. . on hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem. on desperate ground, fight. . those who were called skillful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear; to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from rallying their men. . when the enemy's men were united, they managed to keep them in disorder. . when it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise, they stopped still. . if asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack, i should say: "begin by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will." . rapidity is the essence of war: take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots. . the following are the principles to be observed by an invading force: the further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you. . make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food. . carefully study the well-being of your men, and do not overtax them. concentrate your energy and hoard your strength. keep your army continually on the move, and devise unfathomable plans. . throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight. if they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve. officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength. . soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. if there is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. if they are in hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. if there is no help for it, they will fight hard. . thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers will be constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to be asked, they will do your will; without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders, they can be trusted. . prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious doubts. then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared. . if our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it is not because they are disinclined to longevity. . on the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep, those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down letting the tears run down their cheeks. but let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the courage of a chu or a kuei. . the skillful tactician may be likened to the shuai-jan. now the shuai-jan is a snake that is found in the chung mountains. strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle, and you will be attacked by head and tail both. . asked if an army can be made to imitate the shuai-jan, i should answer, yes. for the men of wu and the men of yueh are enemies; yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right. . hence it is not enough to put one's trust in the tethering of horses, and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground . the principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard of courage which all must reach. . how to make the best of both strong and weak--that is a question involving the proper use of ground. . thus the skillful general conducts his army just as though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand. . it is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order. . he must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and appearances, and thus keep them in total ignorance. . by altering his arrangements and changing his plans, he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge. by shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose. . at the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. he carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand. . he burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and nothing knows whither he is going. . to muster his host and bring it into danger:--this may be termed the business of the general. . the different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground; the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of human nature: these are things that must most certainly be studied. . when invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means dispersion. . when you leave your own country behind, and take your army across neighborhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground. when there are means of communication on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways. . when you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. when you penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground. . when you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear, and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. when there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground. . therefore, on dispersive ground, i would inspire my men with unity of purpose. on facile ground, i would see that there is close connection between all parts of my army. . on contentious ground, i would hurry up my rear. . on open ground, i would keep a vigilant eye on my defenses. on ground of intersecting highways, i would consolidate my alliances. . on serious ground, i would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies. on difficult ground, i would keep pushing on along the road. . on hemmed-in ground, i would block any way of retreat. on desperate ground, i would proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives. . for it is the soldier's disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he has fallen into danger. . we cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes until we are acquainted with their designs. we are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. we shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides. . to be ignored of any one of the following four or five principles does not befit a warlike prince. . when a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy's forces. he overawes his opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining against him. . hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states. he carries out his own secret designs, keeping his antagonists in awe. thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their kingdoms. . bestow rewards without regard to rule, issue orders without regard to previous arrangements; and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to do with but a single man. . confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know your design. when the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing when the situation is gloomy. . place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety. . for it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm's way that is capable of striking a blow for victory. . success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourselves to the enemy's purpose. . by persistently hanging on the enemy's flank, we shall succeed in the long run in killing the commander-in-chief. . this is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning. . on the day that you take up your command, block the frontier passes, destroy the official tallies, and stop the passage of all emissaries. . be stern in the council-chamber, so that you may control the situation. . if the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in. . forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear, and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground. . walk in the path defined by rule, and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle. . at first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you. xii. the attack by fire . sun tzu said: there are five ways of attacking with fire. the first is to burn soldiers in their camp; the second is to burn stores; the third is to burn baggage trains; the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy. . in order to carry out an attack, we must have means available. the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness. . there is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special days for starting a conflagration. . the proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days are those when the moon is in the constellations of the sieve, the wall, the wing or the cross-bar; for these four are all days of rising wind. . in attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible developments: . ( ) when fire breaks out inside to enemy's camp, respond at once with an attack from without. . ( ) if there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy's soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack. . ( ) when the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are. . ( ) if it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a favorable moment. . ( ) when you start a fire, be to windward of it. do not attack from the leeward. . a wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon falls. . in every army, the five developments connected with fire must be known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the proper days. . hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength. . by means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of all his belongings. . unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste of time and general stagnation. . hence the saying: the enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources. . move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical. . no ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique. . if it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you are. . anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content. . but a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being; nor can the dead ever be brought back to life. . hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of caution. this is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact. xiii. the use of spies . sun tzu said: raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources of the state. the daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver. there will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on the highways. as many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their labor. . hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory which is decided in a single day. this being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments, is the height of inhumanity. . one who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no master of victory. . thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. . now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation. . knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men. . hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: ( ) local spies; ( ) inward spies; ( ) converted spies; ( ) doomed spies; ( ) surviving spies. . when these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system. this is called "divine manipulation of the threads." it is the sovereign's most precious faculty. . having local spies means employing the services of the inhabitants of a district. . having inward spies, making use of officials of the enemy. . having converted spies, getting hold of the enemy's spies and using them for our own purposes. . having doomed spies, doing certain things openly for purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know of them and report them to the enemy. . surviving spies, finally, are those who bring back news from the enemy's camp. . hence it is that which none in the whole army are more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies. none should be more liberally rewarded. in no other business should greater secrecy be preserved. . spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity. . they cannot be properly managed without benevolence and straightforwardness. . without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports. . be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of business. . if a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told. . whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de-camp, and door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these. . the enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. thus they will become converted spies and available for our service. . it is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies. . it is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy. . lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on appointed occasions. . the end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy. hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost liberality. . of old, the rise of the yin dynasty was due to i chih who had served under the hsia. likewise, the rise of the chou dynasty was due to lu ya who had served under the yin. . hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results. spies are a most important element in water, because on them depends an army's ability to move. [end - sun tzu on the art of war, text-only] available by internet archive (http://www.archive.org) note: project gutenberg also has an html version of this file which includes the original illustrations. see -h.htm or -h.zip: (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/ / -h/ -h.htm) or (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/ / -h.zip) images of the original pages are available through internet archive. see http://www.archive.org/details/romanceofwarinve corbiala transcriber's note: in this plain text version, underlined text in the original is surrounded by =equals symbols=; italic typeface is surrounded by _underscores_; bold typeface and small caps typeface are represented by upper case. the oe-ligature appears as [oe]. changes to the text (to correct typographical errors) are listed at the end of the book. a few cases of missing punctuation have been regularised in the advertisements without comment. all advertising material has been retained in the same position as it appears in the original book. there are extensive advertisements before and after the title page, following the index and in a sixteen page publisher's catalogue at the end of the book. the romance of war inventions * * * * * the ian hardy series by commander e. hamilton currey, r.n. _each volume with illustrations in colour. s. each_ ian hardy's career in h.m. navy is told in four volumes, which are described below. each volume is complete in itself, and no knowledge of the previous volumes is necessary, but few boys will read one of the series without wishing to peruse the others. ian hardy, naval cadet "a sound and wholesome story giving a lively picture of a naval cadet's life."--_birmingham gazette_. 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(oxon.) the romance of the spanish main seeley, service & co., limited. * * * * * contents chapter page i. how peaceful arts help in war ii. gunpowder and its modern equivalents iii. radium in war iv. a good servant, though a bad master v. mines, submarine and subterranean vi. military bridges vii. what guns are made of viii. more about guns ix. the guns they use in the navy x. shells and how they are made xi. what shells are made of xii. measuring the velocity of a shell xiii. some adjuncts in the engine room xiv. engines of war xv. destroyers xvi. battleships xvii. how a warship is built xviii. the torpedo xix. what a submarine is like xx. the story of wireless telegraphy xxi. wireless telegraphy in war xxii. military telegraphy xxiii. how war inventions grow xxiv. aeroplanes xxv. the aerial lifeboat index list of illustrations a tank _frontispiece_ page machine-gun versus rifle an italian mine-layer an incident at loos an -pounder in action a german automatic pistol bomb throwing bomb-throwers at work the tripod mast listening for the enemy diagram showing the principle by which the aerials are connected to the apparatus the parent of the tank the "guardian angel" parachute the romance of war inventions chapter i how peaceful arts help in war in the olden times warfare was supported by a single trade, that of the armourer. nowadays the whole resources of the greatest manufacturing nations scarcely suffice to supply the needs of their armies. so much is this the case that no nation can possibly hope to become powerful in a military or naval sense unless they are either a great manufacturing community or can rely upon the support of some great manufacturing ally or neutral. it is most astonishing to find how closely some of the most innocent and harmless of the commodities of peace are related to the death-dealing devices of war. of these no two examples could be more striking than the common salt with which we season our food and the soap with which we wash. yet the manufacture of soap furnishes the material for the most furious of explosives and the chief agent in its manufacture is the common salt of the table. common salt is a combination of the metal sodium and the gas chlorine. there are many places, of which cheshire is a notable example, where vast quantities of this salt lie buried in the earth. fortunately it is very easily dissolved in water so that if wells be sunk in a salt district the water pumped from them will have much salt in solution in it. this is how the underground deposits are tapped. it is not necessary for men to go down as they do after coal, for the water excavates the salt and brings it to the surface. to obtain the solid salt from the salt water, or brine as it is called, it is only necessary to heat the liquid, when the water passes away as steam leaving the salt behind. important though this salt is in connection with our food, it is perhaps still more important as the source from which is derived chlorine and caustic soda. how this is done can best be explained by means of a simple experiment which my readers can try in imagination with me or, better still, perform for themselves. take a tumbler and fill it with water with a little salt dissolved in it. next obtain two short pieces of wire and two pieces of pencil lead, which with a pocket lamp battery will complete the apparatus. connect one piece of wire to each terminal of the battery and twist the other end of it round a piece of pencil lead. place these so that the ends of the leads dip into the salt water. it is important to keep the wires out of the solution, the leads alone dipping into the liquid, and the two leads should be an inch or so apart. in a few moments you will observe that tiny bubbles are collecting upon the leads and these joining together into larger bubbles will soon detach themselves and float up to the surface. those which arise from one of the leads will be formed of the gas chlorine and the others of hydrogen. it will be interesting just to enumerate the names of the different parts of this apparatus. first let me say that the process by which these gases are thus obtained is called electrolysis: the liquid is the electrolyte: the two pieces of pencil lead are the electrodes. that electrode by which the current enters the electrolyte is called the an-ode, while the other is the cath-ode. in other words, the current traverses them in alphabetical order. now it is familiar to everyone that all matter is supposed to consist of tiny particles called molecules. these are far too tiny for anyone to see even with the finest microscope, so we do not know for certain that they exist: we assume that they do, however, because the idea seems to fit in with a large number of facts which we can observe and it enables us to talk intelligibly about them. we may, accordingly, speak as if we knew for a certainty that molecules really exist. now when we dissolve salt in water it seems as if each molecule splits up into two things which we then call "ions." salt is not peculiar in this respect, for many other substances do the same when dissolved in water. all such substances, since they can be "ionized," are called "ionogens." now the peculiarity about ions is that they are always strongly electrified or charged with electricity. at this stage we must make a little excursion into the realm of electricity. you probably know that if a rod of glass be rubbed with a silk handkerchief it becomes able to attract little scraps of paper. that is because the rubbing causes it to become charged with electricity. in like manner a piece of resin if rubbed will become charged and will also attract little pieces of paper. a piece of electrified resin and an electrified glass rod will, moreover, attract each other, but two pieces of resin or two pieces of glass, if electrified, will repel each other. this leads us to believe that there are two kinds of electrification or two kinds of electrical charge. at first these two kinds were spoken of as vitreous or glass electricity and resinous electricity, but after a while the idea arose that there was really one kind of electricity and that everything possessed a certain amount of it, the electrified glass having a little too much of it and the electrified resin a shade too little of it. from this came the idea of calling the charge on the glass a "positive" charge and that on the resin a "negative" charge. recent investigations seem to show that we have got those two terms the wrong way round, but to avoid confusion we still use them in the old way. it will be sufficient for our purpose, therefore, if we assume that every molecule of matter has a certain normal amount of electricity associated with it and that under those conditions the presence of the electricity is not in any way noticeable. when a molecule becomes ionized, however, one ion always seems to run off with more than its fair share of the electricity, the result being that one is electrified positively, like rubbed glass, while the other is negatively charged, like rubbed resin. thus, when the common salt is dissolved in water, two lots of ions are formed, one lot positively charged and the other lot negatively. each molecule of salt consists of two atoms, one of sodium and one of chlorine: consequently, one ion is a chlorine atom and the other is a sodium atom, the latter being positive and the former negative. now the electrodes are also charged by the action of the battery. that connected to the positive pole of the battery becomes positively charged and the other negatively. the anode, therefore, is positive and the cathode negative. it has been pointed out that two similarly charged bodies, such as two pieces of glass or two pieces of resin, repel each other, while either of these attracts one of the other sort. hence we arrive at a rule that similarly charged bodies repel each other, while dissimilarly charged bodies attract each other. acting upon this rule, therefore, the anode starts drawing to itself all the negative ions, in this case the atoms of chlorine, while the cathode gathers together the positive ions, the atoms of sodium. thus the action of the battery maintains a sorting out process by which the sodium is gathered together around one of the electrodes and the chlorine round the other. those ions, by the way, which travel towards the _an_-ode are called _an_-ions, while those which go to the cath-ode are termed cat-ions. thus far, i think, you will have followed me: the chlorine is gathered to one place and the sodium to the other. the former creates bubbles and floats up to the surface and escapes. but where, you will ask, does the hydrogen come from, which we found, in the experiment, was bubbling up round the cathode. moreover, what becomes of the sodium? both those questions can be answered together. the sodium ions, having been drawn away from their old partners the chlorine ions, are unhappy, and long for fresh partners. they therefore proceed to join up with molecules of water. but water contains too much hydrogen for that. every molecule of water has two atoms of hydrogen linked up with one of oxygen, but sodium does not like two atoms of hydrogen: it insists on having one only. accordingly the oxygen atom from the water, together with one of the hydrogen atoms, join forces with the sodium atom into a molecule of a new substance, a most valuable substance in many manufactures, called caustic soda, while the odd atom of hydrogen, deprived of its partners, has nothing left to do but to cling for a while to the cathode and finally float up and away. the sum-total of the operation therefore is this: when we pass an electric current through salt water, between graphite electrodes, chlorine goes to the anode and escapes, while caustic soda is formed round the cathode and hydrogen escapes. let us see now how this is applied commercially. for the production of chlorine the apparatus need be little more than our experimental apparatus made large. the anode can be covered in such a way as to catch the gas as it bubbles upwards. in times of peace this gas is chiefly used for making bleaching powder. it is led into chambers where it comes into contact with lime, with which it combines into chloride of lime, a powder which is sometimes used as a disinfectant, but the chief use of which is for bleaching those cotton and woollen fabrics for the manufacture of which this country is famous throughout the world. the germans, however, have taught the world another use for chlorine. those gallant canadians who were the first victims of the attack by "poison gas" who suddenly found themselves fighting for breath, and a few of whom, more fortunate than the rest, have reached their homes shattered in health with permanent damage to their lungs, those brave fellows suffered from poisoning by chlorine. we cannot obtain the other product, the caustic soda, by the same simple means. in our little experiment we succeeded in manufacturing some of it in the region around the cathode, and had we drawn off some of the liquid from there we would have been able to detect its presence. but it would have been mixed up with much ordinary salt, and for commercial purposes we need the caustic soda separate from the salt. the principle is, however, just the same, as you will see. imagine a large oblong vat divided by vertical partitions into three separate chambers. these partitions do not quite reach the bottom of the vessel, so that there is a means of communication between all three chambers. this is closed, however, by filling the lower part of the vat with mercury up to a level a little higher than the lower ends of the partitions. thus we have three separate chambers with communication between them but that communication is sealed up by the mercury. the two end chambers are filled with salt water, or brine, while the centre one is filled with a solution of caustic soda. in each end compartment is a stick of graphite, both being electrically joined together and so connected up that they form anodes, while in the centre compartment is the cathode. when the current flows from the anodes it carries the sodium ions with it, just as it did in our little experiment. but its course, this time, is not straight, since in order to travel from anode to cathode it has to pass through the openings in the partitions, in other words through the mercury. on arrival at or near the cathode the ions of sodium cause the caustic soda to be formed just as in our experiment, but in this case, you will notice, the formation takes place in a chamber from which the salt brine is completely excluded by the mercury. brine is continually fed into the outer chambers and the solution of caustic soda is drawn from the centre one, while the chlorine is collected over the anodes. and now we can go a step further on our progress from common salt to explosive. in the soap works there are enormous coppers in which are boiled various kinds of fat. the source of the fat may be either animal or vegetable, many kinds of beans, nuts and seeds furnishing fats practically identical with that which can be got from the fat flesh of a sheep, for instance. to this fat is added some caustic soda solution and the whole is kept boiling for some considerable time. this protracted boiling is to enable the soda thoroughly to attack the fat and combine with it, whereby two entirely new substances are formed. at first the two new substances are not apparent, for they remain together in one liquid. the addition, however, of some brine causes the change to become obvious for something in the liquid turns solid, so that it can be easily taken away from the rest. that solid is nothing else than soap. it remained dissolved in the water which forms part of the liquid until the salt was put in, but as it will not dissolve in salt water, as you will discover if you attempt to wash in sea water, it separates out as soon as the salt is added. but still a liquid remains: what can that be? it is mainly salt water and glycerine, that sticky stuff which in peace times we put on our hands if they get sore in winter, or take, in a little water, to soothe a sore throat. that it has other and very different uses was brought home to me when, during the war, i tried to buy some at a chemist's, only to learn that it could not be sold except in cases of extreme need under the orders of a doctor. the mixed liquid is distilled with the result that the water is driven off and the salt deposited, which with other minor purifying processes gives the pure glycerine. the next step takes us to the explosives factory, where the glycerine is mixed with sulphuric and nitric acids. now glycerine, as you will have observed, comes from the animal or vegetable sources and therefore is one of those substances known as "organic," and, like many other of the organic compounds, it consists of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen. nature has a marvellous way of combining these same three things together in many various ways to form many widely different substances and if, to such a compound, we can add a little nitrogen, we usually get an explosive. thus, the glycerine, with some nitrogen from the nitric acid, becomes nitro-glycerine, a most ferocious and excitable explosive, the basis of several of those explosives without which warfare as we know it to-day would be impossible. chapter ii gunpowder and its modern equivalents the origin of gunpowder appears to be lost in antiquity. at all events it has been in use for many centuries and is still made in many countries. most boys have tried to make it at some time or other and with varying degrees of success. such experiments generally lead to a glorious blaze, a delightfully horrid smell and no harm to anyone, the experimenter owing his safety to his invariable lack of complete success, for although other and better explosives have superseded it for many purposes it is capable of doing a lot of harm when it is well made. it consists of a mixture of charcoal, sulphur and saltpetre ground up very fine and mixed very intimately together. the mixture is wetted and pressed into cakes and dried, after which it is broken up into small pieces. the precise proportions of the various materials seem to vary a great deal in different countries, but generally speaking there is about per cent of saltpetre (or to give it its scientific name, nitrate of potash), per cent of charcoal and per cent of sulphur. now gunpowder, like all explosives, is simply some thing or mixture of things which is capable of burning very quickly. when we light the fire we set going the process which we call combustion, or burning, and, as we know from our own experience, that process causes heat to be generated. what takes place in the fire-grate is that the carbon of the coal enters into combination with oxygen from the air, the two together forming a new compound called "carbonic acid gas." there is nothing lost or destroyed in this process, the carbon and oxygen simply changing into the new substance, and could we weigh the gas produced we should find that it agreed precisely with the weight of the carbon and oxygen consumed. for the purpose for which we require the fire, namely, to heat the room, the chief feature about this process is not what is formed in the shape of gas, for that simply goes off up the chimney, but the heat which is liberated. we believe that in some mysterious way the heat is locked up in the coal. latent is the term we use, which means hidden: in other words we believe that the heat is hidden in the coal: we cannot feel it or perceive it in any way, but it comes out when we let the carbon combine with the oxygen. why these two things combine at all is one of those mysteries which may never be solved. we have theories on the subject, but all we really know is that under certain conditions if they be in contact with one another they will combine, apparently for the simple reason that it is their nature so to do. when we apply the match to the fire all we do is to set up the conditions under which the carbon and oxygen are able to follow their natural instincts, so to speak. a coal fire, as we all know, burns slowly, for the simple reason that it is only at the surface of the lumps that carbon and oxygen are in contact. if we grind up the coal into a fine powder and then blow it into a cloud, so that every tiny particle is surrounded with air, a spark will cause an explosion. that is how these terrible explosions in coal-pits are caused. this is sometimes seen on a small scale when one shakes the empty fire-shovel after putting coal on the fire to get rid of the fine dust adhering to it and to save making a mess in the fender. that little cloud of fine dust will often burst into flame like a mild explosion. we see from this that to make an explosion we require fuel, just as we do to make a fire: but we need that it shall be very intimately mixed with oxygen, so that all of it can burn up in practically a single instant. now in gunpowder we get these conditions fulfilled. we have the carbon in the shape of charcoal, we also have some sulphur which likewise burns readily, and we have saltpetre which contains oxygen. thus, you see, we do not need to go to the air for the oxygen, for the gunpowder possesses it already, locked up in the saltpetre. moreover, we can see now why it is so important for all the materials to be ground up very fine, for it is only by so doing that we can ensure that every particle of charcoal or sulphur shall have particles of saltpetre close by ready to furnish oxygen at a moment's notice. another thing to be observed, for it lets us into the great key to the manufacture of nearly all explosives, is the scientific name of saltpetre. it is "nitrate of potassium," and all substances whose names begin with "nitr-" contain nitrogen: while the termination "ate" signifies the presence of oxygen. we need the oxygen to make the explosion but we do not need the nitrogen, yet the latter has to be present for without it the oxygen would be too slow in getting to work. nitrogen is one of the strangest substances on earth. extremely lazy itself, it has the knack of hustling its companions, particularly oxygen, and making them work with tremendous fury. whenever we get the lazy gas nitrogen to enter into a combination with other things we may confidently look for extraordinary activity of some sort. so when we put a light to a quantity of gunpowder we set up those conditions under which the carbon and oxygen can combine, and at the same moment our lazy friend the nitrogen turns out his partner oxygen from the nitrate in which they were till then combined and a sudden burning is the result. the solid gunpowder is suddenly changed into a volume of hot gas times as great. that is to say, one cubic inch of gunpowder changes suddenly into cubic inches of gas. that sudden expansion to times its volume is what we term an explosion. if it takes place in an enclosed space so that the gas formed wants to expand but cannot, the result is a pressure of about forty tons per square inch. if that enclosed space were the interior of a gun, that force of forty tons per square inch would be available for driving out the projectile. now, gunpowder is still used for sporting purposes and also for some special purposes in warfare, but it has the great disadvantage that it makes a lot of smoke, so that the enemy would be easily able to locate the guns were it to be used in them. as we know so well, by the messages from france, guns and rifles drop their shells and bullets apparently from nowhere and are extremely difficult to locate. that is owing to the use of improved powders one of the great features of which is their smokelessness. the reason why gunpowder makes a dense smoke, is because the burning which takes place is very incomplete. therefore, by some such means as a more intimate mixture of the materials a better and more complete burning must be brought about. one of the best known of the new powders (they are all spoken of as powders, whatever their form, since they have taken the place of the old gunpowder) is nitro-glycerine, the basis of which is glycerine. the way in which we obtain this useful material has already been explained. it consists of carbon, a lot of hydrogen and some oxygen. these are not merely mixed together but are in combination, just as oxygen and hydrogen are combined in water. carbon and hydrogen will both combine with oxygen and will give off heat in the process, but in glycerine they are already happily united together and so glycerine itself is no use as an explosive. if, however, we bring nitric acid and sulphuric acid into contact with it a pair of new partnerships is set up, one being water and the other a compound containing carbon and hydrogen, a lot of oxygen and, most important of all, some of that disturbing, restless though lazy nitrogen. this is nitro-glycerine, a particularly furious explosive, for that curious nitrogen seems to be so uncomfortable in his new surroundings that at the smallest provocation he will break up the whole combination and then there will be a mass of free atoms of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen, all seeking new partners, just right for a glorious explosion. so furious and untamed is this stuff that it was almost useless until the famous nobel hit upon the idea of taming it down by mixing it with an earth called kieselguhr, which reduces its sensitiveness sufficiently to make it a very safe explosive to use. to this mixture nobel gave the name of dynamite. it is interesting at this point to compare the action of this typical modern explosive with that of the older gunpowder. the latter is only a mixture: the former is a chemical compound. the smallest particle of material in the gunpowder is a little lump containing millions of molecules and still more of atoms: when the nitrogen has broken up the original nitro-glycerine, just before the explosion actually takes place, we have a mixture of _single atoms_. thus the mixture is far more intimate in the latter case and the burning is therefore quicker and more thorough. [illustration: machine-gun _versus_ rifle. this illustrates the rapidity and accuracy with which the modern rifle can be used. sergeant o'leary, v.c., tackled a gun crew of five and killed them all before they had time to slew their gun round--a striking contrast to the "brown bess" of a hundred years ago.] another well-known explosive is gun-cotton. surely this must be a fancy name, for what can harmless, simple cotton have to do in connection with guns. it is a perfectly genuine descriptive name, however. it seems very strange at first, but it is perfectly true that nitrogen, as it turned glycerine into dynamite, can also turn cotton into gun-cotton. cotton consists mainly of cellulose, a compound of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen, happily combined together and therefore showing, as we well know from experience, no tendency whatever to change into anything else, least of all to "go off bang." but that state of things is very much changed when we have induced nitrogen to take a hand in the game. in actual practice, cotton waste, pure and clean, is dipped into a mixture of sulphuric and nitric acids whereby the cellulose becomes changed into nitro-cellulose, just as a similar process changes glycerine into nitro-glycerine. the whole process of manufacture is of course far more than that simple dipping, but that is the fundamental fact of it all. the rest is concerned with getting rid of the superfluous acid, tearing the stuff into pulp and pressing it into blocks. it is probably the safest of explosives, since it can be kept wet, in which case the danger of an accidental explosion is practically nil, provided reasonable care be taken. even when dry, it behaves in a very kindly way. if hit with a hammer, it only burns for a moment just at the point struck. if ignited with a red-hot rod, it burns but does not explode, unless it is enclosed. the burning, that is to say, is not sufficiently rapid to constitute an explosion. on the other hand, if it be exploded by a detonator, by which is meant a small quantity of a very powerful explosive, such as fulminate of mercury, fired close to it, it then goes off with a violence which leaves little to be desired. it would be better still could we persuade a little more oxygen to enter into its composition, for as it is there is not quite enough to burn up the other matters completely. that, however, does not cause smoke, since the combustion is complete enough to change everything into invisible gases. with more oxygen more heat might be generated and the power of the explosion be made greater. still, even as it is, the explosion of gun-cotton has been estimated by a high authority to produce a pressure of tons per square inch, four times as much as gunpowder. nitro-glycerine has the advantage of a rather larger proportion of oxygen to carbon, resulting in its being rather more energetic. yet another class of explosive is made from coal tar. this is a by-product in the manufacture of gas for lighting and also in the manufacture of coke for industrial purposes. it comes from the retorts along with the gas in a gaseous form but condenses into a black liquid in the pipes and more particularly in an arrangement of cooled pipes called a condenser specially placed to intercept it. in the chemist's eyes it is the most interesting of liquids, for it is full of mysteries and possibilities. the most wonderful achievements of chemistry have it for their raw material and there is still scope for much more in the same direction. if the tar be gently heated in a closed vessel it will evaporate and the vapour can be led to another vessel, there cooled and converted back into a liquid. this looks rather like doing work for nothing, but the various liquids, of which tar is a mixture, evaporate at different temperatures, so that this furnishes a means of separating them. the first liquid thus procured is known as coal tar naphtha, and if it be again distilled it can be subdivided further, the first liquid separated from it being known as benzine. this, again, is another of those almost numberless things which consist of carbon and hydrogen. also, like the other similar substances which we have been discussing, it can, if treated with nitric acid, be made to take into partnership a quantity of oxygen and nitrogen. thus we get nitro-benzene. we can repeat the process, when it will take more and become di-nitro-benzene. again we can repeat it, thus producing tri-nitro-benzene. the second liquid separated from coal tar naphtha is called toluene, which again is composed of carbon and hydrogen in slightly different proportions. like its confrère benzene it, too, can be treated with nitric acid, becoming nitro-toluene and then di-nitro-toluene and finally tri-nitro-toluene, the deadly explosive of which we read in the papers as t.n.t. after the naphtha has been removed from the tar another substance is obtained called phenol, which in a prepared form is familiar to us all as the disinfectant carbolic acid. it also can be treated with nitric acid, to produce tri-nitro-phenol, otherwise known as picric acid, which after a little further treatment becomes the famous "lyddite." most of the actual explosives used in warfare are prepared from one or more of the above-mentioned compounds. for example, nitro-glycerine and gun-cotton, having been dissolved in acetone (another compound of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen) and a little vaseline added, form a soft gelatinous substance which on being squeezed through a fine hole comes out looking like a cord or string, and hence is called cordite. other explosives are finished in the form of sheets, the dissolved gun-cotton or whatever it may be being rolled between hot rollers which give it the convenient form of sheets and at the same time evaporate the solvent. by combining these various substances various characteristics can be given to the finished explosive. for instance, the one which drives the shell from the gun, known as the propellant, must not be too sudden in its action. it must push steadily. its purpose is to drive the shell not to burst the gun, wherefore its action must be comparatively slow and continuous so long as the shell is still in the gun. it must "follow through" as the golf player would put it. the charge in the shell, however, needs to go off with the greatest possible violence so as to blow the shell to pieces and to scatter the fragments so that they do the maximum of damage. those explosives, whose function is thus to burst with a sudden shock, are called high explosives, as distinguished from the propellants which produce a more or less sustained push. the great fundamental principle which enables large quantities of these powerfully explosive substances to be handled with comparative safety involves the use of two different substances in combination. that which is used in quantity and which actually does the work is made comparatively insensitive, indeed in some cases it is very insensitive, so that it can safely travel by train, by ship and by road and also may be handled by the soldiers and sailors with very little risk. some of these compounds can be struck or set on fire with impunity. they are none the less violent, however, when, by the agency of a suitable detonator they are caused to explode. the detonator, of course, has to be very sensitive indeed, but it need only be used in very small quantities, so that by itself it, too, is comparatively safe. fulminate of mercury is often employed for this purpose--a compound based upon mercury but in which nitrogen of course figures largely. thus, there are two things necessary for the successful explosion, one of which is powerful but insensitive, while the other is highly sensitive but relatively harmless since it is never allowed to exist in large quantities, and as far as possible these are kept apart until the last moment. one other thing may be mentioned in regard to this matter which is of the greatest importance. that is the necessity for the utmost uniformity in these various compounds, so that when the gunners put a charge into a gun they can rely upon it to throw the shell exactly as its predecessor did. modern artillery seeks to throw shell after shell within a small area which would clearly be quite impossible if one charge were liable to be stronger or weaker than another, for we can easily see that the more powerful the impetus given the farther will the shell go. to secure this uniformity the greatest care is taken at all stages of the manufacture, and various batches of the same stuff are tested and mixed, and any of them turning out a little too strong are placed with some a little too weak, so that their faults may neutralize each other. by such methods as these a remarkable degree of uniformity is attained, the result of which we see when we read in the papers of the wonderfully accurate gunnery of which our soldiers and sailors are capable. in conclusion, a word of warning may be appropriate. reference has been made above to the safety of modern explosives in the absence of the detonators, but do not let that lead anyone to take liberties. should any reader come into possession of any of these materials, even in the smallest quantities, let him treat it with the utmost respect, for although what has been said about safety is quite correct, it only means comparative safety, there can be no absolute safety where these substances are concerned. chapter iii radium in war when we remember how all forms of scientific knowledge were called upon to help in the great struggle, it is not surprising to hear that, although in a comparatively humble way, radium has had to do its share. now radium is one of the most, if not actually the most, remarkable substance known. about a generation ago scientific men, or some of them at all events, were getting rather cocksure. of course they were quite right when they realized how much was known about things and what great strides had been made during the years through which they had lived. they were proud of the achievements of their scientific friends, for i am not imputing personal vanity to anyone, and they had reason to be proud. they made the mistake, however, of thinking that in one direction at least they had learnt all that there was to be known. the present generation of scientific men seem to be almost too prone to go to the other extreme and to dwell rather much on how little we know now and the wonderful things which are going to be discovered in time. but that is by the way. a generation ago men seem to have pretty well made up their minds that they knew all about atoms. they said that everything was made up of atoms, that the atoms could not be subdivided nor changed into anything else except temporarily by combination with other atoms, and that when these combinations were broken up the atoms remained just as before, quite unchanged. they believed that the atoms were unchangeable and everlasting. professor tyndall, in a famous address, referred to this in somewhat flowery language, telling his hearers that the atoms would be still the same when they and he had "melted into the infinite azure of the past," which a wag translated into the slang expression of the time, "till all is blue." now not very long after professor tyndall made this historic speech professor henri becquerel, of paris, was trying some experiments with phosphorescent materials, that is, materials which glow in the darkness. in the course of these experiments he used some photographic plates upon which, to his surprise, he found marks which he thought ought not to have been there. thinking at first that he had accidentally "fogged" his plates, as every photographer has done at some time or other, he tried his experiments again with special care but still he got the mysterious marks. those marks were caused by some of those "unchangeable and everlasting" atoms deliberately and of their own accord blowing themselves to bits. for the celebrated frenchman was not content to let the matter of those mysterious marks rest: he wanted to know what caused them and he did not desist until he was on the track of the secret. it appeared after careful investigation that they were made by the action of something in some of the ore of the metal "uranium" which he had been using. moreover, this something evidently had the power of penetrating through the walls of the dark-slide to the plate within. finally, it was tracked down to the uranium itself which was unquestionably proved to be giving off something in the nature of invisible light, or at all events invisible rays, of strange penetrative power. a little later it was observed that certain ores of uranium seemed to give off these rays more freely than would be accounted for by the amount of uranium present, from which fact it was inferred that there must be something else present in the ore capable of giving off the rays much more powerfully than uranium can. madame curie ultimately found out two such substances, one of which she called, after her native land, polonium (for she is a pole), and the other radium. it is the latter which is responsible for by far the greater part of the rays formed. the rays are invisible, but they affect a photographic plate in the same way that light does. they also make air into a conductor of electricity and if allowed to impinge upon a surface coated with a suitable substance they cause it to glow. this spontaneous giving off of rays is now spoken of by the general term of "radio-activity," and it has grown into an important branch of science. a number of other substances have been found to exhibit the same peculiar ray-forming powers, notably thorium, one of the components of the incandescent gas mantle by the prolonged application of a fragment of which to a photographic plate an impression can be obtained due to the rays. what, then, are these rays? it is found that they are of three kinds, not that they vary from time to time, but that they can be sorted out into three different sorts of rays which are given off simultaneously all the time. the first sort are stopped by a sheet of paper, the second passing easily through a thick metal plate, while the third appear to be identical with x-rays. for convenience the three sorts are termed alpha, beta and gamma rays, respectively, after the first three letters of the greek alphabet. further, the alpha rays prove to be a torrent of tiny particles about the size of atoms, indeed if they be collected the gas helium is obtained, so that evidently they are helium atoms, and since that is one of those substances whose molecules consist of a single atom each they are also molecules of helium. no doubt the reason why they are so easily stopped by a piece of paper is because being complete atoms they are large, huge indeed, compared with the particles which form the beta rays, for they are apparently those same electrons which are found in the x-ray tube, and which are at least times smaller than the smallest atom. when the electrons in the vacuum tube are suddenly brought to a standstill x-rays are given off and in like manner x-rays no doubt would be given off when they start on their journey, providing that they started suddenly enough. hence it is the starting or sudden explosion-like ejection of the beta particles which is believed to give rise to the gamma rays. the strength or intensity of the rays can be measured very conveniently by their action in making air conductive to electricity, for which purpose a very beautiful but simple instrument called an electroscope is employed. it consists generally of a glass-sided box or else a bottle with a large stopper, consisting of sulphur or some other particularly good insulator. through this a wire passes down into the inside of the vessel terminating in a vertical flat strip to the upper end of which is attached a similar strip of gold leaf or aluminium foil. normally the leaf hangs down close to the strip, but if the wire above the stopper be electrified by touching it with a piece of sealing-wax rubbed lightly against the coat sleeve the charge of electricity passes down into the inside and causes both strip and leaf to become so electrified that they repel each other. owing to the non-conductivity of the air in its normal condition the leaf will, if the insulation of the stopper be good, remain projecting almost horizontally for some time until, as it loses its charge by a slow leakage, it gradually settles down close to the strip. if, however, a piece of radium be brought near while it is sticking out, the leaf will fall almost instantly. x-rays have a similar effect even from several feet or yards away. the intensity of the radio-activity of different substances can be compared by noting the difference in the rate at which the leaf falls under the influence of each. what is happening, then, to the atoms of radium, which causes them to show these curious effects and to give off these strange rays? to give any intelligent answer to that question we are bound to assume that which the older generation of scientists thought impossible, namely, that atoms can be broken up. then we are forced to believe that the atoms of this particular substance radium are of a peculiarly flimsy unstable sort, so that they cannot permanently hold their parts together but are liable to break up, as far as we can see through their own inherent weakness and under the influence of disruptive forces at work within themselves. we must remember, however, that the tiniest speck of matter which we can see contains a number of atoms of such a size as to be quite beyond the grasp of our minds. to give a rough idea of it in figures is useless as no one can comprehend the real value of a figure or two followed by probably from a dozen to twenty "noughts." it is best to content ourselves with the general statement that a speck of matter only just visible to the eye contains an exceedingly vast number of atoms. of course a speck of radium is no exception to this and we must remember, too, that all of them do not break up at once. indeed, the number breaking up at any time are actually countable by means of a very simple contrivance and a sensitive electrometer. consequently, in view of the enormous number present and the comparatively small number breaking up at any moment, it is not surprising to hear that, so it is estimated, the process can go on for an almost indefinite number of years, certainly for hundreds. there are, moreover, certain facts which we need not go into here from which the above fact can be clearly inferred, quite apart from what has been said about the vast numbers of the atoms. it seems as if the uranium atoms break up first, giving off helium atoms and electrons and leaving an intermediate substance called ionium which in its turn breaks up giving off the same things again and leaving radium. that in its turn goes through a complicated series of changes still giving off the same alpha particles or atoms of helium and electrons until, it is suggested, it finally settles down into the simple commonplace metal lead of which we make bullets and water pipes and such-like ordinary things. we see then that all through its history--its radio-active history at any rate--this stuff is throwing off atoms of helium at a very high velocity (about , miles a second), and if it be enclosed in anything this enclosing vessel or substance will be subjected to a continual bombardment by the alpha particles. now just as a piece of iron gets hot if we hammer it, so the enclosing matter is heated by the continual blows which it is receiving night and day, year in and year out, from the alpha particles. consequently the immediate surroundings of a speck of radium are always slightly raised in temperature. moreover, if a speck of radium be placed against a screen covered with suitable materials each particle which strikes it will make a little splash of light. at least that is what it looks like when seen through a magnifying glass, but to the naked eye there only appears a beautiful steady glow. suppose, then, that instead of putting the speck of radiant matter in front of a screen we mix it up intimately with a fluorescent substance such as sulphide of zinc, we then get the same conditions in a slightly different form. each particle of the substance serves as a tiny screen which glows every time a particle hits it. thus is produced a luminous paint which glows by night, suitable for painting the dials of instruments which have to be used in the dark. no doubt some of my readers will have experienced the strangely mingled delight and horror of seeing a zeppelin in the night sky intent on dropping murder and death on the sleeping civilians of a peaceful town or city. some too may have witnessed the later acts in that wonderful drama, when, beside the silvery monster illuminated by the beams of the searchlight there must have been, though quite invisible, a little aeroplane manned by one man or at most two. that aeroplane was, no doubt, fitted with instruments at which the pilot glanced now and then and which he was able to see and read because of the tiny speck of radium mixed into the paint. the little alpha particles gave him the light by which to see, but they gave no help to the germans on the zeppelin. hence, in due time he did his work and the gigantic balloon, the pride of the kaiser and his hordes, fell to the ground, a blazing wreck. how he did it i cannot tell, but of this i am sure, that most probably radium helped him by making luminous and visible the instruments which guided him. but probably it has rendered and will still render us even greater services in the way of helping to repair the damages to our injured manhood. how many men came back from the war crippled with rheumatism because of the hardships through which they went. that disease is believed to be due to a substance which mingles with the blood and which, although usually liquid and harmless sometimes changes into a solid and settles in the joints. now it is believed that radium properly administered will act upon that solid and cause it to change back into its liquid form again, thereby curing the disease. certainly many of the mineral springs at such places as bath and buxton give forth a water which shows a certain amount of radio-activity and it may be that which gives those waters their healing properties. if so, we may look forward with confidence to the time when radio-activity will be induced to play a still more successful part in meeting this painful and widespread illness. then, of the other ills which will inevitably arise in our men through the hardships which they have endured are sure to be some of the cancerous type, many of which appear to succumb to treatment by radium. if a very small quantity indeed be carried for a few days in a pocket it will imprint itself upon the skin beneath as if it burnt the tissues. it is never advisable, therefore, to carry radium in the pocket without special precautions. one cannot help feeling, however, that in that little fact is a hint of usefulness when the best modes of application have been discovered, for as a means of safely and painlessly burning away some undesirable growth it would seem to be without a rival. it is said, too, that it has the strange power of discriminating between the normal and the abnormal, attacking the latter but leaving the former, so that when applied, say, to some abnormal growth like cancer it may be able to remove it without harmful effect upon the surrounding tissues. of this, however, it is too soon to write with confidence. it has not been known long enough for our doctors to find out the best modes of use, but that will come with time: meanwhile there are indications that in all probability it will render good service to mankind. chapter iv a good servant, though a bad master one morning during the war the whole british nation was startled to learn that mr. lloyd george, then the minister of munitions, had taken over a large number of distilleries. could it be that he, a teetotaller and temperance advocate, was going to supply all his workers with whiskey? or was he going to close the places so as to stop the supply of that tempting drink? neither of these suggestions was his real reason. what he wanted the distilleries for was to make alcohol for the war, not for drinking purposes but for the very many uses which only alcohol can fulfil in most important manufactures. probably alcohol is the next important liquid to water. for example, certain parts of shells have to be varnished and the only satisfactory way to make varnish is to dissolve certain gums in alcohol. the spirit makes the solid gum for the time being into a liquid which we can spread with a brush, yet, after being spread, it evaporates and passes off into the air, leaving behind a beautiful coating of gum. that is how all varnishing is done, the alcohol forming the vehicle in which the solid gum is for the moment carried and by which it is applied. it is far and away the most suitable liquid for the purpose, and without it varnishing would be very difficult and unsatisfactory. hence one need for alcohol, to carry on the war. then again some of the most important explosives are solid or semi-solid, and yet they require to be mixed in order to form the various "powders" in use by our gunners. the best way to bring about this mixture is to dissolve the two components in alcohol, thereby forming them both into liquids which can be readily mixed. afterwards the alcohol evaporates; indeed, one of its great virtues for this and similar purposes is that it quietly takes itself off when it has done its work like a very well-drilled servant. what then is this precious liquid and how is it produced? in order to answer that question it is necessary first to state that there are a whole family of substances called "alcohols," all of which are composed of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen in certain proportions. there are also a number of kindred substances also, not exactly brothers but first cousins, so to speak, which because of their resemblance to this important family have names terminating in "ol." they owe their existence to the wonderful behaviour of the atoms of carbon. in order to obtain some sort of system whereby the various combinations of carbon can be simply explained chemists picture each carbon atom as being armed with four little links or hooks with which it is able to grapple, as it were, and hold on to other atoms. each hydrogen atom, likewise, has its hook, but only one instead of four. now it is easy to picture to ourselves an atom of carbon in the middle with its hooks pointing out north, south, east and west with a hydrogen atom linked on to each. that gives us a picture of the molecule of methane, the gas which forms the chief constituent of coal gas such as we burn in our homes. methane is also given off by petroleum and it is the cause of the explosions in coal mines, being known to the miners as "firedamp." it is the first of a long series of substances which the chemist called paraffins. the first, as you see, consists of one of carbon and four of hydrogen. add another of carbon and two more of hydrogen and you get the second "ethane." add the same again and you get the third, propane, and so on until you can reach a substance consisting of thirty-five parts of carbon and seventy-two parts of hydrogen. all we need trouble about, however, is the first two, methane and ethane. we have pictured to ourselves the molecule of methane: let us do the same with ethane. imagine two carbon atoms side by side linked together or hand in hand. each will be using one of its hooks to grasp one hook of its brother atom. hence each will have three hooks to spare on to which we can hook a hydrogen atom. thus we get two of carbon and six of hydrogen neatly and prettily linked up together. the atoms form an interesting little pattern and to build up the various paraffin molecules with a pencil and paper has all the attractions of a puzzle or game. all you have to do is to add a fresh atom of carbon alongside the others and then attach an atom of hydrogen to each available unused hook. if you care to try this you will get the whole series, each one having one atom of carbon and two of hydrogen more than its predecessor. if you mix together a quantity of methane and an equal quantity of chlorine, which i have shown you in another chapter how to get from common salt, a change takes place, for in each molecule of methane one hydrogen atom becomes detached and an atom of chlorine takes its place. how or why this change occurs we do not know. it is a fact that the chlorine has this power to oust the hydrogen and there we must leave it, for the present at any rate. the substance so formed is called methyl chloride. in another chapter reference has been made to that substance which is made from common salt and which is so important in so many manufactures called caustic soda. if we bring some of it into contact with the methyl chloride the chlorine is punished for its rudeness in displacing the hydrogen; it is paid back in its own coin, for it is in turn displaced not this time by a single atom but by a little partnership called "hydroxyl" one atom of hydrogen and one of oxygen acting together. we can again form a neat little picture of what happens. the oxygen atom has two hooks, one of which it gives to its friend the hydrogen atom and thus they go about hand-in-hand, the oxygen having one unused hook with which to hook on to something else. in this case it hooks on to that particular hook from which it pushes the chlorine. we have thus seen two changes take place. first, the hydrogen is displaced by the chlorine: then the chlorine is turned out and its place taken by the hydroxyl. and during both these changes the central carbon atom and its three hydrogen partners have remained unaffected. those four atoms are called the methyl group, and a methyl group combined with a hydroxyl group forms _methyl alcohol_. similar changes can be brought about with ethane as with methane, and in them the two carbon atoms and the five hydrogen remain unchanged, whence they too are regarded as a group, the ethyl group, and an ethyl group hooked on to a hydroxyl group gives us a molecule of _ethyl alcohol_. these groups of which we have been speaking never exist separately except at the moment of change, but in the wonderful changes which the chemist is able to bring about the atoms forming these groups seem to have a fondness for keeping together and moving together from one substance into another. in a word, they behave as if they were each a single atom and they are called by the name of radicles; the word simply means a little root. the methyl radicle and the ethyl radicle, since they form the basis of two of the paraffin series, are called paraffin radicles, so that we can describe this useful alcohol as a paraffin radicle with a hydroxyl radicle hooked on to it. if we use the methyl radicle we get methyl alcohol: if we use the ethyl radicle we get ethyl alcohol. now ethyl alcohol is the spirit which is contained in all strong drink. whiskey has as much as per cent and brandy and rum about the same, while ale has only about per cent. all of them may be regarded as impure forms of ethyl alcohol, the various impurities giving to each its particular taste. ethyl alcohol, too, is what is sold at chemists' shops as "spirits of wine," where also we can purchase that which is familiar as "methylated spirits," whereby there hangs a tale. all governments regard alcohol for drinking as a fit subject for taxation. when anyone buys a drink with alcohol in it a part of what he pays goes to the government in the form of duty. on the other hand, when alcohol is used for trade purposes, for making varnish or something like that, there is no reason whatever why it should be charged with duty. but if the varnish manufacturer is to have alcohol duty-free what is to prevent him from using some of it for drinking? to get over the difficulty, that which is supplied to him or to anyone else for trade purposes is deliberately adulterated so as to make it so extremely nasty that no one is likely to want to put it in his mouth. it so happens that methyl alcohol, while as good as the other for many purposes, is horrible to the taste and so it forms a very convenient adulterant for this purpose. therefore, when methylated spirit is sold to you for drying your photographs, the chemist gives you ethyl alcohol with enough methyl alcohol in it to make sure that neither you nor anyone else will ever want to drink it. that, then, is alcohol: a near relative of paraffin oil and also of coal gas, yet it is from neither of these that we get it. the changes described above enable you to realize what it is, but they do not tell how it is made in large quantities. ethyl alcohol is obtained from sugar by the employment of germs or microbes. any sort of sugar will do: it need not be sugar such as we eat. in practice the sugar is usually obtained from starch, that very common substance which forms the material of potatoes, grain of all kinds, beans and so on. there is a kindly little germ which will quite readily turn starch into sugar for us if we give it the chance. the maltster starts the process. he gets some grain, and spreading it out in a damp condition upon his floor sets it a-growing. as soon as it has just started to grow, however, he transfers it to his kiln, where by heating it he kills the young plants. as is well known, every seed contains the food to nourish the little growing plant until it is strong enough to draw its supplies from the soil and the food thus provided for the young wheat plant is starch, which, when it is ready for it, it turns into sugar. the little shoot lives on sugar and the maltster and distiller conspire to steal that sugar intended for the baby plants and turn it into alcohol. so the little plant liberates by some wonderful means a material called diastase, which has the power of changing starch into sugar. it does it, of course, for the purpose of providing its own necessary food, but the maltster does not want the process to go too far: he only wants to produce the diastase, and that is why he kills the plants, after which he has finished with the matter and hands the "malted" grain or "malt" over to the distiller for the next process. the distiller mixes the malt with warm water, whereupon the diastase commences the conversion of the starch of the grain. at this stage fresh grain may be added and potatoes, indeed almost anything composed largely of starch for the diastase to work upon. the process goes on until, in time, the liquid consists very largely of sugar dissolved in water, which is strained away from what is left of the grain, etc. malt sugar is very similar to, but not quite the same as, cane sugar. it consists of twelve parts of carbon, twenty-two of hydrogen and eleven of oxygen. it is an interesting little puzzle to sketch those atoms out on paper, each with its proper number of hooks, and see how they can be combined together. malt sugar, milk sugar and cane sugar all consist of the same three elements in the same proportions and the difference between them is no doubt due to the different ways in which the atoms can be hooked up together. yeast is next added to the liquid, upon which the process of fermentation is set up, the tiny living cells of the yeast plant producing a substance which is able to change the sugar into alcohol. the alcohol thus formed is, of course, combined with water, but it can be separated from it by gentle heating since it passes off into vapour at a lower temperature than does water. thus the vapour first arising from the mixture is caught and cooled whereby the liquid alcohol is obtained. this operation, called fractional distillation, has to be repeated if alcohol quite free from water is required, in addition to which the attraction which quicklime has for water is called into play to coax the last remnant of water from the other. and now, how about the methyl alcohol? that is obtained in quite a different way, by heating wood and collecting the vapours given off by it. hence it is often called "wood spirit." as a matter of fact, at least two very valuable substances are obtained by this operation, methyl alcohol and acetone. the vapours given off by the wood are cooled, whereupon tar is formed while upon it there floats a dark liquid which contains the wood spirit, acetic acid and acetone. to capture the acetic acid lime is added to the mixture, and since there is a natural affinity between them, the acetic acid and lime combine into a solid which remains behind when the whole mass is suitably heated. what comes over in the form of vapour is a mixture of water, acetone and wood spirit. the former is enticed away by the use of quicklime, while the other two are separated by the process of fractional distillation already referred to. now let me ask you to form another little picture, either in your mind or with paper and pencil. imagine two methyl radicles, each, let me remind you, a carbon atom with three hydrogen atoms hooked on and one spare hook. also imagine one atom of oxygen with its two hooks outstretched like two arms, and just link one radicle on to each. then you have the picture of methyl ether. all the ethers are formed by taking two of the paraffin radicles and linking them together by means of the two hooks of an oxygen atom. the ether which is so largely used in hospitals for wounded soldiers is _ethyl_ ether, consisting of two ethyl radicles joined by oxygen. how it is made we will come to in a moment, but as you see already it is a close relative of alcohol. now from methyl ether take away the central oxygen and in its place put carbon. this atom will have two hooks to spare which it can employ to hold on to the two hooks of the oxygen. the result is a molecule of acetone. this is used as a solvent in a similar manner to alcohol for many purposes, and there was a great demand for it no doubt during the war. one interesting use of acetone is in connection with the gas acetylene. of great use both for lighting and also in conjunction with oxygen for welding and cutting metals, this gas suffers from the disadvantage that it cannot be compressed into cylinders and carried about as oxygen can. it can, however, be dissolved in acetone. the cylinders in which it is carried are therefore filled with coke saturated with acetone and then when the acetylene is pressed in it dissolves, coming out of solution again as soon as the pressure is released. in this dissolved condition it is quite safe to carry about. for a moment let us turn back to the commencement of the chapter to the subject of methane. when mixed with chlorine, it will be remembered, one hydrogen atom gave place to a chlorine atom. if the process be repeated another hydrogen atom will be displaced in the same way, while a further repetition will result in the removal of a third, when there will be a carbon atom in the centre with three chlorine and one hydrogen hooked on to it. with that picture in your mind's eye you will be contemplating the molecule of that wonderful and beneficent substance, chloroform. when we think of the numberless operations which have been carried out by the surgeons in the course of this last war we realize a little how great is the total sum of pain and suffering which has been saved through the agency of this substance, this simple neat little arrangement of five tiny atoms. now that again is obtained in manufacture from alcohol. alcohol, bleaching powder and water are mixed and then distilled, by which of course is meant that the mixture is evaporated by heat and the vapour collected and cooled back into liquid again. the liquid so obtained is chloroform. hardly less important than this, in our military hospitals, is ether, to which reference has already been made. it, too, is manufactured from alcohol. the alcohol, together with sulphuric acid, is placed in a still and heated, the vapour given off being led to another vessel and there condensed. the liquid thus obtained is ether and so long as the supply of fresh alcohol is kept up the production of ether goes on continuously. the sulphuric acid does not disappear and so does not need to be replaced, from which it would appear as if it might just as well not be there, but that is not the case. it plays the part of what is called a "catalyst," one of the curiosities of chemistry. there are many instances in which two things will combine only in the presence of a third which appears to be itself unaffected. this third substance is a catalyst. it reminds one of the clergyman at a wedding who unites others but remains unchanged himself. in conclusion, one may mention that many of the medicines with which our injured men were coaxed back to health and strength owe their existence to alcohol, for many drugs are obtained from vegetable substances by dissolving out a part of the herb with alcohol. thus, as a drink, it is unquestionably very harmful. indeed, in that way it probably kills more people per year than its use in the manufacture of explosives caused in the worst year of the war. yet it also furnishes chloroform, ether and medicinal drugs and performs a whole host of useful services to mankind. finally, if oil and coal should ever run short it is quite prepared to run our engines for us. truly it is a wonderful substance. chapter v mines, submarine and subterranean the word mine in its military sense originally meant just the same as it does in the ordinary way, but like many other words it has got twisted into new uses the connection of which with the original meaning is very obscure. one of the most striking of these verbal puzzles is the submarine _mine_. there seems at first sight not the remotest connection between the floating barrel of explosives concealed beneath the water and what we ordinarily call a mine. the explanation of this is that the term has acquired this meaning after passing through a series of stages. when soldiers "mine" for the purpose of blowing up their enemies they dig a hole in the ground, and conceal therein a quantity of explosives so arranged that they blow up when the enemy pass over or near. the operation of digging the hole in the earth is clearly akin to the work of the miner and so such is quite appropriately called a "mine." the hole may be dug from the surface downwards, the marks of excavation being afterwards covered up and obliterated as much as possible. in other cases the hole may be a tunnel starting from a trench and driving towards the enemy's position. the idea, of course, is to burrow until the end of the tunnel is just under some important part of the enemy's works or fortifications. when the end of the tunnel has reached the right spot explosives can be placed there, the tunnel partly stopped to prevent the explosion from driving back upon those who make it and the whole fired at the desired moment. this tunnelling is also called "sapping" and the tunnel itself a sap. military engineers are often spoken of as "sappers and miners" as if the two things were clearly different, but as a matter of fact both are often used to describe the same thing. roughly, we may say that a mine which stays still in the hope that the enemy will walk upon it is a mine proper, while a mine which itself progresses towards the enemy until it ultimately goes off beneath him, is a "sap" and the making of such a thing is "sapping." or we might say that sapping is under-mining, in which sense we use it in general conversation when we speak of something sapping a man's strength. soldiers speak of their engineering comrades as "sappers" just as they term artillerymen "gunners," but the only reason why they call them by that name instead of miners is because the latter is a well-known term applied to those who work in coal mines. a subterranean mine, then, is nothing more or less than a hole in the ground, made in any way that may be convenient, filled with explosives and fired at a suitable time to do damage to the enemy. in other words, it is simply some explosive _concealed in the ground_ with means for firing it, and when the sailor _conceals explosives in the sea_ so that they may blow up the enemy's ships, he borrows his military comrades' term and calls it a "mine" too. counter-mining is the enemy's reply to mining. suppose i was foolish enough to wish to blow up my neighbour who lives in the house opposite to mine. i might start from my cellar and dig a tunnel under the road until i knew that i had arrived under his dwelling. but suppose that he got to know of my little scheme: he could then try counter-mining. in this case it would mean starting a tunnel of his own from his cellar towards my tunnel: then, as soon as the two tunnels had come sufficiently near to each other, he could let off his explosives thereby wrecking my tunnel and putting an end to my operations while yet i was only half-way across the road. thus he would stop me before i had had time to harm him, and since he need only tunnel just far enough to render the necessary explosion harmless to his house, while i to succeed would have to tunnel right across the road, the man who is counter-mining always has a slight natural advantage over the man who is doing the mining. if only he gets to know what is going on in time he can always retaliate. all forms of land mine are improvised on the spot according to circumstances. not so, however, with submarine mines on which much ingenuity has been expended, the mines being made in workshops ashore ready for laying and then laid by ships and sometimes by divers. of these there are two main kinds, those which are put in place in times of peace for the protection of particular harbours and channels, and those which are simply dropped overboard from a mine-laying ship during the actual war. they all consist essentially of a case of iron or steel plates riveted together just as a steam boiler is made, in fact the cases are made in a boiler shop. the charge is gun-cotton fired by a detonator, the latter being excited by a stroke from a hammer, as in a rifle, or else by electricity. in the latter case, a tiny filament of platinum wire is in contact with the detonator, and the wire being heated by the current, just as the filament of a lamp is, the detonator is fired by the heat. of the permanent mines whereby the entrances to important channels are protected arrangements are often made for firing by observation, that is to say, by the action of an observer ashore. being laid by divers and securely anchored to heavy weights laying on the bottom, wires are carried from the mines to the observation station. the observer watches and fires the mines at the right moment by simply pressing a key thereby making the electrical circuit. more often, however, mines are fired by contact. observation mines have the advantage that while they may be exploded under an enemy they will allow a friendly ship to pass in perfect safety. contact mines, on the other hand, will afford protection against attacks by night when enemy craft may attempt to creep in under cover of darkness. [illustration: an italian mine-layer. this photograph was taken looking down upon the deck of the ship. the mines run upon rails, and are pushed by the men towards the stern, whence they are dropped one at a time into the water. the splash indicates that one has just fallen.] contact mines are often fired electrically, sometimes by batteries of their own inside their own cases, or else by current from the shore through wires, the circuit being completed by an automatic device of some sort actuated unwittingly by the unfortunate victim. one of these contact devices will illustrate the general character of them all. imagine a little vessel with mercury in it: it is, generally speaking, of some insulating material, but right at the bottom is a metal stud with which the mercury makes contact. the rim may likewise be of metal or a metal rod may project downwards into it: it matters not which, for we can see at once that it is quite easy so to arrange things that whereas, while upright, the mercury shall be well clear of the upper contact, it shall when the vessel is tilted flow on to it, thereby bridging from lower contact to upper contact and completing the circuit. of course, a mine must only go off when actually struck by a ship and not when it is gently swung to and fro by the action of tide or current in the water. that is easily arranged, for the vessel and contacts can be so shaped that contact is not made until an angle of tilt is reached which no tide or ordinary commotion of the water could bring about. it is clearly possible, too, to combine the contact and observation arrangements in such a way that contact mines can be made safe for friendly ships during the daytime. it is only necessary to adopt the shore battery arrangement already mentioned and disconnect the batteries during the day or when no enemy is in sight, restoring the connection during the darkness or in the event of hostile ships trying to rush the passage. another interesting scheme for keeping mines safe until required is to anchor them in what is termed a "dormant" condition. this means that a loop is taken in the wire rope by which they are anchored, the loop being fastened by means of a link. this link, however, contains a small quantity of explosive which can be fired from the shore. this has the effect of breaking the link, releasing the loop and allowing the mine to float upwards to the full length of the rope. thus the mine is down deep, well below the bottom of the biggest ship until released for action. it is doubtful whether much use is made nowadays of permanent mines of the types just described, for they have, no doubt, been largely displaced by the temporary mine which can be laid in a moment by simply being dropping overboard from a ship, but it is quite possible that some of the defences of, say, the dardanelles, were of the permanent nature. so let us pass on to the temporary mines. these were used by the germans from the first few hours of the war. one of the first naval incidents was when our ships discovered a small german excursion steamer which had been converted into a mine-layer strewing these deadly things surreptitiously in the north sea in the hope that some of our vessels would run upon them. needless to say, that ship went on no more excursions. laid thus, it is evident that there can be no wires running ashore, so that all mines of this class must be contact mines. what makes them of extreme interest is the way they are laid. just think for a moment what is involved. from the very nature of things their laying must often be done in secret. it is not the british practice to place them in the open seas, except avowedly, after due notice, in certain specified areas, where they are laid quite openly under the protection of adequate forces to ensure against interruption. there is little doubt, however, that they have laid many a mine field secretly in purely german waters, while everyone knows that the germans have not hesitated to sow the shipping routes broadcast with these things, such work of course being done secretly and largely at night. the mine can therefore only be laid by dropping it into the water and leaving it. yet it must not float on the surface or it will be easily seen and picked up; it must float below, so that the unsuspecting ship may run upon it. and it is quite impossible to make a thing float in water anywhere except upon the surface. if it does not float upon the surface it sinks to the bottom: there is no "half-way house" between. many people are surprised to hear this, judging, no doubt, by the fact that a balloon floats _in_, and not on, the air and expecting an object floating in water to be able to do the same thing. the difference is due to the fact that air is easily compressible, so that the air close to the earth is denser, more compressed, and therefore heavier, than the air higher up owing to its having the whole weight of the upper air pressing downwards upon it. the density of the air diminishes, for this reason, as one ascends, and a balloon which displaces more than its own weight of air at the surface of the earth rises until it has reached just that height when the air displaced exactly equals in weight the balloon itself: then it goes no higher. precisely the same conditions exist in the sea except that water being incompressible is no denser at the bottom of the sea than on the surface. therefore, if a thing sinks at all it sinks right to the bottom. there is one very ingenious device for overcoming this difficulty by means of a motor and propeller. the mine has enclosed in its case a motor driven by a store of compressed air which operates a propeller. in this it is somewhat like a torpedo, but in this case the propeller is set vertically so that its action lifts the mine up in the water. now the mine is so weighted that it just and only just sinks when dropped in, but on reaching a certain depth the motor starts and by means of the propeller raises it nearly to the surface again. on nearing the surface the motor stops and the mine sinks once more, only to be raised again in due course, so that the thing keeps on rising and falling; it never rises above a certain depth nor falls below a certain depth, but oscillates continually between its two limits. the question then arises, what starts and stops the motor at precisely the right moments to produce this result? it is done by means of a hydrostatic valve. as just pointed out, the water at the bottom of the sea is supporting the weight of all that water which is above it. the water is not compressed by this, but the pressure is there all the same. obviously the degree of pressure at any point depends upon the weight of the layer of water above, and since the weight of that layer will obviously increase and diminish with its thickness it follows that, starting from the surface, where the pressure is nil, we get a perfectly steady and regular increase as we descend, until we reach the maximum at the bottom. now within the mine is a small watertight diaphragm, the outer surface of which is in contact with the water and upon which, therefore, the water presses. as the mine descends, therefore, this diaphragm is bent inwards more and more by the pressure of water and that is made to start the motor. adjustments can easily be made so that a certain degree of bending shall result in starting the motor, which is the same as saying that the motor shall start automatically at a certain depth. likewise as the mine rises under the influence of the propeller the pressure decreases, the diaphragm straightens out and at a certain predetermined depth the motor is stopped. when, finally, the store of motive power is exhausted the mine sinks to the bottom and is lost, a very valuable feature from a humanitarian point of view, since it means that the active life of the mine is short and it cannot go straying about the oceans for weeks or even months, finally blowing up some quite innocent passenger ship. more often, however, this difficulty of depth is overcome by anchoring the mine at the depth most suitable for striking the bottom of a passing ship. but here again there seem to be insuperable difficulties, for the depth of the sea varies and so the length of the anchor rope must be varied with almost every mine that is laid. it has been found possible, however, to make the mines automatically adjust the length of their own anchor ropes so that the desired result is attained without difficulty no matter how deep the sea may be. let me describe how it is done in the elia mines used by great britain. the inventor, captain elia, was an officer in the italian navy. the mine consists of three parts: ( ) the mine proper, a case containing the explosive, gun-cotton and the firing mechanism; ( ) the anchor; and ( ) the weight, all of which are connected together by suitable wire ropes. the mine is lighter than water and so floats: the anchor, which bears no resemblance to the ordinary anchor but which is an iron case containing mechanism, only able to act as an anchor by virtue of its weight, is heavier than water and so sinks, while the weight of solid cast iron sinks more readily still. the anchor is often fitted with wheels so that it forms a truck upon which the mine and the weight are placed, the whole running upon rails laid on the deck of the mine-layer. as this ship steams ahead the men push the mines along the rails, dropping them over the stern at regular intervals. when the thing reaches the water, the weight sinks the most rapidly, thereby tugging at the chain whereby it is connected to the anchor. the latter, being less compact, sinks more slowly so that the pull upon the rope is maintained until at last the weight rests upon the bottom. _then and only then is the pull relaxed._ now inside the anchor is a winch, upon which is wound a length of flexible wire rope, the other end of which is attached to the mine. the latter, it will be remembered, is light enough to float and so, since it lies upon the surface while the anchor sinks, the rope is drawn off the winch. but there is a spring catch which is able to hold the winch and to prevent it from paying out rope, and that catch is only held off by the pull of the weight. consequently, as soon as the weight touches the bottom and its pull upon the anchor ceases, the winch is gripped by the catch, no more rope is paid out, and from that moment, as the anchor descends, it drags the mine down with it. the result, then, is that the mine becomes anchored at a depth below the surface roughly equal to the length of the rope connecting weight to anchor. mines of this kind can, of course, be fired electrically by the tilting of a cup of mercury or similar device as already described. another arrangement is to fit projecting horns upon the surface of the mine made of soft metal so that they will be bent or crushed by a strong blow such as a passing ship would give. this breaks a glass vessel inside, liberating chemicals which cause detonation. the method adopted in the elia mines is to have a projecting arm pivoted upon the top of the mine. the mine is spherical (they are nearly all either spherical or cylindrical), with the rope attached to the south pole, so to speak, and the arm pivoted to the north pole. as the mine floats in the water the arm projects out horizontally. the effect of this arrangement is that when a ship strikes the mine the latter rolls along its side, but the arm being too long, simply trails along. thus the spherical case of the mine turns while the arm remains still and that is made to unscrew and eventually release a hammer which, striking the detonator, fires the mine. in other words, this type of mine is exploded not by the ship giving it a blow, but by its rubbing itself along in contact with the mine. the great advantage of this is that it is only a ship that can do this. no chance commotion in the water can do it: no chance blow from floating wreckage can do it: only the rubbing action of a ship can accomplish it. such a mine, too, is less likely to be affected by counter-mining, of which more presently. apparently the laying of these mines must be very dangerous work, for since a blow will explode most of them, what is to prevent their receiving that blow while on the deck of the mine-layer, or at all events as they are dropped into the water. in all cases, precautions are taken against such an event. sometimes a hydrostatic valve is employed, the arrangement being that the firing mechanism is locked until released by the valve, until, that is, the mine is immersed to a predetermined depth in the water. another device for the same purpose is a lump of sugar. the mine is so made that it cannot be fired until this lump has been melted by the action of the water: sal ammoniac is another substance employed for the same purpose. the technical term for this is a "soluble seal." the firing arrangement, whatever it may be, is sealed up so that it cannot come into operation until the seal has been dissolved away by the water, or until the mine has been in the water long enough for the mine-layer to get out of harm's way. another interesting feature of the elia mine is connected with the source of the power which drives the hammer which causes the explosion. the anchor, it will be remembered, pulls the mine down under water, the latter being of itself buoyant. there is a continual pull, therefore, upon the rope by which the mine is held under. it is that pull which works the hammer. and now observe the beautiful result of that simple arrangement. suppose the mine breaks its rope and gets loose, so that it can drift about and carry danger far and wide. it can break loose and it can drift about, but at the very moment of getting loose the danger vanishes, for the rope ceases to pull and the firing mechanism loses its motive power. in other mines the same result has been sought by means of clockwork, which throws the firing arrangements out of action after the lapse of a given time. this scheme of captain elia's, however, whereby the very act of breaking adrift produces its own safeguard, is one of the most delightful instances of a happy invention. in conclusion, just a word about the measures taken against mines. counter-mining is one. it consists in letting off other mines in the midst of a mine-field with the purpose of giving them such a shaking up that some of them will be exploded by the shock. the simplest and indeed the only effective way, however, seems to be the simple primitive method of dragging a rope along between two light draught vessels and thus tearing the mines up by their roots, so to speak. the very act of thus dragging it along by its anchor rope often causes a mine to explode, well astern of the mine-sweeping vessels, but sometimes they are pulled up and fired or sunk by a shot from a gun which the sweeper carries for the purpose. the sweeping up of the mine-fields is a duty often allotted to the steam fishing boats or trawlers, whose crews seem particularly well fitted for the work. it is a hazardous duty, and many lives have been lost through it. let us hope that in time to come all submarine mines and the dangers connected with them will be a thing of the past, for they are mean, cowardly and contemptible weapons. chapter vi military bridges bridging has always been an important part of actual warfare. in my school days i studied "cæsar" from a textbook which is not much in use nowadays and which had very copious notes, prominent among which was a description, with drawings, of a bridge made by the roman legions in gaul. and a fine bridge it was, too. how its details came to be known was partly through the description given by cæsar himself and partly by a study of certain old timbers found in the bed of the rhone, which timbers were believed to be relics of the very bridge which the great julius himself had had built. this bridge of nearly two thousand years ago appeared to be built of baulks of timber fastened together in very much the same manner as that adopted by the engineering units of the great armies of to-day. every observant person has noticed how tall poles and short sticks tied together with ropes can be fashioned into the firm, strong scaffolding from which workmen can in safety raise great tall buildings. that mode of construction can always be used to form a bridge. equally well known, no doubt, are the gantries built over the footway while a large building is in course of construction. generally of huge square baulks of timber, they are intended to carry very heavy loads of materials and to save the public passing beneath from any possibility of damage through heavy objects falling from above. those gantries furnish us with an example of another sort of construction in wood which can be and is often used in bridging. when the germans retired in northern france they blew up all bridges behind them, and before the allies could use those bridges they had to repair them. if only for foot-traffic, a contrivance of poles, lashed together after the manner of the builder's scaffold, is ample in most of such cases and by its means a strong and safe bridge can be made upon what is left of the old bridge in the course of a few hours. for light vehicles a similar structure but made stronger by more lashings and of poles closer together will suffice, but for heavy traffic, with guns and possibly railway trains, recourse has to be had to the heavy timberwork exemplified by the builder's gantry. this takes longer to make, since the timbers are big, heavy and not easy to move about: they are, moreover, not simply laid beside or across each other and tied, but are cut the right lengths, and one is notched where the end of another fits into or against it. the baulks are connected by bolts and nuts for which holes have to be drilled or by rods of iron with a sharply pointed prong on each end stretching across from one baulk to another, one prong being driven into each. with the long-thought-out military operations of modern warfare it is just possible that steelwork for repairing certain particular bridges might be prepared in advance and simply launched across when the time arrives, but that is manifestly impossible except in certain cases and under particularly favourable conditions, such as railway facilities for bringing up the new bridge close to the site where it is to go. nearly every military bridge therefore has to be more or less improvised on the spot. in a highly developed country scaffold poles or baulks may be found or brought up by road or rail, in less civilised lands their equivalents may be cut and prepared from neighbouring forests, but all armies have, as a recognised part of their organisation, certain engineering "field companies," and "bridging trains," which carry with them large quantities of material carefully schemed out long in advance, so shaped and so prepared that it can be fashioned into almost anything, much as the strips of a boy's "meccano" can be adapted to form a great variety of objects. first, there are pontoons, large though light boats or punts, about feet long, constructed of thin wood with canvas cemented all over to give additional strength and water-tightness. each pontoon rides upon its own carriage upon which there are also stowed away quantities of timbers of various sorts, anchors for holding the pontoons in place, oars for rowing them, ropes of different kinds, and so on. each pontoon, moreover, is divided about the middle into two pieces called respectively the bow piece and the stern piece. the two are normally coupled together by cunningly devised fastenings but they can be quickly separated, in which state they form two shorter boats. other carriages carry more timber and material intended for the purpose of forming "trestle bridges" but which is also usable in connection with the pontoons. of this material the chief sorts are "legs," long straight pieces which form the uprights; transomes, heavier beams which can be fitted across horizontally between two legs so that the three form a huge letter h or a very robust rugby goal; "baulks" which are light timbers tapered off towards each end for the sake of lightness and of such size that they fit snugly into notches which are cut in the upper surface of the transomes; and planks called "chesses" for forming the floors of a bridge. probably the most dramatic incident of the war was when the british, having been apparently beaten by the turks in mesopotamia, driven far back and their general and many troops captured, suddenly turned the tables upon their enemies, driving them from kut and sending them fleeing helter-skelter to bagdad and then beyond. now the capture of kut and then of bagdad were both made possible by the rapid bridging of the tigris, and without doubt this is the sort of material which was used. let us see how it is done. an army arrives at a river across which it is decided to throw a pontoon bridge. the pontoons are unloaded off their wagons and launched into the water. one is rowed out and anchored a little way from the shore, while upon the bank parallel with the river is laid a "transome." on the centre of the pontoon is a centre beam with notches in it like those in the transomes and from the one to the other "baulks" are passed. meanwhile a second pontoon has been rowed into place and more baulks are passed from the first pontoon to the second, while chesses are laid upon the baulks to form a platform or floor. thus, pontoon by pontoon, the bridge grows until it has reached the further bank. if pontoons are scarce and the loads to be carried by the bridge are light they are divided in two, and instead of a row of pontoons joined by "baulks" there is a row of "pieces" joined by baulks. pieces arranged thus form a light bridge, pontoons a medium bridge, while pontoons placed closer together form a heavy bridge. which shall be built depends upon the number of pontoons available in relation to the width of the river and the nature of the traffic which will have to pass over. an alternative arrangement is to make the pontoons up first into groups or rafts and then bridge from raft to raft instead of bridging between pontoons. there is still another way of making the bridge, and that is to put it together alongside the bank, afterwards swinging it across the river like the opening or shutting of a door. anyone can see that there must be many advantages in this latter method when it is practicable, since more men can work at once and with greater safety, for all will be near the bank. it is evident that such a structure depends for its security entirely upon the anchors. those which are carried for the purpose are like those of a ship but there may not be enough or they may not suit every kind of river-bed. they are often improvised therefore. two wagon wheels lashed together, with heavy stones clipped between them, are said to be a very effective anchor. under certain conditions a net filled with stones is surprisingly effective. two pickaxes tied together form a good imitation of the conventional anchor, as also does a harrow sunk and held down by stones thrown upon it. trestle bridges are made in quite a different way. the trestles are formed of two legs or uprights with a transome between, a shape which resembles, as has been already remarked, a very robust rugby goal. the transome is connected to the legs by a special form of band which permits it to be fixed at any height without having to drill any special holes for the connections. the legs are so shaped at their ends that they can be shod with steel shoes provided for the purpose, enabling them to get a good foothold even on shifty soil. the trestles are put together ashore, and each is taken out in a boat or on a pontoon to the place where it is to stand. then it is launched feet foremost into the water, the boat being on the side away from the shore, so that a rope from the trestle to the shore will enable men on land to pull the trestle into an upright position. [illustration: an incident at loos. this picture gives us some little idea of the devastation caused by modern weapons. it also shows the inventiveness of the soldier who makes his rifle into a battering-ram. incidentally we see a kind-hearted soldier rescuing a little girl from danger. this incident really happened.] thus trestle after trestle is added until the bridge has grown right across the water to the further bank. the trestles cannot fall over sideways because of their own width, they cannot fall forwards or backwards because of the "baulks" which pass between them and carry the floor, but as a precaution diagonal ties of rope are always added here and there along the bridge, that is to say, two trestles are tied together with two ropes, each rope passing from the bottom of one trestle to the top of the other, a form of tying which is very effective and very easy and simple to carry out. one interesting thing to notice is the form of the "baulks," in which connection i would like to remark that when i use the word without inverted commas i mean it in the ordinary sense as implying a big heavy timber, but when i use the commas i mean it in its technical sense as it is used in military engineering. in this latter sense it describes the timbers specially provided for the purposes just described. large supplies of the ordinary heavy baulks could not be carried with an army: but strength is required nevertheless. hence the military engineers have invented a form which combines strength with lightness. if you stand a plank upon its edge, supported at each end so as to form a beam, its strength will vary as its width and as the _square of its height_. if then you double its width you only double its strength, but if you double its height you multiply its strength _four_ times. if you halve the width of a given beam you halve its strength, but if you then double its height you quadruple that half, in other words, without making the beam any heavier by these two operations you double its strength. moreover, if you support a beam at each end and pass a load over it or spread a load permanently upon it, its greatest strength is required in the middle. you can shave away the ends without making the beam as a whole any less strong. so these "baulks" are made like planks, very oblong if looked at endwise, also thinner at the ends than in the middle. but if by chance they tipped over on to their sides they would for that very reason be very weak, and that is why the notches are provided in the transomes and the centre beams of the pontoons, in order that the "baulks," having been laid edgewise in them, cannot tip over. thus a considerable saving is made in the weight of the bridging material to be carried. it sometimes happens that when a trestle is dropped into the water one leg will fall into a depression in the river-bed or will sink more deeply if the bed be soft, leaving the whole structure lop-sided and useless. that, however, is easily overcome, since it is provided against. a little iron bracket, which is carried for the purpose, is clipped on to the leg which has sunk near its top and on to it is hung a pair of pulley blocks--one of those little contrivances which everyone has seen at some time or another by which one man pulling a chain quickly can raise, although slowly, a heavy load. by this means the end of the transome is raised until it is horizontal and the legs have assumed an upright posture, when the transome is refastened to the leg in its new position. thus we see the advantage of clamping the transome to the leg rather than fixing it with any arrangement of holes. the iron band, which is fastened on to the transome and which grasps the leg, is so arranged that the greater the load the more tightly does it hold, so that it is perfectly safe under all conditions. the trestle bridge has a great advantage over the floating bridge if the height of the water varies at all, as for instance, with the tide. the former remains still, while the latter goes up and down, requiring a special arrangement to be contrived for connecting it to the shore. under some conditions a suspension bridge is the most convenient form of all, particularly if the banks are high and strong, or if the current be very rapid or the river-bed very soft. in such cases steel wire ropes are stretched across the water between two trestles. the latter may be made in the way just described, but more often they have to be stronger and are built specially out of big strong timbers securely fastened together. their form does not matter much so long as they are strong and stiff, high enough to carry the ends of the suspension ropes and of such a shape as not to block the entrance to the bridge itself. the higher they are the better, because, according to the natural laws which govern such things, the more sag or dip there is in the ropes across the river the less severely will they be strained. they need to be very strong, as the whole weight of the bridge and its load falls upon their shoulders. the pull of the suspension ropes, moreover, tends to pull them forward into the water, so they must be held back by other strong ropes called guys, and the action of these two sets of ropes entails the unfortunate trestles bearing really _more_ weight than the actual weight of the bridge and load. the guys, too, require very strong anchorage or at the critical moment they may give way, when the whole contrivance, with possibly valuable guns or ammunition on board, will be precipitated into the water. the men may be able to swim but the guns will sink. having, then, constructed a trestle upon each bank, securely guyed it back and connected the suspension ropes to it, the next operation is to attach smaller vertical ropes to the suspension ropes at intervals, to support the ends of the transomes. then upon the latter are laid "baulks" and upon them the flooring as usual. or if ropes be not sufficiently plentiful, timbers may be lashed on to the suspension ropes instead, the transomes being fastened to them. that is all that is absolutely essential to a suspension bridge, but one so formed would be rather flimsy and unstable. it needs to be stiffened by diagonal timbers at suitable places and often it has props placed upon the bank reaching out as far as their length will permit over the water to steady and consolidate what to commence with is rather too much like a spider's web. those little strengthening dodges can be laid down in no books. they need to be left to the judgment of the men in charge to do what is necessary in the best way they can with the materials which happen to be at hand. but very often warfare has to be carried on in the most outlandish places where armies can only travel light, and where, hampered by bridging material of the conventional sort, they would have no chance in catching up with a fleet and agile native enemy. yet bridges are needed even more under those conditions perhaps than under any other. there are many examples of this in the wars just beyond the frontier in northern india. then ingenuity has to make good the luck of prepared material and the bridges are made of those materials which happen to be procurable. an army in india once wanted to cross a river, where no materials of the ordinary kind were available. the river, however, was lined with tall reeds. a reed has for centuries been a favourite example of weakness and untrustworthiness, so how can reeds be made to form a safe bridge? this is how it was done. great quantities of reeds were cut and were made up into neat round bundles about a foot in diameter. ropes were scarce too, but these likewise were improvised by twisting long grasses into ropes. it is surprising what good ones can be made in this way, and they served their purpose well. many bundles having thus been made numbers of them were tied together so as to form rafts. each bundle in fact was a small pontoon, and the rafts which were thus constituted differed only in size from the regulation rafts made of pontoons. while this work was being done two ropes were got across the river and secured on both banks: then rafts were floated down in succession, each one on arrival being tied up under the two ropes. finally a track of boards was laid over the centre and the bridge was strong enough for men in fours to walk over it. had it been necessary, the floor could have been made of brushwood, interlaced so as to form a kind of continuous matting or of a layer of branches covered with canvas. floors for bridges can be made in many ways. a dodge which soldiers in the british army are taught is how to make boats for bridging purposes out of a tarpaulin or piece of canvas, supported on a framework of light wood poles or twigs. the outline of the boat is first drawn roughly on the ground. then three posts are driven in on the centre line of the boat and to the top of these three a horizontal pole is tied, thin, flexible branches stripped of their bark, being fixed by having their ends stuck in the ground on either side. the ends are driven in on the outline already marked out so that when done the branches form a framework like the ribs of a boat upside down. other branches are intertwined among these so as to bind them together and finally a tarpaulin or canvas sheet is laid over all. a number of boats formed after this fashion can be used as pontoons to support a bridge, or several can be made into a raft and towed to and fro--a sort of floating bridge. another scheme is to make a number of crates like those in which crockery and other things are often packed. these are of very simple and easy construction, consisting of sticks slightly pointed at the ends driven into other pieces which are perforated with suitable holes to receive the ends. the only tools necessary are an axe (or even a pocket-knife will do) to sharpen the ends and an auger to make the holes. almost any sort of wood can be made to serve. the cover for this, and indeed for most of these improvised rafts, is tarpaulin or canvas, the latter of which, being the material used for so many purposes, is almost sure to be available in some form or other. for instance, every one of those familiar "general service wagons" has its large canvas cover. in fact, a general service wagon, taken off its wheels and wrapped up in its own canvas cover, makes quite a serviceable boat, pontoon, punt, barge or whatever you like to call it. then there is an ingenious type of little bridge which can be quickly and easily made where bamboos or similar light canes or sticks are available. the only tool required in making this is a couple of poles ten feet or so in length. to commence with, these poles are laid side by side upon the bank with one end of each pointed out over the water, overhanging it by about four feet. two men then climb along these, while others sit upon the inshore ends to keep them from tipping into the water. seated, then, on the outer ends of the poles the men drive some bamboos or whatever they are using into the water, after which they tie a crosspiece to the uprights, so forming a light trestle. then the poles are pushed forward until they overhang another four feet beyond the trestle just made, the other men, of course, continuing to sit upon the rear ends. and so the bridge grows until it entirely crosses the stream. between the trestles other light poles are laid and tied, forming the floor upon which men can cross in single file. another type, known as the "hop pole" bridge is made of slightly heavier poles which are tied together in threes so as to form isosceles triangles. each triangle forms one trestle. the two poles which form the sides project a little above the apex so that in fact we have an isosceles triangle with a v at the apex. to the root of the v another pole is tied loosely and the whole trestle is pushed feet first into the water. then, by pushing the pole, it is forced into an upright position in which it is secured by the pole being firmly fixed to the shore and strongly lashed to the root of the v where, before, it was only loosely tied. a second trestle is then in like manner fixed in front of the first one, connected to it by a pole just as the first is connected to the bank. and so the thing grows. to all the upper ends of the v's a light pole is tied to form a handrail. in this case, of course, the floor of the bridge is nothing more than a pole, but with the assistance of a handrail it is quite easy to walk along a single pole. and that reminds me of a simple type of suspension bridge which, an engineer officer once assured me, is actually copied from one habitually made by some of the indian natives. it consists of three ropes upon one of which you walk, while the other two form a handrail upon either side. the three ropes are held at intervals in their correct relative positions by little wooden frames formed of three sticks tied together, one rope being tied to each corner of each triangle. on the banks stakes are driven in and tied back with cords to give additional strength, and to them the ends of the ropes are secured. one drawback to this form of bridge is that the ropes are naturally far from level and one has to walk down a steep hill to commence with and up again at the other end. i once saw a specimen of this kind of bridge across a wide ditch, a part of the old defences of chatham, and an elderly gentleman who was with me, a man of considerable proportions, insisted upon trying it for himself. he took but a step or two when his foot began to slide downhill along the foot rope faster than he dare move his hands along the hand ropes, with the result that he was very soon in a very uncomfortable position. thus he remained, to the amusement of all his friends, until two stalwart royal engineers came to his aid and "uprighted" him. in crossing a swamp something in the nature of a bridge is sometimes required. canvas laid upon branches often makes a good road over what would otherwise be impassable. rapidly moving detachments of cavalry are provided with what is called "air-raft equipment," which enables them to get their light "horse artillery" guns across rivers which would be impassable otherwise. it consists of sixty bags like huge cylindrical footballs except that the outer covering is canvas instead of leather. these are blown up partly by the mouth and partly by pumps provided for the purpose until they are just about as tight as a football should be. then they are laid out in rows of twelve, each row being fastened together by the bags being tied to a pole running lengthwise of the row. cords are attached to the bags for the purpose. the five rows are then placed parallel and connected together by two light planks called wheelways placed across the rows and tied thereto. this arrangement is capable of carrying light guns or ammunition wagons. the men are expected to ride through the water, but if necessary something can be laid upon the raft, between the wheelways, to form a floor upon which men and even horses can ride. as part of the equipment there is a small collapsible boat with oars and by its means men first cross, carrying with them a line by which, afterwards, the raft can be hauled to and fro. rafts can be made, too, of hay tightly tied up in waterproof ground-sheets or tarpaulins or canvas. indeed, given a little ingenuity and the need to use it (for it is very true that necessity is the mother of invention), it is surprising what a large variety of things can be pressed into this service. of course, barrels can be made to form excellent pontoons, but there is one clever little way of using them which is more than usually interesting, and with that i must conclude this chapter which has already exceeded its appointed limits. imagine two poles perhaps ten feet long, placed parallel. between them, at one end, a barrel is lashed: at the other end is a plank forming with the poles a t. a man can then sit upon the barrel and paddle about, for the poles and planks will steady the barrel just as the outriggers and floats steady the narrow canoes or catamarans of which we read in books of travel. for that reason a bridge formed of such is called a "catamaran" bridge. of course, if there are only a few barrels to be had they can be fitted out like this and then combined into a raft. or if there are enough of them they can be anchored at intervals and poles or planks laid from one to another so as to form a continuous bridge. or a single one may be used as a boat. i can almost fancy i see some of my readers who have access to a pond rigging up an old barrel in this way, just to see how it goes. chapter vii what guns are made of no longer ago than the days of the crimea, the largest guns were made of the cheapest and commonest kind of iron, that known as cast iron. this material has the advantage of being cheap and easily worked, but is comparatively weak and liable to crack, so that the guns of that time were comparatively small compared with those of to-day; they could only withstand a feeble explosion and their range was therefore limited. had the energetic explosives of the present time been employed in them they would inevitably have burst, killing their gunners instead of the enemy. attempts were made to strengthen them with bands made of wrought iron, a form of the metal which is tough and elastic and therefore better able to withstand sudden shocks than the more brittle cast iron, but it was not a real success. at first sight one naturally wonders why the whole gun was not made of the stronger wrought iron. the reason was that while cast iron can be melted and poured in a liquid form into a mould, so as to produce the shape of the gun, wrought iron will not melt. it will soften with heat, in which condition it can be hammered into shape and, moreover, when in a very soft state two pieces can be joined by simply forcing them closely together, which operation is called welding. with the machinery available now it would be possible to make a gun of wrought iron, but even a few years ago it would have been quite impossible. there was an obvious need therefore of a metal which could be melted and cast in moulds like cast iron, yet tough and strong to resist shock like wrought iron. fortunately this problem excited the interest of a certain mr. henry bessemer, a gentleman who, having made a considerable fortune through an ingenious method of manufacturing bronze powder, had sufficient leisure and money to devote himself to its solution. the vast steel industries of great britain and the united states are the direct results of this gentleman's labours, and in the latter country there are quite a number of towns which, being the home of steelworks, are called by his name. iron is one of the most plentiful things in the world. deposits running into millions of tons are to be found in many parts, but it is practically always in the form of ore, that is to say, in combination with something else generally oxygen and sometimes oxygen and carbon. the former sort of ore is called oxide of iron and the latter carbonate of iron, and both of them bear not the slightest resemblance to the metal. they are just rocks which form part of the earth's crust, and it is only the metallurgist who can tell what they consist of. in order that the iron may be obtained from the ore it is necessary for the oxygen to be separated from it, an operation which requires the intervention of heat, and the heat must be obtained from a fuel which consists mainly of carbon. wood fulfils these requirements, but there is not enough wood in the whole world to smelt all the iron which we need. it was not until "pit-cole" displaced "char-cole" (to use the spelling of the period) that the iron industry began to assume its present importance. to produce iron cheaply, therefore, ore and coal should for preference lie side by side, and in some few favoured localities that state of things exists. generally speaking, however, the ore and the coal are not found together, with the result that one has to be taken to the other, and in practice it is usually the ore which is taken to the coal. hence, the iron and steelworks are generally to be found on the coalfields, while the ore comes by rail or ship from, it may be, remote parts of the world. the method by which the metal is obtained from the ore is in principle very simple. coal and ore are mixed together in a furnace, the fire being fanned by a powerful blast of air. the result is that the bonds uniting iron and oxygen are relaxed by the heat, when the oxygen, having a preference for union with carbon rather than with iron, leaves the latter to join up with some of the carbon of the coal. the furnace in which this operation is carried out is a tall, vertical cylinder of iron, lined with firebrick. the fire is at the bottom and the fresh fuel and ore are thrown in at the top. as the ore is "reduced" (the chemist's term for removing oxygen from anything) the liquid iron accumulates in the lowest part of the furnace, whence it is drawn off at intervals, being allowed to run into grooves or gutters in a bed of sand, where it solidifies into what is called "pig iron." along with the coal and ore, there is thrown into the furnace from time to time quantities of limestone which combines with the earthy impurities with which the ore is contaminated. together these form what is called "slag," which also exists, while in the furnace, as a liquid, but is so much lighter than the molten iron that it keeps quite separate and can periodically be drawn off through a hole higher up than that through which the iron is obtained. the slag solidifies into a hard stone which is broken up and used for making concrete and tar-paving, also for road metal. the kind of furnace just described is, owing to the strong blast of air needed for its operation, called a "blast-furnace." one would be inclined to think that a fire so well supplied with oxygen, both from the blast and from the ore itself, would cause the fuel to be completely burnt up, yet such is not the case. the gases which ascend from the fire consist largely of "carbon-monoxide," a burnable gas with lots of heat still left in it. years ago, and one may still see instances of it, this gas was allowed to escape at the top of the furnace, where it burnt in the form of a huge flame. in most modern furnaces, however, there is a kind of plug in the orifice at the top which, while it can be lowered in order to admit the ore and fuel, normally prevents the escape of the gases, which are led away through pipes. in some cases the gases are burnt under boilers to provide the works with steam, in other cases they heat other furnaces for metallurgical purposes, while in yet others they are employed to drive large gas-engines to generate electricity. it is sometimes a difficulty to find useful employment for the vast quantities of this "blast-furnace gas" which are produced at a large works. we see, then, how is obtained the pig iron from which the other kinds of iron and steel are made. it is not pure iron by any means; indeed, it is not sought to make iron pure, as is the case with most other metals, since, in its pure state, it is too soft to be of much use. all the familiar forms of iron and steel are really alloys of iron and carbon, a fact which tends to give iron its unique position among the metals, since by exceedingly slight variations in the percentage of carbon we can vary the properties of the iron to an amazing extent, thereby producing in effect a wide range of different substances each particularly suitable for a particular purpose. to make cast iron, such as the guns of the crimea were made of, it is only necessary to melt up some pig iron and to pour it into a mould. there is scarcely a town in which there is not an iron foundry, either large or small, and that is the work carried on there. a smaller form of the blast-furnace, known as a "cupola," melts the pig iron, and the moulds are generally made of sand. the process of pouring the melted metal into the moulds is called "casting" and the things so produced are "castings," and are said to be made of "cast" iron. [illustration: an -pounder in action. the crew consists of six men. no. (the sergeant) gives instructions. no. stands at the right of the breech. no. fires the gun. no. holds the shell ready for placing in the bore. no. adjusts the fuse and hands the shell to no. . no. prepares the ammunition and hands it to no. . in this picture only three of the crew are left.] wrought iron is made by working the molten pig iron instead of casting it. the work is done in a different type of furnace altogether from the blast furnace and the cupola. it is more like an oven, in the floor of which is a depression wherein the molten metal lies. the fire-place is so arranged that the flames pass over the metal, being deflected downwards upon it by the roof as they pass. it should be understood that in casting pig iron one does little more than form it into some desired shape, the nature of the metal undergoing little or no change. in working it, however, into wrought iron, we change its nature. the pig iron contains from to per cent of carbon, which it obtains from the coal in the blast-furnace, and it is this particular proportion of carbon which gives it its own peculiar properties. to convert it into wrought iron a workman puts a long iron rod into the furnace and stirs the metal about, thereby exposing it to the air and permitting the carbon to be burnt out. as it loses carbon the iron becomes less and less fluid until it reaches a sticky stage. thus the workman, who is known by the name of puddler, as the process is called puddling, works up a ball of decarbonized and therefore sticky iron upon the end of his rod. having thus produced a rough ball or lump he draws it out of the furnace and leaves it to cool. thus the result of the puddling process is to produce a number of rough lumps or balls of iron with only about one-tenth per cent of carbon. they are next reheated, in another furnace, and a number of them are hammered together under a mechanical hammer into larger lumps called blooms or billets. the hammering process has the effect of driving out impurities and also of improving the texture of the metal. iron sheets, bars, rods and so on are formed by heating the billets and rolling them out in powerful rolling mills, machines which in principle are precisely similar to the domestic mangle, wherein two iron rollers with properly shaped grooves in them squeeze out the billet into the desired form. wrought iron, owing to the method by which it is produced, is not homogeneous, that is to say, it is nor quite the same all through, with the result that when it is rolled it develops a grain somewhat similar to the grain in wood, so that if bent across the grain it is somewhat liable to crack. on the other hand, it has the advantage over steel that it rusts much less readily. hence, for outdoor purposes it is still sometimes preferred to the otherwise more popular steel. now the problem which bessemer set before himself was to find out how to make a metal which could be cast like cast iron yet should be as strong and tough as wrought iron. after a little experimenting, by a happy inspiration, he hit upon the idea of blowing air through a mass of molten pig iron, thereby burning out the carbon, just as is done in the puddling process, only much quicker and with less labour. by this means he produced a metal with less carbon than cast iron and more than wrought iron, a sort of intermediate state between the two, and to his joy he found that this "bessemer steel" could be cast like cast iron yet had strength and toughness equal to if not superior to that of wrought iron. moreover, it was homogeneous and when rolled did not possess the troublesome grain characteristic of wrought iron. having thus found the way to make this new and desirable metal, bessemer encountered a great disappointment, so great that it would have entirely beaten many men. he made samples of steel and submitted them to experts in iron manufacture. everyone thought them admirable and many large iron works were induced by them to make arrangements with bessemer for the right to use his process. his name was already famous and it seemed as if a new fortune was made, when, to his alarm, he learned that wherever it was tried except in his own works, the process was a miserable failure. instead of being at the end of his labours he was just at the beginning. it turned out that the particular iron which he happened to buy and use at his own works was particularly free from an impurity which is, generally speaking, a great nuisance in iron, namely, phosphorus. it was pure accident which had led him to use this iron: it happened to be the kind he could purchase most easily in the small quantities needed for his experiments but it led him into a great difficulty, for other people, after paying him for the right to use his process and after spending large sums on the requisite plant, found themselves unable to make the steel because of the phosphorus in their iron and finding themselves unable to make a success were inclined to write him down a fraud. as it turned out, after much labour on bessemer's part, it was due to the presence of tiny percentages of phosphorus in most of the iron that is produced. after much trouble he was able to induce certain owners of blast-furnaces to make, by special methods, a kind of pig iron practically free from phosphorus and therefore suitable for his process. this special pig iron was known as bessemer pig iron. a little later a new inventor, a welshman, thomas by name, overcame the difficulty in another way, but to explain that i must first describe the bessemer converter, the special apparatus designed by bessemer for making his steel. it can best be likened to a huge iron kettle with a big spout at the top and with two projecting pins, one on each side. these pins rest in supports, so that it is easy to tilt the whole thing over on to its side. this is lined with fire-clay or some suitable heat-resisting material. through one of the "pins" (trunnions is their proper name) there runs a hole, communicating to what we might call a grating in the bottom of the converter. to this hollow trunnion there is connected the pipe from a powerful blowing engine, so that air can be driven in at will. to load or charge the converter it is tilted over somewhat to one side so that molten pig iron can be poured into it. the blast is then turned on after which it is raised to an upright position with the air bubbling up from below through the iron. thus by being brought into close contact with air, the carbon is burnt out of the metal until none is left. that, however, is not desired, so, as soon as the carbon is known to have all gone, a fresh quantity of molten iron is added of a special kind, the amount of carbon in which is known very exactly. thus all the carbon is first removed and then exactly the right amount is added, and so the desired result is attained with certainty. now thomas's improvement was this. he discovered that the converter could be lined with certain substances which have a great attraction for phosphorus and under those conditions any phosphorus which may be in the ore goes readily from the iron into the lining, or forms, with material from the lining, a slag which floats upon the surface of the metal. when the process is completed the converter is tipped over once more and the metal, now steel, is poured into rectangular moulds from which the steel can be lifted after cooling in the form of ingots. steel produced by bessemer's process as improved by thomas is called basic bessemer steel. incidentally thomas, by this invention, laid the foundation of much of the steel industry of germany and belgium, for there are enormous deposits of ore in the neighbourhood of luxemburg which because of the presence of phosphorus were useless until thomas showed how it could be dealt with. and there is another interesting feature of this "basic" process. phosphorus is a valuable fertilizer, so that the "slag" makes a very fine chemical manure. it is ground up into a fine powder and is sold to farmers under the name of thomas's phosphate powder. it owes its fertilizing virtues to the presence of the phosphorus which it has stolen from the molten iron. bessemer derived a huge fortune from his process after he had fought and overcome his difficulties, in addition to which he received the honour of knighthood and became sir henry bessemer. it will be noticed that one of the virtues of the process is its economy in fuel. during the whole time that the metal is in the converter, from twenty to thirty minutes, no fuel is used to keep it hot. the reason for that is that the carbon which is being got rid of is acting as fuel. it is burning with the air which is driven through, thereby generating heat. in bessemer's early days, it was arranged that he should attend a meeting of ironmasters at birmingham to explain his new process. on the morning of his lecture two eminent ironmasters were breakfasting together in a birmingham hotel when one exclaimed to the other, "what do you think, there is a fellow coming here to-day to tell us how to make steel without fuel." to this eminent south wales ironmaster the proposal seemed preposterous but it was true all the same. although vast quantities of steel are made by the bessemer process there is another one of equal importance known as the siemens-martin open-hearth process. in this the molten metal is kept in a huge bath practically boiling until the carbon has been reduced to the required amount. perhaps the most interesting feature about it is the way in which fuel is saved by what is called the "regenerative" method due to that versatile genius sir william siemens. the open-hearth, as it is termed, is a huge rectangular chamber of firebrick with a firebrick roof, and doors along one side just under the roof through which the process can be watched and new materials be added from time to time. the fire is some way away and not underneath as one might perhaps expect. now if a deep coke fire is fed with insufficient air it does not give off carbonic acid such as usually arises from a fire, and which as everyone knows will not burn, but a gas called carbon monoxide which will burn very well. so the fire-place for these furnaces is constructed in such a manner as to produce carbon monoxide, which then passes through a huge flue to one end of the open-hearth. here it meets air coming through another flue and the two combining burst into flame over the metal. the hot gases resulting from this burning pass out through a flue at the other end of the hearth to a tall chimney which causes the necessary draught, but on their way they pass through a chamber loosely filled with bricks. consequently the hot gases only reach the open air after having given up much of their heat to these bricks. after that operation has been going on for a time certain valves are operated and the gas and air then come in at the other end of the hearth, travelling through it in the opposite direction. and the air comes through the chamber which has the hot bricks in it, bringing back into the furnace a large quantity of that heat which otherwise would have gone up the chimney but which the bricks intercepted. thus all day long does this reversal take place at intervals, the fresh air all the time picking up and bringing back some of the heat which just previously had escaped towards but not into the chimney. this arrangement enables the process to compete, so far as economy is concerned, with the bessemer process. at intervals the steel is tapped off from the furnace and run into ingot-moulds, the same as with the other process. on the whole it is regarded as producing a slightly better steel, the operation being under slightly better control. however the steel is made the ingots are reheated and either hammered under a powerful steam hammer or pressed in an enormous hydraulic press. this greatly improves the quality. the steel can then be rolled into plates, bars or whatever form may be required. the finer qualities of steel such as are used for making sharp tools are made in quite another way. instead of being made from crude iron by taking out the carbon, the materials are the finest qualities of wrought iron and charcoal which are mixed together in the correct quantities and melted in a crucible. this cast steel is very hard, so that it will carry a very fine, sharp edge. it is also capable of being tempered by heating and cooling, so that the exact degrees of hardness and toughness can be attained. of recent years a special quality of steel for tools called "high-speed" steel has been produced, mainly by the addition to ordinary cast steel of a small percentage of tungsten. the advantage of this is that, within certain limits, this does not soften with heat, and it is, i can assure you, a great invention in war-time, when a nation is straining every nerve to turn out guns and shells as fast as possible. for all these things need to be turned in lathes and if you have ever watched a metal-turning lathe at work you will have noticed that the tool which actually takes a shaving off the article being turned tends to get hot. for this reason lathes are usually fitted with pumps which pump cold soap-suds on to the tool as it works. what you see there is the energy employed in shaving the metal being turned into heat in the tool. if left uncooled by the water it would soon be red-hot. and the faster the machine works the hotter will the tool get. now with the old steel a very little heat will suffice to make it soft, when its cutting power is lost. so with the old steel, no matter how much cooling water you might use, there was a distinct limit to the speed of the lathe and the speed at which the work was finished, for if that speed were once exceeded a stop became necessary to regrind the tool or to put in a fresh one. but with high-speed steel that limit is much higher, for it can get almost red-hot before it loses its hardness and consequently machines can be run and jobs finished at a speed which would have been out of the question only a few years ago. if one belligerent knew how to make high-speed steel while the other did not the former would have an enormous advantage in war-time. speaking generally, steel such as is used for tools is called hard steel, while that made by the bessemer and siemens-martin processes is called mild steel. leaving out of account for the moment fancy steels such as that just described, where other metals are added to the mixture, the essential difference between all the varieties of steel is simply a slight difference in the percentage of carbon. this is so remarkable that it is worth while to tabulate these percentages again. cast iron has from to per cent. steel from one-fifth to one per cent. wrought iron less than one-fifth per cent. mild steel, which has least carbon of all the varieties of steel and in this respect is therefore nearest to wrought iron, is used for the same purposes as wrought iron, such as shipbuilding, bridges and roofs, tanks, gas-holders, etc. when the admiralty want a specially fast ship such as a torpedo-boat destroyer with a hull as light as possible consistent with strength they have it made of steel with a slightly larger percentage of carbon so that the steel is stronger and the vessel's frame can be made lighter. the steel for shells, too, needs to be of a certain strength to give the best results, so the percentage of carbon is adjusted accordingly. for guns themselves, again, special properties are needed, and so not only is the carbon regulated to a nicety but other things such as nickel and chromium are added. altogether, steel is one of the most marvellous substances known, certainly the most marvellous metal. copper is just copper and no more, zinc is just zinc, and the same with lead, but iron (which really includes steel) can be adapted to so many purposes, can be endowed at will with so many different properties, that without doubt iron, common, plentiful iron, is the king of all the metals. chapter viii more about guns as has been remarked elsewhere, some of the guns used by the soldiers in land warfare are very different from those used in the navy. the latter, being carried on the ships to which they belong, can be of those proportions which best suit their purpose. consequently they are usually very long compared with their diameter. the field guns used by the royal field artillery are shorter in proportion to their calibre than are the big naval guns. otherwise they would be far too long to handle in the field. they are mounted on carriages drawn by horses, and are so handy that they can go anywhere where infantry can go and can travel just as fast. it takes a very short time to get them ready for action, too, so that they can accompany infantry quite freely, neither arm impeding the movements of the other. the horse artillery, again, whose guns are even lighter still, can accompany cavalry, travelling as fast and coming into action almost as quickly as the troopers themselves. the famous french "seventy-fives" (meaning millimetres calibre) which played such a great part in the war, are field guns intended to move rapidly and to operate with infantry. both these types of gun were used by the british in south africa, as also were some field howitzers, a type of gun to which further reference will be made later. but the boers taught the world something new as to the possibilities of moving heavy guns quickly. perhaps the reason for this was that they, being something of the nature of amateurs in the art of warfare, were less under the influence of tradition. anyway, they surprised the british by the quick way in which they moved heavy guns, sometimes into quite difficult positions, over rough ground and up steep hills. these heavy guns of theirs were called by the british soldiers "long toms." but the british were quick to respond, particularly the ever-resourceful navy. when the war broke out there were, in the neighbourhood of durban, a number of warships which had as part of their own armament some of those guns which afterwards became famous as " · 's," that being the diameter of the bore in inches. they were of the long shape usual in naval guns, and it is easy to see that they were much heavier than the field guns of inches or so in diameter. captain scott (now admiral sir percy scott) saw that these would be useful, so he quickly designed some carriages for them, got these made in the railway workshops at durban, and in a few hours was rushing them up to ladysmith. it was these guns very largely which enabled that town to hold out for so long, until, in fact, it was triumphantly relieved. thus the effect of the boer war was to show that much heavier weapons could be manipulated in the field than had been considered possible before. the great war which followed but a few years later carried on this same lesson, for one of the great surprises with which the allies were confronted in the early days of the conflict was the inexplicable fall of fortresses which till then had been deemed almost impregnable. liége, namur, maubeuge and, finally, antwerp, all fell to a wonderful gun of enormous dimensions which the austrians had produced from up their sleeve, so to speak. like conjurers they had kept them secret until the last moment. these weapons which made history so fast were of the kind called howitzers, a name mentioned just now. it should be explained here that gunners talk of guns and howitzers as if the latter were not guns; but that is only a convenient habit which has grown up, for the latter are unquestionably guns. the distinction is, however, so convenient that we may well adopt it ourselves for the rest of this chapter. repeated references have been made already to the question of the length of guns, and it has been pointed out that to get high velocity, great range and vigorous hitting power a gun needs to be as long as possible. on ships this is only limited by the strength of the steel of which the gun is made, for beyond a certain length the gun bends of its own weight. ashore, however, the difficulties of transport impose a further limitation in most cases, although the famous · , like many other naval guns, has a length of calibres, and the guns of small calibre do approximate somewhat to the proportions of the naval guns, since even then their length comes within manageable limits. modern warfare, however, requires the use of larger shells containing larger charges of explosives, and to fire these requires guns of greater calibre. we hear of shells of as great a diameter as inches being thrown into the belgian fortresses and of course nothing smaller than a -inch gun could do that. now a -inch gun, if made to the naval proportions of calibres or even calibres, would mean a length of at least to feet. it would also mean a weight exceeding tons, for the -inch naval gun of calibres weighs about tons. and it is easy to see that such a gun would be very difficult to move on the field of battle. indeed, it would be almost useless because of the time it would take to get it into position and to construct the foundations which it would need. if the austrians had only had such as those the belgians would have had plenty of time to prepare for them at antwerp, whereas it was the quickness with which they brought up their heavy guns that astonished everyone and took their opponents by surprise. the secret of this astonishing performance lies in the fact that they were not guns at all but howitzers, which instead of being long, slender tubes are short, fat ones, and that involves a different idea in gunnery altogether. the "gun" fires _at_ an object. the howitzer fires its shell upwards with the purpose of dropping it _upon_ the object. the difference between the two is well illustrated by the methods of practising with them. in learning to work a gun the gunners fire at a vertical target just as those of you who practise shooting at a miniature range fire at a target of paper placed vertically against a wall. the target for howitzer practice, on the other hand, is a square marked out on the level ground, and the object of the gunners is to see how great a proportion of a given number of shots they can drop inside that square. of course, being so much shorter the howitzers cannot throw a shell so far or at such a high velocity as the naval guns, but that can to a certain extent be compensated for by using a higher explosive for the propellant. that, however, involves greater stresses in the tube when firing takes place and also calls for stronger foundations in order that the aim may be steady. a great part, too, of the velocity of a naval shell is required for the penetration of the armour, whereas against forts or earthworks it is sufficient if the shell "gets there." moreover, generally speaking, it is possible to get much nearer to a fortress or entrenched position for the purpose of attacking it than it is to an enemy ship on the sea. except for the occasional help of a mist there is no "cover" to be obtained at sea, while on land the ground must be very flat indeed if there is no low hill or undulation behind which a gun can be set up unnoticed. the austrians cherish a piece of steelwork from one of the forts of antwerp which they smashed with a shell from one of their big howitzers at a range of seven miles. they evidently were able to get their big howitzers within that comparatively short distance of the antwerp fortifications without being molested. [illustration: a german automatic pistol. the action is fully described on the illustration.] in this connection one often hears the word mortar used, and just a reference to that will be appropriate here. many years ago short guns which threw their balls very high were in use, and because of their resemblance to the mortar which is used for pounding up things with the aid of a pestle these were termed mortars. later a man named howitzer introduced a type of gun which was something of a compromise between the long thin gun and the short stubby mortar. as time has gone on, however, the mortars have grown in length while the howitzers have shortened, until to-day the two names are used almost indiscriminately to denote the same thing. hence the giant howitzers of the austrians are often spoken of as the "skoda" mortars, skoda being the name of the factory where they were made. at one time many people wondered why the germans did not put some of these huge mortars on their battleships: many thought that they would do so, and that by that means they would demolish our navy as they had already smashed the belgian forts. the reason they did not is, no doubt, the very simple one, that our naval guns would have probably sunk their ships before the howitzers could have reached ours, because if they had attempted to make up for the shortness of the weapons by using higher explosives, these mortars would, there is little doubt, have knocked to pieces the ships on which they were mounted. the old-fashioned fortress, suddenly made "out-of-date" by the skoda mortars, was usually armed with guns of the naval type. sea-coast forts are always so armed. nowadays, however, the inland fortress takes the form of a labyrinth of trenches and underground passages, combined with deeply excavated chambers known as dug-outs, and these do not fitly accommodate large guns at all. the guns are placed well back behind the trenches sheltered behind hills or woods, over which they hurl their shells. the chief defenders of the actual trench are the machine gun, which is little more than an automatic rifle on a stand, and the trench mortar. we are now in a position to sum up broadly the features of modern artillery. there is first the naval gun, the ideal gun, long and of great range, able to send forth its shells with great velocity. this gun appears again in the sea-coast forts, where the conditions are very much those which obtain on a ship and where the attacking party is of necessity a ship. in the field we have the field and horse artillery, which we may regard as the naval gun modified somewhat in order to make it easy to move about, so that it can accompany troops and support the operations of both infantry and cavalry. these light guns are supported by the field howitzers, which are also light and easily handled, and the guns of the · type, originally naval guns but now mounted on wheels and possessing a certain amount of mobility, not equalling the field guns it is true, but still very serviceable in a campaign. then we have the howitzers of various sizes which have rendered the old-fashioned steel and concrete forts useless, and which are the chief weapons used in the modern trench warfare. it is these which blow in the walls of the trenches and dug-outs, shatter the barbed-wire entanglements and render it possible for the infantry to attack an entrenched position. finally, we have the machine guns, each of which is equivalent to a considerable number of riflemen and which, with the trench mortars, form the chief defences of the actual trench itself. of course these are only useful against attacks by infantry: they cannot in any way cope with the heavy artillery. that has to be dealt with by the opposing artillery posted away back behind the trenches. and now let us take a rather more close look at some of these weapons. essentially each one is a steel tube. it may be a single tube or it may be several one outside another. it may even have a layer of wire between two tubes as many naval guns have. it is invariably (one small exception will be mentioned later) loaded at the breech or rear end and not through the muzzle as used to be the custom. for this purpose it needs a breech-block or door, which can be opened to put in the shell and explosive, and which can then be closed tightly so that it will not be driven out or burst open when the explosion takes place and also shall be gas tight so as not to let any of the force of the explosion escape. then the gun must be mounted upon a carriage so that it can be quickly moved about. the lighter forms of artillery are fired when upon the same carriage upon which they travel. in years gone by the whole thing, carriage as well as gun, used to run back when the gun was fired, which was a great nuisance since it had to be got back into position again after each shot. to obviate this the gun is now mounted upon a slide, and it is the slide which is fitted to the carriage. thus the gun can slide back without the carriage moving at all. the latter is made very strong, and shoes are provided at the end of chains which go under the wheels just like the "drag" which coaches and heavy carts have for use going down hills. there is also a part like a spade which can be driven down into the ground so that, what with the shoes and the spade, the carriage is fixed very firmly. the gun is kept at the front part of the slide by means of a powerful spring, which is compressed when the gun is fired but which, as the force of the recoil is spent, pushes the gun back to its original position once more. the spring is often reinforced by a cylinder and a piston with compressed air or water behind it, acting after the manner of those door checks with which we are all familiar, its function being to steady the motion of the gun and to let it go gently back to its place without slamming, just as the door check prevents a door from slamming. by this means the gun is returned automatically after each shot to practically the same position which it occupied before, so that it does not need re-aiming each time, but only a slight readjustment if even that. the result of this is that such a gun can be fired very rapidly. in fact, it can be fired just as fast as the gunners can keep on reloading it. the big skoda mortars owed their mobility to the clever way in which they were constructed. the gun tube itself, the support for it or mounting, and the steel foundation were each fitted to a special motor-driven trolley. the steel foundation was dumped down on the ground, which of course was prepared for it in advance, then the mounting was run right on to it so that it simply needed bolting down and finally the tube was hoisted by specially prepared appliances into its place. it is said that the whole operation occupied less than an hour. for firing, these mortars of course are pointed at a very high angle, almost like an astronomical telescope. no doubt the gunners have many jokes about "shooting the moon" and so on, for that is just what they seem to be attempting. for loading, however, they are lowered into a horizontal position: the shell comes up on a small hand-truck, is raised by a specially designed jack until it is level with the breech, and is then pushed into its place. the breech is then closed, the tube re-elevated, and all is ready for firing. between these two forms of gun, the field gun on its light carriage, which not only bears it from place to place but forms its support while in action, and the great mortar carried in parts on specially made trolleys, there are now an enormous variety of guns and mortars adapted for the various purposes which experience in the great war revealed. artillery suffered many changes in the light of the south african campaign and of the russo-japanese war, but of far more importance have been the lessons learnt in northern france and on the plains of poland. to some extent these lessons have been learnt and profited by during the actual war, but there is no doubt that as men have time to think over them in the years of peace which are ahead many more developments will take place. unless, that is, we are on the threshold of that happy time when guns and fighting material of all sorts will be looked upon as the relics of a bad and ruinous time now happily past. in conclusion, a passing reference must be made to the trench mortars and similar contrivances which have arisen as the result of the prolonged spell of trench warfare which no one had ever contemplated. these are in effect very short range mortars or howitzers, specially intended for throwing bombs from trench to trench. some are simply the larger mortars on a small scale, but one has decidedly original features. this consists of a short light mortar into which the bombs are slipped through the muzzle, thus reverting to the old method of loading. the propellant is combined with the bomb and there is a percussion cap which fires it as soon as it strikes the bottom of the tube. thus the operation is just about as simple as it can be: the man merely places the bomb in the upturned muzzle and lets it slide down. an instant later, up it comes again, to go sailing through the air into the trench of the enemy a hundred yards away. one must not conclude this chapter, however, without a reference to those useful weapons which are known among the soldiers as "archibalds" and officially as anti-aircraft guns. these are perhaps the most familiar guns of all to the general public, since they were installed in many places in britain for the purpose of dealing with the zeppelins. no doubt not a few of my readers have had the experience of being awakened from their beauty sleep by the cracking of the anti-aircraft guns and have seen their shells bursting like squibs in the air. they are fairly long guns, not unlike field guns, but they are mounted upon special supports which enable them to be pointed at any angle so that they can fire right up into the sky. the sights, also, are somewhat different, being fitted with prisms, or reflectors, so that the gunners can look along the sights and align the gun upon an object overhead without lying on their backs. much more could be said on this subject, but national interests forbid, so with this general review of modern artillery we must pass to another subject. chapter ix the guns they use in the navy both the great english-speaking nations are immensely proud of their navies. they can, on occasion, produce soldiers by the million of the very highest and most efficient type, but they never feel quite that pride and patriotic fervour over their soldiers that they do over their ships of war and their sailors. the guns, therefore, with which the ships are armed, always form a subject of great interest, especially those large ones which constitute the armament of the dreadnought battleships and battle-cruisers. let us first consider what is required in a naval gun, for it must be remembered that the naval and military weapons are different in some respects. experience at the dardanelles showed that even the guns of the _queen elizabeth_, the largest and most powerful then known, fresh from the finest factories, were not particularly successful against the turkish forts. the germans, too, set up what was probably a naval gun and occasionally dropped shells into dunkirk with it at a range of twenty miles or so, but without causing much harm, and the fact that they only did it occasionally and then abandoned it altogether seems to indicate that in their opinion they were not doing much good with it. it must not be assumed from this that naval guns are bad guns or poor guns, however, but simply that they are made for a special purpose for which they are highly efficient, from which it follows almost as a natural consequence that they are somewhat less efficient when used for some other purpose. their purpose is to pierce the hard steel armour with which warships are protected and then to explode in the enemy's interior, whereas in modern warfare the greatest military guns are chiefly required to blow a big hole in the ground or to shatter a block of concrete. in both cases the ultimate object is to carry a quantity of explosive into the enemy's territory and there explode it, but whereas the land gun has simply to do that and no more, the naval gun has to pierce thick armour-plate as well. and just think what that means. many large ships have their vital parts protected by armour-plates twelve inches thick. moreover, the armour-plates are made of very special steel, the finest that can be invented for the purpose. vast sums of money have been expended in experimenting to find out just the best sort of steel for resisting penetration by shells. some time ago i saw several pieces of armour-plate which had been used in one of these tests. they had been set up under conditions as nearly as possible the same as those obtaining on the side of a ship and then they had been fired at from varying distances, the effects of the various shots being carefully recorded. and that is only one experiment out of tens of thousands which have been tried again and again, while the steel manufacturers are always trying to improve and again improve the shell-resisting properties of their steel. thus, we see, the presence of the steel armour which has to be perforated before the shell can do its work makes the task set before the naval gun somewhat different from that which confronts its military brother. these considerations result in the naval gun needing to have as flat a trajectory as possible and its projectiles the highest possible speed. now trajectory, it may be useful to explain, is the technical term employed to denote the course of a projectile, which is always more or less curved. let us imagine that we see a gun, pointed in a perfectly horizontal direction, and let us also imagine that by some miracle we have got rid of the force of gravity and also that there is no air. under those conditions the shot from the gun would go perfectly straight and with undiminished velocity for ever and ever. then let us imagine that the air comes into being. the effect of that is to act as a brake which gradually slows the shell down until finally it stops it. theoretically, perhaps, it would never quite stop it, but for all practical purposes it would. again, let us suppose that while the air is absent the force of gravity comes into play, what effect will that have? it will gradually pull the shell downwards out of its horizontal course, making it describe a beautiful curve. but, someone may think, does not a rapidly-moving body remain to some extent unaffected by gravity? not at all: it falls just the same and just as quickly as if it were falling straight down. if our imaginary horizontal gun were set at a height of sixteen feet and a shell were just pushed out of it so that it fell straight down the shell would touch the ground in one second. if the ground were perfectly flat and the shell were fired so that it reached a point half a mile away _in one second_ it would strike the ground exactly half a mile away. you see, the horizontal motion due to the explosion in the gun and the downward motion due to gravity go on simultaneously and the two combined produce the curve. to make this quite clear, let us imagine two guns precisely alike side by side and both pointed perfectly horizontally. from one the shell is just pushed out: from the other it is fired at the highest velocity attainable: both those shells will fall sixteen feet or a shade more in one second, and if the ground were perfectly level both would strike the ground at the same moment although a great distance apart. clearly, then, the faster the shell is travelling the more nearly horizontally will it move, for it will have less time in which to fall, and the slower the more curved will be its path, from which we see that the air by reducing the velocity causes the curve to become steeper and steeper as the shell proceeds. if, then, our gun is placed low down, as it must be on a ship, to get the longest range we must point it more or less upwards because otherwise the shell will fall into the water before it has reached its target. when we do that we complicate matters somewhat, for gravity tends to reduce the velocity while the shell is rising and to add to it again while it is falling. we need not go too deeply into that, however, so long as we realize that, whatever the conditions may be, the shell in actual use has to follow a curved course, first rising and then falling. the really important part about a shell's journey is the end. so long as it hits it really does not matter what it does on the way, and if it misses it is equally immaterial. the reason why we need to bother about the first part of the trip is because upon it depends the final result. whatever the trajectory may be we see that the shell must necessarily arrive in a slanting direction. and the more steeply slanting that direction is _the less likely is the target to be hit_. if the shell went straight it would only be necessary to point the gun in the right direction and the object would be hit no matter how far away it might be. the more curved the course is, the more likely the shell is to fall either too near or too far, in the one case dropping into the water, in the other passing clear over the opposing ship. let us look at it another way. suppose the vital parts of a ship rise feet out of the water and the shell arrives at such an angle that it falls feet in yards: then, if the ship be within a certain zone yards wide it will be hit in a vital spot. if it be nearer the shell will pass over, if it be further the shell will fall into the water. that yards is what is called the "danger zone." if the shell is falling less steeply, say, feet in yards, then the danger zone is increased to yards and so on, which gives us the rule that the flatter the trajectory, or the more nearly straight the course of the shell the greater is the danger zone and the more likely is the enemy ship to be hit. we have established two facts, therefore, first, that the trajectory must be as flat as possible and, second, that to make it flat the velocity must be high. we can also see another reason for high velocity, namely, to give penetrating power. to obtain a high velocity the gun must be long, and consequently naval guns are always long, a fact which is very noticeable in the photographs of warships. the reason for this is quite obvious after a little thought. you could not throw a cricket ball very far if you could only move your hand through a distance of one foot. to get the best result you instinctively reach as far back as ever you can and then reach forward as far as you are able, so that the ball shall have as long a journey as possible in your hand. perhaps you do not know it but all the time you are moving your hand with the ball in it you are putting energy into that ball, which energy carries it along after you have let go of it. and it is just the same with the shell in the gun. so long as it is in the gun energy is being added to it but as soon as it leaves the muzzle that ceases. after that it has to pursue its own way under the influence of the energy which has been imparted to it. the powder which is employed as the propellant or driving power is of such a nature and so adjusted as to quantity that as far as possible it shall give a comparatively slow steady push rather than a sudden shock, so as to make full use of the gun's length, the expanding gases following up the shell as it goes forward and keeping a constant push upon it. on the other hand, a gun can be too long, for no steel is infinitely strong and stiff, so that beyond a certain limit the muzzle of the gun would be likely to droop slightly of its own weight and so make the shooting inaccurate. the limit seems to be about calibres or, in other words, fifty times the diameter of the bore. for a considerable time the standard big gun of the british navy was the -inch, that being the calibre or diameter of the bore. the famous _dreadnought_ had guns of that calibre and so had her immediate successors. the -inch gun of fifty calibres weighs tons and fires a projectile weighing lbs. which it hurls from its muzzle at a velocity of about feet per second. more recently the size has grown to ½, and even as great as inches calibre, but we may for the moment take the -inch gun as typical of all these large guns and have a look at its construction. it is made of a special kind of steel known as nickel-chrome gun steel, formed by adding certain proportions of the two rare metals nickel and chromium to the mixture of iron and carbon which we ordinarily call steel. the metal is made after the manner described in another chapter and is cast into the form of suitably-sized ingots which are afterwards squeezed in enormous hydraulic presses into the rough shape required. besides giving the metal the desired form this action has the effect of improving its quality. since a gun is necessarily a tube it may be wondered why the steel is not cast straight away into that shape instead of into a solid block and the reason why that is not done is very interesting. it is found that any impurities in the metal--and it is impossible to make it without some impurities--collect in that part which cools last and obviously that part of a block which cools last is the centre. thus the impurities gather together in the centre of the mass whence they are removed when that centre is cut away, whereas if the first casting were a tube they would collect in a part which would remain in the finished gun. the ingot, then, is cast and pressed roughly to shape. then it is put into a lathe where it is turned on the outside and a hole bored right through the centre. but that is by no means all of the troubles through which this piece of steel has to pass. it undergoes a very stringent heat treatment, being alternately heated in a furnace to some precise temperature and then plunged into oil, whereby the exact degree of hardness required is attained. moreover, this is only one of the tubes which go to make up the gun, which is a composite structure of four tubes placed one over another with a layer of tightly wound wire as well. first, there is the innermost tube, the whole length of the gun, then a second one outside that, usually made in two halves. both are carefully made to fit, and then the outer is expanded by heat to enable it to be slidden over the inner one, after which on cooling it contracts and fits tightly. outside this second tube is wound the wire, or more strictly speaking tape, for it is a quarter of an inch wide and a sixteenth thick. it is so strong that a single strand of it could sustain a ton and a half. it is carefully wound on; first several layers running the whole length of the gun and then extra layers where the greatest stresses come, that is to say, near the breech, for that has to withstand the initial shock of the explosion. altogether about miles of wire go on a single gun. the advantages of this form of construction are many. for one thing, a wire or strip can be examined throughout its whole length and any defect is sure to be found, whereas in a solid piece of steel, no matter how carefully it may be made, there may lurk hidden defects. moreover, if a solid tube develops a crack anywhere it is liable to spread, whereas a few strands of wire may be broken without in any way affecting the rest. it has been found that even if a shell burst while inside one of these guns no harm is done to the men in the turret where it stands, a thing which cannot be said for guns composed entirely of tubes, so that the merit rests with the wire. a third advantage is that the wire can be wound on to the tube beneath it at precisely that tension which is calculated to give the best result, whereas in shrinking one tube on to another this cannot always be attained. over the wire there come two more tubes not running the whole length but meeting and overlapping somewhat near the middle, so that at one point there are actually four concentric tubes besides the wire. at the rear end a kind of cap called the breech-piece covers over the ends of all the tubes, itself having a central hole into which fits the breech-block, one of the triumphs of modern engineering, of which more in a moment. while we have in mind the wire-wound form of construction it is interesting to note that something similar but in a crude form was practised sixty years or more ago. the guns of that era were some of them even of cast iron while the more refined consisted of a steel tube strengthened with coils of wrought iron. this iron was first rolled into flat bars, then it was made hot, and wound on spirally round an iron bar the same size as the tube. a little hammering converted this spiral into a tube which was then fitted round the steel tube. thus, although very different there is still a distinct resemblance between this old method and the up-to-date wire-wound weapon. the manufacture of guns, it may be remarked, owes more to one man than to any other, namely, mons. gustave canet, a french engineer who, having fought in the franco-german war, decided to devote his engineering talents to developing the artillery of his native land. he spent many years in england but later established works at havre for the manufacture of guns upon improved methods, finally merging his interests into those of the great french armament firm of schneider of creusot. by french and english artillerists at all events the name of canet is regarded with reverence. but to get back to our naval gun. it will be clear that operations such as have been described, involving the handling of great tubes fifty feet or more in length, heating them as required, dipping them in oil while hot and so on, can only be carried out at works specially designed for the purpose. the furnaces where the tubes are heated are well-like formations in the ground, deep enough to take the tube vertically. to lift them in and out there have to be tall travelling cranes capable of catching the tube by its upper end and lifting it right out of the furnace so that its lower end clears the ground. to accomplish this with a little to spare the cranes need to be seventy feet or so high. then there are deep pits full of oil so that a tube can be heated in a furnace, drawn out by a crane and quickly dropped into the adjacent oil bath. likewise there have to be pits of a third kind wherein a cold tube can be set up while a hot one is dropped over it for the purpose of shrinking the latter on. then, of course, there have to be lathes of gigantic dimensions capable of taking a length of nearly sixty feet and of swinging an object weighing anything up to fifty tons. but of those machines we can only pause to make mention, for we must pass on to the breech-block, in some ways the most interesting part of the gun. when it was first suggested to leave the back end of the gun open so that the powder and projectiles could be put in that way instead of through the muzzle, people at once foresaw how much would depend upon the arrangements for stopping up the hole while the gun was fired. for, of course, the force of the explosion is exerted equally in all directions, backward just as much as forward, so that unless very securely fixed the stopper closing the breech would be liable to become a projectile travelling in the wrong direction. to fix such a thing securely enough to avoid accidents would surely take up too much time and so largely neutralize any advantage arising from its use. these fears were, indeed, to some extent justified by accidents which actually occurred with the early examples of breech-loading guns, and for that reason our own authorities for a time looked askance at breech-loaders. now let us take a look at the breech-block of the -inch naval gun of to-day, which never blows out, not even when lbs. of cordite go off just the other side of it. the explosion hurls an -pound shell at the rate of feet per second but it never stirs the breech-block. yet it can be opened and closed so quickly, including the necessary fastening-up after closing, that shots can be fired from the gun at the rate of one every fifteen seconds. the breech-block partakes of the nature of a plug and also of a door. it swings upon hinges like the latter but its shape more resembles the former. if we want to make such a thing very secure we usually make it in the form of a screw with many threads, but that entails turning it round many times and that takes time. given plenty of time to screw the breech-block into its place and there would never have been any anxiety as to the possibility of its blowing out, but there is not time. the problem, therefore, was to get the strength of a screw combined with quickness of action. this dilemma is avoided in the following simple manner. the breech-block is given a screw thread on its exterior surface, and the hole in the breech-piece is given a similar screw-thread on its inner surface, just as if the one were to be laboriously screwed into the other after the manner of an ordinary screw in machinery. then four grooves are cut right across the threads on the block and similarly on the breech-piece, so that at four different places there is no thread left. in other words, instead of the thread running round and round continuously, each turn is divided up into four sections with sections of plain unthreaded metal in between. thus in a certain position the block can be pushed into the hole without any threads engaging at all, for each strip of threaded block passes over an unthreaded strip in the hole and vice versa, in other words, the threads on the one part miss those on the other part. yet an eighth of a turn serves to make all the threads engage and the thing is held almost as securely as if it were just an ordinary screw with threads its whole length. the block is carried upon a hinged arm so that although it can be turned in this manner it can also be swung back freely when necessary. combined with the breech-block is a pneumatic contrivance which blows a powerful jet of air through the gun every time the breech is opened, thereby cleaning away the effects of the last explosion. each of these great guns is mounted upon a slide so that when it is fired it can slide back, thereby exhausting the effect of the recoil, yet can be returned instantly to its original position. indeed, this return is brought about quite automatically by the agency of springs, compressed air and hydraulic power. thus the gun fires, slides back, returns and is at once ready for the next shot. it is trained, or pointed in a horizontal plane, by turning the turret in which it stands but the correct elevation is gained by the use of telescopic sights. the principle of these sights is very simple. imagine a graduated circle fixed to the side of the gun. pivoted at the centre of the circle is a small telescope. the telescope can be turned round to any angle upon the circle and it can then be clamped at that particular angle. the range having been given to the officer in command of the gun from the range-finding station on another part of the ship, the telescope is set to the correct angle. then the gun is elevated or depressed until the ship being aimed at is precisely in the centre of the field of view of the telescope, in other words, until the telescope is pointing exactly at the ship. then the gun is fired. the effect, therefore, is this. the telescope always points (while the gun is being fired) at the object aimed at, but the gun is pointed upwards at a certain angle, which angle depends upon how the telescope is set upon the divided circle. thus the setting of the telescope for a given range produces the correct upward tilt of the gun for that range. the breech-block carries a trigger and hammer arrangement whereby the firing can be done and also an electrical arrangement so that an electric spark can be employed. both these firing contrivances are so made that they cannot be operated until the breech-block has been inserted and _made secure_. thus a premature explosion is guarded against. chapter x shells and how they are made modern warfare seems to resolve itself very largely into a question of which side can procure the most shells. during the great war there was a time when the british and their allies were hard pressed because they had not sufficient shells. the enemy had in that matter stolen a march upon them and had during the winter, when military activity is at its minimum, rapidly produced large supplies of high-explosive shells. discovering their lack the british set about remedying it in true british fashion. it is quite characteristic of this strange people to let the enemy get ahead at the commencement, after which they pull themselves together and put on a spurt, so to speak, and after that the enemy had better prepare for the worst, for defeat is only a question of time. so, finding themselves short of shells, they set to and dotted the whole country in an incredibly short time with huge factories entirely devoted to making shells. older factories also were adapted to the same purpose. places intended and normally used for the manufacture of the most peaceable things--ploughs, gramophones and piano parts for example--were soon turning out shells or parts thereof by the thousand. electric-light works, waterworks, cotton mills, technical schools, all sorts of places where, for doing their own repairs or for some similar reason, there happened to be a lathe or two, all these were organized and in a few weeks they too were working night and day "something to do with shells." meanwhile other factories were springing up for the purpose of making explosives while others again were erected for producing the acids and other chemicals necessary for the explosive works; and yet another kind of works, the filling factories, came into being as if by magic and thousands of girls flocked from far and near to these places, there to fill the shells with the explosives. even the soldiers did not realize a few years ago how important the supply of shells was going to be. the rifle has fallen from its old place of importance while the gun and the shell have risen to the first place. what, then, is a shell? it is what its name implies, a case covering something else, just as the shell of a fish covers its owner. it is a hollow cylinder of steel with certain things inside it. its chief function is to hold these other things and to be shot out of a gun carrying them with it to their destination. you want to cause an explosion in an enemy's ship. you cannot get near enough to put the explosives there by hand, for he will not let you, so you put them into a steel shell and then hurl the whole thing at him out of a gun. [illustration: bomb throwing. one of the most striking things about the war was the re-invention of the bomb thrown by hand. this officer hurled bombs at the enemy for twenty-four hours continuously.] in the attempt to prevent your doing him any harm by thus throwing boxes of explosives at him, the enemy clothes the sides of his most valuable and important ships with thick steel plates, wherefore you have to make your shell strong and tough so that it shall not splinter against the armour but shall on the contrary bore its way through, finally exploding in the interior of the ship. if it is not a ship that you are attacking but, say, an earthwork or an arrangement of trenches, then you do not need to penetrate steel armour and your shell can be thinner and of lighter construction. it still needs to be strong, however, for it has another function besides simply carrying the explosive. it must hold the force of the explosion in for a moment while it gathers force so that when the hour comes the pent-up energy may strike all round with the utmost violence. even the most powerful explosives are comparatively feeble if they go off in the open. by holding them in check for a moment and then letting their force loose suddenly you get a much more forceful blow. shells which contain only an explosive are called common shells or high-explosive shells. shrapnel shells constitute another type in which the force of the explosion is simply employed to release a number of round bullets, which strike mainly because of the velocity which they derive from the original motion of the shell. these are above all things man-killing shells, for their result is akin to a volley of bullets at close range. we can thus sum up the chief types of shell as follows: the naval shell which has to be capable of penetrating armour: the high-explosive shell which must be able to break up earthworks and blow down the walls of trenches: and the shrapnel shell which scatters a shower of bullets and is most useful in attacks upon bodies of men rather than upon material structures. some shells have their propellent explosive combined with them just as the familiar rifle cartridge contains the propellant combined with the bullet. in the larger sizes, however, it is much more convenient to have the propellant in a separate cartridge, which can be handled separately and loaded into the gun separately. as has been already explained, the propellant is a "powder" which gives a steady push rather than a destructive blow: moreover, it is practically smokeless, so as not to "give away" the position of the gun to the enemy. the "high explosive," however, shatters and usually makes a dense smoke, so that the observers can see where it fell and report to the gunners whether or not they have got the range. soldiers' letters have told us of the "black marias" and "coal boxes" used by the germans, those terms being simply soldiers' nick-names arising no doubt from the fact that certain particular shells are filled with "tri-nitro-toluene" which gives a black smoke. clearly, smoke, which is most objectionable in the propellant, is a positive advantage in the bursting charge. and now let us take a glimpse at the manufacture of one of these terrible missiles. an ingot of shell-steel is first cast as described in an earlier chapter. since impurities are apt to rise, while the metal is liquid, the top of the ingot is always cut off and discarded. this waste material is used for many other purposes, in which a chance flaw would not be a serious matter, under the title of "shell-discard" steel. the lower part is then heated and passed through a rolling mill, a machine very similar in principle to the domestic mangle, the rollers being of iron with suitable grooves cut in them. a few passages through this machine transforms the ingot into a thick round bar. this is then sawn into short pieces called billets, each of which is the right size to form a shell. again heated, a powerful press drives a pointed bar through the softened steel, thereby converting the short billet into a rough tube. another press then slightly closes in one end, making it resemble a bottle without a bottom and with the neck broken off. the rough forging is then ready to be machined, an operation which is performed in a lathe. the outside is made perfectly round and smooth and of precisely the right size. the inside is also bored out to the correct diameter and finished off to an exceeding smoothness so as to avoid the possibility of any rough places irritating the explosive which in due time will be filled into it. for the same reason, the inside, when finished, is varnished in a certain way and with a certain varnish. the formation of this varnish is one of those little thought of but highly important services which alcohol renders to us, as mentioned elsewhere. the smaller end (that which has already been partially squeezed in) is bored out and screwed for the reception of the nose-bush, while the other end is recessed for the reception of the plate which forms the bottom. most of these operations have to be very accurately carried out and, to ensure that that is so, gauges are continually employed to check the work. these gauges are based upon a very simple principle, known as the "limit" principle. this is both interesting and important, sufficiently so to merit a more detailed reference. it must first be realized that no two things are alike and no measurement is perfectly correct. when we lightly speak of two things being "alike" we really mean that for the purpose contemplated they are nearly enough alike. two things might be "alike" for one purpose and yet be so unlike as to be useless for another. what the authorities do in the case of shells, therefore, and what is done nowadays in many branches of engineering, is to recognize this fact and at the same time overcome the difficulty by stating what difference is permissible. in other words, instead of saying that a thing must be a certain size, it is required to fall between two limits: it must not be more than one or less than the other. for example, suppose a hole is required to be nominally an inch in diameter it may be specified that it shall not exceed an inch plus one-thousandth or fall short of an inch minus one-thousandth. in such a case a variation of a thousandth of an inch either way is permitted. the permitted variation may be more than that, or it may be less and be measured in ten-thousandths, it all depends upon circumstances. clearly in every case it is desirable to permit as large a variation as is consistent with a good result. now to make measures with the degree of accuracy just mentioned is not easy. one can just about see through a crack a thousandth of an inch wide if held up to a bright light. how then can dimensions such as these be dealt with easily and quickly in the rough conditions of a large workshop? let us again think of that one-inch hole and we shall see how simply and easily it is done. the gauge in such a case would be shaped somewhat like a dumb-bell, one end being the "go" end and the other the "not-go" end. the former is made to agree as nearly as possible with the lower limit, the other with the higher limit, and all the inspector has to do is to try first one end in the hole and then the other. one must "go" in and the other must "not-go." so long as that happens he knows that the hole is correct within the prescribed limits. if, on the other hand, both go in, then he knows the hole is too large, or if neither goes in he knows it is too small. it may be urged by some acute reader that the gauges themselves cannot be correct, and that is quite true, but it is possible, by great care and laborious methods, to produce gauges which are correct to within far narrower limits than those mentioned. in the case of outside dimensions the gauges take the form of a thumb and finger capable of spanning the object to be measured, and in that case also two are used, one of which must "go" and the other "not-go." by methods such as these the shells are measured and examined. one of the most important features of a shell is its driving band. in the old days of round cannon balls it is said that the gunners used to wrap greasy rag round each so as to make it fit the cannon and to prevent the force of the explosion to some extent wasting itself by blowing past the ball. that is one of the functions of the driving band. it is made of copper which is comparatively soft, and it forms a fairly tight fit in the bore of the gun, so that while the shell is free enough to slide out of the gun it is tight enough to prevent the loss of any of the driving force of the explosive. its second purpose is to give the necessary spinning action to the shell. the old cannon ball suffered from the fact that it offered a considerable surface to the air in proportion to its weight. the idea arose, therefore, of making projectiles cylindrical and with a pointed nose, so that while the weight might be increased the resistance to the air might be even reduced. but it was clearly no use doing this unless the thing could be made to travel point foremost. now for some rather mysterious reason, if you shoot a cylindrical object out of a gun, it will turn head over heels in the air, unless you give it a spinning motion. this motion, however, because of a gyroscopic effect, keeps the shell point first all the time. it has another effect, too, known as "air-boring." a spinning shell seems actually to bore its way through the air. probably this is due to a centrifugal action, the spinning shell throwing the air outwards from itself and so to some extent sucking the air away out of its own path. whether that be the true explanation or not, the fact remains that the spinning shell makes its way through the air better than a non-spinning one would do. the gun, therefore, has formed in its bore a very slow screw-thread called "rifling," from a french word meaning a screw. and it is the second function of the copper band to catch this rifling and by it be turned as the shell proceeds along the barrel. the soft copper conforms to the shape of the rifling and so itself becomes in a sense a screw engaging with the rifling. this band is situated near the base of the shell, lying in a groove turned in the shell for its reception. to prevent the band turning round without turning the shell there is a wavy groove turned in the bottom of the larger groove, and the band, being put on hot, is squeezed into the latter by a powerful press. the nose-bush is a little fitting of brass which screws into the smaller end of the shell and it has a hole in its centre into which another brass fitting, the nose itself, is screwed. the base of the shell is closed with a little disc of steel plate. people sometimes wonder why the original forging is not made solid at the bottom so as to save the necessity for this disc, but the reason is that if that were done defects might very possibly arise in the steel in the centre which, since it is the very spot whereon the propellant acts, might let some of the heat or force of the propellant through, causing a premature explosion of the charge inside the gun itself instead of among the ranks of the enemy. in the case of naval shells, the nose is not of brass but of a soft kind of steel. one might expect it to be of the very hardest steel, since it has to pierce the hard armour, but experience has shown that the soft nose is better than a hard one. the reason probably is that a hard nose splinters, whereas a soft one spreads out on striking the armour and then acts as a protection to the body of the shell behind it. in these shells, too, the fuse which explodes the charge is placed in the base. in the others it is in the nose, but clearly it could not be so placed in the armour-piercing shell. it is interesting to mention that the propellent "powder" has combined in it some vaseline or other greasy matter which acts as a lubricant between the gun and the shell when firing takes place. shrapnel is so different from the other types of shell that it merits a short paragraph or two to itself. instead of being filled, as the others are, solely with explosive, the front part of it accommodates a considerable number of small round bullets, behind which comes a charge of gunpowder. the front half of the shell is separate from the back part, the two being connected by rivets of soft iron wire, so that a sudden shock can rend them apart. the shell is fired from the gun and comes flying along: suddenly, owing to the action of the fuse, the gunpowder explodes: the case then flies in two, the bullets are liberated and fall in a shower. in the south african war, where fortifications were few, these shells were very effective, but against fortifications, and particularly against trenches and barbed wire, big explosive shells are of much greater value. chapter xi what shells are made of the body of a shell is made of steel of a fairly strong variety. that is to say, it is stronger than that used for shipbuilding and for bridges and such work: but it is less so than some of the higher grades of steel, such as that used for making wire ropes. owing to so much of this steel being rolled during the war, "shell quality" has come to be as well known to the general engineer as any of the many varieties which he has been accustomed to since his apprentice days. many people wondered, at one time, why the cheaper and more easily worked cast iron could not be used for shells. there was a period when the steel works were quite unable to cope with the demands for steel, yet the iron foundries were crying out for work. this question then arose in many minds, why not make cast iron shells? the answer is that cast iron is too weak: it would blow into fragments too soon. just think what a shell is and what it has to do. it is a metal case filled with explosive. it is thrown from a gun and is intended to blow itself to pieces on arrival at its destination. it is that self-destruction which carries destruction to all around as well. it is necessary, in order to obtain the best result, that an appreciable time should elapse between the ignition of the explosive and the bursting of the case. the force of the most sudden explosion is not really developed at once, but takes an appreciable time. after ignition, therefore, as the explosion gradually becomes complete, the pressure inside the shell is growing, and too weak a shell would go to pieces before the maximum pressure had been attained. thus much of the energy of the explosion would simply be liberated into the air instead of being employed in hurling the fragments of shell with enormous force. that is, of course, not a complete explanation of the whole action of a high-explosive shell, but it indicates generally the reason why a special quality of steel is required in order to get the best results. steel having been dealt with in another chapter, we will pass to the other metals which play important if not essential parts in the production of modern projectiles. so important are several of these that the lack of one or two of them would, under modern conditions, mean certain defeat for a nation. let us first of all take copper, of which is made the driving bands of the shells and which in combination with zinc forms brass of which noses and other important parts are made. its ore is found in many parts of the world, notably in the united states, chile and spain. the ores are of several kinds, the simpler ones to deal with being oxides and carbonates of copper, meaning compounds of copper with oxygen and with oxygen and carbon respectively. it will be remembered that ores of iron are usually of the same nature, namely, oxides and carbonates, and consequently we find that the method of obtaining copper from these ores resembles the methods employed to obtain iron from its ores. the ore is thrown into a large furnace, like the blast furnaces of the ironworks, and in the heat of the fire the bonds between copper and oxygen are loosened and the superior attractions of the carbon in the fuel entice the oxygen away, leaving the metal comparatively pure. unfortunately, however, copper is found most plentifully in combination with sulphur with which it forms what is termed sulphide. this copper sulphide is called by miners "copper pyrites." another trouble is that mixed with the copper pyrites there is usually more or less of iron pyrites, or sulphate of iron, so that to obtain the copper not only has the sulphur to be got rid of but also the iron. this complicates the operations very much, the ore having to be subjected to repeated roastings and meltings during which the sulphur passes off in the form of sulphur dioxide (a material from which sulphuric acid can be obtained), leaving oxygen in its place. thus the copper sulphide becomes copper oxide, after which the oxygen is carried away by carbon, leaving the relatively pure metal. moreover, at each operation various substances are thrown into the furnace called fluxes, which do not mingle with the metal but float on the top in the form of slag, and into the slag the iron passes, so that finally the copper is obtained alone. zinc is another important material for shell-making. its ores used to be found in great plenty in silesia, but the chief source of supply is now australia. it is what is called "zinc blende," and consists of zinc sulphide, or zinc and sulphur in combination. in all these names, it may be interesting to mention, at this point, the termination "ide" indicates a compound of two substances, so that we can safely conclude that the "ides" consist of the two elements named in their titles and no others. thus zinc sulphide is zinc and sulphur and nothing else, iron sulphide is iron and sulphur, copper oxide is copper and oxygen, and so on. the blende is first roasted in huge furnaces specially built for the purpose. to ensure its being thoroughly treated it has to be "rabbled" or turned over and over, since otherwise all of it might not be brought into contact with the necessary oxygen. at one time done by men with rakes, it is now generally accomplished by mechanical means. a description of one such furnace will be of interest. it consists of a long rectangular building of brickwork bound together with steel framework. inside it is divided up into low chambers, the roof of each forming the floor of the one above. at intervals along its length mighty shafts of iron pass up from underneath right through all the floors, emerging finally above the topmost, while along underneath the furnace there runs a shaft the action of which turns the vertical shafts slowly round and round. attached to the vertical shafts are long strong arms of iron, one arm to each floor, and upon the arms are placed rabbles, as they are termed, pieces of iron shod sometimes with fireclay, resembling most of any familiar objects a small ploughshare. as the arms slowly revolve, at the rate of once or twice per minute, the arms are carried round and round and the rabbles plough up and turn over and over the layer of ore lying upon the floor. there are arms on the top of the furnace, too, sometimes, where the ore is first laid so that it may be dried by the heat escaping from the furnace beneath, an interesting example of economy effected by utilizing heat which would otherwise be wasted. the whole of the furnace, from end to end and on every floor, is thus swept continually by the rotating arms with their dependent rabbles, and the latter are cunningly shaped so that they not only turn the ore over and over, but gradually pass it along the different floors or hearths. it is fed automatically by a mechanical feeder which pushes it on, a small quantity at a time, to the drying hearth on the top. then the rabbles take charge of it and gradually pass it from the area swept by one shaft to that of the next until it has passed right along the top and has become thoroughly dried. arrived there it falls through a hole on to the topmost hearth or floor, along which it travels by the same means but in the contrary direction until it again falls through a hole on to the top floor but one. and so it goes on until at last, fully roasted, it falls from the bottom floor of the furnace into trucks or other provision for carrying it away. some kinds of ore require to be heated by means of gas which is generated in a "gas-producer" near by. in others, however, the sulphur in the ore acts as the fuel, and so the furnace, having been once started, can be kept up for long periods without the expenditure of any coal at all. very little attention is needed by furnaces such as these, so that with no fuel to pay for and very little labour, they are extremely economical. owing to the great heat, too, the arms would stand a very good chance of getting melted were they not kept cool by a continual stream of water flowing through the shafts and arms. this furnishes a continual supply of hot water which is sometimes used for other purposes in the works. the process of roasting, whether carried on in furnaces such as these or not, results in the formation of oxide instead of sulphide; in other words, the sulphur is turned out and oxygen takes its place. the dislodged sulphur then joins up with some more oxygen and forms sulphur dioxide, which can be led away to the sulphuric acid plant and there, by union with water, turned into that extremely valuable substance, sulphuric acid. we cannot, however, treat zinc oxide as we would iron oxide or copper oxide, for zinc is volatile, and so, instead of accumulating in the bottom of a blast furnace as the iron and copper do, would pass off up the chimney. the oxide is therefore mixed with coal or some other form of carbon and placed in retorts made of fireclay. these retorts are fixed in rows one above the other like the retorts at a gasworks, and hot gases from a gas-producer down below pass around and among them. to the mouth of each retort is fitted a condenser, also made of fireclay. now what happens in the retorts is this: the heat loosens the bonds between the zinc and the oxide, the latter passing into union with some carbon from the coal. the zinc at the same time becomes vapour and passes into the condenser, the lower temperature of which turns it into a liquid which the workmen remove at intervals in ladles. on being poured into moulds and allowed to solidify this metal is called by the name of "spelter," which bears to zinc the same relation that pig-iron does to the more highly developed forms of iron. spelter is simply zinc in its crudest form. tin, although less important in war than copper and zinc, plays a not unimportant part. it has been found for centuries in cornwall. the romans used to trade with the natives of britain for tin. although considerable quantities of it is still obtained from there, the greatest tin-producing country of all at present is the federated malay states. australia also furnishes ore, as does bolivia and nigeria. in cornwall the ore occurs as rock in veins or lodes filling up what must once have been fissures in granite rocks. that near the surface has long been taken, so that to-day the mines are very deep and costly to work. some can only afford to operate when the market price of tin is above a certain limit. much of the ore from the newer districts--the malay states, for example--is in small fragments mixed with gravel in beds near the surface. such is called alluvial or stream tin, since the deposits were undoubtedly put in their present position by streams or rivers. so long as they last these easily accessible alluvial deposits will always be cheaper to work than the deep mines. on the other hand, they may give out, and recent explorations underground seem to indicate that there is still much valuable ore not only of tin but of other metals too, to be obtained from the old mines of cornwall. the ore of tin, like so many other ores, is generally oxide. it is first roasted to expel sulphur and arsenic which are often present as impurities, and then it is melted in a reverberatory furnace such as that described for the manufacture of wrought iron. as usual, the oxygen combines with carbon, the impurities form slag which floats on the top, and the pure metal falls to the bottom of the furnace from whence it can be drawn off. mixed with or in the neighbourhood of tin ore there is sometimes found another mineral called wolfram, which plays an extremely important part in modern warfare, so much so that the british and other governments engaged in the war were at times hard put to it to find enough. its value resides in the fact that it contains tungsten, an element which has wonderful powers in hardening steel. it consists of tungsten and oxygen, but is not an oxide since there is also iron in the partnership. this fact is very useful, however, since it enables the particles of wolfram to be picked out from the mass of other stuff among which they are found by a magnet. there are some very wonderful machines called magnetic separators, made for this express purpose. in one, with which i am familiar, there is an endless band stretched horizontally upon two rollers. one of the rollers being driven round the belt travels along so that the mineral being fed on to it in a stream is carried along under several magnets. these magnets are very different from the ordinary magnet, inasmuch as they are revolving. we might almost describe them as small magnetized flywheels. as they spin round they pick up slightly the particles of ore which contain iron, but have no effect at all upon those which do not contain iron. they do not actually lift the particles up on to themselves: they just exercise a slight pull upon them, and by virtue of the fact that they are revolving, pull them off the band and throw them to one side. the wheels can be set closer or farther from the belt at will so as to make them act more or less strongly, and thus the most magnetic particles can be separated from those less magnetic, these latter being still kept separate from the wholly non-magnetic particles. thus by simple and purely mechanical means are the precious bits of wolfram obtained from the other less valuable or worthless minerals with which they are mixed. the same method is used with other minerals besides wolfram: it can be applied to all those which exhibit in some small degree the magnetic properties which we usually associate with iron. this sorting out of one mineral from others continually crops up in connection with nearly all the metals except iron. iron is practically the only one whose ore occurs in vast masses which need simply to be dug up and thrown into the furnace. the others, where they occur as rock in veins, have to be crushed to detach what is wanted from what is not wanted, and then the two have to be sorted in some way. magnetic separation is but one of these ways. another takes advantage of the fact that we seldom find two things together which have precisely the same specific gravity. consequently, if we throw the mixture on to a shaking table the heavier particles will behave differently from the lighter ones and the two will separate. the same result can be obtained by throwing the mixture into a stream of water, the water acting differently upon the lighter and upon the heavier particles. another way which may be mentioned is founded upon the fact that some things can be readily wetted with oil while others throw the oil off and refuse to be wetted by it. if a mixture of these two sorts of thing be stirred violently in a suitable oily liquid the former will be found eventually in the froth, while the latter will sink to the bottom. all these different methods are employed, as they are found necessary in preparing the ores of the various metals to which we have been referring. except in the case of alluvial ores which have been broken already by the action of ancient streams of water, nearly all ores (except iron) have to be crushed before the ores can be separated out. some of this work is done by the very simplest contrivances, showing how in some cases invention has almost come to a stop through the machines having been reduced to their simplest form. a notable instance of this is the stamp mill, in which heavy timbers are lifted up by machinery and then allowed to slide down upon the ore, just like gigantic pestles. more elaborate grinding machines are sometimes used, however, but it is impossible to mention them all here. the action of sorting out the fragments of ore from the miscellaneous assortment of crushed rocks is termed "concentrating," and the sorted ores are called "concentrates." another metal which has proved itself of immense importance in war is aluminium, and it fittingly comes at the close of the list since it is dealt with in a manner peculiar to itself. practically all the others are obtained from their ores by means of heat and heat alone. aluminium is obtained by electricity acting in the process called electrolysis. it is surprising to learn that aluminium is one of the very commonest things on the face of the earth. clay and many common rocks are very largely made of it. clay, to be precise, is a silicate of alumina, a term which is interesting when it is explained. silica is the name given to oxide of silicon. sand is mostly silica. alumina, too, is oxide of aluminium. silicate of alumina is a combination of the two. any clay, therefore, could be used as an ore from which to obtain aluminium, but of course there are certain minerals specially suitable for the purpose, since in them the metal is plentiful and easily extracted. in another chapter reference is made to the production of caustic soda from a solution of common salt by electrolysis. the same principle, precisely, is used to obtain the metal aluminium from its ore, which is generally an oxide. common salt, let me remind you, is sodium and chlorine combined. when you dissolve it in water it becomes ionized, which means that each molecule of salt splits up into two ions one of which is electrically positive and the other electrically negative. then, when we introduce two electrodes into the solution and connect them to a battery or dynamo, all the positive ions go to one electrode and all the negative ions to the other. we cannot dissolve aluminium ore in water, but we can in a bath of molten cryolite, and for some reason or other, whether because of the heat or not we cannot say, the ore becomes ionized, the aluminium atoms being one sort and the oxygen atoms the other sort. these ions then sort themselves out, the oxygen ions being taken into combination with the carbon rod which forms the positive electrode, while the metal ions collect upon the negative electrode. since this latter is a slab of carbon which forms the bottom of the vessel in which the process is carried on, the result is that pure aluminium gradually accumulates in the bottom of the vessel and can be drawn off from time to time. aluminium is always produced in places where electric power can be obtained cheaply, such as near waterfalls. chapter xii measuring the velocity of a shell in at least two of the preceding chapters of this book reference has been made to the speed at which a shell fired from a gun travels through the air. such velocities as , feet per second have been mentioned in this connection, and some readers are sure to have wondered how such measurements could possibly be made. possibly some sceptics have even supposed that they were not measured at all but simply estimated in some way or other. they are actually measured, however, and by very simple and ingenious means. needless to say, electricity plays a very important part in this wonderful achievement. in fact, without the aid of electricity it is difficult to see how it could be done at all. people often ask how quickly electricity travels, as if when we sent a telegraph signal along a wire a little bullet, so to speak, of electricity were shot along the wire like the carriers of the pneumatic tubes in the big drapers' shops. that is quite a misconception, for in reality the circuit of wire is more like a pipe full of electricity, and when we set a current flowing what we do is to set the whole of that electricity moving at once. if we think of a circular tube full of water with a pump at one spot in the circuit, we see that as soon as the water begins to move anywhere it moves everywhere. moreover, if it stops at one point it stops simultaneously at every other point. while practically this is the case it is theoretically not quite so, for the inertia of the water when it is suddenly started or stopped no doubt causes a slight distortion of the tube itself resulting in a very slight (quite imperceptible) retardation of the movement of the water. electricity also has a property comparable to the inertia which we are familiar with in the objects around us, and there is also a property in every conductor which to a certain extent resembles the elasticity of the water-pipe, whereby it may for a moment be bulged out. in a short wire, however (up to a mile or so), particularly if the flow and return parts of the circuit be twisted together, this electrical inertia practically vanishes and consequently we may say that for all practical purposes the current starts or stops, as the case may be, at precisely the same moment in every part of the circuit. that fact is of great value when, as in the case we are now discussing, we want to compare very exactly two events occurring very near together as to time but far apart as to place. [illustration: bomb-throwers at work. many kinds of bombs are used. one has a metal head and a handle about a foot long, with a streamer to ensure correct flight; another form resembles a brush when it is flying through the air; and a third, known as "the egg," is oval in form.] we need to compare the time when the shell leaves the gun with the time when it passes another point, say, one hundred yards away, and then again another point, say one hundred yards further on still. supposing, then, a velocity of , feet per second, the time interval between the first point and the second and between the second and third will be somewhere about a tenth of a second. so we shall need a timepiece of some sort which will not only measure a tenth of a second, but will measure for us a very small _difference_ between two periods, each of which is only about a tenth of a second and which will be very nearly alike. that represents a degree of accuracy exceeding even what the astronomers, those princes of measurers, are accustomed to. this exceedingly delicate timepiece is found in a falling weight. so long as the thing is so heavy that the air resistance is negligible, we can calculate with the greatest nicety how long a weight has taken to fall through a given distance. near the muzzle of the gun there is set up a frame upon which are stretched a number of wires so close together that a shell cannot get past without breaking at least one of them. these wires are connected together so as to form one, and through them there flows a current of electricity the action of which, through an electro-magnet in the instrument house, holds up a long lead weight. at some distance away, say one hundred yards, there is a similar frame also electrically connected to an electro-magnet in the same instrument house. this second magnet, when energized by current from the frame, holds back a sharp point which, under the action of a spring, tends to press forward and scratch the lead weight. the third frame is likewise connected to a third magnet controlling a point similar to the other. to commence with, current flows through all three frames so that all three magnets are energized. the gun is then fired and immediately the shell breaks a wire in the first frame, cutting off the current from the first magnet and allowing the weight to fall. meanwhile, the shell reaches the second frame, breaking a wire there, with the result that the second magnet loses its power, lets go the point which it has been holding back and permits it to make a light scratch upon the falling weight. this action is followed almost immediately by a similar action on the part of the third magnet, resulting in a second scratch on the lead weight. the position of these two scratches on the weight and their distance apart gives a very accurate indication of the time taken by the shell to pass from the first screen to the second and from the second to the third. from those times it is possible to calculate the initial velocity of the shell and the speed at which it will move in any part of its course. indeed, with those two times as data, it is possible to work out all that it is necessary to know about the behaviour of the shell. this is rendered practicable by the fact that the moment the wire is cut the magnet lets go, no matter what the distance of the screen from the instrument may be. but for the instantaneous action of the current, allowance of some sort would have to be made for the fact that one screen is farther than another and the whole problem would be made much more complicated. even as it is, someone may urge that the magnets themselves possess inertia and will not let go quite instantaneously, but that can be overcome by making the magnets all alike so that the inertia will affect all equally. it is only necessary to have a switch which will break all the three circuits at the same moment (quite an easy thing to arrange) and then adjust all three magnets so that when this is operated they act simultaneously. after that they can be relied upon to do their duty quite accurately. thus by a method which in its details is quite simple is this seemingly impossible measurement taken. chapter xiii some adjuncts in the engine room before we deal with the subject of the engines employed in warfare, it may be interesting to mention two beautiful little inventions which have been made in connection with them. let us take first of all a contrivance which tells almost at a glance the amount of work which the engines of a ship are doing. as everyone knows, there is in every ship (except those few which are propelled by paddles) a long steel shaft, called the tail-shaft, which runs from the engine situated somewhere near amidships to the propeller at the stern. many ships, of course, have several propellers, and then there are several shafts. now each of these shafts is a thick strong steel rod supported at intervals in bearings. if anyone were told that, in working, that shaft became more or less twisted, he would be tempted to think he was being made fun of. yet such is literally the case. the thick strong massive bar becomes actually twisted by the turning action of the engine at one end and the resistance of the propeller at the other. and the amount of that twisting is a measure of the work which the engine is doing. the puzzle is how to measure it while the engine is running, for of course the twist comes out of it as soon as the engine stops. a space on the shaft is selected, between two bearings, for the fixing of the apparatus. near to each bearing there is fitted on to the shaft a metal disc with a small hole in it. on one of the bearings is fixed a lamp and on the other a telescope. when the engine is at rest and there is no twist in the shaft, all these four things--the lamp, the two holes, and the telescope--are in line. consequently, on looking through the telescope the light is visible. but when the engine is at work and the shaft is more or less twisted one of the holes gets out of line and it becomes impossible to see the light through the telescope. a slight adjustment of the telescope, however, brings all four into line again, which adjustment can be easily made by a screw motion provided for the purpose. and the amount of adjustment that is found necessary forms a measure of the amount of the twisting which the shaft suffers and that again tells the number of horse-power which the engine is putting into its work. but it is also necessary to know how fast the engine is working. there are many devices which will tell this, of which the speedometer on a motor-car is a familiar example. most of those work on the centrifugal principle, the instrument actually measuring not the speed but the centrifugal force resulting from the speed, which amounts to the same thing. there is one instrument, however, which operates on quite a different principle, because of which it is specially interesting. it consists of a nice-looking wooden box with a glass front. through the glass one sees a row of little white knobs. if this be placed somewhere near the engine while it is at work immediately one of the knobs commences to move rapidly up and down, so that it looks no longer like a knob but is elongated into a white band. there is no visible connection between the instrument and the engine, yet the number over that particular knob which becomes thus agitated indicates the speed of the engine. let us in imagination open the case and we shall find that the knobs are attached to the ends of a number of light steel springs set in a row. the springs are all precisely alike except for their length, in which respect no two are alike. indeed, as you proceed from one side of the instrument to the other each succeeding one is a little longer than the previous one. now a spring has a certain speed at which it naturally vibrates and other things being equal that speed depends upon its length. you can, of course, force any spring to vibrate at any speed if you care to take the trouble, but each one has its own natural speed at which it will vibrate under very slight provocation. every engine is, of course, made to run as smoothly as possible. all revolving or reciprocating parts are for this reason carefully balanced and in turbines the whole moving part, since it is round and symmetrical, naturally approaches a condition of perfect balance. hence every engine ought to run perfectly smoothly. as a matter of fact, however, no engine ever does. there are certain limitations to man's skill and at the high speed of a fast-running engine, such as is to be found on a destroyer, for example, some little irregularity is sure to make itself felt by a slight vibration in the floor. it may be hardly perceptible to the senses, but to a spring whose natural frequency happens to be just that same speed or nearly so, it will be very apparent and in a few seconds that spring will be responding quite vigorously. it is another example of the principle of resonance, which is employed so finely in making wireless telegraph apparatus selective. every wireless apparatus is made to have a certain natural frequency of its own and it therefore picks up readily those signals which proceed from another station having the same frequency while ignoring those from others. in just the same way a reed or spring in this speed-indicator picks up and responds to impulses derived from the engine only when they are of a frequency corresponding with its own natural frequency. hence, one spring out of the whole range responds to the vibrations of the engine while the others remain almost if not entirely unaffected. in another form, the springs are actuated electrically. a magnet, or a series of magnets, is arranged so that as the engine turns the magnets pass successively near to a coil of wire, thereby inducing currents in that wire. they form, in fact, a small dynamo or generator, generating one impulse per revolution or two or three or whatever number may be most convenient. then the current from this is led round the coil of a long electro-magnet placed just under the free ends of all the springs. the magnet therefore gives a series of pulls, at regular intervals, and the rapidity of those pulls will depend upon the speed of the engine, while the frequency of them will be registered by the movement of one or other of the springs. this instrument can also be employed to determine the speed of aeroplane motors and, in fact, any kind of engine, especially those whose speed is very high. chapter xiv engines of war the phrase which i have used for the title of this chapter is often given a very wide meaning which includes all kinds and varieties of devices used in warfare. in this case i am giving it its narrower sense, taking it to indicate the steam-engines and oil-engines which are employed to drive our battleships, cruisers and destroyers, our submarines and our aircraft. they are inventions of the highest importance, which have played a large part in shaping modern warfare. the type of engine almost invariably used on ships of war other than submarines is the steam turbine. great britain, for the most part, uses that particular kind associated with the name of the hon. sir c. a. parsons, while the united states rather favour the curtiss machine. other nations have adopted either one of these or else something very similar. all turbines are very simple in their principle, far more so that the older type of steam-engine, called, because the essential parts of it move to and fro, the "reciprocating" steam-engine. in these latter machines there are a number of cylinders with closed ends and with very smooth interiors, in each of which slides a disc-like object called a piston. the steam enters a cylinder first at one end and then at the other, thus pushing the piston to and fro. the movement of the piston is communicated to the outside by means of a rod which passes through a hole in the cover at one end of the cylinder, the to and fro motion being converted into a round and round motion by a connecting-rod and crank just as the up and down motion of a cyclist's knees is converted into a round and round motion by the lower leg and the crank. the lower part of a cyclist's leg is, indeed, a very accurate illustration of what the connecting-rod of a steam-engine is. as is evident to the hastiest observer, some arrangement has to be made whereby the steam shall be led first into one end and then into the other end of the cylinder: also that provision shall be made for letting the steam out again when it has done its work. moreover, such arrangements must be automatic. hence, every reciprocating engine has special valves for this purpose and such valves need rods and cranks (or something equivalent) to operate them. further, to get the best results the steam must not simply be passed through one cylinder but through several in succession. engines where the steam goes through only one cylinder are called "simple," where it goes through two they are "compound," where three "triple-expansion," where four "quadruple-expansion." generally speaking, each cylinder has its own connecting-rod and crank, also its own set of rods, etc., for working its valves. hence, a high-class marine reciprocating engine is of necessity a complicated mass of cylinders, rods, cranks and other moving parts continually swinging round or to and fro at considerable speeds, all needing oiling and attention and all liable at times to give trouble. and now compare that with the turbine, which has two parts, only one of which moves. that part, moreover, is tightly shut up inside the other one, being thereby protected from any chance of damage from outside and likewise rendered unable to inflict any damage upon those in attendance upon it. at first sight it seems very strange that the turbine should be the newer of the two, for it is simply an improved form of the old time-honoured picturesque windmill which used to top every hill and grind the corn for every village and hamlet. the old windmill had four sails against which the wind blew, driving the whole four round as everyone knows. the new turbine has a great many sails, only we now call them blades, and the steam blows them round. the old windmill had to have another smaller set of sails at the back for the purpose of keeping the main sails always in that position in which they would catch the full force of the breeze. in the turbine we need not do that, for we shut the windmill up in a kind of tunnel and cause the steam to blow in at one end and out at the other. the difference between the various kinds of turbine lies simply in the manner in which the steam is guided in its passage through the machine. after that general description we can take a more detailed view of the parsons turbine. the casing or fixed part is a huge iron box suitably shaped for standing firmly and rigidly upon the floor of the engine-room. it is made in two halves, the upper of which can be easily lifted off when necessary. often, indeed, this upper half is hinged to the lower, so that it can be opened like the lid of a box. inside, the casing is cylindrical, comparatively small at one end but increasing by steps till it is very much larger at the other end. at each end is a bearing or support in which the rotor or moving part is held and in which it can turn freely. the rotor or part which rotates is a strong steel forging shaped somewhat to follow the lines of the inside of the casing. it does not entirely fill the casing but leaves a space all round and all the way along, which space is intended to accommodate the blades. the ends of the rotor are smaller than the body since they are intended to fit into the bearings, and one of the ends is prolonged so as to be available for coupling to the propeller-shaft of the ship. at one end of the casing, the smaller one, is the steam inlet and the steam after emerging from it passes along till it finds its way out at a very large outlet formed at the bigger end. on its way it has to pass thousands of small blades so that the progress of each individual particle of steam is not a straight line but a continual zigzag. there are rings of blades round the rotor, tightly fixed to its surface. there are likewise rings of blades affixed to the inner surface of the casing, the rings upon the casing coming in the spaces between the rings on the rotor. let us imagine that we can see through the casing of a turbine at work and that looking down upon it from above we can trace the progress of a particle of steam. it rushes in from the inlet and at once makes straight for the outlet at the further end. suddenly, however, it encounters one of the guide blades (those on the case) and by it is deflected to one side, we will suppose the left. that causes it to rush straight at one of the blades upon the rotor against which it strikes violently, giving that blade a distinct and definite push to the left. rebounding, it then comes back towards the right but quickly is caught by another guide blade and by it hurled back upon a second rotor blade, giving it a leftward push just as it did to the first. thus it goes zigzagging from one set of blades to the other until, tired out, so to speak, it finally flows away forceless and feeble through the outlet, having given up all its energy to the blades of the rotor against which it has struck in its course. that, then, is the journey of one single particle. multiply that by an unknown number of millions and you have a description of what takes place in the interior of a steam turbine. the blades are so proportioned, so arranged and so placed that it is very difficult indeed for a particle of steam to creep past without doing its share of work. practically every one is made use of and while, of course, the action of a single particle of steam would have but a negligible effect, the vast number engaged cause the rotor to be powerfully blown round. the reason why the casing and rotor are made larger and larger as one proceeds from the inlet towards the exhaust or outlet is that the steam must, if all its energy is to be extracted, expand as it goes and the enlargement provides room for this expansion. one of the great advantages of the turbine is that the steam is always entering at the same end. in the cylinder of a reciprocating engine the steam enters alternately. it comes in hot but as it does its work and finally goes out it becomes very much cooler: the next lot of steam which enters, therefore, is chilled by the cool walls of the cylinder which have just been cooled by the departure of the previous lot of steam: so heat is wasted. wasted heat means fuel lost, and as any given ship can only carry a limited quantity of fuel, wasted heat means less range and more frequent returns to the base to coal or to "oil." also let me remark again upon the simplicity of the turbine as opposed to the other sort. the latter consists of a mass of moving and swaying rods and cranks, to work among which, as the engineers have to do, is a terrifying and nerve-racking experience. the turbine, on the other hand, has its only working part enclosed. it is difficult to tell, by looking at it, whether a turbine is at work or not, so silent and still is it, so self-contained. the reciprocating engine-room is noisy and full of turmoil: the turbine room is weirdly still by comparison. on the whole, too, it makes better use of the steam which it uses, but it has one decided drawback. it will not reverse, which the other type of engine does readily. this means that two turbines have to be coupled together, one with the blades so set that the steam drives it round correctly to produce motion ahead and the other set the opposite way so that it drives the vessel astern. the steam can be sent through either turbine at will and so motion can be obtained in either direction. whichever turbine is in use the other revolves idly. unfortunately it is impossible to make a turbine to go slowly and yet be efficient. consequently, slow steamers cannot use turbines, but for warships, which are nearly all fast boats, it has almost displaced the older type of engine. the curtiss turbine is different from the parsons in that the steam encounters periodically, in its passage through, a partition perforated with funnel-shaped holes. between the partitions it passes blades upon which it acts just as already described. the chief effect of this is to permit the machine being made of a rather more convenient shape and size. other varieties of turbine are more or less combinations of the two ideas underlying these two. when we look at a locomotive in motion we always see steam coming out of the funnel, but we never see that in the case of a steamer. that is because all the energy of the steam is taken and used in the latter case, while in the former much valuable energy goes off up the funnel, making a puffing noise instead of doing useful work. on the steamship the steam is led not to the open air but to a vessel called a condenser the walls of which are kept cool by a continual circulation of cold water. the steam on entering the condenser at once collapses into water, leaving a vacuum. a pump called the "air-pump" removes the water (which was once steam) from the condenser and also any air which might get in, with the result that the engine is always discharging its steam into a vacuum. thus to the pressure of the steam is added the suction of the vacuum. in turbine ships the cooling water for the condensers is circulated by powerful centrifugal pumps driven by subsidiary engines. the steam is obtained from boilers of that special variety known as "water-tube." the boilers with which most people are familiar are either lancashire or cornish, both sorts being large steel cylinders with two steel flues in the former and one in the latter running from back to front. the fire is made in the front part of the flue and the hot gases from it pass to the back and then along the sides and underneath through flues formed in the brickwork in which the boiler is set. locomotive boilers, however, have no flues, but the hot gases from the fire in the fire-box pass through tubes which run from end to end through the cylindrical shell, each tube starting from the fire-box behind and terminating in the smoke-box in front. thus we have tubes with fire inside and water outside: hence such boilers are called "fire-tube" boilers. on many ships of the merchant type cylindrical boilers are used which combine the features, to some extent, of the cornish and the fire-tube, since there is a flue running from front to back in which the fire is made and the hot gases return from back to front through a number of tubes which occupy the space above the fire. arrived at the front the gases pass upwards to the chimney. water-tube boilers are different from all of these, since in them the water is inside the tubes while the fires play around the outside. this enables steam to be got up very quickly, a matter of much importance for a warship which may be called upon to undertake some operation at a moment's notice. the boilers are fed with water from the condensers, so that the same water is used over and over again. when coal is burnt it is put on the fires by hand, for although mechanical stoking is a great success on land, there are special difficulties which prevent its use at sea. it is becoming more and more the fashion now to burn oil instead of coal in several types of ships and in those cases the oil is blown in the form of spray into the furnace. this has many advantages, some of which are exemplified on a small scale by the difference between using a coal fire and a gas stove. like the latter, the oil spray can be quickly lit when needed and as quickly extinguished. it can be regulated and adjusted with equal facility. oil can be taken on board too through a pipe, silently and quickly and without the terrible dirt and the exhausting labour involved in coaling a big ship. oil, too, can be taken on board at sea, from a tank steamer, almost as easily as it can be taken in ashore, whereas the difficulty of coaling at sea despite many ingenious efforts has never been solved quite satisfactorily. finally, oil can be stowed anywhere, for the stokers do not need to dig it out with a shovel. therefore it can be carried in those spaces between the inner and outer bottoms which have to be there in order to give strength to the ship's hull but which would be quite useless for carrying coal. the advantages of oil fuel, therefore, are many and no doubt it will be used more and more as time goes on. for great britain, oil fuel has the disadvantage that it has to be imported whereas the finest steam coal in the world is found in abundance in south wales, but the difficulty may eventually be overcome by distilling from native coal an oil which will serve as well as that which is now imported. so much for the turbine, the engine of the big ships: now for the diesel oil-engine which drives the submarines. it belongs to that family of engines called "internal-combustion" since in them the fuel is burnt actually inside the cylinder and not under a separate contrivance such as a boiler. there have been oil-engines, so called, for many years, but they were really gas-engines since the oil was first heated till it turned into vapour and then that vapour was used as a gas. the diesel engine, however, actually burns oil in its liquid state. to understand how it works let me ask you to conjure up this little picture before your mind's eye. a hollow iron cylinder is fixed in a vertical position: its upper end is closed but its lower end is open: inside it is a piston, free to slide up and down: by means of a connecting-rod hinged to it and passing downwards through the open lower end the piston is connected to a crank and flywheel. at the upper end of the cylinder are certain openings which can be covered and uncovered in succession by the action of suitable valves. now let us assume that that engine is at work, the piston going rapidly up and down in the cylinder. as it goes down it draws in a quantity of air through a valve which opens to admit the air at just the right moment. the moment the piston reverses its movement and starts to go up again that valve closes and the air is entrapped. the piston continues to rise, however, with the result that the air becomes compressed in the upper part of the cylinder. now it is necessary to remind you at this point that compressing air or indeed any gas, raises its temperature. this air, therefore, which was drawn in at the temperature of the outer atmosphere, by the time the piston has reached the top of its stroke has attained a temperature well above the ignition point of the oil fuel. the piston, having arrived at the top of its stroke, the upper part of the cylinder is filled with hot compressed air: the next moment the piston commences its descent, but at precisely that same moment a valve opens and there is projected into the cylinder a spray of oil. instantly it bursts into flame, heating the air still more, so that as the piston descends the air, expanding with the heat, pushes strongly and steadily upon it. the amount of that push can be varied by varying the duration of the jet. the longer the jet is injected the more heat is generated and the more sustained is the push. on the other hand, if the jet is cut off very quickly the push is only a gentle one. the power of the engine can thus be adjusted to suit varying circumstances by a slight variation in the valve which controls the jet. the piston having thus been driven down to the limit of its stroke, it commences another upward movement, at which moment another valve opens and lets out the hot waste gases which have resulted from the burning of the oil. thus the cylinder is cleaned out ready for a fresh supply of pure air to be drawn in on the next ensuing downstroke. the engine thus works upon a series or cycle of operations which are repeated automatically over and over again. first comes a downstroke, drawing in air: then an upstroke, compressing it: then a second downstroke, during which the fuel burns and the power is generated: and, finally, a second upstroke during which the waste products of the burning are ejected. power, it will be noticed, is only developed in one out of the four strokes: the other movements having, in single cylinder engines, to be performed by the momentum of the flywheel. in most cases, however, the engine has several cylinders in which the cycles are arranged to follow in succession. thus, if there are four cylinders, there is always power being developed by one of them. the valves are operated automatically by the engine itself just as is the case with steam-engines. the engine also works a small pump which provides the very highly compressed air necessary to blow the oil jet into the cylinder. arrangements are often provided whereby the engine when working stores up a reserve of compressed air which can be used to start it. from the very nature of its working such an engine cannot develop power until it has accomplished at least four strokes or two revolutions, so that it cannot possibly start itself. if, however, compressed air be admitted to the cylinders to give it a vigorous push or two and so get it going, it can then take up its own work and go on indefinitely. in some cases this is not necessary and that of an engine in a submarine is one of them. in that instance, the electric motor, which drives the boat when submerged, can be made to give the engine a start. by altering the rotation in which the valves act the direction can be reversed. a very simple mechanism can be made to effect this change, so that reversing is quite easy. aircraft are mostly, if not entirely, driven by petrol engines, some of which are very little different from those of a motor-car or motor-cycle. these motor-car engines are so well known that little need be said about them. it may be well to explain, however, that they, like the diesel engines, work on a cycle of four strokes, as follows:-- first stroke (down) draws in a mixture of air and gas. second stroke (up) compresses the mixture. just at the top of this stroke an electric spark fires the mixture, causing an explosion which drives the piston downwards, thus making the third stroke (down), during which the power is developed. fourth stroke (up) expels the waste products of the explosion. although all of them work on this same cycle, in which they resemble the engines of the motor-car, there are several much-used types of aero-engine in which the mechanical arrangement of the parts is quite different. of these the best known is the famous gnome engine which has a considerable number of cylinders arranged around a centre like the spokes of a wheel. the centre is in fact a case which covers the crank, and the cylinders are placed in relation to it just as the spokes are placed around the hub of a wheel. there is only one crank and all the connecting-rods drive on to it. owing to their position around it they thus act in succession, giving a nice regular turning effort. further, these engines differ from all others in that the crank is a fixture while the rest of the engine goes round, exactly the opposite of what we are accustomed to. the engine, in fact, constitutes its own flywheel. rushing thus through the air, the cylinders tend to keep themselves cool, doing away with the need for cooling water and radiators. consequently engines of this type are the very lightest known in proportion to their horse-power. a fifty horse-power engine can be easily carried by one man. it would be possible to go on much longer with this most interesting subject of engines, but having treated the three types which are most used in warfare, it is now time to pass on to something else. chapter xv destroyers except for the submarine the most prominent craft during the war has undoubtedly been the destroyer. all warships are in one sense destroyers, since it is their prime duty to destroy other ships, so why should one particular kind of boat be given this name specially? like many other of the terms which we use it is an abbreviation, a mere remnant of a fully descriptive title. "torpedo boat destroyer" is what these ships are called in the navy list. even that full title, however, only tells us what their original purpose was: it leaves us very much in the dark as to the many various functions which they perform. the invention of the torpedo called for the construction of small boats whereby the new weapon could be used to best advantage, and so we got our torpedo boats. they in turn called forth another boat whose duty it was to run down and destroy them, and in that way we get our destroyers. from that bit of naval history we can almost see for ourselves what the characteristics of the destroyers must be. they have to be bigger than the torpedo boats, but as the latter were quite small the destroyers, though larger, are still comparatively small craft, latterly of about one thousand tons. then they have to be very fast, in order to be able to chase the others and, finally, they need one or two guns, comparatively small so as not to overburden the ship and yet large enough to dispose of anything of their own size or smaller. unquestionably, their greatest feature is their speed. they are the fastest ships afloat, rivalling even a fairly fast train. some of them can exceed forty miles an hour. they are very active and nimble, too, being able to turn in a comparatively small circle. for warships, too, they are cheap, so that a commander can afford to risk losing a destroyer when he would fear to risk another vessel. for all purposes except the actual hard-hitting they are the most useful weapon which the commander of the fleet possesses. when the main fleet puts to sea a whole cloud of these smaller craft hover round looking for submarines or for the surface torpedo boats which might try to attack the large ships under cover of darkness, while keeping a sharp look-out, too, for mines or any other kind of floating danger, and thus they screen the more valuable ships. likewise do they convoy merchant ships sometimes, especially through waters believed to be infested with submarines. they also sally forth on little expeditions of their own, knowing that they can fight any craft equally speedy and show a clean pair of heels to any heavier ships, while by adroit use of their own torpedoes they may even "bag" a cruiser or two. they are pre-eminently the enemy of the submarine, for the under-water boat is necessarily less active even when it is on the surface than they are, so that a submarine caught by a destroyer stands a very good chance of being rammed by it, which means that the destroyer deliberately rushes at it, using its own bow as a ram wherewith to knock a hole in it. or if that be not practicable the destroyer, while dodging the torpedo of the submarine, may plant a single well-aimed shot into its opponent and the fight is over. a cleverly-handled destroyer appears to have little difficulty in avoiding the comparatively slow torpedo, but no ship ever built could avoid a properly aimed shell, two facts which are clearly indicated by the very few cases in which, during the war, a destroyer has succumbed to a submarine. the gun of the latter, if it has one, is no match for the guns of the destroyer. naval strategy and tactics, when one thinks about them carefully, reveal a very close resemblance to those of the football field. the destroyers are like the forwards, quick, light and nimble, valuable chiefly because of their ability to run swiftly and to dodge cleverly, while the heavy, stolid backs represent the battleships in their ability to withstand the heavy shocks of the game. any imaginative boy will be able to carry this simile farther still and a comparison of the description of the battle of jutland with his own knowledge of the game will reveal a surprising parallelism. thus the reader will to a very large extent be able to see for himself the manifold uses to which these wonderful little ships lend themselves, and he will see that above everything else it is their speed which counts, which fact gives us the key to their peculiar construction. to commence with, they are made as light as possible. the material used is different from that of ordinary ships, being "high-tensile" steel, a steel into which a little more carbon than usual is introduced, resulting in about per cent higher tensile strength but also involving, alas! rather more brittleness. when made of this material the whole framework of the vessel can be made of lighter beams and the covering can be of thinner plates than would be the case if the mild steel ordinarily employed for shipbuilding were used. the high-tensile steel is lighter for a given strength and therefore a ship built of it is lighter than it would otherwise have to be. besides the use of this particular material every resource in the way of ingenuity and skill on the part of the designers is bent towards saving weight. no unnecessary part is ever put in, but, on the other hand, necessaries are skinned down to the utmost limit consistent with safety in order to produce a light ship. how difficult this problem is is hardly realized until one thinks of the conditions which prevail when a ship floats in the water. the upward support of the water is exerted in a fairly regular way all along the ship while the weights inside which are pressing downward are concentrated in lumps. the engines, for example, represent a very heavy weight concentrated in one fairly confined spot. thus the vessel has to have sufficient stiffness to resist the action of these opposing forces which are thus tending to break her in two. that, moreover, occurs in the stillest water; when the sea is rough still worse stresses are brought to bear upon the comparatively fragile hull, for a wave may lift each end, leaving the middle more or less unsupported, or one may lift the middle while the ends to a certain extent are left overhanging. all this, too, is in addition to the knocks and buffets caused by huge volumes of water being flung against the ship by cross seas in the height of a tempest. in the case of ordinary ships where speed is not of such great importance, the problem is simplified by the use of what is termed a high "factor of safety," which means that the designers calculate these forces as nearly as they can and then make the structure _amply_ strong enough. in other words, care is taken to keep well on the safe side. in a destroyer, however, there is no room for such a margin of safety. risks have to be taken, and it is only the high degree of skill and experience possessed by our ship designers which enable these light ships to be made with, as experience shows, a very considerable degree of safety. they have to be continually choosing between strength on the one hand and lightness on the other and the way in which they combine the two is marvellous. the weight thus saved is used for carrying engines, boilers and fuel. relatively to its size, the destroyer is about as strong as an egg-shell, but its engines are of extraordinary power. the destroyers are generally organized and operate in little groups or flotillas of perhaps twenty or so with a small cruiser or a flotilla leader as a flagship, on which is the officer in command of them all. there is also usually a depot ship for each flotilla. the flotilla leaders are what one might call super-destroyers, about double the size of the ordinary large destroyer, which is to say, about two thousand tons, and capable of very high speed. the depot ships form a kind of floating headquarters for their respective flotillas. they are usually old cruisers which are specially fitted up for the purpose, and although they are of comparatively slow speed they can by wireless telegraphy keep in touch with the destroyers, which can return to them when occasion permits or demands. they carry workshops in which small repairs can be carried out, spare ammunition and stores of all kinds and spare men for the crews. in fact they can look after the smaller craft much as a mother looks after her children, and for that reason they are sometimes called "mother ships." as has been said, the destroyer was originally intended to destroy torpedo boats, but small torpedo boats have almost gone out of existence or rather the class have so grown in size as to have become merged in the destroyers, which, it must be remembered, are well armed with torpedoes which they have at times used with great effect. it is not surprising, therefore, to find that a still newer class of ship has arisen which has been described by one authority as "destroyer-destroyers." officially known as "light armoured cruisers," not very much is known of their details. they are, however, about tons, with guns, large enough that is to dispose of any destroyer which they might encounter. thus, to review the whole class of ships of which we have been speaking, we may say that there are the destroyers, all the more recent of which are about tons but diminishing as we go backward in time to about or ; the flotilla leaders about twice the size of the largest destroyers; and the destroyer-destroyers nearly twice as large as the flotilla leaders: all are characterised by high speed and by guns just large enough for the work for which they are intended. all are armed, too, with the deadly torpedo for attack upon larger ships than themselves. they are essentially night-birds, much of their time being spent stealing about with all lights out, in pitch darkness, seeking for information or for a chance to put a torpedo into some chance victim. these night operations are very hazardous, but so skilful are the young officers who have charge of these boats that seldom do we hear of mishaps. but although, as has been said, the torpedo boat has almost vanished, its under-water comrade has recently assumed a place in the first rank of importance, and perhaps to us the most valuable work of all done by the destroyer is that of hunting down and sinking these modern pirates. chapter xvi battleships perhaps the greatest war invention of modern times was the british battleship _dreadnought_. of course, there have been battleships for centuries. in history we read of fleets consisting of so many "ships of the line" or in other words "line-of-battle" ships, meaning ships which were considered capable of taking their place in "line of battle," as distinguished from "frigates" which correspond to the modern "cruiser." the "line-of-battle" ships were stout and strong with plenty of guns. they went into the thick of the fight, since they were capable of giving and receiving hard blows, while the lighter frigates hovered around seeking an opening to use their higher speed to cut off stragglers or to prey upon merchant ships. although so different in form and material that a sailor of the old days, could he revisit the earth, would not recognize them, the battleships of to-day are the real descendants of the "line-of-battle" ships of those times. they are stout and strong, with the heaviest guns, capable of giving and taking the hardest knocks, and it is they who form the backbone of the fleet. as we saw in the accounts of the battle of jutland, the german fleet tackled our cruisers and lighter vessels but discreetly withdrew when the battleships came up. looked at in another way, we may say that a battleship is a floating fortress. its speed is not great, when compared with other ships, but it is constructed to carry enormous guns. it is also armoured with steel plates of great thickness and of special hardness placed upon the outside of the hull so as to cover its vital parts and protect them from the shells of the enemy. its chief function, we may say, is to carry its guns: to enable it to do this with safety, it is armoured: and to enable it to get to grips with its enemies it has engines and boilers. those are the three features of greatest importance in a battleship, its guns, its armour and its engines. all else is of minor importance. it is strange to think how short a time the iron or steel ship has been with us. in the american civil war, for instance, only about sixty years ago, the battleships were made of wood. it was during that war that ericcson thought of the idea of putting iron plates to protect the sides of a ship from the hostile shots, and from that improvised armouring of a wooden ship has arisen the iron-clad or, more correctly, steel-clad monsters of to-day. it is just about fifty years ago since the last iron-clad wooden battleship was launched for the british navy. her name was _repulse_, and she took the water in . with a tonnage of and a horse-power of , she had a speed of knots. her armouring of iron was in parts ½ inches and in other parts inches thick, while she carried guns of sizes which to-day would seem mere toys. if all her guns were discharged together she would throw a total weight of lbs. of projectiles. now, for comparison, let us take a modern battleship, the _orion_, for example. the tonnage is , , the horse-power , . she is more than twice the length of the older ship and is armoured with steel inches thick. her large guns, each ½ inches in diameter, if fired together (as i once heard them, like thunder, though miles away) throw a weight of , lbs. from this we see the wonderful growth in size, speed and in hitting power during the comparatively short period of fifty years. but there is a more striking comparison still. the _repulse's_ guns threw lbs. and the _orion's_ throw , . but that takes no account of the energy with which the weight is thrown. a tennis ball hit hard, might really contain more energy and do more damage to anything it hit than a cricket ball thrown gently, which illustrates the fact that in comparing the power of guns we need to consider something more than the mere weight of the projectiles. to arrive at a real comparison we take the weight of the projectiles in tons and multiply it by the speed at which they leave the guns in _feet per second_. and we call the answer so many "foot-tons." now the energy of the _repulse_ thus reckoned comes to just under , ; that of the _orion_ to just under , . the _orion_ can hit twenty-three times as hard as could its forerunner of only fifty years ago. since the _repulse_ all our battleships have been built of wrought iron or mild steel. speaking generally, there was a steady development in size and horse-power and in speed until , in which year there was launched the world-famous h.m.s. _dreadnought_. previously no battleship had been faster than knots: she was designed for knots. her tonnage was , , exceeding by more than tons anything that had gone before. but the great change was in the guns. pre-dreadnoughts had, or one ought to say "have" for there are still many in existence, four of the biggest guns, a number of medium-sized guns and a still larger number of smallish guns intended for the purpose of keeping off torpedo craft and such small fry. at one stroke lord fisher, who was then the first sea lord of the british admiralty, changed all this. he swept all the medium-sized guns away and gave this new ship ten of the largest guns then in use. the advent of this ship startled the whole naval world, for it was seen at once by all those able to judge that there was a vessel which might be expected to sink with ease any other ship afloat. the onslaught from those ten guns would be more than any other ship could stand. so other powers set to work to copy more or less exactly, while great britain quickly built more like her. so important was this new invention that very soon the strength of the naval powers began to be reckoned entirely on the number of dreadnoughts they possessed, the older ships being left out of account as though they did not make any difference one way or the other. but great britain was not content with the _dreadnought_, for each succeeding ship or set of ships was improved until, only four years later, there was launched the _orion_ already referred to, nearly tons bigger, with more horse-power, and with ½-inch guns instead of -inch. the _orion_ and her sisters are often spoken of as super-dreadnoughts. the dreadnoughts as a class are often referred to as "all-big-gun" ships, since that is the feature which most distinguishes them from those which went before. these large guns are mounted in turrets as they are called. we might describe these as turn-tables with a cover over something like a small gas-holder. there are usually two guns in each turret, although there are a few ships whose turrets have three in each. the turrets seem to be standing on the deck of the ship and it is by turning them round that the guns are trained or pointed at their target. the original _dreadnought_ had one turret in front and two behind, all on the centre-line of the ship, and two more, one each side, amidships. in late vessels all five turrets are on the centre-line. thus the _dreadnought_ can fire six guns ahead, eight astern and eight to either side, while the newer ships can fire four ahead, four astern and all ten on either side. there are other battleships with even more guns than these, such as the u.s.a. ship _wyoming_, with twelve -inch guns, but the british navy seems to prefer to stick to the original number of ten. the reason for this is that every such ship is a compromise between three alternatives. the three great features have already been pointed out, namely, the guns, the armour and the propelling machinery. either of these can be increased at the cost of one or both of the others, but all cannot be increased without sinking the ship, unless indeed, the ship be made larger and then other considerations crop up. and that brings us to another class of ship often ranked among the battleships. these remarkable vessels are also termed cruisers and the fashion seems to have established itself of combining the two names and calling them battle-cruisers. they gave a fine account of themselves during the war. the first three of these, of which the _invincible_ is usually taken as the type, made its appearance the year after the _dreadnought_, and like the latter were the offspring of the fertile brain of lord fisher. the _invincible_ was about the same size as the _dreadnought_, but had nearly twice the horse-power ( , ), which enabled it to attain an actual speed of nearly six knots more, namely, · . for guns it had eight of the same large weapons, and it was armoured with -inch steel armour-plates instead of -inch. thus we see illustrated what has just been said, less guns and thinner armour, to allow for more engine power and higher speed. or, to put it the other way, we observe how higher speed was attained at the expense of the guns and the armour. but just as the _dreadnought_ was followed by other still greater improvements in the same direction we get, in , the famous ship _lion_, a vessel not unknown to the germans, a "super-invincible." this ship has a tonnage of over , and , horse-power. it was designed to do knots. we saw the use of these ships in the jutland battle, when, using their high speed, they attacked the german battleships and kept them engaged while the slower battleships came up. though they suffered severe losses, which probably the more heavily armoured battleships would have escaped, they held the germans so that it was only the failing light which saved them from utter destruction. another example was the way in which they hunted down von spee and his squadron off the falklands, when they caught the germans because of their higher speed and then sank them by means of their heavier guns with practically no loss to themselves. we saw them again in the heligoland battle, coming up to the assistance of the lighter vessels just in the nick of time and scattering the enemy like so much chaff. a fact little known to most people and productive of much surprise is that these battleships and cruisers are not such very large vessels, when compared with those of the merchant service. the _lion_ is feet long and feet wide, the _aquitania_ is feet long and feet wide, and the _olympic_ is feet long and feet wide. the mighty _orion_ makes a poorer showing still in point of size, since she is only feet long and feet wide--little over half the length of the _aquitania_. it is difficult to compare the tonnage of a warship with that of a merchant ship, since they are not measured in the same way. the former is the "displacement" or actual weight of water displaced: in other words the precise weight of the vessel in tons of lbs. the tonnage of a merchant ship, however, has nothing to do with weight but is based upon capacity and is arrived at by a purely arbitrary rule, thus: all the enclosed space in the ship is measured in cubic feet and the total is divided by one hundred. that gives the gross tonnage. to arrive at the net tonnage the space occupied by the engines and all other space necessary for the working of the ship is excluded. originally the tonnage of a merchant ship was the number of "tuns" of wine which it could carry. thus, you see, comparing the tonnage of a warship with that of a merchant ship is somewhat like comparing a pound with a bushel. net registered tonnage is generally considerably less than the displacement tonnage of the same ship, so that a warship is usually less than a merchant ship of the same nominal number of tons. and now let us turn to some of the internal arrangements of these wonderful ships, more particularly to the means for working the guns. each turret is placed over the top of what we might call a well, running right down deep into the inside of the ship. at the bottom of this well is the magazine, where the shells are stored and also the cartridges containing the explosive which drives the shell from the gun. underneath the turret, forming a kind of basement to it, is a chamber called the working chamber, and up to it the shells and cartridges pass by means of lifts. for safety's sake only a small quantity of explosives is kept here at any one time, but it is from here that the guns overhead are fed. shells and cartridges alike pass up as required by means of hoists right to the guns. indeed, the hoists are ingeniously contrived so that in whatever position a gun may be the hoist stops exactly opposite the breech, or opening at the back of the gun through which it is loaded. then a mechanical rammer drives the shell or cartridge into its place in the gun. the hoists are worked by hydraulic power or electricity, and in most cases by both, arrangements being made so that either can be used at will, thus serving as alternatives in case either should get out of order. the turrets themselves are also turned by power. indeed, so heavy are the weights involved that only by the use of carefully designed machinery is the operation of such great weapons made possible. a single shell of the · -inch gun weighs lbs. around each turret there is placed a wall of thick armour plate as high as it is possible to make it without interfering with the movement of the guns. this is called the barbette armour and the space enclosed by it, in which the turret stands, is called a barbette, an old fortification term meaning a place behind a rampart. the turret is covered over, as has already been remarked, by a steel hood, so that altogether the guns and their crews are about as well protected as it is possible to be. that all this means a considerable burden upon the ship is shown by the fact that a pair of -inch guns with their turret and barbette armour will weigh something like tons, and if there be five of them that means tons in all. down below in the magazine there are lifting appliances whereby the shells can be readily picked up and run to the hoist. moreover, there is elaborate machinery for keeping them cool. our allies the french had, years ago, several bad accidents through the explosives going off spontaneously in their ships, and this is quite likely to happen if the magazines become too hot. so refrigerating apparatus is installed similar to that employed in meat-carrying ships, which provides a constant flow of cool air into the magazines. the ships also are subdivided to the greatest possible extent consistent with efficient working, so that in the event of a collision or a torpedo making a hole below water the ship may not sink. as far as possible the divisions or bulkheads are made to run right from top to bottom without any openings, but that obviously is a very inconvenient arrangement, so in many places there have to be doorways through them, leading from one part of the ship to another. in such cases these are closed by water-tight doors, which can be shut before the ship goes into action or into any dangerous region. the engines of these vessels are now always turbines. this type of engine has many advantages over the older type, in which certain parts move to and fro, that motion being changed by cranks into a round and round action. for one thing, they are lighter for a given power, so that more power can be put into a ship without adding to the weight. that means higher speed. then there is less to get out of order. anyone who has been into a ship's engine room where to and fro or reciprocating engines are at work will realize this, for there is a maze of rods and cranks all moving together, and many parts which need to be oiled while in motion and which would get hot and tight if they were not carefully looked after. all this in an enclosed space with possibly an uncomfortable motion of the whole ship used to make the engineer's life at sea a very hazardous and unhappy one. but the turbine is entirely enclosed. there is nothing to be seen moving at all. indeed, there is only one moving part, and that is coupled directly to the propeller-shaft, so that nothing could possibly be simpler. chapter xvii how a warship is built when it is decided to build a certain ship, the first thing to be done is to draw it on paper. the admiralties of the world, and also the great shipbuilders, have each their own chief designer installed in a big, light, quiet office fitted with large strong, flat tables at which work a number of draughtsmen. the naval authorities tell the "chief" in general terms what they want the ship to be capable of, and he determines its size and form. then the draughtsmen work out his ideas on paper, themselves deciding upon the minor details, until they have produced exact representations of the ship which is to be. some draughtsmen deal with the actual hull of the ship, while others design the various fittings and minor details, all working, of course, under the constant supervision of the chief. in this connection one may perhaps allude to a matter which the general public often seems to misunderstand--the work and functions of a draughtsman. i have heard people say of a boy that he is good at drawing so they think of making a draughtsman of him. now the point is that the actual drawing is perhaps the least important part of a draughtsman's work. he has to know _what to draw_. he is given just a rough idea of something and from that he has to produce a perfect design, bearing in mind that the thing to be made must well fulfil its purpose, must be easy and cheap to construct, must be strong enough yet not too heavy, must be made of the most suitable material and so on. he has to possess a good deal of the knowledge of the skilled workman, he has to be something of a scientist and a good mathematician in addition to his ability to make neat and accurate drawings. so, you see, these men whose minds conceive the details of our great ships are men of long training and experience, with far greater knowledge and skill than we sometimes give them credit for. anyway, there they stand, each at his own table, bending over his own drawing-board, each doing his own particular share towards producing the perfect ship. but when all is said and done, there are limitations to the cleverness of the cleverest among us, so the next step, after the draughtsmen have done their best, is to test what they have done by experiment. years ago a certain mr. william froude interested himself in the question of the best shapes for ships, and he found that by making an exact model of a ship and then drawing that model through water it was possible to foretell just how that ship would behave. he built himself a tank for the purpose of these experiments at torquay, where he lived, and by its aid he added a very important chapter to the science of shipbuilding. nowadays the admiralty have a large and well-fitted tank at portsmouth, the united states navy have one at washington, private shipbuilders have the use of a national tank at bushey, near london, while several of the large firms have tanks of their own. the national tank at bushey, by the way, was given to the nation by mr. yarrow, a famous shipbuilder, in memory of mr. froude, it being called the "william froude tank" in recognition of the great work done by him. now these tanks may be described as rather elongated swimming-baths. such a structure is generally a little narrower than the average bath, but it is longer and much deeper. at one end there are miniature docks in which the models float when not in use, while at the other there is a sloping beach upon which the waves caused by the models expend their energy harmlessly. along each side there runs a rail upon which are supported the ends of a travelling bridge. driven by electric motors, this bridge can run to and fro from end to end of the tank, and its purpose is to drag the models through the water. carried upon the bridge is a platform which bears a number of instruments, chief among which is a self-recording dynamometer. now a dynamometer is an instrument for measuring the force of a "pull," and when we call it self-recording we mean that it automatically takes a record of a series of pulls or of a varying pull. in this case there projects below the bridge a lever, to the end of which the model under test is attached. as the bridge rushes along it pulls the model through the water by means of this lever, and the force which is expended in doing so is recorded in the form of a wavy line upon a sheet of ruled paper. if the model slips through the water very easily there is little pull upon the lever and the line drawn by the pen of the instrument remains low down upon the chart. if, however, much power is needed and the pull is a strong one the pen moves and the line rises towards the top of the paper. any change, whether increase or decrease, is thus shown by the rise or fall of the ink line. one model can be thus tried at various speeds and its behaviour noted under different conditions. other matters can be investigated too, such as whether or not the bow rises in the water or falls when the boat is in motion, also how much such rise or fall may amount to. the suitability of a certain shape of vessel, moreover, can to a certain extent be seen by observing the commotion which it makes in the water. everyone has noticed the way in which a ship throws up a wave at its bows, and that bow-wave, as it is termed, represents so much energy being wasted. the power of the engines is absorbed to a certain extent in making that wave. it is impossible to make anything which when forced through the water will not make some wave, but certain forms cause less of it than others, and the designer of a ship seeks to find that form which will make the smallest bow-wave. in like manner the eddies which a ship leaves in its wake are the result of wasted energy, and the ship must be so shaped that they too will be reduced to a minimum. shipbuilders find that there are three things which retard a ship's movement: skin friction, or friction between the water and the sides of the ship; wave making at the bow and eddy making at the stern. the first depends largely upon the smoothness of the ship's surface, the second and third depend upon its shape. if a model behaves badly in the tank the fault may be either too much wave making or too much eddy making, and which of these it is the dynamometer does not of course tell. in many cases the experienced eye of the tank officials furnishes the clue to the trouble, but in some cases a cinematograph is used to make a complete series of photographs of the model and the water around it as it rushes from end to end. these can then be studied in conjunction with the chart and the cause of the fault discovered. the real aim, it is obvious, of all these tank experiments is to find out the lowest horse-power necessary to drive the ship, or the best form of ship to get the highest speed out of a given horse-power. the cost of keeping up these large tanks and making the models and conducting the experiments is very great, for not only are the premises very large (i know one in which the water alone cost nearly a hundred pounds) but a highly skilled staff is necessary. the saving effected in the cost of ships and the superior efficiency of the ships makes it well worth while however. there is still one other point about this matter which will possibly be puzzling the observant reader. what are the models made of and how are they made? they are made of paraffin wax, and a very important department of the experimental tank is that where the models are formed. first of all a rough mould is fashioned by hand in modelling clay and into this is poured melted wax, the result being a very rough model of the ship. this is then placed in the model-making machine. those of my readers who are familiar with an engineer's shop will know what a planing machine is like, and from that they can form an idea of the general structure of this remarkable tool. there is, first of all, a travelling table which, as the machine works, travels to and fro. spanning this table is a beam which carries on its under side two revolving cutters, so that as the table passes beneath them the cutters can operate upon anything placed upon the table. another part of the machine is a board upon which is placed the drawing showing the external shape of the proposed ship, and working over this board is a pointer connected by a system of rods and levers to the cutters just mentioned. the rough block of wax, then, having been placed upon the table and the to and fro motion set going, the attendant guides the pointer along the lines of the drawing, and as he does so the cutters so move as to carve away the soft wax into the precise shape of the model. a little smoothing by hand is all that is necessary to complete the conversion of the rough piece of wax into a perfect model. it is then placed in the water and ballasted with little bags of shot until it floats at just the correct depth, and finally a light wooden frame is fitted to it for the purpose of making the connection to the lever by which it is pulled along. thus, after much thought and experiment, the designs for a new ship are completed. tracings are then made of them on semi-transparent paper or cloth, which tracings are then used as "negatives," from which a number of photographic prints are made, just as the amateur photographer makes prints from his negatives. at least that is how they used to be done, in a huge printing frame, but nowadays a machine is more often employed which passes the tracing or negative with a piece of photographic paper behind it slowly past an electric light, thus doing the work more quickly and more conveniently, for the drawings of ships are often very long and would either require an enormous frame or else would have to be made in pieces and joined together. the prints are finally passed out to the works to be translated in terms of iron, steel and wood. perhaps the most important part of a shipyard is the mould loft, a large apartment on the floor of which the ship is drawn out full size. then from these full-size drawings moulds or templets are made of wood or soft metal, showing the exact size and shape of the various parts. the moulds or templets go thence to the workshops, where the bars and plates of steel are cut to the right shape and perforated with holes, and some of the pieces are there joined together with rivets. [illustration: the tripod mast. here we see one leg of the tripod mast of a warship. these masts have greater stability and freedom from vibration than others. they are used for observation and range-finding, and have a fighting-top on which guns of small calibre are mounted. here is shown a sailor carrying a wounded comrade.] from the workshops the various pieces or parts go to the yard where the slip is on which the vessel is being built. this slip is by the water's edge, conveniently placed with a view to the fact that later on the great structure, weighing possibly thousands of tons, has got to slide down into the water. where the keel of the ship is to go a row of timber blocks is placed a few feet apart, and upon these blocks the plates of steel which form the lowest part of the ship are laid. upon them are laid other parts, and upon them others, the joints being made by riveting. thus the great ship grows from the keel upwards. as she gets bigger and bigger there comes the danger of her tipping over, and that is provided against by the use of props or shores along both sides. by the time the hull is ready for launching it is often of great weight, all of which is borne upon the wooden blocks underneath the keel. consequently, if the ground be not good, piles have to be driven in or concrete foundations laid to enable the huge mass of the ship to be supported. for this reason a large vessel cannot be built anywhere but only on a properly prepared "slip," and it is the possession of a large number of such places which enables great britain to build so many ships at once. along each side of the slip there is usually a row of tall masts with a beam projecting out sideways near the top of each, forming cranes by which the heavier parts can be hoisted into position. in other yards, again, there is a tall iron structure called a gantry along each side of the slip, while travelling cranes span across from one to the other over where the growing ship lies. these travelling cranes, worked by electricity, permit heavy weights to be handled with ease and safety. other subsidiary cranes, meanwhile, carry the heavy hydraulic riveting machines by which riveting is done. much riveting is done by hand, men working together in squads of four. of these one, often quite a boy, heats the rivets in a small furnace, after which he throws them one by one to man number two, who inserts each as he receives it in its proper hole and holds it there with a big heavy hammer or else a tool called a "dolly." number two is called the "holder-up," since he holds the rivet up in its place while the remaining two hammer it over with alternate blows of their hammers. in many cases, however, the two last described men give place to one, who is armed with a tool in shape much like a pistol and operated by compressed air obtained through a flexible tube. when he presses a trigger a little hammer inside the "pistol" gives a rapid series of blows to the rivet, completing the job more quickly than the two men can do with hand hammers. a third way of doing this operation so important in the building of a ship is by the hydraulic machine suspended from the cranes. to the casual onlooker this has the notable feature of being silent, whereas riveting by hand and still more by a pistol hammer is terribly noisy. the reason for this is that the hydraulic riveter does not hammer at all, but, like a huge mechanical hand, it takes the rivet between finger and thumb and just squeezes it down. one strange result of all this hammering in of rivets is that every ship by the time it leaves the slip has become a huge magnet, with somewhat disconcerting effects upon its own compasses, but of that more later on. thus the great ship grows, being made piece by piece in the workshops to the shapes indicated from the mould loft and put together and riveted on the slip, until finally in due time it is ready to take its first journey. the launching of a big ship always strikes me as about the boldest and most daring thing which is ever done in the course of industry. for the huge structure, naturally top-heavy, weighing hundreds or thousands of tons, is just allowed to slide at its own sweet will. from the moment it starts until it is well in the water it is in charge of itself, so to speak, and if anything were to go wrong no power on earth could stop it once it had got a start. that nothing ever does go wrong, or scarcely ever at all events, is due to the care with which all preparations are made before that critical moment when the ship is let loose and to the skill and experience of those in charge. as the hull reaches that degree of completion when it can safely be put in the water, strong wooden structures termed launching ways are constructed one on each side of her. these really act like huge rails upon which in due course there will slide a gigantic toboggan. tremendously solid and strong they have to be, as they have each to carry half the total weight of the ship. under each side of the ship and upon the launching ways there is built a timber framework capable of raising the ship bodily off the blocks upon which until now it has reposed. these two frames, being connected together by chains passing beneath the keel, constitute what is called the cradle, the "toboggan" which is to slide down the ways, bearing the ship upon it. it is easy to see that being top-heavy something must be done to give the ship support before the shores on either side can be taken away, and it is equally clear that these latter must be removed before she can slide down to the water. neither would it do to let the vessel slide upon her own plates, so we see that the cradle fulfils a twofold purpose, first enabling the ship to reach the water without ripping holes in her own plates, and secondly giving it the necessary side support to prevent it from toppling over on the way. when all is ready, but a short time before the hour appointed for the launch, a curious operation is performed. between the main part of the cradle and the part which actually slides upon the ways wedges are inserted, hundreds of them, and they are all driven in simultaneously. their purpose is to make the cradle slightly higher and so to lift the ship off the blocks upon which it was built. if they were driven in one at a time each would only dig its way into the timber and nothing else would happen, but being driven all together a most powerful lifting action is produced which actually raises the mighty ship. so hundreds of men stand, each with his hammer ready to strike a wedge, while the foreman stands by with a gong. at a stroke on the gong the hundreds of hammers strike as one, and so the ship is raised off the blocks, which can then be removed, to facilitate which they too are built of wedge-shaped pieces which can easily be knocked apart. the shores, too, have ceased to serve any useful purpose and can be taken away until at last all shores and all blocks are gone and the vessel rests upon the cradle only. meanwhile tons of grease have been put on the ways, and the ship, urged by its own weight, is straining to get down the greasy slope into the element for which all along it has been intended. at this stage the only thing which restrains it is a kind of trigger arrangement on either side which locks the cradle in its place. in some yards elaborate mechanical catches controlled by electricity are used for this, but in many the old device of "dog shores" is still used. these are simply two stout wood props which fit between a projection on the ways and one on the cradle, there being one dog shore on either side. just over each dog shore there hangs a weight. the person who performs the ceremony cuts the cord which holds the weights, the weights fall, the dog shores are knocked away, and the ship is free. slowly at first, but gathering speed every moment, she moves majestically downwards into the water, being ultimately brought to rest by means of chains. whether done by the simple dodge of cutting a cord or by the more refined method of pressing an electric push, the launching is generally preceded by the breaking of a bottle of wine against the bows and the pronouncement of the vessel's name. once safely afloat, the vessel is towed away and berthed alongside a wharf whereon are cranes and other machines which lightly drop on board of her the massive turbines and boilers which in time will propel her, and the guns with which she will fight. all the multitudinous little finishing touches are here put into her until at last she sallies forth on her trial trips to show what she is capable of, after which follow trials of her guns, and then she takes her place in the fleet. thus, briefly sketched, we see the history of the warship from her inception in the minds of her designers till she is ready to meet the foe. chapter xviii the torpedo in parts of south america there lives a little fish, which, if you touch its nose, gives you a severe electric shock. the natives call it the "torpedo." when an artificial fish came to be invented, capable of giving a very nasty shock to anyone touching its snout, that name was bestowed upon it too. even more than the submarine, the torpedo resembles a fish with its graceful outlines and its fins and tail, the chief difference being that the tail of the torpedo carries a couple of little rotating propellers. looked at another way we may say that the torpedo is an automatic submarine. as a matter of fact, we all know it best as the weapon of the submarine. it was originally invented by an austrian who took it to a mr. whitehead, an englishman who then had an engineering works at fiume. this gentleman took up the idea and developed it into the whitehead torpedo, which is to-day used by half the navies in the world, the rest using something very similar. it is curious to note that the german variety is called the schwartzkopf, the meaning of which is "blackhead." the smooth, steel, fish-like body consists of two separate parts, which can be detached from each other. the front part called the "head" is made in two kinds, the war-head and the peace-head. the former contains a large quantity of explosive and the mechanism for firing it on coming into contact with any hard body. it is only used in actual warfare. the peace-head is precisely the same shape and weight as the other but is quite harmless, so that when it is fitted to the torpedo the latter can be handled with perfect safety, a valuable feature during the frequent exercises through which our sailors go in their efforts to attain perfection in the use and handling of these valuable weapons. so much for the head. the body of the torpedo contains a beautiful little engine precisely similar to a steam-engine but on a small scale, which is driven by compressed air, a store of which is carried in a compartment provided for the purpose. then there is an automatic steering apparatus controlled by a gyroscope, the purpose of which is to keep the torpedo steered in precisely that direction in which it is started. if any outside force, such as current or tide, deflects it from its path the gyroscope, acting through a rudder at the tail, brings it back again. like the submarine, moreover, it has rudders which can steer it upwards or downwards and these again are controlled automatically so that having been set to travel at a certain depth the torpedo can be launched into the water with the practical certainty that it will descend to that depth and then maintain it. this remarkable result is attained by the use of two devices acting in combination, namely, a hydrostatic valve and a pendulum. either of these alone would set the thing going by leaps and bounds, at one time above the required depth and at another equally below it, and so on alternately. the hydrostatic valve consists of a flexible diaphragm, one side of which is in contact with the water outside, so that since the pressure increases with increasing depth, it is bent inwards more or less as the depth varies. this deflection is made to control the horizontal rudders. suppose that things are adjusted for the rudders to steer the torpedo horizontally when at a depth of ten feet: if it descends to twelve feet the increased deflection of the diaphragm will so change the rudders that they will tend to steer slightly upwards: if, on the other hand, it rises to eight feet the contrary will happen, with the result that it will descend. as has been said already, this alone would result in a continually undulating course, so the pendulum is introduced to check the too decided changes in direction and so produce a practically straight course. there is an interesting feature, too, about the propeller. it is "twin" but not, as in ships, two screws side by side. instead, they are both set upon one shaft or rather upon two concentric shafts, like the two hands of a clock. the hour-hand of a clock is on one shaft, a solid one, which itself turns inside the shaft of the minute hand, which is hollow. the propellers of the torpedo are likewise, one on a tubular shaft and the other on a solid shaft inside it. these two shafts turn in opposite directions, but since the two propellers are made opposite "hands" they both equally push the torpedo along. the reason for this arrangement is that without it the action of a single propeller would tend to turn the torpedo over and over. instead of the torpedo turning the propeller the propeller would to some extent turn the torpedo. the range of the torpedo depends, clearly, upon the quantity of compressed air which it is able to carry and that is limited by certain practical considerations. one of these is the space required to store it, and a very ingenious method has been invented whereby the limited supply is eked out so that in effect its quantity is increased. as the air is used up the pressure in the air-chamber naturally falls and when that has gone on to a certain extent chemicals come into action which generate heat, whereby the remaining air is raised in temperature. this, of course, increases the volume of air and the result is just the same as if a greater quantity were carried to commence with. the explosion is brought about by the pressing in of a pin which normally projects from the nose or point of the torpedo, and it would be very easy to knock this accidentally, causing a premature explosion, were not precautions taken to prevent it. these take the form of a little fan which is turned by the water as the torpedo proceeds through it. the firing-pin is locked by means of a screw so that it cannot be operated until it has been released by the withdrawal of the screw and that can only be done by the fan. thus, while on the submarine or whatever ship carries it, the torpedo cannot be fired: it only becomes capable of explosion after it has passed through the water for a certain distance, far enough, that is, for the fan to have undone the screw. thus the maximum of safety is combined with the maximum of sensitiveness when the object aimed at is struck. there are other forms of torpedo which although little used are by no means lacking in interest. there is the brennan, for example, at one time much favoured in the british navy. its propellers were operated from the shore, by the pulling of two very flexible steel wires. the effect was much as if the thing were driven by reins, as a horse is driven. on shore was a powerful engine with two large drums on which the wires could be wound and by which they could be drawn in at a very high speed. by pulling one more than the other the torpedo could be steered and it is said that such a torpedo could be made to follow a ship through complicated evolutions and fairly hunt it down, finally overtaking and striking it. the purpose of such weapons was clearly to defend a port or roadstead against enemy craft which might try to rush in. it needed to be controlled by someone perched upon an eminence of some sort from which he could watch its course and guide it as might be necessary. compare this with the ease with which the whitehead torpedo is just slipped into the water and then left to itself. a submarine has in its bows either one or two tubes just large enough to hold the torpedo easily. at the front is a flap door which is kept closed while the torpedo is slipped into its place. then the similar door at the rear of the tube is closed after which the front one can be opened. water of course flows in and surrounds the torpedo when this takes place and a little push from some compressed air sends it floating out. as it emerges from the tube the engines are set going automatically and likewise the gyroscope which steers it, after which it continues to proceed in a straight line, soon seeking and maintaining the desired depth. other vessels besides submarines have submerged torpedo-tubes like these, but others again have tubes of a different kind. these are fixed on the deck and have the advantage that they can be pointed in any direction almost like a gun, whereas the others are either fixed rigidly in the vessel or are only slightly movable. in the case of these other tubes the torpedo is shot over the side of the ship, off which it leaps into the water somewhat like a man diving. one other kind of steerable torpedo may be mentioned because of its ingenuity, although so far as is known it is not in actual use. it is called the armorl, a compound of the names of its inventors, messrs. armstrong and orling. it is controlled by wireless telegraphy in a very simple but effective manner. the rudder which steers it is connected to a small crank in such a way that as the crank revolves it turns the "helm" first to one side and then to the other. suppose that, to commence with, the rudder is straight: a quarter of a revolution of the crank sets it to one side, say, the right: another quarter sets it straight again: a third quarter sets it to the left: and so on. the crank is turned by a wound-up spring, the effect of which is, however, normally held in check by a catch. when a wireless impulse comes along the catch is lifted for a moment, the crank slips round a quarter of a turn and the rudder is moved accordingly. every impulse changes the position of the rudder and by sending suitable series of impulses it can be set as desired and changed at any moment. a difficulty with all these guided torpedoes is that they must carry some indication whereby their place at any moment will be made visible to the man in control. a little mast and flag would do, for example, but it would be a fair mark for the enemy's guns and being shot away would leave the torpedo uncontrollable. the same objection seems to apply to the wireless antenna which this last type must carry with which to receive their guiding impulses, but that can be made light and almost invisible. it is when the thing is clearly visible that the danger arises, and, of course, to serve its purpose it must be visible. the way in which this difficulty was overcome by messrs. armstrong and orling is a beautiful example of ingenuity. they cause a jet of water to be blown upwards by compressed air, something like the spouting of a whale, so familiar in books of natural history. that forms a mast which is clearly visible, yet the enemy may blaze away at it to their heart's content without damaging it in the least. chapter xix what a submarine is like the precise details of the submarines of our own navy or of any other for that matter are wrapped in mystery. those who might tell do not know and those who know must not tell. true, there have been fully descriptive articles in many books and magazines, but it may be safely asserted that those descriptions are nothing more than what this chapter avowedly is, reflections by the authors on what such a craft must be like, more or less. it is just as well that this should be clearly understood, and the following description does not claim to be any more than that. just as an aeroplane follows the general design of a bird of the swallow type, which soars without flapping its wings, so the submarine necessarily follows much the lines of a fish. it has fins which help to guide it, it has rudders which compare with the fish's tail, and while it cannot use either fins or tail to push itself along as the fishes do, it has one or more propellers which serve that purpose admirably. it is rather remarkable that, while we often imitate nature very closely, there is one very important mechanical feature which almost invariably distinguishes man-made schemes from natural ones--that is, that man uses rotary motion for many purposes whereas nature practically never does. to be perfectly honest, the natural mechanisms are far too difficult for us to copy or i expect we should do so. for example, watch a goldfish and see how cleverly it uses its tail. man could never hope to make anything so perfect as that tail. absolutely under its owner's control, it serves a double purpose of propelling and steering in a manner which is equally beautiful and impossible to imitate. for certain definite purposes, however, a rotary propeller is quite as good as anything which the fishes can show us. as a straightforward, simple, forward-pushing device it is equal to anything that a fish possesses. it has to be given that one duty, however, and no other, the steering being the task of a separate device, the rudder. there again, too, we see how nature does two things with one kind of mechanism while we have to use two, for the fish steers itself to right and to left with its tail in a vertical plane, but if it wants to steer upwards or downwards it twists its tail over somewhat towards a horizontal plane. the submarine, however, needs two distinct and separate rudders, one for right and left steering and one for up and down, the latter being generally a pair, one each side the vertical rudder for the sake of symmetry and balance. so we find that a submarine has a body like that of a fish except that it is rather more rotund, perhaps, than the most portly fish usually seen. it has certain fixed fins projecting from its sides, which together with the rudders enable it to be guided. it has also certain long fins called bilge keels for the purpose of keeping it from rolling too much. also, it has one or more propellers and the two kinds of rudder already referred to. a fish, never wishing to get outside itself and walk about upon its own upper surface, needs no deck, in which the submarine differs from it, for the crew require somewhere where they can enjoy a breath of fresh air when opportunity offers. it is not a very commodious place, one could not exactly take a long walk upon it, nor even play deck-quoits, but on the back of the submarine there is an undoubted deck where the men can get out and upon which they can stand when she is on the surface. a fish, moreover, takes little heed of things upon the surface: its interests lie almost entirely below. hence it has no conning-tower or periscope, but without these the submarine would be useless. the former is a little oblong tower something like a chimney, which projects upward from the deck, while projecting to a higher level still is the tall hollow mast with prism and lenses at the top called the periscope, through which the commander of the submarine, himself comparatively inconspicuous, can sweep the horizon for enemies or victims. the problem of constructing a ship to travel under water is quite different from making one to travel on the surface in the ordinary way. when deep down the pressure of the water tending to crush the vessel is something enormous. roughly speaking, it is a pound per square inch for every two feet in depth, so that if a submarine dives to a depth of fifty feet the water presses upon it with a force of about twenty-five pounds upon every square inch of its surface. on a square foot, that means over a ton. and there are many square feet of the surface in even a small submarine. consequently, the whole shell of the ship has to be of very substantial construction. moreover, there are curious strains which come upon the vessel when it dives to which surface ships are not subject. all these have to be reckoned as far as possible and allowed for. the size of the modern submarine is not known with any certainty, but we may put it down roughly as two hundred feet long and at least a thousand tons displacement, which means that that is its actual weight, including everything and everybody on board, when it is just about to submerge. of course, a submarine, alone among boats, has two "tonnages." when it is on the surface it is comparatively light. indeed, "running light" is the technical term describing it when it is riding upon the surface of the water like an ordinary ship. then, by increasing its weight, it can cause itself to sink until the little promenade or deck called the superstructure is just submerged and little can be seen above water except the conning-tower. that is termed the "awash" position, and it is clear that it is then displacing more water than when running light, and hence its displacement tonnage must be more. when it is desired to sink, the vessel is set in motion in the awash position, from which it is gradually steered downwards by the diving rudders, until only the periscope, or it may be not even that, is left showing above. then the maximum of water is being displaced. it is then actually displacing more than its own weight of water, for if left to itself it will rise rapidly and it is only the speed and the action of the rudders which keep it under. we see, then, that the action of a submarine in submerging itself is a real genuine dive. it sinks upon an even keel until it is awash, after which it goes under "head-first," just as a swimmer does. it also rises bow first. this tendency to rise when the combined action of movement and rudder ceases constitutes a very considerable safeguard, for should anything happen to the propelling machinery the vessel simply rises. at one time weights were attached to the under side of the hull which could be detached from the inside so that in the event of the vessel descending against the wish of her commander, she could be simply forced to the surface by the great excess of buoyancy resulting from shedding these "safety weights." of course, in the event of a serious perforation of the hull neither of these forms of surplus buoyancy would bring the boat up. let us now trace the operations of diving right through, supposing that our submarine is first running light. in that condition she is being driven by the oil engines which constitute her primary propelling power. the hatch or door at the top of the conning-tower is open, as also, it may be, is the one lower down, just at the foot of the tower. men are standing upon the little platform formed by the tower, and one of them is steering by means of a wheel, keeping his eye, moreover, upon a compass also provided there, that being in fact, to the submarine when light, what the bridge is to the ordinary steamer. other members of the crew may be upon the superstructure or deck just below, while others again are down inside, attending to their duties there. under these conditions the inside is by no means an unpleasant place. plenty of fresh air comes down through the open hatches and through the ventilators, it being drawn down through the latter by means of a fan. preparations are then made for submerging. the hand-rail along the little deck is removed. the upper steering wheel and compass are covered up or shut away into the coverings provided for them, the wireless apparatus, if provided, is removed and the mast shut down. hatches are securely closed and valves in the ventilating pipes are closed. in fact every opening is shut and made water-tight so that no risk shall be run of diving prematurely and taking in water accidentally. the quarter-master transfers himself to the steering wheel inside, where he has another compass to guide him, not of the magnetic variety this time but a cunning application of the gyroscope. the commander, too, having descended before the last hatch was closed down, takes his stand at the eyepiece of the periscope, since that is now his only means of seeing what is going on above. another man takes his place at the wheel which controls the diving rudder, conveniently near to which is a pressure gauge so connected to the outer water that as the ship dives its depth is recorded upon its dial: that in effect is to him what the compass is to his comrade at the other wheel. with every movement of men there needs to be adjustment made to keep the ship on an even keel. otherwise she would go down by the bow or down by the stern according as the men's weight shifted towards either end. this is arranged for by two small tanks formed in the structure of the vessel, one at either end. connected together by pipes and controlled by compressed air, water can be transferred from one to the other at will and so the balance be always kept. quite simple manipulations of a valve serve to accomplish this delicate balancing performance. it is perhaps not of such importance at this stage, but in a moment, when the whole vessel will be under water, a very little movement indeed will suffice to upset the equilibrium. next water ballast is admitted into certain other spaces in the ship's structure, these spaces being called, because of the use to which they are put, ballast tanks. gradually, as the incoming water increases the weight of the vessel, she sinks until she is awash. then the diving rudders are set at the right angle (a pendulum serves to show the angle at which the boat points) and down she goes. as the pressure-gauge indicates the approach to the required depth the rudder is flattened out a little until just that position is found which keeps the boat under at the desired depth. of course, when all hatches and openings were closed the supply of fresh air was cut off and after that the crew had to depend upon the air contained in the submarine. also, they had to stop the engine, for without air it cannot work: nor can it work without giving off fumes, which, if admitted to the ship, would soon suffocate the crew. just before closing up, therefore, the engine is stopped and electric motors take up the task of driving the ship. now suppose that, while running submerged, the commander espies, through his periscope, an unsuspecting enemy. he tries forthwith to get as close as he can. having noted the direction of the vessel and which way she is going and as far as possible her speed, he submerges more deeply, in all probability, lest the white streak which represents the wake caused by his periscope should reveal his presence. for possibly she is one of those terrible destroyers in fair fight with which he has but a poor chance. his only safety lying in complete invisibility, he therefore submerges entirely, trusting to his calculations to lead him in the desired direction. thus he attempts and, if he have good luck, he succeeds in getting reasonably near to his foe. then he must try so to man[oe]uvre that his bow shall at the right moment be pointing towards the quarry, for his torpedo tubes are in the bow and they are fixed, or nearly so at all events, so that he can only fire them in a direction nearly, if not precisely, in the direction of the centre line of his ship. nay, he must do even more than that. it will not do to fire the torpedo directly at the ship, for a torpedo is comparatively slow. suppose it is capable of forty miles an hour, and the other ship is a mile away: the torpedo will take ninety seconds to reach it. and in that time it may have travelled a mile or so itself. so the submarine man has to allow for that. occasionally, therefore, he comes up a little for a moment in the hope of getting a sight of the enemy while not revealing his own presence. or perhaps he may decide to risk being seen and caught, trusting to the chance of getting his own blow in first. he needs to be a most resourceful man, with clear and keen judgment and supreme self-confidence, or he can never grapple with such a task. supposing, then, that he succeeds in getting undetected into a favourable position, as he thinks; at the critical moment the other ship may change its course, and the whole scheme goes awry. perhaps he then tries to follow, but that is bad, for the end of a ship is not nearly so good a target as the side and the part hit is not so vulnerable. the first torpedo may, however, so disable the vessel as to give him chance to get into position for a second and better shot. anyway, when he thinks he has got his best chance he lets off a torpedo, immediately diving to be safe out of harm's way for a while. then he rises to see the result of his work. if successful he would be sure to hear the sound, for water is an excellent sound-conductor and a submarine is like a gigantic telephone ear-piece. it must be a nerve-racking job at the best of times, for the submarine is a very vulnerable craft. a member of the crew of a german submarine captured during the war is reported to have said that out of ten submarines attacked, nine were sunk. that may or may not be true, but it is certain that a very little damage, which would hardly affect an ordinary craft, is enough to sink a submarine. that is because, in order to be able to sink at will, the reserve of buoyancy has to be very low. an ordinary surface ship has at least as much of its bulk above water as below: hence it can take on board a weight of water almost equal to, if not exceeding its own weight before it sinks. at the best a submarine has not more than per cent of excess and so it sinks if water amounting to only per cent of its weight gets into it. in other words, the reserve in one case is at least per cent: in the other at most per cent. during the war a submarine saw and tried to track down, somewhat after the manner described, a slow, steady-going collier which plies between london and the north carrying coal for a london gas-works. having, as it thought, got into position for discharging its torpedo it rose for a final look when (it must have been to the amazement of the crew) the collier was seen making straight for them. what they really thought no one will ever know, for the collier had the best of the encounter, the submarine was crushed beneath her blunt bows and sank, no doubt, for ever. the mere fact that a slow, clumsy, heavily-laden collier could ever thus vanquish an up-to-date submarine is eloquent testimony to their vulnerability. many a submarine, too, has fallen to the shells of an armed fishing trawler simply because the shells of the latter were so much quicker in action than a torpedo, coupled with the fact that one well-placed shot, by preventing a submarine from diving, renders it almost helpless. some submarines, however, have a gun on the deck, so that when light they can fight like a destroyer or other lightly-armed vessel. the gun shuts down into a cavity when the vessel goes below. the periscope, which forms such an important part of the submarine's equipment, is really very little more than a telescope. on the top there is a little mirror, or more probably a prism or three-cornered piece of glass which serves precisely the same purpose in that it reflects exactly as a mirror does. this is so placed that it throws the light from distant objects down the tube into the interior of the ship. in the tube are lenses very like those of an ordinary telescope and the light may be made to throw a picture upon a little table or screen or else can be viewed through another prism directly by the eye. in either case the periscope is just like an ordinary telescope set up vertically with a prism at the top so that it can "see" at right angles, and possibly another at the bottom so that the picture can be viewed at right angles to the direction of the tube. the latter is necessary only for the convenience of the observer, since otherwise he would have to be upon his back to look up the tube. the whole apparatus can be rotated mechanically and a scale forms a means of measuring the precise direction in which the prism or mirror is at any moment pointed. this is useful for measuring roughly the position of the "prey," and it may even be used as a rough means of getting the range. another feature is the gyroscope compass, to which a passing reference has already been made. it is fairly well known that an object when spinning exhibits properties quite different from those which it possesses when still. a boy's top is a familiar illustration, for while spinning it will stand perfectly steady, supported only upon a tall peg with a sharp point, a pose which it will absolutely refuse to maintain when not spinning. now fortunately for the present purpose it so happens that one of the peculiarities of the gyroscope or spinning-wheel is this: that if mounted in a certain way it persists in placing its axis in the same plane as that in which the axis of the earth lies. if you imagine for a moment a plane or flat surface of which the earth's axis forms a part you will see that wherever that plane cuts the surface of the earth will be a line in a north and south direction. consequently, if any horizontal object has its axis in that same plane it, too, will always point north and south. a wheel, small but heavy, is therefore mounted with its axis supported horizontally upon a little metal raft floating in a trough of mercury and driven round at a very fast speed by a small electric motor fixed in it. whatever its position may be to start with, this revolving wheel will in a short time slew itself round upon the supporting mercury until its own axis is in the same plane as the axis of the earth: until, in fact, its axis points due north and south. arrived in that position, it will remain there no matter how the ship upon which it stands may turn. since it floats freely upon mercury the motion of the ship has little effect upon it, so little indeed, that it has no difficulty in following its own peculiar bent, even if the ship be describing circles. the advantages of this are various: two of them may be stated. first, the apparatus points to the actual geographical north and not to the magnetic north, which is a slightly different direction and one, moreover, subject to frequent variation. second, it is absolutely unaffected by the presence of iron or other magnets, a very fruitful source of error in the magnetic compass when used upon an iron ship close to steel guns and electrical machinery. surrounded with iron as is the compass in the interior of a submarine, the magnetic needle practically refuses to work at all, so that, although employed on other ships, it is on the submarine that the gyro-compass finds its most important field of usefulness. the pressure-gauge or manometer, which indicates the depth, is probably not different in any respect, except in its dial, which is marked in feet-depth instead of in pounds-pressure, from the pressure-gauge used on steam boilers. it has either a little cylinder with a piston in it which the water presses upwards more or less against the force of a spring, a diaphragm which is bent more or less, or a bent tube which tries to straighten itself out as the pressure inside it increases. the older submarines derived their power from petrol engines similar to those which drive high-power motor-cars, but nowadays these have given place to engines of the type invented by the unfortunate diesel who, after making one of the most brilliant and successful inventions of modern times, committed suicide, apparently in the height of his success. these engines burn cheap heavy oil in place of the costly refined petrol: they are exceedingly reliable and well-behaved, and are free from many of the troubles which affect the petrol motor. they are referred to in more detail in another chapter. in twin-screw boats there are two distinct engines, one for each propeller. each engine, too, is coupled to a dynamo by which it can generate electric current, which is stored in large accumulator batteries until required and then withdrawn to drive the dynamos as motors while the boat is submerged, for if you feed a dynamo with current it becomes a motor. a great deal of work is done, on the submarine, by compressed air, of which large stores are carried in strong steel cylinders. for example, the ballast is ejected from the ballast tanks, when the boat is required to rise, not by pumps but by the action of compressed air from a cylinder. the simple movement of a tap thus suffices to blow out the water in a very short time. the torpedoes, too, are given their initial push which sends them out of their tube into the water by compressed air. in other ways, too, compressed air is employed and to facilitate its use there are many tubes and valves whereby the cylinders and other apparatus are connected. like all things human, these tubes and valves have their defects, which in this case means that they leak somewhat, but this defect is of value since the leaking air helps to keep pure and sweet the air inside the boat which, when submerged, the men have to breathe. to what extent it is used i do not know, but it is a fact that certain chemicals, caustic soda for instance, have the power to absorb the objectionable carbonic acid which makes tightly-shut rooms seem "close" and uncomfortable, and if something of that sort be employed, it, together with the fresh air which thus leaks in by accident, is undoubtedly enough to enable men to live under water for many hours at a stretch. on the other hand, several instances are on record in which strong healthy young officers have, after a course of service on a submarine, been found to be suffering seriously from chest and lung trouble, brought on, no doubt, by long spells of duty in this unhealthy atmosphere. it used to be the custom to keep some white mice on board a submarine to give warning of the impurities in the air. being very susceptible to the smell of petrol vapour, which used to be a source of considerable danger, and also to carbonic acid, these little creatures squeaked with anxiety some time before the conditions became really dangerous, thus giving timely warning. there is an instrument, however, which will give an indication of this sort and probably it has been brought in to reinforce the mice if not actually to supplant them. this interesting little instrument, which the gasworks people use for detecting leakage, consists of a metal drum with a porous diaphragm. normally the pressure of the atmosphere upon the diaphragm is equalled and balanced by the pressure of the air inside the drum, but if there be gas in the air this balance is upset, the diaphragm is bulged in or out and a finger is thereby moved, which movement forms a measure of the amount of gas present. in conclusion, we may fittingly take a glance at what happens when a submarine founders. only a few years ago this occurred with lamentable frequency, though now it is quite rare except under the actual stress of warfare. several interesting schemes were therefore invented to give the men at least a sporting chance of getting to safety. one was to make the conning-tower detachable and water-tight, so that the men could get into it, fasten themselves in and float up to the surface. the practical difficulties in the way prevented this being a success. for example, if sufficiently detachable in an emergency it was difficult to make it sufficiently water-tight in ordinary use. another and better device provided the men with small helmets and jackets, like the dress of a diver very much simplified. one of these for each man was stored in an accessible place in the boat and partitions were devised inside the hull itself in order that whatever happened there should be air entrapped somewhere wherein the men could live for a time and put on their helmets in safety. then, thus provided, they could crawl out through the hatchway and float up to the surface. arrived there they could inflate their jackets by blowing into them, open the window of the helmet and float upon the surface in comparative safety until rescued. this apparatus was largely installed in british submarines and a tank was built at portsmouth where the men could actually practise with it under water. a third device may also be mentioned. this takes the form of a buoy fitted into a recess in the boat's upper surface. sufficient line is coiled up inside it and when the occasion arises it can be released from inside. this does not in itself save the crew but it may go a long way towards ensuring their safety by letting those above know just where the sunken craft is and guiding them in their efforts to raise it. the torpedo, the weapon without which the submarine would be practically useless, is dealt with in another chapter. enough has been said here to give a good general idea of these interesting craft, their fittings, their uses and the sort of life which befalls those who man them. chapter xx the story of wireless telegraphy for ages people were puzzled as to the nature of light. pythagoras, that old greek who invented what we now call the forty-seventh proposition of euclid, thought that the bright body shot off streams of tiny particles which literally hit the observer in the eye. sir isaac newton thought the same, but for once "the greatest scientist of all time" was wrong. for when the danish astronomer, romer, discovered that light travelled at the rate of somewhere about , miles per second it dawned upon people that it was scarcely believable that particles of any kind could by any means be made to move so fast. so they set about searching for a new explanation, and they found it in the idea that light was conveyed from the bright body to the observer's eye by means of waves, and as there cannot be waves of nothing they had to imagine a something to exist in all the vacant spaces of the universe capable of forming the waves of light. this something was called the luminiferous ether or light-bearing ether. we can neither see, feel, taste nor hear it. our senses tell us nothing about it. indeed, if it does really exist it must be so very different from anything that we do know by our senses that one is often tempted to doubt its existence. still, it explains so many things which are otherwise unexplainable and enables us so correctly to reason from one phenomenon to another that our reason forces us to accept it as a fact, at all events until something better comes along. this wave theory in regard to light was finally set at rest by the curious discovery about a century ago by dr. thomas young of london that if two lots of light were brought together in a certain way they produced darkness. now if a ray of light were a stream of particles, two such rays would inevitably and always, if added together, produce a doubly brilliant light, and under no conceivable circumstances could they do anything else. but two lots of waves can, and do, under the proper conditions, neutralize each other so as to produce rest. this mutual action upon each other of two sets of waves can be very simply exhibited by two violin strings tuned to _nearly but not quite the same note_. if you have a violin handy, try it and you will find that when either string is plucked separately it gives a steady continuous sound, but if both be plucked at the same time they give a throbbing sound. that is because, periodically, as one string is coming up the other is going down, so that they neutralize each other, while at other times, owing to the fact that one is vibrating faster than its fellow, both are rising and falling together. when neutralizing each other there is a momentary silence, while in between the silences come the times when both are acting together and therefore producing a specially loud sound. and so as the vibrations of the faster keep gaining upon those of the slower string one hears a continual crescendo and then diminuendo repeated over and over again. so two sets of sound waves sometimes produce silence. and in like manner two sets of light waves can be made so to "interfere" (that is the technical term) that together they produce darkness. so for a hundred years or more people have, generally speaking, accepted the idea that light consists of waves in a medium called the ether. heat also is brought to us from the sun and from any distant hot body by similar means, the difference between light waves and heat waves being simply in their wave length or the distance apart. the different colours of light, too, are to be accounted for by different wave lengths. you have of course seen how a magnet can act upon a piece of iron at a distance. you may, too, have tried the experiment of jerking a magnet past a piece of wire, thereby generating an electric current in the wire. both those things need, for explanation, that we assume the existence of a something invisible and undetectable by our senses between the magnet and the iron and between the magnet and the wire, by which the action of one is conveyed to the other. so people imagined another ether capable of acting like a link between the magnet and the iron and between the magnet and the wire. now just about half a century ago a celebrated professor of cambridge university brought all these facts about light, heat, magnetism and electricity together and by skilful reasoning showed that but one ether sufficed to explain all these things. he showed how magnetic and electric forces acting together could produce waves like those of light and heat. and finally he demonstrated by figures that waves so formed would necessarily travel at the very speed at which light and heat are known to move. this is known as the electro-magnetic theory of light. and not content with showing the nature of things already known, professor clerk-maxwell added a prophecy that there were other waves in existence of longer wave length, which no one then knew how to make or to detect if made. following up this prophecy many investigators sought these waves, and the first to find them was professor hertz of carlsruhe in germany. fortunately for his position in the minds of english people he died before the war, so that his name is not sullied by the stupidities of which german professors in more recent days have been guilty. on the contrary, his writings show him to have been a kindly, modest, genial soul, and particularly gratifying is his generous assertion in one of his books that had he not himself discovered these waves he is certain sir oliver lodge would have done so. he seemed quite anxious to share the credit of his discovery with his "english colleague" as he called him. let us see then how these "hertzian waves" are produced. in the year a dutch experimenter named cuneus thought he would try to electrify water. he got a glass flask and filled it with water into which he let drop one end of a chain connected to an old-fashioned frictional electrical machine. thus he stood with the flask in his hand while a friend worked the machine. after a short time the friend stopped and cuneus took hold of the chain to lift it out, when to his astonishment he received a shock which knocked him over, broke his flask and sent him to bed to recover. unwittingly cuneus had invented what became known thereafter as a leyden jar, leyden being the town in which he lived. it consisted, you will notice, of two conductors, the water and his hand, with an insulator, the glass, in between. to understand or rather to give ourselves a useful working explanation of how such an apparatus comes to be charged we must first imagine that everything contains a certain normal amount of electricity which we can by certain means add to or take away from at will. when we add some to anything we say we have given it a positive charge: when we subtract some we say that we have imparted a negative charge. clearly, if we add some to one thing we must first obtain it from something else, and if we take some away from one thing we must do something with what we have taken, and so we add it to something else. therefore whenever we charge anything positively we must charge something else negatively and vice versa. now the ease with which we can thus charge two bodies seems to depend upon their nearness to each other, so that the easiest things to charge are two plates of metal separated by the thinnest possible insulator. modern leyden jars are usually formed of a thin glass jar with a lining inside and out of tinfoil. the leyden jar is, however, only one form of the piece of electrical apparatus known as an electrical condenser, and many other forms exist. for example, a flat sheet of glass with foil above and below, or several such piled one on top of another. an eminent electrician whom i know has recently made some of two tin patty pans put bottom to bottom, nearly but not quite touching, the whole being enclosed in a solid block of paraffin wax. and i might describe many other forms, but whatever they may be every one is essentially two conductors with an insulator between. now when a condenser has been charged its charges remain for a considerable time unless they be given a chance to escape. suppose you have a charged condenser and that you take a wire and with it touch simultaneously both the conductors, the surplus on one "plate" will rush through the wire and make good the deficiency upon the other; it will thus in an instant become discharged. now several scientific men had suggested, before hertz's time, that when that occurred something else happened too. they thought that the charge did not simply rush from one plate to the other instantly, but that it oscillated to and fro for a period; that the surplus rushing round overshot the mark, so to speak, and not only made up the deficiency but caused a surplus on the opposite plate, after which this new surplus rushed back again through the wire, doing the same thing, though to a less and less degree, several times over before a condition of perfect rest was reached. to use a simple analogy, it was thought that the surplus swung to and fro like the swinging of a pendulum. we know that a pendulum swings because of its inertia, and electricity possesses a property very like inertia which, it was thought, would cause it to behave in the same way. the ether waves travel at the rate of , miles per second, so that if, as was thought, a sudden current of electricity gives rise to a wave, currents which succeed each other at the rate of one per second would produce waves , miles apart. a hundred currents per second would give a wave length of miles. a thousand per second would give miles. but a thousand succeeding currents per second are difficult to produce, and miles is so very much greater than the tiny fraction of an inch, which is the length of the light and heat waves, that hertz had to find some way of making currents succeed each other faster even than a thousand times per second. so he thought of these oscillating currents which were supposed to occur when a condenser was discharged, and he rigged up a condenser with an induction coil and a spark gap in a way which he thought would do what he wanted. there is not room here to explain the induction coil, indeed it is so well known that it will be quite sufficient to state that it is an apparatus which takes steady current from a battery and gives back instead a lot of little spurts or splashes of current at a rate of, say, fifty or one hundred splashes per second, according as we adjust the little vibrating spring which forms a part of the coil. we can so connect this to a condenser that each splash will charge it up; and we can combine with it a spark-gap, that is to say, a gap between two knobs, so that every time it is charged it immediately discharges again through this gap. thus we may have, say, one hundred splashes per second, and each splash is followed by several oscillations across the air-gap, the oscillations taking place at the rate of perhaps a million per second. each series of oscillations is called a "train." now a million per second gives a wave-length somewhere about what hertz wanted, so he arranged his apparatus as just described. for a condenser he used two metal plates a little distance apart, the air between forming the insulating material. he set up his apparatus in a large room, and having started the coil he moved about with a nearly complete hoop of wire, the ends of which nearly touched. working in darkness he found after a while that sometimes he could see little sparks, very small but just visible across the gap between the ends of the bent wire. those sparks only occurred when the coil was in action, and so he knew that the one was the result of the other's work. by careful painstaking experiment he found that the sparks were unquestionably caused by waves, and that the waves moved with the same speed as light, also that they could be reflected and refracted just on precisely the same principles as those which control light. moreover, he measured the wave-length. at first sight it seems incredible that anyone could measure the distance apart of waves which travel at such a speed as , miles per second, but fortunately, by a special application of "interference," it is possible to make the waves stand still and tamely submit to measurement. an example of this can be seen by simply tapping a glass of water, when the ripples being reflected off the sides interfere with each other and become stationary. stationary waves are half the wave-length of the original waves, and by using this method hertz was able to make a measurement which at first sight seems beyond the bounds of possibility. thus hertz discovered how to make the waves which clerk-maxwell had predicted and also how to detect them when made. it was not long before the idea arose of using these waves for signalling to a distance. many experiments were made but with no very striking success until when marconi first came to england. hertz had noticed that the farther apart he placed the plates of his condenser the farther could he get his tell-tale spark, so marconi saw that the plates of his condenser, too, must be far apart. he also found that the earth could be used as one of the plates, that in fact there was a great advantage in so using it. so, one plate having to be the earth itself and the other removed as far as possible from it, the tall masts of the wireless antenna came into being. [illustration: listening for the enemy. special sensitive cylinders are sunk into the ground to which the usual telephonic apparatus is fixed. this enables the sappers to detect any underground operations by the enemy.] when marconi came to england he was taken under the kindly wing of sir william preece, the veteran engineer of the post office, and the facilities which sir william was able to give no doubt helped largely in his subsequent rapid progress. after a few experiments in london he got to work across the channel, sending messages from the north foreland lighthouse to wimereux on the coast of france, including congratulatory messages between the french authorities and good queen victoria. a little later he was signalling from niton in the isle of wight to the mainland and to the far west at the lizard. the first wireless telegram which was actually paid for was sent by lord kelvin, the father of cable telegraphy, from niton to the mainland, whence it was transmitted by land wires to sir george stokes. this incident, so interesting because of its marking a stage in the history of this great invention, also because of the persons concerned, occurred in . but marconi was quickly increasing the range of his apparatus far beyond anything already mentioned. he journeyed in the italian warship _carlo alberto_ as far north as cronstadt and as far east as italy, keeping in communication with england all the time. then he crossed the atlantic, again keeping up communication with england the greater part of the journey. raising his wires to a great height by means of kites he was soon able to signal from nova scotia to the great station just previously built at poldhu in cornwall, and then wireless telegraphy from land to land across the great ocean became an accomplished fact. we all know how things have progressed since then. a telegram by marconi is as commonplace to-day as a telegram by cable. the british government is now engaged upon a series of stations dotted about the globe in such a way that every part of the widely separated british empire shall be in constant touch with every other part by wireless telegraphy. in other words, the range of the system has now become such that nothing further is needed. the british admiralty has a few wires slung to posts on the top of the offices in london, and those few wires enable touch to be maintained with ships. as almost every intelligent newspaper reader in great britain knows, the germans were in the habit, during the war, of sending news to the united states by wireless telegraphy, which news was always picked up by the admiralty installation and circulated to the british newspapers, often to the amusement of their british readers. the famous _emden_, too, which had such a run of success until it encountered the australian cruiser _sydney_, met its end entirely through the intervention of wireless telegraphy. these incidents give us a good idea of the usefulness of wireless in naval warfare. in military work it is used chiefly in connection with air-craft, but of that more will be said in another chapter. [illustration: transmitter. receiver. diagram showing the principle by which the aerials are connected to the apparatus.] chapter xxi wireless telegraphy in war the history of this wonderful invention has been described in the preceding chapter. now we will see how it is applied in warfare. let us take first its uses in connection with the navy. the aerial wires or antenna are stretched to the top of the highest mast of the vessel. where there are two masts they often span between the two. ships which have masts for no other reason are supplied with them for this special purpose. in the case of submarines, the whole thing, mast and wires included, is temporary and can be taken down or put up quickly and easily at will. the stations ashore are equipped much after the same manner as are the ships, except that sometimes they are a little more elaborate, as they may well be since they do not suffer from the same limitations. for example, the well-known antenna over the admiralty buildings in london consists of three masts placed at the three corners of a triangle with wires stretched between all three. however these wires may be arranged and supported they are very carefully insulated from their supports, for when sending they have to be charged with current at a high voltage and need good insulation to prevent its escape, while, in receiving, the currents induced in them are so very faint that good insulation is required in order that there may not be the slightest avoidable loss. the function of these wires, it will be understood, is to form one plate of a condenser, the earth being the other plate and the air in between the "dielectric" or insulator. in the case of ships "the earth" is represented by the hull of the vessel. it makes a particularly good "earth" since it is in perfect contact with a vast mass of salt water, and that again is in contact with a vast area of the earth's surface. salt water is a surprisingly good conductor of electricity. in land stations "earth" consists of a metal plate well buried in damp ground. the whole question of conduction of electricity through the earth is very perplexing. there seems to be resistance offered to the current at the point where it enters the ground, but after that none at all. consequently the resistance between two earth plates a few yards apart and between similar ones a thousand miles apart is about the same. though the earth is made up mainly of what, in small quantities, are very bad conductors indeed, taking the earth as a whole it is an exceedingly good conductor. that makes it all the more important that where the current enters should be made as good a conductor as possible, and the construction and location of the earth plates is therefore very carefully considered so as to get the best results. wires, of course, connect the antenna to the earth, thereby forming what is called an "oscillatory circuit." the ordinary electric circuit is a complete path of wire or other good conductor around which the current can flow in a continuous stream. an oscillatory circuit is one which is incomplete, but the ends of which are so formed that they constitute the two "plates" of a condenser. in that way, according to theory, the circuit is completed between the two ends by a strain or distortion in the "ether" between them. a continuous current will not flow in such a circuit, but an alternating, intermittent or oscillating current will flow in it in many respects as if there were no gap at all but a complete ring of wire. at some convenient point in this oscillatory circuit are inserted the wireless instruments, one set for sending and the other set for receiving, either being brought into circuit at will by the simple movement of a switch. in small installations the central feature of the sending apparatus is an induction coil operated by a suitable battery or by current from a dynamo. connected with it is a suitable spark gap consisting of two or three metal balls well insulated and so arranged that the distance between them can be delicately adjusted. this is generally done by a screw arrangement with insulating handles, so that the operator can safely adjust them while the current is on. the current from the battery or dynamo to the coil is controlled by a key similar to those used in ordinary telegraphy, the action being such that on depressing the key the current flows and the coil pours forth a torrent of sparks between the knobs of the spark-gap, but on letting the key up again the sparks cease. since the sparks send out etherial waves which in turn affect the distant receiving apparatus it follows that a signal is sent whenever the key is depressed. moreover, if the key be held down a short time a short signal is sent, but if it be kept depressed for a little longer a long signal is sent, by which means intelligible messages can be transmitted over vast distances. certain specified wave lengths are always used in wireless telegraphy. that is to say, the waves are sent out at a certain rate so that they follow each other at a certain distance apart. in other words, it is necessary to be able to adjust the rate at which the currents will oscillate between the antenna and earth. every oscillatory circuit possesses two properties which are characteristic of it. these two properties are known as capacity and inductance. it is not necessary to explain here what these terms mean precisely. it is quite sufficient just to name them and to state that the rate at which oscillations take place in such a circuit depends upon the combined effect of these two properties. consequently, if we can arrange things so that capacity or inductance or both can be added to a circuit at will and in any quantity within limits, we can within those limits obtain any rate of oscillation which we desire and consequently send out the message-bearing waves at any interval we like; in other words, we can adjust the wave-length at will. fortunately, it is very easy to add these properties to an oscillatory circuit in a very simple manner. a certain little instrument called a "tuner" is connected up in the circuit and by the simple movement of a few handles the desired result can be obtained quickly even by an operator with but a moderate experience. he has certain graduated scales to guide him, and he is only called upon to work according to a prearranged rule in order to obtain any of the regulation wave-lengths. as a matter of fact, the instruments are not directly inserted in the antenna circuit, the circuit that is which is formed by the aerial wires, the earth and the inter-connecting wires. instead, the two sides of the spark-gap are connected together so as to form a separate circuit of their own, the local circuit as we might call it, and then the two circuits, the antenna circuit and the local circuit, are connected together by "induction." a coil of wire is formed in each, and these two coils are wound together so that currents in one winding induce similar currents in the other winding, and by that means the oscillations set up by the coil in the local circuit are transformed into similar oscillations in the antenna circuit. this transformation involves certain losses, but it is found in practice to be by far the most effective arrangement. both the circuits have to be tuned to the desired wave length, but that is done quite easily by the operation of the handles in the tuner already referred to. it is to this coupling together of tuned circuits that marconi's most famous patent relates. it is registered in the british patent office under the number , and hence is known as the "four sevens" patent. it has been the subject of much litigation, which proves its exceptional importance, and it is to the fact that the marconi company have been able to sustain their rights under it that they owe their commanding position to-day in the realm of wireless telegraphy. the receiving apparatus also consists of a separate local circuit which can be coupled when desired to the antenna circuit through a transformer. the same simple tuning arrangement is made to affect this circuit also, so that the "multiple tuner," as the instrument is called, controls all the circuits both for sending and for receiving. the oscillations caused in the antenna circuit by the action upon it of the etherial waves flowing from the distant transmitting station pass through one winding of the transformer and thereby induce similar oscillations in the local receiving circuit which are made perceptible by the receiving instrument. reference has already been made to the original form of receiving apparatus called the coherer. this, however, has been very largely superseded by the magnetic detector of marconi and the crystal detector, both of which make the signals perceivable as buzzing sounds in the telephone. the magnetic detector owes its existence to the fact that oscillations tend to destroy magnetism in iron. it is believed that every molecule of iron is itself a tiny magnet. if that be so one would expect every piece of iron to be a magnet, which we know it is not. we can always make a piece of iron into a magnet by putting another magnet near it, but when we take the other magnet away the iron loses its power, or to be precise it _almost_ loses it. a piece of even the best and softest iron having once been magnetized retains a little magnetic power which we call "residual" magnetism. all this is easily explained if we remember first that a heap of tiny magnets lying higgledy-piggledy would in fact exhibit no magnetic power outside the heap. if, however, we brought a powerful magnet near them it would have the effect of pulling a lot of them into the same position, of arranging them in fact so that instead of all more or less neutralizing each other they could act together and help each other. then the heap would become magnetic. on removing the powerful magnet, however, a lot of the little ones would be sure to fall down again into their old places and so the heap would at once lose a large part of its power, yet some would remain and so it would retain a certain amount of "residual" magnetism. if, then, you were to give the table on which the little magnets rest a good shake, the "higgledy-piggledyness" would be restored and even the "residual" magnetism would vanish. so we believe that the little molecules lie just anyhow, wherefore they neutralize each other and the mass of iron is powerless. when another magnet comes near, however, they are more or less pulled into the right position and the iron becomes magnetized. when the magnet is removed the magnetism which it produced is largely lost, and if last of all we give the iron a smart blow with a hammer even the residual magnetism vanishes too. now, oscillations taking place in the neighbourhood of a piece of iron possessing residual magnetism have much the same effect as the blow of a hammer. probably because of its rapidity an oscillating current shakes the molecules up and strews them about at random, entirely destroying any orderly arrangement of them. and marconi used that fact in detecting oscillations. two little coils of wire are wound together, one inside the other. through the centre of the innermost there runs an endless band of soft iron wire. stretched on two rollers this band travels steadily along, the motive power being clockwork, so that it is always entering the coil at one end and leaving it at the other. as it travels it passes close to two powerful steel magnets, so that as it enters the coil it is always slightly magnetized. the oscillations are passed through one of the two concentric coils, and their action is to remove suddenly the residual magnetism in that part of the moving wire which is at the moment passing through. that sudden demagnetization then affects the second of the concentric coils, inducing currents in it, not of an oscillating nature but of an ordinary intermittent kind which can make themselves audible in a telephone which is connected with the coil. this arrangement, then, causes the oscillations, which will not operate a telephone, to produce other currents of a different nature which will. the reason why oscillations have no effect in a telephone is no doubt because they change so rapidly, at rates, as has been mentioned already, of the order of a million per second. the telephone diaphragm, light and delicate though it is, is far too gross and heavy to respond to such rapidly changing impulses as that. in the magnetic detector the difficulty is overcome by making them change the magnetic condition of some iron wire which change in turn produces currents capable of operating a telephone. the crystal detector achieves the same result in another way. there are certain substances, of which carborundum is a notable example, which conduct electricity more readily in one direction than the other. most of these substances are crystalline in their nature, and hence the detector in which they are used gets its name. carborundum, by the way, is a sort of artificial diamond produced in the electric furnace and largely used as a grinding material in place of emery. it is easy to see that by passing an oscillating current, which is a very rapidly alternating current, through one of these one-direction conductors one half of each oscillation is more or less stopped. oscillations, again, are surgings to and fro: the crystal tends to let the "tos" go through and to stop the "fros." that does not quite explain all that happens. it is not fully understood. the fact remains, however, that by putting a crystal in series with the telephone the oscillations become directly audible. the term "in series with" means that both crystal and telephone are inserted in the local receiving circuit so that the currents in that circuit pass through both in succession. the resistance of the crystal being very great, a special telephone is needed for use with it. it is quite an ordinary telephone, however, except in that it is wound with a great many turns of very fine wire and is therefore called a high-resistance telephone. whichever of these detectors be used, then, the operator sits, with his telephone clipped on to his head, and with his tuner set for that wave length at which his station is scheduled to work, listening for signals. he may go for hours without being called up, and in the meantime he may hear many signals intended for others. he knows they are not for him, since every message is preceded by a code signal indicating to whom it is addressed. under the conditions of warfare there is far more listening than there is sending, but when a station wishes to send the operator just switches over, cutting out his receiving apparatus and bringing his transmitting instruments into operation, and, having adjusted his tuner for the wave length of the station to which he desires to communicate, he flings out his message. in war-time, too, there is much listening for the signals of the enemy, which is the reason why as few messages are sent out as possible. in this case the man sits with his telephone on his head carefully changing his tuner from time to time in the endeavour to catch any message in any wave-length which may be travelling about. this searching the ether for a chance message of the enemy must be at times a very wearisome job, but it must be varied with very exciting intervals. on aircraft it is clear that no earth connection is possible. the antenna in that case usually hangs vertically down from the machine or airship. under these conditions the valuable effect of the earth connection is of course lost. as will be remembered, the earth-connected apparatus sends forth waves which cling more or less to the neighbourhood of the earth's surface, while those from the non-earthed apparatus as used by aircraft tend to fly in all directions. the latter apparatus is in fact almost precisely similar to that which hertz used in his first experiments. hence the range is comparatively poor under these conditions, but it is good enough for very valuable work in warfare. communication between airman and artillery by this means has revolutionized the handling of large guns in the field. to save the airman from the accidental catching of his aerial wire in a tree or on a building there is sometimes fitted a contrivance of the nature of wire-cutters so that he can at any moment cut himself free from it. so far we have dealt almost exclusively with the naval and aerial use of this wonderful invention. it is employed, though in a lesser degree, in land warfare. in such cases the aerial may be merely a wire thrown on to and caught up on a high tree. more elaborate devices are used, however, such as a high telescopic tower similar to the tall fire-escape ladders of the fire-brigades. anyone who has seen the ladders rush up to a burning building and commence to erect themselves almost before they have stopped will realise how valuable such a machine must be for forming a temporary and easily movable wireless antenna. the power which causes the tall tower to extend itself erect in a few seconds is compressed air carried in cylinders upon the machine, while the power which takes it from place to place is a petrol motor, and since the latter can be made to re-charge the storage cylinders it is clear that in it we have a marvellously convenient adjunct to the wireless apparatus. but apart from such carefully prepared devices the men of the royal engineers are past masters in the art of rigging up, according to the conditions of the moment, all sorts of makeshift apparatus whereby signalling over quite long ranges can be carried on by "wireless." such improvisations, could they be recorded, would constitute war inventions of a high order. chapter xxii military telegraphy telegraphy plays a very important part in warfare. the commander of even a small unit cannot see all that his men are doing or suffering, but is kept posted by telegraph or telephone, while communication between units depends very largely indeed upon such means. wireless telegraphy, in land warfare, is largely devoted to communication between aircraft and the artillery batteries with which they are working, and to avoid interference with that important work telegraphy _by wire_ is employed for most other purposes. right at the front this communication is kept up by means of that type of instrument which the soldiers call a "buzzer," for the good and sufficient reason that that is really what it does. in view of the fact that soldiers speak of their home-land, for which they are enduring all manner of risk and hardship, and to which they are longing to return, by the contemptuous-sounding name of "blighty," we might expect that what they call a buzzer has nothing whatever to do with making sound, but in this case the name describes the thing very aptly. its sole purpose and intent is to make buzzing sounds of either long or short duration. perhaps the simplest way in which i can describe this useful and interesting invention is by telling you how you can make one for yourself. it is nothing more than an electric-bell mechanism connected up in a certain way. as most people know, an electric bell contains a magnet made of two round pieces of iron placed parallel and yoked together at one end by means of a third piece of iron, generally flat, while on to each round piece is threaded a bobbin of insulated wire. the iron becomes a magnet when, and only when, current flows through the wire. near the free ends of the round pieces, or the poles of the magnet, to use the orthodox term, is placed another little piece of iron called the armature, carried upon a light spring. when the current flows in the wire the armature is pulled towards the poles against the force of the spring, but when the current ceases the magnet lets go and the armature, urged by the spring, swings back again. behind the armature is a little post through which passes a screw tipped with platinum, and in operation this screw is advanced until its point touches a small plate of platinum carried by the armature. connection for the current is made to this "contact screw" whence it passes to the armature, through the spring to the wire upon the magnet, through that and away. on completing the circuit, then, as when you push the button at the front door, current flows and energizes the magnet. a moment later, however, the armature moves, breaks the contact with the screw and stops the current. then the magnet lets go and the armature springs back, making contact once more and setting the current flowing again. these actions repeat themselves over and over again quite automatically, and the hammer which is attached to the armature vibrates accordingly. that is the ordinary familiar electric bell. cut off the hammer and you have a buzzer with which excellent telegraph signals can be sent. so much for the sending apparatus. the receiving device is simply an ordinary telephone receiver. there is sometimes a little confusion in people's minds because of this. a telephone is used, but it is used as a telegraph instrument. the sounds heard in it are not speech but long and short buzzing sounds which, being interpreted according to the code of morse, deliver up their message. now the telephone, by which term is always meant the receiver (the sending part of the telephone apparatus being a "microphone"), is one of the most remarkable pieces of electrical apparatus which the mind of man has ever conceived. it is astonishingly robust. with ordinary care you cannot damage it. there is no need whatever to keep it wrapped in cotton wool or even to keep it in a case. without harm you can put it loose in your pocket. within reason you may even drop it a few times without harm. its cost is only a few shillings. yet its sensitiveness is simply astounding. it will detect the existence of currents so small that any other type of instrument to deal with them has to be extremely delicate and costly. it consists of a magnet fitted into a little brass case with a little piece of soft iron fixed on each pole, while each of these "pole-pieces" is surrounded by a tiny coil of wire. the lid of the box is a disc of thin sheet-iron, and things are so proportioned that the pole pieces nearly but not quite touch this sheet-iron "diaphragm." an outer cover, generally of ebonite, serves to catch the sound-waves caused by any movement of the diaphragm and convey them to the ear. the action of the permanent magnet tends to pull the diaphragm inwards--to bulge it in slightly--so that it is in a state of very unstable equilibrium. because of this instability a very tiny current flowing through the coils and either adding to or subtracting from the strength of the magnet is sufficient either to draw it still closer or to let it recede a little. whether it approaches or recedes depends upon the direction of the current through the coils and makes no difference to the sound. the movement of the diaphragm is great or small according as the current is strong or weak: any variation in the current causes a perfectly corresponding movement in the diaphragm. even those very small and very complex changes in air-pressure which give us the sensation of sound are very faithfully followed by this simple bit of sheet iron, so that the sounds are faithfully reproduced for our benefit. at the moment, however, we are not dealing with speech but with buzzing sounds, which are very simple, being merely a rapid succession of "ticks." the telephone, it must be remembered, takes no notice of a steady current, except when it starts and stops. but each time that occurs it gives a tick. hence, if we start and stop a current very rapidly, or to use another term, make it rapidly intermittent, we get a rapid succession of ticks, and if rapid enough they form a humming, buzzing, or singing sound. if very fast you can get a positive shriek. the precise character of the sound depends entirely upon the rapidity of the intermittency. now it is easy to see that the current passed through an electric-bell mechanism is intermittent. it is the very nature of the apparatus to make the current intermittent. it is by so doing that it works. therefore, if we pass the same current which works a bell through a telephone we get a buzzing or humming sound according to the speed of interruption. the vibration of the armature itself also causes a humming sound of a similar note or tone to that heard in the telephone, but it must be clearly understood that these two sounds are quite different. one is the result of mechanical motion, the other is the result of electrical action producing motion in the diaphragm of the telephone. when you listen in the telephone it is not that you hear the sound of the bell mechanism, you hear another sound altogether, although, since both have the same origin, both have the same note or tone. take any old bell, then, which you may happen to have or be able to procure and an old telephone such as can be bought for a shilling or so at a second-hand shop, and these together with a pocket-lamp battery can be formed into a military field telegraph. the way to connect these up is to run a wire from one of the copper strips on the battery to one of the terminal screws on the bell, a second wire from the other screw on the bell to one of the flexible wires of the telephone, which may be a mile away if you like, a third wire returning from the other flexible wire of the telephone back to the battery. to send signals all you have to do is to touch the return wire upon the second strip of the battery for short or long intervals, thereby making the dot-and-dash signals. or a simple form of key can easily be contrived for the purpose. every time you complete the circuit the buzzer will buzz, in other words, it will permit an intermittent current to pass round the circuit and a buzzing or humming sound will be heard in the telephone, no matter how far away it may be. this arrangement, however, involves two wires between the two stations, and in practice only one is usual. this could be arranged by running the third wire from the telephone not back to the sending station but to a peg driven into the earth, connecting the second pole of the battery in like manner to an earth pin at the sending end. thus the return wire would be done away with and the earth utilized instead. to do that, unfortunately, you would need to increase very greatly the power of your battery, for although the path through the earth itself offers practically no resistance at all to the current, the actual places where the current passes to earth and from earth, especially if they be simply temporary pegs driven into the ground, offer very considerable resistance, so that in order to get enough current through the buzzer to make it work would need a powerful battery. there is another way, however, by which that difficulty can be overcome quite easily. probably all my readers know something of the induction or shocking coil, wherein intermittent currents in one part of the coil induce intermittent currents of a somewhat different kind in another part of the coil. few people realize, however, that the same effect can be attained, within limits, in a single coil such as the winding upon the magnet of an electric bell. watch a bell at work and you will notice a bright spark at the place where the contact is made and broken. that spark is due to a sudden rush of current which takes place in the coil when the original current is stopped, in other words, when the contact is broken. it is as if the coil gives a rather vicious "kick" every time the current is stopped. there is not much electricity in this "kick" current, but it is very forceful, and it is that force which makes it actually jump across the gap after contact has been broken, thereby causing the spark. now we can capture most of that energy and make it go a long distance through wire and through earth carrying our messages for us. to do this we need to make a new connection on the bell at the place where the spring is fixed. then we can make two circuits. one is between the two terminal screws of the buzzer, in which circuit we must include the battery and the key. that circuit will be just as it would be if we were fixing the buzzer to announce our visitors at the front door. the second circuit is different: lead one wire from the new connection just made and take it to a pin driven into the ground. if the ground is just a shade moist a wire meat-skewer will answer admirably. then lead a second wire from that one of the two terminal screws which is connected directly to the winding of the magnet (not to that one which is connected to the contact screw) and lead it away to your distant station. at the other station connect the single wire to the telephone as before and the other "end" of the telephone to a pin in the earth. you will find that the "kicks" from the coil will traverse wire and earth-return quite easily, while there will be no difficulty about working the bell, for the small battery will do that quite well. in fact, after cutting the hammer off and so converting a bell into a buzzer, i have got quite good results with one-third of a pocket-lamp battery. the little flat batteries so familiar to us all if divested of their outer covering will be found to consist of three little dry cells any one of which is quite capable of sending messages in the way described as far as any amateur is likely to want to send. to be able to send and receive at either end it is only necessary to connect both telephones and both coils "in series." that is to say, connect one end of the coil to the long wire and the other to one wire of the telephone, the other wire of the telephone being connected to earth. if this be done at both ends signals can be sent and received both ways. many young readers, scouts, members of cadet corps and the like, will find great pleasure and interest in constructing and working this apparatus, besides which it shows precisely what the official "buzzer" is like. although beautifully made, of course, the army instrument is essentially just that and little more. it has an additional feature, however, namely, a microphone, so that when desired it can be used as a speaking telephone for transmitting verbal messages. it also has the bottom of the case made of a brass plate so that earth pins are often unnecessary, the case dumped down upon the ground being a good enough "earth." buzzers are not used for very long lines: forty miles is about the limit, and usually the distances are very much less. that is because long lines rather object to rapidly changing currents flowing through them. why, you say, what currents could change more rapidly than telephone currents carrying speech, yet they go for hundreds of miles? true, but in that case there are two wires, flow and return, twisted together all the way, under which conditions they interact upon each other in such a manner as to abolish the difficulty to which i am referring. buzzers and indeed all the telegraph circuits consist of one wire and the earth, which is quite different. another objection to the buzzer is that it is apt to interfere with others. for instance, if two buzzer sets are at work anywhere near each other and the wires run parallel for a distance they will be able to hear each other's signals as well as their own. if two such sets are earthed near together the same thing happens, the signals of one are picked up by the other, a very annoying state of affairs for the operators. right at the front, however, amid the rough and tumble of the actual fighting, the buzzer is supreme. the wire used is sometimes plain copper enamelled: more often, however, it is a mixture of steel and copper strands twisted together and covered with a strong insulating covering. this is carried on reels in properly fitted carts which can advance at a gallop, paying out the wire as they go. the inner end of the wire is connected to the axle of the reel in such a way that a telegraphist in the cart is in communication all the time with the starting-point, the wheels of the cart providing him with an earth connection. when laying these wires another interesting little device is often used--an earth plate on the operator's heel. thus, while carrying the wire along, laying it as he goes, he can still be in communication with the starting-point every time he puts his heel to the ground. for the longer lines away back from the fighting the methods employed are just the same as those of peace. "sounder" instruments are used, wheatstone automatic machines, duplex and quadruplex systems, whereby two and four messages are sent simultaneously over the same wire, indeed all the contrivances and refinements of the home telegraph office are to be found in the field telegraph offices. but it would hardly be fitting to describe them here. some information on the subject will be found in "the romance of submarine engineering," where their application to cable telegraphy is dealt with. a genuine speciality of warfare, however, is the methods by which makeshift arrangements can be set up, such as sending telegraph messages over a telephone wire without interfering with the latter. imagine that a and b are the two wires of a telephone circuit running (for the sake of simplicity) from north to south. at the south end i connect a telegraph set to both wires while you, we will imagine, do the same at the north end. you and i can then signal to each other without the telephone man hearing us at all. to him the two wires are flow and return, to us they are both "flow," the earth being our return. thus our signals never reach his instruments at all. but when we each connect to both his wires, do we not "short-circuit" or connect them to each other, thereby destroying his circuit? no, we are too cunning for that. we first connect the two wires a and b together with a coil of closely wound wire, having, in scientific language, much "inductance," and telephone currents shun a coil of that sort. then we make our connection to the centre of that coil so that our currents go to a through half the coil and to b through the other half. this enables us to use the apparatus without interfering with the other fellow at all. for this, by the way, we must use ordinary telegraph instruments. we cannot employ a buzzer, for these coils which we use to obstruct the passage of the other man's telephone currents would also obstruct the changing currents from a buzzer. the slow, steady currents of the ordinary telegraph pass quite easily, however. again, suppose you and i want to communicate by buzzer and there is already a wire laid passing both of us but in use already for ordinary telegraphy. we only need to add a "condenser" to our apparatus and we can manage all right. as a matter of fact, the service instruments generally have condensers partly for this very purpose. each of us then connects his instrument to the wire and to earth, after which we can signal to each other while the telegraphist is unaware of the fact. the reason that is possible is the reverse of what we saw just now. there we had a coil which obstructed buzzer or telephone currents but passed ordinary telegraph currents. here we use condensers which will pass our buzzer currents but not the ordinary telegraph currents. thus the soldier telegraphist is up to many dodges whereby he can save time or save material, both of which may be precious. as in bridge building and other branches, he needs to be quick to adapt himself to circumstances, to utilize to the full any opportunities which may present themselves. but his principles are quite simple and do not differ in any way from those of peace. it is only in applying them that the differences arise. chapter xxiii how war inventions grow the inventor of one of the devices described later on in this book modestly claims that he did not invent it but it invented itself. what he means is that he worked step by step, from simple beginnings, each step when complete suggesting the next. to put it another way, many inventions grow in the inventor's mind, sometimes from unpromising beginnings, the most unlikely start often resulting in the most successful ending. who has not heard of the "tanks" which made such a name for themselves when they suddenly appeared in northern france? the british commander-in-chief simply mentioned that a new type of armoured car had come into use with good results, but the newspaper men set the whole non-teutonic world laughing with droll stories of huge monsters suggestive of prehistoric animals which suddenly began to crawl through the slime and mud of the battle-field, pouring death and destruction upon the astounded germans. how they came to be called tanks no one seems to know clearly but that is how they will be known for all time. it has been suggested that they were so named because tank is one of the things which they certainly are not, the intention being thereby to add to the mystification of the enemy. that is by the way, however, for we are more concerned with the things than with their name. their precise origin is wrapped in mystery but we have it on excellent authority that they grew out of the peaceful "tractor," originally intended to drag a plough to and fro across a field in the service of the farmer. an illustration of one of these interesting machines will be seen in this book which will well repay a little study. it consists of a steel frame or platform upon which is mounted a four-cylinder petrol engine with a reservoir above to carry the supply of fuel and with a radiator in front to cool the water which keeps the engine from becoming too hot. towards the back of the vehicle is what is called by engineers a worm-gear, the function of which is to reduce the one thousand revolutions per minute of the engine to somewhere near the slow speed required of the wheels of the tractor. this worm-gear is simply a wheel with suitable teeth on its edge in conjunction with a screw so made that its thread can engage comfortably with the teeth. this latter, because of the wriggling appearance which it presents when it is revolving is called a worm, which name it gives to the whole apparatus. both wheel and worm are mounted in bearings which form part of a case enclosing the whole so that dirt is excluded while, the case being filled with oil, ample lubrication is assured. the shafts of both wheel and worm emerge through holes in the case. it will easily be seen that each single turn of the worm will propel the wheel one tooth, so that if the wheel have fifty teeth, for example, the worm will turn fifty times to the wheel's once. thus a great reduction in speed is attainable with this device and what is equally valuable, a great increase of power also results. thus a small engine, working at a high speed, is able by means such as this to pull very heavy loads at a slow speed. it is evident, however, that the reduction necessary in this case cannot be attained even by a worm-gear, for there are other wheels visible which show that ordinary tooth gearing is also employed to reduce the speed even further before it is applied to driving the tractor along. practically all the other gear which we see in the picture, above the platform, consists of the controlling apparatus. the object with a screw-like appearance just behind the engine is not really a screw but is a flexible coupling joining the engine to the worm-gear, its "flexibility" enabling the two to work sweetly together even though by chance they may get just a little out of line with each other. but by far the most interesting part of the machine is that which is underneath the frame. at one end we see a pair of ordinary-looking wheels and between them the gear for swinging them to right or left for steering purposes, but even they are somewhat unusual, since they will be seen to have flanges or rims round the edge for the purpose of biting into the earth, so that they may be able to guide the machine the better in soft ground. the back wheels, however, are quite peculiar, for there is a pair on each side and round each pair is a chain somewhat after the fashion of a huge bicycle chain. the links of this chain are made of tough steel and they are two feet wide, so that each chain forms a broad track upon which the machine moves. the links of this track-chain will be seen to be tooth-shaped so that they grip or bite deeply into the yielding ground. the teeth, moreover, are shaped like those of a saw and they are so placed as best to help the tractor forward. between the two chain-wheels will be noticed a row of smaller wheels and it is these which largely support the weight of the machine, the chains forming tracks upon which they run. the wheels actually turned by the power of the engine are the chain-wheels, and their action is such as to keep on laying down and then taking up again two broad firm tracks along which, at the same time, they keep propelling the other wheels which carry the weight above. the effect, really, is just as if the machine had a pair of driving wheels two feet wide and of enormous diameter, of such diameter, in fact, that the part in contact with the ground is almost flat. thus there is always a broad bearing surface to prevent sinking in soft earth, while the tooth-like shape of the links gives a firm hold even under very adverse conditions. this form of construction has been used for some few years now under the name of "caterpillar" or "centipede" traction. a glance at the picture will explain those names, particularly if the chain-driven part of the vehicle be imagined to be a little longer than it is in the particular machine shown. the idea of armouring a vehicle with bullet-proof plates is also a fairly old conception. armoured trains were used again and again during the south african war, and armoured motor-cars became familiar to most people. in the case of cars, however, the armour could only be very light and the guns carried were limited practically to a single machine-gun and some rifles. moreover, the operations of a car are very largely confined to such places as are blessed with good roads or smooth plains. an armoured car of the older type would have cut a poor figure amid the shell-holes and mine-craters of northern france. it would have had to keep to the roads and so it was little used. but the idea of an armoured vehicle was good and a good idea is never entirely lost. sooner or later some genius puts it to good use. thus the idea of an armoured vehicle came to be associated with the idea represented in the centipede tractor and the result was the tank. why not armour a large centipede, said someone? make it very big and strong. it will trample down the barb-wire entanglements as if they were grass. if made long enough and rightly balanced it will pass over the trenches like a moving bridge. nothing but a direct hit from a heavy gun will do it much harm. for, observe, the mechanism can be entirely covered up, all the vital parts can be well protected, and the chain tracks can be so strong as to be almost undamageable. [illustration: _by permission of_ _messrs. foster and co._ the parent of the tank. here we see an innocent agricultural tractor with caterpillar hind wheels. it is out of such a machine that the idea of the formidable tank was evolved.] thus we get a glimpse of the growth of this simple peaceful agricultural machine into one of the most striking mechanical achievements of the great war. another thing which seems to have grown more or less of itself is the bomb or grenade. before the time of modern accurate fire-arms hand-grenades were quite a recognized weapon. the "grenadier" guards owe their title to this fact and carry the design of a bursting grenade upon their uniforms. yet until a few years ago everyone thought that such things were done with for ever: that with modern rifles soldiers would seldom get near enough together to use grenades and that if they did the bayonet would be the weapon to be used. when, however, the germans were driven back at the battle of the marne and found themselves compelled to entrench in order to avoid further disaster, it soon became evident that neither rifle nor bayonet nor both together entirely filled the needs of the infantryman. since the allies were not powerful enough to drive the germans from their trenches forthwith, they, too, had to entrench. gradually the trenches drew nearer and nearer together and at the same time skill in entrenching increased. thus a time soon arrived when both rifle and bayonet were largely useless for purposes of offence. then the hand-grenade came into its own again, for the men could throw it from the depths of their own trench high into the air in the hope that it would fall into the trenches of the enemy. the call for these quickly produced the supply. there is little need to describe them here, for who among us has not intimate friends who used them again and again? this much may be said, however. they were little hollow balls of cast iron, sometimes chequered so that when they burst they flew into many fragments. inside was a charge of explosive with a suitable fuse or firing mechanism. some were fixed to the end of a stick for convenience in throwing, while others were simply handled like a cricket-ball. they serve to show us, however, how an old idea may under fresh conditions be revived into what is practically a new invention. another example of the same sort is the revival of chain mail. who, but a few years ago, would have thought it possible that modern soldiers would go to battle sheathed in shirts consisting of little metal plates cunningly connected by wire links and so overlapping each other as to form a perfect shield for all the more vital parts of the body? to what extent these were worn i do not know, for the british soldier is a very shy fellow in some ways and there are few who would not be a trifle ashamed to let their comrades see them thus garbed. they would feel that it was a confession of fear, and however afraid an englishman may be he will never admit it. he is really a pious fraud, for the more he is really afraid inwardly the more courageously will he act just to hide his fear. since, however, the bullet-proof helmet is worn officially nowadays there seems no reason whatever why the bullet-proof waistcoat should not be adopted officially too. it is very light and very flexible and it is claimed that it is quite effectual in stopping rifle and machine-gun bullets. thus we see in what different ways inventions grow. some are warlike from first to last, like the gun and the torpedo, but we find a vast range of peaceful things growing into implements of warfare, as the farmer's tractor has been developed into the tank, while not less interesting are the old ideas revived and adapted to modern needs, exemplified by the hand-grenade and the chain armour. chapter xxiv aeroplanes of all the great inventions perhaps the most striking because of the suddenness with which they have come upon us are those relating to the navigation of the air. until a few years ago "to fly" was taken to typify the impossible. now we see men flying every day and there is scarcely anyone who has not had a friend or relative in the flying corps. recent experience, too, has shown that this one invention has revolutionized warfare in several important departments, particularly in the use of very heavy long-range artillery. huge guns, hidden in a hollow or behind a hill, have been set to throw shells on to an unseen target, while a man in an aeroplane above watches the result and signals back by wireless. thus by the aid of aircraft the power of artillery has been immensely increased. again, aircraft have superseded cavalry for reconnaissance purposes, that is to say, for finding out the enemy's strength and preparedness. only a few years ago a general who needed information as to his foe would send forward a screen of cavalrymen who would cautiously creep forward until, judging by what they could see and by what sort of a reception they got, they were able to form some idea of the foe's arrangements. nowadays, however, the airmen sail over his head and take photographs of him and his positions. a careful commander to-day not only screens his men and his guns from view along the land but he also tries his best to make them invisible from above. and, speaking of inventions, the soldiers have shown a degree of ingenuity in making themselves and their guns invisible which almost merits a volume to itself. the airman, therefore, goes up and sails over the enemy. he may be simply observing for some particular unit of artillery, or he may be sent to find out things generally--nothing in particular, but anything which seems likely to be of use. he looks out intently and carefully, moreover he not only looks with his own eyes: as has just been mentioned, he takes photographs, which can be developed on his return and studied minutely at leisure. he may, or may not, according to circumstances, send back reports of an urgent nature by wireless telegraphy. in some cases these duties are all carried out by one man, but in others there are two: one the pilot who looks after the working of the machine, and the other the observer whose whole attention can thus be devoted to scrutinizing the enemy. of course, when aeroplanes go on scouting expeditions like this they are apt to be attacked by the enemy both by anti-aircraft guns and also by other aeroplanes. the former can only be met by high speed and the steering of a somewhat erratic course so as to confuse the gunners and prevent them from taking good aim. the other aeroplanes, however, must be met by actual fighting. the only way to defeat them is to go for them and attack them, a machine-gun being the most usual weapon. besides those who go up for definite scouting operations or to "spot," as it is termed, for the artillery, there are other machines whose sole duty is fighting. these go up for the purpose of driving off those machines of the enemy which may come prying, or to keep the ground, so to speak, for the scouting machines and enable them to do their work unmolested. then there are, of course, still others whose function is to carry out bombing expeditions. all these different duties call for different types of machine, but i do not propose to go into the differences here since changes are so rapid in this particular field that only the general principles remain unchanged for any length of time. what has just been hinted, however, as to the different kinds of work which the aeroplane is called upon to do will enable the reader to see why different kinds of machines are needed. so far we have only spoken of aeroplanes. there is a kind of machine sometimes called a hydroplane but which we are gradually getting to call a sea-plane. the latter term is much to be preferred, since the former is also in use to denote a special kind of high-speed boat. now a sea-plane only differs from an aeroplane in that it has floats instead of wheels. the aeroplane has wheels to enable it to alight upon and arise from the ground: the sea-plane has floats by which it can alight upon the water and arise from the water also. in some instances this float idea is made so pronounced a feature of the machine that it becomes a flying boat. sea-planes are therefore really only aeroplanes specially adapted for a certain purpose. they are really just as much aeroplanes as those machines which go by that name. it is somewhat unfortunate, therefore, that a separate term is used to describe them. but there it is: names grow in a very curious way, not always in a logical way, and a name having once stuck to a thing in the mind of the public it is very difficult to make any alteration. aeroplanes, then, may be said to include a subdivision known as sea-planes, and for the rest of this chapter what is said of aeroplanes will apply to sea-planes also. without doubt, these are the fastest vehicles in existence. many of them can exceed a speed of a hundred miles an hour. consequently, the pilot lives while he is aloft in the equivalent of a furious gale, and it would seem as if that must produce such a degree of cold as to be almost unendurable. moreover, it appears that this cold is almost as bad in summer as in winter, for the temperature high up in the air is much the same all the year round. the consequent muffling up with thick clothes and gloves, while it mitigates the cold, must add greatly to the pilot's difficulties in managing his machine. the protection for his eyes and ears which is made necessary by the same conditions must likewise add to his difficulties or at any rate to his discomfort. on the other hand, the effect of gliding at a very high speed over a perfectly smooth track, for that is in effect what it is, is very exhilarating, which to some extent compensates for the other drawbacks. moreover, the handling of such a machine in the air, particularly if a fight is included in the programme, appeals strongly to the sporting instincts of young men, so much so that during the war, in spite of the dangers and hardships, and the continual loss of life, there was never a dearth of men anxious to become pilots. owing to these considerations, too, it follows that the best aviators are to be found in those lands where the people are most devoted to sports. hence, as we have it on excellent authority, the young men of great britain and the united states, with their love of adventure and their strong sporting instincts, make better men in the air than the germans. but really we are more concerned here with the machines than with the men, so let us get back to our subject. the aeroplane consists of one or more "planes" or surfaces which, on being held at a certain slant and then pushed forward rise or remain supported in the air. therefore the plane or planes need to be supplemented by first a tail and horizontal rudder to hold them at the correct slant, and an engine and propeller to drive them forward. it is not necessary, here, to go over the history of the aeroplane, as that has been told so often. it is not of much interest, moreover, except to those who are particularly concerned with small details of construction, for in a general way the machine of to-day is very little different from one pictured by sir george cayley a hundred years ago. it is only the perfecting of the details which has transformed a dream into a very real thing. so we will look only at the construction of the aeroplane in a general way, to do which we must first consider why it flies at all. it is due to the well-established law that action is always accompanied by a reaction equally strong and in the opposite direction. when a gun is fired the explosion not only drives the shell forward but equally drives the gun itself backward. the backward energy of the recoil is precisely equal to the forward energy of the shell. the two are equal but in opposite directions. in like manner a rocket ascends because the hot gases from the paper cylinder blow forcibly downwards, thereby producing an equal reaction upwards. now the plane of a flying machine is held with its forward edge a little higher than its rear edge, so that as it is pushed along it tends to catch the air and throw it downwards. hence the reaction tends to lift the plane upwards. when the machine starts the reaction is not sufficient to overcome gravity, which is trying to hold the machine down upon the ground, but as the speed increases and the air is thrust down with more and more violence the point is ultimately reached when the reaction is able to overcome gravity and the machine ascends. when a sufficient height is reached, the pilot alters the position of his horizontal rudder or "elevator" so as to make the position of the plane more flat, with the result that it throws the air downwards to a less extent, and the reaction is thereby reduced until it is only just sufficient to keep the machine at the same height. to descend, the position of the plane is made still flatter, the reaction is reduced still more and gravity has its way once again, bringing the machine to earth. in other words, the machine acts under the influence of two forces: the downward pull of gravity and the upward reaction due to the action of the machine in throwing the air downward. the former never varies, the latter can be varied by the pilot at will: he can increase it by increasing the speed or by increasing the tilt of his plane or planes: he can reduce it by diminishing the speed or the tilt. since generally speaking the speed of his engine will remain constant, he rises, remains at the same height or falls, at will, by the simple manipulation of the elevator through which he can change the tilt or inclination. most machines have a fixed tail as well as a horizontal rudder or elevator, the same being so set that it tends to keep the plane in a certain normal inclination, the elevator being called in to increase that or diminish it as may be required. in addition to the elevator there is also another rudder of the ordinary kind, such as every ship and boat has, for guiding the machine to right or left. the elevator steers up and down, the rudder steers to either hand. provision is also made for balancing the machine. this is sometimes in the form of two small planes hinged to the main plane, one at either end, connected together and to a controlling lever by wires, so that by their use the pilot can steer the right-hand side of his machine upwards and the left-hand downward, or vice versa, if through any cause he finds a tendency to capsize. in some machines the same effect is produced not by separate planes but by pulling the main plane itself somewhat out of shape, but precisely the same principle is involved. the planes are usually made with a slight curve in them, so that they may the better catch the air and "scoop" it downwards, so to speak. they usually consist of fabric specially made for the purpose, stretched upon a light wooden framework. the whole framework is usually of wood with metal fittings frequently made of aluminium for the sake of lightness. the engines have been mentioned in another chapter. the propeller which is almost invariably fixed directly upon the shaft of the engine has two blades only and not three as is usual with those of ships. precisely why this should be so is not clear, but experience shows that two-bladed propellers are preferable for this work. they are made of wood, several layers being glued together under pressure, the resulting log being then carved out to the required shape. this makes a stronger thing than it would be if cut out of a single piece of wood. all parts, engine, elevator, rudder and balancing arrangement, are controlled by very simple means from the pilot's seat. in monoplanes there is but one main plane, resembling a pair of bird's wings. or if we care to look upon it as two planes, one each side of the "body," then we must call it a pair. since the name "mono" indicates one it is best to think of it as one plane although it may be in two parts. the biplane has, as its name implies, two planes, but in that case there can be no doubt, since they are placed one above the other. machines have been made with three planes and even with as many as five, but monoplanes and biplanes appear to hold the field. it is not possible for an aeroplane to be in any sense armoured for protection against bullets: for defence the pilot has to depend upon his own cunning man[oe]uvres combined with the fast speed at which he can move. for offensive purposes he usually has a machine gun mounted right in front of him with which he can pour a stream of bullets into an opponent or even, by flying low, he can attack a body of infantry. it is recorded that one german prisoner during the war, speaking of the daring of the british pilots in thus attacking men on foot, exclaimed, "they will pull the caps off our heads next." some of the aeroplanes have their propeller behind the pilot and some have it in front. the latter, to distinguish them, are called "tractor" machines, since in their case the propeller pulls them along. now it is easy to see that a difficulty arises in such cases through the best position for the gun being such that it throws its bullets right on to the propeller. but that has been overcome in a most simple yet ingenious way. the gun is itself operated by the engine with the result that a bullet can only be shot forth during those intervals when neither blade of the propeller is in the way. the propeller is moving so fast that it cannot be seen and the bullets are flying out in a continuous rattle, yet every bullet passes between the blades and not one ever touches. it is easy to see that when an aeroplane is manned by a single man, as is often the case, he must have his hands very full indeed, what with the machine itself and the gun as well. in fact, he often has to leave the machine for a short time to look after itself while he busies himself with the gun. now there we see a sign of the wonderful work which has been done in the course of but a few years in the perfecting of the aeroplane, the result of a series of improvements in detail which make but a dreary story if related but which make all the difference between the risky, uncertain machine of a few years ago and the safe, reliable machine of to-day. modern machines are inherently stable. the older ones had the elements of stability in them but they were so crudely proportioned that these inherent qualities did not have a chance to come into play. if one drops a flat card edgewise from a height it seems as if it ought to fall straight down to the ground. yet we all know from experience that it seldom does anything of the kind. instead, it assumes a position somewhere near horizontal and then descends in a series of swoops from side to side. there we see the principle at work which, in a well-designed aeroplane, causes inherent stability. the explanation is as follows. the aeroplane is sustained in the air through the upward pressure of the air resisting the downward pull of gravity. that has been fully explained already. now gravity, as we all know, acts upon every part of a body whether it be an aeroplane or anything else. but for practical purposes, we may regard its action as concentrated at one particular point in that body, called the "centre of gravity." likewise, the upward pressure of the air acts upon the whole of the under surface of the plane or planes, yet we may regard it as concentrated at a certain point called the "centre of pressure." further, we all know from experience that a pendulum or other suspended body is only still when its centre of gravity is exactly under the point of suspension. if we move it to either side it will swing back again. in just the same way, the only position in which an aeroplane will remain steady is that in which the centre of gravity is exactly under the point of suspension or, in other words, the centre of pressure. for the centre of pressure in the aeroplane is precisely similar to the point of suspension of a pendulum. let us, then, picture to ourselves an aeroplane flying along on a horizontal course with this happy state of things prevailing. something we will suppose occurs to upset it with the result that it begins to dive downwards. it is then in the position of sliding downhill and instantly its speed increases in consequence. that increase of speed causes the air to press a little more strongly than it did before upon the front edge of the planes. in other words, the centre of pressure shifts forward a little, with the result that the centre of gravity is then a little to the rear of the centre of pressure. a moment's reflection will show that with the centre of pressure (or point of suspension) in advance of the centre of gravity there is a tendency for the machine to turn upwards again, or, in other words, to right itself. if, on the other hand, the initial upset causes it to shoot upwards the speed instantly falls off and the centre of pressure retreats, turning the machine downwards once more. and the same principle applies whatever the disturbance may be. instantly and automatically a turning force comes into play which tends to check and ultimately to correct what has gone wrong. this principle explains the behaviour of the card dropped from an upstairs window and, no doubt, as has been said, it operated also in the early flying machines, but in their case other factors caused disturbing elements with which the self-righting tendency was not strong enough to cope. as time went on, however, experience taught the makers how to avoid these disturbing factors until at last the self-righting tendency was able to act effectively, thus producing the aeroplane which is inherently stable and which will, for short periods at all events, fly safely without attention from its pilot. each little improvement in this direction was an invention. of course, there were certain men whose names stand out prominently in the history of the aeroplane, notable among whom are the wright brothers, but the final result is due to innumerable inventions, many of them by unknown men. but perhaps someone will say, how can you possibly talk about final results in a matter which is still in its infancy? the answer to that is that so far as the safe, "flyable" machine is concerned, it has arrived. little now remains to be done in that direction. further improvements there will, of course, be, but the great fundamental problems of flight have been solved. chapter xxv the aerial lifeboat balloons had not long been invented when the idea arose of a device by means of which an aeronaut who found himself in difficulties might be able to reach the ground in safety. in other words, the need was felt for something which should play towards the balloon the part which the lifeboat does to the ship. the original idea of a parachute was even older than that, since we are told of a man away back in the seventeenth century who amused the king of siam by jumping from a height and steadying his descent by means of a couple of umbrellas. it was not, however, until the very end of the eighteenth century or the beginning of the nineteenth that descents were made from really considerable heights from balloons. the usual arrangement then was to have the parachute hanging at full length fastened below the basket, or tied to one side of the balloon in such a manner that it could be detached by cutting the cords that held it up. when the parachute was carried below the balloon basket the man was already in the cradle or seat of the parachute ready to be dropped, but when the seat was tied to the side of the car of the balloon the aeronaut, when he wished to make a descent, first got from the car into the seat, and, casting himself adrift from the car, swung out from under the centre of the balloon so that when he was hanging clear another man in the balloon cut the cords or pulled a slip-knot which set the parachute free. there were different ways of doing this and when a man was by himself he had to get into the sling of the parachute and, on finding himself clear of everything, he would give a tug to a cord which would release a catch holding up the parachute and allow it to drop to earth. the parachute, at the very first, was but a simple affair, being little more than a circular sheet of cotton or similar fabric, but it was very soon found necessary to make it _a bag_ or it would not properly hold the air. cords were attached at regular intervals all around the edge of this bag, these cords being gathered together and attached to the edge of a basket which carried the man. sometimes only a sling was used, or a simple light seat after the fashion of the "bosun's chair" upon which a sailor is sometimes hauled to the top of an unclimbable mast, or a steeplejack to the top of a chimney. thus, when it was dropped, the weight of the man, pulling upon all the cords simultaneously, drew down the edge of the bag, which, catching the air in its fall, acted as a powerful brake and reduced the rate of falling to such an extent that if all went well the man alighted in safety if not comfort. as has already been remarked in another chapter, air, which seems to us sometimes to be so exceedingly light as to have practically no weight at all, really has weight and also the property which we call inertia, by virtue of which things at rest prefer to stay at rest. now when this open air-bag, of considerable area, is pulled downwards it causes a very considerable disturbance in the air. as it descends the air inside and beneath it is first pushed downwards and compressed a little, then it commences to move outwards, towards the edge, round which it finally escapes to fill the slight vacuum in the space just above the descending parachute. all this the air objects to do because of its inertia. the parachute has to force it to act thus and in that way it uses up some of the force of gravity which all the time is pulling the man earthwards. in other words, that force, instead of dragging the man downwards at such a speed as to dash him to pieces, is so far employed in churning up the air that what is left only brings him down quite slowly and ends with just a gentle bump. that is the scientific explanation of what happens, although expressed in somewhat homely language. to anyone who thinks of this matter it will be clear that a relatively heavy weight like a man, suspended from a parachute, is like a very delicately poised pendulum, and consequently it is not surprising to hear that the early parachutes oscillated very considerably from side to side, so much so, indeed, that this oscillation became a decided danger, for before the proper shape of the air-bag was found out they sometimes skidded and even turned inside out. it was found, however, at quite an early stage that this instability could be to some extent cured by making a hole right in the centre or crown of the parachute through which the air compressed inside could blow upwards in a powerful jet. at first sight it seems as if this would much weaken the parachute and cause it to descend too quickly, but quite a large hole can be safely made, and to make such a hole is only the same thing as slightly reducing the area and that can be easily remedied by slightly increasing the diameter. reading of this many years ago, i have often been puzzled as to why the presence of the hole should have this steadying effect, the explanation given in the old scientific textbook from which i learnt it being obviously very unsatisfactory. of recent years, however, this subject of parachutes has been very deeply studied by an eminent engineer of london, mr. e. r. calthrop, the inventor of the "guardian angel" parachute to which these remarks are leading up, and he has hit upon what is undoubtedly the explanation. he says that the big jet of air shooting upwards through the crown of the parachute forms in effect a rudder which steers the parachute in a straight downward course, just as the rudder guides a boat upon the surface of the water. it is quite possible that thus far the impression conveyed to the reader's mind is that the parachute and its use are very simple, straightforward matters. one may be inclined to think that it is only necessary to get a circular sheet of fabric, to fasten the cords to it, to connect them to a suitable seat and then to descend from any height at any time in perfect safety. if you make a model from a flat sheet of cotton, then one made like a bag, and drop them with little weights attached from the top window of your house you will see what funny things the air can do. after having tried these little ones, you will begin to suspect that the big parachute is full of waywardness: and, as a matter of fact, until recent years, it has been very largely a delusion and a snare. by its refusal to act and open at the right moment it has sacrificed many lives. although apparently so simple, there were conditions existing and forces at work which for a century or more had never been properly considered and investigated, and it is only now that we have arrived at a parachute whose certainty of action and general trustworthiness entitle it to be called the "lifeboat of the air." the troubles with the older parachutes were two. first, although often it opened quite quickly, and carried its load as perfectly as could be desired, it sometimes had the habit of delaying its opening, and unless the fall were from a very great height it was unsafe to take the risk, indeed, it sometimes refused to open at all, and the poor parachutist suffered a fearful death. it had to be carried in a more or less folded-up state. often it was hung up by its centre to the side of a balloon, when it was very like a shut-up umbrella. consequently the power of opening quickly and certainly was of the first importance, and the lack of that power and the uncertainty of its action were a very serious defect. it has always suffered from an ill reputation as to reliability. the second fault lay with the cords. they would persist in getting entangled. everyone knows how a dozen cords hanging near together will get entangled with each other on the slightest provocation. such cords if blown about by a strong wind would be much worse even than when still, and if, as must often be the case with parachutes, they be coiled up, we all know from our own experience that some of them would be almost sure to get knotted and tangled together when, in a sudden emergency, the attempt was made to pull them all out of their coils in a second or two. just picture to yourself what it means: a dozen coiled cords all close together, themselves all coiled up in loops, suddenly pulled. something awkward appears almost inevitable. and the result of even one rope going awry may be fatal, for it may prevent the parachute opening out fully, probably giving it a "lop-sided" form incapable of gripping the air effectually and consequently allowing the unfortunate man to fall with a velocity which means certain death. this second cause of failure to open, through entanglement of cordage, has happened in a number of cases, with fatal results. so much for the faults of the old primitive parachute. now let us consider for a moment the urgent need for a parachute which is free from such faults. the man who goes up in a balloon on a saturday afternoon feels so sure of his "craft" that he thinks he needs no "lifeboat," yet men in ordinary free balloons have been killed for want of them. the spectators at country fairs no longer appreciate a parachute descent as a great and extraordinary spectacle. but in warfare, with kite balloons by the dozen, with dirigible balloons by the score and aeroplanes by the hundred, the call for parachutes is urgent and irresistible. at all events, mr. calthrop found an irresistible call to devote years of close study, unceasing toil and considerable sums of money to the task of perfecting an improved parachute which would always open and open quickly, and whose cords would never get entangled. he has the satisfaction of knowing that by so doing he has provided an appliance that in the air is as reliable as a lifeboat is at sea, and that at all times, and from every kind of aircraft, can be depended upon in case of accident to save the lives of gallant airmen who but for his work would be dashed to death. the great war has taught us to regard life somewhat cheaply. for years we were more concerned with taking life than with saving it, yet surely to save the life of one's own men is equivalent to taking the lives of one's opponents, so that even from the point of view of warfare the saving of life may be a help towards victory. this is particularly so when the lives saved are those of the choicest spirits, and among the most highly trained. it has been reckoned that to make a fully-trained pilot costs as much as £ , so that to save but a few, even in their preparatory nights on the training-grounds where so many accidents happen, makes quite an appreciable difference in the cost of a war, without considering the main question of the men's lives. many inventions arise through a man thinking of an idea and then seeking and finding some application for it. elsewhere in this book, i give examples of such cases. here we have an instance of the opposite, for mr. calthrop found his thoughts strongly directed in this direction by the death of a personal friend, the hon. c. s. rolls, one of the early martyrs in the cause of aviation, not to mention others who shared the same risks and in some cases the same fate. his interest thus aroused, he first studied all the records which could be found relating to parachute accidents, so as to ascertain, if possible, what were the causes of failure. then he commenced a long series of experiments with a view to removing these causes. improvement after improvement was tried, unexpected difficulties were discovered and grappled with, the kinematograph was called in to record the movements of the falling objects, a task for which it is far better fitted than the human eye, and after years of this there emerged the finished parachute, automatic in its action, perfectly reliable and a true safeguard, which i am about to describe. the parachute's body consists of the finest quality silk carefully cut into gussets of such a shape that when sewn together somewhat after the manner of the cover of an umbrella, they form a shallow bag, parabolic in section, of that particular shape which the material would assume naturally were it perfectly elastic when enclosing its resisting body of compressed air. at intervals round the edge are fastened twenty-four v-shaped tapes. these are only a few feet long and the lower end of each v-shaped pair is attached to a long main tape. there are twelve of these main tapes, and their lower ends unite in a metal disc from which is suspended the sling and harness by which the man is supported. [illustration: the "guardian angel" parachute. ( ) shows the airman in the harness by which he is attached to the parachute. by means of the star-shaped buckle he can instantly release himself. ( ) shows the parachute two seconds after the airman has jumped from the aeroplane. in ( ) he is seen nearing the ground. (_by permission of e. r. calthrop, esq._)] so the twenty-four short tapes form twelve v's to the points of which are attached the twelve long tapes which support the man. the reason why tapes are used in this particular parachute and not cords will be referred to later. in the crown of the silk body there is the usual hole for the purpose of forming the air-rudder to steady the parachute in its descent. and now we can consider the first great feature of this wonderful invention and ask ourselves these questions: "by what means is it made to open?" "what makes it more reliable than others?" to answer that we must first see why the others sometimes refused to open. in whatever way an ordinary parachute may be packed it must, when coming into use, assume the state of a shut umbrella with a hole in the top. in this condition it is assumed that as it falls the air will find a way in through the lower end and will blow the parachute open in precisely the same way that a strong wind will sometimes blow out the folds of an umbrella. but, as a matter of fact, the loose folds of a parachute, when the edge of the gussets is gathered in, are sure to overlap and enfold each other more or less. thus, when in the shut-umbrella state, it sometimes happens that air which is inside can escape upwards through the hole more easily than fresh air can get in from below. the parachute, in such a state, is, let us imagine, falling rapidly through the air. the result is just the same as if it were still and the air were rushing upwards past it. and the upward rush past the top hole tends to _suck air out_ through the hole faster than fresh air can find a way in at the bottom. this is the principle of the ejector, which engineers have put to many uses. for example, the vacuum brakes employed on many large railways owe all their power to stop a train to a vacuum caused by an ejector. there is a short tube or nozzle, placed in the centre of another tube through which steam blows. the action of the steam in the outer tube as it rushes past the end of the inner tube drags after it the air which is in the inner tube so effectively as to produce quite a good vacuum. and in precisely the same way, the upward rush of air past the parachute, or what is just the same, the falling of the parachute through stationary air, can suck the air from inside the latter and create a vacuum in it if the gussets gathered together at the mouth unfortunately overlap one another and are thus locked together by the pressure of the air striving to get in. thus, instead of the downward fall causing the ordinary parachute to open, as in most cases it will do quite well, the fall under these particular conditions actually binds its folds together and prevents it from opening. it is true this does not often happen, but the risk is _always_ present at every drop, and this unreliability has cost the lives of brave men and women, and the knowledge of this constant risk has led others to write down the parachute a failure, by reason of its known unreliability to open instantly. even when it does open the depth it falls before it opens is so variable, by reason of the fight between vacuum and pressure, that it may be one hundred feet one time and one thousand feet next time with the same parachute. now the "guardian angel" is designed so that those conditions cannot occur. its silken covering is first laid out on the ground and into the centre is introduced a beautifully-designed disc of aluminium, somewhat like a large inverted saucer, of exceeding lightness but of ample strength for what it has to do. then the silk body is pleated and folded back over the upper part of this launching-disc and gradually packed so that it occupies but a very small space upon the upper surface of the disc. it is so folded that its edge comes in the topmost layer and also in such a manner that on the tapes being pulled the silk unfolds easily and regularly, flowing down as it were over the edge of the disc almost as water flows if allowed to fall from a tap upon the centre of an inverted saucer. after the folding is complete another aluminium disc is placed above the packed silk body which shields it from the enormous air pressure when it is being released from an aeroplane flying at top speed. the upper and lower fabric covers are then superimposed and sealed and the "guardian angel" parachute is ready for use. the tapes, likewise, are folded up, in a special way upon the bottom cover, which is sprung over the bottom of the disc. the bottom cover with the tapes upon it, is pulled away by the weight of the airman as he makes his jump to safety, and the tapes are so arranged that a pull upon them causes them to draw out steadily and smoothly, almost like water falling from a height. if we regard the silk as forming a shallow bag inverted, we may say that it is folded upon the disc inside out and the function of the disc is to cause it to spread and enclose a wide column of air as it is pulled from its folds. to commence with it is nothing more than so much folded-up silk, but from the first moment of action it becomes a bag with a wide-open mouth, for its open mouth cannot be smaller than the disc. therefore, from the first instant it begins to grip the air and the ejector action never gets a chance to commence. the pressure of air inside is from the very commencement of the fall greater than that of the surrounding air. moreover, the disc covers the hole until the parachute is actually open, thereby making ejector action doubly impossible. the widely-opened mouth of the air-bag (i cannot help repeating that term for it is so expressive) swallows up more and more air as the thing falls rapidly, with the result that the air inside is instantly compressed and the increasing pressure as the silk is more and more fully drawn out causes it to expand until the whole is fully extended like a huge umbrella. the instant compression of the enclosed column of air is what causes it _always_ to open automatically. when once it is pointed out it is easy to see what a difference the presence of this disc makes. it is so simple that it cannot fail to act and having once produced that open mouth all the rest is due to the action of natural forces which can be absolutely relied upon. the ordinary parachute with its hopeless irregularities has, in fact, been converted into a machine whose action can _never_ fail. the disc is fastened to the balloon or aeroplane and is left behind when the parachute falls, having done its work. and now let us consider the tapes. as has already been remarked, a series of coiled cords cannot be relied upon to pull out straight without possibility of entanglement, but a tape, if folded to and fro like a chinese cracker, will invariably do so. so packed tapes have been substituted for coiled corded rigging, with the certainty that they cannot be entangled in the fiercest air current. and now we come to another interesting feature. the man is not suspended directly from the small disc to which the tapes are attached but by a non-spinning sling which contains a shock absorber. this latter consists of a number of strands of rubber and it is owing to its action that the aviator who trusts his life to the parachute suffers little or no shock; even when the instant opening of the parachute begins to arrest his fall. and not only does it save him from shock, but it also avoids the possibility of too great a stress coming suddenly upon the parachute or its rigging of tapes. the aviator himself is attached to the parachute through the shock-absorber sling, by means of a harness which he wears constantly throughout his flight, so that in the event of trouble he only has to jump overboard and the parachute automatically does the rest. this harness consists of two light but strong aluminium tubular rings through which he places his arms, combined with a series of straps which can be so adjusted that the stress of carrying him comes upon those parts of his body best adapted to bear it. this improved parachute is the only one which is capable of being used instantly and without preparation for descent from an aeroplane flying at top speed. it is easy to see that it is one thing to drop from a stationary or nearly stationary balloon and quite another to dive from an aeroplane at one hundred miles per hour. the latter is equivalent to suddenly trusting oneself to a parachute _during the strongest gale_. it has been found, by experiment, however, that high speed is no bar to the use of this parachute since it only causes the parachute to open a little more quickly than usual, which means that it can be used with safety from an even lower height. under the worst conditions this wonderful parachute can be relied upon always to open and carry its load at a height of only one hundred feet, and its use is safe in all circumstances when dropped from two hundred feet above the ground. after it has once got into operation and taken charge of affairs, so to speak, the man descends at the rate of only fifteen feet per second, which is just about the same as dropping from a height of a little over three feet. in other words, he will arrive on the ground with no worse bump than you would get by jumping off the dining-room table. but suppose that there were a wind blowing: would not the parachute come down in a slanting direction and then drag the man along? or may he not alight upon a tree or the roof of a house, only to be pulled off again and flung headlong? quite true he might, were not proper provision made for such occurrences. embodied in the harness is a lock which can be instantly undone, by a simple movement of a lever in the hand, and by its aid the man on touching earth or on alighting upon anything solid can release himself instantly, after which the parachute can sail away whither it will, but he will be safe and sound. what mr. calthrop has accomplished by the invention of his "guardian angel" parachute may be summarised briefly by saying that he has reduced the minimum height from which a parachute could be dropped from two thousand to two hundred feet, and that he has made it possible to launch a parachute, with the certainty of safety, from any kind of aircraft flying at the slowest or highest speed of which they are capable. * * * * * you are only a boy now, but when in years to come you are quite old and have grey hair you may become a member of the air board and--who knows--it may become your duty to decide that this great invention shall be always used on the training grounds to save the lives of the young men, not yet born, who are then learning to fly. during the war, one was killed every day, in a year, many of whom might have been saved had more "guardian angels" been in use. index acetone, , , acetylene, aeroplanes, types of, , air-raft equipment, alcohols, , , , , , aluminium, anchors for floating bridges, anti-aircraft guns, _aquitania_, s.s., armourer, austrian heavy mortars, , , bamboo, bridges made of, basic steel, becquerel, h., benzene, bessemer, sir henry, , , , , blast-furnace, , boilers in warships, breech-block of guns, , "brennan" torpedo, calthrop, e. r., , canet, gustave, canvas boats, carbolic acid, carbon, , , , carbon in steel, carbon monoxide, carriages of guns, cast iron, , catamaran bridge, , caustic soda, , , chloride of lime, chlorine, , , , , chloroform, clerk-maxwell, professor j., coal dust explodes, coal tar, contact-firing mines, copper, cordite, cotton explosives, , countermining, , crucible steel, curie, madame, detonator, diastase, diesel engine, , _dreadnought_, h.m.s., driving-band on shells, dynamite, electricity, positive and negative, , electrodes, electrolysis of salt, , electrolyte, electrons, electroscope, "elia" mines, ethane, ether, , explosion, force of, field guns, , flotilla leaders, fractional distillation, , french field artillery, froude, william, fulminate of mercury, glycerine, gravity, action of upon shells, , , "guardian angel" parachute, gun-cotton, , gunpowder, , gyroscope, uses of, , helium, hertzian waves, high explosives, , high-explosive shells, high-speed steel, hop-pole bridges, horse artillery, , howitzers, , , hydrostatic valve, , hydroxyl, , "interference" of waves, , _invincible_, h.m.s., ionogens, ions of common salt, iron ore, kieselguhr, ladysmith, guns at, launching a ship, "limit" gauges, line-of-battle ships, _lion_, h.m.s., lyddite, machine guns, magnetic detector, malt, marconi, methane, methylated spirit, mine, submarine, _et seq._ mine, subterranean, mortars, , , , , naval guns, , _et seq._ naval shells, , nitrate of potassium, nitro-benzene, nitro-glycerine, , , nitrogen, action of, , observation mines, oil fuel, _olympic_, s.s., organic substances, _orion_, h.m.s., parachutes, paraffins, periscope, , petrol engine, , phenol, picric acid, pig iron, , poison gas, pontoons for bridging, propellants, , , radio-activity, radium, _et seq._ rays from radium, , reeds, bridges made of, _repulse_, h.m.s., rheumatism and radium, rifling in guns, rolling mills, , salt and explosives, saltpetre, , , scott, sir percy, sea-planes, shell-steel, shrapnel shells, , , siemens steel, , sights for guns, smokeless powder, soap, sodium, , soluble seal used in mines, spinning action of shells, stability of aeroplanes, steam-engines, steel for guns, sulphuric acid, , , suspension bridges, "tanks," telephone used in telegraphy, tin, , t.n.t., toluene, torpedo boats, trajectory, trench mortars, trestle bridges, , tri-nitro-benzene, tri-nitro-phenol, tri-nitro-toluene, tungsten, , "tuning" wireless telegraph apparatus, turbine, steam, uranium, "whitehead" torpedo, wire-wound guns, wolfram, wood spirit, wrought iron, _wyoming_, u.s. battleship, x-rays, , zeppelin _v._ aeroplane, zinc, , , printed by william brendon and son, ltd., plymouth, england. _great classics for little children_ the children's odyssey told for little children by prof. a. j. church, m.a. _with fourteen illustrations. extra crown vo, s._ "a really charming volume in all respects. no writer has done work of this kind so well since kingsley first set the fashion in his masterpiece, _the heroes_."--_guardian._ "the stories could not be told more simply and directly, or in a way better fitted to delight and interest children, than they are in this charming book. we are delighted to see the book embellished with flaxman's exquisite illustrations. greatly daring ... they have been coloured in simple colours, like those of classical wall paintings. the effect is quite excellent."--_spectator._ the children's iliad told for little children by prof. a. j. church, m.a. _with fourteen illustrations. extra crown vo, s._ "what need nowadays to praise prof. church's skill in presenting classical stories to young readers? this is a capital example of the cultured, simple style. a delightful gift-book."--_athenæum._ "prof. church has written as good a book as can ever be produced for english children from the literary treasures of greece. the illustrations are worthy of the writing."--_sheffield independent._ "with delightful simplicity of style prof. church retells the story of the siege of troy so that it ceases to be 'history,' and becomes an engrossing narrative. the handsome volume has a dozen excellent illustrations."--_dundee courier._ the children's Æneid told for little children by prof. a. j. church, m.a. _with fourteen illustrations in colours. extra crown vo, s._ "professor church has probably done more than any other man living to bring the classics of greece and rome within the comprehension of young folks. he has a simple style that must be the envy of writers for children."--_dundee advertiser._ "a delightful gift-book."--_athenæum._ seeley, service & co. limited * * * * * the romance of animal arts & crafts describing the wonderful intelligence of animals revealed in their work as masons, paper makers, raft & diving-bell builders, miners, tailors, engineers of roads & bridges, &c. &c. by h. coupin, d.sc., & john lea, b.a. (cantab.) _with thirty illustrations. extra crown vo., s._ "will carry most readers, young and old, from one surprise to another."--_glasgow herald._ "a charming subject, well set forth, and dramatically illustrated."--_athenæum._ "it seems like pure romance to read of the curious ways of nature's craftsmen, but it is quite a true tale that is set forth in this plentifully illustrated book."--_evening citizen._ the romance of insect life describing the curious & interesting in the insect world by edmund selous author of "the romance of the animal world," _&c._ _with sixteen illustrations. extra crown vo, s._ "an entertaining volume, one more of a series which seeks with much success to describe the wonders of nature and science in simple, attractive form."--_graphic._ "offers most interesting descriptions of the strange and curious inhabitants of the insect world, sure to excite inquiry and to foster observation. there are ants white and yellow, locusts and cicadas, bees and butterflies, spiders and beetles, scorpions and cockroaches--and especially ants--with a really scientific investigation of their wonderful habits not in dry detail, but in free and charming exposition and narrative. an admirable book to put in the hands of a boy or girl with a turn for natural science--and whether or not."--_educational times._ the romance of the animal world describing the curious and interesting in natural history by edmund selous _with sixteen full-page illustrations. extra crown vo, s._ "mr. selous takes a wide range in nature; he has seen many wonders which he relates. open the book where we will we find something astonishing."--_spectator._ "it is in truth a most fascinating book, as full of incidents and as various in interest as any other work of imagination, and, beyond the pleasure in the reading there is the satisfaction of knowing that one is in the hands of a genuine authority on some of the most picturesque subjects that natural history affords. mr. selous' method is strong, safe, and sound. the volume has numerous illustrations of a high order of workmanship and a handsome binding of striking design."--_school government chronicle._ seeley, service & co. limited * * * * * the romance of modern electricity describing in non-technical language what is known about electricity & many of its interesting applications by charles r. gibson, a.i.e.e. author of "electricity of to-day," etc. _extra crown vo. with illustrations and diagrams. s._ "everywhere mr. charles r. gibson makes admirable use of simple analogies which bespeak the practised lecturer, and bring the matter home without technical detail. the attention is further sustained by a series of surprises. the description of electric units, the volt, the ohm, and especially the ampere, is better than we have found in more pretentious works."--_academy._ "mr. gibson's style is very unlike the ordinary text-book. it is fresh, and is non-technical. its facts are strictly scientific, however, and thoroughly up to date. if we wish to gain a thorough knowledge of electricity pleasantly and without too much trouble on our own part, we will read mr. gibson's 'romance.'"--_expository times._ "a book which the merest tyro totally unacquainted with elementary electrical principles can understand, and should therefore especially appeal to the lay reader. especial interest attaches to the chapter on wireless telegraphy, a subject which is apt to 'floor' the uninitiated. the author reduces the subject to its simplest aspect, and describes the fundamental principles underlying the action of the coherer in language so simple that anyone can grasp them."--_electricity._ the romance of the ship the story of her origin and evolution from the earliest times by e. keble chatterton, b.a. oxon. author of "sailing ships and their story," etc. etc. _with illustrations. price s._ "one of the most instructive and intelligent treatises on sea-life that it has yet been our lot to peruse."--_syren and shipping._ "there is not a doubt about this volume being the best of its kind yet published."--_dundee courier._ "absorbingly interesting and highly instructive."--_liverpool daily post._ the romance of modern astronomy by hector macpherson, junior _with illustrations & diagrams. extra crown vo. price s._ "we can conceive no book better adapted than this handsomely got up and beautifully illustrated volume to attract the young, and even older people to the study of the sublimest of sciences."--_edinburgh news._ "described in popular language, yet with a thoroughness which will give the reader a surprisingly complete grasp of the subject."--_christian._ "an ideal book for presentation, as indeed all messrs. seeley's romance books are."--_eastern morning news._ "an excellent compendium of the most interesting facts in astronomy, told in popular language. great care has evidently been taken to secure accuracy. the illustrations are exceedingly good."--_the athenæum._ seeley, service & co. limited * * * * * stories by prof. a. j. church "the headmaster of eton (dr. the hon. e. lyttelton) advised his hearers, in a recent speech at the royal albert institute, to read professor a. j. church's "stories from homer," some of which, he said, he had read to eton boys after a hard school day, and at an age when they were not in the least desirous of learning, but were anxious to go to tea. the stories were so brilliantly told, however, that those young etonians were entranced by them, and they actually begged of him to go on, being quite prepared to sacrifice their tea time." _profusely illustrated. extra crown vo, s. each_ the children's Æneid the children's iliad the children's odyssey the faery queen and her knight the crusaders greek story and song stories from homer stories from virgil the crown of pine stories from greek tragedians stories of the east from herodotus story of the persian war stories from livy roman life in the days of cicero with the king at oxford count of saxon shore the hammer story of the iliad story of the odyssey stories from greek comedians heroes of chivalry and romance helmet and spear stories of charlemagne _extra crown vo, illustrated, and other sizes_ _s._ _d._ last days of jerusalem the burning of rome the fall of athens stories from english history patriot & hero _s._ _d._ the chantry priest of barnet heroes of eastern romance three greek children to the lions a young macedonian _s._ heroes of eastern romance _s._ _d._ heroes and kings greek gulliver nicias story of the iliad and Æneid to the lions _s._ story of the iliad story of the odyssey story of the iliad and Æneid _d._ last days of jerusalem story of the iliad story of the odyssey stories from virgil seeley, service & co. limited * * * * * a catalogue of books for young people, published by seeley, service & co limited, great russell street, london _some of the contents_ adventure, the library of bedford library, the church, stories by professor giberne, books by miss heroes of the world library, the marshall, stories by miss beatrice marshall, stories by mrs. missionary biographies olive library, the pink library, the prince's library, the romance, the library of royal library, the russell series, the scarlet library, the science for children sunday echoes wonder library, the _the publishers will be pleased to send post free their complete catalogue or their illustrated miniature catalogue on receipt of a post-card_ seeley, service & co. limited * * * * * catalogue of books _arranged alphabetically under the names of authors and series_ aguilar, grace. the days of bruce. with illustrations. extra crown vo, s. (scarlet library.) andersen, hans. fairy tales. with illustrations. s. d., s., and s. d. (scarlet and prince's libraries.) alcott, l. m. little women and good wives. with illustrations. s. (scarlet library.) also little women, extra crown vo, s. d.; and good wives, extra crown vo, s. d. arabian nights' entertainments. with illustrations, s. d. (pink library); s. (royal & scarlet libraries); s. d. (prince's library). ballantyne, r. m. the dog crusoe and his master. with illustrations by h. m. brock, r.i. extra crown vo, s. and s. d. bedford library for boys and girls, the. a series of books describing the adventures, bravery, and resource of soldiers, sailors, and others in all parts of the world. sq. crown vo, with many illustrations in colour, s. d. daring deeds of famous pirates. by lieut. e. keble chatterton, r.n.v.r., author of "sailing ships and their story," &c. &c. daring deeds of hunters and trappers. by ernest young, b.sc., f.r.g.s., author of "the king of the yellow robe," &c. &c. berthet, e. the wild man of the woods. with illustrations, s. d. blake, m. m. the siege of norwich castle. with illustrations, s. boisragon, major alan m. late royal irish fusiliers. jack scarlett, sandhurst cadet. with coloured illustrations. extra crown vo, s. brock, mrs. carey. dame wynton's home. a story illustrative of the lord's prayer. with eight illustrations. crown vo, s. d. my father's hand, and other stories. crown vo, s. sunday echoes in weekday hours. a series of illustrative tales. seven vols. crown vo, s. d. each. i. the collects. ii. the church catechism. iii. journeyings of the israelites. iv. scripture characters. v. the epistles and gospels. vi. the parables. vii. the miracles. working and waiting. crown vo, s. brown linnet. the kidnapping of ettie, and other tales. with sixteen illustrations. crown vo, s. bunyan, john. the pilgrim's progress. with illustrations. extra crown vo, s. (scarlet library). carter, miss j. r. m. diana polwarth, royalist. a story of the life of a girl in commonwealth days. with eight illustrations. crown vo, s. d. charlesworth, miss. england's yeomen. crown vo, s. d. oliver of the mill. with eight illustrations. cr. vo, s. d. ministering children. . olive library. crown vo, cloth gilt, s. d. . scarlet library. crown vo, cloth, s. . with illustrations. cloth, s. d. ministering children: a sequel. with illustrations. cloth, s. d. also with eight illustrations. cloth, s. and s. d. the broken looking-glass. crown vo, s. the old looking-glass and the broken looking-glass; or, mrs. dorothy cope's recollections of service. in one volume. with eight illustrations. crown vo, s. d. chatterton, e. keble. the romance of the ship. with illus. ex. cr. vo, s. the romance of piracy. many illus. ex. cr. vo, s. church, professor alfred j. "the headmaster of eton (dr. the hon. e. lyttelton) advised his hearers, in a recent speech at the royal albert institute, to read professor a. j. church's 'stories from homer,' some of which, he said, he had read to eton boys after a hard school day, and at an age when they were not in the least desirous of learning, but were anxious to go to tea. the stories were so brilliantly told, however, that those young etonians were entranced by them, and they actually begged of him to go on, being quite prepared to sacrifice their tea time." the children's Æneid. told for little children. with twelve illustrations in colour. extra crown vo, s. the children's iliad. told for little children. with twelve illustrations in colour. extra crown vo, s. the children's odyssey. told for little children. with twelve illustrations in colour. extra crown vo, s. the crown of pine. a story of corinth and the isthmian games. with illustration in colour by george morrow. ex. cr. vo, s. the count of the saxon shore. a tale of the departure of the romans from britain. with sixteen illustrations. crown vo, s. the faery queen and her knights. stories from spenser. with eight illustrations in colour. extra crown vo, s. stories of charlemagne and the twelve peers of france. with eight illustrations in colour. crown vo, s. the crusaders. a story of the war for the holy sepulchre. with eight illustrations in colour. extra crown vo, s. stories from the greek tragedians. with illustrations. crown vo, s. greek story. with illustrations in colour. crn. vo, s. stories from the greek comedians. with illustrations. crown vo, s. the hammer. a story of maccabean times. with illustrations. crown vo, s. the story of the persian war, from herodotus. with coloured illustrations. crown vo, s. heroes of chivalry and romance. with illustrations. crown vo, s. stories of the east, from herodotus. coloured illustrations. crown vo, s. helmet and spear. stories from the wars of the greeks and romans. with eight illustrations by g. morrow. crown vo, s. the story of the iliad. with coloured illustrations. crown vo, s. also thin paper edition, cloth, s. nett; leather, s. nett. cheap edition, d. nett; also cloth, s. roman life in the days of cicero. with illustrations. crown vo, s. stories from homer. coloured illustrations. crn. vo, s. stories from livy. coloured illustrations. crn. vo, s. story of the odyssey. with coloured illustrations. s. also thin paper edition, cloth, s. nett; leather, s. nett. cheap edition, d. nett. also cloth, s. stories from virgil. with coloured illustrations. crown vo, s. cheap edition, sewed, d. nett. with the king at oxford. a story of the great rebellion. with coloured illustrations. crown vo, s. crown vo, / each. the fall of athens. with illustrations. crown vo, s. d. the burning of rome. a story of nero's days. with sixteen illustrations. cheaper edition. crown vo, s. d. the last days of jerusalem, from josephus. crown vo, s. d. also a cheap edition. sewed, d. stories from english history. with many illustrations. cheaper edition. revised. crown vo, s. d. patriot and hero. with illustration. crown vo, s. d. extra crown vo, / each. to the lions. a tale of the early christians. with coloured frontispiece and other illustrations. s. d. heroes of eastern romance. with coloured frontispiece and eight other illustrations. extra crown vo, s. (royal library); s. d. a young macedonian in the army of alexander the great. with illustrations. extra crown vo, s. d. the chantry priest. with illustrations. s. d. three greek children. extra crown vo, s. d. crown vo, / each. a greek gulliver. illustrated. crown vo, s. d. heroes and kings. stories from the greek. illus. s. d. the stories of the iliad and the Æneid. with illustrations. mo, sewed, s.; cloth, s. d. also without illustrations, cloth, s. to the lions. a tale of the early christians. with illustrations. crown vo, s. d. cody, rev. h. a. on trail and rapid. by dog-sled and canoe. a story of bishop bompas's life among the red indians and esquimo. told for boys and girls. with twenty-six illustrations. extra crown vo, s. d. apostle of the north, an. memoirs of bishop bompas. with illustrations and a map. s. d. nett. _new and cheaper edition._ with illustrations. extra crown vo, s. nett. (crown library.) coolidge, susan. what katy did at home and at school. illustrations in colour by h. m. brock, r.i. crown vo, s. (scarlet library.) what katy did at home. extra crown vo, s. d. coupin, h., d.sc., and j. lea, m.a. the romance of animal arts and crafts. with twenty-five illustrations. extra crown vo, s. cowper, f. caedwalla: or, the saxons in the isle of wight. with illustrations. extra crown vo, s. d. (prince's library.) the island of the english. a story of napoleon's days. with illustrations by george morrow. crown vo, s. d. the captain of the wight. with illustrations. extra crown vo, s. d. craik, mrs. john halifax. illustrated. extra cr. vo, s. (scarlet liby.) currey, commander e. hamilton, r.n. ian hardy, naval cadet. coloured illus. ex. cr. vo, s. ian hardy, midshipman. a stirring story for boys. with coloured illustrations. extra crown vo, s. ian hardy, senior midshipman. with col. illus., s. davidson, n. j., b.a. a knight-errant and his doughty deeds. the story of amadis of gaul. col. illus. by h. m. brock, r.i. crown vo, s. the romance of the spanish main. ex. crown vo. with many illustrations, s. things seen in oxford. cloth, s. nett; leather, s. nett and s. nett. dawson, rev. canon e. c. heroines of missionary adventure. with twenty-four illustrations. extra crown vo, s. lion-hearted. bishop hannington's life retold for boys and girls. illustrated. crown vo, s., s. d. (olive library), and s. d. in the days of the dragons. crown vo, s. d. missionary heroines in many lands. ex. cr. vo, s. d. missionary heroines of the cross. with illus., s. d. defoe, daniel. robinson crusoe. with illustrations. extra crown vo, s. and s. d. (scarlet and prince's libraries.) elliott, miss. copsley annals preserved in proverbs. with illustrations. crown vo, s. d. mrs. blackett. her story. fcap. vo, s. elliot, prof. g. f. scott, m.a., b.sc., f.r.g.s., f.l.s. the romance of plant life. describing the curious and interesting in the plant world. with illustrations. ex. crown vo, s. "popularly written by a man of great scientific accomplishments." the outlook. the romance of savage life. with forty-five illustrations. extra crown vo, s. the romance of early british life: from the earliest times to the coming of the danes. with illustrations. ex. crown vo, s. everett-green, evelyn. a pair of originals. with coloured frontispiece and eight other illustrations. extra crown vo, s. & s. d. field, rev. claud, m.a. heroes of missionary enterprise. with many illustrations. extra crown vo, s. missionary crusaders. with many illustrations and a frontispiece in colour, s. d. gardiner, linda. sylvia in flowerland. with illustrations cr. vo, s. d. gaye, selina. coming; or, the golden year. a tale. third edition. with eight illustrations. crown vo, s. the great world's farm. some account of nature's crops and how they are grown. with a preface by professor boulger, and sixteen illustrations. second edition. crown vo, s. giberne, agnes. the romance of the mighty deep. with illustrations. s. 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(scarlet library.) marshall, beatrice. his most dear ladye. a story of the days of the countess of pembroke, sir philip sidney's sister. illustrated. extra crown vo, s. the siege of york. a story of the days of thomas, lorde fairfax. with eight illustrations. crown vo, s. an old london nosegay. gathered from the day-book of mistress lovejoy young. with eight illustrations. crown vo, s. old blackfriars. in the days of van dyck. a story. with eight illustrations. crown vo, s. the queen's knight-errant. a story of the days of sir walter raleigh. with eight illustrations. extra crown vo, s. marshall, emma. crown vo, /- in colston's days. a story of old bristol. with illustrations. crown vo, s. in four reigns. the recollections of althea allingham, - . with illustrations. crown vo, s. in the choir of westminster abbey. a story of henry purcell's days. with illustrations. crown vo, s. and at s. d. in the east country with sir thomas browne, knight. with illustrations. crown vo, s. a haunt of ancient peace. memories of mr. nicholas ferrar's house at little gidding. with illustrations by t. hamilton crawford. crown vo, s. kensington palace. in the days of mary ii. with illustrations. crown vo, s. d. and s. the master of the musicians. a story of handel's day. with illustrations. crown vo, s. and at s. d. the parson's daughter, and how she was painted by mr. romney. with eight illustrations. crown vo, s. and at s. d. penshurst castle. in the days of sir philip sidney. with illustrations. crown vo, s. d., s. cheap edition. demy vo, d. winchester meads. in the days of bishop ken. with illustrations. crown vo, s. d., s. cheap edition. demy vo, d. under salisbury spire. in the days of george herbert. with illustrations. crown vo, s. d., s. cheap edition. d. under the dome of st paul's. in the days of sir christopher wren. with illustrations. crown vo, s. crown vo, /- under the mendips. a tale of the times of hannah more. with illustrations. crown vo, s. constantia carew. crown vo, s. crown vo, / castle meadow. a story of norwich a hundred years ago. an escape from the tower. life's aftermath. now-a-days. on the banks of the ouse. winifrede's journal. extra crown vo, / the old gateway. millicent legh. violet douglas. helen's diary. crown vo, / brothers and sisters. brook silverstone. /- the first light on the eddystone. * * * * * missionary biographies. with many illustrations and a frontispiece in colour. price, s. d. extra crown vo. . a hero of the afghan frontier. being the life of dr. t. l. pennell, of bannu, told for boys and girls. by a. m. pennell, m.b., b.s. (lond.), b.sc. . missionary crusaders. by claude field, m.a., sometime c.m.s. missionary in the punjab. . judson, the hero of burma. the life of judson told for boys and girls. by jesse page, f.r.g.s. . on trail and rapid by dogsled and canoe. by the rev. h. a. cody, m.a. . missionary knights of the cross. by rev. j. g. lambert. . missionary heroines of the cross. by canon dawson. * * * * * the olive library. stories by well-known authors. extra crown vo. with coloured and other illustrations, s. d. each. andersen, hans. fairy tales. r. m. ballantyne. the dog crusoe. charlesworth, miss. ministering children. a sequel to ministering children. england's yeomen. oliver of the mill. church, prof. a. j. the chantry priest. heroes of eastern romance. a young macedonian. three greek children. to the lions. a tale of the early christians. dawson, rev. canon e. c. lion-hearted. the story of bishop hannington's life told for boys and girls. everett-green, evelyn a pair of originals. hughes, t. tom brown's schooldays. kingsley, chas. westward ho! marshall, mrs. the old gateway. helen's diary. brothers and sisters. violet douglas. millicent legh. mulock, miss. john halifax. stowe, mrs. beecher. uncle tom's cabin. wilberforce, bishop. agathos, the rocky island, and other sunday stories. philip, james c., d.sc., ph.d. the romance of modern chemistry. with twenty-nine illustrations. extra crown vo, s. * * * * * the pink library. stories by well-known authors. crown vo. with many illustrations, s. d. church, prof. a. j. to the lions. the greek gulliver. marshall, mrs. brothers & sisters. brook silvertone. charlesworth, miss. ministering children. the sequel to ministering children. the old & the broken looking-glass. dawson, canon e. c. lion-hearted. missionary heroines in many lands. lambert, rev. j. g. missionary heroes of n. & s. america. missionary heroes in asia. missionary heroes in oceania. missionary heroes in africa. wilberforce, bishop. agathos & the rocky island. alcott, l. m. little women. good wives. berthe, t. e. the wild man of the woods. seeley, e. the world before the flood. andersen, hans. fairy tales and stories. grimm, the brothers. fairy tales and stories. coolidge, susan. what katy did at home _by various authors_ the life of a bear. only a dog. the life of an elephant the arabian nights. * * * * * the prince's library. with coloured frontispiece and other illustrations. extra crown vo, s. d. patriot & hero. by prof. a. j. church. cranford. by mrs. gaskell. the vicar of wakefield. by oliver goldsmith. the arabian nights' entertainments. andersen's fairy tales. grimm's fairy tales. the wolf's head. by the rev. e. gilliat. the last of the white coats. by g. i. whitham. diana polwarth, royalist. by j. r. m. carter. the fall of athens. by professor a. j. church. the king's reeve. by the rev. e. gilliat. the cabin on the beach. by m. e. winchester. the captain of the wight. by frank cowper. caedwalla. by frank cowper. robinson crusoe. by daniel defoe. reciter, the golden. a volume of recitations & readings in prose & verse selected from the works of rudyard kipling, r. l. stevenson, conan doyle, maurice hewlett, christina rossetti, thomas hardy, austin dobson, a. w. pinero, &c., &c. with an introduction by cairns james, professor of elocution at the royal college of music and the guildhall school of music. extra crown vo, pp., s. d. also thin paper edition for the pocket, with gilt edges. small crown vo, s. "an admirable collection in prose and verse."--the spectator. reciter, the golden humorous. edited, and with an introduction by cairns james, professor of elocution at the royal college of music. recitations and readings selected from the writings of f. anstey, j. m. barrie, s. r. crockett, major drury, jerome k. jerome, barry pain, a. w. pinero, owen seaman, g. b. shaw, &c. over pages, extra crown vo, cloth, s. d. also a thin paper edition, with gilt edges, small crown vo, s. robinson, commander c. n. for the honour of the flag. a story of our sea fights with the dutch. with illustrations by lancelot speed. crown vo, s. sanderson, rev. e. heroes of pioneering. true stories of the intrepid bravery and stirring adventures of pioneers in all parts of the world. with sixteen illustrations. extra crown vo, s. stories of great pioneers. with coloured and other illustrations. extra crown vo, s. d. * * * * * royal library for boys and girls, the. a series of handsome gift books by celebrated authors. illustrated by h. m. brock, lancelot speed, and other well-known artists. ex. crown vo, s. each. . a pair of originals. by evelyn everett-green. . john halifax. by miss mulock. . uncle tom's cabin. by h. beecher-stowe. . westward ho! by charles kingsley. . robinson crusoe. by daniel defoe. . tom brown's school-days. by thomas hughes. . grimm's fairy tales. a new translation. . the arabian nights' entertainments. . andersen's fairy tales. . what katy did at home and at school. by susan coolidge. . heroes of eastern romance. by prof. a. j. church. . lion hearted. by the rev. canon e. c. dawson. . the adventures of a cavalier. by g. i. whitham. * * * * * the library of adventure with many illustrations. extra crown vo, s. each. "delightful books of adventure, beautifully printed and tastefully got up."--educational times. adventures of missionary explorers. by r. m. a. ibbotson. adventures in southern seas. by richard stead, b.a. adventures among trappers & hunters. by e. young, b.sc. adventures in the arctic regions. by h. w. g. hyrst. adventures among wild beasts. by h. w. g. hyrst. adventures on the high seas. by r. stead, b.a. adventures in the great deserts. by h. w. g. hyrst. adventures on the great rivers. by richard stead. adventures in the great forests. by h. w. g. hyrst. adventures on the high mountains. by r. stead. adventures among red indians. by h. w. g. hyrst. * * * * * russell series for boys & girls, the. coloured and other illustrations. extra crown vo, s. d. stories of polar adventure. by h. w. g. hyrst. stories of great pioneers. by edgar sanderson, m.a. stories of elizabethan heroes. by the rev. e. gilliat. stories of red indian adventure. by h. w. g. hyrst. stories of indian heroes. by e. gilliat, m.a. stories of great sieges. by e. gilliat, m.a. * * * * * the library of romance fully illustrated. bound in blue, scarlet, and gold. extra crown vo, s. each. "splendid volumes."--the outlook. "gift books whose value it would be difficult to overestimate."--standard. the romance of the spanish main. by n. j. davidson, b.a. (oxon.) the romance of piracy. by e. keble chatterton, b.a. (oxon.). with many illustrations. the romance of scientific discovery. by charles r. gibson, f.r.s.e. the romance of submarine engineering. by thomas w. corbin. the romance of aeronautics. by charles c. turner. the romance of the ship. the story of its origin and evolution. by e. keble chatterton. with thirty-three illustrations. the romance of modern astronomy. by hector macpherson, jun. with twenty-four illustrations. the romance of modern chemistry. by j. c. philip, d.sc., assistant professor of chemistry, south kensington. the romance of modern manufacture. by c. r. gibson, f.r.s.e. the romance of early british life. by prof. g. f. scott elliot, m.a., b.sc. with illustrations. the romance of modern geology. by e. s. grew, m.a. (oxon.). the romance of bird life. by john lea, m.a. the romance of modern photography. its discovery and its application. by c. r. gibson, a.i.e.e. with illustrations. the romance of modern sieges. by the rev. e. gilliat. with illustrations. the romance of savage life. by professor g. f. scott elliot, m.a., b.sc., _&c._ with illustrations. the romance of the world's fisheries. by sidney wright. with illustrations. the romance of animal arts & crafts. by h. coupin, d.sc., and j. lea, m.a. with illustrations. "extremely fascinating."--liverpool courier. the romance of early exploration. by a. williams, b.a., f.r.g.s. with illustrations. "we cannot imagine a book that a boy would appreciate more than this."--daily telegraph. the romance of missionary heroism. by john c. lambert, b.a., d.d. with illustrations. "about pages of the most thrilling missionary lives ever collected in one volume."--methodist times. the romance of plant life. by prof. g. f. scott elliot, b.a. (cantab.), b.sc. (edin.). with illustrations. "besides being entertaining, instructive and educative."--liverpool courier. the romance of polar exploration. by g. firth scott. with illustrations. "thrillingly interesting."--liverpool courier. the romance of insect life. by edmund selous. the romance of modern mechanism. by a. williams. "genuinely fascinating. mr. williams is an old favourite."--l'pool courier. the romance of modern electricity. by c. r. gibson, f.r.s.e. revised edition. "admirable ... clear and concise."--the graphic. the romance of the animal world. by edmund selous. "a very fascinating book."--graphic. the romance of modern exploration. by a. williams. "a mine of information and stirring incident."--scotsman. the romance of modern invention. by a. williams. revised edition. "an ideal gift book for boys, fascinatingly interesting."--queen. the romance of modern engineering. by a. williams. "an absorbing work with its graphic descriptions."--standard. the romance of modern locomotion. by a. williams. "crisply written, brimful of incident not less than instruction. should be as welcome as a ballantyne story or a mayne reid romance."--glasgow herald. the romance of modern mining. by a. williams. "boys will revel in this volume."--city press. the romance of the mighty deep. by agnes giberne. "most fascinating."--daily news. * * * * * scarlet library, the illustrated. large crown vo, cloth, gilt. with eight original illustrations by h. m. brock, lancelot speed, and other leading artists. price s. per volume. the pilgrim's progress. the wide, wide world. uncle tom's cabin. ben hur. gen. lew wallace. westward ho! kingsley. john halifax. by mrs. craik. robinson crusoe. defoe. little women and good wives. the history of henry esmond. by w. m. thackeray. the swiss family robinson. grimm's fairy tales. poe's tales of mystery and imagination. don quixote. by cervantes. gulliver's travels. swift. the days of bruce. tom brown's schooldays. tales from shakespeare. lamb. hans andersen's fairy tales. the arabian nights' entertainments. the scalp hunters. by captain mayne reid. ministering children. ministering children. a sequel. the dog crusoe. ballantyne. masterman ready. marryat. what katy did at home and at school. by susan coolidge. the old gateway. e. marshall. millicent legh. e. marshall. vicar of wakefield. * * * * * science for children our good slave electricity. by charles r. gibson, f.r.s.e. with many illustrations. extra crown vo, s. d. the great ball on which we live. by charles r. gibson, f.r.s.e. with coloured frontispiece and many other illustrations. extra crown vo, s. d. the stars and their mysteries. with illustrations. extra crown vo, s. d. scott, g. firth. the romance of polar exploration. illustrated extra crown vo, s. "thrillingly interesting, excellently illustrated."--liverpool courier. seeley, a. this great globe. first lessons in geography. s. d. seeley, m. the world before the flood. stories from the best book. with illustrations by g. p. jacomb hood. crown vo, s. and s. d. selous, e. the romance of the animal world. illustrated. ex. crown vo, s. "a very fascinating book."--graphic. the romance of insect life. illustrated. ex. cr. vo., s. "mr. selous, the well-known naturalist, writes in purely informal style."--the globe. wonders of animal life. extra crown vo, s. wicks, m. to mars via the moon. an astronomical story. with eight illustrations. extra crown vo, s. wilberforce, bishop s. agathos. with illustrations. fcap. vo, sewed, d.; cloth, s. agathos, the rocky island, and other sunday stories. with sixteen illustrations. extra crown vo, s. d., s. d. the rocky island and other similitudes. with illustrations. fcap. vo, sewed, d.; cloth, s. winchester, m. e. adrift in a great city. illustrated. crown vo, s. a city violet. crown vo, s. the cabin on the beach. illustrated. crown vo, s. d. a nest of skylarks. s. a nest of sparrows. crown vo, s. a wayside snowdrop. crown vo, s. d. chirps for the chicks. s. d. williams, archibald, b.a. (oxon.), f.r.g.s. the romance of early exploration. illustrated. s. "a companion volume to 'the romance of modern exploration,' and if possible, more full of romance."--evening standard. the romance of modern exploration. illustrated. s. "a mine of information and stirring incident."--scotsman. the romance of modern mechanism. illustrated. s. "mr. williams is an old favourite; a genuinely fascinating book."--liverpool courier. the romance of modern invention. with illustrations. "an ideal gift book for boys, fascinatingly interesting."--queen. the romance of modern engineering. illustrated. "an absorbing work with its graphic descriptions."--standard. the romance of modern locomotion. illustrated. "crisply written and brimful of incident."--glasgow herald. the romance of modern mining. with illustrations. "boys will revel in this volume."--city press. the wonders of modern engineering. ex. crown vo, s. whitham, g. i. the last of the white coats. a story of cavaliers and roundheads. illustrated in colour by oscar wilson. ex. crown vo, s. d. * * * * * the wonder library with eight illustrations. extra crown vo. price s. wonders of animal life. edmund selous. the wonders of modern manufacture. by c. r. gibson, f.r.s.e. the wonders of savage life. by professor g. f. scott elliot, m.a., b.sc. the wonders of astronomy. by hector macpherson, junr., m.a. the wonders of invention. by a. williams, b.a. revised and brought up to date by t. w. corbin. the wonders of modern chemistry. by james c. philip, d.sc. the wonders of electricity. by charles r. gibson, f.r.s.e. the wonders of animal ingenuity. by h. coupin, d.sc., and john lea, m.a. the wonders of mechanical ingenuity. by archibald williams, b.a., f.r.g.s. the wonders of asiatic exploration. by archibald williams, b.a., f.r.g.s. the wonders of the plant world. by g. f. scott elliot, m.a., b.sc., f.l.s., &c. the wonders of modern railways. by archibald williams, b.a., f.r.g.s. the wonders of the insect world. by e. selous. the wonders of modern engineering. by archibald williams, b.a. (oxon.) the wonders of bird life. by john lea, m.a. * * * * * wright, sidney. the romance of the world's fisheries. with many illustrations. extra crown vo, s. young, ernest. adventures among trappers and hunters. with sixteen illustrations. ex. crown vo, s. * * * * * transcriber's note: the following changes have been made to the text: page : added missingopen quotation mark: ("=it is no exaggeration to say that commander currey bears worthily the mantle of kingston and captain marryat.=") page : added missing open quotation mark ("by writing this series the author is doing national service, ...") page : added missing word "on" (needless to say, that ship went on no more excursions.) page : changed "bridginv" to "bridging" ( ... certain engineering "field companies," and "bridging trains," ...) page : changed "chili" to "chile" ( ... notably in the united states, chile and spain.) page : changed "alumimium" to "aluminium" (alumina, too, is oxide of aluminium.) page : changed comma to period at end of sentence (... if the mild steel ordinarily employed for shipbuilding were used.) page : deleted spurious comma following "experience" (... as experience shows, a very considerable degree of safety.) page : changed "nutil" to "until" ( ... which is stored in large accumulator batteries until required ...) page : added missing period ( ... by long spells of duty in this unhealthy atmosphere.) page : changed "aliminium" to "aluminium" ( ... another aluminium disc ...) the cavalry general by xenophon translation by h. g. dakyns xenophon the athenian was born b.c. he was a pupil of socrates. he marched with the spartans, and was exiled from athens. sparta gave him land and property in scillus, where he lived for many years before having to move once more, to settle in corinth. he died in b.c. the cavalry general is a discourse on the merits a cavalry general, or hipparch, in athens should have. xenophon also describes the development of a cavalry force, and some tactical details to be applied in the field and in festival exhibition. preparer's note this was typed from dakyns' series, "the works of xenophon," a four-volume set. the complete list of xenophon's works (though there is doubt about some of these) is: work number of books the anabasis the hellenica the cyropaedia the memorabilia the symposium the economist on horsemanship the sportsman the cavalry general the apology on revenues the hiero the agesilaus the polity of the athenians and the lacedaemonians text in brackets "{}" is my transliteration of greek text into english using an oxford english dictionary alphabet table. the diacritical marks have been lost. the cavalry general the duties of a hipparch ( ) or commander of cavalry at athens i your first duty is to offer sacrifice, petitioning the gods to grant you such good gifts ( ) as shall enable you in thought, word, and deed to discharge your office in the manner most acceptable to heaven, and with fullest increase to yourself, and friends, and to the state at large of affection, glory, and wide usefulness. the goodwill of heaven ( ) so obtained, you shall proceed to mount your troopers, taking care that the full complement which the law demands is reached, and that the normal force of cavalry is not diminished. there will need to be a reserve of remounts, or else a deficiency may occur at any moment, ( ) looking to the fact that some will certainly succumb to old age, and others, from one reason or another, prove unserviceable. ( ) for the title, etc., see schneid. "praemon. de xeno." {ipp}. boeckh, "p. e. a." . ( ) or, "with sacrifice to ask of heaven those gifts of thought and speech and conduct whereby you will exercise your office most acceptably to the gods themselves, and with..." cf. plat. "phaedr." e; "euthr." b. ( ) the greek phrase is warmer, {theon d' ileon onton}, "the gods being kindly and propitious." cf. plat. "laws," b. ( ) lit. "at any moment there will be too few." see "les cavaliers atheniens," par albert martin, p. . but now suppose the complement of cavalry is levied, ( ) the duty will devolve on you of seeing, in the first place, that your horses are well fed and in condition to stand their work, since a horse which cannot endure fatigue will clearly be unable to overhaul the foeman or effect escape; ( ) and in the second place, you will have to see to it the animals are tractable, since, clearly again, a horse that will not obey is only fighting for the enemy and not his friends. so, again, an animal that kicks when mounted must be cast; since brutes of that sort may often do more mischief than the foe himself. lastly, you must pay attention to the horses' feet, and see that they will stand being ridden over rough ground. a horse, one knows, is practically useless where he cannot be galloped without suffering. ( ) lit. "in process of being raised." ( ) or, "to press home a charge a l'outrance, or retire from the field unscathed." and now, supposing that your horses are all that they ought to be, like pains must be applied to train the men themselves. the trooper, in the first place, must be able to spring on horseback easily--a feat to which many a man has owed his life ere now. and next, he must be able to ride with freedom over every sort of ground, since any description of country may become the seat of war. when, presently, your men have got firm seats, your aim should be to make as many members of the corps as possible not only skilled to hurl the javelin from horseback with precision, but to perform all other feats expected of the expert horseman. next comes the need to arm both horse and man in such a manner as to minimise the risk of wounds, and yet to increase the force of every blow delivered. ( ) this attended to, you must contrive to make your men amenable to discipline, without which neither good horses, nor a firm seat, nor splendour of equipment will be of any use at all. ( ) lit. "so that whilst least likely to be wounded themselves, they may most be able to injure the enemy." the general of cavalry, ( ) as patron of the whole department, is naturally responsible for its efficient working. in view, however, of the task imposed upon that officer had he to carry out these various details single-handed, the state has chosen to associate ( ) with him certain coadjutors in the persons of the phylarchs (or tribal captains), ( ) and has besides imposed upon the senate a share in the superintendence of the cavalry. this being so, two things appear to me desirable; the first is, so to work upon the phylarch that he shall share your own enthusiasm for the honour of the corps; ( ) and secondly, to have at your disposal in the senate able orators, ( ) whose language may instil a wholesome fear into the knights themselves, and thereby make them all the better men, or tend to pacify the senate on occasion and disarm unseasonable anger. ( ) see "mem." iii. iii. ( ) cf. theophr. xxix. "the oligarchic man": "when the people are deliberating whom they shall associate with the archon as joint directors of the procession." (jebb.) ( ) or, "squadron-leaders." ( ) "honour and prestige of knighthood." ( ) "to keep a staff of orators." cf. "anab." vii. vi. ; "cyrop." i. vi. ; "hell." vi. ii. . the above may serve as memoranda ( ) of the duties which will claim your chief attention. how the details in each case may best be carried out is a further matter, which i will now endeavour to explain. ( ) "a sort of notes and suggestions," "mementoes." cf. "horsemanship," iii. , xii. . as to the men themselves--the class from which you make your pick of troopers--clearly according to the law you are bound to enrol "the ablest" you can find "in point of wealth and bodily physique"; and "if not by persuasion, then by prosecution in a court of law." ( ) and for my part, i think, if legal pressure is to be applied, you should apply it in those cases where neglect to prosecute might fairly be ascribed to interested motives; ( ) since if you fail to put compulsion on the greater people first, you leave a backdoor of escape at once to those of humbler means. but there will be other cases; ( ) say, of young men in whom a real enthusiasm for the service may be kindled by recounting to them all the brilliant feats of knighthood; while you may disarm the opposition of their guardians by dwelling on the fact that, if not you, at any rate some future hipparch will certainly compel them to breed horses, ( ) owing to their wealth; whereas, if they enter the service ( ) during your term of office, you will undertake to deter their lads from mad extravagance in buying horses, ( ) and take pains to make good horsemen of them without loss of time; and while pleading in this strain, you must endeavour to make your practice correspond with what you preach. ( ) lit. "by bringing them into court, or by persuasion," i.e. by legal if not by moral pressure. see martin, op. cit. pp. , foll. ( ) i.e. "would cause you to be suspected of acting from motives of gain." ( ) reading {esti de kai ous}, or if as vulg. {eti de kai}, "more than that, it strikes me one may work on the feelings of young fellows in such a way as to disarm." see hartmann, "an. xen. n." . ( ) cf. aesch. "p. v." ; herod. vi. ; dem. . ; thuc. vi. ; isocr. {peri tou zeugous}, c. {ippotrophein d' epikheiresas, o ton eudaimonestaton ergon esti.} see prof. jebb's note to theophr. "ch." vi. p. , note . ( ) lit. "if they mount." ( ) like that of pheidippides in the play; see aristoph. "clouds," foll. and for the price of horses, ranging from minas (= l circa) for a common horse, or minas (say l ) for a good saddle or race-horse, up to the extravagant sum of talents (say guineas) given for "bucephalus," see boeckh, "p. e. a." (eng. tr.) p. . cf. isaeus, . ; . ; lys. "de maled." . ; aul. gell. "noct. att." v. . to come to the existing body of knights, ( ) it would tend, ( ) i think, to better rearing and more careful treatment of their horses if the senate issued a formal notice that for the future twice the amount of drill will be required, and that any horse unable to keep up will be rejected. and so, too, with regard to vicious horses, i should like to see an edict promulgated to the effect that all such animals will be rejected. this threat would stimulate the owners of such brutes to part with them by sale, and, what is more, to exercise discretion at the time of purchase. so, too, it would be a good thing if the same threat of rejection were made to include horses that kick on the exercising-grounds, since it is impossible to keep such animals in the ranks; and in case of an advance against a hostile force at any point, ( ) they must perforce trail in the rear, so that, thanks to the vice of the animal which he bestrides, the trooper himself is rendered useless. ( ) or, "as regards those who are actually serving in the cavalry." for a plausible emend. of this passage (s. ) see courier ("notes sur le texte," p. ); l. dind. ad loc. ( ) lit. "the senate might incite to..." ( ) reading {ean}, or if {kan} with the mss., trans. "even in case of an advance against the enemy." with a view to strengthening the horses' feet: if any one has an easier or more simple treatment to suggest, by all means let it be adopted; but for myself, as the result of experience, i maintain that the proper course is to lay down a loose layer of cobbles from the road, a pound or so in weight, on which the horse should be put to stand, when taken from the manger to be groomed. ( ) the point is, that the horse will keep perpetually moving first one foot and then another on the stones, whilst being rubbed down or simply because he is fidgeted by flies. let any one try the experiment, and, i venture to predict, not only will he come to trust my guidance, but he will see his horse's hoofs grow just as round and solid as the cobbles. ( ) see below, "horse." iv. . the greeks did not "shoe" their horses. assuming, then, your horses are all that horses ought to be, how is the trooper to attain a like degree of excellence? to that question i will now address myself. the art of leaping on to horseback is one which we would fain persuade the youthful members of the corps to learn themselves; though, if you choose to give them an instructor, ( ) all the greater credit to yourself. and as to the older men you cannot do better than accustom them to mount, or rather to be hoisted up by aid of some one, persian fashion. ( ) ( ) like pheidon, in the fragment of mnesimachus's play "the breeder of horses," ap. athen. see courier, ib. p. . ( ) see "anab." iv. iv. ; "horsemanship," vi. . with a view to keeping a firm seat on every sort of ground, it may be perhaps be thought a little irksome to be perpetually marching out, when there is no war; ( ) but all the same, i would have you call your men together and impress upon them the need to train themselves, when they ride into the country to their farms, or elsewhere, by leaving the high road and galloping at a round pace on ground of every description. ( ) this method will be quite as beneficial to them as the regular march out, and at the same time not produce the same sense of tedium. you may find it useful also to remind them that the state on her side is quite willing to expend a sum of nearly forty talents ( ) yearly, so that in the event of war she may not have to look about for cavalry, but have a thoroughly efficient force to hand for active service. let these ideas be once instilled into their minds, and, mark my words, your trooper will fall with zest to practising horsemanship, so that if ever the flame of war burst out he may not be forced to enter the lists a raw recruit, unskilled to fight for fame and fatherland or even life itself. ( ) in the piping days of peace. ( ) see "econ." xi. . cf. theophr. "ch." viii. "the late learner": {kai eis agron eph' ippou allotriou katakhoumenos ama meletan ippazesthai, kai peson ten kephalon kateagenai}, "riding into the country on another's horse, he will practise his horsemanship by the way, and falling, will break his head" (jebb). ( ) = l , circa. see boeckh, op. cit. p. . it would be no bad thing either, to forewarn your troopers that one day you will take them out yourself for a long march, and lead them across country over every kind of ground. again, whilst practising the evolutions of the rival cavalry display, ( ) it will be well to gallop out at one time to one district and again to another. both men and horses will be benefited. ( ) lit. "the anthippasia." see iii. , and "horsemanship," viii. . next, as to hurling the javelin from horseback, the best way to secure as wide a practice of the art as possible, it strikes me, would be to issue an order to your phylarchs that it will be their duty to put themselves at the head of the marksmen of several tribes, and to ride out to the butts for practice. in this way a spirit of emulation will be roused--the several officers will, no doubt, be eager to turn out as many marksmen as they can to aid the state. ( ) ( ) on competition cf. "cyrop." ii. i. , and our author passim. and so too, to ensure that splendour of accoutrement which the force requires, ( ) the greatest help may once again be looked for from the phylarchs; let these officers but be persuaded that from the public point of view the splendid appearance of their squadrons ( ) will confer a title to distinction far higher than that of any personal equipment. nor is it reasonable to suppose that they will be deaf to such an argument, since the very desire to hold the office of phylarch itself proclaims a soul alive to honour and ambition. and what is more, they have it in their power, in accordance with the actual provisions of the law, to equip their men without the outlay of a single penny, by enforcing that self-equipment out of pay ( ) which the law prescribes. ( ) or, "a beauty of equipment, worthy of our knights." cf. aristoph. "lysistr." , and a fragment of "the knights," of antiphanes, ap. athen. b, {pant' 'amaltheias keras}. see "hiero," ix. ; "horse." xi. . ( ) lit. "tribes," {phulai} (each of the ten tribes contributing about eighty men, or, as we might say, a squadron). ( ) i.e. the {katastasis}, "allowance," so technically called. cf. lys. "for mantitheos"; jebb, "att. or." i. ; boeckh, "p. e. a." ii. xxi. p. ; k. f. hermann, , ; martin, op. cit. p. . but to proceed. in order to create a spirit of obedience in your subordinates, you have two formidable instruments; ( ) as a matter of plain reason you can show them what a host of blessings the word discipline implies; and as a matter of hard fact you can, within the limits of the law, enable the well-disciplined to reap advantage, while the undisciplined are made to feel the pinch at every turn. ( ) "the one theoretic, the other practical." but if you would rouse the emulation of your phylarchs, if you would stir in each a personal ambition to appear at the head of his own squadron in all ways splendidly appointed, the best incentive will be your personal example. you must see to it that your own bodyguard ( ) are decked with choice accoutrement and arms; you must enforce on them the need to practise shooting pertinaciously; you must expound to them the theory of the javelin, yourself an adept in the art through constant training. ( ) ( ) techn. {prodromoi}, possibly = the hippotoxotai, or corps of mounted archers--scythians; cf. "mem." iii. iii. . or, probably, "mounted skirmishers," distinct from the {ippotexotai}. cf. arrian, "an." i. . . see aristot. "ath. pol." . . ( ) reading as vulg. {eisegoio}, or if with l. d. {egoio} (cf. above, s. ), trans. "you must lead them out to the butts yourself." lastly, were it possible to institute and offer prizes to the several tribal squadrons in reward for every excellence of knighthood known to custom in the public spectacles of our city, we have here, i think, an incentive which will appeal to the ambition of every true athenian. how small, in the like case of our choruses, the prizes offered, and yet how great the labour and how vast the sums expended! ( ) but we must discover umpires of such high order that to win their verdict will be as precious to the victor as victory itself. ( ) see "hell." iii. iv. ; "hiero," ix. ; "cyrop." i. vi. ; martin, op. cit. p. f. ii given, then, that your troopers are thoroughly trained in all the above particulars, it is necessary, i presume, that they should further be instructed in a type of evolution the effect of which will show itself not only in the splendour of the great processions ( ) in honour of the gods, but in the manouvres of the exercising-ground; in the valorous onslaught of real battle when occasion calls; and in the ease with which whole regiments will prosecute their march, or cross a river, or thread a defile without the slightest symptom of confusion. what this formation is--essential, at least in my opinion, to the noblest execution of their several duties--i will now, without delay, endeavour to explain. ( ) ( ) e.g. the panathenaic, as depicted on the frieze of the parthenon. ( ) or, "what this best order is, the adoption of which will give these several features fair accomplishment, i will without further pause set forth." we take as our basis, then, the constitutional division of ten tribes. ( ) given these, the proper course, i say, is to appoint, with the concurrence of the several phylarchs, certain decadarchs (file-leaders) ( ) to be selected from the men ripest of age and strength, most eager to achieve some deed of honour and to be known to fame. these are to form your front-rank men; ( ) and after these, a corresponding number should be chosen from the oldest and the most sagacious members of the squadron, to form the rear-rank of the files or decads; since, to use an illustration, iron best severs iron when the forefront of the blade ( ) is strong and tempered, and the momentum at the back is sufficient. ( ) see "revenues," iv. . ( ) decadarchs, lit. commanders of ten, a "file" consisting normally (or ideally) of ten men. cf. "cyrop. ii." ii. ; viii. i. . it will be borne in mind that a body of cavalry would, as a rule, be drawn up in battle line at least four deep (see "hell." iii. iv. ), and frequently much deeper. (the persian cavalry in the engagement just referred to were twelve deep.) ( ) see "cyrop." iii. iii. , ; vi. iii. , ; vii. i. ; "pol. lac." xi. . these front-rank men would seem to correspond to our "troop guides," and the rear-rank men to our serre-files to some extent. ( ) cf. aelian tact. , ap. courier. the interval between the front and rear-rank men will best be filled supposing that the decadarchs are free to choose their own supports, and those chosen theirs, and so on following suit; since on this principle we may expect each man to have his trustiest comrade at his back. as to your lieutenant, ( ) it is every way important to appoint a good man to this post, whose bravery will tell; and in case of need at any time to charge the enemy, the cheering accents of his voice will infuse strength into those in front; or when the critical moment of retreat arrives, his sage conduct in retiring will go far, we may well conclude, towards saving his division. ( ) ( ) {ton aphegoumenon}, lit. "him who leads back" (a function which would devolve upon the {ouragos} under many circumstances). cf. "cyrop." ii. iii. ; "hell." iv. viii. ; plat. "laws," d. = our "officer serre-file," to some extent. so courier: "celui qui commande en serre-file. c'est chez nous le capitaine en second." ( ) or, "the rest of the squadron." lit. "his own tribesmen." an even number of file-leaders will admit of a greater number of equal subdivisions than an odd. the above formation pleases me for two good reasons: in the first place, all the front-rank men are forced to act as officers; ( ) and the same man, mark you, when in command is somehow apt to feel that deeds of valour are incumbent on him which, as a private, he ignores; and in the next place, at a crisis when something calls for action on the instant, the word of command passed not to privates but to officers takes speedier effect. ( ) i.e. all find themselves in a position of command, and there is nothing like command to inspire that feeling of noblesse oblige which is often lacking in the private soldier. see thuc. v. ; "pol. lac." xi. . supposing, then, a regiment of cavalry drawn up in this formation: just as the squadron-leaders have their several positions for the march (or the attack ( )) assigned them by the commander, so the file-leaders will depend upon the captain for the order passed along the line in what formation they are severally to march; and all being prearranged by word of mouth, the whole will work more smoothly than if left to chance--like people crowding out of a theatre to their mutual annoyance. and when it comes to actual encounter greater promptitude will be displayed: supposing the attack is made in front, by the file-leaders who know that this is their appointed post; or in case of danger suddenly appearing in rear, then by the rear-rank men, whose main idea is that to desert one's post is base. a want of orderly arrangement, on the contrary, leads to confusion worse confounded at every narrow road, at every passage of a river; and when it comes to fighting, no one of his own free will assigns himself his proper post in face of an enemy. ( ) lit. "where to ride," i.e. in what formation whether on the line of march or in action. the above are fundamental matters not to be performed without the active help of every trooper who would wish to be a zealous and unhesitating fellow-worker with his officer. ( ) ( ) cf. "hiero," vii. ; "cyrop." ii. iv. . iii i come at length to certain duties which devolve upon the general of cavalry himself in person: and first and foremost, it concerns him to obtain the favour of the gods by sacrifices in behalf of the state cavalry; and in the next place to make the great procession at the festivals a spectacle worth seeing; and further, with regard to all those public shows demanded by the state, wherever held, ( ) whether in the grounds of the academy or the lyceum, at phaleron or within the hippodrome, it is his business as commander of the knights to see that every pageant of the sort is splendidly exhibited. ( ) cf. theophr. "ch." vii. (jebb ad loc. p. , n. ). but these, again, are memoranda. ( ) to the question how the several features of the pageant shall receive their due impress of beauty, i will now address myself. ( ) read {tauta men alla upomnemata}, or if with pantazid. {apla}, trans. "these are simply memoranda." and first to speak of the processions. ( ) these will, i think, be rendered most acceptable to heaven and to earth's spectators were the riders to ride round the agora and temples, commencing from the hermae, and pay honour to the sacred beings, each in turn, whose shrines and statues are there congregated. (thus in the great dionysia ( ) the choruses embrace their gracious service to the other gods and to the twelve with circling dance. ( )) when the circuit is completed, and the riders are back again in front of the hermae, it would add, i think, to the beauty of the scene ( ) if at this point they formed in companies of tribes, and giving their horses rein, swept forward at the gallop to the eleusinion. nor must i omit to note the right position of the lance, to lessen as far as possible the risk of mutual interference. ( ) each trooper should hold his lance straight between the ears of his charger, which in proportion to the distinctness given to the weapon will rouse terror, and at the same time create a vague idea of multitudinousness. ( ) ( ) {tas pompas}. see a. martin, op. cit. , . ( ) celebrated in march (elaphebolion). ( ) or, "by dancing roundelays in honour of the gods, especially the twelve"; and as to the twelve cf. aristoph. "knights," , "birds," ; plat. "laws," ; paus. i. . ; . ; viii. . ; plut. "nic." ; lycurg. . ( ) or, "it would be a beautiful sequel to the proceedings, in my opinion, if at this point they formed in squadron column, and giving rein to their chargers, swept forward at full gallop to the eleusinion." see leake, op. cit. i. . ( ) lit. "nor will i omit how the lances shall as little as possible overlap one another." ( ) lit. "every trooper should be at pains to keep his lance straight between the ears of his charger, if these weapons are to be distinct and terror-striking, and at the same time to appear numerous." as soon as they have ceased from the charge at full gallop, the pace should at once be changed; and now, with footing slow, let them retrace their course back to the temples. in this way every detail characteristic of knightly pageantry ( ) will have been displayed to the delight of god and man. that our knights are not accustomed to these actual evolutions, i am well aware; but i also recognise the fact that the performances are good and beautiful and will give pleasure to spectators. i do not fail to note, moreover, that novel feats of horsemanship have before now been performed by our knights, when their commanders have had the ability to get their wishes readily complied with. ( ) lit. "everything that may be performed on a mounted horse." possibly, as cobet suggests, {kala} has dropped out. see "horsemanship," xi. , . but now, let us suppose it is the occasion of the march-past, ( ) in the grounds of the lyceum, before the javelin-throwing. the scene would gain in beauty if the tribal squadrons were to ride in line of columns ( ) as if for battle, in two divisions, five squadrons in the one and five in the other, with the hipparch and the phylarchs at their head, in such formation as to allow the whole breadth of the racecourse to be filled. then, as soon as they have gained the top ( ) of the incline, which leads down to the theatre opposite, it would, i think, be obviously useful here to show the skill with which your troopers can gallop down a steep incline ( ) with as broad a front as the nature of the ground permits. i am quite clear that your troopers, if they can trust their own skill in galloping, will take kindly to such an exhibition; while as certainly, if unpractised, they must look to it that the enemy does not give them a lesson in the art some day, perforce. ( ) {dielaunosin en lukeio}. see a. martin, op. cit. ; cf. arist. "peace," . ( ) or, as we might say, "in regimental order," "with the commanding officer in front and their respective squadron-leaders"; and for the lyceum see "hell." i. i. ; ii. iv. . ( ) lit. "the apex of the confronting theatre." ( ) see "horsemanship," viii. ; "anab." iv. viii. . to come to the test manouvres. ( ) the order in which the men will ride with showiest effect on these occasions has been already noted. ( ) as far as the leader is himself concerned, and presuming he is mounted on a powerful horse, i would suggest that he should each time ride round on the outer flank; in which case he will himself be kept perpetually moving at a canter, and those with him, as they become the wheeling flank, will, by turns, fall into the same pace, with this result: the spectacle presented to the senate will be that of an ever rapidly moving stream of cavaliers; and the horses having, each in turn, the opportunity to recover breath, will not be overdone. ( ) {dokimasiais}, reviews and inspections. see a. martin, op. cit. p. . ( ) where? some think in a lost passage of the work (see courier, p. , n. ); or is the reference to ch. ii. above? and is the scene of the {dokimasiai} phaleron? there is no further reference to {ta phaleroi}. cf. s. , above. see aristot. "ath. pol." (now the locus classicus on the subject), and dr. sandys ad loc. the scene is represented on a patera from orvieto, now in the berlin museum, reproduced and fully described in "the art of horsemanship by xenophon," translated, with chapters on the greek riding-horse, and with notes, by morris h. morgan, p. . on occasions when the display takes place in the hippodrome, ( ) the best arrangement would be, in the first place, that the troops should fill the entire space with extended front, so forcing out the mob of people from the centre; ( ) and secondly, that in the sham fight ( ) which ensues, the tribal squadrons, swiftly pursuing and retiring, should gallop right across and through each other, the two hipparchs at their head, each with five squadrons under him. consider the effect of such a spectacle: the grim advance of rival squadrons front to front; the charge; the solemn pause as, having swept across the hippodrome, they stand once more confronting one another; and then the trumpet sounds, whereat a second and yet swifter hostile advance, how fine the effect!--and once again they are at the halt; and once again the trumpet sounds, and for the third time, at the swiftest pace of all, they make a final charge across the field, before dismissal; after which they come to a halt en masse, in battle order; and, as now customary, ( ) ride up to salute the senate, and disband. these evolutions will at once approve themselves, i think, not only for their novelty, but for their resemblance to real warfare. the notion that the hipparch is to ride at a slower pace than his phylarchs, and to handle his horse precisely in their style, seems to me below the dignity of the office. ( ) in the hippodrome near munychia, i suppose. ( ) lit. "... it would be beautiful to form with extended front, so as to fill the hippodrome with horses and drive out the people from the central space, beautiful to..." the new feature of the review would seem to have been the introduction of a sham fight in three parts, down to the customary advance of the whole corps, {epi phalaggos}. cf. virg. "aen." v. foll. but see martin, op. cit. . ( ) lit. "the anthippasia." ( ) "as is your custom." see "mem." iii. iii. . when the cavalry parade takes place on the hard-trodden ( ) ground of the academy, i have the following advice to give. to avoid being jolted off his horse at any moment, the trooper should, in charging, lean well back, ( ) and to prevent his charger stumbling, he should while wheeling hold his head well up, but along a straight stretch he should force the pace. thus the spectacle presented to the senate will combine the elements of beauty and of safety. ( ) cf. thuc. vii. . ( ) see "horsemanship," vii. . iv to pass to a different topic: on the march, the general will need to exercise a constant forethought to relieve the horses' backs and the troopers' legs, by a judicious interchange of riding and of marching. wherein consists the golden mean, will not be hard to find; since "every man a standard to himself," ( ) applies, and your sensations are an index to prevent your fellows being overdone through inadvertence. ( ) the phrase is proverbial. cf. plat. "theaet." b. but now supposing you are on the march in some direction, and it is uncertain whether you will stumble on the enemy, your duty is to rest your squadrons in turn; since it will go hard with you, if the enemy come to close quarters when the whole force is dismounted. ( ) or, again, suppose the roads are narrow, or you have to cross a defile, you will pass, by word of mouth, the command to diminish the front; ( ) or given, again, you are debouching on broad roads, again the word of command will pass by word of mouth, to every squadron, "to increase their front"; or lastly, supposing you have reached flat country, "to form squadron in order of battle." if only for the sake of practice, it is well to go through evolutions of the sort; ( ) besides which it adds pleasure to the march thus to diversify the line of route with cavalry maneuvers. ( ) see "hell." v. iv. for a case in point. ( ) or, "advance by column of route." see "hell." vii. iv. . ( ) or, "it is a pleasant method of beguiling the road." cf. plat. "laws," i. b. supposing, however, you are off roads altogether and moving fast over difficult ground, no matter whether you are in hostile or in friendly territory, it will be useful if the scouts attached to squadrons ( ) rode on in advance, their duty being, in case of encountering pathless clefts or gullies, to work round on to practicable ground, and to discover at what point the troopers may effect a passage, so that whole ranks may not go blindly roaming. ( ) ( ) {ton upereton} = "ground scouts," al. "orderlies." ordonnances, trabans (courier). see rustow and kochly, p. . "cyrop." ii. i. ; ii. iv. ; v. iii. ; vii. v. , and vi. ii. ; "anab." i. ix. ; ii. i. ; where "adjutants," "orderlies" would seem to be implied. ( ) al. "to prevent whole divisions losing their way." cf. "anab." viii. iii. . again, if there is prospect of danger on the march, a prudent general can hardly show his wisdom better than by sending out advanced patrols in front of the ordinary exploring parties to reconnoitre every inch of ground minutely. so to be apprised of the enemy's position in advance, and at as great a distance off as possible, cannot fail to be useful, whether for purposes of attack or defence; just as it is useful also to enforce a halt at the passage of a river or some other defile, so that the men in rear may not knock their horses all to bits in endeavouring to overtake their leader. these are precepts known, i admit, to nearly all the world, but it is by no means every one who will take pains to apply them carefully. ( ) ( ) see "econ." xx. . foll. it is the business of the hipparch to take infinite precautions while it is still peace, to make himself acquainted with the details, not only of his own, but of the hostile territory; ( ) or if, as may well betide, he personally should lack the knowledge, he should invite the aid of others ( )--those best versed in the topography of any district. since there is all the difference in the world between a leader acquainted with his roads and one who is not; and when it comes to actual designs upon the enemy, the difference between knowing and not knowing the locality can hardly be exaggerated. ( ) or, "with hostile and friendly territories alike." ( ) lit. "he should associate with himself those of the rest"; i.e. his colleagues or other members of the force. so, too, with regard to spies and intelligencers. before war commences your business is to provide yourself with a supply of people friendly to both states, or maybe merchants (since states are ready to receive the importer of goods with open arms); sham deserters may be found occasionally useful. ( ) not, of course, that the confidence you feel in your spies must ever cause you to neglect outpost duty; indeed your state of preparation should at any moment be precisely what it ought to be, supposing the approach or the imminent arrival of the enemy were to be announced. let a spy be ever so faithful, there is always the risk he may fail to report his intelligence at the critical moment, since the obstacles which present themselves in war are not to be counted on the fingers. ( ) cf. "cyrop." vi. i. , where one of the persians, araspas, undertakes to play this role to good effect. but to proceed to another topic. the enemy is less likely to get wind of an advance of cavalry, if the orders for march were passed from mouth to mouth rather than announced by voice of herald, or public notice. ( ) accordingly, in addition to ( ) this method of ordering the march by word passed along the line, the appointment of file-leaders seems desirable, who again are to be supplemented by section-leaders, ( ) so that the number of men to whom each petty officer has to transmit an order will be very few; ( ) while the section-leaders will deploy and increase the front, whatever the formation, without confusion, whenever there is occasion for the movement. ( ) ( ) i.e. "given by general word of command, or in writing." as to the "word-of-mouth command," see above, s. ; "hell." vii. v. ; and for the "herald," see "anab." iii. iv. . ( ) reading {pros to dia p.}, or if {pros to}... transl. "with a view to." ( ) lit. pempadarchs, i.e. no. in the file. see "cyrop." ii. i. foll., iii. . ( ) lit. "so that each officer may pass the word to as few as possible." ( ) cf. "anab." iv. vi. . when an advanced guard is needed, i say for myself i highly approve of secret pickets and outposts, if only because in supplying a guard to protect your friends you are contriving an ambuscade to catch the enemy. also the outposts will be less exposed to a secret attack, being themselves unseen, and yet a source of great alarm to the enemy; since the bare knowledge that there are outposts somewhere, though where precisely no man knows, will prevent the enemy from feeling confident, and oblige him to mistrust every tenable position. an exposed outpost, on the contrary, presents to the broad eye of day its dangers and also its weaknesses. ( ) besides which, the holder of a concealed outpost can always place a few exposed vedettes beyond his hidden pickets, and so endeavour to decoy the enemy into an ambuscade. or he may play the part of trapper with effect by placing a second exposed outpost in rear of the other; a device which may serve to take in the unwary foeman quite as well as that before named. ( ) lit. "makes plain its grounds of terror as of confidence." indeed i take it to be the mark of a really prudent general never to run a risk of his own choosing, except where it is plain to him beforehand, that he will get the better of his adversary. to play into the enemy's hands may more fitly be described as treason to one's fellow-combatants than true manliness. so, too, true generalship consists in attacking where the enemy is weakest, even if the point be some leagues distant. severity of toil weighs nothing in the scale against the danger of engaging a force superior to your own. ( ) still, if on any occasion the enemy advance in any way to place himself between fortified points that are friendly to you, let him be never so superior in force, your game is to attack on whichever flank you can best conceal your advance, or, still better, on both flanks simultaneously; since, while one detachment is retiring after delivering its attack, a charge pressed home from the opposite quarter cannot fail to throw the enemy into confusion and to give safety to your friends. ( ) n.b. throughout this treatise the author has to meet the case of a small force of cavalry acting on the defensive. how excellent a thing it is to endeavour to ascertain an enemy's position by means of spies and so forth, as in ancient story; yet best of all, in my opinion, is it for the commander to try to seize some coign of vantage, from which with his own eyes he may descry the movements of the enemy and watch for any error on his part. ( ) ( ) as, e.g. epaminondas at tegea. see "hell." vii. v. . whatever may be snatched by ruse, thief fashion, ( ) your business is to send a competent patrol to seize; or again where capture by coup de main ( ) is practicable, you will despatch a requisite body of troops to effect a coup de main. or take the case: the enemy is on the march in some direction, and a portion of his force becomes detached from his main body or through excess of confidence is caught straggling; do not let the opportunity escape, but make it a rule always to pursue a weaker with a stronger force. ( ) these, indeed, are rules of procedure, which it only requires a simple effort of the mind to appreciate. creatures far duller of wit than man have this ability: kites and falcons, when anything is left unguarded, pounce and carry it off and retire into safety without being caught; or wolves, again, will hunt down any quarry left widowed of its guard, or thieve what they can in darksome corners. ( ) in case a dog pursues and overtakes them, should he chance to be weaker the wolf attacks him, or if stronger, the wolf will slaughter ( ) his quarry and make off. at other times, if the pack be strong enough to make light of the guardians of a flock, they will marshal their battalions, as it were, some to drive off the guard and others to effect the capture, and so by stealth or fair fight they provide themselves with the necessaries of life. i say, if dumb beasts are capable of conducting a raid with so much sense and skill, it is hard if any average man cannot prove himself equally intelligent with creatures which themselves fall victims to the craft of man. ( ) e.g. defiles, bridges, outposts, stores, etc. ( ) e.g. a line of outposts, troops in billets or bivouac, etc. ( ) "it is a maxim, the quarry should be weaker than the pursuer." ( ) zeune cf. ael. "n. a." viii. , on the skill of wolves in hunting. ( ) for {aposphaxas} courier suggests {apospasas}, "dragging off what he can." v here is another matter which every horseman ought to know, and that is within what distance a horse can overhaul a man on foot; or the interval necessary to enable a slower horse to escape one more fleet. it is the business rather of the cavalry general to recognise at a glance the sort of ground on which infantry will be superior to cavalry and where cavalry will be superior to infantry. he should be a man of invention, ready of device to turn all circumstances to account, so as to give at one time a small body of cavalry the appearance of a larger, and again a large the likeness of a smaller body; he should have the craft to appear absent when close at hand, and within striking distance when a long way off; he should know exactly not only how to steal an enemy's position, but by a master stroke of cunning ( ) to spirit his own cavalry away, and, when least expected, deliver his attack. another excellent specimen of inventiveness may be seen in the general's ability, while holding a weak position himself, to conjure up so lively an apprehension in the enemy that he will not dream of attacking; or conversely, when, being in a strong position himself, he can engender a fatal boldness in the adversary to venture an attack. thus with the least cost to yourself, you will best be able to catch your enemy tripping. ( ) or, "sleight of hand"; and for {kleptein} = escamoter see "anab." iv. vi. , ; v. vi. . but to avoid suspicion of seeming to prescribe impossible feats, i will set down, in so many words, the procedure in certain crucial instances. the best safeguard against failure in any attempt to enforce pursuit or conduct a retreat lies in a thorough knowledge of your horse's powers. ( ) but how is this experience to be got? simply by paying attention to their behaviour in the peaceable manouvres of the sham fight, when there is no real enemy to intervene--how the animals come off, in fact, and what stamina they show in the various charges and retreats. ( ) {empeiria}, "empirical knowledge." or suppose the problem is to make your cavalry appear numerous. in the first place, let it be a fundamental rule, if possible, not to attempt to delude the enemy at close quarters; distance, as it aids illusion, will promote security. the next point is to bear in mind that a mob of horses clustered together (owing perhaps to the creatures' size) will give a suggestion of number, whereas scattered they may easily be counted. another means by which you may give your troop an appearance of numerical strength beyond reality consists in posting, in and out between the troopers, so many lines of grooms ( ) who should carry lances if possible, or staves at any rate to look like lances--a plan which will serve alike whether you mean to display your cavalry force at the halt or are deploying to increase front; in either case, obviously the bulk and volume of the force, whatever your formation, will appear increased. conversely, if the problem be to make large numbers appear small, supposing you have ground at command adapted to concealment, the thing is simple: by leaving a portion of your men exposed and hiding away a portion in obscurity, you may effect your object. ( ) but if the ground nowhere admits of cover, your best course is to form your files ( ) into ranks one behind the other, and wheel them round so as to leave intervals between each file; the troopers nearest the enemy in each file will keep their lances erect, and the rest low enough not to show above. ( ) cf. polyaen. ii. i. , of agesilaus in macedonia, b.c. (our author was probably present); iv. iv. , of antipater in thessaly, b.c. ( ) lit. "steal your troopers." see "cyrop." v. iv. . ( ) lit. "form your decads (squads of ten; cf. our 'fours') in ranks and deploy with intervals." to come to the next topic: you may work on the enemy's fears by the various devices of mock ambuscades, sham relief parties, false information. conversely, his confidence will reach an overweening pitch, if the idea gets abroad that his opponents have troubles of their own and little leisure for offensive operations. but over and beyond all that can be written on the subject--inventiveness is a personal matter, beyond all formulas--the true general must be able to take in, deceive, decoy, delude his adversary at every turn, as the particular occasion demands. in fact, there is no instrument of war more cunning than chicanery; ( ) which is not surprising when one reflects that even little boys, when playing, "how many (marbles) have i got in my hand?" ( ) are able to take one another in successfully. out goes a clenched fist, but with such cunning that he who holds a few is thought to hold several; or he may present several and appear to be holding only a few. is it likely that a grown man, giving his whole mind to methods of chicanery, will fail of similar inventiveness? indeed, when one comes to consider what is meant by advantages snatched in war, one will find, i think, that the greater part of them, and those the more important, must be attributed in some way or other to displays of craft; ( ) which things being so, a man had better either not attempt to exercise command, or, as part and parcel of his general equipment, let him pray to heaven to enable him to exercise this faculty and be at pains himself to cultivate his own inventiveness. ( ) cf. "cyrop." iv. ii. ; vii. i. . ( ) {posinda}, lit. "how many?" (i.e. dice, nuts, marbles, etc.); cf. the old game, "buck! buck! how many horns do i hold up?" schneid. cf. aristot. "rhet."iii. . . ( ) "have been won in connection with craft." see "cyrop." i. vi. ; "mem." iii. i. ; iv. ii. . a general, who has access to the sea, may exercise the faculty as follows: he may either, whilst apparently engaged in fitting out his vessels, strike a blow on land; ( ) or with a make-believe of some aggressive design by land, hazard an adventure by sea. ( ) ( ) a ruse adopted by jason, b.c. cf. "hell." vi. iv. . ( ) cf. the tactics of the athenians at catana, b.c. thuc. vi. . i consider it to be the duty of the cavalry commander to point out clearly to the state authority the essential weakness of a force of cavalry unaided by light infantry, as opposed to cavalry with foot-soldiers attached. ( ) it is duty also, having got his footmen, to turn the force to good account. it is possible to conceal them effectively, not only between the lines, but in rear also of the troopers--the mounted soldier towering high above his follower on foot. ( ) or, "divorced from infantry." in reference to {amippoi}, cf. thuc. v. ; "hell." vii. v. . with regard to these devices and to any others which invention may suggest towards capturing the foeman by force or fraud, i have one common word of advice to add, which is, to act with god, and then while heaven propitious smiles, fortune will scarcely dare to frown. ( ) ( ) or, "and then by the grace of heaven you may win the smiles of fortune," reading with courier, etc., {ina kai e tukhe sunepaine}. cf. "cyrop." iii. iii. . at times there is no more effective fraud than a make-believe ( ) of over-caution alien to the spirit of adventure. this itself will put the enemy off his guard and ten to one will lure him into some egregious blunder; or conversely, once get a reputation for foolhardiness established, and then with folded hands sit feigning future action, and see what a world of trouble you will thereby cause your adversary. ( ) s. should perhaps stand before s. . vi but, after all, no man, however great his plastic skill, can hope to mould and shape a work of art to suit his fancy, unless the stuff on which he works be first prepared and made ready to obey the craftsman's will. nor certainly where the raw material consists of men, will you succeed, unless, under god's blessing, these same men have been prepared and made ready to meet their officer in a friendly spirit. they must come to look upon him as of greater sagacity than themselves in all that concerns encounter with the enemy. this friendly disposition on the part of his subordinates, one must suppose, will best be fostered by a corresponding sympathy on the part of their commander towards the men themselves, and that not by simple kindness but by the obvious pains he takes on their behalf, at one time to provide them with food, and at another to secure safety of retreat, or again by help of outposts and the like, to ensure protection during rest and sleep. when on active service ( ) the commander must prove himself conspicuously careful in the matter of forage, quarters, water-supply, outposts, ( ) and all other requisites; forecasting the future and keeping ever a wakeful eye in the interest of those under him; and in case of any advantage won, the truest gain which the head of affairs can reap is to share with his men the profits of success. ( ) al. "on garrison outpost duty." ( ) reading {phulakon}, or if with courier {thulakon}, "haversacks," i.e. "la farine, le contenant pour le contenu." indeed, to put the matter in a nutshell, there is small risk a general will be regarded with contempt by those he leads, if, whatever he may have to preach, he shows himself best able to perform. beginning with the simple art of mounting on horseback, let him so train himself in all particulars of horsemanship that, to look at him, the men must see their leader is a horseman who can leap a trench unscathed or scale a parapet, ( ) or gallop down a bank, and hurl a javelin with the best. these are accomplishments which one and all will pave the way to make contempt impossible. if, further, the men shall see in their commander one who, with the knowledge how to act, has force of will and cunning to make them get the better of the enemy; and if, further, they have got the notion well into their heads that this same leader may be trusted not to lead them recklesssly against the foe, without the help of heaven, or despite the auspices--i say, you have a list of virtues which will make those under his command the more obedient to their ruler. ( ) or, "stone walls," "dykes." vii if prudence may be spoken of as the one quality distinctive of true generalship, there are two respects in which a general of cavalry at athens should pre-eminently excel. not only must he show a dutiful submission to the gods; but he must possess great fighting qualities, seeing that he has on his borders a rival cavalry equal to his own in number and backed by a large force of heavy infantry. ( ) so that, if he undertake to invade the enemy's territory unsupported by the other forces of the city ( )--in dealing with two descriptions of forces single-handed, he and his cavalry must look for a desperate adventure; or to take the converse case, that the enemy invades the soil of attica, to begin with, he will not invade at all, unless supported by other cavalry besides his own and an infantry force sufficient to warrant the supposition that no force on our side can cope with him. ( ) the reference is doubtless to the thebans. unfortunately we do not know, on good authority, how many troops of either arm they had in the field at leuctra or at mantinea. ( ) lit. "without the rest of the city," i.e. the hoplites, etc. now, to deal with this vast hostile array, if only the city will determine to sally out en masse to protect her rural districts, the prospect is fair. under god, our troopers, if properly cared for, are the finer men; our infantry of the line are no less numerous, and as regards physique, if it comes to that, not one whit inferior, while in reference to moral qualities, they are more susceptible to the spur of a noble ambition, if only under god's will they be correctly trained. or again, as touching pride of ancestry, what have athenians to fear as against boeotians on that score? ( ) ( ) see "mem." iii. v. , where it is contended that in pride of ancestry athenians can hold their own against boeotians. but suppose the city of athens determine to betake herself to her navy, as in the old days when the lacedaemonians, leagued with the rest of hellas, brought invasion; ( ) and is content once more simply to protect her walls through thick and thin. as to protecting what lies outside the city wall she looks to her cavalry for that; and single-handed her troopers must do desperate encounter against the united forces of the enemy. i say, under these circumstances, we shall need in the first place the strong support of heaven; and in the second place, well will it be for us if our cavalry commander prove himself a consummate officer. ( ) indeed, he will have need of large wisdom to deal with a force so vastly superior in numbers, and of enterprise to strike when the critical moment comes. ( ) see thuc. ii. , , , etc., and in particular iv. , hippocrates' speech before the battle of delium, b.c. ( ) a "parfait marechal." he must also, as it appears to me, be capable of great physical endurance; ( ) since clearly, if he has to run full tilt against an armament present, as we picture, in such force that not even our whole state cares to cope with it, it is plain he must accept whatever fate is due, where might is right, himself unable to retaliate. ( ) so jason, "hell." vi. i. . if, on the contrary, he elect to guard the territory outside the walls ( ) with a number just sufficient to keep a look-out on the enemy, and to withdraw into safe quarters from a distance whatever needs protection--a small number, be it observed, is just as capable of vedette duty, as well able, say, to scan the distant horizon, as a large; and by the same token men with no great confidence in themselves or in their horses are not ill-qualified to guard, or withdraw within shelter ( ) the property of friends; since fear, as the proverb has it, makes a shrewd watchman. the proposal, therefore, to select from these a corps of observation will most likely prove true strategy. but what then of the residue not needed for outpost duty? if any one imagines he has got an armament, he will find it miserably small, and lacking in every qualification necessary to risk an open encounter. ( ) or, "his better plan would be to." ( ) reading {anakhorizein}. cf. "cyrop." ii. ii. ; "anab." v. ii. ; or if {anakhorein eis}, transl. "or retire into safe quarters." see "hell." iv. vi. . but let him make up his mind to employ it in guerilla war, and he will find the force quite competent for that, i warrant. his business, so at least it seems to me, will be to keep his men perpetually in readiness to strike a blow, and without exposing himself, to play sentinel, waiting for any false move on the part of the hostile armament. and it is a way with soldiers, bear in mind, the more numerous they are, the more blunders they commit. they must needs scatter of set purpose ( ) in search of provisions; or through the disorder incidental to a march, some will advance and others lag behind, beyond a proper limit. blunders like these, then, our hipparch must not let pass unpunished (unless he wishes the whole of attica to become a gigantic camp); ( ) keeping his single point steadily in view, that when he strikes a blow he must be expeditious and retire before the main body has time to rally to the rescue. ( ) {epimeleia}. cf. "cyrop." v. iii. . ( ) lit. "or else the whole of attica will be one encampment." as at the date of the fortification of decelea ( b.c.), which permanently commanded the whole country. see thuc. vii. . al. courier, "autrement vous n'avez plus de camp, ou pour mieux dire, tout le pays devient votre camp." again, it frequently happens on the march, that an army will get into roads where numbers are no advantage. again, in the passage of rivers, defiles, and the like, it is possible for a general with a head on his shoulders to hang on the heels of an enemy in security, and to determine with precision ( ) the exact number of the enemy he will care to deal with. occasionally the fine chance occurs to attack the foe while encamping or breakfasting or supping, or as the men turn out of bed: seasons at which the soldier is apt to be unharnessed--the hoplite for a shorter, the cavalry trooper for a longer period. ( ) ( ) see "anab." ii. v. ; "cyrop." iii. iii. ; iv. i. . {tamieusasthai}, "with the precision of a controller." ( ) cf. "hell." ii. iv. ; vii. i. . as to vedettes and advanced outposts, you should never cease planning and plotting against them. for these in their turn, as a rule, are apt to consist of small numbers, and are sometimes posted at a great distance from their own main body. but if after all it turns out that the enemy are well on their guard against all such attempts, then, god helping, it would be a feat of arms to steal into the enemy's country, first making it your business to ascertain ( ) his defences, the number of men at this, that, and the other point, and how they are distributed throughout the country. for there is no booty so splendid as an outpost so overmastered; and these frontier outposts are especially prone to be deceived, with their propensity to give chase to any small body they set eyes on, regarding that as their peculiar function. you will have to see, however, in retiring that your line of retreat is not right into the jaws of the enemy's reliefs hastening to the scene of action. ( ) or, "having first studied." cf. "mem." iii. vi. . viii it stands to reason, however, that in order to be able to inflict real damage upon a greatly superior force, the weaker combatant must possess such a moral superiority over the other as shall enable him to appear in the position of an expert, trained in all the feats of cavalry performance in the field, and leave his enemy to play the part of raw recruits or amateurs. ( ) ( ) cf. "cyrop." i. v. ; "mem." iii. vii. . and this end may be secured primarily on this wise: those who are to form your guerilla bands ( ) must be so hardened and inured to the saddle that they are capable of undergoing all the toils of a campaign. ( ) that a squadron (and i speak of horse and man alike) should enter these lists in careless, disorderly fashion suggests the idea of a troop of women stepping into the arena to cope with male antagonists. ( ) or, add, "for buccaneers and free-lances you must be." ( ) lit. "every toil a soldier can encounter." but reverse the picture. suppose men and horses to have been taught and trained to leap trenches and scale dykes, to spring up banks, and plunge from heights without scathe, to gallop headlong at full speed adown a steep: they will tower over unpractised opponents as the birds of the air tower over creatures that crawl and walk. ( ) their feet are case-hardened by constant training, and, when it comes to tramping over rough ground, must differ from the uninitiated as the sound man from the lame. and so again, when it comes to charging and retiring, the onward-dashing gallop, the well-skilled, timely retreat, expert knowledge of the ground and scenery will assert superiority over inexpertness like that of eyesight over blindness. ( ) see "horse." viii. ; cf. "hunting," xii. ; "cyrop." i. vi. foll. nor should it be forgotten, that in order to be in thorough efficiency the horses must not only be well fed and in good condition, but at the same time so seasoned by toil that they will go through their work without the risk of becoming broken-winded. and lastly, as bits and saddle-cloths (to be efficient) ( ) need to be attached by straps, a cavalry general should never be without a good supply, whereby at a trifling expense he may convert a number of nonplussed troopers into serviceable fighting men. ( ) ( ) ({khresima}) l.d. for the {upomnema} itself cf. "cyrop." vi. ii. . ( ) or, "thus at a trifling outlay he will be able to render so many non-efficients useful." al. "make the articles as good as new." but if any one is disposed to dwell on the amount of trouble it will cost him, if he is required to devote himself to horsemanship so assiduously, let him console himself with the reflection that the pains and labours undergone by any man in training for a gymnastic contest are far larger and more formidable than any which the severest training of the horseman will involve; and for this reason, that the greater part of gymnastic exercises are performed "in the sweat of the brow," while equestrian exercise is performed with pleasure. indeed, there is no accomplishment which so nearly realises the aspiration of a man to have the wings of a bird than this of horsemanship. ( ) but further, to a victory obtained in war attaches a far greater weight of glory than belongs to the noblest contest of the arena. ( ) of these the state indeed will share her meed of glory, ( ) but in honour of victory in war the very gods are wont to crown whole states with happiness. ( ) so that, for my part, i know not if there be aught else which has a higher claim to be practised than the arts of war. ( ) cf. "cyrop." iv. iii. ; herod. iv. ; plat. "rep." v. d. ( ) cf. eur. "autolycus," fr. , trans. by j. a. symonds, "greek poets," nd series, p. . ( ) cf. plut. "pelop." (clough, ii. p. ): "and yet who would compare all the victories in the pythian and olympian games put together, with one of these enterprises of pelopidas, of which he successfully performed so many?" ( ) "to bind about the brows of states happiness as a coronal." and this, too, is worth noting: that the buccaneer by sea, the privateersman, through long practice in endurance, is able to live at the expense of far superior powers. yes, and the life of the freebooter is no less natural and appropriate to landsmen--i do not say, to those who can till and gather in the fruit of their fields, but to those who find themselves deprived of sustenance; since there is no alternative--either men must till their fields or live on the tillage of others, otherwise how will they find the means either of living or of obtaining peace? ( ) ( ) cf. "econ." v. . here, too, is a maxim to engrave upon the memory: in charging a superior force, never to leave a difficult tract of ground in the rear of your attack, since there is all the difference in the world between a stumble in flight and a stumble in pursuit. there is another precaution which i feel called upon to note. some generals, ( ) in attacking a force which they imagine to be inferior to their own, will advance with a ridiculously insufficient force, ( ) so that it is the merest accident if they do not experience the injury they were minded to inflict. conversely, in attacking any enemy whose superiority is a well-known fact, they will bring the whole of their force into action. ( ) or, "one knows of generals," e.g. iphicrates at oneion, b.c. cf. "hell." vi. v. . ( ) lit. "an absolutely weak force." now, my maxim would be precisely converse: if you attack with a prospect of superiority, do not grudge employing all the power at your command; excess of victory ( ) never yet caused any conqueror one pang of remorse. ( ) or, "a great and decided victory." cf. "hiero," ii. . but in any attempt to attack superior forces, in full certainty that, do what you can, you must eventually retire, it is far better, say i, under these circumstances to bring a fraction only of your whole force into action, which fraction should be the pick and flower of the troops at your command, both horses and men. a body of that size and quality will be able to strike a blow and to fall back with greater security. whereas, if a general brings all his troops into action against a superior force, when he wishes to retire, certain things must happen: those of his men who are worse mounted will be captured, others through lack of skill in horsemanship will be thrown, and a third set be cut off owing to mere difficulties of ground; since it is impossible to find any large tract of country exactly what you would desire. if for no other reason, through sheer stress of numbers there will be collisions, and much damage done by kicks through mutual entanglement; whereas a pick of horse and men will be able to escape offhand, ( ) especially if you have invention to create a scare in the minds of the pursuers by help of the moiety of troops who are out of action. ( ) for this purpose false ambuscades will be of use. ( ) or, "by themselves," reading {ex auton}, as l. dind. suggests. cf. polyb. x. . , or if as vulg. {ex auton} (sub. {kheiron}, weiske), transl. "to slip through their fingers." ( ) zeune and other commentators cf liv. v. (diod. xiv. ), but the part played by the roman subsidiarii at the battle of the allia, if indeed "una salus fugientibus," was scarcely happy. would not "hell." vii. v. be more to the point? the detachment of cavalry and infantry placed by epaminondas "on certain crests, to create an apprehension in the minds of the athenians" in that quarter of the field at mantinea was a {mekhanema} of the kind here contemplated. another serviceable expedient will be to discover on which side a friendly force may suddenly appear and without risk to itself put a drag on the wheels of the pursuer. nay, it is self-evident, i think, that, as far as work and speed are concerned, it is the small body which will assert its superiority more rapidly over the larger, and not vice versa--not of course that the mere fact of being a small body will enable them to endure toil or give them wings; but simply it is easier to find five men than five hundred, who will take the requisite care and pains with their horses, and personally practise of their own accord the art of horsemanship. but suppose the chance should occur of entering the lists against an equal number of the enemy's cavalry, according to my judgment it were no bad plan to split the squadron into divisions, ( ) the first of which should be commanded by the squadron-leader, and the other by the ablest officer to be found. this second-officer will for the time being follow in rear of the leading division with the squadron leader; and by and by, when the antagonist is in near proximity, and when the word of command is passed, form squadron to the front and charge the hostile ranks ( )--a maneuver calculated, as i conceive, to bring the whole mass down upon the enemy with paralysing force, and to cause him some trouble to extricate himself. ideally speaking, both divisions ( ) will be backed by infantry kept in rear of the cavalry; these will suddenly disclose themselves, and rushing to close quarters, in all probability clench the nail of victory. ( ) so at any rate it strikes me, seeing as i do the effects of what is unexpected--how, in the case of good things, the soul of man is filled to overflowing with joy, and again, in the case of things terrible, paralysed with amazement. in proof of what i say, let any one reflect on the stupor into which a body of men with all the weight of numerical advantage on their side will be betrayed by falling into an ambuscade; or again, on the exaggerated terror mutually inspired in belligerents during the first few days, of finding themselves posted in face of one another. ( ) or, "troops." ( ) possibly on flank. see courier, p. , on spanish cavalry tactics. ( ) lit. "supposing both divisions to be backed by footmen," etc. ( ) or, "achieve a much more decisive victory." cf. "cyrop." iii. iii. . to make these dispositions is not hard; the difficulty is to discover a body of men who will dash forward ( ) and charge an enemy as above described intelligently and loyally, with an eager spirit and unfailing courage. that is a problem for a good cavalry general to solve. i mean an officer who must be competent to so assert himself in speech or action ( ) that those under him will no longer hesitate. they will recognise of themselves that it is a good thing and a right to obey, ( ) to follow their leader, to rush to close quarters with the foe. a desire will consume them to achieve some deed of glory and renown. a capacity will be given them patiently to abide by the resolution of their souls. ( ) {parelontas}, in reference to s. above, {parelaunoi}, "form squadron to the front." ( ) "to be this, he must be able as an orator as well as a man of action." cf. "mem." ii. ii. . ( ) cf. tennyson's "the charge of the light brigade": their's not to make reply, their's not to reason why, their's but to do and die. to turn to another matter, take the case in which you have two armeis facing one another in battle order, or a pair of fortresses ( ) belonging to rival powers, and in the space between all kinds of cavalry manouvres are enacted, wheelings and charges and retreats. ( ) under such circumstances the custom usually is for either party after wheeling to set off at a slow pace and to gallop full speed only in the middle of the course. but now suppose that a commander, after making feint ( ) in this style, presently on wheeling quickens for the charge and quickens to retire--he will be able to hit the enemy far harder, and pull through absolutely without scathe himself most likely; through charging at full speed whilst in proximity to his own stronghold (or main body), and quickening to a gallop as he retires from the stronghold (or main body) of the enemy. if further, he could secretly contrive to leave behind four or five troopers, the bravest and best mounted of the squadron, it would give them an immense advantage in falling upon the enemy whilst wheeling to return to the charge. ( ) ( ) al. "fields and farmsteads between." ( ) or, "retirements," see "horsemanship," viii. ; "cyrop." v. iv. ; "hell." iv. ii. ; "ages." ii. . ( ) or, "having precluded in this fashion." see theocr. xxii. : {ton men anax ataraxen etosia khersi prodeiknus pantothen}, "feinting on every side" (a. lang). al. "having given due warning of his intention." cf. aristot. "h. a." ix. . ( ) cf. aristoph. "knights," (demosthenes calls to the hipparchs (?)): {andres eggus. all' amunou, kapanastrephou palin}. ix to read these observations over a few times will be sufficient, but for giving them effect the officer will need perpetually to act as circumstances require. ( ) he must take in the situation at a glance, and carry out unflinchingly whatever is expedient for the moment. to set down in writing everything that he must do, is not a whit more possible than to know the future as a whole. ( ) but of all hints and suggestions the most important to my mind is this: whatever you determine to be right, with diligence endeavour to perform. for be it tillage of the soil, or trading, or seafaring, or the art of ruling, without pains applied to bring the matter to perfection, the best theories in the world, the most correct conclusions, will be fruitless. ( ) {pros to paratugkhanon}, lit. "to meet emergencies." cf. thuc. i. : "for war, least of all things, conforms to prescribed rules; it strikes out a path for itself when the moment comes" (jowett). ( ) or, "is about as feasible as to foretell each contingency hid in the womb of futurity." one thing i am prepared to insist on: it is clear to myself that by heaven's help our total cavalry force might be much more quickly raised to the full quota of a thousand troopers, ( ) and with far less friction to the mass of citizens, by the enrolment of two hundred foreign cavalry. their acquisition will be doubly helpful, as intensifying the loyalty of the entire force and as kindling a mutual ambition to excel in manly virtue. ( ) see schneid. ad loc.; boeckh, "p. e. a." pp. , ; herod. vi. ; thuc. vi. ; aristoph. "knights," ; aeschin. "de f. l." - . see for this reform, martin, op. cit. , . i can state on my own knowledge that the lacedaemonian cavalry only began to be famous ( ) with the introduction of foreign troopers; and in the other states of hellas everywhere the foreign brigades stand in high esteem, as i perceive. need, in fact, contributes greatly to enthusiasm. towards the necessary cost of the horses i hold that an ample fund will be provided, ( ) partly out of the pockets of those who are only too glad to escape cavalry service (in other words, those on whom the service devolves prefer to pay a sum of money down and be quit of the duty), ( ) and from wealthy men who are physically incompetent; and i do not see why orphans possessed of large estates should not contribute. ( ) another belief i hold is that amongst our resident aliens ( ) there are some who will show a laudable ambition if incorporated with the cavalry. i argue from the fact, apparent to myself, that amongst this class persons are to be found most zealously disposed to carry out the part assigned to them, in every other branch of honourable service which the citizens may choose to share with them. again, it strikes me that if you seek for an energetic infantry to support your cavalry, you will find it in a corps composed of individuals whose hatred to the foe is naturally intense. ( ) but the success of the above suggestions will depend doubtless on the consenting will of heaven. ( ) ( ) "entered on an era of prestige with the incorporation of," after leuctra, b.c., when the force was at its worst. see "hell." vi. iv. . ( ) or, "money will be forthcoming for them." cf. lys. "against philon," xxxi. ; martin, op. cit. . ( ) cf. "hell." iii. iv. ; "ages." i. . courier brackets this sentence ({oti... ippeuein}) as a gloss; martin, p. , emends. ( ) as to the legal exemption of orphans schneid. cf. dem. "symm." . ; lys. "against diogeit." . ( ) lit. "metoecs." see "revenues," ii. ( ) lit. "men the most antagonistic to the enemy." is the author thinking of boeotian emigres? cf. "hell." vi. iii. , ; diod. xv. . . ( ) lit. "with the consenting will of the gods these things all may come to pass." and now if the repetition of the phrase throughout this treatise "act with god," surprises any one, he may take my word for it that with the daily or hourly occurrence of perils which must betide him, his wonderment will diminish; as also with the clearer recognition of the fact that in time of war the antagonists are full of designs against each other, but the precise issue of these plots and counterplots is rarely known. to what counsellor, then, can a man apply for advice in his extremity save only to the gods, who know all things and forewarn whomsoever they will by victims or by omens, by voice or vision? is it not rational to suppose that they will prefer to help in their need, not those who only seek them in time of momentary stress and trouble, but those rather who in the halcyon days of their prosperity make a practice of rendering to heaven the service of heart and soul? battle studies ancient and modern battle by colonel ardant du picq french army translated from the eighth edition in the french by colonel john n. greely field artillery, u.s. army and major robert c. cotton general staff (infantry), u.s. army joint author of "military field notebook" [transcriber's note: footnotes have been moved to the end of the book.] [illustration: colonel ardant du picq] [illustration: letter from marshal foch to major general a. w. greely dated malsherbe, october , ] translation of a letter from marshal foch to major general a. w. greely, dated malsherbe, october , my dear general: colonel ardant du picq was the exponent of _moral force_, the most powerful element in the strength of armies. he has shown it to be the preponderating influence in the outcome of battles. your son has accomplished a very valuable work in translating his writings. one finds his conclusions amply verified in the experience of the american army during the last war, notably in the campaign of . accept, my dear general, my best regards. f. foch. preface by frank h. simonds author of "history of the world war," "'they shall not pass'--verdun," etc. in presenting to the american reading public a translation of a volume written by an obscure french colonel, belonging to a defeated army, who fell on the eve of a battle which not alone gave france over to the enemy but disclosed a leadership so inapt as to awaken the suspicion of treason, one is faced by the inevitable interrogation--"why?" yet the answer is simple. the value of the book of ardant du picq lies precisely in the fact that it contains not alone the unmistakable forecast of the defeat, itself, but a luminous statement of those fundamental principles, the neglect of which led to gravelotte and sedan. napoleon has said that in war the moral element is to all others as three is to one. moreover, as du picq impressively demonstrates, while all other circumstances change with time, the human element remains the same, capable of just so much endurance, sacrifice, effort, and no more. thus, from caesar to foch, the essential factor in war endures unmodified. and it is not the value of du picq's book, as an explanation of the disasters of , but of the triumphs of - , which gives it present and permanent interest. it is not as the forecast of why bazaine, a type of all french commanders of the franco-prussian war, will fail, but why foch, joffre, pétain will succeed, that the volume invites reading to-day. beyond all else, the arresting circumstances in the fragmentary pages, perfect in themselves but incomplete in the conception of their author, is the intellectual and the moral kinship they reveal between the soldier who fell just before the crowning humiliation of gravelotte and the victor of fère champenoise, the yser and the colossal conflict of to which historians have already applied the name of the battle of france, rightly to suggest its magnitude. read the hastily compiled lectures of foch, the teacher of the École de guerre, recall the fugitive but impressive words of foch, the soldier, uttered on the spur of the moment, filled with homely phrase, and piquant figure and underlying all, one encounters the same integral conception of war and of the relation of the moral to the physical, which fills the all too scanty pages of du picq. "for me as a soldier," writes du picq, "the smallest detail caught on the spot and in the heat of action is more instructive than all the thiers and the jominis in the world." compare this with foch explaining to his friend andré de mariecourt, his own emotions at the critical hour at fère champenoise, when he had to invent something new to beguile soldiers who had retreated for weeks and been beaten for days. his tactical problem remained unchanged, but he must give his soldiers, tired with being beaten to the "old tune" a new air, which would appeal to them as new, something to which they had not been beaten, and the same philosophy appears. du picq's contemporaries neglected his warning, they saw only the outward circumstances of the napoleonic and frederican successes. in vain du picq warned them that the victories of frederick were not the logical outgrowth of the minutiae of the potsdam parades. but du picq dead, the third empire fallen, france prostrated but not annihilated by the defeats of , a new generation emerged, of which foch was but the last and most shining example. and this generation went back, powerfully aided by the words of du picq, to that older tradition, to the immutable principles of war. with surprising exactness du picq, speaking in the abstract, foretold an engagement in which the mistakes of the enemy would be counterbalanced by their energy in the face of french passivity, lack of any control conception. forty years later in the École de guerre, foch explained the reasons why the strategy of moltke, mistaken in all respects, failed to meet the ruin it deserved, only because at gravelotte bazaine could not make up his mind, solely because of the absence in french high command of precisely that "creed of combat" the lack of which du picq deplored. of the value of du picq's work to the professional soldier, i naturally cannot speak, but even for the civilian, the student of military events, of war and of the larger as well as the smaller circumstances of battle, its usefulness can hardly be exaggerated. reading it one understands something, at least of the soul as well as the science of combat, the great defeats and the great victories of history seem more intelligible in simple terms of human beings. beyond this lies the contemporaneous value due to the fact that nowhere can one better understand foch than through the reading of du picq. by translating this volume of du picq and thus making it available for an american audience whose interest has been inevitably stirred by recent events, the translators have done a public as well as a professional service. both officers enjoyed exceptional opportunities and experiences on the western front. col. greely from cantigny to the close of the battle of the meuse-argonne was not only frequently associated with the french army, but as chief of staff of our own first division, gained a direct knowledge of the facts of battle, equal to that of du picq, himself. on the professional side the service is obvious, since before the last war the weakness of the american like the british army, a weakness inevitable, given our isolation, lay in the absence of adequate study of the higher branches of military science and thus the absence of such a body of highly skilled professional soldiers, as constituted the french or german general staff. the present volume is a clear evidence that american officers themselves have voluntarily undertaken to make good this lack. on the non-professional side and for the general reader, the service is hardly less considerable, since it supplies the least technically informed with a simply comprehensible explanation of things which almost every one has struggled to grasp and visualize during the last six years extending from the battle of marne in to that of the vistula in . of the truth of this latter assertion, a single example will perhaps suffice. every forthcoming military study of the campaign of emphasizes with renewed energy the fact that underlying all the german conceptions of the opening operations was the purpose to repeat the achievement of hannibal at cannae, by bringing the french to battle under conditions which should, on a colossal scale, reproduce those of hannibal's greatest victory. but nowhere better than in du picq's volume, are set forth the essential circumstances of the combat which, after two thousand years gave to field marshal von schlieffen the root ideas for the strategy expressed in the first six weeks of . and, as a final observation, nowhere better than in du picq's account, can one find the explanation of why the younger moltke failed in executing those plans which gave hannibal one of the most shining triumphs in all antiquity. thus, although he died in , du picq lives, through his book, as one of the most useful guides to a proper understanding of a war fought nearly half a century later. frank h. simonds. snowville, new hampshire, october , . translators' note colonel ardant du picq's "battle studies" is a french military classic. it is known to every french army officer; it is referred to as an established authority in such works as marshal foch's "the principles of war." it has been eagerly read in the original by such american army officers as have chanced upon it; probably only the scarcity of thinking men with military training has precluded the earlier appearance of an american edition. the translators feel that the war with germany which brought with it some military training for all the best brains of the country has prepared the field for an american edition of this book. they are sure that every american reader who has had actual battle experience in any capacity will at some point say to himself, "that is absolutely true...." or, "that reminds me of the day...." appendices ii, iii, iv, and v, appearing in the edition from which this translation is made, deal with issues and military questions entirely french and not of general application. they are therefore not considered as being of sufficient interest to be reproduced herein. appendix vi of the original appears herein as appendix ii. the translation is unpretentious. the translators are content to exhibit such a work to the american military public without changing its poignancy and originality. they hope that readers will enjoy it as much as they have themselves. j. n. g. r. c. c. introduction we present to the public the complete works of colonel ardant du picq, arranged according to the plan of the author, enlarged by unpublished fragments and documents. these unpublished documents are partially known by those who have read "studies on combat" (hachette & dumaine, ). a second edition was called for after a considerable time. it has left ineffaceable traces in the minds of thinking men with experience. by its beauty and the vigor of its teachings, it has created in a faithful school of disciples a tradition of correct ideas. for those familiar with the work, there is no need for emphasizing the importance and usefulness of this rejuvenated publication. in it they will find new sources of interest, which will confirm their admiration for the author. they will also rejoice in the popularity of their teacher, already highly regarded in the eyes of his profession on account of his presentation of conclusions, the truth of which grows with years. his work merits widespread attention. it would be an error to leave it in the exclusive possession of special writers and military technicians. in language which is equal in power and pathetic beauty, it should carry its light much further and address itself to all readers who enjoy solid thought. their ideas broadened, they will, without fail, join those already initiated. no one can glance over these pages with indifference. no one can fail to be moved by the strong and substantial intellect they reveal. no one can fail to feel their profound depths. to facilitate treatment of a subject which presents certain difficulties, we shall confine ourselves to a succinct explanation of its essential elements, the general conception that unites them, and the purpose of the author. but we must not forget the dramatic mutilation of the work unfortunately never completed because of the glorious death of ardant du picq. when colonel ardant du picq was killed near metz in by a prussian shell, he left works that divide themselves into two well-defined categories: ( ) completed works: pamphlet (printed in but not intended for sale), which forms the first part of the present edition: ancient battle. a series of memoirs and studies written in . these are partly reproduced in appendices i and ii herein. ( ) notes jotted down on paper, sometimes developed into complete chapters not requiring additions or revision, but sometimes abridged and drawn up in haste. they reveal a brain completely filled with its subject, perpetually working, noting a trait in a rapid phrase, in a vibrating paragraph, in observations and recollections that a future revision was to compile, unite and complete. the collection of these notes forms the second part: modern battle. these notes were inspired by certain studies or memoirs which are presented in appendices i-v, and a study on combat, with which the colonel was occupied, and of which we gave a sketch at the end of the pamphlet of . he himself started research among the officers of his acquaintance, superiors, equals or subordinates, who had served in war. this occupied a great part of his life. in order to collect from these officers, without change or misrepresentation, statements of their experiences while leading their men in battle or in their divers contacts with the enemy, he sent to each one a questionnaire, in the form of a circular. the reproduction herein is from the copy which was intended for general lafont de villiers, commanding the st division at limoges. it is impossible to over-emphasize the great value of this document which gives the key to the constant meditations of ardant du picq, the key to the reforms which his methodical and logical mind foresaw. it expounds a principle founded upon exact facts faithfully stated. his entire work, in embryo, can be seen between the lines of the questionnaire. this was his first attempt at reaction against the universal routine surrounding him. from among the replies which he received and which his family carefully preserved, we have extracted the most conclusive. they will be found in appendix ii--historical documents. brought to light, at the urgent request of the author, they complete the book, corroborating statements by examples. they illuminate his doctrines by authentic historical depositions. in arranging this edition we are guided solely by the absolute respect which we have for the genius of ardant du picq. we have endeavored to reproduce his papers in their entirety, without removing or adding anything. certain disconnected portions have an inspired and fiery touch which would be lessened by the superfluous finish of an attempt at editing. some repetitions are to be found; they show that the appendices were the basis for the second part of the volume, modern battle. it may be stated that the work, suddenly halted in , contains criticisms, on the staff for instance, which aim at radical reforms. ernest judet. contents frontispiece--portrait of colonel ardant du picq foreword preface translator's note introduction a military thinker record of military service of colonel ardant du picq extract from the history of the th infantry regiment part one: ancient battle introduction chapter i man in primitive and ancient combat ii knowledge of man made roman tactics; the successes of hannibal; those of caesar iii analysis of the battle of cannae iv analysis of the battle of pharsalus and some characteristic examples v morale in ancient battle vi how real combatants are obtained and how the fighting of to-day requires them to be more dependable than in ancient battle vii purpose of this study and what is necessary to complete it part two: modern battle i general discussion . ancient and modern battle . moral elements in battle . material and moral effect . the theory of strong battalions . combat methods ii infantry . masses--deep columns . skirmishers--supports--reserves--squares . firing . marches--camps--night attacks iii cavalry . cavalry and modern appliances . cavalry against cavalry . cavalry against infantry . armor and armament iv artillery v command, general staff and administration vi social and military institutions; national characteristics appendices i memorandum on infantry fire . introduction . succinct history of the development of small arms, from the arquebus to our rifle . progressive introduction of fire-arms into the armament of the infantryman . the classes of fire employed with each weapon . methods of fire used in the presence of the enemy; methods recommended or ordered but impractical . fire at will--its efficacy . fire by rank is a fire to occupy the men in ranks . the deadly fire is the fire of skirmishers . the absolute impossibility of fire at command ii historical documents . cavalry (an extract from xenophon) . marius against the cimbrians (extract from plutarch's "life of marius") . the battle of the alma (extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq) . the battle of the alma (extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq) . the battle of inkermann (extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq) . the battle of magenta (extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq) . the battle of solferino (extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq) . mentana (extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq) battle studies a military thinker near longeville-les-metz on the morning of august , , a stray projectile from a prussian gun mortally wounded the colonel of the th regiment of the line. the obscure gunner never knew that he had done away with one of the most intelligent officers of our army, one of the most forceful writers, one of the most clear-sighted philosophers whom sovereign genius had ever created. ardant du picq, according to the annual register, commanded but a regiment. he was fitted for the first rank of the most exalted. he fell at the hour when france was thrown into frightful chaos, when all that he had foreseen, predicted and dreaded, was being terribly fulfilled. new ideas, of which he was the unknown trustee and unacknowledged prophet, triumphed then at our expense. the disaster that carried with it his sincere and revivifying spirit, left in the tomb of our decimated divisions an evidence of the necessity for reform. when our warlike institutions were perishing from the lack of thought, he represented in all its greatness the true type of military thinker. the virile thought of a military thinker alone brings forth successes and maintains victorious nations. fatal indolence brought about the invasion, the loss of two provinces, the bog of moral miseries and social evils which beset vanquished states. the heart and brain of ardant du picq guarded faithfully a worthy but discredited cult. too frequently in the course of our history virtues are forsaken during long periods, when it seems that the entire race is hopelessly abased. the mass perceives too late in rare individuals certain wasted talents--treasures of sagacity, spiritual vigor, heroic and almost supernatural comprehension. such men are prodigious exceptions in times of material decadence and mental laxness. they inherit all the qualities that have long since ceased to be current. they serve as examples and rallying points for other generations, more clear-sighted and less degenerate. on reading over the extraordinary work of ardant du picq, that brilliant star in the eclipse of our military faculties, i think of the fatal shot that carried him off before full use had been found for him, and i am struck by melancholy. our fall appears more poignant. his premature end seems a punishment for his contemporaries, a bitter but just reproach. fortunately, more honored and believed in by his successors, his once unappreciated teaching contributes largely to the uplift and to the education of our officers. they will be inspired by his original views and the permanent virtue contained therein. they will learn therefrom the art of leading and training our young soldiers and can hope to retrieve the cruel losses of their predecessors. ardant du picq amazes one by his tenacity and will power which, without the least support from the outside, animate him under the trying conditions of his period of isolated effort. in an army in which most of the seniors disdained the future and neglected their responsibilities, rested satisfied on the laurels of former campaigns and relied on superannuated theories and the exercises of a poor parade, scorned foreign organizations and believed in an acquired and constant superiority that dispenses with all work, and did not suspect even the radical transformations which the development of rifles and rapid-fire artillery entail; ardant du picq worked for the common good. in his modest retreat, far from the pinnacles of glory, he tended a solitary shrine of unceasing activity and noble effort. he burned with the passions which ought to have moved the staff and higher commanders. he watched while his contemporaries slept. toward the existing system of instruction and preparation which the first blow shattered, his incorruptible honesty prevented him from being indulgent. while terrified leaders passed from arrogance or thoughtlessness to dejection and confusion, the blow was being struck. served by his marvelous historical gifts, he studied the laws of ancient combat in the poorly interpreted but innumerable documents of the past. then, guided by the immortal light which never failed, the feverish curiosity of this soldier's mind turned towards the research of the laws of modern combat, the subject of his preference. in this study he developed to perfection his psychological attainments. by the use of these attainments he simplified the theory of the conduct of war. by dissecting the motor nerves of the human heart, he released basic data on the essential principles of combat. he discovered the secret of combat, the way to victory. never for a second did ardant du picq forget that combat is the object, the cause of being, the supreme manifestation of armies. every measure which departs therefrom, which relegates it to the middle ground is deceitful, chimerical, fatal. all the resources accumulated in time of peace, all the tactical evolutions, all the strategical calculations are but conveniences, drills, reference marks to lead up to it. his obsession was so overpowering that his presentation of it will last as long as history. this obsession is the rôle of man in combat. man is the incomparable instrument whose elements, character, energies, sentiments, fears, desires, and instincts are stronger than all abstract rules, than all bookish theories. war is still more of an art than a science. the inspirations which reveal and mark the great strategists, the leaders of men, form the unforeseen element, the divine part. generals of genius draw from the human heart ability to execute a surprising variety of movements which vary the routine; the mediocre ones, who have no eyes to read readily therein, are doomed to the worst errors. ardant du picq, haunted by the need of a doctrine which would correct existing evils and disorders, was continually returning to the fountain-head. anxious to instruct promising officers, to temper them by irrefutable lessons, to mature them more rapidly, to inspire them with his zeal for historical incidents, he resolved to carry on and add to his personal studies while aiding them. daring to take a courageous offensive against the general inertia of the period, he translated the problem of his whole life into a series of basic questions. he presented in their most diverse aspects, the basic questions which perplex all military men, those of which knowledge in a varying degree of perfection distinguish and classify military men. the nervous grasp of an incomparable style models each of them, carves them with a certain harshness, communicates to them a fascinating yet unknown authority which crystallizes them in the mind, at the same time giving to them a positive form that remains true for all armies, for all past, present and future centuries. herewith is the text of the concise and pressing questions which have not ceased to be as important to-day ( ) as they were in : "_general_, "in the last century, after the improvements of the rifle and field artillery by frederick, and the prussian successes in war--to-day, after the improvement of the new rifle and cannon to which in part the recent victories are due--we find all thinking men in the army asking themselves the question: 'how shall we fight to-morrow?' we have no creed on the subject of combat. and the most opposing methods confuse the intelligence of military men. "why? a common error at the starting point. one might say that no one is willing to acknowledge that it is necessary to understand yesterday in order to know to-morrow, for the things of yesterday are nowhere plainly written. the lessons of yesterday exist solely in the memory of those who know how to remember because they have known how to see, and those individuals have never spoken. i make an appeal to one of those. "the smallest detail, taken from an actual incident in war, is more instructive for me, a soldier, than all the thiers and jominis in the world. they speak, no doubt, for the heads of states and armies but they never show me what i wish to know--a battalion, a company, a squad, in action. "concerning a regiment, a battalion, a company, a squad, it is interesting to know: the disposition taken to meet the enemy or the order for the march toward them. what becomes of this disposition or this march order under the isolated or combined influences of accidents of the terrain and the approach of danger? "is this order changed or is it continued in force when approaching the enemy? "what becomes of it upon arriving within the range of the guns, within the range of bullets? "at what distance is a voluntary or an ordered disposition taken before starting operations for commencing fire, for charging, or both? "how did the fight start? how about the firing? how did the men adapt themselves? (this may be learned from the results: so many bullets fired, so many men shot down--when such data are available.) how was the charge made? at what distance did the enemy flee before it? at what distance did the charge fall back before the fire or the good order and good dispositions of the enemy, or before such and such a movement of the enemy? what did it cost? what can be said about all these with reference to the enemy? "the behavior, i.e., the order, the disorder, the shouts, the silence, the confusion, the calmness of the officers and men whether with us or with the enemy, before, during, and after the combat? "how has the soldier been controlled and directed during the action? at what instant has he had a tendency to quit the line in order to remain behind or to rush ahead? "at what moment, if the control were escaping from the leader's hands, has it no longer been possible to exercise it? "at what instant has this control escaped from the battalion commander? when from the captain, the section leader, the squad leader? at what time, in short, if such a thing did take place, was there but a disordered impulse, whether to the front or to the rear carrying along pell-mell with it both the leaders and men? "where and when did the halt take place? "where and when were the leaders able to resume control of the men? "at what moments before, during, or after the day, was the battalion roll-call, the company roll-call made? the results of these roll-calls? "how many dead, how many wounded on the one side and on the other; the kind of wounds of the officers, non-commissioned officers, corporals, privates, etc., etc.? "all these details, in a word, enlighten either the material or the moral side of the action, or enable it to be visualized. possibly, a closer examination might show that they are matters infinitely more instructive to us as soldiers than all the discussions imaginable on the plans and general conduct of the campaigns of the greatest captain in the great movements of the battle field. from colonel to private we are soldiers, not generals, and it is therefore our trade that we desire to know. "certainly one cannot obtain all the details of the same incident. but from a series of true accounts there should emanate an ensemble of characteristic details which in themselves are very apt to show in a striking, irrefutable way what was necessarily and forcibly taking place at such and such a moment of an action in war. take the estimate of the soldier obtained in this manner to serve as a base for what might possibly be a rational method of fighting. it will put us on guard against _a priori_ and pedantic school methods. "whoever has seen, turns to a method based on his knowledge, his personal experience as a soldier. but experience is long and life is short. the experiences of each cannot therefore be completed except by those of others. "and that is why, general, i venture to address myself to you for your experiences. "proofs have weight. "as for the rest, whether it please you to aid or not, general, kindly accept the assurance of most respectful devotion from your obedient servant." * * * * * the reading of this unique document is sufficient to explain the glory that ardant du picq deserved. in no other career has a professional ever reflected more clearly the means of pushing his profession to perfection; in no profession has a deeper penetration of the resources been made. it pleases me particularly to associate the two words 'penseur' and 'militaire,' which, at the present time, the ignorance of preconceived opinion too frequently separates. because such opinion is on the verge of believing them to be incompatible and contradictory. yet no calling other than the true military profession is so fitted to excite brain activity. it is preëminently the calling of action, at the same time diverse in its combinations and changing according to the time and locality wherein it is put to practice. no other profession is more complex nor more difficult, since it has for its aim and reason the instruction of men to overcome by training and endurance the fatigue and perils against which the voice of self-preservation is raised in fear; in other words, to draw from nature what is most opposed and most antipathic to this nature. there is, however, much of routine in the customs of military life, and, abuse of it may bring about gross satires which in turn bring it into derision. to be sure, the career has two phases because it must fulfill simultaneously two exigencies. from this persons of moderate capacity draw back and are horrified. they solve the question by the sacrifice of the one or the other. if one considers only the lower and somewhat vulgar aspect of military life it is found to be composed of monotonous obligations clothed in a mechanical procedure of indispensable repetition. if one learns to grasp it in its ensemble and large perspective, it will be found that the days of extreme trial demand prodigies of vigor, spirit, intelligence, and decision! regarded from this angle and supported in this light, the commonplace things of wearisome garrison life have as counterweights certain sublime compensations. these compensations preclude the false and contemptible results which come from intellectual idleness and the habit of absolute submission. if it yields to their narcotic charms, the best brain grows rusty and atrophies in the long run. incapable of virile labor, it rebels at a renewal of its processes in sane initiative. an army in which vigilance is not perpetual is sick until the enemy demonstrates it to be dead. far, then, from attaching routine as an indispensable companion to military discipline it must be shown continually that in it lies destruction and loss. military discipline does not degenerate except when it has not known the cult of its vitality and the secret of its grandeur. the teachers of war have all placed this truth as a preface to their triumphs and we find the most illustrious teachers to be the most severe. listen to this critique of frederick the great on the maneuvers which he conducted in silesia: "the great mistake in inspections is that you officers amuse yourselves with god knows what buffooneries and never dream in the least of serious service. this is a source of stupidity which would become most dangerous in case of a serious conflict. take shoe-makers and tailors and make generals of them and they will not commit worse follies! these blunders are made on a small as well as on a large scale. consequently, in the greatest number of regiments, the private is not well trained; in zaramba's regiment he is the worst; in thadden's he amounts to nothing; and to no more in keller's, erlach's, and haager's. why? because the officers are lazy and try to get out of a difficulty by giving themselves the least trouble possible." * * * * * in default of exceptional generals who remold in some campaigns, with a superb stroke, the damaged or untempered military metal, it is of importance to supply it with the ideals of ardant du picq. those who are formed by his image, by his book, will never fall into error. his book has not been written to please aesthetic preciseness, but with a sincerity which knows no limit. it therefore contains irrefutable facts and theories. the solidity of these fragmentary pages defies time; the work interrupted by the german shell is none the less erected for eternity. the work has muscles, nerves and a soul. it has the transparent concentration of reality. a thought may be expressed by a single word. the terseness of the calcined phrase explains the interior fire of it all, the magnificent conviction of the author. the distinctness of outline, the most astounding brevity of touch, is such that the vision of the future bursts forth from the resurrection of the past. the work contains, indeed, substance and marrow of a prophetic experience. amidst the praise rendered to the scintillating beauties of this book, there is perhaps, none more impressive than that of barbey d'aurevilly, an illustrious literary man of a long and generous patrician lineage. his comment, kindled with lyric enthusiasm, is illuminating. it far surpasses the usual narrow conception of technical subjects. confessing his professional ignorance in matters of war, his sincere eulogy of the eloquent amateur is therefore only the more irresistible. "never," writes barbey d'aurevilly, "has a man of action--of brutal action in the eyes of universal prejudice--more magnificently glorified the spirituality of war. mechanics--abominable mechanics--takes possession of the world, crushing it under its stupid and irresistible wheels. by the action of newly discovered and improved appliances the science of war assumes vast proportions as a means of destruction. yet here, amid the din of this upset modern world we find a brain sufficiently master of its own thoughts as not to permit itself to be dominated by these horrible discoveries which, we are told, would make impossible fredericks of prussia and napoleons and lower them to the level of the private soldier! colonel ardant du picq tells us somewhere that he has never had entire faith in the huge battalions which these two great men, themselves alone worth more than the largest battalions, believed in. well, to-day, this vigorous brain believes no more in the mechanical or mathematical force which is going to abolish these great battalions. a calculator without the least emotion, who considers the mind of man the essential in war--because it is this mind that makes war--he surely sees better than anybody else a profound change in the exterior conditions of war which he must consider. but the spiritual conditions which are produced in war have not changed. such, is the eternal mind of man raised to its highest power by discipline. such, is the roman cement of this discipline that makes of men indestructible walls. such, is the cohesion, the solidarity between men and their leaders. such, is the moral influence of the impulse which gives the certainty of victory. "'to conquer is to advance,' de maistre said one day, puzzled at this phenomenon of victory. the author of "etudes sur le combat" says more simply: 'to conquer is to be sure to overcome.' in fine, it is the mind that wins battles, that will always win them, that always has won them throughout the world's history. the spirituality, the moral quality of war, has not changed since those times. mechanics, modern arms, all the artillery invented by man and his science, will not make an end to this thing, so lightly considered at the moment and called the human soul. books like that of ardant du picq prevent it from being disdained. if no other effect should be produced by this sublime book, this one thing would justify it. but there will be others--do not doubt it--i wish merely to point out the sublimity of this didactic book which, for me, has wings like celestial poetry and which has carried me above and far away from the materialistic abjectness of my time. the technique of tactics and the science of war are beyond my province. i am not, like the author, erudite on maneuvers and the battle field. but despite my ignorance of things exclusively military, i have felt the truth of the imperious demonstrations with which it is replete, as one feels the presence of the sun behind a cloud. his book has over the reader that moral ascendancy which is everything in war and which determines success, according to the author. this ascendancy, like truth itself, is the sort which cannot be questioned. coming from the superior mind of a leader who inspires faith it imposes obedience by its very strength. colonel ardant du picq was a military writer only, with a style of his own. he has the latin brevity and concentration. he retains his thought, assembles it and always puts it out in a compact phrase like a cartridge. his style has the rapidity and precision of the long-range arms which have dethroned the bayonet. he would have been a writer anywhere. he was a writer by nature. he was of that sacred phalanx of those who have a style all to themselves." barbey d'aurevilly rebels against tedious technicalities. carried away by the author's historical and philosophical faculties, he soars without difficulty to the plane of ardant du picq. in like manner, du picq ranges easily from the most mediocre military operations to the analysis of the great functions of policy of government and the evolution of nations. who could have unraveled with greater finesse the causes of the insatiable desires of conquest by the new power which was so desirous of occupying the leading rôle on the world's stage? if our diplomats, our ministers and our generals had seized the warning of , the date of the defeat of austria, it is possible that we might have been spared our own defeats. "has an aristocracy any excuse for existing if it is not military? no. the prussian aristocracy is essentially military. in its ranks it does accept officers of plebeian extraction, but only under condition that they permit themselves to be absorbed therein. "is not an aristocracy essentially proud? if it were not proud it would lack confidence. the prussian aristocracy is, therefore, haughty; it desires domination by force and its desire to rule, to dominate more and more, is the essence of its existence. it rules by war; it wishes war; it must have war at the proper time. its leaders have the good judgment to choose the right moment. this love of war is in the very fiber, the very makeup of its life as an aristocracy. "every nation that has an aristocracy, a military nobility, is organized in a military way. the prussian officer is an accomplished gentleman and nobleman; by instruction or examination he is most capable; by education, most worthy. he is an officer and commands from two motives, the french officer from one alone. "prussia, in spite of all the veils concealing reality, is a military organization conducted by a military corporation. a nation, democratically constituted, is not organized from a military point of view. it is, therefore, as against the other, in a state of unpreparedness for war. "a military nation and a warlike nation are not necessarily the same. the french are warlike from organization and instinct. they are every day becoming less and less military. "in being the neighbor of a military nation, there is no security for a democratic nation; the two are born enemies; the one continually menaces the good influences, if not the very existence of the other. as long as prussia is not democratic she is a menace to us. "the future seems to belong to democracy, but, before this future is attained by europe, who will say that victory and domination will not belong for a time to military organization? it will presently perish for the lack of sustenance of life, when having no more foreign enemies to vanquish, to watch, to fight for control, it will have no reason for existence." in tracing a portrait so much resembling bellicose and conquering prussia, the sharp eye of ardant du picq had recognized clearly the danger which immediately threatened us and which his deluded and trifling fellow citizens did not even suspect. the morning after sadowa, not a single statesman or publicist had yet divined what the colonel of the th regiment of the line had, at first sight, understood. written before the catastrophes of froeschwiller, metz and sedan, the fragment seems, in a retrospective way, an implacable accusation against those who deceived themselves about the hohenzollern country by false liberalism or a softening of the brain. unswerved by popular ideas, by the artificial, by the trifles of treaties, by the chimera of theories, by the charlatanism of bulletins, by the nonsense of romantic fiction, by the sentimentalities of vain chivalry, ardant du picq, triumphant in history, is even more the incomparable master in the field of his laborious days and nights, the field of war itself. never has a clearer vision fathomed the bloody mysteries of the formidable test of war. here man appears as his naked self. he is a poor thing when he succumbs to unworthy deeds and panics. he is great under the impulse of voluntary sacrifice which transforms him under fire and for honor or the salvation of others makes him face death. the sound and complete discussions of ardant du picq take up, in a poignant way, the setting of every military drama. they envelop in a circle of invariable phenomena the apparent irregularity of combat, determining the critical point in the outcome of the battle. whatever be the conditions, time or people, he gives a code of rules which will not perish. with the enthusiasm of pascal, who should have been a soldier, ardant du picq has the preëminent gift of expressing the infinite in magic words. he unceasingly opens an abyss under the feet of the reader. the whole metaphysics of war is contained therein and is grasped at a single glance. he shows, weighed in the scales of an amazing exactitude, the normal efficiency of an army; a multitude of beings shaken by the most contradictory passions, first desiring to save their own skins and yet resigned to any risk for the sake of a principle. he shows the quantity and quality of possible efforts, the aggregate of losses, the effects of training and impulse, the intrinsic value of the troops engaged. this value is the sum of all that the leader can extract from any and every combination of physical preparation, confidence, fear of punishment, emulation, enthusiasm, inclination, the promise of success, administration of camps, fire discipline, the influence of ability and superiority, etc. he shows the tragic depths, so somber below, so luminous above, which appear in the heart of the combatant torn between fear and duty. in the private soldier the sense of duty may spring from blind obedience; in the non-commissioned officer, responsible for his detachment, from devotion to his trade; in the commanding officer, from supreme responsibility! it is in battle that a military organization justifies its existence. money spent by the billions, men trained by the millions, are gambled on one irrevocable moment. organization decides the terrible contest which means the triumph or the downfall of the nation! the harsh rays of glory beam above the field of carnage, destroying the vanquished without scorching the victor. such are the basic elements of strategy and tactics! there is danger in theoretical speculation of battle, in prejudice, in false reasoning, in pride, in braggadocio. there is one safe resource, the return to nature. the strategy that moves in elevated spheres is in danger of being lost in the clouds. it becomes ridiculous as soon as it ceases to conform to actual working tactics. in his classical work on the decisive battle of august , , captain fritz hoenig has reached a sound conclusion. after his biting criticism of the many gross errors of steinmetz and zastrow, after his description of the triple panic of the german troops opposite the french left in the valley and the ravine of the mance, he ends by a reflection which serves as a striking ending to the book. he says, "the grandest illustration of moltke's strategy was the battle of gravelotte-saint privat; but the battle of gravelotte has taught us one thing, and that is, the best strategy cannot produce good results if tactics is at fault." the right kind of tactics is not improvised. it asserts itself in the presence of the enemy but it is learned before meeting the enemy. "there are men," says ardant du picq, "such as marshal bugeaud, who are born military in character, mind, intelligence and temperament. not all leaders are of this stamp. there is, then, need for standard or regulation tactics appropriate to the national character which should be the guide for the ordinary commander and which do not exact of him the exceptional qualities of a bugeaud." "tactics is an art based on the knowledge of how to make men fight with their maximum energy against fear, a maximum which organization alone can give." "and here confidence appears. it is not the enthusiastic and thoughtless confidence of tumultuous or improvised armies that gives way on the approach of danger to a contrary sentiment which sees treason everywhere; but the intimate, firm, conscious confidence which alone makes true soldiers and does not disappear at the moment of action." "we now have an army. it is not difficult for us to see that people animated by passions, even people who know how to die without flinching, strong in the face of death, but without discipline and solid organization, are conquered by others who are individually less valiant but firmly organized, all together and one for all." "solidarity and confidence cannot be improvised. they can be born only of mutual acquaintanceship which establishes pride and makes unity. and, from unity comes in turn the feeling of force, that force which gives to the attack the courage and confidence of victory. courage, that is to say, the domination of the will over instinct even in the greatest danger, leads finally to victory or defeat." in asking for a doctrine in combat and in seeking to base it on the moral element, ardant du picq was ahead of his generation. he has had a very great influence. but, the doctrine is not yet established. how to approach the adversary? how to pass from the defensive to the offensive? how to regulate the shock? how to give orders that can be executed? how to transmit them surely? how to execute them by economizing precious lives? such are the distressing problems that beset generals and others in authority. the result is that presidents, kings and emperors hesitate, tremble, interrogate, pile reports upon reports, maneuvers upon maneuvers, retard the improvement of their military material, their organization, their equipment. the only leaders who are equal to the difficulties of future war, come to conclusions expressed in almost the same terms. recently general de negrier, after having insisted that physical exhaustion determined by the nervous tension of the soldier, increased in surprising proportions according to the invisibility of the adversary, expressed himself as follows: "the tide of battle is in the hands of each fighter, and never, at any time, has the individual bravery of the soldier had more importance. "whatever the science of the superior commander, the genius of his strategic combinations, the precision of his concentrations, whatever numerical superiority he may have, victory will escape him if the soldier does not conduct himself without being watched, and if he is not personally animated by the resolution to conquer or to perish. he needs much greater energy than formerly. "he no longer has the intoxication of ancient attacks in mass to sustain him. formerly, the terrible anxiety of waiting made him wish for the violent blow, dangerous, but soon passed. now, all his normal and physical powers are tried for long hours and, in such a test, he will have but the resoluteness of his own heart to sustain him. "armies of to-day gain decisions by action in open order, where each soldier must act individually with will and initiative to attack the enemy and destroy him. "the frenchman has always been an excellent rifleman, intelligent, adroit and bold. he is naturally brave. the metal is good; the problem is to temper it. it must be recognized that to-day this task is not easy. the desire for physical comfort, the international theories which come therefrom, preferring economic slavery and work for the profit of the stranger to the struggle, do not incite the frenchman to give his life in order to save that of his brother. "the new arms are almost valueless in the hands of weakhearted soldiers, no matter what their number may be. on the contrary, the demoralizing power of rapid and smokeless firing, which certain armies still persist in not acknowledging, manifests itself with so much the more force as each soldier possesses greater valor and cool energy. "it is then essential to work for the development of the moral forces of the nation. they alone will sustain the soldier in the distressing test of battle where death comes unseen. "that is the most important of the lessons of the south african war. small nations will find therein the proof that, in preparing their youth for their duties as soldiers and creating in the hearts of all the wish for sacrifice, they are certain to live free; but only at this price." this profession of faith contradicts the imbecile sophisms foolishly put into circulation by high authority and a thoughtless press, on the efficiency of the mass, which is nothing but numbers, on the fantastic value of new arms, which are declared sufficient for gaining a victory by simple mechanical perfection, on the suppression of individual courage. it is almost as though courage had become a superfluous and embarrassing factor. nothing is more likely to poison the army. ardant du picq is the best specific against the heresies and the follies of ignorance or of pedantry. here are some phrases of unerring truth. they ought to be impressed upon all memories, inscribed upon the walls of our military schools. they ought to be learned as lessons by our officers and they ought to rule them as regulations and pass into their blood: "man is capable of but a given quantity of fear. to-day one must swallow in five minutes the dose that one took in an hour in turenne's day." "to-day there is greater need than ever for rigid formation." "who can say that he never felt fear in battle? and with modern appliances, with their terrible effect on the nervous system, discipline is all the more necessary because one fights only in open formation." "combat exacts a moral cohesion, a solidarity more compact that ever before." "since the invention of fire arms, the musket, rifle, cannon, the distances of mutual aid and support are increased between the various arms. the more men think themselves isolated, the more need they have of high morale." "we are brought by dispersion to the need of a cohesion greater than ever before." "it is a truth, so clear as to be almost naïve, that if one does not wish bonds broken, he should make them elastic and thereby strengthen them." "it is not wise to lead eighty thousand men upon the battle field, of whom but fifty thousand will fight. it would be better to have fifty thousand all of whom would fight. these fifty thousand would have their hearts in the work more than the others, who should have confidence in their comrades but cannot when one-third of them shirk their work." "the rôle of the skirmisher becomes more and more predominant. it is more necessary to watch over and direct him as he is used against deadlier weapons and as he is consequently more prone to try to escape from them at all costs in any direction." "the thing is then to find a method that partially regulates the action of our soldiers who advance by fleeing or escape by advancing, as you like, and if something unexpected surprises them, escape as quickly by falling back." "esprit de corps improves with experience in wars. war becomes shorter and shorter, and more and more violent; therefore, create in advance an esprit de corps." these truths are eternal. this whole volume is but their masterful development. they prove that together with audacious sincerity in the coördination of facts and an infallible judgment, ardant du picq possessed prescience in the highest degree. his prophetic eye distinguished sixty years ago the constituent principles of a good army. these are the principles which lead to victory. they are radically opposed to those which enchant our parliamentarians or military politicians, which are based on a fatal favoritism and which precipitate wars. ardant du picq is not alone a superior doctrinaire. he will be consulted with profit in practical warlike organization. no one has better depicted the character of modern armies. no one knew better the value of what clausewitz called, "the product of armed force and the country's force ... the heart and soul of a nation." no more let us forget that he launched, before the famous prediction of von der goltz, this optimistic view well calculated to rekindle the zeal of generals who struggle under the weight of enormous tasks incident to obligatory service. "extremes meet in many things. in the ancient times of conflict with pike and sword, armies were seen to conquer other solid armies even though one against two. who knows if the perfection of long-range arms might not bring back these heroic victories? who knows whether a smaller number by some combination of good sense or genius, or morale, and of appliances will not overcome a greater number equally well armed?" after the abandonment of the law of , and the repeal of the law of , and before the introduction of numerous and disquieting reforms in recruitment and consequently, in the education of our regiments, would it not be opportune to study ardant du picq and look for the secret of force in his ideas rather than in the deceptive illusions of military automatism and materialism? the martial mission of france is no more ended than war itself. the severities of war may be deplored, but the precarious justice of arbitration tribunals, still weak and divested of sanction, has not done away with its intervention in earthly quarrels. i do not suppose that my country is willing to submit to the mean estate, scourged with superb contempt by donoso cortes, who says:-- "when a nation shows a civilized horror of war, it receives directly the punishment of its mistake. god changes its sex, despoils it of its common mark of virility, changes it into a feminine nation and sends conquerors to ravish it of its honor." france submits sometimes to the yoke of subtle dialecticians who preach total disarmament, who spread insanely disastrous doctrine of capitulation, glorify disgrace and humiliation, and stupidly drive us on to suicide. the manly counsels of ardant du picq are admirable lessons for a nation awakening. since she must, sooner or later, take up her idle sword again, may france learn from him to fight well, for herself and for humanity! ernest judet. paris, october , . * * * * * ardant du picq has said little about himself in his writings. he veils with care his personality. his life and career, little known, are the more worthy of the reader's interest, because the man is as original as the writer. to satisfy a natural curiosity, i asked the colonel's family for the details of his life, enshrined in their memory. his brother has kindly furnished them in a letter to me. it contains many unpublished details and shows traits of character which confirm our estimate of the man, ardant du picq. it completes very happily the impression made by his book. "paris, october , . "_sir,_ "herewith are some random biographical notes on the author of 'etudes sur le combat' which you requested of me. "my brother entered saint-cyr quite late, at twenty-one years, which was i believe the age limit at that time. this was not his initial preference. he had a marked preference for a naval career, in which adventure seemed to offer an opportunity for his activity, and which he would have entered if the circumstances had so permitted. his childhood was turbulent and somewhat intractable; but, attaining adolescence, he retained from his former violence a very pronounced taste for physical exercise, especially for gymnastics, little practiced then, to which he was naturally inclined by his agility and muscular strength. "he was successful in his classes, very much so in studies which were to his taste, principally french composition. in this he rose above the usual level of schoolboy exercises when the subject interested him. certain other branches that were uninteresting or distasteful to him, as for instance latin grammar, he neglected. i do not remember ever having seen him attend a distribution of prizes, although he was highly interested, perhaps because he was too interested. on these occasions, he would disappear generally after breakfast and not be seen until evening. his bent was toward mechanical notions and handiwork. he was not uninterested in mathematics but his interest in this was ordinary. he was nearly refused entrance to saint-cyr. he became confused before the examiners and the results of the first part of the tests were almost negligible. he consoled himself with his favorite maxim as a young man: 'onward philosophy.' considering the first test as over and done with, he faced the second test with perfect indifference. this attitude gave him another opportunity and he came out with honors. as he had done well with the written test on 'hannibal's campaigns,' he was given a passing grade. "at school he was liked by all his comrades for his good humor and frank and sympathetic character. later, in the regiment, he gained naturally and without effort the affection of his equals and the respect of his subordinates. the latter were grateful to him for the real, cordial and inspiring interest he showed in their welfare, for he was familiar with the details of the service and with the soldier's equipment. he would not compromise on such matters and prevaricators who had to do with him did not emerge creditably. "it can be said that after reaching manhood he never lied. the absolute frankness from which he never departed under any circumstances gave him prestige superior to his rank. a mere lieutenant, he voted 'no' to the coup d'etat of december , and was admonished by his colonel who was sorry to see him compromise thus his future. he replied with his usual rectitude: 'colonel, since my opinion was asked for, i must suppose that it was wanted.' "on the eve of the crimean war, his regiment, ( th) not seeming destined to take the field, he asked for and obtained a transfer to the light infantry ( th battalion). it was with this battalion that he served in the campaign. when it commenced, he made his first appearance in the fatal dobrutscha expedition. this was undertaken in a most unhealthy region, on the chance of finding there cossacks who would have furnished matter for a communiqué. no cossacks were found, but the cholera was. it cut down in a few hours, so as to speak, a large portion of the total strength. my brother, left with the rear guard to bury the dead, burn their effects and bring up the sick, was in his turn infected. the attack was very violent and he recovered only because he would not give in to the illness. evacuated to the varna hospital, he was driven out the first night by the burning of the town and was obliged to take refuge in the surrounding fields where the healthfulness of the air gave him unexpected relief. returned to france as a convalescent, he remained there until the month of december ( ). he then rejoined his regiment and withstood to the end the rigors of the winter and the slowness of the siege. "salle's division to which the trochu brigade belonged, and in which my brother served, was charged with the attack on the central bastion. this operation was considered a simple diversion without a chance of success. my brother, commanding the storming column of his battalion, had the good fortune to come out safe and sound from the deadly fire to which he was exposed and which deprived the battalion of several good officers. he entered the bastion with a dozen men. all were naturally made prisoners after a resistance which would have cost my brother his life if the bugler at his side had not warded off a saber blow at his head. upon his return from captivity, in the first months of , he was immediately made major in the th regiment of the line, at the instance of general trochu who regarded him highly. he was called the following year to the command of the th battalion of foot chasseurs. he served with this battalion during the syrian campaign where there was but little serious action. "back again in france, his promotion to the grade of lieutenant-colonel, notwithstanding his excellent ratings and his place on the promotion list, was long retarded by the ill-will of marshal randon, the minister of war. marshal randon complained of his independent character and bore him malice from an incident relative to the furnishing of shoes intended for his battalion. my brother, questioned by marshal niel about the quality of the lot of shoes, had frankly declared it bad. "promoted finally to lieutenant-colonel in the th in algeria, he took the field there in two campaigns, i believe. appointed colonel of the th of the line in february, , he was stationed at lorient and at limoges during the eighteen months before the war with germany. he busied himself during this period with the preparation of his work, soliciting from all sides first-hand information. it was slow in coming in, due certainly to indifference rather than ill-will. he made several trips to paris for the purpose of opening the eyes of those in authority to the defective state of the army and the perils of the situation. vain attempts! 'they take all that philosophically,' he used to say. "please accept, sir, with renewed acknowledgements of gratitude, the expression of my most distinguished sentiments. "c. ardant du picq. "p. s. as to the question of atavism in which you showed some interest in our first conversation, i may say that our paternal line does not in my knowledge include any military man. the oldest ancestor i know of, according to an album of engravings by albert dürer, recovered in a garret, was a gold and silversmith at limoges towards the end of the sixteenth century. his descendants have always been traders down to my grandfather who, from what i have heard said, did not in the least attend to his trade. the case is different with my mother's family which came from lorraine. our great-grandfather was a soldier, our grandfather also, and two, at least, of my mother's brothers gave their lives on the battlefields of the first empire. at present, the family has two representatives in the army, the one a son of my brother's, the other a first cousin, once removed, both bearing our name. "c. a. du p." record of military service of colonel ardant du picq ardant du picq (charles-jean-jacques-joseph), was born october , at périgueux (dordogne). entered the service as a student of the special military school, november , . sub-lieutenant in the th regiment of the line, october , . lieutenant, may , . captain, august , . transferred to the th battalion of foot chasseurs, december , . major of the th regiment of the line, february , . transferred to the th battalion of chasseurs, march , . transferred to the th regiment of the line, january , . lieutenant colonel of the th regiment of the line, january , . colonel of the th regiment of infantry of the line, february , . died from wounds at the military hospital in metz, august , . campaigns and wounds orient, march , to may , . was taken prisoner of war at the storming of the central bastion (sebastopol) september , ; returned from enemy's prisons december , . served in the syrian campaign from august , to june , ; in africa from february , to april , ; in franco-german war, from july , to august , . wounded--a comminute fracture of the right thigh, a torn gash in the left thigh, contusion of the abdomen--by the bursting of a projectile, august , , longeville-les-metz (moselle). decorations chevalier of the imperial order of the legion of honor, dec. , . officer of the imperial order of the legion of honor, september , . received the medal of h. m. the queen of england. received the medal for bravery in sardinia. authorized to wear the decoration of the fourth class of the ottoman medjidie order. extract from the history of the th infantry regiment campaign of on the nd of july, the three active battalions of the th regiment of infantry of the line left limoges and angoulême by rail arriving on the rd at the camp at châlons, where the th corps of the rhine army was concentrating and organizing, under the command of marshal canrobert. the regiment, within this army corps, belonged to the st brigade (pechot) of the st division (tixier). the organization on a war footing of the th regiment of infantry of the line, begun at limoges, was completed at the châlons camp. the battalions were brought up to seven hundred and twenty men, and the regiment counted twenty-two hundred and ten present, not including the band, the sappers and the headquarters section, which raised the effectives to twenty-three hundred men. the troops of the th corps were soon organized and marshal canrobert reviewed them on the st of july. on august th, the division received orders to move to nancy. it was placed on nine trains, of which the first left at a. m. arriving in the evening at its destination, the st brigade camped on the leopold racetrack, and the th regiment established itself on the place de la grève. the defeats of forbach and reichshofen soon caused these first plans to be modified. the th corps was ordered to return to the châlons camp. the last troops of the d brigade, held up at toul and commercy, were returned on the same trains. the st brigade entrained at nancy, on the night of august th, arriving at the châlons camp on the afternoon of august th. the th corps, however, was to remain but a few days in camp. on the th it received orders to go to metz. on the morning of the th the regiment was again placed on three successive trains. the first train carrying the staff and the st battalion, arrived at metz without incident. the second train, transporting the d battalion and four companies of the d was stopped at about p.m. near the frouard branch. the telegraph line was cut by a prussian party near dieulouard, for a length of two kilometers, and it was feared the road was damaged. in order not to delay his arrival at metz, nor the progress of the trains following, major morin at the head of the column, directed his commands to detrain and continue to metz. he caused the company at the head of the train to alight ( th company, d battalion, commanded by captain valpajola) and sent it reconnoitering on the road, about three hundred meters in advance of the train. all precautions were taken to assure the security of the train, which regulated its progress on that of the scouts. after a run of about eight kilometers in this way, at marbache station, all danger having disappeared and communication with metz having been established, the train resumed its regulation speed. in consequence of the slowing up of the second column, the third followed at a short distance until it also arrived. on the afternoon of the th, the regiment was entirely united. the division of which it was a part was sent beyond montigny and it camped there as follows: the th chasseurs and th regiment of the line, ahead of the thionville railroad, the right on the moselle, the left on the pont-à-mousson highway; the th regiment of the line, the right supported at the branch of the thionville and nancy lines, the left in the direction of saint-privat, in front of the montigny repair shops of the eastern railroad lines. the regiment was thus placed in the rear of a redoubt under construction. the company of engineers was placed at the left of the th near the earth-works on which it was to work. along the ridge of the plateau, toward the seille, was the d brigade, which rested its left on the river and its right perpendicular to the saint-privat road, in rear of the field-work of this name. the divisional batteries were behind it. the division kept this position august th and during the morning of the th. in the afternoon, an alarm made the division take arms, during the engagement that took place on the side of vallières and saint-julien (battle of borny). the regiment immediately occupied positions on the left of the village of montigny. at nightfall, the division retired to the rear of the railroad cut, and received orders to hold itself in readiness to leave during the night. the regiment remained thus under arms, the d battalion (major deschesnes), passing the night on grand guard in front of the montigny redoubt. before daybreak, the division marched over the bank of the thionville railroad, crossed the moselle, and, marching towards gravelotte, descended into the plain south of longeville-les-metz, where the principal halt was made and coffee prepared. scarcely had stacks been made, and the men set to making fires, about a.m. when shells exploded in the midst of the troops. the shots came from the bradin farm, situated on the heights of montigny, which the division had just left the same morning, and which a german cavalry reconnaissance patrol supported by two pieces had suddenly occupied. the colonel had arms taken at once and disposed the regiment north of the road which, being elevated, provided sufficient cover for defilading the men. he himself, stood in the road to put heart into his troops by his attitude, they having been a little startled by this surprise and the baptism of fire which they received under such disadvantageous circumstances. suddenly, a shell burst over the road, a few feet from the colonel, and mutilated his legs in a frightful manner. the same shell caused other ravages in the ranks of the th. the commander of the d battalion, major deschesnes, was mortally wounded, captain reboulet was killed, lieutenant pone ( d battalion, st company), and eight men of the regiment were wounded. the colonel was immediately taken to the other side of the highway into the midst of his soldiers and a surgeon called, those of the regiment being already engaged in caring for the other victims of the terrible shot. in the meantime, colonel ardant du picq asked for lieut.-colonel doleac, delivered to him his saddlebags containing important papers concerning the regiment and gave him his field glasses. then, without uttering the least sound of pain, notwithstanding the frightful injury from which he must have suffered horribly, he said with calmness: "my regret is to be struck in this way, without having been able to lead my regiment on the enemy." they wanted him to take a little brandy, he refused and accepted some water which a soldier offered him. a surgeon arrived finally. the colonel, showing him his right leg open in two places, made with his hand the sign of amputating at the thigh, saying: "doctor, it is necessary to amputate my leg here." at this moment, a soldier wounded in the shoulder, and placed near the colonel, groaned aloud. forgetting his own condition, the colonel said immediately to the surgeon: "see first, doctor, what is the matter with this brave man; i can wait." because of the lack of instruments it was not possible to perform the amputation on the ground, as the colonel desired, so this much deplored commander was transported to the metz hospital. four days later ( th of august), colonel ardant du picq died like a hero of old, without uttering the least complaint. far from his regiment, far from his family, he uttered several times the words which summed up his affections: "my wife, my children, my regiment, adieu!" part one ancient battle introduction battle is the final objective of armies and man is the fundamental instrument in battle. nothing can wisely be prescribed in an army--its personnel, organization, discipline and tactics, things which are connected like the fingers of a hand--without exact knowledge of the fundamental instrument, man, and his state of mind, his morale, at the instant of combat. it often happens that those who discuss war, taking the weapon for the starting point, assume unhesitatingly that the man called to serve it will always use it as contemplated and ordered by the regulations. but such a being, throwing off his variable nature to become an impassive pawn, an abstract unit in the combinations of battle, is a creature born of the musings of the library, and not a real man. man is flesh and blood; he is body and soul. and, strong as the soul often is, it can not dominate the body to the point where there will not be a revolt of the flesh and mental perturbation in the face of destruction. the human heart, to quote marshal de saxe, is then the starting point in all matters pertaining to war. let us study the heart, not in modern battle, complicated and not readily grasped, but in ancient battle. for, although nowhere explained in detail, ancient battle was simple and clear. centuries have not changed human nature. passions, instincts, among them the most powerful one of self-preservation, may be manifested in various ways according to the time, the place, the character and temperament of the race. thus in our times we can admire, under the same conditions of danger, emotion and anguish, the calmness of the english, the dash of the french, and that inertia of the russians which is called tenacity. but at bottom there is always found the same man. it is this man that we see disposed of by the experts, by the masters, when they organize and discipline, when they order detailed combat methods and take general dispositions for action. the best masters are those who know man best, the man of today and the man of history. this knowledge naturally comes from a study of formations and achievements in ancient war. the development of this work leads us to make such an analysis, and from a study of combat we may learn to know man. let us go even back of ancient battle, to primeval struggle. in progressing from the savage to our times we shall get a better grasp of life. and shall we then know as much as the masters? no more than one is a painter by having seen the methods of painting. but we shall better understand these able men and the great examples they have left behind them. we shall learn from them to distrust mathematics and material dynamics as applied to battle principles. we shall learn to beware of the illusions drawn from the range and the maneuver field. there, experience is with the calm, settled, unfatigued, attentive, obedient soldier, with an intelligent and tractable man-instrument in short, and not with the nervous, easily swayed, moved, troubled, distrait, excited, restless being, not even under self-control, who is the fighting man from general to private. there are strong men, exceptions, but they are rare. these illusions, nevertheless, stubborn and persistent, always repair the very next day the most damaging injuries inflicted on them by experience. their least dangerous effect is to lead to prescribing the impractical, as if ordering the impractical were not really an attack on discipline, and did not result in disconcerting officers and men by the unexpected and by surprise at the contrast between battle and the theories of peacetime training. battle, of course, always furnishes surprises. but it furnishes less in proportion as good sense and the recognition of truth have had their effect on the training of the fighting man, and are disseminated in the ranks. let us then study man in battle, for it is he who really fights. chapter i man in primitive and ancient combat man does not enter battle to fight, but for victory. he does everything that he can to avoid the first and obtain the second. war between savage tribes, between arabs, even today, [ ] is a war of ambush by small groups of men of which each one, at the moment of surprise, chooses, not his adversary, but his victim, and is an assassin. because the arms are similar on both sides, the only way of giving the advantage to one side is by surprise. a man surprised, needs an instant to collect his thoughts and defend himself; during this instant he is killed if he does not run away. the surprised adversary does not defend himself, he tries to flee. face to face or body to body combat with primitive arms, ax or dagger, so terrible among enemies without defensive arms, is very rare. it can take place only between enemies mutually surprised and without a chance of safety for any one except in victory. and still ... in case of mutual surprise, there is another chance of safety; that of falling back, of flight on the part of one or the other; and that chance is often seized. here is an example, and if it does not concern savages at all, but soldiers of our days, the fact is none the less significant. it was observed by a man of warlike temperament who has related what he saw with his own eyes, although he was a forced spectator, held to the spot by a wound. during the crimean war, on a day of heavy fighting, two detachments of soldiers, a and b, coming around one of the mounds of earth that covered the country and meeting unexpectedly face to face, at ten paces, stopped thunderstruck. then, forgetting their rifles, they threw stones and withdrew. neither of the two groups had a decided leader to lead it to the front, and neither of the two dared to shoot first for fear that the other would at the same time bring his own arm to his shoulder. they were too near to hope to escape, or so they thought at least, although in reality, reciprocal firing, at such short ranges, is almost always too high. the man who would fire sees himself already killed by the return fire. he throws stones, and not with great force, to avoid using his rifle, to distract the enemy, to occupy the time, until flight offers him some chance of escaping at point-blank range. this agreeable state of affairs did not last long, a minute perhaps. the appearance of a troop b on one flank determined the flight of a, and then the opposing group fired. surely, the affair is ridiculous and laughable. let us see, however. in a thick forest, a lion and a tiger meet face to face at a turn in the trail. they stop at once, rearing and ready to spring. they measure each other with their eyes, there is a rumbling in their throats. the claws move convulsively, the hair stands up. with tails lashing the ground, and necks stretched, ears flattened, lips turned up, they show their formidable fangs in that terrible threatening grimace of fear characteristic of felines. unseen, i shudder. the situation is disagreeable for both: movement ahead means the death of a beast. of which? of both perhaps. slowly, quite slowly, one leg, bent for the leap, bending still, moves a few inches to the rear. gently, quite gently, a fore paw follows the movement. after a stop, slowly, quite slowly, the other legs do the same, and both beasts, insensibly, little by little, and always facing, withdraw, up to the moment where their mutual withdrawal has created between them an interval greater than can be traversed in a bound. lion and tiger turn their backs slowly and, without ceasing to observe, walk freely. they resume without haste their natural gaits, with that sovereign dignity characteristic of great seigneurs. i have ceased to shudder, but i do not laugh. there is no more to laugh at in man in battle, because he has in his hands a weapon more terrible than the fangs and claws of lion or tiger, the rifle, which instantly, without possible defense, sends one from life into death. it is evident that no one close to his enemy is in a hurry to arm himself, to put into action a force which may kill him. he is not anxious to light the fuse that is to blow up the enemy, and himself at the same time. who has not observed like instances between dogs, between dog and cat, cat and cat? in the polish war of , two russian and two polish regiments of cavalry charged each other. they went with the same dash to meet one another. when close enough to recognize faces, these cavalrymen slackened their gait and both turned their backs. the russians and poles, at this terrible moment, recognized each other as brothers, and rather than spill fraternal blood, they extricated themselves from a combat as if it were a crime. that is the version of an eyewitness and narrator, a polish officer. what do you think of cavalry troops so moved by brotherly love? but let us resume: when people become more numerous, and when the surprise of an entire population occupying a vast space is no longer possible, when a sort of public conscience has been cultivated within society, one is warned beforehand. war is formally declared. surprise is no longer the whole of war, but it remains one of the means in war, the best means, even to-day. man can no longer kill his enemy without defense. he has forewarned him. he must expect to find him standing and in numbers. he must fight; but he wishes to conquer with as little risk as possible. he employs the iron shod mace against the staff, arrows against the mace, the shield against arrows, the shield and cuirass against the shield alone, the long lance against the short lance, the tempered sword against the iron sword, the armed chariot against man on foot, and so on. man taxes his ingenuity to be able to kill without running the risk of being killed. his bravery is born of his strength and it is not absolute. before a stronger he flees without shame. the instinct of self-preservation is so powerful that he does not feel disgraced in obeying it, although, thanks to the defensive power of arms and armor he can fight at close quarters. can you expect him to act in any other way? man must test himself before acknowledging a stronger. but once the stronger is recognized, no one will face him. individual strength and valor were supreme in primitive combats, so much so that when its heroes were killed, the nation was conquered. as a result of a mutual and tacit understanding, combatants often stopped fighting to watch with awe and anxiety two champions struggling. whole peoples often placed their fate in the hands of the champions who took up the task and who alone fought. this was perfectly natural. they counted their champion a superman, and no man can stand against the superman. but intelligence rebels against the dominance of force. no one can stand against an achilles, but no achilles can withstand ten enemies who, uniting their efforts, act in concert. this is the reason for tactics, which prescribe beforehand proper means of organization and action to give unanimity to effort, and for discipline which insures united efforts in spite of the innate weakness of combatants. in the beginning man battled against man, each one for himself, like a beast that hunts to kill, yet flees from that which would kill him. but now prescriptions of discipline and tactics insure unity between leader and soldier, between the men themselves. besides the intellectual progress, is there a moral progress? to secure unity in combat, to make tactical dispositions in order to render it practically possible, we must be able to count on the devotion of all. this elevates all combatants to the level of the champions of primitive combat. esprit appears, flight is a disgrace, for one is no longer alone in combat. there is a legion, and he who gives way quits his commanders and his companions. in all respects the combatant is worth more. so reason shows us the strength of wisely united effort; discipline makes it possible. will the result be terrible fights, conflicts of extermination? no! collective man, a disciplined body of troops formed in tactical battle order, is invincible against an undisciplined body of troops. but against a similarly disciplined body, he becomes again primitive man. he flees before a greater force of destruction when he recognizes it or when he foresees it. nothing is changed in the heart of man. discipline keeps enemies face to face a little longer, but cannot supplant the instinct of self-preservation and the sense of fear that goes with it. fear!... there are officers and soldiers who do not know it, but they are people of rare grit. the mass shudders; because you cannot suppress the flesh. this trembling must be taken into account in all organization, discipline, arrangements, movements, maneuvers, mode of action. all these are affected by the human weakness of the soldier which causes him to magnify the strength of the enemy. this faltering is studied in ancient combat. it is seen that of nations apt in war, the strongest have been those who, not only best have understood the general conduct of war, but who have taken human weakness into greatest account and taken the best guarantees against it. it is notable that the most warlike peoples are not always those in which military institutions and combat methods are the best or the most rational. and indeed, in warlike nations there is a good dose of vanity. they only take into account courage in their tactics. one might say that they do not desire to acknowledge weakness. the gaul, a fool in war, used barbarian tactics. after the first surprise, he was always beaten by the greeks and romans. the greek, a warrior, but also a politician, had tactics far superior to those of the gauls and the asiatics. the roman, a politician above all, with whom war was only a means, wanted perfect means. he had no illusions. he took into account human weakness and he discovered the legion. but this is merely affirming what should be demonstrated. chapter ii knowledge of man made roman tactics. the successes of hannibal, those of caesar greek tactics developed the phalanx; roman tactics, the legion; the tactics of the barbarians employed the square phalanx, wedge or lozenge. the mechanism of these various formations is explained in all elementary books. polybius enters into a mechanical discussion when he contrasts the phalanx and the legion. (book .) the greeks were, in intellectual civilization, superior to the romans, consequently their tactics ought to have been far more rational. but such was not the case. greek tactics proceeded from mathematical reasoning; roman tactics from a profound knowledge of man's heart. naturally the greeks did not neglect morale nor the romans mechanics, [ ] but their primary, considerations were diverse. what formation obtained the maximum effort from the greek army? what methods caused the soldiers of a roman army to fight most effectively? the first question admits of discussion. the roman solved the second. the roman was not essentially brave. he did not produce any warrior of the type of alexander. it is acknowledged that the valorous impetuosity of the barbarians, gauls, cimbri, teutons, made him tremble. but to the glorious courage of the greeks, to the natural bravery of the gauls he opposed a strict sense of duty, secured by a terrible discipline in the masses. it was inspired in the officers by a sentiment of the strongest patriotism. the discipline of the greeks was secured by exercises and rewards; the discipline of the romans was secured also by the fear of death. they put to death with the club; they decimated their cowardly or traitorous units. in order to conquer enemies that terrified his men, a roman general heightened their morale, not by enthusiasm but by anger. he made the life of his soldiers miserable by excessive work and privations. he stretched the force of discipline to the point where, at a critical instant, it must break or expend itself on the enemy. under similar circumstances, a greek general caused tyrtaeus to sing. [ ] it would have been curious to see two such forces opposed. but discipline alone does not constitute superior tactics. man in battle, i repeat, is a being in whom the instinct of self-preservation dominates, at certain moments, all other sentiments. discipline has for its aim the domination of that instinct by a greater terror. but it cannot dominate it completely. i do not deny the glorious examples where discipline and devotion have elevated man above himself. but if these examples are glorious, it is because they are rare; if they are admired, it is because they are considered exceptions, and the exception proves the rule. the determination of that instant where man loses his reasoning power and becomes instinctive is the crowning achievement in the science of combat. in general, here was the strength of the roman tactics. in particular cases such successful determination makes hannibals and caesars. combat took place between masses in more or less deep formation commanded and supervised by leaders with a definite mission. the combat between masses was a series of individual conflicts, juxtaposed, with the front rank man alone fighting. if he fell, if he was wounded or worn out, he was replaced by the man of the second rank who had watched and guarded his flanks. this procedure continued up to the last rank. man is always physically and morally fatigued in a hand-to-hand tournament where he employs all his energy. these contests generally lasted but a short time. with like morale, the least fatigued always won. during this engagement of the first two ranks, the one fighting, the other watching close at hand, the men of the rear ranks waited inactive at two paces distance for their turn in the combat, which would come only when their predecessors were killed, wounded or exhausted. they were impressed by the violent fluctuations of the struggle of the first rank. they heard the clashes of the blows and distinguished, perhaps, those that sank into the flesh. they saw the wounded, the exhausted crawl through the intervals to go to the rear. passive spectators of danger, they were forced to await its terrible approach. these men were subjected to the poignant emotions of combat without being supported by the animation of the struggle. they were thus placed under the moral pressure of the greatest of anxieties. often they could not stand it until their turn came; they gave way. the best tactics, the best dispositions were those that made easiest a succession of efforts by assuring the relief by ranks of units in action, actually engaging only the necessary units and keeping the rest as a support or reserve outside of the immediate sphere of moral tension. the superiority of the romans lay in such tactics and in the terrible discipline which prepared and assured the execution. by their resistance against fatigue which rude and continual tasks gave them and by the renewal of combatants in combat, they secured greater continuity of effort than any others. [ ] the gauls did not reason. seeing only the inflexible line, they bound themselves together, thus rendering relief impracticable. they believed, as did the greeks, in the power of the mass and impulse of deep files, and did not understand that deep files were powerless to push the first ranks forward as they recoiled in the face of death. it is a strange error to believe that the last ranks will go to meet that which made the first ones fall back. on the contrary, the contagion of recoil is so strong that the stopping of the head means the falling back of the rear! the greeks, also, certainly had reserves and supports in the second half of their dense ranks. but the idea of mass dominated. they placed these supports and reserves too near, forgetting the essential, man. the romans believed in the power of mass, but from the moral point of view only. they did not multiply the files in order to add to the mass, but to give to the combatants the confidence of being aided and relieved. the number of ranks was calculated according to the moral pressure that the last ranks could sustain. there is a point beyond which man cannot bear the anxiety of combat in the front lines without being engaged. the romans did not so increase the number of ranks as to bring about this condition. the greeks did not observe and calculate so well. they sometimes brought the number of files up to thirty-two and their last files, which in their minds, were doubtless their reserves, found themselves forcibly dragged into the material disorder of the first ones. in the order by maniples in the roman legion, the best soldiers, those whose courage had been proved by experience in battle, waited stoically, kept in the second and third lines. they were far enough away not to suffer wounds and not to be drawn in by the front line retiring into their intervals. yet they were near enough to give support when necessary or to finish the job by advancing. when the three separate and successive maniples of the first cohort were united in order to form the united battle cohort of marius and of caesar, the same brain placed the most reliable men in the last lines, i.e., the oldest. the youngest, the most impetuous, were in the first lines. the legion was not increased simply to make numbers or mass. each had his turn in action, each man in his maniple, each maniple in its cohort, and, when the unit became a cohort, each cohort in the order of battle. we have seen that the roman theory dictated a depth of ranks to furnish successive lines of combatants. the genius of the general modified these established formations. if the men were inured to war, well-trained, reliable, tenacious, quick to relieve their file leaders, full of confidence in their general and their own comrades, the general diminished the depth of the files, did away with the lines even, in order to increase the number of immediate combatants by increasing the front. his men having a moral, and sometimes also a physical endurance superior to that of the adversary, the general knew that the last ranks of the latter would not, under pressure, hold sufficiently to relieve the first lines nor to forbid the relief of his own. hannibal had a part of his infantry, the africans, armed and drilled in the roman way; his spanish infantrymen had the long wind of the spaniards of to-day; his gallic soldiers, tried out by hardship, were in the same way fit for long efforts. hannibal, strong with the confidence with which he inspired his people, drew up a line less deep by half than the roman army and at cannae hemmed in an army which had twice his number and exterminated it. caesar at pharsalus, for similar reasons, did not hesitate to decrease his depth. he faced double his strength in the army of pompey, a roman army like his own, and crushed it. we have mentioned cannae and pharsalus, we shall study in them the mechanism and the morale of ancient combat, two things which cannot be separated. we cannot find better examples of battle more clearly and more impartially exhibited. this is due in one case to the clear presentation of polybius, who obtained his information from the fugitives from cannae, possibly even from some of the conquerors; in the other it is due to the impassive clearness of caesar in describing the art of war. chapter iii analysis of the battle of cannae recital of polybius: "varro placed the cavalry on the right wing, and rested it on the river; the infantry was deployed near it and on the same line, the maniples drawn close to each other, with smaller intervals than usual, and the maniples presenting more depth than front. "the cavalry of the allies, on the left wing, completed the line, in front of which were posted the light troops. there were in that army, including the allies, eighty thousand foot and a little more than six thousand horse. "meanwhile hannibal had his slingers and light troops cross the aufidus and posted them in front of his army. the rest crossed the river at two places. he placed the iberian and gallic cavalry on the left wing, next the river and facing the roman cavalry. he placed on the same line, one half of the african infantry heavily armed, the iberian and gallic infantry, the other half of the african infantry, and finally the numidian cavalry which formed the right wing. "after he had thus arrayed all his troops upon a single line, he marched to meet the enemy with the iberian and gallic infantry moving independently of the main body. as it was joined in a straight line with the rest, on separating, it was formed like the convex face of a crescent. this formation reduced its depth in the center. the intention of the general was to commence the battle with the iberians and gauls, and have them supported by the africans. "the latter infantry was armed like the roman infantry, having been equipped by hannibal with arms that had been taken from the romans in preceding battle. both iberians and gauls had shields; but their swords were quite different. the sword of the former was as fit for thrusting as for cutting while that of the gauls only cut with the edge, and at a limited distance. these troops were drawn up as follows: the iberians were in two bodies of troops on the wings, near the africans; the gauls in the center. the gauls were nude; the iberians in linen shirts of purple color, which to the romans was an extraordinary and frightening spectacle. the carthaginian army consisted of ten thousand horse and little more than forty thousand foot. "aemilius commanded the right of the romans, varro the left; the two consuls of the past year, servilius and attilius, were in the center. on the carthaginian side, hasdrubal had the left under his orders, hanno the right, and hannibal, who had his brother mago with him, reserved for himself the command of the center. the two armies did not suffer from the glare of the sun when it rose, the one being faced to the south, as i remarked, and the other to the north. "action commenced with the light troops, which were in front of both armies. the first engagement gave advantage to neither the one nor the other. just as soon as the iberian and gallic cavalry on the left approached, the conflict became hot. the romans fought with fury and rather more like barbarians than romans. this falling back and then returning to the charge was not according to their tactics. scarcely did they become engaged when they leaped from their horses and each seized his adversary. in the meanwhile the carthaginians gained the upper hand. the greater number of the romans remained on the ground after having fought with the greatest valor. the others were pursued along the river and cut to pieces without being able to obtain quarter. "the heavily armed infantry immediately took the place of the light troops and became engaged. the iberians and gauls held firm at first and sustained the shock with vigor; but they soon gave way to the weight of the legions, and, opening the crescent, turned their backs and retreated. the romans followed them with impetuosity, and broke the gallic line much more easily because the wings crowded toward the center where the thick of the fighting was. the whole line did not fight at the same time. the action commenced in the center because the gauls, being drawn up in the form of a crescent, left the wings far behind them, and presented the convex face of the crescent to the romans. the latter then followed the gauls and iberians closely, and crowded towards the center, to the place where the enemy gave way, pushing ahead so forcibly that on both flanks they engaged the heavily armed africans. the africans on the right, in swinging about from right to left, found themselves all along the enemy's flank, as well as those on the left which made the swing from left to right. the very circumstances of the action showed them what they had to do. this was what hannibal had foreseen; that the romans pursuing the gauls must be enveloped by the africans. the romans then, no longer able to keep their formation [ ] were forced to defend themselves man to man and in small groups against those who attacked them on front and flank.[ ] "aemilius had escaped the carnage on the right wing at the commencement of the battle. wishing, according to the orders he had given, to be everywhere, and seeing that it was the legionary infantry that would decide the fate of the battle, he pushed his horse through the fray, warded off or killed every one who opposed him, and sought at the same time to reanimate the ardor of the roman soldiers. hannibal, who during the entire battle remained in the conflict, did the same in his army. "the numidian cavalry on the right wing, without doing or suffering much, was useful on that occasion by its manner of fighting; for, pouncing upon the enemy on all sides, they gave him enough to do so that he might not have time to think of helping his own people. indeed, when the left wing, where hasdrubal commanded, had routed almost all the cavalry of the roman right wing, and a junction had been effected with the numidians, the auxiliary cavalry did not wait to be attacked but gave way. "hasdrubal is said to have done something which proved his prudence and his ability, and which contributed to the success of the battle. as the numidians were in great number, and as these troops were never more useful than when one was in flight before them, he gave them the fugitives to pursue, and led the iberian and gallic cavalry in a charge to aid the african infantry. he pounced on the romans from the rear, and having bodies of cavalry charge into the mêlée at several places, he gave new strength to the africans and made the arms drop from the hands of the adversaries. it was then that l. aemilius, a citizen who during his whole life, as in this last conflict, had nobly fulfilled his duties to his country, finally succumbed, covered with mortal wounds. "the romans continued fighting, giving battle to those who were surrounding them. they resisted to the last. but as their numbers diminished more and more, they were finally forced into a smaller circle, and all put to the sword. attilius and servilius, two persons of great probity, who had distinguished themselves in the combat as true romans, were also killed on that occasion. "while this carnage was taking place in the center, the numidians pursued the fugitives of the left wing. most of them were cut down, others were thrown under their horses; some of them escaped to venusia. among these was varro, the roman general, that abominable man whose administration cost his country so dearly. thus ended the battle of cannae, a battle where prodigies of valor were seen on both sides. "of the six thousand horse of which the roman cavalry was composed, only seventy romans reached venusia with varro, and, of the auxiliary cavalry, only three hundred men found shelter in various towns. ten thousand foot were taken prisoners, but they were not in the battle. [ ] of troops in battle only about three thousand saved themselves in the nearby town; the balance, numbering about twenty thousand, died on the field of honor." [ ] hannibal lost in that action in the neighborhood of four thousand gauls, fifteen hundred iberians and africans and two hundred horses. let us analyze: the light infantry troops were scattered in front of the armies and skirmished without result. the real combat commenced with the attack on the legitimate cavalry of the roman left wing by the cavalry of hannibal. there, says polybius, the fight grew thickest, the romans fought with fury and much more like barbarians than like romans; because this falling back, then returning to the charge was not according to their tactics; scarcely did they become engaged when they leaped from their horses and each seized his adversary, etc., etc. this means that the roman cavalry did not habitually fight hand to hand like the infantry. it threw itself in a gallop on the enemy cavalry. when within javelin range, if the enemy's cavalry had not turned in the opposite direction on seeing the roman cavalry coming, the latter prudently slackened its gait, threw some javelins, and, making an about by platoons, took to the rear for the purpose of repeating the charge. the hostile cavalry did the same, and such an operation might be renewed several times, until one of the two, persuaded that his enemy was going to attack him with a dash, turned in flight and was pursued to the limit. that day, the fight becoming hot, they became really engaged; the two cavalry bodies closed and man fought man. the fight was forced, however; as there was no giving way on one side or the other, it was necessary actually to attack. there was no space for skirmishing. closed in by the aufidus and the legions, the roman cavalry could not operate (livy). the iberian and gallic cavalry, likewise shut in and double the roman cavalry, was forced into two lines; it could still less maneuver. this limited front served the romans, inferior in number, who could thus be attacked only in front, that is by an equal number. it rendered, as we have said, contact inevitable. these two cavalry bodies placed chest to chest had to fight close, had to grapple man to man, and for riders mounted on simple saddle cloths and without stirrup, embarrassed with a shield, a lance, a saber or a sword, to grapple man to man is to grapple together, fall together and fight on foot. that is what happened, as the account of titus livius explains it in completing that of polybius. the same thing happened every time that two ancient cavalry organizations really had to fight, as the battle of the tecinus showed. this mode of action was all to the advantage of the romans, who were well-armed and well-trained therein. note the battle of tecinus. the roman light infantry was cut to pieces, but the elite of the roman cavalry, although surprised and surrounded, fought a-foot and on horse back, inflicted more casualties on the cavalry of hannibal than they suffered, and brought back from the field their wounded general. the romans besides were well led by consul aemilius, a man of head and heart, who, instead of fleeing when his cavalry was defeated, went himself to die in the ranks of the infantry. meanwhile we see thirty to thirty-four hundred roman cavalrymen nearly exterminated by six to seven thousand gauls and iberians who did not lose even two hundred men. hannibal's entire cavalry lost but two hundred men on that day. how can that be explained? because most of them died without dreaming of selling their lives and because they took to flight during the fight of the first line and were struck with impunity from behind. the words of polybius: "most of them remained on the spot after having defended themselves with the utmost valor," were consecrated words before polybius. the conquered always console themselves with their bravery and conquerors never contradict. unfortunately, the figures are there. the facts of the battle are found in the account, which sounds no note of desperation. the gallic and roman cavalry had each already made a brave effort by attacking each other from the front. this effort was followed by the terrible anxiety of close combat. the roman cavalrymen, who from behind the combatants on foot were able to see the second gallic line on horse back, gave ground. fear very quickly made the disengaged ranks take to their horses, wheel about like a flock of sheep in a stampede, and abandon their comrades and themselves to the mercy of the conquerors. yet, these horsemen were brave men, the elite of the army, noble knights, guards of the consuls, volunteers of noble families. the roman cavalry defeated, hasdrubal passed his gallic and iberian troopers behind hannibal's army, to attack the allied cavalry till then engaged by the numidians. [ ] the cavalry of the allies did not await the enemy. it turned its back immediately; pursued to the utmost by the numidians who were numerous (three thousand), and excellent in pursuit, it was reduced to some three hundred men, without a struggle. after the skirmishing of the light infantry troops, the foot-soldiers of the line met. polybius has explained to us how the roman infantry let itself be enclosed by the two wings of the carthaginian army and taken in rear by hasdrubal's cavalry. it is also probable that the gauls and iberians, repulsed in the first part of the action and forced to turn their backs, returned, aided by a portion of the light infantry, to the charge upon the apex of the wedge formed by the romans and completed their encirclement. but we know, as will be seen further on in examples taken from caesar, that the ancient cavalryman was powerless against formed infantry, even against the isolated infantryman possessing coolness. the iberian and gallic cavalry ought to have found behind the roman army the reliable triarians penned in, armed, with pikes. [ ] it might have held them in check, forced them to give battle, but done them little or no harm as long as the ranks were preserved. we know that of hannibal's infantry only twelve thousand at the most were equipped with roman weapons. we know that his gallic and iberian infantry, protected by plain shields, had to fall back, turn, and probably lost in this part of the action very nearly the four thousand men, which the battle cost them. let us deduct the ten thousand men that had gone to the attack of hannibal's camp and the five thousand which the latter must have left there. there remain: a mass of seventy thousand men surrounded and slaughtered by twenty-eight thousand foot soldiers, or, counting hasdrubal's cavalry, by thirty-six thousand men, by half their number. it may be asked how seventy thousand men could have let themselves be slaughtered, without defense, by thirty-six thousand men less well-armed, when each combatant had but one man before him. for in close combat, and especially in so large an envelopment, the number of combatants immediately engaged was the same on each side. then there were neither guns nor rifles able to pierce the mass by a converging fire and destroy it by the superiority of this fire over diverging fire. arrows were exhausted in the first period of the action. it seems that, by their mass, the romans must have presented an insurmountable resistance, and that while permitting the enemy to wear himself out against it, that mass had only to defend itself in order to repel assailants. but it was wiped out. in pursuit of the gauls and iberians, who certainly were not able, even with like morale, to stand against the superior arms of the legionaries, the center drove all vigorously before it. the wings, in order to support it and not to lose the intervals, followed its movement by a forward oblique march and formed the sides of the salient. the entire roman army, in wedge order, marched to victory. suddenly the wings were attacked by the african battalions; the gauls, the iberians, [ ] who had been in retreat, returned to the fight. the horsemen of hasdrubal, in the rear, attacked the reserves. [ ] everywhere there was combat, unexpected, unforeseen. at the moment when they believed themselves conquerors, everywhere, in front, to the right, to the left, in the rear, the roman soldiers heard the furious clamor of combat. [ ] the physical pressure was unimportant. the ranks that they were fighting had not half their own depth. the moral pressure was enormous. uneasiness, then terror, took hold of them; the first ranks, fatigued or wounded, wanted to retreat; but the last ranks, frightened, withdrew, gave way and whirled into the interior of the wedge. demoralized and not feeling themselves supported, the ranks engaged followed them, and the routed mass let itself be slaughtered. the weapons fell from their hands, says polybius. the analysis of cannae is ended. before passing to the recital of pharsalus, we cannot resist the temptation, though the matter be a little foreign to the subject, to say a few words about the battles of hannibal. these battles have a particular character of stubbornness explained by the necessity for overcoming the roman tenacity. it may be said that to hannibal victory was not sufficient. he must destroy. consequently he always tried to cut off all retreat for the enemy. he knew that with rome, destruction was the only way of finishing the struggle. he did not believe in the courage of despair in the masses; he believed in terror and he knew the value of surprise in inspiring it. but it was not the losses of the romans that was the most surprising thing in these engagements. it was the losses of hannibal. who, before hannibal or after him, has lost as many as the romans and yet been conqueror? to keep troops in action, until victory comes, with such losses, requires a most powerful hand. he inspired his people with absolute confidence. almost always his center, where he put his gauls, his food for powder, was broken. but that did not seem to disquiet or trouble either him or his men. it is true that his center was pierced by the romans who were escaping the pressure of the two carthaginian wings, that they were in disorder because they had fought and pushed back the gauls, whom hannibal knew how to make fight with singular tenacity. they probably felt as though they had escaped from a press, and, happy to be out of it, they thought only of getting further away from the battle and by no means of returning to the flanks or the rear of the enemy. in addition, although nothing is said about it, hannibal had doubtless taken precautions against their ever returning to the conflict. all that is probably true. the confidence of the gallic troops, so broken through, is none the less surprising. hannibal, in order to inspire his people with such confidence, had to explain to them before the combat his plan of action, in such a way that treachery could not injure him. he must have warned his troops that the center would be pierced, but that he was not worried about it, because it was a foreseen and prepared affair. his troops, indeed, did not seem to be worried about it. let us leave aside his conception of campaigns, his greatest glory in the eyes of all. hannibal was the greatest general of antiquity by reason of his admirable comprehension of the morale of combat, of the morale of the soldier whether his own or the enemy's. he shows his greatness in this respect in all the different incidents of war, of campaign, of action. his men were not better than the roman soldiers. they were not as well armed, one-half less in number. yet he was always the conqueror. he understood the value of morale. he had the absolute confidence of his people. in addition he had the art, in commanding an army, of always securing the advantage of morale. in italy he had, it is true, cavalry superior to that of the romans. but the romans had a much superior infantry. had conditions been reversed, he would have changed his methods. the instruments of battle are valuable only if one knows how to use them, and pompey, we shall see, was beaten at pharsalus precisely because he had a cavalry superior to that of caesar. if hannibal was vanquished at zuma, it was because genius cannot accomplish the impossible. zuma proved again the perfect knowledge of men that hannibal possessed and his influence over the troops. his third line, the only one where he really had reliable soldiers, was the only one that fought. beset on all sides, it slew two thousand romans before it was conquered. we shall see later what a high state of morale, what desperate fighting, this meant. chapter iv analysis of the battle of pharsalus, and some characteristic examples here is caesar's account of the battle of pharsalus. "as caesar approached pompey's camp, he noted that pompey's army was placed in the following order: "on the left wing were the nd and rd legions which caesar had sent to pompey at the commencement of the operation, pursuant to a decree of the senate, and which pompey had kept. scipio occupied the center with the legions from syria. the legion from cilicia was placed on the right wing together with the spanish cohorts of afranius. pompey regarded the troops already mentioned as the most reliable of his army. between them, that is, between the center and the wings, he had distributed the remainder, consisting of one hundred and ten complete cohorts in line. these were made up of forty-five thousand men, two thousand of whom were veterans, previously rewarded for their services, who had come to join him. he had scattered them throughout the whole line of battle. seven cohorts had been left to guard his camp and the neighboring forts. his right wing rested on a stream with inaccessible banks; and, for that reason, he had placed all his seven thousand cavalry, [ ] his archers and his slingers (forty-two hundred men) on the left wing. "caesar, keeping his battle order, [ ] had placed the th legion on the right wing, and on the left, the th, which was much weakened by the combats of dyrrachium. to the latter he added the th in order to form something like a full legion from the two, and ordered them to support one another. he had eighty very completely organized cohorts in line, approximately twenty-two thousand men. two cohorts had been left to guard the camp. caesar had entrusted the command of the left wing to anthony, that of the right to p. sylla, and of the center to c. domitius. he placed himself in front of pompey. but when he saw the disposition of the opposing army, he feared that his right wing was going to be enveloped by pompey's numerous cavalry. he therefore withdrew immediately from his third line a cohort from each legion (six cohorts), in order to form a fourth line, placed it to receive pompey's cavalry and showed it what it had to do. then he explained fully to these cohorts that the success of the day depended on their valor. at the same time he ordered the entire army, and in particular the third line, not to move without his command, reserving to himself authority to give the signal by means of the standard when he thought it opportune. "caesar then went through his lines to exhort his men to do well, and seeing them full of ardor, had the signal given. "between the two armies there was only enough space to give each the necessary distance for the charge. but pompey had given his men orders to await the charge without stirring, and to let caesar's army break its ranks upon them. he did this, they say, on the advice of c. triarius, as a method of meeting the force of the first dash of caesar's men. he hoped that their battle order would be broken up and his own soldiers, well disposed in ranks, would have to fight with sword in hand only men in disorder. he thought that this formation would best protect his troops from the force of the fall of heavy javelins. at the same time he hoped that caesar's soldiers charging at the run would be out of breath and overcome with fatigue at the moment of contact. pompey's immobility was an error because there is in every one an animation, a natural ardor that is instilled by the onset to the combat. generals ought not to check but to encourage this ardor. it was for this reason that, in olden times, troops charged with loud shouts, all trumpets sounding, in order to frighten the enemy and encourage themselves. "in the meanwhile, our soldiers, at the given signal advanced with javelins in hand; but having noticed that pompey's soldiers were not running towards them, and taught by experience and trained by previous battles, they slowed down and stopped in the midst of their run, in order not to arrive out of breath and worn out. some moments after, having taken up their run again, they launched their javelins, and immediately afterwards, according to caesar's order drew their swords. the pompeians conducted themselves perfectly. they received the darts courageously; they did not stir before the dash of the legions; they preserved their lines, and, having dispatched their javelins, drew their swords. "at the same time pompey's entire cavalry dashed from the left wing, as had been ordered, and the mass of his archers ran from all parts of the line. our cavalry did not await the charge, but fell back a little. pompey's cavalry became more pressing, and commenced to reform its squadrons and turn our exposed flank. as soon as caesar saw this intention, he gave the signal to the fourth line of six cohorts. this line started directly and, standards low, they charged the pompeian cavalry with such vigor and resolution that not a single man stood his ground. all wheeled about and not only withdrew in full flight, but gained the highest mountains as fast as they could. they left the archers and slingers without their defense and protection. these were all killed. at the same time the cohorts moved to the rear of pompey's left wing, which was still fighting and resisting, and attacked it in rear. "meanwhile, caesar had advanced his third line, which up to this moment had been kept quietly at its post. these fresh troops relieved those that were fatigued. pompey's men, taken in rear, could no longer hold out and all took to flight. "caesar was not in error when he put these cohorts in a fourth line, particularly charged with meeting the cavalry, and urged them to do well, since their effort would bring victory. they repulsed the cavalry. they cut to pieces the slingers and archers. they turned pompey's left wing, and this decided the day. "when pompey saw his cavalry repulsed and that portion of the army upon which he had counted the most seized with terror, he had little confidence in the rest. he quit the battle and galloped to his camp, where, addressing his centurions who were guarding the praetorian gate, he told them in a loud voice heard by the soldiers: 'guard well the camp and defend it vigorously in case of attack; as for myself, i am going to make the tour of the other gates and assure their defense.' "that said, he retired to the praetorium, despairing of success and awaiting events. "after having forced the enemy to flee to his entrenchments caesar, persuaded that he ought not to give the slightest respite to a terrorized enemy, incited his soldiers to profit by their advantage and attack the camp. although overcome by the heat, for the struggle was prolonged into the middle of the day, they did not object to greater fatigue and obeyed. the camp was at first well defended by the cohorts on watch and especially by the thracians and barbarians. the men who had fled from the battle, full of fright and overcome with fatigue, had nearly all thrown their arms and colors away and thought rather more of saving themselves than of defending the camp. even those who defended the entrenchments were unable long to resist the shower of arrows. covered with wounds, they abandoned the place, and led by their centurions and tribunes, they took refuge as quickly as they could in the high mountains near the camp. "caesar lost in this battle but two hundred soldiers, but nearly thirty of the bravest centurions were killed therein. of pompey's army fifteen thousand perished, and more than twenty-four thousand took refuge in the mountains. as caesar had invested the mountains with entrenchments, they surrendered the following day." such is caesar's account. his action is so clearly shown that there is scarcely any need of comment. initially caesar's formation was in three lines. this was the usual battle order in the roman armies, without being absolute, however, since marius fought with two only. but, as we have said, according to the occasion, the genius of the chief decided the battle formation. there is no reason to suppose that pompey's army was in a different order of battle. to face that army, twice as large as his, caesar, if he had had to preserve the disposition of cohorts in ten ranks, would have been able to form but one complete line, the first, and a second, half as numerous, as a reserve. but he knew the bravery of his troops, and he knew the apparent force of deep ranks to be a delusion. he did not hesitate to diminish his depth in order to keep the formation and morale of three-fifths of his troops intact, until the moment of their engagement. in order to be even more sure of the third line of his reserve, and in order to make sure that it would not be carried away by its enthusiasm for action, he paid it most particular attention. perhaps, the text is doubtful, he kept it at double the usual distance in rear of the fighting lines. then, to guard against a turning movement by pompey's seven thousand cavalry and forty-two hundred slingers and archers, a movement in which pompey placed the hopes of victory, caesar posted six cohorts that represented scarcely two thousand men. he had perfect confidence that these two thousand men would make pompey's cavalry wheel about, and that his one thousand horsemen would then press the action so energetically that pompey's cavalry would not even think of rallying. it happened so; and the forty-two hundred archers and slingers were slaughtered like sheep by these cohorts, aided, without doubt, by four-hundred foot [ ] young and agile, whom caesar mixed with his thousand horsemen and who remained at this task, leaving the horsemen, whom they had relieved, to pursue the terror-stricken fugitives. thus were seven thousand horsemen swept away and forty-two hundred infantrymen slaughtered without a struggle, all demoralized simply by a vigorous demonstration. the order to await the charge, given by pompey to his infantry, was judged too severely by caesar. caesar certainly was right as a general rule; the enthusiasm of the troops must not be dampened, and the initiative of the attack indeed gives to the assailant a certain moral influence. but with trusted soldiers, duly trained, one can try a stratagem, and the men of pompey had proven their dependability by awaiting on the spot, without stirring, a vigorous enemy in good order, when they counted on meeting him in disorder and out of breath. though it may not have led to success, the advice of triarius was not bad. even the conduct of caesar's men proves this. this battle shows the confidence of the soldier in the material rank in ancient combat, as assuring support and mutual assistance. notwithstanding the fact that caesar's soldiers had the initiative in the attack, the first encounter decided nothing. it was a combat on the spot, a struggle of several hours. forty-five thousand good troops lost scarcely two hundred men in this struggle for, with like arms, courage and ability, pompey's infantry ought not to have lost in hand-to-hand fighting more than that of caesar's. these same forty-five thousand men gave way, and, merely between the battle field and their camp, twelve thousand were slaughtered. pompey's men had twice the depth of caesar's ranks, whose attack did not make them fall back a step. on the other hand their mass was unable to repel him, and he was fought on the spot. pompey had announced to them, says caesar, that the enemy's army would be turned by his cavalry, and suddenly, when they were fighting bravely, step by step, they heard behind them the shouts of attack by the six cohorts of caesar, two thousand men. does it seem an easy matter for such a force to ward off this menace? no. the wing taken in rear in this way loses ground; more and more the contagion of fear spreads to the rest. terror is so great that they do not think of re-forming in their camp, which is defended for a moment only by the cohorts on guard. just as at cannae, their arms drop from their hands. but for the good conduct of the camp guards which permitted the fugitives to gain the mountains, the twenty-four thousand prisoners of the next day might have been corpses that very day. cannae and pharsalus, are sufficient to illustrate ancient combat. let us, however, add some other characteristic examples, which we shall select briefly and in chronological order. they will complete our data. [ ] livy relates that in an action against some of the peoples in the neighborhood of rome, i do not recall now which, the romans did not dare to pursue for fear of breaking their ranks. in a fight against the hernici, he cites the roman horsemen, who had not been able to do anything on horseback to break up the enemy, asking the consul for permission to dismount and fight on foot. this is true not only of roman cavalrymen, for later on we shall see the best riders, the gauls, the germans, the parthanians even, dismounting in order really to fight. the volsci, the latini, the hernici, etc., combined to fight the romans; and as the action nears its end, livy relates: "finally, the first ranks having fallen, and carnage being all about them, they threw away their arms and started to scatter. the cavalry then dashed forward, with orders not to kill the isolated ones, but to harass the mass with their arrows, annoy it, to delay it, to prevent dispersion in order to permit the infantry to come up and kill." in hamilcar's engagement against the mercenaries in revolt, who up to then had always beaten the carthaginians, the mercenaries endeavored to envelop him. hamilcar surprised them by a new maneuver and defeated them. he marched in three lines: elephants, cavalry and light infantry, then heavily armed phalanxes. at the approach of the mercenaries who were marching vigorously towards him the two lines formed by the elephants, the cavalry and light infantry, turned about and moved quickly to place themselves on the flanks of the third line. the third line thus exposed met a foe which had thought only of pursuit, and which the surprise put to flight. it thus abandoned itself to the action of the elephants, horses and the light infantry who massacred the fugitives. hamilcar killed six thousand men, captured two thousand and lost practically nobody. it was a question as to whether he had lost a single man, since there had been no combat. in the battle of lake trasimenus, the carthaginians lost fifteen hundred men, nearly all gauls; the romans fifteen thousand and fifteen thousand prisoners. the battle raged for three hours. at zama, hannibal had twenty thousand killed, twenty thousand prisoners; the romans two thousand killed. this was a serious struggle in which hannibal's third line alone fought. it gave way only under the attack on its rear and flank by the cavalry. in the battle of cynoscephalae, between philip and flaminius, philip pressed flaminius with his phalanx thirty-two deep. twenty maniples took the phalanx from behind. the battle was lost by philip. the romans had seven hundred killed; the macedonians eighty thousand, and five thousand prisoners. at pydna, aemilius paulus against perseus, the phalanx marched without being stopped. but gaps occurred from the resistance that it encountered. hundreds penetrated into the gaps in the phalanx and killed the men embarrassed with their long pikes. they were effective only when united, abreast, and at shaft's length. there was frightful disorder and butchery; twenty thousand killed, five thousand captured out of forty-four thousand engaged! the historian does not deem it worth while to speak of the roman losses. after the battle of aix against the teutons, marius surprised the teutons from behind. there was frightful carnage; one hundred thousand teutons and three hundred romans killed. [ ] in sulla's battle of chaeronea against archelaus, a general of mithridates, sulla had about thirty thousand men, archelaus, one hundred and ten thousand. archelaus was beaten by being surprised from the rear. the romans lost fourteen men, and killed their enemies until worn out in pursuit. the battle of orchomenus, against archelaus, was a repetition of chaeronea. caesar states that his cavalry could not fight the britons without greatly exposing itself, because they pretended flight in order to get the cavalry away from the infantry and then, dashing from their chariots, they fought on foot with advantage. a little less than two hundred veterans embarked on a boat which they ran aground at night so as not to be taken by superior naval forces. they reached an advantageous position and passed the night. at the break of day, otacilius dispatched some four hundred horsemen and some infantry from the alesio garrison against them. they defended themselves bravely; and having killed some, they rejoined caesar's troops without having lost a single man. in macedonia caesar's rear-guard was caught by pompey's cavalry at the passage of the genusus river, the banks of which were quite steep. caesar opposed pompey's cavalry five to seven thousand strong, with his cavalry of six hundred to one thousand men, among which he had taken care to intermingle four hundred picked infantrymen. they did their duty so well that, in the combat that followed, they repulsed the enemy, killed many, and fell back upon their own army without the loss of a single man. in the battle of thapsus in africa, against scipio, caesar killed ten thousand, lost fifty, and had some wounded. * * * * * in the battle under the walls of munda in spain, against one of pompey's sons, caesar had eighty cohorts and eight thousand horsemen, about forty-eight thousand men. pompey with thirteen legions had sixty thousand troops of the line, six thousand cavalry, six thousand light infantry, six thousand auxiliaries; in all, about eighty thousand men. the struggle, says the narrator, was valiantly kept up, step by step, sword to sword. [ ] in that battle of exceptional fury, which hung for a long time in the balance, caesar had one thousand dead, five hundred wounded; pompey thirty-three thousand dead, and if munda had not been so near, scarcely two miles away, his losses would have been doubled. the defensive works of munda were constructed from dead bodies and abandoned arms. in studying ancient combats, it can be seen that it was almost always an attack from the flank or rear, a surprise action, that won battles, especially against the romans. it was in this way that their excellent tactics might be confused. roman tactics were so excellent that a roman general who was only half as good as his adversary was sure to be victorious. by surprise alone they could be conquered. note xanthippe,--hannibal--the unexpected fighting methods of the gauls, etc. indeed xenophon says somewhere, "be it agreeable or terrible, the less anything is foreseen, the more does it cause pleasure or dismay. this is nowhere better illustrated than in war where every surprise strikes terror even to those who are much the stronger." but very few fighters armed with cuirass and shield were killed in the front lines. hannibal in his victories lost almost nobody but gauls, his cannon-fodder, who fought with poor shields and without armor. nearly always driven in, they fought, nevertheless, with a tenacity that they never showed under any other command. thucydides characterizes the combat of the lightly armed, by saying: "as a rule, the lightly armed of both sides took to flight." [ ] in combat with closed ranks there was mutual pressure but little loss, the men not being at liberty to strike in their own way and with all their force. caesar against the nervii, saw his men, who in the midst of the action had instinctively closed in mass in order to resist the mass of barbarians, giving way under pressure. he therefore ordered his ranks and files to open, so that his legionaries, closed in mass, paralyzed and forced to give way to a very strong pressure, might be able to kill and consequently demoralize the enemy. and indeed, as soon as a man in the front rank of the nervii fell under the blows of the legionaries, there was a halt, a falling back. following an attack from the rear, and a mêlée, the defeat of the nervii ensued. [ ] chapter v morale in ancient battle we now know the morale and mechanism of ancient fighting; the word mêlée employed by the ancients was many times stronger than the idea to be expressed; it meant a crossing of arms, not a confusion of men. the results of battles, such as losses, suffice to demonstrate this, and an instant of reflection makes us see the error of the word mêlée. in pursuit it was possible to plunge into the midst of the fugitives, but in combat every one had too much need for the next man, for his neighbor, who was guarding his flanks and his back, to let himself be killed out of sheer wantonness by a sure blow from within the ranks of the enemy. [ ] in the confusion of a real mêlée, caesar at pharsalus, and hannibal at cannae, would have been conquered. their shallow ranks, penetrated by the enemy, would have had to fight two against one, they would even have been taken in rear in consequence of the breaking of their ranks. also has there not been seen, in troops equally reliable and desperate, that mutual weariness which brings about, with tacit accord, falling back for a breathing spell on both sides in order again to take up the battle? how can this be possible with a mêlée? with the confusion and medley of combatants, there might be a mutual extermination, but there would not be any victors. how would they recognize each other? can you conceive two mixed masses of men or groups, where every one occupied in front can be struck with impunity from the side or from behind? that is mutual extermination, where victory belongs only to survivors; for in the mix-up and confusion, no one can flee, no one knows where to flee. after all, are not the losses we have seen on both sides demonstration that there was no real mêlée? the word is, therefore, too strong; the imagination of painters' and poets' has created the mêlée. this is what happened: at a charging distance troops marched towards the enemy with all the speed compatible with the necessity for fencing and mutual aid. quite often, the moral impulse, that resolution to go to the end, manifested itself at once in the order and freedom of gait. that impulse alone put to flight a less resolute adversary. it was customary among good troops to have a clash, but not the blind and headlong onset of the mass; the preoccupation [ ] of the rank was very great, as the behavior of caesar's troops at pharsalus shows in their slow march, timed by the flutes of lacedaemonian battalions. at the moment of getting close to the enemy, the dash slackened of its own accord, because the men of the first rank, of necessity and instinctively, assured themselves of the position of their supports, their neighbors in the same line, their comrades in the second, and collected themselves together in order to be more the masters of their movements to strike and parry. there was a contact of man with man; each took the adversary in front of him and attacked him, because by penetrating into the ranks before having struck him down, he risked being wounded in the side by losing his flank supports. each one then hit his man with his shield, expecting to make him lose his equilibrium, and at the instant he tried to recover himself landed the blow. the men in the second line, back of the intervals necessary for fencing in the first, were ready to protect their sides against any one that advanced between them and were prepared to relieve tired warriors. it was the same in the third line, and so on. every one being supported on either side, the first encounter was rarely decisive, and the fencing, the real combat at close quarters, began. if men of the first line were wounded quickly, if the other ranks were not in a hurry to relieve or replace them, or if there was hesitation, defeat followed. this happened to the romans in their first encounters with the gauls. the gaul, with his shield, parried the first thrust, brought his big iron sword swooping down with fury upon the top of the roman shield, split it and went after the man. the romans, already hesitating before the moral impulse of the gauls, their ferocious yells, their nudeness, an indication of a contempt for wounds, fell then in a greater number than their adversaries and demoralization followed. soon they accustomed themselves to this valorous but not tenacious spirit of their enemies, and when they had protected the top of their shields with an iron band, they no longer fell, and the rôles were changed. the gauls, in fact, were unable either to hold their ground against the better arms and the thrusts of the romans, or against their individual superior tenacity, increased nearly tenfold by the possible relay of eight ranks of the maniple. the maniples were self-renewing. whereas with the gauls the duration of the combat was limited to the strength of a single man, on account of the difficulties of close or tumultuous ranks, and the impossibility of replacing losses when they were fighting at close quarters. if the weapons were nearly alike, preserving ranks and thereby breaking down, driving back and confusing the ranks of the enemy, was to conquer. the man in disordered, broken lines, no longer felt himself supported, but vulnerable everywhere, and he fled. it is true that it is hardly possible to break hostile lines without doing the same with one's own. but the one who breaks through first, has been able to do so only by making the foe fall back before his blows, by killing or wounding. he has thereby raised his courage and that of his neighbor. he knows, he sees where he is marching; whilst the adversary overtaken as a consequence of the retreat or the fall of the troops that were flanking him, is surprised. he sees himself exposed on the flank. he falls back on a line with the rank in rear in order to regain support. but the lines in the rear give way to the retreat of the first. if the withdrawal has a certain duration, terror comes as a result of the blows which drive back and mow down the first line. if, to make room for those pushed back, the last lines turn their backs, there is small chance that they will face the front again. space has tempted them. they will not return to the fight. then by that natural instinct of the soldier to worry, to assure himself of his supports, the contagion of flight spreads from the last ranks to the first. the first, closely engaged, has been held to the fight in the meantime, under pain of immediate death. there is no need to explain what follows; it is butchery. (caedes). but to return to combat. it is evident that the formation of troops in a straight line, drawn close together, existed scarcely an instant. moreover each group of files formed in action was connected with the next group; the groups, like the individuals, were always concerned about their support. the fight took place along the line of contact of the first ranks of the army, a straight line, broken, curved, and bent in different directions according to the various chances of the action at such or such a point, but always restricting and separating the combatants of the two sides. once engaged on that line, it was necessary to face the front under pain of immediate death. naturally and necessarily every one in these first ranks exerted all his energy to defend his life. at no point did the line become entangled as long as there was fighting, for, general or soldier, the effort of each one was to keep up the continuity of support all along the line, and to break or cut that of the enemy, because victory then followed. we see then that between men armed with swords, it was possible to have, and there was, if the combat was serious, penetration of one mass into the other, but never confusion, or a jumble of ranks, by the men forming these masses. [ ] sword to sword combat was the most deadly. it presented the most sudden changes, because it was the one in which the individual valor and dexterity of the combatant had the greatest and most immediate influence. other methods of combat were simpler. let us compare pikes and broadswords. the close formation of men armed with pikes was irresistible so long as it was maintained. a forest of pikes fifteen to eighteen feet long kept you at a distance. [ ] on the other hand it was easy to kill off the cavalry and light infantry about the phalanx, which was an unwieldy mass marching with a measured step, and which a mobile body of troops could always avoid. openings in the phalanx might be occasioned by marching, by the terrain, by the thousand accidents of struggle, by the individual assault of brave men, by the wounded on the ground creeping under the high held pikes and cutting at the legs of the front rank. men in the phalanx could scarcely see and even the first two lines hardly had a free position for striking. the men were armed with long lances, useless at close quarters, good only for combat at shaft's length (polybius). they were struck with impunity by the groups [ ] which threw themselves into the intervals. and then, once the enemy was in the body of the phalanx, morale disappeared and it became a mass without order, a flock of panic-stricken sheep falling over each other. in a mob hard-pressed men prick with their knives those who press them. the contagion of fear changes the direction of the human wave; it bends back upon itself and breaks to escape danger. if, then, the enemy fled before the phalanx there was no mêlée. if he gave way tactically before it and availing himself of gaps penetrated it by groups, still there was no mêlée or mixture of ranks. the wedge entering into a mass does not become intermingled with it. with a phalanx armed with long pikes against a similar phalanx there was still less confusion. they were able to stand for a long time, if the one did not take the other in flank or in rear by a detached body of troops. in all ancient combat, even in victory achieved by methods which affected the morale, such methods are always effective, for man does not change. it is unnecessary to repeat that in ancient conflicts, demoralization and flight began in the rear ranks. we have tried to analyze the fight of infantry of the line because its action alone was decisive in ancient combat. the light infantry of both sides took to flight, as thucydides states. they returned later to pursue and massacre the vanquished. [ ] in cavalry against cavalry, the moral effect of a mass charging in good order was of the greatest influence. we rarely see two cavalry organizations, neither of which breaks before such reciprocal action. such action was seen on the tecinus and at cannae, engagements cited merely because they are very rare exceptions. and even in these cases there was no shock at full speed, but a halt face to face and then an engagement. the hurricanes of cavalry of those days were poetic figures. they had no reality. in an encounter at full speed, men and horses would be crushed, and neither men nor horses wished such an encounter. the hands of the cavalrymen reined back, the instinct of men and horses was to slacken, to stop, if the enemy himself did not stop, and to make an about if he continued to advance. and if ever they met, the encounter was so weakened by the hands of the men, the rearing of the horses, the swinging of heads, that it was a face to face stop. some blows were exchanged with the sword or the lance, but the equilibrium was too unstable, mutual support too uncertain for real sword play. man felt himself too isolated. the moral pressure was too strong. although not deadly, the combat lasted but a second, precisely because man felt himself, saw himself, alone and surrounded. the first men, who believed themselves no longer supported, could no longer endure uneasiness: they wheeled about and the rest followed. unless the enemy had also turned, he then pursued at his pleasure until checked by other cavalry, which pursued him in turn. there never was an encounter between cavalry and infantry. the cavalry harassed with its arrows, with the lance perhaps, while passing rapidly, but it never attacked. close conflict on horseback did not exist. and to be sure, if the horse by adding so much to the mobility of man gave him the means of menacing and charging with swiftness, it permitted him to escape with like rapidity when his menace did not shake the enemy. man by using the horse, pursuant to his natural inclination and sane reasoning, could do as much damage as possible while risking the least possible. to riders without stirrups or saddle, for whom the throwing of the javelin was a difficult matter (xenophon), combat was but a succession of reciprocal harassings, demonstrations, menaces, skirmishes with arrows. each cavalry sought an opportunity to surprise, to intimidate, to avail itself of disorder, and to pursue either the cavalry or the infantry. then "vae victis;" the sword worked. man always has had the greatest fear of being trampled upon by horses. that fear has certainly routed a hundred thousand times more men than the real encounter. this was always more or less avoided by the horse, and no one was knocked down. when two ancient cavalry forces wanted really to fight, were forced to it, they fought on foot (note the tecinus, cannae, examples of livy). i find but little real fighting on horseback in all antiquity like that of alexander the great at the passage of the granicus. was even that fighting? his cavalry which traversed a river with steep banks defended by the enemy, lost eighty-five men; the persian cavalry one thousand; and both were equally well armed! the fighting of the middle ages revived the ancient battles except in science. cavalrymen attacked each other perhaps more than the ancient cavalry did, for the reason that they were invulnerable: it was not sufficient to throw them down; it was necessary to kill when once they were on the ground. they knew, however, that their fighting on horseback was not important so far as results were concerned, for when they wished really to battle, they fought on foot. (note the combat of the thirty, bayard, etc.) the victors, arrayed in iron from head to foot, lost no one, the peasants did not count. if the vanquished was taken, he was not massacred, because chivalry had established a fraternity of arms between noblemen, the mounted warriors of different nations, and ransom replaced death. if we have spoken especially of the infantry fight, it is because it was the most serious. on foot, on horseback, on the bridge of a vessel, at the moment of danger, the same man is always found. any one who knows him well, deduces from his action in the past what his action will be in the future. chapter vi under what conditions real combatants are obtained and how the fighting of our days, in order to be well done, requires them to be more dependable than in ancient combat let us repeat now, what we said at the beginning of this study. man does not enter battle to fight, but for victory. he does everything that he can to avoid the first and obtain the second. the continued improvement of all appliances of war has no other goal than the annihilation of the enemy. absolute bravery, which does not refuse battle even on unequal terms, trusting only to god or to destiny, is not natural in man; it is the result of moral culture. it is infinitely rare, because in the face of danger the animal sense of self-preservation always gains the upper hand. man calculates his chances, with what errors we are about to see. now, man has a horror of death. in the bravest, a great sense of duty, which they alone are capable of understanding and living up to, is paramount. but the mass always cowers at sight of the phantom, death. discipline is for the purpose of dominating that horror by a still greater horror, that of punishment or disgrace. but there always comes an instant when natural horror gets an upper hand over discipline, and the fighter flees. "stop, stop, hold out a few minutes, an instant more, and you are victor! you are not even wounded yet,--if you turn your back you are dead!" he does not hear, he cannot hear any more. he is full of fear. how many armies have sworn to conquer or perish? how many have kept their oaths? an oath of sheep to stand up against wolves. history shows, not armies, but firm souls who have fought unto death, and the devotion of thermopylae is therefore justly immortal. here we are again brought to the consideration of essential truths, enunciated by many men, now forgotten or unknown. to insure success in the rude test of conflict, it is not sufficient to have a mass composed of valiant men like the gauls or the germans. the mass needs, and we give it, leaders who have the firmness and decision of command proceeding from habit and an entire faith in their unquestionable right to command as established by tradition, law and society. we add good arms. we add methods of fighting suitable to these arms and those of the enemy and which do not overtax the physical and moral forces of man. we add also a rational decentralization that permits the direction and employment of the efforts of all even to the last man. we animate with passion, a violent desire for independence, a religious fanaticism, national pride, a love of glory, a madness for possession. an iron discipline, which permits no one to escape action, secures the greatest unity from top to bottom, between all the elements, between the commanding officers, between the commanding officers and men, between the soldiers. have we then a solid army? not yet. unity, that first and supreme force of armies, is sought by enacting severe laws of discipline supported by powerful passions. but to order discipline is not enough. a vigilance from which no one may escape in combat should assure the maintenance of discipline. discipline itself depends on moral pressure which actuates men to advance from sentiments of fear or pride. but it depends also on surveillance, the mutual supervision of groups of men who know each other well. a wise organization insures that the personnel of combat groups changes as little as possible, so that comrades in peace time maneuvers shall be comrades in war. from living together, and obeying the same chiefs, from commanding the same men, from sharing fatigue and rest, from coöperation among men who quickly understand each other in the execution of warlike movements, may be bred brotherhood, professional knowledge, sentiment, above all unity. the duty of obedience, the right of imposing discipline and the impossibility of escaping from it, would naturally follow. and now confidence appears. it is not that enthusiastic and thoughtless confidence of tumultous or unprepared armies which goes up to the danger point and vanishes rapidly, giving way to a contrary sentiment, which sees treason everywhere. it is that intimate confidence, firm and conscious, which does not forget itself in the heat of action and which alone makes true combatants. then we have an army; and it is no longer difficult to explain how men carried away by passions, even men who know how to die without flinching, without turning pale, really strong in the presence of death, but without discipline, without solid organization, are vanquished by others individually less valiant, but firmly, jointly and severally combined. one loves to picture an armed mob upsetting all obstacles and carried away by a blast of passion. there is more imagination than truth in that picture. if the struggle depended on individuals, the courageous, impassioned men, composing the mob would have more chance of victory. but in any body of troops, in front of the enemy, every one understands that the task is not the work of one alone, that to complete it requires team work. with his comrades in danger brought together under unknown leaders, he feels the lack of union, and asks himself if he can count on them. a thought of mistrust leads to hesitation. a moment of it will kill the offensive spirit. unity and confidence cannot be improvised. they alone can create that mutual trust, that feeling of force which gives courage and daring. courage, that is the temporary domination of will over instinct, brings about victory. unity alone then produces fighters. but, as in everything, there are degrees of unity. let us see whether modern is in this respect less exacting than ancient combat. in ancient combat there was danger only at close quarters. if the troops had enough morale (which asiatic hordes seldom had) to meet the enemy at broadsword's length, there was an engagement. whoever was that close knew that he would be killed if he turned his back; because, as we have seen, the victors lost but few and the vanquished were exterminated. this simple reasoning held the men and made them fight, if it was but for an instant. neglecting the exceptional and very rare circumstances, which may bring two forces together, action to-day is brought on and fought out from afar. danger begins at great distances, and it is necessary to advance for a long time under fire which at each step becomes heavier. the vanquished loses prisoners, but often, in dead and in wounded, he does not lose more than the victor. ancient combat was fought in groups close together, within a small space, in open ground, in full view of one another, without the deafening noise of present day arms. men in formation marched into an action that took place on the spot and did not carry them thousands of feet away from the starting point. the surveillance of the leaders was easy, individual weakness was immediately checked. general consternation alone caused flight. to-day fighting is done over immense spaces, along thinly drawn out lines broken every instant by the accidents and the obstacles of the terrain. from the time the action begins, as soon as there are rifle shots, the men spread out as skirmishers or, lost in the inevitable disorder of a rapid march, [ ] escape the supervision of their commanding officers. a considerable number conceal themselves; [ ] they get away from the engagement and diminish by just so much the material and moral effect and confidence of the brave ones who remain. this can bring about defeat. but let us look at man himself in ancient combat and in modern. in ancient combat:--i am strong, apt, vigorous, trained, full of calmness, presence of mind; i have good offensive and defensive weapons and trustworthy companions of long standing. they do not let me be overwhelmed without aiding me. i with them, they with me, we are invincible, even invulnerable. we have fought twenty battles and not one of us remained on the field. it is necessary to support each other in time; we see it clearly; we are quick to replace ourselves, to put a fresh combatant in front of a fatigued adversary. we are the legions of marius, fifty thousand who have held out against the furious avalanches of the cimbri. we have killed one hundred and forty thousand, taken prisoner sixty thousand, while losing but two or three hundred of our inexperienced soldiers. to-day, as strong, firm, trained, and courageous as i am, i can never say; i shall return. i have no longer to do with men, whom i do not fear, i have to do with fate in the form of iron and lead. death is in the air, invisible and blind, whispering, whistling. as brave, good, trustworthy, and devoted as my companions may be, they do not shield me. only,--and this is abstract and less immediately intelligible to all than the material support of ancient combat,--only i imagine that the more numerous we are who run a dangerous risk, the greater is the chance for each to escape therefrom. i also know that, if we have that confidence which none of us should lack in action, we feel, and we are, stronger. we begin more resolutely, are ready to keep up the struggle longer, and therefore finish it more quickly. we finish it! but in order to finish it, it is necessary to advance, to attack the enemy, [ ] and infantryman or troopers, we are naked against iron, naked against lead, which cannot miss at close range. let us advance in any case, resolutely. our adversary will not stand at the point-blank range of our rifle, for the attack is never mutual, we are sure of that. we have been told so a thousand times. we have seen it. but what if matters should change now! suppose the enemy stands at point-blank range! what of that? how far this is from roman confidence! in another place we have shown that in ancient times to retire from action was both a difficult and perilous matter for the soldier. to-day the temptation is much stronger, the facility greater and the peril less. now, therefore, combat exacts more moral cohesion, greater unity than previously. a last remark on the difficulty of obtaining it will complete the demonstration. since the invention of fire arms, the musket, the rifle, the cannon, the distances of mutual aid and support have increased among the different arms. [ ] besides, the facility of communications of all kinds permits the assembling on a given territory of enormous forces. for these reasons, as we have stated, battle fields have become immense. supervision becomes more and more difficult. direction being more distant tends more often to escape from the supreme commanders and the subordinate leaders. the certain and inevitable disorder, which a body of troops always presents in action, is with the moral effect of modern appliances, becoming greater every day. in the midst of the confusion and the vacillation of firing lines, men and commanding officers often lose each other. troops immediately and hotly engaged, such as companies and squads, can maintain themselves only if they are well-organized and serve as supports or rallying points to those out of place. battles tend to become now, more than they have ever been, the battles of men. this ought not to be true! perhaps. but the fact is that it is true. not all troops are immediately or hotly engaged in battle. commanding officers always try to keep in hand, as long as possible, some troops capable of marching, acting at any moment, in any direction. to-day, like yesterday, like to-morrow, the decisive action is that of formed troops. victory belongs to the commander who has known how to keep them in good order, to hold them, and to direct them. that is incontrovertible. but commanders can hold out decisive reserves only if the enemy has been forced to commit his. in troops which do the fighting, the men and the officers closest to them, from corporal to battalion commander, have a more independent action than ever. as it is alone the vigor of that action, more independent than ever of the direction of higher commanders, which leaves in the hands of higher commanders available forces which can be directed at a decisive moment, that action becomes more preponderant than ever. battles, now more than ever, are battles of men, of captains. they always have been in fact, since in the last analysis the execution belongs to the man in ranks. but the influence of the latter on the final result is greater than formerly. from that comes the maxim of to-day: the battles of men. outside of the regulations on tactics and discipline, there is an evident necessity for combating the hazardous predominance of the action of the soldier over that of the commander. it is necessary to delay as long as possible, that instant which modern conditions tend to hasten--the instant when the soldier gets from under the control of the commander. this completes the demonstration of the truth stated before: combat requires to-day, in order to give the best results, a moral cohesion, a unity more binding than at any other time. [ ] it is as true as it is clear, that, if one does not wish bonds to break, one must make them elastic in order to strengthen them. chapter vii purpose of this study what would be necessary to complete it any other deductions on this subject must come from the meditations of the reader. to be of value in actual application such deductions should be based upon study of modern combat, and that study cannot be made from the accounts of historians alone. the latter show the action of troop units only in a general way. action in detail and the individual action of the soldier remain enveloped in a cloud of dust, in narratives as in reality. yet these questions must be studied, for the conditions they reveal should be the basis of all fighting methods, past, present and future. where can data on these questions be found? we have very few records portraying action as clearly as the report on the engagement at the pont de l'hôpital by colonel bugeaud. such stories in even greater detail, for the smallest detail has its importance, secured from participants and witnesses who knew how to see and knew how to remember, are what is necessary in a study of the battle of to-day. the number of killed, the kind and the character of wounds, often tell more than the longest accounts. sometimes they contradict them. we want to know how man in general and the frenchman in particular fought yesterday. under the pressure of danger, impelled by the instinct for self-preservation, did he follow, make light of, or forget the methods prescribed or recommended? did he fight in the manner imposed upon him, or in that indicated to him by his instinct or by his knowledge of warfare? when we have the answers to these questions we shall be very near to knowing how he will conduct himself to-morrow, with and against appliances far more destructive to-day than those of yesterday. even now, knowing that man is capable only of a given quantity of terror, knowing that the moral effect of destruction is in proportion to the force applied, we are able to predict that, to-morrow less than ever will studied methods be practicable. such methods are born of the illusions of the field of fire and are opposed to the teachings of our own experience. to-morrow, more than ever, will the individual valor of the soldier and of small groups, be predominant. this valor is secured by discipline. the study of the past alone can give us a true perception of practical methods, and enable us to see how the soldier will inevitably fight to-morrow. so instructed, so informed, we shall not be confused; because we shall be able to prescribe beforehand such methods of fighting, such organization, such dispositions as are seen to be inevitable. such prescriptions may even serve to regulate the inevitable. at any rate they will serve to reduce the element of chance by enabling the commanding officer to retain control as long as possible, and by releasing the individual only at the moment when instinct dominates him. this is the only way to preserve discipline, which has a tendency to go to pieces by tactical disobedience at the moment of greatest necessity. it should be understood that the prescriptions in question have to do with dispositions before action; with methods of fighting, and not with maneuvers. maneuvers are the movements of troops in the theater of action, and they are the swift and ordered movement on the scene of action of tactical units of all sizes. they do not constitute action. action follows them. confusion in many minds between maneuvers and action brings about doubt and mistrust of our regulation drills. these are good, very good as far as they go, inasmuch as they give methods of executing all movements, of taking all possible formations with rapidity and good order. to change them, to discuss them, does not advance the question one bit. they do not affect the problem of positive action. its solution lies in the study of what took place yesterday, from which, alone, it is possible to deduce what will happen to-morrow. this study must be made, and its result set forth. each leader, whose worth and authority has been tested in war and recognized by armies, has done something of the sort. of each of these even might be said, "he knew the soldier; he knew how to make use of him." the romans, too, had this knowledge. they obtained it from continuous experience and profound reflexion thereon. experience is not continuous to-day. it must be carefully gathered. study of it should be careful and the results should stimulate reflexion, especially in men of experience. extremes meet in many things. in ancient times at the point of the pike and sword, armies have conquered similar armies twice their size. who knows if, in these days of perfected long-range arms of destruction, a small force might not secure, by a happy combination of good sense or genius with morale and appliances, these same heroic victories over a greater force similarly armed?[ ] in spite of the statements of napoleon i, his assumption that victory is always on the side of the strongest battalions was costly. part ii. modern battle chapter i general discussion . ancient and modern battle i have heard philosophers reproached for studying too exclusively man in general and neglecting the race, the country, the era, so that their studies of him offer little of real social or political value. the opposite criticism can be made of military men of all countries. they are always eager to expound traditional tactics and organization suitable to the particular character of their race, always the bravest of all races. they fail to consider as a factor in the problem, man confronted by danger. facts are incredibly different from all theories. perhaps in this time of military reorganization it would not be out of place to make a study of man in battle and of battle itself. the art of war is subjected to many modifications by industrial and scientific progress. but one thing does not change, the heart of man. in the last analysis, success in battle is a matter of morale. in all matters which pertain to an army, organization, discipline and tactics, the human heart in the supreme moment of battle is the basic factor. it is rarely taken into account; and often strange errors are the result. witness the carbine, an accurate and long range weapon, which has never given the service expected of it, because it was used mechanically without considering the human heart. we must consider it! with improvement in weapons, the power of destruction increases, the moral effect of such weapons increases, and courage to face them becomes rarer. man does not, cannot change. what should increase with the power of material is the strength of organization, the unity of the fighting machine. yet these are most neglected. a million men at maneuvers are useless, if a sane and reasoned organization does not assure their discipline, and thereby their reliability, that is, their courage in action. four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely. there is the science of the organization of armies in a nutshell. at any time a new invention may assure victory. granted. but practicable weapons are not invented every day, and nations quickly put themselves on the same footing as regards armament. the determining factor, leaving aside generals of genius, and luck, is the quality of troops, that is, the organization that best assures their esprit, their reliability, their confidence, their unity. troops, in this sense, means soldiers. soldiers, no matter how well drilled, who are assembled haphazard into companies and battalions will never have, have never had, that entire unity which is born of mutual acquaintanceship. in studying ancient battle, we have seen what a terrible thing battle is. we have seen that man will not really fight except under disciplinary pressure. even before having studied modern battle, we know that the only real armies are those to which a well thought out and rational organization gives unity throughout battle. the destructive power of improved firearms becomes greater. battle becomes more open, hindering supervision, passing beyond the vision of the commander and even of subordinate officers. in the same degree, unity should be strengthened. the organization which assures unity of the combatants should be better thought out and more rational. the power of arms increases, man and his weaknesses remain the same. what good is an army of two hundred thousand men of whom only one-half really fight, while the other one hundred thousand disappear in a hundred ways? better to have one hundred thousand who can be counted upon. the purpose of discipline is to make men fight in spite of themselves. no army is worthy of the name without discipline. there is no army at all without organization, and all organization is defective which neglects any means to strengthen the unity of combatants. methods cannot be identical. draconian discipline does not fit our customs. discipline must be a state of mind, a social institution based on the salient virtues and defects of the nation. discipline cannot be secured or created in a day. it is an institution, a tradition. the commander must have confidence in his right to command. he must be accustomed to command and proud to command. this is what strengthens discipline in armies commanded by an aristocracy in certain countries. the prussians do not neglect the homogeneity and consequent unity of organization. they recognize its value. hessian regiments are composed, the first year, of one-third hessians, two-thirds prussians, to control the racial tendencies of troops of a recently annexed country; the second year, of two-thirds hessians, one-third prussians; the third year, all hessians with their own officers. the americans have shown us what happens in modern battle to large armies without cohesion. with them the lack of discipline and organization has had the inevitable result. battle has been between hidden skirmishers, at long distance, and has lasted for days, until some faulty movement, perhaps a moral exhaustion, has caused one or the other of the opposing forces to give way. in this american war, the mêlées of agincourt are said to have reappeared, which merely means a mêlée of fugitives. but less than ever has there been close combat. to fight from a distance is instinctive in man. from the first day he has worked to this end, and he continues to do so. it was thought that with long range weapons close combat might return. on the contrary troops keep further off before its effects. the primitive man, the arab, is instability incarnate. a breath, a nothing, governs him at each instant in war. the civilized man, in war, which is opposed to civilization, returns naturally to his first instincts. with the arab war remains a matter of agility and cunning. hunting is his principal pastime and the pursuit of wild beasts teaches the pursuit of man. general daumas depicts arabs as cavaliers. what more chivalrous warfare than the night surprise and sack of a camp! empty words!! it is commonly said that modern war is the most recondite of things, requiring experts. war, so long as man risks his skin in it, will always be a matter of instinct. ancient battle resembled drill. there is no such resemblance in modern battle. this greatly disconcerts both officers and soldiers. ancient battles were picnics, for the victors, who lost nobody. not so to-day. artillery played no part in ancient battle. the invention of firearms has diminished losses in battle. the improvement of firearms continues to diminish losses. this looks like a paradox. but statistics prove it. nor is it unreasonable. does war become deadlier with the improvement of weapons? not at all. man is capable of standing before a certain amount of terror; beyond that he flees from battle. the battle of pharsalus lasted some four hours. caesar broke his camp, which is done in the morning; then the formation for battle; then the battle, etc. and he says that his troops were tired, the battle having lasted up to noon. this indicates that he considered it long. for the middle ages, consult froissart. the knights in the battle of the thirty were armed for battle on foot which they preferred in a serious affair, that is to say in a restricted space. there was a halt, a rest in the combat, when the two parties became exhausted. the bretons, at this rest, were twenty-five against thirty. the battle had lasted up to exhaustion without loss by the english! without montauban the battle would have been terminated by complete and mutual exhaustion and without further losses. for the greater the fatigue, the less strength remained for piercing the armor. montauban was at the same time felon and hero; felon because he did a thing not permitted by the code of combat; hero, because, if the bretons had not ably profited by the disorder, he would have been killed when he entered the english formation alone. at the end of the contest the bretons had four killed, the english eight. four of the killed were overcome by their armor. explain how, under turenne, men held much longer under fire than to-day. it is perfectly simple. man is capable of standing before only a certain amount of terror. to-day there must be swallowed in five minutes what took an hour under turenne. an example will be given. with the present arms, whose usage is generally known, the instruction of the soldier is of little importance. it does not make the soldier. take as an example the case of the peasants of the vendée. their unity and not individual instruction made them soldiers, whose value could not be denied. such unity was natural in people of the same village of the same commune, led in battle by their own lords, their own priests, etc. the greater the perfection of weapons, the more dreadful becomes modern battle, and discipline becomes more difficult to maintain. the less mobile the troops, the deadlier are battles. bayonet attacks are not so easily made to-day, and morale consequently is less affected, man fearing man more than death. astonishing losses seem to have been suffered without breaking by turenne's armies. were the casualty reports submitted by the captains of those days correct? frederick liked to say that three men behind the enemy were worth more than fifty in front of him, for moral effect. the field of action to-day is more extensive than in frederick's time. battle is delivered on more accidented terrain, as armies with great mobility do not need any particular terrain to fight on. the nature of ancient arms required close order. modern arms require open order, and they are at the same time of such terrible power that against them too often discipline is broken. what is the solution? have your combatants opened out? have them well acquainted with each other so as to have unity. have reserves to threaten with, held with an iron hand. modern weapons have a terrible effect and are almost unbearable by the nervous system. who can say that he has not been frightened in battle? discipline in battle becomes the more necessary as the ranks become more open, and the material cohesion of the ranks not giving confidence, it must spring from a knowledge of comrades, and a trust in officers, who must always be present and seen. what man to-day advances with the confidence that rigid discipline and pride in himself gave the roman soldier, even though the contest is no longer with man but with fate? to-day the artillery is effective at great distances. there is much liberty of movement for the different arms. the apparent liaison between arms is lessened. this has its influence on morale. there is another advantage in reliable troops, in that they can be extended more widely, and will consequently suffer smaller losses and be in better morale for close conflict. the further off one is, the more difficult it is to judge of the terrain. consequently the greater is the necessity for scouting, for reconnoitering the terrain by skirmishers. this is something that the duke of gramont forgot at nordlingen, and which is often forgotten; but it constitutes another important reason for the use of skirmishers. the formation in rank is a disciplinary measure against the weakness of man in the face of danger. this weakness is greater to-day in that the moral action of weapons is more powerful, and that the material rank has the inherent lack of cohesion of open order. however, open order is necessary to economize losses and permit the use of weapons. thus to-day there is greater necessity than ever for the rank, that is for discipline, not for the geometrical rank. it is at the same time more necessary and doubly difficult to attain. in ancient battle unity existed, at least with the greeks and the romans. the soldier was known to his officer and comrades; they saw that he fought. in modern armies where losses are as great for the victor as for the vanquished, the soldier must more often be replaced. in ancient battle the victor had no losses. to-day the soldier is often unknown to his comrades. he is lost in the smoke, the dispersion, the confusion of battle. he seems to fight alone. unity is no longer insured by mutual surveillance. a man falls, and disappears. who knows whether it was a bullet or the fear of advancing further that struck him! the ancient combatant was never struck by an invisible weapon and could not fall in this way. the more difficult surveillance, the more necessary becomes the individuality of companies, sections, squads. not the least of their boasts should be their ability to stand a roll call at all times. the ancients often avoided hand to hand conflict, so terrible were its consequences. in modern combat, there never is hand to hand conflict if one stands fast. from day to day close combat tends to disappear. it is replaced by fire action; above all by the moral action of maneuvers. dispersion brings us back to the necessity for the unity which was an absolute necessity in ancient battle. strategy is a game. the first strategist, long before napoleon, was horace with his three enemies. the size of the battle field permits, less than ever, holding units together; the rôle of the general is much more difficult: many more chances are left to fate. thus the greater the necessity for the best troops who know best their trade, who are most dependable and of greatest fortitude. to diminish the effect of luck, it is necessary to hold longer, to wait for help from a distance. battles resolve themselves into battles of soldiers. the final decision is more difficult to obtain. there is a strange similarity in battle at one league to battle at two paces. the value of the soldier is the essential element of success. let us strengthen the soldier by unity. battle has more importance than ever. communication facilities such as the telegraph, concentration facilities such as the railroad, render more difficult such strategic surprises as ulm and jena. the whole forces of a country can thus be united. so united, defeat becomes irreparable, disorganization greater and more rapid. in modern combat the mêlée really exists more than in ancient battle. this appears paradoxical. it is true nevertheless of the mêlée taken in the sense of a mixed up affair where it is infinitely difficult to see clearly. man, in the combat of our days, is a man who, hardly knowing how to swim, is suddenly thrown into the sea. the good quality of troops will more than ever secure victory. as to the comparative value of troops with cohesion and of new troops, look at the zouaves of the guard or the grenadiers at magenta, and the th at solferino. [ ] nothing should be neglected to make the battle order stronger, man stronger. . moral elements in battle when, in complete security, after dinner, in full physical and moral contentment, men consider war and battle they are animated by a noble ardor that has nothing in common with reality. how many of them, however, even at that moment, would be ready to risk their lives? but oblige them to march for days and weeks to arrive at the battle ground, and on the day of battle oblige them to wait minutes, hours, to deliver it. if they were honest they would testify how much the physical fatigue and the mental anguish that precede action have lowered their morale, how much less eager to fight they are than a month before, when they arose from the table in a generous mood. man's heart is as changeable as fortune. man shrinks back, apprehends danger in any effort in which he does not foresee success. there are some isolated characters of an iron temper, who resist the tendency; but they are carried away by the great majority (bismarck). examples show that if a withdrawal is forced, the army is discouraged and takes flight (frederick). the brave heart does not change. real bravery, inspired by devotion to duty, does not know panic and is always the same. the bravery sprung from hot blood pleases the frenchman more. he understands it, it appeals to his vanity; it is a characteristic of his nature. but it is passing; it fails him at times, especially when there is nothing for him to gain in doing his duty. the turks are full of ardor in the advance. they carry their officers with them. but they retreat with the same facility, abandoning their officers. mediocre troops like to be led by their shepherds. reliable troops like to be directed, with their directors alongside of them or behind. with the former the general must be the leader on horseback; with the latter, the manager. warnery did not like officers to head a charge. he thought it useless to have them killed before the others. he did not place them in front and his cavalry was good. general leboeuf did not favor the proposed advance into battle with platoon leaders in front of the center of their platoons. the fear exists that the fall of the captain will demoralize the rest. what is the solution? leboeuf must have known that if the officer is not in front of his command, it will advance less confidently, that, with us, all officers are almost always in advance. practice is stronger than any theory. therefore fit theories to it. in column, put the chiefs of platoon on the flank where they can see clearly. frightfulness! witness the turks in the polish wars. what gave power to the turks in their wars with poland was not so much their real strength as their ferocity. they massacred all who resisted; they massacred without the excuse of resistance. terror preceded them, breaking down the courage of their enemies. the necessity to win or to submit to extreme peril brought about cowardice and submission, for fear of being conquered. turenne said, "you tremble, body...." the instinct of self-preservation can then make the strongest tremble. but they are strong enough to overcome their emotion, the fear of advancing, without even losing their heads or their coolness. fear with them never becomes terror; it is forgotten in the activities of command. he who does not feel strong enough to keep his heart from ever being gripped by terror, should never think of becoming an officer. the soldiers themselves have emotion. the sense of duty, discipline, pride, the example of their officers and above all their coolness, sustain them and prevent their fear from becoming terror. their emotion never allows them to sight, or to more than approximately adjust their fire. often they fire into the air. cromwell knew this very well, dependable as his troops were, when he said, "put your trust in god and aim at their shoe laces." what is too true is that bravery often does not at all exclude cowardice, horrible devices to secure personal safety, infamous conduct. the romans were not mighty men, but men of discipline and obstinacy. we have no idea of the roman military mind, so entirely different from ours. a roman general who had as little coolness as we have would have been lost. we have incentives in decorations and medals that would have made a roman soldier run the gauntlet. how many men before a lion, have the courage to look him in the face, to think of and put into practice measures of self-defense? in war when terror has seized you, as experience has shown it often does, you are as before a lion. you fly trembling and let yourself be eaten up. are there so few really brave men among so many soldiers? alas, yes! gideon was lucky to find three hundred in thirty thousand. napoleon said, "two mamelukes held three frenchmen; but one hundred french cavalry did not fear the same number of mamelukes; three hundred vanquished the same number; one thousand french beat fifteen hundred mamelukes. such was the influence of tactics, order and maneuver." in ordinary language, such was the great moral influence of unity, established by discipline and made possible and effective in battle by organization and mutual support. with unity and sensible formation men of an individual value one-third less beat those who were individually their betters. that is the essential, must be the essential, point in the organization of an army. on reflection, this simple statement of napoleon's seems to contain the whole of battle morale. make the enemy believe that support is lacking; isolate; cut off, flank, turn, in a thousand ways make his men believe themselves isolated. isolate in like manner his squadrons, battalions, brigades and divisions; and victory is yours. if, on account of bad organization, he does not anticipate mutual support, there is no need of such maneuver; the attack is enough. some men, such as orientals, chinese, tartars, mongols do not fear death. they are resigned to it at all times. why is it that they can not stand before the armies of the western people? it is lack of organization. the instinct of self-preservation which at the last moment dominates them utterly, is not opposed by discipline. we have often seen fanatic eastern peoples, implicitly believing that death in battle means a happy and glorious resurrection, superior in numbers, give way before discipline. if attacked confidently, they are crushed by their own weight. in close combat the dagger is better than the bayonet, but instinct is too strong for such people. what makes the soldier capable of obedience and direction in action, is the sense of discipline. this includes: respect for and confidence in his chiefs; confidence in his comrades and fear of their reproaches and retaliation if he abandons them in danger; his desire to go where others do without trembling more than they; in a word, the whole of esprit de corps. organization only can produce these characteristics. four men equal a lion. note the army organizations and tactical formations on paper are always determined from the mechanical point of view, neglecting the essential coefficient, that of morale. they are almost always wrong. esprit de corps is secured in war. but war becomes shorter and shorter and more and more violent. consequently, secure esprit de corps in advance. mental acquaintanceship is not enough to make a good organization. a good general esprit is needed. all must work for battle and not merely live, quietly going through with drills without understanding their application. once a man knows how to use his weapon and obey all commands there is needed only occasional drill to brush up those who have forgotten. marches and battle maneuvers are what is needed. the technical training of the soldier is not the most difficult. it is necessary for him to know how to use and take care of his weapon; to know how to move to the right and to the left, forward, to the rear, at command, to charge and to march with full pack. but this does not make the soldier. the vendeans, who knew little of this, were tough soldiers. it is absolutely necessary to change the instruction, to reduce it to the necessary minimum and to cut out all the superfluities with which peacetime laborers overload it each year. to know the essential well is better than having some knowledge of a lot of things, many of them useless. teach this the first year, that the second, but the essential from the beginning! also instruction should be simple to avoid the mental fatigue of long drills that disgust everybody. here is a significant sentence in colonel borbstaed's enumeration of the reasons for prussian victory over the austrians in , "it was ... because each man, being trained, knew how to act promptly and confidently in all phases of battle." this is a fact. to be held in a building, at every minute of the day to have every movement, every attitude under a not too intelligent surveillance is indeed to be harried. this incessant surveillance weakens the morale of both the watched and the watcher. what is the reason for this incessant surveillance which has long since exceeded shipboard surveillance? was not that strict enough? . material and moral effect the effect of an army, of one organization on another, is at the same time material and moral. the material effect of an organization is in its power to destroy, the moral effect in the fear that it inspires. in battle, two moral forces, even more than two material forces, are in conflict. the stronger conquers. the victor has often lost by fire more than the vanquished. moral effect does not come entirely from destructive power, real and effective as it may be. it comes, above all, from its presumed, threatening power, present in the form of reserves threatening to renew the battle, of troops that appear on the flank, even of a determined frontal attack. material effect is greater as instruments are better (weapons, mounts, etc.), as the men know better how to use them, and as the men are more numerous and stronger, so that in case of success they can carry on longer. with equal or even inferior power of destruction he will win who has the resolution to advance, who by his formations and maneuvers can continually threaten his adversary with a new phase of material action, who, in a word has the moral ascendancy. moral effect inspires fear. fear must be changed to terror in order to vanquish. when confidence is placed in superiority of material means, valuable as they are against an enemy at a distance, it may be betrayed by the actions of the enemy. if he closes with you in spite of your superiority in means of destruction, the morale of the enemy mounts with the loss of your confidence. his morale dominates yours. you flee. entrenched troops give way in this manner. at pharsalus, pompey and his army counted on a cavalry corps turning and taking caesar in the rear. in addition pompey's army was twice as numerous. caesar parried the blow, and his enemy, who saw the failure of the means of action he counted on, was demoralized, beaten, lost fifteen thousand men put to the sword (while caesar lost only two hundred) and as many prisoners. even by advancing you affect the morale of the enemy. but your object is to dominate him and make him retreat before your ascendancy, and it is certain that everything that diminishes the enemy's morale adds to your resolution in advancing. adopt then a formation which permits your destructive agency, your skirmishers, to help you throughout by their material action and to this degree diminish that of the enemy. armor, in diminishing the material effect that can be suffered, diminishes the dominating moral effect of fear. it is easy to understand how much armor adds to the moral effect of cavalry action, at the critical moment. you feel that thanks to his armor the enemy will succeed in getting to you. it is to be noted that when a body actually awaits the attack of another up to bayonet distance (something extraordinarily rare), and the attacking troop does not falter, the first does not defend itself. this is the massacre of ancient battle. against unimaginative men, who retain some coolness and consequently the faculty of reasoning in danger, moral effect will be as material effect. the mere act of attack does not completely succeed against such troops. (witness battles in spain and waterloo). it is necessary to destroy them, and we are better at this than they by our aptitude in the use of skirmishers and above all in the mad dash of our cavalry. but the cavalry must not be treated, until it comes to so consider itself, as a precious jewel which must be guarded against injury. there should be little of it, but it must be good. "seek and ye shall find" not the ideal but the best method that exists. in maneuvers skirmishers, who have some effect, are returned to ranks to execute fire in two ranks which never killed anybody. why not put your skirmishers in advance? why sound trumpet calls which they neither hear nor understand? that they do not is fortunate, for each captain has a different call sounded. example: at alma, the retreat, etc. [ ] the great superiority of roman tactics lay in their constant endeavor to coördinate physical and moral effect. moral effect passes; finally one sees that the enemy is not so terrible as he appeared to be. physical effect does not. the greeks tried to dominate. the romans preferred to kill, and kill they did. they followed thereby the better method. their moral effect was aided by their reliable and deadly swords. what moral force is worth to a nation at war is shown by examples. pichegru played the traitor; this had great influence at home and we were beaten. napoleon came back; victory returned with him. but at that we can do nothing without good troops, not even with a napoleon. witness turenne's army after his death. it remained excellent in spite of conflict between and the inefficiency of its two leaders. note the defensive retreat across the rhine; the regiment in champagne attacked in front by infantry and taken in the rear by cavalry. one of the prettiest feats of the art of war. in modern battle, which is delivered with combatants so far apart, man has come to have a horror of man. he comes to hand to hand fighting only to defend his body or if forced to it by some fortuitous encounter. more than that! it may be said that he seeks to catch the fugitive only for fear that he will turn and fight. guilbert says that shock actions are infinitely rare. here, infinity is taken in its exact mathematical sense. guilbert reduces to nothing, by deductions from practical examples, the mathematical theory of the shock of one massed body on another. indeed the physical impulse is nothing. the moral impulse which estimates the attacker is everything. the moral impulse lies in the perception by the enemy of the resolution that animates you. they say that the battle of amstetten was the only one in which a line actually waited for the shock of another line charging with the bayonets. even then the russians gave way before the moral and not before the physical impulse. they were already disconcerted, wavering, worried, hesitant, vacillating, when the blow fell. they waited long enough to receive bayonet thrusts, even blows with the rifle (in the back, as at inkermann). [ ] this done, they fled. he who calm and strong of heart awaits his enemy, has all the advantage of fire. but the moral impulse of the assailant demoralizes the assailed. he is frightened; he sets his sight no longer; he does not even aim his piece. his lines are broken without defense, unless indeed his cavalry, waiting halted, horsemen a meter apart and in two ranks, does not break first and destroy all formation. with good troops on both sides, if an attack is not prepared, there is every reason to believe that it will fail. the attacking troops suffer more, materially, than the defenders. the latter are in better order, fresh, while the assailants are in disorder and already have suffered a loss of morale under a certain amount of punishment. the moral superiority given by the offensive movement may be more than compensated by the good order and integrity of the defenders, when the assailants have suffered losses. the slightest reaction by the defense may demoralize the attack. this is the secret of the success of the british infantry in spain, and not their fire by rank, which was as ineffective with them as with us. the more confidence one has in his methods of attack or defense, the more disconcerted he is to see them at some time incapable of stopping the enemy. the effect of the present improved fire arm is still limited, with the present organization and use of riflemen, to point blank ranges. it follows that bayonet charges (where bayonet thrusts never occur), otherwise attacks under fire, will have an increasing value, and that victory will be his who secures most order and determined dash. with these two qualities, too much neglected with us, with willingness, with intelligence enough to keep a firm hold on troops in immediate support, we may hope to take and to hold what we take. do not then neglect destructive effort before using moral effect. use skirmishers up to the last moment. otherwise no attack can succeed. it is true it is haphazard fire, nevertheless it is effective because of its volume. this moral effect must be a terrible thing. a body advances to meet another. the defender has only to remain calm, ready to aim, each man pitted against a man before him. the attacking body comes within deadly range. whether or not it halts to fire, it will be a target for the other body which awaits it, calm, ready, sure of its effect. the whole first rank of the assailant falls, smashed. the remainder, little encouraged by their reception, disperse automatically or before the least indication of an advance on them. is this what happens? not at all! the moral effect of the assault worries the defenders. they fire in the air if at all. they disperse immediately before the assailants who are even encouraged by this fire now that it is over. it quickens them in order to avoid a second salvo. it is said by those who fought them in spain and at waterloo that the british are capable of the necessary coolness. i doubt it nevertheless. after firing, they made swift attacks. if they had not, they might have fled. anyhow the english are stolid folks, with little imagination, who try to be logical in all things. the french with their nervous irritability, their lively imagination, are incapable of such a defense. anybody who thinks that he could stand under a second fire is a man without any idea of battle. (prince de ligne). modern history furnishes us with no examples of stonewall troops who can neither be shaken nor driven back, who stand patiently the heaviest fire, yet who retire precipitately when the general orders the retreat. (bismarck). cavalry maneuvers, like those of infantry, are threats. the most threatening win. the formation in ranks is a threat, and more than a threat. a force engaged is out of the hand of its commander. i know, i see what it does, what it is capable of. it acts; i can estimate the effect of its action. but a force in formation is in hand; i know it is there, i see it, feel it. it may be used in any direction. i feel instinctively that it alone can surely reach me, take me on the right, on the left, throw itself into a gap, turn me. it troubles me, threatens me. where is the threatened blow going to fall? the formation in ranks is a serious threat, which may at any moment be put into effect. it awes one in a terrible fashion. in the heat of battle, formed troops do more to secure victory than do those actively engaged. this is true, whether such a body actually exists or whether it exists only in the imagination of the enemy. in an indecisive battle, he wins who can show, and merely show, battalions and squadrons in hand. they inspire the fear of the unknown. from the taking of the entrenchments at fribourg up to the engagement at the bridge of arcola, up to solferino, there occur a multitude of deeds of valor, of positions taken by frontal attack, which deceive every one, generals as well as civilians, and which always cause the same mistakes to be made. it is time to teach these folks that the entrenchments at fribourg were not won by frontal attack, nor was the bridge of arcola (see the correspondence of napoleon i), nor was solferino. lieutenant hercule took fifty cavalry through alpon, ten kilometers on the flank of the austrians at arcola, and the position that held us up for three days, was evacuated. the evacuation was the result of strategic, if not of tactical, moral effect. general or soldier, man is the same. demonstrations should be made at greater or less distance, according to the morale of the enemy. that is to say, battle methods vary with the enemy, and an appropriate method should be employed in each individual case. we have treated and shall treat only of the infantryman. in ancient as in modern battle, he is the one who suffers most. in ancient battle, if he is defeated, he remains because of his slowness at the mercy of the victor. in modern battle the mounted man moves swiftly through danger, the infantryman has to walk. he even has to halt in danger, often and for long periods of time. he who knows the morale of the infantryman, which is put to the hardest proof, knows the morale of all the combatants. . the theory of strong battalions to-day, numbers are considered the essential. napoleon had this tendency (note his strength reports). the romans did not pay so much attention to it. what they paid most attention to was to seeing that everybody fought. we assume that all the personnel present with an army, with a division, with a regiment on the day of battle, fights. right there is the error. the theory of strong battalions is a shameful theory. it does not reckon on courage but on the amount of human flesh. it is a reflection on the soul. great and small orators, all who speak of military matters to-day, talk only of masses. war is waged by enormous masses, etc. in the masses, man as an individual disappears, the number only is seen. quality is forgotten, and yet to-day as always, quality alone produces real effect. the prussians conquered at sadowa with made soldiers, united, accustomed to discipline. such soldiers can be made in three or four years now, for the material training of the soldier is not indeed so difficult. caesar had legions that he found unseasoned, not yet dependable, which had been formed for nine years. austria was beaten because her troops were of poor quality, because they were conscripts. our projected organization will give us four hundred thousand good soldiers. but all our reserves will be without cohesion, if they are thrown into this or that organization on the eve of battle. at a distance, numbers of troops without cohesion may be impressive, but close up they are reduced to fifty or twenty-five per cent. who really fight. wagram was not too well executed. it illustrated desperate efforts that had for once a moral effect on an impressionable enemy. but for once only. would they succeed again? the cimbrians gave an example [ ] and man has not changed. who to-day is braver than they were? and they did not have to face artillery, nor rifles. originally napoleon found as an instrument, an army with good battle methods, and in his best battles, combat followed these methods. he himself prescribed, at least so they say, for he misrepresented at saint helena, the methods used at wagram, at eylau, at waterloo, and engaged enormous masses of infantry which did not give material effect. but it involved a frightful loss of men and a disorder that, after they had once been unleashed, did not permit of the rallying and reemployment that day of the troops engaged. this was a barbaric method, according to the romans, amateurish, if we may say such a thing of such a man; a method which could not be used against experienced and well trained troops such as d'erlon's corps at waterloo. it proved disastrous. napoleon looked only at the result to be attained. when his impatience, or perhaps the lack of experience and knowledge in his officers and soldiers, forbade his continued use of real attack tactics, he completely sacrificed the material effect of infantry and even that of cavalry to the moral effect of masses. the personnel of his armies was too changing. in ancient battle victory cost much less than with modern armies, and the same soldiers remained longer in ranks. at the end of his campaigns, when he had soldiers sixty years old, alexander had lost only seven hundred men by the sword. napoleon's system is more practicable with the russians, who naturally group together, mass up, but it is not the most effective. note the mass formation at inkermann. [ ] what did napoleon i do? he reduced the rôle of man in battle, and depended instead on formed masses. we have not such magnificent material. infantry and cavalry masses showed, toward the end of the empire, a tactical degeneracy resulting from the wearing down of their elements and the consequent lowering of standards of morale and training. but since the allies had recognized and adopted our methods, napoleon really had a reason for trying something so old that it was new to secure that surprise which will give victory once. it can give victory only once however, tried again surprise will be lacking. this was sort of a desperate method which napoleon's supremacy allowed him to adopt when he saw his prestige waning. when misfortune and lack of cannon fodder oppressed him, napoleon became again the practical man not blinded by his supremacy. his entire good sense, his genius, overcame the madness to conquer at all price, and we have his campaign of . general ambert says: "without military traditions, almost without a command, these confused masses (the american armies of the civil war) struck as men struck at agincourt and crecy." at agincourt and crecy, we struck very little, but were struck a lot. these battles were great slaughters of frenchmen, by english and other frenchmen, who did not greatly suffer themselves. in what, except in disorder, did the american battles resemble these butcheries with the knife? the americans were engaged as skirmishers at a distance of leagues. in seeking a resemblance the general has been carried away by the mania for phrase-making. victory is always for the strong battalions. this is true. if sixty determined men can rout a battalion, these sixty must be found. perhaps only as many will be found as the enemy has battalions (note gideon's proportion of three hundred to thirty thousand of one to one hundred.) perhaps it would be far and away better, under these circumstances, to fight at night. . combat methods ancient battle was fought in a confined space. the commander could see his whole force. seeing clearly, his account should have been clear, although we note that many of these ancient accounts are obscure and incomplete, and that we have to supplement them. in modern battle nobody knows what goes on or what has gone on, except from results. narrations cannot enter into details of execution. it is interesting to compare tales of feats of arms, narrated by the victor (so-called) or the vanquished. it is hard to tell which account is truthful, if either. mere assurance may carry weight. military politics may dictate a perversion of the facts for disciplinary, moral or political reasons. (note sommo-sierra.) it is difficult even to determine losses, the leaders are such consummate liars. why is this? it is bewildering to read a french account and then a foreign account of the same event, the facts stated are so entirely different. what is the truth? only results can reveal it, such results as the losses on both sides. they are really instructive if they can be gotten at. i believe that under turenne there was not existent to the same degree a national pride which tended to hide unpleasant truths. the troops in contending armies were often of the same nation. if national vanity and pride were not so touchy about recent occurrences, still passionately debated, numerous lessons might be drawn from our last wars. who can speak impartially of waterloo, or waterloo so much discussed and with such heat, without being ashamed? had waterloo been won, it would not have profited us. napoleon attempted the impossible, which is beyond even genius. after a terrible fight against english firmness and tenacity, a fight in which we were not able to subdue them, the prussians appear. we would have done no better had they not appeared, but they did, very conveniently to sustain our pride. they were confronted. then the rout began. it did not begin in the troops facing the prussians but in those facing the english, who were exhausted perhaps, but not more so than their enemies. this was the moral effect of an attack on their right, when they had rather expected reinforcements to appear. the right conformed to the retrograde movement. and what a movement it was! why do not authorities acknowledge facts and try to formulate combat methods that conform to reality? it would reduce a little the disorder that bothers men not warned of it. they jump perhaps from the frying pan into the fire. i have known two colonels, one of them a very brave man, who said, "let soldiers alone before the enemy. they know what to do better than you do." this is a fine statement of french confidence! that they know better than you what should be done. especially in a panic, i suppose! a long time ago the prince de ligne justified battle formations, above all the famous oblique formation. napoleon decided the question. all discussion of formations is pedantry. but there are moral reasons for the power of the depth formation. the difference between practice and theory is incredible. a general, who has given directions a thousand times on the battle field, when asked for directions, gives this order, "go there, colonel." the colonel, a man of good sense, says, "will you explain, sir? what point do you want me to guide on? how far should i extend? is there anybody on my right? on my left?" the general says, "advance on the enemy, sir. it seems to me that that ought to be enough. what does this hesitation mean?" but my dear general, what are your orders? an officer should know where his command is, and the command itself should know. space is large. if you do not know where to send your troops, and how to direct them, to make them understand where they are to go, to give them guides if necessary, what sort of general are you? what is our method for occupying a fortified work, or a line? we have none! why not adopt that of marshal saxe? ask several generals how they would do it. they will not know. there is always mad impatience for results, without considering the means. a general's ability lies in judging the best moment for attack and in knowing how to prepare for it. we took melegnano without artillery, without maneuver, but at what a price! at waterloo the hougoumont farm held us up all day, cost us dear and disorganized us into a mad mob, until napoleon finally sent eight mortars to smash and burn the château. this is what should have been done at the commencement of the general attack. a rational and ordered method of combat, or if not ordered, known to all, is enough to make good troops, if there is discipline be it understood. the portuguese infantry in the spanish war, to whom the english had taught their method of combat, almost rivalled the english infantry. to-day who has formulated method? who has a traditional method? ask the generals. no two will agree. we have a method, a manner rather, that accords with the national tendency, that of skirmishers in large numbers. but this formation is nowhere formulated. before a campaign it is decried. properly so, for it degenerates rapidly into a flock of lost sheep. consequently troops come to the battle field entirely unused to reality. all the leaders, all the officers, are confused and unoriented. this goes so far that often generals are found who have lost their divisions or brigades; staff officers who have lost their generals and their divisions both; and, although this is more easily understood, many company officers who have lost their commands. this is a serious matter, which might cost us dear in a prolonged war in which the enemy gains experience. let us hope that experience will lead us, not to change the principle, but to modify and form in a practical way our characteristic battle method of escaping by advancing. the brochure of the prince of prussia shows that, without having fought us, the prussians understand our methods. there are men such as marshal bugeaud who are born warriors in character, mental attitude, intelligence and temperament. they recommend and show by example, such as colonel bugeaud's battles in at the hospital bridge, tactics entirely appropriate to their national and personal characters. note wellington and the duke of york among the english. but the execution of tactics such as bugeaud's requires officers who resemble their commanders, at least in courage and decisions. all officers are not of such temper. there is need then of prescribed tactics conforming to the national character, which may serve to guide an ordinary officer without requiring him to have the exceptional ability of a bugeaud. such prescribed tactics would serve an officer as the perfectly clear and well defined tactics of the roman legion served the legion commander. the officer could not neglect them without failing in his duty. of course they will not make him an exceptional leader. but, except in case of utter incapacity they will keep him from entirely failing in his task, from making absurd mistakes. nor will they prevent officers of bugeaud's temper from using their ability. they will on the contrary help them by putting under their command men prepared for the details of battle, which will not then come to them as a surprise. this method need not be as completely dogmatic as the roman. our battle is too varying an affair. but some clearly defined rules, established by experience, would prevent the gross errors of inefficients. (such as causing skirmishers to fall back when the formed rank fires, and consequently allowing them to carry with them in their retreat, the rank itself.) they would be useful aids to men of coolness and decision. the laying down of such tactics would answer the many who hold that everything is improvised on the battle field and who find no better improvisation than to leave the soldier to himself. (see above.) we should try to exercise some control over our soldiers, who advance by flight (note the vendeans) or escape by advancing, as you like. but if something unexpected surprises them, they flee as precipitately. invention is less needed than verification, demonstration and organization of proper methods. to verify; observe better. to demonstrate; try out and describe better. to organize, distribute better, bearing in mind that cohesion means discipline. i do not know who put things that way; but it is truer than ever in this day of invention. with us very few reason or understand reason, very few are cool. their effect is negligible in the disorder of the mass; it is lost in numbers. it follows that we above all need a method of combat, sanely thought out in advance. it must be based on the fact that we are not passively obedient instruments, but very nervous and restless people, who wish to finish things quickly and to know in advance where we are going. it must be based on the fact that we are very proud people, but people who would all skulk if we were not seen, and who consequently must always be seen, and act in the presence of our comrades and of the officers who supervise us. from this comes the necessity for organizing the infantry company solidly. it is the infantryman on whom the battle has the most violent effect, for he is always most exposed; it is he therefore who must be the most solidly supported. unity must be secured by a mutual acquaintanceship of long standing between all elements. if you only use combat methods that require leaders without fear, of high intelligence, full of good sense, of esprit, you will always make mistakes. bugeaud's method was the best for him. but it is evident, in his fight at the hospital bridge that his battalion commanders were useless. if he had not been there, all would have been lost. he alone, omnipresent, was capable of resolute blows that the others could not execute. his system can be summed up in two phrases; always attack even when on the defensive; fire and take cover only when not attacked. his method was rational, considering his mentality and the existing conditions, but in carrying it into execution he judged his officers and soldiers by himself and was deceived. no dogmatic principles can be drawn from his method, nor from any other. man is always man. he does not always possess ability and resolution. the commander must make his choice of methods, depending on his troops and on himself. the essential of tactics is: the science of making men fight with their maximum energy. this alone can give an organization with which to fight fear. this has always been true. we must start here and figure mathematically. mathematics is the dominant science in war, just as battle is its only purpose. pride generally causes refusal to acknowledge the truth that fear of being vanquished is basic in war. in the mass, pride, vanity, is responsible for this dissimulation. with the tiny number of absolutely fearless men, what is responsible is their ignorance of a thing they do not feel. there is however, no real basis but this, and all real tactics are based on it. discipline is a part of tactics, is absolutely at the base of tactics, as the romans showed. they excelled the gauls in intelligence, but not in bravery. to start with: take battalions of four companies, four platoons each, in line or in column. the order of battle may be: two platoons deployed as skirmishers, two companies in reserve, under command of the battalion commander. in obtaining a decision destructive action will come from skirmishers. this action should be directed by battalion commanders, but such direction is not customary. no effect will be secured from skirmishers at six hundred paces. they will never, never, never, be nicely aligned in front of their battalions, calm and collected, after an advance. they will not, even at maneuvers. the battalion commander ought to be advanced enough to direct his skirmishers. the whole battalion, one-half engaged, one-half ready for any effort, ought to remain under his command, under his personal direction as far as possible. in the advance the officers, the soldiers, are content if they are merely directed; but, when the battle becomes hot, they must see their commander, know him to be near. it does not matter even if he is without initiative, incapable of giving an order. his presence creates a belief that direction exists, that orders exist, and that is enough. when the skirmishers meet with resistance, they fall back to the ranks. it is the rôle of reserves to support and reinforce the line, and above all, by a swift charge to cut the enemy's line. this then falls back and the skirmishers go forward again, if the advance is resumed. the second line should be in the formation, battalions in line or in column, that hides it best. cover the infantry troops before their entry into action; cover them as much as possible and by any means; take advantage of the terrain; make them lie down. this is the english method in defense of heights, instanced in spain and at waterloo. only one bugle to each battalion should sound calls. what else is there to be provided for? many haughty generals would scream protests like eagles if it were suggested that they take such precautions for second line battalions or first line troops not committed to action. yet this is merely a sane measure to insure good order without the slightest implication of cowardice. [ ] with breech-loading weapons, the skirmishers on the defensive fire almost always from a prone position. they are made to rise with difficulty, either for retreat or for advance. this renders the defense more tenacious.... chapter ii infantry . masses--deep columns. study of the effect of columns brings us to the consideration of mass operations in general. read this singular argument in favor of attacks by battalions in close columns: "a column cannot stop instantly without a command. suppose your first rank stops at the instant of shock: the twelve ranks of the battalion, coming up successively, would come in contact with it, pushing it forward.... experiments made have shown that beyond the sixteenth the impulsion of the ranks in rear has no effect on the front, it is completely taken up by the fifteen ranks already massed behind the first.... to make the experiment, march at charging pace and command halt to the front rank without warning the rest. the ranks will precipitate themselves upon each other unless they be very attentive, or unless, anticipating the command, they check themselves unconsciously while marching." but in a real charge, all your ranks are attentive, restless, anxious about what is taking place at the front and, if the latter halts, if the first line stops, there will be a movement to the rear and not to the front. take a good battalion, possessed of extraordinary calmness and coolness, thrown full speed on the enemy, at one hundred and twenty steps to the minute. to-day it would have to advance under a fire of five shots a minute! at this last desperate moment if the front rank stops, it will not be pushed, according to the theory of successive impulses, it will be upset. the second line will arrive only to fall over the first and so on. there should be a drill ground test to see up to what rank this falling of the pasteboard figures would extend. physical impulse is merely a word. if the front rank stops it will let itself fall and be trampled under foot rather than cede to the pressure that pushes it forward. any one experienced in infantry engagements of to-day knows that is just what happens. this shows the error of the theory of physical impulse--a theory that continues to dictate as under the empire (so strong is routine and prejudice) attacks in close column. such attacks are marked by absolute disorder and lack of leadership. take a battalion fresh from barracks, in light marching order; intent only on the maneuver to be executed. it marches in close column in good order; its subdivisions are full four paces apart. the non-commissioned officers control the men. but it is true that if the terrain is slightly accidented, if the guide does not march with mathematical precision, the battalion in close column becomes in the twinkling of an eye a flock of sheep. what would happen to a battalion in such a formation, at one hundred paces from the enemy? nobody will ever see such an instance in these days of the rifle. if the battalion has marched resolutely, if it is in good order, it is ten to one that the enemy has already withdrawn without waiting any longer. but suppose the enemy does not flinch? then the man of our days, naked against iron and lead, no longer controls himself. the instinct of preservation controls him absolutely. there are two ways of avoiding or diminishing the danger; they are to flee or to throw one-self upon it. let us rush upon it. now, however small the intervals of space and time that separate us from the enemy, instinct shows itself. we rush forward, but ... generally, we rush with prudence, with a tendency to let the most urgent ones, the most intrepid ones, pass on. it is strange, but true, that the nearer we approach the enemy, the less we are closed up. adieu to the theory of pressure. if the front rank is stopped, those behind fall down rather than push it. even if this front rank is pushed, it will itself fall down rather than advance. there is nothing to wonder at, it is sheer fact. any pushing is to the rear. (battle of diernstein.) to-day more than ever flight begins in the rear, which is affected quite as much as the front. mass attacks are incomprehensible. not one out of ten was ever carried to completion and none of them could be maintained against counter-attacks. they can be explained only by the lack of confidence of the generals in their troops. napoleon expressly condemns in his memoirs such attacks. he, therefore, never ordered them. but when good troops were used up, and his generals believed they could not obtain from young troops determined attacks in tactical formation, they came back to the mass formation, which belongs to the infancy of the art, as a desperate resort. if you use this method of pressing, of pushing, your force will disappear as before a magician's wand. but the enemy does not stand; the moral pressure of danger that precedes you is too strong for him. otherwise, those who stood and aimed even with empty rifles, would never see a charge come up to them. the first line of the assailant would be sensible of death and no one would wish to be in the first rank. therefore, the enemy never merely stands; because if he does, it is you that flee. this always does away with the shock. the enemy entertains no smaller anxiety than yours. when he sees you near, for him also the question is whether to flee or to advance. two moral impulses are in conflict. this is the instinctive reasoning of the officer and soldier, "if these men wait for me to close with them, it means death. i will kill, but i will undoubtedly be killed. at the muzzle of the gun-barrel the bullet can not fail to find its mark. but if i can frighten them, they will run away. i can shoot them and bayonet in the back. let us make a try at it." the trial is made, and one of the two forces, at some stage of the advance, perhaps only at two paces, makes an about and gets the bayonet in the back. imagination always sees loaded arms and this fancy is catching. the shock is a mere term. the de saxe, the bugeaud theory: "close with the bayonet and with fire action at close quarters. that is what kills people and the victor is the one who kills most," is not founded on fact. no enemy awaits you if you are determined, and never, never, never, are two equal determinations opposed to each other. it is well known to everybody, to all nations, that the french have never met any one who resisted a bayonet charge. the english in spain, marching resolutely in face of the charges of the french in column, have always defeated them.... the english were not dismayed at the mass. if napoleon had recalled the defeat of the giants of the armada by the english vessels, he might not have ordered the use of the d'erlon column. blücher in his instructions to his troops, recalled that the french have never held out before the resolute march of the prussians in attack column.... suvaroff used no better tactics. yet his battalions in italy drove us at the point of their bayonets. each nation in europe says: "no one stands his ground before a bayonet charge made by us." all are right. the french, no more than others, resist a resolute attack. all are persuaded that their attacks are irresistable; that an advance will frighten the enemy into flight. whether the bayonet be fixed or in the scabbard makes no difference.... there is an old saying that young troops become uneasy if any one comes upon them in a tumult and in disorder; the old troops, on the contrary, see victory therein. at the commencement of a war, all troops are young. our impetuosity pushes us to the front like fools ... the enemy flees. if the war lasts, everybody becomes inured. the enemy no longer troubles himself when in front of troops charging in a disordered way, because he knows and feels that they are moved as much by fear as by determination. good order alone impresses the enemy in an attack, for it indicates real determination. that is why it is necessary to secure good order and retain it to the very last. it is unwise to take the running step prematurely, because you become a flock of sheep and leave so many men behind that you will not reach your objective. the close column is absurd; it turns you in advance into a flock of sheep, where officers and men are jumbled together without mutual support. it is then necessary to march as far as possible in such order as best permits the action of the non-commissioned officers, the action of unity, every one marching in front of eye-witnesses, in the open. on the other hand, in closed columns man marches unobserved and on the slightest pretext he lies down or remains behind. therefore, it is best always to keep the skirmishers in advance or on the flanks, and never to recall them when in proximity to the enemy. to do so establishes a counter current that carries away your men. let your skirmishers alone. they are your lost children; they will know best how to take care of themselves. to sum up: there is no shock of infantry on infantry. there is no physical impulse, no force of mass. there is but a moral impulse. no one denies that this moral impulse is stronger as one feels better supported, that it has greater effect on the enemy as it menaces him with more men. from this it follows that the column is more valuable for the attack than the deployed order. it might be concluded from this long statement that a moral pressure, which always causes flight when a bold attack is made, would not permit any infantry to hold out against a cavalry charge; never, indeed, against a determined charge. but infantry must resist when it is not possible to flee, and until there is complete demoralization, absolute terror, the infantry appreciates this. every infantryman knows it is folly to flee before cavalry when the rifle is infallible at point-blank, at least from the rider's point of view. it is true that every really bold charge ought to succeed. but whether man is on foot or on horseback, he is always man. while on foot he has but himself to force; on horseback he must force man and beast to march against the enemy. and mounted, to flee is so easy. (remark by varney). we have seen then in an infantry mass those in rear are powerless to push those in front unless the danger is greater in rear. the cavalry has long understood this. it attacks in a column at double distance rather than at half-distance, in order to avoid the frightful confusion of the mass. and yet, the allurement of mathematical reasoning is such that cavalry officers, especially the germans, have seriously proposed attacking infantry by deep masses, so that the units in rear might give impulse to those in front. they cite the proverb, "one nail drives the other." what can you say to people who talk such nonsense? nothing, except, "attack us always in this way." real bayonet attacks occurred in the crimean war. (inkermann). [ ] they were carried out by a small force against a larger one. the power of mass had no influence in such cases. it was the mass which fell back, turned tail even before the shock. the troops who made the bold charge did nothing but strike and fire at backs. these instances show men unexpectedly finding themselves face to face with the enemy, at a distance at which a man can close fearlessly without falling out on the way breathless. they are chance encounters. man is not yet demoralized by fire; he must strike or fall back.... combat at close quarters does not exist. at close quarters occurs the ancient carnage when one force strikes the other in the back. columns have absolutely but a moral effect. they are threatening dispositions.... the mass impulse of cavalry has long been discredited. you have given up forming it in deep ranks although cavalry possesses a speed that would bring on more of a push upon the front at a halt than the last ranks of the infantry would bring upon the first. yet you believe in the mass action of infantry! as long as the ancient masses marched forward, they did not lose a man and no one lay down to avoid the combat. dash lasted up to the time of stopping; the run was short in every case. in modern masses, in french masses especially, the march can be continued, but the mass loses while marching under fire. moral pressure, continually exerted during a long advance, stops one-half of the combatants on the way. to-day, above all in france, man protests against such use of his life. the frenchman wants to fight, to return blow for blow. if he is not allowed to, this is what happens. it happened to napoleon's masses. let us take wagram, where his mass was not repulsed. out of twenty-two thousand men, three thousand to fifteen hundred reached the position. certainly the position was not carried by them, but by the material and moral effect of a battery of one hundred pieces, cavalry, etc., etc. were the nineteen thousand missing men disabled? no. seven out of twenty-two, a third, an enormous proportion may have been hit. what became of the twelve thousand unaccounted for? they had lain down on the road, had played dummy in order not to go on to the end. in the confused mass of a column of deployed battalions, surveillance, difficult enough in a column at normal distances, is impossible. nothing is easier than dropping out through inertia; nothing more common. this thing happens to every body of troops marching forward, under fire, in whatever formation it may be. the number of men falling out in this way, giving up at the least opportunity, is greater as formation is less fixed and the surveillance of officers and comrades more difficult. in a battalion in closed column, this kind of temporary desertion is enormous; one-half of the men drop out on the way. the first platoon is mingled with the fourth. they are really a flock of sheep. no one has control, all being mixed. even if, in virtue of the first impulse, the position is carried, the disorder is so great that if it is counter-attacked by four men, it is lost. the condition of morale of such masses is fully described in the battle of caesar against the nervii, marius against the cimbri. [ ] what better arguments against deep columns could there be than the denials of napoleon at st. helena? . skirmishers--supports--reserves--squares this is singular. the cavalry has definite tactics. essentially it knows how it fights. the infantry does not. our infantry no longer has any battle tactics; the initiative of the soldier rules. the soldiers of the first empire trusted to the moral and passive action of masses. to-day, the soldiers object to the passive action of masses. they fight as skirmishers, or they march to the front as a flock of sheep of which three-fourths seek cover enroute, if the fire is heavy. the first method, although better than the second, is bad unless iron discipline and studied and practical methods of fighting insure maintaining strong reserves. these should be in the hands of the leaders and officers for support purposes, to guard against panics, and to finish by the moral effect of a march on the enemy, of flank menaces, etc., the destructive action of the skirmishers. to-day when the ballistic arm is so deadly, so effective, a unit which closes up in order to fight is a unit in which morale is weakened. maneuver is possible only with good organization; otherwise it is no more effective than the passive mass or a rabble in an attack. in ancient combat, the soldier was controlled by the leader in engagements; now that fighting is open, the soldier cannot be controlled. often he cannot even be directed. consequently it is necessary to begin an action at the latest possible moment, and to have the immediate commanders understand what is wanted, what their objectives are, etc. in the modern engagement, the infantryman gets from under our control by scattering, and we say: a soldier's war. wrong, wrong. to solve this problem, instead of scattering to the winds, let us increase the number of rallying points by solidifying the companies. from them come battalions; from battalions come regiments. action in open order was not possible nor evident under turenne. the majority of the soldiers that composed the army, were not held near at hand, in formation. they fought badly. there was a general seeking for cover. note the conduct of the americans in their late war. the organization of the legion of marshal saxe shows the strength of the tendency toward shock action as opposed to fire action. the drills, parades and firing at potsdam were not the tactics of old fritz. frederick's secret was promptitude and rapidity of movement. but they were popularly believed to be his means. people were fond of them, and are yet. the prussians for all their leaning toward parade, mathematics, etc., ended by adopting the best methods. the prussians of jena were taken in themselves by frederick's methods. but since then they have been the first to strike out in a practical way, while we, in france, are still laboring at the potsdam drills. the greater number of generals who fought in the last wars, under real battle conditions, ask for skirmishers in large units, well supported. our men have such a strong tendency to place themselves in such units even against the will of their leaders, that they do not fight otherwise. a number of respectable authors and military men advocate the use of skirmishers in large bodies, as being dictated by certain necessities of war. ask them to elucidate this mode of action, and you will see that this talk of skirmishers in large bodies is nothing else but an euphemism for absolute disorder. an attempt has been made to fit the theory to the fact. yet the use of skirmishers in large bodies is absurd with frenchmen under fire, when the terrain and the sharpness of the action cause the initiative and direction to escape from the commanders, and leave it to the men, to small groups of soldiers. arms are for use. the best disposition for material effect in attack or defense is that which permits the easiest and most deadly use of arms. this disposition is the scattered thin line. the whole of the science of combat lies then in the happy, proper combination, of the open order, scattered to secure destructive effect, and a good disposition of troops in formation as supports and reserves, so as to finish by moral effect the action of the advanced troops. the proper combination varies with the enemy, his morale and the terrain. on the other hand, the thin line can have good order only with a severe discipline, a unity which our men attain from pride. pride exists only among people who know each other well, who have esprit de corps, and company spirit. there is a necessity for an organization that renders unity possible by creating the real individuality of the company. self-esteem is unquestionably one of the most powerful motives which moves our men. they do not wish to pass for cowards in the eyes of their comrades. if they march forward they want to distinguish themselves. after every attack, formation (not the formation of the drill ground but that adopted by those rallying to the chief, those marching with him,) no longer exists. this is because of the inherent disorder of every forward march under fire. the bewildered men, even the officers, have no longer the eyes of their comrades or of their commander upon them, sustaining them. self-esteem no longer impels them, they do not hold out; the least counter-offensive puts them to rout. the experience of the evening ought always to serve the day following; but as the next day is never identical with the evening before, the counsel of experience can not be applied to the latter. when confused battalions shot at each other some two hundred paces for some time with arms inferior to those of our days, flight commenced at the wings. therefore, said experience, let us reënforce the wings, and the battalion was placed between two picked companies. but it was found that the combat methods had been transformed. the elite companies were then reassembled into picked corps and the battalion, weaker than ever, no longer had reënforced wings. perhaps combat in open order predominates, and the companies of light infantrymen being, above all, skirmishers, the battalion again is no longer supported. in our day the use of deployed battalions as skirmishers is no longer possible; and one of the essential reasons for picked companies is the strengthening of the battalion. the question has been asked; who saved the french army on the beresina and at hanau? the guard, it is true. but, outside of the picked corps, what was the french army then? droves, not troops. abnormal times, abnormal deeds. the beresina, hanau, prove nothing to-day. with the rapid-firing arms of infantry to-day, the advantage belongs to the defense which is completed by offensive movements carried out at opportune times. fire to-day is four or five times more rapid even if quite as haphazard as in the days of muzzle loaders. everybody says that this renders impossible the charges of cavalry against infantry which has not been completely thrown into disorder, demoralized. what then must happen to charges of infantry, which marches while the cavalry charges? attacks in deep masses are no longer seen. they are not wise, and never were wise. to advance to the attack with a line of battalions in column, with large intervals and covered by a thick line of skirmishers, when the artillery has prepared the terrain, is very well. people with common sense have never done otherwise. but the thick line of skirmishers is essential. i believe that is the crux of the matter. but enough of this. it is simple prudence for the artillery to prepare the infantry action by a moment's conversation with the artillery of the enemy infantry. if that infantry is not commanded by an imbecile, as it sometimes is, it will avoid that particular conversation the arguments of which would break it up, although they may not be directed precisely in its direction. all other things being equal, both infantries suffer the same losses in the artillery duel. the proportion does not vary, however complete the artillery preparation. one infantry must always close with another under rapid fire from troops in position, and such a fire is, to-day more than ever, to the advantage of the defense. ten men come towards me; they are at four hundred meters; with the ancient arm, i have time to kill but two before they reach me; with rapid fire, i have time to kill four or five. morale does not increase with losses. the eight remaining might reach me in the first case; the five or six remaining will certainly not in the second. if distance be taken, the leader can be seen, the file-closers see, the platoon that follows watches the preceding. dropping out always exists, but it is less extensive with an open order, the men running more risks of being recognized. stragglers will be fewer as the companies know each other better, and as the officers and men are more dependable. it is difficult, if not impossible, to get the french infantry to make use of its fire before charging. if it fires, it will not charge, because it will continue to fire. (bugeaud's method of firing during the advance is good.) what is needed, then, is skirmishers, who deliver the only effective fire, and troops in formation who push the skirmishers on, in themselves advancing to the attack. the soldier wants to be occupied, to return shot for shot. place him in a position to act immediately, individually. then, whatever he does, you have not wholly lost your authority over him. again and again and again, at drill, the officers and non-commissioned officer ought to tell the private: "this is taught you to serve you under such circumstances." generals, field officers, ought to tell officers the same thing. this alone can make an instructed army like the roman army. but to-day, who of us can explain page for page, the use of anything ordered by our tactical regulations except the school of the skirmisher? "forward," "retreat," and "by the flank," are the only practical movements under fire. but the others should be explained. explain the position of "carry arms" with the left hand. explain the ordinary step. explain firing at command in the school of the battalion. it is well enough for the school of the platoon, because a company can make use thereof, but a battalion never can. everything leads to the belief that battle with present arms will be, in the same space of time, more deadly than with ancient ones. the trajectory of the projectile reaching further, the rapidity of firing being four times as great, more men will be put out of commission in less time. while the arm becomes more deadly, man does not change, his morale remains capable of certain efforts and the demands upon it become stronger. morale is overtaxed; it reaches more rapidly the maximum of tension which throws the soldier to the front or rear. the rôle of commanders is to maintain morale, to direct those movements which men instinctively execute when heavily engaged and under the pressure of danger. napoleon i said that in battle, the rôle of skirmishers is the most fatiguing and most deadly. this means that under the empire, as at present, the strongly engaged infantry troops rapidly dissolved into skirmishers. the action was decided by the moral agency of the troops not engaged, held in hand, capable of movement in any direction and acting as a great menace of new danger to the adversary, already shaken by the destructive action of the skirmishers. the same is true to-day. but the greater force of fire arms requires, more than ever, that they be utilized. the rôle of the skirmisher becomes preëminently the destructive role; it is forced on every organization seriously engaged by the greater moral pressure of to-day which causes men to scatter sooner. commanders-in-chief imagine formed battalions firing on the enemy and do not include the use of skirmishers in drill. this is an error, for they are necessary in drill and everywhere, etc. the formed rank is more difficult to utilize than ever. general leboeuf used a very practical movement of going into battle, by platoons, which advance to the battle line in echelon, and can fire, even if they are taken in the very act of the movement. there is always the same dangerous tendency toward mass action even for a battalion in maneuver. this is an error. the principles of maneuver for small units should not be confused with those for great units. emperor napoleon did not prescribe skirmishers in flat country. but every officer should be reduced who does not utilize them to some degree. the rôle of the skirmisher becomes more and more predominant. he should be so much the more watched and directed as he is used against more deadly arms, and, consequently, is more disposed to escape from all control, from all direction. yet under such battle conditions formations are proposed which send skirmishers six hundred paces in advance of battalions and which give the battalion commander the mission of watching and directing (with six companies of one hundred and twenty men) troops spread over a space of three hundred paces by five hundred, at a minimum. to advance skirmishers six hundred paces from their battalion and to expect they will remain there is the work of people who have never observed. inasmuch as combat by skirmishers tends to predominate and since it becomes more difficult with the increase of danger, there has been a constant effort to bring into the firing line the man who must direct it. leaders have been seen to spread an entire battalion in front of an infantry brigade or division so that the skirmishers, placed under a single command, might obey a general direction better. this method, scarcely practicable on the drill-ground, and indicating an absolute lack of practical sense, marks the tendency. the authors of new drills go too far in the opposite direction. they give the immediate command of the skirmishers in each battalion to the battalion commander who must at the same time lead his skirmishers and his battalion. this expedient is more practical than the other. it abandons all thought of an impossible general control and places the special direction in the right hands. but the leadership is too distant, the battalion commander has to attend to the participation of his battalion in the line, or in the ensemble of other battalions of the brigade or division, and the particular performance of his skirmishers. the more difficult, confused, the engagement becomes, the more simple and clear ought to be the roles of each one. skirmishers are in need of a firmer hand than ever to direct and maintain them, so that they may do their part. the battalion commander must be entirely occupied with the rôle of skirmishers, or with the rôle of the line. there should be smaller battalions, one-half the number in reserve, one-half as skirmisher battalions. in the latter the men should be employed one-half as skirmishers and one-half held in reserve. the line of skirmishers will then gain steadiness. let the battalion commander of the troops of the second line entirely occupy himself with his battalion. the full battalion of six companies is to-day too unwieldy for one man. have battalions of four companies of one hundred men each, which is certainly quite sufficient considering the power of destruction which these four companies place in the hands of one man. he will have difficulty in maintaining and directing these four companies under the operation of increasingly powerful modern appliances. he will have difficulty in watching them, in modern combat, with the greater interval between the men in line that the use of the present arms necessitates. with a unified battalion of six hundred men, i would do better against a battalion of one thousand prussians, than with a battalion of eight hundred men, two hundred of whom are immediately taken out of my control. skirmishers have a destructive effect; formed troops a moral effect. drill ground maneuvers should prepare for actual battle. in such maneuvers, why, at the decisive moment of an attack, should you lighten the moral anxiety of the foe by ceasing his destruction, by calling back your skirmishers? if the enemy keeps his own skirmishers and marches resolutely behind them, you are lost, for his moral action upon you is augmented by his destructive action against which you have kindly disarmed yourself. why do you call back your skirmishers? is it because your skirmishers hinder the operation of your columns, block bayonet charges? one must never have been in action to advance such a reason. at the last moment, at the supreme moment when one or two hundred meters separate you from the adversary, there is no longer a line. there is a fearless advance, and your skirmishers are your forlorn hope. let them charge on their own account. let them be passed or pushed forward by the mass. do not recall them. do not order them to execute any maneuver for they are not capable of any, except perhaps, that of falling back and establishing a counter-current which might drag you along. in these moments, everything hangs by a thread. is it because your skirmishers would prevent you from delivering fire? do you, then, believe in firing, especially in firing under the pressure of approaching danger, before the enemy? if he is wise, certainly he marches preceded by skirmishers, who kill men in your ranks and who have the confidence of a first success, of having seen your skirmishers disappear before them. these skirmishers will certainly lie down before your unmasked front. in that formation they easily cause you losses, and you are subjected to their destructive effect and to the moral effect of the advance of troops in formation against you. your ranks become confused; you do not hold the position. there is but one way of holding it, that is to advance, and for that, it is necessary at all costs to avoid firing before moving ahead. fire opened, no one advances further. do you believe in opening and ceasing fire at the will of the commander as on the drill ground? the commencement of fire by a battalion, with the present arms especially, is the beginning of disorder, the moment where the battalion begins to escape from its leader. while drilling even, the battalion commanders, after a little lively drill, after a march, can no longer control the fire. do you object that no one ever gets within two hundred meters of the enemy? that a unit attacking from the front never succeeds? so be it! let us attack from the flank. but a flank is always more or less covered. men are stationed there, ready for the blow. it will be necessary to pick off these men. to-day, more than ever, no rapid, calm firing is possible except skirmish firing. the rapidity of firing has reduced six ranks to two ranks. with reliable troops who have no need of the moral support of a second rank behind them, one rank suffices to-day. at any rate, it is possible to await attack in two ranks. in prescribing fire at command, in seeking to minimize the rôle of skirmishers instead of making it predominate, you take sides with the germans. we are not fitted for that sort of game. if they adopt fire at command, it is just one more reason for our finding another method. we have invented, discovered the skirmisher; he is forced upon us by our men, our arms, etc. he must be organized. in fire by rank, in battle, men gather into small groups and become confused. the more space they have, the less will be the disorder. formed in two ranks, each rank should be still thinner. all the shots of the second line are lost. the men should not touch; they should be far apart. the second rank in firing from position at a supreme moment, ought not to be directly behind the first. the men ought to be echeloned behind the first. there will always be firing from position on any front. it is necessary to make this firing as effective and as easy as possible. i do not wish to challenge the experiences of the target range but i wish to put them to practical use. it is evident that the present arms are more deadly than the ancient ones; the morale of the troops will therefore be more severely shaken. the influence of the leader should be greater over the combatants, those immediately engaged. if it seems rational, let colonels engage in action, with the battalions of their regiment in two lines. one battalion acts as skirmishers; the other battalion waits, formed ready to aid the first. if you do not wish so to utilize the colonels, put all the battalions of the regiment in the first line, and eventually use them as skirmishers. the thing is inevitable; it will be done in spite of you. do it yourself at the very first opportunity. the necessity of replenishing the ammunition supply so quickly used up by the infantry, requires engaging the infantry by units only, which can be relieved by other units after the exhaustion of the ammunition supply. as skirmishers are exhausted quickly, engage entire battalions as skirmishers, assisted by entire battalions as supports or reserves. this is a necessary measure to insure good order. do not throw into the fight immediately the four companies of the battalion. up to the crucial moment, the battalion commander ought to guard against throwing every one into the fight. there is a mania, seen in our maneuver camps, for completely covering a battle front, a defended position, by skirmishers, without the least interval between the skirmishers of different battalions. what will be the result? initially a waste of men and ammunition. then, difficulty in replacing them. why cover the front everywhere? if you do, then what advantage is there in being able to see from a great distance? leave large intervals between your deployed companies. we are no longer only one hundred meters from the enemy at the time of firing. since we are able to see at a great distance we do not risk having the enemy dash into these intervals unexpectedly. your skirmisher companies at large intervals begin the fight, the killing. while your advance companies move ahead, the battalion commander follows with his formed companies, defilading them as much as possible. he lets them march. if the skirmishers fight at the halt, he supervises them. if the commanding officer wishes to reënforce his line, if he wants to face an enemy who attempts to advance into an interval, if he has any motive for doing it, in a word, he rushes new skirmishers into the interval. certainly, these companies have more of the forward impulse, more dash, if dash is needed, than the skirmishers already in action. if they pass the first skirmishers, no harm is done. there you have echelons already formed. the skirmishers engaged, seeing aid in front of them, can be launched ahead more easily. besides, the companies thrown into this interval are a surprise for the enemy. that is something to be considered, as is the fact that so long as there is fighting at a halt, intervals in the skirmish lines are fit places for enemy bullets. furthermore, these companies remain in the hands of their leaders. with the present method of reënforcing skirmishers--i am speaking of the practical method of the battlefield, not of theory--a company, starting from behind the skirmishers engaged, without a place in which to deploy, does not find anything better to do than to mingle with the skirmishers. here it doubles the number of men, but in doing so brings disorder, prevents the control of the commanders and breaks up the regularly constituted groups. while the closing up of intervals to make places for new arrivals is good on the drill ground, or good before or after the combat, it never works during battle. no prescribed interval will be kept exactly. it will open, it will close, following the fluctuations of the combat. but the onset, during which it can be kept, is not the moment of brisk combat; it is the moment of the engagement, of contact, consequently, of feeling out. it is essential that there remain space in which to advance. suppose you are on a plain, for in a maneuver one starts from the flat terrain. in extending the new company it will reënforce the wings of the others, the men naturally supporting the flanks of their comrades. the individual intervals will lessen in order to make room for the new company. the company will always have a well determined central group, a rallying point for the others. if the interval has disappeared there is always time to employ the emergency method of doubling the ranks in front; but one must not forget, whatever the course taken, to preserve good order. we cannot resist closing intervals between battalions; as if we were still in the times of the pikemen when, indeed, it was possible to pass through an interval! to-day, the fighting is done ten times farther away, and the intervals between battalions are not weak joints. they are covered by the fire of the skirmishers, as well covered by fire as the rest of the front, and invisible to the enemy. skirmishers and masses are the formations for action of poorly instructed french troops. with instruction and unity there would be skirmishers supported and formation in battalion columns at most. troops in close order can have only a moral effect, for the attack, or for a demonstration. if you want to produce a real effect, use musketry. for this it is necessary to form a single line. formations have purely moral effect. whoever counts on their material, effective action against reliable, cool troops, is mistaken and is defeated. skirmishers alone do damage. picked shots would do more if properly employed. in attacking a position, start the charge at the latest possible moment, when the leader thinks he can reach the objective not all out of breath. until then, it has been possible to march in rank, that is under the officers, the rank not being the mathematical line, but the grouping in the hands of the leader, under his eye. with the run comes confusion. many stop, the fewer as the run is shorter. they lie down on the way and will rejoin only if the attack succeeds, if they join at all. if by running too long the men are obliged to stop in order to breathe and rest, the dash is broken, shattered. at the advance, very few will start. there are ten chances to one of seeing the attack fail, of turning it into a joke, with cries of "forward with fixed bayonet," but none advancing, except some brave men who will be killed uselessly. the attack vanishes finally before the least demonstration of the foe. an unfortunate shout, a mere nothing, can destroy it. absolute rules are foolish, the conduct of every charge being an affair requiring tact. but so regulate by general rules the conduct of an infantry charge that those who commence it too far away can properly be accused of panic. and there is a way. regulate it as the cavalry charge is regulated, and have a rearguard in each battalion of non-commissioned officers, of most reliable officers, in order to gather together, to follow close upon the charge, at a walk, and to collect all those who have lain down so as not to march or because they were out of breath. this rearguard might consist of a small platoon of picked shots, such as we need in each battalion. the charge ought to be made at a given distance, else it vanishes, evaporates. the leader who commences it too soon either has no head, or does not want to gain his objective. the infantry of the line, as opposed to elite commands, should not be kept in support. the least firm, the most impressionable, are thus sent into the road stained with the blood of the strongest. we place them, after a moral anxiety of waiting, face to face with the terrible destruction and mutilation of modern weapons. if antiquity had need of solid troops as supports, we have a greater need of them. death in ancient combat was not as horrible as in the modern battle where the flesh is mangled, slashed by artillery fire. in ancient combat, except in defeat, the wounded were few in number. this is the reply to those who wish to begin an action by chasseurs, zouaves, etc. he, general or mere captain, who employs every one in the storming of a position can be sure of seeing it retaken by an organized counter-attack of four men and a corporal. in order that we may have real supervision and responsibility in units from companies to brigades, the supporting troops ought to be of the same company, the same battalion, the same brigade, as the case may be. each brigade ought to have its two lines, each battalion its skirmishers, etc. the system of holding out a reserve as long as possible for independent action when the enemy has used his own, ought to be applied downwards. each battalion should have its own, each regiment its own, firmly maintained. there is more need than ever to-day, for protecting the supporting forces, the reserves. the power of destruction increases, the morale remains the same. the tests of morale, being more violent than previously, ought to be shorter, because the power of morale has not increased. the masses, reserves, the second, the first lines, should be protected and sheltered even more than the skirmishers. squares sometimes are broken by cavalry which pursues the skirmishers into the square. instead of lying down, they rush blindly to their refuge which they render untenable and destroy. no square can hold out against determined troops.... but! the infantry square is not a thing of mechanics, of mathematical reasoning; it is a thing of morale. a platoon in four ranks, two facing the front, two the rear, its flanks guarded by the extreme files that face to the flank, and conducted, supported by the non-commissioned officers placed in a fifth rank, in the interior of the rectangle, powerful in its compactness and its fire, cannot be dislodged by cavalry. however, this platoon will prefer to form a part of a large square, it will consider itself stronger, because of numbers, and indeed it will be, since the feeling of force pervades this whole force. this feeling is power in war. people who calculate only according to the fire delivered, according to the destructive power of infantry, would have it fight deployed against cavalry. they do not consider that although supported and maintained, although such a formation seem to prevent flight, the very impetus of the charge, if led resolutely, will break the deployment before the shock arrives. it is clear that if the charge is badly conducted, whether the infantry be solid or not, it will never reach its objective. why? moral reasons and no others make the soldier in a square feel himself stronger than when in line. he feels himself watched from behind and has nowhere to flee. . firing it is easy to misuse breech-loading weapons, such as the rifle. the fashion to-day is to use small intrenchments, covering battalions. as old as powder. such shelter is an excellent device on the condition, however, that behind it, a useful fire can be delivered. look at these two ranks crouched under the cover of a small trench. follow the direction of the shots. even note the trajectory shown by the burst of flame. you will be convinced that, under such conditions, even simple horizontal firing is a fiction. in a second, there will be wild firing on account of the noise, the crowding, the interference of the two ranks. next everybody tries to get under the best possible cover. good-by firing. it is essential to save ammunition, to get all possible efficiency from the arm. yet the official adoption of fire by rank insures relapsing into useless firing at random. good shots are wasted, placed where it is impossible for them to fire well. since we have a weapon that fires six times more rapidly than the ancient weapon, why not profit by it to cover a given space with six times fewer riflemen than formerly? riflemen placed at greater intervals, will be less bewildered, will see more clearly, will be better watched (which may seem strange to you), and will consequently deliver a better fire than formerly. besides, they will expend six times less ammunition. that is the vital point. you must always have ammunition available, that is to say, troops which have not been engaged. reserves must be held out. this is hard to manage perhaps. it is not so hard to manage, however, as fire by command. what is the use of fire by rank? by command? it is impracticable against the enemy, except in extraordinary cases. any attempt at supervision of it is a joke! file firing? the first rank can shoot horizontally, the only thing required; the second rank can fire only into the air. it is useless to fire with our bulky knapsacks interfering so that our men raise the elbow higher than the shoulder. learn what the field pack can be from the english, prussians, austrians, etc.... could the pack not be thicker and less wide? have the first rank open; let the second be checkerwise; and let firing against cavalry be the only firing to be executed in line. one line will be better than two, because it will not be hindered by the one behind it. one kind of fire is practicable and efficient, that of one rank. this is the fire of skirmishers in close formation. the king's order of june st, , reads (p. ): "experience in war having proved that three ranks fire standing, and the intention of his majesty being to prescribe only what can be executed in front of the enemy, he orders that in firing, the first man is never to put his knee on the ground, and that the three ranks fire standing at the same time." this same order includes instructions on target practice, etc. marshal de gouvion-saint cyr says that conservatively one-fourth of the men who are wounded in an affair are put out of commission by the third rank. this estimate is not high enough if it concerns a unit composed of recruits like those who fought at lützen and bautzen. the marshal mentions the astonishment of napoleon when he saw the great number of men wounded in the hand and forearm. this astonishment of napoleon's is singular. what ignorance in his marshals not to have explained such wounds! chief surgeon larrey, by observation of the wounds, alone exonerated our soldiers of the accusation of self-inflicted wounds. the observation would have been made sooner, had the wounds heretofore been numerous. that they had not been can be explained only by the fact that while the young soldiers of kept instinctively close in ranks, up to that time the men must have spaced themselves instinctively, in order to be able to shoot. or perhaps in , these young men might have been allowed to fire a longer time in order to distract them and keep them in ranks, and not often allowed to act as skirmishers for fear of losing them. whilst formerly, the fire by rank must have been much rarer and fire action must have given way almost entirely to the use of skirmishers. fire by command presupposes an impossible coolness. had any troops ever possessed it they would have mowed down battalions as one mows down corn stalks. yet it has been known for a long time, since frederick, since before frederick, since the first rifle. let troops get the range calmly, let them take aim together so that no one disturbs or hinders the other. have each one see clearly, then, at a signal, let them all fire at once. who is going to stand against such people? but did they aim in those days? not so accurately, possibly, but they knew how to shoot waist-high, to shoot at the feet. they knew how to do it. i do not say they did it. if they had done so, there would not have been any need of reminding them of it so often. note cromwell's favorite saying, "aim at their shoe-laces;" that of the officers of the empire, "aim at the height of the waist." study of battles, of the expenditure of bullets, show us no such immediate terrible results. if such a means of destruction was so easy to obtain, why did not our illustrious forbears use it and recommend it to us? (words of de gouvion-saint-cyr.) security alone creates calmness under fire. in minor operations of war, how many captains are capable of tranquilly commanding their fire and maneuvering with calmness? here is a singular thing. you hear fire by rank against cavalry seriously recommended in military lectures. yet not a colonel, not a battalion commander, not a captain, requires this fire to be executed in maneuvers. it is always the soldier who forces the firing. he is ordered to shoot almost before he aims for fear he will shoot without command. yet he ought to feel that when he is aiming, his finger on the trigger, his shot does not belong to him, but rather to the officer who ought to be able to let him aim for five minutes, if advisable, examining, correcting the positions, etc. he ought, when aiming, always be ready to fire upon the object designated, without ever knowing when it will please his commander to order him to fire. fire at command is not practicable in the face of the enemy. if it were, the perfection of its execution would depend on the coolness of the commander and the obedience of the soldier. the soldier is the more easily trained. the austrians had fire by command in italy against cavalry. did they use it? they fired before the command, an irregular fire, a fire by file, with defective results. fire by command is impossible. but why is firing by rank at will impossible, illusory, under the fire of the enemy? because of the reasons already given and, for this reason: that closed ranks are incompatible with fire-arms, on account of the wounding caused by the latter in ranks. in closed ranks, the two lines touching elbows, a man who falls throws ten men into complete confusion. there is no room for those who drop and, however few fall, the resulting disorder immediately makes of the two ranks a series of small milling groups. if the troops are young, they become a disordered flock before any demonstration. (caldiero, duhesme.) if the troops have some steadiness, they of themselves will make space: they will try to make way for the bullets: they will scatter as skirmishers with small intervals. (note the grenadier guards at magenta.)[ ] with very open ranks, men a pace apart, whoever falls has room, he is noticed by a lesser number, he drags down no one in his fall. the moral impression on his comrades is less. their courage is less impaired. besides, with rapid fire everywhere, spaced ranks with no man in front of another, at least permit horizontal fire. closed ranks permit it hardly in the first rank, whose ears are troubled by the shots from the men behind. when a man has to fire four or five shots a minute, one line is certainly more solid than two, because, while the firing is less by half, it is more than twice as likely to be horizontal fire as in the two-rank formation. well-sustained fire, even with blank cartridges, would be sufficient to prevent a successful charge. with slow fire, two ranks alone were able to keep up a sufficiently continuous fusillade. with rapid fire, a single line delivers more shots than two with ancient weapons. such fire, therefore, suffices as a fusillade. close ranks, while suitable for marching, do not lend themselves to firing at the halt. marching, a man likes a comrade at his side. firing, as if he felt the flesh attracting the lead, he prefers being relatively isolated, with space around him. breech-loading rifles breed queer ideas. generals are found who say that rapid firing will bring back fire at command, as if there ever were such a thing. they say it will bring back salvo firing, thus permitting clear vision. as if such a thing were possible! these men have not an atom of common sense. it is singular to see a man like guibert, with practical ideas on most things, give a long dissertation to demonstrate that the officers of his time were wrong in aiming at the middle of the body, that is, in firing low. he claims this is ridiculous to one who understands the trajectory of the rifle. these officers were right. they revived the recommendations of cromwell, because they knew that in combat the soldier naturally fires too high because he does not aim, and because the shape of the rifle, when it is brought to the shoulder, tends to keep the muzzle higher than the breech. whether that is the reason or something else, the fact is indisputable. it is said that in prussian drills all the bullets hit the ground at fifty paces. with the arms of that time and the manner of fighting, results would have been magnificent in battle if the bullets had struck fifty paces before the enemy instead of passing over his head. yet at mollwitz, where the austrians had five thousand men disabled, the prussians had over four thousand. firing with a horizontal sector, if the muzzle be heavy, is more deadly than firing with a vertical sector. . marches. camps. night attacks. from the fact that infantry ought always to fight in thin formation, scattered, it does not follow that it ought to be kept in that order. only in column is it possible to maintain the battle order. it is necessary to keep one's men in hand as long as possible, because once engaged, they no longer belong to you. the disposition in closed mass is not a suitable marching formation, even in a battalion for a short distance. on account of heat, the closed column is intolerable, like an unventilated room. formation with half-distances is better. (why? air, view, etc.) such a formation prevents ready entry of the column into battle in case of necessity or surprise. the half-divisions not in the first line are brought up, the arms at the order, and they can furnish either skirmishers or a reserve for the first line which has been deployed as skirmishers. at leuctra, epaminondas diminished, by one-half, the depth of his men; he formed square phalanxes of fifty men to a side. he could have very well dispensed with it, for the lacedaemonian right was at once thrown into disorder by its own cavalry which was placed in front of that wing. the superior cavalry of epaminondas overran not only the cavalry but the infantry that was behind it. the infantry of epaminondas, coming in the wake of his cavalry finished the work. turning to the right, the left of epaminondas then took in the flank the lacedaemonian line. menaced also in front by the approaching echelons of epaminondas, this line became demoralized and took to flight. perhaps this fifty by fifty formation was adopted in order to give, without maneuver, a front of fifty capable of acting in any direction. at leuctra, it simply acted to the right and took the enemy in the flank and in reverse. thick woods are generally passed through in close column. there is never any opening up, with subsequent closing on the far side. the resulting formation is as confused as a flock of sheep. in a march through mountains, difficult country, a bugler should be on the left, at the orders of an intelligent officer who indicates when the halt seems necessary for discipline in the line. the right responds and if the place has been judged correctly an orderly formation is maintained. keep in ranks. if one man steps out, others follow. do not permit men to leave ranks without requiring them to rejoin. in the rear-guard it is always necessary to have pack mules in an emergency; without this precaution, considerable time may be lost. in certain difficult places time is thus lost every day. in camp, organize your fatigue parties in advance; send them out in formation and escorted. definite and detailed orders ought to be given to the convoy, and the chief baggage-master ought to supervise it, which is rarely the case. it is a mistake to furnish mules to officers and replace them in case of loss or sickness. the officer overloads the mule and the government loses more thereby than is generally understood. convoys are endless owing to overloaded mules and stragglers. if furnished money to buy a mule the officer uses it economically because it is his. if mules are individually furnished to officers instead of money, the officer will care for his beast for the same reason. but it is better to give money only, and the officer, if he is not well cared for on the march has no claim against the government. always, always, take draconian measures to prevent pillage from commencing. if it begins, it is difficult ever to stop it. a body of infantry is never left alone. there is no reason for calling officers of that arm inapt, when battalions although established in position are not absolutely on the same line, with absolutely equal intervals. ten moves are made to achieve the exact alignment which the instructions on camp movements prescribe. yet designating a guiding battalion might answer well enough and still be according to the regulations. why are not night attacks more employed to-day, at least on a grand scale? the great front which armies occupy renders their employment more difficult, and exacts of the troops an extreme aptitude in this kind of surprise tactics (found in the arabs, turcos, spahis), or absolute reliability. there are some men whose knowledge of terrain is wonderful, with an unerring eye for distance, who can find their way through places at night which they have visited only in the day time. utilizing such material for a system of guides it would be possible to move with certainty. these are simple means, rarely employed, for conducting a body of troops into position on the darkest night. there is, even, a means of assuring at night the fire of a gun upon a given point with as much precision as in plain day. chapter iii cavalry . cavalry and modern appliances they say that cavalry is obsolete; that it can be of no use in battles waged with the weapons of today. is not infantry affected in the same way? examples drawn from the last two wars are not conclusive. in a siege, in a country which is cut off, one does not dare to commit the cavalry, and therefore takes from it its boldness, which is almost its only weapon. the utility of cavalry has always been doubted. that is because its cost is high. it is little used, just because it does cost. the question of economy is vital in peace times. when we set a high value upon certain men, they are not slow to follow suit, and to guard themselves against being broken. look at staff officers who are almost never broken (reduced), even when their general himself is. with new weapons the rôle of cavalry has certainly changed less than any other, although it is the one which is most worried about. however, cavalry always has the same doctrine: charge! to start with, cavalry action against cavalry is always the same. also against infantry. cavalry knows well enough today, as it has always known, that it can act only against infantry which has been broken. we must leave aside epic legends that are always false, whether they relate to cavalry or infantry. infantry cannot say as much of its own action against infantry. in this respect there is a complete anarchy of ideas. there is no infantry doctrine. with the power of modern weapons, which forces you to slow down if it does not stop you, the advance under fire becomes almost impossible. the advantage is with the defensive. this is so evident that only a madman could dispute it. what then is to be done? halt, to shoot at random and cannonade at long range until ammunition is exhausted? perhaps. but what is sure, is that such a state of affairs makes maneuver necessary. there is more need than ever for maneuver at a long distance in an attempt to force the enemy to shift, to quit his position. what maneuver is swifter than that of cavalry? therein is its role. the extreme perfection of weapons permits only individual action in combat, that is action by scattered forces. at the same time it permits the effective employment of mass action out of range, of maneuvers on the flank or in the rear of the enemy in force imposing enough to frighten him. can the cavalry maneuver on the battle field? why not? it can maneuver rapidly, and above all beyond the range of infantry fire, if not of artillery fire. maneuver being a threat, of great moral effect, the cavalry general who knows how to use it, can contribute largely to success. he arrests the enemy in movement, doubtful as to what the cavalry is going to attempt. he makes the enemy take some formation that keeps him under artillery fire for a while, above all that of light artillery if the general knows how to use it. he increases the enemy's demoralization and thus is able to rejoin his command. rifled cannon and accurate rifles do not change cavalry tactics at all. these weapons of precision, as the word precision indicates, are effective only when all battle conditions, all conditions of aiming, are ideal. if the necessary condition of suitable range is lacking, effect is lacking. accuracy of fire at a distance is impossible against a troop in movement, and movement is the essence of cavalry action. rifled weapons fire on them of course, but they fire on everybody. in short, cavalry is in the same situation as anybody else. what response is there to this argument? since weapons have been improved, does not the infantryman have to march under fire to attack a position? is the cavalryman not of the same flesh? has he less heart than the infantryman? if one can march under fire, cannot the other gallop under it? when the cavalryman cannot gallop under fire, the infantryman cannot march under it. battles will consist of exchanges of rifle shots by concealed men, at long range. the battle will end only when the ammunition is exhausted. the cavalryman gallops through danger, the infantryman walks. that is why, if he learns, as it is probable he will, to keep at the proper distance, the cavalryman will never see his battle rôle diminished by the perfection of long range fire. an infantryman will never succeed by himself. the cavalryman will threaten, create diversions, worry, scatter the enemy's fire, often even get to close quarters if he is properly supported. the infantryman will act as usual. but more than ever will he need the aid of cavalry in the attack. he who knows how to use his cavalry with audacity will inevitably be the victor. even though the cavalryman offers a larger target, long range weapons will paralyze him no more than another. the most probable effect of artillery of today, will be to increase the scattering in the infantry, and even in the cavalry. the latter can start in skirmisher formation at a distance and close in while advancing, near its objective. it will be more difficult to lead; but this is to the advantage of the frenchman. the result of improving the ballistics of the weapon, for the cavalry as for the infantry (there is no reason why it should be otherwise for the cavalry), will be that a man will flee at a greater distance from it, and nothing more. since the empire, the opinion of european armies is that the cavalry has not given the results expected of it. it has not given great results, for the reason that we and others lacked real cavalry generals. he is, it seems, a phenomenon that is produced only every thousand years, more rarely than a real general of infantry. to be a good general, whether of infantry or cavalry, is an infinitely rare thing, like the good in everything. the profession of a good infantry general is as difficult as, perhaps more difficult than, that of a good cavalry general. both require calmness. it comes more easily to the cavalryman than to the foot soldier who is much more engaged. both require a like precision, a judgment of the moral and physical forces of the soldier; and the morale of the infantryman, his constitution, is more tried than is the case with the horseman. the cavalry general, of necessity, sees less clearly; his vision has its limits. great cavalry generals are rare. doubtless seidlitz could not, in the face of the development of cannon and rifle, repeat his wonders. but there is always room for improvement. i believe there is much room for improvement. we did not have under the empire a great cavalry general who knew how to handle masses. the cavalry was used like a blind hammer that strikes heavily and not always accurately. it had immense losses. like the gauls, we have a little too much confidence in the "forward, forward, not so many methods." methods do not hinder the forward movement. they prepare the effect and render it surer and at the same time less costly to the assailant. we have all the gallic brutality. (note marignano, where the force of artillery and the possibility of a turning movement around a village was neglected). what rare things infantry and cavalry generals are! a leader must combine resolute bravery and impetuosity with prudence and calmness; a difficult matter! the broken terrain of european fields no longer permits, we are told, the operation of long lines, of great masses of cavalry. i do not regret it. i am struck more with the picturesque effect of these hurricanes of cavalry in the accounts of the empire than with the results obtained. it does not seem to me that these results were in proportion to the apparent force of the effort and to the real grandeur of the sacrifices. and indeed, these enormous hammers (a usual figure), are hard to handle. they have not the sure direction of a weapon well in hand. if the blow is not true, recovery is impossible, etc. however, the terrain does not to-day permit the assembling of cavalry in great masses. this compelling reason for new methods renders any other reason superfluous. nevertheless, the other reasons given in the ministerial observations of , on the cavalry service, seems to me excellent. the improvement of appliances, the extension of battle fields, the confidence to the infantry and the audacity to the artillery that the immediate support of the cavalry gives, demand that this arm be in every division in sufficient force for efficient action. i, therefore, think it desirable for a cavalry regiment to be at the disposal of a general commanding a division. whatever the experiences of instruction centers, they can not change in the least my conviction of the merit of this measure in the field. . cavalry against cavalry cavalry action, more than that of infantry, is an affair of morale. let us study first the morale of the cavalry engagement in single combat. two riders rush at each other. are they going to direct their horses front against front? their horses would collide, both would be forced to their feet, while running the chance of being crushed in the clash or in the fall of their mounts. each one in the combat counts on his strength, on his skill, on the suppleness of his mount, on his personal courage; he does not want a blind encounter, and he is right. they halt face to face, abreast, to fight man to man; or each passes the other, thrusting with the sabre or lance; or each tries to wound the knee of the adversary and dismount him in this way. but as each is trying to strike the other, he thinks of keeping out of the way himself, he does not want a blind encounter that does away with the combat. the ancient battles, the cavalry engagements, the rare cavalry combats of our days, show us nothing else. discipline, while keeping the cavalrymen in the ranks, has not been able to change the instinct of the rider. no more than the isolated man is the rider in the line willing to meet the shock of a clash with the enemy. there is a terrible moral effect in a mass moving forward. if there is no way to escape to the right or to the left, men and horses will avoid the clash by stopping face to face. but only preëminently brave troops, equally seasoned in morale, alike well led and swept along, animated alike, will meet face to face. all these conditions are never found united on either side, so the thing is never seen. forty-nine times out of fifty, one of the cavalry forces will hesitate, bolt, get into disorder, flee before the fixed purpose of the other. three quarters of the time this will happen at a distance, before they can see each other's eyes. often they will get closer. but always, always, the stop, the backward movement, the swerving of horses, the confusion, bring about fear or hesitation. they lessen the shock and turn it into instant flight. the resolute assailant does not have to slacken. he has not been able to overcome or turn the obstacles of horses not yet in flight, in this uproar of an impossible about face executed by routed troops, without being in disorder himself. but this disorder is that of victory, of the advance, and a good cavalry does not trouble itself about it. it rallies in advancing, while the vanquished one has fear at its heels. on the whole, there are few losses. the engagement, if there is one, is an affair of a second. the proof is that in this action of cavalry against cavalry, the conquered alone loses men, and he loses generally few. the battle against infantry is alone the really deadly struggle. like numbers of little chasseurs have routed heavy cuirassiers. how could they have done so if the others had not given way before their determination? the essential factor was, and always is, determination. the cavalry's casualties are always much less than those of the infantry both from fire and from disease. is it because the cavalry is the aristocratic arm? this explains why in long wars it improves much more than the infantry. as there are few losses between cavalry and cavalry, so there is little fighting. hannibal's numidians, like the russian cossacks, inspired a veritable terror by the incessant alarms they caused. they tired out without fighting and killed by surprise. why is the cavalry handled so badly?--it is true that infantry is not used better.--because its rôle is one of movement, of morale, of morale and movement so united, that movement alone, often without a charge or shock action of any sort can drive the enemy into retreat, and, if followed closely, into rout. that is a result of the quickness of cavalry. one who knows how to make use of this quickness alone can obtain such results. all writers on cavalry will tell you that the charge pushed home of two cavalry bodies and the shock at top speed do not exist. always before the encounter, the weaker runs away, if there is not a face to face check. what becomes then of the mv squared? if this famous mv squared is an empty word, why then crush your horses under giants, forgetting that in the formula besides m there is v squared. in a charge, there is m, there is v squared, there is this and that. there is resolution, and i believe, nothing else that counts! cohesion and unity give force to the charge. alignment is impossible at a fast gait where the most rapid pass the others. only when the moral effect has been produced should the gait be increased to take advantage of it by falling upon an enemy already in disorder, in the act of fleeing. the cuirassiers charge at a trot. this calm steadiness frightens the enemy into an about face. then they charge at his back, at a gallop. they say that at eckmühl, for every french cuirassier down, fourteen austrians were struck in the back. was it because they had no back-plate? it is evident that it was because they offered their backs to the blows. jomini speaks of charges at a trot against cavalry at a gallop. he cites lasalle who used the trot and who, seeing cavalry approach at a gallop, would say: "there are lost men." jomini insists on the effect of shock. the trot permits that compactness which the gallop breaks up. that may be true. but the effect is moral above all. a troop at the gallop sees a massed squadron coming towards it at a trot. it is surprised at first at such coolness. the material impulse of the gallop is superior; but there are no intervals, no gaps through which to penetrate the line in order to avoid the shock, the shock that overcomes men and horses. these men must be very resolute, as their close ranks do not permit them to escape by about facing. if they move at such a steady gait, it is because their resolution is also firm and they do not feel the need of running away, of diverting themselves by the unchecked speed of the unrestrained gallop, etc. [ ] galloping men do not reason these things out, but they know them instinctively. they understand that they have before them a moral impulse superior to theirs. they become uneasy, hesitate. their hands instinctively turn their horses aside. there is no longer freedom in the attack at a gallop. some go on to the end, but three-fourths have already tried to avoid the shock. there is complete disorder, demoralization, flight. then begins the pursuit at a gallop by the men who attacked at the trot. the charge at a trot exacts of leaders and men complete confidence and steadfastness. it is the experience of battle only that can give this temper to all. but this charge, depending on a moral effect, will not always succeed. it is a question of surprise. xenophon [ ] recommended, in his work on cavalry operations, the use of surprise, the use of the gallop when the trot is customary, and vice-versa. "because," he says, "agreeable or terrible, the less a thing is foreseen, the more pleasure or fright does it cause. this is nowhere seen better than in war, where every surprise strikes terror even to the strongest." as a general rule, the gallop is and should be necessary in the charge; it is the winning, intoxicating gait, for men and horses. it is taken up at such a distance as may be necessary to insure its success, whatever it may cost in men and horses. the regulations are correct in prescribing that the charge be started close up. if the troopers waited until the charge was ordered, they would always succeed. i say that strong men, moved by pride or fear, by taking up too soon the charge against a firm enemy, have caused more charges to fail than to succeed. keeping men in hand until the command "charge," seizing the precise instant for this command, are both difficult. they exact of the energetic leader domination over his men and a keen eye, at a moment when three out of four men no longer see anything, so that good cavalry leaders, squadron leaders in general are very rare. real charges are just as rare. actual shock no longer exists. the moral impulse of one of the adversaries nearly always upsets the other, perhaps far off, perhaps a little nearer. were this "a little nearer," face to face, one of the two troops would be already defeated before the first saber cut and would disentangle itself for flight. with actual shock, all would be thrown into confusion. a real charge on the one part or the other would cause mutual extermination. in practice the victor scarcely loses any one. observation demonstrates that cavalry does not close with cavalry; its deadly combats are those against infantry alone. even if a cavalryman waits without flinching, his horse will wish to escape, to shrink before the collision. if man anticipates, so does the horse. why did frederick like to see his center closed in for the assault? as the best guarantee against the instincts of man and horse. the cavalry of frederick had ordinarily only insignificant losses: a result of determination. the men want to be distracted from the advancing danger by movement. the cavalrymen who go at the enemy, if left to themselves, would start at a gallop, for fear of not arriving, or of arriving exhausted and material for carnage. the same is true of the arabs. note what happened in to the cavalry of general martineau. the rapid move relieves anxiety. it is natural to wish to lessen it. but the leaders are there, whom experience, whom regulations order to go slowly, then to accelerate progressively, so as to arrive with the maximum of speed. the procedure should be the walk, then the trot, after that the gallop, then the charge. but it takes a trained eye to estimate distance and the character of the terrain, and, if the enemy approaches, to pick the point where one should meet him. the nearer one approaches, the greater among the troops is the question of morale. the necessity of arriving at the greatest speed is not alone a mechanical question, since indeed one never clashes, it is a moral necessity. it is necessary to seize the moment at which the uneasiness of one's men requires the intoxication of the headlong charging gallop. an instant too late, and a too great anxiety has taken the upper hand and caused the hands of the riders to act on the horses; the start is not free; a number hide by remaining behind. an instant too soon: before arrival the speed has slowed down; the animation, the intoxication of the run, fleeting things, are exhausted. anxiety takes the upper hand again, the hands act instinctively, and even if the start were unhampered, the arrival is not. frederick and seidlitz were content when they saw the center of the charging squadron three and four ranks deep. it was as if they understood that with this compact center, as the first lines could not escape to the right or left, they were forced to continue straight ahead. in order to rush like battering-rams, even against infantry, men and horses ought to be watered and fresh (ponsomby's cavalry at waterloo). if there is ever contact between cavalry, the shock is so weakened by the hands of the men, the rearing of the horses, the swinging of heads, that both sides come to a halt. only the necessity for carrying along the man and the horse at the supreme moment, for distracting them, necessitates the full gallop before attacking the enemy, before having put him to flight. charges at the gallop of three or four kilometers, suppose horses of bronze. because morale is not studied and because historical accounts are taken too literally, each epoch complains that cavalry forces are no longer seen charging and fighting with the sword, that too much prudence dictates running away instead of clashing with the enemy. these plaints have been made ever since the empire, both by the allies, and by us. but this has always been true. man was never invulnerable. the charging gait has almost always been the trot. man does not change. even the combats of cavalry against cavalry today are deadlier than they were in the lamented days of chivalry. the retreat of the infantry is always more difficult than that of the cavalry; the latter is simple. a cavalry repulsed and coming back in disorder is a foreseen, an ordinary happening; it is going to rally at a distance. it often reappears with advantage. one can almost say, in view of experience, that such is its rôle. an infantry that is repelled, especially if the action has been a hot one and the cavalry rushes in, is often disorganized for the rest of the day. even authors who tell you that two squadrons never collide, tell you continually: "the force of cavalry is in the shock." in the terror of the shock, yes. in the shock, no! it lies only in determination. it is a mental and not a mechanical condition. never give officers and men of the cavalry mathematical demonstrations of the charge. they are good only to shake confidence. mathematical reasoning shows a mutual collapse that never takes place. show them the truth. lasalle with his always victorious charge at a trot guarded against similar reasonings, which might have demonstrated to him mathematically that a charge of cuirassiers at a trot ought to be routed by a charge of hussars at a gallop. he simply told them: "go resolutely and be sure that you will never find a daredevil determined enough to come to grips with you." it is necessary to be a daredevil in order to go to the end. the frenchman is one above all. because he is a good trooper in battle, when his commanders themselves are daredevils he is the best in europe. (note the days of the empire, the remarks of wellington, a good judge). if moreover, his leaders use a little head work, that never harms anything. the formula of the cavalry is r (resolution) and r, and always r, and r is greater than all the mv squared in the world. there is this important element in the pursuit of cavalry by cavalry. the pursued cannot halt without delivering himself up to the pursuer. the pursuer can always see the pursued. if the latter halts and starts to face about the pursuer can fall upon him before he is faced, and take him by surprise. but the pursued does not know how many are pursuing him. if he alone halts two pursuers may rush on him, for they see ahead of them and they naturally attack whoever tries to face about. for with the about face danger again confronts them. the pursuit is often instigated by the fear that the enemy will turn. the material fact that once in flight all together cannot turn again without risking being surprised and overthrown, makes the flight continuous. even the bravest flee, until sufficient distance between them and the enemy, or some other circumstances such as cover or supporting troops, permits of a rally and a return to the offensive. in this case the pursuit may turn into flight in its turn. cavalry is insistent on attacking on an equal front. because, if with a broader front, the enemy gives way before it, his wings may attack it and make it the pursued instead of the pursuer. the moral effect of resolution is so great that cavalry, breaking and pursuing a more numerous cavalry, is never pursued by the enemy wings. however the idea that one may be taken in rear by forces whom one has left on the flanks in a position to do so, has such an effect that the resolution necessary for an attack under these circumstances is rare. why is it that colonel a---- does not want a depth formation for cavalry, he who believes in pressure of the rear ranks on the first? it is because at heart he is convinced that only the first rank can act in a cavalry charge, and that this rank can receive no impression, no speeding up, from those behind it. there is debate as to the advantage of one or two ranks for the cavalry. this again is a matter of morale. leave liberty of choice, and under varying conditions of confidence and morale one or the other will be adopted. there are enough officers for either formation. it is characteristic of cavalry to advance further than infantry and consequently it exposes its flanks more. it then needs more reserves to cover its flanks and rear than does infantry. it needs reserves to protect and to support the pursuers who are almost always pursued when they return. with cavalry even more than infantry victory belongs to the last reserves held intact. the one with the reserves is always the one who can take the offensive. tie to that, and no one can stand before you. with room to maneuver cavalry rallies quickly. in deep columns it cannot. the engagement of cavalry lasts only a moment. it must be reformed immediately. with a roll call at each reforming, it gets out of hand less than the infantry, which, once engaged, has little respite. there should be a roll call for cavalry, and for infantry after an advance, at each lull. there should be roll calls at drill and in field maneuvers, not that they are necessary but in order to become habituated to them. then the roll call will not be forgotten on the day of action, when very few think of what ought to be done. in the confusion and speed of cavalry action, man escapes more easily from surveillance. in our battles his action is increasingly individual and rapid. the cavalryman should not be left too free; that would be dangerous. frequently in action troops should be reformed and the roll called. it would be an error not to do so. there might be ten to twenty roll calls in a day. the officers, the soldiers, would then have a chance to demand an accounting from each man, and might demand it the next day. once in action, and that action lasts, the infantryman of today escapes from the control of his officers. this is due to the disorder inherent in battle, to deployment, to the absence of roll calls, which cannot be held in action. control, then, can only be in the hands of his comrades. of modern arms infantry is the one in which there is the greatest need for cohesion. cavalry always fights very poorly and very little. this has been true from antiquity, when the cavalryman was of a superior caste to the infantryman, and ought to have been braver. anybody advancing, cavalry or infantry, ought to scout and reconnoiter as soon as possible the terrain on which it acts. condé forgot this at neerwinden. the th forgot it at solferino. [ ] everybody forgets it. and from the failure to use skirmishers and scouts, come mistakes and disasters. the cavalry has a rifle for exceptional use. look out that this exception does not become the rule. such a tendency has been seen. at the battle of sicka, the first clash was marred by the lack of dash on the part of a regiment of chasseurs d'afrique, which after being sent off at the gallop, halted to shoot. at the second clash general bugeaud charged at their head to show them how to charge. a young colonel of light cavalry, asked carbines for his cavalry. "why? so that if i want to reconnoiter a village i can sound it from a distance of seven or eight hundred meters without losing anybody." what can you say to a man advancing such ideas? certainly the carbine makes everybody lose common sense. the work of light cavalry makes it inevitable that they be captured sometimes. it is impossible to get news of the enemy without approaching him. if one man escapes in a patrol, that is enough. if no one comes back, even that fact is instructive. the cavalry is a priceless object that no leader wants to break. however it is only by breaking it that results can be obtained. some authors think of using cavalry as skirmishers, mounted or dismounted. i suppose they advance holding the horse by the bridle? this appears to be an absurdity. if the cavalryman fires he will not charge. the african incident cited proves that. it would be better to give the cavalryman two pistols than a carbine. the americans in their vast country where there is unlimited room, used cavalry wisely in sending it off on distant forays to cut communications, make levies, etc. what their cavalry did as an arm in battle is unknown. the cavalry raids in the american war were part of a war directed against wealth, against public works, against resources. it was war of destruction of riches, not of men. the raiding cavalry had few losses, and inflicted few losses. the cavalry is always the aristocratic arm which loses very lightly, even if it risks all. at least it has the air of risking all, which is something at any rate. it has to have daring and daring is not so common. but the merest infantry engagements in equal numbers costs more than the most brilliant cavalry raid. . cavalry against infantry cavalry knows how to fight cavalry. but how it fights infantry not one cavalry officer in a thousand knows. perhaps not one of them knows. go to it then gaily, with general uncertainty! a military man, a participant in our great wars, recommends as infallible against infantry in line the charge from the flank, horse following horse. he would have cavalry coming up on the enemy's left, pass along his front and change direction so as to use its arms to the right. this cavalryman is right. such charges should give excellent results, the only deadly results. the cavalryman can only strike to his right, and in this way each one strikes. against ancient infantry such charges would have been as valuable as against modern infantry. this officer saw with his own eyes excellent examples of this attack in the wars of the empire. i do not doubt either the facts he cites or the deductions he makes. but for such charges there must be officers who inspire absolute confidence in their men and dependable and experienced soldiers. there is necessary, in short, an excellent cavalry, seasoned by long wars, and officers and men of very firm resolution. so it is not astonishing that examples of this mode of action are rare. they always will be. they always require a head for the charge, an isolated head, and when he is actually about to strike, he will fall back into the formation. it seems to him that lost in the mass he risks less than when alone. everybody is willing to charge, but only if all charge together. it is a case of belling the cat. the attack in column on infantry has a greater moral action than the charge in line. if the first and second squadrons are repulsed, but the infantry sees a third charging through the dust, it will say "when is this going to stop?" and it will be shaken. an extract from folard: "only a capable officer is needed to get the best results from a cavalry which has confidence in its movement, which is known to be good and vigorous, and also is equipped with excellent weapons. such cavalry will break the strongest battalions, if its leader has sense enough to know its power and courage enough to use this power." breaking is not enough, and is a feat that costs more than it is worth if the whole battalion is not killed or taken prisoner, or at least if the cavalry is not immediately followed by other troops, charged with this task. at waterloo our cavalry was exhausted fruitlessly, because it acted without artillery or infantry support. at krasno, august , , murat, at the head of his cavalry could not break an isolated body of ten thousand russian infantry which continually held him off by its fire, and retired tranquilly across the plain. the nd was upset by cavalry at solferino. from ancient days the lone infantryman has always had the advantage over the lone cavalryman. there is no shadow of a doubt about this in ancient narrations. the cavalryman only fought the cavalryman. he threatened, harassed, troubled the infantryman in the rear, but he did not fight him. he slaughtered him when put to flight by other infantry, or at least he scattered him and the light infantry slaughtered him. cavalry is a terrible weapon in the hands of one who knows how to use it. who can say that epaminondas could have defeated the spartans twice without his thessalonian cavalry. eventually rifle and artillery fire deafen the soldier; fatigue overpowers him; he becomes inert; he hears commands no longer. if cavalry unexpectedly appears, he is lost. cavalry conquers merely by its appearance. (bismarck or decker). modern cavalry, like ancient cavalry, has a real effect only on troops already broken, on infantry engaged with infantry, on cavalry disorganized by artillery fire or by a frontal demonstration. but against such troops its action is decisive. in such cases its action is certain and gives enormous results. you might fight all day and lose ten thousand men, the enemy might lose as many, but if your cavalry pursues him, it will take thirty thousand prisoners. its role is less knightly than its reputation and appearance, less so than the rôle of infantry. it always loses much less than infantry. its greatest effect is the effect of surprise, and it is thereby that it gets such astonishing results. what formation should infantry, armed with modern weapons, take to guard against flank attacks by cavalry? if one fires four times as fast, if the fire is better sustained, one needs only a quarter as many men to guard a point against cavalry. protection might be secured by using small groups, placed the range of a rifle shot apart and flanking each other, left on the flank of the advance. but they must be dependable troops, who will not be worried by what goes on behind them. . armor and armament an armored cavalry is clearly required for moral reasons. note this with reference to the influence of cuirassiers (armored cavalrymen) on morale. at the battle of renty, in , tavannes, a marshal, had with him his company armored in steel. it was the first time that such armor had been seen. supported by some hundreds of fugitives who had rallied, he threw himself at the head of his company, on a column of two thousand german cavalry who had just thrown both infantry and cavalry into disorder. he chose his time so well that he broke and carried away these two thousand germans, who fell back and broke the twelve hundred light horsemen who were supporting them. there followed a general flight, and the battle was won. general renard says "the decadence of cavalry caused the disappearance of their square formations in battle, which were characteristic in the seventeenth century." it was not the decadence of the cavalry but the abandonment of the cuirass and the perfecting of the infantry weapon to give more rapid fire. when cuirassiers break through they serve as examples, and emulation extends to others, who another time try to break through as they did. why cuirassiers? because they alone, in all history, have charged and do charge to the end. to charge to the end the cuirassiers need only half the courage of the dragoons, as their armor raises their morale one half. but since the cuirassiers have as much natural courage as the dragoons, for they are all the same men, it is proper to count the more on their action. shall we have only one kind of cavalry? which? if all our cavalry could wear the cuirass and at the same time do the fatiguing work of light cavalry, if all our horses could in addition carry the cuirass through such work, i say that there should be only cuirassiers. but i do not understand why the morale given by the cuirass should be lightly done away with, merely to have one cavalry without the cuirass. a cavalryman armored completely and his horse partially, can charge only at a trot. on the appearance of fire arms, cavalry, according to general ambert, an author of the past, covered itself with masses of armor resembling anvils rather than with cuirasses. it was at that time the essential arm. later as infantry progressed the tactics changed, it needed more mobility. permanent armies began to be organized by the state. the state thought less of the skin of the individual than of economy and mobility and almost did away with cuirassiers. the cuirass has always given, and today more than ever it will give, confidence to the cavalryman. courage, dash, and speed have a value beyond that of mere mass. i leave aside mathematical discussions which seem to me to have nothing in common with battle conditions. i would pick to wear the cuirass the best men in the army, big chested, red-blooded, strong limbed, the foot chasseurs. i would organize a regiment of light cuirassiers for each of our divisions. men and horses, such a cavalry would be much more robust and active than our present cuirassiers. if our armored cavalry is worth more than any other arm by its dash in battle, this cavalry would be worth twice as much. but how would these men of small stature get into the saddle? to this serious objection i answer, "they will arrange it." and this objection, which i do not admit, is the only one that can be made against the organization of a light armored cavalry, an organization that is made imperative by the improvement in weapons. the remainder of those chasseur battalions which furnish cuirassiers, should return to the infantry, which has long demanded them, and hussars and dragoons, dismounted in the necessary number will also be welcomed by the infantry. as for the thrust, the thrust is deadlier than the cut. you do not have to worry about lifting your arm; you thrust. but it is necessary that the cavalryman be convinced that to parry a vertical cut is folly. this can be done by his officers, by those who have had experience, if there are any such in peace times. this is not easy. but in this respect, as in all others, the advantage lies with the brave. a cavalry charge is a matter of morale above all. it is identical in its methods, its effects, with the infantry charge. all the conditions to be fulfilled in the charge (walk, trot, gallop, charge, etc.) have a reason bearing on morale. these reasons have already been touched on. roman discipline and character demand tenacity. the hardening of the men to fatigue, and a good organization, giving mutual support, produced that tenacity, against which the bravest could not stand. the exhausting method of powerful strokes used by the gauls could not last long against the skillful, terrible and less fatiguing method of fighting by the thrust. the sikh cavalrymen of m. nolan armed with dragoon sabers sharpened by themselves, liked the cut. they knew nothing about methods of swordsmanship; they did not practice. they said "a good saber and a willingness to use it are enough." true, true! there is always discussion as to the lance or the saber. the lance requires skillful vigorous cavalrymen, good horsemen, very well drilled, very adroit, for the use of the lance is more difficult than that of the straight sword, especially if the sword is not too heavy. is not this an answer to the question? no matter what is done, no matter what methods are adopted, it must always be remembered that our recruits in war time are sent into squadrons as into battalions, with a hasty and incomplete training. if you give them lances, most of them will just have sticks in their hands, while a straight sword at the end of a strong arm is at the same time simple and terrible. a short trident spear, with three short points just long enough to kill but not only enough to go through the body, would remain in the body of the man and carry him along. it would recoil on the cavalryman who delivered the blow, he would be upset by the blow himself. but the dragoon must be supported by the saddle, and as he had kept hold of the shaft he would be able to disengage the fork which had pierced the body some six inches. no cavalry of equal morale could stand against a cavalry armed with such forked spears. as between forks and lances, the fork would replace the lance. that is, of course, for beginners in mounted fencing. but the fork! it would be ridiculous, not military! with the lance one always figures without the horse, whose slightest movement diverts the lance so much. the lance is a weapon frightful even to the mounted man who uses it properly. if he sticks an enemy at the gallop, he is dismounted, torn off by the arm attached to the lance which remains in the body of his enemy. cavalry officers and others who seek examples in "victories and conquests," in official reports, in "bazancourt" are too naïve. it is hard to get at the truth. in war, in all things, we take the last example which we have witnessed. and now we want lances, which we do not know how to use, which frighten the cavalryman himself and pluck him from the saddle if he sticks anybody. we want no more cuirasses; we want this and that. we forget that the last example gives only a restricted number of instances relating to the matter in question. it appears, according to xenophon, that it was not easy to throw the dart from horseback. he constantly recommends obtaining as many men as possible who know how to throw the dart. he recommends leaning well back to avoid falling from the horse in the charge. in reading xenophon it is evident that there was much falling from the horse. it appears that in battle there is as great difficulty in handling the saber as in handling the bayonet. another difficulty for the cavalryman lies in the handling of the musket. this is seen in the handling of the regulation weapon of the spahis. there is only one important thing for the cavalryman, to be well seated. men should be on horseback for hours at a time, every day, from their arrival in the organization. if the selection of those who know something about horses was not neglected in the draft, and if such men were, made cavalrymen, the practical training of the greater number would be much more rapidly concluded. i do not speak of the routine of the stable. between mounted drills, foot drills might be gone through with in a snappy, free fashion, without rigidity, with daily increasing speed. such drills would instruct cavalrymen more rapidly than the restricted method employed. a dragoon horse carries in campaign with one day's food three hundred and eight pounds, without food or forage two hundred and seventy seven pounds. how can such horses carry this and have speed? seek the end always, not the means! make a quarter of your cavalrymen into muleteers, a quarter of your horses into pack animals. you will thus secure, for the remaining three quarters unquestioned vigor. but how will you make up these pack trains? you will have plenty of wounded horses after a week of campaign. chapter iv artillery if artillery did not have a greater range than the rifle, we could not risk separating it far from its support, as it would have to wait until the enemy was but four or five hundred paces away to fire on him. but the more its range is increased, the further away it can be placed from its support. the greater the range of artillery, the greater freedom of action from the different arms, which no longer have to be side by side to give mutual support. the greater the range of artillery, the easier it is to concentrate its fire. two batteries fifteen hundred meters apart can concentrate on a point twelve hundred meters in front of and between them. before the range was so long they had to be close together, and the terrain did not always lend itself to this. furthermore, do not support a piece by placing infantry just behind or alongside of it, as is done three-quarters of the time at maneuvers. on the contrary hide the infantry to the right or left and far behind, cover it without worrying too much about distance and let the artillery call for help if they think that the piece is in danger of being lost. why should infantry be placed too close, and consequently have its advance demoralized? this will throw away the greatest advantage that we frenchmen have in defense, that of defending ourselves by advancing, with morale unimpaired, because we have not suffered heavy losses at a halt. there is always time to run to the defense of artillery. to increase the moral effect advance your supports in formation. skirmishers can also be swiftly scattered among the batteries. these skirmishers, in the midst of the guns will not have to fear cavalry. even if they are assailed by infantry it will not be such a terrible thing. the engagement will merely be one between skirmishers, and they will be able to take cover behind the pieces, firing against the enemy who is coming up in the open. guibert, i believe, held that artillery should not worry whether it was supported or not; that it should fire up to the last minute, and finally abandon the pieces, which supporting troops might or might not recapture. these supporting troops should not be too close. it is easier to defend pieces, to take them back even, by advancing on an enemy dispersed among them, than to defend them by standing fast after having participated in the losses suffered by the artillery under fire. (note the english in spain. the system of having artillery followed by infantry platoons is absurd.) artillery in battle has its men grouped around the pieces, stationary assembly points, broadly distributed, each one having its commander and its cannoneers, who are always the same. thus there is in effect a roll call each time artillery is put into battery. artillery carries its men with it; they cannot be lost nor can they hide. if the officer is brave, his men rarely desert him. certainly, in all armies, it is in the artillery that the soldier can best perform his duty. as general leboeuf tells us, four batteries of artillery can be maneuvered, not more. that is all right. here is the thing in a nut-shell. four battalions is a big enough command for a colonel. a general has eight battalions. he gets orders, "general, do so and so." he orders, "colonel, do so and so." so that without any maneuvers being laid down for more than four battalions, as many battalions as you like can be maneuvered and drilled. chapter v command, general staff, and administration there are plenty of carefree generals, who are never worried nor harassed. they do not bother about anything. they say, "i advance. follow me." the result is an incredible disorder in the advance of columns. if ten raiders should fall on the column with a shout, this disorder would become a rout, a disaster. but these gentlemen never bother with such an eventuality. they are the great men of the day, until the moment that some disaster overwhelms them. cavalry is no more difficult to work with than infantry. according to some military authors, a cavalry general ought to have the wisdom of the phoenix. the perfect one should have. so should the perfect infantry general. man on horseback and man afoot is always the same man. only, the infantry general rarely has to account for the losses in his command, which may have been due to faulty or improper handling. the cavalry general does have to do this. (we shall lay aside the reasons why.) the infantry general has six chances for real battle to one for the cavalry general. these are the two reasons why, from the beginning of a war, more initiative is found in infantry than in cavalry generals. general bugeaud might have made a better cavalry general than an infantry general. why? because he had immediate decision and firm resolution. there is more need for resolution in the infantryman than in the cavalryman. why? there are many reasons, which are matters of opinion. in short, the infantryman is always more tired than the cavalryman. his morale is therefore harder to keep up. i believe therefore that a good infantry general is rarer than one of cavalry. also, the resolution of an infantry general does not have to last for a moment only; it has to endure for a long, long time. good artillery generals are common. they are less concerned with morale than with other things, such as material results. they have less need to bother about the morale of their troops, as combat discipline is always better with them than with the other arms. this is shown elsewhere. brigadier generals ought to be in their prescribed places. very well, but the most of them are not and never have been. they were required to be in place at the battle of moscow, but, as they were so ordered there, it is evident that they were not habitually in place. they are men; and their rank, it seems to them, ought to diminish rather than increase the risks they have to run. and, then, in actual engagement, where is their prescribed place? when one occupies a high command there are many things which he does not see. the general-in-chief, even a division commander, can only escape this failing by great activity, moved by strict conscientiousness and aided by clairvoyance. this failing extends to those about him, to his heads of services. these men live well, sleep well; the same must be true of all! they have picked, well-conditioned horses; the roads are excellent! they are never sick; the doctors must be exaggerating sickness! they have attendants and doctors; everybody must be well looked after! something happens which shows abominable negligence, common enough in war. with a good heart and a full belly they say, "but this is infamous, unheard of! it could not have happened! it is impossible! etc." to-day there is a tendency, whose cause should be sought, on the part of superiors to infringe on the authority of inferiors. this is general. it goes very high and is furthered by the mania for command, inherent in the french character. it results in lessening the authority of subordinate officers in the minds of their soldiers. this is a grave matter, as only the firm authority and prestige of subordinate officers can maintain discipline. the tendency is to oppress subordinates; to want to impose on them, in all things, the views of the superior; not to admit of honest mistakes, and to reprove them as faults; to make everybody, even down to the private, feel that there is only one infallible authority. a colonel, for instance, sets himself up as the sole authority with judgment and intelligence. he thus takes all initiative from subordinate officers, and reduces them to a state of inertia, coming from their lack of confidence in themselves and from fear of being severely reproved. how many generals, before a regiment, think only of showing how much they know! they lessen the authority of the colonel. that is nothing to them. they have asserted their superiority, true or false; that is the essential. with cheeks puffed out, they leave, proud of having attacked discipline. this firm hand which directs so many things is absent for a moment. all subordinate officers up to this moment have been held with too strong a hand, which has kept them in a position not natural to them. immediately they are like a horse, always kept on a tight rein, whose rein is loosened or missing. they cannot in an instant recover that confidence in themselves, that has been painstakingly taken away from them without their wishing it. thus, in such a moment conditions become unsatisfactory, the soldier very quickly feels that the hand that holds him vacillates. "ask much, in order to obtain a little," is a false saying, a source of errors, an attack on discipline. one ought to obtain what one asks. it is only necessary to be moderately reasonable and practical. in following out this matter, one is astonished at the lack of foresight found in three out of four officers. why? is there anything so difficult about looking forward a little? are three-quarters of the officers so stupid? no! it is because their egoism, generally frankly acknowledged, allow them to think only of who is looking at them. they think of their troops by chance perhaps, or because they have to. their troops are never their preoccupation, consequently they do not think about them at all. a major in command of an organization in mexico, on his first march in a hot country, started without full canteens, perhaps without canteens at all, without any provision for water, as he might march in france. no officer in his battalion called his attention to the omission, nor was more foresighted than he. in this first march, by an entire lack of foresight in everything, he lost, in dead, half of his command. was he reduced? no! he was made a lieutenant-colonel. officers of the general staff learn to order, not to command. "sir, i order," a popular phrase, applies to them. the misfortune is not that there is a general staff, but that it has achieved command. for it always has commanded, in the name of its commanders it is true, and never obeyed, which is its duty. it commands in fact. so be it! but just the same it is not supposed to. is it the good quality of staffs or that of combatants that makes the strength of armies? if you want good fighting men, do everything to excite their ambition, to spare them, so that people of intelligence and with a future will not despise the line but will elect to serve in it. it is the line that gives you your high command, the line only, and very rarely the staff. the staff, however, dies infrequently, which is something. do they say that military science can only be learned in the general staff schools? if you really want to learn to do your work, go to the line. to-day, nobody knows anything unless he knows how to argue and chatter. a peasant knows nothing, he is a being unskilled even in cultivating the soil. but the agriculturist of the office is a farmer emeritus, etc. is it then believed that there is ability only in the general staff? there is the assurance of the scholar there, of the pedagogue who has never practiced what he preaches. there is book learning, false learning when it treats of military matters. but knowledge of the real trade of a soldier, knowledge of what is possible, knowledge of blows given and received, all these are conspicuously absent. slowness of promotion in the general staff as compared to its rapidity in the line might make many men of intelligence, of head and heart, pass the general staff by and enter the line to make their own way. to be in the line would not then be a brevet of imbecility. but to-day when general staff officers rank the best of the line, the latter are discouraged and rather than submit to this situation, all who feel themselves fitted for advancement want to be on the general staff. so much the better? so much the worse. selection is only warranted by battle. how administrative deceits, in politics or elsewhere, falsify the conclusions drawn from a fact! in the crimea one hundred per cent. of the french operated upon succumbed, while only twenty-seven per cent. of the english operated upon died. that was attributed to the difference in temperament! the great cause of this discrepancy was the difference in care. our newspapers followed the self-satisfied and rosy statements given out by our own supply department. they pictured our sick in the crimea lying in beds and cared for by sisters of charity. the fact is that our soldiers never had sheets, nor mattresses, nor the necessary changes of clothes in the hospitals; that half, three-quarters, lay on mouldy straw, on the ground, under canvass. the fact is, that such were the conditions under which typhus claimed twenty-five to thirty thousand of our sick after the siege; that thousands of pieces of hospital equipment were offered by the english to our quartermaster general, and that he refused them! everybody ought to have known that he would! to accept such equipment was to acknowledge that he did not have it. and he ought to have had it. indeed he did according to the newspapers and the quartermaster reports. there were twenty-five beds per hospital so that it could be said, "we have beds!" each hospital had at this time five hundred or more sick. these people are annoyed if they are called hypocrites. while our soldiers were in hospitals, without anything, so to speak, the english had big, well-ventilated tents, cots, sheets, even night stands with urinals. and our men had not even a cup to drink from! sick men were cared for in the english hospitals. they might have been in ours, before they died, which they almost always did. it is true that we had the typhus and the english had not. that was because our men in tents had the same care as in our hospitals, and the english the same care as in their hospitals. read the war reports of supply departments and then go unexpectedly to verify them in the hospitals and storehouses. have them verified by calling up and questioning the heads of departments, but question them conscientiously, without dictating the answers. in the crimea, in may of the first year, we were no better off than the english who complained so much, who has dared to say, however, that from the time they entered the hospital to the time that they left it, dead, evacuated, or cured, through fifteen or twenty days of cholera or typhus, our men lay on the same plank, in the same shoes, drawers, shirts and clothing that they brought in with them? they were in a state of living putrefaction that would by itself have killed well men! the newspapers chanted the praises of the admirable french administration. the second winter the english had no sick, a smaller percentage than in london. but to the eternal shame of the french command and administration we lost in peace time, twenty-five to thirty thousand of typhus and more than one thousand frozen to death. nevertheless, it appeared that we had the most perfect administration in the world, and that our generals, no less than our administration, were full of devoted solicitude to provide all the needs of the soldier. that is an infamous lie, and is known as such, let us hope. the americans have given us a good example. the good citizens have gone themselves to see how their soldiers were treated and have provided for them themselves. when, in france, will good citizens lose faith in this best of administrations which is theirs? when will they, confident in themselves, do spontaneously, freely, what their administration cannot and never will be able to do? the first thing disorganized in an army is the administration. the simplest foresight, the least signs even of order disappear in a retreat. (note russia-vilna). in the crimea, and everywhere more or less, the doctor's visit was without benefit to the patient. it was made to keep up his spirits, but could not be followed by care, due to lack of personnel and material. after two or three hours of work, the doctor was exhausted. in a sane country the field and permanent hospitals ought to be able to handle one-fifth of the strength at least. the hospital personnel of to-day should be doubled. it is quickly cut down, and it ought to have time, not only to visit the sick, but to care for them, feed them, dose and dress them, etc. chapter vi social and military institutions. national characteristics. man's admiration for the great spectacles of nature is the admiration for force. in the mountains it is mass, a force, that impresses him, strikes him, makes him admire. in the calm sea it is the mysterious and terrible force that he divines, that he feels in that enormous liquid mass; in the angry sea, force again. in the wind, in the storm, in the vast depth of the sky, it is still force that he admires. all these things astounded man when he was young. he has become old, and he knows them. astonishment has turned to admiration, but always it is the feeling of a formidable force which compels his admiration. this explains his admiration for the warrior. the warrior is the ideal of the primitive man, of the savage, of the barbarian. the more people rise in moral civilization, the lower this ideal falls. but with the masses everywhere the warrior still is and for a long time will be the height of their ideals. this is because man loves to admire the force and bravery that are his own attributes. when that force and bravery find other means to assert themselves, or at least when the crowd is shown that war does not furnish the best examples of them, that there are truer and more exalted examples, this ideal will give way to a higher one. nations have an equal sovereignty based on their existence as states. they recognize no superior jurisdiction and call on force to decide their differences. force decides. whether or not might was right, the weaker bows to necessity until a more successful effort can be made. (prud'homme). it is easy to understand gregory vii's ideas on the subject. in peace, armies are playthings in the hands of princes. if the princes do not know anything about them, which is usually the case, they disorganize them. if they understand them, like the prince of prussia, they make their armies strong for war. the king of prussia and the prussian nobility, threatened by democracy, have had to change the passion for equality in their people into a passion for domination over foreign nations. this is easily done, when domination is crowned with success, for man, who is merely the friend of equality is the lover of domination. so that he is easily made to take the shadow for the substance. they have succeeded. they are forced to continue with their system. otherwise their status as useful members of society would be questioned and they would perish as leaders in war. peace spells death to a nobility. consequently nobles do not desire it, and stir up rivalries among peoples, rivalries which alone can justify their existence as leaders in war, and consequently as leaders in peace. this is why the military spirit is dead in france. the past does not live again. in the spiritual as in the physical world, what is dead is dead. death comes only with the exhaustion of the elements, the conditions which are necessary for life. for these reasons revolutionary wars continued into the war with prussia. for these reasons if we had been victorious we would have found against us the countries dominated by nobilities, austria, russia, england. but with us vanquished, democracy takes up her work in all european countries, protected in the security which victory always gives to victors. this work is slower but surer than the rapid work of war, which, exalting rivalries, halts for a moment the work of democracy within the nations themselves. democracy then takes up her work with less chance of being deterred by rivalry against us. thus we are closer to the triumph of democracy than if we had been victors. french democracy rightfully desires to live, and she does not desire to do so at the expense of a sacrifice of national pride. then, since she will still be surrounded for a long time by societies dominated by the military element, by the nobility, she must have a dependable army. and, as the military spirit is on the wane in france, it must be replaced by having noncommissioned officers and officers well paid. good pay establishes position in a democracy, and to-day none turn to the army, because it is too poorly paid. let us have well paid mercenaries. by giving good pay, good material can be secured, thanks to the old warrior strain in the race. this is the price that must be paid for security. the soldier of our day is a merchant. so much of my flesh, of my blood, is worth so much. so much of my time, of my affections, etc. it is a noble trade, however, perhaps because man's blood is noble merchandise, the finest that can be dealt in. m. guizot says "get rich!" that may seem cynical to prudes, but it is truly said. those who deny the sentiment, and talk to-day so loftily, what do they advise? if not by words, then by example they counsel the same thing; and example is more contagious. is not private wealth, wealth in general, the avowed ambition sought by all, democrats and others? let us be rich, that is to say, let us be slaves of the needs that wealth creates. the invalides in france, the institutions for pensioners, are superb exhibits of pomp and ostentation. i wish that their founding had been based on ideas of justice and christianity and not purely on military-political considerations. but the results are disastrous to morality. this collection of weaklings is a school of depravity, where the invalided soldier loses in vice his right to respect. some officers want to transform regiments into permanent schools for officers of all ranks, with a two-hour course each day in law, military art, etc. there is little taste for military life in france; such a procedure would lessen it. the leisure of army life attracts three out of four officers, laziness, if you like. but such is the fact. if you make an officer a school-boy all his life he will send his profession to the devil, if he can. and those who are able to do so, will in general be those who have received the best education. an army is an extraordinary thing, but since it is necessary, there should be no astonishment that extraordinary means must be taken to keep it up; such as offering in peace time little work and a great deal of leisure. an officer is a sort of aristocrat, and in france we have no finer ideal of aristocratic life than one of leisure. this is not a proof of the highest ideals, nor of firmness of character. but what is to be done about it? from the fact that military spirit is lacking in our nation (and officers are with greater difficulty than ever recruited in france) it does not follow that we shall not have to engage in war. perhaps the contrary is true. it is not patriotic to say that the military spirit is dead in france? the truth is always patriotic. the military spirit died with the french nobility, perished because it had to perish, because it was exhausted, at the end of its life. that only dies which has no longer the sap of life, and can no longer live. if a thing is merely sick it can return to health. but who can say that of the french nobility? an aristocracy, a nobility that dies, dies always by its own fault; because it no longer performs its duties; because it fails in its task; because its functions are of no more value to the state; because there is no longer any reason for its existence in a society, whose final tendency is to suppress its functions. after had threatened our patriotism, the natural desire for self-protection revived the military spirit in the nation and in the army. the empire developed this movement, changed the defensive military spirit to the offensive, and used it with increasing effect up to or . the military spirit of the july restoration was a reminiscence, a relic of the empire, a form of opposition to government by liberalism instead of democracy. it was really the spirit of opposition and not the military spirit, which is essentially conservative. there is no military spirit in a democratic society, where there is no aristocracy, no military nobility. a democratic society is antagonistic to the military spirit. the military spirit was unknown to the romans. they made no distinction between military and civil duties. i think that the military air dates from the time that the profession of arms became a private profession, from the time of the bravos, the italian condottieri, who were more terrifying to civilians than to the enemy. when the romans said "cedant arma togae," they did not refer to civil officials and soldiers; the civil officials were then soldiers in their turn; professional soldiers did not exist. they meant "might gives way to right." machiavelli quotes a proverb, "war makes thieves and peace has them hanged" the spaniards in mexico, which has been in rebellion for forty years, are more or less thieves. they want to continue to ply the trade. civil authority exists no longer with them, and they would look on obedience to such an authority as shameful. it is easy to understand the difficulty of organizing a peaceful government in such a country. half the population would have to hang the other half. the other half does not want to be hanged. we are a democratic society; we become less and less military. the prussian, russian, austrian aristocracies which alone make the military spirit of those states, feel in our democratic society an example which threatens their existence, as nobility, as aristocracy. they are our enemies and will be until they are wiped, out, until the russian, austrian and prussian states become democratic societies, like ours. it is a matter of time. the prussian aristocracy is young. it has not been degenerated by wealth, luxury and servility of the court. the prussian court is not a court in the luxurious sense of the word. there is the danger. meanwhile machiavellian doctrines not being forbidden to aristocracies, these people appeal to german jingoism, to german patriotism, to all the passions which move one people who are jealous of another. all this is meant to hide under a patriotic exterior their concern for their own existence as an aristocracy, as a nobility. the real menace of the day is czarism, stronger than the czars themselves, which calls for a crusade to drive back russia and the uncultured slav race. it is time that we understood the lack of power in mob armies; that we recall to mind the first armies of the revolution that were saved from instant destruction only by the lack of vigor and decision in european cabinets and armies. look at the examples of revolutionaries of all times, who have all to gain and cannot hope for mercy. since spartacus, have they not always been defeated? an army is not really strong unless it is developed from a social institution. spartacus and his men were certainly terrible individual fighters. they were gladiators used to struggle and death. they were prisoners, barbarian slaves enraged by their loss of liberty, or escaped serfs, all men who could not hope for mercy. what more terrible fighters could be imagined? but discipline, leadership, all was improvised and could not have the firm discipline coming down from the centuries and drawn from the social institutions of the romans. they were conquered. time, a long time, is needed to give to leaders the habit of command and confidence in their authority--to the soldiers confidence in their leaders and in their fellows. it is not enough to order discipline. the officers must have the will to enforce it, and its vigorous enforcement must instill subordination in the soldiers. it must make them fear it more than they fear the enemy's blows. how did montluc fight, in an aristocratic society? montluc shows us, tells us. he advanced in the van of the assault, but in bad places he pushed in front of him a soldier whose skin was not worth as much as was his. he had not the slightest doubt or shame about doing this. the soldier did not protest, the propriety of the act was so well established. but you, officers, try that in a democratic army, such as we have commenced to have, such as we shall later have! in danger the officer is no better than the soldier. the soldier is willing enough to advance, but behind his officer. also, his comrades' skin is no more precious than is his, they must advance too. this very real concern about equality in danger, which seeks equality only, brings on hesitation and not resolution. some fools may break their heads in closing in, but the remainder will fire from a distance. not that this will cause fewer losses, far from it. italy will never have a really firm army. the italians are too civilized, too fine, too democratic in a certain sense of the word. the spaniards are the same. this may cause laughter, but it is true. the french are indeed worthy sons of their fathers, the gauls. war, the most solemn act in the life of a nation, the gravest of acts, is a light thing to them. the good frenchman lets himself be carried away, inflamed by the most ridiculous feats of arms into the wildest enthusiasm. moreover he interprets the word "honor" in a fashion all his own. an expedition is commenced without sufficient reason, and good frenchmen, who do not know why the thing is done, disapprove. but presently blood is spilled. good sense and justice dictate that this spilled blood should taint those responsible for an unjust enterprise. but jingoism says "french blood has been spilled: honor is at stake!" and millions of gold, which is the unit of labor, millions of men, are sacrificed to a ridiculous high-sounding phrase. whence comes this tendency toward war which characterizes above all the good citizen, the populace, who are not called upon personally to participate? the military man is not so easily swayed. some hope for promotion or pension, but even they are sobered by their sense of duty. it comes from the romance that clothes war and battle, and that has with us ten times more than elsewhere, the power of exciting enthusiasm in the people. it would be a service to humanity and to one's people to dispell this illusion, and to show what battles are. they are buffooneries, and none the less buffooneries because they are made terrible by the spilling of blood. the actors, heroes in the eyes of the crowd, are only poor folk torn between fear, discipline and pride. they play some hours at a game of advance and retreat, without ever meeting, closing with, even seeing closely, the other poor folks, the enemy, who are as fearful as they but who are caught in the same web of circumstance. what should be considered is how to organize an army in a country in which there is at the same time national and provincial feeling. such a country is france, where there is no longer any necessity for uniting national and provincial feeling by mixing up the soldiers. in france, will the powerful motif of pride, which comes from the organization of units from particular provinces, be useful? from the fusion of varying elements comes the character of our troops, which is something to be considered. the make-up of the heavy cavalry should be noted. it has perhaps too many germans and men from the northern provinces. french sociability creates cohesion in french troops more quickly than could be secured in troops in other nations. organization and discipline have the same purpose. with a proud people like the french, a rational organization aided by french sociability can often secure desired results without it being necessary to use the coercion of discipline. marshal de gouvion-saint cyr said, "experienced soldiers know and others ought to know that french soldiers once committed to the pursuit of the enemy will not return to their organization that day until forced back into it by the enemy. during this time they must be considered as lost to the rest of the army." at the beginning of the empire, officers, trained in the wars of the revolution by incessant fighting, possessed great firmness. no one would wish to purchase such firmness again at the same price. but in our modern wars the victor often loses more than the vanquished, apart from the temporary loss in prisoners. the losses exceed the resources in good men, and discourage the exhausted, who appear to be very numerous, and those who are skilled in removing themselves from danger. thus we fall into disorder. the duke of fezensac, testifying of other times, shows us the same thing that happens to-day. also to-day we depend only on mass action, and at that game, despite the cleverest strategic handling, we must lose all, and do. french officers lack firmness but have pride. in the face of danger they lack composure, they are disconcerted, breathless, hesitant, forgetful, unable to think of a way out. they call, "forward, forward." this is one of the reasons why handling a formation in line is difficult, especially since the african campaigns where much is left to the soldier. the formation in rank is then an ideal, unobtainable in modern war, but toward which we should strive. but we are getting further away from it. and then, when habit loses its hold, natural instinct resumes its empire. the remedy lies in an organization which will establish cohesion by the mutual acquaintanceship of all. this will make possible mutual surveillance, which has such power over french pride. it might be said that there are two kinds of war, that in open country, and in the plain, and that of posts garrisoning positions in broken country. in a great war, with no one occupying positions, we should be lost immediately. marshal saxe knew us well when he said that the french were best for a war of position. he recognized the lack of stability in the ranks. on getting within rifle range the rank formation tends to disappear. you hear officers who have been under fire say "when you get near the enemy, the men deploy as skirmishers despite you. the russians group under fire. their holding together is the huddling of sheep moved by fear of discipline and of danger." there are then two modes of conduct under fire, the french and the russian. the gauls, seeing the firmness of the roman formation, chained themselves together, making the first rank unbreakable and tying living to dead. this forbade the virtue they had not divined in the roman formation, the replacement of wounded and exhausted by fresh men. from this replacement came the firmness which seemed so striking to the gauls. the rank continually renewed itself. why does the frenchman of to-day, in singular contrast to the gaul, scatter under fire? his natural intelligence, his instinct under the pressure of danger causes him to deploy. his method must be adopted. in view of the impossibility to-day of the roman draconian discipline which put the fear of death behind the soldier, we must adopt the soldier's method and try to put some order into it. how? by french discipline and an organization that permits of it. broken, covered country is adapted to our methods. the zouaves at magenta could not have done so well on another kind of ground. [ ] above all, with modern weapons, the terrain to be advanced over must be limited in depth. how much better modern tactics fit the impatient french character! but also how necessary it is to guard against this impatience and to keep supports and reserves under control. it should be noted that german or gallic cavalry was always better than roman cavalry, which could not hold against it, even though certainly better armed. why was this? because decision, impetuosity, even blind courage, have more chance with cavalry than with infantry. the defeated cavalry is the least brave cavalry. (a note for our cavalry here!) it was easier for the gauls to have good cavalry than it is for us, as fire did not bother them in the charge. the frenchman has more qualities of the cavalryman than of the infantryman. yet french infantry appears to be of greater value. why? because the use of cavalry on the battlefield requires rare decision and the seizing of the crucial opportunity. if the cavalryman has not been able to show his worth, it is the fault of his leaders. french infantry has always been defeated by english infantry. in cavalry combat the english cavalry has always fled before the french in those terrible cavalry battles that are always flights. is this because in war man lasts longer in the cavalry and because our cavalrymen were older and more seasoned soldiers than our infantry? this does not apply to us only. if it is true for our cavalrymen, it is also true for the english cavalrymen. the reason is that on the field of battle the rôle of the infantryman against a firm adversary requires more coolness and nerve than does the rôle of the cavalryman. it requires the use of tactics based on an understanding of the national characteristics of ourselves and of our enemies. against the english the confidence in the charge that is implanted in our brains, was completely betrayed. the rôle of cavalry against cavalry is simpler. the french confidence in the charge makes good fighting cavalry, and the frenchman is better fitted than any other for this role. our cavalry charge better than any other. that is the whole thing, on the battle field it is understood. as they move faster than infantry, their dash, which has its limits, is better preserved when they get up to the enemy. the english have always fled before our cavalry. this proves that, strong enough to hold before the moral impulse of our infantry, they were not strong enough to hold before the stronger impulse of cavalry. we ought to be much better cavalrymen than infantrymen, because the essential in a cavalryman is a fearless impetuosity. that is for the soldier. the cavalry leader ought to use this trait without hesitation, at the same time taking measures to support it and to guard against its failings. the attack is always, even on the defensive, an evidence of resolution, and gives a moral ascendancy. its effect is more immediate with cavalry, because the movements of cavalry are more rapid and the moral effect has less time to be modified by reflection. to insure that the french cavalry be the best in europe, and a really good cavalry, it needs but one thing, to conform to the national temperament, to dare, to dare, and to advance. one of the singular features of french discipline is that on the road, especially in campaign the methods of punishment for derelictions become illusory, impractical. in there were twenty-five thousand skulkers in the army in italy. the soldier sees this immediately and lack of discipline ensues. if our customs do not permit of draconian discipline, let us replace that moral coercion by another. let us insure cohesion by the mutual acquaintanceship of men and officers; let us call french sociability to our aid. with the romans discipline was severest and most rigidly enforced in the presence of the enemy. it was enforced by the soldiers themselves. to-day, why should not the men in our companies watch discipline and punish themselves. they alone know each other, and the maintenance of discipline is so much to their interest as to encourage them to stop skulking. the twenty-five thousand men who skulked in italy, all wear the italian medal. they were discharged with certificates of good conduct. this certificate, in campaign should be awarded by the squad only. in place of that, discipline must be obtained somehow, and it is placed as an additional burden on the officer. he above all has to uphold it. he is treated without regard for his dignity. he is made to do the work of the non-commissioned officer. he is used as fancy dictates. this cohesion which we hope for in units from squad to company, need not be feared in other armies. it cannot develop to the same point and by the same methods with them as with us. their make-up is not ours, their character is different. this individuality of squads and companies comes from the make-up of our army and from french sociability. is it true that the rations of men and horses are actually insufficient in campaign? this is strange economy! to neglect to increase the soldier's pay five centimes! it would better his fare and prevent making of an officer a trader in vegetables in order to properly feed his men. yet millions are squandered each year for uniforms, geegaws, shakos, etc! if a big army is needed, it ought to cost as little as possible. simplicity in all things! down with all sorts of plumes! less amateurs! if superfluous trimmings are not cut down it will be unfortunate! what is the matter with the sailor's uniform? insignificant and annoying details abound while vital details of proper footgear and instruction, are neglected. the question of clothing for campaign is solved by adopting smocks and greatcoats and by doing away with headquarters companies! this is the height of folly. i suppose it is because our present uniforms need specialists to keep them in condition, and smocks and greatcoats do not! appendix i memorandum on infantry fire [written in (editor's note)] . introduction it may be said that the history of the development of infantry fire is none too plain, even though fire action to-day, in europe, is almost the sole means of destruction used by that arm. napoleon said, "the only method of fire to be used in war is fire at will." yet after such a plain statement by one who knew, there is a tendency to-day to make fire at command the basis of infantry battle tactics. is this correct? experience only can determine. experience is gained; but nothing, especially in the trade of war, is sooner forgotten than experience. so many fine things can be done, beautiful maneuvers executed, ingenious combat methods invented in the confines of an office or on the maneuver ground. nevertheless let us try to hold to facts. let us consider, in the study of any kind of fire, a succinct history of small arms; let us see what kind of fire is used with each weapon, attempting at the same time to separate that which has actually happened from the written account. . succinct history of the development of small arms, from the arquebus to our rifle the arquebus in use before the invention of powder gave the general design to fire arms. the arquebus marks then the transition from the mechanically thrown missile to the bullet. the tube was kept to direct the projectile, and the bow and string were replaced by a powder chamber and ignition apparatus. this made a weapon, very simple, light and easy to charge; but the small caliber ball thrown from a very short barrel, gave penetration only at short distances. the barrel was lengthened, the caliber increased, and a more efficient, but a less convenient arm resulted. it was indeed impossible to hold the weapon in aiming position and withstand the recoil at the moment of firing. to lessen recoil there was attached to the bottom of the barrel a hook to catch on a fixed object at the moment of discharge. this was called a hook arquebus. but the hook could only be used under certain circumstances. to give the arm a point of support on the body, the stock was lengthened and inclined to permit sighting. this was the petrinal or poitrinal. the soldier had in addition a forked support for the barrel. in the musket, which followed, the stock was again modified and held against the shoulder. further the firing mechanism was improved. the arm had been fired by a lighted match; but with the musket, the arm becoming lighter and more portable, there came the serpentine lock, the match-lock, then the wheel-lock, finally the spanish lock and the flint-lock. the adoption of the flint-lock and the bayonet produced the rifle, which napoleon regarded as the most powerful weapon that man possesses. but the rifle in its primitive state had defects. loading was slow; it was inaccurate, and under some circumstances it could not be fired. how were these defects remedied? as to the loading weakness, gustavus adolphus, understanding the influence on morale of rapid loading and the greater destruction caused by the more rapid fire, invented the cartridge for muskets. frederick, or some one of his time, the name marks the period, replaced wooden by cylindrical iron ramrods. to prime more quickly a conical funnel allowed the powder to pass from the barrel into the firing-pan. these two last improvements saved time in two ways, in priming and in loading. but it was the adoption of the breech-loader that brought the greatest increase in rapidity of fire. these successive improvements of the weapon, all tending to increase the rapidity of fire, mark the most remarkable military periods of modern times: cartridges--gustavus adolphus iron ramrod--frederick improved vent (adopted by the soldiers if not prescribed by competent orders)--wars of the republic and of the empire breech-loading--sadowa. accuracy was sacrificed to rapidity of fire. this will be explained later. only in our day has the general use of rifling and of elongated projectiles brought accuracy to the highest point. in our times, also, the use of fulminate has assured fire under all conditions. we have noted briefly the successive improvements in fire arms, from the arquebus to the rifle. have the methods of employment made the same progress? . progressive introduction of fire-arms into the armament of the infantryman the revolution brought about by powder, not in the art of war but in that of combat, came gradually. it developed along with the improvement of fire arms. those arms gradually became those of the infantryman. thus, under francis i, the proportion of infantrymen carrying fire arms to those armed with pikes was one to three or four. at the time of the wars of religion arquebusiers and pikemen were about equal in number. under louis xiii, in , there were two fire-arms to one pike; in the war of , four to one; finally pikes disappeared. at first men with fire-arms were independent of other combatants, and functioned like light troops in earlier days. later the pikes and the muskets were united in constituent elements of army corps. the most usual formation was pikes in the center, muskets on the wings. sometimes the pikemen were in the center of their respective companies, which were abreast. or, half the musketeers might be in front of the pikemen, half behind. or again, all the musketeers might be behind the kneeling pikemen. in these last two cases fire covered the whole front. finally pike and musket might alternate. these combinations are found in treatises on tactics. but we do not know, by actual examples, how they worked in battle, nor even whether all were actually employed. . the classes of fire employed with each weapon when originally some of the infantry were armed with the long and heavy arquebus in its primitive state, the feebleness of their fire caused montaigne to say, certainly on military authority, "the arms have so little effect, except on the ears, that their use will be discontinued." research is necessary to find any mention of their use in the battles of that period. [ ] however we find a valuable piece of information in brantôme, writing of the battle of pavia. "the marquis de pescani won the battle of pavia with spanish arquebusiers, in an irregular defiance of all regulation and tradition by employing a new formation. fifteen hundred arquebusiers, the ablest, the most experienced, the cleverest, above all the most agile and devoted, were selected by the marquis de pescani, instructed by him on new lines, and practiced for a long time. they scattered by squads over the battlefield, turning, leaping from one place to another with great speed, and thus escaped the cavalry charge. by this new method of fighting, unusual, astonishing, cruel and unworthy, these arquebusiers greatly hampered the operations of the french cavalry, who were completely lost. for they, joined together and in mass, were brought to earth by these few brave and able arquebusiers. this irregular and new method of fighting is more easily imagined than described. any one who can try it out will find it is good and useful; but it is necessary that the arquebusiers be good troops, very much on the jump (as the saying is) and above all reliable." it should be borne in mind, in noting the preceding, that there is always a great difference between what actually occurred, and the description thereof (made often by men who were not there, and god knows on what authority). nevertheless, there appears in these lines of brantôme a first example of the most destructive use of the rifle, in the hands of skirmishers. during the religious wars, which consisted of skirmishes and taking and retaking garrisoned posts, the fire of arquebusiers was executed without order and individually, as above. the soldier carried the powder charges in little metal boxes hung from a bandoleer. a finer, priming, powder was contained in a powder horn; the balls were carried in a pouch. at the onset the soldier had to load his piece. it was thus that he had to fight with the match arquebus. this was still far from fire at command. however this presently appeared. gustavus adolphus was the first who tried to introduce method and coördination into infantry fire. others, eager for innovations, followed in his path. there appeared successively, fire by rank, in two ranks, by subdivision, section, platoon, company, battalion, file fire, parapet fire, a formal fire at will, and so many others that we can be sure that all combinations were tried at this time. fire by ranks was undoubtedly the first of these; it will give us a line on the others. infantry was formed six deep. to execute fire by rank all ranks except the last knelt. the last rank fired and reloaded. the rank in front of it then rose and did the same thing, as did all other ranks successively. the whole operation was then recommenced. thus the first group firing was executed successively by ranks. montecuculli said, "the musketeers are ranged six deep, so that the last rank has reloaded by the time the first has fired, and takes up the fire again, so that the enemy has to face continuous fire." however, under condé and turenne, we see the french army use only fire at will. it is true that at this time fire was regarded only as an accessory. the infantry of the line which, since the exploit of the flemish, the swiss and the spaniards, had seen their influence grow daily, was required for the charge and the advance and consequently was armed with pikes. in the most celebrated battles of these times, rocroi, nordlingen, lens, rethel and the dunes, we see the infantry work in this way. the two armies, in straight lines, commenced by bombarding each other, charged with their cavalry wings, and advanced with their infantry in the center. the bravest or best disciplined infantry drove back the other, and often, if one of its wings was victorious, finished by routing it. no marked influence of fire is found at this time. the tradition of pescani was lost. nevertheless fire-arms improved; they became more effective and tended to replace the pike. the use of the pike obliged the soldier to remain in ranks, to fight only in certain cases, and exposed him to injury without being able to return blow for blow. and, this is exceedingly instructive, the soldier had by this time an instinctive dislike of this arm, which often condemned him to a passive role. this dislike necessitated giving high pay and privilege to obtain pikemen. and in spite of all at the first chance the soldier threw away his pike for a musket. the pikes themselves gradually disappeared before firearms; the ranks thinned to permit the use of the latter. four rank formation was used, and fire tried in that order, by rank, by two ranks, upright, kneeling, etc. in spite of these attempts, we see the french army in combat, notably at fontenoy, still using fire at will, the soldier leaving ranks to fire and returning to load. it can be stated, in spite of numerous attempts at adoption, that no fire at command was used in battle up to the days of frederick. already, under william, the prussian infantry was noted for the rapidity and continuity of its fire. frederick further increased the ability of his battalions to fire by decreasing their depth. this fire, tripled by speed in loading, became so heavy that it gave prussian battalions a superiority over others of three to one. the prussians recognized three kinds of fire, at a halt, in advancing, and in retreat. we know the mechanics of fire at a halt, the first rank kneeling. of fire in advancing guibert says: "what i call marching fire, and which anybody who thinks about it must find as ill advised as i do, is a fire i have seen used by some troops. the soldiers, in two ranks, fire in marching, but they march of course at a snail's pace. this is what prussian troops call fire in advancing. it consists in combined and alternating volleys from platoons, companies, half battalions or battalions. the parts of the line which have fired advance at the double, the others at the half step." in other methods of fire, as we have said, the prussian battalion was in three ranks; the first kneeling. the line delivered salvos, only at command. however, the theory of executing fire by salvo in three ranks did not bother frederick's old soldiers. we will see presently how they executed it on the field of battle. be that as it may, europe was impressed with these methods and tended to adopt them. d'argenson provided for them in the french army and introduced fire at command. two regulations prescribing this appeared, in and . but in the war which followed, marshal de broglie, who undoubtedly had experience and as much common sense as m. d'argenson, prescribed fire at will. all infantry in his army was practiced in it during the winter of - . two new regulations succeeded the preceding, in and . the last prescribed fire in three ranks at command, all ranks upright. [ ] thus we come to the wars of the revolution, with regulations calling for fire at command, which was not executed in battle. since these wars, our armies have always fought as skirmishers. in speaking of our campaigns, fire at command is never mentioned. it was the same under the empire, in spite of numerous essays from the boulogne school and elsewhere. at the boulogne school, fire at command by ranks was first tried by order of napoleon. this fire, to be particularly employed against cavalry--in theory it is superb--does not seem to have been employed napoleon says so himself, and the regulations of , in which some influence of soldiers of the empire should be found, orders fire in two ranks or at will, by bodies of men, to the exclusion of all others. according to our military authority, on the authority of our old officers, fire at command did not suit our infantry; yet it lived in the regulations. general fririon ( ) and de gouvion-saint-cyr ( ) attacked this method. nothing was done. it remained in the regulations of , but without being ordered in any particular circumstances. it appeared there for show purposes, perhaps. on the creation of the chasseurs d'orléans, fire by rank was revived. but neither in our african campaigns nor in our last two wars in the crimea and italy can a single example of fire at command be found. in practice it was believed to be impracticable. it was known to be entirely ineffective and fell into disrepute. but to-day, with the breech-loading rifle, there is a tendency to believe it practicable and to take it up with new interest. is this more reasonable than in the past? let us see. . methods of fire used in the presence of the enemy; methods recommended or ordered but impractical. use and efficacy of fire at command undoubtedly at the potsdam maneuvers the prussian infantry used only salvos executed admirably. an unbelievable discipline kept the soldier in place and in line. barbaric punishments were incorporated in the military code. blows, the whip, executions, punished the slightest derelictions. even n.c.o.'s were subjected to blows with the flat of the sword. yet all this was not enough on the field of battle; a complete rank of non-commissioned officer file closers was also needed to hold the men to their duty. m. carion-nisas said, "these file-closers hook their halberds together and form a line that cannot be broken." in spite of all this, after two or three volleys, so says general renard, whom we believe more than charitable, there is no power of discipline which can prevent regular fire from breaking into fire at will. but let us look further, into frederick's battles. let us take the battle of mollwitz, in which success was specifically laid to fire at command, half lost, then won by the prussian salvos. "the austrian infantry had opened fire on the lines of the prussians, whose cavalry had been routed. it was necessary to shake them to insure victory. the austrians still used wooden ramrods. their fire came slowly, while the prussian fire was thunderous, five or six shots to the rifle per minute. the imperial troops, surprised and disconcerted by this massed fire, tried to hurry. in their hurry many broke their fragile ramrods. confusion spread through the ranks, and the battle was lost." but, if we study actual conditions of the period, we see that things did not happen in such an orderly sequence. firing started, and it is said that it was long and deadly. the prussians iron ramrods gave them the advantage 'over an enemy whose ramrods were wooden, harder to manipulate and easily broken. however, when the order to advance was given to the prussians, whole battalions stood fast; it was impossible to budge them. the soldiers tried to escape the fire and got behind each other, so that they were thirty to forty deep. here are men who exhibit under fire an admirable, calm, an immovable steadiness. each instant they hear the dead heavy sound of a bullet striking. they see, they feel, around them, above them, between their legs, their comrades fall and writhe, for the fire is deadly. they have the power in their hands to return blow for blow, to send back to the enemy the death that hisses and strikes about them. they do not take a false step; their hands do not close instinctively on the trigger. they wait, imperturbably, the order of their chiefs--and what chiefs! these are the men who at the command "forward," lack bowels, who huddle like sheep one behind the other. are we to believe this? let us get to the truth of the matter. frederick's veterans, in spite of their discipline and drill, are unable to follow the methods taught and ordered. they are no more able to execute fire at command than they are to execute the ordered advance of the potsdam maneuver field. they use fire at will. they fire fast from instinct--stronger than their discipline--which bids them send two shots for one. their fire becomes indeed, a thunderous roll, not of salvos, but of rapid fire at will. who fires most, hits most, so the soldier figures. so indeed did frederick, for he encouraged fire in this same battle of mollwitz; he thereafter doubled the number of cartridges given the soldier, giving him sixty instead of thirty. furthermore, if fire at command had been possible, who knows what frederick's soldiers would have been capable of? they would have cut down battalions like standing grain. allowed to aim quietly, no man interfering with another, each seeing clearly--then at the signal all firing together. could anything hold against them? at the first volley the enemy would have broken and fled, under the penalty of annihilation in case they stayed. however, if we look at the final result at mollwitz, we see that the number of killed is about the same on the side that used fire at command as on the side that did not. the prussians lost dead, the austrians . but they say that if fire was not more deadly, it was because sight-setting was then unknown. what if it was? there was no adjustment of fire perhaps, but there were firing regulations; aiming was known. aiming is old. we do not say it was practiced; but it was known, and often mentioned. cromwell often said, "put your confidence in god, my children, and fire at their shoe-laces." do we set our sights better to-day? it is doubtful. if the able soldiers of cromwell, of frederick, of the republic and of napoleon could not set their sights--can we? thus this fire at command, which was only possible rarely and to commence action, was entirely ineffective. hardy spirits, seeing the slight effect of long range firing in battle, counselled waiting till the enemy was at twenty paces and driving him back with a volley. you do not have to sight carefully at twenty paces. what would be the result? "at the battle of castiglione," says marshal saxe, "the imperial troops let the french approach to twenty paces, hoping to destroy them by a volley. at that distance they fired coolly and with all precautions, but they were broken before the smoke cleared. at the battle of belgrade ( ) i saw two battalions who at thirty paces, aimed and fired at a mass of turks. the turks cut them up, only two or three escaping. the turkish loss in dead was only thirty-two." no matter what the marshal says, we doubt that these men were cool. for men who could hold their fire up to such a near approach of the enemy, and fire into masses, would have killed the front rank, thrown the others into confusion, and would never have been cut up as they were. to make these men await, without firing, an enemy at twenty or thirty paces, needed great moral pressure. controlled by discipline they waited, but as one waits for the roof to fall, for a bomb to explode, full of anxiety and suppressed emotion. when the order is given to raise the arms and fire the crisis is reached. the roof falls, the bomb explodes, one flinches and the bullets are fired into the air. if anybody is killed it is an accident. this is what happened before the use of skirmishers. salvos were tried. in action they became fire at will. directed against troops advancing without firing they were ineffective. they did not halt the dash of the assault, and the troops who had so counted on them fled demoralized. but when skirmishers were used, salvos became impossible. armies who held to old methods learned this to their cost. in the first days of the revolution our troops, undrilled and not strictly disciplined, could not fight in line. to advance on the enemy, a part of the battalion was detached as skirmishers. the remainder marched into battle and was engaged without keeping ranks. the combat was sustained by groups fighting without formal order. the art was to support by reserves the troops advanced as skirmishers. the skirmishers always began the action, when indeed they did not complete it. to oppose fire by rank to skirmishers was fools' play. skirmishers necessarily opposed each other. once this method was adopted, they were supported, reinforced by troops in formation. in the midst of general firing fire at command became impossible and was replaced by fire at will. dumouriez, at the battle of jemmapes, threw out whole battalions as skirmishers, and supporting them by light cavalry, did wonders with them. they surrounded the austrian redoubts and rained on the cannoneers a hail of bullets so violent that they abandoned their pieces. the austrians, astounded by this novel combat method, vainly reinforced their light troops by detachments of heavy infantry. their skirmishers could not resist our numbers and impetuosity, and presently their line, beaten by a storm of bullets, was forced back. the noise of battle, the firing, increased; the defeated troops, hearing commands no longer, threw down their arms and fled in disorder. so fire in line, heavy as it may be, cannot prevail against the power of numerous detachments of skirmishers. a rain of bullets directed aimlessly is impotent against isolated men profiting by the slightest cover to escape the fire of their adversaries, while the deployed battalions offer to their rifles a huge and relatively harmless target. the dense line, apparently so strong, withers under the deadly effect of the fire of isolated groups, so feeble in appearance. (general renard.) the prussians suffered in the same way at jena. their lines tried fire at command against our skirmishers. you might as well fire on a handful of fleas. they tell us of the english salvos at sainte-euphémie, in calabria, and later in spain. in these particular cases they could be used, because our troops charged without first sending out skirmishers. the battle of sainte-euphémie only lasted half an hour; it was badly conceived and executed, "and if," says general duhesme, "the advancing battalions had been preceded by detachments of skirmishers who had already made holes in enemy ranks, and, on close approach, the heads of columns had been launched in a charge, the english line would not have conserved that coolness which made their fire so effective and accurate. certainly it would not have waited so long to loose its fire, if it had been vigorously harassed by skirmishers." an english author, treating of the history of weapons, speaks of the rolling fire, well directed, of the english troops. he makes no mention of salvos. perhaps we were mistaken, and in our accounts have taken the fire of a battalion for the formal battalion fire at command of our regulations. the same tendency appears more clearly in the work on infantry of the marquis de chambray, who knew the english army well. he says that the english in spain used almost entirely fire in two ranks. they employed battalion fire only when attacked by our troops without skirmishers, firing on the flanks of our columns. and he says "the fire by battalion, by half battalion and by platoon is limited to the target range. the fire actually most used in war is that in two ranks, the only one used by the french." later he adds "experience proves fire in two ranks the only one to be used against the enemy." before him marshal saxe wrote "avoid dangerous maneuvers, such as fire by platoon, which have often caused shameful defeats." these statements are as true now as then. fire at command, by platoon, by battalion, etc., is used in case the enemy having repulsed skirmishers and arrived at a reasonable range either charges or opens fire for effect himself. if the latter, fire is reciprocal and lasts until one or the other gives way or charges. if the enemy charges, what happens? he advances preceded by skirmishers who deliver a hail of bullets. you wish to open fire, but the voices of your officers are lost. the noise of artillery, of small arms, the confusion of battle, the shrieks of the wounded, distract the soldiers' attention. before you have delivered your command the line is ablaze. then try to stop your soldiers. while there is a cartridge left, they will fire. the enemy may find a fold of ground that protects him; he may adopt in place of his deployed order columns with wide intervals between, or otherwise change his dispositions. the changing incidents of battle are hidden by smoke and the troops in front, from the view of the officers behind. the soldiers will continue to fire and the officers can do nothing about it. all this has been said already, has been gone into, and fire at command has been abandoned. why take it up again? it comes to us probably from the prussians. indeed the reports of their general staff on their last campaign, of , say that it was very effectively employed, and cite many examples. but a prussian officer who went through the campaign in the ranks and saw things close up, says, "in examining the battles of for characteristics, one is struck by a feature common to all, the extraordinary extension of front at the expense of depth. either the front is spun out into a single long thin line, or it is broken into various parts that fight by themselves. above all the tendency is evident to envelop the enemy by extending the wings. there is no longer any question of keeping the original order of battle. different units are confused, by battle, or even before battle. detachments and large units of any corps are composed of diverse and heterogeneous elements. the battle is fought almost exclusively by columns of companies, rarely of half-battalions. the tactics of these columns consists in throwing out strong detachments of skirmishers. gradually the supports are engaged and deployed. the line is broken, scattered, like a horde of irregular cavalry. the second line which has held close order tries to get up to the first promptly, first to engage in the fight, also because they suffer losses from the high shots directed at the first line. it suffers losses that are heavy as it is compact and supports them with impatience as it does not yet feel the fever of battle. the most of the second line then forces entry into the first, and, as there is more room on the wings, it gravitates to the wings. very often even the reserve is drawn in, entirely, or so largely that it cannot fulfill its mission. in fact, the fighting of the first two lines is a series of combats between company commands and the enemy each command faces. superior officers cannot follow on horseback all the units, which push ahead over all sorts of ground. they have to dismount and attach themselves to the first unit of their command met. unable to manipulate their whole command, in order to do something, they command the smaller unit. it is not always better commanded at that. even generals find themselves in this situation." here is something we understand better. it is certainly what occurs. as for the instances cited in the general staff reports, they deal with companies or half-battalions at most. not withstanding the complacency with which they are cited, they must have been rare, and the exception should not be taken as establishing a rule. . fire at will--its efficacy thus fire at command, to-day as in the past, is impractical and consequently not actually used in battle. the only means employed are fire at will and the fire of skirmishers. let us look into their efficacy. competent authorities have compiled statistics on this point. guibert thinks that not over two thousand men are killed or wounded by each million cartridges used in battle. gassendi assures us that of three thousand shots only one is a hit. piobert says that the estimate, based on the result of long wars, is that three to ten thousand cartridges are expended for each man hit. to-day, with accurate and long range weapons, have things changed much? we do not think so. the number of bullets fired must be compared with the number of men dropped, with a deduction made for the action of artillery, which must be considered. a german author has advanced the opinion that with the prussian needle rifle the hits are % of the shots fired. but then how explain the disappointment of m. dreyse, the happy inventor of the needle rifle, when he compared prussian and austrian losses. this good old gentleman was disagreeably astonished at seeing that his rifle had not come up to his expectations. fire at will, as we shall presently show, is a fire to occupy the men in the ranks but its effect is not great. we could give many examples; we only cite one, but it is conclusive. "has it not been remarked," says general duhesme, "that, before a firing line there is raised a veil of smoke which on one side or the other hides the troops from view, and makes the fire of the best placed troops uncertain and practically without effect? i proved it conclusively at the battle of caldiero, in one of the successive advances that occurred on my left wing. i saw some battalions, which i had rallied, halted and using an individual fire which they could not keep up for long. i went there. i saw through the smoke cloud nothing but flashes, the glint of bayonets and the tops of grenadier's caps. we were not far from the enemy however, perhaps sixty paces. a ravine separated us, but it could not be seen. i went into the ranks, which were neither closed nor aligned, throwing up with my hand the soldiers' rifles to get them to cease firing and to advance. i was mounted, followed by a dozen orderlies. none of us were wounded, nor did i see an infantryman fall. well then! hardly had our line started when the austrians, heedless of the obstacle that separated us, retreated." it is probable that had the austrians started to move first, the french would have given way. it was veterans of the empire, who certainly were as reliable as our men, who gave this example of lack of coolness. in ranks, fire at will is the only possible one for our officers and men. but with the excitement, the smoke, the annoying incidents, one is lucky to get even horizontal fire, to say nothing of aimed fire. in fire at will, without taking count of any trembling, men interfere with each other. whoever advances or who gives way to the recoil of his weapon deranges the shot of his neighbor. with full pack, the second rank has no loophole; it fires in the air. on the range, spacing men to the extremity of the limits of formation, firing very slowly, men are found who are cool and not too much bothered by the crack of discharge in their ears, who let the smoke pass and seize a loophole of pretty good visibility, who try, in a word, not to lose their shots. and the percentage results show much more regularity than with fire at command. but in front of the enemy fire at will becomes in an instant haphazard fire. each man fires as much as possible, that is to say, as badly as possible. there are physical and mental reasons why this is so. even at close range, in battle, the cannon can fire well. the gunner, protected in part by his piece, has an instant of coolness in which to lay accurately. that his pulse is racing does not derange his line of sight, if he has will power. the eye trembles little, and the piece once laid, remains so until fired. the rifleman, like the gunner, only by will-power keeps his ability to aim. but the excitement in the blood, of the nervous system, opposes the immobility of the weapon in his hands. no matter how supported, a part of the weapon always shares the agitation of the man. he is instinctively in haste to fire his shot, which may stop the departure of the bullet destined for him. however lively the fire is, this vague reasoning, unformed as it is in his mind, controls with all the force of the instinct of self preservation. even the bravest and most reliable soldiers then fire madly. the greater number fire from the hip. the theory of the range is that with continual pressure on the trigger the shot surprises the firer. but who practices it under fire? however, the tendency in france to-day is to seek only accuracy. what good will it do when smoke, fog, darkness, long range, excitement, the lack of coolness, forbid clear sight? it is hard to say, after the feats of fire at sebastopol, in italy, that accurate weapons have given us no more valuable service than a simple rifle. just the same, to one who has seen, facts are facts. but--see how history is written. it has been set down that the russians were beaten at inkermann by the range and accuracy of weapons of the french troops. but the battle was fought in thickets and wooded country, in a dense fog. and when the weather cleared, our soldiers, our chasseurs were out of ammunition and borrowed from the russian cartridge boxes, amply provided with cartridges for round, small calibered bullets. in either case there could have been no accurate fire. the facts are that the russians were beaten by superior morale; that unaimed fire, at random, there perhaps more than elsewhere, had the only material effect. when one fires and can only fire at random, who fires most hits most. or perhaps it is better said that who fires least expects to be hit most. frederick was impressed with this, for he did not believe in the potsdam maneuvers. the wily fritz looked on fire as a means to quiet and occupy the undependable soldiers and it proved his ability that he could put into practice that which might have been a mistake on the part of any other general officer. he knew very well how to count on the effect of his fire, how many thousand cartridges it took to kill or wound an enemy. at first his soldiers had only thirty cartridges. he found the number insufficient, and after mollwitz gave them sixty. to-day as in frederick's day, it is rapid random fire, the only one practicable, which has given prestige to the prussians. this idea of rapid fire was lost after frederick, but the prussians have recovered it to-day by exercising common sense. however our veterans of the empire had preserved this idea, which comes from instinct. they enlarged their vents, scornful of flare backs, to avoid having to open the chamber and prime. the bullet having a good deal of clearance when the cartridge was torn and put in the gun, with a blow of the butt on the ground they had their arms charged and primed. but to-day as then, in spite of skill acquired in individual fire, men stop aiming and fire badly as soon as they are grouped into platoons to fire. prussian officers, who are practical men, know that adjustment of sights is impracticable in the heat of action, and that in fire by volleys troops tend to use the full sight. so in the war of they ordered their men to fire very low, almost without sighting, in order to profit by ricochets. . fire by rank is a fire to occupy the men in ranks but if fire at will is not effective, what is its use? as we have already said its use is to occupy the men in the ranks. in ordinary fire the act of breathing alone, by the movement it communicates to the body greatly annoys men in firing. how then can it be claimed that on the field of battle, in rank, men can fire even moderately well when they fire only to soothe themselves and forget danger? napoleon said "the instinct of man is not to let himself be killed without defending himself." and indeed man in combat is a being in whom the instinct of self preservation dominates at times all other sentiments. the object of discipline is to dominate this instinct by a greater terror of shame or of punishment. but it is never able entirely to attain this object; there is a point beyond which it is not effectual. this point reached, the soldier must fire or he will go either forward or back. fire is then, let us say, a safety vent for excitement. in serious affairs it is then difficult, if not impossible, to control fire. here is an example given by marshal saxe: "charles xii, king of sweden, wished to introduce into his infantry the method of charging with the bayonet. he spoke of it often, and it was known in the army that this was his idea. finally at the battle of ---- against the russians, when the fighting started he went to his regiment of infantry, made it a fine speech, dismounted before the colors, and himself led the regiment to the charge. when he was thirty paces from the enemy the whole regiment fired, in spite of his orders and his presence. otherwise, it did very well and broke the enemy. the king was so annoyed that all he did was pass through the ranks, remount his horse, and go away without saying a word." so that, if the soldier is not made to fire, he will fire anyway to distract himself and forget danger. the fire of frederick's prussians had no other purpose. marshal saxe saw this. "the speed with which the prussians load their rifles," he tells us, "is advantageous in that it occupies the soldier and forbids reflection while he is in the presence of the enemy. it is an error to believe that the five last victories gained by the nation in its last war were due to fire. it has been noted that in most of these actions there were more prussians killed by rifle fire than there were of their enemies." it would be sad to think the soldier in line a firing machine. firing has been and always will be his principal object, to fire as many shots in as short a time as possible. but the victor is not always the one who kills the most; he is fortunate who best knows how to overcome the morale of his enemy. the coolness of men cannot be counted on. and as it is necessary above all to keep up their morale one ought to try above all to occupy and soothe them. this can best be done by frequent discharges. there will be little effect, and it would be absurd to expect them to be calm enough to fire slowly, adjust their ranges and above all sight carefully. . the deadly fire is the fire of skirmishers in group firing, when the men are grouped into platoons or battalions, all weapons have the same value, and if it is assumed to-day that fire must decide engagements, the method of fighting must be adopted which gives most effect to the weapon. this is the employment of skirmishers. it is this class of fire, indeed, which is deadliest in war. we could give many examples but we shall be content with the two following instances, taken from general duhesme. "a french officer who served with the austrians in one of the recent wars," says general duhesme, "told me that from the fire of a french battalion one hundred paces from them, his company lost only three or four men, while in the same time they had had more than thirty killed or wounded by the fire of a group of skirmishers in a little wood on their flank three hundred paces away." "at the passage of the minico, in , the nd battalion of the st received the fire of a battalion of bussi's regiment without losing a man; the skirmishers of that same organization killed more than thirty men in a few minutes while protecting the retreat of their organization." the fire of skirmishers is then the most deadly used in war, because the few men who remain cool enough to aim are not otherwise annoyed while employed as skirmishers. they will perform better as they are better hidden, and better trained in firing. the accuracy of fire giving advantages only in isolated fire, we may consider that accurate weapons will tend to make fighting by skirmishers more frequent and more decisive. for the rest, experience authorizes the statement that the use of skirmishers is compulsory in war. to-day all troops seriously engaged become in an instant groups of skirmishers and the only possible precise fire is from hidden snipers. however, the military education which we have received, the spirit of the times, clouds with doubt our mind regarding this method of fighting by skirmishers. we accept it regretfully. our personal experience being incomplete, insufficient, we content ourselves with the supposition that gives us satisfaction. the war of skirmishers, no matter how thoroughly it has been proven out, is accepted by constraint, because we are forced by circumstance to engage our troops by degrees, in spite of ourselves, often unconsciously. but, be it understood, to-day a successive engagement is necessary in war. however, let us not have illusions as to the efficacy of the fire of skirmishers. in spite of the use of accurate and long range weapons, in spite of all training that can be given the soldier, this fire never has more than a relative effect, which should not be exaggerated. the fire of skirmishers is generally against skirmishers. a body of troops indeed does not let itself be fired on by skirmishers without returning a similar fire. and it is absurd to expect skirmishers to direct their fire on a body protected by skirmishers. to demand of troops firing individually, almost abandoned to themselves, that they do not answer the shots directed at them, by near skirmishers, but aim at a distant body, which is not harming them, is to ask an impossible unselfishness. as skirmishers men are very scattered. to watch the adjustment of ranges is difficult. men are practically left alone. those who remain cool may try to adjust their range, but it is first necessary to see where your shots fall, then, if the terrain permits this and it will rarely do so, to distinguish them from shots fired at the same time by your neighbors. also these men will be more disturbed, will fire faster and less accurately, as the fight is more bitter, the enemy stauncher; and perturbation is more contagious than coolness. the target is a line of skirmishers, a target offering so little breadth and above all depth, that outside of point blank fire, an exact knowledge of the range is necessary to secure effect. this is impossible, for the range varies at each instant with the movements of the skirmishers. [ ] thus, with skirmishers against skirmishers, there are scattered shots at scattered targets. our fire of skirmishers, marching, on the target range, proves this, although each man knows exactly the range and has time and the coolness to set his sights. it is impossible for skirmishers in movement to set sights beyond four hundred meters, and this is pretty extreme, even though the weapon is actually accurate beyond this. also, a shot is born. there are men, above all in officer instructors at firing schools, who from poor shots become excellent shots after years of practice. but it is impossible to give all the soldiers such an education without an enormous consumption of ammunition and without abandoning all other work. and then there would be no results with half of them. to sum up, we find that fire is effective only at point blank. even in our last wars there have been very few circumstances in which men who were favored with coolness and under able leadership have furnished exceptions. with these exceptions noted, we can say that accurate and long range weapons have not given any real effect at a range greater than point blank. there has been put forward, as proof of the efficacy of accurate weapons the terrible and decisive results obtained by the british in india, with the enfield rifle. but these results have been obtained because the british faced comparatively poorly armed enemies. they had then the security, the confidence, the ensuing coolness necessary for the use of accurate weapons. these conditions are completely changed when one faces an enemy equally well armed, who consequently, gives as good as he gets. . absolute impossibility of fire at command let us return to fire at command, which there is a tendency to-day to have troops execute in line. can regular and efficient fire be hoped for from troops in line? ought it to be hoped for? no, for man cannot be made over, and neither can the line. even on the range or on the maneuver field what does this fire amount to? in fire at command, on the range, all the men in the two ranks come to the firing position simultaneously, everybody is perfectly quiet. men in the front rank consequently are not deranged by their neighbors. men in the second rank are in the same situation. the first rank being set and motionless they can aim through the openings without more annoyance than those in the first rank. fire being executed at command, simultaneously, no weapon is deranged at the moment of firing by the movements of the men. all conditions are entirely favorable to this kind of fire. also as the fire is ordered with skill and coolness by an officer who has perfectly aligned his men (a thing rare even on the drill ground) it gives percentage results greater than that of fire at will executed with the minutest precautions, results that are sometimes astonishing. but fire at command, from the extreme coolness that it demands of all, of the officer certainly more than of the soldier, is impracticable before the enemy except under exceptional circumstances of picked officers, picked men, ground, distance, safety, etc. even in maneuvers its execution is farcical. there is not an organization in which the soldiers do not hurry the command to fire in that the officers are so afraid that their men will anticipate the command that they give it as rapidly as possible, while the pieces are hardly in firing position, often while they are still in motion. the prescription that the command to fire be not given until about three seconds after coming to the firing position may give good results in the face of range targets. but it is not wise to believe that men will wait thus for long in the face of the enemy. it is useless to speak of the use of the sight-leaf before the enemy, in fire attempted by the same officers and men who are so utterly lacking, even on the maneuver ground. we have seen a firing instructor, an officer of coolness and assurance, who on the range had fired trial shots every day for a month, after this month of daily practice fire four trial shots at a six hundred meter range with the sight leaf at point blank. let us not pay too much attention to those who in military matters base everything on the weapon and unhesitating assume that the man serving it will adopt the usage provided and ordered in their regulations. the fighting man is flesh and blood. he is both body and soul; and strong as the soul may often be it cannot so dominate the body that there is no revolt of the flesh, no mental disturbance, in the face of destruction. let us learn to distrust mathematics and material dynamics as applied to battle principles. we shall learn to beware of the illusions drawn from the range and the maneuver field. there experience is with the calm, settled, unfatigued, attentive, obedient soldier, with an intelligent and tractable man instrument in short. and not with the nervous, easily swayed, moved, troubled, distrait, excited, restless being, not even under self-control, who is the fighting man from general to private. there are strong men, exceptions, but they are rare. these illusions nevertheless, stubborn and persistent, always repair the next day the most damaging injuries inflicted on them by reality. their least dangerous effect is to lead to prescribing the impracticable, as if ordering the impracticable were not really an attack on discipline, and did not result in disconcerting officers and men by the unexpected and by surprise at the contrast between battle and the theories of peace-time training. battle of course always furnishes surprises. but it furnishes less in proportion as good sense and the recognition of the truth have had their effect on the training of the fighting man. man in the mass, in a disciplined body organized for combat, is invincible before an undisciplined body. but against a similarly disciplined body he reverts to the primitive man who flees before a force that is proved stronger, or that he feels stronger. the heart of the soldier is always the human heart. discipline holds enemies face to face a little longer, but the instinct of self-preservation maintains its empire and with it the sense of fear. fear! there are chiefs, there are soldiers who know no fear, but they are of rare temper. the mass trembles, for the flesh cannot be suppressed. and this trembling must be taken into account in all organization, discipline, formation, maneuver, movement, methods of action. for in all of these the soldier tends to be upset, to be deceived, to under-rate himself and to exaggerate the offensive spirit of the enemy. on the field of battle death is in the air, blind and invisible, making his presence known by fearful whistlings that make heads duck. during this strain the recruit hunches up, closes in, seeking aid by an instinctive unformulated reasoning. he figures that the more there are to face a danger the greater each one's chances of escaping. but he soon sees that flesh attracts lead. then, possessed by terror, inevitably he retreats before the fire, or "he escapes by advancing," in the picturesque and profound words of general burbaki. the soldier escapes from his officer, we say. yes, he escapes! but is it not evident that he escapes because up to this moment nobody has bothered about his character, his temperament, the impressionable and exciteable nature of man? in prescribed methods of fighting he has always been held to impossibilities. the same thing is done to-day. to-morrow, as yesterday, he will escape. there is of course a time when all the soldiers escape, either forward, or to the rear. but the organization, the combat methods should have no other object than to delay as long as possible this crisis. yet they hasten it. all our officers fear, quite justifiably from their experience, that the soldier will too rapidly use his cartridges in the face of the enemy. this serious matter is certainly worthy of attention. how to stop this useless and dangerous waste of ammunition is the question. our soldiers show little coolness. once in danger they fire, fire to calm themselves, to pass the time; they cannot be stopped. there are some people you cannot embarrass. with the best faith in the world they say, "what is this? you are troubled about stopping the fire of your soldiers? that is not difficult. you find that they show little coolness, and shoot despite their officers, in spite even of themselves? all right, require of them and their officers methods of fire that demand extremes of coolness, calm and assurance, even in maneuver. they cannot give a little? ask a lot and you will get it. there you have a combat method nobody has ever heard of, simple, beautiful, and terrible." this is indeed a fine theory. it would make the wily frederick who surely did not believe in these maneuvers, laugh until he cried. [ ] this is to escape from a difficulty by a means always recognized as impossible, and more impossible than ever to-day. fearing that the soldier will escape from command, can not better means be found to hold him than to require of him and his officer, impracticable fire? this, ordered and not executed by the soldiers, and even by the officers, is an attack on the discipline of the unit. "never order the impossible," says discipline, "for the impossible becomes then a disobedience." how many requisites there are to make fire at command possible, conditions among the soldiers, among their officers. perfect these conditions, they say. all right, perfect their training, their discipline, etc.; but to obtain fire at command it is necessary to perfect their nerves, their physical force, their moral force, to make bronze images of them, to do away with excitement, with the trembling of the flesh. can any one do this? frederick's soldiers were brought, by blows of the baton, to a terrible state of discipline. yet their fire was fire at will. discipline had reached its limits. man in battle, let us repeat again, is a being to whom the instinct of self-preservation at times dominates everything else. discipline, whose purpose is to dominate this instinct by a feeling of greater terror, can not wholly achieve it. discipline goes so far and no farther. we cannot deny the existence of extraordinary instances when discipline and devotion have raised man above himself. but these examples are extraordinary, rare. they are admired as exceptions, and the exception proves the rule. as to perfection, consider the spartans. if man was ever perfected for war it was he; and yet he has been beaten, and fled. in spite of training, moral and physical force has limits. the spartans, who should have stayed to the last man on the battle field, fled. the british with their phlegmatic coolness and their terrible rolling fire, the russians, with that inertia that is called their tenacity, have given way before attack. the german has given way, he who on account of his subordination and stability has been called excellent war material. again an objection is raised. perhaps with recruits the method may be impracticable. but with veterans--but with whom is war commenced? methods are devised precisely for young and inexperienced troops. they ask, also, if the prussians used this method of fire successfully in the last war, why should not we do as well? supposing that the prussians actually did use it, and this is far from being proved, it does not follow that it is practicable for us. this mania for borrowing german tactics is not new, although it has always been properly protested against. marshal luchner said, "no matter how much they torment their men, fortunately they will never make them prussians." later de gouvion-saint-cyr said, "the men are drilled in various exercises believed necessary to fit them for war, but there is no question of adopting exercises to suit the french military genius, the french character and temperament. it has not been thought necessary to take this into account; it has been easier to borrow german methods." to follow preconceived tactics is more the part of the phlegmatic german than it is ours. the germans obey well enough, but the point is that they try to follow tactics which are contrary to nature. the frenchman cannot. more spontaneous, more exciteable and impressionable, less calm and obedient, he has in our last wars promptly and completely violated both the letter and the spirit of the regulations. "the german," said a prussian officer, "has sentiments of duty and obedience. he submits to severe discipline. he is full of devotion, although not animated by a lively mind. easy by nature, rather heavy than active, intellectually calm, reflective, without dash or divine fire, wishing but not mad to conquer, obeying calmly and conscientiously, but mechanically and without enthusiasm, fighting with a resigned valor, with heroism, he may let himself be sacrificed uselessly, but he sells his life dearly. without warlike tendencies, not bellicose, unambitious, he is yet excellent war material on account of his subordination and stability. what must be inculcated in him is a will of his own, a personal impulse to send him forward." according to this unflattering portrait, which we believe a little extreme, even if by a compatriot, it is possible that the germans can be handled in tactics impossible with french. however, did they actually use these tactics? remember the urgent warning of blücher to his brigade commanders, not to let bayonet attacks break down into fusillades. note the article in the present prussian firing regulations, which prescribes trial shots before each fire delivered, "so as to dissipate the kind of excitement that possesses the soldier when his drill has been interrupted for some time." in conclusion, if fire at command was impossible with the ancient rifle, it is more so to-day, for the simple reason that trembling increases as the destructive power increases. under turenne, lines held longer than to-day, because the musket was in use and the battle developed more slowly. to-day when every one has the rapid fire rifle, are things easier? alas no! relations between weapons and the man are the same. you give me a musket, i fire at sixty paces, a rifle, at two hundred; a chessepot, at four hundred. but i have perhaps less coolness and steadiness than at the old sixty paces, for with the rapidity of fire the new weapon is more terrible at four hundred paces, for me as well as for the enemy, than was the musket at sixty paces. and is there even more fire accuracy? no. rifles were used before the french revolution, and yet this perfectly well known weapon was very rarely seen in war, and its efficacy, as shown in those rare cases, was unsatisfactory. accurate fire with it at combat distances of from two hundred to four hundred meters was illusory, and it was abandoned in favor of the old rifle. did the foot chasseurs know fire at command? picked troops, dependable, did they use it? yet it would have been a fine method of employing their weapons. to-day we have weapons that are accurate at six hundred to seven hundred meters. does that mean that accurate fire at seven hundred meters is possible? no. if your enemy is armed as we are, fire at seven hundred meters will show the same results that have been shown for four hundred meters. the same losses will be suffered, and the coolness shown will be the same--that is, it will be absent. if one fire three times as fast, three times as many men will fall, and it will be three times as difficult to preserve coolness. just as formerly it was impossible to execute fire at command, so it is to-day. formerly no sight-setting was possible; it is no better to-day. but if this fire is impossible, why attempt it? let us remain always in the realm of the possible or we shall make sad mistakes. "in our art," said general daine, "theorists abound; practical men are very rare. also when the moment of action arrives, principles are often found to be confused, application impossible, and the most erudite officers remain inactive, unable to use the scientific treasures that they have amassed." let us then, practical men, seek for possible methods. let us gather carefully the lessons of their experience, remembering bacon's saying, "experience excels science." appendix ii historical documents . cavalry an extract from xenophon. "the unexpectedness of an event accentuates it, be it pleasant or terrible. this is nowhere seen better than in war, where surprise terrorizes even the strongest. "when two armies are in touch or merely separated by the field of battle, there are first, on the part of the cavalry, skirmishes, thrusts, wheels to stop or pursue the enemy, after which usually each goes cautiously and does not put forth its greatest effort until the critical part of the conflict. or, having commenced as usual, the opposite is done and one moves swiftly, after the wheel, either to flee or to pursue. this is the method by which one can, with the least possible risk, most harm the enemy, charging at top speed when supported, or fleeing at the same speed to escape the enemy. if it is possible in these skirmishes to leave behind, formed in column and unobserved four or five of the bravest and best mounted men in each troop they may be very well employed to fall on the enemy at the moment of the wheel." . marius against the cimbrians extract from plutarch's "life of marius." "boiorix, king of the cimbrians, at the head of a small troop of cavalry, approached marius' camp and challenged him to fix a day and place to decide who would rule the country. marius answered that romans did not ask their enemies when to fight, but that he was willing to satisfy the cimbrians. they agreed then to give battle in three days on the plain of verceil, a convenient place for the romans to deploy their cavalry and for the barbarians to extend their large army. the two opponents on the day set were in battle formation. catulus had twenty thousand three hundred men. marius had thirty-two thousand, placed on the wings and consequently on either side of those of catulus, in the center. so writes sylla, who was there. they say that marius gave this disposition to the two parts of his army because he hoped to fall with his two wings on the barbarian phalanxes and wished the victory to come only to his command, without catulus taking any part or even meeting with the enemy. indeed, as the front of battle was very broad, the wings were separated from the center, which was broken through. they add that catulus reported this disposition in the explanation that he had to make and complained bitterly of marius' bad faith. the cimbrian infantry came out of its positions in good order and in battle array formed a solid phalanx as broad as it was wide, thirty stades or about eighteen thousand feet. their fifteen thousand horsemen were magnificently equipped. their helmets were crowned by the gaping mouths of savage beasts, above which were high plumes which looked like wings. this accentuated their height. they were protected by iron cuirasses and had shields of an astonishing whiteness. each had two javelins to throw from a distance, and in close fighting they used a long heavy sword. "in this battle the cavalry did not attack the romans in front, but, turning to the right they gradually extended with the idea of enclosing the romans before their infantry and themselves. the roman generals instantly perceived the ruse. but they were not able to restrain their men, one of whom, shouting that the enemy was flying, led all the others to pursue. meanwhile the barbarian infantry advanced like the waves of a great sea. "marius washed his hands, raised them to heaven, and vowed to offer a hecatomb to the gods. catulus for his part, also raised his hands to heaven and promised to consecrate the fortune of the day. marius also made a sacrifice, and, when the priest showed him the victim's entrails, cried, 'victory is mine.' but, as the two armies were set in motion, something happened, which, according to sylla, seemed divine vengeance on marius. the movements of such a prodigious multitude raised such a cloud of dust that the two armies could not see each other. marius, who had advanced first with his troops to fall on the enemy's formation, missed it in the dust, and having passed beyond it, wandered for a long time in the plain. meanwhile fortune turned the barbarians toward catulus who had to meet their whole attack with his soldiers, among whom was sylla. the heat of the day and the burning rays of the sun, which was in the eyes of the cimbrians, helped the romans. the barbarians, reared in cold wooded places, hardened to extreme cold, could not stand the heat. sweating, panting, they shaded their faces from the sun with their shields. the battle occurred after the summer solstice, three days before the new moon of the month of august, then called sextilis. the cloud of dust sustained the romans' courage by concealing the number of the enemy. each battalion advancing against the enemy in front of them were engaged, before the sight of such a great horde of barbarians could shake them. furthermore, hardship and hard work had so toughened them that in spite of the heat and impetuousness with which they attacked, no roman was seen to sweat or pant. this, it is said, is testified to by catulus himself in eulogizing the conduct of his troops. "most of the enemy, above all the bravest, were cut to pieces, for, to keep the front ranks from breaking, they were tied together by long chains attached to their belts. the victors pursued the fugitives to their entrenched camp. "the romans took more than sixty thousand cimbrians prisoners, and killed twice as many." . the battle of the alma extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq. a letter sent from huy, february , , by captain de v----, a company officer in the attack division. "my company, with the rd, commanded by captain d---- was designated to cover the battalion. "at eight or nine hundred meters from the alma, we saw a sort of wall, crowned with white, whose use we could not understand. then, at not more than three hundred meters, this wall delivered against us a lively battalion fire and deployed at the run. it was a russian battalion whose uniform, partridge-gray or chestnut-gray color, with white helmet, had, with the help of a bright sun, produced the illusion. this, parenthetically, showed me that this color is certainly the most sensible, as it can cause such errors. [ ] we replied actively, but there was effect on neither side because the men fired too fast and too high.... the advance was then taken up, and i don't know from whom the order can have come.... we went on the run, crossing the river easily enough, and while we were assembling to scramble up the hill we saw the rest of the battalion attacking, without order, companies mixed up, crying, 'forward,' singing, etc. we did the same, again took up the attack, and were lucky enough to reach the summit of the plateau first. the russians, astounded, massed in a square. why? i suppose that, turned on the left, attacked in the center, they thought themselves surrounded, and took this strange formation. at this moment a most inopportune bugle call was sounded by order of major de m---- commanding temporarily a battalion of foot chasseurs. this officer had perceived the russian cavalry in motion and believed that its object was to charge us, while, on the contrary it was maneuvering to escape the shells fired into it while in squadron formation by the megere, a vessel of the fleet. this order given by bugle signal was executed as rapidly as had been the attack, such is the instinct of self-preservation which urges man to flee danger, above all when ordered to flee. happily a level-headed officer, captain daguerre, seeing the gross mistake, commanded 'forward' in a stentorian tone. this halted the retreat and caused us again to take up the attack. the attack made us masters of the telegraph-line, and the battle was won. at this second charge the russians gave, turned, and hardly any of them were wounded with the bayonet. so then a major commanding a battalion, without orders, sounds a bugle call and endangers success. a simple captain commands 'forward,' and decides the victory. this is the history of yesterday, which may be useful tomorrow." it appears from this that, apart from the able conception of the commander-in-chief, the detail of execution was abominable, and that to base on successes new rules of battle would lead to lamentable errors. let us sum up: first: a private chasseur d'afrique gave the order to attack; second: the troops went to the attack mixed up with each other. we needed nearly an hour merely to reform the brigade. this one called, that one congratulated himself, the superior officers cried out, etc., etc.; there was confusion that would have meant disaster if the cavalry charge which was believed to threaten us, had been executed. disorder broke out in the companies at the first shot. once engaged, commanders of organizations no longer had them in hand, and they intermingled, so that it was not easy to locate oneself; third: there was no silence in ranks. officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers commanded, shouted, etc.; the bugles sounded the commands they heard coming from nobody knew where; fourth: there was no maneuvering from the first shot to the last. i do not remember being among my own men; it was only at the end that we found each other. zouaves, chasseurs, soldiers of the th line formed an attack group--that was all. about four o'clock there was a first roll call. about a third of the battalion was missing at nine at night there was a second roll call. only about fifty men were missing, thirty of whom were wounded. where the rest were i do not know. fifth: to lighten the men, packs had been left on the plain at the moment fire opened, and as the operation had not been worked out in advance, no measures were taken to guard them. in the evening most of the men found their packs incomplete, lacking all the little indispensables that one cannot get in the position in which we were. it is evidently a vital necessity to restrain the individual initiative of subordinates and leave command to the chiefs, and above all to watch the training of the soldiers who are always ready, as they approach, to run on the enemy with the bayonet. i have always noted that if a body which is charged does not hold firm, it breaks and takes flight, but that if it holds well, the charging body halts some paces away before it strikes. i shall tell you something notable that i saw at castel-fidardo. they talk a lot of the bayonet. for my part i only saw it used once, in the night, in a trench. also it is noted that in the hospital, practically all the wounds treated were from fire, rarely from the bayonet. . the battle of the alma extract from the correspondence of colonel a. du picq. letters dated in november, , and february, , sent from rennes by captain p---- of the th battalion of foot chasseurs, with remarks by the colonel and responses of captain p----. first letter from captain p---- "... it is there that i had time to admire the coolness of my brave captain daguerre, advancing on a mare under the enemy's eyes, and observing imperturbable, like a tourist, all the movements of our opponents. "i will always pay homage to his calm and collected bravery...." remarks by the colonel. "did not captain daguerre change the bugle call 'retreat,' ordered by ---- to the bugle call 'forward?'" answer of captain p---- "in fact, when protected in the wood by pieces of wall we were firing on the russians, we heard behind us the bugle sounding 'retreat' at the order of ----. at this moment my captain, indignant, ordered 'forward' sounded to reestablish confidence which had been shaken by the distraction or by the inadvertance of ----." . the battle of inkermann extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq. first: letter sent from lyon, march , , by major de g----, th line regiment. "... the st battalion of the th light regiment had hardly arrived close to the telegraph when it received a new order to rush to the help of the english army, which, too weak to hold such a large army, had been broken in the center of its line and driven back on its camps. "the st battalion of the th light regiment, major vaissier, had the honor to arrive first in the presence of the russians, after moving three kilometers on the run. received by the enthusiastic cheers of the english, it formed for battle, then carried away by burning cries of 'forward, with the bayonet' from its brave major it threw itself headlong, on the russian columns, which broke. "for two hours the st battalion of the th light regiment, a battalion of the th line regiment, four companies of the rd battalion of foot chasseurs, five companies of algerian chasseurs held the head of the russian army which continued to debouch in massed columns from the ravine and plateau of inkermann. "three times the battalion of the th light regiment was obliged to fall back some paces to rally. three times it charged with the bayonet, with the same ardor and success. "at four in the afternoon the russians were in rout, and were pursued into the valley of inkermann. "on this memorable day all the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the th light regiment performed their duty nobly, rivalling each other in bravery and self-sacrifice." second: notes on inkermann, which colonel a. du picq indicates come from the letters of captain b---- (these letters are missing). "in what formation were the russians? in column, of which the head fired, and whose platoons tried to get from behind the mead to enter into action? "when major vaissier advanced was he followed by every one? at what distance? in what formation were the attackers? in disordered masses? in one rank? in two? in mass? did the russians immediately turn tail, receiving shots and the bayonet in the back? did they fall back on the mass which itself was coming up? what was the duration of this attack against a mass, whose depth prevented its falling back? "did we receive bayonet wounds? "did we fall back before the active reaction of the mass or merely because, after the first shock, the isolated soldiers fell back to find companions and with them a new confidence? "was the second charge made like the first one? was the th line regiment engaged as the first support of the th light regiment? how were the zouaves engaged?" . the battle of magenta extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq. letters from captain c----, dated august , . "at magenta i was in espinasse's division, of marshal macmahon's corps. this division was on the extreme left of the troops that had passed the ticino at turbigo and was moving on magenta by the left bank. close to the village a fusillade at close range apprised us that the enemy was before us. the country, covered with trees, hedges, and vines, had hidden them. "our st battalion and the nd foreign regiment drove the austrians into magenta. "meanwhile the nd and rd battalions of zouaves, with which i was, remained in reserve, arms stacked, under control of the division commander. apparently quite an interval had been left between espinasse's division and la motterouge's, the st of the corps, and, at the moment of engagement, at least an austrian brigade had entered the gap, and had taken in flank and rear the elements of our division engaged before magenta. happily the wooded country concealed the situation or i doubt whether our troops engaged would have held on as they did. at any rate the two reserve battalions had not moved. the fusillade extended to our right and left as if to surround us; bullets already came from our right flank. the general had put five guns in front of us, to fire on the village, and at the same time i received the order to move my section to the right, to drive off the invisible enemy who was firing on us. i remember that i had quit the column with my section when i saw a frightened artillery captain run toward us, crying 'general, general, we are losing a piece!' the general answered, 'come! zouaves, packs off.' at these words, the two battalions leaped forward like a flock of sheep, dropping packs everywhere. the austrians were not seen at first. it was only after advancing for an instant that they were seen. they were already dragging off the piece that they had taken. at the sight of them our men gave a yell and fell on them. surprise and terror so possessed the austrians, who did not know that we were so near, that they ran without using their arms. the piece was retaken; the regimental standard was captured by a man in my company. about two hundred prisoners were taken, and the austrian regiment--hartmann's th infantry--was dispersed like sheep in flight, five battalions of them. i believe that had the country not been thick the result might have been different. the incident lasted perhaps ten minutes. "the two battalions took up their first position. they had had no losses, and their morale was in the clouds. after about an hour general espinasse put himself at the head of the two battalions and marched us on the village. we were in column of platoons with section intervals. the advance was made by echelon, the nd battalion in front, the rd a little in rear, and a company in front deployed as skirmishers. "at one hundred and fifty paces from the austrians, wavering was evident in their lines; the first ranks threw themselves back on those in rear. at that instant the general ordered again, 'come! packs off. at the double!' everybody ran forward, shedding his pack where he was. "the austrians did not wait for us. we entered the village mixed up with them. the fighting in houses lasted quite a while. most of the austrians retired. those who remained in the houses had to surrender. i found myself, with some fifty officers and men, in a big house from which we took four hundred men and five officers, colonel hauser for one. "my opinion is that we were very lucky at magenta. the thick country in which we fought, favored us in hiding our inferior number from the austrians. i do not believe we would have succeeded so well in open country. in the gun episode the austrians were surprised, stunned. those whom we took kept their arms in their hands, without either abandoning them or using them. it was a typical zouave attack, which, when it succeeds, has astonishing results; but if one is not lucky it sometimes costs dearly. note the rd zouaves at palestro, the st zouaves at marignano. general espinasse's advance on the village, at the head of two battalions, was the finest and most imposing sight i have ever seen. apart from that advance, the fighting was always by skirmishers and in large groups." . the battle of solferino extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq. letters from captain c----. "the th infantry was part of the rd division of the th corps. "coming out of medole, the regiment was halted on the right of the road and formed, as each company arrived, in close column. fascines were made. "an aide-de-camp came up and gave an order to the colonel. "the regiment was then put on the road, marched some yards and formed in battalion masses on the right of the line of battle. this movement was executed very regularly although bullets commenced to find us. arms were rested, and we stayed there, exposed to fire, without doing anything, not even sending out a skirmisher. for that matter, during the whole campaign, it seemed to me that the skirmisher school might never have existed. "then up came a major of engineers, from general niel, to get a battalion from the regiment. the rd battalion being on the left received the order to march. the major commanding ordered 'by the left flank,' and we marched by the flank, in close column, in the face of the enemy, up to casa-nova farm, i believe, where general niel was. "the battalion halted a moment, faced to the front, and closed a little. "'stay here,' said general niel; 'you are my only reserve!' "then the general, glancing in front of the farm, said to the major, after one or two minutes, 'major, fix bayonets, sound the charge, and forward!' "this last movement was still properly executed at the start, and for about one hundred yards of advance. "shrapnel annoyed the battalion, and the men shouldered arms to march better. "at about one hundred yards from the farm, the cry 'packs down,' came from i do not know where. the cry was instantly repeated in the battalion. packs were thrown down, anywhere, and with wild yells the advance was renewed, in the wildest disorder. "from that moment, and for the rest of the day, the rd battalion as a unit disappeared. "toward the end of the day, after an attempt had been made to get the regiment together, and at the end of half an hour of backing and filling, there was a roll-call. "the third company of grenadiers had on starting off in the morning one hundred and thirty-two to one hundred and thirty-five present. at this first roll-call, forty-seven answered, a number i can swear to, but many of the men were still hunting packs and rations. the next day at reveille roll-call, ninety-three or four answered. many came back in the night. "this was the strength for many days i still remember, for i was charged with company supply from june th. "as additional bit of information--it was generally known a few days later that at least twenty men of the th company of grenadiers were never on the field of battle. wounded of the company, returned for transport to medole, said later that they had seen some twenty of the company together close to medole, lying in the grass while their comrades fought. they even gave some names, but could not name them all. the company had only been formed for the war on april th, and had received that same day forty-nine new grenadiers and twenty-nine at milan, which made seventy-eight recruits in two months. none of these men were tried or punished. their comrades rode them hard, that was all." . mentana extract from the correspondence of colonel ardant du picq. letters from captain c----, dated august , . "november , at two in the morning, we took up arms to go to monte-rotondo. we did not yet know that we would meet the garibaldians at mentana. "the papal army had about three thousand men, we about two thousand five hundred. at one o'clock the papal forces met their enemies. the zouaves attacked vigorously, but the first engagements were without great losses on either side. there is nothing particular in this first episode. the usual thing happened, a force advances and is not halted by the fire of its adversary who ends by showing his heels. the papal zouaves are marked by no ordinary spirit. in comparing them with the soldiers of the antibes legion, one is forced to the conclusion that the man who fights for an idea fights better than one who fights for money. at each advance of the papal forces, we advanced also. we were not greatly concerned about the fight, we hardly thought that we would have to participate, not dreaming that we could be held by the volunteers. however, that did not happen. "it was about three o'clock. at that time three companies of the battalion were employed in protecting the artillery--three or four pieces placed about the battle-field. the head of the french column was then formed by the last three companies of the battalion, one of the st line regiment; the other regiments were immediately behind. colonel fremont of the st line regiment, after having studied the battle-field, took two chasseur companies, followed by a battalion of his regiment and bore to the right to turn the village. "meanwhile the st line regiment moved further to the right in the direction of monte-rotondo, against which at two different times it opened a fire at will which seemed a veritable hurricane. due to the distance or to the terrain the material result of the fire seemed to be negligible. the moral result must have been considerable, it precipitated a flood of fugitives on the road from mentana to monte-rotondo, dominated by our sharpshooters, who opened on the fugitives a fire more deadly than that of the chassepots. we stayed in the same position until night, when we retired to a position near mentana, where we bivouacked. "my company was one of the two chasseur companies which attacked on the right with the st line regiment. my company had ninety-eight rifles (we had not yet received the chassepots). it forced the volunteers from solidly held positions where they left a gun and a considerable number of rifles. in addition, it put nearly seventy men out of action, judging by those who remained on the field. it had one man slightly wounded, a belt and a carbine broken by bullets. "there remained with the general, after our movement to the right, three companies of chasseurs, a battalion of the th, and three of the th. i do not include many elements of the papal army which had not been engaged. some of my comrades told me of having been engaged with a chasseur company of the th in a sunken road, whose sides had not been occupied; the general was with this column. having arrived close to the village, some shots either from the houses or from enemy sharpshooters, who might easily have gotten on the undefended flanks, provoked a terrible fusillade in the column. in spite of the orders and efforts of the officers, everybody fired, at the risk of killing each other, and this probably happened. it was only when some men, led by officers, were able to climb the sides of the road that this firing ceased. i do not think that this was a well understood use of new arms. "the fusillade of the st line regiment against monte-rotondo was not very effective, i believe negligible. i do not refer to the moral result, which was great. "the garibaldians were numerous about monte-rotondo. but the terrain like all that around italian villages was covered with trees, hedges, etc. under these conditions, i believe that the fire of sharpshooters would have been more effective than volleys, where the men estimate distances badly and do not aim." notes [footnote : general daumas (manners and customs of algeria). nocturnal surprise and extermination of a camp.] [footnote : among the romans, mechanics and morale are so admirably united, that the one always comes to the aid of the other and never injures it.] [footnote : the romans did not make light of the influence of a poet like tyrtaeus. they did not despise any effective means. but they knew the value of each.] [footnote : also their common sense led them to recognize immediately and appropriate arms better than their own.] [footnote : this is an excuse. the maniple was of perfect nobility and, without the least difficulty, could face in any direction.] [footnote : this was an enveloping attack of an army and not of men or groups. the roman army formed a wedge and was attacked at the point and sides of the wedge; there was not a separate flank attack. that very day the maniple presented more depth than front.] [footnote : they had been sent to attack hannibal's camp; they were repulsed and taken prisoner in their own camp after the battle.] [footnote : this extract is taken from the translation of dom thuillier. livy does not state the precise number of roman combatants. he says nothing had been neglected in order to render the roman army the strongest possible, and from what he was told by some it numbered eighty-seven thousand two hundred men. that is the figure of polybius. his account has killed, forty-five thousand; taken or escaped after the action, nineteen thousand. total sixty-four thousand. what can have become of the twenty-three thousand remaining?] [footnote : the numidian horsemen were a light irregular cavalry, excellent for skirmishing, harassing, terrifying, by their extraordinary shouts and their unbridled gallop. they were not able to hold out against a regular disciplined cavalry provided with bits and substantial arms. they were but a swarm of flies that always harasses and kills at the least mistake; elusive and perfect for a long pursuit and the massacre of the vanquished to whom the numidians gave neither rest nor truce. they were like arab cavalry, badly armed for the combat, but sufficiently armed for butchering, as results show. the arabian knife, the kabyle knife, the indian knife of our days, which is the favorite of the barbarian or savage, must play its part.] [footnote : they formed the third roman line according to the order of battle of the legion. the contraction of the first line into a point would naturally hem them in.] [footnote : brought back by hannibal who had reserved to himself the command of the center.] [footnote : the triarians, the third roman line.] [footnote : what effect this might have, was shown in the battle of alisia, where caesar's men, forewarned by him, were nevertheless troubled by war-whoops behind them. the din of battle in rear has always demoralized troops.] [footnote : his cavalry consisted of seven thousand horse, of which five hundred were gauls or germans, the best horsemen of that time, nine hundred galicians, five hundred thracians, and thessalians, macedonians and italians in various numbers.] [footnote : caesar's legions in battle order were in three lines: four cohorts in the first line, two in the second, and three in the third. in this way the cohorts of a legion were, in battle, always supported by cohorts of the same legion.] [footnote : caesar stated that in order to make up the numerical inferiority of his cavalry, he had chosen four hundred of the most alert young men, from among those marching ahead of the standards, and by daily exercise had them accustomed to fighting between his horsemen. he had in this way obtained such results that his thousand riders dared, in open field, to cope with pompey's seven thousand cavalry without becoming frightened at their number.] [footnote : any one who wishes to read in extenso is referred to the fight of the ten thousand against pharnabazus in bithynia, xenophon, par. , page , lisken & sauvan edition.--in polybius, the battle of the tecinus, chapt. xiii, of book iii.--in caesar or those who followed him the battles against scipio, labienus, and afranius, the getae and the numidians, par. , page , and par. , , and , pp. , , and , in the african war, lisken & sauvan edition.] [footnote : in ancient combat, there was almost only, dead or lightly wounded. in action, a severe wound or one that incapacitated a man was immediately followed by the finishing stroke.] [footnote : hand-to-hand, sword-to-sword, serious fighting at short distances, was rare then. likewise in the duels of our day blades are rarely crossed in actual practice.] [footnote : to-day, it is the riflemen who do nearly all the work of destruction.] [footnote : considering caesar's narrative what becomes of the mathematical theory of masses, which is still discussed? if that theory had the least use, how could marius ever have held out against the tide of the armies of the cimbri and teutons? in the battle of pharsalus, the advice given by triarius to pompey's army, a counsel which was followed and which was from a man of experience, who had seen things close at hand, shows that the shock, the physical impulse of the mass was a by-word. they knew what to think of it.] [footnote : the individual advance, in modern battle, in the midst of blind projectiles that do not choose, is much less dangerous than in ancient times, because it seldom goes up to the enemy. at pharsalus, the volunteer crastinius, an old centurion, moved ahead with about a hundred men, saying to caesar: "i am going to act, general, in such a way that, living or dead, to-day you may have cause to be proud of me." caesar, to whom these examples of blind devotion to his person were not displeasing, and whose troops had shown him that they were too mature, too experienced, to fear the contagion of this example, let crastinius and his companions go out to be killed. such blind courage influences the action of the mass that follows. probably for that reason, caesar permitted it. but against reliable troops, as the example of crastinius proves, to move ahead in this way, against the enemy, is to go to certain death.] [footnote : the men of the maniple, of the roman company, mutually gave their word never to leave ranks, except to pick up an arrow, to save a comrade (a roman citizen), or to kill an enemy. (livy).] [footnote : a small body of troops falling into a trap might present a sort of mêlée, for a second, the time necessary for its slaughter. in a rout it might be possible at some moment of the butchery to have conflict, a struggle of some men with courage, who want to sell their lives dearly. but this is not a real mêlée. men are hemmed in, overwhelmed, but not thrown into confusion.] [footnote : the greek phalanx.] [footnote : the romans lost no one as their companies entered the openings in the phalanx.] [footnote : the roman velites, light-armed soldiers, of the primitive legion before marius, were required to stand for an instant in the intervals of the maniples, while awaiting the onset. they maintained, but only for an instant, the continuity of support.] [footnote : a result forced by the improvement of war appliances.] [footnote : in troops without cohesion, this movement begins at fifty leagues from the enemy. numbers enter the hospitals without any other complaint than the lack of morale, which very quickly becomes a real disease. a draconian discipline no longer exists; cohesion alone can replace it.] [footnote : it is a troublesome matter to attack men who shoot six to eight shots a minute, no matter how badly aimed. will he have the last word then, who has the last cartridge, who knows best how to make the enemy use his cartridges without using his own? the reasoning is always the same. with arrows: let us use up their arrows. with the club: let us break their clubs. but how? that is always the question. in matters of war, above all, precept is easy; accomplishment is difficult.] [footnote : the more one imagines he is isolated, the more has he need of morale.] [footnote : are not naval battles above all the battles of captains? all captains endeavor to promote a feeling of solidarity which will cause them all to fight unitedly on the day of action. trafalgar--lissa. in , the duke of medina sidonia, preparing for a naval engagement, sent three commanders on light vessels to the advance-guard and three to the rearguard, with executioners, and ordered them to have every captain hanged who abandoned the post that had been assigned to him for the battle. in , the english admiral benbow, a courageous man, was left almost alone by his captains during three days of fighting. with an amputated leg and arm, before dying, he had four brought to trial. one was acquitted, three were hanged; and from that instant dates the inflexible english severity towards commanders of fleets and vessels, a severity necessary in order to force them to fight effectively. our commanders of battalions, our captains, our men, once under fire, are more at sea than these commanders of vessels.] [footnote : the effect of surprise would certainly not last long to-day. however, to-day wars are quickly decided.] [footnote : see appendix vi. (historical documents). (editor's note).] [footnote : see appendix vi. (historical documents). (editor's note).] [footnote : see appendix vi. (historical documents). (editor's note).] [footnote : see appendix vi. (historical documents). (editor's note).] [footnote : see appendix vi. (historical documents). (editor's note).] [footnote : it is true that such measures are recommended in camps of instruction and in publications. but in maneuvers they are neglected in the mania for alignment, and in that other mad desire of generals to mix in details which do not concern them.] [footnote : see appendix vi. (historical documents.) (editor's note.)] [footnote : see appendix vi. (historical documents.) (editor's note.)] [footnote : see appendix ii. (historical documents.) (editor's note.)] [footnote : a propos of gaps: at the battle of sempach thirteen hundred badly armed swiss opposed three thousand lorraine knights in phalanxes. the attack of the swiss in a formation was ineffective, and they were threatened with envelopment. but arnold von winkelried created a gap; the swiss penetrated and the massacre followed.] [footnote : see appendix ii. (historical documents.) (editor's note.)] [footnote : see appendix ii. (historical documents.) (editor's note.)] [footnote : see appendix ii. (historical documents.) (editor's note.)] [footnote : it is hard to determine what method of fire, at command or at will, was used. but what we find in the works of the best military authorities, from montecuculli to marshal saxe, is general opposition to the replacement of the pike by the rifle. all predicted the abandonment of the rifle for the pike, and the future always proved them wrong. they ignored experience. they could not understand that stronger than all logic is the instinct of man, who prefers long range to close fighting, and who, having the rifle would not let it go, but continually improved it.] [footnote : the danger arising from this kind of fire, led to proposals to put the smallest men in the front rank, the tallest in the rear rank.] [footnote : nothing is more difficult than to estimate range; in nothing is the eye more easily deceived. practice and the use of instruments cannot make a man infallible. at sebastopol, for two months, a distance of one thousand to twelve hundred meters could not be determined by the rifle, due to inability to see the shots. for three months it was impossible to measure by ranging shots, although all ranges were followed through, the distance to a certain battery which was only five hundred meters away, but higher and separated from us by a ravine. one day, after three months, two shots at five hundred meters were observed in the target. this distance was estimated by everybody as over one thousand meters; it was only five hundred. the village taken and the point of observation changed, the truth became evident.] [footnote : his war instructions prove this. his best generals, zieten, warnery, knew of such methods, saw nothing practicable in them and guarded against them in war as indeed he did himself. but europe believed him, tried to imitate his maneuvers on the field of battle, and aligned her troops to be beaten by him. this is what he was after. he even deceived the prussians. but they came back to sound methods after , in and afterwards.] [footnote : it is noted here that french uniforms are of an absurd color, serving only to take the eye at a review. so the chasseurs, in black, are seen much further than a rifleman of the line in his gray coat. the red trousers are seen further than the gray--thus gray ought to be the basic color of the infantry uniform, above all that of skirmishers. at night fall the russians came up to our trenches without being seen by any one, thanks to their partridge-gray coats.] internet archive (https://archive.org) note: project gutenberg also has an html version of this file which includes the original illustrations. see -h.htm or -h.zip: (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/ / -h/ -h.htm) or (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/ / -h.zip) images of the original pages are available through internet archive. see https://archive.org/details/someprinciplesof bird some principles of frontier mountain warfare by brevet-major w.d. bird, d.s.o. (late professor at indian staff college.) london: hugh rees, ltd., , pall mall, s.w. some principles of frontier mountain warfare. the saying that there is no new thing under the sun, is as applicable to military affairs as to those of everyday life, for it is fully admitted that the principles underlying all strategy and tactics, whether of mountain or other warfare, are immutable. but though the principles of strategy and tactics are unchanging, organisation, formations, and minor items of procedure, must be continually amended to meet ever varying circumstances, and, in addition, each campaign possesses special characteristics demanding further modifications. there are, in fact, no invariable rules in the conduct of war, and whilst formalism is harmful in all matters, in military operations it is disastrous. an army relying on an established code of rules will often defeat itself in their application, and even if this disaster is avoided, the enemy will soon become aware of the methods in vogue, and will so frame his tactics as most advantageously to counteract them. each problem, great and small, each set of circumstances, must, therefore, be considered on its merits, principles must be applied in the solution, not rules, and strategy, tactics, organisation, equipment, and other matters, arranged accordingly. it is in this spirit that the problems of indian frontier warfare should be approached. general considerations. the strength and organisation of a force destined to undertake operations against the transborder clans of the indian frontier is naturally conditioned by the physical features of the area, by its fertility, and by the numbers, character, organisation, and armament of its inhabitants. it has been truly said that in war every available man should be employed, for one can never be too strong, but this aphorism is always qualified by the number of men that can be fed in the district which is to form the seat of war. the problem of the numbers to be used against the pathan tribes is, therefore, by no means easy of solution, for, as a great french king said of spain, in mountainous countries possessing, as does the indian borderland, few natural resources, but inhabited by a hardy though scanty population, large armies risk starvation, small are in danger of defeat. the tribesmen of the north west frontier are brave, and inured to fatigue and hardship, a considerable number have been trained in our indian army, and these have some knowledge of tactics, and acquaintance with british methods. the clansmen possess no artillery, but in other respects are fairly well armed, and owing to the cheap sale of rifles and ammunition in afghanistan, are daily becoming more formidable in this respect. they suffer, however, from two grave military faults, lack of discipline and cohesion, and at present would, it is believed, be unable to mass against any one of several columns invading their fastnesses. they would, more probably, be content merely to defend their own valleys and homesteads, rather than attempt to defeat, in detail, the divided forces of an invader operating from exterior lines. it would seem, then, that in a campaign in the indian borderland, british troops would be justified in undertaking a concentric invasion from several localities. certain advantages may also be claimed for this policy. the road space occupied, in these pathless regions, by a large force moving on one line, is so great, that, as was demonstrated in sir w. lockhart's advance from shinawari, in , the rear of the column will be several days' march behind the leading troops. in these circumstances, not only will risk of defeat in detail be even greater than in the case of concentric invasion--for small columns can better exercise mutual support, than can a large force moving in a restricted valley--but the length of the convoy train, and the seeming strength of the force, will be a direct temptation to the tribesmen to avoid battle, and have recourse to guerilla warfare. besides, if small columns are employed, the whole country will be, in the first instance, over-run, and the enemy may, on account of the apparent weakness of the various detachments, take heart of grace and fight. this, after all, is what is most desired, for the aim is always to attain rapid and decisive victory, and so end the campaign. an argument against convergent invasion is, that since it may be necessary to use more than one line of communication, not only will the employment of larger numbers be necessary, but more transport animals, the provision and care of which really constitutes the main difficulty in frontier warfare, will be required. this drawback may, however, be mitigated by opening only one line of communication, along the easiest route, the other detachments moving as flying columns, until the heart of the district is reached, when their surplus animals can be transferred to line of communication duties. strength and organisation of columns. in deciding the strength of a column for an expedition against the north west frontier tribesmen, the first requisite, having regard to the foregoing considerations, is so to limit numbers, that, in the topographical conditions likely to be met, the force can, as an entirety, make a march of reasonable length, let us say eight or ten miles. assuming that the column will move at an average rate of about two miles per hour, that, in order to avoid risk of disaster, it is, as a rule, desirable for the main force not to march before dawn, and to be in camp by dusk, and that ten--twelve hours of daylight are available, it is clear that the road space occupied must not, for a ten mile march, exceed ten to fourteen miles. that is to say, the numbers that can fulfil this condition on a narrow track, amount to about fighting men, carrying three days' rations on the person, and five days' on transport animals. suppose that four such columns are destined to invade the afridi tirah. the afridis are said to possess , to , fighting men, and if it be assumed that two-thirds of these have breech loading rifles, and that the whole mass is unlikely to attack any, one, or even two columns, the largest hostile gathering that a british detachment may expect to meet is - men, of whom - may be well armed. a column of disciplined troops need not therefore fear reverse. the composition of a column is regulated by the topography of the area of operations, but the following example will show how the allotment of troops may be determined. as basis for calculation a mixed brigade[ ] organised for independent action may be taken. to these troops may be added a squadron of silladar cavalry, if the country is suitable to its action, and a mountain battery, which, together with the infantry, form a handy force of the three arms. but the column is still weak in infantry, on which the brunt of the fighting will necessarily fall, and possesses no technical troops for road-making, etc. both requirements may be fulfilled by the addition of a pioneer battalion, or, since some hold that sappers and miners are more economical than pioneers, a battalion, of british infantry, or of gurkhas, and a company of sappers and miners may be included. it now only remains to give the troops an ammunition column, the necessary staff, certain additional medical, and administrative details, and the force--one infantry brigade organised for independent action, one squadron, one mountain battery, one british battalion, one company sappers and miners, etc.--will be complete, and adequate for its purpose. footnotes: [footnote : british infantry battalion; native infantry battalions; / british field hospital; - / native field hospitals; field post office; brigade supply column.] marches and protection. a body of troops moving in an enemy's country is liable to be attacked at any time, and from any direction, and must, therefore, always take measures for the protection of its front, flanks, and rear. in warfare in civilised and highly developed countries, when the enemy's object is rather to defeat the fighting force than to harry the convoy, and when troops can march on broad frontages, the protection given by bodies of cavalry with horse artillery, flung far to front and flanks, and supported, if necessary, by infantry, is usually adequate. but when the line of march leads along a single file track, winding through narrow valleys, and over rugged mountains, when the column, compared to its strength, occupies an inordinate length of roadway, and is therefore especially vulnerable to flank attack, and when the enemy, or at any rate a portion of his warriors, prefer plunder of baggage to pitched battles, other measures to safeguard the force must be taken. flankguards can rarely make their way over the steeply scarped hills enclosing the north west frontier valleys, and since the advanced guard can, in such conditions, effect no more than the clearance of the valley in which it is moving, it becomes necessary to adopt a sedentary form of protection for the flanks of the force. this consists of picquets, posted along the route, in localities commanding approaches to the roadway, or from which the enemy can fire on the column. these picquets, together with the advanced and rear guards, secure the movement of the remaining troops; they are, as a rule, found by the units composing the advanced guard, and withdraw under the supervision, and if necessary with the assistance of the rear guard. the order of march of a column, in border, as in other campaigns, is conditioned by the proximity, strength, and probable action of the enemy, by the topography of the district to be traversed, by the object to be attained, and by the composition of the force. the first duty of the staff officer to whom is confided the drafting of orders for a march, will therefore be, by personal observation, and from intelligence and other reports, to find out as much as possible of the country, and of the enemy's dispositions and probable tactics. armed with this information he will be in a position to arrange the order of march of his column according to the circumstances of the case. when the enemy, for instance, is in force in the vicinity, and his actions, such as throwing up of entrenchments, harassing camp in large numbers, imply that he will offer vigorous resistance to the advance, it is probable that the baggage and supply column will be best parked, under sufficient guard, either in the camp, or in some other locality easy of defence, whilst the remainder move off, in preparatory formation for action. if the clansmen are reported to be inclined to dispute the advance in force, but are some distance from the camp, the most suitable order of march may be deduced as follows. the enemy being in strength, the column should move in compact formation, and deliberately, the advanced guard being pushed only so far forward as to secure the troops from surprise, and as few road picquets sent out as may be, in order that the fighting force may be reduced as little as possible. the method of posting and withdrawing picquets will not materially differ from that which will be described later. the tribesmen being known to be in force and prepared to resist, it follows that the bulk of the fighting men must be at the head of the column; and as the advanced guard will be near the remainder, it need be only sufficiently numerous to insure that the duties of protection are adequately performed. suppose the tribesmen five miles distant, and that, as a rough basis for calculation, two companies can secure about one-and-a-half to two miles of roadway; then about three companies will be required for picquetting. if three companies be added for other purposes, the advanced guard infantry should be of sufficient strength. the advanced guard will require a proportion of technical troops for road making and repair, and for this purpose two companies of pioneers, or the bulk of a company of sappers and miners may be allotted. cavalry are not, it is considered, in place with an advanced guard moving in an enclosed and intricate country, nor, since the main body will be close behind, need any special medical details be included. whether artillery should be allotted is a more open question. in favour of placing guns with the advanced guard, it can be argued that they may be of assistance in clearing the hills to be occupied by picquets or vanguard; against their inclusion it may be urged that artillery ammunition will necessarily be scarce, owing to the difficulty of carriage, and should only be employed when an advantageous opportunity for inflicting loss occurs, but that advanced guard commanders are prone to make too much use of their guns. on the whole, when the advanced guard is not far from the main body, it would seem that the inclusion of guns in the former is unnecessary. the organisation and order of march of the main body may be as under. it is clear that the numbers available for action will be those left over after suitable deduction has been made for baggage and rear guards. these, therefore, must first be allotted. light duty men, officers' servants, cooks, etc., should suffice to secure the regimental transport, and for policing the drivers, but the supply column, hospitals, and reserve ammunition, require special escorts, and perhaps one company each may be adequate for the two first mentioned, and one or two companies for the ammunition. the strength and composition of the rear guard is the next item, and this is regulated by its function of supervision of the retirement of the picquets. such being the case, it appears that, in no circumstances, should a large force be detailed as a rear-guard. there is not space in a narrow valley for a strong rear-guard to manoeuvre, so that it will merely afford the enemy a good target, without corresponding advantage; besides, the rear-guard can, if necessary, be continually reinforced by incoming picquets. a rear-guard, then, should rarely include more than four companies of infantry, and in the circumstances under consideration, may be weaker. though cavalry may be useful for the delivery of a counter-attack, the horses afford an easy mark, whilst its presence with the rear-guard may cause the enemy to keep to the hills instead of descending into the valley, where they will be more vulnerable. cavalry, it seems, should, therefore, not be added to the rear-guard infantry. mountain guns may be of assistance to picquets in distress, or in the delivery of a counter-attack, but they should, both for their own security, and to prevent waste of ammunition, be kept well back. in the present case the rear-guard is not likely to be harassed, so no artillery need be included. a rear-guard does not require technical troops, but some hospital riding mules, etc., may be allotted for rapid transference of wounded. the total deductions from the fighting force of the column will therefore be:-- _advanced guard._ six companies infantry, bulk of one company s. and m. _escorts, etc._ three or four companies infantry. _rear-guard._ two or three companies, with machine guns. in all about one and a half battalions, one company sappers and miners. there remain three and a half battalions, one mountain battery, one squadron, and the administrative services, at disposal. the order of march of the main body can now be dealt with. perhaps half a battalion may move in front, then the mountain battery, which should not require a special escort, next the three battalions. after these may follow the reserve ammunition, the hospitals, the nd line transport with b. echelon st line transport[ ] of all troops, except the advanced and rear-guards, and then the supply column. at the tail of the main body may move the b. echelon of the advanced and rear-guards, so as to be readily available in case any troops belonging to either are obliged to bivouac outside camp; and finally, since they are unlikely to be able to undertake effective pursuit, may come the cavalry, so as to be at hand in case they are required to assist the rear-guard to counter-attack, by charging any tribesmen who have ventured into the valley. though b. echelon st line transport of the advanced and rear-guards is placed at the end of the column, it is considered that all troops should be so equipped that they can be independent of camp and transport for at least two, and better still, for three days. it is a lesser evil to carry an extra, but in some degree decreasing load, even if it prejudices mobility, than to starve, or run undue risk of sickness from cold and damp. the next case to be considered will be when the enemy is not in great force, and is more likely to harass than to seriously resist the advance of the column. in such circumstances, the main objects will be to complete, as rapidly as may be, the proposed march, whilst inflicting on the enemy, should he give the opportunity, the greatest possible loss. since the distance is to be quickly traversed, and because a road picquet takes some time, even as much as an hour, to secure and establish itself on a hill, it follows that, unless risk is to be run of the march of the main body being delayed, the advanced guard must precede the main body by at least one hour, and may even move off in the twilight which precedes dawn. this settled, the composition of the advanced guard may be dealt with. if it is proposed to make a ten mile march, then, calculating from the data previously mentioned, about one battalion will be sufficient to picquet the roadway. to this force some four companies may be added, so as to leave a good margin for securing the camp site, and for unexpected contingencies. technical troops will, as before, be required, and as the advanced guard will be some way from the main body, a section of mountain artillery may be included. neither cavalry, nor special medical units, seem necessary. the composition of the advanced guard may, therefore, be:--one-and-a-half battalions infantry, one section mountain battery, the bulk of one company sappers and miners. as already stated, before deciding on the order of march of the main column, the deductions to be made for escort and rear-guard duties must be fixed. light duty men, etc., should suffice to secure the regimental transport, three companies to safeguard the reserve ammunition, hospitals, and supply column, whilst the mountain battery hardly needs a special escort. in respect of the rear-guard, in the case under consideration it is possible that the picquets may be harassed as they withdraw, the strength of the rear-guard may, therefore, amount to four companies of infantry, with machine guns, and one section mountain artillery, with some ambulance riding mules, etc., in addition. the total deductions, for purposes of protection, from the fighting force of the column, therefore, amount to:--infantry, two battalions three companies; artillery, two sections; sappers and miners one company; and there remain, for disposal, infantry, two battalions five companies, artillery, one section, cavalry, one squadron, besides various administrative units. no serious opposition being expected to the march of the column, the comfort of the troops may be considered in regulating the order of march. as before, and for the same reasons, the cavalry, and the b. echelon st line transport of the advanced and rear-guards, and of the picquetting troops, may march at the tail of the main body. it should hardly be necessary to place, in addition, a body of infantry at the end of the column, but, if desired, the remaining four companies of the battalion furnishing the rear-guard may move immediately in front of, or behind, the cavalry. the rest of the fighting force can march at the head of the main column, followed by the reserve ammunition, hospitals, b. echelon st line transport, with the nd line transport, and then the supply column. in circumstances where little or no resistance is expected to the forward movement of a column, but serious opposition to the withdrawal of picquets, and to the march of the rear-guard, the following modification will be necessary in the order of march just dealt with. the strength, composition, and time of march of the advanced guard need only be altered by the deduction of, say, one section of sappers and miners, and perhaps, too, the withdrawal of the mountain guns. the escorts, etc., of the non-fighting portions of the main column may remain as before suggested, as may the strength and composition of the rear-guard. the order of march of the main column will, however, require transposition somewhat as follows: since the principal opposition will take the form of pursuit by the enemy, the bulk of the fighting troops should move in rear of the main column, so as to be in position to undertake the offensive if required. the units may, therefore, march as follows: two companies of infantry; the supply column; the b. echelon st line transport, (except, of the advanced and rear-guards,) with the nd line transport; the hospitals; the reserve ammunition; b. echelon st line transport of the advanced and rear-guards; the rest of the infantry, less four companies; the remainder of the artillery; one section of sappers and miners, the cavalry, and finally four companies. footnotes: [footnote : st line transport is usually divided into two echelons a. and b. the former includes ammunition reserve, intrenching tools, water, signalling and medical equipment. the latter blankets, rations, and cooking pots, etc.] action of the advanced & rear-guards, and of road picquets. speaking generally, the procedure followed by an advanced guard may be somewhat as follows:-- both on account of considerations for its own security, and because hills will thus be more rapidly secured, it is desirable that the positions to be occupied by road picquets should, so far as it is practicable to do so from the valley, be decided some time before the main guard arrives opposite the various localities. it is also understood that considerable latitude is allowed to the picquet commander as to the position occupied, and that he is at liberty either to demand reinforcement, or to return redundant men to the advanced guard, as occasion may demand. the advanced guard may move in the following order. first a vanguard of one or more companies, preceding the remainder by about half a mile, and adapting its formation to the ground. then the mainguard, at the head of which should be the advanced guard commander, his staff officer, the battalion commander of the unit furnishing the leading company, and the company commander. [illustration] as the troops march up the valley, the advanced guard commander should decide what localities are to be held, and in what strength. he should issue his orders to the battalion or company commander, as the case may be, when the picquets should move direct to their positions. meanwhile, the staff officer should make, in sections, a rough sketch of the positions occupied by the various picquets, which should be numbered consecutively as they move out, the sections of the sketch being sent, as completed, to the officer commanding the rear-guard. in addition, to insure that no picquet is overlooked by the rear-guard, a double sentry, with a paper showing the number of its picquet, should be placed in the roadway beneath the height occupied, and it is the duty of the picquet commander to keep in touch with this sentry post. in this manner the roadway should be picquetted, until the locality is reached where the column is to halt, when the advanced guard commander should take the usual measures for the security of the camp, for safe-guarding the water supply, etc. it has been suggested that an advanced guard should be divided into two portions, advanced guard, and the picquetting troops, each under a separate leader, the object being to free the advanced guard commander from the work of picquetting, so that his whole attention can be devoted to tactics. the advanced guard is to clear the hills, which are then to be occupied by picquets. this system does not appear sound, for it necessitates two men doing the work of one, and, in practice, the advanced guard usually either meets with little or no resistance, or with such serious opposition that picquetting is in abeyance. each picquet, when it reaches the position selected by its leader, should intrench, taking especial care to provide head cover, so that the enemy may not be easily able to observe the moment of its final withdrawal. before the last troops of the main column have quitted camp, the rear-guard commander should have arranged his force in a series of successive positions, calculated to enable the units to mutually support one another's retirement, as well as to assist, if necessary, the withdrawal of picquets. the guns should, for reasons already given, be kept well back, and this system of successive positions should be continued throughout the march. it is, of course, understood that the main column keeps contact with, and regulates its march by that of the rear-guard. it is sometimes advocated that the camp picquets should, before the column marches off, be relieved by the rear-guard, with the object of enabling the picquets to rejoin their units. this arrangement does not appear advantageous. the troops detailed for the relief of the picquets will probably have to move out in darkness, and over an unknown area, and though, if the enemy advances during the relief, he will be opposed in double strength, should his attack be delivered later, units who do not know the ground will be placed in positions they will not be able to defend to the best advantage. besides, the men composing the rear-guard, whose functions are in any case sufficiently arduous, will be involved in additional and unnecessary fatigue. the withdrawal of picquets may be carried out on the following principles:-- when a picquet commander sees, or receives reports that the rear-guard is approaching, he should send the bulk of his picquet to a position, previously reconnoitred, on the lower slope of the hill, and in the direction of the line of march of the column, whence the retirement of the remainder can be covered by fire. whilst on the hill, and especially as the time for withdrawal approaches, the men of a picquet should be careful not to show themselves, in order that the enemy may not, by counting heads, be able to divine that retirement has been begun. similarly, the men left on the hill to the last, should, above everything, avoid exposure. when the picquet commander sees the rear-guard commander, who will usually be with the last troops, and whose presence will be shown by a flag, is opposite his post, he should give the signal for the evacuation of the hill top, on which the men should creep back, and as soon as they are below the sky line, run down the hill to a position beyond that of their covering party. the withdrawal should then be continued according to the accepted principles, until the whole picquet has reached the valley, when its leader should report to the rear-guard commander, receiving orders whether the picquet is to proceed to the main column, or to join the rear-guard. the rear guard commander should have previously called in the road sentry post marking the locality held by the picquet, and the map furnished by the advanced guard will have been of assistance in identifying its position. [illustration] it is contended that the withdrawal of a picquet rests, except in special circumstances, entirely with the picquet leader. he is the man on the spot, and can best judge when the retirement should commence. the rear-guard commander should rarely attempt to regulate the actions of the picquets, of whose situation he cannot have adequate knowledge, but should exercise general supervision, ready to afford assistance if required. at times picquets may be able to support one another's movements, but, as a rule, a picquet will be too fully occupied with its own affairs to be able to render assistance to its neighbours. the above outline of a withdrawal presupposes that hostile pressure is not unduly severe. if the enemy venture to close with the rear-guard and picquets, it is submitted that an immediate counter-attack should be delivered, the main body being halted. to lose so golden an opportunity of inflicting loss on a volatile foe seems on the one hand unwise, whilst, on the other, it is surely both undignified and demoralising to permit savages to hunt british regulars into camp. the delivery of a counter-attack is accompanied by some risk, and its success will depend on the aptitude of the rear-guard commander for stratagem, for, if loss is to be inflicted, the enemy must, as a rule, be trapped. simple ruses which suggest themselves are, either to attempt to attract the tribesmen into the low ground by a bait of ammunition or transport animals, the cavalry, guns, and part of rear-guard, infantry being previously concealed in positions from which they can take advantage of any mistake the enemy may commit, and the retirement of picquets stopped, as soon as the attack is delivered. or, two or more picquets, which have been previously reinforced by troops moving along concealed lines of advance to the hill tops, may feign retirement, and attack the tribesmen as they follow over the crest line. if stratagem fails, the column should halt and drive off the enemy, a proceeding which should be repeated until he is taught that to follow up british troops is neither profitable nor advantageous. attack and defence. success in war depends in some degree on adaptation of tactics to local conditions, and it is therefore clear that, to attain rapid success against the inhabitants of the north western frontier, a knowledge of their tactics is required, and that, whilst the british aims are pursued with unswerving determination, their probable movements must be met and defeated. the tribesmen, like most savages, are only really formidable when one is running away from them. they fight well in positions strongly fortified, and with flanks secure, but, being without the discipline or cohesion to meet envelopment, are much influenced by pressure against their flanks. pathans are fearful of artillery, and do not, as a rule, seriously resist a determined advance, preferring the easier and less dangerous enterprise of harassing the retirements which they believe are an inevitable corollary to forward movements; or of attacking isolated detachments, whose operations they have observed from their hill-tops. they are suspicious of ambuscades, except when excited in pursuit, and are not prone to accept battle unless surprised. like other people, they shoot well when not themselves under effective fire, and, when shooting into a valley, where the strike of the bullet can be observed, their fire is accurate. on the other hand, owing to their relatively defective armament, and to lack of ammunition, tribal fire as a rule lacks volume. the tribesmen skirmish well, and move quickly over their hills, but rarely, except when engaging a small force, or by night, attack in mass. on the other hand, they often crowd their defensive positions with men. they are said to dislike being overlooked by their opponents, and therefore do not care to attack up hill, but will, at times, try to rush a detachment, with the object of capturing rifles and ammunition. the fact that a proportion of the men possess only inferior fire-arms, renders possible resort to shock tactics, especially when roused to a pitch of fanaticism. pathans are partial to night operations, probably because they believe that there is little fear of interference after dark. their enterprises are usually on a small scale, but night attacks in force, are possible. their inadequate clothing, and the cold of the early morning, however, usually forces them to seek shelter as the night wears on. from the above description it will be seen that british troops, so long as they observe the ordinary principles of war, have nothing to fear from the tribesmen. but it is to be remembered that, unless stratagem is intended, the offensive is the general rule in tribal warfare, for the enemy construes a defensive attitude as a sign of fear, and becomes correspondingly elated. the composition of forces despatched on reconnaissance and minor punitive expeditions requires careful consideration. columns composed of men drawn from many different infantry units are inherently weak, so that, in all operations, complete units, so far as they are required, should be employed, cavalry being added when local conditions are favourable. artillery will generally be necessary, as well as a proportion of technical troops, but the strength of columns should, within limits of safety, be low, in order to insure mobility, and to encourage resistance. the military value of the enemy must not, however, be underestimated. the main object of all operations is to quickly attain a decisive success. to this end the tribesmen must be induced to stand and fight with the purpose of inflicting casualties on them. it is to be remembered that the enemy can, less easily than the british, afford losses, especially of arms. commanders, without being prodigal of their men's lives, need not, therefore, be afraid of incurring casualties, especially when there is likelihood that the enemy will suffer loss to at least an equal extent. if the tribesmen's losses are heavy, those of the british troops will probably be considerably less. close fighting is all to the advantage of trained soldiers. as has been stated, the clansmen will rarely commit themselves to battle in conditions favourable to the british, unless they can be outwitted or surprised. night operations may, therefore, frequently be necessary, having special regard to the fact that, from their hill tops, the enemy will overlook all manoeuvres. as the natives are not often abroad in the early morning, surprise, at dawn, will not present unusual difficulties. the enveloping form of tactics, when the enemy is attacked both in front and flank, is as effective in tribal as in other warfare. but, owing to the topographical advantages enjoyed by the tribesmen, it will be necessary to hold them closely in frontal attack, and so distract their attention from outflanking movements. this may be possible, for they fight with confidence when behind cover. mere frontal attack is likely to be at once costly and ineffective; hence, if neither envelopment, nor night operations, are practicable, resort may be had to such stratagems as a feigned retirement, or bait of transport animals, to tempt the pathans from their hills. though the possibility of tribal counter-attack, by shock, must not be lost sight of, the british advantage in training and armament should enable a central general reserve to be dispensed with, the object being to so dispose the troops as to insure envelopment. good information and staff work, and a sound system of inter-communication, will, moreover, if all ranks are imbued with the spirit of mutual support, go far to insure success. commanders, especially of small forces, should remember that hesitation will be quickly observed by the enemy, but a bold front, and ready stratagem, will soon cause him to lose heart. when a post or isolated detachment requires assistance, aid can often be most rapidly and effectively given by application of such indirect pressure as will tend to divert the enemy's attention. in minor tactics, whilst taking every advantage of the cover afforded by features of ground, troops must beware of seeking shelter in hollows or nullahs, places which will, assuredly, have been marked by the enemy's riflemen, so that their occupation will rarely escape punishment. in attack, infantry units, whilst securing their flanks, should advance up salients, taking care to afford one another mutual fire assistance. supports and local reserves should be pushed as near to the firing line as the shape of the ground will permit; but, at times, reserves may be able to effectively support the troops in front by covering fire, from suitable positions, behind, or on the flanks of, the line of advance. fire should be reserved until units have closed on the enemy, the object being to prevent the early evacuation of a position, after having caused a few casualties at long range. as the enemy's fire, though likely to be accurate, will probably lack volume, resort need not be had to widely extended formations. to gain ground, and when assaulting, the procedure outlined in the training manuals requires no modification. artillery should be handled with discretion, and should be on its guard against the tendency to open fire whenever a target is seen. its aim should be not to evict, but to hold the enemy to his sangars, and to inflict loss when he retreats. the steep forward slopes of hills will enable fire to be continued until the infantry has closed on the tribesmen, but oblique, rather than frontal fire should be employed. it is, of course, important to insure close inter-communication between infantry and artillery. in tribal, as in other warfare, unless the enemy is completely enveloped, efficient pursuit is necessary to set the seal on victory. pursuit can, at first, probably be best undertaken by the enveloping wings, artillery co-operating to head the enemy off in the required direction, whilst the cavalry press forward. a portion of the artillery should, therefore, move with the outflanking wings, keeping as near as possible to the firing line. pathans, familiar with the country, and confident that they have everything to gain, and but little to lose by such tactics, favour the harassing of troops as they withdraw from heights, or along valleys. though it may be taken as a maxim that there will be no pursuit if the enemy has, in any recent fighting, been adequately punished, the conditions may have been such that casualties could not be inflicted. in these circumstances, the clansmen must surely not be permitted to embarrass the british movements, and must be convinced that pursuit is both dangerous and unprofitable. mere counter-attack, when the enemy is not surprised, is likely to lead to no advantage, but a few skilfully laid ambushes will soon discourage his zeal for pursuit. should he, however, persist in following up the troops, counter-attack should at once be made, and the retirement discontinued. the enemy, it is to be remembered, will, as a rule, offer the greatest opportunity of inflicting loss when he follows up a retirement, and, in such operations, the aim must be rather to cause than to avoid casualties. all withdrawals should be pre-arranged and systematic, flanks being securely held, and the principle of mutual support observed. but formalism must be avoided, and procedure must never be permitted to become so stereotyped that the enemy will be able to confidently anticipate the movements of the troops. men must beware of entering nullahs, or depressions of any kind, until the further edge has been secured; and, when on a hill top, the provision of such cover as will conceal the head-dress is of importance. transport animals should be clear of the fighting troops before retirement is begun. if the object is to slip away from the enemy, the retirement should be made at a time when movement is not expected. when a valley is to be swept in course of punitive operations, an adequate force should be left to secure the entrance, if the column is to leave by this route. troops, as has already been suggested, should, in respect of ammunition, food, and warm coats, be independent of transport animals, and it should be understood that units are always to be prepared to remain for the night away from camp. the men should be trained to economise water, which is often scarce across the border. ammunition and rifles being the main objects of tribal ambition, special care should be taken to prevent them from falling into the enemy's hands. against the north west frontier clans, the offensive, as usual, is normally the best defensive, but it may sometimes happen that small british forces are temporarily obliged to act on the defensive. in such circumstances, it is to be expected that the enemy will adopt the tactics, common amongst savages, of seeking the flanks of the troops, both to avoid fire, and to obtain the advantages of enfilade. it follows, then, that defensive measures should include all round protection, whilst a relatively large reserve should be kept ready to attack the hostile levies, as soon as any portion comes within charging distance. experience tends to prove that a compact body of even a section, if well entrenched and supplied with ammunition, has nothing to fear from pathans, especially when the british leader is animated by the proper spirit of timely offensive. camps. it is desirable for a column escorting a large baggage train--and this is essentially the predicament of civilised troops engaged in frontier mountain warfare--to be collected in camp before nightfall, otherwise the enemy may be given unduly favourable opportunities of employing harassing methods. but it does not result that the situation of troops unable, for any cause, to reach camp, is at all desperate. strong and compact forces adopting the usual precautions, can probably, in many, if not in most cases, march in safety after nightfall, but small detachments and baggage can rarely do so without undue risk. these, then, should always park and intrench towards nightfall, wherever they may find themselves, when they will have little to fear, for experience, as has been stated, tends to show that even a section, securely intrenched, and with ample ammunition, can hold its own against heavy odds. the form of camp, and the nature of the protection adopted, depend, as usual, on the topography, and on the character of the enemy. a common method is to place transport, etc., within a perimeter occupied by the fighting troops, but this arrangement is by no means invariable, and it may be convenient to form two or more camps, or to separate transport from fighting troops. the camp will, as a rule, be located in proximity to water, that is to say in a valley, and in such circumstances, if it can be sited well under one of the enclosing ranges of hills, protection from sniping will be afforded from this direction, though the overhanging heights must be securely held. sometimes a small basin is available for the bivouac, and in this case, the troops can, to a great extent, be secured from this favourite tribal device of firing into camp after nightfall. as is the case in all war, the measures taken for the security of a camp include a system of picquets, and in frontier expeditions these are placed all round camp, either on the level, or on any commanding heights, within, at any rate, effective rifle range. picquets may be pushed even further forward, but when so situated, must be numerically strong, as they are liable to be rushed, though more for the sake of capturing their arms, than with the object of inflicting loss. no picquet should be of less strength than one section, all should be intrenched against attack from any direction. their bearing from camp should also be taken, and they should be in signalling communication with the main body, so that assistance may be requested and despatched when necessary, or warning given of the approach of the enemy in force. bombs should be useful adjuncts to picquet defence, in case the enemy should succeed in forming a lodgment near the sangar. though a sedentary system of picquets may discover the presence of a large hostile body near camp, and may, in some degree, check sniping, the latter evil cannot, by this means, be completely prevented. tribesmen, especially since they are aware that the british rarely risk troops, other than picquets, outside the perimeter, will often creep in and snipe from the area between the picquets and camp. there seems, however, no valid reason why sniping should be passively tolerated, when it can probably be effectively combated by placing, in certain localities between the camp and picquets, small patrols of picked men, provided with grass shoes, whose duty will be to stalk and bayonet venturesome marauders. against this proposal it has been argued that the british, and especially the european soldiers, are unfit to cope, by night, with tribesmen, inured from childhood to move silently in darkness over rough ground. the contention is considered to be inadmissible, for though there is, and must be, risk in stalking snipers, picked british soldiers are surely now, as formerly, more than a match for pathans, in all circumstances when the numbers are fairly even. the form of intrenchment, if any, excavated round the bivouac, is conditioned by the character of the enemy. if he is prone to adopt shock tactics, and to attempt to rush the camp under cover of darkness, a ditch to check his charge, backed by a parapet with head cover, will be the most favourable form of defence. but if he is partial merely to harassing methods, such as firing into camp, the perimeter defences should be calculated to mitigate their effects, by providing, for all troops, trenches well traversed, and with parapets both to front and rear. if both forms of attack are possible, parapets with trench and ditch should be made, the trench, or ditch, being first dug, according as a charge or sniping is most to be feared. naturally units protected by high ground on one or more flanks, need only make cover so as to secure themselves from the directions from which fire can be delivered. only infantry should hold the perimeter of a camp, machine guns being placed at the angles, and the defence of each confided to one unit, divided responsibility not being permissible. supports may, if necessary, be located in intrenchments behind the perimeter, and a homogeneous body of about half a battalion, allotted as reserve, and given a bivouac near that of the column commander. in case of attack, the duty of cavalry soldiers is to stand to their horses, of artillery to man their guns. to neither, therefore, in normal circumstances, should a portion of the perimeter be confided, and both should be placed within its circumference. at the same time, guns should be so disposed, in pits or epaulments, that they can sweep ground across which attack is most likely to be made; or they may be laid so as to search localities where tribesmen may collect prior to delivering an assault. protection of line of communication. the protection of a line of communication is secured by combination of passive and active measures, though the latter are of the greatest importance. passive measures include the provision of fortified staging posts, linked up by a series of road picquets, and supplemented by escorts to convoys. the active defence is by means of flying columns. roughly speaking, it may be said that about men per mile suffice for all protective purposes, and it is assumed that the responsibility of a staging post commandant extends half way to the posts on either side of his own. the garrison of a staging post must be of sufficient strength, and of suitable composition, to secure the convoys halting there for the night, to furnish them with police escorts for the next day's march, and, if road picquets are found from the post, to supply these also. road picquets can either be sent out each day from staging posts, can be permanently located in a succession of blockhouses, or can be semi-permanent, that is to say can be supplied from a series of minor posts connecting staging centres. in each of the above cases the same number of men will be required. the first method, by concentrating the troops each evening, makes for their general security, but, since picquets must daily, and at fixed hours, move to and from their places, a good deal of fatigue will be imposed on the men, and there will, in addition, be some risk of minor disasters to individual picquets, which may be ambuscaded. moreover, since the convoys cannot march until the picquets are in position, and as picquets cannot be risked outside the post before sunrise and after sunset, the hours available for the movements of the convoys will be a good deal curtailed. under the second alternative, a weak cordon is formed, portions of which cannot, owing to the topography, easily render one another support in case any picquet is attacked in force. on the other hand, no time will be wasted in posting and withdrawing picquets. the third system is a compromise between the two already mentioned, and seems, on the whole, to be the most advantageous. if three or four relatively large posts are placed, in dangerous localities, such as valley junctions, between staging centres, there will be little or no risk of their capture by the enemy. since the picquets necessary to watch, by day, the area between the posts, will have but short distances to traverse to reach their positions, the time available for movement of convoys will not be curtailed; and as the ground intervening between two posts will, in some degree, be overlooked from them, there will be less chance, than under the first method, of picquets falling into ambuscades. the efficiency of the protection of a line of communication depends, however, on the active, not on the passive measures for its security. active defence is maintained by flying columns, of strength and organisation suitable to the character of the enemy and the nature of the country. to these columns is confided the protection of certain areas, an end attained, not by inactivity, for the troops should be continually on the move, so that the enemy can never be certain when and where to expect them, but by a vigorous and energetic offensive in whatever directions an efficient service of intelligence reports hostile gatherings. the enemy's movements and projects must, in fact, be anticipated, rather than countered when in course of execution. defence of a post. when considering what steps are to be taken for the defence of a post, large or small, the maxim that the offensive is the best defence must be ever prominently before the mind. it follows that the first step, after a site has been selected, the water supply secured, and the usual measures for security taken, should be to set apart as many men as possible for offensive purposes, including reconnaissance. in other words, the strength of the reserve should be calculated from these premises, having due regard to the number of nights in bed required by the whole garrison; and the reserve should not be such men as may be left over after the requirements of passive defence have been fully satisfied. the next item should be the selection of a keep or citadel, where stores and ammunition can be placed, and where hospital, headquarters, and a central signalling and communicating station can be located. in this keep may be placed machine or other guns, if available, so arranged that they can sweep approaches to the post, and also, if possible, protect with fire the flanks of picquet stations. it will now be time to allocate, generally, the troops destined for guard and picquet duty. these arrangements may be primarily made from the interior of the post, its safety being the first consideration, though for reasons of sanitation the more space that can be given to troops and convoys the better. picquets having been roughly allotted, the plan of defence should be regarded from the enemy's point of view, and the necessary changes made; and, finally, the bearings of the picquet positions should be taken from the keep, and routes to them cleared, in case they should require reinforcement by night. it should only be necessary to keep picquets at their full strength in night-time. by day the bulk of the men could fall back into the interior of the post, an arrangement which would at once facilitate water and food supply, and would also be advantageous from a sanitary point of view. the next duties will be to deal with the general sanitation of the post, and especially of the rest and convoy camps, to mark out the latter, and to secure their policing. as time goes on, the post commandant can arrange for improved communication between the keep and picquets, as well as throughout the interior of the enceinte, sign posts being erected and the water supply enclosed. * * * * * * transcibers note: one instance of "defensive" has been changed to "defence."