# ent

id: 53792
type: WORK_OF_ART
entity:
  the Love of Relations Of our Esteem for the Rich and Powerful Of Benevolence and Anger Of Compassion Of Malice and Envy Of


id: 53792
type: ORG
entity:
  Injustice Of the Origin of Government Of the Source of Allegiance Of the Measures of Allegiance Of the Objects of Allegiance Of the Laws of Nations Of Chastity


id: 53791
type: ORG
entity:
  Ideas Division of the Subject Of the Ideas of the Memory and Imagination Of the Connexion or Association of Ideas Of Relations Of Modes and Substances Of Abstract Ideas PART II


id: 53791
type: WORK_OF_ART
entity:
  the Sensesx Of the Ancient Philosophy Of the Modern Philosophyx Of the Immateriality of the Soul Of Personal Identity Conclusion of this Book LIFE OF THE AUTHOR


# bib

id: 1726
title: Theaetetus
author: Plato
txt: ./txt/1726.txt
cache: ./cache/1726.txt
extension: .txt
mime: text/plain
summary:
  answer to Socrates, proceeds to define knowledge as true opinion, with THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And is that different in any way from knowledge? THEAETETUS: No. SOCRATES: And when a man is asked what science or knowledge is, to THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And ''appears to him'' means the same as ''he perceives.'' THEAETETUS: I should say ''No,'' Socrates, if I were to speak my mind THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And you would admit that there is such a thing as memory? SOCRATES: Yet perception is knowledge: so at least Theaetetus and I were THEAETETUS: I cannot say, Socrates, that all opinion is knowledge, THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: I would have you imagine, then, that there exists in the mind THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, you have described the nature of opinion with THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And so we are rid of the difficulty of a man''s not knowing THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: In the same general way, we might also have true opinion about


id: 4705
title: A Treatise of Human Nature
author: Hume, David
txt: ./txt/4705.txt
cache: ./cache/4705.txt
extension: .txt
mime: text/plain
summary:
  ideas, or impressions, or objects disposed in a certain manner, that is, concerning the idea, and that it is impossible men coued so long reason of ideas, the action of the mind, in observing the relation, would, lively idea produced by a relation to a present impression, in a lively idea related to a present impression; let us now proceed impression naturally conveys a greater to the related idea; and it is on related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; impression, when placed on a related object by a natural transition, that means acquires a relation of ideas to the object of the passions: relation of ideas or impressions, nor an object, that has only one relation of impressions and ideas betwixt the cause and effect, in order in the objects or ideas hinders the natural contrariety of the passions,


id: 4723
title: A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
author: Berkeley, George
txt: ./txt/4723.txt
cache: ./cache/4723.txt
extension: .txt
mime: text/plain
summary:
  has a power of framing ABSTRACT IDEAS or notions of things. TWO OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF ABSTRACT IDEAS.--Whether form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which their minds ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS, and annexed them to every common name ideas that a general name comes to signify any particular thing. same thing, whereby they are perceived--for the existence of an idea nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist WITHOUT the mind, exist without the mind, yet there may be things LIKE them, whereof they possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. exist without the mind, like unto the immediate objects of sense. MIND.--Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do really exist; ideas, and the existence of objects without the mind. suggest ideas of particular things to our minds. of our thought is an idea existing only in the mind, and consequently


id: 1580
title: Charmides
author: Plato
txt: ./txt/1580.txt
cache: ./cache/1580.txt
extension: .txt
mime: text/plain
summary:
  Socrates of any definition of temperance in which an element of science I ought to know you, he replied, for there is a great deal said about Yes, I said, Charmides; and indeed I think that you ought to excel I said to him: That is a natural reply, Charmides, and I think that he said: My opinion is, Socrates, that temperance makes a man ashamed or Very good, I said; and did you not admit, just now, that temperance is Yes, I said, Critias; but you come to me as though I professed to know asking in what wisdom or temperance differs from the other sciences, and Yes, Socrates, he said; and that I think is certainly true: for he who has this science or knowledge which knows itself will become like the Say that he knows health;--not wisdom or temperance, but the art of


id: 2529
title: The Analysis of Mind
author: Russell, Bertrand
txt: ./txt/2529.txt
cache: ./cache/2529.txt
extension: .txt
mime: text/plain
summary:
  the relation to the object, while the fact that knowledge is different A mental occurrence of any kind--sensation, image, belief, or knowledge of a present physical object, while an image does not, except the causation of an image always proceeds according to mnemic laws, i.e. that it is governed by habit and past experience. Images also differ from sensations as regards their effects. past sensations seems only possible by means of present images. is a vague word, equally applicable to the present memory-image and to In that case we say that the image or word means that memory-image is accompanied by a belief, in this case as to the past. The content of a belief may consist of words only, or of images only, or both images and words occur in the content of a belief. and images, memories, beliefs and desires, but present in all of


id: 5827
title: The Problems of Philosophy
author: Russell, Bertrand
txt: ./txt/5827.txt
cache: ./cache/5827.txt
extension: .txt
mime: text/plain
summary:
  of ''sense-data'' to the things that are immediately known in sensation: arises as to the relation of the sense-data to the real table, supposing we have to consider the relation of sense-data to physical objects. place at different times has similar sense-data, which makes us suppose sense-data, I should have no reason to believe that other people exist physical objects as we should naturally infer from our sense-data. physical object corresponding to the sense-data in the way in which an relations of sense-data, the physical objects themselves remain unknown in fact, have acquaintance with things without at the same time knowing therefore to consider acquaintance with other things besides sense-data that knowledge of physical objects, as opposed to sense-data, is only sun: you then know the same fact by the way of knowledge of _things_. have knowledge of a thing by acquaintance even if we know very few


id: 10615
title: An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
author: Locke, John
txt: ./txt/10615.txt
cache: ./cache/10615.txt
extension: .txt
mime: text/plain
summary:
  these means, they come to frame in their minds an idea men have of a motion and rest, are equally clear and positive ideas in the mind; looks on it, cause as clear and positive idea in his mind, as a man ideas of their own minds, cannot much differ in thinking; however they Whether these several ideas in a man''s mind be made by certain motions, thoughts towards the original of men''s ideas, (as I am apt to think they knowledge the mind has of things, by those ideas and appearances which together; and as to the minds of men, where the ideas of these actions the mind of things that do exist, by ideas of those qualities that are to the existence of things, or to any idea in the minds of other idea in my mind, without thinking either that existence, or the name MAN


id: 10616
title: An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 2 MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 3 and 4
author: Locke, John
txt: ./txt/10616.txt
cache: ./cache/10616.txt
extension: .txt
mime: text/plain
summary:
  use of by men as the signs of their ideas; not by any natural connexion of names to things, that the mind should have distinct ideas of the making another understand by words what idea the term defined stands idea the word light stands for no more known to a man that understands refers the ideas it makes to the real existence of things, but puts such mind makes those abstract complex ideas to which specific names are Besides words which are names of ideas in the mind, there are a great particular thing agree to his complex idea expressed by the name man: evident, that there are few names of complex ideas which any two men use As the ideas men''s words stand for are of different sorts, so the way of general certain propositions concerning man, standing for such an idea. man''s reasoning and knowledge is only about the ideas existing in his


id: 9662
title: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
author: Hume, David
txt: ./txt/9662.txt
cache: ./cache/9662.txt
extension: .txt
mime: text/plain
summary:
  All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are natural reason and abilities; if that object be entirely new to him, he particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them. reach the idea of cause and effect; since the particular powers, by common experience, like other natural events: But the power or energy by Inference and reasoning concerning the operations of nature would, from natural causes and voluntary actions; but the mind feels no difference He reasoned, like a man of sense, from natural causes; but reasonably follow in inferences of this nature; both the effect and most natural principles of human reason.[32] But what renders the matter we can reason back from cause to new effects in the case of human


id: 39964
title: The Positive Outcome of Philosophy The Nature of Human Brain Work. Letters on Logic.
author: Dietzgen, Joseph
txt: ./txt/39964.txt
cache: ./cache/39964.txt
extension: .txt
mime: text/plain
summary:
  concepts the truth of which cannot be proved by reason, like the natural thought, in order to understand thus by the unit of human reason the philosophy can be a general and objective understanding, or "truth in nature of all concepts, of all understanding, all science, all thought understanding of the general method of thought processes to our special understand the nature of things, or their true essence, by means of Existence, or universal truth, is the general object, there arise quantities, general concepts, things, true perceptions, or Truth, like reason, consists in developing a general concept, the human being, of understanding the nature of things which is hidden nature of reason consists in generalizing sense perceptions, in natural universe is not a mere sum of all things, but truth and life. of logical reasoning to know that truth is the common nature of the


id: 32701
title: Kant''s Theory of Knowledge
author: Prichard, H. A. (Harold Arthur)
txt: ./txt/32701.txt
cache: ./cache/32701.txt
extension: .txt
mime: text/plain
summary:
  perception or experience of the objects to which they relate. pointed to by Kant''s phrase ''objects are _given_ in perception''. urge that Kant afterwards points out that space as an object the fact that Kant speaks of space not only as a form of _perception_, object of perception; in other words, space, in the sense of the one Kant''s second argument is stated as follows: "Space is represented as of an object; yet the pure perception of space involved by that space is a form of sensibility or a way in which objects appear produced by things is to imply that the object of perception is merely the view that the object of perception is not the thing, but merely an perception and knowledge with which Kant''s treatment of space and time the relation of knowledge or of a representation to its object. what Kant says is that representations as related to an object must


id: 47658
title: The Problem of Truth
author: Carr, Herbert Wildon
txt: ./txt/47658.txt
cache: ./cache/47658.txt
extension: .txt
mime: text/plain
summary:
  natural man, the fact is essentially the same--the true reality of The reality then, the knowledge of which is truth, is not the immediate different things, first realities and secondly ideas, and that we can us see what it implies as to the ultimate nature of truth and reality. the ultimate nature of reality and truth, that we are now to examine. Our ideas, by which we try to understand the reality of things are just And so the question arises, how far are our ideas about things truths understand the nature of truth, we shall see reality in the making. working ideas--cause, time, space, movement, things and their the reality of things, and there is but one way of testing the truth of our science is true knowledge, in the objective meaning of truth, for Neither, then, is reality truth, nor appearance error.


id: 55761
title: The Philosophy of Spiritual Activity A Modern Philosophy of Life Developed by Scientific Methods
author: Steiner, Rudolf
txt: ./txt/55761.txt
cache: ./cache/55761.txt
extension: .txt
mime: text/plain
summary:
  percepts given to the senses, i.e., the Material World. and Reality, Subject and Object, Appearance and Thing-in-itself, Ego perception the object appears as given, in thought the mind seems to naïve man calls the outer world, or material nature, is for Berkeley world is my idea, I have enunciated the result of an act of thought, Thought contributes this content to the percept from the world of instead of a world-knower, subject and object (percept and self) would object, determined by natural law, is perceived by us as a process of all that is objective would be contained in percept, concept and idea. with external objects the idea is determined by the percept. of action lying outside the real world of our percepts and thoughts, in knowledge, man lives and enters into the world of ideas as effective moral activity depends on knowledge of the particular world


id: 53792
author: Hume, David
txt: ./txt/53792.txt
cache: ./cache/53792.txt
extension: .txt
mime: text/plain
summary:
  passions, their nature, origin, causes and effects. _that ''tis from natural principles this variety of causes excite is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; resembling impression, when placed on a related object, by a natural ''Tis a quality of human nature, which we shall consider afterwards,[3] that means acquires a relation of ideas to the object of the passions: relation, can ever cause pride or humility, love or hatred; reason reason we must turn our view to external objects, and ''tis natural for But when self is the object of a passion, ''tis not natural In order to produce a perfect relation betwixt two objects, ''tis If morality had naturally no influence on human passions and actions, relation betwixt a person and an object, ''tis natural to found it on passion or sentiment which is natural to me; and ''tis observable, that

title:
  Philosophical Works, v. 2 (of 4) Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author


id: 53791
author: Hume, David
txt: ./txt/53791.txt
cache: ./cache/53791.txt
extension: .txt
mime: text/plain
summary:
  all our simple impressions and ideas, ''tis impossible to prove by a same manner as one particular idea may serve us in reasoning concerning ''Tis the same case with the impressions of the senses as with the ideas can plainly be nothing but different ideas, or impressions, or objects their idea, ''tis evident _cause_ and _effect_ are relations, of which ideas of cause and effect be derived from the impressions of reflection ''tis equally true, that all reasonings concerning causes and effects impression to the idea of any object, we might possibly have separated the memory or senses to the idea of an object, which we call cause or idea of the related objects, by a natural transition of the disposition idea, when this very instance of our reasonings from cause and effect ideas, which may be the objects of our reasoning. believe that any object exists, of which we cannot form an idea.

title:
  Philosophical Works, v. 1 (of 4) Including All the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author


